The National Register. — London, England, 1812-05-31 00:00:00

THE NATIONAL REGISTER. Conotitution, anti tab3o. PRINT! D AND PUBLISUED AT NO. 5, PICKETT-STREET, STRAND, NEAR TEMPLE BAR. V 231. SUNDAY, NI AY 31, 1812. PRICE 9 -t- v. , 7 16 .1 41 THE POLICY ABROAD CONSIDERED. • TO THE EDIT OR OF 'I HE NATIONAL REGISTER' ......_—• m....... d !Jr ;;I{~ EXTENDING OUR SYSTEM OF MILITARY OPERATIONS Slat,—A recent correspondence has brought this im taht subject in a tangible shape before the public. It is unnecessary to advert to the momentous nature of the question ; and it wou?d be almost presumptuous to offer a peremptory opinion, when persons of the highest politi cal authority express sentiments diametrically opposite. However, neither side has offered more than simple asser tion, and until they favour the public with the grounds. upon winch they re..t their conviction, I should not con sider myselfinstified in assenting implicitly to an authority unsupported by filet or argument. it implies, Sir, the most correct knowledge of our re sources, to maintain or deny the practicability of extend. ing the scale of our militias- operations on the Continent. That knowledge, but few have an opportunity of acquir ing ; and those who possess the greatest facilities in that respect, who are presumed to be masters of the subject, hive increased the difficulties attending the discussion by th mai ked differences contained in their corres pondence. Without presuming to determine whether Lord WEL LESLEY) or Lord LivEltPooh, has the advantage of truth r.r. his side, I must acknowledge that the present state of tlu Continent appears to offer a strong argument in favour of a vigorous application of our energies. At the came time the relaxation visibly apparent in the efforts of the eriemy in the Peninsula, strongly recommends any measure wnich mi Olt enable Lord WELLINGTON to take advantage of their present embarrassments. This is certainly a most critical juncture in the affairs of Spain and Portugal. The vast force which IluoNAhmorE is collecting in Poland ; the . magnitude of the object he has there in view ; the resistance he has to apprehend, and the necessity he is under of covering his rear, and keeping open his communications with France,—these complicated c,nses will compel him to consider every other object as one of a secondary policy and alarm. The negociations pend• ri between our Government and that of Sweden, must also excite his most serious apprehensions. Whatever may be the extent of his activity or of his resources, the 'Jos tle attitude of the Northern States, will require their ful lest employment. No man is better acqu-Jintel than he is h . ith the difficulties and dangers of a Russian war. The Pze of his preparations attests his anxiety ; and the French Ruler is too shrewd not to perceive, that no victories or acquisition s made beyond the Niemen, will compensate f r the risks and loss he will incur in the contest. The battle of Austerlitz, or of Eylau, oh any other engage ment he fought with the Russians, will offer him no en couraging recollections on the opening of a campaign, or 0 . 0 the eve of a confli c t. 'Fh e battle of Evlau Alone caused lum a loss of 30.000 men in killed and Nv ounded. Three or four such victories, would leave him alone to prosecute his plan of conquests in Russia. 17 4.1 7 . No. t. Involved in a contest of that description, BUON APAIITL will have no means of detaching reinforcements to his az-. mies in the Peninsula. We see him, on the contrary, withdrawing a considerable part of his torces from ilmt quarter. Would it not, therefore, be of the utmost im portance to take advantage of his weakness there, and compd, him to disgorge in Spain, what he may de• vour in Poland ? Lord WELLINGTON has opened the campaign under the most brilliant and auspicious circumstances. The Spa niards themselves begin to display renewed energies ; and their Government seems to be animated by an honest det r mination to co-operate vigorously with the Ailies for the liberation of the Peninsula. These are hopes whi;:h the most ardent amongst us did not dare encourage ; ana, I trust, they will not be disappointed horn ill-timed and er roneous motives of. economy. I call them, Sir, erro. neoni, because by making great expence and exertions for a short time, we might soon be able to curtail both to half their present enormous standard. Do we mean. to leave this war a fatal inheritance to our children ? A contest, which by a generous exertion might be terminated in the course of twelve months, is likely to last as many years.. Sikh a protracied.state of wai faie none can contemplate without horror, or look to i:s conclusion wid.out dismay. The best interests of humanity have already suffered too much tinder its duration c 1 pressure. I therefore anxiously wish to see the practicabilitvof ex tending..our military operations on the Continent, proved in this most favourable juncture. If the present be neglect ed, fortune, I am afraid, will not offer another. Should rho Allies re-occupy Made id, and expel the invaders from the South, BUO:4APARTE would not retrieve the loss and disgrace—by even planting ins eagles on the towers of Petersburgh and Moscow. The event would terrify in the midst of his triumphs ; and all his conquests in the North would he ephemeral acquisitions, if Lord WELLINGTON, at the head of a British, Spanish, and Portuguese force, threatened to p:lss the barrier of t.;,e Pyrenees. His Lordship already presses upon the enemy every direction. They fly at his a pproach. They suffer the most important fortresses to be taken, without darhig to hazard a battle for their relief. This is a strong con fes%ion of their weakness. With such palpable pro'.fs of a great change in the character of the war, the public would not shriiiik from an experiment, however euen sive, which should be likely to expel the enemy frt in Spain. Could any sacrifice be too great, -t,v!;i,.11 would secure the attainment of such an object ? Were BtroNA PA RTE absolute and undisputed master of the rest of ITA rope, this reverse in the Peninsula would outweigh all his other advantages, and ultimately subvert his authori•v. I wish, to know, Sir, the amount of our disposeakle regular force. If it were possible to send ittimediatelr R reinforcement of 20,000 to Spain, I should in that case feel the strongest confidence that the French, in less than three months, would he obliged to abandon the whole of the South of Spain, together with the capital, and probably retreat as far as the Ebro. All the resources and population of Spain would be thus placed at the disposal . '4i