The National Register. — London, England, 1809-06-04 00:00:00

THE NATIONAL REGISTER. JUNE 4. Vienna, and that in consequence colonial p.-Alncn had fallen considerably. Now we know from other sources, ' that colonial produce has fallen' greatly in price ; at Hamburgh, for instance, coffee has sunk 50 per cent. But we are by no moans so well convinced of the pretended Cause. Some more German Papers have arrived. The moot intercs'ii,g• part of their contents relates to the enterprising Colonel Scum, who appears to be proceeding in his plans of operation with the greatest activity. Letters from Lu nenburgh of the 40th ult, state, that a division of his troops entered 034 town on the 9th, made several requisitions. took docsn the French Arms, and placed those of Great Britain in their place. • Another division of his troops has entered Weimar, and a third has proceeded towards Hos Lock and Pomerania; soveral smatl 'detachments have taken Helmstadt, Saitzgitter, Schoppenstedt, .llalderstadt, and Goslar ; at the latter place tliey carried off the Go vernment money and property, as powder until lead, from the magazines. It is supposed that ScaiLL snort tie in possession of Hambur4h. Letters from Munic4 ;ititte , the! Bavarians have obtained considerable success in the Tyrol. General DEROY, it is said, after a battle of eight hours continuance, defeated the Tyrolese, and relieved Xi:ft:stein, Which was besieged lik= them. The German Papers . also give a sketch of the terrils demanded by Russia of Sweden: they are the possession of Finland, and the excluSion of the English from the Swedish ports.—The RevdlutiOn is said to have thrown an obstacle in the way of Peace, and'it is de clared that Russia will only 'negociate with the lawful.Go vernment' of Sweden. Dispatches have been received from Lieut.-General Sir ARTHUR WELLesi.v.Y,. &fed Oporto, the S.Mth ult: and at the same time Lisboa :W i pers •to the 22. ti came to hand. The latter give some very exaggerated statements of the successes of the British and Ponape'le arities, which the official dispatches enable us to correct. The fact, as stated by Sir An Faun himself, is, that so far front the whole of Marshal SOeLT'S army havia::: been compelled to surrender (as falsely asserted . in the Portuguese Gazettes), the attempt made, to cut off his . retreat has avowedly proved unsuccessful, Souf.T havin•2; with the remnant of his force effected his escape; and the British army has in Consequence returned to Oporto, in order to direct its'ef forts against the army of Marshal VICTOR, the Stmthern side of Portugal. lt appears by Sir A. NVELL*BI.EV'S dis patche.s, that Sou uf's retreat, after the action of the It!th, was so rapid, and his remnant force so much dispersed, that it was. found impossible to - continue the pursitit, -without dividing the British . army so as to render it lei:, fit for ulterior operations. Souur, after having lost his 'ar tillery, 'baggage, ammunition, and at least one-fourth of bis army',. and left behind the whole of his sick and wounded, bas effe'cted his retreat -tbrorigh'the Mountains by Villa del Rey to Orense, for the obvious purpose of forming a jnuctiou with • Marshal NEy in Gallicia. In his however, his rear-guard was overtaken at Ituvaens by a detachment: of the British army, consisting of some com panies of the Guardi; an action ensued, is which the enemy were defeated, and completely put to the rout. The French in their.fiight not only destroyed every' thing that could encumber them; but killed or ham-strung all the horses and mules belonging to their- triggage-waggons artillerY, Findittg . it itnposible to intercept ILO , St, enemy, Sir Atrraua WELLEKI.Ev, having cleared Portugal of the French, had returned to Oporto, and was to pro ceed to the Sonthwacd, whore there was every hope of his being ale to act. with c•iicct against the army of Marshal Vic Tort, who. was said to be menacing Portugal on the s:deof Alc:intara ;- and troops had been sent to Lisbon In join those Ivhich were at Abrantes, destined to oppose the enemy. According IN a teller from Abrantes, of the 20th ult. a French corps of IZ,ooomen had forced the bridge of Ai cantara, and had proceeded to Castel Franco. on their route towards Thaeyda, with the intention, it was supping, ell, of succourin;; Soul:r ; but it is imagined, that wheu the retreat of Soilur is fatly known, they will move dow;t the Tagtis to take advantage of Sir A. WELLEstrv's ab sence. Another French corps, hut few in numbers, had appeared on the South Bank of the Ta , :its, at Mentbrio and Sakritio. It cannot but appear most extraorilinary, that there should he such a wide difference between the accounts .hich Minislcrs had formerly given of the state of Portu gal, and of the probable results of the victory of Sir Ai.- Tuvii. WELL EST:EV , and that which must he necessarily in ferred from the above dispa'Aies. Whoa the former dig patches of Sir A Tat% verc received, the Park and Tower guns were tired, and every demonstration of joy was made, as if a most important Vid ory bad bees guined.—low to what does this alledged victors. ainnu mt : Is it act evident, fron all Accounts, that the rear of Mar shah Stiiu...r's Army %Vas the only part engaged. And is it not equally evident, and equally mortifying, that Marshal Sou LT has clic:etc,' his retreat, end that the acquisition of Oporto, and a brush with Marsh:A Scour's rear, have hie the only fruits of S;r alliva's victory. ''Sv e canno t b u t here (4)serve, that no possible good pur pose can be answered by this system of delusion. In a free country, the people should know ail, because in hand .:Intl heart they should participate in all. This, in fact, should he the Main distinction of a popular form of•go vernment. In despiatic•s!ates, it is dangerous to trust the people. It is a principle of government to keep Ihein in blindness, in order to keep them in awe. Ott the other hand, in a free slate, as the peol•!!, can always i trt!s!er.l, as their • interest is identified with that if !lie 11 / 4 ;overnmeut; so should every thing he fair betweea them. la a free government there is a tacit hut well-undors!ood 'partner-. ship between the people and the state. In such a part Lir. ship every thing should be fair and common : there'shonlit he no coitiTalment, no . reserve, no deception. Th e un i te d efforts of the fi rm are .not to be expected, unless upon thia basis. faille first moment of a great disaster, it may- h e ' prue/ent,' it may be necessary' to soften the effect of ?t oa. the public mind—to communicate it gradalim, and thus t,o y, dilute its force by a gradual development. In these c.v.. cumstames, 'sac!) 'reserve, 'and even disguise, is neces s a r to elude s the first . force of popular passions ; but evea iq such cases the disguise must be only temporary : the peo- pie must . not be duped. There is. not, however, the same ,excuse fur the exaggeration of a trivial success, as for the i considerate communication of a great calamity. In the fOrmer Case, it I:: necessary to consult the passions of the people. In, the latter, ac , there is nothing to apprehend , 4() is there no reasonable excuse for deception. Popular, desp,..ir may lead . to mischievous effects; and some sacri in • • f l ees.; there m fore,•ay be allowable, - order to chid.; it 1