The National Register. — London, England, 1811-11-24 00:00:00

NATIONAI2 REGISTER. statement,in whichhe acknowledges the death of 120 men, a number which, under all the circumstances of the case, may be quadrupled without any disregard of truth. The argument he employs to explain and justify this failure, are too singular to be suffered to pass unnoticed. Had not the report been trans mitted by him el the War Minister of NAroLEoN, one might be induced to suppose that the following passage had been penned on purpose to form a charge of ignorance, neglect, or a wanton waste of lives, against the new-fangled Marshal. 4 , The assault had failed," it says, 46 because the breach vas in : a recess covered hy the fire of the enemy ; be cause it was too narrow ; because the troops de bouched from too great a distance ; and finally, be cause the battering train of three pieces of cannon has inszSicient to level 14 parapets and drive the enemy from the breach." We will ask whether these excuses of the failure could not have been anti cipated ; especially by a Commander who has had so much experience in sieges as SUCH ET ; and whether, under such circumstances, an Officer, who bad the least regard for humanity, would have sent his troops to a certain death ? 46 After this tinfor twiet affair," continues the report, is a resolution was adopted to erect a new battery nearer, to in crease the number of guns, and to push the covert way to the foot of the breach." When these works, svhieh ought to have been accomplished before any attack was made, were beginning to play, General ELANy, having previously collected the corps of MAni, Commander-in-Chief in Murcia, and the divisions of A LtILYERA nc VILLA CAMPO and Ostsro, with the neighbouring guerillas, advanced at the Lead of 20,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry, to raise the siege of Saguntum. There is no operation in war, of which the con sequences ought more serionsly and attentively to be weighed and calculated, than an attempt at re lieving a besieged fortress or town, by a general engagement in its vicinity. If it be done in the expectation of effective co-operation on the part of the besieged, or wier a view of compelling the enemy to divide his force, it ought at the same tune to be considered, that the very catastrophe which the battle is intended to prevent, will, should it be lost, be hastened ; whilst the army which, after the reduction of the place, would otherwise have been able to check the further advance of the con queror, is broken and dispirited, and obliged either to give up the defence of the province, or to shut itself up in the remaining strong places, where it may be invested and taken in detail. Neither are the advantages of attacking a besieging army in its lines, as great as they are generally imagined. SvcHET, is to leave a division to blockade the for tress, and to march with the rest against the re. lieving force. Then, indeed, may the General who makes this disposition expect a sortie on the part of the garrison, which he seems to invite, as it is impossible, if he wishes to contend with effect against the advancing enemy, that he should leave a sufficient number of troops behind to awe the be sieged. Then also may his opponent entertain req. sonable hopes of success, especially if he be able to draw him into action at a considerable distance from the blockading division, so that the divided corps can lend each other no assistance. But, for that purpose, he ought only to alarm the besiegers Itv his approach, to hover some days in their. vicinity, threatening :t variety of points, and consequently checking their operations, without coming so near as to be compelled to fight a decisive battle in sight of the place he wishes to relieve, unless every effort to entice them away h .5 failed: for there he will find his enemy strcee, and should he be defeated, his disaster wit:. .-Ised by the garrison, will, as in the preseet case, pro. duce their immediate surrender. Here, toe, should the besieging General adopt the tac , tics of ancient times, and await the attack in his lines, the chance of discomfiture runs strong against the assailant. We will Must! ate this assertion hr an instance from history. Alcsia being besieged by the R omans, the Gauls, who had a great superimity of numbers, resolved to attack them in their lines. C-7.tiAlt gave orders to suffer them to advance, ami when they were rushing into his purposely weakly defended entrenchments gave orders to one of his Li9ntenents to sally out and fall on them on one side, whilst lie should attack them on the other. The capture of twenty thousand of the Gauls with their General, and the destruction of almost their whole army proved the excellence of that plan, which might, no doubt, be carried into effect in mo dern times with equal success. Circumstances having induced General &Axe to think the preservation of the fortress of Saguntum an object, both within his ability to obtain, and equal to the dangers of the undertaking, on the 2.5 th of October last he offered battle to the be sieging army on ground, which even from the re port of the enemy, the only document hitherto in our possession, seems to have been most judiciously chosen. During the first, and indeed, the greatest part of the action, the advantage both in ma. nceuvring and in fighting was evidently on the side of the Spaniards. Marshal SUCUET was even com pelled, for once, to do justice to their valour. He begins by acknowledging that their first onset " convinced him" that he had to contend with the , advantages of attacking a besieging army in it; ! pellea, tor once, to uv juaut‘..a. ...... ......... . --- ___ lines, as great as they are general l y imagined. 1 begins by acknowledging that th eir first onset The modern practice followed in this instance by l 44 convinced him" that he had to contend with . ~,,, . ip. ..... _ ........00.- . . .