The National Register. — London, England, 1808-10-09 00:00:00

642 THE NATIONAL REGISTER. 01 ending twenty thousand men to Calabria would pro duce such a result. The Neapolitans may be disposed to insurrection in favour of their exiled Monarch ; but when we reflect on the doshonourible compromise which the greater part of the Nobility entered into with their op pressors, there is reason to apprehend that the former, so far from contributiug to such an tryout, would make every eft, A to counteract it. The French, however, will be ob;ged to keep an army of forty to fifty thousand men in Italy, the greater part of which they will employ in the south, to maintain the tranquillity of that peninsula. With such a formidable force in the country we doubt Very much if the Satives will have the* courage to make any exertions in favour of their independence. If that he the case we should keep to no purpose 30,000 men in Sicily. But should our whole army, on the• contrary, be collected in Spain, amounting, we will suppose, to about 60,000, the enemy would be either compelled to withdraw the greatest part of his force from Italy, and thus endanger the loss of that important possessions or he unable to op pose an effectual resistance to the united strength of Creat Britain and Spain beyond the Pyrenees. This subject re quires the maturest reflection. The principal object of this war should he to weaken on the Continent the opinion of French invincibility ;—should we have the fortune to triumph over the enemy, and, in conjunction with our A ilies, expel them from Navarre, overwhelmed with shame and disgrace, tais effect is immediately produced. it is then we can reckon on insurrections in Italy and other co.intries ; and then would be the time to fly to their assistance. This plan of operations has manifest and deci sive advantages ; for whilst it distracts the attention of the exiity, and compels them to withdraw a considerable part of their force from Germany, it gives Austria a chance of prosecuting the war with vigour and success, and affords Italy some prospect of salvation. But all these reflections arc as problematical, as they are momentous, until it be dttcided who is to conduct the' operations of our army. It is unnecessary to recur to his- • tory to be convinced that the talents and the reputation of the ( ommander decide the events of a campaign ; the ex perience ;if our own time confirm, but too painfully, the justice of !he observation. Whilst the afthirs of Europe arc approaraing esery day nearer and nearer to a crisis, which decides oar fate in common with that of other Na tions. we dare not proceed beyond gentle innuendoes and delicate insinuations, relative to the appointment to the chief command. It there be any man in this country, who does not discover in such conduct a well-founded for alarm and anxiety, though we may be astonished a! reso lution, we cannot avoid entertaining a very suspicions opi nion of his heart and his understanding. Every thing that is sacred to man, is in dauger, and, in the digress and Fs turhation of such a stale, we are as anxious about trifling considerations, as if we existed in times of the profoundest security. What has occasioned this futility and relaxation in the national character ? Are we fully aware of the dan ger that menaces us ? Do we sufficiently appreciate the g:at'us and the pertidy of the enemy ? Would to Heaven that no fatal experience might teach us the extent of his resource.:, and the destructive tendency of his projects. Every day furnishes a new proof of his versatility, dissitnn leion aod insatiable ambition ; and we look to the conso ;:dation of his power and his indefatigable pursuit of new acquisitions, with as iuclifference, which does not du much OCT. 9. honour to our judgment and foresight. Englishmen the modern Philip is more ambitious, more profligate, and a more inveterate enemy of our freedom and country, than is imagined. His resources are as various, as his designs are flagitious. This moment to conciliate Russia, and render her subservient to his will,.he orders hls agents to circulate the report of an insurrection in Petersburg, and the arrestation of Alexander. The gross fabrication is im mediately transmitted to this country, in order that the unwarrantable observations of our journalists may con. firm the infatuation and dependence of that ill-fated Mo narch. • Against such .an individual more than ordinary precau. tion necessary. lint all our energy and foresight b e our nfnirs he confided to ;neon!. useless if the direction of petcnt persons. If every particle of individual virtue and public spirit he not.extinet ; if we set any value on the privileges we have acquired by the glorious exertions of our forefathers, we will jealously and conscientiousi; ex.!. mine the merits of the man, to whom our fortunes at;(1 those of our Allies arc to be intrusted. We relied it ag:Ua and again, who is to command the formidable army vie have sent to the Continent ? We feel no antipath‘ 0r pre judice ag,ainst any of the candidates, vve will part 011:arise no one ; but we have a right, in common with the rest of our countrymen, to insist strenuously that the Mel its of the officer, to whom this important command will be cm.- . tided. be strictly investigated. There is something peculiarly vile and repulsive in base insinuations, which some hireling writers throw (q.t arr , inst the men, who have the courage and the honesty to expose themselves to calumny, and, perhaps, to c I anef, to prevent the dishonour of the army and country. lint what is the country, or its interests to men, who, in oppo sition to their conviction and conscience, have . the to bestow the titles of factious and disaffected on thus, who resist an appointment, which they secretly disfippreve of themselves? no they reflect on the injury they do the community by thus calumniating the zeal and courage of a few honest men ? Arc they so callous, so dead to every generous feeling, as not to know that their sycophancy and want of principle may contribute to the destruction or captivity of our whole regular army ? Is it possible that they can be so profligate or so stupidly ignorant as to term faction the united disapprobation of the people and army, and even of the most enlightened members of the Ministry ; whilst, according to the same jesuitical logic, only a few infallible and truly disinterested retainers at the Horse Guards, and one or two Morning Papers, afford ex clusive proofs of patriotism and loyalty. We know to estimate the professions and civism of those arch-patriots; and should they have the misfortune to triumph over tle• feelings and good sense of their country, they will, sooner or later, have cause to bewail the mischief they co ntributed to occasion. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. FROM TILE DUTCH P.IPEI:S. FRANCE. 20.—The grind army now on it 3 march f. , r Spain, will, it is confidently Ivserteti, be commanded hy the I nt . - peror in person. His Evrellency Mnrshal Ma,:•ena will, it 11 said, have the command of a seperate army, consisting of 80,000 men. At the last parade on the llth inst. when the advanced goad of the graizd army was present, his Majesty ordercd the frooP: .