The National Register. — London, England, 1815-10-08 00:00:00

I tt • . iCt• Trii I the assurances which he gave, or which he caused to be pro mulgated, that he was seconded by Austria, produced pre cisely the effect he desired. He had, from this moment, a support in the population, which no longer rendered it possi ble to repulse him, except by arming the citizens, one agdinst the other. The crisis, besides, was so rapid, that in the short transition from hesitation to compliance, and from thence to the necessity of obedience, the most rigourous justice could have discovered but few who were guilty, though even the dread of plunging into a civil war would have permitted here the application of revolt. It was diffi cult for the citizens to binder what the Government itself could not prevent. The delusion which alone supported the Government of Buonaparte gradually subsided; no doubt could be entertained, shortly after his entrance into Paris, that he would bring upon us a foreign war ; but doling that interval he became possessed of all the resources of Govern ment: his strength daily augmented by the calling together all his cid soldiers, and he had restored the hope of peace by entering into negociations. Forced to explain himself with respect to that liberal and popular Constitution which he had so pompously an nounced, public expectation was deceived to such a point, that a cry of indignation was beard from one end of France to another. It is to be regretted, that at that decisive mo meat negociations were not opened, as well with the , King as with the Allied Powers. The publication which Buona parte made of his Additional Act to the Constitutions of the Empire, would have been, for him, the signal of his down fall. It was discovered also, though a little too late, that lie had deceived us in regard to the forces which he said he possessed, and which he was about to sacrifice to his own desperate circumstances; but things were come to that ex tremity, that without a reverse, nei'her France nor the army could decla'e itself. The Sovereigns bad made promises, and we were ignorant of their designs, because, in fact, there was a good deal of ambiguity in their declarations. We were equally ignorant of the designs of the King, and it was feared, not only for himself, but also for the repose of France, that the Ministers would persist in some of the er rors of their preceding Government. The Chambers, on their side, would not run the risk of aggravating our miseries, by emplcying delusive remedies, or by anticipating events. Above all, we were anxious to avoid deceiving ourselves as to the intentions of the Sovereigns; and this it was which produced that want of unanimity which partly subsists at present. In short, it may be affirmed, that if the exclusion pronounced by the acts of Congress upon the Government of Buottaparte had been understood to apply to every other Government except that of the King, France would have adopted means to prevent the war from taking place. This last rem irk may not appear unimportant, at a moment when we have to discriminate with equity between real offences and those which were the effects of necessity, and of the embarrassment of circumstances. " These considerations, though general, were indispensible in forming a correct judgment of our present situation. Buo naparte was irrevocably lost before •his abdication: be no longer 'etained any influence, except over the soldiers, who fancied hey should still find him invincible; but his last discomfiture had destroyed that only remaining charm. A stranger henceforth to France, as he had ever been to our manners and ottr true interests, he no longer has, nor will ever have in France any partizans who need be feared. The army has submitted; if there he still any he s itation in France, it must be attributed to the ignorance of what is passing, to the uncertainty of the future. Negociations for ut.ace have mot yet commenced ; the'people know none of the V I i••• ATIoNAL REGISTER. . 643 intentions of the Allied Powers: the truth is. that France is only anxious to strengthen her union with her Monarch. The Allied Sovereigns desire that France should be calm and tranquil with respect to all parts of her territory it is in their power to produce that effect: it will be sufficient to announce that the war is finished, and France will he at out e pacified. This declaration may not prrhans be consistent with the or dinary rules of diplomacy ; hut it is necessary. 1 pacifica tion would prejudge nothing; it would only terminate cala mities : the rest of our troubles would soon be got over. Every one would obey the King. We should no longer se parate the interests of the people from those of the throne. Every one is even convinced that the King. it. consolidating his power, would find no eb.tacle4 but what he 'night easily overcome. None of the dangers which wet eto be leafed at the peace of Paris, now exist ; Buonaparte was then left in possession of a title, a territory, and the oornp of a •ovei eign ; his abdication was only a treaty with the Mies. Nt.w. he is no less abandoned by France than bv fortune; he his no longer an army, a peop!e, or pretensions Pt uden e te• quires, however, that his posi:ion should not present anty op portunity for again troubling the repose of the wot 1,1 " The brothers and the other members f his family have no credit in Fiance. They have neither the cia'itivs which inspire confidence, nor those which give influence ; i may be necessary, however, to remove them. With..ut being at all dangerous, personally considered, fake hopes loi?!.t mate them, and induce them to heroine the lust' nitwit's of others. l'he same spirit of precaution may apply to other individuals. W hen licence and subjection have alternately inflamed so many pas.ions, and produced so much ,cot t uption in a people, there will always he found In( it who d t not know how to submit to any government ; oth••rs. who cannot bend to the forms of a constitutional monarchy, acrd who have fidelity only to revolutions But these individual , are few in number, for on this point there is mote dan4er in ex tending applications, than in limiting them. %Ve should never behold in public disorders any thing beyond , he first cause; and it has always been seen that endeavours to detect a faction only serves to create new factions. The King knows well that peace can be established only by putting an end to all uncertainty ; that it is impossible to punish a n in dividual, without menacing thousands of citizens, and with. out thus exposing ourselves, sooner or later, to fresh tumults and insurrections. The seeds of hatred which are sown in the heart at the commencement •-)f a new reign, never die. " The Sovereigns desire to know who were the abettors, the instigators, and the authors of the return t.f Buonaparte. We venture to say that it . was the particular state of France which, as a principal cause, produced his re.utn, If we were to undertake a rigorous inquiry. we must necessarily enter into the details of grievances which existed, f he im prudent conduct which occasioned those grievances, and of the government who permitted, and in come degree bgiti mited them. In this manner we should arrive at a general inquisition upon the whole4ituation of France. and from thence at a general overthrow of every thing. A proceeding of this kind is impracticable. In a nation like thk, it mos t he. with _caution that we agitate the present ; and it is only in the future that we can discuss the past There has been already much talk about conspiracies which pr eceded the ar rival of Buonaparte, from.the want of-yigitante on tl.e part oe Ministers, who could neither foresee nor preven • his depar ture from Elba. After his debarkation was eti ec t, ( l, t o. t h at took place was nothing more than the deplorable consequences of alarm and precipitation. It is well known, that it. was not a handful of soldiers which protected Buonaparte in the city of Lyons, in the midst oi a population of 100,000 souls. S; ell he , tis ta• It, lus n• n t he 111