The Statesman. — London, England, 1810-03-28 00:00:00

_-_ • - I ;I A that it placed the invite of the expo. „,.,r. . i.l t cliar:r point of view than (bet of soy; r sV.IOC3S. I.:t them now rater to that od. r. rtic Noble Lord . woold not dispute tbs. othen:irity of tho papers dravia ep by General pot official capacity as Quarter-Ma,. ,1 • ahe Noble lord would admit d te. GAior sti kuritj'y of Ow pape r subtnitted by General s w .vortig ta the Lieutenaut-Gensral of the army . se i i i;•z, on Co. 27th of August. Here Mr. Poo, sill) read at e , lett tlt the Journal of the Army, and rut passages with the evidence' of Broworigg; that 'Officer • had affirmed, oat if nie army hd reached Santsliet by the 3d L ....it, the ulte a rior objects of the expedition o f sect) not have been abandoned; bat it appeared fr o t!! . papi•rs before them; that on that very or t h e y h ad received intelligence, that the enemy's t u t were di ainctly seen lying at Antwerp. On or I t, Aligost, the ships bad get up between the iitailet and the town. It appeared too, that sr i, m ai :tom inforination that they did not knot* ~ p a t part of the Won the naval arsenals were iscoher was it the;; known that those or. , 01 ,1, acre pro:et:tett by the guns from the cite. (11 the Bth of August, the day before' that' atm . it had boon said, that the army might l at . t oriel' Antwerp, and opened a fire upon it .hat day intelligence was received of a eon. 0,1 rattle Merriam of force, so that were the fiat t tartially, or, even half of thent . trtie, loathe), proceeded, as, hail been sapposed fei;ti t s o talirs on ilic 3J, 'Un thee, 'subsequent arrival at instead of fading, it in the defenceless ow cot it was expected to have been found in; p r y would have found it strung, and formidably o r vieleil. Toe Noble Lord hail spoke of the qat. :o f of the enemy's troops, which we would am• hoe to contend With ; .but dii the Noble lord forrt abut undisciplined troops might effect white nitilcr the cutter of town walls, fortresses o ,,:hatteiies, race . whist 'veteran troops Die a r liohle Lord feirtle,t the striking instances of this ofwaril in the course .of the Spanish resistance 4 . ; ,„; Ole Flame's ? In the felt, the armies of i i •aiii Were enable so make any efft'ctoal con tr,l, hot tinder the walls of Sarragossa and' Ge r,„,a, the mere peasantry Were for a time ion o. r 5411... as the 10th of Angust they had informs. r „ n she the Kiitgarf Holland hail reached Ber. r.n.np Z.nou, and. tbat•lbere were near Antwerp o j the iteighhouring cantonments, an army amrto;int to 20,000 men,. au; or the greater part of shmo, were sold to Its Fratah. 1.1.0 what said tie Almy Journal of the 14th of August ? Thn tar CummandO iu Chief had teceived eons. hiiiiiratinha from Mrs most confidential quarters, roaming the troth . of al; the preceding Intel. krare received from the 3J down to the 10 1 , reflecting the force of tht enemy st u d the st rength of Ant* erp. Hilts the IStlitingd . lollr, they. got ac. moots of Vie slate_ of tago Soul Lief kenshu he the Noble Lord osiOt $47 all tins wait in. tornation given to the C,onntatiders, but we the Gerenintent had had different informaiirm, and ,poe that we acted. To recur, then, to the Noble Lird's fi d n in format'' , in. A tullo.re, io the first place, ti w it to be remarked,. that the per.ons giving the Warm (nun jif re out neat shave it as !it he observed, that the citadel .of Antwerp, able'. was said its be so weak, and concerning which to•Governmetat piratti*nded to sonar') information, that there was iii their awn's:Trot ovidence proof M. they ; could iiiit kora c the siateof that *ye' ;. none hut militatfy mats were 014)4'4 to go into the filgtii—toithsti ditch care and caution was it looked lohy the French. Then what was. the informa• tun still respect to Lillo and Leifkeitshoeik ? With tetra to the focuser, Fort* 1;t11 , ), -. 1t - 'ap pea red to 'wit a strong slate Of defence,' with goals mounted ' J alsatlra, 'rite other f at, Lief kettshoeik . , it oiteto U. Of tlienwa l the scite of Lill? op. parttl to be .the must devoted. The informant kJ no ‘telieve it to be bomb prOof. lire N hie Lord's own spy hat told hi n that Lille was is a stroog state of defence.. But there was other Ofarinalion. I!. appeared (emit this, that on .the lo of Aagust trout,' were marching to Antwerp him all patters, though none had as yet arrived title. It appeared also, that on the sth of Au. tat { the garrison of Antwerp consisted of 5,000 aira, heicht cote eripts, douaniers and volunteers. flu dr sth and 6th, troops from Calair and Emlegne were marching to Cattlind and Bres iini On the oth 31141 10th, there were at Pada Blegett.op 6 Zoopp from 5,000 to 0.00.) BAH' troops ; and oh die 11th, at Breda, fiergen.op.Zootn, &fitment and its vicinity, and ea•! sod a there were 26,000 troops, exclusive of the garrison of Flushing. The head quarters *meat Itoxertlial, anti the army was commanded by the King of Holland in person. New all this, Rao to he recollected, came from tile Ni le land's own spy. His own spy told him that riven were 26,M0 troops in the vicinity• on the llth of August, and those 26,000 exclusive of the ;orison of Flushing. This was the species CIICOU raging information which the Noble Lord had received from his own sry. [Hear! hart] Not a single officer or engineer who 111 given his opinion upon the remote prac. linhitity of the Expedition, who did not found ()Onion upon the most (ratified provision of 'my thing turning out favourable ; and indeed the Nahle Lord seemed inclined to limit the provision still more by araning, that the Expedition must line h.en successful, if it had obtitaeles to csntend %lib, either as to the .e.lcnients, the cli /I:Ate, or the enemy. (A laugh.) With regard' ' l'o• natal part of the Expetlition, the Noble Ind at the head of the Admiralty seemed to he Its provident as the Noble Lord himself. Ills opinion given in the secret information respecting the navigittion of the Scheldt, had been treatc4 xWI the same care and attention that distinguished . a ll the other proceedings of his Lordship. It stated that the passage from the Dawns to Bathz might be ef f ected in forty-eight hours, but I P" the condition of the 'must favourable cit.. riimainces ; .and that to effect tais passage with expediti o n and safety, it was necessary that unle*iiiinld be a pilot in every lima of battle ship aid frigate; the other entitle of Secteri.sg the safe pasting of the ships was, that of having t4ita blloystd; now, with respect to the buoys, ... a :4 there *as not one, and as to the number of pilots, there was but one fur the whole fleet. He now came to that period in the Expedition .when the army was assembled at Baths; and first, he would . beg the attention of the house while he read to them, at greater length. than Ile wished, the paper adtlressed by General Brownrigg to the General OlVers at Batkz. It began by stating,' that= 't" The armament hating arrived at the point from wheat* farther arrangements are to be made for tarrying into erect the ulterior object of the Expedition; and various totpartant consikl..ratimis combining to call for an immediate determina tion—how far that object can be obtained with the means in our poire! t it becomes necessary to detail these means, and to advert to circumstances which have ensued from the com mencement of the undertaking. • " And first, it may he premised, that according to the orb• g i a l plan of operations, it was intended that a division o( the army should he landed on Cadsand, and by that means stripe to our fleet an entrance into the West Scheldt, and prevent. succrurs being thrown into Flushing; thus effectually blnelt ailing the fortres9 by sra, while the army which disembarked on tire North side of Walcheren, completed Cie investment on the butd side. The landing on Cadsand became impractica ble trim the tempestuous state of the weather, the forte of ihe,eirroly, and from a deficiency in means to debark at once a body of troops capable of contending with the numbers there was every reason to suppose would be prepared to dis pute a landing." • „)lere . then appeared the force of the enemy, and our comparative inefficiency to contend uitli . their increasing numbers. The - state or Cadsand was here given, and it would be here re collected; that General Brownrigg, in his evi dence, completely acquitted Lord Huntley of not having acted right, and distinctly stated, that in similar circumstances he himself wouhl have acted in the same way. Where then lay the fault, hut with the planners ? He then goes on to say that— " These circumstances, which it was not possible to con tralti, gave the enemy the opportunity of largely augmenting his garrison of Flushing, which, together with the nature of the ground on which the attack was in,he carded on. rendere4 still more difficult from the extensive powers of inundating in the enemy's hands, protracted the reduction of the place to fifteen days from the period of our Appearing before it, notwithstanding the unremitting exeittioas of the navy and troops engaged in the operation. With these uneontrnulable obstacles to contend with, the prospect soon vanished of being obi.. by a rapid and simultaneous effort, to tarry the object of tisc Expedition to its ultimate extent, and which Could alone lesure the complete success of the enterprise. enemy having for some days enjoyed an uninterrupted com munication with Cadsund, and having by this more than dou!sled his force, led to the necessity Of adding to the besieging corps a large porthole of the force destined to pro. reed by the West Scheldt to the more distant pellagra at. tack ; and rendered that forte assimilable for that object, until e.e became pg;wessed of Flushing. " Havik thus stated thetactual clicumstanees under which the armament has at •.ved in its. present siradtioas ne Must s owsit consider what we have yet to accumplisifood the force likely to be opposed tons. " The acength of the enemy, by cocoon*" ittelligeoce, appear, to be nearly as fallow. : " In Bergen-op-Zoom - - 6,030 4. Breda - - *- - 2,000 " t'antoned between ,> en-op-Zoom and Ant._ werp . . . " rntfrirp ." . " On the left Bankof the Scheldt " At Tlgnien . • stkramAk his plies hail been *lmbed; or discomfited ? And it the Noble Lord felt that such was the fact, why did he not move a ceniure upon those men who had refused inquiry into the causes of the failure of that Expedition,? But with respect to Austria—Austria required no such exertion upon our parts, neither as to number nor as to place. He could not help adverting here to the meaner of expression, to the general tone in which the No. ble Lord had last night conducted his defence.. The Noble Lord seemed as if he had performed some great service to the country, and wu in other parts so gay, airy, and lightsome, as if he was enjoying some, pleasant entertainment; and that too while he was answering to the Repre. sentatives of his insulted and injured country for the many thousands of his countrymen whom his wild fantastic experiments at expedi. tions had buried in a foreign grave. Men, no doubt, differed very much ; but he did not think that any other man, so circumstanced, could have spoken upon the subject without real agony , of mind. But the Noble Lord could be calm, could be even gay, and at his ease, though he had done this in Opposition to the spirit of all the opinions he had consulted. Sir Home Pop. ham in vain pressed for dispatch, and threatened the Noble Lord of the Admiralty with the dread. ful cousoquences of delay, in having to contend with . the most serious - of obstacles—the elements; bos4he 11jsallic Lord knew better. "Go on, Sir Home—only go, and I dare say de emir well." (A laugh.) Another ground, u stated by the Noble Lord, was that of raising the cha. racier of the army—to raise higher the military character. Did the Noble Lord find that charac. ter so fallen and degraded, that it became exped. ent to throw away,the lives of a great army in or. der to restore it? This was indeed a compliment to our militiry Means ! but if that expedition had found their character high, had it by its own virtue worked that character higher ? Where bad we met the en,lny upon equal terms and not been conquerors ? But were we a berd of the veriest cowards, common humanity should have prevent. ed him from such a cruel experiment. Nelson, and the fights of Aboukir and Copenhagen had been introduced. Why, what similarity was there between that Hero and the Commander in Chief of the late gapedition, whom the Noble Lord se.] lected for celerity, sagacity, and dispatch. The Noble Lord thought he Was upon a rock ; he called for acquittal from the justice of the House. He( M r.P.) called also upon the justice of the House. lie asked them if they would say that the Noble Lord was not responsible for its failure ? But the Noble Lord had indeed reason to calculate libe. rally upon the lenity of the House. They had often pardoned his offences, only to repeat the exer. cisc of their forgiveness. He was ho was right—if right, why thr amongst - hie colleagues, in which , ciates took a part. Why did they was inconivetetit to the situation Why did tl4ey agree that he should the tennity ion of the . Expeditior plea to be turned out, . • • t.OOO - SADO " 530 " Total - WOO And thus we had it in evidence that the enemy's force at that time appeared front concurring intel.. ligence to amount to 35,500nten. lie (Mr. Pon. sonby) would nut here ask whether this account was or was nut exaggerated. General Brownrigg had since reduced it to 30,000 ; but had there been but twenty thousand, they would, in suoh cerium. statues, he as formidable as fifty. Thu success upon Antwerp depended upon ederity of move. meat —that celerity upon effective co:operation on the part of the Navy, and thkt eo.operation on ' the reduction of the forts of Lille and Leifken. sluveik. Upon the Ist of August, the enemy's fleet was above the boom at Lillo i and the general opinion was, that that boom could not be forced: But the statement went on to say that :4 Our Iota! numbers, including artillery, cavalry, and in-. rotary, amount to about 30,000 etfective ; of which 6000 are left in Wakhereo, and '4,000 must necessarily be left in South Bevel:it'd, giving a disposable force of only 22,000 men forth. siege of Antwerp, and the other operation:connected with it." Srt that 2e . ,000, to say nothing of the casualties of sickness, were to advance to the siege of Ant., were, and to. contend with 35,500 men. The House will observe, however, the mode of the siege as recommended in the following pas.mge " In proceeding to the siege of Antwerp, it would no doubt be a leading object in , the plan of operations, to ;venom*. date it as far as possible to obtain the co-operation of our sm. val nr.z.uts, withmt whica the enterprise would be clogged with the difficulty of transporting by land from the poise of dettarloation, through aweeenty's conntry, all the ordnance, sores, and entrenchinh tools, 'owns:ley to undertake the siege of a con- iderable place, and to provide the means of subsist ence for which we Could not well command the resources of the country beyond the reach of one arms; and it would be a cmisiderahle increase of these difficulties to collect Willey can be had, or try trasport, if they be prepared, the vast quanti ties of platform., fascines, and gabions required for such a siege. " plan 14 which only the cm-operation of our naval force can he ot•tincd, would be .by the reduction of Lillo and Lief keivillocik, and the complete investment of Antwerp botii hanks of the River." . • From this it appeared that nothing less than the complete investment of Antwerp could jle leffec. that. Such was the laugnage of the General who had talked of taking Antwe r p b y bombardment. One would almost be led to doubt, upon referking to this paper, if ib e writer of it was the sable Gee. Catlett' who had given his evidence at theft Bar. The Noble Lord had said, the expedition had not been fairly tried. In what ruipect Did lie NNW to say, that the egeeution had defeated the plan'? .Were the Generals wrong in retreating?Genefil Woutak ..tbe Notate Lord have had them, eta after iletaltenrigg's piper of the 26th of August, Nisi'. r t one forward; or if he admitted that: nothing ( Could, have been done sifter that period, ke!talled • upon. Ike. ANliable Lord to,..stille t what—erreir the execution .*as the cause of nothing having been done before it? Why not openly state to his Majesty—to that flouar whore and lie* that tlkey 'wen. Anxious to seise ,iiitionfitstsedertobend ou't the Noble Lord. They were so anxious to get rid of him, that they suffered him to plan what they wereconscious must fail, but which failure w °Uhl relicts them of the Noble Lord, Ihe,ifulise then would now pause, and retrace the tpischietous effects of their orris Misjudged lenity tlowards the Noble Lord,. and the set of men who leave been so long abusing. it. This conduct of that House was one of the most powerful causes of the late calamitous expedition. They had now the consequences of their weak indulgence in the incorrigible fatuity of a'set of men, who thought that because they were tolerated they were ap proved. Unfeeling from habit, bold from igeo ranee, and confident from impunity, they grew mere hardy as they became more criminal. Let the House assert its dignity, by wresting from them the means of doing mischief. They had beard of libellers within and without those walls— let the House be but tree tb itself, and to the' Country, and such conduct woult be the most tisftactory answer to all Such charges. General CRAUFURD thought that in such a question as the present, where it regarded the po licy of an Expeditioa, the presumption must be in favour of Government, for this reason, that they must be in possession of -more accurate itsforms-- tion ; (a laugh) accurate iit comparison with the information of those who opposed them. As to the allegation that the North of Germany . would have been a proper object of diversion, he • could not agree iu it. Thongh wo were to support Ter allies, It was net necessary that we should turrets,- der ourselves to them at discretion, and adopt their suggestions In opposition to our own delibest rate judgment. Ho could answer, from his ewe • experience, that, the suggestions of allies, in this respect, were not always the. best. If we had lent a &lir troops to the North of Germany, where a temporary insurrection might, thereby, have been raised, what would this be, but exposing the un. fortunate people In the rage of the tyrant, andleay. log them', in. lisp long run, to murder and cruelty of the worst kind. This would, be the most far;toes Machiavelian policy. Austria:, hitwerec, having thrown away any chaneresif Russia joloiug her in the coutest, we could no where march-- in army where they would not be ultimately-exposed to the whale force of the French Ruler. Suppose, even, we had had confidence 'in the persevermice ofAustria, there was not a spot .hero •we could land and' have a depbt and place of~ retrest.„ In these circumetancei, co-operation . Germany ties out of the question. If an army • eoeld have been sent to • Cadiz, there we might hive acted . with effect; but there our assistance was nut sired at the time. , The naval arsenals . in the Scheldt, he did maintain, were more forlnidable. against us, -in case of invitaion, in the , hands 'of' the Ruler . of France, .than ,all his hirr o ast Tr and. nalsonaded • retostrces. A bason had been coaatructitig at Antwerp for the ammentriodation of 1 50. sail of the line; and to what bounds, thiimight be carried it was impossible to conceive, there be ing no bo'unds whatever to the resources which this river poured in from every quarter. In frost, only - •••• • • I : • Z . • ' tO nil, it was understood., 'meld be OCCIMIIIPP• dated; but what wit the Importance even of this We must have 20 sail watching them at Yaietentle l and 20 more at Deal, And yet there was a possi. bility of their getting out by coining to leeward. It might ems be in the power of so ettriordi. ' scary a mesas the person' to whom we were 'no* opposed was known to be, to increase the 50 to 100 nil. Ile could not transport his immense Boulogne lodes to our shores only from want of man of war-to protect' them. Let the House look, then, to the use to which this armamatit in the Scheldemight at one time be employed, when joined by another from Holland, in effecting a land. ing on the eastern coast of this country. Our ene. my knew. too well to' make an attempt at the inn. sion of England without such a force as must en sure success. He was awavelhat be must use im. mensely formidable 'meant. This be novel' could do, while the Continent remained a check ove bit actions. This was no longer the case, and he would now be at leisure to-turn his mind to the invasion of England *in reality. The Scheldt wee one of the most formidable engines for enabling hint to accomplish 'this object, else indeed, without • which, he never could attemptit with any prospect of success. Who then would say, that this watt '!'" an expedition not called , for ? That it' was not et or one of the greatest ntioild iitiportante?' was, id fact, the Daly 'sit where we 60.14 make a diversion is hawse of the commint eons, eusd th• epottelanatif, pektt of our Lentil cur enemy's country, at Wet titereeiiciWWltit fail to have been moot' etibmvitning to 'him.— He hoped he bad this prettyselearly proved' the policy of the' eipeditiod. laugh.l Ile had done so as far as his shattered brain would allow. [Hear, hear!] He •then proceeded to shew that the expedition was'even expedient. In doing so, be commented on the opinions of the Olftcer,s who , - had been consulted previous to the expedition, and contended that none of them bore out thaatio tninality of Ministers in undertaking the stXpati , tion. Intelligence bad also been received *et the works of Antwerp were in a defective state, a$ ' that the troops were extremely few in somber.-ft This had since been mot by counter iatelligence„ . but the reetified statement seemed,to be false. 'sit appeared that there, were not 30,000 its all, law eluding seamen, and yet they had been told that s in ten days the enemy would have against thin 40,000 melt in arms. If they were entitled to &mat the men taken from their ships, we wore equal* entitled to count our seamen, who would mere than double theirs. Ile contended, therefene that it was-itteridence that the intelligence received b$ Govdritment was Correct,. and that Government was justified in undertaking the Ezpeditiod; •ee , pecting, as had . been positively stated to 00, the , . .• r'• ii ' .%•';1 f.. ~ ?. -t• , iicy . p.. ...,...., by on ...._ instructions as to,the , diversions of different carpi, - fis the first place he could easily reconcile with • .(Ise possibility of carrying a sufficient force to' • the ulterior destination. The great point to • be kept in *view by a Commander, where he had distinct operations' to carry on, was, al. • ways to take as much to the ulterior deltic*. .. tion as the fire' service in which he had been en. gaged, would permit. That Cadsand might have . been. taken, had they gone up the Veiling Passage, by the . dkvisina of Marquis ll.untley,*he was aim.. &lent, and the whole'of Flushing might have beets taken possession of by 7000 mew. 'By destroy. ing the means of' Cadsand communicating with •' -Flushing, the division which had taken possessiolt• of it, might have departed without leaving a mad • • behind, proceeded up the Scheldt, and been dispo.• sable for the occupation of Santiliet. If'. the' Honourable Gentleman ItLvi bees' able to take it I part in military transactions, hel would have un. dectaken to have conquered Flushing with WOO Men, and would have answered with his head for the success.. Leifkenshoeik might be taken hi the same manner in three days. Thedee they would proceed against Lillo, and take It' too.- II things might not be done as he 'had now stiiiiffp . he Would consent that any military reputtitilitt be ever had should be blasted for ever. • It - alight ° be asked, what would be done with South 'Wye. Sand ? To this he answered, that the batteries might have:, been taken in a few hears, by tba boats belonging to the ships. Then they ', wchild proceed to Baths, which might be takesesilthilli ' the same tlittii . Gie. Hope had employed in that ier. trice. Bating taken Lillo and Llefkenshosik, lad ,opened the Scheldt to the navy, he *Mild theta 'have looked to ii combined operation. It was la evidence, thatiffie Officers employed in the Espe. difieki wouldliave mtgaged to have opened a fire , s sin. Antwellp, from 30 guns; within :ten days after taniffivg. He would not be satisfied with this, WO would have combined with it an open. 0.14 on their glacier. With' the assistance of grans ,fristies4be. I#lo, he wodld haVe engaged La this. t hsuserri within , erteen daysto have wade a. kieselyskii thelrlglacier, which wOuld; - . l e w as cotainearkmr..was . almost uniformly the . u; Os caset wai l l i wi 4' A immediate. surrender of it the. teirte, ' ratini ; st...encianter the horrors' - sctised by .. iiit eel ,soldiery. As to the 'Mega whichlrie .weil l linie been able - to bring to this ietvicef' . SUS .660 men arriied in 'the { tchetdt, 7000 beiWa. ;to 'noshing; ffooo . at .- - ,itta , • . - •. Ilouth Aftvelandti'W-itt!ffantvllet, 'Mid 2000. 2. at - Lille' Ind Ilefkkitibtkilt 'there *onto reetale.. . 1 40;900, ittleb ite itotaktlff+ride in tbi . folliwiei• • ~ tninnet.:4o.lo;:lviAlticAr'silr of seanten, &c. fiat ' . - • c a r rying on the krill' 4ff,oooto. doter tie.; operatiettc. *Whit tbalfieteo be pledged Weil' :'• ' • that hi:doubt heed eff•ard the Oita. Aa 'l4-6.1 L *girtison t'af • "thaVerp: i ', "...* . iii . eltatice to 'OeCtirsi,. i 4. ' Ahemsetici. would be by ' '; ..ning'Witilltettreir 444 7 , •' l 7'. • . Tering. Thal •wouldjlisßit. .roceed to Breda and. Bergen-op-Zoom, whitih to ° Y would also 'Mat s ..`• andwhich ) by GtiOd, they would &auks able to!taksi ' •••••• 7 • . .1 - - 1 At / , wL i ~' ' ) - • ' .~ w repeat tne caer. • - as either wrong or that the wind and "weather, at that season, WVs# lat latent intrigue almost unifortray favourable; and it appeared . even his near asso. etitlence that to fi nd wind id weather such y all agi:ea that be the British had experienced, it was anal*[ in which be held t deed. Thus' were - Minister! . completely just. 11d stay in office tilt tied la undertaking. the operation. - Be should on, he himself had show, '•however o the piactiefibility, as well ss whether that Ex. possibility of accomplisiiim the ensfer_titkiegi„ e (34"-P.) believed- • awei—ttrat—littnittilit itrtett: Wttli greatest ad out the F o spe. propriety in adopting the grand line of 'psi. ruble Lord. They licy pursued by them on this occasion. -The