The Sun. — London, England, 1859-07-30 00:00:00

might probably do. (Hear.) No man who had ever been raised to a throne had taken more pains than the Emperor of the French to advertise to the world what he believed to be his future destiny and its fruits. The Emperor was a man of thought before he was a man of action ; as they had been told last night, he was an author before he became an Em - perer ; and, after he had attained ripe age, after long study and reflection, he gave to the world, in works of deep thought and intense feeling, a programme of his opinions and his policy. Whether dating from London, or from his prison at Ham, or pleading for life before his peers in France, he ga ve earnest of that whic h he had since p roved himsel f the world, as a man of strong purpose and inflexible will. The dream of the exile, the prayer of the captive, the address of the candidate for power, all betrayed one recollection, and all pointed to one day of national retribution. They all repeated that one word which, he said, no Frenchman could utter without emotion ; and since he became Emperor of France he had, almost con stantly, inspired his army with the belief that he and they had one common commission unfulfilled, until by a last, great, glorious enterprise they had effaced the stain of Prance's deepest humiliation and her most dire despair. He did not wish to say one word in disparagement of the illus trious ruler of the French nation, who could not be offended at our accepting as true what he had himself avowed with pride, It might be said that he (Mr. Horsman) was repeat ing an old story; but lie might remind hon. gentlemen that the works to which he had referred had recently been re produced in prance, and had been revised and republished under the authority of the Emperor himself. They were extensively circulated and widely read in France, and what was the effect they produced upo n the French people ? Why, they could only be regarded as a re-affirmation on the part of the Emperor of the policy of the exile. They afforbled ded the key to what would otherw ise be a mystery, and ena people to interpret what would otherwise be u nintelligible —namely, that these vast preparations, the extension of the navy, the fortification of the coast, the enlargement and in crease in the number of transports, and the conscription for the marine, all indicated preparation for a gigantic enter prise to be undertaken some day or another against a gigan tic naval Power, and that Power need not be na med. The .English were a practical and business- e peep Jeren when they had these writings, which had been latery produced and circulated, and when they saw the enormous military and naval preparations which were made in France, it was no wonder that they should ask . , " A.re we in that state o perfect security and defence in which we ought to be even in times of peace ? " He repeated again that, in making this statement, he did not say one word against a ruler of whom he had never spoken disparagingly, nor did he my a word against that great and gallant people • who all who knew them must admire ; but he did say that they must look forward—as was quite consistent with the most honourable policy—to some future occasion when war might break out, and these preparations were made in order that they might not a second time be the vanquished party. He need scarcely refer to what was, he believed, a notorious fact, with regard to which her Majesty's Ministers were no doubt fully in formed that since the conclusion of the peace of Villairanca so far from the activity app arent in the naval arsen als of France having been at all relaxed, it had certainly, until within the last 24 hours, been very much on the increase. Yesterday the noble lord,l after making his statement with reference to Italian affairs, drew the atte st ntion n of the house to the announcement whi ch had ju bee made in ifoniteur. Now, no one would wish to diminish the im portance—whatever it might be—of that announcement, but he might observe that if both England and France had had war establishments, or if the British Government had been making preparations in anticipation of an immediate pros pect of war, the announcement of a reduction of the mili tary force of France might have been very important to this country. What he maintained, however, and what he had endeavoured to enfore upon the house was, that the arma ments of France were as much above the requirements of a peace establishment as those of England were below them — (hear) —that we had reduced our establishments to a danger ous point ; and that, whatever might be done by foreign Governments, there was a certain minimum of power below which this country ought never to allow its defences to fall. (Hear, hear.) In a time of profound peace, and in a spirit of over-confidence in the continuance of that peace , this country had, in his opinion, allowed her defences to all to too low a point. They had fallen far below the require ments of a peace establishment, and when he looked back to their condition when the mutiny broke out in India, he must say it was fortunate that at that time:it never entered into the mind of any enemy to take advantage of the position of this country. For years past we had been pro ceeding with dangerous reductions, we had now fallen far below the minimum point, and 11 he wished the house to do was to raise our defences to that minimum point below which, even in a (time of peace, they ought never to be allowed to fall. He was aware tilt some hon. Mends of his, whose opinions he valued very highly, would think that these precautions and forebodings deserved very little regard. No man could admire, and respect, and honour more than he did the motives and principles of those who were designated, invidiously in his opinion, to distin guish them from the rest of the house, as the " Peace party;" but while, on the one hand , the y honestl y and conscientiously followed their vocation, he must say, on the other hand, that he believed if their views were carried be yond a certain practical point they were dangerous to the country. His feeling was that the men who, by timely warning and precaution, averted the horrors and calamities of a warlike attack were the real friends of humanity and of their species —(hear) —while the men who by blindness, by over confidence. or by weakness, tempted and provoked attack were, although unconsciously, the real enemies and destroyers of their country. He believed that if the prin ciples of the party to which he was referring were carried out to their full extent this country would be placed in such a state of weakness that invasion would be rendered so tempting as to be inevitable. He believed there was no statesman, ne diplomatist, no military man in Europe — there was not a soldier in France who did not feel that it depended on England herself whether at some future—and it was to be hoped, far distant day—all that accumulation of the elements of destruction might not break upon her head ; and woe to her if the storm found her unprepared ; woe to the Ministers of England who might have invited such a catastrophe! There was a certain little episode in the late Italian war which we would do well to remember. We were told that on the night before the battle of Sol ferino the Austrian generals had made all their dis positions, on the most approved military principles, for surprising the allied army at the hour of nine in the morn ing ; but at six o'clock they were themselves surprised and slaughtered by their enemies. It was to be hoped that Austrian counsels would not prevail in our English camp, and that the tocsin of Parliament would be sounded before it was too late. He did not say that any English Minister would for a moment be induced to neglect what he deemed to be necessary for the safety of his coun try ; but he sincerely believed, with all respect, that the present Government were not adequately alive to the mag nitude of the occasion. The heart of the country was sound —its instincts true and unerring ; its feelings were too strong to be trifled with on that subject , and for that mode in which the Ministers discharged themselves of the grave responsibility now resting upon them in connection with it, they would be called to a strict account. (Cheers.) He had spoken out freely on this great question, because it was one on which no false delicacy should prevent them from im pressing upon the Government what it ought to know. As far as it depended on the Secretary of State for War, no doubt everything that eminent ability and great energy could do would be achieved, but the labours and the good will of one man were not enough to cope with the crisis. Seeing, then, the great fact of our urgent want of prepara tion, neither on that nor on future occasions should he be deterred from stating to the house what he had now felt it his duty to state, although he had, perhaps, trenched on ground which no other hon. gentleman had ever ventured upon. (Cheers.) Thanking the house for the indulgence it had extended to him, he had now to move—that the ex pense of completing the necessary works of national de fence, projected or already in progress, fhould be met by a fund specially provided for that purpose, and independent of the annual votes of Parliament. The amendment having been seconded, Mr. S. HERBERT said—Sir, I have listened incommon with the rest of the house with great admiration to the able and eloquent speech of my right hon. friend. If I do not follow him through the whole of it—if I do not venture upon the delicate ground on which he has thought fit to trerd—it is because I do not wish to give any encouragement to converting that which ought to be a de bate on the question of what should'be the system and the basis of our peace defences into a discussion upon foreign po licy, in which we are to criticise the character, the motives, the past life, and intentions of any great Sovereign in Europe. (Cheers.) I maintain that in the preparation which we have been making, if such a word can be used, or rather in the defences which we are strengthening and confirming, we are following the legitimate pacific policy which is the true policy of a great commercial country like England. (Renewed cheers.) We have no offensive designs—we can have no offensive designs against any nation in the world. Peace is our great security ; the great source of our pros perity and :our wealth—peace is best suited for the form of Government under which we have the happiness to live. (Cheers.) I say, then, that if I now discuss the question of our defences it is not with the view of showing what pow 3r we may be able to exercise against any one, but merely what are the means which we are taking, which we hope and which we ought to take for putting ourselves in a state of security against any attack. I recollect the time when the spirit prevailing in this country on these subjects was very different from what it is now. The history of our weakness in point of defence is curious to follow. After the long war, when we, like the rest of Europe, were ex hausted by the enormous efforts we had made in that great struggle, we believed, and Europe also believed, in a per petual reign of peace, never to be disturbed again by war. Ding that time we lived upon our capital. We never reproduced those means of defence which were essential to seeP the country in proper security. Even when we began t o awake to the danger of our situation, and to the necessity of snaking some exertions to remove it, the coun tryhow,* exact go so willingly along with us, nor did this from us any increased activity, but the con trary. I recollect when the discussion on our fortifications first arose. I recollect the appointment of the first com mission to examine into the defences of our dockyards. I recollect when my hono urable friend th e l a t e Secretary to the Admiralty and m ys elf con jointly were o bjects of gr ea t a tt a ck in this house because port a large easteaai u n lishment for the we endeavoured to crea te at Devon cons t ruc tion and repair of our com mittee of this house sitting upstairs condemned as extrava gant gent the schemes we had then attem pted to carry rava into ef fect. So far from beingatravagant, as it h as turned out, those schemes have siAleeen enlarged. They were larger ften than anything before contemplated by any Govern - meta, or ever carried into execution in any dockyary, but stil they were found to be insufficient, and have since been greatly extended. I say this to show that in times when pubic opinion was adverse, I, atileast, was not one of those who retrained acquiescent in the then existing state of thing:, (Hear, hear.) For a long period before that, whe ther yogi looked to the army or the navy, but more especi ally to the army, which has never been so popular with this horse as the navy, there was nothing but apathy, ne glect, and, let me add, ignorance. We allowed our men to perish, partly because we did not choose to be at the ex pe.ase of housing them as we ought to have done partly because we did not believe, but rather scouted as the cry of sanitarian quacks, the notion that men ought to have fresh air to breath. (Hear, hear.) The other night a debate arose on the subject of the appointment of a commission to inquire into ti le state of our fortifications. I am very glad to find that, l ooth as regards the necessity of more rapidly inireas• ing our defences and of instituting a thorough investigation by competent persons into the nature of those defences, be fore we embark in a great expenditure upon them, we have the testimony, concurrent with my own, of the gallant offi cer the member for Westminster, and of my right hon. friend the member for Stroud. I did not, coming in withithe new Government to an office of immense detail, attempt at once to pass :an opinion upon questions of this description ; but as soon as my own mind was made up as to the neces sity of some immediate action in this respect, I made to the Government the identical proposal which the hon. and gallant member for Westminster has made, and in spirit, though not as to the means of accomplishing it, the same proposal as my right hon. friend has just laid before us. (Hear, hear.) I am satisfied of this, _ . though many persons doubt it, that in a country which like England never, except after long effort and great excitement, has had a large army, and which never will have such an army except after long effort and great ex citement, you are bound to take care that every means by. which the services of your force, small as it is, can be made more efficacious, shall be immediately adopted. (Cheers.) Your army, if small, ought to be the best equipped, best armed, and best trained in the world—(renewed cheers) — and no effort on the part of the authorities ought to be omitted in order to produce that result. But among those efforts it appears to me that, having great dockyards and arsenals in which are concentrated property of immense value, and, what is far more important, the means of sus taining and increasing your maritime strength, there ought to be provided that apparatus for defence which mere flesh and blood can not alone supply. It is cheaper to build for tifications than to depend on the maneuvering of an army in the field. Any military officer will at once admit the truth of this, costly as these works may appear to be; and certainly my hon. friend has not exaggerated a bit in the remarks he has made upon the estimates. He has said, indeed, that we are now proceeding by voting mere " driblets." But that is a comparative term. The " driblet," as he calls it for the present year exceeds the sum of £lOO,OOO. But what is the comparative cost of fortifications against that of an army ? The mere pay of an army would amount to L 757,000, or from that to £900,000 a-year. But £5,000,000 spent in fortifying our arsenals would, at 6 per cent., be only a yearly cost of £300,000 ; and there is this also to be said of an army, the men die, the powder and shells are blown away, the rifles wear out ; everything has in it the element of decay ; but if you have secured a well considered system of defence by fortifications, that remains not only for you, but for posterity. (Hear.) It must be remembered how essential is the complete defence of our arsenals to the existence of our navy ; in war, even a victorious fleet sus tains great damage, and requires costly repairs to put it in an efficient state again ; the arsenals are the reproducing establishments of our maritime power. Without going into minute detail, I should like to tell the house what are the amounts it has voted this year for fortifications. For Ports mouth, irrespective of the sums already voted, it is £405,000 ; but that does not complete the defence of Portsmouth ; nothing is proposed for fortifying Spithead. Again, for Plymouth £335,000 have been voted, but that sum will not put Plymouth into a complete state of defence. I could go through the whole list of arsenals, Pembroke, Sheerness, Chatham, Woolwich, they are all in the same , state. I have always endeavoured to speak frankly to the house on this subject; and in this spirit I must state that Woolwich is totally undefended. (Hear, hear.) It is pro tected by the long reaches of the Thames ; still, it is a great arsenal, and at present defenceless against attack. It has been said that Woolwich is incapable of defence, and that the true policy of England would be to break up the estab lishment, createothers elsewhere, and not risk so much ma terial in one arsenal. That is dquestion into which I cannot enter to-night ; it ought to be thoroughly considered. I have been asked whether the sums voted will be applied. An hon. gentleman has remarked that we take the votes, and sometimes do not spend the money. It is true that at the end of the year, it appears by the accounts we have not spent the money, and the sums have to be voted over again. lam asked how this can happen ? There is a difficulty in public works that does not exist in private undertakings, such as railways. Their projectors work on, and if they are delayed by any accident they make up the lost time after wards. To show what delays public works are liable to, I may state I have recently heard that a strike is impending among the men employed that may impede certain works in the London district for some time. It is in consequence of such unforeseen delays that it happens the money for public works has to be voted again. It was remarked the other night that the commission to be appointed to inquire into the state of the notional defences ought to have a wider field of investigation. But I want an inquiry into specific objects, I want advice on those specific objects; if you widen the field of inquiry, and direct the commisoion to report on military questions, as to where armies should be posted in case of invasion, then you will want another class of men to make the inquiry; you will increase the number of the commission and delay the report. If I wanted to shelve a question, a large commission of inquiry would be the best instrument for the purpose. But I want to act imme diately, and therefore wish to get the men the best fitted for the task, and confine them to one particular subject. (Hear.) It is not that I have neglected the subject. My predecessor appointed several officers of great eminence to draw up a detailed report as to the steps necessary to make available all our disposable force, and the best means of rapidly increasing it, in case of a sudden outbreak of war. (Hear, hear.) We have got that report, and we are at this moment acting on it as rapidly as it is possible to do. (Hear, hear.) We will go further than that. We wish to see young !officers obtaining a knowledge of the military features of the country, and surveys are being made with the view to military purposes; it is not that we expect an enemy actually to land, but we ought to take every precau tion in our power and every Government must wish to see the army we do raise made effective by practical study of the profegsion: It is the basis of a sound peace establishment you want. Looking at the Army Estimates, at the enor mous sums voted, and at ithe small force maintained in England, I think nothing can be more unsatisfactory than that we should spend so much money and have so small an army. (Hear, hear.) But what is our peculiar case ? We have had to re-arm the whole force ; and we are doing so at this moment at a great expense. I may allude in passing to a rumour which has been mentioned, that in consequence of a rise of sixpence in the cost of each musket, asked by a foreign contractor, I have suspended the contract for a supply. I not know in what the report could have originated ; the only thing on which it can be founded hap pens to be a transaction of the exactly opposite kind. The only case in which,l have meddled with a foreign contract is by making an arrangement to obtain a superior kind of mus• ket at a small additional expense—(hear)—and we shall ob tain a large supply of a better description. But to revert to the subject of which I was speaking—the late Government sent some very distinguished naval officers to inspect our for tresses in the Mediterranean. I think nothing can be worse than to submit a subject to a commission and then shelve the report. We are, therefore, acting on that report. It states that though some of the works in the Mediterranean have fallen into disrepair, yet no additional force is required for them, nor any change in their armament; and I believe that the notion of any attack on Malta or Gibraltar is quite absurd. It would have been an easy thing, in the opinion of many, to propose to increase the force of the army, by taking a vote for, say 10,000 men; but that would have been an army on paper. Ido not wish to deceive the country, First actu ally raise the 10,000 men, and then it will be time enough to talk of increasing your regiments. I believe this country - will never have a large army; but the army we have got we must make as perfect as we can. Without a conscription, having to trust wholly to voluntary enlistment, and obliged to com pete with the wages of labour, this country can never have a large military force. We have now some battalions coming home from India; if you create a force in the meantime, when these Indian troops arrive you will haves larger army than the country will like to pay for ; there will be an out cry for disbanding the additional battalions, and many discontented and idle men will be thrown on the half-pay list. I wish the Mouse of Commons would come to some conclusion on these points, and not be so wild for an increase of the army at one time and for its reduction at another. We have got the whole of the ordnance to replace, and very soon all our ships will be armed with a large proportion of rifled cannon. This cannot be done without supplying a new sort of ammunition. These are the things that make our estimates so large while our army is so small. Improve ment and change are constantly at work, and I frankly say that I do not see the slightest prospect of any very material reduction in those portions of the army estimates which are applied to the production and reproduction of warlike stores. (Hear.) The right hon. gentleman has truly said, that without the report of a commission we cannot proceed upon any plan which may be proposed for our adoption. Unless you can satisfy the public that you are working upon the best plans, and that every care is taken to insure efficiency, you will never get them to go willingly along with you. Whether the work will be done by large votes, or by other means, we must first of all know from a commission what we ought to do, and then we must do it. (Hear.) Recol lect, however, that meanwhile we are not losing time. Not one work is stopped, and every sixpence that has been voted will be spent. I recently asked a very distinguished Engi neer officer if I gave him a ante blanche what could he do more than he is doing. His reply was that the arrange ments necessary for getting large bodies of men together would take time ; that the building season was nearly gone by; and that, upon the whole, he did not think he could proceed much faster in the present year. We shall take the opinion of the contemplated commission as soon as pos sible, and I believe we shall gain time if the country is satisfied, first, that the works are necessary ; secondly, that our plans are approved by competent authorities; thirdly, that is absolutely indispensable to vote money for their exe cution. (Hear, hear.) Here I must take exception to some of the words which I find in the motion of my right hon. friend. He says that " the expenses of com pleting the necessary works of national defence should be met by a fund specially provided for that pur pose, and independent of the annual votes of Par liament." lam not sure that the course here recommended is necessary to any well-considered plan for hastening our works of national defence. Certain I am, at all events, that if you expect Parliament to go warmly along with you in your plans, you must net attempt to cheat it out of the money requisite for the execution of your works. (Hear, hear.) You must allow Parliament to exercise its judg ment upon each step as it is taken if you wish to obtain its confidence and co-operation. (Hear.) One or two words upon another point and I have done. The right hon. gen tleman has accused us of not giving due encouragement to the volunteer movement because it is plebeian in character. Now, I do not wish to cast any blame upon the late Go vernment, with whom the volunteer corps originated, but I must say that as far as rifles are concerned we have given much more encouragement to volunteers than our prede cessors. (Hear, hear.) I believe that at the present moment there are forming several very efficient battalions of volun teers, and certainly, at all events, it never occurred to me to look upon the movement as plebeian and to discourage it upon that ground: On the contrary, as I stated upon a former occasion, what I want to see is a military spirit per vading all classes of the community, but especially the in fluential and intelligent iniddle-class. I believe the volun teer corps will effect that object to a large extent, and therefore I think they ought to be encouraged. (Hear, hear.) H av i ng t h us s t a t e d unr eservedly the opinion I hold upon, all the various points mentioned by my right e into office I_ hon. friend, and endeavoured to satisfy the house that we subject. I have been house will probably be are not altogethea idle, I shall only add that the moment I be issued i e u e r n n turned y ov a d tt u en otino it toev ever rhi since,veryans serious i (t)hu the f i fe da bed e to hear or p that two, a n t d l mission will • men nominated on it willletlaPiratoptoseedgeenotil'el: set to work as soon as possible thereafter. Whenever th e . Government are put in possession its subject-matter, and ve their most anxious attention to f r equently done, tile) , will make instead i the foundation it, as is too foundation of imme diate and energetic action. (cheers.) Sir F. SMITH said that in reference to the question of fortifications it must be remembered th at there were several diffe r ent descriptions of fortifications. The first was coast fortifications, and these , as applicable to England, were not required, and to create t hem would iv mow; _ thrown away, ':he fortifications of arsenals, and these were en required ewder.ine this country to a limited extent, and he hoped the commission would only recommend so much of this kind of fortification as 'was absolutely required. The third class of fortifications was those in the interior of a country. He believed such fortifications were not wanted in England, though in saying this he was opposing the opi nion of the late Duke of Wellin, o -ton, who thought that works should tie erected at Reigate, at Croydon, at Brighton, and the most vulnerable parts of the coast. If these works were erected we should have to man them, and therefore he was anxious that the fortifications of our dockyards should be limited. He believed that gigantic for tifications were projected for Devonport. He hoped that the Government would weigh the matter well before they incurred such an expense. The projected works at De vonport would require a garrison of 40,000 men, and where were they to be found ? We had at the utmost on paper 110,000 men of all descriptions of troops. If 40,000 men were required for Devonport, 30,000 would be wanted for Portsmouth, which would make 70,000 for these two ar senals alone, while Portland and Plymouth and others would also require considerable garrisons. The right hon. gentleman had ti ilked of our not having a large army, and we certainly had not. We were going to defend our com mercial harbours, but he hoped that would be undertaken by persons on the spot, as we had not troops for the pur pose. Whatever the Government determined to do after they received the report of the commission he hoped they would do rapidly. As to the mode of defence into which the commission was 1 o inquire, was it to be maritime or military, or a combination of both ? He did not think slightly of volunteers, for he believed that, well-trained and armed, they would be a most efficient force in aid of mili tia and troops of the line. He, as an old soldier, would re commend the Government to trust to the navy, and not to allow that force to be reduced to too low a scale. We could not depend on a rapid manning of the navy in case of emergency, and the men ought not to be hastily dis- charged. - Sir C. NAPIER said with reference to the defence of our arsenals, Portsmouth: could only be taken by " coup-de main," and by a fleet running into the harbour, which was too shallow for large ships, and the entrance to which might easily be blocked up by two or three sunken vessels. As to fortifications at the Isle of Wight or in the vicinity of the Needles, they would be of no use. Fortifying Gos port was also of no use, as it would only prevent its being taken by surprise. During the last war, when we had all Europe, and America too, against us, who defended the country? When the great Napoleon threatened us with insesion, we trusted to the navy ; and in the narrow seas, although it was a difficult service, hardly a ship was lost that was employed in the blockade. We had got into the state in which we were because we had not adopted steam in our navy as soon as we ought. In 1848, when he com manded the Channel squadron, the first line-of-battle ship —the Blenheim—was fitted with a screw, and though she was a very inferior ship, on the first day she joined she went to windward of the whole fleet. This success was reported to the Admiralty, who did not go on adopting steam power. Three other ships, which were afterwards fitted with screws, were found to answer as well as the Blenheim. Why did the Admiralty not go on further with that kind of ship ? After the expedition to the Baltic in 1854, the French had only one screw ship of the line, but now they had got 33. But it was not ships alone that were neces sary—men were required, and it was a great error, after the Russian war, to pay off so many men, who got dis gusted with the service, and we had been now for two years trying to get some of them back and could not. The French had an excellent plan of getting their fleets ready for sea. When they talked of reduction they took a few guns out of the ships and sent the seamen into barracks, and when they wanted to call them out they were at hand, men and officers, all told off for their stations, and in forty-eight hours they were on board the ships just as they were before they were paid off. The honourable and gallant gentleman here referred to some statement of Sir Charles Wood when First Lord of the Admiralty as to the manning of the French fleet, and said that Admiral La Susse had stated that the French had a reserve of 50,000 sailors and could make up the number to 90,000. What was our present state ? We were told that we had 26 sail of the line, full-manned and fit for service. But that was not the case. We had 14 sail of the line in admirable order and manned, but no more. We had only seven sail of the line in the Channel fleet, and since it had been created it had not been a month at sea. That was not the way to train officers and men for service. The officers and men were not to blame, but the Admiralty was for al lowing the ships to remain so long in harbour where, though a good deal might be learnt, yet no proper and thorough knowledge of their duties could be learnt by the men and officers. In the war just ended the French fleet had had good practice in carrying troops to and fro. Our fleet had no practice because we could not man our ships. Now was it not a disgrace to our country, a disgrace to every govern ment and every Admiralty board, that here in 1859, after a peace of so many years the British fleet could not be manned even by the offer of a bounty ? As Mr. Tierney once said, " Give me a full exchequer and a well-manned fleet and I will defy the world." If we had that there would be no no cessity for spending enormous sums upon the fortifications which could not be completed for so many years. It was not likely that an enemy would choose to land exactly where our fortifications were built. Were we going to fortify Tor bay, and the whole of our southern coast ? The truth was that if France once obtained the superiority at sea, this country would net be worth six months' purchase. If we had not the Channel for a ditch between us and France, should we be satisfied with an army of 600,000 men opposite us whilst we had only 110,000 men for the defence of Eng land? France had proved in this late war that she could transport her army by water as well as by land, conveying half her troops from Marseilles to Genoa, a distance of 150 miles. It was true there was then no enemy at sea to op pose her on the way, but if once she got command of the Channel she could do the same again. He therefore hoped we should go on building ships in every dockyard, and not be induced to desist by any professions of a reduction of the French forces until we saw that France really had disarmed a large party of her army and of her fleet, and that she was paying off and unrigging her ships, and after that was done we might feel safer, and might ourselves do the same. Mr. COBDEN, who was loudly called for, said he could not pretend to throw any light on the technical questions at issue. But he observed that this matter had now arrived at a stage where the old appliances and remedies were of no use. We had voted this year 261 millions sterling for our defences, of which 121 were for our navy. Together we had voted for our defences twice as much this year as was voted in the year when he first catered that house, and three times as much this year for our navy alone as was voted in 1835, when Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wel lington were at the head of affairs. And now his right hon. friend (Mr. Horsman) came forward and said that we had not yet a minimum of an establishment, and that we must set every public and private dockyard at work to increase it. It was quite evident, therefore, that we could not, by voting any amount of money and going on in the same course, bring ourselves into a satisfactory position. He (Mr. Cobden) would therefore suggest whether there might not be another view of the question—whether gentlemen in a state of panic and alarm might not have exaggerated the case, and fallen into some hallucinations about the danger impending over us—whether they had not altogether mis taken the evil with which they had to deal ? Now, he had been for some time past out of the reach of blue books, but two days ago he stumbled by accident on a document ori ginally prepared for the information of our Government, which gave a description of the comparative force of the English and French navies. He confessed that he had read that paper at first with some incredulity ; and if he had not within his own recollection an incident which oc curred seven years ago, he would not now venture to quote the statistics of that document, after what he had heard said of the awful preparations which had been made in France. The incident he alluded to was this. Seven years ago, in 1852, when the panic of a French invasion raged as much as it did now, if not more, he laid a wager with a general officer, who had ever since been paying ten guineas a year to the Manchester Infirmary as a penalty for his rash adherence to. an association which he (Mr. Cobden) had ventured to call in question upon this subject. To decide that controversy, he (Mr. Cobden) applied to the French go vernment for information, and got a statement of the naval budget of France for that year, which he placed in the hands of several gentlemen having the control of influential organs of public opinion, and one of those gentlemen, who was now sitting in the House of Commons, and who was the pro prietor of a great journal in the North of England, made use of that information honestly to stem the torrent of alarm and apprehension which then prevailed. He remembered also that his hon. friend the member for Dumfries wrote to the French Minister of Marine, M. Ducos, whose reply was, " In answer to your newspapers accusing us of menacing naval preparations, I will state that I have not added a boat to our marine, or a gun to the armament of our ships." Remembering these incidents, he would venture to quote the document which he had mentioned, in reply to his right hon. frier d below him who now spoke of the French as hav ing made " gigantic preparations for the invasion of a coun try which was a great naval power." Now what did this document show ? The only salutary treatment for such a fever as now affected many persons in and out of that house was a cool investigation of the facts of the case. He had had an opportunity of reading over this statement with the aid of a few friends who were well acquainted with nautical matters. He found that in this report, published by our own Government, having been drawn up confidentially for their information by a commitUe appointed for the purpose, there was a comparison of the French and English navies, showing what they were in 1852, when this awful panic prevailed before, and what they were in 1858. Now, if the house would be a little calm, he (Mr. Cobden) would state the results of that comparison. It was admitted that the French had a show of superiority in steam frigates, whilst we had a considerable superiority in screw line-of-battle ships. (No, no.) In line-of-battle ships, built and build ing, as against the French, built and building, we had a superiority—he believed we had ten line-of -battle ships more than the French, without including the blockships, which, he was told, were serviceable. In the number of frigates, the French navy was somewhat superior to the English, but there was the rest of our navy, not to beleft out of the com parison, consisting of the corvettes and sloops, and all those vessels which, according to the opinion of the wisest persons upon naval affairs he had been able to consult were the most effective of all. The Americans were build , ing nothing but corvettes, and they said those were the most serviceable vessels in case of war. Now, in 1852, England had 176 war steamers, and in 1853 she lied 461 war steamers. This was an increase of 28S in that period. The French in 1852 had 122 war steamers, and in 18.8 they possessed 264 war steamers, showing an increase of but 142 against our increase of 288. Our increase had therefore been just double the increase of the French in the number of steamers. In 1852, moreover, the English navy had 299 sailing vessels, and in 18.58 we had 296 sailing vessels, show ing a diminution of three. The French in 1852 had 253 ; sailing vessels, but in 1858 they hal only 144, showing a diminution of 114 in the number of French sailing ships, whilst our number had diminished by only three. The reason of this was that the vast increase spoken of in the number of the French screw steamers had arisen from the conversion of their sailing vessels into steamers. We had been going through the same process with our sailing vessels, but at the same time we had been building other sailing vessels, wiljlstve 144 covertea more sailing vessels into steamers THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, JULY 30, 1859. than the French had done. The French had been convert- ing, and not building, so that they now possessed fewer sailing vessels by 114 . than they did in, 135.2, 1 whilst we had nearly the same Lumber of saiiiiieveSseli now as we had hen. Taking then the whole force of sailing vessels and steam ships together, he found that in 1852 the English navy had 475 vessels, and in 1853 it had no fewer than 760 vessels, showing an increase of 285 in six years. On the other hand, the French in 1352 had, of steamers and sailing vessels to- gether, 380, and in 1858 they had 408, showing an increase of only 28. This great increase of the French navy, which had been so much talked of, amounted to just 28 vessels — whereas the increase of the English navy in the same period amounted to 285 vessels. Really, when he saw these figures be almost doubted whether there was not some mistake abut them, until they were corroborated by persons more conver- sant with the matter than he himself was. But if it were true that we had now 760 ships of war against the French 408, and if the augmentation of our navy had been 285 against the French 28 in a period of six years, what became then of those gigantic !preparations for an attack upon our naval power at which the right hon. gentleman was so much terrified. (Hear, hear.) Now, he observed in the comparisons which had been publicly made of English and French navies, one omission, and he must say it was an uncandid omission—that of the corvettes and other small vessels of war. He was told by the wisest heads both here and in America, that those large line-of-battle ships, upon which were now pluming ourselves as our sole defence, would in a case of war be found to be mere slaughterhouses He did not pretend to offer this as his own opinion. knew that it was acted upon in America, where the United States Government had not laid down one line-of-battle ship, and did not intend to do so, confining their navy alto gether to those long, low vessels, the corvettes, of a tonnage _ _ _ equal to our severty-fours. The argument he had heard was that, if we put a thousand men into a line-of-battle ship, with 30 tons or 40 tons of gunpowder below them, and exposed that great ship, a most conspicuous target, to the fire of such missiles as were now contrived to be discharged from the kind of guns at present in use or in preparation, we should really be providing a mere slaughterhouse for those men. (Hear, hear.) This idea was corroborated by one passage of the report he had quoted, in which, speak ing of the iron-sided ships under construction, it was re- marked that they were expected in France to supersede line-of-battle ships ; that no more of these would be laid down, and that in ten years that class of vessels would be come obsolete. Now the point he would call attention to was this. With the rapid progress of discovery and im- provement now both in the building of ships, and in gun nery, was it not apparent that we should be subjected to a great and constant increase of expenditure in substituting one kind of ship and gun for another ? This novel state of things must be the cause of endless expense for different new kinds of armament. Only compare the armaments of the present day with those in use 20 years ago. He remem bered 12 years ago sitting on a committee with respect to the navy, and at that time there was not a screw line-of battle ship in existence; at that time they were think ing of having a fleet of paddle-wheel steamers. Now, all our steamers had the screw. He remembered the time when it was considered that 32-pounders were the ne plus ultra of the armament of a ship of war, and we were just then dispensing with the old carronades by which Nelson won his battles. Now, a modern ship of war was armed with sixty-four pounders, and with ninety eight pounders carrying hollow shot and shell. The whole thing had been completely metamorphosed, and so it might be with regard to the line-of-battle ships. At the end of this financial year we should have fifty line-of-battle ships. He was informed by competent judges that they were a complete mistake, and that in case of war, we had better put our men and guns into anything rather than a line-of-battle ship. The impression was now gaining ground that we should have to alter that system, and 'to adopt a longer, lower form of ship. This opinion recom mended itself to common sense, for we were making im provements in gunnery to enable us to throw a shell three or four miles. It would not be difficult to strike such a mark as a line-of-battle ship, and if a shell were thrown into her, causing her to explode, with 800 or 1,000 men on board of her, and with 30 or 40 tons of powder stored be neath them, the destruction would be enormous. He did not think we had yet got to the limit of these inventions ; mechanical genius was only now beginning to be directed to these things, and he observed that in America an im proved rifled cannon had just been tested, carrying twice the distance with the same quantity of powder. He did not say we should adopt all these inventions, but we should not have a larger stock on hand than we could help, lest it should have to be superseded at a great expense by some thing different. Now, seeing that by this alarm and panic about invasion we did not mend our situation, he asked could we not find some better way to remedy the evil ? Could not reason and common sense be brought to bear upon it ? What was it that we were afraid of ? It was said that we were afraid of France, for no one said anything about America ; no one pretended to be afraid of Holland or Spain ; and as for Russia, since we had destroyed her fleet in the Black Sea, Lnd limited her future armament there, he had not expected to hear anything more of that. It was obvious that wo were only alarmed at France, and in that case the question they ought to ask was, " is our Go vernment, after all, on friendly terms with that of the Em peror ?" (llear.) lie had heard his noble friend (Lord J. Russell) declare that he had the most perfect confidence in the Emperor's loyalty, good faith, and fidelity. Now was that true, or was it not ? That the country did not believe it was true was certain—(cheers)--and the reason was this, while the Government were telling us that they had confi dence in the Emperor they presented us with a bill of four or five millions for the increase of our armaments to protect us against him. He (Mr. Cobden) could imagine nothing more perilous, and he must tell the h ouse h e h a d come to the conclusion that we really were in danger of a war with France. He had of late observed quite an altered tone in the way in which men spoke about the matter. He heard them beginning to say that we had better fight it out ; and they argued very intelligibly. They said, "If while the Government is telling us that they h ave perfect confidence in the Emperor they indrease our armaments and add 4d. to the income tax, which they require us to pay in October —if all this goes on when there is no quarrel, when there is nothing to explain and nothing to remove out of the way, where is it all to end ? Surely we had better have a war, destroy the French fleet, and start afresh." Apart from the question of humanity, which, however, he should be sorry to put for one moment out of:his sight, there was no logical answer to this line of argument. It was a great misfortune, but we were drifting towards that point, for the English people were beginning to get reconciled to the pos sibility, nay to the inevitableness of a war with our neigh bours. (Hear, hear.) He did not say that it was the fault of this Government or that Government, or of the Govern ment of France ; but amongst all those Governments the responsibility must lie. We all knew the amity which the two Governin:'nts had long expressed for each other; we had heard of our Sovereign going over to France and em bracing its ruler in a bathing machine—(laughter)—and of ths French Emperor coming over to England and receiving courtesies and honours at Windsor. But was there, with all this, no forbearance, no honesty, no desire to come to a proper understanding ? It was degrading the policy of one enlightened and civilised nation towards another below the conduct of the red Indians in their woods. The Indians when they had smoked the pipe of peace, buried the hatchet of war, in token that they did not intend to go on alarming each other by preparations for hostilities. (Hear, hear ) Yet we, while professing all this apprehension, went on ex pressing confidence and even offering adulation to the Em peror of the French—of whom if he (Mr. Cobden) had to speak, he should not have fallen into quite such a strain of compliment as had been us,ed by the noble lord. (Hear.) He (Mr. Cobden) feared the separation of Parliament. because when Parliament was not sitting other organs of public opinion, which were not always so peaceable as they were in that house, were left in possession of the field ; and much more mischief consequently hap pened in the recess than in the session. (Hear, hear.) He wa ; anxious, therefore, that this house should give expres sion to the fact that other states of feeling and other views in Englandexisted than he had seen prevail out of doors for some time past. (Hear, hear.) Was it impossible in the course of the friendly communications which were passing between the two countries to exchange a word of explanation ? (Cheers.) Had his noble friend, or the noble lord the mem ber for London, or the right hon. gentleman opposite, or Dord Derby, ever exchanged a single word in explanation of these preparations for war? Let him not be told that those preparations wci not against :France. Everybody knew that it was against France that we were preparing. Look at our facetious publication, Punch, of that very week, and they would find John Bull was represented grumbling at having a heavy extra insurance because his next door neigh bour—they could not mistake who that meant—was so fond of fireworks. (Hear, hear.) Look at all our organs of opi nion—look at the Edinburgh, at the Quarterly, and at all the newspapers, from the nines downwards, and they would find them all possessed with the threats of an invasion. He had been so struck with a paragraph in the letter of one of " our own correspondents" at Paris that he had cut it out and brought it down with him to the house. The writer stated that, " at Toulon, notwithstanding the peace, appli cations for leave of absence had been stopped ; the men-of war's men were armed with tomahawks and boarding Pikes, and a war with England was considered imminent." He (Mr. Cobden) only wondered that the writer did not add that the men were supplied with scalping knives as well as tomahawks. (Laughter.) He hoped that the country would not fall into a false security engendered by the old Latin maxim which said that if you would preserve yourself in'peace be prepared for war. No one could really think that that old saw had any application in these times. Look at the great military powers ; look at France, at Austria, at Russia. lied they not all been at war, and coul I any one doubt that the reason was to be sought in their great standing armies ? (Cheers.) An honourable member talked of fifty line-of-battle ships; but they had all read the statement in the Edinburgh, showing that in point of ton nage and weight of metal thrown by our guns, our naval f ,ice now exceeded that which we possessed in 1809, when we were at the very height of the war; and t he y did not think there was some danger of our falling i nto what had been described by Lord Aberdeen as a desire to test the effi ciency of our great warlike preparations? (Cheers.) Was there net dangir that something might happen in Egypt or elsewhere, and that we migh t find ourselves after all in that state in which we had all at least dreamt we sho uld never again fail—plunged into a war with our ne xt door neighbour ? What proof had we that France wished to in vade us ? What overt act had the Government of France or the French pcopl in any collective capacity ever com u'as constantlyinvo flatted to warrant such suspicion ? Recollect it was not against a war with France that we were nicking these pre parations, but against an invasion. Englishmen never fell into such a panic before ; and it was surprising that they lve as d s in urn i i t n . g ha ) ‘ t v d w i e d j not jke see til etVreiiiiresluilttetlbmetNsvheouinlil_ tended to invade them without warning? (Hear.) He should perhaps be told that the Emperor had attacked Aus tria. Ile (Mr. Cobden) was the last man will would wish to see two neighbouring powers going to war for any con ceivable purpose whatever, feeling certain as he did that there was no rational object to be gained by hostilities that could not be equally gained without them ; at the same time he must remind the house that in the late war the feeling of all the world was in favour of France and against Aus tria. He did not wish to speak disrespectfully of any or- ganised Government, but the Austrian rule in Italy had, nevertheless, been universally considered as the standing nuisance of Europe ever since it had been established. (Hear.) It was, however, ti very different thing to go and help a 'discontented people, and to go and invade a nation that was at peace with them. Moreover, we were their best customers. The exports of France to this country were greater than to any other country in the world ; and we were thus their best friend. We were told that they wanted to come and plunder the Bank of England ; but the Bank of France always contained a far greater amount of bullion than our great national monetary establishment. Then we were told that they desired to pillage London ; but he did not hesitate , •-• to say that there was far more portable wealth in France— he meant wealth in the shape of jewellery and ornaments — than in this country. They were a naticn that liked that sort of thing ; and (hough we might put more capital into a steam-engine, they spent far more than we did on their orna ments. (Hear, hear.) Was it probable that France would descend from its high station at the head of the civilised nations of the globe, and fall into the ranks of savages who were in the habit of making piratical filibustering descents upon their neighbours ? (Cheers.) Was he to be told that he was merely one of those peace-men who would rush into 'danger with their eyes shut ? They were far more fanati cal about war who overlooked the considerations to which he had been adverting, than he was fanatical on.the subject of peace. Were they sure that we had not ourselves pro voked all that had happened by our great armaments ? He (Mr. Cobden) had kept a careful watch over this subject, and he was by no means prepared to say that we had not brought the whole difficulty upon ourselves by the steps we had taken to fortify our coasts, to increase our fleets, and to create docks for steam ships. Take the works at Keyham, which had cost £1,500,000. He well remembered that it was immediately resolved to construct similar works at Brest or Cherbourg. In 1851 he (Mr. Cobden) moved an address to the Queen on the subject. That address was so reasonable that the noble lord did not venture to meet it by a direct negative, and so he moved the previous question. The address was to the effect that her Majesty would enter into negotiations with France with a view to stop the rivalry between the two countries, and if possible to lead to a rautual reduction of their armaments. On that occasion he brought forward evidence to show that the French had increased their fortifications solely because we had increased ours. France was a great country, with an extensive seaboard, and she was therefore entitled to maintain a large navy, but it did not follow that she should wish to have as large a navy as ours Indeed, she ought not to haveso large a navy. Nay, more than that—if he saw any disposition on her part to have as large a navy as ours, and especially if she did not yield to a fair explanation, then he should suspect some sinister de sign. (Hear, hear.) He would tell the house candidly that if it came to a rivalry between the two countries, and if France refused to listen to explanations, he would as cheer fully vote £.500,000,000 as £5,000,000 to maintain our mari time superiority. (Loud cheers.) And for this reason. England had no frontier but the sea. England had unfor tunately forty or , fifty colonies which had no means of defence except that naval protection which we afforded them. Lastly, we had five times the mercantile tonnage of France ' • for all of which reasons we ought to have a larger navy. Besides, France was obliged to collect a large army to guard her frontier, and therefore he did not think she would refuse at our hands so reasonable an explanation as this. (Hear.) Tho French had never pretended to com pete with us in naval matters. M. Thiers, M. Lamartine, and other great authorities had laid down the doctrine that she had no need for so large a navy as we were obliged to keep. M. Thiers, it was true, said it was necessary that some power in Europe should keep up a large fleet, in order to prevent any power from exercising a despotism by sea but he had never pretended to dispute the right of England to have a larger fleet than France. But why should we not have a reduction of our armaments in the same man ner as we had had an inciease of them ? The taxpayers of the country, and especially that quiet but influential portion of them who possessed fixed incomes, and on whom the 4d. income tax payable in October would especially press, would begin to inquire why the navy should be increased at a cost of £4,000,000 or £5,000,000. Mind, he (Mr. Cobden) did not ask for a disarmament. He did not want our navy to be reduced till it was as low as the French ; but he wanted to know why an agreement should not be come to that where they had two ships we should have - three. Surely a proposition of that kind might be made between powers which had such a high opinion of each other's loyalty and fidelity. We ought to look beyond the circle of European politics, and think what would be the effect of continued over-taxation on our relation with the United States. There could be no doubt that the prosperity of this country would be very seriously affected if it were called upon to bear un necessary burdens. There would be a daily increasing dif culty in maintaining our rivalry, and people would be more and more induced to emigrate. That was not a state of things which would be at all desirable. It was said that it would make ns a military people ; but it had hitherto been our boast that we were not a military nation, and no one could for a moment suppose that to alter our character in that respect would conduce to our prosperity. Look, for example, at the disparity of the sexes caused by the military system. They took numbers of able bodied .young men and sent them abroad or shut them up in barracks; and that, joined to the effects of emigration, was already producing serious results. In 1851 there were in this country half a million more women than men. He feared that in 1851 there would be nearer a million ; and that naturally led to a state of things which was the reverse of desirable. (Hear.) He trusted that hon. gentlemen would see that they had far, more at stake in the general prosperity of the country than in the mere interest of any member of their families. Let them look at the question in that patriotic light, and lend their aid in cutting down an expenditure which at the best was a necessary evil. So far as it was necesary he would submit to it, but he entreated the house not to continue any burden upon the people of this country which they could not defend by the argument of reason and justice. (The hon. gentleman was loudly cheered.) Sir J. PAKINGTON—I am desirous, Sir, before this discussion closes, to offer some few observations to the house, and particularly to notice portions of the speech of the hon. gentleman which we have just heard. The hon. member, in the early part of his speech, instituted a com parison between the strength of the English and French navies, and made an omission—l have no doubt uninten tionally—which destroys much of the value and importance of his statement in that respect. In drawing that compa rison the hon. gentleman adverted to the total number of screw steamvessels in both navies, and inferred therefrom that the English navy was stronger than that of France, in a considerable ratio ; but he altogether omitted from his estimate of the apparent superiority in point of strength of the English nary the important fact that no less than 160 or thereabouts of those vessels are gunboats—(hear)—and therefore vessels of extremely small size, carrying only one or two guns—(hear, bear)—though no doubt very valuable for purposes of home defence, for action near the shores, or in our harbours or rivers. The hon. member for Roch dale also commented much on what he called the impolicy of persevering in the construction of line-of-battle ships, founding his remarks on his recent experience in the United States, where he says they have entirely abandoned the construction of vessels of that calibre, having discovered that the modern corvettes were more valuable for purposes of war. I admit there is some truth in that part of the hon. gentleman's speech ; but I may be allowed to remind him that we have been told this evening by the Secretary of State for War that we live in a time when great improve ments and changes are being rapidly made in the means and appliances of war ; and I think the hon. member will hardly contend that, at such a time, a great nation like England is to stand still as regards the maintenance of her armaments. (Hear, hear.) 'lfie thing is impossible; we must protect our interests. We must in this particular case establish our armaments as best we may with reference to the existing state of things ; and I maintain that in the existing state of things it would be the height of impolicy and imprudence for England to allow any nation to get ahead of her in respect to line-of-battle ships. (Hear, hear.) But I admit that in the course of years that class of ships • may become less in vogue than they have been heretofore ; and, feeling uncertain as to what may be the ultimate importance of line• of-battle ships, it was the intention of the Board of Admiralty, having once esta blished the unquestionable superiority of England in that respect, to suspend the building of that class of vessels un til certain experiments in naval architecture with respect to iron-bound ships and corvettes should have been fairly tested. I hope the new Board of Admiralty will adopt a similar course. The hon. member for Rochdale also alluded to what he denominated the great panic in this country with regard to the French. He says he complained of a panic of that kind seven years ago, and now he has to do so again. Does the hon. member mean to argue that be cause there may be an undue state of alarm in the public mind in that respect, that therefore we ought to suspend all preparations for the defence of this country, to trust entirely to the amicable relations between the two Glevern ments, and to take no precautions with a view to our secu rity ? (Hear.) I hope that that is not the feeling of the hon. gentleman, and from one passage in his speech I am disposed to trust that it is not. I understood him to say, if he could be once satisfied that the French G overnm ent had ulterior designs against us, and were not disposed to continue amicable relations with us, he would be ready to support a vote for £100,000,000, or any other sum, in order to put the defences of the country on a satisfactory footing to meet such a state of things. (" Hear, hear," from Mr. Cobden.) I heard that declaration with sincere pleasure, and I cannot doubt that the country at large would readily adopt the same liberal view, should circumstances ever ren der it necessary. There is no one less disposed than lam to say a word that might induce a feeling of anything like panic ; but in discussing a question of this kind, which has been so ably brought before us by my right hon. friend the member for Stroud, I think it linwir to look only to the French or ta.any one country in particular. (Hear.) There are other countries to which we ought to look ; and it seems to ale that the wise and prudent course for this country i s , not to treat this as a comparative q uestio n in connexion with France or Russia, or any country in particular, but as a positive question, in which we recognize the absolute duty imposed upon the nation to take care that its means of defence aro in the state they ought to be, having due regard always to the degree of preparation in count r i es a b roa d , It has been said by the Secretary for War that we are en gaged in these efforts not from jealousy of France or any other country, but in order to make up a long arrear of neglect. (Hear, hear.) No doubt that is so. At the end of the last great European war we fell into a state of false security. (Hear, hear.) We thought the world would be at peace for ever, and we allowed our preparations for a state of war to cease. (Hear, hear.) As has been truly observed, we have been living on our capital, and now we must incur the cost of raising those means of defence which in common prudence we ought not to have neglected for a day. (Hear.) No one can be m ore earnest than I am to cultivate peace. Tie palicy of this country is essentially a policy of peace. We have no ideas of aggression upon any country. (Hear, hear.) Our desire, above all, is to cultivate friendly rela tions with France. (Hear, hear.) The happ'ness of both countries and of the world depends on those friendly rela tions being maintained, but that is no reason why we are not to take those precautions that every great nation ought to take to support its position among the other nations of the world. (Hear, hear.) With regard to the motion be fore t lie house, I cannot but observe that the reference made to Portland harbour is a very strong point indeed in its S favour. We have there established, as the ecretary of War infoimed us, a harbour to which our fleets are now con stantly reortirig•; and yet we are told by the right hon. gvatleinan that this noble harbour is absolutely w ith ou t defence, and not only without defence, but wo h ave b een informed that it will take twenty years to complete the de. (Hear, hear.) I thi n k The fences that are necessary. right hon. the Secretary for War made a very gati4f4otory statement with regard to the expenditure q the current vear in so far as the construction of our harbours and the defences of our arsenals are concerned, for he stated that the works were going on as rapidly as they could do, and that, if more money was voted for th a t p ur p oae , it Would be difficult to spend it during the preset Year. So far the.i newer of the right hon, &eml owall was satisfactory. But I do not thins he caught up the spirit and scope of the motion of my right hon. friend (Mr. Horsman), nor did I understand him to give the house any information as to the policy of the Government on this question for the following year. (Hear, hear.) I am sorry that the Sec retary for War did not state more distinctly than he did how far he concurred in the scope and spirit of the light hon. gentleman's proposal—viz., that a large sum should be devoted to the speedy construction of our fortifications, ',and that we should not go on year after year spending driblets of money, and taking as long as 20 years to complete the most important of them. (Hear, hear.) I should like to hear the Government tell us whether they think the spirit of my right hon. friend's motion is wise and prudent or not. (Hear, hear.) I confess that I agree with him in thinking that it is not prudent to go on spending our money in driblets for these important objects, and that the sooner the great objects we have in view are accomplished the better. (Hear, hear.) I would in some degree apply the same principle to the improvement and strengthening of our navy. Before Parliament meets again after the proro gation, the Government will have to prepare their estimates for the coming year, and I must be allowed to exprees my anxious hope that on this subject of strengthening the navy they will not be content to rest where we are. (Hear.) The hon. member for Rochdale is mistaken if he thinks the navy of England is now what it ought to be. (Hear, hear.) When I brought forward the navy estimates for this year, though I made large proposals to the house, I distinctly stated that in the opinion of the late Government those proposals were not sufficient ; that they should be extended over at least another year. The opinion of the lath Government was, that to place the navy of England in the state in which it ought to be would require an expenditure of from £2,500,000 to £3,000,000. (Hear, hear.) The pro posal which I made on behalf of the Government was, that for the current year there should be an extra expenditure for ship building of £1,300,000. I afterwards brought for ward a supplementary estimate, which had been proposed by the present Government, of £400,000 rnore for the con struction of sloops and other small vessels—so that the ex tra expenditure for shipbuilding purposes I proposed for the present year amounted to from £1,700,000 to £1,800,000. (Hear, hear.) No doubt that will effect a great deal, but I believe that in the following yearthe present Government ought to propose extra estimates of not less than another. million. (Hear, hear.) Lord C. PAGET would not have troubled the house if it had not been for the topics touched upon by the hon. mem ber for Rochdale. He (Lord C. Paget) thought he had better show the house what the French had in line-of battle ships. They had in commission 20 line-of-bat; le ships, and they had in reserve 12 line-of-battle ships which might be put to sea in a few days. From the last infor mation received from Brest, it appeared that there were no less than 3,000 sailors in barracks inside the main fort at Brest. Those ships, therefore, though not in commission, were perfectly ready for war if required. The French , therefore, had 32 line-of-battle ships. We had 26 sail of the line in commission and nine blockshipi, so that we were nearly equal. But, in addition to the French fleet, there was Russia, which was also making great progress. Russia had now 8 screw line-of-battle ships, 6 frigates, 4 paddle frigates, 9 corvettes, 75 gunboats, 1 transport, and 18 small steamers. That was a very respectable force, and therefore, without agreeing to the proposition of adding a million or two to our estimates every year, or, on the other hand, to that of the hon. member for Rochdale—of cutting our navy estimates down to £5,000,000, we might safely follow an intermediate course. Mr. BENTINCK observed that the real difficulty under which we laboured was the manning of our ships, and not so much the number of the ships themselves. That was the great point to which attention should be directed, for, without success in that, all our vast naval expenditure was useless. His anticipations 'as to the result of his question had been fully realised, for he had elicited very little infor mation, and he hoped the house would support the motion of the right hon. gentleman the member for Stroud. It was nothing short of national insanity to leave our navy in an ineffective state; and he hoped no opportunity would be lost of urging a vigorous policy upon the Government, without which we may one day have to witness the tread of a hostile force upon our shores. (Hear, hear.) Mr. NEWDEGATE said that the only policy for Eng- - land to follow was to be prepared for attack, for, without attributing any ill-faith to the Emperor of the French, it was impossible to feel secure against a nation so fond of military glory, and in which changes were so frequently occurring. Lord H. VANE; hoped that his right hon. friend the member for Stroud would not go to a division, for he had elicited an opinion on the part of the house in accordance with his views. He thought it would not be necessary to show distrust of France, but it was evidently necessary that we should plaCe our country in an efficient state of defence, and that without regard to the armaments of France. Lord PALMERSTON—I imagine that my right hon. friend must have accomplished in the course of this debate the purpose which he had, which I suppose to have been a desire to impress on the house by his own remarks the great necessity of speed in completing those fortifications which are essential for the safety and defence of our naval establish ments, our dockyards ; and also to impress on the house the fact that the measures requisite for the permanent defence of the country, whether connected with our naval or mili tary establishments, are measures which indicate no desire on the part of the country for war, and measures which can give no umbrage to any foreign power whatever—measures which indicate no jealousy of any particular power, but are founded on the common sense principle that a nation which is desirous of peace must be able to show the world that it is able to defend itself against any attack. (Hear, hear.) Well, I think the unanimity that has been expressed from every part of the house sunk be exceedingly gratifying and satisfactory to my right hon. friend, and I hope that, con sidering the particular nature of his motion, and con sidering also the particular working of it, that he will be satisfied with the result which he has now obtained, and will not press his motion to a division, which would imply, perhaps, differences of opinion which do not exist as to the matter of the motion. The motion goes to ex press an opinion of the house that some fund should be provided for the completion of 'their fortified places, and that that fund should be independent of any vote of Parliament.' Now it would not, I think, be very expe dient for the house to affirm in the abstract that some fund should be provided unless they point out in what way the fund is to be raised. It would be a more fitting and more usual course to wait until the occasion arose when some specific proposal was suggested for the consideration of the house, and whatever arrangements might be deemed fitting I think the house would be of opinion that this expendi ture, in whatever manner it might be provided, should not be wholly withdrawn from the annual and periodical super vision of Parliament. (Hear, hear.) In the course of the debate two great branches of our defensive system have been adverted to, to which my right hon. friend has more pointedly directed the attention of the house. The first is the comple tion of those works which are for the permanent defence of our naval establishments. There cannot be two opinions on that point. (Hear.) It is quite obvious that our maritime power depends on these great dockyards, which are the cra dles of our naval power, remaining safe from all attack, and there are certain fortifications which are necessary. My hon. and gallant friend the member for Southwark seemed to think thae it was wholly unnecessary to defend either Ports mouth or Plymouth, that it was sufficient to secure them from an irruption of ships from the sea, and that land de fences were totally unnecessary. My hon. and gallant friend, according to the old theory, thinks there is nothing like leather. (A laugh.) He thinks that everything turns upon naval attack and naval defence. But thqse who had considered the matter withoutsuchprofessional views, must see it is necessary to provide against land attacks, that a com paratively small force might lani in the neighbourhood, and might by shelling, or by rapid assault, deprive us of the elements of our naval pqwer. Now, it is quite clear that it is an object of the very first importance to complete these de fences. My noble friend ;the Secretary for the Admiralty has told the house that soon after our taking office it was resolved that a commission should be appointed to consider what were the works requisite to make those defences efficient. That commission will proceed with its examina tion, and I have no doubt that these works will not be very long in being completed. When we know what are th e works which are necessary and best calculated for the defence of these various establishments, the expenditure that will be required for completing them, and what lathe shortest period within which, if ample funds were provided, the work might be completed, we shall then be in a condition to make parlia ment such proposals as we consider are best adapted to the security of the country. I should hope that my right hon. friend will be disposed to leave to the Government any pro posal which they may think fit to submit to the considera tion of the house. I entirely differ from what fell from my hon. and gallant friend the member for Southwark, who said the safety of this country depended entirely on our naval defences. I estimate as highly as any man can do the great importance of our naval defences. It is manifest, looking at our insular position, looking at our various colonies and foreign possessions which we have to defend looking at the vast amount of commercial property which we have continually floating on the ocean—it is plain that we must have a large naval force, and that without it possibly great injury might be sustained. But I protest against the doc trine that if by any accident we sustained a naval reverse —that if by any accident the fleets of any other nation had for a time the command of the Channel by which they were enabled to land tr oo p s i n t hi s coun t r y, I protest against the doctrine that this country would then be lost. (Cheers.) I admit it is necessary to provide the best and most complete naval defence the science and resources of the country can supply; but I feel satisfied that,. if by any accident a landing should be effected on our coasts by a hostile force, there are on land in this country ample means of repelling the inva sion and causing the invaders to rue the hour they sent the force. Sir, the works we propose are not intended, as some gentlemen suppose, to prevent any landing on the coast ; no man would dream of fortifying our coasts so as to prevent the possibility of an enemy's force making a de scent. We know from what we ourselves have accom plished, at Alexandria and elsewhere, that a determined force will always effect a landing in spite of any opposition. The works, sir, which we propose and which form the sub ject of this discussion, are simply for the defence of particu lar points and particular dockyards, and for their defence in case of the descent of a military force we will have at our command the regiments of the line, the militia regiments, and the population of the country ; because, although I think the rifle corps fever in some parts of the country was a sort of epidemic not likely at the present moment to lead to any particular result, yet, when we look to what occurred in the great war, when hundreds and thousands of men were ready in arms to defend their country, when the population was much less, we must feel that, if the country was again in peril of invasion, h un d re d s o f thousands of men would enrol themselves in her defence; and if by possibility any enemy's force landed, it , would find itself far inferior to the force which attacked it, and must meet a reverse. But however earnest we are to afford the country the best possible naval defences, and however essential it may be for the country to have an adequate naval defence, I hope neither the house nor the country will be led away by the notion put forward by my hen, and gallant Mend the member for S ou th wark, that the country 4.zkends solely and entirely on her naval rasources, and a that defence was forced or eluded, we jaw° my rig ht hon. fri en d w ill b e satisfied with the should have nothiui: to do but go like lambs to the but e h er . I shou,l4 result---die has obtained a very useful result—he has elicited the general determination of the house to support the Go vernment, whatever it may be, in all measures necessary for the defence of the country. When the prop er ti me ar rives, and when the Secretary far War h as received the re port of the commission as to the works necessary for the protection of the dockyards, what the cost will be and what the shortest time in which they can be completed, then it will be the duty of the Government to consider what pro posal to make to find the money, and then I will call on my ghat hon. friend, and I am quite sure we shall hay? his assistance in carrying into effect whatever measures are re quired to be taken. (Hear.) The house then divided— For Mr. Horsman's re501uti0n.......... 70 Against .... • ••• 167 Majority -97 - The SPEAK ER having put the question that he leave the chair, Lord PALMERSTON said he did not intend to take supply at that hour (20 minutes past 12) ; and, considering the number of hours the Speaker had been in the chair tha day and the day before, he trusted the house would con sent to postpone all o r d ers on w hi c h the re was a prospect of any discussion, and take only those which were 11110P posed. (Hear, hoar.) He proposed to take supply again on Monday morning. SUPPLY REPORT. The report of the committee of supply was brought up and agreed to. The following bills passed through committee County Cess (Ireland) Acts Continuance ; Manufactures (Ireland) Acts Continuance ; Colonial Legislatures' Pow er of Repeal; Barbuda Government; and Military Swags Banks. The following bills were read a third time and passed • Local Government Supplemental ; Militia Ballots Suspen sion; Constabulary (Ireland) ; and Dwellings for Labour ing Classes (Ireland). After a short discussion the Locomotive Bill was with drawn. The Fireworks Act Amendment Bill was committed Pro forma, and the . house resumed. , CHURCH-RATES ABOLITION BILL. Mr. GREGSON, for Sir J. Trel a w n y, withdrew this bill for the present session. The house adjourned at ten minutes past one. PARLIAMENTARY DIVISION, HO USE OF COMMONS.-JuLY 28. SUPPLY. Order for committee read ; motion made and question 15 0- posed, .‘ That Mr. Speaker do now leave the chair : :„ Amendment proposed, to leave out from the word "T 11 , 4 ,t. to the end of the question, in order to add the words " `mi expense of completing the necessary works of nitions. defence, projected or already in progress, should be 0, 6 " by a fund specially provided for that purpose, and pendent of the annual votes of Parliament," insteti! thereof. Question put, That the words reoed'to left out stand part 9f the question." Thephouse divideu —Ayes, 167 ; Noes, 70. - AYES-167. " Adam, W. P. Ferguson, Sir R. A. Noble, J. , Adderley, C. B. Fermoy, Lord North, F. Agnew, Sir A. Finlay, A. S. O'Connell, D.; Anson, Capt. Fitzroy. Rt. Hon H. Ogilvy, Sir J. Antrobus, E. Foley, Hon. H. W. Paget, C. ' • ... Archdall, Capt.M.E. Fortescue, Hon. D. Paget, Lord C. 0 4 . Arnott, J. Fortescue, C. S. Palmerston, V"' Ayrton, A. S. Freeland, H. W. Paull, H. Bag - well, J. Gallwey, Sir W. P. Paxton, Sir J. Baines, E. Gavin, Major Pease, H. Baring, Sir F. George,. John Baring, Thos. Geo. Gilpin, C. Bathurst, A. A. Gladstone, Capt. Bazley, Thomas Gladstone, W. E. Pollard Errquhari' Beale, Samuel Greene, Capt. J. Pritchard, John ~ Beamish, F. B. Gregson, S. Proby, Lord. G. ' PPigorienrrYnteiy,S;Fiwrrgn:cf: : Beecroft, G: S. Grey, RV Hn. Sir G. Puller, C. W. Bethell, Sir R. Giuney, John H. Redmond, J. Bonham-Carter, J. Hankey, Thomson ,Ridley, G. : Booth, Sir R. G. Ireadlam, Thos. E. Rogers, John. D, Bouverie, E. P. Henley; - .J. Rothschild,Rare il Bridges, Sir 8.,'8t. Herbert, S. Russell, A. J. g• t it Brocklehurst, John Howard, Hon. C. Salomons,Alder in— Browne, Lord J. T. Howes, Edward Salt, Vitus ..„. Buchanan, W. Humberstone, P. S. Schneider, H. WP ' Buller, J. W. Ingestre, Viscount _Sclater:.Booth, G. Buxton, C. Ingham, R. Scott, Sir W. • Byng Hon. G. H. C. James, Edwin Shelley, Sir ..1: '' Caird, James . Johnstone, .Hon. H. Sheridan, R. B. Calthorpe, F.lll. Johnstone, Sir J. Smith, A. • Campbell, W. F. Jolliffe, Sir W. Smollett, A. Cardwell, Rt. Hn. E. Jones, D. Somerville, Sir ,' Cave S. Kershaw, J. Staniland, M. Churchill, Lord A. Kingscote, Lt.-Col. Stanley, Lord Clay, James Kinnaird, Hon. A. Stansfeld. J. 1 Clinton, Lord R. Labouchere, H. Stebl, John Clive, Georo-e Laing, S. Stirling., Wnt. Cobbett, J. M. Lawson, W. Tite, Wm. Cobden It* Lefroy, A. Thrner, J. A. Coninghsot, Wm. Levinge, Sir R.G.A. Valetort, Lola,. Cowper, W. F. Lewis, Sir G.C., Bt. Vandekeur, u.....-°'o. Crook, Joseph Lindsay, W. S. Vane, Lord Pt. „ C. Cross, R. A. Locke, J. Villiers, Rt. 1 1° ' Dalglish, Robert Lockhart, A. E. Walters, R. Davey, R. Lopes, Sir M., Bt. Warre, J. A. T. Deasy, Richard Lyons, Dr. Watkins, J. L. Denison, W. H. F. Lysley, W. Wemyss, J. Denman, G. McEvoy, E. Westhead, 1 3 - Dillwyn,•Lewis L. Maguire, J. F. Whitbread, S. Douglas, Sir C. Marshall, W. Williams, W • ,ir g 'Dunbar. Sir Wm. Martin, J. Will oug hby, Euston, Earl of Massey, W. N. . Wiison, J. Evans, T. W. Miller, William Wynne, C. GY Ewart, J. C. Mitchell, T. A. • . Ewart, William Monson, W. J. 'TELLER S ' Ewing, H. E. C. Morris, D. Brand, H. 8.....,..,40 0 Fenwick, Henry Mundy, William . linatehbull-lau• NOES-70. ,-, $. Bentinck, G. W. P. Hennessy, - J. P. - N ew d eg ate, C . j. 0. Bramston, T. W. Holmesdale, Lord' Pakington; Si.' Brooks, R. Hopwood, J. T. , Palk, L. IV. Cochrane, A. D. Hornby, W. H . P arker, MsJo' .. . Cole, Hon. H. A. Hume, W. Pennant, Col: Cole, J. L. Jermyn, Earl Potts, Ge05.e . ,,,,,Ta Dawson, R. P. Jervis, Captai n P ug h , D. (tiai.j.l" Deedes, Wm. Kendall, N. R ams d e n, Sir W . Du Cane, Chas. Kennard, C. Ridl ey , Sill' " Earle, R, Kinglake, A. W. Selwyn, C. J. Edwards, Major H. Knightley, R. Spooner, R,.... n. Egerton, A. F. Leeke, Sir H. Stanhope, . 1 ~,,. Eleho Lord Legh; G. C. • Stracey, Sir 'II. Fellowes, Edward Legh, W. • Thynne, Lor. Galway, Viscount Liddell, Hon. H. G. Torrens, R. ,- o nll Gard, R. S. Long, R. P. Trollope, sir 0 Gaskell, J. M. Lygon, Hon. F. Vance, John ,j, I.• Goddard, A. L. Malins, It., Walcott, Ad ril. if . • Gordon, Capt. Gore, J, R. 0. Manners,miine:7 H. .L iu d J . . J.R. w W ood atline ß o . l l + . J' Gore, W. R. 0. Montagu, Lord R. Gray, William Morgan, Major: TELLERS , Griffith, C. D. Morgan, C. 0. S. Hamilton, Lord C. Mowbray, Rt. Hn. J. Horsrnan, E. Hartopp, E. B. Mure, David Napier, Sir C. COUNTRY MA.RKBTS. LIVERPOOL—JULY 29. ' cor tl We had only a small attendance of buyers at our to ol exchange this morning, and the demand for both whe a o ,lo o flour was quite in retail, w ithout any alt e ration. in the from last market day ; it is difficult, however, to o btain d 0 advance then established. Indian corn neglected , a ll to 2d per cental l ower on the week. O u t s a nd oat_ A ll'e s fl oir dull sale. Egyptian beans, peas, and ba.rley each had consumptive inquiry at previous prices., WAKEF—J . IMT 29. The wheat trade still v i still but business rather bett or for for fine fresh parcels. Quotations unaltered. In oats, and shelling no change to note. ' at. 0 4 doom., ( 1 Whet4,.per qr. of 8 bushels 601 b., Essex, 0 re, T - / Kent, white, o d, 48s to 52s ; new, 48s to 535; -- 4 i t ta fot-I . old, 42s to 455; new, 42a to 45F, ; Li nco l ns hire on' , shire white, new, 46s to 50s ; red, 41s to 445. Averages for the week : Wheat 23,65 qrs., at 44s id 1) Barley.... . 10 3os ° a ' o Peas •••• ----. tt --8 a" Beans 2O 4ss 9ri - Oats „„ 24s u' i , Rye .._... EXETER—JULY 29. 5? Farmers being actively, engaged in harvest oP er 4 l : 3o: the business was extremely dull to-day, at , the fo' " 0 ,1 prices : to ,- 6 a Wheat, white ..5s 3d to 5s 9d I Barley .. 3s n 6cl , to 30 Ditto red 4s 3d to 4s 6d I Oats . 3 s Od ~u, OP" • 1‘. Flour, fine, 34s to —s ; seconds, 32s to - , - , 51 3 e 1 .,,,, otocA vi rib.. CATTLE—The market was poorly supplied IP- A. moderate attendance of bi farmers. Pork carcases supply. sc l t ° 6 6 1 4 Fat beef,p score, lOs to 10s6d Ewes, per lb .• • • oto Pork carcases, doBs Od to 88 6d Wethers, do- •• • • g id to Lambs, per 1b:.... 6fd t o 7d F at c a l ve s, do.. -us Rough fat, 4d per lb. I BRISTOL SUGAR—JULY 29. all The market conti nues w ith ou t a lt era tion. -For s u g a r el , the spot th ere i s a f a i r d eman d b ot h f or pan and g; )00 purposes, at about f ormer prices, A moderate busin e ll t 10' been doin g in floating citrgoes, in some cases at a slig "AO provement in value. Refiners' produce of fori with a ready sale, at fully former rates. Rum is aFP dull. .ET--JULY 29. the close ef t he maric e '' Walls Eud• 0. 1 6 6 Braddyll's Hetton•• • • 'l6 5 Framwellgate .... •.. ' 'l6 6 Gosforth ........ •• • " . 14 0 Whitworth ........ • ' .11 6 Hartlepool. ; ..•• • • • • 6 Heugh Hall ........ South Kelloe .•• • • ..I°, 3 Keiper Grange. ••• • ' ,6 Hetton Lyons 31 1111 ' ,14 Benson._ „ ..... • 16 6 Cassop .... • • .1 1 , 6 Hetton.... ........ • 0 Nixon's Duffryul, - ; ; 1 ; 0 2 1 Powell' s D uffrri :et, 52—Sold, 39. COAL MARE (Prices of Coal per Ton at a. d. ) Byass's Bebside West Hartley .15 0 Hastings Hartley .....15 9 Holywell 14 6 Tanfield Moor 13 0 Tanfield Moor Butes-13 0 Wylam .2_ l6 0 Walker Primrose 13 3 Walbottle Hartley 14 0 Clark's%yest Hartley l5 6 Lambert's West Hart ley 15 0 Walls End. South Hartlepool. 16 0 Ships at marks ter At a meeting of the Bank of Manchester ired 1 s day—Mr. Stell in the chair—a dividend was d ia e ll ' f-91; the rate of 10 per cent. per annum for the pto t ;,,,r, l _,: e to The chairman stated that the intention to ref9 - ' -- s tOw limited liability had been formally notified to the eti cu poo on the 6th of June, and that since that date the of the bank had increa....ed. BIRTHS. ERSKINE.—On the 25th inst., at Clifton, Staab r „t. Hon. Mrs. Biber Erskine, of a daughter. • of Ft/gen.—On the 29th init., at Tulse-hill, the w"" • t y , H. Finch, 31st Regt., of a son. PONSONBY.—On the 27th inst at St. .Tamcs's-1) Hon. Mrs. Spencer Ponsonby, of a daughter. fo MARRIAGES. ilea% OGILVY—KINNAIRD.—On the 27th inst., at St; "' t s oA tl o Hanover-square, Reginald Ogilvy, Esq., eL u n e ' ' ird , Sir John Ogilvy, Bart., M.P , to Olivia B.Nlim -3 only daughter of Lord and Lady Kinnaird. i j a-, or TURNER—HIDE.—On the 28th i ns t., at the Pa ri .a . 0 , 10 0 Brighton, Ed war d T urner, Esq , L eecr ofts, o point, in the county o f S ussex , to Frances, rllliceseP late John Hide, Esq., of Tollington-park, rlld DEATHS. cl, $-°l3' BnEwEn.—On the 28th inst., at 11, Clarendon" 77. ~„(1 sington-park, Colonel Brewer, H.E.1.C., ag e " o ' 00 . P' e d ERSKINE.—On the 27th inst., at Ripon, the 0 Very Rev. Henry David E rs ki ne , Dean Of o f 73. HEmsLEY.—On the 28th inst., Edward HenlsleY' Park-road, Stoke-Newingt on , aged 62. CAP MTIONALD.—On the 24th inst., at R eadirl '' ° Ott M'Donald, aged 88. Pt PROITT.—On the 25th inst., at Wandsworth; TII°S. Esq., formerly of 229, Strand, aged 75. -10 C4 ' LONDON : Printed and Published by multi:ft' 1.10._, o t of No. 112, Strand, Printer, at The Sure Oflice'co,O7 Strand, in the Precinct of the Savoy, ill the Middlesex, Saturday, July 30, 1859. 4 I JAJ