The Statesman. — London, England, 1810-03-03 00:00:00

MINGTEs OF EvaBIYGE;- .4c.... TAKEN BEFORE THE .ClOllrlfaoF THE WHOLE HOUSE. AFROINT 10 CONSIDER OF THE POLICY AND CONDUCT OP THE LATL EILYEDITION TO THE SCHELDT. TWELFTH DAY. The Right lien. the Earl of CHATHAM called in. Examined by the Committee. In a letter from Lord Castlereagh toYour Lord. ship, dated the 2d Sept. 1809, to be found in paper (A.) in No. 8, your Lordship is. reminded of positive instructions relative to obstructing the navigation of the Scheldt; the words are these:— " I am to express to your Lordship his Majesty's confident persuasion that, previous to your return, and in conformity to your instructious, your Lordship will co.uperate with the navy in giving effect to any measures Sir Richard Strachan may think fit to adopt for obstructing the navigation of the Scheldt ;" what steps did your Lordship take to give effect to that instruction ? I had it not in toy power to give any. How was the army employed from the taking of Flushing on the 1•lth or 15th of August, till their retreat was resolved ou ? The army was not employed at all during that period ; it could not be employed during that period. Before, or at the time of the sailing of the Ex. pedition, was your Lordship instructed to believe Antwerp to be pregnable by a . cau p.dc-main ? I had intelligence communicated to me, that the • fortifications of Antwerp were in so bad a state that perhaps it might be open to a coup-de-main. If success had attended tho attack on the run nels of Antwerp and the French fleet, was your Lordship instructed to look to any ulterior ob. ject? I had iro other instructions than are be. fore the ComMittee. Your Lordship having stated that you had re. coived information that from the state of the forks of Antwerp, Antwerp was liable to be taken by a coup-de-main, from whom did yoqr Lordship receive that information ? It was in the information which has been laid upon the ta ble; I received it from the Secretary of State offi. clally. Did any conversation pass between your Lord ship and the Secretary of State, upon the suhject of the taking of Antwerp by a coup.de.maiii ? 1 do not know absolutely by a coup-de-main ; but I had conversations as to whether it might not be taken, without a regular siege, or without a bom bardment. what way was it proposed at that time that Antwerp should be taken, if nut by a cottp.de main, yet without siege or bombardment? If there J ad been an opening fur it from the state of the works, and the weakness of the garrison, proba bly by assault. Did Lord Castlereagh express to your Lord ship any expectation that Antwerp would be taken by assault ? He certainly exprcised such expec tation, under the circumstances which I have stated. Those circumstances mean the intelligence to which you Lordship has referred ? Tne'works lining in so bad a state, and the garrison so weak as to admit of such a measure. Did Lord Gistlereagh iliforni your Lordship that he supposed the wurks to be so weak, and the garrison in such a state as that your Lordship would be able to take it by assault ? He seemed certainly to thi•ik that it ini;;lrt be possible, under the favourable circumstances I have inentiotied. With all the intelligence submitted to your Lordship by Lord Castlereagh, did your Lordship ever eittertain any expectation that you should he able to take Antwerp by assault ? If that intelli gence, which represented the very decayed state of the works, and the absence of troops to the great extent stated in some of the intelligence, had turn. out to be true. I certainly thought it might have been possible to have taken Antwerp by some vi. porous attack, probably by assault. Will your Lordship state to the Committee the names of any General Officers with whom you con versed on the subject of taking Antwerp by as. welt. I should think I must have mentioned it to all the General Officers, or to all probably with whom I had conversation ou the subject. Previous to sailing, or at any other time, did your Lordship ever ask the opinion of Sir Eyre Coate, as to the practicability of taking Ant. werp by assault, or the probability of success in that enterprise ? I did not ask ally formal opi nion on the subject of Sir Eyre Coote ; but con versed with him on different modes of operation that we might pursue. Is the Committee to understand that no opinion was asked of or was given by Sir Eyre Coote on that particular point? No formal opinion. Was any opinion at all, formal or informal, given to your Lordship by Sir Eyre Coote, on that subject ? Ido not know that there =sassy opinion at all given; because I know that he con. sidered our operations must be regulated by cir. cumstances when we arrived. Can your Lordship name any other General Officer besides Sir Eyre Coote ? I conceive, as I said before, that the question must have arisen in conversation with all the General Ole. cers ; we talked generally of the means of our further operations, but no distinct opinion was asked, becanse I did not conceive they could give one. Does your Lordship recolleft any marked con versation on that subject with Lord Paget ? had a good deal of conversation at different times with Lord Paget; I do not recollect any marked conversation, that is, any formal or distinct opi nion given by him upon that subject. With General Grosvenor ? I have had eonver:. nation with General Grosvenor •en the subject generally. With General Brownrigg ? I had. setae - Upon that particuL , point ? On that point. Does your Lordship recollect tbo conversation that passed between your Lordship: and General Browurigg on that particular point ? I cannot recollect any particular conversation ; my con ♦ersations with General Brownrigg were very Ire. quest. In the Memorandum or Statement, was the at tack on Antwerp described u intended to be a si. =I N" • • t_ . , meltaneous operation. with the descent on the island of Walchereu I It eet*itily . was. Did not that Memorandum Also give a genefal 'description of the information. of which his Ma jesty's Government et that time'were in possession with respect to the defences of the Scheldt, in. eluding the works of Antwerp? I think it did, as well as I recollect. Did it not contain a general reference to certain military obstacles that the 'army might expect to meet on their arrival before Antwerp, to impede the complete execution of the service, and did it not particularly contemplate the, possibility of the enemy's being enabled to avail himself of the pro tection of the guns of the citadel to secure either the whole or a part of tho ships afloat; and did not your Lordship understand that the decision upon the policy of the Expedition was formed, having those difficulties in view ? I did. Upon the information that Lord Castlereagh was enabled to lay before your Lordship. before you left England, what degree of hope did you feel yourself justified in entertaining , that the ul. tenor objects of the Expedition might be success. fully accomplished, supposing the fleet arrived at Santvliet upon the 3d of August ? I think that if the intelligence turned out to he true, and that every other circumstance also turned out favoura. bly, I should have entertained (as I believe I said when I was before examined) a confident hope of success as to the result of the Expedition : by circumstances turning out favourably, I meao,. the fleet could Ave arrived by thsts 2d or 3d of August at Santvliet. .Slate to the Committee in a general way what number of days you apprehend would have been necessary, after the corps arrived at Santvliet, to disembark and advance it to Antwerp in a state to storm the town, if the situation of the works ad initted of sack. an operation ? 1 cannot possibly state how long it would have taken to have landed the army, as it must have depended entirely upon the nature of the beach, and, the naval moans there were for that purpose ; but I conclude that it might have been done in the course of two or three days. When did the first appearance of sickness to any extent shew themselves in the army.? a think towards the 20th of August, to any considerable degree. had the army been healthy prior to that period ? It had, been very healthy. Supposing the army had been carried up at once to Santvliet, and disembarked there fur carrying on operations against Antwerp, has your Lordship any reason to suppose that the health of the army Would have been exposed to suffering from the same disease that affected the troops in Walcheren and South Bevelanti ? I believe that the vicinity bf Antwerp (but I cannot speak from my own : knowledge) is certainly healthier than the islands of South Bpvelansl and Walcheren, and that whilst the troops remained embarked they certainly would not have been exposed to any sickness. Your Lordship having stated that you, did not conceive that the Expedition to the Scheldt posed either the army or the navy to imminent ha. 'ard, will your Lordship have the goodness tb state generally to the Committee the grounds ilson. which that opinion is formed, so far as relates to military operations ? There might be inure or less ,loss, but I did not consider that there was any very great risk in the expedition against IValche ren, or in taking possession of South Beveland, or in the subsequent landing. of the army, record. ing to theintelligeneelvceived of the strength of the enemy ; and I was confirmed in that opinion by the intelligence I afterwards received ; there was no force collected at Antwerp that I could consider as exposing the army to immitteut dam. ger. Is the Committee to understand your Lordship's opinion to be, that in case the feet had arrived on the 31 at Baths, the army might have been diseni. barked, and continued oil shore from the 3d down to the 25th, without prejudice, in your Lord. ship's judgment, to its secure re-embarkation ? The army might certainly have continued to that period, had it been collected in the field ; but I am by no means sure it could have remained in security, embarked in any operations to that pc. riod, that would necessarily have divided the army very *Rich, and not placed it in a state to make bead against the enemy. Prom the information your Lordship received, what do you conceive to be the composition of the 'enemy's force, in a military point of view ? There was certainly a very large part of that force, which, though applicable to garrison duty, would not have been formidable in the field. ' Does your Lordship recollect information re. ceived by Sir Jahn Hope, which bears date the 23d Of August, and which states the enemy's force on both sides of the Scheldt, including the garrisons of ituegen.sp. owe and Antwerp, to emolint to 21,780 men, exclusive of the workmen of the 'ar. 'senate and the crews of the ships ? I think there was such intelligence received, that accords very much with all the rest of the intelligence, which made the whole number about .35,000 men, at the time of our arrival at Baths.. Supposing your Lordship had found yourself in a situation to land yonr army at Santvliet, at the beginning instead of the close of the month of Au. gust, what hope do you now feel yourself justified in entertaining with respect to the prospects you shouW have had, of accomplishing the ulterior ob. Meets of the Expedition ? If the intelligence, ethich I am not able to speak positively to, had -been true, respecting the state of Antwerp, which I had received in the communications from the Secretary of State, I could • certainly have had considerable hopes of success ; but if "Antwerp was in a state that the works were completely re.' paired, I should certainly have thought that such cess, even if we had lauded at the early period named, to have been very doubtful indeed. , [Here follow several questions respecting for. mcr assaults upon Antwerp.) Is the Committee to understand your Lordship sailed with the Expedition fr o m Deal believing y ou should Bud the situation of Antwerp ace* with the information your Lordship had received? I knew nothing whatever of the truth of (Mink'. ligence; crime I could only know whether it - • THE STATESMAN. would toils eat to be•true or not when I ar. rived at my dostination ; I had no ground for be. ,lieving ur disbelieving It ; I had uo means of knowiat whether th'e intelligence was from good sources sir otherwise. Did pair Lordship believe that die nitimate atm. ccss of the Expedition against Antwerp depended upon the fleet arriving at Santvliet by or about the 3d of August, according to thd intelligence which your Lordship had received ? I think it depended very much on the early arrival of the army at Santvliet, as of course the enemy would be in a state of less preparation. Then, as your Lordship sailed from Deal, hay. ing received information that the fortifications of Antwerp were in a state of decay, and that there was but a very small garrison there, and as your Lordship believed that the object of carrying An twerp was only likely to be attained by the speedy arrival of the armament at Santvliet, did your Lordship make any arrangement, and what, for disembarking the army, in the first instance, at Santvliet ? That arrangement could only be made on the arrival of the armament at Santvliet, iu concert of course with the Admiral. I Is the Committee to understand that your Lord. ship sailed from Deal without making any ar rangement •fur landing the army at Santvliet ? %Without any decided arrangement for that 'pur pose—certainly none could possibly be made, from the nature of thu circumstance. Did your Lordship upon your sailing make any arrangement at all fur the landing.of the army at Santvliet ? No detailed ai.rangement certgittly ; I did not conceive it was a thing that could be made; before I sailed I had no precise knowledge where we should be able to land, or the nature of the landing-place, tilt it was reconnoitred, or whether the corps would arrive together or sepa parately. Did your Lordship receive any directions from the Secretary of State to make such arrangement I do not recollect any. In consequence of the Admiral's communication to your Lordship on the Bth of August, relative to naval co-operation in the reduction of Flush. ing, did any thing pass between your Lordship and the Admiral upon that subject ? I had some conversation I think with the Admiral at that time upon the subject. If the fleet could have gone up the Scheldt sooner, would your Lordship have proceeded to attempt the ultimate object of the armament, with. out•waiting for the reduction of Flushing ; I mean after the originally projected plan of operations vias frustrated by the necessity .of carrying so con. siderable a part of the armament into the.anon.. pot after the enemy had reinforced Flushing to so consihrabte an extent, and after additional troops had been landed to accelerate the reduction of that fortress ? I certainly should. Is the Committee to understand that the reason your Lordship remained so long on Walclieren, and allowed those troops that were landed in ad. tjition to Sir Eyre Coote's'original corps to do su, was, that until the whole armament exclusive of Sir Eyre Coote's force should arrive in' the neigh bourhood of Bath; no operation against Antwerp could be undertaken ; that the forwarding 'of the armament to that point depended 'solely upon the Navy, and that the anxiety Which your Lordship felt upon this subject, arising from a sonviction of the infinite itnpurtance• Jf celerity towards final seems, was from time to timeConimrinicated to the Admiral in the wrgent manner in which it was the instispensible duty of the Com Mender in Chief of the land forces to make such, representation ? The corps und..q. General Grosvenor, which was the additional corps landed, necessarily remained un til the transports could arrive to carry them up the Scheldt; it was impossible for-any operations early sort to be undertaken till the armament was. collected, particularly the cavalry and ordnance shipirend the ships with the ammunition and with the provisons : and therefore until the whole was collected at Bathz, unquestionably I should sly it was impossible for any operation whatever to have been-undertaken, and therefore I remained for that reason at IValcheren ; the corps which had been landed remained on shore alsoTur the same reason : with respect to any communication I had to make to the Admiral on the subject of expedition, urged to him the necessity of expedition, and I . had every reason to believe he was impressed with the same sentiment. 'Did your Lordship ever give any authority or instructions to Lord ltoisly'm or Sir John Rope, to concert and undertake any operation with the navy before you shoulttarrive in person on South Beveland ? Sir John HOpe was landed for the ex_ . ecution of .a particular service, which w:is merely to take the batteries, and to open a way for the fleet, and to *collect the resources in provisions, cattle, and horses : I certainly never gave any or ders to Lord Roselyn, vheioemmandeci then) after the landing of Lord tluntly's division and hii own; because it was impossible any operation of any I sort or kind whatever could be undertaken till the ordnance ships with the ammunition and pro.' visions could have . been carried up the river. Did the Admiral communicate to your Lord ship the order he sent le Sir Richard Keates to concert operations with Lord R,osslyn, arid request your Liardship to give orders of a similar de. scription to that General'? No, he did not ; the" fetter from Sir R. Keates to Lord Ross() n wai copiniunicated to am by his Lordship. Was every possible arrangemeirt for the speedy execution of the projected plan of operations made by your Lordship antlyour Staff ita,stieli a man. der, that it the naval means could have been ern,: ployed, no delay would have happened on the part of the army ? There certainly was. After the whole of the army had assembled at Bath; did not all the intelligence your Lordship received represent the works of Antwerp to be ire such a state, and the garrison so strong, as to make it impossible to take the place without a siege ? I think all the'intelligencc went to that etreet. Did not the intelligence at this period also state that the enemy had already collected between 30 and 40,000 men, in Antwerp, Bagen-op-Zoom, Breda, and that ueighbourhood, including the force in Cacisand ; that this fvroa was daily in. 11 • • , • . creasing, and that every prepariaelitttiloonfniiiiandwldolaerAstesendtelotivoantdekerithithehro: to appose our landing at Sant,' That was certainly the substabnecte the Nee. fence received ; had no very distinct hitelligem. as to the extent of the preparations making to re„ 'list the lauding at Santviiet, enemy had constructed several batteries Dyke ; the inundations too were rep very considerable. sickness 01 Did not this intelligence, aid the off c 4114, the army, and your Lordship's own reasuninsh to the use the enemy must necessarily har e ' m at t e of the interval between your first arrival el cheren and the period to which I allude, to a t n e L orate the defences of Antwerp and the other forts, arid to collect a considerable defensive force froi all quarters, determine your Lordship's ire.ginent against the practicability of then attacking Ace twerp ?—They certainly did. Did not your Lordship, on the 27th of Au gu l t. assemble th e Lieutenant-Generals of the Army la ja a Council of War, atid is not (licit opinion s before the Hong? —1 assembled the Lieuie ni t Generals on the 27th of August , And I 11- eaert• their opinion is before the Reuse. Did your Lordship understand that the Meet! thin:led from or concurred in that opinion? I ceived, certainly, that the Admiral concurred j t the opinion, that nothing further could be at, tempted. What induced your Lordship t' form th a t cu. jecture ? I received a letter from the Admiraial the 27th, the day the Council of War asseelleaL in which he distinctly stated that opinion. Will your Lordship have the goodness to pr e duce the Admiral's letter of the 27th o f m oo It is a letter stating ,the reasons of Sir Richae Strachan for desiring his letter to be sent hornets the Admiralty ; 'it is in that letter he states a fillet opinion that no further operation could, atek any prospect of success, be at that time outlet: taken. VII. Lordship produced a copy of Oahe ter, which was read.] COPY OF SIR R STRACHRICS LETTER, St. Domingo, Botha, Aug. 17, 11$1,' " Mr. Lou D—ln consideration of your note, 1(1,114 ; k cutter; there are two others waiting for orders besides dem but I remind you, you have not a men provisions h r arm!), and we have not above four for the navy, which, Ong we come to •divide with you, will retrace to to a .no; days; it therefore-becomes indispenbahly net r!sor) call the attention of Government to this circle:maw, sal pray pm to let me dispatch the vessel t two bait' 1 vat" dispatches. We are now at two-thirds alinoanct:: the oil serious consequences may arise front ans delay, win you consider the vast member we have to witted, o least seventy thousand.--44 am sure )(Aar Lardstup we be of my way of thinking, " that not a moment Mow be lost in communicating home."—All I shag ,ay that you do not propose to go on to Ant,. ,1 the reason mentioned in your lett.3. ; and really when I raw bider the reduced state of the provisions, the imreasiagoct ness, and the increasing, power of the enemy, little owe con he expected from any operation, unless it is the amis.' of our country to keep the army here to the accomplialene. of tile object, and reinforce it as circumstances may neres , ary. I should have been on shore, hot ant ant wed; haw thing should have prevented me i f I could base been aat useful ; your Lordship may rest mowed that I shall broody So do every thing you ;impose, :cud that the Nay) berg, disposal Tor every purpose to forward the public service. " I have tile honour to be, " Yohr Lordship's most hnilible and oebdient smart, "To his Excellency (signed) R. 3. STRACHAN. ° the Rt. Hon. the End of Chatham." Your Lordship might write a short letter, but peayt don't prevent mg sending the vessel boom t, I see them: as. dims consequeurea likely to arise, from tote Govetumeot ignorttut of the want of pro,visMus." [Here follow* an examimation similir to Oche, mer ope, relative to Antwerp, Fort Liilo, &c.] Upon the receipt of Sir Richard Strachan'a let s ter of the 27th of August, did your Lordship . call upon the Commissary-General of the Army, for a report of the state of the provisions, sod dihf -it cuerespotid with the estimate Sir Richard Sou• chan had given of their amount ? I certainly 'thought it. my duty to lose no time in looking We the subject, not being at-all aware of that being the case, and I found it entirely erroneous, Li that there was amontli's provisions for the troops. Ilas your Lordship reason to know that it en deliberately decided most advisable fur the public service that the supply of provisions should be progressively forwarded to the army, so as not to encumber their movements.iiith a,grcatcr proper (ion of provisions at any one time than the public service could possibly require ? I understood that to be the intention ; and, in point of fact, weal. ways had a sufficient supply of provisions. firs LORDIIIIP'S NARRATIVE: • Does your Lordship recoiled having delivered to his Me. jests any earrative of the proceedings in Zealand us the 15111 of January! 1 'did not deliver any narrative of the proceed. ings in Zealankto his Majesty;but I transmitted tt to his Ma jesty at Windsor on the 15th bf January. Was that narrative accompanied by any letter ? It Moot accompanied by any letter; there was a noleoftranuoinini; a note to Colonel tor I think. M.'s your Lordship any copy of thatnote ? I have tit Does your Lordship recollect having applied far that at naive to be returned to your Lortlyhip by his Majesty? IL . '" member having expressed * wi s h t o his Majesty, at the if: vee, on the 7th of Febr uar y I t hi n k, th a t he would bate . the goodness to return the narrative, because I wished make some alteration, to leave out a passage there was lob and it was so returned. aad D r i n Y w ratt lini Lef lual a u l te li r il ? )re ll e t el iv ve as th e a it t h na er rra on t t iv a e e think it was Oil the 10th I received it back; it was me sent bock with a mite from Colonel Taylor, saying th at had the King 's command to send it back; hotpot's* el ': Did your Lordship tender the narrative it:Aia to the KW on the Ilth of February? I did. Was it gi'len by his Majesty, at the same Levee it whirl/ it was tendered by your Lordship to his Majefty, to the . Str e _. tary of State ? It was not given at the Levee ; tylsg . 7.7, ba Sth ek n o r n th Th e e lOrk -14 at an audience after the Levee and received his idelfsl is, command to give it to the Secretary of State, which imm-diately. Without its passing into big Majesty's Muni ? yr" 1. , Majesty desired I mould gi v e it to the Secretary of yhISS lias your Lordship any copy of the narrative as municatedso his Majesty Oil the 15th of January ? I lad'e n r; Can your *Lordship state the substance of the altet:ansi, really do not think, especially after so long en exaialnaLt: I have now gone through, that I eau recollect Itetf i e i ce substance ; it was a passage towards the close oft Which contained rather matter of opinion or spent rather discussion, which I thought would be better: 4, T .report; d and I asked his Majesty's permission to lests7_,,i; peseta out of the report, yvhich I did. do not think, SO long an examinatiou, I could take upon mein safer; stance of that oassage, ur to recollect it ; hot to m !tier of 'opinion, and was only one ;me et wl *ought wouldonol accord in auy respect with the rest of ale tolerative, which was merely a statement of facts.. wti;rio Does your Lordship recollect the purport of the e st Mad or 2ottionied the narrative when it was first delivere d , site 1.5t0 of January ?— , lll was a note of transmission, the n irrative to Colonel Taylor for the King. ' Lordship was directed to witlidraw it rete 1)1Eu. On Wednesday, at Kennington, in the 27th year of 3111(11i:ix Franklin, Esq. late Resident Commissarvat Piebge• On Tuesday liot, sat Black wall, Mr. LON UON i Priute nod PIA fished b; IiT&TEIWAN Orrlc4, 67, COW .1., at IP \ 1 1~~0, it; LA Gi ' Pli el go r 0..., Om TI P Sew ,(:cur. ze. Tkis _~ NFa bus Or Mi. Nader The sad id EU lan. rr . • _. ;,. Plan Ins 01 Doer lit Si. I !Clod I. si kNNU Dyer, ?Awl 1 ., c ilio Ii sy 'RI Iv tut Pen. tisf ad Co :611, - t No. DJ Ta Le eXt ix we: IR ir t IRE* I, Nel From it beg *Oa 'OH 9,031 IN - .. ~ with ll Sofia 1001 *hie Uttis r l igtver EIJI I J'' • f.,•, 4 In intE tlOl3 J. I O! R the rn Uriv a h eir 4 34 the