The Sun. — London, England, 1852-04-06 00:00:00

LONDON, had employed a military force for the suppression of that savages into the citizens of t a regularly established state ;'who allOulehhe better able to do so, however, on the arrival of the rebelli on —that he proclaimed martial law, under which he had vainly expected that teir chiefs would recognise and next mail. caused some persons to be put to death and others to be observe the lase of nations; we had entered into diplomatic Mr. GLADSTONE ho p ed the Co mmittee would not r a s hl y imprisoned. Nov, with regard to the twenty-one executions relations with them—aPPotnted agents to reside amongst infer from what the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said, which had been referred to, they had the authority of Sir H. t hem , and sti p ulated that the chiefs should p reven t d e p re - no doubt in perfect correctness, that the vote now proposed Ward for stating that not a single individual was executed datiens—should restore . stoler property, or ma k e compenta- of 480,0001., together with the vote which was taken last n or imprisoned simply for having borne arms against h er tion. Those stipdaons had Kafirs ill kept, for the . year of 300,0001., was anything like the total expenditure. Majesty's authority. Every one of these individuals were e r o ere—te rise the word sof their own great c hi e h sandiiii _ a , On th e con t rar y, these votes represented only th e ex t r a ex punished because they had taken a part in those atrocious I nation of irrecla i mable thieves ; and ther e was no difference pense of the war, or rather only a part of the extra expense crimes which marked the progress of the insurrection, such I between chiefs and followers. The chiefs had been utterly of the war. But the figures and the military expenditure in as the murder of the Count Mataxa and the burning of his faithless; they had displayed the greatest skill and inge- this matter were, not the entire or worst part of the evil, four servants. The Honourable Member had referred to a nuity in evading the provisions of the treaties. The frontier though the figures t hemselves wer e almost frightful and in petition alleged to have been signed by twenty-three priso - f armers h ad bitterly complained that the B r itish Govern- credible. The tales of the frontier policy at th e Cape, an d ners in the lonian Islands, who were confined for the part ment, which had deprived them of the right of redressing of the loss brought on this country in connexion with it, they took in the insurrection at Cephalonia. Now, after the their own wrongs, had not sufficiently p r otected them would be regarded by those who came after us in future ages statement he had made, on the authority of Sir H. Ward, and against the depredations of the Kafirs. Some of these corn- as most fabulous.—(Hear, hear.) It would appear ex seeing that some of those prisoners whose lives had been plaints had, without doubt, been well founded. With regard traordinary that a country like this should have gone spared had been sentenced to be imprisoned, some for life and to others he (Sir W. Molesworth) must observe that, when hunting to the very ends of the earth to find the others for twenty years, and that not more than two or three individuals had to redress their own wrongs, and when, in means and opportunities , of squandering the treasure years have elapsed, he thought it was rather premature— so doing they h a d t o i ncur cons ider a ble risk and trouble, and • the lives of its subjects, and that for no even admitting it to be a constitutional course—for this House they wer e a pt to overlook m i nor wron gs, which were not conceivable purpose or policy —net to found colonies or ex to endeavour to procure their deliverance. The Hen. worth the risk and trouble of redressing, and this had been tend them with greater effect than it might have done under Gentleman, not content with making these ch ar g es within the case un der the commando system. Bat whe n, as under a different system, but on the contrary, to deprive them of the House, had also made a statement out of doors, to which the treaty system, a Government undertook to redress the the epportunity of learning all the lessons of freedom of he had no opportunity of giving a contradiction. The Hon. wrongs o f i n di v i duals, then every wron g, however trifling, self-reliance and of independence, which alone could be the gentleman will recollect that he had addressed a letter to r ea l, or i mag i nary, became, if unre d resse d, the s ource of grit,- basis of their social greatness, and which alone could assure the Daily :Sews in the latter part of last year, in which he WOOS complaint against the Government. Thus whenever, either the duration or the utility of their connexion with stated that he had received a letter fro m two prisoners in under the treaty s y s t em , a s h ee p h a d b e en lost or an ox had this country. The Committee was indebted to Sir W. Cephalonia, the contents of which he had adopted by en- strayed on the eastern frontier of the colony of the Cape, the -Molesworthon this occasion, as on many former ones, for closing it for publication in the same paper. Amongst other f armer had i nvariably assume d th a t the Kafirs had stolen it , havin g laid before it, in a f o rm th e most luminous , and w ith charges contained in the letter made a g ainst Sir H. W ard , and that the Govern ment oug ht to recover it. Therefore, a diligence the, most praiseworthy, many of the facts which was one to this effect—that Sir H. Ward, on th e occas i on of partly on account of that, part l y on accoun t of imaginary bore upon this interesting and most painful question. It his second visit last autu mn to the island of Ce phalonia , had depredations, t h e C o l on i a l G o vernment had been constantly would be quite unnecessary, therefore, for him (Mr. Glad induced some of these prisoners to withdraw their signatures called upon to enforce the provisions of the treaties with the stone) to go over ground which had already been so ably to the petition by offering bribes of money to t h e i r wives, savages. But those t rea ti es could only be more strictly trodden by his Hon. Friend. There was, indeed, an abun and holding out hopes of pardon to the priso ners th emse l ves. en f orce d b y constan t recour se to armed force, and that dant scope 'for arithmetical calculations and comparisons, Now, that was a charge of a serious character, and reflecting would lead to war. Some Governors rashly engaged in war, which in some degree might bring home to the popular mind gravely upon the conduct of Sir H. Ward. But Sir H. Ward others endeavoured to avoid war. For instance, Sir George of this country the enormous absurdities that we were per bad written to him (Mr. F. Peel) o n th e s u bj ec t o f th a t Napier, who had been Governor of the Colony of the Cape petrating in Southern Africa —as, for instance, when we told charge, and he would take leave to read the paper re- from 1837 to 18 44 , had stated in his dispatches , and in his them that the Goaernment of South Africa—not in one year ceived from him in reference to it. What was the authority evidence before the Kafir Committee , that he had been re- or in two, but habitually and with every promise of perma upon which the charge was made ? On the authority of two peatedly urged to make war upon the Kafirs, and that there nence—cost us infinitely more per head than the government prisoners, one of whom, Larnburnatos, was the second in were many persons in South Africa who profited largely by of Great Britain and Ireland, they began to think it strange. command, and directly concerned in the burning of Count Kafir wars. Sir George Napier stated that he thought it But look at the matter in another aspect, and inquire what Mataxa and his four servants. This man has written a a great folly for a great country like England to be easily were those provinces . . in South Africa, the contigrity of paper in modern Greek, and dated from Corfu, the transla- provoked into a Kafir war; that he had declined for the which to the Kafirs had brought all this expense upon us; lion of which he had before him, Th e su bj ec t and purpor t sa k e o f a few head of cattle to incur the expense of a. Kafir the y would find that, according to returns which were then of. it was that be had n ever s i gned nor heard of' the letters war; and he had proposed, instead of going to war, to pay upon the table* of the House, 5,500 was the entire white •to Mr. Hume •/ that an impositio n h a d, th ere f ore b een p rac . in certain special cases, compensation out of the public Population of the province of Albert and Victoria, and. th e tieed upon him, for that he could not have signed it, because purse to persons who had suffered from Katir depredations. territory keown as British Kafraria. And if they bought it purports to have c ome f rom c ep h a t on i a , w h ereas With regard to this policy he (Sir W. Molesworth) must uP this Population ten times over, and transported th em i n in reality, h oe was all the time in the Hodse of mention a fact well deserving of attention namely, that the carriages and four from the provinces they now inhabited Correction at Corfu, H av i ng t h us t a k en th e t rou ble of interest of one-fifth of the sum which a year of Kafir war to a' Position'of security, the expense of so doing wou ld not as certaining - the truth o f t hi s c h arge ma d e aga i n st Sir H. would cost; would more than cover the average annual loss amount to one-half or one-fourth part of th a t w hi c h Wa rde he trusted that th e H ouse wou ld a g ree w ith him in from Kafir depredations. For Sir George Napier had stated they were expending in the Kafir war. And f or w h at thinking that the so urce f rom w h en ce th e Hon. Member that during the six years of his government the average an- conceivable object? He was not arguing the pe cun i ar y v i ew derived his information was quite enough of itself to vitiate nual loss from Kafir depredations had not exceeded 36,0001. of the question, to induce the Committee, on account of pa every other charge and allegation that could be made against a year. The Committee knew that a Kafir war now costs cuniary losses merely, to forego the conferring som e grea t the H. Ward.—(llciar, hear.) In respect to the e xercise of about 1,000,000/. a year, andle (Sir W. Molesworth) found benefit upon Africa; on the contrary, the syste m th e y lue high police power under which he imprisoned editors that the statements of ir George Napier were confirmed by were now pursuing conferred on Africa no benefit what ever , and writers of newspapers, he (Mr. Peel ) could assure the official returns. For the ten years of Sir George Napier ' s for it insured the recurrence of these Kaffir wars w i t h a , non. Gentleman that Sir H. Ward was as staunch an advo- government there had been no Kafir war. ' Sir George was regularity that was becoming absolutely a s t on i s hi ng Wh a t not needless went a t homeon this should ocine a s i pursue ? o ba rrtt ioeu la r hoe f l e d l t quarrels.c t o h n a d t uc i t t of was bT entirelyetyhi were orre e cate of a free press as the Hon. Member himself, and that an old soldier — he knew the evils and the cost of war , and then was the course which the Parliament and the Govern_ ha had as corre c t an appreciation of what the rights of the would not rashly engage in it. He thought that neither meri discussing press were as any person could have. But Sir H. Ward felt the honour nor the dignity of Great Britain required it toHete that it was only by this exercise of the high police power treat savage tribes as civilised nations , nor to engage in re that he could punish those slanderous, immoral, and seditious gular war with Kafirs as with a European community, for that governor, or of this or that minister—ex publications, that had disgraced the columns of the lonian violation of treaties and for offences against the law of cept that, in justice to Sir Harry Smith, he must newspapers ; and he was entitled to credit for so doing. nations. The policy of Sir George Napier had not been say, with his Hon: Friend (Sir W. Molesworth), that he Until two or three years ago there was a strict censor- followed by his successors. In 1546 Sir Peregrine Maitland was not aware of any valid grounds of ce nsure upon his ship of the press, and Lord Seaton proposed to remove involved us in a Kafir war for the loss of one axe. In 1847 militar y character.— (Cheers.) He (Mr. Gladstone) set it. - Sari Grey ultimately' assented to its removal on one Sir Henry Pottinger renewed that war for the loss of two aside all retrospect of a recriminatory nature, but he did coadition namely, that a law of the press, punishing goats—Great Britain had about a couple •of millions to pay, hope that he might be permitted now again to pronounce sedition, immorality, libel, and slander — similar to the and the consequence was that the British money abounded in this House words similar to those which he had taken one in this country—should be passed. Lord Seaton did in Cape Town, and commerce flourished. The present war the liberty ( f using on a former occasion; for wh en th e l ast procure such a law to be passed, but experience had ' would be more expensive than the last, for we had now in Kafir war was about being brought to a termination, and shown that that law was utterly futile and ineffectual. South Africa half as many troops again as we had 'in the they had one of these votes proposed to them,s he followed Sir 11. Ward found it impossible to obtai n a ver di c t war of 1846. The present war had been produced partly by the Right. Hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton under it from an lonian jury. It should be borne in mind causes similar to those which had produced former Kafir (Mr. V. Smith) in beseeching and entreating Parliament ' that Sir H. Ward had shown a great readiness to be re- wars—partly by three special causes. Those causes were— to proceed seriously to consider the question of our lieved of this power. He did propose in the last lonian Par- First, the - conduct of .Sir Harry Smith in making himself in frontier policy, and of our colonial policy in general liament to divest himself of this power, provided the As- 1847 the Mkori Mkalu, or great chief of British, Kafraria ; at the Cape, at one of those golden opportunities when eembly would substitute for it a better l aw fo r the p r ess. secondly, the 'frontier policy of Sir Harry Smith, which had the public mind was smarting under the su ff er i ngs th a t That proposition was, however, rejected by a majority of 22 consisted in perpetual and vexatious interference with the had been entailed by our past proceedings, and subjects to 18—a majority that was opposed to the policy of Sir H. affairs of the Kafirs, and in a continued and galling attempt which were connected with the welfare of a remote de- Ward. He certainly considered from 1817 to le4B that the to destroy the authority of their chiefs; thirdly, the igno- pendency were no longer dry or uninteresting to it. lonian people did not enjoy the full measure of independent ranee of Sir Harry Smith of the feelings which the Kafirs en- There was one passage in a dispatch addressed by the late and; constitutional government which was guaranteed to tertained towards him and his frontier policy. He ( Sir W. Secretary for the Colonies to the Gallant Officer who had them by the treaty of. 1815. They had only the appear- Molesworth) had proved these positions at length last year. gone out to assume the goverhment or the Cape, to which ance of an elector a l body, because they were only permitted He would not do so again , for they had not been contra- he (Mr. Gladstone) could not help referring at the present to choose one out of two names that were submitted to them. dieted, and, in fact, they had been admitted in the last dis- moment, because it was a passage which had the character Inethe course of 1849 a n adequate reform measure was car- patches of Lord Grey. He thought that Sir Harry Smith of being eminently prospective. He would not answer for rigid, and the electoral body was increased from 1,500 to ought never to have been appointed governor of the precise accuracy in quoting the terms used; but he about 6,000, an d mos t i m p or t an t rights were conferred upon Cape, and ought 'to have been recalled long ago. He spoke thou g ht that General Cathcart had been instructed in the them. A peopl e w h o were now possesse d o f a cons tit uen t only of the civil proceedings of Sir Harry Smith. He did first-instance to address himself to the conclusion of the war, assembly, f a i r ly c h osen by th emse l ve s, had the power of not feel competent to pronounce a decided opinion upon the that he had been instructed to expedite the operation of working out commercial representation, legal, or other re- military proceedings of Sir Harry Smith. He must, how- the constitution ; and that he had been instructed, lastly, form, provided they only showed themselves qualified to ever, say that he could not discover any essential difference to consider fully the question of the frontier policy,, and exercise and enjoy, in a p ro p er manner , th e liberties wbich between those tactics and those for which Sir Harry Smith to make a re p or t upon that question, to be submitted to we conferred by a constitutional government.—( Hear.) had acquired great renown in the Kafir war of 1835. Those ( th A e ir. British Government spnpmreontecat thus opened nd was by Parliament. N no means Now to him The motion was the n agree d to, and the House went into tac ti c s had been to sta r v e th e Kafirs into sub mission, b y in a Committee of S u p p l y. wa di n g their f a stn esses a n d swee pi ng o ff th e i r cattle. For satisfactory. He was perfectly convinced that debates THR KAFIR WAR. the success of those tactics, it was indispensable to prevent in this country between one system of frontier policy and On the vote for 460,000/, to defray the expenses of the the Kafirs from simultaneously invading our colony and another were, in the main, idle, futile, and mischievous in Kafir war being proposed, sweeping off the cattle of our colonists. For these purposes their results. They would proceed upon the false assumption Sir W. MOLESWORTII said he would not at present two armies were indispensable—namely, an invading army that the regulation of the relations between our European discuss' the causes of the present st a t e of South Africa, nor and a protecting army, Of one of these armies Sir Harry settlers and those barbarous natives of Southern Africa were what should be the future policy of this country towar d s Smith had been deprived by the discontent of the Dutch, and matter s to be settled only bygentlemen sitting herein London. South Africa. He should confi ne hi s observations to the the disaffection of the Hottentots. Therefore, when Sir They also proceeded on the false principle that the moving question now before the Committee, namely, our expendi- Harry' Smith invaded t he f astnesses of the Kafirs and s we p t p ower of the o p eration s in our South African policy was in • tore on accou nt of South Africa. H e w i shed to call the off the cattle, the Kafirs turned our flank, invaded the colony, this country, and not on the spot, and that the responsibility attention of the Committee to the great and increasing and carried off the cattle of the colonists. And when Sir for every depredation ,committed on the frontier rested o n amount of th a t e xpenditure, as shown b 7 returns which Harry Smith returned fro m the fastn esses of the K afirs, that House, and not on the inhabitants of the frontier itself. had been lat e ly p rese nted to Parliament. 'That expenditure bringing along with him their cattle, the Kafirs returned It was not in the present century that that question had to had gone on steadily and rapidly -increasing for the last to their fastnesses, bringing along with them the be considered for the first time—(Hear, hear)—they were twenty yea rs . On the average of the three years ending cattle of the colonists. htherefore, for the ill-success not without the light and teaching of experience, although 1850, it had amoun t e d t o halt a million a year, or to about of Sir Harry Smith's tactics, ,th°se persons were they had unfortunately chosen to reject them. Their co three tim es th e average o f th e th ree years endin g 1836 ; or chiefly to bl ame w h o had produced discontent amongst lonists in North America had had aborigines to deal with, • t 0 about Si. a h ea d f or every E uro pe a n colonist in S ou th th e D u t c h, an d di ssat i s f ac tion amongh the Hottentots ,' l n t o and had they tr ou bl e d th e mo th er coun t r y f or armaments . Africa ;or to about 20s. in the pound upon our exports to the cause of that discontent and disaffection he would not and votes—for half- mill i o ns and millions of money, and for South Africa. Those exports rose and fell pretty much a s in q uire • at present. He must say 'that when he considered the lives and blood of their gallant men, in order to obtain a our military expenditure increased or decreased, and were the position of ou r ga ll a nt troops in South Africa, in the defence against the barbarians on their frontier ? N o ; th ey f rea rat immediately after. a Kafir ware The reason was midst of a populatio n on e-half of whom were hostile, and had known well how to defend themselves and th e y h a d imp e ; our exports to South Africa consisted chiefly of 'the other half were in about equal proportions discontented, at the same time 'regulated their affairs infinitely better onion for merchandise f or our t roops, w i t h some mus k ets an d ammu- disaffected, and doubtful—when he considered that those than they could have been regulated by this country, even rilWra the Kafirs ; and during er immediately after a troops bad not suff e red one positive defeat, had not lost one though we had expended all our national resources in th e un . war there was a b un d ance o f B r i t i s h go ld i n South single convoy, but had accomplished many gallant feats of dertaking. He wished, therefore, to avail himself of that op- A.frichttaand commerce fl our i s h e d. Th ere f ore , if we cou ld arms —h e th oug ht th a t th e y d ese rved great credit for'them- portunity of entering his respectful protest against the funcle- Wand w our troops from. South Africa, and as a selves, and reflected credit upon their veteran commander, mental principle of the policy that appeared to him to be in compensation for so doing were to make the coin - whose health had been worn out in the service of his coun- volved in the instructions to General Cathcart. He said that fists a present of all our merchandise which they try.—(Hear.) A high military authority had expressed his it was not for the Government and the "Parliament in this , . actually e consumed, we should make a most excellent bargain- Opinion in another place that when, the fastnesses of the country to devise a new system of frontier policy ; and t great increase in our South African military expendi- Kafirs were sto rme d by our troops, they ought to be de- he was amazed that a nobleman of great ability, who had ore had arisen chiefly from two causes—namely, from the stroyed, and roads ought to be made into them. With the had long experience as a Secretary of State, should have great increase in th e ex t en t o f our S out h Af r i can d om i n ions, utmost deference to that high authority, he (Sir W. Moles- stated gravely that he was convin ced the time had come to and from the abolition of the old and cheap system of self- worth)doubted wh e th er those things could be done by any consider the necessity of some change in our frontier policy. protection by th e co l on i s t s. I n t h e course o f t h e l as t ten amount of military force which we could send to South Africa. Why, they had been co nsiderin g little else in our frontier 'years the' British empire in South Africa had been more The fastn esses of the Kafirs were of two kinds —either stee p p olic y for the last 25 years; and every change seemed onl y than doubled. I n 1842 it covered an area of 110,000 square mountains, capped with sandstone, resembling vast fortifi- to have made matters worse than they had been before. miler. In the course of the next six years 120.0J0 square cations, with huge masses of sandstone rising several feet They had changed it already, and they were proposing to T o ile's had been added to it, an d it was ex t en ded to nearly from the surface of the ground ; or d ee p, narrow, gloomy change it again ; just as a sick man in his bed, weary of e! 27 th degree of south l a tit u d e . If a li ne were drawn in ravines , called kloofs. B o th mount a i ns a nd ravines were lying on one side, thought it better to turn on the other not y,.about that latitude right across South Africa, from the covered with the peculiar bush of S ou th Africa. In that because he had any hope of relief, but because the excessive .- nman to the Atlantic O cean , it wou ld be about 1,000 miles bash, and behind th e ma sses of sandstone, the Kafirs lurked weariness and disgust created by his position rendered him long, and would constitute a b ou t th e northern boundary of and skirmished with i m punity—retreating as our troops ad- wretched and impatient. Let them not again enter on the the British dominions in South Africa. The territory lying vanced—advancing as o ur troops r e t rea t e d. Our troops could question of changing their frontier policy in a spirit like that. to the south of that line might be called British South Africa, not occupy these fastnesses, for they could not live in th e m . Th ey had alread y seen that benevolence, in g enuit y , and because u nine-tenth s o f it were British dominions, the re- To open roads in them, over the mountains and the kloofs, courage had been exerted in that mattertothe p u er t i m od o , st u , n a le n s d s Maining t en th was t h e terr i tor y i n h a bit e d b y our K a fir would be a task of immense engineering difficulty, and would had been exerted in vain; and the result was that. they. had enemies, an d w hi c h was now surroun d e d on a ll s id es b u t cost an immense sum o f money both i n making and repair- worse prospects before them than a t any former the seaside by British dominione. The area of B r itish South ing. And when the roads h a d b een ma de, unless the bush they changed their whole method of Proceeding.' If he was Africa was 260,000 square miles, about the same as that of on both sides wer e d e st ro y e d, the roads would be only narrow right, it was to the colonists themselves they should look for the Aust r i an empire. Its population amounted to about defi les, and the Kafir lurking in the Bush would shoot with the r eg ulation of their frontier relations.—(Hear.) And he 700,000 persons ; of these one-seventh, or about 100,000 were impunity at our passing t roo p s . B u t t o destroy the bush should add that, in that case, they should look to the colo 'oet European origin, and the greater portion of whom were would b e a task of herculean labour, for the bus h would not nists also for the determination of what that frontier was to ' discontented; about 150,300 were Hottentots and mongrel burn. It was composed of pl an t s o f so j u icy a nature that be; they should not send out gentlemen from this races, generally disaffected; about 350,000 were K a firs flame would not communicate f ro m one plant to another. country, with commissions and with treaties, to disport and kindred tribes, most of whom were our avowed enemies; An European could not m a ke a s i ng le s tep in the bush themselves in the wilds of Africa, by adding once a week and the remaining 100,000 were Zoolahs in Natal, of doubt- without cutting his w a y, except in the paths made by wild or once a fortnight some district once or twice as large as ful'alle g i an c e , I n th e midst of this discontented, traitorous, beasts. But the Kafirs, with wonderful dexterity and Great Britain to the dominions of the Cape. Whatever or hostile population, we had about 10,000 British troops, agility, crept through the bottom of the bush l ike snakes was done there should be done under the responsibilit y of wh o , alone and unaided, were, according to Sir Harry Smith, and other reptiles, and none b u t H o tt e ntots could Jolley. , representative inetitutiona; and they might rely upon carrying on a war over an area of twice the size of the them. To destroy this bush it must be cu t down b y' it that if they gave to the colonists the boon of local United, Kingdom, with tribes as fierce as the Circassians or the hand of man , and it must be kept down or it.would liberty—subject,- of course, to the maintenance of imperial eaigerinen He thought, therefore, the state of South Af r i ca soon spring up again. To cut it d ow n an army of la- unity—without stint or limitation, they would find no was critical, and it was no wonder that our military expen- bourers would be required, and whilst doing i t an army disposition to -- grudge the sacrifices and the efforts e hature on account of it had greatly increased of late yea rs . would be r equired to protect the labourers; and when defile necessary for the selfedefence of the colonists. The o e,"e other cause of the great increase in our military ex en- the r o und would be so sterile and ar id that it could not be (Hear, hear.) He was not so visionary as to say that they "tnreehe account of South Africa had been the abolition in applied to a ny useful purposes. Th ere f or e, he thought it could expect at once to'put an end to our military establish -18330.0 of the old, cheap, and effectual system of self-protection probable that the bush of South Af r ica never would, nor meats on the frontier. What he wanted was to see the my_wehchionists. With regard to that system he must oh- ever could, be destroyed, and w o u ld co ntinue to afford hiding centre of responsibility and action, which had been wrongly setae that it was similar to that which had been used by places for Kafirs as long as Kafirs should exist. He was placed in this country by a modern and vicious policy, in nor colonists • .si l v i t ns l 11l South Africa it had originated with the Dutch. believed, however, that the commencement of the termina- was to see the centre of responsibility . carried back to the eft: the Dutch and Kafirs first met on the eastern frontier nation had begun. 1t was a most important question, what place from which it. ought never to have been removed. le ec *. e '°nY of the Cape, the s u peri o r cattle of the Dutch had should be done to prevent the recurrence of similar wars? (Hear, hear.) He wanted to see the the colonial community oi ree ars 'at are tbly tempted the cupidity of the Kafir—a petty (Hear, hear.) He should not discuss that question at pre. in full recognition of the principle tkat with themselves lay hon e "- had ensued, like that which had raged in sent, except to repeat a warning which he bad given the the first duty • and responsibility of their own defence. He _ att tunes On . `Be l ine n e „the b or d ers bet ween England and House four years ago—nail:43'y, that if our present S ,uth was convinced that in urging that view he was urging that called, h ad et) ..ne ~.e . B oers, as the f r o n tier D u tch were African policy should be adhered to, - there would be a Kafir for which they would themselves be the most r eady to con e regular sy st aTemed for mutual ass i s t ance , an d f or med war at the end of every four or five years; unless, indeed, tend. 'Parliament and the Government had only to give system. ve tae hn t ,Of irregular defence, called the commando we were to attempt to prevent a Kafir war yinpg "'them the freedom which the American colonists had enjoyed; ' his -16 aded rou s k et 7 cattle of a Boe r was s t o l en , h e se i ze d a large military force permanently stationed South and with the enjoyment of that freedom they would, he felt gather, went off t o , persuaded,cheerfully accept the burden of its responsibilities. mounted his horse, called his friends to- Africa. He thought that, under the present system, at himself with a stroirgurit of of his property, and righted least 7,000 British troops would be required to be perma- What was the duty which the British Government and much the better i f he ahal aif he recovered his property so nently stationed in dominions Africa to preserve peace and order Legislature owed to them Their first duty was to protect R himself. In these experitiuollet he had nobody t o blame but w ithin the British-4,000 men on the eastern them against those enemies, if there should be . such, with ' 'and marauding savag e u t t h i the Boer classed the prowling frontier of the colony of the Cape, 1,000 at Natal, 1,000 in whom they could not 'themselves cope—against civilised • -with equal zest the cattle-stem-re beast of prey, and shot down I Orange territory, and 1,000 for a garrison and reserved force powers, if any attack, which he did not see any reason to African savages, who, like ai leg lion and Kafir. The South I at Cape Town. Those 7,000 men would cost in effective apprehend, should be directed against them by those powers. brute f orc e, considered lenien ether o _savages, worshipped military expenditure probably half a million a year, on the He would go furtber t and say that we should not grudge our strength—who were acccustomed t ° o o weakness and cruelty average of years. This was not an extravagant estimate. money in the first instance, but that we should .continue to their chiefs—had been appalled by tli he slain wholesale by For the seven years ending 1850 our effective military ex- assist them liberally, until they should be completely ex• of the Boer, dreaded his vigour and eh e courage and energy penditure on account of South Africa had amounted to tricated from a vicious system.—(Hear hear.) He was him aa a su perior being, and feared rn o ca °we sa , looked upen 3,334,000/ , or about 480,000 1 . a year ; and the average sure that the Hon. Member for Montrose— careful, and with his loaded roer than a score of her V: amounted Boer number of British troops in South Africa during that period justly careful; ache was, for the economical expenditure of eiplined 'troops. By these means the Boer i ety's best dis- was 4,800. There could be little doubt that, under the pre- the public funds—would feel that we could not in a -moment Boers had themselves as effectually on the eastern frontier of defended sent system, the military expenditure of this country on ac- cure the consequences of a policy pursued during a long of. Go o d H ope as t h e i r d e scendants had lately ( l oa t h e, Cape count of South Africa , for the next period of seven years series of years. In his (Mr. Gladstone's) opinion, no eco- Orange territory and Natal, and now dia_u n d er she 11l the ,--namely, that ending 1857, would be greater than that for nomy could be more false than to put an end suddenly of Capricorn, whence they had offered to com e tn r " l ' t i th e period ending 1850 . Because the present war 'was a to our military expenditure in Southern . Africa, What s• • assistance .—( Hear, hear.) The co mmando s y s tem had c on 1 more formidable one than that of 1846 and 1847; because he recommended was a change in the centre of respon linued in full vigour up to the year 1833, when it was i Natal and the Orange sovereignty, which had been ac- sibility. Let that question be made a colonial clues - abolished. He asserted that it had worked well on thel quired i n th e f ormer per i o d , were beg i nn i ng t o b ecome expert- tion; let it be treated as a local question, and let it whole in prot ec ti ng th e lives and proper t y of the f rontier I s ive; and bec ause th ere c ou ld be no doubt that immediately fall within the sphere ot local liberties and local re farmers. He found that under that system our military af ter the termination of the last war Sir HarSmith, with sponsibilities. Surely that was no unreasonable demand. arse In ,South Africa had been steadily and gradually di- v iew to economy, had made too large a reduction' in the Surely it was not a question of British or imperial interest • rninished, and cease quentiv our military expenditure had ayatera y . force in South Africa. Under the present whether or not the frontier of the Cape colony should be at also been steadil andgradually diminished. He found South Ah.there was this dilemma with regard to the Great Fish River, or the Orange River, or. the Kei. that in 1816 our g in South Africa had . minter e; if you made too large a reduction in your Those were matters, if there were any, which the colonists military force 3l forc e • amounted to 4,500 men ; that in almost every subsequent the save es Iv with a view to the saving of money, should be permitted to consider for themselves; and if they la down to 1833 it had been regularly diminished, till, ! more than the ere emboldened to disregard their treaties weee allowed to consider them, they would gladly undertake In 18,33, it amounted to 2,000 men. In that year our effec- than your savin g U s t l r Y did, and then if war followed, more —and they had already made many declarations to that . tine military expenditure had amounted to 100,000/. Since you wish to enforce tre soon spent ; on the other hand, ef effect— to discharge the duties which belonged to the condi then it had gone on steadily and rapidly increasing, both constantly maintain intoies and preserve peace, you must tion of freemen. -The Nouse might rely upon it that in ia •Periods of peace and i n per i o d s o f war . Of the two and incur almost a yea r est , t ; l e a Africa a large milit ar y f orc e, doing everything they could to foster that spirit of freedom Years of peace ending with 1834 our effective military ex- that under the present systiananditure. He thought, therefore, and self - re l iance, they would, on the one hand, be giving Penditurs on account of South Af r i ca had been 100,0001. for the Colonies sh ou ld , after the prudent Secretary of State the most Powerfill stimulus to the growth of the colony and ,!!!"Year ;on .the averae of the three ofpeace ending ' war, undertake to preserve peace termination of the present the development of its prosperity—a far more powerful eti with '1846 e that expenditure years pea with less than 7,000 British and order in British South mules than they could give by pouring out their treasures - Year, or , to • had increased to 280,0001. a Africa trop for a time do with less, an if h s Il e might per- over the sands of Africa while they would, on the other an& lasuy nearly three times what it had been in 1833 ; haps he ' a were 1 m ig h t ucky, and the hand, he was convinced, by contributing to link with o t her ending w i th on the average of the two years of peace term of his office short.get hh some credit as an utmost possible firmness the bonds of attachment which to 380, 1850, that expenditure had amounted economist, but in all props lay he would be it had been i a year, or to. nearly four times what Kafir war to his successor. For initance, haaqeesarth a costly connected that colony with Englande(Hear, hear.) to periode of 1833.--( Hear, hear.) Next, with regard returned to office at the beginning of last u• " I '' .- Year at Grey not Lord J. RUSSELL Bald be had listened attentively to the his admunst • ' the finance Right Hon. Gentleman, with a hope that he would have fur any importance in leer. There had been no war of accounts for the last years of . . ration would have fishedthem . - • solutiondiffi I with some o that . very cu t problem' since 1833 there had been three Kafir 'South Africa ; but he would have bequeathed —the government - of Southern Africa But, able and elo- I said to have coat 500,000/. • th wars ; the first was on account of war, There- I f the present Kafirquent as the speech of the Right Hon. Gentleman undoubt- 2,000,000/. ; and we should b; , e second had cost nearly to his successors the who e o _ to our prese.n edly was, he (Lord J. Russell)confessedthat he had the expense of the present e l ucY if 3 000 000/ covered fore, if we were determined to adhere . t South me' wed. from ' one. For ' ' . make up our minds to pay annually tens it no new light with respect to the best sys- . our effective military expenditure the year of war 1835 African policy, we must European colonist iii of policy to be adopted in that colony. The question, , Africa, had been returned at 240,4 ea account of South about 5/. ahead for the defence of every year. - (Ilear.) In he thought, was not that which the Ri htGentleman g t Hon. the two years of war, 1846 and 18°91. On the average of South Africa, or about half a million a . supposed. - The • 47, it had be made in our system of middle of question to be discussed at present, in the .860 noth. a year, or more than three times amounted to his opinion a great change ought to to the colonists of heath had century, was not such a question that 860 as in 1835; and during last year it must have what it had been South African policy. We ought to give the comp letest ton- , i ad arisen in North America in the 17th.—(" Hear, 1,000,0001., or fully four times what it have amounted to South Africa the freest institutions and soon them ,r9 e l Mn Roebuck.) The Hon. and Learned Mem- Sheffield seemed to Therefore, since 1833 our peace ad been in 1835. trol over their local atiairs.—(Cheers.) We ought, as expenditure circumstances look at WhateLn d ed to doubt that position. But let expenditure, on account of South Africa, had and our war after the termination of the present. war as upon them.- first persons who ti ad been done in North America. The increased fourfold, and our last peaceeach of them would 'permit, to require those colonists to take ' —sometimes co a gone out from England to that country nei - , sting of the exceeded by fifty per cent. our former wa expenditure had selves the defence of their frontier against the native races — , , in vessels, sometimes c o • . owners and crews of merchant Therefore the year 1833 constituted an epochri e xpenditure. (Hear, heard—and finally to reduce the military force out with som e osisting of adventurers who had COMM' • • gone 1 n the histor of 'our South African expenditure. From the 3' South Africa to be maintained at the expense of this country individuals singe esdsion from the Crown, and sometimes I that year,, our expenditure had gone on gradually of nature dirni n . . hh- in our military expenditure.--(Hear, hear.)buccaneering those persons " had founded or thir itary enterprises— then it : . had gone on steadily and rapidly increasing, and would whole HUME asked whether the present vote was for the some part of the coast their own settlements uld ' on increase, if the present system were adhered to. In 183 ror only a portion of the year ; and whetner any 3 a yea those settlements werend in two •or three I great change was m • years ewe t n ade in our South African policy. The old accounts had been received from the Cape to enable the Go those who had been engaged inthem „ p away, and • cheap and effectualhad been murdered had been abolish system of self- protection by the colonists vernment to judge of the probable total expense? • by the savages among whom. theY had ' fixed their'! ' a for it the s s abolished and the Colonial-office had substituted ' The CHANCELLOR of the RXCHEQUER—It was an y stem of protectabodes. , But no account of . tho se , trae„ • e n ' aeons reached this with .......__, ....., mg the f r ontier by treaties -mad e estimatee of the expense of the Kafir war up to the 25th •country foi 'd of erhaas - t - a pip)P wo or three years, and' licence ~ , ,,,, t enforced by British troops. By those , March. With regard to future prospects, 'it . was altogether - the knowledge of alietn• might wider any elf ' ' "" 1 " 1 " 14 theoretically transformed the bola African I ini l Patteible for hint to say what they atpresent ; he -4 e d to a few ofoursea were - port towafh for 0.4 Y+~..~i, 11:1 ..,~i:.. THE SUN, EVENING, APRIL 6, debate, namely, the feeling of this country. It was clear that British colonists, by their superior civilisation, could successfully resist barbarous tribes, but for that purpose they should be allowed to act for themselves. This country had not allowed the colonies to act for themselves. There was a place in this country called " Exeter Hall," which repre sented a most respectable, but most mistaken feeling. Now Exeter Hall. said " we had no right to take that territory, because it was contrary to morality to do so." He asked the Right Hon. Secretary for the Colonies if he was prepared to maintain our colonists in Africa? If they were to be maintained, it must be against the aborigines, and the best mode of doing so would be by giving the colonists the power of self-government. But they might rest assured, if they gave the colonists power to maintain their dominion in the country in which they had been planted, the result would be the natives would be exterminated.— (Hear.) .It was a lamentable consequence, no doubt, but it was one from which history showed there was no escape. The black man would disappear before the white than. There were, however, compensating circumstances. Africa'was now to a great extent like America when discovered by Columbus, but Africa colonised by a European race would become what America now was. The first step was a painful one, and would be productive of much cruelty and immorality; but the result would be the planting of a population far more moral, and far more capable of spreading civilization and Christ ianity over the wild regions of South Africa The people of this country could not bear that the colonists should re main en Africa at the expense of England. This country might defend thorn against Internet foes, but the colonists must be left to defend themselves against internal aggression. The Right Hon. Gentleman said that he was about to give the colonists the power of governing themselves. The people of England must decide whether the colony was to be main tained, but if they decided that it should be retained, they might rest assured that it would be at the expense of the African community, and that no power .of theirs would pre vent the extermination of the African race.— (Hear.) Mr. ADDERLEY did not think that any consequence such as that alluded to by the Hon. and Learned Member for Sheffield would follow the granting of self-government to the colonists at the Cape. The Right Hon. Gentleman had stated that the question was one which ought to be dealt with cautiously, and with care, and delay. He admit ted that it should be dealt with cautiously and with care— and with delay also if delay were possible. Much wouldde pend on the dispatch which the Right Hon. Gentleman in tended to send out, and even the not sending it—the silence of the Right Hon. Gentleman—would lead the colonists to form au opinion of the future policy of the Government towards them. He was glad to hear the expressions used by the Noble Lord the Member for the City of London with reference to the conduct of Sir H. Smith. Those expressions of the opinion of the Noble Lord were, like himself, noble and generous. Whatever might have been the faults of Sir H. Smith in his civil government, he thought nothing in his conduct could justify the dispatch Earl Grey had sent out to recall him. The Noble Lord had taken credit to the late Government for conceding a Constitution to the Cape. He believed the Noble Lord had done what he could to forward the granting of that Constitution; but he thought the Noble Lord had nut taken sufficient precaution to pre vent the measure being frustrated. He was firmly con vinced that if the colonists obtasned self-government they would not give up one inch of their territories, and that the result would be the formation of a British colony in those territories. With regard to the present vote, the only fault he found with it was that it was too small. It was impossi ble 'for any one to suppose that 480,000/. represented the whole expense incurred during the last year for the Kafir war. Whatever the expense might amount to this country must pay (it, and he saw no reason why the real amount should not be stated. The amount, whatever it might be had been incurred by our own Minister. It was the penalty we had to pay for o ne—and he feared it was not the only one —of Lord Grey's experiments in colonial rule.—(Hear.) The great question for consideration was how to prevent the recurrence of so expensive a war. He had great con fidence in the present Administration and he had reason to believe, from what he had heard, that the Right Hon. Secretary for the Colonies would givs satisfaction to the • colonists, as he had given . satisfaction to those interested in the colon y at home, if he immediately promulgated the p romised constitution. He trusted by the time the next news arrived from the Cape that the war would be over. He hoped it would not be the sham submission of which they had received information by. the last mail, because they had had experience that those submissions were only temporary, and were the result of successes by the British forces. Sir Harry Smith had now, for the first time, a sufficient force with him, and he felt satisfied that that able and gallant officer would not fall under the unjust censures that had been cast upon him. The Hon. Gentleman then referred to the account given of the termination of a former Kafir war, in 1835, to show that the submission of the chiefs could not be relied upon, but which was by no means a real settlement of the differ ences between the Kafirs and the colonists. The great difficulty was, to know how to make such arrangements for the protection of the frontier and the future amicable rela tions with the chiefs as would ensure permanent peace to the colonists. If the matter was left to the inhabitants of the Cape, they were both ready and willing to undertake the maintenance of their own territory. He was satisfied if that was done they would have as strong, and as permanent, and as peaceful a colony as England possessed in any part of the world. Colonel THOMPSON said that the great question, which appeared to have been lost sight of, was how had this war begun ? Did it begin by a bull or two goats ? Did it not rather commence with such conduct as had brought forwari a Gesler, and had lost Austria some of her fairest provinces.? Was it not a fact that it rose from an English ruler desiring literally to set his foot upon the neck of a Kafir chief ? It was more than human nature could endure, and he was not surprised that some of their own countrymen actually prayed for defeat upon their country's arms. He believed the Anglo-Saxons thought they had a right to tyrannise over and oppress all other nations. What nation was there that did not hate them.—(Laughter.),The lonians hated them— the Kafirs hated them—and why? Because the depository of power in the colony chose to set up these differences of race against which: the Kafirs revolted. For this miscon duct—for this injustice, they were now, in addition to large sums previously voted, called upon to pay 400,0001., together with the loss of confidence and popularity among the natives. He thought they were bound to mark their sense of votes like the present by veing against them. .F.--I.eBELewas not desirous of prolonging the debate, but he felt that he owed it to the Noble Lord (Earl Grey) , under whom he had the honour to serve, to make a few observations in reference to what had fallen from the Honourable Member for Staf fordshire. The House would remember that that Hon. Member had placed a notice upon the paper reflecting severely upon the conduct of Lord Grey. and imputing to him everything that was mean, and base, and injurious; alleging that he was desirous of shuffling from himself to the officers employed the responsibility of the situation of affairs at the Cape, which he alleged resulted from the mismanagement and mal-administration of that Noble Lord. It might also be remembered that in the public papers and elsewhere, where no answer could be given, those attacks and misrepresentations were perseveringly indulged in. Whenever the affairs of the Cape were introduced the name of Lord Grey was always brought forward, and no pains spared to exhibit his conduct in the most unfavourable light. He begged to say that in any place where the op portunity could be afforded him, if the Hon. Member for Staffordshire. or any other H on . Member, brought forward a motion on the subject, he (Mr. Peel) should be prepared to defend it, and particularly with reference to that dispatch to which so much allusion had been made, and he trusted he should be able to substantiate every word and every statement contained in it. But he understood the object of this discussion was different. It was said that so long as Parliament undertook the management of the affairs at the Cape so long would they have a return of those harassing and devastating wars, so costly and so inglorious to the Bri tish arms. Now that there was a prospect of its termination it was suggested that they ought to transfer to the colonists the management of their own affairs. He thought it was quite premature to lay down any course of policy, and con tended that the course adopted by the late Government was that which was the most advisable. They had sent out as sistant commissioners, and it was intended to have submitted their report and suggestions to the consideration of Parlia ment. He admitted that large tracts of country had been added to the Cape, and the most of those additions had been made during the administration of Earl Grey. He was pre pared to show that these acquisitions were made in the in terests of the colonists; and as to their policy on the eastern frontier, that it was undertaken for the protection of the lives of the colonists. With regard to the statement as to political changes by the establishment of a new Parliament, he believed Lord Grey and the late Government were zea lously desirous of establishing a representative government at the Cape, but these delays had arisen from that party of which the lion. Gentleman opposite was a member, who had timed their opposition so well as to prevent the good inten tentions of Lord Grey from being carried into effect. Mr. DRUMMOND regretted the Hon. Gentleman oppo site had not brought forward his motion, of which he had given notice. He did not think the change in Go vernment was a fair reason why that motion should be postponed. He rose to do a signal act of justice towards Sir H. Smith. If the Noble Lord (Lord Grey) had chosen to object to Sir H. Smith's policy, it was open to the Noble Lord to recal him • but when the Noble Lord went beyond that, and pretended to censure Sir H. Smith's military ope rations—(No, no)—he asserted that Lord Grey's dispatch did censure Sir H. Smith's military, operations—who, be asked, was that gentleman who presumed to offer those comments on Sir H. Smith? where was his experience, his military education?—(Hear, hear, and cheers.) And when, in contradiction to this, he bad the opinion of the Duke of Wellington in favour of Sir H. Smith and 'in censure of the dispatch, he thought that was a sufficient vindication of Sir H. Smith's military reputation. He pronounced the dispatch of Lord Grey a shame.—(Hear, hear.) He had never given a factious vote. When he recollected the dirty Ceylon busi ness, he felt convinced had Sir H. Smith been a Lord of the Bedchamber, or the relation of a Cabinet Minister, the dis patch of Lord Grey would never have been w ritten—( hear)—and what was more, the unmanly act of throwing down the dispatch on the table of that Hous e before the cha racter of Sir H. Smith could be vindicated, would neteshra...ve occurred. He looked upon it as a very dirty job.--(id e „ Lord J. RUSSELL—Sir, after what has Just fefle a u f o e ul w the Hon. Member for Surrey, I cannot avoid sae that words. The Hon. Member expressed his regraseytthinetnataottitohne Hon. Member had not brought on the debate o share of the of which he had given notice. I will take iisaY is gthhabteLhoardd responsibility of this matter. My own op Grey was reluctant to recal Sir H. Smith, been for some time convinced, and lnaa beewunh.eft.ohr.esrotsuier time of opinion, that it was a matter of cl i o n. u . l b th t to indulge in H. Smith did :not take a too saangeianeeliavediew nis own operations, and whether he wae_ n n in t y l opinion Government anticipations too favourable. I was anxious that Sir H. the Smithwasrhoultda he a ve cl e a y s e e r . y eApi por t un ity of , bringing h to fro r m eason wh to ich exp i e t ct was the anticipated in Sir Harr length accounts were ldrechesivreed evident Government could speedy termination of . the a a y e a s. r It was then Lord Grey Smith's letters and clop t P tthat * re proposed toe he. Cabinet that. Sir beHa,gsemedithinsthuoaueldoinion called, and the Cabinet Gunaenimcamouselywithr o decis My belief is that Lord r 7 f sion, and lam quite sure it was rom no want of upright d o others. Such ness or generosity —from no wish of throwing bl ame which a course forms no he had himself incue part of m y Noble Friend's character. Then the Hono irable G e ntleman says —repeating an insinuation I did n o t expec t to hear from h im—if Sir H. Smith had been like Lord Torrington, the relation of a Cabinet Alinister, such a dispatch would not have been written. Sir, no doubt Lord Torrington is a distant relation of mine, but he did not owe to that re lationship the appointment of Governor of Ceylon. I men tioned three or four persons to Lord Grey who I thought were fit to hold the appointment. I believe Lord Grey pre ferred at first some other, but afterwards he informed me he had received a suggestion, I know not from whom, that Lord Torrington was a fit person to entrust with the Government of Ceylon. I gave my acquiescen ce , b ut t h e sugges ti on did not, orig i na te with me. My own opinion is, that Lord Tor rington, instead of being treated with favour, underwent an unfair ordeal, and that partly on account of being unfortu. nately related to me, unmerited blame attached to him, and repeated faults were attributed to him. But I say that Lord Torrington 's administration was successful—whatever diffi culties he had to encounter he overcame, whatever disturb- TUESDAY this country had not then enjoyed its present rapid and ex tensive means of communication. But other adventurers had gone out and taken the place of those who had disappeared, and the settlers having gradually - become stronger, had, at length, been able not only to repel the savages but to exter minate them. For the races thus destroyed there had been little sympathy felt in this country ; and, indeed, their fate was as generally unknown as the fate of our own early ad venturers. There was no resemblance between that case and the case of our South African frontier, or even the case of the present frontier of the United States? What had happened during this very year in the United States ? Wh y , it appears from some of those reports which were presented to Congress by the different Ministers of that country. and more especially from the report of the Secretary at War, that there had been carried on a frontier war against the barbarous ledians by the regular troops of the United States; that the expense of conveying those troops from one part of the frontier had of late been enormously increased,, and that the charges incurred in that way by the central Gov ernment of the United St ates h ad amounte d to so mewhere about 700,0001. more th an t h e c h arge i ncurre d is the preceding year.—( Hear, h ear .) T hat was an expense w hich fell, not on any individual state, but on the central Governme nt of the country, which would not permit its citizens to be overrun or destroyed by the Indiane.—(Hear ' hear.) In South Africa the diffi cu l t i es of our position had been greatly aggra vated by the circumstances under which we had undertaken to colonize that country. We had chosen in the ye ar 1819 to say that w e would plant a settlement in South Africa far beyond the metroolis of the colony ; and a considera ble made grant had been by that House f o r the purpose of carrying out th a t project. Now, that was not our ancient policy in North America—if policy that could be called, which had b een i n reality the neglect and abandonment of all policy.--( Hear, hear.) If our settlers had been attacked on the frontiers of South Africa, and if women and children had been murdered there, would it be quite satisfactory to that House, after we had sent out the colonists, that they should have been left to their fate? Different Governments and different Secretaries of State—Lord Stanley at one time, Lord Glenelg at another and Lord Grey at another had acted nn the belief that the lives o f our own citi zens whom we bad sent out to South Af r ica could not form a matt er of indifference to t h e people of England. There was a no th er event w hi c h might have oc curred ; and that w as , t h at the colonists m i g ht have plun dered or unjustly att ac k e d the natives. But eve n that would not have been, borne by the people of this count r y or b y their representatives. I n the year 1835, when it had been thought that some injustice had been shown to the abori gines that House had interfered for their protection.—(Hear, hear.) They had thus been led, step by step, to the adoption of a system which he admitted could not be carried on to its present extent—namely, th ey had said on t h e one hand that they would not allow B r i t i s h colon i sts t o be murdered, while they said on the ot h er han d t h a t they would not allow any injustice to be do ne to t h e nat i ves —and more than that, they would not allow the savages to 'murder one another.—( Hear.) That was, at all events, a very honour able feeling on the part of thi s country; and It was certainly a very different one from that which had prevailed a few we to deal with the future gove rnmen t o f the colony centuries ago. But the questi on a t presen t arose, how are ? Upon that question the Right Hon. Gentleman had said that it was a great fault on the part of Lord Grey to have told General Cathcart that he ought to make a report to the Government at home. But he (Lord J. Russell) confessed that he quite concurred in that proceeding, and b e f ore G en eral Cathcart had left this country he had had a l on g interview with him, and had told the Gallant General that in dealing with the policy to be pursued hereafter much might depend on the judgment which he would form upon the subject. It was therefore desirable, in his opinion, that General Cath cart should make known the conclusions at which he might have arrived in the matter. The great difficulty of the case arose from the fact that we had in the colony but a very small white population, surrounded by a comparatively large native population ; so that there had been no means, such as had existed in North America, of outnumbering the natives. The different . Governors of the colony—Sir B. D'Urban, Sir P. Maitland, Sir H. Pottinger, and Sir H. Smith, had endeavoured, one after another, to supply that want of an ove-whelming white population by military frontiers and military defences. But the establishment of a military frontier had necessarily entailed enormous expense, and difficulty, and loss of life, among our troops. With regard to the future policy to be pursued in the co lony, we had a problem of the utmost difficulty to solve. He did not think it would be satisfactory to this country on the one hand that we should withdraw our troops, and that the colonists should be left without any sufficient protection. He believed that such a course would bring dis honour on the British name , and that it would be a lament able presage for t h e future maintenance of the British em pire.—(Hear, hear.) But, on the other hand, he thought that we could not continue to maintain an immense frontier, which was, in fact, no use to this country—( Hear, hear) — by a mere military force. They would be obliged to adopt a policy between these two courses. He thought that such a policy might be established, and he should say that some 4,000 men might be sufficient for many years for the Cape. Undoubtedly the question of self-government in the colony was one of immense importance. There had not been, of late years, any effort made to give these free institutions to that colony. He regretted that a misunderstanding arose in which the late Government thought they were in the right, as doubtless, also did the representatives of the colonists, and which misunderstanding prevented the es tablishment of free representative institutions in that colony in the year 1850 or 1851. He believed that other wise the Cape colonists might now be in possession of these institutions. Having obtained such, he be. tiered they would conduct them in a different spirit from that which they heard mentioned to-night of the lonians.—(Hear, hear.) He believed the Dutch as well as the English colonists understood the working of free insti tutions; and that when the Constitution was in operation the representatives would be guided by the wishes and opinions of the colonists themselves.—(Hear, hear.) He (Lord John Russell) could not conclude without saying a few words in reference to Sir Harry Smith. As regarded his high mili tary character and reputation nothing had occurred to im pair it.—(Cries of " Hear, hear.) He should be sorry , in - Geed, if a reputation so brilliant, and confirmed by the repre sentations of his gallant fellow-soldiers, should be injured by what had taken place—(Hear, hear ;)—and he doubted not Sir Harry Smith enjoyed the favour and confidence of his fellow-countrymen of all classes.—(Hear, hear.) Sir J. PAKINGTON had 'listened to the speeches of the several Hon. Members who had addressed the House on this important subject, not alone because of the ability of those addresses, but also of . the interest which attached to the subject. The Hon. Baronet the Member for Southwark always spoke with ability on this subject; and the right Hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford had also delivered a speech in much of which he (Sir J. Pakington) entirely concurred. However, he should add that, after listening to these speeches, 'he had heard nothing to affect the inte n ti on of the question ra i se d by Hon. Gen tlemen as to wh a t was to be the future po li cy o f the Govern ment with respect t o t h e f uture b oun d ar ies of the Cape. That was a qu est i on of great difficulty, which difficu lt y was much increased b y l ate events; and i t was a q uestion on which it was the fi rst duty of a Governmen t t o exercise the greatest care a n d caution before comm i tt i ng t h ems elves to pledges or prin c i p l es. of policy.— (Hear, hear.) He mi g ht observe that, when seeking a vote of supply on account of this Kafir war, nothing could be more natural than that a discussion of this kind should arise. Yet, at the same time, he should say he thought it was somewhat premature. — (Hear, hear.) It had been impressed on her Majesty's Mi nisters that they should give free institution to the Cape, and bestow on them freedom, and then to leave them to the control of themselves. Now, with re g ard to conferring the b oon of freedom on the Cape , he might ob serve it had been a l ready done, though, in hi s o pinion, some what too tardily, — (gean ) ilia (Sir J. Pakington' s ) pre decessor had sent out to the Cape a form of constitution w hich was at p resent under consideration at the Cape, and since he (Sir 3, Pakington) came into office he had done all in his pswer to facilitate the consideration of these ordi nances with a view that no time should be lost in putting them in operation.—(Hear, hear.) But when they came to c onsider the fut ure policy which the Governmen t was to ex ercise with reg ar d to the Cape, he should say t h e ques ti on was exceedingly complicated.— (Hear, hear.) N o p erson could deny that great disaffection had existed in that colony in reference to British rule. The slavery question was one cause; the struggle with regard to the admission o f convicts was another; and th e delay of granting the boon of freedom had been the third cause. It was therefore the duty of Go vernment to see that no danger should be incurred by the too precipitate arrival at a decision.—(Hear, hear.) He did not wish to attribute blame to any quarter; but he should say that a great extent of territory had been added by the late Administration. Neither had he any desire to say anything unfavourable of Sir Harry Smith, inas much as he had listened with pleasure to, the manner in w hich his high military merits had been spo k en o f th a t night.—(Hear, hear.) The last dispatches received from the Cape went far to show th at Sir Harry Smith was still serv ing his country with th e same vigour as was displayed by him on the plains of India—(Loud cheers) —and he fully ex pectedth w the beforewar at an end, b u t a l so, that before his return, Si r H arry Smith long to h ear that, not only were t h e ev il s of have achiev e d t h e great o bj ec t o f hi s c ommand. —(Cheers.) ee r would u.) ld o n deed he (Sir J. Pakington) knew of no in telligence that would b e more acceptable to him, or, h e be lieved, to the public in g eneral. But w i t h a ll th ese f ee lin g s deep in his mind, he could not fail to recollect that it had been under the Administration of Sir Harry Smith that great and rapid accessions had been made to the possessors of Great Britain, and which accessions had been the chief means countryin t h the t late the K c a a fi p r e hear.)of Sir Htahrirsy Smith arriv ed lBl7. He was not more th an a 'fortnight there when he wrote home to say that he h ad extended the Engl i s h boun dary by some 70,000 squar e mil es and in winaDr.—ece(mHbeaerr: ; the following February—three months from his arrival—he wrote to say he had added also the Orange River sovereignty. It had been asserted by the Noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Russell) that Sir B. D'Urban had also that tendency to increase territory. Now, i n 1835, the question of whether or not Kafiraria was to be added to the British dominions was at issue; and on that occasion Lord Glenelg refused to give his sanction to the project.-- (Hear, hear.) However, Lord Grey did give his sanction to every one of these additions made by Sir Harry Smith. The dispatch of Lord Glenelg in 1835 contained the following :—" The claim of sovereignty over the new provinces, bounded by the Keiskamma and the Kei, must be renounced. The territory of the Kafirs, lam aware, is fertile and salubrious, contrasted with our sterility of position. But the great evil is the magnitude, and conse quen t extent of its, boundaries, and the certainty of our being brought into contact with tribes numerous and war like"—(Hear, hear.) How di fferent was the poli c y of Lord Grey—( Hear, hear) —Lord Glenelg a l so added " The' restitution of invaded rights would involve injuries more f orm idable than any they could remedy." Yet, no later than September last, Lord Grey, notwithstanding his pre irious sanction of extensions wrote a dispatch instructing that the kingdom of the Ora nge sovereignty sho u ld be revoked, and that it should be in consequencelabandoned —(Hear, hear.) They were now awaiting the arrival of dispatches from the Cape, which were expected to contain the report of the Commissioners, who, by desire of the Government, were addressing their attention to the subject. It was under these c i r cumstances that her Dlajesry's Minis ters were called upon to address themselves to this most im portant and most difficult task of extricating the country from the embarrassments in which it had been involved.— It would be most agreeable to the present Government if they could now take that most popular course of saying they were resolved to throw the question to the colonists themselves; but he was in hopes the country would appre ciate the course that they were more disposed to take — namely, to say that it was a question of extraordinary diffi culty, that they had to repent a hasty decision to act, but would now give all the attention in th e i r power to the sub ject. He could pro mise the beste attention of her Majesty's Ministers to the subject . He ft they were bound to wait, not only for the information they expected, but also for the completion of that war, a nd the result sen t a tive institutions which y were going to confer; and he trusted they would be able. with due ca re an d cau tion, to bestow the blessings of freedom and safety on that colony without in the least impairing the dignity or honour of the Crown.—(Cheers.) y that - Mr. ROEBUCK'begged to sathe Right Hon. t Gen tleman who last' addressed the House did ho understand the question.— (Laughter.) There was more behind the curtain than had been referred to hina, or by any other Hon. Gen- Velma yslioluid Addpigied the melte() 44 the course of that 1852. ances occurred he suppressed, and he left the colony in a far better state than he found it.—(Hear.) Mr. HUME said if the Hon. Gentleman (Mr. F. Peel) could defend Lord Grey's policy, he was the only Member who could do so.—( Lughter and hear.) He had never heard any one, in or out of the House (except the Hon. Gentleman), who attempted to defend Lord Grey and his dispatch to Sir Harry Smith. He advised Government to let the colony govern itself, and not to allow Downing-street to interfere in their local affairs. Never was a man more ill-treated than Lord Torrington, who rather deserved ap proval than censure. Unfortunately, however, he failed to preserve harmony among the members of his Government, and so was recalled. But when the Hon. Member said Lord Grey favoured one man because he was a connexion of a Cabinet Minister, and did wrong to another who had no such advantage, the Hon. Member did a gross injustice to Lord Grey. Air. HINDLEY was surprised that the Hon Member for Leominster (Sir F. Peel) had not vindicated the sanction of Lord Grey to the vast accession of territory which had taken place. He believed that our real policy was that of Lord Glenelg, and that we ought not to have passed beyond the Fish River. The vote was agreed to, and the House resumed. EXCHEQUER BILES. The Exchequer Bills Bill passed a second reading. The Inv , ntions Protection Bill was read a third time. CORRUPT PRACTICES AT ELECTIONS BILL. The House then went into Committee on this Bill. On the 6th clause, Mr. WALPOLE moved an amendment, in order to pre clude the extension of the inquiry into practices at elections which had taken place some time before the last election. Lord J. RUSSELL said he thought it would be material to empower the Commissioners to institute inquiries into elections that had occurred 20 years ago. Mr. ANSTEY strongly opposed the amendment, saving that the Bill was of little use now, and if the amendment was introduced, the Bill would become a mockery and a sham. Sir F. THESIGER said, some limit sorely should be im oosek.upon the Commissioners-(Hear, hear)—but to fix a term of years alone would be difficult. He suggested, there fore, a period often years, or three elections. Mr. BOUVERIE said, the Bill as it had stood followed the precedent of the St. Alban's Bill. Mr. REPTON said that Bill gave very large powers, and inquiries had taken place into elections in 1846 and 1841. Mr. HUDSON said, since his friends had come into offiee he had received from his constituents numerous applications for the patronage of the Government. Now until the party opposite satisfied the country that this system of dispensing patronage would be abolished, no Bill of this kind could be thought honest.—(Hear, hear.) Corruption at head-quarters was greater than that which ever prevailed among the poor electors.—(Hear, hear.) Sir A. COCKBURN hoped the amendment would not be agreed to, as it would make the Bill inefficient. Judging by the last election (Newport), where scenes of tumult and debauchery had taken place which ought to make us ashamed, there was greater necessity than ever for such a measure. Mr. BELL (stralairEiVitbf " nh- nh") said the stringiney of these laws prevented their operation, and that theVom missioners ought not to have the power of making fish of one person and flesh of another.—(Laughter.) The Committee then divided, when there appeared— _ For the amendment ... 99 Against it Majority ... —l7 The amendment was therefore lost. Mr. MULLINGS then moved, after "election," to add, " and whether or not all or any of such corrupt practices were committed or done by the fraud or contrivance, or at the instance of annand what person or persons in particular, and for what object, or under what circumstances." Sir A. COCKBURN argued that the addition proposed was superfluous. A similar case had not happened twice within the last twenty years. The Commissioners had not to determine the disfranchisement of any borough ; that was to be determined by Parliament. Mr. WALPOLE had no doubt the Commissioners would make a proper report to the House. Mr. MULLINGS would not press his amendment. Mr. J. STUART said no one doubted that the dockyard boroughs were the most corrupt in the kingdom. The Bill whypocrisy was founded o n th e most hypocritical pretences. sai d when thea m Hoens.t unjust Gentleman charge e 1A . him COCKBURN h it he made and unfounded charge. Mr. ANSTEY, was also of opinion that it was hypocritical to attack the recipient of the bribe and not the briber. The amendment was then withdrawn. Mr. ADDERLEY moved a proviso, having for its object the "legalisation of necessary refreshments at elections." At present, it was impossible to give any refreshments without coming within the definition of treating, an d t hi s h e re . garded as an anomaly. It had already been proposed to issue a certain number of refreshment tickets by the sheriff, the general expense to be borne by the candidates ; but he was anxious to have the principle of reasonable refreshment ratified in the present B ill. Lord J. RUSSELL did not think this proviso could fairly be introduced into the present Bill, bat it would be compe tent to affirm the principle in a separate measure. Mr. ADDERLEY reminded the Noble Lord that treating was mentioned in the Bill before the House. Sir A. COCKBURN said the Bill did not attempt to define treating. Mr. M. J. O'CONNELL did not think this proviso could fairly be dealt with in the present BilL Mr. ADDER LEY asked when any measure on the subject was likely to be introduced? Lord J. RUSSELL said that the Hon. Member on whom he relied for the Bill was the Hon. Member for Essex ; but it would be competent for the Hon. Member ( Mr. Adderley) to bring in the Bill himself. Mr. J. S. WORMEY said the present measure applied principally to boroughs, and it was in counties that the prac tice complained of principally prevailed. After a few words from Mr. C. FORESTER, Mr. ADDERLEY promised himself to introduce a Bill on the subject. After some conversation, clauses up to 9 were agreed to. On clause 10 being proposed, Mr. HUDSON wished to ask the Noble Lord lately at the head of the Government to state candidly whether he had not dispensed his patronage, for the many years he was in office, on political grounds, ' , tiler than in reference to public advantage P—(Laughter.) Unless there was some clause introduced into this Bill requiring the Government to dis- pense their patronage without favour and affection, it could not confer any benefit on the country. The remaining clauses of the Bill were then agreed to, the House resumed, and The CHAIRM AN reported the Bill with amendments. The Law of Wills' Amendment Bill was read a second time. _ _ Tha Sheep, &c., Contagious Disorders' Prevention Bill passed through Committee. The Boroughs (Scotland) Bill passed through Committee. The following Bills were read a second time :—The Com mons Enclosure Acts Extension Bill, the Linen, &c., Manu factures (Ireland) Bill t the Differential Dues Bill, the Eccle siastical Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Bill, and the Poor Relief Act Continuance Bill. The Proclamation of Parliament Bill was brought down from the House of Lords, and read a first time. The House adjourned at Half-past One o'clock. HOUSE OF LORDS, April 5. Lord REDESDALE took his seat on the Woolsack, in :he absence of the Lord Chancellor. at Five o'clock. EXPULSION OF SCOTCH MINISTERS FROM HUNGARY. The Marquis of BRE A.DALBANE presented a peti tion from the Free Church, Presbytery of Glasgow, complaining of the recent expulsion of the Free Church ministers from Hungary. ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE. The Earl of DERBY gave notice that he should to morrow move the adjournment of the House until Mon day, the 19th inst. COLONIAL BISHOPS. The Archbishop of CANTERBURY introduced a Bill for enabling colonial and other bishops to perform certain functions under the commission of Bishops of England and Ireland. , WAR WITH AVA. The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH spoke to the following effect : -My Lords, I trust that I may now speak without any incorrectness of expression of the war with Ava. As„ yet there has been no declar a tion of war on our part, and it is not customary for princes in the East to issue a t any such such declaration, and therefore it cannot be expected t a monarch as the King of Ave will make such a matter. We are, however, at war havewitheU clung to yc h an ge in Ara. The Government of India appears, however, to l ace , and yet it the last to a hope that war would not take has made requioitions on Ave which it having under it l us t have foreseen would ultimate terminate in war, without a war would taken any of those preparations which 5U of necessity require. In thatthceohuentry, and also in this, it pe that we may have as appears that we may cling to please. That, however, is we - 0 be played by two parties, much or as little of war as i v nw a et the ep 1 ea this se. not the case. War is a g and we cannot deal with-era ° ti t le King f A • g tr me a dummy s play, war as if he were atliitoege ailing our provinces of Tennas in order to conduct If he should decide on ass o f Chittagong,Assam, ,he Arracan, serim, or of , n or tuent in Indiaoorveorfy will subject our 6- .._.a (iet he will have em barrassment indeed; for . . .. the advantage of Ret ied an interior line of o • ing on what is ca) operations. Allow state to you, as me, my Lords', to d with our last shortly as I can, the cir cumstances connected . ur last war in Ava, for it is ne w" magnitude of the • ne cessary to see t he magn i tude ed, my L crisis as it now stands. There were emP Y. Lords, in the last war with Ava, of not less than 40,000 m a force French lately en —a force as large as that which the Bonapn i te too w him for the conquest of Egypt ; 30,000 native troops and nearly 7,000 Europeon bayonets formed that f o rce. Of the European s troops, t wo reg i ments, the 13th an d the 3 th , left Calcutta in April, 182 an d in January, 1826, they 4, 1,800 strong, had not 500 men left fit for service • m the field • and I believe that the mortalit y i n the other European ' not inferior. I doubt much regiments Was at the end of that war 10,000 m en out of the whole 40,000 were fit f or d u ty in the field... The whole army in Arracan was utterly wasted away, and was unable to • give any co-operation to the other forces. On the 11th of May it landed at Rangoon, and was not able to followi move from that pl ace till th e 11 t h of the F e b ruary following. It was detained there for 11 moaths, having' been surrounded by a large Burmese not army, and being able to move forward. During that time the European troops lived entirely on salt provisions. No fresh provisions were to be had in the country, and when bullocks were sent them, every bullock sent from India cost in freight 101. Notwithstanding the great amount of the force sent to Ave, I believe that the General, in advancing on the capital of that country, had never more than 5,500 men under arms, and I know that on the 24th of February, 1826, ho had with him only 4,000. men. To that small force had our grand army dwindled away. We have undoubtedly now some advantages which we did not then possess, but the climate of the country continues the same, as also the same impracticability of moving in it for nine months of the year. We have also undoubtedly now great ad vantages in the rapidity of steam navigation ; but we must not overestimate them. We can convey troops and munitions of war to that country more rapidly than we could then ; but I doubt whether we can convey them at less expense. Title is most valuable in military operations, but I doubt whether, in point of cheapness, the moving of troops is less expensive than before. Moreover, our large steam-vessels draw too much water to move much further down the river than Rangoon. Smaller steam-vessels, how ever, by towing gunboats, will much facilitate the opera tions m h of the army. But, at the same time, it must remembered that at the moment the army leaves t lie of the river—and nobody knows this better than . I cannot Noble Duke ( Wellington) at the table --leech move without animals, and animals under for, though • to ad ' ' cir cumstances must be a great expense en , tey cannot though these smaller steamers may conveY men, cannot convey animals. There is also anetheiriota formerly. The we shall have now, but which we had a l to the troops under climate of Arracan, then so fatal in consequence of the General Morrison, is now improvteare b is always a great dif land having been cleared. But., A mend, gta they now ferauce in the health of WV we ll are, and in that of troops exposed as our troops would be in the open field for military operations. I feel confident, • however, that the health of the troops would not be liable to such loss as it was in the late war. But there are other circumstances very disadvantageous to us at present, as compared with the former occasion. Rangoon was then attacked by surprise, and not more than 17,000 Burmese were then in Arracan. Rangoon MU attacked by 10,000 men, and was captured without loss. We then proceeded to fortify our position and to• occupy the great Pagoda, which at once protected and was the key to it. What is the case now? By our operations, untoward as they are, we have indicated the point of attack. We have had a col lision with the Burmese on that point, and, without finding any fault with the officers in command, we have twice most unfortunately retired, after a collision, from the conflict. Now the mere circumstance of our retiring under such cir cumstances must give encouragement to the Burmese. The town of Rangoon, which we occupied before, is now de stroyed, and another town, four miles from the river, is built beyond the reach of our steamers, and the whole of the Pagoda to which I have before a , luded, with terraces of brick each rising 15 feet above the other, now rises to a height of 200 feet above the level of the river, and com mands all the ground in the neighbourhood — a position which is now fortified and stockaded in every direc tion, and defended by 100 guns. It is impossible not to ex pect that great loss will be incurred in taking it; and it is to be attacked, not by 10,000 men as formerly, but by only 7,000. Moreover, the circumstances are particularly un fortunate under which we are called on to carry our army there. The Punjaub ii not yet so settled as to enable us to withdraw any considerable force from it, and, without drawing troops from Bengal, we have not three regiments available to be sent there with safety. I regret, my Lords, to find that one regiment hss been sent from Fort William— for there is only - one regiment left to supply its place, and that another has been sent from Furt St. David, which is left without European troops at the very moment when we may be about to engage in another war ; so that in the front of the Nepaulese we are withdrawing the only regi ment which we have to defend Calcutta. There is also ano ther circumstance to be considered, which I take to be one of a very serious nature. In the last war all the operations in Ava were carried on by the Madras army, and a number of the soldiers who composed it were brought from that presi dency owing, as I firmly believe, to the great personal influ ence and the great personal ability of Sir Ihomas Mont.& Without his influence I think that the Government would not have been able to withdraw from that presidency 23,000 men. [A. Noble Lord said—" 28,000 men."] Yes, 28,000 men, including Europeans. I remember, with regret, cer tain passages in the recent history of the Madras army which make me doubt whether we can dispatch a large force of it from that presidency on service beyond the sea. The Bengal soldier is accustomed to leave his wile and family in his native village when called into active service, but the soldiers of the Madras army take their wives and children with them into the camp; so that, when they go beyond the sea, all their famili es form a village, which is left without means of support. When I arrived, some years ago, at Madras. I found two regiments there--I will not Bay in a State of mutiuy, but so disinclined to proceed to China that it became a matter of deep anxiety and appre hension to the Government; and the cause of this disincli nation was the terrible state of misery and distress in which the wives and children of the men of the regiments which had already sailed for China ware left. I see, my Lords, no alteration in the regulations of the service which can relieve these persons from the distress which they suffer when their husbands and fathers proceed beyond the sea. Notwithstanding all this, I will assume, for I doubt it not, that we have entire success in the war. What will be the consequence of that success? The result will be the en tire dissolution of the Burmese empire, and then it will be for our Government in India to consider what it will do under such circumstances. I know, my Lords, that the Governor-General will be placed in circumstances under which a great pressure will be brought to bear on him as to the policy which he ought to adopt. First, there are certain enteprising British merchants, who having exhausted all the forests on one bank of the river and its tri.. butaries, are very desirous of possessing the teak forests on the other side, for the purpose of carrying on and extending their trade by Rangoon; and they are in concert and con nexion with the press of Calcutta, the movements of which I view with anxiety and distrust. They say that in conse quence of our occupying the whole Burmese empire an over land intercourse with China may be established, and that great advantage would accrue to our trade from its extension along that Burmese frontier. That is a feeling which actuates the press of Calcutta. I hope that my Right Honourable Friend the Governor-General of India will treat that press with the disregard which it deserves. Bet, my Lords, there is also another serious pressure which my Right Honourable Friend ought to disregard, and which it will be more difficult I am afraid for him to resist ; that is the pressure of a part of the civil and of the whole military service. They have before their eyes the occupation n 0 r refused and interference ha . whom paymentah.uo this gnfhoo r of Affghanistan, which produced a complete revolution in the army of Bengal. That will always be the case where a great territory is to be occupied even for a time, and still more where a new territory is to be annexed to, and brought under our dominion. Young officers are then placed in com mand of districts—others are placed in political employ ments, where they actually direct the operations of troops under the command of their superiors. Great rewards and distinctions are obtained—great talents exhibited ; and every man, with a natural ambition, looks forward to the promo tion he may attain; and thus the idea of a new war, likely to terminate is new conquests, is dear to that army —an army full of enterprise, and of those feelings which naturally excite military men to great actions. Under such circum stances, I view with great alarm the annexation to our em pire of a large portion—ay, or even of any portion—of the Burmese territory. It is essentially a false position. My Lords, you must have seen before now that, with great ability on the part of our generals, with great courage on the part of our soldiers, and with the most perfect equip ment on the part of our army, it is very difficult to retain an eminently false position. A false position is as danger ous to an empire as it is to an army, and always ultimately vindicates its power over those who sin against the first principles of true policy. I feel, my Lords, perfectly satis fied that the annexation of Ave, drawing in that direction a large portion of the vital resources of the British empire in India, will naturally impair both its civil and military strength. It is because I entertain these apprehensions of the consequences of the military occupation of Ave, and of the fatal effects of our most complete success, that I request you, my Lords, to call on her Majesty's Ministers to produce such papers on this subject as can be produced without detri ment to the public service, for the purpose of making us acquainted with the causes of this war. I have not heard that any trustworthy military officer on the part of the Go vernment has been sent to Rangoon to ascertain the facts out of , hich it has arisen. They rest entirely on the authority of persons who went with Colonel Ogle to that country. What value is to be attributed to their statements we know not; for it is stated, with a degree of con fidence almtst inclining us to treat it as a certain-y, that the total amount of the indemnity which we require from the Government of Ava is only 9001. ; and yet to obtain that sum all these public dangers which I have recounted are to be encountered. Now, my Lords, when I look at the cha racter of the trade carried on at Rangoon, I cannot help looking with suspicion at the statements made. One of the most considerable traders at Rangoon is a person of mm reasonsodore I have Lam bert fr m be , ryed an i d n the name of Crisp. That man, as soon as be knew of the probability of war, freighted a schooner with arms and sold it to the Governor at Rangoon. When the Gover tahtepmrehseenwt,enfotrtotn) requested him to p The Governor of Rangoon the This is a description of one of the Burmese Government. . , and t o of it t d h e e w i n n j in nry the bll inflicted to ü b p e on pa h iod i great war is to be undertaken, and I, camsequence 100/. for this mans l head . , an d d I . confess, for one, that I should not have been This is y grieve if he had got it.— . ti ) r. be at stake, no matter but if there is not an overwhelming neces (tph:erlisroeenfairef,oralonwodk to it as a matter of great danger. If our war how ever small the Injury . , must be submitted to, and we we heard several months ago, were likely s ttyfor reputation our stated, I think we ought not to interfere. The services of to be engaged in a di ff erent affair with the Nizam. W e h e ard that the Indian Govern tnblaes:feanddruasre army,i Government, as a creditor of the N i zam , had required him to pay a certain sum of money, and that if he did not pay it by a certain day his territory was to be occupied and his troops put down. I think that the Governor-General should not have made such a demand without having a certainty that he had the Madras army in hand • for , the town of Hyderabad is in the hands of the Arabs, and SO are a l l the for in • ts the neighbourhood. They will defend them with bravery, and, unless we postpone the demand for that payment, it will be difficult for the Madras army to carry into effect two distinct and distant operations at the same time. I hope, my Lords, that my Noble Friend opposite will not think it inconsistent with his duty to lay the papers to which I have referred on the table, in order that we may know on what grounds the British Govern ment is proceeding in this war. The Earl of DERBY—With regard to all military opera tions in India, my Noble Friend speaks with a knowledge that gives him great advantage over us. Whatever may be the difficulties attending the operations now going on in Ave —which I am afraid I must agree with my Noble Friend in characterising as a war—l am sure my Noble Friend would be the last man to desire, if protection were required by her Majesty's subjects, that war should not be engaged in if ne cessary for that object.—(Hear, hear.) Whatever may be the pressure of the Calcutta press, or of any portion of those enterprising merchants, or of that army desirous of fresh laurels, I am sure that the Noble Earl himself is not more anxious than the Governor-General is to avoid any accession —(Hear I agree with the Noble Earl in of ter rit ory. . ) thinking that such an accession as that alluded to, so far from being an advantage, would be a disadvantage. To a certain extent I shall be able to produce the papers required by the Noble Earl; andi when they are produced, I hope he will be satisfied that, as on the one side there has been no desire to incur the hazards of a war, but, on the contrary, a unanimous desire to try all means to avoid it; so, on the other hand, the measures taken by the Governor-General have been so prompt and effective as to lead to the very reasonable conclusion that no protracted hostilities will take place with the Burmese empire; and that no such consequence as the disruption of the Burmese empire is likely to follow from what the Noble Earl calls the complete success —but which, in that case might be con sidered the lamentable success—of our forces employed There is no doubt we were justi fi ed in making our clai ms. I am not in a position to enter into a discussion of the mel .i t ... e of those claims. Rut the justice of them was IV ey ,',,Y e 1 ceased upon the Bing of Ma by former and Governorse,e th e Ring those King of Ave not only acquiesced in the justic __ wing claims, but he admitted the justice of them by moving claims, whatever one Governor and substitutiug another. So t ha t . _ acte i 4 case may be the policy of the matter, here is a prta_",y„ nrecog . to prove porthat our claims of 9,000 ru pees_ a w n e n re ary n " - Commodore nised unfounded. About the 6th J of Lambert, in the execution of his instructions, pro cee ded up the river for the purpose of comm u n i cating with the •new Governor of Rangoon. These com m unications were not o f . an unfrieddly hischaracter, a recei ved a deputation fr om and he vessel, though the parties were not of high rank the Governor o n board then sent Commander Fishbourne . e 11 to demand compliance with the to the Governor, formally ;,„ commander Fishbourne and the terms sent to b..-- s ubjected to insults • were and in officer with him British officer acting under the o r d ers of no 1 dignit.ies,w Sovereign could submit to. Whether these o f his e p• o ni a mistaken sens e of dignity on. the indignities a , Governorr°s of Rangoon I will not part co the , .say, but the ware kept waiting • British officers were subjected to insults and indignities, which could be taken in no other sense than as premeditated. A refusalwas g i ve n to the othcers to the effect that they could not be co mmunicated with as the Governor was whole of the communications from the Burmese were those of a superior to au inferior • the language in which the communications were couched altogether claimed supe riority for the Burmese, though no people are more sensi tive as to dignity and forms than the Burmese. On re ceiving a letter of instructions, Commodore Lambert, in re taliation for the insults from the Burmese, took upon him self—without, however, having received precise instructions to sei ze on a vessel belonging to the King of Ava, which he carried with him. While engaged a s , this proceeding, the commodore's ship was fired at from a stockade, and as violent hostilities had commenced on the part of the Burmese it Wad the imperative duty of Commodore Lambert not to