Star. — London, England, 1806-02-08 00:00:00

.. The pofitiOn of the Met was,' however, determined upon, and the campaign was opened towards the , , end of September. The operations were cowmen ced by Generals Bernadotte and Marmoat, who direc ted their march towards Wurtzburgh, thence into the Margraviate of Anfpach, and having in their route colleded all the Bavarians that could be found, they erofted the Danube at Ingolfladt and New bourgh, driving before them the (mall corps under General Kienmayer, and entered Bavaria with be tween fiery and feventy thoufand men. And here commenced the misfortunes of the campaign. Whe• thee General Mack undervalued the force of that army, or whether he was uninformed or milinform• ed as to its dellination, which he might have con• ceived to he a momentary irruption into Bohemia, remains to be explained. Certain it is, that inilead of changing his own pofition, in consequence of it, he contented himfelf with detaching an inconfidera hie force,under the command of General Kienmayer, for the purpofe of watching its operations. Daring the above period, the French army under Bonaparte, amounting, according to the nearest cal culation, to eighty thoufand meet, creed the Rhine. The Eledorate of Wirtemberg, the plains of Nord lingen, Sec. were palled with a degree of rapidity al molt unexampled. On the 6th and . 7th of Odober the greateit part of the French army had . croffed the Danube near Donauwerth, had taken up a pofitium between that river and Augfburg, bad by this move ment formed a junction with the army under Berna dotte, and had thus potted thernfelves in the rear of the Imperialills. From this movement commenced that fpecies of warfare by which the French rendered themfelver fo formidable in former campaigns. Of the affairs of the Sth, sub, and 11th, I have already had the hottour of traufmitting to your Lordthip the official accoptt. To thofe who were the molt fanguine, the are of the battle of the t ith had given fame hopes of fhture foccefs, but they were illufory. General Ney had quietly made his retreat upon the main of the Frineb army, (till between the Danube and Augiburg, and . , the communication between the Auftrians and the Ruffians was now completely cut off. In confeimence of this movement (whether by choice or neceffity I know not) General Mack divid ed his army, and General Jellachich was detached with, I believe, fifteen or firms battalions, towards the Tyrol. Orders were fent at this rime to the gar rifon of Memmingen, which confifted of eleven bat talions, to evacuate that place and join the above corps under General Jellachich. Whether the order arrived too late, or whether it was ill delivered, I am alfo unable to decide I but the garrifoa capitulated to the French under General aavoult, after the town had been nearly reduced to allies. It is la tie obferv ed, that the artillery defined for the fortifications of that place was fill without the town. Upon this oc teflon a great number of Bavarian peafants who had joined the French, and who were taking poffiffion cf the above artillery, were cut to pieces by the Au. &lan huffars, who carried the whole or the greateft part of it off. I am forry en fay that a general conflernation and difmay is beginning to prevail here, at leaf in the public The pretence of the Emperor of Rutfia, who, as expelled here on the sth of next month, may per haps tend to difpel the gloom, particularly Mould affairs take rather a more favourable turn in the in terval. If in truth they bear an inaufpicious alped, they are not by any means defperate. There is an army of referee of 50,000 men ; there are as many more Ruffians on their march ; tome reinforcements may be drawn from Italy ; so or 60,000 men may, It is to be hoped, be laved from the Aultrian and Ruffian armies now in C a ermany fo that, in the courfe of three or four weeks, unlefs thert artnie. flsould be abfolutely and literally annihilated, we ball have confiderably above roo,doo men ready to take the field. Had hottilities commenced at the proper period in Italy, we fhould in all probability have been in poll Cann of the Milanefe. On the 16th infant, the day on which it was cal culate& that the Art duke would trots the Adige, a cannonade was opened front the French fide of Ve rona upon the works conftruding by the Auttriato an their fide, and which was anfweecd by them.— This is the only ad of hottility, which, down to this date, has taken place in Italy. I have the honour to be, &e. (Signed) ARTHUR. PAGET. (NOM.) reztraft from a Difpatch of Lard G. L. Cower, to Lord Md. grave, dated St. Peterfburgh, 29th June, 1803--(No. 27.) My Lord—The annexation of the Ligurian Re• public to the French Empire, executed at the very moment when a Ruffian Plenipotentiary was expeded in France, charged with propofitions of which the profeffed object had been the general arrangement of the affairs of Europe, is confidered as ha grofs au intuit to both povereigns, whole lentiments that Ple nipotentiary was empowered to declare, that his Im perial Majesty 1.4 G judged under there circumfances, he could not, ccnfittently with what is due to his own dignity, or to that of his augult ally, permit 1 4 4. Novorilzol to proceed to fulfil the objed of his million. I have the honour to be, with the higheft refped, my Lord, your Lordfhip's molt obedient. and molt humble fervant. (Signed) GRANVILLE LEA/LSO/4 COWIE. Ixtraft of a Difpatch from Lord 0.. L. Gower, to Lord Marna, dated Peterfburgh, aid Juiy, loot. No. 31.) tly Lord—l was on the print of &fp:itching yet terday the meffinger to England. when I received an invitation from Prince Czaruaryfki to a conference, in which h.; read to me fume very irr poi tart dif patches he batik& received from Count REZUMOU- Ikoi and General Win zingerode. By there it appefis that the Emperor of Germany is at laft awakened to a fenfe of his true dignity, and the real it:lc:elks of his Empire; and that forefeeing the inevitability of war, he is determined not to leave to Bonaparte the' choice of the moment to commence 7 . .ttratrt of a Difpatch from Lord 0.1.. Gower to Lord Mulgrave, ,lAkd St. Petellbur6h, 3d September, taos. (N 0.38 ) My Lord—The lalt difpatches from the Ruffian A irbafrador at Vienna fpeak in flung terms of the • .oarlike temper of th.it Cabinet. Ceitain communi cations had been made from Paris, which indicated y:elding difpotition on the part of Bonaparte ; but To tilde indications Count Cobent zel ferns to attach sI r credit, and Count Razumrutkci reprefents, that Cie pretent character of the Aultrian Minifry is a 41 contra to its (orates timidity and indtcifion, • ind that a firm eonvidion teems now to prevail atl Vienna, that it is through war alone that any fecurity can be obtained againft the ambition and power of France. There is jut ground for ezpeOing, that his Imperial and Royal Majefty, being perfuaded that war is inevitable, may be induced not to wait the iffue of the propofed uegociations with the French Government, but that he will commence hoftilities at the time when the fuperiority of the allied forces promifes the bea profped of fuccefa. Towards the beginning of Odober the Aullrian army upon the Venetian frontier wilt be completed to its full elle blifhment, and will, without doubt, be greatly fupe• rior in numbers to the French fences in Italy ; and the Ruffian armies will be futhciently asolkranced into the Hereditary States, to enfure their arrival upon the frontiers of BivariA, before the French troops from the coaft and the interior of France can reach the German Empire t I have therefore, in fcveral converfations lately with Prince Ciartorificy and Comte Stadion, urged the expediency of lofing no time in begirsping war. The Prince informs rne, that he has already inftruded Comte RAZUMOIA.OI to prefs this contideration upon the attention of the Court of Vienna, but that he will nut fail to repeat the in ftrudions to the Ruffian Ambafrador. I have greet fatisfadion in obferving the increafed energy and vigour of this Court. The Emperor, forefeeing the poilibility of Bonaparte effetling a large augmentation to the French army, to conk quence of the menaced attack by the allied powers, hts refolved to be prepared to meet filch an effort, by a correfponding exertion on his part, And he has or dered a levy for four men in every Soo, which will produce above iso,ooo men. A corps of about ten thoufand men, under the mmand of his Imperial Highnefs the Grand Duke Conflantine, and compofed chiefly of the garrifon of .Peterlburgh, began their march, towards the Prof ile's frontier, on Thurfday the 22d. The troops Jetlined for Pomerania are ready for embarkation, and will probably fail in about fix or eight days ; . they amount to ao,coo men. Ne.difpatches, however, have been received from M. Alopeus, who was , chaiged to negotiate with the King of Sweden, the necerfary arrangeme'nts for the landing of tie Ruffians at Stralfund, and the augmentation of the Swedilh garrifon at that port. I have the honour to he, will the ilighell refried, my Lord, you Lordfltip% moll obedient humble fervant, (Signed) GR•MIIILL[ LE,EBOIII No. Ili.--(A.) Plan of Operations propofed by t►e Court of Vienna. France, upon the new organization of her army, has on font, 312 Regiments of the Line 30 -- of Lisa Infantry 85 Cavalry •16 Artillery . 4 0,4:8 mcn. 107.540 64,1:6 sIA3O s9B.cat This number, with the addition of the different corps in C4lrriCa and the Viands, of at regiments of Dutch foldiers, t t Swif. regiments, 18 of auxiliary troops from Italy, and the Imperial Guard, which confilis of is,ooo men, make' a total et 65 t,964, the whole military force now on foot in France. Thefe troops are, for the greater part, already 03 the war eflablithment. Any grand deicent from England upon the coati of France, with a probability of decided fuccefs, is fcarcely to be expeEltd. France may, therefore, venture to draw almost all her I oops from her interior, and from her coalls. Betides, a well arranged national guard, in perfea dilcip.ine, would enable her to frare her troops of the line, even from where they had been employed in preferving dumef t.c or der and rectirity. It follows, that France might i employ smooo men in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. In uplittlition to that force, the 250,000 Alsatians, and 115,000 Ruffians, Ilipolated in the lan treaty, compote a total force, which is, in comparifon. fo much the leis to be depended upon, becaule very little effective Alliance is to he expected from the Swedes and the Eoglilh. The following ate the neceffety concluflons horn the tiatement ill. Confidering this estimate, and the advantages which France enjoys in its geographical firuation, whether for defence ~ r for aggreillort, the maintenance of peace, till a more favourable conjuntluiT (hall arile, feems to be infinitely .!efirable. ad, If, however, war Ihould become inevitable, not only to enfure its fucceis, but to avoid likewife evils more alarming than thole of the prefent mo ment ; it would become indifpenably net • far y, that the Allied Courts fbnuld ule their molt vigorous ef forts to oppofe thole of the enemy, and bring into ef ficiency means at leaft equal to theirs, if not inperinr. The military arrangements, the financial, and the general policy of the Allies mull concur in putting forth' thofe energies, by which alone we can hope to give fuccefs to our effort , . 11—Military Arrangements. This en-operation ,in Oleic three branches could be of very little effect if the Aultrian armies Ibould not come into the field more than 300,000 firong. The firtt of the papers fubj•tined thews what would be the deficiencies to be fupplied in toe Imperial it'd Royal army, in recruit ing, in appointments, and in remounting the cavalry, hcfide other augmentation!, needfully to mile tt from its prefent weak hate, upon a peace *Rabin molt, to the number above mentioned—and at the fame time, to ;cave the number of troops requifite for fgrvice in the interior of the monarchy, and for the obi - err:ince of the movements of Prutlia. The difficulties which flrike,upon a firil view, will appear Hit! more confiderable, upon a due attention to the manner in which the Marlin troops are now difiributcd. The line formed to prevent the intro d uetion of infeefious difeafe, has, indeed, contributed to obviate, in part, that difadvantage, as it leaves the Venetian dominions of the empire no longer in dan ger of a furprtfe from the French. But if it were nee l'Ary to take meafOres to oppole a great force to that which the enemy might bring againti us from the in. reri.,r of his domintonr, then would dirpoiltions the molt prompt and vigoielua be requifite, to the feaforto. able concentration of the Aufirian troops, which are, in great paw, at a difipnce from the fronsiers in dan gcr, to put them upon the footing for war, and to ' hi ing them to .it upon the points which are the molt ex pnfed. This &It 'mature would require to be earticd into effeet with the greater aftivity, heeaufe it could not be melted that the troops of his Majetty the Emperor of Ruffia fhould, from fuch a dillances arrive on the feene of atlioa till after the Aufirian troops mould have fatined the fir& attacks of the enemy. His Malay will not be deterred by there great difficulties, if war Mall become unavoid able ; he will, in that cafe, ufe his molt flrenuous endeavnurs to furmount every difficulty, and fulfil his engagements. But to give effed to this Ready refolution, it is neceffary— zdly. That there (bould be adequate financi.il re (forces, and that the difficulties which prrfcnt thcm felves under that head lhould be removed; the Impel ial Court of St. Feteriburgh has already been intnrmed of the vaR and nfeeffary expenditure required to put the infantry, the cavali y, the carriages and artillery; the objects of the Commiffaties's department, the magazines and (Imes, in fhort, every thing belonging to the army, upon the full war ellablifhment. The luceour of fifteen millions of florins, which has been afked from England,, for this primary fervicc, is not more than one half of what is adually wanted. The expence of each campaign of the laft war was from one hundred and ten to one hundred and twenty millions. The fubfequent rife of the prices of comma ditiet would render the expence of the fame ol jeers, now, confiderably greater. But, fuppofe it even nit to exceed the former, yet the fuhfidy of thirty milli ,its of florins, which is Aced from England, added to the ordinary peace expenditure of the army, would leave Rill an enormoua deficit, which the burthcncd finances of Auftria could hardly make good. It f , I. lows, that, unlefs England grant the fuhfidy which has been demanded, it mull be impoffiblc for the Court of Vienna, notwithflanding its determined in. elination, even to make thofe preparatiOns for war, which are hot to be attempted without an affuranee of being able to follow them up, and maintain them. Thefe confederations being (lased, it is next to be examined, what would be the detail of the operations of the armies in Italy, the Tyri3l, Switzerland, and the frontiers of Germany, if they fhnuld make all their movements in perfed mutual concert. It is this concert of operations which mutt meet the firß plans and marches of the enemy. Its prompt or tardy fire. eels, its favourable or unfavourable refult, will de termine, i t fad, the whole fortune of the war, and, of comic, the fate of Europe. Conlidering the geographical pnfition of France ; its German frontier ; Switzerland, which is in fob. jugation to it ; and the Italian Republic ; and, ob !crying, on the other hand, the pofition of the Here ditary dominions of Aultria ; it is irnpoffible not to difcern, that it would be imprudent to make any at. tempt from Germany, againtt France; in Alface, on the Rhine. Such an attempt could be made, only, by palling the Rhine at Manheim, or by laying liege to Mentz. . In the firft of there enterprizes, there would be the lft difadvantage of advancing, from the very firtl p,amidft fortified places of .he greatelt ftrength ; ' f being forced to carry on a war of lieges, with an ormous confumption of men and money, and with in a profpell of any happier iffue of the campaign, even at the heft, than by rite redudion of one of thofe %Tong places. To undertake the liege of Mentz, at leaft 50,000 men would be neceflary to blockade the place, and to cover the operation, of the liege. The extent and flrength of Mentz are loch, that we (horrid be detained before that place alone for half the cam paign ; and nn operation fubfrquent to it, Amender, could lead to any but very uncertain and infect, re re baits ; becaufe the places upon the Meufe on the one fide, and in Ahace on the other, would every where arrest the progrefs of our armies. Add to there ano. flier eonfideration of not leis weight, that, fince nei• then of thofe operations could be cartied into effect but by great armies, there would be few troops left to cover the Upper Rhine. The enemy might avail himfelf of that local weaknefs ; might direft his at tack there, while we (hould be occupied in the liege of Landau or Mentz ; and might thus advance in a line of operation (hotter than outs; might polfefs himfelf of our communications; and might get be• tween us and all our fupplies. To avoid being cut off from thefe, we should, in that cafe, be obliged to abandon every thing without flrikirg a blow. An attempt dr °ugh Switzerland, againit Franehe Comte, would be, indifputably, the molt formidable to the enemy. His frontiers are there open. But, as filch a plan of operation could not be carried into effed but through Swabia, by the Voralberg, or below the Lake of Cunitance, on account of the itnpnfliJi lity of having fupplies conveyed‘hrough the Tyrol ; it would be necefrary, before attempting it, to have made conlidcrahle progrefs in Suabia, and to have an army of obfervation opp‘dite Straiburg, to watch the enemy. It would even be necrffary to have ob tained fume advantages in Italy, before hazarding an attack in Switzerland. A retreat of the army in Italy towards Klagenfurt, would prevent the army in the Tyrol from joining in the operations in Switzerland. The enemy would pliers themfelves of the Puller Thal, (the Puller Thal is in Elie Tyrol, between Brixen and Lientz, and communicates smith the vale of the Adige), on the great road for our com munications and conveyances, to and from the Tyrol. We Ihould be compelled todetach troop, from the army in Germany, for the interior detence of Auttr ia, and not only to relinquifh all offindive operations, bitt even to confine otirfelves within the line of the Lech, or, pollibly, the Inn in Germany, and there to take ' a elefenfive polition, in order not to be at too great a dillance from Auttria, and to be ready to fupply with due promptitude the affillance which might there be wanted. It follows, from all theft confiderations, that the war (hr old begin with vigorous offenfive operations in Italy. It is there we &mild aft with the fuperior force of our army. A victory gained OM, would afford us the fame advantages for the profecutios ot• offerifive operations agaMit France, which France would acquire from onr lofs of a bat tle, in order to penetrate into the Auiliian Heredi tary dominions. If the difficulties of our lunation render it even impoflible for us to arm, and advance to ad upon the frontier as foon as the enemy, bow much leis is it to be expelled, that the troops of the Emperor of Ruffia could anise in time to alt at the very commencement of the wat It would be the intereft of France to nre every means to anticipate their arrival, by an early and decifive fuper loth!. Any concentration of our troop , . or the march of the Ruffians. would not fail to afford Bonaparte a fpecious pretext to declare war. Toe force of this obfervation is, to prove, t:rat in the cafe of war with France, the plan of ol , crati-n., the firft diftribution and difpotal of th: troop.. tn.: commencement and the firft progrefs of the military movements, mull be arranged, on the fuppolition :hat war will be begun by the Auitti.rtis alo.le. It would be requifite, that the army in Italy llionld begin its movements with forcing the paffa7 of the Adige, difiodging the enemy from the Mina°. invert. ing Mantua and Petehiera.detaching a body of tr. nps to the Po, to obfet ve the Soot!) of Italy, and open its way to the Adds, in order to cover the blo.kade nr liege r‘ftliefe places. Only the reduflion of thee two fortreffes, or fome fuck great AA fortunate event., as are 11 ,, t to be reckoned upon, could induce the corn. milldam of this army to pn!li hi. operations fat ther. The army in Germany would commence its ope rations by piffling the Inn, would enter Bavaria, and would there await on the Lech the movements of • the other armies, and in particular, the arrival of the • troops front Ruffia. The army in the 'Tyrol would be determined in its movements by.thofe of the at• mic , in Italy and Germany. In the caic f the operations spina Switerseland, a part of the troop, in the Tyrol would In employe.' in an attack on the Grifons and the other !sail Canton , .; and the reit would, in the cate of the /k -ali of the army in Italy, advance lions itti defeatism , and join that army. This i. alkthat,with our preatell efforts, and upon the rupporition of .de, calcd focal., we Ca eiPC to ACCOMplini, till the whole of the plans and Powers of the Coalition Ikea% be in full aflivity. If Italy be the grand point of . operation at the commencement of hoftilities, Swig. zerland muff become Inch, as Coon as we 'hall have obtained fucceffes in that quarter, and (hall have ad-. vanced through Suabia. Switzerland offers to of conqueror the advantage of the instep commonica tion between Italy and Germany ; it gives the faci lity of fending (applies and reinforcements with promptitude to the one or the other of tittle coun tries ; and it is only through Switzerland that en en trance can he effetled into France on the fide ef Frenetic Comte. It would, then, be necetfary to carver ourfelves on the fide of Alface, by taking Be fort and Hunningen, and leaving, at the fame time s a eonfiderable body of troops in Suabia, to cover the right wing of the army in Switzerland from any at temps by the French from Strafburgh, and to protett our communications, and enlare the conveyance of fupplies. The realons have been explained, on account of which, in the general flan of operation, it is not in dicated in what manner the troops of the two Im perial Comm height co-operate, either in union under the fame tlandunds, or by a concert in their move ments. We mull look forward to the cafe of Au. Itria being attacked by Fiance before the arrival of the Ruffians in Germany. The combination of the operations of the two Craws would, tben, depend upon the refoltition of Prnfria. And, thanks to the wife meafures of the Emperor Aletander I we are loon to learn decifively how far we may, or may not reckon upon Prof Tian emoperation, upon the neutra lity of that power, or its relation of our propofitions. We than, then, be enabled to prefent to the Imperial Corot of Ruffia, upon the requelt which it has corn murticated, propofals for its co operation towards the common and general (third. We may here previoufly fubmit the eonfideration s that the line of operation in Italy i, the vn , at re mote, and that it is these the campaign mutt he opened with the greaten vi tour ; rim toe Court if Vienna will therefore fend a great army into lisle, in order to all with rapidity upon that line ; and that therefore the march of the Rotrian troops, and their fubilitution for thole of Altai-hi, amidil the movements of the war in Italy, would be impoffible. As Coon as we (ball certainly know die rook of the great and important Ilep which his Majelly the Em peror' of all the Ruffles has taken at the Court of Berlin, we (hall add, without delay, whatever re mains to be communicated farther upon the Coble& of the friendly propofitions here explained, and upon the plan of operations for the two Courts in Germany. And Ihall forthwith fubmit it to the Court of RuCGA. No. 111. (B.) j i , r 1 Eztradta from 2 Paper intituied, ite-narka no the Plata of Opera- Lions propufed by Auftyia. The plan which the Cabinet of Vienna has trent - - mined to that of St. Peterfbnrgh prefents a new proof of the intimate confidence mutuallyfubfilling between the two Ingcrial Courts ; and if the war now under taken to check and reltrain the ambition of Bonaparte (hall terminate happily, hs caeca: mutt be owing to the continuation of that confidence. Upon this prin ciple we (hall, without difTembling any difficulty, olTer our remarks upon the plan, article by article, in order to obviate, as much as poffible, the difficulties apprehended by the Aultrian Cabinet. The plan begins with Itatng, as a faR, that the real forces of the French amount, upon the new or.: ganization, to 598,084 men, and with the addition of thole which Are at the difpolal of the French Go. vernment, to 651,94 men.' The Cabinet of St. Peteriburgh has reafon to believe, that the French army is far from being complete on its new orgAtti• ration, in confequence of the difficulty which the French Government has to furmoont, and no:with. , Handing the violent means it is obliged to tifo, to mutter the freth confcripts, who firive, in all poffible ways, to avoid the fervice. &fides, though the Englith fhnuld be unable to drat any •femharkatinn on the French cnalt, fuf ficient for the profeeution of regular war within France, they nrty, nevertheles, occupy a confider. able number of the French troops, by menacing a alefeent on all the acceffible points: On the Lower Elbe, on the Wcfer, on the eon% of Holland, Flanders, France, and Italy. The French, in (bort, mull be natutally . obliged to divide their Orength, and dillribute their fnrces for the defence of every alfailable point of their poffetlions. It flllowt, that the French can be in a con. ditinn to oppnfe fit many a► 5u0,000 men to the ope. rations of the Powers of the Coalitii , n, and that a deduttion of perhops one third of their forcer may be confidently reek , ned upon. The difproportion of no,oooAultrialit, and t ts oco RufTians to the French troop which can be htuug of air! them, will be therefore leis conlidefahlt than it has been suppoled. From the unta' forces of France the plan (1 the C, cl.lhons have bet advantages p ditioc, ssoethr• f u a,, 171.,t it i, fi realonin , , proiraWc that an affairs thc uld het sentirob:c cAlcui.itinn of the rd.tiire. and the :Mile, which is prefet.test io Pmutt o f Vie,...;., the I: t:lovriog coo- co drown :—" I. Iti.it the ;••4:14l h Fiancc tr,i •y • by its reog. elp!. cal • ii , r detenee i.r for aggreflion, ere ro.d.k. to remain at peace till a mere 1:41o:c of offsirs." would be folid and jull, if it were 1 ly more favourable aittjunitute of 4 ether arife ; if the Coon of Anton* 1.. .............4116 „.......... ....