The National Register. — London, England, 1813-08-01 00:00:00

• 77 r - , •••• 91 t . lf o r ' I •' • 7 . • v.. Airowore... • EGISTER. ME NATIONAL Cur Mug, Conotitution, anti tato. PUBLISHED AT O. 11, NEWCASTLE•STREET, STRAND. • No. 292. The fate of the Armistice is now ascertained. It has been Teneixed for another month, and the long-announced Con gress i-. at last . appointed and assembling at Prague. It is even asserted that an English • inister, escorted by a French guard of lionoUr..is • ou his way tLrough France to the beat of ot,?;ori nion The A os.eric ambassador, and the -envoy -from 'he gnanish Cortes, who were to attend the discussions Sir an universal peace. are, however not yet mentioned,*but the mones of the Russian, Prussian, French, .and Austrian plempotentiaries are given, and •it is probable that the journey of P.C"NADOTTE to the head quarters of the Em peior Of RUcCI A, is' connected with his accession to the ongress. The late angry aspect of the North, has softened FA . , a acific smile, wig it be the harbinger of a secure and :eace . .Circuptstances have so greatly changed since' we-c nimented on the possibility of reducing, by a treaty, the.. powr France, and chaining the ambition.of her chief, tha , ear opinion has also under gone some alteration.. The brililant pr-spect that ,has since opened in the West, was th..-1 still Irid in the womb of futurity. The Spanish Cam pal:n was scarcely opened, and NAPOL EON, in possession of Madrid and one-half of the Peninsula on the one side, and on the whet - , successfully repelling the 4orthein'Allies across the Elbe, seemed to be regaining too much power by war, and too likely to encreasc Ins new advantages,. not to make it advisable to check him midway in his career, by a treaty guaranteed by every European nation, and therefore less exposed to infraction. Ile Lad put forth too much, strength at the beginning of the campaign, not to cause doubt and alarm, and the Allies conceived that only two ways existed of removing the dangers which the revival of his military force portended : either to overpower him by superior numbers, superior skill, and superior exertions, or to stop his immediate progress by an Armistice, anti, by the speedy con clusion of a treaty, prevent him from carrying his extensive preparations into effect, and make him lay down his arms, before one half of the immeose numbers whom he had called to the field, had.become soldiers. The first, they would most willingly have adopted, but on comparing their means with the greatness of the enterprise, they found that they were not equal to it. The' second, was rendered in some degree advantageous by their own situation, and easy of attainment, by the enemy's wish to extricate himself from the difficul ties into which his tash advance bad once more plunged him, and which had induced him to propose an armistice. They resolved to' acrOpt it, but only in part, as a temporary expe dient whiCh would supply -them - with increased resources for war, and not as a road to peace, which they contemplated V. No. CUM. SUNDAY, AUGUST], 1813. with disgust and apprehension. They relied; wimps, too firmly on their own stability of principle, antithe 'integrity of their Ministeis, and conscious of the goodniast of their cause, forgot the weakness incident to humanity,and de spised the subtlety and artio;-es of the enemy as powerless, however skilfully exerted, and frequ cntly.applied, against the open honesty of their purpose. And yet it was at the very time they thought themselves impeneti able to the arts of the French:Ruler, that they fell into his snares ! For had they not been deceived by his representations, and those of his agents, they • would have perteived that he had pushed his advantages to the greatest possible extent, and that bad they continued to retire unbroken before him, instead of signing an armistice, he would not only have ceased to follow them into Poland, but alarmed at the landing of the Swedes in Pomerania, and the activity of the allied partizans in his rear, would have speedily fallen back to Dresden. A se cond retreat.on his part would have proved the ephemeral . nature of hiss successes, and might have decided Denmiak, andcrerhaps Austria, to abandon him entirely to his fate, if opc to join in his oyeithrow. It is true that the Russ ian stud rpssian, grand army was inferior in numbers, but this ittfe riorityhad notTrevented it from retiring in excellent order, even after the sanguinary. and uhfavourable actions of Bautzen and Wurtchen, and it would not have been more dangerous to move from the Oder to the Vistula than to march from the Elbe• to the Oder, even supposiog the enemy had been so rash as to pursue, and thus incur the Same pet its he M Moscow. Under every point of view, therefore, and with the information which we have since acquired, hut which the Allies ought they to have possessed, it is •clear that 'they committed a gross fault in concluding the originsif armistice, even had it enabled them to prevent ..the -full tvellpement of the military resources of France, What then shall we now think of the renewal of the armis tice, and of the real appointment of a Congress? The first inference which naturally springs from these oc. currences, is, that the Allies had miscalculated their means, and that, notwithstanding their exertions during, the ori ginal suspension of hostilities, their hopes, and those of the world, have been disappointed, and the accession of strength gained by the enemy has far exceeded theirs. The i seCond, is, that finding the same, and perhaps an augmented,- in equality of force continued to exist, their firmness - pose has been shaken, and they begin to concei BUONAPARTE may be sincere, in the declarations b of his wish for peace, and his pretended regard fol nits. If this be the case, well may he exult at the lug ascendancy of his fortune, and severely will their credulity. If, (and, we - fear, from corrobora' counts transmitted to us from the most respectable there is some troth in the report,) he has already s of put- eive that be makes Ir bums- r prevail- they rue ating 1 quarters, raised a • , 4 / POLITICAL 1)IQUISITION. RENEWAL OF THE ARMISTICE. PRICE I +I I I Ii '