The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1805-06-21 00:00:00

;11 .;, be United Parliament. They can no longer wish for env separation from this country, as even all topes of tranquil and lasting benefit would be for n i t , fletl, when under the dominion of France. unfortunately, however, considerehle drienotent• rust naturally remain amongst t'lle.mejority of the ee o P le, as long as there is may jealousy or distrust I,emein them and their government, the conse quence of which is, that Ireleed, instead of being, it is cahrulated t o be, a tower of strength to the to spire in general. now only tends to our geaeral weakness and iesecurity. The suspicions of the Go vernment h the the effea of keeping a large portion o f our military to keep down disturbances, and serve for the protection of that country against any attempt upon it from abroad. This state of things, I leer, must continue some time to come, and as l o ng as any difficulty remains onpesei to the claims o f t he Catholics, they will, re course, be in some wee discontented. Whenever that impediment shall b e re moved, we have no reason to doubt of perfect cordiality of iffeetion prevailing amongst the people (tithe two countries In the mean time much may certainly be done by the Government of Ireland, even without a repeal of the restrielions on the Ca tholics i but. unhappily, we have reason to lament that Lord klerdwicke's mild anl conciliating dispo sition is very diff.ent from that of some other men of high authoria y, with whom he finds himself as sociated. Unfortunately, we find yet in that sours try, a N oblemen , one o f the first in the Administra- eipn (we believe Lord Reddesdale), whose strone; prejudices must be in the minds of the great maj a n y of the Irish nation, and must, therefore, ever r ' evert nine from being agreeable to them. — Thinking as I do upon that point, and being of o pinion that the minds of meta there, can scarcely ever be coneilteed under such circumstances, I own, that I view the continuance of the Noble man alluded to in his important station, with very gre..t anti ty, as I do not conceive that any thing ,ffeattel can be dune there, except by the efforts m a mild and united government. In treat ing of the state. objects, and occurrences of the war in general, it is with sstisfalion that I see one pleas ing ex •eption in the war in India. The circum stele. s which have taken place in that quarter, thoieei not hitherto sufficiently explained, e s not T re,e.it any disagreeable contemplation to tin. Bri t 'mpire ; but, looking to the remainder of our 11,, in et defensive operations, I can observe no thieg to be admired in them. Having ail s.dy .hewn that no ;:teat improvement has been made in our militoy system and posture of defence, I come next to connect. ;he objeCts, as well as theeffe.ls of the war. As to tee nbjea, it was professed to be the necessity o f putting limits to the encroachments and bound leas ambition of France, as also to diminish the pow . aof that country. Such being the ostensible objeets, eref have next to look to what have been the effeEts ef it. Instead of diminishing the encroachments and riser of our enemy, we now observe the iron CrolOn of Italy lately placed on theheed of rhe French I' for. Spain, from b-ing our Friend and Ally, is n w converted into an aeliee enemy. Even Pm tug I, so long in &hence with Great Ilritein, is now red ced to such a state as to be obliged to purchase a e g:aceful and precarious neutrality, by the pay ment of her treasures. and thus gives our enemy .t rat eirdituit support than he could derive from i any hostile efforts that country could make age st us. Flanders and Holland, so nearly conneEtcd with us in fernier times, arc, the one incorporated with France, and the other su'ieeesd to his power, so that the resources of the twe ate united with those ot the enemy against us. Haeovcr, completely in the power and possession ot the French Emperor, is redeced to the necessity of furnisitieg hint with considerable means for making War against its own and legitimate Sovereign. In fine, bar. we till all the most sanguine hopes of Frelieh ambirt,in re..11,,d, end. the Alpi, the Pyre nees, the Rhine, and the Ocean, insufficient Es...le-l arks fur Its extensive and encreasing empire. The posture which the enemy assumes is the mot formidable that can be well conceived.---lt holds Italy and Hanover as strong stations, to cor,troul and overawe the Emperor of Germany. The vast space she occupies. either direaly or indi reteiy, in the map ot Europe, together with her im mense population, will be sufficient to convince us of the vast extent of her resources for military opt retorts. We do not know, at this time, of any detal , reigns in the revenues, or credit of the F renchGii• vetament, and 1 suppose that will scarcely again be conteueed, as was once done before by our present M i sister, that they were not only on the brink, but in the very gulph of t urn. similar asset tines were also made tga celebrated writer in this country, Sir Francis .• a van.; s, whose writings long predifted that France, ie the prosecution of the veer, 'twit hievi tatey Le ruined in its finances. Tee French mi nister of fiaance. however, in ti s last report upon that subjett. asserted that no more debts could be accurnmeted by the war, but they already had meat s to cure it on for ten years to come, and that Nvialieet :ter enlargement of expenses they might teontitaue it for thirty years more ; that its Glut alloil fur another tea years would make no difference to Fume, while the continuance .f it by this coml • try wnti:l cost no less than four milliards 1 and teat whatever may be the exponces of France. . as it slid not exceed thirty mations annually, would be completely covered by its regular re venue. Even Sir F. D'lvernots himself admits, that whatever their unsocial defalcetions were before, they tumid means to supply them ;luting the wee by contrhnttaons raised upon other commies, and that there is no &Sett now, thous.. he is of opi n i on , th at i t ttfast operate prixertully in i mute, MS LEC means were exhausted ot replenishing tlemi from the territories of °diet s. I, however, this hot perceive that these is match elience ot this last helsPenmg ; and, considering the enormous power and population of that country, with no 11.01 C than an expenditure of :10 millions annually, I see no rea toe to expel, that if this be in reality a war to be Be tided by tinence, the revenues of France are likely to be ruined. The contrast, on the contrary, I consider AS very uafavourebte, when France can go on with the War at the expellee 4, 1 - 30 millions or less, while it costs this c..uetry from TO to tiO millions a year. The next ulajesn to be consiecree it, the state 01 the armies cl France, which we tied to he Ind a.:11 com plete in every tespeel, composed ot disetp.istrol, el peri:,Lc2d aad VCCI.TiII Lumps, commaneed by offi cers of rich appioved reputation and abilities, its.-- cieeang the most formidable stations, to overawe and intimidate their Otighhours, and numerensly assembled in the opposite and convenient ports of that country, of Holland, Flanders, Spain, and Italy, still threatening us with all the horrors and dangers of invasion. Looking next to the unexpeCted condition of her navy, what an extraordinary scene presents itself? England, by all its bnaated naval exertions, has launched, in the last year, only three additional ships of the line, and no more than seven-frigates. France, on the other hand, has been enabled to col. left, in the same year, twenty-five ships of the line; Spain as many more, equipped and ready for service, which, when combined with the Dutch force, will muster eighty-fear ships of the line, which is only eight vessels short of the last returns of the British navy. In ad titian to them, we must take into ac count their great proportion of frigates and innu merable flotillas, and thus view, with awe, how much the enemy has been, in so short a time, able to etfeft, by skilful management and judicious com bination. By these exertions he has found means of occupy all our ships in the blockade of his nume toil, ports, and in the mean time contrives also to send nut squadrons for offensive operations against us. This, Sir, is the sad discouraging scene produced in the proseewion of a two years war, professedly undertaken for the diminution of the power of the enemy ? What are we to think of the secure sailing of the French fleet from 'Poulon, their proceeding to Cadiz, and subse qitently effeCting a junftion with the Spanish squad ron in the very sight of the English fleet stationed off that harbour? The Toulon fleet arrived at Cadiz on the !nth of April, and the next day, after being joined by the Spaniaido sailed again in company on the 10th ; and, wh it is still more strange, has not since been heal(' if, hor do we at all know what part of the world was their destination. Our management on the occa sion was certainly such as to demand the most se rious enquiry, and it is astonishing to fiad that no investigation of it has since taken place. I should be sorry to say any thing that may be thought to refl on a gallant officer, but such a condo it as that ob served by him on this occasion was such as had never before passed withoutiexaminationin the British navy. 1 am decidedly of opinion, that nothing ever more tended to produce that superiority of which we al wilt justly boasted on the was, than the judicious seleftion of competent officers to be employed upon every station. Any thing which could be thought to imply disgrace has always, heretofore, created meth jealousy in the royal navy, and such a cir cunistence as that of Cadiz should not be allowed to pass without satisfis3ory explanation. It is, in deed. possible, that the great superiority of farce which the combined fleets might have over him, de terred Sir John Orde from making any resiitaoce to them; but as other men, of superior spirit and de termined intrepidity, have been known in the late war (alluding, we snopoie, to the celebrated exploit of Admiral Cornwallis leaving only five ships, against a French squadron of thirty-six sail, of different rate.) to fight even against an equal or greater disparity of numbers, the public, surely, must think it right, and will expect that Sir John °ode should account for having retired before them. I have lately received a representation of the English Let off Cadiz, that the Adoei ral's ship, the G!..my. #s well as the Agnnernmen, the Centaur, Ihe Peizatierioss, said the Bay, were a very unserviee &hie state, which, if true, contains a serious and severe charge against the Board of Admiralty, though their being also short of water and other necessaries seems to rest more immedi ately with the Admiral. This is the state in which the English fleet is generally represented to have been ; but, on the other hand, why is not Sir John Orde, if he found himself too weak to face the com bined squadron, obliged to account for his not taking a station between them, m as to prevent their junc tion, while he sent for a reinforcement ? If his ships were in this bad and Jecrepid state, why did he not represent it to the Board of Admiralty? Why was ha short of water and stores, when he had Malta and Sicily convenient to him ? If he was of ne cessity Inroad to retire before the eliemyo why did he not leave some vessel to watch, and convey in telligence of the course they were steering ? When Lord Nelson arrived at Gibraltar in pursuit of the enemy, he found no ship, nor could lie gain any in telligence of what became of Sir John Orde ur his squadron, and under these circumstances surely the subjeft demands at least a satisfactory explanation. oss to the destination of this squadron, the reports and rumours of it seem so very various, that little more is left for it but mere conjefture. Some per sons suppose, that it was destined for Jamaica, while sobers imagine that it sailed fot the coast of Brazil. In either case it is calculated to do a great deal of mischief. The capture of Jamaica, which could not probably oppose an adequate resistance, would be produatve of great consteinatioa in the commercial world. Both these points of attack were of the utmost importance, anal the rich posse: 7 sions of Portugal in the Brazils would be of as great, if not greater consequence to us, than even Jamaica itself. The Port of Rio de darner°, and others, would give the enemy a serfs, strong, and conveni en station, where they would be secure from any British rouse that could be brought against them, and would enable them to cruise in the rear of our East In tie trade; and also give them the command of the trade to South America. A slight reference to the map will shew the importance of this station in a military point of view, independently of its rich produCtions; and, in the opinion of some of the ben informed persons, would be more advan tageous to them than the possession of Egypt, which we so strenuously contended for. Another suppo sition is, that the destination of the combined squad ron has for the East Indies; and, every thing con %Meted, I must confess that I would rather have them there than in either of the other two places; for though by a co-operation with some of thenative pow ers still in arms Against us, they might do much mis chief for a while, yet the effefts of it would be so re motely felt by this country, that little could ulti mately be apprehended, as they would have to contend against two such distinguished officers as Sir Edward t'ellew and Sir 'Phoirtes Trowbridge. But while we may consider ourselves as tolerably safe from our superior force in the East, we are in no state whatever to cope with the enemy, either at LI:II.I 7 CA or the Brazils ; and such is now the com pete:lye superiority against us, that France might strike a fatal biow m ether of these quarters, king before we could tolled any sufficient meals of pre- venting them. Considering, therefore, this situa tion of France, in point of revenue, as Well as naeal and military ((lice, we cannot be without serious grounds of apprehension. It may, indeed, be said. that however ill we succeeded in other respells, we had at least repelled the danger of invasion ; but the worst of it is, that while we see them prevailing in so many other quarters, they do not still cease to threaten to; with that invasion. For my own part, I never was of opinion that an invasion could spec dily be effeded ; and should it happen, I never had the smallest doubt of what must be the result of it : but I know, that the preparation for it, on the part of the enemy, would oblige us to incur a very enormous expenditure,and keep our best military force at home for out own protedion His Majesty's speech, at the opening of Parliament, informed us, that the enemy's preparations in the different ports went on with increased adivity, ant I can see no reason to sosped that the plan has been abandoned. We all must know, that whatever may be the temper of the French Emperor, he is by no means subjeft to passion in his military enterprises; and it is clearly evident, that the invasion of this country is now quite as predicable as it ever was before. Ihe de signs of the enemy will be more regulated by the state of his own preparations, than by the danger of the attempt, while we can see no material improve ment in our military system, and no one objed of the war hitherto accomplished. For this reason, we should call upon the Ministers to state explicitly, what hopes they now entertain of doing more against the enemy than they have hitherto done, and what means they have of effeding it? We cannot longer congratulate ourselves, or entertain any expeda dons from the deranged state of France, as has been done heretofore, while we see them holding sta tions in Germany so advantageous and strong, as to enable them to controul and overawe the whole of that Empire, and find that no progress has yet been tnade iu forming alliances for ourselves. The com munication of last night (which he hire real) affords us no light whatever on this subject, and I believe there never has occurred any instance or example in the history of this country, where Government made such declarations, and yet kept the public and Parliament so entirely in the dark. To all former communi, ations of ths kind it was usual for His Ma jesty to state at the opening of Parliament in time of war, either that it still continued, in consequence of being unable to obtain advantageous terms of peace, or that we had offered terms, or that negotiations of alliance were then in train. This message, on the other band, did only state that we had confidential communications with foreign powers, but, though Russia was barely mentioned, did not inform us whether we were likely to have any alliance with that power, or whether the negotiations were for the purpose of obtaining A peace, or for the joint prosecution of the war. I will not dispute the justice of the position laid down in His Majesty's Speech, that the security of his dominions is intimately con neEted with the general state of Europe, nor can I see any prospel of accomplishing any of the objeds of the war, but by a coalition with some of the great Powers of the Continent. I also admit, that, under certain circumstances, it might be out of our power to make a desirable peace, without the concurrence and assistance of Foreign Powers. But what I must objed to is, carrying on, single-handed, a merely defensive war, without being able to make any hostile impression on the enemy. - A defensive war, though a paramount objc in times and cases of im minent danger, is to me preferable only to an in glorious and disadvantageous peace. If we are obliged to continue the contest, it should he done with allithe power we could bring into adion, and with proper regard to a celebrated quotatiop 4-- PossA qua plurima virtus Es%e, t, et tote czrtstuni est corpare regni." —lf a combination on the Continent be predicable in our favour, I should certainly give it the prefer ence to any peace that could not be obtained upon reasonable terms, hot I should prefer the latter, if we bad even the next beet security for its stability, to that of reducing the power of the enemy, through the guarantee or aftive mediation of some of these leading powers. If there be no other way of making a peace but through the interference of friendly powers, that fad should be explained and proved to the satisfaCtion of the public. It is impossible, that if our negotiations were in any forwardness at the commencement of the session, they should not have been brought to some conclusion before this time. 'The overture made by France, stated no terms, but offered the opportunity of negotiating, which I should have been willing to receive. and at the same time invited the other great powers of Europe to a general congress for that purpose. We have hi therto been left in complete ignorance of the views and designs of our Government. This situation of things is unprecedented in the annals cf tins coun try. We are asked to appropriate 5,000.00di. of money for Continental purposes, without knowing whether it be or he not for the contingent chant: cf assistance. who the parties are, or what is their power, situation, or disposition—a degree of confi dence waich this House should never place in any Mintfter. When tubsid es were voted in the last war, the power and dispositions of the parties to whom they had been granted, were the subjed of daily debates among-t us. Ido not oppose the vote of a subsidy, as such, but wish to be informed of the nature of the service which the parties have engaged for, and what is their power of being effec tual? I can, indeed, scarcely think that the co operation of Austria, or Prussia, singly,or a coalition with Russia, without the assistance of one or other of them, would be well worth the purchase, as there is not one of them which I think able to do any thing very material of itself against France. It would be right also to consider in this respell the advanced period of the year, for we ate now draw ing towards the end of June, and I know of no military dispositions as yet made by Russia, which in the present year could he brought to bear upon the French. My principal ()Ned is, that the House should not separate without some explanations on this head from His Majesty's Ministers. It thinga are in so unfinished a state. that it would not be ht to snake any further conei. lication now, the remedy would be to keep thin Session open by ad journments, till the proper period shall arrive, what ever impatience some Gentlemen may have to retire to the country. 1 shall therefore conclude with moving, " chat an humble Address be His Majesty, praying that he pleased nst to prorogue the ~. -.. R may be expedient to afford farther explanit ;an epla tire to his pending negotiations with tore;g pnive.s, and the views and objetts of them, in reference to the contest in which His Majesty is engaged." Lord CASiTI..F.REAGH sale he would not at tempt to follow the Hon. Gentleman through all the long Ind very able speech he had jdst made, as. if he did, he should necessarily trespass too long on the time of the House ; he would. therefore, content himself with applying his arguments to such parti cular parts of it as appeared to him to require oh serrations to be made on them. The Hon. Gentle man, towards the conclusion of his speech, had al luded to the vote his Right Hon. Friend meant to call for on a future day, and, under all the circum stances of the case, had cautioned the House to be careful how they place confidence in Ministers to such an extent as the sum now wanted. He hoped, however, to convince the House, before he sat down, that if they have not a proper degree of confidence in the present Government, they..hould endeavour to obtain one in which they can place confidence. In many parts ..f the Hon. Gentleman's speech he differed very little from him. He agreed perfthly with him, that at no period of our history was the country more true to itself. lie held also the same opinion with regard to the present state of Ireland. In short, he believed there never was a period in which the picture of the actual situation of the country presented so favourable an aspe&. He admitted that the lion. Gentleman may, as a Mem ber of Parliament, call on Ministers, not only for an account of the resources of the country. but also to shew how they were administered. But, however much he may doubt the ability of Ministers, lie must admit the general prosperity of the country. He confessed he rejoiced ire that as much as any man could do, but at the same time assured the House, that he would not wish to make that at any time whatever a ground for the continuance of war, if peace could be obtained on safe and honourable terms. The Honourable Gentleman had stated that \ Ministers had at the commencement of the war boasted that our finances were in such a state, the war could be carried on for some years, without making any addition to our debt. That calculation was, however, made on the supposition that the ex pences were to remain on the same scale they were at that time; but if, wince that period, more exten sive measures have been adopted than were then foreseen or expeded, it could not be matter of sur prise to any one that the expences should be very much increased, and therefore tl.ey were, in the course of things, higher this year than they were the last. But the Honourable Gentleman was certainly incorren, when he stated the increase of thirty mil lions; he must know that was only the nominal in crease, and that in reality it was not more than half. There were two parts of the system of Administra: tion, in which the Honourable Gentleman had stated he thought our situation bad, viz. the as my and nava-. He thought, however, the Hon. Gentleman could .tot but in candour allow that the state of the army was very materially altered fur the better than it 'e is atthe period he had alluded to. The Noble Lord AIL wed that circumstanced as this country is at present, we could not carry the army to too high a push, either in numbers or discipline; but he was certain that in comparison with the amount of the army in 1 .02, which was during the last war, and vamp it was in a complete state, and yet it had since then Matas , ed very - much. to lnere, -be as -adistai.-19 174,000 men ; on the Bth of June, 1 sr , it was 176,199 men ; in that it is now higher than it was at any mind during the last war, when it was at the' high:st stare of improvement to which it could arrive. In the beginning of 1804, the whole regular force was 232,000; it was now 247,000 men, which clearly sheered an increase of 15,0uu men for our home defence. In cur various settlements abroad there were then • about 50,000. At present there were 77,000 men. He [tasted, therefore ' it wc ohl appear the exertions of Government had not been Small when it was evident they had in so short a time in creased the regular army 34,0)0 men. The in crease of the disposethle Infantry was 22,000, and in both that and the gross force, the general aspect was such as to be highly encouraging : In the four first months of this rear the adcution was 20,000, and there was a very fair prospect ; that in'the course of the next eight months there would be at least 15,00) more, which gave in the whole year an increase cf 3.5,000 mint aid that he thought was one of the strongest proofs that Govern ment had left no means untried to increase the re gular army, and had succeeded very much in their en deavours. The 0 , her branch et the system to which the Hon. Gentleman had al:u led was the navy. In this he had endeavoured to shew that very little adif tion had beets made by the Noble Lord who was last at the head of the Admiralty Board. The Hon. Gent. had said there were no more than three ships of the line added during the period of that Noble Lord being at the head of that Board. He ought, how ever, to have stated the whole number of those ships which were obliged to be put out of commission, and the number necessary to supply their plater. He would then have sbewn that in the whole time during which Lord Melville was at the head of .I,e Admiralty, there were added to the navy 43 sal; cf the line, 32 frigates, 53 gun-brigs, and 33 fire ships. making in all 170; so that the number of ships now in commission, of all kinds, exceeded by 60, those of the period to which the Hon Gentleman alluded. The Hon. Gentleman had thought roper to state the causes of the war, in winch, however. he was very wrong. Government did not enter into the war, as the Han. Gentleman chose to as-nine, from the speculative hope cf reducing the power of France, from the sole means of the resent-re, of this country, but from a thorongh convielion, founded on the general condo& of the enemy, that they had no choice ; and that if they had not made a stand when they did, they would have been guilty of as aft of folly and weakness, for which the Hon. Gentleman might very fairly and justly have him, e 4 them. The Hon. Gentleman was, however, 'vie content with haring named untruly, the objeft of Ministers in entering into the war, but he had pm ceeded and made as unfair and uncandisf a coati:ism on the mode in which they had carried it on. With all the great and acknowledged superiority of o .r ival force, it cannot be supposed that we can at ail times keep a safirci nt number of ships for the pro of refore conclude wen a..... ... e , - --•.....-- __ __ ._ Jdruss be presented to reetion of our varii)as fireign stativlns, and for our would be gracioliii home cktence, and be always superior. or even equal Parliament before it in number to the enemy in all places. We MUM for