The Sun. — London, England, 1859-10-06 00:00:00

the Board of Civil Office, Hwasbana, to return from Shang hae to Pekin, and they may arrive any day. If the envoy of Britannic Majesty w ill h ays the goo d ness to wa it until the Chief Secretary Kweiliang and his colleagues reach the capital, they will thereupon receive him at once, and he will enter the capital to exchange the treaties (or will exchange the treaties in the capital). At Peh-tang-Ho itself there has always been a military station and a battery for the defence of the coast. Orders have been issued to remove the troops and guns to the rear; and as soon as this shall be effected a vessel (or vessels) will be prepared for the. Governor-General to proceed with out side the bar to welcome her Britannic Majesty's Envoy to Peh-tang-Ho, whence he can proceed by land to Pekin. A . necessary communication addressed to Mr. Bruce, &c. [The character signifying " her Majesty" is not on a level with that signifying the Emperor, as by the fixed rules of Chinese official composition it would be were it employed in speaking of the. Emperor himself. It marks a non-appre • ciation of the complete equality we claim for our Sove reign with all allies, the Emperor of China included, and I should recommend that the - original be returned for cor rection.—T. W.] Enclosure 4 in No. 9. REAR-ADMIRAL HOPE TO MR. BRUCE. Coromandel, off the Peiho, July 1, 1859. Sir,—l have the honour to acquaint you that the means at my disposal have proved insufficient to remove the ob stacles opposed to your entry at the mouth of the Peiho ; and that they are of so formidable a nature that any fur ther operations cannot lead to successful results. I expect the repairs of the gunboats to be completed about the middle of next week, and I hope to be able to reassemble the force outside the bar about that time, and under such circumstances I shall be glad to know in what way I can most forward the objects of your mission. I have also to request that you will be so good as to for ward a copy of this communication to M. de Bourboulon, and inform that gentleman how much I am indebted to Captain Tricault, of the Duchayla, for his assistance dur ing the engagement of the 25th ultimo.—l have, &c., (Signed) J. HOPE. Enclosure 5 in No. 9. IZR. BRUCE TO REAR-ADMIRAL HOPE. Magicienne, off the Peiho, July 2, 1559. Sir,---I regret that in consequence of a resistance which our previous experience of Chinese warfare could not have led us to anticipate the means at your disposal have proved insufficient to, remove the obstacles to my progress up the Peiho. Allow me at the same time, whilst offering you my pro found sympathy for the loss sustained by the squadron, to express my sincere admiration of the decision and gallantry shown in the operations undertaken for that object. As you inform me that in the face of this formidable re sistance further operations cannot lead to a successful re sult, I beg to state that I have for the present abandoned all attempts to reach Pekin, and have resolved to refer home for instructions as to the course to be adopted. Wi th this view Mr. Rumbold proceeds by the next inasl to Eng land, to furnish her Majesty's Government with full par ticulars respecting what has occurred. Under these circumstances I agree with you that the re turn of the Marines and Sappers to Hong Kong is desir able, and that the ships should be employed in the man ner most conducive to the security of her Majesty's subjects and to the protection of their interests at the several ports. In accordance with your request, I have communicated to M. de Bourboulon a copy of your latter. —I have, &c., (Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE. No. 10. MR. BRUCE TO THE EARL OF MILMESEURY. (Received Sept. 13.) Shanghae, July 13, 185 1 1 My Lord,--I propose in this despatch to give a succinct account of the course I have adopted, and of the grounds on which it is based.. It is necessary to allude briefly to the maxims of China in regard to intercourse with foreign nations, as they afford the key to what has taken place. In China international relations have been always studiously ignored by the Government, and in no single in stance has a foreign minister succeeded in obtaining admis sion to the capital, except on performance of the " kotow," or ceremony of vassalage, or in the character of tribute bearer. The subjects of foreign nations residing in China are represented as belonging to barbarous tribes, and living by trade of all occupations the one least in repute among the Chinese, as devoid of civilisation, and ignorant of the rules of reason, and by all means to be confined to the outskirts of the country. According to the maxims of the Government they are en titled tome rights beyond those accorded by the favour of the Emperor, and though c i rcums t ances an d t h e wea k ness of the Governmeni have led it to acquiesce in the concession of considerable privileges to foreigners in distant seaports, it is remarkable as preying how tenaciously it holds to its traditions, that it always classifies as acts of rebellion the measures of coercion adopted by foreign Governments to ob tain redress for wrongs done to their subjects. Now the British treaty of Tien-tsin (which is much more complete in this respect than the treaties signed at that place by the other Powers) asserts principles which are dia metrically opposed to those traditional pretensions of the Chinese Government. According to it the British minister is to be accredited as a representative of an independent equal power ; and the Chinese Government, in its treatment of him is called upon finally to abandon the assumption of supe riority which it asserted uncompromisingly during Lord Amherst's embassy, and so lately as three years ago, when Count Poutiatine ffrst proposed to visit Pekin. MS is to be allowed free and unrestricted communication with the capital, not only as specified in the French and American treaties, when he has business to transact, but whenever he wishes to visit it. His diplomatic intercourse is to bo conducted according to the usages of western nations, and he is not to be called on to perform any ceremony of a nature derogatory to his character as representing an equal and independent nation. In future access to the capital is to be recognised as a right the minister can insist, instead of its being begged for as a favour; and either refused or conceded, on such terms as the Chinese might choose to impose, for the sake of saying their own dignity at the ex pense of that of the foreign envoy in the eyes of the Chinese population. The clauses which permit British subjects to travel in the interior, and open the Yang-tze river to British shipping aro equally subversive of the established maxims of Chinese statesmen. To push us back on the sea-board, and confine to as few sea-ports as possible, to keep us outside the walls of important cities, and vilify us to the people in order to preserve a wall of separation between the races, is the policy which the Chinese Government, from its adherence to usage,' and from its indifference, if not dread of all progress, which can only be attained through novelty, would gladly follow, if it dared to do so. It is not surprising, therefore, when the allied squadrons left the Peiho river last year, and the panic produced by their presence began ,to subside, that ancient maxims and prejudiees should have gradually resumed the ascendant at Pekin, and that the Imperial cabinet should have entertained hopes of recovering part of the ground it had lost. There is proof its language and feeling with regard to foreigners having undergone no change in a decree published in the _Pekin Gazette, on the 25th July, one month after the signa ture of the treaty, in which allusion is made:to the barbarians suddenly rushing up the river to Tien-tsin, and retiring, moved by the commands of Kweiliang and his colleague, signified with affectionate earnestness." Smigko-lin-sin, a Mongol prince, reputed to be their best general, was made commander-in-chief of the Pechelee province, with a large force at his disposal ; the forts at Takoo rebuilt and strength ened, and stakes and obstacles of different kinds placed across the river to efface the impression produced by the proceedings of lart year, and by preventing foreign ships from arriving at Tien-tsin, to render Pekin more inaccessible than ever. While these preparations were going on the departure of the high officer of the Board of Revenue, who was to settle the tariff at Shanghae, was detained, in order thathe might not reach Shanghae until the season for operations in the Gulf of Pechelee had passed, and when he started he was accompanied by the Imperial commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana. Subsequent events leave no doubt in my mind that the statement contained in the letter of which Mr. Parkes obtained possession, is substantially correct, and that they were instructed to obtain modifications in the principal articles of the treaty—the residence at Pekin, the opening of the Yang-tze river, and circulation in the interior, to all of which the Emperor strongly objects. In their first letter the commissioners advanced the prin ciple that the treaty having been signed under pressure, its provisions had not been fully discussed. But the determina tion evinced by Lord Elgin not to allow the treaty to be called in question seems to have convinced the commission ers that it was advisable to rest satisfied with the concession made as to permanent residence at the capital. It is clear, however, that their remonstrances against the policy en joined on them from Pekin, were most unpalateable to the Emperor and his counsellors, who urged them to make further efforts ; and the dissatisfaction with the conduct of Ho, who seems to have pointed out most strongly the inex pediency of the course proposed, is reported to have been expressed in the autograph rescript, that " his obstinacy would be the cause of calamity to him." In the beginning of March, Lord Elgin, who had left Shanghae on account of the unsatisfactory state of Canton, wrote to the commissioners, stating that her Majesty's Go vernment had agreed not to establish the mission permanently at Pekin, on condition of a proper reception being given to her Majesty's minister. lie further informed them of his approaching departure from China, and of my appointment, charged with important documents to be delivered at the capital, and warned them solemnly that peaceful relations could only be maintained by a faithful observance of the treaty. The Imperial commissioners, in spite of this infer bullion, continued at Soo-chow, instead of returning to the capital to prepare for the reception of myself and the French minister ; and their motive in so doing was made suffi ciently manifest by their attempts, through a Chinese for merly in Mr: Wade'e, but now in the Chinese service, to ascertain whether wo would consent to exchange ratifica tions at Shanghae, or, at least, to be conducted from that point by land to Pekin. This journey occupies two months, and I leave your lordship to judge whether, had we adopted this route, we should not have abandoned, for all practical purposes, one great object of the treaty, viz.: free access to the central government. It was only after my arrival at Hong Kong that I heard of the commissioners having remained in the south, and re ceived Mr. Hart's memorandum (enclosed in my dispatch of May 30), describing the hostile feeling of the Court, and throwing considerable light on the motives of this incon venient delay of the commissioners. I felt at once that it became necessary either to throw overboard my instructions entirely, to abandon the visit to Pekin and the attempt to establish, on a proper footing, once for all, our diplomatic relations with the Court of Pekin, or to deilare that I would insist on exchanging the ratifications at the capital within the period stipulated in the treaty, and 6n a personal recep tion by the Emperor for the purpose of delivering to him her Majesty's autograph letter. I could not doubt that the task of extorting a recer don at Pekin in a form implying a surrender on the part of the Emperor of his pretentious to a recognition of our equality on paper; and that the Chinese government, in accordance with its usual policy, would en deavour, by prescribing the route I was to follow, by limit ing the number of my attendants, and by bad arrangements during the journey, to put me in the degrading position hitherto occupied by foreign envoys, and recover by this means the prestige it had lost by our successful coup de main of last year. To prevent such a result, and to receive free access to the capital in future on becoming terms, I decided, after mature reflection, on proceeding by the river, the natural highway to Tien-tsin, under the British flag, as its presence at that place would establish in the eyes of the Chinese that our visits to Pekin are a matter of right, not of favour. M. de Bourboulon, whom I consulted before deciding on the course to be pursued, entertained views similar to mine, and wrote a despatch to the commissioners in the same sense. I could not, however, in face of the unsatisfactory infor- mation I had received, hope that the Chinese Government would agree to such a complete revolution of its mode of dealing with foreigners, unless I was backed by sufficient force to inspire it with alarm. I Lccordingly consulted with Admiral Hope and Sir Charles Van Straubenzee on this point. Several gun boats and part of the squadron had been dispatched by Sir Michael Seymour to Shanghae, pre vious to my arrival in China, to be ready to accompany me to the north. This measure had been adopted before unfa vourable intelligence had been received from that quarter. We agreed, on consultation, that the force dispatched was not large enough to produce the desired impression. It was accordingly strengthened, particularly in the class of vessels that can cross the bar, and brought up to an equality with that which accompanied the allied ambassadors last year. The larger the force, the less likelihood, judging from our experience of the Chinese character, there would be of a collision. On arriving at Shanghae, where I proceeded as soon as my French colleague was ready, I found, as I anticipated, the commissioners armed with pretexts to detain me, and prevent my visit to the I'eiho. Their letters, though mo derate in tone, alluded to the three principal clauses of the treaty, and proposed to re-open discussion upon them. Had I accepted this overture, and abandoned the course laid down in my letter of the 16th of May, they would have inferred that I was to be " soothed and controlled," and would have postponed the ratifications, with the intention of obtaining my assent to conditions which would have deprived these clauses of their practical efficacy. This view is confirmed by the fact that they were not in possession of the ratified treaties, the Chinese Government having thus confined them to the task of gaining time, if nothing else, by renew ing negotiations, reserving meanwhile in its own hands the power of exchanging the ratifications or not, as it might seem expedient, after the result of the interviews had been communicated to it. I think that the commissioners themselves were acting rather in obedience to their instructions from Pekin than in the expectation that their attempts to detain us here would be successful. For as soon as they received my letter, stat- ing that I would not enter into discussions until the ratifi- cations were exchanged, and declining any intevview with them at Shanghae, tho twelvemonth allowed by treaty for the exchange having almost expired they changed entirely their tone. They acknowledged the propriety of abiding by the terms of the treaty, and stated that they had memorial . _ _ _ ised the Emperor to send down a high officer to Tien-tein, whom we should find on our arrival ready to conduct us in time to the capital. Though they hinted at a journey by Land from the river's mouth, and wished me to anchor the squadron outside the bar, they did not state that orders had been given to preVent us entering the river and making use of it to reach the town of Tien-tsin. Admiral Hope left a day before the reply of the commis sioners was received, being desirous of making the passage under sail. The place of rendezvous was fixed at the Sha- Loo-tien Island, whence he was to communicate to the au- :horities the approaching arrival of the ministers of England and France, en route for Tien-tsin, and inquire whether orders had been given for ow reception. I announced his departure the next day to the commis sioners, and suggested the propriety of their proceeding to the Peiho on board one of the steam ships, owned by Chi- nese, lying here, by which means they would be able to reach it in time to receive us. They declined doing so, on theground that they could not adopt so unusual a method of travelling without the Emperor's permission. This may be so, but I am inclined to think they shared in the feeling expressed in confidence by the most enlightened of their as sistants, that he would not go to the north, as there would be trouble, and that the Emperor and his counsellors were so unreasonable that they could not be brought to terms without another lesson. M. do Bourboulon and I left Shanghao four days after he receipt of the letter of the commissio ners , i n o r d e r to _ _ _ _ afford time for the memorial to reach the Emperor, and for she necessary orders to be given, should he be inclined to accord us a friendly reception, and carry out the recom- mendations it contained Mr. Ward, the American minister, accempanied us at heir express invitation, having claimed, under the most fa- voured nation clause, the right to exchange the ratifications at Pekin and present his credentials to the Emperor. My dispatch of the sth instant, which is forwarded by the present opportunity, gives in detail the events that took place at the Peiho. fhave only to remark, in explanation of the course pursued, that we found ourselves off the mouth of the river, which forms the highway to Pekin, within a few days of the period fixed by the expiration of the treaty for the exchange of the ratifications. On re- questing a passage to be opened for us, and explaining the peaceful objects of the mission, we were informed that there was no authority on the spot ; that the fort and barriers were not constructed by order of the government, but by the people, who had built and garrisoned them for their protection against rebels, not to keep us out of the river. In proceeding to remove them we therefore violated no order of the Imperial government, and had we been suc cessful, the government could, and would, no doubt, have disavowed entirely the acts of those who opposed us. At the same time we were convinced that the repugnance of the Chinese government to execute fully the treaty, and to grant us the recept ion we were instructed to demand could only be overcome by a sense of their inability to resist us. Tho pre parations made since last year had given them confidence, and that feeling would have been increased had we, on com ing in presence of them, receded from the demands we had made. Under such circumstances to have accepted the proposal of the Governor-General of Pehili would have been to enter on a path which must have ended in disgrace and failure ; and nothing, in my opinion, would have justified us in consenting to it, unless the only competent authority to pronounce a judgment on such a question had expressed doubts as to the result of an attempt to force the passage of the river. But I can state positively that if Admiral Hope had expressed doubts on the subject they would not have been shared by the squadron, nor by those who have had most experience of warfare'in China ; and if it be decided that the means at our command were insufficient to justify us in pursuing so bold a line of policy. it is but right that I should share that responsibility with him. The intendant of this place has received official notice of these events from Pekin, with orders, as he states, not to molest the English. But the effect of this check must be prejudicial to our interests, as in this, more than in almost any country, we are respected and considered in proportion as we are feared, and whatever may bo the ultimate decision of this Government with reference to the treaty of Tien tsin, I do not think that its provisions can be carried out until we recover superiority in the eyes of the Chinese. Mr. Wade has, drawn up a full and explicit memorandum on the proceeedings of the Chinese Government within the last year, to which I beg to call your lordship's attention. —I have, &c., (Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE. Inclosure 1 in No. 10. TRANSLATION OF A PAPER FORWARDED TO THE EARL OF ELGIN IN MR. PARKE'S DESPATCH OF JAN. 15, 1859. {MEMORANDUM. — Two Chinese clerks, perfectly unknown to each other, have suggested, the moment they read this paper, that it was the composition of a small official sent by Hwang-tsung-han to Shanghae, to watch the progress of affairs. The writer speaks of himself throughout an official of much lower rank than the person he addresses, but I do not think that this is Hwang. The words " Governor- General" (of the Two Kwang) prefixed to Hwang's name, must have been elevated, had the letter -been written to him direct. It must have been sent to Canton after Lord Elgin's departuro for Hankow and before his return to Shanghae.— T. W.] The administrasor-in-chief of barbarian business in the capital are the three Princes Hwui, Kung, and Ching (1). When the four Imperial commissimers (2) had their audience to take leave, his Majesty very positively signified to them that it was his pleasure net to allow peace to le made in this sort of way (3), and that the whole fifty-six articles of the Treatp of Tein-tsin must be cancelled. Ho, Governor-General of the Two Kiang, received them at Chang-chow in the Bth moon (August, September), and stoutly maintained that there must be no mention whatever of change.. They were consequently at issue until their arrival at Shanghae, when, owing to the strong support given to the Treasurer Wang to the representations of Ho, the commissioners began to incline to a compromise. Several memorials were addressed to the Throne in the joint names of the whole five, in reply to which they con tinned to receive, in every case, his Majesty's peremptory injunctions (to persist in the course prescribed) ; until, in his last decree, his Majesty declared his pleasure to be, that peace were made with the barbarians, four conditions must be insisted on. Firstly, he would on no account allow trade from Han khow to Nankin. (Secondly, this condition is omitted, most likely by mis take, as the text below shows the question to have been the residence of a Minister at Pekin.) Thirdly, he would not allow (foreigners) to circulate in the different provinces. Fourthly, ho would have the provincial city of Canton evacuated at an early date. On receipt of his Majesty's commands as above, the com missioners had several consultations with the barbarians. They, alas I would give in one pointonly, to wit, the evacua tion of Canton ; in the other three they held out for what had been proposed at Tien-tsin. The commissioners and the Governor-General Ho ac cordingly made up (4) another memorial, to the effect that the barbarians had promised to evacuate Canton ; that as regarded adMission into Pekin, they would not be allowed to go and come in large bodies, nor to build churches there, but that the admission of four or five on any future occasion, when they might have business of importance to transact, need not be prohibited; that, as to circulation in the pro vinces, no one was to travel save with a passport, to be issued under the seals of the local authorities and the con suls of the barbarians ; no one would take on himself to go without one ; so that, as it would still rest with the local authorities, when the time came (5) to give or withhold a passport, this point might, in their opinion, also be con ceded. There thus remained no question but that of the navigation of the river up to Hankow, whither it would really be difficult to prevent the barbarians from proceeding. To this representation they received for answer from the Emperor, " Try again with all your might, and you will succeed again." The commissioners and Ho, after receiving this, again put their seals to the treaties, and exchanged copies of them as concluded; and it was agreed that in the third moon (April, May), the barbarians should go into the capital again to exchange national letters (letters between the Go vernments). Ho, the Governor-General, returned the same day to Soo-chow.; the Treasurer Wang also returned on the sth. The English leader Elgin had started up the Great River on the 3d, with five steamers for Hankow. Just before his departure, he said : " Provided that the pro vincial authorities behave well to me, I shall not insist on ready money (or immediate payment) (6) at Shanghae, and I will write to Canton, and have the city evacuated at once; but if there is any more fighting (on my journoy), I must poet pone action (on these points)." The commissioners an swered—" We will write to prevent any one giving you matter of offence; at the same time there are several posi tions along your road in the hands of the rebels, and we are responsib!e for any trouble these may occasion you ; nor will it be our affair if your vessels come to harm by getting aground on any of the numerous shoals in the Great River." "It does not concern you, of course," said he, "I can take careof myself," and so he started. The following day he got aground off Fu-sha.n, and after transshipping his guns, &c., to a smaller vessel, on the sth, he got off by dint of great exertions on the Bth, and was reported to have passed Nankin on the 11th. It was also said that the lung-haired men (the rebels) had fired upon him, though this is not cer tain. On the 10th, however, a number of devils were brought back, the barbarians said, ill of the small-pox, but the people have it, wounded by the rebels. Which is the truth I know not. In conclusion, I may remark that everything relating to the barbarians is kept so quiet that it is hard to learn the facts. To give an instance : since the commissioners ar rived here every conference they have had with the chiefs to discuss business questions has been held either on board a steamer or in some out-of-the-way place, and, their mea sures agreed on (the conferring parties), have gone home to carry them out. This is for fear they might be overheard by the native servants of the different houses of business, who understand the devil-language. The Emperor has been moved to abolish the restrictions on opium, and to admit it into port at 30 taels per picul im port duty, and into the interior at 15 taels transit duty. The tariff is settled. All goods pay 5 per cent. ad valorem. This is proposed as the import duty. If barbarians go into the interior to sell merchandise, they are to pay 21 per cent. (as a transit duty), whether they pass eight barriers or ten. On tea and silk there are some augmentations and some dimi nutions. The rules are now in force, and, as soon as the seal has been put to them, a copy shall be submitted to you. Touching the money payment to be made to the barbarians (to the English) 6,000,000 dollars, and to the Americans, 600,000 dollars, the latter, some time ago, expressed their readiness to the commissioners to give up 100,000 dollars; they v. ould require only 500,000 dollars, namely, 100,000 to be paid at Shanghae, 100,000 at Foochow, and 300,000 at Canton, to be deducted during three years, from the duties. The commissioners had settled the form of in strument, so that the American question may be looked on as decided. A despatch to this effect must (soon) reach Canton. The English indemnity will, most likely, follow a lika rule of apportionment, a quota being levied on the (cus toms of the) places aforesaid, or the whole may be laid on the Shanghae duties, in which ease the people (of Canton) need feel no alarm. These barbarians are very anxious, nevertheless, to make Canton pay the largest share. This would delight them. Indeed, so deep-seated is the ill-will with which they regard the Canton officials, gentry, and people, that they actually talk of shutting up Canton as a port altogether, and never trading there again. They have several times "pressed the Commissioners, with all their might, to denounce the Governor-General (Hwang), and the three gentlemen (Lo, Lung, and Su), as a condition of peace (or before they would treat of peace). This has not only been done by word or mouth, but there has been cor respondence upon it, of which I enclose copies. The Commissioners, I should humbly suppose, can hardly have been so stupid as to give in to everything in this way (7). They may be holding suchlanguage as a means of keep ing (the barbarians) within range (8 ). It is impossible tc say. Should they have moved the Emperor, as was suggested, his Sacred Majesty would not surely have ac cepted their view of the case. Never, since the world be gan, was there such a doctrine as that the official, instead of punishing the robber for his theft, is to conciliate him by doing whatever his malignity may dictate against the per son he has robbed (9). (My remarks, I am sensible, are presumptuous). • How should an officer of my low estate and mean abilities venture on propositions at random P It is our duty to abide his Majesty's decision. Another statement is that Ho is strongly urging an ap plication to the Emperor to transfer the seal of High Com missioner for the Five Ports from Canton to Kiang-su, and and that the commissioners will very presently address the Emperor to that effect. After his return to Soo-choo, the Governor-General Ho addresses to the Emperor two memo rials in succession, setting forth how difficult it was to ne gotiate peace ; that after all his pains he had only got so far; that the barbarians when they had got a foot wanted ever an inch more ; that they were quite ready to add something to the 56 Articles they now had, but would not abate a single letter. Further, he said that he knew it was in the hands I of the three Princes that the direction-general lay, and it his Ma)esty would not agree (to what he, Ho, recom mended), he must beg him to send the three Princes at manage the things for themselves. Td this the Emperor in his autograph rescript (10), rejoined, " No luck, of a truth, can attend such perversity and opiniativeness" (11). The Treasurer Wang was at the same time commanded to return with all speed to Soo-chow ; the Emperor would not allow him to remain at Shanghae interfering in barbarian affairs. It was subsequently asserted that the Governor-General Ho had been deprived of his button, and five commissioners ordered to proceed from the capital to Tsing kiang Pu (12), whether for this or some other matter it was not clear. But (these two last statements) are but a report, which, as I have not seen the documents, Ido not venture to affirm is true. I purpose, as soon as I have despatched this letter (13) (lit., petition), going in person to Soo-chow to see the Treasurer Wang, and find out (14) the truth from him. I shall ask him for copies of some of the despatches, which I will for ward in a separate cover. The French were away last month at Japan and in Anam. They were not by when the English and the other nations were negotiating. Since their chief's return to Shanghap he wanted to go to Pekin to build churches there, a proposition which induced much discus sion, without any satisfactory result (15). The tradespeople (or mercantile Chinese) say that no harm will come of this ; they (the French) must talk in this fashion; and that when the English Chief returns (16), everything will be settled, all and sundry. The Russians are not at Shanghae, and have taken no part (in what has passed). The Commissioners themselves are entertaining every day, or sitting for their portraits (161), or paying visits to the devils, taking their fill of enjoyment with nothing whatever to do. Pwan Si-thing (Pontinqua) reached Hangchow on the 12th of the moon, but has not yet arrived at this place. The man the Commissioners, and the barbarians really want is Howqua (17). It is a matter of indifference to them whe ther Pontinqua comes or not; by the time he arrives, I imagine, there will be nothing for him to do. _ _ Another rumour is that the Commander-in-chief Yang has retaken Nganking (18). The Prefect Wu says that he has written full particulars of all that has been reported in this letter to Chang, the Han-lin (19), and gives me to understand, consequently, that I need not trouble your ear with a repetition of them. I have, therefore, the honour to transmit you this sum mary. OBSERVATIONS. (1.) The Prince llwui is Mien Yu, only surviving bro ther of the late Emperor; Kung is Yih Su, brother of the present Emperor; Khing is a Prince of the 2d Order of Imperial Nobility, whose name I cannot ascertain. (2.) Kwailiang, Hwashana, Mingsheu, and Twau Ching. shih. (3.) _Lit., such a peace fashion, or such peach measures. (4.) Made up, concocted; a certain amount of fraud is implied. (5.) When application is made. (6.) Immediate payment, viz., of the indemnity. - (7.) Lit., a thousand consents, and a hundred compliances. (8.) More literally employ this (language) for the pur pose of tethering—a favourite word of Keying and others in relation to the government of foreigners. (9.) The barbarian is the robber, Hwang, Governor amoral of the Two Kwang, the master of the house, whom he has injured ; will Government forget itself so far as to make terms with the barbarian by persecuting Hwang ? (10.) The despatches to the Emperor are returned to the high officers authorised to address them, with some slight •bservation written in red ink by the Emperor, If his an swer is of great length, or requires deliberation, he writes merely, " Our Alacet will be given separately." In tho lat tar caso he sends down what we call an Imperial Decree to the Great Council for transmission to the officer or officers concerned. (11.) Lit., where there is a determined bias and self opinion there is indeed no such word as happiness (or for tune). (12.) A place near the Yellow River, at which the Go vernor-General Ho was to have met the commissioners as they came down. The rumour here alluded to is probably a revival of the above, which was in circulation in August and September. (13.) The form in which the inferior addresses the supe rior official. (14.) Rather, spy out. (15.) Baron Gros did not sign the tariff, &c.. until some days after Lord Elgin's departure for Hankow. It was stated that some missionary question was under discus sion between his Excellency and tho Commissioners. (16.) Returns from Hank-ow. 16A.) The Commissioners sat more than once to the Honourable N. Jocelyn, who photographed them at the British olnsulate. (17.) Ilowque, and some other ex-hongists had been expected at Soo-chow, to advise the Commissioners regard ing the amendment of the tariff. (18.) This report probably grew out of the collision of the Ngan-king rebels with the squadron escorting Lord Elgin, of whose approach, to judge from appearances, the Imperialist force endeavoured to make some use. (19). There are more than one doctor of the Han Lin of this surname at Canton. (Signed) T. WADE. Inclosure 2 in No. 10. Memorandum by Mr. Wade, intended to accompany the translation of a letter forwarded by Mr, Parkes, from Canton, to the Earl of Elgin, on the 15th January, 1859, pri.cis of which was inclosed to the Foreign-office. The letter-forwarded by Mr. Parkes, of the genuineness of which I see no reason to entertain any doubt, read by the light of the correspondence of the Imperial commis sioners and earlier proceedings of the Chinese Government, ever since negotiations fairly commenced at Tien-tsin, fur nishes, to my mind, a clue deserving of attention to the course the Government has in this last instance pursued. According to the writer, evidently an official who has access to good information, the Emperor determined, the moment our backs were turned, to cancel the whole treaty extorted from him in June, 1858, and for this purpose sent Kweiliang and his colleagues south. This accords with a rumour purront at Shasighae in August ; Kweiliang was said to be in deep disgrace for his negotiations, the first public notice of which by the Chinese Government was in a decree of the 25eh July, to the effect that the barbarians who "burst into the river" with their ships had retired in obedience to the affectionate commands of Kweiliang. The use of the term "barbarian," as Lord Elgin com plained in a letter to the commissionez s of the 7th. Septem ber, was itself an infraction of Article LI of the Treaty, committed within one month of its signature. The mission of Kweiliang and his colleagues, ostensibly to revise the tariff, was remqrkable as being so much more than what the treaty required. It had been stipulated merely that a high officer of the Board of Revenue should repair to Shanghae. Two ex-commissioners of the Canton Customs were indeed added to the commission, but one of of these was replaced by Twau Chingshih, one of the under secretaries most actively employed during the treaty nego tiations. His leave-taking manorial, also published in the " Gazette," assured the Emperor, in stock phrase, that he would be zealous in " soothing the barbarians." Rumour, as I have said, made the object of this mission anything but a revision. Nothing, however, very positive was stated, nor did the reports on the subject command general attention. Meanwhile, as Kweiliang and his colleagues had pro mised at Tien-tsin, on the 4th July, to obtain from the Em peror, as soon as they returned to Pekin, a decree appoint ing a Commissioner to revise the tariff, which decree would reach Shanghae as soon as Lord Elgin, his Lordship, after ten days' delay at Shanghae, had written on the 21st July to complain that he was still without a line from P,kin on the subject. On the 27th he received a letter from Ho Kwei-tsin, an: nouncing the appointment of the Commission, composed, with the addition of himself, of the members enumerated above, who, he said, would arrive about the 18th of Aug. Lord Elgin visited Japan ; and having made his Treaty there, hurried back to Shanghao, to learn, by a letter from the Commissioners themselves, that they could not be at Shanghae before the 6th of October. It is, I repeat, quite clear that Kweiliang and Hwashana, the highest officers of the Civil estabrshment, were not coming to revise a tariff. Indeed, another object of their mission was eventually stated in their own letter of the 22d of October, to which we shall come in duo time. Ho Kwei-tsing'a assurance that they would be down by the 18th of August, was given, I imagine, to prevent the possi bility of Lcrd Elgin's returning to the Peiho. The decree he forwarded was dated the 15th July. The prescribed time for an official journey of the distance is 55 days. This would have brought the commissioners to Shanghae by the 10th of September. I presume Ho chose a middle term for safety's sake. I attribute the Commissioners' delay of their departure from Pekin, or their loitering by the way, to the one cause -the fears of the Government that, when the commission ers had declared their errand, we might revisit the Peiho. \Ve knew from the Gazettes that the forts were being re built—this of course was in itself no matter of surprise; that timber was purchased to stake the river, at which we could not either be astonished , but lastly, and this is noteworthy, that these operations were conducted under the special au thority of Sung-ko lin-sin, x Mongolian prince allied by marriage to the Imperial family, distinguished as the con queror of the rebels on the occasion of the Tai-ping incur sion into Chih-li in 1853-54, and appointed during our stay at Tien-tsin High Commissioner of War and Commander. in- chief of a force stationed at Tungchow to cover the ca pital should we advance upon it. It is also important that his labours had proceeded with such rapidity, that, by the 21st November, he was enabled to report the com pletion of the works on the Tien-tsin river ; for which ser vice, by a decree of the above date, he was rewarded by a sur coat of honour. My impression is confirmed, by all that has since occurred, that the arrival Gf the commissioners was delayed purposely until the river defences were in a state of forwardness. Fbr, once more, they were coming, not to revise the tariff, but, as Canton letter states, and their own correspondence presently shows, to discuss modification if not abrogation of three important privileges which distinguished our treaty from any other; to wit, the residence of a Minister at Pekin, cir culation of British merchants in the interior, and the navi gation of the great river; also to require the rendition of Canton. Ho Kwei-tsing, as in duty bound, went to meet the senior commissioners as they entered bis jurisdiction; and the statement in the Canton letter that it was on the strength of his representations, supported by those of , his provinoial Treasurer Wang, that they were led to mo dify materially the course prescribed by their instruetions, is borne out not only by the gossip of the period, but by a communication subsequently made by an indisputable au thority, which I do not feel at liberty to name, that they had come down charged to make war rather than concede the per manent residence of a minister. The words stated by Ho, when remonstrating against such policy, were " that war would be absolute madness." I confess that, with some faith in the narrator, I believed him, at the time he stated this, guilty of a simple exaggeration, a la Chinoise. It must not be forgotten that throughout the whole of this period, from June to October, affairs in the south were in a condition that augured ill for peace. Long after the Treaty was signed, Hwang, and a com mittee of three Cantonese of high standing in the class we style " the gentry," who held an Imperial commission for the enlistment and control of militia, were persisting in acts of war. After the tactics of 1856 and 1857, when Yeh was in power, the native servants were called home from Hong Kong, and the supplies of that colony cut lioff by semi official committees estabished in the adjacent districts. Sol diers of tho Canton garrison were kidnapped and assassin ated. A proclamation, under Hwang's seal, offered a high reward for Mr. Park( s's head. Even so late as the 22d August Hwang had supported the special committee in its war-taxation, on the ground that though a Treaty had been concluded at Tien-tsin, ho know not its conditions, and that it was as necessary as ever to be ready for banditti. I see no reason to doubt, when we read the Emperor's decree of the 21st October, in which he rejects the com missioners' censure of Hwang and the committee, that the court was encouraging the latter to persevere in their at tempt to expel th: , allies from Canton, where by treaty they were to remain till the indemnity agreed to was paid. The commissioners arrived at last on the 6th of October. They had been duly apprised of the dissatisfaction occa sioned by the tardiness of their movements ; and having first apologized in a private note for not visiting Lord Elgin until the ostensible business of their mission—the tariff re vision—was en train, they dispatched an official letter, in a most conciliatory strain, to beg Lord Elgin to appoint de puties who might meet their own for the revision of the tariff. The officers they named were Wang, the Commis sioner of Finance, chief civilian of the province, and Sish, for the three years previous Ta autae, or Intendant at Shanghae, one of the few Chinese I have met who, not withstanding much ignorance and prejudice still remain ing, really appreciat9s the power and probity of the foreigner, or who appear soberly to contemplate, without abatement of pride in their own country, the possibility of utilising barbarian ability to her advantage. He had been named to the commissioners by Lord Elgin at Tien-tsin. Lord Elgin. met their proposals by demandiug, first, an acknowledgment of two letters, written early in Sep tember,eonf poteuhageche;h distanceat they e b y ee e nf x r c no u n s iog e odetieiaklt Pekin; his s i Wang's h complaining of proceedings in the south, and still unnoticed. lr pacifica° i u m n a that s hostile attitude as not being assur e d o f our intentions and i v g o n l T un o h r a e t n i e l e . c r r e ed e o p n i t y o tl p w i r e o a grounds England, France, AMerica, and Russia. It does not appear for all that was promised on the sub ject, that even this meagre notice,:which promul g ated none of the conditi ons o f th e peace, was ever published'elsewhere At Canton, ind ee d, th e Hi gh Committee's Mklitia con- . firmed to annoy the foreign garrison until January, when one_ of their positions at ;Shek-tsin was destroyed. The garrison were then made to patrol the neighbourhood, the result of which measure was a speedy restoration of order. The commissioners' overtures did not yet satisfy Lord Elgin. He took them to task for having allowed near four months to elapse without making known the existence of a treaty ; and he demaanded the removal of Hwang, and the dissolution ofthe Imperial committee before he could con sent to go into the tariff at all. This line of action of course greatly perplexed the commissioners. As Chinese statesmen they would be slow to comprehend why the barbarian should postpone commercial considerations to any other and they hastened to soothe him accordingly. They had already, they said, denounced Hwang, and would again denounce him, praying the Emperor, at the same time, to withdraw their powers from the Committee. Lord Elgin, on this, engaged if they would promise to communicate to him the Imperial rescript to their me morial, to commence the discussion of the tariff, and this promise given, named Mr. Oliphant and myself as his deputies. Up to this time they had not breathed a word regarding the real matter of their mission. They were doubtless in much embarrassment as to the mode of introducing it; and the opinions of Ho, who drew his inspiration from Wang and Sich, the two chiefs of his provincial staff, both able, and intimately lies, had, I feel satisfied, in no way dimi nished their difficulty in approaching the retractation of a treaty concession. At length, on the 22d October, reassured by the favour able progress of the tariff and its concomitants, they, with tvident delicacy,and diffidence, declared the true object of their coming. Moralising briefly on the end of negotiations, they pointed out that those at Tien-•tsin were conducted so completely under pressure of an armed force as to leave no place for deliberation ; the Emperor had, accordingly, specially commissioned them to come to Shan,;hae, " ear nestly to press a matter which would be to the advan tage of both parties." Among the conditions extorted there were some of real injury to China, which there bad been no opportunity of explaining; of these they name one only—the residence, in permanence, of a British Minister at Pekin. As the Queen of England has an option, by treaty, they beg her Majesty may be prayed to decide that the Minister shall only visit Pekin en occasions. They avow that this condition is most irksome to China, and in Chinese fashion they strive to show how irksome it will be to us. A rude and numerous Tartar soldiery ; the unacquaintance of metropolitan officials with foreign affairs ; the temper of the population—these are the dangers which should incline us to forego this ono—to us usol.ss, and, for the reasons enumerated, perilous—privilege; the more readily to forego it, as, on the other hand, we are gainers to a considerable extent in the many which we should still retain. Looking back to the Tein-tsin period, we call to mind that the commissioners, although committed in their letter of the 11th June, 1858, to the declaration, that to a Minister's permanent residence there was properly no objection," and to the proposition that, the recent collision considered, the Minister had better live at Tien isin—an official residence being assigned him at Pekin— had attempted on the 21st Jane to recede from these proposals. They had, they said, received a decree, desiring them to do their best to persuade Lord Elgin to give up this invi dious privilege, " the north being cold and excessively dusty" also with it the right to open Chin-kiang, the right to circulate ingthe interior before the people should have been duly warned, the right to navigate the Great River, by which we should drive the Chinese out of the field. On all these points they again made a fight at their con- ference with Mr. Bruce on the 24th Juno. On the eveniag of the 25th they made a last effort, through Count Poutia tine and Mr. Reed, to dissuade Lord Elgin fron . ), insisting on the residence of a Minister, and the right of British merchants to circulate in the interior, pleading that, unless his lordship gave way on those points, their lives would be forfeited. Lord Elgin standing firm, they urged, even on the morn- ing of the 26th itself, a modification of the text, by yhich the Minister might be authorised to be constantly in resi dence at Pekin, instead of entitled to reside there, without moving, a change which, as liberty of his movements is secured in another article, was adopted. Those, with the addition of the surrender of Canton, are the questions on which, according to the Canton letter, the Emperor instructed the Commissioners to stand out, and it is upon these I gather, from their letters of the 27th and 28th May, the Commis- sioners would have engaged Mr. Bruce in discussion, had he accorded the interview they proposed. They had, withal, another end to gain. Lord Elgin met their request of the 22d October by an emphatic declaration that it lay not with him to abate one tittle of the Treaty. He pointed out the real object and advantages of diplomatic relations as established in Europe, _ _ and briefly adverting to past misunderstandings between our countries, expressed his doubt that the Imperial Go vernment could provide guarantees for the maintaining of _ _ peace, equivalent to that supplied by thepresence of a Afini- star at Pekin. The Commissioners, on the 28th October, admit that our Minister's right to permanent residence is incontestable, but the exercise of it will humiliate China in the eyes of her subjects. They, therefore, again pray Lord Elgin to move the Queen to use the option the Treaty leaves her Majesty in their favour, and there is no satisfactory arrangement they are not ready to make. Lord Elgin undertook to submit the correspondence to her Majesty's Government, and to recommend that if her Majesty's Minister were preperly received next year, and full effect given to the Treaty in all other particulars, the Minister should be directed to choose aresidence elsewhere, and to visit the capital either periodically or when business _ required it. The tariff negotiations were now brought to a close, and Lord Elgin announced his intention► to proceed up the Yang tze, to see what ports it would eventually be desirable to open. Tho commissioners acquiesced with a good grace, pro mised to send an officer to wait on his lordship, and to ad- vise the authorities of the provinces he would - have to tra- verse of his approach. This was partly in fulfilment of their under taking to make any satisfactory arrangement, partly, I feel sure, from words that fell from the Judge, in the hope that we should have a profitable collision with the insurgents at Nankin. At Hankow we found a proclamation announcing that the English, French, and American nations were come to look at the place, but not to trade, so the people need not be alarmed. There was not, it is scarcely necessary to observe, any signs of alarm, except that produced by the official runners and such persons, ;Vho at first insisted on forming our escort, and in that capacity unne cessarily thrashed the crowds that assembled round us, and used every effort to prevent the tradespeople from taking our money. The people themselves were here, as through out the whole 600 miles of our journey, civil, inoffensive, and eager for trade. I regard the policy of the Government in this to have been the same it has long adopted at Canton—to promote an aversion to foreign intercourse among the people, and to impress on foreigners that the people are hostile and hard to control. The doctrine finds its place, as we have seen, among the arguments against a Minister's residence at Pekin. On his return to Shanghae in January, Lord Elgin found the news from Canton still far from satisfactory. Just as he was about to start for Hankow, the commissioners had mooted the question of that city's rendition, and the payment of the indemnity, but had received no positive answer as to the course his lordship proposed to take. They had also requested us, by letter, to adopt the same arrangement as the French. They had writ t.tn, besides, a cir cular to the British, French, and American ministers, regard ing the future issue of pessports, and various other points which would be raised under the new treaties. Lastly, they prayed for some settlement of the duties owing under the provisional system adopted during the occupation of Shanghao by the rebels in 1853 and 1854. These letters had been sent in but a day or two before Lord Elgin's departure, and he, consequently, had delayed replying to them until his return. On receipt of the Canton intelligence, ho recommenced correspondence by an inquiry whether the promised decree removing llwang had been obtained. The commissioners sent him a decree of the 21st October, acknowledging their denuncia tion of Hwang, "for conduct calculated to produce mis chief ;" defending him, however, as having acted on the offensive only until the Treaty was concluded ; defending the committee as simply engaged in keeping the peace; and concluding with the observation that it would be for the Emperor himself to deal with Hwang should he have committed himself since the treaty was signed. Tho commissioners must have received this rebuff before Lord Elgin left Shanghae, but were doubtless in no haste to show how their advice had been relished by their master. Before their reply had reached him, Lord Elgin had answered their circular of the 7th Nov. I need notice but two items of his answer. He undertook most readily to guarantee that every precaution would be taken to prevent the abuse of the passport system by British subjects. At the close of his letter, he replied to their remark that their queries had been put by reason of their ignorance of foreign affairs, by observing that the most evident remedy of this defect would be, in sending a Chinese Legation to England. The commissioners rejoined at length, but noticeably about passports, which, they observed, the consuls would have to apply for to the Chinese authorities, to whom they must be, in due time, surrendered to be cancelled. This was on the 14th. On the same day, Lord Elgin had written to express his serious dissatisfaction at Hwang's continuance in office. He would now call on the commis sioners to settle the indemnity in strict accordance with the provisions of the s7parate article, or, as instructed by her Majesty's Government, he would eject the Chinese autho rities from Canton. A very crestfallen answer fullowed from the commission ers. They had done their best. The Emperor alone could decide. The Canton question they had not had time to settle since Lord Elgin's return. On the 20th of January, Lord Elgin, having received news of the Shek-tsing affair, wrote again. He reviewed I his correspondence with the commissioners since their ar rival in October. He was now convinced that Canton was to them a question of ultra vires ; he should, therefore, desire our executive there to act with vigour, and when the 1 ratifications were exchanged, the Emperor should be asked whether things at Canton had been done with or without his authority. The commissioners wrote to assure him that Hwang should now be certainly removed and 'the special com mittee dissolved ; but Eord Elgin, inclosing them a copy of the letter forwarded by Mr. Parkes, announced his intention to / roceod himself to Canton. On his return to Shanglue in the course of six weeks, should he not find the commissioners there, he would proccel to Pekin. The commissioners wrote, roundly abusing Hwang and the committee. The Emperor's decree must arrive in three weeks. In the interim all pending questions could be dis cussed. They were quite competent to deal with the Can ton question. They prayed him to remain. Lord Elgin was inexorable. The conditions of the Can ton question, he wrote, 25th of January, were specified in the treaty. Had the Emperor chosen that the commis sioners should close it, he would have given them the re quisite powers. They had not kept faith about Canton. They had promised months before to effect an improve ment there. - None had been effected. He would himself enforce a better order of things. This done he would re turn to discuss whatever remained for consideration, peace ably or otherwise, as the Chinese Government might see fit. Lord Elgin then departed, and on the 14th of February the commissioners forwarded a decree, not, indeed, re moving Hwang from tho Governor-Generalship, but still transferring his seal of Imperial commissioner for the superintendence of foreign trade to Ho Kwei-taing. This decree was, doubtless, shaped so as to save the im perial dignity. The Emperor would not disgrace the Go, vernor-General (who has- since been transferred to Sze chuen), under pressure, and his choice of Ho, as Hwang's substitute, he had reason to believe would soothe us. I have gone thus at length into this section of the cor respondence, from October to January, to show with what reluctance the Chinese Government took a minimum of action against an officer notoriously corrupt, and flagrantly tyrannical in his jurisdiction, and denounced by the highest in the land for a course of foreign policy prejudicial to the interests of peace. My convic tion is, that the Government, or, to take a hint from the opening clause of the' Canton letter, that portion of it which had the credit of establishing the special committee, and authorising its operations, never abandoned the notion of recovering Canton until their defeat at Shek-tsing, a village near Canton, and other movements of the allied force broke the spirit of the militia. It is also my impression, however contradictory the statement may appear, that the strong language held to the commissioners by Lord Elgin throughout this period, while it deterred them from attempting any of the changes I am persuaded they were sent southward to effect, enabled them at the same time to hold their own with the Emperor byre presenting the impossibility of retracting what he is as sumed to have required from people so violent and deter mined. His withdrawal of the seal from Hwang was probably balanced somewhatin the Emperor's mind by the opportu- nity afforded him of declaring in his decree, that our ac counts from Canton (of kidnapping. assassination' &c.) surprised him much, as, in the " soothing and bridling" of .. • Foreign nations, China had never been treacherous. Lord Elgin acknowledged the receipt of their last letter on the 3d of March. He therein told the commissioners of the appointment of his successor, charged with the ratified copy of the Treaty, to be exchanged at Pekin, and of his own immediate departure for England. He communicated to them the consent of her Majesty's Government to make the British Ministees residence at Pekin but occasional, on the conditions before recited ; and, bidding them fare well, reminded them them that peace was only to be kept unbroken by a strict observance of the Treaty—by a mu tual recognition of the equality of nations, between whom, he took occasion to remark there could be no such relation as that implied in the words " soothing and bridling." The commissioners received this on the 29th of March. They made no move north, notwithstanding; on the con trary, on learning Mr. Bruce's arrival, they moved from Soo chow, where they had spent the new year, to Shanghae. Mr. Bruce's despatch to liweiliang, of the 16th May. announcing his arrival, and requesting that suitable repara tions may be made for his reception at Tien-tsin, and his journey to Pekin with the ratified treaties and the auto- graph letter of her Britannic Majesty, reached the commis• t4ioners on tho 27th, and their proceedings from this data are deserving of close attention. Mr. Bruce found at Shanghao, on the 6th June, three despatches from the commissioners, the first dated the 27th May, the day on which the second admits his letter of the 16th May had arrived ; also admits that Lord Elgin' last letter, announcing his departure, had reached them on the 29th March. They had remained, neverthe Less, because his lordship had said he would return to dis- cuss various questions, which they do not enumerate. Hir successor, who is, of course, equally competent with him- belt; is bound, they think, to take up the pending discus sion with them, and with all speed, as the day named fm the exchange of ratifications draws near. The second, which is dated the 28th May, acknowledging Mr. Bruce's cf the 16th, urges that an important affair like the exchange of ratifications cannot be hurried through as he proposes; repeats that Lord Elgin's letters had — kept them at Shanghae, the journey from which place to Pekin would take two months ; none but they themselves could represent the Chinese Government in the matter ; there was no one to receive Mr. Bruce at Tien-tsin, and nothing ready ; they therefore propose that Mr. Bruce instead of waiting "up there," where he will find it very hot, should put off his departure, and grant them an interview. This is accompanied by another of the same date, in which insisting again on Lord Elgin's engagement to return and discuss various questions, they beg to enumerate those of which he had disposed and those loft unsettled. He had agreed, they say :- Ist. That the coming visit to Pekin was to be exceptional ; the Minister was not constantly to be at Pekin. 2d. That his visit to liankow was exceptional ; our move ments were henceforth to be in accordance with the Treaty stipulations. 3d. That none but respectable persons were to obtain passports, for the issue of which regulations must be de vised, The Canton question was not settled, and Lord Elgin had promised to go further. To take the last first, Lord Elgin had expressly told the commissioners that the Canton question must be settled, and promptly, according to the Special Article, which prescribes payment at Canton to be arranged by the Canton authorities. Before he left the south, Mr. _ _ Bruce had ascertained in May that the Canton authorities had no knowledge of this stipulation, or, if they had; were without any instructions to give it effect. The other three are the ever-recurring clauses of diffi culty ; the original modification of the first being further modified by total omission of the conditions on which her Majesty's Government, as the commissioners had been duly apprised in Lord Elgin's last letter, would consent to modify it. The other two are stated as they stand, I can only suppose to draw from Mr. Bruce some stish ac quiescence in what would have been literally hard for him to dispute, as might preclude the possibility of his sug gesting any arrangement for the :anticipation of the treaty terms, the far receding extinction of the rebels, before which no British subject can by treaty claim to enter the region they infest. _ _ Recalling the pertinacity with which the commissioners Lave revived their objection to our enjoyment of the privi- leges hero adverted to, the statements in the Canton letter, and in other quarters, of the Emperor's violent opposition to the concession of them, when we see them now, we should have said needlessly, reproduced once more, we can only in fer that some further limitations were contemplated. A Chinese, last year my head clerk, but promoted, after the treaty, for his supposed knowledge of foreign affairs to a mandarinate of the fifth grade, and now attached to Kweiliang, called twice on Mr. Lay in the spring, first to ascertain whether we would agree to exchange ratifications at Shanghae ; secondly, if we would consent to proceed, overland,, thence to Pekin. The latter, be it observed, is the time-honoured form of introducing the periodical missions from Anam, Lewschew, and other dependent States, into Pekin ; the form which enables China to maintain before her subjects that show of surveillance and patronage by which she has over sought to negative a barbarian State's assumption of equality with herself. The American treaty enables China to give the United States' Minister such a reception. So long as he does not insist on an audience, no tradition will be violated. It does not practically secure him access to Pekin for any diplomatic purpose. The above proposal accepted, our circulation under pass ports would infallibly have been infecterl by the precedent. No one would have travelled except under an official pF tection, resembling that proposed years ago by Kiying or the neighbourhood of Canton—a protection so irksoitae and profitless to the few who availed themselves of it, that travelling, if it were to be under such auspices, was soon foregone altogether. This is, of course, speculation ; nor is it more when I de dare my belief that the commissioners rather hoped than expected that we should halt at Shanghae, as they proposed, within three weeks of the day we were by Treaty to be at Pekin. They were, I imagine, acting under orders to try everything that might prevent our visit to the capital. On receiving Mr. Bruce's peremptory reply of the Bth of June, followed by his supplementary note of the 11th, the commissioners laid down their arms. His letter of the Sth, Ley wrote, had been sent to the Emperor, who would receive - - it in some nine days. They had moved him to send a high offi cer to Tien-tsin to meet Mr. Bruce, whom they recommended to leave his ships of war outside the bar, and proceed in light marching order to Pekin. They cannot themselves take steam as Mr. Bruce proposes, as the Emperor has has not authorised them to do so, but in obedience to his Majesty's commands (when received does not appear), they will go north with all speed. The suggestions respecting the an chorage of his squadron is brought in, as it were, casually : " The commissioners would wish," &c. There is no hint that the route by the Tien-tsiu River is condamnee, or that theattempt to ascend it will be opposed. Yet they must have known that opposition was immi nent. The high authority, cited before, assured my in formant that so certain was he of a collision, that be should keep himself out of the way. The Court, he said, was not disabused of its invincibility, nor would it be without another defeat. It was for all that not to 3 proud to be treacherous, as we have found to our cost. Admiral Hope bailed lefore the commis - ----- sion ers' last letter Wia received, . but his first pro ceedings, it is worthy of observation, actually filled the measure of their requirement. He approached the bar on the 17th, with only one steamer and two gunboats, and the officer sent in to communicate with the forts crossed the bar in a ship's gig. On the 20th, finding that the people on the spot, who maintained, as on the former day, that they had closed the passage of the liver without the orders of Government, had not, as they had promised, removed, but, on the contrary, had greatly multiplied the obstacles in the way of a free pas sage, he gave notice to the Intendant of Tien-tsin that his squadron would remain at the mouth of the river while Mr. Bruce was at Pekin; he, therefore, wishes his men to land to purchase supplies. The Intendent only opposes their landing lest they should lose themselves in winding paths, amongst the camps and field-works which, he says, abound along the way between Ta-koo and Tien-tsin. He says no thing of the Government's objection to leave the river open, and ho does say that the defences he alludes to are not to our address. • All this while n 1 official, the militia and peasantry on shore affirm, is near the spot. Mr. Ward, the American Minister, is told the same story by the same people on the evening of the 24th; the batteries :appear deserted until the following forenoon, when, as the foremost gun boa* according to notice given the previ um evening by Admiral Hope, attempts to pass the booms, they pour forth a fire from 70 guns, which for strength and direction is without precedent in our annals of Chinese warfare. Still no official appears at Taku. On the other hand, Hang, the Governor-General of the province, does send a letter to Mr. Bruce, from a point some ten miles up the coast. It is dated the 23d, but does not reach him till the 25th. Now Mr. Bruce's letter of the 9th, which had electrified the commissionrs, was to reach Pekin in nine days —say before the 20th. We know, by experience, that communi cations between Taku and Pekin do hot take more than 24 hours. The Court, if it were prepared to disavow the host tile act of the ,Taku garrison, must have forgotten that it could, hardly, under the circumstances, plead ignorance of the great danger of a collision between the large force it had placed, months before, at Taku, and a foreign squadron which had now been waiting since the 16th to have the river opened fur the British Minister's admission. If it were bona fide intent on the preservation of peace, why should no official have presented himself to the Admiral at Taku or why should the only move of the character of a pacific overture been made at the eleventh hour, ,by a circuitous route and with a want of alacrity at nrst'sfght inexplicable? For the despatch had been the best part of two days coming ten miles. It invites Mr. Bruce to wait for the arrival of liweiliang and his colleague, promising him that when he, Hang, shall have moved to the southward the garrison and arma ment of the positicn from which he writes, he will come out to welcome him to the place, Peh-tang• Ho by name, a port, if it deserve the designation, which the Americans found in a few days was doubtfully accessible even to a ship's boat. I feel satisfied that, our object considered, the fulfilment of the treaty, not in the letter but in the spirit, we should make a mistake in approaching the capital otherwise than by its recognised highway. Ido not see that the Ameri cans can refuse to proceed to Pekin by Peh-tang-Ho, or by any less desirable route ; Article V of their Treaty im posing on them almost all the restrictions which it is the very aim of our Articles 111 and IV to withstand. The American.3linister may visit Pekin once a year, with 20 people for a suite; he is ,to give intimation of his ap proach through the Board of Rites ; and is to complete his business without necessary delay; he will be held, as I have before hinted by the Government and people of China, at precisely the same 'value as a Lewchewan or Siamese Envoy. This, some will say, is of little conse quence. It is at least of this much, that little attention will be raid to the representations of an officer who takes so low a place, and it is only by insuring the attention which must be yielded when the question of equality is no longer in dispute, that wecau hope fora peaceable settlement of mis understanding with a people whose bigotry, arrogance, and insincerity are kept in check only by their fears. To close observations which have greatly outrun their intended length, I am persuaded that ita aversion to con ede, even limited by the three privileges so often alluded to, is what has betrayed the Chinese Government into an let of war, which, with its usual pusillanimity, it was pr e pared to disavow had its forces suffered defeat. It has never accepted the changes forced upon it—the novelty, in the sense in which Western nations unLrstand it. It was ready, more suo, to fend off those without fighting, and the - 3ommissioners were, I make no doubt, to detain us at Shanghae under ono pretext or another, until the year was so far spent that we might be induced, in our greed for commercial advantages, to accept an 'exchange of ratifica tions at Shanghae. Foreign relations, which in Chinese are simply synonomous with a Superintendence of Trade, would then have been handed over to Ho, whose "sooth ing and bridling," we are evidently assumed to prefer, and the great gain of the Treaty, the one means of preventing tacal misunderstandings, viz., the right of appeal to the central Government against the acts of its subordinates, would, in default of precedent, have been as much in abey ance as though it had never been concluded. Diplomacy failing, the Government still veiled its readi ness for war—possibly from doubt in its powers, perhaps in the hope of taking us completely unawares. _ _ Mr. Hart's interesting memorandum on Sungkolin-sin's temper and arrangements, together with Mr. Morgan's in - f9rmatton on the - same head, are more or less corroborated by the junkmen who lay off the Peiho, lamenting 0, ievously the interruplion of their trade. it must be noted in qualification of Sunko-lin-sin's prow ess, and of the court's resolution, that his victory was not adopted by the Government for some four or five days ; at the end of which time the forts first showed the flags of five out of the eight banners under which the Tartar force is enrolled. Since my return to Shanghae I have learned that many Chineses ascribe the collision altogether to Sungko-lin-sin, and entirely acquit the Emperor. They represent him as unable to restrain the Mongols, who, on learning that the Emperor was decidedly opposed to overt hostility, declared that, at all events, they would not admit the barbarian by way of Tien -tsin. The statement is very possibly the truth —it corresponds, more or less, with the report brought by M. Mouly from Pekin. It would consist perfectly with the timid treachery of the Chinese Government that, having placed its responsibility, as it hoped, a courert. by with drawing its official presence from the scene, it should bide the issue of a course which, if unsuccessful, it was thus armed to condemn; and with the short-sightedness which, in my opinion, distinguishes its policy, that it should over look the more terrible consequence of a success such as that it has obtained. (Signed) THOMAS WADE, Chinese Secretary. No. 11. MR. BRUCE TO THE EARL OF MILMESBURY. (Received Sept. 13.) Shanghae, July 15,1859. My Lord,—Your lordship has been informed in my pre vious despatches that the American minister, Mr. Ward, had associated himself with us in cur demands to exchange the ratifications of the treaty at Pekin, and had further stated to the Imperial commissioners at Shanghao that he was instructed to deliver in person the letter of the President of the United States of America to the Emperor of China. He could only claim these privileges un d er the roost favoured nation clause, and therefore awaited the results of the at tempts made to detain us at Shanghae. When they failed he expressed his intention of going to the Peiho, and re ceived an invitation from the commissioners to accompany us there. On the 24th he crossed the bar of the Peiho in a small steamer, with the intention of proceeding to the booms, and making the attempt to advance up the river, leaving it to the Chinese to fire on him if they chose to do so. His steamer, however, grounded before reaching them, and was with difficulty got off by the gunboats, after considerable delay. He therefore contented himself with demanding a passage, and was met by a refusal on the part of the mi litia, who gave themselves out as the garrison of the forts. He remained at the mouth of the river during the attack, determined to push up had wo opened a way through the barriers; and it is very gratifying to me to bear testimony to the friendly feeling and assistance we derived from him self and Flag Officer Tatnall on the:. day. After we had decided on abandoning the attempt to reach Pekin, Mr. Ward considered himself bound to effect, if pos sible, the exchange of ratifications under the provisions of the American treaty. Ho had received no communication since his arrival from the Imperirl Government, but he ad dressed a letter to the Governor-General, expressing his wish to proceed to Pekin and exchange the ratifications there. This letter ho despatched in his steamer to Pe • tang-ho, with his secretary and interpreter. I enclose a memorandum, she wing the nature of the approach to Pe-tang -ho and its defences. I have heard indirectly that when the boat from the steamer approached the shore, most of the villagers fled. With difficulty two men were found to whom the object of the visit was explained and the letter delivered, on their undertaking to forward it to the Governor-General, whose place of residence they would not, however, divulge. They at the same time urged the bearers to return without delay to the boat, to avoid being attacked by the horsemen who were seen in the neighbourhood. It was fortunate they did so, for they were chased by the cavalry, two of whom pursued them into the water. Soon after a junk came off with provisions, and a mes sage from the authorities of the place to say that the letter had been forwarded, and an answer would be shortly re ceived. On the sth of July, Mr. Ward informed me that the Governor-General had appointed Friday, the Bth, for an interview at Pe-tang-ho. Having left on the 6th, I do not as yet know the result. 1 do not think that the Chinese will make difficulties about exchanging the ratifications of the American treaty. The conditions under which the American minister is alone entitled to visit the capital, contain nothing offensive .n to al superiority. Chinese trattreaty dinconsistentoes not with open it s theclaimslasit give the ye of na n g te river, or any port to the north of Shaugha c e o , u n n o i r . It leaves also do right to travel in the interior o , f ti t o i n ie ry. untouched the important of transit duties. The z tzo true policy of the Chinese w ould be, therefore, to reutve THE SUN, LONDON, THURSDAY EVENING, OCTOBER 6,185 g.