The National Register. — London, England, 1811-09-08 00:00:00

' 4 l NATIONAL REGISTER `~ eur king, Canaittitian, anb 11-04, PRINTED AND g 3 tIBLISETED AT NO. 5, PICKETT-STREET, STRAND, NEAR TEMPLE BAR. • N°.193. POUT. DISQUISITION. No. 179. f SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 811. PR TCE 9d. treaty what we have shed so much blood and wasted so much treasure to withhold from him, without instantly impressing the continental States, who, though loaded with fetters, still look up to us as their future deliverers, with a fatal belief that we found the cause was hopeless : a belief that must, even should favourable opportunities occur, palsy the arm of resistance, for how, would they think, can the slave and the feeble succeed against him whom the free and mighty have opposed in vain and at last made their ally ! • Such would be the advantages which France would derive from a treaty founded on the basis of statu quo. They would be great, undoubtedly, far greater than we ought, if possible, to allow ; but yet we are convinced they would not satisfy NAPO* L EON. His policy leads him, in all his diplomatic as well as military transactions, not so much to re tain as to acquire, and this basis would only secure to him the possession of that be already enjoys, with out adding to the number of his means or the ex tent of his dominions. Nay, he would purchase this security by the sacrifice of all the former colo nies of France and Holland which are now occupied by our troops, whilst those of Spain would also elude his grasp, as their independence from the Mo ther Country, lately proclaimed, would then be more easily accomplished. These cotbiderations, which, we have no doubt, would not escape NAPO LEON'S attention, form an additional reason for re fusing to credit the pacific rumour to which we have already alluded. But, on the other hand, what would be the si tuation of this country, were such a treaty con cluded. Armed with the undisputed sovereignty of the seas, we should retain all the conquests which, in the course of the war, we have m a de in every part of the world. All the colonies of Fr+nce and Holland in the East and in the West, on the South American or African Continent, would become integral parts of our dominions. The liberty and integrity of Portugal, already re. conquered by our arms, would be secured by the treaties, always supposing that it could be deemed safe to conclude a peace with the French Emperor. Our trade would roll once more Into its former channels, and spread over the whole ontinent. Our vast accession of colonies would us to supply all the wants of the world out W i.ikelL.# RUMOURED NEGOTIATION FOR PEACE. .t. ; r, A rumour lately reached us, which we at first disregardea and wouldl2ave passed by unnoticed had it not been renewed from so many quarters as to gtow entitled to some consideration. It stated, that not only had negotiations for peace been opened between France and England, but.that the grand and general basis of• in statu quo . had been laid. Although we are still little inclined to grant much I report, yet, as we think the question Igh in itself to justify an investiga ierits, we shall endeavour to unfold 'Jut faiily to our Readers in the fol ,servations. In entering into such an ex not discuss the propriety or im more forming a treaty with the pre- France, bgt examine whether the ru woUld Winstref great advantage to we could 'admit without violating engagements with allied nations. • peace be concluded on the terms men would be the state of the present Bel- France would remain in posses countries which we cannot hope for wrench from her grasp, and which northern campaigns have enabled her `mpire. The national extinction of destruction of the Hanseatic league, of the Hanse towns, the erection \gdoms, and the firm establishment itical and military supremacy in Ger creation of the Confederation of the receive our sanction. Spain, with a few fortresses, already held by ,st remain in his possession, and the influence which he has acqpired over ,urope, and which although now felt his allies, or rather his vassals, still feeling of indignation which at the :y would blaze out into avenging prove resistless and perhaps endless opposed by our counsels and our .er inveighing against his ambitious ;gressions, after contending with ' many years, we cannot grant v .„ . . fir".j6 ezr..., li , i tA 7 . ,•,. I: ~ tlarsl/'u 1~ai..~1 credit to such a r - important .enoug .tion into its rneri them briefly but lowing obseryatic - position,. we sha: policy of once m sent Ruler of Fr moured basis w 4 us, and which v car engagements Should a peac tioned, what wot ligerent Powers ? sion of those co many years to w her three last nor to unite to her er Holland, the de: and occupation of dependent king of French politic many by the cre Rhine, must rec -he exception of the enemy, must overpowering inf continental Eurc and dreaded by I excites a secret f first opportunity hostility, must p when no longer arms. For, afte and lawless aggr power for so mat Fol. 1 17. ~+