The Sun. — London, England, 1855-01-27 00:00:00

n the Government with success. What further I have to i say is, that I do not think that the general aspect of affairs abroad at all warrants the depression which I see it has in some quarters produced. No doubt the accounts which we have received from our camp before Sebastopol are gloomy and disheartening ; but, with respect to the great objects of the war in which we are en g a g ed, I believe that our prospects are by no mean s g loom y . When I sp oke on a former occasion with reference to Austria, my language was moat erroneously construed as depreciating the con duct and intentions of that Power. Now, I wish to give every credit and importance to that which Austria has done. It is in consequence of the large armaments she has made, the equipment of her army to the extent of 500,000 men, the entrenchment and strengthening of positions which were weak, and the raising of au enor mous force of cavalry—it is in consequence of these pre parations that the Emperor of Russia has abated much of his pretensions, has been ready to consent to terms which in last August he utterly rejected, and that he now seriously *wielders whether or not he will make those con cessions which are necessary for the purpose of procuring peace. It is in a great degree owing to the admirable abi lity and, still more, the admirable patience exhibited by Lord Clarendon in his negotiations—(hear, hear) —that we have the advantage of Austria throwing her weight into negotiations, with the assurance that if a peace each as she thinks safe for Europe cannot be obtained she will act with the allies, bringing with her the aid of 500,000 men. We have, in the next place, to rely, without the smallest hesi tation or doubt, ea the fidelity of our ally, the Emperor of the French—(Cheers)---of whose good raith, besides all other actions and all other assistances, I saw and heard such proofs during my late residence in his capital that I cannot have the slightest hesitation in assuring the house that the two countries of England and France will remain united to the end of this great struggle. (Loud cheers.) Well, then, with these advantages, I think we may hope to see one of two things—one no doubt mere desiralele than the other; but the other, at the same time, an honourable course, and one from which we should not shrink—either the Emperor of Russia would make those concessions which will be just and honourable for Englend,, for Franco, and for the safety of Europe ; or, if he should fail in making those concessions, there will be such a force of European arms collected against him that a final triumph must attend those arms. (Hear, hear.) I could not. help expressing this conviction on the present occasion, Incense I think that, w hoever may bo Minister, he may rely, first, on the patriotic feeling and loyalty of the house--(hear; hear)—next on the unflinching alliance of the Eurperor :1 the French, and 'thirdly, on the assist ance of the Emperor of Austria, if honourable terms of ose n uot be obtained. (Hear, hoar.) Per ha p s I ma y re a P e era pitted to say, as I have now left Lord Aberdeen's Government, that I eaanot refrain on this occasion from quetin g the words of Sir R. Peel, with respect to that noble lord, and also freely declaring that, in my opinion, they are fully justified. When Sir R. Peel was leaving office; be said— "lly noble friend has dared to avow that there is a moral obligation upon the Christian Minister of a Christian country to exhaust every effort for the maintenance of peace before Wertz-ring the risk, not to say the guilt, of war. But while helms not shrunk from the manly avowal of that opinion, I will, in justice to him, add this—and it is perfectly consistent with that opinion as to the moral obligation of maintaining peace, while peace can be maintained with honour—that there never was a Minister less inclined to sacrifice any essen tial interest, or to abate anything from the dignity and honour of this country, even for the purpose of securing that inestimable blessing." I believe the opinion thus expressed to be perfectly just. My noble friend had entered into this war not until it was necessary, and it was only a few days ago that I had a long conversation with him on the terms of peace with which we eight to 'be satisfied ; and I must say I entirely con curred. in all lee said, and had the fullest reliance that he would. not concur in any peace which is not just and ho nourable, and which would not be approved by the general feeling of this country. (Hear, hear.) Perhaps I may say a few words with respect to the Government I have loft, and for joining which I have often been taunted. I cannot but say that I look back to my association with many of the measures and acts of that Administration with great pride and satisfaction. (Hear, hear.) I look back, above all, eeith the greatest pride and satisfaction to that speech of 'eloquence and wisdom delivered by my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer when proposing his financial scheme two years ago, and maintaining , as I be lieve, the tru e principles of finance. (Hear, har.) It is a satisfaction to me to think that the splendour of that exhibition was so great as to shed some portion of its bril liancy on those who were his colleagues. (Hear, hear.) I know it was said at the time when that Administration was formed, that those with whom I had always been con nected—the Whig party—had not, in the distribution of power, that degree of influence that properly belongs to theta on account of their character, abilities, and num bers. It always appeared to me before that period that a very aajnat notion had found its way among the pull° to a. very great extent—namely, that the Whig party was an exclusive party and required all power and office for itself, and was not prepared to support any sys tem of administration in which it did not enjoy that mo nopoly. I must say I think that opinion was an unjust one, and the conduct of the Whig party during the last twe years fully justifies my opinion. I will venture to say that no party ever behaved with greater honour or more disiaterested patriotism than the Whig party who, daring the whole of that period, liar supported the Government of Lord Aberdeen. It is my pride, and it will ever be my pride to the last day of my life, to have belonged to a party which, as I conceive, upholds the true principles of freedom and the just influence of the people • and whether in or out of offi ce , it w ill b e m y cons t an t endeavour to pre serveand to maintain the principles which the great Whig party has laid down. (The noble lord sat down amid con siderable cheering from both sides of the house.). Lord PALMERSTON—It may be probably expected that-I should not allow the address of my noble friend to pass. without some observation on the part of her Majesty's Government, and, in the first place, I must beg to assure my noble friend and the house that nothing could be more painful to me, officially and personally, than the step which helms felt it his duty to take in separating himself from the Government of which we were both members. There have been, no doubt, at particular times, temporary differences between my noble friend and myself, which may have appeared to estrange us from each other—(laughter) — but I can assure him that these differences have passed away from my mind—(hear)—as I know they have from his ; and I can assure him that, whether I act with him or whether we are divided, the great esteem which I feel for his high character and for his great abilities, and the deep friendship with which I am animated towards him, never can be affected by the past, the present, or the future. (Hear.) No w, sir, undoubtedly I must admit, a public man has a perfect right, without an impeachment on the part of any person, to quit office whenever he thinks that his continuance in office cannot be reconciled with his sense of duty; and however those whom he may leave may regret the loss, if he sots in the manner I have stated, he stands per fectly free from all reproach. With regard to the circum stances to which my noble friend has adverted, it is not for me to say whether my noble friend was right or wrong in acquiescing last year in the appointment of the Duke of Newcastle to the office of Secretary of State for the War Department ; neither is it for me to say whether my noble friend was right or wrong in proposing that I should be substituted for the noble dike in the discharge of the duties of that office. I was absent in Paris at the time when the correspondence to which my noble friend bad adverted passed between him and Lord Aberdeen ; but I am ready to corroborate what my noble friend has stated, that when, on my return from Paris, he communicated to me that correspondence, and when the question arose whe tier or not, in consequence of Lord Aberdeen having de clined to adopt his recommendations, ho should deprive the Government of his services, I, together with every one of his colleagues, urged him and entreated him netts quit the Government. I certainly thought it my duty to join with my colleagues in earnestly requesting my noble friend to continue to give the Government tho benefit of his services. The noble lord consented to do so, he yielded to the recom mendations of his colleagues, but from that time to the period of his resignation I am not aware that ho ever re verted to the proposal which he had made to Lord Aber deen. Now, Sir, lam sure my noble friend will feel that in what I am stating I am speaking as if I were not a party concerned in the transaction, but sireply as a member of a Government from whom ono of his colleagues has departed, but from the time when that correspondence oeourred— from the 2d of Dec. or somewhere about that period—when at the earnest and unanimous request of his colleagues, my noble friend consented to remain in office, my belieris that up to the moment of his resignation he did not renew his proposal. Now, Sir, lam quite ready to admit that my noble friend may have felt a ditheulty in meeting such a motion as that which stands for to-night in the name of my hon. and learned friend the member for Sheffield. Enter taining as he did an opinion that a change ought to be a mad e in the W ar D epar t men t , my no bl e f r i en d ma y h ave felt difficulty in resisting a motion the obvious intention of which was to effect each h I think my sa bl e friend him* c elf ange,but at the same time made just now u p on that s, in them ot i on, has remarks which he inde pendently of all personal consid er a tion , apart shownfrom that a pre ference for one man over another, there were grave con stitutional objections sufficient to any man in voting against it. My noble friend very was impossible that a, commit supervng, tee g the said that it criticising, and superintending the cher: , the War Department, could co-exist with tfs e e n r et b i° er ns ai o e f charge of the duties of that deplirtinent. Bnt my noble friend might properly and naturallythe continued to entert a in an opinion th a t a chan hav e necessary with re gar d t o the p erson w h o held the office of Secretary of St a t e f er W ar , y e t I must venture humbly to submit to him that th a t o pi n i on oug h t to have been repeated to the noble lord at the head of the Government before the re-assembling of Parliament after the late recess. He ought to have given the Govern ment the opportunity of stating to him whether or not that proposal would be accepted on his renewal of it. If, be fore Parliament met, ray noble friend had said to the head of the Government, "I, in common with all mankind, ex pect that when Parliament meets some motion will be made, either inculpating the Government or requiring an explanation from them with regard to the conduct of the the conversation at ever streetcorier war o—f e r, indeed, the leading articles in every nowspapei e mus t havesatisfied every one that su ch an l event was to be l oo k e d f or— if the noble lord had said, " Such a motion appears to me, if not inevitable, at least highly probable, and I tell you before hand that if it cornea ou I cannot resist it, un t l b e a ss , s c u on ch du a c n t i s l such changes are made in the depar t men t L, o ha d t the ( be ebthe war," then the Govern ment wou ld .en whi c h oppor tunity either of reconsidering the ob ja t h aves made to the noble lord's proposal or f acq uiescing in at once. If the s ame o bj ec ti ons which had been made to it on a former occasions had prevailed, they wo uld then have had the opport un it y o f d eterm i n i ng w hether they w ould con tinue to sustain the loss of the noble lord's services, or whe ther they would deem that loss to be of such pre-einiuent importance as to impose on them the necessity of surren dering their offices into the hands of her Majesty, w ith a view to the formation of some other Government. A re signation at that time and under those circumstances, might have happened without az,y disparagement to the parties concerned. Ample time would have been given for arrange ments of any kind, either for the remodellin g of the exist log Government or for the formation o f a ne w - ono. Such a Proceeding would have been in the ordinary practice of politics, bat the course taken by my noble not lofri i e n n ._c d_ o , rr l es r p n o n i s i t v enture h um bl y to submit to him, w ( lance with th e usua l prac ti ce of public men. (gear.) It t was one calculated inevitably to place the Governmen t to i which he belonged in a of embarrassment in w hich, is t u he p lit ace st of position a..,colleague at least, they ought not to have ray noble friend—not having while he , THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, JANUARY 27 5 1855. tiated, or even attempted to be substantiated, which I might apply myself to answer. Now, the statement which the hon. and learned gentleman made ho put upon a very simple issue. He says that there left the shores of this c.nintry ono of tho largest and best appointed armies that England ever sent forth. He recites their numbers, and he asks what has become of those forces. And here I must say my hon. and learned friend fell into one inaccuracy, be cause ho asks what has become of the whole number of men, as if they all went out with the original expedition, many hofadthnemot have e ve h d— aan a sentaud overlooking since then, thefact and circumstance which must be taken into account in estimat t that ha t others iug arithmetically the proportions which have fallen in baztle or died from disease. Sir, I confess that I approach this subject with unaffected feelings of pain. I am not about to attempt or pretend to bolster up a case by read ing letters or extracts from letters, seeking to convey to the house impressions other than those that in my con science I know to be correct. I believe that exposure to sufferine . , exposure to an inclement season, and to priva tions of all descriptions, has reduced the army under the command of Lord Raglan to a state that does excite deep anxiety in the mind of every Englishman. But, sir, so far as it depends upon us, I might quote the very observation which fell from my hon. and learned friend when he said, " You have transported to the shores of Balaklava stores enough to feed and shelter twice the body of men that you have sent out." (Hear, bear.) Now, yotimay ask—as I have no doubt you will do—what is the reason why an army each as the hon. and learned gentleman described it -so fully equipped, should have fallen in so short a period into a state arguing a great want or defect in the in ternal organization, either of that army itself en the spot, or in the departments charged with the administration at home ? The lengthened remarks I made the other day when I had to disuse this subject will, I trust, enable me to abridge, and even justify me in abridging, as much as possible, the statement I have to offer to-night; but I stated then and I state now, my belief that the first cause to which you must trace the disorganieatien in that army is to be found in the system we have parsted during a long period of peace. (Hear, hear.) I am not now speaking merely of reductions effected in mon or in votes of money, but of the destruction of the very sources of our military power during the 40 years' peace which followed 1815; and I think I can satisfy yea in a very few words that we have had virtually no army during that time—that we have kept our forces for purposes of police at home and in our colonies rather than for purposes of defence abroad. We have, indeed, maintained our forces in a state of high discipline up to a certain extent of or ganisation, but not beyond it. What I meats—if the house will pardon me for noticing it—is simply this :—English men are people who can do as well, and, perhaps, one's na tural national vanity leads one to think that they can do even better than any other persons, anything whatever that they choose to attempt. But, I ask, what is your English army? It is only a collection of regiments. The internal discipline of those regiments is certainly complete —you have in every company and in every regiment a most perfect regimental system ; and, if you observe, you will led that in the actions that have lately taken place, and in the whole of the campaign during which they have occurred, there has not been the slightest sign of regi aseatal disorganisation. On the contrary, it is admitted on all hands that the relations between the officers and the men—the affection between them, and the confidence the men have shown in the courage and capacity of their officers, have been most admirable, and could not be ex ceeded. All this has been witnessed, although there has been wanting that control over the whole army which you can get only by practice—and you have had no such prac tice. I say, then, in fact, that what you terrn'the English army, has not been an army, bat a collection of regiments. Why, I venture to say that there have been field-officers in command of regiments in the Crimea who, until they went there, unless they had been in India or been quartered in Dublin, never in their lives saw a brigade. What, then, I ask, can you expect from such an army ? You look for a per feat regimentalorganisation, and you succeed in find ing it, but can you expect men who have never seen an army in the field, and are utterly unacquainted with the movements of such a force and with the regulations required for its sup plies and its security—can you expect such persons to be Heaven-born administrators, who can do not only what they have never practised, but what they never even saw done? This is a very important element in the considera tien of the causes of the misfortunes which have occurred to our army abroad. Again look at the composition of your army as regard s th e individual men. In England you have the highest degree of civilisation to be found in the world. As a matter of coarse, therefore, you have the miuutest subdivision of labour; and, from the smallness of the country and the close proximity of different places you have the most rapid communication between your cities and towns. Well, what is the result ? Why, that the English peasant never does anything for himself, as in the case iu less advanced states of society. His house is built for him, and so is his dress and everything ho requires; except in the case of the most remote districts of your em pire, where a few of the peasantry may be found who built their owu cabins and make their own clothes, shoes, and ether articles in a primitive manner. The great subdivieioa of labour consequent on high civilisation offers such faci lities for every man getting everything done for him that a man does not know how to turn if he is thrown upon his own resources and left to shift for himself. I recollect an lion. friend of mine opposite handing me last autumn a letter, with suggestions relating to the clothing of the army to be sent to the Crimea, which I adopted without loss of time; and that letter conoluded, I remember, with a re markable sentence of warning, to the effect that when I had dose all the things that he recommended they would be almost valueless, for the men must suffer through not knowing how to help themselves. An army is a vast and complex maehine, and I raight refer you to the failures that occurred at the commencement of former wars in which England has been engaged. I might also ask you to look at the successive re ductions you have made in the strength of your force, and especially to the dinembodirneut of the militia after 1815— measure which continued until this body was reconstituted for the first time in 1852. I might further point to the de struction of your waggon-train—to the entire destruction of your staff abroad. All those things have boon done year by year under the pressure of economy, without there being a single attempt made (indeed that was thought to, be almost, foreign to a country such as ours) to organise an seas, we are apt to be rebuked by Him at whose breath the stormy tompee? rages, and found that serious losses might be sustained on that element. We have this fertile,. dies,lvautage as regards transport by sea, that we have al most exit; lasted our resources for conveying by steam the articles necessary for the sustenance of our erroy. I should like to state to the house, because it is, perhaps, scarcely aware of it, what amount of transport has been necessary to couvey, not only our men, not only our horses, not only our ammunition, but the food, the provender, and military stores requisite for the maintenance of au army such as ours. And when it is said that these departments of the Government have been slack and remiss in their mode of executing their duty, I think I owe it to the Admiralty tensed this paper to show what au immense power has been put into exercise in order to convey this army and its stores. I find that from the 7th of February, 1851, to the 10th of December, 1854, and from the 11th of December, 1854, to the 22d of January, 1135, that the Admiralty in their own ships or hired transports have conveyed to the East—British troops from England, officers, 2,141 ; men, 51,234; horsos, 5,408 ; provisions from England, 29,261 tens, navy service ; 18,897 tons, army service; 19,135 Ordnance stores; 110,81;7 tuna of coals; 3,320 naval stores, and from Malta 7,189 tons. French troops from Marseilles and Toulon—officers, 556 ; men, 14,055 ; horses, 193 ; stores, 8,037. From Calais to the Baltic—French troops—officers, 437 ; men, 12,888 ; horses, 21 • British stores, navy p ro vision, 9,346 tens ; Ordnance ;toms, 266 tons; naval stores, 247 tons; coals, 47,907 tons ; making a grand total of 3,134 officers, 81,167 men, 5,622 horses, and 254,433 tons of previsions and stores. I have road this statement, for I deem it of im portance that the house should know the description of duties exacted from this department, and to show the extent to which the Admiralty has been able to co-operate with the military department in furnishing these necessary supplies for the sustenance and strengthening of the army. I shall hereafter have occasion to show the charges Made with respect to these - departments, but I will now go back to the point from which I started, which was that if the Government be asked who is to blame that the stores have not been removed from Balaklava to the camp—if we are expected to make a guess as to this in order to put on other men's shoulders and to shift the blame from our selves, the burden of which we have no right to bear, you will be disappointed in your expectations ; for the Go vernment are determined to take no such course. We hare written to the Commander-in-Chief, pointing out the failures which appear to have taken place, drawing his attention to circumstances which have been reported to us, and desiring him to use the supreme powers intrusted to him to displace those men who have shown themselves incompetent, and to replace them by those acting under his eye, who have qualified themselves in the stern school of experience and who have given proofs of their adminis trative ability. It is not in the power of the Government, at this distance and without information, and it would be cowardly and discreditable without certainty, to attempt to throw the blame on men who are absent—who may be accused unjustly, and who, at any rate, are now gallantly , porilling their lives in the service of their country. (Hear.) The hon. and learned member for Sheffield has not quar relled with the Government on a subject which last session was the great object of debate. Then wo had not sent cut mon enough, then we had neglected to form a reserve ; hut I think these discussions showed at least that the 1 Government had seat out a considerable force, and had ' formed a considerable reserve, which, however, I ad mitted had ceased to be a reserve, as it was sent to reinforce the main body of the army. The difficulty now arises to create a reserve, and the Government will ask for powers to form one, and I have no doubt but that they will receive from this hoes' every vote necessary for that purpose. I wish to state that the Government have no wish to conceal any portion of their conduct, but they may have, and they have, strong reasons for refusing to submit to this vote ; but anything that the Government can produce in the way of information, which will show what has or has not been done, the Government are ready to produce. My hen. friend has given notice of what ho desires shall be proelaced, but some part of that informa tion cannot be ()Wailed because it does not exist; but everything without prejudice to individuals that can be got shall be produced. I will add to those of which notice has been given the accounts of ammunition, of which there is said not to have been a safficiency, and also those of food and clothing—l will add all these,for I think there exists in the country a great delusion on these matters, and that it is imagined, because the army is not in posses sion of what it ought to be, that those stores have not left the shores of England. There are some of the statements which have been made so absurd that I should hope they i almost carried their refutation with them. I read in a newspaper the other day a paragraph headed " How the Government provides ammunition," giving an account of the Lancaster guns, the shells of which, it was said, were so small that they would not fit the bore, and there was so much " wind' that it was impossible to fire with accu racy. I, by a great chance, mot with another paragraph in a different paper, headed " The Ordnance again," which stated that the shells sent were much too large, and that the men were engaged in filing them down. Now, if these statements were read by gentlemen who could not read both, they, seeing them in print, might deem them conclusive. I was told the other day that the huts were sent out without nails. I thought this a most ex traordinary statement, and, before I could receive infor mation ou this from official quarters, a gentleman hap pened to come into my room to whom I mentioned this, and he said that, as he was very curious to see the huts stowed, he saw there embarked, and he was particu larly struck, not only with the frames into which they fitted, but also with the way in which every nail and screw appeared almost to be in its proper place. Yesterday I read a statement with respect tothe clothing sent out in which it was stated that it was the custom to send out the coats without the buttons, which were sent with them and sewn on by the soldiers, and that the coats lately despatched to the army were without buttons. In answer to this I may state, in the first place, that it is not the custom te send out coats without buttons, and that the coats sent to the army were completed before they left England. I will not detain the house with a budget of these statements I have tcollected, but I mention these as specimens of the levity with which such charges aro made, and which have not , the slightest foundation in fact. I have statedthe intention of the Government to lay on the table of the house the re i turns, for were I now to go into details as to how many , thousand blankets and coats bad been supplied such a course would be uneatidactory, as I would much sooner 7 pass over these things and lay the necessary documents before the house, and tkey will then be able to judge of the truth of the statement of the insufficiency of the pro- visions made by the Government. The noble lord who sits I am sorry to say, behind me mentioned that one cause of the determination at which he arrived to leave this Go vernment was this—that the War Departments wore not so modified, as to be really effectual for the purpose of the war. The noble lord, I think, objected to the humble indi vidual who is now addressing you being charged with the moving of the army estimates in this house, for he thought the office ef the Secretary at War ought to be confined to the Secretary of State. Ties house will recollect in the dis cussions which took place last session that 'stated my views as to the manner in which these departments ought to be reorganised and consolidated, and at the same time I stated the opinion I entertained as to the position ' held by the Secretary at War. I stated that the office ought not to be held by one who was a Cabinet Minister, but that his duties ought to be confined simply to the finan cial details of the army. I stated also that at the moment the Government should be enabled to make arrangements by which these departments could be put on a better and 1 sounder footing I was not the man te stand iu the way, and that I would readily and gladly give up the office I now hold. (Hear.) When I pressed this matter on the 1 attention of the Earl of Aberdeen I stated that I was per fectly willing to resign the office which I held, for I felt— an opinion which I bad expressed, and which I still adhere to - that some change was necessary, and I felt that I ought to lose no time in redeeming the pledge which I had made. I consulted same of my colleagues on this matter, and among others the noble lord the member for Tiverton, and I told him my feeling as to qu itting the office I now hold in the Government in the event of any change—if it should be merged or so altered in its character that I could not hold it. The noble lord gave me his opinion with great friendliness, and with sincerity, I hope, and said that were he Secretary of War he should think its combination with j that of Seeretary at War would impose so large an amount of business that it would be impossible that a single man could perform it, and urged that I would not take the course centemplated—that of placing my resignation in the hands of Lord Aberdeen. I cannot say that I have seen any reason to change the opinion I stated as to the neces sity of a complete remodelling of the War Department. You want some person to conduct the finance of the army, another for the provisioning of the army, another for the arming of the army, and again, the commander-in-chief to maintain and conduct the business of the army ; these are the persons who should form a board, over which the Secretary of State, the chief Minister for the War Depart ment, should preside, and from whom the others should receive instructions, and to whom they should make reports of the progress made in carrying out his will. I understand, speaking generally, that this was a view shared in by all the members of the Govern ment, and answers, with the difference of the Financial Alinister, to that mentioned by the Duke of Richmond. What you want in these departments is a division of labour, and to secure among the subordinates the complete subordination of all to one common head. It was with this view that the noble duke the Secretary of State has for some time past been leaving meetings of all i different heads of the departments—sitting together to receive instructions and to make suggestions—bringing any business which they had not tie power singly to perform, and to receive instruc tion in the presence of each other, ro that each might know exactly what the other was doing. The object of this was to combine all the means in their power to attain ono cons- mon object. Minutes ware taken at these meetings, copies of which were sent to the principal members of the Go vernment. At every fresh meeting the minutes of the last were read, and reports were made as to the progress of the works in hand. The noble lord behind me said ho differed from me as to the constitution of this board; but I did not know at the time, neither do I at this moment, the amount of the difference of opinion between us. I have mentioned this, because it is alleged that the Government did not intend, and have not taken any steps to make alterations in these departments. I may also add that in the autumn the Commissariat Department was removed the e c h n i o e t f h Minister of te W rn m a k % c II I ! b ir i i g 5 from the con t ro l o f th e T rea sury, and placed under that of essaiiitel,oehsoswaryevfeorr, carry ingtthheatyou s g a r n e y a r d a i c fti ti e c t a il l t c ie h s an ar g e e s s e .. A t T t a h k e e on of th e war —th a t you have not been able to make cotaahemeonasceemoefnttheef o o p rd er m a a t u ie o n e: which found that they could not supply a saffisient num ber of shells fitted with fuses for the work in hand. An officer of engineers received instructions from the Secre tary of State, and organised a factory out of his own re , sources, in Which any quantity of this delicate work can be executed at considerable saving to the country. With regard to the waggon corps, of which it has been stated there was a great want, I do not think it was organised till the later years of the war under the Duke of Wellington, who farmed it himself. It gradually baggage° dwin dled down, ahol t s he year d. after A ii c t lea t i li e r p 1 5832 cannot °l 18 b 3 e kept it w i a n s a state of great efficiency during a time of pe a c e . You fcoalili owedno t havehy theiryou r train regiments o f saddles while you have your railways to c o n ve y them in a short time to their de s tination. The Government , however, felt the necessi ty animals not only of providing the wagg on cor p s, and com menced buying along the coast of the with place on to i p ,ck e . south of France, but in Spain, Tunis , Egyp t, and where ver they were likely to find horses or mule s ada p ted for their . purpose. The Duke of Newcastle has organised a corps, and I sea from accounts in the newspaper; that fresh sup- Plied of baggage animals are arriving at Balaklava, and I have every reason te hope that when this establishment is pat en a thorough good footing by an experienced officer who discharged the same duty for Sir Charles Napier we shall find that it will not be possible for our army to fall into the same state in which it has been. I believe the commissariat in the Crimea has been overburdened with work, and that their duties ought to be confined to the pro viding of provisions, and not, as hitherto, to its transport likewiee. The Duke of Newcastle has also established a staff corps fur the purpose of providing a police for the army. This was sent out some time ago, and is working 1 satisfactorily. He is engaged in forming an hospital staff, which will, I believe, be the means of redressing ono of the most crying grievances of the army, by stipplyiug the want of a permanent staff attached to the hospitals, instead of trusting to those mon passing through the hospitals. It is impossible for anything to be worse than the system - that has hitherto been pursued in this respect. I trust that by adopting a sounder ene ' copied from that of our a lli es, nur hospitals will be placed in a more efficient state than they have ever yet been. The naval transports are said to have been numerically insufficient for the transaction of the business required of them, without being subjected to a strain which ought not to be put upon that service. My right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty will explain the alterations intended to bo made, in order to produce an efficient transport service and to enablethem to grasp a busi ness as comprehensive as that which has of late been thrust upon them. The moment that it came to the knowledge of the Government that errors arose from the way of stowing the ships—by the overcrowding of one ship aid then shifting the carve to another—a committee was appointed to examine) into the cause, to trace out the de linquents, and to lay down a c le a r and simple system by which the recurrence of these errors would be prevented. to last autumn, when the Government read accounts Allowing the incompetency of the medical staff, they sent out a commission to inquire into the cause, but they did eat intrust this to medical men only. They desired to have a searching investigation, and they connected with the commission gentlemen independent of the medical pro fession, and who had no interest in screening its errors ; unconnected also with this department' of the Government, and having no interest in screening its shortcomings. They received instructions to probe the investigation to the ut most, to obtain the truth and to expose it without mercy. At the same time they received instructions, in order that no precious time might be lost, to report as they went on —to make every practical suggestion they deemed it desir able to adopt; and instructions were given also to •the heads of the hospitals at Scutari, and to Lord Raglan, to adopt such suggestions on hearing the' reasons for them. I hope shortly to lay the results of these inquiries before the house, and, what is of more importance, the steps taken in consequence of them. I have stated, I fear at some length, details which must be wearisome to the house, but, having done that, I wish to ask the hones what is its intention with regard to the motion before it? Do you propose to a committee upstairs of 15 gentlemen no less a subject of consideration than the condition of the army before Sebastopol, and the conduct of the departments at home who have the management of that army? I will take the last case first, and I ask, supposing yon carried this motion—supposing there was to be found a Govern ment which would submit to Buchan inquiry—what would be the effect of the appointment of the committee upon these departments, and what would be its ulti mate effect upon that army whose safety, of course, is our principal object ? I apprehend that if you refer to the committee the inquiry of how those departments are to be re-modelled and consolidated, how their authority is to be made subservient to one supreme authority, the Govern . ment must, until the committee have decided what they will recommend, abstain front carrying into effect their own measures, and wait until some blueLbook comes out ' in August, to tho recommendations of which they can give practical effect. How would the committee get at their , information ? Would they examine the men charged with. the execution of the measures into which they are in quiring, or get the opinions of those men at second-hand ? The members of the Government are, atthis moment, more conversant:than a committee can be with the deficiencies of the machinery they have been called on to work; they know its weak places, they know what are the remedies that' should be applied, they have a clear object in view, and they are ready to carry it out; but a committee must hear evidence and counter-evidence, must sift that evidence backwards and forwards. and, after a long delay, mv.st come probably to the same conclusion, having interpeeed the delay of a whole session for the purpose of doing by their authority what ought to'be done by the authority of • the Government. But what will be the effect' of the in quiry upon the departments themselves ? We know what it is to subject the conduct of any department to a 'com mittee. The head of that department, with other members of the Government in this house, must attend to conduct his defence. What time would be left to the members of the Government to adminis'aer to the army, to carry on the measures necessary for the prosecution of the war, if their time were to be taken up in a committee-room of the House of Commons, answering questions, producing returns, and endeavouring to defend themselves from the attacks made against them in the committee. For all purposes of action, the Government would bei pa ralysed during the time the inquiry lasted. What would be its effect upon the army? How do you intend to examine into the condition of the army ? Do you intend to sand commissioners to Sebastopol to inquire into the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief like those whicin the Directory sent to General annouriee, or to send out mem bers such as were sent by the Dutch Senate to contml the Duke of Marlborough ? You will not do that. Them, do you intend to bring home officers from Sebastopol to give accounts to the committee of the condition of the army ? Those are the duties of the Commander-in-Chief and of the executive Government. If the Commander-in-Chief is in capable of performing them he ought to be recalled ; :and if the Government are convinced of his incapacity they are guilty of a crime in not recalling him; but they would o.lso be guilty of a crime if they jumped at that conclusion without evidence and without proof, and disgust the ar my by committing a gross injustice and sacrificing a man for the unworthy purpose of placing on his shoulders the bla me that the House of Commons wished to place on the shoul ders of the Government. There may be Governments who have shielded themselves under proceedings like that, but this Government is not capable of such conduct, and, if it were, I for one would not remain a member of it for one hour. If you intend to carry this motion you intent to paralyse the action of the Government at home and of the army abroad. for it is impossible for a commander-in-chief and his officers to act freely when they know that there is ajury sitting on their ovory action, and that there are wit nesses misrepresenting their conduct whom they have net the immune of answering. You will also inspire the army with disgust at their commander, so that, in whatever way L you put it, the inquiry is objectionable, because either you fail is getting your information, or if yon get it, you do so • at the expense of the efficiency of the array. I cannot con ceive by what arguments you can justify this motion. Yon may say,—here is a case of (duster, of great sickness and mortality in the army, and we think the Government are to blame for it; but, if that is what you think, the Go vernment ought to bear the punishment. You cannot mean to inquire into the mode of conducting the business of a de partment, or to enter into a pedantic disquisition as to the duties of this or that office ; for, depend upon it, you must look not so much to the form of the office as to the energy and will of the man who holds it. It is your duty, if you entertain that opinion of the Government, not to institute inquiries which may be prolonged to the dog days, but fearlessly to say, " You, the men conducting this war, are unfit for your posts—(Opposition cheers)—you are con ducting it•in a manner discreditable to yourselves, and, what is much more important, destructive to the best in terests of the country ; we will, therefore, put you out of the Government, and we will substitute for you those in whose capacity and integrity we have more confidence." (Hear, hear.) I am perfectly willing to abide by that test; but I ask the house, if they have made up their minds to take that course, to avow it manfully, and at once. There is no disguising the fact that this Government has existed for a long period without what may be termed genuine party support ; it has, consequently, been sub jected to defeats upon cross motions of every description, and, no doubt, its strength and efficiency have been greatly impaired. The Government has also been exposed to much obloquy and calumny. Some people have said it should despise obloquy and calumny, but, howeyer the calumniator may be despised, no Government in a country like this can afford to despise the calumny. With con stant repetition it has its effect upon the character of pub lic men, as this Government has found by that course being recklessly and unscrupulously pursued. But the Government now stands in a situation much more preca rious than it did. Wo cannot deny that a Government already weak has received a heavy lelo.v by'the secession from its ranks of a man whose talents, character, and ante cedents make him in every way the first man in this house, and give him a personal influence over it that no one else possesses. I lament that secession for the sake of the Go vernment, for the sake of the public service ; and I hope the noble lord, who has treated me since I have been his colleague with a confidence and kindness I shall ever grate fully recollect, will pardon me for saying, for his own smite, I do not think that this is a moment when any servant of the Crown ought to leave the public service, the emergency being so serious; but I feel the full weight of the loss of the noble lord, and on account of that loss, I ask the house, above all things, for a plain, rapid, and intelli gent decision as to our ourselves. You have negotiations of the greatest importance pending, the state of things in the Crimes requires constant and daily action, you require both for the negotiations and for the purpose of carrying on the war measures to be at once directed and carried into effect, and the suspension of all the functions of the Go vernment which necessarily takes place when its existence is staked on a vote of the Howse of Commons, of which no one can say what will be the result, is most fatal to the public service. What I ask is a decision at once and in plain language upon this point. It is indifferent to me in what shape it comes, but I should regret to see such a mo tion as this carried, for I do not want a precedent to be set for transferring to committees upstairs the functions and prerogatives of the Crown, and I wish the Executive to be respected by this house, as well as to see it respect the decisions of the house. Each has its own peculiar functions, which cannot trench upon one another without injury to the public service. I hope the house will con sider well the course it is about to pursue. There are great perils surrounding this country, it is a moment of breath less anxiety, and it does become the senate of the nation clearly to express its intention as to what men it will in trust with the management of the difficult and delicate affairs that are now in progress. With these feelings, I express my intention of voting against the motion of the hon. and learned gentleman. I have endeavoured as shortly as I could to vindicate the Government from the charge of having knowingly and with their eyes open suffered our gallant army to perish. I have oven, by the last mail, received accounts of a re - distribution of ground, by which the work and labour to be borne by our soldiers will be much decreased, and of the arrival of baggage animals, which, I trust, may facilitate the carrying up to our army of the clothes and provisions necessary for its very existence. It is necessary for that army and for the country that a speedy and distinct decision should be taken as to th stability or the termination of the Government which now holds the reins of power, but which ought not to hold them if it cannot use them effectually. It is time that the House of Commons should decide upon this point. We are ready to abide by their decision ; but, I say again, let that decisi o n b e pl a i n an d intelligible, and, above all things, let it be speedy. (Hear, hear.) Mr. H. DRUMMOND—The right hon. gentleman shall understand, at least from me, plainly and intelligibly, that I do impute it to the gross incompetence of seine man or men that an event has occurred without a parallel in history; that an army, three times victorious, has been left to perish, to be utterly destroyed, by the incom- • petence of those who ought to have supported it. The whole 'country is in wrath with somebody, but no ono seems to know who that somebody should be. (Hear.) That is the plain question we want to have answered. Is • this wrath confined to one party, or is there not a burst of indignation front ono end of the kingdom to the other? Is it net re-echoed from Germany and from France ? Is it not asked in all their papers, what can the English Govern ment be composed of ? And was ever such cruelty exhi bited towards men as that with which they have treated their army? I should have thought the right hon. gen tlemen themselves would be the very first to thank us for coming forward and asking for information. I am not r content to throw the blame on a Government. I can un- I derstand that it is very decent and proper and right for all the gentlemen sitting there. to put themselves forward • in order to screen their subordinates ; but it is not satis factory to us. Does any one mean to say that it is the fault of the right hon. gentleman that the army is ( starving? No; but it is the fault of the Govefnment. army for any purpose in the held. Well, a few years age the nation was startled by the appearance of a letter from a great authority—the greatest military authority this country ever saw. The Duke of Wellington addressed his celebrated letter to Sir John Burgoyne, protesting against the defenceless state in which England was placed. Sub seqaently to this, and even prior to it, great efforts were made to increase the steam navy which we now possess, the creation of which began some 10 years ago, and an augmentation was likewise made to our army. Bat the Government of Lord Derby restored that great source of military power—the militia—which had been lying dor mant for so long a period. While all this was taking place, our commerce and our wealth, and consequently our means of supporting our national establishments, were simulta neously increasing. We had, at the same time, a growing demand for the services of those establishments. Our colonies were rising into empires, Australia was fast be coming one of the most important possessions, and our dominion had extended in other parts of the globe scarcely l simple s e i sn the ee important.tohp,,itnij its sit p af c o th w i co , eia t .c h a a gu t e bnatbeingße gentlemen geu s n e i r , teh l da w tw a wi nt t ahro t ui o st know a if a the l least ss i o t t difficulty and at a moment's notice? Just look at the different occasions on which we have commenced war. I don't know of any instance in which England has been plunged into war in which she has not met with reverses. Be former cases differ from the present in this, that we haVe to set against misfortunes of this description great military successes. If I were to read to the house the accounts a hich the Duke of Wellington gave of the state of his array after the retreat from Burgos yon would recognize complaints very similar in terms to those we now see in the public press; but complaints 10t arising as soon after the beginning of the war, but at a period subsequent to that, and even after the army was guided by the greatest military genies of his day. Take a later case. When our expedition was sent into Affghenis tan the mortality in the army was frightful. Again, the expedition that went under General Godwin into Burmah suffered from a rate of mortality amounting to 48 per cent. I sincerely wish I could draw up a more favourable state ment than I can do regarding our army now in the East, because, I grieve to say that, since I was asked at the com mencement of the session what number of our men had fallen by disease or the sword, the mortality has nearly doebled, and the drain now going on in the army under Lord Raglan, amounts, unfortanately, to nearly 14 per cent. I said I would net quote letters that I have re ceived, stating that in some portions of the army there is a very degree of efficiency, because there is a very different degree of comfort ; for I apprehend that every one in this house knows perfectly well that the sufferings of the men have been proportionate to the distance of their encamp ment from that port, which was describes by the hon. and ' learned gentleman as choked with stores, food, clothes, and the means of shelter, sufficient for a body of troops twice their number ; and that it has not been the want of those provisions or stores, but the impossibility of moving them from Balaklava up to the camp which has constituted the difficulty. I have received a letter from a gentleman who has been engaged on a commission which we sent out some time back to inquire into the state of the medical department and hospitals, both at Constantinople and in the Crimea, and he puts the case in this way. After de scribing the condition of affairs there, he says, " Your Government has sent out plenty of everything ; hey have sent it 3,000 miles, but the distance is 3,00 i ; and the last six miles are more difficult than the first 3,000." I believe that this is a true representation of the state of things. You will ask me what is the cause of that defi ciency? (Hear, hear.) Well, in discussing that point the house must make allowances for the great diffioulty that had to be encountered there, as also for the circum stanco that at this distance from the scene we cannct be fully informed of the real state of the me. We know that before the army left Varna there was a collection of ani mals amounting to about 5,000 with the expedition. Since then the cavalry horses and many of the artillery horses have died from exposure to the col} and want of food, and this at a time when it was said that there was forage to great amounts in the harbour of Balnklava. Now, I have an extract here pretty well describing what happened in the Crimea before a certain date. It states : " Before the middle of August there were in the six regi ments of English cavalry 1,000 men dismounted, and the horses of 700 others were unserviceable. The baggage ani mals died, the artillery cattle were scarcely able to drag the ' guns, and one-third of the reserve ammunition was given over to the Spaniards because the ammunition carts were required for the conveyance of the sick, the number of which daily in creased." The sentence applies strongly, I apprehenl to Balaklava and Sebastopol, as it describes the destruction of horses, the impossibility of obtaining ammunition. It then goes on further to describe tho state to which the Light Bri ga le had boon reduced : " These troops (the Light Brigade), which only three weeks before had traversed 60 miles in a single march, wore now with difficulty, and after many halts, able to reach the heights, although only four miles from the camp, and the sides of the mountain were covered with the caresses of many hundred animals who dicd . in the effort." The extract proceeds : " The loss of the British army in September was consider able. Above 2,500 men had died of sickness or fallen into tie enemy's hands. 1,5'41 horses had perished from want, exclusive of those lost in battle. To fill the cup of disaster, fever and diarrhoea, assailing bodies which fatigue and bad nourishment had already predisposed to disease, made fright ful Dysentry, the scourge of armies, raged, and in a short time many thousand men died in the hospitals." Now, all this was not written by Lord Raglan detailing bow his army was situated—it was written in the year 1809, to describe the state of the British army after the battle of Talavera ; and I quote it because it tallies with singular exactness with the precise amount of our losses in each par ticular arm of the service now. It is, as I said before, difficult to see where the fault originated. It is sometimes stated that wo have " the command of the seas"—that was the popular expression ; •and it was said—" You might as easily supply y our men before Sebastopol as you could sup ply them at home." But when we talk of commanding the Does any one say that it is the fault of the noble lord No ; but it is that of the Government. - Why did ti noble lord retire? Because he has not yet been - able Belie factorily to ascertain upon whom the fault rests. My right hon. friend has completely evaded the question. I thought his speech the other night most conclusive for his own defence ; the only fault I find with it is, that it was too clever. It showed him to be a very eloquent man. Eloquence is a fine art, the sister of poetry and painting, and there is a strong family likeness. The consequence was, that when we got the speech in plain black and white before us, many thin g s appeared very dif ferent to what they were before they had been translated. There was ne doubt as to the propriety of sending trews to Varna, for the assistance, as was said, of " the Turks and civilization," although how the troops got together I know not. (A. laugh.) Varna lies on the road from Rus sia to Constantinople, and it was very natural to plant an army there ; bat, to my infinite astonishment, I found, after the army had arrived there, that one of the essentials of an army—namely, a waggon train, had been wholly for gotten, and it now turns out that the Duke of Newcastle, having sent the army there in September—having always intended to send it there—just discovered—three weeks ago—that a waggon train was necessary, and accordingly telegraphed to Cal. Macuaurdoc to come over, who, I be lieve, remained here for three weeks. Mr. S. HERBERT said, a waggon train did exist, but it was under the commissariat until the alteration to which the kou. gentleman referred had been made. Mr. H. DRUAIMOND—The army remained for a con siderable time in that un'aealthy place Varna, no one knows why. Sending an army without a waggon train is like send*.ng a ship to sea without masts or steam, But I am not going to enter into the military question. I shall take the vurgeirest-looking view of the whole subject, for I think that if there had been sense enough in the Govern ment to manage a private commercial concern, they would have got over this wonderful seven miles. There is ne doubt that my right hon. friend has fully discharged his duty, that he has seat out articles liberally and lavishly, and we shall have to pay a lavish bill for them ; but the ' persons for whom we bought, and to whom we sent them, never got them—that is the point. The Duke of Newcastle refused to allow officers of cavalry regiments to take their four horses, because " Colonel Kinloch was gone to buy mules in Spain." Well, Col. Kinloch did buy mules in Spain. I believe that, for three months after they were bought, they remained in Spain, and I do not know whether they have ever been sent out at all. The inquiry we wish to make is as to how these things came about. How was it, again, that the Commander-in-Chief did not give the Duke of Newcastle a hint that he had forgotten the waggon trains ? Does the Duke of Newcastle ever go to a friend's to dinner by railway? If so, does he not ascertain before he arrives at the station whether his f r ie n d w ill sen d hi s I carriage to carry him the odd two miles to his house ? If not, that two miles may lose him his dinner in the same way that the odd seven miles in the Crimea have lost the army their dinner. But this is still more remarkable. Only last spring Lord Hardinge issued an order directing L each man to carry in his kitailb. less' than before, ' pro mising that that 3.31. b. should be carried at the public ex pense. Could not Lord Hardinge have asked the Duke of Newcastle whether he had any means of carrying these baggages ? We may remember, too, the debates in the House of Lords, in which Lord Ellenborongh distinctly alluded to the question of waggon trains, and pointed out either their distance from the scene of action or their in efficiency. But I now pass on to the most extraordinary thine. I lest sight of the army for a time, when on a sudden I found that it had left Varna and gone to the Crimea. What appeared so extraordinary to me was, the war being understood for the defence of Turkey, that her Majesty's Ministers, this house, and the whole country, should think that the defence of Turkey and the invasion of the territory of Russia was one and the same thing. At the end of the last war the Government desired the Duke of Wellington to draw up a statement upon the mili tary power of Russia, its power of aggression upon Europe, and its means of defence. The duke did so, and we never heard or thought more of it until he came into office many years afterwards, when he found that the Governments of Austria, Bavaria, and Prussia had ob tained the same kind of information, and the three re ports were lying in some office in this country. They all agreed upon this point, that however Russia might bluster she could do nothing in the way of attacking the rest of Europe ; but that all the other powers of Europe would perish in an attempt to attack Russia. This ap peared to me a very string reason against our proceeding as we did. But it was more extraordinary that the army should have been sent to the Crimes, without any of the necessary information. The right hon. gentlemen said the other night that Lord Raglan had been directed to procure the best information. They had written to Lord Raglin to procure information ! Why, it reminds me of the Chinese proclamation—" Sound the gongs, and drive the barbarians into the sea." (A. laugh.) Writing to Lord Raglan did not give him the information he wanted. Why did you not make our ambassador at Constantinople procure that information for you before you went to the Crimea ? (Cheers.) My right hon. friend has alluded to a letter that I troubled him with, bat I also forwarded him a letter re lative to a person who was thoroughly master of the lan guage, and who offered his services to the Government to procure information for them. The right hon. gentleman gave me a civil answer, and the person was not employed. (A laugh.) I know that Lord Stratford was asked for this information in 1553, and that a relation of mine was sent to Lord Stratford, and recommended to him a person who spoke the whole of the languages of the country. Lord Stratford was implored to send this person to the Crimea to obtain information. Instead of which, the army was sent with no knowledge either of the fortifications or the country, the force in the town of Sebastopol itself, or the Russian force in the Crimea. I say this was a most rash and ill-considered proceeding, and that the thing wanted was the information which the Government had refused to take measures to obtain. It is all very fine now to talk about despising calumny. The only doubt I have is, whe ther there has not been toomuch leaning on the part of the Government in the direction of the newspapers—(hear)— and whether, if it had not been for the newspapers, that expedition to Sebastopol would ever have been sent. You did net know, as 1 have said, the nature of the soil, the extent of the fortifications, the number of men in the place, or the disposition of the inhabitants ; and so ill-in formed have you been, and so ill-informed has Lord Raglan been, that while the German newspapers—no doubt instructed by the Russian Ministers in those States—have from time to time published statements detailing the num ber of reinforcements sent by the Emperor of Russia into the Crimea, Lord Raglan had ne knowledge whatever of . the arrival of those reinforcements. The diplomatic de partment ought to have supplied this kind of information, and the Ministers at Berlin and other places ought to be asked what they have been about to neglect this informa tion. I should like also, to know the truth about the opinions of officers highly placed relative to the amount of force necessary for this expedition. It has been stated by the friends of Marshal St. Arnaud that it was his opinion that it was impossible to expect success unless the fortress of Sebastopol was invested by an army of 50,000 men, with another army of 50,000 besides to protect the be siegers. I should like to know whether other commanders did not share that opinion. I remember hearing that a strong opinion was expressed by an officer high in our ser vice, who was engaged in the expedition, that the force which invested Sebastopol was not sufficient. In the last edition of a work by Sir H. Douglas, I find Sir H. Douglas is of opinion that to invade the Crimea and lay siege to Sebastopol with the force at our command was a desperate and daring operation, and that it was undertaken contrary to the judgment of an eminent engineer officer, whose opi nion ought to have been taken. But while it would not be difficult to prove that several persons of high authority thought the force sent to the Crimea wan insufficient, the course I shall pursue is to give the Government everything they ask in order to carry on the war, strongly objecting to your whole proceedings from beginning to end. The landing of the troops in the Crimea was, I admit, a well effected and creditable operation. (Hear, hear.) It was, indeed, considering the extent of the force to be landed, a most wonderful thing, and people who think that the landing of such an army upon a hostile shore is as easy a thing as going down to a whitebait dinner at Greenwich know very little of the difficulties of such an undertaking. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) I then come to the case of the artillery. Now, did you intend to invade Russia or not ? If you did wliy was there no proper siege artillery ready ? (Hear.) Only this morning I received a lettbr from an officer in the army, who says :—" There was not one single 13-inch mortar for the first two months of the siege." Then, again, why was no provision made for hospital accommodation ? There were neither hospitals at Bala klava nor at Scutari. And here, again, I wish to attribute no blame to my right hon. friend. He has done admirably in sending 10,000 beds, but I do not believe they are put up yet at Scutari. Part are at one place and part at another ; like the Minie rifles, which were sent to one plaee,while the ammunition was sent to another. Why was there net a supercargo on board the Government vessels, who had con- ' mend of the things on board, and who knew what ought to be left at each place at which the vessel stopped ? There were provisions without end at Balaklava, but the army could not get them because no one had the order to give them out. (Hear, hear.) The commissariat has been, as they_say, iu the hands of the Treasury. Lord Aberdeen was the head of the Treasury, and was it possible that the whole feeding of the army was intrusted to Lord Aberdeen and the clerks of the Treasury ? No wonder, if so, that the troops could not get anything to eat. I have received a letter from an officer in the Guards. The hon. member proceeded to read the letter, which stated that the writer met the colonel of his regiment with a pair of saddlebags upon his horse, with which he was going to Balaklava to draw tallow candles for his men, which, it was stated in a general order, would be issued for their use. They went together to the stores, where they were told that there was not a tallowcandle in all Balaklava. Another general order was issued that any regiment might have potatoes on application. Down the writer'went to Balaklava, but none could he get for his meth, although tons of potatoes at Balaklava were beginning to decay. Sooner than throw them overboard, the French soldiers got them for nothing. Why, then, the writer asked, were these general orders given to isms potatoes and candles, except to humbug the people of England ? The men, too, he added, were one year in arrears of clothing. It had been at Scutari for months, and it had been pro mised to be brought up, but it was there still, and the men were in rags. The writer of this letter says this sort of thing has been caused by the country's neglect. I say it has been caused solely by Ministerial incompetence. (Cheers.) So, again, the militia clothing has been delayed, until the tailors have lost 10,0,_0/., because Lori Her dingo could not settle the cut of those ridiculous German postboys' coats. (A. laugh.) An order was sent to Gibral tar for the men there to practise with the Minis ride. But from the day on which the order was given, until a few weeks ago, I understand there was not a Minie rifle to be got there. With regard to this Mini, rifle, I believe that Mr. Westley Richards went to an enormous expense, and incurred a great deal of trouble, to perfect it. After a wearisome delay, one of the specimens was selected, and what did the Government do? They sent it to Lee to ba manufactured, and there they also manufacture Minie rifles forthe Emperor of Russia. Upon inquiry, I find that Mr. Filder is still at the head of the catimissariat at Sebastopol, who was the man that Sir Thomas Picton wanted to hang. (Laughter.) When the w oo d e n hut s were first talked about the Duke of Newcastle was asked hew they were to be got up from Balaklava to the camp? " Oh," says lie, " the men can draw them up." They are already overworked by other duty, and it has been calcu lated that it would take the labour of 2,500 men for three weeks to draw them to the camp. By the last accounts it was stated that some of them had arrived, but that they were being harried up by two planks at a time upon mulea the planks being burnt up for firewood as they arrived, from the unlikelihood of the rest ever following them. The want of shoes and other clothing has been disgraceful, and these details we can only get'at by a committee of this house, which I therefore think ought to be granted. (Hear, hear.) The original fault, from the beginning, I take not to be so much a single fault as an aggregation of faults, arising from your having despised your enemy too much. (Hear, hear, hear.) Whatever the honour able member for the West Riding may say, his talk about crumpling upßussialike a sheatof paper ran through the country, and people thought that Russia was a little, foolish, second-rate rower, which you had the means of was in the Cabinet made any distinct proposal, of which i I am aware, for the better prosecution of th e war, which had been rejected, and on the rejection of which ho was entitled to say that he could not continue to be responsible for measures of which he disapproved,—on Tuesday even ing last, after having appeared in this house, and having given notice of motions which he had to make in his capa city cf President of the Council, writes to tho noble lord at the head of the Government, tenders his re signation upon the simple ground that ho is una b le t o re sist the motion of the lion. and learned member for Shef field. If, as I have said before, my noble friend's resigna tion was founded upon the objection of the First Lor d of the Treasury to adopt the chan g e which he had proposed in the War Department, I think he would have done better to have repeated that reason in the letter in which he ten dered his resignation. That would have given the noble earl at the head of the Government the opportunity of re coil- idering the proposal, and the reasons on which it was founded, and if he had declined to adopt it, and my noble friend had still continued of opinion that this was a sine qua non change which he had proposed, then his resigna tion would have been placed on grounds to which it ap pears to me nobody could in reason have taken any objec tion. Bat I mast say that I think the noble lord's col leagues are entitled, not only to feel regret at the loss of so great, so eminent, and so influential a member of the Government and of this house, but they are entitled also to say that that loss occurred ' to them in a manner in which, according to usual practice, they were not jas tided in expecting it. (Hear.) - With regard, therefore, to the circumstances under which my noble friend has quitted office, I feel bound to state that I think the hasty and pre cipitate manner in which he tendered his resignation was a departure from the ordinary practice, and was a mea sure, I sin hardly say of Alai the Government had a right to complain, but which, at least, they were not j usti fied in expecting. Having stated thus much on this part of the subject, I shall abstain from any further remarks with regard to it. I can assure my noble friend that, in making this critieism upon the course he has pursued, I (heti'', and not from any do it from a strong sense of un friendly feeling towards him. " Hear," from Lord J. Russell.) I entirely agree with the opinion expressed by the noble lord towards the close of his address, that, who ever may be charged with the management of the war in future will feel it his duty, as far as his functions go, to conduct the war with vigour and energy, with a view to a successful result. Undoubtedly I concur in that view, and her Majesty's Government have felt it their duty, notwithstanding the loss which they have sustained by the secession of the noble lord, not to ran away from the motion which is to come on this evening. They have felt that it would have been a disgraceful eight if they ,had not determined to meet that motion. We stand as we are, minus the loss of the noble lord (laugh ter), and without any other change. We are ready to meet the motion as we stand, and if should be car ried, as of course may ensue, it is unnecessary for nee to say what the result will be. (" Hear," and a laugh.) If, in the course of the debate, reasons should be urged against the motion, of sufficient weight to induce the house to re ject it, why then it will lie for her Majesty's Government to consider what course they will pursue with regard to their composition for tie future. (A. laugh.) This, how ever, we say, that whoever may be the person charged with the conduct of this war, it must be conducted in the man ner described by the noble lord—in accordance with the public feeling of the country, and with all the energy and vigour of which tho Government is capable. (Hear, hear.) If it be so conducted, I concur with my noble friend that this war cannot fail of being brought to a successful issue. We have for us, not only the unanimous and enthusiastic feeling of the British nation, but we hare also the cordial persistence and co-operation of our great ally, the Em peror of the French, and the French nation. (Hear.) I must say that ono of the most magnificent spectacles which history has ever presented to mankind is to see these two great nations uniting their efforts in so noble and glorious a cause. We have often seen in former times two great Powers united and co-operating for the purposes of injustice, in the pursuit of further conquest, and for tho destruction of the independence of nations ' • but this is the first time in the history of mankind in which we have seen two great nations, co-operating cordially and earnestly as onelPower in support of a cause honourable to both. (Hear, hear.) It must be evident, therefore, that if' the energies of this country are directed, in co-operation with those of the French nation, by a Government which knows the value of the instruments it possesses, and which appreciates the objects it has in view, my noble friend will prove a true prophet, and the war will be conducted to an honourable and safe peace—a peace which will secure not only the dignity of the country, but the independence and future tranquillity of Europe. (Cheers.) THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. Mr. ROEBUCK then rose to bring forward the motion of which he had given notice, to the following effect :—" That a select committee be appointed to inquire into the condi tion of our army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army." The hen. and learned gentleman said,—ln bringing forward the motion which stands on the paper in my name, I must, in the first place, beg the kind indulgence of the house to aid in some degree my physical inability. (Hear.) The queAioa itself is so serious that it requires no apology. , We have sent from this country an army the mast unparalleled in its efficiency and in its numbers that ever left this coast; which has by its deeds not only maintained but enhanced the glory of its country—(cheers)—and it now appears by the askaow lodgment of the noble lard this evening that this army, by the neglect of the Government at home, has been reduced to a condition that wrings the heart of the nation. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, I say, Sir, when I consider the ditties of this house, what they are, and how they are to be sin. ployed, I think the question which I am about to bring forward requires no apology. (Hear.) But, when I ad dress myself to the question itself, I cannot but regret I what has fallen from the noble lord this evening. The noble lord says that he was unable, as a Minister of the Crown, to resist this motion. He says that the hous e ought to exercise its inquisitorial duties with regard to this question, and in the same breath he says that he will not support the motion either by his speech or his vete, thus neglecting that which, as a patriot, he ought to per forms. (Hear, hear,) He ought to forget private affec tions and personal regards when he considers not only that an army of England is at stake, but also that the very existence of the country is in jeopardy. Deserted, then, by the noble lord, but maintained, as I believe, by the inherent value of the question itself, I shall boldly ad dress myself to that which I have to propose to the house. The question naturally divides itself into two parts—first, what is the condition of our army before Sebastopol ; and, next, how has that condition been brought about ? Now, sir, it appears to me, as the noble lord himself has con fessed to-night, that about the condition of the army there cannot be two opinions. They are without shelter, with out clothes, without food, and without ammunition. That is the condition to which they have been reduced, as I be lieve, by the incapacity of those whose duty it was to mi ' nister to their wants. (Hear.) We have nothing before us to make us believe that the position of the Govern ' ment as regards the army is in the slightest degree changed, The incapacity that has brought about this result still continues to govern—(hear, hear)—therefore, all I have to do is to submit to this house that inquiry is requisite as to the causes that have brought about this state of misery in which the army now exists, and when I have done that I think I shall have done my duty to this house. Now, sir, it may be thought necessary that I should say something as to the state of tho army new before Sebastopol. I beg, first of all, however, to say that with the military part of the question I have no concern; as to the expedition to the Crimea I am unable to judge. I am no soldier; but as to the conduct of those whose duty it wan to minister to the wants of that army, when so placed, I think this house is able to judge, and, as a member of this house, I think I am bound to pass a judgment on this matter. Now, sir, the first question I have to inquire into as to the number of soldiers before Sebastopol. I think it is pretty well ascertained that we have sent from the shores of this country 54,000 soldiers, equipped as we have never equipped soldiers before, who have done all they could to support the honour and glory of this country. I want to know what has become of those 54,00 e soldiers 1 It appears, from the best information, that there are now not more than 14,000 mon actually in arms before Sebastopol, and of those 14,000 less than 5,000 are in a state of health. I have now in my hand a letter dated January 8, from Constantinople, the writer of which sk.tos that, according to the best information, the effective force of the British before Sebastopol did not exceed 14,000 men; that the artillery and engineers have diminished in a simi lar ratio ; and that the cavalry had ceased to exist as a . force, the horses having been taken up for the transport of previsions. The writer also says he is sure that the British army will within two months be totally destroyed; and, speaking of a general who has been out there and has now returned, he states that, in accordance with his opinion, and the opinions of those most likely to be well informed, he is firmly persuaded that a great disaster is about to befall the army now before Sebastopol. 14,000 men, then, re main out ef the whole 54,000. I want to know, sir, what has become of the 40,000 troops who have disappeared from the ranks of your army? (Hear, hear.) This is a simple matter of figures, and if your force has been reduced from 51,000 to 14,000 men, I repeat—and I am obliged to ask the question—what has become of those 40,000 troops ? (Here a brief pause intervened, from the evident physical weak ness of the speaker. He then resumed.) I feel, sir, that my strength is very inadequate to this task, and I there fore hope that the house will bear with me. (Cheers, fol lowed by a recommendation to the hon. and learned gentle man to be seated.) No, no • I will endeavour to proce e d. The condition of the army being such as I have stated, ley next inquiry is—How was that condition brought about? My belief is, that it has been produced by incapacity at home and incapacity abroad —by incapacity on the part of those whose duty it is to minister to that army's wants. At the present moment I am given to understand that the harbour of 13alaklava is encumbered with stores— that the country, which possesses means of transport be yond those of all th e wor ld, has been enabled through the enth us i asm of the peo p le to lay on the shores of that harbour stores sufficient to maintain an army twice as storiesif h ic which 3 n w oit ex e i u s ir ; es bu fo t r ti t i h i e t, ir li trans portedlargeasththeasetdeprived of everyth2e'gen seven miles interven e mi le s across the ocean, another provision. occasioned ? that, therefore, your forces are as an army . . How has this r army was sent to the Crimeahurd by the insu ffi ciency of the Why, vaiinngt first,anc made here when the ineffi ciency of those to whom it was c;onLle' a xtext, by the p,winhteonf hisit reached that country. (Hear, hoar.) [At thi s again unable to pro ceed, the hon. and learned gentleman was la and at length he observed]--I really, strength so feeble th a t I canno t cont inuetse e r em arks feel my in my present state, I shall at o nce (cheers)— an d , the resoluti on w hi c h i s now in your hands"( 0 ew move cheers)—viz., f or a comm i ttee of iuquiry into threen condi tion of our army b e f ore S e b astopol, and into the conduct of those departments of Government whose duty it was to minister to its wants. (Hear, hear.) The motion having been d u l y seconded and the question put, an interval of several moments elapsed without an other speaker presenting himself to continue the discus sion. After repeated cries of " Di v id e, " and " Read, Read," Mr. S. HERBERT roes and said,—Si r, I have felt some h es it a tion in rising at this moment through that w hi c h , I am sure, has been the sub j ect of p ain to e v eryone present— uaniely, the physical infirmity tinder which my hen, and learned friend was compellecttodesist t irompis i t a ettempt to address the house in support of the se ! My hon. and learned friend, frwieniPPme hasu make that motion from the mo s t say, was fully entitled to Ina this house, from the hi g h great given notice. (Hear.) position which ho holds marls his character. (Hoar, hear.) I independence which mar under which he labours, talents by which he is disti l n i guired, and likewise from the still more regret the indisposition case substan• because it places me in a po. , itiou of some difficulty, inas much as there has been no charge made , no r e"'., crumpling up whenever you liked. (Hear.) -I;,;.„rero, hoar the noble lord (.7. R ussell) city tha t the aii,Dobr ling to allow Russi% to remain a gre,atliewa,r• th e e 41 rem ain great as long L, of Russia. (A laugh.) This kind of blusterinerue tered by your speeches at the Reform Club• r!;entpoor ment of the now Minister at War, with his Pb u has been something like a trick upon the when I put a question to the Governmen t, an so iat to give us a Minister'at War, it was in t he lee °rile', the appointment had been recommended 11,...c0te and Ellonborough, and the right hon. member (Hr. E. Ellice). I am sorry to see the n oble r n 0 : fourth bench behind the Ministry. L , °1 10: 061 0 and happy may he be." (A laugh.) He I 'V ~, sorri,",o in order to get for us this War Minister. gT i t i t tl cost so much. I think he might have been g° 0 10 ! if rate. But we must have a War Minister, I,ll`_'beA military opGrations must be placed under °na pe J:, are not to become the laughingstock of E ur° The office of First Lord of the Treasury. Is es sible one, anti one requiring upon occasion Woof much firmness, and if the Fit st Lord finds a % or e Yip Cabinet conducting a war which he knows n° a 4 manage than a steam engine, it would ha" 004 him to give him a monta's wages and get vine be °"s 4 head of the Ministry won't do it thee it ha!, iftt l o e an irregular way, and more damage is done cabo,d at the head of the Government does his duty Tier hon. members seated near Lord John Rasseu• 0 . is which has been pursued in the present e sc o f both to the Government and to the colleagl is 7 0 0 victual to whom I h ave re f erre d. (Hear, be3,,r'looll one other point which I w i s h to impress ul°°`'irelOti If we are to get out of thi s mess it will re i. g e ll G o io o o o nary energy and no sh o rt, p a lt r ymeasures. wre,d , must do a great deal, and let the house P ia dio l ; a great deal in its turn. Let them give t o to r War all the power he requires—let them Ril ls o o t, l4 o o lisment if he wants them—let him ber 1 , 2 „,0, 0• 0 time, a species of military dictator. That n 0? a military power is pretty clear from the ° d t have been making at Sebastopol. But why t o ar. military force in two, and why do we not 11 10 . 9 force into the Qleen's service ? But so kro_ o f 1 " repugnance to this step, that when the Dei‘ e 0 1 0 0 ton asked for Sir Thomas Munro to be his see,, r ecoeyo wand in Spain, all his influence was unable i° ,,iti: l 4 ,o appointment. At that time the 'Whig sea a (on the Opposition benches), and opposing !, 0 00 r the Duke of Wellington. (Hear, hear.) 13° „ u ra 4 crying the present war or refusing the Gove r 'ooo. they require; and it will be the fault of tb° 1 0 1/ if they do not do what is wanted. ( 11e , ar le right hon. friend (Mr. S. Herbert) may rest -13 at" he is the last man to be found fault With. o, tiftl asked who is the tru e cu lp r it, I s hould acc,,ur,, tl e ') total ignorance of what th e arm y underte c "'d, sea"/ the Crimea and in besieging Sebastopol; * P o le 1 4 Y the total incompetency of Lord Aberdeen, t :ly u missariat composed of Treasury clerks. I 0 0 011 ° Duke of Newcastle when I see him, but . fao Lord Aberdeen long, and I must say that Il o r him for his amiable and pe ace f u l, but 0.10 ifo gerent, qualities. (Cheers.) t 90? Col. NORTH agreed with the SecretarY:as he spoke of the disadvantages encountered l e a , ye, army from the regiments being so rarely 10 1 0 17 0 t r People might ridicule the camp at Chobao4c6 garded it as a most fortunate thing that, " formed. (Hoar.) The French officers ..s Wlf be ir l 'iS; camp were of opinion that no troops coun, l 4l7i the •fficeis of the regiments thoroughly un",:"0 duties, and that the manoeuvres were porfeTnoraf falling off was in the staff officasrs, who 1 10 „ 0 1 0 learning their deities practically. The right. " ( joltyQ tary at War inquired whether they were to s,,e, ° ; ,f, or sions to kits:afore with the Ceitamander-in -u° , - .j PT), him assistance ? A commission certainly Pitlle,/ out in the shape of a correspondent of on°° papers of this country, who had given anyalaell once to the Commander-in-Chief. Nobody flai l l,i, a greater sense of the influence and high c1i1b,,7111..' than himself, but he was bound to say t le some means ought to be taken of repressing t, - occasioned. Be did not mean to say that '' find fault with things which appeared to h..% proper management, but he complained tbai' information most injurious to our army s ilt the enemy. No man W as more e s teemed 1 1; of the army than Lord Raglan, but North) complained of w as th e mann er in wii!" been sent out, and the improper spirit It o patriotic offers (lour own merchants 1 154 h and which he could term nothing less then' lence. On this topic he might allude to respondence between the Admiralty, the Messrs. Collier, in:Tenants of Lo n d on , which; Permitted him, he would read. (Hear , " ilth of December Mr. J. Collier wrote to the the Admiralty as follows : t t ° " Sir,—From several reports, we refire a ble brave defenders at the Crimea are not s 6 eel; that much-sought for be verage , a cu p of coffer ' friends; the French, obi a i n it qu i c kl y, the li" ourtp with rations roasted an d groun d , w hilefr theirs raw, and scarcely resting time, much 19- pose 'of roasting and gr i n di ng th e i r eeuee',..gsce° much preferable at meals un d er th e circuulsv— frost, and rain. pero A ti : "We have the most extensi ve pl an t / 11 for the purposes, and capable of roasting , Lee' picking large quantities of coffee ; being most extensive extensive patronage of the trade for 41 • are conversant in treating the article (the roatta ya Produces or destroys its flavour) which ea ready for use as fresh as if obtained at how , occasions. " Should youthon. board consider our au n t iy , o f tp of notice, and have the same prepared • r ende r jesty's dockyards, we shall be most Jowl:o.3,nm to sistance in arranging or suggesting v lalow-coui promoting the comfort of our pr' l gallant defenders of our great nation. bajentlY, .‘ ReniaulluscaraumamgM- E ; c i alVt A m-re patriotic offer than that could hardly • inasmuch as there was no kind of stipulat i l ij o merchants should supply the coffee theme t of wished being to give the Government the bal. sett skill and experience. But how was that off answer of the Admiralty was in the follosvia " Admiralty, De c ' " Gentlemen,—ln acknowledging the receipt 01 of the 11th inst., I have to refer you to the 140 , 0 . sioners of the Treasury on the subject of roa sts '" ing coffee f the troops in the Crimea; 01 " lor am, Gentlemen, your obedieiitsn, On the receipt of this communication, Are s . 2ll. posing the Admiralty had nothing to do with roasting the coffee, addressed the same letter stay, and he (C o lo ne l N or th) mus t fa y gl i t / which they receiv e d, an d w hi c h was sigoa velyan, was a most insulting reply to a ve" offer. " Gentlemen,—l am commanded by the I,° ' " Treasury-chambers, Detdo sioners of her Majesty's Treasury to acquaint P ti l ence to your letter dated the 15th inst., that thuin out for the use of the army in the east is roasted A establishments, and my Lords are not aware tional assiste.n,ce is required to hasten the operstl° "I am, Gentlemen, your obedient se) B. " Messrs. Collier and Son, 10, Foster-street, But, notwithstanding this reply, what vac to be the fact ? Why, that up t o th a t time, 11 °. t h, of the coffee had been ground; it was only W l # l, short period previously that a ny h a d b e en res°'; o f Then, again, with respect to Minie rifles, he be! t) a letter he had received, that a l arge qusut i valuable weapons were sent out in a vessel col the lion. Capt. Campbell. But in what mat received ? They were put on board at 12 o'el°,'3l packed lip in boxes, and in such a man ner thsfr possible to tell whether they were Minie rifles else. Mr. IL MILNES regretted that any accide stances, however important, should have - part of this debate, and he regretted this the ":0 9 0; count of the particular circumstance of the ell e ; tP„ ever interest hon. gentle men mi g ht h ave in t` l- 0 w d )) 4 the noble lord the memb er f or L on d on , there 11 1 10,1,3 feeling of unfeigned regre t th a t th e no ble lne te efr p ly separated from his co ll eagues i n th e presen t st li b iel ° o'l, Notwithstanding th e a bl e v i n di ca ti on o f the 1 1 ° 0 (lir. M. Milnes) could not completely din bid (Ii mind that this w a s no t th e momen t w hen e l ' 6 0. 31 13 :i Russell's) resignation ou g ht t o t a k e pl ace . ' h ie , oi l i with the noble lord in the mai n groun d o f hi 3° " el t i) act, believing that th e D u k e o f N ewcas tle ve ss :11 1 ;01 1 ' fortunate choice a s a Mini s t er o f W ar , a lthouf , ;'o possesa great abilities in another ca p ac ity. It n et the unhappy contingenci es in w hi c h th e y •Wer e ,,,l that all official accounts whatever were regox" i i fd r house with considerable doubt— It was difficg,.cle "tars gentlemen to reconcile the official reports r u- 0. 11 !l if house or to the country, through any s ouree„ with not only the private information from tPipPlit but also with the very confessions of the GV„ .e ri . 0 0 17 self. (Hear.) He could not agree with his 'dee pe/ lent friend (Colonel North) that the great be ,r 0 )1 0 4 1 misfortunes of our army was to be laid upon t ,",ot, j Commons. It was not to the circumstance 0 ' Kori tions having taken place in the number of our they were to ascribe the misfortunes in queetieli e r not believe that the order would have been h 4 O O/7 . 0 because the matter i n h an d was l arger and ree r "aeLl Ira lie would rather argu e , b ecause thi s sma ll awl' Do' r into a stat 3 of disorganisation, therefore, if ther!,o,lA a larger army it would h ave been no better arrelie4 believed our misfortunes were owing to a lor i g t public neglect and maladministration, and the, er , . 41 / wanted was a strong and vigorous administroVs, must do their best in this matter, and therefor e ' fi lryir duty of the Government to strike and s pars " 014 a man had pro ve d hi mse lf i ne ffi c i en t, w hatoce his station or power. (Hear, hear.) Reference% 3y/e; made to the conduct. of the press, but he (Mr', 10 11 01i:I could only say the best organs of the press hi-J.4o i r i firmed in every tittle of information. Thep ' b0' 4 ,1 tions of the leading portion of the English P lar in every point completely fulfilled, and if het l/ le 04 attended to in time they might have consider*gical the difficulties of the Government. These pro go le had been spoken of as merely "factious virult Pe7 r e; (the hon. member) thought it did not become ;" 0 - 0 1(1 0 1 this country to sneer at what the press had l'''job, if ig people in the Crimea, when they saw how M es‘."ol: e l Times fund was spent. It was expended int o re hundreds of British lives and in the clothin :, el 5 which the Government bad sent out deficient,;,lo Iu the face of facts like these, it was ieepos4 o ell e fr d with disregard of the efforts of the press. oe et before the house was, whether they should ee ° ,,bt ! d el appointment of a select committee. He thneclertepi; committee would not be a proper tribunal r re slil d o cnmstances, for it could not, in any degre't v itne o oll' the exigencies of the case without having th e , "„ ecel f fore it. The case of the Walcheren expedit ,° : tigated before a committee of the whole hou s 'i n eai d t nesses—the culprits be might say—were eieno bar; and the Government, who were respoo sL ite9,l expedition, remained in o ffi ce and awaited thl„;vr of the house. That case was not auxin ous to t' boe' dc g r e g fthe 1 11 and, as he considered the proposition 0 and c o l learned member for lqieffield to be IlDillStr " pointmcnt of a c omm itt ee unnecessary, he eii°' it. (Hear, hear.) , o t ca,r The Marquis o f GRANBY sa id h e cola. I Lvee i , o tt see how 13 o r 14 mem b ers o f th e H ouse of qi, i o judge of the ac ti ons o f men 3 , 000 m il es aut . 1 - fr ., He therefore thought that the motion would jest. He hoped, now that negotiations were "7; 0 3 4 ole ti , that ho might be allowed to state his opinion a d l ' ee te l t d fication which had been offered for the war,: e e ,. o tat' the house that we had entered into it 63 He was not one of those who thought that go 7 d b°oo ought never, under any circumstances, t° , s t What he said was, that before we went toic°,,o3„Atir clearly know that war was absolutely n ocesse r .' f ee' aggression of which we complained wasof 0 0 w l' 8 ,j10;1 i i 4at 1 1 ` 1 4t tbe 8 b 44 4 hki , it ea et . o e ,Y c ) ' I ON %IC ° "t 1 llalit D OI, i kApjo 4 4 1) 1 , ° 80, 0,1 61_1 % kl a bi A+ ki;-•L i t' l,l, ,at b ob tieredf I , t io ii re q ) h th b e ee t 444,er ir at t 11110 ° f° pDY, t4lt the th 0 of t j k Pr Tr e t ° YO cb• t 6 ( 1 ) 141 / 4 4 th:tilo b°s%) r I r eur cre o f f an ;he 0 ° i ‘tp e , t it, (I A al et to f • ,7 tl l , l ' l ",oviq ip able w ° o 4 ,1-41 , 4 g e e, tier b et io o 4 leo , fo tr i .• 'r. e, 81,41, ;ta: °e° h u . i s s o 1 1 , oPet:aiago 4 rin I . 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