The Sun. — London, England, 1860-06-22 00:00:00

ought to cease to exist." (Hear, hear.) That is to say, we are called upon to affirm that it is expedient that a certain thing should be done, though many of us may believe that great difficulty may be experienced in working out the ne- cessary details. (Hear, hear.) Nor do I think the difficulty which presents itself in dealing with the question in this form is diminished by the suggestion which my right hon. hiond has thrown out, to the effect that we are not now asked to consider the case of the native army, but only that of the European force in India. If that were really so, and that we were simply to decide upon what should be done with a force of 20,000 or 30,000 Europeans, our views upon the matter might indeed be materially altered. If we could dissociate from the question at issue to-night that larger question of what ought to be done with a native army. then no doubt the interests involved would be less important, and the point at issue drawn within much narrower limits, I am, however, afraid that you cannot separate the case ol the local European from that of the native Indian army (Hear.) And for this reason, if you were to maintain in India 'a powerful European force, consisting of 60,000 or 80,000 men, composed of the principal troops of the line, and if together with and by the side of that army you were to keep up at the same time a native army, which would be necessarily less looked to, less thought of, and less trusted, and which would be mostly employed, in all probability, on services in connection with which opportunity would be taken to economise European life—if, I repeat, two such armies were to be maintained in a separate form, and with out any tie or bond between them, it is, I think, plain that the officers of the native force would feel that their position was one—l will not say of degradation, but at all events of inferiority—that they would lose that self-respect and esprit de corps which ought to belong to every army— (hear, hear)—and that employment in the native force, in stead of being sought- for by competent men in India as heretofore, would form a refuge only for those who can obtain no other employment. (Hear, hear.) I have heard something of jealousy between the two branches of the service; but which state of things, I should like to know, is more likely to create and perpetuate an ill-feeling of that nature than that in which the officers of the one army will attempt to assert the superiority of their position over the officers of the other, while the latter will feel that they are placed in a position of undeserved but not the less real in feriority. (Hear.) To take such a course, then, as to that which I am alluding, would, in my opinion, be to destroy the efficiency of the native force. But the question may be asked, do we require native troops, and can we trust them after the experience of the last few years? I answer that question by another—how are those native troops to be replaced ? (Hear.) You cannot hope, with any European force which you can command, to rule over a million and .a half of square miles and 150,000,000 of inhabitants. 60,000 or 80,000 Europeans will never suffice to keep in subjection so great an empire, and you cannot increase your army beyond that limit, partly because of the com parative smallness of our military establishment, and partly because of the waste of European life in India. It should else loe borne in mind that you require services to be per med in India which European troops cannot render, 'while I believe, in practice, no large force of Europeans has laken the field in India without being accompanied by native troops. Let me also remind the house that circum stances might arise which would render it a matter of con siderable difficulty to keep up the number of European troops in India, even at the lowest limit upon which you might deem it expedient to fix.• There are many circum stances in this country the tendency of which is to make recruiting difficult ; wages are rising, the position of the Labourer is improving, the capital of the country is rapidly increasing; but notwithstanding these facts, emigration has not altogether ceased. If the contingency should arise . —which is painful even to contemplate, but still within the r , *lgo of possibility, because it is that against which the ex i, itence of an army is intended to provide—if a war should ta k e place in which England should be compelled to take part, I do not see by what means you could maintain an E uro pe, an force of 70,000 or 80,000 men in India unless you resorted to the expedient which unfortunately you had to adopt in the Crimean war of enlisting foreign mercenaries. (Hear, hear.) I hold, then, that the maintenance of an. Indian army both for the present and for the future is in evitable—(hear, hear)—and holding that opinion, I am glad to beliesee, as I do, that the dangers incident to its existence are considerably exaggerated in popular belief. You have in India every variety of race and opinion, and between these various populations the old feuds and animo sities still continuo. In 1857, when the mutiny first broke out, the first thing done was to raise a new native army, and that army marched on the enemy as it would have done had it been a foreign enemy. You would have no difficulty in obtaining the assistance of troops raised in any part of India to put down such disturbance. The greatest danger you had to encounter at the time the outbreak occurred was that of giving the element of one single race a vast preponderance in the native force. With the lesson we then received, I repeat" the maintenance to a con siderable extent of a native force is under the circumstances of India inevitable. If the maintenance of a native army be inevitable, and if at the same time a native army cannot be maintained entirely dissociated from the European force, without the officers and men losing their esprit dc corps and self-respect, there must to some extent be a local European force remaining in India. I don't like on questions of this ' kind to appeal to authorities, however eminent, because reasons of policy ought to stand or fall by the weight that belongs to them. But I find that Sir John Malcolm, when examined before this house in 1813, so exactly expressed the opinion I have endeavoured to lay before you, that I will quote one sentence from his evidence. He was asked — "If the European regiments were to be reduced, and the infantry of the Company's army to consist of natives alone, what would be the effect ?" His answer was—" If such a separation were to take place it would tend materially to destroy the efficiency of the Company's army. . . . In the sepoy sery ce the officers cannot be employed except in all the lowest drudgery and fatigue of war. They will in con sequence sink in their reputation, and will become little better than a country militia." He goes on to argue that an army, exclusively native, or ganised in the manner now proposed, would sink into a position not superior to that of the armies of native princes. (Hear, hear.) There is one consideration which you cannot altogether overlook, although I am far from regarding it as of paramount or primary importance. I mean the feelings of those whom you are about to transfer from one service to another. I allude to that subject, because my right hon. friend said that with very few exceptions the feeling of the officers of the Indian army was favourable to amalgamation —or at least that it is only the older officers that are against amalgamation, the junior officers being in general in favour of it. There must be much that is conjectural in an esti mate of the opinions of a large body of men with whom we do not come into personal contact ; and when your opinion is known a person in that position naturally shrinks from expressing views which a-e known to be unwelcome and which it is useless to discuss. That exists on one side as well as the other. But, having communicated to a great extent with the Indian army, and having a few years ago resided in India, I must say I never heard the opinion that any of the officers, except some very young officers of the Indian army, were favourable to the change. (Hear.) I certainly have heard officers say that amalgamation would take place sooner or later, and that military influence prevailed at home which made it desirable that it the change were to take place the sooner it did occur the better, so as to relieve them from unsettlement hereafter. That is a feeling which prevailed some time ago, and no doubt it is rather increased than diminished by the long period of suspense in which the Indi n army has been kept. There is another ground on which I believe that some officers of the local force may be not unfavourable to amalgamation. No one who has heard the expression of opinion among the officers of that force can fail to be aware that one of their strongest feelings a few years ago—l am not identifying myself with that feeling as founded in justice, I speak merely of its existence—one of their strongest feelings was a belief that they have little chance of justice at home—that interest, and influence, and favour have a great deal to do with military administration here—(hear)—and that their military service at a distance does not stand a fair chance ; and they argue in this way :—lf we remain as a local force we have no chance whatever, but if we take our turn in service with the European forces we shall be brought under the notice of the . authorities at home, and we shall have some chance of recognition. I believe some of the officers of the local force are in favour of the amalgamation on that ground. But it is not for the sake of the officers of the Indian army that I would main tain a local European force in India; it is for the sake of the public service in India. (Hear, hear) In all the discussions on this question I have never heard afair and satisfactory aniwer given to what is, in my mind, the greatest objection to the measure of the Government, that you will lose the most valuable assistance which the Go vernor •General now has in carrying on the local adminis tration of Indian affairs when you lose the service of seine thousands of officers trained exclusively to the Indian ser vice. (Hear, hear.) I don't know that it would be possible to get any more important testimony than that of the Go vernor-General himself upon this subject, and here is what . he says : " No one would dream of attempting to administer the civil affairs of India through officers who were not attached to the Government hysomeother ti than the receipt of In dian salaries. And inasmuch ' as thee ' fficiency of our military service, in those branches of it which are of daily import ance to th e peace and safety of the .country, such as the management of irregular regiments, or the conduct of the half -political, half-military operations on the frontiers and in native Eitgawetes; depends mainly upon the application which officer the with which he to his early training, upon the heartiness undertakes his duty, and upon his persever ing adherence to it,lshould grr a tly deplore seeing her Ma je, n India ty's army who are entirely, or even in the greater part, by men are at liberty to cast themselves loose from the country at ficant sacrifice of their interests their. and at an insigni- Now, sir,, don't supp ose that * any man in this house will argue the question on the ground that it isbetter altogether f y ro p ro r 0 p t the i n civil t a a , t l e n o ti f n E i s i t t r r a . - - to separate officers of the of India. That may be v y er tiou r.an civilisation, but it is certainly not a system that would 1 ) -' (Hear, hear.) There system eadroany pants of answer in India. India in which it would not be possible 'lister civil affairs without the employment of inilita mi that purpose. Let any man read t i e Works orfYsicnum for 11, tr ardes on India , and he will have no do ubt on this point. Ea' Only think what is the condition of life in man y of the wild reg i o ns of India, and y ou will be able to j ud ge how far it would be ro ,ita c in countries of that description to sepa rate the power of administration from the power of the THE SUN, LUNDON, FRIDAY EVENING, " I adhere to the opinion that the interests of India re quire that there should be an army devoted to India. I am confirmed in it by the experience which I have acquired, after much intercourse with officers of her Majesty's regi • ments of the Line in India, of the unwillingness which ap pears to prevail among them to look to India as the scene of their profession for any considerable length of time: During the excitement of active service this feeling was not so per . ceptible; though even in 1858 the applications for leave to return to England were numerous ; but since the cessation of military operations it has become very strong, anti it is not too much to say that it is a rare occurrence to meet with an officer of the Line who looks forward contentedly to a long stay in India. Ido not think that the unwillingness will be removed by throwing open the door to their employ ment in every kind of Staff or irregular service. Maker; every allowance for the events of the last three years, for the disjointed and uncertain condition of service in India to which those events have led, and for all the discomforts of frequent and unseasonable movement of corps and indiffe rent accommodation, the feeling is, I fear, likely to prove a listing one among those who are brought to India only ac cidentally. I believe that there are very few Englishmen indeed who will readily make up their minds to devote themselves to a career inthis country, unless they are trained to look to it, and are bound to it from their youth." I think it is impossible to overrate the value and importance of an opinion of that kind coming from the Governor-Ge neral. I have in the course of the last two years made my self acquainted with many opinions which have been ex pressed uponimportant matters byLord Canning. Sometimes it has been my fortune to differ from him, but far more fre quently I have agreed with him ; and whether I have agreed or whether I have differed, I never saw an opinion of his expressed upon any question of policy which did not bear the marks of anxious and careful inquiry, and of the most cautious examination and consideration. (Hear, hear.) And recollect, when Lord Canning expresses this opinion he is not so much a man telling you what he thinks about the question as one who gives evidence as to a fact which has come under his knowledge. From his position he knows better than any other man can do what are the feel ings of those who are engaged in the Indian service. Ap plications for leave are made to him ; he knows who wishes to stay, and who desires to go ; and when he speaks of a prevalent distaste for Indian service as existing among men who are not trained in early youth to Indian life he is only bearing witness to a fact which is more or less familiar to every one who is conversant with Indian society. (Hear.) No doubt, the feeling of which he speaks has been aggra vated by the recent mutiny, and by the antipathy of races to which I am afraid it has led, but it is a feeling which existed in India years ago, and I have repeatedly heard from able and experienced servants of the Government, from men whose Indian career has been one unbroken suc cess, from men who, if any men have done so, have won the prizes of Indian public life, that although they were satis fied with the fortunes they had made, although they did not regret that their lives had been passed in India, yet that if any opportunity of coming to England had offered itself to them earlier in their career, they would undoubtedly have thrown up the service and returned to this country. Nor do I assert this only from my personal experience. Of all the public men who have ever served in India there is none who has left a more illustrious name than Lord Metcalfe. He was a man who possessed all those qualities which make success not a matter of speculation, but of cer tainty; yet what was the case with regard to Lord Met calfe ? We have it upon record that not long after he entered the Indian service he became so wearied, and so disgusted with the apparent hopelessness of his career, that he wrote to his f iends imploring that he might be allowed to sacrifice his prospects in India and return to England. If a road had been opened to him, if it had been in his power, without any material sacrifice, to come home, he would have acted upon the feeling which he then acknowledged, would have abandoned his prospects in the Indian service, and India would have lost one of her most illustrious administrators. (Hear.) Ido not say that the life of public servants in India is one which men ulti mately regret. It is a career of great interest. It offers noble opportunities, and men who go out determined not to look back, and knowing that their lives must be passed in India, become mentally as well as physically acclimatized and make the most valuable public servants that we have. But what I say is, that in the first instance there is a strugs gle and a sacrifice, and that the prospect of banishment from England for the greater part of his life is one which no -nan willingly faces. It is a sacrifice generally made only when men are driven by necessity. In the next place, if you do find men who are willing so to serve, it is hardly possible they should acquire the same training as they do now ; for in order to gain a real knowledge of India I believe that it is essential that men should go there at a thee of life when their ideas are still unformed, when their habits are flexible, and when they can adapt themselves to any situation. (Hear, hear.) My right hen. friend asked why should not that be the case with officers of line regiments—why should not they go out early and determine to remain in India ? Because they have no certain' y of being able to do so. Suppose there is a war or a prospect of awar at home, and an officer is living with his regiment in India, and has for years been studying the languages of the country, intending to retire from the service and devote himself to civil administration. His regi ment is recalled with a prospect of being engaged in hostili ties, and it is impossible for him with honour to leave it. (Hear, hear.) He therefore quits the country, and takes his part in the events which may be passing on this side of the globe. He thus loses the special aptitude for Indian affairs which he had acquired, and a trained administrator is lost to that country. You must not mea sure the amount of loss sustained merely by the number of persons who are thus inevitably prevented from pursuing an Indian career. You must bear in mind also the element of uncertainty, the not knowing whether or not they will be able to continue in the Indian service, which will more than any thing else discourage men from entering upon what is at first a very laborious and very irksome task. Ido not like to read extracts, Fut only two days ago I received a letter from a gentleman of considerable position and very high attainments, who for a time held an official situation in India, but who is wholly unconnected with either the civil or military service of that country, and whose opinion is therefore a perfectly unbiassed one. He says : " I am convinced that no man, let him possess a c mem tration of all talents, can or will fit himself for service in India unless it is the business of his life." "At the end of 18 years' service in a tropical colony, with a thorough know ledge of the languages, I felt every day I had something to learn. I learnt by every day's experience how I must have irritated my people by my ignorance of their habits—an ignorance excused only as being obviously ignorance," I think that it is impossible to overrate the importance of this subject, because we have in India to deal with a people whom we can hardly measure by any European standard. In Indian affairs we have repeatedly seen how great dis content and dissatisfaction has been created by ignorance, as was the case with regard to the mutiny at Lahore. I will not refer to the more signal illustration which the events of the last two years have afforded, but this I will say, that having heard, as we all have, innumerable speculations as to the cause of the recent insurrection, I believe that al though undoubtedly there were deep-seeted causes also at Work, and although there were persons who for their own objects excited the people, yet I am inclined to think that the alarm excited by the greased cartridges was not affected. but was a real alarm, caused by our ignorance of the preju dices entertained by our army upon that subject. Ido not believe that any European going for the first time to India and having to do with the natives, can avoid giving offence and causing discontent, however anxious he may be to do so. If hon gentlemen wish to see the subject discussed far more fully and ably than I can deal with it, I can only re fer them to that admirable minute of Sir James Outran, which they will find at page 110 of the blue-book, and with every word of which I would express my concurrence. T now come to that upon which my right hon. friend laid the greatest. stress. He argued as if there was a necessary con nection between the existence of a local European force and the existence of discontent , and want of discipline in that army. We have had a great many assertions made upon that point both in this house and out of it; but I have not found any proof given of the truth of these assertions. True, insubordination prevailed to a lamentable extent among the local European troops of India last year. But what ought to be shown, and what has not yet been shown, is that the local character of that army had nothing to do with its in subordination. The incidents of their mutiny are fresh in the recollection of every member in this house, and there fore I need only say that the event was altogether excep tional and casual. lam not here to defend these men. Their claims were not reasonable and their conduct was unfortu nate. But I maintain that the circumstances which led to that mutiny were such as can hardly recur. In the first place, you had the older troops, as I believe, greatly demo ralised by two years of civil war. Then you had a number of recruits raised in haste and sent out ft om this country, under the urgent necessity of the case, with the political object of making as great a display of European force as possible ; but in point of training and discipline they were not in such a state as they might have been if despatched under different circumstances. Then, there were exaggerated expectations entertained, I am told, by many of these troops on the subject of prize money. Those expectations were disappointed, and that dis appointment produced discontent. And although I am most unwilling to say anything which may appear to throw blame upon the local authorities, who in a very delicate matter undoubtedly acted to the best of their judgment, still I have always thought that if some rather fuller and more detailed explanation of the grounds on which the decision of the Government was based bad been made known to the men, and it had been proved to them that they were only asked to do what they were previously bound to do, some- thing at least might have been done—l do not know how much—toward 3 allaying their discontent. All these consi derations form certainly not a justification, but a palliation and explanation of the bad feeling which existed among the local force. And what I wish to ask my right hon. friend is this—Can you show, have you ever attempted to show that, placed in the same circumstances, influenced by the same opinions, and exposed to the same—l will not say real but supposed—provocation (and even if it was ill-founded the men felt it to be real to them)—troops of the line would not have acted precisely as they did ? (Hear, hear.) Then, is the accident of a single mutiny to condemn a service of 100 years ? You had a mutiny at the Nore;but did you on that account condemn the whole constitution of your navy ? (Hear, hear.) lam told that we must accept the opinion of the highest military authorities on this subject. Now, Ido unreservedly accept that opinion as conclusive upon the fact of the mutiny ; but what I do not see is the connexion be tween the local character of the force and the insubordina tion which has unhappily existed. I have endeavoured to collect the reasons and arguments by which that view is supported, and I find it stated by some very able advocates of the proposed amalgamation, that men serving in the local force become desperate because they have no oppor tunity of returning to England. If that argument had been used 70 years ago, in the days of Clive and Hastings, it might have held good; but the pension list of the Indian army sufficiently proves that the men who go out to serve in the local European force do look forward for their return, and actually do return to this country as much as their brethren of the line. Another plea urged in favour of the amalgamation is that if insubordination shows itself in a portion of the troops of the line, it can bo stopped by changing the quarters of the men, and thus preventing it from spreading to the rest of the army. Now, I see no reason why you should not take just the same precaution in the case of a local force. This objection would be per fectly valid if it applied to alocal force raised for a territory cf a very limited area. It would be perfectly sound, for example, in Malta, the lonian Islands, or the West Indian colonies. But, when we are considering the case of a local force maintained in an empire the area of which is greater than the whole of Europe, it is unreasonable and absurd to say, " Oh I it is dangerous to have a local force, because, if there be any inclination for mutiny or combination among them, you have no means of separating the regi ments." (Hear.) But in his speech the other night the right hon. gentleman said it was the opinion of military men that a local force was apt to deteriorate, because it had no opportunity of access to the highest military authorities. Well, I want to know who the highest military authorities are ; because I should say none is, or ought to be, higher than the Commander-in-Chief in India. His power and responsibility are generally equal to, and sometimes even greater than those of your commander of the forces at home. (Hear.) This objection, then, like the one I have previ ously noticed, merely takes the form of some general rea soning upon the subject, and it is applied to a case to which it has no relation whatever. It is perfectly true that local regiments raised for a small colony can never have an opportunity of seeing service upon a large scale ; but it is quite a different thing where your local force is intended for a vast country like India, and is in magnitude quite an army of itself. (Hear.) And with regard to disaffection, I believe that so far from the fact of troops being localised in India being an incentive to discontent among them, it operates exactly the other way. I believe that nothing tends so much to keep up a healthy English feeling or a sentiment of patriotism among a body of men, whether in the civil or tho military service, as the knowledge that they are settled among a vast popr'ation wholly alien, and in part, perhaps, hostile, but who always regard them in the light of strangers, and in comparison with whom they are themselves but a drop in the ocean. My right hon. friend made very light of an argument which is often used, viz , that if discontent should arise in the one army the pre sence of the other army would act as a check upon it. And he made this remark—in which I entirely agree with him —" God help us if our best resource or only chance for pre serving India is to be found in the employment of one Eng lish force against another I" Nobody, I should suppose, contemplates the possibility of such an alternative ; yet it has been argued that, if there be a danger of combination or discontent among the troops quartered in India, the evil would be less likely to spread over two separate forces dif ferently constituted and entertaining different ideas than over one army homogeneously composed. That is all that I have heard asserted on the subject, and as far as it goes I believe it is a sound and fair argument. But, quoting dis tinguished authorities, the right hon. gentleman spoke of the inefficiency as well as the bad discipline of the local European force, and he used words to this effect, that it is the commonly received opinion—l am glad my right hon. friend did not endorse that opinion—that officers cannot pass 10 or 15 years in India without losing something of their energy. This is an invidious subject ; but if ono is to compare the services of the two armies respectively, I will venture to say that those whe were lately known as Com pany's officers have had their full share of all the honour acquired in Indian warfare, and that there has certainly been no inferiority on their side. Look back only for 20 years, to the period of the greatest disaster that ever befell our arms in India, Whose name is associated with that event as the general then commanding our troops ? I am not mentioning this as any reproach to Sir J. Elphinstone, who was sent out late in life, and at a time when he himself admitted that he was hardly fitted to undertake an active command. That was the doing of the Government of the day. But the fact remains that it was under the command of a Royal officer that the disaster in Affghanistan occurred; while it was under three Company's officers, Generals Nett, 1 Pollock, and Sale, that that disaster was retrieved. (Cheers.) Again let me turn to the events of the last three years. I should be sorry to appear to undervalue or disparage such brilliant services as those which have been rendered by Lord Clyde, Sir W.Mansfield, and Sir Hugh Rose. It was lately part of my duty to ask this house to recognise those ser vices, and I certainly never discharged any duty with greater pleasure. But every man acquainted with England or India must feel that the imminent peril was past, the neck of the rebellion broken before those distinguished men reached the scene of action. (Hear, hear.) And when Delhi fell, who were the chief agents in producing that important result? Why, those eminent Indian generals—Wilson, Nicholson, and Neill, and that great Indian civilian, Sir J. Lawrence. (Cheers.) And when I hear it said that officers after 10 or 15 years of Indian service lose a part of their energy, I ask myself whether I am dreaming or under a delusion when I suppose that Munro, Malcolm, Ochterlony, Henry Law rence, Outram, Herbert, Edwardes, and many others not undistinguished in this house, were men who spent not 10 or 15 years, but the whole of their working life in active employment in India. (Hear, hear.) Personal contrasts are very disagreeable, but if we are to compare officers of the two armies with each other, I must say I think an offi cer in the Indian service has opportunities for a manlier training than can be had by an efficer in the Queen's army. Surely, a command on the Punjab frontier involves greater responsibility and more active duties, and brings with it greater knowledge of military life, than a command at Alder shott. And when we are speaking of service in India, what can be more important than an acquaintance with the country, its climate, its people, its roads, means of trans port, and commissariat? And at what a serious disadvan tage in these respects must an inexperienced Queen's officer be placed on arriving in India ? Moreover, it should be re membered that we aro now always sure of obtaining the best men in the Indian service to fill the highest commands; whereas, under a single amalgamated army, a variety of causes would deprive you of that advantage. Upon the question of the relative efficiency of the forces Sir Thomas Franks was called before the commission to express his opinion, and ho said : " I have served in the field with portions of the European forces of the three presidencies, and nothing could surpass their gallantry, efficiency, and intelligence." (Hear, hear.) Sr W. Cotton said : " Ido not think it is possible to have better staff officers than the Indian army had, nor that there should be a more efficient foree than the Indian artillery." Sir James Outram may be said not to be an entirely im partial witness, but lam sure he would not state as a matter of fact that which ho did not solemnly believe. (Hear, hear.) Sir James Outram said : " Men of the local force are better in health and physical energy, man for man." He adds, and there is some significance in what he says : " If, as is alleged, the discipline of the local army is bad, the fault of bad discipline is generally supposed to be with the Commander-in-Chief, and of all the Commanders-in- Chief who have served in India only one has been appointed from the fecal service." (Hear, hear.) And he adds : " Contrast the performances of the Bengal Commissariat during the mutinies, when the empire was in a state of dis lccation, with those of the Royal Commis ariat in the Crimea, under the eye of the British nation, and where a land transport of seven miles only was required of the de partments." Lord Ellenborough, who has deeply studied war, and is thoroughly acquainted with military questions, stated explicitly that the company's officers have a more ex tensiveo It ' t i e n T s h t y e e C k o n m o p w a l n e y d ' g s e; offi ta c l er th s t h s a r v e e vo a lu e knowled gecomparat i ve l y w i t h o ffi cers o f th e li no : theyq ti u o i n red a mwuo would h t d m p ore ro . bably have been, as soldiers, superior to the officers of the Queen's army. They had seen more, they had more en larged minds, because they had more to do:" But upon this question I do not want merely to refer to the evidence of all who are now living. My right hon. friend in the course of his speech referred to the treatise of Sir J. Malcolm, and I admit that a higher or better opinion than Sir J. Maleohn's it is impossible to cite. Ido notpretend to know what opinion he expressed at other times, because this is a question itp.ai which men's views differ at different periods of their lives ; but he was questioned in 1813, be fore a committee of this house, and, after stating in very high, but still general terms, his opinion of the character of the local troops, a question was put,which bears very closely on the proposition now made by the Government. He was asked,— " Would it be advantageous to have tho regiments of Europeans in India completed by filling up the casualties with recruits, or to have them occasionally r renewed by en tire regiments That is practically the question ;am in issue—whether it is better to keep an army permanently in India, recruiting it I from England, or to renew it by s e ndin g out entire regi ments. Sir John Malcolm said : " It would, no doubt, be mDst economical to have them filled up with recruits, and the regiments would always continue more efficient, as any new regiment coming entire from England is unfit for service fir, I may say, a twelve • month at least."' _ __ _ _ __ _ _ My right hon. friend quoted Lord Metcalfe, and I find in Lord Metcalfe's volume of papers the following passage : "The Indian army, although it be taken under the C ro wn, must, nevertheless, continue in some respects a se parate body,—that is, it must be officered as at present by officers brought up in its own bosom." (Hear, hear.) He then proposes a system of exchange, so that, if there is any meaning in words, it seems as if he were contemplating a state of things in which the local army was to remain distinct from that of the line. (Hear, hear.) Again my right hon. friend cited the greatest name and authority on military subjects in modern times—the Duke of 'Wellington. I heard with interest, and I have since read carefully the passage quoted. But what does the Duke of Wellington say ? Ido not find in that passage a single word about amalgamation (cheers), not a single word about the disadvantage of " e a local army. 'What the Duke of Wellington said was that the Company's troops ought to be transferred to the Crown. (Hoar, hear.) That is quite a different question, and I venture to suggest that the motive may well be supposed to be that, knowing there was a feeling among officers as to the superiority of service directly under the Crown over service under the Company, he thought the supposed inequality between the two was the cause of jealousy which it was ex pedient to remove. (Hear, hear.) I have only one more authority to quote. Let me remind the house that lam not calling witnesses into court. I am only taking the liberty to cross-examine witnesses whom my right hon. friend has called. I have not looked through the writings cf Lord Cornwallis. Ho may have entertained different views at different times ; but, looking over Lord COl-1- waPis's work, I alighted on this passage : " several ob.:cetions have occureed to me on more mature deliberation against declaring all the forces in this country King's troops. If an act of Parliament could be obtained permitting tile Company to beat up for recruits, and to keep them under martial law until their embarkation, and if some means could be adopted to establish equality of rank between King's and Company's offie - ,rs, I believe I should be satisfied." (Hear, hear.) 'What becomes of the authorities cited in favour of the Government plan ? Lord Metcalfe favours a local army ; the Duke of Wellington is only for a transfer of the troops under the Crown ; and Lord Cornwallis would be satisfied with the maintenance of a local force on certain conditions which have long since been fulfilled. (Hear.) The opinion of Lord Cornwallis alludes to one of the prin cipal grounds upon which the :asion is based—the alleged existence of jealousy and rivalry between the two services. Ido not care to deny that such jealousies have existed. No doubt, beyond the limits of natural and healthy emulation, jealousy has existed prejudicial to the interests of the pub • lie service in India. But why has it existed ? Let us see what complaints the local office' s have had, and up to what time they have been excluded from an equality of rank and honours. The first instance of a Royal commission being granted to an Indian officer is in 1788. The rank of Lieu tenant-General was not granted until 1813. The order of the Bath was nominally in 1815, but given for the first time in 1826. Brevets for service datefrom 1828. The rank of General was first extended in 1837. Their rank as officers was not recognized in Europe until 1855, end the first instance of a Commander-in-Chief being appointed from the local forces was in 1856—only four years age. (Hear, hear.) It is not unnatural that, treated in such a way, they should have en tertained feelings of jealousy towards their more fortunate comrades. We should entertain the same feelings under the same circumstances. It is very easy to do away with the feeling by doing away with the circumstances. By far the greater part have been removed, and if any remain they are insignificant. But when it is said that jealousy must exist between two armies differently constituted in two countries, I say that jealousy need not exist unless you put one army in a condition of-greater advantage and favour than the other. (Cheers.) In one respect there is a disad vantage in the continuance of a local force. I admit that many soldiers who are invalided at an early age are only invalided as far as India is concerned, and are still able to do effective duty in a temperate climate. But, if that is ad mitted to be a disadvantage, it is one from which it is very easy to escape, because there is no difficulty whatever, as far as the men are concerned, in arranging a system of trans fer from one service to the other, by making the service in one army count towards pension for service in the other. It involves no other difficulty than the mere mechanical one of balancing an account. (Cheers.) In the case of the exchange of officers from one service to the other I am dis posed to agree with Lord Canning that the difficulties, though grave, aro not insuperable. But there is one other consideration which I think the house ought not altogether to overlook, and that is the effect of the change on the army of the line. What do you propose to do? Why, virtually to employ 25,000 or 30,000 troops in India more than have hitherto been considered necessary. You will not be able materially to reduce your colonial forces. You can reduce a few at the Cape, because the number there is extravagantly high. But with that exception you cannot reduce the co lonial forces. If, then, the colonial service cannot be re duced, and the Indian service is to be increased, every offi cer and soldier gets a longer period of service abroad, and a proportionately shorter period of service at home. (Cheers ) For the men, perhaps, it will not make much difference ; but for officers, consider how far you can afford to make the ser vice less attractive than now. You now requirefrom them in tellectual qualities of a higher character than before, the pay is low compared with other professions, and I apprehend that this change will materially increase the difficulty—a diffi culty already great—of obtaining candidates for commis sions. It is now your object to induce, as far as you can, men of social position and of independent fortune—who have a stake in the country and are citizens as well as sol diers—to enter the army. That is a principle which may be carried too far. I think it is carried too far if you sacri fice the intellectual qualifications of an officer to 'those ad vantages ; but, kept within reasonable bounds, no doubt this is a sound policy, and it will be for the house to consi der how far this prospect of considerably increasing the period of foreign service will be likely to affect the entrance of such men into the army. (Hear.) It may be said, per haps, that individual officers can find the means of evading foreign service, because they can generally, at least in time of peace, arrange an exchange out of a regiment which is going abroad into one which is to remain at home. But, even when such exchanges are possible, I do not believe that is a system which the house will desire to encourage. (Hear.) A good deal has been said as to the inconvenience of locking up in India a considerable European force, by making it a merely local force, when you may require it nearer home. There is an India: ias well as an English side to that question, and it might be contended that, consider ing that India bears the expense of maintaining an army for her protection, it is not reasonable that she should be ob liged to maintain as large an army in time of peace as in time of warfor thebenefit of the Home Government. (Hear.) But I deny that in .any strict sense of the word a European local force is locked up in India. The Company's forces have had before, and the local Indian troops may have again, if required, to serve in time of war beyond the limits of India, in Egypt, and in China. When any great emergency arises there can be no doubt that they will and ought to be sent out of India, provided that it be for the purposes of a war, and not for ordinary garrison duties. 'What I contend for is, not that a local force shall never, under any circum stances, cross the frontiers of India, for that has never been the case ; but that India shall be its home, and that it shall not leave India except in the case of war. (Hear, hear.) If its liability not to leave India except in the event of war constitutes any objection to a local force, precisely the same objection applies to the rule which regulates the service of the Guards at home. Ido not think it worth while to go further into this question now. It is really a question which it is hardly possible to argue fully within the ordi nary limits of a debate; but there is one aspect in which the house ought to look at it, and that is in its effect on the power of the Governor-General. lam far from wishing that, in regard to administrative matters, greater authority should be given to the Governor-General than he now pos sesses. In some respects I think he, or rather his Staff at Calcutta, have a larger administrative authority than is desirable. I should be glad to see somewhat less centrali sation in tho a _ministration of India, and somewhat more local freedom given to the minor governoi - s. (Hear, hear.) But that feeling is quite consistent with the opinion I now venture to maintain, that in all matters which are politidal or military the power of the Governor-General ought in India to be supreme. (Hear, hear.) Since the days of Hastings, to whatever disadvantages the Indian Admini stration has been exposed, it has always been free from the evil and danger of a divided authority. If that danger is ever to arise, the division of power can only be between two persons. The only person who could possibly be placed in a position which would_ render him a rival to the Governor- General would be the Commander-in -Chief. In the case of a local army stationed in India every officer looks up to the Governor-General as the head of the whole local service and the representative of the Crown ; but it is obvious that the same feeling will not and cannot exist in an army of the Line, which is serving only for a short time in the country, and of which the immediate head is the Comman der-in-Chief on the spot, with a limited appeal to the Com mander-in-Chief at home. I believe—but Ido not want to go into the subject now—that the effect of the change now proposed will be greatly to increase the power of the Com mander •in-Chief at the expense of the Governor-General. (Hear, hear) I do not want to e xaggerate the amount of inconvenience, not to say dang er, which will ensue ; but the effect, both as regards the relations of the two, the the G o n o v e e r w n i m t h e n the t o h t h t e h r e , n a a n t d t v e as p r r i e n ga ee rd sa s n tdhe subject relations p n o!' lation, will be most injurious. (Hear, hear.) I am not going, at this time, into a consideration of the estimated cost of the army. I agree most fully in the remarks made by the gentleman to whom my right hon. friend committed the charge of the inquiry into this subject, that materials are wanting for anything like a minute or correct estimate of the cost of the propo se d change. The question to be con sidered is, how far the invaliding of soldiers, with all the expense it occasions, will be diminished by a system of more frequent relief. I think that, of itself, not altogether free from doubt. (Hear, hear.) It is distinctly asserted, and is, indeed, familiar to every ono of us, that however m en may suffer in the course of years from the Indian climate, possible to quarter a large number of European troops in the hills. On the other hand, however, the mortality which "Ills upon young soldiers from their own imprudence, their ignorance of the climate, their neglect of precautions, can not in a proportionate degree be diminished by artificial means. Then you have further to consider, even assuming that more frequent removals would diminish the mortality of the troops, whether that would compensate for the enormous cost of transport and the practical neutralization of a considerable portion of the army by its being on the passage backwards and forwards. I have touched WI lightly on these two last topics because I fear I must have exhausted the patience of the house in endeavouring to state, most imperfectly, the grounds on which I object to the total substitution of the army of the Line for a local force in India. In doing so, I can assure the house I have discharged what is to me a distasteful duty. I would always much rather on Indian questions support the Government than oppose it. (Hear, hear.) I know in this case I am acting against the opinions of many of those whom I deeply respect; but I know the arguments I have laid before you—and the weight of which I feel far more strongly than I have been able to express—l know these arguments do weigh heavily on the minds of those who, from their experience and knowledge of Indian matters, are most competent to form a judgment on the question. (Hear.) I wish only that the subject shall—as lam confident it wal— receive a fair, impartial, and deliberate consideration. (Hear, hear.) lam well aware that from the position I have occupied I have been too much mixed up in this question, too long personally interested in it, to approach it at this time with a completely unbiassed mind ; and, whatever de cision the house may come to, I for one will acquiesce in it, knowing from experience that upon all questions of admini stration the collective judgment of this house is generally wiser and sounder than that of any individual member. Cheers.) General PEEL—Havingbeen a member of the royal com mission alluded to by his noble friend, and differing from the decision to which his noble friend had arrived, he was anxious to take the earliest opportunity of stating the grounds upon which he had arrived at that totally different conclusion. (Hear.) The question before the house, whe ther we should continue a local force in India, or that the European troops in that country should henceforth form part of the Queen's general army, was far too important to be made the subject of a party contest. Nor did he see that there was the slightest disposition to make it so. But what he meant was that they should not allow their judgment to be swayed by any prejudices of officers of the Indian or the regular army who might have interests of their own which might be affected by the change. His noble friend was very naturally in some degree biassed by the opinions of those by whom he had been surrounded when at the head of. the India Board, and no doubt his (General Peel's) opinions were as much biassed by his connexion with the royal army. (Hear.) The arguments on each side were so evenly balanced that it was impossible to expect una nimity, and he would abstain therefore from quoting any authority. It was well known too that in the commission to which allusion had been made there was a bare majority coming to a conclusion exactly opposite to that of the mi nority, and in each case the reasons were folly given in the report. He had no hesitation in sa)lng that he generally agreed in the s iews of the majority, while his noble Mend as generally agreed in the views of the minority. The majority consisted of five eminent officers of the regular army, while the minority consisted of the names of four as eminent officers of the Indian army. Buthe might call at tention to the fact that the officers composing the majority had all served in India, and were as distinguished as those who differed from them. He observed from the papers on the table that the report of the commissioners had been re ferred to a naval and military committee at the India house, which was unanimous in condemning the decision of the royal commission. In the midst of all this conflict of opinion Lord Derby's Government was called upon to form a decision, and that decision was no doubt that there should be a local army to consist of two-fifths of European troops. He of course as a member of the Government had concurred in that decision, but the mutiny which had broken out in the Indian European army since was of itself sufficient to justify a change of opinion. Ho admitted that with regard to the mutiny the Government was wrong at the commence - ment, but it was impossible to get over the fact that a muti nous correspondence was carried on for some time between the different regiments, and not even up to the last moment did the non-commissioned officers and old soldiers come forward to give information. Either they knew of the mutinous feeling of the men or they did not ; if they did, and concealed it, they were as soldiers not worth their salt. (Hear, hear.) There were many other reasons besides the mutiny justifying a change of opinion. He found that Lord Canning in one of his last despatches gave Sufficient grounds to warrant any such change—for so far from the pro posal of Lord Derby's government to have a local army composed two-fifths of Europeans being approved by him, he wrote home recommending in the strongest terms the amalgamation of the two armies. Another fact of an im portant character was the number of men who accepted their discharge whenever an opportunity occurred. The fact that at the end of the eight years' see vice a number of men belonging to the local army accepted their discharge at once put an end to the efficiency of the local force. His noble friend said that if a local force existed they should be allowed to exchange from one force to the other. They were he be lieved, able to do that now, and it was natural that after several years' service in India a man should wish to come home if his time were allowed to count on for pension. He took it for granted that a plan had been determined upon before his noble friend had determined, while Secretary of State for India, in favour of a local force, but they had no details before them as to how it could be carried out consis tently with justice to both officers and men. But supposing such a plan devised, there were still other difficulties to be overcome. Hitherto the European army in India had not only provided the military service, but had supplied an effi cient staff of civil and political officers. No one would deny that, whenever such duties were entrusted to military men, whethef of the one service or the other, they were always efficiently performed, and though officers had been sometimes accused of want of general business ability, political and civil appointments had been filled by them as well or better than by persons selected from any other class of the com munity. He agreed with Sir C. Trevelyan that if the two armies were amalgamated there would be no want of candi dates for the service who would look forward to passing their lives in India, and earning distinction in that country, whereas if the Indian army was merely a local one, there could be no doubt that appointments, instead of being thrown open to all candidates, would be confined, as heretofore, chiefly to the friends of the members of the In dian council, than which nothing could be more prejudicial to the efficiency of the service. His noble friend had ob jected that, in the event of the amalgamation, officers ap pointed to political employment would be liable to be re moved when their regiments were ordered home, and the service would suffer by continued change. But that would not be the case; after two or three years of service, such officers would be placed upon the staff list, and thus effici ency would be provided for, and an end put to that fatal system of denuding regiments of all their best officers and leaving the regimental duties to men of less experience. Another objection which had been made to the proposal for a Royal army was this—it was said that a local army always secured a certain and sufficient amount of permanent local force to be maintained there, because it was not removable at the caprice of the Government. Now, he did not attach any importance to that. It could never be supposed that the home Government would not feel the same interest in India as it felt in any other part of the empire. India was repre sented in the Cabinet. But it was a mistake to suppose that the local force could not be now removed from India. The opinion of the law officers of the Crown had been taken on that subject, and there was not the least doubt that the local force of India could be removed from that country. It was folly, however, to suppose that any British Govern ment would ever endanger India by removing from it any larger number of troops than the Governor-General sanc tioned. The greatest exertion was made in this country to send troops to India in the hour of her need during the mutiny, and some of our garrisons and colonies were placed in jeopardy in order to do that. India must be prepared to give as well as to receive assistance. Another ground of objection was on the score of expense. It had been said, and properly, that the amount of force in India must always be regulated by the amount of the Indian revenue ; and it was the o, inion of the minority of the Royal Com mission that the authority of the Secretary of State for India, and of the Indian Government, would be interfered with by haying a Royal army. But recollect the amount of force in India, whether local or European, must always de pend on the Governor-General, and on the Indian govern ment. The home government had not authority to send a single regiment to India without its being applied for by the Indian government. The right hon. baronet would admit that there was not that difference between a local and a re gular force that cught to influence the decision of that house. If the whole of the army in India were a regular army he did not see why the allowances received by that army should not be subject to revision, and made more in accordance with the allowance to the troops in the colonies. Of course those who remained there for life should receive a higher rate of pay, but if the regiments were relieved oftener he did not see why there should be that immense difference between the pay of the regiments servingin India and that of the regiments serving in the colonies that there was now. But there was another objection which, although it had not been brought forward so prominently, had, he was afraid, affected the opinions of many more than any of the objections he had hitherto stated, and that was the fear entertained of the transfer ofpatronage from those who now held it to the Commander-in-Chief, or to the Horse Guards. He thought that was a bugbear. The original appoint. ments would be open to the whole world. The Commander in-Chief had expressed his willingness to give up all patron.• age as to original appointments, and the only thing left for him would be the commonregimental promotions, in which sword, and how much more influence the administrator of affairs must have who is a military officer than if he were a mere civilian. My noble friend Lord Ellenborough felt that so strongly that he at one time threw out a suggestion that all the civil servants should be required to pass through the army, in order that they might hare me military training. Ido not go that length, but I assert what I be _ _ ieve no one conversant with Indian affairs Ni ill require me to prove, that Indian administration, to be successfully car ried on, requires a large admixture of the military element. (Hear.) Well, then, the question is, how will you get mili- Lary men to take part in that administration ? My right hon. friend's theory—at least, it is that'hich is usually put forward—is that all you have get to do is to give induce- ments and facilities for officers of the Line to leave their regiments and enter into the civil administration, and you will by that means obtain an ample supply. (Hear, hear.) To that I have two answers. In the first place Ido not be lieve that you will get men, and in the second I do not be lieve that if you do they will be men who have received so useful and valuable a training as is now enjoyed by officers in India. With regard to the first point, the difficulty of obtaining men, probably tLe house will permit me to read another extract from Lord Canning's recently published minute : there was no patronage, as it was a mere matter of course. As to the officers to be selected, he took it for granted that that would be left to the Governor-General, and he also took it for granted that all appointments and commands in India ought to be left to the Governor-General. The Governor- General should at all events have a veto : and the patron- age, position, and power of the Governor-General of India, so far from being injuriously affected, would be higher if this proposal were carried out. The only difference would be this, that they would deprive the Commander-in-Chief and the Indian Council of the power of making original ap - pointrnents. We had raised 22 regiments of the line, two regiments of cavalry, and wo had also made a great addi tion to our artillery and engineers entirely to do service in India, and depend upon it if the Indian Government did not employ them we should have to add another million and a half or two millions to our army estimates to maintain them. If there was not a regular army in India these men would be entirely displaced. And for what purpose ? To enable the Indian Government to raise now regiments, and to proceed in that course which had proved so fatal. The wisdom of disbanding old regiments for the purpose of rais ing new ones he could not see. lie would undertake to sup ply India with every man that she required, and he would maintain a much larger force in this country than was now maintained without adding one shilling to the army esti. mates. For these reasons, and trusting he had not said one word that was offensive to the Indian officers, he trusted that leave would be given to bring in this bill, and he should give it his cordial support. Col. SYKES said he would take a much more extended view than that of class interests. The question was, would this bill tend to the good government of India and the satis faction of the people. The great thing to argue was the ult - mate results of the bill. Last year his right hon. friend ob tained leave to augment the troops from 20,000 to 30,000, He had now altered his opinion of the local European force, because they attempted to maintain their rights when the Government of the East India Company terminated. The hon. and gallant member recapitulated the facts connected with the claim of the Indian troops to a bounty upon re-en listment, arguing that they were right as to the view they took of their own case ; and of the 10,0 0 which came home a great portion of them re-enlisted. There had been several instances in which regiments had insisted upon and ob tained their rights, but that had not led to any want of con fidence in them in future times. The hon. and gallant member read an extract from an address from Lord Clyde to the Bombay army, complimenting them on their bravery and discipline as shown in the face of the enemy and during the recent mutiny in India. The hon. and gallant member also read extracts from despatches from Sir H. Rose and General Mansfield equally complimentary to the bravery and discipline of the Bombay army. From all this he was justified in saying that the grounds for the amalgama tion, as regarded the cause of the mutiny, had no founda tion in fact. His right hon. friend had quoted Malcolm and Metcalfe in favour of this principle of amalgamation. But when these celebrated men expressed themselves in favour of amalgamation, the officers of the native troops had no sank. But as these officers had obtained rank in 1855, the reasons urged by Malcolm and Metcalfe for the amalgama tion were no longer in force. The hon. and gallant member then referred to the patronage which this principle of amalgamation would throw into the hands of the Go vernment, and said that, although that subject had been pooh-poohed, yet it was a fact that, if the principle was carried out, the Horse Guards would have to grant 4,980 new commissions, and this was no small amount of patron age. He would advise his right hon friend to withdraw the bill. Mr. PEACOCKE supported the bill, the principle of which must be admitted to be based upon right grounds. Sir DE L. EVANS said he desired to express a few words on this subject; but he felt great embarrassment in at pre sent presenting himself to the house, when the bill before it was not yet read oven a first time, disinclined as he was to take any course that could at all have a tendency to era bsrrass the Government. Much had been said about India, but in his opinion they yet knew very little of that great nation. With regard to the bill, he must say that it was, in his opinion, a very bad and very ill-framed bill ; because in it the Government proposed to preclude any further step t 4 be taken in reference to the arrangement. With respect to the Royal Commission that sat last year on the subject, ho must say that it was not right to place the Commander-in chief of the army as a member of that commission, stand ing as he did in a position in which ho should not be ex posed to conceive a prejudice. Looking at the speech which was delivered on the subject of the reorganisation of the Indian army by the Secretary of State for India, the right hon. gentleman in that speech, delivered on the 10th of August last, expressed opinions on the question entirely at variance with the opinions which he gave expression to in introducing the present bill. The hon. gentleman in that speech, delivered on the 10th of August, said it was his in tention to recommend an augmentation to the extent of at least 30,000 men to the local European force in India. The right hon. gentleman spoke in high terms of that force on that occasion, and said they had not, as imputed, mutinied; but now the right hon. gentleman spoke of them as having mutinied, and that it was desirable to do away with them, as a local force, and to amalgamate them with her Ma jesty's forces of the line. It was his intention to move for correspondence on the subject. He was rather sur prised at having heard the right hon. gentleman say that the men of the local European force, when it was pro posed to them on their disbandonment to enter the Queen's regiments of the line, were not entitled to bounty. Now that was not fair towards the men, and particularly when it was born in mind that when men volunteered from the line into the local European force in India, it was a fixed rule that they received a new bounty. Why, then, should not the men of the local European force in India be en titled, on the same principle, to a similar advantage. Itwas now plain that the real originators of the so-called mutiny sat on the Treasury benches. From the manner in which the men were sent home it would appear that the authori ties at Calcutta had some resentment against them. They all remembered the state in which some of those poor fel lows were brought to Liverpool ; yet, unworthy of the ser vice as they were said to be, were immediately re-enlisted in her Majesty's service. Could any step be more incon sistent or self-convicting. He was ready to admit the high position of the officers upon whose opinion the Government was proceeding, but he did not think that opinion was so overwhelming. Sir Hugh Rose said that recent events had convinced him that a local force in India was dangerous, but the fact was that the career of those officers was a suffi cient explanation for what had occurred. It was most ex traordinary that officers should thus speak of men who had distinguished themselves in every field, and who well main tained the honour of those who had fought in the great battles of India since the days of Plassy. It would almost seem from the reports that the local troops had disgraced themselves in every field. Why, who was it . who had been the saviour of the British empire in India ? The noblest civilian in the service, Sir John Lawrence. Sir Henry Lawrence, too, was called upon to perform the most arduous and difficult service. But it was said, forsooth, that the local troops were not sufficiently dis ciplined. However, the proof of the pudding was in the eating of it, those officers' opinions could not be maintained, and he thought they were by no means justified in the cen sure they had pronounced. He understood questions had been put in the committee on the organisation of the Indian army whether some officers had not been selected for high commands in India who were physically incapable for the service. Those questions were rejected and treated with disdain by officers of high position on the committee, but there was no doubt that the Horse Guards had made such appointments. One of them was reported to be wrong in his upper storey, and another was both deaf and blind. Such was the operation of that most exemplary of military institutions, the Horse Guards. Of the last appointment he spoke with the greatest reluctance, yet it was his duty to say that an officer who had seen no service had been ap pointed by the noble lord at the head of the Government to the command of 320,000 men. In spite of those assurances that were made to them, they could scarcely believe that Horse Guards appointments were made without perfect regard for fairness and fitness. If the Horse Guards were such a piece of perfection in military administration, how came it that committees of inquiry had been moved for, both by the Horse Guards itself, and the War Department, one of which was now sitting, to inquire into all kinds of irregularities. It was unparliamentary to refer to the pro ceedings of a commission which had not yet reported, but the Governor-General had not hesitated to do so, and he would take upon himself to say that the revelations which had already taken place concerning it disclosed matters of extreme imps,' tar cc. The SPEAKER here interrupted the hon. and gallant gentleman to remind him that it was a rule of the house not to refer to the proceedings of a commission which had not been reported. Sir DE LACY EVANS said he only wished that other hon. gentlemen, not Radical members like himself, would adhere to the letter of the rule. However, as the house would now be soon in possession of the report of the com mittee in question, he had every reason to believe that there would be a fair opportunity for considering the matters he referred to in the second reading of the bill. At present the Government were aiming at acquiring the whole patronage of the Indian native cadetships, and that was not a power which ought to be entrusted to the Horse Guards. Is was generally thought, however, that some higher influence had been used to make the Government go rou nd from their statements of last year, when they declared that a native force of 30,000 men should be maintained in India to state operateco- with the European army. He thought the ments of the noble lord the member for Lynn were quite conclusive against the bill, and he warned the house not to consent to the dangerous extension of the patronage and power of the Crown, which evidently constituwteidthtthheecthonieef object of the bill. (Hear.) Captain JERVIS said he was much struck of the speech of the hon. and learned gentleman who had ju s t spoken, and the purport ofw h h i c e h in w g a t s e t h e xattetnhde the b re bill patronage sr n ea e l g ly e nothing but a job, its object of the Crown. That was a question which he did not expect to have been called upon to discuss. The question was whether we were to have a local army, or whether the Eu ropean army was to be increased ; and, upon that point, Lord Canning's despatch clearly pointed out that the Indian army could not be recruited from England. Sir C. Tre velyara, who was by no means disposed to follow the Govern ment blindly, did not dispute that point, yet the hon. and gallant member for Westminster had made the debate the , groundwork of an unwarrantable attack upe n the Horse Guards. A commission was appointed in 1837, of which the noble lord at the head of tht; Government was a member,in which it was clearly laid down that while the Commander in-Chief was responsible to the Crown for the discipline of the Army, the Secretary of State was alone - responsible for the expense. The Commanders-in-Chief in• India were re sponsible alone to the Gover:ament, which could be seen by a letter written by :Lord Clyde to the Governor-General, when he declined giving any o pinion respectilng the ma nagement of the army in India, be cause he believed his duty to be to obey any instructions he p light receive. Leave was then given to bring in tae bill. The Poor Relief (Ireland) Bill wak: read a second time and ordered to be committed on Monday- The Local Boards of Health Bill was•. read a third time and passed. The Local Government Supplemental 13111 was also read a third time. The Anstruther Union Harbour Bill went into com mittee. The various clauses were agreed to, arid the house re sumed. Several orders were postponed, and the house went into committee on the INLAND BONDING BILL. The remaining clauses of the bill were agyeed to, and the house resumed. CALEDONIAN AND CRINAN CANALS BILL. On the motion that this bill be read a third time, Mr. W. WILLIAMS moved, as an amendmtut, that the bill bo read a third time that cial• three months. The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, was sur prised at the opposition of his hon. friend, as the bill was one for the benefit of the public. Col. FRENCH supported the amendment. After a few words from Lord JOHN MANNERS and. Mr. LAIN G, The house divided, when there appeared — For the third reading For the amendment... . Majority for third reading.. The bill was then read a third time. LAW OF PROPERTY BILL. This bill was read a third time. BURIAL GROUNDS (IRELAND) ACT (1856) AMENDMENT BILL. This bill was read a second time. CRIMINAL LUNATIC ASYLUM BILL. This bill passed through committee. PROFESSIONAL OATHS ABOLITION BILL. This bill passed through committee pro forma. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHARITIES BILL. On the motion that the adjourned debate on this bill be resumed, Mr. HENLEY moved that it be recommitted. Mr. BOWYER (the originator of the bill) said he had no objection, and seconded the motion. The bill was then recommitted. On clause 1, which provides that Roman Catholic CL ari ties should not be void on account of certain conditions of trust, Mr. HENLEY expressed himself not satisfied with the. construction of the clause. The clause said that any canon. of the church, trust, discipline, rule, &c., of the charity, were not to be considered superstitious. The ATTORNEY-GENERAL here read the clause, which, with certain omissions, would run thus :—" No gift for any legal charitable purpose shall be, nor be deemed to be unlawful or void by reason of any trust, gift, or bequest ;" and no gift for a valid, legal, or charitable pur pose, shall be deemed or held to be superstitious. No such case as a mixture of " bad" use with " good" use would be recognised, as the bad would infect the whole; but re member that what was given for good use would be valid in law, and not accounted superstitious. Mr. ADDERLEY thought the clause went further than the hon. and learned gentleman supposed. A thing might be good and legal in one country, and bad and superstitious in another. Mr. NE'WDEGATE moved that the Chairman report progress. After some conversation, the committee divided; and there appeared— For reporting progress Against Majority The clause having again been put from the chair, sores discussion arose, and Mr. STEUART having moved that the Chairman report progress, the committee divided, and there appeared— For reporting progress Against Majority —34 Mr. WHALLEY wished to know under what disabilities the Roman Catholics laboured, or upon - what ground they olaimed an exceptional law. He moved that the Chairman do report progress. After some discussion the committee again divided, and there appeared— For reporting progress Against it Majority ... —3B Mr. WHALLEY moved that the Chairman leave the chair. The committee then divided, and the numbers were— For the motion 9 Against Majority On the clause being again put, Mr. STEUART moved that the Chairman report pro gress. Mr. NEWDEGATE thought the minority had done their duty, and that they should not further persist in their opposition. The committee again divided, and there appeared— For reporting progress 7 Against 46 Majority On the clause being put, Mr. WHALLEY moved that the Speaker leave the chair. He would suggest a " count out." He afterwards withdrew his motion, and moved that the debate be ad- journed. The CHAIRMAN said that that motion could not be entertained in committee. The clause was then put and agreed to amid cheers. The house adjourned at 25 minutes to four o'clock. COUNTRY MARKETS. MANCHESTER-JuxE 21. Fresh English wheat could not be had on lower terms, and foreign brought quite as much money, but sales were limited. Flour a slow sale, and unaltered in value. Beans, oats, and oatmeal as before. BIRMINGHAM-JUNE 21. - A fair supply of English wheat, for which quite as high prices were obtained. Foreign neglected. Barley remains unaltered. More business doing in fine oats. Beans and peas fully as dear. MELTON MOWBRAY-JUNE 19. There was a`moderate show of wheat to-day, with a fair business at the annexed prices :—White wheat, new, 6?1 Od to 57s Od ; red, 47s Od to 54s per 36 stone ; barley in small supply, at 38s to 43s for malting, and 32s to 36s per qr. for grinding ; oats, 28s to 36s Od per 21 stone ; beans, 50s to 51s for old; new, 49s per 38 at. PLYMOUTH-JUNE 19. Business was dull to-day, and prices for oats unaltered; barley scarce, and at late prices ; wheat as dear. A thin attendance at market. The quotations are—English white wheat, 62s to 64s ; red, 60s to 62e per qr ; French do., 56s to 58s ; grinding barley, 32s to 34s ; oats, 245 to 265; and flour, fine, 44s to 455 ; seconds, 41s to 425. EDINBURGH GRAIN-JUNE 20. Wheat on the top Os 6d up.... average Os 8d down. Barley on the top Os 6d down average Oe 3d down. Oats on the top Os 6d down average Os lld up. Beans on the top Os 6d up .. .. average Os Id up. Averages per Imperial quarter. Wheat.... Barley . 1 16 10 7-12ths Oats Beans Total Supply and Sales. Wheat .1174 qrs Sold 785 qrs 8ar1ey........ 140 qrs Sold 17 qrs Oats 591 qr 5........ Sold 406 qrs Beans 46 gra ........ Sold 41 qrs DERBY SMITHFIELD—Jurtz D. There was a moderate supply of fat beasts, and no ad vance in price was obtained. The supply of sheep larger, and prices rather lowe r. Lambs were plentiful, and sol d well. Fat and store calves plentiful, and there were more pigs in demand. Beef ............ 8d to BdSi 8 dSi Veal 7d to 71d Mutton .... ....... 8d to 1d Pork Lamb ........ .. 9d to 9jd R oug h f a t, 4 s 9d per s t on e. iiides, 3id to Sid ; calf skins, 7cl to Od. BIRTHS. BOWER. — On the 19th inst., at Tickhill Castle, the wife of E. C. Bower, Esq., of a son. MITFORD.—On the 19th inst., at 26, Manehester-square, the Hon. Mrs. Townley Mitford, of a son. SHERSON.—On the 20th inst., at 23, Thurloe-square, the Lady Ann Sherson, of a son. MARRIAGES. BUTL ER — DRADSTIA.W.-011 the 21st inst at St. John's, Hackney, Ch ar l es E . K . B ut l er, of Onslow-square, the eldest son of Charles S. Butler, Esq., M.P., of Cazenoves, Middlesex, to Mary Ann, second daughter of the lateW. Bradshaw, Esq., of Upper Homerton, Middlesex. FANE—TlionNuiLL.—On the 21st inst., at St. Stephen's, Paddington, John Augustus, eldest son of Lieut.-Colonel and the late Lady Ellen Fane, of Wormsley, Oxfordshire, to Eleanor, daughter of the ' late T. Thornhill, Esq., of Woodleys, in the same county. DEATHS. GRAY.---At his residence, Woodspeen, Perks, Edward W. Gray, Esq., Alderman and J.P. for the borough of New bury, aged 74. STUART.—On the 13th inst., at 14, Oxendon-street, Hay market, Captain R. Stuart, R.N., aged 78. UMPHELBY.--OR the 19th inst., Charles Umphelby, Esq., of Denton House, Norfolk. LONDON : Printed and Published by MURDO YOUNG of No. 112, Strand, Printer, at The Sun Office, No. 112, Strand, in the Precinot of the Savoy, in tit) conntY of folidcllovy, Friday, June 22, 1860. JUNE 22, 1860. c still by far the largest and most formidable mortality is that which arises among newly-landed troops. (Hear, hear.) 1 find from one statement that eight regiments of the Line lost 110 out of 1,000 men in the first year. And, of course, the more frequent the reliefs, the more frequently you bring young, raw, unseasoned soldiers into India, the greater will . _ _ be the mortality from those causes which affect men on their first arrival. The house must not omit to observe, also, that the liability to sickness which affects men who have been long in the country is capable of diminution by pru dent sanitary measures,• more especially when it is found .