Star. — London, England, 1810-01-24 00:00:00

C• !y le Ct te .t% n ut i 4 lex :0' rid, f ir . . . . . , . . po i nt so which o foe should h aves been diree. uxam nepled calamities, his Weary's Mini : tc d, was another s ubject mature cnsderation.— the greater number of whom the terrors of impeach,- Discontents had shewn themselves in many places— ment were impending, should dare to remain in office. i n t he North of Germany and elsewhere. To take (Hear, Hear !)—But if Parliament should, without advantage of these ought to have been our object— any regard to their past conduct, think proper to giVe b u t instead of that we delayed our expeditions till its support to such rulers, or lend its sanction to such the hopes of Austria we re destro y ed, and then sen t meas ures , nothing could more clearly evince that , them on destinati o n s where our resources were s q uan- silent but a c t ual and alarming change which said I dered, our brave troops sacrificed, and all our enter- to have taken place in the British Constitution : no- I prises attended with complete failure. Continued thing could more indisputably shew the resemblance I disgraces betel the country, and accumulated discs- between the government of this country and those old I ters marked its Government ; but of all our calami- governments of Europe, which, weighed down hr the ties, the Expeditions to Spain and Walcheren claimed in fl uence of corruption and imbe c ili t y, fell suc cess i ve ly t he pre-eminence . The failure of the Campaign of a certain and easy prey to the superior wisdom and I 180 i in Spain, seemed to have no other consequence energies of the power which has enslaved them.— than to induce Ministers to risk its repetition. At Having made these general observations upon the ' that periods though we had brave troops and good subject at large, he proposed to apply himself more. Generals, still a superior force opposed to us, and a particularly to what appeared to him to be the main Goveinment aiding us by Decrees which it was too question under consideration =- the conduct of the war. i v i eek to enforce, should have shewn us the impolicy Every Gentleman who heard him must be aware, that 1 of our operations. Du r ing the whole C am p ai g n Sir since the last session of Parliamen t the conduct of the ! Jelin Moore was never succoured by a single Spanish war in every quarter had been attended by failures' ar my : indeed every day gave us more occasion to more complete, disgraces more signal, and losses a dmire the valour and regret the fate of that lament- more deplorable, than had ever been paralleled in ed officer. All the skill and perseverance which he any war in which this country had been engaged-- t vinced were only sufficient to facilitate the retreat of That was the plain, but true statement of the case, 1 oer ill-fated army. What was the result of this cape- which, though it might be attempted to palliate, it 1 r ience ? Only to confirm our Ministers in their infatua- was absolutely impossible satisfaCtorily to account for, 1 tion (Hear) —only to induce them to send fresh forces or successfully to justify. As that House must he' to a country where we had failed before, and to a Go- sensible how much such a state of things must impli. vernment with which no previous arrangement had , cate the conduct of those entrusted with the admini. been nude. Even the pompous embassyofLord Wel- stration of affairs—how far it must affect the charac ltelee proved abortive; that embassy which promised ter of the nation—it was was one of it most important e , mud' and performed so little (Near) returned and essential duties to institute an immediate, vigi. after a battle which was followed by a retreat—a slant, and severe inquiry into the real causes of the na. ~;: e r y which was marked with all the calamitous eon- tional calamities, and even to carry up the result of g c q l tcii e e s of a defeat ! (Hear, Hear.) After this, such inquiry to the foot of the Throne, in an Address oar c elebrated expedition to the Scheldt was prepared to his Majesty, stating that they could no longer re -an expedition formidable, certainly, in expence, and pose confidence in those Ministers whose conduct had whose expectation was of course commensurate with produced such lamentable instances of public die- j t i c , magnitude of its preparation ? It was sent out aster and disgrace. But without entering into the' after the Austrian armisttce, and therefore destitute detail, jest then, he must be allowed to make one of any foreign object. Its design was, then, as the general remark, that the number, the nature, and sreeh informed us, purely British ; and this design, the succession of their failures, were prima facie l 3 0 plattsible in appearance, how was it accomplished? evidence of the incapacity and ignorance of his Ma- Did we conciliate a foreign country, or did we bene- jesty's Ministers ; for, though he should not con- fit our own ? No I After having met no opposition tend that failure was in all cases a proof of want in its progress, our army returned with diminished of wisdom or of imbecility, yet he must contend, numbers fioin the demolition of' a single fort, which that where failures have been constant, frequent, and a few weeks can re-establish ! Even in its original invariable, they afford the strongest presumption foundation, this Expedition was erroneously planned, of the weakness and incapacity of those, whose mea as appeared . from the - dispatches of Lord Chatham, sures thus uniformly terminate in disappointment who was:compelled to abandon its objects, in cause- and disaster—(Hear, hear.) That such had been fi ance of finding Antwerp in a defensible state— the issue of all the measures of his Majesty's present the dozen ships, - which it was our object to destroy, Ministers, he need only appeal to their history for a moored in safety under the citadel—and even the ha- demonstration. If he were to go into any detailed tarot of a landing un the continent dangerous in the proofs of this assertion, it would be an insult to the estreme. How was this error remedied ? Was it by enlightened Assembly he was addressing ; to the re the quick withdrawing of the troops ? Alas ! no ; that collection •of every one of whom, innumerable in. would have too glaringly exposed the weakness of our stances to illustrate it must be familiar. What mea government ; and so the brave soldiers were doomed sure of theirs, during the last 12 or 18 months, could to lingering destruction in a climate notoriously pesti- be contemplated that had not ended in failure and lential. Two circumstances might. have shewn Mi- disgrace ?—(Hear, hear !) The calamitous retreat nines: its fatal influence ; the first was.the publication of the army under Sir John Moore was one memo of a book on the subject by Sir John Pringle, in which rable instance, and that but a few months before be gave a catalogue of its incidental diseases, and was preceded by the disgraceful Convention of stated the average of sick there in 17/7 to be as four Cintra ; in short, every where, and in every possible to ore. What they were in the late expedition re- way, and under all possible circumstances, they had mined yet to be decided. The second circumstance most deplorably failed. Success had never crowned which mould have warned Ministers, was the stipu- their measures but in their ever-memorable attack lotion which the Dutch were obliged to enter into upon Copenhagen.— ( Hear, hear.).— Against the with all the foreign troops in their pay, not to employ enemy every operation of theirs proved abortive ; it • them in Zealand during the fatal season our Govern- was only in their attacks upon friends that their mea mein had selected. (Hear.) He should now con- sures were not characterised by failure. ( Hear, hear, elude, without touching on many remaining grievous hear.) it was impossible that such continued failures charges, which he left to abler hands than his. What could be ascribed to accident, to a miracle, or to any he had already stated, was, he conceived, a sufficient thing but their own weakness and incompetence. That ground for an ameftdment, for the purpose of moving man must possess a mind of an extraordinary descrip which he had risen. The statement which he made, tion, who could ascribe the Convention of Cintra, the even inexperience might have undertaken without expulsion of the British army from Gallicia, the dis vanity, as the cause in which it originated must call; graceful termination of the Expedition to Walche fort% instinctive and unqualified condemnation. He ten, and the late disasters in Spain, to accident, er concluded by moving that the word cc expedition" any othet cause than the measures of the seises: and should be omitted, and words to the following effect most vig orous Administration this country had ever Mould be inserted : possesse d. (Loud cries of hear, hear, hear.) If this " Tice House sees with sorro w a nd n s ai gnat t on expeditions country had really had a firm, a connected, and a indertakeo, in which our resources were lost, and our troops wise Administration, such as that even which existed *liked in enterprises, theconsequences of which were injuritnis, . Pitt, whosePi measures, the offspring under the late Mr. i.si whi:h only occasioned a repetition of former valour, produc t: gno other effect than the expesut eof our Councils to the deri- of a great mind such as he had, were directed to the Sol of our enemies: Thatnow the House demands, as the only accomplishment of great national objects, the country ronement to an injured and insulted people, that the most would not have to lament the disgrace that had been Lomas enquiry into such disgraceful expeditions should be in- brought upon it. But, no ; the Government was a cituted." The Hon. Mr. WARD, in rising to second the Government of departments. The Noble Lord at the Amendment proposed by his Noble Friend, begged to I head of it, more distinguished for virtues than to nsure the House that it was not his wish unneces- lents, enfeebled . by age and bodily sufferings, was in wily to trespass upon its attention, or, upon light duced to add the weight of office to the infirmities wounds, to disturb that unanimity which Gentlemen of a g e, and to embitter the last moments of a decli esmed so anxious for on the present occasion. But ning life with the toils of business, for the purpose of I'llen he adverted to the nature of the measures keeping together an Administration, the Members of which had been pursued by his Majesty's Govern- which entertained at the same time the greatest ) Men, who, con raont—when he considered the weakness and impo - tem p t for each other (hear, hear, /ear . leT of their wholes stem of conduct, he felt himself as could be proved, even by their own documents , imperiously called upon to declare his decided disap- passed the time they should have devoted to the pu b s l'Phation o f t h e Address. It appeared to him that lic service, in dark machiavelian intrigues , and in de tne pact afforded sufficient groundsenot alone to con- vising schemes for parcelling out the public depart der° the policy.upon which it turned, but to enable ments.— (Hear, hear, bear.) It was from their divi the Hou se to farm an adequate judgment of the fu- ' glens at home, and their disgraces abroad, that Par . tore measures of those men by whom the resources o f liament was to infer the evidence of their wisdom ; fee • nati on had been so shamefully misapplied. 11 and if they should only make the estimate according • that H ouse were to a to the rules which prevailed in common life , the pre tie Nobl e M over , it ree to the Address proposed would by in effect resolve to address , sumption must be, that failures constant and uniform can only be ascribed to ignorance, incapacity, or ne aft steer t h e ca l am i t i es w hi c h h a d b een su ff ere d, for the tontintiance of that express in that instance b policy and those measures t 0 glect. When he considered their own shameful dissen which al one those calamities were to be ascribed. If tions ; when he contemplated the calamitous transac ons that had been the consequence' of their measures that H ouse were not to . • transactions which, when recorded in history, would ether resentment for the past, or anxiety for the fu- reflect disgrace upon posterity—he could not hes i t ate tyre—if they w not to 'ex pression to their ten -if ex ti to assert that they were not fit persons to be entrusted urns with respect to the authors and the causes of , th* e great public distress, he was convinced that they i with the Government of this country.—(Hear, hear.) A Government that was weak aid thus divided, t"'lld be wanting in duty, both to the public and t i .s . , could expect no issue to their measures but failure; -emseives. So far, therefore, from supposing that they would a • • giee to the Address originally proposed, he and such a Government it was the duty of every was • Member of that House to endeavour to turn out by serseaded that they would be convinced of the all lawful means. In the view he took of their con and of addressing his Majesty in another form, and duct, he found that the more he sifted and examined Consequently adopt the Amendment moved by their measures, the more reason he found to em it% Noble Friend. If the Parliament was ever to and to withdraWe all confidence from act it should act at the p re sent moment ; and if demo them, R should not he was sure it would not p ers ons who had so misconducted themselves in t he 4ct at all. If th i at mw Housewere to resign its in- Administration of public affairs—(Hear, hear.)— • '—lt was not his intention to enter into any detailed "tutorial power as to the acts of any set of men, view of the particular miscarriages which he con y c ontroul which it ld to renounce the salutar used to • demned. This he hoped would be done by persons le exercise over the Servants of the Crown, it would, More competent . to it than himself. He wished only hew convinced, be a proof of the decay ot parlia mentto call the attentson • -of the House to one or two ~ aryvirtue, and an unerring symptom o f the de- cine o f he ••• of e • • Points - Ist, He wished' to notice the conduct of the t .trne Twit the onstitution. It wits r . .. . fisher ' ' sign in 'apasi and Portugal. This was easy in, of astonishment, that after such a Nees of camPa :C n. • • • ' kW . bemuse all the eirendistances or it were before the Honse, to enable Gentlemen to form a correct judgment upon it. The only difficulty would be to account for the conduct of Goternment, according I to any intelligible principle or theory. Whatever might have been the ground of the first expedition to Spain, he could not conceive why Ministers had en gagd in the second campaign in that country, against every principle of reason and experience.— If they had looked to the past, they would have had the benefit of authority and experience to deter them from such a course ; and yet, notwithstanding such authority and dear-bought experience, they had thought proper to act against both. They could not have been insensible to the example presented by the former campaign, in the sufferings and retreat of a British army, under one of the ablest Generals this country had ever produced ; when that army, instead of inspiring and animating,seemed only to have chilled the ardour of the natives ; when our liberal aid —libe ral towards them, but injurious to us, could not in duce them to look upon us in any other:light than as intruders. 'When Ministers were aware of all this, as well as of the nature of the country in which they were to act, and of the effect produced by the charac ter, good or bad, of our troops, he was at a loss to conceive why they had determined upon this second campaign. If, as had been asserted in this country, we had the whole of the people of Spain with us ; it., they were disposed to welcome us as deliverers, and could be animated by the presence of a British force to an ebullition of zeal, or to make, the neces: sary sacrifices in the unequal struggle' in which they were engaged, then indeed the best feelings of our nature, a sense of compassion for them, and a love of freedom in virselvel, would induce us to make another effort in their cause. In cons& aeration of the blood that had been shed, one might wish that more might be spilt in furtherance of their glorious object. But the conduct of the Spaniards wm the reverse of what had been held out, as instead of their receiving us with enthusiasm, they contented themselves with shewing a bare preference to England over France. All we had gained were some tardy and unimportant concessions from the Supreme Junta, yet, in this state of things, Sir John Moore was or dered to advance ; and instead of being supported by the Spanish armies, he met with none of their troops but a few miserable bodies, which crossed him on his route, and served only to embarrass his march. Thus far they were informed by all the documents they had seen and read, and thus far they were borne out by the communications from Sir John Moore, and the ex perience exemplified in his life and by his death. Not withstanding all this weight of authority and experi ence, his Majesty's Ministers thought proper to march another army into Spain. It could hardly be sup posed that Ministers did not repose confidence in a General to whom they had entrusted such an army, upon such a service; yet if any doubt should exist on that head, he would give up the argument he meant to found upon it. He would not take the trouble to refute those, who, in the desire of calumniating ablest General this country could produce, repre sented him as influenced by the pedantry of the ser vice—as the admirer of Bonaparte—as unfavourable to the cause and character of the Spaniards—a man who could not be made the dupe of the treasons of Don Thomas Morla (hear, hear !)—he whose illustrious name survived his signal services, and whose charac ter would ever put to shame the base calumniators, who dared to detract from his eroinent merits, (hear, hear!) Leaving , that illustrious authority , therefore.! out of' the question, he would defy his Majesty's Mi nisters to produce any one officer, who had served under that General, whose opinion was opposed to that of Sir John Moore; unless, perhaps, they relied more upon the authority of the military missionaries whom they had spread over Spain, than upon that illustrious officer, and preferred the opinion of Colo nel Carrol to that of Sir John Moore. The only way, therefore, in which they could justify their conduct, was by proving that a change had taken place in the sentiments of the people of Spain. The contrary he-be lieved to be the case, and the most disgraceful character of their revolution was,thatit had produced no eminent soldier or statesman, and which had never been able to create an army adequate for its defence ; for it ap peared, that this universal Spanish nation, every hand in which was to be raised in its just cause, had never raised more than 100,000 men. The Supreme Junta had not done any thing ; and the imbecile Go vernment of Charles IV. had never been weaker, more contemptible, and disgraced. What in ducement then had his Majesty's Ministers to send a second army into Spain ? Was it the result of the battle of Medellin ? Or did the swamps and morasses of Estremadura hold out any temptations for the entrance of an army into that province in 1 the summer months ? Was not the energy of the country paralised by the base spirit of its Rulers, whose every measure was characterized by weak ness ? Was it to be expected that a people, fin- so Many ages sunk in a state of slavery, would have spirit and resolution sufficient to establish a vigorous Government, capable of managing their affairs with 'ability, and competent to the expulsion of the enemy' from the country ? (Hear, hear.) But with such mew as formed the Junta, was it possible that any such results could have been expected ?—with men who proposed to assemble the Cortes (the representatives of the nation, from whose exertions alone the salva tion of the country was to be hoped for) at a period, when, according to any probable calculation, the progress of the enemy would have involved the Junta and the nation in or indiscriminate ruin, unless acci dent, England, or a miracle, were to save them ? What good was to be expected from men who behaved in this manner, instead of giving to every man of the nation, what they had not before, an interest in the salvation of his country ? In this situation of affairs, however, the second Expedition was determinedon, the success of which must necessarily have depended on the full and cordial co-operation of the Spanish nation. It might be said, that the renewal of the war in,ger many opened a new prospect for Spain, aisit that Bonaparte would be obliged to withdraw sorbed his troops from Spain, to prosecute designs against Austria. But if so, why had the ElltMition not been conducted upon a scale correspondenrwith the forces by which wars in Europe are usually carried on ? Why, instead of employing 10,000 men on the coasts of the Adriatic, and 40,00 men in Wakheren, had not the whole of the British disposeable army been concentrated in Spain, for the purpose of driving the enemy out of that country ? Why had only 25,000 , the-I . - men, a force so mach inferior to'iirtii-tuaintaitted by France at all times is that minify, been employed in that Expedition to Spain ? It might be said, as indeed it had already been said, that the country could not support a larger force ; but that was a very goad argument against sending an army to Spain, not for sending only one-half the force that was necessary to be employed there. The capital error in A obb operations in Spain was the supposition that the t. nish troops would co-operate with our armies. whole of the evidence of Sir John Moore, and all the experience we had had of the Spaniards, chewed the fallacy of that supposition, and that the Spanish armies could not co-operate with ours. At the same time 'the French were always able to concentrate their whole force to act against ours, by withdrawing their different detachments from districts, which they could afterwards easily repossess ; and thus the British army must have been left to contend against them alone and unassisted. The Spanish troops, inured to the climate and acquainted with the country, were pe culiarly fitted to act in small detachments : the British troops, on the contrary, not possessing the same advantages, but depending ois their firmness and discipline, could 'act effectually in large bodies; the Spaniards could act only in detail ; the British. en a great scale, suited to the operations of a re vlar army, for which it was impossible that the Spanish troops could be fit. No blame was, bow. *ever. imputable to the Spaniards for their not having a regular army. It was the necessary consequence of their late detestable Government, which consisted of Court favourites and nobody else ( heer, hear, hear. ) Ali their Officers bad gone over to Joseph ; ; and it was obvious to every one that a regular arms was not to be rapidly created. It required the care of a vigi. hint Government, and the operation of wise and wadi. ' concerted .measures, to establish an army ; and those were characteristics that did not belong to the Spanish Government. The House must observe, that the whole of his observations applied to the conduct of the war, so far as it regarded the measures of his Majesty's Ministers. Though be was. sensible of many weighty objections to the military operations of the war, he should leave the discussion of that part of the question to abler hands ; but Ministers had sa completely cummittei themselves upon this head with the General, (lord Wellington), that they must stand or call with him. If Lord Wellington had been defeated, then Ministers might defend themselves by saying, that the defeat was only the fortune of war ; that they had done their duty in providing a sufficient army and skilful offi cers, and that they were not responsible for the fate of war. A sliqrt time before, Lord Wellington had 'defeated the French upon the oouro, aid then at Ta. iavera,tar which he was raised szo the peerage. But though the valour of British troops, in both instances, was diplayed with its wonted superiority, these victo ries had led to no result but what was to be ex. ' pected from defeat : these victories left Europe in the same state of despair in which they found it ; the British army was obliged to leave its sick atid wounded on the very spot where it bad conquered ; and the general result was the abandonment of Spain and the renunciation of the great objects of the war. If the Generals of former times, th e Cadogans, Athlones, and Marlboroughs had acted upon the same principles as Lord Wellington, France would-long since have been Mistress at'e, world, and England must have sunk under the weight of her Victories. But they had acted upon. far other principles, and the consequences of their victories led to far different results. It was a' well-known obser. vation of historians respecting King William, that though he might suffer a defeat, he always took cape that it could not lead to any ruinous consequences. The plans of our modern Generals were far different ; for though a defeat at Talavera would have been utter destruction, the victory did not advance our ob ject one step further. He was ready to ascribe every credit to the individual valour of the British troops; but he must lament the absence of the art of that great man, who could prevent a retreat from being ruinous, and rendered even victories unavailing. He could not account for the conduct of the Government, in sending the second expedition to Spain ; unless upon that mischievous principle of keeping the dis -1 poseable force of the country in action, upon the folly, infatuation, and madness of being stirring and doing something ; a conduct which resembled the despe. . rate phrenzy of a losing gamester, rather than the de liberate determination of reason—the Monstnau pulls virtute redemptum." As to the Expedition to Walcheren, he did not mean to enter into any detail, either as to the manner in which it had been originally concerted, or finally aban- - doned. History contained nothing so disgraceful. At first, the object of that expedition was to seize some ships, and to make a diversion in favour of Austria; But if the object was to oblige Bonaparte to withdraw any part of his troops from the Danube, the expedi•- don. should have been sent, and the British force em. ployed, upon softie point as near as possible to the scene of action. At all events, the British army should have been directed to some point, where it would have bad to contend with some of the best troops .of France, where it might produce relief - to our Allies .in that scene where upon the issue of the struggle every thing depended. But the army had been sent to a point most distant from that scene, where the enemy was fully prepared to meet them, and whence if even we had been successful, we should have been compelled to return. But even supposing we could have remained, did his Majesty's Ministers suppose that that great and consummate General and States. man, Bonaparte, would have detached any part of his principal force from the Danube, before the ac compli sh. meat of his great object in that quarter ? Did they imagine that he would have done, what no Subaltern in his army, what even they themselves, wise as they were, would not have done; that for the sake of a few towni in Zealand, he would have arrested his brilliant career, and lost the opportunity of fighting such a battle as that of Wagram ? If any effor t was to be expected from the Expedition, the North oe.re,, Europe was its proper destination, as nearer to Vet r: grand scene, and because its .population was ready 4 ./ and willing to aid and second our operations. It was ' is .1 not surprizing, that a Government should have other . views: .but Gentlemenwould recollect, how bitted*: the members of the present Government complained • of their predecessots. in office, for not having sent a force to some point near the scene of ac ti on , • previous..to the battle of Eyieu. It would be ret mechbered how this accusation, (armed, for two success