The Statesman. — London, England, 1810-02-22 00:00:00

ML 'ES OF EVIDENCE. -•••••••.-- TAKE* B ORR TII E COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE OHO% APPOINTED TO CONSIDER Oh THE OLICY AND CON DUCT OF THE LATE EXPEDITION TO TILE SCHELDT. IItTIVITII DAY-t6l. 15. REAR-ADMIRAL siR R. ETRACHAN CALLED IN AND EXAMINED VT THE COMMITTEE. I was seat fur about the 191 h of June to the Admiralty. ben I sat, Lord Nlnl,trave, Sir Richard Bickerton ' and Mr. Wellesley Poly $ Fief *nape eturvenAtion: Cape:sin Plampin Ii:6• sent for, and pion afterwards Lord Castlereagh came in. After we had cnnsersed upon oho subject, particularly thou, the landing at Sartslict. Lord Mulgrave promnsed to send for Sir Home Popham. In the previous convermtinn, I ob served, that I thought there would he snoserlifficalties in get ting to the ulterior objects at the Expedition, ns there might be greater difficulties in the navigation of the Scheldt than at present appeared. When Sir Hume Popham CUM' in, he was enmulted about a hnding at Simtvliet. I do not recol ' lect any thing else particular. What nag the nature of these difficulties ?-1I conceived, that notwitts•tandinz the Government had remise to betiere the enemy had very few 'rani» in Flanders ne in Holland. that in a very short time, lime before we mild get to Ant werp to accomplish the object of the Eapedition, the p l ow: latino of the country, and the troops in the diferent gartiebde• would be collected ...palter in su et numbers that the retreats of the army might be rut or if it passed above Antwerp; I also thought it wint'll be accessary. to ennble the army to get up to Antwerp, to take the forts of Lillo and Liefketo shoeike; at the same time I believed the intelligenre that the Goverumetit had teceived, that there were very few troops in Flandersor in Holland ; but I could hnrdly believe it pm sible tin army could penetrate so far as Antwerp without • briar es powd to lease their retreat cot oh; for in the time it would take to destroy the basal arsenal:, and - to get at_ the enemy's ship*, which I concluded would, to save t .basadves, i • go above Antwerp, the away would have an oppeffseity of collecting all his farce from the garrison towns in frame. 1 Flanders. and Holland; and at that time it was runtawited there would be a cessatiiin of hostilities between France and Austria; these were my principal doubts of the success €lO.l the ulterior objects of the Expediting. a Did you find Sir Mane Popham accurately acquainted with the navigation of the Schel , h, fir were you obliged to sound as you advanced ?—Sir Home Popham bad a general • • motion cur the Scheldt. but be dial not treaty know where every shoal lay, nor the marks for avoiding those shoals; it • was, therefore, neremary to have the difereotshosh pointed out by buoys, at vessels stationed as buns. Do you loam what part of,lle I putt was latendettai act agalmt Ant werp ? A t the eanaterereactly my 'hire proportion ; bat it will appear . % the, orders that Went glom and the nrmagernents that were made for use p . of the army. that the division of it under 'Sir Eyre • was intended for 11 Icheren ; the other part of the" -. ander lAN !testily's- (and with that part I concluded Chatham prepaseid to Igo), was intended for Antwerp, as would have Amite Joined by Lord lluntley's and Si, Jo Hopes divisktes. • Do you imagine that the force which you bare staled. to gether weds the proportion of artillery and artillery horses, Could with safely have been conveyed up tbeWestern Scheldt without wai i t t l i bi to buoy the p image T—l have already gives my 'Anion • 4bakkend, that, if every thing bad been fa. yourable as t evatsallirst Imeadled for our entering the WIN. era Scheldt, we should eerlalidy pave endeavoured topelsoreg op without the delay ..f binyingthe Pular!) 1119 4 11 "IID qu•mce of air being under ebb necessity ur.gefegg ails. ltminepot for security. ow irta twilit blowii‘'wfither; the Originnl title of the Espeditiao was directed to another. Amami, which was the reason me took time to beny the Western Scheldt. • Waal length tif time do you think it would hays labia la favourable weather to lye proceeded with that allaniut if forte, from tfie mouth the Scheldt to Sant flirt /--1111111ak in Iwo ne dirge days after they had passed Flualtioga Ihyllus third day the whole might have been up. Do yam thiok they could have passed with the winkle the farte, including transports, both Waheherea mil Gill. sand, 'idiom occupying either?—lt is itossible collate to. pass. but I tbbik a very considerable loss, sed um/ acd tltts would hare happened. if such an MIMS SW Wm made. Do you think it would have been practicable with Maw ' parts ? It is practicable, under similar circumstances of vest tins. Would it not have requir:d considerable time to have di.- embarked the troop., the heroes, and the artillery in the wighboorlsood esf S *malice ? I think it would Out longer than a disembarkation at any other place. Whatlength of tine would it prehably have taken ?—I think lir whole of the intoury, and the artillery belonging to the Infantry, world have been Leaded in one day, and a . treat part of the cavalry, if ma the trawler is ith regard to the battering train. I cannot exactly state how lung it might be, bat not more et two days. Would the time pi Ate Air that disembarkation have de winch Spot; the slii of the weather and the surf ? re ti t d h e a li t part of the river bolds, near Santvliet, the weather would hare verb little rive r etfered with us, but of course it would have setsracd us a little; we may say about half a day. ' • Do you know what number of men could disembark nt one time from the whole of your Oret ?—I understood from Sir Richari Kea% .0 ith whoa the arrangement for disembark ing the tromps was left, that lie could have landed between ten and twelve 'toms and men ip the course of a few hours. Were sou provided with the number of boats, eat-boats, titc. mentimwd in the memo, andum, of the Admiralty, No. 1, dated the 9th of June?—We had more (Lir boats than are !mentioned in that paper. I recollect Mr. Pole shewiug me this paper is the Secretary's rtmin at the Admiralty, and I think. to the best of my recollection, I remarked that would d. very well, supposing we had the whole together, and that it would not do to put the troops in the gun-boats, although some of the gun-boats might be made ase of for that_perpose. Isoniider that the means which the Admiralty furnished were must ample, and that nothing was wanting to forward i the success of toe Expedition on the part of the Admiralty;} if I had thought these had been any thin: Wanted, I sboold have stated it, and I ant sure it would have beets complied with immediately ; I believe all the flat bottomed boats in the country went with the Expedition. and beAdm that, a great number of rowing and sailing boats were hired at Deal, and added to • the means of landing the troops, as well as buns Mg tar passages of the Scheldt. Did either Lord Castlereagh or Lard Mulgrave make any observatinin upon the sentiinent you mule of the dilliculties that would attend the magi...anon to Antwerp ?—I do not re eolleet that they did; I know that Lord - Mulerave was ex tremely 'Dalian about the Expedition, and upon my remark ing lit him that I thought all we should do would be taking Wakheren, be said that the country would be very little sa tisfied with such an expeisive armament doing nothing more than taking Waleberen; I remarked to his Lordship that I was reedit' it woad turn out so, that for my part I knew m i thing of the navigation,. but t hat I would do my best to accomplish all the objects of the Expedition, and that I should be mody-so serve _under any °leer they bad more emfidetice in than me; Lord Mulgrave observed, that be hid the fullest confidence in me, nod that be had reason to think we should do very well. Did you understand that there was a ford found between the island of South Beveland and the main land near Bergen op-Zoom ?—1 knew of that ford, it had been there many years. Was not the possessioa of Flushing considered in a patrol and military polio of view, as of the greatest importance to this country; ?—I thought no, and thlnk'so still. What number of line-of-battle ships is the basia of Flush ing capable of containing ?—I believe twenty sail of large s'iips might be mowed in the basin. What depth of water was there in the basin at high water and spring tides?— I cannot positively say , but I believe 11:1 • feet. Ist') feet water, could 43 sail of the line, baying their Wei and stores on board. and having two months provislune, go out by the Scheldt in sue tide?—Nu, it would be to lighten the ships to enable them to go out of lie biro there is a bar at the entrance of the basin, therefore I believe. the ships cammt go into the basin or come out of the basil with their guns, for I know, in the manna of March or Aprils when the enemy had reason to think it was Wooded by this. Government to attack Walcheren, they hurried their ship,, est without either their gum or stores, and Obey went up kir Tensaw to take theieguns mad stores in, which wore mad ow them le miters. The great advantage that the enc., AMC derived from the book, was, that their ships could Ile 14:1:, pity from the ice,sad being at the mouth of the river could sealer go In scathes they would have beets able abbey i Semi eat at Antwerp; sed.l have beard, that is • of air wren yossessitm of Waltheren the' s:l ra:t: obliged to make slijs fel their ships above Antwerp, Mai (bey owlet clot" of the lids, so that it would be very dill oat. if mug improctlitabk,ffint the enemy to at oat a squadron In the wieder. Would it net be fiellifienely dasgerom to keep an Sitali,le arei spies are seratity'e Oust, *About baying any port or a il _ ..1.;..... • :..;...--- It STA' - Iv • ••, . • • . . ler far oar . Isell mid* ltd lost it might be morretry. Wossia ma the_ _pnldeation of Fluebing have ready law" that dangers— lres, with regard to the ships; bat the ri pener of keepino Flashing, sail the great low of men that would atteed it. makes it a more advisable thing sot to keep the i.laad of Watchmen. What did you Cuosider as the jilt haste and most material' object of the Eipettkiim?—l considered the destruction Ist the enems's beet. and the etatrosing the dork-s arth and ars serial at Aut weep, the great object of the Expedition, cams pined it* the destruction of the d0i.4.-yard, basin, sad kits . I serial at Waleheren. Did you consider the destruction of the docks and arsenals at Antwerp a material object of the Expedition ?—1 did. Do you know whether the last anchorage occupied by the enemy's fleet was under the protection of the gum of the ci tadel at Antwerp ?—A part of the enemy's fleet lay aa the sea face of Antwerp, and of course they were within the • range of the guns of the citadel but I doubt if the enemy bad any batteries organs mestere on the wharfs at Antwerp; the enemy had Antwerp on their right, and the Tete de Flandre on their left. Had you rearm to he satisfied with the professional jag mew and resources of Sir Home Popham, while acting soder your order in the Scheldt T—Mott fully so. From your communications with Goveniment, did you sup- pose titers to know w ;tether the Scheldt was navigable fee' ships of the line above Aut weep or ?—ln conversations I had with Lord Mulgrave and some of the Members of the Board of Admiralty, I think they did not seem to under stated that ships of the line could go above Antwerp. was always of opinion myself that they could, and it hassinte tensed oat that they have game above Antwerp. nod that was one of my reasons for thinking that we should find it a difil icult matter to destroy the estemy's fleet if they should go above Antwerp, add our army not be able to pin possession of that plater.. , At what time were you enabled to pet that part of your in structions into eseeution, to posh up a sufficient amount of y'mr force above tire town of Flushiog, to preset* the escape i of any vessels in Flashing, or the vielaity &hip the Scheldt? —I 1110 k it was the 24 or 9d of August that a teasiderahle. part of the flotilla girt into the West Scheidt; it was not ne cessary to posh any part of the larger ships mto the Scheldt, in cos Rance with that part of my orders because the enemy had no force at Fleshing that the gin-b oats could not intercept ; balked at that thee they had n e t eararmed vessel • lathe mouth of the Scheldt. A part of the squadron would have been ordered into the Sebeidt. if I bad not received in telligent* that the enemy's fleet had got above the hoes at Lille; I therefeee did not consider it was proper to expose thiships unnecessarily when iso Object could be obtained by it. - 'llsen the Committee is to leritaptd, ame could, have pushed a prepaid's', of your ffiart the Scheldt sootier, but for the renegers, have glee*? ' se. certainly we might: Theo the Committee is to onderstead there wits no part of of your betdadwas in a situation to go up the &Arbil, no . your lest of the Scheldt P—Theite was 'mit ; but et was that Lord Gardner should have gone into the Scheldt. as It hare wild before, after the batteries of Cadsand were taken, anted orden were given to him, in conformity to the orders I hod received from the Admiralty, upon the Idea that the enam fleet 'lrk in a situation to be attacked by, .out's; but w 1 llfototd that the teeny's fleet bad gone again up the Scheldt. , it did not appear to no of se much im portance plashing and eiskiag oar barge tips throw* the den gereas 'hoop at the entrance of that river, fad therefore I countenauced L ad Gardner In rensehtiog al anchor in the West Putt, that is, of West CaPpel, is by 'that means he was in a siosation to assist Commodore Owen MO Ms boats, in case we had found let necessary to land *ea Cadsand, or to posh in through the Duertoe or Vfeilan passages, where .tre_tould get pilots to take citeSge of the ships. Did yea not write a letter on the 27thof August to the Ad miralty ?---Yes. I did. Was that letter of a public or private store?—Any; let ter that I wrote fb the Secretary of the Admiralty (and that letter I believe was published) was of a stabile imearta ' Did y ou ever express a come* that that letter was pub lished —When I wrote the letter, it was with as impres sion that the cisuntry would he very mach diswtis>fed that, more was not done, and I thought et was due to myself and the navy, to state to that branch of the government that I was under (the Admiralty) that we were d es to gar oe• ' or. that we had taken all tbe Iwasaki thOontawy M Anon; and therefore I *rote this letter; I teetotal, idtisa,l.Wellte the letter did not think it would bellishileived, but I was was in thinking so; if I bad thought it freight bap been pato listed, I should have hero more cantle* la wording it, that it might sotconvey a reisetiou apse Lord Chatham or the army. What I saw the 'Meer atteretanis in the paper. it struck see pay-terribly that It ovoid be the meaaeof making a breach %Nivea" the; two seevide t gad them of coarse I ex-. pressed be* verjaaory IWM that I bad worded letter I. that manner at tie atone tease rillierved.l9 Lend and indeed to many' Officers of the army; that J mostx t e - written a similar letter. for it was only a statesseat of i ; but I might have pet' it together in such ita m orter as not le be offensive, fir in the way it was worded,it Ripener* like casting a reflection upon Lord Chatham and tar pri nc ipal' officers of the kroty, and Lam very glad to hileitithit .ppet lenity of exploandig !ix Ir, because l did sot Intalalle Mit any reflection upon Lord Chatham; or the otiverior Olden of the army, fur lam not a judge of military miters. At the same time I could net help regretting, and I del at this mo ment regret most sincerely, that having been brought up as we were to the point of attack upon the enemy, old haying worked our people op to the highest pitch of entliusiasds, we should have been under the necessity of retiring. Fro. what happenal since, in consequence of the sickness of the army, I am convinced that it was the wisest measure that the Commander in Chief of the army could pursuer fur I doubt very mach whether • his Lordship would have been able to acco•nplish the fall of Antwerp. - considering the sea son of the year, the-very sickly state of the troops, and the increasing force of the enemy; but as we'did not see much force, I thought, and still do think, that we ought to have attacked Lillo and Liefkeinhoeilc, which might leave open ed a field to some enterprise or other, and might have uren the means 'of ear getting hold of the enemy's fleet ; and it was with this impression I wrote my leuer. Did you ever consult with the Commander in Chief of the Army about attacking forts Lille and Lief kenshoeik, and going forward ?-06 the thlt elf Asp*, Sir Home Popham and nytelf weM to head-quarteav to sake with Lord Chat ham, sad at that time hi a Lordship did ore speak at. all as if be had flushes about going on: at the saute (Imelda Lordship tneatimied-thot the enemy were increasing in Aare. Sir How Popham spoke a good deal in favour of the beach fat bodies the okay on, and this was the g coeval 'coeversit tikethat *Wed at that time. However, his Lordship pro - tedoesniag to Bathe ou the following day, which was the 251*, hod there, in conversation with see ' he first spoke of retie*, aleodoning the increased force of the enemy, the ed vented lesson (and we had certainly very bad weather), and the sickly state of the troops the army was - just then begin. sing tobe sickly, and keseemed to hint to me, that be wish. ed fee.esthe letter from me upon the subject. Accordingly, lathe meet day I wrote ta his Lordship, and that letter ac mine to the Admiralty of the with of August, and re the Committee :in that letter it will p)• r, that pssposed an attack ,upoo LiUo and Lief kenshoya, with a view of opening a field to farther enterprise; this was the -only conservation or correspondence I had with his Lordship oportahat subject;. I think that letter was timed the Both Atwut.- - • Locate the proposition of attacking Fort Lille had been . ffilitihkedell. do you think the fleet might have gone up so as Wiesare attacked Amwerp, or in what way, to have Likes ion of the French lettl-.lf Lille and Lierkeasheeik 06 .5 nc ecit taken, the fleet would certainly have gone up; that -is. the frigates and flatilla would. and probably some of the line, and it would have reinaineitto be discovered whether the works at Antwerp would prevent . our passing Antwet p to attack the French Sect I thitei, to the best of my recol-, lei - lion. by ;be time the French fleet aas brought down before Antwerp, fi ve sail of the line had heea up shove it. When ee Conversed on the propriety of attacking Lilla and Lief ken- , shoeik, Sir It. Keats was in compaby with me, and most of the Lieutena..i-Geuerals of the keen'. except Lord 'react and Lord Ilmitley I then stated that I thought Lilt.— might he attacked with a large preportiim to . Um army, and that a small proportion of It might he landed on the boel side to attack, Liefkenshoeik, and that I thought it ueeessary that the army should occupy the Sykes on both banks of the river. We bad a great deal of conversation otaibis subject, amid it k was the opinion of the officers of the army then lament, that we should have little prospect of suceeeding in the ulteekr objects of the Expedition, esen if we succeeded u taking Lillis and Lief henshoeik, and that rousidedug the state of swap, It Would be injudiciou s to ma k e t h e attempt bat I Ind no *tube of our haven it in Aar power to pass the fri 4istes Mid 'event! ships of the line, indeed we 'should have at., 1 Mode if; up towards Antwerp, if Lillo and Lief ken( IMaibeeu taken. You %hl* there was no impediment by thehoma or chain qbas wagged to have been laid across?—Yes, the beam and abate was an impediment, hut U iniehtbave been forced. ' Wilkie what space of time, reckoning from the dity saw milled frau; the Howie, do you thiuk Ch e t 20,0110 meta atoll, ',have bet* hustled at Siolvliet, reckoning for eireircetestances 'of wind, weather, shoals, and oppusithek Bai a -OM y . ,? —With the wind asel'aeather lee had. le d the isu/edt - . sly • we sort with, 'doubt it weal& bait bola *runt& 'slate. ; r r ii% . -. 4ff i a allit a a il a algstr ibit was " 'Manta smile a pniper lauding ea Sasitvliet till the Oth tof 416 A • er r lot rta m lik , Argent, if so soon as that, catty in getting the transports which had the heavy because we &mad a great dill- sests "ludt eki *ewe Ara m ta v evanytwieshiage4l.... __ 74, --- ak , e r e . tt. of the army, and provisiain and other stares, tiwoo .r : T h lai t i C eve', Pit h At ide T e gt hh ar eg g i Yeas sod that ene "flaw lion y weu with the skrs Sion* Passage hen the West Scheldt, molter to *Wit Mina potter to „ od a. di m mesa obliged to pram through a waskway the Galen -aboal. & the wi n d „ ad ins which was under the lire of Flushing: it was not till after the 4 _Ser' eseb urdre were Part ot ieu ber hi u d i.e a unamtila raspilled. bi eat that aame , hl 7 ....... 2s tie ts, fall of flushing that the heavy ordnance and all the cavabal • I gut thrmigla.ood, therefore.. if the army did land at Sant 'Het. which it certainly might have dons before, it must have gone without the artillery and Many stores circa-eery to a siege. t beg leave to correct niyseif in my answer, that 1.1 do not wow to say we bad 10.000 men to land, because a great ' part of the army was employed in investing Flushing, there fore there was not that number of men to be landed, as well as I can recollect. la what seamier did you propose to Lord Chatham to at tack Fort Lillo ? —With regard to the 111:01ner of attacking Fort Lille no the land side, I conid make no proposititua to his Lordship with propriety, as it was a military operation; bet 1 did say that the ships of war could attack the fort at the same time that the army did. What plan did you propose for the attacking of Lief ken shoeick ?—A similar one to that of attacking Lillo ' • we in-. tended to have lightened' ghtened two ships of the line, and placed one against each of their forts, and with a thircLand fourth ship to have attempted to force the boom, but it would have been neressery to have a favourable wind for this purpose, and the river is very winding about that part; but I did not eider into this detail - before Lord Chatham, it was only a matter of conversatine with the Sea Officers. I barely tinned to his Lordship,-that if the army attacked the forts, he should hare every naval assistance it was is my pewee to ofer. In the event of the ships not breaking the boom, was not that boom so constructed as to bring the ship Immediately under the battery of Liefkrialioeik ? -1 think it was, and I think the undertaking would have been very hazardous. In the ignorance of the width of the Scheldt, and with the unctetninte whether it would have been sak to pass between the etadel of Antw.lp and the Tete do Flaudre, would you, if LI knishoelk and Lille had been taken, have still ventured up the Seb ids with the English fleet ?-1 should have gone as far up the Scheldt as the aruty could have gone to co-ope rate with us, and I should have taken uo more ships with me that% was necessary; and if I discovered that it was not practicable with any prospect of success to pass Antwerp and the Tete de Flandre, I should have returned back again. When you talk of the field for further enterprise that Would have been opened by taking Lino and Lief keithoeik, had you any other object en view than an attack on the ships at Antwerp?—The capture or destruction of the enemy's flotilla, and the ships that were below Antwerp, and to dis cover whether there was a probability of success in going fur ther on. Can you form any judgment of the probable loss of the army in its attack upon the two forts of Lillo and Lief ken shneik 1— I think both the army and navy must have lost many Inca, as both services would have been very hatch ex posed. Supposing the army to have suffered very much, which you think probable, in its attack apon those forts, would it have been in a condition to have reached along either bank of the Scheidt, if the enemy land a considerable force in Antwerp US oppose them ?—I think it would nut have been prudent to have advanced if many men were lost, and the enemy were in great force; but it is impossible to say whether many men would have been lost or not, and it could have depended a good deal upon the General whether he thought he should be justified in running the risk of advancing along the dykes. You have statedahat you would have approached Antwerp with the ships, and that if you had found it necessary you would have withdrawn them again; what is your (minim as to the manner in which the army, which was to have accoins pa 6.41 the fleet on both sides of the Scheldt. could have made iV retreat, if the enemy had had a superior force at Ant warp 2—lt was epos the supposition that the enemy were in rattle force, that I thought the army should not em barrels itself. by ening too far inland ; and that incase it was Pr likelss to be assailed by a superior rune they could always - I)' ) v _ retreat from the dyke into the vessels ilia; would accompany them up theriver, and the army could be furnished with am- " 0 she aatis Foos, .- 1 munition and provisions from the vessels going up the river; if the General,. Conight it necessary to retreat. I should of course lave given hinsoU the assistance that was necessary, and fallen back with the army. J. H. a., •IS the event of forts Leif kenshoeik and Lillo being taken, J'lll°- C. yes bsrro stated that it capcapnecessary for the army to take Daniel Rossiter. poessidon of both sides of. the river before the fleet could ad- Thomas Macredie, tit. vanes- to Antwerp; whei you gave that opinion, were you David W. Pe a rce, Ge awarirthat the part of the army oethe left bnk would be Sidney Chapatis, Gent. exposed to the whole force the enemy could collect in French One. M 'Ss'uei Gent • Fiapdess?—Yes, I was: and I coaclide that this was one of BARRACKa the reasoas that Lurd (Asthma did out agree to second my •' har Ba X at "' fro tadtiois. raritml. Yea have spatial of taking or destroying the esseasy'sships ' of woe; supposing the enemy's ships of war to have gone up abote Aotwerp, would it not have been a great ',Neel to de. stray the doek-yard and the ships that were huildiow at Antwerp?—Yes. certainty; It was part of our instructions to do so, and we shouldhave attempted to do it if it had ap peared practicable when we came to the place. If the army bad been able to tab: the town of Antwerp at as early.petiod, do yuu know of any reason why the dacha 'yard and ships building there might not have been destroys* without the assistance of tie Davy P—No, certainly, if the army had taken wegs, the dock-yard and slipping fig& I have been destroyed without the assisMactof the natty. _ Supposing the armyto have taken pessesion of Cadsandlakr your opinion could the batteries of the island of. Walellarmi have opposed any obstacles to vessels passing up or dotes the Scheldt 2—No, they could not. Whets you stated that they thought, in case of the army hay ipg possession of Antwerp, the ducks and arsenals anaht have been destroyed, did you mean the possession of the citadel of Antwerp 1-1 conceived that the army could notiJOituel4 Ant werp without having possession of the citadel. I believe the citadel commands the dock-yard. ' Do you not consider the weather to have been extremely unfavourable, particularly to the ulterior objects of the Ex pedition, from the time of your arrival of Walcherenl—l certainly do. Was it not more unfavourable than at that season of the year might have been reasonably expected?—Most ear tainly ; and from the bad weather we experienced in the be. ginning of the Expedition the delay in proceeding up the Scheidt arose. Had it not been for the unfavourable state of the wealta* ' are von not of opinion that the operation upon Ca _dts* would have succeeded P—l think it would. What knoll of time would it have taken to have carried up' the fleet to Santyllet, supposing Cadsand to have bees ailluto s and the wind reasonably fair?—lf Cadsand bad .betilultrilas and that dividon of the Stet which was intarbalktalfm4 ' gone up the Scheldt, bad not gone into the • It might very shortly have got up to Santyliet ; think in oar' days the wholearmament mi ght have beentip, allowing the wind and weather to be favourable. , Hod you any information of the number of the enemy's force at Cadsaud, at the time it was proposed to land there? —No; when the Expedition was formed ' Cadsand was not a part oT it, but afterwards it was agreed that it wit neces sary to take.Cadsand, far tba pupae of passing up the Sebeldt with more facility, and not to wait for the capture of Fts:l4Z at first a regiment was thought Sufficient after that li was *semitone& millet last it Came to ailieisina of theanny, then our squadron was increased in proportion; 1 do not believe that the Cove; ninent th ou ght the enemy could send any coatiderable force to Cadsand; I do not think so myself, mid I thought that the force that was ordered for Out ten& both on the part of the army and eery, fully sufilcieat far the purposa ; jest before the It %pedalo* sailed, it ta rock me that there might be a Want of boats, and then I ordered the division of Lord Gardner to place itself in. readiness to assist with his boats to ensure the l utollrjg, and I considered at that sink, and 1 row do consider; that t made the most ample provision for that service, fur I could not conceive, with the intelligence that e had, that the enemy could collect such a force as to resist that tibial Was sent to Catiamd, and therefore I aas much surprised w bra. we arrived in the Stone Deep, to hear films Coutinodore Owen that the enemy were in considerable force, and ns the weather was so very bad that we were obliged to go into the Floompota frees the appre bemina that many of our transports would drive on shore, mid that great part of our if not the whole, might be sunk; after etuasiting with Lord Chatisatn, it wow agreed to direct Commodore Gwen to map* his landing, and I be lieve there were-very few days, if thole orders bad not been givce; that the commoddie mai Mire lataled the troops; if be had nut bad those orders, and had succeeded illiandse4 the tamps and destroyiog the bait ries upon Cadsand, we Aland still leave found a daticulty an getting the transports out of (he East Scheldt into the West Scheldt; ins seesaw Of the wind blow jug in, and geuerialy,blowiesevemfresli ' Supposing the fleet to have pencil op the Scheldt, - case of failure, re hare been Staid to cetera, could dose so without n shift of wind 2-allo, it could' - base tided it dwelt- LORD GARDNER'S E' Thb related to the refieisition for *he goodness to state to it Committee yoar whether it would ve been posdble, "he alai .aat. ataubce, la jag sfr- OLD DiILEY, FEB. V. g srw convict e d to, and other articles The Sessioa commenced this day, before Woon and Mr. Justi property of G eorge William lienicy was capitally stealing a ap c p u a a re t i, n t . h a e ist i c ) La Uudy son. The Prosecutor and Prisoner were se rroci „ it a livery stable, and the property wassc al p itoni the bed-chamber of the former. Thomas Passmore was capitally indicted tot feloniously breaking and entering the doellini house of William Winter, in .the p ar i s h of Mar; 'la-Boone, in the day time, and stealing ther e 'll':silver watch, and bank-notes to the aluouot X. 17, the property of William Williams. It appears that the Prisoner was einployed labourer in the vault of the house of Mr. %in n in Cumberland-street, Portmais-square. The p ry : secutor was entrusted with the care of the ho whale it was undergoing repair; upon the 16th o i January the Prosecutor went oat, after twi n , locked the door of the garret where he slept. on. his return, hu. perceived that the dour w " ii broken open, as also was his box, a n d tit property specified in the indictment stoles,., The Prisoner . was at this time absent f, work, but . returned neat morning, and wa n eight days after apprehended by a Row., strld Officer, at the instance of the Prosecutor. Mr. Winter said, that he went, on the 16th January, to his house, to inspect the condu c t his workmen, and, met the Prisoner walkiaid en‘ stairs from thegarret, with much confusion i n appearance ; his work being confined to the he could not possibly havo any occasion la . 4 1 ' the top of the house. The Prisoner had ously asked the Prosecutor fur the loam eta note, and stated, that his wife WKS in much tress for money to pay a bill. - A tailor was • then called, who said, that alai days after the robbery, the prisoner beughtamay two waistcoats, and breeches, and other Artie* for which he paid him with a five pound note; also wanted gold for a twenty pound note. The Prisoner was convicted of Larceny. • From the LONDON GAZETTE, Fas. to. MILITARY PROMOTIONS. War-Of fire, Fob. 20, 1810. • BREVET. Captain John Campbell, of the 78th Foot, to be Baj a l l k Army. HOSPITAL STAFF. To be Hospital-Mater for General Serrke, J. H. Ludlow, Gent. John. C. Yeoman, Gent. Daniel Romiter, Thomas Macredie, Gent. David W. R. Nam, Gent. Sidney Choppln, Gent. Giles M‘Baine, Gent. BARRACKS. Charles Baynton. Gent. to be a BarrittkvYaster is Cent Britain, vice William Cnrbyo, promoted. ' • the King's Germain Legion. 7th Battalion of the Lige, Hospital-Mats William Sudan be Atabtant-Surgeon„ vice Suffers. who retiree, blcsionanuust. The Appointment of Lieutenant Twits*, Stqemie to he Captain oe,n Company, by purchase, iii the ` .%h Font, siee Curry, as stated in the Gazette of the 13th Febrazry,lBUS, has out taken place. • '1 he undermentioned 01Seen are superseded, being &bat without leave, viz. • Lieutenant Laroche, of the lath Light Dragoons. Captain Muller, of the Skilian Regiment. BIRTHS Oa Thursday lastpatlieigate, Lady Geo►gina Barnes its - • 00 Sunday Marningt tie 1 lth testis*, at Hemsted, in Kw, Lady Darley, widow delve late Sir Wm. Darfty, am MARRIED. - Saturday, at Afll Priors,. Langley St. Albyn, Esq. sf Al. faxton, t • Mint Caxton, only daughter of the Res. L. ' Lurton Minister of tin; parish and Taunton St. James. The Duke of Orleans to the Princess t Amelia, weld daughter of the King and Queen of Naples nod Sicily. DIED. On the 20th Inst. In Rand-street, Master Edward INtil Marten, second son of G. S. Marten, Esq. of Sank* Lodge, Hens, aged eight. Friday morning last, Mrs. Peacock, wife of Mr. Pami r Salisbury-Nuare Fleet-street • Lately, at Da;ttan-house. Scotland, in the 74th vearofkk tyre, the Rev. Henry Grieve, senior Minister- of the Old Church of Edinburgh. Ou Tuesday, at St. Martin's states-house the celebrated and well-known character, Sir Harry Diinsdale, many wan representative for the ancient 'borough of Garrett. A PROOF of the EFFICACY' of that 'most excelled _ ---- -- - ---- _ _ ' • MUICINE THE CORDIA L BALM , OF QUITO, ' Which is an infallible Ctire for all Nervous Disorder. To Mr. WITHERS, Chemist, Stroud, London. ' SIR —My Wife was afflicted with a severe Nets roes Fever, attended with ; violentbeating of the heart , lownewaf spirits, and a dreadful sick head-ache, which tr. doced her so Latch that she became unable to speak or walk for several weeks, and would frequently Lunt, and rem:tisk that state fora emisislentisle times together with a sear II the neck ; all of which gave way to the CORD BALM OF QUITO. "Miring her illness, I had the advice and attendance of several Medical Men, who, after tryirg every means in their power, gave beg over as iottwabe, sr. T expected every hour would have been her last, when s hr - • tonately saw your B elm ofQuito advertised in the tilago Courier d s and as the last resource, I resolved that lima make a trial of it, and. therefore bought e. same l ot. Messrs. Rutter and Co. and gave it &ceased's( to the time, and, astonishing to relate, before she had takes Ihr whole of the luittle, I Rerceived a wonderful champ OW lt better and hy. Irer tektite three more bottles, two sell 10 ° one la:If-guinea Roes, she recoserel her speech aid wat tle to gee whom; as wool 0 and I have no doe* but that lifile more bottles will restore her to her former state of brill , You are at liberty So publish this letter for the boa 4 others ; and any Sir, year obliged bitable servant, MURDOCK. M•DONALD. Glasgow, March 30, 1808. P. S. Farther partieolats day be twirls by applicatios to Mtn. Baxter and Cu. Glasgow. - WITH ERS's CORDIAL. BALM OF QUITO, iiiiiit il is a most cooreniet.t, safe, and infallible Remedy for Nerma. • Bilious, Gouty, and Itheum, i tic Disorders, and every hint o f Debility or Itelaration in Persuto, of Other 4ex, MN 6( old, whether hereditary, natural; or occasioned by a red deuce in hot or nohealthyelimistes, the immoderate use elan; spirituous liquors, or other potions fluids, teosralcatary al*. or too chive an application to study, eicesisivegrief; loillik i , hint • tater( vy, dissipation, .-* - lollir.`.' head:; I 1 1 •I I ; awe d en th e s e h e id t, an d i n ihm adin rat 00 0 macury, unipation, excess, imp or to 'retain, could it have practicer, fainting dui 'intent incadlnenv, col d --Nu, it could' not—it must lonqlS invcatt wisstilw,, trembling or *linking of haft g ham sbortotss of breatb, tonsonsptive • - andivohl hy W. Wittier. , Chemist, 1019; E. V I DAN CE. kr" . maw bit au aaspeawbic yadicine y eidsit f ie. r for lubma so 'laud. &Mips on 2 :lt d. " I . pee wo e. . 11psi Commence yosir Id limn been possible, c LlClbti)CW's fNialed'aad Published Ay D. v st 4, 1111181ilice, p• Joie matiusea ••lisansiodaaVitsicar.gi, Ti N i;, • • oiled th• 'tin ful' tYn T Per i/ tb • is had ie rrl 1. 7- 1 4 644 , oat lAS Rill h ;( li by de lied • Te irk MO bin!, - - rne /high :th kit t ' r I t t; Nt ,1i lull , Ile soh 1 - at.