Star. — London, England, 1810-02-19 00:00:00

': M _ ... THE INQUIRY. MINUTES OF EVIDENCE. FIFTH DAY, FEBRUARY 9.--(Concln led). F.AY. C. R.Owee. EMI. Captain of his Majesty's ship the Clyde. Examined by the cmontinee. Commanded a division of the Flseiremployed io the late I:pe on:ion, to the Scheldt. His first instruction went te the cep t ree of the Island of Cadsand, ar.d afterwards to the blocking the Ghent Channel. He received another instruction, given in et consequence of the change of plan that recommended discretion in proceeding, as it was probable the enemy's naval force might in the first instance be directed immediately to Cadsand. Relate what you did in consequence of timer instructions, as far as relates to the operation against Cadsand.—My original instruc tion had been communicated to Lord Huntley or the moment that I received it ; the second was communicated when his Lord ship embarked on the eetaiii g of the 27th July. My Lord Huntley also showed ire eis instructions, and a question arove as to the number of men that could be landed; Lord Huntley's in. structions supposed that 1 had the means of land,ing 2000 - men at one operation; I had not the means for that number; the num ber for the men of war was 615, at the rate that we calculated the boats to carry them ; but from some other means which discovered, that number was carried to 700; the Transports boats, if the weather had been fit for them to act e would have doubled that =umber. My Lord Huntley was anxious to see the Commander in Chief of the Army or General Brownrigg, the A::jutant-General, to have those orders explained ; and as early as the tide served on the morning of the lath, I furnished him with a vessel to go tit the Commander in Chief. It will be neces sal v to say I had been detached a day or two before, ani lay at an anchorage not inenediatety in the Downs. Lord Huntley e l un derstood, joined the Venerable, where the Commander in Chief was, just as she we. genies under way, aed was directed to fol low her throu ; h the Coin Stream, nod that she would heave-to when she wes clear of the Narrows; she passed me where I was laying, fol.:mein r the Venerable, but the weather was then very fo •gy ; I knew that orders nuts( be in their way to me to get tinder way, ash! I had great fear of l o sing the vessel that Lord I Wintry was hi, and that the troops would be left Without their General, I therefore eel-ailed her. I received my orders very shortly afterwards to weigh and proceed with the division ; we arehered that Meta off Blatikeebtirg, in a fair position for pro ceidiee to Cadsand in the morning ; whilst the squadron was getting under weigh in the moreing lOr that purpose, I had again e rersat ion with Lord Huntley on the subject of the slow ram • expected to he landed, and likewise upon the cautionary Lordship wished to see the Generals of the division 4, Generals Dyott .uid alontresor, and they came on consequence of Lord Huntley's instruction r u st my tie discretion, it was determined that the transports ichnr low down in the Channel, whilst I proceeded tur a() a situation from which I could notice what passed the channel I occupied, or the other entrance to Flushing _ Duerluo • my reason few taking that position 'wee, that given to und erstand my Lord Gardner, with a squadron of cattle ships then before Flushing, was to co-operate with o follow one through the channel by which I entered; I !hat his Lordship's squadron was not in a situation to ne through that channel, and tl.at if I had co-operation it could be by the channel of the liuerloo. The ttetle, , that I entered the channel, it blew too strong for boats to 'here was too much serf upon the beach; disposition was lauding on the morning of the 36th, at dawn of day.— nended to take the last part of the ebb-tide in -shore, and . low-water, which was between nide and ten o'clock; iestion arose as to the number of men that I could actually 'iore. It blew then too strong for the transport boats to : means of the men of war, were, as I said belere,limited hundred, and my I.ord Huntley did not think, with the instruction that he had, that he ought to risk the landing with so force, especially as I coeld not insure the boats returning second number of men under an hour; I think that it Ave been considerably more ;I stated an hour at the time. evening of the 21th, I had a letter from Sir Richard Stra and I returned an answer, pressing upon him, that my Lord expected a grater force to land than I had the means of on shore. On the evening of the 30th, I had another letter Richard Strachan, desiring me to suspend our operationt that side, until we had better help; my Lord Gardner's was at that time at the entrance of the Duetloo. Ou morning of tha 31st, another disposition was made fur land • measures wire taken for rimming the transports with regiments, on shore, to fecifitate the operation; but the • were then in considerable force, and it was still judged wait for the assistance of Lord Gardner's boats; I there a letter to his Lordship, informing him that it was for _ that we waited; and In return, his Lordship sent me !en-act from his instructions jet which it appeared, he was or remain where he was; the conclusion j draw from that . was, that it was intended we should proceed further and au ititeinent was made for that purpose. noon on the tietb, a signal was made to me that the were bringing down field-pieces; and on the evening of Ib, another signal was made to me for enemy's troops, in a ...station where they could he annoyed by gun-vessels. I went immediately to the ship which made the signal, but the soldiers then not to he seen; they had taken post behind the sand- , and in a battery on one Bank of the beach where we In. to land; the report of the officers of that ship, made item or fourteen hundred that had been seen ; we saw men in small parties of fifty and a hundred on the following we could form no judgment of the whole force upon iland. stated, that you then imagined you were intended for a destination; what further destination did you understand tended ?—t concluded to pass into the Scheldt, and on the .uenst I did receive an order to be ready to pass in under the line-of-battle ships which Sir Richard Strachau in me it was his intention to lead in. the goodness to state what were your subsequent opera -The letter I, have alluded to of the 241 of August, directed Toceed as near to Flushing as I could without exposing opens to risk front the enemy's fire, and to endeavour to the communication between Cadsand and Flushing. I forward some of the vessels that same night, but I was too he whole division to move, and guard-boats were like for the same purpose; on the 3d the whole division near as they could, without being exposed to the one . lon that evening received an order to send back the of troops with my Lord Huntley, to the Veer Gat, but remain myself for the purpose that had been before directed.— Sat same day 1 observed vessels passing between Flushing 'adsand, and sent the boats in chace of them, the vessels I believe, by running up the Scheldt, and the brig whose made to cover the boats wits disabled In attempting to re in consequence of a shift of the wind; she afterwards shore on the Ellebogg, outside of Flushing; the next morn en vessels to her assistance, and when she floated, went and took that position myself; it was a position upon the the Ellebogg which divides the channels of the Weill') and luerloo; I considered it a good position for assisting in the of Flushing, and 1 held that station the rest of the siege. statement that I give in this manner upon recollection is im ', but the C.:pomander its Chief has a ready call upon all the imandera of divisions for narratives; mine has been deliver -I of course he is now in possession of my detailed narrative whole proceedings. •ou know whether, after you had taken that positional the the Ellebogg, any vessels did pass from Cadsand tte Flush • was the blockade complete ?--The blockade was by no complete; on the ftli several vessels passed over full of 4 ; I saw them preparing, and had the men of war ready to eider way after them; -at the instant of their putting off, the it hen and the Zenobia weighed by signal from Me, but the vas so short and the wind so strong, that the vessels got in spite of them, some gun-boats came down from the , but also too late to cut them off; they took a position, would prevent any more vessels passing; but it came to strong that the gun-bout were driven from that station, re obliged to seek shelter in the Slough. The same yes ' attempted on the evening of the 6th also, to return to Cadsand ; they were all cut off but one sehuyt and one boat, and "urned again to Flushing; that schuyt sa the following morning returned again to Hushing, full of troops, after the gun-boats had - driven from their station. That was the last reinforcement got in; from that time, I consider the blueeade to have been complete. ..• . De you imagine, that If such had been your instructions in the first instance, or if you bad been provided with any different description of force, it could have been possible to have invested flushing on the sea-side without occupying Cadmium' ...It blew strong between the 3d and the 7th of August, too strong for gun-boats to have remained la that channel fur the greater part of tunttey was (knead. I shertly after arzhored tin CO. lliag to C getting uncle a conversatit were es .ortier ; bib I. under him, 0 board; in ce orderto use should a:ich• ettr up low either in the railed the Di I was given line-of-battlo me and to ft oliserved th. follow me t from it, it c the day that And, there made for la: It seas inter to land at it but a qnesti put on shot act. The m to seven hu instruction small a for( with a seco would have On the eve] ohan, and I kluaittey ca putting on from Sir R upon that . squadron v the morain ing. and n two regiro enemy wel better to w tore sent a his boats tl an extract dered to re order was, JitTansoner About enemy Wel the stab, a situation w immedlatel were then • hills, and funded to I twelve or f arriving in day, but the island. You state furrher slei to be totem of Augt Rorer of ti formed me Have tht tions ?-r1 me to prod the tramps cut off the pushed fun hate for the wise sent I moved as n my's fire. division of to remain n Ou that sar and Calsan escaped, I I signal I null join me, in ran on skier ita•;, I sent N d M to and I end of the the Duerlo blockade of The staterr perfect, bu Commands rd, and au of the win Do you cid of the • it.g, or wa niatis con troops; I get under Nynllllen Tun wall a across in s Slough, IN whish wo blow so at and were sets had at Cadsand; returned a returned a been chive that got it . complete. Do you first insta descriptite flushing very strOr gun-lsoats the time; posed - from the (safety by any . could have been _ me . _ - ow( ._ . bons, eelty from the tl __ busts Was not Wm the want oft but the wind Blowing extremely hord directly off ;he 'their means of towing not being Breit , thet would fl gt I much propr•_ss, and there was danger of their being drifted undei the - ati tries which vlere at the other exteesnity of the beach whim it wa intended to land. .. ...- \ft I \ • • If yi u had heen provided witha sufficing number , Ai I competent description, could you have affected a ti Mai dent force for the purposes of the Etpetlition, on the gOtia ...... Tile qnestion was to land 2000 men ; f u r that we must hate had a much greater force of men of war; the Men of war we had, had their full complement of boats—as many as. hey could well W carry. hit was your destination after the surrender of Flushing f-- A tier the surrender of Flushing, I was detached with a small ' squadron to the side of Prowers-haven upon Scowen. Are the Committee to understand, that the projected operation ,of the landing 2000 men of Lord. Huotiey's division was defeat ed for the want of a proper description of boats ?--I was hbver pe-pared to expect that it was necessary that 2000 men oboulabo :anded ; I never heatir of ouch an expectation until lord Hum. ley had embaibed, all the arrangements had been made for some day. - I)7d you understand frog,/,ord Huntley, that he had an ex i?ectation of being able to land two thousand men at one op,. ration ?—Never, until the evening of the 27th. _ - —i\ .1, u ..... _ But on the evening of the 47th you did understand so N—Cer ..ainly on the evening of the 27th; but as I have stated, the at. rangentents were made some days before; on the 24th, 1 gave my instructions to the Captains under me, and on the 25th I sent a copy of those instructions to my Commanderin-Chief. Was the squadron under , your command provided with flat boats for landing troops, in addition to your own hosts?—lt woos State, as far as you know, the designation of the fire-ships under the command of Captain Tomlinson destined to yactill Walcheren, so far as belongs to the present question ?—Thilet vessels formed no part of the squadron under my orders- T -thep joined me in The Weilin Channel, and I attached a gun-bsis to them for their protection; of their subsequent movements I 'know nothing. Can you form any opinion of the number of troops that were transported from Cadsand to Walcheren, on the 6th of August and the following day ?—The number was considerable ; but cannot judge of them. , Were the batteries on the coast of Cadsand in such number and of such& description as to render it very difficult for troops , tus land upon that Island ?—The batteries were not strong on the part of Cadsand ; where I was the troops might have been co vered well; but the tides were very strong, and there was dan ger If boats could not move rapidly across it, that they might be drifted within the fire of those batteries. Is the Committee to understand, that there are parts of the island of Cadsand where troops might be landed without being exposed to the fire of any batteries whatever ? No, but the troop, might have been coveted by the ships of. war. Under all circumstances you are in possession of, do you th?nk it would have been advisable in a military point of view to have attacked the French at Cadsand ?—lt certainly was desirable to disarm the batteries at Cadsand. _ _ _ Was it in your opinion advisable, under all the circumstances that you know to have misted ?-0n the morning of the soth, 1 think it might have been attacked with success, the enemy had not then shown any force. Were the batteries on the coast of Cadsand close or open batte ries ?—They were open ; I am not clear that there was not aim lisade in the rear—there was no intrenchment behind them. If the Island of Cadsand had been in our possession, would it have been possible for the transports to have proceeded up the Scheldt without molestation front the guns of Flashing ?—i think it would. You hare stated, that you cannot ascertain the precise nurnßer of men which the boats of Lord Gardner's division might have carried, without ascertaining the precise number of men they would have carried ; have you any means of knoWing whether those boats would. with your own, have been able to lard the 2000 men which Lord Huntley required ?—They would no doubt whether the whole number landed.by my beats sad those of Lord Gardner's division would have exceeded one thot sol. I understand you to have stated, that you think if the landing had been effected at Cadsand on the 30th,lt would not then have been opposed by a force that would have resisted ?—There was no appearance of force on the morning of the SOth. If it bad not been for the violent state of the wind on that mor ning, would not that landing have been effected ?—1 think it would; some stress was laid on Lord Huntley's Instructions to land 2000 men ; but still I think the landing would have been carried into effect. Ho many men of war had you under your cothmand?—Tbere were five frigates, five sloops, I think three or four gun vessels, and I was joined there by a bomb ; the sloops were for the most part a small class of brig which has not boats for landing troops. Do you happen to know whether Lord Gardner's squadron had flat boats ?—1 understood sot generally; there might have been a few, but not generally. Do you happen to know whether Lord Gardner bad sit or eight sail of the line ?—I am not certain by any means; but I think six. In the conversation you had with Lord Huntley on the 27th of July, did you understand I.ord Huntley MA reason to expect that you would have had the means of landing 20(X) men ?—My Lord Huntley's instructions expressed that expectation. I think you have stated in your evidence that it was Sir Ri chard Strachan's intention to have gone up the Scheldt on the sd of August; what day did the frigates and line-of-battle ships pass up the Scheldt ?_The order for the frigates to pass was received on the Bth ; they passed on the 11th ; there had been a previous order which was countermanded: the line-of battle ships did not pass through until the day after the batteries were opened against Flushing, but they came to the inner part of the Ducrloo on the day the trigates passed through. Can you state to the Committee the reason why they did not ' pass sooner ?—From the Bib to the 11th the wird wulotil, they /mild not go ; Sir Richard Strarban's intention to pass through with the line of battle ships I have stated was expressed to me in a letter dated the 2d. Can you state the reason why they did not pass up between the 2.1 and the Bth cannot. You do not know any reason why they could not have passed up between the2d and the nth ?—There were many days on which they could have passed, there were some days en which they could not ; the intention of Sir Rickard Strachan's letter on the 2d was to hold the ships in readiness to push up, after the retreat of the Frew. line of battle ships had been cut of by our troops at Baths; whether the French ships having passed Baths made any change in the plan I really do nut know. You have stated, that notwithstanding some stress was hid upon the subject of Lord Huntley's intstructione from the •30th, you would have landed the 2000 men ; in what numbers did you_ mean to disembark these men?--I think if I could have premis ed a rapid return of the boats, that they would have landed with the 700 men. Then, according to I.erd Huntley's instructions, you and Lord Huntley would, notwithstanding those instructions, have risked that landing, contrary to your sense of the instructions?--What I state is matter of opinion, gathered from the terms in which the conversation was held; my Lord Huntley was anxious for the performance of the service and would, I have no doubt, have taken upon Mm that discret ion Which every officer at a distance' from his superior must do. You have stated to the Committee,that you had in eontempla don to have run transports on shore, for the purpose of landing two regiments. but were prevented in consequence of the accu mulated force that appeared to be collected at Cadsand ; if you had thought of this measure a little owner, might not you have put the teen on shore by the same means 1--There was an objec tion to the running the transports on shore while the enemy was in force, and the weather was unsettled; it would not have made the number actually landed'greater; the intention was tole* the boats return more rapidly, but on the Mtth the wittiwas diesetly off the laud, and it would have been difilcutt inset the transports there. At whit distance from the shore do you imagine the trans ports would have grounded ?—The shore was more steep than I expected to havefound it, but I really cannot say how near the transports would have gene without rounding. Is it your opinion that it a landing had been, dttempted on the rank of 790 men, Carload wookl have been in possession of the British Army ?—We should have made our lending good--the enemy had $ forte there on the mow evening. . • How early in• the day amid the isadlagprobably have bass made good ?--Betwees alas and tea fa the morolug. alt, Vat I ii4diaaiti.fatifit . issita . ism lot cadsiod was,. *II sathinka,7l:uu r'a t 5h0u114.16. hat:c.rera5i0nan".:::":011:7;;;;meL4414161"41:Chatk77..c.......',1"4:11114'rtie1itib...0nge...11.1.„...77, t &nu b t : l ll 4llgie t; loe ltr i l went * c:M ilt m l" un th ic C In: : j o f 700 men ! f. ig :: e em a i l ::: . it " .: aer ft tlie Thl7 , de: t—i . wen: ra lY on ' e a r boa t d o rd the Thalia 7 ... T p- rir l i lli t7. 4 ,l ll4 .1 " -1 delivered:t ot :: . 0 . ...t t ; ...cd a 6.. ....64 of .-era o n eeekila r bed the kited* on shore that was intended—the ph oe nZo&i .. 4 -_ matctig . *bale frifade ate vr,its f.. td Did you coraniehicato this vision . to Lord' Huntley ?--I told oh bosedthe h aa dAt tat toesahir Cadtg li teit .liellaelinbe h the Ex4tedidon e " what The areiv 2! it ed t of 3fi ltl l y e , aF Alabl ev' tit • WIT Lord Handily Aliat thertfmight be a retain of she hints , in • about an hour, but not in less than thee. Did the same objection which you .stated to employ t he o'elOck, we anchored abreak of Blankenburgh, which Is at a liQ Ira:upon boats, apply to thooloollotiog the let-boats you w ith ' di st a n ce tom Cadsand. your squedroa 1--By so Apia; the flatefelets were takeninto the On th e m o rnin g o f t h e 941 4 had ye t i .on opportunity cif os. calculation of the 700 men. serving what was the state of the batteries: r bf the enemy' s in t :. you room on board row sliladron for more flat-boats than in Cadsand i---On the 30th I went on bitsrd the beediaa ntr l ilesised P--I think not ; Iliad the transports examined, they were ship, and waked on the .IVlattluis of Huntley ; I had an opp urt , alt of too small a size to carry Bat boats. nity of observing tisestite'of the batteries, lint not of the enemy's 1 ' State whether, after Lord Huntley communicated to you his force ; the state of thellatteiles nearly ininfinned that I bad se i i listructions not to attempt a landinguniest he could put on shore of &moue of the sosethefere, when I went to reconnoitre it, i, 4 ; Sono men at one trip, you had an opportunis7 of commootnatilet I had an oppormattypt observing sow few gun ' s the sec on d • ; 'thin pert of the initructions to Mr Richard racban, or in point which I did Do t o b ser v e th e first time I was sent eheie. ilffact, did comotesicate that part of the instruction so Sir Kich. From the observations you made ttft the kith, did you think it Strachan 1----1 did not consider the instruction was not to land would have been practicable or prudent to have attacked th„a unless 2000 men could be put on shore ' • but it did state an tepee- batteries by landing detachinents of - not snore than 700 men at a tatitm that I could land that number; I did not know . it until late rime ?--The batteries appeared to me to have very li t e s t rontt f in the evening of the 27th, and had so opportunity to communi- in themselves, but the propriety of attacking them with 7cp e „,.. case it. would depend entirely upon the enemy's force, which I rano: vouch for; I do not know what force the enemy had them; the What was the distance between your squadron and that of Lord Gardner on the morning of the 30th f---Lord Gardner's b atter i es appeare d to me to b e o p e n batteries: squadron was in sight to leeward, hot that was Olin the eotirse of Do you know the reason why the debarkation did net take the forenoon ; it took its statiou off the Merle*. ptace !-- I know the orders that were given with regard to the (In h Do you know the state of the French force as to skips of wartrkation, but I cannot say that I know the reason why tho se in the basin of Flushing, at the time you speak of their ounobers, orders were not executed; forte, and state of equipment ?---There were no vessels in the i Whet were the orders that were given ?---The day of the 30th basin - she enemy's Beet it was understood when we sailed was at '' was principally spent in making arrangements for the landing; Flushing, but I had learned from a cutter on the evening of the I orders we-e given that the i.tli regiment was to land in n nate , asi i 28th, that the ships bad returned to the Schtkit ; I saw three sail : o rd e rs ;ante that night (I do not recollect at what hour of i n n 1 which I supposed to be of the line in the Scheldt, there was a t night, but on the night of the 30th, that the transports ronrain. frigate and some gun-boats on Hushing. 1 ing the two other battalions of General Montresorn brigade, which were the Seth and 4.sid, were to run on shore, while the i In your *Mon was the previous capture of Flushing necessary 1 pub land's' in•boate : on the mornittg of the 31st the soldier were 1 to the laureled attack upon Antwerp ? -- As matter of op i n ion I think not, but chit .opinion is formed since the event; I beg fur- ready to step irto tbe hoattewith two days provisions cooked sc• 'her to state that in the employment 1 was, r could take but a •. cording to orders g yen, Old the Ships stood it: closer to the coast ' very natruw view of of the proceedings or intentions. • on the morning of Ore Sint ; afterwards those orders were culla. ' In your onirtion, considering the other points et descent that • termanded, but Ido not•know the reason why. were within our power, did not the debarkation upon WAlche- • Is it your opinion that the snips of war could have approached rem mischievotiely as well as unnecessarily retard the objects of near enough to the coast to have covered the riche, kation of au the Exnedition. . . detachment on the :title or '3lst 1.-I thou)), think the Naval Officers are the best judges of that question ;but it appears to n:e (The Witness was desired to withdraw, and a warm Dzbat , ensued.] there was no difficulty in landing, unless what might arise trom The Witness was again called in, and the question innPoted• the enemy having a greater force than we could oppose to them in To answer that question, I think I should at the time he in the first instance.; of the enemy's force lam not a judge. possession of more than I actually know ;I am not at all , aware W 23 that detachment provided with the intrencbmg tools which of the objects of the Expedition, but from common report the might have been wanted for that service ?—The lielarqui, of view in which the Comtoander in Chief saw it then must be very of Huntley did not communicate to me his intentions, or the ra- Afferent from that in which be would see it liow ; I humbly sob- ture of the operations that were likely to be executed by the divi.. snit this is a question I cannot answer. a -ion ; hut we bad intrenching tools enough to make batteries, to Thie object stated In the question related so a former mica:Jon es take auy small post. in which. the main object is stated tb be the destniction of the I Did you, at any time on the .oth or 31st, state to the Marquis arsenals at Antwerp ; was not that object. mischievously and un- of Huntley, that there was a deficiency in the intrenching tools,if necessarily retarded by the debarkation •at "Walcharan ?" --- if the 1 any field works were to be raised 1-There were twosntall ordnance same troops were afterwards to proceed to Antwerp, it must of i vessels fitted out with Intrenching tools, woe for the Marquis of couse be a very great delay'; in the way 1 then saw at, nlusisiOn i Huntley'sdivision, the other for Sir John Hope's; the arrival of seemed to be a very primary object. i those vessels was reported to me on the 30th, when we were Are you correctly understood to have stated , if it had n o t been lying off Cadsand • I had the day before , officially reported to the for the unfavourable state of the wind, the boats of th e Men of I Marquis of Huntley, that in consequence of the want of intrench- War together with the boats of the Transports, might have ing tools, the engineer's department was entirely inefficient, but lauded 1400 men at once I—They worn'. ' this difficulty was obviated by the arrival of the vessels I have moo in point of fact, by the return of the men of war's boats might cloned on the 20th. nor the whole 2000 men have been landed in three hours 1-1 Do you know of any report.rnade to the Marquis of Huntley thi•A they would not have been landed in 3 hours. I thick we upon the day intended for his landing, that the enemy were rery should have found difficulty in getting the boats back.• strong in Cadsand ?—The isfyinphen frigate was lying in-shore ; That is supposing that the men of war's boats should have re- she made signals with regard to the enemy's force by onegraph, turned no-It would have been an hour at least before they could which signal was read by every frigate, consequently I heard have returned ; I think from the state of the weather it would the pinport of the intelligence communicated by Captain Max have been more. well in that way. In the communication made by you to Lord Gardner, did you . What intelligence did that frigate convey by telegraphic signal? ask for the boats of Lord Gardner's squadron to be sent to you, It was I think on the 30th, but I am not positive, thit be tele or did you ask for the junction of Lord Gardner's squadron with graphed that there were 1,500 men 'seen on shore; at another your's ?—1 wrote for his Lordship's co-operation; lat the some time that there wore some field-pieces seen on shore. time stated that his boats were what I wanted ; and I made the What distance of time was there between those two communit conunuoication, thinking they might conic when the ships could cations ?--The 1,500 men were telegraphed on the 30th, and the not. field-pieces on the Slat '; but he was making constant signals, Idid What were the contents of Lord Gardner's letter inclosing the not attend to them in general. extract front his Instructions ? -It was a letter of form,. merely Do you know that the Marquis of Huntley himself recon laclosing the instruction ; and acknowledging the receipt of mine. mitred that forte reported by the frigate, or sent any Orme WI Is the Committee to understand, that that extract from the in - his Staff to reconnoitre it 1-.1 do not know that lie dia l 1 mime structions implied an order to Lord Gardner not to detach his on board the head-quirters ship. boats from hie squadron no-The order was for Lord Gardner to At what hour on the Mith did those two vessels with the keep the situation he then held, and that perhaps it might not be trenching tools on board report themselves to you ?—I do net ' necessary at that time for the troops to be landed at Cadsand. remember the hour, it was in the morning. I believe that these Was the in the instruction, or was that only the inference vessels came in the convoy with us, but I did not perceive them drawn from the instruction?--It was In the instruction. in so large a convoy, and nobody else knew any think akin Hay, you got that original extract, or have you a copy Of that t h em . extract with you ?--it is in town; I have no copy with ewe. [No. 0, beinn the Sixth day's examination, entirely consists of How far were the ships you commanded from the intended certain Mentor:lona delivered in by Sir Hoene Popham relative to place of landing ?---The first station I took was from two to three his knowledge of the navigation of the Scheldt. The substance miles from the place n it was intended to move the ships,•and to of three Memoranda have been already given in the examinatioa go wi:hin half a mihnof the beach. of that officer. Was the state of the wind on the morning of the 30 th of July , . e such as to enable the Boats of the men of war and the fiat busts lei effect a lauding P--it was; they would have been some time in re wing in. You have stated, that at noon on the 30th of July, a signal was made for Fieldpieces coming down to the shore ; would it, in your opinion, have been prudent to have larded seven hundred men, stating as you do the difficulty of getting the boats off to 'mid 700 others?---At that time the idea of !audios had been abandoned for the day. You have stated, that if the English Fleet had passed flushing they might nave proceeded to Antwerp ; state to the Committee whether you think they cesuli have passed I.illo before they had got to Autwerp, without the capture of Lillo I—lhaire not stated that they could have gone to Antwerp. You have stated that on the morning of the 30th of July you. could have landed in the boats of the men of wee under your command, about 700 British troops; at thet time had you any reason to know what the strength of the enemy in Cadsand was ? —1 have stated that we saw no force at that time. , Enke Witness was (Greeted to withdraw ] Brigadier-Genera! MONTRESOR examined. Were you not's General Officer under the coinntaod,of the Marquis of Huntley in the late Expedition 1-1 was. . 7 Did Lord Huntley communicate to you his instructions ?-.-He did. • , What were these Inetructione 'relative to the landing in Cad , sand ?-411'hat the larding in Cadsand was intrusted to the wish •,. stodb men, to hi tinder my command. , [The witness went on to state that it was considered unsafe nal land this body of men, unless at one trip, on account of the nuns.' bets of the enemy, but that there Was not a euffielent number of boats provided for the purpose ] Did Lord Hantley express to you, in sonversatton, any dliale.i pointment in finding there were not boats to enable him to carry into execution that which he had understood from General /Samaria he was to carry into effect, namely, the landing 9000! um atone time ?-No man could express greater disappoloment. What passed in that converiadon ? [The witness was directed to withdraw, and a long discussion as to the propriety of the question took place.] The Witness was again called tc, and the citation proposed. He expressed great surprize that the boats were not in number suffacis.nt to land the 2000 at he had expected. The Cotintiodore said, he could not depend upon the eransport boats, ai they COuld nor row on shore if the weather was rough; there was nothing further that I recollect that was material. • Was that the only conversation in which ley express any surprize and not* sufficient nt one trip ?---He day when I sa* with that 10.- - " Do you ..__ tu r it t_one* merle k CRAMS lie - I wail ' ilk t inig - ,M R. GOSS, Surgeon, has the honour to inform. his Friends and Correspondents, that from the continuer increase of g.plicationsforthe treatmeat and cure of VENEREAL. COMPLAINTS and DEBILITY, he hasbeen induced to take a Partner, and the Concern will henceforgi be conducte4 under the firm of Goss and Co. He assures them also, that the same princi ples Of Integrity, Secrecy and Delicacy, will be invariably observ ed, which hitherto have marked a Practice as successful, its it is widely extended. Letters from the Country, containingo Bank note, describing particulars of the case, age and usual mode of living, punctually attended to, and Advice and Medicine sent to any part of the Kingdom. No. Is, Bouverie-street, Fleet-street, Feb. L t IMO. IMPORTANT DISCOVERY. THE Advantage the Public must always derive from regularly educated professional men directing almost exclusively their studies t. one species of malady, was nevermore clearly demonstrated than by the unexampled success which has attended the administration of their new reined,', aid the extraor dinary cures it bas performed. For along aeries of years Messrs. Coital! and Co. Surgeons; formerly in his hl;;jcsty's service, have made the Venereal Disease the particular object of their investi gation, and are happy in having discovered a medicine superior to mercury, in the cure of that complaint ; it Is sufficient to obsffve, dui the effects of this remedy are diametrically opposite to those of mercury, for though it completely eradicates every vestige of the virus, in its most confirmed stages, yet it does not in the least injure the constitution on the contrary, It renovates the System in all its natural functions, promotes appetite, and facilitates d:- gestion; thes instead of r educing a strong and vigorous constini thin to the frightful condition that mercury does, it not only pre" serves that constitution in its primitive state, but restores a weak and debilitat.ll one to its natural strength and vigour. Nunt'arr less instances are on recent record of the superior efficacy as medicine. ittlnherent and specific virtues acting as a perpttiA corrective to bodily debility, whether proceeding from an ex:of of conjugal or illicit pleasure, sir from the more insidl, , as, 00 0 0 'not less destructive, ii ulgenee of incautious rutls of both In a certain pernicious habit. Amidst the meiatteltnly variety are el disorders which arc the conirequence of this solitary vice, there none more afflicting than that distressir.g state of debility and de' Acielice which prevents or embitters the matrimonial state; thL Unhappy safferer broods over his misfortune, ashamed to seek ie ._ reduced to such of we.:kness 'as to raider rt • of that "ID , . I. • . • et &if ci Meld affle twaeb rib g' atfli SAO iiiii aheitei Sit el* *OA the time ; itn? tell et " 141 - 'posed tlf the enemy's fittritiledelde Without posmiliss al Ciii.• . Wisell44lllllll,VlllPkwillo Nl* IR She sand must eettahttrhatelsesb gara t4 4o/140 1 1. *-, " 4 T . sees at taw • desk OR tl si egret 0 1 erer., ,8 ; , , r• You state, that on thelOth le !go TVS 1 ..; • • `4,, • • from the transports boats • &OM hh b*ess • - : ititlefax eplitis2oo, NI, 1121. !Wald jame Waft safety by any other descAPthsis of boats 'ion ilkit'ilay ?—.Thep in altars sfiviellessa . ?f OD own t..—.,we e mr t o i taid. co coal: Kaye been landed' front doe sneer saf wiz% boats ; the dia. ' Ili ft' issir ft,,• Meteor* citify Irom the trapsporks lusts Was Nat frOas the want of Gareth *Awed a lan of. theta divisions a 700 men I n deek olliWe . . . ... . . . _ . ~_..-1-. —lr .1... 1....1 arasi ...MA hall! had the brirada on shore that was listen bat I recollect that was mamas. .. hat the only conversatiOn in which you heard Lordffunt• belt 'at" be is reduced "J . " O a state 431 w" kncss *a' to '"— Ns any surprise and disappoimMent at finding there were life oppressive. To such persons it mast be a consoling rtil,.C. Eden number of boats provided to land %/CO mien itt' tion to know, that they may now, by a hew infallible mode Of ?—s-lie repeated his surprise afu:rwards, the following treatment, be restated t.n that greatest of all humanblessing l l 3 iii n I sa* him, that the squadron had not been furnished strong, manly and v iirous constitution. t number abeam . in all Cases of debility, deficiency., from whatever cause gristle , in not know, that Transport Boats are Usually employed t. as well as in every species of venereal infection, Messrs. Currie lebarkation of troops t-r They are 'ganerally;' but this i and Co., may be consulted by patients of eithr sex with the i opien Roadsted, the landing trempl is transpeet hops i penes: secrecy, and honour, at their house, No. lin, Hatto9- :we precarious. f ' Garden .. • Patients la the hr country, describing the parrical sra of their com . l'aP, . i ' plaints„by letter pi's; paid. enclosing a Bulk notes Xs WILLIAM PAISLEY, wil l Zii" CaPiaila ill flit a &lie theneeessary medicine and agile= seat to soy Part of th. Evineers.—.Examined Ay Its GOlNS:iil.fie : kiar . ,dom. No. 107, Hatton-1;m it you Chief Engineer in Lord Huntley's shtijes —.I + -------: you employed to reconnoitre the .defences . • tp4oyed to reconnoitre span the praeticabilityisf a land!ng LONDON i Printed and pablishis4 by LEV AL KENT, ei„, e a " md. . terburysl)lace, Lambeth at the 81-AA-O rr ice, No. 1. mart was your repart, spun that subject t—i pt: stator the salt- e tract. Published also at the YiTarrOrrsch,Tet u f le l a ' . , ..