The Sun. — London, England, 1828-02-08 00:00:00

slight kw Party in t uently, analaughter• story of tbi t warranted 'Ay —a more ces did not nes and auf n fee-simple file the heir :ourse to the was only a obliged to acv, in order . Another quity Courts may be pm ars, but this )Ugh he has t his agree irts of Law. multiplied. as a lease, to sue the ,o sue in his observed es to their rength or nterest of sts of jus- same. It n those of come out t of what ially. In en instru- tdversary. in dispute One of the sum Aland the eipt must The given to ay money as raised, ics ought t of corn- Fit money it money [lowed in liers, by of adopt evidently ieficial to h I have lry ; y be coo, ns makftw law c0n, 14 ie t ought [i do not.. .0 banish Veers of pies and the vu- Swift's V s4ll' ing a Chaneerysuit. - I ash any man acquainted with the law, to say how inanY - oT the cases entered in the present 'paper for trial at Westminster might not have been kept 7, - " out of Court, to the advantage of all parties, if the suitors could have been brought before a plain arbitrator to settle their difference? This system of arbitration exists in - France, in Denmark, and in the maritime country of Holland. ' At Laneaster Assizes, 141. was the average • amount of fifty of the actions entered for trial. The costs were of course much higher. A majority of these causes vrould never have seen the light, if the parties, in the ab eenet of their attorney, could have been brought before an arbitrator. This • principle has never been tried in this country, but it ought to be, for it has been introduced into others with the most eminent success. It is also founded in justice, and in the obvious dictates of common sense. In England, it was only after the parties had had their . passions worked up and their purses wor keddo wn, that arbitration was thought of. My fist object is to expedite the proceedings in cases of debt. Secondly, to let the debtor know the precise cause of proceeding ; so that he may defend himself if right, or yield if wrong. Thirdly, to give him no unnecessary inconvenience till he is found wrong, as Par, at least, as is consistent with the due secu rity of the claimant. Ilse present practice is, to arrest the debtor instantly, and then to bring him into Court. I need not allude to the privilege of Parliament—that is very well understood. A rich man may easily get bail. —.He gets his butcher or baker to stand bail for him.— To be sure he cannot immediately afterwards he hyper critical in the examination of the bill, nor over fastidious in his judgment of the meat. But the poor tradesman who is arrested, is put to far more serious inconvenience; if he cannot procure hail he must he confined in gaol. No man who is imprisoned ever holds up his bead as lie did before, except, indeed, for political offences, and then the doctrine is reversed.—(A laugh.) Why should a man be arrested on mesne process at all ? Is it likely, that men in general will leave their wives and children, their homes, or their country, because a process is served on them for a debt, say of 50/. ? Our law proceeds on a supposition that men always run away the moment they have a notice of an action for debt. Do you le gislate wisely—do you legislate like men of sense —do you legislate with common consistency, when you legislate against all men upon a case which may happen only to one in a thousand ? Alter the law and what will be the effect ? Will it injure any person ? No ! on the contrary, it will benefit all classes. Its first effect will be to make tradesmen less easy in giving credit. At present tradesmen do not compete in the goodness of their articles, or in the honesty of their dealing, but in giving credit ; and often in giving credit to profligate, ex travagant persons whom they ought not to trust. Those who can and do pay, have to pay for those who don't—a sort of dividend in all bad debts. Why not serve a writ at the usual place of business or residence, and only call on the party to find bail, when there is a reasonable suspicion of an intention to fly? Holland is a mercantile country, and Scotland is a wary country, and in both this is the law. A defendant ought to receive some security from the plaintiff, lest he should be put to unnecessary expellee, in a vexatious prosecution, or by a person who, if he fail, may take the bene fit of the Insolvent Act. The process of outlawry is foolish in its nature, for if a man does not choose to be present, why not proceed without him? Outlawry is a sad engine to harass an absent man. Ilia goods are forfeited. For relief, in certain cases, the party must apply to the Lords of the Treasury. What have the Lords of the Treasury to do in the administration of the laws?— Next comes the law where the parties are supposed to be in Court, and are called upon to state their cases. He ap proached the subject of special pleading with caution be fore a person (the Solicitor-General) so very intimately acquainted with the subject. Anciently this pleading was by word of mouth ; it was orig inally in French, then in Latin, and it is now i n English. The present practice is, however, liable to many great objections. It is a fertile source of absurdities. Lord Coke had eulcgised the spe cial pleading in his day, and had declared it so excellent that good pleading was delightful to every body. I would wish to make it as pleasurable now as formerly. Lord Itirnafield had said, that the rules of good pleading were the rules of good sense, accompanied by no little subtlety. The Courts of Law have given themselves too much to these subtleties ; the evil is increased by the Legislature lending itself to the frequent pleading of the general issue. I wish to revive the system of old, mending it where time has shewn that the original may be improved upon. The principles of special pleading are very short and easy. The first great object is to compel each party to disclose, fully andfairly, the claim and the defence. The second is, that no needless impediment in the termination or decision of the suit he allowed in either the plea, the replication, or rejoinder. Thirdly, all repetitions of words and circumstances should be prevented, as well as all re pugnant and inconsistent grounds disallowed. On these three principles the ancient pleaders founded their system. At present what is called the Count, gives no knowledge of what the action is about. I will show this by referring to a common count for money bad and received. The plea is for a thousand pounds, though the demand may really be for only ten. But the same words are used for seven different kinds of actions. Money paid from one person to another for the use of the plaintiff. Money received on failure of a consideration. Money paid on a mistaken - point of fact. Money paid by a stakeholder, in conai deraiioia of an illegal contract. Money paid to a re venue officet for releasing goods. Fees of office to try an assize of officr, and many others. I will instance eight different pleas to recover a gun which the plaintiff has lost. First, it is stated that the gun came into the defendant's bands by finding ; though, in fact, it was not lost or found by either party. Secondly, the gun taken by a man in any way, not a felony. Thirdly, a deposit. Fourthly, stopped for money unpaid. Fifthly, an Action of Troyer, brought by the Assignees, if the gun was sold after the bankruptcy of the vender. Sixthly, against the Assignees, to try the bankruptcy. Seventhly against the Sheriff, to try the validity of an execution, and every variety of action under this bead; Eighthly, Inisdeliversd or detained by a carrier. All these actions differ as much as light from darkness, and yet they are all brought under the same form of spe cial pleading. The next instance in which the same com plaint may be made, is in actions of trespass--under which general denomination actions of assault of all kinds may be brought, and the same language will be employed in de scribing them. I will not repeat the various terms etn ployed alike in every sort of action included under this bead, for they are too ludicrously absurd for this oc casion ; but my complaint is not so much the absurd rigmarole of the terms used in the declaration, as that in all actions for the seduction of the wife, the seduction of the daughter, or that of the servant maid, the same words are employed as in actions for hostile attacks upon the person itself. The consequence of all this is, that these declaration s tell me nothing of the merits or nature of the individual case ; they give the Court no information— they afford none to the opposite party ; perhaps you will say, but the opposite party , ought to know what is the sub ject of the action in which he is thus made defendant ; well then I will agree with you, that he ought to know it; but surely if be is bound to possess that knowledge, the plaintiff is equally, if not more strictly, bound to have the sa me knowledge; a n d if he has, he ought to communicate it. Under the general head o f trep the particular ac bon in which the pleadin gs afford - the most definite in formation, is that of ari action of trespass in the plaintiff's close, and just in the same proportion is that information more useless in that than in any ether case of the same kind, for the action being generally bro ught to try* title to landed property, the damages give* are onl y ie. , as that sum will as well d ec id e the right as any other; whil e i n those ac tions of tresp ass ar i s i ng ou t of personal misconduc t, in which the feelings of th e i n di v iduals are deeply concerned, and where the amount of damages is most material, we are left in the dark, the present form of pleading only giving as „ re e lse inform a ti on where it i s l eas t m aterial. I h ave `'" thus Called your att en ti on to t h e ev il s o f pleading in the de c l are tion ; I will now proceed to the second point of this p art of the subje ct —namely, to the pleas which the defendant pots upon the record in answer to the plaintiff's complaints, en this stage of the cause we encounter the same evils. If the plaintiff tells us little, the defendant does no more; in that respect, at least, they are even. Thi s i s , perhaps, in co nsequence of 'the former evil ; but be it what it may ; t h e y ought to b e t o tell the defe n d ant the real nature of his compla i n t, and t he defendant ought rem edied together, The pla intiff ought to make him equal! acquainted wi th the matter of the answer. If this w ere always done, per jury would not .30 often be committed ; every thing in tended.to be proved ought to be stated on each side, and the ra llies knowin g th e evidence on which the respective state-. ' we nt! must be estabtished, would have an opportunity of ex amining into the character of the witnesses, and of pro curing the best evidence to elucidate the point. At p resent the mystery 6l. o . leading l eaves them in doubt,and the vague state ,ents o n the record, unaccompanied by other information, ope n a door to th e admission o f f a l se h oo d in the witn es ses. Wh e never the parties fight each other on the record in 'the orot instance, they always renew the fig ht by perjury in Cou rt. I will now g i ve the House some instances of the evils of this system of pleading. In the action of Assumpait t he defendant may plead th e general issue alone, but it is oisti -Within his pl easure to put any or all of the following d face, Upon the record. The defendant may first deny t h e supposed contract, saying, " I did not promise you ;" t h e next 'Plea may be payment-,-then usury—then that the ,i i t t ge d debt was won et gaming —then infancy—then ac cool- and elltillikiioll.o4h4lla 4 relates - of the claim by the • -- . • plaintiff—and, lastly, eoverture. Every one of these plias differs from the other, but they are all introduced in the same manner to the Court. The action of trover is another example of the existence of the same evils.' In that action the statements of the plaintiff are equally indefinite, and the same general allegations will describe many dif ferent claims. To this action, if it be to recover a gun, the defendant may plead that he took it as a gatnekeeper, bringing thus many questions into discussion ; if it be for goods, the defendant may set up a right of lien ; and this right of lien may be claimed by a number of different persons —by an attorney, by a banker, and lastly, by the captain of a vessel for the payment of passage in his ship. All these different pleas may be pleaded in nearly the same manner, and the defendant, but especially the Court, will receive little information from the matter thus put upon the record. Let rue not be supposed to be speaking incautiously. I have cases chewing the existence of these evils, which many perhaps would hardly believe possible. In almost all these cases the pleas are couched in nearly the same words ; and if the counts in the declaration teach us little, the pleas are equally defective on the same point. These matters have been the subject of consideration with Mr. Justice Black stone, who has alluded to many of the distinctions of special pleading, and who, in describing the generality of the counts and pleas in assumpsit (which he has not des cribed very accurately), and those in trover and trespass (where he has more nearly approached oorrectness), he has taken occasion to conclude his'book on Civil Actions with the following most eloquent and elegant, and I will leave you to say whether most just and appropriate, eulogium : " This care and circumspection in the law, in providing that no man's right shall be affected by any legal proceed ing without giving him previous notice, and yet that the debtor shall not, by receiving such notice, take occasion to escape from justice ; in requiring that every complaint be accurately and precisely ascertained in writing, .and be as pointedly and exactly :answered ; in clearly stating the question either of law or of fact ; in delib e r a t e ly resoving the former after fnll argumentative discussion, and indis putably fixing the latter by a diligent and impartial trial ; in correcting such errors as may have arisen in either of those modes of decision, from accident, mistake, or suns prise; this anxiety to maintain and restore to every indivi dual the enjoyment of his civil rights, without intreuching upon those of any other individual in the nation—this parental solicitude, which pervades our whole legal Con stitution, in the genuine offspring of that spirit of equal liberty, which is the singular felicity of Englishmen." —[The Honourable Member in reading this passage laid an emphasis of so peculiar a kind on the expressions parental solicitude and felicity of Englishmen, as to cause a gene ral laugh. ]—Now, Sir, the inconsistency of the rules of pleading is the next head to which I shall direct your at tention, and that inconsistency is as manifest as the vague inaccuracy I have already pointed out. Why shall infancy and coverture be allowed to be given in evidence as:they are under the general issue, which other defences must be pleaded in order to be proved? If it is rght that some specific defences, of which your general plea gives no notice to your opponent, may be proved under that plea, why is he compelled to give notice of oihers, in order to enable himself to put witnesses into the box on purpose to prove them ? Why do you in one case multiply counts, which in the other your own practice declares to be unne cessary ? Where there are ten different ways of stating a defence, and all of them pre employed, it is impossible that any two can be true ; at the same time they disable both the opposite party and the Court from knowing the real question intended to be tried. Yet this practice is generally resorted to, because the party does not accurately know what course his opponent may make. He has there fore thrown his drag-net over the whole ground, In the hope that in some part or other he may be successful. In fairness this ought to be avoided on both sides, but such is not often the practice; and the instance of an action of debt on bond will afford, by the manner in which the op. posite course may be pursued, a strong instance of the in consistencies in pleading to which I have alluded. In the first place, the defendant may deny that the bond is his ; then he may plead that he has paid it (a circumstance not very likely to happen if it is not his bond) ; then that he paid it before the day ; then that he paid it after the day (things equally unlikely to happen if it was not his bond); and, lastly, a general release from the plaintiff to the de fendant (a thing which, if the bond was not the defendant's bond, would be at best unnecessary) ; and all these incon sistencies a man may run into, if he does not choose to rely upon one of these pleas. I ask, Sir, whether the de fendant ought not, in justice, to say on which of these va rious pleas he intends to rest his defence ? If these seve ral pleas were consistent with each other, well and good ; but while so contradictory, ought they to be al lowed to be put upon the record together ? I will mention a case which occurred to me at York, and which exhibits a singular proof of the folly of the tech nicalities with which special pleading so often abounds. That action was on a wager regarding the life of Napoleon Bonaparte, and the first count of the declaration stated it as a wager on the life of a certain Napoleon Bonaparte, describing hint with a minuteness which an individual un tutored in the admirable science of special pleading would have deemed at least unnecessary, The second count spoke of him as " a certain other Napoleon Bonaparte" (a laugh), and the third count using the same form of expression as the second, again described him as a certain other Napoleon Bonaparte—(renewed laughter.) There was no sense in all this—it did not afford any additional ground of complaint to the party—it was no advantage to him, but it was much to the practitioner; it made the suit more costly, and that is the only advantage I can find to have been derived from it. By a particular law a defendant is prevented from pleading double, but he is allowed to do so if the leave of the Court can be obtained for that purpose. Now that leave, from being a matter of favour in the discretion of the Court, has become almost a matter of right, and the mo tion to plead double is now treated by the Courts as a rule of course. On this subject I have one remark to make. This motion is generally made by Counsel on a half-guinea fee ; and the mischief arising from the manner in which this motion is now treated by the Courts is this, that frauds are often committed, and attorneys' clerks are frequently in troduced into a course of fraud by a practice which I be lieve to exist among some of them, of defrauding Counsel of the half-guinea fee given on such motions. The facility of possessing this sum of money afforded by the manner in which the Courts meet the motion, which they still con sider necessary, seduces them into acts which are but the forerunners of a bad practice in another satiation in the pro fession. The Counsel's name may be put to the motion—it is a mere matter of course; and the clerk, whom circum stances induce to take advantage of ehis circumstance, be gins with pocketing the Counsel's fee, and ends, when he is an attorney, with being struck off the roll for having em bezzled or misapplied the money of his client. There is another inconsistency in the law of pleading. A defendant may plead nine different pleas, but the plaintiff's replication (though it might well include them all) must be single.— If the defendant pleads infancy, s l may admit his infancy at the time of the original contract; but I may state a pro mise made by him after he came of age—or I may deny his infancy : but I must not do both. It seems reasonable, that as the defendant may plead in a certain manner, I ought to have all the same advantages in answering him ; but such is not the rule—the steps must be multiplied ; and the consequences of this multiplication are obvious, as we may remember in the tale of the horse-shoe, and the pro gressive value of the nails. Now my proposition on this part of the subject would be, to allow the plaintiff and de fendant each to plead two pleas, both of which should most distinctly state the ground on which the respective parties meant to rely. I have now to notice the subject of demur rers, and I shall go through it very shortly. In demurrers it is a rule of the Courts that if you demur to the law, yon admit the fact. Why such a rule should obtain, I am quite at a loss to determine. I need not tell you that every argu ment in a man's life is a demurrer. If I am alleged to have made a promise at a particular place, I may say that I did not make the promise, which would be a direct issue on the fact ; or I may say, that I could not have made the promise, as I was not at the place, which would be a de murrer in argument ; but if I admit I waspla ce, surely the s urely I may add, that may being there is no proo f of t h e other p art o f t h e proposition—and that, alth oug h my ad versary is ri g ht in one point , his argument on the oth e r is not necessarily true ; but this s y st e m of defence, though perfectl y good i n common sense, is not admissible in law ; and the plaintiff who should frame his replication in that manner, Would be met by an objection that he was plead ing double * I will now speak of objections on the record and in arrest of judgment. On this point I say distinctly that all merely formal errors ought to be a llo wed to be cor rected in any sta ge of variance. the p ro ceedings, and no man should I would have no such oc cur as that o f which our Courts h ave l a t e l y pre - sented turned round upon a sented an instance in the case of the indictment of an indi vidual on a charge of After the record had been taken down, the cause, had opened, the witnesses incurred, an acquittal was directed as of course, because, in • the word mother' had been inserted in examined, and all the ex p ense and inconvenience the pleadings, of a trial in stead of grandmother. There could be no doubt that the perjury, which consisted in the denial or a payment, was equally committed, whether that supposed payment was made to the mother or the grandmother. These, Sir, are some of the inconsistencies which I am prepared to prove exist in the present rules of pleading. I n the first instance they give to the opposite party and the Court no notice of the real question at issue. But, perhaps, it will be said that this kisvwledge is Dot afforded to the opposite party, because he must he presumed to know all, and to be prepared to defend himielf against one demand, in how many different ways soever it may be stated to have arisen. On these objections to our present system, I say, as I have said before, I will legislate, not even on the ten thousandth instance of error, but 'on the general fault, and not leave open the door by which such numerous errors may continue to be admitted. In the next place, I would allow no fai lure of a case on account of the want of a sufficient stamp. In a case which occurred not long since, my Lord Dudley was turned round, because, it was said, there were a few words more in the instrument than we had counted, and the tamp was some half-crown below the value required. It was an undefended cause, and we got a rule for a new trial, is it appeared that we had counted right after all; but sup. pose that we had been wrong in the number of words, what difference would that have made in the justice of the ause ? and why should we have lost a private sight be %lose, through an error, we had paid a smaller sum than we ought to the Stamp Office? I would allow the Judge !-o inflict a penalty of 201. instead of 101. for the deficiency if the stamp ; but I would not allow the party to be turned ,ound, and to lose his trial, because ge was supposed to 'lave got a wrong stamp affixed to his agreement or deed. In order, Sir, that you may not 'suppose these objection s are altogether theoretical, I will produce a letter which I have received from an eminent practitioner, detailing th e particulars of a case, in which the debtor took many of those advantages which our present system of administer.. ing the laws allows. The case related in that letter is that of a poor Welsh widow, who had a claim by way of mortgage on some property. The interest on the mortgage was not paid up, but she did. not foreclose and go into Equity—she rather chose to .bring her action at law. Th e letter states, that "the defendant was a Member of Parlia ment, and some delay occurred, as usual." I beg pardon, :air. —(A laugh. )—Of course, I am not answerable for the terms of the letter—" and some delay occurred as usual, with Members of Parliament, in getting an appearance en tered." Finally, however, an appearance was procured, a de claration was filed, and then the defendant craved oyer of the bond. That was obtained, but the requisition and the Irant ofit occasioned some delay. The defendant afterwards pleaded, first, that the bond was not hie ; next, that he had paid the interest; . thirdly, that he had paid it be fore the day in question ; fourthly, that be had paid it after that day ; and, lastly, he pleaded a general perform ance of the covenants in the bond. The fact was, that he employed all these pleas as so many excuses to save him from paying at all.—(Hear.)—The plaintiff took issue on the points of fact, and the defendant elm demurred to the replication, filing a sham demurrer soiety for the purpose of delay. The plaintiff joined in demurrer, the paper books were made up, and when all these expences had been in curred, every thing that had been done was found to be useless—no defence was offered in law or in fact, and the matter finally went in the shape of a Writ of Inquiry for the assessment of damages ; but by this process of delay, the pleadings had been swelled from 5 to 118 folios, and the judgment had been delayed nearly one year. The de fendant then brought a writ of error, which delayed the cause for nearly four terms longer. lie never followed up the writ, but the expence incurred was grievous. The costs of the original suit amounted to 841. 45., and those of the suit in error to 191. 10s., and this expence was incur red for a cause which was literally undefended. So tender is " this care and circumspection in the law, in providing that no man's right shall be affected by any legal proceeding, without giving him previous notice, and yet that the debtor shall not, by receiving such notice, take occasion to escape from justice, in correcting such errors as may arise, and in maintaining and restoring to every individual the enjoyment of his civil rights, without entrenching upon those of any other individual in the nation ;" a care and circumspection which is indeed a " parental solicitude per vading our whole legal Constitution."—(Cheers.)—The consequence of this " parental solicitude " was, that the costs amounted to thirty pounds besides and beyond those which had been taxed between the parties. The 30/. she never got ; no doubt he paid her attorney the taxed costs, but she was 301. out of pocket ; a sum which, for aught I know, might amount to six years' interest on the mortgage. This letter was communicated to me by a gentleman, who did not know that I was acquainted with the defendant ; but so it was, I did know him, and a better or kinder man there could hardly be—be was distressed indeed, and there fore he had had recourse to these expedients for delay ; but he was not one of those who felt indifference to the pains of the humble, if not actual pleasure in their miseries. Had he been such a man as some there are, who are now in this country, had he possessed wealth, and had he re joiced in expending it in pertinaciously and oppressively de feating, at least for a time, the claims of a poor and de fenceless widow, he would have argued the demurrers of law by his Counsel before the Judges, and have defended his cause on the facts before a Jury. He would then, when the first Court had given judgment against him, have carried the .11.13 e in error through the Exchequer Chamber to the House .of Lords; and the extra costs, instead of being 301., would have been I know not how much --probably five hundred pounds.--( Hear, hear, hear.) — So tender is " this care and circumspection In the law, in providing that no man's right shall be affected by a legal proceeding, without giving him previous notice ; and yet that the debtor shall not, by receiving such notice, take occasion to escape from justice."—Sir, after Air. Justice Blackstone had written these words in his Commentaries, there occurred a case which he himself has given to the world its his Reports, and which, as he wrote it after this splendid eulogium on the law, might well have made him doubt the truth and justice of that eulogium. I wonder much, that when the last edition of Isis Commentaries ap peared, he did not correct the error into which his great admiration for our legal forms had led him: The case to which I allude was in substance this :—A Mr. Robinson (I hope he was no relation of the Noble Lord lately at the head of his Majesty's Government (a laugh) tried an action against a poor man, living near him in Yorkshire. The declaration contained five counts, and twenty-seven pleas, and occupied two thousand sheets. The pleadings were held to he bad ; and it having been told tke Court that Robinson had used certain malicious expressions regarding his opponent, and had said that he understood law, and would catch the fellow, that he would scourge the man with a rod of iron, /sc., they refused to try the cause, and ordered Robinson (who appeared for himself, stating lie could get no Counsel to appear for him) to amend his pleas, and directed Serjeust Maynard, and an other Counsel, to settle the issue between these parties. These two Learned Gentlemen performed in one hour the duty assigned them, and the issue then, instead of being spread over 2,000 sheets, was included within the compass of a quarter of a sheet, without, as I can find, any injury to the real merits of the cause. Why, Sir, why, I say, did Robinson declare that he would scourge this poor man with a rod of iron ? Because he. was a pertinacious, obstinate, and oppressive person, who would use his wealth to the in jury, nay, the ruin of his poorer neighbours. But why did he threaten to scourge the man with a rod of irti? He had DO occasion to have resorted to a rod of iron to scourge his opponent. The flapper of parchment, that excellent and " parental" corrector of our errors—that parchment which, while it pretended to enlighten, served only to keep the Court as well as the .poor man in the dark—was a far more safe as well as effective, and a far more ruinous and deadly scourge than any rod of iron which this wealthy op presser could have employed to gratify his vengeance— (Hear.) And this brings me, Sir, to the next point—that of evidence to which I wish to direct your attention; but before I do so permit me to say a few words on a sub ject intimately connected with that of evidence—l mean the subject of Juries, upon whom I wish to express an opinion, as they have been of late attacked by some of the legal Reformers of the day. I say then, that I con sider the institution of Juries a most wholesome, wise, and perfect invention, for every purpose of judicial in quiry and decision. I say this the more readily, as I have been lately erroneously represented to have entertai ned doubts as to their fitness for the intended object of their institution. My words are the result of experience in the practical profusion of the law ; and I declare that I believe there is, and could be no other way, so admira ble in the administration of the law, so well calculated to prevent wrong, to secure sight, and to do full justice be tween all parties, as that old and excellent, and constitu tional guardian of our liberties, a Jury.—(Hear, hear.) They are meat useful, where no men in another situation could hope to be so. In the first place, they correct the impressions of the Judge, not only in a political rase (for there are others in which all mustJudesbutin a h l a l v ita e ne som nc e eain de gree which, of in any way, ay political or personal bias), whether aga i nst party or counsel (and more against the latter t han the former), this bias may exist. In the second place, they correct the Court in errors into which learne it woulddperso n persons a o r t e be so d m ec e e ti r m ou e e s led fr om th e w a nt of knowledge of the common affairs of the world--affairs which, p erhaps for them to attend to with accurate nicety. Thirdly, and above all, who can so well weigh the evidence of men as twelve impartial persons, of various habits, opinions, and tempers, indifferently selected from the middle classes of the country? Lastly, I wish to know, who are so well able to assess the amount of damages? Where a wan com plains of any injury which is properly the subject of da mages, who are so properly fitted to determine whether these damages shall be .50/. or 500/, or whether the party is entitled to any compeniation at all? Sir, the Institu tion works well and admirably. It wants but one addition to complete its utility, and that is, to draw over, or rather, I should say, to draw back from the jurisdiction of the Court of Equity, those causes which that Court has, in the lapse of time, attracted to itself. I shall not press the sub ject further, for I begin to feel that I am exhausted with the labour which I have undertaken, and I fear that by more enlarging upon this point, I thould but exhaust your • patience. I will, therefore, proceed to the subject of evi dence. In the first place, I will state, before I go into the principles of evidence, one matter on which I am inclined to support an opinion that may perhaps be erroneous, but that certainly deserves consideration ; namely—that the exclusion of the evidence of parties interested ought to be abolished. Certainly, the law requires some revision on that point. The friend of exclusion thinks, that to ad mit the party himself would but tend to the increase of per july. I acknowledge that there may be some reason to `ear his eagerness will mislead hire, but that same cause operates on other men, and frequently makes them swear too near the wind. But the rules of law, as they at pre ,ent stand, are inconsistent ; for a man, though he may aot swear in his own cause in a Court of Justice, may ap pear as a witness in the same cause, if it is referred to an arbitrator. It once occurred to me to examine a rich man, against whom a claim had been made, and who had writ ten many letters on the subject of that claim. I pressed him upon the subject of what he had before thought, or 'aid, or written about the claim, but he positively refused to say any thing about the matter. I had the letters lying in a bundle before me on the table. At length, after giving him a great many hints as to his having written some let ters which did not agree with the evidence he was then Living, I chewed him the letters as they lay under my hand, and advised him not to be so eager iu his testimony, but to reflect a little and try if he could not recal to his memory • , ornething of the kind I had hinted. Me refused my advice. I then directed myself to his Solicitor, suggesting to him the true nature of the case, and I asked him whether he would advise his client to continue to resist payment of the demand ? He answered, certainly not ;--the arbi tration terminated, and the money was paid the next morn ing. Now this result could not have taken place in an open Court. The party, I am persuaded, did not intend to perjure himself, but he had entirely forgotten what he had previously done. I mention that case in candour as one against me, but I am not yet convinced that the principle is erroneous. 'That witness, as the case was before an arbi trator, escaped the consequences of his eagerness ; but he would have been ruined to the end of time if the same occurrence had happened in a Court of Justice, where nobody would have believed but that he was perjured.— But whether parties are admitted or not as witnesses, still I say that the rule should be uniform, and if a party to a cause is not allowed to be examined before a Judge and Jury, he ought not to be permitted to give evidence before an arbitrator in a Court of Equity on affidavit. If any thing can be, I must say, that I think the affidavits in the Court of Chancery are a nest of perjury. Whether it is right to admit or to exclude such evidence, I will not now determine, but surely the dissimilarity of practice is a sufficient ground for my asking for an inquiry.— The first great point on which the evidence of parties is excluded, is to be found under the head of their inte rest in the cause. That rule is constantly acted upon in Courts of Justice ; but I do not know any reason why all per sons of good character, whether interested or not should not be admitted as witnesses, subject only to the question of the amount of credit which the Jury might think due to their testimony. The case of Bent v. Baker first drew the distinction between an interest in the question itself, and an interest in the event of the cause, and determined that unless he was interested in the event of a cause in such a manner, that the first verdict could be given in evidence in his favour, he was admissible. In that case there were ten underwriters on a policy of insurance ; an action was brought against one, and all the nine others were brought as witnesses. It was quite clear that they were interested in the question, and that if the verdict went against the first, they would all be liable to pay the amount of their sub scriptions, but they were not interested in the event, as the first verdict could not be given in evidence for them in the other actions. They were, therefore, admitted as witnesses. I will not pause, Sir, to ask your opinion on this case, but proceed to state in what manner it operates. If I am interested to the amount of one shilling in the event of a suit, I am not a competent witness ; but suppose my father is a man of large property; suppose him bed-ridden or lunatic, and almost at the point of death ; and suppose, for any purpose whatever, or by any person whatever, a com mission of lunacy should be issued, I may be a witness, and swear myself into the possession of 5,0001. a-year. From these considerations, Sir, I say, if a line is to he drawn, it is not between one sort of interest and another, but between competency and credit.--(Hear, hear, hear.)--Again, a person who has this interest, if objected to, may become competent by giving a release to the party against whom his claim may exist. The drawer of an accommodation Bill of Exchange is not a com petent witness without a release; but if he and the other party execute mutual releases, his testimony becomes admissible. The parties in this manner may cook up a case for the Court, well knowing, if they are honest to each other, the releases will be mutually redelivered the moment the cause is over. In another instance the law capriciously requires written evidence of a contract which is not thought necessary in other cases. I am well aware 'of the great benefits of the Statute of Frauds, and I agree with Lord Hale, that " every line in it is worth a sub sidy." Now I do not wish to diminish its worth, but, by adding a few more lines, to increase its value to a still greater number of subsidies.—(Hear.) ---I would adopt something like the French law of Contracts, and by that law modify our own. I would not require that everycon tract should be in writing, but that every contract for a vaiue of above one hundred and fifty pounds should be in writing, and where almost all men are able to write cor rectly as at the present day, I do not think I should be re quiring too much. But the law of evidence of written contracts requires alteration, as much as the law regarding interested witnesses. The books of a deceased person are evidence, if he has entered the receipt of sums by which he makes himself chargeable for ever so small a sum. If he only charges himself with 51. or 5e., he makes his books evidence for his representatives, who may gain 5001. The great ground on which they ought to be excluded is, that of their having been made for such a purpose;, and with regard to the case of Barker v. Wray, which was decided with reference to that point, I will only say that it was the common feeling of the profession, that such books should be admitted in all cases in which it was not proved that they had been manufactured with the view of being made evidence. In another point is this same law of the admission of such evidence incon sistent with isself. A person's book is evidence for him self, in a matter arising from the composition of tithes, al though he does not charge himself with a single item in it. In the rules for the examination of witnesses, nothing can be better than many parts of the system now established. All I lament is, that different Judges lay down different rules on this subject, and one will allow an advocate to cross-examine his own witness, if he sees that that witness is really hostile, while another will refuse the same permis. siou. All tests are excluded, whether they apply to the knowledge or the skill of the witness. If I want to apply a test to his memory or to his skill, I am unable to do it. First, as to his recollection. I may not allude to the con tents of one of his own letters, in order to ark him whether the subject, which I know to be treated of in that letter, has been so treated of or not. I must put the letter into his hand, by which he, at once, becomes acquainted with the contents, and perhaps defeats the object of my inquiry.— There is another subject which I will mention, and that but briefly, because I once had the honour to bring a Bill before this House on that subject. It is one of exclusion of evidence in the case of libel. In that case the test of the malice or no malice, on which the action depends, must be deciegl, not only by the truth or falsehood of the a lleged libel, but by the intention of the party. Now that question I am not at liberty to determine, by examining i n to the intention of the defendant, for that is disallowed by the law. A man may be guilty of publishing a libel—the falsehood of the publication may be quite apparent; but then he is precluded from giving evidence of tie: intention with which that publication was put forth—a matter which I deem to be peculiarly for the consideration of a Jury. I maintain that such evidence ought to be admitted in all cases where due notice is given. Again, why is it that one class of persons should be excluded from giving evidence in crimi nal cases, while the evidence of all others was admitted ? Why, for instance, should a Quaker be prevented from g i v i n g testimony in criminal as well as in civil cases ? 1 was once engaged in a case where our principal witness was a Quaker ; we forgot the circumstance; and, upon going into Court, his testimony was refused because he would not take an oath, and the consequence was that the a ccused escaped. Why, I ask, should you refuse the evi. dente of a Quaker or of any other Sectarian, provided he believes in God and the existence of a future state, and ten ders that evidence according to the forms of the persuasion to which he b e l ongs ? Why should the testimony of any man be refused, unless it appeared that he was rendered infamous by the verdict of a Jury ? But this was no tall. I may cross-examine a witness as to his general charater ; I may ask him whether he has not himself had the foulest charge preferred against him five or six different times; and if be answer in the negative, I am bound to take thetas his answer, unless I am in a situation to produce the re- , cord of his conviction. Thus, an innocent person may be made to suffer, while a guilty one escapes e as I am bound and concluded by his answer. I must here observe, that all rules of presumption of evidence are bad ; and I par titularly object to what it, by Chancery - Barristers, called egui pollent evidence. Upon the construction of written instruments the Court always decides, while the constructio n of parole evidence is left to the jury. But a latent ambiguity might exist ; as, for instance, in a case where John Noakes, of such a parish, was alluded to in a document, and it turned out that there were two persons of that name in that parish, then surely extrinsic evidenc,- ought to be allowed ; and it should:be left, not to the Court, but jury, to decide the point of identity. The I w i subject has b een l a id d own by m y L or d B acon . iI n haveo h upon the subject, and merely throw po t t th is e naydoubts out these observation s for general consideration. I now come to the general construction of the law with re -pect to Wills and Deeds. I think it would be wise 'o get rid of all technicaliti es and obscurities in the respect, and to place the law on a plain, a sound, and - -traight-forward understanding on the subject. Why, I tik, should there be a difference between the mode of be towing property by will and by deed ? A man may, ;t present, bestow property by will, and yet be as .melt in the dark with respect to the disposal of it at 'ie would be when the will itself was about to he brought •uto operation.---[The Learned Gentleman occasion dly loivered his voice so much, towards the conclusion of "is sentences, as to render the latter branches of them alto tether inaudible in the Gallery.) Another point is, that if , man appoint another his executor, he is supp o sed to release !um from any debt at the time owing by him to t h e testator. Igain, if a man had made two wills of the same da te , one .f which was out of his possession, and if he destroyed one. ;t is presumed that he intended to destroy the other also : lad if both wills be in his possession, the case is presumed different, and it is held that he merely wished to destroy the duplicate; and yet by the one act his intentions as the lisposal of his property may be defeated, and his estate conveyed away to his 150th cousin. If a man makes a will by which he, for certain important purposes, conveys An estate out of him, even for an instant, and takes it bacl: , tgain, it is held that the estate reverts hack to its original uses ; and it is well known that Lord Erskine lost a con siderable estate in Derbyshire in this way. In fact, in cases where it is most important that a man should see his way, he generally never knows so little, or is so ignorant to the consequences likely to result from his own actions. I should say, having laid down these principles that it is de sirable that all descriptions of evidence,including all records, all writings, and all the testimony of every kind, which a party can possibly procure, should be brought into Court, in order to facilitate the administration of justice, and render it more perfect. By requiring the best evidence which can be obtained, in relation to every subject—by admitting and calling for the best that can be expected— by only excluding such written and parole evidnese as it is possible for either party to manufacture. and get up to serve his private purpose—by allowing all persons not infamous, and therefore, disqualified to give testimony in every case—by permitting the fullest ex amination into all matters suggested or demanded by the information arising out of the cross-examinatioa of wit nesses—by the adoption of these, and similar alterations and improvements, we may hope to leave the law so ra tional, so perfect, and so consistent, that it will want only one step to complete it—namely, to extend its opera tion to all the Courts, and render it applicable on all occa sions. Why written evidence shall be a subject for the decision of the Court, and not for the consideration of a Jury, I profess, Sir, I ant unable to understand. In the Courts of Chancery no oral evidence is received— no witnesses are ever seen. In the Law Courts a con trary proceeding is adopted, and with very beneficial results. I would propose to make the same description of evidence applicable in Courts of all sorts, and I would have one uniform and rational law founded thereupon. The Statute of Limitations is an important subject, and, as I think, requires alteration. I cannot understand why there should be no limitation on an action of specialty, as in that arising out of a bond ; for a bond may be 20 years old, and yet in law as good as ever. Lawyers cannot pre sume that it has been cancelled as lone- as it is th ere star ing them in the face. A limitation of ten years, during which no interest has been paid, might be enough as re spects bonds. Why parole evidence should be allowed to take away the effect of the statute of limitations I cannot perceive. According to , the dictum of my Noble Friend, now at the head of the Common Pleas in the Sister King dom—the House will perceive I allude to Lord Plunkett— an individual not less distinguished by his eloquence than by his legal knowledge—Time is armed with his scythe to destroy evidence, but the Legislature has made use of the healing under his wings to cure that destructive effect. At one time the Courts of Law held that any thing, even the simplest expression, would take a debt out of the statute of limitations; for instance, if a defendant were to say. to a plaintiff--" I have paid the debt," that assertion was taken as proof that a debt had at one time existed, and it devolved on the unfortunate defendant to show in what manner he had paid the debt. Again, if he said, " I owe you nothing," the assertion was taken as an acknowledg ment ; and he was also required to prove an acquittance of the plaintiff's claim. The reply, " six years have expired" was equally dangerous. In fact, so deeply did Lord Erskine feel the difficulties which encompassed the defendant under the statute of limitations, that he said, and perhaps was justified in saying, that the only safe answer a defendant could give, when his adversary sent a fishing witness to establish his claim, was to knock him down—(a laugh)-._as in that case the defendant could only be tried for the assault. There are various processes by which different periods for recovering property are fixed—if by formedon, the action must be brought within a certain time ;—the right might formerly be brought within sixty years; now the period was limited to thirty years, and if the party sues to recover property of which he has him been disseised, then he must proceed within twenty years. And why, let me ask, does this difference exist between these different modes of pro ceeding? Because one of the statutes was passed in the reign of Henry the Eighth, while the other was passed in the reign of James the First. But, Sir, look at the situa tion in which a defendant is placed by a Writ of Right. He is at once put upon the proof of the title of his an cestors, while the plaintiff has nothing to do but lie by and pick holes in his case. This however, is only one of the many hardships and inconveniences to which a party may be put by this course of proceeding, and that too, without the other party running the risk of paying a far thing costs. I was myself engaged in a case of the kind at York, in which the record was withdrawn on the part of my client, owing to some unexpected defect in our evi dence. Three weeks after this, a document was found at Exeter, which established the claim of the other party, whereas, had the case been tried in spring instead of August the successful party would hare been defeated. We find there is no limitation with respect to the claims of the Crown or of the Clergy. I would not wish to restrict the natural rights of the Church. I would only regulate, not take away, its power. I would not wish to repeal the Nullum Temps Act, but I would limit its operations to sixty or eighty years. The course of these observations brings me to the trial of the issue ; and here I cannot help observing, that I think the Judge is much hampered and inconve nienced by being left wholly alone during the progress of a cause. Motions for new trials mainly depend upon . the notes taken by one Judge, and sometimes read over by another. Now, it often happens that one Judge is a slow note taker, and is often inaccurate, while another may be a quick and accurate taker of notes ; but few, if any of them, take their notes in short hand. I think it would be advisable, therefore, to have regularly swore short-hand writers it each Court, not that the Judge was to be alto gether bound and concluded by the notes so taken, but in order to afford him the satisfaction of knowing that any little omission or inaocuracy on his part might thus be remedied and set right. Another important point, as it appears to me, is, that in all causes brought into Court, • each party should be allowed to sift and comment upon his adversary's case. I have myself been often obliged to open a case, as it were, in the dark; I have, to be ' sure, made something like a guess at my adversary's ease, but more I could not do; and I have been obliged to proceed with the greatest caution, not knowing how far my witnesses could bear cross-examination, or how soon they might break doWn. The rule, as it at present stands, is, that Counsel cannot reply unless the defendant calls wit nesses; but Counsel are frequently afraid to call witnesses for the defence, from a fear of the effect which a powerful reply might have upon the Jury. In a word, the present system had a tendency to counteract, instead of advance, the ends of justice. With respect to the law of arrest, I would allow no man to touch the debtor or his goods be fore trial ; but on the other hand, I say, that I wo uld sl; B asquickly, low of no let, no hindrance, to interpose between him 01 " his creditor after trial —sure, I am, that no hooestl: will oppose me in the assertion (or, if I am oppetf d ti l o n n ; it must be by some crotchetty and fanciful itnsg' ° i a that no shelter or protection should be extern. edvewrdict was• fraudu lent debtors.—(Hear, bear.)—When once A obtained by a plaintiff, it should be acted 9° 71 but, at the same time, as dimply of c hattel ty i s isting law of England, the recovery . „. by replevin or detinue. If I bring re covery of a gun, for instance, I' l°°lcno / .. an t ac f s o t r on for the the value of the gun, but for the gun itself; and take the body oi the debtor in panam, although t gun is in existence. But the worst chapter of the law is that in which you get land in specialty. S u ppoie 10,0001. of mine be laid out by another in a dishonest speculation in land ; I caa the party, but he laughs at one, ' and gives me land which has in th, interim fallen in value to such a degree that I get not more than 2001. a-year, being less than one - half the interest of as passible. propene ex.. my money. Bfst supposing the individual to be in Perlia ment, or to live abroad, or to die, the Court of Chancery would look upon it as a simple contract debt, for which not one acre of the land would be liable after the death of the party: Again, suppose I sue a titan who owes me n I get a verdict, and send an officer te, seize, and' money ; on entering the house lie sees my 5,000 guinea . _ lying on the table, and yet----will the House believe, it?--he cannot touch a farthing of the money ; he may take the he may seize the goods ; but the money he cannot touch . - This was the law as laid down by Lord INlanefield—a man, whose legal knowledue and liberal opiniOue upon the law if the country were exceeded by none—a man, who was held in the highest 6stiffiation for his legal knowlelge anal acquirements (however attacked on the subject by one of the ablest writer of his day)--sa man, I say, who was nil mired by all, for the sound discrimination which he brought et the decision of all questions of law, except, perhaps,, ,y those who were jealous and envious of an .exeelience they could not attain; it was deeLded b y that Totoble Lore, , that money could not be seized upets, because money esuld not be sold. This opinion was aftertn.L ris c°llfi ' ire. ~ by Lord Ellenborough. With all these anomalie: sta ,"i 3 es in the face, who is it, I ask, that is to be considered . innovator ?—Those who are for preserving the letter, while. they ate departing from the spirit of the law ; or I, who am desirous of departing from the utter, in order to pre serve the spirit? The Funds lieve risen—money has be- come plentiful—trade has almost grown up in the interval and now, by adhering to the old law, tinder changed cira eurnstancee, you in fact alter the law while you pretend to adher e to it. I defy the wit of man to shee• !re a wronger or a m ore comp l ete ease , i n which that mon is an amovater who says, do not chaneeeasand that man a strict observer of ancient forms and practices Who says change the position,. ',alt keep the relation.--(Hear, hear.)—The stately vessel has gliding down the stream, followed by a smaller hark, been which, i n t h e wor d s o f P ope, ""pursues the triumph and partakes the gale" at souse distance, but with equal speed ) you cannot stop the bark :vitt - Mut producing a c h ange , an d to l et it preened No m a is to prevent it. n, but such a one pointed out by the Roman Poet, rust leus expectat, would thing of i m pelling the progress of the bed( ; none but a fool would exclaim, "stop the boat!" anti all but a fool most see, that to allow themselves to follow each other, the cree moving as the 'other move , a nd chan g in g as the other shames, is to preserve their relative position...-(Hear, , hear.) We are, as it were, floating down the g reat stream of time; events daily happen...changes hourly occur, ii- : opposition to which it would he ridiculous for us to hole up a finger—changes which instead of produc i ng murmurs of dissatisfaction, ought to be blessed as thedispensationsof Providence ; and shall we convert them into cur s e s, b y .in obstinate and blind adherence to that maxim, "Do not change ?"—forgetting all the great alterations that hanc teen going on in spite of us, and by avoiding change, making the most violent and fatal innovation. Then what do I propose? That all a man's debts should be paid parri passe —that all his debts should be paid out of Allis goode---4hat his person should only be taken when he- refuses to give up goods which it is known he pos sesses—that his goods should be rigorously sifted, and bolted from bine—that he should be prevented from practically re maining possessor of any property because it is the pro perty of his creditors—that whether real or peesonal, his eoods should bey made available- But then I would nec take the person if I were morally certain I had al/ the goods, unless in cases of quasi criminal conduct, such as where a debtor has entered into criminal speculations, or where he has been guilty of buying goods, that he relight sell them immediately, without ever intending to ply for them. I would draw a line (which is easily drawn, be cause it is done every day by the Insolvent Debtors' Court) between imprisonment which is nut a satisfaction of the debt, stud imprisonment which may be justifiably used as a listens of extorting payment, although chiefly and almost wholly as a punishment for misconduct. The Insolvent Court makes the distinction, and why should not other Courts have the power to sepirate misconduct from the payment of debt, stud thus affix a punishment of theca inonthe-,in one mama of two months in another, and so iL. proportion to the- decree of !asiminality? We Should then, in my opinion, see the late on this subject brought to as • o' great perfection as in the nat ure o f thi rsts it can acquits!. (Hear, heere). , I have o n e or t wo o th er points to whi c h I must refer, and one of them is ehe s u bje c t o f A ppea l s . .All I have to say upon this topic, however, is so bvious, and so manifestly and entirely directed to prevent vexatious litigation, that it is hardly necessary for me to do moreehan to state my principle. The Right Hon. Gentleman opppsite (Mr. Peel) is no doubt perfectly aware, that what be did on the subject of Writs of Error, has, in fact, occasioned a great, increase of litigation. A man cannot, indeed, oh - tai.n delay as formeily ; but the consequence has been, that many more causes are defended, and at an enormous ex pence. Hundreds of actions are now resisted which before were undefended. In the Court below the plaintiff his -his judgment; and what I suggest is, that security shaft be ' ' taken from the defendant, in case the appeal shall be de cided against.him. When this security has been given, let the appeal proceed' but the very necessity to give security would almost put an end to the appeals. What I propose is bottomed on the same principle as the extension of the Statute of 3. Jas. I. by the Right Hon. Gent.—it is a mo dification, and, as I conceive an improvement. I would also allow a Judge to have the power of saying to a defend ant, " You shall pay by instalments, upon giying good security—(Hear, hear, hear.)—l, in my legal discre tion, will grant you this delay and facility." The result would be, that property would not be needlessly torsi. to pieces,and the honest debtor ruined. At all events,if his:could obtain fair indulgence in a reasonable and honourable way e lle would never think of setting up the frivolous defence we now witness, nor would he resort to Writs of Error and Appeals for the purpose of procuring delay. lam confi dent e o a c r c .) .Theincidentally in Housentally that some such measure might be adopted ; and I have therefore great hopes, from the further •and candid ex willexamination be w moinf costs — e thatao, of I t the ex e s have subject..--(Heal, e v : said little .—( topic, ll which a e u l ' h or nothing tion in the course of this discussion—but one which is, per. haps, of all the most important. A man, in ordinary ' eases, would in vain ark me to advise him to bring au ac tion. I should give such advice to no man ; for if he proceeds against a rich and pertinacious debtor, he may ob tain a verdict for 201., and have to pay 30/. or 401. beyond the sum recovered, for his taxed costs....-(Hear.)—l have before me several instances of the kind : from one bill of 5001., no less than 2021. was deducted; from another of 217/., 76/. was deducted, and that in the Court where they are proverbially liberal. In a third instance, 4/. was taxed off from a bill of 261. It is to be observed, that the whole expense would have been incurred, if the debt sought to be recovered had been only 100/. instead pf 5001. How then, let me ask, is this to be remedied ? I think, by better rules of taxation. Attorneys, by being deprived of their legitimate charges, should not be driven to insert items in their bills which ought never to find their way into them. At present, as they ere not allowed to practice ; charge at all for consultations and for preparing cases, and t e i si l e e_ on o e e db p i ai sg t not half enough for the expense of witnesses kept in at tendance—they are obliged, in self-defence, to make it up - Tit): expense way' charged d e fo r o t t h h e e r lo my conscience, o I fa n ster in t e podee c rs a cias s: t ets , before r almt,t, which, ne, 2 ,hae 3 ; B or / ned . tao r, - , e n l l 'e . taxa tion, not less than 147/. t.h s ao v u e nt r h e aoy d ri e t cl ie u s cte in d . . nd contend, we see the evil effects of p ,. ar .t t o ial b c e h view to the general system of the law you seem to be doing good when unskilful surgeon, mischief; you are acting like an T without regard to the new organ system of the law, as the whole system of the human el Reform same. you . body, ought to be considered at with its relation to an o oth t, er I believe, would lead to Then are we, at this tins° i changes? We have gr ea thethpe?nderout laws of Justinian, that 200 without going to the --;., ers—jealous of their I von say, a, justly ancient rights, a_n, d ,', u der the sn jealous of their in vasion as any peors a to n al - -a S yet we know that there existed a consall, noto ter the whole Civil Law of Scot land. They c: t . a ass ert of thei r Statute Book, as was Weight, for t iz h a e t w " li . ole St h at e ute w l. h a e r le r said, I thinirs tinder a later Minister. But, pausing this under their camels ben d vas of Snot t 'i„ l d a comprised in three pocket duodecimoi; ~et von ears . trenchant reform with an unsparing hand ' 'into that mint , e ven . 1 )--first, under Lord Grenville, and • pr ecedent, I will quote to you the authority of Lord Hale, o b ee quently than whom no man ever existed more tenacious) attached to the ancient institutions . of his counts' "In his celebrated i' • , the . Lau, reattse on the Amendment of . he says • ----" By long use and custellis m en es Pe ci allY that are aged, and h ave been' long educated in the pro ,ession and practice of the law, contract a kind of super stitious veneration of it beyond what is just and reasona ble. They tenaciously and rigorously maintain these very forms and proceedings and practice s / whi"ht though possi tily at first they were seasonable and useul ; yet by the very change of matters they become not only useless anti imper tinent, but burthensonte and inconvenient, and prejudicial to the common justice and the common good of mankind: not considering that the forms and prescripts of laws were " not introduced fie their own sakes, but for the' use of public justice; and therefore, when they become insipid, useless, impertinent, and possibly derogatory to the end, they may and r oust be removed."---Such is the language of Sir l e . H a le ; and after Lord Coke, and perhaps Littleton, there isno higher authority in the law than Shepherd, the well-known author of tke " Touchstone," who, in another