The National Register. — London, England, 1809-08-06 00:00:00

kUG. 6. VIE NATIONAL REGISTER. . . . . Ipre sse d one syllablq from which • 1 could foim the most faint dea that he Exit aisappoioted Li any thing resting with me. TI is Lord.4ll ip *8 ailasioo had reference only to the senior officers who acted with him in Aix Roads, upon whom he generally east hiame without giving the smallest intimation, either by word or manner, that In his expressions of dissatisfaction he included his Commander ut Chief.—After some remarks upon the errors of Lord Cochrane's- narrative log, Lord Gambier said—" And it is very fair here to remark the fact acknow ledged by Lord Cochrane in his evidence, that heerred in no less than four paints of the compass in the report he made to me before the attack of the direction-in which the Trench fleet was moored, in two lines from the Port of Isle WALL." Lord Gauthier next made some observations on the statement of Lord Cochrane in respect to the state o f the enemy's three grounded ships, which his Lordship assured the Court had since been ascertained to be erroneous.—llis Lordship then proceeded thus : 66 It now only remains fur me to request the attention of the Court to some .conclusion tt hica I think may he draw n from the whole of the statement I have submitted to the consideration of you, Sir, and the rest of the Members of this Honourable Court, and by which, with the additional evidence I have to it will, I Ratter myself, distinctly appear, ht, That during the time of this service, the most unwearied attention was applied by me to.its main object—the destruction of the enemy's fleet, 2d, That in no part of the service was more zeal and exertion shown than during the whole of the 12th of April, e. lien I had necessarily in view two objects, the destruction of the enemy's fl-et, and also the preservation of that under my command ; for the extreme difficulties in approaching an enemy closely sue,. mottled by shoals, and strongly defer led by batteries, rendered caution in my proceedings peculiarly necessary. Sd, That ti!ree out of the ►seven of the enemy's ships aground on the Paiials, were from their first being ►►n shore totally out of the reach of the guns of any ships of the fleet that might have been sent in; and that at n• time whatever, either sooner or later, could they have been attacked. 4th, That the other' font of the eleven ships, of which the enemy's fleet coruisted, Were never in a situ ation to he assailed after the fire ships had failed in their object. These are the points o►n which I rest my justification, trusting, that it will appear to the Court, upon their review of my whole ease, that I did take the most effectual measures for destroying► the enemy's fleet ; that neither neglect nor unnecessary delay did take place in the execution of this service; ►and, on the contrary, that it was owing to the time chosen by me for sending a force in to make the attack, that the service ruts accomplished with so very inconsiderable a loss. Had I pursued any of the measures deemed practicable and proper, in the judgment of Lord Coch rane., I am firmly persuaded the success attending this achieve ment would have proved more dearly bought than any yet re corded in our naval annals, and, far from accomplishing the hopes of my country, or the expectations of the Adininalty, must have disappointed both. If such, too, were the founda tion of his Lordship's prospects, it is just they should vanish be fore the superior considerations attending a service involving the naval character, and most important interests of the nation. I conclude by ohserving, that the service actually performed has been of great importance, as well in its immediate effects, as in its ultimate consequences, fur the Brest fleet is so reduced as to be no longer effective. It was upon this fleet the enemy re lied for the succour and protection of their %Vest India colonies; and the destruction of their ships was effected in their owo harbour, in sight of t housands of the French; and I congratulate myself and my country, that this important service has been effected, under Providence, with the loss only of 10 men killed. 3 wounded, and one missing, and not even one of the smallest of our vessels employed has been disabled from proceeding on any service that might have become necessary.—The extent of diffi culties and prospect of danger ill this enterpri.se were extreme, and the gallantry and determined spirit of those engaged most conspicuous. These merits, and those difficulties, ,ought not to be depreciated on account of the inconsiderable loss sustained on the occasion. I by no means seek to arrogate to myself any merit by these observations; but I make them as a tribute of praise due to the zealous services of the brave officers and men under my command, and with a view of pointing out how justly they are entitled to the gratitude of their country." Mr. Stoke* called. Q. Could any of the enemy's ships, on April 12, before they ran up the Charente, have annoyed, and reached the ship' that might have been sent in to attack them ? A. The FoutiroTemit and Cassatd both lay abut i the Catourd about a thirst of a wile 4011 distant from the Isle of Aix, and close on the edge of the bank that extends from the isle d'Aix, to the N. W. foist of the Pallas Shoal, the Foudroyant also lay rime to that bank, and, I suppose, about three cables distant frost the Cassard ; the three-deckers lay with their broad-sides flanking the passage, and would have fired with complete effect ;many ships that might approach.—Q. After the enemy's ships had runup the Charente, could they have been approached by any Al f the British ships ? A. No.—Q. Is the navigation of Aix Roads difficult for large hips, and much limited in sprt.tce t A. Very diißcult for large ships, deep water, mr4chlim ited. —Q. had three or four line of bate tie ships beet; advanced towards the Isle MA ix, and laid during the night at single anchor, could they, by vceighing when Lord Cochrane made the signal, about five A. 111, at that time of tide, have gone into the road d'A ix, without the greatest danger, to .have attacked any part of the enemy ? A. Had four sail of the. line gone into Alt Roads, w lien Lord Cochrane !nude the signal, they wonl I there have met a force equal to them selves; they would have made an attack under every disad vant:ize ; the fire of Isle d'A:v, as well as the fire of the Fottdro:,aut, the Cassard, and Ocean, would have heen directed on them, they had no place to retreat to, and their only safety remained in the destrnctiun of the enemy's ships, and in silencing the batteries from the Isle d'Aix, which l am sure it world have been impossible for them to accomplish.—Q. Were the ships and vessels sent in to attack the enemy as soon as it could have been done with propriety, conside;ing the hate of the wind and tide. A. They were, in my oltinioa. Captain Bligh called In and sworn. Q. Do you recollect the telegraph signal being made from the Imperieu4, on the 12th of April; and vi hat was that signal? A. I think that half the fleet could destroy th e enemy's ships. —Q. unit I sent in line of battle ships that day to Aix [toads, early in the morning, or sGon after, w ere any of the enemy's ships in a situation to have enabled them to take or annoy oar ships as they advanced ?—A. Two of them were lying with their broadsides towards the entrance, and would have consider ably annoyed any ships scat against thetu.....44. Were any of the enemy's ships that were aground capable of annoying our Clips? A. Early in the morning they lay with their Isrpadsides towards the entrance, rand I think were capable of annoying the -hip4.--Q. What number of guns were there on the batteries al Aix Island ? A. W her, at anchor in Aix Roads, I counted fifty; there might have been more ; but I am certain there were not iris. Q. I f any of our lioe of battle ships bad advanced and bad becson• crippled, could they have returned that day befnre night; or what would have been the consequences ? A. Ido not think, under all the circumstances, that if the line-of-battle ships had been sent in, they ever would have rettrrned; I think it would have been sending them to irretrievable destruction.—Q. When 1 sent you into Aix [toads, what were the orders, in the after noon of the 12th, I gave you ? were they discretionary or not ? A. To use my utmost endeavours to destroy the enemy's ships : considered them discretionary, i I the same measure, as the sole responsibility rested on the a ,ptain, the Pilot ha v ing re fused to take the ship in. SIXTH HA V. Captain filigh, examined by Lord Gambier. Q. Did you hear Lord Cochrane express to Captain Beresford, when at Ai% Roads, the probability of three or four of our. line of battle ships being last in attacking the enemy, and what passed on that subject ? A. When Capt. Beresforit asked Lord Cochrane his reasons for snaking tl n signal to the Coln minder in Chief in the morning, that half the Hee( could destroy the enemy, he said, that he calculated on our lining three or four of our ships if the Commander in Chief had sent the squa dron in.—Q. If the two line of battle ohipi of the cnenty, which had remained at their anchorage on tae , i norning. had ,• moved towards the C harante, at half past eleven o clock, (wild the frigates alone, assisted hy the smaller vesseli, have succeeded in their attempt to de.troy the w hole of the seven ships of the enemy that were onshore on the Palais ? A. No, I am confi dent they would not have made any impression on the enemy's ships; but on the contrary, I think it would have been attended with the lon of some of our own ships.—Q. Did it appear ti you on the morning of the 12th April, or at any time when she enemy's ships were on shore, that a signal had been made that they could be destroyed, that there was, on my part any neglect or unnecessary delay, in taking effectual measures for destroying them ii A. I have not the least dot . .t that If our ships had been sent in on the morning of the 12th, t would have been wading them iligU their inev 4441 e debtructivii.