The Sun. — London, England, 1860-06-13 00:00:00

the cost of these vessels, nearly £600,000 a piece, would be entirely thrown away. (Hear, hear.) Having 110 w stated his views, he should not further trespass on the house than to express his confident hope that under the noble duke at the head of the Admiralty, the noble lord the secretary, and the noble lord the head of the adminis- tration, all of whom had such a deep interest in the em- ciency of the navy, and also with Sir Richard Dundas for first naval lord—a man who was unrivalled in his position — the subject which he had introduced would not be neglected. He ventured to ask for a committee to inquire into our naval administration, with a view of putting it in such a state of efficiency as that England, who expected so much from her navy, might not be disappointed in the day of trial. Lord C. PAGET, having complimented the gallant admiral en his moderation, declared that the present Board of Admi ralty had no disposition to evade any legitimate inquiry. He would remind the house that a committee was sitting on the piers and harbours, respecting which his hon. and gallant friend was under a mistake in saying that he (Lord C. Paget) had opposed the bill. He had admitted the prin ciple of the bill but had objected to the details. They were then about to appoint a committee on transport ships, and also the committee on the gunboats, to which he had not offered any objection. There were at the present time three inquiries going on with the different branches of the Admi ralty duties, not one of which had been opposed by the Admiralty itself. Besides this, a royal commission had lately been appointed to inquire lute the mast department, and he trusted the result of that commission would be that wherever improvement was required it would be carried out. He was not prepared to say that he thought the pre sent system as satisfactory as could be wished, but at the same time this was not the moment for him to enter into the merits or demerits of the system. All he could say was that if he were called upon to give evidence, he should give it with the utmost frankness and candour. There were, there fore, four inquiries going on into the various branches of the Admiralty business, all of which had received the full approbation of the board ; but his hon. and gallant friend was not satisfied with that, and wished for an inquiry into the constitution of the Admiralty Board itself. He thought that as there was a very important inquiry now going on into the constitution of the War-office and military depart ments, and, as he understood, although he had only heard it from rumour, that there were ♦ery many great authori ties who, whilst his hon. and gallant friend was for chang ing the constitution of the Admiralty, considered the ten dency was raiher to assimilate the War-office to the Admiralty —(no, no)—at all events, he thoqght it would be advisable under the circumstances to await the report of the committee of inquiry going on with regard to the management and control of the War Department. He did not gather from the observations of his hon. and gallant friend that he found fault with the Admiralty beyond these particular branches to which he (Lord C.lPaget) had alluded. He believed the gist of the hon. and gallant member's argu ment was that the whole board, with the exception of the First Lord, should be composed of naval men. In the first view no doubt that looked very well. He might be excused, as a naval man, for having the highest respect for his brother officers. and he certainly had every reason to believe that they performed their duties, in whatever situation they were placed, as well as anybody else. (Hear, hear.) But the military duties of the Admiralty, so to speak, formed but a small portion of the general business of the board. The hon. and gallant gentleman seemed to have overlooked the vast amount of social duties imposed on the Board of Admiralty, and he (the noble lord) would there • fore give a little sketch of those duties irrespective alto gether of the purely naval duties. Ho would speak first of its municipal duties. The board had the management of all piers and harbours, and the dealing with all the tidal waters of the United Kingdom entailed a vast amount of business. Until very lately they had the packet duties also to perform, but of these they had now been relieved with great advantage, not only to the board, but to the country. With regard to the civil duties of the board, first of all they were merchants. They purchased a vast mass of raw ma tarial.—(An Horr. MEMBER—They don't sell.) They sold old stores—(hear)—and among their purchases were timber, copper, coals, hemp, and a variety of other articles. They were also great manufacturers almost of every trade from great anchors down to the minutest nails, and they N rere shipbuilders in a very extended sense of the term. All these matters and each of them were under the control of lord of the Admiralty. His hon. and gallant friend had made a little mistake in leading the house to suppose the ship-building department was not under any particular lord. It was entirely under the first sea lord of the Ad miralty. The board also purchased an immense amount of provisions not only for the navy, but for the army and other public departments; and they were chemists, for they purchased all the medicines for the great bulk of the fleet, and for our more distant stations. These were duties which the house must admit were entirely of a civil nature. (Hear.) Then came the scientific duties. They were as tronomers, for they provided all the scientific instruments necessary for the guidance of the mariner ; and they were hydrographers, for they had to survey every sea on the globe. They were also architects, having to construct vast docks, barracks, and hospitals, and in fact buildings of every nature. He (Lord C. Paget) was ready to maintain that the Admiralty business as carried out by the board had very many advantages over any other department. The whole of these duties and a vast mass of other business to which he had not adverted, were so interwoven with one another that if the officers were not to meet daily at the beard to discuss important measures, the effect would be that they would have one officer carrying out works with out the knowledge of the board. He had endeavoured to show the working of the Board of Admiralty. There were two important principles belonging to the board. It had the power of acting with suddenness and secrecy in all matters where suddeness and secrecy were required, and in all mat ter's where ventilation was required the Admiralty had equal power to deliberate carefully. He would now refer to its military duties. The First Lord had in his hands a very important privilege, and when the hon. and gallant gentleman wished to touch the constitution of the Admiralty, he should bear in mind that promotion in the navy, from top to bottom, with the exception of the ap pointment of flag officers—all promotions and appointments to ships of every description, were in the gift of the First Lord. (Hear, hear.) He thought it was a very important thing that the First lord should have the power of these promotions. Whereas in the army promotion generally went by purchase, and in some branches of it by seniority, promotion in the navy was by choice, and the First Lord had the whole power in his hands. He maintained that if they were to put that power into the hands of naval men, they would be running a very great risk. (Hear, hear.) He was far from saying there were not many naval officers who would conduct that patronage with the strictest im partiality, but he maintained that those who had spent their lives in the service must have necessarily a great number of personal friends and followers, and they would be liable in the office of First Lord to be pressed by many considera • tions of that nature which the First Lord was entirely clear from now. (Hear, hear.) He might add that he was frankly stating his own opinion with regard to these mat ters. A very strong opinion had been lately given with . respect to Board meetings. He referred to the opinion given 'by the dockyard committee, with regard to the officers of the yards. They found that there was not sufficient personal communication the one with the other, and they recom mended morning meetings at the dockyards with the view of carrying out their plans in common. Ile had now touched upon all the objections which he believed had been made as to the present constitution of the Board of Admi ralty. He trusted his hon. and gallant friend would not push this matter' to a division, as there were at the present time severe) inqviries going on with regard to the Board of Admiralty, and also an important inquiry as to the consti tution of the War Department. If the hon. and gallant gentleman should persevere, he (Lord C. Paget) was afraid he must, on the part of Government, oppose the motion. Mr. B. OSBORNE said ho never heard a more practical or sensible speech than that made by the gallant admiral. He never made a suggestion against the present system of promotion, nor that the First Lord of the Admiralty , should be a naval man. His motion was simply for a , select committee to inquire into the constitution of the , Board of Admiralty. The noble lord's answer was tha t there were four commissions already. Then he said that the Admiralty were engaged in many trades, and the country had a right to say that the board were "A Jack of all trades, and master of none." But who was to blame for issuing all those commissions ? Why, the noble lord himself had done more to bring discredit on the board than any member of the house. Did he not, in that house, im peach the Board of Admiralty for having wasted £11,000,000 in five years ? After that statement, the noble lord was bound to second the motion 6f the gallant admiral. He (Mr. Bernal Osborne) would support that motion, because ho thought it would do a great deal of good, and tend to relieve the board from many charges brought against it by, the noble lord himself. In fact the noble lord had given that evening the strongest reasons for granting the commission to inquire into the constitution of the Board of Admiralty. .He was surprised. at the noble lord taking the present t!a ur,32, as, on a Ramer occasion, he spoke in strong terms of t h , e necessity of an inquiry into the constitution of the b oard. Lord A PAGET denied having said so. ch ar' CMORNE—WeII, when the noble lord made the ge of £1 1,000,000 having been wasted by the board, he was bound to, have asked for an inquiry. He (Mr. B. Osborne) Wont d vtte in support of the motion, and, in his opinion, the Co. upktroller ought to have a seat at the board. (Hear.) There WAS no doubt that the navy estimates were enormous, but tb country would not grudge them if they saw that the syst el a was well worked. (Hear, hear.) C d plonel DICK:, 30N thought the reasons urged by the noble lord against t. 'le motion were not satisfactory. He (Colonel Dickson ) ould bo very sorry to see the army placed under a bo Irclt constituted in a manner similar to that of the Board ( r,‘! ,a'miralty. He thought that the various duties which had i;f)bs performed by that board could not be properly attend ed t dit ought to be inquir e d i n t o whether a in ore jui licit GO arrangement could not be made. c. )uld nut too soon h ave t h e proposed In his opinion lb.( 9 inquiry. (Hear.' Sir J. PAKIN C aoN said, the charges which h a d b een made by the nobl e l o rd last year against the Board o f Ad miralty had tend e( 1 very much to excite unpleasant feel ings in the minds 1 of th public; but he had never hesi tated to give the bloleord credit for the frank and manly manner in which he had expressed himself since he bad filled the office of Secretary to the Admiralty. (Hear.) Of course ne (Sir J. Pakington) spoke with some difficulty on the present subject, as he had only had a year and- a half's experience of the duties of the First Lord ; but he agreed in the opinion which had been expressed by the hon. member (Mr: B. Osborne), that the Comptroller ought to have a seat at the board, and the Accountant- General also. (Hear, hear.) Knowing the difficulties of the business to be transacted by the board, he should be sorry to see an inquiry sent before a select committee composed of hon. gentlemen who had had no experience of the nature of the duties which came before the board, but he would suggest that the Government should take upon themselves to make the inquiry, and take the same course with reference to the navy which they had taken with reference to the army. (Hear, hear.) There should be a well-selected com mission to make the requisite inquiry. He could not assent to some of the statements which had been made by the gal lant admiral—for instance, that the board only learnt through the public journals of the launch of a vessel some days after the occurrence. Now, in his experience, when at the head of the board, no launch took place without the board having the fullest notice. As to shipbuilding he could state that the surveyor attended at the beard one day in every week with reference to that subject, and there wasno shipbuilding of any importance which was not discussed at the board. As to the iron vessels called rams costing £600,000 each, he believed the statement would be nearer correctness if it named £600,000 for two of these vessels. (Hear, hear.) Mr. LINDSAY said he had made up his mind to vote for the motion. The amount of duty to be performed by the board was so large, and of so varied a character, that he could not see how it could be performed by any board constituted as the Board of Admiralty was atpresent. This house, and this house alone, was the proper tribunal to in quire into the constitution of the Board of Admiralty. He would not say one :word in relation to the charges which had been brought against the noble lord and the Admiralty, but he was aware of those charges, having seconded the motion made by the noble lord. The hon. member did not particularly name Sir Baldwin Walker, or any particular person in connection with those charges ; but he expressed a desire to know how a sum of £5,000,000 had been disposed of in connection with the administration of the Board of Admiralty. Mr. BENTINCIC. said this question was one of the greatest importance. The hon. gentleman said he made no , particular charge against the noble lord or any other per son in particular of the Board of Admiralty, and in that re spect he (Mr. Bentinck) concurred, and so long as a civilian was to be kept at the head of that board, he believed they could not have a more efficient man in that position than the noble duke now at the head of the board. But he must at the same time say, that civilians, in matters connected with the navy, were mere tyros and schoolboys. With respect to the gunboats referred to, he must say that it appeared to him reprehensible to have allowed them to remain so long without being inspected, and if the right hon. hart. was the party who ordered them to be hauled up the slips, it proved that civilians should not be selected to serve on the Board of Admiralty. It was said that they ought not to have the inquiry asked for, inas much as there were four different committees sitting at pre sent on naval subjects; but that was not sufficient reason why the inquiry asked for should not take place. With re gard to the promotion of officers, it appeared to him that a naval man would be the best judge of the merits of officers, and as to who amongst them were the best qualified in their r profession for promotion. Of the merits of a naval officer, a civilian could not be a judge; and it unfortunately hap pened that he was so much mixed up with Government, and E . party, and political interests and influences, that his , pro motion of officers was not free from suspicion. He certainly apprehended that there was something wrong in the con stitution of the board. The great explanatory fact was, that the prize of the office was too great for the Admiralty to relinquish, and they could not ask, with any hope of suc cess, that the board would give that precious jewel up, which, like the brightest gem in the British Crown, was highly valued. Sir C. NAPIER hoped the motion would be carried. He would not refer to those civil duties to which his noble and gallant friend had referred, and which were all rubbish, but would offer a word or two upon their military duties. Now, there was a general complaint throughout the navy against the Admiralty and a general mistrust of it in the country. The enormous expense of our naval armaments had been com plained of, but that had been explained by the necesssity for building an entire new navy, and of continually adding to our fleet so as to keep in advance of France and Russia, both of whom, as was known, had been making enormous strides of late years. He did not complain of the First Lord of the Admiralty being always a civilian, but he would ask how was it possible that the government of such an enormous machine as the British navy could be properly conducted when the head of the department was constantly changing. Sines 1850 we had as First Lords, Sir F. Bar ing, Sir C. Wood, Sir J. Graham, the Duke of Northum berland, then Sir C. Wood again, then Sir J. Pakington, and now the Duke of Somerset. How was it possible that auy regular system could be carried on or any permanent improvement introduced, whilst not only the chief, but the other members of the board and the secretary were chang ing with every change of Government. It was very rare for any Lord of the Admiralty to remain when the Govern ment went out. And then who were the persons selected as Lords of the Admiralty. Generally members of that house, friends of the Ministers, and persons who were highly connected and commanded political influence, but who were not necessarily persons possessing any know ledge of naval matters, or even men of distinguished abi lity. How was it possible that a board so constituted could carry on the business satisfactorily ? Then the First Lord —a civilian—had all the patronage and all the appoint ments. It was true the house once put a check upon this by allowing only one promotion to be made for every three vacancies. That rule was good for the nonce, but the First Lord had taken these promotions of one . in three as part of his own patronage. He was sorry to say he had heard the remark that all the appointments since the present First Lord of the Admiralty came into office had been given to people who had been in constant command. He would not mention names, but he might state that there was one officer who did his duty well in the Burmese war, and who had been passed over 16 or 17 times, and he had just been passed over again by an officer senior to himself, but who had recently had an appointment. lie was not the only one who had been passed ever. There were a great many others who had not been employed. He did not find fault with those who had been employed ; they were all good officers, but how was it possible for the others, who never stood any chance of hoisting their flag in time of peace, to be efficient in case war were to break out. There was another thing he would mention, and that was that when officers were appointed they received contradictory orders. The greater part of the business was carried on by private letters between the first lord and the commander in-chief. The noble lord told them to-night that the first lord could give an order if it was signed by the secretary. But by Act of Parliament an order, to be legal, must be signed by two lords and by the secretary. The six lords met in separate rooms, and each had his separate work to do, one the shipbuilding, another the victualling, and an other the store department, and so on. It was true they assembled at the board at 12 o'clock. In theory the thing seemed perfect, but it did not work well in practice. A Lord of the Admiralty, after doing his business at the board went down to Somerset-house, where a whole heap of papers was placedixfore him. It was impossible for him to read them, and he signed them as fast as possible, so that in fact the actual duty was performed by the department. When he went to the Baltic in command of the Baltic fleet he was ordered by the Secretary to the Admiralty to go to Wingo Sound and there await orders. He, however, got another letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Clarendon, who being informed that the ice in the Baltic had broken up, ordered him to place his fleet in a position that would prevent the possibility of a Russian fleet getting into the North Sea. The Admiralty orders told him to do one thing and the Secretary of State's orders told him to do an opposite thing. He did not hesitate, because the So cretary of State's orders agreed with his own intention. He proceeded up the Sound, and got up to Copenhagen, and it was well he did so.. If he had followed the Admiralty orders the northern confederacy would, there was no doubt, have been established. Ho got a letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty, calling his attention to 4he orders for him to remain at Wingo Sound for further orders, and asking for an explanation of his not having done so. The next packet brought him a letter from. the First Lord of the Admiralty. It was on public affairs, and ho supposed he might read it. No, he would not read it. (A laugh.) His answer to the Admiralty was that the orders of the Secretary of State superseded their lordships' order. Besides the confusion in the giving of orders there were other things that were wrong. The Admiralty had never, since the peace, adopted any means of manning the navy. A commission was appointed for the purpose, but the Ad miralty had never carried the recommendation of the com mittee into effect, and the navy was no more manned now than it was when he brought forward the motion. Then, there was the management of Greenwich Hospital. Hon. members who read the account of the manner in which Greenwich Hospital was managed, would be astonished and thunderstruck. Greenwich Hospital was established for the benefit of seamen of the royal navy, and their widows and orphans, but the widows and orphans had never had any attention paid to them. Then the state of the discipline of the navy was very unsatisfactory. He would improve the constitution of the Board by making the First Lord a vice admiral of Great Britain, and he should be styled Minister of Marine. If his plans were carried out there would be great improvements in the navy, and all the evils which existed would be corrected. As to the Controller of the Navy, his duties were such that he had nothing whatever to do with the management of the timber, and he knew no more than he (Sir C. Napier) did of the quantity of timber in store. As to the statement which had been made by the Secretary of the Admiralty against Sir B. Walker, he would say no more than this—that Sir B. Walker had gone into the whole of it, and had proved clearly that the whole of the money voted had been accounted for. Still the stain of the statement remained, for it bad not been removed. The next qaestion brought forward was the affair of the gunboats. T h e hon. gentleman the member for Norfolk had stated that the machinery for hauling up the gunboats was ordered by the late I'irst Lord of the Admiralty, and the whole was done Till& SUN, - LONDON, WEDNESDAYXEVENING, JUNE 13, 1860. under his direction. These gunboats had been a shame and disgrace to the country. They were told the contract was that theyshould be built of sound timber. But no examination of this matter had taken place up to this time. There was now a committee sitting on them, and therefore he would say nothing further about them. The hon. and gallant member then:complained thali after the Russian war, on the return of the fleet to this country, the men were turned adrift, and the Admiralty had not, up to the present time, been able to regenerate the navy. They were in want of petty officers, and they could not get them. There had been no economy in the course pursued. He implored the house to come to some arrangement. If the Admiralty was well conducted, no examination into the conduct of the Board could injure it ; while, on the other hand, the inquiry would be a source of great satisfaction to the country. They would know how the fleet was managed. If the Board were guilty, of course they would not submit to the appointment of a committee ; but he trusted one would be ;granted, and that it would make a searching ixquiry. Mr. WARRE said he had come to the conclusion after much consideration that it would not be advisable to press this motionto a division; but if it were done, he should vote against it. He believed the discussion of those questions would be of considerable advantage to the public service, and he did not think the suggestions of the right hon.baro net the member for Droitwich would be thrown away. He thought that if other powers in Europe made costly and large experiments in their navies, it would be absolutely ne cessary for this country to move with them pa7i passu. At the same time it was his wish that the day might be far dis tant when they would be called upon to use these destruc tive arms against each other. Sir J. ELPHINSTONE thought the discussion that had taken place would answer all the purposes intended by the gallant admiral. At the same time he thought the Admi ralty acted more on political principles than with a view to promote the success of the naval service. The Admi ralty had jurisdiction over the tidal waters, and that function was not always discharged with a view to the rublic good. As to the ship-building department, cientific men were of opinion that recently the ships were not built as formerly, with a due regard to stowage. If that department were thrown open to the public the country would be better served. In steam machinery, also, the Ad miralty were not competent judges, and with respect to the wood department, the board was highly culpable for not having a sufficient quantity of seasoned timber always on hand to meet any emergency. The surveying department was most important, but conducted in a most imperfect manner by means of the most wretched vessels. The trans ports were even more faulty. The comptroller of the navy was the most important person in connexion with the Ad miralty, and yet he had no voice at the board. As to whether a naval man or a civilian should be at the head of the board was a matter of great difficulty, inasmuch as the department was almost entirely of a political character. Sir C. WOOD doubted whether a select committee of that house would be fitted for making such an inquiry as the one proposed. A commission would certainly be better qualified for such a purpose, but he thought the board itself should be left to do so. With reference to what had been said about the objectionable timber being used in the construction of the gunboats, he could say that with one exception the contractors stated that they had the seasoned timber which was required for building them. It was necessary that these boats should have been built within a certain time, and that being so he should have ordered them to be built of the best timber that could be procured. Putting in defective bolts was clearly a fraud, and as such a defect might have led to loss of life, it was a crime also. (Hear.) He had before stated to the house that he had consulted the naval officers of the board as to the building of these boats. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, as the boats were built under an order from the board, and that could not have been given without the sanction of the board. The right hon. gentleman then stated that sheds were built for the purpose of placing the gunboats under cover, as it was considered it was better to do so than to keep them in the water. As to appointments, he had never made an appointment or promotion in his life without the full concurrence of the board, and he never appointed or promoted any one who was not, in his opinion, well quali fied for the office. He believed that upon the whole, it was for the benefit of the public service that the First Lord of the Admiralty should be a civilian, as he was the better able to hold the scales even between the naval lords. As to ship building, that subject was always brought under the consi deration of the board, as the building must be done by the order of the board. Ho might also mention that of the five junior lords four were naval. There were already four or five committees or commissions sitting upon the naval ser vice, , and, therefore, he did not see that any advantage would arise from acceding to the present motion. As to giv ing the comptroller and the accountant-general seats at the board, he could assure the house that if that were done, these important officers would be quite unable to attend to their respective duties at the dockyard. He had also a good deal of experience of several boards, and he could safely affirm that he did not know of any board in which business was better performed than at the Board of Admiralty. (Hear.) Lord LOVAINE was of opinion that some improvements might be made in the constitution of the Board of Admiralty. The changes that took place on changes of Administration were not desirable, but he did not see how that could be avoided. He hoped the Admiralty would not lose sight of the necessity of making such improvements as might ap pear to be required. ._ Admiral SEYMOUR said in the navy a strong opinion prevailed that there was a bias at the board wbiah was in jurious to the public service. In France the various de partments formed a committee acting under the Minister of Marine, who was solely responsible, and who could deviate from the recommendations of the committee as he thought proper. He was of opinion that a civilian at the head of the board was preferable, but he should be guided in naval matters by the opinions of the naval lords. He did not ap prove of the necessity of naval lords having seats in that house, as the presmace of the First Lord and the Secretary of the board in Parliament was amply sufficient for every purpose. Admiral DUNCOMBE said he was bound to say that no ono at the head of the Board of Admiralty could act with greater impartiality than the noble duke now at its head. He, however, thought that a naval man was best qualified to preside as First Lord. He would not now press his mo • tion further, and would withdraw it, with an intimation that he would, in the next session of Parliament, bring the constitution of the Board of Admiralty again Before the house. sequence of events that have taken.placeeeince, and longer and more careful consideration, that my colleagues and my self have arrived at the conclusion that it is not expedient to continue that separate local force. I wish to state be fore I go further what the chain acircumstances and argu ments were by which we arrived at this conclusion—not only to relieve ourselves of the appearance of inconsistency ; but because the same arguments may weigh with others, and tend to induce the same conclusions. When India was governed by the Company this question was not brought to my notice. The only military question con nected with India I had had to decide was the addition of one regiment to the local force, which I assented to with the concurrence of Lord Hardinge ; and the substitution of irregular for some regular cavalry. I have been asked whether the disposal of the officers of the native army will not be an insuperable obstacle to the change. Ido not think it will be, by placing them on an unattached list of officers for S 4 taff appoint ments. Before this question of the amalgamation of the Indian army could be brought to a decision the matter was taken out of the hands of the Government. When last June I was appointed to the office which I now have the honour to hold I found that my noble friend who preceded me had decided on maintaining a local army in India— (hear)—to the extent of two-fifths of the maximum Euro pean force in that country, and I am not ashamed to con fess that I was extremely unwilling to distnrb the decision in this respect at which my noble friend had arrived. I well knew the singlemindedness with which he formed his conclusions on all subjects connected with India which came under his notice, and that he had carefully considered this particular question. I felt, therefore, the strongest anxiety to carry his views in the matter into effect. I may, however, remind the house that at that time the mutiny of the European troops in India had been only recently reported in this country, and that its more grave features had not been brought to our knowledge. It was under these circum stances that I made the announcement in August last to which I have referred. I then, as appears from the papers which h6e been laid before the house, submitted to a member of the Council of India who came over to this country charged with the views of Lord Canning on the subject, and who certainly is one of the ablest advocates of the maintenance of a local army, the determination at which my noble friend who preceded me in office had arrived on the subject. I stated to Col. Durand that that determination was to keep up the local army to the extent of two-fifths of the maximum European force in India. Now, it is desira ble, as the house will not fail to perceive, that the amount of that local army should not be a varying, but a fixed amount, because any variable force would be more easily kept up by sending out the Queen's troops to India, ac cording as their services might be required. I was, however, in hopes—though my hopes were not perhaps quite so san guine on the point as those which others entertained—that the European force in India might be diminished to an extent which Ido not now deem expedient. I took the maximum which General Hancock in his report suggested should be 60,000, and I asked General Durand whether 24,000, the two-fifths of that number, would not be a suffi cient force to maintain. As will be seen by his letter, he said that it must be a mistake to take that number as two fifths of all the force, the artillery being taken into account, and concluded by observing that there was no alternative between the adoption of Lord Canning's proposal, supported in the main by the report of the committee, and a new act, leaving it to the wisdom of Parliament, which would then assume the responsibility to devise whatever it might deem expedient. Now, Lord Canning's proposal was that there should be an army of 80,000 Europeans, two-thirds of which should constitute a local force. The military com mittee of the Council of India concurred substantially in that view, fixing the total at 78,000 instead of 80,000, so that I looked on Lord Canning's proposal :as being sup ported by the report of the military committee, and came to ) the conclusion that the local force, in accordance with the opinions of its principal advocates, ought to amount to two thirds of whatever number of European troops we maintained in India, whether that number were 40,000, the two-thirds of 60,000, or 53,000 some odd hundreds, the two-thirds of 80,000. It was also contended that a small local force would not occupy that equality of position as compared with troops of the line, which everybody seemed to regard as indispensa ble. These views, I confess, took me somewhat by surprise, and tended very much to shake my confidence in the pro priety of the determination which I had announced to the house. While the question was pending a succession of let ters, extracts from which were laid on the table of the house, arrived from India, pointing out how much more grave and serious the conduct of the European troops who had muti nied was than had been supposed in the first instance. The mutiny began to assume the appearance not of being the work of young men who had just gone out to India, but of an organised combination among their older comrades, and this new aspect of affairs furnished ground for se • rims consideration. In dealing with this subject, more over, the question of expense presented one of the greatest difficulties. I myself was under the impression that the additional expense of Queen's troops would be greater than that of a local force. This, however, was a point with re spect to which it was not easy to procure any independent expression of opinion, those who took opposite sides with respect to it being disposed to regard each so entirely as accurate their own facts and figures. I ultimately referred to the Registrar-General under these circumstances, and suggested that a civilian not likely tobe biassed by military views should investigate the question. This report has been laid upon the table, and the result is that the additional expense of maintaining Queen's troops ) is found to be much less than the Indian authorities sup posed. In the course of the autumn we received accounts of a number of men who took their discharge from the In dian army, and that in consequence that army was reduced from being upwards of 24,000 to 12,000. The question, then, which we then had to consider was not whether we should maintain the Indian army such as it was, but whether we should reform it, and raise a new army —not to the extent of 24,000 men, for that number would not be satisfactory to the advocates of a local army—but to the extent of at least 40,000. Now, it seems to me that we may dismiss altogether from our notice the proposal for maintaining a small local army in India, which is a course which everybody who pays regard to the efficiency of such a force seems to condemn. That was the question which we had to consider last June or July, but such is not the case at the present moment. Circumstances have altered within the 10 or 11 months, and we aro not therefore open to the charge of inconsistency, if we have now come to a different decision from that at which we some time ago arrived. I have made this brief statement in order that the house may see the reasons by which our policy has been guided, and I shall now proceed to state more fully the grounds on which our decision is based. In doing so I think I may avail myself at the outset of an ad ' mission which was made in the discussion on the motion of my hon. and gallant friend behind me, to the effect that a priori the argumentis now in favour of our having a Queen's army in India. During the period of the existence of the Company's Government there were many reasons which might be advanced in support of the maintenance of a Company's army. It was many, years ago contended that it was necessary the army should belong to the governing power of the country, although even then many high au thorities differed on the subject. Since, however, the transfer of power from the Company to the Queen has taken place, I think the force of argument lies entirely the other way. Dismiss altogether, for the reasons I have stated, the idea of a small local force, I would ask whether it is desir able to raise in the same country and from the same class two bodies of men upon the 'same principles, but ruled by different authorities and guided by different forms of mili tary discipline. That is the first question which I call upon the advocates of the maintenance of a local army to answer in the affirmative, and if they cannot do so upon any rea sonable grounds then I contend the a priori argument is against the view which they take. If, then, they are not able to substantiate their view in this respect, they must either show that the local reasons are so strongly in favour of a double army as to counterbalance the general disad - vantagse connected with such a system, or that it is impos sible to put an end without some degree of injustice to the existing army as it stands. Now, lam prepared to admit that much ought to be conceded to the wishes not to be lost sight of in dealink with this question. The prop osal is that they should be united to and form part of the Imperial army. I admit fully nothing can be prouder than the recollections of the old Indian army of the three provinces ; but we propose that they should form part of an army on the standards of which are emblazoned many of the battles from which they derive their own renown. Seringa patam and Delhi are not only on the standards of the Indian army; but on many of the standards of the English army: Arcot and Plessey would be associated with the Peninsula and Waterloo. I admit that the older officers are all for the maintenance of the Indian army, but the younger officers are in favour of amalgamation. Among the papers you will see statements to that effect. I would beg to call attention to the letters on the subject of Lord Elphinstone contained in these papers, because they contain the most reasonable and well-considered views on the whole question, without any prejudice of any kind. 'What does Lord Elphinstone say ? I was constantly in communication with him on this subject, and in a letter to me Lord Elphinstone says:— _ " With regard to the local army, I think that people in this country, with the exception of a few of the senior officers, aro fast coming round to the view I have alway s taken'of the subject. If the local army has no exclusive privileges and advantageA, it must of necessity sink into a secondary and inferior force. The conviction is now forcing itself upon the more intelligent of the local officers. They see that in amalgamation with the British army lies thei r only chance of continuing upon a footing of equality, or, perhaps, I should say, of maintaining the superior status which they have hitherto enjoyed." The same observations are made by a very able and wall known Indian officer in this country. I asked him, "What do the officers in the army think of amalgamation'?" He said, "Every officer above' the rank of a major is for the continuance of the local army; of those under that rank nine-tenths are for amalgamation." I t i s not unnatural that the older officers should be attached to the glorious recollections of the service with which they were connected ; and, on the other hand, it is also natural that the younger and more active officers should be glad to have the chance of service in connection with their brothers in arms else w h ere t h an i n I n di a; an d w h y s h onld ' we damp that spirit f rom w hi c h the efficiency of our ft4ure army in India is to be derived ? Wel1 7 now I must perf orm what certainly is the most painful part of my duty to-night, which is to call the attention of the house to some of the extracts of the letters on the table, which I must say appear to me to furnish the strongest grounds for the course we are about to take. It would be exceedingly unbecoming in me, a civilian, to venture to give an opinion on the efficiency, or discipline, or conduct of a regimenb of soldiers; but those most competent to form such opinions have given them. They have influenced us, and I think they ought to influence this house. I shall give no opinion of my own ; I shall simply read extracts from the letters which are before you, containing the views of persons well acquainted with the circumstances, well acquainted with the facts, well able to form an opinion,'and which will, I have no doubt, have great weight with this house. Of the gallantry, bravery, and endurance of the Indian army no one has ever expressed a doubt; but there does seem to be, I confess, a most unanimous con current testimony of all officers of the Queen's troops that the discipline of the Indian army is not what it ought to be. To a considerable extent that has been admitted by their own officers. I don't mean by discipline being well set up, or smartness on parade ; but I mean what has been so well expressed by Sir john Lawrence when he said : "While I admit that the tone and interior economy of a royal regiment may on the average be somewhat superior to that of a local regiment." 1 (Opposition cries of " Hear, hear.") All I seek to establish by that extract is that the interior economy of a royal regiment is superior to that of a local regiment. (Hear, hear.) It is admitted that the discipline of a Queen's regi ment remaining long in India deteriorates to a considerable extent. What does that prove ? It proves that there is some cause acting upon both local and English regiments to deteriorate the discipline of an army remaining long in India, and it is not difficult to assign a reason. I use the word discipline as the shortest. I mean by it the interior economy of a regiment and the relation subsisting between its officer and men. I believe it has been generally observed that a local colonial corps which cannot come under the general supervision of higher military authorities is apt to degenerate, more especially if they serve in a climate where exertion and energy are not likely to carry them on for a very long time, unless under the stimulus of war. Officers, after 10 or 15 years in India, are not so active and energetic as they might have been in a cool climate, or had they been in India for a shorter period. That this is the case we have the direct testimony of Lord Elphinstone again. He speaks both of the system of native and Euro pean forcei. He says : " The same system, resulting in the total want, of influence over their men by the regimental officers, has led to both mutinies. The organization of the late Bengal army was as faulty as its discipline was lax." There could not be a more impartial witness on this subject than Lord Clyde. He served in India and all parts of the world, and was a most competent authority on military matters. What does Lord Clyde say ? " It is clear from what we have now seen that it is abso lutely necessary not to trust to local corps, and that we can alone put faith in a discipline which is constantly renovated by reliefs from England, and the presence of officers with their regiments who look to them as their homes." Sir J. Outram says— " So bad has been the system of promotion to commands, and of selections for staff appointments in the local British force, that the only wonder is that any discipline at all is maintained." In a letter to the Duke of Cambridge he says— "As your Royal Highness knows, I have always been strongly of opinion that it is impossible, as shown by prac tice and experience, to maintain discipline in a local corps, such as we expect in her Majesty's regiments, but it did not occur to me that the loyalty of the local corps might suffer!' Sir IL Rose, not a martinet soldier, goes at great length into the question. I will only read ono paragraph ; the whole letter turns on the same point : " Nobody has mixed more with Indian officers than I have. I have never had a shadow of difference with them because I was a Queen's officer and they were Company's or Indian officers. I know the state of their feeling. They admit to me that the disorganisation and undiscipline of the Bengal army, and in a lessor degree of the Indian army in. ,general, were the causes of the mutiny. They admit espe cially, since the mutinous conduct of the European Indian army in the discharge question, that amalgamation is neces sary for the better discipline of the Indian army." Such is the opinion of these high authorities. lam quite aware that there is much to palliate the conduct of the younger soldiers. But it is not true that the mutiny arose among the younger soldiers. We thought at first that this had been so, but what says Lord Clyde upon the point ? " I beg leave again to draw your Royal Highness's at tention to the fact of the passive participation of the non commissioned officers and so-called good men of the Bengal Artillery in the evil intentions of the younger and bolder men who were so near the commission of the worst crime. liven in the old regiments the men have not confidence in their officers. In my mind I must accuse the old soldiers of the Bengal Artillery of having been the prime movers and ringleaders in all this bad business." It is perfectly obvious from his letter that, while Lord Clyde did not attach much importance to the outbreak of the recently-enlisted soldiers, the deepest possible impres sion was produced on his mind by the disaffection of the veterans of the Bengal army. He thought, in fact, that the state of that army, particularly in its older regiments, was perfectly fatal to the maintenance of a local European corps. A much more serious subject of reflection, however, presents itself in connexion with what then took place— viz., the power of. combination possessed by an army per manently located in India with a separate interest from the rest of the Queen's troops. (Hear.) All history tells us of the danger that may result from a large body of men with arms in their hands having such a separate interest and a remarkable power of combining together, for that the com bination which took place on the occasion to which I have referred was extensive and perfect is abundantly clear. I do not insist upon this with the view of dilating on the faults of the men who took part in the movement, but I do wish strongly to impress it upon the house as a warning for the future. (Hear, hear.) And hero I will read only one para graph from Sir William Mansfield's letter : " I have observed in some Parliamentary speeches which arrived by the last mail a disposition to slur over and make little of the misconduct in the local European army in this country. I venture to impress on you the gravity and dan ger of the crisis which we have tided over, and that it was impossible to exceed in completeness and wickedness the combination whieh threatened us in May last. Such was the feeling throughout the Bengal Artillerymen that, though the old soldiers and non-commissioned ' officers were too wary to commit themselves to overt crime, not one of them in any part of the country came forward to warn their officers of what was impending ; thoir combination and con spiracy in this respect being more thorough than that of the Sepoys themselves in 1857." That suggests matter for very serious consideration, and the view which may be taken of it is expressed in a fartherex tract from Lord Clyde's letter, whisk says : " Whatever may now be done, the recollection of this strike or mutiny will never die out in the Indian local army. It will very possibly affect her Majesty's army also in a minor degree ; but in the former—the Indian local army —it will live for ever, and be a precedent to which the minds of the men will always revert when they are dissatis fied with their work or the regulations affecting them. I am, therefore, irresistibly led to the conclusion that hence. forth it will be dangerous to the Sate to maintain a local army . . . I feel I should be wanting in my duty were I to remain silent, now that the strongest conviction has arisen in my mind that from henceforth we should have no local Europeans whatever." Now, be it remembered that Sir W. Mansfield was origin- ally in favour of the maintenance of a local European army. He had stated that opinion very decidedly, but the result of what occurred on this unhappy oecasion entirely converted him to the opposite view. I shall not fully discharge my task if I do not advert to the main arguments of those who advocate separate armies for India. The first argument, which has been brought forward in two or three papers which are before the house, refers to the dangers which must ensue to India if there should be any withdrawal of troops from India to England. I think that argument is without foundation. It must be for the Central Govern ment to decide where the wauts of the empire are greatest, and where the strength of the empire ought to be concen trated. During the Criinean war it might be necessary that the forces of the country should be concentrated at home. During the China war-they were properly diverted for the defence of our Indian empire. If the Home Government are not to be trusted with the decision and the discretion of saying where the forces of the empire ought to be stationed, they are not fit to hold the position of rulers. The danger is said to be in withdrawing such a force as will endanger the safety of India, and we are told that the safety of India was endangered by the troops that were kept back in consequence of the Crimean war. Now I have ascertained that the force in India in 1857 was less than the force in 1854 by 1,500 men only. What is the proposal a That one-third of the force should be Queen's troops, over whom the Government have absolute power of withdrawal. Take the proportion of 60,000 and 20,000 which has been proposed. The Govern s meat at home have the power of withdrawing 20,000 men, and we are told that a force of 1,600 will endanger the safety of our Indian empire. The argument is perfectly absurd, even if the Government are not to be trusted with the power of looking to the safety of the empire. The next argument is that the power of the Governor-General will be destroyed by the removal of the local European army. lamat a loss to see how this position is proved. It is said, with tr u th, that it is impossible for the Governor-General to perform those duties which would be far better discharged by the Adjutant-General or the Quartermaster -General. The Go vernor-General ought to have, locally and temporarily, the whole power that the Government at home possess. Tho next argument is the great expense of the Queen's service, I confess thitt on the ftrst considerat'on of the matter I thought the expense of the Queen's troops much greater than, upon investigation, it appears to be. Depend upon it, also, the most efficient force will be the cheapest in the end, and I do not think we ought to be deterred by the greater expense of the plan proposed if on other accounts we think it good. From the calculations made lam inclined to think that if the whole of the existing local force were con verted into Queen's troops, the increased cast would be about £114,000 a year. A saving ar otherwise of £20. ) ,0(0 would, however, as I think, be no consideration in an, eats penditure of £14,000,000, if it weighed with considerations of safety or efficiency. I believe that the expenditure may be 'very much rednced by depots, reliefs, and the double staff; and I confess I think there is no proof that the change proposed would entail an increased expense of 1' £200,000. It is further object e d that the whole expendi- 1 ture for India is thus thrown npon he authorities at home. No expenses, heweyer, can be incurred for India except by the consent of the Secretary of State and the Council for India, and that is as complete a check as can be devised for the control of the expenditure s The greater expense of the Queen's troops must depend upon the superior health of the local troops. But the returns do not bear out that con clusion. The health of civilians is said to deteriorate ac cording to length of residence in India. Mr. Martin, a me dical authority in the Indian service, says that length of re sidence in India, so far from conferring immunity from illness leads to physical degradation. The general assumption is that English regiments, on landing, have so much sickness that they lose their men. This is not, however, borne out by the facts. Mr. Hammish asserts that the most beneficial results will follow from the practice of more frequent reliefs. It is perfectly well known that men come home invalided from India who are quite competent to serve in this climate. Another observation I wish to make is one suggested by an old Indian of great experience --that of late years there has taken place a great change in the character of Indian offi cers. They are not so entirely devoted to India as their scene of service as they formerly were, when they used to go on leave only to the Cape of Good Hope and return to India again ; a practice which led the officer to regard India very much as his home. The more rapid and easy commu nication with England now enables officers to come home, instead of going, as heretofore, only to the Cape; and this circumstance has tended very much to diminish the differ ence between the officers of the local army and those of the line. (Hear, hear.) The former are not so exclusively Indian as they once were. But what are the services for which these officers are required ? They are r rincipally on what is called staff employment, and that in India has a very large signifi cance. It includes diplomatic service, employment as agents, magistrates, and judges, service in the Commissariat and Ordnance departments, in the pay-office and in public works, and indeed in every conceivable mode of employment. So far as the civil service is concerned, I think the supply from the army is a very valuable one ; but the efficiency of the army is impaired by the removal of officers from their regiments. (Hear, hear.) The system is by universal ad mission the worst that could be adopted for the army. The officers are taken from their regiments and employed in the discharge of civil duties, perhaps for many years, and then return to the command of their regiments when they have ceased to have any practical knowledge of military matters. (Hear.) (The right hon. gentleman read the opinion of Sir P. Grant in corroboration of this view.) The arguments against our expectations of getting a sufficient supply of officers from the line are founded on a state of things in which those officers have not been in a position to obtain those appointments. It is only recently that Staff appoint ments have been thrown open to troops in the Queen's ser vice, and therefore it is not fair to argue that young men will not in future be found to do that which hitherto they have not had any opportunity of doing. Upon this point Sir C. Trevelyan says :-- "But if, instead of this, an Indian career were opened to line officers, and it were arranged that a certain period of regimental service in India, with a certain proficiency in military science and the native languages, would qualify for transfer to the local Staff Corps, young men would crowd into the line regiments serving in India in order to push their fortunes in that country." Other authorities have expressed similar opinions. What I contemplate is a body of officers so raised, so trained, and so employed by the Indian Government rising in the corps by certain numbers who would be devoted to an Indian career: That is the ultimate state of things which I hope to arrive at, but which cannot be arrived at for some years, as the existing Indian officers have a prior claim to service on the staff. They are to a great extent at present em ployed, and it is only as vacancies occur that openings for officers of the line will present themselves. This attempt will afford ample time to ascertain whether or not the officers of the line will furnish a sufficient number of can didates. If the supply from that source should not be adequate, there will be ample time for us to take other means for procuring the requisite supply of officers. I blow that some fears have been expressed lest we intended to break faith with the Indian officers, but those fears are unfounded, as such an idea has never been entertained. (Hear, hear.) It would be most unjust, most ungenerous, and most unwise to break faith with those officers. (Hear.) Take the case of an European regiment in the,company's service. All the existing officers of that regiment must have risen by regi mental seniority until they arrived at general seniority. All the officers in that regiment will come in as Queen's offs. cers, available fot general service. Every man in that re giment will have entered for 10 years, and at the end of that time will be entered for general service. If the regi ment remains in India for 10 years, the probability is that neither officers nor men will have any complaint to make of Indian allowances. After that time the regiments will be available for general service. With regard to these re giments we propose to try a system which is much advo cated by many gentlemen in this house will be successful or not. We do not propose to introduce the purchase system there. A man entering will rise by seniority to the rank:of captain, and thence to the grades of major and lieutenant colonel, partly by selection and partly by seniority. I do not myself entertain that antipathy to the purchase system which is felt by some, but I will enter into the subject now. The real difficulty does not occur in European regiments or ,in the amalgamation of forces. The difficulty arises from the number of officers of the native army whose regiments have been disbanded. There were 74 regiments of regular native infantry in the Bengal army, but only 15 now re main. No one will propose to create anew the Bengal army as it existed before the mutiny. These officers could not claim it as a right that the Indian army should be main tained on its former footing and to its former extent in order that their pay and privileges should be preserved to them unchanged. Nor could they claim that a European army should be formed with a view to their em ployment. The arrangement which we propose, as it seems to me, violates no right to which they can lay legitimate claim, and it is just the course proposed by Sir Patrick Grant in reference to the Madras army, when he suggested the reduction of 12 regiments. There will be no difficulty in forming a staff corps and officering the regular regiments from this corps. In some districts a large number of officer's are employed, and if some facility be offered to that end I believe it will lead to the retirement of many, and that ultimately we are more. likely to want officers than to have more than we need. Then I have heard that a great many officers would be glad to change their positions for a similar rank in the line. Every officer of the Indian army will, if he chooses, have the power of exchanging into the line, and will be eligible for command in any part of the world. (Hear.) Thus the general plan will be, that the European regiments will form part of the Queen's army, the existing officers retain ing their positions, rising by seniority, as they do now; that officers will be eligible for general service, rising by seniority to the rank of captain, and afterwards by seleo tion to the rank of major and lieutenant- colonel ; that the existing officers of the Indian army will be employed either as they are now in the regular regiments, or in various situations on the staff; and that ultimately vacancies in the staff corps will be filled up by candidates selected from the Queen's general army. (Hear, hear.) That is an outline df the scheme for the regulation of the Indian army. But I wish to.place before the house the alternative, which is a matter for serious consideration. We are called on to main tain a local army of at least 40,000 men. The number of local troops at this moment I will assume to be 15,000. The question, therefore, is not one of maintaining an existing establishment, but of raising 25,000 'nen in addition, and of raising them in this country for service in India. Now, how is that to be done ? Lord Canning's lost minute pro poses 24 additional regiments for Bengal alone. It is admitted that new regiments cannot and ought not to be formed in India. That experiment has been tried, and failed. We must form, drill, and train in this country for the•serviee of Bengal alone 24 European regiments. What will the advocates of economy say to this? In the mean time we are to,maintain the same number of Queen's troops in India. And then, when these new and raw troops are trained and drilled, I suppose the old and experienced soldiers are to be disbanded. I ask the house seriously to consider this question. If we adopt the views I have stated we shall be put to the expense, trouble, and delay of raising these men, and of training them in England for a certain number of years, paying out of the Indian revenue for the ,double force of Queen's troops now forming part of the gar rison of India, and the force trained in this country which is to form the future garrison. I do not think that anybody will entertain each a project on the score either of economy or efficient'. (Hear.) Hitherto I have said nothing as to the authorities on one side or the other, but I must beg the house not to be led away by the notion that this is a mere question between Indian and English authorities. The highest Indian authorities are extraordinarily divided on the point. Lord Ellenborough, who has paid great atten tion to it, is strongly in favour of an Indian army. Lord Elphinstone, who has had more experience in India than almost anybody, who has been Governor of two Presiden cies, whose conduct throughout the whole of the Indian mutiny has met with universal, approbation—(cheers)—and who has shown himself most competent to deal with Indian questions, is in favour ofihe amalgamation. Lord Canning has sent home a strong minute against amalgamation. Sir C. Trevelyan, who, with all his faults, knows a great deal about India—(hear)—and has paid great attention to all military questions there, expresses an equally strong opinion the other way. nem are no two men who are better ac quainted with India than Sir G. Clark and Sir 3. Lawrence, and they express directly opposite opinions. Sir Archdale Wilson, the conqueror of Delhi, goes one way ; Sir 3. Outram, the conqueror of Lucknow, goes the other way. Sir Itt Vivian is strongly in favour of a local army ; Sir Patrick Grant desires amalgamation. Going back to the past, we find that Sir T. Munro was favourable to a local army,while SirJ. Malcolm thought amalgamation desirable. Islauntstuart Elphinstone was in favour of a local army; Sir C. Metcalf thought there ought to be one army only. I have quoted half a dozen authorities on each side who most decidedly differed among one another; and the argu ments I have endeavoured to lay before the horse are not overborne by the overpowering weight of Indian officers. Lord Cornwallis was strongly in favour of one army, anti -that in the time of the Company's rule. He could not carry out his views, tho India Company being too stro lg for him, and the opinion of one of the m os t experienced ' statesman and soldiers. (Hear.) I was surprised the other day to hear the Duke of WeHingl on quoted as an authority for a native army, Now, in 1812 Lord Melville wrote to th e Dalce of Wellington, then in Spain, and asked his opinion on this subject. I need not state labw great was his experience of Indian matters, and how entirely he was i il financed by the sole consid era ti on o f t h e good of his country: The Duke of Wellington wrote to Lord Melville, in answer, to this effect : " I will not miss this opportunity of stating to you my opinion—first, that the European army in the East Indies ought to be the King's; secondly, that the three armies (that is, the armies of the three Presidencies) ought to continue separate and distinct; thirdly, that the native army ought to be the Company's, if the Company should continue to be the Sovereign of the territory ; . • . fifthly, it is my opinion that all authority, civil and military, must be vested by the law in the Governor .in Council. The law must re cognise no other authority in the State. The Company may, and ought to, instruct the Governor in Council—first, to leave all matters of discipline solely and exclusively to the Commander-in -Chief, and to interfere in them in no man ner, excepting when the safety of the State should require it; secondly, that allrecommendations to military appointments, such as the staff officers of the army to commissions, promo tions in the army of persons—civil or military —to fill the departments of the army, and the inferior commands, should be made by the Commander-in-Chief to the Governor in Council. The Governor in Council should be obliged to record his reasons for dissent. Thirdly, the recommenda tions to superior command, such as divisions of the army, should be with the Commander-in -Chief when the holders of these commands exercise no civil authority or, political function ; and that, in the case of a nomination to a higher command being vested exclusively in the Governor in Council, without the recommendation of the Commander in -Chief, the Governor should be directed to consult with the Commander• in -Chief in making the selection. It would be very desirable to leave a latitude by law to the Governor in Council to promote officers for meritorious ser vices,_ at the recom men d ation of the Commander-in-Chief, out of the usual regular routine, as well as to pass over off], cers guilty of misconduct. This might be done by giving the Governor in Council the power to promote such officers, by brevet in the first instance, wheshould suttee d to the first vacancies in the 'rank in which they should have been promoted in the regiment to which they should belong." I have read the whole of that opinion, :and it will be ob served that the three main conditions which, in the Duke of Wellington's opinion, should be carried into effect are that the European army should be the Queen's, that the armies of the three Presidencies should be distinct, and,thut the supreme authority of the Governor-General should be recognised. I must deny that this is exclusively an Indian question, and I maintain that both on Indian and on Im perial grounds the course to pursue is that upon which the Government has resolved. It is quite true that the mutiny of the Seyoys is over, and that tranquillity is restored ; but I confess that there are still some grounds for solicitude. The confidence which once prevailed is shaken, and, what is still more alarming, I am afraid that there is considerable estrangement between the races. Therefore it is essential, in the first place, to put on a footing which cannot be shaken our military superiority. The rebellion was put down by the unparalleled bravery of our forces, and we have vindicated and established our superiority ; but I. hold that that must be maintained so potent and evident that none shall question the efficiency of our arms. (Hear, hear.) lam far from meaning that we should not endea vour to make use of conciliatory means. We are bound to show the natives that we are their friends and benefac-• tors, and that they would lose by a change. I believe that such a course of proceeding is essential to the maintenance of our power in India. lam anxious, however, not to place everything upon mere force, or upon the authority of the Government, but to depend likewise upon measures of improvement and upon the influence of reason. Still to be able to act in this way they must feel, and we must feel, that we are not to be shaken in our military ascendancy. ' It must be felt that our rule is fixed, so that we may be enabled to extend those blessings to India which I believe it is our destiny to confer. This we should do, not only for Indian, but also for Imperial reasons ; for the evil which falls on India must be felt in this country. In the last mutiny how much English blood was shed, and what a great strain India became upon the resources of England It is upon England in case of emergency that the pressure must come; therefore, it is only fair, right, and just that we should put our army in India in a state of the greatest possible discipline and efficiency, and constitute it in such a mariner as to enable it to be prepared, as far as human foresight can do so, to prevent the possibility of the recur rence of such a calamity as we have lately experienced. I hope the house will concur in the plan which is now pro posed by the Government, and I beg to move for leave to bring in a bill to repeal so much of the Act of the 22d and 23d of Victoria, cap. 27, as enables the Secretary of State for India to raise men for her Majesty's local European forces in India. Mr. H. SEYMOUR and Lord STANLEY simultaneously rose to move the adjournment of the debate. Sir C. WOOD suggested that he might be permitted to introduce the bill to-night, and that the discussion might be taken on the second reading. After some conversation it was ultimately arranged that the debate should be adjourned, and the debate was accord ingly adjourned to Thursday week. PASSING TOLLS. Mr. FENWICK obtained leave to bring in a bill to abolish passing tolls. BURIAL-GROUNDS ACT. Mr. H. HERBERT obtained leave to bring in a bill to amend the Burial-grounds (Ireland) Act, 1856. The Councillors of Burghs and Burgesses (Scotland) Bill was read a third time alid 'passed. The house adjourned at 1 o'clock. THE LOCAL ARMY OF INDIA. Sir C. WOOD said—l rise, pursuant to the notice I have given, to move for leave to introduce a bill repealing the powers possessed by the Secretary of State for India to raise men in this country for the local service of her Ma jesty in India. The bill I propose to introduce contains only one simple clause for this purpose ; and I have adopted this mode of bringing the question before the house, in order to test its opinion on the principle of the measure, without encumbering it with any details that might dis tract attention from the main subject. In the execution of the measure a great number of details will have to be care fully considered. Indeed, if the house refers to papers now on the table, it will find among them a letter addressed to me from one of the ablest officers now serving in the Indian army, suggesting the necessity of appointing,, a com mission or committee of experienced officers, to go into the numerous and minute details that will arise when the mea sure is brought into practical operation. I will therefore state generally the principle of the plan which I think must be adopted, and avoid entering into a statement of the details. I adopt this course also for another reason I stated in the session that the Council of India did not concur with the plan. It was very natural they should not be disposed to part with the powers they have possessed. But they have stated fairly and frankly that if the decision of the house confirmed that of her Majesty's government they would faithfully endeavour to carry that determination into effect. (Hear.) I did not think it fair to ask the Council of India:to prepare any plan, or consider any plan, till that decision had been come to; but I shall be most anxious to have the benefit of their advice on the details of any plan it may be determined to carry into execution. I think there can be no great difficulty in carrying a plan with this object into execution. Even among the papers on the table of the house there are no less than three detailed plans of the kind. Two of them are drawn up by the officers of the India army, and one by an officer of the Queen's forces, now serving in India, Sir W. Mansfield. I have received a fourth detailed plan, also drawn up by an officer of the Indian army ; and in principle all these four plans are much the same ; if they differ it is on points of detail. They, therefore, show a general concurrence of in dependent authorities, all intimately acquainted with the subject with which they deal. Before going farther I will state what the military forces in India have heretofore been. It is generally known that the India Company had in India thre 3 large armies—those of the three Presidencies, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. Each of these consisted of native regi ments, comprising artillery, infantry, and cavalry. The Company had had besides these, from the earliest times, a number of local troops—the Company's troops they were called —raised in Europe. They consisted of artillery and infantry. There have been also, for many years back, a considerable number of Queen's troops ; they comprised only infantry and cavalry. The European infantry was therefore com mon to the line and the local forces; the European cavalry was exclusively that of the Queen's army ; the artillery was exclusively the Company' s . B e f ore the breaking out of the mutiny there were three regiments of infantry in each Pre sidency, 'nd a corps of srtillery. After the Sepoy mutiny, discontent arose in the local army, and a large proportion of it obtained their discharge. The Queen's troops in India have for many years been in the proportion of about two to one of the Company's European troops. In 18.52 the. Queen's troops were 28,000 to 14,000 of the Company; but during the mutiny the number of the Queen's troops was 90,000 to 24,000 of the Company's European force. After the discontent manifested by the Company's local troops, about 11,000 of them took their discharge, and this force was reduced to about 12,000 men. Now, the only question on which I wish to take the opinion of the house is this, —whether we shall continuo to maintain a separate European force for. local service in India, or whether all the European troops in India shall form part of the Queen's general army. I must /Ay that this question is one on which I long entertained the most serious doubts. stated last session that we were prepared to maintain toga certain Went a local army in India; and it is only in con- co UNTRY MARKETS. LIVERPOOL —.JUNE 12. We had a good attendance at to-day's market, and a fair consumptive demand for wheat at 3d par cental ad vance on the week's extreme rates. Oats were easier. Oatmeal also a better sale. Beans 6d to is dearer. Peas and barley in fair request. Indian corn was irregular in. value. The market dosed steady, at an advanee. LEEDS—JUNE 5. Fine fresh new wheats must be quoted fully 2s per qr. dearer than last Tuesday, but the demand for old is limited, at is per quarter advance. Oats and beans in favour of the, seller. Arrivals this week : Wheat I • .. 3,183 qrs. Barley Oats ...... Rapeseed Beans .. Linseed Flour ...... Averages for the week : Wheat 1,764 qrs., at . 53s 101 d Peas .••• —s Od Beans 8ar1ey......... 400 37s Oct Oats —........—s Od Rye 36 — 36 s Od • ..................... 351 190 sackg. NEWCA STLE - UNDER-LYNE—JUNE 12. A limited show of wheat at market to-day, for which the trade was firm for most samples ; other grain in active. White ruled at 56s to 60s, red 503 to 57s per qr. Barley, 29s to 44s ; oats, —a to —s ; beans, 38s to 48a ; peas, —s to —s. SLEAFORD—Juign 11. The supply of wheat was limited, and there was a thin attendance. Trade ruled firm, at frilly last week's rates. Beans and barley without alteration, NORWICH CATTLE-3 - IRO 9. This morning our market a%hibited a very large show of store cattle, comprising Sccts, Devons, shorthorns, and Irish, in good condition. A. good attendance of buyers, and there was a brisk sale. A fair clearance was effected , on very good terms. Fat beasts a tolerable show, and all sold. Scots, 4s to 4s ad ; shorthorns, 3s 6d to 4s 6d ; Irish, 3s to 4s 6d ; Devons, 45 Od to 4s 6d (estimated weight when fat). Sheep—There were good supplies of sheep in the pens. Fat sheep, 8s to 9s Od per stone; prime, 9s 6d to Os. Pigs—A fair supply. Store pigs 30s to 355; fat pork' 8s Od to 8s 6d per stone. THE MAILS. MAILS DUE. Australia, Ceylon, and Mauritius (via South ampton) Overdue. Do. (via Marseilles) Overdue. Bahamas and H avana ( v i a N ew York) .• • • ul y 4 . Canada, &c. (via Cork) .. .. • • • • June —• Cape of Good Hope, &c. • • • • July 1. China, Penang, and Singapore. (via S'ampten) June 18. Do. (via Marseilles) June 12. Gibraltar (via Southampton) • • • . June 10. India (Calcutta), Ceyl on , &c. (via Southampt on) June 18. Do. (via Marseilles) June 12. India (Bombay), (via Southampton) .. June 10. Do. (via Marseilles) .. .. June 20. Lisbon, Brazils, Buenos Ayres, &e. .. Jul _ 5. (via. Southampton) .. June 10. Lisbon, Vigo, and Oporto June 11. (via Marseilles) .. June 20. u: M n a t t e a d , (%ia Cork) .. June 21. Western Coast of AtrTa, Madeira Teneriffe .. June 10 E S g ta y t Dp e t s a C n a d lif A or d p eri a, &c. West Indies and Pacific, c art , gen , u a, Cuba, &c. June. 14. B I 11. HS. BECKWITH.—On the 12th inst., at Surbiton, the wife of Edward L. Beckwith,'Esq., of a son. CouLsoN.— S. the 12th i ns t., a t N or th E n d , Croydon, Mrs. H. On. Coulson, of a daughter. bourne-pa th rk, GlBB.—oe e 11th i ns t., a t 7, Kild are-gardens, West the wifo of George Gibb, Esq., of a son. MARRIAGES. Paddin gtnn . CuunIE—BLYTHOn the 12th i ns t., a t S t. J ames ' s, second James P. Currie, E sq ., t o E up h em i a Anna, gardens, daughter of James Blyth, E sq. , o f 2 4, Hyde-park PRA:TT-- BANKS.—On the 11th inst., at St. Matthew's, Walsall, the Rev. P. E. Pratt, curate of St. Margaret's Leicester, to Clara, eldest daughter of W. Banks, Esq., of Walsall. DEATHS. BRIGGS. —On the 6th inst., at Richmond, William Briggs, Esq., aged 38. Br...yrn.—On the 6th inst., at Hackney, Robert Alexander Blyth, of the firm of Blyth, Son, and Cooper, Chi swell street, aged 41. C ARNEGIB.—On the 9th inst., at Leamington, Lacly Car negie, aged 96. COLBY,—On the 3d inst., at Greenwich, Mary, the wifo of Commander Colby, of Greenwich Hospital, aged 65. FRANK.S.—On the 12th inst., at Waltham Abbey, Essex, Mr. Edward Augustus Franks, the oldest inhabitant, aged 94. ROBINSON.—On the 10th inst., at BeauJah-hill, Norwood John Robinson, Esq., of Lloyds, aged. 86. LONDON : Printed and Published by IIfUI3.DO YOUNG, of No. 112, Strand, Printer, at The Sun Office, No. 112, Strand, in the Precinct of the Savoy, i R the coon q r of Middleemr, Wednesday, dune 13, 1860. I at •I.( of ge