The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

/ B r it a i n . Beim", however, he went from the 1 monstrous birth, to the horrible catastrophe, be willed to *Mice the evidence given by Sir Davol Humbs. en a point not strictly connect ed with toe other matte's he would have to ley in order before them. ltappeared from his teati 'pony, that, oa , the Jalh of lerch, he woe consult ed. i u the Cabinet,4o tt a plan, totally distinct from the Expedoson then uuder consideration." This was not distinct io its object, whatever it might here been its its plan, of which they had no infor motion ; and the opinions delivered thereon ought to have caused Ministers to pease before they cuter ed on an enterprise so extrusive and so dangerous, as that they had attempted. This original plan was to have been carried into effect with 15,000 men. Had it succeeded, then, indeed, there would have been enure for triumph, bat it was not attempted, and the reason was, that, two months alter the retaru of rrer army front Spain. welted not in this country a itisaosalile form of 15,000 tarn. On the mine 'object, and to the same effect, was the evidesice of General Calvert. who said. that, (ruin the return of the army of Corunna, . 4 a very small portion of it was fit fete service." Let the blouse compare these facts, (which, but for this inquiry, they would eleven Wore been acquainted with) with the state ments made to them, and the returns laid before them Low Session, add they a ould sec that tin y were only made to delude them and the country.— They would see that it was not exaggerated when It was stated. that the army sent to Spain *was - ed ; for. notwithstanding all the endeavours of :di nisteis to conceal the truth, it was now evideut. that though 23,000 men left Commie iu January, in Match there were not in the kingdom 13,000 tit for foreign service. Having thus noticed this pre hasinary muter, he would proceed to what might be considered as the first overt act connected with the Expedition nutter their cousidersition. This was a letter from Lord Castlereagh to Sir Datid Dust des, to consult hint, as a professional man. on the soli:et of the Expedition. He aparoved of this con sulting with men of profession il kisowledge,but when hr trod the opidoms of there professional men, and looked et the use made of them by blicisters, his sarpririe was unl•ounded, that they shduld ever here thought it necessary to consult at all, rod then act in such direct - Opposition to the *deice given. lii this letter, I.orrt Cutlers agh mentioned, list the plan was an old our, nia . ured by )ears.—He next communicated the intelligence received frau" the North of France, from which he conclud ed, that the enemy was never more assailable. and that. if the present season was ilutr,rad to PIT, there would sever hereafter he 'initialed po good an op portemity of sendiag so large a force from this coun try apinat so small a force of the enemy. This letter, of the a9sh May, was auswerad on the 3d June, by Sir David Donde% who, very properly, faring to rely ou his sole judgment io so weighty a matter, bad, iu the intermediate. tune, Liken the i e r e n e ntis of lour other officers. He would state what opinions were, and it would be seen. that though Ministers used the formality of asking ad vice. they had previously resolved, and 'veal as if such advice lied never been given. The Command er-in-Chief. referring to the last paragroph in Lord Castlereagh's letter, delivers it as hi. opinion, that the Itritirli forces should not be ,inked ott so desul tory an ar t , , niment, as that an expedition could auppos,ll to here the probability o! a smaller force being opposed to them. He recommends it to the Noble Lord to consider and ascertain erecurately the .mount of the eneinj's force, and not to plunge into an enterprize of such inegni bide, on Incite comparative speenletion, without knowledge of the real state of the case. Sir I). Doodles then proceeds to speak of the tore mode-, the old one (of which, clot to surprise the House, it was sufficient to say, that it was, if possible. snore extravagant than that which was acted on), and the new, and in both sniggests that the relative strength of the Expedainnand enemy ought to be made snore • matter of calculation tl.ass of seppoeitien. Hr goes on to Calera. the Noble Lord, that Antwerp, with the situation of which he was personally ac 'insisted. was a great town, and fortified so as to be capable of sustaining a regular siege. lie then re comoserls, its coocitemo, what ought to have load great weight with the Noble Lord, and damped his esithusitetic spitit, before he ventured to send nut the last force he had been able to create. sir, in all possibility, twit would be able to invade, for his rash expeditions. Sir D. Dundas teld him. that this was a service of great risk, and that the safe return of die army. even if they were stieceesful„ must be very precarious, from the resembling of forces by the rueoly, from all points, to intercept them ita again descending the river. Had these opinions heen weighed by Minirters, they would have found it more necessary to consider what hates the enemy vivid collect, than what was their strength ie the differetit forts upon the Scheldt. Tue next evidence he bad to consider, was that of (,erseral Calvert. to whom the Commauder•in- Chief ale lied for his opinion on the subject. He. General Calvert. was pn'o'ied of what many might think an indispensable prelonasary to giving advice, but which lle.isters throogboot ,wined to deem altogether meter eoery, local knowiedge. He informed them that Antwerp Ives formidable, and that, on the appearanee of the Expedition Wall- Acres, the enemy would collect all their fereee, and be ambled to concentrate them about that point with greet facility. by intone of the est merons canals which intersected the country. lie further stated. that as there was no dere on which to ertitnate the strength of the enemy, he could not devote on that point. This was the "million of (Semen! Calvert. lon net of the Noble Lord, so bent upon eending his Faperlition, that he could venture to dr cide on dais it'll less, lie now came to an opinion, which, if It'.nistere read, he was astonished it did not induce them to prime- bersve they risked so much. This w.a , i••• w ayi..sou of Colonel Gordon. Colonel Gor don to eompare the extent of the means an hash as a primary eject nod I • ol.e!ftere• hen, hie was oat to be satt.ti•ii it oh a Colje:- tate, that the regular fames of the 'meaty were wohdraern. Ministers, io their defence, it might 4.• *..t• 1)044..1. would say. that they had inforinatiou paw,' ier to Litt.* ; but the House had all thee. idem e bet., them, Itol it ass imiKrallibla to give credit to this. opr."- I. iou to the 'Torino. of so many mi. fit. ) . , nee, elf :n-r!•.ts cat on to state, tioit tar len.•...tott of huoth • P.n.-I:11"i w:t. hie, sod of 'o d or! anal Wolcherets gle•sfithle. In Nlinisters had clever read these pipets, as they appeared sever to Lave thought of acting upon their content.. 'I hey paid no attentiou to the excellent advice they reetivcd. They utterly disregarded the impressive conclusion of Colonel Utersilea's opiuion, that even o the most eligible of these plans would he a most desperate our ; and that it would be attended with the utmost risk, both to the army and navy employed upon ii."— The twat opinion was, drat of General Brow nrigc. It nearly concurred with the others, and stated only this distinct idea, that Antwerp and the enesny's nett might be taken by the British fleet going up the Scheldt, with ten thousand men, to land mew. sionally, as circumstances require 1. This, Lord Dorchester considered as ee most extravagant notion ; arid, ehoughGen. Brownrigg's opinion was not so de cidedly adverse, as those of the other military raven consulted, yet et was not very encouraging to Minis ters to undertake the F:xpeilition. he last of the four consulted by thcConoi.wider-in-Cliiefovas Gen. Hope ; and here he begged the }louse to observe, that all these profesesiossal persons concurred in re presenting the attack on Antwerp, and the destruc tion of the arsenals, as the great and main objects of the Expedition : they never spoke of IVulclieten us a principal object at all. General Hope, looking at this, was of opinion, that the attempt on Antwerp could not be made wit hoot great risk to the force einplco eft, a n d ni adequate chance of sue as. Ilere, ih,'n, were tine military opsisians, foor of them decidedly adverse, nod the fifth Lot favour able to the Expedition. :Ministers having bot tomed on the=e, then thought it necessary to have a few Filirai opinions al-o, to strengthen them itt their resolution. Sir llome Popham was sent hat from Portsmouth, aid, after a vooversa bon with Lord Mulgrave on she Pubjeet, thought fit to put les upaden into writing, and de. liver it on the I Nth Julie. lii this memoranda the plan was similar to that which 'WAS afterwards adopted, but it coutatued two points as necessary to conduce to the success of the undertaking. These were, lit, to embark the troops in men of war, and as few horses as possible ; for success depending en tirely on the speed and rapidity of their movements, it was requisite to avoid se siding numerous trans ports, or a great body of houses, either of which would cl o g mud retard the progress of the Expedi-. tion. And, secondly, to hasten their departure, as the season %sus last advancing, which wouleliuhl to their difficult ire dreadfully, by giving them the sea son and elements to contend agamet. To this it was acceded by Lord Malcrave, and unless they could sail by the tGth or 27th ofJune, that it would he impolitic tee make the attempt at all. Ministers, however, treated this naval just in the fame orgy as they treated the five military opinions. By the orders Irons the Admiralty, see far from se ndmo only ships of war ; ships of war werenot.to proceed up the river, except is vote of absolute vectssity ; and for the sake of celerity, instead of iterating as few, they sent as many horses as they could. On the 19th Jahr, Sir It. &radian, who was to command the naval part of the Expedition, was cosoulted. He pouted out the difficulty of getting up the river Scheldt, and the danger to which the force would be ewe:med, of being cut off, ole its return down the river, by them tid strength of the Mien hi.6lllts tint regulars collected by tier enemy. 11',1- chervil, he thought, might be takeu ; Lot the Ilouse would, hr trusted, sliver by their vole, that they did not cowider this olsj rt as sufficient to justify : o great an Expedition. In the interviews Sir It. Strachars had with I ord Mulgrave. that No ble Lunt seemed to tie as s entente of success as the other Noble Lord who plaiii.c.lthe eisterpri.e, and to pay as little regard tie the she ,. gers and (llness attendant Impose it. Ile can Sir It. Strait:Lam and ustored hint that all ootelsl do very well ; 1111 11 . .lifilleCe which the gallant Admiral had too much re aeon, on his side, to doubt. tapiel Poreliester now came to consider the plan ; nod here, he confessed, he had a considerable difficulty to suresionto ; fur, having to reason on what ass merely ideal, nod server carried into execution, he found it no easy matter to comprehend what the plan really east. Indeed it was n it one, it was many plans. The Noble Lord (Castlereagh) had lea plan; the Admiralty had their plan, and that spiwared to liiin the stoat wive one, for they resole eel to take goad care of their own fleet, whatever became of the enemy's. The Right liouourable the Chancellor of the Exchequer lead his plan to effect a great diversion for the military powers then engaged in Europe, at tiny point (.eo matter whether difficult or dangerous) where the fewest dollars were wanted. Brit Minister,, with all their rage fur expeditiews, seemed to have forgot ten Cast bullion wus saseaa.any, and perhaps more in cumin them into execution, than either pow. der or shot. The Right Hou. Secretary (Mr. Canning) might cuss have his plan, though they were yet to learn from lion what it was. I'rrhapa 'LOCI' was the state of his mind at that period, that hr did not deers it necessary to divulge it to his colleague The naval Commander had two or three plans, and the military Commauder in-Chief had 11011 r. (A laugh.) As far, however, as he e opal c Alert from a view of the whole, the central underst sodwg ,ee.m,4l to he, that the left wing of the army a!toultl attack Walcheren--1 party should take possession of Caiheariel, anti the m sin body, to the number of twenty-two thousand men, proceeded up the river to Said het, oectspying Bevelawl in their progress. This was what was called the second, ulterior, simultaneous, subs., quAit operatow.—(Bear! hear!)—ln the calm- Intion• on this 'Usage %west ion, it was always ex pected that the main-body should reach Sotorliel in four days. What Rewinds had 3linieters for this conclusion ? Sir Richard Striae,' said it was pos sible to accomplish it with wind and wewher inva riably f.vourahle. Vet, with all the pretentious taken, roma of our vessels were stranded, mid lay a con-iderable time in that situation. Sir Ric hard Steadiest also considered the takiror possession of Bevebutil.as indispensable. But before he went into doled on this part of h:s subject, he wished to call the attention of the Hato, to LAM Castle resah's letter to the Commander-ill-Chief, of the t?:341 of „lime. This contained the proiee of the Eat:edit' ; stilted that it was His bisisty's plea sure that it s'muM pr. creti, end She aature of the etatimuoicutiors made to Lord Chatham en the From a vie w 44 this letter, it would ap rr-air that Lewd (Thst'eren 4 ls haul out-run ILL Ma jetty's sairc•-oss; fur. ors she lbeh, lie had ordered the Coniasander-in Clilr I to have all the dis posable fs me in the kingdoms reedy for eta barkatioo.—Said tke Noble Logi, in his pro jef, notwithetandiug the getter % effect of the Expedition is to be on the war in Europe, it is to be a principal object to destroy the finial cations of Antwerp, the dock-yard, awl *termite, arid, if practicable, to interi opt the navigation of the Scheldt. He doubted mach, slier all, that there were in existence such arsenals as those at Dorsnoef, here directed to be d. stroy ed. As for the at powerful diversion in favour of our allies," how gould the Noble Lord expect it to be so. *lien he knew, that, after thetoup-de-maix, our force, for want of foreign coin, ion-t return immediately ? The Noble Lord continued to pr, ject. that, in case the enemy's ships idled' sliwilil tie carried above Antwerp, and put in a situation where we could not get possession of them. Anil here, for tke first time, the Noble Lord seemed to consider that any difficulty might arise. But lie over looked rather than thought of ov.:rcomiti4 diffi culties ; and though hr could not abut hut eyes•to its beteg in the power of Vie enemy to remove the. India (Object out of our reach, lie was still defer. mined on undertaking the enterprize. Sir Home Puplsain was of °trillium that the armament might pass up to Sin vliet, provided one bank of the liver was iii our possession, and this, he bad to I the house, was the general opinion. It was re lust keble, also. that Sir Richard Keats, one of the most experienced otfieeis in the sery er. had never thee consulted. Ile !led expressed his hopes that the Experfoion might not hr entang led in the siege of Flashing, but proceed to the ulterior ohjeeta, and take Baths, us nn indispensable step to their further progress. This was another naval °pinto'', that, without great rapidity, success was very imprubahle, with this addition, that a floc tills of 80 gun-boats was necessary. In all the calculations of our sanguine Alinisters, four days. the hardy possible nine, were reckoned on as suf ficient to enable the armament from Deal, to reach Santvliet. Noire of the difficulties, delays, or dis appointments, so common in operations depending on so many and such various circumstances, ever entered into their computation. They were to have every thing favourable; the wind, the wea ther, the roues, of which they kra w nothing, were all to be the finest imoginable, and the whole was to go on like a time-piece; without friction. But in the very outset, one of four hundred ships Falling • little behind, caused some friction and delay ; this was one of the ships which was necessary to curry out the flotilla, to be armed in the mouth of the Scheldt. He new Caine to the intelligence given to the Secret Committee ; a person whom Ministers represented as one well acquainted with the Scheldt, and worthy of the firmest reliance being placed on his statements, described the Slough Passage as diflieult for even small single Ye-sels, and declared it to be IteCeiNify to have a pilot in every hue-of-battle ship anal frigate. I low were our fleet provided? They hail only one pilot; and Sir It. Sire chaii declared that he could not get one Loll enough to venture to carry his ship sae up this danger ous and difficult navigation. 'lt was true the river might be leinyerl, but this would occupy a week, and preclude all possibility of a rapid advance.—lt also appeared. from the testimony of this perscu, flint it was rally possible to pro( evil to Bathe with the wind in two points of the compass, betwera the South mid We-t. and 'irritator with a avant wird io other two prii , es. But Ministeta did not tare fur thew" diflo allies. owl proeeerted. as if they could have relays of favourrlrle wi-als at every corn. r of *boa %sooting liver. The time itecessery to 'eke possessiou of South Berg lund, and to 'educe ii ithz, they left eutirely net of their eousideration. The -needy surrender of both these pisses was very mitspecita, amid cumuli never have been uninitiated iu uny prellllllllllty stew taken by :Minister+, if tiny 41441 iiike tiny preli ttt tt ary general view of fie- matter. Briliz in partieular wire capable of a resistance sufliciew ly long to have disconcerted their whole plan of operations. Lilly and Liefki Hillock were also by inniny deemed itidis pensahle awl capable of s imilar yeomanry. To inert the flotilla in the river—to t a k e :ne s e ...t o n of B er ,.. land—to reduce Bailie—and to have wind and wee titer far all re-easi tttt presented to our Ministers neither diffieuliy tier subject for deliberation. Ge overt Brovirmigg, wlia seenenl somewhat to parti. einem in the sanguine expect:4mm of Lord Castle. reugh, in• his rendes:cc. stated, that, if the army could have landed on 31. t August, they might have been successful. , Being furth• r examined, he said. that, taking possession of Carbsoil would be hut the work of an hour. lie. like Mtniatera, forgot that the north-westerit wind, an unruly spirit, must blow before they could accomplish their ob ject. ite, Gen. Brownrigz, imputed the failure to the unfortunate tiereseity which obliged the arma ment to assemble in the Room pot. Lirrei Castleresigh. when exastiiised, would sot fix dates so nearly as General Brownrigg ; but lie was of opinion. that. under favourable circumstances, the engem:era might arrive rally. and be sucesssful. On being questioned as to the furce and dispositions or the hia answer was, that he could not presume to judge what might lie the movements of the enemy. As a -51ein'ier of that House he to gin hare declined answering this miestiou, when pressed int hint, but stove he libel answered it, he stood condemned nut of his own mouth.— What ! was he not to es!culitte on the re-i-t. ate:* likely to lie 44r-red—to niceties:l, as fir as poasible, the movements likely, or in the power of the esieury its be mite? Was he to se n d troop., not only to learn whether they could trio ere t. bat whether they could ever return ? This sirs it point he ought most decidedly to have a-- rr tamer,. as i be. fate of the army, of the Est edillerit, anal eventually of the kingdom, whose last cud great. tit hopes a ere thus embarked, ',speeded upon It. The Nrible Lord who commanded the Expe dition was cep ally wary tint to ennun u to precise dates in his answers, wia the lity of oecomphiltimg the ulterior objects 4,1 the Exp. d-iion; though le had no hesitation thrOwii.g sarcasms on his c.. 11, ague.. Ile was •warr of the difficulty ; he kilo,v that a eyes! until was derr.aWy 10 go up the Sclie!ilt, anti Molt a Weill wind Wrote x surf , 111(11 rrt.•lentl 'nail nag almost iiiiieacticaltle. 0.1 as to the retel l in g S in fur was prs4lote, bait IMO IWO ; 11.1 i ILA? I ilY!I npinin•.s hash SWISII.II 41 il's ill/1110s. Vl ti.it ..s. it that these naval oriht.ie.4 fh,•iht that she unkeenea navhgatieus of a ricer I 14•• the Scheld , ,aas lifficult! I/ • (I.oid Lot 1::i; Anther examined npon the time thee Art, appeared quote n.r.a l s t. if it c iota have been el'. eh, I n e t. .ic 6 August. 09 Inc contrary, Captain Wit! General supposed t!4 the • might unit must lie effected on the 4 h , io Older rust to the a.tay, a. suet latilutelycrrr>•a rc,to q t , 4 uu Antwerp , ou ihe 11011 i. These were eontradictions and incinisistencies, and,. in general, from this clashing of "pub' s ,,, the culeul..tion of being aide to re.ich Ssitt4,•t in four days, WAS mot probable, ~,,,i that male without the slightest allowance fur &he, accidents, weather or dilliculties, And with a tit, forgetfulness of sweltininairy It was wit till after the fiat e.f the iist.g.n.4 that the E•peilition 'night he Imeieesoril, jesty's t! , ititAht it expedient in into the le' of its sit. ce.., contet the ithotricies in their their oj. Ct. Ile litre the undertaking to hotline; Lilt „„ the architect, wet., is said to hive Ittlt , t I, ..-i,.1nl floor, 6-fore he re, o In tea the in.'. 23 . itV .•I t.nr t w stow-caw.. If the iusttuttions wr,e t lb. y would be tumid itteo,wi4trwt w th the piece, mid those of one iiis:•er et b..rs once anti those of another. The in-tette , in s i, e i ti ,„ to tit Margin* of I Nutley Weft in t h e tri . llll of what a eltrrerards performed. It ought, iu tie drat stance, have heels aeccrieined, th a t t..kiog o f Cadiaud war an indopeuiable pin of ary projict fur the purpose of angel:Mg Atito.- rp . Capt. Hatichett, of the Runes, bud iitfurtatil thew, that while the pollens fro m Flushing elms hint, the halls of Cadsand went through km.— After etaline si much upon the reasons or ju,tly estimating the propriety of the enterprise, he ihoell continent upon what he eauld term no othevtl int the romance of this Expedition. Ile could dean. urinate the intended attack eipan Antwerp lie t o other appellation than that of lib:it:tiny. It w:isn. miler to that of a vistmary knight-errant open windmills, related by a fain ma and ingeolom A dige of romantic adventursa. General Don spoke of the fear and perturbation which wired the Wig. latuot s , when they heart' of the English non-; but certainly it could not be twain that ant alann was raised among the milliasy, or th o . e were to defend the place ; end, therefore, the terror imputed was to be consid e red no ether poe- Iflity than that of the lashes. There Premed to have been great ignorance of the teal slier and population of Antwerp, at the time when this Expedition was planned, rind afttrawils set •all, tor it had been eloWildetid, at One tWr.l:5ll, 11". tog lost its ancient impetlattom and the !woe orer;ro,sit wish gras-, and nearing the napect of desolation. The opomotia ,raid by Mira-t rs at that tame were very conteuly to the stein lion of the Wirer. Ala 111,•:., if ee w,r, to 4.4; o r mi m e o f attack, how was the town to hr tak-tt Win, It was slated, that' the attack was to be IPaiit' 1111011 all Slur weak 1 , 01•1110. (A /leek., A Aollor coniitleretina was, how were tiny :o get clear of Fort Lilo? 0 ! that plate was to lie taken by meats of sues and mortars. As to the iimudatiun, tha was never thought of. nor was it ever 'opined Ines.. Generil Browurigg was the only Oliver who con s driest the mode of attack likely t o art eked the number of guns :not arttlicry tor the under:ski:4. Iftted, tha- kit a .p might be taken I. ) assault. 'Thus far ;woo ohd the evalecce of Cent-J.41 Rtnertir•,47, Cul.e was coot eery to th a t sit rout moral +oil military officer. At the saner . refetynce were 1111.1 in his examination 1 lame, they * mild perceive, f , , when a titivation was put, whether Of not Ants-cep ould lie taken by buraliatdment ? To th- Brow nrigg answer/46m it could not. ( Hear! Arco '1 Wiwi, Ibis answer wail compare d with ilia ° l onia(' had pr..vionsly expresses!, pe gimps this was so u fortunate question. Another digestion is • jib ri apsort to the prob-bility of taking the, • - loll , * its rase the attack were succestful, which answers in a similar manlier. Hi. rustier at., t i ".c he found the shii.ping might. notwithstanding, a removed higher up (min their situation at An:we: - and thereby another object of the Esped.ti %%mild have failed, for it was not 111:.ly they Will have beet captured. It had been istitta 1 / 1 " Innis that the bombardment round have the ths et, Ily ilitimitlAli•ig th e peo pl e t o late. ‘Va, it yowiiide that a root popui..• could he iiitimidat.d, suretiunded as flier to . by the troops of lionapaite? Wo. it I keit - tii• t any success could result Irani the attempt for leis they were, es lie might tomptessed 016 the walls of Antwerp, and dewed the chance (1 egress. and vigorously bombarded in that aiteatia it would I uve been :n vain to expect a Latour , ' inane. A creot deal hod also Bien s'ieged the probability of taking Antwerp 'my a rorp • mein, hot if the elate corresoontle I Ith pl that appeared altogether impracticable. It Va` ;stated by the (s oetal. In adverting to tin: • donee Lord Coodpreogh. It , • hound, that. er he comniceett the sit:l464 found but the ottani condition of tnp milted tnere was no probability t t thinonode of otteirk. Rut th.n It ,• '• • i COl.r.r•i.ity with 1.1. n:•rnaoru•d ptuvide two strised. lo: leo hut. mi.l the I. t• MOWS 101C111 Ku. tie. 11 ; ;;I 11101!0. Pl/1.41141 rod. ni himibardina CI.. *us the 111.1:r tronnrknblo, sis 1:. WIN pi ru.i•trly In,ul of 2. place• I. crimp- ch•-mcil Th? t ltt Chathwy. wd. of "11 enorrot...l with 1.1,4 OA cot .1. ro. the stirt-t Expedit ion. Thotigl) itertued to bate I ." Lsis•Lt • tittle the 1.% 1)1,11(10n mr.'t d. fie l••ol,A.''', they .1 1.1 . arrive st ti. ir ilertio-tc n:i. In mglopt that crn•:urt wink ssittible 1.6 ;hat lie isti...;.l.t li. 41 w p!...-es in thrSi..hcii'.t. .1 the time unlit winch Inc had -.• Is tlw isisr.sisit wf tstscs;s:ist..:•. .I.ts omit C , •stils• us s • r is..tric•bl.. %etidit , knowi 1 . . lII' h It% null, Irc t! ns, ot %um k t u 1• a “, 411,011 , ••11% ( . 1.11011.11, • :.* et I