The Sun. — London, England, 1815-01-28 00:00:00

V y. Should lie a:tempt tc prGre that th.,:.b(:ic;) Was at all times safe and.practicable, then proofs might be urged against him in the third Charge, hi which he was accused of a precipitate decision tq'etnha rk. Having made these general observations "Pon . the three Charges as constrasted with each O ther, he would n o w proceed to the first military offence, viz. "For lauding, or continuing on shore when landed, between the 7th and 12th June, ' • ; t ear Tarragona, a J arge qu a n tity o f h eav y artil , "Yp, ammunition, and stores, when he had good l esson to believe that no real benefit could 'be de iked for or 12 days as to producing the fall of 4 aragona by these meins, and when he had re veived i n f ormat i on w hi c h b e b e li eve d , t h at l ong i e . tor e that time a superior force would be near t int, and was aware_ that the siege must then be I.)andoned, knowing at the same time the great ttifficulty and dangers attending a sudden embark- It was not easy to meet this charge without *littring into some detail. .Upon first seeing this I :large, he had concluded that he might rest sa tisfied w i t h denying that previous to the 11th at bi g 4 t, any intelligence whatever had 'reached him, "Which in .his opinion, under all the circum stdnces of the case, he should have been warrant in abandoning the enterprise Committed_to charge. He-eXpected that to establish the mili tarY offence against him, the Judge Advocate W.ould have attempted to prove that be had land, ed unnecessary stores, Sic.; and farther, that th:-. athumnition; and stores remained on '4ore unnecessarily, after he had received infor ktrtion which lie believed, that long before the I) ;.'ssible capture of t h e pl ace , a super i or f orce •of 111 e enemy would c e rt a i n ly b e near hi p i: I n ad (titian t o this he expected that it would have been IToved, that no adv . antage could accrue from fn 's delay, and that it would have been pointed :ftt in what manner he had . deviated froth the I,l'it of his' instru c ti ons . The• Whole crimes al,' Ii reel against him appeared to hinge . upon his be noreal benefit could be expected after bi,e'7ol ' , in continuing on shore. Here lie could " wished that the 'charge h m had 'u) more gene- Z' that his belief and • information - had been '.'ired, anti that he had been broadly charged ; 1 0' having remained unnecessarily before Tarra ',,t)4. thi- way the task of the .Tiidge Advo-: t :!e %you'd have been =eh more simple. It would F 4 only have been necessary to prove these l li c ts, and it would not have been expected of 0 . . 4.1 to dive into the recesses of his breast, to. t"eover what he did or did not believe. No at a`tllPt had been made to establish the charge 'by L I 7 such evidence. Nothing- was produced but t l i etters to establish his bullet' of the. approach' . enemy, and const ruc ti ons were Fret on them ot,:)!Iy unwarranted. Wh e n h e fi rst saw - t h e .; th r ges, he wds at a loss to Conjecture why the' o„oitds expressly pitched on as the day when he di f r icui to hav e d es i ste d from the siege ; but his t y ie t ieg on this subject had b ee n sinc e - remove d t o th b Production of his letter of the 7th of June Perm i ssi t ike of Wellington. Thisletter, with the bail • °I I' of the Court, he would at present . .., .= " mY d,a r y" Camp Before Torrag.ona ! _trime,7, 1813 . verb ; k,,, iThlr-jtre. Woliugtan,—l am much afraid we have up. ' .1"Ini Lordship \ i ' , " we are able to perforsm_;,niTts ran jr .ii . have I as prudence to execute '''''' ll peri l - t o h I will penev . er . e a. . -. as yet no Qertain, information pt.tr ts on t. t- to eastward...,..or s "1'143 ' "-n ip : Caen the but thcefrSeaacrbeerVes ix days I may i te•ltt .N.)th, and if they prove true , In Li%•e - the hope or 1 tha t „, ach r td itY 4 " fc ), :r, ittfiAt rtly supertor, u ai withoutcnt ate that Su= theta of a retreat, V) tage.iaf aulf , ort 7 0 e Men s e vithout difficulty, ! And_ n bringinto tAc.fic..l(.24,r. , the S ' - -s iia e rds really - have what they a;„, _9iiy,force, 1 4,,, Y ; s r t l p , have, ,s .s:il ii l P Zt ? t.xce . ed, P o'i all sorts, 19;000, of which i. 1 1 ,,,. . e 4 ve 4000 at the least to-cover our gitns'and mask the ro • o . St curt• n . ''''" T ‘ , our left sank, and prevent Such et's direct and i ex l!.. ° . :. l .'arral..;:ina, I I -e attacked the Col de Balagner,. 1 the fi,. t" - -. ..it to tall to-morrow or next day With respect to se e „ ,7 • ;_utti) , , , J can . say nothin . gfurtherat presentthan that they v t 'Your Lordship has directed tiiti'it fdlilie(1•1:;-Yr.-;1::11:t11)(al g iial ! r i l. t su ' i t ' l 'i' vi r r e :o -' o'n a in ca,e it s !iota I d fall. ThiS r a - very Cuiviiderably, and make them ;Alit for at . ) . t I .'et : n LIM 'e l;tlrt. therefore ,' to propose to your _tit-tisiiip. that SbOnd'O' meteivesl! if , , maid'. bC., sent for that purpose, and . tv,', t l , ',,t'ula send some recruits for their regiments, I thua c k it t, "'. ue of service, as the Catalonians desert so, much, 0- p(r.lei.C.'4bilrzes giveme every assistance in ower, hot ft,,, t ' , c, , lVe has ...to o little asistancc in staff officers; three or Ito more would be well employed, and are necessary; kie l ley aini elothe;.• arc loth much reqnired, at least they tt tell " a l , The Admiral, prtiPoscs s.,oding a ship to Alicao !/ ""s'lhue' I have jait had time to write these few lines. ha re R : • 1 s ..s.e. " .L MURRAY." .%IV.aS. there in this letter one word of the ad . bl tii tsli3ll of t6e in}wott of superior forces of the w e lny ,?' 'was, not the whole of the latter part of ttititztter founded Upon, the contingency of the b 4 '°f Tarragona ? The reports. alluded to had t`l in eiretdatio'n from the day of the discrn -4144ti0n. Colonel l'revot, besieging the fort 14" PiiiiipPe renorted by epress on the 4th, that p'ter't'sxoPeettal to ' he .attacked..by ~Marsliz,d.rSuclietin ;I I ti 4 next day ; and Aoiniral riallow t I, as early 'l . R I , , I , e 7th, 'lli...dell by these reports, actually sent 4,, "°(litional naval force, to check the immediate , • i'prn• , " of t 1 . 'l. rshal at the bridge of Amposts t"ti, t h ..„.„ • ic ~, d . 1 I Itlterehl4brO. Tlie.consegliences predicted in this 4 1 lettc;:el'e the same as what had been stated in b f the i to t he Duke of Wellington-, from Castalla, 11 , i s 6 ~ :,t ; I I °f l'lly, and were even anticipated by I ,,, i i . en 7 : - 7 / ' n Ill s a;s - v;er of the 23d of May. He did '' " l ' ' tin e s ,: l e e nt il lost direct terms assert, that on the I 'lad ocelitred upon which he , was in t rit er iti.alzest degiee authorised to ahant.on the A ta 41)1.14e. That he was never sanguine - of stieccs.s 'cic i) ''t trut.'., for before he sailed he (lid not I I eet tt . , ' , "at I arragona would fall ' unless directly i • minted • Nth : , 1 • 'hut nothing. had occurred up, to this N ( l,!` t° diminish his expectations. ir became t i ,, , Ilt th at tai i „ . , 1 " 11 ing but t Some fortunate chance t iti, l e tieviatiou front ,tlie'.(liVeet Hoe of opera the.', could put iis in possession of the place; but 4 ! el • t h en i • ••.• .; • hed Itv, lances, s() ar• from hetn34- din-nls , Illatt knflterially increased in olir favoiir, for on lit,,,•,dity the' Port San Plpe fell, the posses -4", °lw•ilich sealed the direct maith,,of the enemy . . . ii)ertel:tortosa. The difficulty of relieving the place Ilii,'l,c(l, and the knowledge tlfthis difficulty ;14 ' t , be naturally expected to produce a corm , Ill at tl l lll - 11.- effect on the minds Of the garrison. On EllettY he first :entertained a ray of trope, not so ~‘: , ,kh.,).-• tile capture of Tarrap.ona. but that the ii-ytiition ~ , :1, t( )41 , x% onto prove an etieciive diver . sion in 1 1. 1 a ,of ' the 'allied army in Valencia. Without alt''tt •••,,c,cluisitiOn of the COl de Balit'o - iier, made "on • in, i: , 0 'll ti i _ 'tie COttlll not have 'remained after the 9t11. ,_ '41., tl, -they wet e - still the same bitiia t i im 'as . tii the 7 t1% TG e t 1 reports of the 6th had-been-foUntf-: ' ll ttt. s . : `' s e., and on the 8:11 many of those alluded to ' itier ctf the 9th 'had been also fo Ind to be Cathay wiihout foehdatien. There was every rea son to believe that these reports were inveeted by the enemy himself, and propagated by his parti zans and numerous spies in the camp. Yet such was the only foundation for assuming his . belief of the advance o f a superior enemy. Those ‘e.llo were not, responSible,, and who had no authentic source of information, might be under the influ ence of such commuiriCations ; but it was the bit siness of the General to calculate, cornbine, and compare these rumours, with his more . authen tic sources of intelligence. In all armies the practice was common of fabricating intelligence with the 'view of deceiving the etICIIIV.' lu the late war this stratagem was pushed farther by the }'french Commanders than ever before. "Cofild he be guilty of a military offence in not hav ing blindly run into the snare laid to .entrap him, and in not havine+ followed a delusion too evidently raised with a view- of misleading him ? The reports in question bore every mark of French f a b r i ca ti on : t h e y weere Contradicted by his, more authentic intelligence, and the. next day brought with it their ,complete refutation. He returned to the meaning of the words bet weeia the 7th and the i 2th. His observations had been hitherto directed 'to the: first interpretation which might be put on them, namely, that the 7th was the express clAy when he discovered and saw the impossi bility of success. To thesecond, that the intelligence • whicti he was at once accused of - believing and diS: regarding, was received between the 7th and-the 12th, he begged leave to draw the attention of the Court. It was important that the time should be more correctly and precisely stated, be cause his degree of guilt must nathrally depend not only en the length of tune which he reinained, but on'the distance of the enemy. For instance, supposing the intelligence to have reached hint on the 7th, he might be found guilty of lying idle .for four days, and it the authentic intelligence reach ed him on the II th at night, by deferring orders for embarkation till next morning; tin great degree of blame could be attached teellim. But he needed not this indulgence; for he would prove, not only that he gave the necessary orders for embarkati_ n on the night of the 1 lth, bat he could prove, by the retufnof Lieut. Col. Williamson, that so far from being idle, '26 pieces of artillery were re-em barked during that night and the morning of the 1 9 th. As the Judge Advotate had not had it in his power to put the Court in 'possession of the first authentic intelligence of the movements of the enemy, he would now give this information, and expose to the view of the Corirt the whole grounds of his conquct'at that period. He knew to a certainty, even before the 7th, that strong detachments of the enemy lead arrived at Tortosa ; but this proved n ot hi ng , a:; that place required reinforcements. Ott the Sdl douot as to Marshal Suchet's march to the northward! was removed. Oti the morning, of that day a mes senger arrived from Valencia, dispatched by one of our most confidential agents, with the Certain intelligence that' 9,000 men, front San Phelippee and the banks of the,Xticar, had quitted Valen cia, and that the" Marshal himself on the 7th, had followed them. The late political changes in Spain fortunately enabled him to mention the name of the meritorious individual who furnished the in formation, lion Vicente Larente, Inspector of the Botanical Garden under the French Govern ment,. at Valencia. The original note was stillln his •possession, and would be laid before the Court, together - with a certificate of the payment of the boat conveying this important messenger. 'With , respect to the French .arny t ir , nd t e o r bUeeinner4 move_ Caen; it was rumoured, indeed, ment, but could he ever have expected that it . wOuld• not be united, and that his Moveable co lumns would have remained divided - at Gerona ; Puizcerda, and Barcelona, unconcerned specta tors of the arrival of an army in the province ? He knew, however, that it was not assembled on the sth, and thatit had Hot reached Barcelona on the evening of the 9th ; on the everting of the 10th, he learned, that by forced marches it had reached the Lobregat, and that it was advancing with ra pidity. This intelligence was given him by - Ge neral Copons,, whose division he found in move ment at Reuss, about four o'clock on that day. In one of his dispatches he had said, that the expectation of reinforcements was one of the reasons. which induced him to continue the siege; this. expectation certainly had some weight, and had the reinforcements arrived, the result might reinforcement, have been different. This pro mised by Lord W. Bentinck in his letter of the 9th, was to sail in ten days, c ons i ste d o f the 44th regiment, and the 6th battalion of the German Legion, together 2000, besides a emi. , iderable number of the Italian Levy and Neapolitan troops ; upon the whole nearly 3000, arid a regiment of cavalry, which I thought would have augmented . my force. Lord IV. Bentiuck had good grorinds to change his intention, but of that change he (Sir J. M.) was not aware till afterwards. Three thousand men at that period would have been iii_ valuable ; be had a right to expect them, anti, in case of their arrival, lie had determined on an ac tion, and, indeed, was ready to seek it with either "of the enemy's columns with the force he then had ; • and though the reinforcements would not have placed him on a par with both the columns, it would lave given . him a superiority:over either, mid enabled him to prevent the junction of the two foreei. Sir J. MURRAY apologized for the length of his address; but begged permission to re -state the points he bad endeavoured to establish. He then recapitulated the chief points of his defence, and proceeded to state that he.was aware, at the time, of the risk he incurred in- - continuing operations after the Bth, and asked what military operations Were free from them-? Every battle is a risk, and the expedition itself was nothing more than a risk. The.greaCeSt 4El' of a good General is to risk with judgment, taking care that the risk is not equal to the object attempted: he applied this•to the case in que§tion, send said he had only- risked -a few stores and some iron guns, for the chance :of accomplishing two of the objects of the Duke of Wellington, besides other objects .of inferior importance, though by no means trical. He hall run this risk., whether-with judgment or not the Court: would determine, but at all events tie did it with deliberation, aid with -a perfect sense of the danger to which he was exposed—b u t if suc h a Cousidtration could have infitzeneve 14s-conduar, he should richly hare deserved'the .ecasere of the ; such were his views of the subject, and the line of conduct he had adopted, in his humble opinion, with a view less to the success of an in dividual object than to the accomplishment of the plan of the Duke of Wellington ; and therefore he contended that -his conduct was not unmilitary, arid so far front being in opposition to his instruc tions, it was not only rn the spirit, but even in conformity to the very letter Of those instructions. Although he felt satisfied that be stood fully ac quitted, and that the charge was entirely disprov ed, yet the deference lie felt due to the. Court, and'the regiird'thieto his own character, induced him to enter mo re a t l engt h into the subject, and to state the miniver by which he was - actuated' throughout the operation. From his-instructions it was evident that the siege of. Tarragona had two objects in view —first, 'the - capture of the place ; and secondly, such a diversion itvfavour of the'Diie del Pardue as would•enable him to force the line of the' Xuear, and from. thence possess himself 'of the kingdom of Valencia. .Suelt being his view of the case; he had rio difficulty in landing with all the expedition which the weather- Woold permit ; and he believed that every thing that= was lost was on shore before the 10th; even if it had been proved that he then despaired of Suceess.The charge was, " for landing, and permitting to re main on shore when landed." The latter part of the Charge he had no hesitarion in admitting ; but no evidence had been adduced to prove that any guns had been landed after the 'loth. He would confine himself, therefore, to permitting the ar tillery and stores to remain on shore/ He hoped he had sufficiently demonstrated that he never saw, till the night of the I 1 th, any physical impossibility of success, and no necessity' for embarkation could therefore, till then, occur to him. It was only on the morn . - ing of the Gth that the fi rs t batteries were open ed on the Puerte Real. On the 7th, in the . evening-, another battery was .constructed, which opened its fire on the morning of the Bth ; and on the evening of that-day the first batterieS, which were to play upon the- body of the place, consisting of ten pieces of cannon, were com menced.' They opened their fire on the morning of the I I th. Ltere, then, were no marks of de sponding; and while these, orks were going on, it would hardly be urged that any of the guns shauld he embarked. On the very-night of the siege being raised, even fresh works would have been begun, and probably completed. • In fact, prospects of success were held out to the last.---- He acknowledged That he had been taught to ex pect something from the character of the Gover nor; but it was but justice to that Officer, how ever, to state, that the information which he re ceived upon this subject was false, no reasonable hopes of success being deducible from that Of ficer's conduct. Sir John Murray then proceeded to contend, that from the opinion of Colonel Thackery, as well as from - other circumstances, be was perfectly justified in not despairing of success 7 a feeling in which he was upheld by the letter of his - instruc tions; froar which he was expected to push the experiment, as to time, to the utmost extremity, consistently with the safety of th e ' a r m y. Wi t h these facts in' view, he would ask, if he had given -up the siege on the 7thi or even the 9th, how he could have answered to his Excellency ; or to, the country; for not having.made the experiment ? He bad then noeertain knowledge of the advance and 'near approach of Marshal Suchet ;, and, he, therefore, could not on those days have adopted so unwise and so pusilfanimousa line of s eondrict he- could have no motive tor it but the fear of clamour, -and a dread of the responsibility which such clamour might occasion. -He hoped lie was above such fears; and that he had, in the con scientious.tlischarge of his duty,unhesitatingly ex posed himself to all the illiberal arid unfounded at tacks which had been made upon him, was now clearly established. It appeared that Marshal Sachet, knowing the importance of the positions he occupied, clung to them to the last ; that he did not quit Valencia till the 7th, and his troops did not reach Tortosa-till the 10th. Now if he (Sir J. M.) had commenced embarkation on the 7th,or even on the Bth or 9th, what would have been the conduct of Marshal Su- Oct He might boldly affirm, that he would in stantly have retraced his steps, and have instantly established himself at Mogente and St. Filippe.— This, however, would not have been the' only misfortune : for the Duke del Parque would have been immediately opposed to the whole weight of the enemy's force. If he defended the position of Castalla, he would inevitably have been defeated, and in all probability.,would have had greardiffi culty to preVent the total dispersion of his army. Under all these circumstances, the importance of drawing Marshal Sachet's army to the greatest possible; distance froni the Spanish corps was most evident ; in fact, the further the Marshal could lie drawn from the Xticar, the greater was the pro bability of the Allied Army returning in time to support the Duke del Par-time—whilst. the, more harassing the march became,. and the longer Su chet was detained in Catalonia, the less chance was there of his -having either the inclination or the power to retire from it, seeing the advanced position which the grand army, under the personal coMmand Of his Excellency the Commander of the Forces was daily acquiring on his flank. A precipitate abandonment. of the siege might have produced consequences no less unfortunate, in the eastern extremity of the Province—inas much RS the co-operation of Lord Exmouth had been required, to make a diversion in favour of the forces at Tarragona, by an -attack upon the Bay of Rosas, And as his Lordship, had' been' engaged in this E x p e diti on , b e (Sir John Murray) felt himself bound in honour,,,as well as iri duty, not to expose him to hazard, Whieh could he avoided ;. and he felt it no less prudent to await the event, and to profit by the consequences, which, he conceived, must infallibly have resulted from this operation.. Had Lord Exmouth's force been crippled, then indeed would the clamour have been formidable, and it would have become, the more forcible as his (Sir John's) conscience would have told -him it was just. Had the plan been his own, lie might have acted as he . pleased t but as that was not the case, and as the sticcess•of the plan depended on his remain ing a 9; Tong as possible before Tarragoba, he bud To • e:!oloe of action left. 17p to the I 1111, there was no physical impracticability in conductinglt siege, although there might be something to ap prehend, but there was• nothing to excite despair : the enemy - was in march only on one flank, and under such circumstri s uces, he would not have. been justified•in abandoning the siege, after the assurance that he had given the Duke of Welling ton, that he Would persevere till the last ; besides the advance of the enemy was not unexpected; or calculated to 'excite his alarm. From Idle ad vance of the enemy there was cause of anxiety, but he Issouldmot admit that it was p. grotifid of des pair. Whil e M ars h a l S ac h et was on his march, he (Sir J. Murray) determined to attack the column of Dccaen, and took steps .for the measure. De spimilencyforined no part of his feelings;olibe 'should not ha - ve committed hitnself itt such decisive 'ope rations'. At nine o'clock on the night olthe I Itit., he . obtained int - on - nation that Stichet was on his march Iran Tortosa,' and then, add n'ot till then; he thoUght it would be flue height of temerity and' folly to persevere in the sieee.. The'physicai•im- ' possibility then hecanie - iipparent, and all' hope of capturing Tarragona •vaniShed. Nothing more: was to be done,with Sachet, and then !!e gave the necessarvoklers for the embarkation. lkit shOuld'he proved that he afterivards neglected Tiny necessary orders or steps to save the troops 'and stores, he must be found guilty -of the Charge. 'So long as he considered himself opposed only Decaen's force, he determined tO attikk it;' and '6013r gave up the intention on hearing of the march of Su- ' chat : he did not abandon the Siege till, in the words of Sitchet,, " the fires of his army 'covering the heights,• conveyed intelligence of Iris ap-• proach." Till then the Allied Army could not have abandoned the siege without disgrace to the Commander and the Whole Army. SECOND CHARGE. The Defence 'to the SeCond Charge was then entered into. The accusations contained in this Charge surprised as much as they astonished Ge neral Murray. The FirSt Charge wilp more - of a public nature, as it related to what m?ght be d e emm a failure in judgment. But this Charge more immediately 'applied in a personal point of view, as it charged him with direct disobedience of orders—an imputation of error might be borne, but the charge, of disobedience of positive orders ' could not be admitted. It' was a charge, which had. never entered his mind—in vilin bad he per used over and over again the instructions of the Duke of Wellington, to discover in what part he had neglected or disobeyed them ? -still he fowl& n o ordelethe're which' he• had disobeyed.' The charge accused bitn of a neglect of duty, and with disobedience of orders in not re-embarking the troops 'after the capture of the Col de' Bala— omer, and opille. CO the. relief of the armies in Valencia. Th ese c h arges he most peremptorily fle, nied ; there, was nh 'to 'di the army even after the siege' of .Tarragoria should be ruin ed. Before those charges could be proved "miCtinsi • him, it Was- necessary fo prove -that the writteli : - orders of the Duke of Wellington had been Olieved tlioSle'idliarges his defence would be Made on three gronpals, although it would - be a • good legal defencer,. if he only,prOVed that he had -.not disobeyed airy ivritten order's ; • but 'this fence he did not consider as sliffieient to satisfy I.his (Iwn mind, and therefore-he prove; _se. , :Comity, that he did give orders for the embarka-' tion of the troopS e as spoil aS. the siegelwaS raised ; and, thirdly ; that he 'so acted as to ass i st, as f ar . as was possible, .the unties in 'Valencia. Ile then went into a deli'ill 'Of facts and arguments thereofi r_ to prove what' he had stated, and i n part i cu l ar " read the seventh .parauraph ,of his instruetions e to spew that the Duke' of -Wellington saw the difficulties of his . (Si r -.T;ill.'s) situation, and.ex pressly said, that the siege of Tarragona -was A a question of time and means. He then adduced a variety of argnMents; found. ed on the strength and positions of the enemy, to prove the prudence- of remaining so 'Ong before Tarragona ; and urged, that by so doing be had an opportunity of exercising that. discretional power which• was given to him by the Duke of Wellington's instructions from the 15th para graph of those instructions, it was clear that no time for embarkation was fixed; and by the 22d paragraph, it, was also evident that a discretionary power was given ; and indeed as long as Sachet was kept on the left bank of the Ebro, those in structions might be considered as obeyed, Those paragraphs were all that applied to the ret urn o f the army to Valen c i a , an d it Was therefore ap parent, that no diSobedience of written orders had been proved. With this he might conclude the defence to the second Charge ; but this was not enough to satisfy his own honour; he should there fore proceed to the. two remaining grounds. And when personal animosity and misguided feeling should have subsided, he hoped his defence would be found to contain principles of action which would be considered as worthy of approbation and imitation. General CLINTON, in his evidence, informed the Court, that he came to head-quarters on the night of the LI th, and found that orders had been issued for raising the siege. This circumstance could also be proved by all his St-afi . Officers, to whom he communicated his intentions. However peremp tory the JndgeAdvoCate might have construed his •orders for embarkation to be, yet surely be would not deny, that the place where the_ embarkation was to take place was to be left to his (Gen. Murray's) dis-; cretion. It Was not necessary for him to state to the Court his reasons for embarking the cavalry and :artillery at- Balagner. It was enough that he eonsidered this. the most safe measure for the army which he could 'adopt. In consequence of information, lie afterWardsi . received, that a column of the enemy was at Bandillos, he fore saw that infantry would he necessary to cover-the embarVation of the cavalry. Up to the 14th of June no imputation of delay in the embarkation could be imputed to him. Late in the evening of that night the complexion of things changed. He then received information that the detach men t of De Caen's army, which advanced to Villa franca, had retired to the Lobregat. Now lie found himself opposed only to Marshal Suchet and with the' view of -cutting off the division of his army stationed - at Bandillos, he immediately gave orders for attacking it. Here he had a better prospect of forcing Suchet to retire from the Lower Ebro, than by any other 110,friklo