The Sun. — London, England, 1820-03-31 00:00:00

untold tod:titild-s entiteted tti a village in the norsh ? No ; it was by meeting of Corrorivion. , n rorp •rate eapAcity ; by the assembly of recogi ed bAttirs of the State, by the interchange of 0rd1410119 5111011!. purl the community known o each other. and capable of estimating each o•her's views nuit characters. Do ‘‘e want a mote striking mmit• nf remedying tltieva nee% than this ? r. tioire I more animating ex ample ? Ass terrain fur the It.lot met s of die present (14y to strike nut the co , ,rse by which alone Great Britain could make Mid keep hers: If free? Gentlemen, all power Iq, or ought to be, ae eompAtird by responiihility. Tyranny i s i rre . opon , thie power. This maxim is equally trite, whether the power he lodged in one or many ; whether in N despot exempted by the morns of Go veromeot, from the control ot ; or ill a mob, whose numbers put them hey.mrt the reach of kw. Idle, therefore, and ah,n , d, to tAlli of free dom where mob dnmineels! !die, therefore, ant! absurd, to talk of libvrr y, when you hol.l your property, perhaps rine lice, lost indeed at the nod -of ki despot, hot at the will of act ittliatned, tin infu riate populace! li, therefore,. &Inn"! the reign of terror at Nlianeliester or Sp44elds, there were per sons in this country mho had a ri:4l,t to complain of tyranny, it nas they who lo%eil the C.,oslito tion, who loved the Monarchy, bin who dared n u t utter their opinions or !hell wishes until their bowies wete h:rrieaded, and their children sent to a place of safety. 'chat was tyranny I. and so tar as the mohs were under the confront of a leader, that was de•potisut T. And it was against that ty ra•►ny, that ti spotistn, tl►at Parliament at length a i-rd is attn. Ali power, I say, is vicious, that is not accom panied by proportionate responsibility. Pet sonal responsibility prevents the abuse of individual power ; soch responsibility of character is the se cority aeaiost the aho%e of Collef:'lVC power, when exercised by hodies,of men whose existence is per manent and defined. But strip botlO-s o f th ese el. , „lities, resolve theta into multitudes, and what security have you against any thing that they may do, or resolve ; knowiog that the moment the meeting is dissolvt4l, there is no human being re sponsible for their proceedings 'the Meeting at I‘lanchester, the Meeting at Birmingham, the Met:tine at Spa&lds or Smithfield, what pledge could they give to thr nation of the soundness ur sincerity of their sentimen's ? The local charac ter of Manchester, the local chat aCter of Birinifig. ham, was not pleoged to any of Lire proceed ings to which their names were appended.. A cer tain number of ionbulatoty tribunes of the.people, self-elected to that high funetioti, assumed the name and awbolity of whatever place they thought proper to select for the place of meeting: their matt um was pitched, sometitues here, some times there, according to the fancy of the mob, or the patience of the Magistrates ; but the pro position, the proposer was in all places nearly alike ; and when, by a sort of ventrilo quism, the same voice had been made to issue from half a dozen different corners of the coon try, it was impudently assumed to be an union of sweet sounds, composing the united voice of the people at England Now, Gentlemen, let us estimate the mighty mischief that has been done to liberty by putting down meetings such as I have described. Let us ask what lawful authority has been curtailed ? let us ask what respectable community has been injured ? let us ask what form of municipal institutions has been abrogated by a law which fixes the migratory complaint to the spot whence it professes to originate, and desires to bear of the grievance from those by whom that grievance is felt ; which leaves to Manchester as Manchester, to Birming ham as Birnyugharo, to London as London, all the free scope of utterance which they have at any time enjoyed for making knuw•n their wants, their feelings, their wishes, their reason strances ; which leaves to each of these divisions its separate authority, t) the union of all or of many of them the aggre gate authority of such a consent and co-operation ; but which denies to an itinerant hawker of grievances, the power of stamping their names upon his wares; of pretending, be cause he may raise an outcry at Manchester or at Birmine bam, that he therefore speaks the sense of the town which he disturbs; or still more preposterously, that because he has disturbed half a dozen neighbourhoods in their turn, be is, therefore, the organ of them all, and, through them, of the whole British people. Such are the stupid fallacies which the law of the last Ses sion has extiognished! and such is the object and effect of the measures which British liberty is not to survive ! To remedy the dreadful wound thee indicted upon British liberty, to restore to the people what the people bare not lost, to give a new impulse to that spirit of freedom, which no thing has been done to embarrass or restrain, we are invited to alter the constitution of that assembly through which the people share in the Legislature; in short, to make a Radical Reform its the House of Common.. It has al rays struck me as extraordinary, that there should be persons prepared to entertain the question of so great a change in so important a member of the Constitution, with out considering in what way that change must alreet the situ ation of the other members, and the action of the Consti tution itself. I have, on former occasions, stated here, and I have stated elsewhere, questions on this sulject ; to which, as yet, I have never received an answer. " You who 'wish to reform the house of Commons, do you mean to restore that branch of the Legislature to the same state in which it stood at some former period ? or do yon mean to reconstruct it on new principles ?" Perhaps a moderate Reformer or Whig will answer, that he means only to restore the House of Commons to what it w•as at some former period. I then beg to ask, and to that question al,o I have never yet received au answer, " At what period of our histary was the House of Commons in the state to which you wish to restore it ?'' The House of Commons way, for the p`urpose of this argu ment, he con2idered in two views ; first, with respect to its agency as a third part in the Constitution ; secondly, with le spect to its compsition, in relation to its constituents. As to its agency as a part of the Constitution, I venture to say, with out hazard, as I helieve, of contradiction, that there is no period in the history of this country in which the House of Commons ill he found to have occupied so large a share of the functions of Government as at resent. Whatever else may he said of the House of Commons, this one point, at least, is indisputable, that from the earliest infancy of the Constitution, the power of the House of Commons has been growing till it has altuot!, Elie ti;' r9d of Aaron, absorued its ' fellows. I Rill not saying whether is or is not as it no ht to be. I merely mean to say why I think that• it cannot be intended to complain of the wantof power, and of a due share in the government in the House of Cumulous. I admit, however, very willingly, that the greater share of power it exercises, the more jealous we ought to be of its com position ; and I presume, therefore, that it is in this respect, and in relation to its constituents, that the state of the House of Commons is contended to want revision. Well, then, at what period of our history was the composition of the House Of Commons materially different from what it is at present ? Is there any period of our history in which the rights of elec tion were not as various, and in which the influence of pro perty was not as direct ; is) which recommendations of Candi dates were not as efficient, and some boroughs as close as they are tow,. ? I ask for information: but that information, plain and simple as it is, and necessary, One S110111(1 think, to r a clear understanding. much more to a grave decision of the point at issue, I never, though soliciting it with all humility, have ever yet been able to obtain from any Reformer, Radi cal, or Whig. The Radical Reformer, indeed, to do him justice, is not hound to furnish me with an answer to this question, because with his view of the matter, precedents (except one which I shall mention presently) have nothing to do. The Radical Reformer would, probably, give to my first question an an swer very different from that which I have supposed his mo, Berate brother ts, give. He will tell me fairly, not that he means to bring the House of Commons hack either to the share of power which it formerly enjoyed, or to the modes of election by which it was formerly returned, but to make it, what, according to him it ous:,•ht to be, a direct, effectual Re presentative of the People ; representing them not as.a dele gate commissioned to take care of their interests, but as a deputy appointed to speak their will. Now to this slew of the matter I have no other objection than this—that the Bri tish Constitution is a limited monarchy # that a limited mo narchy is, in the nature of thins, a mixed Government, but that such a House of Commons as the Radical Reformer re quires, would, in effect, constitute.a pure democracy, with which I am at a loss to understand how any monarchy or any limitation could co-exist. I may hare great respect for the person who theoretically prefers a republic to a monarchy. But even supposing me to agree with him in this preference, 1 should have a previous question to discuss, by which he, perhaps, may not feel himself embarrassed; which is this, whether I, horn as I am (and as I think it is my good fortune to be) under a monarchy, am quite at liberty to consider my self as having a clear stage for political experiments; whe ther I should he authorised, if I were convinced of the expe diency of such a change, to withdraw monarchy altogether from the British Constitution, and to substitute an umPlan fled democracy in its stead; or whether, whatever changes may be desirous of introducing, I am not bound to consider the Constitution which I find as at least circumscribing the range, and in souse measure prescribing the nature of the improvement. For my own part, I am undoubtedly prepared to uphold the ancient monarchy of the country, by arguments drawn from what I think the blessings which we have enjoyed un der it; and by arguments of another sort, if arguments of an other sort are brought against me. But all that lam now contending for is, that whatever reformation is proposed should be considered with some reference to the established Constitution of the country. That point being conceded to me, I have no difficulty in saying, that I cannot conceive a Constitution of which one third part shall be an assembly delegated by the people, not to consult for the good of the nation, but to speak day by day, the people's will, which must not in a few days sitting sweep away every other branch of the Constitution that might attempt to oppose or controul it. I cannot conceive bow, in fair reasoning, any other branch of the Constitution should pretend to stand against it, If Go vernment be a matter of will, all that we have to do is to col lect the will of the nation, and, having collected it by an adequate organ, that will is paramount aMl•supreme. By what shadow of argument could the House of Lords be main tained in equal authority and jurisdiction with the House of Commons, when once that House of Commons should be come a mere deputation, speaking the people's will, and that will the rule of the Government ? In one way or other the House of Lords must act if it be to remain a concitrren t branch of the Legislature. Either it must uniformly affirm the measures which come from the Commons, or it must occa sionally take the liberty to reject them. If it uniformly affirm, it is without the pretence of authority. But to presume to reject an act of the Deputies of the whole Nation !—by what assumption of right could three or four hundred great Pro prietors set themselves against the National will ? Grant the Reformers, then, what they ask, on the principles on which they ask it, and it is utterly impossible, that, after such a Re form, the Constitution should long consist of more than one body, and that one body a popular assembly. Why, Gentlemen, is this theory ? or is it a theory of mine ? If there be among those who hear me (as any man in the ge nerous enthusiasm of youth may blamelessly have been), any man who has been Li?ten by the doctrines of Reform, I im plore him, before he goes forward in his progress to embrace those doctrines in their radical extent, to turn to the history of the transactions in this country in the year 1648, and to examine the bearings of those transactions on this very question of Radical Reform. lie will find, Gentlemen, that the House of Commons of that day passed the following Reso lution:— • " Resolved, that the people are, under God, the original of all just power!" Well, can any sentiment be more just and reasonable ? Is it mot the foundation of all the liberties of mankind ? Be it so. Let us proceed. The House of Com mons followed up this Resolution by a •eco4d, which runs in something like these terms " Resolved, that the Corn rnons of England assembled in Parliament, being chosen by and representing the people, have the supreme authority of this Nation." In this Resolution, a leap is taken from the premises of the Radical Reformers to a conclusion, which I know not how they are to deny, especially with such a precedent before them. But the inference did not stup there. The House of Commons proceeded to resolve (and I wish I could see the logical discrepancy between the premises and the contusion,) "That whatsoever is enacted and declared law by the Com mons of England assembled in Parliament, bath the force of law, arch hinds the people Of England, uotlnout the towyent and concurrence of tine Lords or of the Crown." Such was the tiaeoretical inference of the House of Commons in 164.9, the logical dependence of which upon the prernisys laid down by thew, I say, I should be glad t o see I,, g i c ally proved. The practical inferences were not tardy in their ar rival, after the theory. In a few weeks the Flouse of Fords was ►rated useless ; and in a few inoyz we all know what be came of the Crown. Sact., say, were the radical cluctriuo uf IGIB, otiJ SUCIA the cont - z - oences to %Iltich thet naturally ;ed. If we are in direct] to admit the same premises now, who is it, I shottit' he glad to know, that is to guarantee us against similar con clusions ? These, then, are the reasons why I look with jealousrat Par liamentary Reform. I look at it with still more jealousy, be cause in one of the two- classes of men who co-operate in sup port of that question, I never yet found any two individuals in either class who held the same doctrines ; and I never yet heard any intelligible theory of reform, except that of the Radical Reformers. Theirs, I think, it is easy enough to understand. Lilt for theirs, I certainly am not yet fully pre pared. I, for my part, will not consent to take ono step, without knowing on what principle I am invited to take it, and (which is, perhaps, of more consequence) without declar ing oa what principle I will nut consent that any step, how ever harmless, shall be taken. What inure bar mless than to disfranchise a corrupt Borough in Cornwall, which has ex ercised its franchise amiss, and brought shame on itself, and on the system of which it is part ? Nothing. I have no sort of objection to doing, as Parliament has often done in such Cases, (supposing always . the case to be proved), to disfran chising the Borough, and rendering it incapable of abusing its franchise in future. But, though I have no objection to doing this, I will not do it on the principle of improvement. I do it on the principle of specific punishment for an offence. And, I will take good care that no inference shall be drawn from my consent in this specific case, as to any sweeping con currence in a scheme of general alteration. Nay, I should think it highly disingenuous to suffer the Radical Reformers to think, that they bad gained a single step towards the admission of their theory by any such instance of particular animadrorsion on 'proved misconduct. I consent to such disfrancliisement ; but I do so, not with a view of furthering the radical system, but rather of thwarting it. I am glad to wipe out any blot in the preseut system, because I mean the present system to stand. I will take away a franchise, because it has been practically abased, not because I am at all prepared to inquire into the origin or to discuss the utility of all such franchises, amy more than I mean to in quire, Gentlemen, into your titles to your estates, Disfranchis ing Gratnpouud, (if that is to be so,) I mean to save Old Sarum. Now, Sir, I hope I deal fairly with the Radical Reformers, more fairly than those who would suffer it to be supposed, that the disfranchisement of Gram pound is to be the beginning of a system of Reform: while they know, and I bope'inean as well as I do, net to reform (in the sense of change) but to preserve the Constituzion. I would not delude the Reformers, if I could ; and I know it would be quite useless to attempt a delusion upon persons quite as sagacious in their generation as any moderate Reformers or Anti-Reformers of us all. They know full well that the %Vhigs have no more notion than I have of parting with the close boroughs. Not they. indeetlb large, and perhaps the larger part of them are in their hands. Why, in the assembly to which you send we, Gentle men, some of those who sit on the same side with me repre sent, to be sore, less popular places than Liverpool:--but on the bench immediately over against me I descry scarce any other sort of Representatives than Members for close, or, if you will, for rotten boroughs. To suppose, therefore, that our political opponents have any thoughts of getting rid of the close boroughs, would be a gross delusion; and I have no doubt, they will be quite as fair and open with the Reformers OH this point as I am. And why, Gent lemen, is it that I am satisfied with a system, which it is said no man can support who is not in love with corruption ? Is it that I, more than any other man, am afraid to face a popular election ? To the last question you can give the answer. To the former I will answer for myself. Ido verily believe, as I have already sai, that a complete and per- feet democratical representation, such as the Reformers aim at, cannot exist as part of a mixed Government. It may exist, and for aught I know or care, may exist beneficially as a whole. But lam not sent to Parliament to inquire into the question whether a democracy or a monarchy be the best.— My lot is cast under the British Monarchy. Under that I have lived, under that 1 have seen my country flourish, under that I hare seen it enjoy as great a share of prosperity, of happiness, and of glory, as I believe any modification of human society to be capable of bestowing; and I am not pre pared to sacrifice or to hazard the fruit of centuries of expe rience, of centuries of struggles, and of more than one cen tury of liberty as perfect as ever blessed any country upon the earth, for visionary schemes of ideal perfectibility, or doubts Gal experiments even of possible improvement. I am, therefore, for the House of Commons as a part, and not as the whole of the Government. And, as a part of the Government, I hold it to be frantic to suppose, that from the election of Menthe's of Parliament, you can altogether ex clude, by any contrivance, even if it were desirable to do so, the influence of property rank, talents, family connexion, and whatever else, in the radical language of the day, is consi dered as intimidation or corruption. I believe, that if a Re form to the extent of that demanded by the Radical Reformers were granted, you would, before an annual election came round, find that there were new connexions grown up which you must again destroy, new influence acquired which you must dispossess of its authority, and that in these fruitless at tempts at unattainable purity you were working against the natural current of human nature. I believe, therefore, that contrive how you will, some such human motives of action will find room to operate in the election of Members of Parliament. I think that it must and ought to be so, unless you mean to exclude from the concerns of the nation all inert wealth, all inactive talent, the retired, the aged, and the infirm, all who cannot face popular assem blies or engage in busy life; in short, unless you have found some expedient fur disarming property of influence, without (what I hope we are nut yet ripe for) the abolition of pro -etrty itself. I would hare by choice—if the choice were yet to he made— I would have in the House of Commons great variety of inte rests, and I would have them find their way there by a great variety of rights of election ; satisfied that Uniformity of elec tion would produce any thing but a just representation of va rious interests. As to the close Boroughs, I know that through them have found their way into the House of Com mons men whose talents have been an honour to their hind, and whose names are interwoven with the history of their country. I cannot thinl; that system altogether vicious which has produced such fruits. I cannot think that there should he but one road into that Assembly, or that no man should he presumed tit for the deliberations of a Senate, who has not had the nerves previously to face the storms of the hustings. I need nut say, Gentlemen, that r am one of the last taco to disparage the utility and dighity of popular elections. I have good cause to speak of them in far different language. fiat, among nunib,7l,3s other considerations which endear to me the favuoi - i wil;:d. I Lave recuirca at your panda, 4 coo-. fess it is that as yz;at Representative, I am enabled to speak my genuine sentiments on this (as I thinkit), vital question of Parliamentary Reform, without the imputation of slit inking from popular canvass, or of seeking shelter for myself in that species of Representation which, as an element in the composition of Parliament, I never shall cease to de fend. But, Gentlemen, though the question of reform is made the pretext'of those persons who have vexed the country for some months, I verily believe that there arc very few even of them who either give credit to their own exaggerations, or care much about the improvements which they recommend. Why, do we not see that the most violent of the Reformers of the day are ai►ning at seats in that assembly, which, according to their own theories, they should have left to wallow its its own pollution, discountenanced and unredeemed ? It is true, - that if they had found their way there, they might have en deavoured to bring us to a sense of our misdeeds, and to urge us to redeem our character by some self-condemning ordi nance; but would not the authority of their names, as our associates, have more than counterbalanced the force of their eloquence as our Reformers ? But, Gentlemen, I ani for the whole Constitution. The liberty of the subjeci as much depends on the maintenance of the Constitutional Prerogatives of the Crown, on t he acknow ledgment of the legitimate power of the other House of Par liament, as it does in upholding that supreme power (for such is the power of the purse) which resides in the demo cratical branch of the Constitution. Whatever beyond its just proportion was gained by one part, 'would be gained at the expence of the whole; and the balance is now, perhaps, as nearly poised as human wisdom can adjust it. I fear to touch that balance the disturbance of which might bring confusion on the nation. Gentlemen, I trust there are few, very few, reasonable arid enlightened men ready to lend themselves to projects of con fusion. But I confess I very much wish, that alt who are not ready to do so would consider the ill effect of any countenance given, publicly or by apparent implication, to those whom, in their hearts and judgments, they despise. I remember that most excellent and able man, Mr. Wilberforce, once saying in the Elouse of Commons, that be "never believed au opposition really to wish mischief to the country; tbatlhey only wishe just so much mischief as might drive their opponents out,and place themselves in their room." Now, Gentlemen, I cannot help thinking, that there are some persons taniperingwith the question of Refoim something in the same spirit. They do not go so far as the Reformers ; they even state irreconcilable dif ferences;• but to a certain extent they agree andevenco-operate with them. They co-operate with them in inflaming the pub lic feeling net only against the Government, hitt against the . support given 5) Parliament to that Government, is the hope, no doubt, of attracting to themselves the popularity which is lost to their opponents, and thus being enabled to detect and retrieve the errors of a displaced Administration. Vain and hopeless task to raise such a spirit and think to govern it: They may stimulate the steeds into fury, till the chariot is hurried to the brink of a precipice; but do they flatter them selves that they can then leap in, and, hurling the incompetent driver from his seat, check the reins just in time to turn from the precipice and avoid the fall ? I fear they would attempt it in vain. The impulse once given, may be too impetuous to be controlled, and, intending only to change the guidanCe of the machine, they may hurry it and themselves to irretriev abledestruction. May every man who has a stake in the country, whether from situation, from character, from wealth, from his and from the hopes of his children,—may every man who has a sense of the blessings fur which he is indebted to the form of Government under which he lives, see that the time ;ls come, at which his decision must be taken, and, when once taken, stedfastly acted upon—for, or ogaing the instihdiaras of the Monarchy. The time is come at which there is but tins line of demarcation. Ou which side of that line we, Gentlemen, shall range ourselves, our choice has long ago been made, in acting upon that our common choice, with my best efforts and exertions, I shall at once faithfully represent your sentiments and satisfy my own judgment and conscience. - SPAIN. The following article is extracted from Ga - • lignani's Messenger : " A courier extraordinary has just arrived to the Spanish Embassy, bringing advices from Ma drid of the 19th, by which we learn that the following changes have taken place :- 4 ‘ M. Perez de Castro, a Liberal, and former Deputy of the Cortes, is named Minister of Fo reign Affairs, in the place of the Duke de San Fernando, who is chosen Ambassador at Vienna, in the room of M. Cevallos, who is to have a seat in the Council of State. " The Duke de Fenian Nunez, Ambassador at Paris, is recalled, and succeeded by the Duke Del l'arque, one of the first Generals who made war against Napoleon during the late Revolution. " The Duke de San Carlos, Ambassador is London, is also recalled, and the Duke de Frills, whose sentiments have always been liberal, is to take his place. '' Don Onis, former Minister in the United States of America, is named Ambassador at Na ples,in the place of M. Labrador, who is recalled. " M. de C ampuzzno, former Secretary of the Embassy in London, is named Ambassador at Dresden, in piece of M. Salmon, who is to go to St. Petersboigh. " The Count de Torreno, former Deputy of the Cortes, late an exile at Paris, and now in this capital, is named Ambassador at Berlin. " M. de Pando is named Minister in Portugal, in the room of Count de Casa Flores, who is re called." A Vienna article in the Constitutionnel, dated the 15th inst: contains the following paragraph " It has recently come to the knowledge cf the Congress that a Circular has been addressed by the Emperor ALEX ANDER to his Ministers accredited to Foreign Courts. This Sovereign has nut acceded to the decision of Carlsbad and Frankfurt, as a'3lted of him. The diplomatic paper in ques tion has route a great impression; it speaks in a very marked strain of irony of the tone of confidence adopted in the ce lebrated Circular of the Coant de BERNSTORFF, the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs. lt is said that the Emperor will decide as to his own conduct, after camir unicating with the Cabinet of London. The snpericr political 1.1 .as of this Monarch, which the most enlightened part of i is subjects hope to see one day applied to his vast Empire, as they have been in Poland, are nut perhaps altogether in harmony with the principles which direct certain Cabinets of Gkrmany; List the people of the country flatter themselves that they will not be without influence over the nature of the Institution= vblch they believe themselves, tv be on the eve Qionainiag. ~~- I * 4 tilnA. the that AURII lIIG `` . *at 1 1tt► V4llll tesal r eps) leas nistc luau term Tliti l Rest lent i atti c , ju it; of t h bra e , Coe! tad Vea 3 I ng the! of d tar! ) ° PPc Vita one the poi!: ( Nes eon) obj e , „ iuflu tot tried tleb a him ter, .„! -pi th is Iti r. ti„ te,el 14l ast Cl otll itself C ash li►e to rly f °4ll, liecti t t4l that %I'l lii ll'ille t o ,p