The Sun. — London, England, 1815-01-28 00:00:00

higcharacter against the aspersions by which it had. been assailed. He had said that it was to Rear-Admiral Hallowell that he owed all the pre judict2 which had been excited against him, and b.., felt warranted in making this observation, for as far as his Majesty's Government was concern ed, he had it from the- Secretary of State himself, his conduct was unimpeached. Lord Bathurst, however, .thought. that be (Sir John• .ISlurrai) would be most anxious to have the circumstances adv-erted to by Admiral Hallowell, minutely - ex= amitied, and hence did he encourage •the proceed , ing which had taken place. The Judge Advocate, in his statement, had distinctly confirmed this re mark, by the causes which he had assigned for the delay of the trial, and the history of .the transac tion which he gave. The Court would recall to their recollection, that in this statement, it appear ed that the first step taken by-the puke of Wel lington was to call for further informationf, hut before this could be.obtainedi - he received the. commands of Government to frame charges. Here Sir John Murray read that part of the Judge • Advocate's speech to • which he referred, from which it • appeared that in consequence of the publicity given.to Admiral Hallowell's com ments in England, a- Court Martial was consider • ed as a more preferable course than a Court of - Inquiry, or any other•prooceedirn which the Duke of Wellington, from his view of the subject might have thought proper. -It was alSo intimated, that in -all -probability such a course would be most congeoial to the feelings of -Sir John Murray. After this he apprehended he would not be ac cused of using harsh terms, in ascribing his pre sent situation rather to the clamour excited by his Prosecutor, than to may feeling of disapplobation upon the part of his Majesty's Ministers. The Duke of Wellington, upon receiving the charges in question, in dischargeof his duty, cor rected them and sent them back to England; and he (Sfr John) felt.Limself warranted in saying, in discharge of his duty, for in a cdnimuoication from his Grace, he distinctly stated that, hut for the Ad mirals letter and the orders of Govettnnent, be simotild not have thought of makiug (Sit John's) conduct the subject of puhtie inquiry.—lt was smut then by his Majesty's Government—it was not by the Duke of Wellington's orders, that he was brought to trial for failure and. disobedience of ossiersbut by Admiral Hallowell; ignorant of the plans of the campaign, ignorant of the in structions under which he was acting, and, with all respect fdr his character in his own profession, ill calculated to form a sound judgment upon mili tary points. He had at all times mentioned the name of Admiral Hallowell in his dispatches with consideration, and even now, where he had oc casion to notice it, he would do so without ani mosity or resentment. He had only to lament that Admiral Hallowell, both in his letter and his subsequent proceedings, had not manifested a similar moderation. He was aware that, in point of fact, the mo tives by which his accuser was. actuated, would neither, condemn nor acquit hint, }et he would ask whether the dispatch of Admiral Hallowell was written with coolness and without passion 1 Ifit betrayed no symptom of personal animosity—it it breathed on".' zeal in his country's service, antl. was only a statement of facts for the guidance of hiS Majesty's- Government at . home, it was natu rally entitled to every attention ; but when the very eontfary was the case, the Court would no dOubt view it with a jealous eye, and admit its as sertions with caution. " Deeming it," said Ad miral Hallowell, ". of time greutest iniportauce that LordWellingtou should be made early and certainly acquainted - with these, d eplorable proceedings, I have sent Captain Carroll' in the Hyacinth, to land at Alienist, and make his way across the country to his Lordship's head-quarters." Was it to make his Lordship early 'acquainted that lie sent a Naval Officer, when a courier would no doubt have )Cl' formed the task someer ? Was it to give the Duke of Wellington - early and certain intelligence that a copy of this. dispatch was sent home without pass ing through the hands of Sir who was the Rear-Admiral's commanding Officer.! No, it was to Make the whole circumstances more pub lic, and to excite illiberally and irregularlya strong Fejt:thee against him (Sir J. Murray). - lie would ask who had constituted Admiral Hallowell a judge .of the necessity of apprising time Duke of Wellington of the situation of the army ? Was be • the person that was to do so, admitting that the re ressity existed ? Could the Admiral take upon himself to say, that the Duke of Wellington had not foreseen the situation in which the army might be placed, and had not given time reqoisite makes to meet such an emergency ? The true mo tives of his conduct, however, were too evident to be mistaken, and the Court, as well as the public at large, would no doubt put upon them the proper. construction. But if Admiral Hallo well had not • been , actuated by illiberal feelings, why did he attempt to conceal the n hole from the person whose interests and whose honour was so deeply implicated Tha di6patch of the Hyacinth, be (Sir John Murray) was led to believe, was a sudden deter mination on the 'morniog s of the 14th bat he would be enabled : to prove, by incontrovertible evidence, that Admiral Hallowell'i ecsolution, not only to send this ship to Alicaot,• but to send )mcone to the Duke of Welliugton a copy of his to Sir Edward Vellew„Was formed on the evening of!4e. l2th. This he would prove by the evidence of an . Oilieser who was informed of it by the Admiral himself, ii terms such as would no ( Lnibt be considered by am Court conclusive as to the spirit by which his proseentor was influenced. It might peshapa be urged as an esseuse for Ad miral Hallowell, tbat every atosry feeling was in-. fluenced by .a little circle he had long assembled' a b on t . him, who looked up to him and his opi 7 nions as the standard rules of military perfection. They had long been accustomed to bow to his de 7 ckions ; and on this occasion , they appeared to Lave heightened his resentment.by. the re-echo of oivn mis-statcuments, which the. blindness of their ch or their ignorance of passing • events, prevented them front being able to detect.- Admiral Hallowell hall repeatediy put in his clahn to tin admission of the candour and fairness by which his proceedings on this occasion had been characterized. Those, dhowever, who' Were noivaaequainted with the studied concealment ex hint throughout the transaction, would be heti able to judge how far that claim was serving of attention. . On the dispatch of Admiral Hallowell itself, it: was scarce neeevary to state that it merited re probatioo: Nil paper, tinder 'the .naMe of -an official doeimietit, was ever transmitted to G:o-. .vernment, ,which was tikrre caleal;ted to deceise his Al jt-stt's Ministers, and to influence the minds Of the peOple. • The evidence which he would submit,, however, would hest disprove the asser-, tious of the Admiral. Ile, would not, therefore, at this moment, attempt to. - _confitte. the, assertion of Admiral Hallowell, that i here never was ground to believe, that the enemy's columns, advancing front Barcelona, exceeded five thotrsand men.-- In the third charge be would prove directly the 'reverse. He would now only content himself with drawing the attention of the Court to the nature of the renialk by which it was intended to be un derstood, .that neither Admiral •Hallowol, the General in command, nor, any other Officer what ever, had any information that a colotuo of greater strew:: h was approaching. It was of plll,Ntlellet.! to Admiral Hallowell to establish. the weakness of thk column, because he, endeavoured, throughout the whole of his dispatch, to prove, that it was to the approach ~tif this column alone, the pro- Ceedings, which be described, were attributable. It was true the Admiral had not rested this mportant point on Ails, own assertion ; he pro cured a subsequent. • prOof of these numbers. And what way the nature of this proof % ;" Capt. Stoddart saw a peasant at Torre Deinbara, of whose character he had no knowledge, whO told hint two things—the one that the enemy's foree consisted only of 5000 men and five gratis ; the other, that he. had quitted the enemy's camp at Villa -Franca, at half past seven o'clock on the morning of the 13th, when they had no appear ance of advaneing.". The Admiral had said that he had other proofs of this fact, bur what had he . produced Captain Bowen, it was true, said he had received the. tattle information; but it appear ed that it was derived 'from the, same source.-- There was no proof, however, that he had re-. ported the c':rcuinstance to the Admiral, when the dispatch in qnestion was written. A letter from Col. Lander, had, indeed, been snbwitted, and, as far as numbers went, this might be good ; but it could form no ground for the Admiral's assertion, as it had not reached him till the Hyacinth was dispatched. He should have conceived tha the good sense of Admiral Hallowell would have in , dated him to pause before he embodied so vague a, report, in'the fo-nt of a public dispatch; but when, in opposition to probability, as %well as to communication absolutely made to him from Lead quarters, his conduct becOmes indeed unaccount able. The Rear-Admiral was not content with re porting once to the world that the British army had fled to their ships from 5000 net, but report ed twice, and twice did he state, that the gariison of Tarragona consisted of but from 12 to 15;000 men. lie (Sir John) would, however, call an Officer before the Court, who would state, that from those who quitted the town.after he had ap peared before it, intelligence was obtained, that the garrison consisted of 2000 men--and who would prove that ,Sir «Viiliam Clinton himself I had declared, that the calculation ought not to he founded. upon weaker numbers. The Admiral, however, wished it to be believed that the garrison was inSuffiently defended, and that, consequently, it was in his (Sir J's) power ; whether the garri son was sufficient for a long and vigorous defence or not, was a matter of •no importance. It was certainly of sufficient strength to sustain an at tack of one day, for no longer were the batteries open against the place. This, however, was a point of little moment, and he would not have noticed it but to spew the Admiral's perseverance instating every thing which mi4ht tend to exas perate the public mind. Nothing had hen omit ted by hint which could attain this object, and in his anxiety he could . not avoid an exaggeration of our losses ; and as a proof . of his accuracy, even • descended to describe the calibre of the guns. Tie Admiral claimed merit for having corrected this error, hut it was a just ground of complaint that he had made such statements with cool and laud*- able inquiry. The principal feature of the Admiral's dispatch was, that ,the Allied Army had embarked solely, and had abandoned their artillery, solely on ac count of the distant approach of 5000 men. That such was the impression Admiral Hallowell wished to make on the Court, could no:: be, mistaken, and tint the movements of Marshal Su...itet had no share in deciding the re-embarkation. The approach of that Officer was never hinted fit till the scene of Tarragona was closed, and the ope ration at Col de Balaguer commenced. The Marshal's name was never mentioned, and throughout all calculations of his force was stu diously avoided. He (Sir John Murray) would affirm in the Admiral's presence, however, that he knew that it was the combined movements of the two columns advancing an both flanks, (and not the single and unsupported advance of General tie Caen), which induced him to embark the Army. AdMiral Hallowell knew that he had decided upon attacking this latter column, which he stated at 5,000 men, and he knew, for he (Sir John) told him so hims - elf on the night of the Iltb, when ,Jic first levued it, that the rapid approach of Mar shal Suchet .would not only prevent him from carrying the plan into effect, but that it had de cided him to raise the siege, and to embark the troops. Could any man, atteithis statement, call the report which he 'made fair' and . ttl)rej L tu t l l i tia c n et r il If," said Sir John Murray, ~ the ‘ chose to report on the subject at all, he was bOund, if not in - justice to me, at least in the faith ful eNecution of the duty he had! prescribed to himself, to mention every cause : but, abov e a ll, the real cause of the events upon 'which he thowtht himself called upon to address his Majesty's ilk nisters. The Admiral could not have forgotten, on the morning of the 14th, the conversation I had ,with him, to this very point, on the evening of the 11th, and yet I can in no other way account for the omission. But if he was ignorant of the approach of Marshal Sachet, of what value, I ask, is his advice or his opinion ?"' Supposing an enemy only of 5000, men near the BrhiSh forces, Admiral Hallowell might, if he had been asked, recommend that the British troops should not he embarked ; hut had lie known that 20,500 teen, with smaller divisions in their rear, wcrc approachiorz, world his councils have heel' the same ? Att+l yet, admitting that he (lift not recollect the conversation on the Ilth, he Icrie*on.:the evening of the 13th that our trooris •= bacl teerLengaged with th&l,Marsbars whole of that day in the plain of .Tarriigona, what was still more.remarkAble, th 4 tune was composing his imperfe'efrlispatch, under his. very eye, the troops divinnbarked;• frorri his own ship, during the-night, were engagell with-the advance of the'cinny. Of two things, then, one must be true—either Admiral Hallowell was_ norant of the real situation of the. army., or he did know it. If he rlid, his opinions . cOuld, be con-, • , . sidered of little value. • The Admiral had seen from his deck 'the enemy within 'gun-Shot, off the.. beach on "One side, and . he. heard the artillery of Vort Phillipe, on the other. Under these circumstances, of which Ad miral Hallowell could not plead generously, it would have become him to have stated entirely, and not partially, the gronnds upon which his (Sir J. iThirray's) proceedings were founded. In another part of Attniiral Hallowell's state ment, he asserted that' he had promised to embark the whole of the guns, provide€l he Wt - iSaltowed until night. Of this offer, I have no.knowledge or recollection ; but; even if I had, , I should have no hesitation in saying, bat it was utterly impos sible for him to have performed such a)) engage-, Brent. • [liere_a letter from Admiral Hallowell; to Sir John Murray, was read upon the above subject.] It contain:l, - hoWever, Only advice as to the disposition of the, troops to cover the embarkation, and did not contain any offer to carry off the guns. The wildness 'of the advice contained in this let ter, he (Sir J.ilm - ray) . said; he should prove in his defence to the third. charge. Th e ga ll an t,c c ifel:al went on to - state atiextra ordinary instance:of hiterferenee upon the. part or Admiral Hallowell, in the arras events of the army. It consisted- in-the Admiral, instead of, as he was bound to do, facilitating the junction of the Quarter;.Master-General , . .with the General Comnianding in Chief, .having actually, by signal repeated %vith a gun; ordered the Bristol to anchor . at a great. distance from the landing-plac& at the Col, de Balaguer, With no .other view, asi.he (Sir John Murray) . was expressly informed ; and; as he. could prove, from his own acknowledgment, than. to prevent the Q u arter -Master-General repairing to head-quarters. " Well, indeed," said Sir J. Murray, " predict misfortune, if he proposed by this exertion of his authority, to deprive the army of the services Of one, of its most active and intel ligent officers - , and to cripple the most important of the departments by the absence of its chief.— The fact is notorious, and I call iipon AdMiral to assign any other reason for ordering the Bristol to anchor On the 14th of June"--than that of keeping 'General Donkin, at a distance from head- q uarters.'' Sir John MUrray next remarked, that the in fluence cultic) was ascribed to General . Doultin,' over *his councils, • by Admiral Hallowell, had never. existed. He bad no hesitation in saying, that in no one leading operation of the army under his orders, had General Donkin been consulted, till after his decision was formed ; and that in many instances, and .particularly in the transae•. , Lions which were under consideration, be pro ceeded in direct opposition to his opinion. He stood alone on this occasion, and by his own re sponsibility was he content to stand - or fall. With respect to the general character of 'indecision with ,which the Admiral had thought proper to accuse him, he Should he silent. Thosetwho best knew; him, would be best able to appreciate the value of such a charge. • He did give orders to suspend the embarkation of the troops till the receipt of additional infor niation ;, and after directing that the stores and ordnance should continue to be embarked, he rode out towards the Col de Balaguer, on which road he was aware that it was possihle the army might he in motion. On his way back he receive4% , a letter from General Copous, stating the enemy to be in motion directly in, his front, on the road from Villa Franca, and confirming the continued advance in that direction. Not a moment was now to be lost in embarking the troops, which lzecame au act of paramount necessity. It was singular that the suspension of .his first intentions; in compliinent to the Admiral himself, should.now be a groundof ac cusation against him. It was natural to yieldsome ehing to , the Admiral on an occasion where, his hopes of bringing off the guns corresponded soca tirely with his(Gen.M.'s) own earnest wishes ; and th:s consent was a proof of his desire to co-ope rate, as far as possible, with the Admiral, while ids subsequent conduct on tl - t advance of the French, was a proof of the military principles on which be acted. This, however, forn - n4l no part of the charges before the Court ; hut if he had gone oat of his way in observing upon it, it was to slim that he Cad no feeling on the subject hich he was d'esirous of concealing. He be 7 lieved that he could easily answer the principal contradictions charged against him ; and if he could not, at this distance of time, answer some others of trifling nature, he hoped lie would not on that account be condemned. If the object lie pursued was uniform, and the result corresponded with it, any apparent - ineonSistency in the details, must necessarily have arisen out of events beyond his contrOul. The critical position of the armies •under his command, and the nature of his instruc tions, wholly- occupied his mind. To receive and understand reports, to distinguish between troth and falsehood; to act on new contingencies every hour in presence of a superior enemy,, and to watch over the safety as well as the honour Uf the army, was his,particidar province. lint wbat.was Admiral Hallowell's,? Was it to make minutes of the minutest parts of his proceedings. (tor this diary was not a log), without knowing the events which gave them birth, when he was little more than a spectator of events, in which" his own ho nour was no way committed ? If the spirit which influenced Admiral Hallowell- was not evi:lent on the very face of • this proceedint,,, , , - , and if his letter to Lord - Bathurst was not an ad , ditional proof 'of the- feeling which directed it, then every deduction from came 'to effect was. , an end. But it was not because the Admiral hiniself conceived. - that lie (General M.) %vas indecisive, that this accusation had been brought .forward, but because his own coun sel wai rejected, and tbat of 2blai•)r-General Don kin's, as he thought, acted on in preference to it. That this. was the eriw.e in the eyes of Ad miral Hallowell, be himself had almost told the Court, when he mentioned that the guns were spiked, and the carriages burned, notwithstand ing his opinion and advice to wait till night. Pence, the violence exhibited by the Admiral:. This was particularly galling to him, because he • believed that Gen. Murray acted on the opinion of the Quarter-iVaster-General, between whom and, hiliiself there Was no great cordiality. 'ThiS circum stance gave rise to great inconvenience; but he not have mentioned it, if it did not shrew the difficulty 'of a Commander's situation, constantly obliged to conciliate private feelings, and to struggle with the misunderstandings of indivi duals, whose .cordial co-operation was .so essential to the interests'of -the service. Had AdMiral Hal- lowell reflected one moment, he must have per ! .. ceived that the intelligence of the enemy's ap proach, given to General Murray on the forenoon of the 12th by General Donkin, su far from - weighing with him on that occasion, would have led him to pursue quite difierent measures.— Having said thus much ; he had no hesitation in admitting, that he did not pretend to be of so positive a disposition that his opinions or his plans were never to be changed by any Coun sel, however -good. Admiral Hallowell waii not, perhaps, aware, that the operations of an army must depend on - the Movements of the ene my, and' the intelligence received ; and miserably would it be conducted, were a blind, adherence to any particular line of conduct to fortis the princi pal f - attire of the Commander's character. It would be useleSS to bring - further proofs of the Admiral's.dispbsition. Without adv i erting to the .general tenor (Allis. conversation to every rank that would listen to him, enough had been said to prove how little reason there was to expect a fair consideration' or impartial representation of the cases from Admiral Hallowell on this oecasion. The Adneir . al would wish the Court to .be per suaded that his dispatch was penned with all the deliberation and impartiality which so grave a Sub ject required ; that, his mind was divested of every personal feeling, and that he was merely ankious to give an accurate and consistent history of the events which then occurred. Why then, be would ask, was there so much violence, he - might say so much virulence in his dis -patch ) Why• was so dangerous a precedent, de structive of all harmony bet Ween the two services, introduced—the sending to General Murray's • Commanding Officer the copy of a eliminating dis patch, nominally addressed to his own Commander? Why was all this done without General Murray's knOwledge, and, -might almost say, published to the officers under his (General Murray's) im mediate command ? H.c would admit the pro priety of reporting to Sir Edward Pellew the is sue of the expedition, and the share born by the naval force in the service, and that it was like wise equally insaunbent on Admiral Hallowell, from a regard to his own character, if he con ceived there was criminal neglect or misconduct on the part of General Murray, to have preferred charges against hint throUgh his Comthand iug -Officer, .Sir Edward Pellew. This would , nave been at once regular and judicious, cote , siStent with the rules of the service, and suffl eient for all the ends of national justice. Hatt he acted thus, he (General Murray) might have lamented the blindness with which he had un taken the accusation, the preference which he bad given to the weakest sources of information, and the ignorance of the true purposes of the expedi- - tion which had led him . so far out of his depth ; but he would have had to acknowledge that his . conduct had been candid, and consistent with the usages of theservice ; and however much these pro ceedings might have lessened the Admiral's claitU to the character of a wise and prudent Comma .. der, yet he. (General M.) has been the first to ar . piaud the fair and honourable manner of his pro' ceeding. • In discussing this extraordinary doeu-s went he requested the Court to observe, hoof widely time Admiral had travelled frorn the exercise or his duty in his representation. Other proofs. 'of personal hostility were not wanting. He should : content himself with laying before the Court the last act of the Admiral's hostility. • A very short time after he had rejected the Admirals proffered counsel of continuing the operations:at the . Col do . Balaguer, time commencement of Which he' had so earnestly deplored. He alluded to the signal twade from the Malta by hiS orders, when Los.V., William Beotinck's vessel appeared in the offing-,,. After inquiring whether his Lordship was co, hoard, in the face of the fleet, in the presence of the army still under General Murray's commands time signal was made—" We are all delighted."-' As an Admiral he was at liberty to make what signals he might choose, but he left it to the Court if this instance was not an unbecbthing:abuE o of his authority,' and if it had not a strong ten dency to countenance discontent and clamour ill' the army still under his command, and in which', after the arrival of Lord Win. Bemitinck, he AP continued to hold the second place. FIRST CHARGE. He now , came to the consideration of time Charges. Two Proseent'ors bad appeared agaills t contending on principles in direct opP°; sition to each other. The Judge Advacate 119 ' felt this difficulty ; and had adduced no pro ofs: except the documents nrigin'ally furnished to hips' In his observations 'upon this evident inconsi s ii teney, he Very truly stated that Atiniiral Hallow e s , might so conduct case as to make the charget correspond with each other ; and that Genera. Murray was open to animadversion for basin „ continued the siege too long, as well - as for tb • precipitate manner of its abandonment . . This ln l consistency did not seem to be worthy of Adrilir" 4 Hallowell's notice; for he had made no observati on t on the subject, and instead of co-operating %.v it i f the Judge Advocate, lie had contented hirnse,;, with arm attempt to prove that no enemy was In the first charge, he began to sin no the —his crime was of course increasedam theiStoti}ii to have continued on shore on the 9th, 1, and 11th, must naturally have augmented t' st sum of his offences, as the advance of the cue rendered the danger more-pressing ; and yet , ch the 12th, the reverse - of the picture was displAY,. e :, and the Court were informed that the embriros, tion was theirnot only precipitate, but uonece l