The National Register. — London, England, 1814-11-06 00:00:00

THE NATIONAL REGISTER._ What, however, with all our clinging to the Powers that be, is the actual state of, our cmnmerce with those coun tries, and even with Russia? The merchants must answer Ibis question. But we instil by this system an idea that we are grasp ing and ambitious. Every body is aware of this disposition - but ourselves; and in no one instance is combined so striking an example of it, than in the treaty of Pa! is. The prgjet was evidently British ; and the id ea of y okin g Flanders to Holland sprung, in the first instance, most probably from that of the pi oposed matrimonial connection with the House of Orange. The fertile fields of Flanders, appeared too ne cessary to the dull and . monotonous morasses of 'Holland, to be overlooked. The disposition of the people was forgotten, the perpetual state of confusion in which they bad been kcpl for ages•—their fields moistened with the blood of their fel low creatures--the state of peace which they bad enjoyed since they were under the sway of France—their rapid im provement under her system of Government—their conse quent attachment to that country—all were forgotten ; and it should seem that attempts are about to be made to create, by force, an union between two countries, as little likely to coincide in opinions or unite in habits as oil and water arc capable of amalgamation. But to us, the object appears, in addition to that before alluded to, to have been a great one ; for, it should seem the Cape of Good Hope was another of the causes which led to our endeavouring to obtain Flanders for Holland. What ever might be the disposition of • the Sovereign of Holland , the people of that country had no claim whatever upon us to justify our involving ourselves on their account. In any transaction that might make our right to the possession of the Cape in the least doubtful, Holland might have alledged . that an equivalent was necessary. It was very possible, might a British minister have said, but Great Britain is not to .furnish it. But France had artfully contended at that snoment, or rather conceded the Status ante Belize): : shedid this in a moment of distress, merely to establish the Princi ple ; avid out of this erinciple thus established, has grown the cession of Belgium to Holland, though the fact flies in the very face of the principle. The result of this miserable diplomacy, we shall discover in that of the Congress at Vienna. It will then be found that France has made her usually admirable use of this prin ciple, which existed uo where, bat the eh...elle ideas of some London Editors. But there is another mason why it weld _have been bet ter to have left France the Rhine for her boundary,; this rea son is simply, that in the actual state of that empire she will always be able, at the commencement of a continental war, to give hie to- er ilrsteampaign by advancing to the ithiste.' This has been most clearly proved in the events of the past qet years. W ith Spain, either allied or neutral (the former by far the most probablel,with the influence she has planted in Italy, there is nothtng to prewnt her bringing her 250,000 men to Dear on the Flemish frontier. Tiie policy of thus holding .ont ati inducement to a great fiery injurious. In this as previous posseisioa NOV. e. will be recollected, and the loss, in a moment of distres,, will excite an ardent desire to regain the prize. But, if aggrandizement was, a.; it is, the object of the Allies, the principle would have been 'much more easily established, if France . had been permitted to retain the Netherlands. Prussia, it appears, seeks for Saxony—Russia longs for the re establishment of Poland—Sweden, Austria, &c. all look for aggrodizement, but France is to be in Stain quo ante natant. It certainly would have been desirable could such a principle have been established, but not being possible, it never ought to have been attempted. As things are, how do we stand ? France endeavours to protect Saxony, aided by her natural connection with Bavaria, and a strong attachment in Sitxony to the Sovereign : to this, is super-added her influence in W irtemburgh and Italy ; she will be able to bole the House of Lorraine in check, or compel it to an alliance with her. Thus, we think we have rendered the iwpolicy of this measure self-evident, and simply because the project is impracticable. But there is another reason why the allies, and particularly Great Britain, should not have sanctioned this system. There is a rage fur arrondizing as well as (for so it would ap pear) for being arrondiled. This disposition has grown out of the French revolution ; and in our paper of to day, we furnish a curious proof of it, in tho proje i for the reorganiza• tion of Germany, in the Congress assembled at Rastadt. subsequent to the treaty of Campo Formio. It will be seen that one of the objects was to take Hanover off our hands. It now, it seems, is to be made a Kiagdovi. ' Such are the few ideas to which a reflection on the subject of the Congress at Vienna, has given rise in our minds. - Talleyrand, it appears, has pretty distinctly inti»hitei, that unless France is admitted to her share of plunder, there must be a trial of strength, or in a word, an appeal. to arms. Should this unfortunately be the case, all the melancholy results will be charged to (teat Britain, and may he iustly ascribed to the incautiousness of her diplomatic nepresenta tivc, in allowing, fora moment, that her reteriCon of the Care required a recompense to Rolland. Comquest had given her every right to it, her commercial and eastern policy peremup' tinily demanded of her to retain it, and vhv permit for a `moment the propriety of an equivalent to Holland-0 UPI. iland, whose Sovereign was not warm in his seat, and who, i long before he could get himself re-recognized by the F. esi ' -dent of the United States, dispatched an Ambassador to him, I although in a stwe of open war with uA, and that war sprin Z3 i to , 11. out of the mostltnprincipled, flagitious, and atrocious mo -1 lives ; and, the sole object of r.l;icti was, to support the Man . who had deprived this very Prince Sovereign of his posses lions ? This was a grateful return for the united iterest of - i :, Me Regetit, of his Ministers, and of Lord Grenville. To conclude, we feel ou:selves compelled to eNpre. , s our foam *at Esuope is again likely to be harassed by war ; and, from our course of 'seasoning, theme will be little difficulty' for our enemies to ascribe the melancholy events to the in. ordinate ambition of Great Britain. Tile laq war was sail. to /),7 for the Fake of :tiaita. The next will be said to /I. for the rape of rood Hope. Hence, we bear all the odium of war, *A - well as aft its es pence. . 0F this grosi truth, we this day ..ttirriish our readers with tlic contents of a letter from Milan. The iitterest attached to it, pre cludes the necessity of any tnieriatiarrt. It wat tecgivecl after this Fr per bad been farmers mat:on to go to war will bi found s instance t • \ 11W i r ._ i T Or 11 , 5* , 1 4 0% 21t i t t • 1 1, 11 1 !`t i ti 4' : 1, 0 1 - 'vq• Tr - t-',"[ co:A` bed, but not being possible, it never ought npted. how do we stand ? France endeavours to aided by her natural connection with mg attachment in Sitxony to the Sovereign : .added her influence in Wirtemburgh and Able . to bole the House of Lorraine in check, i alliance with her. Thus, we think we have policy of this measure self-evident, and to project is impracticable. !other reason why the allies, and particularly hould not have sanctioned this system. ✓ arrondizing as well as (for so it would ap- Irrondiled. This disposition has grown out ; and in our paper of to day, we proof of it, in the projei for the reorganiza• in the Congress assembled at Rastadt. e treaty of Campo Formio. It will be seen )bjects was to take Hanover off our hands. is to be made a Kiagdovi. 7ew ideas to which a reflection on the subject at Vienna, Las given rise in our minds. appears, has pi etty distinctly inti»hitei, that k admitted to her share of plunder, there f strength, or in a word, au appeal• to arms. afortunately be the caw, all the melancholy barged to Gt eat Britain, and may he incautiousness of her diplomatic Representa- for a moment, that her reteriCon of the Care npense to Holland. Camquest had given her , her commercial and eastern policy perenip' lof her to retain it, and vhv permit for a opricty of an equivalent to Holland —t , ) Ikl- vcreign was not warm in his seat, :,nd who, 7ould get himself re-recognized by the F. esi- ted States, dispatched an Ambassador to him, Ye of open war with t:A, and that war springing iritnprincipled, flagitious, and atrocious mu- sole object of v. I was, to support the Ma ved this very Prince Sovereign of his posses- vas a grateful return for the united i"Aerest of his Ministers, and of Lord Grenville. , we feel ou:selves compelled to cNpreg our pe is again likely to be harassed by war ; and, e of 'seasoning, Oleic will be little difficulty' to accribe the melancholy evemts to the in. ion of Great Britain. Tile la-st war was sail. to of :tialta. The next will be said to for tli(s • Hope. Hence, we bear all the odium of war, F ex pence. • LI truth, we this day ..tarnish our readers with tlic Art. from Milan. The interest attached to it, pre- ity of any oberyatiorn. It Wilt leCgivid *Ref this V' HUM