The National Register. — London, England, 1809-01-08 00:00:00

THE NATION'AL REGISTER, the terms of that Convention were such as ought to have been agreed upon, I am the more desirous that you should resume the considera tion of these two points, the Armistice and Convention, as it ap• pears upon the face of your Report. that a difference of opinion exists among the Members of the Board, which may probably Yproduce a dissent from the majority upon these very questions. ou will ha pleased, therefore, to desire such of the Members tats may he of a different opinion from the majority upon these two questions, to record upon the face of the proceedings their retitons for such dissent. I ; un,, Sir, yours, (Signed) " FREDERICK. ft Gelb, Sir I). Dundas, B." 44 Commander in Chief." The Board met yesterday at the Judge Adv ocate-Geueral's Of flee, when the said Letter having been read, they agreed that the following questions should he put to each of the Me.pbers of the Board I 4pproVe. 10.-Geu. N von* Lt. Gen. Sir G. N ugent Earl of Pembroke Lord I3eathfiel4 fleoeral Craig (icu. Sir U. Puncia:, Disapprove, E4rl of Ilioirits Do you, or do you not approve of the Armistice as con cluded on the 22d of August it . -.:(1S, in the relative situa tion of tho two ar mies D 4 you, or do voul Disapprove, not approve of the t Lt.-nen. Nicol's Conveutionascon% E, of Peatbrolie chided upon the ltiarl of Maim, 31st of Aug. 180. i, in the relntive si tuation of the two I armies DAVID DUNPAS, President. dpprove. tt,-Gen. sir (1,. Nagent Gen. Lord Heathfield Ceneral Craig CiPP• $4 0, DtPl445 (Sipe]) My reasqn for considering the Armistice aq adviiable on the Ira of August was., becauin the enemy had peen' able to retire !N T Op battle pf Ie 21st, 4114 take 4 strong defenskte position. Nst:Ota.s, L. G. think. eonsideriog the great *cease of our farce from the Oro suspension of hostility to the definitive signing of the Con trenti9o, added tp the defeat the enemy had suffered. Sir 'few barrio* was tally 'Oiled to have it skted qu Wort favourable Prink? Ol. t NicALLs, L, G. I approve of the Irtaistice, after a due coasideration of the relitive situations of he two armies on the evening of t he 22d of August, but I cannot fully approve pf the whole df the Conven tit% after a due considerallou of the relative situation of the two armies at that time; because it does not appear to me that, in the progress of the negociatiou, softicient stiess was laid upon the great advantages had resulted, or were likely to result, from the former successful operations of the liritish army in the field, from the positlerable re.inforeements which had joined it subsequent to the. commencement of the negotiation from the rims in which the British army was engaged, being the cause pf rortu g a lt which ova gaod reason to reckon upon the good will, if nut twin the active a.ssistaace, sof the majority.of the inhabitants; aud, also, from the oausual readiness which, its it appears to me, was manifested by General Junot to a .nego•- tiatioa, and by the Freucit Negotiator to accede to terms as they were prpposed, and tq such construction as Liettt.-(ien. Sir Flew Dalrymple put upon them in some instances, where 1 hey might hive pprae a d'tiereucr of interpretation. 1, therefore., think it prilhOle i , for the alove reasons, that if Ic,s favourable terms to the 1 rench army Lad been iusisted apon, they would have been g l Ff„eded to. PENIbROKE, Lieut.-Gen. I feel lest' awkwardness in obeying the order to detail my sen timents on the nature of the Convention, becauie that I have alreatlyjoined iu the triltute e nf applause due another respect: to the Qttipers concerned. My opinion, therefore, is, only opposite $o their's op a question of.judgment, w here their talents are likely , to have so much more weight, as to render the profession of my difference, even on that pejo*, somewhat pajuful. The duty is however, imperious on me not to disguise or qualify ,the &dues tionesvilich I • have ;node during this investigation. , • An Armistice simply might not have heein•objectionahle, he taw Sir ilew inplo, expecting iffilirly the arrival of Sir John Alfinre's division, might bee-aurae adynotage for himself in u short .sopemion of hostilities, than what the Preach onuld drag from it. But as the A rmititice involved, and is fact estah— )ished the who'll Pewit* 4f the CuqTentiou, I ciiMdt separate fr:)ta lattef. •.• • JAN.S, Sir A. Nfeltesie 3 ; has stated that he considered his force at tbe commeOetnetit of the march from Mondego &Nor, as suiticiens to driviThe' French. from' their positions on the Tagus. That force is subsequently joined by above 4000 British troops, under Generals Anstruther and Ackland. The French make an attack with their whole disposable strength, and are •repulsed with heavy loss, though but a part of the British army is brought into action. It is difficult to conceive that the prospects; which Sir A. Wellesley entertained could be unfavourably altered by these events, even had pot (he certainty a:speedy reinforcements to the British army existed, • I • it is urged, that had the rreach been pushed to extremity, they would have crossed the Tap's, and have. protracted tiro campaign in such a manner its to have trounced the 0, 0 1:e portant view of the GellCrals- , naluely, sending succours into Spain. This measure must have been equally feasible for the French, if no victory had been obtained over them ; Suel confess that, the chance of such an attempt seems to me ;smumecl apinst pro bability, Sir flew Dalrymple notices what he calls . 4, 414 crib tical and embarrassed state of Junot," before that. General has been pressed by the British army ; and, in explanation. of that expression, observes, ;bat the surrender of Dupont, the existence of the victorious Spunl4h army in Andalusia, which; cut a - the the retreat of the F reach in that directlon,and theattiNersalAtos, tility of the Portuguese, matte the situation ofJutscst one ofgro4 distress. No temptation for the translation of the . war .iiatsr. Alentejo presents itself from this picture; nor doesauy repre , sentioion give ground to suppke that Junot could have con.. templated the measure as holding forth any prospect boultintate. ruin, after much preliminary distress and disgrace. The strong. est of all proofs as to Junot's opinion, arises from hii•sending. the very morning after the battle of Vimniera, to propose the evacuation of Portugal, a tap which sulfulently indicated that he was satisfied he could not only make ,no effectual defence,„ but could not even prolong the contest to take the chanco , of ac cidents. fie seems, indeed, to have been without nay real re. source. • It appears In evidence, that of the troops left by him in Lis. bon and the forts; a considerable .proportion • wore of very don btfol quality. Those troops on whose fidelity.tre could cone file, had been dismayed hy a pion] defeaVandsthey .were sat. sible that they had no succoqr to leek to Qom, al:woad.: To thq British Generals it was known, hen the ArkaililiCe Wiligutnted. that 10,000 men under Sir J. %lore, as Wellati the $d and 424 regiments of foot, with the -Mb dragoons. .taighk be,immedi. ately reckoned upon; and although much advitatage baul not been drawn from the Portuguese troops, their support, and the general violence of the country agaiust the k'reuctt, cannot bo 144 out oftbis calculation. . . , . . , .• Tife disparity of force and of circumstances was then such as could , le:lve Do doubt that the issue must be favourable to us. I do not omit advertence to the difficultiesarged as possible to occur in furniihitig the IlritiA army with bread. But, putting aside the obvious solution, that such a temporary privation is not ruin, ous to anarnui wtere cattle can be procured in the country, this difficulty cannot.be well pleaded, if admission is to be given to the speculation, that the,heavy e.annou necessary for battering forts St. Julien and Caseacs.Were to be got ashore in the "lays of the Rock of Lisbon. The cueition then coinei• toillis; whether the Convention did (as has been asserted) secure all t Ile 'objects which were proposed in the Expedititat ?If it did not, I`l.-ryas not what his Majesty was entitled to expeti from tl.e :elane.sititatiau of the two armies. , I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to regard the emancipation of Portugal front the French, as the aiole or the Principal'object of the expedition. Vpon whatever territory e contend with the French, it must 'be a prominent onket in the struggle to destroy their resources, and to..narrow.their means of injuring us, or those whose ,cause we are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the Convention, that the terms appear to have extricated Junot's army from a situation of infinite distress, in which it was wholly out, of play, and to have brought it in a state of entire equipmettt, into im mediate currency, in a quarter too, where it must interfere with our most urgent and interesting concerns. • Had it been impracticable to:reduce the French army to lay down its arms unconditionally, still an obligation not to servo for a specified time, might have sateen insisted upon ; or Ilellisle might have been prescribed as the place at which they should be landed, in order to prevent the possibility of their reitrtbrcing (at least for a long time) the armie* cm ployed for the subjugation of Spain. • Verhars a stronger coul:iderattiuu 111411 the merit of thou,. , 1 f : I 1 , , '.l ib (k t . ' ' t . 4 I Si ) ‘ e 11` A e I ' I 1. 1 OA t • f 1 ? • .. .1 . 4 t, . b 4 t i PI - . 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