The Statesman. — London, England, 1810-03-30 00:00:00

might you not have prevented Swift from turning the Sierra Morena, which happened in January, and have prevented him from driving the Spaniards into Cadiz, for the defence of which, you are now sending in dribblets and parcels those very men, whom you had 32„000 strong in Walcheren ?-- Every one of these measures, perhaps, Ministers may say, would have been unadvisable and despe rate. I think, however, that, if they would allow me, I could mention a measure )et more unadvis. able, and yet more desperate than any one of thole, ;lamely, the retention of the island of Walcheren. Then for what purpose, Sir, may we beallowed to ask, was the island of Walchercn retained ? I dare scarcely so far stigmatize Ministers, as to suppose that it was still with a view t.wards a di. version in favour of Austria? Was it in hopes of some corresponding delay on the part of the Em peror of Austria, it signing a peace with France? 'That peace was signed above two months before the evacnation. Was it then from the dissensinns end feuds of (Air Cabinet at hoe..•? To that sub. ject we are told that we arc not to advert.. And why are we nut to advert to it ? Is it because we are nut to iiiiesire into the intrivies of a Cabinet, when they impede the course. of public business? Or is it because we have nu interest in their result ? No, Sir, it is because fortunately we have not been accustomed to have scenes an disgraceful submitted to public view and public animadversion ; be. cause we have nut beets. accustomed' to see the private discussions and disputes of a Cabinet made matter for the columns of a Newspaper. We then, Sir, as part of that public, have obtained, as it were,. a prescriptive right to inquire into the result of those disputes, to ask Ministers whether it is a time to cabal, to plot, and to counterplot, against each other, wheii the brave men they had sacrificed were falling victims to the diseases of Walcheren, when the dearest and last hopes of their country were sinking into the grave their infatuation had prepared. There is, however, another cause to which, I fear, we must refer the retention of the isle of Walcheren--to a conviction, on the part of Ministers, that they had disappointed and beggared the hopes of their country, and to a hope that they yet tnight deceive the public into looting for ward to some ulterior view, they knew not what, and on which the Ministry were as ignorant as the Public. On this bubble, then, have Ministry rest ed their own characters, and the interests of their country—on a bubble, which they knew ultimately must burst, and that at no very distant period, and which must, in the mean while, be atipported 4nd kept afloat, by the sickness and death of those thousands, for whose loss they have to answer to their families, to their friends, to. their country, and to this [louse. pear, hear, hear !] - Mr. W. FITZGERALD rejoiced that it was agreed nit el hands that no imputation rated un the Naval:int! Military Comiaamers of the Ezpedit ion;and that their conduct might beset out of the consileratian of the subject, which must be discussed solely with is reference to his Majesty's Govermumit. e contended that it had been distinctly proved by the es i nce of the Quarter-Master-General anti the, A djutant-Ge ral, that our military means would ant allow ma sonthe•for of any prior Expedition. With respect to the risk, the pnowledge of that tisk accoinpanied not only the progress. ut even the contemplation of the plan: Government, how *ter satisfied of the advantages „ hick she Espeditiats wa. Wended to proddee, by the destrtertion of the accumulated *teal ineana of the enemy, hazarded their Own responsibi lity, and the minor consideration of the tenure of their offi- eial situations. The Gentlemen opposite at one time emi tended that the force at Antwerp was so great, that it was inipmeible surcemfully to attack its and at another time that . the Experti.iim had not ireated any dise , sitei by (tie meal of troops from the Danube, for that the garvaon of Antwerp was in an efficient state. One or other of these assertions must he tree. The fact was, that the Unica army had been recalled from Stralsund vilely for the defence of llollaud. The Noble Lord by whom the debate had been 'breed had assumed ton much, when he said :hat the opiaion of every military man who had been chn-ultcd on tiusteibiref ouiht to have deter. rd Government from the attempt. To refist.. this, he entered iota an evainiaation of the riilitary eitinime in. evidence, and coatended that that of General- flrownrieg par ticularly,. whose sentiments (without making an insidious comparision) were as worthy of attention as those of any oWcer whatever, thought favourably of it ; having declared, that even on' the 25th, had it not been for the sickness of the army, he . should Nave recommended their advance in the conlelence that they would ha** done midi to meet the hopes of the coin-Ivry. 'There was *thee question also which mingled itself with the considerafkm of the possible surrender of Antwerp to a boinhardinent, and that was the probability that that town might he indisposed 'upwards the present dy nasts of France. As to the retention of Walcheren, he as sured the Honourable Gentlemen opposite that they did not . monopolize the feelings of sorrow for the valuable iises which had there been lost by disease. The qaestion was, however, whether the importance of the ob!ect 4an import ance acknowledged by several successive Administratious) coma have justified his Majesty's Ministers in the peculiar circumstances of Europe—in the balanced state of the' war between Fracce and Austria, to ndinquisli such a possession. Walcheren was evacuated in October; how much sooner would the lion. Gentlemen opposite have had it evacuated ? Would they have hail it evacuated when Lord Chatham urged its retention, at when Sir Ilichsrd Strachan wrote home, conjuring Ministers not to take any hasty step on a s.:hject of such importance both in a naval and in a niititarY point of view ? Before it was evacuated it was incuirthent on us to rendes-it less avail 'bk to the enemy as the means of me nace and anitoyance. Orders were given to that effect as won as the treaty between France and Austria was Known, and as WOll 119 those orders bad been carried into execution, the evaenatinawaseffected. if all the argurames , shich.he had usetwite well grounded—if there was no doubt of the po. !icy `of the EifeenTi;m* , -trno Espedtt WWI could hamster, un dertaken at an earlier period ;.if no other Expedition could have been undertaken with so fair a prospect of sutras, or indeed with such combined hopes fif adientage—if the naval an,l military reecutionot theenterprize were free from blame ---if no dishonour bad tarnished his Majesty's arms, then he thought the House bound to concur in the Antra:lama of the Norm. Gentleman, to whirls he tmaffet tedly declared, that he agrFeri with greater satisfaction than on ^sly former occasion of a similar nature. „ . Mr. GRATTAN thought the attempt on Flushing, if it had been tarried in.!) executiou at the time it was planned, would have been warrant. ' , able. Sir Iticharil Strachan had given several opinions on the Expedition ; although ' the last . opinion he gave wasin contradiction to his former ones, yet he must suppose his last opinion as the most deliberate! Mia last opinion was not in fa vour of the Expedition ; he said it was not iiilvis. able. As to the retention of Walchereii, he (Mr. Grattan) could not think it was advisable. If it were retained, the nattire of the climate was such, tliar the annual diminution of the men by deaths would be such - that it would ; require an immense and constant •suPply of fresh troops to continue, piope.rly manned, tlfe rents of a dying army. As to thaopinireu that had been taken, they were not so universally in favoie,of the Expedition as had been represented. One, opinion concluded with saying that Wyss impossible to accomplish the alt. feet of that Expedition. No notice seemed to Imo _Men taken of time and events. %Viten the Rape ditiott was Grst in contemplation, Austria was at war ; but ere it sailed she was no •longer .at war. But still it was - thought proper to cadearoet to • . .a k THP. sTAr create a diversion in favour of Austria when the was at peace. It seemed as if the Ezvedition was undertaken merely for the sake of doing some. thing. At first Ministers adopted the idea of •eteling an army by way of Ostend to the attack of. Antwerp ; bat epee ea:stetting the elisions of 'Officers, the idea:was deprecated, and R was deter.. mined to make the attack with the ,army and navy conjointly. So that here it was seep that Minis ters, if they had not coneulted Sir David Dumb's, would have sent the army by way of Ostend —a' plan which, it was declared by General Calvert, General Brownrigg, and every other man of tary information,COuld only arise in madness, and a measure by which the army would nut only be risked, but absolutely destroyed. In fact, if they had dune so, there would have been no army at all. Then, with respect to the second place, what were the sentiments of Sir David Duntlas ? Dd hsd.declared that it would be in vain to ap proach Antwerp by land. General Calvert said, success was less improbable than if they had ern, by Ostend—but he deprecated the attempt as acs perste. The upinion of Sir John Hope, too, and 'even of the Earl of Chatham, when they arrived at Bevelaud, was, that there was no hope of sue. cuss. As soon as they SAW the nature; of things, aft prospects of carrying their point vanished, :old it was declared timely impossible. Lord Rossiya coincided With these Odieers. Some Gentlemen attributed the fa lung to the lateness of the under taking, but he did not think the Expedition could at any time hate u stiewes.fid. Sir Williata Erskine had frequently pressed: on Ministers his conviction that the project was not feasible nor probable. In his report of the state of Antwerp, he had declared that the town could be secured in one week against the must powerful siege. He was a very intelligent officer, and on his judgment some reliance might be placed. !Pre then was the (victim' of all the officers of the army, except Ge neral Brownrige an the Earl of Chathini e in the very first outset, against the ExPetlitien.- -• What did Sir Richard Strachan.say ? That he doubted from the first moment he heard of the Expedition, that it would be attended by success-41st -be was borne down by the orders of the Admiralty. He knew he was going into seas of as hich .be knew nothing—he doubted the extent. of intelligence re ceived by Ministers ; and in fact had no hopes of attaining the desired result. in speaking to Lard.Mulgrave on the subject, he told him the Expedition would fail, and expressed a desire that anther person should take the coeimand of. the Naval 'Department. Here then was no cams ragmen, to Miaisters. W hat enceuragement then had they received ? The intelligence they bad re ceived was this. They had read a meniorandeat of the state of IYalcheren, written in 1800 ; they had seen another, written hy Geneva! Don, sin the 16th of December, 1803 ; another by an of ficer whose name was not known in 1805; another whirls had no date ; and finally an account of:the military state of Antwerp and ifs written iu 1803, and found in the. poisks'iioe 'el a pri soner taken at Cadsand. All z these moieerred io representing the paltry state of its defence ; but observed, that although there was nt4rospeot of. any assistance being obtained fr;tutiollasel e in one week, the most ample sirpplies could be ()Wanted (rola France. He woutt ask, were His testers justified in seeding out an Expedition upon such .intelligence? It was most ex!rautstinary, most incomprehensible, and must unaccemitable, that they blindly and pusillanimously roeld be in ' duced to adept such a measure. It might be very probable that there were no troops at Walcheren, Antwerp, or Fleshing, before the Expedition sailed ; but there was nothing to prevent, as the event proved, an abundance of troops ,being on the spot on the Bth of August, to oppose the British arms, and to frustrate their attemps. On Lord Huntley's arrival at Cadsand, he found seven thousand men ready to oppose him, and heee, of course, was proved the falsity of the intelligence reoeived by Government : and that being the case, upon what ground were they justi. lied in pursuing the. enterprize, or upon what rational principles could they hope for success Agein, his Majesty's Ministers, by their private information, had heard that the fortifications of Antwerp were dismantled and enfeebled; but in opposition to this was to be stated the report of Sir Eyrc Cuote, Sir David Datlae, and many other officers, who all agreed that Antwerp was a well fortified town, and could not be taken or attacked but by a regular fore:: assisted by a co. vering army and the navy. So here again Was the Wu:elation wider which the expedition hal sailed proved completely false. Sir Richard &name, in his evidence, also proved that the authority on which Ministers founded their expectations was erroneous. He found Cailsand, Fort Lille - , and every other place of strength, in a peifect state of defence.. With respect to the opinion of General Brownrigg, Num which Ministers could now only rely, he would now say a few words. On that gallant General being asked, whether he thou& • it strictly correct to hazard the expedition ? he answered, that ha conceived the project prac ticable, only, from the informatiou received by his Majesty's Meister'. That information before proved false, of course his opinion must have been chenged. But even if that was ' not the case, there was nothing could justify Mi . eistcrs in hazarding an undertaking upon the single opinion of General Brower*, in ceiposition to that of every °Aster in the army. It was some ' what extraordinary that this General, who stood. so singular in his sentiments, and who was so firm ly convieced of the practicability of taking An twerp, that ho afterwards signed his name to the , ILeolation which pronounced the measure impos sible. fleet, however, sailed, and every. thing which was predicted came to pass. It sail ed at it period when that g reatest of enemies, the elements, began to work against it, as finetold by Sir Home Popham ; after an armistice been signed between Austria, in whose favour the diversion was to be made., and France. Had Austria .attempted to renew the war, in consequence, that devoted country must. have Owen hunk still deeper in calamity, and have additional and more irretriesable risio to lament. The plague, too, Which was in well AN. known to exist at that teased of the bears broke out eith its expected violence. Under such a cloud of disadvantages did this ill.planned, im politic Expedition sail from the shores of Oreat • Britain, containing a force of 100,000 men, fes ' wham no other fate awaited but the dreadful any. baleful embrace of horrible and ravaging disease the Commander in Chief, the Admiral of the, Fleet, the great majority of the Officers, all nna.. nimonsly concurring that there were no hopes of . ' esteem's ; and in direct and positive opposition to Sir Richard Strachan, whose opinion was ratified ' by the conduct of Lord Mu!grave, who, by refusing to. comply Allkh his request to be su. perseded, and placing a confidence . in him, notwithstanding his avowed hostility to the measure, had given a convincing argument of his own sense of ;he justice of the'assertions which . Ihad been made. [Hear, hear!} There was no plan of Antwerp or of Fort Lill(); the fleet had no knowledge of the navigation of the Scheldt. : 1 There was tin arrangement for a co.operation of . I the forces—for that was impossible, as they knew nothing of the local circumstances of the country. Caw, hear !] And thus they marched, after having waited tor every preparation to be made to Pthstrate them by the enemy, to du what ? To take Ant werp by a coup.dc4nain ! [Hear, hear 1] ilThe Expedition was completely discomfited ; in , I fact it had died in its, birth. Here then, he would stop n little, and ask the Muse, what they could think of N 1111 6 4,11, who, with pretensions to eons . mon - sense, could act so diametrically opposite to , the common dictates of reason ? He had to re ' gret, he was obliged to go further, and that the painful task of stating still more disastrous occur- reitres had yet to harrow his feelings and excite his indignation. The first reason that was assigned for not proceeding against Antwerp, was the ge neral sickness which prevailed amongst the army in the pestilential Island of Waleheren. At this period, a report was received by his Majesty's Ministers, that there were three thousand four hundred men stretched on the couch of disease; the alarming 'prog ress of the disorder was com mented upon with becoming humanity, and from the a;!counts subsequently received, it was seen, that day after day, the horrid disorder Was increas. jog, and new victims were sacrificed at the shrine of Ministerial impotence. The spirit of British troops was here wasted in despair, and those men, at whose approach their enemies always shuddered, Kith no groundless fears, were here pining amidst the foul atmosphere of contagion , and disease. On former occasions they had only their old enemies the French and the Spaniard, to meet—but herothe dreadful effects , of ' th e plague preyed upon their members, and sunk them into that apathy, o hick the itiserable sense of an approaching wretched and inglorious death was so eminently calculated to impress.— .For this, what excuse could be found for Minis. ten ? • What jtistification could they urge, or wh . at recompense could they make to the manes of so many thousand of their fellpw.creatures ? On the Ist of August Ministers were informed that-there, were upwards of 10.000 sick ,and nearly one-third of - the reinainirtfinces infected. Sir Eyre Conte re. presented, in the most forcible language, the holm. saint/ ut retaining the Wand. of Walchcren ; but ienis not till the 27th of October any resolution ,was adopted for the evacuation of that horrid_ se. [Ware, which had now become the grave of so ninny br ace men, whose lives had been wantonly, uojuat iliably, criminally devoted to the accomplish. mint of no other purpose fur their country than disgrace, and whose fate more firmly impressed on the taints of the people the consciousness of hav ing a set of men at the head of 'affairs, whose ig.' norati6e and want of principle were only excelled by the tenacity with which they clung to those of , (ices they had so grossly abused. It was still more extraordinary, that at the moment those-horrid ca tastrophes had arrived at a climax, a letter was received from the Emperor of Austria, desiring the exertions of the king's troops might be di rected against Holland, while those troops were lying in our hospitals ; and in a few days af terwards another letter was received from the Britisii Minister, in another quarter, advising an attack in the North of Germany. This was another. proof or the want of that information which. ought to subsist- between our Court and others, 'and was of a piece with thezeneral emi r duct of Ministers. To the want of each know ing what the other was-about, might be attri... buted the late calamities ;'as we never could have thought of creating a diversion in favour of Aus.. tria, when she had at the very time that our Expe. I ditioo was near leaving our shores, -Concluded a peace with France. The Hon. Gentleman hero declared that he should like to go on ; but he had I already trespassed-too long on the attention of the Ilouscire - ciFilicarn - It was impossible, after the Expedition had Leen sent out against the 1 opinion of the nasal and other Officers, without proper intelligence and authority,, the measure i filling of i t s great object, of a diversion in fa. your of our Allies who had concluded a Peace, that the conduct of Ministers could be exculpated for retaining possession of a place in the vicinity 1 of nineteen fortified towns, and for leaving an army, and that the finest army of the country, ' for' two months; to die by a hideous disorder, upwards of 11,000 being already sick or dead. —No excuse cbuld be made,. nought could be urged in mitigation of - their offence, nor nothing adduced which could screen them from the deserved censure of that House—[Lour[ and reiterated cries of hear, hear, front the Opposition hendres)—inure espeCially •wneti we were reeeiv. ing daily accounts of another army who were also dying by huitdreds in Spain, and who were also re. fused to be called home, although they could he so ill-spared. There could be but one conduct more reprehensible, and that would be, that Par. liament who would excuse them.— Incessant cries& ar m H e seconds. The tf hear I he !for some hatl-j f censored Lord Chatham, not for any misconduct in ' the Expedition—No ; his hehaiiour on that oc ' ension Rae by no mails improper, and he had binding Oman a: becoming spirit in nut himself to wipe away that stain which now rested tut' his late colleagtte. ' There was sonic reason fur tender nee, tuna As him, for he had laboured under a; they Wouldebree- them greA deal or pbblic obloquy. Is was Lord Chatham had'presented a paper pi, 1 " the King to obtaid secrecy' that he Was e ate l LL ° if the Howie conld belnduced on the p ee : ^casion to pronounce a sentiment of emir:hi on his Majesty's MiniSters aelvim in ate n-fuld degree more guilty than Earl of Cha Mr. CANNING observed hit Hon. Friend kw concluded expressing his opinion that the ca w -- ties brought on the country should be vi s i ted -- the heads of those by whom it was plannol. 4 4 ; rose not only to speak in its justificatioe, prove that Ministers, in planning it, ed by 'motives arising front a just sense of bli ; ditty—such as he would say, if h e were not Patieir ty concerned, entitled them t o th e approbation ref the country—such as might well bo recommended to their successors, and s u ch as no Admiu istrasoiwould blush for cherishing. Ile would not sono der it as an insulated question, but " as a part s e that system which had been pursued through°" the present war, in the pr osecut i on of whirls „, had a double interest, first t o preserve other it," dons (r u in the domination of France, and s ee*, ly, to preserve our own integrity. T o pr ove i s great interest we had in the latter case, needed argument ; but he contended it was eephair on duty to do the former. Standing high as Wed, among the nations of Europe, it was Sae om b eet upon Etigiaed to assist weaker nations against/11, pression, not only as far as we could do so roc. eistently with our' wn interests, but as fie no , doing ao was not absolutely inconsistent with our own security. Throughout the war it had L em I /stir constant practice to avid ourselves of thews. tit of resistance manifested by other nations ag4io t t the encroachments of Frauce and cut I s ant !t o tv to the succour of those who were assailed ' her ambition. It was much to be lamented thd' the course of the war had been such, that s e might shortly have to contend,. single.ltstidetl, out only against the ambitious Ruler of Franc:, lot also against those Powers to whom our assistan t had been extended, who ranged on his side ia cue: sequence of his successes, while their hearts Wm for us, and who might be compelled to raise tha t hands against us. We ought never to lose sight of the policy of making all the Powers of the Conti. ;tent feel their interests aspirated from thesed France; and he desired that the Expedition tole Scheidt might be considered as Intended to lay the foundation of such a separation. It did not ginate in the Austrian war , nor did the LA* don to the Scheldt originate with the present Go. vernmeut ; it had been contemplated by sand successive Administration!, and never was then so urgent an occasion for such an Espadities Hat that period at whit!' the last armament Suited out. He hoped Gentlemen opposite weeliset think he wished to recriminate anyemssweetity might have bestowed-, on th e en t e rprixe, when he stated that such a one bad not always been ding. proved of on that side of the House. It **alai tram him so to recriminate, as he *litchi the AS ject laudable, and the policy wise, that &Wel such an effort. The Noble Lord Ise: bald nmeettled in the office he had lately the homer Opium, oaos ability and zeal could *not be doubted by aspen, had, on his leaving that House (its a debate witicle through some circumstance, he believe!, bad an ver been made public), strongly reeentwetidell such an Expedition to the itnecessors 6f that Adri. nistration of which he formed a part. Hs had de authority of that Noble Lord for such an eilen prise at that time, and what was then the nreagdl of Antwerp compared to its present state? Of .what importance wits it then to what it is nee? What bad we then to apprehend from its strength to what we have now, from, the increard, dem' lopement 'of the ideas of Bonaparte, when cir cumstances which might be considered as forebeit. ings of what he would attempt imperiously calle4 on us to check, if possible, the growing pewees( his navy. He said, we were called upon to en, tempt this from a principle of economy; *teem nomy which would enable us to dispense with tlat . seivices of fleets at Yar m outh, and in the Dons, and permit them to be employed elsewhere. Is this point of view such an Expedition was 'gad European question, and if the Austrian war had never broke out, still would an Expedition larks Scheldt have been likely to produce an suspicions change in the affairs of Europe. On these ciples it was that the Expedition was.plinned sad undertaken. The war between France and AS9' trig subsequently broke out, and then came apt& cations from Austria GA. assistance in the might!' struggle. There were but two modes of affording Austria assistance, the one by direct co-operations the other by making a diversion in her favor to divide the attention of France. It would hardly have been necessary for him to have argued. had' the dit. fit:oy of ditietiy co-operating . with her srelic s o had it not seemed to be believed that:England p ot- . sussed the means o f ca rr yi ng a f o rce to the butte* of the Adriatic, and th at we m i g ht have joined th Austrians in Suabia, and 'tak e n a part in the 118 . t; tlo of Wagram. This m o nstrous ides had be t a entertained. Could it be th o ught that it was 1 1 (*' 'sible for England to carry a force capable of p ru ' diming any important effects through the (te as } almost unknown Adriatic, and land it at Triest e. It was i‘npracticable. A n other place had bee! named a ..ere it was s aid we m ight have co.operstak. with the Austri an army—ltaly. It had bee n , contemplation to afford assistance in that qua r ters but it had been ve r y p ro p e rly desisted fruni, 00, the retreat of the Archduke John. Austria 1 ! Rester entertained the m o nstrous idea of oar hewC . able to assist her its the former place, but had t pressed a hope that h e r cause Would h e assisted 7 -us in Italy, in Spain, or in the Nor th e l if i r many. In Spain we had Maintained thus in some measure complied with her Ivor! ... the prin• but the assistance iltaired elsewhere, .„s„,rectios on cipk of our being averse to exciting , which, as we could not s u pport thew, would op ' impose those who took part i tt v ie s' to gm „ `'misery.. Those who c o ntended that o n :ht 10 hase sent the Expedition to the Nor th .1.10. Expedition give our reertittue 111)1 01126 n p l i a n i g lY `at r l a d th ,l e r r tie t ti l S twol.!triadSeallVitd•wi' tbt's.ciauul9el4llLeg"; emanating from a ftifiail- priSS(4ol7,Cirfid app ye' Ed of T, a - .. ke gre deal or public obloquy. ft was-1;s-- print m- a Lord Chatham hadpresented a paper • tatl Se painl prttat e l t , , a cal m- the King to obtains secrecy' that he was 1 4,.1 2 sat If the House conk! lielndneed on the tra---`• pear p relim 'ere foe 'easion to pronounce a sentiment of °e ` were se I aellrobat,,, a wl!. nit on his Majesty's Minitters they would b th„.. — ieb; .selvoten-fold degree more guilt y teitat;"'"th Ville there tht Earl of Chatham. la. Mr. CANNING observed hie Hon. Fri en d 6.1 Aust diate of concluded expressing his opinion that the e 11.7 thinp to ties brought on the country should be risked the heads of those by whom it was plannal H. Wed jog si by rose not only to speak in its justification su- prove that Ministers, in planning it, sh s ccet semb im, ed by 'motives arising front a just sense . ofT l w ie - - and the ditty—such as he would say, if he were note a m ; his ty concerned, entitled them to the appruhato—.4 inter ich the country—such as might w e ll b o recomm e nd ed to re no to their successors, and such as no Administrati on &site had would blush for cherishing. Ile would not ton.!.- ids. of der that i s t y s a t e em a n insulated wlih i : d q b n e e e s n t ion, pursuedbut atsbaruhun were pros up, 1 teen the present war, in the prosecution of whirls so Pew ry. had a double interest, first t o preserve Arti er ni - was ter dons from the domination of F rance , and second, retto ade ly, to preserve our own integrity. To pse To great interest we had in the latter case, n tet il ..r u Stets a s • sa such el] argument ; but he contended it was et sells , err self in duty to do the former. Standing high as w e d instil old 1 among the nations of Europe, it was iae ofo l o i von arid upon Ettgialtd to assist weaker nations againtrop, an a sm- pressiou, not only as far as we could do so cos. perii to , eistently with our' wn interests, but as fa t a , co have re- doing so was not absolutely inconsistent with oa r thro the own security. Throughout the war it had L eto and tar- 1 our constant practice to avail ourselves of then, a pr cite nit of resistance manifested by other stations agaiso ,swa; ned the encroachments of )France, and consteelyto oble ge. by to the succour of those who were assailed!ij own 'my her ambition. It was much to be lamented fiat 1116 1 this the course of the war had keen such, that o o of ty's might shortly have to contend,• single.ltanded, out ado' our only against the ambitious Ruler of Franc) tut dera se; also against those Powers to whom our assistan t yet ) m• had been extended, who ranged on his side in coo: Ear 'ow sequence of his successes, while their hearts Were of l en, for us, and who might be compelled to raise thee CAW .as. hands against us. We ought never to lose sightlf a.. 151 Joe the policy of making all the Powers of the Cele Ger tisk ;sent feel their interests separated from timed ais use France; and he desired that the Expedition tole her:: sys Scheidt might be considered as intended to lay is cue. ere foundation of such a separation. It did not op. ease ion ginate in the Austrian war, nor dial the Expedi. Tea tad tion to the Scheldt originate with the present G. apa the vernmeut ;it had been contemplated by semil whe cts, successive Administration!, and never was then Ellat and sta urgent an occasion for such an &iodides Mt hes ble that period at whit!' the last armament Was. fieta eau 7UII out. He hoped Gentlemen opposite *mildest In 1 think he wished to recriminate anytemeste thee dim iis. might have bestowed-, o n th e enterpr ise, aka In elk hat stated that such a one bad not always been dine. nut so proved of on that side of the House. It wash/ duc the tram him so to recriminate, as he thought tinge the ere, ject laudable, and the policy wise, that dietatal the lof - such an effort. The Noble Lord Ise bays succeeded wbi re. in the office he had lately the bosom lOWA, ereass imp us. ability and zeal could . not be doubted by *semi for Jut had, on his leaving that House (in a debate whiele elm ion through some circumstance, he believed, had as. but se. ver been made public), strongly recommended dot so such an Expedition to the Successors 6f that Adai. mu ly, nistration of which he formed a part. 'Rebid& of sh. authority of that Noble Lord fur such an cater: ten ran prise nt that time, and what was then the Wag* bad on of Antwerp compared to its present state? Of lie tv. what importance wits it then to what it is aced ahl , ig.' What bad we then to apprehend from its strength pla led to what we have now, from, the increased, dem' sue of.. lopement 'of the ideas of Bonaparte, when at. tier . are cumstances which mi g ht b e cons id ere d a s f o refeet. may :a- ings of what he would attempt imperiously calk4 len rds on its to check, if possible, th‘growing red.( ratj ing his navy. He said, we were called upon to at., din di- tempt this from a principle of economy; (hated.. cur ere nomy which would enable us to dispense wititle wli if- services of fleets at Ya rmou th, and in the Dons, nee the and permit them to be employed elsewhere. Is sal ing this point of view such an Expedition was egad Fr ias European question, and if the Austrian war had tha on never broke out, still wou ld an Expedition to the vii on Scheldt have be e n lik e ly t o p ro duce an aoseiciase in ai r change in the aff a i rs o f E uro p e . On these pria• em w-. ciples it was that the Expedition waspkbasnned sad . ri. undertaken. The w ar b e t wee n France and Ao9' no ire irk subsequently broke out, and then came apple'on Is., cations from Austria far assistance in the mighty an se. struggle. There w e re b u t t wo m odes of affording Ar a Austria assistance, th e one by direct co-operation, a y :re the other by making a di v ersion in her timer to cal ad divide the attention of France. It would hardly po of have beets necess ar y f or hi m t o have arguer the dif* En le, faculty of ditietiy co.opeeating . with her erreirS Tie lie had it not seemed to be believed that:England po!. be .ue sessed the mea ns o f carr yi ng a f orc e to the butts for pre of the Adriatic, and th at we m i g ht have joined t he foe Fa. Austrians in Suable, andtaken a part in the 111 l • chicc, cc, tlo of . Wagram. This m o nstrous idea hod hell At !ed entertained. C ou ld it b e th o ught that it sc an pugpugll ity lible for England to carry a force capable of ere' Ge thi • an diming any impo r tant effects through the (II) a s} .y, almost ise'known Adriatic, and land it at Tries te? of or, It was impracticable. Another place had been. Ae eta act lid stills the Austri an a rm y—lt a ly. It had been n '' id. named u ...ere it was said we might lieveco-opersted: lor 6 . contemplation to afford assistance in .61 9Ha rter, EI ere' be, )rn but it had be e n ver y p ro p e rly desiste d frum nd the retreat of the A rc hd u k e John. Austria hod' to 'on i sts . ver sottertained the tortust rests isle* of oar be ing the too bads -',. tai iv. able to assist her in the former place, sit Iso pressed a hope that her cause would he assisted M' Ti re. us in Italy, in Spain, or in the North 91 V )4 he many. In Spain we had Maintained ourselves. , a nd ' eel ttr act thus its some measure complied with her linsh r ec in : ar. but the assistance desired elsewhere, on t he t r iorns th Me ciple of our being averse to exciting insurrl., oh( re tad- which, as we could not support than, wne' .. o fit Cl tin' impose those who took-part in teem to '7, to lie uc. 'misery. Those who contended teat we 0":"' . ur er rtb a us" sad hale sent the Expedition to the -- " .1 th Ti and Arsenals w e had a view to Wilt. venn Ivl a t t o e n p s i a n s g iyrather than to •the Scheldt, baautethL iit w'r, . 01 er. Expedition gave our isi : rtiestts. the! app °& , lli r a; emanating from a svlbsts.pritsciplevngrtnnt