The Sun. — London, England, 1815-05-26 00:00:00

Treaty of Paris, which, or the Treaty founded on its basis at Vienna ought to govern the affairs of tarope. Whatever. then might be said by Lim , on the subject 'of these treaties, In the course of his statement, the Howe would still . 'be left perfectly master of ita own 'opinions re tyccting them. He was only Amximis, that in•stat ing what he had now submitted to.. the House, Ire should not hie considered at all to shritat - from Meeting the 4uestion which ml ht be raised 'on them, lie believed in his ton. .once, that after such a war as the last, and after - 111 Europe had been thrown-into that state of d • :at ion which tad grown out of it, that the - arra tuepts which. tad been mad e were the most ,for her peaee and happiness that could ha, -en devised. In putting them aside then for this night, he trusted it would not be supposed that be 'shrunk. from their defence. When the proper period ar rived, he was prepared. to justify them as carry ing into execution, not only in sabstance, but al most in all the details, that plan. whidli;liad been - forintql by a statesman for .whom he, and those svho acted with him, must ever feel the highest 'deference and admirition—Mr. He (Jla Fitt) when contemplating the possible success of great confederation against France, had consi . tiered that general arrangement which had been in a great measure carried into effect, to be that which would prove most 'conducive to the happi ness cf Europe.--lle (Lord Castlereagh) was prepared to strew when the question came before the House, that, the decisions which 'bad been suade with respect to the immediate interests Of this country were more advantageous than Apse fondly contemplated by Mr. Pitt as the conse quences of successful-war. 'He had. not hoped that such good,conditions could be obtained for Hot. - land a had been secured at the Congress. Mr. Pitt bad considered it necessary to extend the power of Prussia beyond the Rhine, and the an ttexat ion of Genoa with Piedmont was a part of iris plan, mach-as-that - arrangetnent had of late been censured- by-those - in opposition to the pre sent Governtnent. At an early period of the late war, at least when the successes of the Allies had first 'given a prospect of a successful termination of the struggle against. France, soon after the, Russian arms' had crossed the Vistula, he (Lord Castlerea g h) had transmitted a copy dis; patch of. Air. 'Pitt to the Ambassadoraaf The -Ent— peror Alexander, and desired to be apprised if any, and what alteration had taken place in the views of. Russia with respect to that plan in the event of the contest being brought to a successful issue. The answer to this communication 'in formed him, that '' the Emperor of Russia had 'othing to state in departure from the principles of the arrangentew laid down by Mr. Pitt io 805."-- - -This was some proof of their solidity, and on these principles England had gone into 'the con test closely united in the views with her Allies. Acting on those feelings which had regulated his conduct, however lie might be sensible that it was not possible an arrangement with any particular power could fix the relations of Europe ; and feeling as he did that as all Europe must co operate in the great work, it could only be effect ed in a spirit of compromise ; yet it was no small satisfaCtion to him, and to all who reverenced the Politics of- that great Statesman, Mr. Pitt, as he did, that they had lived to see that reduced to. practice which,his - great mind, when given to the - consideration of this important question, had tawny imagined in the abstract as the utmost "ob ject of his wishes. His plan for checking the power of France had been embodied - in that ar rangement which had been attacked, as he (Lord Castlereagh) must always think, unfairly, at a time - - when the House had not been regularly informed on the subject, and for this it was that it bad been endeavoured to heap obloquy on the 'present Go vernment, Wishing then to-, narrow the ques tion, he would ca ll for no opinion on the Treaty 61 Vienna. That, when eompleted,would be laid - be 'fore them, .and it would be for them to pron Ounce their judgment on it, but in the present state of things it would be idle to maintain Ow they ought to shut their eyes to passing events, and was in a state of comparative inactivity till information of all that had taken place at Vienna had been laid. before the house. He wished at ()lice to bring; the House to the pnly point at present submitted to their consideration. He should call upontheir to give their support to the Crown} in the war in Avbich we were engaged—(Hear, hear l)---for the question was not now, whether or trot we should go to w a r, but whether, being at war, we.should treat for peace with France separate from the Al lies, by departing from those principles On - vi,;hiell the anti determined on e n t er i ng - i nto a nor `con test,? In the debates which had incidentally taken place on this subject, it had not been denied, that. if it were considered expedient to take such a coarse, just grounds existed for going - to war.— Nothing could be more obvious, than that Eng land ant the Allies had aright to go;to , war with France if the French people supported the power of Buonaparte. Ire proportion as it might be con ten- -,t that every nation has a right to choose its own Goverurrrat, so lunch stronger was the right of the Allies to make war on France. In - the choice of a Government, so that choice did "dot effect the safety of others, no man was disposed to admit, in the largest sense, the right of every na tion to act for itself, more than he wag. In propor tion as the restoration of Buonaparte was made the act of tharench nation,the offence of France against the Allies was the greater. If it could be proved, which he did not believe it could, 'that Buona parte was at present at the head of the nation 4 -- tits. - ttr4-F-Z•Crid&, of 1 . 4:: Treaty of Paris would- be greater, as by that solemn act they were bound (and this was in fact the basis of it), to establish another-Gdaernment. And really kite should be in a situation somewhat ludicrous ~ vitit respect to that individual who now presumed he was at the bead of the French Na tion, if it were attempted. to make the treaty of Paris a treaty between 4'ngland and him. What was that treaty ?—The first article in it stipulated t hat he should 'not reign over Ft ance;. - :_ - V,Vhat„ . then, was he to bec om e the conservator 'Cifthis Treaty ? Could the Allies confide to him - the &lie s cation of it, when the first article, and indeed the whole substance of it,' went to exclude him from the Sovereignty of France, and -greater benefits were given to that country than would have' been given bad he-remained at the head of it, as it'was Supposed twat tinder another Government trance would be more disposed for peace than it was reas sonable to expect she could ever be under him. The Question was not now, whether the Allies should declare war, but 'whether they should open negociations witli Buonaparte, as the Beall of - the French, whorls they by a solemn Treaty had ex cluded from that situation. They had now to consider whether . they wtinltl recognise, as the Sovereign of France, a person so proscribed; whe ther they would admit him into all the compli cations of theaffairs of Europe, 'and leave him to make the most of his .reserves, so - that he might go to war with then! at that period when to do so might best suit the purposes Of his ambition. iVe (the Allies and ~England) wer e then in a state of war with Bunnapatte, and con sequently with France, if he were the head of it. However the situation of ,those individoals might be lamented who were not friendly to his Govern ment, lint would, tie involved in the calamity which his unprincipled conduct brought on the Nation (though the AllieS must be tlesiSons to soften the rigours of it as much its possibls), no consideration for theist could alter the general relations between France . and the Allies. He certainly felt that nothing hut a case of extreme necessity ought to urge one country to go to war on account of the persdnal character of the So vereign of another. Hc felt that in proportion as every 'Country elahned the right of settling their own internal affairs, it was possible the motives of the Allies would be misrepresented,, and they svcculd be described to have departed from those principles. which fist united theM in arms against Buouapatte. lii a case, however, so extreme as the preSetit, they could not separate the Govern ment from the Nation, and the conduct of the in dividual who was placed at the head of the former, was sufficient to justify that appeal to the sword which was about to be made. The case was, how ever strengthened by the consideration that be had beets placed at the head of the Government by the French Army, who considered it essen tial to their interests that their Chief should not be - of a pacific disposition, and inclined, to abide by thole treaties which Louis was dis posed to maintain. The Whole course of events which had marked the extraordinary career of Buonaparte, proved that peace was not to be ex pected with him. Admitting his talents to be, great, these hut increased the Oanger, and went not only to affect the interests, but to endanger% i the safety of this,country. If they watched bins through his whole career, it would beseen that in war or peace, in prosperity or adversity, still the same perseverance and unrelenting system of policy was distinguishable. A wish to govern all countries seemed constantly to actuate him, and led hiur to attempt to extend the Slominion of France over all surrounding countries. This ob ject, it would be seen, lie had constantly pursued, even in what , lie called a state of peace, and greater acquisitions had been made by him while profesSedly at peace, than bad ever been _gained by war. It was during peace 'that he had pro cured the annexation of Holland, of the Ligurian Republic, and virtually, though not actually, Switzerland to France.. The thirty-second litary division was thus added to France ; and it was in peace that the greatest and most malignant acts of aggression of his whole system had been ventured upon—he Ineaut his attack upon the, in dependence of Spain and Portugal, in contempt of treaties, and while bound to them by f 5051- tive stipulations. , It was at Fontainbleau, a place fated to he celebrated for Treaties con cluded to be aunulled and neglected, that he concluded those - Treaties which preceded his entrance into the Peninsula. Admitted into Spain by 4 base Minister, he had duo ac quired a footi ng i n th at country, which gained, helmd not hesitated to attempt to subject it to the dotniniort of France. This was his conduct to a country whose only fault had been that of unqualified sub Mission to his will. -Thus con stantly he had pursued the objects of his ambi tion in peace, as in war, and more successfully in the . former, than in the latter. le all circutus stances, the restless ambition of this ektraordi.: .nary man had been unrelentingly the same. Ever seeking anew object, it appeared that he was destined to run a course against the happiness of all nations. If they look at him, the very.acsne of his fortune immediately after the Peace of .1 111 sit, then ail the Pow er s o f E urope seemed inca pable of 'affecting his security—when he became allied with one of the most ancient families of the Continent—When in ,short every thing seemed to conspire to meet his wishes, instead of sitting down satisfied with his good fortune, he remained discontented as ever. Nay, 413 if to spew how impoSsihle it was for him to be at rest, when his hands were as it would be thought, sufficiently full with the war in Spain, •that moment had lie se s lected for the most' gigantic of all his , projects, that which bad ultimately turned to his ruin, the expedition to Russia. `Then, though the peaceftil disposition of theßussian Monarch had inclined him to abstain from war, so long as it was possible to avoid it. .Buonaparte, notwithstanding the diffi culties with which he had to contend in Spain, marched to annihilate the independence of the 14%t Country that remained hi Europe which had not telt the yoke of France. If they followed his course through' this contest—when,they saw him swept from Russia, driven out of Germany, beaten in France, and forced to fly before the Allies in his own country, still it would be found that his disposition was the same, and that when he treat ed with the Ministers of the Allied Powers at Chatillon, his conduct wits marked by his accus tomed sacrifice,.of every principle, and tbc sane,. tion of every dipl omat i c f raud that could. disgraCe • a Sovereign. On a former night he (Lord Castle reagh), had anverted to a docuMent which bad come into his possession, and which, however it might be called in question, he firmly believed to be genuine, and bad therefore no hesitation in submitting it to the House. In this it would clearly be seen, that the object of litionaparte, instead of giving peace to the world, was only to ga4l time, that lie might be able to break the en igltgimematteuitisit‘etilscohhe might enter int o . W hat his were, might be collected front his anxiety to preserve those three places which "opened to' him an entrance into the heart of Ger many, into the heart of.ltaly , and into the North of Europe, especially that part of it most connected with the interests_ of this country.-- Miens such a man was restored to the Govern ment of trance, by an army who felt the pacific disposition ofLouis - - X.VIII. to be incompatible with . its interests, he would ask, whether,:from the character of the individual, if it Was not necessary to resist his - pretensions if -we wished to preserve our'own independenct% His Lordship then read the'docnurent to which he had referred-, premis ing, that the defence which it contained for the breach of it tontemnlated by B uona p arte , b y comparing; it with what had taken place at Dant- Zic and Dresden, whose garrisons had capitulated, but the capitulations had not been ratified by the Commanders, whose approbation was necessary, threw a strong light on the character of the man, since, on these ; he could feel himself justified in .concluding a treaty, which he proposed to violate, though I t w as wort h y o f o b servation, that at Danttic - and at Dresden, the Commanders con cerned had taken all possible care to-place the gar risons in the same situation in which they were before they surrendered, nottvithstanding their sense of duty forbade them to ratify the Con ventions concluded without their concurrence.— This course of reasoning, on the part of Buona parte, it' was the more important to notice; as when it was seen, that on his military power he did not hesitate to annul and break any engage ment he might make, how hopeless tvould, be our situation if our dependence was upon any thing which he might call an emsagement. The paper was dated 19th of March, 1813, was addressed by the Duke of Bassano to the Duke of Vicenza, and consisted of instructions from Buonaparte to the latter. In this paper which was written at the time when Buonaparte was placed in a most criti cal situation between the armies of Blucher and Schwartzenberg, Caulincourt was ordered not to come to a final adjustment, but -to.keep things daps It Bas, that he (Buonaparte) might have an op ; immunity of breaking through: whatever arrange ments might have been . .agreed to. The transla tion of the letter Irons the Duke of Bassano to the Duke of Vicenza, (in the cypher of theEnuperor,• with his Ministers) was as follows : March 19, 1814. "Sts—lour Excellency will hare received, or will, doubt less, in the co urse o f to-day, receive the dispatch from Rheims, of whiCh sl. FrOchot was the bearer, and which Wa, accompanied by a letter frOm the Emperor. The Emperor desires that you would avoid explaining yodrself clearly upon every thing which may relate to delivering up the fortresses of Antwerp, Alayence, and Alexandria, if you should be• obliged to consent to these cessions. His Majesty, intending.,. ever thwt4rh he .should have raoijird thr Treaty, to be guided by the military situation of affairs. Wait till the last mo • ment. file bad faith of the Allies in respect to the capitula tions of Dresden, Dantzick, and Gorcuw, authorizes us to endeavour not to be duped. Refer, therefore, these laes , . lions to a military arrangement, as was done, at Presburgh, Vienna, and Tilsit. His Majesty desires that you would 'not lose sight of the disposition which he•will feel, not to deliver up those three keys of .France, if military events, on'which he is willing still to rely, should permit him not to do so, even; if he should have signed the cession of all those pro , vinces. In a word, his 'Majesty wishes to be able, after the Treaty, to be guided by existing. circumstances to the last moment. Be orders you to burn this letter at soon as you have read it." He fully believed this letter to begenuine: Than it would be ,denied by the enemy was a thing to. be expected as a matter of• course. This was a part of Baonapartes system which was•incorpor ated with falsehood. Fabrications and false-state ments were things that occarred in the ordinary course of his affairs. When he was at-Langres, ' on one occasion; French Papers came to band, and he' rear! .them to the people at one of their - coffee-houses, which described the enthusiasm of .the people, and the great efforts which they had made in behalf of Buonapartes , Government, though the greatest apathy had prevailed there during the whole contest. These forgeries, how ever, were quite regular, and were constantly _in serted in the Journals, even though the depart • * ments from which if-Was pretended th e news h a d come were in the possession of the Allies.—But he was aware what- Ire had advanced would not justify a war, uniessit should appear that it might be commenced with a rational prospect .of success. The grounds on' which success was to be looked. for,. he would briefly state, and it might be right to mention, that with respect to economy, , a war which might be short, was to he pre ferred- to an armed peace, whi c h knight bst. sucteeded by a-war of longer duration. But it was thought the forces of the Continental Powers -had been diminished since last year, or;t1 . ,he admitted that if this were t h e - case; or t h at there was a division ins' the- councils of the Con tinental Powers—that, ins fact, if they had any doubt of its being their interest, at once to have recourse to - arms, the ljne of conduct which it would be wisest for this country to pursUe in that case, would be to wait for •tire. danger, and resist it when it came. Assuming this to be the course which Euglaad ought to pursue, he could, state, that the Allies had no doubt, for he cook' assure the Ilouse that England had done nothing to excite, to persuade or to provoke the Allies to cogage in the contest. England being _the coun try least menaced by the danger, and possessed of the most undoubted resources to meet it, it was not for. her to incite them to action. Her , language had been, " do that which you think , best for your own interests ; if you determine on war we are ready to embark with you, and will Cover leave you ; but - above all; do not divide your strength, nor look on the contest as but the struggle of a day, but considered it as likely to be attended with great dilliculties. This was the language which had been held to the A l- on the part of this country, and they had deliberately decided on war as necessary to their exi s t ence . The result of all their delibera tions - had been this, that no safety for the world p %i a - a r s t e t he l . o ,rb er m e pe ih d f e p,roimn these decisions, itio itnsvith Buona were the strongest proofs of the greatest unanimity amongst the great ,PoWers of the Continent, perhaps, that the bistory•Of Europe had ever disclosed. All were united in this sentiment, that where Buo.s, naparte was concerned, safety could only be fonnd in resistance. lie now came to .speak of .the., means with which the Allies were about to corn--. mence the war.. To say that contest was not 'in the bandrof Providence, and that in • this, as - in other wars, the result might not baffle all calcu lation,ljians %fv the parties, idle, but speaki n g o f th e re l at i ve if succesaon the part of the Allies were probable its the former contest, "that prosnbitity,was now greatly increased. No. man was more disposed than himself- to admit the ;mighty efforts which a great ceuutry united, and 4 0 , 11 '6 nSid t e o rillg repela f oreigninvad er : itself i t s own s"' ha snake the example of France herself ; but 1118 1 k I:0 °5 lowanees for the success with which the 6 e lo ve there practised might in some instancesn of been crowned, he contended the sit u° t hose that country was not such as to lead t° 0 ex' exertions which might formerly have be the pected from her. There wan something w hich state .of France so distinct from that in or d ie she was placed at the commencement, i ° Wet' . former war, that any man who won' t to t O, that the conduct of the people in oppos iti° 0 , 0 41 ' Confederation would be what it was theaater draw a most unwarrantable inference. After' calling their legitimate Sovereign, wh °s- t bee a of this ail?, al, had been one of mercy, and who bad "„ unmindful of ttie libertieS of the people' id portion of them had b ecom e sincerely att . ° e ',. pre'. him, and this, notwithstanding she intl i t a in ; ale sense of the army of Baonaparte, hat! "--„ nifetecr in a variety of instances. It w o a l c erre they. were not attached to . the pi esent :oate meat, and the rev o l u ti onar y 'spirit on wine pa' calculated had almost • wholly died away ha; perished through the horrors to whic h given birth. From all the information be beta ceived, he was satisfied that France, wi th faults, had not turned from the Monarch t ° l . bet' she had sworn alle g i ance , sincerely t° a ttae" olo at self to that man, an d t h a t arm y by whom hi s . P,lo( l had been subverted. F ra n ce i n former wt"ons'the been accustomed t o ca l cu l a t e , not onlY ha iret e r extent of her own means, but on called her " external resources," th e :{: es e 11° other nations. She could reckon 00 r w ide" . !linger, and was therefore now in a situate Tat 111°' ly differing from th a t i n w hi c h - s he stn" . va le , and rod when all her great conquests wer:= l iyh aft and in a situation not at all better than ° at e( tb' she held' in the last campaign. W h a ' lte ; - tal a t issue of the present campaign m ight 're , t oe be Admitted the Allies were in sutlicig"C ' 1- • , A ir occupy a considerable portion of Fian ee h ' ic i, t c ; those places to Which they miglit be 0 ' advance Would be nullified to ;lite Irte t °9 i, th e France; and as funds ''ere indial•len sib i r l aeC e a support of such a contest, every - pla'e a e ta ; - ' 0 0Y•": 1 pied; or every place where, fawn. rife ' ur ge" . the Allies, the ishabitants might be enc°acarcJ :to withhold the payment of the'impof ,ts re i l jaao' of them, would tend to cripple:the m'c il33 I° 0 ' 66 • napii•te, and many he knew-there were , vr 'aafirt far from being disposed to support li;Plat its though they were not b rave enough to ar•c e " - ' overthrow. Under these circumstances titsctt'ior" • " i i ) It mate present situation of France wlt Ther-,state, was to reason most .fallaciooll;„"eeef the other hana, great mOral . feding W 35 11 ' 0 0' throughout Europe. Not only the (.;°"i r ae of al) the countries on the COntinent, ht" " r i ti ore 4 pulation of each felt, that as all the nlis ti f° o the which they had had to deplore proceede d 1 6,o ' ver ie' ambition and wickedness of the French a bailie ment, all their hopes depended On the w 3r ea ta s r so closed, that the resources of one of th e g felt at t cr ie nn ( t ii r s i p es os i a n i E o i f iro ß p il e ot s la h p o a u i l i d e, no lon err e catl e He (L , t o f IV reagh), had anxiously inquired into the 0 1 . 0 ,110 4 Confederation, and he found that at no P a er a i t ilitil i they ever been disposed to put forth t heir " (I ca against France with more ardour. I Si i n e ise i ° o Treaty of Paris, circumstances had tenli e ' to augment . the forces of the Allies, fl at k e Elsa, , numbers, burin every thing that could way effective. Similar augmentations of tb, e . ol oe ss , armies had not taken plaCe., for France °l v , dr affected bye arrangements to•be made sohj ec „ 0 1) 04 4 signing of the Treaty, and Louis; anxious . ro ve by his engagements, had been the first Le S . St ) ! nation the 'advantage of a - stii;.e . of Pel e : r ac ed ° II ' only were the armies of the Alliei - cOns ° '''befo re !, a higher scale than ever they had • be e "„ r teti but most important measures had been ) . o" e a l cak in the event ‘of,failure a to guard 'against th po wer of the bloarwhich they meditated agains t t „ il i c iaes ot a linonapatte. In the whole - til the eo l " Da le 'the; Rhine, - and indeed. throughout the '‘, r o ; GertnirYc:the Militia, called the tandstr for the' been/stalked out to form a.defensive forc e lol ef r o f • protection of each • country. The Al e ee diag 4 'were . such a scale during the P rpc iaib le a of the Congress, that he had somethnes tracarrie‘i to reflect, , that their deliberations weteiaies ,On is the midst of one vast camp, th e a , I be l wale independent of those of France,theo t, • sure he did not exaggerate, in stating' oleo i t ' contain no fewer than a million of 00'13: ststruts_struts_.,• altaegular soldiers, under th e seve sot& tenaates there assembled. These tiiing^looo it ,must be felt ; th a t if th e g reat struggle! " o r kt ri Made at some period or other, a time eoll:ia'aa iz rive when it could be .ventured upon wit h htl t - - aard. Had Buon, • a e Ina apai te • delayed single month, he believed it Would ka 0 1) :; s, • the tit" vast difference in the.attitude of instead of her applying now in their Ita"` would . hive to re-create their armies at „ale' his re turn 0 c ook • mense ex pence, as France. -was now liol ea • , to do by Buonaparte ; from small establisi 6 ,0( , military Nip'". There was no reason to suppose the o ft of Europe opposed to France - iiaa n at tuous cause,: as the -Allies thought wes"` as th e " able to act with success. Such a fr c ti ` j ' a possessed must appear adequate td s wo - blow, and such arrangeineuts were, 113 04 0 ' inP le ; securc its being always kept'iip to its f meat. Thepopnlation of each country, °,: st th as it was, would be SLIM ient to guard tig ai en to/0' being again overrun bylinonaparte thcev s A ( ldel l • verse a s being eapvieneed by the Alliesaand'es or. • A rush nitempted by the French. - If tbe 0 1l 15 • not nowaprepared for War . , there wer e " 100" re for' thinking they would be -prepared at 9 . r yas 11- ~ period, tanaf therefore the only a • lternative „ a a a 'ahe P tie wait till their present Italians were the Confederation, now unanimous , vide(' in opini on —till the French Ruler, xT ed 41 • directed by his own armies, but enc c f, l , a g te e;e a . some event which for a time thigh t Allies from each o ther, take advantage q'oe circumstance again to fill Europe with wa . r i . , a it prepared to admit that some might cons" c s po to go to war With France, and vet be' tug - o ,re ,a s iies dea ra . • to support that war by aTanting. st• aht. a o reign Mowers. however unsound he 11 11 s .r t! . , 1 policy,their yet they might vote in fa Y° `. i ices ' IL Address to-night, without bin-dins.- th c "" el ' a ostg' any manner to the other part of thc t I I 1~ 1 , tie, th, 4/1 C . 0 ;1 1 It 11 tluv, toidu l) tr aci zi lea; ti t:eck e ~~~~e