The Sun. — London, England, 1823-04-15 00:00:00

• lama torronutications of some importance to make to him, which the troubled state of the capital for several days past, and my . overt continued indisposition, had prevented me from submitting to his consideration at an earlier period. Having thus drawn his attention to what I was about to say, I produced your dispatch of the 9th February, and an extract from Sir Charles Stuart's dispatch to you, of the 10th February ; and proceeded to read tohim those parts of each which I thought the most calculated to produce a favourable etfect,aecornpanying my reading with such remarks as the nature of the communica tion required. M. de San Miguel listened with the greatest attention ; but as soon. as I had concluded, observed, that the British Govern ment was labouring under a delusion, in supposing any sort of modification possible. It would be a much easier thing to overturn the whole Constitutional system, and to re-establish absolute despotism, than to concede even the most insignificant of the points which had been pointed out as the most likely to conciliate. He was fully aware that England asked no niodificatians on I her own account. Ile knew that we *shed to preserve to Spain - het constitutional system; that our.'only object in trying to en gage her to yield upon certain points was the conviction, that if a war did break out, we must be, sooner or la ter, involved in it ourselves. Ile knew very well that we should not declare in favour. of Spain at first; bat nobody could be so blind as not to see, that if the war was protracted, and other Powers took part in it, England alone could not remain a passive spectator of what might be its results. No. 40.:.--Sir A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.-- Received March 10. . (Extract:) Madrid, March 5, 1023. A Spanish Gentleman at Paris has written from Paris to that the French Government• has . declared that it Will suspend hostilities if a general amnesty be granted—a ver bal pfornise of modifications hereafter be given—a change of Minißtcrs take place—and the King be permitted to go to the waters of Sacedon. That the negociation must be carried on at Paris, through the mediation of the British Ambastiador ; quotes Sir Charles Stuart as his authority, and refers his friends to me for further information. Now, I have heard nothing from Sir Charles Stuart since the 20th tilt. when he still referred me to his Dispatch to you of the 10th of February, as containing the final determination of the French Government. That determination is very widely dif ferent from the arrangement alluded to by ----. No. , 11.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.— Received March HI, at night. (Extract.) Madrid, March 2, 1823. tittW. Alonsieur de San Miguel this morning, and, to my great.astonishmen,t be asked me what were the precis e condi— .4ons required by France, in case any questions should be asked him in Cortes. I repeated to him the conditions stated in Sir Charles. Stuart's dispatch of. the 10th - February, and those (hardly to be considered Adel) contained in the same Am bassador's .dispatch Of the 21st February *; and, according to his request , I sent him, upon my return home, an extract from the dispatch of the 10th. February. What is in agitation I know not. Ile told me :he should say nothing upon the sub ject, unless called upon by the Cortes; and that if any negocia tions were entered into, he would not be the person to negotiate. I should only mislead you if I were to attempt to give any explanation of this singular conversation. • See No. 33, a Copy of which was received by Sir William Court, subsequently to his Letter of the sth March. 1 ' No. 42. ' . Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning,—Received March 20. (Extract.) - - ~ ' Madrid,. March 11, MI In a few hurried lines, written as the last courier was setting otr, I communicated to you a singular conversation which had passed between M. de San Miguel and myself. I forebore to express any opinion , upon this conversation ; but Whatever hopes some of his expressions were calculated to ex cite are now entirely at.an end. No. 43. Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir Charles Stuart. • ' Foreign Office, March 31, 1023 Sir--The hopes of an accommodation between France and Spain, which his Majesty has so long been encouraged to cite reth, in despite of all untavourable appearances, being now un happily extinguished, I am commanded by hie Majesty to ad dress to your Excellency, for the purpose of being communi cated to the French Minister, the following explanation of the sentiments of your Government upon the present posture of .atrairs between those two kingdoms. The King ilea extutusted his endeavours to preserve the peace of Ettrope..! The. epic:talon of an interference in the internal concerns of on account of the troubles and distractions which have ibr some time prevailed in that kingdom, was not one on which his Majesty could, for himself, entertain a moment's hesitation. If his Majesty's Plenipotentiary at Verona did not decline tak ing part in the deliberations of the allied cubinets upon that question, it was because his Majesty owed to his allies, upon that as upon every other subject, a sincere declaration of his opinions; and because he hoped that it friendly and unreserved communication might tend to the preservation of general peace. The nature of the apprehensions which had induced the King of France to assemble an ansiy, within his own frontier, upon the borders of Spain, had been indicated, in the first instance, y the designation of " Cordon Sanitatrta" The change of at designation to that of an " Army of' Observation" (which tdok, place in the month of September last) did not appear to his Majesty to imply more, than that the defensive system,' , originally opposed to the contagion of physical disease, would bh continued against the possible inconveniences, moral or poli tical, which might arise to France, front 'a civil contest raging a country separated from the French territory only by a con ventional line of demarcation. The dangers naturally incident' to an unrestrained intercourse between two countries so situated towards each other ; the dangers of political intrigue, or of oc casional violation of territory, might sufficiently justify prepa .N rdtians of military defence. Such was the state of things between France and Spain at the opening of the Congress at Verona. The propositions brought forward by the French Prenipotentiary in the Confe rences of the Allied Cabinets were founded on this state of things. Those propositions did l eer relate to any project of car rying attack into' the heart of the Spanish monarchy, but were in the nature of inquiries :--last, What ;countenance France might expect to receive from the Allies, if she should find her. Belt under, the necessity of breaking off diplomatic intercourse with the Court of Madrid ? And, UV, What assistance, in *apposed cases of outrage to be committed', or of violence to be menaced, by Spain. These cases were all contingent and pre cautionary. '1 he answers of the three continental Powers were of a corresponding character. 'l'lle result of the discussions at Verona was, a determina tion of. his Majesty's allies, the Emperors of Austria and itufas;a, and the King of Prussia To make known to the Ca'oblet of Madrid, through their respective Ministers at that Court, their sentiments upon the necessity of a change in the present system of the Spanish Government ; and, in the .event of an unsatisfactory answer to that communication, to recall their respective Ministers ; and to break offal' diplomatic intercourse with Spain. 2dly, To make common cause with .France against Spain, in certain specified cases ; Casa, as has been already observed, altogether contingent and precautionary. is Majesty's Plenipotentiary declined concurring in these measures; not only because he was unauthorized to pledge the faith of his Government to any hypothetical engagement, but bV3334: his Goverment bad, from the month of April, 1820, Uniformly reco mmended. to the' powers of the alliance to abstain front interfaence in the internal affairs of Spain ; and because, having been from the sante period 'entirely unac quainted with whatever transactions might have taken place be ta/ems France and Spain, his Government could riot judge on what grounds, the Cabinet of the Tuileries meditated a isossible discontinuance of diplomatic relations with the Court of Madrid; or on what grounds they apprehended' an occurrence apparently .so iniproliabk, as a commencement of hostilities against France loySpaSu.. • No proof was produced to his Majesty's Plenipotentiary of the .existence of any design on the part of the Spanish Government tai invade die territory of France, of any attempt to introduce disaltivtion among her soldiery, or of any project to undermine • her political institutions ; and so long as the struggles and tlis luirl'utnees of Spain should be confined within the circle of her !aiwn territory, they could not be admitted by the BritishOo.. vernment - to OW any plea for Foreign interference. ' If the end of the last and the beginning of the present century saw all Europe combined against France, it was not on account of the internal changes which France thought necessary for her own political anti civil reformation ; but because she attempted to pro. yakate, first her principles, and afterwards her dominion, by the ireord . loiposSible as it was for his Majesty •to be party to the mea sures concerted at Verona with respect to Spain, his Majesty's Pl:nipotentiary declared , that the British Government could only endeavour throUgh 11i3 Majesty's Minister at the Court of thellatholic King, to allay the ferment which those measures ;night occasion at Madrid, and to do all the good in his power." Up to this period no communication had taken place between his Majesty and the Court of Madrid, as to the discussions at Verona. But about the time of the arrival of his Majesty:a Pitnitrotentiary, on his return from Verona, at Paris, Spam expressed 3 desire for the " friendly interposition" of his J4la 7 'testy, to avert the calamities of war. ..Spain distiodistinctly braised thia desire to the employmen t of sun gond offices" on the • Fart of Cheat Britain, us would not be inconsistent with " the most s trictly conceived system of neutrality." Nor has any Veriod occurred, throughout the wh ole oldie intercourse of the Jiritish Government with spain, at which tile Spanish Govern went has been for ohe moment led, by that of Great Britain, to believe, that the policy of his Majesty, in a contest between France and Spain, would be other than neutral. In pursuance of this request, and of his previous declara tion at Verona. His Majesty's Plenipotentiary received in structions at Paris to make to the French Government the offer of his Majesty's mediation. In making this offer, the 'British Government deprecated, from motives of expediency as well as from considerations of justice, the employment to wards Spain of a language of reproach or of intimidation. They represented as matter of no light moment the first breach, by whatever power, of that general pacific settlement which had been so recently established, and at the cost of so many . suffer ings and sacrifices to all nations. Nor did they disgtuse from` the French Government the anxiety with which they looked forward to all the possible issues of a new war in Europe, if once begun. In addition to suggestions such as these, the British Govern ment endeavoured to learn from the Cabinet of the Tuileries theuature and amount of the special grievances of which his Most Christian Majesty ,complained, against Spain ; and of such specific measures of redress or conciliation on the part of Spain, as would arrest the progress of his Most Christian Ma jwity's warlike preparations. The French Government declined the formal mediation of his Majesty; alleging, in substance, that the necessity of its warlike preparations was founded, not so much upon any direct cause of complaint against Spain, which might be susceptible of accurate specification and of practical adjustment, as upon the. general position in which the two kingdoms found them selves placed towards each other; upon the effect which all that was passing and had been for some time passing in Spain produced upon the peace and tranquillity of his Most Christian - Majesty's dominions; upon the burdensomenesa of that de fensive. armament which France had thought herself obliged to establish on her frontier towards Spain, and which it was alike inconvenient to her to maintain, or without some change of circumstances which would justify such change of counsel to withdraw; upon a state of things in short, which it was easier to understand than to define ; but which, taken alto gether, was so intolerable to France that open hostility would be far preferable to it. War would, at least, have a tendency to some conclusion ; whereas the existing state of the relations between France and Spain might continue for an isMefinite time, increasing every day the difficUlties of Spain, and propa gating disquietude and alarm throughout the French army and nation. But although his Most Christian Majesty's Government de clined on these grounds a formal mediation, they professed an earnest desire for peace and accepted his Majesty's " good offices" with Spain for that object. Contemplating all the mischiefs which war might inflict upon France, and through France ultimately perhaps upon all Eu rope; and which it must inflict, more uninydiately and inevi tably, upon Spain, whose internal anhnosites and agitations a foreign war could not but exasperate and prolong, the Bri tish Government was deeply impressed with the necessity of peace for both kingdoms, end resolved, therefore, whether invest ed or not with the formal character of mediator, to make every effort, and toavail itself of every chance; for the prevention of hostilities. The question was now become a question simply and entirely between Spain and France; and the practical point of inquiry was not so much how the relations of those two govern , ments had been brought into their p r esent awkward complies ' tion, as how that complication could be solved, without re course to arms, and an amicable adjustment produced, through mutual explanation anti concession. Nothing could have induced his Majesty 'to suggest to the Spanish nation a revision of its political institutions, as the price of his Majesty's friendship, But Spaniards of all par ties and descriptions, admitted some modifications of the Con , stitution of 1812, to be indispensably necessary; and if in such a crisis as that in which Spain now found herself, dis tracted at once by the miseries of civil war, and by the ap prehension of foreign . invasion, the adoption of mockflcations so admitted to be desirable in themselves might afford a pros. pect of coniposing her internal dissentions,and might at the same time furnish to the French Government a motive for widrawing from the menacing position which it had assumed towards Spain, the British Goirernifient - felt that no scruple of deli cacy, or fear of misconstruction, ought to restrain them from avowing an earnest wish that the Spaniards could pre vail upon themselves to consider of such modifications, or, at least, to declare their disposition to consider of them hereafter,- It is useless now to discuss what might have been the result of his Majesty's anxious endeavours to bring about an accommo dation between Franco and Spain, if nothing had occurred to internipt their progress. Whatever might be the indisposition of the Spanish Oovernment to take the first step towards such an accommodation, it cannot be disguised, that the prin ciples avowed and the pretensions put forward by the French Government, in the speech from the throne at the opening of the Chambers at Paris, created new obstacles to the success of friendly intervention. 'the communication of that speech to the British -Government was accompanied, indeed, with re newed assurances of the pacific disposition of France ; and the French Ministers adopted a construction of the passage most likely to create an unfavourable impression in Spain, which stripped it of a part of its objectionable character. But all the attempts of the British Government to give effect at Madrid to such assurances and explanations,. proved unavailing. The hopes of success became gradually fainter, and have now va nished altogether. It remains only to describe the conduct which it is his Ma jesty's desire and intention to observe, in a conflict between two nations, to each of whom hit Majesty is bound by the ties of amity and alliance. The repeated disavowal, by his Most Christian Majesty's Gov r. nment, of all views of ambition and agg,randisement, for bids the suspicion of any design on the part of France to esta blish a permanent military occupation of Spain ; or to force his Catholic Majesty into any measures derogatory to the inde pendence of his Crown, or to his existing relations with other Powers. • / The repeated assurances'which his Majesty has received, of the determination of France to respect the d ominion of his Most Faithfid Majesty, relieve his Majesty from any appre hension of being called upon to fulfil the obligations of that in timate defensive connection which has so long subsisted be tween the Crown of Great Britain and Portugal. With respect to the provinces in America which have thrown off their allegiance to the Crown of Spain, time and course of events appear to have substantially de cided their separation from the -mother country although the formal recognition of those provincee, as indepen dent States, by his Majesty, may be hastened or retarded by various external circumstances, as well as by the more or less satianictory progress, in each State, towards a regular and settled form of Government. Spain has long been up prised of his Majesty's opinions upon this subject. Disclaim ing in the most solemn manner any intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in, America, his Majesty is satisfied that no attempt will be made by France, to bring under dominion any of those posses sions, either by conqueet, or brcession, from Spain. This frank explanation upon the points on which perhaps alone the possibility of any collusicn of France with Great Britain can be apprehended in a war between France and Spain, your Excellency will represdnt to M.-de Chateaubriand, as dictated by an earnest desire to be enabled to preserve, in that war, a strict and undeviating neutrality; a neutrality not liable to alteration towards either party, so long as the honour and just interest of Great Britain are actually respected by both. lam commanded, in conclusion, to direct your Excellency to declare to the French Minister, that his Majesty will be at all times ready to renew the interposition of his good offices, ,for the purpose of terminating those hostilities, which his Majesty has so anxiously, although ioeffectually, endeavour to avert.—l am, &c. (Signed) GEORGE CANNING. His Excellency the Right Zion. Sir Chas. Stuart, KALB., acc. We have this morning received. Lisbon Papers from the 21st to the 27th instant, but although their contents are important, the greater import. once' of the Parliamentary proceedings of last night compels ua only to notice briefly the ac, counts which they bring of a victory gained by General REG° over the whole force of the in surgents, at Amarante, on the 23d ult. The rebels lost 16 killed, 40 wounded, and 250 pri soners, and were obliged to fly in the direction of Galliaes. ientobt A COItitESPONDENT.I STOCK EXCUANQE, Twelve o'Ciock.--in conse quence of our strict neutrality, the funds are gradually improving. Consols opened at 781 ut which price they remain 'steady, with little doing. FOREIGN MARKET.- - This is settling day in Foreign Securities, but I do not hear of any de. limiters. Spanish Bonds opened at 304, and went up to 3111. • The interesting Lady COCHRANE embarked a Gravesend, on Sunday last, to join her gallon Lord in South America. HOUSE OF LORDS, APRIL 14. The Mouse' met at eleven o'clock, and. heard appeals till one, when it adjourned to 5 o'clock. At five the Lord Chancellor took his seat on the Woolsack. The Earl of SHAFTESBURY presented a Petition from Dudley, in Worcestershire, against the Insolvent Debtors'Act, and another from the Mayor and Burgesses of Beverley, in Yorkshire, against granting any ftirtber concessions to Roman Catholics. • Lord HOLLAND presented a Petition from Dr. High more, complaining of the oppressive exercise of the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Court ; and another from Camberwell, in Surrey, against the Insolvent Debtors' Act. FOREIGN NEGOCIATIONS. The Earl of LIVERPOOL said, he rose to lay on their Lordships' table the Papers relative to the important ne gociation in which this country had beep lately engaged respecting Spain. In doing so, he felt it, necessary to state the purport of the -Papers, and to make some ob servations on the course puisued by this Government during the negociations for the last nine months, and on our present policy. He should be most unwilling, in, laying the Papers" on their Lordships' table for conside ration, without meaning to call for any declaration 01l their opinion before they had sufficient time to come to a just conclusion, to adopt any course that might be objec tionable ; but he thought no course could be less objec tionable than that he should do, what the Papers alone could not do—put the House in possession of l'acts and arguments by which the conduct of Government was di rected. Even if the Papers lie bad now to present con tained the fullest possible information on the subject, the course he was pursuing, he conceived, would be unobjec. tionable; but some of the Papers which had ehtered into the late negociations belonged to Foreign Powers, and could not be laid before Parliament--and there were some to which the British Government was not a party. In the case of Papers being laid before the House to justify a war, the outline of the argument was always stated ; and he therefore thought it necessary to adopt the same course on the present occasion, in which, however, he would endeavour to be as brief and clear as possible.— There were two points to which lie wished to direct the attention of the House—the general progress of the ne. gociation, and the policy adopted by this Government.— The Papers commenced with the meeting of the Allied Sovereigns; but he would state some antecedent facts, for the purpose of letting the House see what was the state-of Spain at that period. When the King of Spain returned to his country in the year 1814, the Govern ment which was then established had been formed on . principles extremely erroneous, and was by no means applicable to the circumstances of the country. On the King's restoration; it became an object of great import ance how he should act—and Sir Henry Wellesley, the Ambassador of tliis country then in Spain, acting under the authority of the Government here, advised the King to accept the constitution with modifications. The King of Spain was soon afterwards led to think that the opinion of the people was not favourable to the Constitution, and re fused to confirm it, but promised that the Cortes should be assembled, and distinctly recognised the principles of a limited monarchy. And if the principles of the procla. motion issued on that occasion bad been acted on. Spain and Europe would probably be preserved from the dan ger with which they are at present threatened; but it was notorious, that notwithstanding the promise contain ed in that proclamation, the Cortes were not assembled from 1814 to 1820, which was the main cause that pro duced the events of April, MO, by which the Constitu tion of 1812 was restored.. Some of the Powers of Eu rnpe looked with anxiety at the change which that event matte in the Government of Spain; but it' ever -there was a change in the government of any country that could not provoke a foreign power's hostility. it was the restoration of the Constitution of Spain. It had existed from 1812 to 1814, during which two years we had con tended for it, and all the - Pbwers of Europe were anxious to enter into treaties with it; and those by whom it was restored had a right to say. •' We have only brought back that Constitution of which you have already ex pressed your approbation." It must have appeared to every candid man, that though there might. be much in the establishment of that Constitution to regret, yet there was nothing either in the Constitution itself. or in the manner of its restoration, that could justly provoke the hostility of foreign powers. The Government cf this country took every opportunity to state those senti ments and feelings to foreign powers; and to deprecate interference in the internal affairs of other States; and in answer to a question put 'to him by a Noble Lord in that House on the subject, at the time the event he had. mentioned took p lace, lie distinctly _stated the opinions entertained by . his .141Rjesty's Government. In a Paper addressed by this Government to our-Allies in 1821, it was expressly stated, that the policy of this Government was of non-interference in the internal concerns of other States, unless in case of some very particular circum stances, and that there were no such circumstances in the events that had taken place in Spain. Indeed it was his (Lord Liverpool's) opinion, that .f the right of inter ference was a general rule, the case of Spain would form an exception to it. It was also stated to the French Ambassador; to the very last moment of his leaving this country to go to Verona, that with regard both to the po licy and the justice of interfering in the atihirs of Spain, there was the strongest possible objection. In this state matters stood previous to the meeting . of Sovereigns at Verona; and at the time his Noble Friend, who was no more, had prepared to go to Verona, it was not, thought that the a ff airs of Spain would form the most prominent subject of discussion; but he was prepared to act in the same spirit in whatever way it should be discussed.— Circumstances occurred soon after that made it probable that the affairs of Spain would be brought forward by France in a prominent manner : a strong reprensentation was in consequence made to , the Government of France by this country before the commencement of' the Congress at Verona ; and the Representative of this Government at the Congress was instructed to declare, should France make a proposal to interfere with Spain, that this Govern ment considered that any such interference would be both useless and dangerous. and that in no event would this country become a party to it ; and on this principle all the further proceedings of this Goverument on the sub ject were carried on. The French Government pro posed two questions at the Congress-of Verona. The first was, whether, in case France found it necessary to dissolve het relations with Spain, the Allied Powers would do the smile ? and the second was, whether, if war should bleak out between France and Spain. the Allied Powers would assist France ? These questions applied to events that were contingent, not present, and did not contemplate the invasion of Spain by France , but events that might take place. The three other Allied Powers answered, that it France broke oft' her connection with Spain, they would do the same; but the Represen tative of this Governmeut at the Congress gave a dif ferent answer, He stated that it was the policy of this country to abstain &mu interference with the internal concerns of other countries ; and that this Government considered, that any amelioration in the state of the people should come from themselves, and not from lb reign countries, nor be pressed on them by foreign force; and that any attempt on the part of the Allies to change the Government of Spain would probably Injure the Spanish Monarch himself, and would certainly expose him to danger; that by the attempt they would cer tainly inept- an enormous expence, and would probably experience final diaaappointment. In this the first, an awer of the Representative of the British Government, at Verona, be gave a most distinct refusal to our be coming a party to any measures of hostility against Spain. It was then proposed to call on the Spanish Government to set the nig of Spain - at liberty, and in that case the Allied Powers would not interfere in her internal con cerns. The Noble Duke who represented thid country protested most solemnly against any interference with the Spanish Government. and advised the other Powers, that if they interfered at all, it should be wi'.ll the ex. ternal acts of the Government, and nOt with its internal regulations, which, tie said, could not justify interference on the part of the Allies or of Frante ; ana at the same time expressed the earnest desire of his Sovereign to see the relations of good ne i g hbourhopd established=between France and Spain. The Allied Powers next made a declaration, in which they stated three events which might cause them to attack Spain. The first was. an attack on France by Spain ; or , any act to propagate the principles of their Revolution ; the second, the de thronement of the King of Spain ; the third, • a refusal to change the Ministers of Spain. On this declara. tion being made, our representative refused, on the part of this country, any interference by menace, stating that the only ground that could justify any interference was, the external question, which might be a fair subject of mediation. However objectionable the conduct of the allies in making this declaration was, it contained nothing that necessarily led to the invasion of Spain: the first cause of interference was, defence; the other two were contingent. The measure of makinft this declaration a false step, and might break o ff e diplomatic rela tions between Spain and the Allies, but that was not war, 12.0 r a necessary cause of war. There were instances in which diplomatic intercourse was broken oil without forming any justifiable cause of war, and he m ight, in some cases, advise the breaking off of diplomatic inter course (though certainly, not in the case of Spain) and yet not think it necessary to go to war. In the course then taken by the Allies, the invasion of Spain by France did not appear to be contemplated even at the breaking up of the Congress of Verona. The whole policy of the Allies as it regarded Spain, was wrong ; and much of it was un just, but there was no step taken that shewed a d i rect in tention of invading Spain : the spirit of their policy was a different question: On the breaking up of the Con gress it was obviously the policy of this country to en deavour, by every honourable means, to preserve peace; and it was a conscious satisfaction to this country, that we had made an offer of our mediation to France, although it bad been rejected by her. But though the Govern ment of France did not accept our mediation, still the communications received from it did not hold out the in vasion of Spain as an event likely to take place. and the impression on the British Government almost to the time it was announced by the King of France in his Speech was, that it would not take place. What then was the policy the British Government bound to pursue? It was to make every effort to prevent the peace of the world from being disturbed, particularly between France and Spain, as if - once the peace of Europe was broken. no man could say where the war would terminate. it was therefere our duty to Spain, and France, and Europe, and ourselves, to preserve peace if possible. About the period he had last alluded to, we were applied to by Spain to use our amicable , interference with Fmnce, not by any menace of war, but even if' war between France and Spain should take place, this country might remain at peace: France, though she declined our mediation, still express ed a wish for our good offices. One object of Spain was to have the army of observation withdrawn; and though nothing had then been said of an invasion, yet some event had taken place that furnished a plausible pretext fbr France keeping that army on the frontiers of Spain ; but it was clear that such an army mild not be kept by France without its exciting alarm and dissention in Spain. France had a right to keep that army on her frontiers ; and having adopted the measure, good or bad, it could not be expected that she would abandon it, without some thing being done to account or give a reason for her change of conduct. Nothing en earth could induce the British Government to recommend to the Spanish Go vernment, even in the most amicable manner. to concede one tittle of their Constitution that they considered ma terial ; but the British Government knew, as all the world did—as every man in Spain must have known, that some changes were necessary. The British Government had to take the danger of Spain into account, and her means of resisting the attack that was meditated on her ; and though there was no reason to doubt that her means of defence would be finally effectual, yet she was open . to invasion, and though she should be ultimately suc cessf ul . yet her success must be the effect of her suffering. Her provinces must be over-run end desolated, ter such must be the effect of way, whatever proclamations might be issued to prevent it--(hear.) lf, therefore, Spain thought that any part of their Constitution was a proper subject of change, it was thought that they might do now what they would have to do hereafter. Spain was not the first object of the British Government; this country was their first object; but that was his view of the situation of. Spain. What was done by this country, was not pro posed to Spain as a demand, but as a suggestion ; not as any thing a refusal to comply with which might subject her to a penalty, but as what was best for herself: The British Government, in making this suggestion, thought it right to avail itself of the service which his Noble Friend might render on such an important occasion.— It' any country ever owed obligation to another country, Spain did to his Noble Friend. He had rendered the most important. service to that country—hei bad become acquainted with her people. and her Constitution, dur ing the tremendous conflict lie sustained for her liberties ; and his Noble Friend. would be the last person in the world to recommend to Spain any disgraceful coiaession— any thing inconsistent with her character and dignity. This recommendation was made antecedently to any di• rect menace on the part of France to invade Spain ; for up to the •middle of January the Spanish Government was impressed with the opinion that no invasion of,-their country would take place ; and it was but a few days be fore the King of France's speech to the Chambers that there was ground to believe Spain would be invaded.— ' T he papers lie presented would shew what the British Government had felt it their duty to do before that pe riod to prevent war. The King of France's speech, how ever, made a great alteration, and all hopes of an HCCOITI. nusiation appeared to be at an end; but it would appear by the papers, that even then France declared herself de simus of amicable arrangement, and solicited the good offices of' this country, and professed a readiness , to give the passage in the King's speech, that excited great and just offence, a different interpretation. On the first day of the,Session. he (Lord Liverpool) had stated, that he conceived it would be criminal in the Ministers of this country, as long as any hope remained that mediation might be effectual to prevent hostilities, not to endea your, by every means in their power, to attain an ob ject so very desirable.—From the period of that speech he felt it inconsistent with his duty to urge any thing be yond what he conceived the strict policy of this coun try; neutrality,—Now he conic to the most material part of his statement, and what was most important for the country to decide'upon. which was the course pursued by the executive in this negociation. He would say now as he had on a former occasion, that the policy of this coun try was neutrality; and the British Cabinet in every [-stage of the negociation had avowed that policy; and it had not only avowed it, but it had been acknowledged and so understood by the Spanish Government. No de ception had been practised. Whatever had been done, or whatever had been omitted to be done, had been on a complete understanding with the Spanish Government. It may be now expected of him to state the motives that influenced himself' and his colleagues in adhering to neu trality. What he was convinced must weigh with every man was, the consideration of the means and condition of the country to engage in a war. On the first day of the session he had said that if either the honour or the inte rests of the country would be compromised by remaining at peace. we possessed ample means of carrying on war; and he did not say that loosely or unadvisedly, as persons when speaking might say upon general principles, that a country like this must always possess the means of main. raining a war; but he said it undoubtingly, and from his ' situation he was capable of judging of our resources in time detail. But after a war of such unexampled mag nitude and extent as the last, when the commercial and mercantile interests were again flourishing, after having experienced a depression Which had been caused by it, anti which had been more severely felt during the peace than when the war was raging, and when time agricul tural interest was in some degree reviving, because the last to suffer; by reason of these interests settling them selves upon the basis of peace ; it was most desirable to maintain the tranquillity of the country. Their Lord ships were to consider, secondly, the nature of the contest they would have to embark in, 4 ' toto ark:- tint est in corpora /lei." Let them not suppose that it was the mere fitting out of a fleet, or the grant ing of a subsidy, that would he required of England. if she took part of the struggle between France and Spain ; she must enter into it as she did in the last war, engaging all her energies in support of it, and putting forth all her resources. And he begged their Lordships to recollect that a war carried on in - Spain is four times more expensive than one conducted in any other country in Europe ; and let them look on whom the battles fell, on whom the sieges fell, on whom the exertions fell, in the late contest—and let them not only look at the risks and consequences of such a war, but to the magnitude and ex tent of it. On the former occasion, Sl ain was not the end, lint the means. The battle of Europe was fought in Spain ; it was not for the sake of Spain. but for the sake of, restoring the balance of power and liberties of Europe. of which she was an integral part. But Spain was then united. From the Asturias to the furthermost point of Andalusia the Spaniards were united against their in vaders. but now she was a divided country. Civil war was raging in her finest provinces, and the country was contenditig against the towns; the fanaticism ()liberty `raging on the one aide, and the fanaticism of bigotry on the other. Whether he looked at the magnitude of it, or as the exertions necessary for conducting a war, he could not advise it. It was said that the war was not popular in France. It was not popular with the mercannleor commercial interests ; they always, as was natural. Wish" ed to avoid war. Neither, he believed, was it popu lar with the arms*; because a war carried on in that , country was one inwhich little honour could be gained. whatever the success of it might be; but if this co untr y took a part in the contest, he would ask, would not the' Spanish merge in the English war ? as it had been the case on all former occasions ; so that not only Spa . nish interests would be involved, not only would British interests be involved, but the interests of the other countries in Europe. In 1739 this country WAS forced into a war with Spain, on a question of the right of.. search, and the conduct of the two Houses of Parlent was most extraordinary on that occasion. They came to . an unanimous vote that noace should be ma de with Spain until she had allowe d the rig 4ht of search. But the French subsequently took a part in it ; the 11 1. merged into the French war, and the two House r Parliament most inconsistently lost sight of the object for which they went to war, and (lid not insist upon it id, n the subsequent negociations for peace. But it was sai if this country had menaced France, she would have tic. sisted from the unprincipled aggression upon Spain. But then the question would come to the same point. Well'," it have been becoming in this country to have menaced! if . gliitV or anY t he no ha oo d u n n o t t ry in , t p e o n s d se ed ssi t n o g go any to se w ns a e r ? of lalle mai ntai n ultimately forced into the contest, because feeling of honour, would - have acted such a part. B ut the advocates for war had said that England might ht succeed in her attack upon Spain, and finally overru t Portugal, our ancient ally. But he believed .the ()bet that France had in view was impracticable. It was - possible for France to succeed unless she han d h support, 1 she hau of the great mass of the people of Spain ; ' v at the moment that they that and succeeded in consequence, why was this cour?tf., to interfere ? The fi rst operations of the French Mig!'. France mignn be successful ; but their difficulties would reliably Wee"' of those temporary successes, unless the mass of the sp_. nish people was with them, which he believed was n°‘ w ere the case, unless their feelings towards the invaders the materially sdibrd to materially changed, which circumstance wou... 0 the strongest prudential motives for not interfering. , _ ~e w majority of the Spanish nation was in favour of Fe r f, if • Constitution, it would be enabled to right it . ; 7 1 •_.. s were proceeding in consequ ..flae. the minority only was in its favour, it would be ras hness to take a . part with it. If this country wished , t scadsherself the war in which France, most unfortunately for _ wii , she should not do so consistently and Europe, had engaged, he could see no reason i at a to . he would not.say that it might not be necessaryto those ture period to interpose ; and it would be ee 0- n try oa who might then direct the Councils of the be ,e • so ., to Parliament to take such steps as might be ne, s prepar ed for her honour and safety ; but until they were _,..,,i to throw away the scabbard. the neutrality o had1, 1 ; 1 1 0. ; right to complain of false neutrality than qret t. l7 sbe a , 1 because no country had su ff ered more from its I,l_,l„ore, this country to be able to hold the pieud " l a t Vey e woul d of being is ready to do unto others as sh d f o r the with her honour. 13ut should do unto her." His Lordship apologiz% n o f the length of time he had occupied the attentis be laid oo House', and should now move that the ,f-r, t )s 0100 of the table, and the wish of his colleaguesPannPo r, that they might undergo the most minute it I be fel loon that they the House. when he trusted it would , -- i to trop had done their duty to France, to Span. an _ d w i t h yes - GREY said, his opinion was not alterocre e _ ling. ne pect to the inconvenience of this mode of p 0 necessary be. thought still farther information would be it noel' •' )r I lie shot' t ii. fore going into that discussion. Al n done to su was, that, in his opinion, nothing hadbesbeet interests. port the honour of the country or 4..„---, the p a pers were After a few words from Lord fa A ''''' ' -L tinted, acro• ordered to he laid on the table and to_ ; Isiner.elLasT WO dis , . and the House adjourned at 0 CLOCK. ---- I' —...---.-"*".----- liinseScas. PRICE o: TillS DAY AT s STOCKS V , ii Oldcsol a In di a u n. t s.B a A h u ll fn Sl C ie a r n i. At. di C I 7 . ; Ditto Small ................... Bank for Act. ............... India for Con. AFc t • ..... t ; 4 : Bank Stock 3 per Cent. Red. 4 ►er Cent. 754/ 3 Per Cent. CODS. 7 8 1 g, 34 per Cent. r.. 1 New 96g t I 5 i )er Cents. 1797 •. . ... . 1 Old "... Bank Long Ann. 1 . 91 9.16hs Imp. 3 per Cents...- siu-N • TH SOLES( QUIS DICERS FALSI7II ACID LONDON, TUESDAY, Apßth d f i c , oo • aoruirmill country. 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I,%itrofe we .. have not room for observations.; tiliropon disposed, indeed, to hazard ap 1 " 1 .? we Ol e rice momentous questions before us, until oot a en further time to deliberate on the iraPtury by documents at length submitted to the cao ° Ministers. el at th e We are .enabled to state positivelY. 13$ new out ni Guard Ships at the different pow oat' glh,theorid,aerriesdptaopheersc(oimo pnloetteoltylarienunesdt.o material to gence w hich Tha thing wen, published on Saturday and yestertiltr. the articles in the last French. Papers rel ate ' 4' hilie s movements of the. French troops and the ir the Army of the Faith. 11 143 ne: [Extract of a Letter born the Agen pp t m ',WO% 6 nople, dated March 11). ] In ACCOraing to advices from Smvrna of tilt, anti Wears that the Island of Syra bia been attacorwargf 16 French Consulate tota ll y destroyed. Scani 11161 times . nation bad gone down to inquire into the Walla Printed and Published for the Pa Office, No. 112, Strand, by .1, 1 1 . 141;1'.' orais:o2o44-0,,