The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1809-04-22 00:00:00

1 . . there was a deal of dispute about who should coin- , mend it. A Noble Earl iu uly eye woe supposed to have beau appointed to the command; wont *he occasion was ( do not know, but Sir hew Dalrym ple was appointed. It is not my intention to iiii pute any blame, or cast the slightest reflection, on the character of Sir Hew Dalrymple. As far as I have had opportunities of knowing him, I should oy he is as officer of considerable accutuplish meets ; but with regard to Sir Hew Dalrymple, it has happened to him as it has happened to many, this, be has risen in the service without being mukh employed. His conduct in Spain ,hewed great discretion, and gave great *tans taction ; but it is not merely a general opiuiun of a man's abilities, whatever they may be, but his military experience, and ktiowledgo iu the art of war, that capacitates him for such a corn :nand ; and there was a strong feeling. that while there was such a man as Sir John Moore, it 'AMA ireproper to place over hint another officer. who bad not the same degree of military experience.-... Sr Hew Dalrymple is joined to the army with Sir Harry Buirard. I have no personal objection to Sir Harry Barrer& but it does seem us if His Najesty'e Ministers had some object iu vita, to make it impossible that General Moore should have the command of that army which had been entrusted to him in Sweden, mid that I suppose induced them to give the command to General Burrard, sending hiin out in the seine ship."— Here the Noble Lord catered into a variety of de tails, till the handing of the expedition ut Monclegn Baver.--" 1 have,' Ida Lordship stated, " said what justice obliged use to say with regard to General Daltymple. lam nut less willing in pay to Sir Art hiit Wellesley that tribute which his high sere.ces and talents deserve---I believe him, from all I have heard of him, to he a deserving Officer, of great merit and ..elities. In short, such at; Offi cer as the country its these filmy of difficulty may look to w.th hope of the matt advantageous services; but Sir Arthur Wellesley was platted in a situation in which no offi..er ought to be placed. It was im possible that jar Arthur Wellesley should not have felt ti considerable degree of irritation at the coin timid being tiikeii away from him, said if he fell into an error upon this occasion, it was au error into which evirry man of ardent zeal was likely to fall—he saw rat opportunity of acting to the ho nour of his country by striking • successful blow. against the ebeniy. On the 17th of August he came into-contest with an advanced corps of the French army, and then the battle of Viuietra took place. Ido slot wish to cast ugly blame upon hita ; but I think Cie situation in which Is, was placed slid induce hint to incur is hazard which lie ought tint to have done. He advanced with an army little inure than Superior to Junot's, and he ha zarded this curtain consequence. that though his success was n.r decisive. by defeat would have been fatal, had the Urbane of the day been didareet, the whole of the vtpedition must have failed. Oti nor the .26th, Sir Harry Burrard laud* d ; Sir Harry Barran' shewe d his high mind, he dechued to take the command n yid he gen. to Sr Arthur Wellesley all the merit : t lie battle of \boiler.* was gained with 010114 K to the tr. sops engaged 111 sr. I have no doubt that with the ii Immunise* of rorteas further edventa. was might have been obtaieed,by an immediate pule " mAtillen I stowed the reasons given hy Fur H. tiurrard, are very subsist I•ial and sattsfact.wy.Whaterer preju dice may have arisen to the country from that event, to be ascriberd to his Majesty's Ministers in having so arranged, Ili at an officer snookd take the cunt. mand of an ant iv in the midst of an action, and be fore he could h tea any opportunity of examming the scene. It was mit to beexpected, thwt sin officer, with so heavy a respveisibility should have acted otherwise than he did.--*By the next day there were three commanders wiethin the four and twenty hours.— Then followed that which has been the subject of so much dchant, I—the Convention of Cintra. A sah ject upon whit h the public are unanimous in their opinion. His Majesty's Ministers have themselves stated that it disepputun d the hopes and expectations of the people. ; Its effects may he summed up by stating, that Vie French Gentlel obtained the tampon of his army with his artillery, six rowel& of ammunition peed 800 horses equipped and read fur tints, aw I obtained those ale:linage,' which e ()obi have horn well purchased with the knee of half his army. tl'e may appreciate its advantage. by recollecting what happened at Coristina after the distietrous t lefeat of the French troops, in the little which wt are told was fought without hope of ildvatibige. timid, that before our army could embark, it lost 7000 met,, all the horses, stores, arumnuition„ provisions, cud baggage : and that it was in such a state of complete disorgattisation, that at this inotnent it is not that 7000 men wily are lost, but thee whole army are lost to the service of the country, and must be so for months to come. If such has bettn the effect of the retreat froni la, *hat hem not the enemy to boast of fur the retreat from Cintra ?"—The Noble Lord, after stating many tither circumstances connected with the Cintra Convention, expressed his opinion that it was an act which, in very point of view, was inad visable; but the principal blame lie imputed to His Majesty's Ministers, for that extraordinary isr roagement, by which they had appointed a socces sion of °Seen, equally ignorant of local circuin stences, and equally jealous of each .other; hot above all he blamed them for not having instructed there with regard to their ulterior views. " I am;' said his Lordship, " no friend to fettering the dis cretion of a Geeeral Officer ;,havitig formed a plus, aisd concerted his operations, l think as large a power as powsible ought to be given to him; brit surely it was not difficult to foresee, that with such force as was employed iecainst the French, and with the co-operatioi.whieh might be expected Iron the tourageof theS pvnish armieu.soinettrins were likely to be entered 'Lao with the enemy. His Majesty'* Ministers ought, therefore, to have given such general views of their sentiments and wishes as would have enabled the Offiter corninandnio the Expedition to have acted on those principles, ie'hich if they had ucted upon they would not have had to have said of the Convention that it had dhotis pointed the hopes and expectations of the country. Here then is a strong ground for the coridemnati 0000 is His Majesty's Ministers, to whore for this, as well as fur every part of the transaction• the chief Islatne is to be imputed." The Noble Lord ar geed ut considerable length upon the gefterel inn polity of the conduct of Ilia Majesty's Miuwteri with respect to the people and Govetnittent of Portugal. The resoit of that conduct had been, that instead of having an army on the frontiers of Portugal, protecting the interior, we had been obhge.l 1n retain* considerable portion of the army to keep in ivilijectinn the people for whose delit er n dee they were beat. Tlll-se Kruunth he thought *a ncient to cell on the timbre to arraign the conduct of Ili* Majesty's Mittistars. What a vissitr.i.st, the Noble Lord observed, was the emulsive of Ilia Sla- - - • jesity's Ministers with that of the cosisuintnate Ge neral whine plans they had to oppusc !—Alu you ever hear, said his Lordship, of Iloimparte ap pointing Marshal Nil , to cunimami an army, iis the midst atm action, seiollug Genoral to supersede him, and then, in the midst of a battle, sending some other tjetierul ta supersede hint ?—No.—Von have wen how diderently he acts. You have 842e:1 how the moment affnrs took a favourable two, he le: his armies in behind the Ebro, where it might defy ettack, and wait for reinforcemems. You find Imo as soon his pre parations are ready, currying pu one great and aimulteueous operation. ‘Vhoever speaks of him, it is nut possible should speak of hitn withont sS imiring hint for his great abilities. in rapidity of execution he Is only equalled hy his patience in pre paring the means—he has all the opposite qualities of Fabius and Marcellus, whether you con oder the country in which lie act., the people with whom lie has to comen I, and the meats by which he is to subdue them. He rivals !bombe! in the application of the meting, and is exempt front his only fault—that of not improving by pest experience. His Lordshitthaviug, with great eloquence and force of argument, coin merited upon ell the cireuinstaliees connected With the expeditions to Spain and Portugal, censured . iii. Majesty's Ministers for their not having calcu lated sooner than they lied done upon the certainty of Romaine te's sending considerable reinforce ments ? Could they imagine that he would make no exertion to retrieve whet he had lost in Spain ? —Did they imagine that the camp of the Ebro was a camp of amusement only? It was im possible they could have formed such an opi nion of Bonaparte. It was impossible to con ceive he would not make great exertions, and retrieve those losses which miexpeeteilly he had imstained. They must have recollected, that as early us the 16th of September he hail sent a mes sage to the Senate, iu which he had said, that he was determined to carry on war with Spain with the utmost activity, that lie would destiny the armies which England had embarked; mill that the future security and prosperity of a commerciel and maritime peace must depend upon his doing this. H. then was u declaration in the face of the world, which Ministers must have known would be carried into effect. His Lordship proceeded to read several passages from French papers of that period, all of there tending to .hew that Bonaparte was snaking the utmost exertions .to recruit his army, and send reinforcements then adverted and expatiated lunch at large on the utiaccountable delays which had taken place in the expeditions fitted by his Majesty's Ministers; hie contended, that et the tune the expedition com manded by Sat- John Moore was planned. it was madness to direct the army to the north of Spain ; they shou t .1 have lauded at Cadiz insteed of Coyun. nu, they villein hart got in behind the Tagus, ant retired to the centre of Spain, where welt a great aid active population ; he had not the least doubt hat if proper measurer had been pursued, the campaigii would have been attended with Nieves-, and at all events a retreat might have been secured blithe Eng lish forts at Gibraltar, in which situation the Bri tish army might have been an army of reserve, to enable the people of the Spanish provinces to rally, and.with more security manifest their hostility to their oppressor. Having proceeded to justify tine conduct of Sir John Moore, At deteriunied mat* to retreet, and having minutely related all the circumstance* that led to that disposition, his Lordship referred to the conduct of Mr. Frere, with respect tollis correspondence with Gen. Moore. Speaking of Mr. Frere his Lordship said, his con duct with regard to his correspondence, sheer+ him to be a man unqualified for the situation he fills. However harsh it may be, to use sock words monist At person who is nut present to justify linuseif ; yet I must ray, that his presumption and folly, render it highly necessary, that he should be recalled. He talks as if no reinforcements had been received by the French Generals ; will it be believed, that ou the 30th Nov. the fact which was known to Lord Beittinek, that General Casten°, had been defeat ed, and that the French had received reinforce ment* which had raised their army to 130,000 men ; the British Abilister should have been sending to procure information, that he should hare thought the French armies were still confined to 45,000 rnea, and that lie should talk of attack ing the French army before they received their re inforcements. lie talks of the weakuese to which the French were reduced. I remember titet, be fore the battle of Austerlitz, and Jena, it was mint the French were reduced to despair. How absurd it is to state florae as reduced to weaker,, amid de spair, whom we find, immediately after those state ments, to possess the most ample means of Ml. ' quest ! It has been said, that persons who are in the habit of telling falsehoods, believe iii the ni at lad themselves. I haste> , Mr. Frere has been employed is telling these strange stories of the weakness and despair of the French. I re memle r the battle of Marengo wee preceded by accounts in all the newspapers of the weak and re duced state of the French *ratite'. His Lordship itiverted to the instructions of Lord Castlereagh to Sir John- !More, stating. that he was to pay every attention to Mr. Freer, who wise represented as having MI authority only shirt at' ale...lute corn ;naiad. Ile oS"..riael, that Fel Moore hid received no cue Atii Deceintett au imiteursite sr i ts- Irtellt of the French army in it letter from Mr. • Frere, who, hi teens as 'bong as the English Lan guage could entivey, protested moistest the. retreat of Sir jOllll Moore. His Lordship commented CM the inctineistetice of Mr. Freres conduct. in speak ion an coufidently at one period of elle enthusiasm of the people of Spain, mid in a few days aftetsle ecribiire their enthusiasm as totally extinct. His Lonlrhiti eevercly censured the ilictetoriel tow amnrised in this letter to Sir J. Moore, particn tarty when he enuselered the difference betweea their relative si;tiation.i. IL. L or d s hip cos ia ire ,: the colidwa of 11a. iirere,l4 senJiug this mid other • letters to. Sir Jubn Moore, as e puke..Ain whicir lin terms of reprobation coma describe, and par ticularly that part of h;. letter iu oh., h he ri quest ed that the ',ester of it aright hr privately e xa m i n ed before a Council of War—Mr. t tete thus euilus vourin • to take the eleniumid of the army out of s the han ds er Sir John Mom-,t, and place it iu the hands of a Council of War. " It be supposed," said his Lordship, " that the bearer of this: Niter was one of time.: illustrious pt rums who have cons :wowed the profess:Ma of arms 'Mice the French Revolution, that it was General Moreau or some other ilhitiuguirhed person. No ! It was a male of whose conduct I camiot speak %%about disgust and detestation—a man of the lowest origiu s who had been sent out to St. Domingo, and who is ac cused, owl stiongly suspected of having been con cerned in the assassinatioa of is distinguished offi cer. It was pnucipidty from the niterested reprso sentations of this main that Mr. Frere funned his judgment of the forte of the French. armee.— Were His Majesty's Ministers ignorant of the cha racter of this person, who had a regiment in His :Majesty's serric....—did they not know that la- had appeared ni the Courts of this kingdom, in einiee queuce of his participation in usurious tramine tions?—l believe they will find hint on the record. of fraudulent bankruptcies. This was the man • to whom Mr. Frere was appealing from the superior know of Sir John Moore.—Do . they not know he is a person of the worst de scription ? our of those whom France has cast off front herself, hut not without furiiisijog with the melons of destruction. I feel the done to the service by the employment of such a main boat I feel even more the injury and insult offered to a gallant o'ficer. God forbid that I should test - du maple justice to the high, strict, and,chividrous honour of Sir John Moore, who sacrificed every thing for Ilia king and country. Thee are in the circumstances of this transaction the stroogebt reasons for believing from the conduct of this man, who was sent by Mr. Frere, that he was actually. employed by the enemy as a traitor and spy. Mr. Frere says he had sent the letter by this nem, who had just come from Madrid. II- having been at Madrid on the id, is to be examined before the Council of War, to induce Sir John Moore to ad vance. M. Marla writes over the 'Kline day, and gives the account which 1 have detailed of the French eriuies. In what situation was Madrid on the id 13er ember ? The French army was on the heights of Madill. the Iteteiro had been taken the night before, end the night before Morla had written to Bonaparte; and this person, coming from Morla, is the person selected by Mr. Frere to persuade the march of General Moore. If General Moore had advanced, you would have had to lament not alone the loss of that gallant Officer, hut the loss of the whole of the British army. I have stated that Mr. Frere was to have all authority but positive command. This represeutatioa male it diffi cult for Sir John Moore to do any thing but what he del ; to ladvalice towards Coruims, and create that diversion on the ground el' which the Noble Lord will excuse the expedition.— The Noble Lord then referred to the letter of Sir ' John Mriore to Sir David Baird, and contended that the letter written by Mr. Frere hail produced that luoveleanit which had brought ea such die -. niters. The object of the person front whom Mr. Frere received his information, was to draw the thitish army into a situation where its destruction might be insured. Had not Gen. Moore fortun ately received the information of the advance of Bonaparte to Madrid. not a man of the British army would hare escaped. in what way this was to be justified, he knew not.— Upon the whale, all the failures of the campaign were attributable to the misconduct and mis management of his Majesty's Milliliters. We arenow compelled, by the lateireasofthe hour, to close this brief sketch of his Lordship's speech, the delivery of which occupied four hours. Ilia Lordship profess., d himself a candidate for prudeut reform, and after urging a variety of other argu ments with reference to the expeditions to Spain and Portugal, sod the conduct of them on the part of His Majesty's Ministers; he concluded by morieg— .. That an bumble Address be preseuted to His ...tiniest!, to represent to His 31ajestv, that we base cuissidered, with attention, the various doettuients, incomplete as they are, which have been laid bdure as, respecting the efforts made by His Majiwiy, during the last campaign, in support of the resistance of the people of Spain and Pus-tura' to the anjest egression end usurpation of the Fisnch Government. fleet we feel ourselves bound to represent to His Ma jesty, that, ow the result of this exammatios, we have seen, with sourtificatiou and grief, the disgrace haught a His Majesty's Councils, wail the injury siintateed by the Brittels Empire, from the east of informatiou ad foresight which has beta aimed is every part of the conduct of His Ma jesty's Ministers. That a rational plan of operatioa haa at any time lowa fanned by them, either for the directime of our own ClUlliiool, or for combining them with thine of the Spaaish awl Purtnewse parlous , us jest view taken if the political state of either country, our any due guano,* paid to the supply of those swain which nose could base enabled the British Arsine to act with i reasonable hope of tiaras. " That with such proofs lacibre us, it ovoid Dot be con sistent with our duty to withhold ,from His Majesty • de clisratosa or ear full coavictioo, Mat, °Mug to the manias sad saisesaaagetseut of His Majesty's Minister., tbe hopes which the abaci had beau led to entei tale base been disap pointed; • large lad treeless expesubture of the mesas and resources of the country has been imurred; a great and dangerous accession of petit teal, naval, and military strength leis already been obtained by the enemy ; and above 7,uuo if His .11wjesty's brave trnosps, tozetber with their ;idiom Comirisisiller, have been sveisficed enema advantage in eu terprises without plan, combination, -or foremen, aid equally ill-timed and iniehrectell." The Earl of Idsverout—.• My Lords, the question is now fully brought before the considera tion of this House, whether or not, hi the main 0! , - jects attended to dosing the whole of the late rain ' pingo% iii Spain and Portugal, llis Majesty's Nli ousters adopted such plans Its were wise end advis able, end executed them properly, nod with dile energy. The Noble Earl oppo,in- h a s chose n this fair ground of preferring his accusation,and to do lens justice he certainly has, with great eloquence, en tererl most fully into the merits of that question. At the same tune it hiss been allowed in the Noble Lord's own statement to-night, that considerable tlitriett;ties presented themselves to His Biejesty's Mititateri at the period of iheir being called upon to grant assistance to the Spanish nation. Such were also the circultistanres conoected with their first deliberations on the line of conduct tlwy had to adopt, that it wits ant convenient or prudent to britr i r, the citestiOn before Parliament, therefore - - -- t, • lii Majesty's Miniserrs not possessing this tiepins. tunity, and considering the spirit witch Jeweled almost every XOl4ll in this country, mid the general duipusititin in favour of the Opau:sh cram, I wilt . : reeture • to say on adminietration were ever placc , l. in greater difficulty. I would also observe. may Lords, that it is 11(4 fair or right for M timer, tot be placed in that situation in which they are thie, night placed by the Noble Earl; their conduct might, nut to be judged merely from the resutt id opcestetus or the fate of the campaign ; but due ts,itsidere ; thin ought to be attached to the carcousstie.eui mailer which they acted, when they were unites toe ueceuity of determining upon measures witle:.o knowing the coarse of subsequent events. 'l i e Noble hurl thinks 'Ministers ought to have waited till some persevering effort had been matiifested •i .. by the people of Spain; hut what would hate. been the consequence of pivoting stitch a hue of. 4 ' cnduct ?—On that prisimple we 'eight have wait ii from week to week, and from mouth to mouth ; had we waited lii the matiuer that Noble Lord has recommended, I sin persuaded the, present mil- ~ .. unnistration would have been justly entitled to the reprobation of every honest man in the country. My Lords. it is very remarkable that in the course of what we have 'lrani from those oho have es incased their opposition to the conduct of His Ma jesty's Miuisters, every one asserts a plan'of iiiii • owo, which he st nes in his opinion would base been the best or the only one proper to be adopted by His Mojesty‘ Goverutoeut. and yet not woe of them plans so reconitueuded will be found to pos sess an egieetuent with each other. In Liking a view of the subject now under the consideration of the House, I shall call your attention to the two moot martial points of this dimussiun. The first question is, whether under all the circumstances attending the late operations in Portugal and Spain, His Majesty's Nli,•isters have adopted a wise and judicious plait. iind having so formed it, they s afterwards vigorously curried it into etfect. The other question; which I think worthy of your no tice, Is whether those plans which have been since pointed out by those who condemn the measures • of .adiniiiistration, have been such us ought to have been adopted. Now, my Louis, I shall COP , . sider the last question first, and by etym.:lig the difficulty or inadequacy of the plane recommended; I shall -afterwards, with greater facility, be enabled to thew the first plan, which was that we acted open, to have been advisable and prover, and II that it was vigorously carried into effect. It seems to have been thought by many, that it :•;.:1 would have been wise and propc.. to have scut one forces directly into the center of the ipauish king dom .-. •1 at the comruencemeat of the campaign, they ' have also been of opinion, our forces ought to have been lauded somewhere iu the North West of that country, as n e ar Ili poilithle to the Pyrenees, 4 bet 0 they 'night have imitiediattly acted agiviist the enemy. I ain fully aware, many have thelight we but, my Lords, was not the reszurition of Portngal to our uutieut ally ? was nut seudiug our troops .:. into the Tagus, and obtaining the possessor of Lisbon, a measure of very great and serious import- more ? In all expeditions, which may be sent fur the purpose of aiding another country, for the pur pose of defending the country alluded to, or say ether, I thick it is sieemeary in she dist plies to take possession of some port, harbour, or bay, where your transports may lie in safety. Ido net say this is the conduct which, without excep tion, ought to be pursued. Cases may happen, where it might be necessary to land forces on au open beach, and march them immediately into the country ; but in general, and particularly so in regard to Spain, it was necessary to pursue a widely different course of proceeding, bemuse the coast of all that country is such, that at several pe riods of the year it is extremely dangeroim to ap proach, cud the province* adjacent, frOm their own want of supple, did not possess the means of furnishing provisions. The Spanish General, themselves have expressed this opinion. % ould not Romans, if he bad thought it policy, have given directions for the English army being lauded at the place nearest to the scene of action ; but he gave on the contrary, directions totally different. snd assigned the reason for so doing. at the time. My Lords, the principle which I have here laid down, and the principle upon which His Majesty's Ministers acted, is a principle, the justice of which you cannot deity, neither can you dray its probable operation. With respect to the time which elaps ed behare it was thought adviseable to send forces to co-operate with the patriots. I would cell your Lordships attention to an observetion on that eat t of the subject. It has been intimated too, by the Noble Lord, that His Majesty's Miiiisters were not duly informed of the extent of the zeal, sod number of those who had name i• the contest. But I have no hesitation in deolaritig there nese, was so great and simtiltatteous a rising, us tieik place among the Spamisis nation : one province iu stantanamsly succeeded another in the setae cause, but it was not advileable to send mem, till there was some kind of central goveretomit or authority established. A groat deal has b: en urged for the expedients , of sending. a greater number of cavalry, anal that it was the p articular _ mini st of the Spelt hods themselves. We al• aware that a ileroaud of 10,000 was made for the defence of the Aston, : but when it was understood to he a dektitte for e, for the use of a single province, it might justly he doubted if it did oot interfere with the general plan of the campaign. On this subject, ' have no hesitation in making good say assertino, that it w 's not advisable to send a large forte of cavalry, Iw. cause a great force of cavalry should, in my opi. nion, never be sent abroad without a due peeper. tom of iufaotry. It would, 1 ans eisoindetit, heye been the worst plan which could hove been adopted for the int, rest of Spain. It wend have drawn the forces of • hat country from the mountains into the Wails, and thereby have considerehly lessened their *civic's, by reuderi rig uselesi their best mode of w tie fare. Under all the circunistentos, it woo thought proper at the COW I U ellternene Or our r iittons to scud a certain force under the comma of Sir Ar thur ‘Vellesley, sod every circemispectilea was at. triode Ito on the es:coition, used an Aker was see; before, to ascertain the state of SRAM. The Noble, Earl has said much shout this force, which way' i previously tit routines* ; hot what would he have said, if Miiiiitters, at the time. hod not had a force prepared ? Besides, can it be mid, rending teal 12,000 turn, wider the command of Sir Artlitie S '~ '1 ti l i •S