The Sun. — London, England, 1860-07-13 00:00:00

THE SUN, LOIWON, PRIDAY EVENING, JULY Itt 18800 complain, therefore, that the hon. baronet should take this occasion, on going into Committee of Supply, to ask what are the views of the Government with regard to the pre- sent state of Italy. At the same time I must say that, as the hon. baronet went on from one topic to another, I was much at a loss to draw from his observations what was the policy he would recommend. (Hear, hear.) I own I was puzzled to know whether he wished that the King of Naples should be enabled to assert his authority in Sicily, and that the influence of her. Majesty's Government I should be used fur that purpose, or whether he desired that the people of Naples and Sicily should be free to choose for themselves that kind of government which they preferred. In looking at this subject, one must consider what has hap pened since 1815, and more particularly the events of last year. In 1815 Austria had allotted to her Lombardy and Venetia, but her influence was not confined to those terri torities. From ISIS to 1859 she extended her influence over every part of the peninsula ; and when the political influence which a great country such as Austria possesses was not sufficient she sent her armies to put down the in stitutions which the people had chosen for themselves, and to restore absolute dominion. The present Prime Minister of Austria has been obliged to confess that that system has failed. Well-intentioned, as he innintains it was, towards the people of Italy and the general balance of power in Europe, he cannot deny that the result has been such as to make the Italians averse from Austrian rule and to compel Austria to renounce that policy for the future. (Hear.) From 1848 to 1859 France and Austria occupied by their arms parts of the Roman States. In 1859 it happened, as it was very likely to happen in some year or other without any one being able to fix the precise epoch, the King of Sardinia excited the people of Italy to resist foreign domina tion. He assured them that he felt for their agony and that he sympathized with their griefs; and at that time he ob tained the assistance of France to enable him to oppose Aus tria. This country, mailer the guidance of the Ministry of Lord Derby, refrained from taking any part in that war, and that neutrality was applauded and supported by all classes in the country. Assuming that position, therefore, it was not for us to expect any of the rewards or spoils which might be the results of the contest. It appears now that at the ♦ery commencement of the war France had stipulated, not in a formal treaty, but in an agreement so binding that Sardinia could not afterwards free herself from it, that if a considerable part of Italy were trausferred to the King of Sardinia, Savoy and Nice should be annexed to France for the security of her frontier. Her Majesty's Government were asked in the beginning of July last year what was their opinion of that annexation. We believed it would have a mischievous effect ; but we did not say then, we have never said, that we should oppose that annexation by force of arms. We informed the French Government that, in our opinion, a grave mistake in policy would be committed if these pro ♦inces were annexed to France. We pointed out that the distrust which would thereby be created in Europe, on the Rhine, and elsewhere, rendered the annexation in every way objectionable. That was the course we pursued and the opinion we maintained. It is an opinion we have never con cealed from the Emperor of the French, or from any of the other Powers of Europe. But we never proposed to carry that protest to the extremity of war in the event of the an nexation being carried out. In considering the conduct of Sardinia and of the Italians, it must be borne in mind that the people of Italy have, not merely since 1815, but for hun • dreds of years, been suffering from the effects of their own dissensions. They have been subdued by foreign Powers, they have been kept in subjection to tyrants they despised, they have been misgoverned to the utmost, their national genius has been silenced ; and all these misfortunes have sprung frons the same cause. It has been a reproach to them in the eyes of foreign nations, and one which they have felt deeply, that to their own disunion, dissensions, and jea lousies they owed the miseries they suffered. Such being the case, what w.e3 more natural than that the men who wished that their country should be independent, and that she should play her part once more in the great theatre of the world, should apply the antidote where they found the poi son at work, and attempt by union to remedy the disease from which their country languished ? (Hear.) In Tuscany there was no violent tyranny to complain of. The Govern ment was mild, and had it been only a question of driving away one Sovereign and putting another in his place, the people would not have been disposed for revolution; but the feeling in Tuscany, as well as elsewhere, was that, unless they could have union and range themselves under the banner of a single Sovereign, there would bo no chance of security and independence for them as a nation. (Hear.) The King of Sardinia is a brave and gallant man, a soldier who has distinguished himself in the field, but it is not so much his personal merit as his being the sovereign who has evinced a desire to assert the independence of Italy which has rallied the Italians round him and induced them to unite themselves under his sceptre. (Hear.) 'What, then, was France to do in such a case ? The Emperor of the French had signed a treaty by which the Dukes of Tus cany and Modena had their rights reserved to them ; but he had declared at the same time that he would neither use force himself nor permit others to use it to coerce the will of the people of Italy. The Italians were encouraged by that declaration, and proclaimed that their wish was to be annexed to Sardinia. Austria, enfeebled by the war she had just passed through, and dispirited by the reverses she had sustained, although she still maintained her former views as to the rights which wore derived from legitimate sovereignty, agreed to make no attack on the revolted parts of Italy and to confine herself to the defence of her own dominions. What was the course, then, which her Majesty's Government took? Seeing that the people of Italy had suffered from their former disunion, and from the foreign intervention which had taken place in 1821, in 1148, and on other occasions, they deemed that the time had now come when it was right to see whether the Italians could not form and sustain a government for themselves. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, laid it down as a princi ple by which they would abide, that the Italians should be allowed to make their own choice of a government, and that no foreign Power should be interposed to coerce them.. (Hear, hear.) I could not gather the view of the hon. baronet on this subject, but the view I have stated is a broad and simple view. We have found hitherto that the people of Italy who have rallied under the King of Sar dinia have shown no disposition to break into tumult. (Hear, hear.) There has been but one outrage, but one murder committed during the revolution in Central Italy, and nothing like anarchy has di4played itself there. On the contrary, there has everywhere been submission to the new form of Government. Well, then, I come to that which formed the theme of the greater part of the speech of the hon. baronet—the case of Naples and Sicily. And hero I must say I could have wished that the hon. baro net had spared the memory of one who is now no more— Lord Minto. His representations of Lord Minto's conduct are entirely erroneous. Lord Minto wont to Italy at the desire of my noble friend, who was then Foreign Secretary, with the view of reeenciling the sovereigns of Italy to make reasonable and useful improvements, and of recommending the chief persons to remain tranquil under their respective sovereigns, and to look for internal improvement from those sovereigns. Sir U. PEEL wished to say that he should always enter tain an agreeable souvenir of Lord Minto's kindness to him personally. What he said was that his political mission was a failure, and that the Government he represented had deceived the Sicilian patriots. Lord J. RUSSELL.—The hon. gentleman having repre sented certain facts, and having declared that Lord Mint° was the instrument of deceiving the Sicilian patriots, it is necessary to state exactly what occurred with respect to Naples and Sicily. Lord pinto, when he went to Naples found that the King had given a constitution to his people, and that a Liberal Ministry were in office. He assisted at a Council with the King of Naples that sat many hours, and tie result of which was that certain concessions were made to the people of Sicily, which it was hoped would induce them to remain under the sceptre of the King of Naples. Lord 'Minto was authorised to make these proposals to the Sicilians ; but when he arrived there two circumstances had occurred which contributed to the failure of bis endeavours, both of which were beyond Lord Minto's control. One was, that the French revolution had broken out, and that the French people had proclaimed a republic. The minds of men were agitated throughout Europe, as we all remem ber, by that news. The people of Sicily among others were discontented with their former Government, and wish ing for a change, they began to think that some republi can change would be more advantageous than the institu tions they had formerly lived under, or than a return to the sway of the King of Naples. Another circumstance had oc :urred which I may relate, as so many circumstances of a similar character are known that it can be no addi tional reproach upon the late King of Naples to mention it. Lord Minto's only chance was in carrying these con cessions with him as a British Minister, and recommend ing them in that capacity to the Sicilians as a sufficient guarantee for their liberty. But when he arrived in Sicily he found that these conditions had been known some days, and that they had been sent without any recommendation from the King of Naples. The people of Sicily had delibe rated upon those proposals, and had determined to reject them, and thus his mission fail( d at the moment of his arri 'al. Now lot us see what have been our relations with re spect to that Spanish branch of the;llouseof Bourbon which now sits upon the throne of Napl e s. In 1806 the B r iti s h " ernment refused to make peace with France almost solely because the Emperor of the French demanded Sicily, and the British Government to its honour refused to sur render the territory owed to the Govrtt h in or en an t eaellGy Thus the house of Bourbon of Sicily. m e : ;eat Britain the prcservati n established in Sicilyea\rvj,- A constitution was at that time t eh Lord W. Bentinek did much to confirm. By that c onstitution the kingdom of Sicily was to be separated from t ie Tzsd.oin of Naples. If the eldest son of the King of the chose Sicily he was to abandon the crown of Naples whil e if he cho s e N a pl es h e Was to give up Sicily and the second - In 1 4 1 son was to succeed to the throne of that country. y Sicilies procured an a: tide to be inserted n ii n .. f the of of ru the Treat to Two Vienna, in which he was r ecognised sea x.K of the Two Sieelies, whereby the constitu ion of 18 12 em s t and scattere d to the winds. In 1815 the --lug of thePiTeces Tr w o Sieilies made a t r eaty with Austria, by whi c h h e engaged not to introduce into his dominions any other government than that which the Emperor of Austria might think fit e a ' hared uce By this treaty he not o n l y de stroy einto L om bardy. • 12 but he made a compact with d the constitution o f 18 , with a foreign Power that he wou ld not restore liberty to Sicily. constitution, it was over- In 1821, when that country had a con thrown by presence et isforeign. force, and 49,000 Aus trian troops occupied Naples and Sicily. In 1848, again, the King of Naples gave a constitution to his subjects, which he afterwards destroyed by his own hands. Fro :n 1848 to 1859 the people of Naples and Sicily suffered under—not the absolute Government of the monarch and the despotic conduct of his Ministers, but under an arbitrary and vexa tious police, which made every man's house a prison, which tracked men as the - walked the streets, and followed them into the privacy of domestic life; • and which made the whole kingdom such a scene of misery and tyranny as has hardly any example. (Cheers.) The present King succeeded to the throne. The late Government of this country thereupon sent Mr. Elliott to Naples, and told him verbally--for I believe he had no written instruc tions—to advise a liberal Prime Minister and a constitution to the King of Naples. When we succeeded to the Govern ment we advised the King to make concessions of popular institutions, and, above all, to establish - a just administration of the law. (Hear, hear.) The Ministers of the King of Naples said " We do not mean to grant a constitution ; we disapprove of popular constitutions, but we mean to ad minister the law." Upon this we inquired, if they meant to administer the law, why they kept so many persons in prison against the law ? They rejoined that the law was intended for the people, and not for the Government ; that the Govern ment might arrest anybody it pleased, and that it was ne cessary for the purposes of the State that the Government should not be compelled to bring them before the tribunals. Thus we went on, always advising concessions and a liberal constitution, or at the least an administration of the law, and if our advice has not been taken, and the concessimas lately made have not succeeded, it only proves that thoso concessions were made too late. (Hear, hear.) We at least cannot reproach ourselves that we have concealed from the King of Naples the policy that would have saved his throne and given security to his dynasty in future. (Cheers.) Even a few months ago the King of Naples might have se cured both Naples and Sicily. An expedition went out— and here I must explain the particular fact to which the hon. baronet alludes. He adverted to a speech made by me in this house in answer to the member for Dundalk—rela tive to Garibaldi; but the hon. baronet did not state, and probably did not know, the date when that took place. It took place in , he summer of last year, when the King had just ascertained the existence of much discontent in Sicily, and when it was desirable he should take every oppor tunity of meeting this discontent by just concessions and the establishment of a free constitution in that island. The Government of Naples wished us to represent to Sardinia that it ought not to invade a friendly State. It so happened that the King of Sardinia had no such design or in tention, and we received a communication to that effect. What happened lately took place without our knowledge. I know not whether it was without the knowledge of the Sardinian Government, but so far from their having in spired the expedition, I believed they looked upon it as a wild and mad enterprise, and thought they would soon re ceive intelligence of its utter failure. I have stated on former occasions, when Garibaldi was reproached with being a filibuster, that the name could not justly be applied to a man who had rescued a country from slavery, and placed it in a position of liberty and happiness. Garibaldi is at least a man of very extraordinary character. (Hear.) He landed with between 1,000 and 2,000 men, and in the course, I believe, of a fortnight 18,000 or 20,000 of the forces of the King of Naples agreed to evacuate Palermo, and the people of Sicily followed him as their deliverer. (Hear.) Well, then, again comes a new position of affairs. It may be that the people of Sicily will declare in favour of annex ation. It may be, and I think it likely, that an attempt to annex Sicily and then to annex Naples, and, I suppose, the Roman States, would not end in the consolidation of a firm government. For my own part, I doubt very much whether the people of the north of Italy can, under the same sceptre ssith the people of southern Italy, form a firm and permanent government, which would act in harmony for the welfare of the Peninsula. These are my doubts and my opinions. If the King of Naples is able by the con cessions which he has made to conciliate the Neapolitans, and induce them to live under his rule with free institutions, her Majesty's Government cannot find fault with such a result. Again, if the people of Sicily can obtain the con stitution of 1812, and are satisfied with the constitution, it is not for us to find fault with the arrangement. But, on the other hand, we will never lose sight of the principle which we have before enunciated, and which we think is a sacred principle—one to which there are indeed some, but very rare, exceptions—namely, that with regard to the in ternal government of a country the people of that country are the best judges, and that no one should interfere by force to coerce and to overwhelm their decision. (Cheers.) It is not only a nice question but it is one of the most extreme difficulty, for foreigners to declare, " Such a man is worthy of your confidence ; such a Prince may be safely followed ; such a chief is a good political adviser, such another will give you a constitution under which you may live happy." A foreigner should speak on such matters with great mea sure and with greatreserve, and can only give an opinion ac cording to the imperfect lights which he may possess. It it therefore, for the people of Sicily and of Naples, and I must add also—whoever may be offended by that expression—it is for the people of the Roman States themselvesto say what is , the form of government under which they choose to live. . (Cheers.) With regard to the policy of the British Govern , ment, we may from day to day have to treat of matters in which our relations with other Powers may induce us to re commend a particular measure at one time or a certain course at another, but I can assure the house, and it is the only word and the last word I have to say, that, as far as concerns the people of Italy, we have no other policy than to leave them to decide for themselves their own fate. (Hear, hear.) If their decision should be such as tends to the future happi ness and independence of Italy, I feel confident we shall re joice at it, and not on account of Italy alone. " Who values liberty confines His love for her within no narrow bounds ;" and I believe that for the liberty and happiness of Europe, as well as for " the balance of power" in Europe—a phrase which is often abused, but which yet has a clear, and sig nificant meaning—there can be no better guarantee and no greater security than the independence of Italy. (Loud cheers.) Mr. KINGLAKE said the hon. baronet need not have offered any apology for bringing this important subject be fore the house. Sardinia was the neighbour of France, and the Emperor claimed territory to be annexed to France be cause of the extension of the kingdom of Sardinia. It seemed that the Government of France put forward another Power in order that it might have a pretence for having an increase of territory to France. The noble lord (Lord J. Russell) had made a speech that night which had given him (Mr. Kinglake) unfeigned gratification. Was Sardinia labour ing to put together the scattered limbs of Italy, or was she the vassal, the mere vassal, of France ? He rather thought the latter was the case, and recent facts tended to confirm him in that opinion. The King of Sardinia had parted with his ancient sovereignty, and with a great part of his seaboard, in favour of France. He had no longer any ally but France, who was in fact his master. He was in much the same position as King Joseph was in the early part of this century, and whose kingdom soon departed from him. In the month of March last Count Cavour stated that he looked to Venetia, and to keeping Austria in check on the Mincio. The same scheme of policy that had been pursued by Sardinia had been pressed upon the Prince Regent of Prussia. He was, he believed, pressed to appropriate some of the smaller States of Germany in return for giving to France the Rhenish provinces. But the French Emperor encountered in his late interview an honest man, and time had shown that his former statements were true. He asserted that at the meet ing at Villafranca the Emperor of the French proposed to the Austrian Emperor to give back Lombardy if Austria would acquiesce in the operations he would attempt on the Rhine. The answer was very simple. It was, no ; I am a German Prince. Thoyalways found thepolicy of the French Emperors was to invite peace between contending parties at the expense of neutrals and friends. Why was it that Europe was filled from one end to the other with rumours of war ? Along the whole eastern frontiers of France agi tators were at work to foster discontent with existing rule, and prepare the way for a coming change. He had a letter from a gentleman in one of those States, giving an account of an interview with a French emissary, who said that there was not a country in Europe in which French had not a question at issue upon which it could ground immediate action if it were desirable to do so. (Hear.) There was the name of an hon. member used, who was not then in his place—(a laugh, and cries of " Name")—whose policy was the delight and gratification of his Imperial friend. The cause of that state of thinga was the internalstate of France, and it was the policy of its ruler to divert attention from them by inducing the people to look abroad. There was now no longer a system of foreign policy in France, but a series of small conspiracies, many of which were projected by the French police. It was impossible to tell with whom the next war would be. The French Emperor appeared like a dumb animal, who pulled the trigger at random. The words of the noble lord had given great satisfaction when he said that, while it was desirable to be friendly with France, it was necessary not to live apart front other na tions. (hear.) Mr. WHITESIDE—I wish to call the attention of the house to the practical part of this subject. The hon. baronet opposite put a question to the noble lord, to which I was not so fortunate as to hear the answer. Ile asked for information as to the probable demands of Franco in the event of the annexation of Sicily to the kingdom of Sar dinia. No doubt, as the noble lord truly observed, deli cacy and reserve ought to be observed in respect to a future foreign policy, when you are ignorant of what that policy may be, and have no knowledge of the facts. But the noble lord gave no answer to the direct question put to him. He, however, made a statement full of interest, and I only regret that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not here at the time to be instructed by it. (A laugh.) It was declared some months since in this house—although it wasnot i then admitted by the Treasury bench—that long ago %bargain I was struck between the Minister of Sardinia and the French Emperor, that in the event of the kingdom of Sardinia being considerably enlarged compensation should be made to the injured and terrified ruler of France. (A laugh.) The noble lord, however, is the first Minister of the Crown who has ac knowledged gt : t ati truth of this statement, arid ho has truly vernment of added that the policy of the French Government was cal culated to disturb Germany and fill Europe with distrust , Go on was conveyed by our Minister to th e the Emperor. That I hold to be a very iri ,- portant annowicement. It is an announcement of the view which her Majesty's Government took of that transaction. But I beg the house to remember that, while the noble Foreign Secretary has made that significant statement as to the recent policy of France, we have had the Chancellor of the Exchequer announcing to us for weeks and months past, with his extraordinary } owers of eloquence, that no thing but peace and happiness were to flow from our com- mercial arrangements with that country, the policy of which the noble lord tells us fills Europe with alarm and distrust. (Hear, hear.) Which of these two Ministers is in the right I do not pretend to say, except to hint as delicately as I can that I think it is the noble Foreign Secretary, and not his colleague the Chancellor of the Exchequer. (A laugh.) As, however, the noble lord has expressed his opinion, it is only fair that the right hon. gentleman should have an oppur.. tunity of favouring us with the opposite view of the ques tion—(a laugh)—and of depicting the general confidence and tranquillity consequent upon the copclusion of the French commercial treaty. I agree with the noble lord that a policy of peace, to be pursued, I presume, consistently with honour, is the policy worthy of a British Minister. I was not in this house when the discussion took place upon the conduct of Lord Minto ; but I have read what was said on that occasion, and I learnt that the noble viscount de fended that noble lord from attacks then made upon him, as I understand, by certain members of his present Admi nistration. (Hear.) It is a remarkable circumstance that the hon. baronet should commend the patriotic spirit dis played by the volunteers of this country, and that the hon. gentlemen opposite should tell us that Europe is disturbed by rumours of war, changes of dynasty, and possible revo lutions; while for months past we have been assured by the most eloquent members of the Ministry that if we only acquiesced in his schemes we might calculate upon a secure and prolonged European peace. (Hear, hear.) Lord J. RUSSELL explained that the right hon. gen tleman was perfectly right in saying he had declined giving the information referred to in this motion, which ho felt it his duty to oppose. Mr. MONSELL could not collect from the noble lord's speech whether her Majesty's Government were encoura ging or discouraging the annexation of Sicily to Sardinia. If the inquiry addressed to the noble lord had been whether the Government were in favour of leaving the people of Sicily to choose for themselves what form of domestic government they would live under, the noble lord's speech would have been perfectly satisfactory, and everybody pre sent might have concurred in it. That, however, was not the question put by his hon. friend, who wished to know whether the policy of annexing Sicily to Sardinia was to be pursued, and whether the consent of her Majesty's Go vernment was again to be given to principles which must lead to continual changes in the map of Europe, putting every small State in perpetual trepidation lest it should be ,ransferred to some other Power. Mr. GRIFFITH thought the hon. baronet opposite, led away by his laudable feelings in favour of the liberties of one country, had rather overlooked the rights and interests of another. Dazzled by the light of the commercial treaty, he and his colleagues had turned a blind eye upon the pro ceedings of France towards Sardinia and had given delusive and evasive answers in the other House of Parliament ; but since then nothing could be more suitable than the terms in which the noble lord had expressed the policy of this country. The motion for an address for papors was then negatived without a division. THE PAPER DITTY. Sir J. TRELAWNY rose to move "that this house, in consequence of the House of Lords having interfered with the arrangement of supplies for the year, recommended by her Majesty's advisers, and by such interference assumed responsibility for the conduct of finance, postpones the con sideration of further proposals by the Ministers of the Crown towards meeting public expenses until the period when the I authority of the House of Commons shall have been as• serted, and the bill for the repeal of the Excise on Paper shall have become law," but he was interrupted by The SPEAKER, who stated that, one amendment upon the motion for going into committee of supply having been put and negatived, it would be contrary to the rules of the house to propose another. Sir J. TRELAMNY said that, nevertheless, he wish to take that opportunity to make a statement on the subject to which his motion related. It seemed to him that the course pursued by that house on the question of privilege was not worthy of the occasion. He had refused to have anything to do with the three resolutions recommended by the Go vernment, because he thought the house ought to have taken some active step, and not to have been satisfied with mere words. The house was now in a degraded and dis creditable position. It was lowered in the eyes of the people, and its authority for the future was weakened. The very fact that Ministers had deemed it to be their duty to propose resolutions, proved that something had oc curred which was deserving of censure ; but he con tended that abstract resolutions were not sufficient to meet the case. It might be said that the Lords had done well to arrest the repeal of the paper duties, and he faankly admitted that, in his opinion, a reduction of the tea and sugar duties would have given more satisfaction to the people ; but the House of Commons had decided otherwise, and the Lords, unless they were prepared to become re sponsible for the finances of the country, wore not entitled to interfere in the matter. Their conduct in rejecting the Paper Duties Repeal Bill might have the effect of raising a cry of " privilege" and "primogeniture," and it might be (tome an important question whether we should not do well to substitute an elective fur an hereditary peerage. THE CHINA VOTE. Sir H. WILLOUGHBY observed, that as he could not bring forward the motion he placed on the paper he would briefly state his objects. Ho complained of the manner:in which the vote for China was brought forward, and that the expenditure of the year, instead of being £70,000,000, would be £73,800,000. He saw an item set down of £440,000, and wished to be informed what that was for. Was it for the settlement of an account, or what were its objects? The house should know how it was expended. Unless they interfered and checked the expenditure now going on for China they would have no further control over it probably for two years. Gen. PEEL reminded the house that he made a state ment in March last, and certainly he did not expect it would be so soon verified. He said, that so far from £850,000, then calculated for China, being sufficient, it would take ten times that amount. The whole of the na tive troops employed in China were paid out of the re venues of India, and the cost was chargeable on the vote of credit of £500,000. Not a single shilling was taken for it in the estimates of last year, and the outlay for the transport of the troops from India to China was quite equal to that which would have been incurred in bringing them home to this country. It was impossible to separate the army estimates from the budget. The budget professed to set forth the whole ex penses of the year, and if it didnot, to use the expression of the right hon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer it was a gigantic delusion, and the repeal of the paper duty was obtained under false pretences. (Hear.) Ho did not make any charge against the Government for having failed to provide for contingent future expenditure, but he did say it was their duty to have provided for the liabilities ho had mentioned. After all allowances made for the laxity of accounts between the Imperial and the Indian Govtrn rnents, it could not be believed that the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not know that the expenses of the first Chi • nese war, amounting to £400,000 odd, were charged to the estimates of the present year, and that observation did not apply to the Chinese war alone, but to the general estimates of the year. On Feb. 27 he (Gen. Peel) pointed out that 93,500 men wore inadequate for the service of the year, and that it was absurd to suppose that the Indian Government would pay for any deficiency in the service. That remark, too, was made independently of the men going to China. The fact, however, spoke for itself. Within a month after that estimate was laid on the table a revised estimate was introduced, in which it was absolutely necessary to take an additional sum for the men thus thrown on the British establishment, which was to be met by a reduction in other estimates. The reduction was not a reduction in reality, however, but merely a postponement of charges which had better have Leen borne this year. Thus there was a post ponement of the vote of £60,000 fur the carriage depart ment at Woolwich, in consequence of which it had been impossible to issue the guns, their carriages not being ready fur them. He still said that by thus producing the budget before the estimates they Lad given the country a delusive idea of the sum necessary for the public service timing the year. Mr. B. COCHRANE explained that after what had taken place he was unable to make the motion of which bo had given notice, but if an adjout nod debate should arise on the vote of credit, he would move it on the next supply night. Mr. WARNER said he did not rise to ogpose the motion for going into committee. Now that we were at war, that war ought to be provided for. No House of Commons would dispute that position, but still the vote was one which ought not to pass without remark. It was not a vote in which the house could take an interest, for the war had been entered upon by the Crown in opposition to the deli berate opinion of the house, which had never been reversed. They had heard a great d ea l o f t h e recent aggression o f t h e Lords, but this was, in his opi n i on, an aggression much more dangerous; and it was the duty of the house to put on record the circumstances under which it had occurred. The SPEAKER then put the question that he leave the chair, upon which Sir J. TRELAWNY persisted in dividing the house. The house accordingly divided, and the numbers were— For the motion 198 Against it Majority —lBs The house then went into committee. TIIE CHINA VOTE. Mr. S. HERBERT, in moving a vote of credit for the expenses of the war iu China, said — A t this late hour (halt pastwhich it is 10), I will endeavour to make the sta tement toy duty to lay before the house as concise as I can consis t ently with the explanation which I have to give of the vote c f credit which has been laid on the table of the house. But efore I do so perhaps I may be allowed to take some notice ( if the observations which have been made by my gallant friend oppo s it e . Th e ga ll an t general says he prophesied that five ti mes £500 , 000 wou ld b e requ i s it e t o m ake up the deficiency between the estimates and the expenditure fo r last year, and for the China war generally, and ho asks me whether evcryAixpenco of the £680,000 which we took hat not been expended in making up the deficiency on the ordinary estimates of last year? In the first place, net one sixpence of that sum was appliceble to maliing up any deficiency which might have occ s nired in the ordinary estimates of last year. My gallant friend, who is well acquainted with these matters, must have spoken without reflection, for he must have known that you cannot apply one farthing of a vote of credit to any purpose but that for which it was voted. You cannot spend it in making up an ordinary deficiency in the ordinary estimate of the year. If his vaticinations, there fore, should prove correct, which I trust they will not, the deficiency will have to be made up by a vote next year, specially taken to cover it. But so far from all that sum being spent in that way, we have reason to believe that a large portion of it still remains unexpended. We cannot tell yet—until we receive accounts from China it is difficult to say how much of that money has been spent. Some of the regiments embarked later than we thought they would, and rather than being all spent, I should say that there was a surplus left on that vote. The gallant general also says that he pointed out that we were quite wrong in our estimate, that £820,000 followed by £500,000 would not be sufficient— that the war would inevitably come on, and that the Indian Government—and here he was right—would inevitably send home many more troops than we had expected, and he blames us for not having had the foresight to provide for this. Nobody knows better than the right hon. gentleman how much safer it is not to trust to private information. We have reason to recollect the circumstances in which we were placed in the last autumn. The state of India was anything but satisfactory; nothing but gloom pervaded European society in India ; and Lord Canning then said, in answer to letters from myself, that he could not part with European troops, and he could not say how soon a state of circume stances would arrive which would justify him iu parting with any greet number of European troops. TV a listened to that statement—we framed an estimate upon it. Great changes took place in India. The pacification of Oude seemed complete, and in consequence six battalions were despatched from India, which induced us to withdraw the estimate and to produce a revised estimate. I will not go into detail upon the subject, but pass on to the observa tions of the hon. baronet the member for Evesham. And there I must confess that to some great extent I agree with him. But when he says that the estimate is unsatisfactory, I am surprised that it is not to the amount that ho takes Q.X.• ception—which I confess is unsatisfactory—but rather to the manner and the time of proposing it. He says it is not made in the shape we like or at the moment we like. He is silent as to the amount, and I trust he will derive some consolation from the extent of the estimate which is laid before the house. In the consulate° upstairs, of which the right hon. baronet the member for Carlisle was chairman, wo took a great deal of evidence withregard to the state of the account pending between this country and India, and it was shown to be extremely unsatisfactory. (Hear, hear.) I will read just a passage from the report, because I wish to show the principle upon which the Government have acted in apply ing for this veto of credit. " The state of the account between the British Exchequer and Indian territory is most unsatisfactory. The account for the Persian expedition is not yet closed. The account of the first China war is hardly completed yet. The account of the second China war, wLich ended in 1856, is not yet ba lanced. There are four or five different accounts still open, with disputed balances to a large amount; and with respect to the new expedition to China, India, in the midst of the great financial difficulties, has been required to make ad vances in the current year for all expenses incurred in tak ing up transports in India, in paying the men, and in pro viding cattle, horses, and other necessaries, as well as equipments for the army. There does not appear to be any estimate of the amount of these advances ; but while Indian territory is overwhelmed with debt, it will be unseemly that Great Britain should make war on China out of Indian re sources. The repayment of these advances ought to be prompt, and within the present financial year." (Hear, hear.) I entirely concur in every sentence in that passage of the report. This first estimate of £443,000 for past transactions, which I will explain in a moment, is a sum for which I am at any rate not in any way responsible. (Hear.) It is an arrear owing to the East India Company. The accounts have not been audited. The amount has not been entirely agreed upon, but, as the East India Company aro not so rich that they can overlook these little debts, and as they are anxious we should pay them, it is necessary to pay something to them on account of these past transactions. Would it be seemly this year to make war on Indian resources ? I think not. (Hear.) I think it is wise and right that we should lay before the House of Commons, as far as we can form—l will not call it an esti mate, but a guess of what possibly may be the amount re quired to repay the Indian Government, and to pay the army and navy engaged in these operations. The hon. bart. says, "But you should give us this estimate in detail." I do not think it is possible to give that estimate in detail. I asked the East Indian Government to send me, not an ac count of the sums already expended for providing and equipping the expedition, but an estimate of the sums so expended, not, however in detail, because they do not know the exact sums. They refused to send the information officially, upon the ground that they ought not to send offi cially anything pretending to be an account which, after all, was only an estimate of an account. I accepted that which they would give unofficially, because I thought it very im portant that the Government should lay before the house a rough and approximate estimate of what the cost may be. I think it better to dispense with accuracy rather than follow the system which has hitherto prevailed, of first spending the money, saying nothing to Parliament, and after all the transactions are ended coming to Parliament to make good a deficiency over which they have no possible check or control. (Cheers.) I will not weary the committee by citing precedents, but I have carefully examined the precedents of the votes for the China wars (that is, the first and second expeditions), of the votes for the Caffre wars and the Crimean war, and in every case I find a lump sum voted as a vote of credit without details. The reason is obvious. You cannot foresee in war what the expendi ture will be. You have in your estimates the actual cost of the pay of the men. You may put an approximate esti mate of what it will be when the men are on Indian allowances as well as English; you may put an ap proximate estimate of the cost of Indian native troops, but you cannot make an estimate of the cost if the fol owers attached to these regiments. Therefore, if I were to depart from the precedent of putting the estimate n a lump suns I should depart from it for the purpose of laying before the House an estimate which would be illusory, and one which would deceive the House as to the sums which they were voting. What is the use of laying items before the House ? Obviously that the House may exercise its discretion, and accept them or not—that they may put their finger on ono item and say this is too much—you have too many troops, too many camp followers, too many coolies. Then it turns out in practice that they are much less—that the excess of expenditure is under some other head—and thus the inference becomes as illusory as the subject to which it is applied. (Hear, hear.) I may really say that the very term " vote of credit" shows what is intended. It is not an estimate—not sums of money approved by the House of Commons—but a vote given in confidence to the Government that they will spend it for purposes which aro requisite, to the hest of their ability. (Hoar, hear.) And I do not believe we could carry on war otherwise, unless we chose to accept knowingly, and with our oyes open, delusive estimates, delusive criticisms, and delusive votes. (Hear, hear.) I have in this case so far departed from precedent that, instead of voting for the past, I am asking you to vote for the future. According to practice, I might have called upon the committee to vote £400,000 or £500,000, after peace has been made and broken and there is a fresh war, tut I think it much better to put the whole expenditure before the House of Commons. (Hear, hear.) Let us face it at once and see what will be the cost in the course of the year, and should circumstances fortunately occur which would load to an easy termination of these unhappy hostilities, we shall have so much to the good. Probably the committee will not be afraid, as the money cannot be applied to any other purpose, and it will be very unfortunate if the money be not applied to this. (Hear, hear.) First, I ought to state what are the sums of which the items of £413,000 fur past transactions are composed. In the last China war there was an arrangement between the Treasury and the East India Company that the Company should bear all the ordinary charges of the force sent in. aid of the expedi tion, but that they should be reimbursed by the Imperial Government all extraordinary payments. The accounts were settled a few years ago, up to 1847-48. We have still the balance remaining unsettled, from 1843-49 to 1858-59, of £281,000, upon which questions will arise. We have £82,000, on account of Indian military forces stationed in China, and about £BO,OOO the estimated cost of Indian native troops which form part of the garrison of Canton. The great evil of the system, to my nsind, is, that in point of act you have no power over the Executive as to the number of troops you employ. You can vote every man under the Mutiny Act, and not a Melt more can be em ployed as long as you do not vote more money for their pay; but if you a nploy Indian troops you have no check on the amount, except,in the gross sum which you aro after wards called upon to pay. No doubt there has been a very wrong system, and part of this sum, no less than £32,000, is for the cost of troops at Canton in tlse time of the gallant officer opposite, and £BO,OOO is for troops ap to the time this war broke out. The present estimate, therefore, ap plicable to the war in which, I believe, unhappily we are now engaged, is less than £3,800,000 by £113,00 which suns applies to past transactions. The committee would probably like to know the sums directly or indirectly voted for the China expedition. In enumerating them I will follow the terra of the returns moved for by my right hon. friend the member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington), who asks what are the sums put upon the ordinary army and navy estimates for 1860-61, which are applicable to the ope rations in China. Now, I believe that practically, except in the large consumption of stores, the men are not neces sarily an increased charge for that expedition. We have, for instance, nine ba tenons of infantry in China; but, if there were no Chinese war, one or two battalions would be doing garrison duty abroad, and the other seven would be in England, where they would be useful enough. In the same way there would have been no considerable disbandment of seamen in our navy had there been no war. I will, however, give the information the hon. bart. re quires. The items in the army estimates for 1860-61 appli cable to the Chinese expedition were as follows :—Cost of forces of all ranks, £399,583 ; clothing and necessaries, £42,500; provisions, forage, fuel, light, &c., £22,740—, total, £164,828. The navy estimates for 1860-61 included the following sums :—Hire of transports, £107,000 ; coals, £76,000; freight of stores, £17,000; making, with provi sions, bedding, &c., £217,900; adding the pay of men in China (£163,000) it gave a total of £680,900. These two totals in items in the army and navy estimates together made £1,145,723. Of the vote of credit taken last year to the amount of £850,000 the total apportioned for the army was £578,638, and for the navy £268,451 These amounts, together with the vote of credit for £500,000, give a grand total of about £2,500,000. We now come to the vote before us. I have already explained that the sum of £443,896 in arrear due to her Majesty's Government from the East India Company has no relation to the China war. They have so little confidence in the statement they have drawn up that they have forwarded it to me, not officially, but privately, as an approximation to the real amount. The cost of horses, bullocks, and ponies comes to £88,600 ; am munition, £16,000 ; advance of pay to the force on embar kation, £145,702 ; value of stores issued, £30,000. Alto gether, with the hire of the Indian Government steam ships, with rations and allowances to troops on board ship, coals, &c., we have a total of £1,900,922. That is the amount of the East India claim due to us in the course of he year, supposing that the war lasts fora year. and that the ships are kept on for that time. The War office estimate includes the following items :—Difference between British and India rates of pay, allowances to wives and children, cost of natives attached to the force, &c., for 10,985 Europeans, £526,355 ; cost of 7,623 native troops, including pay, allowances, provisions, &c., £182,715; extra clothing and necessaries, £50,000; extra provisions, forage, land transport, &c., £268,000 ; extra warlike and other stores, £150,000 ; extra hospital charges, including hospital ships, £284,208 ; sanitary esta blishments at the Cape, £23,792 ; estimated cost of native Indian troops previously in China, £67,666—making a total of £1,552,736. Then there is the Admiralty estimate to the amount of £359,017. From the total a deduction must be made of the sums which may not come into payment during the year 1860-61. The estimate had been fixed roughly, as I have stated, at £3,800,000. I will not now enter into the policy of the war, because I have already had an opportu nity of expressing my own opinions on that matter when the question was raised at the earlier part of the session. At one time there was every reason to hope from the advices which were received that hostilities would have come to an end, and that a great demonstration of force would alone have proved sufficient to procure us redress for the outrages which had been committed at the mouth of the Peiho. We have been disappointed in that hope. Those, however, who are best informed on the subject still maintain that the chief who is at the head of the war party in China, and who dis tinguished himself by the arrangements he made for our repulse at the Peiho, stands too near the Throne to be agreeable to the Emperor of China. Ile derives great power from the party of which lie is the organ, and till sonic defeat or disaster happens to him, there is little like lihood of a change in the policy of the Chinese Govern ment. But should any reverse befall him, it would be gladly made use of by the Government to reverse a policy which has been originated by ono of whom they are so jealous. These aro mere speculations, it may be said, but they come from an authoritative ssurce. Her Majesty's Government would certainly receive with the greatest de light and satisfaction any news that would encourage us in the hope that we are likely to enter into a better state of re lations with the Chinese. (Hear.) In the meantime I think no one can deny that we are bound to provide for the pos sibility of continuing hostile operations. We have very large forces in China exposed to a deadly climate, and we are bound to do everything to enable them to bring the contest to a speedy and successful issue. (Hear, hear.) Un der these circumstances, I do not believe the House will be staggered even by the large amount of this estimate. Our commanders in China are men in whom we have a right to repose tho greatest confidence, for they are tried men. I have received from General Hope Grant the expression of his confidence in and admiration for the activity, resources, and forethought which he sees displayed by Admiral Hope. Of General Hope Grant's own judgment, prudence, and energy I have formed the highest opinion from the com munications 1 have had with him. I think that the view he took of the question as to the pay of the troops showed great judgment, and on another instance he also displayed a wise discretion. When ordered to occupy Chusan as a depot, he found that the lodgings for the troops were small, inconvenient, damp, and excessively unhealthy. He therefore decided not to endanger the health of his men by leaving them at Chusan, and, taking upon himself the responsibility of disobeying instructions, he at once carried them to a neighbouring island of sandy soil, well watered, and wholesome. Indeed, in all his actions it was impossible not to be struck with the judgment and foresight displayed by General Hope Grant, as well as by the second in command; and we may safely rely upon it that whatever can be done by bravo and practised soldiers, will be accomplished by our forces in China. Looking at the late period of the session, it is important for the Govern ment and for the country that this matter should be decided as soon as possible; and, without making any further ob servations, I beg to move that a sum of £3,800,000 be granted to her Majesty for the China war. Sir H. WILLOUGHBY, referring to the former ex penditure in China, said that, at the beginning of the ses sion no notion was entertained that four millions more were about to be expended. Instead of their expenditure being only 70 millions, it would be nearer 74 millions. (Hear, hear.) It was to him quite inexplicable how the right hon. gentleman could estimate a surplus of half a million when there was a balance owing for the late Chinese war. He would suggest that the £3,800,000 ought to be divided into two parts. What had been voted already this year brought the expenditure for the Chinese war up to £4,600,000, independent of the balance of £lOO,OOO that remained owing. Re understood a noble earl, who had been Governor -General of India, to say, in another place, that he found no difficulty in making out the estimate for the Chinese war. As to the war itself, he thought they could not enter into a more ruinous war than the war with China. That, however, was determined on, and he thought it would be very satisfactory that this large amount of expenditure should be divided. Mr. HANKEY understood the right hon. gentleman to say that troops in India ought not to be employed in a war with China at the expense of the Government of India. He wanted to know how far the outstanding debt between this country and India stood open, and how much was to be paid by India. Sir S. NORTIICOTE said it would be difficult to appor tion the payments to the different items, but they might state that a portion of the vote was to be applied to the old balance of upwards of £lOO,OOO. Mr. S. HERBERT said the outstanding debts with India were running debts, and the charges for recruiting were not in this vote, because that was a running debt. General PEEL said thero was a charge of £l7 for every infantry soldier sent to India, and the expense of every man sent from India would be repayable to the Indian Govern ment—Xl7 for every infantry soldier, £25 for every cavalry soldier, and £5O for every artillery soldier. Was any por tion, he would ask, of the £3,800,000 spent, and what por tion of it ? Ho thought, if it were possible, there should be a distinction drawn between prospective and retrospec tive expenditure. Mr. S. HERBERT said not ono farthing of the present vote would be spent upon the last year. The £850,000 voted at the beginning of the session would be applicable for that purpose, but he could not tell what portion of it had been spent. The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER--The hon. baronet the member for Evesham has expressed his surprise at the large amount of money which the house is asked to grant on account of the war with China, and in that sur prise I myself was, I must confess, disposed to share, when the enormous amount required was first brought under my notice. The present state of things has been with the Go vernment only a recent discovery, for although it was ob vious ever since our proposals had been rejected by the Chinese, that war would in all likelihood ensue, yet it was only within a short period that we were enabled to form anything like an accurate conjecture as to the probable expenditure which would be ten tiered necessary, and I need scarcely add that every fresh communication tends to show that the limits of the demand must be extended. But the hon. baronet contends that it was wrong to state in the House of Commons in February last that there would be a surplus of half a million in round numbers on the balance of revenue and expenditure, when outstanding debts to about the same amount were due to the East India Company which the Govern ment muss have known would become payable. Now, on that point the hon. baronet is entirely in error, for the Government had not the smallest knowledge that the money would became payable, nor an I aware they could possess any such information. The fact is, that this money was found to have become payable after a close inquiry into running accounts, consisting of a great variety of items and a lengthened correspondence and discussions with respect to them, which extended over a number of years. For my own part, I had no knowledge whatever, when the estimates of the year were framed, as to what sums were likely to be come payable between the East India and the Home Govern ment, nor did I think any officer of the Government could have furnished me with any prospective information on the subject. But the lion. baronet has gone further, and con tends that the Government ought not to have entertained an y project for the general reconstruction or modification of the taxation of the country at a time when there was so large an expenditure as that for the China war in prospect. Now, the answer to that charge must, in a great measure, depend upon how far the Government were in possession of information on the subject beyond that which was open to every member of the House. Let me far a moment sup pose that we had peculiar means of estimating the proba ble amount of the expenditure in question, and that we had in consequence known iu February last that it would be necessary to make provision for £3,800,000; it is obvious that in order to do so we must have asked the house, even though no fax were repealed and no commercial treaty with France were concluded, to impose .C 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 in the shape of fresh taxes on the country, a proposal which, an my opinion, it would be most unreasonable on our part to make. The truth of the matter is—and this, however, is the moral to be drawn from discussions such as this in which we are engaged—that it is utterly impossible to estimate the entire charge for a war arising under circumstances such as those in which that with China has originated. Thom t were but two elements upon which to found a decision in. _ . . our possession in February, the one being that we knew the terms which we meant to propose to. China; the other, that we were aware of the amount of force which the Cabinet had decided on sending to that country. The terms embraced a demand for explanatio-. ;,:: cation of the treaty which Lord nut.th; ; but did not include any demand :Co? co.:, in money over and above that which the ti , irtause had already promised to pay. The amour.'_ or force which the Cabinet decided on sending out we.; 10,000 men, in case the whole force con • sisteJ of Europeans, but in the event of any small portion of it being composed of native Indian troops, its number were to be increased, so as to render it equal in point of efficiency to an army of 10,000 Europeans. That was the knowledge which the Government possessed in February. Ido not know whether the house was also in possession of the terms that had been proposed to China, but it did know the intentions of the Government as to the number of men to be sent. Now, just see what the inten tions of the Govarnmeut are worth as to proceedings of this nature at the other end of the world. The terms we in- tended to send to China were essentially altered for reasons of policy which appeared conclusive to our representative in China. I do not cast any blame upon that gentleman, but the fact illustrates the feebleness and inefficiency of the control which the Cabinet in London can exercise over transactions of this kind. Then, as to the amount of force. The amount of the forces under orders for China, which have left the ports of England and India for that country, is nearly twice the amount upon which the Cabinet had decided. Under these circumstances, the hon. baronet can easily judge how impossible it is for the Cabinet at home to form a clear judgment of the likelihood of a war, and of its scale of cost, but the committee must recollect that this mode of providing the cost of these wars is quite new to our annals. We have unfortunately had a variety of these wars, but they have been paid for almost entirely through the medium of the finance of the East India Company, the demands made upon this house at the commencement of those wars being very insig nificant, and repaid when the wars were concluded. The first of these wars was in 1840, and the sum voted by this house in that year was £173,000. In 1841 it only grew to £400,000. In 1842 it increased to nearly £1,100,000, and in 1843 a further sum of £821,000 was voted, and even then a large balance remained, a great part of which was not disposed of until the year after. Now, we are in a dif ferent state of circumstances. A large portion of the expen diture is to be defrayed through the medium of the East India Government ; but in consequence of the change in the Government of the East Indies it has become our duty to ask the house to provide at once the means to meet, as far as we can estimate it, the whole expenditure that will be incurred, either directly by ourselves or indirectly by the Indian Government. The committee must remember that in respect of a good deal of this expenditure it is in advance. The hon. baronet has given notice of a motion to ask what advances have already been made on account of the war in China. Ido not apprehend that it will be possible to an swer that motion, because the great bulk of the expenditure is paid either through the medium of the East India Go vernment, of whose account we are not in possession, or through the medium of the treasury chest in China. The payments made from the treasury chest in China are made in this way :—The persons having charge of the chest, see ing that a great demand upon it is likely to occur, will not wait for the occurrence of that demand, but take steps be forehand to place themselves in funds to meet it. They make a demand, not formally, for the special purposes of the Chinese war, but to meet whatever lawful and proper de mand may be made upon the chest. These sums are to a great extent sent in advance ; some portion is paid through bills, negotiated there, and sent home by the officers of the Treasury chest; but it is their duty not to be de pendent upon the negotiation of bills, as that might cause embarrassment, if not loss to the country. With this they must go on as long as the war is likely to continue. and therefore one of the incidents of a war of this nature is, that a large portion of the draughts made upon this country must be paid in advance, and probably when the war in China shall terminate, especially if it terminates rapidly or suddenly, the Treasury chest may have a largo amount of funds which will be unnecessary, and which will be returned home. I mention these things to show how impossible it is even now to frame what is called an esti- Mate, but at a time when Parliament is about to separate it is our duty to make the best conjectural statement we can, and to ask as large a sum as will make us independent until the close of the campaign—that is, practically until the close of the financial year. The hon. baronet will see hew different are the circumstances now from what they were on former occasions. He says, however, that in my finan- Mal statement I proposed £500,000 as a vote of credit for the war in China. He is inaccurate upon that point. I referred to the vote we had already taken in the course of the session before the 10th of February, for the financial year, which had not then expired ; I referred to the votes included in the estimates for the present year ; and I said also, as to the extraordinary expenditure of the expedition, we ask for £500,000, in order to defray the cost of an ex pedition that was to be in the first instance a peaceful re monstrance. That was clearly a declaration that I was not asking for a sum of money that would suffice to defray the cost of a war in China through the financial year. Ido not hesitate to say it would have been wrong to make any such request. The hon. baronet addresses the question to me, but he knows as well as I do that it is not the business of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to frame military esti mates. They are framed by the Cabinet, and lam willing to take my share of responsibility for them. But in the month of February, having six months of the Parlia mentary session before us, having sent out certain terms, having directed an expedition, and having the power of applying to Parliament for the charges of the war, if a war should break out, Parliament being as good a judge as our selves of the probability of such an event, it would have been a breach of our duty if we had applied to Parliament to defray the expenditure of a war that had not com menced, that might not commence, and of the chance of which Parliament could judge as well as we could. The demand we made was very large in some respects, larger than is stated by my right hon. friend, because of some items of expenditure that had been incurred by this country which did not appear as expenditure for the Chinese expedi tion, and yet were entirely due to it. I will mention one in stance. In the course of last autumn the Admiralty made application to the Treasury to sanction the formation of certain contracts for gunboats which were not included in the estimates of last session. The Treasury acceded, on the ground that a demand had been made on the fleet for gun boats with a view to service in China, and the cost of build ing them, although not appearing as set down to the expe dition, was really a part of its charge. I hope that the vote we ask will cover all charges during the financial year, but after what has occurred, I do not think the Government can with prudence make itself responsible for what may be the expenditure of such a war. The scene is so distant, the circumstances vary so from time to time, that it must be left to others on the spot to take decisions which otherwise would be taken with the immediate authority of the Go vernment. If, unhappily, it should be prolonged beyond the present year, the charge for the second year will in all like. lihood be greater—(hear, hear)—at all events, it will be as great as that we now ask for the first year of the war. (Hear, hear.) And what is the lesson we ought to draw from that circumstance ? It is very desirable that we should, if possi ble, draw some lesson from it, and I confess the lesson I draw is this—that it is impossible to check proceedings of this kind growing out of transactions such as the deplorable events at the mouth of the Peiho, when once they begin. (Hear.) What you should really look to is the mode of con ducting your ordinary communications with such distant Powers, and the responsibility under which they are conducted. It is an extremly dangerous •:‘ mof policy that sends forth treaties to be ex: Langcd at the sword point and at the cannon's re tee a. (Hear, hear.) By that system of policy you necessarily place in the hands of the remote agents of your power an amount of discretion and responsibilit yr which I think too great for men to bear, and certainly much greater than you would ever consent to place in the hands of your Cabinet at home. If lam to look for the immediate cause of the unhappy outbreak, I might say I find it in the instructions of Lord Malmesbury to Mr. Bruce—(" oh, oh I")—hear me out—instructions which desired him to proceed to the Peiho for the purpose of exchanging the treaties attended by a sufficient naval force ; but—and this the sequel of my sentence—in my opinion, it would be most unjust to place the responsibility on Lord Malmesbury, because, in sending these instruc tions—although his was the immediate responsibility, being at the Foreign-office at the time—l don't think he acted on grounds peculiar to himself or the Admini stration of which he was a member, but rather in confor mity with what we may say had been more or less very un fortunately the recent tradition of this country with regard to the conduct of such transactions. I don't wish, there fore, to be misunderstood as if in naming Lord Malmesbury I was in the slightest degree charging upon him peculiar responsibility. I cannot venture to hold out any expecta tions, now that we have reason to believe the war has ac tually broken out, with regard to the limits or amount of the demands that may be made on the house, or the period which those hostilities happily may be brought to a termi nation. I trust and pray that may be at an early period. I believe there is no alternative but to submit, however re luctantly, to this, large demand, which we have submitted at the earliest period at which we could place it before you. I trust wo shall listen to the lesson which is taught us by those transactions, by considering the manner i n which we have been accustomed to transact business o f this kind in distant quarters of the globe, and under c ircumstances of grave and serious loss, as at the outbrea k in the Peiho co ; trust the country will take that matter i nto serius nsido. less ration, and that for the future we ma y be likely t o incur the repetition of such a depl orable calamity. (H our.) Sir J. PAKINGTON said they had a right to further explanations as to the policy of this war, in respect to which the statements made by Ministers were serious and unsatis factory. They were told the sole object of the Goeeenui ent was to demand a ratification of the treaty, and he thought it would turn out to be ruinous to force upon China Euro pean their diplomacy, n aval and m ilitary and unfortunately, resources a l ought to ,home,hav e th e y were scattered and divided at an enormous di s t ance from home. The expense attending this unhappy struggle was nearly six millions of money. They oug h t to have heard a little more of this enormous expenditure when the finances of the year was explained, and when the budget was submitted, (Hear, hear.) The question they had to e consider was this, was ft right for the Government to pre pose a reduction of taxation on the 10th of February with this prospective war with China being present to their rind? He must therefore say that the explanation of the ti'g at bon. gentleman was not satisfactory. He also wished to know how long this six millions was to last. He also - wished to know what they were going to war for—were they going to war for an apology? (Hear.) Mr. B. COCHRANE moved that the Chairman report progress. Lord 3. RI;SSELL said he could not allow the statement of the right hon. gentleman who had just sat down to pass entirely unnoticed. He was quite aware of the grave re sponsibility that rested on her Majesty's Government, but they had sharers in that responsibility. (Hear, hear.) He _ . was not about to blame the right hon. gentleman for the Government to which he belonged, but the house must take into account the girders that were given, and the responsi bility that was incurred by the right hon. gentleman him self and his colleagues in office. (Hear, hear.) When the account was received of the signature of the treaty of Tien tsin, the Government of Lord Derby everywhere received the warmest con g ratulations. It was n o ma tt er of blame that the treaty of Tien-tsiu was signed. But what might the Government of Lord Derby have done ? They might have sent out Mr. Bruce alone, who was well ac quainted with the Chinese authorities. The Chinese were quite ready to negotiate the treaty over again, and those articles which were disagreeable to them might have been re-considered, and if necessary omitted. But that was not the course which Lord Malmesbury pursued. Two months before the present Government came into office there was a meeting at Hong Kong, which Mr. Bruce Sir C. Strau benzee, and hear- Admiral Hope attended; and there they considered what were the instructions of the Government, and what it behoved them to do. They came to the unani mous conclusion that it was their duty to go with an im posing force to the mouth of the Peiho ; and Rear-Admiral Hope said that such was his interpretation of his instruc tions. Where could he have received those instructions, except from the Admiralty of which the right hon. baronet was the first lord. (Hear.) And-now the right hon. baronet came down with an air of surprise, wondering how it was that the present Ministry could have involved the country in a war, and calling upon them to account for it. It was at least something out of character for the right hon. gen tleman to do this. (Hear.) Our representatives in China had done what they had been commanded to do ; they had gone to the mouth of the Peiho with an imposing force. They had then no instructions. Lord Malmesbury was quite right in saying that he had given no instructions to Mr. Bruce or Rear-Admiral Hope to re-enter the river with a force or to clear the passage. But having gone there, and without instructions, they found themselves, as a British plenipotentiary an d Admiral, in a natural and very considerable difficulty. The Chinese had a way of carrying shields with very frightful heads upon them-- most daring and terrific countenances ; these they sup posed would frighten their enemies, and cause them to run away ; it' they did not, they were very apt to run away themselves. (Laughter.) If our plenipotentiary in China had gone with a very imposing force to the mouth of the Peiho, and, 'lading the passage closed, had turned round and sailed back to Hong Kong, he would have been imitating not the most honourable part of the Chinese policy. (Hear, hear.) The right hon. baronet was himself in a great degree responsible for what Mr. I,lruce and Ad miral Hope, having English hearts and feeling English pride, lieu done on that occasion. We had first demanded an explanation; but finding that the Emperor of China had sanctioned these proceedings—though every one denied this —we have asked an apology. What were we to do more ? The right hon. baronet had quoted his (Lord John's) state ment—that our only business in China was trade, but he had added to that, security for the property and lives of British subjects. (Hear, hear.) After a British force had attempted to go up the Peiho, with the view of obtaining the ratification of the treaty of Tein-tsin, after they had been treacherously attacked, and had lost in'killed and wounded between 400 and 500 men—if we had then humbly asked permission to have the treaty railed, without a word more on our part, we should have been exposing the pro perty and lives of every British trader to certain risk, and probably a great many to certain destruction. (Hear, hear.) The right hon. baronet asked what was our present policy in China. The Government, in the first place, had asked that the treaty of Tein-tsin should be ratified, with an apo logy, and no further compensation was asked. The French Government had sent out orders to ask for compensation. Mr. Bruce represented the danger that there would be in making a separate demand from France ; therefore the Go vernment had placed in his ultimatum a similar demand. It did not ar pear that this demand really made any difference in the Chinese answer, which was a total refusal of our terms. The question then was, whether the force that had been sent should not proceed, and must not obtain the terms that were asked. Could any one say that thotie terms had not been moderate and reasonable ? But the question before the committee was, whether they would sanction the expense that had been incurred—an expense caused by a policy which the Government was ready to defend, and for which the right hon. gentleman and his colleagues wore as responsible as they were. (Hear, hear.) Sir J. ELPHINSTONE believed that by occupying a strong point in the centre of China—one commanding the river navigation of the co un t ry — we m i g ht soon ma k e t h e Emperor o China very glad to give us security for all that the interests of our commerce in China demanded. Sir C. NAPIER thought it was wrong to send a diplo matist aloig with the admiral and general in China, and to give him so much power over them. Admiral Hope and General Straubenzee, if they had been left to themselves, would have managed much better. If they had not been goaded on as they were by Mr. Bruce, we should have been spared that affair at the Peiho, and this large sum of money to be paid for the war. It was the same when Lord Elgin was there, and he tried to exercise a similar influence over Sir Michael Seymour, but that gallant officer, knowing bet ter than Lord Elgin how to deal with matters in China, resisted that dangerous influence, and succeeded well in very difficult circumstances. The CHAIRMAN being about to put the motion to report progress, Lord PALMERSTON said he hoped the house would not agree to this motion. By dividing the vote into two por tions the Government had taken away every reason for an adjournment of the debate, since hon. gentlemen would be able to deliver their sentiments on the general subject of the China war when the second vote came on. Ho therefore really hoped the house would consent to this vote at once. They could not imagine of course that the session was tobe eternal—(hear, hoar)—and they could not wish the entire year to be devoted to the business of the House of Com mons. It would be extremely inconvenient to keep putting off public business of great importance until the time when they would scarcely have a day to spare. Mr. B. COCIIRANE said the reason he had moved to report progress was that he and his friends on that side had been taken by surprise at the magnitude of this vote, which was what none of them had ever imagined before it was laid on the table. He also complained that no Foreign-office despatches on this subject had been produced of later date than the 10th of November. Mr. DISRAELI said if the noble lord had made his speech on the value of time at the beginning of the session, it might have been more beneficial. Midsummer-day was now long past, and the house was naturally looking forward to tt termination of its labours for the session. There was every wish to assist the Government in expediting the busi ness, and as on the second vote there would be another op portunity of making some observations on the present un satisfactory state of affairs in China, he would ask his hon. friend to withdraw the motion to report progress. The motion was then withdrawn. Mr. DISRAELI asked what course of proceeding the Government intended for this day (Friday), in order to facilitate the despatch of business. Lord PALMERSTON replied that the first thing would be to receive the report of the committee on this resolution, supposing it now to be agreed to. The house would then go into committee of supply, to take the second resolution, and if that was concluded in time they would go into com mittee of ways and means. The vote was then put by the chairman, and agreed to. The house then resumed. TIIE ANNUITY TAX ABOLITION (EDINBURGH) BILL. On the order of the day for the third reading of this bill, Mr. DUNLOP protested against the passing of the measure, as there was very little hope that it would be pro • ductive of any benefit. He should move that it be read a third time that day three months. Mr. E WING seconded the amendment. Ayes .... Noes Majority The bill was read a third time and passed. THE CENSUS (ENGLAND) BILL. This bill, as amended, was considered. Mr. CHILDERS moved in clause 4 after the words " relation to head of family," to insert " ability to read and write." Sir G. C. LEWIS opposed the amendment. The amendment was negatived, and the bill, as amended, was agreed to, and ordered to be read a third time next Monday. THE CENSUS (IRELAND) BILL. This bill was, as amended, considered and agreed to, and ordered to he read a third time this day. The Crown Debts and Judgments Bill was read a second time. The Enclosure (No. 2) Bill was read a second time. ...,... The Smithfield Markets, Street s , a n d I m p ro vements bill was read a third time and passed. REGISTRATION OF BIRTHS, &c. (SCOTLAND) BILL. This bill was read a second time and passed. The Queen's Prison Bill passed through committee, and was reported to the house. The Court of Queen's Bench Act Amendment Bill was considered and agreed to. ISM id a The t s ß ec a o il n w d a t y im. Railways Act (Ireland) ( ) Amendment Bill wa s re v. ts ed to a t n his The Weights and Measures (Ireland Bill was also read a second time. THE FISHERIES (SCOTLAND) BILL. bill amendment crs w consideredhich sho u l d 0 u a nd id agreed to. i‘ir. The . e I i o i r i d rt s ' person destroying fish in a river not wholly be prevent a . be longing to him; USSON Sir J. FERG ' -L opposed the motion. After som e discussion, the house divided— D am th en en dn m ien o For the amendment Against it .. 99-57 ............ The Felony and Misde mea nor Bill passed through som mil tee. The Tramways (Ireland) Bill was read a third time and passed. PEACE PR ESERVATION (IRELAND) ACT (1856) NAMD. This bill w as brought i E n and M read ENT a first time, and or dered to be read a second time on Monday. The other business was disposed of, and the house ad journed at twelve minutes to four o'clook. [ADvEwrisEuzNT.]—Holloway's Ointment and Pills.— Weekly Mortality.—Measles, whooping-cough, small-pox, scarlatina, and diphtheria have caused many deaths during the past week. These and chest complaints almost alone embrace the Registrar's weekly report. How many of these fatal cases might have been prevented had Holloway's oint ment been well rubbed into the affected parts so soon as disease discovered itself I Upon the neck, back, and breast this preventive ointment should be diligently rubbed every night and morning. It will soon overcome these terrors of the nursery ; it will avert anxiety and spare life. In pul monary diseases, as asthma, bronchitis, and influenza, it will be found equally efficacious in saving the sufferer from consumption, and expelling from the blood the cause of that mel ,ncholy malady. Lorrnow : Printed and Published by MURDO YOUNG of No. 112, Strand, Printer, at The Sun Mee, No. 112, Strand, in the Precinct of the, Savoy, in the efAultY f Middleeez, Friday, July 13, 18GO. establis tained i Prietary energy, Which t cannot I experiei The June, o that the linquen Stock I traced i througl leeuside] time-ba by the the cot( Bell an , to a ma think it raittee. The Stock I servan c busines well as tion ; b money Stock : there ci been in althong bers of The the Din Scrinag on a s fished bers of Shor geour that th was thi which 1 till 16t1 toward , a confi the Br( Exchai of t] Balan yea] Thi for th bonus 121 pe approl to pro Tb( +:_ held IVI Nor slat: the "out Jun all c fOrw to £ for Amou spec' that and Bart men