Star. — London, England, 1810-03-30 00:00:00

ent to a fleet lying exposed like the Eastern squa-, jron, the wear and tear of the ships, the perpetual damages, and perpetual repairs, would soon amount to more than the sums which Might be expended on the possecsicn of Flushing. By the testimony of ano ther gallant officer, the seizure of Flushing was highly desirable ; it was the key of the Scheldt ; no ships of war could escape while we chose to close them up. It wits, said Mr. Rose, an object of more value to seize Flushing, than to destroy the entire fleet at Antwerp. Flushing could shelter in its basin 20 sail of the line ; it was difficult to sty of sheltering how many more it might be made capable ; but this was certain, that if you destroyed Clat basin, (and the most effectual destruction of it for the uses of the enemy was its seizure by us,) a ser vice of more value was effected than the destruction of any - number of French ships in the river. —(4 laugh.) —He did not mean to undervalue the service that might be done in the actual destruction of those ships, but . even if they were destroyed, new ships might be built in the same place ; the forests were not de strxled ; and until that was done, a perpetual suc cession of armaments might issue from those forests. It was equally natural for Ministers to resolve to keep Flushing after its seizure ; for, in that resolu tion, they were equally supported by authority of the first order. The great Lord Nelson, to whom he had so often alluded, was fully of opinion that it should be taken, and when taken should be kept. Sir Richard Strachan, in his letter of the 13th September (and when be Mentioned that officer's name, he knew it was that of i man whose knowledge in his profession, whose skill, judgment, and distinguished bravery, could not be doubted—(Hear,hear,from the Opposition.)-that emi nent Officer, in his correspondence, expresses his wish to enter into a detail of the means of retaining a sta tion, which he considers of the utmost importance to peep. He proceeds to say that every effort may be well expended on the preservation of such a point ; that though the troops suffered by the climate, their numbers should be made up by drafts from the regi ments at home ; and that Flushing might even be made a salient point for. further operations on the Continent. But the feeling that pressed on his mind was, that the harbour could contain twenty sail of the line ready to start, and commence operations on the most exposed and vulnerable quarter of this country. Captain Cockburn, in his letter of the 29th September, adopts almost the same ideas. In speak ing of Flushing, professing to decline all military views, and considering it merely in a naval light, he asserts, that a force in Flushing could lock up the Scheldt fleet so completely, that not a ship of them could steal to sea. It was true, that at the close of his opinion he advised that they should be let out, that the British fleet might have a fair opportunity of meet ing with and capturing them ; but this, though con - sonant to the habits of a brave British seaman, was not suitable to the calmer views of a British Cabinet, and - left an improper hazard. Next, as to the intention of blocking up the river, this, ridiculed as it might have been, was sanctioned by high advice. Sir Richard Strachan, in his letter of the 14th of November, speaks of it as perfectly feasible : he declares it as his opinion, that the mouth of the Scheldt may be blocked up and stopped ; that he had considered the idea seriously, and that his mind was fully bent on the material advantages to be derived from that operation. Here, said Mr. Rose, Mini. sters must have felt themselves justified in placing full reliance, and consciousness that they were doing their duty. But it was still echoed in their ear that there had been errors and misconceptions ' • what was this but that Ministers were not infallible? But errors might be found charged on some other great names, some even of those who had now survived the sneers or suspicion of their cotemporaries, and were handed down to posterity as models of foresight, de cisiou, and intelligence. He did not mean to throw a shade on the enshrined virtue of those distinguish ed men ; but it was impossible to look into their his tory without finding that they had, in their zeal for England and England's 'glory, attempted. projects which they were unable to accomplish. 'He looked to the celebrated attack on Toulon by an army under' Prince Eugene, and a fleet under the command of a great British Admiral. That attempt, concerted with wisdom, and prosecuted with bravery, proved abortive. An allusion had been made to the attack . on Rochefort, and the force employed there stated as holding no comparison in point of numbers to that employed in Walcheren. But draw the comparison , on those separate forces from their p ro p ortion to the ! whole force of the kingdom as it stood at. the periods of those two Expeditions, and they would be found close upon an equality. The Rochefort Expedition was undertaken with all advantages in its favour— accurate information had been obtained. The Ex pedition itself bad originated in the memorial of a most able officer, and yet the whole service done was the capture of the little isle of Aix. Lord Howe, in the Magnanime, with a pilot on board, better ac quainted than any man in England with the French coast, was run aground within two miles of the island. On the return of the Expedition the public expre;sed no displeasure until a clamour was gradu ally excited.. Sir John Mordaunt, the Commanding Officer of the Expedition, was brought to a Court Martial. Much ridicule had been thrown on the idea of taking Antwerp by a coup tie main, but, without attempting to set himself up as a judge of military matters, he had strong authorities for his belief of what might be done by a coup de main. (He then read some extracts from a military work, in which General Ligonier's opinion was given on the nature . and uses of the attack by coup de main, and a narra tive of the capture of Bergen op Zoom by General Lawendall by a sudden attack.) It was, said he, by a coup the .nain that this fortress, then the strongest in the world, was taken. Ismael, with a large army within its walls, was taken by the same rapid and bold assault. But, to revert to the Expeditions of which he had been previously speaking, Lord An son, when First Lord of the Admiralty,. sailed with an army on board, commanded by the great Duke of Marl'iorough, on an Expedition to the coasts of the Bay of Biscay. That Expedition re turned, re infecia ; the Duke went to command in Germany ; and General Bligh, at the head of the farces, landed to destroy Cherbourg ; he Could there lrn a few merchant ships, off a few brass guns. He up the country, and was • shore was impeded, ane d nothing more than burr t destroy a basin, and carry ol marched a short distance uF attacked ; his return to the c the embaskation of St. Cog, taken prisoners of war or slain. expedition. He (Kr. Rose) instance, in which nothing but prevented a total failure. It under General Barrington against India Islands. After a two-month, dalaupe was taken; but the General, acknowledged himself deeply inde. it was not lost to the country, as Cet —the father (said Mr. Rose) of, I believe, The Vice- King of Italy (a laugh)—appeared off the Island'at the moment of its capture with 2600 men, whose ar rival, a few hours earlier, would have foiled the whole expedition. After enumerating some additio nd cases of unavoidable failure, Mr. Rose answered -other points, which had been made in the course of the debate. It had been asserted that the expence of this present expedition must have been understated at £BOO,OOO. The calculation of an Honourable Ge neral (Tarleton) ingeniously swelled it up to three millions, bat the idea was absurd. The estimates were all before the House, mid it was idle to suppose public officers capable of putting so low and unarti. ficial a trick on the common sense of the House; £246,000 had been charged for ordnance transports. This was the charge not of the Ordnance, but of tbe . Transport Board, with whom those miners lay, and. whose peculiar province , and duty it was to collect all , transport services, which were formerly separate, into one system and direction. He still felt. the most pin , fect conviction that the retention of Flushing was is wise measure ; and when th.! country had gives" itself time to consider its value, and calmly estimate, the dangers which menaced it from that quarter of the enemy's force, he was convinced that their judg ment would be altogether in favour of the wisdom which planned the Expedition, and the policy by which its great objects were endeavoured to be re • tained. Lord F. G. OSBORNE addressed the House it support of the Resolutions, in a maiden speech of much elegance and vigour. He felt that he was ob truding himself, when so many other Members, with higher claims on their attention, might be waiting to deliver their opinions ; but on such an occasion he could not be justified to himself in giving a silent vote. He would not attempt to examine whether Ministers ' were incapable of directing tke country, but he-must fix his eyes on what they had done, and there, he could have no doubt, he found the melancholy proofs of incurable weakness or premeditated crime. Could experience do nothing for them ? Was it possible that, after the dilatory and procrastinated expedi tion in 1799, they should have suffered every thing to be ruined by delay in their last abortive attempt at con quest ? 'Why throw away British valour and British blood, after the glcries of Maida, Egypt, and even of Spain? The military renown of the British soldier, was stamped for ever ; and was this crude and creel experiment to be made to try his title to renown once more ? After a train of similar observations, the No-' ble Lord sat down amid the cheers of the House. Lord GEORGE GRENVILLE, after apolo gizing for taking up the time of the House, com mented upon the facts of Mr. Rose's speech ; he fol lowed him in an acute and able examination bf his statements relative to the Rochefort Expedition, and concluded by recommending economy in the treasure and blood of the British people. Mr.FITZGERALD controverted the reasonings of the Noble Lord (G. Grenville) who had just sat down, so far as they went to establish the want of analogy I between the late Expedition and that to Rochefort. After many arguments in defence of the conduct of Administration,the Honourable Member contended, that the place to which the Expedition was sent was, upon the whole, the only place to which it was advise able to send it—and that its object was closely con nected with the safety of the country, it being to de stroy a growing force, still unfortunately. increasing. All seemed to agree_ that the Commanders were exempt from blame ; no unnecessary delay had been proved, and no dishonour had tarnished his Majesty'sl arms.—(Hear.)--He therefore hoped that a majority of the House woold vote as he conscientiously should, for the Amendment proposed by the Honourable General. Mr. GRATTAN, adverting to a part of the ob servations that had fallen from the Right Hon. Gen , tleman opposite, slid, that he would not - with him enter into a comparison of the conduct of the present war with the conduct of that under the direction of the great Lord Chatham. He would not compare a series of defeats witha series of victories. In reply * to what had been urged respecting the retention of Walcheren, he would adduce the best opinion of Sir R. Strachan, which was decidedly against the reten tion. To have retained Walcheren, it would have been necessary to have sent immediately a large force to supply the place of those troops which Sir E. Coote requested might be immediately withdrawn ; and af; terwards to have incurred a a great annual loss. Be sides, there was one argument against the retention of Flushing, whick was unanswerable. It was impossi ble to retain it. By a strange confusion of ideas, Government, because they thought it necessary to send an armament to Walcheren, when Austria was at war, to create a diversion, thought it necessary to keep that armament there when Austria was at peace, and when no rational object was in view. Ministers, however, had been possessed of a disposeable force, and they thought it necessary to do something with it ; but whether to take care of it or to expose it to destruction, seemed to have been to them a matter of indifference. What was the opinion of the General Officers on the object of the Expedition? They de claimed against it. The first idea of Government was to send an army by Ostend. They afterwards mitigated the severity of their' idea, and determined to proceed by ajoint naval and military force. And here, it was curious to Observe, 'the Noble Viscbunt who had said so much against the expediency of listening to military opinions, had in this inetanee listened to them with great deference; for had he not done so, the army would have been sent by Ostend ; that is according to the declared sentiments of all the officers, they would have been sent to incur, not risk merely, but utter destruction.. That plan having been abandoned, what was the opinion of the officers on the conjoint Expedition ? That it was less impracticable than the other, but that it was attended with a hazard which rendered it nearly desperate.--:. Sir John Hope had declared, that as scion as he saw the situation of things, he was persuaded that titt'. .1 attempt was impracticable. Lord R 0115411 Willa , t Mr. CANNING then rose. He said Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Grattan) who had spoken last, had concluded a very able speech with calling upon the House to visit all the calamities of the expedition upon those who were the authors of it. As one of the authors and advisers of that expedition, he trusted that the House would not be sur - prized that he should feel anxious to"answer the call which had been made. He should endeavour, as distinctly, and the Hi iid that the .1 • • • • At could not at any time i der discussion,ltaly,Spain, and the North of Germany Chatham enters:24*d doubts had been separately pointed out as the proper theatre doubts had been borne , for employlog the disposable force of the country.-- dmiralty. Sir It. Strachan —With respect to Italy, as much had been done as 'grave his conviction that could be done, and our force in that quarter did The Hon. Gentleman seriously occupy the force of the enemy at Naples.-_ examination of the Report More than was done he could not have wished to be which contained the infer- done, because it was always his opinion, that it woult had been indeced to be most unjustifiable in this country to stimulate ...isacion chiefly went to prove the or encourage insurrettion, when the probable state of Antwerp and its neighbourhood ; quente ,of such insurrections must eventually be fatal_ aid contended, that it was by no means entitled to cre- t those engaged in them. - A x to the North of Ger cll. Of the falsehood of the information indeed a suffi- m iny,he could not see that such an expedition would cient proof had been afforded on the day after the have been likely to have . been attended with any im siiling of the Expedition, for on the arrival of the portant results It mist be recollected, that once Marquis of Huntley at Cadsand, he found it imprac- before we- had sent an expedition to . the North of Ger ticable to effect a landing, in consequence of the su- • many, immediately prior to the battle of Austerlitz,. perior force of 'the enemy, although in the secret in-; and this expedition was not able to effect any material formation it was stated that the place was without diversion in favour of Austria. And yet he must troops. As little credit was fotind to be due to the ask, was there any resemblance between the state of representations of the dilapidated state of the fortifi- Europe at that time, and what it is at present? An cations of Antwerp. After having dwelt at consi- expedition. going last year to the North of Germany, derable length on this part of the subject, the Right would have only. foundthe broken scatterediragments Hon. Gentleman proceeded to state that the predic- of what were once powerful-kingdoms. (Mar, hear.) tions of all the Officals had been verified, Ministers -When last we sent our expedition to the North of had sent Out an expedition of one hundred thousand Germ - any, Russia and Sweden were our allies, and men, of the result of which the' General had great_ Prussia held a most respectable rank among the na clonists, of which the Admiral had no hopes of. suctions. That State bad since most lamentably changed. ccso, without a plan of Antwerp or of Lillo, and with- Those nations who were then our friends, and who out any 'system of co-operation, to a place where - the still may be inclined to our cause, are forced to act troops, in addition to other evils, were visi'ed by that against us. It would have been idle to have depen most dreadful of all evils, contagious disease. In ded .much on the...co-operation that we might have vain would Ministers refer to former exploits of our received from insurrections. Insurrections had taken bray; saldiers, and delare that from their spirit they place through the North of Germany ;' tail they were had expected every thing. On those occasions they • not of a ninure to interrupt the plaUs of the corn ' hail to contend only against the enemy ; in the pre- mon enemy. A Pruesian Officer (Schill) had, with -sent instance they had to contend with a plague. It a small corps, traversed the North of Germany; but was no excuse for Ministers to say that they relied notwithstanding his activity and personal courage,: on the spirit of the army, when they exposed that he was not able to stir up that country to any effec army to an evil over which no spirit could triumph. rive resistance. Another attempt had been made —Long after. any necessity for retaining . Walcheren by the late Elector of Hesse Cassel (who was much had existed (if any necessity had ever existed), Go- beloved in his territories) to raise an army in the vernment had persevered in its retention. There ap- North of Germany, and yet these attempts had peared to be a correspondent ignorance between the a very partial success. The march of the Duke two Cabinets of Vienna and St. James. The latter lof Brunswick, with his faithful followers, through did not know that the former•had made a peace with the whole North of Germany, was a brilliant and France ; and the former did not know that the troops almost- unexampled military • atchievement ; and of the latter were in the hospitals of Walcheren. In yet, although it shewed the disposition of the the whole of the transaction, Government had been people of that part of the Continent, it also proved. guilty of a conduct so reprehensible, that it could be that they w.tre :c l best n - , that it would be hardly exceeded only by the conduct of that Parliament who possible, even if it were adviseable, to rouse them to would excuse them. a general insurrection. There then being no chance of Zterial - - with that , any mal co-operation . istria, , power could have no-right to expect us not to pursue objects of British policy, especially when they might produce a diversion on the Continent. He would say most distinctly that there was no chance of co-operation at the time that the Expedition was resolved -uponh. either with Austria or with .the population . of the countries to which the Exredition was directed. He never evected, or wished for the co-operation that be • ' • - as shortly as he was able, not only to justify ex-' was to . obtained by a.rising:tsfehe pe - ople, because 1 _ pedition, but to shew that Ministers at that time were he was always impressed with *the conviction that it strictly bound in duty to their country, to. pursue the would be a barbarous policy to encourage insurrec course st hich they had taken. He conceived that the tions which might prove ultimately fatal to those en line which they had taken was precisely what any gaged in them. He wished to state this most dis other Administration, which could be formed in this i wetly, because, humble as he was, he feared that his country, would have taken in the same circumstances. I speeches had been so far misrepresented on the Con- Before the House should form their judgment on this 1 tinent, that the Moniteur stated him to have used a subject, they should bring their minds to consider it 1 language of thatJoit,' lie dietifore felt it necessary 'not as merely an insulated question, but as part of a solemnly to deny that he. 'eVei.used such language, general system that it became necessary tb act on.—. and to abjure the sentiments imputed to him. He We were engaged in a war in which not only the hoped that by the same channels by which his ;whole frame of Europe was attacked, but which also 1 speeches were conveyed to the Continent, this ahjura attacked our dearest interests, and threatened our se- . tion of the sentiments insPuted to him might also be curity. The strongest of the nations yet unsuhdded . i . conveyed. In fact, solar-from wishing for this sort of upon the Continent, Austria, bad taktn„up arms : Co-operation, it was a Material reason for his prefer against France. We were bound to supporftbe canie fence to directingthe Eipeditiou to the Scheldt, that no of Austria, not only from the ties of alliance, but from I such to-operation was to• be expected:. If there was common interests ; we had therefore two distinct ob- ! any one part of the Continent in which less than it; jects to consider in any expedition that could have ;. any other a co-operation from popular insurrection 'been projected at that time ; —we had to consi- ! were to be expected, Antwerp was thin spot. Al der how our force might bst serve the cause of ' though, generally speaking, the Continent had. suf. 'Austria ;—and, at the same time, we were never fered most severely from the devastations of the to lose sight of this consideration, that the perms- T i French armies, yet Antwerp was a town which , had vent interest of this country, should also be attended derived new life from the events of the war., It was to. The object of the Expedition to the Scheldt 'no longer that deserted place in which was said was not to be considered as selfish ; neither was it to be growing in the streets, but it was a town destined to be supposed entirely connected wit h the cause of ,by the sovereign of France to be a great emporium Austria. It was, in tact, an Expedition which had of trade, and one of his principal naval arsenals.,-- been canvassed for several years, and did not merely However other countries might regret the changes to grow out of the Austrian war, or originate with the which they had been subject, Antwerp had cause to present Administration. The idea of an Expedition rejoice, and bless tire day that it was unitedto France. to Antwerp and the Scheldt had been most eloquently It had been a long time deprived of the advantages 'recommended by a Noble Lord whom he succeeded which nature had given it, by 'all , article in a treaty in office (Earl Grey) previous to his quitting that which prevented the free navigation of their own river 'House. When he adverted to that speech, he. must the Scheldt. The events' of the war has restored to mention• that it was one of those speeches, which them this free navigation, and there can be no doubt by some of those accidents that are not unusual i but that Antwerp has gained most materially.by its In that House, was not heard by any but the connection with France. It was therefore not at all Member's. In that speech, the Noble Lord had most to be supposed, that an Expedition directed against eloquently and impressively pointed out to the atten- Antwerp would receive any co-operation from local tion of the House Antwerp and the Isle of Walcberen, insurrection. No such co-operation was sought for, (crier of hear, hear,) and he appeared to leave this plan and the Expedition was to be considered in no other as a legacy to his successors. The Noble Lord wits light than as an act of'legitimate hostility against an a man of most unquestionable zeal for the interests enemy with whom we were at war. As to the se and honour of his country, (hear, hear ; ) and looking crecy of the Expedition be would advert to the /*- with the eye of a statesman on the map of Europe, niteur (the o ffi cial voice of the - French Government) this was the expedition which he thought the most to prove that it' was a surprise on the French Govern promising, without any immediate contemplation of meat Tltis Wauld appear from an •;:iffici.l report an Austrian war. The expedition was therefore ori- sent by the-Minister at war to the Emperor, in which trinally planned on considerations different from the it was stated that this Expeditiorowas originally des. 4`. circumstances under which it took place. When the tined for Spain; . but - that hi consepence of the ar- Austlian war, however, did take place, the expedition micice, it was suddenly ditt s r.ed from its original became more essentially necessary. There were only destination. This report shelved most clearly "that two modes of directing the forces of the country under they were entirely ignorant of the real destination of these circumstances ; the one was to attempt a direct the Expedition. Some Gentlemen had, in their co-operation with the Austrian forces, and the other speech s, appeared to think that it was the duty of was to project an expedition which might occasion a 'lllinisters to foresee every circumstance which could diversion by drawing of a considerable part of the. .happen in a campaign, and therefore they were justly French troops. As to the idea of direct co-operation, chargeable for every misfortune which could occur. ..it appeared to him to be Most absurd. He had heard It was evident, however, that Ministers must leave a 'kit iciele stated in that House of sending our expedition great deal to the conduct of the Generals who were into the Adriatic, and landing them at Tames in or. on the spot. Gentletnen who now discussed this der to join the Austrian armies. • In order to send the question OW judge with all the calmness of lookers reepedition that eeas thus prepared, it ivould have beer; on, who were reckoned often the best judges, from necessary to send about 300 sailiertransports, ,under •their opportunity of seeing both hands. The plait proper convoy, to the Achjetie sea. This flotilla 'iris of an Edition had not, however , this advaben• -.would probably not have aerived.at its destination for .tage. The m ions of the enemy were not to .1 y three months after the war-had commenced, and when' easily foreseen by them, and their plans might east :they had reached Trieste, they would not have found be deranged by an unexpected Movem ent er circene an s n Austrian soldier.within 300 miles of them. As this stance;' which, when every thing wa s over, it wa , counteracte d plat! of direct co-operation appeared altogether absurd, easy to we bow it could have been counteracte l d. it was - of course maturely considered in what points a He conceived, however, that it wa s invossihe to our diversion might best be made in favour of Austria. Be- have pointed out ally other destination in which sides the expedition, the merits of which were now un- forces could have been employed with grata* P ro . :€7 4 hit rear-pv.loo • ;mthat the Expedition cot Lin. Thus er,4 l osit eMccifeded. Lord Chattier now turned to *ambit 'kir thestibject, attliongh.those di ut accident could h at Amin by the orders of the A dmir was on the expeditios hid expressed to Lord Mulgnil rainst the French West-. the Expedition would fail. T months resistance, Gua- here entered into a minute exam eneral, in his dispatc of-the Select Committee, whit] indebted to fortune that ora tion on which Government -, as Count Beauharnois proceed, which information chie r -- 1 1 . 1