The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1809-02-25 00:00:00

in this coots*: was the dispatching of Sir Arthur Wellesley wielLbislorce. and although it will tip per to any fie& who reads superficially the in &tractions of 'th Noble Lord opposite, (Lord Cas tlereagh) to Orel gallant General upou that occa oiort, which ark contained in his letter of the 13th June, and 13tli July. he was left at liberty to act according to his own discretion in consequence of any information he might receive ui on the coast of Spain ; yet it is obvious that in fact that discretion was taken away from him, and that the expedition to the Tagus was fixed oil by the Noble Lord as that by which hostilities were to begirt. When the gallant General arrived upon the coast of Spain, he thought proper to apply to the Juntas of Gellicia and of the Asturias far iiifortnatioo. Ile was told, (I speak from his OW4I words, uttered upon a late debate) that they did not want turn to he sent i.sto Giallicia ; that they considered the expedition to Portugal, and the dislodgment of the French 1 . from that quarter, as prekrable to its being . sent into their urn cipi3try. !le said that . . Vie most intelligent Members of the. Junta of , :,;,,,h,, thoo.. t ht. the he shrill(' go to St. Andero, fa: ner than land •upuo the coast of Spain, and . .tile gallant General flintier said, that his own opinion was, ulna the presence of the liiitisli army in Sorkin was at that time indispensably necessary, in order to connect the Spoilierds Louring them selves, its order to induce a co-operation which otherwise could not e'ost, to etleet a. jiniction Ire t veto the northers SM.; sontlieni forces, and I,e as s;gued that as a 1C.L. ,,, .1 I s ortql:111111Olg the arathi tie... When the &olt General went to Por tngal, the 1)11111 of the campaign Wrim decided ; there was no longer any room fur deliberation; there wailing) longer any room to act upon tiny infor mation tll4 might he received with regard to Spain. When the Noble Lord directed his force to the Tagus, it became impossible to apply any force iii favour of Spain until that expedition was in sonic way or other concluded. 1 do not mom, I um sore, to revive the debate which leis passed with r -gaol to Portugal. It is a subject in itself b urn-, ',neatly reflecting, and we have 1i...0,1 mi mach of it that there is norlibig to mime Inc to re new it.—/hear.' War .' near . I )—A . ..ter that Con vention in Portugal ups coucluiled, the British force, cousisting o;* th;rty thousand in-o. was 111 rb s pombl e fove. to lir ap iied as ills Majesty ' s Ministers tliongrit proper. (Too the 3.1t11 - A cost the Converitiou wit s'gnerl. the eompoittri or Por tugal was at 14 coil. I desire then to know why it was that ' , Mill it 14.401 of time ebipssil betocen ' t'er conclusion of the Convention of Coma, and tire ifith dav of October, when Sir Joloi Nlisore wit nut from Portagnl for B a al; (lira,. ! h. - at.') The gallant General (Sir Artlior 11;e11,..Lo 1, a lthou 4 h ha obeyed the Noble Ltd, dill It 11:1:1,t the eon.. virrion of the aboolute neceosity of 4 lliilish iteiny enteritis Spats, ; the Spaniards theillsrll,4:6 4. , - elared that necessity ; he agreed with them, as he saw they wanted it, so as to form a connection between the different armies as a great botid of union, orineut„uad co-operation. I desire then to know why, between those two periods, no steps were taken to remove the force of Sir John Moore from Spain. Upon the 13th of Octobor, Sir David Baird arrived et 01111111311, with a force inferior to that of Sir John Moore—a force intended for son junction and co-operation with them; but as appears from the pave,' before the House, not for the purpose of separate action. It was not until the it 7111 of October that , his army wee disembarked sit Comma, Up to the 17th of September, I have heard it said, that none of the Juntas could be called the Supreme Junta, but upon that day the Central Supreme Junta was installed at Madrid, and yet it was said to he necessary to have waited from the 13th of October to tise.37th of that mouth, until that army could obtain permission from the Supreme Junta to go to the North of Spain. 1 desire to know, if pone of the agents of the Ministers in Spaie in rosined our General of what was going on in that country, curl of the time wheo it was necessary that the army should assume its situation and exer - . else its functions. It does not appenr that they had any person called an acteedited minister or ambiissolor in that country, until Mr. Frere was sent, awl he tea does not appear to have been appointed until the 7th of November. Ought not such a communication at least to have been kept iip with that body, as that the general arriving with the force could know whether the Spaniards would receive theta or nut, and yet all that time elapsed before any itiformation could be obtained by Sir Mehl Baird, when he landed at Coming, as to whether lie would be received us a friend by those whom he went to assist. Ido not mean to insinuate ally disparagement of Mr. Frere, I do not wish to &enlist. lair merits, they may he as great as those of any man whatever in Ills Ma- . jeaty's tweeter, in his eilicial ditty, but in my hum ble opinion Mr. Frere was rust the proper person to he sent to Spoin.—( Mar. Ilea:, hear !! A mili tary man was the proper person to be stilt to that eoontry. It was eitlirlitiallV a military appoint ment. or it was nothing. lithe whole entintry ant not ready to Were!) •rins iii its defence, amd ready to be organixed by the th•ol exii.O rig Government', and ant with us liguitist Vrance. 1 say there was no ohnnee orsuccess in Spain, for it would oat he safe for us to employ a railitare force in their &floe— I say, therefore, that the proper person to be sent noon that occasion was a unlit:icy, and not a bell oifieor. On the 16th of October, as I before stated, stir John Moore moved fur Spain, and, on the ail, of November, he reached Sala:manta : on the lath he was followed and joined by most part of his army, and, indeed, upou that day, it may be considered as eseembled at that place. It may be for the 'lroise to consider bow he was empleyed all this ti ne. The force, which the Emperor of the Fry-nett bad originally sent to Spain and Portugal, had ap wired to him inadequate for his purpose*: the sorrender of Dupont had weakened it, and broken the connection between its different parts, and in short. all the French force retiring towards the extremities of Spain, was found concentrated is; Navarre. The Emperor of the French himself bed not, at that time, a suffieieut force to enable pint to accomplish his purpose, and he found it incumbent upon him to withdraw hir troops from the Danube and the Vistula, which had been CO.. gaged in the Polish campaign. The distnnee they ball to march was prodigious, and they had go nameitlnse means, fuck to this countrY had, to enable MI IN I F----- . , , .tboo WNW with that precipitation that was nee's ; lost no time in marching forward M conspanions in mass io that part of the w ' a French Emperor himself quitted his •ac , after declaring to his Legielutive Semite his ioteatioos of sabjuguting Spain. Hemet the Etn taiiieritte Maisie at Erfurth, and no sooner were the matters to be concerted betvegn them adjusted, Mss be returned, and met his Legislative Body, and repeated what he had said before to the Senate, and on the sth of November, three days before the English army had reached Salamanca, he set him self at the head of that army winch ha d come from the shores of the Danube and the Vistula. What was the cause of the feebleness of the one power, compared with the energy and activity of the other? I desire to know, why the most effectuul means were trot taken to secure the immediate jutic tiun and co-operation of our force with that of Spain? When it is well known that this eountry euuuot furnish a military force at all equal in point of number to the military force of France, it appears the more necessary that when you are to employ your force against her, that that force should be kept as much assembled together as possible, so that it should be foetid in one compact consolidated body, not broken into freginente, nor scattered here and there, but that the wisdom of His Majesty's Ministers should At least attempt to secure success by the means of an easy junction of our armies previous to their being met by the enemy. What were the consequences o f the dif ferent plaits of 'action observed by the Euelisle ,end the French Goveraments? The g Unit General told us that be considered the presence of the Bri tish army necessary to keep gyms union and co-mtera tios of the S i sunisa forces ; he conitnnuicated, I pre sume, that opinion to Ills Nlajesty's 'Ministers ; no one can question it ; he is an Officer of too much military science to have with-held from Ministers the knowledge of that which was the most import nut point, perhaps, of any fur the success of the reinforcements wilt from this country. If lie were conscious of that, lie must also have known that the sooner that army was there, the more chalice was there of success, and the later the more likely !to be defeated. On the tenth of November, the Sea.,ish armies of Eetraursdura and Leon were del - elite I and overthrown by the French. Upon ' the 12:1. of time wane month the armies commanded by Roman] and by Blake were overthrown at Es ',mete and Reynosa. There was not to be found nu the lith of November ally Sounialt army that deserved the name of a military force, mud on the 14th of the same month the English General and iii 3 army arrived. What were the views of the English arms; bat to produce union amid co-oper slimy anweget the Spaniards I Was this to be ef keted after their armies had been defeatedeto as that tiothisig wailer' when the English tinny left S.:da mes:c.a. What del your army do ? lit what situ rition slid Sir David Baird till;i himself, in oiler to effect hisjuncteit with Sir John Mooil!? lie found nothing but inability to make • forward wove uncut at the time when it was landed. I have heard that so destitute was it in smile respects, when. permitted to land upon the Spanish coast, that Sir David Baird had not even tnoueyenongh to defray the necessary repulses of the arms. That in send - - lug au expedition by sea, it el iy be liable to some accidents in regard to the ships that convey your" ordnance and ausmoolitioa, I will admit; but that you should amid ati officer with a force ander his co:nu:arid, without even a few casks of money to purchase provision', I scarcely could have believed possible. 1 have heard, however, that that gallant Officer had not even money enough to obta;n a supp!y of necessary provisions, but had to have recourse to obtai ' g that credit from pri vate iwlividuuls, which Government had neglected to afford liiiu. The campaign went on as mi l iht be expected : after the destruction of the Spanish armies, I have mentioned. it was not difficult to conceive that the army wider Cast:tuns. called the Ariuy of the Centre, was very soon to follow ; and accordingly, min the eed of November, it suffered a defeat. Thus. Sir, those three armies iv hie:i we ere to tiresome eve ready to unite with ours, were severally overcome by the power of Franee: where as, if the army of England had been ready to erect it junction, I the armies of the French sight have bees defeated. and they might have been saved the trouble of a few forret! marches. These armies being beaten in the field, nothing 're ' mained to the Spaniards but to defend the puss , of the Sierra, but there too a defeat was sustained, sod on the .30th of November it was forced. All this time not a single British soldier had appeared in action against the French. Celerity of movement. quickness, dispatch, and promptitude of action. appear to have been the only things that seemed neoetwery to the galluut General : awl yet, from what causes I know not, but from some causes hi therto unexplained, no British force found its way into Spain, until all the Spanish armies had beets overthtown, and Madrid had again Capitulated to Bonaparte (liter! Hear! liter!) Do not these circumstances demand inquiry? Is it not necessary to know why the character of this country has been traduced by our conduct in Spain ? Is it not necessary to knew why out force was or no use to our elites, no iujory to our rue sates, :mad that it could effect nothing, but nth' its own character for bravery and intrepidity ?—ln this situation Sir John Moore found himself in the month of December, and it appears that it had Men the ititeutioa both of Sir David Baird and. Mr John Moore to retreat so soon as they learnt of the eurrender of Madrid and the defeat of Castanets. fee it was evidently imprudent to keep the field against .such a force is the French Emperor could bring:o;4l,Bst them. Orders, as I have been inform ed, were Actually issued for that retreat. and fortu nate I think It would have been had those order', been persevered in, and that retreat commetwed at that particalar time, if it omit, have been effected without injury to thou. brave troops that oomposed oar army, but the opinion of the Comu.ander-io- Chief Agin n chaueed, and 'desire to know whet were the cause,' that lit odureell the change.—(Hear !) Why after the capitulation of Madrid, sod the advancement of Bonaparte as victor, that retreat was not adopted-1 think the House will desire this itifermation. Was this spontaneous interfer ence of the General himself, or was it the officiol interference of that at home ? I hive beard that Sir John Moore did receive dispatches from the Supreme Junta, and front Mr. Frere s urging him • to advance. I have temdltingitioadirepeasstr • tufts from Mr. Frere of tNt. great etraigth tea. Spaniards 'in the South of Spain, sod that if he, . 1 in conjunction with the Spauish force, .atitseked the enemy there, the Spanish cause, then almost lost, might still be retrieved. I have heard that it was urged to Sir John Moore repeatedly, that he should advance.' I know that this is true, but still our geaeral ignorance demands an inquiry into the veracity of these reports. On the 21st of December Sir John Moore arrived at Selo, and on the 22(1 of December the Emperor of the French left Madrid with a great force. On the %utli of that mouth, such were the efforts of this hot ad vance, that Sir John Moore felt it necessary to re treat again, and under such circunistences too, that if he had remained for '24 hours longer, and engaged Marshal Smiles corps, it was almost next to certainty that not a single soldier could lime returned home. I state this upon the autho rity of officers with whom I have conversed, who gave me as their opinion, that if the British army had engaged with Marshal Sault, it ne ver could have effected its retreat Hi it did.— Sir, in order to account for these proceed. lugs, it is necessary that this House should in stitute the fullest inquiry ; it is necessary to know in what situation Sir David Baird mid Sir Joins Moore found that country, when they ndranced into it; whether that enthusiastic spirit which could alone save them from destruction, actually existed ;• it is necessary to know whether they were willing and cordial io their assistance to the English army; whether they received thei6 as deliverers, or as their goests, with love or with jealousy and fear, and to ascertain what they had to rely upon when they found themselves in the presence of u great hostile army. We must necessarily destitute this inquiry, in order to determine whether it was wise or not for His Majesty's Ministers thus to hazard, in the heart of Spain, one of the best of armies that has ever been sent out of the country. It is necessary to know what military force Sir John Moore found to co-operate and unite with them, and whether he found may thing in the field of battle, except time British and the French soldiers. Perhaps it may be said by Mi nisters, that the Spauiards did not discover all that cordiality and co-operation with us in that cause in which we were mutually engaged, that was ex pected. ('an it be proper, or can it be admitted, that Ministers shall say t his after they have in volved the country in such -tt ruinous, unproduc tive, and inglorious struggle ? The retreat un der the mast inauspicious circumstances com menced, and what was the consequence of that retreat ? In that retreat you lost all your amino. nition, all your magazines, above 0000 horses, and a much greater number of men, time the gal font General opposite (Gen. Stewart) thought pro per to state to the House, when lie said that they unnoticed only to between 4000 and 5000. (Hear!) Our loss was great in consequence of that disastrous retreat, commenced under circumstances which 'thew that had we trusted to the prudence of the Commander, might have been avoided. Is it not true that a retreat had been previously ordered, au advance was made, hind that a retreat was again commanded to be made, and is it nut necessary fir us to inquire whether this was owing to the mis conduct of those at the head of the army, or of those at the head of His Majesty's Councils?— Deeply as we must lasuent the loss of those gallant officers and soldiers who have fallen upou this occasion, and deeply as we may lament the success of the enemy, it is not, perhaps, so ne- Englishmen, as it cessary in the eyes of may be in regard to the Continental powers to free ourselves from that injurious opinion. As to our military character, which must float in their minds, *ma these transactions, do not let us forget that, that although we. have obtained nothing but glory and renown, for our military bravery, Eng land has for ever lost its fame and character, as to a military nation. Were you to propose to send your soldiers again, us un esicouragement and aid of other foreign puwers„ upon uny future occa sion, what would be the answer ? It would be ! No I your troops are good and brave ; tour officers are skilful, intelligent, and courage ous; but there is something in tie: Councils of Lagland, or iii the nature and manner of the appli rainii of her force, that renders it impossible ever to place any reliance upon her military essistance." We have seen already what passed iu the last war with *France, when you appeared in Holland and Germany as auxilaries, you fulled in your efforts; bin true it is, that your force in these Cases was comparatively small ; the problem is ' solved, hy what has lately passed in Spain. Yon professed to send forth the largest army. that ever went from England, for the purpose of meeting the force of France; and what hes been the result ? It has been nothing but a shameful retreat before the armies of France, and a disgraceful escape from the power you anxiously wished to assist. Never eau we rely again upon the confi dence of any power of the continent in our mili tary exertions, however much they, and our. selves may rely 011 our maritime efforts. This campaign, I say, will have an influence upon the character of England long after any of us shall cease to live. As to the Pyrenean campaign which the Noble Lord lately described, I am sure I do not presutne to under-rate it, nor even to know the purport of it, but the moot informed persons state that it was in the North of Spain, somewhere near St. Andero, our efforts were likely to be usefully directed against the French force. The Noble Lord calls this a Pyreue:lii campaign ; but does he imagine that there is only one pass .favourable for the encroachments of the French—there are 11/) lest then thirty-four passes, and it is demonstrable that it was utterly impossible to keep the French army out of Spain, nod if this be true, bow came he ever to think of sending an English army into Spain—(Heer ! Hear ! Hear !) The Fiends army at the outset was 50,000 strong, and the "Spaniards found they were not able to drive 1 " them into their own territory, nod they themselves tell you this. If the Spaniards could net do that, how was it possible that you could beat the three or four hundred thousand uten.they might afterwards have east tb meet you in that minify ? 1 have con vened with no military man upon the subject, w h o h as not declared, that from the beginning, it was vain amid idk to hope for ultimate success in such itcontest. If this root force of Prance could 77 - 7 ' stet be kept out of Spain, 1 desire to kr , cst r i.y Sr John Moores army should. have been so ender'. gered by the imprudent advance that was made. —Was it merely that you could not bear the danger of death, Cult ::us moat hamming of all retreat* that ever was accomplished, took place. Was your character so degraded, that it war twee.- eery we should attempt to raise It by tuck th strut:- tive menus, in the eyts of the world I %t'r never, I believe, have wet the French upon. equel formes, that we hive nut invariably sheen our superiority. Are not the recollections of Maide, and of Egy pt, sufficient to conduce you and the world, of the truth of this assertion ? Do not these thines deserve insit:r! Is it not necesoury to know how Mmitteor have conducted thera:lves in nt. this expedite'', to the Continent, to know on what pritteiples they have (proceeded its e. contqt u, which you entered pith so touch ope, with so nAlt It heart and expectatioe t" a contest in which every Inim almost implicitly relied upon raisilig the power of Eneland, reducing the er g . frandizennto of France, and delivering Europe rom the grasp of tyranny ? Alec! how-have these hopes been blasted, how grievoui ly have our troops sittflred in their vain exertions, and how mural have Ministtirs involved the whole traf;/«. action in dankness and oloseurity. Is it not fleet:s uety to know why your army vim exposed to dan ger, and at the UMW lime to ?reduce welling that was good or ordvantageous to the country ? The soldier should always be prepared to die in hie country's cause, and I doubt arm that Lritish *oldie,* • are particularly impressed with that feeling ; but is it thence to be inferred that yon ore unneeersarily to expose them to dan gers, and to fruitless efforts, so us to bring ruin on themselves, and disgrace upon the nation ? —Other plans of campaign, I know, have been mentioned, which• fn the opinion of some ware likely to have been attended oitli great success; end these are the employing of the troops of Eng land for the purpose of garrisoning some of the strong posts en the continent, and particularly t upon the sea coast of Spain. I presume not to offer any advice upon that subject ; but I believe that that would not have gi% eta tut great benefit. The „Spaniards hate sheave us gra sit jealousy. At Cadiz our reception wine not flattering; and at Ferrol, not an alert was made in our favour. I have heard, but r entmot vouch fee the troth of the report, that even the force which iota Seal it little ago, from i,Lislson to Cudiz, has not-twee pernitted to eater 'the harbour. I have beard this from au authority ,which I deem eery greet, and I shall totatime to i believe it until it be contradicted. I ask the. Neese dims to institute an inquiry for the nut 'pose of discovering %that have been the motives that led Illioistery so to dispose of the force of the country, at first so full of confidence, and now ee full of doubt rend uneertuility as to Ic e d to the hos ,lief that the cause of Spain is desperate. I Ball upon the country to seek for this inquiry. in order to ;hew bow much distress, difficulties, dung . tre, trod perils unexampled, our gallant soldiers have endured in this fruitless and inglorious struggle. Is there an Englishman that could have Seel the exer tionsofsuell troops, and not rejoice in thim ? la there a peasant in the bleakest mountains of Scotland, or is tits !swarm bogs of Ireland, who is not proud of their conduct, and desirous of emulating their ex. • ample, and'of displaying equal courage and intre pidity ? I aver that all possess the same energy and courageour sentiments, and that all are equally ready to imitate their exam; le, and employ their exertions in their country's cause, and the more especially when they are convinced that their exertions will be judi:eiously and prudently applied. I call upon you, by the gratitude yost owe to those who were thus shamefully s u erimg at Corunna, by that which you owe to their em. panions in arms, who are still in etisteoce, and able and willing to guard their country, and to be em ployed upon any ben ice ; I call upon you by the interest you must take in those who yet remain to institute this inquiry, in order that they may not Lc sacrificed by a similar tuisconduca s spoil a future occasion. /Near! /Tear! Bede) I call upon jou, as you value the g!ery of our country, of our future power and reputation, as well as our interest, by every thing that can excite the exertion, of brave men, to institute this, iaves tigation for the satisfaction of all. The pmposi tiou I make to the Home is not for this er that mode of inquiry. I care not whether you de it by a Secret. a Select Committee, er a Committee of the whole House, for either of these will satisfy me, and will gain the object which the country Insist have in view." The Hight llotsourable Gentleman then coucluded his distinct and impressive state ment, by moving. 'FL at this House should ap point a Committee to inquire into the causes, con duct, and events of the late campaign in Spain." Lord CATTLLREAGH rose to state as shortly as he could his motives fur opposing the motion of the lion. Gentleman ; he hoped, that the House would not suppose that he bad been anxious to spread obscurity over the conduct of the war, or to keep the course of the events out of its view ; he could not help thinkine that the Honourable Gentleman come foreword with rather an awkwanl grace that night to state the whole of his ignorance of the transaction, and offer that ignorance as a reason for inquiry. Had the Ron. Gentleman moved for the papers which lie (Lord CASTLEREAGH) was willing, and had declared himself willing to produce, he thought it would bays furnished him with a more rational ground on which to found his motion Ins inquiry, than that ignorance of all informatien n eut . • which he had rested it that night. I-Is admitted ti if there was a printofacie ground upon the face of t 1..- transaction, it would be a good reason for inquiry •,; but tie denied that there was such prima facie, ground in the present instance. We had Helen only as auxiliaries to another power in that great cause. And the circumstances of success or &alum were to depend Principally upon that power, and tint upon its auxiliary ; at all events he was of 'oei- Mon that inforniutien ought to have been called for, before ass aetenipt was made to drag parliniumit into a proceeding from which sods ismonveisieuce was likely to result. Government, to justify their a ts, should prove that they were dictated by wire dons, end never was there a course more clearly ascertained and marked out. than that en which His Majesty's Ministers had acted its the con duct of the Spanish war. Every miehd,;ibre cast to he afforded to Sprain, and, n had ltvtlt dared in. hit Mejfisty's Sp! heat semoorso, en tt Iteinemsei edited( tiny ut relief of the emmitry ke w I Renewable Madma n h a d suffered themselves to he state of Spaiii.;' thut they per measures to satisfy th von of the country, of its ty, and its military strength. Hon. Gentleman would rear of arriving at satisfactory i points hr had no mewls of a ever it was, he thought he we in reconciling it with that culeated by his rife of the avoiding delay. He asked for any man going to Gallia provinces, to pronounce a e abjures previous to the rsounumeot with whom Th. only question in hi Spain was capable of m et:fort as afforded rational if this could be proved to Reese, he felt that it would . ;tretify the conduct of the (3 before them. It had been I *lnas of a people thetniel efforts of regular military fo WITT was a more energetic I ple, than by thaw of Sail emorplished every 'hula to the attempt, and the justic them ; 3 et they had borne better than regular semis thought it very little b censure them in the hou mid descend to the inja tile national character. He tack all that weight to ear some gentlemen %bere silly he thought that there were the cow. of Spain to inspire It we. k aowu that it was tb the whole (votary. It was jug upon another end procu operation by degrees, b rising at the same rootedl and content' for its indeepea the space of five or six I had risen. Bet it was riot that afforded hope; it also coarse of a very few mon an army in Andalusia, and tory over the French. H House, as a cirepanstanc Arleasee of the Spaniards i that when General Spe to know whether he *ha sistauce. they stated that own strength, and recomi the relief of Portugul. No heal* they were to look ; a picture of eocouragemt Seen ; the Spaniards had tagea, and would have enemy. if they had had t follow up their succeese the Oppositiois benches.) fairly with a philosophiesil ;fmriez hot were to en Whet that eta do, was easily inferred fir when in the course of tw driving 100.000 men fron occupied. and confined. I the Ebro. As to whethe operation adopted by Ili§ the hest that could be circumstances, he was . w ere two extreme °pima] which hr would shortly himself an advocate for tl niow had been thrown e earnest, she had the elei Within herself; and that train, being an insular taking any part in the cm that would go more iota of all her honours then policy, or one that coal/ deney to sink her reputat was another extreme mot of thieconntry, though r COOClliabk with sound pc no medium between a la effort, and recommender be kept at home. Wi of the effects that slid dace at home, if it fa grouted of objection to i really impracticable. V ing of troops abroad, the stivens, even of this cote fore, of the system, bey they had ample kiddie As to the extent of the thesauri Speuish troop. to fifty thousand. and he our forces in the liletlite al , istreace they could ; anal troops were sent, t ther ( invernutent had gi The honourable Gent Norte of Spain was the to, stall had *eked why A oak.° ? His Lord.hii his seam wilding the could nut commies a a thus to the Pyrenees. anon had asked why the bet if he had only al which hr (Lord Carden would at least have he questia. Though St. good plater to have sent inalitare man wonld the tem her was past : the ft limited port. end as French troops opens th a very expevel shatter there were NO Silentah a 4orga en the Ifith of nitelicatieso with the appointed to inquiry taken that course with his iastructiont to ti . •