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It ei a concerned ; but while their enmmercial eye sy-45 open, unfortunately for themselves their politi• cal eye was clased. They were not sagacious coon th to an upon the jealous policy of the Chinese and others. who were prudent enough to prohibit us horn any territot iit establishments, and byth at means averted the misfoi tunes which have fallen upon the In dians. By various meansandopportunities,i, , theyear 176.5, we became possessors (A some extensive terri tories, and the wisest and hest informed men of that day advised, that we should never attempt the ex tension of them. In this number was Lord Clive, to whom, fur his vast -ervices and :achievements in India, his country owed the highest obligations. When, by the gallant exettion; of that gnat Officer, we got possession of the dominions of Stqat Dowlah, he advised not that we should keep them, but that they should be restored, and a resolution in conse quence of that was passed on 'he 30th of Sep tember, 1765; that the company should abstain from the ptirAnt of any increase of dominion.— For a similar opinion I have also the high autho rity of Mr. Hastings and the Couixil in the year 1772, who wisely resolved that our object should be to content ourselves with providing for the security of what we already possessed, without engaging in any war for conquest, or any other principle but that of self-defence. This seemed, at that time, to be the principle also of our Government at home; And when I was sent out by Parliamentary appoint ment to Indi.i, my instrations were to do all in my power to preserve the peace of the countr), and comply with the fiesolation of th•• Court of Di reciors, which prohibited any further extension of our territories. All this took place at the time that the French were in Lull force in those countries, and possessed of Pondicherry and many other important places, which then were certainly dangerous to our power in time of war. 11'firn the present Lord Melville was Presidi.int of the Committee on India Affairs, a tlesoltition was passed on the 2Scl of May. 1782, that all schemes of conquest or extension of dominion were repugnant to the security of our in terests in India; the same decimation was repeated in 1784. and afterwards, on the renewal of the Compar I's Charter, in 1792. lam aware that the construCtion which might be put upon these decla rations is, that they only want to prohibit any un just or aggressive wars; to which I answer, that the justice of a war, and, most of all, of a war in India, is matter t!iat cannot be easily decided. Unfortunately for the cause of justice, it so happens, that all the evidence we can have on that imbjeCl is confined to the representation sent of it by the Governor, who may pin what colour he thinks proper upon it : and after that, if the war chance to be successful, we know, by sad experi ence, that the success is generally allowed to stifle every other enquiry, and operates as a justification of the measure. In this remote country, we con fine sairselves to the most favourable statement for the Government ; and the India Princes haveing no Ambassadors or agents here, nor any mode of pub lishing their views: we can have no opportunity or means of hearing the other patty. We had at first what was called the Persian cases of discussion be- tween the Government of Bengal, and the Indian powers ; but even those have only come to us through the medium of agents of our own, ap pointed for the management of such traasaCtion;. Therefore, Sir, with respell to our first establish ment in India, and for the subsequent history of our transactions with the native proven, I need only refer the Honse to a list of these Princes, once splen didly circunispnced in that peninsula, and whose very families have been extinguiched, while we re main in the possession of their territories. Of these I shall first remind you of the Nabobs of Bengal, Benares, and Oude, wlioce families are now sa tinet ; or, if any of the family of Oude be still in existence, it must be in a state of obscurity and insignificance. After these, there follow in pro cession the states of the Rohillas, the Nabob of of Fenacahad, the northern Circars, and the Nabob of the Carrfetic, who have now disappeared, and all their territories taken and annexed to ours. The great remaining ohjee after these, was the territory of Misore, which has been also overthrown; and from the language of the Marquis of Welleslev, it will appear. that he considers the power and re sources of that country in the same light as our own. Since that has been accomplished, the Sow badar of the Ocean, at the age of 100 years, has been induced or compelled, under the pretence of proteition, to admit a large British garrison into his capital, and thus keep his people in complete sub jedion. The Gevik.r has been placed in a similar predicament, under the pretext that he was a chief. tain of too weak intellees for the administration of the government. Having thus, at the conclusion of the last century, got two thirds of the peninsula of India into our possession, there was no other power remaining but the Mahrattas, and the only reason assigned, as far as I can see, by the Marquis of Wellesley, for a war with them, intended, no doubt, for their subjeCtion, is that he thinks the d minution of their power necessary to the se curity of the British possessions in India. [ln confirmation of his statements, Mr. Francis here read several long extracts from the instrations given to the Generals by the Marquis Wellesley, which have already appeared in this paper, and which on the present occasion we must content ourselves with glancing at.] I must say that, for my own part, I cannot conceive any security required for our do minions there more than we had already in our pos session, and I fancy that by a reference to the map, every impartial man must entertain the same opi nion. The Noble Marquis expressed as apprehen sion that all the Mahratta States, of which the Peshaw is the nominal master, might unite in a con federacy against us; and to guard against this, he must have a subsidiary treaty with that Prince, the conditions of which were, that he should receive a perpetual garrison of British troops, and allot a large portion of his terriroty for their maintenance. By the constitution of that country, however, the Pc 'haw is, in fact, no more than a kind of Prime Mi nister to the Rajah ; and, notivithstanding the rank in which he stood, was only primers ',der pores.— This Prince was compelled to subsidise an English military force in perpetuity, and this proceeding was to be represented to two neighbouringChiefrains, Scindiah and Holkar, and to be considered by him as a concession on the past of the British Govern ment. In reference to them, the Peshaw is little moreghan an equal. Cul. Collins was instructed to represent this new species of concession to the 1 Peshaw as the best safeguard for his own interests, security, power, and prosperity; though in the same document it was admitted, that the Prince in ques- tion was so repugnant to such a meaoire, that no thing hut the tear of destruCtion could induce him to submit to it. In the letter of Col. Close, it seemed that the aversion the Prince had to admit of this assist ance was styled by our Government as a [roof of selfish policy and ambitinn. From the rapacity And lawless ambition ascribed to Scindia and another, one would he inc!'ned to think that they were subtle statesmen, bred in tne school of \lachiavel ; where as, by the g,ven of them in another place, they are, as it turned out to be, no more than two boys, and Sciri lia, particularly, " an inexpe rienced youth, not at all conversant with business." The real clime of those people, therefore, is, that . . - they do not like such subsidiary treaties, as must have the clfra of miking them slaves and vassals to the English Government. The condu& even of Tamerlane, in entering that country as a conque ror, was not more despotic than this, for he also laid his hand upon his sword, and proclaimed to the people, that if they would only submit, they would remain hany under his Government. From the little, in the wiy of amelioration, that has been effesled in India by thu Government of the Noble Marquis, so often alluded to, we ought to con clude, that to do good was the most difficult thing in the world to be accomplished.— In the documents before the House, it is evident that every possible pretence has been ransacked in justifi cation of this war. The first was, that of defending ourselves horn the influence and power which the French are represented to possess over the native powers. If such a faa had been ascertained, it may, perhaps, afford some colourable ground for . . , . . it ; but, with the utmost attention and diligence that I have been able to employ in the inquiry, I cdonnt rind that they possessed any. I admit it, at . . the same time, to be good tv , licy not to allow France to retain any power whatever in India, and wi.h some provision for that purpose would be made on the returr. of peace ; though I strongly ap prehend that such a condition will be unattainable. I myself recollen, distindly, the statement made in this House by the present Lord Melville, in the year 1794, th at the treaty then concluded with fippoo would effenually eradicate all the power of the French in India; notwithstanding which, I was since that surprised to hear from the Noble Lord (Castlereagh) opposite me, that Mr. Perrot was at the head of a French army of 14,000 men in the Mahratta country. 1, however, very much doubt whether M. Perrot's was not a Native, instead of a French army; and upon the whole, I cannot find that there have been any more than twelve French officers in the service of the Mahratta Princes. Even these, instead of pos sessing any extensive influence, appear to have been objeas of jealousy and suspicion ; nor did they seem to have any other end than to submit, as they in fad did, to our arms, on the condition of being allowed to carry off their riches. Besides these French, there were a few straggling Portuguese, and perhaps a few Austrian Officers in that service, but the great majority of their European Officers were undoubtedly 13, itish, but they wet e all objects of dis trust and not of power or influence with Scindia. On the danger supposed to be consequent in French Officers instruCting the native Mahrattas in the dis cipline of European taCtics, a much greater stress has been laid than it adually deserves. Such taElics do not at all suit the character of the Mahrattas,and I am convinced that had they not dismounted from their horses to fight upon a new method, instead of adhering to the ancient system of their ca valry, they would have been able to make a more formidable resistance. An illustration of this may be found its the history of the wars of the ancient Parthiens, upon whom all the approved discipline of the Roman armies was incapable of making any very serious impression : and a further example of it is to tie found in the instance of so small a Pri.,cF• as Hol kar. who, by abandoning European dist ipline, and adopting the old and desultory mode of the native cavalry, had been successful in cutting off some of our force, and gaining many advantages, though it is very possible that he has been completely reduced by this time. Great bodies of cavalry arc known to have very great advantages in defensive opera tion, and in irregular and desultory warfare. Even the dust which they occasion is very disadvan tageous to their enemy, as it disables them from discovering the line of their immediate attacks and operations: and, in support of this doctrine, I have the authority of a very able man, Mr. Hastings, whom I have myself heard expressing the same opi nion in Bengal. Even the Marquis Wellesley himself has informed us, that the Mahrattas are not fond of French, or any other European alliances, and have always a great and natural aversion to enlisting into them, or receiving any foreign force into their country. I have before asserted, and I now again repeat it, as a challenge to any man to contradict me, when I say, that not one , of these Mahratta states has at tacked, arranged, or committed, any ag gression against us. The only plea, therefore, for the war, was, that in case of a confederacy amongst them, they might become formidable to the British power. The policy of the Marquis Wellesley, of course, was, to use his own words, that measures should be take to keep them disunited ; but, I hope the sentiment of this House would be, that, in the ap preheasion of such a flame as may be produced by their union, we are not justifiable in extinguishing the people. Any man who looked at the map of In dia, may see and judge whether these states could presume to become the aggressors. Our govern ment will there appear to have entered and ravaged the heart of the possessions of the native Princes, to prove upon them, in that manner, charges of rapa city and ambition. The number of miles our army penetrated, will best explain where the charge of rapacity should rest. We ailed upon the authority of the subsidising treaty of Bassein, formed with the Peshwa, against his inclination, and then caused it to be proclaimed to all the other Princes of the Mahratta States, that any impediment they may throw in the way of tilt execution of that treaty, would immediately be deemed an a& of aggression and hostility. The very statement of such principles and conduct, must, I think, preclude the necessity of any argument in proof of its injustice, or to shew that the existence of perpetual British garrisons, in the heart of their country, must necessarily be dan gerous to their authority and independence. What d:fference does it make to the justice of the case, whether these proceedings took place either in India or in Europe? I am certain, that were I to state of a power on the Continent now at war with us, such proceedings, with regat d to his neighbours, I should meet with the universal concurrence of the House, in reprobation of it. Let me suppose, for instance, such reverses to happen in the affairs of the Empe ror of Austria. as to enable his neighbouring Em peror of the French to demand that he should be allowed to place a French garrison in Vienna, under the pretence that it was necessary to his protec tion and prosperity, and also require that the king dom of Hungary or Bohemia should be given up to him for the maintenance of his troops : I will put it to any Gentleman whether he could conceive that the Prussian, or the other EleCiorates of the empire, oug ht to sit still and submit to it without any alarm for the danger it would occasion to their independence? and whether their submission to it would not he considered as an all of baseness and cowardice? So far from considering their confedera cy to oppose it as an aft of hostility and aggression towards France, I am convinced there is nut a Gent who hears me, that would not justify and applaud it ; and, if this be so, surely the same reasoniog must apply to the case of the Malirattas. It is sin gular to observe the Marquis of Wellesley declare, that the best policy would he to secure to all the Native Powers of India, their rights and independ ence, at the same time, when he made subsidiary treaties, for perpetually occupying the heart of their dominions, to represent it to them as a system founded on principles ofequity, justice, and modera tion. He also made it a criminal and hostile proceed ing in them, to shew any jealousy of an arrangement of this kind, which must infallibly place them in a state of abject subjeltion. In speaking thus freely of public proceedings, I would not be though: per sonally hostile to that Noble Lord, but I feel it a call of duty to censure those proceedings which, supposing the war to be ever so successful, must eventually ex'-aust our resources both abroad and at home. The effeft of those wars has been to leave a great part of that peninsula wholly deprived of cultivation, in so much that I am well informed there is now an absolute famine raging in that country. We never can have more than a preca rious conquest in those countries, as the dispersions of our numerous posts through the vast extent of land from Agra to Pnonah and Hydrabad, must render the scattered divisions of our army unable to support each other, and consequently liable to sur prises. It should also be considered that the great est part of our military force in that country is composed of natives, whom the Mahratta Princes would use every effort to seduce from our service, and turn against ourselves, as nothing could drive them to more desperate measures than to find us in forcible possession of their capitals, and even their palaces. The British European force for the preservation of these acquisitions cannot be less than about 25,000 men, and the extreme dif ficulty of recruiting them renders the lives of sol dies, seasoned to the climate, perfellly invaluable. 1, therefore, hold that it is but a very indifferent po licy to waste the lives of these men in unnecessary wars, as has been done in the present. Now it ap pears that all the strong places stormed, were taken principally by the exertions and valour of European soldiers. To keep such a force always complete, was AS expensive as it was difficult ; and. by erbAvo hag them, we diminish our only security against any confederacy between the Princes, and our na tive Sepoys. Lord Melville has represented strongly the danger of colonising India ; but we are now doing it effectually, by thus encreasing the numoer of European soldiers, a vety small number of which are without women and children. Though I disapprove of so many pacts of the Noble Lord's administration, I am willing to give full credit for his great ability and industry ; and, however great the disorders which have been occasioned by his system, I am happy to rack that the ar paintreent of Marquis Cornwallis, which is a remedy that probes the disease, will remove them, if it be in the power of any man to do so." Mr. Francis then spoke much in approbation of provisions made for the Mogul, an aged Prince, who had for some years been deprived of sight, by the cruelty of one of his Ministers. He considered it as one of the most disgraceful circumstance. of the French Revo lution, that no allowance was made for the support of the Princes of the House of Bourbon, thought the attention paid by Marquis Wellesler to the declining race of Tamerlane highly honourable to himself and to his country. The motion he shook' make was only intended to induce the I louse to review its own pro ceedings relative to the iff sirs of India. Ile meant not to criminate any one at present, though lie con sidered the conduit of Marquis Wellesley. in negl.:fl ing to send dispatches, as soon as the war broke out, to explain the grounds and reasons of it, as a dire& violation of his duty and the At of Parliament ; for we, at present, knew no more of that war, than that, by the direCtion of that Nobleman, it was com menced on the 16th of April. He then concluded with moving a resolution—" That this House hems to the principle recognised in its former solutions of the 28th of May, i 780 ; and also in its subsequent Resolutions, that any war commenced for the extension of out dominion in India, is re pugnant to the interest and policy of this country." Lord CASTLEREAGH, after claiming the in dulgence of the House, observed that as he had tie honour to be principally concerned in Indian af fairs, he felt it necessary to go some length into discussion. in answer to the Honourable Gentle man who had just sat down. It was rather extra ordinary that a Member of that !louse should so nar rate the history of that part of the world for so long a period, as to seek to recal the ignominy of its councils for the last chitty years; that he should charge the Government of that country with ra pine, plunder, and oppression, at this time, atter having sat quiet for so many years without making one observation, or passing a single censure upon the proceedings in that peninsula. The Honour able Gentleman had said lie abed with candour in the manner of bringing forward this question, but with respea to the voluminous papers then upon the table, he confessed he thought nothing more unfair, and it was impossible for him to meet the arguments of the Honourable Gentleman in the manner which he wished, as he did not know to what particular points he would diregt his course, or over what ground he intended to travel ; he therefore was not prepared to say how he should conduct the argu ments, or what grounds it was necessary for him to take, in order to answer the able Gentleman. If what should fall tram lane in the course of the Debate did not go to a C oto- plete answer upon the question, it proceeded entirely from the mode the Hon. Gentleman had taken ; and although he dealt liberally With the persons constituting the Government of India, h e had not done so with their ads. With re•-pelt to the Hon. Gentleman's first proposition, that M be ; calling the attention of the House to the AR of liament upon this subject ; he conceived the ik t , Gentleman had put a construction upon the Ad, which he could by no means sustain upon f Air :UK.. mint. That any extension of the British Empire la India was a source of policy which, under 'basil. cumstances whatever, should be resorted to, o nis a dodritie so futile and absurd, and so wholly u❑like the wisdom of the British Constitution, that it could not stand fur one moment. As well might it be said, that a man WAS to be chained to his poi, without the power of defence or attack, while wt. rounded by enemies. There was another principl e equally absurd, and that was, that the Brit Government in India were precluded from f orm ;.,-, any connections with the Princes of the East, a n d that they were to pay the expences of a military force in land, and not in motley. This clause in the Ad most certainly never meant to rectiguir such a power; it was the intention of the Glverm ment merely to guard against the united effort. if the Indian powers. His Lordship admitted, tha when the Government should have travelled opt of the fair line of policy, then there would be a fair ground of charge against them; bat in the present case, no charge whatever was establhh,-1 against the Councils, either at home or abroad. fa enumerating the several princes who had h:..fa broug' t under the British don.inion, and whote ft milies wete extinet, the Hun. Gentleman went ir.:s prima facie evidence of their dissolution; bnt be. fore he came to censure the Government—before he came to call down the condemnation of the public upon them, he should have brought his charge ow some particular Rounds—on some specific instances of oppression, and have taken the sense of Parlia ment upon them. Parliament could thencome to al conclusion, either one way or the other. With re sped to the commercial interests being turned into territorial interests, that was a measure necessarily resorted to ; it had uniformly been the policy of France to goad l.ngland in that quarter ; all her efforts were directed against it, and it was her ma chinations which drove us to those measures ; if we could have kept in existence our commercial in terests, without territorial possessions, it would have been more politi: ; but in order to secure the oar, we were obliged to obtain the other. The Hos. Gentleman's proposition, therefore, upon this head, did not admit of any qualification. As to the wars . . in the Mysore country, particularly the two tot wars, i wars, f the /lon. Gentleman would have called is question the Councils upon them, lie would have seen that some, at lease, of the transaaions on that subject, had never the finger of calumny pointed at them This alone, his Lordship thought, would go a great length in doing away the charges made against them. I'he restoration of the Ilin doo Rajah and his family was a strong proof of the moderation, lenity, and liberality of Go vernment; and a fristisaetion which, in itself, dis pelled touch of the calumny which had been thrown upon the Councils tit that country. the lion. Gentleman in his inchament had made gene ral charges: to this indictment he put in his plea, which he contended was a good bar to the aftion. The next point his Lordship came to, Was with to sped to the territories of the Oude and the Carnatic, as to the first of which, there were no papers upon the table, by which diet louse could be guided, not could it be --barged that the transactions relative to those countries were an acqtrisition of territory. Is the year 1765, both those became bound within the power of the British empire, they were always sue bordinaLl to, dependant on, and direeted by the British Government and Council. Our cones boa with the Nizam, the Hon. Gentleman considered as a measure of reproach : that he should doge th-s, his Lordship owned he was not; at all surprised. for he did not mean to say but that the native powers were much distressed by the conneaion ; they were at war with other states, and were obliged to resort to a foreign force for assistance, but th it the cou nt-C-6ml wish the British Government was so hor rible, so detestible to the native princes, was an as sertion wholly fallacious. The cha-ge also of the Company's troops, consisting of 10,000 men, being in the terri:or y or the Nizam, was another argument equally futile. for it was to be remembered that they were in possession of a long trait on the south v.te of that territory. The question then CAW to the nature of the conn, a . of the British Gov,m ment with the Marhattas this his L o rds' rti considered the most important cow, .I:q.ot of the whole, and a question aliurtbar of great difficulty; with respect to it transact tine, and su.:lt ideas as eras' arise. from be itsunal doubts upon this subje&. there were two questtors upon this hen!: first, what description of people were the MahrAttas, and what were the principles of policy by which the British Councils were to be guided ? Looking to the general charaCier of the people, their customs, their wars, their dispositions , and habits, it was certainly much better to keep clear of them entirely. They were forrneriy COw posed of a great number of small states, which were frequently at variance with each other. If they kept their old syst:m of warfare ; if they hal continued in their ancient manners, without taking in the aid of foreign councils In all sound policy it would have been our best way to have kept clear of 'hem; but afire the treaty of Bassein, great number of French officers were introdocel into their army. The policy of the Mahratta conneaut then stood upon new grounds. Scindia And iltarr were at variance, their armies becam: regular' suppose then one power got the better of the other both theu united and because organised undertone head ; his Lordship asked, would not tnis coalition be very formidable to the military power of tt;t 1111 Britain in !mita ? it was to this A lteration ra the military system, introdut:ed and dirtaed by I- roach officers, that we were to look for changing di g policy of the Brizish Councils, non with the Marhattas. The Govetirnment of Mysore consisted of a considt cable milaary lone. which was also aided and directed by French orb ' cers ; the objeB, therefore, of Maiquis Welled -1 respecng coat was to augment and strengthen the Peshwa, tent] syst, Cen Not