The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1810-06-09 00:00:00

seeltilletty forces of Spain. Selby, he petteeeiril to the Main points in the pupae, he had to ester. few observations on what was At first part of their contents. the mission of Sir George Saab. This Gentleman wee dispatched fret* England on the Qath of December. entrusted With a mat tot portaist udision, relative to the occupation of Cadiz. At this period Mr. Freve was the British Bilinear with the Supreme Junta, at Saville; and from the 10th December to the stOth of Jemmy, as it appeared from the papers, no fewer then five dispatches were snot to him, in not one of which was any mention made of the important mission and instructions of Sir George Smith. Whether Mr. Coning was ignorant of Sir George Smith's mis sion. or whether his aflame on that subject pro ceeded from the most culpable negligence, remain ed yet with the .111oble Lords opposite to explain. But this one thing was evident, that his being sent unknown to Mr. Frere s and without any communi. cedes en the subject being made to him, was productive of the utmost disorder and confusion. In proof of this he ha i only to read a passage from Mr. Frere's dispatch, which stated, that " the mission of Sir George Smith, and his having order ed troops to proceed from Lisbon to Cadiz, with out appealing to him (Mr. Frere). had given rise to • strong suspicion, that something Moister was intended by the British Government, in conse quence of which the utmost confusion prevailed." These troops thus sent round Irons Lisbon to Ca. dia. remained there on board their ships. sod an. swereil no other purpose but that of creating dis seosiou in Cadiz. and a suspicion of the British. Such a measure could not have been coistriv ed, but by the same men who the year before sent an army under General Baird to COMMIS, without having previously eusured their pea mission to lona, either from from the Local or Central Junta. He id not, however, call their Lordships' attention to this matter so much as connested with his pre. semi, purpose, as to sheer the total want of concert and prudence in the conduct of Ministers. He now came to the more material parts of the corm poudence, from which it was seen that • few months after he i.erioil of which he had been speakingtifir A. Wellesley was dispatched 'o Portugal. In page I would be found iiis first instruction with regard to Spain at that moment exhiviteel in • most interest ing point of view. For after the retreat of Sir John Moore, the Spaniards had resorted to that species of warfare, which experience load sheen to be the only way in which they could hope for success. and from which he sincerely regretted they had ever been tempted to depart. They had adopted the defensive system, which had ever been attended with incalculable effect. as was strongly shewo from the intercepted correspondence of Soult to King Joseph, in which he stated, that in geueral actions, lie was invariably succeessful, but that the war car ried ou by the possautry was so destructive, that no army could resist it. It was, however, at the very moment whet' this iystem was so successfully puns sued—when experience bed proved that all hopes of co-operation were rain, and the moat melancholy experience had sheen its insufficiency—it was at this serf moment that Sir A. Wellesley was and to l'ortugil. What then were his first instructions; of which he hail already spoken?—.. to relieve Por tugal from the presence of a French army, oil then Loco-operate with the Spauiishi armies for the common cause." Yet it soon occurred to Ministers that they had isist obtisimed from theSpunish(iosieriunent any of these securities for supplies, &c. which they had declared to be necessary before assisting them with anodser British army ; and they accordingly, ot, the tlld of April, drew up a second set of media tams for their General, which completely did away the effect of the first. By these, he was directed wet to iota rpm • campaign in Spain, without ea motructions to that effe c t from Mi n i sters . came the third instruction'. on the 25th Mae, which, if the ascend did away the first, equally did away both. Uwe Sir A. Wellesley was directed. after driving the Freuch from Portugal, not to go beyond the frontier provinces of Spain, unleas he tamed an advance consistent with the safety of Portugal. He trusted that Ministers would not ground their defence of the failure of the Ex pedinem into Spain. on this discretionary power entrusted to their Gener a l. Th e y could not be justified in throwing the responsibility off their own shoulders upon those of Sir Arthur Wellesley, for they alone were in possession of the information as to the state of Spain, in every respect, on which the policy or danger of the measure could be decided. The discretion given was merely military; and, considering the ardent spirit and gallantry of the Noble General, tantamouut to a command to march into Spain. And yet these orders were , transmitted aheo Ministers well knew that no pre cautions had been taken to insure supplies to the array from the Government of Spain. In the end of April, Sir Arthur iVellestry arrived in Portugal; and, on the 12th day of May, drove the French from Portugal, an d continued the pursuit to the iath, when lie found it necessary to abandon it. On this part of the subject he had no observations wherewith to trouble their Lord ships. Thecouratry bad paid their tribute of ap plause to the gallant Generall who conducted the enterprise ; and though hi: had heard some cen sure bestowed on the mode of !pursuit adopted with regard to Sonit, yet knowing the vigour and ardour which distinguished the actions of the Noble Offi. CPT. he must gave him credit fur having done all that was possible in an ittrair wltcre• Ileac qualities were so necessary. His motive fqr abandaiiiii. 4 the rewind, as suited in his first diipateh, *as the ne cessity of proceeding to the south, to co-operate with the Spanish army under Cora*, to whom he had promised that sondance. From this he had a right to assume, that Ministers were resolved, drum the beginning, to continue the contest in Spilill, wits the are.), es it stood under Sir A. Wellesley. Now they must either hate believed that Spam af forded the means of supply, oho 6 would enatile an allied army to act for its deliverasice, or they must have known, that neither supplies, pros isions, or co-operation, in that country, were to be depended upon. If they entertained the former opinion, then. instead of the army they did employ, with such a cause as that of Spain to fight 10, evely effective man in J.:aglow', ought to have been employed in the service. Our interest* and our feelings were oldie interested in the strug4lei which was not for Sp ms , a t one ; whi c h 044 nut for k"1116.41 only / bat which was foe the liberties of Poore' b the fee Gt t t multi. totem! then of sending the limited army of Sir Arthur Wel lesley, they Might, front the great resources of the countty at their disposal. to hove sent a Moe sufficient at once to have driven Soult fmm the North of Portugal; to have kept him, and Marshal Ney, in check ; and to hate co-operated with Clemita, against Victor, who, with his urmy, wets at that time, reduced to the !inmost distress. But hers the Usual policy of Ministers appeared. Their flaming zeal to do every thing at once was conspicuous. Spain was not a wide enough field for them, but they must, ut the same moment, grasp at banns, ships, islands, and kingdoms. To restore a kingdom--...t0 destroy a basin—to seise an island—to capture shipping all together, they dissipated their force in every quarter, and they failed its every object. Besides the army in Spain, they must hate another perishing, ingloriously, in the Scheid, sad a third on an island, in the Bay , of Naples, t. the great delight of the king of Naples, who could see them thus so use. lessly diverted from important services. Un like the Completer of the Continent, who had gained every thing by concentrating hiiTorces, and directing them to one object at a time ; our Minis. ters in their vigour would prosecute every object at the sane time, and the event had 'her] the wis dom of their policy ! But there was li.tle ground to suppose that Miiiisteis could have held the opinion to justify this course, mid by the way he had m observe that Cuesta did not consider the ex pulsion of Soult from Portugeth as the Lest mode of commencing the co-operation with Spina— However, en the 18th May Sir it. Wellesley marched to assist Curesta, and Soult, crossing the mountains, occupied Orenzo, and by getting pus. session of the depots, thpre was tumbled to con tinue the catupaign.—At that time Carrera was at Vigo, at the head of 10.000 ; totally midi gaged and inactive, as Ney had marched into Gailicia, and this was another proof that no co operation was to be hoped for in Spain, or Carrera might have marched on St.Otalla and prevented this event. But to return to the co-operation in the South : Their Lordships would hear with surprise, thut in stead of advancing to Placentia, by the shortest erne. in order to cut oft the retreat of Victor, as was afterwaids stated by him to be ins. design, Sir A. Wellesley was obliged, for want of supplies, to march ninety-seven leagues, rather, than sixty. seven. This was owing to his being obliged to take the route nearest the coast, as if lee had taken the interior route, Ms supplies could not have reached hint. Even as it was, instead of accomplishing the ninety-seven leagues in eighteen days, which was the moderate calculation. it was seven weeks before the army arrived at Meanie, and during thil period Victor had retreated, and, being joined by reinforcements fro n the atones of King Joseph, and Sebastiassi, was enabled In retool into the field with that army with who h he afterwards disputed the battle of Tatavers. Thus, when a rapid march was so riereesaary, it appeared that our army, from the want of supplies, was compelled to march thirty leagues round. and tint only so, but the papers .hewed that even marching as near their supplies on the toast as they could, they were stopped at Cotmbra and Alerartes for the want of shots and of money to pay the men. lit the two letters from Sir A. Wellesley to General Cued*, these were the reasons assigned for not joining him earlier, who was at that time maintaining an untamed COM. tlict with 'Victor whose Mice was strengtheueil every day. After all this, led Virtil the loch Mill ltithofJuly, Sir A. Wellesley readied the point of co-opeistion„ and it was commenced under the wor.t of auspices. Conics could not be induced to enter into the plans the English General thinieglet most advantageous ; and he was, therefore, obliged to go into the mea sures oldie Spaniards. What they were. appeared from the result, though the general plan was not so distinetly detailed, as to have snore of it under stood. than that it was a continued system of co operation with the armies of Cuesta and Veoegas. In the former year, the) had the testimony of Sir John Moore, Coload IVaittiughiun. and Colonel Spites, that tile Spani.li armies ought to be better disespliued. and the Government more efficient, before co-operation was pos.ible. Now, let them look at the papers, and :re in what state they were when the system of co-operation was renewed.-- The first thing they had to look at was the sup plies which were so es sen ti a l t o th e operat i ons o f a British army on foreign service. And here they had the testimony of the principal person concerti ed, Sir A. Wellesley—;page 1 nth of his Caere*. pondeticel—that no speedy improvement in the mode of furnishing the supplies was to be expeced; that the impracticability of 'Ointments them was owing to the want of authority met the Government —the state of the country—the timidity of Magis trates, and the indolence of the people. The neat matter worthy of their Lordship.' attention. was the character of the officer at the licarl of the Spanish army with which we were to co-operate. General I t7tieste. On that point. he had the testimony of Mr. Frere, arid of Marquis Welle.ley. Mr. Frere. in page of his Correspondence, stated. that there wee a suspicino that General Celesta me ditated a serious plan of revenge against the Junta, (or 14 , 111 C affront he had sustained from them about half a year before; which plan he would now lie more able to execute, as the army tinder General Blake had been disper-ed.— He also stated that Venegas was utterly incapable of any command. Again. the Noble Marquis op posite, iii page is of his Correspondence, said, that Cueing was deficient in every quality for a general, except in personal courage, and that the impracti cability of his temper rendered it impossible. The third ',object deserving of consideretion, was the state of the Spanish Government. And here their. Lerelships would find the p ros p ec t as di scourag i ng as the pre eerloug two. Mr. Frere (page 44) feared thnt the 31ilitary Junta would, from their incapa city, defeat the whole of the combined operations; and the description of the Spanish Government, given by the Noble Marquis (page lit)), was still worse, lie characterised it as wanting energy and strength ; and. from its incapability. not supported by popular opinion. It was (he said) an anomaly of all IGoterinuents, without poseessing the good qualities or advantages of any one. From these facts, supported Ivy the papers on tier Table, it appeared that Sir A. Wellesley and his arm ) were sent to co-operate with a General unfit to command, and suspected of meditating a a‘rioni fur their neceStary supplies. It was tinder such plait of leptnd o rP n Y a elite Gove a r ge nnt il t i t, ll.l t . t: i w t rl k. r k' s rn t others fur eircurbstances, and utter all the experience they bad, that Ministers would tubmit a British army to the risk of destruction, end to those calamities end digesters which they did actually endure. The result was what they might have expected. end - what Ministers might have known front the inform ation they possessed before sending out the Expe dition. Mr. Frere bad furnished their with abun dant circumstances on which to form a jhdgitsent, though lie had never come to right conclusions on his own facts. Uninstructed, however, by these dispatches. and unimproved by the futul example of the preceding year, they had pursued the seine policy which had led them into so many other dis astrous Expeditions. As a Noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty had told a gallant naval Officer, Who was stating the difficulties of an enter prise to him , aGo sad fay ;" sn hud Government CO this occasion, onlooking all the dangers and dif f iculties he had enumerated, the risk of the [bi fida army, and the honour of the nation, told Sir A. Wellesley to go and try. But though Minis tate" could overlook the character of the Spanish Genera[, the inefficucy of the Spanish Government, and the prentriouniese of supplies. Sir A. %Vines , ley,•iti three days after he joined Cocoa, began to . eaperienee every want, as might have been antici pates!. Deficient its vapplire, lie advanced to 'l's eras where he was oblig ed. even fur the safety of his army, to depend on t he fidelity and eli,cipline of Veniegas, and his army. as well as Celesta. and •In both he was disappointed. Vettegas did not, as tuts projected, advance from La Manc h a and the onountaitious district. end the passes of the Puerto de Betio, which covered the flank of our army, were, by these means, felt undefended. to lie taken ruses-ion of by Soult. The Battle of Talavera was fought on the _Bth arid 49111 of July, end whet ewer might he his opinion of the policy before en tering upon the campaign. of this battle he must say, that it redounded to the praise and honour of its brave Commander. However lie lamented the sation's best blood thus wastefully and improvi dently shed, he considered the day as a day of glory to the General, officers, and men, en gaged, and to the eountry. But what were the consequences of the battle ? 'they were those of defeat rather than of victory, from the Ml6's he had already stated. Our army had no intelligence, or means o' procuring it; mid two days after the battle of Wavers, they did nor know whether the enemy was in their neighbourhood or not. What alight have been foreseen happened. Soult marched down the mountainous district, pos sessed himself of the feebly-defeurled passes of the Puerto de Banqut, and threateued to cut off the retreat of the British army after its victory. But the letter of Sir A. Wellesley, of Ist August, more forcibly described his situation. than any words he could ilbe. This letter, too, was received be Mimi eters at the seine time with the dispatches contain lag the account of the battle of Talavera ; though they, fur some reason best known to them e/elves, took c ire to withhold it frost the public. Here the Noble Marquis minutely detailed the measures pursued for securing the passes, which were quite inadequate to their importance, and • more so, as it was known to Mr. Fiere soil Speni.li Government, trout an intercepted • ler of Soule., what were his design', and ledso known. at the head-quarters of Cuesta's .army, on the first or second week of July, that, in pursuance of that design, he hail reerheel Zamora, on the 4.5 th June, at the head of 18.000. By these WNW Sir A. Wellesley was obliged to renquisls the kid of Talavera, and to leave his wounded •eisder the protection of Costs. Sir A. Wellesley had *here ards expressed his surprise at Cuesta s retreat ; but how could he expect any other con duct from that army. slush he himself described, (p. pe) as having misbehaved, in the presence of the enemy, at Talavera, awl thrown away their sums, friehtened in the sound of their own fire, when none of their IldVVePllfir, were opposed to them or near them' Surely these troops were not to be de pended on, and how could he complain of them for having abandoned his sick ? It was • painful part of his ditty to 'Nell on the misconduct of the Siteiti,la troops, with the feelings he entertained on the eubject. But these things were no reflections on the Mittens!, mistimed character. but on the fitse system which had been adopted of forming the people unto regular armies, which they could not immediately Le fit for, hating for • length of time ceased to be a military people. In other cases they bad displayed acts of the most splendid heroines ever recorded,—flat it was net this individual /spirit *hint had converted• the walls of Seragoem aid estrum into •Intoet impregnable fortifications. It was not this partial energy and animation that would enable them, as armies., to meet the great est military force in Europe, and commanded by the most skilful generals. It *us not possible to expect this much from a people disposed to be free, but not haling enjuryed Met freedom before which would tit them for such a struggle. It was (music, not to the misconduct of the Spanish nee' time but of those who could suppose that a junta of permits composed a geverniuent, and that a crowd of men was a regular army, calculated to trice the phalanx of regulars poured upon them by France. He was ready still to confide in the Spatted% people, and to believe much might yet be dune by their efforts. A spirit yet prevailed among them, elute,' would niche the possession of their country very inconvenient to their oppression., and at best nothing more than a military possession, as far as their armies covered. Ile 'meld not dwell on the serious calumnies which haul marked the two months posterior to the battle of Talavera. The army had sustained every spe cies of misfortune --the went of necessaries and bread —without aid from the country—and their teas ended in an encampment in the most stuwholesome munlit for duty s w a y sittsatioe, whe r e th ousan d s, spared from battle and fectingts weree. wereswept by sickneri--9000 l o that n Novembers oveen beorootba: t 0 all the di ff erence w hi c h took place Decnaher sad January, w a s. the reduction .orOnon of I,lll::iNuiosbtevetrqkyuietnoosirp. turned sad to thhise niecon current ac:etint (page 90) of the nattier, ineapee batty, and base corruption ef the Swinish Govern meet. He also animadverted, in severe terms, on the useless situation iu st,ith our Nltnisur (Mr. knowir; sod waiting in doily neer:on o % 0 116 4* i P itie) pieced I who, Aroth ti rival Ms sueretsor.doSog all - tht time ti; '4 lawn in Spells were in pridgress.itati tiolthc. oLlrt i t ta u: exercise the functions of hlimpter with effect, ati, - fluetice the residing of atipp!ies to tile army. H at Wellealet, when he did arrive, he ackno w l e d g . tik,k a correct view of th e state of alLirs, and tract' most properly in the retnoustrances ht Mail s to try GbieofLrurangleonit;pobiliterwi,thwivichlsokentwt:sheiterclii .itheecetitervhair:ig.atieuieudf.oitio,hig2i!, fore recommended the seialimed Such a pews ' , the Government of Spa: ? They were taun ted o 4 their proposition. asked, Would you send • lecturer Oa pole: economy to another waren, and to force Lions on en isidepuusient government ? Yet, skit all, the seine plus Ira l been adopted, and 1,0 person then the Noble Alaror.s two:ate laid se . dertaken this lectureship. But al oho thee se this? It use after the ateond Briteh army Irv, ken risked on Spatilds ground, Lid compelled irt retreat, and abandon the comas', 10 a state of vs. trrialled culamity—oncountled is al! Voir ot!-.41 euterprizes, whether in Portugal, 10 Su.tt;n, r i rt Walcherett. The lititi,.h army wna reireassidt the frouticrs, and however great the vt, sonde by the Noble Marrone, They were 41: tilv4o. kg, for at that period no good was prae:teslh..... H i , twit dis p.r t t li asithin • fortnight Brier toi• his opinion explicitly. that no lintirli tint,!„„ ever riumerotte, could be usefully enti:loyett Simi'', *bile that country s as iu its preetatt Upon the whole the conclusion to which they Ines come was, that no surceus could be expected's' Split), trusting to sat* a Corerument ; u , auuni t so constituted, cud so commanded, or iO a cos. pain where it wry known bill plies meld lat 14 procured to enable the army to Net. That new.. tens must have known no cliauge had taken plant since tee preceding rear, so fa!Olir cxrmlrhuv to warrout Illtrn in rislZ:ng the fate of another :may on the same ground wheel, hid provsd so erlaatn toils to the gadlent Sir John Moore and his army:. And that without provoling or loordogle Lure, or beim; warned by the horror s id the p.c., they lied plunged headlong into the stinger, and experienced still greater must emir., The brave Moore and bu Cowper:ate is glory might have rotated their dying mowers witO the coosolation. that. thongh they aserifiees to the rashness and ireipa. sty t.i cistern, their Wilt tppy fate would lie so so's • warning. and inculcate so use& o les•nno ne future British General or soldier stia,:lq rent to perish in so unwise en attempt. toct.(k,l ma • trust iu Spanish en-operation. that. elm even in the very next year after they di-d, stets, as precipate and rash as before. again eta, try die same esperimeot. With them, dream dream ensiled. and every dream ended iii Litter opysotuttmetit, till the world rang with the ta u sound. Ltt their Lordships look at the Pali., and the defeats that had been setter'• neis h od they would be able to see whether the stadia: tt..! .they had voted had been wisely or pmpurly tver.y ed. Ile did cliersh the hope, mod woolitche,,:a It to the le -t, that if ever Farrope was word, Ilse country would be an important agent le that great event. But it could genet lip acCulloPlikhed l.y moi expertitioits likelliese,efithessit consultant:the noses of our ; mkt destro)i n g our own terce. - by vtd tog it on diff eren t h azar d s . Th e aestralale (Nett von only to be achieved b ra prudent va n of At resources with which Providence llod bic^":l at Such was not the use made by His 'Mal, sty's pie. rent Counsellor% soil it war important that alai? Lortlehips should be convinced of this, Iron ha inerifficiericy of What they hid siren irtr,aipt. The mnre,tpo, indeed, as they were in snare sure parties in these LelallailitS. l.r lottsilltg without notice. the error- of the founts. eisrupsi , e , . On these groundr, he would cencluile by mot , t two Resolutions. They were to the fellOstillg rtr'"' 1. That it appears I. this Howse, after the mast :masts etamittatloa ref the papers laid before them, retest. to tle late Casspaign in Spans, that the safety of the anny prny.L.dd, without eetty ndueicelem.seiia im hit lyriste w d,d and airy i andra ., l 7 ., ;s Riar. atilt, and that the whole ad malls the retreat al tht COY ed. That. ',rarities to metering eat this Campalea. Xi Motets did not proem? the memory saformatiou of the state of Spain ' or ails military resources—of the sepplol that could tots/forded, ice. as the smog obvious poky) ras )sired; sad that the result of this ro4hueso sod isrol" wos • motet 'be most calamitous& Marq uis Wett.itit.ce—" My Loafs the pmion't:we with which the Noble Mainnis enclitile ' d Isis ter) 41d...f..y nannies, and very eloquent speech, costae the tliaLl :44.• Jetts which tuned' the crowed of those mamma ate eintqA shell this night maintain in respect In the Sparest' Campsla The Noble Morgue very properly observed, that nes tin inhabitants of Slain erre roused to • seslitance of for 1,611 ri.a. 'tun us France, there was presented pi prospect nose roost• able than soy which bad Aram niece the french Iteruho... of employirset the effutis of obis injured nation, wet only is the F. own define., hot in rer!erming the minim of Envoys. 'la Noble M arqo is might also have aided, that sock Arprinled vr on the cuoduet of this country, when sal • sp:rit eons. *sled by the pimple of Apsie, that not only the nth pe adorer 4 the penensida was at stake, bet it reentely affected the 11101. rot, of Britain. The spirit which at that litue anitoste4rhe Spanish people segenrd better torten, to Europe, sal if it had been only resistant to the dowintatin of Franco. , " • insideration Of the state of Escape, we were called man to cherish this attempt at isitkprodeoce; it was oar booth , ' duty to foster, to foment, sad to blow lute its fattest bin. that notional indigoation against the ambition trod mare, thin of our enemy. It has been staled, that the "i''./"'.4" events whirl' have transpi r ed, folly justify the resehlw" which hate buss proposed. NO moat more than r 'smote!' the unfortunate e v en t s o f th e Spanish Ma I mu mesa more Menne the fate of Si, Julin Mane's ta Corneas ; no m a n non estimates the abilities sad be of that (ifISCMI i no inn can feel mon sorrow for he in leockuly death,. sod that of the Wave taws who burls Moder bi• command. My Lords, I regret that tr mote nook accrued to the envenom, =replier font' f petted exultation to' our woos, which ere evil" " t . 1 ' onder-rate ; far the valour which we soldiers there 40 pls)ed redounded to the glory of tent Brasier. AA whatever was or might hove bees the tarlisppe Milt ' the brittle of Cornetts, one could have bete so siJetmisa! , none mold have heir Male destructive le net,' Oul'lif!!' eiple which was concerned in the nose of Sp than '1 hod produced a dereliction of car deteentr;o:on to twee. rate with the efforts of that country i non could We he. '. more evestuelly lajurioes to the netts sad espect s e s sit :r all Europe. And yet, if I INlderstaad the Pleble 111a0....i right, he would heir ravosonteaded to this could. ), at 1... time, to cease her enilenows in tefttillog ll ' 31.:n, .. diced dominion of the Freed' Government. My LA.... I shall sow ad. ert to those tonsures ishieli were 1,111"'^d t' Ministers in the subsequent pot of lite catnpaiya N —46 . . ,, , , jneard to Lord Wethegt o n, the :N o ble Nonni. etion spoke of hint in that meman, oboli t° i s ' . 'i tilr . k ,..k: evinced • potriciple of generosity *hick nvocleh.l minima his condor. upon all seeselmee. At the ! d r.. tine, 1 mutt observe, th at I think the mire to 151.101. ht I