Star. — London, England, 1808-02-09 00:00:00

PiIRLMMEN7Wr PROCEEDING.. HOUSE OF LORDS, FEBRUARY 8. CONIMETICIAL PAPERS. Lord AtiCKLAIND prefaced three motions for Commercial Papers, with a few observations on the flourigfing condition of the trade of this country. In spite of the malignant efforts of the enemy, it bad prodigiously augmented. The exportation in the rti:cattiviz year amounted to 43 millions sterling; and he should be happy to discover that the same success had attended our national industry in the present; but he looked to the future with some apprehension. The arrangements which were suggested for our connection with neutral powers were, in his mind, inadequate. But in order to satisfy hini.:elt on a subject of so much importance, he should move for the information that was necessary, and pro bably make a subsequent application to their Lordships on the subject. The motions were then read from the Woolsack, requiting an account of the Exports during the last year, with the amount of produce and manufactures distinguished—Ordered. AMERICA. Lord GRENVILLE asked, if any communication was to be made to the House on the subject of the negociation with the United States? lord I I AWKESBURY answered, that it would be mentioned probably to-morrow or Wednesday. Lord GRENVILLE said, that to-morrow or Wednesday he 3'l4.Aid move for the. Papers relative to it. ENPEOITION TO COPENIIAGV". The Duke of NORFOLK, after the fullest consideration ht could pay to the subject of the Expedition to Copenhagen, felt it to be, expedient to extend his application for Papeis in the form of four distinct motions. To the three first, he understood no ob jection would be made : he should therefore propose them with out any comment. [The three motions were in substance, that the particulars and dates of such information as had been received from his Majesty's Ministers at Copenhagen, as far as related to the naval prepara tions on the part of Denmark, he laid before the House.) These being read .and agreed to, The Duke of NORFOLK again rose and said, that the vast preparations introductory to the attack upon the Danish capital had excited the curiosity of the whole country, but no one believed that Copenhagen was to be the scene of action. When a doubt could no longer remain as to the object, it was supposed that nothing hostile would be attempted : that these warlike bands would be employed on some ulterior project; and that the negotiation with.the Prince Re gent would he pacific in its conclusion. Was this the fact ? Was the acquiescence of the Prince ever at tained ? On the contrary, were not the equitable prin ciples due from one independent nation to another utterly abandoned, and the fleet of a neutral state seized, without any justification, from the indispensa- ' ble necessity of the measure. He was aware that a necessity might exist that would supply a complete vindication ; but the difficulty was to draw the line where that imperious necessity commenced ; and this view of the affair led him, for a moment, to notice the Declaration subscribed with his Majesty's name, which had received the sanction of the British Go vernment, and which must be attributed to the ad vice of the servants of the Crown. He would ven ture to say, that after an attentive perusal of that in strument, he could discover no such necessity as had been pretended : that attempt at justification which had been submitted to the eyes of all Europe had failed, and we were exposed to the disgrace conse quent on this failure. Admitting there was such a necessity, the difficulty of our situation was to be met with wisdom and policy. It was not enough that by the effort we gained something ; we must compare the losses with the acquisitions, and determine which preponderated. True it was, that we had gained possession of the Danish navy ; but by that posses sion we had thrown Denmark into the arms of France, and increased the number of our enemies by the ad dition of this neutral and independent kingdom. He did expect that some pains would have been taken to satisfy the House on this questiOnable transaction : that the Declaration being incompetent, the defi ciency would have been supplied by documentary evi dence; shewing, that had the Danish fleet not been captured by our navy, it must inevitably have fallen within the grasp of the enemy. It was said that the danger was imminent, because Holstein was in the power of France. This assertion was incorrect ; but were the fact otherwise, until the whole of Jutland should have been occupied by the troops of the foe, no such peril was to be apprehended ; but after we had committed this act of injustice and violence, every thing was to be feared, because we had, by our own misconduct, alienated the affections of a friendly state; yet, if the French army were in Jutland, was the con quest of Zealand secure ? While the Danes posses sed a fleet to defend themselves, the enterprize would have been hazardous and difficult, and might have ultimately terminated in the triumph of naval over military tactics. But the utility of the Danish ma rine was not confined to herself ; it was the constant object of jealousy to Russia, and contributed to con void the operations of that power, which is now ini mical to this country, and has the complete dominion of the Baltic sea. Was it intended by Ministers to assert that no nation on earth had a right to a naval power except Britain ? The same policy which led them to capture the Danish fleet should have urged them on to Cronstadt, to seize the navy of Alexander; and the marine of Portugal should, on the like prin ciple, have been forced into our harbours. To the application of such a rule of conduct, the lobe itself could assign no limit ; from the British Channel to the confines of China it was to be extended. Not Denmark only, but Russia also, by such an aggres sion, was converted into an inveterate enemy—Rus sia, from whence our arsenals are supplied with the most valuable articles for the maintenance of our ma ritime strength—Russia, who herself possessed a powerful navy, which would become a most impor tant accession to the naval resources of France. Mi nisters, surely, under such circumstances, would be disposed, for their own credit, to lay before the House all possible information, to silence the tongue of calumny, which had been so loud upon the occasion. His principal motive in applying for these documents was, certainly, the preservation of the honour of the country, which so long had maintained its character and dignity a mongst the nations of Europe ; but if he only contemplated the peculiar situation of em barrassment to which his Majesty's servants were ex posed, he should discover motives safficient for the predeetion of this information. Even if they were run:; in their conduct, in such papers some apology might be found, by the exposition of their motives ; eley would rather have it supposed that they were hurried on,ward by intemperate zeal, or by sonie ge- 1 nerous prejudices, than have it believed that ;hey in dalged impreper and derogatory designs. His Grace elencluded with moving, that papers he laid on the table, stating the condition of the naval force of Den mars, the means taken for augmenting the same, the expedients adopted for collecting seamen for tie!. s ply of it, the grounds of the alledged confederacy with France, the communications with the Danish Court respecting the shutting of the Sound, the mea-' , sures suggested by Russia and Denmark to exclude' Great Britain from the Commerce of the Continent, i and the project for the employment of the Danish navy for the invasion of these islands. The Marquis WELLESLEY thought, whatever difference of opinion mightkave arisen as to the mea sure of the capture of the Danish fleet originally, that all uncertainty had been removed by subsequent events. He hoped it was now established beyond con lradictiWoni that the enterprise was both j m ust and po itic. thont adverting to a ny other otives, the necessity alone was a complete vindication. What constituted this necessity ? 1. The designs of France —2. The means France possessed to accomplish those designs-3. The concurrence of Denmark with those deigns-4. The imminent danger that hung over the country. What was the situation of France at the time of this transaction, either with relation to Eng land or to the Continent ? To the last moment of the contest with Russia, there was some hope of ar re, ting the progress of the French triumphs. After the battle of Friedland, the hope of the Continent was converted into despair. From that time, there fore, new arrangements were to be made for the pro secution of the war. accommodated to the altered position of public affairs. France had already changed hePobject—continental Europe was at her feet—and thus released from her military foes, she contemplated the destruction of this country, by the only means by which it was possible to effect that desirable purpose, the reduction of our navy ; and the schemes for the annihilation of our commerce are only auxiliary to this design. She knows that it is the glory of Great Britain that the foundation of her power is not the accidental advantages of inferior States, but it is the commerce of the world. Until this is extinguished by the policy and ambition of the enemy, it will be in I I vain for him to attempt the subversion of this vast I empire. France, having subdued Russia, disclosed some particulars of the extent of her designs, and she collected her strength for this new effort. To contri bute to this vast scheme of empire, the naval resour ces of every maritime state were to be concentrated for our destruction. Where would she look for the most powerful means to fulfil her purpose ? Did any Noble Lord doubt that to Zealand she directed her attention, and was it not of the highest importance to disappoint her purposes ? Was it to be iniagined that the consummate General and able Statesman who was at the head of affairs in France, entertaining . such views, would neglect the desirable expedient ot adding the Navy of Denmark to his resources. If we should not be satisfied with this presumptive proof, we might bring the testimony nearer—for he announced this intention almost in direct terms after the fatal battle of Friedland—and the whole of his sub equent conduct has been illustrativeof it. The move ment of the French armies, the appointment of a distinguished Officer at Hamburgh, close to the scene of action, and the collection of a vast military force in that neighbourhood, all conduce to shew that he meant to overawe, if not to conquer, Denmark, and either by fraud or force, to render her subservi ent to his project, for the humiliation of Great Bri tain. This plan was not confined to Denmark—it was to be extended to Portugal ; and in both coun tries all British subjects were to be seized—every means of oppression was to be employed—the com bined forces of these kingdoms were to be directed to complete the punishment of the oppressors of the seas—the enemies to the freedom of navigation throughout the world. This is not vague conjecture : the purpose was disclosed at the Court of France by her military Ruler to the Ambassadors of Portugal and of Denmark, in immediate succession. The com munication was made in the moment of haste, or un der the ebullition of passion : it was imparted during the frigid formalities of state ceremony. It had been asserted by the Noble Duke, that many difficulties would remain to be encountered, ev en after the ene my should be in possession of the peninsula of Jut land. He himself had taken some pains to collect information on the maritime obstructions and facili ties on the coast of Zealand, which he would submit to the notice of their Lordships, in answer to the opi nions to which he had just adverted. The ordinary state of the Belt in the winter season was to have the passage intercepted by floating ice, which was car ried off by the current, and dispersed by the wind, or occasionally melted during a warm interval, so as en tirely to disappear. There were no tides in the Belt, and the course of the stream accompanying the wind, nothing was more frequent than for vessels in that channel to be driven off from their station. In this situation of things, the enemy might with facility ef fect his purpose of transport from the adjacent terri tory, especially as there was no strait where to work to windward was attended with much fruitless exer tion and difficulty. The large extent of mast was another circumstance to be considered ; so that, with out the necessity of supposing any favourable state of the elements, it could be readily imagined, that the occupation of the Continental dependencies of Den mark would be soon followed by the conquest of her insular possessions. It might be inquired if the Da nish army would be inactive during these hostile pm ceedings ? What was its strength ? It was stated at 25 ; 000 men on paper, but he believed in effective force it did not exceed 18,00 1 0. How could this irregular levy encounter the victorious troops of France, pour ed into the country in numbers at pleasure, propor tioned to the degree of resistance to be expected ? It perhaps would also be asked, on what principle of policy it was that we offered to guarantee to Den mark the security of her dominions, when so much difficulty must attend their preservation. He would not pretend to determine what might have been the result, had the Danish army been supported by Bri tish valour, and had their combined exertions been aided by the organization of a patriotic people, in de fence of their hearths and their altars ; but in any view he could take of the subject, it would have been an arduous and difficult enterprize. Some inconve nience would have arisen from other causes. Zea land did not afford a sufficient quantity of provisions for the maintenance of its own inhabitants ; and hence, even for the ordinary demand, it was ne cessary for her to obtain supplies of the principal articles of subsistence from Holstein and Jutland. — If numerous forces were collected in the Island, much larger demands would be made upon the Continent, which would not be answered, because the n c a 2 ri,r increase and te cthe i et vi oir thusot danger,iutl h l e e r b a o e p ‘ possession ‘ p i m n a a r n n edc t et hs m sei ety 000ufflWhatever thoseat security e e rr ultimatelyev . m would ies. ht -be the disposition of England to assist them in this emergency, it might be physically impoisible—the in clemency of the season would probably prevent access at the time when communication was absolutely nc cess try to their suppore Reflecting then, on all these circumstances, it was his firm c onviction, that when ever the French thought it necessary to their schemes of aggrandisement or power, Zealand would have be come an easy victim to their ambition. The policy of Bonaparte might, perhaps, have dictated less vio lent means ; he might have contented himself with threats, I will spare you (he might have said) your islands—l will even resign to you your continental possessions, on the condition that you unite your na val and military forces with the rest of Europe against the common enemy. Ifyou obstinately persevere in maintaining your relations of amity with the despot of the ocean, your German provinces shall be parti tioned by new claimants, and your islands shall be come dependencies on the adjacent shove." It was not difficult to discern, that Denmark nil no strong bias in favour of this country—her disposition was manifestly shewn on the memorable occasion of the Armed Neutrality. But nice inquiries into her poli tical attachments were not, in the present circum stances, necessary : it was sufficient to shew that she was absolutelY dependent upon France • and the un avoidable conclusion was, that she would be subser vient to the purposes of France. The state of the Continent necessarily assimilated her interest to that Government ; and, in truth, she held her most pro ductive territories only by his permission. Not only her dominions, but the chief support of her impor tance—her commerce was at the disposal of the same power ; for, in time of war especially, she must be deprived of her intercourse with the most opulent states, unless the concurrence of France should sanc tion her eroceedings. From all that had been urged on these various departments of the subject, he would draw three natural inferences—lst. It was the pur pose of France to seize the Danish fleet—`2d. It was in the power of France to seize it-3d. Denmark had, no adequate means of resistance. He would consider these positions now as sufficiently established, and would proceed to some other matters of great weight in his view of the subject. . What would have been the consequence, had France obtained the coopera tion of this powerful marine ? Their Lordships would immediately perceive, that it would not have been solitary acquisition. It would have been added to the navy of Russia, and the subjection of the Swe dish fleet would have precipitately followed ; and thus the whole of the floating strength of these three powers would have been under the controul of our enemy. It would have been no trifling accession— forty sail of the line would have been placed in a commanding situation for the attack of the vulture - - rable parts of Ireland, and for a descent upon . the coasts of England or Scotland ; and in eppositioh. to this formidable navy the Admiralty could not have assigned any competent force, without weakening our stations in the Mediterranean, in the Atlantic, and in the Indian Seas, at a time when it was most necessary to maintain our superiority in all these situations.- 1 Such being the character and power of the enemy, and such the condition of Denmark, was it possible' that any one of their Lordships could assert that• the danger was not imminent ? The case of danger, made out even in the imperfect manner he had stated it, was so great, that it concerned the very existence of the country, as an independent power. Had Mini sters not acted as they had dune, they would have fatally abandoned their hiohest duties ; and he hoped in Gon, that if ever similar circumstances should oc cur, the same wisdom would be found at the helm, to conduct the vessel of the state in security, amid the shoals and rocks that would threaten its destruc tion ! The moment was precious—a few weeks, per haps the progress of a single week, would have .ren dered the attempt unsuccessful, and we would have been exposed to all the dreadful consequences he had detailed, Addressing a British audience, he could scarcely justify arguing the subject—the peril to which the nation was liable called up every senti ment of affection to our constitution, to our liberties, and our laws, and, in terms mandatory and irresisti ble, dictated the course which must be pursued. The violence which had been attributed to this measure was unavoidable ; every attempt at negotiation was unsuccessfully made ; every offer of remuneration was insultingly rejecte. It would have been useless to have extorted promises from a people wholly at the disposal of the enemy ; nothing less than the re signation of the fleet was sufficient, and the means by which it was obtained was justified on every principle of truth, equity, and honour. The great maxims of the law of nations were founded on the laws of na ture ; and the law of security or self preservation was among these, the most .impiertant and sacred.— It was a law equally to be obeyed by individuals and communities. The King, placed at the head of the great society subsisting on these islands, had no duty paramount to the protection of his people, and by the servants of the Crown this imperious duty had been on this momentous occasion, vigilantly and ably discharged. The principle of the great law of nature and nations was clearly applicable to the case before their Lordships. Here was an instrument of war within the grasp of our inveterate enemy : we inter posed and seized it ; and this act of energy and wis dom is to have the hard epithets of rapine and im piety ascribed to it. To shew that injury has been done to an innocent party in a transaction, is not to prove its iniquity. All war had the effect to involve in its horrors the helpless and the innocent, but it was not on that account necessarily unjust. Let any man say how war could be conducted without it ? As neutral individuals , might be sacrificed in the common calamity, so also might neutral nations. In cases of this kind, the party committing the injury was frequently mistaken ; it was often not done by the ostensible instrument, but by the silent agent, which by previous misconduct had exposed the suf ferer to such an unfortunate situation. Were not such principles fairly referable to every part of this extraordinary case ? If he had accurately stated the relative rights of communities as founded on the laws of nature, the Government of Great Britain had only put in exercise that law of self preservation that need ed no curious and intricate disquisitions to justify.— What signifies reasoning on abstract rights, it might be said, when the general voice of Europe pro. ff 2 effOrt S re Way dt•( :),L ?:ilcate et b:ub::e ~ ._ , breathe place' . \-f i 4 . "`. th el chimed the criminality of our rnrsy co ofpo n; the tongue of Europe free as to the ere e ei rn e '.'''as public law, affecting the interests of c 'P'es of especially on subjects connected wilt our re . e l' o c ipen l o a3 orna c je ? nt4i C a o od u fv l Een ci t t i l er i o e l i ,to r o. w L thi o lec r .y d ßellee sh .,a i o l u F t . ti a flag is free r e What ship navigated the ocean but , der his orders ? What commerce was th em e l i; rope, but under Met appointment and eontroul ? atl ei l soldier, what lawyer, what churchman, what laeft, d th a e re s d ui t , j b u tt z t a t t e i t o • n an n o o p t i o n l i l o ly n o i f ni th m e ic c a , l on to ti f i l ien im t : body and mind of every individual on its seq . as naa -, .complete ? It 7minded dra llim arm of s tloife Philip of ce ll :ileisnlalrad Orator e to D r el o p t hi ti c ia A t etoilnlleoct„. 1 m sdao i i l od i a, were t e byd Gar triumphant,ee4ci !peak only in the Macedonian dialect. E ver -, 1 4 - throughout Europe the oracular decisions by - aira, ' 1 she is governed were French, and to thern okaia„, — ' „ was paid due only to divine authority. Frain t a te . I considerations, he hoped that the conduct of NI • ters would be respected and g }Troy ed ..and no Miami ceeding in Parliament would tend to st;lly the i ci . of this most distinguished achievem . c.nt - • c ih ": ' o. e ae . that nothing would lead the world to suppo * a l i the councils of theynation suspected the purity as i $ honour of this great public measure. It would la 1 source of gratitkation to the enemy, if he Nutt that th e Senate of the land joined in the condemnation heel so hastily determined. This was the severest bliae l e had felt since he had commenced his reign ; on et ' . occasion at least fortune had not attended his oh* wheels, and in the prosecution of hs most favo l i a project he was humbled and disappointed. Lord HUTCHINSON began whit cum sire hi admiration of the ale and eloquent speech wlichtli, Lordships had just heard ; but eloquent ar.d ,b'e a it was, it had not carried conviction to his mini le certainly had not satisfied him, that the medi a against Copenhasen was justifiable, eider up cs grounds of necessity or policy. What lee feared most in Bonaparte was his cool calculating mind, and the advantage which he would endeavour to active from that event. Had not that taken place, he would have found .it difficult to get Russia to consent to enter completely into his views. He agreed with the Noble Lord, that ships might be driven from the Belt; but he would contend, that such accidents, tho ug h they might facilitate the passage of small - bodies of troops from Holstein to Zealand, woeld never eahk the enemy to reach it in force sufficient to ensure tb conquest of the Island. He was at Copenhagen n the September of the year before last, and be lea some means of obtaining a knowledge, of the deter. mination of the Danish Government. He could appeal to all the diplomatic characters who were there at time for -their opinion of that determinaticn. The Danish neutrality had been violated, and consider. able apprehensions were entertained that the French meant to occupy Holstein ; but so far from reslalritt to attempt to ward off this danger, by a dishonotts able compromise, by. 'submitting to France, items notorious that it was the-determination. cf the Danish Government to evacuate Hols:ein, to retire to their islands in the Baltic, and to preserve the honour, independence, and Commerce of t h e country. Ilie -consequence Of such an attack . .upon • tire part of ' France would be •to throw Denmark into thearmi of England, for which . the occupation of Hoke& would have, _been but a poor compensation., s lit could by no, means agree with the Noble Marquis's the military view which he took of the paSsage of thr Belt, and the contiguous coasts of Holstein *4 Zealand. . The lancer was . full of creeks and said harbours, capable of containing a numerous kills, in the face of which it would be, impossible for the trench to pasS the Belt. Where could low 'i parte assemble such a quantity of craft at-Would eaible , him to transport such an army to Zealand as toil' render it possible to contend with the regular tary force and the numerous militia and populatics; of that island ? How was he to convey to it the ins' mense quantities of stores and artillery of everykial -, necessary to form the siege of the capital ? Ikninart, if determined to resist, and of her detenninatio there was not the smallest doubt upon his mind, had ample means for doing so. France might have wet , • ted Holstein from her ; but her independence, hs commerce, her capital, and every thing else of value, would be beyond her power. Having thus shard! S i given his opinion as to the intentions of Denmark, and the means possessed by France of controalig those intentions, he felt himself under the necessityd claiming the attention of their .Lordships a ht'. longer, while he noticed some allusions which had lace made to his conduct and sentime nts both in the House, as he understood, and another place. 1-12 tray ted that his conduct, while engaged in the servicservicedcountry, had obtained its approbation. That a pp rces Lion he valued too highly to relinqu ish it easil y , and he therefore felt it incumbent on him to maintain and preserve it by every means in his power. It was net by garbled extracts from dispatches that his ccndscto or that of any person filling a diplomatic or any sev:, public situation, was to he. judge , ;. No : he ;ill," claim the privilege of being judg ed b y the wilcil. tenor of his dispatches, and not by pat ti tl selestio made for partkular purposes. • 'lii his osm defer 4 therefore, he would enter into a short detail of sae' transactions previous and subsequent to the, Tre of Tilsit, in which he was concerned. which wont:. prove, that he never could have ud s ered the sentim_ell, so unjustly attributed to him in anal' r e l a ce. II . Russian anny, under the immediate cern man I ot usi• stt Bennigsen, et the beginning cfsht , e; =wilted_ about 70,000. There inert a. ,(:) twci o ther corp . s,s v "! oporations were subordinate to thoso ee tee e• ao alls . ;: e •: consisting altogether of about 50,000rucn. upoilese;.., the French brought at least 1t30,)C0 men to bear. i', thing was so dlfficult as to ascertain the precise straar. i of great armies, as there was alway s so material ~ • and tat ferenze between the numbers upon pace r s , 4 . effective force in the field ; but he was perseitu°"" the contrary, be made his calculation on • tkst ti' had not over-rated the arnouat of the French. CI lowest scale. Was it therefore surprising that, ' such an immense superiority, and so cendecteat e ,_ • e s ) zee, latter should have prevailed over the Reseas • ~ a series of sanguinary actions, the Russ , ans ore s Nev i Niemen on the 14th of June,with a loss of 40, 1°: ....In the ciaurse of the preceding eleven..cWs..4°..,_7e than 1848 bfficers and 27 Generals were eitherlou, wounded. Prussia came forward with ail the sir tend force that reoaa.ined to her, " too certahri a l A' c e ;eeve t in the I he i r La Tilsit' have pe n . had n una o his In ' iter . but rte h av was allen a ! - war ds thl t ~ehad it 9th o f Jul Ire on tl him, kee . Th h a d not tr the 1. p, m pero! ne d his hat in . d to re ited. icient mi ; ti 'gland nedi ark curried i me w of he attei posed." . intervie him WI BiS Lq Govern lie rep vecolle, be Con I • to ma 'that t 1 ar.4_ D charm tee th were i Bute , it Not Oran In 'll nip a I.oro 11,v r 11bably to-m I.ortl GREI 3'lqtkid move f The Duke could pay to t to be, ex pediet four dibtinct jvction would out any comr [llse three dee4 of such l‘linisters at tions on the These heir The Du • • the vast pt the Danisl whole cou• was to be no longer that nothi' b: project ; a gent woul fact ? \Va tained ? ( ciples du utterly al seized, w ble neces n ecessity vindicatii where th view of t the Decl • which ht vernmen vice of tare to s strumen been pre had beet failed, a quent of necessit; with wi! the effot losses preponC possessi sion ice and inn dition He did to satisl that th ciency dente; capture within I danger power were th • should no sucl had cot thing rniscon yet, if quest sed a f have b ultima rnilitai rine wr, object void t" rnical of the assert power them them and tl • ciple, a pplic could the c Denr sion, • sia, f most ritim 1) 0 " . ' tant niste displ all calu Hs was con and he bar po•• pre ri mi. 1 ' the hu 411 tV sal ra I