The National Register. — London, England, 1808-02-15 00:00:00

IMP ■ ~~ I . • a j .:.• ; -• THE NATIONAL REGISTER. regulattog the suspension of the conflicting designs of Russia and France upon the Turkish Empire, it can nevec.be contended that our interests were mortally a minded by such a consention. That, if any article in the Treaty of Tilsit related to the Turkish Empire, it was no article regulating the suspension of the de signs of the contracting parties upon that Empire, is absolutely certain. On no other terms could Pe.►ce between them have been contrixted. The designs of Russia upon the Turkish Empire,and the designs of France, are opposed to one another. About the partition of those spoils they never will agree. In that question too, Austria is more deeply interested than any tither Power, and will, whenever it comes to he decided, risk even her exist ence, to turn the decision in her own favour. To have agitated the question of the partition of time Turkish Empire, was to kindle anew, instead of extinguishing► the flames cif war; and it was only by agreeing to lay aside these designs for a season t hat Russia and France could have concluded a Peace. Nor is this the only convincing proof afforded us of this important poiut. What rational motive could the Emperor Alexautier have for urging Peace bet Ween this country and France, had he known that, in conjunction w ith France, he was about to make an attack upon the Turkish Empire? Was he not absolutely certain that we should take arms on snch an occasion, if not to preserve the Turkish Empire, at least to secure to Austria as large a share of that Empire as possible? lie could have no motive, therefore, in urging, with so much earnestness, a Peace which mast immediately he brokon ; and from this circumstance it is abundantly evident that no secret article for the partition of the Turkish Empire existed. If it be said that he and Napoleon intended to deceive us into Peace, the more easily to accomplish their designs upon Turkey. this is absurd. The fact is, that a state of War affords many occasions for surprising a neighbouring state, but a condition of Peace is entirely ad verse to it. When a large force is already on foot it i► easy,. by pretending one destination, to accomplish another. But, if in a season of Peace, Europe beheld Russia and France conjointly arming, and drawing forces towards Turkey, there would be only one conclusion. It is a very extraordinary truth, that at the moment of the Treaty of Tilsit, the Emperors Alexander and Napoleon, could they have agreed about the partition of Turkey, po ,, sessed advantages for the accomplishment of their object, which there was no probability they would ever again obtain. How easy for them would it have been to have im posed absolute silence upon Austria, which had no force that could once have faced them, and have been in possession of Con stantinople before a British army could hate approached the scene of action ! That they did not act in this manner, at the moment of unequalled advantage, is demonstrative proof, that the design was laid aside, because the two Monarchs were sure they could not amicably settle their pretensions. In regard to a Northern Confederacy againq our maritime claims, and st secret article to this effect in the Treaty of Tilsit, credulity and prejudice themselves will not believe this after the intelligence -which we have now received. W hat is it that his Imperial Majesty so earnestly urges in the conference, we have previously inserted, with Lord Hutchinson? It is peace. But K Northern Conrederacy required War. With what absurd al legations have we been perplexed. Could a Northern Confede racy have accomplished any object which they had at heart, their business w as to prosecute the War; they would never have spoken of Peace. It is said, however, that the Northern Con federacy was planned, in case we should refuse to make Peace. This is truly amusing. What indication of this do we tind in the tone or proposals of the Emperor ? What was he to gain by -)ssible cousequence could a Northern Confederacy Td, but, at the wont, to render the War a little 'e on our part ? That it could Lave had auv such :cc us to renounce our claims, is absurd. in the .us•sia must hale sustained the expense of a Mari . the store lass of her commerce, We :Pout it. rr.n. 16. therefore, as a point ascertained to certainty, that no c on fd, racy, on the part of Russia, was meditated a:oinst us at the car, elusion of the Treaty of Tikit ; we regard it too as a point equally certain, that she would have opposed herself, if ma with arms, at least with reanoi.• trances, to any attempt of Bona parte to violate the neutrality of Donmark ; and we regard it as a point highly probable, that Bonaparte would not have vio lated it in the face of tbe , ,e rc:nowtrawe,,. In this first conversation, every thing on the part of the Em peror breathes a spirit of friendship towards this country. H e is first anxious to.justify to us the Peace is bleb he had wale. lie appeals to our Minister, whether eyen he did not act-mutt the Peace, which hail been concludiel, 71:Tess:try to Russia. in the mtmemphatical mat:ner did that !Minister pronounce his ()piffle ! . in unison with that of the Emperor. Compelled, by imperious necessity, to make a Peace for himself, his good offices were in terposed immediately to accomplish Peace between us and one enemy ; not (according to the just distiection which he made himself) in the spirit of vanity, but in that of friendship, since he regarded Peace as equally conducive to our imerests, and to those of t h e other nations of Europe ; and since he knew that terms, which he considered both reasoeable and honourabl e , nay, which, he could appeal to our Minist , r himself, were reasonable mai honourable, would he offered by our enemv. Nothing, ton, can afford a greater indication of simplicity and sincerity, than the manner in which the Emperor answers the objection of Lord Hutchinson respecting the shortness of the time °tiered for our acceptance of the mediation. it appears, clearly, that the limitation of the period, on a hicla so much stress was laid in this country, had been regarded by the Lin peror, as a mere formality, and of no importance whatsoever. At the moment of this conference, it appears a certainty almost as strong as a case of such a nature admits, that Russia was en tirely the friend of this country : and the probability was grett that she would much sooner again he the enemy of France, than the enemy of England. Her friendship is it h France was com pelled; of course ungrateful, and likely to last in, longer than the necessity was urgent. .411 that t.'ar and jealousy of France, which had precipitated her into the contest, not Only remained, but was more reasonable than ever. With England she had no quarrel, but that of too feeble a co-operation ; the tie of ancient connection remained unbroken ; and England is as still the grand resource against the terror of her great contioental antagonist. She might still, in a very important sense, have been regarded as the Ally of England. Such, it appears with the strooge.4 eii dence, were the relations between Russia and England, which remained after the Treaty of 'Tilsit. How deplorable' am! mighty was the change atfreted by the atmck on Copenhagen, the second conference with the Emperor, of whidi Lord Hutch inson stated the details, is a memorable and - eriking proof:— " intelligence, said his Lordship, of the reetlt of the attack , on Copenhagen arris ed at St. l'etet! , burgli um the '27th or 2Sth of August. On the dth of September I saw the Emperor a s fluid time at Kamincostroff. " Ilk Imperial Majesty began the conversation by askinr me, what I thought of our attack. upon Copenhagen " I replied, that I was entirely ignorant of the eirctomtance4 which hail neva-limed that attack, hot that I hoped the Admi nistration in England could ,justify' themselves, and prove to the world that the Danes were on the. eve ofjoinim; all their forces to the French, to make common e..tisr aj,:iinst Englnid. " llis Imperial Majesty told me in reply, that it nai impos sible for me to be of that opinion, It I would recollect the re peated conversations which had taken place between us, on the subject of Denmark. at Rartenstein, in v. hick he told me that he had used every 03'4)11 in his power to bring fornard the Cron is Prince of Denmark, a n d to induce him to join lll'' enalition agaiu,t France; the an , v‘ets of the Prince had altxays !wen ex plicit ond uniform, that he had maintained for many years a system of neutralitx , iu whirl, he s. as determined to per-were, as the people whom he ginerned bad nourished aad pros;lercd trader it; and that ;to consideration khoulil ever him tis depart from 11.--H is Imperial Majesty tid:led, that I must he avilitainted with tho devi.ion of tharaeter n hirh Lekulud It? What pol Digininda ditty roduced \ CAST V -6111-, * for( kIA Itu i r ' A id /IF \la y AM' • • A a i r • : ;, 1: