The National Register. — London, England, 1809-08-27 00:00:00

542 THE NATIONAL REGISTER. soliciay of i c.. I.vlien an ancient oph►st was arguing to prove tile impossibility of motion, a Philosopher who at tended his lectures made no other reply than by gravely walkinz up and down the room. The friends of the King and of the Constitution might treat the Reformers with the same sort of indiWerence; but to do evil is more with in the power of every man in public, as well as private life, than to do good, a n d one enthusiast is capable of effecting more mischief than a hundred sober minded men can re medy ; neither is it to he forgotten, that supineness and mensibility may suddenly al% ake to terror and to danger. Whilst the Crown has places of emolument to bestow, there will of course be many Candidates, and it will not be necessary to prove, that secret rivalry is more dangerous, because more safe, than a generous and open competition, vhich is restrained by some sense of shame. However speciously and adroitly Statesmen may betray the interests of the people, they receive their reward openly and from the public, and the eye of that public is ever turned upon them with jealousy and suspicion. Nor does public indi nation want any incitement to hunt them down, when their conduct is notoriously flagitious. If placeinen .avere rendered ineligible to seats in the House of Commons, the influence of office would not the less exist, only its operation would be more circuitous. Statesmen, as l mg as they had friends and relatives in the House, would have the same attacks made upon their feelings, and the effect would be precisely the same. . That corruption which you say now circulates so widely in the House of Commons, would be spread more diffusely among the Constituent; this would be changing a lesser evil for a greater, the plothora of redundant health for a consump tion; a little feverish anxiety, for madness; and habitual error, for inexpiable remorse. The Senatorial Statesman is essentially a mixed ch-iraeter. His dependence upon, and attachment to, the Crown, is in a great measure con- Voided by responsibility to his Constituents ; and we all know there are situations in which the greatest fa vourites of the Monarch must do homage to public opi• nion, upon whatever grounds that opinion may rest. But from even this imperfect controul the Constituent is entire ly free; he is little disposed to think of the duties or the reiporp4ibilities which he owes to the country at large, and will readily dispose himself to elect those Representatives who will be most likely to se-Are to him the wages of his own corruption. It is imaginary and delusive to talk of the lower orders being less c:,rrupt than those whom they have chosen to represmit them, and to attempt to shut out from your consideration the motives by which the greater part of mankind are governed, would be like an attempt to overtake the visible horisou, which for ever °peas act you advance. But what is to be the result. of this plan of excluding. Statesmen from the House of Commons, if the House of Lords be not included in the regulation. The elThrt must necessarily be a monopoly of public employments and emo luments: it would convert the intermed►ate barrier be tween the Crown and the People, into an instrument de pendent upon the Crown, obliged to the Crown, and dis posed to assert and increase its rights, in opposition to those of the People. It would increase its strength in pro. portion as it increased the means ; .I had almost said the ne cessity of corrupting it. Besi,les, the Peers are not a fluc tuating but a fixed body, and from that union which would of course pervade them, they would in time become as ; formidable to the Crown as to the People. In little republics, and in small communities, of what ever materials the government may . be fortmnl, a sense of public duty may prove a sufficiently powerful motive of action, and ;lye an impulse to the honest ambition of those who, wish well to their country, but in the ordinary state of human affairs, in the present condition of human society, the determinations of any legislative body, how ever constituted it may be, will certainly be actuated by 'considerations less pure in their nature, and less efficient AUG. 27. 11l opcimion that is the hest government which al fords the opportunity, and elicits the means of controuling the greatest portion of our virtuous propensities, and thereby ultimately concentrating them for the gaud of the public. That degree of mental controul which shall restrain the worse propensities of our nature, and prevent, thew from affecting - our conduct, is no less a desideratum in morals than in politics, and however good men many hope, wise men will despair of finding it. Much has been said and written upon the independence of the component parts of our government, and nothing is more beautiful in theory than the entire separation of each from the other. But we all know that in practice this independence is corn ' pletely amalgamated ; there is in point of fact an intimate and mutual connection between them, which is highly advan tageous, and almost necessary to the happiness of the public. That in many respects they really are independent of each other, cannot be denied, and as little wilt it be de nied that they ought to be so ; on the other hand, to use the expression of Mr. HVAIE (Essay 5 and 6.) the Crown has so many offices at its dsposal, that when assisted by the honest and disinterested part of the House, it wit, always command the resolution of the whole, so far at /east as to preserve the ancient Constitution from danger : we may therefore give to this influence what name we please, we may call it, and sometimes we may justly call it, by the invidious appellation of—corruption and dependence ; but some degree, and some kind of it, arc i !separable from the very nature of our Constitution, and necessary to the p:eservation of owr mixed Government. Nobody will deny that talents of great. magnitude are necessary, in those to whom the business of governing nmukind.is direct ed : without these, Government itself would be neither respectable or safe. It could not long direct the public opinion. It could neither employ the public strength to purposes of public utility, nor even wield its energies for the purposes of general security. In the pressaut state of the world, is it to be expected that we should meet with such a degree of virtue in public men of talent and abi lity, as to he wholly devoid of every particle , ,of personal interest. No institutions of man, however brilliant in theory, can be fenced against the incursions of this prin ciple ; not that we would he supposed to insinuate that public men of grent minds press to the brink of corruption with a more rapid career, .or with greater avidity, than men of inferior abilities, or of more humble situatious. The contrary is most indisputably the fact. The natural tendency of great intellectual endowments is to elevate the mind, and rescue the heart from the dominion of selfish and baser passions, and even to render it indifferent to the love of that wealth which may he amassed without excel leuce, and possessed without dignity. 'The philosopher who has been accustomed to peruse man in the abstract. and the enlightened Statesman who has been employed in examing him more in detail, will be satisfied to derive from his ir.!: , gled vi:tues and frailties, those erects which have in vain been eApected from the influence of principle alone. Such men will consider Parliament as the avenue which leads to public confidence,—a confidence whisk concurs, with other causes of a less honourable nature, perhaps, to stimulate those exertions which lead to the highest employments of the State. Without the profit which attaches to these political situations, and which enables men of ability to erect their fortunes upon the bases of their lime, those ta lents which now occupy the foremost ranks of the State, would probably languish amid the details of inferior offices, be yoked to the desk in order to procure a preca. , rions existence, or be devoted, perhaps, to the views of the Sovereign alone, uncontrouled by the opinion and with out any feelings of regard for the interests of the people.— But called forth as they now are by collision of powers and intellect, they are rendered inure inaccessible by corrup tion ; the love of wealth is purified by the sense of tumour and the fear of shame. A sense of delicacy, and elevation of sentiment are excited ; habits of self respect and self-denial I ,