Star. — London, England, 1810-02-13 00:00:00

conceive the report of the Gener..l ~ I ,) were cant(' upon was the most satisfac -1 .tt k4l be given. ~•„1 zt.lte the result you formed from the re c-,•2:,erai (ricers ?—I can state it as my • far as I can judge froi the reports ti Officers, the result of the inquiry on i V..ty Was—that the troops were not fit. for ( state the number it—l can hardly state the r ; there arc some corps stated to be to a: cer ,!...;;..e fit for service, and some reported unfit for !.orne are reported to be out Of the hospital, ' 'gate to be ut for active duty; other • ....9orted to be, at the time, fit for active r . the Commander-in-Chief call upon you, e ab‘ , ut the 21st of May, for a return to Government of the amount of disposable t ~;,at time fit for service ?—The documents G . 1 „1 prove he did ; and 1 was going on to narn . t>er fit for service on the 23d of May. • , the disposable force which on the 23d Commander-in-Chief was enabled, by .., , sentation, to state to Government to be fit „ ---What I have before stated, 8369 caval -30,',22. infantry t • that was the result. of the r.:ade the 23d (%f May ; it might be, the 20th it was given in. r,?collect a force of 25,000 infantry, and • try being reported to Government as fit for ~,' Counnander.in-Chief somewhere about t 'e May ?—I should rather suppose not; I • 1:•!:-sr:ledge of it. you at any time consulted with respect to le ...,e.heacy of an expedition to the Scheldt, or the t e was ;. not, in regard tothe hfOitibn to the Scheicit,lin t : :•2 ri ,, de of.conductifig it. • • • ; , -;trd t-) the expediency of an attack on Ant ic, • --t)!I the mode of conducting it. u ere you consulted ?—By the Comman d; '~~r '- . ........_ give an :limier in writing ?—I did. • - Oiiit Answer with you ?—I have not ; I :t ;s giver, in. opitli. , n delivered by General Calvert to the was read.] tiir.MOßA,'bUl.f. ET 71! ANtITANT-.6CtiEItAL TO THE COMMAIN.. On rut str JUNE, 1809. which would have attended a debarkation :...agaittide necessary for the performance of the on an open beach, and froth thence corn o i:-‘t an operation through a large track of coun strength has been augmented by all the ad. of the las! century, have been so a b ly and v—ed, that I apprehend it remains only to consider „ , • o f t h e .:111:a service being effected by a conjioct . ...!! • a.tti Army t and in this - case the liondt or. hit presents itstif as the channel through d. • .! i tit iir.:)( i!:!e to enter upfn, any Atllailed reasoning :.rt vvithoat prcriously ancertainift to circlang nets wculd permit of naval c)-opera g ‘4l . 6ees; sonnd:rii.',.and other puioti im :(iWith that servlce, cast only lie karnt4l by a ize.t cscert. of the navy. But on a general view r .c...;,:.• N.:ix:a 4p.-ur ir.dispeusahly necessary to possess Il' A - :. i frt ':c ou;11 cod, if rot of the whole of the island of 1 , .••'•:.. nnd !...11i reTvlzi.nd : and from thimee- with the aid a . ::..: race, ?tld ;:n txtensi7e c:lttimand of small craft-, it migllt, I r.'.:..i: -:Te,1,:•!,..1 ,, i1.h, to land a body of troops at Sandvliet, cont. v •-..., t-b ti..:t. i:s winch to Antwerp, and to the reduction of 1.i1: - -n:d ti etl.,r forts on the right bank of the Scheldt. It tr.l•• ::..e.c, rLc retrula , A, that the citadel of Antwerp is f0r ?1i.!.:11,.. ail.: t 1;;: wt:7lis of the town itself such as would depand ar.(7 a •-ain of artillery, could nct • . ::tie and labour, unless we could se• 7r r.ivigatier oft!: , :-;:heldr, which could only he assured •t p3. - eies,ion of t!ie fortq, rn tlw left as well as on the right urth e rivrr. Frcm tae moment MIT fleet and army appear I the enemy u-t necessarily be apprized of the ob '-.7 st*:!:e crtel;:riz.! ; and having once as:-rained how large a plir9 bf our (. I .l4posuble force was engag ed in it, he would be at Iv y to reurtn:ra'• all his mans of cafence, which would be I) ) the canals of the country, and the general coarse of L.!ivets. no data to go on, in respect to thoenemy's face • no r7tar.;nt oti `sec t red on that point ; but it may be presumed, 11„?.. ea %lye: an occa,i.vi he would not hesi•ate immediately to tor his troops from the fortresses in Holland, the Nether and Friuch Mande: s, and from more remote quarters, if sislicient time for the purpose. The service •.would be eLqus. :131 the troops onployed on it must unavoidably be ex ited to considerable risk ; but I humbly conceive the operaticin this point of view, dots not present the same insuperable diffi :„Hes, wldclt I must be of opinion, would attend an'attempt to r:;11:in the sante service by a debarkation at or in the vicinity I: Ostend, and by a movement from thence to the point of attack. (Stned) " n. ca hvF.itor." V. a; that the opinion delivered by you to the Corn tl.r.s.e.,7 in Chief ? It was. • 11.tve you seen any reason to alter any part of that (1.:;:m E—No, I really h:tve not. II tiat.opinion it is stated, that there were no data: A , ,, the enemy's force ; was any information coni trttice.ed to you as to the enemy's force, when yon '..-..•• c.11:,-,1 upon to give that opinion ?—lt was ge itq4 .;::ited, that it was imagined the country was tn . 'ow of troops at that time. V.t,.t:iy thing more precise or positive stated ?—; "' , :l : :., my recollection. ~,1 1, is 2ny plan sehmitted to your consideration ? 11.2,11!:e subject was conversed upon, the Comman 'jet ill chit. h.td a pl.tn of the navigation of the Scheldt ).! ,,, e him. 'II ret . :l to the formidable state of the fortifica -1",2s of Antwerp ; from what do you infer the forti- ScAtm . r.s were In that state ?—From my own observa- Nrh haring been there in 1794, and from having .card that the fortifications had been improved since it 's time, and that the defects which s* were apparent den had be e n remedied ; I do not knsiw from whom I hAcl heard it, but as general infortration. What was the state of the fortifications of Ant in the pear 179-4 which fell withilt your knowled7 r ei —The kt,l:cct that appeared toe at that time, was •-f great extent of the works, and many of them not being in a g.)oti . butte of repair.; the citadel is detach i'4tr,itn the town, and preseoti a much More forini , Oofenco. than the, ti does, but Iby no means L.rt competent togive a decided opinion upon. 11 ' 4 s,lkjccr, as it w'as..rorrely in occasional . visits to til i"^wn when the arrgewas in that neighbourhood At l had an opportunity of making my observation tirm it. At that period the town regularly forti fi ed, and c l Z lil d it rlnly hataetbeen taken by a regular siege ? ~:a t 'las a matter of opinion that probably officers -sed in that kind of service would be called upon An opinion upon'; I do not know that, visit ttnvn on ly two or three times, I am compe "g 10 give an opinion. e . . , Did you coneider it a fortress ?--Undoubtedly, ibe C 'lodated to hold 14000, including the garrison of That the citadel was a regular work ?—The cita-• ttegen-op-room. del, to the best of my opinion, was a regular work. • i Who was present at the discussion between the Do you consider it a matter of notoriety that the Commander in Chief and yourself, to which you have works had been augmented since that . period ? I -referred, when the map of the ctfurse of the.Scheldt have understood so from conversation, with persons • was before you ? —I really cannot recollect so as to that came from that country, that, since the French ', speak positively; I rather think that General Hope, have been in possession of it, they have repaired the ; the Deputy Quarter-master General was pretent, and works. 1 I think Colonel Gordon, who was at that ti rife Secte- Do von understand it to be a matter of notoriety , ' tary to the Commander in Chief; but it was a sub that the French have throughout all those provinces, . ject that was talked of more than once, it was a con a coneiderable . organieed National Guard or Militia, • • versation that occurred more than once ; It was not a in lependent of their regular. force ?--LI have under- council or any thing of that kind. stood that a force of that kind exists throughout the a Are you certain that Colonel Gordon was present ? whole of the French Empire. —No, I have stated that I cannot be certain, but I Would not a force of that description be applicable rather think he was. to garrison service within a fortress ?—I conceive it I Or at any ether discussion upon this subject ?—I would. . am certain that Thad conversation with Colonel Gor . Would not detachments of seamen, marines, and don upon the subject, and I rather think in the pre artificers, be also applicable to garrison service within sence of the Commander in Chief. a fortress ?—Certainly. 1 Are you certain whether General Hope was. pre- You having stated that you were in Antwerp in sent at that discussion, or any other, upon this subject? 1791, did you happen to know whether the province I certainly have conversed with General Hope upon of Zealand, and especially the island of Walcheren, the subject, and I ant equally certain that I have in were unhealthy in the latter end of the summer and.l the presence of the Commander in Chief. the autumn ?—it was generally reported so to be. Was General Brownrigg present at that discussion? Did you consider it as a matter of notoriety that f —To the best of my recollection General Brownri bb r , the island, of Walcheren was an unhealthy situation was indisposed at that particular time. • for soldiers at thatiod of the year at the time you I Did those discussions take place previously to your gavbthe opinion w r ich has been read ?—The heal. giving in that opinion which has been read at. the thiness or unhealthiness of the island of Walcheren table ?—Conversations of that nature occurred both certainly bad no influence upon that opinion one way previously to my giving in that paper, and subse or the other, it was merely a military question. quently to it. Was it within your knowledge at that period, that Did that particular discussion, when the map lay that island was unhealthy for soldiers ? Certainly. upon the table, take place previously to your giving When you gave that opinion, did you take into your in that opinidb or subsequently ?—That with other consideration the means of transporting artillery from maps generally lay upon the table in the Commander Santvliet to Antwerp ? I did ; and conceived it to in Chief's room. afford one bf the greatest difficulties of the service. You have mentioned a particular discussion with Would it not have required a great deal of time to the Commander in Chief, when a patlicular map lay have collected the beasts of draft, and to have drawn upon the table, and .was consulted ; did that consulta , the artilery from Santvliet to Antwerp ?—lt certainly tion which you so alluded to take place previously would ; the quantity of time must depend upon the to your giving in the information which has been read operations of the enemy, if we were to collect our at the table, or subsequently to its ?,--I think previously means of transporting our artillery in that country, to it, and subsequently to it likewise. and what state the country was in to prevent our col- Am I correct in unde rstandin g that y ou had heard I letting those means of transportation. of an intention to send a large force to the Scheldt Do you thi: it would have been possible, by any previously to your being caned upon to give that opi means,. to have conveyed an army adequate to the nior.-2es. siege of Antwerp, with the ordnance requisite for that What was the amount of the disposable force re siege, from this country by Santvliet to Antwerp, • maining in the country after the expedition had sailed? without giving the enemy considerable time for pre- Of i nf antr y little or nothin g , of cavalry there was a paration ?—Certainly it would not be possible: more considerable force ; but that can be given with In case of a failure, or even in case of success, the greatest accuracy by a return. would not the retreat of that army be exposed to con- In the different conversations you state yourself to siderable difficulty ?—I conceive that must .depend so have had with other officers on the subject of the pro : - much upon the operations of the enemy, and the state posed expedition, was your opinion as to the probable the country was in, that I hardly know how to give difficulties of carrying it into execution diminished or an opinion on the question, which is so very vague ; increased ?—They certainly were not diminished. the retreat of an army from any country must be at- In consequence of those conversations with other tended with dfficulty, but that must depend as to de. military officers, did you conceive a favourable or un greearpon the means the enemy have to assail that favourable opinion of the probable result of that ex army pedition ?—My opinion was, that Walcheren would You say that at the time 'you conversed with the fall ; and I had great doubts with regard to the 11l- Commander in Chief upon the proposed mode of timate operations, as is expressed in my written making the attack, namely, by the course of the opinion. Scheldt, there was a map of the course of Scheldt Had you much intelligence relative to the strength laid before him ; was there any accompanying infer- of the army, and the local situation of the country, rnetiolowitli regard to the state of those forts and previous to the opinion you gave to the Commander fortif.cations which command, at different places, in Chief ?—I certainly had not • and I think I stated the passage of the Scheldt up to Antwerp ?—To the in my opinion, that for want of data, 1 felt it imp os best of my recollection there was not. . , , sible to form an accurate opinir=ni. , • Neither as to their actual state for offence or de. You have stated to the Coßmittee, that between fence, or the amount of the garrisons then occupying the return of the army from Spain, and ihe sailing of them ?—To the best of my recollection there was the late expedition, requisitions were made at the in not. , stance of Government from your office, to the officers • From your knowledge of the country, having sere- commanding regiments. to know in what state the ed there, is not Antwerp so situated as to be capable army was, and. to press their preparation for service ; of receiving reinforcements in a very bhort period of upon a full consideration of the result of all the pre time from a considerable distance of the surrounding vious returns, did it not appear to you upon confer country, owing to canals anetrivers ?---elt is. ence with Lord Castlereagh, when the letter of the Is it not peculiarly so ?—The course of those rivers '23d of May was written, that the 10th of June was which connect France with Flanders , as well as the the earliest day that there could be any rea sonable expectation of the great body of the army being ready canals of the country, is in favour of the en em y en for service ?—lt certainly did. deavouring to succour Antwerp. Was not that letter of the 23d of May addresse d to After your opinion had been delivered to :G overn- all the Commanding Officers of the regiments that meet, by the Commander in Chief, were you ever were included in the first force of 25,000 men ordered called upon to explain any part of that o p inio n ?—I for service ?—The letter of the 23d of May was ad beenreallv did not know till lately that . my opinion had dressed to the Commanding Officers of districts, not delivered to Government , but I ne ver was called to the Commanding Officers of Regiments. upon to explain any part of that op i n ion. Then after that o With a view to its being circulated to those regi on for any further inion opinionoat ou never were called relativeup_ to the Expedition meets ?—Certainly ; the names of the regiments are in the margin; the letter of the 9.3 d of May was writ to the Scheldt-?—I never was called u p on for an y ion.. . ten with a reference to all the regiments supposed en further opin be preparing for service, except those few l i g h t co rp s Was the opinion given by you, which has been read, which had been previously inspected and reported an opinion arising from a discussion with the Corn upon by Sir John Hope, in consequence of a letter of mander in Chief's Staff, on the subject o f the propos the 27th of April. ed Expedition to the Scheldt , or was it onl y y our own individual opinion, without any consultation . with Were not those light corps fitted for Portugal, and' other O ffi cers ?—lt was my own individua l o p inion, not with a view to the proposed service in the Scheldt? I but I certainly had had conversation on that subject • —They were at that time intended for Portugal. 1 well other Officers. Was not it ie point of fact found that eeveral of Could the supplies and reinforcements be cut off the regiments could not be ready for service so soon ( from Antwerp except by an army commanding both I as the eoth of June, and that the equipment el some 1 banks of the Scheldt ?—I apprehend not. of them remained incomplete till the end of that ! Would it not have required a very large force so to I month ?—There were several regiments, particularly have invested Antwerp with security to the besieging i second battalions, reported unfit for servic e as late as army ?—As far as my opinion goes , it would. • I the result of the inquiry of the 23d of May. Would it not have been necessary to have secured In your opinion, did the state of the Army admit our communication with 'that army and its retreat, to of its being earlier sent upon service ?—I really con- j have detached a considerable force to occupy intei- ccived the 10th of June to be as early a day as the vetting posts ?s—l conceive it would. I main body of the Army could be considered fit for What do you conceive would be a competent gar- i active service. risen ftn Antwerp ? I really have not local informa- i You have stated that you were consulted upon the tion enough to answer that question: . 1 late Expedition to the Scheldt, is it in the ordinary You have stated that it would require a very large 4 course of service for his Majesty's Ministers to take force to invest Antveerp ; to what amount do you sop- the opinion of the Adjutant - General o f the Arm y as pose that force must be :'--I really think it is hardly : to proposed Expeditions which may bi from time to possible for a person to give an opinion upon such a time sent forth ?--I conceive it to be entirely optional subject without having time to consider the situation with his Majesty's Ministers whom they please to con of the place, the nature of its resources, the nature of : suit with ; by no means with the Adjutant-General its defences, and the nature of the country round it. unless they please so to do ; there is nothing in his 'ln order to invest Antwerp, would it not be neces- office which entitles him to it. •sary to detach cores to mask Bergen-op-Zoom, and When the state of the defences of Antwerp were the other fortresses in that neighbourhood ?—I conceive discussed, did you represent to the Commander in it would. Chief, or to the Government, that you had under- Can you form any opinion what the amount of stood the works of the place had undergone any im• those detachments mast be ?—lt roust entirely de- provement, and what, subsequent to the - period you peed upon the force that the enemy had in those gar- had seen them in 1794 ?—I really do not recollect any. risons. . . discussion upon the state of the defences of Ant w erp. * Supposing those fortresses to be com p etentl y gar- ' You have stated that in your opinion, much of the risoned ? Bergen-op-Zoom itself if competently difficulty of operating against Antwerp, would have garrisoned, I believe would require 6or 7000 men ; arisen from the delay that must necessarily have hap the lines from Bergen-op-:Lom to Steenbergen might petted in conveying the necessery . artillery from •. ' S aid draught cattle nece-esary For tie- . that artillery; are you aware filet the ho: s, quisite for the transport of the :winery deter: necessary for the attaelrof that town, were previ ..; • at home, and accompanied the Expedition on service —I was perfectly aware of it, but the mode in wh . c:: the question was put to me • did not give me. the l•- berty of mentioning it; I eeas asked merely an ab stract question. •Have you not known places more respectable in their defences than Antwerp, that have been reduced by an army with adequate means appearing before them, without the necessity of undertaking a siege t f a more regular description ?—I conceive a fortress cannot be taken without treachery, without' a siege. Have not fortresses been - reduced by bombard ment ?—A bombardment implies some degree of • siege ; but I should suppose a very extensive fortrese, if it is defended as it ought to be, should not surren der from a bombardment. Was not the fortress of Copenhagen reduced by a bombardment of three days, and was not Copen hagen a place more respectable in its defences than Antwerp is when you inspected the works ?eel really do not feel competent to answer that question ;' I do not know sufficient of the defences of Copen hagen, to say what they were. Do you recollect that Antwerp, including the citadel, was reduced or surrendered, although de fended by an Austrian garrison, to the army of He mish Patriots in the year 1790 ?—1 know it is a fact without knowing , any of the circumstances connected with it. From the local knowledge you acquired of Ant werp in the year 179 t, do you think it was either pro bable or possible to take it by a coup de main ?—I do not think it probable such a fortress should be taken by a coup de main, the works being very extensive ; I will not say it was impossible, but I should think it very improbable. Generally speaking if a place is regularly fortified with a ditch, etc. and all its ramparts armed, would any officer. venture upon attempting to take that - place by assault until a practical breach had been first made in the walls, supposing the place.to be properly defended ?—I conceive a fortress under those circumstances could not be attacked by assault with prudence, till a practical breach was made. Do you consider Antwerp, strictly speaking. a re gular fortification, and do you know that the bath:.: ries of Antwerp were armed it' the manner described in the last question ?—I really have not sufficient knowledge of Antwerp to answer the first part of that question exactly, and I have no knowledge whatever of the latter part of the question, Does not a correct answer to all the preceding questions depend upon a correct knowledge of the nature and number of the garrison of Antwerp ?---I think it does very much depend upon those circum-. stances. Do you know any circumstances that might have prevented a coup de main on Antwerp being success ful, supposing all the army, except the division ne cessary for the siege of Flushing, could have been landed at Santvliet, in the course of a week or ten days after they left this country'?—None but those naturally resulting from the nature of the place itself. State what you consider those circumstances to be ? —lts l'ortifications. Explain more distinctly what you' consider as its fortifications, were there any outworks ?—I have not a sufficient local knowledge to go into the description of Antwerp, but it is generally impressed upon my mind that Antwerp is in such a state as would have made it difficult to take it by assault without any previous attack, but that is more the result of infor mation I have received from others, than any per sonal knowledge. Do you not consider Schovednitz, in Silesia, to have been a very strong place ?—I have always heard it so represented. Was not that taken by Marshal Loudohn by a coup de main ?—lt is an historical fact that can easily be turned to ; I really have not it so correctly in my mind, as to be able to state it in evidence. Might not the terror of a bombardment in a city so ropulous as Antwerp, where the inhabitants may be supposed not well affected to the French Government, and the garrison not of regular troops, bn Burghers, have produced a surreaader rom what would be expected from it fortress with a smaller population, with a garrison of regular troops beg to state, that the answers I have given have been in a military point of view, when I have been asked questions asto the place being taken by bombardment ; certainly, in a military point of view, a fortress should not surrender on a bombardment ; but if you put the case of a rich and populous town such as Copenhagen, it is not merely a military question, but a political one. Can any answer you have made, strictly confining yourself to a military point of view of this subject, be applicable to a populous city where the inhabitants may have a great influence upon the \garrison ?—I conceive in exact proportion as the inhabitants have an influence upon that garrison, the replies will not • be applicable. Are you able to state from your own 'knowledge, what the proportion of the armed French force to overawe the sentiments of the inhabitants of Antwerp was 'at that period ?—I really have no knowledge whatever of the garrison of Antwerp, whether of armed burghers or others. Have you any reason to believe that the inhabi tants of Antwerp were ill affected to the government of Bonaparte ?—No further than I should suppose all inhabitants of towns of that kind would be ill affected to his Government. Did you consider the possession of the town of Flushing as necessary to the ulterior operations in the Scheldt ?—I should conceive that to be a question that can be answered only by Naval Officers, as connected entirely with naval services. Did the country between Santvliet and Antwerp present any obstacles to the. advance of an army . I never passed through that country, and do not know ; there is the fcrtress of Lillo on the right bank of the river. Have you any information upon that subject ? I have not. Do you know whether a considerable part 4 that country cannot be inundated ?—I have always un derstood that it could, but I have no personal know ledge of k. [The Witness was directed to withdraw.] (To be coeineee )