The National Register. — London, England, 1813-07-04 00:00:00

THE NATIONAL , Cur Sing, Constitution, anti tato. PUBLISHED AT NO. 11, NEWCA:,TLE-STRUET. STRAND. Tn No. 2SS• SPLEN Scarcely and an At when the e -the Peninsu revolution, centered ; directed by its firmest united effor Peninsula, battle of S gained, for test in the and F , ench complete s potic hove encouiaged ance, not f for the ems the liherati of a limit& of 111 it ish fi root on a fr of the eartl rights." S. with what when a fie Fiance bei patriotism fortune, as to rende the people rulers and produced c vets all thf in the La , treat, and POLEON ovet awe A that will s( v:linly ten from them successful, the advani then cow] 1 _4 on (Inn SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1813. POLITICAL DISBUISITION. SPLENDID VICTORY AT VITTORIk, AND ITS PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES. Scarcely had the power of France revived in the North, and an Armistice chained the hands of the Belligerents, when the eyes, as well as the hopes of Europe reverted to - the Peninsula There, since tie first dawn of the Spanish revolution, the affections and hest whhes of the world have centered; and though its attention has occasionally been diverted hr wars in other quarters, yet it has. always derived its firmest expectation of ultimate emancipation, from the united efforts of England, Spain, and Portugal. It is in the Peninsula, we observed on another glorious occasion (the battle of Salamanca,) last year, " that true fieedom can be gained, for there alone fleemen fight. The issue of the con test in the-North may give a new .master to the Continent, and F , ench may be succeeded by Russian despotism ; the complete success of the Spanish cause must abolish all :des potic power. In Spain, a whole popuLtion, disciplined and encouiaged by British freemen, sti te_ E; ie under their guid. auce, not for the restoration of z.n a bitrary sovereign, but for the emancipation of their country from a foreign yoke, the liberation of their lawful Prince, and the establishment of a limited monarchy. Hence success must plant a portion of British freedom on the Continent,where, having once taken root on a fruitful soil, it will progressively spread ovet the face of the earth, and restore to mankind the legitimate use of its rights." Such were our sanguine anticipations last year, and with what increased confidence do we now reiterate them, when a flesh British triumph has laid open the frontiers of Fiance herself to our warriors ! If the example of Spanish patriotism struggling unexhausted through every change of fortune, has so far el anged the nature of the northern war, as to render it in a great measure a popular contest, in which the people are immediatela - concerned, and not as formerly, rulers and their armies alone, what will not be the effect produced on the whole Continent by a victory, which deli vers all the North of Spain, exposes the French armies still in the Fast to be entirely cut off, or destroyed in their - re treat, and France itself to invasion ? W-hatever farce NA POLEON may have accumulated to terrify the Allies and ovel awe Austria, he cannot stiae the voice of British triumph that will sound from the Zadora to the Oder, and dispel the v;:inly renovated terrors of his power. He cannot' hide from them that his exertions in the North, although partly successful, have exposed hi - a to ruin in the West, and that the advantages he has -gainlet against them are thus more than counter-balanced. to may threaten to bring the 1,-200,000 men who „A. --- 6tb;,-;) in arms to maintain the intc• grity of his Empire (if' : are to credit the falsehood he has or dercd to be engraved on a monument erected on hio-unt .114. CCLXXX VIII. Vol. VI. Pnirr 4d. Cenis) against the Allied force, if peace is not accepted ou his own terms. But his adversaries will now be conscious that a great proportion of his troops must be sent to repair the late disasters in Spain, and defend from invasion his richest provinces, hitherto freed from the devastations of war. They will, therefore, know that in case hostilities should be renewed, instead of having to encoenter an overwhelming superiority of numbers, they would find NAPOLEON'S strength, reduced below what it was at the opening of the campaign. Should not his pietensions sink with his fortunes, they will break sff the negociations for peace, and once more api.eal to the patriotism of (3er many, for a-combined insuneetion against the common enemy. Austrie. herself, notwithstanding the long indeci sion she has betraeed, and the impoliey . of which she has been guilty to allowing 18,000 Poles to pass through her territories to join the French, would probably then, if not take an active share in hosidities carried on with every pro spect of success, anti the issue of which ntight restore her a peat portion of her lost territory, at least prudently ref , ain from assisting the declining pswer of her fernier Conqueror, who, to preserve Ws crown, would be comeelted to snake such sacrifices as would prevent his being dreaded in haute. Should not the complete victory gained by our immortal W ELLINGTON, therefore, lead to a renewal of hostilities in the North et the expiration Of the Armistice, it will at least have contributed to reduce the pretensions and the power of France so low, as to render peace no longer an object of apprehension to our most suspicious politicians. Whilst such, most likely, will be the consequences of this important triumph on the Continent, let us glance at its most probable results on the immediate seat of war. ' The battle was fought at a distance of only eiOtty miles from the French frontier, and though the enemy does not seem to • have experienced snch a reduction in numbers as to prevent him from keeping the field, had he preserved his artillery, ammunition, and provisions, vet with the loss t,f all of these. even if he had not experienced any other in alai wounded, it is evident that his force, as an army, is dsstroved. In vain -hould the strongest positions present themselves : bow could he occupy them, to check nor pursuit or stop our advance, without artillery and ammunition ; or maintain himself in them without provisions ? But, besides, the high road to France, of which our brave warriors disposse Fed. him during the action, is both the shortest and besi, and will be pursued by our main force, whiTst he retires through s. mountainous and difficult path, where we have only oc( anion to send detachments to larrass his rear, as through the formes we may have it in on r power to reach France befor , hills, shout:3 ' the invasion of that country appear adviseable ti our Commander. The oily place by which this road is defend ed (the easiest of the three that closs the Iyitoises) is St REGISTER. a • A