The Sun. — London, England, 1802-11-24 00:00:00

• T oed • ' ' - v ..• in- the arrangement or those Indemnities.-- ee er y t.4(l)i.„he**iiii'stire", -. musc wish lot the con- • t b' n .ance of Peace; except those who thought that b e Present Peace was so bad-a one, that it oughtfto a e brOken at all eitents,• though it had received the • 0 1 t Prohation of a great- majority of that House, and the People of this Country. Upon these grounds he slould vote for the Address. - ' e Mr• CANNIIVG .Said, he rose to concur in the ael'Proliation given to the Address by the MM.-Men-l: uer who preceded him, bUt with some variation ; upon some points of opinion. The first objed was; to know what line ofecoOdu6t he maybe' deemed:: t° suPpOrt in . the vote he was a bout to givee-e e t, 1 Whatever some bold men 'may. think- proper to'-eaSF-', sett i n mai: ntalning, th a t .War - Vl'as 'the. ret*d'y e ,ftor the evils that surroun d e d us , a ll must concur,' or at, -east a : Wen-Majority, in approving .rhe sy . steerteot". Preparation which Ministers Were it4OPtinge The 110 n. Gentlenian (Mi. Fox) seemed_to:doubt..the exptd:ency and necessity of our increasing our Na:. 'l4 . .iti I Military Establishments. But whether the• t iovse,..suas ul t i mate l y to sa ne - Ike them; he considered s mat:cr for future discussion;' and that Gentlemen were pledged,, by the Present Address, to support. them no farth er t h an the eircurnsrances of . ti -j re et , s e ou ntry.maY r eq u i re . fie' for, one gave . the; nisiers credi t for the Peace theyliad:concindede,,itio by doing so, they had not' One eirei y - iliing 7 :Ati vv -es not done, if everYthing was conciliation prom. liart—All•Was not done -if-we" govt. our rival lonti eteri w e ta"d that 'were i eae ly to submit to insult, were. not cliTossi-• ebullition to - d • in to take advantage of any Stanclipa u e the Country ire favour -of c , ~. .p f or t h e R i ghts of other .N_ atioeis Ille "P ee " from the Throne had not .-alinded to any . of . ' these n r ) toriou s triinSaions, 'on the - Continen t which oc c upied , 0 gre atea portion of • the,publife at. !, ent inti, and only exhorted ;Us to'-telposeCpafidence i'' n the wisdo m Of His , Majest y 's' Co - ttnt'll• - if; ''' e Yer,.ilie - interference'Ofthose Councils in some fore ign proceedings Were really such as-hadebeen-re:. Presented,, they, -in his judgment; afforded no great ground's of. confidence in. their future wisdom,--'• Ther e was no man, for ins . tuocee who did not Sytn:- rathize in the sufferings of the People of. Switier st'nd, and rejoice in the gallant example of- spirit •7,,t 1 loYe of _independence which they exhibiho knoted:+le ey must b e peculiarly so to Eoglishirien,WW n how soon they ma y b e ca ll e d u pon to cxer ile the same virtues. It was, howeve r, to - be __, e ° Pel, that our G o vernment did not instigate_that infortunate Country to resistance ; and if our i.riter cerence was such as public nntoriety proclaiFte.it , li e rt ',. e in lY no remonstrance was ever so no wise. • to ,Nght it of importance :to know by whdin -and 4 n '4 ,.''' ° ,_' r ' that interference was made. It ,was .evi c-. to at the feelings of all ranks of_People•• in ...this b e ,, ln try were in uniion - With .those o f the Sw iss ; - e ' ' a wise Administration should not sufiltr . itstlf ."° 'be led or influenced by- such feeiingS tin every occasion ; and f cur remonstrance was precipitate.. „ . , i 4t did injory inste a d of good. The blow was then ""edy struck. We had no Alliance on the Conti. .bent to back our interference—A us tria was, quite teprepated or :unequal to the attempt, and we could no t expect -to call Armies With the same facility that then may .calla coach. Our interference, therefore, was ill-advised and unnecessary if it.("S' and- could 'Qt h:' attended Y. , ;..,1i any r iforal or poli•ticalzoodi wuatever. The' Swiss were already conquered, 411 (1 the - business was done. ' Did the Ministers ac F c 9rn . Patiy,•their remonstrance with a Declaration - that'. h * should be iiieffeatial, a War • would be the al-' t .toativ e ?. Upon this subject We had no official Corn.' ' T 'urlication, Iti•some cases there Was nothing-more Proper than secrecy, but he was not disposed to ap_ F k r .,' v e of it as applied ,- to the People- governed. 9ere sh ou ld o n a ll sucleocceSions be a corntntinion of N vl s er'Aiments he'rween His Majesty and -his• People. ae n the ,Preliminaries 'of the late Treaty with . tra nce were - untierdiscussion, we were congratulat-, td ---'l . rrsons in -high . situations, on the circum_ ,:ance that our . int e rcourse with the -continent C ul d in future he 'relaxed, if not suspended ; t but that at th e same time, it was our determination , ' longer to snlaniit .. to insult or . encroachment. r '' l cli was then the impression,. and 'now we . had a ~ 1 ,,, t bt to know upon what , system we were going.. W hethe r we were . to .interfere in the internal af fairs of +: o the C ont i nent , 'or , whether, we stand alo n e, 111 indful only our own concerns; disseveted frotn v 4 s e of th e ot h er Powers ; or pay, lik e our 'ices" tor s - , - - se, a (1.11 regard to the general interests of Europe.. e thought that we ought to stand or fall by our es ; others, that we were too honest for any kitid•of Interference. For. l • .he could not mush ad his part, I nire this qent. s superabundance of honesty which some a _', Ge ntlemen were content to state in their places, ianubothers, perhaps, for different purposes, in popu. A r aran . I s gues to Assemblies and their Constituents. th7oe Addresses and Speeches, to which he alluded,. td Nh, perhaps, they could not be regularly guot tioto that House, must have made a strong impres. not on the P u bli c Mi n d, - an d t h e C ountr y oug h t Of ? e n be suffered to run riot in the expectationw..l h• a ee, while a different system was pursuing, ch .Wiwit, must have a tendency to lead us into 'War. rthrespectto the reliance to be placed in the ge selft measur es o f AdMi n i strat i on , h e pro f esse d him p 4 friend to r ecru i t i ng an ex h auste d A rmy , an d a dis mantled Navy, in the face of an imposing ad- N'ers ar eeedi Y ; alth oug h, ' unquest i ona bl y, some l a t e pro kee n g s left us to retrieve and repair, instead of n ien P : n g what- we had. The incorporation of Pied ,aee with France was 'accompanied by the' dis e "'ling of our Army ; and the allotments of Ger - ' II3 Y was our N , perhaps, the effect of the dismantling of fact a .vy• All our Foreign'Acquisitions were, in the giv" up at the time that we should have kept andproportion with our adversary, of ship for ship, j '?'" 1•61. . A '• " ` v as ackn ' man. An contest we could have now, owleo • fo r n • , .ged t o be not so MUCII.I . Oi Power as • nOtir , l atte • e , but the worst method of upholding the •` r . must b ide, fur " .- eto let down the National Spirit.---. _him. lf" had - Al . • - at Res _ ''e , no sposition to go to. War cot ; but from some Speeches he- had heard delivered • th at b y persons in authority,' he -was to infer. s tread decaofthe of L . Y ,Spirit, w i as the Clink: . in , . . - -whi e le e g P eace . . _this, however, vas ;t position. - l i e was . - 413inta- ready to deny, On the contrary, he p r a ine d that there the ' • eopi e of _„ le never was a period when . ;n or ,. C p l abl e to II United Kingdom were more ready or • H oe. Gen continue the War with vigour: The . t ' (Mr. Fox) seemed desirous * of tracing • . . . 'all the . •. digetiltie:i of our situation to the late Admi nhtration; He, pn the othey hand, contended, that the state in - which they left the 'Cbuntry on retiriog from office, Was the reverse Of,,being calamitous. 2— ile.was ready to go through all thecircumstances, point by point', and could scarcely restrain his in dignation ‘vlkn it was asserted, that nothing Lit a desperate effort of patriotism could have induced any other set of Gentlemen to succeed them. It was indeed true, that. the CoinitrY was then left in- volved in an cxtensiveWar, and'that a War with the Neutral'PoWers &vas then in its commencement ; yet notwithstanling all 'this,, theaft y p r epjaps was never a situation' lxiiich afforded rnore: a ternptation to 'the Wishes or ambition'of those Who'WereprOpi;Sed succeed them. An Armament had already, been pronOs , ed, the exigeilcies of the Neutral Waraand to bring it to a sueee„Ocil. terriatnatinn, and.. tha'i. A rinatarent had effadtrally i and glotiously put an end.' to it. The .same.AdatiniStra i tion h;id prepared' ,arief sent :forth the Egyptian Expclition,, the success of which so Mate ' ilaily ' contributed to ih Peace. - "He was very far, from wishing to dis parage the _present 'Ministry but it was bui, justice to say, hat they ancceeded* to, office with this, •,great j; advantage in their favOikr, 'that as the EXpeditions i were Crowned with success, the . y . .were in a condition to claim the merit of it, whereas, hail they :failed, .they a would not, have been liable th any responsibility. A..s to the finances, he must .remark, that till' the supplies of the year had been previously provided for, the.. internal tranquillity was, etaked_; for areaspn had "ran put down, sedition aile.nced, and the remnant ol . party in a great,nicaatire 'dish - ended. fie said much, nor from disrespe a tt to . apy, one, but in justic to _a set of men to Whom there was reitatan to ascribe. the salvation 'of the country. Nothina- cenid therefoi'e be mciredeai,j.ible than a the - sciccessio'n obtained by the present Ministers.- dtaernains thenato consider, what reliance, avaa a to be placed in Administration for their- palitieak ,camlud. since their aecesaionaao 'power,. .Ttermatreonly zOVO pointa , which, at ruck. hijn- a -ahe Ne r utral:War and. the .I. ) eace they 4tttd cnnh 'eludes . ~But alley avere i lettabya l their predeeestoaa the means of,entling at) en44o.'the one, and its sue c6s-ta.antra•lly qad, its its conseqtrencesa to:the ac , compliahment of the other.. -With a. view tar, this question,: he would lank. how this Cnuntry stond in relation_ to RciSsia. We -hail. ; immediately dis patched thither .a _very mile slalt.olater ; but immedi ately afterwards we fnundaiti a party ao!the Planof the German,lndemnitiel. ,Ina.,annryperiod, subse quently, Russia shewed a disposition to.: interfere in - preventing the annexation-oßiedrnont to France, and Piedmont Was. probably• lost to the King ;of Sardinia, in consequence of tour refusal to join in die Russian :interference. Thus far, as to our grounds of reliance on , Ministers for, their condo 't in the ;neutral, War ; and he next came,. to review their merit in concluding the late :Treaty. .It was to be observed, that the House, by approv ing of that Treaty, Was a not bound to it in. all pits parts. It had indeed been discussed, but never de- bated in its terms. The approbation given to it was not on the ground that the terms were advantageous, but on the idea held out that the Peace would 'be durable. lf indeed he had :reason to conclude it would be lasting; : )e felt a no,disposition to quarrel with the tertns.., These were examined; but not canvassed, and the, Country hailed the event with acclamation, in the hopes that °it-would be pernm nent. The disposition of France was then taken upon trust, but how•was it now.manifested in the present state of Europe? and let it be aemem bered, that the People might have aded other_ wise, if. they knew what was to happen.. .He • was willing to agree to. any, tking. - which would give strength : to the strength of the Country ; not so however to that which - would 'strengthen ship, which would at length be . turned against us' when matured and invigorated--a rivalship—" qui audum et reconditum. romeret." France only waited for afavoutable opportunity. of hewing that her emulation was, not.that of commerce, but exter- Mination.; and if it had not burst forth before, it - was, only .because the mea,ns' were:wanting. He wished not to speak against :ijaystern.of prepara tidn, but must condemn anyething which tended first to Jullthe -people, and afterwards suddenly call upon theitafor vigorous t exertion. He wished at once to excite a, steady condua, and 'persevering courage, and a disposition to , take, not a little and contraded, .but a great and comprehensive view of every •interesting subjet. He was an advocate for our having a ready, produdive adiVity, not only capable of meeting particular emergencies, such as - those ofSwitzerland and Malta, but.to meet every danger to which we may be 'exposed—a vigilant, , waking acclivity, diffusing itself over every part of Europe. Lard HAWKESBURY rose, and proceeded to take a comprehensive view of the political state of this Country, and to answer the observations which had been made in the course of the Debate, parti cularly by his Right Hon. Friend who had just sat down. . His . Lordship observed, that the Hon. Members who had spoken, and discussed the ques tion now before the House, had all agreed to as sent to the Address,. but upon grounds that were different, some of them opposite to each other ; and there were some.points in which he could not agree with the Hon. Gentleman. opposite to •him, (Mr. Fox) in some points he had stated, nor with his Right Hon. Friend, ..(Mr. CANNING) in others. 'He agreed - With many of the sentiments, which had -been delivered-by Mr. Fox; but he did. not agree with that Hon. Gentleman, that. the events which had happened since the signing ,of-the Preliminary Treaty of Peace between this Country and France, might not in the opinion of many persons, create a • material difference in the relativesttuatinn of the two Countries, for certainly Francedid.nOt then stand in the situation in-which it .stocalnow. In stating this,, his. Lordship obseri'ed, that he did. not mean to en :ler at present.on ,the question, of whether it was wise in His Majesty's. Ministers to conclude the -Peace on the terms on. which it was concluded, -nor to enter into any comparison between the events as. they stood then, with .the 'events that have hap pened since the Peace. It '}vas said at the conclu sion of the Peace, he believed by him, that it was right then to close the account of the War, and that with 'all the conditions upon which, it was then made, he had, added, it would be' wise to look al.. . . ways On the further etihroachrhentS of France with jealousy and watchfulness; and he had said also, that much might- depend upon the chance there was, at success in endeaVoutingto stop it.- He wished not to apply this to the.preSent case, but the disa. tinaian which that observation was. intended . to Convey, was material: He couldnot agreewith I:is Right Hons Friend 'who had, just sat down, in tie allusion he made tb *hat he had'apppOsed to have been said by him (Lord IIAWKESBIII6') when the subjea..matter of' the Preliminary and , Definitive, Treaties were disewssa in that House': He -re, gretted, that hisUic,Yion. Friend was riot pre. sent at that diseusitc nth ps 'qo that he had not an op, portun . ity of kncwidq f pfecisely, the-sentiment§ on which that Definitive Treaty was defended by His _Majesty's Ministers, for, by the ,representation he made of that matter, and, his arguments from that ie -o.esentation, it was evident hehad, in some respeas t irdeconeeiVed 'Abe gfounds on which .His Majesty's Ministers defended that 'Treaty in its discussion in House. His Right Hon. Friend asked, what the System was'on whi4h4\slinisters had aCted a and whe., the r 'they had 'fel t r„,lsu slied, the Syatem on ;wh ich they had conclndedtT e e, Peaty gust he t ansWered, that His 'Majest,y;',a Ministers• a - aesf, now precisely ott tEe same . S's ., atem as they .atfled . when the Defini e . `live Treaty Was concluded:, That the principle which was then asioVved was. the principle which world govern tEeM ; it was a '.principle, tt hich was perfetily clear and intelligifiJe, and .practicable. that-principle was stated by the .Hpn,Gehtleman opne , s,sse to him,: asefar as the staeernent went, with perfca fairnesslt was that as ear as respeas the Inieres of this q9untry, the Peace was made on terms that wersitononsabic, inasmuch as it Pre -seit'edthe:lntegrity:ct the British Dominions e and it ; was added, at the time of the discussion of that 'Treaty, by some whica*toole a share in it on the part 'of Nis Majesty - Ministers, that, as fares itere speaed the stats, , of the Continent, „many things uere , left undei elTsumstances that ,were unsatisfac tory, arid Mirsistet pad expressed regret.uPon.that occasion, and in, terma e 'tljat were stronger than the H9nourable Gelltleman opposite to him had stated to. night upon that topic. The principle, on which "His Majesty's Ministers. justified themselves then 'Was this, "That to.continue the War for Continen tal. 'Objeas;• withbat the prospect of Contipental 'SuppOrt, wouldltatshrd, and that consequently ~is, I ; •it was better to, e the Chance of Peace, than the . _ ,chance of War-seelfia, Cir w e.were to have the alter native, it vas :desirable for us to try Peace, when in Chntinental objects, outexpeetations had ceased."- - This was the ,prAnciple on which .His Majesty's - Ministeli then aced. It was the principle by which they noact , a, and 'on wl,Ach they would always be `ready to aft, and to,.justify themselves. He knew that his Right Hon. Friend who had spoken. last had allUded to some general topics, and referred to the opinions Of other persons .as to the, : system which Ministers ought to pursue, and who.did not agree with'MiniSters: But he had mistaken some senti ments whiCh were uttered by him (Lord HAWKES BUP.Y.) It Was stated as if something was,saicl. on the discussion of the Definitive Treaty, that. it was tile policy of this Conntry to abstraa itself from the Continent. That was not the principle then avow ed ; bUt he remembered Ttaving said something very different hi e lf.ort that occasion, and he was, ready to defend wbatene then said. had said, it was not the system of this Country to abstraa itself from Crintinental concerns, and ,attend exclusively to its owes resources, :led internal affairs,; he should have thought, if some respettable persons, had not ex pressed a contrary optniop, that the case was too deer for any doubt to, be entertained upon it. He owned, that to a Country so large, and Territories so extensive, commerce so wear . , and interests so complicated, it was.impossible,to apply, with good sense, the principle ofabstraaing itseli, and to at tend to mere internal policy of its own, distina from all_ concert: with the affairs , of s other States, urn all occasions. Those wlen shonld ever attempt to guide the affairs of this Country upon a.contract ed eystem, would soon find it a policy` which, they rnust_abandon, or sacrifice the real interests of_ this C'. entry.' He might objea to this system on a me :e large and extensive,, principle e than any he had hitherto k .tileiltiOtWil, but it, was not his intention to be diffuse in what he had to siihnit to the .House. He knew he_ might ,to s what had been ,the .praaice Ns'ajesty's Ministers,; that was a subjea on, which he tilt more delicacy than otherwise he would have of tiffienity in the detail.. He thought, however, that. the affairs of States, like the affairs of Indivi doals, took their course, from. the circumstances and importance in which they stood.—States that were in size and consequence of a subordinate kind, had to fellow a rule of policy. .different from that which would be a wise one to . a. great and important. State. Inferior or subordinate States,. like inferior and subordinate Individuals, had to look chiefly to MA.intenance and- support, .often little. more than preservation of existence. But Individuals . of rank acid- station,, of high condition in life, had the sup- Tort and assistance of others to ,attend to ; the concerns 'e of' others and interests of others to consider., and, in some cases , to provide for., in States. Great and powerful States had to loO , k to many things besides their own imme diate and internal interest ; both policy and justice required that they should attendto other objeas, for the interest of a great and powerful State was often combined with those who were inferior to it, as well asin endeavouring to, set some limits to ano. ther Power, and therefore it was to him a matter of surptize, that . anyyerson of an enlarged understand__ ing should suppose it could, under any circumstances, be the interest of this Country to pursue an abstraa system, unconnected with any part of the affairs of the Continent. This, he presumed, would be an ao swer to that part ,of the speech of his,Right Hop: Friend which tended. to imply, that, the policy of His Miijesty's Ministers was that of an abstract in , sulated nature. Batt still ilicre might be eircum; stances that ought to govern His Majesty's Mini sters. That the policy which he hasl e already stated, was. that on which His , Majesty's • Ministers had, in some cases, acted, in others forbore to aCf, was a'point which it was almost unnecessary for, him to state.- It was so fresh in the recolleaion of all who heard him, that this ,polV:y of attending to expe diency, had governed this andothor States in the _... n s. . the Case of iNationohimurshless than that of France „in „point of te rrittv .at the time poptilbus than several of the then independent States Of Europe, and yea that vast Nation had been blot, ted out of the Map of 174 - ope, as an indep:ei,dent State. It must be obvious to the House that he alluded th Poland e Upon that occasion, there was a in that House: this"Countr!e, het one feeling, and jet' it had been held, not only by Ministers, but also by a. con, siderable bodir of thot;e svho opposed them, thanthiS Nation ought not, to go to War on that did not believe that any considerable . body, of :nen blained Ministers for their . condua on that occasion . s: . Because wha te ver.protence it mighefuanish afterwards for continuing a contest - that might be ,rte; vitable, it was unadviseable at that time, hoWever de_ sirahle, becauSe it, was" mpossible for. us tohave inter fered, with . any ;alliance of success, without Continen, tal support. From the state of Europe, at that time, under all the circumstances that must inevitably. have been conneacd .with War, there was no, read . sOnable_hope of success, in any cil'arts of ours, with, Out Continental support, Nell. we could not then haVe ; and, thersfore, h o wcver . just itiltself,pr de, sirable the thing might he, there was notating to warrant our active interkrznce. AnOther transac. tion was to be found in the history of Europe," which was more immediately conncsaid with The direain a ter - est of this Country, on the subjed of CUritinental Policy: lt was that of the conduit of King Williattt the Third, tinder all the good qualities Of that Prince :and his' admired general Policy, and when the Poli tical SyStem of this Countsy was . established, on the wisest Ewing. He meant the great point by which. the ambition. of Lonis the 14th appeared on the death of ,the King . of Spain, on the War, of Succession, upon the Will of the .King of Spain. It was then declared,' by King William, to. he the 'pOliey of this Country, under all the circumstances, not .to interfere alone in that question, so as to in yolve this: Conntry in a ,War, without Continental support ; and this was the opinion of a Prince, who, .froin his education 'and habits, was certainly prone to an interference in continental Affairs.; In a . word a it was his opinion, that without Contirtental Stip - port:this Country ought not to interfere in Con. tinental concernseon the ground of Expediency ; but this was a totally distina thing from any ab straa insulated policy.—lt was a policy founded on the reason Of the, thing, arising out. of circumstances over which_we had no scontroula With regard to the, circumstances of .the present moment a and what wound have been wise for, ,His Majesty's Ministers to do, that was,. as he had said already, a question 9f more delicacy than difficulty for him to speak upon 7 4le should, however,, speak in general terms upon that topicn He would say, that the conduct Of His Majesty Ministers was governed by a consia deration. of all the circumstatices.of the case, by a due consideration of the value of objects, of the theca Peace,- and of the State of the Continent at the time. Putting the first point for a moment out of the question, wany observations might he made on the State of the Continent. It might . be . well worth consideration, Whether, if they • thought that the objeas themselves were such, as wouldacles.erve the renewal of . and we were determined to take that .course, it was probable, at this moment, we should have any effeaual support This was a point which must be governed by a variety of con. siderations, ; and he had no difficulty 'in saying, that although,. after a War, such as that which had been.closed, - with: the magnified State of:France, Peace .was, under all circumstances, desirable yet he should have rejoiced, and he believed that every refleaing Man in this Country would have rejoiced, if, by a .wise,, temperate,: and firm condua in the other PoWers of Europe,. a. J3arrier could have been pui to v fatther encroachment ; 'but at present, from points, some of which had been foreseen 'at the time of making Peace s --he meant particularly' some Ouestions as to the Indemnities, which must give to France advantages in all Continental DiscusSions Of: ilais kind ; many evils arose which were unit voidable. It was not necessary fOr ,him, at this time, to consider the Question of Indemnities, .though there was much injustice,, yet, perhaps, _something of the kind .was inevitable. lt was a System of Indemnity, so,called, and nothing more. Bat so it happened, tlrat, the moment the discussion was opened, .France had it in her power to ho'ld oht immediate advantages to some States, ,which made them less vigilant than they should be of the gene ralinterests. of Europe ; sn that in this respea a sys tein was established which was not to the Interest of ~this Country. He had, however, cautioned the House in this respeEt and on. this point ; but most persons agteed, that. the present circumstances aid not warrant a renewal of the Contest ; but what was most material to be considered was'this, if Cob tinental ConneEtions must be had with a view to such a renewal of Hostilities, if it should ever be_ come necessary, by. a hasty' and a premature re newal, we should lose all the advantages of a well concerted system. This was not a point on which he wishesl to hold out any expeaation to the Hisease; he could not with propriety do so if he had any grounds for it ; but the House would feel the pro, priety of the principle which he had laid down, as a rule to guide this proceeding. If we had only a desire for the continuance of Peace, this principle was correct; it was likewise correct ever, in the event of Hostilities tieing una voidable. He wished to be most distinaly understood, as maintaining the opinion, « that under the present circumitances of this Country, and of Europe, if Peace eau be maintained, consistently with honour to ourselves, under, a proper defensive system, it is, under all circumstances, better than a renewal of the War, even' connected with a consideration of ail the events which have happened. His Right Hon. Friend had stated some words of his, used on the discussion of the Definitive Treaty's respetting 'the National spirit of this Country at that time: His Lordship said, he did not state the sentiment in the insulated manner mentioned by his Right Hon. Friend ; yet he state then, and he believed now, that if' a sufficient case Was made of injustice to us, but not only of injustice, but also with a reasonable•expec tation of success, the spirit of the People was fully equal to any contest in which we might be en gaged ; yet, that after ten years War, carried on so extensively arftl so variously in its course, the .spirit of the People did require, in some de- - • •• • concerns ef'.lCitizcloitis--Qop of a i.eCetit,date it n al