The Statesman. — London, England, 1809-10-11 00:00:00

,•• a country, the &taste of which is as fatal as that of Wa'diem's: It h true, that the English were fortunate! A Marls General, called Bruce, the shame of the military game y and whose head the nation must leave to fall ineoh the scaffold, even'. ated fort ihroregle an un,•semplified panic, six boars bof.,re the English arche4. Here then K , again behold the English _enjoying a good fortune upon iiich they could not rely : but these folks boasts events, perched ;with the ever incretsing dintinsati-n of the army, whither could they carry them ? TO burn the French squadron ? to effect this, it was necessary to take Antwerp. But in the French squadron being taken and burned, it remake to ho known whether inch an opera. tine was worth what it has emit, and whether it be very prudent to go'to ass expeetee of many men and of 40 or 50 milliuns, in order to ocea-ion one's enemy a loss of between 15 and 20 millions. But the ships at Antwerp could not be taken. They did not depend unsp tho occupation of Flushing, upon that of \lttcheren, Rot of any island ; they depended upon the Continent. It was necessary to take Antwerp. The English % who for this long time pass, have not travelled neon the Continent, consulted information cut. lected xis years ago, and imagined that Antwerp was still an oven town as it was when it was only a trading port ; they did not take into their calcu &Won the works of these latter years, especially those which .the Emperor has evoked to be raised, Once his journey to Antwerp. Upon establishing ▪ dock.yard in that town, he ordered its fortifica. (sous to be again raised; it is now surrounded with a bastioned ranipart. The ditch filled with water which covers this rampart, has been re. staked ; the left of the town is covered by an int. sense inundation, which removes the approaches upwards of 1500 fathoms ; the right is supported by the citadel, Which is a fine piece of fortifies. ; upon this front, several Works have been . illitablithed ; among others, a fine half-moon with eh eoenterscarp. Upon the left bank of the . e gd, there are no houses, hut the head of Flan. has been re-established, and its works are pr,dected by an inundation of 2009 fathoms in ex. tent. The English could not, therefore, take Antwerp without besieging it, without methodi. . sally opening the trenches, without working on through the inundations and marshes,. in short, without having invested the town ; and if they Seat invest it on both sides, they would require to hare two armies : Ist. One between the Head It Panders and the town of St. Nicholas, oppo. dye to Brawls and to the road of France; in deed, we know no General bold enough to take position with less than 80,000 infantry, and eight and 10,000 cavalry, since he must to withstand the army which should arrive lows France, and tho troops should stretch out *tram the head of Flanders, that is to say, the 'whole garrison of Antwerp, which in a combined Whisk, would sally out that side: 2d. On the aide of the town, the intestuscut could not rca. Manahly take place with an army of less than 410.000 men, having its-front a corps of observa tion, to keep in check the army of the Ddeke of Valet), assembled at 111sestricht, whisk would drew near Antwerp, and having aeoaker corps, towards Berte-on.Zoona againct dui Dutch. It w old, there fore, have been easier for Lord Chat ham to take Brussels, to march against Ghent, and to advance as far as Flanders, leasing Ant. wcrp and the French army behind him, titan to undertake to invest Antwerp and besiegt it. This much with regard to the land side. On the side of the river, the following are the Obstacles which must have stopped the English : Ist. Fort Frederic and Fort Demi, each mount. Aug fifteen 36-pounders; after these, Fort Lillo end the Fort of Liefkenshoek, each mounting sixty 36-pounders, and ten mortars; and be hind, * lino of eatOty gun.boats and pinnaces, lamenting two ktindlro424.pounders. Now, every geofibis man uhu knows that there is only a tilt. tines of 600 fathoms between Fort Lillo and the Fort of Lief kenshoek, which is opposite to it, ppeerrceives that this passage cannot be forced. With regard to Ire-ships, it is well known that fire-ships and infernal machines are ineffectual. The infernal machine which was let off at St. halo bad no effect ; these sort of explosions were never able to shake a rampart. An estacado bad been established, which secured our gun-boats from fire-ships. In fine, we had also ire-ships ; Witte** were &reedy in readiness, and we were go: lag to avail ourselves of the first favourable occa sloo to seed them against the English. Besides, to make use of firoahips, it would have keen ne. weary to approach within 500 fathoms of the town, since from Lillis to Antwerp the Scheldt stakes four elbows, which would have prevented fire•shiis (rein being directed from any greater distance. On the Ma side, In like manner, no success mould ND hoped for; but admitting that by the combination of the effects of the land and sea, Liqu and Lief kenshoek had bees carried, which sit: popes two regular sieges, the enemy would di. rectly after have met with three other barriers to be forced ; the Pearl Fort, Fort St. Phillip, and Fort St. Mary. All them forts are covered by Inundations, and each a them would have re. guired a separate siege. These different operations could nut have taken place without losing 40 days more; and 4uppiming that by the 20th of October the laud and pea forces had been able to approach within 11000 fathoms of Antwerp, they still re quired three tnenths more to take the town. With regard to the squadron, it was entirely shut up within the town, up sad down the river, protest. lug Antwerp, and protected by it. The taking of Autwerp was, therefore, a thing impossible f..r Lord Chatham, an operation much more diffi cult to be effected than the occupation of a qu-r., for of France. However, the following was the system of the French army ; (ruin the 15th of August three corps were formed. The Prince of Potoe Corso wa' at Antwerp n ith 30,000 men, national guards, regulaga, and Dutch troops. The Duke of Cor. negliano was at Ghent with the corps of the Head of bleeder, consisting of 25,000 men ; the Duke of Istria was at Lisle with 20,000 men. We should have let the English, had they se. THE STATESMAN. rionsly presented themselves, cross the channel of I3crgen.op.Zuum, stretch out beyond the inutsda tion of Lillo, and march against Antwerp . ; the Duke of Cornegliano woill.l have preceded to wards the Head of Flanders, and whilst the Eng lish would have been making their dispositions In iniest Antwerp from Fort Lillis to the citadel, t Prince of PunteCorvo and the Duke of Cerne.- Aeon, protected by the inundations ana by the immense works of the town, would have waited for them, and on the day agreed upon, would have stretched out upon the right ; aril then the English army would have terminated iih destinies : the Duke of Istria would during that time have proceeded to the Island of Catlsand. Ois the Ist of September, there were between Flinders apil Scheldt and Maestricht, the enty thousauil wren un. der arms. They were nut all regulars, but they were all commanded by men who had served; they were all volunteers, and consisted, for the most part, of hornier ander-officers, and former soldiers who had obtained their discharges, and who had run to arms on the first signal. Lord Chatham, therefore, charged himself with asenseless operation, and those, therefore, who projected it, chewed themselves to be as ignorant of the climate as of the localities. Lord Chatham saved the English army by determining to re-em. bark it ; but every day that he delays to execute this determination, heightens the misfortunes of and if he is culpable, it is not in having ordered the retreat, it is in having so long delayed to re-embark ; fur (luting this del ey, the English troops contract fresh diseases, and become infected with fresh seeds of destruction. Get it suffice to say that the Etnperur, when ho learned that an English army hid been landed upon that point, recommended that it should not be at. tacked, and that we .hould lea's the destruction of it to the diseases, which, in that .dangerous climate, most do the enemy more injury than the cannon, without its costing any thing to France. The English, in landing in Flanders, therefore, a thing contrary to the rules of Nar Ist, Because tl►ey took for the theatre of their operations a country so unwholesome, that they had to presume that a month's stay in it would de stroy their army ; that the country is covered with strong places, such as Flushing, I3crgen.op- Zoom, Baths, and ; and on the side of the island of Cadsand, the new Fort Napoleon, &c. &c. 2d. Because their principal object appeared to he to capture the sqloadron, they ought to have imagined that the squadron depended upon Ant. werp, and Antwerp was impregnable, tor its communications with France could nut be cut off, except by immense armies, against which the whole population of France would hate time to march. The result of all which is, that the English have been fur so many years shut out of the Continent,l that they are no longer acquainted with it. Every thing has changed, except their hatred against Frasee. With regard to the island of Walcheren, it Is said, that they mean to keep it. We should have, wily 'mime to applaud this resolution fur many reasons : Ist, The Ruglish, although they had 110,(XXI men in the Wood ..f Walcheren, could not prevent it from being attacked and re-taktm ; 2d, 10,000 Engli.h, exposed to the inivence of the climate, would eaperience so much loss, that it would be necessary to be continually reinforcing them ; that, us tite course of the year, 80,000 men Would as necessarily been ne victims to the climate, and it would cost them inure to guard the: marsh, than to preserve the East Indies—but it is probable that time would not be left fur them to suffer such losses. Tho channel between the two islands is so narrow, that bombs can reach from the one to the other. The twenty ships of the' line, and the flotilla which w e have in the Scheldt, would soon make ns masters of that river. It would not be forgotten, that four year. ago, and with our flotilla alone, we were masters of all the' coasts; can it be doubted, that we should soon be ,nasters of a closed see? and can it, at the same time, be supposed that the English would arte:rpt to keep Flushing without being masters of the Scheldt ? Besidca l a lutilla is too dangerous a war fur them. Such a war is nut carried un with boats alone, it is conducted with excellent troops, that is to soy, with means which do not allow the English any advantage over us. We well know that men exist who, although completely ignorant of the art of war, have, not. withstanding, the silly habit of taking and endea vouring to give coyotel to those who arc masters in it 1 Those people, yet more skilful than the public speaker who introduced the subject of the war before Hannibal ) tell you that the English, by preserving the island of Walcheren, will make it a second Gibraltar, or another Malta ; in fine, a commanding point which will render them masters of Flanders, of Holland, isc. Poor madmen they cannot perceive that If the English persist in keeping the island of Walcheren, that circnr . stance would be as advantageous for Ls as if they were embarrassed io the heart of Spain. Ingeneral, whenever an English army lands on the Continent, every real Frenchman ought to re. joke.—Such a contest is completely in our favour: a nation of three millions of men cannot meet man fur man a nation of forty millions. A new army, all the elements of which are in the navy, cannot keep the field against the veteran forces which have occupied two.thirds of Europe ; in tine, an army which can only arrive by sea, has neither ar. tillery, cavalry, nor equipages, at least it has a very great inferiority in all these means, and Lord Chatham really could not mount more than 2000 cavalry ; well, before 15 days were elapsed, the French effective cavalry, which were assembled on the Banks of the Scheldt, anissaisted to 4000 1 " When we nontomer relied, that the British troops are not led on by • Alai lboreach , or a Wolfe , or eveu a Welko. le", we mites'. thil even a the rententplasion of objects parelt national, anl eaessanected whit the fate of Amine, we see much wore ground of apprehessiaa than object of well founded hope." NOTE BY TUE Momirroa.—We here see what the spirit of party is capable of. It is a pity that Sir Arthur Wellesley had not the command instead of Lord Chatham. The . hitter saved the English army ; the other would probably have test it, as he has lust that which he commanded in Spain— where he hail the imprudence to entangle himself with 30,000 men, without reflecting that he thus es posed his left wing to the different corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia, of Elcitingen, and of Tre viso, why had 70,000 men under arms. Ile has, it is true, drawn himself out of this critical situa tion, by a precipitate flight, sad by abandyning his hospitals, his wounaled, his horses, and a part of his equipages. It was thus that Gen. .here, _in his ridiculous expedition, in the month of Nu. 'ember last, fled from Benevento to Corunna, Ibandoning his allies, his horses, his ammunition, end his equipage. •Neither the one nor the other i - of these Generals has displayed that foresight, which is a characteristic so essential in war, and which prompts to do only what can be supported, and to undertake only w hat presents the greatest number of chances of success. Sir Arthbr Wel lesley lies not evinced more talent than the tnen" who direct the Cabinet of St. James's. To wish to support Spain against France, and to contend upon the Continent with France, is forming au enterprise which will cost dear to those who have undertaken it, and who will meet in it only disasters. Conflagrations, it is true, may be kept up—misfortunes may be brought on peace able inhabitants—risers of blood may fl iw—the people, the protectors of whoa) they call them selves, may be ruined—but any other results arc impossible. BR ITISU OPERATIONS IN SOAIN. The Monileur of September 28, contains the follooing observations, in the form of notes, on The London Gazette of Saturday, td of Septum. ber, contaiiiiiig the dispatches frooi Lurd Wel. litigtoo, datedleytosa.—On the paragraph " When I catered Spain, I bad a eamainttientiaa with Ge *rat Guests, through She Robert Wilson and Colonel Roche, warning the occupation of the l'aeno de Banos, And the Paerto de Perairs."—( London G'gssite.) We wish Lord Wellington to command the English armies; with his character he win suff-r some great catastrophe. It appears that he has neither spies nor any accurate information, which is astonishing, in a country where England has so many partizans. "I preferred In go from thinking that the British triwps were mmt likely to do the bwiario e:rectuAlly," &C.--ttiondvn Gaseire. ) NOTE Or THE MONITVIR.—WC are willing to believe that thew dispositions were made; for we see in one of his dispatches, that ho thought he had only todo with 10 or 12,000 h'renc•h; audit was possible that he might march, with 20,000 men, against a corps, which, in his op;nion, con. sisted only of 10 or 12,000 ; but he should have gained better information on his march, and he would have learned that this corps of 12,000 rn-vi amovinteil to 70,000. He had his retreat cut off, and was too fortunate to be able to throw himself, in order to escape, into impracticable toads._._ General WelleAry is inexcusable for not having known that the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia, Elchingen, and Treviso, amoitoted to 70,000 men ; and fur having thought that he could cover his left flank against this formidable army, by leaving two battalions at Puerto (Jane.... What ignorance " 1 acknowledge thst these reason; did not appear to me tattieiest for giving up so importaat a pat falavera.."- -( London (:ette.) Nova otr TIIE Mosittevo...-General Cuesta did right to leave Talavera ; if he had delayed, he would have been lust. Ho did wrong to leave two divisions and 40 pieces of artillery un the Tagus; he lust them : and this post, which was the rear guard, was a post of honour. General Wellesley ought to have occupied it. It is scknowledril in war, that an advanced guard, or a rear-guard, according to the operations. is the post most im portant to defend. But General Wellesley had taken the lead; and, acccording to the laudable practice of his elation, had left to his allies the post of danger. " The enemy, stated to be 30,000 strong, but at all events comiNting of tape carps of Snub sad Nev."—( Undue Gas.) Nova or TILE NIONITtIIa....We see, that even at the time %heti he wrote, the English General did nut know the force of the French. He speaks only of the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia and Elchingen, and appears to have no keowledge of the corps of the Duke of Treviso, twenty-Gee battalions strong, and which, since their entrance into have not been inferior to the best troops in Europe. If Lord Wellesley frequently commits similar errors in war, he talky one day pay dearly for them. " We had reason to expect the advance of Victor's corps to Talavera, as soon a: Gen. (*siesta's march 'Louie he known; and after heavier 12,U,A) wen to watch Ventrat.. and altnwhlA from 10 to 11,000 kdled !Old 14 &ended in the actius, this corps would have antouoted to `. 4 4,ooo."—(Lesulea Gaseite.) NOTE or THIII Moxeratia..--This is a bingular calculation which Lord Wellesley makes of the first and fourth corps, and the reserve. The first corps is composed of 36 battalions, the (Loath of 30; the reserve of 20 battalions, and the cavoiry, of 40 squadrons. Lord Wellesley had therefore around him 170 battalions, and 80 yr 90 aqua. drams, and he expeeted to conquer Madrid with 20,000 Men ! We do not speak of the Spaniards ; they may be reckoned as of consequence for plain daring Isolated persons, or for defending them selves behind a wall ; but very little necolint can be mad,: them hi a regular battle, as the Eng. lish may have been convinced. If Lord Welles. Icy had had, besides his 20,000 men, the whole army of Lord Chatham, a hich • went to bury it self in the marshes of the Isle of Waleheren, he could have derived nothing from his expedition but disgrace, confusion, and defeat. If the Eng. lish mean to dispute Spain with France, they must land an army, if not equal to the French army, at least two.thirds as strong, that is to say, of at least 150,000 men, for the Spaniards cannot be reckoned for more than one-third in a regular battle. Nothing can be more advantageous to France than to have the English engage in land. wen; for then, instead of conquering England by sea, we shall conquer her on the Continent. Such a con. test chews to admiration what those are who direct the Cabinet of Landon. Tlkeosistncles advised the Athenians to abandon their citadel'', and take range on board their ships. t is to be wished that the British Cabinet may peg'. rist, as it has begun, in the plsn of deserting i 3 ships and throning itself on tho Continent. W e have predicted the higiniiiati.in of En„lantl, and peace, before a ye.tr el .rses. Before a year shall bar,. etpired, the Engli4 i , whatever efforts they may mike, will be driven out of the Peninsula, and the imeerial eagle will Ay on the fortress of Lisbon. We had re.oro to expect, that, a. the Marg.'', Reyna would oat remove Ow ho at Irmo t e rit%•r A mnt”e, Y lett would have dewored them. Oer only retreat therefore, by toe bridge of Are° Bawl; :aid if Is , . 1..n1 r. I, I on, the ~lnv, by bresthiag that triage, the ;u p, should h e pain e d with Soot! a d Nev. Rawl' ti•r 4, 0 4 ‘41 to of It'at roily resource. b% r.uld not lake p wo mb d i Ortspettn. as ire thereby left open the en 41 to t h ldip. nt Arzo Mops, from Tabisera, hy Calera ; and after roomer. the oh .le:othtect :lintel-oy, em o I f ooi r w i tont it as l a n tmahle to retire to the bridg •of z I !;•-p AIM to; its up a defensivr position upon the (Lvottott Geurte.) NOTE or vile Meerreus.... We 'lt id not con. tietie these Not 5..-it would be an ins dt to our readers. The falsehond of tie meat of Lord Wellesley stint be evident to every CONCl.osloa....i.oted Weilegt y, without know. ing the force of the enemy ‘sith w hum he had to contend, without being furnished with that n hick constitutes an army, ailvaiiced to Talevera. The idea of entering Madrid tensed his brain. He took the French army (or an army of tiepoys. lie arrived at Talavera ss ilh 25 or 26,000 men. He was there joined by 80,000 slid, with these two armies united, he int •nileil to penetrate to Madrid. The Duke of Dellents manceevred skilfully to draw him on, aeil termed a junction with the fourth corps and the reserve, and, with the King at their.heatl, marched against the enemy. The Duke of Dalmatia, with still mire consider.. able forces than those of the King, marched upon their rear. Lord Wellesley could not extricate himself but by beating, separately, the two senile*. The first and fourth corps preseeted him with an opportunity, since they attacked, without waiting for the three corps commanded by the Dike of Dalmatia. The English fought well ; the battle of Talavera was doubtful ; though the loss of the English was much more considerable than ours, for the French artillery was more numerous. It appears that, by a series of mtiltiplied faults, the French could not take the position on the left; but the English were beaten back every time they attempted to advance epee the French. %Viten the 70,000 men commanded by the. D Ike of Dal matia. were at Plasencia, Lord Wellesley believed there were nut more than ten thousand men there, and formed the most ridiculous combinations. He perceived, however, the fully of his calculations, his extreme imprudence, and was sufficiently for_ tunate to escape into Portugal with his infantry. What would have been the case, if, manoeuvring according to the principlts of war, the French armythad not given battle until all united ? Lord Wellesley says, that the want of the means of conveyance prevented him (ruin marching to Ma drid. What would have been the consequence, if he had marched to Madrid, and the Doke of Dal. matia had placed hi iiself between liim and the Tagus ? Ile wneld have come with his army to France. lie has cierificed brave men through presumption, and iviorance of (hat of which a General ought nit to lie ignorant._ _ _ Thi s eapedition gre.itly resembles that of Gen. Mo o re it, the 'with ref November last. But Ge neral Moore was more pru.leut, and sated himself sootier; and though ho aulfertxl enormous losses, the half of his ar py returned to Englsnd, without their baggage, ke. Like General Moore, Gene ral Wellesley ahatidoned his hospitals, kis bag.. gage, his artillery, and arrived in Portugal a kit the half of his army. At this motneut he has out 18,000 men under arms, out of the .20,00() winds kft the ports of E•iglan,l. RETURN OF THE ELPEDITION FROM THE " We have more than once warned the public oin to I • ton 'Angular relative to the iveut. tif the espeditimi to tne. Scheldt. As soon its that c peJ i lea sailed, we omerveil that the change which had taken piaci! im the Danube, by the ar mistice, so precipitdtely conctud..4l b our ally. could net pro duce any consi.lerahlc effect lin the operations a that e peril tiont and that (;overoment, though it did ant tbinl lit to sehandon that enterprise. entirel., teas still tar from entertain ing any great hopes of its ulteilor ft:ludo." NOTE. OF Till MONITEUIL...-What a wretched excuse! What is there in comm.'', between the af. fairs of the Danube and those of the Expedition to Walcheren Would it not be imagined that France had occasion for her army, which is at Vi. enna, to defend her against the English 1 The Eng. lish Expedition has failed because it was evrasa. gent—it would also Inve failed hid the French been beaten at Wagra;n ; nay, in thtt caw, it would have been the more sure to fail, because a disaster would have rettoibled the energy of the French in the interior; it would have attempted such an operation in a month, and a cli. mate in winch half the army must be swept on' by disease. Had It been undertaken in the inonih of May, there had been one importint chance less against its success, because then no spprehensio need be entertained of disease. The Cabinet of - St. James's, by rending an army to Watcheren, the month of August, has followed a line of ion. duct very ditierent from that which would be per. sued by the most ignorant Captain in the English navy, who would beware of laying hands an a ship, were she even laden with nil the wealth of India, if she were infected by any contagious dis ease: new, the unhealthiness of the nier , hes of Walcheree is as dangeruns to an army as the pes. titmice itself. It was nut the armistice of Zisaim that had ant influence on the English expetti %nu ; csporieticts has long since proved, that nut of a hatt.illon of 1000 men, resident two m•iiiths in f hit island, SOO are in the hospitals befur;" the end of the second mouth. It was a mad expedition, because Flashing ()tight not to be taken •Ithout a long siege carried on amidst inundations; hi:cause, after the fall of Flushing, it would be necessary to procmd to Bats, Bergen-up. Zoom, and Li I in 'order to arrive, after a delay of three nwnths and threa sieges, before a place so strong as Antwerp ; be cause those who planned it must have beep igno. rant that the fourth battalions of all the regimentS of the army which remain in ?ranee We wards of 100,04.4 iota; that inn national gouda