The Sun. — London, England, 1835-04-14 00:00:00

34,697 tiro mem ! towns, or ro;vards 73. The importance which the privilege of ele( hers of Parliament has conferred upon corporat, rather upon the governinr; bodies there, and th foe political services which are brought within the reach o the rifling corporators, have caused this function to be con. sidered in many places as the sole object of their institu. Lion. In some boroughs this right has survived all othel traces of municipal authority. The custom of keeping the unmber of corporators as low as possible may be referred to this causr., rather than to the desire of monopolizing the municipal authority, which has been coveted only as the means of scouring the other and more" highly prized pzivi lege. Hence a treat number of corporations have been preserved solely as political engines, and the towns to which they be lOng derive no benefit, but often much injury, from their exis tence. To maintain the political ascendency of a party, or the political influence of a family, has been the one end and object for which the powers entrusted to a numerous class of these bodies have been exercised. This object Las been systematieally pursued in the admission of freemen, resident or non-resident ; in the selection of municipal functionaries for the council and the magistracy ; in the appeintment of subordinate officers .and the local police ; in the administra tion of charities intrusted to the municipal authorities ; in the expenditure of the corporate revenues, and in the ma cagement of the corporate property. The most flagrant abuses have arisen from this perversion of municipal privi leges to political objects. The commissioners have gene rally found that those corporations which have not possessed the Parliamentary franchise have most faithfully discharged the duties of town government, and have acquired, more than others, the confidenZie and goodwill of the communi ties to which they belong. This has been the case in some even where the ruling bodies are strictly self-elected, and where the general character of their constitution is open to the objections common to the great majority of corporations. Very few large corporate towns were '..ithout members-of Parliament, even before the Reform Act, so that many instances cannot be g iven from among them. The corpo rations of Leeds, Lynn, and Doncaster may be cited as turning their attention to their municipal duties more _ sedu lously than the majority. Among s m a ll t owns , deserving the same character, we r e fer to the corpor a ti ons o f L ou th, Bideford, Maidenhead, &leeks, South Moulton, and Strat ford-upon-Avon. 74. Admission into the corporate body has commonly been sought mainly with a view to the lucrative exercise of the elective franchise. In those towns where a large body of freemen return members of Parliament, the years in which elections have happened, or immediately preceding those in which they have been expected, are distinguished by the admission of a number greatly exceedin g the average, even without the confirmation w hi c h particular inquiries afforded, it would have been impossible to avoid connect ing the two events. At Maldon, 1,870 freemen were ad mitted in 1826, 1,000 of whom were admitted during the election. The average number annually admitted since that time . is only 17. The following table, taken from a Parliamentary return, ordered to be printed on the 3d of February, 1832, shows the annual number of freemen admitted in 128 cities and towns from 1800 to 1831. London and Preston are the only towns omitted. In London, the number admitted varies little ; in Pres ton, freemen . are mostly admitted at the guilds, which occur at intervals of 20 years. The years in which general elections took place are marked by an asterisk (#). The years 1813 and 1816 appear in the table as ifthey were ex ceptions to the general rule, whereas in fact they confirm it. The Bristol return for 1813 includes the period from the 29th of September, 1812, on which day Parliament was dissolved. In that year, 1,720 freemen were admitted at Bristol, instead of 50, which is about the average number of ordinary years. In 1816, elections took place at Glo cester and Liverpool ; in Liverpool 487 freemen were ad mitted, instead of the ordinary average of 30, and at Glo cester, 415, instead of 30 ; making together 902, instead of CO. These last two are the only instances in which the effects of particular elections produce a very marked result in the general table. Year. I Freemen. II Year. I Freemen. II Year. I Freemen. -.....-. 1800 1,775 1811 1,441 1821 1,468 1801 2,051 *lBl2 5,918 1822 1,430 *lBO2 5,782 1813 3,285 1823 2,080 1803 1,397 1814 1,357 182 4 2,237 1804 1,254 1815 1,480 1821 2,655 1805 1,473 1816 2,582 *1826 10,797 'lBO6 4,700 1817 1,715 1827 1,337 *lBO7 3,114 *lBlB 8,889 1828 1,404 1808 1,256 1819 1,430 18t9 1,433 1809 1,270 *lB2O 4,605 *lB3O 9,321 1810 1,606 'lB3l 2,569 The numbe'rs of freemen admitted since the passing of the Reform Act have fallen off in a remarkable manner : and the corporate officers expressed their conviction that the fevenue from admission-fees would henceforward dimi nish, and in som e pl aces wou ld fail altogether. Parliamentary influence bei ng th e p r i nc i pa l o bj ec t f or which freemen are created, it is not surprising that the franchise should be sought most eagerly by those who wished to make it subservient to their own advantage. The most extensive bribery of the freemen systematically pre vails at Liverpool, Barnstaple, East Retford, &c. 7.5. The election to municipal offices is often a trial of strength between political parties. Instances of systematic bribery, for the purpose of securing municipal elections, occur at Maidstone, Norwich, Ipswich, Liverpool, Oxford, Hull, &c. Thus the inhabitants have to complain, not only that the election of their magistrates and other municipal func tionaries is made by an inferior class of themselves, or by persons unconnected with the town, but also of the dis graceful practices by which the magisterial office is fre-, quently obtained ; while those who by character, residence and property, are best qualified to direct and coutroul its municipal affairs are excluded from any share in the elec tions or management. 76. One of the principal means by which the ruling par ties in corporations have effected their great object of se curing political influence, has been the limitation placed on the - right to admission into the corporation. Whatever may have been the case formerly, the ordinaty qualifications for admission to the freedom are now little calculated to an swer the purpose of ascertaining that the persons so quali fied possess a real connexion with the community, and an interest in its good government ; whilst the power exercised by many corporations, of admitting any one at pleasure, without qualification of residence or property, has-been pro ductive of unmixed evil. GOVERNING BODY. 77. In the few boroughs in which the powers of local government are vested in a numerous body of freemen, the general character of the governing body is vitiated by the defects of its organization, which have already been pointed out. The exclusive and party spirit which be longs to the whole corporate body appears in a still more marked manner in the councils by which in most cases it is governed. It has been stated that the members of these councils are usually self-elected, and hold their offices for life. They are commonly of one political party, and their proceedings are mainly directed, to se cure and perpetuate the ascendancy of the party to which they belong. Individuals of adverse political opi nions, in most cases, systematically excluded from the go verning body. Since the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts, and the removal of the civil disabilities of the Catholics, very few instances occur in which either Catho lics or Dissenters, who often form a numerous, respectable, and wealthy portion of the inhabitants, have been chosen into the governing body of the corporation. These coun cils, which embody the opinions of a single party, are in trusted with the nomination of magistrates, of the civil and criminal judges, often of the superintendents of police, and are or ought to be the leaders in every measure that con cerns the interests and prosperity of the town. So far from being the representatives either of the population or of the property of the town, they do not represent even the privi leged class of freemen ; and being elected for life, their proceedings are unchecked by any feelin g of responsibility. The discharge of the functions with which they are entrusted is rendered difficult by the dislike and suspicion which the manner of their election inevitably entails upon them. 78. To . this system may be traced the carelessness often observed in the execution of their duties ; and persons well qualified for the council arc excluded, sometimes for want of vacancies, sometimes through the rejection of the electing body, sometimes through the refusal of such persons to iden tify themselves with a system of which they disapprove. The common council of the city London present a striking exception to the system of self-election for life, and it af fords a remarkable instance of the absence of those evils which we refer to it. The common-councilmen of this city are annually elected by a numerous constitueney, yet changes seldom happen among them. The important requisites of experience in the functionary, and the power of control in the electors, are there effectually united, and produce that efficiency and confidence which are wanting in most other corporate towns. The history of the common council of London is that of a body which has watched vigilantly over the interests of its constitiu nts, and for a long series of years has studied to impfove the corporate institutions with great earnestness, unremitting caution, and scrupulous justice. 79. It is part of the general system of close corporations that all their affairs should be managed with the strictest secrecy, sometimes secured by oaths administered to the members of the common council. The inhabitants, who are subject to the authority of the corporation, have fre quently very imperfect infcrmatien as to its nature and ex tent ; they are ignorant whether it derives its sanction from prescription, from charters, or from by-laws ; and the only mode by which they can obtain information is often throigh the troublesome and expensive process of an application for a mandamus or quo zvarranto. •'l he by-laws which are made, as well as those which are repealed, are seldom pub lished, and the public is generally_ unacquainted with the :r provisions except from common rumour. This ignoranea is sometimes shared by the members of the corporation. Hence violations of the charters and by-laws have been often made with impunity. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS AP POINTED TO INQUIRE INTO.THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES. (Continued from our paper of Saturday.) CORPORATE BODY. 71. The most common and most striking defect in the constitution of the municipal Corporations of England and Wales is, that the corporate bodies exist independently of the communities among which they are found. The Cor porations look upon themselves, and are considered by the inhabitants, as separate and exclusive bodies; they have powers and privileges within the towns and cities from which they are named, but in most places all identity of interest between the Corporation and the inhabitants has disap peared. This is the case even where the Corporation in cludes a large body of inhabitant freemen, it appears in a more striking degree, as the powers of the Corporation have been restricted to smaller numbers of the resident popula tion, and still more glaringly, when the local privileges have been conferred on non-resident freemen, to the exclusion of the inhabitants to whom they rightfully ought to belong. 72. Some corporations are occasionally spoken of as ex ercising their privileges through a popular body, but in the widest sense in which the term " popular" body is used in regard to corporate towns, it designates only the whole body of freemen ; and in most towns the freemen are a small number, compared with the respectable inhabitants interested in their municipal government, and possessing every qualification, except a legal one, to take a part in it. In Plymouth, where the population, including Devonport, is more than 73,000, the number of freemen is only 437, and 145 of these are non-resident. In Norwich, the great majority of the inhabitant householders and rate-payers are excluded from the corporate body ; while paupers, lodgers, and ethers, paying neither rates nor taxes, are admitted to the exercise of the functions of freemen, and form a con siderable portion of the corporation. In Ipswich, containing more than 20,000 inhabitants, the resident freemen form about 1-55th part of the population. Of these, more than 1-3 d are not rated ; and of those who are rated, many are excused the payment of their rates. About 1-9th of the whole are paupers. More than 11-12ths of all the property assessed in this borough belong to those who are excluded from the corporation. All the inhabitants whose rent exceeds 41. per annum are taxed under a local act for municipal purposes. Of those who are -so taxed, less than 1-15th are freemen. The assessed taxes paid in the borough exceed 5,0001. per annum. The amount paid by all the corporate body is less than 1-20th of the whole. The condition of these freemen exposes them to bribery and undue influence, and advantage is taken of that con dition to establish the most demoralizing practices. The following table contains the population compared with the number of freemen, resident and non-resident, as nearly as it could be learned, in several large towns. The ta bles annexed to this report show the populatioi number of freemen, as far as it could be ascei most of the corporate towns of England and We n, and the rtaincd, of les : POP U. LATION. ~. Municipal Borough. IParliamentary Borough. Cambridge Chester ... Exeter 7rswich "Xingston-upon-111,11 Leicester Liverpool ... Newcastle-upon-Tyne Norwich Nottingham Oxford Plymouth Portsmouth • Wigan . . Worcester York 20,917 21,363 28,255 20,454 30,293 40,512 165,175 42,760 61,095 50,220 19,370 31,030 46,232 20,774 13,590 25,260 20,017 22,263 33,552 20,454 49,727 40,512 155,000 53,613 61,093 50,220 21,145 31,030 50,339 20,774 27,000 27,760 jTctal or the 16 tomts. 059,431 715,702 Freemen. 194 1,550 CORPORATE OFFICERS. 60. One vice which we regard es inherent in the cOnsi tation of municipal corporations in England and Wales is, that officers chosen for particular functions are regarded as a necessary part of the legislative body. This 'lotion appears have originated in times - when the separation of constitu tional authorities was not under Stood ; when ju .. : ~,, and executive functions, were confounded. The corporations of England and Wales were originally framed on principles encumbered. with , this confusion, and have been modified, down to the latest changes, with a scrupulous' observance of them. 81. Ti:is union of different functions has been produc tive of much evil. The respect which ought to - be enter• taiued towards the magisterial office has been impaired by the manner in which the magistrates of a corporate town have been involved in the local politics of the body which regulates its taxation, manages its property, and superin tends the. working of its constitution. 82. It will be apparent, from the preceding remarks, that we con',ider the union of the functions of‘ a magis trate with the other duties of the mayor or other head of the municipal council, one of questionable expediency. Other functions often united with the office of mayosmight be advantaJeously separated from it. The duties of coro ner are of this decription. There are serious objections alco to the practice of allowing the mayor to act as the treasurer of the corporation, when the examination and audit of his accounts placed in the body over which he presides. Inconvenience of an opposite kind occurs, where several persons are required to concur in executing, the duties-of a single office ; evidence of such inconveni ence appeared at East Retford and Berwick-upon-Tweed. _ _ 83. a in some cases the duties of the mayor have been totally neglected, either from want of capacity or from want of will ; occasionally from non-residence. At Hartlepool, where the mayor is chosen in rotation from the capital bur gesses, many of whom are non-resident, it sometimes happens that the mayor never attends, even to be sworn into office. At Winchester, the present high steward was chosen, mayor durior , an important litigation in which the corpora tion was involved. He was the son of the patron, and was admitted a freeman the year before his election as mayor. The mayor was ex officio a member of the com mittee for conducting the litigation ; but he appointed a deputy, and entered on the records of the corporation a protest of his ignorance of all relatinc , to it. At Durham, the mayor of the year 1831-2 refused to render the usual account of receipts to the common council. The mayor of Grampound left the borough upon its disfranchisement, and the corporation books and accounts have not been found since. No new mayor was elected after the disfranchise ment until the year in which the present commission issued. In some boroughs the same mayor is continued from year to year ; and in others, as at Cambridge and Tenby, it has been the custom to elect two or three personS in rotation. The effect of entrusting the election to the freemen, con stituted as those freemen now generally arc; is to degrade the office in the estimation of the persons to be governed. At Maidstone, the election is merely a struggle to try the strength of opposing parties, without any personal preference, and bribes are given by persons wishing to avoid being elected. 84. The method of appointing the recorder is often very objectionable. At Newport, in the Isle of Wight, the recorder is appointed formally by the Crown on the nomi nation of the whole corporation, but practically on the dictation of the patron. On one occasion a nobleman was chosen recorder there, whose connection with the corpora tion consisted. in his being a trustee for managing the pro perty of a deceased patron. At Woodstock, the recorder's office has been vacant for several years, because the pa tron's nominee was opposed. The recorders of some boroughs are elected by a constituency of freemen, such as we have already characterized. At Berwick-upon-Tweed, a recorder so chosen tries capital felonies. This officer also unites functions in some cases, which are improperly joined. This occurs when he lives in the neighbourhood, and dis charges the duties of a resident magistrate, at the same time that he is, by virtue of his office, the' presiding judge of the criminal court. In many instances he performs no duties whatever, and his nominal connection with the borough is only a form, through which he exercises over it an unwarrantable control. The charters have often empowered the Recorder to ap point a deputy. The exercise of this power is occasionally useful ; but the practice of appointing a deputy perma nehtly to discharge all the duties of the recorder is very mischievous. Not only is the appointment placed in the hands of an irresponsible individual, but the, difficulty of finding qualified persons to fill the situation is increased. Many persons would accept the office of principal who would decline the office of deputy. 85. The fact that in numerous instances persons not pro fessionally educated are chosen recorders deserves the most serious attention. Such an office ought unquestionably to be filled by one who has received a professional education, and has had some professional experience. In some towns barristers are appointed recorders, who- wholly neglect to attend the borough sessions ; flagrant instances occur at Lancaster and Carmarthen. The recorder of Carmarthen has held the office during 50 years, and has scarcely ever visited the borough, or performed any of the duties of the office during that time. The recorder of Lancaster did not attend the Quarter Sessions once between 1810 and 1832. In 1831 the grand jury of the bo rough presented that it was expedient he should attend. After attending once, in consequence of this present ment, and a subsequent order of the council, he ex cused himself on several grounds, among which Were those —that his other duties were very important—that he was careful of the interests of the corporation, though absent, and that recorders did not usually reside, except for politi cal purposes. Upon this the corporation voted their thanks to him for his attention to their interests. In general even when the salaries would be insufficient to induce a prac tising lawyer to give his time and attention to the office, we apprehend that the connexion which it creates, and in many instances the distinction which it implies would be sufficient to secure the services of competent lawyers without a large pecuniary remuneration. This opinion must, of course, be taken with reference only to such duties as recorders are now expected to fulfil. 86. The extent to which some corporations have carried the principle of treating the corporate offices as a matter of mere patronage may be illustrated by two instances, in which that principle has been applied to the very important office of town-clerk. At Winchester, upon a canvass for that office, between two competitors, one only of whom:was a member of the corporation, a compromise was effected, at the suggestion of some members of the governing body, by an arrangement that the two candidates should nominally hold the - office jointly, that the one who was not a member of the corpo ration, should manage the business, and that the emoluments should be divided. At Boston, on a vacancy of the office of town-clerk, an alderman and justice of the peace for the borough, with two of his brothers, who were also aldermen, supported a candidate, on condition of receiving a yearly allowance out of the profits of the office. The candidate was elected, and the stipulated sum has been regularly paid. Several other members of the council were acquainted with this arrangement, and ratified it by the appointment. 87. All corporations have inferior officers, who axe al most alwnys freemen under the control of the select body. Many of these officers have no duties to perform, and re ceive neither fees nor salaries, yet the election is annually made, and oaths for the proper fulfilment of their duties are solemnly taken, on the installation of these no minal functionaries. The corporations entertain doubts whether 'they can legally cease to elect officers named in their charters ; and unquestionably, a power to dis pense with the election of any chartered officers, on a presumption by the corporation of their inutility, might lead to great abuse. _The common council of the city of Lon don, which possesses extraordinary legislative powers, has assumed the authority of abolishing some useless offices, of consolidating others, and of attaching new and useful func tions to them. THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 1835. CRIMINAL. JURISDICTION. 88. The criminal 'jurisdiction of the municipal corpora tions is extremely defective. The extent of it is tot4lly dis proportioned to the importance cf the town, or to the . pro bable intelligence and respectability of its magistrates. In Bath, with a population exceeding 50,000, in the city and suburbs, no felonies can be tried, but all must be sent to a distance, varying from 18 to 50 miles. In \Vinchelsea, with a population of 772, and in Dunwich, with a population of only 232, the jurisdiction extends to capital felonies. The condition of concurrent or exclusive authority corresponds as little as the extent of the jurisdiction itself with. the mo dern importance of the towns, or with the principles of ex pediency arising out of their situation, and their means of communication with the seat of count . ) , jurisdiction. The grant of exclusive power appears either to have depended entirely on accident or caprice, or to have been determined by circumstances which have long disappeared. Many corporations have disused the jurisdiction conferred by charter. This has generally arisen from an unwilling ness in the corporate magistrates to undertake the responsi bility attached to the exercise of such jurisdiction. 89. The party spirit which pervades the municipal coun cils extends itself to the magistracy, which is appointed by those bodies, and from their members. The magistrates are usually chosen from the aldermen, and the aldermen are generally political partisans. Hence, even in those cases in which injustice is not absolutely committed, - a strong suspicion of it is excited, and the local tribunals cease to inspire respect. The corporate magistrates, generally, speak ing, are not looked upon by the inhabitants with favour or respect, and are often regarded with - positive distrust and dislike. 90. The corporate magistrates are often selected from a class incompetent to the discharge of judicial functions, and the consequence has been, a great defect in the administra, tion of justice. At Est Retford, a respectable witness, who had been clerk to the magistrates, declared that One of the magistrates was in the habit of conversing familiarly with the culprits brought before him, and endeavoured to impress them with the, dea that he was performing an un willing office. On one occasion he saw the magistrate fighting with a prisoner, and struggling with him on the floor. At Malmesbury the magistrate's are often unable to write or •read. At Wenlock blank warrants have been signed by the magistrates ; in one ease a blank warrant of commitment was granted by mistake, instead of one of.ap- prehension, and the constable bad it in his possession for several weeks before he executed it. The jurisdiction of the borough magistrates at Wei:lock is exclusive ; it. ex tends over seventeen parishes, and contains.a population ex ceeding 17,000 persons. Even when the corporate magistrates belong to a su perior class; they are often selected from the senior alder men only, who, from age and infirmities, soon become in capable of performing the functions of their office, while a mistaken notion of dignity keeps them from resigning it. 91. A circumstance much complained of in many places is the non-residence of the magistrates, and this occurs sometimes to an extent that mast be highly inconvenient, without amounting to so great a mischief as would induce Court- of King's Bench to interfere on application for their removal. 'Besides, the expense and uncertainty of such an application are sufficient to deter most persons from . having recourse to it. 92. The evils resulting from the ignorance and in efficiency of the borough , magistrates are heightened by gross defects in other parts of s ' the judicial system. The juries of the borough courts - are often exclusively taken from the freemen; who, besides being composed of an inferior class, are strongly tainted with party feel ings. Northampton furnishes a strong instance of this. At Carmarthen, verdicts are frequently given against justice, from party bias. - The population of that town is 10,000, but the jurors are chosen from a small body of 173 burgesses. At the Spring Assizes of 1833, a true bill was found by the grand jury of the borough for a capital felony. The grand j ur y cons i s t e d o f 20 burgesses ; these, 17 belonged to the corporation party, and the fore man was the committing magistrate. The . panel of the petty jury contained 46 persons belonging t o the corpora tion party, 12 of the defendants' party, and only txo neu trals. An application was made to the judge to order the indictment to be tried in Carmarthenshire. The trial took place there, and the defendants were acquitted. The only answer to this statement was given by one of the sheriffs, who said that there was not a - sufficietit number of respect able persons of the defendants' party to enable him to sum mon a grand jury equally from both sides, and that the petty jury was summoned from those burgesses who bad not attended the previous assizes. At Haverfordwest, where none but burgesses can serve on the juries, there are only 141 burgesses, and not 50 who are fit to serve on them : the juries there, have been openly reprimanded by judges and magistrates for improper acquittals of burgesses upon cri ininal prosecutions ; the practice has not been checked by such reprimands, and the general opinion is, that it is " im possible to convict a burgess." 93. The most incompatible offices are often united in the person of the town-clerk. He very frequently acts as de puty-recorder; which practice, in our opinion, cannot be too strongly condemned. He is often, practically, the prin- cipal attorney for the prosecution of offenders tried a the borough sessions, whose commitment he had previously ad vised in his character of clerk to the magistrates. Even when his name does not appear to the prosecution, the same evil often ensues from its being in the hands of his partner. In York and Hull great complaints have been made of the conduct of prosecutions by the town-clerk's partner, and in the latter place of the advantages which the rules of prac tice give him over other attorneys. In Preston, the town clerk is a member of the council, and his partner is the senior alderman, a magistrate, and a coroner. A strange incongruity sometimes appears in the election of the town clerk to the office of mayor ; in some places where this has occurred an attempt has been made to gloss over the irre gularity, by appointing another town-clerk during the year of his mayoralty. Whilst the same officer thus unites the characters of judge and prosecutor, the selection of the juries is often entirely committed to his discretion, and it cannot be a matter of surprise that suspicions of unfairness and partiality should be excited. CIVIL JURISDICTION. 94. The defects which prevail in the administration of civil justice in corporate towns are of the same kind as those to which we have adverted under the head of criminal ju risdiction. The same union of incompatible functions is found in these courts. If the recorder does not attend, the town-clerk becomes the real judge of the court, from the incompetence of the other magistrates to perform their duty. At Reading, the town-clerk, during his mayoralty, tried and taxed the costs of a cause in which his partner was one of the attornies. In many towns, although he does not practice in the court of record as an attorney in his own name, he is the real attorney in the cause. At Kendal, the town-clerk's partner, who is an alderman, practices in the civil court. The same thing occurs at Scarborough, where the town-clerk acts as assessor in the civil court, and also taxes the costs. This union of conflicting duties is very adverse to the proper administration of justice : it is a frequent cause of suspicion and jealousy amongst the inhabitants, even where the character of the officer is a security against improper conduct. It is justly made the subject of complaint that the town-clerk should act as an atterney of the court, either in his own name, or in that of his partner or agent, as in fact it places the whole power over the proceedings of the suit in the hands of the attorney of one of the parties. 95. The town-clerk often selects the juries in these as ell as in the criminal courts, and they are often chosen from the same objectional class. At Portsmouth, the ju ries are selected by one of the sergeants-at-mace, who is chosen out of two by the plaintiff's attorney. At Chiches ter, they are summoned by an officer who is one of the four nominal attornies in court, the real attorney in the cause having the power oftelecting the nominal attorney. 96. The sergeant's-at-mace and other ministerial officers of the court who are placed in the situation of sheriffs, are often persons whose pecuniary responsibility is insufficient to afford any security to the suitors. 97. The costs of a suit in these courts are in general very considerable, taking into account the fact that the ex pence of witnesses, which elsewhere is one of the heaviest charges in a suit, is here invariably light. The costs of a plaintiff often vary from 15/. to 20/. ; of a defendant, from -81. to 121. The whole system of fees and costs in these courts is objectionable. There is, generally, no authorised table of them, and frequently no well-defined practice on the subject. They are mostly in the discretion of the town-clerk, though they are in some places taxed by the mayor. They bear little relation to the services in respect of which they are paid, and bear no reasonable proportion to the average value of the matter in question. Even un der the present mode of proceeding a reduced scale of fees and costs might be introduced ; but with an improved practice their amount might be materially lessened. 98. Among other causes which have led to the disuse of these courts may be accounted the want of professional skill in the judges. Nor can it be doubted that the intimacy which must necessarily exist between the judge and the parties who appear before him has been one source of the disinclination to resort to these tribunals. A few minutes convert the tradesman and the customer into the judge and the Suitor. Another prominent cause of the desertion of these courts has been the facility of removing the causes, and the general inclination, on the part of legal practitioners, to sue in the superior courts. The plaintiff, on procuring execution, can avail himself of it only within the limits of the local jurisdiction. His process, therefore, is frequently fruitless, the defendant removing himself and his goods be yond the limits of the court. This was a very common subject of complaint. These courts possess• an unlimited power of imprisonment, which in some cases is made the means of great oppression. 99. Notwithstanding their defects, a very general desire was expressed on the part of the inhabitants of those bo roughs where the civil courts had fallen into disuse for their revival ; and any system which would have the effect of distributing justice where the parties interested reside would be regarded as one of the greatest boons which the Legislature could confer. 100. Many of the evils we have enumerated as prevailing in the administration of criminal and civil justice result from the continuance of jurisdiction after the decay of the borough. The limited population of many boroughs pre cludes the possibility of finding within them competent per sons to discharge the duties of magistrates, even in petty sessions, although a sufficient number might be found capa ble of superintending the police, and the paving, lighting, &c. of the town. Even in the • more important boroughs, great injustice results from intrusting the.powers of sitting as magistrates in quarter sessions, and as judges of civil procedure, to persons not having professional knowledge and experience. GAOLS. 101. In the state of the borough gaols, we find additional proofs of the evils of continuing the Present constitution of the local tribunals. Instances rarely occur in which the borough gaols admit of any proper classification of the pri soners. In some large towns, as at Berwick-upon-Tweed, Southampton, and Southwark, they are in a very discre ditable condition. In many of the smaller boroughs they are totally unfit for the confinement of human beings. In these places the prisoners are often without a proper supply of air and light ; frequently the gaols are mere dungeons under the town-hall. In such receptacles it is impossible to put a prisdner to work, or to separate the crinlinals and the debtors. • Felons may often be committed to the county gaol when the borough gaol is in an insufficient state ; but this power -does not extend to prisoners committed from the civil court ; and thus debtors may be immured in places of confinement not thought fit for the reception of criminals. It was fre quently stated, that the gaol of the borough was in so unut a state for the reception of prisoners, that plaintiff's were un willing to consign the defendants against whom they had procured execution to confinement within its walls. At Saltash, it was said that the same feeling prevented the pro secution of criminals. Where the corporate bodies possess the means of im proving the condition of the gaols, the blame of their pre sent state admits of no palliation. Many corporations are unable to defray the expense of maintaining places of con finement more suitable than those they now possess. POLICE. 102. The police belonging to municipal. corporations is for the most part very insufficient, and for supplying the deficiency resort is had to local acts. The superintendence of the nolice, and the powers necessary for watching, par ing, lighting, cleaning, and supplying the towns with water, instead of being entrusted to the municipal authorities, are for tia most part committed by these acts to xarious inde pendent bodies ; although none or these - towns arc too ex tensive to be embraced by one system of- municipal govern ment ; for instance, every quarter of the town of Bath is under the care of a separate board, except one, which is totally unprotected. • Much confusion results from this di yided authority. The powers of local taxation, and the su perintendence of matters so closely connected with the comfort and well-being of the inhabitants, which are now exercised by these bodies, appear to belong precisely to that class of objects for which corporate authority was originally conferred ; b u t grea t di ssa ti s f ac ti on wou ld prevail. among the inhabitants if. these powers were intrusted to the mu nicipal corporations as at present ,constituted.. In several towns much apathy is now shown by the inhabitants with re spect to the municipal benefits conferred by these acts : in Southampton, where the consent of the inhabitants is re quired to bring them within the powers of alocal act, nearly half of the town has refused the benefit 'of it. Great jea lousy often exists between the Officers' of police acting under the corporation and those under the commissioners of these local acts; and the corporate body seldom takes any active share in the duties of the board, of which its members form a part. At .Bristol, a no toriously-ineffective.police cannot be improved, chiefly in consequence of the jealousy with which the corporation is regarded by the inhabitants. At Hull, in consequence of the •disunioir • between the govern ine- body and the inhabitants, chiefly arising out of a dispute about the tolls and duties, only seven - persons_ attended, to suppress a riot, out of LOOO who - had -been sworn in as special constables, and on another similar occasion none at tended. At Coventry, serious riots and disturbances fre quently occur, and the officers of police being usually se lectedfrom one political party, are often active in fomenting theist. In some instances, _the separate and conflie,ting au thority of - the commissioners is avowedly used as a check and counterbalance to the political influence - of the corpo ration. At Leeds, no • persons are elected commissioners of police whose political principles are not opposed to those of the corporation. - An ineffectual attempt to obviate the evils resulting from the want of a well-organized system is made in somo towns by subscriptions for private watchmen. At Winchester, after a local act had been obtained, its powers were found to be insufficient, and the town is now watched by private .subscriptiop, to which the Commissioners contribute 1001. from the rate. The superintendence of the paving and lighting, &c., of the various towns, is in the same unsatisfactory state, but in this branch of police the want of a single presiding au thority leads, perhaps, to less evil and inconvenience. EXTENT OF LOCAL JURISDICTION. 103. The frequent occurrence of precincts, in the heart of the corporate towns, not subject to the authority of their m agistrates, has been mentioned. Such places, by protect ing offenders against the law, still present the same obsta cles to an effective police, which were once found in sanc tuaries. In many cases great inconvenience results from the want of extension of the corporate authority over the suburbs ; and these evils are likely to recur continually, un less ready means could be afforded of enlarging the boun daries from time to time in such manner as circumstances should require. The boundaries selected as the'limit of the Parliamentary franchise, which often extend to the distance of several miles, were not always chosen with a view to the possibi lity of the future municipal union of the annexed districts with the boroughs to which they were attached. PROPERTY. 104: The revenue derived both from the tolls taken at markets and fairs, and from the town dues, is a subject of general complaint, grounded, as well on the consideration that the money thus levied is seldom applied for the benefit of the community, as on the vexatious and injurious nature of that kind of taxation. This arises, in some places, from the exorbitancy of the tax, in others from its tendency to limit the trade of the port. A striking instance of the latter evil is seen at Bristol. Sometimes the dissatisfaction is in creased from the consideration that the individual who takes - tolls to his own use discharges no equivalent duties. 105. The exemption from tolls or dues payable on the exportation or importation of goods, in some of the great commercial towns, constitutes the most valuable privilege of the free merchants, and is at the same time strongly complained of by the merchants who are not ffeemen. In Newcastle, the payment of these tolls has made a difference to a merchant of 450/. annually. In Liverpool, one mer cantile firm has paid to the town dues more than 1,400/. in one year. In some towns, as at Bristol, a merchant, by the payment of a fine, may be admitted to the freedom of the city, and thus relieve himself from many of these op pressive charges ; but in other towns, as at Liverpool, the corporation has, of late years, refused to sell the freedom, and consequently the tolls remain a permanent tax upon the non-freemen merchants. In connexion with this im portant part of the subject, it will not be forgotten, that the freedom, whether purchased or not, conferred an exemption, not a monopoly. Whatever may have been the origin of the tolls, in many cases they are now paid Without any equivalent consideration being rendered by the corporations which enforce them. At Topsham, where the corporation of Exeter levy quay dues, vessels are compelled to incur the expense of lighterage, because they cannot approach - the wharf, in consequence of the neglect of the corporation to cleanse the river. 106. That part of the revenue which arises from fines levied on persons for refusing, to serve corporate offices is also a source of reasonable complaint where such fines have been levied, not for the purpose of compelling persons to serve the offices, but for the sake of increasing the funds of the corporation. 107. By some corporations a revenue has been occa sionally derived from very improper sources. The corpora tion of Tiverton had for many years an allowance from the receivers-general of the county of Devon, which allowance was stipulated for by the corporation, as a consideration for the exercise of their influence with one of the capital bur gesses in obtaining the appointment. In numerous instances individual corporators were accustomed to receive pecu niary allowances from the patron of the borough. These sources of emolument have probably ceased in great mea sure since the passing of the Reform Act, and a principal inducement to belong to the corporate body in,many places has been thereby taken away. 108. The evils which have resulted from mismanagement of the corporate property are manifold and of the most glaring kind. Some corporations have been in the habit of letting their lands by private contract to members of their own body, upon a rent and at fines wholly disproportionate to their value, and frequently for long term of years. Others have alienated in fee much of their property for inadequate considerations. At Cambridge practices of this kind have presiailed to a very great extent. In large towns such malversations are less frequent, the most striking defects in those places not being the clandestine appropriation of the corporate property, but carelessness and extravagance in the administration of the municipal funds, and an exclusive distribution of patronage among friends and partisans. 109. In some towns large sums have been spent in bri bery and the other illegal practices of contested elections. During the election of 1826, the Corporation of Leicester expended 10,0001. to secure the success of a political par tisan, and mortgaged some of their property to discharge the liabilities incurred. In Barnstaple and Liverpool the funds of the Corporation have been wasted in defending from threatened disfranchisement a body of freemen who had been proved guilty of bribery. 110. In general the corporate funds are but partially ap plied to municipal purposes, such as the preservation of the peace by an efficient police, or in watching or lighting the town, &c. ; but they are frequently expended in feast ing, and in paying the salaries of unimportant officers. In some cases in which the funds are expended on public pur poses, such as building public works, or other objects of local improvement, an expense has been incurred much beyond what would be necessary if due care had been taken. This has happened at Exeter in consequence of the elan of avoiding public contract, and of proceeding with out adequate estimates. These abuses often originate in the negligence of the Corporate bodies, but more frequently in the opportunity afforded to them of obliging Members of their own body, or the friends and relations of such Members; 111. Some Corporations consider that their property has been vested in them solely as trustees for the public ; but, in most cases, this truth is-acknowledged only when forced on their attention, is received with difficulty and qualifica tion, and is continually forgotten. Few corporations ad mit any positive obligation to expend the surplus of their income for objects of public advantage. Such expenditure is regarded as a spontaneous act of private generosity, rather than a well-considered application of the public revenue, and . the credit to which the Corporation, in such a case, generally considers itself entitled, is not that of ju dicious administrators, but of liberal benefactors. Even in these cases, party and sectarian purposes often prevail in its application. 112. From this erroneous but strongly rooted opinion,- that the property of the corporations is, held in trust for the benefit of the corporate body only, distinguishing that body from the community with which it is locallly connected, the transition is not difficult to . the opinion that individual cor porators may justifiably derive a personal benefit- from that property. At Cambridge, the practice of turning the cor poration property to the profit of individuals was avowed and defended by a member of the council. 113. This principle has been undisguisedly adopted in few corporations compared with the number of those in which it is indirectly acted upon. Some sense of impro prietycinclicated by the secrecy with which such transac tions are conducted, has accompanied the execution of long leases for nominal considerations, or the alienations in fee of the corporate property to individual corporators. , Ad vantages of a - different kind are offered in the shape of salaries to sinecure, unnecessary, or overpaid officers. These indeed are less 'injurious to the character of the in dividuals who profit by them than direct misappropriation, as custom has been supposed to sanction them ; but the loss to the community is the same. A system of lavish expenditure of this kind, which is found in many of the important corporations, is more extensively mischievous than actual peculation, because there is no.want of persons willing to profit by it, at th• same time that the direct ap propriation of the capital, instead of the, income of the cor poration, is generally contemplated as a fraud upon the public. 114. The salaries to the corporate officers in a great many instances are not at all commensurate with their duties. The allowance to the. chief officer is_ often very large, and it is well understood that he is to expend it in public . entertainments. The practice of having periodical dinners and enter tainments for the members of the common council and their friends, the cost of which is defrayed out of the corporate funds, prevails almost universally. In some places a considerable part of the revenues of the cor poration appears to have been devoted to such purposes. An opinion was obviously entertained at many places, that any degree of, expenditure for such purposes might be jus tified, if the corporation restrained itself within the limits of its permanent income, and didnot tax the inhabitants to supply the means of such expenditure. 115. With the custom of conferring salaries that must be considered exorbitant, even when the officers chosen are competent to the propei discharge of their duties, may be classed the practice of bestowing important and high sala ried situations upon incompetent persons ; both are among the many evils arising out of the system of self-election and irresponsible exercise of patronage. 116. Conduct of this description would probably have been checked by the mere force of public opinion, if the corporate accounts had been subjected to the scrutiny which must have resulted from the publication of them, and a complete prevention might probably have been effected, if a - practical control had been imposed of the same kind as that possessed by parishioners over the expenditure of their churchwardens and overseers. 117. The debts incurred by many corporations have been swelled to their present amount by most negligent and improper management. At Berwick-upon-Tweed, where the freemen manage the affairs of the corporation, and pos sess commons of the value of about 6,0004 per annum, they have borrowed money expressly for the purpose of dividing it amongst themselves. 118. Many of the close corporations have become in debted to the patron of the borough for sums of money advanced to them for municipal and other purposes. At Bodmin a debt of this kind, though not entered on the books of the corporation, has been recently demanded, and satisfied by the alienation of a considerable portion of the corporation property. We are at a loss to understand from what sources even the inconsiderable expenditure of many of the smaller corporations can be provided for since the passing of the Reform Act. At New Radnor the revenue of the corporation is collected by the agent of the patron, and paid to the patron's account, without any interference, by way ,of order or allowance, .on the part of the corporate authorities. The same thing formerly happened at West bury. After the Reform Act, the patron, who is also the recorder of Westbury, desired his agent to relinquish the management of the corporate property, and it is now re ceived by the mayor. A case exactly similar has occurred at Camelford. At Tewkesbury, the corporation being insolvent, and having compounded with their creditors for a payment of 6s. Bd. in the pound upon the amount of tfieir debts, the recorder, who was also Member of Parliament for , the town, advanced 2,000/. to effect the payment of this com position, taking as a security a mortgage of the whole pro perty of the corporation, which produced an income of 221. I Is. Bd. per annum, with a reversionary interest in the market-house and other buildings, at the end of about 60 years. SPECIFIC TRUSTS AND PATRONAGE. _ _ 119. Besides the property applicable to all municipal pur poses, various funds and revenues have been intrusted to corporations for specific objects. Tolls and dues, for instance, have been granted for objects of local utility, as the maintenance of a navigation or a harbour, and they have been granted exclusively for such purposes. Financial abuses of the same nature as those which we have already reported are found in the manage ment and application of these funds. •At Lincoln, river tolls were expressly granted for the maintenance of a navi gation. The navigation has been neglected, to the great injury of the city, and the tolls have been converted into private property. The corporation of Bristol, by order in common council, dated 20 May, 1606, imposed a tax of wharfage on all merchandise brought to the city, for the repair of the quays, wharfs, and bridges, in and about the city. A Parliamentary title to this and other tolls was ob- I tamed in 1807, on an allegation by the corporation that they had been received from time immemorial. They have been leased to the company of merchant venturers for a nominal rent of 101., the merchants undertaking the repair of the wharfs. The amount of the tolls is very considerable , bu t cannot be stated, as the merchant venturers refuse all ac count of them, and of the manner in which they have been expended. At Beverley, dues are levied on vessels enter ing a creek, for certain purposes specified in a local Act of Parliament, which expressly directs that they shall be 1I plied to those purposes only. A portion of these dues is now applied to the general purposes of the Corporation. At Scarborough, dues are levied for the support of the pier, and are exclusively appropriated to that object by an a ncient order in council. , No separate account is kept of these dues, which are merged in the general funds of the Corpo ration. At Boston, a fund appropriated to the maintenance of the harbour is under the control of the council. A member of the council was appointed the banker of this fund, and the security usually required was dispensed With in his favour. He became a bankrupt, with a considerable balance in his hands, and the fund sustained a correspond' ing loss. 120. Other specific trusts are connected with charitable institutions and the administration of charity funds, which are under the control of the corporate authorities. He re . again we find mismanagement and misappropriation to a considerable extent. - The corporation of Exeter is indebted to various cbari ties a sum exceeding 17,006/. At Truro, the charitY Pr ° : perty has been let for a fine and nominal rent. This nowt nal rent has been applied to the charity, and the fine has been appropriated to the purposes of the corporation. A t Cambridge no accounts have been kept ; but the misaV r°- priation of these funds is not denied by the corporation' At Ipswich, malversations have long been matters of corn; plaint. In 1811 a petition upon this subject was pres ented to the Lord Chancellor by a member of the council. It was sent back for the insertion of certain entries from th e corporation books ; but these books were in the po ssession of a member of the self-elected assembly,- and wer e not forthcoming. Other members of the council were dissatis fied with this interference of their colleague, and the tow n " clerk remonstrated with him, urging that, if he per severed , the funds would be taken but of the hands of the co r p ora tion. The petition was consequently abandoned ; and fro" that time to the present, the same waste of the prope rt y has been going on. At Winchester, the management has been actually taken from the corporation in consequence of notorious waiver' sation. 121. The patronage connected with these trusts has i n numerous instances been exercised by the corporate autho: rities, to gain or reward votes both at the Municipal On Parliamentary elections. At Norwich, the patronage of the hospitals, whic h is vested in the aldermen, has been avowedly exercised in favour of their own party. Promises have been given t,° freemen, to place them on the foundation, in return for thel votes at elections, and weekly pensions have been elle r° till these promises could be fulfilled. At Leicester, Coventry, and Northampton, the corpora: tions have exercised similar patronage for the same corroPt purposes. At Boston, party distinctions in the distribu ton of a charity fund were avowed and justified by one °i the magistrates. At Ipswich, it is notorious that pensi one l s upon the foundations which are under the control o f t e ar corporation are selected with the same view; and that their participation in the charity is the price of their votes a.s municipal elections. Some of the funds entrusted to thl corporation have disappeared altogether. These instances are sufficient to illustrate the cha racte d of the abuses which are connected with specific trusts the patronage. They not only prove that the object of the trust has been lost sight of, but that a provision fo r poorer classes of the community, in the hands of the c ore rate authorities, has become a source of corrupt influen ce : a, 122. In some boroughs, as at Derby, East Re d "' f Launceston, &c., the corporation nominates the masters ° the schools, many of which are endowed. At Tewkesbl where the , master's conduct was complained of, it was °lf that no redress could be obtained, because he was one "ci the borough justices, by whom the master is appointed r visited. From various causes, sometimes from the inwr°l9lce, selection of the master, as at Derby, sometimes from n 't, „ ing the education exclusively classical, the schools bave come, in a great measure, useless to the inhabitants, a.vt, much valuable property given for the purposes of educ;tl°,4 is thus wasted. At Derby, the school was once fullc.o„- scholars ; recently it contained only one pupil. At 1 ,„ ; ventry, the funds of the school amount to 900/. per anntlin,id the two masters divide about 7001. between them , bu t only one pupil in 1833, and for one or two years previoash,,.. A great desire was expressed in many places by the -. bitants for the revival of the schools, and that they sh° afford the elements of an useful English education. We have now laid before your Majesty, as concise]," a 0 possible, an enumeration of the principal defects which I`, have found in the constitution and management of t he n Ujc nicipal corporations in England and Wales. We b ur° , certify to your Majesty that the statements contained in this report are amply confirmed in detail by the r esult,s ich the inquiries instituted in the several corporations, "Io results are embodies in the separate reports to which ist have already referred. Even where these institution s ei• in their least imperfect form, and are most rightfully ad Petit nistered, they are inadequate to the wants of the rest, state of society. In their actual condition, where not P o f ductive of positive evil, they exist, in the grert niajor it Y er , nstances, for not purpose of general utility. The P erv ca , sion of municipal institutions to political ends has °c os sioned thc sacrifice of local interests to party Pu r P o t iae which have been frequently pursued through the c orraP and demoralziation of the electoral bodies. In conclusion, we report to your Majesty that there P l .!: veils amongt the inhabitants of a great majority of th e d 'i D e corporated towns a general, and, in our opinion, a In st ,. of satifaction with their municipal institutions ; a distros'oir. the self-elected municipal councils, whose powers are ,5. 1 . 5 ject to no popular control, and whose acts and proceonbl'ijo being _secret, are unchecked by the influence of Il t i o g opinion ; distrust of the municipal magistracy, T o rt with suspicion the local administration of justice, an", the accompanied with contempt of the persons by w hom of law is administered ; a discontent under the borde ° a f o r local taxation, while revenues that ought to be anPli e . wa te the public advantage, are diverted from their legitl oft use, and are sometimes wastefully bestowed for the b e ing s of iilividuals, sometimes squandered for purposes ioJnfore to the character and morals of the people. We tbeq the feel it to be our duty to represent to your Majesty, th;raleS existing municipal corporations of England and f your neither possess nor deserve the confidence or respect st be Majesty's subjects, and that a thorough reform Int:twit effected, before they can become, what we humblY s ot to your Majesty they ought to be, useful and efficie struments of local government. 141 I'dr We humbly submit this our report to your ..-4 royal consideration. JOHN' BLACKBURNE. GEORGE LONG. , FORTUNATUS DWARRIS. SAMPSON AUGUSTUS RUMBA LL" GEORGE HUTTON WILKINSON . PEREGRINE BINGHAM. DAVID JARDINE. JOHN ELLIOT DRINKWATER . THOMAS FLOWER ELLIS. JAMES BOOTH. HENRY ROSCOE. CHARLES AUSTIN. • EWARD RUSHTON. TAN' ALEXANDER EDWARD COCIO3- , JOHN BUCKLE. DANIEL MAUDE. WAIS T WILSON THE PAINTER AND HIS WAI.- ,joug —This eminent painter was sadly unprovided with the pr—to metals while a student in Rome. There is an odd sterYbatts of his doffing his coat one day for a game of tennis in the„ of Caracalla, when, lot on his back, by way of lining.."s-ible; waistcoat, a splendid waterfall, with grotto, &c. became lodoe' a contrivance no doubt of his laundress, to turn his tions to some profitable purpose. DIED. , • e ife On the 9th inst., at Easteot- house, near Wells , 'i:tne'eolf Csetslal-ii: in his 80th y ear , William Bla c kburne, Esq., hl. D•' dish-square, London. • of V ° 's . On the II th in s t., A nn , w ife of 11r. Robert F . Finn' oie, ham-green, aged 37. .i l orlY strOeent,tLheeiclelsttheri-nsscitu.,areMainryh,erwfoethoyfeaArl.exander Gfibs:jrn: ° A f ri, On the 9th inst., at ' Brixton, Ann, the wife ° Nelson, aged 65. es:dnce, On the Bth inst., Mrs. Elizabeth Labrum, at h er ,_d r ,La i br uT'' ' U • N''''. Yr . - ' - late Rica., Jnion-row, New Kent-road, relict Of the . wholesale seedsman, of Thames-street in her 87th Year" -O ne ' On the 3d inst., at Kentish-town. in ' her 35th sloe • wife of J. G. I" ‘elk, Esq., of Walsoken-house, near Nv i. t, ...„. London : Printed and Published by MURDO YOU , he c eao t Y Strand, in t 112, Strand, at The Sun Office, No. /12 , 2 of Middlesex. year,,,.arYn II IR TH . S. 00. On the 13th inst., in Upper Harley-street, the g K Onst.enon, of a son a heir. the 11th in n ' d at Benacre Hall, Suffolk, the la d y of "A°are° Lawson, Esq., 141. P., of a son. ° On the 10th inst., at Dunnichen House, Forfarshire, the James Whitshead Hawkins, Esq., of a daughter. MARRIED. Sl° 6° On the 11th inst., at Compton Basset, Wilts, Georgrauito' Stanley, second son of William Sloane Stanley, Esq., vinfield'e to Laura, daughter of the late William Webber, Esq. , o' imurottri; On the 9th inst., at Lenton, the Rev. Charles Thomas r o f J° Rector of Claypole, Lincolnshire, to Elizabeth, daughte 4,1 Wright, Esq., of Lenton-house, Nottinghamshire. . seq,, On the 11th inst., at St. Peter's, Walworth, Fredernicn matiai son of James Wilkinson, Esq., of Finsbury-circus, to A, C only daughter of Lieut.-Colonel Bryce, of Grosvenor-Plat' ' berwell.