The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1807-12-09 00:00:00

you, since it wonld have spared you all the odium of such an expedition ; but it would have tarnished the Danish name; and the disasters of Denmark cannot be regretted by that nation, wheu it retells that they have saved it from this stain. With what sacrifices did you expel to pay for its ignominy ? You take care Dot to tell ; but all the universe knows that your politics are as avaricious as cruel ; and, be sides, how dare you presume to call those sacrifices, itbich you would have offered the Danes in ex change for their fleet and their honour ? " Deeply at the disappointment of this hope has been felt by His Majesty, he has the consolation of relleBing, that no exertion wa• left untried en his part to produce a different result. And while he laments the cruel necessity when l has obliged ham to have recourse to acts of Ischtility against a na tion, wit'i which it was His Majesty's most earnest desire to 'have established the relatinuaol cominon interest and &Mimics ; Ilia Majesty feels confitent that, in the eyes of Euwpe and of the World, the justification of his conduct will be found in the commanding and indispensable duty, paramount to :di others ansoogst the obligation' of a Sovereign, of providing, while there was yet time, Ica the immediate security of his peolaw.• saving been unable to persuade the Danes to be guilty of cowardice, you console yourselves for it, by reflelling that no exertion was left untried by you to persuade them to it. You wished at one atroke to plunder and to dishonour them.— You have plundered them, but the infamy has recoiled upon you, and you seek to console yourselves for having executed only half of your design ; regretting rather that you &I not render them at once both wretched and infamous, than that you rendered yourselves infamous by reducing them to misery. You talk of a cruel necessity, and pretend even to lament it You wish that in the eyes of Europe and the world, the justification of your condo& may be found in the commanding and indispensable 'dory of providing for the security of ycur nation. You are sensible then, that your condo& needed jos-, tification ; that Europe and the world could not but censure it ; and youpretead to excuse yourselves in their eyes by a cruel necessity ; as a wretch whom hunger has impelled to put the knife to the throat of an honest man, might plead before his Judges You have used the dagger. and do you still think that there is a justification, an excuse for you ? Let us tee what is this cruel necessity, this indispensable duty of providing for your security. This the se• quel of your Declaration wiA show us. " His Majesty had received the most positive information of tbe determination of the present Ruler of Fraser-_ to occupy, with a military force, the territory of Holitain—'er rue purpose of escluMng Great Britain from all her accustomed eliennels of communicators with the Cintinent; or inducing ur compelliug thcCuurt of Denmark enclose the passage of the Sound against the Srßi.h comatioce and navigation ; stud of availing himself of the aid of the Danish Marine for the invasion of Gram Bri tain and of l'eland."'" You labour to establish three falls, which would indeed be necessary foe your justification. You wish, to persuade Europe That yon had authentic information respelling the plans of the Emperor Napoleon ; IL That these plans threatened your security ; 3. That you had no other means of pro. lidieg for your security, than by treating the Danes as you have done. You acknowledge the need you have of these three facts. You are sensible that if one of the three is proved to be false, your condo& towards Denmark is without excuse, and wiil al ways be deemed the height of iniquity. Now these three facts are false, and it is easy to prove them to be so. And, in the first place, how can you have received positive information of the resolutions and of the plans svhi‘h you ascribe to the Emperor of the French? Who revealed them to you ? What proof or even what indication or them can you produce ? If any fail could have been mentioned as a cionmenerment of the execution of these plans, what a handle you woulJ hare made of it ? Instead of has you present us with nothing but the most vague statements. You wish Europe to believe ycur information to be certain, positive, and you do not even suffer us to obtain a glimpse of dui authentic sources from which yotsFetend to have procured it. • All Europe well knows, that yea have on the Continent an 31 my of spies, commissioned to make war on the fidelity of all those who approach So vereigns and their Ministers. All Europe likewise knows, that such soldiers, always worthy of the purpose for which they were desit.ed, sometimes tbrn the offensive arms which you give thee, whist probity, their most inveterate enemy, and yet that they are continually sending you certain, positive, and authentic information ; but all Europe knows still better, that there is a country where the eharader and genius of the Sovereign, and the at tachment of his Ministers, would render any at tack of this kind equally ridiculous and ineffeCtual. If there lee any thing positive and anthentie, it is she impem trable secrecy which. covers the designs o; the Emperor Napoleon; and likewise that peocbgious tepidity of action which is peculiar to him, and which does not reveal most of his prejees, till they ate esecutede Csa you then ave.v sit or means at S information ? Mention them, and perhaps Europe will believe you. If you cannot, talk no more of your authentic information ; and if you have no other ground than conjedtures, fears, alarms, do not assign them as an exculpatory reason. We shall soon see whet falsehood there is in these conje and what hypocrisy in these alarms. But if the projeas which you ascribe to the Em peror Napoleon had been real, they would not have authorised your conduit against Denmark. Supposing even that these projefts had been still more imminent; supposing that this Prince, relin quishing the charader of justice, which he makes his glory, had resolved not only to occupy Holstein, and involve Denmark in a common war against you, but hkevise to subdue the Danes and to conquer their two kingdoms, what tight would you have had to prevent him, to ravage their coasts, to burn their cities, to plunder their magazines, to rob their arsenals, to carry off their fleet i What ! because another Sovereign might have the design to be un- just and atrocious towards the Danes. would that give you a right to be so in reality ? This idea is taw revolting to dwell upon. Will you still speak of the commandia7 and indispensable duty of provid ing for your security ? It is easy 4o confound you on tins point as on thr others. Let us first observe, that it is demonstrn e ! by fats, that the projefts which you are pleased to ascribe to the Emperor Napoleon, never existed ; and certainly he is sufficiently powe , ful to defy you to answer this argument. He did riot invade the Danish territory $ therefore he had no design to do so. Every one knows that for more than six months past, there have been in Ideekknburg, and the other States of Lower Saxony. ►ordering on Holstein. more French troupe than wno!.l have been required to occupy that province and Slesuick. In voile/l ing them there, the Emperor Napoleon did not vio late either the territory of Hamburgh, or that of the adjacent countries, as you accuse him of doing. h was Prussia, your ally, that violated the territory of those States, and drew thither the arms of France. Since then, it is true. Denmark has direded.its at. t ;ttion towards the defence of ft, continental pro vinces ; and thanks to your perniciods thanks to the cruel foresight of your malignant • policy, she stripped her island.:, which you de signed to attack, to send her forces into the pro vinces in the vicinity of the war which ,ots had kindled. Thar, before she cauld have Pittetrated into tbern,Franee would have had to fight the Danes, that is, soldiers of the greatest bravery, and resolved' to suffer every thing, and even death itself, rather than dishonour ; but the Danish trocps, not much inured to war, and commanded by im•xperienced Generals, would have been able to oppose to the French army but an unavailing resistance, or cal culated at the utmost to give some value to the tro phies colleded by the visors. The Emperor Na. poleon could never projed such a victory; it was with very different intentions that he had collvded a formidable force on the Danish frontiers. What were his views? It would be presomptuous to at tempt to penetrate them ; but we may observe, that Swedish Pomeral.4 was open to you, that you had allies there, supported by a strong place, and that for a Long time you had promised them assistance which should enable ti,rrn to ad against the French. These then were to guard the country, of wl.kh you in tended to make the first conquest. To every im partial prison this destination will appear a thou sand times more probable than the design of occu pying the c3n.inentat provinces of Denmark ; a de sign of no utility to the French, and the tal.ehood of which is demonstrated by the event ;slur, I re peat it, that Napoleon might have occupied these provinces; lie did not, and therefore he had ao in minion of doing it. The great swsfortune of the Danes has been, that they did not sufficiently mistrust your politica, and knew too li.tle of those of the Emperor Napoleon. They took no precaution but against the Soft feign whom they ought not to have tented Had his designs been susp.r.fted by them ? At all events they could have entertaiaed no appi ehension for the centre of their power, and never could you have (mud in them less ground.; to jost:ty your feigned alarms. In flat, the Emperor Napoleon was perfally competent to pesters himself cf the continental provinces of Denmatk ; but was lie equally able to possess himself of Zealand ? It the Danes were afraid of his enterprises, had they not the means to proted their coast. ? Did they not know where to find maritime succours ? Have they ever shewn themselves ready to faU under the yoke In filling holstein with troops, had they not mani fested their resolution to repel all violence ? And because it was possiole that their independence might be menaced, was it for you to hasten to trample them under fen: You pretrtsd that the Empev'r Napolirn might have persuaded or forced De.nroork to shut the Sound ; that he might has e empldred the Danish Beet le landing troops upon your territory; sod tha t you might to protide for you? safety. What 1 after having fomented the war by land and by sea for 15. I years, at first to ruin France, and afterwards to weaken her, you cannot now provide fir your sot; ly, but by crushing a feeble State—a State that has al- ways conduaed' itself towards you as a sincere friend—a State which, for a year pat,l, has been your only channel of communication with the Con tinent ? You cannot provide jor your eafi/y but by carrying into its capital desolation and death ? and you dare to proclaim it in the face of Europe? And this Proclamation bears the name of ruts Sovereign, connected with the atni.h Monarch by the most sacred clew* And it is alter having thus provided for year sleety, by dishonourable means, that you give this signal of public joy, formerly re served for the most brilliant vidories ! Oh, in what degradation does not this nation, so base and so vain, find itself all at once plunged France, .you say, Isais.ht have persuaded Desunark to chat the Sound against yea, and employed the Danish fleet to led a landing upon . your shores. I admit, for a moment, the reality of your chimerical alarms. I allow the French, without a navy, to pass the two channels which separate Zealand from the Conti nent. I suppose them ma.ters of that Island and of Copenhagen. Could they .hut the Sound against you without the concurrence of Sweden ?t Do you not remember the facility with which this passage was effeEled by you in 1501 ? And. besides. what can the Baltic d.. f.)r your safety ? To insure the safety of the hourgtois of London, mu.t the doors of this sea be always open to yen ? Your safety might, I acknowledge. be compro mised by the landingof a French army upon your ter ritory ; but it cannot arrive thete,unlesi escorted by a fleet able to combat yoars : and if British pride could condescend to consider the Danish ships worthy of this honour, it might a: least rely upon an immense superiority of number ; the only one, without doubt. the Danes wield be disposed to Allow you. kit to be supposed that England, which is strong enough to extend her despotism over all the seas, would have had no other means of providing for her safety against the Danish fleet, except that of surprising Denmark without defence, to strip it of all its ships of the line, of all its naval forces ? The English. who are strong enough to tyrannize over the vast countries of India, to maintain their do mination in the Anti:l2s, to blockade the posts of Ens opt. to impose upon the Americans the most severe laws, to destroy the commerce of all nations ; the English, with a superabundance of means, which enabled them to WNW* Constantinople, to occupy the Togo,. to attack Egypt, to send an army to Buenos Ayres; the English, who extend their forces with such monstrous extravagance, and lavish them in silly expeditions ; wi:l they be able to persuade Europe, that to place themselves in safety against the Danish fleet. they were forced to have sec .urse to a dishonourable expedition ? " Cstifident as Ilia Majesty was of the authenticity of the sources from which this intelligence was derived, an/ con firmed In the credit which he pee to ir, as w-ell by the note rious and repeats/ declarations of the enemy, and by his re cent occupation of the towns and territories of whet. Pfeutral States, as by the preparations actually made for collecting a hostile force upon the frontiers of His Danis:: Majesty's Con tinental Dominions. His Majesty would yet willingly have forborne to act upon this intelligence, until the complete and practical disci sure of the plait had bean made manifest to all ' the world." "His ►talssty 44 forbear, as long as there could be • doubt of the urgency of the danger, or a hope of on effectual eon•.- %eraerinn to it, in the meant or in the disposii• us of Denmark. —But Ills Maje ty could nut but recollect, that when, at the close of the former war, the Court of Denmark en gaged in a hostile confederacy against Great Britain, tie apology armed by that Court foe so unjustifiable an abandonment of a neutrality which His Majesty had never eoaaa to respect, war founded on its avowed inability to resist the operation of external influence, an/ the throats of a formidable neighbouring power. His Majesty could net but compare the degree of influence, which, at that tine, determined the decision of the Court of Denmark. i s viol.tsott of positive engagements, solemnly contracted but six mouths before, with tire increased operation which France had now the taunts of g.ri:tg to the same principle of intimidation with Icm:doing magnate at her feet, and with the population of ❑nions ruder her banners." Danmark, you say, was 16kely to be in the same • teen Matilda, celebrated for her onis(ortui,es, consort of Chri.tiais theVllth, awl-mother of the I , ,iitee Royal, was stater of the present King of England.''—.4" Mite of the Transioter.) t What the German %Vetter says here, respecting the row ellftellee of Sweden, as necessary to Denmark, to order to shut the Sound against the English, requires explanation r It is very true, the English very easily paned the Sound, in leo!, to atiedlt the Danes, but they owed it in part to Sweden, which, Instead of an understanding with Dtnmark, to present them, did not erea a single battery upon the coast of Hitting berg. It is very wail known, that the passage hetwsen it and Crone:o)am Is too wide to be defended by one slime of the two nati..r.s; but on quitting the Sound, to enter the 1141t4e, shy tr the lug, er.nrrt pass, except between two Danish Islands, very claw ; and consequently Denmark alone might be able to stop them, d these Islands were furnished, with good bat teries. This "Divination 4i,e not ',edict) the reasonctig of the (...limian Writer against the Doslacation of tale Cog of Irslaudr.—( Note ry the Translator.) ' sitnation in which it was placed at the end of th e. late war, in which, ace it ding to you, After having violated a neutrality always ies.pefted by England, it excused itself upon the impassibility of resistiag the menaces of a formidable and neighbouring power. Were France, this day. able to exercise over Denmark the same influence which Russia then exercised over it, the result for pa would be a certain and iurmiaent il4hger / Assuredly no Dane, nor even mil impattial ropean, could civet to see such remembrances transformed by you into justificatory mama. No person could have thought that yaw would have dared to remind him of your condoEl towards Dims mark at the end of the late war. The etents are registered in the history of the times, and the trea ties are in being. These are irrefragabla witnesses. We still remember, that in the month of August. 1800. the two nations, being in profound peace, your ships of war fired upon the Freua, and carried her into your posts, merely becats“l the Commander of the Danish frigate refused a visit and search, as humiliating as contrary to the law of nations ; and now you ate not afraid to impute to Desemirk she violation of the neutrality ! You accuse her of as hostile league with Russia, conclude] four months afterwards, and this confederation had no othcr objeft in view than the maintenance of the princi ples of the Maritime Neutrality, rendered sated for a long period by the assent of all the Continental Powers. The treaty is known, awl dues not contain one single line which discloses a spirit of aggression. You regard it, however, as hostile, and you thus avow yourselves the natural enemies of all those people who wish to defend their rights. You thea, towards Denmark, abase your enormalus superi ority. That nation may recall her reverses of for tune without blushing.; but bow can you reproach bar, without shame, with events of which no Dane will ever speak without indignation ? If it were true, that iu renewing her an cient engagements for the maintenance of tle rights of neutrals, Denmark bad, in 1800, only yielded to the menaces of Russia, and that as this day that nation had been exposed to similar menaces on the part of France, it would be just to observe. that those of Russia, at the first epoch, would have been - more turbulent or troublesome for Copenhagen, than thine of France would have been, even after the peace of Tilsit. The sea formed a passage for the Russian flat ; it formed a rampart or protection against the French army. The me. Daces of France would then have been less support. ed in latter times than those of Russia at the end of !SOO; and if the charater of Paul I. Lactated them suppositions of disquietude and alarms, inspired amcnpt his neighbours, the charaiter of Napoleon rejedls every idea of power compromised, and of menaces hazarded. In the mean time, in granting even that the influence or the menaces of France would have obtained every thing from the weak. ness of Denmark, and would have made you incur the same dangers to which you have exaosed yourselves durirg the last seven years, by her pre. tended docility to Russian influence, how can we see for you " a certain and imminent danger ?" It would have Leen impossible to say what danger re sulted to England trodP the dispositions of Den mark, at the end of 1800, or the beginning of 180/. for Denmark did not prepare any armament. and her intentions then not having, as those of this day. any thing of hostility in them, had consequeatly nothing of a threatening aspefi. Besides, in order to take from the Denies every means of injuring. you had only occasion, at this epoch, to send against them one of your fleets. In supposing even the French to be masters of Zealand, did these not remain to you a similar resource ? That re source, at least, would not hare sullied your purls tics with a new stain. " Mor was the danger I. se imminent than certain. Already the army deslueri for the iiirasion of Honitrin was assembling so the vio!atesl territory of neutral Hanibuigh. And Hal. ate M, once occupied, the island of Zealand was at the mercy of France, and the Nail of Denmark at her disposal. the ft liA lt i6c is , tr w is7 d a c li b,.c ritia ke l i fe a rc a e t m un ag e h t t he ha n s ,: found vermnts it o s f w t a he y l u st: iiish Marine. But the season was 'pp:aching when that precaution wou:il niriongar have availed ; and when His Ma jeaty's fleet must !Lite retired from that sea, and permitted France, in undisturbedtsectsrity, toaocumulate the mem of offence against lies Majesty's dominions." You have yourselves felt the force of this so sim ple, and yet so pressing an objetion. Yon seek to obviate it in speaking of a 'talon its which your squa• drops, being forced to re-enter your ports " fie Freesai would have accumulated with safety the news of attack nsarust your scats ;" but if the sea Lid not been tenable for you, could it have been so fx the Danes or for the French ? "inert are many eth• modes of attack" besides the aelual attack The French have accumulated immense means or attack at the distance of seven leagues from DaC. and yet it was those which they might have Igo able to prepare at 300 leagues from your cony. which inspired you with so muds uneasiness for saftty ! horn &mince the French have it la Ifti Ira prol Pec pei 101 111 i t:i]