Star. — London, England, 1820-08-10 00:00:00

1 i i ~k EASTERN ARCHIPELAGO.—No. In the &err of the 2d of August we laid before our )leaden some remarks on the value of the commerce with the Eastern Islands. We now proceed to offer some ob.ervations relative to the danger of our being excluded from it by the machinations of the Dutch. The dispositioa of the Dutch to deprive us of all share in what we have denominated the Independent Trade in the Indian Archipelago, may be inferred from their unremitted exertions in former times to prevent our obtaining it, and from their present une quivocal language and conduct. In the zenith of .their power they had brought most of the native Princes under their subjection, and where they did not acquire territorial rights, generally obtained grants of an exclusive trade, requiring all native ves sels to carry their pass and flag, and restricting them from entering except at ports where the Dutch had L•'stablishmen;s. At their instigation it was that the natives cut off our early settlements, and there is lit tle doubt that many of our vessels, which have been burnt in the Roads of BataVia and elsewhere, were set fire to by their orders. Their commercial ambi tion and their animosity against British trade were never greater than at this moment. They are deeply impressed with the recollection of their ancient ma ritime and commercial grandeur, and would favour any other nation, especially the Americans, to our prejudice. Of the disposition of the mother-country, "the actual contemplation of a prohibitory duty on 'British shipping trading to their Colonies in the Ar chipelago, i, some evidence, and various incidents which took place at the moment of transferring the colony, are sufficient to prove the assuming spirit of the Colonial Government.—" We have experienced from the Commissioners General of his Majesty the King of the Netherlands," says the Lieutenant-Go vernor in Council, in his dispatch to the Court of Directors of the 9th June, 1816, " an evident dis inclination to concede anything to the British name, or to the character of the British Nation in these seas. Resting on one argument only, that the Con vention contains no clause or obligation on them to acknowledge existing relations, they have uniformly entrenched themselves within what they consider to be the law of the case, and have acknowledged that 'they do not deem it necessary to consider what also may be thought requisite on grounds of justice and equity." And again, in another dispatch of the same date, the Lieutenant-Governor adds, " Judging from the measures adopted by the Commissioners General in this Island (Java), and by the general policy which appears to direct the Presidents and other subordi nate Officers of the present Government, there seems 'reason to believe that their wish is to erase the re collection of a British Administration of the Colony, and studiously to prevent the native Princes and Chiefs perceiving any influence of the British Go vernment in the arrangements made at the transfer." The Dutch Commissioners have essitively refused to guarantee or acknowledge any of the Treaties en tered into by the British Government in Java; or any of those relations of comparative independence on the part of the natives which the British Government had sanctioned ; indeed for them to have behaved well to the British, seems now to be punished as a crime. Supposing, however, the disposition of the Dutch to be more favourable to us than it appears, would prudence allow us to depend upon its continuance for the possession of a cornmerce which we have the means of securing to ourselves by a better tenure than their good pleasure? The means which the Dutch possess of excluding us from the trade of the Eastern Islands, appear to be chiefly 1. By taking possession of the vacant ports. 2. By treaties with the native Princes. 3. By intimidating the natives. 4. By duties on our shipping and manufactures. 5. By vexatious or violent measures directed against our merchants, or the natives with whom they may trade. 6. By degrading us in the eyes of the natives. To these means what can we oppose? To their system of taking possession of unoccu pied ports, and making treaties of monopoly with 'the natives, we can oppose the same system. There are yet, at least there were when the last accounts came away, ports of which we may take possession before them, and Princes at liberty to make treaties 'with us in favour of our commerce. To their intimidation of the natives we may op. pose a course of protection. To their imposition of heavy duties on our regular trade with the Dutch colonies, no resistance can be made in the islands, but to the effect of such a mea sure we can oppose the facility of obtaining our goods free of duty. To the vexatious and violent measures which may be directed against our independent commerce, we may oppose a British authority at hand, charged with the special duty of seeing justice done. Such a protection, necessary at all events, would be , doubly so in the event of heavy duties being im posed on British trade with the Dutch colonies.— Smuggling would then, no doubt, be attempted to a large extent, and, under pretence of repressing it, our independent and legitimate trade in the Archi pelago would otherwise be so harassed by search ings, detentions, and disputes, that it would not be orth having. To the last means of exclusion, viz. that of de grading us in the eyes of the natives, we may oppose, , in the first instance, a strict regard to the engage ments which we have already made with them, either expressly or by implication, and afterwards early in formation and prompt notice of the calumnies that may be propagated against us, of the - arrogant pre tensions that may be set up, and of all other insults that may be offered to us by the Dutch. Ought not the Dutch Government to be held bound to fulfil those engagements which we have either directly, or by implication, contracted with the native Powers during the five-and-twenty years, and espe -cially during the British Government of Java?— Having accepted the benefit of those acts which are favourable to them, should they refuse the burden of those which they may deem otherwise? No provi: sion was made, in our agreements with the native Princes, for the contingency of the Colonies reverting to Holland. The language which we held out to them was that of a Government competent to make agreements in perpetuity ; without such a language, we never could have done what we have done for the Eastern Islands. Our leading measures, of which the Dutch . ire now deriving ' al l the benefit, in the augmentation of commerce and revenue, could never have been effected,. except the naives had relied on our securing to them a perpetuity of those rights which -we had recognized. Our honour, and a re gard for our character with the natives, demand that we should insist on those treaties being.confirmed ; otherwise, we shall be considered as wanting either the disposition, or the power to see our engagements fulfiled. It may be said, that the Convention be tween England and the Netherlands makes no provi sion or reservation which can warrant this demand of ours. But ought the King of the Netherlands to be allowed to take advantage of an oversight, which resulted only frcm our eagerness to restore him his Colonies? Add can the British Government admit that the neglect of a point on which our national ho nour and good faith are concernei, should be attri buted to anything but an oversight ? Is a whole Nation, of between four and five mil lions, industrious, obedient, and strongly attached to us, indebted to our Government for emancipation from feudal bondage, and for the right of civil freedom and security—a people interesting for their simple manners, and amiablefor their virtues, to be abandoned and cast aside without notice or remembrance ? The British Government considered the native Princes as independent Sovereigns, and treated with them accordingly. The Dutch hive refused to gua rantee our treaties, and appear to consider these faithful Allies to the British Nation as mere vassals, who are now subjected to their vengeance and rapacity. If this be unjust with respect to the Settlements actually subjected to European controul, what must be thought of it with respect to those States which .have risen into importance, and maintained their in dependence, by means of their connection with Bri tain, in opposition to the restrictive policy of the Dutch ? The Dutch aim at an absolute despotism over the whole Archipelago, with a view to exercise it oppressively. We have encouraged sentiments of freedom as far as was compatible with tranquillity, and have led the natives to rely up - on us for the con tinued enjoyknent of that portion of independence which we allowed them ; they look upon that allow ance as a grant, and will certainly despise and up braid us if we permit that grant to be revoked by the Dutch. The following extract of a letter from the Sultan of Palembang to the Lieutenant-Governor of Java, written after the actual transfer of Banca to the Dutch, will skew the sort of feeling which prevails among the native Princes: " I hasten to send back my Ambassadors to Ba tavia, to wait upon my friend, the Lieutenant: " Governor, of whom I earnestly entreat that he will 4 4 confirm and settle all the arrangements regarding " me and the country of Palembang, as heretofore 44 existing with the English Government ; and that " those relations may remain uninterrupted, notwith " standing the establishment of the Dutch Govern " ment on the Island of Java. I cannot on any con " sideration separate myself from the friendship ex " isting between me and the English Government ; " and I place my reliance on the English Govern " ment, that their protection will not be withdrawn from me. They have exalted me to the Throne " of Palembang, and for what reason I do not know; " but I cannot understand any other Power upon " which I can place my dependence than the English Government. It is on the protection of the English " Government I place my trust, as I have so long 44 done : their friendship is engrafted on my mind , - ; 64 and my sentiments can never change:' COPY OF A MEMORIAL ADDRESSED TO ALL THE MINISTERS OF RUSSIA, ON TIIE SUBJECT OF THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN. The Chevalier de Zea Bermudez has presented to the Imperial Cabinet the annexed note, relative to the events which have just taken place in the Penin sula, and of which we were already informed by the dispatches that were forwarded to us by our agents at foreign Courts. M. de Zea, in this document, confines himself to informing us, that the Constitution promulgated by the Cot tes in the year 18l2 f has been accepted by the king, and expresses a desire to know how the Emperor has viewed this change of the Government? If the distance which separates us front Spain, and from the States which are best enabled to weigh maturely the nature of the disasters with which she is menaced, be considered, k will be readily acknow ledged, that the position of the Imperial Ministry, with regard to the Representative of the Spanish Nation, was difficult and delicate. The Revolution of the Peninsula fixes the atten tion of the two hemispheres ; the interests which it is about to decide, are the interests of the Universe; and if ever the Emperor wished that the opinion of his Allies might conduce to regulate his own, it cer tainly was at the moment when the note of the Che valier de Zea imposed upon his Imperial Majesty the obligation of pronouncing upon an event which involves, perhaps, the future destinies of all civilised nations. This obligation, however, existed ; for, in these days, every subject of doubt becomes an in strument of malevolence. The necessity of replying to M. de Zea was, there; fore, evident ; but, in this important conjuncture, it appeared natural, that previously to pronouncing an opinion, the Emperor should consider the object which the Allied Powers proposed to themselves in their relations with Spain ; that he should consult the views which they had expressed to that same Power, and that he should take as a guide fc•r his own, the principles of European policy. This is what his Im perial Majesty was bound to do ; this is what he has done. Since the year 181 Z more than one diplo matic document attests the generous solicitude, which the several Courts of Europe have constantly maniiested in behalf of Spain. They applauded the noble perseveran* with which her intrepid people resisted a foreign yoke. They rendered homage to their wisdom, when they rallied round a constitu- 1 tional Throne, the dearest interests of their country ; —the interests of her independence. Finally, from the period when PROVIDENCE restored Ferdinand VII. to his people, they never failed to acknowledge that solid institutions could alone secure on its basis, the ancient Spanish Monarchy, The Allied Sovereigns did more. In the course of long conferences, relative to the differences with Rio de la Plata, and to the pacifisatioa of t,lie Coe tonics, they let it be sufficiently understood; that these intentions would cease to be a means of mce and happiness, if, instead of being grantertsby kind ness, as a voluntary concession, theyiould be adopted by weakness as a last resource of salvation. Let us investigate, on the other hand, the great transactions which established the European Alliance. What is the object of the engagements that were renewed on the (3d) 15th of November, 1818? The Allied Monarchs had just then obliterated the last traces of the Revolution in France; but that Re volution seemed ready to produce new calamities. The obligation of the Monarchs. was, therefore, and their design was, to prevent, bursting frbm the same horizon, the same stotth that should a third time desolate Europe, Nevertheless, as if the alarms which were then ex cited by the state of France, and which it still ex• cites, were not sufficient—as if Governments and Naticns entertained but slight doubts with respect to its future condition, it was necessary- that the Genius of Evil should select a new theatre, and that Spain, in her turn, should be offered up as a fearful sacri fice. Revolution has therefore changed its ground, but the duties of Monarchs cannot have changed their nature, and the power of the insurrection is neither less formidable nor less dangerous than it would have been in France. _ _ In unison, therefore, with his Allies, his Majesty cannot but desire to see granted to the Peninsula, as to its trans-marine Provinces, a Government which he concludes as the only one that can yet justify some hope, in this age of calamities. But in virtue of his engagement of the (3d) 16th of November, 1818, his Majesty is bound to mark, with the most forcible reprobation, the revolutionary measures set in action to give new Institutions to Spain. Such is the twofold idea which is found developed in the annexed Answer, which the Cabinet of Russia has made to the Chevalier de Zea, by order of kis Impe rial Majesty*. The Emperor does not doubt that , his august. Allies will approve its contents, and per- h. hips they have already addressed similar sentiments to the Court of Madrid. The same wishes may, in fact, have inspired the same language, and convinced, •like his Majesty, that crime must always yield per nicious fruit, they have doubtless deplored, as he has, the - outrage which has recently tarnished the annals of Spain. We repeat it, this outrage is deplorable. It is deplorable for the Peninsula—it is deplorable for Europe; and the Spanish Nation now owes the example of an expiatory deed to the people of the two hemispheres. Till this be done, the unhappy L object of their disquietude can only make them fear the contagion of her calamities. Nevertheless, amidst ill these elements of disaster, and when so many rtiotives combine to afflict the real friends of the wel fare of nations, may a better future still be looked for! Is there any wise and redeeming measure, whose effect may be to reconcile Spain with herself, as well as with the other Powers of Euiope? We dare not affirm it ; for experience has taught us to consider almost always as an illusion, the hope of a happy event. But, if we might trust the calcu lations which personal interest would seem bound to indicate : if it were permitted to presume that the Cortes would consult the interest of their own preser vation, it might be believed, that they would hasten I to extirpate, by a solemn measure, ll that is culpa ble in the circumstances which accompanied the change of the Administration in Spain. The inte rests of the Cones are here identified with the interests lef Europe. The misled soldiery who protectetV may tomorrow assail them : and their first duty towards their Monarch, their country, and theinSelves, seems to be, to prove that they will never consent to legalize insurrection. These are hopes which would not appear to be without some foundation. The Emperor is far from cherishing them : and if he•admitted the possibility of a result so useful, he would make it de pend upon the unanimity which might manifest itself in the opinion of the principal Powers of Europe, as to the Act by which the Representatives of the Spanish people ought to signalize the•opening of their deliberations. Thisunanimity, always so power ful when it takes the character of an irrevocable deed * will perhaps carry conviction to the minds of the most eminent members of his Catholic Majesty ; and the Allied Courts would seem to have an easy means of impressing upon their language Web an imposing uniformity. Their Ministers in France have hitherto treated, in their name, with a Plenipotentiary of the Court of Madrid. Can they not now present to him' in com mon, observations, the summary of which follows, and which would recal to the Spanisti Government, the conduct, as well as the political principles, of the Allied Monarchs ? 64 The Monarchs," would say the five Ministers, " have never ceased to entertain wishes for the pros- ' perky of Spain. They will always entertain them. They have desired, that in Europe, as in America, Institutions conformable to the progress of civiliza tion, and to the wants of the age, might procure to Ml Spaniards long years of peace and happiness.— They desire the same at this moment. They have wished that all these Institutions should become a real blessing, by the legal manner in which they should be introduced. trey new wish the same. . " The last consideration will convey to the Minis ters of his Catholic Majesty, with what sentiments of affliction and grief they have learned the event of the Bth of March, and those which preceded it. Accord ingto their opinion, the salvation of Spain, as well as the welfare of Europe, will require that this crime should be disavowed—this stain effaced—this bad example exterminated. The honour of such a repa ration appears to depend upon the Cortes. Let them deplore, and forcibly reprobate, the means employed to establish a new mode of Government in their coun try, and in consolidating an Administration wisely constitutional, let them adopt the most rigorous.laiks against sedition and revolt. " Then, and only then, the Allied Cabinets will be able to maintain a friendly and amicable relation with Spain." Thesc observations, urged in common by the Re ; presentatives of the five allied Courts, would, from thenceforth, demonstrate to the Spanish Ministry the conduct which the Allied Governments "would ób t serve, in - east the consequences of the Bth of March should perpetuate, in Spain, trouble and anarchy,. If these salutary councils be listened to••••if the Cor • This refers to the" Note of the Imperial %Rattan Ministry ,e 0 the resident SparAish Minister," whidi &peered iu the &.'r • of the 31st tes offer to their King, in the name of the Nation. 3 pledge of obedience—if they succeed in e•tahlishin+, upon durable bases, the tranquillity of Spain, ai!Li the peace of Southern America—the Revolution will have been defeated, at the very moment when it thought to obtain a triumph. If, on the contrary, alarms, perhaps too reason able, be realized, at least the five Courts will have discharged a sacred duty—at least a New announce ment will have developed the principles, indicated the objects, and displayed the scope of the Elm - .. pean alliance. The Emperor awaits the answer of the Courts o f Vienna, London, Berlin, and Paris, to the communi cations which his Ministers have addressed to him on this subject. He informs them, that the present Memorial is the instruction which he has caused to be dispatched to all his Ministers on the subject of the affairs of Spain. THE EVENING f.t it LONDON. THURSDAY, AUGUST 10, 1820. MCI& Of STOCKS THIS DAY AT ONE O'CLOCK Bank Stock 223 3 per Cent. Reduced 69 1 / 8 3 per Cent. Cons. 681 A 1 $ 3i per Cent. 77 1 / 2 5 / 8 -4 per Cent. 87 1 / 2 14 5 per Cent. 103 1 / B —Long Annuities 18 1 / 4 India Bonds 245. 25s.—Esc1i. Bills, 4s. ss: pre. Cons. for Acct. 68 1 / 2 8/8 We mentioned, yesterday, that her Majesty Ilte QUEEN had addressed an important letter to tLe KING, on the subject of the pending proceedin, which, it was hoped, would open the way to an aJ tittstment. The Tianes of this morning says, " that the letter was delivered to the Km:, at Windsor. Cottage, early on Tuesdaymorning. His MAJEsry's messenger arrived with an answer at Brandenburt ; ll House about four o'clock of the same afternoon. The QUEEN'S messenger was immediately dispatched to Lord LIVERPOOL, and returned to Brandenburg!' House, from his Lordship, at ten o'clock at night. The fact of this correspondence having taken place has given rise to strong hopes of its leading to an amicable arrangement; and the 31orning Chronicle tells us, that persons most nearly connected with Office, affect to believe that the prosecution of the Bill of Pains and Penalties is even yet to tie avoided." We confess that, however glad we should be to par ticipate in such hopes, we de not participate in them ; and we know well, that persons who are some ' thing more than g 4 nearly connected with Office," be. here no such thing as that the prosecution can or will be avoided. We can well imagine that her 314• JESTY might see the propriety of personally remind ing her Royal Spouse of many private matters, very necessary to be kept in mind, in regulating his cm duct towards her, and of which she Might reason ably suppose his MAJESTY'S Minicefs might not be. in, the knowledge;. and we can see also an important object to be dived by getting his . MA igsTY to identify himself*/ Use ktter, as much as !e is in spirit, with the prosecution against her MAJEETY, before it is further persisted but after the length that mattershave gone..-after the repeated failures at nego- ciation whiCh have already taken place—and consider ing- how much less than what must now be sacrificed *was before absolutely refused----it does appear to us, that it-is not withirarirriiional probability to expect from the negotiation. more than some such advantage in point of relative position between- the two Royal Personages as ;hat which we have last hinted at. If any thing is yet to be done in the way of stopping these deplorable prOceedings, it must be through the medium of the House of Commons % in the form of injunction, and not .negciciation ; but the House of Lords will have met, and gone into the case before the Commons can have an opportunity of making any such wise and patriotic interposition. It is said that an arrangement is making betweet the leaders of all the parties in the House of Com. mons, except the Ministerial, to ptesent the questief respecting the QUEEN from being ever entertaind within its walls. The Paris Papers of Monday arrived thit but they furnish little additional information from any of the quarters to which the public attention II at this moment so anxiously directed. From Spain we learn, that en the night of the 25th ult. .the Cortes had a Secret and Extraordinary Si' ting. Nothing had transpired concerning . its inge, but a general inquietude prevailed ; and strangest reports *ere in circulation. An Order the Day, posted up on the morning of the 27tbr nouiked, • that the night patrols had orders to all suspected persons whom they might meet a\ after eleven o'clock at night. The Ktric and continued at the Baths of Sacedon all the Members of the Royal Family were at Madrid. . A letter from Vigo, dated the 17th (rather 'says; that the Chiefs of the maleottents had the frontiers on the night of the 111th, to the nul of -100 individuals, bet that a party of twen:y diers S had sufficed to disperse them, having 1 upon them; killed seven, : among whom was the neral-in-Chief, and taken eleven prisoners. Esrmosa had advanced at the head of a din but learning that all was tranquil, he fell back l'ontevedia he proposed going to Vigo.—.4: letter, but of the same remote date, makes the ber of Insurgents to amount to three thousand, regards tlle affair as SO Vallaeolid letter. is forenooni ation from attention if of the 25th rdinary proceed' !d i and t:t In Orde? of to 27th i sr.. [II to arrest fleet abrOXI and Qval 11 the otbei ladrid. (rather elit had passed the nunitit twen:y so!' laving firt 4 Was the Ge rs. Genezi a divi,iai I back tire D.—Another tes the no , nosalici, aid lid ktter. • \ n 4 of th V , a