The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1809-10-11 00:00:00

IN roving Antwerp and the French army behind him, thau to undertake to invest Antwerp and be siege it. This much with regard to the same bide. On the side of the river, the following are the ob. stades which must have stopped the English : Ist. Fort Frederick and Fort Dorf, each mount ing fifteen 36-pounders ; after these, Fort Lillo and ' the Fort of Liefltenshotit ; curl mounting sixty 26-pounders and ten itiort.irs; and behind, a line of eighty gun-boats and pinnaces, mounting two hundred 24-pounders. Now, every sensible man who knows that there is only a distance of 600 fa thoms between Fort Lifla mid the Fort of Liefkens lioek, which is opposite to it, perceives that this passage cannot be for,ed. With regard to fire ships, it is well {Enna°, that fireships and infernal InsAines • are ineffectual. The infernal v hies erns let ott . at St. Melo had no effect; these •OS of explosions were never able to shake a rem ain. Au estatedo lied beau established, which se -tired our gun-bouts •from tire-ships. lii fine, i‘e had also fire-ships; sixteen were already in readi ness, and we were going to avail ourselves of the first favourable occasion to send them against the English. Desides, to make use of fire-ships, it would have been necessary to approach within 500 fathoms of the town ; since, from Lillo to Antwerp, the Scheldt makes four elbows, which would base prevented tire-ships from being directed from any greater distance. On the sea-side, in like manner, no slicers% einild be hoped for ; hut admitting, that, by the combine- tion of the effeuts of the land and sea, Lillo and Liefkenshork had been carried, which supposes two regular sieges, the enemy would directly utter have met with three other harriers to be forced; the Pearl fort, fort St. Philip. and fort St. Mary. All these forts are covered by inundations, and each of them would have required a separate siege. These different operations could not hive taken place with out losing 4 days more, and supposing that by the 20th of October the land and sea forces had been able to approach within 2000 fathoms of Antwerp, they still required three months more to take the town. With regard to the squadron, it ryes entire ly shut up within the town, up and down its river, protecting Antwerp, and protected by it. The taking of Antwerp was, therefore, a thing impos sible Lord Chatham, an operation much more difficult to be effected than the occupation of a quarter of France. However, the following was the system of the French army Front the 15th of August three corps were formed. The Prince of Ponte Corvn was at Antwerp with 30,000 men, nationul guards, regulars, and Dueth troop?. The Duke of Came than() was at Ghent with the corps of the Lead of Flanders, cassairtmg of 25,000 men ; the Duke of Istria was at Lisle with 90,000 men. We should have let the FAiglish, had they seri onsly presented themselves, cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, stretch out beyond the inunda on e I.ilM , and march against Antwerp; the Dike of Cornegliano w.iiild have !proceeded towards the Head of Flanders, and, whilst the English would have been making their dispositions to hi tter, Antwerp, from fort Lill() to the citadel, the Prince of Pointe Corvo and the Doke of Cornegli mo, protested by the inundations and by the im mense works of the town, would have for them, and, on the day agreed upon. would have etretened out upon the right ; and then the Elitz lish army would hare terminated it destinies: the Duke of Luria would, during that time, have pro ceeded to the island of Cadmic!. On the Ist of September there were, between Flanders and the Scheldt and Matenricht, twenty thousand men Ins ider arms. They were not all regulars, but they were all commanded by men who hid serve.' ; they were all volunteers, and consisted, for the most part, of former under-officers, and former soldiers, who had olitained their descharges, and who bad run to arms eu the first signal. Lord Chadians, therefore, charged himself with a senseless operation ; and those, also, who pro. jected it, shrewd themselves to be as ignorant of the climate as of the localities. Lord Chatham saved the English army, by determining to re-embaik it ; but every day that he delayed to execute this determination, heightens the misfortunes of his ex pedition ; and if he is culpable. it is not in having ordered the retreat, s is in having so long delayed to re-embark ; for, doffing this delay, the English r -lope contract fresh diseases, and become infected itli fresh seeds of destruction. Let it suffice to say, that the Emperor, when he !earned -dist au EiOish army hail heels landed aatsn that point, recninineocled that it should not . attacked, and that we sli.tuld leave Cie destrites t.ou of it to the diseases, which, in that slairgerous climate, insist do the enemy more injury titan the cannon, without its cosiin.; any thin to France. The English, in landinAri riillititTS, did, there fore, a thing contrary to all use risks of war ; Ist, because they took for the theatre of their opera toms a country so llPMhilketiallr. that they might presume that a mouth's stay in it would destroy this army; that the county is covered with strong places. such as Flushing, Ilergen-op-Zoom, Botha, and Lido; uud, on the side of the Walla of CsJ sand, the new fort Napoleon, Itr. Sce. Recluse their principal object appeared to he to • ,:,lure the squadron ; they ought to have imagined Nat the sgsatifon depended upon Ant werp, and that Antwerp was unpreguaLle. for its consinunicatinsis with France could not be cut off. except by iminense armies, against which the whole population of France would have' time to march. The result of all which iii, that the Cloglish have been for so many year. chat out of the continent, that they are no longer acquainted with it. Every thing has cliaord, except their icitrcil against Fru nee. _ With regard to the island of Wa:cheren, it is said that they meat, to keep it. We should base only cause to applaud this resolution, for 111.iity rea sons; tst. The English, although they hail .20,iton men in the Wind of %Valclieren, could not pre vent it from being attacked and retaken ; 20,000 English. exposed to the influence of the climate, would experience so much loss, that it would he necessary to he continually reinforcing them : that, in the course of the year. 80,000 men a fluid as necessarily become victims to the climate, iii it would cost them more to gourd this island than to preserve the East Indies.; but it is pro bable that time would not be left for them to sutler ouch losses. The channel between the two Islands a so narrow, that bombs coil reach from the one to the other. The twenh• ships of the line, and the flotilla which we have in the Scheldt, would soon make us masters of that river. It would not be forgotten, that, four years :izo, cud with our flotilla alone, we were masters of all the coasts: can it he doubted that we should lie soon masters of a closed sea ? and can it, at the same time, be supposed, that the English would attempt to keep Flushing, without being masters of the Scheldt Besides, a flotilla is too dangerous a war fur them. Such a war is not carried on by boats alone ; it is conducted with excellent troops ; that is to sat, with means which do not allow the English any advantage over us. We well know that men exist who, although completely ignorant of the art of war, hate, not withstanding, the silly hahit of talking and Touring to give counsel to those who err masters in it; those people, yet more skilful than that pii!dic speaker, who introduced the subject of war b..forc Hannibal, tell you that the Engli,h, by preservi•ig the Island •f Wslcheren, will make it a second Gibraltar, or another Malts ; in fine, a command ing point, which will render them masters of Flan ders, of Holland. Poor mailmen ! they cannot perceive that it the English persist in keeping the Island of Walcheren, that circumstance would be as adventurous for urn as if they were embar rassed in the heart of Spain. In general, whenever an English army lands upon the Continent, every real Frenchman ought to rejoice. Such a contest is completely in our fa vour : a nation of 3 millions of men cannot meet, man for man, a nation of 40 millions. A new army, all the elements of which are in the navy, cannot keep the field against the .incient bands, winch have conquered two-third► of Europe; in fine, en army which can only arrive by wur, has neither artillery, cavalry, nor eqiiipages, at least it has a very great inferiority in all these mewls. and Lord Chatham really could not mount more than 2000 cavalry; well ! before fifteen days were elapsed, the French effective cavalry, which were assembled on the banks of the Scheldt, amounted to 4000! rr wiles we Moreover reflect, that the British truope are not led on bye Marlborough, or a Wolfe, or even a Welles ley; we confess, that even in the contemplation of objects purely national, and iinconnt eted with the fate of ,treitria, we see much niore gromid of apprebession than 'abject of welbfouuded hope "s•-(l;goise ) NoTf. Of Tilt MONITLUR.—We Isere are Ad the spirit of party is capable of ! It it a pity that Sir Arthur Wellesley had not the command, in cead of Lord Chatham. The latter saved the Eng lish army; the other would probably have lost it ; as he has lost that which he commanded in Spam ; where he had the imprudence to entangle himself with 30,000 men, without reflecting that he Outs ex. posed his left wing to the different corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia, of Elchingen, and of Tre viso,-who had seventy thousand men under arms.— fit him, it is true, drawn himself nut of this criti cal situation by a precipitate Bight, and by aban doning hit hospitals, his wounded, his horses, and part of his equipages. It was thus that General Moore, in hit ridiculous expedition in the month of November last. fled from Benevento to Co mmis, abandoning his allies, hit horses, his ammunition, sod his equipages. Neither the one nor the other of these Generals has dis played that foresight, which is a characteristic no essential in war, and which prinupt% to do only what can be supported. and 4 undertake only whet presents the greatest number of chancey of 'twee*. Sir Arthur Wellesley has not evinced more talent than the men who direct the Cabi fel of St. James's. To wish to support Spain against France, and to contend upon the Conti nent with France, is forming an enterprise which will cost dear to those who have undertaken it, and alio will meet ill it only disutters. Cotithgris torus, it is trite, may he kept up; misfortunes may be brought on peaceable citizens; rivers of blood unit tIOW ; the people, the protectors of whom they esill themselves, may be ruined; but any other re sults are impassible I BRITISH OPERATIoNs IN SPAIN. The Amateur, of Stptetuber IS, eontu.os the fnitootiatt uhvervations, in the form ninnies on nt London Gesette of S.itur.lay„ . Sept. t, containing the di.patehes from Lord Wellington, duted 1)e -leyto.a, eth Aug. 1809: " When I entered Spaiu, I Lad ■ communication e•lth acorn! Cuesta, through Sir Robert Wiliam and Colonel Ruche, rnperting the occupation of the Puerto de Rao% sod the Puerto de Pereles."-..'Lowdon Gnsttte.) NOTE OF THE AlloatTsuit.—We with Lord 11'ellrsb•y io coium ital the Enghsli undies. IVitii his character, he will rick great catastrophes.. It appear, that he his r,rith.r spiPs nor any accurate information; wliuh is astomus!iing, in • country where England 11.14 so many partizans. " 1 preferred t.i qe , roan ihiiikine that the British troops were mum likely to du the tu•simes eflectually."--(Leedua Gargle.) Noti: OF THE sfoxtrkult.-IVe are willing to believe shut these dispositions were made; f - sr we see ii one of his dispatches that i tie thought he had only to do with 10 or lir,ooo Freed' ; and it was polethle that lie might" iitarch, with '20,000 men, siainst a cows, which, in hies opinion, consistsil only or 10 or 12,000 but he should hare gacied better information on his march, stint lie would 'Joie learned that this corps of 12,000 into amounted to 70,000. He had his retreat cut oil, and aas (Oil fortunate to be aisle to throw himself, in order to escape, intounpracticable road.. General Wellesley is inexcusable for not having known that the corps of the Duke. of Dolinatia, Elchimgem . and Trt ' vivo, amounted to 70,000 men ; and fur having thought that he could cover his Ictt ft:ink against this formidable army, by 'eosin,: two battahons at Puerto Ilailos.—What ignorance ! " I acknowledge that these reasons Aid not appear to me talkieleat for giving up so Important a just as Talavera "•••• brarlon Casette.) PiwrE OF THE Mo4lTcoa.—G-ner.4l I right to leave Talavera ; if he had &hip d, h. would herr hero loot. Hr did wroog to ieave two divisions and 40 pieces of artillery on the Taguv; he lost them : and this post, which was the rear guard, was a post of hanuur. General ‘Vellealey ought to hare occupied it. It is acknowledged in war, tlia to advanced guard, sir • rear-guard, ac cording to the operations, is the post most import ant to lefeod. But General Wellesley had take,' he lead ; and, a..,carding to the laudable prat Lice of ha nation, had left to his allies the post of danger. " The enemy stated to be so,ooe dread, bat at all events consisting of the corps of fluent and Nei - --(Lender Gas) NOTE Of rtes Montrsult.—We see, that even at the tone when he wrote, the English General did Hot know the force of the French. Ile speaks only of the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia and Elehin gen, and appears to have nu knowledge of the corps of the Doke of Trevi4o, twenty-tive hails. 'ions strong, and which, since their entrance into have not been iderior to the best troops in Europe. If laurel Wellesley frequently commits similar error: iu war, he may one day pay dearly for them. We had reason to expect the advance• of Victor's corpx to Talavera, as gotta as Gen. Cuesta's much should be known ; avi.l *flee learlsg eit,noo men to watch Venegas, sod allow ing (ruin to to I 1,000 killed and wounded in the late action, this corps would bane anturitted t 45,000."—."Loedan Oaten( ) NwreOPTite Mossirvtia.--This is a singular• calculation which Lord Wellesley makes of the tirst and fourth corps, and the reserve. The first corps is composed of 36 battalions, the fourth of 30 ; the reserve of en battalions, and the cavalry of 40 squu drorm Lord Wellesley had therefore around hits, 170 battalions, and 80 or 90 sqiiarli fans, and he ex pected to conquer Madrid with '20,000 mess 1 We do not speak of the Spaniards ; they may he reckon ed as of consequence for plundering isolated per ' sons, or fur defending themselves behind a wall, hut very little account can be made of them in a regu lar battle, as the En4lisli may have been convinced. If LorJ Wellesley bad had, besides his 10,000 mess. the whole army of Lo►d Chatham, which went to bury itself in the marshes of the Isle of Walchrren, he could have derived nothing from his ex,,edition but disgrace, confusion, and defeat. If the English mean to dispute Spain with France, they must land an army, if not equal to the French arias, at least toe-thirds as strong, that is to say, of at least 1.50,000 men, for the Spaniards cannot be reckon ed for more than one-third in a regular battle. Nothing can be loom advantageous to France than to have the English clime in laud-wars ; for then, instead of conquering England by sea, we shall conquer her on the continent. Suds a con test .hews to admiration what those are also direct the Cabinet of London. Themistoclas advised the Athenians to abandon ' their citadels, and take refuge on board their ships. It is to be wished that the British Cabinet may per sist, alit has begun, in the plan of deserting its ships and throwing itself osi the continent. We have pre dicted the humiliation of England, and peace, be fore a year elapses. Before a year shall have expired. the English, whatever efforts they may make, will be driven out of the peniosula, and the imperial eagle will tly on the tortrewses of Lisboa. We hyd reason to meet, thst, as the Mar/psis de la Reyna would nut remove t►e boats from the niter Alanaret, &alit would have destroyed theta. Oar only retreat was, therefiire, by the bridge °Limo Horn; and if we had ivaved on, the enemy, by breaking that blidge, while lb. allay shoulj he ritgiigeil with Sou': aaJ Ney, wuri:.l have deprived vs of chat only orsintrre We could nos. take a positiol at firoprsii, vs we thereby left open the road to the brii 4 ge of Arlo ably% holm Talavera, by CaUri w.. 1 atter .og ' the *butt subject Insterely, I was of *aim tint it was advisable to Shire to the Li Wig of .I.so B spit, sail to Who op a defensive praitsisu upon tot Trieur"-4.(Learhaasiothr,, 1110TH or THE NlulareaUit.-"•We *hail not coo. tiiiiie these Itiotere--it would be an insult to our 1 readers. The falwehood of the report ut Lord Web. • Itsley must tar evident to every our. Cuani.ustou.—Lord lellesley. without know ing the force of the enemy with whom he had 1.. comoutl, without being furnished with that %tort' rulastittites au army, arlriiiieed to I :ll:aye:A. Th.: idea of loitering Madrid turned Lis brain. tie took the French army for au as my of Sepoys. Ile arrived at Talavera with tO or 16,000 .urn. Ile was there Joined by 30.000 .s;iatziarits, cud. with these two Home* united, he intrudes' to penetrate to Madrid. The Duke of Bellow, auemeuvred skilfully to draw him nil. and Pinned a Juliet/or:. with the fourth corps and time reserve, rod, with else king at their heed, march. 41 against the eit'etni . - The 'Duke of Dalmatia, with still mole taturblet able forces than those of the King. mans& el (f l og, their rear. Lord IVellealey could trot earricout himself tint by lwating, separately, the two erosive. The first and fourth corps presented brio with an opportunity. duce they ettawked, without waiting for the three corps commanded by the Duke of Dalmatia. The English fought well ; the bottle of Talavera Was doubtful; though the loss of the English was much mole considerable than ours, for the French artillery was more numerous. It appears that, by a series of multiplied fault., th e Irreg.. li ..ould not take the position on the I. ft; but the Euglish were beat-ii back miry tone they at, emptod to .drawee npou the French. %Viten - fife To,ono met. commanded by the Duke of Dahlias liar were at l'lsseocie. lusd Wellesley believed there were tint snore thaii ten thotosiod no-u -tht re, dud formed the insist roilieubitry ethutniisa bons. lie pereelved, .however, the silly of Ina calculations, his extreme imprudence, mud was 1 serf& ;rill ly fortntutte to illespe tutu PortuAal a nth ' his itirontry. What would hove beets the cow, if, maiiceuvrieg aecordtog to the principles of war, the French army had nut vireo mottle watt! all united? Lord Wellesley says; that the want of the mea t•s of ceisomy mire prevrillitd him li.:.ts marchni.: to Madrid. What would have here the consequence, if he had marched to 1114441rir1, mot th. Linke of Dalinalia had placed himself briar-ell him aim t h e Tagus? lie onialti Lire conic with Ins arms to France. lie has sacrificed brave sown .through presumption, and ignorance of that of which hi (;etll'ial ought not to be I,;nuraid. This expedition greatly resetubles that of Gen. Moore us the month of November last. lint (Jesse rat Ili.o:, was linttle pr....lent. and pared liimaelf sooner ; and, though be ruff . ..riot etiortnnus Saws, the half of his army returned to England, without their baggage, &c. Like Gener4l 3loore, General Wehlrsley abandoned his hospital., his baggage, his artillery, nod amyl d in Portugal with the half of his arniy. At tins moment he has not (8,000 men under noes, out of the 4U,000 which left the ports of England. RETURN OF THE EXPEDITION FROM Tllr SCHELDT. " We bare wore than once wanaecl the public not tuba too sanguiue relative to the woe ..1 the rapeuition to the Scheldt. As soon as that expedition sink d, •C salsa t.• 4 that the chant skirl. had taken plate oa the Miami., by Ilse siinistice, so precipitately cusiuluded by our ally, could out prodoes soy euosiiisrableetteet on the upecatmosofinull• saipodittossi aud that Ouvernastrat, limos's it dot not Husk tat us atoadsa the ears-prior entirely, Os. still fa, ti.uri entet taisiog any great hopes of its ulterior results "—(Star ) lure of THE Alublirltilt.-4V hat a wietAlleti eatuse ! %%list /5 ilium In common between the at sirs of the Danube aid those to' the E.:slier:l:l4m en W deliereu l Would !t not be imagined that Prince had occasion for bier army. A hit+ is et Vi ouna.to defend her agaiiiot the E:eglish ! The Eng itela Eats:daunt. has failed becau s e it was extrovao. i put—ot would also .pave faded had the Fr, wit bees heater. at Vi'agram ; nay.in that cast. it would hare been the more sure to fail, in cruse it di...stir *auk! have redoubled the energy of the Frenert et' the interior; froolly, it would have failed, because Roue but absolute lUttultes would have attempted such an operation in a mouth end a climate ire which half the slimy mast be swept off by disease. Had it been widertokee in the nitwit) of May, there had been one importain chance less *pens, its success, because the,, no apereheusioti sired Le entertained of distaue. The Lehriwt sal St. James's,. by sending ass army to Walcheren, in the month of August, has followed a lir.e sal I:ailltitiet very dif ferent from that which would be pursued by the most ignoriiiit Captain in the English navy, who would beware of laying hands on a ship, were ski wren laden with all the wealth of Indio, if she were lafected by any contagious disease : mos, the int , healthiness of the marshes of Walcheren is as dangerous to an army as the pestilenee• itself. . It was not the erinietice of Zinnia that had sty ~lisfluencr on the English expedition; expert cite has long since proved, that out of a battalion. of 1000 Iltell, resident two months in that imbued, *SOO :Iwo in the hospitals before the end of the second month. It was • mad expedition, berminie Flushing ought . net to be taken without a long siege canted on amidst sawidations ; because, atter the fall of Flushing, it would be necessary to proceed t o B a i t . Bergen -ohs-Zoos., and Lillo, In under. to arrow.. after a delay of three months and doer sieges, be s fore ii place so strong as Antwerp; because those who planned it roust have been Ignorant that the fourth liottalions of all the reginietits of the army- , which remelt, in France form upwards of 100,030. men ; th.a the national guards of Is Somme, he Nord, and l'as she Calais, who huve bensved so well; and those of the Moselle, the lVtarre, tlir' vanes, &c. where all the citizens are oilsbera;* would have poured forth, in norm) or twenty stay% an army of gO,OOO men, against any enemy *too should iiisult the Freud' territory. l hey must• finally have beaus ignorant. that the teewtlarmerie , alone furnishes 16,0ti0 of the fi n est e t tw .l r , iiii Ey.' rope. lii less than eight days 4001 i hor,r of timil. ChM. were asoembled ; while Lord Chatham had only VO4O, cavalry in his whole Exp,-dit.on. " All that timelier objects of the expedition have bees / • Ismaisputably ahnostosied, oast we Imitate not to say, that', every um axon will praise Ministers 6,ir their eoodeet, sap io .t stfrospting euiterprites, which, is. COOFfaitelllf la ibitt ' change of circumstance, since the expedition was phoned, cual4 sot hare eteceeded, exempt at au espeuse of bleed far. stionoting thug ratan - ."-( 3ll trisi NOTE or THE M3/ 1 11Trtne--.Niitsisters.rtonteSisosse deserve posher, fat hosaut wenouoced their 'apatite 1 I . L i • I t t?, 1 . • ,-*l'