The National Register. — London, England, 1809-10-15 00:00:00

651 it, without methodically opening the trenches, without w orking on through the inundations and marshes, in short, without hav ing invested the town; and if they must invest it on both sides, they would require to have two armies; Ist. One between the 411ead of Flawlers and the town of St. Nicholas, opposite to Brussels and to the rand or France; indeed, we know no General bold enough to take this position with less than 80,000 Infantry and bet ween 8 anti 10,000 cavalry, since he must ha‘ , " to withstand the army which should arrive from Fra:..-e, am! the troops should stretch out from the Head of Flanders, that is to say, the whole garrison of Antwerp, which in a coral attack, would sally out on that siee ; `2d, On the side of t:44. town, the investment could not reasonably take place with au army of less than 40,000 men, having in front a corps of obser vation, to keep in check the army of the Duke Vnlniy, aisembled at Maestricht, which could draw near Antwerp, and having another corps tcbords . Bergen•op-Zoom agatiA the . Dote!). It would, therefore, have been easier f44r Lord Chat ham to take Brussels, to march against Ghent, and to advance as fur as Flanders, leaving Antwerp a u nt the French army behind him, than to undertake to invest Antwerp and besiege it. This much with re.rard to the land side. On the side of the river, the following are the obstacles which must have stopped the English : lst, Fort Frederic and Fort Doel, each mounting fifteen 36, pounders; after these, Fort Lillo, and the Fort of liefkens shock, each mouwinw si xi y 36-pounders, and ten mortars; and behind, a line of eighty von-boats and pinnaces, mounting two hundred 24-pounders. Now, every aensihle man who knows that there is only a distance of 600 fathoms between Fort Lillo and the' Fort of Liefkeeshoek, which is oppositelo it, per ceives that this passage caunto he forced. With regard to fir - - , 'hips, it is well known that fire-ships and infernal nualfines ace ineffectual. The infernal machine which was let off at St. Maio had no effect ; these sorts of explosions were never able to shake a rampart. An estacado had been estahlisited, which had secured our gun-boats from fire-ships. In tine, we had also fire-ships; sixteen were already in readiness, an we were going to asail ourselves of the first favourable occasion to send them against the English. Besides, to make me of fire-ships, it waist& have been necessary to approach within 300 fathoms of 'he town, since from Lillo to Antwerp the Scheldt makes four elbows, which would have prevented fire-ships from being directed from any greater distance. Oa the sea side in like manner no success could he hoped far; but admitting that by the combination of the effects of the land • and seat, Lillo and Liefketishoek had been carried, which sup poses two regular sieges, the enemy would directly after have met with three other barriers to be forced; the Pearl Fort, Fort St. Philip, and Fort St. Mary. All these fortS are tower ed by inundations, and each of theM would have required a separate siege. These different operations could not have taken place without loosing 40 days more, and supposing that by the 20:h of October•the land and sea forces had been able to ap proach within 2000 fathoms of Antwerp, they still required three months more to take the town. With regard to the squadron, it was entirely shut up within the town, upend down the river, protecting Antwerp, and protected by it. The tak ing of Antwerp was, therefore, a thing iinpoisible for Lord Chatham, an operation touch more difficult to be effected than the occupation of a quarter of France. However, the following was the system of the French army ; from the 15th of August three corps were formed. The Prince of Polite Corvo was at Autwerp with 30.000 men, national guards, regulars and Dutch troops. The Duke of Conegliann was at Ghent with the corps of the. Head of Flanders, consisting of 25,000 men; the Duke of Istria was at Lisle with 20,000 men. We should have let the English, had they seriously presented themselves, cross the channel of Bergen-pp-Zoom, stretch out beyound the inundation of Lillo and march against Ant‘x ; the Duke of Coneglieno would have proceeded towards the Head of i landers, and whilst the English would have been mak, lax their dispositions to invest Antwerp from Fort 141110 to the citadel, the Prince of Ponte Corso, and the Duke Of Coneg iano, protected by the inundations and by the immense work of the town, would have.waited for them, u!ltt on the day agreed upon, would have stretched out upon the right; and then the English army would have terminated hi destinies; the Duke of !Aria would during that time have proceeded to the island of Cadsand. On the lst of September there were between Flanders and the Scheldt and Maestricht, twenty thou bawl men under aruth They were not all regulars, but they C.CT. 15, •.‘ ere all commanded by men who had served ; re all volunteers, and consistod, for the must, Wirt, offtirme , t• ler ottice.rs, and fdrtner soldiers who had obtained theirdtschi- • t •es, mid who had run to arms on the firstsignal. • Lord Chathain, • therefore, charged himself with a , f••.%.`_: ii operation, and those, therefore, wha projected it -he:: -u.l.•.*A selvec to be as ignorant of the climate as of the Inc:tides. •• rd Chatham saved the EugliA army by determining to re-e mi.' k it ; hut every day float he delays to execnte this determtuai--.14 heightens the misfyrtunes of his ex pedition, and if he is col :site it it not in having oFdered the retrelt, it is in having s , 1(114, dO.: layeil to re-embark ; for during this delay, the Eii4l.lslt tr.:ops contract fresh diseases and become infected with Ire: h seeds tif deoructioa, Let it suffice to say that the Emperor when he learned thafao huglish army had bc , .n landed upon that point, recommended that it should not he attacked, and that we should leave the de struction of it to the disease,:, which, in that dangerous climate, must da the i.nemy more ijury than the cannno, w ithont tie costing any thing to France. The English, in i.tnling in Flander , . did, therefore, a !!;ing contrary all the rules of war :I. Because they took for the theatre of their operation's a country so unwholesome, utat tln‘y to pr.`Stllne that ro.tattii's stay in it would destroy their army ; 0,74 t the r‘-untry is c , -)ti - Fred with strong pluceS, such at Flushing, Bergen:-up-'Loots, Bathz, and Linn ; and on the side of the 1,-i,ted of Cads:old, the new fort Napolean, &c. idio. Because their principal object appeared to be to cap!it•e . _ the squadron, t'oey ought to h.tvr: imagmed that t:it , squaLl:e.it depended w)on Antwerp, and that Ani-Aerp 'a3 ..qpregnahle, for its coinmunicatinn6 with France •tould n, , t be ! ui )ff, e xxept by immense armies. against which the wtiule population of France vvou!d have time to march. . . The result of all which is, that the English liave been for so many years shut out of the Colviucut., ttr..t they arc u.l :Inger acquainted with it. Every thing has ex! eist their hatred against France. With regard to the Island of Walcheren, it is taid, that they menn'to keep it. We should have only cause to applaud this : resolution for many reasons ; Ist, The English, altiintig!i had 20,000 men in the Island of Walcheren, could not rev cilt it from being attacked and retaken; 2d, 20,000 English, ekpused to the influence of the climate, would experience so much loss, that it would be necessary to he continually reitiforcing t nein : that in the course of the year, 80,000 men would as necessarily become victims to the climate, and it would cost them more to guard this marsh, then to preserve the East Indies; 'hut it 'is probable that time would not be left for them to suffer such losses. The channel between the two islands is so narrow, that bombs can reach from one to the other. The 20 ships of the line and the flotilla which we have in the Scheidt, would soon make us masters of that river. It would not be forgotten, that four years ago, and with our flotilla alone, we were masters of all the r ' iasts; can it be doubted, that we should be soon masters of a _Used sea? and can it. at the same time, be supposed that . the Ens,lish would attempt to keep Flushing without being mas ters of the Scheldt ? Besides, a flotilla i, too dangerous a war for them. Such a war is not carried on with boats alone, it is conducted with excellent troops, that is to say, with means which do not allow the English any advantago over us. We well know that men exist who, although completely ig norant of the art of war, have, notwithstanding, the silly habit of taking and endeavouring to give counsel to those who are masters in it ; those people, yet more skilful than the public speaker who introduced the subject of war before Hai:Mb:ll, tell von, that the English, by preserving the !slated of Wakheren, vi ill make it a second GibrAtar, or another Alalta ; in hue, a commanding point which svill render them masters of Flanders, or Holland, &c. Poor neuimen! they cannot perceive that if the English persist in keeping the Island id Waleitern, that circumstaoce would be as advantageous for us as if they Hers einbarrased in the heart of Spain. In general, wherever an English army lands on the Continect, every real French Man ought to rejoice.—Such a contest is com pletely, lo our favour : a natiwu of three mtillions of men cattuot meet man for man a nation of forty millions. A oew array, all the elements of which are in the ilavy, cane it keep the held agaiust the veteran forces which have conquered two-thirds of k;urope; in line, an army Iv Well can only arrive by sea, has neitherartillery, cavalry, nor equipages, at least it has a very great inferiority in all these mear:s, and Lord Chatham re .11y could not mount more tbau 200$) cavalry; well ! before 15 data THE NATIONAL REGISTER.