Star. — London, England, 1808-04-26 00:00:00

; 11 GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA. • r rsR from the Honourable TIMOTIIT FICKRILING. a Senator the United States from the State of Massachusett's, exhibit- Lig to his Constituent's view of the imminent danger of an un rx and ruinous war, addressed to his Excellency lames Sullivan, Governor of the said State. City of Washington, Feb. 16, 1808. -Sta—ln the even current of ordinary times, an address from a Senator in Congress to his Constitu ents might be dispensed with. In such times the pro ceedings of the Executive and Legislative of the Uni tzd States, exhibited in their public Acts, might be sufficient. But the present singular condition of our Country, when its most interesting concerns, wrapt up in mystery, excite universal alarm, requires me to be no longer silent. Perhaps lam liable to cen 'sure, at such a crisis, for not sooner presenting to you and them, such a view of our national affairs as my official situation has placed in my power. I now ad dress it to you, Sir, as the proper organ of communi cation to the Legislature. The attainment of truth is ever desirable, and I cannot permit myself to doubt, that the statement I now make must be acceptable to all who have an agency in directing the affairs, and who are guar ,::ans of the interests of our commonwealth, which so materially depend on the measures of the Government cf the nation. At the same time, lam aware of the icalousy with which, in these unhappy days of party dissensions, my communications may, by some of my Constituents, be received. Of this I will not corn plain ; while I earnestly wish the same jealousy to be extended towards all public men. Yet I may claim :.ume share of attention and credit ; that share which is due to the man who defies the world to point, in the whole course of a long and public life, at one in stance of deception—at a single departure from truth. The Embargo demands the first notice ; for per haps so act of the National Government has ever pro duced so much solicitude, or spread such universal alarm ; because all naturally conclude, that a mea sure pregnant with uncalculable mischiefs to all classes of our fellow citizens, would not have been proposed by the President, and adopted by Congress, but for causes deeply affecting the interests and safety of the nation. It must have been under the influence of this opinion that the Legislative Bodies of some States have expressed their approbation of the embargo, ei ther explicitly or by implication. The following were all the Papers laid by the Pre sident before Congress, as the grounds of the em bargo : 1. The Proclamation of the King of Great Britain, requiring the return of his subjects, the seamen especially, from foreign countries, to aid in this hour of peculiar danger, in the defence of their own. But it being an acknowledged principle, that every nation has a right to the service of its subjects in time of war, that Proclamation could not furnish the slightest ground for an en'. b:trgo. 2. The Extract of a Letter from the Graend Judge Reviler to the French Attorney-General for the Council of Prizes This contained a partial interpretation of the Imperial Decree of No vember 21,1806. This Decree, indeed, and interpretation, pre sent flagrant violations of our Neutral Rights, and of the existing Treaty between the United States and France; but still, the exe cution of that Decree could not, frog the small number of French cruizers, extensively interrupt our trade. These two Papers were public. a. The Letter from our Minister, Mr. Armstrong, to Mr. Champagny, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs: and 4. Mr. Champagny 's Aswer.—Both these ought, in form or substance, also to have been made public. The latter would have furnished to our nation some idea of the views and expectations of France. But both were withdrawn by the President, to be aposited among the other Executive secrets; while neither pre sented any new ground to justify an embargo. In the Senate, these Papers were referred to a Com mittee. The Committee quickly reported a Bill for laying an Embargo, agreeably to the President's pro posal. This was read a first time, a second, and a third time, and passed ; and all in the short compass of four hours ! A little time was repeatedly asked to obtain further information, and to consider a measure of such moment, of such universal concern ; but these requests were denied. We were hurried into the pas sage of the Bill, as if there was danger of its being rejected, if we were allowed time to obtain further information, and deliberately consider the subject. For to that time our vessels were freely sailing on fo -eign voyages; and in a national point of view, the parture of half a dozen or a dozen more, while we ;ere enquiring into the necessity or expediency of the .mbargo, was of little moment. Or if the danger to it vessels, seamen, and merchandize, had been so .treme as not to admit of one day's delay, ought A that extreme danger to have been exhibited to .ongress ? The Constitution, which requires the President " to give to Congress information of the State of the Union," certainly meant, not partial, but molete information on the subject of a communica ton, so far as he possessed it. And when it enjoins im " to recommend to -their consideration such teasures as he should judge necessary and expedient," as certainly intended that those recommendations .iould be bottomed on information communicated, not on pets withheld, and locked up in the Executive Cabinet. Had the public safety been at stake, or any great )üblic good been presented to our view, but which ,could be lost by a moment's delay, there would have been some apology for dispatch, though none for act ig without due information. In truth, the measure ap peared to me then, as it still does, and as it appears to the public, without a sufficient motive—without a z e itimate object. Hence the general inquiry, " For), what is the embargo laid ?" And I challenge any man, not in the secrets of the Executive, to tell. I avow, Sir, that the President said the Papers above mentioned " shewed that great and increasing dan gers threatened our vessels, our seamen, and our merchandize;" but I also 'know; that they exhibited no new dangers—none of which our merchants and sea men had not been well apprized. The British Pro clamation had many days before been published in the newspapers, (the copy laid before us by the Presi dent had been cut out of a newspaper) an'cl so had the substance, if not the words of Regnier's letter. Yet they had excited little concern among merchants and seamen, the preservation of whose persons and pro perty was the professed object of the President's- re commendation of an embargo. -The merchants and seamen could acturately estimate the dangers of con tinuing their commercial operations; of which ilan leers, indeed, the actual premiums of insurance were a satisfaction. Those premiums had very little in- Creased i by the British Proclamation, not a cent.; and by the French Decree So little, as not to stop corn. tnercial enterprizes. The great numbers of vesseh }Jading or loaded, and prepared for sea; the maim of sucl reques sage d rejectc inform For to reign' depart were embat OUT vs extren not ti Con Presic State conok tion, him measi it as shout fail: I Had publi , wouh been ing pears to thi • legiti what man, knov menu gers met . < no n men clan the 1 dens subs they sear pert corr sear tinu ke' 11 a sa ere: . and tne; • ~. • • ■ - everywhere made on the first rumour of the embargo, to dispatch them, demonstrated* the President's dan gers to be imaginary—to have been assinned. Or if great and real dangers, unknown to commercial men, were impending, or sure to fall, how desirable was it, to have it officially declared and published! This would have produced a voluntary embargo, and pre vented every complaint. Besides, the dangers clearly defined and understood, the public mind would not have been disquieted with imaginary fears, the more tormenting, because uncertain. It is true that a considerable number of vessels were collected in our ports, and many held in suspense ; not, however, from any new dangers which appeared, but from the mysterious conduct of our officers, after the attack on the Chesapeake : and from the painful apprehension that the course the President was pur suing would terminate in war. The National Intel& gencer (usually considered as the Executive Newspa per) gave the alarm ; and it was echoed through the United States. War—probable or inevitable war, was the constant theme of the newspapers, and of the conversations, as reported, of persons supposed to be beet informed of executive designs. Yet amidst this din of war, no adequate preparations were seen making to meet it. The order to detach a hundred thousand militia to fight the British navy (for there was no ap pearance of an enemy in any other shape) was so completely absurd, as to excite with men of common sense no other emotion than ridicule. Not the shadow of a reason, that could operate on the mind of a man of common understanding, can be offered in its justi fication. The refusal of the British officers to receive the frigate Chesapeake as a prize, when tendered by her commander, is a demonstration that the attack upon her was exclusively for the purpose of taking their deserters ; and not intended as the commence ment of a war between the two nations. The Presi dent knew that the British had no invading army to land on our shores ; and the detached mihtia would be useless, except against land forces. Why then was this order for the militia given ? The nature of the case, and the actual state of things, authorise the in ference, that its immediate, if not its only object, was to increase the public alarm, to aggravate the public. l resentment against Great Britain, to excite a wain pulse ; and in the height of this artificial fever of the public mind, which was to be made known in Great Britain, to renew the demands on her Government ; in the poor expectation of extorting, in that state of things, concessions of points which she had always considered as her rights, and which at all times, and under all circumstances, she.had uniformly refused to relinquish. The result of the subsequent negociation at London has shewn how utterly unfounded was the President's expectation, how perfectly useless all his bluster of war. While no well informed man doubted that the British Government would make suitable re• partition for the attack on the Chesapeake • the Presi dent himself, in his proclamation, had placed the affair on that footing. A rupture between the two nations, said he, " is equally opposed to the interests of both, as it is to assurances of the most friendly dispositions on the part of the British Government, in the midst of which this outrage was committed. In this light the subject cannot but present itself to that Government, and strengthen the motives to an honourable repara tion for the wrong which has been done." And it is now well known that suck reparation might have been promptly obtained in London, had the President's in structions to Mr. Munroe been compatible with such an adjustment. He was required not to negociate on this single transient act (which when once adjusted was for ever settled), but in connection with another claim of long standing, and, to say the least, of double right ; to wit, the exemption from impressment of British seamen found on board American merchant vessels. To remedy the evil arising from its exercise, by which our own citizens were sometimes impressed, the atten tion of our Government, under every administration, had been earnestly engaged ; but no practicable plan has yet been contrived : while no man who regards the truth, will question the disposition of the British Government to adopt any arrangement that will secure to Great Britain the service of her own subject:. And now, when the unexampled situation of that country (left alone to maintain the conflict with France and her numetous dependent States—left alone to with stand the power which menaces the liberties of the world) rendered the aid of all her subjects more than ever needful ; there was no reasonable ground to ex pect that she would yield the right to take them when found on board the merchant vessels of any nation.— Thus to insist on her yielding this point, and insepa rably to connect it with the affair of the Chesapeake, was tantamount to a determination not to negociate 'at all. I write, Sir, with freedom, for the times are too perilous to allow those who are placed in high and re sponsible situations, to be silent or reserved. The. dace and safety of our country are suspended on a thread. The course we have seen pursued leads on to war—to a war with Great Britain—a war abso lucely without necessity—a war, which, whether dis astrous or successful, must bring misery and ruin to the United States misery, by the destruction of our navigation and commerce (perhaps also of our fair est sea post towns and cities), the loss of markets for our produce, the want of foreign goods and manufac tures, and the other evils incident to a state of war ; and ruin, by the loss of our liberty and independence. For, if with the aid of our arms, Great Britain were subdued—from that moment, though flattered per haps with the name of allies, we should become the provinces of France. This is a result so obvious, that I must crave your pardon for noticing it. Some ad vocates of executive measures admit it. They ac knowledge that the navy of Britain is our shield against the overwhelming power of France. Why then do they persist in a course of conduct tending to a rupture with Great Britain ? Will it be believed, diat it is principally; or solely, to procure inviolability to the merchant fla of the United States ? In other words, to protect al seamen, British subjects, as well is our citizens, on board our merchant vessels ? It is a fact, that this has made the greatest obstacle to an amicable settlemerit with Great Britain. Yet, I red peat it, it is perfectly well known, that the desires to obtain 'only her own subjects ; and that American ci tizens, impressed by mistake, are delivered up on duly authenticated proof. The evil we complain of arises from the 'impossibility Of always distinguithing the ptrsOns of two nations, ytho a few years since, were Or people; who exhibit the same manners, speak the same language, and piasess similar features. But seeing that we seldom 'hear complaints in the great , navigating states, how happens there to be such ex treme sympathy for American seamen at Washing ton ? Especially in Gentlemen from the . interior States, which have no seamen, or from thole Atlan tic States, whose native seamen bear a very small proportion to those of New England ? In fact, the causes of complaint are much fewer than are preten ded. They rarely occur in the States whose seamen *are chiefly natives. The first merchant in the United States, in answering my late inquiry about British impressments, says, " Since the Chesapeake affair, we have had no cause of complaint. I cannot find one single instance where they have taken one man out of a merchant vessel. I have had more than twenty vessels arrived in that time, without one in stance of a man being taken by them. Three Swedes were taken out by a French frigate. I have made inquiry of all the masters that have arrived in this vi cinity, and cannot find any complaint against the British cruizers." Can Gentlemen of known hostility to foreign merce in our own vessels—who are even willing to annihilate it—(and such there are) —can these Gen tlemen plead the cause of our seamen because they really wish to protect them ? Can those desire to pro tect our :earner' ' who, by laying an unnecessary em-' bargo, expose them by thousands to starve or beg t One Gentleman has said (and I believe does not stand alone), that sooner than admit the principle that Great Britain had a right to take her own subjects from our merchant vessels, he would abandon com merce altogether ! To what will every man in New England and of the other navigating States, ascribe such a sentiment ? A sentiment which, to prevent the temporary loss of five men, by impress, would re duce fifty thousand to beggary ? But for the embargo thousands depending on the ordinary operations of commerce, would now be employed. Even under the restraints of the Orders of the British Govern-1 ment retaliating the French Imperial Decree, very large portions of the world remain open to the com merce of the United States. We may yet pursue our trade with the British dominions, in every part of the globe—with Africa, with China, and with the Colo nies of France, Spain, and Holland. And let me ask, whether in the midst of a profound peace, when the powers of Europe, possessing colonies, would, as formerly, confine the trade with them to their own bottoms, or admit us, as foreigners, only under great limitations, we could enjoy a commerce much more extensive than is practicable at this moment, if the j embargo were not in the way ? Why then should it be continued ? Why, rather, was it ever laid ? Can those be legitimate reasons for the embargo, which' are concealed from Congress, at the moment when they are required to impose it ? Are the reasons to be found in the dispatches from Paris ? These have been moved for—and the motion was quashed by the advocates for - the embargo. Why are these dis patches withheld by the Executive ? Why, when all classes of citizens anxiously inquire " For what is the embargo laid ?" is a satisfactory answer denied ? Why is not Congress made acquainted with the actual situation of the United States in relation to France ? Why, in this dangerous crisis, are Mr. Armstrong's letters to the Secretary of State absolutely withheld, so that a line of them cannot be seen ? Did they con tain no information of the demands and intentions the French Emperor ? Did the Revenge sail from England to France, and there wait three or four weeks for dispatches of no importance ? If so, why, regardless of the public solicitude, are their contents so carefully concealed ? If really unimportant, what harm can arise from telling Congress and the Nation sOcially, that they contain nothing of moment to the safety, the liberty, the honour, or the interests of the United States ? On the contrary, are they so closely locked up, because they will not bear the light ? Would their disclosure rouse the spirit of the people, still slumbering in blind confidence in the Executive? Has the French Emperor declared that he will have no neutrals ? Has he required that our ports, like those of his vassal States in Europe, be shut against British commerce ? Is the Embargo a substitute—a milder form of compliance with that harsh demand, which, if exhibited in its naked and insulting aspect, the American spirit might yet resent ?—Are we still to be kept profoundly ignorant of the declarations and avowed designs of the French Emperor, although these may strike at our liberty and independence ? And, in the mean time, are we, by a thousand irrita tions, by cherishing prejudices, and by exciting fresh resentments, to be drawn gradually into a war with Great Britain ? Why, amidst the extreme anxiety of the public mind, is it still to be kept on the rack of fearful expectation, by the President's portentous silence respecting his French dispatches ? In this con cealment there is danger. In this concealment must be wrapt up the real cause of the embargo. On any other supposition it is inexplicable. I am alarmed, Sir, at this perilous state of things ; I cannot repress my suspicions • or forbear thus to exhibit to you the grounds on which they rest. The people are advised to repose implicit confidence in the National Government ; in that unbounded, con fidence lies our danger. Armed with that confidence the Executive may procure the adoption of measures which may overwhelm us with ruin, as surely as if he had an army at his heels. By false policy, or by inordinate fears, our country may be betrayed and sub jugated to France, as surely as by corruption. I trust, Sir, that no one who knows me will charge it to vanity when I say, that I have some knowledge of public men and public affairs ; and on that knowledge and with solemnity I declare to you, that I have no confidence in the wisdom or correctness of our public measures : that our country is in imminent danger : that it is essential to the public safety that the bend confidence in our rulers should cease ; that the State Legislatures should know the facts and reasons on which important general laws are founded ; and espe cially that those States, whose farms are on the ocean, and whose harvests are gathered in every sea, should imme -1 diately and seriously consider how to preserve them. In all the branches of Government, commercial infor mation is wanting ; and in "'this desert" called a city, that want cannot be supplied. Nothing but the sense of the commercial States, clearly and emphati cally expressed, will save them from ruin. Are our thousands of ships and vessels to rot in our harboUrs ? Are our sixty thousand 'seamen and fishermen to be deprived of employment, and, with their families; reduced to want and beggary ? Are our hundreds of thousands of farmers to be com pelled to suffer their millions in surplus produce, to perith on their hands ;*that . the President maismake an experiment on our patience and fortitude, and on the towering pride, the boundless ambition, and n z . yielding perseverance of the Conqueror of Europe Sir, I have reason to believe that the President contemplates the continuance of the embargo, until the French Emperor repeals his Decrees, violating, a s well his treaty . with the United States as every m u . tral right ; and until Britain thereupon recalls her retaliating orders !—By that time we may Lave mi. ther ships nor seamen ; and that is precisely the poi to which some men wish to reduce us.—To see th e improvidence of tkis project (to call it by no harsh er name, and without adverting to ulterior views), l et us look back to former years. _ _ _ Notwithstanding the well-founded complaints of some individuals, and the murmurs of others ; not . withstanding the frequent executive declarations of maritime aggressions committed by Great Britain ; notwithstanding the outrageous decrees of France and Spain, and the wanton spoliations practised and ein. cuted by their digitizers and tribunals, of which we sometimes hear a faint whisper, the com;nerce of the United States has hitherto prospered beyond all ex. ample. Our citizens have accumulated wealth ; and the public revenue, annually increasing, has been the President's annual boast. The facts demonstrate, that though Great Britain, with her thousand ships of war, could have destroyed our commerce, she has really done it no essential in jury : and that the other belligerents; heretofore re strained by some regard to national law, and li m i te d by the small number of their cruizers, have not ia fiicted upon it any deep wound. Yet in this full tide of our success, our commerce is suddenly arrested ; an alarm of war is raised ; fearful apprehensions are excited ; the merchants in particular, thrown into a, • state of consternation, are advised, by a voluntary embargo, to keep their vessels at home. And what is the cause of this mighty but mischievous alarm ? We know it in its whole extent. It was the unauths. rised attack of a British naval officer on the Ameri. can frigate Chesapeake, to search for and take some deserters known to have been received on board, who had been often demanded, and as often refused to be delivered up. As was efpected by all considerate men, and by the President himself (as I have before observed), the British Government;oa the first infor mation of the unfortunate event (and without wait ing for an application) disavowed the act of its offi cer—disclaimed the principle of searching national armed vessels—and declared its readiness to make suitable reparation, as soon as the state of the case should be fully known. Under such circumstances, who call justify this alarm of war ? An alarm which greatly disquieted the public mind, and occasioned an interruption of commerce extremely injurious to our merchants and seafaring citizens. I will close this long letter lay stating all the exist ing jerdenctr—for there are no cause: for a war with Great Britain, 1. The British sbips of war, agreeably to tight claimed and ex. ercised for ages—alight claimed and exercised during the whole of the administration of Washington, of Adams, and of Jefferson —continue to take some of the British fermi found on braid of our merchant vessels, and with them a small'number of ours from the impossibility of always distinguishing Englishman flora Citizens of the United States. On this point our Governmett well know that Great Britain is perfectly willing to adopt any ar rangement than can be devised, which will secure to her service " the seamen who are her own subjects," and . at the same tip ie exempt ours from impressment. 2. The merchant vessels of France, Spain, and Holland, being driven from the ocean, or destroyed, the commerce of those coun tries with one another, and with their colonies, could no loam be carried on by themselves. Here the vessels of neutral nations came in to their aid, and carried on nearly the whole of the com merce of those nations. With their seamen thus liberated from the merchant service, those nations, in the present and preceding wars, were enabled to man their s hips of war; and the neutral vessels and seamen supplying their places, became, in fart, though not in name, auxiliaries of war. The commerce of those nation% without one armed ship on the sea appropriated for its protection, was intended thus to be secured under neutral flap—while the merchant vessels of Great Britain, with its numerous armed ship* to guard them, were exposed to occasional captures. Such a mute of things Great Britain has resisted, not in the present only, but in former wan; at least as far beck m that of 175 i. And she has claimed and maintained a right to impose on this commerce some limits and restraints ; because it was a commerce which was de ! . tried by those nations to neutrals in time of peace--because it was a commerce of immense value to the subjects of her enemies-7and became it filled their treasuries with money to enable them to carry on their wars with Great Britain. 3. The third and only remaining pretence for war with Great Britain, is the unfortunate affair of the Chesapeake—whirh having been already stated and explained, I will only remark here, thst it is not to be believed that the British Government, after being defeated as before-mentioned, in its endeavours to make repara tion in London, for the wrong done by its servant, would have sent hither a Special Envoy to give honourable satisfaction, but from its sincere desire to close this wound, " if our own Govern ment would suffer it to be healed." Permit me now to ask, what man impartially view ing the subject, will have the boldness to say there exists any cause for plunging the United States intso a war with Great Britain ? Who that respects his re putation as a man of common discernment will say it ? Who that regards the interest and welfare of his country will say it ? Who then can jUstifY, who find an excuse for a course of conduct which has brought our country into its present state of alarm, embar rassment and distress ? For myself, Sir, I must de clare the opinion, that no free country was ever be fore ao causelessly, and so blindly thrown from the height of prosperity, and plunged into a state of dreadful anxiety and suffering. But from this de graded and wretched situation, it is not yet too late to escape. Let the dispatches from our Minister in, France be no longer concealed. Let the President perform the duty required of him by the constitu tion ; by giving to Congress full information of the state of the union in respect to foreign nations. Above all, let him unfold our actual situation with France. Let him tell us what are the demands and proposals of her Ruler. Had these been honourable to the United States, would not the President have been eager to disclose them ? That they are of an entirely different nature, that they are-dishonourable, that they are tsar nous to our commercial interest, and dangerous to our liberty and indepensknce, we are left to infer. I hope, Sir, that the nature and magnitude of the s subject will furnish a sufficient apology for the length and style of this letter. Perhaps some may deem it presumptuous thus to question the correctness of the proceedings of our Government. A strong sense of duty, and distressing apprehensions of national ruin, have forced the task upon me. To some, the senti ments' which, in the sincerity of my heart, I have el. pressed, may give offence—for often nothing offends so much as TRUTH. Yet'do I not desire to offend any num. But when I see 'the dangerous extent of Ese• cutive infiuenci ; when I 'ice the Great Council of the Nation called ou to enact laws deeply affecting the =PV% I the d" ot : 0 sessigre ; the co h" if 211 ow o f whi phich th &noel its Plainly the c known a rna de loess scot o b e s'the P k h en ce aPI env y to tl sor chanclil od their e gPseto of F a d M sleet • m inces, 1 ai t iA t tite nll2 q I go is c 10 1 pr e War n& { a f t . Sir C The P i MpO rtill 44 TO a The otter esti wet eveo —ls Df istr orate ellaet ted decreed 1 t i eslsto re cr in ti; ruhinz ambled t • If cardidtr hem th "Ire the Act snd the Feb. f r om 1 two d oraii f 1 Cl l l tMted *eke t:24 4 'l mean differ tt sitY to 6 tin +WI bat i l id Pil _.~, . ...~ fa