Star. — London, England, 1810-02-21 00:00:00

I. hating the si.pport of Lord Gardner's fleet and of his 'boats ; !se his 1., rdship, as I believe, could never eater the Weeling Channel at all ; nor indeed was I ever acquainted with what to' - sanctions were given to him on this bead. When it was found that Lord Huntly's division could neither land nor proceed by the Weeling Passage up the Scheldt, as I had intended they should, it was determined to withdraw them • but from the boisterous state of the weather, it was some days before this could be effected. As soon as it was accomplished, they were passed over to South Beveland. With respect to Sir John Hope's operation, it was more pros perous. The object of it was this :—ln the original arrangement for carrying the army at once up the West Scheldt, Sir J. Hope's division was included ; but jest before we tailed, the Admiral reseiveril intelligence that the. French fleet was comedown abreas t of Flushing, and seemed to threaten to.oppose our passage up the Scheldt. In this view, it was conceived, that by a landing on the north side of South Beveland, the island might be possessed, and all the batteries taken in reverse, and thereby the position of the' French fleet, if they ventured to remain near Flushing, would be, as it were, turned, and their retreat rendered more difficult, while t'se attack on them by our ships would have been much facilitat ed ; and for this object, the division of Sir John Hope rat4ir "pre ceded, in sailing from the Downs, the rest of the fleet. The navigation of the East Scheldt was found most difficult ; bat by the skill and perseverance of Sir Richard Keats, this pur pose was happily and early accomplished, though the troops were carried a great way in schurs and boats ; and this division was landed near Ter-Goes, from whence they swept all the batteries in the Wand that could impede the progress of our ships up the West Scheldt, and possessed themselves on the td of August of the important post of Batz, to which it had been promised the army sholdd at once have been brought up. Sir John Mope remained in possession of this post, though not without being twice attacked by the enemy's flotilla, for nine days before any of the gun boats under Captain Sir Home Potshots were moved up, the Scheldt to his support. But it will be recollected that both these operations tended di rectly to forward the original purpoie of a rapid progress up the Scheid. ; the former by opening the Cadsand Channel, could the landing of Lord Huntley's division have been effected; the second by covering the progress of our fleet along the coast of South Be veland; whilst this division under Sir John Hope was at the same time so far advanced towards the destination a: which the rest of the armament was to he assembled It will now only be necessary for mete bring before your Ma jesty the dates at which the several parts of the armament were enabled, according to the arrangement of Sir Richard Strachan, to pursue their progress up the Scheldt. la this place, however, it may be proper that T should pre viglisly advert to the grounds on which the third division under Lieutenant-General Grosvenor, as well as the two Light Batta lions of the King's German Legion (composing part of the force destined in the first instance to proceed against Antwerp), were landed at Waicheren and employed before Flushing. Your Majesty will be pleased to recollect, that the troops which sailed from Portsmouth, under Lieutenant-General Sir Lyre Coote, were destined for the service of Walcheren, and had been considered air sulficient for that object, according to the intelli gence received, and the supposed strength of the enemy ; though at the same time, certainly relying, for the first efforts against,. Flushing, ou the promised co-operation of the Navy, and on their establishing, as was held out, in the first instance, a naval block ade, except on the side of Veer and Rammakins. Unfortunately, however, this did not t;.ke place, and for several nights after the army was before Flushing, the enemy succeeded in throwing from the opposite coast, probably from the canal of Ghent, considera ble reinforcements into the place, which enabled him constantly to annoy our out-posts and workieg parties, and finally to at t.eupt a sally in force, though happily, from the valour of your Majesty's troops, without stvess. This proving very harrassing particularly. from the great difficulty of communication between the several parts of our line, I determined, in order to relieve the troops, and press forward the siege with as much vigour as possi ble, to avail myself for the time ut the services ofthesecorps ; but it is to be remembered, that this was only done because I saw no movement' making to push forward a single vessel up the West Scheldt ; and it therefore seemed more adviseable to have their asaistaece before Flushing, than that they should lie inactive in the Vete Gat ; and they might at any time be re-embarked front Rammakins in a few hours, whenever their transports could be brought up front Veer, and there was the least chance of our proceeding to our ulterior destination. l have already stated that Rammakins surrendered on the even ing of the 3.1 of August. bnmediately upon this event, feeling, as I did, great uneasiness at the delay which had already taken place, and at the departure from the original plan, I wrote a letter to the Admiral, then at Tcr Veer, expressing my hope that the ships would now be able to enter the West Scheldt by the Sloe Passage, and that no time should be lost iii pressing forward as speedily as possible our fur ther operations ; and I requested at the same time, that he would communicate to me the extent of naval co-operation he could af ford, as well for the future blockade of Flushing as with a view to protecting the coasts of South Beveland, and watching the passages from the Meuse to the East Scheldt, as this consideration , would govern very much the extent of force I must be toleave n South Beveland when the army advanced. To this letter he did nut reply fully till the Bth of-August ; but I had a note front barn on the sth, assuring me the transports should be brought forward without delay ; and I had also a very long conversation with bins en the morning of the tith, on the arrangements to be taken fur our further operation when I urged, in the strongest manner, the necessity of net losing a i monient in bringing up the cavalry and ordnance ships, transports, store-ships, victuallers, &c. in order that the armament might proceed without delay to its destination ; and l added my hopes, that they would receive the protection of the sleeps of war, none ot which had yet entered the West Scheldt. To all this, and to the several arrangements explained to him in detail, he fully assented. its his reply to my letter of the 4th on the Bth of August, he acquaints me that several of the smaller vessels of different de. scrytions, had passed through the intricate passage of the Sloe, and that he had ordered the frigates to pass up the West Scheldt, to be followed by the line-of battle ships: and he gave hopes that he should be able to go up the river with the flotilla on the 10th of August at furthest,and that the frigates and line of-battle ships should follow as they came in, in succession. The frigates, however, did not pass Flushing till the even ing of the 11th, and the line-of-battle ships only passed to the anchorage above Fleshing on the loth, the second day of the bom bardment. 'llleee ships .began to proceed up the river Mt the 13th, and ar rived on the 19th ; one division as high as the bay below Waer don, the other off the Hanswent, where they remained ; the Ceurageux passed above Bathz ; the cavalry ships only got thro' the Sloe Passage into the West Scheldt from the 20th to the 23d, and arrived off Bathz on the 22d and 24th; the ordnance-ships and snare-ships passed through from the 29d to the 23d, and arri ved at their destination off Batbz on the 24th and 25th; the trans ports for Lieutenant General Grosvenor's division only came up to receive them on the 19th, on which day they embarked; and those for Major-General Grahanr's division on the 20th and tst ; and they arrived off Bathz on the 24th.. The Corps of Brigadier General Rottenburgh, and the Light Battalions of the Cs: man Legion proceeded to join the Earl of Rosalyn's division in South Beveland. From this Statement your Majesty will see, that notwithstan d:ng every effort on my part with the Admiral, the armament not assembled at the point of Its destination till the 25th, and Course that the means of conunencing operations soouer against _enrwerp were never in my power. It now becanue at this advanced period, nay duty to consider very seriously the expediency of landing the army on the totnparire, all the intelligence obtained as to the strength of the rPcmy, it appeared to be such as to leave (as stated in my dispatch of the '. 9th of A dkust) no reasonable prospect of the lorce under my command, after accomplishing the preliminary eperatious of reducing fort Lillu, as well as Liefkenshoeck on the 'apptite side of Antwerp, without the possession of which, :he dewtnniun of the ships and arsenals of the enetny could not tit efft.d ; and in addition to this, the sickness which had bee gou 14, attack the army about the 20th, and which was hourly in ersasioe to an taming extent, created the most serious appre. aen.:hnis in the minds of the medical men, as to its further pro trees at that unhealthy season , and whic h fatal experience has Steer sh wn to have been but too well founded. Your Majesty will not be surprized, if, under these circitm stances, I paused in requiring the As:rniral to put the army on almarP. That a landing might have been made, and that any force . tl.4.had been oppo,.al to us In the field would have yielded to the superiso valour of lhiti.h troops, 1 have no doubt; but then, any each toccata could have been of no avail towards the attainment es i siselthemate abject;, and there was still less chance that the . •salta• • • jr, • w..{. ,A of the before 4 ea to Majesty . _ 4 slims time 1 their don. • But when, added to this, Wetness to . abrmlns .. had begun to spread - itself ansong'the 'stamps, and the eerie aVA fatal progress of which, at that • season, was but too vassals% tained, it agpcared to me, that. all fu r ther advanee.etetld only tend to cenabit irretrievaily,the Safety of the army which your Majesty had confided to the, and which every prinefple of mi litary duty as well as the direct renew of •my instructiens alike ' forbade. In this state of things, I considered that there was left ail,* alternative, but to pursue the course I have already Stated, fa/ your Majesty's information, In my dispatch of the 24th of Aar gust; and that conduct I now most humbly, but at the . saile time with perfect confidence, submit to your Majesty's jot* meat. . . I shall here close this Report, which, has, I fear, already de tained lov.r Majesty but too long, by observing that wherever it has been necessary for me to advert to the disappointtneats expl4- 1 . rienced, through the arrangemeuts of the Adak* •in the navel co-operation I had been taught to expect, I have confined myself to stating the facts ; abstaining, as it became me, from. ajl com ment, and leaving it to the Admiral, in such report as be may make of his proceedings, to bring under your Majesty's view the circumstances which may have occasioned them, and, abbve all, to account for the difficulties which prevented the invest ment of Flushing (a pstnt never even doubted /of before) . as well as to spew the obstacles which presented themselves to the early progress of the armament up the West Scheldt, which operation I had always looked upon as the primary object of his instruc tions, and on the accomplishment of which our best hope, of suc cess in any of the ulterior objects of the Expedition principally, , if not wholly, depended. . (Signed) CSAT SAM, Litiltellant•Gelleral. , THE INQUIRY. MINUTES OF EVIDENCE. SEVENTH DAY, FEBRUARY . 1 S. !Rear-Admiral Sir RICHARD JOHN STRACHAN, examined. About the 19th of June I was sent for to the Admiralty, when I saw Lord Mulgrave, Sir Richard Bickerton, and Mr. Wellesley Pole ; after some conversation Captain Plampin was sent for, and soon ufterwards Lord Castlereagh came in. After we had con versed upon the subject, particularly about the landing at Sant diet, Lord Mulgrave proposed to send for Sir Home Popham.— in the previous conversatiou, I observed, that I thought there would be some difficulties in getting to the ulterior objects of the Expedition, as there might be greater difficulties in the navigation of the Scheldt than at present appeared; I conceived, that, not withstanding the Government had reason to believe the enemy bad very few troops in Flanders or in Holland, that in a very short time, long before we could get to Antwerp to accomplish the ob ject of the expedition, the population of the country and the troops in the different garrisons would be collected togethet in kids num bert that the retreat of the army might be cut off, if it passed above Antwerp. I also thought it would be necessary, to enable the navy to get up to Antwerp, to take the forts of Lillo and Lief kenshoeck, and 1 knew that the enemy had a boom across from Lillo to Liefkesuhoeck ; at the same time, I believed - the intelli gence that the Government had received, that there were very few troops in Flanders or in Holland; but I could hardly conceive it possible an army could penetrate so far as Antwerp, without being exposed to havetheir retreat cut of; for in the dine it would take up to destroy the naval arsenals, and to get at the enemy's ships, which I concluded would, to save themselves, p above Antwerp, the enemy would have an opportunity of care ting all his force from the garrison towns in 'ranee, Flandery mod Holland; and at that time it was rumoured there would be at cessation of hostilities between France and Austria; thowerfest my principal doubts of the success of the ulterior objects et tiros Expedition. Did you find any difficulty in advancing for orate of: ado is knowledge of the navigation of the Scheldt ?-6-Oestait r ost e end it was necessary before the fleet could poosootop to have the passages buoyed, which took up osemorlikle.l&ellt ferent shoals were buoyed up to the WWI sf jlasfellepet at least it was a week before it was complailly betoptittiMilnior ing this time the ships of war and °they've's& willsikisse going up the Scheldt as they got through the Soo, _lhoskpla c . Sir Home Popham had a general notion of tholdmldt,beit be did not exactly know where every shoal lay, nor the marks for avoiding those shoals ; it was therefore necessary to bore the dif ferent shoals pointed out by buoys, or vessels kedged as buoys. Do you conceive that the whole of this Expedition, with the artillery and horses, could have proceeded safely to Santvliet, with out the delay necessary to buoy the channel ?—I should doubt very much that the whole would have proceeded in safety up the Scheldt without waiting to buoy; but I conceive a very great part of it would, by means that we should have taken to p. event accidents. Do you know what portion of the armament was intended to act against Antwerp ?—At this time I cannot exactly say what proportion ; but k will appear in the that were gives, aud the arrangements that were made for the progress of the army, that the division of it under Sir Eyre Coote was intended for Walcheren ; the other part of the army under Lord Rosslyn (and WWI that part I concluded Lord Chatham propoud to go) war intended for Antwerp, mid would have been joined by Lord Huntley's and Sir John Hope's divisions. Do you imagine that the force which you' have stated, together with the proportion of artillery and artillery horses, could with safety have been conveyed up the Western Scheldt without wait keg to buoy the passage ?---If every thing bad been favourable, as k was at first intended for our entering the/Western Scheldt, we should certainly have endeavoured to proceed up without the delay o(buoying the passages; but in consequence of our being under the l wacessity of going into the Roompot for security, owing to the blowing weather, the original tide of the Expedition was diverted to another channel, which was the reason we took time to buoy the Western Scheldt. Had the Expedition not been diverted into another channel, would not the attempt to pass without buoying with so large a I force have been mended with considerable risk ?—lt would have been attended with some risk; but the object,l think, would have' jestified the risk. What length of time would it probably have taken to have lienveyed that part of the Expedition from the Mouth of the Scheldt to Santvliet ?-1 think in two or three days after they had passed flushing; by the third day the whole might have been up. Do you think they could have passed with the whole of the forte, including transports, both Walcheren and Cadsand, with out occupying either ?—ltis practicable, under circumstances of I volt loss., Would it net have required considerable timeto have disembarked ibetroops, the horses and the artillery in this neighbourhood of Sant wiled I think thewhole of the infantry and the artillery belonging to the infantry, would have been landed in one day, and a great part of the cavalry, if not the whole—with regard to the battering wain, I cannot exady state how long it might be, but not more than two days. • Do you know the nature of the beach ?—Not from my own observation, but from Sir Home Pophain's report, 1 bad reason 'to think the beach v. as good, andvery proper for the disembarks don of infantry and cavalry; but I do not know what the coun try might be behind the Dyke, as it was at too great a distance '.far us to observe. It might have been inundated behind the bank, for aught I know, because a part of the country was observed to be in that state. Would the timor4uisite for that disembarkation have depend , ed much upon the state of the weather and the surf that part of the Scheldt, near Sentvliet, the weather Would have very little Interfered with us, but of course it would have retarded us £ Idols ; we may say half a day. Do you know what number of men could disembark at one time from the whole of your fleet ?—I understood front Bir.R. ,leates, with whom the arrangement for disembarking the troops was left, that he could have landed between 10 and 19,000 men in the course of a few hours. Were you providetioridstbentansher of boots, dat•bests, &c. mentioned in the nannosiellim IfffilkAffilltate No. 1, dated the 9th of June I—l amsidorabostbosiMmi vebialt the Admiralty fur .niched, were oust sosphs, quad that taselidog was wanting to fat ward the success of the , ilasCodi oleo part of the Admiralty if I had thought there bad fay thifig wanted, I should have stated it, and 1 am sure it would hive been complied with im tmheediEuxeply ; l editioa. beli eve anrt.boa besides Itthatta. l a n gr tt at s country we mnabers s i s; ing and sailing boats were hired at Deal,aua added of Indio; the DI dom. ob that 14 1111 ' do , be taking Walcheese, be , ..thecountry would be very lit "edified with welt an commies anitanteat defog nothing room than taking Waleberes ; Yrunarked tells LAW*. that I 'FOE fearful it would turn out so; that for ray part ,thstear nothing ff' the nevigatioty, bet that I went& do my best teaeconntrish all the objects of tipagipennion and that I shouldbe heti reedy to Ter* under any Oiler %hey bid warp coalidanee isthmus. 7,, r't . Did rukuuus 4Feotolis co the eaLtatlidaht-tha =Marl *Nu* i tbat was given by the Commander Chief ?—Yes, I have rand Had you read it previous to the sailing of the eepeditioa ?—I Mai. By whom was it communicated to you, and when ?--That o among others, was sent to me by the Adne earl iralty, y after . dar . 19th of tune.' What others do you allude to?—Gen.A. Hope's , Gen.Catveres, Col. Gordon's, and Gen. Brownrigg's, together with some memoirs of Sir H. Popham. There were others not of much con - Did they occasion any alteration in your opinion?— I' MOW confirmed my own opinion, that the success of thenamedition Wis doubtful. tHere the witness went late a description of the Basin, Jac. of Flushing, and its advantages to the enemy ; but stated it.to be his i opinion, that the great a:pence and loss of men attending the ots;,', cupation of Waicheren rendered that measure inadvisable.) WI at did you consider as the ultimate and most . material obi l ject of the expedition P—The destruction of the enemy's fleet, 1 and the destroying the dock-yard and arsenal at Antwerp, with i the dtotruction of the dock-yard, baton, and arsenal, at Wel cheren. Do you know whether the last aaehorage occupied by the eats, my was under the protection of the guns of the citadel att.., Antwerp ?--A part of the enemy's fleet lay on the sea -face of Antwerp, and, of course, they were within the range of the til t s' tadel • but I doubt if the enemy had any batteries or guns on the wharfs at Antwerp ; they had Antwerp on their right, motelge Tete de Flandre on theirleft. ft Could a landing have been effected at Santvliet, without, befog in possession of the fort of Baths ?---Bathe surrendered wi the least opposition. Had you reason to be satisfied with the professional judgailin of Sir H Popham, while acting under your orders;--J Suppose some ships had stranded, was it probable then- troops on board might have been transferred to other vessels that would still have passed on ?- —They certainly would have been taken out of these vessels, and the object of the Expedition might have been gained, that is, the landing the troops, notwith standing some of the vessels got on shore. Did you understand that the design of Government was to take Antwerp by a joint attack of the army and navy ?--I certainly knew that Government did expect that the army and navy would co-operate heartily to gain the object of the Expedition, and there fore any attempt that was made upon Antwerp would be by a co-operation of the two services. Did you know from your communications with Government, that they were in possession of any plan of the fortifications et Antwerp ?- —1 do not.' Did you suppose them to know if the Scheldt was navigable for ships of the line or not ?-4-111 conversations I had with some of the• members of' the Admiralty, I think they did not seem to under- . stand g h at ships of the line could go above Antwerp. I was al ways Of opinion ,myself thei they could, and it has turned out since that they blue gone above Antwerp, and that was one of ray reasons for thinking that we should find it a diflicult matter to destroy the enemy's fleet if they should, and our army not be able to gain possession of that place. . Were you furnished by Government with any plan of the forts 1 of Lillo and Lietkensboeik ?—I was not. State whether previously to the sailing of the Expedition you were consulted with the Commander in Chief of that Expedition on the best modes et tarrying it into effect, tither by lord Mel grave or Lord Castlereagh ?—I was' requently consulted by Lard Muierave, and Lord Castlereagh was occasionally .present; and I frequently had interviews with 'Lord Chatham; but there never was a meeting betviCen Lord Chatham sod any of the Members of the Government and myself. . What' day did you appear off the Scheldttoith the fleet ?Tbs. 20th of July. 1 l'he witness was directed to withdraw, and again called ip ) At what ' time we re.' ou enableft to Put that part of your in-: *ructions into execution to push up a sufficient amount of your 1 foeceabove Flushing, to prevent the quips of any vessels up the Scheidt I—The 2d or Sd of August a coasklerable part of the Flotilla got into the West Scheldt; it vet not necessary to push any of the larger ships into the Schmidt,, in compliance vrtthi my orders, because the enemy bad no force at Flushing that dial gun-boats could not intercept ; indeed, at that time, they haat any armed vessel in the mouth of the Scheidt. .A pat stets squadron would have been ordered into the Scheidt, if I bad not received intelligence that the enemy's fleet had got above the Boom, at Lillo • I, therefore, did not consider it proper to expose the ships unnecessarily. Then the Committee is to understand, you could have pushed a proportion of your fleet up the Scheldt moue:, but for the rea son you have given?—We might. ' ...• [The witness was directed to withdraw; but was again called' in, and informed; that if any question was put to him, the an. swer to whichwtotild tend, in any degree, to inculpate or grind nate himself, he o as at likerty to refuse answeriug it.] . In case you had pushed any part of your Sect above the town of Flushing, would it not have prevented the reinforcements pas sing from Cadsabd to Flushing - '?—No it would not ; and at the time those reinforceaunts did pass, there was none of the isetin a situation to pass into the Scheldt, except the division imam Commodore Owen, and as he was employed upon that particular service of landing at Cadsand to destroy the batteries, he could not well push into the Scheldt ; and if he. had done io, he wadi have been liable to suffer very great damage from the batted. of Cadsand. Lord Gardner, with his division, as will be seen by * orders already before the Committee, was ordered to co-operate with Commodore Owen, and to push into the Scheldt. after the batteries of Cadsand were taken ; but when in consequence of the ' weather we found it necessary to go into the East Scheldt (t hat is the Roornpot) for the security of the Armament, I sent orders* Commodore Owen not to land, but to preserve a menacing tion ; and Lord Gardner had similar orders to anchor at mouth of the Duerloo for the same purpose, that the enemy imagine we intended to land sothewhere about Zeutbnd alf ,• and it answered this good purpose, that the maw never detached any of his force to prevent our landing where we did, upon Bree Sand nor Dunbach battery. The pilots in Lord iiardn division of the squadron would not sake charge of the largo sill, either to pass them into the Weilin or into the Duerloo, at therefore it was not in his Lordship's pOwer to pass into, Scheldt, even if he bad been ordered; if this division bad pus* icto the Scheldt, they would have been Wilted to anchor above Flushing and Cadsaud, and ar it blest molted he bane t o to in the space between those two pLacee; lea Illillily mold with the wind, as it was S. S,W. send reinforce:nests over,. in the day or night; and this will appear by Commodore OMEN statement, who exerted himself to the utmost to prevent it's Ins deed It 'bl ew so bard at one time, that the gunboats were to the asealiity of leaving the West Scheldt, and dropping into the itrearelli. air security. • 'die Caionitittee is to understand, there was no part ,[ mr Pleat that tisain a situation to go up the Scheldt, on r ot ramp relit* Scheldt ?-1 k ?—There was not ; but it Woe r eigatl Lord Gardner sboeld have gone into the Scholl; le I have solitiofore, after the batteries at Cadsand were takes, alit orders ware Ikea to Wm in conformity to the orders I And ras 1 ceived frets the Admiralty, upon the ii , that the enemy's fleet , was in a sltmiloa to be attacked by mire; but when I found that the eserweg goer hatiosse atr u at e he lieliddt, it did Dot sprier. to see oleo ara* buptetwidr istitsiblimg our Sap dos I dogmas *We at 'the eatergweit theittestiaglit = l l l. westasemod Lord Gardaer is warallakig at as in the West Putt, that is, off West Capper], ett liy chit Mimes was fa a sheaths to assist Commodore Owes With his boom, to ease We b Mid k necessary to land upon Cieisd, or to pub In thrush the Detritus or Weilen passages, what we mold get AO atialle charge of the ships. . If rued thought it necessary, could not you have got 'Ms uisisetween the 2d and the Bth ofAuSaistl-11 cannot • ' , r , at itie aiiiiiist . answer to dates, but I think king before the 81111 K ArSI east orders for a *quadrate of fripsies to pub hoe idle intaileg that they sissatd go up to ileitis; but thou I.lldptenit gain the batteries tin the 11th, owing to swami ewes cd whist aid weather that prevented . " but Ido net dila the piddle awake suffered from thole ' paidegis todwilv +Nadal/sod as it woo, thetwisi bag _ the ier's -.„ mar empires. T itoisivoooossoinoso to aft opiraihmitikbitartrA 21.421.° t kailbod b:11a tffslti I Wm r:lnch • • • • ik ra e you utak, dot bawls tbsoit Ida. di* elf of Anger, t 4 orders yes gam foriltleftlallt lin been obeyed .. ,1 I, the iiketwarbetweest I and the time that th; - - glawynotie . hr, I worn wor t= goihit b yin, :.ri oeder a day was lost ; that was had hoard; the last order to Warm the frigates going ett rt :i : ,........tha soon best alir y peably n.peon the flth, and it pu u b • lithe l' l t sdloblt, .04 the 1 10044400.. awe'. pin. Aito Dleesnook - 7 willo ..1.5 , Le . Did you cot wdtp iLletryill POW August, to the A. miraity i—Yes, iAK " " • - . - Was that letter /to' plaltilb . dtw!= t ature ?—Any l ett , t that I wrote to the Satry of the • y ( and that le tter believe was published) pal Ada puha' entire. Did you ever repress a tonr.erra that that letter was I wrote 411404 . 0404. St. WU .with au' impi cation that th e -,* Would be very mach 'dissatisfied diet more wa s not d ooL , •chooght MK it dui Sea td naffed kid to the Navy,* r ate ' -Wild branch of the 040,1111.41 ft that I was under ( t h e Ad' • :racy) that we were de/trout to go on, or that we had tak er , the mealares neesediry to go on ; and, therefore, I wrote thiiki. ter ; I c.ertandy veto A 'Fete the letter did not think it would l a , published; but I wits wrong in thinking so ; if i had ' t h ought a would, have been puhlished,' I should have been more cautious l a . "Whittles it, that itWik titit'edivief a* relleetion upon Lord ch., 00) 4 th 4 min). Mgeti.s lo ,l4 6 ohacC_ ... 14"Pullidaio the p i ; i t st r il ek.me very forcioty Mat It, Woyal be N the means of n:ok . . r i Ikea& betweo theitstWeerniell, edurdiktio icon rse I expri::.l Am! very scaley I yseo Ow I hyd vrpoot kupt in tim niannr, - - ,at the sante time I ebstived to Lo Ch - atbarn, and indeed r: ;miiifolleers of the army, that I elightikave put it together lo such manner as net to he ahldutre, for* the Way it was w or d it it apPeired like casting a reflecdon upon Lord Chatham and the principal OfSeem of the 'eriny,• and I am very glad to have tia t o PrOdilllitY'a fiii=l , FaT*4 %PO 1 4id "" mean to cm any reflection upon Clotho:1h or the superior Officers of tetarmy, or *yid di inditiellind olt the army, fin' I am not a l of military matters . At **me time I could not help rilret. tings and, I Oa at this safg4,44Alittf4: moil I )4ecrvii , *l4 ijky i t: Lea btonela up af WC WCre. to t illc Pui!ltut *tick %Volt, the tau. My, and we viekkedcrtu. People sip (0 tie highest pi tc h ut en • thueinsm, we *ldd have linen under ilia necessity or retiring.L. Frail what hashappened 'Mao to ClatWesrisace of the sickness of Ake nth* I ant modified ;44* was the *West measure ch.; t i e Commander in chief of the army coold,.pursue; toe 1 clou:t very much whethe his - Lintsisi . 'lipoid have been able t o a s ecnoplish die fad 4 1 4tilihrir ptire season of the y e a, the very sickly state' id the iroepii,•asitl the increasing force Af the enemy,; but oe wad* not see emir* force, I thought sod I still do think, that we. ought to have attacked Lille and Ilikin. shoe*, which might bare opened a field to some wapiti.: or other, and might FA .e been the means of our even getting NA or tae enemy's heel : end k was -with thin imprts4on, l whits my letter. • ,^ - , Did you ever ecnot4taidth the Commander in Chief of the army about outselling ions Lb* and Lietkenshoeik, and going 101. ward ?--On the th itAegust, Sir Home Popham and rays,/ went to • • to dine with Lord Chatham, and at that time pis Le** ea' net Om* at all ai if be had dciubts abeut going oil ; at the sesse-dins, his 14dahly mentioned that the Alicia:ly were increasing •ii force. Sir • Hiame Popham spoite a good deal in favour of the beach for latOnk the army un, ssl this was the general ionveres.tion that partied at that dine; limn ever, his Lordship proposed toming te liacbt do the folio • out day,. which waathe ;iiii ; pod there, In conversation with me, be first spoke of retiringe mentioning the. increased force of :Le enemy, the advanced season (and vfre had certainly very bad yea. don), and the-sicklYmatetif the troop:; the'army was just Gee beginning to be sickly,tind hosanna tp Milt to me that lie whip **for lane letter from nio on the subject. Accordingly, tia the next day I wrote to his i.ordship; and that letter accompiad l' Mine to the Admiralty of the £7th of Austiii, and is ixfure :re " Committee ; in thatletter It will appearlft I proposed as a -1 tack upon 11110 . and Liefkinidtnitit, withril view of opening t field to further mpg:poly, i that Waitaki)* iongersation or tor• respondence I he. with lan Lordship ayes the subject; I thick that letter was die eclihe PAM of August. 1 1 . ' The rest of Sir itkliard Stratton's evidence tended to thee, that, teen should forts Lab abilLimitksieshoeik have been takat, which would have enebilit war &Isms' and some of our Oka 4 war . to so op thaSsibehlts .It :Was ,* oplidon of the Officers ef the At y, that* nit . erjF objects of . the Expedition could nut =been obtai' . 11iiildsbuglit that itlalidlug could not Luc arcked at Sentvlibilidfil dui 10th of August, and even thee IdliOlit the heair erldlinp and cavalry' which could not et Opole the Slough .Paseope entil- fiat had surrendered.. iss 1 - dtatigesVato for an attack on Amway could be made until:anis Lillo and Liefkeushoeik had been taken. He would hive at tempted to break the boo* is the Scheldt, although . the (Mkt taking was very hazardous, as the boom *as reported to be se coostrecterl as, if not • broken, to bring the ships immediately at der the battery of Lie i fitenskmik. He thought the French dip could have been removed above Antwitip, where he would bye attempted to follow them ; bat that as many men both in the Navy and Army *veld have been lost, It would have hem goal dent, werethat found to be the ease, to retire. Had the surf, after advancing cowards Antwerp, bean compelled to Whack, the troops might have been received into the vessels tha: ;Yoshi have accompanied them up the river, and be prOteCted by our fleet in their retreat . It appeared that Government bad net be informed before the sailing of the Expedition of the real state id forts Liho and Liefke.nthooik. If the Army had taken Auto* the dockyards might have been destroyed without the pantifif of the Navy. He conceived that the Army could not fog Antwerp without being masters of the citadel, which WIMP commanded the dock yards. The colsekeibn •of the vibes* proved the oemsaitylof going into the Rompoof, on mows li the great hazard the fleet and transport. woulddiave run by as. choriog at the mouth of the Scheldt. Lord Gardner's evidence related to the requisition for bons* land troops upon Cadsand. . . : • • • ' L • RENOVATED HEALTH. fir has been too freq4entl,r the subject of just ani ' general ieprebation, 'that men destitute of the elements 4 the medical art have offered themselves as c.audidates for pubic patronage in the mufarsion of Physic. For the purpose of dont justice to the result of eur studies and experience, and to prey."( us from being classed among those empiric' whose bnpudent pa. tensions have, unfordlinately for society, been too favouratlyn! missed, we beg leave its submit to the liberal and enlighten*, fldthful statement of our persults and acquirements. After having received a regtdar medical edueation,as &NO of Messrs. Grinds! and Bilaard, whops lectures snared*, * carefully attended, as Professors and Surgeons of the Landon it* pleat, we catered ourselves at. students in that justly ctlebraill school for medical acqtdeassents, , the Royal College of Ef.i!* *Mhz tertre instractieff in the different branches of Aostlray. Surgysy, e Theory and Practice at Physic, Chemistry, hi* valfery, Botany, &c. &c. &c, by those eminent Rtofessors, Uri. Morro, Gregory, Black, Hamilton, Duncan, and Rutheif. 44 . ..We trust we shall not be deemed-presumptuous, is saying. (4 e our proficiency and smisdleineats art not inconederahle. liarirt for a long series of years made VENERRAL COMPLAIN T. 4 and the various diseases of DEBILITY, the pacticular silbier' 4 onr studies and priCtice,it wM,we hope. be alluived that we'birf aeguired superior knowledge 'of their treatment . ma C3 M b slight and recent area of infection, a pare* re-establishment $ in the short per'od of two dayst and in those of tic utmost inveteracy, where other practitioners have failed of sg . as', a proper perseverance in our plan of treatmeof eniuresto ix patient a safe and radiral cure. Amidst the tnelancholg variety of disorders which are the of frets of a habit long and most unhappily pursued by tiv: yei!fe both sexes, there are none more alarming or more distressing r•;'i those defictericies and debilities which. frequently prevent u: rat' bitter the nistrissoalal *ate. To such *soul it must be a (Ai soling relbetalpaleeknow Abet they nay now, by a new mit 411de mode of •t, be restored to that greatest of all hue Miashalls , la *SO& jr, asitl:lgOiouscoustitution. In all Itdsbilay, heal labliarrar 'Wee atising, as well as in even' -do of Vended beilest; we'inay be consulted by paid , : ' 'eldhee sex witlt'the greatest secrecy and honour. Hours of ' solution at home from ten to three, and from six in the eveca till ten at night"' • ' ' . „ • Patisosits In ems esonert, aro requested to state the partial:o, 1 4 . their Cans Ks, lei)_ liikaritl habit of living, Ste. WWl* a re tance for Ovic. and whim the same will be gllgn ' gent 103 fraT part of the To ensure that se crerY,Aw sential to oar stodertglob pease of letters may be we' the accusal' for moildoirh:' I CURitiltaisilektikegeont, N 0.107, Hattair Garlit° ' , . 1, • 4.. m....., -4' INVirillie,ttltaa-Orill .0 6 • • • • In; _ E by 1..] STAR-1 • - . - • - • . , - . . enemy weals' bare Ohm lis tbe r rnaltlf. Seftrivit , 1116 IMO a WW I dim Min of tile he" di" ea reams. ha hattprarroredow do s aid lc tur ' l i e . 11 1 ? -4 1 111111 • 11 rje a lli c := N Z as it Mull , base beets gale me oreuPY , . were lo a per eel ititi \ the riverinfenld-tethe elfeersef limeades un • ‘l„., that these fp were not in a ' u arp .awf t*ispea them. with edits continual:rides Saida Wag cut se. ' - Did either Lord Cdst idle any oh- ' If the exalt was 6 1 4 and buyerbuttuusktgsludi oilditein demo serration upon the stessenouloo sm4-21WIW.diacalties that L before Antwerp, it is unnecessary for me to point om te rim; *Gold attend the naviption to .Ansdnerpt—p4Xatisdt .I.lord Majesty how critical must in a short time hows,hisen their . sit* Musgrave was mareturly andaus iboot the Ex ; and up- don. • But when, ackled to thh, sickness to Ms .ollarsnitng extent on my remarking whim that I tioellst all we skoidd do woe* ---'*" ••••-..•K • Awl oho dierte ribia be tains Walcheren, be said that the country would be very lade '%.