The National Register. — London, England, 1813-04-04 00:00:00

TIONALTItGISTEri THE NA _ _ _ _ Cur fling, eZonstitatiott, anti talus. PUBLISHED AT NO. 11, NEWC ASTLE-STREETI, STRAND. No. 275. SUNDAY,-APRIL 4, 1818. ,POLITICAL DIS2UISITION._ CAUSES CF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH GRAND ARMY. Continued from No. 170. The intelligence of the French army having quitted Mos cow, was instantly communicated to all the Russian corps, and offensive operations were commenced at once on every point. rusow, with the main army, had gained a po sition on the left flank of the retiring enemy, which enabled hint to t:kredten the line of their retreat. Ile was about a day's march ia advance, and if allowed to retain that ad vantage, might either post himself across the direct road from Wizsma to Smolensk°, and thus enclose the French within the ravaged Government of Moscow, and force them to endeavour to open themselves a passage with the sword; or be might proceed without an action until he should unite with the army of Volitynia is the rear of Smoleasko, and carry the same plan into execution at a latter period, but with a greater superiority of force, increased by the support he would receive from Count WITGEN3TEIN on the Dwina, end at a time when the enemy would have been consider-: ably reduced both by the difficulties and privations of his march and the severity of the weather. NA POiEON'pene trated these designs and resolved to defeat them. Although fully aware of the pernicious consequences of delay, he turned aside from the straight road, and by a sudden move: ment on his left, menaced the fertile and hitherto untouched provinces of Kaluga and Tula. At that period his army had suffered but little; the cold was yet moderate and pro . visions were not wanting. lie still headed a force too power.: ful not to command respect and to excite apprehension, If . he could effect his apparent purpose, and occupy Tula and Kaluga, he would find both shelter against the rigour of winter and abundant food to support his troops during that season. Moscow then might have been sacrificed in vain, for though cut oil for a time from his other armies, yet as he should want uothing from them, they might remain on the defensive, whilst the main Ru , sian force would be em ployed in watching him, and at the return of Spring the campaign might be opened without any great disadvantage on his side, and his communications .restored by a single battle. This plan appeared too practicable not to be seriously in tended, and to frustrate its execution KCTUSOW sacrificed the position he held in advance, and made-the movements which led to the sanguinary battle of Malo-Yaroslaw. Of this action the Russian official details have never reached us. It has only been obscurely stated, that after the village of Ma lo-Yaroslaw had been taken and retaken eleven times, Gene ral KUTuSOW learning that NAPOLEON had sent a corps which still more imminently threatened Kaluge, retired forty► vents from the field, to occupy another positiouiithich rot. vr No caair. PittCt gi. " would effectually cover that place. BUON APA aTi. no E °on er • observed the success of his feint, than he hastened back tp Viasma and proceeded in the straight road to S,nolensko without an ene►ny before him. Ile had removed the danger of being cut off from that city, but he had incurred another, which no human means, in his situation, could mitigate, and which proved not less ruinous to his army. He had lost four days in deceiving the Russians at a time when every hoer annouoced the nearer approach of winter in all its horrors, and be had loaded himself with wounded, who would impede and delay his march, when no• thing but , its rapidity could save his army from destruction. Had this happened early in October, it would indeed have rescued him from all his ,difficulties. Ile would have re•* treated safely to Smolensko, and ft om thence to - itespk,• before WITTGENSTEIN could have driven ST. Cm and the Bavarians from Polotzk, and would have been able to take his winter quarters on the Dwina. But it was now too late. Three days before he arrived at Smolensko, the cold had be come so severe, that one half of his horses and great ntlm hers of his men had perished, and one half of his artillery had been abandoned. Winter had now openly espoused the cause of Russia, and ai med even nature against him. He had eluded the opposition of man: but encountered still more terrible antagonists—frost, snow, and famine. These Checked liis flight, and gave time for the vengeance of his pursuers to overtake him. Inure& to.the climate, the Russi ans rushed with fiercer indignation against an enemy, whom) they saw evading their blows. Hardships were forgotten, difficulties were surmounted. • The Cossacks overtook,. liar pissed, and delayed him. A division of Russian infantry came up with him, and defeated his rear, whiIst.KUTUSOW s with the main army, marching across the country, attempted to regain the advantage he bad lost, and to react Smolensko before him. Notwithstanding the complicated impediments which the French incessantly encountered, this was not in his • power. He had suffered himself t° be led too far out of the tight road. They entered Smolensko on the 9th of Novem ber, and it .W. 3.6 only on the 14th be approached that place. Notwithstanding the heavy losses of men, horses, and ar tillery, be had already experienced, NAPOLEON still I, , oessed a formidable army.. Indeed, his junctiott with Vic 101e$ corps at -Smolensko had rendered his •force nearly equal to .whal, it was when he left Mescow. He was now abundantly 'Supplied. with provisions, and occupied a town which, though partly burnt in his advance, had since been repaired and Strongly fortified. It was not large enough to site Der his whole army, but it would contsi'n a nunierows gar. ison, to *check the pursuit of the Russians, whilst he might distiibue the Test of his troops along the Dwtna and the Borystbenes, at Polotzk, Dunaburg, Witespk, Moltitow, and Minsk. Such were the intentions of theneuchEur Lao& when he fe-enter,