Star. — London, England, 1808-11-22 00:00:00

ri COURT I) . ' !Me! 111 T itiCHELSE4I. VA/AM DAY. - - . r, . 1 :: (aix/mad/rm. the 3rist ejesiertlai.) - The Along ADVOCATE read the questions proposild by the Court, with the written answers given tothem, 'in the following order : V. When did you receive orders to take the com. mand of the troops at Cork ?—A. I received those orders on the 12th of June. I had subsequently instructions from the Secretary of State on the 30th, which reach ed me at Dublin on the Sd of i t yly. in consequence of these instructions, I set out on the sth, and arrived ACC:irk the 6th of that month. Q. When did you sail from Cork ? and what was the number of troops you had at that time with you ? —A. On the letb of July I sailed from Cork, with about 9000 men, including 800 cavalry, of which 180 were mounted. Q. What were the instructions under which you sailed ?—A. The orders are before the Court, both from the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State. I have copies of some of them, but others are ^ftnislaid. The ,principal object was to attack the 7 French on the banks of the Tagus, but I was autho -Trize4 to- pursue other designs, at my own discretion, if. Itthought a 'variation would be for' the 'benefit of Spain and Portugal. Q. What were the particulars of your progress qn til you arrived at Mondego Bay ?—The particulars are in the dispatches of the 21st and 26th of July, and of the Sln of August. What is deficient there is supplied in the narrative. 9, What detenuined you to disembark in Wa des° Bay ? What led you to remain there until the 9th,' and then to proceed towards Lisbon ?—A. The reasons are assigned in the dispatches in my letter to Sit Harry Berrard, and in my narrative. The par ticular reason of my remaining until the 9th, and p_ro eeeding then to Lisbon, are in the dispatches of the SOth July and Bth August, in the letters to Sir Harry Barrard of the Bth and 10th August, and in my nar• iye. Q. When you had arrived, in Mondego Bay, what reinforcements did you expect ? Did troops join you there ? and in what number ?—A. I had a letter from the Secretary of State of the 15th July, V , .ch I knew that General Anstruther had been d to sail, and that Sir Harry Burrard had sail .ed with 10,000 men. Q. On the 19th of August, what knowledge had jou of the reiriforcen.ent ?—A. I had nothing further official. Q. Why did you march on the 10th, before the arrival of reinfdrcements ?—A. The objects are stated in the dispatches and narrative. I had about 12,300 troops, rank and file, end the Portuguese corps con ' sisted of 6000. Then there were 1500 Spaniards, and an equal number of the levy of Oporto. Q. What was your progress when in the neighbour hood of the enemy ?—A. I was with the army on the 10th at Lo.f.hina and on the 14th at Ahobaca, and on the 15th at C aldas. We shall here state in a more abridged form the answers in writing to the subsequent question, be cause many of them were resumed in another form, and answered more fully in the posterior-examination under the direction of Lord Moira. The written depositions of Sir Arthur farther said, that the Bishop of Oporto-had promised tupplies k but that a separate contract was entered into in case of deficiency. The detail repeated what was before said, of the incompetency of the horses, and mention ed the artillery which was drawn by them. The sol diers had 60 rounds of powder, 90 mules were laden with 2000 each, and 500,000 were in all the carts -taken together. On the 20th, the army had consu- Jima fourteen days bread, but the communication was still open with she fleet. We had an accession of :4000 men, and yet on the following day we had nine days bread. The number of the cavalry of the enemy was from twelve to fourteen hundred. The British rind rortugucse cavalry consisted.of 210 of the one, sod 260 of the other. - Lord MOIRA said, that he had some questions to pTe, which arose out of the proceedings, as far as the had been hitherto conducted; yet nothing could befarther from his intention than to put the honour able person to whom these questions would be pro posed in any other situation than that of ;respectable Officer in his Majesty's service. Suliitantial justice was the only thing there pursued, and it was a duty they owed to their country and their Sovereign, to ac quit ; and for the discharge of that duty they were• under a serious responsibility. It was under these imqressions. that be should address to that officer the Interrogatories the occasion demanded ; and if any of them should be of a nature that required time for the consideration of the answer, or if the Honourable Of ficer should think fit to decline to give any reply at all, he begged that no unfavourable concluston Might be drawn from his refusal. • The operations in Por tugal Sir Arthur Wellesley undertook, and said he determined to give that direction to the force under his command, after having held a conference with the Junta of Gallicia. In this stage of the observations of the NobJleitinri i some remarks were made by the president; when , Lord Moira suggested that the Court should be clear ed, if Sir David Dundas had any commein to make on the course in which he *was proceeding. This pro position was not adopted, and the Judge Advocate stated the questions to Sir Arthur Wellesley under the direction of Lord Moira. Q. Had Sir Arthur Wellesley any communication with Santander, or any means of knowing what was the disposition of the inhabitants of Biscay as to re ceiving the assistance of the British array ?—A. I was at Coranna when I received a letter from Sir Thomas Dyer, who was employed by his Majesty's Govern mtnt in communicating with the Junta of Oviedo, in which lett* Sir Thomas Dyer ;nforMed me, that he had held out hopes to the *Junta of Oviedo that the troops under my command would land in Asturias ; and he informed me that the communication had been received with satisfaction by the Junta of Oviedo, and he rather urged me to disembark at Santander, in order that I Might attack a French corps which at time had got possession of that city. I commit led upon this subject, among others, with the of Gallicia, who I conceived were interested ie position of the French corps at Santander; was informed by them that such measures 'were i as were likely to be effectual, to drive the FrenCh Santander, which measures afterwards proved to be successful. Lbad nn communication whatever with the people of Biscay, which province, as I under stood at that time, was not in a state of insurrection. Q. Had you any correspondence with the Spanish Generals, and did you state in them the intpoi tauce cif preventing the entrance of reinforcements of French ttodps in Spam I bad no communication with the sp'anish Generals: ' Q. bid you consider the army under your com mand adequate to-. the dispersion of Junot's force, when you advised Sir Harry Burrard to march to cut off the enemy's retreat I did consider the force which marched under my command, to be suffi cient to drive the French from Lisbon, an i from the forts upon the Tagus. Q. What alteration, if any, did you make in that opinion in consequence of the arrival of the division of the French army ?—A. No alteration whatever, in respect to the actual capacity of the army to ob tain a possession of Lisbon, and of the forts of the Taus. Q. You have stated that yon undertook to supply the Portuguese troops. Is it true that the country afforded a sufficiency of provisions for the wants of the army, if due means had been applied to collect deem ?—A. The country afforded us no provisions ex cepting beef and wine : and I believe, that from the time I landed in Portugal, to the time I quitted the army on the .sth September, the troops received only the biscuit 1 have stated in my narrative, and a small quantity of bread that was left by the French at twa places ; and, besides these, after I had given up the command, a small quantity of flour was obtained; which had likewise been left behind by the French. While I commanded the army, this bread supplied the consumption of the Portuguese troops, 1650 in number, who were without any ; and afterwards, I. I believed, the Officers received some bread from the Commissariat; but I am of opinion, upon the whole, that no exertions would have drawn from the Portu guese a supply of bread sufficient for that army. My opinion, stated in my letter, and in the explana tion to my letter, went to the arrangement and the distribution of the supplies, as well as the collection of them. • Lord Moira made an interlocutory remark, after which the Judge Advocate continued the 'interroga tories. • Q. To what extent was the flour, wine, beef, Ind' otter provisions supplied by the country L.A. Wine was procured in alniost every village in sufficient quantity for one, two, or three days consumption probably; but I have seen wine exhausted in more than one instance, when the army has halted more than ohe or two days. in the same place; and I believe that latterly the Commmissary General . wat not able to supply the troops with wine. As long as I coin man4ed the army, there was no want of fresh beef ; and as there were carts of the country drawn by bul locks,. draught cattle might have been killed for the use of the troops. But without resorting to this ex pedient, we very soon found that the supply of cattle was not sufficient in Portugal for a large army ; and, in point'of fact, before I quitted the army, a very large proportion of the food (I think more than half) was in salt provisions, and, I believe, the whole af. terwards. The cattle on which the army under my command was fed, were supplied under a contract with a Mr. Archer, and another Gentleman ; and excepting 10 or 12 head received at one place, and the same number at Caldas, 7-do not recollect that the country ever supplied any_ Sir Anytime iras then asked whether the different Juntas of Spain were not, as far as he eiiuld fauna. judgment, hostile to the co-operation of British troops with their armies ? Sir Attu:loß WELLESLEY replied, that he did un derstand that the Junta of Gallicia was not desirous of having the co-operation of tha British army with their force tinder General Blake ; they had, however, no objection to his landing in Spain, and even recom mended him to . land at Vigo, as being the only harbour' on the Western peninsula capable of sheltering the tramports between Corunna and the mouth of the Tagus. He also understood that the Junta of Seville, I, and the persons in authority in the province of Anda lusia, had no very great desire that the corps of Ge-' neral Spencer should act in conjunction With the army of General Castanos ; although .they were desirous that they should land at Port St. Mary, where they might be able eventually to cover the retreat of Ge neral Castanos, in case he should be defeated by the foe.. In explanation, he begged leave to say that his' opinion was founded from his correspondence with the Generals of Gallicia, who stated, that, as far as related to them, it was their most anxious desire that he -should carry on his operations in Portugal, and drive the French from that country ; and after that was done, they said the British army would form the proper point of connexion between the Northern and Southern armies of Spain. He was then asked, whether he had similar advices from the other Juntas? to which he replied in the ne gative. He was then asked whether, in his opinion, the expulsion of the French from Portugal was an impor.! tant advantage to the cause of Spain ? Sir ARTHUR replied, that in his opinion it was an, object of the greatest consequence to the Spanish na- Lion. He had no doubt whatever but that if the ap-' prehension,of the employment of the disposable force -I of this country in Portugal had been removed from! the minds of the French Generals, they would have l removed a very large proportion of the French army',', of Portugal into Spain. • Captain MALcoi.m, of the Donegal! man •of war,' was then examined, and asked, whether there were any, and what difficulties to impede the landing of troops, Ufsses, and artillery, on thecoast of Portugal, during the time that he,had a command there ? Captain MALCOLM answered, that during the months of August'and September there was a great difficulty in debarking troops, stores, and artillery, on the inhospitable coast - between Oporto and the mouth of the Tagus. During these pnontl4 there was' almost always a swell, which occasioned a consider able surf on the beach. At Mondego there was a river, but at the Mouth of it there was a bar, where there was also a Considerable surf there were but few country boats to be procured upon the coast; but at Mondego they were able to get a pretty consi-1 de,:able supply of boats of the country, schooners, &c. to facilitate. a landing. He knew no other place be tween. Oporto and the mouth of the !taps which afforded so much facility for a debarkation. Some boats, he believed, Opt also have been pi9cdrcd .Maceira and. Peniche 1 an 4 perhop. Itiattdiair o iotht have been effected at either of,those places, ugh not With such facility, As to the Mondego country , boats, they could be anti . use in any other part, and it was not possible to proceed williThem to the South ward. The whole coast was mach expwd to the Western breeze, but the entrance into Mondego Bay was tolerably safe. The wind in the month of Au gust changed, off that coast, from North to West and Southwest. Sir ARTHUR WELLISLEY asked the witness whe ther he recollected any night in the month of August, ! when be was obliged to put to sea in the Donegan,' from Maceira, and give the signal to the transports to weigh anchor ; and whether he did not also recollect how many of the transports lost their anchors upon that occasion ? Captain MALCOLM answered, that on the 30th of August, the wind changed to the South-west ; that he weighed anchor himself, and gave the signal to the fleet, consisting of about 240 transports, to do the same. About one half of them succeeded in getting under weigh, but the others were obliged to remain at anchor till the next day. When he returned to Maceila Roads, he found that about sixty of the con voy had lost their anchors in attempting to weigh ; and he had no doubt, that if the fresh breeze had in creased to a common gale, many of them must have been lost, as they were reduced to their last anchors, and their bottoms were rotten. As to Sir John Moore's :mops, he thought they were very badly found, and -that the transports which conveyed them were by no means equal to beating for a long time off a lee-shore. As to the entrance into Mondego river, it was only practicable for vessels that did not draw more than eleven feet water. He knew the whole coast of Por . tugal from Oporto to Lisbon : there was tolerable • shelter from the westerly breeze at Peniche, but the • anchorage was by no means good. The Mondego river would admit at one time of 25 vessels, drawing not more than 11 feet water. _ _ Captain Malcolm was then asked as to the loss of fiat.bottomed boats during the landing ? He replied, that there were about 20 lost, and seven or eight men drowned. At the time he left Maceira Roads, he could not find in the whole fleet more than '2O or 30 boats which were fit for service. SIR HEW DALRYhIPLE'S NARRATIVE. Sir HEW DALRYMPLE then proceeded to read the paper given in to the Court as the narrative of his proceedings front the time of his being appointed to the chief command of the British army in Portugal: This command bad been conferred on him, as ap. peared from Lord Castlereagh's official letter, in con sequence of the high approbation which the zeal and judgment displayed by him in forwarding the cause of the SEaniards was held by the Government of this country. The instructions which he received were before the Court ; and although from Dupont having in the mean time been beat, the views of his appoint ment must have undergone some change, he did not feel himself entitled ever to throw out of his mind that to cut off so lirge a body of French troops, and to prevent them from retreating into Spain, there to take part against the Spanish nation, was an object never to be lost sight of by him. On the 13th he embarked, and afterwards had a communication with Lord Collingwood. Joseph Bonaparte, he knew, had retreated from Madrid, 'but observing that this was a voluntary retreat, it was by no means apparent that it was not made for the purpose of offensive opera, dons, and to take advantage of the disjointed state of the Spanish army, in consequence of the defeat they had experienced at Rio Seco. On the 19th he arrived off the Tagus, and commu nicated with Sir Charles Cotton. Sir - Charles he found made a very moderate estimate of the French force. He seemed to think that nothing serious was to be expected in Portugal. He (Sir Hew Dalrymple) however, confessed, that he viewed the matter very differently, and that he places', more reliance on the information he had received from Lord Collingwood, by whicl,; the French troops in Lisbon were estimated at 20,000 men. From the moment he had left Lord Collingwood he had reflected on the line of conduct he ought to pursue, and the result of this deliberation had been, not by any act of his to supersede Sir Arthur Wellesley in a command for which he seemed to have been specially selected. He saw no cause why he should take on himself an unnecessary responsibility, by in. terfering with the proceedings of an Officer purposely and specially selected for the particular business in hand, whom he knew to posses the confidence and special directions of Government, and who was by his military knowledge and experience highly qualified for the command. Here he felt himself called on col state an additional reason for his having come to this determination. •He had received a letter (he did not know if he could call it a private one) from Lord Castlereagh, instructing him in a particular manner to cultirate the confidence, and at all times to profit 'by the advice of Sir A. Wellesley. That he migle, expect much assistance, equally from his prudence and temper, as from his knowledge, courage, and experience. He saw, therefore, the fairness as well as expediency of leaving to him the completion of the plan he had so gallantly and' so successfully com menced. On his landing he accordingly sent his aid du-camp to inform Sir Arthur, that he was on his **ay to join the main body, but that though he should wish to be informed of their proceedings, it was not his intention to interfere in the management of the operations which were going on. He must here state, , that though Sir A. Wellesley had addressed to him official accounts of his proceedings down to this period, they had never come to hand, and he landed without ' any information whatever on that head. On joining the main body on the 22d, he foundthem on thegronnd they had occupied the day before. He saw the necessity of removing from that spot ; but why the army did not advance he knew not, nor did be feel any thing perso nal to himself on that subject. He found the state of matters to be something similar to what he had expec ted, and after making every allowance for the great ad vantages which the Britith forces had gained over the enemy in the battle of the preceding day, and the great additional loss al' the enemy in killed, wounded, &c. he could not forbear from seeing, that these advan tages were at least counterbalanced by the inferiority of the British cayalry. In the evening General Kel lerman arrived. At this time he (Si; Hew Dalrym ple) knew nothing of the number and efficiency of the enemy, or of out own troops ; and all the information he acquired' on the subject was derived froni Sir Ar thur Wellesley in the obtervations made by him in the cootie of thy the ardcla of the prelognerf-Treati, which iminediAl [The narrative proceeds to enter I t h e preliminary Conve n ti on , w i n vindicates in the ;articular canton. The words « private Kellerman pledged himself at noderstood in their strict mcaninh wo account be understood to erttnd The endurance of the armistice Hew DarTrnple's) object to el f►sed for it, to give time for Moore's division. As to the net believe that General Kellerman give it ups but the whole seamen di 6000. Had he (Sir Hew Dalrymple in possession of the letter from the this country; stating that the - Portugal by the French army, perty foundin the Tagus, might capture by the British army' have agreed to the article in authorising the French to carry away th e i r pit ...• property, he knew had been viewed with the gsZ - abhorrence. He presumed, howe ver , that ei h i ; considered and compared with other Con the words in which the article was conceived wfmil found by no means unprecedented, p e the broad construction they had received,t l " words would be found, in similar circumsta nce; m the Convention of Alexandria. If t h ese a however, had not been agreed to, the Bt u must have maintained its position till the have advanced with not more than 16111 In either case the advantages must have be en me , as the horrors of famine might hav e b een su ' to those of war. Being once embarked in so cla ng& roue a service, active movement was *only*. for the British forces. The artillery horses, hol e y; were not sufficient for this purpose. Many o f t i ll ; were old, many of them lame and blind, and ewe* remainder were not altogether-fit for such a let*. In addition to this, if it hid been resolved on touts,* the enemy, the British army must have been con* to a positton bordering on the sea, to ensure the* tion of Sir John Moore. Early on the 2 8 cl nw e visited by a Portuguese office r , whose strove* jection was to the 6th article. The obvious...* however, was that the Portuguese Gov erment* then no where to found. The Portuguese Col however, was asked to state hisubservations to tri4 but this he failed to do. On the 24th, Colonel)* returned from the Admiral with the article stir to the Reniart fleet, and was afterwards sem nil to the French General, with a letter, seen mho proved of by Sir Harry )3urrard _and Sir Mkt Wellesley. He (Sir Hew Dalrymple) seeing then pearance of guile in the cendpiet of the French Ge* ral-inClaief, sent for Generals Burrard and Welke* to consult them tit the subject, and Sir Adult& !coley had the goodness to frame a letter of Wee instructions to Colonel Murray on the subject. OS the 29th, Captain Dalrymple returned with the terms of the Convention. Of some of the oracles le on i *. traC Per' san disapproved, and assembled all the Majortvenerals; could for their advice on the occasion. The Anis tice expired the next morning s so that he must titbit have ratified it, or recommenced hostilities. With the approbation of Sir Harry Burrard, Sir Atin Wellesley, Sir John Moore, General Hope, in did ratify the Convention, and the terms we:teat ditately communicated to the Portuguese Conk. --The narrative then goes on to point out thedi ficulties which must have been felt in providing bread and other necessaries to the army, had it bees encreased even by the addition of Sir John Moore'; corps, in consequence of which, and of the dangerof the min; it had been determined that these troops should be landed gradually, and that each division should bring along with it provisions sufficient fat its own use. The determination of Sir Hew Dal• rymple not.to supersede Sir Arthur Wellesley in the command, after the victory which he had gained, hi communicated to the other Major-Generals who wog senior to him, mid they received it in a manna which did them honour. An application had bee made by Admiral Siniivin to him (Sir Hew Di rymple), to know if the Port of Lisbon was to he considered as neutral in repect to the Russian Ike! but to this he had stated that he could give no an. ewer. If hostilities had been to recommence, the different castles and strong holds in possession % the French must have been regularly besieged, after the other 5...-Fort Saint Julien could not hart been taken without battering cannon :—A$ 101 at they remained in possession of the strong possits of Almeida, no ship of ours could approach the town :—A battle must have been fought almost % the city of Lisbon itself, and the view of the can paign which he had originally formed, woeld st the last have been found to be the just one. The cseiP ration of the British, torte with the Spanisti eeah was, and had always been, the main and object ; the other was only preliminary to it. Ma it was.of the utmost moment to afford to the Sc. niards the earliest possible proof of the serious skid we entertained of co-operating with them in the tegi effectual manner. Without entering into a c-akulatio of the time which might have been occupied in redo' cing the forts on the 1 agus, it was enough to say•tbs the heavy rains were approaching, when no =rail into Spain could take place. He again wished that the Convention might be compared with othei Cie} ventions, and in particular with that concluded et Egypt, which it would be found to resemble, notooll in its terms, but in its nature and qualities in others spects, particularly in the dangers of the service, and in the state of the army. He submitted, therefam that the Convention might be vindicated. The were parts of it which he did not willingly agree to; but these were on points of secondary and minor its. portance ; and he did not think himself warranted, when the main object was to be gained, to reject ite because other points, comparatively trifling, could not also be obtained. It must be kept in view, either tilt -be must have agreed to the Convention as it stood; or that the nest morning hostilities.must have Ws resumed, under the disadvantages he had mentioned' and others which might have presented themseles The Convention, as expressly understood by lbs Prench General, did not authorize the removal (fall other btit_ the private property of the French them. selves. This *as a right of which it could hardly" supposed the Portuguese could have expected to ae• prive them ; nor yet could they be warranted in pectin* that British valour, however great, and hoe. ever successful, should hare been able to Tenon do be fiol in L ihk that ti nicate Junta in the and I taken from ; iterediaietn Irak which it crplaiiir god circtunstatees to propettb" fa. it the time be 4 d siting, and shoidi4, :lend to ce it had bee triet t ill i 's COI ::tend beyond the tit, tie it the la n di ng of to * Russian fleet, 1 444 *ow erman was at liben74 %d men did 150 t MOWS ts rymple) hnwevir,hB4 si in the Govtnateuo I property broueu riet y, or the Russian duo ght be proper objtqw Tha r forces, he would It pert question. ' lie a m .i. was . LITT awl. _