The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser. — London, England, 1808-12-15 00:00:00

((INQUIRY, CHELSEA COLLEGE. I TENTH DAY, Dic. 14. The Court resumed its sitting this moping at I • halt Iwot eleven o'clock. The Deputy Jur>Dii; ADVOCATE rasa the sit. rioui letters /bud dispatches to which a reference wits -wade yesterday- iu the narrative of Sir Harry Bur rank They tirincipelly consisted of the hAterr of Lora Castlereagh and General Stuart to Sir flurry Burrarit, previous to his sailing from l'ortsinouth, together with the dispatches of thee officer off Pent che to Sir John filoore Alt Cape Slonilego, Sir U. BIIitILARD expressed to the Board his 'wish to interrogate Sir A. IVelle.ley on certain Friag- Question—Did not the ) drench cavalry patrole the night of the 1 9 tli, and morning of the 20th, 'dose to the quarters ..f the British army ? Anaper-1 do not recollect that the French ca i. wiry rolesl near the Uri iisli camp, on the night of *gust 119. They certainly did so, very early on the • gof the inch.. There was a division of the • 'tall army which had been detached at an early hoar, on that morning, under Gen. Spencer, to wards Lorinna, to facilitate the junction of General Anstruther's brigade, which hail landed in a bay to the southward of P.:niche. l'hisdiririota was posted upon a height between 1,. rr iii eia and Vimeira, and 'the French cavalry patroied very close to it. Question—Do you think it possible for itn army of fimn sixteen to seventilen thousand mien, so situated with respect to the French, to have marched without the mutiny being apprised of its tnareh within cue hour ? . • . . , Answer-1 th ink, undisecertnin cirgnostances of country and of position, it was im.—ible for an army to march, and the march not to be known to the enemy, at the disdimee of urine miles, iu less than two, if mu .three hours. Questiou—Ja nut Tories Vedras nine miles front "frimeira ? ahoni Auswer--Torres Vedias is it eight or nine miles from Viincim. Tin. British army was always under *ma au hour before daylight. There are eross-eoads between the latter and fortes Vedras. In answer to a quest from Sir Harry Barrard with respect to the existence of mountainous tor rents in these roads, Sir Arthur 11'ellesley assert ed. that reels torrents took place, and treated very difficult poses with steep hills on each side. kessertion—ls Torres l'edra. much nearer to Marra than Vimeira, and how much ? Auswer—l slioal.l imagine that 'forres Vcdras is distant from Matra, about nine mole. rod a half, and that Vimeira cannot be less than seventeeu or nine teeio miles. Question—Could the enemy not have 'been at Mass is three to have been reinforced from that and the other forts? Answer—l conceive that the enemy could not have been at Malta, if we had.rnarelwd before day Su the morning. If we could have reached Matra before them, their hue of retreat must have been by (Sir Harry Barrard put onward; of twenty such questiwasto Str Arthur, relative to the distaues 4 oiie place from atiotime., the vower of cavalry and artillery to act, the qmootity of provisions provided tor the army. &c. Lc. which, from the quantity, and greaser importance'sf the matter which follow ed in this day's proceeding's, together with out nar row limit% we ciaiinot Talky deetai.) We H. Boaasau isterrogated hst the Coiner. ' tiaestiotiSie Hugh' Dalisimple and Sir ,Icy have both, stled._ that tbs.-Freneh ire pulsed the Tugus w;tle their whole ' usight'have iuvolvest the liritaili *Hwy in 'rise of doubtful operations, at the very' . 'iritish arcs mightit'ave acted with el • sou of the name opinion ? recrtainly ain. timi--Could not General Junot have .1 his forces across the Togo* insmedi the ltd of August? r—l think he might. ~urostloti—flow it this conclusion to Ire re ...wed, that General Junot thought the conditioOs of the Convention mere advantageous to the Fvineb interest, than the protracting, in the tawnier which has been represented to hate lawn in his power ? Auswer•-•-I conceive that General Junot had his own motive. in not coluiug to :reboil. like Court were of opinion that these three ques !Mats shield be put to the other two Officers. It betug c,uee,ved that Sir Arthur fool already, in Lime previous part of the proceeding., answered the first of them, the second question was put to him, to which his answer was—/ think he might. As to the third, Sir Arthur auswerrd—.. lotion sidering the expediency of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal by sea. I took a view of the British interests and British objects only, situ the olijerts of oar allies. as connected with those of Great Britoil). I considered that the Freud, army, from the ro!ative situatinn of the two armies in Por togal, audits having the military posoession of the coaritry, had a few tosliter y unlit to withdraw by - WE I, with their arms and bogge ; and I do not think it neeessary for me to account for the m o ti v e s of General Jaunt, in prefers. peg the evacuation by sea, to another line of operation ; which, without wishing to say any thing disrespectful of him, might have been hid or unworthy motives, as weil as con ducive to his country's interest." lb. two last quetetiosaa were also put to Sir Hugh Dalrymple. To the accotid question of the three he answer e.l—.• Most certainly." To the third questi lie answered— , 4 I have already stated us the Court the reasons which in duced me to think the Convention to have been ad vasitageoauth the cause of (;seat Britain end her sillier.. Italian be also recollected. that I had par ti, filar instructious for repelling the French from Li s non. and b• prevent their retreat into Spain ; and without pretending to say how far that might have Iseeu in their intro. I had certainly no other means of preventing such a movement. I cannot be aware of the motions which induced General Juirot to rumor with those measures. He doubt less thought he saw sone adiantage to the French 1:! , . ere,' , which I could not discern, in so doing. eNchi.ii re of the great motive, upon all such of-ca sinos, to spare the useless r fusion of lin man blood." The same questions were again put to Sir H. Ttorro4l,; , to 'the , . first of which he answerod— T• Certainly Janet might hare transported. his tromp s aciosa the Tagus upon that oceluaou.". To the second—" 1 d4I nut euude cow.icler what ware the motive, which actuated the F reuch General. I could not couceive what could iimluee him to do that winch I thought was wiestitageour to this coo it ry." • Sir-il..DALiartir ittioatell by Me. Court. Question—Might you nut have insisted upon more favourable terms, before the Convention took place Answer--I suppcoe that from the change of cir euinstanees I "night hare so insiAird, particuhtily upon the 49th mid 'the. 31st ,of A ngnst, when tea landing of Sir John Zlitsore's corps WAS completed ; but L did not then think that the cireum,tauces permitted of the urgociation being protracted, and the four Lieutenant-Generals with %limn I con sulted upon the occasion. scented to me to concur in the same opinion. Thomi Lieutenant-Generals were Sir Harry norms'. Sir John Moore, Lieute t-Geueral Hope, and Lieutenant-General Mackenzie Fraser. Question—How did it happen that the march of the troops under Sir .101 in Moore was so tardy ? Answer-1 do not exactly know ; but, in point of fact, whew the army marched into siiain, tit opt mtiots waited for nothing. when I left Portugal, but notice from Madnit The neces.ary arrangements as to the movements of the troops had been made in Spain, and I had reason daily to expect them to be sent to me. Question-1s it the.' to be understood, that tio 11117.uigement for that operation had been concerted previous to the Ponce Minn ? Answer—Not that I know of. Colonel TORSI:MS Was the neat witness called, and examined by Sir A. Wrt.t.r.st.EY. Qnestios,--Were you preseut on board theßrozen wheal I bad a conven.ation with Sir Harry Burrard, on the evening of the sorb of August ? Anawer-1 was. Questioto—Siate what you recollect to have passed. Answer—Sir Arthur Wellesley mash' his report to Sir Her, Burrard, upon the arrival of that Officer in Sierra Roads; Sir Artlour Weill-lacy re presented to him the state of the army wider his command, and the situation of that of the enemy ; the object of, and principle upon which he had conducted his operations since he had landed at Mondege ; and farther stated, that he had orders for the march of the artnr next morning.— Sir Harty Thwart, replied, that he did not consider it advisable to advaucc from that position, until the army should be reinforced by a division from Sir Johu Moore. Sir Arthur iVellcsley oloxistal, that he thought it of the a•most Importance to push forward by the way of Matra, with a view of turning the enemy's left flank, said to endemetir to bring the French army to the issue of a bottle in the held, as near to Limon as possibie, that we might avail ourselves of the short dist:awe from the Tagus, by fbllswing up the victory,* • a= to present the French from crossing that riser. He further stated, that he was desirous of this (snout taking place near to Lisbon, he having an actual survey of all the country in the vicinity of that town. Sir Arthur Wellesley adde I, that if Sor John Moort's 'corps shoUld be brought down to r c Sierra, Sir H. alurrard must relinquish all the todvautage* to be expected from his marching that body top to Sane • tweet, with a view of cutting oaf the retreat of the French army to the northward. Sir 11. Burrard egain• repeated, that he thought it sothoisalile to bring Sir John Moore's corp. to reader certain those operations which appeare.; to him doubtful.— Sir. Arthur then asked Sir 11. Burrard whether lie Flail teceired his letters of the nth and lush of An ' uet/ winch recommended the IlittirCil of this rein forcement upon Sarotarens• Sir Harry replied, that he had received . those letters ; but hr did no:, in say giresCuCC, snake env comment or oleitivatiolo upon that statement. Sir H. Burrard then wrote a letter to Su Jolla Moore, which 1 did not see, but 1 un derstood it to be orders to come up with his divi sion. I beg leave to state, that, to the best of my recollection, this is the enlostanee of the conversa tion which loaned, although I cannot pledge iny self to its being the exact words. Qatlition-,-Does Colonel Torrens: recollect my stating to Sir Harry Barnard the prehabilitv, that if we did not snore to attack the French, they would attack us Auswer—l do recollect that Sir Arthur made that cilwiervation to Sir Harry ilurrant, adding, at the same time, that a greut expenditure of pro visions would he occasioned by waning. till the tune Sir John Moore could came up, as lie could not he expected for some d tys. Question—Do you recoil ct tuy stating to Sir Harry &ward the probabl • increuied difficulties of supplying the army wit!) provisions, when its numbers should be increased, without any propor tionate increase of means? Aisiover—l do perfectly rece.l.-ct tiiß making that observation. Question—Do you recollect me stain; to Sir Harry Burrard the probability that, if the enemy did not attack us, they would fortif‘ their posiuntis between onr army and Lisbon, during the delay of our marching ; and of my stating to him the diffi culty of our turning fortified positions with cannon, in that country, on account of the narrowness of. the roads? Answer—l do perfectly recollect it ;he adding, at the name time, besides the narrowness, the ge neral Initliietio of the roads, which would reader the operation of t•trnin4 the enemy's Husk, in sny po ■itiou which he might take up, extremely difficult. Question—Do you recollect my sending you with orders to General nine and General Anstru titer, before, or immediately at the commeneement of, the battle of the 21st of August ? Answer-1 do recollect Sir Arthur sending me, with such orders, man the commencemetit of the battle of the e Ist of August Question—What we►e those orders ? Answer—Sir Arthur desired me to ride, as fast as I could, to the brigades of Generals Anstruther and Emir, to communicate to them that they should not move from the position which they int.- copied in the front of the village of Vitiarita;wiilt out further directions from him. On my arrival at that position. I found that General rape ; d ad vanced a little way in front, and was eligazed with the French light troops. I folh•aed Lim, and deli. vered sheet orders, end he consequently retired. It was then, I ti.mk, about half past nine in the s umming. Question—Did I state to you the reason for giv ing these orders ? Answer—Yes, partly ; I understood from Sir Arthur Wellesley that those orders originated from Ore nature of the ground in front of that position, which would render it ineligible to move forwards, and particularly as lie had observed a large French colnmn forming in the wood, evidently preparing •to make a vigorous attack upon our centre. Question—Was Colonel Torreus present ahen I recommended to Sir Harry Burrard, on the held of battle, on the e tot of Angia, to continue the pursuit of our advantages ? Answer-4 wus. ....--. _ . Question—State to the Court what passed. Answer—lmmediately after we had defeated the right colanui of the French army, which had made its attack upon our left, and were then retreating in a precipitate manner, Sir Arthur Wellesley rode up to Sir H. Burrard, and said, " Sir Harry, now is your time to advance, the 'enemy are completely beaten, and we shall be in Lisbon in three days. We have is large body of hoops that have not been in action, let us move them upon the right, upon the road to Torres Vedras,and I'll follow the enemy upon the left." Sir Harry Burrard replied, that he thought a great deal had been done, very much to the eretiit of the troops, but he did not think it advisable to inure off the ground in pursuit of the enem. Sir Arthur Wollesley rcinarked, at the swine time, that the troops were perfectly ready to advance, having .provisions really cooked in havresaeks, according to the orders of the day be fore. Question—Do you recollect my mentioning that the troops had also plenty of ammunition ; besides, that there tetra twelve days' bread in the camp, lOr the original numbers in the army, and a !ufti ciracy of every kind of strifes, in the reserve of the artillery Auswer—l recollect Sir Arthur Wellesley men tioning that there was plenty of ammunition ; that the mules aid the reserved musket ammunition were in the rear of the brisolles ; and that we hail abundance of °Morin e stores, and plenty of pro visions ; but I cannot recollect, at this moment, it lie stated the number of days' provisions we had in the camp. Quegiou—Did I order the inlay, on the 20th, to march Upoll the morning of the 2tatP Answer—You did so. Question—Did 1 countermand those orders, %Then I returned from the Brazen, on the evening of the 20th ? Aoswer—Sir Arthur Wellesley, countermanded those orders immediately upon his arrivak•in the camp, upon the evening of the 40th, in conse quence of the orders he had received from Sir Har ry Iturrarsl. 'l'o a question from Sir 11. TIURILAIIIN Colonel ToR&F.Si answered—The French column arrived at the point of attack upon outf left in about ten mi nutes or a quarter of an hoer after their left co lumn was defeated by our centre. I cannot speak with any accuracy as to the length of the action upon the left, it might probably be an hour, or mere or less. Questioa4—When Colonel Toren, said that he Issard Sir A;rthur Wellesley ask ow, whether I had received hni diapatchcs of the lth. loth, and litb August, did I not tell the latter OtTicerthat 1 had seat them thiiirJoho Moore, by Colonel Duncan. from St. Nlartia's ? Atmer—l do not recollect that Sir Harry Bur- rard made that communication to Sir Arthur Wel !Miry ism my presence. tolunel • Torrens then withdrew, and the meis seaa'er was desired to call in Capt. Cooke. That Officer was nut at the time in attendance. Sir ARTIIIIII WELLUSLEY then addressed the Board, htatiug his anxiety to offer a few observe , tions on the narrative of proceedings which Sir Harry Burrard had on the last (lay read to the Court, and which now constituted a part of its pro ceedings. It was also his intention to au I mitt souse comments en certain points which had been sup ported by the evidence which he hod felt it his duty to produce. The first observation to which he should call the attention of the Board was, the dif ference of opinion which existed between him and Sir /limy Burrard, upon the expediency of having had the position of Santarem occupied by the army which was under the command of Sir John Moore. The reason stated by Sir Harry Burrard for not ac quiescing in his recommendation to that effect , w as , that he believed the force under the command of sir John was not strong enough to cippore the enemy in their retreat. For the particular reasons by which he was induced to recommeud to Siri-lorry Burrard the expediency of occupying Santurein, he begged leave to retW the Board to his dispatches to that officer, which were then before them. The parammtut principle which, in his mind, operated to snake that recommendation, was by no illealle diminished in its influence, frmn any inforantitioa which hefted subseluetitly received: It originited front the impression, that he haul always considered that the British and Freswh armies in Portugal had, in their respective operations, the same military ob ject, viz. the poosession of Lisbon and of the Tarr. To accomplish that object, on the part of ei ther, it was almost a matter of necessity that a battle should be fought in the field. Iu possession of the means which he had, and con scious of the gallantry and energies of the brave troops which he vominanded, he had just.tiahle grounds for expecting that, in place of disadvan tage, the British force would halve been successful in the conflict. The next consideration was, if the French army were repaired in thelleld.in what way would they have retreated ? Ile presumed, a reference to the draught of the two lines, by which only the enemy could retreat, as drawn by the Commandin g ; Of fi cer of Engineers, and delivered to the Court by Sir hew Dalrymple, would fully convince the Board, that, in either view, the posi tion of Santarem would be advantageous to inter rupt or cut oil the enemy's retreat. First, if the French army had passed the Tagus, and retreated by the road to Eleas, the occupation of Santarem Would haventtorded to a British force the facility of crossing the Ta.."ns, and to impede thetn•frout its proximity to a fonlahle part of that river. Secondly, had the enemy made his movenieets for the purpose of falling back upon Almeida, Santarem the road, the British army occupying that 1eni.1 , 0 ., would have interpneed. With respect to ... there being inferior to that of the mem,. to be considered that, in toriniog this deterlin.a lion, lie had calculated, that, previous to retreat, an action must have taken place between the reo armies, in which& was led to hope and to b. lieve that the French would be repulsed, cid el/114! quently would lie considerably weakened. lu such II view of the case, he had no doubt that Sir John Moore's army would have proved itself a instal for the enemy in its endeavour to retreat. Indeed under such circumstances he was confident that the occupation of Siiiitereru was little dangerous, whilst, at the same time, it was very MIMI.. tageous. It could, lie had no doubt, have been supplied from the victualler., by means of carts procured :it Moudcgo. ' Sir A. 11' &Levitt:if uext proceeded to state the numerical force with which he landed at Moiniego, and the various reieurcements be bad received by the voojunetioli of the different briguiles. Besides, be had a right to expect a reinforcement ef Clew Portuguese troops, which %Noah{ hese the army, which be had the honour to c ..... to JOAO) men. He had now reasons to believe, that the report of a rifinforeentent i.t I . IIIIUS Vr-- dots, after the battle of the gist, eirsainfeeniled. It was then before the Board, admitted by the fatt est evideuee, that the euetny were in that enrage went defeated in every quarter, att.! that he at the close of the engagement proposed to Sir Harry Burrard to advance. It wits also iu their reciiiln bon. that hi: tinted his reasons for rec•oinineoilieg a perseverance in the plan of operstiorie whit Iv. had been commenced. Upon tho.,e points of dif ference which occurred between hit, nod Sir I lane Burrar.L . thesCourt would exercise its own judg ment. Yit though the decision of that Officer ate perfectly contrary to that which he (Sir Anhui) en tertained OH the Ilia of August. mut still eciiit limed to entertain, it did by no mean. follow, that the Con veutaei of Chine was not a ylistinable meafurv. It wits true, t h at subsequently to the 21.1, the acme of annoyance, between the BritOili and armies, and the onstaetes of the former in the object of the expeditiou, had y,a roil. Un ihe itst it was it trial of strenxi be tween both armies, which terminated in favour of His Majesty's arms. It was his opinion that the enemy would not hive risked another action, but waled have endeavoured to secure their retreat aerie.* the Tagul. lii the prover* °Swell a plan, they would Wive endeavoured to reach a formida ble positioa iu the front of Lisbon. for the per pose of facilitating their object. To contravene such an attempt, by possessing theiraetves of this po sitiou, subsequently, he recommended the advance of the British to Tones Vedras, on the evening of the it He had since no r , eons to doubt the expediency of that recommendation. Sir HARRY Buaaaao proceeded to examine Sir Arthur Wellesley as halloos :—• Question —He I not the British army the same means of advancing by Mufra, on the morning of the 43d, if Sir Hew Dalrymple had ordered them 'to march ? Answer--I do think that the army might hare mortified to Moira with as much fissility on the 23d, as I thought it might on thet Ist. There was this tliall'ences that on the 24. I believe, Mafia was swenpitil by a French. ersve r and there was none there on the 21st. 1 roust; also state to the Court,. that the object of the reilreh to Marra would, osie the eath have been *fatted ; because, us 1 have just informed theta. there was no chance of • bringing the French to another action. They weiukt- have acted, according to my opinion, OP bog*. as they did us Egypt. They tried thole . statenjah once in the fetid, and havin4 fatted,. they weold continue to retreat in Portugal. until they got into a place of safety. I do not believe that any corps wasilit have formed on •the.fianks of our march on the 23d, because no Frenelnueu remain ed in Torres Vedras on the Quettion—Wan the French corps. wench occu pied Matra on dae-t3d. i. tiae action of the it-t? Answer—That French curls molt have been in the action, midmost have retreated through Torres Nredras. The.whortest road from Torres Vedras tp Lisbon, and of course up the country, es uste4, through Mafra; but it is its my opinion entirely-• consistent with the lute:160o to cross the Tagus, and retreat up the country, to occupy all the pmts that were likely to impede the advance of the Bei. fish troops. Question—Earl Motet—Would the rwaseesinn of Torres Vedras, by the British army, on the 21st of Augtut, have prevented the French from reach ing, before them, the strong positions in front of Li-bon Answer—The occupation of Torres Vedras, on the evening of the 21st, weald have placed us on the shortest road, frost the po , ition of the two or.. niies, to Cahesa de Monte, and we should hove been in a situation. by a subsequent movement, to occu py not only Chastise. but the other positions in front of Lisbon, before the Frewh untold have reached/ them. The French, as 1 before explained. retreat• ed from all points of attack to the northward, ap parently with the iutentiou of failing in with the road from Ttwres Vedras to Lcrina, by which they had advanced to the attack. 1 conceiv..4l that when the action was over, the right of our army itj4 nearer to Torres Vedras than the enemy. and thei fore I should think the right of our army ‘....1h1 hare been at ..Torres Vedras before nil,. part 01 enemy could have re-ached that town au 'him ire vt. Question—Lieutenant-Gen. craucs—Had the army advanced at the time recommended by you on the gl•it, would not its right be murk nearer to Torres Vcitras than the corp 4 described by Gen. Srenc , .r to have formed to the northward, on the road to that position Answer —I should conceive that corps most have been on the ground, or at no very' g 'rut distance. on which (4eu. Spencer stated he saw it, shoot the time that 1 proposed to Sir Da. 111 Burrard to put sue the enemy, although pralsahly not fOrlieed• The right of the British anat. properly to called, was not attacked. T . ** attack was made on the right of the ceotre ; sod all the French treelv which attacked Generals Faitu'a sued .tattrotlier's retirud to the siovtuvrard, with the •t -ceptioo of possibly some auaLS detachment, ; of which, howl-enc. 1 saw none. This riGaisainativ:i 1.4% omeduJed, tits. A. ~t Il