Star. — London, England, 1808-01-28 00:00:00

lewPir objeet of the attac fhould have 'hone did. ben as in adv: clear the Refidenc with the enemy's upon sttyfell to pr had known that tht lu answer to fon had no other gun mentiored, attachq c anther attach thnught the troop aided by artillery, they advanced into or field piece"—th , ufe to him. He part of General the referee under round by the Re dune without any toted his brigade the Refidencia, fee He thought the f him, might have doing this, after town had been eitl No point of retret sth, nor did he kn General W 1.11 1 .11.1 Qt2ellionecl by t web ..iiy tsiundati , ing been commits went to the Rell of July, along wit by Maj:ir Nichols them, as far as r, opininn is, th it n woman and two c quarters of my b I told General L ceires were comp Spanifh army. by opinion that in with your brigad and that you hac for further ;fair A. Certainly, a brigade slid app' gree, inafmuch pointed out in $ that the left c() 1 its orders from Are you Thicnos Ayres nbjeet ? A. Cei town of Bionos fible to concilia enjo F ed a reafor Q.... Can you I troops to penetl when they cool 1 marching twin , I conceived the feat the principi not have met b; General Craw queßions put the fame effeet and General 1.. , 1 ned. Lieutenant C was then called 6 , I commas 1 on the mornins • nearly as the road pointe thing that attr (linnet's of the dnm (hots, fir Some iniellige found of bort fed, and curit have examine( I feared Inch orders I had r forward. 1 dit from a few 11 noes leading I full view of tt of the column firing on my occupy in Lieutenant C in the proprie commencing be there. TI of them item cafe of a nigh denoted a ce refillance. I to lead the r , 'lel to mine. we were unp the defences had entered that was eve ander the St • fire of an en affatlable, th men cr mpof larteeis fro officer and r tame cropor finding it it attack, %%hie or gain any hood, I the fuccefs of approach or • the remain' we had adv. 1 teatcl us frc done fo, column alfo the menieti time. He w a frured tic, hut had not • r was attache e . cr y roan • it , and the • Colonel Cadogan's ffatemeet, and direeled his men to form on the line with mine. I went myfelf to reconnoitre the bottom of the building t farming the fquare in which the Jefuits' Collegess situated ; but though well acquainted with them, I found it impof fible to get any entrance there. On my return to Colonel Caftan, I intimated my intention of pro ceeding to the Refidencia Come of his men had forced open two houfes,but I conceived them of nn confequence, except as affording (hater to the woun ded men. Colonel Codogan however deprecated the idea of giving up the ground we had gained with In much Infs ; and as General Crawford was momen tarily expected up, I allowed him to remain with the troops, in his prefent pofition. 01 trolling to fall in with General Crawfurd, I met Colonel Gard with the divifion of the 45th, and learned from him that the Refidencia was in our peel:lion. Almon imme diately after, the head of General Crawford's column appeared at the head of the narrow greet leading to the back of the St. Domingo Church. I had. often mentioned to General Crawford the advantages of the pofition abaut the Refidencia, and after re latin g to him the misfortunes of the morning, and (Wing the impracticability of overcoming the defences of the enemy, provided as they were, I firongly preffed upon him the propriety of their taking poll at the Refidencia. General Crawford hefitated, and 1 faw an apparent reluctance in him and Major Trotter to retire. He afked me if this was not the St. Do. mingo Church ? I anfwered, Yes ;but I did not think it was an advantageous pofition to take. He remat ked, that it was in flriCt conformity to his orders to , do fn ; and I reluelantly affented to it. General' Crawford afked me if Colonel Cadngan did not cover us ? which I told him he could, if he was able to re (*Ain it. On entering the Church, which we were enabled to do with the three pounder which General ' Crawford had, fome parts of it were found to over look the Mutes more than I confefs I thOught they would. The colours of the 7t ft regiment Were found there, and I was overjoyed that we had entered it, fatisfying myfelf that though T migfn have ;teed contrary, that General Crawford, as an officer, had acted tight. Under there circumaances, Colonel Cadogan was allowed to remain in the patition he had, and the remainder of my column near the convent were brought in. It was my intention to have gone to Colonel Cadngan, but General Craw ford iufilled on my going in where the furgean was, as. I was wounded. Things were at this time pretty quiet, and we retied in confident hopes that a favou rable opportunity would foots occur of renewing the action, or of advancing to the Francifcan church, which was a little in our front, and a very deferable °kid/ to gain. Between eleven and twelve, as nearly as I recollat, it was reported.with other favourable circumfiances, that the colours of the fort had beer hauled down; and no one doubted that the Atg of truce which loon appeared was to furrender, instead of fummoniug us to do fo. Availing themfelves of the flag of truce, the enemy had advanced their approaches ; and after General Crawford had dif miffed the officer, they attempted to prefs forward upon our gun ; but this I was not aware of, until the buftle of Colonel Gard's going out and returning with his detachment attracted my notice, when I heard of the revere lofs he had fufiained. " General Crawford came in &early after, his eye now teemed to be open to the opinion we were in, and to doubt that things were fo favourable as or had hoped, and In fatisfied was I that he would then have thought of retiring, that I dilated Major Mac Lead to take care that our colours were confided tr. Come truDy man. One of them had been placed on the top of the convent, and the direction I had men• tinned mull account for its being then taken down, although the intentien of reciting was not aCted upon for the moment. General Crawford teemed now to think more decidedly of the propriety of retiring.— He anted me if I &mild be liele to accompany him, and teemed Dill to entertain doubts of being warranted in evacuating his poll. It really appeared to me a fubje& of much delicacy, that it was inapnffi ble to prefa it ; and thus a hope of receiving orders, and his fence of duty appeared to me, to lead General Crawford to polipone the retreat until chat moment when it became a matter of confideration whether or not to communicate with the enemy. This 1 think was between two and three. He teemed to think then that a retreat was impracticable, and certainly I thought myfelf it muff have been aoended with a very fevere Infs. In a very little time afterwards, Gen - :ral Crawfurd arembled the field officers, and gave hit opinion decidedly to the effect I have mentioneJ, and on his doing fo directly to myfelf, I laid that in that cafe 1 thought a queftion arofe, as to what effea our conduct would have on the general operations of the army, and whether we were not placed in that critical fituation, as to make i; abro• lately neceffary for us to facrifice ourfelves? Neither General Crawford nor th _de prefent teemed to think there could be any fuch neceffity, and I affented to the judgment of General Crawford, an officer, who, though unfortunate, I mull ever tepee and admire: and I think it a duty I owe him and myfelf to Rate dininaly, that 1 confider myfelf in giving that agent as having fanClioned all that afterwards pared. 1 do not think, however convinced he might be of the pro priety of what he was about to do, ha would have acted fo, without confulting thole whom he did.... General Crawford teemed perfally ready to Cacaos his own life, but thought he was called upon to rave thole under him. When this dirculnon took place, I certainly thought that if we were obliged to Amen der, we might have had better terms ; and when eventually Gen. Crawfurd went out with theSpanifis officer I was not prefent, nor aware that the circum- Dances at the moment led him to make the capitula tion he did. At the fame time, by mentioning this, 1 do not mean to infinnate that I either would or could then withdraw the faoftion I had given to Greaten' Crawfurd." ick of the 451 h regiment ? A ;ht it my duty to occupy the pnt I iancing through the town it was lencia had no conneEtion whatever pofition, I fbould have taken it Prevent the 45th going there, if 1 icy were there. tme quellions the witnefs Rated, he t except the three pounder already fed to his own column ; but there :hid to Colonel Pack's column. He )ps would not have been materially confidetiog the manner in which o the town. He meant light guns foie be had with him were of no was pet fealy convinced, that if a Whitelocke's body guyard, or of :r Colonel Mahon, bad marched efidencia (which they could have difficulty), they might have extris ie. The 451.11 regiment, potted at teemed to be totally out of the action. force which could have extricated 'e found eonfiderahle difficulty in all the troops which entered the :her taken or compelled to evacuate. :at was ever mentioned doting the now where to find Gen.Whitelocke. .ocas declined crofs examining the Wand's the Coml. —Did you learn that there ion for the reports of cruelties hay. 'red by the Britilh troops, when you fidencia in the afternoon of the bah ith General Eglio ? A. I was affitred Is that there was no foundation for ;elated to his regiment. My 6 murders were committed, becaufe a f children were found murdered in the brigade ; but it was any opinion, and Linters the fame thing, that thefe ex tmitted by the banditti attached to the Sir Joust MOORS —Was it your , poffeffing yourfelf of the Convent ;de, you had executed all your orders, Id nothing further to do but to wait *lions frc.m your fuperior officer ? and even my authority in my own pear to me limited in an unufual de. as my own perfonal fituation was general orders ; which alfo exprefred ,olumn of my brigade was to receive Lieutenant Colonel Pack. of opinion that the force fent again(! ; was fufficient to accomplith its , rtainly—it was fufficient to take the Ayres, and if it had been found poi Late the inhabitants, we should have )nable degree of fecurity. tell what was meant by ordering the .rate through the fireets to the beach, ad have eatily got to the beach by td the town by the water edge ? A. objeet in view was to engage and de lalforce of the enemy, which we could )y marching along the beach. TWIVITY THIRD DAY. twford was again called in and a few to him by Members of the Court, to as thole pur to Sir Samuel Auehmuty itmley, and funilar anfwcts were recur Colonel PACK, of the 71ft Regiment, :d. Inded the left wing of the light brigade, tg of the attack, contifting of boo, as I proceeded to Buenas Ayresby Led out in orders. The firlt remarkable rafted my notice was the extraordinary town, interrupted only by a f!wr ran ired at the column from a ditiance.— , ent men of the advance ohferve.t the .fes in Come of the hotrfes, as we pal. idence would lv-rve diaated to me to td them feparately as I went along, but an operation would militate againd the received. and I thought it right to profs id fo, without further oppolition, except flots fired from guns placed in the ave. to the great fquare, and came within he River Plata. I here halted the bead in, to allow it to dole up, and hearing a left, and teeing nothing, nor any poll to I y front or to the right, I conferred with Colonel Cadogan. who agreed with , me iety of taking ground to the left, and the attack, fuppofing the enemy to The lamps were kilt expiring, and fame tmed difpofed as if to afiill the befieged, in fit attack, and circumflances generally :ertain date of preparation and intended I direaed Lieutenant Colonel Cadogan rear attack, and advance in a ftreet paral. I was always under apprehenfion that [provided with means equal to overcome t of the place, and I was loon convinced I upon a contsft the molt unequal perhaps , er fought ; for I had fcarcely approached Francifean church, when I loft, by the .nemy almoll invifiible, and certainly un he officers and almoll the whole of the ding my firfl divifion, and who were vo• urn the different companies, befides the nearly half of the next company, and the ation of the others compofing my divifion. ,mpafible to penetrate to the objet of !eh I conceived to be the fquare and fort, advantageous pofition in the neighbour 'ought it right to Mid, and enquire the the divifion which had gone by the In my left. With this intent, I withdrew Is of mine to the crofs ftreet from which Panted, and which in a great degree pro r om the fi re of the enemy. I had fcarcely when I learned the failure of my other Co; and going up the other (beet, I found tiring, and met Colonel Cadogan in a little was eseeffively diftrefred, and emphatically that he and all his men had done their duty the weans of fucceeding. The aim which led to .)ur column accompanied bids, and nr horfe had been killed or wounded at the gun was loft. I could readily believe Examined by the Judge Advocate. I belonged to the expedition under General Beret f rd. QWhile you were in Buenos Ayres on that oega. lion, had you an opportunity of obtaining a local knowledge of the town and environs I I had an accu rate idea of the town, and a general one of the cirri. rims. I was the fenior of the officers under General Whitelock, whet had belonged to General Beresford's expedition. Q . ... Was you ever confulted by General Whitelocke upon the plas of operations agates the town 3 A. be at head quarters, eept by report. • 8 • once that I happened to General Whitelocke ( poke to Me twice upon the fub-' I never even knew the the point of debarkation, aa. te g than that. 3 d o f J u ly—the orders and Q Did you Rate any other deficiencies arrangement of the attack im „ as Whitelocke, on the evening of the teeing me at head guar . ters, beckoned me diately order a fearch to be made for were then out General of itoplements for forcing doors, and did I not m 're of loch node over.might be Rood that the implemental mentioned w ere on b r confidence which I replied, that every . He Paid, "w h at do you think of this r , to implements IA.I do not recoiled. I always ard placed in the troops, butwas envious ro ice the means fhip, and I did hear General Whitelocke ord er the general's Q. Was any difapprobation of the plan R a t e d at on into execution. Something attracted the the meeting of the 4th of July they poffeffed of carrying the attack that was decided fearch to be made for more. 1 A Id ° illt teCOl" ared to me left that there was, I a f a.t..o' -ome remark. were iu d converfation. General Whitelocke appe ae, attention at this time, and he abrupt y broke off Nn i ll the was his own judgment ;and . I was the more inclined way I have mentioned. If I did not in my • then as a man who intended to ad contrary to what and I believe by myfelf. which were It mind gift that the I an ex plicit difapprobation of the plan of attack, it to that opinion, having t retorted to wa s heeaufe I conceived that the Command er i- . intended mode of attack would not be ._ 1 _ ben ...... . .. o i . - . time teen in a paper. attend nest I Auchmuty. who had lived in dote intimacy lo t h' brigade, but with diredions to under other circumstances . Soon after this I retired I had the pothbie int rma ton trom fi n . sumo to my' General Beresford for three weeks previous to the 1 nec I arrival of General Whiselocke ; and I w • to receive orders. General Crawford had re ig morning, along with the other commanding officers , 1 and in t w ith the convidion that General lvhitelocke oriti t having a : nally intended to ad upon a very different plan a . preparing the difpofition of it, an no the care of his brigade a good deal to me, red from ( n om I Imperious necellity, *skit I never learned, and tr watch, the hour inadvertently patted over, and I Was ; wan . le . d to adopt the one I have mentio d '- se bled. The General Officers, however, were there , . not prefent when the commandingoffieers were *dim. I pettedly aware of the dangers he mutt encut otr , and the moment General Whitelocke law me, he i .-- called me over. Nothing to that time had been fur. I TWENTIMVURTH DAY. niched to the brigade that in m y mind would have i L i e utenant Colonel PACK again called in, and er . forwarded t t a intended. he a t ck I then more decidedly 1 amined by the Court. than the evening before , menti oned m y apprebentions I. Q . .... What would have been the confequence to O n that we had not the means of fuceeeding ; I temarked ' prifoners of a renewal of the attack after the 'I N ? to him that from the turrets of Buenos Ayres the by bombardment or odserwife A. I think t h at , enemy could dillindly percei v e e ver y movement that bombardment of ilnenos Ayres mull certainly hart i w as made, and I fuggetled the propriety. if filch an ; endangered the lives of the 'oilmen, but I do tot attack was to be made , if it wou ld not be better to at think, as I noted before , that the lives of the pa wn i tempt it before day light , when p erha p s we might I would have been endange red from the inh a bi t/mu , have better means fornillied. T o this General White- iI do not think the ' 'mats would have put flee m which he fat's_. i t Locke feemed immediately to a ffent, and he took me : to death. into the room where the othe r General Of fi cers were, , ( H er e General Whiteleeke . gaye in aam 'Mot and mentioned to them what I had raid. It feemed b y Lieutenant Colonel Pack, is my decided opinion that a bombardmen t of Boon to be approved of by the General Officers : but as I thought, In coldly received by the fecond in command , Ayres will prove fatal to the pi ifonerb.") as to prevent much difcuilion upon the merits of the; Q... Is this your hand writing? A. Co c a battlers, and the conference broke up with the orders' Whitelocke. after I came to the Plaza d e l T onal for the attack taking place the following morning. I the morning of the nth, a(ked my <victim oin k (t .. Is the Court to underhand that you never were 1 s i c hi e e o f t h e preceding qaelh„ni an d whe th er I bid contulted until the plin of attack was iffued by Ge- I and objedioa to give that opinion in writing; 14 l octal Whitelocke? A. I here Rated falls--I leave it' certainly not, but at the time of writing,feeiegerie r to the Court to draw their own conclufions. opiaions Rating that the !mule Q .: Having Rated that you was anxious to fee the h ave b em much endang -means of cat Tying the plan into effect, and having I of the inhabitants, if any renewal fuggefted the propriety of attempting the attack be-1 place, I thought I owed it to fore day light, did you or did you not communicate I apprise General Whitelocke that a diltinl approbation of the plan alluded to 1 A. I I alluded to the bombardment. do not recoiled any thing further than what I Rated Q .: _ Was this note written to General Whitelocke. the treaty with General Liniers Q .:.. Having Rated that yen recommended, that if —the treaty was figned on the fuch an attack was to be made, the propriety of at- Locke prevailed upon ate t( tempting it before day light, did you convey your the sth. opinion that it would in this cafe fucceed 1 A. Mull Q.... Is there any thing fo I 'certainly, I never intended to convey the fiightell climate of Buenos Ayres at that approbation of the attack intended, and to General as to ma k e i t i mito rght e f or troops Crawford I opened my mind, deprecating the dread. A. Yea. I always enterveiaed ful lots we fhould (offer by fuch an ill advifed plan. greateß apprehenlions refrealeg Q . In what particulars were the troops under your certa i n ly if ray ()p i ll i on kw w ee c.q.ornend unpr”vided with the means netietrary to riot's to embarkation. I ihetdd t enfore their fucceis ? A. I conceived in many—oin Whitelocke to wait till amore artillery, in fcaling ladders, petards, and better ins. Th ere is not hi ng in die gligastea plement. for forcing open hooks, and which Insider- any time as to prevent mops if nod had been provided before. particular periods, except vibes Q Are you of opinion that if more artillery had of rain, and which was OR - - been attached to the column, they would have had a QHow Coon slid the rain . better chance of fuccefs, the church door having been Ares ? A. There were very ("iced by the three pounder you had with you ? A. night of the ed, and morning Certainly, more a; tillery would have been ufeful, but continue In long as they donut , icaling ladders were particularly clearable in anattack t h e year . of that kind. Q. Had the poll of Coloati Q .:. From what you yaw of the enemy on the sth, not cattle have been procured are you of opinion that your furrender would have troops before Buenos Ayres i been prevented, had you received rupport front the A. Yes. troops attending upon General Whitelocke's perfon, Lieutenant Colonel `or from the referee under Colonel Mahon ?A. Cer- I commanded a divifion I tainly, even a fimple communication of orders would light lairds on the morning have prevented the cataltrophe, or had the 45th regi- 1 r e -p ara d e d from Lieutenant ment adeckas a fupporting corps, or to convey orders- seeded as far u the weft fit Q Can you !late, from your knowledge of the lege, without any confident environs of Buenos Ayres, that the army under Ge-. in bringing up the light three neral Whitelocke, when entire, could have been fo my column, in order to force difpfed as wont off all communication of fupplies to pr i nc ip a l gatewa y, t h e enemy the town ? A. Yes, I think it could. great numbers st every window , I Q. From your local knowledge of the town, eauld 1 this building, and from the I a communication have been ettablithed with the fleet, a te fide of the g reet , an d and a lunation chofen from which the died of batte- with fume ordnance. On \ l i es might have bier tried ? A. Yes. the leading company of sts Q .: State where that lituation in your opinion ought to hive been ? A. 'l'h' Plaza del Toros I con was abfolutely impoalble to netted to be the moll commanding lituation, and bowies at the gun. were and any very eligible fituation and attack I fhould have been induced to have made, t h e greet. I w a s t h er e on would have only been with the view of gaining that threw myfelf and about 1 4 0 one placr. All the ether attacks should have been I i 1 4 0 Yards from the Jefoits' done a , feints, as they could anfwer no end. Q Was the Canaan:l of the Spatufh troops filch as i part of, the column difperkd I joining ; and thole that wr to have proteded them again[ carronades or grape, in general killed or you; and was not a combined attack by land and lea the fome conference with Liet moil likely to produce fuccefs ? A. Ido not conceive (Pelting my remaining in the [kipping could have been well brought into aftion it my duty to detach an until the Plaza del Toros was carried : that place communicate to General would certainly have a good deal prevented the elite poll I then occopiad, and , of the fire upon the troops, from the way in which refult from his approaching they were polled. On the other fide, batteries of manner. I have fence leitrnt heavy ordnance might certainly have been ereaed I detachment eras either killed . with died, although the ground in general is not [ this communication. and that difficulty cleaned. I defended hour', with the lofs Of It fide' favourable to it. Q 4 ,Suppefing the Plaza del Toros to have been in Our patriots, would it have been pralicable to have 5 officers and 8* wounded had an effeaual cooperation from the navy during my then appeared with a R the attack 1 A. Molt certainly. I cannot conceive with no other objedt those that Buenos Ayres could hold out an boar, with bat- t h e tel . o p, i mme ga nte l Lo pi, tines ereaed on the Plaza del Toros, and a well cool - tilted the other olscere ceeabised attack from the navy. to give him a parley. The Croft examined by General Wit ire ince e. my rift was ordered to fel lIIL Had I not in various converfations ' before the of this circuroßaage, tbg id oTJuly. availed myfelf of your local knowledge around my poll, wises Analog. of ths country and its inhabitants ? A On the march fedive, and finding further refit from Enfenad*, General Whitelocke did once or twice rendered; with the concurrence or perhaps oftener, queßion me refpeding the river officers. The officers were Mello, oa points connefted with the march, but elcort to the citadel, and never refpeamg the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres; prifon. I think about apt and never having been in that part of the country, I up at the Jefuit's College, generally could not give any information refpeaing able to march when we . the route. Rated, that about 140 men Q. Did I ever fee yon before you joined the expe- with me—of there lon wr dition at Colonia I A. Never. Lieutenant ... Q : „Had you hoard of the plan of attack before I I commanded the 45th I joiged with the main body on thy 3d of July ? Never. I al the pafonersio7l4 from the erafpuntia oval of the attack took to myfelf pctfossly a that lay optima fait • t. n after the mkt" inlets t A. Yes, it ea he 7th : General 1114. to write this sae o petullatly bad it 6 that kaki of du pa troops to keep the fan .1 dud and ewe& it a edam rye wads, al bees given at dal pt. aid have addled Goad mate 4061161111 isks, mate. berever. k We .1 gerg beelag_ibe lold* wine there tens a digs "hen Z naelli tau a let la July* I very heavy ries is die int of the 3d, bat id nu , liaur do at that ;Mal el ooia been Mateo% et . * tied for the ("apply of 6 ! Pres for a given tiled. CADOGAN called. o of the left wing di rning of the stack. WY ant Colonel Pack. I f* fide of the )elain' CA erable lofs dam Via .hree pounder attedel force as entrance ins 1,1 n e my fuddenly Maids rindow. tad oa Atop the barracks as thug* at the end of da bit In a &Aden the alb if my column. and to To pn e ki ll edcei otir of b ordifelish ievro ad to penetrate farther If 4 ne obliged in all back irft!:edrCniernianeltnenogaibiefilde.vo a Th e t t o tr o k ier • • itpujed. After by* ieutepant Colo* Poi in fo bind n Pak I sa officer and ten al Crawford r the confiqueletadlif kg t h tows i*l6o, titrut that ;very PIK :Med or wonitd4d d that the pacer oded thin poR for tyjeant and if eam d. As oEcer fiat Fs Rig of truce, as afamatonstometa oppfnivi to him i aalt eers army ;Pig , * The Bring from the Peale. and availiat ; enemy poured to finding thy few Pal_ I 61. titer re fi liance Wiel d currence of the rere thep marched P the men carried oil! esci Arany &Aga PI ge. pad about t wo e furrendered. Men tally ca f e 04 0 0 were kilted spa! es Gasp, sth. hoot Ilk it • ..11 , • l I 1