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had accordingly felt hintself realized to apply for a Cunt Martial, to enqinie i tan his eftniiict, con vinced that the result w. eild completely none the charges with which he had been loaded. The Ad ' indult) , had been plaased to accede to his request ; but though he had liege...l that it mieht be an in quiry iato every part at .is conduct; both prior and enfooqiient, they Lad limited it to the days of the twenty-third and tweety-fourth, on whialt days he was charged with not having done the hest in his power, and all taut could have been dune, to take and destroy all the ships of the enemy, which, the charge asserted, he ought to h eve enga.'ed. This, therefore, was the °tile point fur the ci ninderation the Court. ft lamented the investigation was not oft broader and more unli cited nature. If it had • been predicable for him to have entered into the merits of the case, he should have been ai_;e to s'iew that his conduet hid been not only justifiable, :out praise-worthy. That he had not only saved his own fleet, but heal been instrumental in the saving of his country. He trusted, with confidence, that the judgment of the Court, this day, would restere him to the good opinion of that coonti so-of that country, for which he had bled, and for which he had conquered. The charge Against him was not precisely wiihio any of the a: ticles of war, although it assumed one of them as its founde tion. He admitted, that it was at all times the shay of a British Commander to engage my ship cf the enemy, when it might be in his power ; but be denied that it was iocumbent on any such Com mander to prove the physical impossibility of his se engaeing. Neither could he admit that aßi Irish Commander, having once met an enemy, whom he had eng.teed, was bound, so long as that ene my remained in sight, to do every thing in his power to renew the contest. He had two iii stances of it contrary practice, observed reit two me memorable occasions, and by two of the greatest Commanders whom the British Navy hint .seer produced. He meant • hat of Lord Hose n , on the Ist of June, I;n4, and that under Eaeleti. Vincent, on February 14. 1797, no both rifewhich °nominal+, these eminent Officers rer2;enJ for some time in sight of the enemy, whiort they had previously en gaged, without coor:efg a renewal oh the coatest. Of the latter, he could speak with more cirenfi,lence, hevieg himsell been Earl A. Vincent's Captain on that memo;il,le occasion. Of the phopriety Of this condion., in the case of these Noble Commander, no doubt bad ever been started, and tbey were al lewed to have exercised a sound d:scretion. I-1 he tonteaded, was a case of - more n•-cessity that. It was not the fleet wish which be had born e-T;, J ed, that he had :then' co contend. He cad to against an wick from the /toelifort and Ftn•ol squadrons, iliaddition to that which was then. In sight. In Feb icy he had been sent by Adm. Cornwallis to blochede her. 01, with seven sail of the Lae. This was all which could be spared him; ai. a, although he "repeatedly applied for two fligates, only one coold be spared him. It was not his meaning to relied' on the Admiralty. He was well assured they had enough to do to supply ships where they were mint wane J. It was his objed, at present, to di fend him self; not to accuse others. In the same month, the Toulon and Caaiz fleets joined, and it was ascer tained they had proceeded to the West Indies. ha dangerous was his situation at this time, that Lord Gardner dire fled him to leave Ferrol, and come to his Lordship—thirteen sail of the line being thee about to leave Ferrol and go to Comma. Oa the 10th of .fuly they had aduelly befoul to move, and signal posts had been established between Cape Fi nisterre and Corunna, to Ferrol, to enable them to judge when to corn: out. By an m •!er finm Ad. miral Cornwallis, Rear-Admit al Sterling was oriel lid to join Sir Robert, and they were ordered to cruise SO or 40 'caws to the westward for six or sight days, and then to return. The enemy's force was then stated to be 16 sail, with whom, if the Prisoner did not fall in, they were immediately to repair to their respective steams off Ferrol and infich fort. Ott the loth, he was joined by Rear-tadmirel Stirling. The same wind, however, which enabled Admiral Stirling to leave Rochtort, enabled the fleet, which he had hem blockading there, to escane, which it did, as appears (torn the evidence of Ad miral Stirling himself; on the lath, to Corunna, whence it could get out almost at any time. Toe wind had continued nearly for two days to be fair for their departure, and if they had taken advantage of the night, they might have jeiiied the enemy. It was out of dispute, that on the each the wind seas at N. E. which was a favottrable wind for going out ; and it was known to all the Court, that perils' land winds occasionally blew, which might even enable them to effed a similar purpose. At this time a letter was received, written by Lord Nelson, then bound to Europe, to Lord Gardner, and transmit ted to Sir Robert, strongly recommending a care ful watch to be kept on Ferr o l, as a port into which the Combined Fleets might be supposed to attempt ro enter. Accordingly, oa the Xlst, they came in sight, much more numerous, however, than had been supposed, not consisting of sixteen tail of the line, as Admiral Cornwallis 's accounts led to er ped, but of 2a) sail of the line, seven frigates, two brigs, aid a lugger : while to oppose them, there were only 15 sail of the line, two frigates, and two cutters. Notwithstanding this superiority, and every disadvantage of wind and weather, he effeded his oh jef of forcing the enemy to battle ; and, amidst the numberless insinuations which had unwarrantably been thrown ouriageinat his condud, he had never yet heard any ilbjeftten started as to the mode of his commencing the aCtion that day, or to his conduCt id the course of it. By the valour of the Admiral, who was second in command on that day, and by the bravery of his fleet ih general, he had been en abled to achieve, what he presented to think was, in such circumstances, a gloat and important vidory ; a viftory, than which, few instances, and those of modern date, ,more important, or more decisive its their nature, had been accomplished with such a do time the firing ceased, the '. The Vice-Admiral then which was in a damaged rare for edion. lie kept in whole of the night, to pro _ same time, as clam as possi- During the night, he was engaged `the scleadmn had sustained; f the extent of the damage, his power to renew the en ly teat the Fr:.,( cutter, and the mums of Use state of - I -. . ' . ••• . 's. the diffetent ships. the -retefine ire. Who fore the Court, and it would be fur them to judge, whether he would have beanererrented.laitietwiegemi tier the di sa Arent:4m which he should flextime to tleetn. and with his fleet so muds &owed, is aet! tempting to renew the actin,[ ? It was not till about eight in the morning of the fed. that the Admiral saw the Wm greatly to leeward. He thee made signal for her to quit the prizes. and ler the Egrn Pent e to take them in tow. The cutesy were then set n at a distance, about eight or nine miles to wind ward. lie found, this of 15 ships of the line, the lVindccr C.sfte only .ins declared incapable of sail ing, and requiring to lie -to. yet that. nieny of them were very much crippled ; and, is his judgment, and relying on the returns which had been made to him. without 4 mast which could be relied on in a press of sail. That this belief was correct, no other evidence seemed necessary, than the fact that the Rept,:ve sprites her bowsprit, and the Malta her mainmast, on the 125th, being the very first press of sail they had made since the action. Capt. Inman, ton, of whose evidence the Court were already in possession, has afforded his testimony, that he ex pected, when sent to chase a frigate of the enemy, on the day after the H, (ion, that his mast would have gone by the hoard. Another circumstence, which must have resulted from a renewal of the ac. Lion, was the capture of the Windaor Cater, of the primes and the irigetes, three or four sail of the line of the enemy's fleet, appetently in order, hskg ob served wetcheig on the weather-beanoshady to cut oil' the sepereted ships. 'Phis it w a s the Vice•Ad mirars duty to prevent, and to preserve the admin. Lige he had got. Ane.'etr disadvantage under smiich he lehonred,leeettempting to renew the adien, war the waist ree- frigates, on whidi it w 4; uncessary fur hum to enlarge to that Court. it was far from ty..titer his intention to attempt to adduce any tliirg which might tend to diminish that spirit which induces British Commanders to cc:interim every danger when their country's interest eias at stake ; but he must deprecate the idea ',Let it was in cumbent on them, at all times, and in all cases, • to combat with unequal members, to the utter mest, without regard to fitly circumstances which migie exist.—Every ease must be governed I ,y its own circumst.uttes, and must depend on the judgment of Cr.: Commander, subjed to that respensieility which always attaches to such si• Auetions. it appeared to him, that the action was highly insportent, even if the capture of the two ntites had ;nn, the only obje& attained. There were, here ve sixteen sail of the line at Ferrol, which, i they were net already at sea, would, in the event of his ei lug tenable to resume Isis station el teat port, be !eft et full liberty to pursue any ei.e• se they pleas:'!, .n I even to eta a landing io Ire . He really nest feel, in diese circurn seiecee that lie was justified in running the risk wei -II must ti eve enc. Jed a renewal of the anion, .in opoerteuity presented itself far more fa n welt!! than teat which he addled - 2o attemet, te • selt.d as lee was to return in stares of Clem, so soon as he had plued ht. crime! d ships in a place of safety. lie certainly had not offered, but, at the use. time, lie had never eveiditd, a renewal of the emag,eatent ; end though the enemy, v.:cunt:ugly, as one ell- .r. Commanew had represented it, and with a sea to twee the most leeweri part of their fiett, if it %.!4 been described bv another gallant Other, had boric en the 1-litise fleet, he was eon vested, had they been serious in coming to adion, they woil.l have received a proper revenge. But, during the whole of the ?ad, the enemy, as appeared from :he evidence before the Coen, had the wins!, and, of comic. comd not be forced into aeries. On the tAth, at day-ierek. the enemy was SOLI only from she mast head, there being some light breezes. But. even then, supposiag it to have been possible to bring the enemy to a&ion, that could only be ac complished by .4 separation of the squadron s and car. taidly, errs then, not in Ms opinion, without the con sent of the enemy. At six o'clock of the evening of the '2 i•th, the enemy was entirely Olt of sight. The Vise-Admiral accompanied the Waki,or Coale to a piece of safety. resolved to return to his station, and, it possible, to bring the. enemy to adinn. In case of not fiettine diem is )Ferrol, his resolution was to tepeir to the rendezvous off Cape finisterre. He accordingly returned to Ferro! and there re sealed the blockade; the efehe returned to England to refit; and Admiral Stirling, agreeebly to his orders. to Rochfort. Ilse Vice-Admiral had, to the propriety of his conduß in these different reipeds e I the Approbation of the Commander-in-Chief, who not only transmitted to him a letter of .eepro /tenon and thanks, after the action of the 22d, as an additional proof of confidence, on the 17th of August, put under his command a filet of twenty sail of the line to blockade Ferrol, and with farther instrudions, if they had sailed. The enemy had wiled from Ferrol ; but the Vice-Admiral for tunately arrived time mouth at Cadiz to enable Ad miral Collingwood to secure them three Having add to - the best of his judgment, in all these par. titulars, he hole expeded to hare met the reception which he found awaiting him in this country. The Court were already in pos.ession of the testimonial of the gallant Adini•4l, who was second in mn- Mend, on the 2.21 of July, to the propriety of his (the Vice-Admiral':) condud. A simil it testimonial he : , ad also received from his Com:milder-in-Chief ; and he &meted himself the country in general would agree, on his return home, in bestowing the usu.' tokens of aeprobation on liis cueded, and that of Iris gallant associates. this, at least, t/try d, se-ved, however much he himself might hires merited a contrary tee :meet. Judge then of his feelings, on finding himself accused, even by the most mode rate of his Assailants, of hewing trifled with the feel.. ings of the pubic. This, nuwever, proceeded not from any fault of his, but from the m in which his dipatdies were published in r - ,e tendon Garotte. They were not published wheal,' and ...tire; and yet they were not published as extras from, but .as copies of, his letters. lie disclaiawd al: id eof regefling on the Admiralty in t'sis pantie oar. They pro.b.ibly meant to cunvey gratifyir.g intelligence the public, without b-ing aw-re of the interpre tation which might be put on it, or that it would militate to his disadvartage. c , mld not mean so. was apparent from the area I-ss with which they had allavicd him to state the substance of that pant which was omitted. In doing so, how ever, he should cake care to pvepidicethe but rather himself in suffer Any Wien which miga. Amor from want or explanation. lit then read an ad- • • • C, l4444.l b4 B"ell* itiOws 'suss?* accoost dw I •14 140ithich lie.stiys. " Al *maim doe &willolo, AIN to be on asy guard, on amnia oof the w .. a; Newel, and the two captured ship. I hairs sent them sod the Windt*, Cattle away." this had i hem stated, the public could sot have expecteti ft • iamb. They would rather have camrompamedwith , satisfaction what had been done. His letter of the 2tith July too, in which he corrected the unfortarl nate omission relative to Admire( Stirling. breathed similar language, and slimed that a renewal of the er.gagetnete. for the time, was at an end. As to the veport circulated by Lieutenant Nicholson, that the Vice-Admiral had aspired him and authorised him to &clue to the Commanding Officer, that I had it in my power, ar..l was determined to force, the Combined Fleets to renew the anion—why Was not Lieut. Nicholson called on to pewee the fiat. He could not. The Vice-Admirpl declared. on his honour, that he never did send such a mss sage. Sir R. Calder—" That Ido most solemnly." „I Every letter :hewed kis intention not to renevrAte. asion, till he had conveyed the Minton Casei'to a place of safety. These, he hoped, semen justify him in wishing to have an opportunifer to vindicate his character and conduct. 'l hg question divided itetlf into two heads :-.-Firs• Weld he renew the ac tion. if be had inclined ?---Sekeend, whether it would have been prudent so ta•fu ? and whether he did not act wisely, and exe)cise a sound judgment in declin ing to renew it ? it Was evident, that on the 231 he could not rene.v the action ; and that, on the 24th, though the wi 'LI was favourable, he could not renew it, %Nohow separating the squadron, and even thee it weadoeleful with what success. "Fhisheshould wove ; and that it was impessible to take the prisoner; out of th- captured ships, had it been found necessary to destroy them. He lamented the absence of Captain Prouse, as he would have been a material witness to prove the facts in the caw. The signal which he made for a return of the damages weich the different s .ips had sustained, did not impan his determination to renew the 'Rion. His only objea was. to form a line of battle, if the enemy had chosen to advance. It was pleats th it Cap tain Inman made the same distinlion that he did for, thongh crippled, he gave a negative to the signal to lie-by, well kniwing the difference be tween the ability to lie-by fir art enemy, and that of cirryitig a press of sail for the purpose of teaewing the anion. He could sufficiently admire that spi rit of heroism, by which a British Officer was withheld from making signal of inability or• distress ; but lie contended that it would have ill become him, and that he would have ill discharged his duty to the public, if, to such feelings, how ever neenanimetis in themselves. he ha 4 sacri ficed other more imaortent considerations. As to whilt Captain Durham said, he declared that he had eleeadv formed his plan, which was not to separate the ; and to have ordered Captain Durham to keep sight of the enemy, Could only have had the elFea of separating him from the remainder of our squadron. Ile declared, indeed, that he was surprised at Captain D.'s having made the signal tie did. Had Be (the Vice-Admiral) required it. he would have male a signal for it. In fest, the signal made to Capt. Durham, was 77, the signal to bring -to, and not t 5, the signal to re connoitre. A variety of leuers and other documents y aws then put in, and read . • and, amongst the rest, the first dispatch of Sir R . Calder to the Admiralty, after the anion. as it originally stood, without their curtailment. The following paragraph from a pri vate letter to Sir R. Calder, from Admiral Corn wallis, dated July 29, was then read : " But it was not believed that they (the enemy) had so many line of battle ships ; sixteen being all we heard of, from a sloop which spoke them. as they said, on board, :titer they left the %Vest Indies." Question, to the Hon. Capt. Gardner, of the Here--lt this your report of the damages sustained by the Nen ?--Yes, it is. The report was then read. Did the enemy ever chase, or make any attempt to force me to adieu, on the 23d of July last ?-e- No. Could I have forced them to come to anion on that day ?---Not if they chnse to avoid it. If I had gone towards the enemy on the 24th, with intention to renew the Aaiun, could I have compelled them to do se, if they had chosen to avoid it, Withellt approaching so near the shots as to have enabled them to communicate by signals with Ferrol ?---1 am not acquainted with the rela tive sailing of the two leers but lam of opinion, thee could have communicated with the -hole, be e _ fore they could have been brought to alios, had they wished to do so. WAS the British fleet always kept by me between that of the enemy and the port of Ferrol, while the enemy kept in sight?--The British squadron was always nearer to the port of Ferrol than that of the enemy. Were you most in danger, by carrying sail, when sent ley me to Admiral Cornwallis, on our return to shant ?—ln carrying sail to accomplish that duty. which was only performed on Sir R. Calder's ap pearing in sight of Admiral Cornwallis's fleet, the foremast of the Here was in danger of going over the side. Court--From the manner in which you have de scribed the state of the foremast of the Nero, at the time you joined Admiral Cornwallis. what do you suppose would have been the consequence, had the Vice- Admiral found it necessary to carry sail in pursuit of the enemy ?—I think the foremast, par. ticuierly on the 24th. when there was a considerable swell, bad we carried sail. must have gone by the board. from its putting on so bad an appearance. after we had fished it to the extent of our means. Wnat masts of the Hers were found necessary to be, and were takes out, when the Hero was repaired in port ?. I he foremast and mainmast were both taken on., and replaced by new ones. By the Celt r—,>, s 'i.e British Beet was skivers sewer to tic .tior•• 'ban we enemy's, while in sight, in what way could they approach the shore, to communicate with it, before some part of the British fleet, not dis abled, could nave closed with that part of the ene my which was disabled ?--By shore, I meat any pert of it between Cape Finisterre and Ferrol, where by their wishes might be communicated to Ferrol. At what distance were you from the shore while the enemy was in sight eau refer to my book, ! 7K .1. • - / OA the Lid, 4 then PrN:E. 4h-re WA* whether Yho kl not sends 7t. Ift of your damagps by the f i ek Atid 4114, n 2 the orhht between the havd cud 2 1--Yes ri d ' yet belly, by Lirstarnant honnethst the Y . '• er -y what is before the Court. , • - Doh yha lay :. ht stapes en tit- c o f ..,,e 'Wirer rJaSti ?•—Ne. I hid they se. :td:hhavc todhl. As you have said yon are thr acchteirhe ' hhh the relative :ailing of-the flee; s, on *kit ground do yon conclude the -.twiny oottid ea the shore before the British thist could have .etched them ? -Front ' ai s their being fi fteeo or stet a v !stiles distant from us it the time, and the enehe'h li n e of ba t ? !e ships being formed generally th , hail as well as ours. I Say ge e i htly. e Did Thh i tylve any information from the Vice- Admiral, .er the action, that it was his intention to renter ;he action h.-Lieutenant Fennel, eh the Nileehaid me he was tent on 'shard tc know tne dz . "Kies sustain 'd, and that tlitrAd.oiral meant to re new the action in the mcmittg. When did you teceive able info ratatien ?..--Bea tween two and three o'clock in the morning a the ad. . The following paper was :tow put in by Sir R. Calder :-- " I anmit they in the tight of the tht. 1 aid hope to remit - the acoon - Court—You will please to &switch. Captain Gardner as soon as possible, because betis ordered on immediate service. Sir R. Cattito--For that express reason I celled • Capt. Gard* first. Did the er.eihy appear to pod kola , * entered much ?—No. I only olverhed one mai:top-mit yard g ~ o e in the whole squadron. We weft too tar to judge of their sails. The Hon. Captain Legg, oftheßepedaehmatnined. h that the report you made to me of the do, rages sustained by your sLip h-Yest that Is UM • seeond report I seat in. The report wet then read. Did you make a similar report on the thihtbit et; the 224 h-No. I did ant .'.en know that the Imre sprit had beta wnu.sded. I merely specified, chip • the riggioh and sails had been cut ; as the Olcct o' the Frisk came or tyrant s . soon ater th- h . oh, I lhing the nest ship to the Admiral, I bad tin • rehh; made at the tone of the &hush. , scy .i ht - Rep trt was, I believe, transmitted to th A.ltnu 4.:y. ' Sir R. Calder—All the first, or rases reports, were sent to the Admiralty. •Weiz you employed in fishing and securing your mast and bowsprit all the t3..1 at July ?—Nio. it, bowsprit was sot . onsidered an badly wounded as tit be fished, :ill after it sprung on thetveidog oft. • itikh. ihe peehly. were occasionally employed. oar the 23.1. in knotting and splicing the rigghig, oats rev pairing the sails. Did you make the signal to me,on the tsthod the bowsprit b ing sprung ?.-.Yes. Was not that the first lime we had carried rushb sail daring the anion ?--I don't think that we cad carried Any sad to slimily, before that. The Re.'6 . ?she was then under her three top-sails, Ad I forts . sail. Did you, ahem the same time, Me the Make make the signal 4 having spronh her tore-yard h-- Yes • and I think her lowerlahl. Wit the squadron brought-to on the occasion? - Yes: on the k 'she h.stkust, hgnel ' How long was it before the &peter said Melts made the signal they were heady co proceed o 1 ser vice ?—tho /bile made the former signal at seven o'clock in the evening of the thith. when we were obliged to let every thing fly to save the masts. I made the signal, that we were ready to make sail agaie, as soon as It was day-tight on the £6th. Did the enemy ever chase, or mate any attempt to bring the Ili itish fleet to anion on the 234 of July?-.-Never ; but always kept hull down to winds ward. Could I have forced them to anion on that day? I think not. ' Did the enemy appear to you to lyre sustained any considerable damage in their 'ma s ts and yards? —"No. I could only distirigbis'i woe ship, with. I think, her maintop-mil.yard down. Some mhos might have sails clued up to mine. II I bad appmachea the enemy. could I have fetched them, had they avoided me, before they would have been able to cohmanichte with the shore 1--I shoidd think not, :1 they chose to avoid an anion. Was the British fleet kept between the enemi and Ferrol, while the eisitny were in sight ?--I think they were till the 2fth. But not whet, during the latter part of the time, we lest saw them. They then stood to the south wtrd. • IV en we parted with them, could they have fetched Fermi ?---As well as I recoil. ft, I should think nut. Court--You hive stated, that you dirt not dh cover your bowlat it tore shin ig , BI the 25th. is you apprehend, if you bad beta 0.,14 ... to tarty sail upon the Repulse, in persist of the enemy. yeti hr %esprit would hare borne it !..-•rh, Tr ON prit was not sprung till the evening of the 2Stn, sad, as it then went under reefed top-sails, end t e --, I should suppose it was not equei to car• - an) all, at any time ofter the anion. Was there not much sea on the 24th ? A .hrtf sea, and almost calm ; toe ships rolling very tan:`,. Was it so all the day ?...ht . .he mor rig, attar the breeze sprang up, about ten o'clock, the ships did not roll so much. Sir R Ca:der being asked, whether he had any questions to pot to this witness ? sh:J, he hit.l not. Charles B.ylt, of the WI 41sor C. h..., ezonsided. Is this your report of the damages of year ship in the anion h -Yes. Did I hail yos myself, soon after the anion, when you were passing to windward of the Prime of If', Pt ? -Certainly. What did Imy ?—You as'Ked me, whether my foromproat could he got up very soca, or without lon of time ? ' What was your airivret ?---That every exertion should be made. What was my reply ?—That you did_oot doubt it Was Toth. ship in a condition to Work he wi a ward. either in line of battl h or order of esti:tog. so as to force the enemy to anion, on the had or 24th of July?---No. pad you receive any communication from Mt parity of !umbers. At the i enemy were to windward. hailed Or Ifrendser Castle, atAce, desiring her to . preps tke.aale tack during the n tea ber, keeping, at the rat We n the'enemy. During t in repairing the damage the and being then ignorant of he expeled it would he in gagement. lie Accordingly the Nile lugger, en culled