Star. — London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

up by the 4th, the objects of the Expedition A. have been attained ; but it had been stated by a k „ Commander in Chief of the Expedition, that it wee impossible for the army to have arrived at Santvßea before the 6th. When asked as to the practicability of taking Antwerp by a bombardment, Geneed Macleod stated, that on that point he could not be certain ; but as to the destruction of the ships, he hadl given it as his opinion that by the effects of a born.. bardment lie inhabitants of the town and the garri son might be so overawed, as to induce them to sur render the ships; though he admitted that object to be hopeless, who) the ships had been taken up above the town. As to the idea. of over-awing the inhabitants and the garrison, could it be for a moment supposed, that, in the present state of military strictness and dis cipline in the French territory, any such event could take place ? or that the inhabitants and the military of Antwerp would, in order to escape the dangers of our bombardment, expose themselves to the ven geance of their master ? Besides, all General Macleod's calculations were founded on the suppo sition of good roads, of which, however, he knew nothing; and it was since known, that out of twenty five miles of road, five miles were over a causeway, and the rest a deep sand. When asked what his opinion would be of the success of the expedition, if the roads had been as good as he supposed, and the other circumstances favourable, under the actual state of preparation of the enemy. General Macleod answered, that he had put the enemy entirely out of the question. The House could not but perceive, that to leave the enemy out of the question in calcu lations respecting the operations of war, was a very accommodating principle. It also appeared, from General Macleod's evidence, that considering the length of the town, and the distance at which batteries could alone be constructed, there could be little chance of destroying the arsenal or docks, when the shells should be thrown a distance of above one mile and a half at objects not distinctly discernible : that the place was not to be taken by a coup-de-main, as sailable only by a bombardment, and then not to be expected to surrender till a lodgment should be made on the glacis. Having thus disposed of the different plans of at tack, as shewn in the evidence, he had next to ob serve upon the plan of Lord Castlereagh, which, ac cording to that Noble Lord's own statement, was not to consist of long protracted operations, and yet was to have a powerful effect upon the affairs of the Con tinent, which was not to be directed to remote objects or a distant scene, and yet was amazingly to derange all the projects of Bonaparte ; which was to take effect by a coode-maiss, and yet the troops were to be brought away in the moment of success. The Noble Lord, relying on the information he had received; expected that Antwerp could have been taken by as sault ; a circumstance actually impossible, according to the evidence of Sir William Erskine. The infor mation received and acted upon by the Noble Lord Lad been produced before the Secret Committee, and by them reported to the House. Though it appeared . by th.st information that the ditch was in some parts dry, owing to the falling in of the reveternent, yet, mother parts there was water, and- Sir William Er. :line had given it as his o p i n ed &lithe breaches in the revetenient might, in Ne boorsdsorepailed by the ma :ins of the town, and the water is the ditch might 1 in one tide be raised from thole to five feet deep, which that officer would consider a wet ditch. When I they considered that there existed but one or two pastes, made use of particularly by smugglers, prat- I ticah a f. , r the purposes of assault, and that these pas ses could so easily be secured, the House would -be •sees.ble th. t t! , erenever had been a chance of success by i assault. But the Noble Lord stated, that in the event of the assault proving unsuccessful, the_object was to be attained by a bombardment. And here the Noble 'Lord, with his accustomed versatility, was determined ' to have two strings to his bow—he was to have a 1 bombardment, and a battering in breach ; and, whilst sen ling the whole disposable force of the coun try on a h..peless Expedition, employed himself in devising the means of executing his vigorous projects i in every alternative. With this impression, the Noble Lard must in every case have his train of 30 pieces of miliel; and with them proposed to effect his soup- ; deoeie ; but when asked what his idea of a coup-de twie was, it appeared that it was to include an in vestment, a battering train, and a bombardment. It Lad been asked by the Noble Lord, whether the for tress of Schweindnitz had not been taken by a coati ift-arin p but he might as well have asked, whether Troy had not been taken in that manner, as apply the term coup-de-Will to such a. military operation as he had ,n Tiew. Next in the order of successicfn he had to notice Lord Chatham's projects. That Noble Lord, how ever, had no plan at all. He had been, to be sure, t Butz ; but though he had remained a month in the ountry, he had never formed any plan whatever. lie had himself stated, that he had not formed any pla n in detail ; that the mode of attack upon Antwerp was to depend upon circumstances ; and that he had rot thought of any plan for that purpose, because the army had not landed on the Continent. Strange it appeared to him that a General should defer devising any plan until he approached the end of his opera tions. But the ulterior objects had been given up, because the Commander apprehended that before he could proce e d to accomp li s h t h em, h e s h ou ld h ave to undertake, perhap s , two p re li m i nar y s i eges . The trPedition, he contended, ought never to have been sent out, unless his Majesty's Ministers had been well Informed of the actual state of Antwerp, as well' as the number of sieges that must necessarily be under taken, before operations could be commenced against that city. One might have thought that a General; t out at the head of such an Expedition es that, in libith the whole disposable force of the nation was employed, s h ou ld h ave f ormed some i dea o f the ope rat(as he was to conduct, and the sieges.he had to undertake. It never had entered the heads of any set of men but his Majesty's Ministers to send out an Expedition in such a way. The whole army, he ap prehended, was sacrificed, by its having been sent out without knowing that the Expedition could not succeed but after several sieges, when the only chance of success rested upon the possibility of-accomplish. l og its object 'without such previous sieges. The ff ound stated by L or d Ch at h am f or re l inqu i s hi ng s ulterior objects, was the information he received that Antw att erP was not in the state he supposed ,on the d ep * j ure with the Expedition, its works having been re p red about the period of the sailing of the Tr ter ha L r.t co pl rc ar ar tii cc to it t; e • S . . .. , • . . r, r.ttica. lie Hooke had Pen Up the'llfsiebece i Powerettektimiesetylair sthattealistastspaskp u h. ese,,,,_ of Lo r d m a d man wh at res p ect h e paid to t w et . should not think it iecesenry, briefer to thisevidisee, ttlitidenc*, mation upon, which his colleagues had acted, when I hitt leave it to the Hesse to decide, whether, on the. the Anstrian h. he stated, that on his arrival at hi s d est i nat i on h e saw suppositions, the. ropeaacing suppositions on which it Owen Was, and -no reason to believe or disbelieve the informition upon I had been formed, it dins possible that the expedition ' not desire the - which his colleagues had decided to put to hazard_ , could ever reach Antwerp ? But if the Noble Lord. Holland,bat. _., the whole of t h e disposable force of the country.— had ever entertained that expectation, the passages he Majesty's Ministers could not but be sensible then, that Lord Chatham had said, 'that if even the w hole of had quoted. from the evidence must spew him that the questionrespecting the diversion was not made out the information were true, much of the probability of there was no co.operation. Upon- the subject of the by the papers. General Don had stated that this Ex- success against Antwerp would have depended on the , conduct of the nava and military part of the expedi. pedition would have operated as a great dive r si o n hi circumstance of it s being attacked without the inter. tion, 14 was of opinion that no blame rested with favour of Austria, -by making it incumbent on the vention of preliminary sieges, as the army was not in either. But if any blame was to apply, that House French to send a large force to Brabant, which would a state to undertake sieges, and a couts-ele-maia was im- i had no tight to interfere, unless it should• be necessary i otherwise have marched to the Danube t- as if any practicable. The same was the oPtnion of Geheral .to apply, by Address, that the matter should be re- i feeble efforts of ours could, at that dreadful period, Hope respecting the coup-de-nsain. Sir William Ers- furred to the proper tribunal. He had a full persua. i have controuled the destinies of the Continent. There _ kine, whose professional knowledge, displayed in his sion, that the House would agree in the Reso- : was also another opinion in favour of its having ope examination at the bar, entitled him to the admira- ; Intim, that no blame was imputable to the Na-' rated as a diversion, that of Colonel Mosheim. The Lion of that Housean admiration that must be en- i val or Military Commanders. (Hear, hear, hear.) only instance which he was able to mention, was the hanced by the consideration of the early age at which He had, until then, considered the Expedition in a return of a battalion or two from Louvain. But at he acquired that'knowledge,.and the accurate recol. military point of view. It had been said that it had this very moment that Ministers were speculating in lection he preserved of the result of his practical ob. the* elements to encounter, but it had a much more diversions, France had every whereas great a force servations, after the lapse of a long period of time, 1 dangerous enemy to contend • with, in the disease as was necessary for.the complete defence of her vast had stated, that, having been at Antwerp in 1794, he brought on by its having been sent to that pestilential : Empire. In estimating the v alue of th e se di vers i ons , knew it to be secure against a camp-de-main, and that in. climate at that pestilential season. That disease was lit was the duty of the Heuee to consider whether the one week it might be put in a situation to stand a well known to professional men ; it must have been advantages likely to result from them to our al siege. It had been much inissted upon in the oral tes- known to his Majesty's Ministers. Lord Mulgrave, lies, were sufficient to outweigh the calamities which timo'uy at thebar, that as there were no guns on the in the year 1791, commanded in Walcheten ; and the they had inflicted on our own country ? In stating ramparts, Antwerp was incapable of defence. But brave troops he commanded suffered under the same the evidence en this subject, he bad necessarily did Gentlemen not bear in mind that Antwerp had disease, and that Noble Lord knew that on their re- gone to great length, but the importance of the ques now been made a great naval depot, contained a vast turn they fell equally victims to the destructive in- tioe, be trusted, would entitle him to the indulgence naval ursenal, and could, consequently, not be deft. fluence of 'the disease. Ministers had, however, not' of the House. It was now his wish to turn his eyes dent in the ordnance necessary for its defence ? Sir consulted one medical man, either as , to the mode of away from the contemplation of the most :calamitous William Erskine, too, had said, that it was not un- cure, or what would be better, for the prevention of and disgraceful Expedition in which this country had usual to preserve the artillery provided for the defence this dreadful malady. It might be said that secrecy ever been involved : an Expedition which failed not of fortified towns, by removing them, till wanted, . was necessary in the first 'instance ; but what excuse airough any defect of courage in the men who were from a state of exposure to the injuries of the weather. I could they plead for not having taken such advice on employed in it, or of precaution or talents in the per. This led him to notice how little his Majesty's Mini. 1 the repeated applications few medical aid, medicines, sons who commanded ; but entirely through the ig. sters seemed to have attended to the use which might ' and warm clothing for the suffixing sick in the pesti- norance, rashness and impotence of those who plan -have been made of the seamen and marines of the I lential marshes of Walcheren. The Noble Lord then ned it. This fatal Expedition had terminated in na- French fleet for the defence of Antwerp : how little I read extracts from the v .rious pressing letters received tional disgrace, almost in national despondency. It they seemed to be aware that this description of per- 101 l this subject from Sir Eyre Coote, incloging the was the bounden duty of the House to visit such im. sons were the best calculated to serve on a breach !-- urgent applications of Mr. Webb for assistance to be policy and misconduct with its utmo s t indignation.— If they doubted of the fact, let them ask Sir Sidney I sent out in a fast sailing vessel, from the second of He would now submit a set of Resolutions -tor the Smith—let them ask Bonaparte how a party of sea. , September downwards, till at length, when half of the adoption of the House ; to the greater part of which men and marines from a single ship, at the memo- army had perished, two medical men were sent out lie -could anticipate no possible objection, as they were rable defence of Acre, arrested the victorious career to investigate the nature of a malady which had founded on the Minutes of Evidence in the possession -of the French army, and obliged it to retire in dis- been long a matter of notoriety in this country. of Members. His Lordship requested that the grace from before that town. But iii order at once —He came in the next place to consider - the last, Clerk, as he himself was almost exhausted,might be to shew the absurdity of any expectation of success though not the least, important part of the question:, permitted to read the Resolutions ; but this being from a coup-de-main, it was only necessary to state that He wished to ask his Majesty's Ministers, for in the against order, Lord TENIPLE kindly undertook the they had it in evidence, that by means of a line of te- evidence was contained no information, with what task. They were as follow ; - , , legrephs information could be conveyed to Antwerp hope, with what prospect, with what possible chance i I. That on the 28th of July last, and subsequent days, an ar - of the approach of our Expedition before their an- of public advantage, they kept our brave troops in main_ even t , consisting of 99,000 land forces, se sail of th e line, s chors . could be dropped in the Roompot. Sir Wil- that pernicious climate, perishing ingloriously by the h : 3 i p g s un o zi,..13 sailed dgnun t ,ns 2 41 4 ehe bat ev e :lit:s l o g :o l a se ' Sch de b , v havi s liam Erskine too mentioned his doubts to Sir Richard' destructive ravages of its peculiar malady ? He wish- for its object the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships, Strachan before the Expedition sailed • and it was by ed to ask how they could have reconciled such con- either building at . Antwerp or Flushing, or a fl oat on th e Sch e idt ; him mentioned to Lord Castlereagh, and it had duct to any notions of public duty, -or national into- , the destruction of the arsenals and dzick yards at Antwerp, Tor sinceFlushing;reductionof-the appeared that all the predictions of Sir Wil- rest, after the information received from Sir Eyre ; possible, the Scheldt no longer navigable for Liam Erskine had been veri fi ed. Sir Eyre Coote Coote, that there were 8000 sick in the island in the ,1,1 1 ,, o r „, ar n . g ' P . . - considered the attempt at a coup-de-main difficult month of September ? How could the delay in send-. 2.1. That Flushing surrendered on the 15th of August, whereby and hazardous. The Marquis of Huntley did ing out relief have happened, when Sir Eyre Coote the reduction of the island of Watches-en was c ompleted; and that nabs o n a l . the th e enemy not think it practicable ; and General Calvert was wrote so pressingly for blankets, warm clOthing, andrt of at A A ug n e tw st, e all w a e t re teme:t. th o e n thef t e o t u and o aria of the Lieutenan y t.Gentrals, rp declar:d t y o be impracticable, and of the same opinion with Sir Eyre Coote. The medicines; communicating at the same time that the Noble Lord then proceeded to make some observa- sick were lying inhospitals without roofs, and almost i were abandoned. • tions on the defective arrangements which had been without medicines, and would actually have perished! i f o o w un e d oe r. Flu er ste s n a g, des ancl tro of 3d, That the destruction of the basin; dock-yard, arsenal, spe cie. st orehou s e s as s n i f t t w h a s s made for the attack upon. Cadsend, and the impossi- for want of these necessaries if they had nor been re- I i such ad p ,- an o d f t n h a val e sea 1)114 that Lord Gardner could conform to his in- lieved by the smugglers. He was not disposed to; ilavine been eCeeted on the t of of Decesuber p ,th p e island of Wa y !! structions by going into the Wieling Passage w hhout attribute all the blame to Government, but to thel chervil was on the 93d of December, evacuated by his Majesty's pilots. It had been said, that the-French force ap- effect of that miserable subordinationlif departments, I forces, and the Expedition ended. peared at Cadsand by a fortuitous circumstance. But which required that such applications should pass 4th, That It is does not appear to this House, that the failure of this Expedition lmputable to the conduct of the r.rtny or the nand that was a species of accident that reel - ally hap- through three or four o ffi cers before it could arrive at in the execution of their Instructions, relative to the military and pened to the French armies. They had always a the department whose duty it was to comply with it. naval operations in the Scheldt. force sufficiently strong, and at the pre per time, in The Secretary who conducted the affairs of the war sth, That on the 19th of August a malignant disorder sheaved every place where it was wanted. These, however, should possess a controul over every inferior depatt - i t tla ter am° ta rs i t ie his mb li el a r t s y i: s k t rmepusn;t ed and to tha u t, on th ards of e l it o th m o s f Sep were fortuitous circumstances which seldom occurred meat, and issue the necessary orders directly to each. 6th, Tharit appear by the report of the pw Physician appointed in our Expeditions. But in reverting to the intorma. 'lf the Medical Board had been efficient, he should to investigate the nature and causes of the malady to which his Lion upon which his Majesty's Ministers had acted, it not blame his Majesty's Ministers so much ; but that i Majesty's troops were thus evosed, that the disease Is one which prevails periodically in the Islands of Zealand, and is of peculiar been appeared to him that there were peculiarities in it. ; Board was known to have divided; r id o f malignity there, and which constantly follows a law of season, which ought to have led them not to depend upon it. lieved the determination had been taken to g et appearing towards the end of summer, becoming more severe In The person employed to procure this information, ;it before the Expedition sailed. When it was known the autumnal months, declining in October, and nearly ceasing In had stated the number that could be collected at Ant- i that our soldiery were perishing in such a manner, November. That perfect recoveries are rare, convalescence never weip in five days or one week, but the result of such 1 why had they been left to the ravages of the malady selnre or , and p t l b al a n t te wthemh render ee:urren a large quicklyceoffever prnp lays sufferers the founda information went only to shew, that the towns were without immediate and effectual relief . ) When Lord u cient not garrisoned, not that a considerable force might not 1 Chatham relinquished the ulterior objects of the/ 7t inefficient h, That of the for future military army whipurposes. ch embarked for service in the in a larger period of time be assembled. In proof of Expedition, why had not Flushing been corn- Scheidt, 60 Officers and 3900 Men, exclusive of those killed by this they had the report of the French General to his pletely destroyedeand the army withdrawn from that I the enemy, had died before the Ist of February last, and on that . _ frightf; ' -tav 217 Officers and It , Men were r.-- isick. - Government, stating, that so early as the 3d of Au gust, he had collected a considerable force at a point, where it might be seasonably directed to any quarter attacked. He had thus shewn, upon all the data which formed the foundation of all the calcula tions, respecting the Expedition against Antwerp, that it was morally,if not absolutely, impossible that it should succeed. It then rested with him to skew, that if it was not impossible for the Expedition that it should succeed, the nature and character of the arrangements made by his Majesty's Ministers for conducting it rendered success actually im possible. Upon this point "the evidence would bear him out, by sheaving that neither a soldier nor a 'sailor could have gone up to Santvliet within .four days after the arrival of the Expedition. The Noble Lord then took a review of the various particulars to the instructions to the different divisions, to prove . _ .aul scene of contagion and death, whilst it could yet be called an army ? They could not be told that it was necessary to keep Walcheren as a military po sition, because it would cost more to retain it than it was worth ; because our frigates could not at any time remain in the Vere Gat, Ter Veer being within range of the shot and shells of the enemy ; and be cause the island could never be maintained unless by keeping up a large permanent naval force to secure it. Could the population of this country supply the waste that would be the consequence of retaining pos session of that unhealthy position ? General Don, had, in the end, been obliged to apply for reinforce ments, in order to enable him to bring off his hospi tals, which would have been in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, if the naval line had been I forced. What could have induced the Ministers to ) be so callous to the representations of the sufferings of ,269. were reportea...— ...al, That the Expedition to the Scheldt was undertaken tm4er circumstances which afforded no rational hope of adequate success and at the precise season of the year when the malignant disease which has proved so fatal his Majoary's brave troops was known to be most prevalent ;that the advisers of this ill-judged en- ' terprize are, in the opinion of this House, deeply responsible for the heavy c alamities with which its failure has been attended. There was also a second set of Resolutions, as fol lows, relating to the retention of Walcheren :- 1 Ist That Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Crete having, on the 1 9th of September, been left In the command of Walther's, with an army of about 15,000 men, did, on that day, make an ofidal rt p oet on th e state of the island, the extent of force relLoired effec tually to guard it, the:keine* and condition of its defences, and the number of men thee sick and sink for duty; representhig that after suds his exposition, his Majesty's Ministers would be the best Judi*, of the propriety or possibility of keeping the island; and Odin& that the advantages must be great indeed which could composee the loss of lives and treasure which the retention must Demme* occaalon. td, s That a the aid of " _ _ _ till:point, by chewing, that the division of General Coote was ordered to Walcheren ; that of Sir John Hope to the East Scheldt, to wait till a solid footing should be made in Walcheren by the reduction-GT Vere, Armeyden, and Haak, and - then to take up defensive position in South Beveland ; thit the divi sion of the Marquis-of Huntley was ordered againat Cadsand, and then to cut off the retreat of the French from Flushing, brefflcting a lamling between Zout land and Flushing; and, drat the divisions of - Lord Rosslv and Generat Grosvenor were ordered to re the army, which all the country sympathized in with the most painful feelings ? Why had ,they delayed till the winter the evacuation, which should have taken.' place as won as the ulterior objects of the Expedition had been.given up ? Were his Majesty's Ministers oc- ' cupied in considering the means of retaining Wal cheren, or of retaining their own offices ? (liearyhor.) . Had the heart-rending accounts of the sickness of the troops made any impression upon their minds, key never would have exposed the army to the ; calamities it had endured. That intelligence wouick i ip s tve,.4l- . _ . September, hifMajeuy's /Ashlers, that the Manning pregtess of disease was ledh that If it should continue lo the same proportion far three weeks longer (as ,be added there was every probability that ft would), wit possession of the island must become very precarious. 3d, That on the 6th of October Sir Eyre Come, after stating that the cumber of sick was increasing, and that the effective force was thereby rendered so trivial, as to make the defence of the island, if it should be attacked, extremely pricarious, did express hit - anxiety to be Ihformed of the Intentions of his Majesty's Go 'vetiniednt as to the haute state of Watcheren. ' utb, Tlmusetwkhstanding these, and many other pressing re seesestations, on the aiortnist condition of the troops, and the dagger to, which they were exposed, his Majesty's Ministers did -elect to come to any deeidon the 4th of November, and - evanadaY . of - - yn . main in the rear for IsTesatir hours. and not to proceed to - the Ulterior objects till the investmeet of. Flushing should be completed. The artillery too had-been divided into two parts for the first and second objects; . . _ Downs duced any other men to use their efforts to tave-a•t.ink ing, 3 perishing army ; but it was the signal to them to renew their own disunion. (Hear, hear.) .14. Was not against the enemy that they directed thmer-pPiTtits, out- i until Mitt the — final - es . of Wakberen did not take place until i the OW of December. .50, That on the IQth of September, the of skk in the 404 of.,Walcherios eat, exclusive of officers, 6WB; sad th a t the iinnber ofiick embarked for Enshisid, between the mil of November, , r - they employed them ~. ty in preying upon theloselves. .- ...* 15th f s t eplaiiibir . and the veKiel Hove... was 11,199, making in ~ Wilda' in viscera vertcre veres.7 lat 'perk's' SD Ilattiik-itilek of 40119: ' That time which they should have devoted to she cu. That *Amends gnat *ad the Expediting had been public interests,ao the preservation of the army, they i ishwtsionedsis impracticable, &large pr ion ate* lidthlianiar employed in their paltry intrigues and Cabinet hick- waelli'll_, 9ll _,._,t m y '''''° r a c t _t lvaialdur r!t. bl vigw_i_ or any erings. The intelligence of the calamitous sickness 1 orm r"lr s " te 'Zi ch ma' a satitice 7rg' ilk trf i alr aje Zr o i t; l t ' i r tf ' s ,',:l eimb. of the troops was received on the sild of September ; dawn danger af atkiektras the away, and exposed darks a on the Bth, Lord Castlereagh resigned ; and on the psried.et *see t199.01190' wombs. aad ear ritetwittowiss at 17th Lord Liverpool's letter was dated, so - that the Wratthlr_, - the fltal„...ravne , of ncot s disseses te be which as whole of that period, which should have been taken . - 1, =7'"= 4 . 4 7: 4 '7 7 upiu devising measures for the restoration of the , — V d T: Tee nic k Th e --- coa d est at us hitalesty 4 a advisors, aft f or health of the army,was consumed in the inott.ditiraCe. the iscrareat imam cid* Hawn. ful squabbles for office. The Noble Lord InisilhOlttoe The lit Reecdotio!ilacrim_lateereadtom the Cher, mare twin to touch upon,. respeeting the lifeeifini • Lord CASTLFAMMIti wit no t ions to mh o th e up by Ministers, en the ground thet they bellessefised earliest opportooki of sublattato, the UP ON th e . Walcheren te,effcctn diversion in farciarifikoptiti— *anode tip* which he claimed tetchtlieen The kl e gkesectiquegied VW the laser of Mr. IleamMer : retabifct Plidir• du " 4:a S W" u "" 141 1118 and the sccood. Bart bad not sailed from -the tilltheahird of August. • From all these-circiamst.m. i cell, and a variety .of :other. passages in the mi. I dance to the same effect ) . the ,Noble-. Lord inferred, altar the army.could not haeoproceednd to theallterior 'objects according . to thearmagements of .his. Majesty's Ministers until aver that period, 'when even the most -sanguine looked upon success as impossible: These enungements. were, first.that the ulterior objects were sot to be. prosecuted till the investment of Flushing whole or uiaL p........., ---- - the was coollgeted ; 2 dIY , that Sir John . Hope was or. up in devising measures for restoration of the • Stit t Mat mita sae swum.. - _ _ dered• to talte a defensive position in South Beveland ; health of the arnry,was consimsed in the mostdi . t h e orpoust, eimere of dia a mi ss . . il• I 6dly, That the war ships should not be involved in the narrow and intricate navigation of the Scheldt ; and 4thly, That the artillery and ordnance had been divided into two parts, and the second had not sailed from this Downs till!. Sd of August. As to the . _ _ - _ ..• . 1 • • , .. . . - . . ___ ' r surbiltatosidateticasarla 'not have.had iusillinclacialf the lessidian erWalchereni, as istrian Minister did not even know whet* Was, and tha letter from-the Court of Buda did Giza the.continuance of hostilities on our p.trt in 4,bht a diversion in the north of Germany. His I .1. • .