The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1803-05-25 00:00:00

if I \ I+. 11 1i Iji ! F. • I ~~ ' w=l. Mnlm - • ,~ ~.- t word " desire: l as used by the lien. Gentleman to whom I allude; so far from that being an appropri.• . ate expression, the fads I have mentioned, on the contrary, amount to a positive, absolute breach of the Treaty of Amiens , such as does produce on our part a legitimate cause of war. The moment we see the least indication of hostility on the part of another power, we are justified in taking those mea sures which will enable us to meet that hostility. Where, in the present instance, is that proof of hos tility to be found? Ask Bonaparte. What did he conceive the first leadiag . step to the conquest of Egypt ? The possession of Malta. What was ne cessary tb prevent his keeping Egypt ? That which he thought necessary to the accomplishment of its conquest—Malta. But it is said,. ;lett are bound by your treaty of peace to evacuate it you had evacuated it, you would have 'been justified in attacking it for the purpose of re taking it. Will any man then say, that what you might have attacked for the purpose of retaking, in case you had given up, you are not justified in retaining ! Now, Sir, till any body will furhish nie with a clear distinetion beteeen these two cases, I must rejea the belief that either of them can he disproved. Ido not see what possible * difference there can be between our retaining Make, ia conse quence of our finding the French have been guilty of a breach of the treaty, and our endeavotinag to get possession of it by force if we had given it up, which we should most certainly have had a right to have done. I profess lam not inclined to enter into any minute discussion as to the construetion of the tenth article of the Treaty of Amiens, and it is only necessary to my argument to state thus much, and no more. I state, that if we had signed the treaty, and bound ourselves to deliver Malta, and we had refused so to have done, there mig ht have been alledgcd against u'i a breach ci the treaty, prior to that on the part of the French Republic ; but much as 1 question the propriety of the article, I think it is impossible there should be a clear proof made out by which the French can claim of us the execution of that article. That it was difficult to execute, nay, that it was impossible of execution, was one of the arguments I used when the subjea was considered in this House. If there was a beisafJe difficulty on the subjea then, I say we were not wrongtnl retainers of the island we were hi psssessien of, Malta, in consequence of the impossibility of the execution of the article for giving it up; and, therefore, as it was impossible to comply with the letter of the treaty, there was no wrong in dcoarting from the letter, and construing the treaty according to its spirit. I feel that all thr.)e matters have been dwelt on with more force' by other Gentlemen; but I thought it ne. cessa:'y to say thus much ' as I had a strong opi nion on the subjett. On the point of our right of war, I contend that there never was a penod in the annals of our history when we had, in point of justice, so many irresistible grounds of going to war, as seem to exist a'. the present moment I am addressing you. It may be necessary to say one or two words ou the subjea of expediency : a right of war may exist, and yet there may be circumstances of expediency so as to make it doubtful whether Parliament ought to recommend the prosecution of the war, or take measures to put an end to it. But. Sir, are there, or arc there not, sufficient grounds of expediency for carrying on * the war, to be found at the present moment. You say, that not to admit the situation in which the country will be placed by the war, which is now arising, is a situation danger ous in the extreme, and pressing in the most urgent manner on the comforts of the people, would be to disguise the truth. But what is the true way of considering the question of expediency ? We are placed in a situation where our choice is a choice great evils; but before we can determine on the expediency of changing it for a 5..:11C of war, let us see what we lose by so doing ? Is it a state of peace at present ?—(general ra•Jamatilni of her ! .hear !). Will any man say, that we have exchanged a state of peace for that of war. We arc changed, from an unsafe and unequal truce, to a contest, in which we are challenged to meet denge; ; yet, with the hearts, minds, and souls of Eugli,:.nien, we can bravely look danger in the fare, and hope to see a glorious result from daring it. But what do we sacrifice by going to war ? Do we sacrifice thet state, ohich any man can think va luable, or useful, or desireable, for us to continue in ? It we were governed by the very worst ministers that ever were seen in the country, I would ask, Whether they could possibly wish that it should longer suffer under a state of protraifted negotiation, as it has experienced during the last two months. I would ask whether, during the last two months, we could be described as enjoying a state of peace ? May it not rather be considered as a period includ ing all the inconveniences, and, I may say, almost all the expences, of war, without affording us any opportunities of availing ourselves of those chances in our favour, which we might derive from an ac tual state of war. It was an insidious truce, in which you was unarmed, and your ene my was armed—an enemy, whose views of conquest urged them to make new demands, who spread theuoelves in military array for the purpose of watching an opportunity of making a grand attack upon your country. Are we to weit, without giving credit to the designs of the French, till they come and land hew, having completed all their dispositiosts and plans of attack. and ja.efeeted their meats of carrying them into execution. We owe it to our charaCter and our honour to look the danger in the face, and to take those means which God and nun Las given us for our own defence. It has been frequently said, that in the unsatisfeetory situation. of Lurope. it is urfortunate to see. the state of advan tage in which France it pieced, and the state of denger of the other parts of the Continent, and therefore that there ought to be a greatehenge in the relative situatior. of the differe. t countries of Europe, before we undertook to enter upon another war. Thu best illustration I can give with regard to that part of the subjeet is, what I am about to mention. We lied scarce arrived at that point yes terday at which we were called upon to defer•the debate till to-day, when we were desired to look to that great public event by which, within the last mouth, this empire has,. by the mere intimation of its resistance to the ambition, of France, obtained a gr e at, glorious, and important conquest-1 mean the cession of Louisiana. I cannot think any. man will think the ceeeion of Louisiana is a proofof the retnra a seatiouuto of moderation on the part of the Frocb GOnsul ; I cannot imagine that anyone will, burg himself k indicata.Cne ray of modera. two m the naiad of that pes2 • conqueror f or Ire has said to lslasself, " I must Escharge the debt of trues and justice ; 1 must forego my pretensions to Louisiana, as the sr4proOf of my return to what is callM aiproof Of my moderation." What has been the cause of the cession of Louisiana ? What but the apprehension of the rupture with this country. However paradoxical it ray appear, I do considerts the cession of that country the most unequivOcal proof of the hostile mind of the First Consul.-- What has urged him to do it but the hope of doing away the chances of the hostility of one nation ? Of making the forces of that nation part of his military array, and of withdrawing from this country that assistance, which es's. dently it must have received, had France persisted in her design of taking possession of Louisiana. It is not an hopeless view of the contest-to consider s that Bonaparte has felt himself compelled, by the mere appearance of hostility on our part, to forego a measure which he had before determined to carry into efea. Is it not important that the different power: of the Continent should see that there is in this country a spirit to resist, and. a forwardness in seeking for and consolidating all means of resists ance to the overgrown and misdireded power of that great empire Fiance. It is said we are without al- lies. I will not dwell upon that part of the subjedk; but I trust there is no one who hears me who is dis posed to doubt, at this moment, the propriety of our obtaining, at any erpence (hear! boar!) the co-oper ation and assistance of continental allies. It has been said, how can you resist the French empire without allies. We have formerly heard of the necessity of preserving the balance of power, in Europe, while it existed. If it be true, that a system of foreign alliances is of so much import• ance, when we find it ready made to our hands, PI do not see how it is possible for the same mind to conceive or say, that that which is important when made, it is not important to make; how arc you effea the restoration of that balance of power ? By inviting the powers of Europe to assist your endea vours, and by chewing that you are ready to meet and repel the ambitious designs of France. Now, Sir, I think I have troubled the House with nearly all that is necessary for me to say ; I have only one word to add as to the amendment—what I began with I must repeat—that it did appear to me, and does appear to me, that in the present arduous and critical moment, there can he no duty more incum bent on every man in this House, than to speak the sense of the country (violent acclamations) and to shew that we speak it unanimously, there is no sa crifice I would not make, in order to obtain the et pression of this House on the present important subjed, with perfca unanimity—(Hear ! He.. r . 1 ) If then, Sir, I see in the present amendment no real difference with reference to the address, must I not wonder, as well as lament, that there should be : an amendment proposed, which is calculated to do all the injury arising from want of unanimity, with out the possibility of being attended with any coun tereding advantage. I could wish that an amend ment should not have been proposed, the effect of which must be that of weakening the general una nimity of the House. In this view of the ste-jed, I cannot but say, that although there is no: a word of the amendment I should not heartily subscribe to, yet seeing that there is no great and seastantial ground of difference between the terms e: it and the original address, I cannot but lament that any con sideration whatever should have prevented the ex treme and powerful effed, which could ♦ not fail be ing produced, by Parliament speaking ttis day with one unanimous voice. The country is at this moment called to an arduous situation, but I have such con fidence in the minds, hearts, and' spirits of the peo ple, that I have no doubt, that great as the pres sure is, there will be found means, minds and spirits, by the exertion of which this contest will be brought to a fortunate issue. If the country is true to itself in exerting its resources with unanimity, and if Par liament is true to the country in seeing that the means supplied by its generosity and patriotism are faith fully administered, we shall, I am persuaded, come out of this contest with an increase of glory and na tional lustre, and with the satisfy lion of having ad ded to she honour, dignity, and chareder of the country, and by our efforts established its permanent security. Mr. WHITBREAD, after apologizing for his troubling the House, observed, that the Hon. Gen tleman who spoke last, had called for a unanimous vote on this and the last night's debate. He was equally desirous of calling for that vote, which, in point of fad, would be a vote of substantial unanimity ; for he was well persuaded that the whole House were ready to support his Majesty in prosecuting the war in which he had found it ne cessary to engage, and to assist him by the sacri fice of their lives and fortunes. The lion. Gen tleman had told the House there was nothing, save his honor, he would not sacrifice for the purpose pf unanimity. He put it to the Hon. Gentleman, and to the House, whether it was possible to come unani mously to a vote, expressing unqualified approbation of the condua of his Majesty's Ministers. Conceiv ing that part of the paragraph in the original address did not contain such approbation of his Majesty's Ministers, he felt impossible to acquiesce in it. He could not in his conscience say, that his Majesty's Ministers had been uniform with regard to their endeavours to preserve peace ; and he called on the Honourable Gentlemen, who had just sat down, to say whether his Majesty's Ministers had or had not, in point of fad, concluded themselves well. If they had Atfted with uniformity in their endeavours to preserve peace kith France, they must have been .equally uniform in committing the interest and ho nour of this country. His Majesty's Ministers and the country had committed themselves, tty refusing to take notice of the insults and aggressions on the part of France. If the Hon. Gentleman who had spoke last could not approve of this comfit& on the part of his Majesty's Ministers, it followed that he cosid not approve of that paragraph which went generally to justify their condud ; therefore he trusted that those who were desirous of unanimity fur giving support to his Majesty, would afford him a pledge that they wers ready to sacrifice their lives and fortunes in his cause; but he also hoped .they would not express their approbation of his Ma jesty's Ministers, who, he'was of opinitin, had not done their duty. He trusted the I louse would in dulge him with a few observations oa this night's debate; and though it was far from his wish to trespass long on the time of the House, yet lie found it impossible to consider the subjed in that narrow point of view to which the Honourable Gentleman, who had last spoke, had confined himself ; he could not seaside: this as. a question abstracted from tile t. ~~~~~~ 1 of his M.kier,ty's Ministers. He ' whztevee Might he his feelings on parties. in this House, he felt himself, '-oli from • , ~, gt neral coot professed, the, the seibje& of r t ,ase, . 'on the presefit occasion; wholly free _ every party. , He had, on the preceding evening, hailed the arrival of a Right Honourable Gentleman op posite to him (Mr. Pitt) as an happy omen. When he came last night into the House, he waited with anxiety to hear what he should say. He was ready to do ample justice to the brilliance of his display of eloquence ; but, in proportion to his admiration of that eloquence, his regret was deep at the view he had taken of the subeeei. He had observed, that, in one person only, was absorbed the power of the immense empire of France. When a war, on which might depend the fate of mankind, which might lead to events which couldnotbectintemplated without horror, or to successes of the most brilliant nature. If it was true, that the destinies of Europe hung on the lips of one person, it was from the part that Hon. Gentleman had taken, with regard to the politics of the Continent. He should have been most happy had lie found List night, that he had been actuated by sentiments of a different nature ; the Hon. Gentleman entreated the House to review the situation in which the country was placed. He said, he had had the misfortune of frequently speaking on the unpopular side of the question, yet though he felt that his sentiments were not consonant to those of the majority of the House, yet as be felt them to be the sentiments of the country at large, it was his duty not to be deterred from expressing them. Mr. WHITBREAD said, that wh-...n the Message was delivered, the sentiments expressed by the Hon. Gentleman and colleagues, was far from being saris faaory to him. In another debate on that subject, lie pressed for a setisfaelory communication, and if he understood right, a satisfaaory explanation was promised. The subjed of Switzerland wes ably at id eloquently urged in this House already, and he could say that his feelings were as strong as any Gentleman's on that occasion. But how did his Majesty's Ministers a.t in this business ? There was a deputy from that unhappy people at Paris, who applied to the Ministers of the dibrent Govern ; meats resident there, requesting their interference ; but the application was unnoticed by any but the British Minister, who wrote to Lord Hawkesbury on the subjea. His Lordship then sent Mr. Moore on a mission to Switzerland, with irrevocable instruc tions to instigate a war.' He did not pretend to say that. Switzerland was not a ground for war, but he would say that Ministers had risked a war at a time - when they could not be in possession of the result of Mr. Moore'e mission. His Majesty's Minister had declared at that period that there was no risk of a breech of the Treaty of Amiens ; for his part he did lea pretend to he a very great judge, but he thought that supplying of arms, arreenunition, and anoney, against France, was strong grounds for sup posing a breach of treaty was in contemplation. With regard to the Cape, it appeared that the Hon; Gent. sent out orders, first to evacuate, afterwards to retain it, and then to evacuate it again. He mentions this to shew the conduet of Ministers, for it does not appear that any orders had been issued to retain Egypt ; and it certainly appeared extraordinary, that' Ministers, when they sent orders to retain the Cape, did not take the additional step of securing that country. On the 10th of December, the Ho nourable Gentleman informed the House, that the country was in no danger of going to war, and very soon atter the King's Message was brought down ; and he had here to observe, that no explanation had been given by Ministers on that subjeet, though re peatedly urged to it. If -Ministers had waited a little longer, they would have learned that Louisi ana, which was stated as another ground for war, was ceded to America—it would operate as a check to sear. As to the general feeling of the country, he was confident it was against war. He was certain there was not one in the country would put up with an insult ; bin, with regard to the insults which had. been alledged, he would confine hiMself to a very few points. And, first, with respeet to the demand respeeling the liberty of the press, he admitted it was a subjea sufficient to excite contempt, but nogg ground for war. As to the next point adverted to, respeeling the commercial agents of France, there was no doubt but it was a subjea of suspicion ; but, did his Majesty's Ministers do their duty ?—if they did not send those agents out of the country, they had not done their duty. It was in their power to have done so ; but we heard nothing on the subjed, until it was now brought forward as a ground for war. Then: was another point which claimed at tention—lt seemed that Ministers had been cal led on, to send certain persons, obnoxious to the French Government, out of this coun try. He was as anxious as any Gentleman could be with regard to the maintaining the charac ter of the hospitality of the country, which there was no doubt should not be violated ; but when the. Noble Lord Made this statement he was of opinion that the names of the individuals alluded to should also have been mentioned for the information of the House. The Noble Lord, it is true, had written a very able dispatch on that subjea, but which was nevertheless unsatisfaCtory to his mind. We now come to the subjeet of aggrandizement on the part of 1 , ranee. The Hon. Gentleman who spoke early, and who was in the minority on the. question of Peace, spoke against it as reit willing to trust to France at that time. But how did Ministers aft ? Holland was made a contracting party to the Treaty of Amiens, by Which her independence was secured. I • With regard to that country, it seems various repre sentations had been made by the Noble Lord and' his colleagues, and excuses offered, and Louisiana: the cause assigned ; but even if that was the catine • for assembling troops in Rolland, there was less ere. cuse on the part of his Majesty's Ministers; for be would ask, Was there any formal remonstrance made on that occasion, and how was it possible that • Ministers could have abstained from remonstrance on a subjeet so dear to the interests of the country ? He does not believe any remonstrance had been nude ; and on reconsideration of several parts of the treaty, he was of opinion that the admission of French troops into Holland was not sufficient grounds for war. The Honourable Member again alluded to the case of Switierland, which he observed was in possession of French troops after the Treaty of Amiens, in violation of all treaties. But why was not this then held out by Ministers as a cause of war? An iidn. Gentleman who spoke before him, mentioned the Italian aggrandizement. But no mention had been made of the King of Sardinia, who was driven in so unexampled a manner from his pOsiesiioll4. The affair of Piedmont was also alluded to it en atvaneoxed on 41 part 4 France;- • •• - • 4.. " 44. IMP 11111.164 •••• Aut be would ask what difference there was between lein entire annexation to France, or making it barely ,speilitary department. A distinction had been made lorith regard to the Isle of Elba, of Mama and Pla centia, that the occupancy of France implied only its protedion ; but in point of lea, Piedmont, Pal - ;nta, andTlacetstia, were at the time of the Treaty of Amiens in possession of France. He begged leave to object to some positions of the Noble Lord, as es pressed in his speech of last night. The Noble Lord said, Is there no country that would take up the cause of another nation injured and distressed ? He would answer, that in such cases as those-of Swi:- zerland and Sardinia, no person could be more wile ling to enter into the contest than he would be; but as to continental wrongs, as far as it regardfd the Ger Man indemnities, and which had been diiiin guished by the names of robbery and plunder, he would ask, Did the Noble Lord, or his colleague., ;aster any remonstrance against those indemnities ? `But as to the continental wrongs,.io Cod's name let inus know if that was the objet of the war. Let us of raise the spirit of the nation en false grounds,. but let us know the acknowledged objea. With regard to Malta, the Noble Lord in his speech of Mast night descanted on the tricks of France to evade 'the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens ; bat dur ing all those difficulties Malta was still in possession .of England, and as long as those difficultiev conti nued, so long would Malta remain in our pbssessioo. The Hon. Gentleman-had said, that the hostile dis position of France did not appear so much from the papers which it must be acknowledged were insult ing, as from the mission of Sebastiani. But Govern ment had been in possession of the knowledge of Sebastiani's mission; in fad he had an inter view with General Stewart in Egypt.. We are not t'b draw erounds for war on the sepeusi tt tion that the First Consul had designs on Egypt. Sebastiani's report, he admitted, was insulting to the officer commanding in Egypt, but he contended it did not go to the extent mentioned by the Hon. Gentleman. As to Egypt, he was of opinion, that on consideration of the ambitious charader of the First Consul of France, the honour won by the Bri tish on the plains of Egypt, must ever remain nn pressed on his mind.. It was saki by Ministers, that they knew the designs of the First' Gerard on Egypt; what then die they do to prevent it? By the Treaty of Amiens, Malta was to be given up to Neapolitan troops. And, as far as he could learn it, was the general feeling of the At my and Navy, that we made Malta completely French, when we put it in possession -of Naples, which was evidently under the infiugnce of France. He had conceded this principally from the statement of a gallant officer (General Maitland) which left 'him in no doubt as to its correctness. With regard to the observations of an Hon. Gentleman who spoke before him, and who said, as Malta was the key to Egypt, it would be right to take it, even had the sti hipulations been accomplished; but he would ask that Hon. Gentleman, if he would break through a solemn treaty which would involve the country in war with three euatanteeing powers. With regard' P to the stress laid on the conversation of the First Consul, he was ready to admit that the power of the First Consul was like a liquid fire deviating every thing it approached ; but notwithstanding ifie plenitude of power which he possessed; it mast be admitted that he was a man, subjea to gusts of passion like other men, and on that account hut conversation was not such an objea of attention, —The First Consul stated his desire for possessing Malta, but at the same time obServed, that he should not go to war fur Egypt ; he also in: timated, that in the event of the dissolution . Of the Turkish 'Empire, it was. probable that Egyist would fall into the hands of France. The Hoe, Gentleman had said such a declarition was tan-v tamount to a declaration of war. Bat he would' ask, if we did not know that the Empress of Russia' had not entertained similar views On the Turkish' Empire ? he was also ready to ask, if the partition of Poland was not in unison with those views 1 but he would ask if this was the first time of hear-. ing those particulars ? He admitted that the con.' versation of the First Consul was cause of suspicion,' but the subjea not new ; it was well known at the time of signing the Treaty of Amiens. And what does Mons. Talleyeand say ? The First Condi) is willing to give every secu r ity with regar d to' Egypt, though not willing to do so with regard to Malta. He said it appeared that there was a pro jed given in to guarantee the article respeeting Mal ta, by Russia excepting what regards the establish ment of a Maltese Langue. He understood that a • document had arrived this morning, containing in telligence that Count Markoff had dispatched a note to the French Government, expressive of the anxiety of Russia to conciliate the differences of the two Go. vet - laments, but that no arrangements could take place as long as the Maltese Lague was allowed. A Right Hon. Gentleman had said, that Colonel Sebastiani had been sent out for the express isurpose of refuting a statement made in a British publication. [Here Mr. Pitt across the house observed, that he did not say that such was the ground of his ohjec • don, but that his observation was founded on the impropriety of die. original ad of sending Colonel Sebastiani on that mission.] Mr. WHITBREAD again observed, that . it. , appeared the report was made to shoe the siteeptibts' of Sebastiani to refdte the statement of Vritish; .publication. There was another point in which he would admit that his Majesty's Ministers had sided "with spirit ;* he alliided to the publication 'of Rein;.• lhard at Hamburgh. He argued against the folly ;:efour eseasenting to give Malta to Russia, when u e 'new Russia would not accept of it. He then alb.- *tied to a note from Talley rand to Lord Whitworth, in which the First Consul expressed, that as Russ4' I , . w ould net undertake the guarantee of M a lt a , un le ss , l e Maltese Langue was done away ; he had no ob laiesd—• ioneo any measure for adjusting that point. He ;s,tliOtight Ministers had not avail e d th emse l v e s o f t hi s • :to prevent wars - He thought it was not yet ton late e ' . .for mediation: As to the po* of recognizing, the ' tCisalpirie and - Ligurien Reperlhes, it was: a futile • objection ; foi we knew th e First:Cousul IrAlet * .the :head of these governments when the treaty Was con . - ;Cluded. He apologized for trespassing so long on ?the House, and concluded by an earnest wish for the Ipreservation of peace. ... . • Mr. DALLAS Said, the,que4ioix ,S,..t*O-fol4. i Some Gentlemen think Ministers Shasta : hoe. taken `;stand soone r aga i nst the aggrandizententsef trance. Other Gentlemen contend, that there was no just grounds for "Wilt ; if . he witlettstood =he - Noble Se• cretary of State aright; he %Vag of Opinion, that the adkiress.m7is jpstified by *papas ou tile tableil I 1 1 , . i - . z~: I