The Sun. — London, England, 1815-05-24 00:00:00

aveie tcrated to Ole succeeding novet ilent. tnaintaitid, therefore, from the whole bearing irf rite toonsaction-, from the nature of the engag . trient and its accompanying circumstances, it was no itidispntsble condition and the moral 'condi - - lion, the principle of the Treaty of Fontainhlearn and that upon which the Senate proteeded, that the dissolution of Buonaparte's Government avast - 6 be the fundamental part and liasis upon which all 'these arrangements were built ; every one of which he-, - without any adequate pretence taf necessity, fundamentally violated _on his part. The Allies were therefore absolved from the cow alitiout of those treaties, and if they chose to avail hettiselves of tire consideration, We're placed in a a.tate of war with the now existing Govcrinnent of France ; so far as the point related to a mere xplestion of justice. He aihnitted, however, that it was not enough to satisfy'the House as to the ..justice of the case as it referred ,tet the enemy. He was called upon farther to prove, that the alternative of war was just with respect to those countries who- were . to, or nay be, the other patties in it ; and ire trusted, on this head, lie co u ld 'thaw, that under all the cir cesostattee, of the case, there teas a paramount =ll upon them, in the views of a true sense of their own security, the conservation of their . deareit interests and a sense of, imminent and eventual danger, to enter into a state of war.— In this part of the question, the first considera tion was,—Was there any prospect of this coon. try or of Europe remaining at peace with France, ss long as the person now at the head of its Go verimont rent:toted in that situation 1. 11 there was no such prospect, there could be no safety in delay. in argning this position, they bad the me lancholy advantage of the experience of fourteen or fifteen years, winch sheaved to them that there was no engagement-ever concluded with that per son than was not grossly violated by hiatithat his system- was'one of general spoliation and univer sal aggrandizement ; to be regirlarly and posi lively, attached by conquest and force of armsea.— Whim at one period- of the Revolution the vanity of the French was flattered by time novel principle of extending theircountry to what was called its natural limits, such as the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the . Rhine; about that time the present Ruler of France obtained the power cif the Government, and by the Treaty of Latneville ; he was enabled to • achieve that which was contemplated by the-ante= cedent Government. All rea-onable men in Eu ' Tope at the time looked with alarin Vat such an i crease of the cerritories. But in sitbsequeurTrea ties, various small Stares were recognised rode . pendent Republics, ass the Ligurian, Helvetian. 'Load 'others Shut tliese existed not long, for every one of these Treaties were violated, and the terri tories of each were successively either incorporate. ed with Prance herself, or placed in a state of - vassalage or subjugation to her controul. Every one-aaw what little reliance was to be placed on treaties • formed with the Ruler of France ; they afterwards saw what 'Switzerland, what Holland, add var:ous other countries had suffered. Nu de vdtion, no submission, on the part of any State, sufficed to prevent its becoming the victim of his audition. Let them more particularly look to . what the conduct of that person was with respect to a country whose statelaccopied many hourii of their discussion—he meant Spain. 'Spain, which was not only the Ally, but in habits of the most entire sobmision to France. Let the conduct of _its Rider towards that country, its King, and its Nobility, be considered. There was no limits' to his unpriaciplecl aggrandisements, his 'insatiable - ambition. Let they look to, and consider the , grounds and objects, as well as the pretences of his invasion of Russia. No man who considered those could entertain a doubt of Buonaparte's lust 'of universal rule and boundless dominion. A state of peace with one who throughout and uni formly manifested himself to be actuated by such - a principle, was not to be expected for any length of lime. By some it might possibly be held, that since his return to power, Or previous to it, a change in his principles'and :objects may be in duced : but even the circumstances tinder which that return took place, were such as should give alarm and anxiety to every Government of 'Etta Co e. 'Tim. nation at large' , were,' at the time, sa tisfied and happy under the Government of their Bing ; whence did the change arise ? The army were discontented, and the present Rader of Trance came' back, and preceded merely by'the power of the army, who,felt,perpaps, their glory had been in some degree tarnished ; but they felt their, dissatisfaction, and they wished for the Go vernment of a military Chief—why ? Because they wished for a military Government, whose ruling principle they knew wowid be war-- . -a state of things they wished for from motives of personal Interest - and feeling. (Hear, hear !) Under such circumstances, could they look with indifference at such a state of things ? Could they consider the course of events which had occured in Europe it self in consequence of the aggressive ambition of the French Ruler, and not fearfully anticipate what must ensue, if not checked and counteract ed ? CoultFthey imagine —could they put any faith in the prOlessions of a person-, 'who had so gently seized the Onvernment 'or Prance at Iho head of a military power; that the lore of peace would be the ruling principle of his conduct But they had heard further of a prospect' of tbs. cstablishnicnt of a limited Monarchy France, and which would go to afford some security for the- Maintenance of peace. He .Must doubt, bowever a . on viewing the cou rs e o f !hinge Ins' the last - twenty-five years in France, whether in time of peace, a limited Monarchy or a free 'Go vernment could ex* in that country together with. -such a large military bl• esta ishment as would be kept up and he would undertake to say, that a free Government could not exist in France, Tvith a Chief who owed his - title to the sword— whose- fame and power were founded in conquest tdone- Could they - so absolutely shut their eyes— divest themselves of all observation and reflection —or be so blind to all that passed for the _last 15 years, and imagine or believe that a state of re pose and tranquillity could be enjoyed by Europe :Ind this country while the Government of France was in the hands of its present Ruler ? Notwith standing- those views of the question, the, risks end d:aiculties of war were duly considered by lmito ; and there were sou may advise, con trasting tbs evils of war with the blessings of peate, drat clap alrer should be tried with the in dividual tit:At/at the head of the FrencliGovernment, before the awful alternative should be decided; In saying this Ire was endeavouring to state the argument fairly, and a et'aY which some would probably meet it. He was really to admit, that the alternative of War, all circarustatices consider= ed, was of so dreadful a nature, - that if any rational prospect of peace existed, it would be better to embrace it ; bat on that point. he had already stated his opinion. The circumstances under which war may be resoled upon with a view to its rational prospect of .success, then naturally come under consideration, and in that view he held it to be a favourable eitcutustante, that the present Ruler of France should have returned, while the Allied Sovereigns .vere still assembled at Vienna, and hefare several of the armies of Europe were reduced to peace establishments while they were in a state of concert, and in a general state of preparation, which enabled them the more effectually to meet the difficulties.' Stich was the situatiou in which they were placed. They knew that in all Europe, and atuoag the Allied Sovereigns .but one sentinamt existed on the subject. They well knew the means now existed, as well as the will, to give effect to their resolves. But were they to change and adopt the policy of peace --to let Bdonaparte establish his power and re-create his atrinies let the Allied Sovereigns return home, and put their armies on a peace establishment, and the moment would never return when the blow could be struck with so much advantage as under the pr e sent circumstances !" Let the history of Eu rope'be looked to, and see iu what length of time so grand a confederacy of, its leading Powers was formed, as was to be fcruud at present. - The fa lents'and powers of some . of the greatest States men that ever direcaal the affairs of this country., were in vain exerted to - form such a confederacy as now existed—that great object could not be obtained till the year 1813. With such expc rience'and such au example before them, why should they not avail themselves of the present advantages ; if these were now relinquished, what prospect had they of a like •return. We have against France a just, cause of war, from a violation on the part of the enemy of every fun damental principle on which the peace was formed, and a Government was reinstated which experience proved to be incansi , tent with the peace and tranquillity el Europe. But it may possibly be objected to him that the Allies were prepared to treat with the present Ruler of France so late as the 17th of March, at Chatiliona; a few - remarks on that point may be necessary ; the individual was then in indispnted possession of the Govern ment of France. Thoughthe Allies had advanced some way into that country, the far greater part of it was then in the possession of B7toilaparte ; in his bands were also all the fortresses of Italy, as Mantua, Genoa and Turin: He had been • master of every fortress on the .Rhine, and of many on the Elbe On the side of' Holland and the Netherlands he had Antwerp, Luxeinbourg, and Bergen-op-Zoom—in short, all the places of great military strength in that quarter of Europe. Those who looked coolly and deliberately oa that transaction-4hCasaw the dangers to which the Allied Armies might have beet) reduced, if any reverse had occurred, the difficulties to which, in such a caae,Aey would have been - reduced without a single fortress in their possession, editor Buona-- -parte would have been able to dictate the peace, or carried on with iucrcascd adVantage his own opa rations. It was then judged better to sacrifice the lesser consideration with a view to ensure a greater. Such were the causes that led to that negociation. Upon the whole, ander .the existing circumstances, there was no hope of obtaining that state of tranquillity and repose which was al-' most synonitnotts with peace in the ancient ac-• ceptation of that word. A state of preparation, a species of armed truce, attended with a feverish apprehension of being attacked or compelled at no great distance-of time, to engage with InanifoM disadvantages in a state of war, would evidently be much more disadvantageous than engaging : in war, 'under such encouraging Circumstances 'as presented themselves---but still more would it be preferable, when we were conscious of 'the send timent that pervaded our Allies, when we knew we possessed the means of striking-the blow effec tually now, an opporttinity had little prospect of seeing return again—on -a ground of economy. also, the engaging in such a state now would be • far the more preferable; the preparation which already ex i s t e d p resen t e d a great advantages while the disadvantage of being . cotnpelled to- increase our ftirces from a state of peace establishment to a scale adequate to the prosecution of hostilities, would operate incalculably against us. Every thing favourable now presented itself; the dispositioas of the Allies were sura% as could be wished. It was - not, as he had already stated, the object of , the. Prince Regent's Government to . indace the Allies to a more extensive line of polity; than-in their own deliberate view of the subject they should think proper to adopt. This principle was most. emphatically acted upon, and the necessity of the aberpative of war was a point on which Melt reconsideration w a s repeatedly urge d, and their most , delibarate and repeatetlly considered opinions led to that decision which was eommuni cited to Parliament. With respect to the late Government of France, it was his decided-opinion a that a greatmajority of the people of Ranee were in favour of thc return of their foaMer,legi, timate Goveipment. He firmly believed that such a sentiment prevailed in the South, West, and Northern parts of .France ; and this be judged from every ,information that Caine to his know ledge on thc subject.• It was also his full convic-• don, that such a restoration would the best tend to the general security of Europe is and _he should be ashamed if he hesitated to • avow that opinion. At the same time the object was not to interfere with the choice of the people . of France in constituting their form of Government ; though he must observe, we had so far a right. to interfere under general circumstances, as to endeavour to set aside a Government which may be incompatible with the security 9f others. We had not on such a,principle, the right to say what should Ir—hut whit should not be the par ticular' Government ? . The Allies and the Confe deracy being nOw'perfcctly agre e d and decided as to the line of policy to be adopted, he trusted that ihe litattsirGovernment erOtild not nave to - ming upon itself the responsibility, nay the odium, by its ennduct of counteracting the decision and that lineOf policy, whi c h he trusted would eventually tend fn the establishment of that state of things, Which Would ensure the general peace, tranquil& ay, and happiness of Europe. The Noble Earl concluded a v ery argumentative and eloquent speech, by moving an Address to the Pr lime Re , gent, corresponding with his most gracious Mss- sage ; and assuring him of the Cordial Coneut , reoce of their Lordships, in enabling leis Reiyal Highness to adopt those measures which May be necessary, in Conjunction with his Majesty's Al lies, against the Common Enemy. On the question, Earl GREY commenced a speech of considerable length, by observing, the Noble - Earl seemed to address the I - louse, as feeling a confident antici pation of success, without 'taking into his view' the necessary consideration at the other side of the question ; and :at,the same time, he seemed to. resolve the n hole into a question of feeling. Lle thongla it rather too much to come to such a vote' as was proposed, when the House did not clearly, from any thing that had fallen from the Noble Earl, know yet exactly in what state the country was placed as to the actual relations of war. The Address proposed called upon the House to pledge itself to support an interminable war, except in case of the destruction of the present Goveknment of France. Ile then proceeded to discuss the. question of the right of war with France on the 'part of this country, which. he argued could not exist without a proof of its necessity, which alone constituted the right ; and on a - principle a:Jvanced by the Noble Earl himself, reparation or satisfac tion should be demanded for real or supposed in juries, and that satisfaction refused, before a right of war could, exist ; a line of procedure which he observed was not adopted in,the ques tion between this country and France. In -sup port of the principles he adtautced, the Noble Earl -quoted largely the authorities of Gro tious, Vattel, and other Writers on the Law of Nations. What did Buonaparte say in his first Proclamation ? clearly and expressly asserted, that from the breaches towards him of the Treaty of'Fontainbleau, he felt himself ahsolved from all' obligations on his part, and that these violations . hajl restored him to his throne and hi s r i g h ts. A n d he added that he had known it to be in the con templation of the Allies to seize Mink) his asylum, and remove him to some other place of safety. The- Noble Lord had told us to recollect " what the-extent of the obligation was, which .we had a right to enforce by the Treaty of Paris against the Government of Buonaparte." But he (Earl Grey) would say, that the right „r nations to choosetheir own form of Government is generally ccnsidered . and spoken of as a sacred right, and does not abrp-,,, gate a treaty with any State, unless done in viola tiHn of the terms of such Treaty ; and then the contravention of it must :be precise and accurate to authorise hostilities, and must not be in ferred from construction. Now, on looking' at the Treaty, did we find any guarantee for the exch:sion of any particular form of Govern ment in France, or any demand for the proscription of any particular man ? Certainly trot : Therefore the people of Paris were left to choose whatever Chief or Government they, ,pleased, with the single exception of Buonaparte. When the famous Declaration of the 13th of March had bet-n adverted to, as a resolve (port a War of extermination, the Noble Lord had stated, that it bore no such construction, and that it did not go beyond legitimate war. But the Treaty which their Lordships were this night called on to approve of, expressly refers to a particularattiele of that Declaration, in which - it is distinctly stated, that by violating- the Treaty, in quitting Elba, Buonaparte had destroyed the only legal* title on which hi s existence depended, and the . Allied Powers in consequence declared, that he: had thereby put hi mse lf b eyon d t h e pa l e of civil and social relation s , and had rendered himself liable to public vengeance... No such principle as this hail ever before been proclaitneeto the-WorK that there exists at the head of a great nation person who must be overthrown ; and we coinz. mitred ourselves by - declaring, that we never would make peace or truce with him. But ,when our Allies deserted us, as they bad done on former occasions, and when those who now supported Ministers in that House would sup port them no longer, then they would come to the other alternative, and incur the -humiliation, and disgrace of making peace with the man they had proscribed. 'lf such a man should ultimately triuMph, though lie might not be actuated by all, those had passions that had been attributed to' Buonaparte, what hope could they have of favour front him ? It would then be thought that it would have been much better to have confined ourselves to the taking of such securities as were demanded. But he had never yet heard What these securities were ; and he was.prepa7d to contend, that the most perfect security we could have was to be obtained by leaving France confined to the limits of her ancient power, and by the-reduction of the. power of Buonaparte, as her chief, by such a Treaty as that Of- Chmsrpont. - From KR -the in formation which he (Lord Grey), had re ceived, the effect of the re-appearance of Buo naparte was such as to lend a belief that the people, and not merely the military, were adverse to the Government 'of the Bourbon s ; and that so great 'was' the danger before Buona parte's return, that the general impression of the persons Who visited France in the last summer was, that if that Government existed during the life of (lie Ki a n a g l , iat ‘nveotivt,ldrebveoalisi.tlioonngua.ostiitidpobsosiibbl4lyt consequence of his demise. M. de Chabannes has' said, that the Clergy and Nobles were. for the King, but the military, 'and those who had ac-; quired national property, were against him, be , . came they were convioced of the insecurity or their property--and,. considering the great pro pOrtion of people who were connected With the revolutions in the government, and in favour of Buonaparte, he (Lord G.) was not, of dplaion that it was a military revolution. There was riot any thing which could .show the disposition Oil the part of' Frauce to tavourthe attempts of the'A flied Arms, brit the reverse, by oppressing. and extingoishiog the very spirit that was hoped for by the measures they wet about to adopt,: Llia Lordship then alluded ~ lAs t i 4 it; tut: swards the Bourbons, w hile they ' ver s e d s ale , power, mid repeated, th a t aggression &stoic' would he likely t o cause oppressiona" the f i g ilt : tion, while moderation and respect for of the people could alone effect the ' y r our te object. We ought to consider ho" o r .sotirces for carrying on war were better of Of f hisotal t I campaigne s Y p proceedings were e i b i d tracing his career ei t ßfi f gul t sse l s t .f e i ettla in il e t‘Beo s loc 0 :230":11v:le:;51:licSeeir t 3 ; i:1 it:11114. -Silesia, and argued, and 1813, the-FrenchGovernment had ", e , itself in such straits. .When the Alit t e .' ve d ror i : France it had been ,stated, and he ~b o e ' ,l eo ool lle' reedy, that not less than a force of : 4 ` - ss ist . „ . anil had been cut off from affeading .and that the whole defence Of France tva s -• tert to about 1G ,000. Allies united, couh r l ifi n ica o t t il.l)ty l l : n i b s e • i e rs'icti' h i:leaefstlie ' rcisel h sel e sr: l ttt'rnl 540,000 . ;, this was stated at the time to or tb • ajnpunt, without including the Sw edes left eltitYlfi ;;Esssedwebr, as %veil as o ther troops to garrison. But supposing this statenlOtte: been erroneous, as calculatiOna, on. I rally are, it was fair fo 0 81 t " , •ret l° not of the Allied Armies in France ' ll° tar es 340,000, which would be a fair deductiolop.oso aggeration ; but thi s i nva di n g army wansnegreocil; of victorio us t roo p s , aga i ns t on ly fie 10° who we re harassed and worn ant c:o' and disastrous warfare of the two prece°',e;" paigus.. It appeared, however, that SP 3 , ll l . o til f t : u rei c a i l t , a d nAl S: o •e t claepuplei a ar i l ra o t s t i . g it n h e c t r l t h P ee lvilC r , of L eese: lo lV; could produce anf troops. We were i° foe t1 : 0 1 . millions of Subsidy, to be divided he t s. s. „•i i l, three principal Powers ; but the Noble '‘ - fot. l )v . , mad accession ~oan Yost e a f. rt forcei e i u t t wvt t iss wereni g h t t c - , a a s could not have their as e s e i r s t t a :o n c ' e leii f :v i 'e t c ; 4l4::::° : : „ llai s ib'l'i t at tl Ytbi:l i i them ; they were all desirous of oblainiriestr, golden heads which had been so profu se 70e r e bated by England on f o rmer occasions• f si,;r• cessity.of guarding her new aclinisition °tdt way might prob a bly p reven t Sweden fr °11 1,6 1 . 11 paring in the war on the Continetit. 0 ' bo might certainly f u r n i s h 20,900 brave ; ne t cial they could not be p ro duced for the al io 10; g paign, and as t o S pa i n , h er troops, c he jito, crone so little on their °Seri soil, coul d " it. s s.. Dl c l a , ks c calculated thelaotfe d ßwr u iet p iii c s : ln n i ga s t v ro l nn t l e y n nn w yt i i t il l oc o n l s r gt a ea w rt : n fr , o v r i ot i iir tt g at the conclusion of the late cOritest! evo l .at to e s. ma I,r those brave an d i nv i nc ibl e , l eg i o ns whi c " e ls .bled him to gain suc h i m p er i s hable 1811r i trYV 0 lOrilself, and s uc h i mmort ali t y for ili 9 C°ll l l byt: o Z 1 o,ifthey were dispersed and exha astei er e im war with Atiitrica ; and we e Pr ;40 . able to product tinder that illustrious • - ' B ,ites . lif than 20,000 or 30,000 British-trootss "%ercsal'o those were of a very different deScripticacar9co heroes of the Peninsula. The Noble alluded to th e l e t ter o f L or d C ast l e reagh' t '100 1 0 :" ,Hardenbeirg, respecting the partition cc i Self a and accused his Lordship of setting bi 105 1 0 , 1 , 1 as second Minos, to judge antiproclolr, r , towards whole countries, according .t° ideas of political morality, vvithout all c ol& e l tions visit ings of conscience afthe acts to presumed to give hi s fi at He then ree3l;sisic't mF;ny of his forme' e er 11.6 '4 had said enough to shew that after - wit ichivve had escaped in France, awe e oaf e , t o to reflect whether the situation of the ne c 0 .0 i r. , the d s e' er lol'', racy was such as to enable us to enter flvFy. war with - any hopes of similar advantags, - ilit' ll 3 , we had lately gained. He condeinned tit peratelanguage so generally used towar t o ietic L o o t parte, and was of opinion that the Pr. e ps v ..i of, of so much abuse implicated the soun d° T - „ r 9 5 cause. He declared he would go al man to resist the ambition of BitonaP 3 . r ` - e 'iccns we could not see into the heart of mall' l ot 7 1 , not say that a c h ange i n his moral con4lodelio impossible. He was no believer in t lic ,,eseigh6 tion of his desires ; but if there was a° - re el"o s a • his disposition, was it not possible that th e ' e l ' "ag ° 17° be some change in his policy, when reflect' ,f o re .a causes of his former ruin ? lie might th el " iag convinced of the necessity of abando's% o nc e ,. errors for which he paid so dear. The d i rod gf ts , his age was another, inducement for . e ven 0 tion ; he passed a life so full of gr ea g i t be lli e d • - that he could not resume his exertions.s.t9; great exhaustion of • strength and sP rl iri f ee • st te do s, though his iron frame make the of 0 ; , .ist,'•his physical powers mist fail. Awa re e a , • it - was probable that he would cheerfAill,'Llefe'la all the security we could wish for.-- - A` fe - re as"C' I re it was impossible for cis, by our inte l t giv e f bif establish such a G overn ment as A170' 6 -to •: s . s r least prospect of a permanent po ce tbe - tor country. Did we meau to prosecu te of t io for the extermination of Bllonol°llF'it of o lig the • extermin a tio n o f th e military sP ° . e gav v , French people ! If f or the latter, "rfestr°l to know that the spirit can only • b d ev e „ ll 4l . ed by the extinction of the body; a", ' - the Bourbons were restore d,. they 00 15 -` t - f .pr;',ol to this spirit, whi c h wou ld not catt reo - v cc He next touched upon the prohabilitY ° b e for e c u . of hostilities . on the part of America, ffrail had long been engage d in cite w e a e.wit 3 . 001 0 1 and after eulogising the policy of 13 the which had induced him to a bolisil i.o ot !" ,a is Trade, he digressed to deplore tae f r e e s of Ireland ; whose people could-not :; 111/1-t e rl y act to be done by the,Ciovernment of t ', l ,,,eiclr f . t ,/;t1 to. reinove the disqualifications unsier . ;;; 3 ogto,',,• s e • !laboured, and lay the foundation of '' All and affection in that part of the EmPir e ' o o - ias.s circumstances, he repeated-his hope, "'°,or,• t er the House t o p ause b e f ore they rcsol v l e" a nd it' o n 'log the co un t r y i nto an i rr econcilah . 1 ., 4 4. 5 Minable w a r. H e conc l u d e d b • Flit/v.l— 1 4 'g 0 0 is t li t a i r l e a s t s she' ulii - laeeresented t° his he . ness the Prince Itey,ent,_ thanking. his ito74t cic te ce 'l °; t t "t) , o . st gracious Message, and expressing . the L.' , vt: ito of that House t 9 support all such ineasorte cr ow: rs cessary to suppurt the honour anti cligmity of tbri# all' t F o v e i stalish that intimate concert with the G.r.e., - ' 4 sf . "Pe, which was essential to th e sectlrP) je a'sj't e - wel 'thou g h tiuty were :ti ways ready to concur ill ttieo):•tereo GC . i'.try for these poroo s e,z, the could , nts e!',oll' i" giYing th , ,p;:. tro e Mt' • into colsequen:ly ton ' t,i;e - tt ' utakiota of the Co Uyitt kesvecting the deruil3 of illucti thet were total.l