The Sun. — London, England, 1859-02-26 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 26, 1859. estimates which it will be my duty to submit, I hope the committee will not think I am unduly or improperly occu pying, their time if I venture to enter into some explanation of the gradual increase of the amount of the n avy-estimates, and of the great sum which those estimates have now at tained. The hon. gentleman who has been prevented addressing the house had given notice that he would move to refer these estimates to a committee. I am bound to say that the hon. gentleman intimated to me, a short time before the Speaker left the chair, that it was not his intention to proceed with that motion, and I believe his only motive in rising was to announce that intention. [Mr. W. Williams—Not exactly.] (Laughter.) I feel no sur prise that it should be the desire of the hon. gentleman to refer those estimates to a select committee. The amount of the estimates for the present year, 1858-9, is no less than £8,851,371. The estimates which it will be my duty to move for the ensuing year, 1859-60, are considerably in creased, being no less than £9,813,181. There is in round numbers an increase on the estimates of about £1,000,000. It will be my duty, before I sit down, to offer to the house an explanation of that additional million, but there remains the very large sum of nearly £9,000,000 for the current year, with regard to which T think it natural the public should feel a great desire for further information. When these very largsi sums are required from year to year, it is very natural that the public should desire to be informed, and they have a right to expect that they will be informed, on these points—namely, that they derive the full advan tages of these immense sums being expended, and that Ministers are not asking for more than the public service requires. (Hear, hear.) It will be in the recollection of those members who are apt to refer to the favourite year 1835, that in that year the navy estimates had fallen to little more than £4,000,000, while the number of men voted was 26,500 seaman and marines. At that time, it must be re membered, there were none of the expenses of a steam navy. I am very much disposed to think that it would have been better for the country if the navy estimates had never been allowed to fall to that low amount. (Hear, hear.) They were lower then than was consistent with the interests of the public service. (Hear, hear.) By 1845, however, they had risen to £7,000,000, and the number of men voted had risen to 40,000 seamen and marines. This gradual in crease went on from year to year, and in 1841 it led to the appointment of a select committee, presided over by Lord Seymour, which investigated the whole of our expenditure under the heads of army, navy, and ordnance in the closest possible manner. The hon. member for Lambeth himself must allow that if he had succeeded in persuading the house to refer these estimates to a committee he could not have hoped for a more searching inquiry into our expenditure under these heads than was entered into by this committee. The result of that inquiry was that the navy estimates were reduced, and in the following year did not exceed the amount of £6,000,000. They went on slightly increasing, but they did not rise above £6,000,000 until 1852. Between that year, however, and the present year there is a great differ ence, and I desire to enter into a comparison of the expendi ture of the two years, which I trust will satisfy the house and the public that the great increase is owing to causes over which we have no control. I name the year 1852-3, first because I was in office then, and consequently am more familiar with the expenditure of that year, and also because it was the year immediately preceding the great increase 'caused in our expenditure by the cost of the Russian war. .The year 1858-9 is again a year of peace--if not of entire peace, at least undisturbed by any such great war as that. •In the year 18.52-3, the navy estimates were £5,835,588; in the present year they have risen to £8,851,371, being an . increase of no less than 51 per cent. Both being years of peace, it is natural that the house should desire some ex planation of the great difference between them, and I hope to be able to show that the increase has been forced upon us, and has not been caused by the extravagance of any Government, or of any particular Minister. I will take the first item of wages of seamen and marines. In 1858-9 this item is £2,401,599 ; in 18.52-3, it was £1,543,025, being an increase of 55f per cent. This is an item with regard to which there can be no objection, unless you object to the policy of raising the number of men. The number of men being increased, the amount of wages is necessarily in creased. The next item is the cost of provisions, and by an accidental rise in the price of provisions the increase of this item is in a greater ratio than was to be expected from the increase in the number of men. It has risen from £544,507 to £1,027,357, the increase being 88f per cent. I meat to have added, with regard to the increase of the number of men, that since 1852-3 the cost of the Coast guard has been added to the Navy Estimates, being nearly 8,000 additional men to be provided for—to say nothing of additional pay and allowances. The cost of the Coastguard and the Royal Naval Coast Volunteers is £178,592, and it applies entirely to this year, there being no such item in the year 1852-3. The next item is the vote for the wages of arti ficers. It is now £966,921; in 1852-3 it was £666,929, being an increase of 45 per cent. A large increase has been caused by the increase of steam factories to our dockyards, which has arisen entirely from the increased adoption of steam power in our navy during the last few years. This is a cause of course entirely beyond the control of any Government. (Hear, hear.) On the item of naval stores there is an increase of 57i per cent. In 1852-3 it was £882,495, this year it is £1,389,742. This increase is clearly owing to the great additions which have been made to our navy. In illustration of this aug mentation in the cost of our navy the house will perhaps allow me to compare the cost of manning sailing and steam vessels in the years 1852-3 and 1858-9. In 1852 the average pay of all ranks of men was £39 14s. Bd. ; in 1858-9 the ave rage has risen to £.4.3 Zs., being an increase of £3 Bs. 4d. per man. In 1852-3 it required 970 men to man the Britannia, a first-rate sailing ship, and the cost of that ship was • £26,693 yearly. It requires 1,100 men to man the Marl borough, a first-rate of the present day, and her cost annually is £35,248. The Arethusa, a 50-gun frigate of 1852-3, re quired 500 men, and cost annually £14,585. The Shannon, in 1858-9, requires 560 men, and costs £19,341. The cost of building the hull of the Indefatigable, a 50-gun frigate in 1852-3 was £51,836 ; but the Shannon, also a 50-gunfrigate, cost £71,112 ; and the Orlando, a new steam frigate launched last summer, cost £99,375. These figures go far to explain the great difference of expense in one part of the estimates at least. I can give another proof of the same thing in a differ ent way. The construction of the Britannia, 120 guns, re quired 4,550 loads of rough timber and 218 shipwrights, while the Marlborough, the same class of vessel recently built, required 6,068 loads of timber and 334 shipwrights. So that here again you have a proof of how much more costly it is to build ships in these days than it was a few years ago. The Rodney, again, required 3,610 roads of timber and 219 shipwrights, while the Renown, a vessel of the same class, but lately built, required 4,680 loads of timber and 277 shipwrights. (Hear, hear.) The immense increase in the size of our ships has led also to a great augmenta tion in another item in our Navy Estimates, which has been the subject of remark on several occasions—l mean the vote for new works. Between 1852 and 1858 the in crease in new works has been from £265,140 in 1852 to £58.5,862 in 1858, or 120 per cent. The cause of this must, upon consideration, be obvious. As your ships increase in size you find that the slips and docks, which were perfectly sufficient a few years ago, have now become insufficient, and that you must therefore go to the great expense of re construction. We have in the whcle of her Majesty's yards 42 building slips, and at this moment only nine of them are large:enough for the construction of first-rate ships. We are increasing the size of those slips, and, of Course. a large amount of money is required for this Purpose. Then, again, we have 33 docks, of which four only, in her Majesty's yards, will hold our largest ships. We are obliged to alter those docks, and five of them are l a?''Y being increased in size ; but we cannot accomplish 'nn! without expending an immense amount of money, and if you look a t th e es ti ma t e f or " new wor k s " you will find that the large sums there given are devoted to these purposes. es Having en t ere d i n t o thi s com p ara ti v e ofstate ment the expenses of 1852 and 1858, I wish now to refer to some observat ions w hi ch fell from me when mov ing the estimates last y ear. You may remember that I then dr ew attention to the enormous amount of money that was expended in this country steam machinery, in the purchase of i and that we had expended no less than s i t i a 4l•ov t l i ding steam engines for the Royal Navy, to ascertain how thaten that I thought it desirable money had been expended, and that the mode of supplyi ngengines to our vessels was conducted on the be st , tap proved, and most scientific principles. I have redeemed p ledge which I then gave to the house, that there shoul d be an inquiry into these subjects, and in the course of sum mer last I appointed a co mmittee consisting of Ad m i ral Rams Mr. Joh n W ar d, and Mr. Nasmyth, and I entrusted to t hem' the duty of of the navy. in vestigating the state of the steam mach ltlintery of The result of that inquiry is that the sitneaeZ and et in the Royal Navy is in a very creditable stateniaa° v—ear, hear.) this respect the money has been well expendedn public have been faithfully served. (Hear. That committee has issued a most able report containing severalat recommendations which it is the intention of the Admiralty to adopt, as we believe that they will tend to the advantage of the public service. One of those recommendatio ns i s that we should apply for t enders for the supply of engi nes much more l arg ely than has hitherto been the case, and in __ pursuance of this recommendation. we have thought it our duty to invite tenders from Liverpool? Scotlan d, and most of the eminent houses engaged in thi s particular business. (Hear, hear.) I also thought it my duty to appoint anoth er committee to inquire into the labour in our dockyards. Th e sum expended in our dockyards is enormously lar g e, and it is most important that in expending those sums economy should be practised, and that we get 20s. for our pound. (Hear.) I by no means state that I have any suspicion that a wrong practice has existed in the dockyards ; but the com mittee of 1848 recommended an inquiry into this subject, and I wish particularly to ask the attention of the hon. member for Lambeth to this. They state in their report that it is idle to suppose that a Parliamentary committee could really investigate the details of dockyard expendi ture--(hear, hear)—that it is altogether out of the question, and that any efficient inquiry must be conducted by some body of men appointed specially for the purpose. In con eeliuence of that report a committee was appointed soon after ; they closely investigated the expenditure in the dockyards? and as aresult great economy and many im provements were intr od uced. But that took place ten years ago, and I thought it desirable that we should have another inquiry into the expeAlit ure of the dockyards, in order to ascertain wheth er the ney was laid out in the most judicious andeco nomical manner, or whether there was any room for i mp rovement. That committee was headed by Admiral Smart,and it has been engaged i n th e present investigation down to the time. The report is not yet finished, but I understan d from the chairman that the result of the inquiry will be the r e commendation of very considerable changes, which in pinion will lead to a much more economical and judic i o u s ° expenditure in the mention this to show dockyards in future. (Hear, hear.) t i s the desire that there is on the part of t he G overnment to large sums secure.the most advantageous expenditureeoftlti intrusted to their care—(hear)—and I trust parisort which I have instituted between 1858 and a thelg COM will lead to the impression that in the expenditure of these s u ms s we h av e been influenced solely by a s e nse o f duty aesb-w—a desire to exercise the utmost practicable economy. (II ear I will now turn to the estimates which I propose for the en . - gnizig year, NA to the Argt vote, kip, which I shall place in , , your hands at the conclusion of this statement—namely, to the amount of men for which we intend to ask for the en suing year. Before I proceed to say anything with regard to this vote I wish to refer to the report which has just been placed in the hands of hon. members, anl which was looked for with very great anxiety by the public. I allude o the report of the commission moved for by the hon. and gallant officer opposite on the manning of the navy. As that report has only been in the hands of honourable members two or three days, and I had not the advantage of seeing it more than two or three days belbre it was com municated to the public, the committee, I think, will at once see that it was impossible that her Majesty's Govern rant could have framed these estimates with any refer ence to the contents of that report. But I cannot omit to say, and in so saying I think I am only giving ex pression to a very general opinion, that that commission is entitled to public gratitude for the manner in which it discharged its duties. (Cheers.) On consenting to the motion for the appointment of that commis sion, I stated that I had one object especially in view, and that was that some mode should be devised for establishing a connection between the Royal navy and the mercantile navy, in the event of any emergency requiring that addi tional strength should be given to the Royal navy. (Cheers.) I stated that so far as concerned the ordinary manning . of our fleet in time of peace I did not believe that the commis sion would be able to discover anything more effectual than the plan recommended by the Manning Committee of 1852, and carried into full effect by my right hon. friend the member for Carlisle, when he was First Lord of the Admi ralty—namely, the continuous service system. (Hear, hear.) I find in.-the report that the commission entirely confirm the view which I then ventured to express. I think we may rely with confidence on the ordinary manning of our fleet upon that systeM, and I hope the house will enable the Go vernment to carry out that system still more e ffi ciently. I believe that there is no recommendation in the report of the commission, from the beginning to the end of it, which is not at least entitled to the prompt and serious consideration of her Majesty's Government. I will at present express no opinion upon the plan of a most important character which the commission has devised for establishing a connection between the Royal navy and the mercantile navy. The vote for men that we are now going to propose is, I admit, of a very unusual amount. I believe it is the largest vote of men ever proposed i n this house in a time of peace— (hear, hear) —and I admit that we are bound to show rea sons for it. I trust that looking at the state of public affairs and of the naval service, the committee will not hesitate to confirm the opinion of her Majesty's Government, that we should not have done our duty to the country if we had not - boldly asked Parliament to give us this vote. (Cheers.) But I will speak without disguise on this subject. Appa rently, there is only a difference of 3,000 men in this vote, but in reality the difference is much more. The demands upon our naval service in distant parts of the world are not now so great as they were twelve months ago. Our naval force in China is reduced by about one-half. (Hear) During the last twelve months several ships have returned, and several ships are now returning from distant parts of the world, and others have been recalled. Under these cir cumstances, the committee will admit that it is impossible for me to state exactly the number of men which will thus be placed at the disposal of the Government ; but I think I may venture to say that, as compared with the votes of last year, the real available increase must be taken rather at 7,000 than at 3,000 men. I find that at this time twelve. month our force in the East Indies and in China consisted of 68 ships, 767 guns, and 10,000 men. That force is now reduced to 47 ships, 374 guns, and 4,875 men, being a re duction of more than 5,000 men. The committee will bear in mind that this includes the marines attached to those ships. On the East and West coasts of Africa, and at the Cape of Good Hope we have 36 ships, about 200 guns, and 3,200 men, being about 200 men less than this time twelve month, and at present her Majesty's Government do not intend to increase that force. I believe that the negotia tions now in progress between this country and the United States will'enable us at no very distant day to carry on the suppression of the slave trade on much more easy terms and more successfully than at present. I believe that the send ing out of stepmships of smaller tonnage, or gunboats, will materially enable us to do so. On the east coast of Ame rica we have 278 men more than last year. Our force in the Pacific has been considerably increased, and now con sists of 12 ships, 281 guns, and 2,845 men, being 661 more men than we had there a year ago. The main cause of this increase was the disturbances occasioned by the dis • covery of gold in the Fraser River. We received most urgent requests from British Columbia to increase our naval force there, but the ships that we sent out will be shortly recalled. In the Mediterranean, also, our force has been increased. It consists of 23 ships and 5,951 men, being 777 more men than there were last year. The main cause of this increase was that on acceding to the office I now hold I found that our force in the Mediterranean was much below the usual amount. There were several sloops and other smaller vessels there, but no frigates. The result is that on foreign stations we have now 1,786 men more than we had this time twelve month. I will now advert to another heavy item in the vote for this year—namely, the Channel squadron. Our Channel squadron at present consists of seven ships, 498 guns, and 4,697 men. I include two ships—the Ciesar and the Diadem—which will be shortly recalled from Central America, where they are doing temporary duty. The com mittee will remember that a year ago it was my duty to state that we had no Channel squadron whatever; that we had no naval defence of our own coast. • I stated emphati cally that in my opinion we could not do without a Channel squadron—(cheers)—and I promised that as soon as I had the means at my disposal I would provide a squadron for the Channel. Before the close of the summer the Channel squadron consisted of six line-of-battle ships and three frigates, to which was shortly afterwards added another powerful frigate. The line-of-battle ships are the Royal Albert, Renown, Orion, Caesar, Victor Emmanuel, and Brunswick. I have heard it said that this Channel squadron is really too weak to be of any avail to the country. (An hon. member, "Hear, hear.") My hon. friend's cheer gives me to understand that he is of that opinion. (Hear.) But I hope the committee will, at all events, admit that it is a good commencement of the defence of our coast. (Hear, hear.) My hon. friend will admit that five of these line-of battle ships are of a most powerful class. Perhaps I cannot say that the Brunswick is a very powerful ship. • But as I have stated, this squadron is at present deprived of the services of the Caesar and Diadem. They are now recalled, and in the meantime I can state for the consolation of the gallant admiral (Sir C. Napier) that very recently two powerful line-of-battle ships, the St. Jean d'Acre and the AloierA, have been added to ilio 3... run form, Tu a ohm 6 time -it will be further augmented by two frigates. The Channel squadron will therefore consist of eight powerful line-of-battle ships and six frigates, and when joined by the force in the Mediterranean, of four line-of-battle ships and two frigates, the combined squadron in the Channel will consist • of 12 line-of-battle ships, and eight frigates, in all 20r ships of war. The gallant admiral may say that this force is not sufficient, but it is a stronger Channel squadron than we have maintained for many years, and I earnestly hope it will be found sufficient ; but, if not, I am confident the house will place at the disposal of her Majesty's Government the means of making it so to any extent required. (Hear, hear.) As to the number of men the Government asks for, I am aware that, on one hand, we may be charged with extravagance in requiring a greater number than we have ever had in time of peace ; on the other hand, we may be told the number is not large enough. (Hear, hear, from Sir C. Napier.) The gallant admiral in timates that the number is not sufficient ; but it is an un usually large force. The estimate prepared for last year by the right hon. baronet (Sir C. Wood) was 2,000 men more than the highest estimate for 1857. The present Govern • ment found the estimate made for that number when it came into office, and, after mature consideration, thought the late Government had not asked for a greater force than the public service required ; we adopted that estimate, and it is now my duty to ask for such an addition to it as will place at our disposal a force of 3,000 men. As to the man ner in which they will be employed, I have already stated what are the demands of our foreign stations, what are our intentions with regard to the Channel squadron, and what number of men that squadron will probably require. In dealing with figures of this kind it is very difficult to speak with perfect accuracy. These numbers of men are fluctu ating from day to day, as one ship comes into port and an other leaves it; but I think I can say that, after all the men are allotted to the different ports and ships in different parts of the world, we shall have a surplus force at home of about 3,000 men. (Hear, hear.) This brings me to a recom mendation I find in the very able report of the commission appointed to inquire into the means of manning the navy. It is substantially the same recommendation as that of the committee of naval officers that inquired into the same subject in 1852. I will read the passage in the report of the last commission referring to the advantage of having a reserve of seamen at home : " Another recommendation of the committee of 1852, which has not hitherto been carried into effect, is the main taining an adequate reserve e seamen in the home ports. They observed that from the information and evidence that had been laid before them ' during the progress of the in quiry, they had been led to the conclusion that it was de sirable to keep a larger force at home than had been cus tomary of late years ; and they recommended, ' that your Majesty's navy shculd be maintained at such a numerical force in commission as, independently of the Channel squa - dron, will admit of 10,000 seamen and boys (exclusive of officers) being retained in England for the protection of the ports and the coasts of the United Kingdom." " The evidence before us shows that, when a ship of war is commissioned, the most costly part of her complement, namely, the officers, and perhaps the greater part of her crew, immediately become a charge upon the State, and continue so for several weeks, and even months, during which she is unable to put to sea for want of the smaller portion of her crew ; while the whole expense of the ship which she was intended to relieve is going on. "We are, therefore, of opinion that a reserve of seamen should always be maintained in the home ports, ready to complete the crews of ships put in commission, for the re lief of foreign stations, and as the best and most prompt of all reserves in the event of a sudden armament. The num ber to be thus retained in the home parts should bear a re lation to the number in commission ; and, with our present Peace establishment, we think that it should not be less than_ 4,000, besides thole retained in the harbour guard 'With this recommendation !lis- Such an arrangement also would afford a ready mucusmnin your giving a systematic training in gunnery to all the it, the Government ofra e your Majesty's naval service." I most cordially concur ; and I beg to add that before the Manning Commission adopted sense an the obvious erg o had decided—l might say in deference to the report 2, but rather in deference to common before Parliament necessity of the case—not to come without asking for_ a number of men sufficient to establish with the estimates of this year such a reserve. l3, (ll arin ea g r, o h ear.) Of its necessity there can th.e a passage I have read from the re be p n or o t d o o f u t t. conainissio:. fully confirm it. From a t it ve here a statement that will when the Ganges was ee za ny she remained in statement it appears that her crew ; the till January, was detained harbour 110 daYS before she ) —the Marlborough \\'‘a-ith 62 men 18 1 '417, 1858 ; the Diadem, commissioned in Aug t, completed 135 days, and did not go to sea commissioned in November, detained Renown, 172 days for the same purpose, and then sailed short of her complement—(hear, hear was delayed 129 days, and the Eurytthis 121. ships manned within the last few years ; some of themewaerree delayed six months, all of them an average Period of four months, before they obtained their crews. Now, I ask the house whether it thinks the ingenuity of any enemy could devise anything more humiliating' or more calculated t c impress foreign nations with a conviction of the decay o f the naval power of England than the fact that our ships of war remain in port four, five, and six months together, li n _ able to obtain their complement of seamen ? (Hear, hear.) I trust there will be but one feeling in the house as to the necessity of putting an end to this humiliating state of things. (Hear, hear.) We therefore ask for such a number of men as will place a surplus force at our disposal sufficient to Maintain a reserve of seamen in our home ports, which can, at the same time, be made useful in traininf, sailors in gunnery and the exercises so essential to the efficiency of the service (Hear, hear.) The expense of this additional force of 3,000 men is not so large in proportion as the num ber of men required. The estimate for the wages of seamen for the current year i5X2,487,062 ; this amount would have lieenS.444oo more had it not been for the fact that our naval i ° l'Ve WIT consists of a larger number of large ships and a • smaller number of small ones, which diminishes the average expense per man and the number of officers employed. Before I quit the subject of the men there is one other sub ject to which I wish to advert—l mean the practice adopted by the late Board of Admiralty of sending out line-of-battle ships as the flagships of the admirals on foreign stations. (Hear, hear.) My opinion is that this practice leads to a very unnecessary expense, and at the same time interferes with the efficiency of our naval force. (Hear, hear.) The flagships on our foreign stations, with the number of men in each was till lately as follows : Calcutta 720 Boscawen Cumberland Ganges Indus 650 Total 3,390 I have received remonstrances on this point from more than one of our admirals on foreign stations, and I am sure the house will see the force of the objections taken by them. The house is well aware that at one period last year there was some probability of a difference between this country and the United States, arising out of circumstances con nected with the suppression of the slave trade on the coast of Cuba. At that time it was essential that our naval force should be in a most efficient state. But just then I received a letter from Sir Houston Stewart, stating that his flagship, the Indus, was altogether unfit for active service. (Hear.) This may be said of these flagships generally, and, in addition to their being unfit fcr the kind of service in which they ought naturally to be employed on foreign stations, they are taking up a number of men who might be more usefully em ployed in other labours. (Hear, hear.) In my opinion, it is better policy to let the admirals on. foreign stations carry their flags on screw steamships. This would cause a very con siderable saving in regard to men, while the screw steamers would be really fit to render good service on the stations. (Hear.) Acting on this belief, I have recalled flagships from some stations and replacrd them with screw steamers, while in other instances it has been found more convenient to allow the ships to finish their time on the stations on which they are placed. As a rule, in future the practice will be to employ screw steamers on those stations as in every way a more economical system. (Hear, hear.) The next vote is that of the victualling of the navy, amounting to £995,647. Last year it was £1,027,357 —showing this year a saving, which is principally to be attributed to the reduc tion in the price of provisions. The next votes relate to the Admiralty-office, the Coastguard service, the scientific branch, and her Majesty's establishments at home and abroad, being numbered respectively 3,4, 5,6, and 7. 'These all vary more or less from the rates of last year, some being increased and some diminished ; but it is unnecessary to enter into the details, though I shall be ready hereafter to offer any explanation that may be required. Vote 8 re fers to wages of artificers, and I shall afterwards explain to the house the large increase that has taken place in the vote, believing that I shall best consult the convenience of members by separating in this way the extra from what may be called the ordinary portion of the expenditure under this head. On the vote for the expense of wages in estab lishments abroad I shall follow a similar course. Vote 10 is always a heavy item, relating to naval stores. Here, again, I shall defer my explanation of the causes of the great increase that is proposed, only observing for the pre sent that in ordinary circumstances the increase would have been £95,448, in consequence of the necessity of adding to the stores. Vote 11, for new works, is a heavy item, but there is no material alteration from last year. Votes 12 and 13, for medicine and medical stores, and for miscella neous services, require no particular remark. Vote 14, re lating to half-pay, brings before me a subject on which I wish to make a few remarks. The change in the vote itself is very small, amounting to an increase of £12,361, but I am desirous of stating the opinions which I entertain with regard to the present state of the Navy List. (Hear, hear.) I cannot help thinking that this is a very serious question, affecting the welfare and efficiency of the navy. Hon. members who have ever looked into the Navy List must be aware that it is one of the most complicated and unintelligible documents that any man could take into his hand. (Hear, hear.) It is difficult, if not, indeed, im possible, for those who have not devoted their lives to the study of the Navy and Retired List to understand the de tails with which it is encumbered. (Hear, hear.) And what is the result of such an examination of it as can be given ? Is the present state of our naval force with respect to offi cers as put down in that list in a condition of efficiency ? (Hear, hear.) My belief is— and I say it with a full sense of the difficulties of the case, and without wishing to say anything rash or imprudent—that! the state of the Navy List is not satisfactory. (Hear, hear.) It requires revi sion, and if that is carried out with a judicious hand it may tend greatly to the efficiencyof the service and the economy of the public money. There are on the list about 3,700 officers, of whom 1,700 are on the reserved and retired list, and the remainder on the active list. Out of the list of 100 admirals 39 are between the ages of 70 and 87, while of the whole number, excluding the Board of Admiralty, only 14 are employed. (Hear, hear.) Out of 358 active captains 31 are above the age of 60, and while out of the whole number only 90 are employed 180 of the remainder have never served afloat in their present rank. (Hear, hear.) Out of 507 active commanders 56 are above the age of 60, and while out of the whole number only 179 are employed 290 have never served afloat in their present rank. (Hear, hear.) Take next the lieutenants. Out of 1,061 active lieutenants 120 are above the age of 60, and of the whole number about 500 are employed in sea-going, ships and 190 in the Coastguard and packet service. Of the remainder a large proportion are either unwilling to serve without some prospect of promotion or of increased half-pay in consequence of such servitude when they become unfit. (Hear, hear.) This is the state of the upper part of the Navy List. It is overcrowded. These officers cannot get employment, and, as we have seen, a large proportion of them have never served afloat in their present rank. Now, simultaneously with this state of things, it so happens that in the lower ranks of the navy we literally have no officers for the ships. (Hear, hear.) At this moment the ships in commission in the navy are nearly 400 short of their comple ment in regard to mates, midshipmen, and officers of that class. There must be something wrong in a state of things that overcrowds the upper list and leaves an insufficiency of officers for the bottom. (Hear, hear.) Some reform is wanted; but what is to be done ? Promotion in the navy is almost at a standstill. (Hear, hear.) Since I have had the honour of holding my present office—now 12 months— I have had only two vacancies for post-captains in the navy. (Hear, hear.) By an order in council lam bound tk, one promotiu. Jur curee vacant:Los ; anti to tills way I hope to be able somewhat to reduce the overcrowded list; but the system falls very hard on the officers that are not promoted. In fact, the system of promotion may be de scribed as stagnant. (Hear, hear.) We have 11 reserved lists of the higher order of officert, but except in the case of one list, called the reserve flag list, every one of these is completely choked, and we have no power of transferring officers. I have stated to the house that during last sum mer we thought it our duty to ascertain the state of the French navy. We had heard much of the progress made by France in increasing her naval armament during the last few years. We took means of ascertaining what were the facts, and we found that the line-of-battle ships of France were exactly the same in number as our own—viz., 29. The French had fewer three-deckers, first-rates, than we had, but of our 29 ships there we re 9 w hi c h were Inferior to any of the French ones. Therefore, we must make up our mind to this, that in July last the screw line-of-battle ships of France were 29, and those of England also 29 in number ; but that in point of power and efficiency the line-of-battle ships of England were, to the best of my knowledge and belief, inferior to those of France. The 9 ships to which I have referred are sailing SiO-gun ships, which have been converted into screw eighties, and consequently have not room for their engines, and are generally inferior ships. In a report, dated in Decembe r l as t, Si r Baldwin Walker says— " With the exception of some of the more recently built frigates there is scarcely a sailing ship which in its present state is fit to go to sea, and most of them require such ex tensive repairs that it would not be desirable to incur the expense of repairing them. As regards the screw vessels all the 80-gun screw ships which from necessity were con verted have the same armament as they had as sailing ves sels, and are consequently so much pressed with their weights, and cramped for stowage, as to render them bad sea boats. . . . All these 80-gun screw ships ought not therefore to be considered as forming part of the effective screw force, but can only be regarded as vessels fit to re place the blockships for home service. The latter, from their great age, are so defective that they will not be worth repairing after their present commission. To shoiv the superiority of the French ships of the corresponding class, 80 guns, it may be stated that five were reduced from 100 and 10 from 90 gun ships, and are, therefore, not only more powerful sailing ships but better enabled to stow their ma chinery, &c., than the English 80-gun screw ships." Having thus shown the opinion of the Surveyor of the Navy that in July last out of 29 ships we had nice of a very in ferior quality, I will now turn to what our prospects were with regard to the year 1859. We bad four ships receiving engines, and during the year 1859 there were two new ships to be launched and one to- be converted, which would have raised the number of our line-of-battle ships to 36. We found that the progress of the French navy was not to beat all in the same ratio. At the end of 1859, on the contrary, the comparison would have stood—England, 36 line-of battle ships, with 3,400 guns, and 19,750-horse power, none of these ships being the inferior ones to which I have re ferred; France, 40 line-of-battle ships, with 3,706 guns and 27,510-horse power. I hope it will be clearly understood that in making these statements I am not speaking in an unfriendly spirit towards France. (Hear.) No man can desire more than I do, for the sake of France, for the sake of England, and for the sake of the world, that the friend ship and alliance between the two countries may long con tinue. (Hear.) Nor do I intend to blame F rance f or th e efforts which she is making to increase her naval power. (Hear, hear.) On the contrary, I respect the spirit with which the French Goveanment have carried out these addi tions. But my argument is, that we are bound to do the same thing; that it is inconsistent with our naval power and with our national safety and dignity that we should al low such a state of things to continue. (Hear.) When this state of things was brought under my notice last July, when I found nominal equality but real inferiority with re spect to France, and learned that that inferiority would, as time went on, be increased, I felt it my duty to lose no time in bringing that state of things under the consideration of my colleagues. I did so in the month of August last. At that time Parliament was just about to be prorogued, and it would, for obvious reasons, have been extremely unadvis able to come to the House of Commons with additional esti mates for an increase of our force. The Government, how ever, felt that this was a state of things which we could not allow to continue, and we therefore asked the Surveyor of the Navy what arrangement could be made to enable us, with the labour at our disposal, and without exceeding the estimates to which we were pledged, to increase the num ber of our line-of-battle ships. The result of our delibera tions was, that we determined to withdraw from the ordi nary building and repair of ships a force sufficient to enable us at once to commence the conversion of four powerful three-deck line-of-battle ships, viz. ' the Neptune, the St. George„ the Trafalgar, and the Queen, into two-deck screw sips, with 90 guns and 500-horse power each. That was all we could then accomplish. Those orders were given in the month of August last ; during the course of the winter these ships have been rapidly advancing to comple tion, and in the course of the spring they will be launched, and added to the strength of the British navy. In addition to these four ships we now propose to convert five others, viz. the Lion (whi c h was or d ere d t o be converted by the right hon oura bl e b arone t oppos i te, Si r C . W oo d , b u t w ith which no progress has been made), the Nelson, the Royal William, the Waterloo, and the Rodney. The Nelson, d ha in v t e o converted the Royal William, and the Waterloo, three deckers, will, in course of the ensuing year, be converted into ships of hesitated screw state dl aboute-of - t b h a e t t l e e x and the Rodney, at present a 90-gun ship, will be I should o the Rodney, had not a sister ship of hers, the London, lately been so treated with p s e h I c f yt the ef same class. great success . I 11mention the W 1 now new line - of-battle • slops which we propose to add to the navy durinc , the en • 0 suing year. Had no extraordinary exertions have been made only tw o s hi ps would been launched in the Hood course of the year 1859, viz., theand lteßevenge, n both of 91 guns ; the H oo d h aving 600 and the Reven v g e e g o horse power. Gentlemen who have looked at the returns of the navy will see that there are included in them 10 ships as in course of building. These would have been launched at different periods during the next few years, but we have selected those which were the most forward, and therefore could be operated upon most easily, and with the least ex pense, and.propose to launch four of them during the ensu ing-year. In all, therefore, there will be launched during the year six screw line-of-battle ships—viz., the Hood, 91 guns, and 600-horse power ; the Revenge, 91, 800-horse power; the Victoria, 121, 1,000-heilse power; the Howe, 121, 1,000-horse power • the Duncan, 101, 800-horse power; and the Prince of Wales, 131, 800-horse power. It will be seen that during the time that that right hon. gen tleman was at the Board of Admiralty considerable addi tions of smaller vessels were made, such as corvettes, sloops, and, above all, gunboats. lam not sure whether the addi tion of gunboats had not commenced in the time of the right hon. baronet the member for Carlisle ; but our present gunboats were chiefly added by the right hon. baronet the member for Halifax, and I do not think a more valuable ad dition has ever been made to the navy than those gunboats. (Hear, hear.) They are extremely popular, and while I have held office I have received applications for them from the service in various parts of the world. But the additions made by the right hon. baronet opposite (Sir C. Wood) had reference to the emergency in which they were made. Those additions were chiefly made in 1856 ; they had reference to the war then going on with Russia; and the right hon. gentleman very naturally added vessels of a class suited to the emergency of the moment ; but while a - considerable force of those gunboats and sloops was added to the navy, the line-of-battle ships and frigates did not increase in the ratio which the interests of the public service demanded. (Hear, hear.) On the contrary, the result of the war was actually b check the progress which ought to have been made in augmenting the number of line-of-battle ships in the navy. I hold in my hand a statement of the proposals made by the surveyor of the navy for an increase of line of-battle-iaips and frigates during the last ten years. I have the programme submitted and the orders given thereon, but those orders were not carried out. In the course of the last ten years tie orders for ships of the line amounted to 37, but the numbel• of ships of the line actually built during those years was only 25, and therefore when I came into office I found 12 like-of-battle ships less than we should have had if the intentions of the Admiralty from year to year had been carried out, (Hear.) In late years, I believe, the falling-off originated in the requirements of the Russian war, which to a certain extent had the effect of diverting labour from the building of line-of-battle ships. With regard to frigates, that is a strongercase. During the last 10 years proposals were made for adding 37 frigates ; the actual number built was only 23, so that there was a deficiency of 14 frigates in that intend. All this has made a very material difference in the positive and relative state of the navy. I attach no blame to the late Admiralty for having built those smaller vessels, bat we must recollect that m contemplating the future action of our navy we must have regard to the pos sibility of a naval war. (Hear, hear.) We cannot look for a repetition of a war similar to that with Russia; we must, I say, contemplate the possibility of a naval war; and should we ever find ourselves involved in a naval war it will be absoluteiy essential to have line-of-battle ships and frigates in such numbers as will enable us to conduct such a war in a satisfactory manner. Very shortly after I came into office we received at the Admiralty a paper called a " submission," from Sir B. Walker, the Surveyor of the Navy, calling our attention in very strong terms to the un satisfactory state of her Majesty's naval force in respect to line-of-battle ships. This " submission" was laid before the Admiralty, I think, in the latter part of March last. Again, in May we received from Sir Baldwin Walker another pressing " submission," calling our attention to the deficiency of line-ofabattle ships. In the course of the sum mer we thought it our duty to institute inquiries into the state of the navy of France. We felt, as I shall soon show, that the navy of England was not in a satisfactory condi tion ; but we thought it our duty to make inquiries in refe rence to the condition of the navy, of France. In July we again received a strong " submission" from Sir B. Walker, urging on us the necessity of making vigorous efforts for the safety of our own shores in the building of powerful ships of the line. From that document I will read an ex tract. Sir B. Walker says : " The information recently received from France having fully confirmed the accounts previously obtained of the state of the French navy, and shown the additions contem plated during the ensuing year, it is now beyond a question that, although a few years ago we were far ahead of them in respect of screw line-of-battle ships, they are now, for the first time, equal to us, and unless some extraordinary steps are at once taken to expedite the building of screw ships of the line the French, at the close of next year, will be actually superior to us as regards the most powerful class of ships of war." (Hear, hear.) Again, he says " This condition of things would not have occurred if the successive programmes of the last few years could have been carried out, but the exigencies of the late war so inter fered with the building of ships that it was found utterly impossible to do so." I now wish to state to the house that last summer, when my attention was drawn to this state of affairs, the effec tive line-of-battle ships in England were in number only 29. (Hear, hear.) With respect to block ships, of which we have heard a great deal, and of which I scarcely knew how to speak in the first instance on my coming into office, I must say I have now no hesitation in stating that these block ships are wholly useless. (" Hear, hear," and a laugh.) They are good for nothing as sea-going men-of war ; they may be useful perhaps as floating batteries ; but as men-of-war I say they are perfectly useless. Most of them are rotten, and they are very nearly worn out. (Hear, hear.) We must dismiss block ships then and sailing line-, of-battle ships from our consideration. The effective line of-battle ships in England, as I ha% e said, when I came to the Admiralty were reduced to the low number of 29. The house will permit me to state what the number of the navy in England has been in former times. In the seven years' war (1760) there were 113 ships of the line in commission, with 86,626 seamen and marines - in the American war (1783) there were 126 ships of the line in commission, with 105,443 seamen and marines ; in the French revolutionary war (1799) there were 120 ships of the line in commission, with 120,409 seamen and marines • in the war with France (1809) there were 113 ships of the line in commission, with 144,387 seamen and marines ; and in the war with Russia (1856), when we had no enemy on the sea—when we fought no naval action, and when our ships of war were engaged in the transport of troops, or in attacking stone walls, there were 42 ships in commission (including block ships and sailing ships) with 67,791 sea ...en and marines. Thor nuiriug , alu y r and block ships answered the purpose when there was no enemy on the sea; but you cannot calculate on them in future , and, in the event of a naval war, when you want effective ships, although the lowest number you had in the war with Rus sia was 42, your force is reduced to the lower number of 29. That was in the summer of last year ; and four ships were taking in their engines, which increased the number to 33. (Hear.) I shall not dwell longer on this matter. I admit its difficulty, but it seems to me that the difficulty must be grappled with. The efficiency of the public service re quires it. My belief is, without pledging myself to any de tails, that the sound principl e is to follow the rule already adopted to a considerable extent in the army. Naval offi cers, like all other human beings, must yield to the force of time ; and it is essential to the well -being of the navy that we should have the services of active and vigorous offi cers, capable of performing their duties. The best system of promotion is that which, while it induces aged officers to retire, will secure the advancement of younger men to posts which their physical strength and professional attainments qualify them to fill. In answer to a question put to me yesterday, I stated that I should avail myself of this occasion to allude to a subject which has lately excited very great interest—viz , the present position of the surgeons of the Royal navy. (Hear, hear.) lam sorry to find that my answer has been very much misunderstood. Iby no means intended to imply that I had any doubt or hesitation as to the course to be adopted. On the contrary, I then meant, as I mean now, to express in distinct terms my opinion that the present position of the surgeons in the navy is not satisfactory. (Hear, hear.) But Igo still further. The complaints we now hear from these officers are, no doubt, much founded upon the late warrant issued in respect to the army; but I think that even before the date of that warrant the surgeons of the navy were not relatively placed on an equality with their brethren of the army. Now, however, they have an unanswerable claim to the consideration of their country. Nothing in the military service could be nobler or more gallant than the manner in which the medi -6.1 officers of the navy have discharged their duties under the most trying and painful circumstances, and they are, therefore, entitled to more liberal treatment than they now receive. Their claim is based upon two grounds—first, it is due to them as gentlemen that their position should be im proved, and secondly, public policy requires that the services of this most useful branch of the profession should be more highly appreciated and better requited, so that able and effi cient men may not be deterred from joining the navy. It is, therefore, our intention in spirit and in substance to concede to naval surgeons the advantages which they justly seek to obtain. At the same time I will not and cannot now commit myself to the exact mode in which that object shall be carried out. The peculiarities of the naval service may render it inconvenient to follow the precise rule pursued in regard to the army ; but these and other points of detail will be duly considered before our plan is finally decided upon. The naval chaplains have preferred a very similar claim, as have also the class of masters, and it is my desire to take the whole of these questions into simultane ous consideration, carefully examining them in their rela tion to each other before arriving at any definite conclu sion on the subject. The next vote is that for transport, on which there is a considerable reduction. It has fallen from £410,500 last year to £200,000 for the present year. The item for the packet service differs little from the cor responding charge for the last year; and, in fact, it ought not to be included in the navy estimates at all. It should by rights be compromised among the votes for the Post office department—(hear, hear) ;—and I only wonder that t o h f o a se co f m or pa th ri e the right hon. gentlem an o pp os it e did no t ge t r id o f i t l ong ago when he presided a t th e Ad m i ra lt y. Th e general re sultsonne xt between yeer i thes that, e t i s m u p a p t n f o g r w t hee did present nenot and those take any extra money for shipbuilding, and did not add 3,000 men to the navy, there would be a saving of more than £138,000 in favour of the next year. Including the expense for this 3,000 men, but deducting the charge for extra shipbuilding, there would still remain a saving of £23,897 upon the estimates for the next year. The real addition to our naval expenditure on account of the pro posals we intend to make will amount to £1,009,604. With the permission of the committee I shall now turn to the increase of the navy which we recommend; and here I may observe that throughout this statement I wish to deal with the house with the most perfect candour. I must there fore say that this sum of £1,009,604 which appears to be the additional cost we are to incur for shipbuilding, does not represent the whole augmentation of charge which we contemplate. Besides that amount there are postponed payments to the extent of £260,000. Of that money £lOO,OOO will be devoted to steam machinery, which will net be paid for during 1859-60, but will be brought into the accounts for the commencement of the year following, being disbursed by instalments. There will also be a payment of £160,000 due for the construction of vessels by contract. Thus, the entire expense of the in crease we propose to make in tho navy is not exhausted by the sum of £1,009,604 which stands on the paper, but in fact will amount—though it will not all be required for the present financial year—to £1,269,604. The question then arises—Why is that we want this addition to our navy ? Are there sufficient reasons to justify us in asking Parlia ment to grant an increased expenditure for this purpose, in round figures of nearly £1,300,000 ? My belief is that neither in this house nor in the country will there be any hesitation as to the propriety of this outlay. (Cheers.) I am sure it is my duty, as it is the soundest policy, to treat the house with perfect frankness on these subjects. I did so last year, and I intend to do so now. I have previously stated my conviction that the extent of our naval force is known to foreign Powers. Foreign Governments are per fectly well aware of what goes on in this country. If there is• any concealment at all, it is concealment from the people. (Hear.) It is right that the people should know what is the real state of affairs, and why they are called on to make these great efforts. I may state then, at once, that we ask for this great addition to the cost of shipbuilding, because I am bound to say that when I succeeded to the office I now hold I did not find the navy of this country in a proper and adequate state for the defence of our coasts and the protection, of our commerce, (Hear, hear.) I beg here in the most explicit terms to disclaim any intention to cast censure upon any former Administrations. If there is anything which I am more anxious to avoid than another it is any appearance of party spirit or party controversy. I cheerfully do justice to former Governments, - and espe cially to that which immediately preceded us, to which in regard to many points great credit is due ; and while they left many things still to be done, it is but fair to say that there were strong and obvious reasons connected with the Russian war why certain reforms should not then have been adopted. The right hon. member for Halifax lately moved for a return showing the number of ships of all descriptions which during the last few years have been added to our navy. We propose in the ensuing year to con vert five more line-of-battle ships, and to finish six new ones. The result will be that the Royal Navy will, in re spect of line-of-battle ships, be increased by 15. I now come to the question of frigates, and I am sorry to say that, in respect to that class of vessels, our position in compari son with the French navy, is still more unsatisfactory than it is with regard to line-of-battle ships. In the course of the autumn, I found that instead of being upon a par in point of numbers, as was the case with regard to line-of battle ships, we were in a positive numerical inferiority of 12 frigates. (Hear.) The English navy comprises 17 screw frigates and nine paddle frigates, two receiving their engines and six building, making a total of 34. The French navy reckons 15 screws, 19 paddle-wheels, three receiving their engines, one converting, and eight building, making an aggregate of 46. I cannot help here calling the atten tion of the committee to a comparison of the naval forces of England and France at various periods in former years. In 1812 England had 245 line-of-battle ,ships, while ' France had 113. We had then 272 frigates and France 72. In 1820 England possessed 146 line-of-battle ships and France 58. We had 164 frigates and France 39. In 1840 England had 89 line-of-battle ships and France 44. We had 180 fri gates and France had 50. In 1850 England had 86 line-of battle ships and France 45. England had 104 frigates and France 56. I have at the same time to state, for which the right hon. gentleman opposite in some degree deserves the credit, that among our frigates are some of the very finest ships of that class that ever floated. Two very remarkable frigates, the Mersey and the Orlando, have just been launched carry ing 50 and 40 guns respectively. It is true that they are ex perimental ships, and that their value is not yet fully ascer tained, but I have every reason to believe that they will be splendid men of war. Some of the French frigates, too, are not so stron g in respect of horse-po wer as ours are . hen we discovered our inferiority the Government felt, and, I believe, the Committee will also feel, that we really had no opinion but to endeavour, as soon as possible, to remove that inferiority—(hear, hear)—and, therefore, the plan which the Government now asks you to enable Ahem to carry out is this. I may first observe that we have some 12 or 14 sailing 80-gun ships, which, as of that class, are, I fear, almost useless, but which I had hoped might be con verted into good frigates. lam sorry to say that they are so old, averaging upwards of 30 years, as not to be worth the cost of conversion. Upon the other hand, we have about 12 or 13 50-gun sailing frigates which are compara tively young, only averaging about eight or ten years of age, and they will be converted and lengthened, and will be most valuable vessels. Our proposal is, as to frigates, in stead of launching three, which is the usual number, each year, to hurry on two which are building, and so launch five this year. They will be the Galatea, of 26 guns and 800- horse power ; the Ariadne, of 32 guns and 800-horse power ; the Bacchante, of 50 guns and 600-horse power; the Nar cissus, of 50 guns and 400-horse power ; and the Immortalite, of 50 guns and 600-horse power. In addition to these we propose to convert four of the sailing frigates to which I have adverted—the Phaeton, Severn, Sutlej, and the Phoebe —to lengthen them amiefilips, at the bows and at the stern . (Hear, and laughter.) I b e li e v e thes e ships will become as efficient and as valuable as it is possible for converted ships to be. I fear they will be very costly ships, but still most valuable and effective, carrying the same armament they now bear- 7 50 guns. The cost will be for the labour of conversion £42,000 for each ship, and the cost of engines of 500-horse power £30,000, so that each ship will cost about £72,000. If, hoWever, we were to construct new ships of the same size they would cost at least each £40,000 more ; and, moreover, these converted frigates can be added to our navy in a much less time than it would take - to build new ones. We thus propose to add nine frigates in the course of the year. I now have to beg the attention of the committee to a portion of this subject which is the most difficult, but upon which lam bound to be candid—l allude to the sub ject of iron• cased ships. In referring to the French navy I made no mention of what they were going to do in respect to those ships, but it appears that they have laid down at Toulon two vessels upon that plan, which are far advanced towards completion. They are to be about the size and ton nage of the vessel which they consider to be their finest line-of-battle ship, the Napoleon, upon which I understand they have been modelled. They are only to carry 30 guns, but those guns are to be of the heaviest calibre, and the vessels are to be coated with 4f inch plates of iron or steel, it not being yet decided which metal shall be adopted. In this state of things the Government felt it to be their duty in the course of last summer to institute experiments as to the power of certain metal sheathing to resist shot. The committee will perceive that it would not be proper in me to enter into detail at present upon that subject—(hear)— and I can only say that the experiments were most care fully made with all varieties of metal and in all ways. In the course of the autumn, as every gentleman who reads the newspapers must know, some wonderful inventions were made in artillery, and it then appeared to me to be my duty to ascertain how far the previous experiments would be affected by the recent discoveries in artillery arms. The house will not expect me to give in detail the result of these experiments, buer am bound to say that it has convinced the Admiralty that, whatever be the cost, we have no op tion in the discharge of our duty but to commence the con struction of these iron-cased ships. I shall not conceal from the house that they will be the most costly ships ever built for the British navy ; but still, assuming—that of which I have no doubt—that our plans will receive the sanction of Parliament, we have resolved that it is our duty to lose no time in building at least two of these vessels. I am bound to say, also, that we feel it to be no less our duty to throw away no chance whatever in endeavouring to - make these ships as effective and successful as pos sible. We have called upon the most competent parties ' in different parts of England connected with private trade to give us their designs and counsel. We have like wise called upon our officials in the dockyards—upon our able master shipwrights of whom, I am glad to say, we have a considerable number—to furnish us with designs. Tho determination of the Admiralty is to leave nothing un done, to take every precaution that prudence and caution can suggest, in order that the large sums which these ships will cost shall not be thrown away. We are equally re solved at the same time to lose not a moment in bringing these ships into existence. They are the ships which ap peared in our estimates under the head of ships to be built by contract. Wehave not'room to build them in our dock yards. From the mode of construction which we propose we have no hesitation in confiding their construction under ouesuperintendence, to those who will build them by con tract ; and by the close of the year upon which we are now entering, I hope these two ships may also be added to the strength of the British navy. (Hear.) Such are the pro posals to which we ask the consent of the house. If they are sanctioned the result, as regards ships, will be this—in the course of next year 15 line-of-battle ships, about half our existing number of heavy frigates, and two iron-cased ships, which will be as powerful as we can make them, will be added to our navy. The general result will be an addi tion to the naval force of the country of 26 powerful men of-war. (Hear, hear.) Such is the use we propose to make of the sums which we ask you to vote. L-have been per fectly open and candid with the house. (Cheers.) I have stated to them our necessity, and I have also explained how we propose to meet it. If am asked why we propose to do so much, I answer it is not more than the case requires. If I am asked why we do not propose to do more, I say these proposals are the limit of our power—our dockyards could not do more within the year. But I tell you frankly that when these ships are completed—when we have added 15 to our line-of.battle and nine to our heavy frigates, and when we have built the two iron-cased ships to which I have re ferred—l, for one, shall not be content with the strength of the British navy. (Hear.) At the end of next year, instead of 33 as now, we shall have 48 line of-battle ships. But there are four more new ships on the stocks ; there are four more line-of-battle ships which will bear conversion, and I hope that in the ensuing financial year of 1860-1 Parliament will consent to the completion of these eight vessels, thus raising our force at the end of that year to 56 line-of-battle ships. I trust also that Parliament will sanction a further addition to our frigates, so. that ere long our supremacy may be thoroughly re-established. (Hear.) I feel greatly indebted to the house for the patience with which they have heard my protracted, and, I am afraid, in some respects, dull statement. (Cries of "No, no," and cheers.) I trust they will consider that we have done no more than our duty in making these proposals to them. We have made these pro posals from a conviction that it is our duty to invite the House of Commons to aid us in our attempt to restore the naval supremacy of England. (Hear, hear.) We are bound to recollect the vital importance of this question. We are bound to recollect that we have not only, like Rus sia, or France, or the other great continental Powers, to provide for the protection of our own coasts and maintain our position in Europe, but to protect an empire and a com merce that extend over the four quarters of the globe. (Hear, hear.) Our naval force is of necessity divided, and therefore it is essential for England not to allow her navy to fall, as it has fallen, down to the lowest amount ever known in our history—an amount not exceeding that of a neighbouring Power without anything like the same de mand upon its force. (Hear, hear.) It is our duty to take care that our naval force is, not only adequate to preserve our position in Europe, but sufficient to answer the de mands made upon us in all parts of the world. (Hear, hear.) Let me add, abore all, that we make these pro posals in the interests of peace. (Hear, hear.) lam con vinced that with peace England must be powerful. The best guarantee for peace is to show that we are prepared for war, and I cannot, I think,' conclude My speech in more appropriate terms than those which I find in the ad vice of Sir Francis Bacon to Sir George Villiers : " God is the God of Peace,—it is one of his attributes ; therefore by Him alone we must, pray and hope to continue it ; there is the foundation. And the King must not neglect the just ways for it. Justice is the best protector of it at home, and providence for war is the best prevention : of it from, abroad." (Cheers.) Sir CHARLES WOOD did not intend, in any observa tions he was about to make, to offer any opposition to the proposal of the right hon. gentleman. He felt that the country ought to be always prepared for war, and he would therefore vote with pleasure for the proposed increase in the number of men in the navy. He wished to know how the 3,000 men who were to be the reserve were to be lodged. He would suggest that they should be lodged in barracks. Last year he proposed a vote of £25,000 to purchase land for barracks in Keyham to lodge sailors; but that item was struck out by the house in its desire to carry out economy, and he was glad to see that a sum of £25,000 was in the estimates for a similar purpose, and it should have his sup port. He was most anxious that they should have an effective reserve of men. He had last year obtained a vote for 9,000 coastguard men as:a reserve ; and he regrett e d th a t that force was not now to be increased by at least 1,000 men. A naval coast volunteer corps would be a most valu able addition to the naval force of this country, and he was glad to see that means were to be taken to enrol this body of men in the service. He now came to the question of the building of the navy, and he must say that he entirely concurred in the proposal as it had been made to the house. When he was at the Admiralty they employed all the ship wrights they could find; but it was not desirable to build too many vessels, as they were invariably attacked with dry rot in the course of years. The right hon. gentleman then referred to the number of small vessels built by the late Government, observing that they were sufficient for the purposes of the country. The 'late Government had, however, built large vessels of war in the course of the last five years. In 1853, they built 6; in 1854, 8; in 1856, 2 ; in 1857, 2 ; and in 1858, 8; so that with these vessels and 200 gun-boats they had all that were necessary for the present moment. It would no doubt be desirable to build large vessels, but that would.be a work of time. He found that the extra pay for one year amounted to £17,000. The late Governm en t p ro p ose d l ast year to a dd to th e dock yard establishment 1,340 men, but the right hon. gentleman refused to act upon that suggestion, and continued the sys tem of extra men. The right hon. gentleman had quoted the report of the committee over which Lord Seymour had ably presided. That committee was appointed to inquire into the naval and military expenditure, and one of the recommendations of that committee was as regarded extra workmen. In that report it was stated that they ought to increase the dockyard establishment as a matter of public policy, and that the extra pay system ought not to be con tinued. He (Sir C. Wood) quoted from that report last year ; but the right hon. gentleman did not choose to adopt his suggestions and that of the committee, and this year he was pursuing the same course; for, with the experience of last year, he still refused to act on the recommendation of that committee, and increase the establishment of the dock yards. The recommendation he alluded to was not only his opinion, but was also that of high authorities, and he be lieved the system of extra pay to be not only unwise but inexpedient. During the whole of last year, be it observed, Government could not get shipwrights, but even the young workmen left the dockyards and went to work in private yards. By increasing the establishment they kept in their own hands the power of increasing the amount of work when it should be required. But if the men in time of peace were put to task or job work, they would have no means, in time of war, to make that increase which would be essen tially necessary. Now, look at the estimate of the right hon. gentleman. Under the head of pay to the dockyards there appears the sum of £50,000 for extra work, which showed the necessity for increasing the establishment of the dockyards. When all had been done that was proposed to be done by the right hon. baronet the navy would not be made what it ought to be ; and he had stated, and stated truly, that several ships were not in the state they should be. As regarded block ships, they were excellent ships to be used as floating batteries, at such ports as Glasgow, Liverpool, and other important harbours, and to be used for the training of men and boys, and the recep tion of coastguard volunteers ' • but they were not fit to be used as sea-going ships, and should not be excluded from the ships in this country. (Hear, hear.) One thing was certain, that they must build large ships to compete with the ships of other nations. He agreed that the Orlando and the Mersey were both fine vessels, but they ought to have many more that could compete with advantage with those of other countries. They must, for several years to come, increase building ships very considerably, and in eight or ten years their navy would be in a proper condition. He therefore objected to the way in which the right hon. baronet intended to proceed. The same objections he had urged would apply to the steam machinery, for, if it was necessary to increase building, it was also necessary to in crease steam machinery. The only other matter he in tended to refer to was, the proposal to build two iron-cased ships, and if other nations had used them with a probability of success, this country ought not to be without • them. Undoubtedly there were great improvements in the power of the ordnance used on board ships, and it was necessary that they should keep up their improvements to meet and compete with those which other nations had. It was not his intention to offer any opposition, and he believed none would be made to the vote which had been placed in the chairman's hands; but he had thought it necessary to make the observations he had offered to the committee, re serving to himself the power of making such remarks as he might deem to be necessary when other votes should be proposed ; but he believed a permanent increase in the workmen of the dockyards would be the best economy and the true policy for this country to pursue. . Sir C. NAPIER said that during the time he had had the honour of a seat in that house he had never heard the navy estimates brought forward in so clear and distinct a manner as had been done by the right honourable baronet that night. He would not follow the right hon. baronet through his reasons for increasing the navy, but this he would say that he had told them what was not usual. He had told them how the money had been expended last year, and how it would be expended during the present year. This was certain, that they must build larger and longer ships than they had built hitherto, and that would re quire that they should have larger and longer docks. As to manning the navy, the report which had been made by the commission was an excellent one, and if the Govern ment followed it up they would have the means of manning the navy better than it had ever been manned before. He had only one objection to it, that it did not go far enough, and encourage petty officers and men to enter the service by giving them better pay. The pay to petty officers ought to be higher, and, by making it higher, they would always be considered better officers, and the men would be more ambitious of aspiring to be petty officers. He had proposed that the pay of the petty officers should be double that of the men, and that the men's pay should be increased to what it was in the merchant service ; and he trusted that, when the report was taken into considera tion, that he would be able to induce the house to give that increased pay. Since the year 1815, he would like to know what the Admiralty had been doing. He must say that he was very happy he had the honour of proposing the appointment of the commission he had alluded to. The next question was whether the vote of 3,000 men was sufficient. It clearly was not sufficient to keep this country, even with the men coming home from China, in safety. The very smallest number of ships should be ten sail of the line fully manned, and then if it was necessary to have 30 sail of the line on an emergency, there ought to be nine ships with a small crew, which, in case of emergency, could be easily increased. Those ships, together with the Channel fleet, would be of essential service in case of emergency. That house wanted to have an efficient navy. They should have a navy equal to France and Russia, and provided the country was satisfied the money was pro perly expended, that house would never refuse it. But the money was not properly expended. And how could it be otherwise with the constant changes in the Admiralty? Every first lord chose his own admirals. Each of these had his own views, and the result was that what was done by one Admiralty was undone by another. There were always some new ideas displacing the old ideas. This involved a constant expenditure. He recommended experiments, prac tical experiments in gunnery, but notwithstanding all his remonstrances they kept to the old system at Portsmouth. If they had ten sail of the line in the Channel fleet, they ought to have ten sail of the line in the first reserve, and there ought to be a second reserve o f th e same number. Without that he maintained the country was not in a safe condition. Between Brest and Cherbourg, France had 20 sail of the line fully manned. By that he meant tha,t the ships were in the same condition as our first reserve. France at that moment commanded the Channel. France com manded the Mediterranean. That was a position in which that country ought not to be. France had a commercial navy of 180 vessels and 170 steamvessels. She had an army of 700,000 men, and a powerful navy. This country could be invaded by France at any time. Where was our force to oppose to France ? Louis Napoleon could, if he chose, in vade this country. That was a position in which that coun try ought not to be in. (Hear, hear.) He did not wish to give any alarm to France ; but he wished to alarm the gen tlemen of that house, and get rid of the rotten blockships and of the rotten reserve ships. Was that a position that this great country ought to be in ? Our present position was an invi tat ion t • France. He did not say that France had any intention of coming to this country, but if she had she could with her fleet, take the command of the chops of the Channel and destroy our East India trade, and our Mediterranean trade. If France declared war upon us, our first battle ought to be fought at sea; but where were our ships to fight it upon any sudden emergency ? What would be the conse quences if the French, with the'command of the Channel, landed an army on our shores ? Our little island ought to be in a position to defy the world. But was she not, at that moment, at the command of her more powerful neighbour ? This country ought to be in a position to defy the whole world. The First Lord of the Admiralty, when he came into office, found that France and England were equal in their naval power. Then why did he not increase our strength ? Sir J. PAKINGTON—I am not indebted to the hon. and gallant admiral for inforthation on this subject. In August last I took measures to increase our naval strength. Sir C. NAPIER said the First Lord of the Admiralty was especially responsible for the protection of the country, and hoped he would adopt necessary measures for that pur pose. The late First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir C. Wood) paid off seven sail of the line. This made his successor's duties more difficult, as it was not very easy to re-establish that force and re-man our fleet. He (Sir C. Napier) trusted that we should never find a man in that high office who would dismiss our men and weaken our naval establish ments. (Hear, hear.) Sir J. ELPHINSTONE congratulated Sir J, Pakington on the clear and business-like statement which he had made. He (Sir J. Elphinstone) had served on a commission whose object was to place the navy of England on a proper footing. That commission had made a report, the suggestions of which, if adopted by Parliament, would materially benefit the British seaman. If the Government would give prac tical effect to the report of that commission, they would elevate the character of the British seaman and confer great advantage on the country at large. As a naval officer, he thought the British seaman ought to be recompensed for his services. This would be an inducement to others to enter into the service of the country. (Hear, hear.) The ships ought to be so constructed as that the men should have sufficient accommodation, and that the ship's company should be kept, as far as possible, in good health. With respect to small vessels he could not concur with the right honourable baronet. The small vessels sent out to the tropical climates were deficient in accom modation for the men ; there wad not a comfortable deck for the men ; the 'main hatch was bad, and in the hold it was almost impossible to squeeze the men into it. Our docks were also inadequate for the accommodation of her Ma jesty's navy. With Cherbourg staring us in the face, we ought to have a basin capable of accommodating 25 or 30 sail of the line, with the means of fitting out and repairing our vessels. Would any merchant fit up a ship in the stream ? It would be a waste of power. Then why should the Government do so ? (Hear.) The ships should be so fitted up in the docks that they could sail out like a flock of ducks. (Laughter.) Mr. S. HERBERT observed that if the hon. baronet had been in Parliament somewhat longer he would have ob served that the temper of the house was subject to fluctua tions on this subject. He (Mr. S. Herbert) had been Secretary to the Admiralty for four or five years, and he always found it difficult to obtain votes for purposes of the kind now under consideration. Complaints were now made as to the inefficiency of the navy at the time he held office; but it should be recollected that at that time our naval architecture was in its infancy. Every vessel then built was an experiment, and some of them were condemned shortly after their construction. Although criticisms had been made on them by the gallant admiral (Sir C. Napier), yet the Simoom, Birkenhead, 'Vulcan, Mmgara, and another built under the directions of that Board of Admiralty were highly spoken of by the late Board of Admiralty for the service they performed in transporting troops, &c., to the Crimea. With respect to what had been said. as to the rela tive merits of iron and wooden ships and wooden ships cased with iron, experience, he thought, had proved that there was, after all, no very material difference. As to the votes asked for by the right hon. baronet that night, all he could say was that he believed there would be no difficulty raised on the part of any hon. member to the granting of these votes ; and with respect to that required for an addition to the'number of men, he was convinced that if even a larger number was asked for, it would be readily agreed to by the house and the country. (Hear.) One word as to the fleet it was proposed to maintain in China. Ho was one of those who differed from the majority of Parliament in opinion as to the policy of the Chinese war. Since then there had been great rejoicings over its termination, and for his own part he had been disposed to concur in the general feeling on the subject. But now he should begin to doubt the value of the peace and the treaty if we were required to support an armament of 47 vessels and 4,700 men in these distant waters. (Hear, hear.) Tiln hoped, however, that in the course of time these large &Ices would cease to be required, and that we should be able to bring them home, and to con centrate them where, if danger was to be apprehended at all, they ought to be. (Hear, hear.) Mr. 'WHITBREAD said he had always been of opinion that we should have a comparative strength of our navy with that of foreign nations. That had been given to them, and the result was that it had been Fm rirenal n et o hy w tGh s t oa a t t , e e r nd for o rns n oem t n h te e tm a o o u pn t i h at hc o tritthyaodfbteheenFtnirtshteLpoorwd power rf ofth ethAed in the Channel a fleet equal to ours. That was the most a ri l h ar o mg riinshtshtaotneimeeenuttiherae 1 1 ;g ai e ti ve h r e heard ha he o ard n siuteshevaeuratliotimn:teyi. last year. That Sir Baliwn..-. Walker had urged the question upon him in the month of j Wily last year, and yet he had never come down to the house a. stated that fact, mid now he came with a proposal for e a pan:al reconstruction of the navy, and at the same time prop to reduce the wages m,:d of workmen, He did not put the iliench navy at ~.oe same amount as the First Lord, but he knew that at Toulon:" there were nine first-rates ready to put to sea at any mo ment, and in order to meet them we should be obliged to denude our Channel of the fleet, and if we did so we should then leave open Brest and Cherbourg, where there were a large number of other ships-of-war not wholly manned but half manned; and while he did not say that the French desired to attack us, it was evident that they had the power to do so, under existing circumstances ; and they might depend upon it that if ever a blow was struck, it would be secret and sudden. That was a state of things' which, in his opinion, demanded the utmost watchfulness and preparation on the part of this country. The hon. member proceeded to comment on the state of the steam basin at Sheerness, which he said would be most injurious to the vessels themselves; and, at the same time, the basin was only capable of being opened three days in the week, and with some winds it was impossible for vessels either to get out or in ; and yet this was the great steam arsenal which was to watch over and protect the great North. Sea traffic and the Baltic. He believed that the miserable deficiency• of our naval administration arose from our having overtasked our navy surveyor, who, had more work thrown upon him than it was possible that any one man could perform. There was nothing that the British Parliament • had committed more carelessly and recklessly to the entire charge of the • First Lord of the Admiralty than the administration of the navy, and now they learned from the Minister who held that office that we were unprepared to meet possible demands upon us. If they would not take his warnings, or that of others, surely they would that o f th e r i g ht h on . b ar onet, and think it was time to take the matter into their own hands. If they did not, they would some day feel that it was no con solation to find that their confidence had been misplaced and their interests betrayed. • • Admiral WALCOTT said that after all that had been said he did not believe that any such naval deficiency existed on the part of this country as had been alleged. Besides the Royal navy we had a large mercantile marine, which, in any case of emergency, could be brought to bear in a. single week, with an effect that could not be overesti mated. As to the threats or alarms of an invasion, he did not believe that it would be any more successful than the attempts of the Spanish Armada, or those of Admirals von Tromp or de Ruyter. The true course to pursue was to secure efficient officers and men, and to treat them libe rally and justly, and th us a tt ra ct them to the service, and keep the navy in the highest state of efficiency. He utterly denied that the French could command the English Channel, notwithstanding the repeated assertions that such was the case ; and he had the fullest confidence that this country could protect itself in any emergency whatever. We had blockships available for the defence of our coasts, and 7,500 coast guardsmen, wno, in the course of a few hours, could be made to man them in case of emergency. He would declare to God, too, that ware they in dadger of inva sion there was not a seaman on the Thames who would not t heartily join their navy. Let them have fair play in the system of manning their ships, and show the men that there was a fair chance of promotion before him, and they would find all their difficulties disappear. Let them encourage seamen to enter the service, and not turn away the lands man friendless when he had been converted into a seaman, and they would find that the service was looked upon with greater favour. There was no more generous being on earth than the British sailor. With all his reckless spirit he made regular remittances to his parents and relatives, and on every showing he was entitled to a fair and liberal condi tion. But these must no longer be matters of debate. Pre paration must be made before the time for action arrived, and he trusted that the means which Parliament would now place at the disposal of the Government would at length place the navy of the country in & suitable condition of efficiency. Mr. F. BERKELEY wished to know whether the Go vernment had taken any steps for the introduet:on into the navy of breech -loading rifles, such as were employed in the American navy. There could be no doubt that if foreign navies were armed with rifles that could fire five times for one, we should be at a deplorable disadvantage in an 7 maritime contest in which we might here a ft er b e engagea• (Hear, hear.) Mr. BENTINCK said that the statement of the right hon. gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty hod th e advantage in candour and explicitness of every statenen , of the kind it had ever bee n hi s l o t t o li s t en t o , and iv making that candid statement the right hon. gentleman had taken the best means in his power to remedy the con fessedly defenceless state of our navy. There could not be a shadow of a doubt that our navy was not in the con dition it ought to be, and no pains or expense should be spared to render it perfect. The question had been asked by hon. gentlemen opposite, what had been done with the large sums of money which had been voted for the last two years for the navy. (Hear, hear, from the Opposition.) Well, he would state his own opinion, without meaning to impugn the conduct in office of any predecessor of the right hon. gentleman, that so long as the Board of Admiralty re mained constituted as it was, it was not to be expected to have an effective navy; so long as they were content to place a civilian at the head of the Admiralty, so long they must expect results to fall short of fair anticipations. What objection could there be to placing a naval first lord at the head of the board ? The objection commonly urged was, that professional men were apt to be influenced by pre judices which would injure the administration o f civilians. Under such a system a naval lord was appointed to a situation in which he had no power or responsibility, but in which he nevertheless was able to advise. That being the actual system in force, the objection amounted to an absurdity. The administration of the navy should be entrusted to men who knew what the navy was, and who perfectly understood the objects which ought to be aimed at. The report of the commission for manning the nevi was a most useful document, and -in due time would no doubt lead to the best results; but the fact itself of the Admiralty sanctioning the appointment of a commission to teach them how to man the navy was a virtual condemna tion of the system under which they acted, and which stamped it with utter inefficiency, Mr. LINDSAY desired to offer an explanation with re gard to his dissent from the opinions given by the other members of the commission for manning the navy. It was not without regret that he so dissented, but he consulted with men of eminence and authority, and on reading his notes, they agreed with him that the principles he laid down were sound and well-founded. He handed his dissent to the chairman of the committee almost at the same time that the report was signed. He returned the corrected proof of that dissent eight days ago, and if the dissent was not in the hands of hon. members, the fault was not attri butable to him. With that explanation he should, for the present, content himself. (Hear, hear.) Sir F. BARING having defended the appointment of:the s jcbtr regard eh o ue eg m egt ailhn m ore tudnf i oo i btr a o oket n rhi e steeoeh f pfd o ne m r aubr-m ehyensebil:drerngoo. manning suffißbirfil ieseonh t drtti h ey,pin e .hsg nc:o n kiftt a ,nh v y stawoahnuale.dxse a hs n Gm st that,doa ntvrheed eorn p withptlreplied ed wabetonte t : et r regard tr t g ahepeladat should Wbe prepared With for all possible improvements in their naval armaments. He looked upon the present vote not as the end but as the beginning of increased naval expenditure; and in the pre sent state of public affairs he thought that rigid economy was not expedient. He advocated the appointment of a committee to examine our n ava l ex p en dit ure and he believed their inquiry wo u ld b e o f grea t value. It was his opinion that the compulsory retirement of officers when they reached a certain age would not be attended with economy, and would be productive of a very bad feeling. After a few words from Admiral DUNCOMBE, Sir G. PECHELL deprecated an opinion he had heard ins the course of the debate that our neighbours were masters of the Channel. Sir J. PAK INGTON expressed his satisfaction at the manner in which the Government proposal had been re ceived by all the members of the house with the exception of the hon. baronet the member for Halifax, who had thrown into the debate a degree of political asperity which. he (Sir J. Pakington) had certainly endeavoured to avoid. He might say that they had made a step in the construc tion. of ships, when they had added in one year six line-of battle ships to the navy of England. The hon. and gallant admiral (Sir C. Napier), who he did not now see m hie place, had imputed to him that he had said France had the command of the Channel. Now, he begged to state most emphatically that he never said anything of the kind, and should be ashamed of himself if he could be capable 0. giving utterance to an y suc h express i on. H e utter l y an d entirely denied that he had ever said any such thing. On the contrary, they had now a force of line-of-battle shills in England, which constituted a most formidable power. It was in July that they ascertained the: state of the French navy, and in August•they immediately set to work and converted four ships into line-of-battle ships. They had also given orders for rifle cannon; but he did not know the quantity. He thanked the house for the kind atten tion with which they had heard him. Sir C. NAPIER said that the right hon. baronet had ships to put the men in.; but having ships was one thing, and getting men another. If the right hon. baronet had the power that France had of getting men by conscription Or inscription, and if he could, like France, send a fleet to sea in 24 hours, then, indeed, he might say that Franco had not the command of the Channel ; but, unless he could do that, then he (Sir C. Napier) would say that France had the command of the Channel ; and Franco had also, be begged to remark, the command of the Mediterranean. After a few words from Sir C. WOOD, in explanation of what he had said respecting the number of seamen and coast - guard men in the service, A voto of g,487,060 was then taken for payment of sea men and marines, and the house resumed. LOCAL ASSESSMENT EXEMPTION ABOLITION BILL. This bill, after a few words from Gen. Codrington, Mr. Estcourt, and Mr. Wilso u , was read a second time, and ordered to be committed. POOR-LAW BOARDS (PAYMENT OF DEBTS BILL). On the notion that this bill be, read a second time, Mr. Ald erman COPELAND said it was impossible that they could discuss the question at that moment. Some discussion took place, in which Sir J. Shelley, Mr. Ayrton, and other hon. members took part, the object of which was, not to proceed with the bill at that late hour of the night. After some conversation, the bill was read a second time. The other orders of the day were then dispesed of, and the house adjourned at a quarter-past ono o'clock. BIRTHS. BURCHETT.—On the 24th inst., at 3, Clarence-place, Re gent's-park, the wife of Henry Burchett, Esq., of a son. CUMBERBATCH.—On the 23d inst., at 12, Cadogan-place, Mrs. Lawrence Trent Cumberbatch, of a daughter. MARRIAGES BARNAR D — LoNG.—On the 24th inst at North Cadbury, Somerset, Th omas Barnard, Esq., ALP., of Cople, Bed fordshire to Isabella H. Theod or a, y ounges t d aug h ter • Henry L. Long, Esq., of Hampton-lodge, Surrey, and th Lady Catherine Long. PRA the 24th inst., at Christchurch, High bury, Richard Frail, jun., Esq., of Rochester, and of 19, Essex -street, Strand, solicitor, to Hester, the youngest daughter of Henry Stephen Gibbs, Esq., the Shrubbery, Highbury. DEATHS. COLLINS.—On the 23d inst., at Cheltenham, Wm. Collins) Esq., aged 66. CARLIN.—On the 24th in3t., Mr. Thomas Barnes Carlin, of 189, Regent-street, ana 12, Delamero-terrace, Hyde park. DrxoN.—On the 23d inst., at Brook-street, Londos, WE Dixon, Esq., of Govan, Glasgow. LONDON' : Printed and Published by WORD() YOUNG of No. 112, Strand, Printer, at The Sun Office, No. 112, Strand, in the Precinct of the Savoy, in the county o f Middlesex, ttturday, February 26, 1859. _ S I. "„ i "f 1 • Jo Ca Ca • gre, out ff ad nit, of t and WOT wa3 tak plot and tiefiF Cati ter, the NV] tra, wh str, sto brk Dal oft