Star. — London, England, 1808-12-14 00:00:00

was not expedient to adopt that intifition, especially as he had communicated tome thedifficulties the army laboured ulder, - goal the want of cavalry and artil leryhorses, Una the impracticabilityofmoving the army to any considerable distance from the victualling ships. The decision I came to, namely, that the army should Malt, was a serious one, but, in my mind , am ply justified by the considerations opposed to its ad wince. The enemy greatly outnumber.:d the British in cavalry, and the nearer they approached the defen ces surrounding Liabbn, the nearer were they to their resources. In such a state of things, had the British' army received a check, the disasters might have been incalculable. I therefore thought it most proper to desist from an advance till a junction was formed with the remaining part of the British army..—(Here Sir Harry entered into a description of the relative strength of the several forts in the Tagus, and in ferred, that while the British army were engaged in reducing these forts, the enemy might have fought them under great advantage • and further, had Sir Charles Cotton been compelled to put to sea with his fleet, the impression upon the forts could have been very trifling, as the army had no heavy artillery or battering ammunition. The surf toe might have cut off the provisions.)—Under all these circumstances, as I have before stated, I thought it prudent that the army should halt, and I felt great satisfaction that my brother officers, whose talents and experience were unquestionable, concurred with me in the pro priety of-that opinion. On the morning of the '2lst, I landed, and presently heard a firing towards Vi. miera. I was convinced the enemy bad forestalled the necessity of the British army's advancing, by commenciag an attack themselves. I understood Sir Arthur Wellesley was on the left of the army, and I shortly after joined him on the heights. I had a few words of explanation with him, and I h;ciAiuch. rea son to be satisfied with the disposition: he had rnade, that I directed limtoo on, and complete the busi 'ness he bad so successfully and so happily begun.— By thus directing him to proceed, I imagined. I was exercising one of the functions of a Commander-in. Chief, and I held myself responsible for the issue. Soon after, the French gave way, and, in less than two hours they were every where repulsed. At this moment I was informed that no advantage could be expected from the Portuguese cavalry ; and on Sir Arthur's suggesting the propriety of the troops ad vancing, I answered, that I saw fio reason for chan ging my first opinion, and that it was better the army should wait the arrival of reinforcements before they advanced. During the engagement, I had observed the inability of the artillery horses, and a want of celerity in their movements. I also observed large bodies of the enemy's cavalry moving in different directions, and a body of infantry to the left, which had not been engaged. These, and other circum stances formed my determination, and Generals Mur ray and Clinton said I had well determined. It also a peered to me that the enemy's plan of attack was it advised and ill supported. Had we been more alTamed, we should have been more exposed. 1, therefore thought it better to halt and refresh thit men, and to get the wounded on board the ships..... General Auckland's brigade bad been up all ni and the rest of the army was under arms before 4 7 . light. Of these disadvantages the enemy might have profited had we advanced,as they knew the country, and were in possession of its resources ' • but the principal reasons were what he had only stated, and the neces sity of getting the wounded off the field of battle.— On the 22d, Sir Arthur Wellesley came to me from Peniche, and informed me that Sir Hew Dalrymple had arrived. I went to the outposts, and found the French General Kellerman was advancing with a flag of truce ; and of the transactions subsequent upon that, the Board, he presumed, were already in possession." The narrative was laid before the Board in the same manner as those of the other Generals. Several ,questions were put by the Court in writing, to Sir Harry Burrard, on the subject of his narrative, to which he read the answers from a paper in his band. Sir Arthur Wellesley, he said, had informed him that the army was in good condition, except as to cavalry, artillery, fec. He had no message from Sir Arthur during the night of the 20th of August. Sir Arthur, on the 21st, proposed to him to advance, and he had answered as before. The .. rench had, no doubt, as enany of their troops in the battle as were disposable. It was difficult to ascertain their exact number, but he supposed they might be from 16 to 17,000 strong, including cavalry. Before the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple, he knew the state of the army only generally. But he understood that there was a deficiency of ammunition, of cavalry, and of artil lery, and of horses for the Commissariat. As to the quantity or the quality of the provisions, he was not isk4 ' distinctly informed. The enemy, he understood, were in force at Torres Vedras, and from Torres Vedras to Matra, there was the strongest pass he had ever seen. When Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived, he stated to him his reasons for not advancing. Lord MOIRA.—Q. You have stated, that, one of your reasons for not advancing was, that the British troops had been long under arms , nd were greatly fat gued. Is it not to be understood that the French trcops had been an equal time under arms, and as fatigued with the action ?—A. I thought the troops required refieshment. The French troops, I should suppose, must have been under arms much earlier than the Engli , h, as they marched to the attack. , Sir Arthur Wellesley's Statement and Sir H. Bur rard's Narrative were read a second time pro forma. Sir IL DALRYMPLE declined putting any question o Sir 11. Burrard. . Questions by Sir A. WELLESLEY to Sir Harry Burrai d : Q. f Wish to know whether Sir H. Burrard ever heard, that it was a standing order in the army while under my command, that ihe troops when ordered , to march should cook a day's provisions ?—A. I did hear of it. • Q. The troops then being ordered to march on the • 21st, would they not have in their haversacks during the action o( the 21st, the provisions for that day i' A. Certainly, if they received orders to march. Q. On the evening of the 20th, did I not inform Sir Harry Burrard, that I had ordered the army to march on the following morning ?—A. Sir Arthur Wellesley stated, that he intended to march on the foil wing morning, and probably that he had ordered tlie 4-my to advance. ... Q. Sir H. Burrard has stated to the Court, that I - ' I - • _ .. • ' • • t i " Illefeled t en t ai est th e fi eld of battle to resat the e.. Does•be recollect ray haviog proposed it to Ins a second time * in consequence of - a ni which I received fro& General Ferguson ?-1: 11 I I T remember that Sir Arthur said something to ms On ,tbei subject k but if I recollect, it was to pursue on the left where the ground was open, and the enemy would have had a great advantage from their supers- I ority in point of cavalry. General Ferguson's bri- I gade was then winch advanced. Q. Does Sir H: Burrard recollect that the ground in front of the position of Generals Fane and A.nstru ther's brigades was bounded by a hill covered with pine trees, to which the right flank of those brigades would have been exposed if they had p ursued that ' part of the enemy's army which had been engaged I I with them and defeated by them ?—A. There was a hill covered with pines in front. • Q. Does Sir H. Burrard recollect, that in describ ing to him the disposition which I had made of the army, and the orders I had given to the differeacorps. I informed him that I had ordered Generals Fane and Anstrtather, tot to be induces to quit their posi tion on any account without orders from me. A. I was informed that they were not to follow the enemy, and that the order had been given them before they were engaged. Whether Sir A. or somebody else told me I do not know. Q. Does he recollect that the plan, according to which I proposed to him to pursue the enemy, and follow up . our advantages, was to move the brigadts on the right, namely, those of Generals Hill, F no * , and Anstruther, upon Torres Vedras , b y th e hi hi. , road, and to follow the beaten enemy with the o er five brigades, and the Portuguese troops ? A. I un derstood that it was intended to march the brigades on the right upon Torres Vedras. I • de not recollect the rest as part of the plan mentioned to me. Q. Whether Sir H. Burrard recollects that the first time I spoke to him , about pursuing the enemy, I mentioned the plan of marching to Torres Vedras ; and the second time, the pursuit of the enemy with the left ? A. I did not consider them as one and the same plan. I saw a corps of General Ferguson's brigade too far advanced and in a run, and I ordered it to halt. Lord MOIRA.—Q. Did you consider 1500 cavalry, the number at which the enemy's cavalry was esti mated, as formidable to that corps? A. General Ferguson was so far advanced that the corps was in danger of being exposed to the enemy's cavalry, be' fore other troops came up to his assistance. Q. By Sir ARTHUR—Was the period at which Sir Harry Burrard states that he saw one of the corps in advance, and in a run, as he says, before he had de cided that the enemy should net be pursued, and before or after the last attack made by a corps of French infantry on the 71st and 82d ?—A. I think the attack on these two corps was the last of the action— (the latter part of the answer we heard indistinctly, and could not collect whether he stated his decision to have been before or after the attack.) Q. Were not the 36th and the 40th regiments in the same brigade as the 71st, and on the same ground, and was not this brigade supported by the 29th, and agsin in the rear by the brigades of Generals Bowes and Acton, all in columns of brigades, throughout the action ; and at the close of the action, by that of General Craufurd and the Portuguese troops, on the left ?—A. I believe they were—but I cannot speak exactly to the position of the Portuguese troops. • Question to Sir H. Burrard, by the Court.—Was the high-road to Tortes Vedras on the right nearer than that which must have been taken by the enemy who had been engaged on the left ?—A. I cannot answer that question at present—the map now Ihewn to me gives a different idea of it from what I had' in viewing the ground, Same question to Sir A. Wellesley. Was the high road, &c. ?—A. I think it wad. The enemy must have gone round about to Torres Vedras, while our right could have marched by the direct road from Vimiera. Court to Sir Arthur. Had our troops followed up their first success, could the left wing have been em ployed to pursue those troops which had been engaged with our right ?—A. The enemy's left, which was engaged on our right, retired by a road which leads along the heights towards Lisbon, on a different side of the valley from that on which our left stood, and began to retire at much about the same time dtat the attack began with our left wing; and consequently the left could not have been immediately employed topursue those troops which had been engaged with our right. Those troops, I believe, continued in confusion, in the woods which were on their side of the valley, during a considerable part of the day ; and this confusion was considerably encreased, and its duration lengthened, by the attack made by Our cavalry. Q. By General Nicols.—Was there, in your opi nion, a probability of it tercepting any . part of the enemy's forces, if our troops had advanced 3—A. ,I. certainly think, that if the left wing had followed up its advantages as I propcsul, not only many w o u l d have been - taken belonging to the left wing of the French array, but likewise belonging, to the right, The whole French army seemed to me in cinch confu sion, that giving them full credit for great facility andi discipline in forming, after haring been br oken, it { would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for • them to have formed again. .. Q. By the Court.—When did you propose to Sri H. Burrard to adAnce on the 21st ?—A. When the enemy were beaten on the left, I went to Sir H. Bat; rard, and proposed to him to pursue the enemy ; I did it in the way of a continuance or a renewal of a discussion which I had had with him in the Brazen on the preceding evening, and I told him that this' was his time to advance, and that he ought to move the right wing to Torres Vedras, and to pursue the beaten enemy on the left that we had twelve days provisions, plenty of ammunition, &c. But Sir H. Burrard was of opinion that our advantages ought _ not to'be followed up, 'much for the same reasons as he had stated the night before, i and he desired, that I would halt the troops on the ground then occupied: By this time the 71st and 82d were in advance, she 40th and 36th immediately in their rear, on the side I of the valley, and the other troops formed in suc,cesii] sion for their support. Very shortly -afterwards' tilt , last attack was.made by a body of the enemy's idiot- try on the 71st and 82d, which was repulsed, as I. stated in my report to Sir H. Burrard, and it was,, after that, as well as I recollect, that Geneal Feign son seat his Aid-de-Camp, Captain Melia, to inforAt . ere e t t h e g r a t e deakese ► eVilieh might be filet +tad cUlteal efttir.l, en the Q. Do you know what was Do that subject. of ßarrar our aidvir...,,:tr.agaitcirto- M a. . de ander ofthe Forces, who was near to which General fmtidi7Mtheelltishminuto Sairti°Hn. gy m tvolencotnontinnwe our stat state , that T r Ivia Q d to Sir laced to Torres Vedras ?- A. Prev con S si i a r d il A ere w a i d T th li th h t7it eit two W t°lll . l4 S ali p o r Z os Harry Burrard, on the evening of the 20th and on the miles. itions made by him P . . 21st, on the field of battle, to continue in pursuit o Q. Do you know the distance the advantages already gained by the British, as at the time, by the left of our position He certainly, in, visiting the secant:l proposition, did Q. Have you any knowledge having in contemplation the same plan of operations . three miles farther. not mean to recommend the pursuit of the French as tween that and Torres Vedras . undoubtedly were in thing, except the general features. • Q. Do you think, fugitive ftivgreae army, confus thou gh ion. they o a f stQ a a f .tc u lf our army had followed the plan proposed in forward they m pursuing the enemy, must not the French have, gamed which had beet round on them in retiring in very loose order; and in good order, if our infantry had been broken in the pursuit, would vary ; and , not the enemy have had a good opportunity of acting separated, against them with their cavalry ? A. In order to handled ?—) answer that question, 1 must state to the Court, what voured to ' r conceive would have been the operations of the two in regard armies if the plan proposed had been adopted. If the `rest with ._ enemyhad marched to TorreiVedras,,they would have the disposition been cut off from Lisbon by the neares t road to that ; Q. Did , place. If they had retired on Tones Vedras in a state ' their ground, of confusion, they would have been between two bodies ' order ?-6 of our troops. If they had chosen to go round to three miles Lisbon by Villa Franca, it was true they might have centre ot , done so ; but I conceive an army in that situation, of an hour, followed, even at a slow rate, by a victorious enemy," Q. At • absolutely incapable of forming, or appearing - again After the . in the shape of an army. There is no doubt but that 1 •Q. How our army must have kept in order, and preserved the centre and connection between one corps and another in the pro- ately, but posed pursuit ; but by keeping in order, Ido not ! Sir A. mean that they must at all times" have been formed after the. in line. • " mediately . Q. How many cannon did the enemy carry with r_nerals Fare '.. them in their retreat ?—A. According to th e order of 1 , time to which the enemy's battle, they had but 21 piece's of artillery , rals Anstruther' in the action, of which we took 13. If their order i whole had of battle was correct, which I believe it is, they had i Q. W eight pieces left. • 'Vedrac, Q. Do you know if the Reserve of the infantry of northward the enemy were engaged ?—A. I do. to the road Q. How do you now that ? A. From several Q. General circumstances : First, I myself saw them in the battle. I reinforcement 2dly. Several prisoners of the Reserve were taken, 1 Torres - and corroborated the fact. Sdly. General Kellerman I learn that commanded the Reserve, and informed me they were " mour engaged. 4th l y. General Junot, who commanded I was the . _ the army, told me, he attributed the loss of the battle Q. Was you to the impetuosity of the Reserve, who could-not be H. Burrard restrained. And lastly, I heard from many French tinue to -, Officers, that every corps of infantry in their army Ithe enemy. had that day been engaged. Q. Did Q. Did you know it in any other manner ?—A. I action, - knew it from the period at which they were intro- Bided as t. duced into the action. I knew it also from the cir- considered cunistance of the line of march by which they ap- centre . proached, which was that of raw troops ; and by. Wellesley , comparing what I saw with the accounts given me • Question by the French Officers of the line of attack adopted horses ' for that corps of the French army. roads such Q. Might there not have been a second line of in. up your . fantry, as well as a reserve, in an attack of that sort ? with great —A. Such was the situation of the country, that any General number of troops might have been concealed, who by Sir ' :night have been destined to take part in the attack;' Q. - , and it would have been difficult, if notimpossible, for. 21st of us to see them : but I had seen nearly, if not the whole card to %,._ of the French troops on their march in columns in had gained the morning ; and judging by the number I saw, and • I v/as wit) - comparing them with what I conceived to be the Q. P number of troops fit for action, I did -not conceive halt, - that they had any such troops, besides the reserve : Camp, , although it might have been possible to conceal such to continue a body of troops in the hills. I must also mention, advantage .that I saw the tails of their columns. Q• P Q._ Can you say, what distance the right of Gene- were : 111 Hill's brigade was from the left of General Ferri- broken, sbn's'at the conclusion of the battle t A. I should bad, in I think not less than two or three, or it might be three thereby miles. I must observe, that from the nature of this cut o ff action, the right and left wings of both armies were of the t disconnected; and that a valley run from the point, 9. near where the action finished, toVimieta,which sepa- which rated the left wing of the British army from the right, gaged, and also disconnected the two wings of the French render army. At the same time, such was the nature of the —A. country, that it was so complete :y occupied by the the very troops which were on it, which troops were so•com- nion that pletely supported by those on their rear, that we could continue feel no inconvenience from this circumstance. ' Q. Die General Spencer was then - called in and examined the action by Sir H. Burrard : bilious Q. What was the distance between the right of opinion, General Dill's brigade and the left of General F sin's, at the close of the action ?—A. From two and a ' the Q enemy half to three miles, I believe. than' Q. Had the enemy, when they attacked Generals valry _, Anstruther and Fane's brigade, time to regain their Question order before the left were repulsed ?—A. The enemy stances - were in order in two lines immediately on their re- part t treating from the centre and left of our position, grusa, about three miles off. One line I distinctly saw. village Q. Had you reason for knowing that the reserve a stand, of the enemy's infantry were engaged that day ?—A. brigade! Not particularly of the reserve, retiring Q. Were the whole of the enemy's infantry engaged so bad, _that day ?—A. I cannot positively say. ficient Q. Were our artillery horses of sufficient strength brouj s ._ to have been usefully employed against the enemy as Lord far as Torres Vedras, or to seize and keep possesion of a height distant from the main body of our army, the column separated being liable to be attacked by the cavalry or infantry of the enemy ?—A. The horses performed the previous journey from Mondego Bay to Torres Vedras, and as to any particular press or push, every exertion would have been made to over come the difficulties which might have presented themselves. Q. Did you hear that the French at Torres Vedras had been joined on the evening of the 21st by a body of infantry ?—A. I did : about three or four thousand Sir . Q. ded the. advan% A. —A. Q , you recommended plan ' to put ed' of the him ing that doubtful Ls iti alovie athleat eu . mleteritthe CAft tolialt.:H t."—'"• as the distance, 1 17 "Oda 2 1 Hill's Brigade eh , A. About eight cei % toe ice° l inn by the other tit lie a r position line?—A.47l !dge of the grata% • on_ lras ?—A. I believ% lit" ;elm. urc geurras =inures. h y e u y u m th ig in h k t ' no if t p ht uf fo uur und ar : Y e ha Fidench ailma P°lreeer y O W iLelc l l rd bee er, n w re it p h u in i thp sed katteirth b te y ceoan G nfe e nom n ou erals nyt ann: Ans dyldath tnnb ehbao:yve 0144.4 kte k ,... !‘ L moo A th . e I tw th o I, our right might not have been quitgw ,tll stheti take oteion he their separation j u Commanderdgjudged position of 0 thet h proper t a ftc Torres unVedras the siinpvtaeld' forces, :le a ! c° ' w9".--11 due retna o4 t4 ,d you not see the French in them' e pe und, immediately rally, and get into t the je • t off it , saw havealready unelinedinin ad, in distinctly formed true ed rii our position, where they remained Dim* 1 ur. t what time did you first see this line Ld• le retreat. [ow soon after?—A. After the attark.oa ot nd left had Ceased ; I cannot say asti • • ut very 300T1 after. L. Wrixist.ey.;—Was the time you uggili • n't attack had been repulsed by our lef t; t i t , as ly after the attack had been repulsed - sr and Aastrnther's brigades ?-•-•ft. To e en which I allude was after the attack on O A . struther's and Fane's brigades, and afro to tad ceased.. Vas that line formed on the mad to Tea . , or on a part of the scene of action to ' • and ?A. It was towards the northward um • road to Torres Vedras. 3eneral Spencer mentioned that he liemai i - !ement of infantry having joined the hail Vedras en the evening of the 9.lst :bilk • . hat from authority, or only from moan. • A. I did not learn it from authoriry,kat e report in the camp. Was you present when I recommendedkes r t rrard on the field of battle on the 21st, te a. to pursue the advantages we had gained re i emy. A. I was not. Did you, as second in command to me int" • , consider the defeat of the enemy to be so tit as to warrant the pursuit of the enemy ? ered the enemy to be so completely begin and left, that I should have supported Sr A sley in that measure. !Won by Earl MoIRA. If you had had utile for conveying cannon, was the nature cif ti• such as would have enabled you to have Inuit • air artillery ?—A. I think it would bare Ott difficulty they could have got on. astral Faaousow was then called, ander:lmin- . r A. Wsturster. Was you present, on the field of betde, on th- August, when I recommendavAala.. 's • to continue the pursuit of the advantages w rained over the enemy ?—A. I was not preset • with my brigade. Do you recollect after having received mime that you sent a message to me by your Aid p, Capt. Mellish, informing me, that, 411 .; nenue to advance, you would gain stages ?—A. I did send such a message. Describe to the Curt what those who. • • ?—A.' A- coluinn of the enemy i . en, and consisting of from 1500 to 2000 in their confusion, ipt into a hollow, and by placed in that satuation_thaUkt..6. • >if from the main body, by a movement d • •:- . e corps under my command. Did you consider that part of the enemy the troops under your command had Ise t•d, ea the 21st of 'August, to be so benne .-- er the continuance Of the pursuit of •• ••: As they had lost all their artillery, odor r. - very utmost confusion, it certainly was sit k that it was of importance that our, army - i . inue to advance. i. Did.yon see any troops formed at the erd action ?—A. None properly formed. Sae • ins of their infantry -occasionally halted, is Lion, to cover and carry off the booty. I. In what numbers did you observe any etal • enemy ?—A. In small bodies, generally's' ;2 or 900 infantry. The greater part ci • - • 7 appeared to be opposed to our centre. htesuon by Earl MolßA.—Under what . v ices did your orders to halt find you ? t of my battalion was on the village 4 sa, and the other in the rear to suppenr,, age was the last place where the enemy and, and from which they had been drilla sad, that, he hardly thought, hail thesellani, • ring un in der the m grea y cs te m s ra t canondiusinon.e enemy ring oda ent number of artillery-horses, the/ , ught the artillery forward. t Lord Burghersh was theu called and e Arthur Wellesley, Was your Lordship present when I Ito Sir Harry Burrard, on the field of • • . 21st of August;to . continuein the pursuit • vantages gamed by our army over the - - I was. • • • Q. Were you present-during the coney k,. th Sir H. Barrard Goa the lame tubject, as A. I was. • • - Q. Do you recollect trayhr.*on :amended to Sir• Harry Burrard the • 111 for this purpose, which it had been nit put in practice the next morning ; and ‘ hat . 1 ,. out to him the incorveniencies* and di ' bringing Sir John Moore from Mouder3 " e army f—A. I recollect your - . ma to allow the army to move forward* F • gof the 21st. As a reason for that% . • at the armies were 'so nea r ,. as toun 3 r ikat lubtful that one of the two must- stack; 1., • ivancing, the British•arrnfweuid barer. knave, and, in Stir A. Welleibly l a arl.l WWII* Q. Had you any reason to suppose that the enemy had retreated with some cannon ? and what number? —A. They did; with seven or eight pieces, I under stand. ... .. Q. If the British army bad resolved to pursue the enemy on the 21st, what body of men would it have 11 been necessary to leave behind, to collect and take care of the wdunded, and such stores as the army 'toad not haw dale without 1-4ockeire 10- ov .c you , Ter vitt Jed cue the me U' so 'ar