The Statesman. — London, England, 1815-04-08 00:00:00

mac... dress, should confine himself to a few remarks. if this were indeed the day to consider the Treaty— that loose and unguarded 'l'reatyt whose negligent stipulations hart %astral the advantages of the cows try. and produced the events which they all had now to depinre—he should not be content with the few observetione to which he-wes now inclined to restrain itimielf. Re hoped that Treaty, however, would soon come into discussion by which our pest state of security was apparently ruined, and we were now forced to the painful alternative described bythe No ble Lord—that of expensive armament or dangerous and doubtful war. He would then ask why, to the gallant °hirers commanding in the immediate vicinity of the mint interesting point, no regular instruct- I tiotts were given ; why to the officer at that point 1 there was no other guide than an understanding ?. Those were but a part of the enquiries which - it was impossible to avoid making, but • which he would now reserve. Ile agreed that now there was a ne, cessity fur prompt and manly eesolastiun ; that the question was not now to be the niae"of the danger, but the made of averting it. That it tOnuld not be becoiniug them as men, and still lessee Englishmen, to pause when the question was of general security.' lie entirely approved of the temperate language of the Message, and iii this no mil could suppose that be was offering on opinion on the fitness of plunging into hostilities. He confessed that he felt all those events as they came crowding on each other with great regret ; all knew how eagerly lie had atatici ',fated the return of peace, the return to those re. ttenchnients which peace brought, the return to the principles of the liritish Constitution. Now, the prospect was changed—other forms of policy were necessary ; he gave his hearty concurrence to the proposition of placing ourselves in a state of grilled defence— [Hear, hearq—a painful and severe necese sity, but still one front which we could not withdraw.. He approved of the Address in its ot!ser feature of acting in concert with the. Allies. There was no other rood to safety than a sincere, honourable, and Cot concert with the Continental Powers. if his voice was to be heard without the walls of the liticce—if lie could hope that it might pass the li mits of the cour;try, he would wish it to be pro claimed as the sea se of the British Parliament, that this concert wa, essential to all chance of success, that it most be a concert strictly for the general in terests of all. that there should be no straying in search of private objects. He would desire to im press it uprn Sovereigns and nations, that the cause of the French successes was in the want of that con cert ; that those disunited and partial interests sent the enemy to trample from one corner of Europe to. another; and that they never knew safety or victory till they had learned the misfortune of making war on the true principles of national combination.— [Hew !]-11... approved of the Address as directed to those two points ; but lie was not pledged, the lloese.must nut be pledged, to the support of war, till the evidence was laid fairly before them. Till then he must reserve Ms opinion. The Noble Lott/ haul called it au European cause. Move than Eng lish, it was in truth an European, but it was there. fore an English cause.—[Grist of liar!)-8e would again insist upon cancer: as the only hopes of safely. Marquis NV Ei.l.nfiLEY.—Whatever the regret of the present moment, whatever the doubt for the fu ture, it mist he owned we cnu!d not look upon it turning to the animating view of the past. That view was indeed most cheering and exciting. The country at length showed her resources, her native viper, her noble resolution, her mighty and almost inexhaustible means • she had saved heiself, she had awakened Europe, she had secured for herself a new and glorious triumph; all this. was done by Eng land, and he must hope that all this was not done in vain. The events of that war had given us a new courage. At this moment we were g iving an evidence of it. We were deliberating beore we plunged again into that doubtful and stern extremity. We were not berrying into it with the rash blindness that betsiyrd cowardice, but prepared to calmly weigh wild ,didolly 'sambas t! e wisdom and necessity of proteetteg to the extremity of war. Here he should stop the declaration of his opinions, but for the extiaiienus sentiments into which, the Noble Lord opposite (Liverpool) had wandered. That Noble Lord had said, that after twenty. years of change, of elm' moral revolution, it was scarce- ! ly to be expected that the world would quietly sub-1 side into peace ; but who could have supposed ! 1 that such a convulsion would have been so allowed, that the great advantages put into the hands of the Allies e oulcl have been so Mown away, that the world, after having teen saved by our exam. pie, should have been lust by our example ?---He spoke of Congress ; it was a tissue of conduct lead. lug to direct confusion. What man that looked I upon it , . discussion could expect a propitious result. Ile made no objection to the Treaty of Paris, it might be quite right and expedient ; but from that, all went astray. There were two great systems adapted to the time, either of which might have been 1410%141 with a fortunate event. One was, to cir cuiestrilie France widths her ancient limits, but then the same measure should be dealt to all. The other was, to change the limits of the Allied Powers, but then the same measure must be applied to France.— Why was this left undone—why was neither system adopted—why Ka, a meagre middle policy put in act that only combined the bad of both ?—Why was the scale of crime in States Ftl irregularly graduated —why were some punished because they had se rrated fits., and others because they had seceded last ?-- Why had we required Franca to retire within her serietit limits, while we allowed others to ag grendize themselves, and moll the first ourselves ? The consequence was natural—the French people f.lt themselves degraded. Thera was not a man in France who did not appeal to this degradation. It was ono of the great arguments of Napoleon to the reach, that they w ere th us d egra d e d b y L ou i s .— t saying all this, he did no t h es i ta t e t o say , t h at as butt been sufficient contravention of the Trea ties of Paris and Ponlainbleau to authorize our making war . Thus far coi n ciding with the N o bl e Lord (Liverpool), here he must stop. lie was told that the lien-payment of Napuleon's pension was no breach of the contract, as it was only to be paid by the year ' • but was it ititetidNl to be paid ? Didthe Noble Lord say that,, while Napoleon bad not yet received any provision for his support ?-13ut what i THE STATESMAN. consideration.- A premature statement of it could be productive only of embarrassments, because the in ference that must necessarily be drawn was, that you would act upon it if you could, and that if you did not, you bad only given to the world a confession of your own weakness. — [ H ear, hear!] —[t was, he considered, singularly injudicious to introduce into st motion for an Address, in the propriety of which alt parties acquiesced, a discussion of prin ciples perhaps doubtful, but with respect to which it was at present utterly unnecessary for them to decide. As the question, however, had been introduced, and he wished that as little doubt as possible should now I exist respecting it, he would state, in a few words, his own view upon that subject. In his judgment, the Noble Lord had choseu the worst ground he could have selected, on which to establish a right of war, when he pleaded the violation of the Treaty of Fontainbleau. Whether or not the stipulations of that treaty hod been broken, and by whom, it was impossible to ascertain without mitch fuller inform,. tion. The some remark might be applied lo the Treaty of Paris and the first Convention or Fon tainbleau, all of which might he regarded as dif. ferent parts of one and the same important trans action. Bonaparte had, however, been removed from his authority by means of these engagements, and it was inconsequence of his abdication that we had felt ourselves justified in entering into the relation of peace with the country he had governed. A new Government had been established, on which we de clared we could rely with security (we now see what security) for a continuance of peace, and that we would not therefore insist on those conditions which we should have otherwise deemed indispensable. = If that state of things, then, on which we placed this reliance was now altered, the party which had con sented to terms only in contemplation of its con tinuance, was absolved from his obligations, and might revert to the same system and principles which he had previously observed, as essential to his own security. Ile found this opinion fully supported by a passage ia Vuttel, importing that whenever an ad vantage was communicated by Treaty to any Power, it was to be considered as permanent, and not limited I to the life of the Priuce on whom it was conferred, unless conceded purely and unreservedly as matter of personal favour. But it was not a matter of per sonal favour to Louis XVIII. but in the spirit of li beral policy to the Sovereign of a great country, that we had released France from the conditions which we should in different circumstances have judged it expedient to impose. With the cessation of his ex ercise of sovereignty, therefore, ceased the motives which led us to agree to terms of peace otherwise in admissible. The right of war was still only half made out, till the exercise of the right was shown to be necessary to our security. He knew the general principle was, that Treaties between States were not only abrogated by a change in their internal Govern ment ;hut this was a principle which he held to de. pend upon circumstances, and he did not think It ap plied to the particular circumstances of the Ease be fore them. He conceived that this country possessed at present a ground for claims, which might, if sound ' policy required it, be justly prosecuted by arms.— Agreeing, then, in the sentiments so eloquently en , ferced by his NAM Friend, that the Message from the Throne was highly proper and necesary, that an intimate union and concert amongs t all the Members of the late Confederacy was essential to !ia. safety of ' each, and that there was no hope but in the dismissal of all interested Counsels, and ; real adherence to the magnanimous professions of their public declara tions, he not only did not objoct to, but cordially op roved of the Address moved for by the Noble Earl. He trusted, that if war should at length appear tn. avoidable, art opportunity would be afforded to Par. liameat, of offering their advice previous to the adoption of any violent measures. Towards the re lish of that calamity, if it should be found impossible to avert it, he looked not with apprehension, but deep sense of the difficulties and perils it involved ; and should cherish to the last the hope, that it would be found consiftent with our honour, and our se. curity, to perserve inviolate the ;pace which had so lately been concluded.—[ /leer, hear!] The question was then put, and carried nem. die. and the Address was ordered to be presented by such Peers as are of his Majesty's must Jlon. Privy Council.—Adjourned. became of the other stipulations, what became of Parma, e hat of the provision for his son ?—Was it prudent or wise to give the semblance of justice to liii cause ?--Aud this went directly to give him that semblance; it gave it to him above all in the eyes of the soldiery ; and slight as it might seem to us, it was difficult to say what its strength might be its their eyes and the eyes of France. The Noble Lord had spoken of Napoleon as of a man treating with arms in his hand, with something of the place and station of independent sovereignty about him. It was at least true, that he had been on the point of being' Isuccessful, and that the event .of his fall turned on, perhaps, 0110 of the doubtful and fortuitous chalices Ithat ever decided a crisis of such magnitude. But if he had those feelings of remaining dignity; if he had but laid down the arms which he might have re , Wised, if there was still the spirit of sovereignty so Imuch upon him, was he not then a more natural and fitting object of vigilance ?—Why was not a stronger precaution exercised upon his person, or why was I not the Treaty more punctually performed ? ! All this- must have further elucidation. He hoped the day was not distant, when that No ble Lord (Liverpool) would fulfil his promise of , bringing down the papers explanatory of the facts of the whole singular transaction. But whether that Noble Lord would be able to satisfy the House or not, he mast hope that time lesson would not be lost j for the ftiture upon the Allies, that they would re consider the circumstances in which they were placed, and that they would feel on stronger grounds, and with a purer and more vigorous spirit, the necessity of concert in all that they were henceforth to be summoned to do. There were the observations which the speech of the Noble Lord (Liverpool) forced from him; he should conclude them by hoping j that the great opportunity .was not yet lost, that the I memory of the last war was not thrown away, that i by our resources now understood, and by that firm i concert with the Allies of which we had before sew the glorious results, we should be enabled still to , endure the struggle, if that were to be our destiny. 1 But whether that extremity was to be undergone or j not, he could hare no question as to the other pro ; minent feature of time Address: he was decidedly for . strengthening the arm of Government, and giving all lof vigour and weight that was to be found in a wise and manly preparation. 1 Earl GREY expressed his concurrence in most of the observations which he heard delivered upon this, question ; and although there were one or two points f r om which he was. compelled to differ, he had listened to the greater part of the discuulon ' with the highest satisfaction. He agreed with the opinion of the Noble Earl (Liverpool) that at the • period of the Treaty of Pads, it was natural to op-1 prebend, that after so many years of war and con.; vulsion, Europe would not suddenly or instantly : subside into perfect tranquillity : but whilst he ad ; mitted the probability of further dissensions and of future struggles, he must still lament with his Noble Friend (Marquis Wellesley) that the nreaseres which WI Wen pursued, so far from settling those agitne !lons, or curing the evils that threatened a renewal of warfare on the Continent, had tehrbed only to accelerate that calamity. It was painful to observe, 1 that as far as the information of which they m ere in possession enabled then" to judge, there had existed danger of an immediate war among the Powers as sembled to complete the work of peace, and that such was the spirit of disunion and jealie..:sy which prevailed, as to afford too much reason to believe that hostilities would have ultimately become an '. avoidable.—[/least, hear g —Even the mild and be. neficent character of the Sovereign who recently sat 1 On the throne of France, would not, he feared, have been long able to protect the people blessed by his paternal sway, from the consequences of a renewed contest between the different States of Europe.— What, thee, could have induced any set oL men en. trusted with such high duties, to put to hatard, and wantonly to sacrifice the best interests of the world, but the most unpardonable negligence, or a degree of ignorance disgraceful in their situation ? • The Noble Lord had told them that it was the intention of the Allies, and of his Majesty's Government, that the peace should be honourable to France. How clearly was it shown, then, that Ministers were in. adequate to the accomplishment of their own views, : when it was stated, and he believed correctly stated by the Noble Marquis, that there existed causes of !discontent in France, which disposed the people of HOWE OF COMMONS. that country to view the family of Bourbon as the I Mr. FINLAY moved the second rending of the Scotch Union instrument of their degradation ? Upon this ground , Canal Bill. alone, be trusted, his Majesty's Ministers wou ld b e : Mr . W. DUSDAS moved an amendment, that it should be read on that day six mon t h s. called to a severe account. The Noble Lord had ; After some observations from Mr. MA.IORIBANKS against at length entered into au explanation of the dream- the Bill , , ii tT d d e t a 'rom Lord A. HAMILTON its support of it, the stances attending the Treaty of Fontainbleau, trod it 1 ous ;ur the second reading 5 .) 1 Against it 83 I Majority 33 Iwas now confessed, that great advantages had been Lord CASTLEREAGH bronght op several papers relative tiVhe Trees df Ennininhleaa and .irered to lie on derived by the Allies from the removal of the pre table.ati His Lordship also brought up Paris the --t Pa capers relative to sent Ruler of France, and it was not therefore true , n e m,, that he owed his life merely to their generosity. But ; Mr. WHITBREAD concluded, that those were the whole of n w b b e i:i i b er th i e he l y ir t z s e lm re d d i t7 h ( e iv i ed oiri f i . u tr se ; c ti r w e niiii he seen, in proportiou as the interests of the allied cause had - . ehP e w b•oriever, gained by his abdication, was it incumbent on There masa paper which he intended 10 loose for yesterday, the Declaration of the 19th of the Powers in question to observe the strictest )bat h ad forgottenie it b . he i rr; good faith in the execution of the engagements that h w is . Majesty's AL:ass e alors. lii)ew%evro6urd attended it. The Noble Lord had said that there paper, ns the Noble Lord, perhaps. would inform the Ilau,e Mould have been no violation of treaties on the whether it was genuine and authentic. Lord casTl,Eit EACH hail on iliflicolty in coasideriog the part of the Allies, because Bonaparte had di ' Declaration authentic. nod arguitig upon it as such, He would, ' claimed any such ground of complaint. With alt Itawever, Produce it, if the Hell. lielltir111:111 thought proper to due deference to the Noble Lord, this was nut a! w hl e fI P ir tASONBY wished r. I a to know, whether the Nibble Lord sufficient answer, lie had, however, seen in the . had any collection to produce the Declaration published b) the public Prints, a copy of a Proclamation issuer, in l'Allie" the rapture of the uegociations at Chatillon. f liseltd CAST4LERE A Gil did not rourei v e that :to y p u bli c i n - Bonaparte's name, soon a fte r hi s l an di ng on thlt isalktuce would melt fom producing th at pap e r: French territory, in which it was asserted, that the DiESSE•GE FROM Till; 11F.61 2 .Y.C. ' Treaty of Fontairthleau bad been viideted in all its Lerd CASTIA li ttr:AG moved the order of the 1 parts, both as it affected himself, his Empress, and - day far taking into consideration his Rapti Highness his son.—[llear, hear !]—lle trusted, for the pre.; the Prince Regent's most gracious Message. sent, that, whenever this subject should be Wrestle l . The Message was then read by the SpeakergroundsH gated, some grime of defence would be laid by Lo r d CASTLEREAG rose, and declared that, i. his. Majesty's Miaisters, more solid and satisfactory rift dtrecting the attention of the House to the question than the weak and pitiful subterfuges to which the f,.. new before it, he never in any period of his life felt' Noble Lord had that day had recourse to colour and • more deeply impressed with th e importance of the qualify the fact, that no t one farthing had ever been ( consideration, naisitig not of the gte tt events that had remitted to Bonaparte, during his residence in Elba. Yletel , taken place in France: It would now be his %Vitt' respect to our right of ear, in the present in.; let 4e endeav o ur to call flub attention of the House stance, he should make one or two obse r vati ons , but ;these events, in such a manner a s • s h ou ld remove must, in the first place, exp r ess his reg r et, th a t this i . every kind of misconception that m i g ht h are pre question of right, It el been so prematurely brought .i mailed respecting them. In a ll th e c i h irts made by into discussion. It swat not a ma r k o f meet, eisdorne, the Allied Powers during the late war at.,‘..tiost Fri ore, to enter on the declaration of a right of this otature,lthey had not flattered themselves that they should he at a time when • they were net premed to net ittis . able •to deliver the wand from all the dangers with mediately upon it. The loesiioa of exercising OKI "thigh it bad been threatened. They hail hoped, sight ; supposin it to Ma t was ono for alterlyel lower, that if they should not be able to restore the ancient system of Europe to that equitable lance on which it had long subsisted, yet that o. ' should be able to bring about suck a political sysie, as should place the different nations of Europ e /1 comparative safety. Whatever diffe rences of opinio n . might have prevailed between him and Gentlemen n „ the opposite side of the House at former times, e. to; the changes that had taken place, there was e general understanding existing between them, that o u r of every thing which hail been dune there was likely t o arise such a state of Europe as would serve to keep up the different Powers in a cenditiOn in which thee should be capable of supporting amicable relations with each other ; and that the world was again like. ly to be . governed by a solid and secure system e s policy, instead of being oppressed by an over -wets, ing military authority, that threatened to ingtos ai d annihilate every State of Europe in one extensive (111! 1 of despotism. No one who seriously thought on thi s subject could refrain from asking, whether the event that lately took place in France was to overturn the labours of the last 20 years? Whether the pres et , sions of a military chieftain, founded solely on the attachment of nn army, were to be admitted? This chieftain, and the army which now supported him, found a system of peace to lie wholly inconsistent with their views and incompatible with their interests, . they therefore effected a system ss hich did not originate with, the mass of the French people, hut one which , was forced upon the people by an army that could not endure a state of peace. If this system went on, it would its time inflict upod Europe all the call. mities from which it was lately understood to have , escaped; unless endeavours were made to bring about that salutary kind of system in which the mill ' tary should become subservient to the civil power.—. The nations of Europe must either assume a predo. minant military character themselves, or they mast submit to that system in France which now menaced them all with its re-creation. After the ardeous struggle in which they had been so long engaged, after a war of twenty-three years carried on against the most formidable Power that ever existed in the world, the Powers of Europe would act with injuv. tice to themselves if they suffered that Power to re. viva in the form in which it already existed. lie felt the deliberation to which Parliament was now called, to be the most awful which the imagination coeld conceive; and he should be guilty of a dereliction of his duty, if he omitted to state all the circumstances accompanying it : he was not, however, as yet, pre• pared to submit the question to the House in all its bearings, and, therefore, forthe present, it must be narrowed to those points to which the House shoed be called on to give a decision. The Message which had just been read, informed the House, that events had taken place in France in contravention to exist. ing treaties. Those events constituted in themselves a justifiable cause of war against France, if his Ma. jesty's Government and that of the Allied Sovereigns should think that coarse ad v i sa bl e . N o one cola I doubt but that a state of things like this, necessarily called on the Executive G (averment to adopt some pro• ceediugs or other; bet whetheretay measures should be subsequently taken in concert-with the Allies of this I country, must be a question of ulterior consideration. The House could not wish or ripest at this moment I that the nature or extent of such a co-operation should become a subject of diecussion. Nothing could be more inconsistent with the energy of the Crown, nothing could be- more inconsist. ent with the duties 'as well as the privlttiges of Parliament, than that the Parliament should inter fere with a question which rested in the Crown, end assume a responsibility which belonged only to the Government, and which could only be exercised when the transactions to which it referred arrived at a certain stage. Jt was necessary then that the House should narrow its *pinion at the present ma ment to the simple statement contained in the Ws sage. Events had occurred which were likely to disturb the general tranquillity of Europe; and the moment these events were knew'', it was impossible for the British Government to avoid increasing es armaments. We should be prepared to take pre , cautionary measures until the causes and COO. derations carne to be discussed. Ile Wiiherit ja the best place, to submit such considerations 0 should serve to remove many erroneous impree sions that had gone abroad respecting the trestle , that had been contravened. A general impression had gone abroad, that the Treaty of Fontainblem was most improvident; that the Allies bad entered into it hastily, unadvisedly, and with false memo of generosity and forbearance. He had himself discessed this very question with many persons, and the impression he alwass urged was this, that the , Allies had gratuitously, and in the excess of their generosity, granted to Bonaparte a great Wel. gence, which he has since abused. He had obtained an asylum iu the Isle of Elba, with a sovereigief over the place, and liberty to retain his Imperial title; and his Lordship was confident he should be able to satisfy the Mouse that Bonaparte, in coo• tempt of all treaties whi c h h e h a d e n tered into, is his disregard of ev er y i n d u l gence ex t en ded to him, in his ambition an d hi s art ogance , lie disregarded engagements, th a t h e was no t con t ro lled In a l - }' thing except the went o f means t o curr y his perfidious plan into erect. He boldly raised fOr himself a ix destal on which he took his station, with I blew of subjugating all mankind, and he boldly and impiously declared, that be would raise himself to rape. It was impious to break through the solemn eugsr °lent into which he had entered. 11 . 1e'n Sig" in g this engagement, he declared lie would net shed a drop of French blood, awl afterwards cattle with au of rued force, prepared to stir u p a o n, war, and seized upon the throne which hit had At/' dicated ! Was it possible that ary Power coned ever rignin safely enter into an engagement *eh a man who had acted in tint way ? It had awn said, that a gratuitous and general sacrifice had been most imprudently made to Bonaparte-- For his own part, lie never deprecates! *IA had beet, done to him by those Powers came with their victorious armies to the gat" '" Paris. But if the conduct observed towards him 0 0 too generous, the only feeling which could rcpt 1 " the breasts of the British people was, it Ot a fer l . ll -1 " , regret, but a consciousness that the Mile., had ecteJ on great moral principles, and in a miellierwhilli tnust cause their character to stand h igh l ts th ti _ world. If there had been an error in ruloptine conduct, it was en error on the side of magnatettli's, • . ' C owl th thi