The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1810-02-20 00:00:00

r Ihst we ltad takes ail the ocaoset ovetasen to goes , sad likseefeen 1 meet des letter, 11, eestantly, when 1 wrote OM leder, did set think it 'veld be published, bat 1 was wag le **drift as; had thenghl it would ban been yeiliNeked, 1 almaid have been muse einetemse in wording it, that it might not easy, a refection upon Lord Cb s tes i n or the army. %ellen I sew the letter afteresi ds in die paper, it shark me very fenefhly that at mould be the means of soak. tags breach between the two servers, and then of carer I expressed bur very worry 1 was tittle Jsad worded the letter la that stiooltz i at theses. time 1 observed teamed Chat • lima. sad Mcleod to away officers of the Misty, that 1 must boot errata • similar letter, fee it was only a stetemesit of facts ; bet I might have put it together is such a manner as net to be offensive, kw in the way it was woidest it appeared tit* cultism a reflection upon Laid Chatham sod the principal Officers of the army, and 1 am very glad to have this upper. lenity oft spl. ' • g myself, Itercuse l Oid not man to cut asiv riffect ma opus Lord Chath.sen, or the ',Terme officers *filo. ansiy, or any of the movements of the many, for I am tot a .ocige of military tillattere. At the same time I could .eat help regretting, and 1 do, at this moment, regret wont 'piseecely, that, having been hi ought up, as we were, to the poke of attack open the enemy, and having worked our maple up to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, we should have *era wader tbe uneasily of in fillet. From what has Imp rinted since, is eousequeuce of He sicksessof i he twiny, I sin ensiviaced that it ma the Wisest masere that the Cum masider-imCbtel of the army could pursue ; for I doubt ern y mach whether his Lordship would have been able to accom plish the fall of Antwerp, cominlerleg the seasuil uf the year, the very sickly state of the troops, and the increasing force if the enemy ; but as we did not see much force, I thought, wad I still do think, that we ought to have attacked Lille sod Lielltenehoeik, which might have opened a field to some **termite or other, sod might hare been the means of our even getting hold of the eilem., - 's fleet : and it was with this imp-ration that 1 mute my letter. Did yea ever calash with the Commander.in-Chiefuf the army &Wet attacking Forts Lillo aid Llefketistmeik,and poierforeard 1-oii the ba th of August, Sir Hear Prifibaxt and gamed went to headquarters to dine with Lord Chat ham, sad at that time his Lordship did nut speak at all as IF he had tkpahos ahem, going as ; at the same time, his Lordship inentioried, that the enemy were ineseasing in Aare. Sir HAM: Popham spoke a good deal in favour of the Ideteli fur landing the army on, and this was the (racial eon dination that ',abed at that time; however, Lis Lordship pro. posed coining to Claim on the following day, which was the filth, and there„ in atieVerseliein %Ili, me, he first strut...olC. trialr, adelltiefalag the toreros. d force of the euriny, the ad. vowed stases., (mid Waked eertaiuly very bad weather) and the sickly state of the troops; the arum was just theu begin. De l t o be sickly, sad he seemed to lout to me, that he wish ed some letter from are epos, the abject. Accordingly, Oa the unit day, I wrote to kis Lordeldp; and that letter se- Mt paint Woe to the Admiralty of Ilir gyth of duvet, and ;vs=the Committee ; it that letter it will appear, that I an attack upon I Mowed Lielleashoeik, with avtew ifflgelliat • field to (metier enterprise; file Wad the old) melleareetion or, eirvespontleure I hail with hie Lordship Alp o% etaat subject; I think that kiln ore dated the utith of Au. glist Did you mot write a lett . w to Lord Chatham on the o7th of August , --t do Oust regolleet wheat. r I 411 d of met; but if the subject of the letter is stated, it nay bring it to my re entlealim. Incase the preprisition of *Peeking Fort Lille lied been meteesidel, do Ton think the fleet might here gone op so se to have attacked Antwerp, Of ol what way, to have takes erierssiou of the French fleet'—lf Lille end Lief kenshiwik Ise ler, n takers, the fleet "meld certainly have gnat up, : , iat lit the filmes and flotilla would, and preltably awn , U. ti: ships of the Nee, and it would have rentatasti to he rinkover. ed whether the works at Antwerp would revolt ose posing Antwerp tbeltiCk the French Seat. 1 tUlik, la the hest of tit reeolloothst, bii title time. tie Tema Sol um brought Awn hiller Itatiserp i live sail af the Me had boa up Mime if. When we ens shed on the propriety of attacks's/ Lille •;o1 1 ler lieeelmeik, Sir Richard Keats was in company with INA, d 1.4 meet sil stir l.li a1...del .C..-lir. Als of the army, 'es ept teed Paget and Lord Huntley; I then stated that 1 thought LIP° might he attacked with a large proportion of the as ou r , I ow that • frog propurtiou of it mitt be landed ow the Deer side to attack Lief loreshoeik, and that I thought it ne arest" that the unay *Mudd ~crop, the dykes oil both sides of the river. We lad a greet sisal tat conversation upon this ashler t, and it was the opinion of the Offcers of the army theta patent. that we should have little prospect of succeed ing In the ulterior objects of the Expeelitiou, ewes if we so, Cadet' km taking Lillo and Liefkenshoeik, and that, earn dering the state of thin g s, it would lie iojudicioas to male the attempt ; but I had no dem:* of our having it iu um peen to puss the frigates sad several ships of the line, in. &nine should hart attempted to do it, up tiorards Autwerp, if tills aid Liell.euebank hail beau taken. Tea think there wee 110 impediment by the boom or chain that wee said to have hen laid area 1--Yes ; the boom and Aunt woe en impediment, 'bet it eight have been 'breed. 'ln the interview you had with Lott Halgrave, en the loth el Jane, was soy chart rahibited 11l you, skewing the diup sad the different courses of the navigation of the '.--Yes, a very good chart, the last Freak safety , lets we mime found to be very eetreet. ila sm As tattooed short'—Yes. Was that chart, or a copy of it, delivered to you before yea sidled ?—...t0 many of thus, elicits as could be col. legged, were divided awes the differeut slops of war of the lett- Did you Sod that the soundings in your progress np the Sc' eleit se far as Rath:, answered completely to those charts! -••• Neatly so, stMwieg for the diderent time. of tide. As welter the Easters Scheldt as the 11'estera Scheldt —Tbu obagt we. • chart of the West Scheldt only. ' Wee there any chart or any drawing of the toweling* and count a th e Ea s t bAkekti!....We had a chart of the Last liebelelt, hut out as. correct as that of the Went Scheldt, and tler sonesliege very immaret, bat It was lie brit chart that ' *meld be procured , indeed, every paper that could he col lated to give es isforansinns ate sect to al by the Admiral ii.. amid the. gigaton plum too alum to proems pilots for "tee Eepcdition.. Its say adios. chart; Wes the ford is the Berrgeemp.vioni parisep described '—No ; it was sot. Is your interview with Lord Mulgmee, were yni made ve gitaisted esti, the farts of tlicre bring a (rod there '--We had say ateareatios tespectiog it, and 1 doubt if it was greasily egLisestosil that these was a road there. Were you avvate,orseib a cutelaillASOCll before you sailed ! roe, I was set. Did Lord Clinlma• seed sou anY auswer to the letter vow tame to his Lordship not the obth of August ?—I did receive se anima (tom 1 ind Chath•ra , I think it was dated the trill ; 0 is in the paper teeter the conoirotss At the time you thoutlit the attack on eillo and Lief. Iteashoeik prettitable n waa the lived tatostrable ! . —Nu, it was Set. Within that space of time, entrain' from the day yogi ailed froui the vses do you think that iin,ono men resold have bees leaded at isietvliet, reckoning for all circuits. mantes of wend, weather, shoals, soil uppoedissue from the enemy '—With tits Mod and •eatlies we had, and the imp,. shwase that we met with, I doubt if it would hare twee peasible to have made a proper lauding on Semi het till the luth or i ilk of August, if so neon as that, became, ee found • great difficulty in getting the traiumurts shirk had the /witty adosoce of the army, sad preirisioiss, • and other mores, through the Slough P i seage late the lgat acheidt„ main to their !seism obliged to pots through • Peak-way ea the Calvet...Led, which wee soder the Ira of Flanking ; it was sit till aftei the fail of liable( that eat here! mei nonce and ill the cavalry gel 111..encll, amt, 'twee-fore, if the army did land at Sate tort, which it might ordeal, has dune Won, it must have lode 1.11400 the how) artillery, and many ewes necessary to a eters I beg km* to correct myself is my answer, that 1 de out mean to ay we had enosue Ws to WWI. because a greet purl of the army was fuart•••4l is lover.luoc Flußholg. ; Menton' thew* was ant that somber of toes to he landed, as well as I ear real. int. -- ; 4 oprogiot it hod bran the primary object. a wlinE Er"' the Loa,., to laud uu,0.0.11.14.1t S 111•11114.1 01,11 tint 0001411 US., lota • the citeurusioort. Stated in the tart floret., ••—I Non it very difficult in ah twer the frg stw“; I 14.011, I•ovr I cam du it Pliliefee• tort!) either to letywif m th , Committer It certainty Inge intended b> ficintrusai.ai, a. out be seem by my imetauctiniso, that a \ll rt of the farce @lmola ;melt Flushing, end that the other pert should go ep the Scheldt and land a Sautv:let, to accomplish the ulterior object of Use Expedition, to alr tack Antwerp sod destroy the french fleet , but, as I hare before stated, this force was diverted into smother channel, owing to strew of weather, and in consommes of tlpe whole armament going into !be Roompol, that part of the army which was intruded to be lamb d at Sautvliet was landed upon South Beeeland, and I do out think I ant competent to RIISWer what were the reasons of the General for last order ing; to advance: I conceive, bower, that his Lordship waited till them was a sufficient ismst force in the West Scheldt, before he exposed the army by advancing too far into the country, soil probably tic might lie infincncid by the pre. vailivg reports of an armistice between France sad Austin', it will, therefore, be very difficult for me to answer the imes tiott satisfactorily to the Committee soy further than as I have does. Was it a rut of the original plan that lo,noo nen should go to Sant,lief, without taking possessiou of South Lim ited •••—:So ; it was always iotcnded to take possession of South Iterelan.l—indeed it was nteessary to take possession of South Develana, to destroy the batteries that cemniauded the \Vast fcbcldt i the enemy had bettevies upon every point guiug up that river, and the fort of Bulls: was a very ronsiderable work of its kind, and if the sunny had thought proper to hold out, it would have taken us up aortae time before it could hare been carried. What number of the twenty thousand men, of which yon have spoken, do yon think would have been occupied in the taking and keeping possession of South Beveland ":—Boath &relied wan taken by the division under General Hope, I think about seven thousand ince, sad I believe, but I cannot speak positively, that it was the inteetion of Lord Chatham to leave u,eno men on South Bereland. Then t►e Committee is to understand that of the 20,004 men before referred to, e,OOO would have been diverted from that number to keep possession of *oath Beveland be lieve it wan so intended, hut I cannot speak positively, as I never conversed with Lord Chatham epos these subjects. le the plan of the Expedition communicated to you, what was the arrangement made try,whiefi the navy were to coope-• rate is the attack open Aotwerp ?—Thrre was no arrange ment, It was left fur the Cominander in Chu( i and 1, for my part, did sot thiuk it necessary to propose one until the field was open to us, as no correct arrangement could be made till we came upon the spot, and into action i what 1 mean by action, is making • movement. At what time did you think it was fit to make au arringe amid for • joie: attack open Antwerp!—Whenever it was decided upon to lead the army at faatcliet, and foe the navy to move to the attack of Liilo +ad Liefkeushoeik, the sr r%.• . r... r •,ild then have beta made fur the conjunct at. A.ltiverp. W... such arrangement for an attack on Antwerp • i• the conversations situ Lord Chatham on the gall' cif August, to which you have before alluded W.,. ally eueh arrangement sat gested on the mith of An gust by you to Lurd Chatham --No, there um not. Was any bitch arrangement suggested ►y you to Lord Chat ham) nu the e7th of August ?—No, heesu4e I did not consi der at necessary, nor could any arrangement be made WI af ter LiUo sod Lierkenshoeik were taken. Is the Committee to understand, that the arrangements for t►e joint operatives of the army and navy, in the attack on Antwerp, were not to be made till t►e army and navy were dope upon Awhile," ?--Certamly nest; because alien it wig decided to lead t►e army at Sentvliet, and to attack the forts of Liao and Lief kenshorik, the arrangement IlVald t►ee ►ave been made between t►e General and myself for t►e joint attack Go Antwerp, for it was nut certain wbethvr we s►ouid get to Antwerp or not; and ea I knew nolltiag of the de fences of Antwerp, an srraagement could nut have been made till we had opened the way by taking Ulu and Liefken shoetk. When you proposed to Lord Chatham atticking Lillo and Liakenshotik, did you commuuicate to him what your fur sher plans would have bees, as to arrangements axiom Ant werp, lit t►e event of Lino and Liefkenshueik twin taken ! •_The conversation I had with Lord Chatham, anti the Gr. neva tankers then present, went to the attacking of l.illo and Idighenalsoeik, with a view of opening a held to further enterprise, end oMalsisg more local knowledge than he pos sessed without ors. -using 'sure local knowledge than he did, it would uut suave been possible to make any permanent areasioneut for the conjuset attack upon Antwerp: l did propose, wl.en Lillie and Lief kenshoeik were taken, to have pushed the fl t;ates sad flotilla up the Scheldt, toward. A ut weep and oar further operations and success would have depended upon circumstesces. Did you consuluoicate t►at it was your intention to push fiiromil the frigates and flotilla to Antwerp, to Lord Chat ham, on the 4;t11 of August?-1 do sat know whether notintimed frigates exactly, hut I spoke of the skips of war, aid petaled out the necessity of the army oecupyiug both basks ef the river. In what manse, did you promme to Lord Chatham to at tack Fort Llllo—With regard to the meaner of attacking Wort lino on the land aide, I geoid make so prop...taloa to his Lordship with propriety, an it was • military operation ; but I did say, that the ships of war would attack the fort at the same tune that the army did. Did you form any idea what law* of time it might take to get possession of fuel Lille could funs so judgment. IV hat plan did you propose foe the attacking of Little*. short!. ?—..t similar one to that .f attacking Lillo; we in leaded to have lightened two ships of the hoe ' and placed one against each of these fog ts, and, with 3 third and fourth ship, to hive attempted to force the boom, but It would have bees necessary to have a favourable ivied fur this purpose, and the rivse is very winding about that part; bet I did sot eider into this detail before Lord Chatham, it was only a swatter of COUVeI salons with the sea officers: I barely men liaised to his Lordship that if the army attacked the forts, be should have every naval assistance it was in my power to offer. lo the event of the ships not breaking the boom, was not that boom so Constructed as to heme the ship stnntetbal..ly wader the battery of Lieftettshoeik '-11 think it was, rod 1 think the netlevialtieg would have been very hazardous. Does Fort Ulla COlLMlallti Fort Lieflienshuelk !—Ft um the view ! have of tbe,n I cannot pusittiely say whether it does or wet,lmet at appears to me to stand rattier btgher. . . De you know wlortlier Fort LOW not kuuw. Are there not dikes is the beaks of the Scheldt, on which Pee might bare been placed to wintry or obstruct the pas sage of vessels ■p the Scheldt '—Yes; .ud it was fur that reuse that I risked tbe at my le axe," both batiks alba Scheldt. Do Tow keno say thing of the works at the Tete de flow• Ore.*. the left bask oldie Scheldt, opposite to Aotwery ! I do Sot. If with the English beet you bad attempted to paw op the Scheldt, might aid the Emrich fleet ►ave been canoed above Antwerp'—Yes, I think they would ►ave carried their ships above Antwerp. la the event of the French de►t being carried above An twerp, do you think that wit► the English fleet yon could have ventured to pass halve,. the citadel at Antwerp and the works on the Tete de Elamite* '—l doubt whether we should have done it wr not; bnt 1 canoe say whet I would ►ave done, till louse mai acidly titer to me whether it was practicable. What is the width of the Scheldt at Antwerp inward sey ; 1 never was there. la the ignorance of the width of the Aclielrit,and wit► the aweertabity whether it would hate hews safe to pass between thecitadel of Antwerp and the 'Fete de Flaorire, would you, if Liefteashoe ik and Lillo had trees taken, hare still ventured up tl.. Scheldt with the English fleet shalt have gone os far up the Nelbekk as the army could hare rune to co-ope rate with at, and I should Lire take. no more ships with OW the. was areemary ; and a I d ti ore,. d that it WWI cot prortiodde wit► any provict of success to yss Antwerp and the Teta de Flandre, 141101211 h.., ret.srn..ti luck sgAin. Wham you talk of the liebl fat ful ibes enterprise that would have been up►ued by taking Lain and licflienehoeik, had you nay other of is view, than Ali attack un the slops at Astwerp .—The capture Or dr structton of the enemies &tills, and the ships that were below Ant.. ip, sail to doh. &SIT whether thus was a probability ut success in going bather ow. Ca* you form any jaihrnient of the peol&fle loss of the army I. its attack two the two forts ot L i n o And , Awaits %bask bah the army and navy mad have lust many men, as Lail seivices would Usee been eery mach . . exposed. Supposing the army to have suffered very wucb, which you think probetle, in its mania upon those two forts ' would it have bee. to a cnadition to bare IN -died Moog iither bank of the Scheldt if the enemy bad • considerable force in Ant- werp to oppisie them think it would nut have" been pro dent to hove advanced if runny toms were lost, and the enemy were iu great force; but it is impossible to say whether many rams would have hems lost or not, and it would have depended a good deal upon the Gemini whether be thought be should bejustified in running the end( of edemas-leg snug the dykes. Have you not stated, that it was probable many men would be lout in the military and naval service, as they would be exposed to the fire from the enemy's feet !—Yes, I have al ready said so. Year opinion was. that it was necessary the !British army should occupy each bank of the Scheldt, and march along each bank of the Scheldt as the British fleet advanced to at tack Autnerp; was I right is so understanding you !--Yes; that was what I proposed in the course of our conversation ; but it was more conversation with the Generals, than any re gular proposition. I am uot (mite positive that I beee been peifectly Correct in every statement I hove lacule, beeline I did not come prepared to answer many questions that More lama put to me; therefor*, I hope I stout be indulged, if I discover that I have been tasking misstatements, to correct them, both with regard to dates and other matters.. You have stated that you would hare approached Ant werp with the ships, and that, if you had found it necessary, you would have alibi/taco them again; whet is your opinion as to the manner in which the Army, which was to have ac companied the fleet or both aides of the Scheldt, could nave made its retreat, if the enemy had had a superior force at Antwerp'—lt was upon the supposition that the enemy was iu considerlde force, that I thonght the army should not eon haiiass itself by going too far inland; and that in case it was likely to be assaildcd by a superior force, they could always retreat from the dyke into the vessels that would ac company them up the river, and the army could be famished with ammunition and provisions from the vessels going up the river ; if the (k•neral thought it necessary to retreat, I Amid, of course have gives him all the assistance that was necessary, and fallen back with the army. la the event of farts Liefkenshoick and Lillo being taken, you have stated that it wan accessary (or the army to take possession of both side: of the river before the *et could ad , Vance to Antwerp; when you gave that opinion, we r e 3 . 011 aware that the part of the army oa the left balk would he reposed to the %hole force the cutesy could collect in French Flanders'—Yea, I was and I conelue, t►at that was one of the reasons that Lord Chatham did nut agree to second my proposition. We you aware that the country between Antwerp and Lillo could be inundated, and that the march of the army would have been eunfineil to the dyke nod the hank aline river N..-• Yes ; I think the country was inundated in part, sad there fore I thought the army could only co operate with the navy by occupying the banks of the river. Supposing it h.ol been practicable to land the army at Saiitvbet at an early peri l aftur the wail in, attic Expedi tion, with its st..t,s, artillery, and equipments, would it have been urLessary, in order to attack Antwerp, to have taken Lillo and l.ierkenslineik at all !—I believe, when the Coveranseut first thought of the Expedition to Antwerp, it was lot moderator:l that Lille and 1-irfkenalsoeik were is the state thej really are in, and theretl-re I imagine it was intended that the army, upon being landed at Sauteing, should push to Antwerp as rapidly as possible; but by such a movement, and l.itlo and Lirfkenahoeik not being taken, the army would have been separated from the navy all the distance from Santvliet to Antwerp ; and, cunsideriug, as I then did, and do now, that it was in the power of the enemy to collect a very considerable force, I do not think it would have been a wise season, and without the cmoperalkia of the navy, I doubt whether the army would have succeeded is taking or destroying the enemy** ships of war and there fore I considered the taking of 'Lillis and I.iefkenshoeik as indispensable. . _ Yo r u have spoken of taking or destroying the enemy's ships of war; supposiog the enemy's ships of war to have gone up above Antwerp, would it sot have beets a great object to destroy the cluck-yard and the ships that were huddle.% at Antwerp ?—Ycs, certainly; it was part of our instrartioris to do so 1 • and we should have attempted to do it, if it..bad appeared practicable when we came **the place. if the army hail boss able to take the town of Astwelp at so early period, do you know of ;lay memo why the dock yard and ships huddles there, might nut have been destroyed without the assistance of the navy !—No, certainly ; if the army had take. Autwerp, the doc k-yord and shipping might have been destroyed without the smaistarice of the navy. Supposing the army to have taken pomesaion of Cadsand, in your upiniou, cook' the batteries of the islaud of Walehe. ren hare opposed Kay obstacles to vessels passing up or down the Scheldt !—No, they could sot. From the brad of the river and the diagonal position of the boom, are von of °pietism, that, with a leading wind, it is probable your ships would have had headway sufficient to have broken the boom'—We had always doubts whether we should succeed in it or not. When.you stated, that yen thought. in case of the snug having possessive of Antoci-li, the stocks and arsenals might have bees destroyed, did you mean the possession of the Citadel of Antwerp ?-1 conceived that tke army conk! not possess Antwerp without having possession of this citadel : I believe tits cdadvl commands the duck-yard. . . Theo you think, tbat tbr dockyard and arsenal would sot have berwilestroyed, if the citadel brit remained in poa semiou of the rummy am glut suracieutly acquainted pith Antwerp to etre au opinion no this subject. _ . 1/0 )110101 cowii.l.r tie weather to have b-en ettremely tafaveaftble, pe, teularly to the ulterior übjrrtr of the Lt. i thou how the time of your arrival oB IVolcLern !—.. I certainly au. it s not more unfavourable than at that ',aeon o f th e year might have been reusonaldy exported ;—Most err. laiuly; and /ruin the bail weather we i rl4 re, i 1 in the be ginning of the Expedition, the delay in procivding np time be heldt arose. Uoid it not been Our the unfairournlde *tate of the windier, are eon not of opinion that the operation upon Cadeaud would have succeeded think it would. Flail the operation upon Cu laand succeeded, would not the passage np t►e Scheldt, coupled with the occupation of Ssoth Beveland, have been open for the men of war and the transports as fares Santeliet , —Yes, it would. Whet lefts& of time would it have taken to hewn carried up the Fleet to Sassirliet, suppusiup Cadsand to bast hees taken, and the wood reasonably fair ?—lf Cadmod had bees token, end that divisiou of the fleet which was intended to have guise up the Scheldt, had not tome onto the Romonot, It might rely shortly have got up to fiantvliet : I think in four days the whole armaii.ent might hairs ham up, allowing tbre wind and weather to he favourable. I t►ink you ►are already said, that t►e part of the arma ment, e Welt wee destioed to pu up the West Scheldt, going into the Hissenpet, was owing tu the badness of the weather ? n-1 hew ssW N. Had pun any Information of the numbe► of the twiny 's loom at Cadessid, at the time it wan proposed to lead there ? —Not wheel Expsditiva was formed, Codsisad was not • part of it ; bet afterward, it was agreed, it was neeeseory to tabs Ciadinod, fur the propose of passing up the Scheldt wit► mom facility, sod not to wait for the capture of Flushing; at first, • regiment was thought sufficient, after that, a brigade waft mentioned, and, at last, it came to a dieisioa of the army then our squadron was increased is primertiou ; 1 do Out believe that the Government thonght dm seem, could semi soy considerable force to Cadsaad 1 did net think so myself; and I thought that the force that was orderer, foe Calmed, both ou the part of the army and navy, fully atielciest fee the purpose; just be low t►e Expedition mailed, it struck me that there might be a want of boats, snit them I ordered the division of Lord Gardner to place itself in media,. 111 n•ut with ►is hosts to insure the leading, and 1 rousiikned nt that time, and 1 wow do consider, that I made t►e mint ample provision for that service, for I could not ronceive, with the intelimetire that we had, that the ein my could collect such a fnni e as In resat that which we sent against Cashiaad, and thrrefire was much surprised when we mired in the !stone Deep, to bear hum Commodore (►wen, that the enemy were in come de. able tune, and aa the weather was so very bail that we were obliecil to go into the liwompot, from the appoliimsion , that many of our transports would drive us 'burr, :oil that I great port of our flotilla, if mot the whuk, might brannk ; after consulting will Lord Chattato. It en agreed to d• Consioodure Oren to aospeed his lauding ; tt,77„; there were v er y f ew d a y s , if t h ose orders bad sot he,s that the Coutmodore could have landed the troops. ( 4 ; troops, ./tati oot tool those orders, and bad suc cee d e d in land:4oops, and destroying the batteries upon Carlsand, 114 still hare found a difficulty in getting the trami swt , the East Scheldt into the West Scheldt, oil account of t d wind blowing in, and generally blowing very first'. he What were the reasons which induced Government mow the force destined fir Cailsand, first from a r econ.ct t s brigade, nut then from a brigade to a tilvnit , et ot ?—lt sa ayt the Government, it was the nof Lord thathmu &ad self; oleo I say Lord Chtitham and myself, m om , elude the Officers we trusted to. Was that alteration made iu cunsequence of inhlig ss , tidditional force having arrived, or heiag about to emit. s Clutonnd ; it WAS iu consequence of our thinkin g lal sand of greater importance than it was at first though t . g was ant intended, a ft er the batteries were destrag in t, the army should Female on Cadsaud, and they were torahs* again directly, under certain circumstances of regui ntio.. What induced Lord Chatham sod yourself to think th a t k larger force ads necessary to take poseemion of cams 4 than you had originally considered iwersaary for thai Mee !—lteeanse we thought that if the enemy hid Cin t i, entice of the Expedition, he might scud a force into Cadies.4 with a view of succouring Flushing, and we did am lac o eielkiect the force we sent against it to a repulse , we ass to insure the execution of the service. Supposing the fleet to have passed tip the Scheldt, tar n , case of failure to have been forced to return, could it Mut done so without a shift of wind f--No, it cuel4l mat, it sot hare tided it down. IVoolrl it have been possible to have moved the leafy ordsanee and cavalry transports, that were an the aan, o , Passage, and which were destined to set gallon di•te nls into the West Scheldt, at any time before the serr.s.hr of Flushing took place ?—We wore endeavuuriag to de 1 front the time t►at we first lased in Waleberen. I nn channel was so narrow, and the wiled blowing duetily into it, prevented any member of vowels being got thro st y, and it was out till after the fall of Fleshing the whole through all that was possible to be dose in this way !Ulm was dune. Had you not reason to expect stroag westerly •itels at the time of year yuu went on the enemy's coast !—Ytv, aid a was fur that reason that we thought of the Roeurpst, s a g made our amusement to go in there in case it Wee kart whew we cause spun the coast ; this was decided apes a ilsy or two before we left Veal, and we had sure caaverasha with Lard Castkreals upon this subject. Thew it most have struck you, as being extremely he whoa to have reasaiuth with list elect of traasports sad flotilla in such a sitatiou as to have left the I,Vei.; &Asia open to yew, whilst the army obtained sufficient pi.newies of its banks to enable you to run up ?wit did st,ils rue ilist the Meet, and particularly tire smaller vessels, would he et . posed to great hazard at author at the smooth of the Sri, Isl, if it came ins to blow hard ; anti this consideration, si I hr.s said before, 'tutored us to go into the Roompot arni i lieve our going into the Ruomput at that time was IseLe approved of by Lord Chatha m , a ll th e naval officer., 5 , ..4 must of the gears of the army. Vise witness was directed to withdrss [To be mellowed ] IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT. ROUSE OF LORDS, MONDAY, Fin. 19. . V. 116•ZLET iiiiii WIIC. Mr. Feweblasignie sod Mr. Mare were beard et considers% length ter the Responetcnts. Further procecitings is. 'Roans►. Leave was gives Is the Illommis of Ifitotiey to Mead the Conswintee of the House of Corisioas ' employed is she la. quiry into um W auseememt of the Expeditiou to Moira, Mr. Titanic', and several Members hem she MAW COIIIIOIIIIII, brought up a MIMPPer., requesting leave for ti Earl of Chatham to attend time t maim &primed to I, spawn into the F:spedime to the Scheldt. Upon the motion of Lord IVA the 31oretezev wore called in, and iiillsnmed, that this Haw mond teessa as sassier by 31(2.eugess of their eon. WELLESLEY'a oiruser. Upon the motion of t►e Vske of N w , this Bill vas read She third time, sod yss.rd, PUR FUGAL. The Earl of Li TTTTT at. preeeeted a Copy of t►e Ir. raageutsuto entered MOP between His Majesty sad the Prime Regent of l'ortugal.--Ortimed to be laid en the table. The Earl at Lt vantwoot. said, ►e rose, is cesieremenee the indieposittua of his Noble Frieud (Marquis %Whitey) sod the luctomeaieeee which would result to many haste LurJa, to move, « That the Order for takieg HIS Mejevo's Message into comaidevatiuse, this day, be doeharwed eel that the rime be lard fir Thursday next., sad that the Lords be summoned amerdincly."—Ovdered. SCOTCH JL LOCATORS. Lord Gaze vim., was desirous of calling the at !cation of that House to on. of the innumerable instances of disrespectful conduct towards their Lordships. It wont(' be recollected. that remit Reports were to be rinds by the Commission, appointed to investigate the.Jurispradeace of Sec taint. It appeared, that these deports bad length been returned. and subsequently laid before the House of Commove, and bad afterwards bees printed ; while no such Reports bad been prodeced before that House, which was equally concerned hating every information on tkis impottaat ject. Bow His Majesty's Ministen came to art towards that House with such want of reepeet, l could not imagine ; but he thought it his duty assure their Lordships, if UMW esplanation wt not given, he would make a motion very early the subject. The Earl of Lnaawoot, said, he wis sorry it 111 so happened, that, by some inadvertence, these It ports had not been laid before this House, at ti same time with the other, but be had to assure thel Lordships they should be produced the first uppo , Unity. APPIALS. The Earl of LAVDEROAII concurred in the pr priety of those observations which fell from his N , ble Friend (Grenville,) and he had now to mo' for information relative to one of the but effet growing out of the syetibm of Jodicutere Scotland. It woo notorious that the number appeals before the House, ut this moment, were many, that it was not possible they,null he le ceeded ttitotwh for scv,:ral years. 1 here were great many relative to leatieholds, concerning Chi it was certain that the leases would be out lief' the lipped' could be determined ; and agent, were others, respecting legitimacy, wl ich could be decided for seven or eight years to come, "lrl whole families would remain in suspense all II time, before they could ascertain wlotteor cert, persons were the legitimate .iff.prilig of w ares, He should therefore move `•T hut there be had , fore that House au account of the tottinbes of peals brought there for the last ten 'ears, from let of February, 1800, to the lit of Fibrin , 1810." Agreed tee C4VP,tIG7t. The Marquis of LasisnowN observed. the I would tefollret he had en a lorrsker orregi' .l notice, that he should move for t e , t .% leave to the general conduct poi of Ills Msje;iy's Ministers in . !- 4 He heel expected Chet it %geoid i•• • to hive ptfactii his mction 11.`u"c 111104 a hiCh IN under •1, IL; prod? 11 4 ohipe ;,,,,44 there q ',inlet o i , cord u 1 4 4' b i le 11: I • a r i: l a n e i the llbrl4 etee( Aft If k who w 1 4Y babl~ oL. do a Th arm t rum it ma . and h I ;. * ur ia toorr .41 them rorwal Not uu 3- 11,r, eta Ismt Th what l'ity e‘Pel ' 4,, :k Ti feel s r.,1.6e {LIP de t fore II Iti fl out ma y oa t h, pose at pt Pori TI at the afoul sell 4 sobje t, aid Pelt, r a wl a ik i be an stun It Seas h 6 01 111 Iliad i•glw clolOo 11- ~.i.„, ',A., same he ea. 11 •i•iu, Dulu 11.11. i 11106 1 1.. 611, , v form a, .4 Mild It ) I is I prom Th proe a no per sett los% re to. N, NI rho 101 l he Is. Toth .tokft. Mr vitt, meat lc the Cat'' to la. •ip“ T) dad 1tz....-• 14.1141 Loud You ill au 11 bid 1 Mert le Ar• Iv Prato &at we k‘ t 1111+)d000d ik ow AI is ad 1001.4 Ar I: ood Mt at the raft don. assl he at- A arable Th their be b arum Sit io Cam rs,rs SCA. Ire . SL4I ad at Th before pint beets rl. F., dodead if tom Dad Mt it sab. N to act ant Mt. he 4,, i aty tv hdd a were to n ill et ant elle it had f,.,,. to Its- cow. it the hid e than id, vivo. am Got era: Pr e ' est is No- at e more el * , MP, vs jaka ore 1 0 lass iter of tar sae so 11. PM' C' "'re a J s , which t .,: I.eforc throe . t 1 ., dd not 1..., vs that o . - I thot to v eils it I moo• re, orl bi- PI A aft' Is, un the p. Iwo ' ho 1 1 I: • ril 's . . . It c, A LI4I ''.. I t. : ..• , a fik