The Sun. — London, England, 1802-05-14 00:00:00

. Inte nded, to • that the War had been unsuccessful as it c s objea, and, certainly, no man could deny A t l e t this peace was to bt taken as the result of it. ha t t ue same time, it did not follow that the system th'avtsued in the condua of the War was wrong ; it might ha ve f ailed, but snot constat, that any other might li on, succeeded; experience had not decided the ques cent; The same error in opinion existed in the i try, at the present moment, as to its exertions 0 , toe late contest : he had rather, however, that 4,Y s Should err •on the side of exertion, than that were feeling s should have fallen • short. There tv e re two opinions upon - the subject : the one vi as, that this Country had, at all times, a just te e e l w . °F its situation ; that- it displayed a proper. l e ni g) and a correspondent . exertion. His opia ther e was the other way :—He was of opinion that bedwas not a sufficient degree of feeling displayed, • I, e !hat our exertions, .however great they might W ere not great a s com p a red with the real ob_ til t at stake. He wanted to know if any war had of er been carried on before with so universal a cry eh .eace as the prese n t ? When was there a war in en ' a s like the pr e sent, a contempt was 'thrown as t ne gallant exploits of our Fleet and Army, sO• ee to rend er i t a ' matter .of doubt whether the!. s e r , e ' n , °IV of commemorating these Victories would. site be recei ve d with disapprobation, and when e " Vidories were received with such cold ap. jt 4us e ?' He could bring Newspapers to sheets's thee sentiments that were uttered in favour of ps e e nemy ; and he defied any one to. shew any :„ N in which such la nguag e h a d b een pu bli s h e d e 'ltring the late War. I t was' likewise to. be ob satved, that such prints could pot exist without t ilTniters. When we talked of the great exera ks of t h e country, h e t h oug h t we w e re too muc h e n the habit o f app l au di ng ourse l ves , an d i t was a truthe upon such a stibjeCl. • When they talked of- C r' s , e g rea tness of exertion, it was necessary to IV ll p are i t with the greatness of the objeCt. If the ar w as unjust and unnecessary, as was contended 1 1' 1 s ""es then every exertion was too great ; but if Warea s he tho u ght, w a s n ecessary, then the ex ktii°ns of th e C ountry were not great b y any means . hen the mag n i tu d e o f ou r e xertions was spoken 't,vvas necessary to consider the resources of the tt, c3nu try, and what effect those exertions had upon se t e '°. Had they suffered ? On the contrary, our Com sa ' t o and Manufa&ures.had increased, and our re sainfees had - grown with the War.. Much had been. 44 io the course of the War of its ruinous tendency, a a .the distress it brought on the labourer and arti tlb'?; this.was in the true spitit of Jacobinism, the , el of which was to concentrate all the causes of at ; e a notent for the purpose of controlling the Exe ,kt"Ye e. Government.. And what was the distress tlii ni ch so many declamations had pointed ? No tli-er but . what naturally arose out . of the wealth of • af ountry, and which was a necessary concomitant gi .: ) ur opulence. Great wealth produced great luxury, se at luxury pro d u c e d great exPence, and great ex. ess se t ° , Produced poverty, which was a natural secretion an wealth. These reasons besides applied to all wars, te; rl °t particularly to the late War. But it was said, s a ei i ' v ealth of this Country was in few hands, v et St the mass of the people were in a state of po_ NJ' Wealth could not be -in few hands in any tsC• ntr Y; and the fad was, there was no country in , wealth was more generally diffused than in se4 -3 . 'lt seemed ts 'be too much the disposition of L a n n y to say, , g what have we to do with the ba ' jo n e -e of power, or any other dispute, so as - we en th'e,,ircommerce ?". But the question was, whe lk; we could enjoy it under such circumstances ? of said "yes, ,, but France said " no." Was it , e 1 tilportance that France should dittate to us su e Le : e , rr ns of Peace, that she should take from us the th e —r terity of our Flag, and that she should take p c) ; cockades out of our hats, as she had done in pa t -tu g 4l ? He thought the Country was less ea o -tful than before, and that the fee simple of the BredlntY was, on the 3oth of September, of a much t e t value than at present. The Bond, .how. i e t ve ,•'' was signed and sealed, and we must abide by Ch id all its changes. But this ought not to pre_ e us from taking those meas ures which yet re in 4 'ned to us, and which in sound wisdom we ought ese• r :'ke, to prevent those fatal consequences jhdi`~were likely to result to our Empire in • ti/ (11 ' Whatever opi n i on any one might entertain the claim s of France in India, those claims had tl, l 7 te u before b roug h t f orwar d, an d no man c ou ld ee ;r him se lf t h at t h ey m i g h t not le brought for ; rd Was it riot better, therefore, to as-. the qu est i on , , an d to have our rights sic e'wledged, and that this should be done before we LL:otetikitred -Malta, and before we gave out of our tin e the . Cape and Cochin, rather than reserve ht: Point for discussion till the period, when i'tl4nCe ` v as possessed o f th ose places? it might be that the French had shewn no disposition a s ' t ile to our rights in India, but in ihis no confi t,i;ce could be placed. Was there Lot a probability, i n the non-revival of Treaties, the French order hat view the Convention of 1787, in ow s "' that they might renew their claims ?. -They • aB, not,suppose France wanting in any means of <„,gandi4ealeilt. They stewed their disposition p es r eseed . to India, by their anxiety to gain g e : e . s sion of the Cape ; but above all by their ba c " P r Oiea of an Expedition to Egypt, by stem of of which they hoped to march from con 'ss t o conquest, till' they reached our Empire ju dias What was more easy than to ques akes ver u e _t l France as to her intentions before we deli . p os u °tlt of our hands those securities which we th e se , ss e4 ? They should bewate how they suffered ()Or,ountry to be soothed by imaginary benefits : f ar `-•°tnmerce might not suffer immediately, or not been me years to come; but though predictions had inp n ridiculed, yet those which had been made dur faWe American War had been fulfilled and were es euid i ngs Had we notv possessed America, France in g eh Probably not have had the means of continu with late contest., He believed it was an idea ss etlie sTile at th e present moment, th a t the C ountry f ee a u l last t h e i r lives, and that it would continue up on 'mg time to supply food to the animalcUli mint is surface ; but let them beware, our dangers Spain Co llie on in a short time. Let them look ai r aec w sit ade peace, and becam e the vassal of e hardly date the loss of her inde_ de rve "nde u ca d lamity might reach this Country even in our own time. He concluded by moving an Address to His Majesty, stating ‘‘ That they had taken into their serious consideration, the Definitive Treaty of Peace. That they would keep inviolate the Public Faith, as pledged in the engagements en tered into by His Majesty, but that they could not help feeling regret at the nature of certain of those -engagements, relying on His Majesty's paternal wisdom to take such measures as - might avert the danger arising 'from such engagements, expressing their readiness to support His Majesty in such en gagements as he should deem necessary for that pur pose, and recommending to His Majesty to keep a Naval and Military Power sufficient to meet such danger." Lord FOLKESTONE, after endeavoiiring thew that by the late Treaty we have given our sanction to jaccbinical principles, deserted our Al lies, and abandoned our commercial advantages, concluded with seconding the Address. Lord HAWKESBURY then rose ; he said, that he had listened with great attention to his Right Hon. Friend's Speech ; he owned that it was • throughout ingenious, but not always to the point ; • and therefore it could not be expected his answer should follow him through all the digressions he had Made from the subjed. For his Own part, he assured the Right Honourable Gentleman, that •if 'he had thought there was any thing in the Treaty dishonourable to this Country or detri. Mental . to its - interests, he should. have been theforemost to lift up his voice against it ; but convinced as he was that instead of being dis honourable or prejudicial, it was advantageous and glorious to this Country, he found himself called upon tdoppose the present Address. He did not mean to defend the Peace on the ground that we could not hare better terms; but he was to defend the Peace as being honourable, wise, and expedient. He was happy that the whole subject had been now brought at once before the House ; and he was also happy that the ingenuity of his Hon. Friend had been able to find no other objection to it, than that Which applied equally to all Treaties, that one point •had been given up in order to maintain ano ther. Before, however, proceeding to a particular consideration of the objections advanced against the Treaty, it would be proper previously to consider the circumstances that led to it. Immediately upon the present Ministry accepting their offices, they heard of a great battle lost by our, Ally the Em peror, which was quickly followed by the - Treaty of Luneville, and the ratification of that Treaty by the Germanic Empire. The state of Europe, with re gard to Great Britain, was now changed. Instead of a great confederacy under ,her influence, directed against France, a•formidable confederacy was now formed, under the direction of France, against this Country. At that period, almost every man in the Country thought it expedient to open Negotiations - for Peace. Peace was called for alike by all ranks and all parties. Under these circumstances, Ministers, after some previous preparation for' enforcing our claims, and after sending a Fleet to the Baltic, open ed Negotiations with the French Government.— But in such circumstances, was it to be expected that by any Treaty of Peace we should be able to settle the disorders of the Continent, after the Treaty of -Luneville had been signed and •ratified by the Ger manic Body ? It was enough at that time for Great Britain to take care of her own interests and those of her Allies, without .attempting to fix a political system for Europe. The objects which we could hope, or then wish to obtain by Treaty, were, First, The complete integrity of the British Em pire in all its parts ; Second, To maintain gobd faith towards our 'Allies ; Third, To retain out of the conquests we had made, an equivalent for the accessions of .territory acquired by France. At the time when we opened the Nego:iations, it wa s not likely that we could procure such cOndis tions ; but the Naval Victories of Copenhagen and the Nile, which then took place, opened a new prosped of obtaining these advantages. As the Preliminary Treaty which followed, had been al . - ready approved by the House, he did not Mean to enter into its merits at present. He only wished to skew what the. circumstances were which led to the .present Treaty—a" Treaty, which, as it secured the,intcgrity of Great Britain, obtained better con ditions than could have been expected for her Al lies, and had besides acquired her two most im portant- possessions in the East and \Vest Indies, could not be considered as less than honourable. In the eyes of his Right Hon: Friend, however, it would not appear so, and if his views were allowed to be right, no terms, however advantageous, could be justified, if they were concluded with the pre sent Government of France. Lord HAWKESBURY then proceeded to divide the subject into two heads : And first, he was to consider how far the Govern ment, after having concluded the Preliminaries, ought to have been induced by the circumstances -which have occurred since that time, to have refused to conclude the Definitive Treaty on the basis pro posed. He said he had no difficulty in owning that he regretted several things which had intervened, not so much on account of their intrinsic import ance, as, the spirit they manifested in the French Government. But we must consider how far they are consistent with the principles on which the Pre liminary Treaty was concluded, and how far they would have justified ourbreaking off the Negotiations for Peace. What his Hon. Friend had advanced, went to say, that when any Continental Power, however unconneded with us, became involved with France, we must step forward to its assistance, whether it wished for such interference or not: For his own part, he did not, as some did, think we ought to remain as isolated in our politics as we were in our situation ; he thought we should consider ourselves deeply concerned in the policy of the Continent ; but he thought our interference with its quarrels was to be considered as a matter of choice, not of necessity, not of a point of honour. We must- take -into • consideration, whether such interference he consist ent' with our external or internal interests; more .especially at present, after being exhausted by a nine years War, deserted by all our Allies, and forced at last to negotiate a separate Peace. In such a state, there surely could be no obligation on us to give up our own immediate interests for the remote advantages of others. If we advert to what has -been said with regard to Italy ;—if it was not expedient for us to continue the War on ac:ount of Holland and the - Netherlands, much less can it be expedient to continue it on account of Italy, But it may be said, that circumstances may so concur, as to render a smaller objea of more im. portance than agreater. But is this the case at pre sent ? The first intimation which His Majesty's Ministers received of the new Constitution of the Italian Republic, was immediately followed by ac counts of the congratulations of the Court of Ber lin, the acquiescence of that of Vienna, and the as surances of Russia, that she would not intermeddle in the arrangement. Under these circumstances, would any one say, that it was justifiable to con tinue the war on account of the new Constitution of the Italian Republic ? Another subjea insisted upon was the cession of Louisiana by Spain to France. This event could not indeed be viewed with indifference, but it was to be considered how it could justify our refusing to continue the Negotiation for Peace. It had originally been a French Colony, and the Mis sissippi was then the boundary between it and Great Britain. It had been ceded in a private Convention to Spain by France between the Preliminaries and Definitive Treaty in 1763. This shewed, that such transaaions, though not to be approVed, were not now first heard of. Louisiana had even been men_ tinned in the Preliminaries. to that Treaty, which it had not been •in the present. It was then to be considered, if Louisiana, thus voluntarily ceded, and thus originally, situated, was an object which called for a contiruiition of the War. If we consi der its value, it is i , resent almost nothing. But it maybe s; id, what may not .-the industry of the Freud) e;TetSt ? 'When it was formerly in the pos . - session of the French, they were able to make nothing of it, while they rendered their other West Indian possessions of infinite value. As a naval station, the best informed represent it to be of no consequence. With regard to the political effeets prediiied from its cession, in laying open America to the 'influence of France, it must be observed, that -it has hitherto been the 'policy of America to maintain an even balance of power in that quarter of the Globe, between Great Britain and France. America must, by the cession of Louisiana, conider,this balance as destroyed, and of consequence become more jealous of France, and more attached to Great Britain than ever. Some imagined that this new possession of the French might endanger the safety of America ; but when we recolleaed her efforts in 1756, when alone and unsupported, we could not surely fear mhh- for her safety in her 'present state cf power and resources. Ail these circumstances considered, the House might judge if it was expedient to con tinue the War on account of the cession of Louisi ana by Spain to France. The Noble Lord then proceeded in the second place to consider whether the Definitive Treaty had been settled on the basis of the Preliminary Treaty, and whether it was such as in consequence of the Preliminary Treaty the Country had a right to expect. He, allowed that there were many things which might justly be ex peaed to be arranged in'a Definitive Treaty, though wholly omitted in the , Preliminary. Two faults might therefore be imputed to a Definitive Treaty, those of omission and commission. Of the first, the chief.one objeaed to in the present Definitive Treaty was the non-renewal of Treaties, political and commercial, , and particular Conventions. With regard to political Treaties, the principle on which these had been renewed by iformcr Treaties did not appear to be well understood. By the Trefty of Westphalia, Europe had been placed in a different state from what it had previously been, and therefore, in order to ascertain the relative si tuations of the several Powers, it had been custo mary to renew that Treaty, and also any particular Conventions subsequent to it. Many arguments might be advanced for this general renewal of Trea ties, but many might also he advanced against it. In the first place, by renewing many doubtful en. gagements, and consequently increasing the occa. sions of dispute, it destroyed the san6tity of Trea ties, and by bringing them into disrepute, di minished' the obligation to fulfil them.—The 'renewal of former Treaties was, in another point of view, more disadvantageous to Great Britain than to ,any other -Nation, because - we adhere more religiously to our engagements, and therefore should be more cautious ' in consider ing what we enter into. Yet putting these consi derations out of the question, there were many of. the stipulations, the utility of retaining which might be questioned from the change of circum stances. Some, indeed, might be advantageous, but it Was necessary to consider whether these would overbalance those of an opposite nature. - It was to be considered, that formerly all preceding Treaties had been renewed by the other Powers of Europe as well as by us ; but in the present War, no other European Power had done so. If under • these circumstances we renewed former Treaties, we should alone be bound by former Treaties, while the other Nations were free. The manner in which former Treaties - had usually been renewed, was to renew such Treaties generally, and then follow up this renewal by particular exceptions. If we followed this rule on the present occasion, what would be the conse quence ? We should first have guaranteed the Inte grity of the Germanic Empire, and then have been. obliged to guarantee to France.all the conquests she had made on that Empire. The same would have happened with regard to Sardinia and Holland. We could not have avoided this; we had formerly gua .ranteed the'lntegrity of the Germanic Empire, and yet in the same Treaty guaranteed Silesia to Prus sia. In the same manner, a renewal of former Trea ties would have forced us to give our sanaion to all the encroachments of France. Would it have been consistent with the interests, the feelings of this Country, thus to have confirmed the aggrandizement of our rival ? We have it now in our power to, say at least, that if we have' not been able to set Europe to rights, we have not contributed to its confusion ; if we have not been able. to prevent encroach ments, we have not san6lioned them. But it must. further be considered, that by a renewal of Treaties, and the necessary , exceptions, we should not only have confirmed what. we-knew and. understood, but what was yet not settled or defined. By sanaion ing the Treaty of Luneville, we should have made ourselves a parts' to the disthemberment of the Ger manic Fmrite, yet fo take place in consequence of chat Treaty. With regard to Conimercial Treaties, . . t ivas impossible in the . pter,ent circumstances, to re-- e.v them, without renewing stipulations respettini, rights %of neutrality anti personal privileges ex tremely disadvantageous to us. Even if Commer cial Treaties were deemed beneficial, so many things were to be adjusted, .that it was more proper to refer the matter to future discussion, than delay the 'Definitive Treaty till all matters could be ar. ranged, as this delay had already occasioned much inconvenience.. With regard to the benefit expected from Commercial Treaties, it might be observed that our trade to the Continent of Europe during the war had been as flourishing as while these Treaties were in force. The prohibition of our manufadures could still lesS• be carried into effect in Peace than in War, and therefore our commerce in spite of them must he extended. 'lf we were driven to a War of Duties, the advantage was plainly on our side. The exclusion of French wines and brandy by us would be a •more severe loss to France than the exclusion of our ma. nufgtures by her; because we had many other markets to resort to, but we were her only Mer chants for these commodities. With regard to the separate Conventions to be renewed, the two prin. cipally alluded to were those relative to the East India Trade, and that relating to the cutting of Logwood in the Bay of Honduras ; to which he , should add, that with regard to the Flag, which had been most grossly mistaken. So much had last night been said with regard to the East Indian trade, that it was trmecessary for him to dwelt on that subjel. He should observe, however, that though our rights in the East Indies had been ori ginally the same with those of France, yet by conquests, and other events, we had l:come Sove reigns of that country. France had acknowledged us to be so, by receiving from us a right to trade, and stipulations regulating their Commerce in tte Treaty 011783. This Sovereignty was not in con sequence of any stipulation with France, but • ac knowledged by her as the foundation of stipula tions. It therefore remained now to us as perfed as ever. . The Convention of 1787, was certainly wise, and proper at the time, in removing the causes of quarrel which had arisen from . the Treaty. of 1783; bat circumstances had so changed, that the objec tionable points in it greatly preponderated over those which were proper to be renewed. With re gard to cutting logivood in the Bay of Honduras, we remained in the same situation as before the War. Complete occupancy , had fornierly been conceded to us in consequence of specific sacrifices. We did not then hold it, as subjel to Spain and secured by particular Conventions. 'We held it of right, and as the Definitive Treaty had nowise done that right away, it remained to us on the same footing as heretofore. But above all other things, what regarded our Flag had been completely mis understood. This Country has for centuries claimed a right to the Sovereignty of the Seas, and from this Sovereignty arose the demand that other na tions should lower their Flag to us. This Sove reignty inferred a claim with regard to all other nations as well as Holland ; but a particular stipulation with regard to the acknowledgment of it by time latter nation, was introduced into -one of our Treaties with her, in conse. quence of the preceding War having arisen from an attempt on het part to dispute it. This particular' stipulation had never been introduced into any Treaty with France or Spain; from whence it followed, that - by renewing such a stipulation with regard to Holland, we virtually renounced ,it with regard to these Powers. Was it not therefore better to retain our former Rights, in their full vi gour,• than to call them in question by stipulations for their acknowledgment by a particular and a weak Power ? The next question to he considered was, How far the Definitive Treaty agreed with the Preliminary Articles of Peace ? His Right Hon. Friend had di vided this part of the subject into five heads : the firSt related to Prisoners of \Var. This point had been left to be settled by the Definitive Treaty, ac cording to the Law of Nations, and in the regula. tions which had been adopted, that principle had been completely adhered to. The principle 'of each Country maintaining its own Prisoners was first in troduced in the Treaty of 1763, and it certainly Was conformable to the opinion of the best writers on the Law of. Nations, and the wisest men. It was, however, in some degree resisted upon this occasion on the part of France, for she proposed to extend . it to Allies in general, a proposition which was not acceded to on the part of this Country.— France then proposed to extend this principle to such Troops as had been, during the War, in the pay, and at the disposal of Great Britain. To this proposition we could not refuse to agree— and if France had no such Troops to provide ,for in return, we could not object to let. it go to the ac count of her Prisoners of War. The next subjed was, the situation of Portugal. The limits of her territories were arranged in the Definitive Treaty, according: to the stipulations of the Preliminaries.— It had been contended, that we had not kept our faith with Portugal ; but there appeared to him not the slightest foundation for such an assertion. In consequence of the state of the War, it became cessary to send a large, force to Egypr, and the wisdom of that measure had, he believed, never been called in, question. Nis Majesty's Ministers upon that occasion judge4and in his opinion judged wisely, that it would 'be.better to send the whole of our force to Egypt, rathet.3l9n to divide it, and to send part to Egypt and to:keep part in Portugal, by which means both our objea \ S might be defeat ed. But the consequence of our sending so large a force to Egypt, rendered it ibssible - that we could leave a sufficient number omen for the de fence of Portugal. In the Treaty:Of Peace which that Country concluded for herself; perhaps her Go vernment was not free from every degree of blame. When he had the honour of being appointed one of His Majesty's Confidential Ministers,* had occa sion to communicate with the Government of that Country, in which he offered some advice upon the proper means to be adopted for the defence of that Country. One part of that advice he thought it necessary to state, though he felt it extremely un pleasant to make any observations that refleaed upon any indiVidual—but the advice was, that the command of the Portuguese Army should be given to some able and atlive Officer. The person who