The Sun. — London, England, 1855-01-30 00:00:00

eemewhere ; and these faults should hereafter be inquire t d in o t u o l but the inquiry should not be made at a time when w have the effect of paralysing the exertions nowhibcheinogamghatd teo, nor while it would interfere with the efforts w be made without the delay of even 24 hoursr army - e be avoided, to improve the ofconditionnnAtthyanloredasn, I think that there is uo man who will hunoootaretaoirguarhawnigteh imnethine thinking that the necessity for some administration of the army i o ratltheaamPdoswt itphroeasstindgeladeys7tihpe tion, and, if not effected instantly consequences may be such h. itynsrshuydder to contemplate. My ow induces me to ask your lords, it it is this feeling ships, as the first stepwtoltWards effecting the improvements t o express y o ur opinion of the necessity w hi c h are necessary , o f a change being made in the constitution of the military de partment (Cheers. )The noble earl concluded by moving — That it is the opinion of this house that great evils have arisen from the present division of authority and responsi bility in the a dministration of the army, and that the whole of the business connected with this important branch of the public service, which is now distributed among different o ffices, ought, therefore, to be brought under the direct con trol of a single and well-organised department." ThODuke of NEWCASTLE—My lords, as Ido not intend to oppose the motion of my noble friend—and there is a great deal in what he has said in which I entirely concur—it is not necessary for me to trespass upon your attention at any length, for I feel bound to reserve myself on two points, be lieving that this is not the proper occasion to touch upon either of them. My noble and learned friend (Lord Lynd hurst) has given notice of his intention to call your lordships' attention to the conduct orthe war, and to move a resolution condemnatory of the Government upon it, and it will be de eirable that I should reserve for that occasion my vindication of their course. There is another point, my lords, which I postpone with great regret—it is that which relates to my own personal position and conduct. Under any other cir cumstances I should gladly have postponed anything relating to myself, but the circumstances which have occurred so re cently as Friday last, in another place, would render me most anxious to address your lordships on the topics connected with ray own position and conduct, were I not prevented by two considerations—one of which at this moment I do not think it necessary to explain, and the other is this, that on a motion of such importa nce as the present, of such para mount importance to the welfare of the army and the country, I should be most reluctant to mix up any matters relating to myself. But if on this occasion I avoid touch ing on these topics, I trust I may be permitted to say that at your lordships' very next meeting I shall venture h to a dd re ss to you some observations u p on them. T no e duke then proceeded to advert to the speech of the noble earl (Grey), who, he said, had m isunderstood what he had stated last year on this subject. He had never maintained that existing arrangements were entirely satisfactory, but he had expressed an opinion that the noble earl carried his views to an extreme length, and that it would be perilous at any period to effect sudden and sweeping changes in the administration of the army, more especially at a period like the preeent, The noble earl had failed to prove the connec tion between disasters in the Crimea and the depart mental system of our military administration ; and the instances he had mentioned were not to be ascribed to that system, and might have equally occurred under any other. For example. In the matter of Mr. Nasmyth's proposi tion as to the guns, the delay had arisen through a misunder standing between the Admiralty and the Ordnance ; and as to Price's candles, they had been submitted to a medical board, whose report bad been delayed through the illness of its head. Then, as to the loss of the Prince, the mo ment he had heard of it by telegraph, he had or dered the supplies contained in it to be replaced. He wanted to prove, not that neglect and dela y had not taken place, but that, under the existing system, it was possible to make the service work, and he hoped occasion ally to make it work well. He admitted, with his noble friend, that great alterations were necessary. He had found by experience—he thought he was not even in antici pation taking a different tone from that he held last year that in the Ordnance Department great alterations were required, for the system certainly did not work well. What alterations should be introduced his noble friend avoided referring to, and he (the Duke df Newcastle) would follow his example. He believed in that and other depart-. ments great alterations might be effected. Again, in the medical department a very faulty system prevailed. He be lieved attempts might be made in times of peace, but it was impossible in time of war to maintain a medical system exclu sively for the army. He thought it had broken down. He was ready to do all justice to the eminent men serving in that capacity in the army ; but he believed, in the present state of the army, and in the present state of the hospitals, it was absolutely necessary, in spite of all opposition, and in spite of all personal feeling, to try and introduce the civil system into the army. He believed the organisation of the medical board was also defective, and there he agreed with his noble friend that alterations should be introduced. But when his noble friend spoke of a system of consolidation being abso lately necessary, he did not think he had quite explained what he meant by consolidation. If he meant that the duties performed now by the Ordnance Board, commissariat, com mander-in-chief, and all the other departments which were at present separate, should bo included under one roof and superintended by one head, he believed it would bo absolutely impossible to carry that into effect. He had already found that, under the existing system, during the short time that the Secretary of State for War had been separated from the control of the colonies, that he had been overburdened and crushed by details to au extent that had left him too little time to devote to greater and more important matters. If his noble friend pursued consolidation in that sense to a greater ex tent, he was confident that, instead of greater efficiency, lie would render the office still more inefficient ; but if he merely wished to produce greater unanimity of action and better supervision and control over the different branches of the ser vice, then he agreed with his noble friend, and he believed it might be extended further, although he hoped the first step had been already taken. He begged to assure him, that so far from its being possible in time of war to carry consoli dation further, it was found that it had been carried too far already, and in two important branches he had found it neces sary to effect a separation. His noble friend had pointed to the advantages gained by the consolidation of the Admiralty. He agreed with him, so far as regarded a time of peace. He believed that the measure of his right hon. friend at the head of the Admiralty had rightly consolidated the navy transport with the Board of Admiralty in 1832, and up to the breaking out of the war that consolidation had worked harmoniously and well. But if he were to point out that which had more eminently failed and broken down as a system, notwithstand ing the eminent abilities of Captain Mills, he should point to the transport system as having failed more than any other during the time they had been at war. And, although his right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, who had introduced the system, and who was naturally proud of what he had done, admitted that it worked successfully in time of peace, so satisfied was he that the system wasinefficient during the time of war, that he had le imself proposed to the Government that it should be departed from so longsts the war lasted, and that the transport board should be again established. There was another point upon which he had himself found, that, so far from consolidation, separation was absolutely necesary, particularly while an army was in the field. He found that the commissariat hadbcen overworked, that step by step more had been placed on it than it was able to bear. The result had been that the army was deficient in the means of transport ; and he believed if they continued their present system, and left to the commissariat the means of transport for the army, they would never have it effective. So satisfied was he of this that ho had transferred from the commissariat the land transport of provisions, and had appointed an eminent mili tary man to superintend it ; and although there was not yet time to ascertain the result, he felt very confident that it would be the means of placing the army in the field on a better and more satisfactory footing when the new system came into operation. He was aware that the mere they multi plied the heads of departments at home, or in the field, the more they would increase jealousies and misunderstanding; but he hoped to and mutual co-operation and assistance. This land transport system, which he preferred to call it, rather than the " waggon transport," had beet left in the nands of the commissariat, from the advantages that depart ment was supposed to have, inasmuch as feeding the army, that first and most vital point, its supply could not be effected unless it had the means of transport at its com mand. He believed that was an entire fallacy, and that it was far better the transport corps should be separated from the commissariat, of course subject to the control of the Commander-in-Chief ; and the commissariat would then re main with enough to do in providing food, fuel, and forage for the army. Having explained the views he took of con solidation, he came now to the observations that had been made with reference to the state of the officers and men, as regarded a want of instruction, from which serious evils had arisen. Ile attributed a great deal of what the army was at present suffering to a want of that education which ever since the last war they had not the opportunity of obtaining. lie did not speak of the instruction of the officers, but of the men, and co-operating as they now had been for some months with the French army, these errors and defects were still more perceptible, because while the French sol diers —more particularly those who had had the advantage of an African campaign—were willing and able to help them selves in any place, and under any circumstances, their soldiers were unable to do so ; not because they were less intelligent or active, but because they lacked those means of instruction which their Allies had possessed for many years past. He hoped the want of instruction in the use of arms had been to a great extent rectified, if not removed; but as to the more important matters connected with the camp, whatever information they possessed had been picked np by bitter experience during the present campaign. When his noble friend referred to the want of instruction in arms he might have added also, that at the breaking out of the war they laboured under the serious deficiency of a want He f of these arms themselves.erred, not merely to im proved arms, but to all descriptions, and he rejoiced to say that these were being now rapidly replenished,He might point out that that was one of the errors committed during the long Peace. He did not mean that they should have a great collec tion of arms which might be superseded by improvements, but he contended that the armeries of the kingdom should never lukrebeen allowed to be reduced to the condition theywere • at the breaking out of the war. He was speaking, in Mi titoo, but of carbines and swords also ; and he wontelltob sseh"eues', lumber, that they had no efficient means of providing that they le rockets, or armaments. So deficient were they, indebted to private individuals, ou the spur of the moment, to when he looked ime lV a these wants. He frankly confessed that :their condition, he locked back with horror at the alese nee blamed nobody i n Perti t e t r provision eithat description. He must take its share ; but h e t;, every succeeding Government rusted, if it pleased Heaven that they should arrive shortly at a they would take would lee to place faffi teieh'e th r e ars t on en e a o l f s t , h n e o fi t ri o t nl s y tep at s h o me, but abroad, in a state a effici ency takecT—net overcrowding th e m with arms, but enablin g them the disadvantage they laboured under on t:be field withoute present oeca- siou. When his no ble friend s aid that during the last 30 or 40 years gr eat dela y s had taken place s cientific improv ements, then he entirel y a greed with him, but he hoped he had be e n instrumental in corr ecting thet , evil. He ha d turned hie attention to the organisation of the scientific committee, whose investigation had been on the whole unsatisfactory, notwithstanding the zeal an d good intentions of the officers composing it. He had entirely re-organised it, and he trusted it would be found more efficient at the present moment, when so many persons were turning their att e ntion to scientific discoveries. His noble friend had said that he found it slow and dreary work to introduce im provements when he was Secretary at War ; he did not hesi tat° t° say that his experience co rroborated that of his noble friend. If in times of greater leasure it had been slow, it was not surprising that during the last nine o r ten months the machinery which eve Government for the last 25 y ears had found fault with had not worked satisfactorily. His noble friend had said that w N a ,v s elai Secretaries of State. mistake to have appointed.. four with regard to . the appointment of boards there were some advantages te be derived from them, and that was to a great extent the way in which he had been endeavouring to conduct hi s department. He had been prac tically meeting the Commander_iiTa War, and the head of the Board of Ordnance.Commander-in-Chief, the Secretes) , at ina They had ar ranged their minutes, letters, and r confessed he uctions, forming a loard, as it were, practically ; but hefrankly was not so much enamoured of the working board as his extent :nt with iudi noblatrtend. It did away to considerable responsibility among depended on the L arin tdus a reeno tim _ns o ibility. It divided the ~, l lu r i o ol, e r its satisfactory working itael+corrtuturinae individuals composingit. If the head or chief UM and self-will, they might work harmo- nionsly, but if not, each would pursue his own opinions, and I try to carry out his own views. A board would only work 1 well, where there was a prominent supremacy in the head. With regard to another point, following the example of the French, who, in 1820, believed that the English military system was superior, not having then had the immense advantage of twenty-five years campaigning for one-fourth of their army in Africa, he (the Duke of Newcastle) had appointed a commission of three officers to investigate in Paris the whole Fr ric h military system, with the view to their making a reOrt and suggesting such improvements as might satisfactorily be introduced into their system ; and concurrently with that, Lord Raglan had appointed a commission of officers in the Crimea, with the view of ascertaining the practical working of the same system, and acting, of course, under instructidns sent out by himself. From these investigations he hoped tp derive great advan tages. They would obtain the theory of the French system in Paris, while, from the officers in the Crimea, they would have the practice as exemplified in the field. There was an other department in which the French were extremely effi cient, and which was represented by " L'Ecolo de la guerre." They had been obliged to go over the town in order to secure maps of an authentic character upon the breaking out of the war. The defect was an obvious one in the British army, and he had taken the first steps to establish such an institution in London. He had had communications with foreign Govern ments and with Lord Dalhousie in India, in order to obtain a collection of maps with this important object. His noble friend had omitted any reference to the financial system of the army, but it appeared to him that it might be advisable to transfer the auditing of these accounts to the Audit Office. It was not his intention to oppose the motion of his noble friend. If it was thought desirable to place this abstract re solution on the books of the house, he, on the part of the Government, was not disposed to dissent from it. At the same time, he frankly admitted that there were inconveni ences in placing an abstract resolution on the books, and he would submit to his noble friend whether he would think it worth while, after the declarations ho had made, to press it, especially as the notice had been altered from that which was originally given. He agreed with his noble friend that mate rial alterations were essentially necessary, and, whatever Go vernment was to carry them out, he hoped they would be able to do so as circumstances permitted them, and without doing mischief instead of good. Under these circumstances he hoped that the noble earl would not press his motion. - - Lord HARDINGE said, that being supposed to be divested of all political feeling by reason of the office which he had the honour to hold, he should not offer any opposition to tho mo tion of the noble lord. However, ho should beg to set the noble earl right in reference to the statement attributed to him (Lord Hardinge), to the effect that, a few years since, certain battalions of the Guards knew nothing of ball prac tice, in consequence of never having been supplied with ball cartridge. He believed he might state that within the last two years, not only had the Miuie rifle been in troduced, but the practice with that arm had been car ried on with very great effect. Indeed, ho might say that no recruit had gone out to the Crimea since last spring who was not well practised with that arm—(hear, hear.) Since he (Lord Hardinge) had the honour to occupy the position of Commander-in-Chief, a school of musketry had been established, and he believed the result was superior to anything that previously existed. At the battle of Inkerman the rifle was of immense service ; not only was it effective in thinning the Russian battalions, but it also kept down the fire of their batteries at very long range, (Hear, hear.) With regard to the observations of the noble earl as to the superiority of the French civil depart ment of the army over ours, the cause was altogether owing to their being engaged for the last quarter of a century in Algeria, where from 80,000 to 100,000 of the French army were constantly acquiring a knowledge of the art and business of war. Such had not been the case with our troops. (Hear, hear.) But he could not agree with the noble earl as to the inferiority of our military education, inasmuch as the warmest testimony had been borne to the system at Sand hurst by Sir Charles Napier aid other distinguished officers. He should say of the army in general, that no continental na tion had so excellent or perfect a state of military affairs as that produced by our regimental system in point of drill and discipline, to say nothing of the spirit and[affection it infused into the men for each other. That was well known of the infantry ; and Balaklava gave proof of it in the case of the cavalry. (Hear, hear) Our artillery officers were promoted at too advanced a period of life—that he should admit ; but otherwise no artillery in Europe excelled ours. The corn missariat might be more perfect, but the consolidation advo cated by the noble earl would not, in his (Lord Hardingo's) opinion, remedy the evils complained of, and which they all ' sincerely deplored. Lord CAMPBELL said he rose to give his humble but sin cere advice to his noble friend (Earl Grey) not to withdraw the motion. He believed it expressed the unanimous opinion of their lordships. Why then should it not be recorded on the proceedings of the house ? The system, not individuals, was most to blame The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH concurred with the noble duke opposite (the Duke of Newcastle) in thinking that this motion should not be pressed, because, whilst the Govern ment was in its present position, it would not be altogether fair. None of their lordships could tell who might be Mini ster of War to-morrow—perhaps it might be the noble earl (Earl Grey) himself. (Hear, hear, and a laugh.) The Go vernment was at present in the position of a prisoner at the bar whilst the jury was out considering its verdict—(a laugh) —and, perhaps, to-morrow's sun would shine on them no longer as a body of gentlemen forming the Government of the country, but as pronounced " guilty," and, consequently, holding a different position in the Legislature from that which they now occupied. (Hear, hear.) It was contrary to his opinion of public policy that this motion should be made when there was practically no Government to speak upon it. He (the Earl of Ellenborough) had frankly and frequently expressed his opinion of the conduct of her Majesty's Govern ment since the commencement of this war. He had accused them of want of knowledge, want of promptitude, and want of forethought. At the same time he should admit himself guilty of gross injustice if lie did not admit, on the fullest consideration, that by far the greatest portion of our calami ties originated in /.ho orh-n0,,, end not hare. (cries of ,‘ Ilear, hear.") /rad we a Wellington or a Sir George Murray in command the public u6ver would have heard of the slightest portion of these sufferings. He (the Earl of Ellonborough) deeply deplored the position of the Minister of War, answerable as he was for the commissariat department, under the management of Sir Charles Trevelyan, whose elaborate paper he (the noble earl) had endeavoured to understand. (A laugh.) He (the Earl of Ellenborough) had conducted the war department, the financial department, and the whole diplomatic concerns of a great empire. No person ever disobeyed one of his laws—he never had to send in an estimate, or look at the details of accounts. (A laugh.) In this country we were a small military power ; in India we were a great military power, owing to our system, and wars were carried on well. He placed no faith in this amalgama tion system ; and, therefore—but particularly seeing the position in which Ministers were at present placed—he should regret if the noble earl (Earl Grey) peristed in moving his 1 resolution. After a brief pause, Earl GREY rose to reply, and repeated his censure of the divided responsibility which at present existed, the result of which was that the affairs of the army were improperly managed. The motion was then withdrawn, and their lordships adjourned, HOUSE OF COMMONS-YESTERDAY. The SPEAKER took the chair shortly before 4 o'clock, THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, JANUARY so, 1855. PRIVATE BILLS, On the motion of Mr. BROTEIERTOAT, leave was given to bring in a number of private bills. The bills were subsequently brought in and read a first time. STANDING ORDERS. On the motion of Mr. GREEN, the following members were nominated to serve on the select committee on standing orders, viz., Mr. Wilson Patten, Mr. Henley, Mr. Sotheron, Mr. Thos. Greene, Sir J. Y. Buller, Sir H. Ferguson, Mr. E. Denison, Capt. Jones, Mr. Wright son, Mr. Bramston, and Mr. Thornely. COMMITTEE OF SELECTION. On the motion of Mr. GREEN, the following members were nominated as the committee of selection :—Mr. Sotheron, Sir John Y. Buller, Sir Robt. Ferguson, Mr. Bonham-Carter, and the Chairman of the Select Com mittee on Standing Orders. PETITIONS. A large number of petitions were pr;sented praying for a reduction of the duty on stage carriages. Mr. BRIGHT presented nine petitions from different parts of the country praying the house to repeal the newspaper stamp. _ _ WATSON presented a similar petition from the printers of Hull. Sir J. SHELLEY presented a petition from the churchwardens of St. James's, Westminster, expressing sympathy for the sufferings of our brave army in the Crimea, and ascribing them to the mismanagement of the authorities under her Majesty's Government, and praying the house to withhold its support from the pre sent Government, in order that a change may be made in its constitution, with a view to secure a more vigo rous administration of affairs in the Crimea. RECEPTION OF THE WOUNDED IN ENGLAND. Mr. M. MILNES :aid, in the absence of the right hon. baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, to whom he had given notice of the question, he begged to ask the naval lord present whether any correspondence had taken place hetween the Admiralty and the authe lities of Portsmouth respecting the alleged ne glect of suck authorities in making the necessary ar rangement for conveying and succouring soldiers and seamen who had arrived Irons the seat of war in the Himalaya ; and if so, whether there would be any ob jection to produce the correspondence ? Admiral BERKELEY said he could assure the hon. gentleman that it was sot from any neglect that the right hon. baronet (Sir J. Graham) was not there to an swer the question, as he was sorry to say the right hon ourable baronet was so extremely unwell as to be confined to his bed. With regard to the question of the honourable gentleman, he could only say that the man Williams did not belong either to the army y or to the navy, nor w as h e returned either by the captain cr surgeon of th e ship as being on board. He was conveyed in the first place to the Sailors' Home, where h e oug h t to have been re ceiveel, the authorities havin g so k nowledge of such a person being on board, he having been sent home as a distressed Britisk subject. No public correepon , deuce bad taken place on the subject, but his right honourable friend the First Lord of the Admiralty i had wr i tten to the Superintendent of the Dockyard requesting him to make the most searching inquiries into the case. It was an act of justice to say th a t the surgeon o f the ship had written a strong letter, de nying that the man was neglected while oa board. Mr. M. MILNES said the answer was was confined to ' the case of the man Williams i generally to the sick and wounded When they arrived soldiers applied they Were improperly rs and sailors. huddled together, and received no consideration kept what ever at the bands of the Custom-house authorittoiens Mr. S. HERBERT said, (Frectly he saw this ma . tter in 1 the newspapers, he lost no time in writing eoLordHardinge begging that he would institute an inquiry into it, but be found that his lordship had already done so. He also wrote to theTreasuryasking whether there was any truth in the statement as far as it related to the conduct of the Custom-house officers, and lie was told that no such de tention had taken place. He believed the distressing occurrence arose out of an error. An officer was de spatched to meet the Himalaya with the view of making the necessary arrangements for disembarking the men, but before he gat back the vessel bad arrived in port. THE PATRIOTIC FUND. Colonel NORTH wished to ask whether the widows and orphans of those men who, serving under the Fo reign Enlistment Bill, may fall during the present war are to participate in the advantages of the Patriotic Fund ; also, if the widows and orphans of the officers of our army, navy, and marines, who may fall in this war, are to participate in the advantages of that fund ? Mr. S. HERBERT apprehended that the subscribers to the Patriotic Fund intended that it should be directed to the relief of the English army exclusively, and it would not be possible without their consent to apply any por tion of it to a purpose for which it was not originally in tended. Mr. S. A.DAIR said, with regard to the second question, the point was now under the consideration of the finance committee, but temporary assistance had already been afforded to such cases which were looked upon as of an exceptional character. Colonel DUNNE wished to know if the parties ac cepting such assistance would prejudice their right to a pension Mr. S. HERBERT should imagine not. THE CAVALRY CHARGE AT BALAKLAVA. Mr. H. BERKELEY wished to ask the Secretary at War, firstly, whether any correspondence and what has taken place between Field-Marshal Lord Raglan and her Majesty's Government on the subject of the melancholy disaster which occurred at thebattle of Balaklava, where the lives of so many of our gallant men of the Light Ca valry were lost, and whether there be any objection to lay such papers on the table ; secondly, whether due in quiry has bean made or be contemplated on the subject ? Mr. S. HERBERT said—Sir,—ln answer to the question of my honourable friend, I have to state, first of all, that in speaking of the charge of the Light Bri gade at Balaklava, I should find another term for it rather than a melancholy disaster. (Hear.) With regard to the question itself, I may state that Lord Raglan has made a communication to the Government on the sub ject ; but I am not now in a position to lay hie despatch upon the table. I hope, therefore, the hon. gentleman will not press h for t i t e , b attentionut I can f the assure G oTheirmn Government. .subject hanot escaped Mr. H. BERKELEY gave notice that on an early day he should move an address to her Majesty, praying that an inquiry may be instituted into the conduct of Liees.-camerat Loyd Lscan, fur ordering use cnarge of light cavalry at the battle of Balaklava, under circum stances which precluded the possibility of success, but would inevitably lead to great loss of life. Mr. C. BERKELEY asked the Secretary at War if he had any objection to answer these two questions, viz. :—First, Whether the order which had been pub lished in all the newspapers as emanating from Lord Raglan to Lord Lucan for the light brigade of cavalry to make the disastrous charge at Balaklava, is the cor rect order or not ! It runs thus—" Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front ; follow the enemy, and try to prevent their carrying away the guns. A troop of Horse Artillery may accompany. The French cavalry is on the left. Immediate." The second question is, why the remnant of these brave men are not to have a clasp to their medal with the word "Baia klava" upon it, in addition to " Alma" and "Inkerman?" Mr. S. HERBERT had no objection whatever to answer them. In the first place, the words which the hon. member bad given were a correct transcript of the order of Lord Raglan. With regard to the second question, his answer was, that clasps had been granted by her Majesty. REPORTERS IN THE CRIMEA. Mr. BERESFORD asked the Secretary-at-War whether, during the present campaign in the East, rations had been supplied by the Commissariat to any of the correspondents of the daily press, and if so, by what authority had the issue taken place, and had it continued up to the latest returns furnished ? Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, in the early. part of the campaign the correspondents of the daily press were allowed rations upon paying for them, but without the authority of the Government ; and the Board of Audit had properly disallowed the expenses in the accounts sent home. The right hon. gentleman read a letter from Sir C. Travelyan to General Filder, directing the latter to afford accommodation to the representatives of the press, if it could be consistently done ; and accordingly they bad been allowed rations, where they could purchase provisions upon paying for them. Col. KNOX asked whether it was true that the cor respondent of the Times was given a free passage from Varna to the Crimea for himself, his servant, and three horses, when the officers in the service were only allowed one horse ? Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT—I am not aware of any thing of the kind. (Hear, hear.) ADJOURNED DEBATE ON MR. ROEBUCK'S MOTION. Mr. STAFFORD resumed the debate. He observed that the only claim he had upon the attention of the house at that stage of the proceedings was his having witnessed the state of affairs in the Crimea ; which he little anticipated he should have found it necessary to lay before the house, inasmuch as ao one could have foreseen the events which had taken place daring the past week. In this house they had not to discuss the responsibility of individual Ministers, but of the Admi nistration as a body. It was, therefore, with some sur prig* thet, ho heard the right bon. gentleman the Secre tary at War state on Friday night that a commission had been authorised to inquire into the causes of the state of affairs now existing in the East ; but he felt bound to say that, in his opinion, although this might be done, it would not in any way absolve the Government fromresponsibility. Having referred to his experience of matters connected with the war during a recent visit to the Crimea he explained that that visit had been dic tated by no party motive, but that it was entirely of a disinterested character, and he should be most happy to avail himself of any opportunity which the Secretary at War might afferd him of giving the right hon. gentleman the benefit of his observations. The hon. gentleman then proceeded to express his gratification to hear that the Government had taken measures to establish an hos pital for the sick and wounded at Smyrna, and then passed on to notice the Scutari hospital. He admitted that of late its arrangements had been much improved, and were still being improved ; but there were radical evils connected with it which would probably never be remedied, amongst which was the exceeding impurity of the atmosphere in the neighbourhood. In the interior of the hospital, when he visited it, he found the evaporation of noxious gases from the wards, arising from want of attendance, was most prejudicial, and the health of the patients and other inhabitants of the parts im medi?,tely adjacent affected. The hon. gentleman then went on to allude to the position of affairs at an hospital associated in recent history with two remarkable cir cumstances—one a glorious victory, and the other the most abject state of misery and death attending our brave defenders which perhaps was unparalleled in the annals of the world—he meant Balaklava. (Hear, hear.) Whilst at that place he bad gone into the hospital, and, as the house was aware, the two greatest evils existing there was a want of ventilation and cleanliness. He alluded in particular to the case of one invalid soldier, who was almost dying from starvation, and who could keep nothing on his stomach but sago, which, however, he was allowed only once a day, in consequence of the want of dietary arrangements. He (the hon. gentleman) asked to be allowed to take care of this poor fellow, but he was told that it could not be permitted, as he hail not been in the hospital long enough. The bon. gentleman next spoke of the embarkation of the wounded at Balaklava, en board the transport vessels, stating, amongst ether things, the deplorable condition in which the poor fellows were sometimes left on shore prepara tory to being conveyed on board, and the inattention to their comfort, indeed to their common wants, afterwards. In the cases of some who were suffering from diarrhoea, he mentioned the tenacity with which they clung to their miserable blankets and wet and worn over-coats, for warmth, though these coverings were completely over-run with vermin, and sometimes so badly as to be obliged to be thrown overboard ; and afterwards mentioned how he had himself been instrumental in the issue of a number of blankets to the un fortunate sufferers on board the Candia. The hon. gen tleman, however, then observed that after presenting this gloomy picture to the house he should not be doing jus tice to the Government if he did not congratulate the Secretary at War upon having sent out so large a num ber of nurses to the East. (Hear, hear.) It was im possible to over-estimate the blessings and the benefits which they had been instrumental in con ferring upon the unfortunate sick and wounded, and to appreciate the goodness of heart and head by which their attentions and services were dictated. He also mentioned with some pleasure that throughout his progress through the hospitals he had never heard one single word spoken by a single invalid against a single officer in command ; and amongst those who were moat highly spoken of there was no one alluded to in more enthusiastic terms than his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge (hear, hear) whose kindness and warmth of heart, as well as bravery, under all cir cumstances, whether in action or, not, had won for him the admiration of all. The letter of her most gra cious Majesty the Queen created the most enthusiastic and patriotic excitemest amongst the poor sick and wounded bittercases were not It u n f f t r b e e qu m e e n d t ic i i n ne w t h h i e c y h w th e e r y e sweetenedufferers— sufferers--and obliged to swallow, by accompanying them with "The health of the Queen." Another brave fellow in one of the hospitals, on his death-bed, said these terrible words, " Had I been better treated I might have gone back to my duty in the field, and then I would be ready to meet a soldier's death. But England does not care for her soldiers." He then turned aside his head and died. Since he had come back he bad found, in fact, that Eng land cared for little else. (Hear.) This would go to the poor soldiers in the Least through the agency of that press which he was sorry to have seen denounced by the Government. (The hon. member resumed his seat amidst loud cheers.) Mr. B. OSBORNE remarked with pleasure that among the many criticisms pronounced upon the conduct of the war, no direct censure had been hazarded against the de partment to which ho was himself attached—namely, the Admiralty. Adverting to the motion before the house, he commented upon the injustice of sacrificing a minister for the faults of a system. The military organisation of the country was altogether rotten. It could not be reformed by a mere consolidation of departments, but must bo changed and purified from one end to the other, from the Horse Guards to the soldiers' barrack-rooms. Entering into details on this point, the hon. member condemned the system of promotion by purchase, the favouritism which presided over staff appointments, and the general spirit of routine and aristocratic exclusiveness that could be traced throughout every department of annyv.d.ministra tion as regarded the upper ranks of the public service. In reference to the secession of Lord Johnitueeell, he admitod that the proceeding had destroyed the ministry, but pro fessed much respect for Lord Aberdeen ; and declared that for his own part, he could not consent to take refuge in the captain's gig, leaving his companions to weather the storm by themseves. Mr. HENLEY contended that the Admiralty was answerable for the failures in the transport service. If there were faults in the system of officering our army, surely that was known before war was declared. From the despatches of Lord Raglan it might be inferred that the Admiralty arrangements had been deficient from the commencement. All that he had heard induced him to think that the present motion was likely to be productive of much benefit, and he would therefore support it. Be fore resuming his seat he would say that the Duke of Newcastle was the most ill-used man in the kingdom. His colleagues had placed him in a position for which he was unfitted, and when he got into a fix he was abandoned. Admiral BERKELEY challenged investigation into the conduct of the Admiralty during the course of the war, declaring that every service which had devolved upon that department was performed with efficiency and despatch. Mr. BERESFORD highly eulogised the conduct of Lord Raglan, who had been grossly misrepresented by those who said he was not to be seen amongst his troops, and was careless of their comforts. If everything was fairly be fore the public Lord Raglan would stand out at the bravo soldier and kind-hearted man his friends knew him to be, and it would then be seen that he had been from the commencement opposed to the ex pedition' to the Crimea. The Secretary at War tried to throw tho blame from the Minister at War, by seeking to fix it on the officers of brigade, but this was a failure, for no complaint whatever had been made against any brigadier. lie great fault was the absence of all means of transport from Balaklava to Sebastopol, a nee . - gence quite unpardonable, after all the despatches of the Duke of Wellington, in which he had so repeatedly urged the immense importance at all times to an army of the means of transport. Mr. RICE had heard with painful interest the speech of Mr. Stafford, but he thought the motion of the hon. mem ber for Sheffield unlikely to produce benefit, and he would, therefore, vote against it. Mr. W. MILES, in supporting the motion, contended that the War-office had totally neglected the commissariat department. Sir F. BARING opposed the motion as not being calcu lated to produce the immediate redress which the evil de manded. They should not paralyse by such a motion the action of the War Department, nor sacrifice the army that the Government might be destroyed. In reference to the refusal of the Earl of Aberdeen to make the change in the War Department required by Lord John Russell, he de clared his opinion to be that the reasons assigned by the eon,. eeee rea want reimml wee., insufficient. lie thought Lord John Russell had acted creditably, and in voting against the motion he wished it to be understood that he was not, therefore, voting confidence in the Government, either as regards the past or the future. Mr. BENTINCK, although opposed to such a motion in the abstract, could not do otherwise than support it after the disclosures which had been made. Inconveniences might arise in consequence of the motion being carried, but be felt that everything must give way to the necessity of getting rid of the peasant incompetent Government. While taking this course he must say that he could not concede to Lord J.. Russell the praise of being actuated solely by patriotism in quitting the Government as he had done. Mr. RICH eulogised the conduct of Lord J. Russell, and declared that the facts which had come to light rendered inquiry, at all hazards and any inconvenience, an absolute duty. Sir E. B. B. LYTTON—Sir, I shall dismiss very briefly that part of this discussion which refers to the abstract propriety of appointing the select committee of inquiry proposed by the hon. member for Sheffield, I shall leave the Government to -direct their answer upon that point not so much to us as to their late colleague—(hear, hear)—who resigned office rather than resist that inquiry, and who, I conclude, would vote for it but for the natural delicacy of his position towards the Cabinet he so lately adorned. The right hon. gentlemen the Secretary at War and the Secre tary for the Colonies have dwelt on the danger of estab lishing such a precedent as the appointment of this com mittee might furnish. They may dismiss that apprehen sion, for nothing but the extremity of the case can justify this motion, and I trust, for tke honour of the country and the sake of humanity, that a case so extreme may not occur again. (Hear.) If it does not, the motion will be no precedent ; if it does, e similar motion will be under stood to bear the interpretation that the common sense of the house puts upon this ; for I agree with Ministers that they cannot grant this committee without a virtual trans fer of the power and r esponsibilities of the Queen's Go vernment, and the question therefore simply is—Has the conduct of the Ministers in this war been such that this house should qaietly acquiesce, not only in the continuance of their power, but in the mode by which their responsibilities have been discharged ? I, for one, feel that such an acquiescence would be to make us the servile accomplices in the sacrifice of what re mains of that noble army of whose deeds the country are so proud and of whose sufferings the Government should be so ashamed. (Hear , hear.) The noble lord the member for London has refused to make himself that ac complice, although the pain of deserting his colleagues in the hour of their imminent need must have been almost intolerable to so gallant a spirit, and I give him the more credit for the pain on account of the Spartan fortitude with which he has concealed its pangs. (A laugh.) Shall this house be more complaisant than the noble lord, although it has not the countervailing scruples which must have weighed upon a Cabinet Minister, the late organ and leader of the Government in these walls, now standing alone in his abandonment of office ? If we could not feel for the public calamities, we must. still be reused by our own private anxiety and sorrow. I, myself, have two near re lations in this war many of us have near relations among the sufferers. It is our bosh, as a portion of the gentle men of England, that, wherever danger is to be braved or honour is to be won, there some of our kindred blood is flowing or may flow; and aeter the miseries so simply told by the member for Northamptonshire, shall we be de prived of a remedy for the evils you admit, of an inquiry into the abuses you deplore, because of some paltry tech nical objections to the words of the only motion that pro mises relief—because it is a vote for inquiry, when it ought to be a vote of censure ? Take it, then, as a vote of censure, and let it so stand as a precedent for other times, if other times should be as grievously affected under a similar Administration. (Cheers.) I shall not enter into all the details on which the Secretary at War always tries to rest the case of the Government, partly because I have been here anticipated by those who so ably preceded me, partly because I wish to lay clearly before the house the broad principles of the charge which we make against the Ministers. And first, we accuse you of this—That you entered, not indeed hastily, but with long deliberation, with ample time for forethought, if not for preparation, into the most arduous enterprise this genera tion has witnessed, in the most utter ignorance of the power and resources of the enemy you were to encounter, the nature of the climate yon were to brave, of the country you were to enter, of the supplies which your army sheuld receive. This ignorance is the more inexcusable because you disdain the available sources of information. This is the fundamental cause of our disaster, and not the com paratively petty and collateral causes to which the Secre tary at War would assign them. The ignorance, indeed, on a former occasion, the Government confessed; and when we were convened on the 12th of December, we heard that synod of veteran statesmen—those analecta majors of the wisdom and genius of Parliament—actually make their ignorance the excuse for their incapacity. We might accept that excuse for the sake of its candour ; but the Government have asked more, for, as I will undertake to show, they have asked us to acquit thorn of disasters, when they took no pains to acquire the information that was necessary for success. It has, in deed, been said that the public were no wiser than the Government that the public underrated the power of Russia, and demanded the premature siege of Sebas topol ? If this were true, what then ? Why do we choose Ministers—why do we give them salaries, patronage, honours—if it is not to have some men wiser than the public, at least in all that relates to the offices they hold ? (Hear, hear.) It may be a noble fault in a people to dis regard the strength of an enemy when a cause is just. Who , does not love and admire this English people more when they rose as one man to cry, "No matter what the cost or hazard, let us defend the weak against the strong !" But if to underrate the power of an enemy was almost a merit in the people, it was a grave dereliction of duty in a Minister of War. But I deny that the public, fairly con sidered, were not wiser than the Government, and there is scarcely a point which you have covered with a blunderon which some one or other of the public did not try to pre pare and warn you. I shall first notice a subject hitherto little touched on in this house, but which seems to me in timately connected with the condition of oar troops in the Crimea. (Hear, hear.) The war had begun— onr fleets were en the seas—the noblest fleets that ever left these shores, and it was on those fleets, much more than our land force, that the public relied for any advantage over Russia. Well, the ships were on the sea, and Odessa lay before them, surprised and almost de fenceless—Odessa, the great depot of the Russian enemy, the depot of ammunition, provisions, troops for that Crimea which you had already resolved to invade, and you con tent yourself with the holiday bombardment of a single fort. (Cheers.) Lad we may judge of your private instruc tions to your naval commanders when for the audacity of that notable achievemeut your admiral makes an apology. (Hear, hear.) Is Odessa spared for the sake of humanity? Humanity ! Why, you were told that Odessa was the feeder of Sebastopol. You have found it to be so, The Secretary at War expressed big amazement at the celerity with which Russian troops were moved from Odessa to Sebastopol, and to spare the arsenals, the granary, the market, the nursery ground of an hostile fortress was the grossest inhumanity to the army that now rots before the walla which your own lashes has manned and supplied against it. (Hear, hear.) If you were influenced by care for the British trade connected with Odessa, you knew little indeed of your countrymen if you did not feel that you might have come to Parliament with confidence for the most liberal compensation to all British subjects whom the occupation of Odessa—there was no occasion to destroy it—might have injured. This first proof of feeble incapa city links itself with all that has followed. Yon thus forbear the easiest and the wealthiest conquest of all, in order afterwards, in the very worst time, to attempt an achievement the most difficult in itself, and which that forbearance to Odessa rendered more difficult if when you an f d onn ro d ofi y e o s u s still. Why, sir, the whole fortunes of the campaign would have changed if Odessa had been your depot instead of the Russian —nay , could not invade the Crimea before the end of Septem ber, you had postponed that expedition till the spring, and your troops were now happily wintered in Odessa, instead of mouldering Pieceme al, ra gg ed, before Sebastopol. But if you had some reason we cannot divine for not prosecuting the attack at that time, why did you not later effectively blockade Odessa and the Sea of Azoff—(hear, hear)-30 ships of the line, 40 steamers on the Euxine, and yen do not blockade the !great magazine of the enemy. Well, your troops went to Gallipoli. I must here contradict the statements both of the Minister and of the Secretary at the provisionsthere,the willfailed simplest the Secretary of War has se vainl y boasted. I have hero some short extracts from th e letters of an officer, written s t a te his name to any memb er because I can, if necessary, üblication. I read them to his father, not intended f or p of the Government, without, alas I the fear of injuring him in his profession. He is now no more. His father came to me and said, t h roug h his tears, " I would proudly have given my so n ' s life to the service of hi s country , but be was murdered by ' the neglect of the Government, and without any r ea l a id to his country. (Cheers.) This young man had was full of lif e , h ea lth, and arJour ; athletic in his habits, just bought a st e p in his p rofession ; he no raw recruit but accustomed to military hardship , the last man t o murmur without a cause. Ho belonged to that band of heroes, famous oven in the ranks of English valour, the Welsh Freshen. gin first letter in from Galli- ' poli, April 23. Here let me observe that on the 7th of April the Duke of Newcastle had declared that never was an army so well provided for—in food, in all necessaries, even in articles that might be considered luxuries. On the 23(1 of April an officer at Gallipoli writes thus : " There are 20,000 French troops encamped a short distance from our troops. They are in every respect better equipped and provided for than ours. Their Government have provided their officers with mules for the conveyance of their baggage and everything else they require. We have to buy Mules for ourselves, which cannot be done at Gallipoli, as the French Government have already bought thorn all up." Why was this? The Secretary of War said the Government wore buying up animals in Egypt and Spain ; why did you not buy some mules at Galli poli ? " The French soldiers fraternise freely with ours, and to-clay we saw them giving ours some of their bread, of which they have a most bountiful supply, while ours have not enough." At Gallipoli, in April, at the opening of the campaign, the soldiers of the Queen of England eating the bread of our ally ! Is that a position that is worthy her throne, or our pride of a nation, and how does this agree with the Duke of Newcastle's statement of the 7th of April ? Now let us pass on from Gallipoli ; you proceed to Varna, not to fight, not to assist the Turks at Silistria—you have not, indeed, the necessary transports for that—but because Omar Pacha says that the presence there of your army will have a moral effect upon the Rus sians. Now, sir, I think that this was a request on the part of Turkey which, so far as the selection of a site to encamp, we had a right to refuse. We came to defend them and to fight, but not to remain stationary, and melt away by pestilence in a climate notoriously pestilential in that special time of the year—pestilential, net from an accidental cause, but from one periodical and invariable — end which, if your Minister had asked any traveller, or consulted any authority, he must have known. (Hear.) Well, sir, from the camp there, this officer writes, July 28 : " I hope something will be done soon, as I should look forward with horror to another summer in this country. We have now considerable difficulty in getting supplies, and frequently have to live on bread and cheese for a day or two, as ration meat cannot be eaten, though the officers eat it when the men will not." Now comes the reason why that climate was pestilential, and why you ought to have known it. " July and Au gust," says the officer there encamped, "are unhealthy months, as they are all dry and very hot, and the deposits from the lakes, which overflow in the spring, dry up and create miasma. Nearly all our cases of cholera occur in the night, and are mostly fatal in six hours." (Hear.) ' This young man has the cholera himself—he probably re covers—he rouses when the report comes that something is to he done—something, no doubt, which it was necessary to do ; but was it the impression that that something should be the siege of Sebastopol ? Then hear what he says :—" Of course they keep secret where we are going ; but we believe that it is to take Odessa, which is full of corn granaries, &c. I think this is the best thing we could do, and winter there, both army and navy. It is too late in the year to attack Sebastopol." That could not have been the solitary notion of that young soldier ; it must have been the talk of his comrades—" too late in the year to attack Sebastopol !" But, no ! out of all the twelve months, you had taken the worst to encamp at Varna, and it was consistent to take the worst to besiege Sebastopol, that Gibraltar of the East. You take the worst time, not only for military operations, but for sanitary conditions. Open even so common a work as "11`Culloch's Geographical Dictionary," and you will find it was the unhealthiness of the Crimea which frus trated its colonisation by Germans ; open the " Gazetteer of the World," and you will find that it is in autumn the climate is more especially unhealthy, and subject to the epidemics you have found there. Yet you land without ambulances, without waggons, without hospital provision, without even tents. Here ends this young soldiers corres pondence. Scarcely saved from cholera at Varna, cholera seized him at the first breeze from those new and more fatal shores—seized him while his comrades were landing in the Crimea. Without common comforts, without com mon medical aid, he died—calling out in his delirium to be set on shore, so that he might, at least, perish in the field. I then charge you with this—that twice in one cam paign you expose your army in situations notoriously pes tilential, at the precise seasons which you choose for both encampments. Considering this alone we need not pause to weigh the reasons for disasters alleged by the Secretary-at- War—viz., that our staff-officers had no experience of ac tive command, and that our soldiers selected from the pea santry, had not learned to take care of themselves. The main cause is here—the situations to which you have ex posed your army, and the destitution in which you leave it —and the fault is the worse for the reason you state—viz., that your officers were not accustomed to invent resources, nor your soldiers inured to encounter hardships and disease. The defence of the Secretary of War has been chiefly di rected to show that, wherever omissions were discovered and blunders made, he hastened to repair them. That excuse may avail for his department, but it is the duty of the Government, taken as a whole not only to repair but to foresee—to provide beforehand what may probably be wanted, and not to wait till the consequences of their own neglect start up and defy reparation. You cannot repair the loss of life ; you cannot repair constitutions ruined for ever, because men were exposed to disease and deprived of proper medical attendance—because men were sent te bravo all the rigour of a dismal climate, without clothing to cover and roofs to shelter them. Now, even with re gard to a road from Balaklava, you read every day in the papers that the whole region between Balaklava and Sebas topol was exposed to columns of dust. A moment's re flection would have told yon that dust in the summer be comes mud with the first rain of winter; and when, after the battle of Alma, it became clear that you would have to invest Sebastopol, you should have seen to the construc tion of a road between your camp and your harbour. Here, indeed, at first glance, Lord Raglan may seem chiefly to blame. But he told you in his despatch, after the battle of Alma, that he wished he had more men ; and it might have occurred to you that with young recruits — many of them more boys—weakened by disease, and n,A, enough for the work of the trenches, Lord Raglan might have no force to spare for the supplementary labour of roads, and also that he was deficient in the necessary animals and vehicles, and you ought not to have waited for Mr. Peto's offer—your patriotism should have been no less inventive than his—before you had completed a contract for the construction of a road by a certain date. It has been said, " How are Government to blame for winds and hurricanes, rains and mud ?" Buk you are to blame for taking no pains to learn that youilrmy would be exposed to a climate that is subject to winds and hurricanes, rains and mud. (Cheers ) You are to blame for not resorting to the ordinary inventions of art to counteract the hostile operations of nature. (Hear, hear.) When the clouds gather a prudent man takes out his umbrella ; when the wind sets in the east ho will see that his coat can button ; and a man attacked by cold and disease for neglecting such every-day precautions, might as well exclaim, " How could I foresee that it would rain, or that it would blow ?" as you exclaim, " How coal we foresee that there would be winds, rain, or mud ? " in a climate in which winds, rain, and mud are the ordinary phenomena of winter, (Hear, hear.) Attempts have been made elsewhere to fix blame upon our military commanders. It was wisely as well as generously said on this score by the Secretary at War, "What generous man would indeed attack the ab sent agent not here to answer for himself, wh n there sit before us, face to face, the employers responsible for his errors so long as they continue him in office ?" (Hear, hear.) But here what Lord Grenville said en the question of the Walcheren expedition is so apposite that I will ven ture to quote it : "I am disposed," said Lord Grenville, "to believe that in the situation of the commander he did all that could reasonably be expected, or was possible to accomplish. The error was in the plan, and the want of foresight and infor mation on the part of her Majesty's Ministers. The place, the situation, the season of the year were chosen by them. There is a season of the year when the air of that place is most pestilential and dangerous; yet,-to that place, and at that place, say her Majesty's Ministers, we will send the flower of the British army—we will not send it at a time when its operations may be advantageous, but we will send it when from every information it will be destroyed more by disease than by the sword." Does this apply? (Loud cheers.) But it is said in defence of the War Minister, that the fault is not in himself, but ' the nature of his office. lam too happy to accept any palliation for his errors. But if I accept that excuse for the Minister of War, it becomes another grave charge against the collective Government, for you aassated that office, and why did you leave it so imperfect? (Che ers .) Here you had no want of advice and information. You had the recommendations of a celebrated commission, the advice of some of the ablest men, who had ithoroughly examined the subject, and your excuse for not grappling with the question was, that the commencement of war was not the proper moment for a thorough reform in the War administration, and that the proper time to make a war-office efficient was the moment of returning peace. (A laugh.) But, at all events the reform, as far as it went, was, according to you, an improv e ment o n the old system, and yet, under the old system, we fought the wars of the Peninsula and gained the victory of Waterloo. (Hear.) But if the complications of this office were so mischievous, you must have discovered it long ago. Why, when you summoned Parliament for the 12th of December, could you not have reformed the office, even if you did not change the Minister, and propose to us that reform for which you are now prepared ? That would have been worth calling us together for; but no, you then com pleted your cardinaPtin of short-sighted incompetence by confining all your exertions to save the remnant of your army to two bills, for which you said not a day was to be lost, and one of which has remained a dead letter to this hour. (Cheers.) Here, again, tie same eternal want of information ! You go to Germany for foreign troops, and Germany declares your overtures illegal and rejects them with scorn. I ventured to tell you that, if you carried the Foreign Enlistment Bill, you would never be able to use it. And now Parliament meets again, meets with fresh accounts of almost incredible suffering-9,000 of our surviving soldiers enfeebled, I fear, by disease, the huts that should shelter the rest still at Balaklava, and Lord Raglan, according to the despatch we read this morning, • still without men and vehicles to land and fix them. Men look to us, half with hope, half with despair. " What is to be done?" is the cry of every voice. No man is a more shrewd observer of public opinion than the noble lord the member for London, and his resign a ti on s i gn ificantly tells us what ought to be done. (Loud cheers.) But if this motion succeed, if this incomparable Ministry retire, and, like the gallant member for Middlesex, lose a place and find a constituency—(cheers and laughter)—who is to replace them? Where can we find their equals, in the unity of their counsels, the foresight of their policy, and the good fortune that attends their mea sures ? (A. laugh.) Let us compose our terrors, and face the possible calamity of such a loss with manly courage. The hon. member for Richmond chides my right hom friend the member for Medhurst because, on Friday night, he condemned the Government for basing its existence on the principle of coalition. The member for Richmond is historically correct. Looking through our modern history, I find that most of oar powerful, even popular Adminis trations, have been more or less coalitions. Both the Ad ministrations of Mr. Pitt were coalitions ; and the last was very remarkable, for he first turned out the Addington Government, and then coalesced with six of its members. Nay, he was not contented till he bad netted the expelled Prime Minister himself, and made him Lord President of the Council. (Laughter.) But thee there is one indispen sable element of a coalition, and that is, that its members should coalesce. (Loud cheers and laughter.) It is that element which seems to nae wanting in the present Cabinet. (Cheers.) It has been an union of party interests, but not a coalition of party sentiment and feeling. (Cheers.) It was a jest of Lord Chesterfield's, when a man of very ob scure family married the daughter of a lady to whom scan dal ascribed a large number of successful a dmirers, that "nobody's son had just married everybody's daughter." (Great laughter.) If I may parody that jest, I would say of this Government, that everybody's principles had united with nobody's opinions. (Laughter.) It is dimly intimated, that the noble lord—now in a state of transi tion—(a laugh)—but after all he is equally illustrious as the member for Ti rertan—it is intimated that the noble lord the member for Tiverton is intended for an appoint- Pant that some months ago would have satisfied the country and saved the Government. (Hear, hear.) I fear now that it may be too late, and among his greatest dan gers will be the armed neutrality of his unsuccessful advo cate and noble friend. (Laughter.) That noble lord, the member for London, on Friday last attempt e d, no t trium phantly, to vindicate the Whigs from the charge of being '.n exclusive p arty that required all p ower f or itself— (" Hear, hear, " from Lord J, Russell)--and he found a solitary instance for the refutation of that charge in the magnanimity with which the Whigs had consented to that division of power which his desertion now recant: and condemns. But in plain words his vindication only amounts to this, that where the Whigs could not get all the power they reluctantly consented to accept half. ( &Inch laughter.) Now, gentlemen opposite will, perhaps, pardon me if I say, that I think the secret of Whig exclu siveness and 'W big ascendancy has been mainly this—you, the large body of independent liberal politicians, the ad vocates for progress, have supposed, from the memory of former contests now ended, that, while England is advanc ing, a large section of your countrymen, with no viiible interest in existing abuses, is standing still ; and thus you have given, not to yourselves, not to the creed and leader of the vast p o p u l ar party, but to a small hereditary. com bination of great families—(" Hear," from Mr. Bright)—a fictitious monopoly of liberal policy—a genuine monopoly of lethargic Government. It is my firm belief that any Ad ministration, formed from either side of this house, should we be so unfortunate as to losethe present,would be as fully alive to the necessity of popular measures, of steady pro gress—(hear, hear, from Lord J. Russell)—of sympathy with the free and enlightened people they might aspire to govern, as any of those great men who are democrats in opposition and oligarchs in office. (Loud cheers.) But to uee individually and to the public it is a matter of compa rative indifference from what section of men a Govern ment at this moment shall be formed, so lone as it man fully represents the great c ause t o w hi c h the ' and safety of England are committed, and carries into practi cal'execution the spirit that animates the humblest trades man, the poorest artisan who has sent his scanty earning to the relief of our suffering army. (Cheers.) It has boon said, as the crowning excuse for the Government, that all our preceding wars have began with blunders. Were this an arena for historical disquisition I should deny that fact ; but grant it for the sake of argument. How were those blunders repaired and converted into triumphs ? I know a case in point. Once in the last century there was a Duke of Newcastle, who presided over the conduct of a war, and was supported by a powerful league of aristocra tic combinations. That war was, indeed, a series of blun ders and disasters. In vain attempts were made to patch up that luckless Ministry—in vain some drops of health ful blood were infused into its feeble and decrepid consti tution—(a laugh)—the people at last became aroused, in dignant, irresistible. They applied one remedy ; that remedy is now before ourselves. They dismissed their Government and saved their army. (The hon. baronet re sumed his seat amid loud and prblonged cheering.) The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER.—Sir, I do not know that I can recollect an occasion on which there has been before the House—l will not say so great a ques tion, but so remarkable a combination of questions, each of which is great. In this country even the dismissal of the Government is enough to constitute a great party con flict, and to attract much public interest, but the fate of the Government, though it be an element in this discus sion, is the measliest among the elements that it involves— (cheers)—because, Sir, along with the fate of the Govern ment is involved the far exceeding question of the condi tion of your army, and along with the condition of the army is involved that which, if at the present moment it be regarded with less lively interest, is always of the deepest interest to the people of England—namely, the function of the House of Commons to consider and apply a remedy to great national evils. (Hear, hear.) With re spect to the Government, what they have a right to ask is that their position should be perfectly clear and perfectly defined in the face of this house. Sir, the hon. gentleman who last sat down says that the present Government was formed upon a union of interests, but 'not of opinions. (Opposition cheers.) Sir, the judgment of the present Government belongs to a higher tribunal—(laughter and cheers)—l speak it with no disrespect—than any individual member of Parliament or any Parliament that now exists, because this is a question in which personal feelings and prejudice* are so much involved that it is viewed by us with heated eyes. But there is a tribunal that will deal with this question with even-handed justice —I mean the enlightened opinion of the country. (Hear, hear.) After what has happened during the last few weeks, and what we have heard during the last three days from my noble friend, the member for the city of London, I beg to enter my respectful protest against the declaratien of the hon. gentleman (Sir E. L. Bulwer), that the com bination out of which the present Government proceeded was a community of interests and not of feelings and opinions. (Hear, hear.) I beg to render this testimony, as far as I am concerned, in the face of the world, to my noble friend (Lord J. Russell), that in all the measures in which I have been concerned with him, whether in their preparation for this house, or whether in their conduct through this house, I have received from him great cor diality and harmony of support, and he, I trust, has received from me a correlative amount of support. (Hear, hear.) The history of the Government will remain in its acts, and by its acts let it be judged. (Cheers.) 'With reference to the present position of the Government, I must recur to the explanation of my noble friend, for the purpose of ac-, knowledging the tribute, so far beyond my merits, which my noble friend was pleased to pay to a portion of my political conduct. He is in a position in this house in which it is his rare privilege that by the eulogies he confers he can con fer distinction, but that he cannot receive it in return. (Cheers.) I will therefore content myself with owning his kindness in that and many other matters, and in expressing the hope that it may be never effaced from my recollection. Bitt with regard to the position of the Government with reference to my noble friend, it is not to be wondered at if persons viewing the facts from different points of view do not see them in the same light, I hope I may not be thought ,to controvert anything stated by my noble friend, if I re spectfully state to the house that, at the time he announced the resignation of the office he lately hold, his colleagues were entirely unaware, so far as I am acquainted, of any difference of opinion between him and themselves. (Laugh ter and cheers.) My noble friend did nut make any con trary statement; but at the same time I think that those who listened to the statement of my noble friend, and had no other acquaintance with the facts, might justly suppose that he, having made a proposal at a given time for a . change of office in the Government, though he had been dissuaded from pressing it at a particular time, had con tinued to keep that proposal alive, and that only at the last, when he had lost all hope of its acceptance, had pro ceeded to place his resignation in the hands of my noble friend the First Lord of the Treasury. (Hear, hear.) Sir, I venture to state, no far as my knowledge goes, that if such were the impression recently conveyed to the house, that impression was totally unwarranted by the facts. (Cheers.) At the time of the resignation of my noble friend we were not conscious of even the slightest difference of opinion between him and ourselves with reference to the conduct of the war. My noble friend had called attention to a correspondence between himself and the Earl of Aber deen, in which he urged that the present Minister of War should give place to my noble friend the member for Tiver ton, and in which Lord Aberdeen declined to accede to that proposal, acting in concert with his colleagues. It has been stated that Lord Aberdeen was not justified in declin ing that proposal on grounds of private and personal regard, when that change was beneficial to the country. Why, certainly not, sir; he would not have been justified in such a case. But it was not on grounds of private and personal regard that my noble friend lord Aberdeen de clined to accede to that proposal. It was on the 17th of November that the proposal was made, and those who wish to appreciate the circumstances should go back to that pe riod. Sentiments of discontent among the public with reference to the conduct of the Minister of War were not rife in the country at that period. (Cries of Oh, oh !) I will venture to say more (because if I stop here it may seem to impiy that opinions out of doors ought to settle this question)—that the great exertions made by my noble friend the Minister of War, in conjunction with the Com mander of the Forces and the other military departments, in order to send out the army to the East, were exertions that deserved and had won the approbation of the country. (Hear, hear.) Such was the opinion, I believe, of the country, and such was the opinion of my noble friend the member for the city of London, for it may be in his recol lection, that in the early part of November he addressed a letter to the Duke of Newcastle, in which he stated to the duke, with a handsome appreciation of his conduct, that he had done in office everything that it was possible to do. (Loud cheers.) On the 3d of December the correspondence with the Earl of Aberdeen was brought to a close, my noble friend adhering to his opinion, and the Earl of Aberdeen declining to act on that opinion. But from the close of that correspondence till the time of the meeting of Parliament en Tuesday last there is a vacuum that requires to be filled up. I may be wrong—l cannot tell what passed in the mind of my noble friend—but I venture to say that, with regard to my know ledge and in the view of his colleagues, his proposal was not in existence during that period. (Hear.) On the 3d of December, as I have said, my noble friend adhered to his opinion that the office of Secretary at War ought to be abolished, and that of Secretary for War held by the Se cretary of State for the Home Department. Bit shortly after that Parliament met—on the 12th of December—and a debate took place on the Address which may be in the recollection of the members of this house. On the 16th of December a Cabinet was held, and discussions were entered into with respect 'to the proceedings of the Go vernment and the measures of the coming session. The impression made, I think, on the colleagues of the noble lord by the conversations at that Council was, that it was impossible ho could retain his intention of propos ing a change in the War Department; but it was not left to impressions, for on that day, as I am au thorised by the First Lord of the Treasury to state, Lord Aberdeen, being in some doubt as to the meaning of the President of the Council, did himself take an opportu nity of ascertaining what his opinions were, and asked him whether he adhered to his proposal with reference to a change in the War Department. I was not present at the conversation. I speak only of what Lord Aberdeen in formed me, and weal I believe at the time he communi cated to such member of the Cabinet as happened to refer t o him. He stated to me that when he asked the noble lord whether he adhered to his plan, my noble friend dis tinctly announced to him that he had changed his inten tions. (Hear, hear.) He attributed that change to a con versation which he had had with a distinguished person, a friend of his I need not name—not a member of the present Cabinet, but versed in the affairs of military administra tion, and very friendly to the reform of • the military de partment. (Hear.) The noble lord on the 16th of Deeem bar stated that he had changed his intentions, chiefly in consequence of a conversation with his friend, who, though a great military reformer, had convinced my noble friend that the present was not a fitting time for the proposed changes. (Hear.) Well, sir, that being the case, it is obvious that all his colleagues who took the pains to in form themselves on the subject regarded that proposal of my noble friend, not as a proposal that was awake and alive, or one that was to be pressed upon them, but as a proposal which he had given np and definitively aban • Boned. (Cheers.) Nor was there anything that oc curred in the following month that induced the Govern ment to think otherwise, because from time to time, as Cabinet Councils met, measures were discussed ; and on Saturday week my noble friend himself called the at tention of the Government to the subject of the formation of a War Board, and asked what had been done with re gard to developing the views of the Government as to the war, and at that very Council a plan was agreed upon for giving form to measures which had for some time been practically in operation for combining the heads of the va rious War Departments with a view to the practical trans action of the business of the war. My noble friend was a concurring and consenting party in that conversation, and he subsequently went to Lord Aberdeen before the meet ing of Parliament and stated that he intended to propose amendments to that plan, with the terms of which he was not altogether satisfied. (Hear.) These amendments we never had the opportunity of considering. My noble friend said the other night he had no reason 'to suppose they would be adopted by the Cabinet. I venture. however, to say that he had no reason to suppose they would not have been adopted by the Cabinet. (Hear.) lam unaware, and my right horn friend the Scorotary at 'War, who jaite seen A......—..------------------jio of that memorandum, is totally unaware, of anY . V e T anc e of principle that could be raised on it, or of an lil aria lel °IA. opinion that could grow out.of it, with reeer tit , o tker. friend on the one band Or the Government 0.n0....,eateg (Hear.) Therefore, if it be thought that there is "n‘ a tlei of audacity in the members of the Government w r l; oet meet Parliament and challenge a vote on tl .etbe re they have lost the strength and the ornaniente„' _0 bet aence of my noble friend, I trust it will be ree Ilec , ; ery ore. Inet Bel ° t d se , up till Tuesday last his calleagues-4 will ~ o rsoll .. of his colleagues, for I cannot speak for an . P,_,„,,,-4! , private communications, bull his colleagues et is7 nten tea . not aware either that my noble friend had eny_ oc t the!: to revive his defunct proposal, or that in any r a ft'', tho l e existed any difference of opinion between hin. t l i i, c :„ no f 0,, regard to the conduct of the war and the constti:e ii; ase e r f a administrative department. (Hear.) IW e b t aapP ° oo forgive me for having stated in this manner w whic h , to me to be desirable in order to clear the vieu l ttion of I house might entertain—l do not say of the P t et it) thst l °,, i noble friend, for I do not question one 5Y 1 , 1 3 3 .,.' 0100 teyi, from his lips—but to clear the view that th `_' 1), 00,7,, entertain of the position of the Government vin!endot,;e nesday, it was called ou to deliberate in conseP it, rag o f resignation of my noble friend. (Hear.) N° w ' re g uilt, 3 thought that the G overnmen t, as I have said , 7 isos si ,e ° a reckless disreg ar d o f o pi n i o n in meeting r4r on o° ,l7ir e taking the opini on o f th e House of Conim°l's is ts tion that is now b e f ore th em without any an ler w i l t . own composition, and dep r ived of the leader %ocelot they have acted in thi s house. (Hear ) I h esec° ,4lo 4 l are disposed to come to such a conclusion to e e o d u nes do: 0 0 was the position of the Government on W t posinl I Thursday last. It ie very easy to describe the, .. cr i p te ..l a disagreeable position. (Laughter ) am myself not wholly unprepared to concur. (rye "At once, as far as angel's ken, he vi d c e ... The dismal situation waste and Wil • _.„O. he °P r ' of s (Laughter.) Those blasts that come from t ti p tar es side of the houie are not always agreeable; bu, ous e i 1 1 I comfort to some portions of this side of the boa' 50 . .4 quarter where sits the hon. member for AY l ?° ° co lje 4 ,':lo In that c‘tfor,o„ am bound to say that from that quarter issue tne A ut i s ll ' 0 most bitter blasts of all. (Great laughter.) i ' c os . ,o comfort I have with respect to him is, that l s orea or difference between the tone of the speeches h e wn bi' e del the house now, when he avows he has witbdni,, ar e ,i fidence from the Government, and the tone ol ir n e ; o es's on various occasions when he assured the a t i o hour r• his steady allegiance. (Laughter.) I think. th the re' lt er agree with me that those who are charged wi ide o 'l 3 o sibilities of office have something else to do he i ° They d o ing the pleasures of their p os iti o n. o:l eaf let " ti L i 'd something else to de even in ordinary time of eves`; t];', iu times like these, under the pressure ° w ith 'l r to as now beset your army, and, in conneet it t e en OA country. (Hear, hear.) Now, the clu u "„ te, ° ,)oo course was it open to us to take ? W e re "?tlic s l 0 some modification or interchange of ons ee " Tyr l' o bl . enable us to present a more acceptable or Pl o p. Obi it the House of Commons ? I agree with the „ fl ea Or for Aylesbury, who says that, such a elisugZ au el f : r a is" such circumstances could have earned ne '„" tit elo c , o fib l , vernment, but must have enhanced and the ne e : le 00' picion upon them. (H ear , h ear .) That is t, 0 0 mariner, who, under the p ressure of a temP e° bargaining with his gods— " Ad miseras precen, " Decurrere et votis pacisei, " Ne Cyprive Tyrimque m erces ~ 0 04 " Addant avaro divitias marl' ' the vle l 'olt (Hear, hear.) It was not compatible wit h of C° 19 ;1 0 . 4 the Government to offer terms to the Hoes w ir . (Hear, hear.) It would not have been coniPs; os o 4 position and choice of the House of C° ln _ i tih Olet r iti#l terms from a Government so circumstance.. otpoeor Then, if it was not open to us.to modify tbe e ° o tece . „ the Government, was it open to us to aband on TI/ the pressure of a hostile notice? (Hear, hes r , i aste r :d" be a majority here, for all I know, whoa ode f i this night to pass a vote of censure on the 403 , tile al but I think there are 'few that have within to c 9, and justice of Englishmen who will not he trr ne 6"; it was the duty of the Government, hs v "let 0 0' public affairs up to the time when they "J e ns 0 1 ,0 subject of a notice of censure, not to shrink „lf ° s ,iti i os 4 ,, sure. (Great cheering.) It .has been v!.,el t ;e 4 ,,„ right hon. friend the Secretary for the 4 -11 30 1 atO f a were determined , to meet it as we stood, w" - O W% ing the future. (Hear, hear.) It would ha T ti f is ltir cious—it would have been altogether truj us e see t ',l ; ,; to form a conclusion or even a design w ith r o , o t se A future existence of the Government till they Pli,,,c tence and judgment of the House of Comill9n, g i . yet`lr t to that existence ; and if we had shrunk a"„%tiolA,rie given from asking for judgment on our Ps i " 7 e it al (Hearst terms we should hereafter have o t.e°, l o j (.) What sort of an epitaph would lie e lf ' t afj over our remains ? (Cheers.) I should inr - aisil`'. tempted to pen that epitaph, " Here lie the ... „oZ ashes of a Ministry which found England at V; 10 0 1 7 0 her at war—which was content to take hems a , .0' 0 0 f i i. P° of office and wield the sceptre of power s f o al , ii had courage to question its existence. T he leavolio t y gathering over the country—they heard g o tie, e s afflicting news of the state of the sick a nd vr o t e ip t„„ East. These things did not move them to Pfes, hon. member for Sheffield raised his 1011 i (t ee' l , ; thunderbolt at them, then they were 0°7% 5 ;1'41 4 with a sense of their guilt, and, in thinki n g t - a ° bee' n e6 punishment, they abandoned duty." (G rea- the cik eli"L is, therefore, from no mere desire to c ourt c.,, to, - itt, i tion of Parlianaent, and from no mean dli o tee, of d ' office, that her Majesty's Government have " Lu ot o ,l,t . l duty to invite you to pass judgment on tb e e, o o,ol , hon. member for Sheffield. (Hear, hear.) ; i t, 0, 1 for the state of the Government here; ''. the o f' more important in the view of the countre:4 s tet" 4 O i l the army. (Hear.) And it is not o rtly e t e r dert , ele g/, army in the Crimea this house has ° ° c attecand the,oefi must look to the causes or that ) st .r will not P it alL4 applying a remedy. (Hear, alleviate or weaken the Dens!, condition ea ge and the country with respect to the con teeit o , It would be a. vain ntterept, and not only t t i st,,,qe violence to the nature of every Mall who 10 sotb l ; a t' ed, b a man. (Hear, hear.) It is, in truth, the e l l 0 0 '4 9 1 tion of the time. (Hear.) My hon. Die n ` 0t ° ,700 1 , 11°o3tri'nterest fel i t in ei tio for Northamptonshire is right when he ssYt li y trior: England cares . for the army, but that she — Al lti l' ter, said to care for little else. (Hear, hear.) `, O O evilly part, will offer no resistance, and will interrj, o via! yl ment to any measure whatever that cam be ' 3 ' oleP . ,: i l l tribute one jot or tittle to benefit that artel' o 0 , 0 'el): What, then, is the state of this army ? 11°1. 0 s e ?", collect that it is our duty to endeavour to P o f f , ; , 0 1 feeling, and to come to a fair appreciation -Or course, it will appear to all that the e public journals render us is, on the whol city, far from being complete in its eh and does proceed mainly from those those evils of which I do not now in' were unavoidable, or what portion avoided. There are some of the difflek with respect to which we may venture are now in course of diminution ; for : some points in connection with those the present moment the public have bee) with in the most authentic form, I find of warm clothing have been issued, an are new in possession of these comfort: if there are any individual exceptiot doubt of Lord Raglan's general ace have begun to be taken up to the en , be issued to the men. The sickness wh , fearful an extent, according to the later' the military authorities gave me to-day, ' a slight diminution. (Hear, hear.) I that out of 10 vessels which sailed from the stores and men necessary for the e( railway, by this time nearly the whole I believe it was the estimate of the into spirited men who were intrusted with the rail way, that within about three we , fully commencing it that railway wo, (Hear, hear.) What, however, is mob present state of facts is, perhaps, thin ment, which has long been the object of allied camps, has at length, by the effor been completed, and General Canrobe 7 . place at the disposal of Lord Raglan — able to apply to the discharge of dna Raglan has hitherto provided—such a fob diminish by 1,600 men the number of En in the trenches. (Cheers.) Of course I the house that the number of 1,600 in presents the amount of relief ; but m, number permanently in the trenches, ' am not wrong in stating that, so far as siege are concerned, that arrangement addition of from 4,000 to 5,000 health, troops on the spot to the British army, works which it had to undertake. (C] house will think that I have not std cancelling the case which is before us—t , v : „ fused into the statement of them a tinetu'iol , .11 tion. My sole object is, that the facts ° woe", clearly before the house, and au impartiali ut jet °it upon them. (Hear.) Now, with respect til lit olV, the army, that is a question to which, 1 t be oil sirable to refer, because, undoubtedly, either of which goes abroad among the public, or,a t ,joll' 4 ; mode of making that statement, is falls"„se' t i t . calamities, in themselves great and serions . ,, , j ) le r o l l , far beyond their just proportions. For e]ts f ,":;stt t or that 54,000 men have been sent to the ,::ye toot. il 12,000 bayonets is the whole force we 'i ti,..,1 posal. This, of course,,is a matter of fact. ,' OF of the army before Sebastopol as if it e°'„," l o°, 1 fresh from our climate, having undergeui'se, IA of fatigue, but I speak of the number of t'l D 1 ; 1 0 1111 the auxiliary marine force and the na / , ° o se;:s4 gaged in military duties before Sebastopol' o r: ot a i r o i, whole of those who, whether at Balaklays,..„. or ( 4 are on the list of sick. Now, sir, the nu 1, " , , gaged in military duties before SebasWP ° ,,"oo. of f I the latestreturns must somewhat exceed 3ve e se l .f, I do not pretend i to give the precise figure. v o , ej i not the precise returns for the naval brigs 0 0;aji marines, but that is an affair which can/ 1 1 0 , 0:0 11 500, one way or the other. 28,200 men o " t ` be fo e y e ip active service of one kind or another, were ~, Vi l a Sebastopol at the latest moment of which ~ ,ft,„4 turns, and to that mu-t be added, on a ccous I VA' ary naval force, about 3,000 to 4,000 men' % if" of the statement that the army consists di p s 0 1 j that statement goes abroad, and is Wen/. J O well-intentioned members of the comninutobedl was my lot yesterday morning to hear it Priog t lis t before a largo congregation. (Cheers 1a1., 6 0' 0 0° t 1 most meritorious clergyman, addressing u'ibreifielal intelligent flock in London, stated thatth e jar ti sly to the East was, at present , ' represented bY 1 bscly t one-third of its numbers before Sebastopo l. b i e c 00,9 not driven to that melancholy and miser s asv o;.ti we 1 71 that our army of 1854 is gone, and that 00, e p,t, to do but to consider of the formation of a ° 0 13'5 old There have been many calamities, there haiorioeerfo faults, there have been many great and g eadt 0 attended with loss ; in some instances the la p o i " deuce has descended in a manner which eou oof i jil i seen,—idle have been our best hopes , " are 1 14P hor ffr i brought to our tenderest feelings, but wo e s , 5 ',3 d the conclusion that the army which left tli vo e bar e t ii 3 O finest ever despatched from England, is n ° , 0 0 1 i 9 the things which are past. (Loud cheers.it„ es°, re said that I do not pretend to get quit of, t r e l e l ; ono; manner (although those things I have 'F:4ihefel i l it true), I believe much remains behind; an" tor t ' e'Y other subject to which I must venture to It iitf al 0 , 0 1 in this country, necessarily ignorant of ulteel o tli a d are in the habit of giving their judgmen t ' ®for t 0 i, degree by comparison. It is common to 000.4, t i of the French camp and the French ors those e:oile°,01) draw inferences highly unfavourable to ' fo to t , i lf, n lo, the conduct of our own ; and, sir, so far t h e. 0 r i , I', ing to detract from what is stated y re joi e D ir i de of the French as to their organization , to the A , 0 1) ) 1 this opportunity of hearing testitnonf a rerfr,, o r " of military art and science, and those be , t h i v e o late to the care of the soldier, display ! ` ] neighbours, (Clloers,) gut i wish t 0 r 4 0 tilla. .yet (tri ed )rea a u°. e ? 0c,i5 ( iT" ,1 4..10 1 ef ideo i f r o i k. 44 ale, r , l O f kj a ken tl i u° larae te biT°rtabi ° wh ° )JO IY , 43 41 8 (.° , q uire 1 1 0' a of' 3B n e s c ola f t4:Qe h o ° 0 1/, tr e4t n. 41" alli l u to 11° P, e t t t kitei: o ratet i n stsn' i ;ts 1 e , k 'orre 1 5 SOO ° 5 6' 1 4 4 l I Rs h et G a rosa,f r t tt k t !,ileen d ll , 4 tsti t that t, eC' e d t‘ t ; "ore Tot th i ' t o P ° o 4 4 t 1 / a il Is. .9v a i nd s !At t, -eßb e ).cnu'rseY•cot,,,rilti t;roeie icatar i ,e li el it kl,kDio, hich V•oi o est • hq k °411 ) : 11 ha s bes, o f Ik At ktly nig 417. 41 -in thi' e c tio l• t p tV ls lrt 4 rnE 0- 0 0 ,01 o'% E • c ,rf i t, L hay' t so `,o' °et ° T .3 ;ellig ett „trY t he e „ iti the c f 0 0 1 St °I L celis ° 0.'0 ) Nezhe h ero b° ter lP 4t zte Z t tie ore ra 't so li d i l l t t %t k 're • —tto 0 4 f tel des ite tile td tm, e, ,rts ° C 1,4 4 0 k s ky °ply art 111 `" 41,e' u o‘i or rs tl' 44‘ 11 're ' • $ 4 4 ' 4 4: 1 : kt ` ; ° '' ' i o e rce °- ver ° f h to' • 11,4 , fi gli9h ' o t t q ,N 4 t, it} I De" 0 I jl d ib" I l bty 1, 41 k3' 3en b 1 P oly/ T o y l l i fl uo P 00' my "1114: I s the 1 ;4 1el A telt as ea is eq, °l o ll .,f 1 k ti , 4 1• ( 1 4 ttl o 00 . 4 r 4 4 re fsPlrj '- ii r„ r s.) II: // the a.— y " t i the, " k of 'Wi e ti tl ,dly e e bi I . nbiS aid th