The Sun. — London, England, 1805-12-27 00:00:00

TRIAL OF -TICE-.4Di11R..4L SIR 11. CalLbin, &MT. ON BOARD HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP THE PRINCE OF WALES, IN POBTSMOLITII lIARBOCR, ON 1 1 / 4 ION'DAY, DEC. 23,; 1805, AND' FOLLOWING "DAM. THE DEFENCE.—Tano DAY. At the. meeting of the Court on Wednesday Sir It. CALDER ,addressing the Court, said, "tbiri.Pre. sident, and Gentlemen of the Court, I beg leave to give in this paper Us' My Defence, and to request that a friend of mine, conversant in the hind, may be permitted to read it. • • To this the Court very readily assented. Mr. GAZELER i as Sir IL CALnEit's friend, then read his Defence, Which was iin substance as follows': I • " After. having • been 'employed on an arduous, difficult, and important -service. during the last ten months ; having, at 'the end of thht period, coin peUed into adion a greatly superior fleet of the ene rnY, who had, at the same time, the advantage of the wind; and having, under these ,ditliculties, gained over his enemy what he conceived, in the circumstances Of the case, a great and important vidory, he found himself compelled 'to request a trial, in consequence of his not having renewed the engagement during two days. after, in which the I enemy remained in sight. Surmises and misrepre-, ae ntations of his c o n d u ct on this occasion had gone ,abroad, t o allow whi c h to pa ss - o v e r i u sile nce u • ou ld itilVe been construed i n t o a - co n sciousness of guilt. tie had accordingly felt himself obliged to apply for a Court Martial,. to inquire into his condu&, con vinced that the result would completely .refute the charges with which he had been loaded. The Ad miralty had been pl ease d to acce d e t o hi s reques t ;- but thou g h lie had begged that it might be an in quiry into every part of his conduit, both prior and Euesequent, they had limited it to the days. of the twenty-third and twenty-fourth, on which days he was ch arged, with not having done the best in his Power, and :all that could have been done, to take and 'destroy all the ships Of the enemy, which, the charge °S6 erted, he ought to have engaged. This, ther • etore, was the only point for the consideration of the Court. Ile lamented the investigation was 1 1 1 ' 4 a a broader a n d more un li m i te d n a t ure . If i t h a d' en ! 0 36 tieable for.hi m to have entered into the , meritsthat of th e case, ' he should have been able to slew thsithis condnd had been rot only justifiable, but raise-worthy. That he had not only saved his own cc e , et s but had been.instrunientalin the!saving of his elidumutry. He trusted with Confidence, that the j t o t l,T ent ,Of the Court, this day, would restore him f or ,P°Q opinion of the country—of that country, I ' l ' l4 ' he had bled, and for which he had con r.r44d' The charge a gai ns t hi m was not precisely 11 any of the Articles of War, although it, as .. ; l am Il e d one of th em as i ts f oun d a ti on . e admitted that it was at all times the duty of a British Com %lna. nder to eng age a n y ship of the enemy when it .night 111 . his power ; but he denied that it .was Turribent on any such Commander to prove the le)2atieal impossibility of his so engaging. Neither e s'" he admit that a British Commander, having b n ce met an enemy, whom he had engaged, was ( i o 'Nnd, so leng as that enemy remained in sight, to weq,'ry thing in his power to renew the contest. He two instances of a contrary pradice, observed on C ° m ovable occasions, and by two of the greatest ' prn manders the British Navy had ever produced. He meant that of - - .Lord Howa, oti the 'lst of June, 17 D 4 , and that under Karl Sr. VINCENT, on the 14 th et of February, 1797,, bath Of which occasions these eminent Officers remained for some time in sight of the enemy, whom they' had previously en. without courting a renewal of the contest. Of the latter he 'could speak with more confidence, having himself heen.Earl ST. VINCENT'S, Captain on that memorable occasion. Of the propriety of this Pndilel in the case of these Noble Commanders no ' doubt bad ever been started, and they were allowed to have exercised a sound discretion. His, be con tended, WIS,a case of more necessity than either.— I t Nvaanot the fleet with which he had been en gaged that he had alone to contend. He 'had to bridewide against an attack from the Bochetbrt and against an attack from the Rochefort anti errol squadr o n s , i n addition to that which was then e t sight. m Febru he bad been sent 'by 1 / 2 ,4 t ‘QORNWALLI to blockade Ferrol, with seven Sail of the Line. This was all which could be spared tiva, - and although . he. repeatedly applied for two Inar:gates, only one could be spared him. It was, his meanifig ' to' retied on the 'Willi -da'tY. He WaS WCII assured they had enough to. i 6 snPPly ships where they were most wanted. t was his. obje& at present to defend himself, not t° accuse other S.. In the same 'month the, Toulon and Cadiz Fleets joined, and it was ascertained they ha d Proceeded t o the West Indies. So dangerous dives`, his• situation at this time that Lord GARDNER bilreeted hi m to leave Ferrol and come •to his- Lord.' i P" - "thirteen Sail of the Tine being then about ! L ave Ferrol and go to' C'orunthi• On : tho tOth L . 4 July they , had a n u:i llY began .to move, and sig. ' - tral Pests had been established between . CaPeTi tiesterre and; Corinna to' li`erral, to enable Iberia , l u d.ge- when to conic out. By an order from, n. aural e atstwn LUS, Bear Admiral STI RLING was ,i,ndered to join Sir , Itour.ai, add they Were ordered 0 cruize thirty or forty leagiles - to• the we'stward'for l' fo tx or ei g h t , Ys and ' return. The enemy's if r t e l e , w as then stated to be - sixteen 'sail, .with (y b' Prisoner did not in, they were humedi odY„to repair to their respective stations 'off Ferrel A : 4 itochefort. On the 15th he 'was' joined by Rear- , ‘l,lll, STIRLING. The same wind, however, 4 '2' 0 1 enabled Admiral STIRLING to /cave Rode t) enabled the fleet vhieh he had betal blockad. ,g there to escape ; which it did, a s appears from eiletievidence of Admiral' STIRLING himself, on the l ' t o Corunna, where it could get out at ,any The wind had continued nearly for two days 4t, e fair f or their 'departure, and, if they had taken er te arlta ge of the night, they might have Joined the It was out of di:spute that on the e4th the 6 i 1 , 1( was , N. E. which w a s • a favourable wind tbr ha , ( Int, and it w as k nown to a ll t h e C ourt th at ' land s occasion w • d • • all blew which might y eaahle them to effetea similar purpose. 1 0 , • %. , !t a t this t i me , • letter was received, written by No:" Ngtsori, then bound to Europe, to Lard aiup. atuf transmitted to Sir Roamer, strongly re- its a "ending a careful watch to he kepi on Ferrol, , tsu,, port into whi c h t h e Combined Pluto might be P tt 'e,d to attempt to enter . A ctor dhigly on t h e came in'si4ht, much:lyric - 11010ms, how., ever, thaa had beep sqpposed, not consisting of 14 sail of the line, as Adm. Cots:war...Li:l's accounts led LO expeCt,- but isf:..a) sail of the line, 7 frig:nes, 2 brigs, and a lugger; while to oppose them there were only 15 sail of the line, 2 frigates, and 2 cutters. Notwithstanding this superiority, and every, disad vantage of wind and weather, he effectedhis object of forcing the enemy to battle ; and, amidst the numberless insinuations which had unwarrantably been thrown out against his conduct, he bad never yet heard any-objedion started as to the mode of his commencing the a&ion on that day, or to his con dUCt in the course of it. 13y the valour of the Ad miral who was second in command on that day, and by the bravery of his fleet in general, he had been enabled to achieve what he presumed to think was, in such circumstances, a great and important vic tory a viaory than which few instances, and those of modern date, more important, or more decisive in their nature, had been accomplished with such a disparity of numbers. At the time the firibg ceased the enemy were to windward. The Vice-Admiral then hailed the Windsor Castle, which was in a da maged state, desiring her to prepare for action.. He kept in the smile tack during the whole of the night to profea her, keeping, at the same time, as close as possible to the enemy. During the night he was en gaged in repairing the damage the squadron had sus tained, and being then ignorant of the extent of the damage, he expected it would be in his power to renew the engagement. . He accordingly sent the Frisk cutter, and the Nile. lugger, to colic& the returns of the,state of the different ships. Theie re turns would be laid before the Court, and it would '..be for them to judge, if he would have been War ranted, labouring under the disadvantages which he shotild have to prove to them, and with his fleet so much damaged, in attempting to renew the action. It was not . till about eight in the morning of the 23d, that the Admiral saw the Malta greatly to leeward. He then made signal for her to quit the prizes, and for the Egyptiemie to take them in tow. The ,enemy were then seen at a distance, about eight or nine miles , to windward. He found, that of 15 ships of the line, the Windsor Castle only was declared incapable of sailing, and requiring to lie to, yet that many of them were very much crippled; -and, in his judgment, and relying on the returns which had been made to him, without a mast which could be relied on in a press of sail. That this belief was correa, no other evidence' seemed necessary than the fad that the Repulse sprung her bowsprit, and the Malta her main-mast, on the :25th, being the very first press of sail they had made since the aCtion. Capt. Isistast too, of whose evidence the Court were already in possesSion, has af-; forded his testimony, that lie expected, when sent to chase a frigate of the enemy, on the day after the aCtion, , tliat his mast would have gone by the board. Another circumstance which must have resulted from a renewal of the action, was the capture of the Windsor Castle, of the prizes, and the frigates, three or four sail of the enemy's fleet, apparent ly in order, being observed watching on the weather-beam, ready to cut off the separated ships. This it was the Vice-Admiral's duty to pre vent, and to preserve the advantage he had got.— Another disadvantage under which he laboured in attempting to renew theaCtion, was the want of frigates, en which it was Unnecessary for him to enlarge to that Court. It was far from being his intention to attempt to adduce any thing which might tend to diminish that spirit which induces British Comthanders to contemn every danger when their Country's interest was at stake ; but he must deprecate the idea that it Was incumbent on them, at all times, and in all cases, to combat with une qual numbers to ,the uttermost, without regard to any circumstances winds might exist. Every case must be governed by its own circumstances, and must depend on . the judgment of the Commander, subject to that responsibility which always attaches to such 'situations, It appeared to him that the :idiots was highly important, even if' the capture of two prizes - had heeti the. only object attained. There were, however, 16 sail of the line at Ferrol, which, if they Were . not already at sea, would, in the event of ilia being' unable to resume his station off that port, he left at full liberty to pursue any course they pleased,,and even to (Area' a landing in Ire land. He really did netted, in these circumstances, that he was justified in running the risk which must have attended a renewaiof the action, unless an op portunity'presented itself far more favodrable than that which he declined to attempt, resolved, as lie was, to return in search of them $o soon as he had placed his crippled ships in a place of safety. He certainly had not offered, .but, at the same time, he had never avoided a renewal of the engagement; and though the enemy vauntingly, as one gallant Com mander had represented. it, and with a view to cover the most leeward part of their fleet, as it had been described by anether : . gallant Officer, had berne on the British Fleet, . lie was convinced, had they been serious in coining to action, they would have received a proper. revenge. . But during the whole of the' 23d the enemy, as appeared front the eVidence beke the Court, had the wind, and of course could not be forced into action. On the 24th, arday-break, the enemy was seen only from the mast head, there being. some light breezes. ilut, even then ) supposing it to have been possible to bring the enemy to action, ' that could only be accoMplished by a separation ofthe squadron, and certainly, eyes then, not, in his opinion, without the consent of the enemy. At six 'o'clock of the even ing of the 24th the enemy - was entirely out of sight. The Vice-Admiral accompanied the Windsor Castle to a. place of safety, resolved to return to his station, and, if , possible, to bring the enemy to action. In case - of not fieding• them in. Ferrol, his resolution was to repair to therendezVous off Cape Finisterre. He accordingly returned to Ferrol and there resumed the blockade ; the Malta returned to England to refit ; and Admibl STIRLING, agree— ably to his orders, to Rochefort. The Vice... Ads miral had to the propriety of his caudal in these different respeCts, the approbation of the Qom-, matnler in Chief, who 'net only transmitted to hiM *letter of approbation and thanks after the aotion of the 22d, but, as an additional proof of confidence, on the 17th August put under his, command a fleet Of twenty sail of the line to blockade Ferrol, and .with farther instruetioes if they had sailed. The enemy had , sailed from Ferrol, but the Vice,Ad- Miral fortunately arrived time enough at Cadiz to enable 'Admiral CULLINWOOD to secure them there. _ acted to the,be4 of his judgineut in. all these :partieulats, hc little expeaed tea have met the reception which he found. await-ing , .him in this country. The Court were already in possession of the testimonial of the gallant:Admiral who was second in commands ,on the 22d Jule, to the prOpriety•of his (tile Vice-Admiral's) condu(F. A similar testithollial he had also received from his Commander in. Chief ; and he flattered himself the Country in general .would agree on his return home in bestowing the usual tokens of approba tion. on his conduCt, an d t h a t o f his "gallant asso ciates. This, at' least, they' deserved, however much he himself might have merited a contrary treatment. judge then of his feelings, en finding himself accused ; even by the most moderate ofhis assailants, of having _trifled with the feelings of the public. This, how ever, procheded not from any fault of his, but from the'mode in which his dispatches were published in the London Gazette. They were not published wholly and entire, - . and yet they were not published as extracts from, - but as copies - of; his letters. He disclaimed all idea of refleUing on 'the Admiralty iu this particular. They probably meant . to convey gratifying intelligence, to the publie,. without being aware of the interpretation: which might be put on it, or that it would militate to his 'disadvantage.— That they could not mean so was apparent, from the readiness . with which they had allowed 'him to state the substance of that part which was Omitted. In doing so, however, ho should take Care not to prejudice the public, but rather Himself tO.Suffer any 'odium which might arise for want 'of explanation. He then read an ad ditional, paragraph in, his letter to the Commander in Chief, giving an account of the action of the 22d, in which he says, " At' the same time it will be- , hove me to be en my 'guard, on account of the squa dron at Perrol, .and the two captured ships. I have sent them and the Windsor Castle away." If this had been stated, the public could not have expelled. so much. They Wonld • rather have contemplated with satisfildion what.had been done. His letter of the (a6th July too, in which he corrected the unfortunate omission relative to Admiral. STIRLING, breathed similar language, and shewed that a re newal of the enga,;ement for the time was at an end. As to the report. circulated by Lieutenant NtenoLSON, that the Vice-Admiral hadassured him, and had authorised him to declare to the Command ing Officer, " that I had it in my power, and Was determined to force the Combined Fleets to renew the • action"---if so, why was not Lieutenant Nt- CUOLSON called on to prove the fad. He eould not. The Vice-Admiral declared on his. honour that he never did lend such a message. Sir R. CALDER—" That'l do most solemnly." " Every letter shewed hiu intention not to renew the action till he had conveyed the Windsor,Castle to • „ 1 a place, of satety. hcst-, hoped, would justify him in wishing to have an opportueity to vindicate his charaCter and conduct. 'The question ,divided itself into two heads: First, could he have renewed the ac tion„.if he had inclined ?—Second, If it would have been prudent so to do ; and if he did not act wisely and exercise a sound Judgment , in declining to re new it ? It was evident that on the 2ad he could not renew the adton ; and that on the 24th, though the wind was favourable, he could not renew it withont separating the sqttadron,and even then it was doubtful with what success. These he should prove, and that it was impossible to take the prisoners out of the captured ships, had it been found necessary to destroy 'them. He lamented the absence of Captain PaoUsr, as he woul& have been a ma terial witness to prove the fads in , the case.— The signal which lie made, for a return of the damages which the different -ships had sustained did not impart his determination to renew the, ac tion. His only objet NVas to form, a line of battle, if the enemy had chosen to advance. It was plain that Captain INMAN made the same distinction that he did, fur though crippled he gave a negative to the signal to lie-by, well, knowing the ditlerence ..tween 'the ability to lie-by for aUenemy, and that of carrying a press of,sail for. the purpose of renew ing the ;talon.. He .could sufficiently admire that. spirit of heroism by which a British Officer was withheld from making 'a signal of inability, or dia "tress ; but he contended that it would ill have become him, and that he would ill have dischlrg ed his duty to the Public, if to' such feelings, :howeyer magnanimous. in themselves, he had sa crificed other more important considerations, As to what Captain Diativat said,. Ire declared that he already formed his plan, which was not to se parate the fleet, and to have ordered Capt. Dontwa to have kept sight of `the enemy, could only .have .had the tiled of separating him from the remainder of our squadron. He declared, indeed, that he was; surprised at Capt. D.'s having made the, signal be did. Had he (the Vice-Admiral) required it, he would have made.a signal for it, In lad the - signal made to Capt. DuanAm was 77, the signal to bring to, and not 1 9, the signal to reconnoitre." A ;variety of letters and other documents .there .then .thee pttt 'hi and read ; and amongst Vie rest, the first Dispatch of Sir R. CALDria to the Admiralty, after the aetien, as it originally stood, without their curtailment... The following paragraph from a pri vate letter to Sir R. CALDliaj from Adiniral..Cotor ,wmaas, dated July Wig, was then read But it was not believed that they (the enemy) had'iio many' line of battle ships; sixteen being all w . e heard ot;•.: front a sloop which spoke them, as they 'said, on board, after they left the West Indts.7 Q. (To the Hon, Capt. GAR6NER, of the Hero) Is this your report of the damages sustained by the Hero ?—A. Yes, it is. The report was then read. Q. ni,t the enemy ever cline, or make any at tempt to &me me to ad.ion, on the '2 3 d of July last ? Q.. Could I have forced them to come to anion on that day ?—A. Not if they chose to avoid it. Q. If I had gone towards the tacitly on the 24th, with intention to renew the aaion, could I have com pelled them to do so, if they had chosen to avoid it, without approaching so near the shore as to have enabled them to communicate by signals with Fer .rol ?—A. I am not acquainted with the relative sail ing of the two fleets, but am of opinion, they could have comtnunieated with :he shore before they could have been brought to action, had they wislitld to do Sc. Q. Was the British Fleet always kept by me be tween that of the enemy and the Port of Ferrol, while the enemy kept in sight ?-4.. The British StatadrOn NVAS aIW4Yi nearer to tiro Port of Fqrol than that of the.enenty. Q. Was •-your nu't in. danger by carrying - Witensent by,ine to Adniiral Corn Wallis, on our,ro turn to Oshant ,carrying that duty, winch \va s o n ly performoq t on Sir .11. Calder's appearing i n yi lit of Admiral Cornw:illis'i fleet, the foremast of the I - ler() vas i 4 danger of ° go ing over ,the side. COoicr.--Q. From the manner in which you have described the state of the fore Mast of the I Icro, at the time you joined Admiral C9rnwidlis, what do yOti . Suppose would have been .the; consequencehadth e Vice-Adtuiraf found it n ecessary to Carr y sail in pur suit of the enemy ?•--A. think the tbrentast, par ticularly on titeQ.4tb, when there wa s a cons id erable bad v.7:6 carried sail, must have gone by the board, from : its putting oa so bad an appearance after we had fished , it to the 4tent of our moans. Q. What, masts of tlitf'f‘lero there nece:;- sary to be, and were, taken out, when the Ilea) w - as repaired in port ?-H.A. The foremast .and mainina,c were both taken out arid replaced l,y rieW ones. Q. (By the COURT). As the British. Fleet was al ways nearer to the shore than the enemy's, while-in sight, in what way could they approach the shore to communicate with it before so:he part of the Bri tish Fleet, : not, disabled, .could Irtve closed with that part of the enemy which Was shore, I 'twilit any rant it .h.4*;ften terre and Ferrol, IffliOeby yishes COUlmunieated to Ferrol. •'' • Q. At what distance wa§you from the shore while the enemy wasin sight reler to my book: We were 38 leagues N.. Wf _tom 1..L1 1 - 0 1 the sad, the wind then N..,,K0 E, Q. Cali you recoiled whether you did nett send a report of your damages by the Frisk OrNilc, on the night between the vgd 4..4.±d Yes.: I old Verbally by Lieutenant Fennel, of the Nile, nearly what is before the Court. Q. Did you lay ;lily stress (411. the state Of the lower masts ?--A. No. I soja they were badly wounded.. Q. As you have said you are not acquainted with the relative sailing of the fleets, on•what 4roun c l do you conclude the enemy.could„gaitt the Shore . bAbre the British Fleet could have fetched them ?--,A.; Front their *being t 5 or 1.6 lirilcs distant from us at the time, and•the ertemy l .s line of battle ships being formed generally to sail ttik well as our's. I say ge nerally. . • (2. Did . you r ece i ve • an- inform .. .lion from the t 1 Vice Adthiral after the aftion, that it was his inten tion to renew , the adieu ?-A. Lieuteitzint Fennel, of the Nile, told toe; he Was sent on board to know the.damages sustained, and that the Admiral meant to renew the nation in the morning.: -, Whed did you receive this inibrmation A. 'Between two and three o'clock in the morning of the 23d. , The following paper was now put in by Sir R. Calder " Ladmit that in the night of the '2;,'d laid hope to renew the COURT.—You Will please to dispatch Captain Gardner as soon as possible, because lie iy ordercd on immediate service. Sir li. CALDER.,, --.For thatexpress reason I called . Capt. Gardner first. .‘ • Q. Did the enemy appear to you to have sturered much A. No. I'only observed one ruaintopsaih'. yard gone in the whole squadron. , ETC were too lar to judge of their sails. ; The Hon-Capt. Legge,.?f ihe Repulse. , Q. Is tnat th?, Report you made to me of the do mages sustainqt, Vy your ship ; chatthe second Rep or t . 1 sent in. The Report was th is en. read. 0. DM you make a similar report on the ni lit „f the r„.'2,1 ?—No., I did not then:know that the bow sprit had been wont - ied. I_ merely specified that the rigging had been cut, and sails, as the Officer from the . Frisk came on board so soon alter the no , tion, I being the next ship to the Admiral, that I 1)4 no Report made at :that tittle of , the darudge. My Iteport.was, I believe, transmitted t() tho Adtin ralty. • gir R. Calder.—All the first, or rough report's', were sent to the Admiralty. • • Q. Were you etnployed: fishing.,and securini!- your masts and bow-sprit - all - the ,;Jad ctf july 'A. A r ai' the bowsprit was pet considered so badly wounded avto be fiShed, till after-it spilmg oh the - evening' of thei 2;5 th. The people were occasionally employed on the ~. J.3(.1 in knotting and splieing,the rigging, and repairing the sails. Q. Did you m.tko tlalrr signal to me on the of the bowsprit being sprung ?-+A. Yes. 'Q. Was not that the first time we bac! catrivd much Sail daring the aftion I don't think that we had carrW any sail to signify b•A`ore that: The Repulse was their under her three topsaik, and a fbresail. Q. laid you about the Sante time, see the .)I.lltA '•make the signal 'oilier having 'struek her fore-y„nd ? A. Yes ; and I thin!.. her lower yard. ,• Q., Was the Sritxldron brought to on sion on the Repaid tualinig HO l,l /.101,7, was it before the Reptitse and Malta Made they 'were re:idy to"pr‘yeec,l. on Service The Repulse made tin former slo,- nal at :seyen o'clock in the etoning of the. Whet, We ,w - pre obligc:d to 14 every thing fly 'to sa , :e Masts. I made the signal that we wqre r ea dy t:..) make sail again •as soon as it was dzty. on AWL Q. Did the enemy ever chase, or make ali;;; ;!!-' tempt to bring the British lleetAoadion ou the ofJuly Never; but always kept bud down to windward. Q. Could I have forced them to i.itliotl Oa that day ?-;-.A..1 think not, Q. Did the enemy appear to you tohave.sustaid. ed any considerable damage in theit r , I , ti A L;kl yards? • A.- No. 1 could only. distingui , ;ll one'shii... with, I think, her maintopsailiard down. Some others might have saiN clued up to repair. Q. 111 had approach e d , the etiouly, conlkl have fetched• them„ had they avoided tiJi.t, • b4th.1.1 they would .lave been able ,to communicate ah th e share l should think not, it . they avoid, an actiyn; • Q. Was the klritish Meet kept between the et.(;- . my and Ferrol while the enemy were in sight e-- A. I think they woe till the 4 24th ; ,but not when, (ating the latter part. of . 'the time, we last saw them ; they then stood to the southward. W 1 en v. - to parted with them, tkuy have