The National Register. — London, England, 1809-03-19 00:00:00

TIIF, NATIONAL REGISTER. and his hopes of a happy termination of the unfortnnale fl dispute were more sanguine and certain. This is the inva rilble tone of consummate villainy, certain of success. It would be a hazardous speculation to found any con jecture on the increase of his moderation and sense of justice since that period. Miracles may still operate. in ways and for purposes concealed from our limited sight ; but if the heart of a BONAPARTE has become susceptible of generous or humane feelings, we lock upon it as the most extraordinary mat ifestation of Divine interference ever recorded in profane, or even s'cred history. We do not recollect a well authenticated instance of grace operating era artitlian of his cast,—he is incorrigible. As it would be danTereus to calcu ate on supernatural causes, in attempt ingio explain the motives of his acting, we must endeavor to account for his present policy according to those prin ciple:, which st.em invariably to have guided the ambitious aril unprincipled. We have con.,tantly insisted, in opposition to our bro ther jourecists, and to a very silly and a very inaccurate statement of Load CASTLEREAGH, that the French military force is not near so numerous as is generally believed and stated. l is unquestionably the interest of BONAPARTE to impress a very formidable opinion of the strength and num ber of his armies; but we camiot possibly conceive what motives could operate on the Noble Lord to promote the views of the tyrant in this respect. Ilis met-statements must arise from wilful prevarication, unpardonable igno rance, or he considered it as a parliamentary ruse de guerre, and therefore justifiable. Whatever his motives may have been, it is of the highest importance to correct his error of judgment or of design; and we would wish to know his authority for asserting that the French bad 400,000 men at their disposal, ready to pour into Spain ; if the force they had already in the Peninsula, was inade quate to resist our army. We know it, unfortunately, that he, as well as his colleagues, and, in fact, every pre vious administration, were grossly ignorant on a subject it was so much their duty to know, and which they had the means of ascertaining. The French army, according to the opinion of the best informed men on the continetq, never amounted, for the last eight years, to :;00,000 effective men. This state ment is corroborated by the authority or the Prince o 110HENLORE, and indirectly by that of Lord HUTCHINSON. We are informed that his Lordship was of opinion the enemy had not 150,000 in Poland, during the last cam paign in that country; and we know it to be a. positive fact, that their whole force between the Vistula and the Rhine did not amount to 50,000. 1 h that entire cam paign they were unable to blockade 111 e small fortress of Colberg, the garrison of which were in the habit of extend ing their excursions for more than 50 miles in every direc tion; in one of which they picked up General i'ic•roa, who was afterwards exchanged for &yen ea. • As long as the Siege of l)autzic lasted, their offensive operations on the Vistula discontinued for want of an effi e eat force; active warfare in that quarter was not resumed till the besieging army had rejoined the main body. In like manner they were unable to oppose any thing like re sistance to the Swedish army of 15,000 men, near Stralsund and MoteriFat was obliged to collect all the Du!ch troops, who occupied the banks of the Elhe, the Weser and the Fees, the ;g arrisons of Ilainhurgh, Lubeck, Bremen and lianovet, before he Ives able to resist this small force. We do not include in this statement the contingents of Ba varia, Wurtemberg, and Baden, which were mnploved in Silesia, and which may have amounted to about 40,000 men. From the above statement it is clear That the whole force of the enemy, includinz Dutch, Italians, and Germans, d d not exceed 250,000 men. What renders us more posi tive in this opinion,. is. its coincidence with a statement made by the Prince of IIonEN v., in the autumn of 1806. When war between Prussia and Francewas thought proba ble, he sent a list to the Cabinet of Berlin, collected with 191 all the accuracy which the juncture required, of the seve ral corps at that time in :;erienny ;—they amounted, ac cording to his report, to 210,000, Italians included. Airy man, who has trn yelled through France, and in the habit or making °brae vatic:us, must have remarked, that scarce a :old.er was to be seen in the interior. The enoiry, at the period we allude to, had not 40,000 in the interim, the greater part of which were encamped in the neighbourhood of Paris, where they were incessantly • exercised under the eyes of llosapanTu himself. The garrison duty at Brest, Touloe, in the fortresses at Brabant &c. was performed by invalids, or the new organised Na tional troops. There was a small force of regulars kept at Boulogne, not e exceeding 10,000 men. For the defense of Italy he has aliNys relied more on the terror of his name, and the inaekvity of our councils, than on any force he ever maintained there. That is proved to evi dence by the resistance which General Stewart made there with his small corps. We thought it of consequence to make this statement, in order to contradict the extravagant accounts which are current on this head ; and we still believe, and defy any one to contradict on just grounds our F. tatement, that the French effective disposable force, Dutch and Italians in cluded, does not exceed 300,000 men. A great accession of strength, it may be objected, has been added by the late conscription ; but has the war in Spain, the mortality of a winter campaign, the rigours of French service, occasioned no loss , equal, at least, in number, but superior in eflici ency, to what it gains by the conscription of iBO9 amid ie. This ,statement, we hope, will explain to many of on: Readers the relaxation which is visible in the policy of BON APA RTE. The great body of his army is in Spain ; and he cannot leithdraw a considerable part of it without risk ' the loss of the Peninsula. hence these sUmpluous detail; of projected operations against Portugal and Andalusia : but which, for two nsonths, have consisted in Mere demon stration. Hence the addresses which pour in from every province and town in Spain; calculated to overawe Austria into concessions. A visible, strong anxiety, even an un certainty, begin to appear in the councils of the tyrant. The supposition, accounting for his inactivity, as it' he wished Austria to appear it the thaiacter of the aggressor s is drivelling in the extreme, end betrays a profound ig norance of the moral feeling and energy of the indi vidual. He knows too well that he does not govern Europe from opinion;—his dominion is that of terror. His political combinatons are not formed with that de:irate d:scrimination,---whether they will receive the approbation in a moral point of view, of his cotemporaries;---their only object is success ; the means et' atiainmeut are per fectly indifferent ; and if he succeed, he is certain of appro , nation;—if he fall, his apparent moderation will not gain him a single partizan, or yaise a single ern; in his support, in any part of Europe. He is not ignorant of this c-r -cumstance; and tyeealls of honour, justice and hurnan;'r, the voice of his cOttroporaries, or the judgment of rs terity, afford a weak barrier to the execution of signs he may have formed against Austria. His modera tion is the effect of weakneis; his justice, of incapacity. But another letter has been foisted on Europe, :mother secret correspondence between the Editors of the Via l! a Gazette and the Hamburgh Correspandenten. It s ae nounced, however, in the Paris Journals, with too sq•eien as'servations of its authenticity. This letter, wuries! of:- ably forged by the French Government, throws an obscine light on the vacillating sentiments of the members of the Rhenish Confederacy. It is apparent. however, that they apprehend, or are disposed, if not collectively at least ia dividually, in favour of Austria. The paragraph of the letter, which alludes to that part of the Anstrian Declara tion of War (how the Editor has got a sight of this intend ed Declaration, the French papers have not deigned to ex plain), which 'denounce vengeance against the' members of the league, and encourages the subjects to shake off their allegiance— is calculated to touse the sluggish 121'111y of •7 :, 1. MA.RCII 19. THE NATIONAL REGISTER. WI ~!. , . i . and his hopes of a happy termination of the unfortnnale ' all the accuracy which the juneture required, of the see- dispute . . dispute were more sanguine and certain. This is the inva- cal corps at that time in Gerneins.;—they amounted, ne- ' ! riable tone of consummate villainy, certain of success. cording to his report, to 210,000, Italians included. Aoy . • • It would be a hazardous speculation to found any con- man, who has gavelled through France, and in the habit jecture on the increase of his moderation and sense of of making ohrei V ations, must have remarkaal, that scarce justice since that period. Miracles may still operate. in a :oliler was to be seen in the interior. The enemy, at ways and for purposes concealed from our limited sight ; the period we allude to, had not 40,000 in the interior, . n., but if the heart of a BONAPARTE ha s become susceptible of the greater part of which were encamped in the `?'Fl generous or humane feelings, we loek upon it as the most 1 ne i g hb our h oo d o f P ar i s , w h e re they were incessantly . . extraordinary manifestation of Divine interference ever exercised under the eyes of BONAPARTE hilllSislf. The . ~.. recorded in profane, or even sacred history. We do not garrison duty at Brest, Touloe, in the fortresses at 13rabizat i recollect a well authenticated instance of grace operating &c. was performed by invalids, or the new organised Na- a' oa arutlian of his cast,—he is incorrigible. As it would be tional troops. There was a small force of regulars kept dangerous to calcu tate on supernatin ai causes, in attempt- at Boulogne, not,exceeding 10,000 men. For the defense 1 lug 'to explain the motives of his acting, we must endeavor of Italy he has aliNys relied more on the terror of his to account for his present policy according to those prin- name, and the inactivity of our councils, than on any ; , ciple;, which seem invariably to have guided the ambitious force he ever maintained there. That is proved to evi- and unprincipled. •dence by the resistance which General Stewart made there ~; na We have coiantly insisted, in opposition to our bro- with his small corps. ,r. ther jou:lutists, and to a very silly and a very inaccurate We thought it of consequence to make this statement, in .. ~ statement of LoadCASTLEREAGH, that the French military order to contradict the extravagant accounts which are , force is not near so numerous as is generally believed and current on this head ; and we still believe, and defy any i .. i stated. l is unquestionably the interest of BONAPARTE to one to contradict on just grounds our F. tatement, that the , impress a very formidable opinion of the strength and num- French effective disposable force, Dutch and Italians in- her of his armies; but we cannot possibly conceive what eluded, does not exceed 300,000 men. A great accession . . motives could operate on the Noble Lord to promote the of strength, it may be objected, has been added by the late I - views of the tyrant in this respect. ilk mis-statements conscription ; but has the war in Spain, the mortality of a ... must arise from wilful prevarication, unpardonable igno- winter campaign, the rigours of French service, occasioned I, ranee, or he considered it as a parliamentary ruse de no loss , equal, at least, in number, but superior in eflici- .: .., . guerre, and therefore Justifiable. Whatever his motives ency, to what it gains by the conscription of 1809 and Jr. 1 may have been, it is of the highest importance to correct This .statement, we hope, will explain to many of on:- his error of judgment or of design; and we would wish to Readers the relaxation which is visible in the policy of i: • know his authority for asserting that the French had BONAPARTE. The great body of his army is in Spain ; and -... .., .., .r. 400,000 men at their disposal, ready to pour into Spain ; i he catthot withdraw a considerable part of it without risk- if the force they had already in the Peninsula, was Made- I the loss of the Peninsula. Hence these sninpl nous details n; : p quate to resist our army. We know it, unfortunately, of projected operations against Portugal and Andalusia. : , , 'W, . that he, as (fell as his colleagues, and, in fact, every pre- hut which, for two months, have consisted in Mere del11011.• 7, vious administration, were grossly ignorant on a subject it stration. Hence the addresses which pour in from every was so much their duty to know, and which they had the province and town in Spain; calculated to overawe Austria . , , •4 • • • means of ascertaining. into concessions. A visible, strong anxiety, even an un- ' .;.., . , The French army, according to the opinion of the best certainty, begin to appenr in the councils of the tyren .t. . , ~;, : , s, ..... informed men on the contineiq, never amounted, for the The supposition, accounting for his inactivity, as if he . 1 ' last eight years, to 300,000 effective men. This state- wished Austria to appear in the diameter of the aggressor s .i. • ...4 mem is corroborated by the authority or the Prince o is drivelling in the extreme, end betrays a profound ig- . : 1 ,, NORENLORE, and indirectly by that of Lord HUTCHINSON. norance of the moral feeling and energy of the hail- , .. ..,1 We are informed that. his Lordship was of opinion the victual. Ile knows too well that he does not govern enemy had not 150,000 in Poland, during the last cam- Europe from opinion :—his dominion is that of' terror. '';:"i• .. " P l :4 '. paign in that country; and we know it to be a. positive His political combinatons are not formed with that de:irate ~. ~,a, . ..-, fact, that their whole force between the Vistula and the e:scrimination,---whether they will receive the approbation .. -:1 ':',`t.,, Rhine did not amount to 50,000. During that entire cam- in a moral point of view, of his cotemporaries;---their paign they were unable to blockade the small fortress of only object is success ; the means of a!lanoneut are per- .. , i -1 . ' • Ai • it'• Colberg, the garrison of which were in tln habit of extend- fee.tly iniliflerent ; and if he succeed, he is certain of appro.. il'-'::,,i;:: . I ing their excursions for more than 50 miles in every diree- nation;—if he fall, his aplr relit moderation will not guil t .1, e , lion; in one of which they picked up General i'i cT o a , him a single partizan, or aeu e , se a single rm in his support, ~ := 4. . who was afterwards exchanged fur &yen ea. • in any part of Europe. He is not ignorant of this ( - 1 - - .t. ' o . '' - As long as the Siege of Dantzic !,sled, their offensive cumstance; and titfeealls of honour, justice and hunian;'r, operations on the Vistula discontinued for want of an efli- the voice of his eotemporaries, or the judgment Of pet. I ." ''.." c eat force; active warfare in that quarter was not resumed terity, afford a weak barrier to the execution of an,- de- , , till the besieging army had reioined the main body. In signs he may have formed against Austria. His imidera- I i . .i*:. • like manner they were unable to oppose any thing like re- tion is the effect of weakneis; his justice, of incapacity. !. sistance to the Swedish army of 15,000 men, near Stralsund But another letter has been foisted on Europe, another 1 , , 1 1 l'. , and Motermt was obliged to c o llect' all the Dut.ch troops, secret correspondence between the Editors of the Vireo . a who occupied the banks of the Ellie, the Weser and the Gazette and the Hamburgh Correspandenten. It ss lc- , . - Ems, time garrisons of Ilainhurgh, Lubeck, Bremen and nounced, however, in the Paris Journals, with too sa . cien 41' ',•'Y lianovei, before he Ives able to resist this small force. aa'aervations of its authenticity. This letter, ungtie.! 0 ::... i t i ~ ..,.. We do not include in this slatament the contingents o f B a . ably forged by the French Government, throws an of segue ~ varia, Wurtemberg, and Baden, which were employed in light on the vacillating sentiments of the members of the i' s . ~:4'• ... . - Silesia, and which may have amounted to about 40,000 Rhenish Confederacy. It is apparent. however, that they ~ .. .. 1 1 ffr .. , men. apprehend, or are disposed, if not collectively at leas; ie. 1 ;).;!'.'"3 , From the above statement it is clear that the whole force dividuallv, in favour of Austria. The paragraph of the 1. : .;.; -.',:. of the enemy, including Dutch, Italians, and Germans, letter, which alludes to that part of the Austrian Declara- • -••, A . i,,.:,. li dal not exceed 250,000 men. What renders us mace posi- lion of War (how the Editor has got a sight of this intend- . ~.Fr,i,, tine in this opinion, is. its coincidence with . a statement e d Declaration, the French papers have nut deigned to ex- , : -, , ,i. 'i , •," ..., .., a made by the Prince of IIonENIAM IP:, in the autumn of 1806. plain), which 'denounce vengeance against the meinhera of 's;i,, When war between Prussia and France was thouelit proha- 1 the league, and encourages the subjects to shake off their I . . *:. ble, he sent a list to the Cabinet of Berlin, collected with 1 allegiance-- is calculated to touse the sluggish layalty t,f ; 0 ',.. i . 1'•,,.'. . ii... . . M,A.TICTI 19.