The Sun. — London, England, 1855-05-15 00:00:00

IMPERIAL PARLIAM ENT. ROUSE OF LORDS--(YESTERDAY.) The lobbies leading to the House of Lords this even ing presented a scene of the greatest excitement. In the interior of the house the excitement rivalled that from without. The space round the throne was crowded to excess, and the galleries round the house were filled with elegantly-dressed ladies. The gallery appropriated to the members of the House of Commons was also crowded with members of the other house. The LORD CHANCELLOR took his seat on the woolsack at five o'clock. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY. The LORD CRA.NCELLOR, upon an appeal being made to him by Lord LYNDHURST, consented to postpone the re committal of the Cambridge University Bill from to morrow till that day week. Lord CAMPBELL presented a petition from Scot land against the sale of intoxicating drinks. SECOND READINGS. On the motion of Lord REDESDALE, the Surbiton Improvement, the Newport Corporation, Stourbridge Gas, East India Railway, and Madras Railway Bill,. were read a second tirae. THIRD READINGS. On the motion of the same noble lord, the Medical Invalid and General Life Assurance Bill and the Lands Improvement Company Bill were real a third time and passed. Th e Newspaper Stamp dill and other bills were read a first time. MAYNOOTH. The Earl of HARROWBY, in reply to the Earl of Winchelsea, stated that he had received a complaint from the professors of Maynooth, stating that their evi dence had been privately used by Dr. Cullen to show the propaganda at Rome that their opinions differed from the high Roman authorities. He (Lord Harrowby ), in reply, bad told them, that the evidence having ulti mately become a public document, and known to the world, its early communication to Rome by Dr. Cullen merely anticipated its knowledge there ; so that it waq erroneous to impute the private connection to the effect that had been imputed. CONDI7CT OF THE WAR. The Earl of ELLEN - BOROUGH, who had the following resolutions on the paper,— "That a humble address be presented to her Majesty, "To assure her Majesty of our continued support in the Prosecution of the just and necessary war in which her Ma jesty is engaged ; " To declare the sincere gratification with which we have regarded the perfect community of counsels between her Ma jesty and the Emperor of the French, and have seen friendli ness established and increasing between the French people and'our own—events full of hope for the future to other na tions as well as to ourselves ; _ _ “To express our adthiration of the many deeds of valou” by which the allied forces in the East have illustrated their brotherhood in arms, and our satisfaction that the brave army of Piedmont is now called to participate in their actions and in their fame ; "To declare our persuasion that, amid all their disap pointments, the people of this country still retain the gem- Tons feelings which led them at the commencement of the war willingly to place all the . means required from them at her Majesty's disposal—that they will still protect the weal: against the aggression of the strong—and that they are not prepared to consent that Russia shall, by her increasing pre ponderance, so control the Turkish Government as actually to hold Constantinople within her grasp ; " To acquaint her Majesty that, while we admit and lament the privations to which war necessarily subjects all classes of the people, we yet venture to assure her Majesty that they would in so just a cause bear those privations without com plaint if they could feel that the war had been well conducted —that the troops had not been exposed to any hardships which could have been avoided by forethought—and that everything had been done to enuble them to achieve decisive success ; " Humbly to represent to her Majesty that her people, suffering privations on account of this war, have as yep had uo such consolation ; that, on the contrary, we can iot withhold from her Majesty the avowal of our conviction that the conduct of the war has occasioned general dissatis faction and given rise to just complaints ; and that we mu t humbly lay before her Majesty our deliberate opinion that, it is only through the selection of men for public employme t without regard to anything. but the public service that the country can hope to prosecute the war successfully, and t) obtain its only legitimate object—a secure and honourabl.' peace ;" rose and said,—My lords, it is now more than a year that we have been at war,—a period somewhat longer, I be lieve, than the war itself was expected to last by the Mi istry that entered into it,—and during that period we have brought forward the whole military force of the country, such as it is, and also the whole of its naval force. We have had no reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of our soldiers and seamen (hear, hear); but, on the contrary, they have rivalled the great actions of those who have pre ceded them in former wars, and have been led on all occa sions by English gentlemen with their accustomed spirit and devotion. (Hear, hear.) We have been allied with the greatest military Power in Europe—a Power, too, almost our own equal in naval strength. Therehas existed the most cordial union between the forces of the two Powers; and yet, my lords, obtaining, as we have oh tained, so much glory, by the aide of that glory we have seen unusual suffering, and, notwithstanding all our strength, united to that of France, notwithstanding all the devotion of our troops, we have not as yet obtained any decisive success, nor can any man say that, at the present moment, there is any expectation of so doing. This alone, my lords, would justify me in calling your lordships' at tention to the subject, and in asking you to consider what may be the causes from which this failure has originated, and what are the remedies which it may be expedient to apply. Very recently, too, another event has taken place which gives a still graver character to the war. The ne gotiations at Vienna have failed, and they have failed in such a manner—that is, by the production on the part of Russia of proposals which were perfectly inadmissible — (hear, hear)—as to afford the apprehension of a protracted war as well as of a great contest. My lords, under these circumstances I feel that if any apology be necessary for now calling yourlordships' attention to the subject, it is an apology for not having brought forward this question at an earlier period. But, my lords, since the accession of Lord Palmerston to office there has been a sort of torpor in public affairs, and there has been nothing to induce any man tobring forward a great public question. If it had rested with that noble lord the torpor which has existed in parliament would have been extended to the public mind, for the very first measure which he attempted to carry was a measure for the purpose of stifling the Committee of In quiry into the state of the army before Sebastopol, a com mittee voted by the great majority of the House of Com mons, and supported almost unanimously by the people of this country. (Hear.) Strange and singular was the course adopted by the noble lord for the purpose of inducing the House of Commons to rescind the .resolution at which it had arrived. He desired to bepermitted to appear in the world', masquerade in the historical character of Richard 11., whr fell, as history points out, because he exercised undue private partiality, instead of a desire for the public good, in the appointments of persons to office, and because he utterly disregarded the opinions of the public. But, my lords, it was represented that Lord Palmerston was the fittest person to conduct the affairs of the country in time of war on account of his military experience. Now, cer tainly, that noble lord has during his political life, now extended over a considerable period, for a long time held the office of Secretary at War. Now, that office is not by any means connected with the direction of war, but ha , only to deal with the financial affairs of the army, but. nevertheless, he has been represented, because he so loin held that office, as possessing great military experienee We have recently found that Mr. Sidney Herbert, whc lately occupied the position of Secretary at War, very properly, as I think, in the discharge of duties of a pub lic nature, assisted the noble duke who was then at the head of the War Department, but that was by no means done by him in the character oi Secretary at War, nor had the Secretary at War, as such, anything to do with the direction of a war If Lord Palmerston, holding that °film, acquired great military experience and established a great military repu tation, that circumstance must have been known to th e late Duke of Wellington, and would have certainly tended to make him desire to retain him in the Administration of which he was the head. I do not mean to say that tb, Duke of Wellington did not entertain a high opinion of Lord Palmerston's military capacity, but I recollect one circumstance which leads me rather to doubt that he did so. I recollect sitting by the side of the Doke of Welling ton in this house during the unfortunate difficulty between himself and Mr. Huskisson, which led to the resignatior of a portion of the gentlemen who then formed the Coali tion Government. The Duke of Wellington was called out of the house on the occasion to which I refer, and on his return he said to me, " That was Lord Palmerston who wanted to see me, in order to tell me that if Huskisson went out he would go to. I made no reply, for it is not for me to f i re great guns at small birds." (Loud laughter.) S nob, at the time, was the opinion of the Duke of Welling ton. I will not pretend to sa that the small bird doss oti o subsequent times have attained to the dimen --etill,at tperhaps, the character of the eagle----(laughter) peer e d ee re t teriod referred to such as I have stated ap a short t a e opinion of the Duke of Wellington. But formed theeper,the public instructors of the country ir necessary t o pi l e ': that the man of all others whom it was Palmerston. He „ 1: : the position of Minister was Lord man of the situation.' t° use the phrase in vogue, " the that unfortunat e vre,,,k n ITations will sometimes indulg e in dividuals they will gee ° Z. W hich occasionally afflicts in country, and that han indulged in by the peopl e ( T r af l neY• This weakness was pened to the people which occ-151 Y happens to indi viduals who indulge in like weaknesses namely, repent er the weakness. ance seen followed oa the ind4eames— Pe.eple so ready I believe that there is hardly - i x; tl3odividual as th e people of this count r y e Vet. up to the admiration of an -5" o thems 1 short period. For a short period—but for for a e short period —nothing can r exceed th e warm a th ver:v affect i on an d admiration which they m a i n t ain for some individual. but a change soon co mesover the m , and that warmth of affection is soon followed byaigid indiffer ence, more than equal to the intensity of the ad m i ration before entertained. I fea r that at the present moment th , feeling of the people is in that . cold state, and that they op ion of the h.we become g r a dually disappointed at their adoption the man whom they shortly ago desired to . see head of the Government (Hear.) a state thinking, and the pub- While Parliament has been l e P the public has been : of ter or . I.c has com e to appear to be just SA to the *and certain conclusions,whic h adopted in futureuct of the war, avoiding similar die-. appointments and as to the means to b( t for the purpose of have arrived at ta t i selection of the those they have experienced. The peopl( lir conclusion—tha.t it is necessary, in regard their ind ivid ualsfitness, employmen t s, t( for public emploY not a convert to ,thnat not to act by favour. I am all times th e whenever for shortprinciple on which I have' acted , time I have been in posses sion of power; and I can speak from experience of its ad vantages and its dangers. (Hear, hear.) Its advantages are all for the public, and its dangers are for the indivi dual who adopts that as his principle of government. (Hear.) I have myself seen disaster converted into victory, and discouragement into enthusiasm. I have seen public confidence re-established • I have seen public pr os p er ity carr ied to an unexampled of increase, beyond what, at any previous period, it has been known to attain to ; and I have been able, in a very great measure, to trace all these advantages in the condition of the State to the adoption of the principle of regarding solely the fitness of individuals in their selection for public employments. (Hear.) lam enabled, at the same time, to inform your lordships that there is this danger to the individual who acts on that prin ciple—that he is surrounded by persons, by disappointed jobbers, and by little-minded men, depending for their promotion on patronage and favour, who will, animated by the most unscrupulous animosity, join together for the purpose of overwhelming his Government. (Hear, hear.) And if, in consequence of the present feeling of the people, any Government should be established in this country de termined to act on the principle I have mentioned, I feel assured that it would be in danger from the same hostility, unless it received the constant, uniform, and vigilant sup port of the people, on whom it alone could depend for sup port. (Hear.) I have been not unobservant of the events which have taken place in this country during a very con siderable period of time ; and I have conversed with many who have equally regarded those events with vigilant ob servation ; and it is certainly in accordance with my obser vation, and with that of others, that a very great, and, as I think, very dangerous change has come over the practice of the constitution. The time was when speeches in Par liament directed public opinion —(hear)—when, whatever might have been the feeling during the recess, whatever might have been the success of agitators during the period while Parliament was not sitting, the meeting of Parlia ment, and the announcement of the opinions of those who were in the habit of leading parties in Parliament, at once gave a direction to public opinion and brought it into a right and safe course. I fear there has bren growing up a very material change in this respect. Public opinion now is, I fear, more generally formed out of doors, and, being there formed, acts on the conduct of Parliament. I look with great apprehension to a state of things in which persons, however unable, yet wholly irresponsible, possess power greater perhaps than that of Parliament. I look with apprehension to a state of things in which those whom I may call " the gentlemen of the platform" have more influence by their speeches than " the gentlemen of the House of Commons." That state of things has been grow ing up in this country. It fills me with considerable alarm. I know the importance of watching public opinion. I know the importance of endeavouring to direct it. It appears to me that public opinion, if I may so express myself, in a manner resembles a great river between two dikes. The waters rise gradually, ?lowly, imper ceptibly, and without danger, apparently, in the eyes of those unaccustomed to their progress ; but at last they in crease to such a height that they overtop and destroy the dike, and, pouring down on the plain, desolate everything before them. The same waters, however, if distributed by ' prudent and judicious management into streawlets run ning through the fields, would fertilise and beautify the land. (Hear.) It is with the conviction, then, that it is essential to the good working of the constitution that Par liament should direct, as far as possible, public opinion that I make this motion. (Hear.) I make it for the pur pose of enabling your lordships to place this house in the f •ont of the people. (Cheers.) I make it for the purpose of inducing you to go to the foot of the Throne as the faith ful interpreters of public opinion, to state respectfully to her Majesty the extent of public dissatisfaction and the ex tent of public complaint ; to state your determination and that of the people to assist her Majesty with all the re sources of the country in the prosecution of a just and ne cessary war ; but at the same time to state your opinion that the Government must be conducted on the true public principle of selecting men for employment in consideration of their means of serving the State. (Hear, hear.) Before I enter upon the conduct of the war, to which it will be necessary for me to direct your lordships' attention, allow me to thaw distinctly the line which appears to me to se parate the functions of the Government from the functions of the general. It is the duty of the Government to form a plan for the campaign, and it is the duty of the Govern ment to place in the hands of the general to whom they confide the conduct of the campaign the most perfect in strument they can prepare for the purpose of obtaining success—a perfectly well equipped army. It is for the general to carry into execution the plans of the Govern ment • and we, as Parliament, it appears to me , h aveon ly t deal with the conduct of the Government. (Hear, hear.) Your lordships will probably recollect that at the very commencement of this war I, in the most earnest manner, c.l.utioned the house and the public against looking too closely into the conduct of the officers in tho ccm u:aud of the fleets and armies. I reminded your lordships of the extreme sensitiveness of military men, and of the necessity of leaving their minds on all occasions per fectly free to exert all their energies for the public service. I assured your lordships that the hope of public approba tion and the apprehension of public displeasure would al ways be sufficient to animate those officers to the utmost extent of their exertions for their public service. I pro pose to adhere to the reserve I recommended to others, and I wish it to be understood in all I say I deal only with the Government by whom this war has been conducted. (Hear.) For the purpose of conducting the war I appre hend it will be admitted that is necessary we should have men and animals—that is, men aided by animals. Unfor tunately the war has not been conducted in that way; and very little exertion appears to have been made for the pur pose of providing the army with sufficient strength, and with the means of moving. It was not in the first in stance that the standard was reduced, nor was it at an early period that the bounty was increased, but it was by, lowering the standard and by increasing the bounty that the army must be augmented. On a recent occasion the Minister of War very properly issued a circu lar respecting the militia., which relieved from service those men who had not entered thatforce with the understanding that they were to be embodied ; but he accompanied that measure by the offer of a bounty so extremely small as not only to endanger the success of the measure, but almost to secure its failure—(hear, hear)—and I believe that we have lost the services of from 16,000 to 20,000 men for the pur pose of saving some 50,000/. or 60,000/. (Hear, hear.) There has been no real economy except in that in which parsimony was most to be rejected, and in which liberality was most to be invited—namely, in the obtaining of men for the army and navy, and in providing the army with the means of moving. I ventured at a very early period to represent to this house the absolute necessity of taking the most extensive measures for the purpose of providing the army with the means of moving, but it is only within the last three months that any effectual measures have been taken for that purpose—(hear, hear)—and at this moment the army cannot move, and never has been able to move. This immoveability, in consequence of the want of animals, has been the cause of many of the errors which have pervaded the campaign. My lords, early in the last year it was decided, I think most properly, to separate the Colonial Department from the Department of War; but, when that division took place, no measures were adopted—as should have been the case—for the purpose of strengthening the hands of the Minister of War. I en tirely object to the principle of pulling to pieces great de partments in the midst of a war. lam sure that such a measure was totally unnecessary. The only thing abso lutely necessary wasto give the Minister of War full powers over all the subordinate departments, to make his orders run through them, and to give him the power of compel ling the execution of any measures he might direct. Had that power been distinctly given to my noble friend (the Duke of Newcastle), had he surrounied himself, as I think he should have done, with a military staff, instead of de pending upon civil clerks—had it been thoroughly under stood in the Government that the noble duke's orders were at once to be executed in all departments, I firmly believe that many of the disasters which have occurred would have been prevented. But I fear the noble duke has had to fight a battle here as well as in the Crimea—l fear that he has had to wrest the Commissariat from Sir C. Trevel yan—that he has had to wrest the Land Transport Corps from the Commissariat—that there have been difficulties here as well as in the Crimea—and that those difficulties have to a very g reat extent led to the failures we have experienced. My lords, at the commencement of the war the manner in which our forces should act was a matter of the most careful and anxious consideration on the part of her Majesty's Government—whether the army should act as a separate body, or whether it should unite in operation with the army of France. The objection to the union of the armies was obvious the existence of divided commands, an inconvenience which no extent of cordiality and good sense on the part of the generals could by possibility alto gether obviate. (Hear.) It is almost impossible for any two men, however able they may be, to conduct difficult - unitary operations with success under the principle of a divided command. (Hear.) Napoleon said, with perfect truth, that it was better to appoint one general of ordinary abilities to the comma,:d of an army than two men of supe rior abilities having a divided command; and, depend upon it, unity of command is that which most contributes to success. We had th 3 opportunity of employing our troops to a certain extent, perhaps, in the Black Sea, on a separate expedition ; but we had before us the Baltic, the true sphere of our operations. I can, however, quite under stand that her Majesty's Government might have been desir ous that the armies and navies of the two countries should ap pe a together wherever operations were carried on, and I do not deny that there wasconsiderable advantage in that unity of operations, but it was an advantage deeply purchased ny the want of unity of command. It was decided that the war should be carried on i-a the Baltic, and also in the Black Sea. Now, my lords, any one who takes the trouble of looking carefully through the charts of the Baltic will have seen that, while the Russians had taken every precau ti on, by the erection of defences, to prevent ships of large draught of water from entering their ports and from coming near their dockyards, the same precautions had not been taken againet the attacks of vessels of a smaller class, and 'chat both at S weaborr and at Croustadt there were oppor tunities of turning the dockyards and of attacking them by vessels of small draught of water. It was obvious that, in the case of such an operation, it would be most advit able to have at hand a body of troops, because if the marines were landed from the ships for employment on shore the strength of the fleet would of course be materially dimi nished, anti its efficiency for action would be considerably ina pai red. Neither of these considerations appear, however, to have occurred to her Majesty's Government. They sent a fleet to the Bal:ic without gun-boats and without troops. They rendered it impossible to obtain success with the means which they placed in the bands of the admiral. The admiral dial as much as he could do with the means which were in trusted to him. I deeply regret that the public expecta tions were so highly raised at the commencement of the war; that the people were led to suppose that some extra ordinary service would at once be performed by the fleet. For those exaggerated expectations two members of the Government were particu arty responsible. (Hear, hear.) Et is, my lords, a serious thing to disappoint public expec tation in a matter of this kind, and it is a cruel thing to wards the officer in command. I a ill venture to say that, while I do not question the right of a First Lord of the Admiralty—whether he thinks fit to state the grounds of the proceeding or not—to direct an officer to haul down his flag, I do think it is proper that the feelings of an offi cer so oirected to give up his command should be to tho tact extent carefully considered and consulted (hear, hear)—and I do deeply regret that Sir C. Napier is not th e only officer employed in the fleet who has had so reason to complain of the manner in which he has been treated by the Admiralty. (Hear, hear.) I con , m y to th e si. , le r it to b feeling ofm7le o ry a offi pu e b er lie wh d o ut i l,my lords, to consult the 7.43we1l either to the advancetlien to employed under the Crown. ~ , liapnoir.mc h for the Baltic. But it was determiued to to Gallipoli,Mediterranean—first to Malta, then to the last two nae of the army to Malta, or from Malta Constantinople. I do not object =instances of the ri v:X a from Gallipoli to Constantinople. I tLink trenchments at Gallipoli were correct under the then cir- I think the formation of the in cunistances then existing . (111 4 of her Majesty' was requisite under the circum at Constantinople it was but when these troops arrived merit to take a general view war which was then Govern carried on upon the shores 4fblttahe:Black a been e ai n A sia, a s as At the present well as upon the banks of the moment the war in Asia, which is alnabe.s altogether that upon the banks of the Danube, h t irn i xw talit as a THE SUN, LONDON; TUESDAY EVENING, MAY 15 1855. neglected. I can recollect the apprehensions which were entertained in 1829 at the advance of Prince Peskiewikch from Erzeroum to Constantinople. The danger to Con stantinople was almost as great on the Asiatic as on the European shore. Any blow struck against Turkey in Asia paralyses the Turkish empire. More than that—the whole commerce between Turkey and Persia is carried on by Trebizond and Erzeroum, and the occupation of those places by Russia puts an end to that trade, insulates Persia, and most materially affects her policy. But, notwithstanding these circumstanes, we did not carry on war in Asia as we did in Europe, with army against army. W e h a d in Asia nations at our disposal. We had nations con quered, but yet disposed to throw off the yoke. We had still more—a gallant nation which has been for years in arms, successfully defending its independence. We should make war with theirarmy as well as by the troops we could detach for any operation of this kind ; but this mode of action has been altogether neglected, and, as far as I can collect, the appointment of Colonel Williams, who was sent out as a commissioner, appeared about the same time that news was received of the defeat of the Turks at Kars, which appeared to threaten Erzerou m . Th e T ur k e were only saved by the advance of Schamyl. But for that advance the Russians would have been in Erzeroum. I say then, it being the duty of the Government to look to the . whele war, it is a most material and serious defect in the conduct of the war that nothing should have been done for the pur pose of acting in Asia. But it was determined to send the troops to Varna. I entirely approve that movement, and I thank my noble friend the noble earl late at the head of her Majesty's Government for having pressed that course upon his colleagues. I think he did rightly, and for the reasons which he assigned. Not only was it an excellent military position—the best which could be selected at the time—but it " gave the hand" to Austria. That was the expression of the noble earl, and the view which he enter tained was perfectly just and correct. That army, placed at Varna and at Shumla, threatened Odessa, threatened Sebastopol, threatened Anapa, threatened every Russian station upon the Black Sea. It was an excellent po sition in itself ; but no sooner was the army placed there, and about to give the hand to Austria—no sooner was Austria about to rest upon that hand— than we withdrew it, and sent the army to the Cri mea. I think that sending the expedition to the Crimea, after Austria had invited our co operation in the Princi palities was as great an error in diplomacy asit was in war fare. I ventured to caution the Government at the time as to the effect which it must have uponthepolicy of Austria. We have never to this clay been in the same position with respect to Austria in which we were when that offer of co operation was made. What did Austria say when she was informed of the intention of sending the expedition to the Crimea? "That alters my position. I cannot venture to fight Russia by myself, and you have withdrawn the force which might have assisted me." And, my lords, what is it that we have done very recently? Almost at the moment when we were entering upon negotiations, and it wasof the utmost importance that we should have the cordial assist ance of A ustria, yon withdrew the Turkish army and sent it from the Principalities to Eupatoria. The best possible assistance which the Austrian army could have you with drew at the very moment when it was most necessary that it should have something to rely upon. You denuded her alto gether of any extraneous assistance, and you left the Aus trian army with its line extended from the Pruth to the north of Galicia—you exposed her whole line to the attack of the Russian army, with Germany uncertain behind her. How, then, can you complain of the conduct of Austria? If you say that Austria has acted with undue timidity, im pute it rather to your own mistakes—the mistake of the ex pedition to Sebastopol, and the mistake of the expedition to Eupatoria. Those two mistakes have paralysed Austria, and until your army is in a position in which it can assist the Austrian army you may depend upon it that Austria never can venture to give you the assistance which you re quire. (Hear, hear.) The treaty between Austria and Tur key is dated the 14th of June. That treaty was the real cause of the raising of the siege of Silistria. Had your army at Varna had the means of movement, can it be doubted that you would have attempted, before raising the siege of Silistria, to march to support the Turks? Was it consis tent with your honour to allow a place which was the great safeguard of your army to be taken under your very eyes ? But the negligence of the Government had left the army motionless. You could not advance to the relief of Silistria; and when the Russians, compelled by the advance of Austria, retired from the Principalities—when any gene ral in command of an army that could move would have pressed upon their rear and have prevented them taking away the plunder of the Principalities, and retiring by easy marches into Bessarabia—your army was unable to move. Why was it unable to move ? Because ti.e Government had cot provided it with the means. (Hear.) It was no fault of the general; it was the fault of the Government. No thing sufficient was done for the purpose of making those troops really an army; for troops are not an army unless they can move into the field. Consider only for a moment what would have been our position had the proper means been taken to make that army moveable, and had it ad vance I. You would have bad united more than 120,000 men of allies and Turks, in conjunction with, and supported by, an Austrian army. You would have had Bessarabia, and would have commenced the campaign from the Dniester; and the first victory would have placed Odessa, Nicolai, and the Crimea itself at your feet. It was determined, how ever, to send the expedition to Sebastopol. That expedition involved two conditions, both fatal to the efficiency of an army. It was quite impossible to send a sufficient force of cavalry, and it was impossible to send a sufficient number of animals to move the army. It could, therefore, never gain a decisive victory, or move in the field so as to destroy the enemy.. Had it had cavalry, the victory of the Alma would have destroyed the Russian army ; had it had the means of movement when Prince Menachikoff passed the Belbek, he never would have been allowed to retreat. That army has since been placed between Sebastopol and the sea. It is now beleagured, and it cannot move in any di rection. It has the sea open to it, but it cannot advs.nz.e. It is placed in a position in which it cannot obtain de cisive success, and it is placed there by the act of the Go vernment. It is the Government, therefore, that I accuse of the position in which that army is placed. (Hear, hear.) I say nothing of the discretion of sending an army across the sea at the time of the equinox, in 400 vessels, without having sufficiently reconnoitred the place, or hav ing ascertained by information from any quarter what the amount of the defences might be, or what force the enemy might be able to bring into the town. If any general had ventured to do, of his own authority on the geld, that which you compelled our general to do—that is, had he ventured to attack a place, and had he failed in the attack in consequence of his not having had information, and not having reconnoitred the place, he would have been taken before a court-martial, and would have been dismissed the service. You, the Government, are answerable for having effected an operation under these circumstances. I will not go into the military impolicy of it. If you had taken the place, anti had come away, and had destroyed it, you would have had no security in peace, because it might have again been placed in the same condition of defence as before; but, if you remained during the war to occupy it, you would be throwing away a great army, and would be detaining it in a most inconvenient position for the purpose of protecting the town, whereas a blockade would have effected all your purpose. Upon these grounds I say that the Government has not conducted the war well, and that it has placed the army in a position in which it cannot obtain decisive suc cesses. And now, my lords, as regards the third point— the exposure of the troops to sufferings which forethought might have avoided. Is there one man in this house or in the country who does not believe that that was the case ? Hear Dr. Andrew Smith, the gentleman who very pro perly advised the Government at a very early period of the war. He tells you that the lives of hundreds and the miseries of thousands have been the consequence of not doing that which might have been done by forethought for the purpose of preventing the disasters which have occurred. Ask your admiral, and he will tell you that he received no instructions for the preparation of transports. That is a new mode of carrying on a great expedition. I recollect, when I was engaged with the Duke of Wellington and Sir G. Cockburn on a small expedition to China, that we did not forget the sick and wounded. A 74-gun ship was sent from this country fitted for the reception of the wounded, al though wo wero making war at a distance of 25,000 miles, instead of 3,000 miles, as is the case in the present inikance. m y lords, I will.not go into the melancholy details of all the confusion which we have heard of in the transport service, the Ordnance department, the despatch of stores, and the lateness of their arrival—three months being the usual period before they were supplied after the requisi tion was sent in. I will not attempt to harrow your lord ships' minds by tracing the passage of the wounded and sick from the camp at Balaklava, carried by the humanity , of our Allies, nor will I dwell upon the state of destitu tion cn the shore, or the horrors of the middle passage, or the abominations of Scutari. All these things will be chronicled by the faithful pen of history. They are now in the minds of every one, and it is unnecessary for me, fortu nately, further to allude to them; but, my lords, we have reed that which has been stated with respect to those calamities with which the army has been afflicted, and I think that the opinion of all men is this, that however de fective may have been the system, it is not the system alone which is to he impugned, but the conduct of the men by whom the system has been carried on. (Hear.) My lords, to attribute anything to the defects of system is the subter fuge of convicted mediocrity.' (Hear, and a laugh.) Medio crity succumbs to system ; ability dominates over it, and forces men to a better course. Public zeal, seconded by public ability, will drive almost any system into the right course. But that has not been the case here ; and one of the most distressing circumstances, in contemplation of all thet has been produced before the committee, is not so much the defect of the system, which may be remedied, but the extent of mediocrity which pervades the departments. (dear.) It is that feeling, I apprehend, which has led very generally the people of this country to the belief that it is absolutely necessary, for the future, to adopt a new prin ciple in the selection of officers for the public employment. My lords, I entirely agree in that view. It is my belief that the best of all Governments is the Govern ment which affords the greatest facilities for obtain ing the assistance of the ablest men in the public service. ( Hear.) It was upon that principle that I opposed the Reform Bill. I said it was not calculated to produce in the House of Commons the ablest men. Was I right? (Cheers.) Is the House of Commons more distinguished by ability than it was in former times? Have we not been c. :spelled to use up all the old men in the House of Commons because the regenerated House of Commons has not been able to produce young men of equal ability? (Laughter.) I am in favour of administrative reforms precisely on the same principle. I desire to see the ablest men in the public service. (Cheers.) I can recollect well, many years ago. being much struck by the observation of a great philosophical historian who treated of the success and grandeur of the Roman Republic. He compared the whole circumstances of that republic with the circum stances of other States which appeared to have greater chances of progress, and he said, " The cause of the suc cess of the Rowan Republic has 'been this :—the great vir tue anti the great ability of a few great men." (Cheers.) It is, therefore, as far as I can further the object of bring ing able men into the public service, that I altogether adopt the principle which is generally received at the pre sent time. My lords, I recollect having heard that Mr. Pitt once said that in the whole course of his life he had hardly been able to give more titan three or four situations to v a er m y o p s r t o powerful mintl. t Min l i r s e te p r e , r a so m n a s n h o e f w a ivsehreyd bold,. eat manhe owasof a One of the best securities for the proper discharge of pub lic duties is to have a man of very proud mind ; yet so encompassed was Mr. Pitt by the trammels of Parliamen tary Government that, with all his strength, such was the result of his experience. Anti what was the result of his policy. Failure in war was the result of all his ability. (Hear.) Notwithstanding all the sacrifices of the country ens all the courage of the troops, the general character of the military operations of Mr. Pitt was failure, and that failure very greatly to be attributed to the action of that necessity which did not permit him to look abroad for the ablest wen. (Hear, hear.) How different were the cha racter and conduct of his great father? He disdained those trammels; he acted independently of them; he selected the fittest man wherever he was to be found; be restored con fidence to the people ; he restored victory to our arms ; and are eve, who eulogise his character, who admire his genius, who glory in his success—are we to shrink from applying to our own times his principles, as involving too great a sacrifice to the weakness of modern government ? (Loud cheers.) How much more powerful would be the position of a Minister -.131e to select men best fitted for the public service? How much more agreeable would be the possession of office if he had the boldness so to act. ? He would then feel, whatever might happen, whatever might be the success of his Government, he had at least performed the moral obligation he incurred. (Hear, hear.) But, my lords, how can we, sitting here by the hereditary right conferred, for the most part, upon our ancestors, for their services to the State, for their fitness for public employment, how can we refuse to adopt that prin ciple? It is the princple of our own origin. (Cheers.) It was because my father was a great lawyer, not because he was a party man, that he was selected on account of fitness for a great office, that ,of Chief Justice of the Peas. He had no family, no connections; he rose altogether by his fitness. (Cheers.) It was not favour; it was fitness that made Mr. Yorke chancellor and earl. (Cheers.) It was not favour, it was fitness, that made Sir James Harris, the great diplomatist, Earl of Malmesbury. (Cheers.) It was not favour which raised the father of the noble lord oppo site (Viscount Canning) to that office the reward for which was the peerage which the noble viscount now holds. (Cheers.) It was not favour which raised the brothers Cecil to he Ministers of Elizabeth and of James, and the founders of two great families. We are here for the services of our ancestors. Is it for us, then, who sit here by that great right, and enjoy dignity and honour by reason of their services and their fitness for public employment—is it for us to turn round and say, "It is tree our ancestors rose by fitness, but our relatives shall enjoy advantages from con nection with us, and from favour ?" (Cheers.) No ! I trust your lordships will adopt a diff eren t v i ew o f th e i n te res t and honour of this house. I trust you will agree on this occasion to place yourselves in the front of the people and at the foot of the throne to state their complaints and their dissatisfaction. (Hear, hear.) I trust you are fully im pressed with the greatness of the crisis in which we stand, and that you feel all the dangers of the contest in which we are engaged. I feel myself that during this contest, protracted as it will be, we shall often have need of the support of the people. I desire to secure that support by identifying this house with public opinion. I desire to ,place the country on our side. I desire that we should present to the enemy we have to encounter the aspect of a united people, and that we should obtain a secure and honourable peace by acting together—Parliament supported by the general affection and co-operation of the country. (The noble earl, having moved the address, resumed his seat amid general applause.) Lord PANMURE said,—My lords, after the very consi s derable notice which has been given of the address which is now in your lordships' hands, I certainly did expect that we should have heard that address recommended to us in a speech of much more power and ability than that just delivered by the noble earl. I have studied this address, and I must confess that seldom has it fallen to my lot to read such a concoction of assurances as those which are proposed for your lordships' adoption. They commence with truisms which no man can contradict ; they continue with congratulations in which every man must unite ; they proceed to accusations of misconducti in which those who are accused are most indistinctly portrayed ; and they con. elude with representations which, I think, the noble earl, according to his own admission, has gathered from public meetings lately held—that until the proper men are placed in the proper places the hopes of the country for an ho nourable peace will never be effectually realised. Or, my lords, to use the quaint expression of my friend, Mr. Drummond, until the square men shall be put into the square holes and the round men into the round holes ; or, as may be still further gathered from the tenour of this address, until that party' with which the noble earl has now permanently associated himself shall turn out this Government and occupy their places, that nothing will b e right in the conduct of the war and that no honourable peace can be obtained. It is quite impossible for me to meet the noble earl's motion with a direct negative. To a great many parts of the noble earl's motion I can give my cordial assent. (Cheers.) But the noble earl must know that from the whole design and object of that address the Government must dissent, and they cannot butrecognise in it a censure to which they cannot submit. It will therefore be my duty, my lords, to move that this question be not put —not to give a direct negative to it, but to prove to your lordships that her Majesty's Government appreciate the character it is intended to bear, and to give it their most strenuous opposition. Now, I beg to draw sour lordships' attention to the character of this address. Who will ven ture to deny the justice of the phrases used by the noble earl with regard to the gallant heroes belonging to our naval and painters, services who have distinguished them selves in their country's cause during this war? (Cheers.) Who will undervalue the patience with which our army have undergone the sufferings to which they have been ex posed? Who will venture to underrate the gallantry with which both officers and men have performed every duty to which they have been called ? There is no one who regrets more deeply than I the sufferings that have attended the army of the East. But, my lords, I cannot admit that all these sufferings have arisen from the misconduct of the Government at home—l cannot admit that these sufferings have pressed upon the army from the neglect of proper means having been taken by the Government' at home. We must all recollect that when our army took the field England bad been at peace for 40 years. We may remem ber that during that 40 years Government alter Govern ment have vied with each other, not in extending the military education of the army, but in economising the finances devoted to that purpose. We may remember that it was only yesterday that the Commander-in-Chief of this array stated in evidence before the House of Commons that during the Government of the noble earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) the artillery had been reduced by that false economy—(" No, no !" from the Earl of HARDWICKE and other peers.) If the noble earl will be pleased to listen he will probably find that to what I am saying he ought to say "Yes, yes," rather thah "No, no." I was not proceeding to fix a charge against the Government of the noble earl oppo site. I said, what was stated by the noble viscount (Lord Hardinge), that during the noble earl's Government, from the false economy previously practised, the artillery had been reduced to a state from which the Commander-in- Chief and the Master-General of the Ordnance, during the period of the noble earl's Government, erected it into the condition in which it was found upon the opening of the war. (Cheers) And so it was with all our military esta blishments. What little we had was regimentally perfect in its way, but it was not calculated to undertake great operations, and I am sure that the people of this country will make the allowanceenecessary for an army in the field under the circumstances in which they were placed. The noble earl has attached great blame to the Govern ment because our force was sent into the field incapable of movement. Now, it igi N quite true that there was no land transport attached s "that time to the army. The old waggon train had been abandoned —nothing had been set up in its place by the Government, and when the army was called upon to take the field it was natural to suppose that the means of transport would be sufficient. But, my lords, I am bound to say' that every means were taken to make that transport as complete as possible, and I cannot believe that it was from the want of the means of moving our army from Varna that they did not advance to the re lief of Silistria. I must say that in these resolutions I re cognise not, as the noble earl would have us to suppose, the mere desire that the Government should be carried on by the best men without any reference to their con dition or party connexions, but I recognise in them a general censure of the Government for the conduct I recognise the ofresells tnnoble(ilener' arl har a e s , putting haer.) upon the Government a ° the s ofwar. the full and entire responsibility for the whole sufferings of the army, for the position in whichour army has been placed, and for the state in which, according to the noble earl, it lies at present. Now, my lords, there has been much said as to the state and condition of our army. I have already stated that it is quite true that that army during the winter season suffered extremely in its position before Sebastopol. I have already stated that, from circumstances over which the Go vernment of that time had little or no control, there was a deficiency of housing and of supplies of clothing and food, which, however, during the last four months has been en tirely remedied, and at this moment I am entitled to say that our army is in as good a condition as when it left this country, and that it is as prepared to take the field and carry on any operations which may be assigned to it as it has ever been from the commencement of the war. I see the noble earl doubts that statement. He knows the strength of his position and the weakness of mine. He knows that he may with safety make statements about the strength and power of our army ; but he also knows, on the other hand, that I am unable, by document, to give that detailed contradiction which I say, on my character as a Minister and a gentle man, I am quite prepared to give to it. (Hear.) Bift, my lords, with reference to that army, from the beginning of February, in a great measure owing to the precautions previously taken by my noble friend (the Duke of New castle), and owing to the steps taken by the Government who were in power previously to the present, that army began gradually to resume its condition, and to gain in creased efficiency. From the early part of February that army began to shake itself clear from the effects of sickness, and the supplier to the army were impro - ed, both in the time of delivery and the quantity supplied. And, my lords, it will hardly be believed, when the noble earl talks of the state and condition of our army, that it has cot only been increasing in efficiency, but that regularly , since the beginning of March that army has been deriv ing reinforcements from this country and the Mediter ranean, which have put it in as vigorous a condition as it has ever been. But, my lords, the noble earl has given us a speech on the question of the selection for the proper places of the fittest men who can be found in the public service, but during the whole of that speech, and at its conclusion, I have not gathered that the noble earl has put hand upon a single instance —(cheers)—either in which fit men are found in unfit places, or that he has convicted the Government of making any selection of unfit men, which k the noble earl has thought it worth his while to adduce. (Hear.) Whether the noble earl at first intended to charge the Government with having selected unfit men for their places in tire military direction of this war, and has since changed his mind, I am unable to say. (Cheers.) But I do most heartily congratulate the noble earl, and I do most heartily congratulate your lordships' house, that you are not called upon to look at this question in this light— (hear)—for I know that no more unpatriotic course could be taken, or one more dangerous to a successful issue of the war, than that your lordships should by any vote and act of yours lead the commanders of our armies, or even its lowest heads, to suppose that Parliament is dis posed in any way to do them an injustice, or to reflect upon their acts, while they were devoting their best ener gies and mind to the service of the country. (Hear. hear.) Well, my lords, is it in civil employment that the noble earl finds that improper men have been selected. I think that if he advanced such a chargoas that, it was his duty at least to point out some instances in support of it, that we might know the direction in which the noble earl's com plaint tends. But, however, he his chosen to lay hishand upon no particular instance. It is sufficient for him to dis parage all public men—(hear, hear)—by a vague and uni versal assertion, leaving everybody to select for himself the instances which the noble earl might have pointed out to us, but which ho has to-night utterly failed to do. But the noble earl went on to express some opinions in connexion with this subject to which I, at least, cannot give my as sent. He says that he opposed the Reform Bill be cause he thought it limited the choice of the best men for the public service. (" No, no !" from the Earl of Ellenborough.) He said that, under the old con stitution of this country, you had men in Parliament who were fit to carry on the business of the State, but that as soon as the reformed Parliament was established those men of ability were succeeded by men who were not equal to those tion 3 had been disappointed, who nd i ft n the public expec tthat that reform, which in its origin was a measure that was obnoxious to him, had, when tried by experience, proved a failure in its results. Now, my lords, I cannot adroit that the Reform Bill has proved I any such failure. I think that there have been many men returned to Parliament since the passing of that meas ure who have taken a part in the conduct of public affairs which has done them great credit. (Hear, hear.) I believe that the Reform Bill is still capable of furnish ing the country with men well qualified to ainsiniiter its Government, and I am afraid that, so far at least as this argument goes, the noble earl will find but 1 little sympathy from those w h o ar o othe r wi se asso - 1 ciated with him upon those questions. But, if I mis take not, the noble earl went even further, and talked of the contrast which now exists between public men in Par liament and public men on the platform in this country. The noble earl seems to think that Parliament formerly led public opinion in this' country, and that now public opinion too much leads Parliament. My lords, I am one of those who think that public opinion is right in leading both Parliaments and Governments. To a certain extent, no doubt, Governments and Parliaments ought so far to understand public opinion as in some cases to forerun it, but, according to the constitution of this country, I hold that wholesome public opinion, which is formed n e ith er too rapidly nor too precipitately, ought to lead both Go vernments and Parliaments, and I for one should be sorry to see public opinion in this country taking its cue from the Government of the day, or even from the dictation of Par liament itself. (Hear.) And now I come to consider another point--damely, that the resolutions of the noble earl seem intended to cast censure on her Majesty's Government. The effect of that censure upon the Government, if your lordships should think fit to pass it, cannot be but too appa rent. My lords, I think it is worthy of your serious consi deration that three months have scarcely elapsed since we had a political crisis of perhaps the most extraordinary de scription which ever occurred in this country. During that crisis the opportunity of forming a Government was offered, I think, to no less than four distinct individuals. It was offered, among others, to the noble earl opposite, (Lord Derby) of whose party the noble earl who moves this address then formed a distinguished member. Three months ago the policy of the preceding Government with regard to the whole management and conduct of the war stood exactly as it does now. Their neglect to follow out the views of the noble earl in the Baltic, and in the expedition to Gallipoli, to Constantinople, to Varna, and subsequently to Sebasto pol itself, then occupied precisely the same position as it does at this moment; and so, too, the same remark holds good with regard to their omission to carry the war into Asia. Yet at that time, when the Government was offered to the noble earl opposite, and when the noble earl who brings forward this resolution was to have filled a post in the Ministry which would have enabled him to correct those errors, or, at all events, to try and remedy them, the task of forming an Administration was, nevertheless, delibe rately declined by the noble earl's leader; and, therefore, I hardly think it is fair now for the noble earl to pass a censure upon the present Ministry for that position of affairs which he himself had the opportunity to grapple with and to rectify, by being called upon to assist the noble earl near him, who received authority from the Crown to form a Government. But, my lords, is it, I ask, for the good of this country is it for the advantage of the conduct of the war—is it safe, even in a constitutional point of view, to be recurring within the space of three short months to fresh changes in the Government, and to agitate the country from the one end of it to the other? This, my lords, is a serious question, on which, I say, you will do well to deliberate before you determine to adopt the address of the noble earl. I may here just observe that, so far as this is a matter of mere personal consideration for my self and my colleagues, we would be ready to put it en tirely out of sight. The public must, I think, by this time know that it is no bed of roses to undertake the adminis tration of the affairs' of this country at any period, but more especially during the present most responsible and eventful crisis. So far, therefore, as personal consider a,tions are concerned in our retention of office, they are entirely of a secondary nature. But I must take leave to warn your lordships against these frequent changes of the Government. (Hear.) I must warn you that it is not upon any slight or mere party grounds that these changes ought at such a time to take place ; it is not because one party would wish to turn out another; otherwise the public may speedily be led to say, " A plague on all your parties !" and put an end to constitutional government altogether. (Hear.) I warn your lordships seriously against consequences of this kind, and I think it is a sufficient argument to point to the recent changes which have taken place, and to indicate the dangers of your repeating jhose changes, with, perhaps, worse results. I therefore bag your lordships to' pause before you commit yourselves to the adoption of this address; and I entreat you rather to seek by rejecting it, to calm down the minds of the people on the subjeot of change; to enable the executive Government to carry out the plans which it has in view with reference to the con duct of the war ; to show the commanders of your armies that they may trust with confidence in the instructions which they may receive from a Government which has had time to mature those plans ; and, above all, I implore you upon no trivial grounds, especially at such a juncture as this, to give effect to a vote the result of which can only be to settle nothing, for the noble earl proposes no settlement of anything—but to disturb the existing state of things, to e-un settle public affairs, and to jeopardise the result of the great war iu which we are now engaged. (Hear.) The noble lord concluded by moving the previous question. The Earl of HARDWICKE said that, in rising at that early stage of the debate, he felt his own incompetence to deal with the question before their lordships in a manner befitting its gravity and importance, but at the same time having from the beginning been impressed with strong opinions, which he had never concealed, as to the manner in which the war had been conducted, he was desirous of availing himself of that opportunity of laying before the house his views somewhat more',in succession and detail than he hed yet been able to do. Omitting from the reso lutions now under discussion that portion which touched upon out-door agitation, or any topic of that description, he was disposed distinctly to agree with the noble earl who had just sat down that the latter part of the motion ex pressed disapproval of the conduct of the war. With that expression of disapproval heentirely concurred. Everything he thought had not been done to enable the country to achieve success in the war in which it was now engaged. In the first place, _he felt convinced that if a different ,course of policy had been adopted by the Government be fore Russia had crossed, the Pruth, if they had announced to the Emperor of Russia that a cordial understanding existed betwen France and this country, and that we were determined to form an alliance offensive and defen sive with France for the purpose of preventing the over throw of the - Ottoman Porte, and if our fleets had then en tered the sea which the Emperor bf RussiZ considered his own, the war might altogether have been avoided. If, too, after the war had begun a more vigorous line of action had been taken, and if, instead of indulging in - bravado and braggadocio, and unduly exciting public expectation, the Government had shown greater judgment in the handling of our fleets, a greater measure of success might-have been obtained. If the Government had conducted the war, upon the principles upon which they professed to enter into it— for the defence of the integrity of the Turkish empire—if, remembering that we were a great maritime and not a great military Power, they had determined to exhibit tin; might of England in that manner in which it could be exhibited with the greatest effect, if they had de spatched a combined force of 10,000 British and 20,000 French soidiers to assist the Turkish army on the Danube,' and had completely blockaded the Baltic and Black seas, equipping our fleets in such a way as would enable them to carry on a flotilla warfare on the coasts, the Con gress of Vienna would have had a better chance of arriv ing at a successful termination, and our army would not have been placed in the position in which it now was. Our fleets would have been really more useful, and there would have been a better prospect of bringing-the waeto a success ful conclusion than could possibly be the case from running our heads, as we had done, against one of the strongest fortresses in the world. To institute a blockade of the enemy's ports was one . or the most successful modes o f waging warfare which a maritime country like this could adopt, and yet, with great naval resources at their com mand, the Government had failed to do this in a com plete and efficient manner. In the case of the White Sea the Government certainly had a very good answer in the manner in which the trade was carried on be tween this country and that part of the Russian do minions. It appeared that remittances were sent out from this country ono year, and the cargoes sent thence in return in the following year, and there was every reason therefore why no blockade should be instituted until those cargoes had been 'lespatched for which the money had been paid. In the Baltic a thorough blockade had certainly been established, though the result of it had been to throw the whole commerce of Russia in that quarter into the hands of Prussia, just as the manage ment of our armies in the seat of war had resulted in throw ing two of the finest provinces of the Turkish Empire into the hands of Austria. These two German Powers therefore, instead of assisting us to bring the war to a successsul ter mination, were far more likely to desire the continuance of a state of things from which they were so great gainers. But the maritime policy of the Government in the Black Sea was calculated to excite the' greatest dissatisfaction. The Government, indeed, rover seemed to have made up their minds what they should do in reference to the blockade in that quarter, for on the let of June, 18 54, the First Lord of the Admiralty stated in the other house, in answer to Mr. Horsfall, that orders had been given to the admirals, both in the Baltic and the Black Sea, to institute and en force strict blockades, and that there was every reason to believe that those blockades had been instituted ; and yet nearly a year after in that house his noble friend opposite (Earl Granville), in answer to a question from the Earl of Airlie, gave their lordships to understand that a blockade had not been enforced in the Black Sea, but that the atten tion of the admiral had been directed to the subject, and there was every reason to believe that his measures for that purpose would be successful. Such conflicting statements as these were calculated to mislead the mercantile commu nity, to induce them to take steps which the actual circum stances of the case did not warrant, and finally to throw them into a state of doubt and uncertainty which entirely put an end to all commercial operations. The consequence was, that the trade of th e f ore i gner h a d b ee n conducted with facility ; while it was impossible for' our own countrymen to carry on their mercantile transactions. Now, the trade of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff together was of very considerable Magnitude, oonsieting, as it did, of articles which peculiarly belonged to the trade of this country—of wool, linseed, and corn. In 1854 there arrived at Constantinople, from Russian ports in the Black Sea, 453 vessels with linseed, containing 770,000 qua - tern, exclusive of ships containing other cargoes. It was a singular fact that this trade was continually increas ing, for in 1352 only 415,000 quarters arrived at Constan tinople, and in 1853 640,000, while in 1854, as he had stated, there arrived 770,000. Out of the 453 vessels which convoyed these cargoes no less than 333 passed the Straits of Kertch, coming from the Sea of Azoff. Now, ho was sure that if the navy of England in the Black Sea had not been made subservient to the use of the * army, it would have been enabled to perform the great and important duty not only of carrying out an effective blockade, but of conducting upon the shores of the Euxine'and of the Sea of Azoff a system of guerilla warfare which would have tended to harass the enemy and to create an important diversion. There was, however, one imp or t an t po i nt connected with the transport service to which he hoped he might be permitted to refer. It was found essential, from the progress of science, to conduct operations with steam power, and a large expenditure was incurred in that respect. It was of the utmost importance that the ar rangements for coaling ships should be as complete as pos sible, but at Constantinople, Malta, and Gibraltar, he be lieved that the arrangements were very defective. He would ask their lordships toconsider how defective arrange ments in that respect entailed a heavy expenditure on the country. He would take the case of a ship of 2,500 tons, engaged at a rate of 50s. a month per ton ; that was about 2001. a-day. When the ship arrived at Constantinople and required to be coaled, the arraegements,were so bad that only 30 tons of coals could be put on board in a day, whereas, in a good coaling yard, the same quantity could be shipped in an hour; and taking the price of coal at Constantinople at 31. a-ton, the ship would be coating the country 290/. aelay, while she was unne cessarily detained doing nothing. It was of the utmost importance, not only that the arrangements for putting coals on board the ships should be as efficient as possible, but that there should always be a sufficient supply of coals, and that that supply should not be dependent upon the direction of the wind. There was at Plymouth and in the Medway a number of hulks, which might very easily be fitted up with steam power and employed in carrying coals from this country, and then there would be no necessity to rely upon sailing vessels for a supply of coals from Malta or Gibraltar. He would also endeavour to facilitate the means of coaling in those districts. He trusted that he should be excused for entering into those details, for they formed part of the subject under consideration, and, if not attended to, the cost of the war would be enhanced to an enormous extent. Vessels were now in a great measure dependent on, for their motive power, a most expensive fuel, which, if rendered scarce in those districts, might rise to 101. a ton. Though the noble lord opposite (Lord Panmure) was not responsible for all that had taken place, still some blunders had occurred since he had accepted office. A noble !tarsi had already pointed out that a vessel which received a body of troops on board was obliged to unship them, owing to some misun derstanding, and be (Lord Hardwicke) was informed that some curious blunders had lately been made, showing that these departments were still in a state of " higgledy piggledy," and required watching with the greatest care, or the country would be put to the greatest expense, and the army involved in the• greatest difficulty. The other day it was desired to erect, at the seat of war before Sebas topol, some hospital huts for convalescents, and the engi neer whose duty it was to erect them found that the Go vernment had sent over the huts in three ships, of which only one had arrived in the harbour at Balaklava. That ship, however, had only brought the roofs and floors ; the ship that was next coming had the walls on board, and the ship behind carried the windows and doors. Under these circumstances the engineer was completely paralaysed, for be could not put up the huts until the second and third ships arrived. (Hear.) He would repeat another anec dote he had heard. A quantity of harness was sent to the Crimea, and, when the cases were opened, it was found that they contained no back traces, so that the harness was of no use at all. A noble lord had described the army as an army with a head and a body, but no legs, so that it could not move. However, to facilitate that operation, a number of American lumber waggons were sent to the Crimea. Those waggons were fitted with poles, but not shafts • and, though there was harness ready, it a pp eare d that it made for shafts, and poles ; and there was no harness for leaders. These blunders, when elf put to gether, were fatal to the prOgress of the war and to the success of our arms, and, as he intended to give hi s vo t e for the resolutions, only performed his duty in showing that everything had not been done to enable our forces to achieve success. (Hear, hear.) The Earl of ELGIN said it was with very great reluctance that he was about to trespass for a few moments upon the attention of their lordships, more especially as the noble earl who had given way to him had much greater claims on their notice ; but as he (the Earl of Elgin) had been absent from this country for some time, he feared that a silent vote on the subject before their lorcHhips' house might be liable to misconstruction. He had intimated to the noble viscount at the head of the Government his desire to give him an independent support; but it had also ap peared to him that, in the critical circumstances of the country, it was the bounden duty of every public man to tender a hearty and generous support to the Government of the Queen ; and he had now to determine whether cir cumstances had occurred which should induce him to join in a vote condemnatory of the Government. Nothing had occurred in the interval to make him regret that the'pledge of support he had tendered was not unqualified. Neither in the Crimea nor at Vienna had any successes which had attended the exertions of the Government been so complete as to cause the germ of hope he had reposed in the admi nistrative ability of the noble viscount (Palmerston) to ripen into perfect confidence. (Hear, hear.) But when asked to unite in a vote of condemnation on the Govern ment, he had to ask first, was the condemnation just; and rext, would it contribute towards the redress of the evils the existence of which all deplored ? Now, it was notorious that the condition of the army in the Crimea had of late very much improved, and that the Government were prepared with a scheme for the reorganisation of the military departments ; and to condemn the Government in the face of these things would be a violation of justice. The noble earl who proposed it kept Out, of sight the changes which had lately occurred in the Government, and charged all the blame supposed to attach to the conduct of the war upon the present Administration. The first part of the resolutions referred to the general conduct of the war, and was conceived in terms of exuberant exultation. Not a word of national friendships of long standing broken ; desolation carried into many happy homes ; Europe in arms ; Asia agitated to its centre ; America sullenly ex pectant. The latter part of them was couched in terms of exuberant denunciation. Bat the departments impugned by the latter part of the resolutions had been changed, and the departments alluded to in the former part re ' mained in the same hands. And the doctrine of govern mental responsibility could not be carried so far as to make the present Administration responsible for the blame attached to the military departments of the former Govern ment. Even, however, if he could concur in the censure proposed to be cast upon the Government, he should be un willing to do so in favour of the noble earl opposite, and thus to bring about a change of Government at a time when it was most objectionable to have frequent changes of Admi nistration. He happened to be on the Contine: tat the time when the last change of Government took place, and the most painful impressions were created in foreign coun tries as to the instability .A our administrative system in consequence of these frequent changes of administration. And not the least of the calamities which the war had brought upon us was the tendency which it had in many quarters to throw discredit on our constitutional govern ment. (Hear.) The only loss which was really irrepar able was the loss of character. (Hear,) Still there was 4, large measure of consolation. As to the military depart. ment, the character of the British soldier for moral quali ties and physical endurance had been raised to an extent it never had attained before. In spite of the unfavour able tone of a portion of the American press, he had seen in influential journals of the United States commentaries on the conduct of our army at Alma and Balaklava which no true-herrted Englishman could read without emotion. And he had heard tribute not less generous borne to them by our French allies. He had heard, also, from bigotted votaries of that branch of the Christian Church which prided itself on having re tained within italimits room for the exercise of the heroic virtues of Christiania y, a frank admission that the hospi- Itals at Scutari had shown that the fairest and ch o ic es t flowers of Christian charity would bloom even in that which they were accustomed to call the arid soil of Pro testantism. (Hear.) He doubted if the character of states men, and public men, and of Parliamentary institutions, had proportionably risen: (Hear.) It was notorious that doubt had been created, in quarters where it never had existed before, as to the practical efficiency of our much ' vaunted constitution, and its fitness to carry us unscathed through periods of peril. (Hear.) There was only one way in which these doubts could be removed. Let public men evince the same indifference to personal motives, and the same generous patriotism, and the same disinterested de votion, to duty, which had characterised our soldiers in this field and the women of England at the sick bed. (Cheers.) If—which God forbid--it should be otherwise, and if, un- Ihappily, in those whom fortune and rank or royal favour I placed in the van these qualities were wanting, whO .should dare to blame the press and the people of Eng land if they looked for those qualities elsewhere ? (Cheers.) The Earl of WINCHILSEI said he was compelled solemnly to declare his conviction that this was an unjust war, which ought never to have been entered into ; and, therefore, he founded his support of the resolutions on this: that the Government had shown 'a want of judgment in placing the army in a situation in which, humanly speak ing, success was impossible, and sacrifice inevitable, with out the special intervention of Almighty Providence. He did not attribute to the Government all the disasters that had occurred, which ,were partly owing to the impolitic course pursued, by the other house—in obedience to the re publican faction in reducing our military establUments. The Victualling Office, the Commissariat Board, the Trans port• Board, the, Medical Board, all had been affected or destroyed by these reductions, and the result had been to render us, upon the outbreak of the war, unready for any great effort.. The Baltic fleet had left -England in a most disgraceful state as to its manning ; and it was well for us that the Russians had not met it. The 'object of the Se bastopol committee was to bli n d th e p u bli c as t o th e real causes of our disasters. He should vote for the resolu tions, although not perhaps approving of every part of_ them, because the substance of them was this, that the Government had shown a want of the judgment and ca pacity essential for the conduct .of such a war. Earl GRANVILLE said he wondered that the noble lord could support resolutions, the first of which approved the justice and necessity of the war in which we were engaged. He disagreed with the noble earl in the opinion ho had expressed, that if the Russian fleet had come out we should have suffered. (Earl Hardwicke—Hear, hear.) 'On the contrary, I regret that the opportunity was wanting to our gallant sailors of gaining a great victory. (Cheers.) Tho noble earls who had snoken in this debate had not agreed in their tactics, and the noble earl who had brought forward these resolutions had appeared to countenanos, in supporting the last of them, the line taken by a leading opposition paper, in representing the families of the Glowers, the Howards, and the Cavendishes Sitting in con clave, and dictating to the Premier the , colleagues he should choose. (A laugh.) Now, my lords (said the noble earl), lam a Gower—(a laugh)--but lam the only Gower who has any official employment. I am related to a Ca vendish, and the noble duke at the bead of that house has not shown himself slow to discover and encourige,konius, even when found among the very lowest classes of society. (Hear, hear.) I see near me the heir presutnptive to that house, who did not shrink at the university from success ful competition with the ablest and best-educated men of his day; nor did he shrink in his private capacity from aiding the country in any undertaking. And, as far as I remember, his only re l at i on bearing the name of Caveu dish is a gentleman who is fattening on the enormous emofu meats attached to the Foreign Office service. My lords, lam also, I am sorry to say, related to some of the Howards. (Loud laughter.) Not to " all the Howards ;" for since the time of Pope they have so wonderfully multiplied and ...increased— (laughter)—that I believe Mr. Horace Mann would find them as numerous as the Smiths. (Laughter.) But the member of the Howard family selected by the Queen to represent her in Ireland is certainly not, in the west riding of Yorkshire, or any where in-the United Kingdom, considered inimical to the middle classes. My lords, I may as well make a clean breast of it—(laughter)—and I must admit that some of those who have gone before me had such quiversfull of daughters who did not die 01a maids—(laughter)—that I have relations on this side of the house ; I have relations on the cross benches---(hear, and laughter)—and I have re htions on the opposition. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) , Nay, I have had-the unparalleled misfortune of having no less than three cousins in the Protectionist Administration of the noble earl opposite. (Laughter, and hear, hear.) Not withs tandingall thesehereditary infirmities--(laughter) —I have had -occasion, in a career not so brilliant as that of the noble earl, to mix much with the middle classes, and to acquire greater sympathy, perhaps, with them than he possesses—and notwithstanding his adulation . of them, I doubt if his admiration for their peculiar characteristics came quite as freely and frankly from his lips as the sneers in the former part of his speech. There has been on this subject great misapprehension in the public mind as to the appreciation by official men of mien distinguished in t private business, and the facility of obt a i n i ng suc h men t o fill offi cial posts. I remember one of the departments abolished by the House of Commons because it was " too expensive ;" before that happened it lost its secretary because a com mercial company offered him double the salary he was re ceiving from the Government. And a friend of mine, at the head of one of the departments, the expense of which was found fault with last year, was offered 2,000/, a year (double that which he receives from the Government) by a great commercial company—an offer he declined to ac- ----------"'"-------"-----------'"'"- -MP ° f eept. I myself received an offer of the chairina,Ta c hat 1,1-e greatest commercial company in the country ° one of them a descendant of the Plantagenqs---n , _ Avo . —who ( ides the business with credit to hiroselfsdrpril office h a d b een fitted by two members of the aris;(tioacurgabctci tae to the company. Lord Palmerston offeredtoolc bigh uee ep.A councillorship to Mr. Laing. That gentlemaike ,e honours at Cambridge and went to the bar. short time a clerkship in the Board of Trade, and after a firo t year left it to practise in his own profession. In the bead of he received ten times the amount he rcceivedbea servant of the Crown. He was afterwards a t s t n. .0 , 41 ; two companies, one of which he saved from b . ,_ r _1.,,,,,te the sots; • h at b° e a n n t d er h p e ri i sp e astinthte.hheeoaodoooftroyn.e ofs.thoedmoonsbttr, egafismeoxisectiy kind of man to assist us in organising departmen ~. . 0 3 ' could not accede to the offer of the Governiner-Would there are many mercantile or professional men not be so blind as to give up their business for trb.,,tel:l3. porary occupation of political office. My lordsct 11 • 3 'i s bt means say that there are no men of businW.nu wis h to be made available for the public service, but o L. o w hich correct a misapprehension that it is want of offers keeps men of eminence in private business from , ob. the public service. The noble earl went on he be ject to the resolutions because they 1 0 1 ia tL i r t of 1 °"" could not concur in. Secresy was part of .the otiou of and not more secresy, but especially the e legg e e ets. b a d ow ow prosperity, and the concealment of our rift oo hs, Russians were such master' of this stratagetiftnadl'only2o, sorted ceai ed ,t but utth whene same extorted the treaty of Adrianople when theY h e f a g to tell fighting men in the field. Napoleon told his ge ne b r i n gtoa r e ' the truth to him, but lie to all the sverld• different system; he concealed she that oughtt i 'e uth. 13115 we had done that which no other country ha d tablet en to do—we had laid ourselves on the operatinF'_ue owing had dissected ourselves in the face of day. Tblo was 001 to something interwoven in our institutions. ~'-', oaf eobarlitg.edThtoe Duke sp of VirellinWg: tf°lblevlecoar: deficiency had been exaggerated ad:lc:1lb:: _ e im o vi t u l t*li t: newspaper and every speech. No doubt this wasLustrepg'i! out advantage; for a great country, proud of o i, to the . and relying on its resources, might thus be r nr" u for t u correction of faults in its system. Bat were 11 %.',, or , hes i f; get out of this eternal abuse of ourselves? T a „ o p t from the Ministerialists.) The impression le"thr,t Pir r mind from a perusal of these resolutions Was , oe sorf f ? 3 land had shown none of the qualifications nec o e es o i success in a great war, except valour. Nothing ho t c o ' as to our mercantile marine, by whose aid we o r itat veyed iOO,OOO men, English and French, te,!."tia o f 0, 0 Nothing was said as to our landing there-10 0000 ' victories. Nothing as to the application of sisidail: telegraph, or the construct'on of the railwaYiniteprovetVilist Above all, nothing was 'said as to the N o w, o 5 S C• dition of our army at the present time. fie. would be the effect on Russia and on EuroPett,°be, reoool,o ing to all the world such a state o f things as ' read of r tions represented ? Would Russia be 'more rt o t olt s o , peace Or, if she offered terms of peace, sy°ll'., With it, ceptauce of them be liable to misconstruction •,., op pos A sect to the pollFy to be pursued then oble e au ble e; did not agree—especially as to GernianY• T ye .the P i hsi (Ellenborough) was In favour of operations 10 o ted t' a , in Bessarabia, and in Georgia. He had alreadyrtsed b y Co to resolutions of this nature, proposed and suPP°otobaead servative members of their lordships' house , " the eage f os t worst effect in Germany ; and, to Judge ft om,_ p 1110 lit , with which speeches delivered in the Englisuoiepfo'Toes were translated by Russian agents in Germenll any aierl,,oll able to their views, he thought he might nay 0 0 o ', a . effect would be produced. (Hear.) But the_rel_seree.o„, more serious consideration—what effect would tD coo r tr eb lutions have upon France ? He did not Irish auk, ofOop, was a numerous peace party in France, 'the r soo w el t had been swelled 13y the greater part of thos e .ip ivir posed to the present Government. Peace `{hat the belt great a blessing, and war was so detestable, ia i s 4 is cater of peace hadal ways powerful a rent°'t i strv o a a power favour. But the prin3ipal argument foe bY,..t.h: vi er, s o o Fiance at present Was, " We are embarked 1 03 %,,, tbqo t E o n g h l i a m n . d has." Tner we send three Frenchmen for every E n g the - Oa 'l,l O we have not the same interest in " . Te oreh e ' e i -l or ° • A_ L istri_ r ~gist iier interested in the question'than either Franee t r oo , s O l be but that France, with her continental Pc' s ' ~p c erne , lol stake in the Mediterranean, was not deePlY °" b ie or' o r There w T a h s a t n are o g a n o m u e b n t t th vi at a 5 ioco--; _ could not understand. In his opinion, the ° a tit ° 4 , 0 of from time to time uttered very great fallacie? _OlOOO4 Con, not the least of which- was the VOtt l'ai?obcloeibog this war in an Indian point of view. ° ~e o t 1° 10 , 5° (Ellenborough) gave France another arg °- so °"- tee' upon their lordships' house —an assemblage, these of grave, so free from po ular influence —to pass a rld eca o id ol lutions. Well might P they say, as " These co-belligerents of ours artebaebns°oblnt,,:lefiodulefestlosit every qualification but one that can make- th en; 003110 1 1 ua w sn a tw r ie .: rtte T ark h : e og no g b r l e e at ea s r e l o s r h o o my uld sn r d em o e o na nfi b d e e r n th o a o rehr?l,l fo.V o months?" and it might very naturally be asked by Francs'b o' t bre,. ° go on in close alliance with a country wh''' 'two °r oil? with their lordships, even if there war?, 'too' prat' tainty about the resolutions than 13e onic' "i or the, l l o cos; hear.) But there was historical precedent _,, e ito ..00 0 ch H an e g t e h e ou it g e ht a t m a i t ni c e o t n ra si tdieel;ateivoenilottroreffl, motion. In one year after the battle of 1 3 1; pil o ted, a o r f ra ß ig a n m in il g li Ramillies. T c h on ei d r uc l t ord o s f hi t p h s e ' duct of the war was severely 43313-gassed 11 j o rion s •t i t/t s ' and country, but that did ot prevent the g t foredo , and speeches were made pre dict p iti u g r ice e t a b i ° • A u t suta re aa re i l e bl i te after Talavera, addresses came from th e el f Vtreld li is would e l y , of a r eat army would be iriven out of the , . 0 08 ,f ... career of v b i u oto t t r h y a . t did (Hear.)not stay xo t c h io e tb li rih r il l e an r d es s u o l f b ft r er re t l ° (—fraeimraaekra.i splendidtv successesal H a , n ae d nb i d n e landing dente;pr present butun d i e t r w t a a k s i ng not was too naronaionhlyvi ti re t xt u p : eee b t , a t; o t sa s or f Al roo " - r a standing ig i n n k t e h rm e Canrimanead-So..erehei? : h erd: o ;i d u no o t o df l e, , : the hardships and pr'ivatiouet ''''''for the m ' "il l ' to _the co at alit tb NO , 'o° anything that might be 09.1 , 0 0 i der ~ ,ioti,j. e th re eir st l i o Ll rd i s n hip st s o t r :a: begged their 4,-, thes e r ` - ist was fair,. or just, or patriotic, to agree 1- , but Vthott'u,r. so ingeniously contrived to obtain v°l'",,atioos' 0,01)", ously contrived to promote any benefit or - An plf ",' se The Earl of DERBY—My lords, I °a ll -- b e i er" th an thise with what has just fallen from the no t ° o l 3 ;tto with the disappointment he has experi e __„ nce ; ree gb' 0 41 speech of my, noble friend (the Earl of Me ° t Viror e b et "gradiloquent speech," as the noble Jldini ste skit op e _ e :ot er it, but which I call the able and statesina .0 epic VIP my noble friend--so entirely at variance 10 its rill 1"" sec and tendency from that which he bad fn e- , I eb b and against which he had prepared his 10' 1 ,1, t bos s ou gh aware that, if not by the noble lord, atleast 1":03 hoe' thret act with him, it has been industriously cif ° i ,ipo' j v ise s o town and through the members of your 1 0 10 0 1' that it was the intention of my noble friend to t of et ir; e o vidious and unseemly attack upon the on clue lege P,io% ;ant troops, t be 0 0 v I Ps, as also upon the conduct Of „ o ls o vi officers who command them. I know of aPii i btorf 4 , been made to private friends—appeals to the,n`ip?boacoo, professional feelings of members of yourlords`i u 0 0 b icb not to sanction by your assent an attack Ina d° f ° ,or , " i i 0 ' menders of our forces here and at the sea t °,,,,, 0 ° f ief might have the effect of weakening their effor t be O r po f doing great injustice to men actively Bu-raged° 10 0 1 ' the se P e b o f of their country. Ido not know but that c e e ~0 epe e ,„ r have had their effect ; for in the course of t" d, ore - ris r' . .o noble friend there has not been a single w°l. icy of el 1 11° sten, or gesture, which by the greatest ing en iorc is, oe bl feeling could be distorted into an attack. 1 Y b y th e b 1 0 i,ie with regret the sneering • t fon rna cle • et. - is impu a i , l in 3 lord the Minister for War (Lord Pannre" er' tbe having s a g of r congratulated my noble friend on his _ fee ti,,,,tei l views, and adapted his resolutions to th e . a .t i of P ,,,,ce so country. Now, I say, the noble lord had no r i ll s o ": , jo i to throw out that insinuation, because the acts ioril• 4 the altogether disprove the statement of the ne°.loo, i alr oo tla once, but over and over again in las" e°sl ., ° lo ol t y ao °ll question of this war was under con to n OO l O friend entreated and implored of you t ° e to Oa jf ° 4oe . .; criticism on the conduct of the war, an d s _,„ ° -pg tb v .itli e " which the officers of the army were dischaw _.• iil- 1 , so that they should ilot be sed kr '7 fr °° bie l ' embarras ,„, attacks emanating from that house. 1 ° a l 00 0 ' ob' ens a 0 first, there has been no d fo r these in n o f fa i f e round se have been thrown out as to the' intent wee „,re bong they o' friend. (Hear, hear.) But th ese .re t p ert,ti6V have been objected to because f or the re ° . o re _,FUote l l e s "truisms." These resolutions assert the s' t . Ti oe t on of I les tion with which we have regarded therreiPet'lets,;(lto.' of counsel between her Majesty An d tue„iiinei' - 0 .tor French." I believe, my lords, that is a se_ ii i j(? 4 . Y u ft every member of your lordships' house wtiou so ed / J ot, ally as my noble friend who moved the rest teas ora,oo do not coincide with the nobleesyl Neho_l,,,,° 'tootle/to lordships (Earl Granville) that the ttne:';igr",-0 frsi of this house, And its assent of the o . ° ,- b etwe e , or, ,i 0; it reels at the good underttanding ° i ' tip tlia t su s e ' lig t e and England—l repeat Ido not concerForice e.dieg,. pii' s iion of gratification will be regarded in __, ie stan, fu r „,,, cant. When I speak of the cordial 11 ° L eo Oaf OP • 10 . exists between the Governments of Fre,vriuiee,,:eplfil tu as also between the commander thatboth_, i l e ve it ' b foil; I omit the opportunity of saying I beer vr ttis _oft!lo., c t , tics to a noble lord, the commander of.tn!ore pol t o P o e .. say that nothing can have contribute(' !l o g a.' .b ilitf,,h 1 ; the maintenance of that good understanl , attripiF or o , counsel and harmony than the invaroiadaefe,orde, to b° kindness of manner with which he has °li may ',,,,;pg e cc eel his intercourse with all parties. I dW e ' l efte 1 6 ' o r t ° 05 , ttacir of O pot so d this because it has been said an a ujers nee ~ pee , made by my noble friend on the hostconitn;" f it , ). o , o l ' If there had been such an intention I 6if to „ i f f,, :irel' I would be the last man to lend 1.1,"Y5i.„, ott . i e 0 1_,,, i ,e d hardly remind your lordships that 0 1 b io us I),.!• e ad 7 al,. mendation t on the death of the ill w o of P i ' aic l 00r 7 0 , lington, that her Majesty called OX' ° ll e cor, The e' l e ea t ;, 0 site (Lord Hardinge) to succeed to lso I ° l ' t th e a I'','. army. The high estimation which I a __ I A a _ nro sen,A b . P,,, capacity of the noble lord now in metcol:aw reco'o,7e i t 1 war (Lord Raglan) likewise induced it 0 , to ' OO Ol9 1 to the control of the Ordnance, as ;7 'est,' to e oin e ' ePt o b signal merits by recommending her .n ail 0 , 1 01 lu ey i pt ) ,, a seat in this august assemblage. i levi l thi thi eg 910 these noble friends to high position., ... DJ a ny of 4 t if t would be the last man that wouldlouo, VFe,:tiont." Pei would stultify my own reconinienaeur cito .. ,,i r 0 iß i t':# A O ,l, the resolutions go on to tt expreee ° flied f(;,al,oPli re's' many deeds of valour by which the.'" _ lOO , . 00 en 0 4 b ,., have illustrated their brotherhood 111.1_,, w e 0 _ , ,yer _ i t oo enter into the policy of the war in.r5".57,1 va_o'toa ',it.i:ji as this is not the fitting opportul.nbc• skeins oli t f fP o o f rill have an opportunity affordetV _....,ree:in.e Au , tiro of noble lord opposite (Earl Grey) 1„_!..:F„0nef,,,-; 0 _', l l , .. r e , and determination with regard to ' O 7 and . 1 f a lc! , ps! be much ditiappointed if this holsroeeu 07 u pa ; el De Commons also--where the issue h ift of 1 ,,,0 id , 0 . 4 i ~, , hon. gentleman—will not, byl°Louthe wawa, :041,/ prove to foreign countries and 5 ' h o f t-i. ° 00 0 f o intil l o ol regard to the Justice and t o i t terr,ry s_ rai t o necessity of sparing no effort t 4 1 ' a by terayeuelioglii% Pi ;40 thwarted by delay or discourage t, 5 thes e • 90 3 "to ll 0 1 I say I shall be disappointe .. _ u f th i s _ tie e s, cb je .ie t made manifest by the declaration _,.. aro pia,a, oo , i .4g 1 'o' House of Parliament in a inannoenquo trend aitaiwou tot no doubt of our determination On ' ea rl (O rel of f i tee'q it i Greatly as I differ with thef hot , g o usel 0 •,,eik o , 3 3 0 for giving this opportunity o n n.,. ~ape 0n...„,ei110t0 o! 00 for expressing their opinion ; ti lt . o _• e t 3 - ' PI' y ° l , Le ole t ' feeling of this house on the a W e ' l The t t he E 0 re r ive n } 1, come to a division. (Pli eer il l teen s o f t", 001 lt affirm that " whilst we aditteSco all C l3 '; tbeloll ' 51 4 1 ° 4l to which war necessarily suJ.„._,,ty th.' _ at c o m0t,,.., we yet venture to assure her. or to w ittr _ote, OP so just a cause bear those priv y Lion __ 0 1 c i. t , , og y 311 they could feel that the war h d to lia expose d the troops had not been ; ,* ) 3 ~,' 11'