The National Register. — London, England, 1813-09-19 00:00:00

SEPT. 19. alter of their commercial existence, and with that, ni their means ° I subsistence. This vi.dent step was adopted, without even any plausible pretensions, in contemp of every decent form, without any previous declaration, or communication with any other Cabinet, under the arbi trary 3,:d futile pretest that the war with England required it. This cruel sys,em, which was intended to destroy the commerce of the wori.l, at the expellee of the independence, the prosperity, the ri hts unti ,li.;nity, and in utter ruin of the public and private property of a:I the Continental Pnwers, was parsued with unrelenting seven's, in the vain expeetailon of forcing a result, winch, had it not fortunately proved unattainable, wuu d have plunged Europe • for a longtime to Come into a state of poverty, impotence, and barbarity. The Decree by %% HO a new Y each dominion was established on the German coast, and of the title of a Thirty-second Military Division,wns in itself sufficiently calcidated to raise tile suspicions of the adjoining States, and it was the more aisrmi: to 'heat as the forerunner of fu ture and greater daiwers. By this decree it became evident, that the s‘ St- m which had been cre Eted in France (although previously trans es. d. vet ;ail! nroclaiu to be in existence), the system of the pre tended irittiral liriiN of the French Empire, was, without any further ju-lication or estc•m. lion, overthrown, and even the Emperor's arbi trary acts were in tl.e s one arbitrary macner annihilated. Neither the Prince, the E lie: ish Confederacy, nor the kingdom of Westpha lia, no teiritore. great or sm. It, was spared,. in the accomplishment of this dread'ul u.dirpatian. The humid .ry drawn apparently by blind caprice. with int either rule or plan. without sully consideration of an cient or more recent poinical relati •ns, intersected rivers and countries, cut off tlw middle and southern zstatcs of Germany him' all connection „lilt the German Sea, passed the Übe, separated Deamark from Ger many, laid its pick nsions even to the Baltic, and seemed to be rapidly ai)Pf oat:lung the line of l'russean fortresses still occupied on the 04-r ; and so little did this act of wail-pinion (however powerflilly it affected all rightvand p , ssessions, all geoaraphic, political, and military demarcation) carry with it a charm ter of determinate and cnimplete uczession of territory, that it was impossible to view it in any other light than Its a forerunner of still greater usurpations, by which one balf of Germany was to become a French Pro• ince, and the Emperor Napoli on the absolute Ruler of the Continent. To Russia and Prussia this turamtural extension of the French terri tory could not fail of producing the most serious alarm. The latter, surrounded on all sides, no longer capable of free action, deprived of emery means of obtaininT fresh strenoth, appeared hastening to its dis sok.,rion. Russia, already in fear kr her westr en frontier, by the con version of the city of Monza:, declared a free city by the Treaty of Til sit, into a French military port, and of a great part of Poland into a French province, could not but see, in the advance of the French do minion along the va coast, and in the new chains prepared for Prussia, Ole imminent (faller of her German and Polish possessions. From this moment, therefore, time rupture between France and Russia was as good as decided. Not without .deep and just nnxiety did Austria observe the storm which was eathering. The scene of hostilities woeld in every case be contiauous to her Provinces, which, owing to the necessary reform it; the fi n ancial system, which has cramped the te , toratien of her military means, were in a very defenceless state. lit a h„-her point of view, the struggle %Inch awaited Prussia appeared still m o re doulaul, as it commenced under the sae unfavourable conjunction of affairs, with the same want of co-operation on the part of other Powers, end with the same disproportion in their relative means, consequently was just as hopeless us all former straggles of the same nature. His Majesty the Emperor made every effort in his power by friendly meditation aid; both parties to avert the impending storm. No human judament could at that time foresee that the period was so near at hand, when the failure of tht se friendly aileMpts should prove mare ihjoiious to the Emperor Naror.aos; than to his opponents. Thus, however, it was re solved by the wisdom of Providence. When the commencement of hostilities was ao longer &Wald, his Maje.ay was compelled to have recontae to measures which, in so un natural and.dangerous a conjuncture, might combi to his oa security with just considerations for the real iaterests of neighbouring States. The system of unarmed inacti4l, the only neutrality which tho Empe ror Nwoleon, according to his own declarations, would have permitted, was by every sound mmtios of policy wholly inadi»issible, and would at last have proved only a vain endeavour to sbrink trout the approach ing trial. A power so important as Austria could not mmme all par ticipation in the Interests of Europe, our could she place herself in a situation ill whieh, equally inatfcctiee in peace or war, she would rose her voice and influence in all great negotiations, without acquiring any guaranee for the security of her own froetier. TN prepare for war, aaitiast France would have ;teen, under the existing ci. Cents! a I iCeSt as little consonant with equity as with prodeitee. The Emperor Napoleon had given Ws Majesty no personal ground fur hostile pincuOiags ; THE NATIONAL REGISTER:__, .46* 7- 507 ifitl and the prospect of attaining many beneficial results ley a Nki employment of the established friendly relations, by colKientiall representations, and by conciliatory 'councils, had not yet been abandoned as hopeless. And with regard to the immediate interest of the State, such a revolution would inevitably have been attended with this consequence—that the Austrian territory would base become the first and principal seat of war, which with its n ell known deficiency of means of defence could, in a short time, have overthrown the monarchy. In this painful situation Ids Majesty bad no other resonrce than to take the field on the side of France. To take up arms ter h ranee, in the real sense of the word, would have been a measure not only in contradiction with the duties and principles of the Emperor, but even with the repeated declarations of his Cabinet, which had, without any reserve, disapproved of the war. On the signature of the Treaty of the 12th March, 191'1, his Majesty pro cceded upon two distinct principles : The first, as is proved by the .vords of the Treaty, was to leave no means untried which might sooner or later obtain a peace ; the other, was to place bimseff in ternally and externally in a position, which, if it should prove im possible to effect a peace, or in case the turn of the war should tier decisive measures in this part necessary, would enable Austria to act with independence, and in either of these cases to adopt the measures, which a just and wise policy should prescribe. Upon this principle it was that only a fixed and comparatively small pail of the army was destined to cooperate in the war ; the other mili tary resenrces, at that time in a state of readiness, or that still remained to be prepared, were not called forth for the prosecution of this war. By a kind of tacit agreement betwecii the Bellige rents, the Austrian territory was even treated as ventral. Tee real end and views of the system adopted by his Majesty ti old not escape the notice of France, Hus.ia, or any intelligent observer. The campaign of 1812 furnished a memorable example of the failure of an undertaking supported by gigantic powers, conducted by a Captain of the first rank, when, in the confidence of great military talents, he despises the rides of prudence, and waster; the bounds of nature. ,The illusion of glory carried the Emperor Na poleon into the heart of the Russian -Empire ; and a false political view of things induced him to imagine that be stiould dictate a peace in Moscow, should cripple the Bufsian Power for half a ea:tinny, and then return victorious. When this magnanimous constancy of the Emperor of Russia, the glorious deeds of his warriors, and the unshaken fidelity of his people, put an end to this dream, it was too late to repent it with impunity. The whole French army was scattered and destroyed : in less than fir months we have seen the theatre of war transferred from the Dnieper and the Dwina to the Oder and the Elbe. This rapid and extraordinary change of fortune was the fore ninner of an important revolution in all the political relations of Europe. The confederacy of Russia, Great Britain, and Sweden, presented -a. point of union to all eeighbonring States. Prussia, whom report had long declared 'determined to risk all, to piefer even the danger of immediate political destruction to the lingering sufferings of continued oppression, seized the favourable moment, and threw hers( If into the arms of the Allies. Alai)? greater and smaller Princes of Germany inert.. ready to do the same. Every where the ardent desires of the. people anticipated the regular pi o ceedings of their Governments. Their impatience to live in inde prudence, and under their own laws, the sentiments of IA owe ed na tional honour, and the hatred of a foreign dominion, broke out in Inieht flames on all sides. His Majesty the Emperor, too intelligent not to censidcr this change of affairs, as the natural and necessary consequence of a • previous violent- political convulsion, and too just to view it in anger, was solely bent upon securing, by digested and wt.ll-com bleed measure l, the real and permanent interest of the European Commonwealth. Already, in the beginning of December, consi derable steps had been taken on the part of the Austrian Cabinet, in order to dispose the Emperor Napoleon to quiet and peaceful co hey, on grounds which equally interested the world mei his own wee rare. These steps were from time to time renewed and enforced. ilopes been entertained that the impression of last year's cam paign, the recollection of the fruitless sacrifice of an immense army, the severe measures of every description that would be necessary to replace that Loss, the decided disinclination of France, anti of all those nations conneeted with her, to a war. which, withme any prospect of tutnre indemnification, exhausted and Fumed her interni.l strength; that lastly, even a calm reflection on the doubtful Issue of this new and highly imminent crisis, would ne.VC the Emperor to listen to the wresentations of Austria. The tone of these repre i stetations was carefitlly adapted to the circumstances of the time , . serious as the greatness of the object, 'underage as the desire of a favourahle issue, and as the existing friendly relations required.