The National Register. — London, England, 1808-08-21 00:00:00

sZ . N . , Our No. 34. SUNDAY, AI POLITICAL DISQUIStION. zoo . NUMBER THIRTY-FOUR. to::1 c. RIAIL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY; Willi A CONIIIMIATIVE VIEW OF THE AUSTRIAN, RUS SIAN, AND PRUSSIAN MILITARY FORCES. There is no feature more prominent in the character of man than a propensity to exaggeration. Whenever he speaks of his country, her institutions, local advantages and military establishments, no measure is adopted in the indulgence of this inclination, as he thinks it ennobled by the mark it assumes of patriotism. The history of our time recommends particular caution to the political writer in the speculations he would found on these effusions of national self-10%e. If this circumspection be necessary in our examination of the accounts published on any of these subjects by the individuals or governments of most countries, it would be particularly so with regard to the French. What was the eirect of folly or vanity in the ode, was, on the part of the latter, the highest refinement of Machevialism. 11 . -Ae take a retrospective view of the last ten years we are atenished at the boldness and success of these, eaaggera tions, as well as at the credulity and weakness with 'which they were received by other nations. After having been repeatedly deceived in this respect, it might be presumed, that some degree of witticism would be adopted; but they continued from year to year to credit the statements of a goverument, which had an interest, and manifested une quivocal intcutious of a design to deceive. The grossest falsehoods were received as self-evident truths : and these besotted governments maintained diplomatic agents in , France, one would be inclined to suppose, more for the purpose of attending the levees and making a part of the Consular and Imperial State of Bonaparte, than of collect ing intelligence relative to the projects and resources of that restless and enterprising man. The supineness, inca pacity, and trifling submissive deportment of most of the Envoys and Ambassadors at Paris, were subjects of equal indignation and contempt to every man who visited that capital. The superiority, which Bonaparte arrogated in his relations with the Monarchs ofiturope, made them ap prehensive of sending any man who might be obnoxious to him, on account of his talents, patriotism and penetration. , Even the harmless, obsequious mortals, who attended his levees as representatives of their Sovereign, were con. ,tautly surrounded by his spies, and to avoid giving him I , diss.itisfaction, they confired the important duties of their missism to the punctilio of constant attendance at the Thuilleries and to the reputation of connoisseurs. They all, with very few exceptions, seemed to vie in baseness.. The insecurity of the post gave them likewise justifiable cause for supposing that any dispatches they might send through that channel, would fall into the hands of the ty rant ; and their messengers 'were frequently murdered and robbed of th.eir papers. Even their hotels w e r e n ot secure . 'hefidetity of their servants Ulu/ had Nasuis 19 supsact, as. LIA 2 rei•gol. 10 .6 41 . 41 rpi - I, attb Laths. - UST 21, 1808 • Pie let 84 ~ at no means would be left untried to indhce them to betray the confidence of their masters. After these observations, which are only a faint deScripv tion of the immorality and insolence of the one. and th• debasement and inaction of theAther, every doubt will vanish about the absolute ignoraele in which every govern 4 meta must remain: relative to the finances and armies of }Waft. This was one of the great causes of the blunders, miscalculatiosmagni disasters of the Continent. Under such restrictions, moral as well as personal, it was absolutely impracticable for any ostensible agent, let his talents and zeal be ever so great, to make communications to his go. vernment which could be relied on. A veil of impenetra ble mystery was, at the same time, thrown over the finances and the number of conscripts that are annually raised. The exact amount of the ones and the number of the latter have never been satisfactorily ascertained ; for it would betray more than ignorance, it would be a mirk of the grossest stupidity, to take as the rule of our calcula. tions, the communications made to the Senate and Coro Legislatif: The regiments were never stationary. They were continually marching from one place to another. or confined within the lines of a camp, where the police was so severe that no means were left to the most intelligent and enterprising to culkct information. But the conduct of the French government Was theme. trically opposite. Its Ambassadors to the Courts of Maa drid, Vieuna, Berlin, &c. were men, consummate ie the • f • 1111r7" ---- " - "' -' • ." " 111/ 9 1. " ". ..". 4,- .• • 111 '•••• ' T '. 7 - I'7 - 1, -Al .. ~. •11.• e r ..0 • 9 'O. • . . ,• - • . -. ' • TEE ,..„ • . ~ IT' . , .ar •• -..0 - A_ -"- , ..-. - . • arts of intrigue and equally skilled in peace and war. Their national characteristic pertness gave them 4 latitude of ine )0i quiry, which would not be overlooked in any other-Amy .1 and, in coetempt of all the laws and usages of nations, thelr maintained an intercourse with every disaffected isdivided in the army or in a civil capacity, took them literally paw their protection + and by their means, and with the of emissaries, who were scattered in every provi n .. were able to transmit a more exact knowledge of ibe A trian, and other armies than the weak cabinet' ' themselves. The superiority which this gave the French in their military operations will be easily conceived. Their combinations were 'consetfuently bold and certain; and - their movements had f ri that regularity and proMptitud• -. which were al ylkissed in the plans and motions of the allies. , This On fusion and uncertainty on the part of the latter. emortOned all the disasters sustained by Melas, Mack, and the take of Brunstrick. A few days previous to the battle of ',lens no determined plan of operation had been adopted 14 the Prussian Generals; and *bat was decide 4 in one couecil of war was rejected in the neat. No certma information was received of the motion or designs of the French, till *e advanced guards of the left ling were cat to pieces ue*r Saalfeld ; and the magazines at • Naumhurg were taken byrDavoust. As soon as the former occurrence was known at head-quarters, it was debated a considerable time, whetheli the army should quit its position ; bat the disorder in the councils of war held for this purpose was* great, that na'resolution was taken, till even retreat IMicalb, ,wpractisable by the nieveenut of Pay oust's corps in their +AIL IMO - krAii- , ___-~ ir:a... .; . ‘ , l„ DI 11 P. A. 1,1 1 , 4 „ . I . a i t( 1 J i