The Statesman. — London, England, 1815-04-13 00:00:00

4 could, if it were doubted, bring witnesses to their Lordships' bar, who were at Fontainhleau at the time, to prove that Bonaparte was not in a situation so commanding as to entitle him to demand any thing like the terms which were elven him by this arrange ment. But suppose there had been some risk, and they had been forced to continue the struggle a little Integer ; w hen Con a — they expect to carry it on un cles! more favourable circumstances ? Why did they not expose themselves to a little further risk, looking at the great results that might be expected from some present sacrifice ?..---Was not that the policy of their Lnrdships ? Was it not the tory of their Lordships, of Parliament, and of the country ? But even in point of risk, the risk of continuing the contest a little longer was but small indeed, when compared with the risk of acceding to an arrangement like this. The allied troops in the neighbourhood amounted to 140,000 men. Bona parte was surrounded on all sides—all the positions on the Seine were in the power of the Allies—they had 30,000 cavalry, and the force which Bo n aparte had with him (lid not much exceed 20,000 men; and if it were rated at 30.000 men, it would certainly be rated very high. In addition to these advanteges, the Allies had that glorious and triumphant army in the South, under the command of one of whom it might be said that, high as his military talents were, they constituted in that situation the least of his merits, of one who by his probity, magnanimity, and wise conduct, endeared himself beyond measure to his army, and even to the people in the south of France. Never was a Commander more adored than he was by the people of the south of France during the period of his power in that country; never was a wise, brave, just, and beneficent Prince more endeared to his people than he was to those over whom circumstances had given him the temporary authority. With all these advantages, where was the necessity for such en arrangement ns this ? Look at the risk you ran by such arrangement ! Look at it, did he say?— feel it—they knew it. Could they he confident that to.umrrnw world not bring a declaration of war ? Notwithstanding the contemptuous manner in which the Noble Fial I treated the matter, he repeated, look at the risk of such an arrangement. Why did not Ministers send instructions to hint whom they em ployed on the Continent, firmly to contemplate the whole of the circumstances, and insist upon a proper securitv against the renewal of disturbance? They tad advantages which, if he might use that expres sion, it might be impossible to remount. They were in possession of Paris, supported by great and com manding armies,—and they had the Swedish army to reckon upon, if there had been occasion ; and above all, they had that glorious and triumphant army in the south of France. But notwithstanding all these advantages, they absolutely treated with Bonaparte as an independent Sovereign. The act of abdication was not a separate independent act ; it was con nected with the engagements then forming, and was taken as a concession on his part. lie maintained, that this was emit rary to every principle of policy:— there was no necessity for it ; and yet the engages meets were exactly of that description which enabled him with the greatest facility to escape, to return and become the instrument of fresh miseltlef and dis turbance. There was a radical defect in the whole proceeding : fit it prime* was wrong ; it was en tirely a work of supererogation; there was no neces sity for it; and without any thing to justify the ex posure of the tranquillity of Eureee to so great hazard, they conscsited to this arrangement, which was so likely to be the source of new mischief. He would be the last man in the world to blame any generosity that could he shown on such an occasion, consistent with the great object then to he attained— security for Europe against a renewal of the calami ties under which it had groaned so long. But this transaction did not at all proceed on a principle of generosity. There was no such thing in the papers; kind, indeed, t hey contained neither generosity, justice, nor policy. It would have been perfectly proper to have been as generous as was consistent with secu rity : but the great object ought to be, security against the return of that person to power. There might, perhaps, have been difficulties in drawing such an engagement ns would answer this purpose, without rendering the Bourbon cause by itself aground of war: but he was convinced the difficulty might have been got over. Well, the moment the change took place, the moment the great object of all this sinister precau tion had escaped, the Government was all abroad, I the world was all before them, they were obliged to run to Congress to know what was to be done in this new emergency. For the subsequent measures, he (Lord Wellesley) trusted some solid reason was to be given. lie had a high respect for the Bourbons, he had all the consideration that could be given to the fallen fortunes of honourable men, and above all for those of the head of that House whom, from his ' personal observation, lie felt every reason to honour; but he could not bring himself to think of going to war for the mere naked sake of the Boubons. He would now come to the articles:—one of them related to the crown jewels, and on this point be must ob se: ve, from the absurdity of the translation, how little a keowlelge of the French language was re quisite for diplomatic excellence.—[A laugh.]—The original was, 'roux les diamants collronne rPstanl ala Trance; daubtlea,. that the jewels were to belong to the monarchy. The translated ar ticle had it, however, that all the jewels were to remain in Fiance: a condition which, ,if lie was to believe in some of our late importations, we should find it hard to fulfil ; and the probability was, that if we were to have a Treaty with Bonaparte,• an attic!? would insinuate itself into it, that we should provide bine with a new crown. —[it laugh]—But there were more serious objections. Our pecuniary arrangement was the height and extreme of diplo matic improvidence. We had agreed to guarantee him the payment of monies, not for his own per 'mud support, but fur three or four separate purposes. There was thus, a sum for himself, a sum for his fa. mily, smother for his followers, and a fourth for the discharge of his debts. Observe the monstrous ins• providence of this. We were thus actually smooth* ing his way to the Crown of France; we were sup plying hjm with followers in France; and, by the payment of his debts, keeping up the liveliest re-* membraece of him among his late subjects. As to the payment, the Noble Lord (Liverpoo!) had ar gued, and he (Lord Wellesley) thought it a very poor argument, that the term fur the payoseut bad .1.-.1 THE STATESMAN. not come round, nod that, therefore, there was no the vigilance due from them to the general cause. He reason to complain,: but was there any indication : would trouble their Lordships no longer, hut merely giv'en of paving, though it .was then the eleventh ; move, as preparatory to a more serious enquiry, for ! month ? None. Ile believed his Noble Friend on an Address to the Prince Regent, for the Woolsack .would sctrKely be inclined to admit of ' I. Copies or Extracts., or Substance of any ito.trurtiong, much disposition for payment in any case before him which may have beea given by his Majesty's Goveimorot to under such circumstances. But this was not the any of his IllajeA‘'s Naval Commanders, respecting Napoleon B fact.: ,the. agreement was not merely for paying a cer onaparte, and the bland of Ema. tali ) sum of money:it the end Ora year', but it was 2 Copies or Evttarts, or Suh.tance of any Info rmation , to give two millions of francs on the great book, that which his Majesty's Government may have received, respect• . destan of Napoleon Bonaparte to escape trout the is, in the regular security of stock. On this he I sland the r • siand Elba, to'ether with the date of the reception of the might raise money in the mean time, and demand pe- i same. riodical payments. He would not now go further on i Lord LEV ERPOOL.—There was one singularity this subject. lie would not say that we had violated .in the speech of the Noble Lord (Wellesley), that the Treaty ; he was anxious not to pre judge any the House had not heard it before. It was rather a question of the right of war ; but the Noble Lord late period for his alarm. He (Lord W.) could (Castlereagh) at Paris had told the country, and it scarcely suppose the transaction on which the House was no slight proof of the attachment of the army, ; had been just indulged with his Lordship's obsei va. that those arrangements were chiefly looked to by the t tions to be new, and yet it seemed remarkable that military leaders for the satisfaction of their honour. they should now have heard them for the first time. What was the feeling that must then arise, and what ' The Treaty had been for a long period before the the danger of exciting that feeling with the army, by , public. lie (Lard Liverpool) should have thought the non-performance of our arrangements? It, of that nothing could have been more generally known, course, would not be said that this non-performance that every man who walked the streets of this town ) µas produced by a violation of the Treaty ; because, nay. of every town in Europe, should have been :c -if so, .shy not refuse to perform any part of it ? quainted with a Treaty which appeared in all their The virtual abolition of the whole might have been Gazettes. The Treaty had been before the world a pleaded on the same grounds. But the next article, whole twelvemonth, yet in that period the Noble the engagement respecting Parma and Placentia, was, Lord had not detected its danger, or had not let his if possible, more indefensible. Never was there one discovery escape. But perhaps it was the accession more contrary to principle, never was there one more of England to it that produced the danger. Even contrary to the principles on which we had entered this was known. And from the peculiar circum . into the war. There was a living heir of the Duchies stance of a mistake in a Noble Lord's (Castlereagh) of Parma and Placentia the Farnese, connected signature, even the very part which we took was with the House of Spain, connected with the Boer- known. If the Noble Lord knew all this, and bons themselves. This Prince had as good a right to thought of the danger before, and yet did not tell of it, his dominions as any of the restored Sovereigns ; the Noble Lord did not do his duty. [Hear, hear but for his own part, he could never recognize the The Noble Lord had attacked the whole policy of the ' right which had grown up with our Statesmen of the Allied Powers. It was easy to find objections after day , the right of doing justice to the strong at the the fact. It was not for him (Lord Liverpool) to expence of doing injustice to the weak.—[flear, put those Sovereigns on their defence before that I hear !]-1-le could not be brought to understand the House; bat let it be remembered what was their si. wisdom, or justice, or policy, of throwing at the Nation at the time. Were they to treat Bonaparte end of the war, the feebler Sovereigns into one com- as a prisoner, or a man at liberty ? There was ab mon stock of consolidated spoliation [Hear, hear !]; solutely no middle point. The great security would and from that drawing on the order of he knew not doubtless he the seizure of his person ; but then the what bankers, to order of the Emperor of Russia two advantage's were to be weighed on the other millions of souls, to order of anotherPotentatesomany lie was far from thinking the state of the v.ar so more, to another so many more. This, again, was doubtful as it hod seemed to that Noble Lord ; but not at least the policy of the illustrious man (Mr. it was indubitable that Bonaparte had still an army Pitt) in whose school he and the Noble Lord (Liver- with him ; there were besides the armies of Soult pool) were alike educated. In this war the rights and Suchet ; there was, too, an army in Italy that of Sovereigns were as much injured as those of sub- appeared perfectly firm to his cause, and which was , • jects. And for whom was the sacrifice of principle certainly superior in means to the force opposed to to be made ? It was in compliment to Austria, yet it. But this was not all ; was i t not to be rernem. Austria seemed to have no desire for the compliment. bered that he had besides all thp fortresses of 110 - But one of the great objections which pressed upon land, all those of France, all those of Italy, and a hint, whichever was he turned, was the subordinate large proportion of the chief in Germany ? Here a part which we had been induced to take. We ought false movement might have done incalculable title to have taken the lead—they had said no ; after all chief. It was not merely throwing the Allies back • our sacrifices, he must say that then all our expences, to the French froreier, butit was throwing hack the . and labours, and sacrifices had been thrown away.— chance of escape--it wits endangaring all that had 1 The urea question of all, was yet the one which ex- been gained by such gallant triumphant exer cited the least attention. The point was to guard the tions. The hazards were strong, and he at least person es ho was sent to Elba. All considerations sink would not pretend to that supereminent wisdom that ' before that : we made that sink before all. We gave at once might decide on running those hazards. Ho him the hirlependent sovereignty of the island. We would not venture to say, whether it would have there could not glmd him by our land force, nor, as been better to have followed, and fallen on, and a Noble Lord said in the Admiralty phrase, could we ci ushed this man, running the risks of the struggle, guard him by our naval police.—[d laugh.]—Thus we or, at all events, effecting it at the expence of a gav:. , him t :e feeling, the name, and the very means great effusion of blood, or to have done as' it was of returning to his former throne. The Noble Lord done. Ile was not even sure now, with all the had hinted at movements expected in France after events before him, whether he would not have done the long tumult of that country: but did he know the same thing over again. Suppose there had been that there had been actually internal division there a failure, suppose there had been even a great elfu before Bonaparte's retires ?—that the public mind ; sion of blood, what would not England, what would was excited,—that there were even thee com- not Europe havo said, when we might have saved it ? ing into shape, the four parties of the Jacobins who As to the place of residence, what was to be done, or had since appeared to take the lead, and who called what place could have been chosen, whether ill Eag. . C:emselves Liberates, from the Spanish phrase, the land,' Germany, or America, in which he could Constitutionalists, the Purchasers of New Property, have been secure, still on the supposition of his per and the Army? Or did the Noble Lord know, that son not being under restraint? There was no place that army was not to be confounded with any other, where he might not intrigue, no place from which lie that its nature was strongly different, that it had might not escape, still taking it for granted that his • ' flowed its a consequence even from the severity of the • person was not under restraint. The Governmerit of conscription, and that it was connected with all the this country never concealed from any body that they families of France? Habit had, however repulsive, could not be his guards, or rather his jailers, in the produced its effects in this instance as in others; the isle of Elba. The whole fleet of . .. England, lie would Conscription was looked on as almost a resource; and repeat it, could not keep him there; no, nor any he had beard from persons on the spot, that in many where else. After the war, the Mediterranean fleet • instances the return of the conscript on the late dis. had been ordered home ; there were only four sail of ° charges was actually felt as a burden by his family.— the line and some frigates left, and those were only But did not the Noble Lord know that there was waiting for some of oar garrisons there. The Noble . more than the simple mind ; that there was actually , Lord (Wellesl e y) wa s we l come to ma k e th e most o f insurrection digesting in France; and that, as they j this fact. The objection had been made that Elba were only looking out for a Chief, there were those was conveniently situated for keeping up an inter who might think the present one the fittest for their ' course with Italy, but none had been made against its purpose ? Bins we had given, and we had done our ; situation as to France : and as to his removal to Eng best to give him a good cause with his army and his land, though he (Lord L.) had by no means the idea people. On the next point :—it should seem that that his presence here could have worked any con when, by placing Bonaparte in Elba, we had placed sequences, yet what could prevent his carrying on a almost out of our reach the means of guarding him, correspondence with France, and escaping wile's he we should have made the most of what remained? but pleased, still recollecting, the freedom of his person ? this went like the rest. The Noble Lord declared, As to watching him in Elba, what could prevent his that the fleet of England could not watch Elba.— escape? IVe had not the right to search so cluch as When the momentous nature of the charge, when a fishing vessel ; the right of search was nterely a the danger of escape was felt, was not this difficulty belligerent right.—But even if a search were only the stronger claim on our vigilance? But no. to be made among those, it could not extend to an The Noble Lord seemed to have somehow got the armed vessel, unless, indeed, we had particular idea that affairs of state were things of ease. Ile grounds for suspicion. The question, after ail, came (Lord ‘Vellesley) believed them to be like other af- to this—were ne to treat him as a prisoner, or to fairs, in general a chain of diliiculties. The Noble allow him his personal freedom? As to treating Lord, however, judged differently ; lie found lie had with Bonaparte, the subject was not perfectly on stripped himself of the power to do much ; and then derstood when it was put on this single footing,—it drew the rapid conclusion, that he should do nothing. was also treating with his Officers. From the Papers What was done ? There was an understanding with on the table, it would appear, that the Provisional the Officer in command off the isle of Elba. That Government declared that this treaty would satisfy t o derst aiding was not, however, understood by that the Marshals ; and it was of no slight importance that I gallant Officer. One circumstance, curious enough, the Bourbons should come in, trot by the apparent I was to be tinted in this Treaty. England refused to , influence of the Allies, but by that of the French guarantee the Imperial title to Bonaparte, but she themselves. In evidence of this, the arrangement ; gave him her guarantee for all the rest. France had; had been signed by two of the most distinguished given no guaranty for the pecuniary engagement ; and I among the Marshals. As to the subsequent breach of he had understood, that, in point of fact, France ' this arrangement, he had looked over Donaperte's !:ad positively refused to pay. Ile found the whole Proclamations on his landing, and had not found a conduct of Ministers marked by the same features. ; single word in them complaining of that breach; Had they no information ? Had they heard no ru. I they talked only of cOliquest, and glory, and mours of the escape of Napoleon? Were not ru- I the restoration of the French dominion, but not one moors of that kind frequent in France and here ? syllable on the non-fulfilment of the Treaty. As to the He made, in those allusions, no reference to any I pecuniary stipulation, it still seemed a perfectly fair particular department of Government, not to any argument, that the' period agreed on for payment particular information that might have been lately be- not hewing arrived, the payment could not have yet fore the public ; but it was impossible to doubt that been demanded. But what ought to have been his such rumours had existed, and it was pot less impos- mode of redress if he had been injured ? Was he not Bible to believe that 5/inisters had even hem excited to have turned round to the Allies who had guaruu- teed the payment, and t tied whether it wouldb e withheld, before he complained ? Bat he had nut complained. Had one of the a rm) t h at went over to him stated this among their g r ie vances ? N one._ But he (Lord Lis erpool) kilo*, and cools! state from authority, that on a ces fain deinand of seine of this Allies, a pi opei ty was art u li) assi,real for th e payment of the deists incurred by that.- • reaty . Th e Noble Earl did rot admit the right to b a l ance any inconvenience whi ch • miglit arise frnm.ilsa-escal* of Bonaparte, against the consequences of a V io;atinn of the arrnis•ic, the at titles and conditions of whi c h we were bound by. The expediency or prop:iety of these articles and conditions, he should not eater into ; although, whenever an opportunity shorid occur, fie trusted he should be prepared to vituficate the principles of C.,' sego ciations ; and;%ab o v ea il if the Noble Lord ( Wellesley) supposed :Ministers not to have acted on the occasion alluded to upon toe principles of t: e great man who had been held up as a model, he could assure him that he was under a complete misapprehension. As to the Noble Lord's second motion of enquiry, whether information h a d 1e33 received by Government. respecti• g the &sip of Boriaparte's escape, he 'could say, th- - Grover& ment had received noise of such intention or desig n previous to their knowledge of ids Retort! -.rape. Th e Noble Alarquis had said, that the Noble Elrl had, on a former occasion, looked forward to t revival of war ow the Continent. What he said was, th a t after so great a convulsion, no prudent man could so divest himself of all idea of the chances of a re. vulsion, as to preclude the necessity of keeping the country in a state to meet all occurrences. in the interior of France he always admitted, that after ;he restoration of the Bourbons, there would be a considerable degree of discontent; many would be dissatisfied with the very state of peace ; hut he by no means believed there was that great body which there had beets asserted to be. He -did not subscribe to the opinion, that the numbers of military persons in France were greater than in any other country.-- In France, it was true, the military was the most, perhaps the only favoured profession ; and he ad. mitted that the army had considerable influence in it: Ice admitted also that there were other bodies of men there, who, from the part they took in the scenes of the Revolution, would be hostile to the Government of the Bourbons; but those were not the ronstitu. tionalists of France; their opinion, he believed, was the reverse of hostile to that Government. The-epis Ilion of that class of men were in favour of a free Government, and in abhorrence of Revolution; and they were not hostile to the French King, whose mild and wise policy had considerably conciliated them, and whose only chance of, and title to a flee Government, consisted in supporting the Govern. ment of the Bourbons. The question before the House was, whether, if any blame was imputable to the conduct of the Allies in April and May last, that blame consisted in any thing elst:than in not insisting upon the personal restraint of Bonaparte; and then came the question whether, under all the circum stances, it was worth while to insist upon such per. sonal restrait ? if it was not worth while to insist upois entire sestraint, there was no cootending for a shade between such entire restraint and the•liberty whi c h was granted him ; and the whole reasoning the Noble Lords, whom events hail made wise, a not being wise before, fell to the ground: The Marquis of LANSDOWN E.—Melancholy, indeed, was it to consider, that after the most Writ. ordinary successes of last year, no better . security could be obtained than that the Noble Earl had de. scribed. Ile had dwelt upon the relative,situation of Bonaparte after the Treaty of Fontaiubleau, and many of the circumstances which he Imputed:Co that person as a tower of strength, the Noble Marquis could not help considering as weakness- r for in stance, Soult's attachment to him ; but how was the Duke of Wellington situated with regard to Souk? Ile was superior in numbers, perhaps, and certainly in talents, to that considerable Com/nand& « then the garrisons in Germany were so many omelet weakness to Bonaparte; they were detached from him, incapable of giving him assistance: he had no force but that which was at 1 1 101Itainbletio when the treaty was made, which, - he believed, was correctly estimated at no. more than 20,000 Officers and men —many of whom %ere deserting every day—all his communications were cut cd—all his posts were oc cupied by the enemy ; and the number of the Al;:i consisted of 100,000 infantry and 30,000 catalry. tio much for the strong position of Bonaparte that moment!—The Noble Marquis allowed the pt rriety of great gecernsity to a fallen enemy ; taking the case ri:her way, first, in point 4) t f; ". nerosity to such an enemy; mid secritully, 89 it Noble. Earl C 1103: to put it, as n fair subject of r pldient7y—the security which was tht' great obj Pct t!0 treaty, did nut mean security quoad France, ti (pow/ the pet io:i of Bo;lavirte, against whom td the timifeitoes, the nil:a -Ce, and the treaty, i%e, directed ; and ali went upon the principle,. ti i r :e was the ;arson to be guarrled,Agniust. ‘Vhat ' mained, then, but ta tittcore hi: person, or to pli hirn is a place wh:re Le could have no iollueoce. Ilis choice of Elha chouhl. therefore. havel)een sated : himself and his femiiy might hive been p .. vide(' tor; but ► to aci :•oncessions it should Lai I"'" a condition, that the Place of his retiremei should not be so sit.uated a: to enablk: him to upon countries whero he had influence. Was that place? ►Vitere laro yGu placed the man whoa influence over France a nd Italy it was your object to destroy ?—between tho very two countries. His lluence so placed wa, grratovi.r France, but great . . _ over Italy, with all-his Italian means and popolai at his rlisimil. The Noble Eirl asked what 6 1 they possessed to interfere with any operation Boriaiorte's I If there were any doubt on the genre, it should him , lure matter of considersn with the Allies. They should have considered I fore the signitig of the treaty—" We think, that the Law of Natio•ts we cann , t interfere with B pa rte's rights as •overeigo (,f ther6 provide in I lie treaty api:) . st these laws." There no such concert, no Such tiet.-,ociation,—and if thrl was notte the Noble Earl had stilted, that 1i Engli.lt ship (supt. sing America to be included . ' the peace) would have a right to interfere Bonaparte. 'The Ent., of LIVERPOOL intery.ookt the NA) Martinis to corirct him : he Lad said, that if o.in" parte had been seen actually sailing from Eft', 116 would be e had not t: eta over t o ti one. .. — wild state a tf •totne of 11 , rtl for the sl ' 3 r). • The Plante any tf - escao o f . gi a vio;ation fi Is of which o rop•:i e t y o f not enter ty shotad o vitulicate hi hove•all, if on misters not vi upon Ute tt held up as at as under a el •ble Lord's ir nation had th tlte design GOVPril. Or design tl Th e •ta E trl h a d , t revival w,c, that roan could th es of a re. bt eiiping the if s. In the ht that after mild be a would be ri hut he by I" ( , ndy which th t subscribe 7 persons di ,ountry.— the most, end he ad. etice in it : to ies of men 11i e scenes of tr (averment Constitu- tit eyed, was di Tito-anis as r of a free ah 'lion; and ng, whose 3•1 et le to a flee da e Govern. Pr before the th putable to t last, that tit insisting pl ; and then th' he circum. • all such•per. be to insist the 'ding for a ba the•lthesty La asoning of be rise, they co jut elancholy, wt toot writ. tar r security •of rl had de. Fn 'tuition of fet dean, mid to edNo that gsr e Marquis wt 1- 7 -for in. the w was the gh to Souk? WI I certainly ou der « then ins mud of thi :hed from de he had no the when the to correctly sof and men h• y—all his he were oc sn - the Al 'in art I catalry, to aparte at brt d the pro. sot piny ; but of it of ge. tht y, 89 the as ct of e>.• tin • °Wet of pa ance, bra pit whom till thi aty, were be iple, fo What rer re r to rho lueoce.— to 'lutes ie. co been p•• , - an atild 1... re in etirement ye to rely mt %Vas fo art whot fot object IC to His in. Ii It greater tits opulariti tic hat rig:u be ration cf to on (let to i dere io3 en tiered be. be that bi lit th Bea' ve 'hereto, to 'here he I if the" IU that ot (hi :littler} if 'Yet fere wilt FI . ate, he. Nott't • ist if 1.3.'"" las Elba, • • vart.„