The Sun. — London, England, 1855-07-14 00:00:00

ny fresh assurances on this occasion. His Excellency • must be equally well aware of the desire of her Majesty's Go vernment to put a stop to the effusion of blood and to the calam ities that are inseparable from a state o f war, a nd his Excellency will not therefore doubt that his proposition has been- anxiously.considered by her Majesty's Government, and that it, is with extreme reluctance they have arrived at the conclusion that it does not accomplish the objects of the war, an d consequently does not afford the prospect of a safe and honourable peace. It only remains for me to express the regret of her Ms jesty's Government that Count Buol should be of opinion that, by making a proposal which England and France are unable to agree to, Austria has complied with the engage ments she contracted l3y the treaty of December 2, 1654; but her Majesty's Government think that, upon reflection, his Excellency will scarce ly adhere to that opinion. The en gagement contracted by that treaty was that if peace s hould not by a given time be assured on the basis of the Four Points Austria would enter into concert with E n gland and France for the purpose o f devisin g the means of obtaining the objects of the alliance. The time has gone by, and peace has not been s o assured. The failure has arisen from the refusal of Russia to agree to terms which Austria thought just and reasonable, and which, as such, she supported in the Conference ; and the true exe cution of the treaty of the 2d of December would surely be that , Austria should enter into concert with Engl toand and France as to the best means of compelling Russia accept the conditions so proposed to her, and of thus obtaining the great objects of the alliance. Your lordship is instructed to read this despatch to Count Buol, and to furnish him with a copy of it, should his Excel- CLARENDON. lency desire to have one —1 am. &c.? No. 17. • COUNT BUOL TO. COUNT C OL LOREDO.—(COMMUNICATED TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON BY COUNT COLLOREDO . Vienna, ) May 20, 1855. Comte—Lord Westmoreland' has obeyed the orders Court in reading to me a despateh which Lord Claren odfonhis addressed to him on the Bth instant, and in which was enclosed another 'despatch that his lordship had written to Lord Cowley, dated the sth inst. It is wit documents, of sincere regret that we have observed from these of the contents of • which your Excel lency's re port of the Bth instant had already made us cogni sant, that the Government of her Britannic Majesty has not thought it possible to agree to our final propositions, whose aim was to obtain the development of the third guarantee. Lord Clarendon having made the remark that the details of these propositions, as fully explained in my despatch of the 13th of April, and which your Excellency read to his lord ship, had never reached him in a formal shape, we hold to proving that M. Drouyn de ?Buys, who, on his arrival, here, after having had an interview with the Ministers of her Britannia Majesty, was the interpreter to us of the opi nion common to both Cabinets, undertook also when he left us to explain both to his own Government and -to that of Great Britain ow project of an ultimatum ' the result, moreover, of confidential deliberations, in which that states man, as well as Lord J. Russell, bad constantly taken part. With the view of not anticipating the report of this Minister of her Britannic Majesty, nor the overtures which we knew were to reach London from Paris, we refrained from communicating directly to the Cabinet of St. James's the definitive summary of our propositions, copies of which I transmit herewith. These propositions, of which the first comprises five Articles, and the second six, would have been presented under the form of an ultimatum for the choice of Russia. You will also find herewith enclosed a copy of a project of treaty between Austria, France, and Great Britain, which was intended to serve as a complement to our plan, and which fixed as a cams belli every aggresion on the part of Russia of such a nature as to endanger the inde pendence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the excessive increase of the naval forces of Russia in the Euxine. Lord Clarendon does not attach much practical value to this latter stipulation, since he says Austria has already de clared that she could net admit that the question of peace or war should turn upon eight or ten ships. But we may be permitted to remind his lordship of the immense difference that exists between our attitude in the actual state of affaairs, while we are still free to determine as to the question of war, and the contrary position in which we should be placed were the case of war once clearly defined and stipulated by treaty. In this contingency no one can doubt that Austria would scrupulously act up to the engage ments she contracted. Lord Clarendon is of opinion that the time has arrived for Great Britain and France to invite Austria to concert with them, in pursuance of her engagements, upon the measures for giving effect to the treaty of the 2d December. Here, however, and first in order, the q u e s t ion p resents itself, what is the object of the alliance'. It is none other than the re-establishment of peace upon the basis of the four common principles. The first two of these principles have already obtained a complete development in the Peace Con ferences. As to the third, we have proposed to our allies, at the same time binding ourselves, in case of need, to support it by force of arms, a solution which it is our firm conviction would be effectual, complete, and agreeable to European in terests. I cannot do better, M. le Comte, in order to make you ac quainted with all the reasons that we have to bring forward to strengthen this view of the question, than to transmit to you herewith copies of the communications which I have made to Baron Hubner upon this matter, and which you will have the goodness also- to place before Lord Clarendon. If Russia, being placed in a position to agree to one or other of these propositions of the ultimatum, had rejected both of them, we should then have had proof that she will decidedly not give her assistance to the complete realisation of the third guarantee, in so far as its object is to put an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea. It being impossible, therefore, to do else than consider as ex hausted the means of conciliation for bringing about such a peace as the interests of Europe, and our own in particular, require, the Emperor, our august master, decided to have re course to arms as a means of obtaining this pease, the want of which is so generally felt, and which would miscarry under the resistance of one Power alone. On the other hand, so long as an absence of assistance on the part of our allies puts obstacles in the way of this last and decisive proof, our impartial estimation does not allow us to make the responsi bility of the failure of the negotiations fall exclusively upon Russia. We are most antious that the remarks made in this and the annexed despatch should be of a nature to modify the impression that our plan in the first instance has produced upon the Government of her Britannic Majesty. If, however, despite our wishes, such were not the case, we co uld only earnestly desire that the chances of war , to which our allies have determined to leave the task of effecting the cessation of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, may soon take such a turn as to attain this end in a manner that would appear to them more on a par with their sacrifices than the solution that we have proposed to them. To insist upon an international engagement, imposing upon Russia terms for the permanent limitation of her naval forces in the Black Sea, is—and we are far from not recognizing it—a right that belongs to the belligerents, since they have especially reserved to themselves the power of im posing, over and above the four guarantees, such particular conditions as the continuance of hostilities might render ne cessary. But we maintain that this mode of solution, brought forward absolutely and to the exclusion of every other method, were it equally efficacious, cannot authorise out allies to appeal, as regards us, to the stipulations of treaty of the 2d of December, and can only be included among such conditions of peace as are alluded to above, and which the protocol of the 28th of December, when defining the third guarantee, makes expressly to depend ou the events of the war. Faithful to our engagements, and attaching, moreover, the greatest value to the ties that unite us to England, we shall firmly maintain our present policy, and await the turn that events may take, and the propitious moment for re newing negotiations for peace, in which we will not, under any circumstances, take part, except with an unchangeable determination that they shall lead to a positive and efficacious development of the four guarantees. The language which we propose to hold to Russia, and which, when held, we will faithfully make known to the Government of her Britannic Majesty, will be conceived in the same spirit. Your Excellency is instructed to read this despatch and its annexes to Lord Clarendon, and to give him a copy of them. PROPOSITIONS. FIRST PROPOSITION. Receive, &c., BUOL, Article 1. The High Contracting Parties being desirous that the Sublime Porte shouldesta established in the advantages of the good understanding engage f ag N e a t t o ions among the various States of Europe, h stehveerLaallwy re spect the independence andterritorial integrity of the Otto man Empire, guarantee in common the strict observance of this e ngagement, and will in con s eque nce very event which would be ofanatur consider every act and e q uestion of European interest. If aeto endanger it as a difference should arise between the Porte and one of the Cent t w o States, before resorting to arms, should Powers, those P o wers in a position to obviate this contingencyaplace the other by pacific means. Art. 2. The Russian Plenipotentiaries and those Sublime Po rte will p ro p ose in common to the Conference ofthe the equal effective force of the naval armaments which the t wo se a -bordering Powers will maintain in the Black Sea, and which must not exceed the amount of Russian vessels at pre sent afloat in that sea. The arrangement which they shall have made in this re spect shall form a n inte g ral p art of the General Treat y . There shall also be inserted in the Treaty the measures which the said Plenipotentiaries shall have agreed to, with a view to enforce the precise and constant observance of the stipulations of the present Article. Art. 3. The rule respecting the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, established by the Treaty of July 13, 1841, shall remain in force, with the exceptions specified in the following Articles. Art. 4. Each of the Contracting Powers which has no es tablishment in the Black Sea will be authorised by a firman from his Highness to send into and station in that sea two frigates or vessels of smaller force. Art. 5. In the event (which God forbid !) of the Sultan being menaced with aggression, he reserves to himself the right of opening the Straits to all the naval forces of his allies. SECOND PROPOSITION. Article 1. The Hih Contract i ng Powers being desirous that the Sublime Porte should participate in the advantages of the good understanding established by the Law of Na tions among the various States of Europe, severally engage to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, guarantee in common the strict observance of this engagement, and will, in consequence, consider every act and every event which would be of a nature to endan ger it as a question of European interest. If a difference should arise between the Porte and one of the Contracting Powers, those two States, before resorting to arms, should Place the other Powers in a position to obviate this contin gency by pacific means. A r t . 2. The rule respecting the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, established by the Treaty of spec ifie July d in the 13, 184 f ollowing Articles 1, snail ntii?ue in force, with the exceptions : Art. 3. Each of the Contracting Powers which has no establishment in the Black Sea, will be authorized by a fir man from his his Highness to send into the station in it two frigates or vessels of smaller force, in order to protect their commerce, and to exercise the necessary inspection. • Art. 4. If Russia should increase the amount of her naval forces at present afloat, as duly defined, the contracting Powers who do not possess an establishment in the Black Sea would be authorised by a firman of his Highness, by gi v i ng a previous warning of five days, to send respectively into that sea an additional number of vessels of the same class, equal to one-half of the naval forces of Russia. Art. 5. At no time will ships of war of foreign nations be allowed to anchor in the Golden Horn, with the exception of the small vessels hitherto admitted belonging to the Embassies ; and in time of peace the number of ships of the line of the Contracting Powers which have no establishments in the Black Sea, must never exceed four at a time before Constantinople, on their way from the Dardanelles to the Black Sea, and from the Black Sea to the Dardanelles. Art. 6. In the event (which God forbid !) of the Sultan being menaced with aggression, he reserves to himself the right of opening the Straits to all the naval forces of the Allies. After the reading of the six Articles the Russian Plenipotentiaries would be confidentially informed that, con sidering the reservation made by them in the interpretation of the first article, which declines the engagement to enforce the observance of the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire ; considering, moreover, their re fusal to agree to any limitation of the Russian forces in the Black Sea ; Austria, France, and Great Britain, whilst re specting the sovereign rights of Russia, will avail themselves of the same rights by agreeing among themselves by a formal document -1 st. To enforce the• observance of the principle established in the Ist article, in the event of the violation of the inde pendence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire by Russia. 2clly. To consider as a cases belli the increase of the amount or strength of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea as regards its effective force at the beginning of the war. If Russia should herself engage not to exceed that number, the three Powers would consent not to give publicity to the Convention. PROJECT OF TREATY. Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, and the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, desirous of securing the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and being respectively desirous of carrying into effect the engagement stipulated in the article of the treaty concluded on the between have named!as their Plenipotentiaries, dtc., who having examined their full powers have agreed upon the following articles : Art. 1. The High Contracting Parties engaged, in case of need, to employ their armies and fleets in order to attain the object above specified. Art. 2. If, therefore, one of the Powers which signed the said treaty of the were to commit an aggression on the Ottoman Empire of a nature to endanger one or other of the two principles established in the preamble of the pre sent treaty, the high contracting parties, on the appeal of the Sultan, would proportionally join in defending that Em pire in a manner to be mutually determined and agreed upon. Art. 3. An excessive increase of the naval forces in Russia in the Euxine would be considered as an act of aggression, calling for the application of Articles 1 and 2. Art. 4. Ratifications. SECRET ARTICLES. Article 1. In the event of Russia augmenting the amount or the strength of her naval forces in the Black Sea so as to reach its effective amount at the commencement of the war, according to the statement hereto annexed, and if the remonstrances addressed in common to Russia, as well as the presence of the allied fleets in the Black Sea, were to prove fruitless, the nigh Contracting Powers agree to consider this fact as giving rise to the application of the third Article of the Treaty of, this slay. Consequently they would consider the existence of such effective force as a. casus belli, and would immediately employ their land and naval forces in order to compel that Power to conform again to those condi tions of equilibrium which are necessary to the interest of Europe. Art. 2. Ratifications. points, even if they were to e deemed sufficient and satis factory in themselves, could of be considered as being se cured to Europe, so long as hose guarantees for their con= tinned observance, which millt have been provided by a sa tisfactory arrangement on to third point, eontinue to be pertinaciously declined by bssia. it is not enough that Russia should stipulate that he will no longer seek authori tatively to interfere in the affirs of the Principalities and of Servia ; it is not enough thathe should consent to delegate by stipulation to a commissia composed of representatives of the several States interestd in the navigation of the Da nube the task of keeping cler the channels of that river and its communications with the ' , lack Sea. The interests of Eu- rope require, over and above hese arrangements, that some valid security should be obtaied that Russia should nolonger possess that overwhelming mral and political influence in the Principalities which her prepnderance in the Black Sea has heretofore enabled her to exerise, and that she should not, by a constant maritime supciority in that sea, have tho means of supporting by her Bet the march and invasion of her army, and of thus strikirt a mortal blow at the heart of that empire of which the Pricipalities are only the depen dent extremities. Even, therefore, as regards the first two points, the en joyment of any advantages Which might be obtained under ' those points would be precaious so long as the preponder ance of Russia in the Black '.ea were allowed to continue. But when the direct bearing)f that preponderance on the great question on which tie war has been undertaken is considered, the refusal of Rijsia to consent to any measures which would effectually put n end to that preponderance, is a warning which Europe calla with safety disregard, and plainly shows that Russia is tot prepared to lay aside her long-cherished views of aggrssion on Turkey ; and it affords a manifest proof ,that the anxiety felt by the Powers of Europe for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire has a just and valid Dundation. Russia has asserted that aregard for her dignity precludes her from acceding to tie teriis proposed by the Allies on the third point. But the dignit' of Russia cannot require that she should keep up in time )f peace, and on the immediate threshold of her weaker neighbour, a force wholly unneces sary for purposes of self-defence, but enabling her at the shortest notice to subvert tlx idependence of that neighbour and to change the territorial distribution of Europe. Yet such is the position which 'lassia has maintained in tho Black Sea, and which she has even now publicly avowed her de termination not to renounce It is needless to dwell on she absence of any motive of self preservation to justify this 4etermivation on the part of Rus sia. It would be a mockeryto pretend that she has anything to fear from the hostility of Turkey ; and while Turkey IS at peace and free from threatened attack by Russia, and while the Straits between the Mediter ranean an d th e Black Sea are closed except to a smalLand limited number of ships of war of the Western Powers, Russia has nothing to fear from tho naval forces of England and France ; while, on the other ns.ua, tns present state of things in the Black Sea demon strates that when war exists between Russia and Turkey, and when the Straits are consequently open to all the naval forces of the Sultan's allies, England. and France, if sufficient time be afforded them, can collect in the Euxine a naval armament strong enough to sweep from the waters of that sea every ship bearing the flag o uwia. Russia has indeed ?Riegel that the preponderance which she wishes to maintain in ;he Black Sea is essential for the security of the Turkish encpire against the aggressions of other Powers; but it is not from the hostility of the Western Powers, but from the traditional and, it is not too much to say avowed, policy of Russia, that the Turkish em pire has danger to apprehoid. The present war has been undertaken to provide securities against those ambitious de signs of Russia which menace the safety of Turkey and the future repose of Europe ; znd, in short, to quote the words of a recent Russian proclamation, to prevent, as far as Tur key is concerned, the accomplishment of the wishes and the views of Peter, of Catherine, of Alexander, and of Nicholas. The Western Powers, in conjunction with Austria, have considered that this object would most effectually be secured by restricting within reasonable bounds the power of Russia in the Black Sea. They would have preferred, as the most certain means to this end, that Russia and the Porte should both renounce the right to maintain in the Black Sea any naval force beyond what might be required for the mere pur poses of police ; but the Western Powers were willing to ac quiesce in the maintenance by Russia of a limited and speci fied amount of naval force in the Black Sea, reserving to themselves the right of maintaining in the aggregate, on their own part, in that sea a corresponding amount of force ; re quiring also, however, as a security for the observance of such a stipulation, the farther right to establish consuls in all the Russian ports to the eastward of the Straits. But the West ern Powers, who now hold exclusive possession of the Black Sea, where the Russian flag dares not show itself, had no in tention of proposing to Russia conditions derogatory to her dignity; and they never pretended that Russia should be bound to accept as consul every individual whom they might think proper to appoint as such, and that she should be pre eluded from exercising the usual discretion as to withholding the exequatur from any person against whom well-founded oko ;tion could be raised. Russia, however, has refused to subscribe to these reason able proposals ; and in their place she has offered two schemes of modification of the treaty of 1841, the practical effect of which would be that, whichever of the two schemes the Western Powers might accept, those Powers would be obliged to keep up perpetually in the vicinity of the Darda nelles a large naval force prepared to act in any contingency which might occur. For, according to one schem e , Russia proposed that the St ra it s between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea should at all times be open to the ships of war of all nations, and therefore, of course, to her own Black Sea and Baltic fleets. The effect of this scheme would have been that Constanti nople would at all times have been exposed to all the dangers which might have arisen from the sudden appearance before that city of an overwhelming Russian armament, while the tranquillity of the Mediterranean, and all the great interests in that sea, would have been liable to disturbance by the action of a powerful Russian fleet, sallying forth at any moment from the Euxine. To guard against this double danger, the Governments of England and of France would have been compelled to main tain in the Mediterranean war establishments in the time of peace, and permanently to station their armaments at a great distance from their arsenals and resources ; so that a peace concluded on such conditions would have been nothing more than an , armeoaltrace divested of the security which is the ptsos, and unaccompanied by that cessation of expenditure which ought to follow the termination of a war. According to the other plan proposed by Russia, by which the Straits were to be closed, while Russia was to remain at liberty to maintain an unlimited naval force in the Black Sea, there might at all times have been in that sea a Russian force equipped for war, and available for a sudden descent on the capital of the Turkish empire, keeping alive the ap prehensions of the Porte and giving constant anxiety to Europe. This scheme would have equally imposed upon the Western Powers the necessity of maintaining in the Mediter ranean a force sufficient at all times to hasten to the protec tion of the Turkish empire, at any moment when the Porte might require its assistance. Her Majesty's Government would appeal to what passed in the 12th Conference, as recorded in the protocols, as evi dence to show how well-founded was the determination of the Western Powers to insist on the cessation of the prepon derance of Russia in the Black Sea, as alone offering any real security for Turkey and for Europe against any ulterior designs on the part of that aggressive Power; for in that Conference the Plenipotentiaries of Russia insisted on substituting, on the part of Russia, a merely moral for a material guarantee of the territorial integrity and independence of the Turkish em pire, and they refused to be parties to an engagement which the other Powers were prepared to contract, not only that they should themselves respect, but also that they should cause, and, in case of need, by force compel, that indepen dence and that territorial integrity to be respected by others. The refusal of the Russian Plenipotentiaries to acquiesce in any arrangement by which the objects contemplated by the third point could be effectually secured necessarily interrupted the Conferences; and, accordingly, the fourth point did not come formally under discussion. The interest which Eng land and France have uniformly taken in the welfare of the Christian subjects of the Sultan is, however, a sufficient gua rantee as to the spirit in which the two Powers would have entered upon the discussion of the fourth point ; and, though circumstances beyond the control of those Powers closed the door against that discussion, it is with no small satisf ac ti on they have seen that, since the commencement of the war, and since the interference of Russia in Turkish affairs has been made to cease, the Sultan has continued to give effect to his benevolent intentions in favour of his Christian subjects, whose condition has of late been materially improved by the wise and spontaneous action of their own Sovereign. I cannot, however, wholly pass over an observation which fell from the Russian Plenipotentiary, and which is recorded in the protocol of the eighth Conference, that the question involved in the fourth point was one of conscience and not of policy. It would, indeed, have been fortunate for Europe if this plea of conscience had not been used as an instrument for de stroying the political independence of Turkey. By the Treaty of Kainardji it is provided that the Sultan shall protect the Christian religion and its churches ; and it was upon a complete misinterpretation of this treaty, but withcatt even an allegation that its stipulations had been vio lated, that Russia claimed aright of interference between the Sultan and 10,000,000 of the Sultan's Christian subjects. If the claith had been yielded to, and if a great wrong had thus been perpetrated, the authority of the Sultan within his own dominions would, in a great degree, have been transferred to a foreign Power, and an important step would have been taken to wards the overthrow of the Turkish empire and the estab lishment of Russian supremacy on its ruins. Europe, then, is indebted to the timely and energetic inter ference of the .Western Tow= for its preservation from the dirastrous consequences from which such a catastrophe must inevitably have been followed. The Conferences of Vienna are now closed, under circum stances which preclude all speculation as to the period at which negotiations for peace may with anyprospect of success be renewed. But when that period shall happily arrive, her Majesty's Government will steadily keep in view the princi ples which have guided them throughout the past negotiations, and, while seeking to provide for the security, the welfare, and the happiness of the people of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, and to insure the removal of the obstructions which have rendered the navigation of the Danube difficult and pre carious, they will neglect no means of obtaining for the Turkish empire, and for Europe at large, sufficient guarantees against the recurrence of the danger which it is the object of the pre sent war to avert. In the meantime, her Majesty's Government have reason to expect that the Sultan will make liberal and effectual provi sions for the privileges and interests of all his Christian sub jects. You are authorised to real this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Court to which you are accredited. CLAREND ON. —I am, &e., CRYSTAL PALACE.—SHILLING DAY.—JULY 13. Admission on payment, 9,232 ; ditto by season tickets, 978.—Total, 10,210. MILITARY DISTURBANCE.—The town of Chatham on Thursday evening exhibited another scene of military riot, which turned out more seriously than those of Tuesday ani Wednesday evenings. The disturbance arose at the Trumpet public-house, Chatham, between the marin es and sailors against the 27th Regiment. About 200 men from the barracks arrived in the town as pickets, under non-commissioned officers. Some of the picket* aided and assisted in the disturbance by rushing into the house with their bayonets drawn, ma rines as well as the 27th, each party taking the part of their comrades. The town presented one scene of con fusion, and the soldiers appeared highly exasperated one against the other. Another strong force arrived from the barracks, headed by superior officers, and owing to their praimworthyconduct restored order about 9 o'clock. The disturbance commenced about 8 o'clock. Several of the soldiers and sailors were wounded in the affray, and one man was so seriously injured that he was taken to the hospital, having received three bayonet wounds. He belonged to the 81st, and got mixed up in the crowd. The 27th only arrived in Chatham on Tuesday last from Canterbury. It seems that some old animosity existed between the marines and the 27th. The 60th Rifles took part with the marines in this affair. A military inquiry is to take place into the cause of this affray. THE SUN, LONDON, SATURLAY EVENING, JULY 14 1855. (No. 18.). TIIE EARL OF CLARENDON TO THE EARL OF WESTMORELAND. Foreign-office, June 2, 1855. My Lord,—l herewith transmit the copy of a despatch (No. 17) from Count Buol to Count Colloredo, with its en closures, which have been placed in my hands by Count Colloredo. I have told the Austrian Minister that, after an attentive perusal of these documents, I could only again express my regret that proposals to which it.was impossible for her Ma jesty's Government to agree should have been renewed by the Austrian Government ; but that the sincerity of our regret could not be doubted by Count Buol after the many proofs that her Majesty's Government bad given of the importance they attach to the co-operation of Austria in a cause which concerns her more directly even than it does the Western Powers, and from which her Majesty's Government could not believe that her support would now be withdrawn. I told Count Colloredo that I had already discussed with him one of the propositions transmitted by Count Buol, and that the opinion of her Majesty's Government upon it had been conveyed to your lordship in my despatch of the Bth of May, and communicated to Count Buol ; and that the other proposition having been forwarded by your lordship, I would read to him the answer which was about to be sent to you. After reading to Count Colloredo my despatch of May 29 (No. 16) to your lordship, I said I wished to avoid all discus sion that might be irritating, and which, from the tone of Count Buol's despatches, I was led to think would be useless, but that there were some statements in those despatches to Count Colloredo and M. de Hubner upon which I should take the liberty of offering a few remarks. In the despatch to M. de Hubner, Count Buol stated that Austria provides a progressive report of much weight and value to Turkey, by stipulating that for each new ship that Russia may construct the allies shall be permitted to make a proportionate addition to their naval stations in the Black Sea ; and that, in the event of the Porte thinking itself menaced, it may call the allied fleets to its aid. Upon this I begged to observe that the real object of the third basis appeared to be lost sight of, and that, so far from causing the preponderance of Russia , to cease, the proposed conditions would go to establish a competition for prepon derance between the allies and Russia. Such a state of things would not be peace, but a constant preparation for war, and a constant source of uneasiness to Europe. The Porte, I said, required no permission from any other Power to call upo❑ its allies for assistance when threatened with danger. The Sultan might at any time do so of his own free will and pleasure ; and if the proposal of Austria wero adopted, and no effectual limitation were placed on the Rus sian fleet, that fleet would be a standing menace to Turkey, and the Sultan would be continally justified in asking for the aid of his allies, who would be in honour bound to afford it. If the danger was imminent, the allied fleets ini;lit arrive too late to save Turkey.; but, whether the danger was imminent or prospective, the naval forces of England and France could only be summoned to the Black Sea for the purpose of repelling Russian aggression, and on every such occasion Europe would have to fear s and Eng land and France would have to be prepared. for, the renewal of hontilitic...._ . Count Buol in the same despatch says that the common efforts of the allies should be directed to limiting the political power of Russia, so as to render it, if not impossible, at least eminently difficult, for her to abuse her material resources ; but that the cessation of Ru.ssian preponderance in the Black Sea would only be one of the means towards that end, as the diminution, or even the total destruction of that fleet, would not alone be sufficient to deprive Russia of the advantages over Turkey which she derives from her geographical position. I expressed my entire concurrence with Count Buol as to the desirableness of limiting the political power of Russia ; but, instead of entering upon a new problem, the practical solution of which was not even alluded to by Count Buol, I thought it would be more prudent for the allies to confine themselves to the question at issue, which was how to give effect to the third basis, and to put an end to the preponder ance of Russia in the Black Sea, and as yet no way so simple or so effectual had been discovered as such a limitation of her naval forces in that sea as should render their amount con sistent with the safety of Turkey. In his despatch to Count Colloredo, Count Buol expresses his firm conviction that the proposal of Austria for giving effect to the third basis would be effectual, complete, and in conformity with the interest of Europe ; and his Excellency adds that its rejection by the Western Powers does 1.1 , ,)t per mit Austria to cast exclusively upon Russia the responsibility of the failure of the negotiations. Upon this I remarked that England and France, being at war with Russia, and having made vast sacrifices, must be allowed to judge for themselves on what ,terms they could make peace consistently with their honour and with the objects for which such sacrifices had been made, and that the necessity under which they felt themselves of declining the proposals of Austria proved that, in their judgment, those proposals were neither effectual nor complete, nor likely to be for the advantage of Europe. But Russia, I said, had rejected terms that Austria thought reasonable in them selves and necessary tor the peace of Europe, and that were not inconsistent with the dignity of Russia ; and because she had so rejected them, and because the Western Powers could not agree to conditions that Austria has since proposed, and which are altogether different arekkineffectual for their object, it is surely unjust to say that Riigland and France oppose obstacles to peace, and that Russia is no longer exclusively to blame for the failure of the negotiations. I must also, I said, express my regret that Count Buol should now be of opinion that the proposal to limit the naval forces of Russia could only be considered as one of the condi tions which the belligerents had expressly reserved to them selves the right of imposingbeyond the four points, and which the continuation of hostilities might render necessary, for his Excellency, to the best of my belief, had not regarded the pro posal in that light, even when discussing it with the Plenipo tentiaries of England and France, and he had supported it in the Conference, and had recommended it to the acceptance of the Russian Plenipotentiaries, as the best means for giving effect to the third basis. The object of the third basis is to put an end to the prepon derance of Russia in the Black Sea; the limitation of the Rus sian fleet in that sea comes then strictly within that object, and is not a distinct and separate proposal apart from the four bases, and such as the allies reserved to themselves the right to bring forward, according as the events of the war might make it necessary. I requested Count Colloredo to assure Count Buol that we did not, as he supposed, exclude by anticipation any other project that would be equally efficacious; but that we declined and must continue to decline all such means as are manifestly ineffectual for the objects we have in view. Count Colloredo observed that some sacrifice should be made to secure the alliance of Austria. I said, I entirely agreed with him, and that we had shown all possible deference to Austria. It was solely out of defer ence to her that England and France had agreed to the four bases, and bad consented to enter upon negotiations for peace ; it was to meet the views, and to secure the co-operation of Austria in a cause which might be considered essentially her own, that England and France adopted a course which they would not otherwise have pursued until the events of war had more distinctly defined the relative position of the belligerent Powers. Count Colloredo then adverted to the great interests which Austria had at stake, and the risk she would incur by going to war with Russia without being able •to reckon upon the material support of the Western Powers, while she would have to fear the if not the hostility, of Prussia, and of some of the German States. I said that, so far from questioning these considerations, her Majesty's Government gave great weight to them, and never failed to make allowance for the disadvantages under which Austria thought herself labouring. It was for Austria to decide between the considerations alluded to by Count Colloredo ' and the engagement s s h e h ad entered into with the Western Powers; but whatever her decision might be, and whatever view Austria might take of her own interest and obligation, no effort on the part of her Majesty's Government would be wanting to maintain unimpaired the friendly rela tions that now existed between the two countries. On the other hand, however, we must claim to be the beat guardians of our own honour and the best judges of our own interests, and Austria would have no just cause for complaint if we declined to accept conditions which wemight regard as inconsistent with our honour, and ineffectual for the objects that England and France had pledged themetAelvuesEtNopseoeN.ure. —I have, &c., p . s . ___Your Lordship is instructed of toreadthis des hi p s atch to him a copy it, should Excel lencyCou n t desireß u o l , - to a havet give one. C. No. 19. The Earl of Westmorland acknowledges the receipt of Lord Clarendon's despatch of the 29th of April, which was communicated to Count Buol, who promises a speedy reply. No• 20. Foreign-office, un h TDB E ARL OF CLARENDON TO . TUB EARL OF WESTMORLAND.J2. My Lord, ---W ith reference to your Lordship ' s despatc of the sth i nst., in which you report that Count Buol had stated that his object was not to make a proposition in any way on behalf of the Governments of England and France, but entirely independent of them, I have to observe that, as the propositions were formally submitted to the Govern ments of Englilha 'and Fran ce, those Governments, if they had agreed to them, would il3 honour ha ve been bound to ' abide by then, and to seek no other or better terms ; and Austria then, in bringing them beforo the Conference, would fairly have been entitled to say that she did so in behalf of the English and French Governments. I must further observe that, although Count Buol may consider that the nomination of consuls was sufficiently alluded to in the second article of his project, yet England and France could not consent to delegate to the Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiaries the settlement of a question of so much importance as that of the right to appoint consuls in Russian harbours for the purpose of superintending the ob servance of the treaty. And, lastly, with respect to the fulfilment of the obits _ _ . . . , - tions contracted by Austria by the treaty of the 2d of De cember, which Count Buol said was a subject more imme diately connected with the ultimatum which Austria had proposed to address to the Russian Government, in which was involved the question of an immediate declaration of war, I can only repeat that it is the wish of her Majesty's Government to avoid an irritating discussion upon a question with respect to which the Cabinet of Vienna appears long since to have formed its opinion and taken its decision. I shall, therefore, confine myself to remarking that Austria has bound herself to concert measures with England and France for giving effect to the treaty of the 2d of December, if peace was not made on certain bases before a specified time. That time has long since elapsed, and the bases have been re jected by Russia ; but the project of Austria would not have given effect to the bases, and would not have put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. England and France were therefore compelled t• decline adhering to a pro position which, although it may be called an ultimatum, cannot be said to have involved an immediate declaration of war, as there can be no doubt that the proposal would have been gladly accepted by Russia.— I am, d:e., CLARENDON. No. 21. THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO THE EARL OF WESTMORELAND. Foreign-office, June 13, 1855. My Lord,—Count Colloredo yesterday read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that he considered that the reserve made in the protocol of December 28, with respect to the principle of putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, is at present in full force ; that the events of war must bring about the solution of the point ; and Count Buol hopes that the efforts of the allies will obtain the end in view as completely as Austria would probably have obtained it, either by peaceful methods or by joining in the war, if her allies had not rejected the last Austrian proposal. However much Count Buol regrets the rejection of that plan, the continuation of the war in no way changes the position of Austria and her allies towards each other. Austria will maintain her rights and perform her duties as regards the Eastern question, on the bases agreed upon, and, until she learns to the contrary, will conclude that her allies will do the same. Austria will more especially endeavour to maintain the concession obtained from Russia on the first and second points, and also as regards the material guarantee (of the Ottoman empire) ; Austrian troops will remain in the Prin cipalities to defend Turkey from attack on the side of the Danube, until the chances of war may dispose the belligerents to resume the work of peace on the bases already admitted and partially developed. Without giving any opinion on the probabilities of the war, the Austrian Government cannot conceal its apprehen sion that the greatest successes in the Crimea may not be suf ficient to induce Russia to make peace, and that the reverses of Russia may so excite the Russian people as to render peace more difficult of attainment, so that the war may be indefi nitely prolonged. The consequences will be that the Ottoman empire will be exhausted, and the original object of the war lost sight of. Count Buol fears that amidst these new complications the grand political end of the alliance will disappear. Austria will assuredly do nothing to hasten a result so much to be lamented ; on the contrary, the Austrian Cabinet is deter mined to maintain its intimate relations with its allies, and Count Buol hopes to find on their part similar intentions. I told Count Colloredo that, without consulting my col leagues and learning the opinion of the French Government, I could give no answer to the despatch he had just read, and which I had listened to with much regret, as it was un favourable to the prospects of an alliance from which we had expected so much towards bringing the war to a successful end, and from which, when peace was concluded, we had looked for important advantages to Europe. Austria, I said, might confidently rely that England and France would maintain their engagement, and perform their duties with scrupulous good faith, and that it would be their object to maintain the most friendly relations with Austria, but I would not conceal from Count Colloredo my own opinion that the continuation of the war must, to a certain extent, change the position of Austria and her allies towards each other unless she took part in the war, in ful filment of her engagements ; if she did not do so the cause must be either that it would be inconvenient to her to give effect to the treaty of December 2, or else that her Allies were to blame for the rupture of the negotiations, Upon the first cause, which was too improbable for belief, it would be unnecessary to make any remark ; but against the second I must beg in the strongest manner to protest, and for the reasons which I had given in answer to another despatch of Count Buol's, which Count Colloredo had just read. If England and France had been extravagant in their demands, or had sought to gain any advantage over Russia beyond the terms that had been agreed upon between the three Powers, Austria would have been fully justified in considering herself rel eased from her engagements, and in throwing upon her allies the responsibility of the consequences ; but no condition was pressed which had not previously been assented to by Austria, and which was not subsequently sup ported by her in the Conference ; and, because these propo sals were rejected by Russia, it was difficult to understand by what process of reasoning Austria arrived at the conclusion that she was thereby emancipated from her obligations, and that her only duty was to wish success to her allies in the war which they were still determined to carry on. The questions involved in the four points would, I said as a matter of 3ourse, come under consideration whenever nego tiations were resumed ; but England and France must consi. der themselves entirely free to act according to circumstances, and that. they must in the meanwhile regard as non avenus the partial arrangements made at the Conferences of Vienna.l Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol, and give his Excellency a copy of it, if ho should desire to have one. I am, &c., No. 22. Lord Clarendon informs the Earl of Westmoreland that Count Colloredo had read to him a despatch from Count Buol expressing his regret at the termination of the Conferences, and his surprise at the objections made by the Cabinets of London and Paris to the proposition which he had brought forward at the Conference on the 4th inst. , which proposition, he said, had originated with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who, hav ing been in direct communication with her Majesty's Govern ment, was considered at Vienna to be the special representa tive of the policy and views of England and France. Lord Clarendon declares his total dissent from the state ment and opinions of Count Buol. (No. 23.) CIRCULAR DESPATCH ADDRESSED TO HER MAJESTY'S REPRE SENTATIVES AT FOREIGN COURTS. Foreign-office, June 19, Sir,—On the 4th instant a Conference was summoned at Vienna by Count Buol, the proceedings at which are recorded in the protocol of which I enclose a copy.* This protocol, together with the protocols of the Confer ences held at Vienna between the 15th of March and the 26th of April, of which copies have been transmitted to you, will place you in possession of tho details of the negotiation in which her Majesty, in conjunction with her allies, has recently been engaged, and which, to her Majesty's great regret, have not resulted in the conclusion of a peace with tho Emperor of Russia. I consider that the present will be a fitting opportunity to state for your information and guidance the views of her Ma jesty's Government upon the negotiations which have thus been brought to a close. The stipulations for which, while reserving to themselves the right of insisting upon other special and additional con ditions, her Majesty and her allies considered it more parti cularly incumbent on them to provide, were as follows :- 1. That the exclusive right to interfere to a certain extent in the internal affairs of provinces belonging to the Turkish Empire, which Russia had in former times wrung from the necessities of the Porte, should no longer be exercised by that Power. 2. That the channel of the Lower Danube, and more espe cially the outlets of that river into the Black Sea, should no longer be subject to the exclusive control of Russia, but should, on the contrary, be confided to the superintendence of delegates appointed by other Powers as well as by Russia, and who should take measures for freeing and keeping free from obstructions the great water communication of Central Germany with the rest of the world. 3• That the Turkish Empire should become part of the system of European equilibrium, and that means should be taken to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. 4. That the pretensions of Russia officially to protect the Christian subjects of the Porte should be renounced, and that the Powers should use their influence to obtain from the Sul tan, by an act of his own Sovereign authority, the confirma tion and observance of the religious privileges of his Christian subjects. A communication to this effect was made to the Court of Russia at the close of last year, and was accepted by that Power as the basis on which negotiations might be entered into. Negotiations were accordingly commenced at Vienna, but, unfortunately, it is only on the first and second points that anything approaching to an agreement was arrived at ; for, the refusal of the Russian Plenipotentiaries to accede to the reasonable proposals made to them by the Plenipotentiaries of the allies on the third point stopped the progress of the nego tiations upon that point, and the fourth point was, in conse quence, not brought under discussion. It satisfactory, however, to her Majesty's Government to be able to appeal to the protocols on the first and second points as an evidence of the anxiety shown by the allies to devise terms of settlement advantageous to the general interests of Europe, and more immediately conducive to the development of the prosperity of Germany ; and her Majesty's Government, therefore, regret the more that the refusal of Russia to accept the proposals of the allies on the third point should have stood in the way of the advantages which would have resulted from the arrangements which might have been made in regard to the matters to which the two first points related. Her Majesty's Government are aware that Count Nessel. rode, in a despatch which he has recently addressed to the Russian Ministers at Foreign Courts, has sought to place in a favourable light the course pursued by Russia in the dis cussions on the two first points, and to persuade foreign Go vernments, and more particularly those of Germany, that the continued preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea has no direct bearing on the questions which relate to the Principa lities and to the navi g ation of the Danube, nor on the inter ests of Germany, and that Germany, therefore, ought not to co-operate with the allies in their efforts to reduce that pre ponderance. of pec he uad ca e s d e that a n Her ip a M r aj t a e l s t e y o ' n s g G i d o e v r e a r t n i omne of f t a t r h e e , r ea h o l w f a e v e t e s r , serve to dispel the illusion which it was the object of Count Nesselrode's despatch to create. Her Majesty's Government have no desire to undervalue the importance of the matters to which the arrangements in regard to the first two points sketched out in the protocols of the Conference relate ; but her Majesty's Government must be permitted to observe that, as re gar d s th e Principalities, any r i g ht s w hi c h R ussia might possess or claim under her former treaties were at once extinguished by the abrogation of those treaties on the breaking out of the war, and that, consequently, the exemption of the Principalities from the exclusive protec tion of Russia is no t th e result of any concession made b y Russia to the interests of Germany, but is the direct con sequence of the violent act of aggression committed by Russia on the T ur ki sh empire; and, as regards the naviga tion of the Danube, it is to be observed that although the arrangements proposed i n th e fif t h protocol would be, to a certain extent, satisfactory , yet it was mai n l y ow i ng to the refusal of Russia to accede to the reasonable suggestions put forward by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria in the fourth Co nference, that those proposed arrangements were not made more complete, and more in conformity with the general in terests of Europe. But the arrangements proposed in regard to the first two * See Eastern Papers, part XIV, dL~RL~AT tI~)r~ RESIGNATION OF LORD JOHN RUSSELL ("' Prom the Times of this day.) Yesterday afternoon Lord John Russell anticipated the certain decision of the House of Commons by a tardy re signation. As constitutional propriety required that the resignation should be accepted by , the Queen before it was announced to the house, and her Majesty happened to be at Osborne, the evening sitting passed, oddly enough, without any allusion to an event, as we must consider it, of European importance. It is said that his lordship was still hesitating between the numerous conflicting consider ations that presented themselves, and had even accepted with all seriousness the invitation of his colleagues to re main where he was, when a very remarkable incident de termined, or rather compelled, a contrary decision. The members of the Government in the House of Commons not inoluded in the Cabinet, represented by Mr. Bouverie, are reported to have informed him that they were not pre pared to vote against Sir Bulwer Lytton's motion. This removed all doubt as to the result of the impending divi sion, and, as Lord John could no longer hope to save him self, even at the cost of the whole of his colleagues, he wisely preferred to do with somethi ng lik e grace what be would otherwise have had to do with no grace at all. The Cabinet must feel relieved of a very unmanageable burden. No doubt, in Lord John Russell it has lost great abilities and personal influence, and no doubt he is not pleasant either as an antagonist or as a rival ; but his continuance in the Cabinet had become impossible. A Minister whom Russia could claim as a sympathiser, Austria as a plenipo tentiary, the Peace party as an advocate, the seceded Minis ters as one of their own opinions, and every Parliamentary foe as a probable auxiliary, was absolutely incompatible with the safety of Government. Lord Palmerston had, indeed, requested him to take no notice of the "much ado about nothing" that had been got up, and to stay in ; but, when the Premier had tolerated him so many weeks, in the face of M. Drouyn de l'Huys' retirement under the same circumstances, ho had no alternative but to hold the same language still, and, in common phrase, to "stand by Lord John. But, though Lord Palmerston might be pre pared to consult his consistency at the expense of power, the occasion was not one that depended on the interchange of courtesies. The public and their representatives would not stand the incredible absurdity of a war conducted by ministers, one of whom thought it might have been avoided but for the obstinacy of the rest. War with a neighbour. ing nation was bad enough, and could not be helped, but a fundamental difference about the war in the Cabinet it self was a gratuitous aggravation, and could be helped. So the British public has spoken in no uncertain tones ; the House of Commons has expressed itself as plainly as it could do ; and Lord John has given way to the storm, and retired. What is now become of Sir Bulwer Lytton's motion— how those members of the Cabinet are to be dealt with who are said to agree with Lord John—and who is to fill up the vacancy, are questions of great moment just now. It is more important to assign a true value to this event, and there we cannot be far wrong. Most interesting is it to trace the growing intensity of the popular feeling, and its increasing impatience of anything like disloyalty in the quarrel with Russia. It was the people who forced Lord Aberdeen into the war, which he would have been glad to spend the remainder of his days in putting off by every means in his power. It was the people who joined as one man to everthrow the Government, when enormous blunders and neglects seemed to betray an indolent and inefficient administration. It was the stern aspect of the people, and its resolute determination that the sufferings and the deaths of so many thousands should not be in vain, which infused into our negotiations, in spite of the chief ne go ti a t or , an unwonted ° firmness and dignity. Accordingly, it is the people who have dismissed Lord John, for the present, to that retirement where he may, if he pleases, still split himself into doubts, and di vide his precarious sympathies between England and Rus sia. In fact, the British people, for all that Mr. Cobden says to the contrary, are resolved to go on with this war ; to persevere, in spite of losses, disgraces, and even appa rently irretrievable disaster. The war may have to stand that greatest., and severest, and truest of all tests—the ordeal of failure. Success is no test. It gilds a bad cause as much as it recommends a good one. Knaves and tyrants may prosper and give thanks. To suffer the loss of friends, to pay largely out of the pocket, to bid farewell to private wealth and national prosperity, to smile on disaster and welcome poverty, all for the sake of a good cause, makes that cause sacred, honourable, and heroic. These are the things that bring us back to the nobility of ancient days. We cannot command success ; but England is satisfied that her cause is good, and she will persevere all the more that she has to do so through many obstacles and in much dis couragement. What cause so good as to have escaped those trials ? This is the natural feeling of the people, and it is a per fectly right one. A very slight reflection will serve to show that, if there is any subject in the whole sphere of human action on which there ought to be no doubt or de mur, it is the awful business of war. A Government may or may not be very cordial or unanimous on a question of reform in institutions that have lasted for centuries unreformed, or on a question of railways, or other material improvements ; almost any question, indeed, of mere secular import may be left open for the variety and fallibility of human judgment ; but in war we are assuming as we needs must assume, the tremendous prerogative of Heaven—the assertion of justice by the sword. The man who takes the responsibility of sending fleets and armies to kill, to burn, to waste and destroy; to spread ruin among millions, to sow the seeds of endless resentments, to stop the progress of civilisation, and drive the human race back again to the desert, ought to be very certain, very hearty, in his hideous work - . To do all this doubt ingly, with a perpetually intrusive misgiving that, after all, there was no need for it, and that we are responsible for these horrors, implies a singular indifference to huma nity, justice, and truth s That th e na t ure o f th e wor k de mands the rmest determination and most unyielding de cision, and that hesitation and doubt are sure to be written in blood and tears, is only a proof of the infinite moral gravity of the task, and the necessity of a thoroughly re solved mind. M. Droun de Lhuys evidently saw this. Had he felt negotiation exhausted and the war unavoidable, be might have continued to assist with his counsels. Had be been a soldier, he would have been bound by the oath of military obedience, and flip,o would have boon enough warrant for his conscience and an end of dubitation • but, as it was, he was at liberty to doubt, an d did doubt ; so ho resigned, and now neither stains his hands with war nor infects the war with infirmity of resolution. Lord J. Russell had not the same fineness of apprehension and gravity of action. He seems to have thought he might take a voluntary and prominent part in wholesale destruction of his species, even at the time when he was de cidedly of opinion that it was all unnecessary. This is to play with the sword and throw firebrands in sport. The British public feels as the French Minister felt on the matter, and they have now compelled the English Minister to follow his example. We could wish that the lesson had not been necessary, but, at all events, we have reason to be proud of a public opinion that can promptly and decisively arrest the vacillation and supply the shortcomings of our rulers. (From the Daily News of this day.) Lord John Russell has resigned. The public may pos sibly learn the fact with feelings of surprise : they will learn the cause with sentiments of mingled astonishment and disgust. When we noticed yesterday the ill-concealed efforts that were making by a certain section of those who have heretofore been reckoned amongst the friends and followers of Lord John, to induce him to retire on the eve of the coming struggle, confessedly in the hope that they might thereby propitiate their assailants and save themselves from party humiliation at his expense, we intimated our disbelief in the success of a manoe uvre a t once so miserable and so mean. We could not persuade ourselves that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, and with the memorable warning afforded by th e even t s of January last, the noble lord would voluntarily quit his post under fire. Nor has the event falsified our anticipations as far as he is concerned. Lord John cannot, in point of fact, be said to have manifested on the present occasion any anxiety to shirk the responsibility which he had incurred. He in truth hugged himself in the belief that he had made a dex terous and successful coup ; and, utterly unconscious of the obloquy he had drawn upon himself, fancied that he could reconcile the discrepancies and prevarications of the last two months. At all events he was ready to stand the brunt of the threatened assault and to abide the con sequences. Not so the men by whom he has been sur rounded. Scared at the sound of the rising storm of popular indignation, andlsolicitous only for the retention of power, men who six weeks ago were ready to acquiesce without hesitation in the proposal of compromise with Russia sug gested by Count Buol, have not been ashamed to join in forcing Lord John to tender his resignation to the head of the Government. Through every rank and grade of the party efforts have been made to further this uesign. The pride of the Secretary for the Colonies having been stung into making the offer we have mentioned, resort was had to the respectable and high-spirited device of a round robin addressed to Lord Palmerston, urging him to accept the resignation. This document was actually hawked about th precincts and passages of the House of Commons for signature during the sitting of the house yesterday, and while the two noble lords continued to occupy their usual seats, side by side, upon the Treasury bench. We are unwilling to state how many names of men calling themselves Whigs were appended to it • but we believe we may venture to say that the rebukes which its authors en countered from the manly, and independent members who refused to act a part fit only for sailors in a mutiny on ship-board, served to convince them that their clumsy de vice is one too shameless even for the present House of Commons. But the lengths and the depths to which Mi nisters and their creatures are ready to go to elude trial and condemnation are too plainly indicated by the use of means such as that we have referred to. What is to be said or thought of themen who, having in the Cabinet assented to the proposal!recommended by Lord John, and who having in Parliament assented to his sudden repudiation of that proposition, are now ready to lend their aid in hustling him out of office, in the hope that when he is gone they will be suffered to remain there? So long as they believed it possible to patch up a peace by agreeing to Austrian terms of accommodation, these worthies saw in the terms advocated by Lord John nothing that was not politic and approvable. When these terms got wind prematurely, and national feeling began to menace all who adopted them with condign censu re , these men were eager to concur with the ex-plenipotentiary in his hollow and insincere repudiation of all diplomatic action and his ap peal to the warlike spirit of tho country. The delusion thus practised upon Parliament, with their concurrence, and amid their exulting cheers, is exposed by the despatch of Count Buol; and what happens ? Are these men ashamed ? Do they propose to resign? Do they attempt to throw the blame on the Secretary for the Colonies? Nothin g of the sort ; th e y con ti nue i ndifferent and un affectedby the exposure, until a question is asked, after an an interval of three weeks, that elicits a full avowal of the facts, and subsequently provokes a motion for a vote of want of confidence. And then these craven colleagues of a too reckless Minister, cabal together with their under lings in office to throw him overboard, in order to appease the storm. Had these men one spark of manly feeling, their duty was to have thrown up their offices, either when the Austrian proposal for peace was overruled or when they heard Lord John mislead the House of Com mons into the belief that the Cabinet were united on the necessity of prosecuting the war. They did neither, be cause they were ready to become abettors of both the be tral of the country's honour and the shabby disavowal of it. They obtain ed by their duplicity a party majority, which they persuaded themselves would render them secure for the rest of the session ; and now, when the consequences of the trans action are with retributive justice about to fall on their heads, they try to cheat their fate by making one man a scapegoat. And finally, what shall be said of Lord Palmerston, if it be true, as we are informed, that he has advised the Quee n to accept Lord J o h n ' s resignation, in order that he and the rest of the Cabinet may have a chance of retaining their places? Times are stranffely altered since 1850. Lord Palmerston was then a Secretary of State against whose official conduct a motion of censure was aimed. Lord John Lussell was then Prime Minister. Then, as now, there was not wanting timid and time-serving counsellors ready td - urge ,that, the assailed secretary should be sacrificed, and p3itk interests thefebY conSeod(l. But Lord John was at least true to his yoke-fellow in office, Whateter he might be to his own principles. He determined to stand or fall with the colleague whose acts he had tacitly ap proved. The positions of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Rtissell are now reversed. The noble member for London is now the secretary assailed, and the noble member for Tiverton is now Premier. We have no pity for Lord John, but we have infinite contempt for his treacherous allies in office. We have no notion of "crimes being punished by other crimes and greater criminals." Lord Palmerston cannot escape from the consequences of personal and poli tical complicity in the misdemeanours of Lord John Rus sell ; but he can still further damage a shattered reputa tion by trying to sever the defence of himself and his con federates from that of one who a few years since behaved so differently towards him. We have been told that " there is honour among thieves ;" it is more than can be said of our living Whig statesmen. T_HE VIENNA CONFERENCES. The papers which have just been laid before Parliament, for the purpose of elucidating the communications of tho Western Powers with the Austrian Government, are by far the most curious and important documents published in the whole series of these transactions. They demon strate with precision what the views of the British Cabinet were on the fulfilment of the Third Point as explained by Lord Clarendon. They show that from an early period in the negotiation Austria was endeavouring to evade the obligation created by the Treaty of the 2d of December. They reveal the discussions which took place at Vienna in Count Buol's apartments, for the purpose of arranging the course of proceeding in the formal meetings of the Con ference ; and, lastly, they indicate the exact moment of Lord John Russell's apostacy from the principles he was sent to Vienna especially to advocate and defend. We shall endeavour here to present our readers with a suc• cinct analysis of the leading occurrences thus brought be- fore us, though the papers themselves will be found in another part of our impression. . . . . As early as the 3d of April an Austrian communication was made to Lor,i Clarendon to the effect, that although tho Cabinet of Vienna preferred the expedient of the limitation of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea, yet, in the event of Russia rejecting that proposition alto gether, Austria, not being at present engaged in hostilities, would have no sufficient motive to declare war against Russia if this were the sole obstacle to peace. To meet this contingency Count Buol was of opinion that recourse must be had to the system of counterpoise ; and it may here be observed that the whole of this discussion might be summed up in two words—viz., whether the cessation of the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea was to be effected on the principle of limitation or on that of coon terpoiie. Upon this important point the British Government, as represented by Lord Clarendon, has never had the slightest hesitation ; and we are happy to add that nothing can be more clear and peremptory than the despatches of the Foreign Minister throughout this correspondence. Lord Clarendon instantly told Count Colloredo that he " had heard the Austrian despatch with equal surprise and con corn, as it was nothing short of a declaration that Austria would not adhere to the treaty of the 2d of December if the Western Powers persisted in carrying the third basis into effect, for Count Buol must be aware that his pro posed system of counterpoise was both inadequate and impracticable." He then exposes with great force of argu ment the absurdity of such conditions, and concludes in the following language : " Yet such were the terms, I said, upon which Count Buol seemed desirous to conclude a peace that was to be honourable and just—that was to maintain the indepen dence and integrity of Turkey, and that was to furnish solid guarantees for the future tranquillity of Europe ; but I need hardly say that in such arrangements her Majesty's Government could take no part. If the war went on, it would be for Austria to consider her own position, not only during its continuance after the preparations she had made, the language she had held, and the engagements she had entered into, but also at its conclusion, when peace was made between the four belligerent Powers." The instructions sent to Lord - John Russell on the same day were, that he should explain to Austria the system of neutralisation, which meant that all vessels of war should be excluded from the Black Sea, and also that of the limi tation of the naval force ; and he was also instructed that, in the event of Austria refusing to bind herself to co-ope rate in war with France and England upon Russia's reject ing both propositions, the negotiations must be broken off. The Austrian Government, in the confidential conversa tions which are here reported by Lord John Russell, ad mitted the value of these expedients, and promised them her support in the Conference ; but it declared that Aus tria was not prepared to go to war on account of the re fusal of Russia to limit her naval force in the Black Sea, and thought that the same end might be accomplished by ot , er means. M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John ener- , getically opposed and refuted these Austrian suggestions ; and Lord John, in particular, declared that "the project of counterpoise was ineffectual, as we could not always have a large fleet at hand ; humiliating to Turkey, if she were always to lean on Franco and England ; unsafe for Europe, which would be kept in the perpetual ferment of preparation for war." Count Buol seemed shaken by these arguments, and Lord John reported that " this was, in his opinion, an attempt on the part of Austria to induce the Western Powers to relinquish their proposals on the third point ; as such it had entirely failed!' This was on the 9th of April, and a fortnight later he received the ap proval of her Majesty's Government for the ability with which he had held his ground. But in the interval a sin gular change had occurred". On the 16th Lord John himself put forward a plan by which, so long as the Russian naval force in the Black Sea should not exceed four sail of the line, four frigates, and six smaller vessels, other Powers at amity with the Sultan should have the right of sending half that force re spectively into the Euxine ; and that, if the Russian force was increased beyond that limit, a large number of shifts of war of the Sultan's allies should be admitted. So that we have here the first symptoms of the British Plenipo tentiary coming round to that very system of counterpoise which Lord Clarendon held to be "inadequate and im practicable," and Lord John himself five days before de clared to be "ineffectual." We shall not attempt to follow the diplomatic conclave into the nice and subtle elaboration to which these propo sitions were subjected. The substance of them may be summed up in very few words :—Austria, foreseeing, or more probably knowin g , that Russia would not consent to the direct limitation of her naval forces was endeavouring to obtain the assent of the Western Powers to propositions of a totally different character, more especially calculated to throw over to an indefinite period the cams belli in which she herself is involved. The last scheme was, that Austria would make it a cases belli by treaty if Russia should hereafter increase her naval force in the Black Sea beyand the number maintained by her in 1853—that is to say, beyond the armament she had prepared to suppoi t Prince Monschikoff's mission, and to execute the massacre of Sinop° ; and this was the proposal which Lord John Russell, on the 18th of April, thought deserving of his as sent. To quote his own words on so important a point : " I confess it appears to me that if this third system can be made an ultimatum by Austria, it ought to be accepted by by the Western Powers. In saying this I may appear to con tradict my former opinions; but, in fact, I do not is!ra ct those opinions. The system of limitation I believe to bo far better than that of counterpoise. But the question is be tween an imperfect security for Turkey and for Europe and the continuance of the war." This " imperfect security," then, was precisely what Lord John Russell was, on his own showing, prepared to accept. He even begged that he might be allowed to be heard personally by his colleagues in support of it before a final decision was made. But the question was not only between an " imperfect security and the continuance of the war." The real question lay between honour and disgrace, between success and defeat. Within three days of this very date, and while this shameful despatch was still on the road to London, Lord Clarendon told Count Colloredo, in very different language, that " England and France were not prepared to sacrifice to the alliance of Austria their honour and the future security of Europe, and that peace upon the terms proposed by Count Buol would be as dishonourable as it would be hollow and un safe." Such was the Plenipotentiary, such was the Mi nister; the one already crouching in imperfect security, the other repelling almost as an insult the proposals his colleague had accepted. But one touch is wanting to com plete the picture. Before Lord John Russell could know the impression produced in London by his defection he makes Count Buol the depository of his recantation, and pledges himself to that Minister to support the proposi tion of the Austrian Cabinet against the polity of his own country and its Allies, and against the recorded instruc tions and declarations of his own official superior. We doubt if the annals of diplomacy or of official life can fur nish another example of an important mission performed with such wilful indifference to the first principles of consistency and duty. It is unnecessary to pursue in this place the subsequent incidents in this transaction, so far as they concern Lord John Russell—his ambiguous demeanour on his return, his war speech in the House of Commons, which was a practical fraud on Par liament, and his fresh attempt to dislocate the Govern ment upon a reverse having befallen the British army ; but, if ever a severe condemnation fell upon a Minister, Lord John Russell is that Minister ; and the Government shares his fault in not having instantly punished him by dismissal. It is proved, however, by these despatches that the lan guage of Lord John Russell to his colleagues in no degree affected the tone or conduct of the Prime Minister or the foreign Secretary. We refer more particularly to the despatches of the Bth of May, the 29th of May, and the 2d of June, written after Lord John had returned to this country, and we are convinced they will he read by men of all parties with pride and satisfaction. The propositions which Austria wish to substitute for those of the Western Powers, and for the interpretation she had herself before adopted, are literally pulverized by argument. The posi tion of Austria, with the Western Powers alienated, Prus sia triumphing over her in Germany, and Russia bent on her humiliation, is shown to be almost intolerable; yet these stern truths are conveyed to our timorous ally with so much courtesy of language that she could not resent their application. But, above all, the great end of the I war, the diminution of the power of Russia, as a State which had become menacing to the peace and security of the world, is steadily kept in view. This is the end to which Lord Clarendon has throughout steadily adhered, even against the defection of colleagues and of friends, pledging himself that "England and France will not abandon that cause, but will use every means at their command, and will shrink from no sacrifice, to obtain their demands, which are founded on justice and have the safety of Europe for their object." This principle we believe to have the united support of the Government as it will now be constituted, and we are confident that this principle alone will obtain the suffrages of the Parliament and the people of England.— Times. ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS. —The annual election of officers to this institution took place on the 11th inst., when William Lawrence, Esq., F.R.S., was elected pre sident, and Benjamin Travers, Esq., F.R.S., an d Edward Stanley, Esq., F.R.S., were elected vice presidents, being the second occasion on which this honour bas been conferred on each of the above named gentlemen. At. a meeting of the Court of Examiners on the 13th inst., the following gentlemen were admitted members of the college, having previoi sly undergone the necessary examinations, viz.: Messrs. Charles Dumaine, Trinidad, West Indies ; Charles Sey mour Thane, Baybam-terrace, Camden-town ; Samuel Fuller, army; William Isaac Spencer, York-place, Portman-square ; Frederick John Wells, Victoria-road, Pimlico ; Lawrence Kiernan, Australia ; John Hall, Caroline-place, Haverstock-hill ; Henry Frederick Hol land, Godalming, Surrey ; Peter Vincent Timothy, Australia ; David H enr y Ogden, Skipton iu Craven ; Michael James Callender, Greenside, Durham ; and William Sims, Southauipton. NAVAL AND MILITARY INTELLIG.Verag° Her Majesty's new yacht Victoria and Albert , Ca r ' the Hon. Joseph Denman, left Cowes at noon yesterdat and sicarned round the Isle of Wight, which passag e ; accomplished it; three hours and 20 minutes, a distan ce o f about 62 miles by the chart. The Chester eteam-tranr port was towed into Portsmouth harbour yesterday by th e Echo tug to land her obsolete stores. The followiq troops are under orders to embark in the steam-transPl4 Arabia at Portsmouth dockyard (probably to•daY) steam-trans • Crimea :-11 officers, 165 men, and 128 horses of the 6t Dragoon Guards; 25 horses of the Ist Dragoons; 25 bates. of the 13th Light Dragoons; 1 officer, 1 man, ad 2 bo n , of the sth Dragoon Guards ; Major Weal e, 2 men, Lou, horses of the 50th Foot ; Lieutenant Heywood, of W.' Rifle Brigade ; and 1 medical officer. The City of AhB,_lr., deen steam-transport is expected at Portsmouth this WI • to receive troops. The Powerful, 84, Captain T. L. Massie, from r°T ts. mouth, with seamen, marines, and stores for the Crinleal arrived at Plymouth yesterday. 'cad The Penguin, 6, Commander Etheridge, which arr l .„. at Plymouth on Thursday from the Cape of Good 0. 4 1' has been absent from England 4 years 7 months and 2 at,"' She went first to Sierra Leone, where she continued ' ll.- 1 months, and captured two prizes. The remainder of Ja 9 time was expended at the Cape and the Mozambiq ue Cha¢ nel where she captured a bark and a dow. Almo st ally t t he officers and crew who went out in her continue on boru,„, and, although fever has visited the ship, there has bee fatal case. She lost two men by accident—one through t i n l fall of a tree when cutting firewood at Sierra Leon° ; another, Danford, a carpenter, who, tenaciously enue ll ' e der ing to recover a bucket from the side of the ship when full sail, was drawn overboard and drowned. The Pen h e t is so rotten in the bows that fears were entertained 02.'1:4 fitness to undertake the passage home. She was Apr' to go up Hamoaze yesterday. or The steam-vessel Avon, from Woolwich, arrived mouth on Thursday. The Rhadamanthus, steam store-ship, Master-0; islander Belam, arrived at Woolwich yesterday mor es cenveyed machinery, &c., to Portsmouth. Orders arrived at Sheerness yesterday for the Meteo r ' bs guns, floating-battery, Captain F. B. P. Seymour, W h o taken into No. 1 dry-deck, to make good damage °AO screw-propeller. The Trusty, floating-battery, so s 4ol out of the dock, and the Meteor was taken into th e yesterday, and will be docked to-day. The Lolus store-ship, Master-Commander 'WOO to -hell Browne, yesterday had only one lighter more of sile•.pt complete the quantity ordered to be shipped, on the e at of which she will immediately be swung for the adju.„lo.,, of her compasses. She is to proceed direct for the P,,st, The Eurotas, 44-gun frigate, now in No. 2 dry ?Sea Sheerness, to be fitted for a mortar ship, is being sy; e r to adapt her for a screw propeller. She will have P ° ful machinery. A large number of artificers are enlP'' on her. sde Orders have arrived at Sheerness for mails to be _ 9 lOO. up ready to be put on board the Centaur, 6-gull Pbte wheel steam-frigate, Captain W. J. C. Clifford, an jet Hermes, 6-gun paddle-wheel steam-sloop, Conall 39n o i, Henry Coryton, to be ready to-morrow and Monde,' !lie The number of horses and troops the Transit is lated to take out on her present outward passage 9 ,,'515 , horses on the main deck and 60 on the upper dee!' al troops, in addition to her officers and crew, consisti l l e a' 160 in all. She stows one month's provision for 1,0 0 °' 1 ;44 and 87 tons of water. Her coppers are capable of cee" -- for 1,000 troops or seamen on full allowance. Ten seamen belonging to the Meteor floating bsAr have been committed to Maidstone Gaol for 28 dart ii% hard labour for negligence of duty and insolence. these men were recently paid oft from the Lily, 1 " sloop, at Devonport. from TI • merchant ship Kangaroo, Captain Pickering , a ll Adel ,ide, 18th of March, for London, landed a mail 710 passengers at Plymouth on Friday. She spoke Alw4oo in ht. 9 12, long. 44 E.. the ship Cherusker, 45 den'ilel Calcutta, for London ; May 18, in lat. 15 30, long. 4 l o t the bark Dina, for Java ; June 12, in lat. 19 0 1C.5 26 0 W., the bark hank of England, steering nortilzior the ship Humboldt, 16 days, from New York, fro m bu Eu r. 10 1 g sign Carl von Blucher, grandson of the late 11 191 „1 1 0 0: Blucher, has 'volunteered to serve in the Foreign 9- 0 Ho was bronght over from Heligoland by the Hora tio L il landed at Folkestone with 185 other volunteers, neat3l of whom are perfect in their small-arm drill. ttit i The following appointments were made yesterday 9 Admiralty : li i Captain Robert Fanshawe Stopford to the go en Mitchell. Surgeon John Dunlop, to the Excellent. A. R. Brown, master's assistant, to the Hermes- f During the present week 54 men and 41 horses Dor 13th Light Dragoons, for some time past stationed the chester, have left that town for Southampton, und er Or command of Lieutenant Mac Neil. They will there bark for the Crimea. About 8 a.m. yesterday several companies of frer e eto ' tillery and Sappers, in heavy marching order, wit' : battery companies, were pa ra d e d a t Woolwich for le pe ii service. The horses and equipments are 'complete l , l 44 and the men, mostly recruits, a re a fi ne , h ea lthy-t o if set of fellows, apparently well adapt e d f or the dill 4" which they are about to be engaged. de' a Large reinforcements for the Crimea continue tt,,, be spatched. with all possible speed from the Irish Po""i following movements are reported from Cork, una„ e tt eer of Thursday:—The Trafalgar transport arrived ill 40 town yesterday, to take out draughts of the 13 04 00 47th, and 55th Regiments to the seat of War• ti e draughts number about 350 men. The followin b oa rd s { were yesterday conveyed by river steamers on i ;; A t Bride of the Sea transport, for conveyance to th e o {4 o war :-30th Foot-2 captains, 4 subalterns, 3 serg b e jtk_ i r o ! drummers, 71 rank and file. 49th-1 captain, 494 e on 5 sergeants, 2 drummers, 143 rank end file. 50li' d 7 terns, 1 sergeant, 1 drummer, 18 rank and ,„L'we.o• k —6 subalterns, 5 sergeants, 2 drummers, 1 4 140arlf, file. The 9th and 89th draughts were conveyed from Am er w" and immediately embarked on board a rive r I g neistl conveyance to the same transport, the for_ 2 o o .f r i g uera , of 1 capt . in „ 2 subalterns, 2 sergeants, 2 l° l- nha iterusu rank and file • and the latter, 2 caPtain4 6 1 3 .7 e bar k ; sergeants, 2 drummers, 108 rank and file ; t°"'" 111 2 1 °e on board this transport -6 captains, 26 subalterns, of the geants, 11 drummers, 569 ra n k and fil e . Draugh ts ; tb/ 17th and 39th also arrived from Limerick yesteran l er strength of the former being 2 captains, 4 subalteln car, geants, 2 drummers. 130 rank and file; the latter, k e ao tins, 3 subalterns, 5 sergeants, 2 drummers, 113 r 9r ,t oe rll file, to embark on board the Royal Charlie, whic h is The expected in the harbour, for conveyance to Balakla0"000 following officers accompany the draught; :-3 9 t 11 ;;Or Dalrymple, Lieutenants Gatty and Tryon. tains Brabazon and Lindesay, Esigns Parker ano er io son. The remainder of the officers are gone ° l e r t,, il The Duke of Bedford transport arrived yesterday ip the conveyance of a further reinforcement to the troop s y 1 Crimea. She takes out draughts of the 21 st now in barracks, amounting to 13 officers, 10 serg:7o o , drummers, amounting to 13 officers, 10 sergeants , ,i' mere, and 322 A 322 rank and file. These will, it is exPe,y;ijcil on board this evening. The following officers cur ar e' the Crimea, per the Bride of the Bea :-30th Foot Major Campbell, Captain Brooke, Lieutenante9ll,ool'ii. and Tolcher, Ensigns Deane and Campbell. 4 0 t?- 1 , 0 0 9 '; Captain Astley, Lieutenants Rogers, Madan, alla,": 0 - 007 Ensign Burrowes. 50th Foot-,Lieutenants Creagh, Hickman, and Leach. 68th—Li e utenallt 9 , Light, Nicholetta, Clarkson, Thornt on , a nd Stirs/ 41 %4( u following embark per th e t rans p or t D u k e of Bed f t ° o o o ; 57th Regiment—Captains St ewar t an d Ll o yd, Liet l ito olv Schomberg, Sir R. Douglas, Sh ure , an d Clarke, -" Chantar and Baynton. snd l ' It is rumoured that the 3d Dragoon Guards Hussars are to proceed to India. BANK OF FRANCE. The following was the situation of the JO Thursday, July 12 : Cie. fr. 0 I I Cash and ingots Cash at the branch banks Bills due yesterday to be paid to-day l9B'6l°l II Bills becoming due in Paris, of which Ai l 79,382,003 f. 50c. are from the branch 5 9" banks 190, 7 8 4 ' 660 , Bills in the branch banks Advances on coin and ingots 6 50 6 i Do. in the branch banks Do. on public securities of France 36,8 4 "40 ~ Do. in the branch banks Do. on railway shares and bonds 7 0 , 3,,' I '9o o Do. in the branch banks I °O6: / 0 / 1 Do. to the State by treaty of • June 30, 1848 60, 00 0 n, Advances on Treasury bills Rentes of the reserve fund 12, 9811 , 0e 41 i Rentes of disposable funds 52, 29 4'i100 'y Hotel and furniture of the Bank a 0 / Real property of branch banks.... 4,86 - 1 460 4 1 Expenses of administration l l3, w 272 1 ' Sundries 0 0 7' 1,014, 10 ' / 50 ° 6 O 0 Capital 9l, i / 2 „ , ' Reserve fund 12 ,9 8'0 00 / Reserve iminobiliere Notes to bearer, in circulation Do. of branch ' banks 116,814,540) Do. to order (Post bills). 6,1 79, 1'0 5 1 9 Bills payable at sight 8 6 5 -'Ol 41 1 a Account-current of Treasury Creditor 543, 6 °Vg6 4 / Various accounts-current 121 ,7 °,,"08° 0 Do. branch banks or, 0 0 $ 30, 1 6 Dividends to be paid 3,55 1V 0 Discount, interest, and expenses Charge for safe keeping of securiti es .. '2 14 0 Re-discounts of the last half-ye ar * 1 , 013 '44 8 0 ef 1 Overdue bills - '0 5 i sundries . 102 8 2>, nBO Mt. Ob 1,014, 1 "010` . .A1 It appears from these returns that the roetalli°,ofitihro has declined at Paris 53 millions, and in the P," - off;fi, 30 millions. The account current of the Tre ° ter: increased 3i millions. The whole of the toetalv:illior amounts at present to 314 1 millions to 6631 333- 2 notes in circulation. 04 1 A return issued yesterday shows that the J e a 14/ corps of Great Britain consists of 958 omcers 14/3 non-commissioned officers. 0 16 , ADULTERATION OF FOOD, &c.—Yester.a , mittee appointed by the House of Coinn3ono v" sore into the adulteration of food, drinks, and aline bled in No. 13, Committee-room ; Mr. Sch° l l,,lcbo, ll6 o chair, the other members being Lord G°u —l Arlioill Peacocke, Mr. Otway, Moffatt, H on . r4 e rs 00 1 Mr. Wise, Lord C. Hamilton, Mr. Swift, 11 , 1 ;1 5 !„; c° 0 0 1/ ,' Mr. Knlght, Mr. Kinnaird, Mr. Gregsoup ow' to tfr Ebrington. Dr. Hassell was th e first witness, % and deposed that he h a d paid grea t attent l° troriei adulteration of f oo d, d r i n k s , and drugs in the 1%01(00 and he had found in the course of his ana lyticoP' ; ', 01 11/ 0 4 that adulterati ons were excee di ng ly prevalent "bplit all articles, for the purpose of increasing tb eir o cr%l weight, and a ddi ng to their pungency and ~ a remedial m easure h e wo uld suggest theselbf sip% of a ce n t ra l b oar d to super i n t en d the purY, ° oo ol .lolf disposed of publicly, furnished with a staff 0 ' a blnielf inspectors, the board to have the powe r of roodlittO the names of parties who adulterated their: ono aid of inflicting fines and punishments. theu adjourned until the beginuiDg of PO Authors Canoels tst oVrfyP ©fewel:l:.umecl, IVFLO( for the p„ Pi/P AISES: W ith ft COTT, Theesher or b I t intel The retnis4 Partici solicitors, 1,1.1 solicitors, 9, B l ers, 46 Chan tor s , • •.• et the A " ennou Sale, ' Letk Dated 12 ENGIN t :94:40e0 11 1:81e ip tag:: :306:0:100u 0 0 266 1000 426 1;1 2OO EXGII et4 NTS tithe agars ,Atil time, : 14 7 le :I t. TP coneltulo Ida of a 'ant 17 1 Pit oft, s.:l I be %lie N ; mir : ; 6 b e TONI l'ltitwtseds b , O . • t t n °ll "ftd b v --.......L ..... .uta , Mu t , 13,, lu Del lemon` We pi ' b ner , 41 1:47 414 Woo/ gar ; ..C1 )1 11111 b ePe tisk p T n • It( h>l.4end 4 one mr rg ift -4 conclim I°, 1 o '? ili he p, ' IIB I3ANDS ?Mowed 1 k.Y O be folk .411. 10- co . ncluc algendou ) 1 1 1 It (ire 4 CE t. Tc pl al lic ban - .Pher ntu 4010 conclu ° l 2l lt. • Vt - " 4-41 ribm Act Ri 1'0.x440.1" 78 -) 6 4-1 74..... i Itn" l e Chu ' 414d er C. 4 1;‘0 11 , of h,