Star. — London, England, 1808-03-16 00:00:00

-"---"TRIAL OF GENERAL WHITELOCKE. ft Did you know where General Whitelocke *as to be found on the sth ? A. ft was not fpecified in any orders. but I fhould have fent any communica lion to White's houfe. Admiral MURRAY Calla Q Was any plan for a combined attack upon the town of Buenos Ayres ever propofed to your ? A. Nu regular plan was ever propoled, but the General himfelf obferved that he meant to attack from the weftward, land wiflsed for any affiftanca I could give him to land there. Q_ Was you ever confulted. or had y ou an y know edge of the plan of attack that aattally took place ? A. None whatever. Q Are you of opinion that a combined attack would have been predicable or expedient ? A. Yes, it would. tZ If that an attack had been pmpofed, what affittance could you have rendered from the boats of 'the fleet, (hipping, and gun boats ? A. I think the gun boats, and loch other veffels as were of eafy draught of water. would have been of effedual fer vice in the attack, when co operating with the army. IQ State what paffed from the arrival of the fleet off Buenas Ayres, to the fignatnre of the treaty ? A. The gun boats on the 4rh of July were brought near the nver of Buenos Ayres, but not then near enough to a&. Boats were direfted to found by day and night, to endeavour to afcertain the depth of water. Captain Thornton reported to me, that he himfelf had founded, and found the channel very intricate, and the founding' very irregular ; that he had, when abreaft of the town of Buenos Ayres, and on the fituation where vefrels fhould be placed to aft againft the town, from 7 to t t feet water., and to' twice the length of the boat, (even feet again, fo that veffels drawing more water, could not be depended upon to ad on the srh—he had with difficulty the gun brigs and gun boats in that fituation above the. town, to enable him to move down with the gun boats, and two of the armed fchooners to affift in the attack, if neceffary. That he had been employed' in landing proviftons and fpirits to that part of the army commanded by Sir Samuel Auchmuty ; that he had likewife landed mnflcet balls ; that the fitna• tion of that part of the army, on their marching into the town, prevented him at that time from making ufe of the gun boats, left they &mild fire upon our own people. That the next morning four of the gun boats were placed and opened their fire on a Mt atton that appeared likely to have effed, andcontinued firing until the truce was made. The boats were kept there during the time the truce was made, and until the preliminaries were figned. I received a letter from General Whitelocke recipe:ling to fee me. 'ions againft the enemy, who had fled fr.sm him in all dirations, leaving him in poffeflion of the Refidencia, with a great number of Draft guns, ammunition, &c. with two sr three days provifions. This letter was fent to General Whitelocke by Captain Whittingham about two o'clock.] " Captain Whittingharn offered to leave the 40 !grenadiers with me, but 1 declined it, as I thonght it of snore importance that he lhould get fafely back to General Whitelocke with the intelligence, which he had been able to collect, of the lima tion of affairs in our quarter. In about half an hour after his departure, the enemy collated again, and threatened a fecond attack, but their own cannon being difcharged upon them, they retired. About four in the evening, General Gower fent me two lines to inform me, that hoftilities had been forpended till further orders. About (even o'clock, General Craw ford came with a fimilar notification. I wifhed is have fume private communication with General Crawford as to our general fi nation, but General Crawford thought it would be looked on as improper by Colonel Eglin, the Spanifb officer who was with him. I therefore remained in ignorance of the unfor tunate turn matters had taken. Next morning. the 7th. being deptived of the means I had hitherto ufed of feeding the men by foraging. Major Tolly and my. .(elf thought it advifable to make a demand from Ge neral Liniers. of the quantity of provifions we re. cpsired ; as a realon for which, I told General Liniers in the note I fent him. that it was . poffible, if I fent out to procure provifions from the adjoining houfes, the troops might come to bloodfhed again. I Rated my numbers at one half more than I had, Goo inked of too. 1 received is reply a promife that provifions (hould he fent. None were received (except a (mall proportion to the lick and wounded of both armies,) until 7 o'clock in the evening, when a confiderable (ripply of bread arrived under charge of Captain Barker of the 9th dragoons. In the courfe of the day, about three o'clock, I received a letter from Lieute nant Colonel Torrens, to halt on Inch ground as I might then occupy, till farther orders. I had alfo four communications to prevent irregularities Paid to have been committed by our men near the Refiden. cll. The officer who brought that letter from Lieute nant Colonel Torrens. brought one from General Gower, and two from Genera l Crawford. Having only a double (entry on the outfide. I think it necef fary to contradia the affertlon made in thole letters. Indeed the S,4anifh officer voluntarily confeffed to me that eveni.:g, that the reports of the irregulariles on our part were unfounded. This day we were em ployed in making up ball cartridges, which I had the means of doing from the enemy's flares. On the morning of the Bth, I received a verbal nseffage from General Crawford, to evacuate the Refsdencia, and join the main body of the army at the Retie°. As this did not agree with the order of the preceding day, I fent a note requefting an order in writin and d ; alto alking what I thould do with my prifoners cannon? General Crawford fent me a written reply. which was fatisfa&ory, in confequence of which I releafed the prifoners and joined she army with the cannon about twelve o'clock. Q . By the Court. Defcribe the petition and lirength of the Refidencia. A. It occupies a fquare of 150 yards one way and too the other. It contains two very large churches. fome very large wards or hofpitals. being a chat it able inflitution. One third of the whole area, or nearly, has an open (pace or yard ; the front and the weft presents a lofty dead wall to the ftreet—the other half is furrounded by a fighter one o rbt ten feet high. It had fiont and rear gates the oof was not com manded by any adjoining buildings. Q z Was it !arable to open a communication with the beech on having poffeflion of Refidencia ? A. Pet. fealy Co, it blrders on the river, and there are not any intervening buildings. It is about ago yard, from the fhore. Q What number of prifoners was taken by the 45tn regiment at the Refidencia, and thud d e adjoining houfes ? A. We had 43 taken in arms, and iso tick and wounded, whom we found in the hofpital. not in cluding about ao Spanifh Surgeons attending them. Qz.Would not artillery have been of great fervice in tatting the Refidencia, and in maintaining it when occupied ? A. Certainly, and I could have ditlodged Come of the parties who prelfed on General Crawford. Q At what hour did Captain Whittingham arrive at the Refidencia on the 6th ? A. About one o'clock, and I had no previous communication from the com mander in chief. Q . Would a reinforcement from the troops under General Whitelocke, or from thole under Colonel Mahon, have afforded you the means of co-rperating with the other attacking colums ? A. It would cer tainly have enabled me to have communicated with General Crawford, which, under circumftances of imperious neceffity, I would have attempted with and an appearance of fuccets , w ithout any affittance, which I could have d one b y occupying the large intermediate houfes. Q_Do you know of any Wholes arifing from the ftreugth of the enemy, or other circumftances to have prevented Inch a reinforcement from reaching you, if orders had been given for that purpofe ? A. I know of no feriotis obttactes. The diftance from the Cora; di Miferari to the Refidencia, may be about a mile and three quarters. Queftion by the Court. • Having raid in your letter that fome of your fol diets had made prifoners from motives of humanity, had you received any orders which made fuch an apology necetfary? A. Not by any means. Q If you had known where the Commander of the Forces was, would you not have tried to communi cate with him on the s aved ? A. Not in the mo ln thrninge I could not hav e fp a force sufficient. evening I would have attempted it, had I known that Colonel Mahon was fo dole to me. Do Readers know that this interesting Trial cont et(' on Thursday morning the 28th day of Jana , Ir . As it was impossible that the day on which it ou la terminate could be known, we have, since the onineteemcnt, beer printing it in separate sheets, of ull o o kee are published along with this Paper,— Thoseefecr Readers who file the STAR, or bind it tip, „Alive the goodness to prefix to our present so ber these Supplementary Sheets, (as if they were the inp plement of yesterday's Paper). The procee aAss which here follow, arc in continuation TwVITY-rOURTH DAY (In continuation.) toenn , Ayres. Having previoufly occupied the rads by which we were to enter the town, we s ,,, e a forward at day light, in two column', con. Ming each of four companies, having the command tithe right wing myfelt, whim the left was under giinr Nichols. Having proceeded about three wets of a mile, the columns came together, in okqttence of the junaton of two roads, and I was trader the neceffity, in conformity to my orders, to made a cnnfiderable detour to the right, by which meansi did not reach u n t il Relidencia, the poft I 1124 ordered to occupy, three or four minutes alter the left wing, whom I found in the aft of breaking open the doors of that building. My tors M taking that petit was hot trifling, three men only king killed. Perceiving fome tamales in the vicinity and nearer the banks of the river, which I confitlered t *Jae ible to occupy. 1 moved forward with my sing, and feleaing three of them, left a company in etch, and returned to the Refidencia with the gee. Wier:. Hearing a confiderable fining on our left, I&flied Maj , r Nichols to make the neceffary ar• torments for the occupation of the Refidencia, a dacquainted him that I would take the grenadier owpat.y with me and reconnoitre the potation of General Crawford's brigade, and retnin to him teediattly. I accordingly let out by the Itreet by which I had entered the town, and turning to my tight, came into one that led direaly to the great 'rue. I proceeded about thirty or forty yards, and I tame to a very large bottle which I thought it meld be ptudent to occupy with my (mall detach. vot, _I therefore proceeded to break open the door, and finding it very difficult to effea, I fent tack my Adjutant with a few files to the Refidencia Ent the porpofe of obtaining the affilfance of tools. He bad scarcely returned, when I was joined by a picquet of the riflemen which had left me in the morning and had entered the town with the light battalion. The officer commanding them brought tie General Crawford's orders to charge down the beet with the grenadier company, fupported by this ititcpier. I accordingly did fo, and met for fome little time with no other oppofition than the dii. charge of a heavy piece of ordnance twice, which had been polled at the other end of the (beet. I dranced, 'weever, towards the centre of the town, red I found the tops of the houfes crowded with the enemy, and they opened a fmart fire of mufketry ~gas on we paged. When I had got about half a mile, Wing the men confiderably out of breath, and the peat difficulty of our moving forward from the in. mid fire, I dreve off my met to a flreet on the nett. Seeing Colonel Pack with lime of the light lottalinn approaching towards the Church of St. Demingo,.l crolftd the flreet on purport to confult boo, as from his local knowledge he was perfealy acquainted with our filtration as to the praaicability of any further advance through the 'trees, leading !needs the Square He told me that it would be ttoprffible for me to reach the Square without the lass of the greater part of my detachment ; 1 there. fee returned back and found General Crawford vi h fereral companies of light infantry and riflemen together, with a field piece in the lame Itreet with toy detachment. I remained tinder General Craw. ford's orders during the veil of the day. !Iy inartic. was to recopy the Refidencia were giVen me vet. billy. I have no knowledge of the communication befog made to any officer who commanded on my Itft, that I was to occupy thi Refidencia. I reached that plan atone (even o'clock in the morning. It appeared to me to be a very ftrong building, but, as ldid not enter it, I cannot give an accurate defcrip lissof it. I had no intention of joining General Crawford until I received his orders to that /flea. 'named no inarations as to any future operations 'net I had occupied the Reftdencia ; I . conceived I Ins to maintain that poft. .......... (tertian by General Wu r "c a. DA you recolleet my alking your opin i o n on the . ‘lll to the truth of the fiatemcnt , refpeSing the tatperated !late of the inhabitants and the fatal *ft% to the prifoners hail the town been bombarded ? General Whitelocke did aik my opin ion, and I glint, that the prifoners would have been in a Very dangerous fituation, and I put this in writing at Cornets% Whitelocke's requell• Lieutenant Colonel Ntennts called. "I commanded the left wit% of the 45th regiment its the day .1 the attack, being then a Major in that "Patent. The wings of the regiment never joined, slier leaving our ground, until the arrival of both at the Relidencia. Of the operations, until the middle Odle following day, being the 6:h, my public letter le General Whitelicke will give an account. (This letter was then read. It gave a very flatter tntl Arc( unt of the fucccfs of Maier Nichols' opera- 1.1.11111111=0 . 1•121111 , . . 1 . , ...p ~,„ pr .... : . ; ; ,t• , " ),, : e 'l.:1• c ;7 ; •4 _ . . . . . . . 1,.• . ,*.--,: le.:7y--I..ii .. i • . . t 7. ; • ; , , S1;:p r r 5 . :,,, • De 4 1:4 : , ' • 11 • " 1 ) -IPN.• Ok . '... .9.111 . / . : • 16 1 vri , ,,. --- i 8 • 4? :ir .." .:•--- ,-- • , .., j) ) . ~ . • ~..‘ ' lli ir • . . [l)RicE Slx- Pr•.NC _ __ _______. •,. -- -. I' & 11 !11l • I.? 1 Orte . TWENTY-FIFTH DAY. Admiral Murray Rated that having received a letter from General Whitelocke on the evening of the 6th of July, he went on fhnre on the morning of the 7th, where he met General Whitelocke and the other General Officers. General Whitelocke then informed the witnefs of the calamities the army had I - offered, and defcribed the terms offered by Liniers as extremely advantageoue. The General then alked me if he could expell any cn-operation from me ? I told him yes : but he anfwered that it would ferve no purpofe to gn on with any operations in South America, as we had not a tingle ftiend in the coun try. I then alked him if he had confulted with the general officers ? and Paid I thought we could do fomething more. He told me he was affured that the prifoners would be cut to pieces if we proceeded to further operations agairdt the town. I certainly nbferved upon this, that I could not agree to theft terms, without fiat confulting the next officer in command to me then at Buenos Ayres, as Admiral Stirling was at Monte Video, with the line of battle thips. 1 immediately communicated with Captain Bayntnn, who was then on the top of the fame houfe with me. Captain Bayntos told me he thought I could not do otherwife than fign them, for that the General mull be the bell judge of what the army croild do. I then found I mutt take all the refpon. Ability on myfelf for any thing that might happen afterwards, although I knew I thould only have to anfwer for the naval department. General Gower then explained to me more fully our fit nation, and afTured me that better terms could not be pro. cured, and that as to Monte Video, it was with great rebalance the Spaniards had allowed us to keep it fo long as two months, inftead of one which they had firth propofed : under all eircumltances, I concurred in oinion that we &fluid not be able to keep that country againft the force then in it, and I tigned the treaty. Upon his examination by the Judge Advocate, Admiral Murray Rated, that fix gun boats and two fchooners of eafy draught of water, carrying 24 pounders, might have been employed againtt the town ; two of thefe gun boats were left at !tarragon by General Whitelocke's orders, but the other four, with the two fchooners, bore down upon Buenos Ayres on the 6th, and cannonaded it for tome time. The fchooners carried two 24 pounders as bow guns, and fix earronadec each. Tneboats and launches, of the men of war might have been fitted up with guns, and employed againit the town, but only in fine weather, and not at that feafon of the year— Admiral Murray never knew any river in which the fea ran fo high as it did in the Plata at that feafon, and even the gun boats were in danger of being fwamped. The witaefs Rated it to be his belief that General Whitelocke had not the molt diltant idea of any affißance from the navy in the attack of Buenos Ayres, after landing at Barragnn, except in fupply ing the army with provifions, if in want cf them, and he never entertained any doubt but that the army would have taken Buenos Ayres without any dif ficulty. Examined by General Warrs coc arr. In anfwer m the fit R quellion pin—Admiral Mnr ray admitted that two of three clasfporta were left behind at Monte Video on account of drawing to much water. O Do yrn not underßand that my not fixing upon i t a i Y t o i nto.Pneoc, n afitnchde :pla n, ei; w I it was rd toffrrotehmfen town wan . t a o n t d f a k t g h e :nud i to a: f o p: n o r municate with you as to further operations ? A. I certainly underftood from the General that he would better feel his way when he got up to the place, and that it was his intention to attack on the weft fide of the town; but I did sot underßand from hint that he exptaed any Affiance from the navy, more than I before Rased, for he knew that the (hips of war could not crime doter than they did. He re quelled when at Barragnn. that I would fend the tranfpnrts up towards the town, in order to make it appear to the enemy that he meant to attack in another place ; but as as T before Rated, I do not think that General Whitelocke cape/led any At tame from the armed veffels ih any attack of the place, but merely to cover the !hove on landing pro. 'Mons or the troops it fill, for he had frequently eapreffed that he only wanted me to laud the army, and he would anfwer for the tell. Q . _ Could the fehonners have come near enough rto tile their carronades ravioli the town ? A. I think during a part of the flood tide they might, but they could not remain there the whole of the time. for if driven rin (hate, they could not be got of again.--The carronades were 9 pounders. Q2eftions from Sir Joni. Money. Could you not have furnifhed implements from the (hips of great ufe in forcing the barricadoes of the town, and were you ever applied to• for this put. pofc ? A. Certainly iron crows might have been furnifhed if required from the (hipping. Nn appli cation, however, was made on that fubkft, nor did I know were wanted. What dißance were the men of war and gnu boats from Buenos Ayres on the 4th, s,th, and 6th of July ?—A. The (hips of war were never nearer than five or. fix miles, and they were then in 16 feet water. The gun brigs were above the town, and I believe they were fometimes a mile and a half, and fometimes two miles from the town or more ; mean by the town, the fhnre above the Toros. On the yth they were Rill nearer, and on the morning of the 6th they were within pint black. (rot of the cita del—the fchooners were likewife moving down at the time the truce was made. and one of them had. by her (hot, difperfed a confiderable body of the enemy from a church. Captain Davenport . , of the 6th Dragoon CluttPds; He Rated, that he was the fenior forviving officer of that regiment. They marched to the attack at the appointed hour, but did not enter the city until (even o'clock, in entifequence of toting their way.-- They then met two difmnunted troops of the 9th Dragoons with two field pieces, nod Col. Kington took the whole under his command. They advanced to the fecond fqtrare, amidit the tuna profound filence, but the firing then opened upon them. and all attempts to penetrate further were in vain, al though Colonel Kington and Captain Burrows gal lantly placed themfelves at the head of the men, during which ferric* Colonel Kington was killed They then retreated after fuitaining a very confider able lois, and occupied a large hoofs in the rear, where captain Folter, General Whitelocke's Aid de Camp, joined them, and reconnoitred the town from the top of it. After this, a (mall detachment took polteflion of a church, ahaut yo yards in advance, and they continued in theft politions until the treaty was figned. The difmounted dragoons were armed at the attack with carbines and ammunition, but they had no fworits or bayonets. Captain FRASSIto of the Artillery. He Rated, that by General Whitelocke's defire, he remained by his perfon the %thole day. That the IGeneral was at the Coral the whole of the sth, except Huthen he went to White's houfe for about half an hour. It was impoefible, from the fpot on which General Whitelocke walked, to fee any thing of the town, or its entrances. Being aficed how General Whitelocke was employed on the day of the attack ? the witnefs Rated, that the General employed himfelf in giving orders to the few mounted dragoons that were around him, to gallop after a few miferable individuals, who were flying out of the town to et. cape the affault. The wand's exprefily (wore, that with the exception of the few fcattered (hots, °tea fioned by the execution of thefe orders, there was nothing like an alarm in the poll occupied by General. Whitelocke and his referve that day. On General Whitelocke's proceeding to White's houfe. about dufk, he gave orders for a arong guard to be polled on the roof and around the houfe, in order to pro tea his perfon, and then went to sleep. The witnefa thought General Whitelocke was very filent and re ferred, and with the exception of the above orders. and thofe iffued when at the Coral, the witnefs knew nothing of what paffed that day. TWENTY-SIXTH DAY. Captain Faasaa of the Artillery called. Q State if you examined the guns on the Plaza, And their slumber and other particulars ? A. Imme diately on my arrival at the Plaza del Toro., I went to reconnoitre the lituation of fuch places as might be proper for ereitinf batteries againit the Citadel of Buenos Ayres. I did not therefore rstytelf examine the guns, hut a report of their (tate was made to me, and there were eleven pieces , of ordnance. from 39 down to 8 pounders, which were immediately let ' viceable, and captured at the Retiro. There were b fides, at the Coral, three pieces ferviceable—there were alfa of ordnance (piked, but which might have been.rendered ferviceable, to ; and of ordnance I em barked at Monte Video , and which I prefu me mi g ht have been landed in the cootie of a few hours, ix pieces ; maltit,g a total of 36 pieces of ordnance, from ,; 3510 8 Aires having examined the tipanifh ads. ;' nal, I reported to Genes al Whitelocke that they I, ~~ Jti ea, Ii Mt s rea. cs- tut each rice must core riling. Currie :11 s a 'sire e, of the d CAII . C r;'•