The Sun. — London, England, 1807-01-06 00:00:00

~._.. to negotiate without Ru3sia ; and when :• :) sent her Ministers to Paris, we negotiated in form, but in sub.tance in concert.— ignathre of D'Oubril's Treaty, Great Bri ni released from its engamements. But, Twat) , was disclaimed by Russia, the ti were re; :aced .on their fermer foot- Lord"Luuderdille had instructions to con- Treaty in which the interests, of Rus gefitt not scrupulously attended. to. Did :the feei dis Satisfied with the terms by cite liritish Government ?. The terms ii Ii possession ; that is, that. we .co etery that we then held, except equivalent to it. should be given to us in e. This a -.ls a basis partichlarly, applicable to itien of both Countries—France was power the Continent, Great Britain at sea. Neither had the prospect of making any consider ahie impression on the other...lt was. a principle of e.qunlity to hold Sicily for our Allies, to• maid tale good, faith with Naples, to ,recover Hanover, which,as it was unjustly seized, itaxeuld have been dishonourable to abandon ; to , smaintain the in-, tegrity of Sweden and Portugal. These were general propositions, from which we never materially re-' ceded. ft must be recollected that the value of concessions for Peace increased when that Peace was likely to be precarious. There never was, at any period of the Negotiation, the power of Obtaining terms such as could. have been ac, ceded to: Previous to Lord Yarluouth's arrival from France, no particular terms had been specified ;- thencame the proposition of the uti possidetis.—But from this the French GOvernment immediately re ceded, both with relpeet to Sicily and to other ob jects. Nothing, however, was distinctly stated until after the signature of:D'Oubril's Treaty. At that time Lord Yarmouth stated, that Hanover, the Cape, and remained pure and'untouched,---.- Soon, however, this rejection. of the basis operated with a vengeance. The French Negotiator declares that his master will not surrender Pondicherry, Sn rinam, Tobago, Goree, Berbiee ? Essequibo, &C, — Malta too was to be subject to the payment of cer tain pensions, &c. ; the British garrison to be limit ed in. force ; besides the tit nute of Malta would ,have become quite insecure from the loss of Sicily, on twhieli that Island depends for ita provisions. For Hanover it was proposed by .the French to take the principality of Hoya ; the Cape was to become a free port, that is, Englandi was to pay the expenees of the establishment, and other nations to derive the ad vantuges of it. Independensly therefore of the viola tion of faith, these were terms which Great, Britain could not accept. She could not agree to abandon Russia and Sicily. The equivalent for Sicily waito be given to Sicily. ThesKing of Sicily was to have been dethroned, and Great Britain to provide for his subsistence. Could any man with a heart, and with feelings truly English, say that these were terms to w hich his Majesty's Ministers could have listened ? On the 4th September, atter the information of the non-ratification of the Russian Treaty had. reached Pa t -is, a great change took place, and they .were dis posed to go much further; they were willing togive up Hanover wit houtdeduaion, Malta withouirestriaion, theabsolute sovereignty of the cape to Britain, Pon dicherry, Cleandernagore,. Tobago, &c. . These were better terms, but they were-far from the original basis. Yet such as they were, they were to be at th:.- price of abandoning lussia and. Sicily. ,Had they, however, been infinitely more advan tageous, at such a price they ought not-to have been purchased : and at what time too were they offer ed ? not until the French Emperor had left Paris, to take the command of his armies, then on their march a . ;ainst•Prussia. • His (Lord Howick's) opinion of .the Russian connexion was, that if a ,hope remained of retrieving the affairs of Europe, it rested on an intimate understanding-between , Great _Britain and Itus4a. • By every tie both of good faith' and of in •terest, we were bound strictly to adhere to our en ' ygemeets with that Power ; and with regard, to Sicily; when it was recolle&ed how the King of Si cily had been brought into the present War, it must be evident that we were bound to defend it for. him, could obtain some fair equivalent. With regard to Dalmatia, considering it even as a Russian objea, hid Russia' no right to expe& any thing from France at the conclusion of a Peace, in return for her acknowledgment of the Imperial title ; for her consent to the occupation. of Naplet and of Holland ? • she had a.rigiit to demand the evacuation of Dalmatia ; besides, Rtissia was in possession of the strong fortress of Cattaro, ,on the, borders of Dalmatia, from which Prance, with.all her-power, could not dispel hcr. But Dalmatia was not alone Russian ohje4—it was a British object.--Let the situation of Dalmatia be considered—it was not.ht 'contaa with. France—it was, an •advanced position,• which afibrded the French means of communivation with the discontented bashaws of Turkey,. and sub sequently of attacking India. It also, by flanking Hungry, becamedangerous to the German Powers. it was a position mire formidable eveniu Peace than in War ; and in every point of view it was import ant to Russia; it was important to England:: it was important to Europe, that Dalmatia should not. re main in the possession of the French. Some might' contend that the British Government ought not to' have rejected the terms °tiered,: because it would be difficult to procure better. To that he would an swer, that they -were rejected. because, it would. have been dishonourable to have accepted them, :Insuf ficient as they were, they become more.se,.wheo it was con:>idered 'that they were not offered until Bo naparte had left Paris ; and therefore that they, would . not have produced the etrea, without which a Peace ~ on our part was scarcely dvsitable, of ditilising Peace over Europe. • For lie would ask,.would our accept ranee of the offered terms have, stopped the opera . Cues of . the French armies ? Could any assurances of Talleyrand's,:on that head, have been satisfaaory The principal inducement held out to: M. D'Ou-. bra to 'sign his precipitate Treaty, was, that the changes in Germany ,might b e p revente d. B u t bis'aignatore was scarcely dry, before the Rhenish. -Confederacy took place. There were two results to be expeCted from the War between France and PaissitL Either that Prussia would be successful or • that she would be unsuccessful, Had she been .suc cessful, what would have been said of alie,Adtaiiiii etiation who had concluded a Peace- on iesutlicient temis, - and by that means. cramped the .energies of ,t!, c. 'and that at a time when they Might other wis 3 , have been exerted with • vigour and effect ? if .niiaucceasful„, would our situation have tin Lne- i ;~itr. t) liorated Does any .boly believe that, after the bat tle of Jena, Bonaparte would have been stopped by the terms . of any Treaty recently concluded with Great Britain r Ekperienee had shewn the contrary, aad the transactions in which M. Sebastiani was en gaged, afforded sufficient proof 'of cases in which Treaties were violated by the French. To add to the 'atrocities e e of that man, be bad, -on his-mission to. Con stantinople, passed through the country of the Hos . podars, by whom he had been treated with hospitality and kindne3s . ; and yet his first at on his arrival at Constantinople was in dire& hostility to their lute-, rests. -We-had a right, therefore, to conclude, that. had the French concluded a Treaty with us, they. - :would, in the present circumstances of the Conti nent, have described us in the detestible light of • having been the original instigators of the• Cont inental War, and -of having deserted the Powers whom we had excited to *ion. The present deplorable situation of Prussia increasing the immense power of France, placed the prosped of Peace-. at a greater distance. Far would he be from encouraging any san - guine ex pedations. What remainedwas ittthe hands of Heaven: We had donewhatourhonourdemanded ofus. Whether the chastisement of gurope was to continue; orwhether t Ire instrument of vengeance was speedily to be deprived of its power, he knew not; but this he kne*,thatGreat Britain had negleded nothing which it was her duty to perform—nor did he see reason for despondence or dismay. He looked confidentially through the medium of the honour, the courage, and the resources of this Country, to the period when it would be practicable to re-establish that balance of power on which the tranquillity and happinesa of Europe so materially depended. There were two - points which he had omitted in his statement : the one related to the extraordinary Note of the 4th of SepteMbete as published its the French Papers, in .viting Lord- Lauderdale to a conference with M. Talleyrand; but which disgraceful Note never was delivered to Lord Lauderdale ; for, bad it been delivered to him, it :would most certainlf have been -his • duty not to have remained a rsoment longer in Paris. What could have been tie mo tive of this pnblication, he was at a loss;to guess. It must - have originated in some error, of which we were ignorant, for certainly nothing could , have been more unjust than its applicator to the Noble Lord. The other point related :o the sudden change which the French Governmett had asserted had taken place in the tone of ow Bri tish Councils, when Mr. Fox was no longer able to attend them. They said, that the War Part: then 'prevailed. To this assertion - he could give the most._ complete denial. Whoever knew any thing of the Noble Lord, his colleague in office (Lord Gre nville), must be well aware, to those uncommon ta lents fot business which he possessed, he enked a firmess of mind which would not allow him to )e dic tated to by any -man. For himself, he had the sitistacs tion of refieding,that from the commencemeet of the Negotiation to the frzonclusion of it, his sentiments were unaltered. It was true, that the last letter writ , ten by illr. Fox. was on the 26th of June, and that the subsequent details were carried on by others ; but he knew his sentiments for the remainder of the period during which he was capable of expressing those sen ' timents ; he knew that he always under Stood that utipossidetis was the. basis offered by the French Go vernment.;_ and - he knew the indignation which he felt at the cavils and equivocations on that subject, On Sunday, the 7th of Septeinber e the Sunday pre ceding his death, when there appeared to be rather a favourable turn in the Negotiation, anxious as that great man was for the restoration of Peace, he declared that there were three- objects, without the acquisition of which Peace ought not to be con cluded : Ist, the maintenance of the honour of the Country--the second was the preservation of our connexion with Russia—and the third was the re- , establishment of the King of Sicily. It was on these two last pOints that the Negotiation had been broken 'off; and he folemnly declared to the House, that this rupture was in strut conformity to the • senti ments and recommendations of that, Illustrious Statesman, who, in the most severe moments of his illness, stated it to be the ardent wish of his mind to accomplish, before his death two_ great works on which he bad set his heart—the restoration of Peace, and the Abolition of the Slave Trade, After a brief recapitulation of the principal topics of his speech, Lord Howick concluded by movieg an Address. si milar to that which was voted in the House of Lords on Friday last. . [Mr: MONTAGUE and Lord YARMOUTH rose to gether; but the sense of the House being strongly in favour of the Noble Lord's prior title, .Mr. Mon tague give way.] Lord I AR,IIUUTIT apologized for offering him self to the notice of the Manse so early in the De"- bate. He trusted be *should' be acquitted of pre sumption, in claiming the priority of persons much better able to direEt the tudetnent of the House, by the candour„ of Gentlemen on every side, who would be sensible of the propriety -of his ollering an elucidetion of some circumstances respeding the -Negotiation, and some' respeEting himself, in this early stage of the debate. -It we.. es*ential that he Should rescue hitnseil from some impute, tions cast upon 'him, in another place, by a Noble Lord high in auttiolity; to whom he could- not regularly allude. .He had seen the expressions he .alluded to in as very respectable Newspaper early on Saturday. , He could not doubt the authenticity of the report, and . he wished to set himself right with the House, and to set the House-right with respect . to the question initbe points toe which he Meant par ticularly to advert; He thought, he could prove to the Boise that the refiedions cakt . 'upon hiM were un— feundede He hoped it would not be taking up too much of the timeof the House if he should, in his view .of the surbjed under debate, gi-) back to the causes of the present ,war. Considering - the aSsigned grounds in the renewal of the War, he was'of opinion, that at the beginning of this year there were strong rea- ' sons for entering into Negotiations for Peace. One great causeof the war was the impessibility_of obtain tug .a sufficient guarantee for the security of-Malta.' Au official statement in the Meniteurdeelared, long • 'after the commencement of the waf, that so long as England retained Malta, Bonaparte would not relin quish the sovereignty of the Kingdoth of Italy. .111al ..ta, however, was no;...the only cause of the War : the desire to resist the aggrandizement of France .was another cause: Russia, was as averse as we to the oVerbeet big power and charaiaer Of France... But, Russia was unwilling to engage ln the euterprize of reducing France, tilr .Britain, which had little danger to apprehend, individually, from the rekdt e the contest, should be engaged, Front this principle arose the Coalition, in which two Powers joined-=a th,ird ought to have joined. That Coalition Was de feated by means of the policy Prussia had thought props to pursue. In the Spring of 1806, the Con tinent at - lin - de(' a very gloomy prospect. Austria was prostrate at the .feet of France ; Prussia, was bound 'to France in an alliance offensive and defensive. There was nolonger any• hope of saving Europe b3t• War. The only remaining chance of saving it was by Peace. The existence of Austria could be pre served by Peace, aloes Peace alone could break the union between Prussia and France, so detriMen , tal to every hope of the deliveranee of the world as ,an union cemented by the transfer of a. part of his Majesty's dominions. It was of littleinornent which Power had Made the first overture. The first that overcame the mad and fooliSt pride of robbing Na tions of ; Peace, rather than make an overture, was entitled to the praise of both Nations, and of all man kind. The-great Statesman whose loss Europe had to deplore. had.conduaed the earlier part of the Negotiation.by the channel of a private correspond ence, the substance of Which was before the House. 'When he (Lord Yarmonth) was introduced into the Negotiation, one great difficulty in the way of Peace Was the connection with Russia. That, how ever, may be got : over on paper. But there was' a difficulty with .respect to Hanover, which was much less capable of manageMent. It was known that we would spurn any peace which would not: .be coupled with the restitution of Hanover to our be= loved:Sovereign. But at the same time Prussia had been the unalterable Ally of France since the Revolu tion, and Hanover had been conveyed to Prussia, as well in reward of that alliance as in consideration of valuable cessions in exchange. 'Hence it .was ma terial that the intended cession should be made. mat ter of confidential verbal communication, till the _Peace, for which it was to be ceded, should be as certained and agreed upon. The communication , was made confidentially, and treated of in letters .from one friend to another. So he may speak of the Ministers of foreign relations of this Country and of France, though th countries were at war. Though both parties, actuated by a desire for Peace, had cove , panted for the cession of Hanover as one of the terms, yet it was required on one side, and agreed to as reasob able on the other, that with a view not . to dissolve the bonds whi c h united France with Prussia, this agreement should not be disclosed unless Peace should have taken place. In the beginning of June the proposal was sent by him to Mr. For. He de clined putting it on paper, in regard to the cenfi dential restriction imposed by the French Govern-1 tnent ; and it was not till the day of his departure for France, with the answer of his Majesty's Go verninent, that be was induced,. on the'represen tenon of Mr. Fox, on the representation that we were all mortal, and that in cases of such im portance, some fixed record, independent of hninan casualties, should be preserved, 'that he was in duced, on the faith .of an assurance that the docu ment should notpasys the Cabinet, to commit the sub- Stance of the proposal made to him to writing. He' did not mean to decorate himself with plumes to which he was not entitled. It may he true that ! one motive for chusing him to be the instru ment of, the Negotiation, was his having been the bearer of the proposition from the French Government ; but, if it •were inferred, as it had gone abroad, that he had been chosen on that ° eround only, .without any tegard to qnalification, the inference was false. He regretted as .much as any one that the choice of his Majesty's Go vernment had .not. fallen on some person cif greater ability; but it was' at these= time material to be known,',that any other person in such a capa city would nut .have been setfered. to remain twtdve hours in Paris without producing his full powers. M. D'Oubril was not „suffered to remain so long without producing them ; and he believed it ,was case unparalleled in history, that he.(L'ordYartuoutl)" was not called, upon to produce his. , He, had hoped that the private letter of Mr. Fox to Talleyrand, con veyed by him, contained some memorandum of the substance of what he had communicated, and he told Mr. Fox he did hope . so. He comninniCated to Talleyrand the wishes of Government ; he made. the demands he was instruaerto prefer in , a fair„ dire t, and manly manner, and not with any artifice for the purpose of taking in. - He did state the basis ofthe intended Neeotiation. to .. be, that of actual possession; and no o%jeaion was made to that state ment, then, or at any other time---it being alwa rs understood, that, though the uti possidetis was tile basis, it was' subje& to exlilanation and variation, according to mutual interest and convenience. , The Negotiation might. have proceeded on thisunder standing, were it not for the ealousies conceived by the political death of ,Mr, .which was under stood- to have taken place the I'7th of July. He bad presented a Note to_assert, the basis of the uti possidetis as soon as he had communicated his full powers; and, in his second Note, that basis was insisted - upon as much as it could be. But it was not easy in private quarrels to make an individual eat his wOrdS. It was much more difficult to bring to that submission a man. who was at the head of 500,000 troop s . Herice,the management • by which to, avoid a retratlatien the word edopte was sub stituted for the word reconnoi4, in,the. acknowledg ment of the long-coutested basis. Little progress, however, was made in. the Negotiation ; atci scarcely • had an exchange of visits taken place when M. • D'Oubril arrived at Paris. i ll • Was of little moment now to inquire, whether the Treaty signed by D'Oubril was the aCt of his own impropriety—or , Whether the refusal to ratify, it arose merely , from: a - change in the Russian Ministry, subsequent to his Setting out: on his mission. He had given his Ma, jesty's Ministers intimation by which they may have anticipated the possibility of M. D'Oubril's con- • clachne a l separafe Treaty,----and, in fa&, he did two days after sign a Separate Treaty. There arose the difficulty of his (Lord Yarmouth's) situation, and on this point particularly he trusted to the candour of the House for'a.patient hearing, though the state 'tent was, he was aware, tedious.--On 89turday:* morning, on getting up, he had read these words in 1' a respeetable Newspaper, imputed, to somebody, he could not say,--" The Noble Lord (Yarmouth) having instruaions not to produce his full lowers, with out a written acknowledgment of the desired basis, , 'did think it proper to •prednce these : powers," It was impossible he could have had such instruc- • 'lions.' It was a known thing, that no Paper . • , ti `could paas . till 'the 'l4l powers had been exhibi ed. He was instrueted to present a Paper, 'contain . ng, the sentiments of his Majesty's Government, to the French Minister. But the French- Minister refu to receive it as a diplomatic commanication, with 'out an exhibition of full -Powers. The French Mi nister desired him, in these circumstances, to go • -home and 'copy the Note, and give it to-him as a. Newspaper ; and then he would answer :it, under an engagement not to make the contents public. If his :Majesty's Ministers -were desirous to get a writ ten,ackno wledgment of the basis in question, there should have been a letter 'on the subject to the French Minister, which he would have been well contented to have delivered as a post-boy, and which must have called fOrth an answer. This answer he might have had authority to open, and thus a written 'ae:- knowledg - tnent of the basis might have been obtain; ed, which would not have been denied except 4a moment of anger. In the events that had occurred, even the agreement to cede Hanover might. have been deriied.—He expelled it would have been; and it probably would, had it not been for the war between France and Prussia. When he had .receivdi, ed the communicatiot: reffeEting on his disclosure btu his full powers, he had sent a justification' on this most material points, as between him and his Ma jesty's Ministers. He did not conceive that what he wrote would come before the Public, or he would have wrote a great deal more. He had no instruc» tion to withhold his full powers, except on the ground of Sicily; and he considered the consent of his Majesty's Ministers, to negotiate for that island, as an evasion of the claim to its absolute unqualified cession, which he had been before instrualed to insist upon as a necessary preliminary to the farther pro gress of the Negotiation. - The only , question be* tween him and his Majesty's Ministers was, the question of expediency ; and his answer to what they urged against him on this point was, that he could not possibly have advanced a step further its the Negotiation without exhibiting his till powers. it would have been a question in that case with the French` Government, whether it should sacrifice the chance of Peace with England, and with that change the King's' German dominions, to the preservation of its alliance with Prussia ?or whether - it would en counter a Prussian War for the chance-of a Nego tiation with England. In order to create an atux nativein this case, lie thought it necessary to give a real existence to the Negotiation by the exhibitiors of his fiall powers. If he. had not - taken this resolu tion, he should have been under the necessity -of getting into a post-chaise, and proceeding, not to .Bbulogne, for he was 'not an accredited Negotiator, hut to some other part from whence hiS Majesty's .Ministers might have had news of him, 'and of the issue of the Negotiation - with which he was intrust-- ed, in a fortnight after the close of the proceeding", He wished he had had provisional instruttioas how he . should ad in the event of the conclusion, of separate treaty by D'Oubril. Then he would hey, been - in utrutnque paratus. But it was not till the fact of the signature . of •t he separate Treaty was known to all the COUVLS of -rope that instru&ions were sent to him hOw to re gulate his . conduct upon that event. Shortly after Lord Lauderdale was joined with him in the ma nagement of the Negotiation. He had too long• an acquaintance with that Noble Lord, too high a valno upon that acquaintance, too high a sense of his talents and his character, to feel hurt Upon that appointment. He owned he was hurt at the condu6t of hisAlajesty4 Ministers in the matter ; but he had too high a re spe6,l for the Noble Lord to allow :bitn to , see that he fat himself from that time to be a mere dead , letter ; but be dreaded, that if he should withdraw front the Negotiation new difficulties ;and fresh-cold ness, and want of confidence should•arise. No one could doubt that the opportunity was favourable ter the conclusion of a more glorious Peace than hadat any other time been Offered to , this country. We had broken, off in the consideration:of Dalmatia and Sicily. Our engagesnents with the Emperor of Rus sia were the grontid of this tenacity, .and our en gagements'with the King of Naples, and the intrin sic value of the Island ()f Sicily itself. It 'was trot very easy to justify.the breaking offa Negotia tion.so essential to the repose of two great nations, without the proof of having made every reasonable attempt to bring it to a favourable issue. What we thought due to - the honour of Russia certainly could not wear an unfavourable appearance when: proposed by- us; but we should be informed whether Russia. herself 'set au equal value upon what we insisted upon,. from a sense of her regarding it with equal estimation. When 'the Kingof Naples entered into the war, with View to the common interests of nations, he x-t,as nattrally defended, by dgreat part of the disposeahit force of this empire, at a vast cxpence. He wished Ave could be told that we were at war .because the , Emperor of Russia- disapproved of the terms offered for hint Self or for the King of Naples. What w o uld. 'the coUntry think when we were told that more gto riot-14 Wins than had ever before ix!en , offered :had been rejeaed at a time when we had failed in •every ContidentaLattempt, merely on the ground'of this one iMpedintent ? We might say to itussi3, in also the fa& of her alliance. with us- was clears and her assent difficult, Yhus much to mitigate thy'plaee, %Vhich, if thou. urgest in strid4ustice p Must avail. Brit was it to be supposed that the King of Napleo would not have been extremely happy to exchange Sicily, from which he might easily- be expelled by France at a favourable opportunity, for some posses- - sion which the maritime superiority of Britain would always be sufficient to preserve to birn, or some ono which, by its own terrestrial power,would be sufficient to maintain itself ) Dalmatia and Albania had been of fered to the King of Naples, and it was not clear) if the attempt had been made, but the Balearic Isl* might have been annexed to these ; Dalmatia woul t have,excited more jealousy if giVen to Russia,' tha I if given to - Austria -.or Naples. If it was clear tact the war was continued because justice would not done to our Allies, there would be no doubt as to; the resolotion the House ()Light to come to ; 1 13 , `more ought . thero to be it the- war-Were-- coutikviecl on account or India.' BLit if it was honinue.i c,il 01 0 ' former ground,. the identity of the sentitnents, the reciprocity of the obligations of our allies, to be established. He • had , risen..nierely to re; his own condu . at the very extracrdinary. lion of a public man charge'd wills violating, 'lr struLlions which he bad never received.