The National Register. — London, England, 1808-07-17 00:00:00

. • NATIONAL IttGMl'llit THE ? ! (hi ling, iironaitution, anb 11,031. SUNDAY, JULY 17, 1808. No. 29. POLITICAL DISQUISITION. WEXNER TWENTY-NIX& CAN A CO-OPERATION IN FAVOUR OF SPAIN BE EXPECTED FROM AUSTRIA ? -.•....-: Political discussions, even in ordinary events; are so viable to mistake, that the political writer should adopt the highest degree of caution in his disquisitions. Actuated by this principle we endeavoured, in opposition to our warmest wishes and heartfelt partkipation in the efforts of a gene rous people, to restrain our desires, and to examine the first accounts we received from Spain with an unbiassed judgment, and according to the experience of late events. In adopting this prudential course the superficial or too Sangninc observer Might suppose, that some of our pre ceding Numbers had a tendency to weaken the public in terest in favour of the Spanish Patriots. We have been so frequently disappointed iu the course of sixteen years; we have seen projects, apparently suggeited by the highest rlitical sagacity, so easily fruitrated, that we thought it prudent to wait for official communications, or more re . - plar intelligence, before we could renounce facts and ex periehce, for the first uncertain and unofficial accounts we received relative to the Spanish Insurrection. However, as an obitinate adherence to error is not the character of this Paper, and as a higher object is proposed in it than to suppdrt the interests of a party, in opposition to the general interests of the community, we make now no difficulty of declaring, whatever distruit or appreli'en sion we felt in the commencement, that the situation of Spain is such at present as to promise a result, which the must sanguine, or the most enthusiastic; would not have dared to expect three months ago. Every new intelligence bringi a corroboration of this Opinion. It is not the partial insurrection Of a few towns 6r districts, or of one or two provinces—it is the simulta heous rising of a grossly offended people. . Abandoned as they were by those to whom they were accustomed to look up for c(,unsel or redreis, they were obliged to appeal to themselves in this extraordinary emergency: All those iegulatnins arid contracts. which fOrmed a code of poli tical jurisprudence for the several States of the Cimtinent, were violated and rendered null by the very man, who projected their subjection and ruin. Fortunately however that this unprincipled man had lost sight of, or, in the inso lence of his success, diiregarded the circumspection he found it eipedient to observe in his preceeding transac 'ions. But on this occasion, he was guilty of the most un provoked violation of every thing that ii dear to a people, without even condescending to palliate the aggreision. injuries are fOrgotten by a people; as well as by indivi dnals—but insults never. And here the insult is aggra vated bithe gross contempt he showed for the feelings and understandings of that gallant people, and by the baseness and perfidy he displayed during the Whis a le. films actiovi: • Now thit we have the circumstances of that iniquitous Pe. XXIX.—VoI. PIUCE i 3 aggression before us, so very far from being astonished at , the resistance and detestation shewn by the Spaniards; we are inclined from an observation of their national charac- ' ter, to believe that their future efforts will correspOndwith their present exertion ; and if they fall, which we are now far from apprehending, they will fall with our . admiratinti and regret, aqd with the conviction that their struggle would he probably the last against the most outrageous system of usurpation ever imposed on Mankind. , • • As every day raises this magnanimous people our opinion, let us, instead of indulging ourselves in a pomp- • Ous enumeration el their prowess and high spirit, examine how they may be efficaciously assisted. l. A very fortunate circumstance for the hp itniardi is the extent of the French conquests, net one of which can be abandoned, without prodUcing events Similar to those which have occurred in Spain. Another circumstance. equally imiiortant, is, that the French Army is not near so numerous, a, is commonly supposed. lu asserting that it does not ainifunt to 250,000, exclusive of the auxiliaries, we are confident that our atisertion cannot be satisfactorily refuted. Let us now examine how many Bonaparte can safely employ beyond the Pyrenees. „ As long as we keep from ten thouiind to fifteen thou sand men in Sicily, he will be obliged to have at least 25;000 men in the Kingdom of N aples; and in consequence of the fernientation which reigns in every part of Italy, he must have 15,000 in Tuscany and the' Roman State. It is probable he will find it expedient not to diminish the corps of Davoust; in Poland, which has the double object, bf awing Russia and menacing Austria. The corps in Sileiia is scarce Sufficient to occupy the numerous fortresses in that country. It Mal , not be unnecessary to observe at the same time; that a considerable part of this force con sists of his German Allies, who, in case of a new conti nental war, will nit oppose any cordial aslstance to Austria ; whilit the army under the command of Mar• mint will probably remain in Dalmatia, in order to sup port his intrigues in Turkey, and for the purpose of inti midating the Court of Vienna. Without the most imm: 7 tient danger he cannot withdraw a single regiment from the corns of Bernadette t for there is every reason to bclie:ie that the Ilanoverians, and the provinces com posing the new Kingdom of Westphalia, are not disinclined to follow the example of the Spanish nation. , And if the 'deteitation; which the Brabanters and Dutch feel against the French, be considered; it may be presumed that Bonaparte will not leave thOse countries in a defenceless state. . . . • • Under this point . nf view, there is no possibility of his beii able to employ a hundred thousand men against • 1' • Spain. And are these sufficient for the subjugation of that country and of Portugal ? They certainly are not. Ile will he either reduced to the nemisity Of dividing this army into four or five dilTerent corps, it order to secure their sObsistenze ; or he mnp kecp thorn in one cr `.,w4 armies, 14 which meow' ttiediftcuity tdvidirg,provisions will be encreased ; and ihciuld they penetrate fccin one ex- • 41 1 lb. • • d ~•I