The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1809-04-22 00:00:00

r I --~*-- -than to assist isseleiry—to produce these before your Loidahips in such a manner as to enable you to . pronounce that judgment which the importance of toe case requires, cud the country expects, would , be for me, I fear, utmost impossible. I feel, there fore, the necessity, at the outset of what I am silent to state, to solicit a more than usual portion of your Lordships patience and indulgence, while 1 endeavour to execute a task that 1 would rioher have been counnitted to abler hands. But, as no other Peer •lisle expressed an intention of standing forward, I feel that I owe it to my coun try, in this its most ['entails state, nut to sutler the consideration 9f such a subject to be any longer de- : (erred. It cannot toe necessary to recut to the re collection of the House the universal sentiment that prevailed on the first news of the resistance of the people of Spain to an uaurpatioa which, whe ther on account of the violence #lltl injustice of the act itaelf„ or- the fraud and perfidy with which it was accompanied, it is impossible to describe. The -1,.. ition mac universal ; one universal spirit broke farili, without distinction of rank or party; and, . vliat was far inure calculated to insure the ad vaustage of our assistance, was, that all the generous I . ;lllplithiew of the nation, that lose of liberty, hatred of oppression, sentiments of the hlebsings we enjoy. ed, and a forecast of the etruggleb we might have to maintain them, all comipired to excite in the breasts of Englishman', those feelings which I tract wo ne ver shall want when the.eouteat is between justice, freerioniomd public iudepeudeuce de the one side, and the highest atrocity and oppresaust on the tither. Accordingly the feelings of the country in favour of Spain, were universal, and the voice of opposition ceased. A liberal iodulgence Woe given to Ministers of what they pleased to demand. All was given they asked under that responsibility which at tached to them fur the truth of the statement they held forth to the public, and for the solidity of the grOaattli on which they acted. Maier that re sponsibility every thing was granted fur the support of that righteous cause in which the country has' so cothusunitically emisarked. The day is now come when we are hound to ask, in justice to ourselves amid the country, what fruits have been derived from those advalitugeti with which Ministers set out in the cause of Spain. It is now to be alicem that what was granted liberally has been employed wisely mid with a vagour proptirtionate to the ineguitude of the trust. We have a right to expect from Ministers this; first, to 'thew us that they had sufficient and satisfactory information to justify them in the hopes they held out to us, to aid the resistance of the. Sponiali ; secondly, that hewing that information, and being side to thew the grounds on which they acted were solid, that their measures were proper. tinned to the end, and that they acted with energy, 'firmness, promptitude, and caution ; that they have been looking to the affairs of Spain wit:. the eves of stetlismen ; it at their means were well proportioned to the attainment of the object ; sad that they acted with that happy won't' of energy .end eattcon,so indispensthly necessary to ensure bocce**. 1-eas not of those, who. however inviting the pro ' (sleet held out to us in the month of May, last year, with respect to Spain, thought that the bituatiou of His Majesty's Ministers was uut sutrounded . with difficulite*-1 could not say, at that time, that His Majesty's Ministers were placed upon a bed of roses. I think their situation was *.situa tiou of great difficulty and danger y tequiriog the utmost vigour, coercion, and wiodom, in preparing the means by which this country web to atfc-d As effectuel assibtance to Spain. I hope I than not be charged with having a disposition to undervalue the resource, of the country. Even after all our losses Swifter the looses of the last campaign, great as they *ere in treasure, in character, and honour— Even after those losses, I am persimeled, and I Use no vain boast when 1 say, that, under an ad ministration of prudence and wisdom, the country is possesses] of ample 41116411$ to bring the contest in which A is engaged to an honoursinle termination. I trost .not be thought to talk the language of despondency, when I hay, that, in order to Swinton) the ultimate contest which is to decide for over the power and independence of the country, the true poll:ey of those who govern it must be to pay a strict attention to economy, to be actuated by a determination to conceutrate your means— ant to endanger them in any specUlation in which the event is doitlitful, but purening die economical system of husbanding your resources, by which alone you will enable yourselves to continue the Contest, the cessation of which does not depeoll on you, but moon the injustice of your enemy. 1 re meroberthis policy was much derided on a former occasion ; but, notwithstanding the ridicule which was thrown on it, I think the country will one day know how to appreciate that system which Was steadily roomed mud acted upon by the last Ail- Ministration. lam not prepared to say that that policy should be extended, so far as to prevent our availing ourselves of a good opportunity of' apply ing ourresources upon occasions which bold out a reasonable prospect of success. On the contrary, I think that the adveatege of that system of policy is, that while it enable* you to maintain a protract ed contest, it also enables you to tight the last hat tie which is to decide on the fate of the country.— It is the concentretion of your means, and the provensent of your resources, by which alone you can have every thing ready to avail yourselves of such an opportunity. I will not conceal front .you •hat I am one of those who thought such. CiiM p was given to this country he the eteuts esiicto took place in Spain hot year. I census/Iy, without 'woo; to,, farmisrable an opinion sr hli porters, did Oyu them credit for their 'entities iu a situation in which it behoved thins to guard against popular delusions, as well as too excite [no polar enthusiasm. in such a situation I gas- fluent ereilit for this—that they would nut of themselves willingly do any thing to excite those p.u.sinsis Obich were necessary to be restrained, and, bast of all, to hold out hopes which were out [wallies' tos facts. And this leads UVy to the consideration of the tire* iwint ors which His ?.lajesty's Nboi.terr are boutol this day to give an account—Whether they took means to obtain information with regard t o j i ,oio, and whether the information they received was that which . joistitied the hopess they held out to the public. We cannot forget the magnificent ac equate which were el rotated at the time, of the re solurces of Spain—of' the tothusiaam soul spi- VI el the people—of the vast armies they had collected, and with which it was everted # -...•101111k I r~ t _ . 'they would drive the Freacli beyond est ta guy. I remember that it was stated, that every thing but official documents justified the statement of the amount of the Spanish armies as cofisisting of upwards of fuer hundred thousand men, esclusive of a body of reserve, con sisting of a million ; and both these exclusive of the volunteers. We heard then of nothing but tlia spi rit and enthusitunu of the Spaniards. I, have looked in vain to the documents presented by His Majes ty's Ministers—nothing of the kind. i find, on the contrary, in the letters of every officer, of the greatest character, amid whose erejit b taints highest with this House, statements of a very dab-rent de scription. 1 tied Lord William Bentimk, soon after his itrri‘ al at Madrid, sending accounts orthe state of the army highly tomfavourable ; that the greatest danger was to he aprehentlett from their inability to contend with the French, and that they were not prepared fur the reverses they had met with. After the defeat of General Blake, I find the uceounts received were still more unfavourable. If I luuk to time letters of General Broderick, I find t h ew 110 less discouregiug with respect to the people of Spain. In the letters of September 10, and November 5, you have accounts of the French array, and of the Spain's!' army opposed to them, which were calculated to encourage His Majesty's Ministers in auy thing rather than in saliguine hopes of success. In wine of the letters there are .accounts of the total want of confidence in those who ought to have setahe fire...example of heroism and devotion to their country. By the letters of General Baird and General Moore, we final that spirit which was so *imposed to he itniveriol, mid which to be successful must be persevering, had wholly subsided. Sir John Moore-states, that he heard of enthusiasm, but he had met with it no where—that the first reverses chequed it, and that he lied not been able to collect auy grounds to justify the sanguine hopes which had been formed. I have fband it my duty on borne former occasions, to stare my feelings of - disadvantage arising from the want of at politicel correspondent as well as a military one, and I have heard no satisfactory reason for withholding that information I required. If the enthusiasm of the people of Spain, excited by their hatred towards the French, was what it has been described, nothing could be to necessary as that the Government established there ihoold give a direction to that spirit. tiarely it was of importance that political nems should have been sent to that country, to co-operate aith its Go vernment ; but it has been remarked by my Noble Friend, that there seems to have been a disunints in the Government upon this occasion, and while we have ample doenoneuts laid before us by the Secretary of State, the political correspondence of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has been with held, except some documents which it was impos sible to withhold. We have Mr. Freres letter of Nov. 30, in which he complains of the want of es ertiou, and the want of the means of defeuree on the part of the people of Spain. 1 have called your Lordships' attention to this letter, borause it thews by the admission of Mr. Frere that there was a de ficiency in those means which were necessary to en able the people of Spam to deletet themselves agaiii.t the Attacks et the armies of Fraace. But I fear this passage in Mr. Frere's letter is applica ble to a mach Ist ger deseription of country, than General Moore could have passed. General Moore could have seen nothing of Spain but what was to Lassen on his march from Portugal to Salamanca. But Mr. Frere describes a much larger portion of country, and I suspect that there is an omission this letter, that it may appear 1111rf slr. Frere was writing not as to the small district between Leon and Salamanca, but of the whole Leatiese. If Mr. Frere should have expressed himself with re gard to such an extensive portion of country, stat ing, that throughout the whole of it there was a want of energy and exertion, then I ask what credit can lie given to His Majesty's Ministers, for deli berately holding out to the people of Eugland, such unigniiie hopes of ultimate success of the exertion of the people of Spain? I know not upon what au thority His Majesty's Ministers could have consi dered themselves as justified in the statements they nride at the time ; conscious as they mast have hven of the contents of the official docu ments which at: have before us. But their in formation was not confined to the statements or British officers and agents; all the infor m:aims they received was of the same description. I would refer you to the proclamations of the Go verntueuts of the two Castiles and Lent,, and the proclamations of Gen. Artuanda, after the defeat of Can. Blake, complaining of the want of every thing necessary to enable hint to resist the enemy. I would refer von also to the statement of Gen. Car tailor, who gives the same accounts after the defeat tit*Tudela, amid states the frequency of desertion in his army. How strongly is this confirimel?—We find that the whole united force of the principal armies of Spain, the army of Gen. Blake, the army in Estiousadent, sod thoarner of Anytime instead of amounting to 400,000 men, was not equal to the army with which the French began their attack in August: and (shave authority for stating it never exceeded 30,000; that the army in Estremaditra was not more than 12,000—that the army of Castanos, hick was said to moonlit to 60,000, never exeeeded cloathed, and ill pro vided with even• riersessary to enable them to keep the field—that these armies, including the army of Amigos), did not exceed forty thousand, ■nd eoinpowil of men of all descriptions, deficient of supplies, arms, aad accoutrements, anal la bouriog under all the disadvantages of new-rinsed levies. ‘Vhen we Lute these things before us, are we mint called on to exact a severe account from Ministers, and to ohlige them to shew that they had some better 111P1001 lac which they could expect to oppose a successful resi:oance to the atnliittows views of Framer, ilia% .:or of those of which we have hitherto bran,. I ktollV I -hall he told that it s+•:t+ by the.e ocw Eyries (:mart Dupont was th-featet!--that seas de•feuded—that the Freud' were repulsed from (;ollicia, ■nd Jo seph Bo n aparte driven from Madrid : that an ebullition of enthusiasts nod stiontaileous resist ance on the part of the peryle of Spain, broke out at once, is lint to be dl•iptite.l ; Lout, it I stated Jul the letters to time Secretary for the War )epartinent, that it was not a smitten thollition of rage upon the contieraance of wbirh we (emir' sot depend with certainty, but that it visa a pereevering spirited feel- .. ing of patriotism, which, is stalc,l inn letter to Lord Csistlereagli, sus nut to be intituidute d by threats or seduced by conipminise ; a spirit which was calculated to curvy tie people through a hoar and difficult contest ; certainly it was the existri•er of such * spirit that could warrant His Majest y 's ' Ministers iu risquing so large a proportion of the remaining forces f this country. But let it be con sidered what was the iitinition of Affairs at the beginning of the contest. Early in July, you have General Dupout defeated ; towards the latter end of July, Joseph Bonaparte rttired, and it um not till November fullowiiig. that the French armies re ceived sot reinforcements. At the time the French were behind the River Ebro, their force did nut amount to more than forty thionsand men. if we have these facts us existing at the tint insurrection, we have also the proof, that the whole of the period during which the French force 'vas there, there ens a fatal inaction on thepart of His Majesty's Minis ters. as well au of those who had the conduct of the offain of Sprit], which suffered the Ft each to remain there unmolested until they had received the reinforcements they expected. Now this must havetwrisen from one of two causes ; either that there was not that persevering spirit, or that these heiag the elements of that spirit, there was not a Goverinneut capable of giving a proper direction to it; and, whichever of these two views you take, in neither case is the conduct of His Majesty's • Ministers exempt from blame. Either they had information or they had not. if they lied not, they stand charged with culpable negligence ; and if they had information, and held out hopes which that information slid not justify, they stand iii a much higher degree responsible to the public for their contact. I hove already said, it was not a sudden ebullition that should have led us to de • art from those principles of economy I have so often recommended. His Majesty's Ministers should have been satisfied, not only of the existence of a proper spirit in the people. lot that there was a government in that country which had • acquired sufficient authority to give it the necessary energy. If neither of these things existed, or if the one exalted without the other, it was the very pitch of madness in His Majesty's Ministers to lavish as they have done the resources of this country. It there was a spirit in the people, though acting outlier the disadvantage of not having a proper spirit in the Government, I do not any that assist ance should have been wholly withheld ; but we certainly should not have sent ati army where we had not the necessary Illeall% to afford supplies •to that arm:, or effectual assistance to those it was intended to protect : we ought rather to have given our assistance by money, and by the welbapplied exertions of our naval force on the coast of Spain. Unless both these circumstances were united—nnless, according to the best informatiou, there were good grounds for believing there was a persevering spirit in the Spanish nation, and a spirit in the Government to give it a propel direction, the Government of this country should not have hazarded a British army. Now let us consider what His Majesty's Ministers have done. It may he said that though there was net in the first instance a central Government to direct the energies of the people of Spain ; yet, that every body must be convinced of the uecesisity of giving effect by our means to their exertions. It may be said there were proofs of the existence of a consi derable spirit of enthusiasm, and with those proofs it may be asked, would you wait till that spirit had subsided, without taking any measures for its support ? I say I would not—l would have made preparations; but before I allowed my self to send an English army into Spain, I would ' have seen that there were reasonable grounds of success.—'Then let us consider under these cir cunistatices, what we have done. Supposing the I spirit of the people to have been as we wished it ; and I confess I was among the most • Let ns consider what measures have been taken with a view to bring the powers of this country to give the must effectual aid to the cause of Spain.— In considering this subject, I shall first state the different anodes of action, and then it will not be necessary to do any thing more clean state my objections to the plan upon which His Majesty's Ministers resolved to act. I state that there were four different ways by which this country might have assisted Spain. We might have assisted Spain lay sending/in army in the North ; in Catalonia and the East. by the attack of the French army in Por tugal. and on the frontiers of Spain, or. it might have lwen done by assembling an army on the South of Spain. As to asiernbling an army on the North, it has been stated by one Minister, that it was a most chimerical project, that was not al ways his .tentitileut ; for in ono of his docu snesits, we find Gijon and St. Andern, as the beet place to net in. Undoubtedly with respect to the co-operation of an army as applicable to that point, much depended on the time, unless it acted in the month of August. it could aot act at all ; the difficulties with respect to supplying the army with provisions would have barn very great, in conse quence of its having been found necessary to supply General Blake's army. When I look to the diffi culty of finding provisions; the disadvantages of the debarkation and the insecurity of a retreat, I am net inclined to say that that would have been an athistable point. As to the East in Catalonia, I should say that the time which would elapse before you could assemble an army, would bean objection to that point; the remaining quarters to which CO army might have been directed, are Portugal u id the 'South of Spain, the preference to the one over the other depends upon the time--that which is of the'greatest value in all military operations. If yon could have been ready in August or September, it might have been edveutageous to have collected an army in the South of Spain. But, sine I um, if von could have sent an army before the end of September. there could he no question (for reasons which t will not enter at large into,) that the pre ference ought to have heir given to the Smith, and that the embarkation shouldl have been at Cadiz instead of Commis. With respect to the advan tage of the lest mode of employing a Bri , fish army. I am inclined to 'agree with His Majesty's Ministers that it was striking an import ant blow by the distraction of the French force in Portage, and by its effects in giving encourage ment to the people in Portugal. and of availing yourself f the whole population of that country in addition to that of Spins. I have therefore no dd.- .. __T ~., fealty in stating, that to commence ad attack on the army in Portugal. provided that attack had been properly conducted as a general iietiou, mud lint as a separate movement, which ended, mr all suet iiieusures tout feel, that would unquietion eddy •leive been the best mode. Let us consider how Ills Majesty's Mionters found themselves tolled 1) 1 1011 to net. I have said, that of the four plains they neglit have chosen any one ; but then it true übsiolu tely necessary that they should have had some plan. lemitpurte, in one of his plans, states. that success military oteeratious depend* oil liseetig a measles- plan : whether the plait they might ailept uou Id have beet: the beet wise yet, uhateier they clid„ cousidering the interests of Spain, and the character of the sunny against whoa they were to tee, is regular plan was merles eery !Near a single movement war merle. I leave stated that the true policy or the mune): was to huatesial its resources, and concentrate its Invites, for a favuurable opp ortutsity—Now. let os See la what eituation His Majesty's Miaistere ft11111(1 th 4•111.1 ItrlVell at the commencement of tile trauseet ions in Seeiu. One eximethtion had been writ to iweeltie under that gallant Officer, ever to be Issmented, Sir JohreMoure, with eleven thousund men. If it was not for pressing eireitmetances, 1 would stop to *peek of that expedition, in %Inch 11,4000 were sent to assist the King of Sweden, attacked from Norway, by Roselle by Frame, and liy Leis mark. To support this Mouateli, 11,ouu wee: sent, without any knowledge 0r nay point on which they were to act, or without tiny *Mug baviug here previously concerted on the subject. It is ;mew sible to advert to whet pea. happened to Ss rtlrn. without referring to a greet steal of al.st lots peso' d this Lauer. We bed undsr our considelutimi the tiu fortunate seteeb4 of t hut expientitin, in is%ltch the Mulish tieiy sis debt toyed. It trusteed t the eafey of Sweden was the object of that now pay the penalty of that expedition by the state of ruin to wheel the King of Sweden by our meet es has been melt:ed.—His Majesty's Ministers think they did their duty by sending elev.o thotieend men under an officer who does trot know ths e objeut for whiclehe is sent.—When it arrived there, it seemed to be unexpected ; the King of Sweden i. disappointed as to its employtreist, and we hare the uiifnrtuuatc , vie:tens-twice of a British officer. bring forced to emote in iiistp:iee.—Sir John Moises had hero suet iis Seedea with eleven thou nand into, from whence he re; ereed in the manlier I deeerilictl. About the mime time Genteel Wel heley was eeit to tittnek the French its ,Portrigal. You had a . rm.,: tinder Sir Julio Motet of eleven thousand nem ; an expedition of Geiteral %Veneto ley e l tee:ay-live thousand • i em and au esy.eiii lion under Genera Speurer of five thousand men. Having such a force at their disposel, the tint thing to he considered .Wes the plan of operation, on which it was to he employed---they acted on the same system Of thnughtleseuess they had dune before. With all these inealis in their hands, they embarked on a sea of difficulties with out chart or compass. Instead of comeitieieg one Commander to direct the whole expedition, they send Sir Arthur Wellesley under a roving commis sion, to act where aud bow he can. They send aii order to General Speucer to 4es-operate with hint, Sir Arthur Wellesley being instructed to (ieueral Spencer, noel at the same titers General Spencer a discretion by a hicil Ise either to co-operate with Sir Arthur We to go through the Straits of Gibraltar, where lie is to act without tether thought or plata. I centred, that when there was a general resistance on the part of the people of Spent to the pvnver of France, the first thing his Majesty's Ministers ought to have done should have been to have collected the metres adequate to the object, before they uudertnok to net at all. I have said that the proper opportunity was affisrolcd 'Portugal . but I have also said there should have been a preliminury plan. How did His ftliajeety's Minister, act.? I think alter the first at - counts in May, au expedition was sent off for the purpose of taking adventage of the disturbances in pain. Sir Arthur Wellesley left Loudon after the 14th of June, with orders for Portugal, with a tall. bability that eomething might occur to lead hint to Spain. The Nolsie Lord opposite shakes his head, and says,—No. I shall he glad to bear how Sir Arthur Wellsoley's expedition was fitted out. I know it ass sit out under the greatest dis advantages, detieient in horses and cavalry, unit those things which were moat wanted for the ser vice on which lie was employed. i have stated that there was an advanta 4 e arising from the expeditious which His Majesty's Ministers had planned not having been acted noon ; but there were also some disadvantages. General Moore's force required filar to recruit, awl Sir Arthur Wellesley's being intended fora different service, was deficient in what was most required. When it was that Minis ters first undertook to employ the army in Spain, I cannot Gee. but it was subormeasst to the !lit of June. Lord Castlereagh writes to Sir A. Welles ley that the accounts from Cadiz were bad ; but it appears that he had an expedition in view. fur on that day CoL Blown is ordered to collect information with respect to the country. On the 30th of June they seed their final instructions, and there are twit separate itistitietions of the same date. In the first, he is directed to proceed to the coast of Spline to collect information with regard to any point on which it may be possible to art_,- and by-another letter, of the nine date, a second positive instruce tion is sent (leering him to proceed off the Tops. In the interval between the fine and second letter, it appears that the intelligence came from Sir Charley Cotton, representing the French force at 4,000 men : without wetting to hear from Col. Brown, but acting open the intelligence of a Naval Officer certainly entitled to every uttention, for his gallant services, though, perhaps, not the fittest per son to be relied 011111 this instance, His Majtstt a Mististers changed their object, and directed Sir Arthur Wellesley to pmeeed immediately. without loss of time, to the Tastus. Hewes hardly clear of the Channel, before Ministers received from Gen. Spencer more accurate lICCOMOttie Gen. Spencer stated it to be 20,000 men ;--then all was alarm and confusion, end Ministers coutemplated 'endue; out an expedition upon a more extensive scale, aud they then thought flint ge,ooo men were hardly sufficient. Whet' the fusee was ,sueinented by so largc& a number, it appeared to His Masjesty's Mieitters to he too large to lie entrusted to the coin:. nosed of Sir Arthur Wellesley. It is seppe.ed Ur