The Statesman. — London, England, 1815-04-29 00:00:00

lir ) ...t?•' - : 1.. 1r,,,.__ lents as this man, who had ',reified us all out of our senses, would, perhaps, be as obnoxious, and one of these might, perhaps, be selected to succeed Bona parte. There was Marshal Ney, whom the Declara tion of Louis XVIII. very improvidently called the second object of hate to Bonaparte. Supposing Bo naparte to fall, and his dynasty to become extinct, did it follow that the French would choose the Bour bons? Of ill the houses in Europe they had the least chance - Of again-succeeding to.the Throne of France ; and if all the intelligent part of mankind were poll ed, there would he more votes against the policy of their succeeding than in favour of it.—Utlo,sto! from the illinisters).—Those who say no, would, perhips, vote the other way ; and they were so used to majo rities, that they could not suppoie themselves in the minority : but there were many who cheered Minis: turs in the House, who maititained a very diffeteut opinion out of its walls ; and there was nothing so' ditlerent as the language of Members on the steps of the lobbies, and their language when on the Ministe. rial benches : but he would not be shaken in his as sertion. The restorati of the Bourbons would slot' be the necessary consequence of eves, successful war : we might fight France again into that bloody repub lic, which we declared incapable of being treated with then, and whom we proscribed, as we have done • Bonaparte, as one with whom no negociation could be entered into. That farce was acted formerly, till at length we entered into two negociations wish the • Republic, both of which failed of success. Ile en treated the House to pause before they plu ng ed into a war of mere'speculation , in order to affor d time to decide whether it was not better to wait for the chance of peace. True, we had a right to consider ourselves in a state of war by the Treaty of Paris, .hut there was a difference between having and exer cising a right : and there was nobody mail enough to say, that because we hat:a right we should exercise it by way of establishing it. By the, preamble of the Treaty of Paris we learnt that the restoration of the Beu.bons enabled us to give better terms to France than if she were still governed by Bonaparte : but I we had never been told what terms would have been imposed on Bonaparte which had not on Louis. Ile had been told, indeed, that larger terms had been before rejected by Bonaparte ; that he once proposed to us pence with terms of larger territory, and cir cumstances of more glory to France than Louis re ceived ; and this proposal being accepted by Lord Castlereagh on behalf of the British nation, Bona- parte changed his mind, and would not abide by them. There was still another material document signed at Vienna, but which, not having been ratified, was not yet laid before the House : he alluded to the Treaty 1 of Congress. lie maintained that the right of going to war with France rested solely on the Declaration contained in the Treaty of Paris, that better terms were given heg when accepting of the Bourbon fa. mily, than if she had continued under the dominion of Bonaparte. The Allies had only to say, there fore, let France place herself in that state of restrict. ed limits as to territory which we thought necessary to our safety, while France was under her present Chief, and we will stiffer the peace to continue. No' such proposal was' made by them. On the contrary it had been acknowledged, that Ministers had re.,, eeisetl an overture from the French Government, though no answer had been returned, and it was ; merely communicated to our Allies. Whether the Allies had taken it into consideration, or whether they had thrown it aside into one of their waste-pa per trunks, he knew not ; but certain it was, the overture had received no answer from Ministers. He would ask whether, fifteen months ago, when this man was in much greater power (for now he looked upon him as inferior in power), there was any body who would not have jumped at a Treaty which would have given France her present limits? Would it not hare been universally said, that any Minister was insane who would not have advised the accept ance of such a peace? Since this mass was at the head of the Government, had there been any act of aggression by France ? Was she fitting out any ar mament that threatened the security of this country ? Ilad she made any irruption into the territory of her neighbours ? You would have made peace with Bona parte when his power was greater than now, when • he was much more formidable; and would you stow refuse to remain at pence with him, when his acts at least had been better ? Of motives he would not speak ; it would best become every man to look into his own ; a good act might have a good motive, or it might have a mixed motive; but when he j sn w a bad act, he %eas sure it could have but one.; The principle, then, on which the justice of going to war rested being so extremely narrow, he would beg leave to seggest the consideration, whether the ' blessings of peace were not deserving of being main tained, before thin fatal blow was struck, and it was too late to recede. Ile believed that whatever might • have been the fetilirtz when Bonaparte first landed at Carnes, the fervour for war had very much abated.— When Bonaparte first landed, he was talked of by the courtiers about the Bourbon Family as a monster and a villain, who would not fail to be hanged; but in the whole of his march to Paris, and for the pur pose of his restoration, not one drop of blood had been shed; and now, when he appeared firmly seated were we to open the flood-gates of blood and slough- ' ; ter, and say that no peace was to be held with him ? Where were the financial means, he would ask, for carrying on this colossal warfare? Was Russia, or Austria, or Prussia, in such a financial situation that any one of them could rely on its own resources?— The fact was, they were all of them in a state ap proeching to complete exhaustion, and must be retie- rated by supplies from this country. What, then, was the situation of our own finances? On this, point it was sufficient to state, that no matt, however sanguine his views, could say that the Contest could ' be a long one without their total ruin. Then it! s h ou ld be well considered what was the probability of the Allies continuing united for any length of' time. In the new Treaty of Vienna, there was a refer ence to the Treaty of Chaumont, in which he under stood it was stipulated, that the Allies should main tain a defensive league for 20 years. This might be'very twbper ; but let the House look back to the l ast 20 years, and see the political changes which has, taken place; that those Powers we now acted with had not long since been partners to the hostile eicrusion Of our commerce from the Continent; and that all the Powers in the progress of the contest would each bare his own particular interest to serve. ~ 1 Y THE STATESMAN. Even supposing, also, that the event was as success- struction was such a meaning imputable to it as the proper feelings, the war must be with France. and fel as the most sanguine could hope, and that• the Honourable Gentleman attached, and theta gave as it would be for Europe to contend for its own liberty Allies were again able- to march their armlet under little countenance to assassination as many speeches and safety. He could conceive that Fra nce , „ eel tip walls of Paris, o hat would be thegosnter*ltiey Relied heard from the Hon. Gentleman in that House. out with revolutions, might prefer eubmissi me to L‘ri Winn most likely maintain the‘Glevernm s eat the lbw- But, to return to the subject more immediately be- usurper, rather than make a moral effort i n h er owe posed by their confederated arms, and the mint fore them, he would state, that if the lioweegorehe behalf, and that when ,he had restored his army she might be fatal to-The lihertietieof mankind. •it rifeits -Conirnent remitted that their safety was best to be would still submit ; but Europe was .not t o borer now, however, obvious that She Allies could not commeitedaby ions, they. bedeome to this conviction France to choose her own field of action. s e„,,, e Prussia, and all Germany, &c., were not to b e ' take Bonaparte by surprise, because they could net -from* consideration of the dangers.with.which they posed . again to plunder and devastation. It ex. f ee h e t oFtrheenicrh profitsar army was not p,sfs4iin4l take Fiance by a coup-de-main. • Hebad been !gm- mem - Individually' threatened. They had not been was right t_in such .... an event to make the sest—of•esse in tiering various means of defence; the - white flag na Iginided on by. inctlentirds fronalhis country ; for the where waved in any part of France ; and the intern - course pursued V s /441104nm had i beets f eather t t h o at en o! . t F h rr wcoerlhderasesalfc.to End If they thought it their right to di d . rill perate Manifesto of the Allies must have consolidated suggesting the difficulties ' they were likely the strength of that country in his favour. Every counter. Indeed, if the Continent did not feel that advancement. . , . day the chances of success became weaker, and his war was their true interest, it would have been the turb Europe, she•oeght to teach those.wbo•nere pi means of resistance stronger. On all these grounds most unwise policy to urge them into it , as such a ; fond of war, that they were not to have it exactly al he moved " An Address to the Prince Regent, pray- coalitian could only be kept together by a feeling of j they wishedit, but as Europe should ch oose ;,._ big that he would be pleased to take such measures sacred interest. Ministers had no hesitation in say- llt was unjust to suppose that the All" Powers as might be necessary to prevent this country from ing, that if the sentiments of the Continental Powers I wanted war. The history of the times 'since th e being involved in war, on the ground that the exe- , remained determined as to war, then they were pre. I French revolutjon, showed the dangers arising franc cutire power of France was vested in the hands of pared to engage in their support ; but if circum- I a confidence in the pacific professions of Boas, any particular person." • I stances subsequent to the:Declaration had led them' parte, who weakly imagined themselves t o b e Sir M. W. RIDLEY • seconded the motion. It to hesitate, and material differences of position had safe by the policy of peaceful relations with hie. was an indisputable principle, that every nation had taken place, Ministers were perfectly desirous • that —[(lean, hear !]—lt was only by a deg,; tore from la right to choose its Sovereign, and that House should these considerations should be taken into account.— that infatuated system of the-'Hon. Member's, theta be the last place where such a principle was denied,. At the time when the treaty was signed at Vieuna, union was effected among the States, instead of par. las it was to its exercise that we owed the privileges !it was known that Ney had acted the part of a suing private individual interests, and bet ra‘ i ng one Iwe possessed. Ile really believed, however unpleee grafter, and that littledependence could be placed another; and the world could not show at, instance sent it might he to think so, that Bonaparte's Gomm, on the army at Melun ; but it was not known that of equal moderation to that displayed by the alliance. • ment was founded on the affections of the Friona' the King would be obliged to retire from his coital. The Honourable Member spoke in the spirit of de. people; and he was afraid that the personal feelings I Hence the Allies were called upon to see a character . lunation of the Attie!, and lowering the characte r o f of animosity with which that man was regarded, iof greater difficulty and danger in the events which the Government of his own country. Wh en he was were in danger of banishing the better judgment of ! had occurred. Something had been said of the little charged with his mission to Fronce, whateve r d anger I the House and of the country. He should not give dependence that was to be placed on coalitions ; but, , might be apprehended from the negociations, h e ki t way to these feelings, but consider as deliberately as as far as he had an opportunity of examining the it a duty that ail conditions should be bone fide main. he could the grounds of national policy on which the j principles on which the Allies acted, he was enabled twined. The negociations in France proceeded on th e j House ought to proceed. lie hoped that Ministers jto declare that their sense of the greatness of the priuciples of the Declaration at Frankfort; an d i t would show, that an alternativeof peace still existed. ; danger to which they were exposed had only 'added was an object to show, that if there was h a d f a i t h , Ile agreed, that from past experience we had little !to their sober conviction that they could. not take the fault would lie with Fl-ance. If the Fre nc h now ' reason to trust the promises of Bonaparte; but if the ; the benefit of peace in the present circumstances of submitted to Bonaparte, it was not from thei r own new French Constitution was carried into effect, he was! Europe. The present circumstances had a character general desire, but from the desire and power of th e likely to be less able to interfere with the inte interests 1 morepeculiar than any thing presented in history, soldiery, It by no means followed that the Alli es of this or other countries. Before the House launch- ;by that flagrant breach of treaty which ha 4 deprived were to treat with him ROW, merely because thiy h a d ed into a boundless expenditure, it became them to j Europe of all the advantages she expected from.the treated with him before his act of abdicati on . A reflect upon the financial situation of the country.— I peace which had been concluded. The return of this Treaty-might have - been'etstmftrehed With hint b e t ween They had that night heard the declaration of the man to France, in defiance of all- enetieentents, was Chatillon anti Park ; .biathe withdrew his own pro- Chancellor of the Exchequer for Ireland, that tax- lan insult, as well as an injury to all parties s and. position within. three days, ow theasvent" of thea'ery ation had reached its limits, and that no other tax I exceeded whatever was done by precedini.GOVerpe first slight success whiclittettvetienced. The Alli es but what he had proposed was likely to produce any meats of France, however base and degraded:. pits 'inadene proposition njoy . ,eteatotumble than the Treaty thing. This was a most serious consideration, and • mats glorified himself on the perpetration of MS tigite of e Paris. It was said, that Bonaparte offerekmors favourable terms, whiik were refined. . That i nas not for tis and other reasons he should support the mo- I faith. Resentment was not, indeed, to commit 1 . : . e • Hon with the view of protecting the country from , another nation to all the consequences of war . ; but the case. Though his Minister propoetetsuch terms, what he considered au unjust , unjustifiable , • d the character of Bonaparte in those transactionsle oithdrew s therg. -W,baletieeetemes•hed•beeemede an un- 9 necessary war. marked in distinct and legible terms . : The HQn. we cou ld not haveadenitted Benaparte's Ambassador i Lord CASTLEREAGH said, that in any obser- Member had never thought Bonaparte's character a at the Congress as to the:settlement of Europe. A vations he had to make, he should certainly confine I matter of great importance; but take his previous , great advantage was gained - o r Femme, 'under the himself within as narrow limits as possible. After i conduct, and couple it with the present circumstauces, change of Government, iu.the.safety of admitting her • the conduct which the Hon. Gentleman had pursued, and a complete case was made out against any reli- Minister-to Congress. The Allies do make 'artifices he could nut, certainly feel su r p r ised at such a mo- ^ since upon him, and which 'reduced the question for a general. Peace. Whether io adversity or is tion as the present, even from him ; but he should merely to that of poster. We were fully entitled to prosperity, ht -uaparteenever neglected Sini"Step to feel surprised if the Honourable Gentleman succeed. presume that lie would only preserve peace till the ; gratify his views of ambition ; no step .was ever left ed in inducing the house to vote in support of it.- occasion suited him to violate it, when we had with by him to seek after something unpossessed ; nothing What must be the effect of the success of suet' a mo- i other nations reduced our 'expellees, while he con- l with him wig ever fixed except a constant attempt to tion in fettering the hands of the Executive Govetneltinned his labours to augment his military farce.— aggrandisomentreVieflatisifvertilitdie wog :Shelled, . • : ment, and on the general system of our policy as It I Were it supposed that this new Constitution would . the same thiagsmust happen. lie would only changebil : regatded - our Allies ? It was impossible, he conedve be any stolicisteet controul ? How many Coultituelmeens,..in larder to recover what he hail*** het • ed, for any man to concur in the Address, who had lions had France already received in the course of al Bonapirte's character, was peculiar to himself ;lad not made up his mind on the question, whether ear few years ? if Constitutions on paper could oon e Ihe knew ,circumstances of his conduct niarked by security was to be looked to its immediate war, or I trout Bonaparte, he would be the most inoffensive o f 1 systematical bad faith, and of mitichte bad euflicient in an armed state of nominal peace, and who was persons alive. The party in France with whom he I evidence. He had .air Intercepted' instruction front not prepared to approve that nominal peace, which at present connected. himself did not entertain sea-1 Bonaparte to his . Minister, which was to have been must lie attended with an expenditure nearly as great i tlments in general in comedies - . with him, and ,he : destroyedin certain cases, which from accident it ass as war. Such a person Must also be convinced, that i viewed them only as instruments•by which he could I not so done. It disclosed a- 'system of via, me in the present critical circumstance, it would be wise re-assemble his formerly victorious bands, who were, paralleled in the transactiens.of the civilized world. to adopt a course at variance with our Allies. Sure ! still thirsting for plunder and spoliation. Did anyj It was dated March the 19th, when the discussions he was, that no Hon. Member could think it wise for I body think that when he again got at the head of I were not closed, and when he was undertaking a the Government to depart from the pledges it had ! 400,000 troops he would find any objection or dile ; hazardous military operation, and which might be given, unless the safety of the world was to be sougltO ficulty to disposing of his present counsellers, ; fatal to him, when he moved from Arcis-sur-Atrhe.— for its separating the interests of this country from • whether Fouche or Lucien Bonaparte, if they op.! Bonaparte thought his success problematical, and gave those of the Continent. He was not surprised at I posed his views ? What did he say to Monsieur ! new instructions in favour of concessions. The ire the Hon. Gentleman's looking as he did to what he ; Leine, who was at the head of some assembly structions were in the form of a secret letter, signed called peace, rather than to the means of permanent or other? He told him after his return from by the Duke of Hassan°, addressed to Caulincourt. e 1 and ultimate security. He was not surprised at tee Russia, that they talked about what they did not, There had been many instances of breaches of fleece gloomy picture which the Hon. Gentleman Itid understand, that they might pi about their business, ; ciations. The Minister of Bonaparte Was desired to drawn, when he recollected his prophecies on former:jehat he was born fur his situation, and that the.' conclude a 'Treaty, but to keep ha c k c er tain parts as occasions ; but it was at least reasonable to add, that nishei of the French had made him their Emper or .] long as he could, the executien of them being to be ir the House had been unfortueateiy so illsedeineeli e ft had been said that he was now a changed man,.! delayed, notwithstanding any ratifications, so that as to listen to his advice, and to these predictioast e !! and that since his return he was determined only on., an unfair advantage might be afterwards taken of the prospects even of an armed peace would have the conciliation of all Powers, Great Britain among.; them. This was a circueneteince contrary to Min i been very -different from those which the coup the rest; and as a proof of this, he had taken a mea- : perience in such matters. There was expresseda now enjoyed, and we should have left in the hands' sure on one subject which particularly proved his : deliberate intention to ratify and subsequently to re -lof the enemy most extensive and fertile districts, !conciliatory views as they regarded the opinions or ; fuse compliance with the Tetesey ; A nd whet were ' whose independence was most closely connected with I I Great Britain ; but this measure he had previously 1 •those points on which this baa faith Was " to • tarn?— the interests of this country. Neither would the ; opposed, and bald he would he the last to agree to, Why, they were What Bonaparte coiled the Ores Powers of the Continent have been left in that state : even for the honour of France. These opinions great keys of the French empire ; and which sufficient of strength and vigour which they now fortunately I were not idle dreams as to what would be his cor. :'ly showed what his objects were. The first of these presented, and which left at their disposal the alter- duct if his career were suffered to proceed to any I keys was Antwerp, which might be called the key native of peace or war. [Hear!] lie wished great extent. What grounds were there for trusting' of England; the second key was 'Mesoz, which shortly to advert to the consideration, whether the •to his keeping the peace that were consistent with was in fact the key of Gerineny ; and the 0 44 : conduct of Government had been constitutionally j ethe views and expectations of the perjured French key, which was to he, kept back eve's after the correct. Parliament in their Address of the 7th *army ? His present situation might be called a re- ratification, *at Alessandria, which was in fact nut ' inst. had given no pledge as to the policy whether of election ; but it was the effort of a large.scorrupted the key gf France, but the key of Italy. What war or peace. The only pledge they had given was, army, tired of peace, dissatisfied with half-pay, un- - better proufe• could he given of the nature of that the arm of the Executive Governme o tsho u ld be . easy under the beesevoleut and • pacific sway of man ? It was clear he would break the Treaty i• fortified both by sea and land ; bat it in no way ex- Louis Milt., which was ho nour ed by th e res p ec t soon as.suited Nee Was it, thee, unimportant 1 0 e' pressed, whether the security of the country would 'of the other winces. The prospects of the soldiery that this man wits placed iu power or not ? In veer, be best sbught by active warfare or by a defensive were to revel again in the plunder of other countries, he would probably sobs pour a military deluge oser system ; so that the House could stilt ex e r c i s e its and to gain military promotion through war : they the world. Disclaiming the notion of making tsar controlling authority. But the Hon. Gent. thought thought only of rising above their respective g r ad es . against an individual, yet there might be as muc h that his Majesty's Ministers were guilty of a breach 'Weed, if he did not shape his coudu,ct a c c o rdi ng t o on the point of character as km the case of a dispute d lof duty unless they declared their opinions as to • their *loos of promotion and pillage, he was lik e ly territory or a disputed succession. Might not ° those preparatory measures which Parliament had to meet the contempt of the army, and to become Powers of Europe protest against the power of ' authorised, and the results to which they might lead. ' odious to them. The Noble Lord sincerely believed individual, whose character wouldnot apply to any The principles on which Ministers had acted were this must be his course. With such a person the of the mural or social reiati o ns of life?—This We these—that if there was a doubt as to the course to : question might surely arise, whether the greater was more than what was necesearity adequate 1 " be pursued, then that line - of policy should have the danger was in actual contest, or in slumbering over defence of ei common interest in a common war. — preference which the Powers of the Continent, as i dangers speedily to be apprehended. Instead of the The Allies did not proceed on any impracticable or being first exposed to the danger, should deem it 1 Continental Powers being now found in th e reduced wild ;lotion ; told if tney stood fai r ly by each otheretl° best to adopt ; and if they resolved on war, then ; state of peace which was their desire, they were yet country.would has:' no, ceuse to complain. They were that would be a reason for our embarking in their lin military strength : and they had a just claim on united to support the arrangements which had bee^ support, rather than separating our interests from the French nation, who were, strictly and morally framed by the Treaty of Peace, of which Bffl' 3. theii's.—Ministers were perfectly willing to al- speaking, parties to the Peace of Pads. Never was parte', abdication was a part. ' The Hon. alembeCt low our Allies . the full benefit of a deliberate re- . a nation, under such circumstances , treated so well; object seemed to be to find fault with Minister'. lie view of all the circumstances of the case. To il- 1 never was the garb of conquerors so stripped off, and ; conjured the House to consider' what might be thee'' lustrate this, he should advert to the chr ono t o - such an endeavour to appear r ath e r as allies th an ' teaser an Addresi.such as had been proposed. . I '"? .e ' gy of the whole •of the transactions .-- When f o es. Those wh o sa w P ar i s a t th a t ti me , m i g ht h av e ! who had concluded the peace must be quite as vs' . the Allies issued their declaration of the 13th seen that foreign interests a n d gl or y s ee med forgot- I cerely disposed to preserve it as the Hon. Ile °lle. ' of Mardi, it was directed against an individual, who, ten for the sake of France. The other P o w er s had By passing such an Addrees, France could only be , in breach of the most solemn engagements, was in. uow a distinct right to call on the F re nch people to luded into the notion of an impression on the P e ° starling France, and whom they conceived as far attend to the Treaty, which was founded on the ex- : of England different from that of the Condole. — from being likely at that time to exercise the chief elusion of Bonaparte. If, however, the French! With respect to the pecuniary support of our Alliee authority in that country. lie differed from the people were so Infatuated as to lend themselves to , a distinct proposition at no very distant Jay *ea . ,: Hon. Gentleman as to the character of that Declare- the views of-Bonaparte, and betome a 'party to so Ibe submitted on that subject,. which would not ,_ tion ; and when the time for discussing it arrived, he gross a breach and fraud, then he must s ay, it was I found such as to•give an undue facility to war t h roo , should be prepared to show that upon no fair con. an unfortunate case : but if France were so dead to our m 'ails. He trusted he should soon smelt' .' 1.1 evil os I wok W► ultcli pled $lll O Fu 0; iPpf far l'oli f-nm At as iare u as is- X V ;oed of ort. yeti ?go. bleu tl to 'jot s IS ) tie eine( hat of of Nlll ex- any a s; tll re- ere Too ! Celli nree tint Pllt. dun heie in 1 key ai a Filch nou hird the A (la Opp hat tort the nos v ai Nlt he will - er. dor met wit loft ocl Srei ited tha the 1114 II lie any Cri tort tea to: All Avi e or 14 it tbit Sirs, reit ieee gel ,0•• Wp let's to He Mn Ho 104 lha si to Ire* Jr ki • 11) e the (Int ie.• clu la 4 t tErl