The Sun. — London, England, 1855-06-19 00:00:00

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT. HOUSE OF LORDS-(YESTERDAY.) The Loan CRANCELLOR took his seat on the woolsack at five o'clock. Lord LONSDALE presented a petition from Kelso, praying for the prohibition of distillation from grain. FEES IN COUNTY cour,Ts. Lord BROUGHAM rose to put a question to her Majesty's Government respecting the fees paid in county courts. Tne noble and learned lord proceeded to state the increasing amount of business transacted in the county courts since the original act establishing them had passed, and the proportionate diminution of causes in the superior courts. It was of the utmost importance, considering that the vast majority of causes in the county courts were in regard to sums under 201., that the fees exacted in these courts should be in proportion. What, however, was the fact ? The fees taken in these colds amounted to about 270,0001. a year. The taxes—not fees, for fees they were not — which were exacted in the superior courts were restricted to only 50,0001. a-year. The noble lord condemned the system, in respect to fees established in the county courts, as most grinding oppression and extortion. It was altogether in opposition to the spirit of the act, under the act by which the courts were constituted, which was to render law as cheap as possible to the poor man. He then proceeded to analyse the fees, and summed up his analysis by stating that the amount of fees extorted is in a great many cases 160 per cent be yond the amount sued for. He drew a distinction be tween the mode by which the judges of the superior Courts were paid and that in which the judges in the County Courts were paid. The former were paid out of the Consolidated Fund, but he considered it disgrace ful that the latter should be paid out of the funds of the court. Lord PORTMAN entirely concurred with all that had fallen from the noble and learned lord who had just sat down. He thought that very great injustice was done to many of the judges of the County Courts. They complained not only of the great difference that was made as to their salaries, but that that difference was founded upon no intelligible principle. He hoped that the noble lord on the woolsack and the noble earl who represented the Treasury in this house would give their best attention to the subject. He trusted that the Sec retary of the Treasury would not be allowed to interfere in any Way with the successful operation of the act, which was the case by his interfering with respect to the salaries of the judges. Earl GRANVILLE fully admitted the justice of the remarks of the noble lord, but he regretted that he could give no distinct pledge that they would be removed. The noble lord on the woolsack had lately brought the sub ject before the Government. He trusted that this cir cumstance would satisfy the noble lord • at the same time he assured him that the matter should receive the serious consideration of her Majesty's Government. After a few words from Lord CAMPBELL, The LORD CHANCELLOR said the 'whole subject was under the consideratiou of the Government, as the evil complained of admitted of no further delay. The noble and learned lord sympathised with his noble and learned friend, and regretted that the salaries of the county court judges should fluctuate. At the same time he must say that those judges who did the most work were not those judges who had received increased pay. After a few words from Lord BROUGHAM, the subject dropped. The report on the Leases and Sales of Estates Bill was considered and agreed to. The Infants' Marriage Bill report and amendments were brought up and received, and the third reading fixed for Thursday next. The Insurance on Lives Bill was read a second time. The Cinque Ports Bill was real a second time. The Earl of DERBY rose to propose the names for the select committee for the Religious Worship Bill. The motion was agreed to. The Earl of SHAFTESBURY declined to serve on the committee. Their lordships then adjourned. HOUSE OF COMMONS-(YESTERDAY.) The SPEIKER took the chair at 4 o'clock. The following bills were read a third time and passed : —Capetown Railway and Dock ; Derbyshire, Stafford shire, and Worcestershire Railway (No. 2) ; Glasgow, Kirkintilloch, and Baldernock Roads ; Hoffe's Estate ; Royal Medical Benevolent College ; Dagenham Docks ; Great Northern London Cemetery. The further consideration of the Torquay District Churches Bill, after some discussion, was postponed. The following bills were considered and ordered to be read a third time :—Dundalk ffarhonr and Port, Lon don and Brassington Road, Wad hurst and We-t Far leigh Roads, West Bromwich Improvement, Westmin ster Improvements, Westminster Land Company. PETITIONS. Petitions were presented by Mr. Ellice, from Ros common, in favour of the Lord Advocate's Education Bill ; by Mr. Henley, from Oxford, against the sale of intoxicating liquors on the Lord's-day. THE REPORT OF THE SEBASTOPOL COMIIITTEE. Mr. ROEBUCK brought up, amidst some cheering, the report of the select committee on the army before Sebas topol, which was then laid on the table. On the motion, of Mr. DISRAELI, it was ordered that the report should be read by the clerk of the house. Sir D. LE MARCHANT, the chief clerk, accordingly read the report as follows : " Tho complicated nature of this inquiry, the variety of subjects investigated, the number of witnesses examined, and the frequent inconsistency and contrariety of the evi dence, render it no easy task to present a clear, definite, and just exposition of the matters submitted to your com mittee.- "The difficulty of this task has been enhanced by the impossibility of summoning some persons as witnesses who might have furnished important infoimatien. From the same cause some persons are left under imputations, in re gard to which your committee regret thi.t they can pro nounce no conclusive opinion. The fulness of the investi gation has, moreover, been restricted by considerations of state policy, so that in the outset of this report your com mittee must admit that they have been compelled to end an inquiry which they have been unable satisfactorily to complete. _ _ " liavingoffered this preliminary explanation, your com mittee will endeavour to state, as shortly as the subject will allow, the opinions which they have formed in regard to the following heads of this inquiry, viz. : "1. The condition of our army before Sebastopol. " 2. The conduct of the departments, both at home and abroad, whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army. "THE CONDITION OF OUR ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL. " An army encamped in a hostile country, at a distance of 3,000 miles from England, and engaged during a severe winter in besieging a fortress which, from want of num bers, it could not invest, was necessarily placed iu a situa tion where unremitting fatigue and hardship had to be en dured. Your committee are, however, of opinion that this amount of unavoidable suffering has been aggravated by causes hereafter enumerated, and which aro mainly to be attributed to dilatory and insufficient arrangements for the supply of this army with necessaries indispensable to its healthy and effective condition. Iu arriving at this opinion they have made allowarce for the unexpected severity of the storm on the 14th of November, and they have not bee❑ unmindful of the difficelties which a long period of peace must inevitably produce at the commencement of a campaign. " In order to obtain an adequate notion of the painful condition of the army the evidence must be perused ; and your committee will only refer to such details as may be requieito to sustain their opinions. "From the Itch September, when the army landed in the Crimea, until the end of October, or, as witnesses state, until about the middle of November, the troops suffered from overwork and from dysentery, but were not, upon the whole, ill-provided with food. Even at this period there was a want of clothing for the men in health, and a painful deficiency of all appliances for the proper treat ment of the sick and wounded. As the season advanced the causes of sickness increased, and the army, with its number of effective men daily diminishing, became more and more disproportionod to the amount of duty which it had to perform. . " From the middle of November this army was, during a period of many weeks, reduced to a condition which it is melancholy to contemplate, but which was endured both by officers and men with a fortitude and heroism unsur passed in the annals of war. They were exposed under single canvas to all the sufferings and inconveniences of cold, rain, mud, and snow, on the high ground and in the depth of winter. They suffered from overwork, exposure, want of clothing, insufficient supplies for the healthy, and imperfect accommodation for the sick. " The fatigue necessarily . resulted from the inadequacy of the force for the task assigned to it. The British army was a portion of an allied force. The whole scheme of the siege, the extent of front to be defended, the positions to he maintained, and the works to be undertaken, depended on military considerations, and were decided upon in con junction with our allies. Your committee regard these matters as beyond the limits of their inquiry. "The other causes of suffering will be reviewed under the following heads : THE CONDUCT OF THE DEPiCTMENTS BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD WHOSE DUTY IT HAS BEEN TO ADMINIS TER TO THE WANTS OF THE ARMY. "THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT AT HOME, "The responsibility of the expedition to the Crimea rests upon the home government. The Duke of Newcastle, in his despatch addressed to Lord Raglan, on the 10th of April, 1854, directs careful, but secret "inquiry" to be made into the present amount and condition of the Russian force in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress of Sebastopol.' And his ("race further observes, that before the siege of a fortress so strong can be attempted, it is necessary that information which can be relied on shall be obtained upon many points on which little or nothing is at pre=ent k nown. ' A secon d despatch, d ate d the 29th of June, directs that the safety of Couttantinoplo having b t e a e s n sia se n _cured, whatever mi g ht b e th e moveme nt of the be undertaken, no campaign in the Principalities should ken but that measures should be at once con certed for the si • ege of Sebastopol. There is,' it is added, no prospect o f a safe and the fleet peace until the for tress is reduc e d, and fleet taken despatch leaves to Lord Raglan or destroyed.' The scrotion only ' in case of some insuperable impediment, such as a want of ample p r eparation by either army, or of the possession by Russia of a force in the Crimea greatly out - numbering that which can be brought against it: "The Cabinet appear to have been confident of success Lord Aberdeen st ates it to have been their impression that . Sebastopol would fall almost immediately by a co up d, main. The Duke of N ewcastle says , that he expected the army, after capturing Sebasto p ol w ould winter there or else, after destroying th e fortress, w o uld return to .! nter on the shores of the Bosp horus. Sir J ames Graham wi has the strongest opinion that the order for the expediti on was given at the right time, and was executed at the right time. " This report shows the results which ensued upon the frustration of these expectations. Your committee have inquired what information the Government had obtained which induced them to order this expedition. In regard to this matter it may be observed that the Duke of Newcastle had, in his despatch of the 10th of April, estimated the Rua- SiAla forces in the Crimea at ;7'0,000 men, and he believes that when the eapreition was ordered no more reliable ea counts had been received. Sir James Graham, however, says that at a later period, viz., the last week in July, ho had obtained from a Crimean authority a complete ac count of the Crimea, its localities, its harbours, its roads, its productions, and supply of water, and, what was most important of all, a statement of the force, which was esti mated by his informant at 70,000 men, 8,000 of which were cavalry, 40,000 constituted the garrison of Sebasto pol, and the remaining 30,003 were dispersed through the Crimea.' Vice-Admiral Dundas had, on the 10th of May,. 1854, written to Lord Raglan a letter, in which, relying upon information which ho had obtained, he estimated the Russian forces in the Crimea at 120,000 men. The embas• sies at St. Petersburg and Constantinople were unable to furnish any information upon these important subjects. " Lord Raglan, in his despatch of the 19th of July, states that `the descent on the Crimea is decided upon more in deference to the views of the British Government than to any information in the possession of the naval and mili tary authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces or to their state of preparation.' " The terms of reference do not call upon your commit. tee to pronounce any opinion in regard to the policy of the Government in ordering the expedition to the Crimea: but it is their duty to report how far the preparations made were adequate to the preparations which had been ordered. "The general direction of the war was in the hands of the Duke of Newcastle, who, in the spring of 1854, hell the office of Secretary for War and Colonies. In July these departments were divided, and the duke being relieved from colonial duties, undertookthe immediate conduct of the war. " When this important change was effected it does not appear that any order in council, minute, or other docu ment was prepared defining the special duties of the War Department. The duke, as Secretary of State, had un doubtedly, before as well as after the change, ample powers; he considered himself officially responsible for all the de partments under his control, and he could issue such orders as he thought fit for their guidance. He states, however, that he felt his means to be insufficient for the due per formance of his separate duties as Secretary of State for War; he considered the organisation of all the war depart. ments and their relation to each other to be in an unsatis factory state, but he felt it to be impossible, consistently with attention to pressing businees, to attempt their re-or ganimation. "In making the separation between the Secretaryship. of War and the Colonies, together with the transference of the commissariat from the Treasury to the Secretary for War, the Cabinet considered that they had adopted mea sures initiatory to other changes which would necessarily follow. The members of the Cabinet did not, however, hold any consultations upon the changes to be made, or the best mode of effecting them ; they separated, as usual, at the close of the Parliamentary session in August, and as they were not summoned to a meeting, they did not re assemble in council until the second week of October. At 'a later period of the year Lord John Russell expressed his dissatisfaction with the state of the War Department, and suggested Lord Palmerston as the fittest person for the office of Secretary of War. He adduced some cases where he said there had been a want of vigour in the exercise of authority, although the Cabinet, he added, ' had done much in its recent meetings to repair omis siens.' Your committee notice with regret that the Cabinet did not meet in August or September, when these omissions might have been sooner remedied. Lord John Russell also observes, that ' the House of Commons would expect, after six or seven months' deliberation, a final arrangement of the War Department. Your committee can find no trace of these deliberations ; and any evils that may have resulted from delay in such arrangements are, therefore, properly laid to the charge of the Cabinet. " At the date of the expedition to the East no reserve was provided at home adequate to the undertaking. Mr. Sidney Herbert states, in his memorandum of the 27th of November, ' The army in the East has been created by discounting the future. Every regiment at home, or within reach, and not forming part of that army, has been robbed to complete it. The depots of battalions under Lord Raglan have been similarly treated. " The men sent out to reiuforce the army were recruits who had not yet become fit fur foreign service, and the depots at home were too weak to feed the companies abroad. " The order to attack Sebastopol was sent to Lord Raglan on the 20th of June; the formation of a reserve at Malta was not determined upon until early in November. "It will be seen from the correspondence between Lord J. Russell and Lord Aberdeen, that Lord Reglad had re ported that 'he wished he had been able to place in the position of Balaklava, on the 26th of October, a more con siderable force,' and also, ' that on the sth of November the heights of Inkerman were defended by no more than 8,000 British infantry." When the Duke of Newcastle in formed Lord Raglan that ho had 2,000 recruits to send to him, he replied that ' those last sent were so young and unformed that they fell victims to disease, and were swept away like flies. He preferred to wait.' " In December the power of reinforcing the army with efficient soldiers was so reduced that the Government thought it necessary to introduce a Foreign Enlistment Bill for the purpose of raising a foreign legion. " Your committee must express their regret that the formation of a large reserve at home, and also in tke proxi mity of the seat of war, was not considered at a much earlier period, and that the Government, well knowing the limited numbers of the British army, the nature of the climate in the East, as well as the power we were about to encounter, did not at the commencement of the war take means to augment the ranks of the at nay beyond the ordi nary recruiting, and also that earlier steps were not taken to render the militia avail .ble both for the purpose of ob taining supplies of men, and also, in ease of necessity, for the relief of regiments of the line stationed in garrisons in the Mediterranean—measures which they found themselves compelled to adopt at a later period. " THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR. " On accepting the Secretaryship for War, the Duke of Newcastle found himself in this disadvantageous position —he had no separate office for his departments, he had no document prescribing his new duties, no precedents for his guidance, and his under seeretariea were new to the work. In this situation he undertook the superintendence of nu merous departments , with whose internal organis a tio n h e was dissatisfied, and the management of a war urgently re(); l i i .n e g d iz e m , x a t i aiii ni d p v e itT e r c o t i i l y s operation s. ft.auano t d with the best mode of exercising his authority over the subordinate de partments, and those departments were not officially in formed of their relative position, or of their new duties to wards the Minister for War, His interference was sought for in matters of detail, wherein his time should not have f been occupied, and he was left unacquainted with trans ! actions of which he should have received official cognisance. Feeling his large responsibilities, ho took upon himself to remedy innumerable deficiencies which were brought to his notice, and, in the, meantime, matters of paramount necessity were postponed. "The evidence, moreover, shows that the duke was long left in ignorance, or was misinformed, respecting the pro gress of affairs in the East. He was not, until a late period, made acquainted with the state of the hospitals at Scutari, and the horrible mode in which the sick and wounded were conveyed from Balaklava to the Bosphorus. Lord Aberdeen has significantly observed that the Government were left in ignorance longer than they ought to have been of the reel state of matters in the l met. The Ministers, he says, were informed of the condition of the army from the public papers and private sources long before they heard it offi cially, and not hearing it officially they discredited the rumours around them. Thus, while the whole country was dismayed by reports, and was eagerly looking for some gleam of official intelligence, the Cabinet, according to the statement of Ministers, was in darkness. " Harassed by these rumours, and perplexed by the in discreet silence of those who should have enlightened him, the duke sent a commission to inquire into the state of the hospitals at Scutari and in the Crimea. The commission was issued in October ; it did not report until April. A form of proceeding suited to redress grievances at home, or to become a basis for legislative measures, was ill adapted to relieve the pressing wants of 5,000 men suffering under usieinanagernent and neglect. " With the same benevolent intention, the duke, through the channel of the Foreign-office, requested Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to take upon himself, in addition to his many onerous duties, a certain amount of supervision and assist ance of those hospitals. " The clothing of the troops was not within the province of the Secretary of State; awl the Duke of Newcastle says it was extremely doubtful whether he had any right to in terfere. The soldiers hail received the ordinary supply for the year ; yet the peculiar circumstances in svkich the army had been placed induced the duke to recommend to the Commander-in-Chief that an extra supply should be furnished, and, in addition to this, warm clothing should be prepared to meet the inclemency of the weather. The system of clothing the army was then, and still is, in a state of transitiou. Whenever the existing contracts cease, the clothi ng w ill b e supp li ed by the Ordnance, or by a clothing department. " The warm clothing was considered so important that, upon hearing of the loss of the Prince cleanser, all the mili tary departments were occupied with this supply. The Secretary for War issued orders; the Secretary at War was constantly at the Ordnance, urging and hastening these proceedings; clothiug was bought also in Austria and in Switzerland. Ambassadors, ministers, consuls, and agents were applied to for assistance ; money was profusely ex pended, and at a later period in the winter the troops must have received a supply far larger than was required for their reduced numbers. "THE SECRETARY AT WAR. " The duties of the Secretary at War are shortly stated by Mr. Sidney Herbert ; they still be found more fully enumerated in a memorandum, which was given in evidence before the committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure in 1850. " The division of the Secretaryship of War and Colonies, though technically it did not alter the position of the Secre tary at War, yet practically diminished the exercise of his power, and tended to limit his functions to the original duties of his office, namely, the financial business of the arwv. Even in these matters the authority of a Secretary of State, when exerted, must necessarily over- r id e th e control of a Secretary at War. Mr. Sidney Herbert, as Secretary at War, had no power to originate anything ; but from praiseworthy motives, and with a view to relieve the Duke of Newcastle, he undertook to do a duty which was not the business of his office. Thus, in _ December, having learnt from private sources the deplorable condition of the hospitals, he wrote to the commandant, to the chief medical officer, and to the purveyor, urging and authoris ing them to procure whatever might be wanted, assistants, supplies, or additional buildings, promising them his ap probation for such outlay, and placing unlimited funds at their disposal. " While expenditure was thus encouraged, some finan cial regulations were still enforced, suited to a time of peace, inapplicable to a period of war, and operating un justly on the soldiers who had been wounded or afflicted with sickness in the Crimea. According to these regula floes every soldier coming into an hospital is obliged to bring with him his kit; but although the t r o o p s , upon landing in the Crimea, had been deprived of their knap sacks, which in many cases were never restored, yet no or, der had been issued to furnish another set in lieu of those articles which the soldier had been compelled to relinquish, awl which are essential to his cleanliness and comfort. Again, upon leaving the hospital, men were exposed to a recurrence of sickness from insufficient clothing, and no proper arrangement had been made to furnish this supply. "An improvement, involving seine outlay, has been suggested to your committee, which deserves the attention of the Executive Government. The general hospital at Chatham is said to be inconveniently situated, and ill suited for the reception of invalids from the seat of war. Vessels of large size cannot go there, and consequently the siel: and wounded have either to be removed to a smaller ship, or sent,by other means to the place of their destina tion. At the same time your committee may remark that while hospitals are provided for the reception of officers in the navy returning sick or wounded, no such accommo dation exists for officers of the army. 8 " You r comm i t t ee may here also express a hope that the vile which have arisen from allowing soldiers' wives to accompany an army in the field will prevent a repetition of this error. ".A me morandum will be f oun d i n th e appendix, pur port lug to be by the Duke of Newcastle,' but written by " THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. " Your committee deem it unnecessary to state the various duties of the Ordnance Department, nor need they enter into details with the view of proving that upon the efficiency of this department the naval and military ser vices depend. " In April, 1854, Lord Raglan, the Master-General of the Ordnance, was appointed to the command of the forces in the East; and shortly afterwards Sir Hew Ross was named lieutenant-general of the Ordnance—an office which had beers for many years abolished, but which was now re vived. " Lord Aberdeen, in making this appointment, had to some extent in view the abolition of the office of Master- General. This subject had not, however, been considered by the Cabinet, and in the meantime the Ministers believed that the Lieutenant-General would have all the authority of Master-General. " The Lieutenant-General does not possess this power. He is only a board officer ; and while in reference to mili tary duties ho exercises the Puthority of Master-General, yet as regards the civil functions of the Ordnance he acts only as a member of the board. " The Board of Ordnance, moreover, differs from other , boards in this respect—namely, that according to the prac. tics or to the regulations of the department, the presence of one board officer constitutes a board. During the sum mer and autumn of 1854, a board officer, the Surveyor- General, was also employed abroad ; so that during v. period when the pressure of business was heavier, and when the expenditure of this department was larger than in any previous year, two officers were wanting whose functions the most economical administrations had been unable to dispense with in times of peace. " The Ordnance, even with its peculiar constitution, may work efficiently while under the superintendence of a vigilant Master-General, who has supreme authority, and who is, therefore, justly held responsible for all its pro ceedings ; but the substitution of a lieutenant-general changes the whole system of the office ; its duties are then divided among the members of the board without any su pervising authority, and the business commenced by one member maybe taken up or interrupted by another with out unity of purpose, and without due responsibility. " The evils arising from the absence of the Master-Gene ral are abundantly exhibited in the evidence. The state ments of Sir T. Hastings, the Comptroller of Stores, and of Mr. Monsell, the Clerk of the Ordnance, amply prove the unsatisfactory state of this department, while it would seem, from the language of Sir Hew Ross, that he was im perfectly acquainted with the constitution of the board of which he was a member. " From the evidence it will be seen that a conflict of au thority arose between the members of this board. At a time when urgent business required their attention they were engaged in disputes, in preparing statements, and in making appeals to tba Secretary of State for War. Sir Thomas Hastings says, that although he made more than one application informing the Secretary of State that he had important communications to make to him, he received no answer to his letters. Mr. Monsell, when he differed from the other members of his board, applied to the Sec retary of State, who, by lending his sanction to the Clerk of the Ordnance, enabled him to overrule both his col leagues, and thus interfered in a matter involving ques tions of military discipline, as well as of departmental sub ordination. In noticing the unseemly conduct of this board, and the differences which were brought prominently for ward in the evidence, your committee observe with regret that the public service has suffered from the want of judg ment and temper on the part of officers who were en trusted aiming a critical period with important public duties. " Your committee consider that it was detrimental to the public service that the office of Surveyor-General should have remained so long vacant, and that the duties attached to that office should have been consequently im posed upon officers of the department who had already as much upon their hands as they were able to perform effici ently:. . _ "Your committee believe that Lord Aberdeen would have acted more beneficially for the public eervise if he had appointed another Master-General when Lord Raglan could no longer discharge the duties of the office, and they aro of opinion that a vague intention of remodelling the Ordnance Office affords no justification for the course pursued. If this office were deemed to be imperfect, and ill-adapted for its functions, there was the more need during its continued existence of an able man to superintend its proceedings. The Ordnance•office strikingly exemplifi es th e disordered state into which a department may fall when there is no able baud to guide it. " After perusing the evidence, it will excite no surprise to find that the arrangements attempted by this office in reference to warm clothing, huts, and Minie rifles were imperfect and dilatory. Huts were ordered at Constanti nople and Trieste, as well as in this country. The brat order hero was issued on the 17th of November. When the huts at length arrived at Belaklava, the exhausted trensport service was unable to convey them to the camp. It appears from the evidence of air J. Burgoyne and Sir F. Smith that if canvas had been sent fur doubling the tents, and planks for flooriug, effectual shelter for the troops would have been provided at a much earlier period, and at a smaller cost. It is impossible not to believe by these means the sickness and suffering of the troops would ' have been diminished. " Your committee must express their dissatisfaction with the administration of the contract system under this department, and they consider that no change will be effective which dues not lead to a revisal and amendment of this branch of the office. "The tools supplied to the army are stated to be of bad quality. Under a recent order the Ordnance furnish all tools. The pioneers' tools were heretofore supplied by the colonels of regiments. For this last supply the Ordnance is not responsible. The officers examined almost uniformly describe the tools supplied to the army as unserviceable. Sir T. Hastings, on the other hand, states that ' he believes the great mass of tools were good, but thinks that many have been ill-treated, and that good tools in the hands of men who do not understand them may be readily destroyed.' There is, however, no doubt, that upon previous occasions as well as in the present campaign, these articles of field equipment have been condemned. In this country under a proper system of contract and inspection there can be no difficulty in obtaining tools of the best quality. The supply of interior tools must be ascribed to carelessness or disho misty on the part of the persons responsible for the supply. Your committee cannot ton forcibly express their opinion of the importance of placingin the handsel the soldiers the very best articles that can be provided. " While the committee have felt it their duty to make thesoobservations on the inadequate and disordered state of this department., and its failure in some important func tions, they feel bound, at the same time, to mention the admirable equipment of the corps of artillery attached to the army, and the testimony generally given to the effi cient armament provided for the navy. TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT AT 1101111. "The sea transport between this country and the seat of war has been conducted by the Board of Admiralty, under the immediate superintendence of Captain Milne, one of the Lords of the Admiralty. This business was formerly transacted by a Transport Board, which was abolished many years since. During the Inv, year requi sitions for transport were sent to the Admiralty from several different quarters; the inceuvenience of this system was so great, that Sir James Graham says he deemed it indispensable, with the view to regularity and promptitude, to bring these req u i s iti ons to one common centre, from which the Admiralty might receive order s. This change had not, however, been con pleted before he left office. The Duke of Newcastle says, that no system will work well until the sea transl.;ort is placed under the management of the Minister for War. Such a course Sir J. Graham and Capt. Milne consicLr ob jectionable; it wou:d, they say, divide authority, increase correspondence, and lead to confusion ; whereas now the whole service afloat is united together in one link of re sponsibility. " Sir J. Graham was, however, induced to re-constitute the Transport Board, for the reasons which will be found in his evidence. " The mode in which ships wore taken up is stated by Capt. Milne, and considering the urgent pressure of the pub lie service, this buainess appears to Lave been ably conducted. In pronouncing this opinion, your committee advert to the magnitude of the operations executed. Within a year somewhere abont 150,000 men and above 7C09 horses wore conveyed, principally by steam, a large portion of them to a point 3,000 miles distant from this country; besides which ves.els had to be provided for stores to an enormous amount, fur the purposes of war, for the sustenance of both army and navy, and for the effective mainte nance of a steam fleet. .-iudden requisitions fur huts, and other urgent necessaries, had also to be met. "There is, it is said, an obvious error in comparing the transport service between England and the Crimea to a inereanthe arrang arrangement for the conveyance and d e li very o f a given amou n t of tonnage. The transports, when sent to the Crimea, could not deliver their stores and return. A large number were permanently detained, from military considerations, and many others were kept at Balaklava, because there ware no warehouses on shore to receive their cargo. . - . " Many complaints were made to your committee of the mode in which stores were sent to the East. The mods in [ which stores were sent depended on the nature of the re , quisitioe. Naval stores were apparently, sent under a , satisfactory system. When the Ordnance Board apply, a vessel is placed at their disposal provided they require it • and, latterly, a similar system has been adopted with' the medical department. The chief complaints have arisen in reference to mixed cargoes. The captains of the vessels, according to the Admiralty instructions, have charge of the cnrgo ; but it is admitted that when large passenger steamers were employed in this service the cap tains ware often unaccustomed to these duties, and iu such cases the appointment of a supercargo would have been beneficial. Until December it appears that a cargo-book was not regularly kept. A Treasury minute, dated 11. th December, 1854, states that some articles sent out to the Crimea have been taken back to England in the same ves sels, and brought out again to the Crimea before they have been delivered ; and that in other cases, where the • vessels have remained with the army, it has been three or four months before they had been received by the commis. sariat. Ships were also so loaded that on arriving at the port to which part of the cargo was unknown, and the ship had to proceed on her voyage, carrying with her things that ought to have been delivered at the interme diate port. Much suffering was the consequence of this faulty mode of proceeding, the sick at Scutari being in need of stores, which, in consequence of bad arrangements, were carried to Balaklava. " The unnecessary sufferings of the soldiers directly re ferable to this neglect form one of the most painful por tions of the evidence; but on what department the blame should rest, whether on the office of the Commander-in- Chief, or of the Secretary -at-War, or of the Secretary of State for War, your commiteee are unable to decide. " Dr. Menzies had also, in a report to Major Sillery, the commandant, dated tho 7th of August, directed attention to this subject. " No steps having apparently been taken in pursuance of this suggestion, or of that of Dr. A. S m ith t o t h e military secretary, on the 25th May, 1854, Sir J. Graham, on the 25th of October, at the instigation of the Duke of Newcastle, wrote a private letter to Vice-Admiral Dundas, request ing him, after conferring with Lord Raglan, to have two large steamers fitted for this service. On the receipt of b th eo is an l s e e tt e er vy one,arAdmiralexDpusontdead to Dundas did be not, as Sebastopolashestate states, ina act, few be underwdays,a his superintendence.udmoreoverhetlidit consider the tran s p or t s to "Thus it appears that the preparation of ships for the acounv:nyasnsegenoofntthiye neglected.sick d When it is remembered wounded w as at first forgotten, that db out of the limited number of the British army, 13,800 wore removed,3 l (lt c h on o se f andthe 7 s t i h ck o o f r w F o eb u r n u d 3 e r d y , , b t e h tw o •e ( e h n sa th d e ftl ' this neglect may be imagined. No foresight, qB i u t epe i nte s cem s 3 a b itoel r, could have provided for this large number. Some ships f should, however, have been specially tilted for a service A. . . •• • "THE TRANSPORT SERVICE IN THE BOSPHORLTS. " All transports, upon their arrival in the Bosphorus, were placed under the orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer. This officer had been specially selected for this duty by Sir James Graham on account of his professional character and expe rience in matters connected with the embarkation and dis emb trkation of troops. He was placed, in the first instance, under the orders of Vice-Admiral Dandas ; but a separate power was afterwards given to him within the limits of the Bosphorus, subject always to his reporting to the naval commander-in-chief. " As early as the Bth of September Rear-Admiral Boxer applied for a ship to be attached to hirni , elf, with an expe rienced master, three good warrant officers, and a small gang of artificers and mechanics. A compliance with this requ,st would, he said, obviate delay and unnecessary ex pense in works which could otherwise only be executed by hired artificers. To this application the Board of Adrui ray replied, that ' the service being temporary they were not prepared to send out a receiving-ship, with its esta blishment.' On the 20th Nov. he repeated his application, but before it had been received the board had reconsidered its decision, andfhad ordered a vessel, the Melampus, to be got ready for this service. The Melarnpusaccordingly sailed in December. Sir J. Graham says he regrets that the first application was not acceded to; and when the hurricane of the 14th Nov., with all its disastrous consequences, is remembered, it is obvious that this unfortunate decision may have increased the difficulties of that deplorable crisis, and may have subjected ReAr-Admiral Boxer to some of the charges brought against him. "Itmust be observed, however, thatßear-Admiral Boxer had permitted Commander Barlase, on accouet of his know ledge in gunnery, to join theforces in the Crimea, although this officer—having been for' three years in the Turkish service—had been specially chosen to assist him. The rear admiral thus lost the person best fitted to communicate with the Turkish authorities at a time when his assistance would have been most useful. " Under such disadvantages he was required to repair the damages of the hurricane, and to forward to the Crimea supplies of every kind in lieu of those which had been lost. Deputy Commissary-General Smith, anxious toifulfil the duties of his office, thought that vessels wore delayed for coaling and watering, and that they were left iu positions where the loading was rendered unnecessarily difficult. This mismanagement he ascribed to Ad idral Boxer. Hence differences arose between them, and both Lord Raglan and Mr. Commissary-General gilder were even tually applied to on the matter. "Your committee are of opinion that there was some unnecessary detection of transports at Constantinople, and! that the arrangements for coaling were very deficient ; bat as they have not been able to examine A tiniral Boxer they cannot pronounce an opinion as to his share of respon sibility. His letters in the appendix show that he exerted hill:lsta' strenuously to discharge duties for which it is ad mitted that his means were inadequate, and, if he failed under these difficulties, his subseq cent endeavours in the harbour of Balaklava appeared to have been successful. " THE COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT AT HOME. " The coximisaiiat has been during many years a sub ordinate department of the Treasury; and although nomi nally transferred to the Secretary fur War in the summer of 1854, it was not placed under his immediate control un til the 22d of last December, when a Treasury minute was issued authorising this arrangement. "Up to that period Sir C. Trevelyan, the Assistant- Secretary of the Treasury, was practically the head of this department. He stated that the forms of the commissariat had been improved and simplified some years ago, and that although persons might inisunlerstand any regulations, yet he did not believe these forms were to be blamed. He would willinely submit them to any practised accountant for his opinion. Deputy Commissary-General Smith says that, as long as regulations are required, none could be made of a more simple furies than those applicable to the commissariat and he hail never heard any complaints arisiug out of observances of these forms. " THE COMMISSARIAT IN THE EAST. " It is the duty of the commissariat to furnish the army, when in the.field, with plovisione for the Well, forage for the animals, and land transport. "Commissary-General Filder was app,intecl by the Treasury to superintend the establishment of the commis sariat in the East. He was selected, it is said, on account of his experience and special fitness for the charge ; and authority was given him to provide such persons as might be required fur the service; ample funds were also placed at his disposal, and ships were ordered and provided to act under his exclusive directions. " With these large powers, heavy duties were imposed upon him according to an arrangement which appears to have been injudiciously adopted at the commencement of the campaign, It was determined that there should be only one store department with the army, and that this should be under the care of the cuininiesariat. From this decision it followed as a consequence that the commissa riat Was expected to make good the deficiencies of many distinct departments. All the miscellaneous articles of equipineut which cause undo,- the name of quartermaster general's stores were given in charge to the commissariat, and, in addition to these extraneous duties, this depart ment was required not only to keep a large amount id Ord ,nance stores, but also to purchase mates Ms and tools iu the East for the purpose of the siege. "The military system in this country affords the com missariat no opportunity of becoaring acquainted with.the army, or of ministoing to its wants • so that in a camp a ig n the officers of thi s dep ar t men t find dremseivai called upea to furnish supplies in regard to which they may have had no experience; while the officers and men, being often ignorant of the proper duties of the commissariat, consider this department responsible for everything they may require. " LAND TRANSPORT. " From the first the system of the laud transport was found to he imperfect. No adequate measures were adopted for its improvement, so that the army, when enc ►roped before Sebastopol, depended for all its supplies upon a service defective in its organisation and in its superinten dence. " The army landed in the Crimea without the animals necessary for the conveyance of the baggage, or for the removal of the sick and wounded ; mucii inconvenience and suffering resulted from thisdeliciency ; but if, as stated to your committee, every available vessel was employed for other purposes, the commissariat cannot he held responsi ble. " When the army had encamped before Sebastopol mules and baggage animals w ere b roug ht over f rom V ar na. O n the sth o October Commissary -General Filder asserted that he had transport sufficient for all the purposes of the army, and submitted to Lord Raglan a Belie uo for disposing of aoeve 2000 animals, which were at Varna, and which he said were not waited, and would only be an incumbrance iu the Crimea. During this same period Sir Edmund Lyons writes, that the transport animals, though in fair condition, were not sufficient in number. "On the Bth of November the commissary-general was informed that he must prepare for wintering in the Cri mea. At this period he still possessed a large number of baggage animals, and a considerable ainonut of hay and forage, on board ships, in or near the harbour of Salaklava. " About this period the Commissary-General became alarmed, foreseeing that the conveyance of guns and ammu nition for the sieg e and for the defence of our position, the removal of the sick and wounded, the distribution of ra tions, of forage, of clothing, of fuel, of medicines, and of medical comforts, besides numerous other supplies, which, iu the position of the army, were scarcely less important, would all be imperilled by a failure in the land transport; while the service was itself seriously endangered from the want of shelter and forage for the animals during the ap proaching winter, and from the bad condition of the roads between Balaklava and the camp. "Your committee are not aware that any measures were adopted for the protection of the animals from the incle mency of the season ; Sir John Burgoyne thinks there was a great want of care, and that in a few instanced whore the animals were attended to they wero preserved. The drivers were inefficient, and, being without proper super intendence, lost, or indolently neglected, the animals en trusted to their charge. • " THE ROAD. "So mtioh of the suffering of the troops has been ascribed to the wretched, or, as some witnesses state, the almost impassable condition of the seven miles between BAlaklava and the camp, th at your committee en d eavoure d t o ascer tain who was responsible for the ma i ntenance o f th e roa d s, and what i nsupera bl e objects impeded their repair. " Wh en th e army reached the h e i g ht s a b ove S e b as t opo l they found t wo pr i nc i pa l roa d s f rom B a laklava to Sebas topol, o ne th e fi ne Government roa d , th e o th er , f ur th er to the left, a useful farm road. The army held the Woronzoff road up to the time of the battle of Balaklava, in October. Immediately after that action it became uecesary to draw in the outposts, which lost to the army the use of that road; the other road, however, remained, and was avail able for all purposes until the rains commenced. "On the 13th of November Commissary-General Filcher wrote to the quartermaster-general, expressing his appre hension, and calling attention to this important subject. "The duty of staking and maintaining roads for the army falls upon the department of the quartermaster general. This officer was !about this time disabled by severe illness. Sir J. Burgoyne, the chief engineer officer on the staff, and other military authorities, state that the soldiers could not be withdrawn from the trenahes for the repair of the road. The alien were already overtasked by military duties; they were growing weaker from day to day, while their difficulties were increasing. An a tt emp t was made to employ Turkish troops on this work, but it was noon abandoned. " From the 14th of November, the date of the hurri cane, the land transport was gradually reduced in strength, until it al mos t cease d t o ex i s t. Th e C omm i ssary -General writes:—' The men and beasts perished, owing to the fatigue they underwent in s t rugg ling through th e d eep mu d with supplies, and f rom expos ure to wet and cold.' To repair these losses recourse was had to the depot at Constauti- Mr. Sidney Herbert in January last. His views upon the which it mud have been known the casualties of war Would best mode of constituting the War Department, and giving render indispensable. to it an effective control over the subordinate:departments, " THE TRANSPORT SERVICE IN THE BLACK SEA. and here explained, as far at least as he deems it advisable " The evidence exhibits a marked contrariety of opinion to introduce a change during the p ressure o f war , which as to the responsibility for the transport service in the Black leaves little leisure for re-constituting the military depart- Sea. Sir Jaines Graham said that the naval commander ments. in-chief, Vice-Admiral Dundas, had, under the Queen's regulations, authority over the whole of the transports, and he cited, in confirmation of this statement, sundry minutes of the Board of Admiralty; and he added that Lord Raglan had a concurrent authority over this service. " Vice-Admiral Dundas, on the contrary, alleged that he had nothing to do with the transports. According to his statement, they were entirely under the management of Lord Raglan, Rear-Admiral Boxer, and Captain Christie. " Captain Milne, the member of the Board of Admiralty who had the superintendence of the transport department, stated that the admiral commanding in the Black Sea was responsible for the transport service in that sea. A supreme power was, however, given to Lord Raglan, who had a veto over the movement of all the transports, and a con current authority with the naval commander-in-chief. " The difficulties of performing various services connected with the army are ascribed to the want of sea transport ; while the evidence of Captain Milne shows that no applica tion was made to the Admiralty for additional transports in the Black Sea. Numerous witnesses testify to the want of arrangements in the harbour of Balaklava, and to the dis order of the shore from the want of any sufficient landing places and wharves. "In Balaklava there was a division of authority ; the transports were under the immediate direction of Captain Christie; the harbour was under the management of another naval officer, and the shore was subject to military autho rity. Absence of regularity and arrangement on the shore or in harbour necessarily delayed the service of the trans ports ; in such cases it was not easy to ascertain on which of these three authorities the blame should rest. "The narrow limits of the harbour, which is described by Admiral Dundas as a mere ditch, rendered it, under the best system of arrangement, an inconvenient place forland ing the vast quantities of stores required for the army, in cluding gum, ammunition, engineer stores, &seines, ga biting, camp equipage, quartermaster-general's stores, and con in isiaria t supplies. " The want of system which prevailed on the shore is generally admitted ;the harbour was not governed with the authority necessary for the maintenance of order, and the transports were compelled to anchor outside the harbour— an anchorage which naval men justly considered to be un safe. nople ; but the waste and consumption of animals exceeded the supply, and the service of the land transport could no longer be performed by the commissariat. "The horses of the cavalry were then employed, and thus valuable animals, trained for the duties of the cavalry and artillery, were used and worked to death in services which should have been performed by animals purchased for about 51. or 71. each. " The broken road, and the want of land transport, in creased the confusion of the harbour. Sir E. Lyons ascribes the crowded state of the harbour, and its attendant incon veniences, to the delay in removing cargoes from the ships to the camp. " As far as the information obtr ined enables your com mittee to form an opinion, it appears to them that in this matter there was a want of due foresight and decision. Early in November, when the probable necessity of wintering in the Crimea was contemplated, energetic means should have been taken to provide and maintain an effective communication between the camp and Bila klava. The road bad then already been injured by the traffic, and its condition had excited the apprehensions of the commissary -general, who had called attention to the subject; if a military force could not be spared, measures should have been taken to obtain other labour in the E:ist, or application should have been made to the Home Go vernment, who slight have sent labourers from England. Such precaution would have saved much loss of time, and many valuable lives, and would have contributed to main tain the land transport service in an effective condition. The probable failure of the communication was not, how ever, brought to the notice of the Duke of Newcastle until too late to enable him to take measures in England to pre vent the serious calamities which subsequently arose. " DEPOTS IN THE EAST. " The consequence resulting from the failure of the transport service would have been in some degree obviated by the formation of depots in the neighbourhood of the camp, or between the camp and Balaklava. " The establishment of depots is a duty specially noticed in the commissariat regulations. Sir C. Trevelyan states, that in October, Commissary General Filler was engaged in the formation of a depot near the camp, in order that he might be secure against the contingencies of the weather; but after the action of Balaklava, the commissariat chest was ordered on board ship, and the transports were sent out of the harbour. At this time the abandonment of Balaklava was contemplated. After this followed the battle of Inkerman, when the transport service was occu pied in bringing up, ammunition, and a few days later came the hurricane and catastrophe.' From this time for ward all the available animals were employed for the daily requirements of the army, and the establishment of depots was relinquished. "At Constantinople Deputy Commissary General Smith established extensive magazines; he states that the sup plies under his charge were sufficient, and the arrange ments for the custody and delivery of stores unobjection able. In August, or early in September, he entered into con tracts for a supply of fuel, and could have procured enough for the army throughout the winter, but he was not able to obtain transports for its conveyance; at the same time the quantity that did reach Balaklava was more than could be carried to the camp. "He tried to hire native vessels for the service ; but after the hurricane the masters of these vessels could not be induced to attempt the voyage. According to his evidence, it would appear that sat Constantinople ,he had in store all the supplies which the army would require. No blame can justly be attached to Deputy Commissary- General Smith, nor can ho he held responsible for the difficulties and distress which occurred in the Crimea. "COMMISSARIAT SUPPLIES. "FOOD FOR Tri E MEN. "The Commissariat Department obtained an abundant supply of salt meat, biscuit, and rum from England. This was furnished by the victualling department of the Admi ralty, on requisition from the Treasury ; and the duty of the commissariat as to these supplies consisted merely in keeping the account and in arranging the distribution. Fresh meat was chiefly procured from Eupatoria, from Constantinople, and from Smyrna. Deputy Commissary General Smith stated that he had at Constantinople 4,000 head of cattle during the winter ready for the consumption of the army, beside: 2,000 at Smyrna ; and that if he could have obtained sea transport, he thinks he could have sent a regular supply to the army. "The witnesses are not agreed as to the quantity of fresh meat supplied to the army ; the regularity of the distribu tion depended partly - on the zeal and energy of the several commissariat officers, and also on the position occupied by the troops. Until the end of October the rations, it is said, were furnished with regularity, and consisted of fresh meat twice or thrice in the week. Mr. Parker, chaplain to the fist division from the 28th of November till the 23d of January, states that during that period the hospitals were supplied with fresh meat almost every day, but the troops did not receive it, he thinks, above once a-week ; he never knew them, however, to be without rations. Other witnesses say that the soldiers during the winter months suffered occasionally from want of their rations, and more frequently from the irregularity of their issue. In the appendix a statement by a board of officers will be found, iu which it is affirmed that the men for days and weeks together went to the trenches with an insufficient meal, and oftentimes with none at all, save a little biscuit and rum. Any result derived from an average of rations issued is delusive, because privation one day is not com pensated by superfluity on another. Even when the men received a !sufficient meal, the proportion of salt meat with out an accompanying supply of vegetables was greater than was consistent with the health of the troops. This deficie eney of fresh meat, the most wholesome, as well as the cheapest food, is ascribed to the failure of the sea trans port, the ships having been disabled by storms, and then delayed by repairs ; in one instance all the cattle on board perished from the inclemency of the weather, or from the violence of the waves. " Vegetables, which, according t o the int en ti ons o f th e government, eliould have been issued gratuitously, were very scantily supplied; indeed several witnesses assert that none were ever seen in the camp. One ship loae of vege tables was detained in the harbour until the cargo was de cayed • and at Eupato r i a , it is said, there wa s an i mmense store of onions lying on the wharf, while disease, from want of vegetables, was spreading through the camp. The deputy commissary general states that he had an abundant stock of rice at Constantinople during the time when it was wanted even for the hospitals in tho Crimea. Pre served potatoes were, it is said, early in the autumn offer ed to the soldiers, but rejected ; later in the winter, when the supply of vegetables was essential, it does not appear that the offer was repeated. Coffee, which had been ordered as an extra ration, was distributed to the troops in a green state, and (there being no means of roasting it) wits of little use. The explanation offered to your committee on this point is not satisfactory. The more immediate comfort of the troops appears to have been overlooked, while ingenious arguments on the volatile aroma of the berry, and on the Turkish mode of packing coffee, were passing backwards and forwards between Com missary General Flitter and the Treasury. • " FORAGE. " 'W hen the army first encamped before Sebastopol stacks of forage were found in the neighbourhood; these were soon consumed, and henceforward there appears to have been much difficulty in obtaining fodder fix the horses. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who left the heights on the 7th of November, said that hie baggage ani mals were frequently without food ; and that on one occa sion he was obliged to kill 21 ammunition ponies, which he had not the means of feeding. The Earl of Lucite, com manding the cavalry division, complained repeatedly, from the 29th of September to the date of his departure, of the condition to which the horses were reduced from want of food. Lord Cardigan mentions the same difficulties, but did not find the p ressure so severe l e n til a ft er th e sth of November, when his brigade was posted on the heights. After the hurricane the supply of forage failed, and under the combined effects of work, exposure, and insufficient food, the cavalry gradually ceased to exist as an effective force. " To what extent the commissariat is responsible for the deficiency in all these supplies is a question to which it is not easy to give a definite answer. " Sir C. Trevelyan, speaking as the head of the commissa riat, and desirous of relieving the department from raven• sibility, affirms their conduct throughout to have been ir reproa,:hable, and ascribes blame to other persons. Accord iug to his opinion, the quartermaster-general, for whose good intentions he made full allowance, ought to bear the chief responsibility. This officer,'he says, 'is responsible for the road to the camp and for the reed along the border of the harbour at Belaklava. By him also buildings should have been appropriated for magazines, and stables for the bag g age anim a ls sh ou ld h ave b een provided. ' "Sir C. Trevelyan also states that the endeavours of the commissariat were frustrated by the mismanagement of the ti•ansports, that there was a want of proper arrange ments in the harbour of Balaklava, and still worse dis order at Constantinople. Rear-Admiral Boxer did not,' he says, possess the altitinietrative qualifications requi site fur that important station, and he delayed the trans ports in the Bosphorus or appropriated them to other ser vices:' In confirmation of this statement he :mentioned the Rockliffe transport awl the Jason, which last, he said, had been detained three weeks at Constantinople. Some letters from Rear-Admiral Boxer will be found in the ap pendix, denying this assertion. Rear-Admiral Boxer also, it appears, in December remonstrated against the irregu lar system pursued by the commissariat in the Crimea, and requested the interference of the commander of the forces. He suggested that some of the largest transports should be strongly moored in Balaklava Harbour as float ing depots, and that the smaller steamers should be told off for the special duty of conveying supplies. " Your committee have not been able to examine Corn 'flies ery General Milder or Rear-Admiral Boxer, and they cannot therefore, decide upon whom this blame should rest. " Both these officers were, apparently, convinced that the transport system in the Black Sea had been ill-con ducted. Whether, however, the Vessels had been injudi ciously detained as store depots by the commissariat, or improperly employed in other services by the admiral at ConstAntinople, are questions which your committee cAu not satisfactorily answer. These arrangements might with propriety, have been reviewed by the high naval and mi litary authorities. They alone had the means of deciding these dif f erences, and of enforcing such a system as might best secure tlfe conveyance of supplies with regularity and dispatch. "Before closing their observations on the commissariat department in the East, your committee notice with plea sure the willing testimony which many witnesses have borne to the zeal &nt energy which some subordinateofficers of the commissariat displayed in procuring supplies, and in relieving, as far as they were able, the distress of the troops during a period of trying exigencies, it- THE AfEpICAL DEIAIITMENT AT HOME. The medical dePartinent of the army and Ordnance is under a director-general, who has an aesistant to aid him in his multifarious duties. Dr. Smith, the director-general, states that he was under the immediate authority of five different superiors —the Commander-in-Chief, the Secre tary of State for War, the Secretary at War, the Master- General of the Ordnance, and the Board of Ordnance. He further states, that upon the separation of the two depart. ments of War and Colonies, he received no communication ordering him to correspond directly with the Secretary for War. The Duke of Newcastle says, that in August last he himself told Dr. Smith that the Secretary of State for War was his real and only master. Had such an arrange. ment been earlier adopted, Dr. Smith says it would have saved labour, while the service would have been more effi ciently conducted. The director-general states that when he first heard of the probability that a force could be sent to Turkey, he proposed that three medical officers should be sent to make inquiries which might be beneficial to the troops. This suggestion was adopted. Ho also selected surgeons to be attached to regiments, and gave them direc tions for their guidance. He recommended that ambul ances should be prepared, and an ambulance corps ap pointed. For this purpose ho advised that able-bodied soldiers should be selected. Lord Raglan and Lord Har dinge objected to taking from the ranks effective fighting men, and pensioners wore employed instead. Dr. Smith remonstrated in vain. 11;entire failure of this corps, and the subsequent sufferings of the army, are abundantly proved. "In 314 y, 1831, Dr. Smith addressed a letter to the mi litary secretary of the Curatuauder-in-Qbief, reconmendin.; that, `in the event, of the hosPitals boipg eatablished at V! AY EVENING, JUNE 19, 1886. distance from the army, ships should be fitted for the tran sport of the sick and wounded.' This application was not attended b. " Before the army left England the most experienced pur veyors were assembled by order of the Secretary atWar, and after consultation with the Director-General of the Medical Department, they drew up a report in regard to the stores required for the medical treatment of the troops. " Dr. Smith states that he issued orders to the druggists for the supply of medicines ; ho made requisitions on the Ordnance for the hospital stores, and through the Ordnance to the Admiralty for the supply of medical comforts. The system pursued as to medical comforts was altered after Sept., when Dr. Smith provided this supply. Respecting the hospital stores. Dr. Smith says, that when he had made his requisition on the Ordnance his duty ended. His office had no further information on the subject; that he occasion ally applied or sent to ascertain what had been dome, but that this was outstepping the functions of his department. "The strict economy enforced (luring a long period of peace, by means of a rigid system of audit and account, may doubtless, at the first outbre .k of war, have still fettered Dr. Smith, ES well as otter public servants, who dreaded to incur responsibility for any expedition, however urgent, which was not guarded by all the forms and documents usually required. An excess of caution, in the first in stance, led probably to some evils, which a lavish outlay could not afterwards repair. The letters of the Secretary at War, read by him in his evide',ce, forcibly illustrate this observation. In many cases instructions in this mat ter might have been useful to public servants, whose expe rience was wholly founded on the methole, rightly. insisted upon during peace. "THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT IN THE EAST "The army, when sent to the east, had a greater num ber of medical men in proportion to the number of the troops than ever before accompanied a British army, and the witnesses generally concur in testifying to their zeal and efficiency ; many of these were, however, disabled by sickness before the descent on the Crimea, .so that after each of the actions, at Alma and Inkerman, some regi ments had not the requisite number of medical men. The ambulances for the conveyance of the sick and wounded wer " e too heavy, an d ill a d ap t e d f or th e i r purpose. The treatment of the sick and wounded in the camp at Balakiava and Scutari has already formed the subject of a lengthened report by commissioners specially appointed for this purpose; further information upon this point will be found in the evidence already pfesented to the house. The condition of the tent-hospitals, as clesz.ribed by Mr. Parker, chaplain to the First Division, was, from th e 28th of November to th e 23,1 of January, tho period of his stay in the Crimea, so wretched and painful to hear, that your committee gladly avoid repeating thosa deplorable details. The medical men, it is said, were indefatigable in their attentions; but so great was tho want of the commonest necessaries, even of bidding, as well as of m e di c i nes an d medical com f or t s , that they sorrowfully admitted their services to be of little moil.. " The hospital at Balakiava had an advantage, inasmuch as it was nearer to the limited supplies which were on board ship but the uncertainty whether or not Balaklava could be retained, disconcerted the arrangements of this hospital, and upon one occasion thepatients were removed. In regard to its subsequent condition, there is a difference of opinion, depending probably upon the dates of the several visits ; but the prevailing testimonfis to the effect that this hospital was for many weeks in a discreditable state. "Allowance must be made for the circumstances in which the continued possession of Balaklava was held, anti for the difficulty of establishing a hospital in such build in.'s as were found - there. The want of proper orderlies, the insufficiency of medicines especially of opium ; o f medical comforts„ some o f which were essential to the health of the men, and the great want of purveyor's stores, have been so fully set forth in the report of the commis sioners, that your committee deem it superfluous to adduce further evidence in corroboration of their statements. They will, therefore, proceed to observe upon " THE HOSPITALS AT SCUTARI. " When the army arrived in. the EIA various places were suggested for hospitals, but Scutari was eventually decided upon as the fittest for the purpose. " The sytsetn of regimental hospitals was adopted in the first instance, and the general hospital was not established until the army moved to Varna. " The Duke of Newcastle says that he did not issue any instructions as to hospitals ; he left that to be executed by the medical board. Dr. Smith, the director general of the medical department of the army, says that he had nothing. to do with these hospitals, and that his interfer ence could only have caused confusion. He selected medical men forihe hospitals, and he sent to the Ordnance a requi sition to provide hospital furniture proportioned to the amount of force, and there his duties ended. "Your committee, after hearing evidence affirmin3 the disgraceful state of the hospitals at Scutari, endeavoured to ascertain by whom the chief authority was exercised, and on whom the responsibility must rest. Major Sillery was commandant, and had sole military charge of all the hospitals. Dr. Menzies was superiuten dent of all the hospitals, having immediate charge of the Turkish Hospital, with Dr. M`Gregor under his orders, in charge of the Barrack Hospital. Dr. Menzies was Ap pointed by Lord Raglan, on the recommendation of Dr. Dumbreck and Dr. Hall, and remained superintendent from the 26th of June, 1854, to the 2d of January, 1855. He alleges that during a portion of this thee he was placed in an anomalous position, by the arrival, on the 4th of November, of Dr. Cumining, his superior officer, who had been sent from England as member of the commission of inquiry, and to supersede him in his office when the in quiry of that commission had been brought to a close. " When the expedition sailed for the Crimea Major Sillery gave iustructions to Dr. Menzies, in pursuance, it is said, of directions through Rear-Admiral Boxer, from the Duke of Newcastle, repeated by Lieut.-General Sir George Brown, to report the-accommodation that could be provided in the hospitals for the sick and wounded who Might be expected front the first operations of the army ; Dr. Menzies' report, dated the 7th of August, will be found in the evidence. Dr. Menzies in this report impresses on the local military authorities, as Dr. A. Smith had before done in his letter to the military secretary at the Horse Guards, the necessity of providing fit transports for the conveyance of the sick and wounded. "Dr. Hall, the inspector-general of the army, was sent by Lord Raglan to iuspect the hospitals in October. He remained at Scutary about three weeks, and then reported them to be in as go o d a s t a t e as could be reasonably ex pected.' Dr. Menzies repotted periodically to Dr. Hall, as his official chief. Dr. Menzies, although concurring in the opinion of Dr. Hall, appears subsequently to have made several appeals to the commandant and to the pur veyor for means of improving the condition of the hospi tals ; but either no measures, or no efficient and adequate measures, seem to have been adopted for the purpose. "In juetice to Dr. Menzies it must be admitted that he was engaged in incessant and onerous duties. He was con sulted in all difficult surgical cases—he performed the most serious operations himself. His time was occupied in in validing men, ho:ding boards, making monthly returns and quarterly returns, daily reports and weekly reports; reports to Dr. Hall, who was satisfied with the hospitals ; reports to Dr. Smith, who could not interfere ; reports to the Duke of Newcastle, who was never informed, of the real state of things. Amid all these labours ho had no time left for that which should have been his principal duty— the proper superintendence of these hospitals. " Dr. Menzies states ' that he was overwhelmed by the work of the three deputy inspectors when he gave up his charge,' ` his health being then broken down.' This state ment is confirmed by Dr. Dumbreck, who, having heard Dr. Menzies' evidence, says, `the clashing of responsibility and confusion th a t existed in the admiuistration 'of the hospita s was not crediteble to our system ; we seem to have fallen into a state of inanition ; we had no purveyors, no orderlies, no hospital corps. Dr. Menzies I believe to have been clearly overworked, and put in a position no man was able to cope with.' - "The duties of Dr. Menzies was 'further obstructed by a conflict of authority with the purveyor, who claimed to act independently, under the instructions of the Secretary at War. When one purveyor had been pronounced by a me dical board unfit for the active duties of his office, and was about to be removed, he was retained in this responsible situation by superior authority. All tioubt as to the autho rity of the purveyor woald have been removed by proper instructions from the Secretary at War. These were Lot, however, Sent until the 11th of November. " Your committe ;oust declareit to be their opinion that blame attaches to Dr. Menzies, inasmuch as he did not report correctly the circutnstauces of the hospital ; he stated that he wanted nothing in the shape . of stores or medical comforts at the time when his patients were desti• tute of the commonest necessaries. " With this confirmation by Dr.• Dambreck, deputy inspector -general of hospital's, of the whole testimony re lating to this painful subject, your committee are totally a t a loss to comprehend the report of Dr. Hall, more espe cially with rog.srd to the Barrack Hospital, the scale of so much misery and suffering. The Duke of Newcastle states • that the disgraceful condition of the hospitals was first brought under his notice in the middle of October.' Dr. Hall was at Scutari from the 3d to the 23d of that. month. Dr. Hall's report seems to have misled both Lora Raglan and the Government at home, awl' to have occasioned much delay in measures taken afterwards for the remedy of the evils, which might have been arrested earlier in their progress. "The offi c e of purveyor had been,, with four exceptions, discontinued for many years, and there was difficulty in finding a - person competent to perform these duties. The selection of Mr. Ward for this post was not fortunate ; among other proofs of his unfitness, it appears that when an inquiry was instituted into the amount of the pdrvey or's stores, no account could be produced of any stores later than the end of August. When it is remembered that the insufficiency or these stores was a source of much suffering, if not of more fatal results, it must be observed that heavy .'responsibility attaches to the commander-in chief of the forces, who, acting on the representation of the quartermaster-general, retained Mr. Ward in his office after he had been pronounced unfit to discharge its duties. The Secretary at War had said, There can be no objec tion to try Mr. Ward, as I will promise, if he is not effi cient, we will remove him.' When, however, the appoint ment had been made the commander of the forces had the sole authority, and overruled the decision of the medical board.• The appointment of Mr. Wreford, who was sent out as purveyor .in chief, did not remove those difficulties. The distinct duties of Mr. Wreford and Mr. Wardi was were increasednot understood bynew by uncertainty.theso off ce rs , 3 a i n r. .d Maxwell,the conf usion he ee commissioner, who was sent to inquire, seems to ha two returned undecided in opinion as to which of these officers was answerable for the supply of stores. " The apothecary's d e p ar t me nt at Scutari better condition. His store was the aware under only for the hospitals, but for the army , usie an entry he had no account of his stores, and never t t the 28th of in his books from the 11th of September under what depot, r u a a s s t ; in yetnnc rot November. Your committee are not admitsinstructtihoants suchhe wa s a b s u a t gross ro Government had been It is, moreover, manifest that the tel stores, since Mr. S. o n actingdne conduct w ; There h f o e r r e e deceived in regard to these hospital athesslattateSreelcieretit:nryonftdWutyar. o g f o n C e o In t h m r o o n u s al hava Herbertb ebeen n h had l stated manner t o e ds .b e e necessary for the purposes of a these stores could bo issued. "With plenty of materials, cl that It is now proved if there were thofor i n vi s th w t e i r i e o sroapciudnirtbyronuesctsh.at. they never could be pro duced ' military hospital.' t'ng the sufferings o t e patients, there tal, and aggreva protect the cumbrous forms inconveniencing the f ser h vice of the hospi t least no forms topublic purse against were a neg li gen ce or peculation. The distress in these hospitals world if 11aveb een more severe, and the s u ff er i ngs more acute, pr i va te charity had not stopp e d i n t o re d ress the evils of official mismanagement. Assistance which had been discouraged as superfluous was eventually found to be eseential for the lives of the patients. " When the quantities of hospital stores which were sent from England are contrasted with the scarcity, or rather the absolute dearth of them at Scutari, and when the state of the purveyor's accounts is remembered, it is impossible not to harbour a suspicion that some dishonesty has been practised in regard to these stores. From the returns in the appendix it appears that before the 24th of July 5,717 bedsteads, sde;o9o,oolliOnbenedasnadini flannelpailla s sse h s i , r 7 ts ,l4o complete hospital d tion of other articles; and utensils of ; withdldcs a full . crirtporopweorre- 1 m o il db 7 ordered by the medical board to be supplied an" B ' — ' . al i the Board of Ordnance. A committee of the house ° et .. not efficiently prosecute an investigation into the diss,l!re., ance of these stores, but the subject well deserves the sideration of the executive government. e 0 1011' "In order to show the dreadful discomfort of th be and the neglect on the part of the authorities, it 133 %,,5, sufficient to state that in the Barrack Hospital at Scu ken t ' thi ( s ,m gl: i r o i r ng s e l v ie il ry w , as during the zeoeth of November, while there her s an s 2,000 patients in that hospital, the whole number of_ r st washed was only six. At a later pried it is fair to add" e st f a l ff 6 . either in i' g u l le t e p d r . o vid cd w n i; ; li ni s tb P fe e o e rw ? t a o l urs. i i s h t e ' i l i tio s ei c i a ; tions for such an emergency, or unacquainted sf _ s „ to powers and authority as military cernmandant, r.PP67,tO have been completely paralysed in his attempts w i g: e ite s iteheeehrotshpeitraelsspnenndeeihrihhitsyeerfddeirsre. directing Was unprovie",,sid to T M er r h . e 7 r a e ff q o u r i ti ret s i ta f t o e r s tthhaet removal lillery wee,a.lobetir sauces. There is abundant proof throughout the el hes e g n e e n e e ee ra si l ty h h os e p y i e t i l id la tahreeseesptarebvliisihieedd fpeorssheysses that the military officer in command:a any stations If a utb o t n i t e l y or direct expenditure, and to meet all .cases of regulations of the War Office. ' "The immediate measures taken •by the ant e telly home—when the condition of the hospitals wits mor e _ r i vs te , brought to their knowledge by the press and / 0 1 . ! se er. information _than it had been by the medical ofte_e r ti s t h e lin• . the appointment of the coeunaission of inquirl, " striections to her Majesty's ambassador et Consten,ti.„l9:ooPl:. which will be found in the appendix. The conee' l 7 it fee eider this last step to have been as injudicious do. if unavailing for the purpose for which it was int ee s , or iole evil, the evil could only be increased biyith the division and uncertainty of responsibilitlerisolerfeeenoe to nor cop of another authority, having neither Te' s 'i ri h n e instructioaa nectien with our military administrati 41. .on w ee° I'D to the ambassador to provide on applicatt„ „ow to is' supplies for the wants of the hospitals, wouid ware 0 the t h e tt 9 ; b e r t: r b it l i i e s : ed et depoilystncituiphiltinnt(eit:huctauhtihr:aireitifieosfatthheompoewweerrsehaesploitstsleesene;eer the " The want of an energetic governing commissaries and purveyors. chief cause o a f P a P l e lt r ll :; with ° adequate staff to maintain constant inspectictoll,% hoe tin a besg bl Coo trol Fe e to evi y l o s t:r m e o o o tn o m r hospital, require the care, superintendence, 3 uw bef 1 , - tee same n e t no t an efficient general officer as much as siunr youge . i i. accord -Sillery worked very the field. Mr. Herbert says that .Mayor ital.; hi s a l l to have been left in the command of the he!? „ A . wo test the ioe e rg z r i He n i a n k at g r i pd n t tery rank was not sufficient;' that his. Ig,"`siepesno ot 3 of to have bee r io n D e t have had, to be at the head of sn F st ofseer ought o r b ° e pee eizantic character ;' that a general with full a t . () o ught bean - __pa pointed from this autrY ' Ist Scut3rl dent g l i shsee i eu s nsrat e terra w mutues e pytie l , sidnghttdtbbtott,eitteabnhotnu'obihteeoof‘ ic a fs fi t op, t i ci l i ! gt t e sr 3 l i. Ihtbhatisaofal,ebinfu:ri w oth i hbii s t i nceshrbenetinhrt:sr:n;hhet ta_ I.l3,o:stdit , ~ greater influence.' And Air' elerbe i and t h e g reats* __ w hile theY we re .. ' mities that occurred in them, to P under the command of Major'Sillerf*, a Raglan to i Your committee reeret that measure spared such an officer with a s uffieiell that Cr _ „ r ue sition in '' It may not have been possible for ,issojt. for t bi, ser v i ce in the pressing circumstances of his p 0 s wort , o so , taken either to reinforce the staff ureter eficientlY "°' sleet to have enabled him to provide more e , 0 ge aerel ° wo command, or to send out on the etnergenee./ --r i the fs sr ls r e sles of sufficient rank from England. 1' W s . no _ Lord, jar Lord Beer: ens a su ie b ls se oi q u u te e t n l who Ther' p u ke rei t 0 , tLlyourandlevricuoinasmidepraatuiloent, at w sn ,;erseli se iTtser Stllery in the beginning of December. ~i %. i li i„at l's r i v e r te castle sent especial hestructions W Lord , be gr. 111 w o e the sth of January, which were followeofisir/ t() Lora ote o f further instructions on the leth. It i s nt in th e ! vg the Pau et to add, that a gradual emendates ~s me mel the hospital took place from the time of s' w ok' command. .. but r i li• . wi no le to . vats Your committee, in conclusion, _ , ssnie ntah , to p re lence. that the first real improvements in tile ' attributel_sneeo tion of the hospitals at Scutari are to be, ~r i e et e 7 ts , e , (tfek.) A fund, raised bY in f !iitbafilly„lotO was administ4red bt• the proprietors 0 1wen t are„ or gigs paper, thr - ongh 31r. Macdonald, an in r e etall st " bam i °f agent. At- the suggestion of the. See oi sed s coned eng"eations, private exertions' sDahliro subeCIVI.OO,,, Nightingale, with ;Admirable devoton, 01 . *S' I l c rod Go, nurses, and u dertook the care of they 'l'vey. s tar p ee The Uon. Jocelyn Percy. the Hon• an ee i a t'ter 1 ort , Stauen , . ie rep dolphin Osborne, and Mr. Augustus e _e ee lua ni • e luch sonal•inspection of the hospitals, furnisseueleses, r eee e h_ oo o.l, and suggestions to the Government. )35:_',,e, w er , suffering was alleviated, the spirits of pose . f poie. il and many lives were saved. (Hear' ) et o tbe elv e O LI Is " Your committee have now adverb,. oest e e as; 1 tbee ; contained in the re?lies to above 2' ' o ° ° ,, ri sire di id s re' noticine these various subjeets theY " o „porti ou e e 0/ undes- 'distinct heads, in order fairly to r o f te- t ee sponsibility.suffering veld' " Your committee report that the e, _near I,eted; resulted mainly from the el; cut:eli a c_ e _l_i so. e ~, , , i ii expedition to the Crimea was unclert, li 'l_ e _ a diterel I n te e The Administration which ordered the t t e r t k' ne e o l ith the adequate information as to the pi th amlonn eelus iatel t he re i Crimea. (Hear.) They were of e ko d, or , ae d " I 'd strength of the fortresses to be t ` tLSC,. or ho p ed en d sources of the country to be iatle,d. Iteli see"'rotru" expected the expedition to be irtreetases o e *l' o igo. as they did not foresee the prole:Listay;(o ca utP_ n d fl;e, struggle they made no provieion' for wi n ...,, clean' bless The patience and fortitude of We ei o l o s w ee,se o leie admit atien and gratitude of the netso F, ir b e rol e .„tioll'e doubtless ha v e gi b n e they have fought, lie I, and suffered. 1-S4,re:wallies el" and equally heroic pationcounder suff erl o %itrY . • e ( 6 " oft's' the • hope that Your every co tg i ll nrlntlietfrteuietlieail British will naislcalkliP°o:ii: dt : c , h l y g o ee s i ie . rti t i L e s lie " l o re e : P ( 1:; r h ea ' e 0 3. i r o tb d o e l valour which this noble army has clisPlee es o may hereafter be exposed to such s ufer' o in these pages." (Loud cheers.) i d _,, e cGS. ~, The report was ordered to be prinL e 'ell' 1 s' lo " vrva I "'` e. PUBLIC BUSINESS-31011.--L be h s ` i be 01 ' be t on t' Mr. DISB.s.ELI reverted to the aPP, O OO O- 1 the 11°00 the noble lord at the head of the 3° r •,1 0 11°P e ;; co ° f , h . 0 ject of utorning s eetAngs. (Hear.), - e onfe: n is of "1, -- ere lord had consiLlei-ed the effect on the 1 34 101) 1 ' ° i - es eere b e Speaker and clerks, by. the habitnaindivido nentt4e.. meetings at noon. The pressure tir e s ittin e g s !,, el - st a le. was unendurable, and he thought tbe' e ru te. ssre cotele - 0 1 made quite the exception, anti not th, e b Tee eet s tic° 01 re sure fixed for to-morrow was the I 'l g ives es w e: o ' l o e sation Bill s , but an hon. member h e e, le or the .tb in 0 , amendmeut, which affected the 'Sri s e h T c esir , h t y t het e ° o e and the Speaker would be kept 1 . 0 !S ty . t nouell tt i o ge s t es morning and the evening. Ile ce lu i g t3 t tners-n- ssfieeel ts mittees. only ought to be taken 2 i d Ito CO ?„ 4 , that, the business for to-matron all " o at 1 311 '4 speo'o, committee ou the Metropolis Irnitroveli_a ths t te the eof i l v ,, Lord PALMERSTON was quit e a c 7 n d witb h l' nt it . 1. 0 - 0 the clerks, and all official persons e ,_e_ni t tings ; .tdo to ,p;,.. suffered inconvenience from tetor; i li l i j t 6 , o o tie'irPi'thotlt, PAII impossible that measures, i d n u g r inga recourse Hi asked by hon. gentlemen fora all, rooting/ tee the bueight solar motions, but the effect 1 t'io fontrol oer r if tbe e' that the Government would lesr, h e thought'osfine !best sittingsC Olidr e i c n e i vturhbociocinsitlerautieenowoteboenisrtpe,e_rbn; of the house. It would be bette °Lows to tb but te! to them. -. . 9, selves to the days allotted . .___ sittleg e o, 8 a/011l1Liio convenience attending, thes fro it. oos e , hon. gentleman appealed to boil. iss at( odta pre sent could not Ella any remedy Mr. DISRAELI inquires} to adhe re .. morrow. • Bo a to v 7.3 divo a jog' l Lord PALMERSTON" nt, B,IT B Vg ". ill 00 0. order of business as ref "sel to the fact thattenoi,, , Mr. WILLIAMS r a r t e i : , of oenseers at ' 1 " ~ 1 „, e rk' s tinge clashed with the d s l ie re ,- o le -humour°, , eb, mittees. WIRY one! .. 0, .on_ wee Sir H. WILLOV ere se e 'resal t I li !, g that morning sitting *r_ in „. (A, laug s g A hon. members in the iro v 4" e a7 'red as ()t the A rrang e tlig The subject then " 1 A CRB OF FLA.G OF 'II' o tiOn THE MASS - ING ON A-- --F ll ' tet" HANG°. ~ Lid he wished to ask aell,. OiL .4 teeteCOY lib s ' d •ralty with regard we sue Capt. P Lord f the A ne l °le vel , e l / . the First 0 aL reared of a murderous .seci.!, meat which ha( rs i it j t 'sd by the Russians on I . l , j 4 pie• ss ei ENGLISH SA,l,,(l4nOtige-5_ of in the ' r oe 1,1 had been c°m-f- her Is=Jogy's boats „ d bOOO & coo officer o f out o wished to know whether the right hon. t O6 on the subject, and w te t hs slf 50 . g 0 0 state the facts of the c ase. x6eedingly sorr y 0 ..404 ier.ii b Sir C. WOGD—/ am e d , Dant friend sr,, it ~i ( Li er story to which 110 T hon. an g , 1 belw din v. . e a v whether any despaten e a b e reee' Y'.hat did cur,etoo be 10 satisfactory to the house, * 1 übjee t the t ub oh • ntle 9 ea ou ti that the fullest informatto prepared to lel . 0 1 " pee r ' to the public. lam also from ' i t ' afill I 1 to lg deenatch received this morning _ 3,_ did ocor.coso ,53 tee true. I will state shortl because °O d in conteining full particulars of wie t e sty's shlP. floor; e oll , that some short time ago her 31 21 .1 __ As p eal 5 i . el ,d, and destroyed some coasting 0 9 7 the e e e _e l ; fo , , c OO three personse-the capttdn of one , t ):` .kon pie u, e i,,ea i ro je and another. Fienish sailor — :se the sus, dire ° ; on 0 . re' WON , taken re. tit. tiod miral Dundas, anxious, flom ins" . seyerigo Resale homes not to injure with uneecessarlpnes t,e d tin re of the country so long to St. Petersburg were Linterrupteee to pn; ho e r e_ or , sack to bear up to Hango in o or es d ! toe d, ... o tbe4rs . the persons who had been s le i n d fe e t': et. l.' s s et quested to be rut on shore thore,,o'rreo vrivigil.tiVo7ler sons who had also been taken IlVe ba t the ero go L o th° burg, and who had also requested rued to ,e .. e, 0 ce11",,, hi„ on shore there, The Cossack returTs'oedllsose si'lZ Ll e to put these persons on shore, and at 0 11 _; ‘ ,„ A 1.i.:0 place she anchored, and sent the e u no at's crews betln_ore seven prisoners and the ordival. if an P ee t oriel, e l , truce was displayed for at least as e ' e i v ed, s u t ' be jet , ; l o s reached the jetty. Nobody who Pe erri ved 9i Eee r Y e' e ri' landed the prisoners and their hsgn one , vie do ea est 0 who ran a way . at once. The a t „lig ,. ,0 Aro r ei t / 0 oo f mained in the boat. A body of Itusej,„, o we • bra P or to have amounted to from 300 t O O 4 u . y r, etas'e o " Tb e to 0' jetty. Lieutenant Genexte, the f 6 " e a sber e ' tr ied o, truce, and explained why they eatnlynee, Ow en 0 .119 . , 0 0?, nish captain also took the flig 01 , e , ressY„„ a sis", c eS plain, both in Finnish anti Englih, tin the Pr is t eej o jit came oil shore. The officer in corm:o°3; bailateen' 0 1 0° only understood English, but t r uce'snolil an ts •o te d ee' not care in the least for a flag of v hereuP ° ocer giv th e ' l show how the Russians would fight , `_„., the 0 T hey rili a Russian soldiers immediately fired uy s. o o 7 o e il. e ll. I th e prisoners on the jetty, and killed ; I " tne W o o ° t ' b es .s i fired into the boat tlll every in an l d thre vi o ut , t eeli r Russians rushed into the boat, O an_ do d l ean s , or e .._ t ee bodies overboard, dragged one Iv ..'.', and lel'i,tern'sjii: him on the jetty, and bayonetted hins etus eins, fr oKtee' for dead in the boat. The cutter noet4,o'oroseete_. ot"); day, the gig was sent in, and it w" to th e jet i Y gh t ' ° J " II tance that the cutter was moored es t h e n vs .0 _ ee there were some dead bodies in it. it i l . -,'_' the a r ,: 3 1 , 1 te, io e through his shoulder, cut the fast s , D .L . ° lu t is ,"bet 1i!,04. 9 , the cutter from the jetty to thetnuele se ertei n , a 0 t he b r e V man wounded with two balls tlteo,r, anal; 0,0_0,111,r5 the Cossack st.ending in in order ~. come of the men in the cutter, sent 1 . 0,,,,, n0 i t 1 ~ 11 t 0 try j i whole story rests. re `o' ° antsg te Mr. HEADLA3I asked whether the _ere vitt 0. off the single survivor, on whose 0e1"" e don 0 1 s e nes t ate takine soundings under the protec art W . t t he J Sir C. WOOD —So far Al 1 0 ? I C E 01i e Leo OA le, e ti ceived by the Government gee., 1 e So b the statement that some of the officers,;„ gag be es t r he meat is wholly untrue. ee l. pn Sir C. WOOD then laid the deep 1..•• it was ordered to be printed. Of'oll3l' 0, .ADMINISTRATIVE o , e s by __r it e' The adjourned debate was thou re pss,iniiteirsepoipt, for A u be e r elb out of d • t 0° t upon the origin of the demand ei .t,o3t.adiu If of , i notwi __ 0 tive Reform, observed that, r,.._nbequer, ° . " o „ye , 0. t taken by the. Chancellor of the e _ -eese e . o „ r esen' ar t i eet o s sf e .; Lord GODERICH, who, after some vs' cures of reform had been adopt d_ b: Sly:, pep 01).4 t namely, the consolidation of tie ~‘,Vte ,e,„cr., 1 the order ill Col.lllCil of 2d May: 11,1:: a• Mee A sneered that there was u°./.ll°- 14_!PI-I.!' .4