The Sun. — London, England, 1855-06-19 00:00:00

HOUSE OF LORDS-(YESTERDAY.) The SPEAKER took the chair at 4 o'clock: ?Az .„ tradva AHNI 11v1PE MAL PARLIAMENT. The Loan CHANCELLOR took his seat on the woolsack at five o'clock. Lord LONSDALE presented a petition from Kelso, praying for the prohibition of distillation from grain. FEES IN COUNTY COURTS. Lord BROUGHAM rose to put a question to her Majesty's Government respecting the fees paid in county courts. The noble and learned lord proceeded to state the increasing amount of business transacted in the, county courts since the original act establishing them' had passed, and the proportionate diminution of causes in the superior courts. It was of the utmost importance, considering that the vast majority of causes in the county courts were in regard to sums under 201., that the fees exacted in these courts should be in proportion. What, however, was the fact ? The fees taken in these coasts amounted to about 270,0001. a year. The taxes—not fees, for fees they were not— which were exacted in the superior courts were restricted t only 50,0001. a-year. The noble lord condemned the system, in respect to fees established in the county courts, as most grinding oppression and extortion. It was altog ether in opposition to the s p irit of the act, under th act by which the courts were constituted, which was to render law as cheap as possible to the poor man. He then proceeded to analyse the fees, and summed up his analysis by stating that the amount of fees extorted is in a great many cases 160 per cent be yond the araount sued for.. He drew a distinction be tween the mode by which the judges of the superior Courts were paid and that in which the judges in the County Courts were paid. The former were paid out of the Consolidated Fund, but be considered it disgrace ful that the latter should be paid out of the funds of the court. Lord PORTMAN entirely concurred with all that had fallen from the noble and learned lord who had just sat down. He thought that very great injustice was done to many of the judges of the County Courts. They c omplained not only of the great difference that was made as to their salaries, but that that difference was founded upon no intelligible principle. He hoped that the noble lord on the woolsack and the noble earl who represented the Treasury in this house would give their best attention to the subject. He trusted that the Sec retary of the Treasury would not be allowed to interfere in any way with the successful operation of the act, which was the case by his interfering with respect to the salaries of the judges. Earl GRANVILLE fully admitted the justice of the remarks of the noble lord, but he regretted that he could give no distinct pledge that they would be removed. The noble lord on the woolsack had lately brought the sub ject before the Government. He trusted that this cir cumstance would satisfy the noble" lord ; at the same time he assured him that the matter should receive the serious consideration of her Majesty's Government. After a few words from Lord CAMPBELL, The LORD CHANCELLOR said the whole subject was under the consideration of the Government, as the evil complained of admitted of no further delay. The noble and learned lord sympathised with his noble and learned friend, and regretted that the salaries of the county court judges should fluctuate. At the same time he must say that those judges who did the most work were not those judges who had received increased pay. After a few words from Lord BROUGHAM, the subject dropped. The report on the Leases and Sales of Estates Bill was considered and agreed to. The Infants' Marriage Bill report and amendments were brought up and received, and the third reading fixed for Thursday next. The Insurance on Lives Bill was read a second time. The Cinque Ports Bill was rea3 a second time. The Earl of DERBY rose to propose the names for the select committee for the Religious Worship Bill. The motion was agreed to. The Earl of SHAFTESBURY declined to serve on the committee. Their lordships then adjourned. HOUSE OF COMMONS-(YESTERDAY.) The following bills were read a third time and passed : —Capetown Railway and Dock ; Derbyshire, Stafford shire and Worcestershire Railway (No. 2) ; Glasgow, Xirkintilloch, and Baldernock Roads ; Hoffe's Estate ; Royal Medical Benevolent College; Dagenham Docks; Great Northern London Cemetery. The further consideration of the Torquay District Churches Bill, after some discussion, was postponed. The following bills were considered and ordered to be read a third time :—Dundalk Harbour and Port, Lon don• and Brassington Road, Wadhuret and West Far leigh Roads, West Bromwich Improvement, Westmin ster Improvements, Westminster Land Company. PETITIONS. Petitions were presented by Mr.. Ellice, from Ros common, in favour of the Lord Advocate's Education Bill ; by Mr. Henley, from Oxford, against the sale of intoxicating liquors on the Lord's-day. THE REPORT OF THE SEBASTOPOL COMMITTEE. Mr. ROEBUCK brought up, amidst some cheering, the report of the select committee on the army before Sebas topol, which was then laid on the table. On the motion of Mr. DISRAELI, it was ordered that the report should be react by the clerk of the house. Sir D. LE MARCHANT, the chief clerk, accordingly read the report as follows : " The complicated nature of this inquiry, the variety of subjects investigated, the number of witnesses examined, and the frequent inconsistency and contrariety of the evi dence, render it no easy task to present a clear, definite, and just exposition of the matters submitted to your com mittee. _ "The difficulty of this task has been enhanced by the impossibility of summoning some parsons as witnesses who might have furnished important information. From the same cause some persons are left under imputations, in re gard to which your committee regret that they can pro nounce no conclusive opinion. The fulness of the investi gation has, moreover, been restricted by considerations of state policy,.so that in the outset of this report your com mittee must admit that they have been compelled to end an inquiry which they have been unable satisfactorily to complete. " Havingoffered this preliminary explanation, your com mittee will endeavour to state, as shortly as the subject will allow, the opinions which they have formed in regard to the following heads of this inquiry, viz. "1. The condition of our army beKre Sebastopol. `• 2. The conduct of the departments, both at home and abroad, whose duty it has bean to minister to the wants of that army. " THE CONDITION OF OUR ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL. " An army encamped in a hostile country, at a distance of 3,000 miles from England, and engaged during a severe winter in besieging a fortress which, from want of num bers, it could not invest, was necessarily placed in a situa tion where unremitting fatigue and hardship had to be en dured. Your committee are, however, of opinion that this amount of unavoidable suffering has been aggravated by causes hereafter enumerated, and which are mainly to be attributed to dilatory and insufficient arrangements for the supply of this army with necessaries indispensable to its healthy and effective condition. In arriving at this opinion they have made allowarce for the unexpected severity of the storm on the 14th of November, and they have not been unmindful of the difficulties which a long period of peace, must inevitably produce at the commencement of a campaign. " In order to obtain an adequate notion of the painful condition of the army the evidence must be perused; and your committee will only refer to such details as may be requisite to sustain their opinions. " From the 16th September, when the army landed in the Crimea, until the end of October, or, as witnesses state, until about the middle of November, the troops suffered from overwork and from dysentery, but were not, upon the whole, ill-provided with food. Even at this period there was a want of clothing for the men in health, and D. painful deficiency of all appliances for the proper treat ment of the sick and wounded. As • the season advances! the causes of sickness increased, and the army, with its number of effective men daily diminishing, became more and more disproportioned to the amount of duty which it had to perform. " From the middle of November this army was, during a period of many weeks, reduced to a condition which it is melancholy to contemplate, but which was endured both by officers and men with•a fortitude and heroism unsur passed in the annals of war. They 'were exposed under single canvas to all the sufferings and inconveniences of cold, rain, mud, and snow, on the high ground and in the depth of winter. They suffered from overwork, exposure, want of clothing, insufficient supplies for the healthy, and imperfect accommodation for the sick. " The fatigue necessarily resulted from the inadequacy of the force for the task assigned to it. The British army was a portion of an allied force. The whole scheme of the siege, the extent of front to be defended, the positions to be maintained, and the worksto be undertaken, depended on military considerations, and were decided upon in con junction with our allies. Your committee regard these matters as beyond the limits of their inquiry. ." The other causes of suffering will be reviewed under the following heads - - • 11. . " THE CONDUCT OF THE DEP A.RTMENTS BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD WHOSE DUTY IT HAS BEEN TO ADMINIS TER TO THE WANTS OF THE ARMY. " THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT AT HOME. "The responsibility of the expedition to the Crimea rests upon the home government. The Duke of Newcastle, in his despatch addressed to Lord Raglan, on the 10th of April, 1854, ' directs careful, but secret "inquiry" to be made into the present amount and condition of the Russian force in the Crimea and the strength of the fortres s of the Sebastopol.' And his grace further observes, that ' before siege of a fortress so strong can be attempted, it is neceobtainedssary that information which can be relied on shall be upon n many points on which little or nothing is at pre cot l w second despatch, dated the Dth of June, direcotanti A. at the safety of Cenetantinople having been secured, whatever might be the movement of the Russian forces, no be undertaken, but that in the Principalities should carted for the siege of . s t ei meastires should be at once con , no prospect of a safe ant ' l Sebastopol. `There is,' it is added, fleet peace until the for tress 13 reduced, and the l e: taken or destroyed.' The despatch leaves to Lord Rag a st di h .cretion only `in case of some insuperable impediment, the as a want of ample preparation by either army, possession that which n by Ruisia i of a force in the C rimea g re a t ly oat. number can he brought ag ainst it. n g " The Cabinet appear to have been confident f o success. Lord Aberdeen states it to have been their imp ression that Sebastopol would fall almost immediat e l y by . main. The Duke o f Newcastle says, that he army, after capturing Sebastopol would winter there, o r else, after destroyinc, the fortress, would return to winter on the shores of the * Bosphorus. Sir James Graham has the strongest opinion that the order for the expedition was given at the right time, and was executed at the right time. `• This report shows the results which ensued upon the frustration of these expectations. Your -committee have TT iniaired what information the Govern ment had obtained " 311, induced them to order this expedition. In regard to , r it may be observed that the Duke of Newcastle espatch of the 10th Of April, Wilma:tea the Rile. , the Crimea at 30,000 men, and he believes a expedition , was ordered no more reliable ac counts had been received. Sir James Graham, however, says that at a later period, viz., the last week in July, he had obtained from a Crimean authority a complete ac count of the Crimea, its localities, its harbours, its roads, its productions, and supply of water, and, what was most important of all, a statement of the force, which was esti mated by his informant at 70,000 men, 8,000 of which wete cavalry, 40,000 constituted the garrison of Sebasto pol, and the remaining 30,00) were dispersed through the Crimea' Vice-Admiral Dundas had, on the 10th of May, 1854, written to Lord Raglan a letter, in which, relying upon information which he had obtained, he estimated the Russian forces in the Crimea at 120,000 men. The embas sies at St. Petersburg and Constantinople were unable to furnish any information upon these important subjects. " Lord Raglan, in his despatch of the 19th of July, states that ' the descent on the Crimea is decided upon more in deference to the views of the British Government than to any information in the possession of the naval and mili t-iry authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces or to their state of preparation.' " The terms of reference do not call upon your commit tee to pronounce any opinion in regard to the policy of the Government in ordering the expedition to the Crimea; but it is their duty to report how far the preparations made were adequate to the preparations which h _id been ordered. "The general direction of the war was in the hands of the Duke of Newcastle, who, in the spring of- 1854, held the-office of Secretary for War and Colonies. In July these departments were divided, and the duke being relieved from colonial duties, undertook the immediate conduct of the war. "When this important change was effected it does not appear that any order in council, minute, or other demi- Mont was prepared defining the special duties of the War Department. The duke, as Secretary of State, had un doubtedly, before as well as after the change, ample powers; he considered himself officially responsible for all the de partments under his control, and he could issue such orders as he thought fit for their guidance. He states, however, that he felt his means to ba insufficient for the due per formance of his separate duties its Secretary of State for War; he considered the organisation of all the war depart ments and their relation to each other to be in an unsatis factory state, but he felt it to be impossible, consistently with attention to pressing business, to attempt their re-or ganisation. . "In making the separation between the Secretaryships of War and the Colonies, together with the transference of the commissariat from the Treasury to the Secretary for War, the Cabinet considered that they had adopted mea sures initiatory to other chang es which would necessarily follow. The members of the Cabinet did not, however, hold any consultations upon the changes to be made, or the best mode of effecting them ; they separated, as usual, at the close of the Parliamentary session in August, and as they were not summoned to a meeting, they du not re assemble in council until the second week of October. At a later period of the year Lord John Russell expressed his dissatisfaction with the state of the War Department, and suggested Lord Palmerston as the fittest person for the office of Secretary of War. He adduced some cases where he said there had been a want of vig our in the exercise of authority, although the Cabinet, he added, had done much in its recent meetings to repair omis si - Ins.' Your committee notice with regret that the Cabinet did not meet in August or September, when these omissions might have been sooner remedied. Lord John Russell also observes, that the House of Commons would expect, after six or seven months' deliberation, a final arrangement of the War Department. Your committee can find no trace of these deliberations ; and any evils that may have resulted from delay in such arrangements are, therefore, properly laid to the charge of the Cabinet. "At the dato of the expedition to the East no reserve was provided at home adequate to the undertaking. Mr. Sidney Herbert states, in his memorandum of the 27th of November, ' The army in the East has been created by discounting the future. Every regiment at home, or within reach, and not forming part of that army, has been robbed to complete it. The depots of battalions under Lord Raglan have been similarly treated. -" The men sent out to reinforce the army were recruits who had not yet become fit for foreign service, and the depots at home were too weak to feed the companies abroad. " The order to attack Sebastopol - was sent to Lord Raglan on the 29th of June ; the formation of a reserve at Malta was not determined upon until early in November. "It will be seen from the correspondence between Lord J. Russell and Lord Aberdeen, that Lord Raglan bad re ported that `he wished he had been able to place in the position of Balaklay.s, on the 26th of October, a more con siderable force,' and also, `that on the sth of November the heights of Inkerman were defended by no more than 8,000 British infantry." When the Duke of Newcastle in formed Lord Raglan that he had 2,000 recruits to send to him, he replied that `those last sent were so young and unformed that they fell victims to disease, and were swept away like flies. Ile preferred to wait. "In December the power of reinforcing the army with efficient soldiers was so reduced that the Government thought it necessary to introduce a Foreign Enlistment Bill for the purpose of raising a foreign legion. " Your committee must express their regret that the formation of a large reserve at home, and also in the proxi mity of the seat of war, was not considered at a much earlier period, and that the Government, wall knowing the limited numbers of the British army, the nature of the climate in the East, as well as the power we were about to enco , inter, did not at the commencement of the war take means to augment the ranks of the army beyond the ordi nary recruiting, and also that earlier steps were not taken to render the militia avail ble both for the purpose of ob taining supplies of men, and also, in case of necessity, for the relief of regiments of the line stationed in garrisons in the Mediterranean—measures which they found themselves compelled to adopt at a later period. "THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR. " On accepting the Secretaryship fur War, the Duke of Newcastle found himself in this disadvantageous position --he had no separate office for his departments, he had no document prescribing his new duties, no precedents for his: guidance, and his under secretaries were new to the work. In this situation he undertook the superintendence of nu merous departments, with whose internal organisation be was dissatisfied, and the management of a war urgently requiring prompt and vigorous operations. "The duke was imperfectly acquainted with the best mode of exercising his authority over the subordinate de partments, and those departments were not officially in formed of their relative position, or of their new duties to wards the Minister for War. His interference was sought for in matters of detail, wherein his time should not have been occupied, and he was left unacquainted with trans actions of which he should have received official cognisance. Feeling his large responsibilities, he took upon himself to remedy innumerable deficiencies which were brought to his notice, and, in the meantime, matters of paramount necessity were postponed. "The evidence, moreover, shows that the duke was long left in ignorance, or was misinformed, respecting the pro gress of affairs in the East. He was not, until a late period made acquainted with the state of the hospitals at Scutari, and the horrible mode in which the sick and wounded were conveyed from Balaklava to the Bosphorus. Lord Aberdeen has significantly observed that the Government were left in ignorance longer than they ought to have been of the real state of matters in the East. The Ministers, he says, were informed of the condition of the army from the public papers and private sources long before they heard it offi cially, and not hearing it officially they discredited the rumours around them. Thus, while the whole country was dismayed by reports, and was eagerly looking for some gleam of official intelligence, the Cabinet, according to the statement of Ministers, was in darkness. " Harassed by these rumours, and perplexed by the in discreet silence of those who should have enlightened him, the duke sent a commission to inquire into the state of the hospitals at Scutari and in the Crithea. Tho commission was issued in October ; it did not report until April. A form of proceeding suited to. Fet: ress grievances at home, or to become a basis for legislative- measures, was ill adapted to relieve the pressing wants of 5,003 men suffering under mismanagement and neglect. • " With the same benevolent intention, the duke, through the channel of the Foreign-office, requested Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to take upon himself, in addition to his many onerous duties, a certain amount of supervision and assist ance of those hospitals. " The clothing of the troops was not within the province of the Secretary of State • and the Duke of Newcastle says it vas extremely doubtful whether he had any right to in terfere. The soldiers nad , received the ordinary supply for the Sear; yet the peculiar circumstances in which the army had been placed induced the duke to recommend to the - Commander-in-Chief that an extra supply should be furnished, and, in addition to this, warm clothing should be prepared to meet the inclemency of the weather. The system of c l o thi ng th e army was then, and still is, in a state'of transition. Whenever the existing contracts cease, the clothing will be supplied by the Ordnance, or by a clothing depart rent. "The warm clothing was considered so important that, upon hearing of the loss of the Prince steamer, all the mili tary departments were occupied with this supply. The Secretary for War issued orders; the Secretary at War was constantly atd the Ordnance, urging and hastening these proceedings ; clothing was bought also in Austria and in Switzerland. Ambassadors, ministers, consuls, and agents were applied to for assistance ; money was profusely ex pended, and at a later period in the winter the troops must have received a supply far larger than was required' for their reduced numbers. "THE SECRETARY AT WAR. _ _ "The duties of the Secretary at War are shortly stated by Mr. Sidney Herbert; they will be foUnd More fully enumerated in a memorandum, which was given in evidence before the committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure in 1850. " The division of the Secretaryship of War and Colonies, though technically it did not alter the position of the Secre tary at War, yet practically diminished the exercise of his powcr, and tangled to limit his functions to the original duties of his office, namely, the financial business of the army. Even in these matters the authority of a Secretary of State, when exerted, must necessarily over-ride the control of a Secretary at War. Mr. Sidney Herbert, as Secretary at War, had no power to originate anything; bat from praiseworthy motives, and with a view to relieve the Duke of Newcastle, he undertook to do a duty which was not the business of his office. Thus, in December, having learnt from private sources the creplorable condition of the hospitals, he wrote to the commandant, to the chief medical officer, and to the purveyor, urging and authoris ing them to procure whatever might be wanted, assistants, supplies, or additional buildings, promising them his ap probation for such outlay, and placing unlimited funds at their disposal. " While expenditure was thus encouraged, some finan cial regulations were still enforced, suited to a time of peace, inapplicable to a period of war, and operating un justly on the soldiers who had been wounded or afflicted with sickness in the Crimea. According to these regula tions every soldier coming into an hospital is obliged to bring with him his kit; but although the troops, upon landing in the Crimea, had been deprived of their knap sacks, which in many cases were never restored, yet no or der had been issued to furnish another set in lieu of those articles which the soldier had been compelled to relinquish, and which are essential to his cleanliness and comfort. Again, upon leaving the hospital, men were exposed.to recurrence of sickness from insufficient clothing, and no proper arrangement had been made to furnish this supply. " An improvement, involving some outlay, has been suggested to your committee, which deserves the attention of the Executive Government.. The general hospital at Chatham is said to be inconveniently situated, and ill suited for the reception of invalids from the seat of war. Vessels of large size cannot go there, and consequently the sick and wounded have either to be removed to a smaller ship, or sent by other means to the place of their destina tion. At the same time your committee may remark that while hospitals are provided for the reception of officers' in the navy r e t urn i ng s i c k or woun d e d, no such accommo dation exists for officers of the army. evils which You "Your committee arisenitteamayfrhoro s ere also express soldiers' a di h e o r r w th iv a e t s th to e a o e f ee ,t,h m Ais p m s. ei n er y moi. a: r _ a a n r7 in the field will prevent a repetition um will be found in thppdix, ar ortine. t e by the D u k e o f Newcastle,e ' a but en written p by Mr. Sidney Herbert in January last. His views upon the best mode of constituting the War Department, and giving to it an effective control over the subordinate,departments, and here explained, as far at least as he deems it advisable to introduce a change daring the pressure of war, which leaves little leisure for re-constituting the military depart ments. a . l Vil.f THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY, EVENING, JUNE 19,_ 1658, which it must have been known the 'casualties of ivar would render indispensable. " THE TRANSPORT SERVICE IN THE BLACK SEA. "The evidence exhibits a marked contrariety of opinion as to the responsibility for the transport service in-the Black Sea. Sir James Graham said that the naval comMander in-chief, Viee-Admiral Dundas, had, under the Queen's regulations, authority over the whole of the transports, and he cited, in confirmation of this statement, 'sundry minutes of the Board of Admiralty; and he added that Lord Raglan had a concurrent authority over this service. " Vice-Admiral Dundas, on the contrary, alleged that he had nothing to do with the transports. According to bis statement, they were entirely under the management of Lord Raglan, Rear-Admiral Boxer, and Captain Christie. " Captain Milne, the member of the Board of Admiralty who had the superintendence of the transport department., stated that the admiral commanding in the Black Sea was responsible for the transport service in that sea. A supreme power was, however, given to Lord Raglan, woo had a veto over the movement of all the transports, and a con current authority with the naval commander-in-chief. " The difficulties of performing various services connected with the army are ascribed to the want of sea transport ; while the evidence of Captain Milne shows that no applica tion was made to the Admiralty for additional transports in the Black Sea. Numerous witnesses testify to the want of arrangements in the harbour of Balaklava, and to the dis • order of the shore from the want of any suikeient landing places and wharves. " In Balaklava there was a division of authority ; the transports were under the immediate direction of Captain Christie; the harbour was under the management of another ' naval officer, and the shore was subject to military autho ' rity. 'Absence of regularity and arrangement on the shore or ip, harbour necessarily delayed the service of the trans ! ports ; in such cases it was not easy to ascertain on which of these three authorities the blame should rest. "The narrow limits of the harbour, which is described by Admiral Dundas as a, mere ditch, rendered it, under the best system of arrangement, an inconvenient place forland ing the vast quantities of stores required for the army, in cluding guns, ammunition, engineer stores, &seines, ga • biene, camp equipage, quartermaster-general's stores, and commissariat supplies. " The want of system which prevailed on the shore is gmerally admitted ;the harbour was not governed with the authority necessary for the maintenance of orkler, and the transports were compelled to anchor outside the harbour — an anchorage which naval men justly considered to be un safe. • " THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. " Your. committee deem it unnecessAry to state the various duties of the Ordnance Department, nor need they enter into details with the view of proving th upon the efficiency of this department the naval and military ser vices depend. " In April, 1854, Lord Raglan, the Master-General of the Ordnance, was appointed to the command of the forces in the East; and shortly afterwards Sir Hew Ross was named lieutenant-general of the Ordnance—an office which had been for many years abolished, but which was now re vived. _ _ " Lord Aberdeen, in making this appointment, had to some extent in view the abolition of the office of Master- General. Thu subject had not, however, been considered by the Cabinet, and in the meantime the Ministers believed that the Lieutenant-General would have all the authority of Master-General. " The Lieutenant-General does not possess this power. He is only a board officer ; and while in reference to mill- • tary duties he exercises the ti athority of Master-General, yet as regards the civil functions of the Ordnance he acts only as a member of the board. " The Board of Ordnance, moreover, differs from other boards in this respect—namely, that according to the prise. tice or to the regulations of the department, the presence of one board officer constitutes a board. During the sum mer and autumn of 1854, a board officer, the Surveyor- General, was also emuloyed abroad ; so that during a period when the pressure of business was heavier, and when the expenditure of this department was larger than in any previous year, two officers were wanting whose functions the most economical administrations had been unable to dispense with in times of peace. " The Ordnance, even with its peculiar constitution, may work efficiently while under the superintendence of a vigilant Master-General, who has supreme authority, and who is, therefore, justly held responsible for all its pro ceedings ; but the substitution of a lieutenant-general changes the whole system of the office ; its duties are then divided among the members of the board without any su pervising authority, and the business commenced by one member may be taken up or interrupted by another with out unity of purpose, and without due responsibility. " The evils arising from the absence of the Master-Gene ral are abundantly exhibited in the evidence. The state ments of Sir T. Hastings, the Comptroller of Stores, and of Mr. Monsen, the Clerk of the Ordnance, amply prove the unsatisfactory state of this department, while it would seem, from the language of Sir Hew Ross, that he was im perfectly acquainted with the constitution of the board of which he was a member. " From the evidence it will be seen that a conflict of au thority arose between the members of this board. At a time when urgent business required their attention they were engaged in disputes, in preparing statements, and in making appeals to the Secretary of State for War. Sir Thomas Hastings says, that although he made more than one application informing the Secretary of State that he had important communications to make to him, he received no answer to his letters. Mr. Monsen, when he differed from the other members of his board, applied to the Sec retary of State, who, by lending his sanction to the Clerk of the Ordnance, enabled him to overrule both his col leagues, and thus interfered in a matter involving ques tions of military discipline, as well as of departmental sub ordination. In noticing the unseemly conduct of this board, and the differences which were brought prominently for ward in the evidence, your committee observe with regret that the public service has suffered from the want of judg ment and temper on the part of officers who were en trusted dui ing a critical period with important public duties. " Your committee consider that it was detrimental to the public service that the office of Surveyor-General should have remained so long vacant, and that the duties attached to that. office should have been consequently im posed upon officers of the department who had already as much upon their hands as they were able to perform effici ently. " Your committee believe that Lord Aberdeen would have acted more beneficially for the public service if he had appointed another Master-General when Lord Raglan could no longer discharge the duties of the office, and they are of opinion that a vague intention of remodelling the Ordnance Office affords no justification for the course pursued. If this office were deemed to be imperfect, and ill-adapted for its functions, there was the more need during its continued existende of an able man to superintend its proceedings. The Ordnance-office strikingly exemplifies the disordered state into Which a department may fall when there is no able hand to guide it. " After perusing the evidence, it will excite no surprise to find that the arrangements attempted by this office in reference to warm cluthing, huts, and Millie rifles were imperfect and dilatory. Huts were ordered at Constanti nople and Trieste, as well as in this country. The first order here was issued on the 17th Of ,Novemb3r. Whea the huts at length arrived at Balaklava, the exhausted transport service was unable to convey them to the camp. It appears from the evidence of Sir J. Burgoyne and Sir F. Smith that if canvas had been sent for doubling the tents, and planks for flooring, effectual shelter for the troops would have been provided at a much earlier period, and at a smaller.cost. It is impossible not to believe by these means the sickness and suffering of the troops would have been diminished. " Your committee must express their dissatisfaction with the administration of the contract system under this department, and they consider that no change will be effective which does not lead to a revisal and amendment of this branch of the office. "The tools supplied to the army are stated to be of bad quality. Under a recent order the Ordnance furnish all tools. The pioneers' tools were heretofore supplied by the colonels of regiments. For this last supply the Ordnance is not responsible. The officers examined almost uniformly describe the tools supplied to the army as unserviceable. Sir T. Hastings, on the other hand, states that hebdlieves the great mass of tools were good, but thinks that many have been ill-treated, and that good tools in the hands of men who do not understand them may be readily destroyed.' There is; however, no doubt, that upon previous occasions as well as in the present campaign, these articles of field equipment have been condemned. In this country under a proper system of contract and inspection there can be no difficulty in obtaining tools of the best quality. The supply of inferioi tools must ba ascribed to carelessness or disho nesty on the part of the parsons responsible for the supply. Your committee cannot ton forcibly express their opinio❑ of the importance of placingin the handsof the soldiers the very best articles that can be provided. " While the committee have felt it their duty to make theseobservations on the inadequate and disordered state of this department, and its failure in some important func tions, they feel bound, at the same time, to mention the admirable equipment of the corps of artillery attached to the army; and the testimony generally given to the effi cient armament provided for the navy. " THE TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT AT HOME. "The sea transport between this country and the seat of war has been conducted by the Board of Admiralty, under the immediate superintendence of Captain Milne, one of the Lords of the Admiralty. This business was formerly transacted by a Transport .Board, which was abolished many years since. During the past year requi sitions for transport were sent to the Admiralty from several different quarters • the inconvenience o f thi s system was so great, that Sir James Graham says he deemed it indispensable, with the view to regularity and promptitude, to bring .these requisiti ins to one common centre, from which the Admiralty might receive orde. s. This change had not, however, been con pleted before he left office. The Duke of Newcastle says, that no system will work well until the sea.tians e oct is placed under the management of the Minister for War. Such a course Sir J. Graham and Capt. Milne consider ob jectionable ; it would, they - say, divide authority, increase correspondenoe, and lead to confusion ; whereas now the whole service afloat is united together in one link of re sponsibility. " Sir J. Graham was, however, induced to re-constitute the Transport Board, for the reasons which will be found in his evidence. " The mode in which ships were taken up is stated by Capt. Milne, and considering the urgent pressure of the pub service, thisbusiness appears tohavebeen ably conducted. In pronouncing this opinion, your committee advert to the magnitude of the operations executed. Within a year somewhere about 150,000 men and above 700 J horses were conveyed, principally by steam, it large portion of them to a point 3,000 miles distant from this country ; besides which vessels had to be provided for stores to an enormous amount, for the purposes of war, for the sustenance of both army and navy, and for the effective mainte nance of a steam fleet. Sudden requisitions fur huts, and other urgent necessaries, had also to be met. "There is, it is said, an obvious error in comparing the transport service between England and the Crimea to a mercantile arrangement for the conveyance and delivery of a given amount of tonnage. The transports, when sent to the Crimea, could not deliver their stores and return.' A large number were permanently detained, from military considerations, and many otherN were kept at Balaklava, because there were no warehouses on shore to receive their cargo. _ "Many complaints were made to your committee of the mode in which stores were sent to the East. The mods in which stores were sent depended on the nature .of the re quisition.' Naval stores were apparently sent under a satisfactory system. When the Ordnance Board apply, a vessel is placed at their disposal provided they require it '- and, latterly, a s i m il ar s y s t em has been adopted with the medical department. The chief complaints have arisen in reference to mixed cargoes. The captains of the vessels, according to the Admiralty instructious, have charge . of the cargo ; but it is admitted that when large passenger steamers were employed in this service the cap tains were often unaccustomed to these duties, and in such cases the appointment of a supercargo would have been beneficial. Until December it appears that a cargo-book was not regularly kept. A Treasury minute, dated 12th December, 1854, states, that some articles sent out to the Crimea have been taken back to England in the same ves sels, and brought out again to the Crimea before they have been delivered ; and that in other cases, where the vessels have remained with the army, it has been three or four.months before they had been received by the commis sariat. Ships were also so loaded that on arriving at the port to which pat of the cargo was unknown, and the ship had. to proceed on her voyage, carrying with her things that ought to have been delivered at the interme diate port. Much suffering was the consequence of this faulty mode of proceeding, the sick at Scutari being in. need of stores, which, in consequence of bad arrangements, were carried to Balaktava. " The unnecessary sufferings of the soldiers directly re ferable to this neglect form one of the most painful por tions of the evidence; but on what department the blame should rest, whether on the office of the Commander-in- Chief, or of the Secretary-at-War, or of the Secretary of State for War, your commitece are unable to decide. "Dr. Menzies had also, in a report to Major Sillery, the commandant, dated the 7th of August, directed attention to this subject. " No steps having apparently been taken in pursuance of this suggestion, or of that of Dr. A. Smith to the military secretary, on the 25th May, 1854, Sir J. Graham, on the 25th of October, at the instigation of the Duke of Newcastle, wrote a private letter to Vice-Admiral Dundas, request ing him, after conferring with Lord Raglan, to have two large steamers fitted f or this service. On thel receipt of this letter, Admiral Dundas did not, as he states, act, because every one expected to be in Sebastopol in a few days, and moreover he did not consider the transports to be under his superintendence. "Thus it appears that the preparation of ships for the conveyance of the sick and wounded was at first forgotten, andetubsoquently neglected. When it is remembered that out -nf the limited number of the British army, 13,800 were removed, sick or wounded, between the 30th of September and the 17th of February, the dreadful consequences df this neglect may be imagined. No faesight, it is said, could have provided for this large number. Some ships should, however, have been specially fitted for a service "THE TRANSPORT SERVICE IN THE BOSPHORUS. " All transports, upon their arrival in the Bosphorus, were placed tinder the orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer. This officer had been specially selected for this duty by Sir James Graham on account of his professional character and expe rience in matters connected with the embarkation and ais emb akation of troops. He was placed, in the first instance, under the orders of Vice-Admiral Dundas ; but a separate power was 'afterwards given to him within the limits of the Bosphorus, subject always to his reporting to the naval commander-in-chief. " As early as the Bth cf September Rear-Admiral Boxer applied for a ship to be attached to himself, with an expe rienced master, three gixid warrant officers, and a small gang of artificers and mechanics. A compliance with this requ. st would, he said, obviate delay and. unnecessary ex pense in works which could otherwise only be executed by hired artificers. To this applicatiOn the Board of Admi ralty replied, that ' the service being temporary they were not prepared to senjoi out a receiving-ship, with its esta blishment.' On the oth Nov. he repeated his application, but before it had been received the board had reconsidered its dc vision, and had ordered a vessel, i he Melampus; to be got ready for this service. The Melampusaccorlinglysailed in December. Sir J. Graham says he regrets that the first application was not acceded to; and when the hurricane of the 14th Nov., with all its disastrous consequences, is remembered, it is obvious that this unfortunate decision may have increaded the difficulties of that deplorable crisis, and may have subjected Re ,r-Admiral Boxer to some of the charges brought against him. " It must be Observed, however, thatßear-Admiral Boxer had permitted Commanderßorlase, on accouflt of his know ledge in gunnery, to join theforces in theCtirnea, although this officer—having been for three years in the Turkish service—had been specially chosen to assist him. The rear admiral thus lost the person best fitted to communicate with the Turkish authorities at a time when his assistance would have been most useful. " Under such disad vantages he was required to repair the damages of the hurricane, and to forward to the Crimea supplies of every kind iu lieu of those which had been lost. Deputy Commissary-General Smith, anxious tolfulfil the (woes of his office, thought that vessels were delayed fur coaling and watering, and that they were left in positions where the 'loading was rendered unnecessarily difficult. This mismanagement he ascribed to Adwiral Boxer. Hence differences arose between them, and both Lord Raglan and Mr. Commissary-General Filder were even tually applied to on the matter. "Your committee are of opinion that there was some unnecessary detention of transports at ConstAntinople, and that the arrangements for coaling were very deficient ; but as they have not been able to examine Admiral Boxer they canuut pronounce an opinion as to his share of respon sibility. His letters in the appendix show that he exerted himsel strenuously to discharge duties for which it is ad mitted that his means were inadequate, and, if he failed under these difficulties, his subsequent endeavours iu the harbour of Balaklava appeared to have been successful. " THE COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT AT HOME. "The commissariat has been during many years a sub ordinate department of the Treasury ; and although nomi nally transferred to the Secretary for War in the summer of 1834, it was.not placed under his immediate control un til the 22d of last December, when a Treasury minut,) was issuet authorising this arrangement. "Up to that pariod Sir C. Trevelyan, the Assistant- Secret.try of the Treasury, was practically the head of this department. He stated that the forms of the commissariat had been improved and simplified &Hue years ago, and that although persons might inisunlerstand any regulations, yet he did not believe these forms were to be blamed. He would willingly submit them to any practised accountant for his opinion. Deputy Commissary-General Smith says that, as long as regulations are required, none could bo made of a more simple form than those applicable to the commissariat ; 'and he had never heard any complaints arising out of the observances of these forms. "THE COMMISSARIAT IN THE EAST. " It is the duty of the commissariat to furnish the army, when in the , field, with provisions for the men, forage for the animals, and land transport. "Commissary-General Fikter was app6inted by the Treasury to superintend the establishment of the commis sariat in the East. He Was selected, it is said, on account of his experience and special fitness for the charge ; and authority was given him to provide such persons as might be required for the service; ample funds were also placed at his disposal, and ships were ordersd and provided to act under his exclusive directions. " With these large powers, heavy duties were imposed upon him according to an arrangement which appears to have been injudiciously adopted at the cornusenceinent of the campaign. It was determined that there shOuld be only ono store department with the army, and that this should be under the care of the cornmissari tt. From this decision it followed as a consequence that the eJmmissa riat was expected to wake good the deficiencies of many distinct departments. All the miscellaneous articles of equipment which came under the name of quartermaster general's stores were given in charge to the commissariat, and, in addition to these extraneous duties, this depArt meat was required not only to keep a large amount of Ord nance stores, but also to purchase materials and tools in the East for the purpose of the siege. " The military system in this country affords the corn missariat no opportunity of becoesiug acquainted with the army, or of ministering to hi wants ; so that in a campaign the officers of this department find themseives called upsid to furnish supplies in regard to which they may have had uo experience; while the officers and men, being often ignorant of the proper duties of the commissariat, consider this department responsible for everything they may require. " LAND TRANSPORT. " From the first the system of the 11nd transpprt was found to be imperfect. No adequate measures were adopted for its improvement, so that the army, when enc ►mped before Sebastopol, deponded for all its supplies upon a service defective in its organisation and in its superinten dence. " The army landed in the Crimea without the animals necessary for the conveyance of the baggage, or for the removal of the sick and wounded ; much iucouvenience and suffevingresulted from thisdeticieuJy ; but if, as stated to your, committee, every available vessel Wa3 employed for other purposes, the commissariat cannot be held responsi ble. " When the army had encamped before Sebastopol mules and baggage animals were brought over from Varna. On the sth of October Commissary-General Filder asserted that he had transport sufficient fur all the purposes of the army, and sub:flitted to Lord - Raglan a Belleau) for disposing of above 2000. animals, which were at Varna, and which he said wore not wanted, and would . only be an incumbrance in the Crimea. During this same period Sir Edmund Lyons writes, that the transport animals, though in fair r 1 condition, were not sufficient in number. 1- "On the Bth of November the commissary-general was informed that he must prepare for wintering in the Cri mea. At this period he still possessed a large number of baggage animals, and a considerable amount of hay and forage, on board ships, in or near the harbour of Balaklava. " About this period the Commissary-General became alarmed, foreseeing that the conveyance of guns and ammu nition for the siege and for the defence of our position, the removal of the sick and wounded, the distribution of ra tions, of forage, of clothing, of fuel, of medicines, and of medical comforts, beadles numerous other supplies, which, in the position of the army, were scarcely less important, would all be imperilled by a failure in the land transport ; while the service was itself seriously endangered front the. want of shelter and forage for the animals daring the ap proaching winter, and from the bad condition of the roads between Balaklava and the camp. • "Your committee are not aware that any measures were adopted for the protection of the animals from. the incle mency of the season ; Sir John Burgoyne thinks there was a great want, of care, and that in a few la stances whore the animals were attended to they were. preserved. The drivers were inefficient, and, being without proper super intendence, lost, or indolently neglected, the animals en trusted to their charge. i the ca "So 8o tain muchwhom p o , f the suffering of the troops has been ascribed " THE ROAD. to the w re t c h e d , or, as some w it nesses s t a te, the almost impassable condition of the seven miles between Balaklava an was r e t s h p a a t a y s o i b u l r e f o a e r ni t m he it i t a e a e i i t i s cl a e a a a v e c a n a r t e4 he to r a u s a c i e s r : and. what insuperable objects impeded their repair. When the army reached the heights above Sebastopol they fo un d two principal roads from Balaklava to Sebas topol, one the fine Government road, the other, further to the left, a useful farm road. The army held the Woroozoff road up to the time of the battle of Balaklava, in October. Immediately after that action it became. necestary to draw in the outposts, which lost to the army the use of that road ; the other road, however, remained; and was avail able for all purposes until the rains commenced. "On the 13th of November Commissary-Gensral Filder wrote to th euar t erma ster-leneral, expressing his appre hension, an d calling attention to this important subject. "The duty of making and maintaining - roads for the army falls upon the department of the quartermaster general. This o ffieer was /about this time disabled by severe illness. Six J. Burgoyne, tLe chief engineer officer •on the staff, and o th e r military authoritit 3 , state that the soldiers could not, be withdrawn from the trenches for the repair of the road. The men were already.overtasked by military duties; they were growing weaker from day to dey, while their difficulties were increasing. An attempt was made to e . .nploy Turkish troops on this work, but it was soon abaneloned. ." From the 14th of November, the date of the hurri cane, the land transport was gradually redueed in strength, until it almost ceased to exist. The Commissary-General *rites: The men and boasts perished, owing to tliQ fatigue that' undorwe nt in struggling through the deep mad with supplies, and from exposure to wet and cold.' To repair these losses recourse wee had to the depot at Coustauti. nople ; but the waste and consumption of animals exceeded the supply, and the service of the land transport could no longer, be performed by the commi9sariat. • - " The horses of the cavalry were then employed, and thus valuable animals, trained for the duties of the cavalry and artillery, were used and worked to death in services which should havebeeu performed by animals purchased for about 51. or 71. each. "The broken road, and the want of land transport, in creased the confusion of the harbour. Sir E. Lyons ascribes the crowded state of the harbour, and its attendant incon veniences, to the delay in removing cargoett from the ships to the camp. "As far as the information obtcined enables your com mittee to form an opinion, it appears to them that in this matter there was a want of due fore Sight and decision. Early in November when the probable necessity of wintering in the Crimea. was contemplated, energetic means should have been taken to provide and maintain an effective communication between the camp and Bela klava. The road had then already been injured by the traffic, and its condition had excited the apprehensions of the commissary•general, who had called attention to the subject ; if a military force could not be spared, measures should have been takensto obtain other labour in the East, or application should have been made to the Home Go vernment, who might have sent labourers from England. Such precaution would have saved much loss of time, and many valuable lives, and would have contributed to main tain the land transport service in an effective condition. The probable failure of the communication was not, how ever, brought to the notice of the Duke of Newcastle until too late to enable him to take measures in England to pre vent the serious calamities which subsequently arose. " DEPOTS IN THE EAST. ", The consequence resulting from the failure of the transport service would have been in some degree obviated by the formation of depots in the neighbourhood of the camp, or between the camp and Balaklava. " The establishment of depots is a duty specially noticed in the commissariat regulations. • Sir C. Trevelyan states, that in October, Commissary General Frlder was engaged in the formation of a depot near the camp, in order that he might be secure against the contingencies of the weather; but after the action of Balaklava, the commissariat chest was ordered on board ship, and the transports were sent out of the harbour. At this time the abandonment of Ualaklava was contemplated. After this followed the battle of Inkerman, when . the transport service was occu pied in bringing up ammunition, and a few days later came the hurricane and catastrophe.' From this time for ward all the available animals were employed for the daily requirements of the army, and the establishment of depots was relinquished. "At Constantinople Deputy Commissary General Smith established extensive magazines; he states that the sup plies under his charge were fficient, and the arrange ments for the custody and delivery of stores unobjection able. In August, or early in September, he entered into con tracts for a supply of fuel, and could have procured enough for the army throughout the winter, but he was not able to obtain transports for its conveyance ; at the same time the quantity that did reach Balaklava was more than could be carried to the camp. "He trie,i to hire native vessels for the service ; but after the hurricane the masters of these vessels could not be induced to attempt the voyage. According to his evidence, it would appear that at Constantinople he had in store all the supplies which the army would require. No blame can justly be attached to Deputy Commissary- General Smith, nor can he be held responsible for the difficulties and distress which occurred in the Crimea. " COMMISSARIAT SUPPLIES. "FOOD FOR T.'E MEN. • "The Commissariat Department - obtained an abundant supply of salt meat, biscuit, and rum from England. This was furnished by the victualling department of the Admi ralty, on requisition from the Treasury ; and the duty of the commissariat as to these supplies consisted merely in keeping the account and in arranging the distribution. Fresh meat was chiefly procured from Eupatoria, from Constantinople, and from Smyrna. Deputy Commissary General Smith stated that he had at Constantinople 4,000 head of cattle during the winter ready for the consumption of the army,' beside • ?,000 at Smyrna ; and that if he could have obtained sea transport, he thinks he could have sent a regular supply to the army. "The witnesses are not agreed as to the quantity of fresh meat supplied to the army ; the regularity of tho distribu tion depended partly on the zeal and energy of the several commissariat officers, and also on the position occupied by the troops. Until the end of October the rations, it is said, were furnished with regularity, and consisted of fresh meat twice or thrice in the week. Mr. Parker, chaplain to the fist division f r o m th e 28th o f N ovem b er till the 23,1 of January, states that during that period the hospitals were supplied with fresh meat almost every day, but the troops did not receive it, he thinks, above once a-week ; he never knew them, however, to be without rations. Other witnesses say that the soldiers during the winter months suffered occasionally from want of their rations, and more frequently from the irregularity of their issue. In the appendix a statement by a board of officers will be found, in which it is affirmed that the men for days and weeks together went to the trenches with an insufficient weal, and oftentimes with none at all, save a little biscuit and rum. Any result derived from an average of rations issued is delusive, because privation one day is not com pensated by superfluity on another. Even when the men received a sufficient meal, the proportion of salt meat with out an accompanying supply of vegetables was greater than was consistent with the health of the troops. This defici ency of fresh meat, the most wholesome, as well' as the cheapest food, is ascribed to the failure of the sea trans port, the ships having been disabled by storms, and then delayed by repairs ; in one instance all the cattle on board perished from the inclemency of the weather, or from the t - violence of the waves. " Vegetables which, according to the intentions of the government, should Lave been issued gratuitously, were very scantily supplied; indeed several witnesses assert that none were ever seen in the camp. One ship load of vege tables was detained in the harbour until the cargo was de cayed • and at Eupatoria, it is said, there was au immense store of onions lying on, the wharf, while disease; from want of vegetables; was spreading through the camp. The deputy commissary general states that he had an abundaut stock of rice at Constantinople during the time when it was wanted even for the hospitals in the Crimea. Pre served potatoes were, it is said, early in the autumn offer ed to the soldiers, but rejected ; later in the winter, when the supply of vegetables was essential, iL does not appear that the offer was repeated. Coffee, which had been ordered as am extra ration, was distributed to the troops in a green stAte, and there being no means of roasting it) was of little use. The explanation offered to your committee oa this point is not satisfactory. The more immediate comfort of the troops appears to have been overlooked, while ingenious arguments on the volatile aroma of the berry, and on the Turkish mode of Racking coffee, were passing backwards and forwards between Com missary General Filder and the Treasury. " FORAGE. " NV hen the army first encamped before Sebastopol stacks of forage were found in the neighbourhood; these were soon consumed, and henceforward there appears to have been much difficulty in obtaining fodder ft.r the horses. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who•left the heights on the 7th of November, said that his baggage ani mals were frequently without food ; and,that on one occa sion he was obliged to kill 24 ammunition ponies which he had not the. means of feeding. The E old of Lund, com manding the cavalry division, complained repeatedly, from the 29th of September to the date of his departure,' of the condition to which the horses were reduced from Wanes of food. Lord Cardigan mentions the same difficulties, but did not find the pressure se severe until after the sth of November, when his brigade was posted on tha heights. After the hurricane the supply of forage failed, and under the combined effects of work, exposure, and insufficient food, the cavalry gradually ceased to exist as an et.feJtive force. _ ' "To what extent the commissariat is responsible for the deficiency in all these sapplies is a question to which it is not easy to give a definite answer. " Sir C. Trevelyan, speaking as the head of the commissa riat, and desirous of relieving the department from respon sibility, affirms their conduct throughout to have been ir renroa,hablo, and ascribes blame to other persons. Accord ing to his opinion, the quartermaster-general, for whose good intentions he made full allowance, ought to bear the chief responsibility.• Thisofficer,' he says, is responsible for the road to the camp and for the ro..d along the border of the harbour at Balaklava. By him also buildings should have been appropriated for magazines, and stables for the baggage animals should have been provided. - "Sir C. Trevelyan also states that the endeavours of the commissariat were frustrated by the mismanagement of the transports, that there way a want of proper arrange ments in the harbour of Balaklava, and still worse dis order at Constantinople. Rear-Admiral Boxer di.l not,' lie says,.' possess the administrative qualifications requi site fur that important station, and he delayed the Y trans ports in the Bosphorus or appropriated them to other ser vices.' In confirmation of this statement he mentioned the Rockliffe transport and the Jason, which last, he said, had been detained three weeks at. C enstantinople. Seine let , ters from sear-Admiral Boxer will be found in the ap pendix, denying this assertion. Rear-Admiral Boxix also, it appears, in December remonstrated against the irregu lar system pursued by the commissariat in the Crimes; and requested the interference of. the commander of the forces. suggested that some of the largest transports shoubt be strongly moored in Ba4lllava Harbour as float ing depots, and that the smaller steamers should be told off for the special duty of conveying.supplies. " Your committee have not been able to examine Corn miSsary General" leilder or Rear-Admiral Boxer, and they cannot therefore, decide upon whom this blame should rent. . . " Both these officers were, apparently, convinced that the transport system in the Bieck Sea had been ill-cen ducted. Whether, however, the vessels had been injudi cionsly detained as store depots by the commissariat, or improperly employed in other services by the admiral at Constantinople, are questions which your committee can not satisfactorily answer.- These arrangements might with 'propriety, have been reviewed by the high naval and mi litify authorities. They alone hadthe means of deciding these differences, and of enforcing such a system as might best secure the conveyance of supplies with regularity' and dispatch.. " Before closing their observations on the commissariat :department . in the East, your committee notice with plea sure the willing testimony which many n ituesses have borne to the - zeal and energy which some subordinate officers of the commissariat displayed in procuring supplies, and in relieving, as far as they were able, the distress of the troepe during a period of trying exigencies. ' THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT AT HOME. "The Medical department of the army and Ordnance is under a director-general, who has an assistant to aid him in his multifarious duties. Dr. Smith, the director-general, states that he was under the immediate authority of five different superiors—the Commander-in-Chief, the Secre tary of State for War, the Secretary at War, the Master 'General of the Ordnance, and the Board of Ordnance. He further states, that upon the separation of the two depart .ments of. War and Colonies, he received no communication ordering hiatto correspond directly with the Secretary for War. The Duke of Newcastle says, that in August last he' himself told Dr. Smith that the. Secretary of State for War was his real and only master. Had such an airange- Mont been earlier adopted, Dr. Smith says it would have saved labour, while the service .would have been more effi ciently conclucted.. The director-general states that when first heard of the probability that a force could be sant lo'Turkey, he proposed that three medical officers should 'be sent to make inquiries which might be beneficial to the .troops. This suggestion was adopted. H also selected surgeons to be attached to regiments, and gave them dire° , tions for their guidance.' He recommended that ambul ances shOuld be prepared, and an ambulance corps ap pOinted. For this purpose he advised that able - bodied. ,soldiers should be selected. Lord Raglan and Lord Har ding° objected to taking from the ranks effective fighting men, and pensioners were employed instead. Dr. Smith remonstrated in vain. "The entire failure of this corps . , and the subsequent suffering's of the army, 'are "ribuniiantli proVed. "In May, 1831, Dr. S.nith addressed a letter to the mi litary secretary of the Commander-in-Chief, recommending that, ' in the event of the hospitals being established at t_t distance from the army, ships should be fitted for the tran `• sport of the sick and wounded.' This application was not I attended ti). " Before the army left England the most experienced pur veyors were assembled by order of the Secretary atWar, and after consultation with the Director• General of the Medical Depaitment, they drew up a report in regard to the stores required for the medical treatment of the troops. " Dr. Smith states that he issuel orders to the druggists for the supply of medicines ; he made requisitions on the Ordnance for the hospital stores, and through the Ordnance to the Admiralty . for the supply of medical comforts. The system pursued at to medical comforts was altered after Sept., when Dr. Smith provided this supply. Respecting the hospital ,stores. Dr. Smith says, that when he had made his requisition on the Ordnance his duty ended. His office had no further information on the subject; that he occasion ally applied or sent to ascertain what had been dome, but that this was outstepping the functions of his department. "The strict economy enforced during a long period of peace, by means of a rigid system of audit and account, may doubtless, at the first outbreak of war, have still fettered Dr. Smith, Ls well as other public servants, who dreaded to incur responsibility for any expedition, however urgent, which was not guarded by all .the forms and documents usually required. An excess•of caution, in the first in stance, led probably to some evils, which a lavish outlay could not afterwards repair. The letters of the Secretary at War, read by him ip his evidence, forcibly illustrate this observation. In many cases instructions in this mat ter might have been useful to public servants, whose expe rience was wholly founded oath) methods rightly insisted upon during peace. "THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT IN THE EAST. " The army, 'when sent to the east, had a greater num ber of.medical-wen in proportion to the number of the troops than' ever before accompanied a British army, and the witnesses generaily concur in testifying to their zeal and efficiency ; many of these were, however, disabled by sickness before-the descent on the Crimea, so that after each of the actions, at Alma and Inkerman, some regi ments had net the requisite number of medical men. The ambulances for the conveyance of the sick and wounded were too heavy, and ill adapted for their purpose. " The treatment of the sick and wounded in the camp at Balakiava and Scutari has already formed the subject of a lengthened report by commissioners specially appointed for this purpose; further information upon this point will be found in the evidence already presented to the house. Tho condition of the tent-hospitals, as described by Mr. Parker, chaplain to the First Dirision, was, from the 28th of November to the 231 of January, the period of his stay in the Crimea, so wretched and painful to heAr, that your committee gladly avoid repeating those deplorable details. The medical men, it is said, were indefatigable in their attentions; but so great was the want of the commonest necessaries, even of bedding, as well as of medicines and medical comforts, that they sorrowfully admitted their services to be of little avail. " The hospital at Balaklava bad an advantage, inasmuch as it was nearer to the limited supplies which were on board ship but the uncertainty whether or not Balaklava could be retained, disconcerted the arrangements of this hospital, and upon one occasion t bepatients were removed. TR regard to its subsequent condition, there is a difference of opinion, depending probably upon the dates of the several visits ; but the prevailing testimony is to the effect that this hospital was for many weeks in a discreditable state. "Allowance must be made for the circumstances in which the continued possession of Balaklava was held, and for the difficulty of establishing a hospital in such build ings as were found there. The want of proper orderlies, the insufficiency of Medicines, especially of opium ; of medical comforts, some of which were essential to the health of the men, and the great want of purveyor's stores, have been so fully set forth in the report of the commis sioners, that your committee deem it superfluous to adduce further evidence in corroboration of their statements. They will, therefore, proceed to observe u2on " THE HOSPITALS AT SCUTARI. " When the army arrived in the E Let various places were suggested for hospitals, but Scutari was eventually decided upon as the fittest for the purpose. " The sytseta of regimental hospitals was adopted in the first instance, and the general hospital was not established until the army moved to Varna. " The Duke of Newcastle says that he did not issue any instructions as to hospitals; he left that to be executed by the medical board. Di. Smith, the director general of the medical department of the army, says that he hail nothing to do with these hospitals, and that his interfer ence could only have caused confusion. He selected medical men for the hospitals, and he sent to the Ordnance araqui sit!on to provide hospital furniture proportioned to the amount of force, and there his duties ended. " Your committee, after hearing evidence affirming the disgraceful state of the hospitals at Scutari, endeavotired to ascertain by whom the chief authority was exercised, and on whom the responsibility must rest. Major Sillery was commandant, and had sole military chargesof all the hospitals. Dr. Menzies was superiuten deut of all the hospitals, having immediate charge of the Turkish Hospital, with Dr. M'Gregor under his orders, in charge of the Barrack Hospital. Dr. Menzies was ap pointed by Lord Raglan, on the recommendation of Dr. Dutnbreck and Dr. Hall, and remained superintendent from the 26th of June, 1854, to the 2d of January, . 1855. He alleges that during a portion of this time he was placed in an arionidlcius position, by the arrival, on the 4th of _November, of Dr. Cumming, his superior officer, who bad been sent from England as member of the commission of inquiry, and to supersede him in his office when the in quiry of that commission had been brought to a close. " When the expedition sailed for the Crimea Major Sillery gave instructions to Dr. Menzies, in pursuance, it is said, of directions through Rear-Admiral Boxer, from the Duke of Newcastle, repeated by Lieut.-General Sir George Brown, to report on the accommodation that could be provided in the hospitals for the sick and wounded who might be expected from the first operations of the army ; Dr. Menzies' report, dated the 7th of August, will be found in the evidence.. Dr. Menzies in this report impresses on the local military authorities, as Dr. A. Smith had before done in his letter to the military secretary at the Horse Guards, the mcessity of providing fit transports for the conveyance of the sick and " Dr. Hall, the inspector-general of the army, was sent by Lord Raglan to inspect the hospitals in October. He remained at Scutary about three weeks, and then reported them ' to be in as good a state as could be reasonably ex -pected.' Dr. Menzies reported periodically to Dr. Hall, as his official chief. Dr. Menzies, although concurring in the opinion of Dr. Hall, appearb'subsequently to have made several appeals to the . dbinnialidaht and to the pur veyor for means of improving the condition of the hospi tals ; but either no measures, or no efficient and adequate measures, seem to have been adopted for the purpose. "In justice to Dr. Menzies it must be admitted that he was engaged in incessant and onerous duties. He was con sulted in all difficult surgical cases—ho performed the must • serious operations himself. His time was occupied in in validing men, holding boards, making monthly returns and quarterly returns, daily reports and weekly reports; reports to Dr. Hall, who was satisfied with the hospitals ;• reports to Dr. Smith, who could nut interfere ; reports to the Duke of Newcastle, who was never informed of the real state of things. Amid all these labours he had nq time left for that - which should have been his principal duty— the proper superintendence of these hospitals. " Dr. Menzies_ states ' that he was overwhelmed by the work of the three deputy inspectors whea he gave up his charge,' his health being then broken down.' rhis state ment is confirmed by Dr. Dumbreck, who, having heard Dr. Menzies' evidence, says P the clashing of respondbility and Confusion th a t existed in the administration of the hospita s was not creditable to our system ; we seem to have fallen' into a state of inanition ; we had no purveyors, no orderlies, no hospitel corps. Dr. Menzies I believe to have been clearly overworked, and pot in a position no man was able to cope with.' "The duties of Dr. Menzies was further obstructed by a conflict of authority with the purveyor, wbo claimed to act independently, under the instructions of the Secretary at War. When one purveyor had been pronounced by a -me dical board unfit for the active duties of his office, and was about to be removed; he was retained in this responeible situation by superior authority. All 'doubt as to the pitho rity of the purveyor would have been removed by proper instructions from the Secretary at War. .These were rot, however, sent until the 14th of November. • "Your committe oust declareit to bo their opinion that blame attaches to Dr. Menzies, inasmuch as he did not report correctly the circumstances of the 11; , 3 1 ,ital ; he stated that he wanted nothing in the shape of stores or medical conafortsat the time when his patients were desti• tut!) of the commonest necessaries. • _ _ "With this confirmation by Dr. Dumbreck, deputy; inspector-gener a l o f h osp it a l s, o f th e w h o l e testimony 're lciting to this painful subject, your committee are totally at a loss to comprehend the report of Dr. Hall, more espe cially with regard to the Barrack Hospital, the scene of so much misery and suffering. The Duke of Newcastle states • that the disgraceful condition of the hospitals was fist brought under his notice in the middle of October.' - Dr. Hall was at Scutari from the 3.1 to the 23d of that'inonth. Dr. Hall's report seems to have misled' both Lord Raglan and the Government at home, and to have occasioned much delay in measures taken afterwards for the remedy of the evils, which might have been arrested eat Tier iu their - progress: • - "The office of purveyor had been, with four exceptions, discontinued for many years, and there was difficulty in findiug a person competent to perform these duties. .vThe selection of Mr. Ward for this post was not fortunate ; among other proofs Of his unfitness, it appears that when an inquiry was instituted into the amount of tho purvey or's stores, no account could be! produced of any stores later than the end of-August. When it is remembered that the insuffiSiency of these stores was a source of much suffering, if not of more fatal results', it must be observed that heavy (responsibility attaches to the commander-in chief of the forces, who, acting on the representation of the quartermaster-general, retained Mr. Ward in his office after he had been pronounced unfit to discharge its duties. The Secretary at War Lad said, ' There can be no objec tion to try Mr. Ward, as I will promise, if he is not effi.- chant, we will remove him.' When, however, the appoint ment had been made the commander of the forces had the sole authority, and overruled the decision of the medical board. The appointment of Mr. Wreford, who was sent out as purveyor in chief, did not remove those difficulties, The distinct duties of Mr.• Wreford an d Mr. were not understood by these officers, and the conf . uss t o h n e was increased by new uncertainty. Mr. Max s wl ll ' haN „ commissioner, who was, sent to inquire, seem returned undecided in opinion as to which hese two officsrs was answerable for the supply of stores. w " The apothecary's department et S cuta r i i in better condition. His store was the •geerA thes was not ne n only for the hospitals. but for the army in d ep ot yet he had no account of his stores, and under what November. Your committee are not w 2 in his books from the 11th of September tn.crtiheeae2Betnhtroyf r : j e ct icn at War Secretaryof duty. instructions he was acting ; but the latcaeie admits that such conduct we S s Government stores, since c h e a 11 Mr. been s : It is, moreover, manifest that s s. ths i deceived in regard to these hospital Chef u g h There f o r e Herbert had stated in Houseof forms have been all manner tbe of Commons, thst they never could be pro these stores could be issued. With plenty materials, the forms were so cumbrousnecessary for the purposes of a now proved that if there were t m lu i c li e t i a i r w y i h th os t p h it e a r l a . p h i li t t y is cumbrous forms incouveniencing the service of the hospi tal, and aggravating the sufferings of the patients, there were at least no f orms to protect the p ublic p urse against negligence or peculation. The distress in these hospitals would have been more severe, and the sufferings more p rivate charity had tot stepped in to redre ss the Of o cial mismanagement. Assistance which a cute, eviifieffi m had b t eacbeeesnsen titiiasciofruoragtehde lives asstrperfluous was eventually found to of the patients. When the quantities of hospital stares which were sent from England are contrasted with the scarcity, or rather the absolute dearth of them at Scutari, and when the state of the purveyor's accounts is remembered, it is impossible not to harbour a suspicion that some dishonesty has been practised in regard to these stores. From the returns in the appendix it appears that before the-24th of July 5,717 bedsteads, 9,000 beds and paillasses, 7,140 complete hospital dresses, 5,000 linen and flannel s hirts, with a full propor tion of other arti c l es , an d u t ens ils of 11 descriptienas were ordered by the medical board to b e su pp lied and shippedll the Board of Ordnance. A committee of the house coda not efficiently prosecute an investigation into the &sal p 'sr' ance of these stores, but the subject well deserves the con sideration Of the executive government. "In order to show the dread ful discomfort of the me t h in the neglect on the p iof the authoritiee, it may s ufficient to State that in the Barrack H os p ital at Scut! during the mu: th of November, while there were shall° 2,600 patients in that hospital, the whole number of still washed was only six. At a later period it is fair to add the this glaring evil was mitigated. "Major Snlery, either unprovidcd with spec'al instrii?" tions for such an emergency, or unacquainted with his powers and authority as military commandant, enro l.° e ost incurhaf u e le6e sTt. hu er hospitals Tkri sel ,'Tore responsibility dssuei abundant b. requited ludi his tnydf o ooa r rfn d tdet directing re e . oc ot if H ntg e hpwr payment removalay e l unp r o v lied have been completely paralysed in his attemp° govern staff. Mr. Stafford states that Major Sillery. WO * ll l l o,, e r that the military officer in command at any stations general hospitele are established possesses authority to or direct expeoditure, and to meet all cases of emergencT _ e " The immediate. measures taken by necessity beyond those provided for by the esteblisnea mgehfeonuithtfeto : we t haerevsilwtad evidence regulations of the War Office. home—when the condition of the hospitalths ewaasu'tinholeititergesj; ea ter brought to their knowledge: by the press and bY Pri or , information than it had been by the medical officers d thei n " the appointment of the commission of inquirY, a n . a , plc, structions to her Majesty's ambassador at Constaaea °on. which will be found in the appendix. The c ouiref i e t we ., eider this lest step to have been as injudiciousn a ~ i f -unavailing for the purpose for which it was inte detterioss the division and uncertainty of responsibility wa s s e rt s . ero ece evil, the evil could only he increased by the int nor ~011. necticn with our military administrate ei. . of another authority, having neither relation to ' nat e ru e ct a i nl to the ambassador to provide on applicatio rao" e to jai' supplies for the wants of the hospitals, would seem „ .es 00 the commandant himself of the powers he ply that the authorities at home were as little Iva" commissaries and purveyors. ' with an " The want of an energetic governing anthori y; efficient adequate staff to maintain constant inspectional]: been th discipline, appears to your committee to b aps been ie chief cause of all the evils; 5000 or 600 0 w en t 'l control of hospital, require the care, superintendence, a The i ember is an-efficient general officer as much as the Barney a ough t c°t the field. Mr. Herbert says that 'Major Siller; bis reili. to have been left in the command of the hoent f was that according to his own light, but that be ..--s not tai y rank was not sufficient;' that his ' b h d s aepa rtine nt f , Major Sillery worked very indefatigably in ‘ee 1 a Wa n ° Posses:ea over the the rank in the army and the weight VI to f o ch 0 have had, to be at the head of an establisbuienbt to h s vo gigantic character ;' that a genera offir 0..„,,ii, been appointed from this countrY, with nd at Scutari oreenli Lord Hardiege states, ' that the column' f higher rank a t to have been entrusted to an °fficer °f rthtes, that, greater influence.' And Mr. Herbert -- n ti a thegr eetcala e the great pressure upon these hospitals, a while they Nor mities that occurred in them, took Pie ce under the command of Major SllerY. d Reis!' to have " It mayhot have been possible for Lor a ft- for this service. spared such an officer with a s ufficient s . t i o n in the rnei:, in the pressing circumstances of his P pai s t were c et e rl )our committee regret that naeasure _ o _, aog am, etas e 110, 0 oflot to taken either to reinforce the staff under le e ril en 'il, for !' ,l " . to have enabled him to provide more enacrestiarelothCl4. command, or to send out on the eueergencYtr; natter ar7 of sufficient rank from England. Wh ile Lord Itail.'"e_ subsequently under consideration at hone e'erseded .11100.1gret. appointed Lord William Paulet, who suPfluee °IS Sillery in the beginning of December. Th?. m . peuleter castle sent especial instructions to Lorded l4l . lll ; a r r . Id — er b e., el o , t ! the sth of January, which were follow nY t ; Lord " . further instructions on the 16th. It is fsia ~,,o stetet_eat Paulet to add, that a gradual amendment i ta tito ing h his 36' the hospital took place from the time of cs r e entah l c command. ; ar e ar r k i : o t but r u ai " Your committee, in conclusion, that the first real improvements iu the a3ttrihuted tesoPevo tion of the hospitals at Scutari are to he; ar i es te h tout veto suggestions, private exertions, and sebscrip ,ewe' lence. (Hear.) A freed, raised by Pn be Tinto 'lota was administered by the proprietors oa, we t en d a'* vite . paper, through Mr. Macdonald, au intelile _4 .4 h'ar ' d ~, agent. At the suggestion of the Secretaarlyie'ed a ba , 1 1` . Nightingale, with admirable devotion, erg._ A '' s a wo uncl a st e , nurses, and u dertook the care of landsietea, after „1e,.. The Hon. Jocelyn Percy, the lion. stag •, a P ets dolphin Osborne, and Mr. Augustus Ste e n , r_ , ° lss atere e r e b soual inspection of the hospitals, furnish , t b v ese ole os .9_, a , and suggestions to the Government. By ewee were rai" suffering was alleviated, the spirits of th c hief Fe ints and many lives were saved. (Hear.) to t he ~oe in " Your committee have now adverted 00,,ttoo s ; - thesi contained in the replies to above 2 1 , 0 'J ae divid ed t ee re' noticing these various subjects they ha uudee distinct heads, iu order fairly to MT ortion rro , sponsibility. of t he a the feria bleb " Your committee report that the sti unde r w este j, un xe to the resulted mainly from the circurestals _ editiontelisj the expedition to the Crimea was underta The Administration which ordered that r e f the f erces •th tb u adequate information as to the amount 0 ointe a e a be cc Crimea. (Hear.) They were not acclia or with the O a strength of the fortresses to be attackei a tsy , h0e , a ( 1,10 ,1 sources of the country to be T hey a t ly suceesgtevatea expected the expedition to be inernecliac ot 0 pro in , as they did not foresee the probehldY,4o c are Pe 5 t he struggle they made no provision for a wi s n i a,,, a e uiet,b o lf " The patience and fortitude of this 17.,,These_50, admiration and gratitude of the natila n , e t . b e roia ' st eels, they love fought, het, and suliered. o. l s so d pri v et , will and equally heroic patience under su fferi c 7 i ntrY w , blv have given them claims upon their c doubtlss be gratefully acknowledged. (c . b e t e .:p sl rt ,*;, itii e: Your committee will now closetthetios dial:Voile hope that every British army may, f° a, rod that valour which this noble army has displaYe asare r may hereafter be exposed to such sufterolgs in these pages." (Loud cheers.) ere'b - S - The report was ordered to be pr inted,' sfelee• de to PUBLIC BUSINESS—MORNIN', be had ins sub' the Mr. DISBA.ELI reverted to the apPee'roeet 0 0 es n oble the noble lord at the head of the elevern ho ped t* o f the Sm,,pueuk meetingsneel-u, ii ( a tate n tti r t tn l ahobeaoleex: I ject of morning sittings. (Hear.) tea oe cien ce e f thes e lord had considered the effect o n the c° (tele° 00,aerse and ~t, tha t) 1 - 00 ,ets 1 1 .) co of * sure fixed for to-morrow e. clerks, n,aht ie b i(l3 y p,,,n :twe t e h aoss e ,u, grthbahatuebtpii ilte,rui:iita:il ri,i_ i , l iti ivetvi.eutnliol 10,00;!boset3,:t os op. co r:31:e:, sation Bill, but an hon. member list ,le o f the th is t er amendineet, which affecte I the prieg e ; and the Speaker would be kept in . i thouP 60,4, ,1',,, morning and the evening. He certain! aio4 sit t 0 mittees 'that CiOir iTtlot 0 a mittees only ought to be taken at ar, o eol.rfined u that the business for to-morrow shell,' iurit 0. 0 sr,e , 0:: committee on the Metropolis Ira p° t hat th the Lord PALMERSTON was.quite avneeted wit h b t at it ~,,, the clerks, and all official pareons c n i — sittings. ;.,,, et to P o , suffered inconvenience from nerh , b ie wss den t: . T out , e I, impossible that measures, wh enstdoeation tsno„stal during a seseion, could r eceiv t coy' . 110 was _ at , t ar es ins recourse to sittings in the ti as, ear tu;' 00 1,1:. asked by hon. gentlemen for a seri ratnetioei ther o►busitil cular motions, but the effect of of the house. It would be better,r,ems to ALted the re, that the Government would 1 hon. gentleman appealed to ho t _ l;ai. f e e ran- but A D P selves to the days allotted to a , a s itting s, m orning r i °. convenience attending these eo ,.. , _ .ofl a s fo olsecgbo:ttrhool : g y b e: , i 13 1 ; fi t v li e 0 t r il ',_; o :: sent could not tee any remedy:to! the arraneew the Mr. DISRAELI iequired a adhere t° morrow. Lord PALIIERSTO. ,d, arraugeo• ig " • a t nilor n co , order of business as at p r . tten P . of members a e a erit e ea e tinge clashed with the duties ei ny ree-' 0 a hum our mittees. 14BIT "1- It of long speech° Sir H. WILLOT-76.0.0 the rest] . . lati,,u.) that morning sittings 0 ise,s. 0. . {ben the ev en '' ar eves disposed, to a" . t , r r syl SAILOr t e The subject BOF ENG/ LI O F leglO of lief p e p r e r d. t to the fact th at .ii..,, I to *,:eiri j i lIANG,°c' o gjeF, said be w_itshewd.ttiol regari. Capt. - OT-T e e the Admiral 1 on the e:. Eta mast which P"" t' mitted be the Rumens ,__ o n lowee,v'el the First Lord . , senee eed of a muYrde.rous out rs ' le e sa e hoMT"H.I.I.nEWeingibAAA:IIaTG ON A FLAG ask a q otion,re, had been coin f her Mejesty's boats in Pit` 3 ,„ re e i_ s a officer a sue ° h a lly despatch Dad b u tr olet u t tb e on the subject, and wte t bs li to stele . 0 oe state tha fats of the case.xceedingiy sorrY _ t i e i .11 be Sir C. WOOD -e-I am e ,•ndea it 11 l ler g allant irie , be lieve o re e story to which say hou. andhortly, because e __, t oll_ dtb , too true. I will statehouse,s __ hat die ol' ajs y be,:al 0 wished to know wil etheerther the right hon. satisfactory to the .7_ t h e s nbjec . e t ,be b _ d o, that the fullest information UU 3 ito 731 apsePOPr9 to the public. I am also .prepreia .010, nrt epir d this woman, from •cUr• 1 5 01 C j dosnatch r eceive of e what e el oe co , o n • •ng full perticulars . i. , s ship .„,,, e , _ s, couterni ~ that a some short timeseme ageooaheetrinaglatveoeseisYseisthaeevaer.ooooFse.i.arsoiiii,, three persons—the captain of one ' l o ' loo prie eeste ed r , rs ee and another Finnish sailor— re we'nstructionitre th°...101 miral Dundee, anxious, f. onl 1 ary 0 00 1 4 00 a i. e „,. home, not to injure with unnecess ;.. _ , , ,,1j0i , et.ad tho,,boro of the country so long as th: e , e u Ztl . r e ,`,t eii, e e a r to St. Petersburg were Linterinll, to , r w eee D e no , sack to bear up to Hangs in ,u'eaetureaur ott.astrera the persons who had been 0 0 ' ;, 0 d w o o St•4o t , quested to be put on shore there,,esoes l is nagba err sons who lead also been taken Plie v ha t ethajogo oth! burg, and who had also requested a s e t ,i ste ncer! it h tr f on shore there, The Cossack rent.r_Tsetee a liore e ~iia 6 to put these persons on shore, a d ! tit er on e ' w . la n o ° 01) place she anchored, and seat the veta'eacbrusto bealearperooecie seven prisoners and the ordinary„f aptet 0 . ,e a e , truce was displayed for at least isee thejet/s r , reached the jetty. Nobody was s a e:P,, tr iee e .,,, 0r y to or te! waoaan away ret once. The boe,t U,,,e.. r" i ere rela, 0 0 '; landed the prnoners and their Der s 4a, whe dos eu :;" stf, 1 moaned iu the boat. A body of 11-05,0, cre aired iris '_' fie; to have amounted to from 300 t,c'est., . The o s a jetty. Lieutenant Geneste, the ow' on JOS tr it' are 10° au alii po t truce, and explaiued why they c e , tr uce, 0 0 . e a e t nish captain also took the ii g l'. t he rea'sessie f ,i' t plain, both -in Finnish and Engliseesa o f the te the, came on shore. The officer in coruinnt lie , se the a 0 0 its , only understood English, but s pols , e i l os, 3 0 00 oo re a t il not care in the least for a flag of trwheretiPncer*c tlil show how the Russians would fi _ght, ori t h e s e- - T bea ,p Russian soldiers immediately firertPboto all- ©boat tall• e f it ,, ,'" prisoners on the jetty, and killed . 12 th soiee loth tired into the boat till every Iwo . 1 A t hrOW_ 00 D, ao jr ) . Russians rushed into the boat, La_l-.'n'aee nit eve` i ' o 0 4 `, bodies overboard, dragged ono ( avj u e ,,,_ a ,„a ,N: g te te'', f ala t him on t jetty, and bayonette t P l ""' 1 to th e i ° o igh t, 0 ,1 ' O ll tauce that the cutter was .. To _ the tie 0_ pe 1 d f o a r y t , l e t a n d e in gi s t the s h e ost. soul iu,T 11 The pc noireut? r li m o t a there were some dead bodies in .. iv r ___ h the. t ie d t:_ t tel . man wounded with two ballslit:°l4, s od 4i t ' o o ,a , e u , t I, lil through his shoulder, cut the ! e slip. In t w i t: a l :4o, l o the cutter from the jetty to tn ea d r to ascertaie,, oear t ti the Cossack standing in in or e e , .. a , boat 4 . PI i come of the men in the cutter, sn , 'l , 000 it 0 ql , t 1 w hose ev" tr c 'l Is off the single ,survivor, on soY ais e . whole story ream. Le re We e ree 10 • ther we e " - e re e 0 1 ' re Mr. HEADLAM asked whe fa vre ~,, 0 0. , 0 , ~ 0 L• he e be ae the statement that some of the a __ Ti of t .as t iii taking soundings under the prote tr_ or t tha t iti, to 1 rsoeeturtraviiiiiitcitas,f,realviitibti„bc:i,.; Sir C. WOOD —So far as any! believe to D Or ant goes . 1 . lu tile te ble , lespatch OP °O . ev• . lal it was ordered to be pi iuted. „„ see .caaa , slo t ADMINISTRATIVErer eme eiSvoietrdCi by C. 37 WOOD t'ewhollyG Pot Government ° II d the out of doors ..„3-the 0 teo upon the origin of the demandLThoredaGtljoouprEnentliteibia,twehwaa,saarliteernsoreel;reelirb:rl°-slalosccirtee, a notwithstandl:l7ly Ototeet,ol tive Reform, observed tua ) 30 Bobequero 00%004 taken by the Chaucellor of t led by the presea „ t ore,. Pt to nElUarwegeolyf,retiluerracut:oclibiteiaentiadn_op4_e_u. 0 llvii r iatrh r p eg v a p r A t i uteli t? the order if Cotancil of 2d May: A appeared that there wee AO intuition cal w ~, I I I