The Sun. — London, England, 1860-03-14 00:00:00

that it was a European, and consequently a British interest, to lay, as the preamble of the treaty of Zurich calls it, " a large and solid base for the external and internal indepen dence of Italy." It was, therefore, for European objects that we employed the influence of Great Britain, and we em ployed it peacefully, with a view of reconciling differences, with a view of preventing war, with a view of laying the foundations of peace between the great Powers of Europe. But, sir, if in consulting at once the interests of Great Bri tain and of Europe it should be our fate at the same time to contribute in any, even the smallest degree, to the permanent independence of Italy, to the raising up of a people long sunk, to enable men of the most cultivated intellect and in pos session of every gift of knowledge to exercise their minds without the fear of consequences ; if we should be enabled to see that country again, which has been for three centuries sunk and degraded—to see her at length taking rank amongst the leading Powers of Europe, under the great abilities and honest heart of a prince of one of the most dis tinguished families in Europe, then I say that so far from being ashamed of contributing to that remit, or shrinking from any responsibility, I shall, on the contrary, always take pride to myself for having in any way brought it about. (Cheers.) Mr. WHITESIDE disputed the doctrine that the house could not examine into the conduct of a Government, except when discussing a vote of censure. There was no such practise known to the constitution, and therefore they must not be precluded from discussion. He did not mean to make any personal attack on the Emperor of the French. (Hear.) He agreed that it was the business of Ministers to promote peace, and to avoid intermeddling, and for that reason he could never understand why our ambassador had been withdrawn from Naples, but it was a totally different matter when they cane to a question touching the public law of Europe. He could not help remarking that the Swiss statesmen had foreseen this annexation of Savoy from the first, nor bad ever wavered in their warning ; but in passing he wished to say one word respecting the three statesmen on the Treasury benches. The Chancellor of the Exche quer was locked up in his budget, the Foreign Secretary had spoken out, but the Prime Minister had obstinately held his tongue, or at least had never uttered an intelligible sentence on this subject. The Swiss believed in a bargain between France and Sardinia, and they said so from the first, so that the noble lord had clear notice, and yet the noble lord made a statement in July, that the French Em peror did not contemplate annexing Savoy. He found that On the 26th September, another distinct statement was made to the Government on the part of Switzerland, pray ing them to remonstrate, or interfere and prevent the an nexation of Savoy. Nothing, however, was done by the noble lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs at that time. In December the Swiss minister at Paris once more repre• seated what had been represented so far back as July, but nothing followed consequent upon that statement. He found that on the 22d of December it was stated on the part of Austria that in the event of this question being mooted in the Congress she would use her utmost endeavours to maintain the independence of Switzerland, but no corres ponding statement had been made on the part of her Ma jesty's ministers. On the 9th of January it appeared the noble lord informed Captain Harris that the Government were anxious to do all in their power to secure the inde pendence of Switzerland ; but they did nothing. (Hear.) They did not even submit is the different Powers of Europe a 'Women* of the communications which had been re peatedly addressed to them by the Government of Switzer land. The Swiss Minister said that the matter was so serious, and so materially affected not only the independence but the very existence of Switzerland, that he trusted her Majesty's Government would give it their earnest consideration ; but notwithstanding that moving appeal no consideration was given it. There were some communications which the noble lord seemed not to have answered at all. On the 27th of January Lord Cowley wrote to the effect that he should be glad to receive instructions as to the language he ought to use with regard to the question of the annexation of Savoy and the county of Nice to France, and from that letter it appeared that up to the 27th of January the noble lord the Foreign Secretary had given no instructions on the subject. On the 28th of that month the noble lord, however, wrote an important despatch, in which he stated that the question of the annexation of Savoy would be re • garded as an act of territorial aggrandisement, and the com mencement of a now struggle between France and Europe. This was a very solemn and awful thought which was sug gested by the noble lord. (Hear, hear.) The despatch was a very good one so far as it went ; but the matter was al lowed to rest there, and no action was taken by the noble lord—no general remonstrance was made founded upon the international law of Europe which might be calculated to cheek any attempt at territorial aggrandisement. There lips a despatch contained in the book on the table which appeared very strange when they compared it with the language used by the French Emperor. On the 3d of February Sir J. Hudson, our Minister at Turin, was told by Count Cavour that the Sardinian Government had not the slightest intention of selling or ceding Savoy. The Swiss Minister had stated that from the beginning there was an arrangement for one party to give up Savoy and Nice for a consideration, and yet it was denied by Count Cavour that there was any agreement to that effect. Lord Cowley, how ever, wrote to the noble lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in February, stating that he had had an opportunity of ascertaining from Count Walewski that he recognised the accuracy of the report which he (Lord Cowley) had sent to the Foreign Secretary in July last, but had reminded him that such declaration was made in view of the strict accomplishment of the treaty of Zurich, and that if Sardinia was to be aggrandised by the annexation of the duchies, it must be at the cost of Savoy and the county of Nice, which must pass to France. That was very decided language. (Hear.) He should like to know when it was that Count Walewski made this communication to Lord Cowley. He understood that Count Walewski retired from office early in January, and therefore it must have been made in December. But with a knowledge of these facts, what did the noble lord do ? or what did the noble vis count, who was so bellicose when he had a small country in hand, do ? Neither of the noble lords did anything. The Emperor had said that among the possible arrangements discussed between the French and Sardinian Governments, when they found themselves fighting side by side against Austria, was the cession of Savoy and Nice to France in the event of certain contingencies arising. Count Cavour and the Emperor were, therefore, opposed to each other on a matter of fact, and he (Mr. Whiteside) was inclined to think it was the Emperor who was accurate. (Hear.) It was true that the noble lord the Foreign Secretary made four propositions, but he had no business to make them, for they were only meddling with matters which we had much better have left untouched. The whole matter came to this, that the French Emperor had said very truly the whole aspect of the question had been changed, and changed by her Ma. jesty's ministers—that the last of the four propositions led necessarily up to the annexation of Tuscany to Sardinia, and that led up to the contingency upon which the Emperor was to annex Savoy and Nice to France. He found that the noble lord the Foreign Secretary received a despatch on the 10th of February from Lord Cowley in which our ambassador stated he had had an opportunity of seeing the Emperor peror on th e su bj ec t o f t h e annexa ti on o f S avo y an d to France, and that his Majesty did not deny that, under certain eventualities, he might think it right to claim a proper frontier for France, and he 1 elieved the people of Savoy wished to be annexed to that country. The noble lord had written in one of his prOpositions that the will of the people ought to decide as to the annexation of certain provinces to Sardinia, and the French Emperor did not ob ject to that, but contended the same rule should apply with r egard to the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France. The Emperor had fairly retorted the ar gument of universal suffrage on her Majesty's ministers. Up to the present hour no appeal had been made on behalf of the interna tional law of Europe to the parties who, according to th e ex pl an ations given by the noble viscount and th e no bl e lord, ought all to have been consulted before these trea ties were subverted or set aside. He thought that this, was one of the most important questions which had come before the house for a considerable period, and chiefly be cause the noble lord had said that it touched the tranquillity of Europa. The Government should never object to a right understanding of the foreign policy of this country, because it was in vain for them to ask for a reduction of expenditure, while, according is the statement of the noble lord, the tran quillity of Europe was threatened by a policy which they themselves had encouraged if not even created. He did not wish to censure the French Emperor. He thought ho was a very able man ; he thought he wished to revive the tra ditions of the First Empire. He was an Emperor without an empire, and ho would like to furnish himself with one as easily as possible. (A laugh.) He had great designs ; he said the people of Savoy would rather live with him than under the present Government of Savoy ; but he now objected to universal suffrage, and said the thing might simply be done by the mayor. (Laughter.) Let him know how the thing was to be done, and he would march in with a corps and settle the dispute. (A laugh.) But let them observe what passed during all this time. On the 24th of Septem ber, the Emperor, at his interview with Mr. Cobden, told him that aggrandisement was the last thing he sought for ; that the race of men called Tories had prevented him get ting English coal, which could only be used in the French uavY, and that he believed they had some design against him ; and that he only desired to enter into a treaty of peace ancicommerce with England. Now, on the same day the Government were informed by Lord Cowley that two king doms were about to be annexed, and the most p olite letter in the world was written back in reply. He did not blame those gentlemen who wished to have a great market for their industry; he only compla ined that some of our mer e chants did not get all the consi d eration to which they were French en titled. The Emperor o f the was the ablest man on the continent of Europe as a sov er e ign, art and and h t e a , k p perhaps, rh a p s , said " I will give free trade to one p end Nice to myself." If anything falling from so humble Savoy an individual as himse lf co u l d ever reach th e ears of so great a potentate, he would remind him of that interesting anec d o te related of Napo l e on the Great on the last n i g h t f his voyage to St. Helena. There wasa conversation about a camp library, and the Emperor said he had his camp library with him. When they were within sight of the rock which was to be his grave he desired the library to be brought to him, and that having been done he took out a book, and, in a clear voice, read the story of a benevolent fairy. The story was this— A French farmer prayed to this benevolent spirit to give him what was best suited to his condition; and he asked first for health for himself and family, next for fruitful erops, then for an additional farm ; and his requests were granted. Then he asked for a park and a castle, which were also granted. But in a corner of the park there was a little slope belonging to a neighbouring farmer, and he conceived a desire to obtain it, but his neigh bour would not sell the slope, nor exchange, nor yield it. The fairy had warned the farmer not to ask for what was unreasonable, on the peril of being re if ~i ed to his former condition. The benevolent spirit warned him against inor dinate ambition, refused the territory, and restored him again to his position of destitution and poverty. The Em peror, having finished the story, closed the book, and said, 1 " This applies to me likewise; and behold lam at St. Helena." ) (Hear.) That was the picture of a very great man morals ; ing on the conduct which had led him to the condition in which he then stood. He (Mr. Whiteside) believed, with the noble lord, that the policy commenced in this particular matter was a policy of the last consequence to the peace of Europe, and he did not think he had been judicious in pro moting that policy; therefore he said that the inquiry for information was both reasonable and just. (Hear, hear.) Mr. MILNES thought that the hon. and learned gentle man had shown something like forgetfulness when he traced the picture of diplomatic confusion, of which he said he was totolly unable to discover a solution. That inability, how ever, appeared to arise from the omission of one part of the argument. The hon. and learned gentleman charged Count Cavour with that which was contrary to the fact. He (Mr. Wiles) believed that Count Cavour was incapable of such an act. He believed that in the conversation which took place at Plombieres, or somewhere else, the arrange ment was not that Savoy or Nice should be ceded if Sardi nia was aggrandised in any way, but only if Sardinia got possession of Lombardy, Venetia, and the quadrilateral. In that event Sardinia would assume a military position, and France was to be authorised to demand a rectification of her frontier by the cession of Savoy and Nice. But that condi tion had not been carried out—Venetia was not annexed to Sardinia, and the great quadrilateral remained a menace on the part of Austria to Sardinia and the security of Italy. Therefore Count Cavour was perfectly right in the position he took. Up to the present moment he absolutely asserted that if Savoy and Nice were separated from Sardinia it could only be by a force majeure on the part of France, and not in consequen.e of any agreement between the Emperor and M. Cavour. The Emperor of the French had now asserted that the annexation of Tuscany and the Duchies was equal for all the purposes of the agreement to the annexation at first contemplated, and therefore he claimed the cession of Savoy and Nice. In making that assertion the Emperor placed himself in a totally fresh position towards Sardinia, which M. Cavour never recognised, and M. Cavour main tained that if Sardinia were put in possession of Venetia, with a kingdom stretching from sea to sea, the question of the rectification of the frontiers of France might come legi timately before Europe. If, therefore, Savoy and Nice were given to France it would only be because Sardinia was not in a position to resist, and because having received from France the magnificent possession of Lombardy, it was im possible she could hold any other language except that al most of a dependent. He believed that Italy had a bright prospect before her, and he trusted the house would never, for any other consideration, lose sight of the great advan tage which would accrue to Europe and humanity from the national independence of that country. Mr. B. COCHRANE protested against the notion im plied in the noble lord's despatches, that countries had a right to choose their own rulers. There were some of the inhabitants of Zante who meant to petition the Congress, if a Congress were held on the affairs of Italy, and to ask that the lonian Islands might be annexed to the kingdom of Greece. How could the noble lord reply to that? The principle he had adopted was a most objectionable and sub versive one. The arguments used by the Emperor of the French to palliate the annexation of Savoy were such as would apply to Switzerland or any other small neighbour ing territory. And on the side of Nice, where was it pro posed to fix the new boundary of the French empire—at San Remo, or still further on, within the limits of Italian soil ? He (Mr. B. Cochrane) in perusing the additional Italian despatches, could trace the same spirit which ani mated the noble lord and the noble viscount in 1848, when they interfered in the affairs of Italy in such a manner that the independent parties throughout Italy felt that Italy had been betrayed by them. To show what the Piedmon tese thought of the policy which their Government had been led to pursue, he quoted a speech of Count Solar della Margherita, in the Parliament of Turin. Sardinia had never gained anything but loss and misery from any con nection with France, and if the King now gave up to France his ancient territory it would be a discredit to him. Mr. HORSMAN said he had been surprised at the altered tone of the noble lord on the previous night. The noble lord said that if the annexation of Savoy took place, then England would have no alternative but either war or silent acquiescence. Now he (Mr. Horsman) would not accept that alternative. As for war, he believed there would be an unanimous opinion amongst all the members of that house in condemnation of any Minister who should make the annexation of Savoy to France at this moment a ques tion of war ; and there was no prominent part that he him self would not take in impeaching a Minister who could be guilty of such a criminal act. Then what other alternative was there ? The noble lord's own despatch of Jan. 28 con tained a paragraph stating that great alarm and distrust would be excited throughout Europe by the annexation of Savoy. But there was a contrast between that despatch, which treated it as an European question, and the lan guage of the noble lord now, which seemed to lower it to a question between Savoy and France, as to the transfer of a few mountain tops and a few hundred thousand inhabitants. That was not the question, but the question was one of giving a new military frontier to a great military power, with a pass through the mountains for the conveyance of its artillery. This was the object which France now sought to obtain. For the last 45 years France had been complaining of the treaties of 1815, which she viewed as a great wrong and a grievance to herself. The Emperor Napoleon had held out the hope to France that he would be the person destined to relieve her from this humiliation. But what had France to complain of ? The nations of Europe, which had been trampled under the heel of Frame for 15 years, the nations of Europe determined that France should have a clearly de fined frontier. At that time there was a proposal for the dismemberment of France, and the Duke of Wellington pre vented it. But the Duke of Wellington, though he was in favour of keeping France still a great power, was of opinion that her frontier ought to be clearly defined ; and now, what right had any one nation, what right had Sardinia, to say that France should make herself larger ? It was quite evi dent that by the war of last year France had entered on a new career of self-aggrandisement and conquest. The ob vious course for us to pursue, since England herself would be endangered by this, was to form alliances and combina tions with those powers which might be threatened as well as ourselves. The lust of conquest in France, if it were now indulged, would become stronger. The policy of Eng land in past times had been such as he now recommended; it was our traditional policy. He thought our Government would have done more wisely on this occasion if they had entered into a prospective alliance with Prussia, as a pro test that could not have been mistaken against this aggres sion and challenge to Europe. In his view this would have been the sound and wise policy to have adopted, and then England would have been taking a dignified attitude, in stead of hugging a commercial treaty with France while this was going on. The policy of total acquiescence was a dangerous and unworthy policy. Lord H. VANE regretted that discussions like this, which wero of a provoking character, and could attain no object, should be prolonged ; and he disapproved of the vitupera tion of the head of the French Empire, in which some hon. gentlemen indulged. But he thought the deliberate opi nion of the House of Commons ought to be pronounced on this question. He regretted that so much of the correspon dence that had taken place on this subject between our Fo reign Secretary and our Ambassador had been in private letters. He hoped that her Majesty's Government would take care that hereafter there should be a record of any im portant conversation that took place between the Minister of F oreign Affairs and our Ambassador in France. It was impossibl e that the House of Commons should be informed of the events that took place if matters of this kind were wrapped up i n secret correspondence. In fact, he had heard i t statementrai saete it said that a great portion of the correspondence relating laid a i ob d f ya privateir a before irs, the a nd correspondence H that o u s s e o o much u C c h o m t 0 hf m at t o h n no s no fair busi nessfair was n t to t foreign ao fairw re a i g li a affairs view was placed before th a t h ouse. Mr. D. GRIFFITH said it had alwayseen bassumed that the proceedings in Centr a l Italy had been caused d o ther parties, and had not been th e spontaneousn c by act of the people themselves. He was • con - vinced, however, that though there had been some pressure on Sardinia, the Go vernment of Sardinia had by no means been the cause of this movement. On the contrary, he believed that the Go vernment of Sardinia was extremely unwilling after the treaty of Villafranca to be mixed up with the affairs of Central Italy. Since that treaty various propositions for the settle ment of Italy had been made, but the people had never changed for a moment, and there was little doubt that at this moment they had shown their desire by their votes to be an nexed to Sardinia. The policy of non-intervention followed by her Majesty's Government had had an important effect on Italy and on the peace of Europe generally. The Em peror of the French might say to Sardinia, "True, I did not give you Venetia as I had promised, but if you obtain Cen tral Italy that will be an equivalent." Central Italy, how ever, was never the Emperor's to give, and he (Mr. Griffith) believed that no small portion of the present difficulty arose from the fundamental error which bad gone through the whole of these transactions, that the proceedings in, and aspirations of Central Italy were merely at the suggestion of the government of Sardinia, instead of being the sponta neous acts of the people. Mr. KINNAIRD asked the noble lord whether any se curity had been taken, as was currently reported, for the protection of the neutrality of Switzerland by the cession of Faucigny and Chablais ? Viscount PALMERSTON—I am anxious to say a few words in reply to what has been advanced in the course of this debate. The hon. and learned gentleman (Mr.White side) misunderstood that which I stated on a former occa sion; for he said that I laid down the principle that if this subject were d e b a t e d a t a ll it mus t b e b y th e censure e ith er of the Emperor o f th e F renc h or o f h er M a j es t y ' s Govern ment, and that I wished to preclude the house from expres sing its opinion or discussing the matter, except with a view IRE SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVENINC I , MARCH. 14, 1860. to the actual censure of one or the other government. My observation related solely to what had fallen from the right hon. gentleman the member for Bucks, whom I understood to say that the conduct of her Majesty's Government lay open to considerable animadversion. It never entered into my mind to lay down the doctrine that Parliament was not to discuss a matter of great European interest connected with the foreign relations of this country, and the affairs of Europe, unless that discussion had reference to a direct reso lution of censure. I certainly never laid down a doctrine so inconsistent with the proper functions of Parliament. I think that the course which her Majesty's Government have pursued upon this matter is much more clear and consistent than would appear from the observations of the hon. and learned gentleman. When first this question of the cession of Savoy and Nice to France was spoken of as a matter still in doubt, my noble friend immediately instructed her Majesty's ambassador at Paris to question the French mi- - - nister as to the fact, and to ascertain whether there was any foundation in the statement. He did so, and was told by Count Walewski that the notion had been abandoned. (Hear, hear.) After that there were rumours, no doubt, that the plan was still in contemplation, but it is well known that it had been settled upon the peace of Zurich that whenever the treaty should be signed, a congress should be assembled for the purpose of taking cognisance of the treaty of Zurich, and of taking into consideration the settlement of the affairs of Italy. If that had been done the natural course would have been to state at the congress the opinions which England or any other power might have entertained on any arrangement dependent upon, subsequent to, or consequent upon, the arrange ments of Zurich and the settlement of the affairs of Eu rope. There would, therefore, have been no great use in this country entering into an angry correspondence with the French Government upon a contingent event which would depend upon discussions in the congress, whenever that congress might take place. The house is aware that the treaty of Zurich was much delayed ; and as the con gress wasnot to meet till the treaty had been signed, it was not until the end of last, or, I believe, the beginning of the present year, that it became known that the congress had come to nought. When we became aware that the congress would not be assembled, my noble friend, as appears from the papers which have been laid before parliament, did ex press a very strong opinion to the French Government with regard to the contemplated cession of Savoy and Nice. I did not quite understand which of the two opinions that the honourable and learned gentleman has expressed be entertains, because at one moment he seemed to censure my noble friend for not having expressed the opinion of England with sufficient firmness and strength, and at another time he criticises my noble friend's despatch for being too strong and energetic. The course which her Ma jesty's Government pursued was one that in my opinion showed considerable discretion, and was the one that ought to have been adopted. In the first place, as was stated by my right hon. friend (Mr. Horsman), it was quite clear that this was not an occasion upon which the issue of peace or war would depend. Whatever opinion we might entertain upon the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, no one can maintain that that cession would involve so directly the in terests of this country that it would justify the Government in going to war with France to prevent it. France would not, so far as we were concerned, be more formidable because she had Savoy and Nice than she would be without them, and therefore our interference ought not to be viewed by the French Government or the French nation as arising from any jealousy of the power of France ; because so far as England is concerned France would not be stronger with the two provinces nor weaker without them. And there fore it was not from any apprehension that we originated the negotiation; nor is the case one in which, should that negotiation not succeed, this country would think it right to take up arms to prevent the cession from being com pleted. (Hear.) That being agreed on all sides, I think it is clear that the measures which have been suggested in the course of this discussion would not have been expedient. We are told, for instance, that we ought to have applied to the great powers of Europe, and to have entered into an alliance with Prussia, and Austria, and Russia, to prevent the transaction from taking place. The way to prevent it was to point out to the Government of France the objec tions that suggested themselves to our minds; for unless we had been of opinion that it was a matter of sufficient importance to justify the country in taking up arms, my own opinion is to have endeavoured to array a hostile con federacy against France would have been an injudicious method of endeavouring to accomplish our purpose. (Hear.) It would have raised the national feel ings of the French nation; it would have stimulated the sense of dignity of the French Government ; it would have borne the appearance of compulsion when we were not prepared to exercise compulsion ; and therefore it would be calculated to prevent the accomplishment rather thanto for ward the attainment of our wishes. (Hear.) That which it was expedient to, do, when it was evident that there would not be an opportunity of bringing this matter under the discussion of the assembled council of Europe, was to state fairly and distinctly, as my noble friend did, to the French Government, the objections which ho saw to the project, and then to communicate those objections to the other great Powers, in order that they, knowing what we had done, might take a correspeading step on their part, and make known their objections likewise to the French Government. That was what we did, and it appears to me that that was the course which it was best to adopt to ac complish our purpose without wounding the dignity or France, and without placing the French Government in a position in which they could not yield to any demand with out a sacrifice of dignity and honour. (Hear.) The hon. and learned gentleman says that he does not yet know what are my opinions upon this matter. My opinions agree entirely with those of my noble friend, and I perfectly sub scibe to every word in those despatches which have been laid upon the table, and of which, I think, almost every body, with the exception of the hon. and learned gentle man—has expressed his approbation. Indeed, I almost think that the hon. gentleman himself, on a former occa sion, did justice to the spirit with which my noble friend has represented the opinions of her Majesty's Governmes in this correspondence. (Hear, hear.) I think it would 14 a great mistake on the part of the French Government if they were to persist in this plan. (Cheers.) When the pre-- sent Emperor of the French mounted the throne, or rather when he first became the ruler of France, there were no doubt excited in the minds of a great many of the Govern - ments of Europe apprehensions founded upon an opinion that he might adopt the policy of his uncle, which was a policy that had involved the whole of Europe in the ca lamities of war. Well, the Emperor took an early occa sion to declare that the empire meant peace, and that was a declaration that was received with the greatest pleasure and satisfaction by the whole of Europe. It inspired a con fidence in his policy—in the future policy which it was sup posed to be his intention to :pursue. Ido not hold that what took place last year was any departure from that policy. (Hear, hear.) France undertook a noble enterprise—it undertook the enterprise of freeing Italy from foreign domi nation, including, let it be remembered, French domina tion ; for part of the scheme was that when Italy should be free, France, as well as Austria, should retire from any future interference in her affairs. (Hear, hear.) It would have been a most honourable and a most glorious result, and it will still be—if the result should so turn out—if, after having restored Italy to that freedom and independence of which she had so long been deprived, France had been con tent with the glory of the achievement without mixing with a generous enterprise any small and petty motive of self aggrandisement. (Cheers.) If reasons are assigned why this cession is demanded, I cannot admit that there is any force or strength in them. It is said, for instance, that if Piedmont were a small power, she would continue to be a harmless neighbour to France ; but that if Piedmont were enlarged so as to comprise eight, ten, or eleven millions of population, then she would become for midable as a neighbour, and that therefore an additional security was required to the French frontier. Still I must observe that when that language is held by a country con taining upwards of 30 millions—l believe 35 or 36 millions— of people, the most warlike on the earth, full of resources and compact of territory—when, I say, a country like that as serts that she is in danger from a neighbour with 10 or 12 million inhabitants, it is an argument that cannot for a moment be seriously maintained. (Hear.) But then it is said that France must have her natural boundary, and that the population of Savoy speak the French language. Now ; in the first place, history tells us that natural boundaries are no defence whatever. What instance is there on record in which an army, sufficient in strength and determined to invade a country, was over stopped either by rivers or by mountains ? And, therefore, whether the Alps, or the watershed of the Alps, are in the possession either of France or Sardinia—France, being the strongest power of the two, would be able whenever she pleased to enter Italy ; and if Sardinia should ever be insane enough to fancy that she could attack France, I think the French armies would be able to give an account of the invaders as would not en iforl re in. the T h econfederation them to repeat the attempt. (Laughter.) But then it is said th a t S ar di n i a m i g ht b e come a member of a confe deracy against France, and that she might afford a passage tothelotroopsofo t h er countries. muste 0 n The si st of answer powers o t o northt is is pf the Alps, by ps,and it is not lik e ly th a t th e y wo uld go i n to It a ly e p rn u p rp ir o e se is o :p fc e r n o e s e sing the Alps when they might enter Fan way of her eas t ern f ron ti er. (H ear, h ear. ) B u t r t (and I believed the intention of the Emperor in enunciating that idea was perfectly • • it is not conceivable that any confederae wotlde si be nl f ere . ), d e ai r bs to ldi sa England hnedae,r atnod n i n tEuropeh the i p rtoi r hnu o ec p ci o op s ml d for the purpose of invading Prance. 'Y (lrear h v e e a r r l ot h m av e e o s a o s i said io t n h w a o that there Savoy,c h h e r would o is u ih n du o t bt d ehaonersegt pre cedentproposed s upon which that precedent would be founded. If to the question of natural boundaries, and lay down y the e doctrine that the country which claims them is to be the judge of what they are—(hear, hear)—it i s easy to see that E ur ope would find it very difficult to foretell where the danger would begin, and where resistance upon a great sc a l e would not be required. (Hea r. ) If language is to be th e measure of self-aggrandisement it w ould be difficult to say that many countries have a secure title to the possessions which they now hold. These two principles, therefore—natural . boun daries and language—are princip les which it would be very dangerous to Europe to see established in practice, however small the circumstance may be in regard to which it is now sought to carry them into effect. (Hear, hear.) There is one point, indeed, in respect to which the cession of Savoy to France would be attended with direct danger to a country the independence and neutrality of which it s 1 the interests of Europe and of France herself to anaintait.- __ l mean Switzerland. (Hear.) lam asked whet ter any' steps have been taken to provide for the security of Swig' ,:erland lin the event of that cession taking p lace. ' A Ve, . have not taken any such steps, and I will tell the house I v b ,y we h ave not. If you begin talking about the medificat l'oll of a mea sure which you want to present in its entirety , youweaken the ground upon which you stand. (Hear.) 3 A will be time enough to talk of that when the cession has ' • become inevit able ; and therefore it would not have been p rudent to have begun to talk to France about the condition on which the cession of Savoy should take place, so long to s it was the in tention of the Government to try and prevea , t the annexa tion from taking place at all. On what gra finds, then, I may ask, can the Government aid the house , entertain the opinion that the cession may not be effected? In the first place, the Emperor has stated that Savoy sht till not be taken by force of arms. In the next place, LT has . stated that it shall not be taken without the consent of the sovereign and the people; and lastly, that it shall mot be t 'eken. - without consulting—and when you say without cons tilting, it fol. lows that you mean without obtaining the a ass nt—of the other Powers of Europe. If, then, these cc ou'litions here laid down are abided by—if France abstains &coin force, ob tains the consent of the sovereign and the :pe ople, and the assent of the other Powers—l say we are cam. eto a point at which we are justified in hoping tkat reason, r eflection, and a due regard to the interests and honour of Fa •anee may in duce the French Government to abandon t'ae project which it has entertained. (Hear.) But we are 1 ;old that we have laid down a doctrine with regard to Ti weeny which we ought also to apply to the lonian Islands. The answer to that is obvious. In the first place, we did not propose uni versal suffrage to the people of Tuscar L y; but the great difference between Tuscany and the loi aian Islands is one that applies also to Savoy. In Tuscany r, as in Modena and Parma, the sovereign had fled. He / lad done just what James 11. did when he left this cm entry without a Go vernment; and a provisional government of their own having been formed the people had, determined that they would not have their runaway soy ereign bank again. We are not the sovereigns but . the protectors of the lonian Islands, at all events we have 'not yet run away from them, and till that happens there is - no parallel between the cases. (Hear.) The same may be sai Aof Savoy—the King of Sar dinia still reigns in Savoy, a' ad therefore I maintain that the people of that country ire not in the position of the Tuscans, to say of their own authority to whom they will belong. (Hear, hear.) It.apr mars to me that we have upon the whole pursued the tours e which wasbest adapted for the purpoeo via had in view. 1 Ve inquired of the French Go vernment if they entertains 1 such an intention as had been imputed to them, and they I mid they did not. We knowing that in case the event ui Jon which the question hinged t a king place, we should ha- re an opportunity of moving the question in congress waited till it should be assembled, and when we found that it was not to meet we communicated to the French Government t he strong objections we enter tained to the project. WI ten we had done so, without at tempting to array the other Powers of Europe in a hostile confederacy against Franc a, we communicated our views to those Powers, and as ti ie French Government has an nounced that it will cons' alt them, they will be obliged, in answer, to state to Franc e the opinions which they hold. In our opinion the question. is one of European interest and I cannot imagine that the other Powers of Europe will not take the same view of it that we have done—a view not tinged with passion or jealousy, or one to which France can justly take umbrage. Our objections are founded upon prin ciples of general European interests, in which I hold France has as much concern as any of the rest. We have stated in a calm and temperate manner the reasons which have in duced us to think that the proposed step would be unad visable, and I cannot divest myself of the impression that the Government of France would gain more by preserving the good opinion of this country, by retaining the confi dence of Europe, and by disarming the great Powers of all feelings of jealousy and suspicion of warlike designs on the part of France. To my mind they would gain far more by that than by any advantage which they could de rive by the acquisition of some mountain tops and half a million of new subjects. (Cheers.) With regard to the other point adverted to, I cannot but congratulate the house and country upon the prospect which seems to be held out—that quiet determination on the part of Tuscany to unite herself to Sardinia, and that there will be created in North and Central Italy a state which by the freedom of her institu tions, and by the independence it will have acquired, will hold out a fair prospect that Italy may for a third time place herself in that eminence, as a portion of the civilised world, which she occupied in the days of the Roman Emperors, and afterwards in those periods when the revival of arts and letters placed Italy, though not then a great military power in a position of honotu• and glory that as long as history re mains will be looked back to with pride and admiration. (Cheers.) I cannot but think that Italy, which has dis played such public spirit, and which has developed so much talent and patriotism, is that Italy of which England may be proud of having given her moral weight and influence to in order to bring such a state of things about. (Cheers.) It is moat important to contrast the judgment and the modera tion and temper, of those statesmen who during the last twelve months have contributed so much to Italian renown, with that less laudable spirit which prevailed in 1848—a temper and moderation which may indeed give us the most mums-lane hop°m of fvohu... I ~.11l only any with ragstra to that Italian statesman whose name has been often men tioned in this debatte—Count Cavour—that though there may be those whose views he has defeated and whose policy he has thwarted, yet that the future will respect him as one of the most distinguished patriots that ever adorned the history of that country—a country which is under as great obligations to him as any nation ever owed any one of its members, and feeling this, and the success which has attended his policy, he need not be disturbed by the criti cism which his public actions may in any country have oc casioned. (Cheers.) Mr. DISRAELI observed—As some observations of mine appears to have given rise to this debate, I wish to say a few words before its close. It is gratifying to see that the noble lord at the head of the Government has recalled that con stitutional dogma which he laid down in so general a man ner on a previous occasion, that in case the Opposition in the House of Commons was not satisfied altogether with the course of foreign affairs pursued by the Government it was their duty to originate an immediate vote of censure. The noble lord now says that I indulge in animadversions on the conduct of the Ministry, and therefore I am bound to make some such motion. But what I said was that their conduct was involved in so much mystery that it required explanation, and I particularly guarded myself against any other object in it than a desire to obtain information upon some particular points; and, indeed, it was quite clear from the course of the discussion, and especially from what fell from the Foreign Secretary, that it was a perfectly rational desire on my part, and that it was the duty of the Government to take measures to give the information which was required by the house. Under that impression the noble lord gave notice of a motion, that he would this even ing, on the presentation of papers, make a defence of the conduit of the Government as to those points which ap peared to us to require explanation. The noble lord the First Minister has spoken of some in this house who would make the annexation of Nice and Savoy to France a cause of de claring war. The noble lord never heard from me any ex pression of that sort. The noble lord has spoken of some who would make the annexation of those Sardinian pro vinces to France as good reasons why measures should be taken by England to form a league among the great Powers of Europe. Again, I say, he never heard an expression of that kind from me. The noble lord will also admit that the modest proposition of a pretest the other evening received on my part no sanction. But as that subject has given rise to so much misconception on the part of one hon. gentle man who took part in those discussions (the hon. gentle man the member for Birmingham), and who does not show the same ability upon this as upon other topics, I might inform the hon. gentleman who accuses the gentlemen who sit on this side of the house of desiring to involve the country in a war with France, because they recommend a protest against annexation, that the very fact of having re course to a protest is prima facie evidence that the country is not going to war, and that it is a diplomatic instrument as formal as any treaty or convention—that it is not merely a burst of rhetoric, but it is an instrument which expresses and records the feelings of nations when they may not think it advisable or prudent to have recourse to extreme measures; and the present Government is not the Government, nor the present Foreign Secretary the Minister, who should raise anyolbjection to a course of that kind, or hold it up to the notice of the house and the country as one of an irritating and hostile character, for in the case of Cracow—a case where very grave doubts were entertained, even by eminent jurists, that there had been any violation of the Treaty of Vienna—the English Government of that day did not go to war, but protested, feeling that there had been a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, and sent formal protests to the dif ferent courts. The Prime Minister of that day is the Foreign Secretary who now sits opposite. (Hear, hear.) I now come to the explanation of the Foreign Secretary. He presented a paper to-day, after a formal notice that he would explain the policy of the Government on the impending annexation of Savoy and Nice, but he forgot to make any explanation about that annexation. His whole speech was on the settle ment of Italy, and se far as the case which I was able to put before the house at the end of a long debate the other night, but which was placed before the house to-night with bril liant and logical precision by my hon. and learned friend the member for Dublin University, he never afforded us any information. He never denied that statement which I made, though not with the confidence which I have now in its accuracy, as to the repeated warnings with which the noble lord was furnished as to the policy of the French Govern ment. The whole of his observations on this head were most meagre and limited as regards annexation—the noble lord made an unfortunate start from the begin ning. His first observation was made as if he would startle this side of the house, but, in reality, it com pletely wrecked his own case, for he said that this affair of the proposed, annexation of Savoy was known to the late Government; that it was known to Lord Malmesbury ; and he said that the records of the Foreign-office would not show that Lord Malmesbury had received any satisfactory reply. I might a t ano th er ti me a tt em pt t o p rove that he h a d a satisfactory reply ; but I take the noble lord's own show ing, and upon that it i s pl a i n th a t if hi s p re d e cessor had not received a satisfactory reply it was evidently the duty of the noble lord to have pressed for one. (Hear.) I retaeraber once being told, when we were seated on the benches oppo site, that we took with the responsibility of office the en gagements of our predecessors. If that principle be true in our case, it is also just in that of the noble lord ; and the very fact that the answer to Lord Malmesbury by the French Government was net satisfactory should be the very reason why the noble lord should prick up his ears and obtain satisfactory information as to the annexation of Savoy. However, there is no doubt from the evidence that the noble lord was obliged to make some inquiries, and he received that answer, as appears from the papers, at an early period —in July —announcing that the Imperial Government had given up all intention of that annexation. During the inter val between July and the despateh of January the noble lord received frequent intimations from our own ambassa- dor at Paris of the intention of the French Government to revert to their original policy in contemplation of the events in Italy. There is no doubt whatever now, that besides this information from our own ambassador, from the first the Swiss Government, deeply interested in this question (for their existence as an independent and free people entirely depended upon it), pressed in every way upon the repre sentatives of the Queen and the Government, directly and indirectly, their great anxiety upon the subject. But what is the defence of the noble lord ? He does not contradict one of our facts, but rather confirms them. It was the most singular defence ever offered by a minister, and especially by one in the responsible position of the noble lord. His defence is this—lt is very true those representations were made to me, but I thought nothing of them—that they were mere threats, and I treated them with indifference. But have those threats turned out to be mere threats—on the contrary, have they not turned out to be grave events which have been accomplished ; and I believe, notwithstanding the prospect the noble lord held out to us, they are on the eve of completion. (Hear, hoar.) What are we to think, then, of a Minister who treats those intimations as mere insincere threats—turn out to be grave, well-considered, and mo mentous information on a subject of the highest policy. To my mind it implies a want of perception. I say that from July to the end of January, when that almost solitary de spatch was written—so far as a despatch expressing a policy is concerned—the noble lord was completely or ought to have been entirely aware that the policy of the French Go vernment was, that if Sardinia was to be aggrandised by the annexation of the duchies and Tuscany, as a matter of course France would demand annexation to herself of Savoy and Nice. With that information before him, I say the noble lord pursued a policy which favoured and assisted the aggrandisement of Sardinia, and to that degree and in that manner the noble lord was inevitably carrying out and pursuing the policy of France in respect to the extension of its present frontiers. This appears to me to be quite unac countable. At any rate it has not received any answer from the noble lord, or from the first Minister. I also inquired why the noble lord devised a policy for the settlement of Italy at the commencement of the month of January, which was re corded in the four propositions—why, when those proposi tions were communicated to the great powers, the noble lord did not communicate at the same time the cognisance which he had of the inevitable policy of the French Government, if the scheme expressed in the four proposals were successfully realised in Italy. Upon that point we have had no answer. The great powers appear to have been left, so far as England is concerned, completely in the dark. Indeed, there is one de spatch which has not been mentioned in the discussions of to night, namely, the despatch of the 6th of February, from Lord Bloomfield to the noble lord, in which he stated that the Prussian Minister, in a state of some anxiety, inquired from the noble lord (of coarse having received information from the Swiss Minister) what her Majesty's Government had heard respecting the annexation ; what it was their in tention to do ; and Lord Bloomfield said there were no in structions from the noble secretary except this, that the English Government had received no official, no formal communication upon the subject, and, in fact, that therefore the better thing would be to leave the matter alone. Now we know what the noble lord meant by saying that he had re ceived no official communication, because his communications were in private letters—those letters respecting which I im pressed upon the house the ether night the importance of expressing some opinion as to their production. Private let ters are perfectly legitimate so long as they are private, but they will bring the utmost confusion into public affairs if public functionaries are permitted to fall back from public despatches upon private communications. I say, then, that on the second point on which I wished for information— namely, why the noble lord in communicating with our allies on the subject of Italy did not frankly inform them of what would be the probable consequences if this policy were suc cessful as regards the expansion of the frontiers of France — we have no explanation from the noble lord. We have an explanation, or dissertation, from the First Minister on the settlement of Italy instead of upon the an nexation of Savoy. The noble viscount takes a totally dif ferent view of the whole affair from that taken by his col league :—The reason Is by we took the course we did was that we expected everything would be settled in Congress, and therefore, as a Congress was expected, and as annexation would not take place until Congress met, we thought it un necessary to express our opinion to the French Government, to communicate to our allies and other Powers of Europe, or to take any steps regarding a policy which was, in the opinion of the Government, at least a most pernicious and perilous policy, and which might be averted or counter acted. Such is the statement of the First Minister. Let us now see what there is of solidity in the clif f...clic° betwocn tlao two noblo lords, and what excuse there is in that ♦iew of the case for this ap parently unparalleled neglect. I can treat it as negligence by using the lightest phrase. If the statement of the noble lord be correct, when did the difficulty arise which made the French Government first recur to the original policy of an nexation, and when did the idea first became prevalent that congress would not take place. There is no doubt that it was towards the end of November, when the difficulties connected with carrying into effect the treaty of Zurich be came generally felt amongst all practical statesmen, tha t Count Walewski intimated to the English Government that in consequence of those difficulties and the preliminaries of Villafranca not being carried out, it would be necessary for the French Government to re-consider their position, and if the result of doing so should be that Sardinia would be greatly aggrandised by the annexation of several Italian provinces, France must look to the annexation of Savoy and Nice as necessary towards the completion of her military frontier. Ido not believe there is a sane man, or one among all the statesmen who were cognisant of the real state of affairs, who believed that the idea du congress be fore the end of December was not utterly impracticable. What were the steps taken then ? The First Minister dwells upon the congress as the cause which was to absolve the Government from the consequences of their negligence. We know by the records before us that at the end of De cember or early in January the greatest anxiety prevailed in Europe upon the subject. The Swiss Government took every passible step to bring their anxious views before our Government, but I do not find that we took any steps in consequence to re-assure Switzerland or to influence France, or to lay before her those considerations of a high and pure morality of which the First Minister had been so exuberant to -night. (Cheers.) I want to knew whether the Queen's Ambassador, or the Secretary of State, or any one in authority or influence, was authorised to lay before the Emperor those considerations militating against his intended policy which the noble lord ex pressed to-night, and for which he received the ap probation of the house ? We have no evidence of it. There is no evidence that a single thing was done during the six weeks until Jan. 27th. Wo know now from private let ters that Count Walewski was frank and sincere in his ex planations of his policy to our Government, although the noble Secretary treated it as mere rumour and idle menace. The Swiss Government took every possible means, with the great energy and perseverance characteristic of the race, to bring the proposed fate of their country before the English Government. We know well that apparently her Majesty's Minister in Paris was not wanting, and that even when Lord Cowley was absent our charge d'affaires wrote a de spatch—not a common despatch, but one which in 24 hours ought to have been responded to in a manner that would have influenced the opinion of the Court at which he was a resident. But I see nothing until a few days before Parlia ment met, and then I find a despatch from Lord Cowley, who, seeing the storm that was rising, and referring to what he described as interpellatiens in both Houses of Parlia ment, and knowing that, although he had warned the Mi nister frequently, his warnings had been expressed in docu ments which it would not be parliamentary to refer to, abso lutely did that which, as far as my experience goes, is un known, and referred for his vindication in a public despatch to his private letters. (Hear, hear) An ambassador must be hard pressed indeed and a Minister must be in a peculiar position to be driven to take such a step as this. A few days before Parliament met we had this high-sounding de spatch, and we have had high-sounding despatches before. We remember the Russian war and the circumstances which led to that war. There was a great secret disclosed then which might not, but for an accident, have been revealed for 50 years—l allude to the communication which took place between the late Emperor and Sir H. Seymour. What happened then ? We then had the history of the last of the De Medicis and the war of succession over again, and that despatch, written with so much literary ability, did not prevent the Russian war, and we ought to take warn ing by it—that a rhetorical despatch is not a spe cific against an impending war, if there are causes which render that war imminent. So far as this discus sion is concerned, arising from the observations I made on Friday night, I sum it up in this way, that with ample in formation as to the intentions of the French Government, in case of the aggrandisement of Sardinia, to annex Savoy to the French empire, the Queen's Government took no step whatever to influence the French Government to adopt a contrary policy to the one they had pursued, but they pur sued a policy in Italy which necessarily led to annexation. Well then, sir, we have received no information upon the second point as to whether, when the Government commu nicated formally their plan for the settlement of Italy, the French Government did not simultaneously communicate to them the fact that the adoption of that policy must necessarily bring about the annexation of Savoy to France. We have had no answer to that question to-night, though we have had the reply of the two most eminent men in the Ministry. Now, sir, what has been the conduct of France upon this question ? Whenever we have made inquiry upon the matter the noble lord the Foreign Secretary has told us that these questions might kayo a Very pernicious effee upon our relations with our near neighbour, and the noble lord has denounced these inquiries as prejudicial to the public interests, and that it would be more statesmanlike to inquire into the subject in a more formal manner. (Hear, hear.) If the noble lord had got up in his place and had said that a discussion on this annexation could not take place without serious injury to the public interests, and if he had appealed to the patriotic forbearance of the Opposi tion, then, so far at least as I am concerned, not a word from that time would have issued from my lips. (Hear, hear.) But the noble lord laid the papers upon the table, and he thereby solicited the opinion of the house. There may be gentlemen in this house who consider the conduct of the French Emperor as alarming to Europe, and that it ought to be resisted by the Great Powers of Europe, but those hon. gentlemen did not sit on that (the Opposition) side of the house. Well, the noble lord has placed the papers upon the table of the house, and I never know that there was any other meaning in that other than that it was intended to invite inquiry into the conduct of the Go vernment, but not necessarily to pass a censure upon the Government. It seems now that the taste of the present Government is always in the extreme, they desire our ap proval or our censure. (Hear.) But the House of Com mons have a duty to fulfil ; if upon reading the papers placed before them they find them imperfect, obscure, or involved in mystery, and if any part required explanation, they were bound to take the usual parliamentary means of making the inquiry sufficient—(hear, hear)—and I am not aware that any other means have been taken up to this time than those which the custom of Parliament allows in en deavouring to obtain more accurate information than yet placed on the table of the house. (Hear.) Well, then, sir, let us look at our relatiens with France, and see whether there is any danger of those relations being prejudiced in consequence of this apprehended annexation of Savoy and Nice. I said the other night, and I repeat it to-night, that so far from the conduct of the French Government to wards the English Government and the English nation on this matter of annexation is concerned, it has been a frank, candid, and a sincere policy—(hear, hear) —nothing to complain of as regards the conduct of France ; and I cannot see that there is any cause of quarrel with France. (Hear, hear.) The French Government have given timely and repeated notice of their Emperor's policy, and they have told our Government that if Sar dinia were aggrandised, France must annex Savoy and Nice. There was a notion prevalent after the treaty of Zurich that that aggrandisement would not take place, and then France said she would renounce her policy. Among the latest documents we find that France expressed her inten• tion, if the settlement of Italy as then contemplated should take place in the spirit of that treaty, viz., that if the duchies should be annexed, to renounce the policy to which she had previously referred. I want to know then what cause of quar rel we have with France ? May all powers, I say, behave towards us with the same frankness and candour. France said distinctly that if Sardinia were aggrandised it would be inevitable that she should not be restricted to her present frontier ; and yet with that knowledge the Foreign Minister of this country favoured the policy which he knew would inevitably lead to that result. (Hear, hear.) It might be better for England that Sardinia should be a more powerful state, and that France should have her frontier extended, but the Government could not now turn round and denounce France for annexing the Sardinian provinces, when she had month after month told them that their policy would inevit ably lead to this result if an addition of territory were made to Sardinia. (Hear.) Therefore I say, sir, these are not dis cussions which will tend to irritate the French Emperor or the French nation, but they will tend to injure somebody else. (Hear.) I think we ought to remove this bugbear from our minds. Do not let us be thwarted by the Goyernmentfrora expressing our opinion on the subject, which is one of unpa ralleled importance to this country, and a discussion upon it ought not to be stifled by the Government. (Hear.) The noble lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has been brood ing over the affairs of Italy ever since his first visit to that country, and he should, therefore, have matured his arrange ments with more facility. He might say that it is a very serious thing that Savoy and Nice should belong to France; but on the other hand we might add that we are in the hands of eminent statesmen, who by their ceaseless labours, by their happy vigilance, and by their blending of courage and dis cretion, have secured a free and independent Italy. But no, said the noble lord, we have nothing to do with it. Then was the noble lord justified in sending his proposals to France and all the other great Powers, in the hope that he could influence the conduct of those Governments ? (Hear, hear.) I say, then, that it is not the English Government that can complain of the want of candour of the French Go vernment, or of the policy which the Emperor has pursued. But what is this policy ? The noble lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs is astonished that the House of Commons should notice this point, and he says the questions are irri tating, and that repeated discussions are perilous to the peace of Europe, and the noble lord did that which is cer tainly peculiar to him—he lost his temper, and he tells us that these discussions are not to be tolerated—that the House of Commons should not inquire into the policy which has been so strongly described by the Government. There is nothing in the records of England which could convey to the country that something is pending—that there is some thing which is likely to endanger the peace of Europe— than the description given by the Secretary of State as to this intended policy of France. The noble lord's description of it has been heard to-night from that celebrated despatch which is fresh In everybody's mind, and the noble lord has expressed the view of the Government upon the subject, and the noble lord the First Minister has expressed himself in language calculated to impress Parliament and the coun try that a crisis might be at hand. Is it to be expected, then, that the House of Commons should be silent ? The noble lord having denounco the policy of the Emperor members would come down to the house and put questions to him ; and I look forward to Friday with great alarm, in consequence of the notices which will be placed on the paper, to inquire whether affairs are less alarming. In conclusion I think the policy of the Emperor of the French, ' in reference to the natural boundaries of empires requires the constant attention of the country. I think it is a policy ' of very great danger, and if this principle of natural boun daries be countenanced there will be despair and distrust in Europe, and if there should be sanguinary war—if empires should be overthrown, and if dynasties should be subverted her Majesty's Government, which had assisted that policy, will be responsible to the country and to history. Mr. KINGLAKE said he did not intend to trouble the house but with a few observations. He agreed with the right hon. gentleman in thinking that the tendency of this discussion had been not to increase the venom which seemed to be infused in former discussions upon the subject, but to remove it. (Hear, hear.) Much of what had fallen from the noble viscount was extremely gratifying. He understood the noble viscount to say that he understood that when the Emperor promised to consult the great Powers of Europe it was made in its natural sense, and therefore they might hope that the annexation of the provinces was an event which would not take place without the assent of the Powers which were interested in them. If that were the case there was an end of all discussion on the subject. What they had maintained was, that this annexation would be extremely dangerous if made without the consent of the great Powers. He could not help saying that the noble lord at the head of the Government seemed inclined to put a more favourable construction upon the conduct of the Emperor of the French than upon that of members of that house. The Government had taken upon themselves to impute to members that they were in favour of a war po licy. For his part he indignantly repelled an accusation of that kind. No man would feel more than he did the hor rors of war. (Hear, hear.) The noble viscount told them the policy of the Emperor was the policy of peace, and then he proceeded to say that the war which took place last year was no exception to that policy of peace. Ho had waited with great curiosity to know how the noble lord would jus tify that statement ; it was by asserting that the war which did take place was a noble enterprise. He supp ose d the meaning was that that aggression on the part of the Emperor of the French was a lawful idea, and that therefore it de served the applause of England. He (Mr. Kingl a k e ) di d not agree with that view. He thought that 'fever there was a war which began in cold blood the war which was commenced last year by the Emperor of the French deserved that descrip tion. The noble lord had treated this question as if we were bound at the outset of any discussion with a foreign power to make up our minds whether or no the discussion was to end in war, a doctrine which he (Mr. Kinglake) contended was contrary not only to diplomatic usage but also to the general habits of mankind. Ho most emphatically pro tested against such a doctrine. To put thus the alternative of war to a foreign country was offensive and inadmissible, whereas if you did not mean it your negotiations were de prived of all power. He must say that although he ap proved of much of the language of the noble lord the Secre tary for Foreign Affairs, he could not but observe that when he came to compare the published correspondence with events he was struck with the want of reality in that cor respondence, as presented to the house. What he meant was this, that the language used by our Secretary of State had not produced its natural results. (Hear.) The noble lord had, it was true, remonstrated in strong and vigorous language, and front that it might have been hoped that there would be concession to his demands, or else counter arguments, or at all events irritation. But in this corre spondence there was neither acquiescence, nor counter-ar gument, nor irritation. It was treated, in short, as null, and did not seem to have been noticed by the French Go vernment. The only observation the French Government seemed to have made was that there was a great deal of force in the arguments, but he thought they might be an swered. Subsequently the Emperor addressed his Cham bers, and announced, without comment, his intention of an vexation. Some explanation of this singular circumstance was, however, given by the discussion of that evening, as ho now understood from both noble lords that the result of the transaction was that in July the Secretary for Foreign Affairs strongly protested against the annexation of Savoy and Nice, and was told that the project had been abandoned, but that afterwards, when it became probable that Central Italy would be annexed to Piedmont, it seemed to have been fairly enough intimated to him that is that case the Emperor would revert to the annexation idea. But then the noble lord had said that as the accession of these provinces was only a contingency, he thought it his duty to abstain from making any protest. The result was completely to alter our position with regard to France. The Emperor said he had all along declared his intention, and that under thee, circumstances the Government of England remained silent. He (Mr. Kinglake) had promised that he should only make a few comments on the observations, and ho had now only to thank the house for their attention. _ _ Mr. S. FITZGERALD had found the speech of the First Minister more satisfactory than that of the Secretary of State, because the former had given up the position that discussions on this question might lead to serious conse quences, and that no one should commence them unless he was prepared to bring forward a vote of censure. The noble lord now admitted that:they 'might discuss this question without any very dangerous consequences. He found, how ever that they could not have any discussion likely to in fluence the result, as that before the motion of the hon. member for Bridgewater came on the annexation trans- action would have been completed. The correspondence which had been laid on the table seemed to place the noble lord the member for London in a false position ; for whilst nobody believed that the noble lord would wilfully mislead the house, yet the manner in which private letters and pub lic correspondence were mixed up was such that it had been impossible for the noble lord to answer the question put to him at the commencement of the session by the right hon. member for Buckinghamshire. The noble lord, then, re ferring to the commuuication of July, said that the annexa- tion project had been given up; whilst the private letter which had since transpired hinted strongly and frequently at annexation. He (Mr. Fitzgerald) hoped that for the future no private letters would be mixed up with official cor respondence. In other respects he thought that the Govern ment had by their conduct earned strong disapprobation. First of all as to the position in which they had put us with regard to France. France was so placed as to be al most in the right, and our Government in the wrong. France had always said that in certain contingencies it would be necessary for her to possess Savoy, and further that we gave our implied consent to the annexation by urging on the aggrandisement of Sardinia, which was the contingency contemplated. The First Minister had that night expressed a sanguine hope that the projected annexa tion would not be persisted in, but it must be observed that from the commencement her Majesty's Government had expressed an extraordinary facility of conviction. The F oreign Secretary was convinced that the great Powers would be consulted, and the First Lord had made the same state ment, but since then they had found that the transaction was only to be explained to them. Nobody now believe that their consent was to be asked. So it was with other cases — with the municipality and the Sardinian Parliament—all allusion to which was left out in the despatch published 11 the Ilioniteur. The noble lord the member for London, in his despatch to Lord Bloomfield, gave the latter little en couragement to obtain a remonstrance from the court of Ber lin, whilst to Sir J. Crampton or Lord A. Loftus there were no letters at all. He (Mr. Fitzgerald) had only further to express his hope that nobody would say thatthe expressions which had been used that night were calculated to irritate the French people, or to insult their Government. He could only say that he had never used a term expressive of other than respect, and as to the policy of the Government his language had never been half so etrong as that of the noble lord opposite. He did not think, therefore, that it lay in the mouth of the noble lord to say that irritating language had been used on that side of the house. Mr. B. OSBORNE said that if the language used to night by the noble lord the First Minister was more satisfac tory to the hon. member for Horsham, the language of the hon. member must also be considerably more satisfactory to the noble lord. (Hear, hear.) But he (Mr. Osborne) could not permit the hon. member to take advantage of so short a memory and to make an apologetic speech. The. hon. mem ber was the man who, only a few nights ago, wanted no figures of rhetoric ; he was for re-animating the Holy Alli ance. (No, no.) He had been that night thrown over and discarded by his backers, but on a former night he had de nounced the Frenek Emperor by name. (Ns, no.) The fact was that the Irish element was much too strong in the ex-Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but he had been put aside by the right hon. gentleman of his party who had spoken that evening, and now was overflowing with respect for the Emperor of the French. He took the view in con tradistinction to that taken the other night by the hon. member for Horsham. He regretted that the hon. gentle man had brought forward the subject in this manner. He thought the Emperor of the French stood acquitted of any deceit in these transactions. He thought no man could read these despatches and have any right to accuse the Em peror of playing any deceit—(hear)—and if there had been any deceit in these transactions, he thought our good friends the Sardinians were to blame for it. lie thought that the prjAciple of intervention, which he was sorry to see we were r;nher rashly rushing into, was the cause of that little epi • sode. But when they talked of disrespecting the treaty of 1815, he asked who had ever treated it with greater disre spect that the noble lord (Lord Palmerston)? The noble lord committed the greatest outrage on that treaty, for he re joiced on every occasion that Lombardy was taken from Austria. The right hon. gentleman the member for Bucks mentioned the annexation of Cracow, but that was a great mistake, for the annexation of Cracow took place so far back as 1836. Mr. DISRAELI—No ; in 1840. Mr. OSBORNE—At all events a debate on it took place in 1836. The annexation of Cracow was clearly a disruption of the treaty of 1815. Every nation, for its own purposes, had put its foot on this treaty of 1815. He did net think this country had any right to interfere in the annexation ?f Savoy. He believed the real thing was that they were afraid of France going to the R hine. If they had ne confidence in the Emperor why did they enter into such intimate alliances with him ? (Hear, hear.) He believed the whole mistake was this—we had a certain number of statesmen in this country who have an ardent desire to raise up a great king dom in Central Italy. 11,3 (Mr. Osborne) had the greatest admiration for the Italians, but he was not blind to the diffi culties of our statesmen interfering in the cause of the Ita lians. If the Italians could build up their own indepen dence well and good, but the more we interfered the greater handle we were giving to the French Emperor for ag grandisement. He was surprised at noble lords and hon. gentlemen believing in Emperors issuing proclamations on going to war for an idea. To be sure language was of great importance, especially when you were addressing soldiers. He never supposed it could be for the interest of France, which was not a constitutional country, to erect a consti.• tutional kingdom at her own gate without some strategic compensation. (Hear, hear.) But he should never suppose that England was going to play her game by erecting a kingdom in Central Italy. He could not help remarking the change of opinion upon the opposite benches, and most wisely too, because, from the language indulged in the other night by hon. member for Horsham— Mr. S. FITZGERALD—Repeat it. (A laugh.) Mr. OSBORNE could repeat both the language and the manner, too. No man in theithouse who heard that speech but must know that it was the speech of a man who was following the instructions of his party, and took it with all his heart. He was glad the right hon. member for Bucks had disowned the language of his under-secretary ; and he hoped that in future discussions the same wise and states manlike spirit would be observed as that which characterised the leader of the opposition on this occasion. (Hear.) Lord J. RUSSELL—I have a few words to say at the end of this debate. I cannot but remark that the hon. gen tleman the member for Horsham has made a statement this evening very different to that he made the other night, be cause then I understood him to say there ought to be a solemn protest addressed on the part of the powers of Eu rope, and that that protest should be collective. Mr. FITZGERALD—I never said anything of the kind. Lord J. RUSSELL—I recollect the hon. gentleman using the words, " A solemn protest on the part of Eng land." Mr. FITZGERALD—Hear, hear. Lord J. RUSSELL—I could not help expressing then, as protest y opinion ngi that hi wouldnatt into if effect ff h e oe be pt veryeww h e what stot they difficultE proposed, for p e them wer e ntlooetmxtpoarkienes insist n s s t o o ti w l solemn I I n n and very difficult for the Emperor to yield to a protest that would look very much like a threat. (Hear, hear.) That was the view he took then • but he has now changed his tone. It se ems t o me the right hon. gentleman the member for Bucks has transformed this question very much. I never heard that her Majesty's Government had brought any charge against the Government of the Emperor of the French of deceiving us. A statement appears in Lord Cowley's de spatches, in which he said he had often heard Count Walew !id express an opinion, that if this plan—which he thought impossible—could ever succeed, in that case Savoy would be annexed. Lord Cowley goes on to say—" I never said such a proposal would be approved by her Majesty's Go vernment." There is certainly no charge in Lord Cow ley's despatches of deeeit on the part of the French Go vernment. On the contrary Lcrl Cowley did receive com munications from Count Walewaki, but he did not think it prudent to write despatches about them. We might have written despatches week after week, and I might have been saying to the French Government that if the annexation were proposed we would object to it, and the French Govern ment might have gone on replying that if a certain event happened he would require Savoy. Ido not think i f we had done so it would have made any difference at all, because the question was a practical one, and our opinions were known. If the congress had met it would have been discussed, or would have been soon afterwards. The hon. member for Horsham says, we ought to have sent copies of the despatches to Berlin,Vienna, and St. Petersburg. Well, that is the very course I have taken. (Hear, hear.) If the hon. gentleman had waited till to-morrow, ho would find I have done what he says I ought to have done; but he is too quick at censur ing, and blames me for not doing the thing that I have done. But what have I not thought proper to do is, to ask those powers to conform their language to ours, and to enter into anything like an alliance or combination which might seem hostile is the Emperor. With regard to the French despatch, I certainly cannot inform him what it contains. It has arrived to-day, but it has not yet been put into my hands, and I cannot say what form it may take. But there is another thing which the right hon. gentleman the member for Bucks goes upon, and is always repeating, although he carefully veils his meaning. 'He says that this proposed annexation of Savoy is brought on because we will persist on the policy of making a great kingdom in Central Italy, and annexing Tuscany to Sardinia. I endeavoured to explain to the right lion. gentleman that we endeavoured to prevent force being used, and . that there is but ono prac tical way by which, if successful, we might prevent annex tion altogether, and that was by saying to the Emperor of the French that he made very unreasonable objections. When you oppose the use of force in Central Italy, let your troops withdraw, and let the Austrians enter, and they will be able to restore the Grand Dukes and the Romagnas to the Pope, and then there would be no question of an nexation. That is the real meaning of the right hon. gen tleman's proposition, though he does not avow it as his opinion. We have preferred to let the Italians take their own course as to annexing themselves to Sardinia. They have done so ; and they have chosen to annex themselves to Sardinia. PETERBOROUGH ELECTION. Mr. GEORGE, chairman of the Peterborough Eloction Committee, declared Mr. G. H. Whalley to be duly elected for that city. THE INDIAN ARMY. Col. SYKES moved for certain returns connected with the re-organisation of the army in India. An Hort. lilEmrmithere moved that the house be counted. There being only 37 members present, The house adjourned at a quarter past 10 o'clock. LONDON : Printed and Published by MURDO YOUNG , of No. 112, Strand, Printer, at The Sun Office, No. 112, Strand, in the Precinct of the Savoy, in th e ()ouz o of Midd! sex , Wecloaclay, March 14, 1860. C4UI \-A m _ MALI) at One LEASE viz.:--N Nos. 1 tt court, Bi 8, and 4, building Plans obtained hall. ~CO: This i COURT Tridne 3larch, Port of t the year ° ~ T Provisio: Capital Depoatt A elan every pc the coil stverablt and that his or In George 1 James L Bank. James N Way CI dark W Chant John John AN Charles Merch H. T. 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