Star. — London, England, 1808-01-28 00:00:00

Leo i nn w, of your own knowledge, if my in tome meafure by the fituation of thefe !Inures ? Y iere obtained hi this way A. I conclude A. Fuel could only-he procured at the farm honks, p o w , for parties were fen tto receive them. and the marches appeared to me to be regulated by A vere p o 'ou know what information General W. circumaances. m" Redin9ion of the flrengt h of the enemy Q._Could we have procured thefe conveniences if c l ean° ? A. Ido not kilo!. the army had marched in parallel columns ? A. I the„_. yell Rate any more particulars upon the faw few or 11 , • ufes on our lest Rank, being the „f the con „eri,.inn previnua. to your march only line in which a parallel column could have causing of the ad ? A. I rec olleft no farther marched. nor do I think any farther c mverfation • (4 : Could we have arrived former, or marched with o f an y confequence. lam certain the conver- g r eater rapidity, without dint-en ing the men, confi• wed with the General's remark, "Don't you daring all the circumflances of the nature of the g to rain !" This was about nine o' - g rou nd , and Rate of th e tr o ops ? A . Ido not think it they could have reached Reduetion fooner, without Di d yo n know, before this lail converfation, %octal Whitelocke had difpatched any letter I Gower ? A. I did n"t. The Cow t will Ac e theta were two converfations. r . What observations did General Whitelocke you mentioned the exhauiled nate of lake abet : ' to ps, and that of the advance, from what you rolat R e duaion ? A. Ido not recoiled any parti ark be made. - Do Do ynQo know whether General Whi t el o cke Tece iy e d the letter he ezpeded from General Eier, when the drum was ordered to beat to arms, 'd o cut, nor did he fay any thing on the fub. te• What kind of weather was it on tlie 2d ? A. Do 'r be sight af the tit there was a few drape rain ; he a d o u very cloudy, and it rubbed a little in the item " sad again at two o'clock in the morning (the ca . (Z. you (late the reafon for the change of 41 , on the morning c f the 2d of July ? A. I en tired at t he Q2arter Mailer General, and was told K guide had promifed to lead the General a lh rand better way to a ford rather above the Chicu sw Q, When the army haltel upon the zd, were you rized of the operatiln in which the adv., ed gi ps was to be engaged on that day ? A. I under. loud it was intended that they fisculd ford the river t h e y could, either at the Chico pafs or above it. Q From whom did you receive this information? I cannot fay Folitively—it was generally under- Q_Did you hear the Deputy Q . liatter Maffei ',sacral inform G...neral Whitrlocke, At the time rhea the queflion of halting was under conlidera. ins, that he knew Major General.Gower confidered ie older he had received as peremptory, and was itermined to obey it ? A. Ido not knuw the order t ilieded to. Q , Did you hear the Barter Mailer General, at tie= referred to in the lad queltion, lay any thing rfrrhat he knew of the intentions of Gen. Gower ? ATo the bell of my recnlleelian, did nor. (tlf an important fel vice hrd been to have hen perfumed, was the fituation of the troops Inch ae to under a halt unavoidable, when you gave your (Ti los that the halt on the zd was advifeable, Irons thee:hafted lime rf the troops ? A. I have no doubt, that the (pit it of the troops would have car tied them through much more fatigue, but, unlefs for very cffntial pupae*, I do not think they could hare marched much farther. (Ong wu the caufe of the difiontents you for meth allodeito ? A. It originated from their not getting wood with the facility they expeCted, with which to cool their victuals. dilbeffing the men : they flight have come fooner to their ground on each day's match, it the army had not been fo frequently halted. Q . Did I not repeatedly exprefs apprehenflone of the Cain felling in, and evince great ar,ziety to gct the men under cover, in the vicinity of the town ? A. Grnetal Wltitelocke certainly did. 111 a Qrong with to cover the men had not urged me to prefs forward, could not the Commirfaria have fupplied the army frcm the refources of the country ? A. There is no doubt that cattle migh t have been had in abundance, with proper precau lion. Q . ._ As form as we had taken Buenos Ayres, could we hot immediately have reoccupied Colonia ? A. Moll tertainly. Q . Would it have been advifable to have left a large body of men at Colonia while we attacked Buenos Ayres ; and would it have been fide to have lett a fmall detachment there ? A. Colotiia, from its tituation and defences, did not require a large body of men to be left there. (I . _ Were the 38th and 87th, which you have Ra ted to be inured to the climate and the farvice, in better marching order than the 36 h and 38rh, corn• poling part of the advanced corps! A. 'The brit two regiments marched infinitely better than the sth and the other part of my brigade ; and when I eta ted that I thought the army could not h.rve reached ReduCtion former, I think the 38th, 4orh, 87111, ant 95th, and 17th Dragoons could have marched tar beyond it : 1 think the 38th and 87th could certainly match better than the 36th and 88th. If the 36th and 881 h were able to march on the zd to take the Chucllo and take poll on the Mi • ferari, might not the whole of your brigade have marched as far from-ReduCtion, if the line of march f the advanced cL•rps had been followed, and the river palled at the fame ford ? A. fart of my brigade might have marched much fat ther : the whole of it could have marched as tar. Qt2ettioned by Si. Jiro' MOORS. By your evidence it appears that during the whole march the troops a ere much exhaulted and fatigued, by being hang under arms, frequent halts, and want of regular Ares of provilions. Thus all the confiquences of a forced aad rapid march feem to have attended the army, a ithout gaining any more than thirty miles in four days. In your opinion. could any azrangetnewh have been made previous to leaving Mon Video, fo as to have enabled the army to have reached Red/tenon on the t a of July, being in two days [turn its landing at Enfeeada ? A. I have no doubt that arrangements might have been made fa that the troops could have reached Reduc lion ; hut I am very dlobtful if the cannon could have been got through the twamp in time to have been ready to move forward wi;h us on the 3o'h. In that c rfe 'might not the river have been re cl,nnoitred that day, fa as to have paired it on the 2d, and advanced to the fuhurbs of Buenos Ayres A. If the army had matched from Barragon on the 3oth, it could not have reached ReduCtion till late in the evening of the ;ft. Of c/ uric no arrangements could have been made that evening to reconnoitre the river. In explanation, I allude to the troops alone getting forward co foon—the guns could not. If the advanced corps had marched on the 29th, they might have reached Reduttion time enough to 'reconnoitre the river on the t 11, in which cafe the main blely might have been in readinefs to leave Reduction on the ad, but not /oil the greatell part of the artillery. Were the difficulties and misfortunes of the ar my in Sood: America to be attributed to the na• ture of the country and of the fervice, or to defec tive arrangements ? A. We certainly experienced many difficulties from the nature of the ground, and other localities. All of them might been lurmounted however by arrangements. I have laid already the troops themlilves were equal to any thing. (tWu the fummrns to attend head quarters, on therolningcf the 4th, the fits iolimatiun you had of dauphin of attack ? A. The &It intimation I had oftheplan ofattack was after I arrived at Lead corters,in confequence of the fummons. OCan you tell what meafures were taken, be im the arrival of the main body before Buenos ,Ayres, and the clofe of the 4th, to enfure the fuccefs cif the attack, by bringing up artillery, or any other lams? A. I have given in evidence every thing Itnow on the fubjedt. QWould not the FrEilion of the Recollettas have leaned the left flank of your brigade and'the opera. timid the army, and made any opening between the any and the army ? A. I do not know what a . it urnald have had, to have detached a farce to oc espy the Recollettas ; certainly a communication could not have been kept open with the fleet, unlef. tic line made a movement more to the left. Q, Would nit the m of the Itecollettas, Wit been advifable, have prlduced the advantages pointed at by the fait qucilion ? A. It would, it it lad been fupported. (t .. Was the Ration where the Commander in Diet was to be feund during the attack of the sth, stifled to the Generals and other officers of the troy? A. It was not notified to me. 1 Q.... Were the posts, if *retreat hecAme neceff.try, &wind in oreers, or otherwife, to the General.' and other officers of the army ? A. They were not no- tified to me. Ulm you any other information to give to the i I Court, on the fubje4l of the charee agaioti General Whitefrac, down to the 4rh of July ? A. I cannot to to mind any other information. (.I . liellionii by General Wu rr LicKf. QDid yon not give to General Moire:lock:, ilium hr arrival at Monte Video, copies of the letters you lad wrilen to the Secretary of State, giving an ac cent of the country, and the force neteffary to con gnu. and keep it ? A. I did. (OWere your opinions altered by any infrequent Rents, and what were they ? A. My opinions re. Mined unaltered. Q.Was not every arrangement completed on Oaring that General Crawford was in the River, in order that no time Hy uld be 1011, as Coon as he join. && ;and were not hones and Flores embarked as far alit was pre4lie tide ? A. Preparations were made, Ind Wier and ti .res were embarked. I have already 'ied to the Court how far I was coniulted on there k tNernenits. , w long wa s B r igadier General Crawford °chimed in the River by contrary windft, before he unit e d at Monte Video ? A. He had heard of Ad• tn .. iral M urray b e i ng in the River on the 3ot h o f M&Y: he came to anch•rr at Monte Video on the of June, i l_Corifidering the diragreeable marches acrnfs the i "nlinr did the convenience of fuel appear to 1 1 )11 to be neceffary ? A. For cooking, abhlutely utel iarY ; for drying e men, moft defirable. , Were any ot h er p l aces f oun d except t h e farm pontes where Inch conveniences were afforded ; and, 11 " e trot the marches and places of halting regulated TWELFTH DAY. Sir SAM U FL AUCH M UTy again called ,in. Q Is there any partioilar rainy rearm' in that pact of South America where yip iirved, of does it rain with little intermiffion through the whale year A. It rains vtith (honer or longer intervals throughout the whole year ; in the winter the rains afe of longer duration. (Z_ Were there any difficulties to impede the march a hoby of infantry or cavaloy from Colonia to Monte Video, and what is the dillance of thefe places from each other ? A. There are many rivers on the road, the dillance is about 130 rnilec. I flyluld think the march is impraZlicable at that feafon of the year, on account of the heavy rains which had fallen. (What proportion of cavalry was mounted, and to what regiment did they belong when General Whitelocke took the command ? A. At Monte Video part of the 17:h light dragoons were mounted, I think in general about po ; about too belonging to the tyh dragoons were mounted at C lonia. When I gave up the command, there were about 400 horfes in go-d order—there were ab )ut tOOO more grazing. ()_ :• If a movement in force bad been made to Coln. rt'sa about the .nd of May or beginning of June, would it not have furnifhA the means of fupplying the army with the best horfes ? A. There were few good horfes left in that part of the country, nor 4o I think it likely that more could have been procured. When General Liniers croffed over to relieve Monte Video his march was delayed foi want of fintfes. Q Can you account for the frequent halts in the course of the march ? A. I cannot. My Elation was generally in the rear : there were very feldom occa finned by the rear belttg at any difiance fromthe main body, 1-. me halts were necelfary in crofling the livers. (Z When the main body halted on the ad of July, could they then have given fupport to the advanced guard in cafe of peed ? A. When 1 gave i t as my opinion, that it was avifable to halt, I was firmly periiiarted in mj owe Mirk!' that we scold not tufsPort the advanced guard. Q . _ When the firing s Was beard on that day, did General Whitelocke rake any fleps to afctrtain from whence it proceeded ? A. I do not kno* that he did Q Do yrol kw w of the older given to Col ael Mahon to halt At keduAion, and what Were the reA lons for doing lb ? A. I recollect the General laving that he thought it advifable to order Colonel Mahon to halt. tictil we knew where we were ourfelves. oCnuld not the artillery and troops left with Colonel Mahon at Rerittaion, have been Or ,, ttght up to Buenos Ayres by the evening of the 4 h ? A. Ccr tainly. Q. Were any attemirs made in reynnoitre the bridge after General Whitelocke'. arrival as Mile rati ? A. I cannot tell. _ Was your opinion alked or given on the plan of attack of the town ? A. My pinio n was never :diced, nor did I give any account as 11 the lime. Q_Was the fittiati , n of things fuch on the 6th rtf July as rendered the attack of the sth abfolutely °c ern:try by a coup de main ? A. Not being confulte.i on the equipment of the army, I do not what were the Gineral's refources, but by a movement to the left a communication might certain ly have been opened with the Navy ah-ve tire town. (t_Was the enemy in filch force without the town as to render the art ack by a coup de main necefrar A. Not that I know tf. _ _ Q Do you know whether the Comm - intler of the forces ever recnntwitted the ,town previous tic the attack ? A. He did not. .. Q If Maj •r General G.w..er hall, after cr , (flog the Chuelln, advanced to she IniOge and diflidged the enemy, w old not ft eit retreat have opencel a free paff.sge to the army ? A. I vas nor acq sai ited with the face of the country near the bridge Ge neral G:wer certainly was thong enough to dill dge the enemy, but he mull have ricked the bringing on of a general affirm. He certainly could have ad vanced to the brid!,e if the country had been siren. Q._ Would it not have been more advifeahle to have brought on a general action than to hare at tacked the enemy in the town. [This cpiellion was put by General Nottroa, but withdrawn after fome convcrfation.] Q. If a communication had been opened 'sr i h the fleet by a movement to the lefr, would there have been any necellity for attacking the town by a coup de main ? A. Certainly these could have been no immediate necefliry if fupplies had been obtaiaed from the (hips. Q Had General Whitelorke proceeded to the b'idge, would he tiot have been able to fupport his Advanced clrpt., if General Gower's attack had brought on a general action ? A. I am not ftiffi cienrly acquainted with the cnuntry to anfwer the !quellinn. 1 [Here Sir Simnel Auchmuty withdrew.] Captain Ettazsa, of the Artillery, called in and fwnt n. The witnefs gave into Conrt the official returns • nf ohlt part of the expedition in his department, the reading of which occupied forne time. Upon bi•• examination afterwards, he Rated, that although the difficulties of the marches we'e great ftorn the fwamps and rivulets, yet that all the artillery via' have been brouglA up in good time if it had been General Vs'ilitelocke's pleafore. The witnefs admitted that dive had been a great falling (If in the pityli cal llrength of the holies employed for the convey ance of the guns and ammunition, but thiy, was amply compenfated by the energy of the detachment of feamen who dragged the guns, and whole fpirits were equal to any lervice. 'fnete was noth ng in the witnek's department to. skli:ch the failure of the operations could be attributed. His detail of the marches, &c. was nearly. a repetition of the evidence already given, but he Iptilte to fereralcusi us traits in General White:ix ke's character. On one t ccafi the witnefs had g one forward to General Gower's column to difcharge what he conceived to be an important's:hay to the fervice: upon hi. teturn Ge. neral Whitelocke became extremely warm, and atked him what he meant by ati.iching Limfelf In much to General G bwet?iGencral Wilitelocke then proceeded to charge the witnefs and Captain Hawker, of the artillery, with paying inlie yelped' to General Gower than to the Commander in Chief, and c n chided by Willing that in future they fh mld never leave his pet fon without exprefs permiffion. • THIRTEENTH DAY. Colonel MAII^N, of the 9th de agorns, who eons. mended the fele' ve which was left by General Wh 7 :e locke at Reindion, was tl►en called. He fpoke to the numbers and Qrength of his cletachwev . , and give in the nfhi►.iel rettons—thefe have been a' . ready detailed in the neufpapeis. He then read and deli .vered in .the stations rders and counter otders he' received from General Whitelocke, which will be found in the evidence of C lonel Torrens, the next witnefs. He laid he could, at any time have marched from ReduOion to the fuhurbs of Buenas Aytes in four hours,without the artillery,which lath he thought would require twelve hcurs for its conveyance, from I the many lwamps and rivulets. He ws pettedly well convinced that abundance of provifions might have been obtaineJ for the army, even ftom the country itfelf, without having recoutfe to the Navy, if patroles and piquets, &c. had besn fent cut to fcour the country, and prepare the way for the march of the troops by reconnoitering or otherwif:. While at Redudion, the few dragoo s ns he had with him daily. brought in more bullocks and Iheep than could be tiled. _ Examined by General WHiTELocKt. Were the fwamps on the mai& inch as are ufual in other countries, or did they exceed any detcriptiou ever given of them ? A. The difEcultie. were certainly very unufual, and far greater titan any defcr iption I ever heard of them. oWas not theground on each bank-of the rivu lets iwampy and difficult to pats, and did not the men wade much on each day's march ? A. Yes. QHow deep were tlioce rivulets ? A. They varied —•tome of them were above the waiftband of the men's fmall clo►he3. QCottld you not have marched a greater dill ance yin other countries in let's time and with lets fatigue to the troops A. Certainly—the delays were chiefly vccafinned by the artillery not being able to pafs, and I conceive very fcw countries would prefect Co many obliacles. (tWere n. - . 4 the cafualt its to the hot fee very great, • anti nonfeitinntly (lees lirilscl the tiirwirbti c ofi detail .. led dragoons in an ationnhing degnee T A. Yen. Did I not at Moo to Vide. facilitate as Much di in my potnet the M , tinting of the cavalry T A. Cet randy. . Lieutenaht Cnlonel TOR It iof the tin+ toot tilled; 4 , I was Upon General Whitelr.cke's Staff on the ekperfitinn to South Arnetica as Military Me information which General Whitelneke tt Wired at Monte Video Tenn Ring the eremy was eery defec tive, as we had never any dirett c •tnmunicntinn with - . Buenos Ayres. We heard genetally that the inhabi• rants were determined in defend the u wn to the laft; and had ereeleti batteries in the principal (trees, and that 40 or So heavy canner we,e Mounted upon them. Evet y perfon from whorminformation tauld he obtained, was examined as to the bell fituation f..r leading t! e army on the fouthern fide of the deer: The Qrooter Mallet General, and Captain Thornton ni the Navy, were fent up to reconnoitre. Upon t: eir return, linfenadn di Bar ragon was fixed upon as the m II prnCticsble place for debarkation.. We heard generally that the Spninfli army amounted to Socc men; fnme perfotte laid it was 10,000, and fome x,coo. I w•as generally in attendance upon General Wilirelncke trnm hi, arrival at Monte Video, to the attack tip, n &cellos Ares. Snmetimes I was with the advanced guard, and at oilier times on various paints of dozy. I was frequently entrdned with the w icing and delivery of orde , s by General Whitelocke. On the evening of the 28,h June, in reply to a re port from General Gower, that he had reached the I eights above Enfenada Bay, I was direded to wore to him to defire that he would be ready to advance when the Commander of the forces joined him next day with the main body of the army. On the even t/4g of the noth of June, in teplrto a dilpatch Jinni . General Gower, I was dented to order him to halt upon the ground he then occupied until General Whitelocke joined him next day. On the morning of the zd of July, rib nit two o'clock, I was ordered to write ui the Major General, to &fire that he would move that morning. I believe C. lnnel But ke was prefent when the General didated that letter, and I am.fire he was aware of its content r, as he was in converfati,n with the General pievioufly. I have nn copy of that or any other letter ; they were all written on my knee, and being in the field, I had nil the means of taking copies I was dint:led in that letter to dente that the Major general fhould ad• vance that. morning with the column under his command, feel his wan a nver the Chuello at any place he might find praCticnnle above the bridge, to take a pofirion in the v,ellern fubinha el Buenos Ares, and communicate with the (hipping, to avail himfelf of any favourable opportunity of fending a fummons to the Spanifh Gencral, refuting to fome previous crnverfnti , n or communication they had on the fuh jont of the terms to he granted, and Rating generally that it was his intention to fupport Mete were no exprelliors nhntever in this letter about en. teting the town. Genecal G wer was to take poll .in the wellern fuhurbs, but no further. To the heft of my recolledin• . part of the letter contained thefe wends : it is my intention to fupport you with the column tinder my immediate cammand." The order given to Major General Gower to march, was a peremptor y one. Ft om the time of our landing at ..Enfenada to the night I am fpeaking of, no informa tion whatever had been received of tire hiength and numbers of the enemy. It was not exactly known how many paffes there were above the bi idge ; the Chic, Pals was, nom ink:illation we teceiven, thought imps adicable : the guides told us that by going further up we fhould turn the fource of the liver. The Paffa Zemora was rever mentioned until we pallid ReduClion, and the guide teemed to - .have but a faint recnlleCtion of it. MG), ewe left Monte Vi Jet the guides were not confromel, becanic one of them was unwilling to appear Attlee in the hufinefs., I. fl it Ihnuld create any jealnufynin .he p it t of the Spaniard, and it j tie him. I was rever pre-. fent when the other two, who were Americans, 'acre confronter", I u. I know they went bp tie river wi Is Colonel Burke. One of thefe American.; was at tached to General Gower, and the other to Colnnei Mahon. To my knowledge they never were cnn• fronted together. I do not recalled that any Pent were taken to reconnoitre, except on the evening a the tll ; the boric. were ordered for that purpofe, he ready in the morning, but the reconnoiffince did not take plnce. No orders whatever were iffrien on the night of the IR, as to any operations for next day. General Whitelocke never told m: whir weir his intentions as to halting at Redunhon, but I enn• finered he meant to do it, hecaufe the Admiral had fent an Officer from the !Let to know if we want.nl fpirits or provisions, and this officer was directed to have a proportion of each landed by ten o'clock next morning, which added toile Genera': inren tinn to reconnoitre, I thought wruld cnnfunta the greatell part of that day. At nine, or half pall nine, however, an order w as given to march, and din! was the firft intimation I had of the General's, inren• tinn to march that day. There was nothing in the letter I wrote General Gower which lad me to draw any conclufion as to the period at which*Genetal - Whitelocke was to fupport him with the main body' nor did any thing fall from General Whitelocke'a converfation to this purport. I was not pier: at when the order to march was given. I had gone with an order to Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and on my return, I ' found the troops under arms. About eight n'cinck that morning I rode out to the front with Galva! Whitelocke, and we met Colonel Burke, who was re. turning from General.Gower, to whom he had deli vered the letter I wrote. When General Whitelneka received General Gower's letter, he (poke in pi Wit c with Col. Burke, and I heard him fay he would fend nut the 87,h to fupport General Gower. I then went to Sir Samuel Auchmuty to get this iegimeht reany, but the Gene: al called me back, and dcfired me n, tell Sir Samuel to get his whole brigade ready. I could not find Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and on my return, I f and the order to advance as already, Rated, had been given out. On the halt'of the ao• lumn on the ed if Judy, Captain Whittingham came from the General to dente I would write to Colonel Mahon, ordering him to halt an. Reduaion until ilia Cher orders. A previous order had been fent to ha e him up with the artillery and ftnres to Reduction, an I was direßed to point out to Major Gwy nne , o lit . oth, the dittation our column took. Major Gwynne was left at Reduaion, in the carn of the fuck and fatigued men—this firft order alto defied Col. Mahon to follow Goma W.'a cokim u N