The National Register. — London, England, 1809-10-15 00:00:00

:OCT. THE NATION acre e'aps.4l, the Fre,neh effective cavalry, which were assem bled In the 13anks of the Keheldt, amounted to 4000! •• Reflecting also that our troops are not led 01l by a Marl t‘ borough, a %Voir, or even a. Wellesley."—London Papers. Note by the Motiitpti.—We here see what the spirit of party is capaNe of. It is a 'pity. that Sir Arthur Wellesley had not the commond instead of Lord Chatham. The latter saved tuesEng. Hot-army ;: the other Would probably have lost it, as he has lost tiiat whiek he coniintindel in Spain —where'he had the im. prudeace to entangle hiinselr with 30,000 mcn, without reflecting that he Thus exposed his left wing to the different corps of the Duke 4 of Daliiialsa, of Elchingrco, and of Trevisa, alio had 7U,0e0 :Tien unaer arm ile . has, it is true, drawn himself out ot critical sittiati: - ‘ti, by a precipitate flight, and by aban doning •his hospitals, his wouaded, his horses, and a part of hi equipage's. It was thus that General Moore, in his ridiculous expedition in the month of November last, 1.. d from Benevento to Coronoa, abandoning his allies, horses, his ammanition, and his equipages. Neither the one nor the outer or tiv-se Gr. nerab has displayetl that foresight, which is a characteristic sn eoentiiil in war, and whirl' prompts to do only what can be supported, and to uadertake only what presents the greatest nulaber of chances of success. Sir Arthur Wellesley has not evilrel more talent than the men wit!) direct the Cabinet of St. James's. To wish to support Spain against France, and to con tend •he Continent with France, is forming an enterprize which will cost dear to those who have umiertaken it, and who vs ill meet in it only disasters. Cotillauations, it is true, may he kept up—misfortunes may he brought on peaceable in hablta ts—rivers of blood may flow—toe people, the protec to of whom they call themselves, may be ruined—but any other reaults are impossible. -..N11M1.- T; e Moniteur of Sept. 28, contains the following observation+ en the London Gazette of Saturday, September 2, containing the dispatches from Lord Wellington, dated Deleytosu. On the paragraph • 6 When entered Spain, I had a communication with Gene ral Cuesta, &c." The Moniteur remarks :—We wish Lord Wellesley to com mand the English armies With his character he will suffer some great catastrophe. It appears, that be has neither spieS nor any accurate information; which is astonishing iu a counts y where England has so many partisans. . " I preferred to go, thinking that the British troops were mast likely to do the business effectually, &c." Note.---We believe that his dispositions were made; for we see in one of his dispatches, that he thought he had only to do with IQ or 12,000 French, and it was possible that he might march with 20,000 men againsta corps, which, in his opinion, consisted only of 10 or 12,000; but he would have gained 'setter information on his march ; and he would have learned that this corps of 12,000 men amounted to 70,000. He had his retreat cut off, and was too fortunate to be able to throw himself, in der to be able to escape, into impracticable roads. Ceoeral Wellesley is ineseuSable for not having known that the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia; Elchingen, and Treviso, amoutited to 10,000 men, and for having thought he could cover his left flank against this formidable army , by leaving two battalions at Puert o Banns. W hat ignorance! " I acknowledge that these reasons did not appear to me suf. tarot for giving up so important a post as Talavera." Note. ;corral Cuesta did right to leave Talavera; if he had delayed, he would have been lost. He did wrong to leave two divisions and 40 pieces of artillery on the Tagus; he lost these; and this - p:wst, which was the rear guard, was a post of honour ; General W ellesley ought to have occupied it. 1t is acknowledge , ' in war, that an advanced guard, or a rear guard, according to the operations, is the post most important to defend ; but ral Welle3ley had taken the lead, and according to the laudable practice of his maul), had left to his Mikes the post of danger. " The enemy stated to he 30,000 strong, but at all events eon- • sibling of the corps of Soult and Ney." Nate.—We see, that, even at the time when he wrote, the English General did not know the force of the French ; he speaks only of the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia and Eleningen, and appears to have no knowledge of the corps of the Duke of Tre viso, 25 battalions strong, and which, since their entrance intn bpoin, have nut been inferior to the best troops in Europe. If Lord Wellesley frequently commits similar errors in war, he tray one day dearly pay for them. 16 .r 4" c had reason to expect the advance of ‘ r ictor's corps to .. r . +r L REGISTER. 653 TataV era, as 900 n. as General Cuerta's march should he known; and that after leaving 1 , 2,000 ineo t►► watch Veoegas, and from.lo to 11,000 killed and wounded in the late actiou, this corps would have amounted to 25,000." /i'utc—l'his is a singular calculation which Lord Wellesley makes of the first and fourth corps, and the reberve. The hrst Corp, is composed .of 36 hatialioas, the fourth of 30, the reserve of 20 battalions, and the cavalry of 40 t•quadrons. Loyd Wel lesley had •therefore around him 170 bait:slims and SO or 90 squailrous, an,l he expected to conquer Madrid with YO,OOO men, We do not speak of the Spaniards; they may be reckoned as of consequence for plundering single persons, or for defending them selves behind a wall, but very little aecnunt can he made Nf theta in a regular battle, as the English may have been convinced.— If Lord Wellesley had had, besides his W,OOO men, the w hole army of Lord Chatham, which went to bury itself in the marshes of the Isle of Waleherea, he could have derived nothtnz from his expedition hut disgrace, confusion, and defeat. if the Eng lish mean to dispute Spain with France. they must land an army, if not equal to the Fwnele army, at least two-thirds as stron i :, that is to say, of at least 150,000 men; fur the Spaniards cannot he reckoned fur more than one-third Su a regular battle. Nothing can he more a , tvantageons to France than to have the Engikh engage in land-w ars; for then,• instead hf conquering England by sea, we aka Conquer her on the Continent. such is cunielit shews•to admiration what those arc who direct the Cabi •net of London.. Themistocles advised the Athenians to abandon their citadels, and_take refuge on hoard their ship. It is to be wished that . the British Cabinet may persist, as it has lwgun, in the plan ►►f deserting its ships, and throwing itselfupnn the Continent. We have predicted the humiliation of England; and peace before a year closes. Before a year shall have expired, the whate.vec efforts they may make, will be driven out of the. Pe- • iusnln, and the Imperial Eagle shall.wave on the ftirtre:4es of Lkbon. [At the end bf Ike . next paragraph, the Monit cur adds the fol-. lowing note :]—We shill not continue these notes; it would be an insult to our readers; the falsehood of the report of Lord Wellesley _must be evident to every one. Lord •Wellesley, • without knowing the force ef the enemy with whom he had to • • Contend, without being furnished with that which constitutes an army, advanced to Talavera. The idea of entering Madrid turned his brain. He took the French army for an army of • Seapoys. He arrived at Talavera with 25 or 20,000 men. lie was then joined by 30,000 Spaniards, and with these two armies he intended to penetrate to Madrid. The Duke of SA- • !lino manceuvrea skillfully to draw him on, and formed a junc tion with the 4th corps and the reserve, and, with the King at their head, marched against the enemy. The Duke of Daliva tin, with still more considerable forces'thao those of the King, • marched upon their rear. Lord Wellingum could not extricate himself hut h) heating separately the two winks. The Ist and • 4th eorps prescitteel him an opportunity, since they attacked, without waiting for the three corps commanded by the Duke of • Dalmatia. The English fought well; the battle of 'Talavera was doubtful, though the loss of the English was much more ' considerable than our' ; for the French artillery was much • More numerous. It appears, from a series of mitt plied faults, the French could not take the positioe oa the 11444 but the Loglish were beaten back every time they attempted tlf advaece upon the French. When the 10,9 i.);) men commanded by the Dake of Dalmatia were at l'iacentia, Lord' Wellesiey there were not sure than 10,019 iii;• l %., w it ' gave h i inie ir to the most riiliculens combinations. lie perceived, •ivisvcCei, the fully of his calculatiotet, tits extreme imprudence, aud was suf. • geienily fortunate to sase himself in Portisgal with hi. infantry. What would have been the case, if, manieuvritig act.ortlits4 to the principle, of war, the French Art ball only give', oatile united! Lord IVellia.;ton vat's, " tie want of the trietins of conveyance presented hint from marching In Madrid." What would have been the consequence if be 1644mitrehed to Madrid, and the Duke of Dalmatia had p;nred hinnielf ivetu ee l ; him n i 4 the Trigt:s I He wonid have come with his army to Fr. gace . lie would have sacriticed brave weft prmatiuption, anti iguaranee of that of wille:t a General ought not to be mot. This-expedition greatly retionibles that of General Moo r .. i n the mouth of Novemocr last; hat M o ore %c o , moth pruilcitt, hod Kaved hiioself 1,0041er, and i 11 . /101• be St/tit:rot cola mous losses, th o o half of his are,v reiunieti.itt lioghtlitt. Like General Moore, Aileherallry aiwtolotird his hmititals, hit baggage, kit 4 artiiler, and arrived in Portugal K itb ttie half of __. » ._ ~_'• .04.041.41."