Star. — London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

; that the country would not 'be satisfied such an armament stop short with - a success as the seizure of Walcheren. grave was very ardent, and the Admiral of their The Chancellor of the Ex also desciv3i' of sending out an expedit sheaved no disposition to send it to any quarter rope where it might be connected with, Important diversion in aid of those.great rations which were deciding the fate of of the world. For some years past, been employed in increasing our regular number far beyond any that we had before, in order to be prepared for a . terference with continental operations. time enough to plan and arrange every thing _ views, yet when they at last sent over the army, they forgot that bullion was a necessary article, and that, indeed, it was sometimes as needful and as useful in such operations as even powder and shot. What plan the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was more particularly attached to, he could not tell—but it was probable, that just at that time, he had - some little In the Seem Committee [ that our men of war might transports coed not go I,y . fire from that place. The. Ant Weep, Ministers said had the late unfortunate atteinFt !hem a tatinniteobject,* and pet :0 the preliminary and indis consideration, whether the defences of the Schetdrtould "be passed, or Ikbetiier they (Year'!)` The occupation considered to be essential, auf gate him some kind of plea because it brought to mind of pat t of the' natal service ..0 meant the gallant conduct of „aptain _ , cif the Raven ; but how did ire • represent the ;natter? the shells of Flushing, said the truly gallant Captain, came aboard- him, while the round shot from Cadsand went through him I--- , 1( Hear, hear.) Sir Richard Strachan told themlar , ther, that the ship was crippled and grounded.— Thui we sent to force that passage without considet - the of ' ! Then • 'me at Luc. quiry. -. The letter of Lord Castlereagh to the Com mander in Chief was the next point of evidence. — The advisers of this unfortunate measure, having re solved that they should have an Expedition, turned, to ask the advice of professional men ; but it would appear as if they asked it for the express purpose of acting against it. His Lordship's letter says, that the plan had been long in agitation : he takes away from himself all the excuse that might flow from piste, or want of time for digesting his plan. The letter stated that no certain intelligence had been ob tained of the number of troops in Holland, or of the state of the general military preparations there ; but that the greater number of the troops for the defence of the coast had been marched into the interior, and. left the coast more naked than it had been ever before, or probably, would ever be again. Sir D. Dundas, not relying solely on his own opin►on in an affair of such importance, took that of five military men of experi ence ; his.answer follows the letter paragraph by pa ragraph ; he expresses himself unwilling to give an - caffie'-nt information has'been had ; :rigate ; _ they had but one pit Sir Richard Strachan could not find him when he wanted him. Lord Gardner's fleet thought that tcpass up theScheldt without possessing Cadsand, &c. would be destruction. The person examined had likewise"mjnutely stated the winds ye. quired, particularly of two points between North and South, r opinion len no sufficient he thinks that nothing but the clearest, most distittct, and perfect information can be a ground for proceed ing ; and then taking it for granted that such infor mation is to -be procured, details two modes of at tack, one-by a march over land, and the other by a course similar to that which was afterwards followed. He observes, that the actual strength. and situation of fortresses, and troops, must be fully known before any thing could be undertaken with a calculation of success. He then conceives the army to have arrived before Antwerp, where he was once as a Comman der. ,'his he speaks of as a strong town, and capable of standing a regular siege, at least till the whole , force of France and Flanders came pouring upon the British. This was, one would suppose, enough to have awakened the Noble Lord ; this might have stopped his ambition ; this might have shaken him from his idle dream of pernicious enterprize, and taught the enthusiast that his laurels were not to be gathered on the bloody fields of Zealand ; this might have taught him not to risk the last dispose able army which he had, which he could create, and risk it on an expedition more disastrous than that from which it had but just returned. Sir D. Dundas -.711? plan of his own, which he did not communicate to his colleagues. The Admiral appeared to have * plan.; but the Commander in Chief 'appeared to have no plan at all. The Noble Lord .had• felt it' difficult to settle what plan he should pursue on. the . present oc casion ; but he should then endeavour to 'follow up what seemed to have been the' intention of the Go vernment. The general understanding of the busi ness seemed to be; that part of` nut army was in the first instance to take possession of the isl And of Wat chmen, and to take Cadsand by another corps: The main body was to advance to Santvliet to about the number of 21,000, including however eight detach ments to be sent to South Beveland. This was so far the apparent plan, which, however, related, ac cording to documents before the House, in not very intelligible language,. to 44 a second, ulterior, s;multane out, subsequent operation . 1 " (Hear, hear.) Now it was necessary that the main body. should get to Santvliet as speedily as possible ; and accordingly four days were calculated for its passag e from the Downs to Santvliet. Sir R. Strachan had said, that'll wind and weather were favourable it might be done in a week ; but atter all, with every precaution thathad vessels - behind, and some necessary for going up the river to . Batz. This acumstance became still more important in prckeed ing up the river, which was so very winding, that to realize the calculations of his Majesty's Ministers they ought to have priwided relays of favourable winds at all its turnings: The Slough passage was very difficult of navigation even - for merchant vessels Tuna ivithaut the proper winds in the Scheldt, the whole object most. have been speedily abandoned. We seemed to have forgotten the time to be lost itt:tak- ing South Bevelanci; yet the capture of that and Batz were silisolutely - necessary. Although they were ac quired so-soon, that was not a - matter to be depended upon ; for Sir Richard StraFhan was surprized on receiving information from Sir Join Hope of the sur render of ffatz, which the General thought might have held out some days, and our means of reducing which we !were even obliged to land at the distance of some miles from the place. Thus we neglected to alloW•for probable and unavoidable accidents, for the manning of the flotilla, for the eking of South *Dive land, and for the reduction of Betz. The calculations of General Brownrigg, who did think suc c ess doubt ful, we=e favourable only upon the supposition of our landing on the Ist, 2d, or 3d of August, but no far ag means , effecting if. we can._ to Santvliet, another step in this romance of a cam , paign ; for a rotnance it was, and, like a very cele. brated production of that nature, contained, .among .other curious particulars, something about an attack on a wind-mill.—(Heiv.)—Sir Home 'Popham had' stated, truly enonglii that *Fort Lillo was a desirable object in making xvay to Antwerp ; and that Officer seemed to think that the introduction of a few rockets and shells would have influence enough with the pee ple of that city to induce them to press for the sue 'render of the place; but it is not shewn how (commanded as they were by a garrison and a cita- I del, and even by those very ships, which, by taking out their guns, could be carried above the city towards Dendermonde) the rockets were to persuade them to press the military for this surrender. Sir Tome Popham, it appeared, would first mask Lillo, then, perhaps, he would mask Antwerp, and go after the ships and attack them, if they were moved , up the river. The cpinion of General Sontag was 'pretty sanguine. The General had been, he under stood, in foreign as well as British service, and was said . to have seen military operations upon a large s:ale ; but his Lordship did not know that his opi . urges Lord Castlereagh to consider the delay and the disparity of force .which might make the expedition ruinous and disgraceful. The next evidence is that of General Calvert ; and his evidence deserved par ticular notice, as he had, what Ministers egregiously had not a knowledge of, the local. He says plainly, that the most rapid movements must be liable to much impediment ; that the forts on the Scheldt must be taken before the fleet could pass up the river —and that the ignorance respecting the force which the enemy could bring down, precluded any thing like the formaLion-of a fair estimate of the chances of success. It appears that the measure of information which Lord Castlereagh felt enough to make him hazard fleets and armies, was not enough for even the been taken, some were 1, _- stranded. In addition to that cause of delay, it was found quite necessary to take South Beveland, since the enemy had batteries on that island all up the river as far as it went ; and besides, Batz might hold out for some time. The Noble Lord then referred to a letter of Lord Castlereagh to the Commander in Chief, of the 23d of June, stating, that, on the 21st, he had received the King's pleasure that the expedi tion should go forward. The ardent zeal of the Se cretary of State had outrun the royal sanction ; for he had, previously to obtaining it, told Sir David Dundas to hold- the army in readiness. The great objects of the expedition were stated to be, the cap ture or destruction of the enemy's ships at Antwerp, ther. ft was supposed that Batz would be-taken in-an hour or two. As for Cadsand, a nortr-west wind WAS wanted ; but then that rude north-wester produced a surf on a lee-shore. General 13rownrigg thought success doubtful, from wind, weather, &c. but that on the 3d August there would have been a fair pro spect.of the further success of our operations. Being asked more particularly as to those causes which tea dered the completion of the proposed cbjects so very doubtful, General Brownrigg had stated the unfortu nate necessity they were under of - assembling ;he armament in the Roompot—a circumstance, he added, which would not have Occurred, had they been ac quainted with the great inconveniences of the Slough Passage. the ' of So' nion in this case was much better for that circum stance. He had been at Antwerp in the times of Pi chegru ; but we were now only considering the case of an expeditiou of 17,000 men against Antwerp.— The French Empire could not have been so low in respect to military resources in this quarter, as to be unable to collect a copsiderable force speedily from Holland, from Flanders, from Westphalia, or from the vicinity of the capital itself, in a quarter, too * where it was acknowledged there are so many chan nels of communication. It was reported that there were very few troops left in Antwerp. Why, there might not possibly be more than one regiment in Portsmouth; but would Bonaparte send such an ex pedition, if he could, to attack Portsmouth_ upon ..... enough for ___ adventurous spirit of military men. He was of opi nion that the sieges of the towns must at all events occupy a period sufficient to allow the collecting of the wh.,le force of the Dutch and Flemish garrisons, to over , helm the few troops that must be dispersed through' that most difficult country. Colonel Gor don's evidence declares that the data, which to Lord Castlereagh's military ardour gave all satisfaction, did not give him (Colonel Gordon) room for even a guess at the strength of the defence which might be opposed to the British troops. He supposed that the chief force of the line had gone towards Germany ; but he knew nothing of the militia, which might be broug%t forward on an emergency. He thought that Cadsand and South Beveland ought to be occupied, that the fleet might have no difficulty in going up the river. The letter concluded by declaring, in the most impressive and decided terms, that the enterprize was one of the most desperate nature, and that it was not to be doubted, that it was one which must put a large proportion of our naval and military means into im minent danger. General Broderick's evidence-esta blished the conclusion which had been derived from the former authorities. General Hope's opinion began" by making a variety of assumptions, on which, sow ever, the whole difficulty of the attempt lay. He as sumed that the precise extent of the danger tirss known, and that the precise forte to meet that danger was in full preparation. Having disembarrassed him self of these difficulties, he assumed that the destina tion of the service was the destruction of the fleet and arsenal at Antwerp. He thought Lillo and the other forts must be taken before a safe approach could be made ; and, upon a mature weighing of the whale matter, decided upon it, that the attempt would be - mischief. - if it failed, and in the Scheldt ; and, if possible, the rendering of the River Scheldt no longer navigable—and this, they now told us, was to be done by a coup-de swain. This was the object on which their eyes had been• - fixed for so long a period. Another ob ject was the arsenals and depots at Tergoes and Flushing, though perhaps nobody knew any thing of such arsenals. As to the scheme of destroying the navigation of the Scheldt, it was impracticable. As soon as Flushing was gained, reinforcements were to be sent forward, it being still deemed important un der many contingencies , to hold the island of Wal eleven. This Expedition must surely have been con sidered as a powerful diversion upon the Continent. He could not but request the House, when they look ed at it in that point of view, to'consider that the main body of it- consisted of not more than 17,000 men, who were to return directly after they had accom , plished the specific object of Antwerp. The Noble Secretary of State, however, hopes confidently that' all the difficukiei will be overcome. How ? Not by methods provided or foreseen by Government, but forsooth, by the valour and energy of his Majesty's troops ! He could not, however, omit a principa l point, the probability of those ships being protected' by the enemy. He then prudently considers difficul ties and possible failure, and yet points out not the slightest method by which to overcome them. He followed this up by saying, although the objects of our Expedition could be removed farther from us at the discretion of the enemy, yet it was deemed' neces sary to recommend the undertaking of the Expedi tion. The House should bear in mind that we could not go from Santvliet to Antwerp with safety, but with the possession of one of the banks of the Scheldt. The north bank of that river and the possession of such information ? Could we not, even though, per haps, we' have not above 10,000 regular effective troops in the country, collect our militia and other means of resistance ? Of our great army, not more than 17,000 could ever get to Antwerp ; and yet we had been told, that 4.0000 men would be requisite to besiege it. General Don had said, that great alarm was excited in Antwerp by the terror of the British fleet. As for the people of Antwerp, they were not so formidable from their numbers. The popnla. don, which had long been falling off, could not have received any great recent increase, unless we consider ed the number of military or naval persons stationed there, who were not in the usual estimate of resident population. Every body knew that Antwerp was fot a long time past only the monument of departed great• ness. A gallant General being asked how he could have reduced Antwerp, answered, by vigoroas at tacks on all the weak points ; then came something about the windmill. But had we an army of such an amount to carry on the battaringia breach ? Was all this to be attempted on the 'faith of recollection, not quite accurate, of Genenal Sontag I -It , was said, by bringing up a great number of guns. Very proper certainly ! Then, how take Lino ? Why with cannon and mortars I But could not the enemy make use of dikes, and inundate a considerable part of the land in their defence ? But then, by what vigour, under all these circumstances, we were to get up to the ships and destroy them, if they were moi'ed high erup the river, was a poser that had not been distinctly an swered.. In all has calculations, General Brownrigg proceeded. upon the supposition that 30 pieces of ord nance was to be employed. In one instance, how• ever, that _officer had stated, that of these fifteen Lord Castlereagh, , Secretary .rate, being examined in the House, as to the time he calm lated upon to be taken in the passage of the Expedi tion, had said, that he expected that it might arrive there in a few days from the Downs. Being asked an important question respecting his. information con. cerning the strength and movements of the enemy's forces in drat quarter, and the probable nature and ex tent of the resistance he might expect him to make, his Lordship had answered, that he could not presume to judge-of the movements of the enemy. That Noble Lord had certainly- a right tb decline giving an an swer to that question, for obvious _reasons, had he chosen to do so ; but, having given that answer, he would venture to say, that that Noble Lord stood • condemned upon his own testimony. Was he not to calculate with care the time that might be necessary for forwarding the operations of this great expedition, to acquire some knowledge of the strength of the enemy, and his means of augmenting that strength, and to take these important circumstances fully into his consideration ? Was lie to send an Officer and troops abroad, not knowing what they were to meet with ? That was the great point for strict judgment, and for conclusive information, before he sent out the armaments ; a point, indeed, on which essentially de , pended die fate of .our gallant army, and on which might have depended the fate of the kingdom ! (Hear!) The Noble Lord (Purchester) came next to the examination of a Noble Earl (Chatham) who was the Commander in Chief of this expedition.— The Noble Earl was certainly very prudent and cal tious in respect to giving any opinion ; bf had no wish to engage in that sort of .campaig4 but what had come from him was certainly, in its effect,' very I like a sarcasm upon his colleag ues in the Ministry..- _ - full of hazard, likely to do much . little good if it succeeded, and leaving us this conso lation, in not making the attempt, that nothing of se• rious advantage was lost by our leaving the matter as it was. Of five military men, four were directly ad verse, and one unfriendly to the plan; but the Ministers, in the spirit of their ruinous enthusiasm, must exhibit a mad perseverance ; they melt-have naval opinion& Sir Home Popham was summoned to state his ideas on the attack of Antwerp. In his answer, giving a plan of the Expedition, he particularly pressed three ••points ; one, that the troops should be embarked in ships of war, as the transports must impede the ope rations ; the second, that few horses should be em barked ' • and the third, that the Expedition should be - pushed forward immediately ; that it should not be relayed be Id the middle Of June,_ when the South Beveland were thought to be indispensable.— Sir Home Popham had given it as his opinion, that) with every circumstance of wind, ecc: being favour able, we might be on the coast - from the Downs in I . 24.'hours, and in 48 hours afterwards at Santvlief.--. lir Richard Strachan had said, that -we could not do ' •vritbon;lgreat darTer and loss to our ships and. is from Bate' 'which inesit therefdre be taken, and !Where Sir John ilopebadstttedthere were 14 or 15 guns mounted: South Bevelind and Batz must, -therefore,be taken.. Sir Richard .IC:rats, one of the g llta most experienced Naval Officers, 'held , * high Coin. iuttknd in the Expedition, but does `nor appear that b :hie lilts in any respectpreviously &insulted. He lead, tbolitorer,- made a communication to Lord Castle.l -,' litho , - shewed but little disposition to consult - -- -ts; it Some facts, indeed, the Noble — Earl had stated:to tha House ; one of which was i that you could not pro teed up the Scheldt, unless .you had the advantage of a westerly wind : and he also added, that with that desired westerly wind you were under the necessity of meeting with a high surf, that rendered your land ing extremely.difficult, .. Being asked further respect ing the difficulties of: ring' up the river Scheldt, he had told them ' 'that. he had always understood that, the entering a nd advancing with an armament up a winding river,,,:where .navigation was not perfectly known to those who wished to get up it, was an un dertaking of very great difficulty and of danger...— . His Lordship, however, had further stated, that in lua opinion it was not possible tohave landedthe army with its artillery, its. stores, &c. at • Santiliet .on the. General should be heavy artillery and fifteen mortars. But this division seemed only to have been adopted for the purpose of introducing a high sounding exprcs• sion-in the sentence, immediately following, namely, that .it would be necessary for the reduction of Ant werp; to assail it by a vigorons bombardment and blockade."-In the same examination General Brown. rigg, argning - hypothetically ae to the arrival of the thfferentdivithons - of the itrrny,' with their ordnance and stores-at the intended palms, gave it as his opi. nion,that Antwerp might haerbeen ttken by assault, if tbnartny, - &c. had been np on the 6th ; and so far he sanctioned. the confident etztoecrations of the Noble lord as . tb the mode of conduedtig the operations of Ilaks campaign, eirtpatticipate it, the tarrigume views eespecting the-effect's of the born enslyittrivat of the delayer Ton &lists were shortest and the moon at ate . 16r by.dexy_ in the advance of the season, they omit have tg. 'en counter the most formidable of All opposition, that4f • the elements. But the Noble advisers, plannern.and directors of this grand act of Ministerial folly. Willed it otherwise : they ordered that the troops shol44,§e put on board transports in their movements up the Scheldt ; they enibarked horses- • te quicken the rapi dity of the attack ; and, initead4 sailing in the tnid. _ _ Atgh, With hitch Sir Richard •Keats; it seethed, was in fa *our of proceedidg•to the ulterior libieett and not for 'Wasting 'time or triitipitin;Walcheterr.:q . This cirnnm ristang would prn4 Material, in mime respects; in re rlewinKthe whole-ea& '; toted as to the time betcotapield - ai Sirgichard 'said is depended Clatirely on the itate'of the weather.' and was subject 'id rainy thence§ that WiDatz were defended , it might *fielded the' a fekvidays. Utdeinswe WWl' "the - of the -• sixth ;: but is Macleod .and General :Filers thought of .being before Antwerp on the 10thiltati• presumed the‘lancling at .Bantvliet on the 4 , tb.ifillre . House would see Dow thele great eharaeteisaioltehd as to the practicability of the means employed .Ha had thus endeaveurett to shew that four days Were not sufficient far the purpisse intended, and in thishis opinion was conoborated, by That of the Earl of ch 4 -. thami::the Commander in Chief ; but Ministeriorisid ' _ • _ - dine vand the e. .ty . _ troops. It ...aid be recoilected e what iiapillesion this opinion had-made tin the Honseirins• th mho , practicability of the objeit of the Espetlitioft big then afterwards, that Officer had stated itvanstoti4or-atwither question, :that-it had never been his opinion, that Antwerp could bee mrtainirsectneadbrlthontbardetent ; and ~• be acintittethhawbatheught it would -4 ' 4 " 111 they could be In Wipeditien a ... di of June, the Expedition Lty loitering on our. shores !landed , great reltrity, Vitt efforts • enemy evidently _,. Avant:me: dineklerint __ or -talteurupthe river shave thetitaidaalf;ikntwerp. , - till The 28th of July ! Sir- Richard Strachan, in. his I might make-I•tthimate *intent...doubtful, and even four preltminary•circumenmces (whir hhe had already, another part of his:eitidenee tecikge had stated, that - answer, urged the importance of -speedy esertionj the ' though we arrived in time . off' lanttlietofiet the na- noticed), and ett- intricate, `flange and diffidgt by &bombardment Kik off,tha materiels for ship probability of the French troops gathering in the tear tore of the Expedtliutti rs?leculiaily•subject . to navigation. •The sameacatt. of sashssee&and preeipi- ,baildingonkhLabek)deetVoyeditilutt that it was net of our army ; and, lastly, the fact, that the hostile : chances; and the ixtebabihtrWas dna Shine chances tation:which was •evidentiar tho flen,ef Ministers, :possilleiscrey thetilocksrerpthe'carsenal by such fleet could go above Antwerp , an d lie under the. guns m i g ht happen w hi c h • m i g ht re dder success very un- was- I st a distinguished feitture)iim the inede of car- boon ;. Initiriuevidebeeci.ahlefore, they bad of the Citadel. Of this fact Lord Mulgrave appeared certain. • He said that *e cdtoelnot go up the Scheldt I ryiag.it into 'execution. • They:had formed. a greet tlmstapinital . lof /Geneva& iihmenriggothat the great to be totally ignorant. • The gallant Admiral, who with less than eighty gun-boats, to enable us to cope! plan for iattiteking Antwerpr• the capture and de- Is* the Ettpadttion >were/impracticable, so far would have courted enterprise, finished by saying, with thenumerous French flotilla. You might pass; struction of the- French ships, the arsenals, depots, as respected the destruction of the ships and the der that he thought the armament must be satisfied with over f r om D ea l t o santvliet in four days, but you ate &c. and various ether important objects ; and yet it malhion of the arsenal. stopping at Walcheren. Lord Mulgrave's answer reminded by Sir Richard that you must stop in the was not until after orders were given to prepare the The next part of 'the evidence ha bad to notice, was one which, it was to be expected, that the deci- Scheldt and arm your gun-boats. He armed 26 of troops for this serviceg that they had begun to ar- s that of General, Macleod,- who seemed to think &ion of that House would force him to hear and feel—. them in one day. His Majesty's Minister:, in *sir, range a plea of operations for making goad ay . r that it the 'libelee:my had been, as it was projected' - .. - • , . , ... . .. . . - . , : ! .‘''f ..t . ': .4 , 7./ •.•' ". • . i ••., ~4 „ : " . . . --. • ' ..c St. -'. ~..!4ftt 4 ,.. : 1.. ' , ~ , i.. ' 1 . • . • ~; . . lb, ;• . - • . led 4ftiflebig talittliiidas, had reclsonsid O a . > i it ltt ce into - the-siieldt. 1 so impiefeit there Woe the easiele and quiokeft of finsiligits 'the Hotr k e had boon•told n. Dird Mull. - over, and nu the larid,.there ivere s the melt excel- ss FluOing ; hsitlhat ralty had siplatt lent roads : They calculated the progrtss of the in the face oithe enemy's Exchequer wes Expedition by a Dort of -time-keeper, without- - fric- naval establishment at Al burhe tion ; but a. little friction occurred on entering into been growing for years r quarter.of Eu- the Scheldt, which- they never dreamed of : a ship had long beetivith them vith, or offer an laden with suns to arm the gun-boats, was behind- they had not attended to !at military ope- hand, andinipeded their proceedings. Intelligence pensable consideration,. ' of the war, and had been in the Secret Committee, by a - persotr river Schetdrtould "be t, Ministers had who was . ctly acquainted with the navigation of could easily be forced ! ilar army to a the Schel and it was singular that Ministers seem- .of Cadsand WAS consk ever possessed ed to kneireothing about the Went Scheldt and the so it was+ and it gaiti t more direct in Sloiigh Faiiage. - This pilot had said, .that the pas- sure. to' mention it, be Dns. They had sage might' be made to Bata in - 48 hours, with no the Meritoriodrttriduct m'y thing to their delays,' buts`--;ghat lt . was necessary to have a pilot on in the affair theft. He 1 r the army, they board every ihip of the line and frigate; and they Captain Hanchett, tl l ' /