The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1810-03-30 00:00:00

• gem the aplaieta mein fencl by the 'Ointment of *fuse tiara, when ti.ry theaght it requisite to it'- ll:mire into the failure et' the Scheldt Expedition. Itie wort.l not now ttaLin the House by investigat ing the policy of ties Kepeclition, or inquire into the wisdom of ruakilig an attack upon Atitscrp, or upon the ar, , elial shit clock at Fluehing, with the h o e remai n , of our army, and the most lavidt ex penditure of our money, and at a time when our bled and twasure were so absolutely requisite to our own defence. It was lamentable that by this Expedition, and the badly-conducted measures in the Peninsula, we were reduced to very grievous comequenteo. Such had been our loss, that our army are left with an effective force of not more than t 3,000 men. After adverting to the con duct of Ministers, its their different expeditions, he said, if there was one• inexaure worse than another, it was the retention of %Nicht:rem—lle would ask, did these failures take place in con-c -epience of dissensions in the Cabinet, into which the House was not to inquire ? Why should they he prevented from inquiring into tho,e dissen.iiins? Were they of such a iti.gracefial complexion, that they would not endure examivation ? This subject was ate, of the most important maitre, for Ministers *ere nor called upon to answer for the blood and teessure which they had so uselessly wasted. Mr. FITZGERALD said, the Noble Lord, who had just sat down, had introduced many subjects, irre . levant to the matter under consideration„ particu tarty when he real the' work containing a mutative of the expedition to Rochfurt. The analogy be tween the two expeditions, mentioned by another • Noble Lord, (Castlereagh) was forgot on the pre- , sent occasion. He wet happy to think that it seemed admitted by all, that the question did not affect the •character of the naval or military part of the expeili- Con. The object of the present Inquiry was, and very fairly, how far the conduct of Administration was in volved in the policy of that undertaking? But, how ever their conduct might be implicated. it mss rely fortunate for the country, that no imputation what ever resod upon the army or the hav).—(lkar. Atitr.)—A considerable stress was laid upon the propriety' of sending troops to the North of Ger many, if any intention existed to wake 4 dleen.lo4 ill faveor .of Austria. But the /ion. Gentlemen opposite Militia recollect„ that it was not in our power; we did not Isms -ens the military meatus of sending an Expedition. at tile onninriune period, for co-operating with the insurrection in the North of Gertuttuy. With respect to the policy of the tprdition, he would do Ministers the justice to say, they had acted in the beet manner for the de fence of the country; for. to attack the force et Antwerp and Flusiiiiig„ though attended with risk, was an object of the first importance to our own existence. Therefore, the Adruniistration had no wish to throw any liability from themselves upon the officers they consulted ; bat, looking at the ob ject as one of 'itch magnitude, they were resolved to eterifier their own responsibility for the dele,ice of the country, in preference to the minor ro in deletion of maintaining their station in office.-- (Hoer, £ear.)—la the first instance, it hail Men represented. there were no soldiers, but burghers and artificers, to defend Antwerp. Now, that in formation was or was not correct ; if it was not cor rect, then there was an army, and that army • kept there for the purpose of defence, in stead of being marched to the Danube; and then Were would be proof that the Expedition to the Scheldt had openited as a diversion in favour of Amara. He would put the question, if the opi- Woos of all the officers consulted were unfavour able to the Expeditiou ? Was that of General Brow origg and Sir Johu Hope to he denominated advent be the enterptire ? Whatever respect was due to the charat ter of Sir William Er.kiue, the itaine.degree of respect was due to the character auci-opiuious of General Browurigg. Looking at the political situation of Etvope atone, or scuitig aside that consideration, the Mioisters who planned the Expedition to Antwerp, for the pureo.e of pre serving our vital interests, were entitled to a eon aiderable share of merit. (Deer. Ira?, hear.) — He lamented, with others, the loss of our valiant soldiers; but he could assure the Hon. Members op posite. they had not monopolized all the feeling on thataisbject. He would not condescend to go into the calcalation made by an llon. General. (Tarleton.) that every man cost the country forty pounds. This, or illy other suns of money, wilt a paltry con videvation, when put in competition with the hers of our brave men. As to the retention of Wel cheren. it was evacuated time militia opportunity, after proper measures had been pursued to render Flushing • place not mailable in the hands of France against this country. If it should appear that the Scheldt Expeditiou was the best means of aesisting•Auetrio. if it was, in addition. a great ob ject with respect to our /tort II .fety ; if every thing was done which could he those it the time it was in oar possession; if the evacuation took place as soon as possible; aud If no disgrace had tarnished His Majesty's soma, he considered himself bound to oppose the motion before the Honer. However la . locatable the loss might have been, he should moat heartily concur in the propriety of its being carried into ext (fficio. . General TARLETOR explained. ClaatritaK rose for the purpose of submitting a few observations to the House. In comparing the Scheldt Expedatiou with those undertaken in the seven years' war. by the illustrious Earl of Chat , hats, Ministers were pursuing the hest inode, of all others. to bring themselves into disgrace. Minis had been mid to magnify the importance of taking Flushing; as if d had been the principal object of the plat!, when it wei. devised ; whereas, it folly ap peared, that Flushing was foreign to the tint avowed purpose of that expedition. Sir Richard Strada.% opinion had beets referred to. given on a former occasion, but he would oily notice what thevallant Admiral stated, in gii MA his evidence before the Home; and he was the more in clined to remark what he alleged on that oc casion, becan.e it was his last <minket on the subject. To retain Walchereo with 5,000 mem, if practicable, would have been a different con aiderabon from that which arose, to consequence of its being necessary to retain it at the risk of eS,Onn men. It seemed to be a doctrine on the ether aiae Or the Howie, that if there was a dis posable force, it 'H o st be applied to ionee ;rider , . taking ; but, who tt,r iii,uriou s or beile!icial, whe ats or Weeded with lose sleety to our amy, Air pealed 'an immaterial consideration. The idea of the Minister. appeared to be, to send the army by Ostend. Afterwards, however, upon consulting with the Generals, they had mitigated the idea, and instituted a combined military and naval operatkn. It might, therefore, be stated, to those who prainded to undervalue military opinion , that if such opinion was not resorted to, and adopt ed, in tin present instance, the army would have been sent to Ostend; that is, it world have been placed in a situation, ib which, according to one au thority, they must have risked, and to others, they must have destroyed it. Generals Browitrigg arid Dimling had so delivered their judgments, cod Sir John Hope had stated, that as suer B. he haul land ed, he found that the object was utterly impracti cable; but what was the opiaion which Lord Rosa lyn had delivered? he hod been asked whether he thought that the lateness of the expedition had prevented its success? and his answer was, that he d it to hare been at all times impracticable. Sir Wm. Erskine had said that Antwerp might have been taken in one week. Lord Chatham had confessed that he hail doubts, but that they were borne down by the Admiralty; end Sir Richard Strachau had expressed his apprehensions, and set fortli'the danger of attempting the navigation of a river, wholly unknown to our naval forces. But it had been said that we had acted by intelligence from abroad ; that intelligence lied been stated in part to have been received from an officer. One of the documents bore the date of I SW, the other of 1805, and another, no date whatsoever; in addition to those, there was one dated December 1804, which was no other than an extrect from an army list, which was found upon an officer taken at Cadsand (a &with !) According to this, it had appeared that France was not prepared immediately, that shy could rat muster forces to any amount for a week ; that was fair enough, it Cu saying, in effect, if you tire not prepared is that space of time, all hopes of but cesa ate in vain. Hear, hear) But why should we send an expedition tothe an Runt of 40 thousand men upon such futility of info'm atin.,? ( Hear, hear,) It had been *Wert also, that some ii.:orrnation had been received from or very souog man, in the year 1805; it was not stated ....c•lict he was a young matt in the year alluded to, or a young Ulan at present, and an infant at diet permd„ The sum of hi s informatio n , hosree i r, was, that if there were works at Antwerp. they had escaped his observa tiou.-1 lawgh.l—He had heard from a friend, that there were five thousand regular troops there; but it might ha perfectly true, that, on the 3d of July, they bad no troops whiesoever, aid yet, on the ash of August. were perfectly prevred. Lord Castlereagh's letter to Sir Amid Du."las had stat ed. that there never was so sm iii a number of troops as at present in o! ,ce. Sir David funds, therefore, went 1,, tl n assumption which was stated WINN/ the !thority of Ministers. For the opinion,. therefore. ...sea upon this as sumption, the Minister,' • deeply responaible. When those men *treed t there wereafew or no troops, they had stated gist was not the fact; but the blame did not rest solely with them. On the contrary, perhaps. the greater portion of it was to be attached to Ministers, for reposing such blind confidence and untlistinguisbing reliance, notwith standing all those opinions which represented Ant. werp as so enfeebled. Sir Richard Stmehan bad said, that Government was deceived ; he had said so from experience; and their ignorance of the state of Fort Lillo was equally manifest in the result. Another of their informants had stated, that be was at Antwerp about eighteen years ago, and had heard, two years before, of the defenceless state of that town. He entered here into a minute COCO. !slims of the amount of the forces at Antwerp, from which he concluded that it was in a state of complete preparation. Lillo was said to have been weak, but the contitiy was proved. 0116111 d was reported to It aye been exposed ; but the Marquis of Huntley found, by experience, that the intelligence was false. Wli it he m:•riii 'older from all this was, t hat the opt. nion of Ge!:. Brownrigg did not justify M inisters in acting contrary to all other opinions. Bat the cir cumstances under which the Expeditiou sailed, were the most ill-judg, 4 and unfortunate that could be conceived; it smiled at a time who the elements were most unfaseurable, and when every chalice of weather and of climate opposed the suc cess of the undertaking. If they attempted to renew the 'war 1! Austria again. they would only be inducing her to renew her misfortunes, and to commence that which they themselves had deprecated in the North of Europe; but there was another objection, and that was the plague. They had waited till that was at the greatest height, and theu sent off the expedition. Sir Richard Strachan declaring that he knew nothing of the navigation of those parts, (hear, hear;) declaring also, that he had made no arrangement, because he was unacquainted Null the place ; anal yet so intent was the Ministry in the pursuit of its favourite ape. culation, that it pereevered in the project of taking Antwerp by a map-de-main. The expedition had deed in its birth, Governmerit was ntis-informed, but had not the judgment to detect the mil-information ; where at expected to have met rite force, it hail en countrre4 many; and in addition to this, it had ex posed the army to such calamitous disorders, that one of the reasons stated, for not attacking Fort Lill°, was the sickly state to which that artily was reduced in consequence. Perhaps, as the Noble Lord hail ohserved, it might not be necessary to measure our forces with a ina thematical accuracy, when we were shout to send them to the held; but, in the present instance, they had Lot only an enemy. brit a plague to oppose. It Was na excuse for Ministers to say, that they de wnded upon the spirit of the army, when they ex posed that army not may to danger hut disease. Nor was the progress of the Expedition inconsist ent with the circumstances under which it was at tempted; upon the 27th of August, the place was considered to be untenable, and, on October 17, it was debated even whether they could transport their sick ; there woe such a corresponding ignor ance between the Governments of Austria and of England, that one did not know that peace was mask, and the other did net kora+ that the army was in an hospital. Upon the whale, the conduct of the Government was se bad, that nothing could be worse. but the comfit/I of the PArliement which would excuse it. Alliuinn arid been made to bed Ch.ithant, but the fact a that instead of risking, he had schooled no czrose au army, even is censph ince with petiular f 1 eling. The present Lord Chat ham had presented a paper to the King, praying for secrecy, and mould they, the Parliament cf Eiti , • latid go farther, and e3tahii•h the irrespoitsibilttolF Alinnters, that injuring, in a tea•fold dtgrer,'•the constitution of the country? Mr. CANNING said, that as the Right Ho st. Gent. had called upon the House, to visit upon the authors of the. Expedition the calamities which had resulted from it ; lie, us one of tho-e authors, ft it himself called upon to answer. Ile should state, what, in his opinion, would not only go to excuse, but to justify and prove its propriety. Before the House proceeded to decide no the pi inciple upon which the advice was given, they should coesider it not as an insulated question, as a concern iii winch England alone wits long interested, but as port of system of war, in which they had been long en gaged, and he feared, were long likely 'to be en gaged, that of a general struggle against particular usurpation, that of the cause of all Europe, against a power which was acting for the destruction of all that was free, and generous, and exalted. Ile trusted that he should not be rejected by the Ilona! fur contending, that a cation, standing in Well a situ ation as this, and acting in such a cause, should consider for the other nations of Europe ; nay, that it should not barely confine itself to the good of those with whom it was especially connected, hut should extend its advantages and assistance to those in whom • spirit had an-eu favourable to the general cause. Th. y were not cow merely fighting in their own cause, not wily against him, their old enemy, but against those whose hands were against wink their minds were for us. He belived it would natively lie disputed, that the best councils were those which combined with ti e e aid of foreign pow ers. the security of our own. It a_ppeared, by the papers, that the question of the Expedition to the Scheldt did not originate in the Austrian war, it was not advised barely by the present Government, but had long been under the consideration of another Government. He would assure the Hon. Gentlemen opposite. that when he alluded to this circumstance, it was with the utmost' respect fort speech, which, he must say, was one of the greatest he had ever heard in that House • though, by some accident, it was only heard'by themselves. Upon that occasion, the Hon. Member, on retiring from office, had laid down to his successors, the nceessity of attending to Antwerp, and the Scheldt. Ile who had looked, not only with the eye of a Statesman, hut of a Statesman presiding over that particular department, had left his iejunction and authority, that Antwerp and the Scheldt were ob. jects which, consistently with the interests of this country, could not be overlooked. But there was a vast difference between the state of Antwerp then, end at the time when this Expedition was under taken. They now heard the boasts of the enemy. with respect to his growing navy, so that, eveu upon a question of economy. they were bound to make an attempt upon that quarter, if it was for no other purpose than to dispense with, or slither to employ more beneficially, the fleets which were occupied in watching that quarter. Besides '- this, the Austrian war required aid. There were only two mode, ; by direct operation and by assist ance. He ridiculed the wild and monstrous notion that Trieste should form the object. He denied that the co-operaCen could be most effectually per farmed in Italy. The retreat of the Archduke John rendered that unavailing. There remained only an other way of assistance, and that was by diversion. The attempt at Naples was abandoned, upon the principle that it would excite iusurrection, without being able to afford it any effectual support. '1 be North of Germany, after being maturely weighed, was given up, upon the same principle. It was not necessary to abjure all advantage ourselves, in order to support en ally. At one time when the Russian and Prussian army w as entire, and before the spirit was subdued, it might have been advantageous to attempt the North of Germany, but now it was otherwise, Prussia was broken up as a state—the weapon was struck from her hand S in all the other Governments. though the people were discontented, yet they were not in a situation to co-operate; and, if this country was to succeed in exciting them to insurrection, it would only hare the effect, mikes adequate assistance could he af forded, of subjecting them to a greater and more rigorous despotism. If the Prussian troops could have been brought to act, it would only operate to furnish Bonaparte with a pretence for wresting the shadow of a crown which he had vet allowed to their Monarch. He (Mr. Canning) complimented the Duke of Brunswick in strong terms; but slated that there were advantages for which this country might pay too dear itself, and for which it might expose others to calamities too bitter and too tasting. He knew of no advantic 4 e l,lcety to he derived by Austria, which could justly such an attempt as that of the North of eirrosauy.— The Expedition to the Scheldt was undertaken for our own objects, and also for thus. of Austria. Ile had seen, in one of the French Papers, the Motif /ewe words attributed to so huintle an individual as himself, which lie had never nettle use of; he had been represented there, es having said, that the Expedition was sent out upon a supposition that Flanders would rise in its support ; he had belt' no such language; he had enteitumed no such senti ment.. We did not go there, seckitie for insurrec tion ; our object was lepitimate, hostile war— (Hear, Aear.)—He had been led to advert to the Muitilemr, which was no ordinary Paper, but might be considered us the organ of the French Government, and in that Paper was to he found the moat unequivocal tesitan ni e that the French government was taken pry surprise. The French Minister of War, supposed that the expe dition ass originally fitted out for Spain, but that it afterwards turned to Waleheren ; so that there wa. the testimony of the Frew h lovernment itself, after all the complaints of del4y, that we had taken them by surprise on this important occession. The utmost that a civil gore' ttttt ent could do, upon an occasion when a military service was to be en gaged, was to point out the object of etiterprize. to give sufficient support to the undertaking, cud to hold themselves in a reasonable sad adequate resoni.sibility. But the idea ofeffecting the reduc tion of the town, by other means than I,r militery opera(' , was absurd. hlnch hail been said about the evidence of Colonel Gordon ; grt at •trt , nt 11,1• I been laid upon his assertion, that the elite s. was a desperate our s and his ',ogle ti-itanooy Mss placed in competition with, or n „,, t , is hitzliest eltisnation thou the united iiittCh a phatiria of well-grouudesi issforinii.lo.l 'and usicluerUirijaUi truth. The mit v rat trovestrigg twos ': by the Hossossr..ble fieotlens,l oppoAlte, eousideresi of no weight or imports heii r i ng nothing of veracity to pris'bnlsibiy to justify it. liot said tlits';szag,osisi the opinions of Sir t 1 or Ctr t ! s w hove testivisth,e to 4 s ta - e of their project. They .d'oAitl alitrigiiiitly lin the judgment of exprrktive, u,.,, „ , the strength cf talent, when it oas r.ottniosi. •,,,, their talents isaa never bean pot to the tvs: • their juilginent had never been imtureil. t:ot MAI, nllll WiPicomiletent to judge, vise , son whiow eptition should be considered Wit'? Cesserul Browns igg wits the man, is 'N.. tliCirstv, even sirs, t le and 111114111110Yttli, , down all those otnldiord to thr attack efforts of justice and policy; hot it eas t • coned.- to tome tl.e however oniu.l who.h influenced their plans, if the encl..; ~, tetided with groilicatiou. It lidd [Jetta S“; the world stood upon an elephant, ow l the upon a tottui►e, but what the tortoise stood O F nobody knew. General Brownrigg was the torte. His opinions were considered ungrounded; i,, t why they were, nobody could sty, no reason coui.l be a•signed for a doubt of their iigeuuotsntt►, proof was brought forward of their wemknes* or unatithenticity. With respect to Lord Chatham, lie had his complete opinton upon the ente►prn r , und they contoured x long string of proofs (tithe probability of eucceel. It was evident to even• body of militury kilos ledge, that the town of !GI . . were could not have been token without operations, anti by the timely intervention of such object would most assuredly have been ...- complislied. Gentlemen were determined nit to acknowledge this. The instance of Copenhagen. which was a proof of smelt a position, w as rejo , ;..i. 1 hat city, it seemed to the Hun. 11,1 been taken by too much surprise. There ex:.•rd, ut the time of its bombardment, a slocci•* of in dignation in the bosoms of the inhabitants defenders of• it. The indignation was iodeed ti strange nature, ae it facilitated the totretaler. There were innumerable instance. of the succel., o f such measures. In the lust French campaign, inourier penetrated to Flanders, at the time till the garrisons were fully supplied, and in t;•,: flush of vigour and determined resistance. lie stood before his enemy with au inferior urine; he tflreater.ed, acted, and compered. it might be said, that un instance in site rrectli Po- Yoko ion ass no proof. He would then give ti., stature or Prague, and of S% eltrill2. 0 birn had tr.;, alw•uvbttderau•el capable of the most put ei sucreisfid defence, but which had, by the 011?..; . e. tent operatinn of military' attack, hers rrductd :, state of dependence. in the like bummer, the tress of Lerida, when high in warlike : , was, in a fortnight, toweled by siege lir the DM: .f Orleans. Why, the should Gentlemen usnrt, that the question abounded with 1/11Cil grOf. 11111 , TV• babi!ities. It would, indeed, be highly criminal to act tuider circumstances of expected iniprobabi. tt ; brit none concerned upon the present occiisiwi could be accused of such a conduet. 3lathernaticil arguments trete; those which had been offered in the course of the discussion of the present ques tion ; but when he considered the occasion upon whicb those arguments had, been advaiscril, lie abjured the application of any such. But shat was the hinge upon which the enterprise The necessity which forced the army uut of the right direction, which direction was to Ca,!. stud. Could any one deny, that, if the Expedi tion had arrived in time, the projet would net have succeeded. He saw, from the countenance of an Hon. Gentleman opposite, that lie hail a se vere jodge; one who looked upon him, as not naly responsible for the liiiure, hut. accountable, that a wonderful and unprecedented success had not at. tended it ; so that he had not only to nlliviate the sorrows arising from ill fortune, but alsn to appease unprovoked resentment and discontent. To the House' he untild look, and not to those partial judger4Yor justice; and, he was continced, that the motivelliy which he hail been influenced would not he overlooked ; those motives, which were net attributable to any thing but the love of his coun try. He complained, that those Gentleman bad owe way of viewing their own traniection , , nod another way of tiewing those of others. The 1:c -hilies of Bonaparte had often been heard tt; had often been repeated by those Gentlemen, as great and unparalleled, but they had never matised his conduct at Lob's. But what would be said, if an army of France was in f any part of this country ? that the Tyr,:o. e; : r kept that part in dependence Import "".• taw! subj. et to his frown ? a hoof be had 015 victorirus troops in the I I N. of Wigle?— Gear, from the •opposition Benches.) —What .."..• upon touch ocraNtno, be the lortlog. of r.tt'al •k The pos.eto•ion of tqictt a 1 ,14ce, tty the cortn, would be, by no mo-ans eto prtni,•,, to to Go v. Briton aq OP 11.1.%.1....'011 of A otv. co p • have been to Fraii , e ; and was it nothing M.!. *it!. the tam! (...•t of success this ri.tvrp: WRS muiemtvleim, and t'ust, had the blow cu' it would have been a great defeat bm the r •••• France. Lem any man be placed to time •.•.. , t• • of one of the idnieCtr.ri of this enterprise, u!..1 hint be uslit-.1 whether, in such a oituatioo, • have come to 51 dect•lt)tt to to the vine of open' Much blame had been a►tributed to .11t n i•I•'ri r ictidirn¢ out any Es.pe,litinia to ouch a chine.. the authority of a leatmd man lad bean id, • • as a reason fur alonalohing such a project ; thought that oinnion proved too much, fh, : • held no army ilould ever be rent t . FL:: a corn Imit , n ah..h rperatid anti the propriety of an attatk upon a ul $ l l other". It tars the benefit of En4l.ie posse... The m,etrie t f t Innate ati.l of • t‘ete cr.triuttly etemplitied ; hut the f! , al.iitild nut derent iterif ; it rboill,l sir-red toy what ttnure the We r t India bland- I. Levu to ; ILrt 4 111116112, •o di4! ruing to t KOLL. , r. repitte %. it:l ttri or. amt. eager.. %Yale:het:en i,ad been the object of 11; ,,, drier, of R att irk : aye, and of ; It wag nnr hell so pestifernu., it thrimmd tornint more irnp,otiiiit. It haul I.er , " respecting tiwt tOar.d, trial tht SAiss regi 'll 1.