Star. — London, England, 1810-02-09 00:00:00

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE. TAKEN BEFORE THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE HOUSE, APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE POLICY AND CON DUCT OF THE LATE EXPEDITION TO EWE SCHELDT: 4 Mato fu . yea arttliinit:prac iie statement ave es that kwirepresents Atka as drained as kw, .hart that of itny=periotkdriegular troops, Lead it may h e shmed, that we can never find the enemy mote . esti go ortid or more assailalsk in that qu, nor is it probable that Great Britain will ems have a larger rouble force applicable to suds a service Mint at the present nu. went.-1 have, &c. (Signed) " CA . STLERZAG II• " The Right y Hon. the Commander fn Chief, Ike' transmitted (lune 3d) to Lord Cantheastacn, in answer to his Letter of the 29th sy , 1809. " The object to be attained asatated; B a most important and desireable one, but the forcjame have to employ must be consi dered, and the difficulties aml tasks they have to micoonter from the enemy's strength and liikantages, must be Well weighed.— Our utmost means may be reckoned at about 23 or 90,000 infan try, and sor 6000 cavalry. There appears to be two - routes by which such an army might undertake to approach from the mast to Antwerp. " Ist, From Ostend or its neighbourhood by a marc h o f a b ove one hundred miles through the country of Flanders, and by Aloft, Vilvarde, and Malines. " 2d. By naval and land operations within the Scheldt, and along that river to Antwerp ; first occupying the islands of \Val cheren and Sud Beveland, and probably the opposite bankrof the Scheldt. ' 6 Every calculation or prospect of successful attack can only be foreseen and made on a knowledge of the relative situation and strength of the enemy's country, fortresses, and armed men that can be brought in defence of both. If the route of the army is therefore to be taken as in the first case, through Flanders, the country is known to be one of the most intricate in Europe for military operations, being every where intersected with deep running rivers, large canals, and considerable ditehes and inclosures, at the same time that the passes and important points are guarded by fortresses and walled towns, the most in considerable of which are capable of making a resistance against an army scantily provided with siege artillery. Of the first class near this route are Nieuport, Ostend, Ghent, Oudenarde, Dender mond', Brussels, Matinee. The progress of military operationi in Flanders, from the difficulties of advance, arc well known never to have been rapid. FIRST DAY, FEBRUARY 2. The Right Hon. Sir 10111.1 ANSTRUTUra, Bart, in the Chair. The Right Hon. Sir DAVID Dnignas K. B. Commander in Cale! a the Army was called in.—Examined by the Committee. At what time were you first made acquainted by his Majesty's Ministers with their intention of sending an Expedition to the Scheldt ?—lt was on the.22d of March that I was desired by Lord Castlereagh to attend a Cabinet that was to be held on the 24th at Burlington house. On the iSth of March I had been appointed Commander in Chief. ;;;Fi Whit was the nature and substance of the communication made to you by Lord Viscount Castlereagh ?alt was to attend the Privy Council upon the subject of a proposed Expedition toWsi eberen, and an attack on the French fleet there ; that was the ge peral information I had, and on that sUbject I was desired to attend to be asked a question by the Council. By the Privy Council you mean the Cabinet ?—I do. Did you in consequence attend on the 24th ?—I did. Have the goodness to relate what passed between you and his Majesty's Ministers on the 24th with respect to this Expedition ? —1 have a memorandum to that effect, which I will read if I may be permitted, The object was the propriety and possibility of an immediate attack on the Island of Walcheren, and particu larly 04 Flushing, and on the French fleet of nine or ten sail of the line, which was at that time in the harbour of that place not in a state to proceed to sea. The attempt was represented as from miny considerations most desirable, for the navy had then a large disposable farce, and also that it should be made within a abort limited time, depending upon the tides; far it was to be apprehended that on the smallest alarm the enemy would with draw their ships from Flushing, and carry them up the Scheldt to Antwerp. Fifteen or sixteen thousand land forces were consi dered as necessary for this operation, and I was desired to state whether such a force could at that time be assembled. This I was not then enabled to do in the affirmative. 1 [The Witness. was directed to withdraw. The ChM; iran was directed to report progress, and ask leave to sit again. ITaper " With our state of preparation and numbers, an attempt by this first route of a rapid march through Flanders to arrive at Antwerp, would certainly be most singular, and perhaps without example. For a very considerable Beet and army must arrive and anchor on a part of the enemy's coast, which is at all times flat, dangerous, and without bay or shelter of any kind, in order to land on this open beach (betwixt two of the enemy's fortresses) about 30,000 min, 7 or hOOO horses, and a considerable artillery, and perhaps other carriages and horses, medical commissariat and baggage, if means and circumstances allow ; to give up all coin muLication with their shipping, and to march immediately with out tents, for no means of carrying them could be provided or depended on; without hospital equipment, with only a scanty supply of bread for a very few days, through an hostile country, must intricate and difficult in its nature, where the use of the ca nals could be so easily impeded, where the bridges which are numerous would be destroyed, where the enemy would imme diately be in front, rear, and on both flanks, being enabled so to do from the situation of his strong garrison towns; where the sick and wounded must be abandoned whenever they become so, from want of carriage ; where necessity would soon induce ra pine, plunder, and great loss; where, if such an army was not sooner arrested in its progress, it must arrive after a march of above 100 miles, at its destined point, andtefore a great town (Antwerp) sufficiently fortified to require a regular siege, and which this army could not carry on, unless the exertions of the fleet, and another considerable body of troops, had opened and en sured a communication by the Scheldt. " During such a march, had some of the defensible towns even opened their gates, it is evident such an army could not di minish its numbers by leaving garrisons to occupy them, and thereby attempting to keep up a communication with the origi nal point of landing, where possibly a fortress (Ostend) may have been secured, but which fortress is not such a one as can etfectually cover and secure the re-embarkation of a considerable corps. " Supposing after such a march, the main object of the Expe dition to have been attained in the destruction of the enemy's fleet, it is evident that the army could not calculate (from the time and force the enemy must have acquired) on returning by the same route, but must trust from the previous measures taken and its own exertions, to return (having at;complished its object) by the Scheldt. " If it therefore appears that the advance through Flanders is attended with very great difficulties, and that at any rate a return by the Scheldt is the most expedient and eligible, it would follow also that the attack should be directed from. that side, and be a combined naval and l an d o p erat i on , the detail of whic h must be well considered and arranged by bo th services. " In whatever way Antwerp is to be approached or taken, the service is one of very great risk, and in which the safe return of the army so employed may be very precarious, from the opposi tion made, and the l e ng t h o f t i me consumed in the operation, which enables the enemy to assemble in a short time a great force from every part of the Netherlands and Holland, and even from Westphalia, by the course of the Rhine, as well as from the fron tier of France. " D. DUNDAS. SECOND DAY, FEBRUARY 5. Mc Right Hon. Sir Darts DITNDAS, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Army, wa4 clled in —Examined by the Committee. ' Have the goodness to proceed in stating what passed between you and his Majesty's Ministers on the Sith, with respect to the Expedition ?—After every previous inquiry and report which had been made from the Commanding Officers at the several stations of the troops, and from the well-known shat tered situation of the army after the return of so large a portion of it from Spain, such a force could not then be provided ; besides the very indifferent gene rni state of health, there was not one of those corps which returned from Spain whose clothing. arms, ac coutrements, and other parts of military equipment, were not in a most defective state, and required con siderable time, under every exertion, to replace and repair. Did any thing more pass between his Majesty's Ministers and yourself at that time relative to the projected Expedition to the Scheldt ; and if there did, state what it was ?—I recollect no debate or discus sion taking place, or opinion being called for ; gene ral conversation might pass while I remained there. As I considered myself sent for to answer on a parti. cular subject, I retired soon after that was done ; and as T took no notes at that time, I have now no further recollection of what passed at that meeting. Do you recollect at any other time since that pe riod, being consulted relative to the expediency of an Expedition to the Scheldt do not recollect upon the expediency, but I had a great deal of communi cation of course with the Secretary of State after that, from that time, till the Expedition sailed ; I mean that I never was called to a Council or a Meeting. Was the Expedition suspended in consequence of the difficulties you have stated in procuring a suffi cient force ?—Upon my word I cai.not say ; it is not for me to judge of that. When was there any fresh communication upon the same subject « i:h you ?—From the 24th of March to the Bth of May there appears to have been no pe. culiar communication on the subject of Walcheren from his Majesty's Government ; I mean official to roe as Commander in Chief ; but every exertion continued to be made and urged to the several corps to complete them for service. What was the communication made to you on the d Bth of May, and by whom ?-0n the Bth of May Lord Castlereagh applied for the state of the infantry in England, and the date that each battalion might be considered as fit for service, and in a state for em barkation : on the 10th of May a Return was trans mitted to Lord Castlereagh of all the Battalions now in England, with the effective strength of each ; on the ‘2oth of May, Lord Castlereagh desired the mode in which it v ould be proposed - to brigade two corps, one of 25,000 Infantry and 5,000 Cavalry, the other a reserve of 10,000 Infantry and 2,000 Cavalry ; cn the 21st of May a Scheme was transmitted to Lord Castlereagh, specifying the battalions as they lay in districts for an army of 25,000 Infantry and 5,000 Cavalry ; that for the reserve was postponed ; I was vot enabled to do it then. _ _ When wis the, next communication relative to the Eapedition to ; the Scheldt ?---9n the 20th of May, Lord Casttere4gh requested my tentiments on the practicability of an attempt on the enemy's naval establishment in the Scheldt, the extent of means it would require, and the mode by which it could best be carried into execution, for the consideration of his Majesty's Ministers ; on the 3d of June my answer was transmitted on the above subject to Lord Cas tlereagh. • Can you state the substance of your answer to Lord Castlereagh have that answer here, and also his Lordship's letter to me. [Sir David Donk! Is delivered in a Letter from Lord Castle reagh to hiatself; d.ned May 2.9, 1809; and his Answer, dated id June 1809, which wtro read.] • (Confidential).—Cory of a Letter from Lord Ca smitzenn to the Commander in Chief. ' " Downing-street, May V. 9, 1869. " SlR—The naval establishment which the enemy'bas created in the Scheldt has already led to the construction of not less than twenty sail of the line in different stages of equipment, and pro- IYI:Sei to receive at no distant period an extension in point of num ber of ships, and a solidity, in point of defence, which must ren. J der it, as a maritime position, not only extremely formidable to the security of Great Britain, but still more invulnerable to at t:.ek. These considerations have long' attracted the serious at tention of his Majesty's Government, and they feel it their duty t, investigate with the formidable means, both naval and milita e which his Majesty Ims at present at his disposal, how Ear it is possible to strikes blow against the enemy's naval resource4n• that quarter, including the destruction of their arsenal at ;kw werp, and the ships of war stationed in different parts of the cl•t•ldt between Antwerp and Flushing. " The extreme importance of this subject will, I am persuad ed, induce you to give it your best attention, and I have to re- Twit that you will favour me with your sentiments for the con ..dtration of Lie 111.•jesty'e Ministets upon tilt: prasticabUity of should for A service, Eyre Coote should be appointed Second in C 0..., Was that the whole of that communication That was the whole of that communication. What was the next ceinmunication of an official liitur6 ?-0n the 16th of July, Lord Castlereagh re gamed that another cavalry regiment should ' be ad ded ; on the 17th, Lord Castlereagh was acquainted, that the 2d Dragoon Guards were under orders. When was the next communication on this subject? When the expedition was determined on in the be ginning of June, I had afterwards various meetings and conversations with Lord Castlereagh, relative to the state of the troops, and the maws of assembling them ; after they were put in march to their several places of embarkation, and arrived there the end of June and the beginning of July, they were put under the orders of the General Officers appointed for the expedition ; a very large proportion embarked ai Portsmouth, because they were carried by ships of war lying there, and intended to distract the attention of the enem!, and leave them in suspense as to the ob ject of the expedition. Were you consulted upon the plan of the expedi tion cannot say consulted, further than the times that I have mentioned ; I at no time had any com munication with the Admiralty or Navy on the gene ral subject of Walcheren, or the mode of execution ; I had, with Lord. Chatham and the Secretary of State, conversations relative to the troops and equipment, and all sorts of things of that kind, and with Lord Chatham, individually, perhaps; whether that a mounts to consultation I cannot say. Was any detailed plan of the intended operations submitted or communicatecUto you ?—I have no re collection of any detailed plan, any full plan submitted to me ; nothing regularly officially in my situation of that nature : I knew, from a variety of people, a great deal which was going on, but no detailed Was your opinion asked as to the - practicability of the attack on Antwerp. and the probable result of the expedition, upon or after the 22.(1 of June ?—I re member no opinion, nor could I expect any thing of that kind being asked after . the army was prepared : I recollect nothing of the kind. 1)o you recollect any consultation with his Ma jesty's Ministers on the subject of your answer to Lord Castlereagh ?—No, none. Were you consulted with about the appointment of Ithe Commander in Chief of the Land forces ?—I do not recollect being absolutely consulted by Ministers, but I thought it a very proper one ; I knew of it. Explain to the Committee whether the operation upon which you were consulted upon the 24th of March, was the same operation that was subsequently carried into effect, or do you consider it a perfectly distinct operation ?—Perfectly distinct. Was that operation, upon which you were con sulted upon the 24th of March, laid aside in conse quence of the state of the army, not admitting at that moment of a force of 16,000 men being applied to that service ?—I suppose that was aprincipal rea son, but I do not know what other reasons there might be; I have no doubt that was a principal reason. In point of fact, the state of the army did not ad mit of 16,000 men being employed in that service ? That was what I stated, I apprehend, at the time . Was the basis of the army employed in the late expedition to the Scheldt, the army which return ed after serving with Sir John Moore in Spain ? —That would be more correctly known from looking at the composition of the force that went to the IScheldt ; the names of the regiments : I think, on I recollection, that it was. , Was it not a considerable time after the . return of 44 Horse Guards, Jung 3, 1809." that army, the army being disembarked at different Are you in porsession of the opinions of other offi- I ports, and the regiments being very much mixed to. cers given upon the same subject ?—Yes, lam in pos- f gether in the transports, before any effectual means session of four opinions ; I have them not here. could be taken for refitting that army for service ?.-e Whose opinions were they ?—Of the Adjutant Ge- It certainly was. neral, the Quarter Master General, the Deputy Quar- Did not a very considerable proportion of theforce ter Master General, and of Colonel Gordon who is afterwards employed in the Scheldt arise from drafts my Secretary. from the militia which were incorporated into those Were those opinions in writing ?—They were in regiments ?—Not only into those regiments, but into writing. all the regiments, I apprehend, that embarked : I do Are they in your office ?—They are in my office. not know the exact number, but no doubt there must Were those individual opinions, or were they the have been a considerable number. result of any military consultation ?—They were opi. Do you recollect having repeatedly written, at nions that those Gentlemen wrote by my direction ; Lord Castlereagh's instance, or directed the Adju separate opinions ; separate papers • and those pa- tant-General to write circular letters to all th e regi pers were sent to th e S ecretary of itate along with ments to accelerate the refitment of the army, and to my own opinion, desire to know the earliest day at which the regiments What was the next communication in point of could be completed for service ?---This was repeatedly time which you had with his Majesty's Ministers upon done. this subject ?—On the 18th of June Lord Castle- Do you recollect dint some regiments in the reagh transmitted his Majesty's pleasure for holding Southern Districts had not completed their equip in readiness •Tor immediate embarkation 35,000 in. I ments so late as towards the end of June cannot fantry and 1800 cavalry ; on the 22d, the Comman. 1 recollect particular regim en t s , b ut I h ave no d ou b t der in Chief tra nsm i tte d to L or d C ast l ereag h a de- I that was the case ; I am sure it was the case. tailed state of force to proceed on service, with a staff( You have stated to the Committee, that on the civil and military ; the force amounting to 35,400 in- I 21st of May you made a ret urn to the Secretary of fantry, and 1900 cava l ry ; also, the force that would I State, of the corps of 25,000 infantry and .6000• ca remain in Great Britain, Ireland, and the Islands valry ; do you speak of the effectives as they then in the Channel. stood upon the Monthly Returns, or mean to describe : Does that number include the Foot Guards and the ! that corps as having been then reported complete and Artillery ?—The Foot Guards but not the Artillery; ! fit for service ?—The numbersavere collected from the infantry I call them. ' Adjutant-Genera from the last returns, and they What was the force of the Artillery ?—I do not I stood on the returns as effective. !mow the particulars ; I apprehend the Board of) Would the effectives on the monthly returns dis- Ordnance can give a detail of them ; I cannot give it tinguish whether they were equipped and fit for ser upon recollection, and have not it marked down here. vice ?—.They certainly were not from the monthly re- Was the 22d of June the earliest period at which . turns, but from the latest returns, which were proba so large a force could be collected ?—Upon my word j bly later. I cannot say exactly, they might some days sooner Do those returns•distinguish whether they were ef perhaps ; on the 20th of May there was an arrange- fective, or whether they were equipped and fit ment of 25,000 men given ; afterwards, between that for service ?---I cannot say ; this goes to numbers l and this last date, 35,000 or more were assembled ; merely ; here is a return of the Southern District on the men were recovering fast, there was a great in- j the 7th of May, of a great number of the regiments, crease of men during that period ; I donot think such shewing the deficiency of those regiments, which is a force as that could have been well assembled before ; of the nature alluded to : here is. the deficiency of that period which may be called an army of 40,000 elothing, acoutrements and arms on the 7th of May, men, such a number could not have been got sooner . t ransm i tte d b y Si r Jo h n Hope, Of ten battalions in Have you any papers in your office which would l that district, which i s a s p ec im en o f t h e ot h ers. shew what was t h e largest force which could have You have stated, that you delivered in a written been assembled at different periods, previous to opinion to Lord Castlereagh ; did you receive in wri the 22d of June ?—I think not ; it is very difficult to ting any comment on that opinion, or any letter in ascertain the number at any particular point of time; censequenete of it, from Lord Castlereagh ? Ido not we had mouth) , returns ; and there were later:lmbue recolkct receiving 'any. .. - • rj! of discussion of that opinion ?—No, .I did not. Had not Lord Castlereagh from time to time CO n . versa.tions with you with respect to the operation s i n the Scheldt, subsequently to receiving your report of, the 3d of June ?—Certainly, upon some points; bu t I do not recollect any formal conversation or explana, Lion of that answer or report that I gave ; certainly • there were constantly conve rsat i ons o f some kind or other, relative to the state of equipment of the troop s . that was the general subject, m ore t h an the policy o f the object ; that was none of my concern. Do not you recollect having had communication, with Lord Chatham and Lord Castlereagh respe ct , ing the Expedition, and particularly respecting il l ., defences of Antwerp ?—I cannot think that I corid have any considerable conversation respecting t1ie42,,. fences of Antwerp, for I never saw a plan of i t: I: do not recollect having a plan of Antwerp she me ; I have been there myself ; and as far as I ; me , I might mention, but it must be a very commo n co:. versation that passed on the subject ; there ‘‘,ls nti thing written ; nothing from me to judge from b 4, mere conversation. Did not Lord Chatham and Lord Castlerno t communicate with you on the subject of A ntwerr, on the ground of your having been Commander o f that fortress about the years 1793 and 1791, with a view of obtaining your general opinion and know ledge of the state of the works at the time y(.,u we re Commander ? —The army was encamped near Art. werp, and I was very considerably indisposed, and the Duke of York desired me to go to Antwerp, which was in the rear of the army at this time, as a sick quarter, and to take the command. I was these about seven or eight days ; during that time, I looked about as much as I could, but it wa s vtlr , lit,le ; however, I had a general idea of Antwerp, and I dare say I communicated that to Lord Castle. reagh and Lord Chatham, very naturally. Had not Lord Castlereagh, both with and without Lord Chatham, communications with you on the sub ject of the difficulties of ascending the Scheldt, and the difficulties the army might meet with in its ulte. rior operations against Antwerp ?—I cinnot recollect particulars ; but I have no doubt we had many such communications, from the intercourse that was going on between Lord Castlereagh and myself, and whica was always on a very friendly footing. Was not Lord Castlereagh in the habit of almost daily communication with you, and of disclosing, in the most confidential and unreserved manner, the mi. litary operations which were in tontemplatian ? Lord Castlereagh, I think was very much unreserv ed to me, as much as I could possibly look for a au individual, certainly. Did the opinion, delivered by yon in writing to Lora Castlereagh, ever become matter of discussion between you and Lord Chatham ?—No, I cannot say particularly ; I do not think it had a formal discus sion I dare say many of the points might, to a te:- tain degree; but as an opinion it never came under discussion. Were you ever asked to revise thatopinion, or called upon for a further opinion ?—I never was asked to re vise that opinion, or called upon for another formal opinion of the same nature ; that was a regular op:- niott I was required to give. Was the operation that was afterwards attempted, the operation upon which that opinion was given . That the paper explains, I should imagine, suffici ently ; the subject was the same. Were the opinions given by other officers who had been applied to by you, collected by you, and trans , mined through you to Lord Castlereagh?—They were at the same time with my own. What was the opinion given by you in consequence of the slight observation you had been enabled to make, while in command 'at Antwerp, of the proba ble state of defence of that fortress ?—I was enabled to say that the citadel was a very considerable one .certainly, and would require a siege of some duration probably to take it. The town was surrounded by :very high wall ramparts, there was a very deep ditch, great old mounds of earth, and other circumstances Ido not know, I believe that was what is called a: •demi-rebutment ; in short, it was a place that could not be entered without a regular siege unless it was surrendered, if there was a sufficient number of men in it—it has sustained several sieges, and has been given up without a siege, but then it was alwis s when the country was possessed by the •enemy, tied then it must fall of course. Have not many places, more considerable in poir of defence than you at that time stated Antwerp to be, been surrendered on bombardment in consequence of an army appearing before it.with adequate means. without a • regular siege ?—Many places have been surrendered cestainly of thildescription, and under :those circumstances. In the case of Copenhagen, was not that reducei without a regular siege ?—lt was a regular siege, I apprehend, as far as it went ; there were all the cere monies pc, a regular siege, parallels and batteries I apprehend, but - I am not suffiCiently informed upon the subject ; I apprehend it was attacked in a regu lar manner for a certain time ; the town was not car ried by assault, and 1 do .not know that breaches were made Ithe siege was a regular one I apprehend. Is Copenhagen a more formidable place-in point of defence than you considered Antwerp to be ? All other circumstances . supposed the same, I only judge from a :plan ; I never saw Copenhagen, I should judge it to be a more defensible place; a great portion of it is covered with water, and is not to be approached. Were there at the time you were in the command any outworks to Antwerp, to prevent an army from taking its position as near it might find convenient to the place ?-4 have mentioned that I was not enabled to know it completely ; but I do not believe there were any advanced forts or redoubts, or works of that nature towards the land. What was the population of Antwerp was it not froth sixty to eighty thousand inhabitants ?—I know nothing about the population it is a very large old city ; the houses ate very Ire in general ; there 'S great deal of vacant space within, which lies Wawa doze of l anes. / explaining or going deeper into it, or any thing o f mu . an suorct or tnat . oprnism t—l do not recollect were you I uunita r reillibe asia e4Pik any form conversation ; I very probably had wi - . ?—The text 41E441 iltamminication . was j Lad Castlereagh, but I never had any formal way o f • Castlereagh's' satificatiotemi• of his Majesty's pleasure, that the Earl of Chithani that sort that I sec4ect. should be appointed- to the command of the &POW Ireisi — iireirArailiirconversatiorr With Lord c a . for foreign service, and that Lieutenant General Sir tlereagh in the nature of debate or discussion of _ . . _ _ ,~ ~~ . s f. . . asLiblik. • • IL r•r^ earl less tl ita for. • . a ter a "bras cod ater kft r or es sof garri its req o ,r- of ! leak acev state a thl u4U Myra id of In i xi 6 Dit Dc I a: ite !Ho the En km