Star. — London, England, 1808-12-15 00:00:00

E that battalion, neighbourhood French would I risons and the fl in the field. Q. 4it had 1 • - , CITY OF LONDON TAYS&N, Doc. 23, 2108, THE COMMITTEE appointed au the 9th of De etiour, by the MEACHAM'S and INHABITANTS of LONDON, to attend to the Affiliation of a General Subscrip tion to old of the bravo SPANISH PATRIOTS, now straggling In the Field to defend their Couplet from a &rep and cruel In vader, cannot discharge that deny without making an earnest Appeal to the attention el their geaeewtl Countrymen, of all Tanks, in behalf of a Natiewand a use so interesting to all the spnipathies of Britons. A people contending for their Independence, liberties, and se softy, kora foreign tyranny and oppression—a nation, friendly ha its dispoddons--.honoumble in all its national condudt Ind thamoter--fitted, by political and commercial interests and.rein". titans, to be closely connected in alliance and friendship with Great Brittle, and now struggling, with heroic fortitude, In it] common cause, against a °outman and moat formidable foe ; suf fering in the arduous conflict the greatest hardships, and endur ing the severest privations, has—surely, strong cla ims of every kind On every inhabitant of these Islands ; and though the greatest exertions have, with the general approbation of this nation, been made by Government to afford the moat extensive, speedy, and effectual aids of treasure, arms, ammunition, military stores, equipments, and clothing, for the maintenance and support pf the Spanish troops, together with the succour of large bodkin( Bri tish soldiers, it is still felt, that the generous maulfestadoti of the popular sentiment, and such further aids, of various kinds, ati general and liberal Subscription may supply, cannot but have Sr. of animating and consoling to the Spanish soldier, and con vincing to the Spanish Governmtle and people, of the perfect union in opinion and sentinient which on this subject subsists usioughout mese wands., The Connnittee rely, with confidence, that the good example of the public Corporations and Companies, and of the Inhabitants of the Metropolis, will be followed by the prindpal Cities, Towns; and Districts of the United Kingdom, in order to form together on offering worthy of the great cause for which it is tnade-.4f the high character and affluence of the Empire which presents It, and * to be accepted by the gallant, disinterested, and high-spirited nation, nation, to whose brave d -ef it is offered. The Right Hors the P. Free R. H. Martin Lord Mayor J. Gerdes A. Mundell Lord Eardley W. Gordon, M. P. N. Newnharn, Aid. A. Anderson A. Goldsmid E. Parry 3. Ansley, Alderman J. L. Goldsmid J. Pierce J. J. Angerstein H. Goodwin Sir C. Price, Batt. I. Atkins, Alderman A. Glennie • M. P. .1. Bainbridip Sir R.C.Glynn,Bart. Sir J. Perring, But. A. Baring, M. P. R. Hockey E. Quin • 1 3, Blackburn, M. P. J. Hadmaa T. Rowcroft R. Barclay T. Harrington J. M.Raikes W. Bonbons, M. P. Harrison J. Russell J. Bosanques Q. Harris G. Sandeman C. Bulk: C. Hanbury C. Scott C. Bosanquet J. Inglis J. Shaw, Ald. M. P. L. Bolden' J. Jacob ''• R. Slade_ D. Bayky J. Jackson Lieut. Scott C. Brooke J. Ines • C. Smith Aldm. Sir W. Curtis, Bart. W. Knatohbull E. Shaw M. P. P. Kensington R. 'Thornton. H. Comb; M.P. B. Long J. Tunno Alderman , Sir J. Lubbock, , C. Turner J. Cohen But. M. P. Sirß.Wigram,Bart. A. Chatfield W.Mellish, M.P. G. Ward I. Dennison 3.Marryatt, M.P. J. Wilmot,inn. C. Enderley J.Maidand, M.P. B. Waters Z. Forster M. M'Donnell Amount of Subscriptions Advertised _ ADDITIONAL SIT" 4111,41P1 O. TIONS. _ Carrick and Maclean 50 0 Glynn, Mills, Halifax, and Co. - 305 • Alderman Scholey 52 10 Daniel Fosaick - 10 10 T. Bed, Swithin's.lane r.O 0 Randall Jackson 10 10 ADDITIONAL SUESCR S'llithX, Marten, and _ fieschell, Brot,den, Pith chef and Schreiber 105 0 John Strover - 10 0 Mrs. Strover - 5 0 Their Grand-daughter 1 0 . Stratton, Gibson, ani 1 Fuller - 105 0 PTIONS AT LLOYD'S. Lefevre,Cuniei,& Ce. 104 0 T. Rice, of Breekbin d 0 D. Stephenson - 50 0 S. Doneldran - SS 10 Turnbull and Co. of Gt. St. Barbs - 101 0 William Cardale 10 10 Rev. E. Ward, ios. 6d. Hammerskys and Co. 105 0 65 4 ITPfigato 3 7, 4 4 l er i sple 103 0 Jenner, Bush, & Joiner 105 0 James Dunlop 52 10 _ . brakv, and J. Rosa and co. or *aka, pet Join Taunbull 105 0 Subscriptions are received at the Mandan House, Lloyd's Coffee-house, and all the Bankers in London and Westminster. The Bankers and others, who have received subscriptions, are respectfully requested to send the particulars to the Committee, at the City of London Tavern. COURT OF INQUIRY', CNELSRA COLLEG.& TENTH DAY,-.CONCLUDED. EXAMINATION OF SIR A. Wi.j.LESLEY SY SIR MARRY SURRARD. Q. Did the French cavalry patrole round the Bri tish camp on'the night of the I9th of August. How near, and when e—A. I don't recollect that the French cavalry patroled very near the British camp, on the night of the 19th of August. They certainly did very early in the morning of the 20th. A division had been dispatched at an early hour that morning, under General Spencer, on the road towards Lourinha to facilitate the junction of General Anstruther's bri gade, which had landed in a bay to the southward of Peniche. That division was posted on the height between Lourinhau and Vimiera, and the . French ca- valry patroled very closee• to it. Q. Do you think it was possible for an army con sisting of 16 or 17,000 men, to march nine miles after part of another army greatly superior in cavalry with out the movement being speedily made known to the train body of the retreating army ?—A. I think under the circumstances of the country, and of position ? it was possible for the army to march* at nine..vorles distance, without that march coming to the knowledge of the other army in less than two or three hours. -. Q. What distance was it from the British army to Tones Ve Iras ?—.A. It was nine miles from Vimiera $o Tones Vedras, and the British army was always on its march an hoar before day-light. r Q. Is Torres Vedras less distant fromVimiera than hi.dm Is, and how much ?—A. I imagine Torres Ve. d ram i s 12 miles distant from Mafra—Vimiera is from 17 to 19 miles. Q. If the French at Tones Vedras had kittriiicor , the march of the British army, could not they have reached Matra first, and have gained reinforcements. teem St. Julien and Cascayes ? - I sital conceive not—the British would have been at first, as they would have marched an hour before day-light; The enemy's line ot tetreat would I probably have been by Cabesa and Montelaver. always estimated the French force in Lisbon, St.. .In-1 lien, Cascayes and the batteries, to be about 5000 They were troops in whom much confidence could not be planed for operations in the field, being principally Hanoverian, Italians, and people from Dalmatia j and as ate British Admiral Vas anchored off Cascayes with the fleet, and had with hint the Royal Veteran Battalion for the purpose of alarming the the enemy upon those points, and as was settled with him, that as we.advanced, he Abould'illsOnbarh and the Rarities of the fhietin the of the Rod of Lisben, I ontelve the clot have ventured to treebeit the soe forts on thy Tagus to reinfbree . . been nangswy to aufick Cascayes and • fort St. Julien, how did you propene to get heavy cannon From the ships. It had been settled before I left England that I should have the use of the heavy , cannon I vranted, from the ships of the fleet,. and ammunition for 24-pounders, and mortars ' were sent from England in a store-ship, which joined the fleet before we were in a situation to underta ke any siege. I conceived that when the enemy should have _keen defeated; 'and I should be in possession of the left Bank of the Tagus, and of the sea.coast as far as the Rock of Lisbon, should be able to land the ar tillery I required. for the siege of St. Julien, if not of •Cascaves, at some of the.bays between Cascayes and ,Cape itccka. Q. Could you have made such landing from the ships ?. A. I cannot be certain whether I could have landed from the ships ; because this must have de pended on the state of the weather, which was very precarious ; but I thought it very probable that the, weather would have admitted of landing in one of those bays, and it is now certain that it would, as the horses of the 18th Dragoons were landed at Cascayes Bay. Q. How many days would it have required to have taken both places ? i. A. I never made up my mind on that subject,"anough some time must have been necessary ; and Ido not believe that the arid would have been suffici. , :ntly strong to byre underta both sieges at the same time. Q. Had not the French the power over the m horses, &c. in the Royal Palace, and in Lisbon, sod 1 the neighbourhood ? and would not these have assist-' id much in enabling them to go to Santern, or to silky other place to which they might wish to retires? A. They certainly had within their power a great naniber of horses, mules, &c. which must have been of great use to them in this or any other expedition 'of the kind. Their cavalry would have tended to give greater celerity to their movements; and there were boats in the Tagus in sufficient number to pea the army to Cascayes at once. '•ti Q. After the battle of the 17th, were you not nearer to Santern than Sir John Moore's carps lies when at Mondego, and might you not have -anima there before his corps ?—A. After the action ,of the 17tb;' I was nearer to Santern than Sir Johuigfoote's corps was when at Mondego, and certainly *might have arrived there . before Sir John Moore's corps could arrive in a state of equipment. I conceived, that there were two distinct lines of operation ingot.- tugal, and two modes of supporting them,-one by, Cascayes, dependant upon communications with the coast Tor supplies of all kinds ; the other by Santern, depending for supplies on thg costaiMnication with Mondego. [He proceeded to state the 31:peeler &drainages of the latter, there being in that line places under the controul of the Government of Portugal, whick would have served as depots, and have kept up the communication, whereas on the other,-the proper• posts of communication, and also those places fit for depots, either were not in the possession ,of the .Go vernment, or had been burnt.] " Therefore," continued Sir Arthur Welles*, " I conceived, that, after the action of the 17th; it was not expedient that I should change my plan. of operations with a view to those reasons only ; and that,, it would be best that - the corps should take their line ' to Santern, and should communicate with M " Q. Do you not think that the victuallers whi . victualled. Sir John Moore at Santern, could also have victualled you ?—A. If I had been at Santern, and.all previous arrangements had been made for the 'supply of the corps under my command at that place, as detailed in my letters of the Bth, 'loth, and 12th 'August, to Sir H. Burrard, I conceive .the corps might have been victualled.--In answer to a questio. as to the propriety of allowing General Anstruther' Finigade to land where it did land, 'Sir A. Welles ley said, " I was not informed of the arrival •of Ge. iieral Anstruther's brigade till the night of the 18th August. They were then off the Burliags to the southward of Cascayes, and could not have. Land • them nearer to Cascayes, than where they did land; without sending them back to the North against the wind, or altering my position again and falling back on Cascayes after the action of the 17th August, to facilitate the junction. Q. Might not the rest of the force have landed at Maceira, and formed a depot there ? A. I conceiv ed the formation of a depot of provisions and stores on any part of the coast was very precarious, parti. cularly so from the beginning of August to the end .of Septerhber ; it might have been effected by a long course of fair weather, but was a position not to be calculated on. Q. If artillery horses had been landed, might not they have been given to the Commissariat ? A. They might have been disposed of in this, or any other manner; but they could have been of no use ft: the Commissariat, as there were no carts with abo Commissariat, or in the country, which could been driven by horses. Q. If artillery horses bad been landed, could not artillery waggons have been landed with them and made useful to the Commissariat ? A. I conceive that there were not more artillery waggons with the army than would be sufficient for carrying stores for the artillery, but those artillery waggons might be employed in carrying provisions where the Comman der in Chief should WO proper. ' Q. Was there no good ground at ordear Mafra or 'Lisbon, for cavalry to act on ?—A. In my opinion, cavalry could be usecl i with advantage in nearly all parts of Portugal ; not in large bodies any where, but every where in small bodies ; and there was ground between Mafra and Lisbon, on which cavalry could act with,advantage. He did lit recollect to have ever heard at what time the light dragoons marched. Be imagined that they went in company with Sir J. Moore's corps. Sir H. BURRARD interrogated by Lord MOIRA. Ist Question—Sir Hugh Dalrymple and Sir A. Wellesley have both rated, that the French might have passed the Tagus with their whole force, and might have involved the British army in a long course of doubtful operations, at the very.time the British army might have acted with effect. Are you of the same opinion ? A. I certainly am. 2d Question—Could not General Junot havetrans ported2 his forces across the Tagus immediately after the 22d of August ? A. I think he.might. 10 Question—How is this conclusion to be resisted, that General Isnot *Ought the conditions.of the Con. !vention more advsnstageous to thy Frew& Worm, thal4 An the muses which has bens have been in his power ? A. I con..; re r ese ceree tatenl Janet had his own motives in not easing to The Court Court were of aphtioa that these three guts -611115 should be put to the other two officers. It being cenceired that Sir Arthur had already, in some pre vious part of the proceedings, answered the first of them' the second question was put to him, to which his an swer was--I think he might. As tb the third, Sir Arthur answered, 8 , Where -I gave myopinion of the proprietyof allowing the French to e evacu a te sea, I took into my considera tion from a consideration of these interests ; of the relative Portugal and by British objects only. It was situations of the two armies in Portugal, and of the French army . 11214 g -been in possession of the coun try, that I came tb be of opinion that they had a fair military right to withdraw by sea, with their arms and baggage. Ido not think it nec essar y count me to ac count for the motives of General Junot in preferring the evacuation by sea to another line of operations, which,, w ithout expressing any personal disrespect for him, might have been bad or unworthy of h i m , as well as prejudicial to his country. I mean, it is not for me to account for these motives, whatever they may have been." The same questions were again put to Sir Harry Bturard ; to the first of which he answered— , ‘ Cer- Junot might have transported his troops across the Tagus upon that occasion." To the second- 0 I did not much consider what were the motives which actpated the French General. I could not conceive what could induce him to do that which I thought was advantageous to this country." Sir Hsw - DaeRYMPLE examined by the Court. The same question was put to Sir Hew. Aeswer. I have already stated to the Court the seasons which induce& use to think the Convention adventure= to us and our allies. It must also be in I bed particular instructions to take, care in expelling the French from Lisbee,that they should be prevented fro= Spam- Without pretendittg to say ol e / r u t =v. been the irtentibn of the now to MIMI their retreat through Bpais, frunst stain state,, thee ansrd to , my opinion aadthat of all nry Officers,' hatter:oast., mesas of nectging that pun el wry instructions, or preventing their retreat oao Spain (if such hod been their intention), excqn by eigidag that Convoy,- don. I cannot be answerable for &motives which induced General Junot to suchaConventios. It was probable that that General saw some aelPantage L I to Lis country from it which he (Srt Hew) Wild not discern, exclusive of that great and obviousethethiato. l spare an useless effusion of blood. - - • The question having been pat to •Iblatliitta • new form, he •answered, that tlsss heat most have had motives either* his awn advantage or that of his country, but selleilene motives werelse could' not possibly say..'' .en' • `. ' Q. Had you awiiilllebt of -Sir John Moore's divi sion landing in time, et you lead resolved on further. operations ? A. I supposed they would soon , land, and their landing was completed on the Slst ; at that time, however, Ithought cueumstances had changed, and that they did not permit the negociation to be any longer protracted. Four Lieutenant-Generals, whom I - consulted on the occasion,, appeared to coin aide _with me in that minion., 'Thew Generals wore Sir Harry Burrard, Sir Moore, Lieutenant-Ge neral Hope, and Lieutenant-General 'Mackenzie • Frazer.—Lieuteniatt-Generals Sir Arthur Wellesley and. Lord Paget were then absent on a more distant service. Q. At what time did the British army set out on its march to Spain ? A. I cannot say when, in point of fact, the army marched for Spain. When I left Portugal, they waited for nothing but a notification from Madrid, that the necessary arrangements had been made in that country to forward the movement of troops. . Q. Was there not any arrangement previously ex. siting ? A. None that I know of. Colonel Toanea called, and examined by Sir ARTHUR WELLZSLET. Q. Were you present on board the Brazen, ow the evening of the 20th of August, at a conversation be tween me and Sir Harry Burrard ? A. I was. Sir ARTHUR WELLISLEY.--State that conversation. Colonel TORRRNS.-4 was Present on board the Brazen when Sir Arthur Wellesley made his report trn the evening to Sir Harry .Burrard, who had then arrived in Maceira roads. , Sir Arthur Wellesley sogreseated the state of the army under his command, the titration and strength of the enemy, and the prin Athlobjects which he had-in view. He gave an ac. daunt bf all his operations from the time of his landing at Mondego Bay, and further stated that he had issued orders for the advance Of the army on the ensuing morning. Sir Harry Burrard replied, that he did not conceive it advisable for the army to advance from that position until it should have been rein. lerced by the division under Sir John Moore. Sir Arthur observed, that it appeared to him that it was of the utmost importance to push forward by way of Mafia, with a view of turningtbe enemy's k* flank, and endeavouring to break the' French army. -LHe wished to force them to a battle as. near Lis. ben as possible, in order that we might avail our selves of the short distance from the Tagus, to follow up in such a manner the victory which he expected to gam as to prevent them crossing that river. He also added, that he wished the bank to be in the neigh. beurhood of Lisbon, as he had a most accurate stsa. vey of all the surroundin g . country. Sir ArthurNWl lesky also objected to bringing down Sir John Moore to Maceira, as he conceived that Sir %nerd would, by that measure, preclude from all e :diedri t i l i t riel e eu:r ; maso vi evr4r n ajraciu ta tohnt ge oirnondig: t sh , l re h wwevera ich htri.etcll 2 h l: oo;u t toggisantersdni o hih therwise oriojetherwtdera v,t oNorthward. and saree b dale cutting e a n t il tgo 'him to be doubtful. Sir Arthur then .asked him, whether he had received his letters of the Bth and 10th of August, recommending the march of these reinforcements upon Sargent t Sir Harry Burrard acknowledr er t v lw a t he had receiiied those 'newt, bee made so fiat or comment upon them •WI Harry Burrard then wrote a letter to Sir Jolon Soft ordering him to come down along the oust. to hi 'nil was, as well as he could foam, the 1 sutotance of the convatatien. Q, Does Colonel Torten eel:ellen 'eV Deetlirs tO Sir limy Sotrord the probability, tha% • we &rim move forw;rd tchittack . us ?—I dO recollect that Arthur Wellesley ; and al ' , mumble opportunity might John Moore, who could" - days. Q. Do To" recollect card the difficulty that the army with provisions, much increased, without of means ?—A. I do 4 - Q. Do you recollect my lity.that if the enemy shou ld. take advantageof t he de ing their position in such , the difficulties of drawing roads, we should find it al them I do remember only mentioned the narrc country, but the badness Q. Do you . recollect • sions of General Fane fore the ‘batde, or immediately silent, with orders ?—A. ' to ride as fast as I could Fane, and convey hit move from the position of the village of Vimiera On my arrival at that - Fane had advanced a engaged with some of . delivered the orders, and he coasiapeidy ratii e d. Q. Can you state the - reason that I go t f or 6 4 orders ?—A. I understand that those orders aros 'from the nature of the ground in bent, addle , so y iender .it ineligible to move further. H e observed that he saw a large bg i d y y s z rend, . • • • for a vigorous attack:yea. • t i ore . li . Do * remember my I nning is fi t • Burnud to continue the ptomdterila •••A. Yee, umperretrely after we Wid M o d '`lleitt coati= of the French array, ellidt son ' lag precipitately, Sir Arthur Wellesley code up t o : si r H. and said, " sir Harry, now a ir time o • aware "too the y, th ey *are eeiejileti it* old or mask to Litho lateen Icy ; a large i a , troak &ger am ix, listh e mai*, s ; let u I move ttearjoi s ek r i r ho, 4 1 - the rod to Torras Pedro:, own willow tie away **hairs Wt." Sir Harry replied, that le** a graa deal had been done, .very much to the risk of the troops, that he did not think it advisable to do mote, or_q_nit the ground in'pnrsuit afflue ntl y. Sir Arthur Welledey (*saved at the time, that troops were perfectly ready to advance, ha a rin co lc visions ready cooked in, their haversacks, to the order of the receding day. . g.. ' Do .you recollect my mentioning that tee warnterelve days bread for the army at. Vitali:4l4 pinny of ammunition I A. Ide not renembetke mentioning twelve days, but I know you maenad that there was plenty of provisions and stwassition. Q.. Were • not orders given on the 20th fir tts march of the troops next day ? A. They Wert. ' Sir ARTHUR WILLI:ILLY then read to the Goat a written statement of his reasons why the army ogle to advance. He considered that the mamma, ..ciently 4stroag to beat the enemy, and he always eta • sidered Lisboa as the grand of de cambial' ott:.lxoth skies— -Hale' • -Tehn ifoortki t i e en to go to• Sastander, to cut o the retsina iseantal to the north, and from plans of the enemy's roma which afterwards fell into possession of Iltitia anay, it Was evident that they had meditated a re• treat in that direction. He had calculated that rte a battle the enemy would have been so much bans; that Sir John Moose's division would have bet a Ifull match for them, especially wiles other dieidots of his army were followitg them up. .0140 Rib I when he proposed marching hluditinel of from sixteen thousand to such tbmisiille , tish troops in high order and spirits, sad weilvisip ped, and he had reason to doubt of die issue ds battle with the enemy. On the 21st be did all the he could to prevail upon Sir Harry Burrard walks the army to follow up the advantages it had geed As to the armistice which he had approved of, it ii/ no means followed, that that which would not best been right on the morning of the 21st might ant te right on the evening of the 22d. On the 81st tlt enemy were in the utmost confusion. On the lli , they were no longer in that state. The situation ti the French army had been much improved in cc* quence of the British army not having followed • its advantages. There was no longer any chance d preventing them from • crossing the Tagus, if thetbd been so disposed. [Sir Assns WittstatXt Eta fined by Sir HO BURR/MD.I __ Q. Walt not there the same facility of advancer Mafra on thead that there was on the marl 21st, when Sir A. Wellesley had rem IS .* army should advance I A. Thum iv., 040 the same facility, but there was so longer de. ohjeet, as there no longer remained a chance Ant ing the French to another action. They led_!: thek strength in the field, and failed, and OM had adrancedi upon the 23d, the French Isiii . vi i i , fought no More battles, but would have cotello" retreat. Sir H. BURRARD then read another written a* ment. Is the first place he did not suppose the enemy had their whole force in the field ; s ad confessed lie did not know that such a considers! body of them had been separated from o th e ::: army. He thought the Brush line was t extended, and that an advance was inealiT l ::: Other Olken of great experience had coi ncided: his opinioa. - , He, however, knew that he was toF responsible for his determination, and assated P Court that if he was wrong, it was merely from o error in judgment. Sir A. Wisziestxt said, that however widell'sl differed then and now from Sir Harry Burre d the _prep_riety of advancing, he was convi nced ; Sir Kam was actuated by no unworthy smock , that if he was so doing, it eras merely fl Ma .. , ..*- 1. in judgment. • . ......Ados 1 • Sir- Haw Dastrnisent then pat, some q •, rbic b 1 Sir Harry &mud, respectisquthe aar'olls_?:!,, ra l 1 the tithes Lieutenant;Gallords gav e ta Z 1 5;iild plia of d m Convention, that the Fr I, e Pankitted to evacuate Portge' by sea, oaTrws With than their arms and lig.e. i Sir H. Dumas) acimoidged that tits P696# • eaaillmii geoesally speed to. Sir Haw DAtamitas tiles fad * short• viat • dill. • the tistemYs they wotla :hat observation made i t &also, that he thO ug a t I , a night be lost by waitaih r t, Ad not be expected for I N Z 1 t my stating to Sir /tarry t there would be in ins, when its number out any proportionate its - p er f ect ly . reco ll ect i t. a ct_ my also :stating the po t should not attack us they s v i delay of 'Our army, by 1 1 Leh a manner, that , cossid4 a tying, cannon on such ri g it almost impossible to II number this ; and that pa ll Larrowness of the role 2ess of them. :t my sending you to the i e and General ?kastrutba • mmediately on its c. : . . A. Sir A. Wellesley desired • uld to Generals Anstrather • is orders that they should 11 xi which they occupied in , niera without fun* direct* sal t position, I found that Cacti to L "little way in front, tad w sbe )f the enemy'slittt troops, 1 erui is. - • • 44 1101 0' et I we as isi . ,