Star. — London, England, 1813-03-13 00:00:00

Relation su4tquently found himself involved in other difficulties. - He had scarcely entered into Spilin when he was encountered by the insuffidency of his own means and by the superiority of the enemy. So hardly was he pressed, that that which was at first a 'vigorous and offensive operation, assumed, and wisely assumed the character of a retreat. Marmont, joined , Spanish _ ..... simply as 11%...- by other troops, appeared in such force that it re- endangered, and might have been more so were there gaited the ablest exertions of military skill to disen- not at the head of our army a man who, however he gage the British army from its embarrassments. In might prize theglory consequent ,ai military achieve addition to all this, his Noble Relation heard nothing ment, yet had won that glory cheap when the inte of that on which he (Lord Welle s l e y) was sure t h a t rests of bis country required its sacrifice. The dan 'he must have relied—the arrival of the Sicilian ex- ger which appeared to arise from the want of disci. :pedition. Under these circumstances he commenced pline consequent on the retreat of the troops, which his retreat., He would not enter into the details of he felt himself called upon •to repress, went far to this retrograde movement ; it was sufficient to say show the im perfection that a combination of events rendered this retreat not of the system which it had been asserted had .been acted on. It was well known a matter of mere wisdom or prudence, but of actual what disorders were generally consequent either on necessity. Lord Wellington commenced his retreat system of his systematically, by reversing the whole the advance er retreat of an army, how much disci pline was impaired by it, and, therefore, gratuitous advance. ' It was not a feigned retrear,—it was no movements were o f all lings the least expedient.— deceptive movement, resorted to for. the purpose But the fact he would repeat was, that the army had of ensnaring the enemy. It was an actual retreat, which the superior force of the French, and the ab- been compelled to retire : with respect to that, there could be no question. The only question was, whe sence of all tidings of the Sicilian expedition im- thee this compulsory retreat was owing to a deficien ,aously dictated. And here •he would state it as cy in our resources, or those being not inadequate to is firm opinion—an opinion, the soundness of a mat-administration of them ? A Noble Lord might which he was persuaded could be established by proof, that had Lord Wellington received an addition laugh, but in his apprehension there was much more to his means of 15,000 British troops (which would cause for lamentation than merriment ; and he would have been but a very moderate reinforcement, con- have been lost to every feeling of honour and of that duty which he owed his country, if he had not sidering the resources of the country), instead of retreating; he would have been enabled to advance endeavoured to show in its proper light the system of opinions to which he conceived it was owing that an in perfect confidence and security, even had he re- mained doubtful as to the co-operation of the Sicilian arduous campaign bad effected ,not our approxima • force; don, but our removal from its object. Most certainly and still more so had that force arrived, and had he been apprized of its arrival. To this point we had not approximated to it, for what was it ? If nothing but what was honest, great, and generous be begged the particular attention of their Lord- mingled in it, was it not the reduction of the French ships ; because it was applicable to all that followed. power in Spain, with an ulterior view to the se lf his Noble Friend bad received such a reinforce- curing our own freedom and independence, and intent, an opportunity would have been afforded, of the attainment of a general and honourable peace ? which his great military genius would, no doubt, have He would now trespass on the indulgence of their gloriously availed itself. He, however, was compelled Lordships while he would risk a few statements, by 'o retreat ; and in the course of that retreat he achiev- which he hoped to throw much light on the subject ' distinguished victory, the character of which before them. He had stated, that a force of 15,000 well appreciated by the country to render it men, consisting of 12,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, necessary for him to say any thing upon it. But of re c-oits of this victory his Noble Relation had been would have sufficed to ensure the ultimate success of the campaign, and he had sbewn that if this force was to take advantage. It had been well said by not sent out in proper time, it was not because our ale Lord opposite, in moving the Thanks of rnent to Lord Wellington for his great and resources were too confined to admit of it; it was not then a question of submission to necessity between - exploit, that he had converted retreat into the two Noble Lords, but simply a question of po- But able and skilful General as be was, it lacy : and lie would endeavour to throw such possible for him to convert at once a system of light upon it, as would greatly assist them in deci into a system of advance. To do that, he must ding it. It was ;, - st very difficult to _perceive the ad his whole system of depots and magazines.— vantages that would have resulted from a reinforce , himself ignorant of a subject of this kind, ment being sent out in sufficient time to enable Lord spoke in the presence of many Noble Lords Wellington, after the siege of Badajaz, to keep in would correct him if he was in error. As it was' check the French army that was advancing to im inctly understood, that although his Noble pede his operations. It was true, indeed, that the could convert retreat into victory, he could landing of the Sicilian army had in some degree Ally convert a system of retreat into a system caused a diversion in his favour, had prevented Sts 'once. By this time the French corps, under chat marching against him • but this, in.the event of Bonaparte, had been rendered efficient b y the troops he had mentioned having been sent nut, aachments from Suchet in Catalonia, sent after Su- would have been complete ; as it was, Joseph had , w of the arrival of the Sicilian expedition at advanced, having been reinforced by a detachment, It was true that Suchet did not move his from Suchet's force, while the Sicilian expedition had corps, but he marched a sufficient force to retired into Alicant without having by their landing Joseph to hang on the flanks of the British produced a single advantage save the very inade and to deprive Lord Wellington of all the quote one he had already noticed. Now the discus= ' the victory of Salamanca. If the Sicilian sion turned principally upon two points--whether we ion bad arrived at an earlier period—if Lord could spare the number of men necessary for the re ;gton's army had been augmented even by a inforcement, and whether our finances admitted of •.ce, what m ight not have been the consequences their being sent out ? It would hardly be asserted glorious achievement ! The subsequent fai- that the crisis was not such as called for the greatest the attempt on Burgos was also attributable sacrifices, and that a fortunate result would not insufficient means in Lord Wellington's pos. have been well purchased by any we could have What ought to have been the reasonable made ' • yet strange as it might appear, the Noble .ion of the country had the presence of ade- Lords had acted as if the opportunity which then means rendered that operation successful ! His presented itself, would have been sure to present it.' 'relation had distinctly stated that the fate of self at all times. They said it was wrong to make a ipaign depended upon it. Thus it appeared fl our i s h i n one campa i gn suc h as t h e y s h ou ld not .b e a hae before Burgos, a sufficient reinforce- able to repeat, and they prudently determined to, id reached him from England, the reduction make such a reserve of the resources entrusted to ,oi tress might have decided the fate of the their management, as would enable theme to put forth An. The object of the campaign was to corn- an uniform and equal mass of strength in all the French w evacuate the South of Spain—an campaigns which they might have to conduct, and lt object, in whatever way considered—im- this system they adopted at a time when they were, as a military operation—important, as a perfectly aware of the certainty of hostilities between Insideration. In the North and central part Russia and France—aware of "the temper in which the terror of French doMinion operated in Russia was about to engage in those hostilities -but in,Andalusia and the other Southern aware that the resources of France were in the hands a that feeling had a good deal worn out by of a man, he would not say of the only one able to possession of the French ; and it was there- draw forth such an army as its Ruler had lately led Ily desirable that possession should be termi- to destruction, but certainly of the only one who, Instead of effecting this object, however, the having drawn it forth, would hazard it as he had were compelled to evacuate the whole of done. They were aware of,,the all-grasping ambition, but the frontier towns. Was it politic, or was French call it) moral to allow this ? Such, of the violence of this man—aware of the eagerness with which he would rush forward to the attain had been the result. By the want of suf. means on our part, the French had been able ment of any object, however small, which could in :t and concentrate a powerful army, de- crease his power or flatter his vanity ; and yet, hav es of all the advantages of victory, and cow- ing reason from all these considerations to hope for ig us to retreat, and to end the campaign as we the most efficient diversion in the North of Europe, it. But in addition to the evils of this disap- they reasoned about distributing their resources in just sub-divisions to each future campaign, and missed le in a military point of view, let their Lord- the golden opportunity which but too probably was consider it as affecting the sentiments of the never to return—too short-sighted to perceive the ob niards towards the English. After having seen vious consideration that one bold effort might have drive the French triumphantly before us, the Spa. precluded the necessity of any effort in future, and is, in a period of time so short as hardly to b e ' thus most beneficially spared those resources, the hus. rated by the imagination, saw us driven in our banding of which was deemed so material The before the French, and found themselves sud- French might have been thus driven behind the Ebro exposed to the return of the evils from which _their power might have been prevented from taking fondly flattered themselves they had been deli 1. He hoped that the lesson thus inculcated on that route in Spain, which, it was much to be feared, it would soon be found to have taken. The faith, Spanish mind ii :gilt be wiped out by the future !saes of the British Army ; but enquestionably the generous zeal we owed the Spanish people, which we owed to Russia and to the world, would have I in;preWon must be very strung and very unfa- b e arable to us. The Noble Marquis then proceeded been evinced ;we should have been entitled to every praise for our magnanimity, and riot less for our eco aenttrid, that the plan of operations which it was nomy, if economy were rightly understood. But it ~.ee had compelled the enemy to raise the siege was not only in false economy we had erred, we had Cadiz, and abandon Andalusia, had also expel- contemplated danger, when not a shadow of it ex -1 the british force from Spain, and enabled the isted, and were I 'via: in expense at home, while our aerny to take possession of the capital under circum :diva s higl,l) favourable to the confirmation of his 1 by security at home was to be most effectually obtained ' l a mer, taut the fact was sufficiently obvious that spirited exertion abroad. The soundest statesmen who had ever contemplated the subject were unani ite view was one adopted subsequently to the result I mous in opinion that England were best defended by operations which Undoubtedly were meant to be fore i gn warfare ; a most unloultedrfor and desirable f.ai a a ed up by other; of a similar nature, if i - m ' sma " ' oportunity or carrying on such warfare had occurred p tet.:nent had not prevented it. Had Lord Wet- I — w e had a fi eld now where we could meet our enemy lington retired as a further inducement to the army hand to hand, and foot to foot, and yet our statesmen to evacuate tile South of Spain ?—certainly not— could talk about the inexpediency of making a flou we had his (min statement that he had retired be- i_ risii, and advocate 4 long-protracted system which it cause Sir Renland Hill's army was in such a situae could be scarcely hoped would he no' more Chap I se. lion the t the junction of the Army of the North gauvely Mischievous in placing that serene and ho, was nec essary to prevent its being cut olf. % The _ o distanee. . W ;jai re convinced that a misiresumesut of and above that arising from the or 'd em would have enabled Lord his menses, proticjed it had the battle of Salamanca, or ave derived no rime advan tage from the SiciNen expedition than he actually did derive ; and his chance of success would have been materially enhanced, had it reached him pre vious to the siege of Badajoz. He would now proceed to skew how easily such a reinforcement could have been sent out ; so far as the number of men was in question. We had at home forty. five battalions of infantry, and sixteen regiments of cavalry to supply it; and that it could be well spared without hazard to the country must be ad mitted, when it was considered that we bad besides 70,000 militia, 200,000 local militia, and a volunteer force of 68,000 men, in additioa to the force which he had-shewn to be disposable. There was also the garrison of Gibraltar, amounting to between 4 and 5000 men. Was it too much to say, that under these circumstances a force, to the amount he had stated, should have been sent to the Peninsula, at a moment when the enemy was so employed in another quarter, that no adequate means of resisting the accession of strength they would bring to Lord Wellington's army was in his power, and when there was no sible reason for withholding . them? For he could. state, upon competent autkorsty, that the disturbed districts were principally, and effectually, occupied by militia. But what was not the least singular fee. cure in the whole business was, that there actually was a greater number sent out, by a departure of the No-, ble Lords from theirown system, than he had stated to be requisite ; on the lowest calculation 18,000, men had gone out, of these there were 4000 recepits, who reached the army previous to the battle of Sala- manca, as did also a reinforcement of cavalry and infantry, to such an amount as gave a reinforcement of 10,000 previous to the battle of Salamanca—the, remainder did not reach the army till subsequent to that engagement ; and the point at issue was, why they did not reach it before ?—why, they were net present at it, but withheld till intelligeoce of its bay ing been fought had been received. The reason, they alfedged, for pursuing this line of conduct was, that Lord Wellington had himself declined having any reinforcements till March, the most favourable scows for sending them out. They might have Lord Wel lington's authority for withholding them, if no refe rence was to be had to circumstances. If Lord Wel lington gave the advice, he could never.suppose that it would be followed spite of any circumstance that might arise to render it expedient to swerve from it. Was it possible that they could ndt discern that his advice was only given in the abstract, or thatahey could imagine, that from Christmas to Lady-day to March, was the only time when troops could-be seat out with propriety, however pressing the necessity for them, produced by victory or any other cause ? A rule might be very just- in ordinary cases, which would be extremely inapplicable in extra ordinary ones. But why did they not observe their own rule i , why did they not send out troops in the early part of the year 1812, particularly when they were aware of the strenuous resistance with which the Russians . were about to meet the , aggressions of Bonaparte? And again, he would ask, why they departed from it when a departure from it was now useless, and send out troops after the battle of Salamanca ? As soon as the intelligence of that battle had reached them, their observance of times and seasons was no more. The troops were immediately embarked at a most unfavourable season of the year—at a season when the transports in which they were stowed could not even lie at anchor without suffering very severely. The consequence was such as might have been ex pected : they arrived at Lisbon in November, and found the roads so bad as to render it extremely diffi cult for them to reach the army ; accordingly none of them did reach it till December ; and as to die Horse Guards, after suffering most dreadfully at Portsmouth, where they embarked, they arrived at Lisbon with more of horse-hairs than horse-tails.— (A largh.)—After this they, like the rest, reached the army after the campaign was concluded, and it was utterly impossible that they could do other wise. Now what was the reason that the latter reinforcement did not go out with the first? and what was the reason that to the aggregate they would have composed was not added the number which • would have made up the force he had stated to be , necessary ? It was incumbent on the Nobly Lords to assign sufficient reasons, for if their Lordships would grant him (Lord Wellesley) the Committee of In quiry for which he should move, he was prepared to shew, upon the authority of the most competent and skilful military officers, that if the reinforcements had been sent, toe results would have been such as would have satisfied the most sanguine. The resources of the country, he would contend, rendered it a matter of no difficulty to send it. The resources, in point of men, had grown out of the alarm of the country.... an alarm which did honour to those who, alive to the danger of their native land, had adopted such effec tual means for its defence, as the high state of the regular army, in point of discipline and every other requisite of a military force, reflected the greatest ho nour upon the illustrious Person whom he now saw in his place, and from whose indefatigable exertions for so desirable a purpose, the country, and he might say the world, had derived such signal benefits... (Hear, hear.) —But, happily, we no longer looked foe. ward to that dreadful moment, when resources so judiciously prepared were to be used in the imme diate defence of the country : the danger was re. moved from our own shores, and it now became the duty of Ministers to use those resources in the manner ' that would be most conducive to prevent,a recur rence of that danger. Whatever force could have been spared should have been sent to the Peninsula. Now that which he had stated to be absolutely nears.' sary, would be but a trifling draft from our ordinary 1 sources. How little, then, could it be felt, when taken from those ample ones which circumstances had placed at our disposal ? How, when such an op portunity lay before tlsem, could dinisters devote 4 sum of £400,000 to calling out the Local Militia, when that win, with a small addition, would have enabled then to tape advantage of it to a yrry irn• porta* extent; it might be thought that be wits attributing too much to the aid of so small a sum, but ,he would desire their 14ordsha4b 10 cOniklets which the sence of periously I 'his firm : which he proof, Ilia to his me have beet sidering I retreating in perfect trained 4 force ; an had he bi he begge ships ; be If his Nol itnent, an which his glorious!] to retreat ed that 41 was too v necessary the fruits unable to the Noble Parliamei glorious I victory.. was impo retreat ini change hi Be was 11 but he sp ',.. who woul he distinc i Relation ' not so ens of advanc Joseph 13 , detachme chet knev Alicant. whole cor enable Jo army, an ` I . fruits of t cxpeditrin ... Wellingtc t, srnallforc 'i , of that gl • lure in the to the insi session. expettatic quate me, Noble Re the camp that if, v. ment had of that foi campaign pel the Fi impertanl i poi cant, moral cor of Spain i full force- provinces the long 1 fore hip] nated. 1 . British w Spain, bu it (as the however, ficient .me to collect priving ui i pelting us ! began it. , pointmem • ships cons Spaniards us drive tl lards, in separated turn, bete •enly cip hey fond vered. f th.: Spann SUCCesSes the inipre vourisble I i 1 to tonttni 1 boabte,l h I; 4) of Cadiz, led the 1 , . ! fur ru yto ' staiact shi pp..cr, tile view tit operat f,,iiimed n Age.:nell hug ton r ' • to evacu Mi not been attended With 's grace to toe General anxiety, an incekulable and his troops, but, on.. the contrary, with au- peat, was convener peradded glory; but had either glory or adieu, 13,0001nen over and above tae been the result to the nation ? Hid 1$ dinerpsystem of reeruitirisi ' safety or that of Europe been increased by it?. It Wellington to follow up his was materially diminished, but still more materially reached him previous to the was the Spanish cause, considered simply as such, even though he should hal A• n • nit Pasiasala, but merely too defray the additional ez• pence arising from having 15,000 men in the Penin. sula instead of at home. Now, in the exercise of their military discretion, the Noble Lord bad not scrupled, while they complained of the inadequacy of our resources, to apply this sum for the purpose of having the Local Militia exercised fourteen days at home, %hen there was no prospect of their am'. vices being wanted, than to apply it to prlnnote the vigorous conduct of a war abroad, which was likely, if vigorously prosecuted, to continue so desirable a state of our domestic affairs. While such a sum u this was so improperly, in his opinion, withheld from the purpose to which it ought to have been applied, he understood that on a recent occasion a vaunt had been made, that eleven millions had been expended in eleven months, on the prosecution of the war in the Peninsula. Now this boast was calculated to convey a very exaggerated and very unfair view of the subject, it would naturally beget the opinion that a million 1 month was expended, which would not have been expended, had we taken no part in the af fairi of the Peninsula ; whereas the sum applied to the furtherance of our views there, was only the dif ference between the sum that it would take to main tain the troops serving there, wheresover they might be serving, and the millions on which the vaunt was grounded. And he was too well acquainted i with the principles by which the whole political life 1 of dr, Noble Lord had been governed, to fear asser ting, that although we had no army in the Penin sula, there would not be a reduction of one man in the aggregate of our force. From what he had said, be misted their Lordships would think that he was justified in saying, that a sum of 46000 would have defrayed the expenccs of the additional force that he had contended ought to be sent to the Peninsula, in. eluding that which had been applied to the training of the local militia; but he would suppose that a sum of two millions had been necessary, would not such an addition to the burdens of the country have / been cheerfully submitted to by every man who had a stake in it, and had sufficient quickness of intellect to discern the vast importance of seizing with spirit the unhoped-for opportunity that presented itself ? But while it was considered impracticable to increase our exertions abroad, it would be worth while to ex amine the manner in which our resources were sip plied at home. He had selected for the judgment of their Lordships a few articles from the Barrack, As% my, and Ordnance Estimates of last year, from which be conceived some useful conclusions might be drawn. —For new barracks in Ireland, *there was a sum of 4125,667, this was the estimate of 1812, and it was rather a singular coincidence, that the estimate of the present year was to exactly the same amount. For new barracks in England, the estimate was 844,770. For the new breakwater in Plymouth S und,a18•000. Fur new buildings, a new wharf, and chymical lec ture-room at Woolwich, 460,000. For Martell* Towers on the Eastern coast, 45.700, and for what ' purpose money was expended here, unless it was to protect our shores from the ghosts of the Danish Beet, he could• not conjecture—(al/au/h.) Another estimate was fur new works on the western he.ghts of Dover, where no doubt the danger was very press. in —(A laugh.) There was another, for a consider. , able sum, for a new mint—a new Mint! (2.arshier.) We were preparing, it appeared, for the act of cum. age, whenever it might please Heaven to send us bullion. There was an estimate of 4125,000 for the Military College at Sandhurst ; to this institution there was no one more favourable than he was, sen sible of the service it had rendered the country. But even here, at such a time, he could not conceive but there was a misapplication of the public money. The Noble Marquis next proceeded to examine the alleged difficulties of carrying on the war in the Pe. ninsula, arising out of the want of specie, endeavou. ring to chew that those di ffi culties had been cleated 1 by the grossest mismanagement. He insisted that the defence of their conduct set up by Ministers, namely, the satisfaction of Lord Wellington with the manner ' in which they had supported him, was groundless and absurd—groundless, because they had mistaken for satisfaction the obedient acquiescence which it ' was the duty of the officer to render to superior an. thority; and absurd, because no deference to his opi nion could excuse them for having failed to exercise their own judgment, or free them from responsibility; deprecated the danger that would arise to the cowl, try from Bonaparte's being able to impute our fai. lure in the Peninsula to the avowed insufficiency of our resources; expressed his confidence that their Lordships would not sanction such a motion, and concluded with moving for a Committee to inquire into the circumstances and conduct of the last cam: paign. i Earl BATHURST could not resist the chal. l iaises that had been thrown out by the Noble Mar. 'guts. That Noble Lord had told their Lordships ' that he should admire the temerity of the man who would tell them, that Lord Wellington felt satisfied with the conduct of Ministers, during the last cam paign. He would evince that temerity—be would tell their Lordships, that Lord Wellington was com pletely satisfied with the conduct of Ministers, during the whole of that campaign which had afforded so much ground of complaint to the Noble Marquis.—. (Hear, hear.; At least. so far had Lord Wellington voluntarily expressed himself iti the course of his cor respondence with Ministers. (Hear s hear.) But this was not the only reason for objection to t4e mo tion before their Lordships—this was not his motive for objecting to inquiry, provided e fair cage were made out. In strewing that no such ease had beets made out, in his opinion, he should not pretend ;: t follow the Noble Lord througn the whole of his ar. guments and illustratiops, They had been told that: the Ministers had ;rot employed all the resources of the country—that the system which they had pursued had cempletely tailed- . Marquis WE4LESLEY explained the systems on which lie had enlarged, Earl BATHURST resumed.—With deference to the Nome Marquis, he was mot particular about the terms in which the idea had been conveyed, but what had been said resolved itself into this—that the by', tem which had been pursued by the Government was The system of the Noble f il tu o l ui dam ein ett ra all ce y a a r l e l n the g means and Resources of the country ; the Ministers had not pursued any such w system, consequently the Ministers had not embraced all the means and -resources of the country. The have bean perfected, bad rkible Lord's sTstem would I