Star. — London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

nisters from this irnputation. 'The expeditroo ssisent to the Scheldt not for selfish-purposes, but to operate as a powerful diversion. Was this country, as affairs then stood, to turn its back upon the Continent They were bound to their allies to send an Expedition to the Continent. It was their duty to send an army to the opposite coast, even though it should not be Age to make any considerable advance from it. Four dayi before the expedition was determined on, Government received news of the battle of Aspern, in which • the, French were supposed to have lost 50,000 men. Were they not justified in sending an army of 40,000 to the Continent, at a moment when the fate of the world depended on what was passing on the Danube. In con sequence of that battle France was drained a sec ond time of the most efficient part of her military population. The great battle, that followed, that of Wagram, ad verse as the result of it was'-to the Austrians, sheaved the pers®n at the head of the French Government the danger of committing his Crown to a second struggle. The issue of that battle was only known to his Majes ty's Ministers the day before the expedition sailed. To prove that the expedition operated a diversion in favour of Austria, it was not necessary to short!, that troops were sent from the Danube to oppose it. It was su ffi cient admit of being compressed into a narrow compass. The question was in a great degree professional in its nature, and only to be travelled over with great diffi dence. He felt much indebted to the Noble Lord for the opportunity he had afforded him of stating his sentiments to the House. No other tribunal could possibly have enabled him to bring his views of it be fore the Public. No other mode of discussing or exa mining it could have enabled him to separate that mass of calumny that was attached to it. The public fortunately were, or might be, in possession of the whole of the evidence that was given at tbe Bar. Hardly a question that was proposed was stopped, so that they had every information before them precisely as it was sought. The question which ought to be for their consideration was not respecting an expedition that had been tried and failed, but respecting an 'ex pedition which had not been tried. The latter part of the expedition never had been reduced to practical effect. Whether it might or might not have succeed ed,was merely a question of theoretical knowledge, the issue of which was to be tried. As to the policy of the measure, he entered upon the discussion with a firm conviction that Government stood upon .a rock that was not to be shaken. In the course of the exa, mination, he had been asked his opinion as to the opinions which came from the Horse Guards ; and the impolicy of the attempt was endeavoured to be inferred frurn the discourngin;,T nature of these opi nions. But did it not often happen, that there was material difference between formal opinions and, those _ that were given in the coarse of conversation ? There was no mode less calculated to promote a service than a formal opinion, given on certain data, which would of course govern the nature of the opinion ; there was none in which more useful information could be obtained, than in detailed conversation. — Lord Chatham, for instance, had given no' formal the lb; of the Expedition ; but he did if he could sliew that corps were prevented from join ing the army in Moravia. But it was a fact that though no troops were detached from the Danube, the garrisons of Custrin, Glogau, and the other fortresses in Silesia, were concentrated and sent into the North of Germany to oppose it. As to not sending the ex pedition in the first instance to that quarter, nothing would have been more unjustifiable. In the first place it would be necessary for them to create an army in the North of Germany ; and, were they afterwards to disgrace themselves by abandoning it ? Government, whatever might be said, were rather inclined to the generous side of the question, and to benefit the Con tinent, than serve their separate interests. It had been imputed as blame to the - that they had opinion on . subject _ ..le Expe. ; it in a much more effectual way, in repeated inter views and conversations. What was the use of opi nions, but for the purpose of balancing all the risks and gains of an Expedition ? This could not be done by puffing a case on paper, which, from the very ature of it, must be stated as drily as if it were pro s osed to a lawyer. He, for one, would not avail himself of a formal opinion to obtain a shabby cloak kr his conduct, whatever it might have been. But the fact was, that though he could produce no formal (pinions directly in favour of the late Expedition, he • had a variety of conversations with different Officers on•the Expedition. These were so satisfactory that be mob the King's pleasure, on the 14th of June, on the subject of the landing at gantvliet, though the measure was not finally decided until the 21st of Juste. There were only two lines of operation.; In his vie* -rk Id be *- 'de r*- - :Ant one Ministry not taken more military opinions. They were not, however, always to be relied - upon ; it was like laying the title deeds of an estate before counsel ; he might ' deny the validity of the title deeds, and yet ten to one but next morning he would set off and purchase the estate.—(A laugh.) He was content, however, to defend the object even of retaining Waicheren ; it was no contemptible object, as it involved the posses sion of the port of Flushing, a port of the utmost naval consequence to the enemy in every point of view. The objection to die climate he should not now combat ; he wished, indeed, that the medical department of the Expedition should be totally reserved as a separate question. This objection ,however,was often over-ruled by a paramount interest; and the risk was considered in , ferior to the benefit which the possession of this island procured. This had been proved to be the opinion, of our ancestors in many cases. In the time of Queen by which an attack cou. made on _werp ; which should go directly to the Scheldt, another in. volving a march across the Continent. The hitter he zonsidercd as impracticable, not so the former. It was not,' he would contend, necessary for Govern tnent to protect itself as to the policy of an Expedi tion, by the previous sanction of a military authority. - Me could appeal to Gentlemen on the other side on id he find any Elizabeth it was retained ; in 1747 and 1794 .it wax also kept possession of ; it had, indeed, been retained by many 'different Administrations, and relinquished rather on grounds of military interest than medical inexpediency. The unwholesomeness of the climate of Walcheren was not, 'however, to be imputed to him as involving the fate of the whole army; it could not at most only concern that part of it which was de- 'He never heard, ncr eon] stined to the island itself ; and, of course, did not in- volve that part which was destined to Antwerp, com paratively healthy. A hope, indeed, had been en tertained, that the ultimate object of the Expedition, the seizure, or destruction of the ships, might have been effected before they got above Antwerp, or even under the protection of Liilo. This hope was b• If those chances of war which it frustrate )y one Ix was impossible to foresee, and which therefore no Ministry should be condemned for not guarding against. The chief question now then to be considered was, whether the advantages naturally to be expected from the Expedition were - worthy of its adoption, and in this point of •iew the risks were first to be consi dered. As to the risk of disease, it was only to be judged of on the limited scale in which he had al ready considered it, and had proved to be much greater than even medical men expected. As to the expence of the Expedition, this had been at first im puted to Ministers, by the indignation of the city of London, as exceeding 15 millions. When the de bate came cn in that House, those fifteen millions dwindled down to five or six. Now he could posi tively, and without fear of contradiction, state, that the additional expence entailed upon the country by the Expedition, did not exceed one million ster ling. A great part of the force had been conveyed by the navy, which was in regular pay, and a great esta blishment of transports was necessarily obliged to be kept up in consequence of the possible emergencies of our troops in the Peninsula. These considerations necessarily diminished the supposed additional ex pence of the Expedition. Now, he would ask, was one million a sum too great to risk for the accom ';shment of the objects which they had in view It might be said those objects were impossible. Go vernment had, however, acted upon the best possible' information ; they had been enabled to know exactly the situation of the enemy's force at a given period, , and were of court enabled to calculate the necessary force to be opposed to it. The greatest possible force of the enemy. even at the latest period, soldiers, sailors, &c. included, did not amount to more than 30,000 men. We had, including seamen, a force of 46,000 to act against Antwerp. Tf any man was to doubt, under , these- circumstances, the possibility of executing our proposed purpose, it would be a foul de , preciation of the value of our forces. It was said, how ever, we had no plan, and the Noble Lord opposite seemed td rely much on this supposed discovery. It must however be recollected, that it was impossible for General to be able to state, at the bar of that House, a speculative plan, ready cut and dry, to be used withal out any regard to time, place, or circumstances. A hope' had been entertained that the Navy would be enabled to co-operate in the higher bunches of the Scheldt, and General Brownrigg had in his testimony fully confirmed this opinion. This was, then, not to be idered br f Arrows t and .44 had a great deal . the hour was far ad. Adjournment was put by the the affirmative. The at Half-past Two _ -.Le ships not to be expected thit un Administration was ne cessarily to know the exact soundings of every river Ito which they might destine an Expedition ; but still, even if the ships did go four miles up the river, above Antwerp, it was no argument that they were ' therefore secure from attack ; they might be destroy- ' .ed from the banks of the Scheldt , supposing , as Mt would have been the *case, that the country had been DAI 7 6si in our possession, in consequence of a protracted mi- , uer . litary operation. The Noble Lord here commented on the strange circumstance of Lord Porchester's not We have thil morning received German Papers to having ever thought proper to call in evidence the th rt 3 1 • e tl, P ar is Papers to the 2lst, and Dutch to the Quarter Master General, from whom the fullest in- 24th instant. The private letters from the Elbe are formation might have been expected, and by whose documentary testimony the House had been so ac- filled with details respecting the vigour with which curately instructed. He neglected also to call either the interdiction of commercial intercourse with this the Commanding Officer of the Artillery , or of the country and her colonies, is enforced. At Hamburgh Engineers, who, one would have supposed, were so and the other Northern 'parts of Germany, corporal capable of giving adequate assistance in any dim- i cut All these Officers ' ' fully - i n t h e punishment besides mprisoninent for one, two or o'clock, tc, this titsY.l 'I E EVENI GS'. LONDON. -. • TUESDAY, MARCH 27. . PRICE OF STOCKS THIS DAY AT ONE O'CLOCK * 3 per. Cent Cons. For money 6811 3 —ace. 69 to 69i. per Cent. Navy 99.1 } — Exchequer Ss. to lOs. prem. • ity, - ----- bad agreed possibility of taking Antwerp b'y a coup.&-main. That three months, is the certain consequence to any per a coupde-main was not incompatible -with i siege, son who is found with sugar, tea, coffee, or tobacco, he proved by reading several military opinions, and in his possession. - The German Papers contain at particularly that of General Ligonier en the trial of fun length the Decree of tle King of Paussta against Sit John Mordaunt, concerning the siege of Rochefort. the commerce of this country, a correct abstract of Having then the information which they had, and the sanguine hopes in which they were in consequence so which, appeared in the 'STAR of yesterday. The Paris Papers contain a detailed account of the wellgrounded, itwould have been culpable in Ministers to have doubted of their prospect of success; it would ceremonies performed at Vienna on the marriage by have been a prodigality, indeed, of our military force proxy, of the Emperor of FRANCE, to the Princess of to place them, with any doubt, in competition with AusTara.—Th:s will be found in our front page. the motley corps of soldiers, sailots, conscripts, and custom-house officers, which composed the enemy. e !• The Dutch Papers state the departure of the Vice f Italy fin - Paris, to be present at the marriaa• The division of Dutch troops under General Gration, R o c, which went to Stralsund, had not to Holland i until the month of September. He believed at the time I the Expedition arrived, the Dutch had very few more The American frigate, John Adams, which has been kept waiting at Cowes in the Isle of Wight, for troopsthanwerenecessary to garrison BergenopZoom. . dispatches frdm Mr. PINKNEY, the American Minis- The Emperor of France had himself acknowledged in the Moxiteur, that there was at that time a great fer- ;ter, sailed yesterday, ment and disaffection in many of the departments. He Dispatches were yesterday received at the Foreign saw no reason for believing In the Morning Chronicle of yesterday there was, that the garrison of Ant- Office, from Spain. weep was at all respectable in numbers prior to the . 21st.—The force that was destined to attack them a long article stating that, in the course of last week, was 23,000 choice troops, aided by near 20,000 sea - various negociations were carrying on to extend or to men, and this force, greaea% it was, would have been alter the basis of the Administration. We have been still further reinforced after the fall of Waicheren --at some pains to ascertain the correctness of the state- He He considered that the private information which Go - ment to which we have alluded, and we feel it a vernment bad, was far superior in value to the se duty which we owe to the public to assert that it is collection of Sir William Erskine, of the state in not founded in truth. which Antwerp was 16 years ago. It had been ob• ARMY..—Sir LUCAS PEPYS, late Physician General, served by many, that the Expedition had been long is President of the Royal College of Ph)hicians of and Ph- - -to the Kin; . . 4 thi enemy. The fact, however, was, that _.geral Monet was afraid of an invasion in the month of April, before any such measure was resolved on ; it was from the corps of General Crawford that they expected this invasion, although the real destination ,of his troops was for Portugal. He believed, how ever, that they had no information at all respecting the real , of the Expedition, and that instead destination of HoHaul, they believed it was proceeding to the London, ysician lg. Mr. KBATE, late Surgeon General, receives £lOOO per annum for tke Surgeoncy cf Chelsea Hospital— is Surgeon to the Prince of Wales and to the Duke of York, and is Master of the College of Surgeons of London. We are sorry to hear that General Fox had lately I a from his horse at Portsmouth, whither he bad Government. Nortis of Germany. He thonlit the' merits of the question. in a military point of view, would be best estimated from the speculative opinions of mili tary men, and although he was ready to bear testi. molly to the merits of - Sir William Erskine, _yet he would not say that his account of Antwerp, from what he had seen sixteen years ago, ought to outweigh the recollection atid opinion Of all the other Military characters, who had as good an opportunity o(eing acquainted with Antwerp as he possessed. He thought that, considering all the circumstances of the had _ _ -)f Expedition, it _ a fair and reasonable prospect of success at the time that it sailed. If he bad shrunk from advising the expedition, tinder these circum stances. he should have conceived hiinself guilty of a gross violation of duty. It was not to be argued that Ministers should never venture an expedition without a mathematical certainty of success. It was not by this cautious , policy that our navy had added so much honour to the country, and that Nel son atchieved such splendid victories. Risks must be run when the object was equal to them. Our army had lately rivalled the exploits of the navy, and when Sir John Stuart won the memorable battle of Maida, or when our armies drove the French from Egypt and from Portugal, those important advantages were not obtained without considc'able risk. He did not mean to say that Ministers would be justified in send ing our armies on wild romantic expeditions, at tended-ivith great risk ;' but when the risk was not su perior to the object, they would be criminal in not ex erting the power of the country, whether it was far the attainment of British objects alone, or whether it was for objects combined with the interests of our of the armies of '.. ' - ' ,•• - . - . - Ptiiiiiit ; bat ileteaiiingh Mink* aldialhisiabe '-errhirig Wag tere freqsanferks of , on a bombardment, ' still,- dating that opariakia, thd Mr. Pdosouby, haviagatated that he in ships on the stocks might , be ;destroyed, the -arsenal Co say on the ilubject; and that the hot il burned, anti even the fleet afloat receive much 4unoy- vanced, the question of Adjournment t ante. There was not a single probable proof to shew SPEAKER, and carried in the affir that the ships had even got Above the Citadel. It was House watt of _course. adjourned, at I , . . • _____,_ --- -- —,A.--.1. ...a .1::. .I—.. *1 that point. document in the Office to inform him, that the Ex pedition to the Dardanelles, or to Buerios'Avres, vas adopted on previous-military information, Ministers were not to be overwhelmed because they , could not produce the sanction of formal miU ary opinions. Did Gentlenien mean to say, that no Ezped • ion -Rolls ever, ,to he fitted oat -Except recom• arended,hy a Board of Officers ? die cotild shew the :limit that such leas not the practice of former Go vernments. He would read a passage from a - dispatch of the late Lord chathani, relating to the Expedition * - -It Rochefort, That Expedition it was well against - known wholly failed, and yet so convinced were- the public of its propriety, that not a murmur wee/ever heard against the great Minister who planned it.— The Officer who Commanded on that occasion; Sir -John Mordaunt, -went out under an impression that ,lie would not- succeed, and he wished to obtain a .specific plan of operations. To this Lord Chatham .replied, that it was for the Commander to judge of the probability of success tram contingencies that might arise, and that his Majesty thought it im :to lay down precise regulations for the conduc P t r r a Commanding Officet, which might toe liable to be • defeated by unexpected occurrences. It was for the Covernmcnt to judge of the policy of the plan; it was for him to look to its execution. Government, for their own satisfaction and information, might resort to the opinion of military men; but they were not to be' , implicitly bound by them. They were to justify their conduct on the rationale of the question, and not on the authority of officers. But hewould examine a little into these opiniens, and the House would see that there was not one of them which was positively unfavourable to • _:_ the Ex, dition The first was the opinion of the Com. xpet stuutder in Chief. In all the conversations that he had with Button the subject, he had never given a con , clusive opinion against the Expedition. In his formal opinion before the House, it would be seen that he had • recommended the attack by the Scheldt, in preference to the march across Handers. He had never delivered any opinion against it,cxcept contingent, on the amount of the force the enemy might collect. Colonel Gordon's opinion• did not apply (be inc,int nothing disrespectful to that Officer, of whose talents and information he thought highly) to the plan that he had proposed, butt one that he struck oust himself. General I-lope gave it as his opinion, that the army might have ad-, ' vanced early in August to Antwerp ; General Brown - rigg hid also stated there was nothing to (-pose them. But these opinions, even if less favourable, were not to be conclusive upon theju dginent of-Government. He wished tosubmit to the Howe the grounds upon which I be acted, and l to surrender himself to their impartial ' judgment. He was persuaded he would be able to hbew nbt only that Ministers were inStifiable, but that t,;(y would Have been highly crim:nal if they had not sent cut the expedition. The expedition was not estrus plisi .• ~. • • . tl . ~ !.... - • a ~, _ ~: to be jt.dged by the failure in the fiction of the Iconsu purely as h military operation, out open, to . _. one , _.....r. It so ships at Antwerp ; that was only one feature in it. !to all the assistance of the navy, and under this view concurred to render these failures of great In answer to all the objections that had been urged it might not seem so impossible as it appeared to the and affliction, ought Ministers to have undertaken an against the Expedition, on the score of policy and Noble Lord opposite, to take Antwerpby a coup-de- Expedition which promised no benefit, but insured • 4. 1 e1..y, he would maintain, in the first place, that it main ; but even by a military plan this operation was innumerable misfortunes ? Walcheren was his great could not have been sent out sooner, and that no perfectly possible. . His Lordship here went through object. Where was the necessity of sending such ' •tx licre could it have been so advantageously employed. the evidence, to prove the propriety of .this opinion, force to such a place ? But it had been said, . St Me thought it could have been employed more ad-' in which he -shewed he was supported By Generals proof should be given of the power of the country. vantageously in the Peninsula, others in the North of) Calvert, Brownrigg, &c. Foil above SOO years, the This was a noble mods of giving the testimony of Germany. Both parties, however, joined in rem). town of Antwerp, excepting the Citadel, has never mighty power in a people who had reviled us as 4. e luting its being employed in what they called a selfish b ee n defended. It had not undergone any Apai nation ofshopkeepo rs unpossessed of miliairtatrenfgth i : cbject. He was anxious to rescue his Majesty's Mi- since the 16th century, in the titus of the Duke of andactivity. . - - • . 6.3 , 44. * . , ' . v ) • - - f• . ' ' • • I . . . _ -.. . .. ' .. fall _ Ltely gone to his Refreshmr _.rents to all the regiments Lord WEI I LINQTON, as of General GRAHAM'S army, • are to bg immediately embarked at Portsmouth. j The LEDA frigate sailed from Guernsey, on Friday last, with a fleet of transports, having on board the 38th and 44th regiments ; the former 1:a Lisbon, the latter for Cadiz. The Countess HARCOURT, WE are sorry to say, is prevented, by indisposition, from receiving cam/ pany on Wednesday the 28th natant. BANNISTER'S BUDGET.—Last night this meritorious eihr of and much.esteemed Comedian . -Jibited a medley G. pleasantry, under the title of Bannidir's Budget, at Freemasons' Hall. The Hall was crowded w►th an attentive, delighted, and elegant audience. The late gales, have, we fear, made some severe havoc among our shipping. A note of which we in sert a copy, was yesterday afternoon forwarded to LLOYD'S directed to Mr. Jontr BEN NET, jun. from J. BARROW; Esq. dated---, ADMIRALTY-OFFICE, MARCH 28, Two o'clock. 44 I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you the enclosed letter from Lieu. tenant 3.IOWDEN :••—• SIORML-sous', MAacm 25, IEO. ' Be pleased to inform my Lords Commissioners of the Admi ralty, that this evening the vessel stationed with the light on the Qwess,,drifted from her moorings, and is now at anchor In the port. His Majesty's ships, or others, coming from the East• ward, might be of fatal consequence, in hauling to the northward or westward, if not informed the light is rine. (Signed) W. BOWDEN, Lieutenant: " Their Lordships, at the same time, direct me to acquaint yob, that the Light-house will be re-placed as soon as possible." FALMOUTH, MA;Zii 24. Allies. Ili the present instance the risk was small, and the object great. He therefore thought it was Arrived the Danish brig Princess Mails, In eleven days front the bounden duty of Ministers, under all the circum- i Quimper, detained by the Hero privateer, et Plymouth.—Wind E. DEAL. MARCH H. stances he "had -stated, to act as they had done, and j Remain lais Majesty's ships as per last. The brig Samu el, men they would be for ever degraded if they had shrunk i from the discharge of that duty. On - these gro , thined to be on shore near Vralmer Vast* PEI remains - In are untis . lous situation.-,-Wind N.E. blows hard. he rested, his defence, and could not but oppose the re- 1 PLYMOUTH, MARCH U. solutions of the Noble- Lord. 1 It h as bl o wn a t r emendous g ale at East since yesterday. It is Mr. YONSONBY then t'ose (after some cries- o f impossible for any ship to get up channel; and several that sailed on Thursday and Friday have put backs and others have run in f to Adjourn). It had been said that the great object of ' •sroour South h a y America,T h e the Expedition was to aid the efforts of Austria.— 1 Such a thing, if it was the object,, was directly op- 'be Bomb t paid to-morrow„ and will sail immediately after for Cadiz. posed to the instructions which his Lordship had 1 have a v l e l s sa " i l l s jd s f ‘ o . h r tc Ca h v d l iz ers - the D.evalialSTdATlDOedN Willr Ike TILLIIO RR and Take TAR are paying ti-day. and are expected 1 to sail-to-morrow. Arrived, the Foam:Des:A, 98, and l'Asti given ; because, the instructions which Lord Chat- was . I . 7 aLs frigate, they were both bound fat the Downs; arifdrcthd ham had received, were to attack the fleet and the ar senals of Antwerp, at the same time combining what -1 back m bl lDA the ex eviboaledncegotawf i the thin si t g e h rl t y of ple. Pcnirn Tohue Asst th, bat wo w ; Lied ever might be favourable to Austria. He had said for the eastward on Thursday, under convoy of the SPRICIRTLI that the scheme upon which the country was bent, had and EARL SPRN cut cutters, are ;II wied.bouad in Torbay. never been undertaken. Did he mean to say, that YARMOUTH, MARCH 06. The skip mentioned in m last anchored in the Ronda Tesler the officers neglected their duty ? He had blamed day P. M. end were m th e from D owns bound fortis Sleeve, vie. rn unjust, that Ministers - should be censured for th e 11 41 H i6 onoara s ble Gimps PAUL ITT Carla% R . nd failure of Expeditions, undertaken under an ordinar h y Le 1 9, :o z u si r c t-egv . is, Captain FOR air; and remain with degree of risk, and that various calamities conspired the ships as per last. Th ree gun more sail were discovered in the tannot be able to get into the Roads till the afternoon. -- render the late unfortunate. If s , many things °g' ?" will ', abate d, end lam happy to say that the magnitude _ .. The pie is very much . ships of war hays role it out !fifths% sostaiainiany • LEITH, 1111 MICH 14 The Lady Forbes,Wurrs, oodtioooks, gICIII-OPD, of Leo, saUeA from Madeira - —• with x fair wind, fof P sloops eif war. th at J saile4 setelea. froe/ The Made Sti ta A:r n , Mit a° 2141 , md liebrui ttovim, fli wi th doof• a of faiiwarinn : j er t e"?.l trona Leith Moults 'on Tuftary Mt a mese. Sala Mit that _ morning, hie 24/41afiet sne•btlit . Filler, Lieut. 51100.11141 W' y: 1 0-. a con fee Helisqlettd. as s 1 )1 its LONDON t Feinted aad published by LIVIA. KENT, ef nil tetterya o Lembetb, at the STAR OtlnCt, No. 1, Color • (..4 Pl"' To VII *the Sze& Orrice, Temple Bor. • . _ • • I