The National Register. — London, England, 1812-09-13 00:00:00

------ z ' . ..• - W. THE NATIONAL REGISTER. Cur Kiel, Constitution, :ma Latins. - PUBLISHED AT NO. 357, STRAND, CORNER OF EXETER. 'CHANG& PRICE 9d. No. 246 SUND AY, SE PTEMBER 13. 11:111 POLITICAL DIS2UISITION. SPANISH CAMPAIGN. The hopes-Which a view of the Spanish campaign, imme diately after the battle of Salamanca, encouraged us to ex press,. though sanguine, we're neither extravagant nor un founded. Every arrival has since nroved them just ; and, notwithetanding the anticipati ms of the despondent, and the misrexesentatinnilif a few writers who still pretend to expect nothlhg 4at ruin from our triumphs, the full tide of British succeitOptinues. to roll unobstructed against French des . potism,- through every part of the Peninsula, •As envy is ever alive to - - detract from merit its due, there are some, but stnel is their nntnber and great is their disregard of truth and of public opinion ; who still attempt to as cribe . to chance, events which are the result of the deep est : :*nbiiiations of genius. They cannot deny that im port*. advantages have been gained, and brilliant exploits athieved, but they contend, that for the one we are solely indebtA to the unguarded hurry of the enemy in endeavour ing to profit by our errors, and for the other to the mere me chanic-d valour of our men. They do not choose to perceive in the vat ions movements of the forces under LordW EL L INC- T 3A, the traces of a regular plan, and therefore do not suppose that contingencies have been calculated, and that it was only after a due and ralture consideration of his means, that our s';ilful Commander, convinced of their adequacy, undertook the noble task of liberating Spain. In their wisdom they judge him to have rushed beyond the Portuguese frontiers, uncon scious, and perhaps careless, of what might folloW his rash. • advance, but relying.for safety on the courage of his men in whatever situation they might be placed. They conceive it probable. therefore, that he will be driven from all his con quests with the same rapidity he has effected them; and with their usual good nature endeavour to poison the enthusiastic exultation of the people, by the apprehension of future dis wtets. But the season of popular delusion is past. The victories that have demolished the fabric of French tyranhy in Spai.i, have also dissolved th 4 mists of prejudice at home. The nation, grown fully sensible of the mttgnitude and effi cacy of its military means, and of the ability ant energy with which they are wielded, now requi res. a continuance of those exertions which have already been crowned with such signal success. The Cry of alarm is heard without dismay, as totally unjustifiable, and in the glorious cause of freedom, fought for on the plains of the Peninsula, all ranks feel the same interest, and the hearts of the cottager and peerbeat for once in unison. Such a revolution of popular feeling is not the result of argumentation or bribery. It is the effect of experience on minds naturally •well disposed, too vehement not to be sometimes misled, but endowed with too much reason to long under the power of prejudice and delusion. But what is the experience that has produced such a sudden and universal change ? It is that of facts ; that, which only a few patical ravens, who still croak evil bodings in the public ear, vainly try to discredit; that which proves that our successes in Spain are not the consequences of unfore seen chances and _circumstances, but sprifig. frcgn a regular Vol. Y, . No. pla i n, which every additional triumph serves to unfold and which now lies open to every fair and unprejudiced observer. Lord W. knew that although the Russian war had comoelleci BUON AP ARTE to recap several corps from Spain to the North, the French force in that country was still considerable ; surpassing far that which he had under his own command, or which he could derive from Spain itself. But it was divided, and Offered him several points of attack. on which he could bring, if not a superiority, at least au equality of force. if he engaged them separately, the tried valour able • men, their confidence in his abilities, and their devotion to the cause in which they fought, secured him from defeat, if they did not insure him victory. A doubtful battle left him the power of retiring unbroken, whilst a triumph enabled him, from the distance at which " the other French armies were posted. to pursue the advantages he had gained, until he had either destroyed the force with which he had been engaged, or unfitted it for further opera tions. He mi g ht then fill upon.a new enemy and follow the same system until there ,:bould remain no opponent to conquer. At the period this plan was formed the French force in the Peninsu'a waft divided into three armies. That of M A UMW< T o' cipied the north, SOULT the south, and SUCHET the east. T . ..lere were besides a fi.wo intermediary corps to maintain their com munications with each other, and a pretty considerable divi viston.for the protection of the capital. Had our Colman . der,•at the opening of the campaign, marched direct against Madrid, SOULT and M A RMONT would have instantly joined. and compelled him, from their overbea , ing •superiority. to a precipitate, and, perhaps, a ruinous retreat. To fight them with success be must have kept them divided, and for this purpose, as well as to conceal his real intent whilst he was securing the means of carrying it into execution, he distract -1 1 cd the attention of the enemy by the sudden attack and cap- Iture of Ciudad Ilt)drigo in the north , the destruction of the 1 bridge and forts at Almaraz in the centre, and the brilliant storm and reduction of Badajoz in the south. Thus, on three I most important points, he not only alarmed, but materially ; weakened the French, and clea red the way f . or the invasion 1 of Spain either in the north or in the south, leaving his op ponents unable to ascertain on which side he intended to act. I and therefore to unite for its defence. M ARNIONT being i the neare3t, he resolved to attack him, and, if he succeeded in defeating him, to drive the Usurper from his capital. II The greatest rapidity was requisite to prevent a junction of ;hostile forces, and by the capture of Salamanca his Lordship I hoped to bring MARMON T singly to a battle; but when he found that General had taken up a position behind the Douro where he could receive r,!infi,rcements, he drew him from his strong holds by a retrograde movement, and by a show of timidity filled him with that excess of _confidence which anticipates triumph but meets with ruin, and which, in this instance, emboldened M A RMONT to tight even before he had been joined by his cavalry and the powerful division Ibrought Ly JOSEPH in his rear. No sooner , had cur Comm 1 . mander punished his pres um p tion at the sanguinary battle 1 of Salamanca, than he followed his routed opponent to the 1 of p is ru ect t - t t r h . a a t n h d is a! th i e iu sa te m. time ba" k s leav in t g he J opsoEurrn",no"crnsuPsieettiongsuls) ,