The National Register. — London, England, 1815-05-28 00:00:00

NATIONAL REGISTER. .Y 28. power that was calculated to excite alarm ; and this alarm was nicreased from a consideration of the power by which his usurpation was supported. He knew that the whole nation of France was against him ; who then it would be asked, were they who brought him back to France? They were the persons composing the army —persons who wanted a Military Chief, and wished for a Military Government. He had heard something said of prospects being held out that a limited Monarchy and a free Constitution would be esta blished in France. He knew there were many things ut this mo ment which prevented the accomplishment of such a plan ; he wish ed to ask, whether, with suck an army as was now in France, and under such a leader, it was possible a free Government could exist ? There could be none free in any country. the title of whose Chief depended on the sword. It had been said, that peace was such a desirable thing, that no war should ever be attempted until nego tiation was first tried. But with the present Government of France there was but oue or two alternatives, either a war, or a state of preparation for war ; the question then was, whether, with all the dangers of such a Government before us, we should proceed to repel those dangers at once, or wait and take the chances of peace. Noble Lords should recollect the reason why former efforts against France had failed ; it was because the great powers never could be got to form a general confederation until very lately. This grand object had nut been attained until the year 1818, and that %sant of general confederation was the great cause ut failure. When, therefore, we had such a great, powerful, and united league as this bet Ore us, was it to be thrown away ? An usurping Govern meta, upheld by military torce, now existed in France, which was inconsistent with the peace of &trope : we possessed all the means of crushing this Government ; and if these were suffered to pass sway they might never have them azain. He (Lord L.) had used his best endeavours to ascertain the sentiments of the different Allied Courts and of the first military officers to be employed, and he had founil the former unanimous es to the necessity of the greatest exertions, and the latter unanimous as to the strong proba bility of success with the forces to he placed at their disposal. The npcertsinty of war was proverbial, and the event of battles was in the hands of Providence ; but as tar as dependance conic' be placed on human means, on the disposition which prevailed among the powers of Europe and their subjects, and on the military judgment. of those in whom he confided, be certainly did think that the means, as tar as human judgment went. were sufficient and likely to pro duce the desired succees. Indeed, what other alternative was left but war, or an armed peace almost equivalent to war in point of expellee, and leaving the country in a feverish state of auxiety as to detence?—Suppusing a treaty with Iluonaparte, could any man Contemplate a peace establishment in the old sense of the phrase? The Country could only have a feverish and disturbed repose. The system of armed defence was calamitous in itself, and one of which the country had no experience. If we went to war now, we might hope to bring it to a happy and speedy issue : but if we began with all the heavy expellees of an armed peace, most probably soon to terminate in a defensive war. we should have to repent of the policy pursned.—Whatever might be the issue of the war, never had one been mitered into with more mature deliberation. The war on which they had resolved was not a war of interest or aggrandi-e -fluen- He felt, on the part of his colleagues, and on the part of all the powers, that they had no interest in view, but the security of Europe and of the World. They wished not to see France aban doned to the ravages of war, her provinces or her resources cur tailed, but only such a Government existing in that country as would afford security to the rest of Europe. In this view he thought it would be generally admitted that the restoration of Louis XVIII. to his throne, was au object dear to the heart, not only from feelings of ° Poliathy, but from a principle of general expediency. He could state it as the. couvietion of his mind, founded on the fullest enquiry (which it was his.duty to make), that the great majority of the People of France, lie would say three fourths of them, desired the ret n rn of the King. As. -far as the weight of metal evidence went, lie believed this to be the sentiment of theeouth of FranCe, of the west, and of the north. With that opinion of the state of public sentiment in that country, and looking to what was best for the Se. neral security an d repose o f E urope, h e was 'not ashamed av'o'w his anxious wish for the restoration of Limis XVIII. to his thro ne. -it, Was true, we h a d no r i g h t to di ctate to an i n d epen d ent coun t ry what its goventment should be, or who should be at its head; but we had a right to interfere and say. that France shortlel not haeg, a government which threatens the repose, the security, and the very. existence oesurrottuding nations. The noble Lord concluded with moving an Address, in answer to the Prince •Regent's Message, as. eitiinß his Royal Higlineu of their cordial support in all the measures he might deem neccsiork against the enamel) enemy. • 341 Earl GREY began by observing, that the speech of Earl Liverpool abounded copiously iu assertion, and but little in argument ; it was full of the confidence of success, and hardly contemplated the possi bility of failure ; and the speech of the Noble Lord had concluded by moving an Address in reply to the Message, speaking nothisig but war, although in reply to a question which he had pot to the Noble Lord last night, he had declared wv were still at peace. The Noble Lord had talked of the tight of making war. A war might iudeed be just; but to be just, it must be necessary; and, on the present occasion, he could not see the necessity which existed to make this a just war. There must also be a demand of satiatactiou of a wrong before we could be justified. If a right was invaded, 4 wrong was threatened. The first step was to demand satistaction of the right invaded, and security against wrong threatened. Had any right been at present invaded by litiontparte, or had any de mand of satistaction been wade from him? If not, in what did our right of war consist ? It could only exist in the breach of some treaty ; and lie now understood t h at the present war was determined on, on the grounds of the contravention of the Treaty of Paris, the fundamental principle of which was the abdication of Buoimparte. The Noble Lord said, no man could hold more sacred than he did the right of the people to choose their own Government; yet he was ready to agree with the Noble Lord who moved the Address, that this right should be so exercised by a people as nut to become dangerous to others. But was it every species of danger, however remote. that gave to other countries a right of interference in the Government of any particular state or people ? What were the cases in which heretofore nations had thought it right to interfere in other Governments except their own. He bad looked carefully into this subject, and the only case in which lie had found fweign states interfere in the internal Government of others was, where the particular Government, by family or other alliances, threatened the . liberties of other countries. The Noble Lord then proceeded to enter into a review of the Pragmatic Sanction, and the War of Succession, and contended that such was the origin of the wars _ the first in the reign of Charles of Spain, and the other in that of Charles the Second; those were cases which threatened and endangered the Fireflies of Europe! and was there any such eve existing now ? He believed it never yet was heard of before, that the private character or person of the Governer of any nation was to be made a plea of interminable war with that country. The Noble Lord (Liverpool) had said, that not only on the Treaty • of Paris but on the Treaty of Fontainblean, and the Convention o f • Paris also, were the obligations of Buonaparte to be judged of: ho • would take it so, and proceed to examine those treaties; and to • begin with the Treaty of Fontainbleati : Had that treaty seen ad hered to? The Noble Lord did not say it had been entirely ; and lie (Lord G.)• meant to contend that the violations of that treaty were sufficient to justify Buonaparte. First, there was an itiliinge- • meet of the treaty, in not paying the pension; next, in the seques tration of Buonaparte'a effects and those of Isis family. It was at first said, reasons of state rendered the sequestration of property necessary and justifiable, since that it was done to satisfy Boone parte', debts. How should this be, since another as title :t the treaty provides for the payment of those debts wit of the monies 1 due to the Civil List. There was also another violation of the— , treaty. as applied to the Archduchess. Conti the !Coble Lord deny that it was in contemplation to deprive Ituonapaelei wife of the possessions which had been assigned to her ; and watt i t not also even in contemplation to remove Buonaparte from tbitt iselelnus . which he hall chosen for himself. Yet the Noble Lord mid these.. regulations of the Treaty of Fontainblean were no justification of Buonaparte ; and that he ought to have applied to the Sove reigns for redress. This he (Lord G ) hail denied, sauce, ac cording to Vattel, the breach of any particular article 'of a treaty was a• vieation and setting ande of the whole treaty. -As to the Treaty of Paris, was there in that treaty any as tick precluding . France from a change of formin her Gbvernment, or excluding any particular person by name from becoming the head Of the Govern ment If not, how had the people of Fralsee been guilty of any . breach of the Treaty-of Paris in the change of Government they bad made. Was Buonaparte named at all in the Treaty of Paris? Or ' was his abdication at all referred to? It might be said, that terms had been given to France, under the Bourbons, in consequence of the hopes which bad been entertained of peace for Eorope, nisder their *wee. If it was so, all that we had a right to do was to ask Biumatraete to . giveseciirity fa preserving the same terms as we bad expected from. the Bourbons. The next object of consider:mini' was the character of the war. He was surprised the Noble Lont pool) had not said more upon the subject. To form an idea of the. character of this war, it was only necessary to teed the declaration . of the Allies on the 13 th of March, 'which elated that by leggin'