Star. — London, England, 1810-03-12 00:00:00

' ~' .. e ' •' ' . Gardner. With that twit Untended is have the attack of thelinenty's fleet , it had not retreated before the armament arrived on the Coast of Zealand. It was also in my contemplation by means of that sae co-operate with the Army in any attack upon Flushim the assistance of the Natty should be thought desirable. 'proved by my orders to Lord Gardner of the 1 e 1 July ; but it is so far from being true that this view _ ; the result of any. a g r e ement preconcerted with ' as the Statement seems to imply that the first spontaneoui offer l of t.cit, co-operation on my part was passed by without any im mediate notice by his Lordship. This offer was contained in re? Letter of the Bth of August, to which I shall shortly have occa sion to allude. 1 For particulars of the co-operation and assistance actually af iforded by the Navy in the commencement of our operations, I may refer to the last paragraph of Lord Chatham's Dispatch of the 2d August. In answer to the imputation of misconduct thrown upon the for not having realized the hope " that by a powerful co-opera tion from the sea at the moment the troops presented themselves before the place, the labour and delay of a regular siege might have been avoided"—lt is perhaps sufficient to state, that such a hope mast appear very chimerical, except upon one of two sup positions. If the Commander iti Chief, from a conviction that the works of Flushing on the land bide were either too weak or tots extensive, or manned by a garrison too inadequate to Yeast a sudden and gtneral assault, had proposed a simultaneous at-. tack front the line of battle ships, our fire might certainly bare contributed to the success of such a project; but an enterprise so desperate as this, under the well ascertained circumstances of the fortress and garrison, can never have been for a moment in contemplation. If for the purpose of sparing to his Army the labor r and lake , of a reg ular siege, the Commander in Chief had wished to make his atta ck on the sea front, to embark the assailing army in the boats of the fleet, and to land them under the protection of our ships of the line, I need only say that I was perfectly ready to share the hazards of such an attack, and that the ships were prepared for the service. It could not be for me to suggest suck a measure, which of course must originate with the Commander in Chief, to whom however I thought it my duty to state in my Letter of the Bth of August my readiness to " act under a previ ous concert for co-operation with the Army in such a plan of at tack as might accelerate the surrender of Flushing." But such a proposal, in point of fact was not made Lome; from „ wisence I must conclude, that it was not thought to offer ant ra metal prospect of adequate advantage. A concerted and combi ned attack, it should seem, was thought hopeless until the land batteries should be in a condition to act ; but that a vigorous at tack by the Navy upon the sea front, an attack undertaken at the moment the Troops presented themselves before the place, would have afforded reasonable grounds of hope ; although it is evident that in this case the enemy, after simply shutting their gates against the Army, whose musketry unassisted by great guns could have done little mischief to the garrison, would have direc ted their whole 4te against us, and having crippled a part of our fleet, would have been still able to impose upon our Troops the labour and delay of a regular siege. I will next advert to the charges or insinuations, in relation to my conduct, in having failed " in performance of an assurance that the whole of the armament should be at once transported up, the Scheldt," in having adopted a measure, which though of great advantage as applied to the division ietended for the attack on Walcheren, was not a little at variance with the leading 'purpose of the Expedition, namely, the running with the right wing and the advance of the Army ,at once up the Scheldt. These observations art accompanied with a denial that even this change in the destination of part of the fleet from the West to the East Scheldt, " would have delayed the advance more than three or four days ;" a remark in which I entirely concur with Lord Chatham, though on grounds very different from those assumed in the Statement. Upon this part of the case I must recur shortly to the original discussions and plans relating to the Expedition, and the circum stances under which we arrived at Walcheren. i It had been at one time proposed before we quitted London to land the whole Army in Tholen and South Beveland, as present ing fewer difficulties than the navigation of the Scheldt, which, under the most favourable circumstances must always be liable to various contingencies. This proposal was, I understand, a good deal discussed, and on this point it is only necessary to refer to my instructions to Sir Richard Keats, where he was directed to give every assistance in transporting the troops to South Beve land and Tholen. Another plan had beets proposed of disembarking in the Slough, marching across South Beveland, embarking again at Bathe, and landing at Santvliet. This plan appeared to be approved by many good judges of military operations. ' The third plan which was suggested es preferable to either of the former, provided we met with no oktueles, was to proceed di rectly up the West Scheldt, and this was ultimately adopted, be cause by keeping the troops in the transports it promised to pre serve them in a snore efficient state until their immediate service should be called fur. To this arrangement the command of the Whieling passage was thought to be necessary, for which reason a respectable force was destined to occupy Cadsand. Speaking of the failure of the attack on Cadsand, Lord Chat ham says, " in the first place the beach was so exposed that in blowing weather it was found impossible to land.' Secondly, " From what cause I know not, the Marquis of Huntley's divi sion could not be taken up in the first instance high enough to attack the Breskens battery, the only one from its situation of much importance." Lastly, his Lordship says, " Commodore Oweh appears to have experienced great disappointment in not having the support of Lord Gardnerei fleet and his boats." I trust that I shall be able to answer in a very few words the . prec': ling insinuations. I confess that I was aware of the import ance of Cadsand before we sailed from England; Lord Chatham 1 front being impressed with the same idea was induced to send over an Engineer (Captain Paisley) to report on the practicability of effecting a landipg on the beach. The same Engineer in bis evidence; and speaking of the time to which Lord Chatham al ludes, when he says, (" the beach was so exposed, Scc.") answers, " it appears to me there was no difficulty in landing, unless what might arise from the enemy having a greater force than we could oppose to them in the first instance; of the enemy's force I am not a judge." I do not believe that the Breskens battery had occurred to any person until I stated in the ptinted Secret Circular Memorandum, i " that the first thing the enemy ought to do would be to erect a mortar and furnace battery at Breskens, &c." 1 never heard a • wish on the subject of passing the Breskens battery, and I do think it it had been represented to me as so exttemely strong I should have urged the propriety of landing below it, and taking 4t in reverse in preference to the risk which the troops in trans- 1 ports would be subjected to by passing it. The Engineer in Mi ' antes of Evidence, says, " the batteries appeared to me to have very little strength; the batteries appeared to me to be open bat teries." I refer to these Minutes of Evidence merely as proofs of the 1 inaccuracy of the Statement. I selected Commodore Owen, an Officer of great intelligence and professional talent, for the purpose of co-operating with the Marquis of Huntley ; I gave him every latitude of discretion ; 1 the Quarter -Master-General sent Lord Huntley a copy of the ' Commodore's instructions, and I apprehend there is no position or part of the beach between Slues and the Ghent Canal on which he would not have attempted to effect a landing, if any proposi tion or request had been made by Lord Huntley to that effect: I only require on this point that a dispassionate attention should be paid to my orders, that my letter of the 20th Ittly to Lord Gardner, coupled wi th that of the I 6tb, should be read with at tention; and that a reference should be made to the evidence of Commodore Owen and the Marquis of Huntley, which I think will unequivocally prove ' that no application was ever made to me for a proportion of boats beyond what was carried by Com modore Owen's squadron. Our original determination of landing in Zoutland Bay was tail aside in consequence of intelligence received at Deal df the preparation of the enemy on that part of the coast, and a memoir was drawn up on this subject which was submeted to Lord Chat -1 barn and Lord Castlereagh, and approved of by both ; and it was I consequently determined to land on Domburgh Beach ; but on our arrival at Walcheren, the surf was found to be so heavy on Domburgh Beach, in consequence of a string westerly wind, that landing there was impossible; it became then absolutely necessary to take shelter in the RooMpot and Veergat, and the constant succession of gales for many days after our arrival, made it im possible, independently of other obstacles, to recur to the original intentiun of entering the western mouth Of the tichtidt. Upon the chabge in our measures, which was thus forced upon us by the untoward state of the wea ther, I must here beg leave to offer a very few remarks. It is admitted by Lord Chatham to have been in some respects advantageous, by placing the tremens and small eratt in a place of security, and by facilitating the dist/abate kation of the troops on the Bite Saud. • t REAR-ADMIRAL SIR. RICHARD STRA CHAN;6 NARRATIVE. r No. i.—Copy of a Let•er front Rear-Admiral Sir R. J. FIT RA CH•N to J. W. CROILEIL, Esq. on Lord Chatham's having produced a private Note ofthe Rear,Massirars, **spatting Provisions, —.o l lsoodon, February 28, 1810. Sir-1 understand thlt L94%Chetham last night produced a private Note of Mine, under daps 27th of August, on the subject of Provisions and other matters, to the House of Com mons. The allusion to Provisions in that - Note was in consequence of an error in the Statement which was given to me, from the prin cipal Agent of Transports, respecting the Provisions of the Army, but it was lmmedi;tely corrected, and I think subse quently reported to their Lordships. I mention this that their Lordships may be convinced of my anxiety to prevent any improper impression in regard to the sup ply of Provisions for the Army. The observations which I made In that Note, to meet the feel ,ingir of his Lordthip, on the view he bad taken of the difficulties which.presented themselves on his expectation of success, appear to me unimportant 1 the thing was decided upon ; it was not a . megnent to analyse the principles of that decision, and my public Vandiezatnination at the Bar of the House of Com mons, i r trust, have explained my sentiments and decision upon this.subject. I have the honour to be, Sir, John Wilson Croker, Esq. Your very humbleservant, I . ;cc. ;cc. E4e. Admiralty. (Signed) RD. J. STRACHAN. No. 11 Copy of a Letter from Rear-Admiral Sir R. J. STRACHAN to J. W. Caozza, Esq. respecting din Statement of the Earl of Chatham. London, March 3, IMO. Sir—When I solicited my Lords Commissioners of the Admi ralty to procure for me an authentic copy of the Statement of Lord Chatham upon the late Expedition to the Scheldt,-1 Made that request in the hope that I should be permitted, after exa mining the subject of that Paper, to submit to their Lordships' consideration such observations as might arise from it; and I have noW to request that you will convey to their Lordships my thanks for the 'minds:ion of the Paper, and at the same time solid' their attention to the observations upon it which I lido now the honour to enclose. Feeling perfectly conscious that every exertion had been made. by mein forwarding the objects of the Expedition, and that nd blame could be justly imputed to myself or the Navy, I could no‘possihly suspect that Lord Chatham, to the irregularity of pre senting immodiately to his Majesty such a Paper as that which I have received, had added . the impropriety (to use no stronger term) of endeavouring to exculpate himself by private insinua dont against the conduct of others. Every Officer has a just right, and where he really believes fai lure to have arisen from the misconduct or negligence of those with whom he has been associated in a joint Command, is in duty_ bound, in many cases, to state his o p inion o ffi ciall y to the 0 6 "rnFae g its It Is for his Majesty to judge of the propriety and neces shy of instituting any inquiry upon the subject ; but to assume the privilege of conveying private insinuations to the prejudice of Others, from whose knowledge they are studiously concealed, must prove utterly destructive of all mutual confidence in joint Operations of the Army and Navy. Their I.ordships will now be able to judge whether there is any Mundation for the imputations, that the delays originated with myself, or with any others in the Naval Service, or whether atzrMg my command on the late Expedition, any proeeding on my part, has in any respect justified the line of conduct which Lord.Chatham has thought fit to adopt towards me. Upon this subject, that I may not interrupt my observations upon his Lordship's Statement, I will now advert to my Letter of the etth of August. that Letter was an official one; I have already expressed my regret that it was 110 inadvertently worded, as to excite any sus picion of my imputing blame to the Commander in Chief ot, the Army, on the ground of his then determining to abandon any further attemptin the Scheidt. I was not aware that any expressions which I might have con sidered myselt justified in using for the purpose of conveying toy sentiments to their Lordships, would have been given to the world, if they should have been thought injurious to the charac ter of the Cs mmander in Chief of the Forces. In my Letter to Lord Chatham of the 26th of Aug ust (Endo sureto No. 29, Admiralty Papers, No. 3), I offer ed the fullest co-apes - mil:in of the Navy In any further attempt in the Scheldt, and therefore I thought myself bound to state in my official Let ter, that I had made such offer, and I was of opinion, as I have since explained in my evidence, that it would have been advisea ble to have attacked forts Lillo and Liefkenshoeik. It appeared to me that this offered a chance of opening some further field of enterprise for the Navy, or at all events of as certaining whether the destruction of the enemy's fleet, or of any considerable part o i l' it, was indeed practicable ; but in expressing my wish, I meant to represent it to be more of a Military than a Naval question, and I never p?esumed to set my opinion upon that subject against the professional opinion of the Army, still less to impute any misconduct or blame as attaching to their determina tion, that such an attack was not. adviseabte. When all these circumstances, their publicity, and my readiness at all times to do justice in this respect to the Army, are consl dered ; I cannot think that a misinterpretation of the general ex pression in a public official Letter could even palliate, much less justify, the secret attack which has been made upon my character and conduct. With these general observations I submit to their Lordships that it is much more easy to answer direct charges than indirect insinuations, and, I trust they will therefore excuse my troubling them at greater length than I should otherwise have thought ne cessary. I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient hum ble Servant, (Signed) aD. J. STR.ACLIAN. John Wilson Croker, Esq. &c. occ. fcc. Admiralty. No. lit. -From Rear-Admital Sir R. J. STR ACllAN,containing his Observations on the Statement of the Earl of Chatham. London, March 5, 1810. PESERVATIONS on the garl of CaATMA m's Statement of his Proceedings; dated 15th October, 1809; presented to the King 14to February, 1810. tree.. the first point to whlch.Lord Chatham in his Narrative has called Ms Majesty's attention, namely, " the ground upon which after the Army was at length assembled near Bathz, a landia4 in prosecution of the ulterior objects of the Expedition . Ins not deemed advlseable," it would be ' im p ro p er for me to ninke any observation, because the reasons which are said to have rendered it " clear and evident that ow further operations could at that time be undertaken With any prospect of success," were such as I was rot competent to appreciate, and therefore did not pre sume to discuss. Nut being aware, from my own übser..ations that further suc cess was nrattainable, 1 ventured to offer the fullest assistance and co-operation of the Naval armament under my command in ally ulterior measures which might be deemed adviseable, and I trust that in making this offer I shall not be thought to have been guided by a too forward and indiscreet zest, rather than by a due sense of my professional duty. Won the second point, namely, " Why the Army was not sooner assembled at Bathz to commence further operations," I feel confident that I shall have no difficulty in proving, in direct cantiaactisn to the assertion in Lord Chatham's statement, that the delay did in no shape rest v.:th me, or depend upon any ar rangements in which the Navy was exclusively concerned, but that on the contrary every facility was afforded by the Navy to. Wards acceleratitig the movemeit of the Army, and every exert . tion used by all those under my command in the various and complicated services entrusted to them. I have in vain endeavoured to ascertain the foundation upon which the assertion rests, that It "was distinctly agreed upon that * vigorous attack by the Navy upon the sea front should be made at the same time that the Troops after eikcting their landing"ad vanted to invest Flushing, it being hoped that by a powerful co operation from the sea at the inoment the Troops presented them selves before the place, the labour and delay of a regular siege might have been avoided." I cannot find any Instructions, Orders, Letters, or Communi cations, either previous to our departure from the Downs or sub sequent, alluding to any such agreement, and can have no diifi • eulty, not merely in . asserting that so such agreement was trimly, but that from the nature of the thing itself it is quite impossible that any such agreement could hav • been made. It cattainly was in contemplation, if the enemy's fleet tad re • pained in the lower part of the river, more particularly in the v unity of Flushing, to have pushed a fleet of line-of-battle slips into the eheldt to attack them, and a squadron for that y orpose among other objects was rea4y under the orders of Lord - t l at Baths. r hat sch all td the men of t a h l e rea U dy stated. e Lord Chatham melded to think It neletem p ry pe t ens on7 on this tshhiosusludbasjescetnibhleavine war m an y o d o tra ni i his to los remembereA that the French fleet had retreated above j were dismantled (vide Min. Ev. pa. 119 ) so that the . pr esen ce -111° ' and out line-of-battle ships in the West Scheldt could ut.t lof nee"' sort until the army should have been assembled at B a h even then, unless it should have been deemed inexpedien t for z' and M have e - army to have advanced upon Antwerp, until we should have already , _ for phiptme .... broken the boom of M that not ilo ; I still think • more than four jects three plans had bees proposed, the last of which, as I con- ships could hate been required for that P uTore ; in th e mean ceived, had been selected as the mo st advanta g e o us, only u p on time our flotilla would have been amply sufficie nt ßatW zto to have p ro . the supposition of Mir esnwasterieg no ,siatacks to the navigation of teetech the passage od the army from the whole fleet up the West Scheldt. -• Now the Wieling Chinnel should not have agreed to any 'proposition fur crossing t7liet ' al 1 bad been rendered initooneelble to us by our fibre at Cadsand, unless h bad been quite certain that I had the meet a mp l e the i army • and consequently our expect:Mons in this respect had been wholly of givinmit the fullest protection. - Beinh, however, lenleanb particularly overthrown, and the ground of preference on which the third plan anxious to pursue the lino of conduct most congenial to had been adopted was in course removed ; but it is evident that ship's wishes, and consequently best adapted topromo te his I.°,4ted: . a C1:y..1, the practicability of the first plan which proposed to carry the co-operation, I promised every exertion iu carrying A:: Menth e: army through the •Mast Scheldt to Tholen, or that of the second, into exeoution. accordingoo which the troops were to have been landed on South Accordingly, on my return from- Lord Chatham, 1 Beveland and to have proceeded to Bothz could not materially my arrangements for accelerating the various complicatedcontinuedcontinued objects affected‘ by the enemy's possession of be Cadsand, or at all by the which were to be attended to. circumstance of our fleet being compelled by stress of weather to The first part of the flotilla which got through the Slaugh take shelter in the Veer Gat ;en the contrary it will appear by applied to the cutting off the communication between to i l wer l the military instructions to Sir Joh', Hope " that the navigation • and Flushing ; beoluse his Lordship had re g retted ( that,;;': .• ..' lll- , of the East Scheldt being little understood, and whether there was urging it as a subject of complaint ) that supplies had I v e ' - f : '" ,, . sufficient depth of water for the transports and victuallen which often thrown into Fluehinga In feat, until alter th. 7.: ~e. , 1. ',- mulct necessarily attend this service, it is now judged most ad. gust, the weather continued so bad with the wind at O. \V, aa ' ,l' viseable that the operation should take place by the Veer-passage." S. S. W. that we were unable to interrupt the commute • o r. a Now the only imaginable impediments to the further progress the enemy, as the only vessels by which we could "."1. ''- effect i: sat re of our army must have been apprehended either from a military constantly driven in by the gales and not could keep the era. The force of the enemy occupying South Beveland, or from -the French wind which was most adverts to as wag most favourable Lo th e fleet in the West Scheldt, or from the enemy's flotilla; but the enemy, who could front Cadsand run 'defers It into Flushin g corps of Sir John Hope became possessed Of the whole of South without the possibility of interruption. Beveland on the 2d August. The French fleet had retired be- On the 7th we mere able, by the weather moderating, toel '2, yond the boom of Lillo on the Ist August, from the enemy's Bo- blish the sea blocka de of Fl ushing, and on tha 9th a cordite es tile title which was unable to prevent the corps under Sir John Hope bod y of the flotilla, under the command u. Sir Mollie Popham, ' from taking possession of Bath; or to regain possession of it be- were carried through the Swatch-may of the Cahoot ' S an d at th fore the greater part of the guns which had been previously wilt- entrance of the Slough Panne and proceeded to Bathz, where . ed were rendered serviceable, and which on the first appearance they arrived on the Ilth. At the sante time a squadron of frig ate s of the British flotilla. retired in confusion, and never afterwards passed Flushing to join this flotilla, and procroled the I on follow. repassed the boom of Lillo, no opposition to the movements of mg day up the Scheldt. the army could at any time have been reasonably apprehended. With respect to the line-of-battle Mips, great difficulty had to. With respect to the immediate difficulties which may have ope- curred from the objections of the pilots, but I regretted this Ms hated as an objection to the disembarkation of the troops on South because I had consideredithese ships, if in vmseepteuce of my o ff., Beveland, and to their subsequent mach acr oss that island, I they should be called for by-Lord Chatham, as applicable to ts ‘ . used only refer to the opinions of the naval officers who vrede ens- co-operation in the attack of the town. And having placod tin Plotted in the Slough, by which I think it will appear that twenty different divisions of the fleet employed in the various services .; thousand men and four thousand hones might have been landed the East Scheldt, at Bathz, in the Slough, and In the West Scheldt, from the Slough in 46 hour*, that cavalry and ordnance horses under the command of Officers of respectability, with directions ' might easily perform this march from the Slough to Bathz in S 6 to press the passage of the transports through the Slough, Ito hours, the distance being front thirty to 35 otitis. With regard roained in the vicinity of Walcheren, far die purpose of comm. to artillery, it was stated by Sir John Hope, in answer to a ques- ricating with Lord Chatham, as I conceived it any duty tq do, tion as to the number - of guns found in Baths and Waerden which iuntil he should think it right to proceed to South neveland. 'Dui might have been used for the ulterior objects, that there were ships of the line, therefore whose immediate presence at 8010 twelve 24-pounders in the battery at Waerden , and fourteen or, did not for the ream:cm which I have just mentioned appear O no , fifteen at Bathz, all of which, as the General believed, were on at all necessary, did not pass Flushing until the attack qn the 14th. travelling carriages. I might add that the quantity of ordnance I The Courageox, which ship was intended to go up the river when and ordnance stores taken on the island, as appears by the return the frigates did, proceeded early in the morning of the 15th. I in Journal Army Proceedings, page 15, was such at 1 should sup- detained the others, as the anchorage at liathz was very cor.fintil pose to be sufficient for all the possible wants of the army. and at that time extremely crowded, but they were oply a few When, therefore, Lord Chatham contends in his statement miles lower down, and within reach of going up in one dile mim e that the second point, namely, " why the army was not kraf o rk, ever it should be required of them to proceed up the river. me sooner to the destination from whence its Ulterior operations • The transports proceed i edom the river in different divisions 4 were to continence is purely a naval consideration," his position fast as the difficulties I have stated could be overcome, and i s is certainly true in words, but as certainly incorrect in Its im- consequence of the arrangements made, and the exertions of the plied meaning. It is obvious that the army might have marched I Officers employeds with fewer emir:lents tbon I believe hooves to Bathz-in the course of a few days, but it is also obvious that it occurred to to large a flee. in such a navigation. could not be conveyed on board a fleet of four hundred transports, I I trust I have now succeeded la 'mooing the point with which jbesides frigates:, sloops, and flotilla, through a very intricate chem. I set out, namely, that if the. Army was not sooner assembled at mei, without some delay. The difficulty of conducting such a fleet Bathe, the delay was in no shape imputable to my misconduct; at all, through the mazes of such a navigation can only be appre- the particular line of operations which had been suggettoi to the ' dated by pro'esslonzl men; it was very greatiy increased by an Commander in Chief of the Forces, and to myself, as most like adverse wind, blowing for some time with such violence as to ly to insure the attainment of the ultimate objects of the Mee! .' render the expedient of warping (the only means of proceeding) dition, was departed from, is notorious; but I have endeavoured totally impracticable ; such obevacles to our progress were only to to Thew that the failtue of the attack on Cadsand was not owing' be overcome by great exertions and perseverance, by a consider- to any defect in the orders and instructions issued by ant, and it able but not as I trust an unnecessary expenditure of labour and was teidently impossible, that while Cadsand and Flushing re• time. mined in the hands of the enemy, I could carry such a naval art I can only say, that I made every arrangement by appointing moment as was assembled under my orders to the point of gene the most active Officers to every separate part of each service, cal rendezvous. No precautions of mite could ammo the Fleet and that I had every reaoon to be satisfied with their zeal, activity and Army against the fury of the elemeets, or enable us in spite and eiertion. of the adverse gales, to reach by •the shortest course our tomer 'Having anticipated many of these difficulties, I attempted in a deedeation. conversation with Lord Chatham on the Ist of August, to ins-' 4 Jn conveying the Fleet to s secure place of refuge, anyone press them on his Lordship's mind, and I Inferred from his an- where the disembarkation of the troops tout plate with hole savers, that he intended to modify his future plans in cones- loss of time and without any loss of .lout::, Ito act I shall not be quence and to proceed by South Beveland instead of the West accused either of a dereliction of my duty, or of.any inattentioom Scheldt.! Under this persuasion I directed Admiral Otway to -the interests of the Army. take the command of the Fleet employed before Walcheren, that Front this period s I considered myself boand implicitly to acs I might be at liberty to employ, my whole attention in forwarding cede to the wishes of the Comm:older in Chief. With him alone the different preparations necessary to facilitate the progress of was there an option between a march of 36 bouts, and a voyage the Army to the destination front whence its ulterior operations of an indefinite length. I trust that it mos owing to no deka of were to commence. , zeal on my part, and lam sure it was owing to no want of ex- I immediately directed Sir Home Popham to proceed, through i cation on the nart of the many excellent naval Officers whom I the Slough with several sloops of war, all the bombs gun-brigs had the honohr to command, that the lirogrets Ma fleet which and gun-boats, and use every exertion in getting the f l otilla into it was necessary to warp, or, in less technical larguage, to haul by human labour, through the windings of a most intricate Men the West Scheldt, that it might in the first instance co-operate . with Commodore Owen in completing the naval blockade of nth and often directly in the teeth tit tbe.vrind., appeared s ot tardy Flushing, and to be ready to proceed to fsathe at the shortest no- that Lord Chatham " saw no movemeet making to past f:nod a single vessel to the 'West Scheldt." The exertions of the nova tice, whenever its services should be required there, for the pur pose of prosecuting the ulterior objects of the ExpeClition. Officers and men were not rendered less irksome by the peo I Aso instructed him to hasten as much as possible the pr suasion that the labour, which, though incemant, often Proved of the Transports through the Slough. f- ' unavailing, might have been mare 4 to them at the expiate of a I short march across the Wand of South Bevelond. To impute to The subsequent news of the rapid occupation' of South DIOn. me or to the Navy, under the name of delay, the loss of time land and of the fort of Bath:, with a quantity of artillery nod I which was passed by me in con st a nt s olicitude, and by the mss ammunition in the other forts (v. Jouraal Army Proceedings, pa. in unremitting tolhis net what I should have expected from Lot , 15. Sir John Hope) adapted to our future operations; and also of the facility which might be afforded to our arrangements for 1 C hatham ' ed I It would have beep more agmeoble to myself to have offered crossing to Santvliet, by a lord reported capable of being palmed to their Lordships a simple journal of the daily transactions of the_ by some part of the army, further strengthened my opinion that i l the lauding in South Beveland with all the cavalry and irlantro I Fleet, as that course would have afforded me the opportu ty paying a just tribute of gratitude to the numerous able and . would be the only means of rapidly approaching towards the al- ' timate objects of the Expedition.. .1 oars Officers, by whom I was aided in the different brooches.' Accordingly, in my interview with Lord Chatham on the 6th, possibly consider the service, under my directions, and who m ay e themseloes as unjustly subject, together with myself, to tom with I stated fully the di ffi culties I had to encounter front the unto- ; potation, from the marked and perhaps invidious accuracy itil ward state of the weatheroand front the intricacy of the channel :t mom. t which the particular days of arrival of different division) ate in passing the vessels through the Slough, as also Mum the 0 1 , spec r 's ified in Lo d Cha tham Statement. . culties made by the Pilots, who refused to take charge. of sio, But I ant convinced that it was not the Intention of his Lorth vessels, or even to carry the line of battle ships into the Weed , . shlp in collecting such a multitude of dates, to attribute shit Scheldt (vide Lord Garden ' s Letter.) :. t t blame to those Officers. He has clotted his Report by pointing the strong impression I felt upon this subject induced me to me out as the only object of his animadversion. deviate front the line of conduct I have always adopted in rola:ion w hich preveeted He leaves me " to account for the diffi dl culti to military matters, of nut interposing any opinion ; and I den- '.. difficulties whit* cured to propose to his Lordship to commence the disembat katien • the investment of Flushing, as well as Med ,.___ ament h? presented themselves to the early progress of the e • rut by landing the cavalry immediately on Southßeveland and march the West Scheldt." ing them to Bathz, which might be followed by all the infantry .rendered He was not lt seems that the !hit point Imo not occupied in the siege of Flushitig; stating that much delay and aware , t re Chu impossible by the state of tbe winds ; he was not cusp Ma Scheldt had difficulty would arise an getting our numerous vessels and toms- - ports through the Slough; that in addition to the frigates which were already under orders to proceed into the West Scheldt, I the circumstances impeded his early-progress up the of his being blown- into the East West Scheldt. I have now ceased to he Concerning Ldrd Chatham s op i nion s . _ 'should be able in a day or two to get s su ffi cient portion of sloops : anxiou s that their solicitous,but I am 'and ever shall be sumerely • with and extra flotilla, consisting of the transports I ordered t o be arm- .to regret the confiden ce s . Lordships should not see cause • mom ed and the launches of the fleet to be fitted with carronades, to , e upon this loosest which they have been pleosed to honour m encrease the flotilla through the Slough to send up to co-operate . m I s lot o• I . ottocu 1 . (Signed) with the army at Bathz , and such a limited number of transports • Rear Admiral. London., sth March, Ihlo. as might contain articles essential to the fi rst advance of the army. Sir R• J. Strecloo I also informed his Lordship that every possible exertion was . No. 4.—Mopy of a Letter front Rear Admiral R. . , S ir making tmaccompliah the passage through the Slough, on the nos- ' to J. W, Croker, Em. enclosing one front Rear Adams , M•) Lure of which exertions, being wholly technical, such as buoying Richard Keats.--(Received 7th March, at IP. • IMO. and anchoring small transports on the side of the shoals, and London, 6th March, truoion of et making arrangements for warping, (the wind being still. adverse) I Sett — Having understood that an improper cons . that it cannot be necessary for me to dwell. ' Letter of the 27th of August last had taken place and ' Lords C oto ' That Loid Chatham fully understood the nature and extent of though I thought it my dum to represent to had , e ~... ' the obstacles to our getting into the West S c heldt which I de- • '' smilers of the AdmirOty that Lord Chathammao n" r • that ' scribed, is obvious from his Letter of the 7th os - August (No. o. sion not to advance, antecedent to the date of that lette , Military Papers B.) written after the interview in which I had did not do it till the 27th.thesubje tt explained them and ventured to propose the remedy of landing .-I wrote to Sir Richard Keats for his opinion on . re ld the cavalry, &c. on South Beveland. t and having received his answer , I beg leave to ly it befit , dotted To this letter I beg to call the most particular attention, as it is for their Lordsbips' infommtlon, which I hope w a y be sa very 'difficult to reconcile the statement In that letter with the in- A copy of my letter to Sir Richard accotimanies this. RACIh... sinuations which it is my painful duty to 'answ er. It is no less iam (sign , /rm. • ) R. J. ST P difficnii to reconcile the admission, that " the active enterprim • J. W. Creker,Esq. di h Itld of the enemy and the reinforcement thrown Into Flushing render- Lon d on, sth Marc h + . • (Eac h 1 .)al of my friers ed it necessary to land General Grosvenor ": 'division" with the 1 , It appears to me from the report of sever , . 4,4 assertion in the statement , that ' s it.is to be remembered that this . ''‘` l- let ter of the 2,th ii ' that an improper construction of my e was only dont) Immose hi; Lordship saw no movement making bought t my &id last has taken place ; and that although I t . . m .___,_ , t o to push fotward a single vessel up the West Scheldt." ' enr to my Lards Commissioners of the ho t a ra n i; Upon the justice of the last obsernotioo, a ft er the conversation re r e m s om thaw Itacl, °lade his decision not to advance, ec. •oyth. v which haioniesed between us mi*, ipsh, I dam not trust myself . '''''' ba" a - d not do it till the - so • to the'date of that l e tte r : that he di eye to state 00 with making any continents. , , nt I request you will have the goOdo ohm 0 I then thought and" still thittlellundflintplaseWiltait I•feld note ' th i g ' cc " - view with Lord Chat" ti : . the impression which our inter I sinned to suggest had beat adopted, 'had the cavalry bontliaudesi • convey the sane to s belith made On ymor ertiod, that may . ._ that respect on South Beveland and a limited nutidmi of trarttplithisan se. sat isfy them the report I made In llO Meted, that a delay of only a few .days would have resulltahfroli Imrddisifst to IR m, j, STRAC ' s the adverse accident which had upavOidably given a different • 'Alive &e. correct.— , (Signe B, &c. A 1 " . 1 T e Rear Admir a l Sir t. G t 'oust . i course to the direction of our operations. • ' . - . •- . L I, • we proepedid ttt Ws INdship further *On, this by this ithange of, kite &Stint. ned up the her titan of *1 Met the ocaupgices cif Wood 'weans* unnecessary, alartd. and that if it could have been rdi it /would have occa- that squadron' to stoned a very inconvenient of outArce. Qa•the other Flushing wherein. hand 1 this change of destination anemia*/ tailed coproduce some tsirable. ' This is delay 3n the naval operations, by forcing' us to proceed by a eir- 6th and I'.oth of luitous instead of a direct * navigation i but the main question is 'kw of mine was bow far it necessarilyiended to retard the;lttaintnent of the tilte- Lord Chatham, ( rior objects of the expedition. sno ntaneoui offer I I have already stated, that for the &true ofttrabl. Mt those ob- ' _a -k— z...• ..s . an.kirla se I rnn. . 71 I I I. ;