The Statesman. — London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

Tfts wo r m his letter to the Commander in authorities %shoo opinions were on the iehle.-- iit I the •Aeulkst, with respect to the Commander in CAW t h e 29th of June , to Liiiig - . ei4 . 4 dated . a n issue. In his own mind he was, iolbiFExperlitilitt e he ;admitted that hisotilnlon was' sleet al to.eall upon Government to pause and' iset.i''oin to t h e diffieultiee in the one castecoeld. /., r o ounitel,andthatiti the other they %ref:: ion- elehlierate• triton it; but he could not admit (and sishol for the opinion of tie:Coin. in all The Conversations with the Commander in 14eilie : but be li able ' Chief to put that matter to reel. - ad. Chief Which he had held, divested of all respnitei- ' Joie ' e el , e hi s Majesty's Government well.. knew bility, he had never understood), that he bail die.' pour , . course pursued. 'tiactly protested against the proposed ' ' ' o utlaw whichever might be theoperattotis i 0 side expectations of certain mace's& as impracticable, and consequently impolitic. He 1.,.,,1 ow difficulties , an d, w ith en ee le i ng . oesuldenad a single sentence of the short letter of' Tie hat. n 914111• • h• d ' le saa.;ume.as to t 0 result, were estrous..p e r * his Lotelahip on the subject. 66 The advetree Vi s ' i Y i I- n which presented the .less risk..! through Flanders would be attended with 'great i Alooibtow that eel osi the su pposed ohl l ie . stem that Government difficulty, and at any rate the' attack by the drr to call for 'Dietary opinions in writing, Scheldt would be preferable." The Command eer.' I'''' i . ente red his caveat. He appealed to an • Hon. • er. in Chief' would • not have Assisted Goveru ft"„oonen o pposite, whether such had been the ment by .pointing out the best means of at "' l e e 0 ( Government ? Had it been the prac- tainieg 'the object, had he considered the ob- • F a ' •the sins that Memorable Gentleman ject to ,be wholly unattainable. lie pro. oaf 's:mg igk i the Military Administration of the coon- ceeded.. '" In whatever way Antwerp is to be ap try the merits or preached or taken, the service will he. one of ; een • Whatever might ha v e b wa i t , of that HotsouribloeGeratleman's mie great risk, as the enemy will soon he enabled to re; he (Lord C.) krie%v very well, assemble from every part of the Netherlands, , tee masa s i tias ' n , at tack them woold not be to justify his and even from France." This statement was Ea. Its would nut even allude to them invidi. merely an explanation of the 'circumstances r ooy, j et t h a t %Tenet he a bad return to the Ho- which induced the Commander in Chief to be . potable G en tleman, w'.,), whatever difference of neve, that the enierpriie was attended with coh. '. . il e e , might exist between them, was a generous siderablc risk. Whether the peril existed or not , ew e Leek to the National Glory a mi dst p a. belon g ed to-another p ert of the ar g ument.— t. eal easiest, esee ' and he did justice to the weird- The Commander in Chief never pronounced an hi s country, although the Government of op inion ag ainst the o p eration exce p t contin g ent Mks of was nu longer in his hands. eVith- on the amount of force with which the enemy i,t tSeter o f e me anin g an y li ereentry attack tie that lio- might be prepared to resist. With respect to ie - peal& Gentleman, he would ask him, if he the opinion of Col. Gordon, he trusted, that in urc caled un to justify the Expedition to the commenting upon it, he should not be considered as DeJeleiee, whether he could produce a writ- depreciating the judgment of that Officei, for' le , te eitei e authority to that purpose ?—. whom he entertained a high respect. But when e e et le: produce the written authority of the Colonel Gordon stated in his opinion the exe eseitivider in Chief that a naval equipment with. trerne hazard and risk to which the Expetlitiod . ou tlay army . was the hest calculated to secure would be subject, he did so in the contem. edeert in Tien ? Could he produce military leaden of circumstances wholly inappliceibli.— splices witirrespect to the Expeditions to South In the passage to which - he alluded, Colonel teet? These were large military questions.. Gordon declared, that. he considered an attack n e k e l never heard that the lion. Gent. had ob. by troops in launches as highly dangerous : land the previous sanction of any high military nothing could be more true; it was even physic r n ewel to them. No such documents weee in ally impracticable from the n at n r e of the d ee t i v afire over ;chief, lie had had the honour to pre. fences; but then such a mode of attack .was not F ee entitle believed that no such document existed. contemplated. Sir Willies* Erskine, id his opi. ! o utwit the system on whichthe Government had nion, did not estimate the risk of landing so istiertobeot conducted, and thereforeereenght not highly as the subsequent tisk. Gen. Hope stated, ,be overwhelmed and borne down becauselee had that if the Expedition wired early in August, the se „a acted it. At the same time, he certainly troops might have advanced to Antwerp, and since eurcrtainA great defeeence to the Military Autho. I commenced operations. Such was also the opi. t e e , the declaretions of which were on fhe oleo of General Browurigg, and that of Colonel tele of the blouse.; 'and when in his Majesty's Gordon. The House would see therefore, that so esvernment he should have ceueeived. himself 1 far were the cluments of these opittions from be. pity of a great dereliction of duty, had he not I tug adverse to the policy and pricticability of the Aped himself to be influenced by them. En. 1 Expedition, that they gave it great countenance. pre as he was, in moving away the collateral ' Two of those opinioes seppurted that particular 1 pists which obstructed the access to the main at.. operation, a coup-de-main, in which the lion. pow, he woul,l take the opportunity of ado'. Gentlemen opposite had so entrenched themselves; is; another caveat against the doctrine that bad i bet the meaning of which, in the larger sense in Lest ioc.ilcated in this diseussien. He denied that which he understood it, lie would explain before he get ere bounden duty of Government to ab- sat down. Government were bound to obtaia all ei.n from sending out an e.:eperlition, not only theinfurmation on thembject which they could re eks the object of it were declared easily prac. cure: and, upon w review of that iafermetion, they ,•:ISie by . military men, hut also, unless the pre- were bound to come to a decis'ion. lf the' /se nature of the required operations could be House would allow him to explain fully the t,tinetly anticipated, and the details of the resist- I grounds am which they had been induced to adopt :we dee was to he expected minutely ascertained. the measure under consideragon, he was persnad. qlear, !wadi Had the ion. Gentleman opposite ed, with all due deference 'and humility, that They it minister knowledge of the state of the arse. would declare, not only that Government had said Conetantinopte when he sent his Expedition I been justifiable in' the step which they had taken, odic Dardanelles ? lie had not the least dispose. 1 but that they were bound by a paramount duty, Leto eareat the forbearance of the opposite side i not to let slip an opportunity which' - appeared of the Ilutiq., because their practice when in go- 1 to ifford an excellent mode of annoying the enemy. irturaeat was similar to that of his. Ile never I lie would not argue ' the question on the narrow' enler,tood that it had been the practice, at the ;grounds upon which it bad been argued by the ep..• s3t times, to restrict Government to those military I poeite side of the House. It bad been assumed by, weettions only, the nature of which vas precisely I them, that the destriction of the ships .at Ant. Wren, and the result of which could not be ails- i were was the sole object of the Expedition. That' ftitly foreseen. Ile world beg leave to read a • was not the ease. It was certainly a principal ~,art pAss ige fro;nAre instruetionaliven by 'Wel- feature of the Expedition, but it was connected with hen, Ea: I of 'CtiliThen, to Sir J. Mortfiettf;Vie other objects. In proceeding, he would observe, - Cairn miler of Ili! fhtpettition scot to Rochefort, that the subject had been disengaged of several tee. shiei leapeteoiou raii o c- The Parlia , aent of that pies which had. been urged in accusation of his. day, ia:4eail of reptekeltine I. iril Chathhtu for the Majesty's Gsverssisseest ots former occasions. Tips' miuplettrfailere of tim Exiedition, bestowed ap. I House had nut • beets told by the Noble Lod that plAii , Q ;11,4 o,:liiratieit tin him for the effort. Was l the operations could have been commelteed'at 1 1, 1 iteleelie• to sitiipose that Lord Chatham had re. earlier period. The evidence bacon ~ . troeot trivet! the fullest information . on the subject—that proved, that the utmost diligence and en hie woule nut allow the troops toeinbark without had been ust.4. He appreheud e d also, that it Lit.'a 102411cEnitical demonstration of success—that lie been distinctly ascertained b . . the evident, that 1.441 not Clint: tee mole' etieo of the enemy was there was ,no other woke weed* creek! be -put tie prittei l it •on wisie:, he was bound unweariedly into competition with. the service tetidertrikeet. to act? The instructions to which 'he `alluded This was at- Most' iteportant co ; ---.- mere under the !iign Manual. After some lines He piit it - `to lose .Individeals who' 4104141114 '47 proceeded thes : •" And whereon nothing doubts with reilieet 'to the etwlig otthe Ow ref so speedily and effectually annoy the enemy sure, whether 'theta &NMI 4M. Sae Proceed nan enterprize against Rochefort, our will and fronton's& two causes ; either etc sitebvitte fhat .we pleasure is, that you attack, its far as it is practi- had timed oes bestows tistaNlMieseohlv 'track w el relee," for on the practicability it appeared the were bouid tedefen4 with ellf-endiTided NOM, sir elm was left to decide, " thlettemy, by making *opirrion; tlmt biassed by self-interest we turned a descent on the French coast s near Rochefort, our backs'ou the North of Germa n y , where ostr ii make, if practicable, to attack the force there, army would have been aided in its eifterlsb! ( e l i t e . and to harp and destroy the docks, arsenal, and amn= st ions of a brave population ? lie hid. it ss t!iipping. After the attack of Rochefort, should , duty durito , the progress of tbs Gonandetee to circumstances admit of further operationsi yen must i bring these two points ender • consideration, and consider L'Oricnt and Bourdeaux as your next ! to she w. that the dee:meals ofd . . _., .. 44 ,'P•i ii : in te ; t i l y ti object., and our will aid pleasure is, that you 1 ferreted to another objime Proceed to one or both of those places as may ale.: he incurred the 'reepoeffibilett of *Wing M e ' Pear advisable." Thus it seemed that this Officer wishes. Ile had.satiikd the L'Emn itkials9 with 1 I went without a distinct knowledge of the recise rest to the inadequscrid the peceniary ' Penal*. object entrusted to him, but with a dis c retion pee of the country in that respect.; and, however be elect' he was to exercise as circumstances offered. I might bo accused of ameasiontag disclemerre pre- Sir J. hionlaunt wrote a letter to Lord Chatham ; judicial to the-national credit end prostallitb its in which he stated, that Sir E. !holm and Vice- trusted that nu such evil would accrue, sifted . the Admiral Knowles were desirous of more specific inconvenience which bail existed had been hi! u.P. ""lens. TI) this letter Lord Chatham replied, foraier occasions. He acitnowledeed that he was " that he was commanded by the King to judge etcessively anxious to satisfy the blouse end 'Eit el the practicability of any operation on the rope Beat his Majesty's Government tad Proceed' 'pet - ' elm* the 'object; boOthat they irr, - principles ha which iotortisked seat sties attendant ma its failure, the eompellance s. the army to -perform great and berpaawee services was generally admitted. The Noble Lord dwelt at ;nine length on the question of the diversion which -this Expedition afforded to Austria, -and. had contended Butt it could not aid did .not create any such diversion. Uucmostiesebly they, hope of creating -a diversion had entered very ' largely into the views of his Majesty's Govern., mentj when preparing the Expedition. So slosh , ' were they impressed frith the necessity of distract ing the attention of the enemy, that had the at. tack on Antwerp been considered impractis cable, they should have thought it their duly to make a descent upon some other part of the meat, even had such a descent been wholly unconnected with any British object whatever. Let the situation of the Continent, when the Er pedition was only in contemplation, and when it sailed, be compared ; the opposite side of the House took a very unfair view of the power of this country, when they asserted that a British army of near 40,000 men were not likely in the then I state of- the Continent to create a favourable diversion. What was the state of the great contest on the Danube? Abotit four days be. fore he hail taken his Majesty's pleasure on the subject, information arrived of the battle of Asisern . What, was the force of the con. "tending Votes ?Aim et Aisieja, by her of ficial report on that day, which promised so much for Europe, was 75,000 men. The Aus trians estimated the French at 100,000 men. What number did the French lose in the battle ? Lit. Ale short of 60,000. At such a moment could { we have such a mean and contemptible feeling to. wank ouraelves as to tell Austria that 40,000 Bri. tish troops were of so little worth, that we would keep them at home, and leave her to decide the contest singly ? France had drained the Lew Countries even before the battle of Asperne. On the QV of June a French order was issued that the troops at Antwerp should proceed to As: 'write. After a.pause in the fate of France of six weeks or two months (a pause during which the opposite side of the Houle would have wished hie Majesty's Government to remain timid and inactive), the battle of Wagrant was fought. The news of that battle arrived only the day before the sailing of the Expeditioe. Though there war enough of British interests and 'Collateral inducements still to make it the bounden duty of Government to send out the armament, yet cer. tainly the question of diversion had undergone some change. iI e had been called on to prove that the British Expedition had occasioned the return of any regiments from the Manioc to Antwerp—this was not necessary. A force might have been retained at Antwerp in consequence of the Expedition which would otherwise have quitted it, at a time %hen the contest on the Danube was not deter mined, and when the French did not• know bet that the whole 'North of Eeropo would rise jgainst them. If ho were asked why the Expedi. hew were•not tent thither, he would - answer, that it was impracticable. It would kayo been necessary ' lelteet'elealesl.alt Stew among the inhabitant' • that array i would; boweveri reqtaillinftd of-the' British. By rcinaitriog there in 'winter; the Bd. fish army would have been completely committed, and by ceasing away it would have disgraced it. self, sad would hare injured those whom it was sent to assist. However cheap the opposite side of the House might held the Expedition, the French Government did not do so, for they ordered - the evacuation of the fuer principal forts in the Prussian domitiieas, in order to avail themselves of that force against ns. But in fact the tendency of . the Opentlidil to produce a diversion was too ob. viouslo vaquise farther comment. The whole of the Noeth` of Europe was in movement, and the elect of withdrawing, the French troops might have been,. th*t 4 tbc whole would have exploded. • So far from having inclined to British objects, all the dispositiens that bad been made by his Majesty's Government leaned to general and not to selfish interests. He was yeti however, to learn,; het it was a reproach to Government that it allowed the interests of its own country•to min. gte with those of other nations. Ile was yet to learnt that for the impose of disclaiming any self. isb view, a Government ought to prefer a less ad. vantageons to a more advantageous operation. lie was justified, therefore, in considering the de struetioe of the naval means of the enemy in the Scheidt as a principal feature, though not the sole feature of that enterrize. Commodore Owen, than whom a more gallant and well.infurmed officer did not exist, had distinctly declared that be always considered Flushing as a se.st formidable post, and had said, that to watch the enemy's force there, it would bieuedeesary to i her an equal fleet at two different stations. It was rather too much to contend that a Govern. me ett were nut actuated by national policy in any measure, irthatioessere was not accomplished to its tallest extent. The Governor of Bathe bad emcee:o that Owe. Why was there not as greet' a probability thattlneGovernor dAntwerp might have evacuated Antwerpt Of those contingen. . tics, unconnected with military Alines, military 1 men'were not competent to judge. When Gene ral Crawford %as asked a question involving ta, co ntemporary ; he replied• very justly, 46 that it was a political consideration." If a man ,bent the title deeds of so estate - which be wainffered to le. gal men to examine,,theywould seed them back; say they Vire bad, and purchase thi estate the Wet Wads* : Whets a question oar put to a mint* latte, - a mffiteryansirer was bepected ; when putto a eye pm, a legal answer was expected ; hut in neither of these cases could any thing rational be 'A rsiorka There were many iaterme t needs strong . . • ''Pots a: contingent events might arise, the re- ed .- on no narrow view of the selgieeti wow" Liu" m ex — post — e d. iiraigha There were many taterme. .v.vw„-Tki !e of which main the King judged highly had gone to the Scheldt 'on the PriviciPil l " biCk 'f d • reset( setting *hieb were stroeg enough end oT, pre jqd,ciat. to the public genial." Itsppear- the Condoms& wets pat tit mach iill.olMall of s .a. e . ikiiiG e 'veadoeur au undertake a service, ,oromerf !11, therefurt that the Government to which Great Britain. IVith respect to the puseibiliny to gi," mh. i i t i o e m t t it . s altory cout i ne „des uski had i to (Lord eastlereagh) bad had the honour neat igeg se large *force to one poi .....1 istikil°44 : l le hliw rite la . ' . 411. .4100111*. Taking it however ass agaial to Wong, was sot the first Government thatkad a one to the Peninsula it cuspe d agdyliti-..e ------ v g vat est an &polities wittiest as•vrtaining its oh- gitiation• of those who tewpar ial• ' 11111 1 04.11" . 114 • t. - " •to gt i a, edisqlsese. all Fttech ar nee with twalltarniatirel precision. The only ra:- discussions, in coalPfetelo 4lo "___. 4l. ,L iibi ••- . L - , ____. ' ,_ .: - .. litilall, 1 14411111 r alt the conquest of • Wal... not. intent news •sittich bad firkesees, tunsf.alcaletina that cook* be made by statesmen of the country. There wo• oww""7, -- •'-r 4 iimpitogoimVic - be "sigwe ei t t g he d44s6l ‘ force they "s, by balancing the chances of means With the against, his • Majesty's Got erosset, w " - k wi elwaseterliplibk es it bad been as- bad forty Seardfaiinte,a ealculatiaswhich most bematie nothing hat bore Ong eightt boas Art . . • iferilrigooore Willebete., inwaTed' thirty $h , . . i , a . `elf tbe pee of fisiking, and ` , ceesit of I •1.......••........ and not In safari men atone.- the leedeginey of the force omit 41111.... ' ' vatipsfave .• . . ~._ 4:4 l Lossre-ihr- WWI* ' 6 ° t" . . 4. l, saw*lssaai Among •Im C411& 11 0 4 itit. 00 4 th libltalum...—__ • - . O ^4VVA.IIO ,- .4.• Mo. • ._ ..:. ..; - ", • ' _ . arms td ,the army ': 1 . =~.~. Z~ y ~,~.,..' ;.. ~ .. the daztrxctleo rtliflasPlog wadd make two years difference in the 114•111 equipment of France.— Theisoilities fur coppering,. careening, wadi brokes..haaked.shins, arc. were destroyed. offs . was a coosiderable object. With respect to 44 Medical part of the question, he thought that. • •. 1 ought not to be mingled with the present discos. A vg ; sion.. Although. be allowed-that: the. ezgeslitioh...g , .. .had been embarked with :the: knowledge that Wa1.. 4 4 .checou was an unhealthy place, yet4se• confessed s o that be never noderostised it to, be a 40.priV e tr a , that no consideration of polioyt or justice, I iudoce Governmeet - te-mmilit: the Biltish• aTO .14—j Walcheren. Our 11110111ta. had 41 11 f1 1 1 0 1 12 i;k4 ./41 Flushing, and in .Brill forobere,thirty year., der_ ing the reign of. Elisabeth; Tbe question of the, redaction of. Walcherms. , altad beam in the coo: temptation of several soesimeive, isdastnistratiom, and had been abandonal osa grounds of • tart', not medical expediency. Besides, ha was. nqt lhargeable with the speculative unhealthiness ofi's whole army; 12,000 only of whom were to have remained at Walcheren ; the remainder were to have•adranced to Antwerp, which place, sc. cording to Geo. Brownrigg's evidence, was one of the healthiest spots in Europe. There was.ao r other prospect which Government had in view when the operations were undertaken. k was hopoil that a blow might be. struck at the ships in the Scheldt before they could get up to Antwerp. Had theltivelisialnat.passession of the batteries eft the lower Scheldt, and interposed` I Torbe Unworn - **7 - "` the fleet of the enemy and their retreat, they would have been captured; of all which, there was a rational prospect at the cemmencemcat of the • business. It would then have been one, of those centingencie' which the servi, happened, it was failure of which ble Lord then . question, viz. wl result from the zarding the risks vantages, were to fected the fate .tended to ouiew french fleet it, . . , than might reasonably ble.attainment of risks greater th or say want of These points the placed is a satisfactory peintoef AM, ~ As. expences attending the Eapedition c if they wrists . • duly weighed, there certaioly.croahl be tiro =t; .' declammioe upon.that point. It wouldhe . , , however, to suppose , that it niushbe mostimpenai a* -,* as it undoubtedly Ras the aritstutcui% IMO il' been undertaken by this cpentey. Who cite .: 0 . London, .ie. the, ebullition. of ice beligastien.4ll, . the issue of it, , ,,awelkd.tbe amount of: gm V;Pla•- diture it occesioned to so less than Mesa 1 4 1 0i 0 , 1 ;# ~ I .The Gentlemen on the other side ptibe $ . .: sunk indeed below , that eatitaite, atnt CV ft; only to fi ve or Mx, millions. 'Whit Ilb OP - iiiMaied,,j,n_iheiprt state f our Smut ' ,WI, • diPUY and Progigilay Awartvral, nuns! They would not take the .empumeS..ikg . fr. lower rate. Yet, upon a fait, end iteSur4llo.Mr.‘ eelatiou, the whole expenditure 'inanities; tide, mighty effort, this omit etemerous And cp. tensive armament, -did not enseuqt, to. en, gee, lion—nut to more, than about BQO,OOOI. , ceii, the scale of expendituary, (bertha; . 0 4e4wertz , prize was 'not to be std. • - lEl s ti 1 fourths of the troops were ealliersi over bits t • . Navy. Still, hottever, r; tbaf;t4atispOrli Ciel ~ note paid off and dillialtael fltiiielest.,-:e 2 P• 114 ,11; the army to .setne •riil iiiii •liftPnAg , Ivbele, 094 ; withstanding, thee: ' saigktolso.einisiderml, as comparatively cheep. 'New, me to the military; risks, be would reatlilritlyit-tberPolll4 ballmit • indeed, if they were not,esnielereated, q a rik,- tiotial prospect of eseettal..- Tb;t the overy. ; must had such *protract 4011Iceole.befere them, be hoped he should be shisEtemotevineo the House. Certainly the Information• epos whiek Germ.. Mat acted is 06 sadeetaklag, lantfallyfullident, to justify Otte tiske..mbleh it-Apparel to levyltet- In the first ,phookeykedatest satisfastory infer.. nation respoctiartimameind ef.theenoiny's foils. Such information, u wis observed by Gllll.:Unpep ' must always in its nature- be very loose,. un- . ime it be official informality*. But , GuTtrnmenC. had official information on this head at n period not very remote from the dine of determining on the Expedition. These official decorticate showed, keet only • the fore* of the enemy at the be er* to September, 11106, but . the position. of ••410ffierent regiments. From these It also ap- 11111111114.16bs order to-itierease the French forcq on illetilimilibe, the Low Constriei were nearly swept of all the troops they contained. lodged 01 thaw dominion's tended to prove hat. the Nc.., r. tends tends :and thq adjacent eountrim .1.000 , 0501-- pb lel? dabbed -of simeat um thin. it . Abe ellaoo, :of regular. troops. TMs the general information, received at the period he had mated, mad theeals. segment information received at variegations% eon. ' ! coped in ascertaining. If each was tbe.etate .a( 1 the woofs mimes of defence, then we should look.. at the relative nieens'ef the two parties.— According to the evidence of General Brews. rigg, theispessy's forudown to the last momeut did not .4cOsed 30 2 000 men, including. tkai crews etibisr, , shipe, Iktow we had a Tecate-,q( f thi.rtY-411113;611 men, and the euall‘mill creiresi Ate _admit° support them, mid whit such a such a.stilmrieelty, had we notils..faireel trooped of suede's ? Re 'looked at the. smerate force t, he letest .period, and taking that a.this if , ,If the Oimayited bat, 30,000 OM slaiiiirf crWtion end quality, be *weld again :led thelot eery rationatempeclation glue. evilest such *fuze, so coeval ? - lie gool4 'livid to depreciate tier --elearseisf lififf., , armyA i r o ldll it eirr. ape- net , IBM' et ritgiiliesh wy Jiktillle:to- bat et c they 'USN hilfebietalkiiiht•Olifiligh . • forty4litee.iiestemiltielle ; Slit the!iland: it ‘ll/11.4:41 1 11101kno- - • WO/ eilativesilliationelmbilllikhetboll4. the EipeNtier erste Abfietted. - Ii was !inks on the consideration of , Ivies was undertaken. As it . was one of those chancey t4a, :b implied no error. TO go! .proceeded to dismiss tivie4gtot anther the. ari vari tiges w bith might . e Expedition did. not jeitify s which it riviikincur,e44o.B44.;., to ,be i consideettilboth 1.0 1 , 64.t300. the .Costiasetty 314;as tier ro security by the dosintAilk4 *IP! the Scheidt. - TVlSlckt**ll ll ;, - .my were calcswo,.. 49, wank , asonably be see& felt tlo of these advaetagee If or "wroth. , that might be, famed koP dish yf nwdieiees or of inerilital alder he evidence before the goose - Wulf .. i ; ••• ... 1 i . i tt 1 :. . I 1 . i • i c ; i,. li' '!..• . . , i 14 . . • , • • • • f: . •. • • . . ...*