Star. — London, England, 1815-04-29 00:00:00

• . . >i-as mere whAt was neeinarily adequate to a defence of a common interest in a common war. The potion;i not proceed on any impracticable or wild not i and if they stood fairly by each other, .this cannery.would have no cause to complains They were un ited to support the arrangements which had b er') g ri med by the Treaty.of Peace, of. which Bo navete's abdication was a part. The. Hots. Mem bees object seemed to be to find fault withislinisters. .....171e c onjured the House to, -consider what might be e x effects of an Address such as had been proposed. Thos e who had concluded the Peace, must be quite at sincerely disposed to preserve it as the Honourable plumber. By passing such an Address, France could (t ar be deluded into the notion of an impression on people of England different from that of the Cnn ti„ene With respect to the pecuniary support cot our i stees, a distinct proposition, at no very distant day, uld be submitted on that subject, which would not . be toned such as to give an undue facility to war through our means. He trusted he should soon satisfy the House, that the proposition was studiously calcu lated mgt to produce those effects which : some might a pprehend. Great Britain would net give assistance to favour the motives of .war, but would act so as to late the subject to the proper feeling of the danger a nd necessity, by the other Nations of the Continent. Lord A LTHORPE observed, that as to the in tercepted instructions 'Waded to by the Noble Lord,. , t wa s impossible for the side of the Huse to argot, rn it, as they could not be sure of its authe.nticity.— iie doubted the policy or practicability of dethroning B o hapare ; but felt confident that the personal cha racter ot that individual was not more danger• us to the tranquillity of Europe than the military spirit -.owprcvalent in France, and it certainly Wits a bad way of putting down that spirit, by compelling the nation to war. No one lamented more than he did the return of Bonaparte to power—and no one would, it necessary, oppose hitn with more vigours But at present he did not think a war advisable, and he would therefore vote for the Address. Mr. PONSONBY rose and said, that he was one of those who, on a former night, voted for the Ad dress, and had therefoie reason to complain of the Noble Lord's conduct on that night, when having the Treaty of Vienna two days in his paiession, et gaging this country to support our Allies in a war, he yet told the House that an 'alternative still re mained, and tl-at the question was still open. Thi; was not a fair P aiiamentary proceeding, and skewed a desire of deceiving not justifiable even, io private life. The Noble Lord had said; the war would not be undertaken fbr the purpose _Of displacing Bona pan,es or restoring the Bourbons ;what could be the motive of such conduct, except in the eipectation of a division, lor the purpose of swilling hii majotities ? This night, at least, the Noblekord was sufficiently explicit, for the object of the war was acknowledged to be the dethronement of Bonaparte. It has been said, that the character of Bonaparte is such, as to pr elide the possibility of-having, confidence in him. Tie was aware of that would asks- may not cir cumstances be sufficiently powerftil to inside.. to place a confidence sufficient " for our *pose ?- Such circuustances now eti;t. "Me Noble Lord had said, that unless proposals of peace were milk at Chatillon to 11:-)napsrtu the Allie-. never would have taken ?atis. This was The Nam • Lord's statement ; and, if it were comet, there mutt be a very great portion of the population of France straitly inclined &peace. Situated as 11 mapatte was, the niece military could not enable him to maintain his power against the l force about to be opposed to him. In this situation, I.e /twit necessarily .appeal to the people—and nothing could render that appeal mote effective than the treans which were now made use of to crush him.— The Noble Lord seemed - to think it impossible that either the conduct or character of Bonaparte could be changed. He (Mr. Ponsonby) was inclined to think, that the characters of men were not very apt to change, particularly when they had arrived at Bona parte's period of life. But the same remark could :,ot be nppli..:d to their conduct. That was the crew. tore of circumstances, and must change according to their influence: But it would be asked, has Bona parte given any pioof that circumstances have at All operated to alter his course of prdteedings ? What was his conduct, in giving liberty - to the Duke of Angouleme—id rescuing him from captivity ? Was not this a proof that his conduct was changed (Lord Castlereagh, °MIS Me table, " No.") No I. (re. iterated Mr. Ponsonby) did he ever act on such ar principle before ? In ne former instance was he known to proceed in this manners surely ke did not so demean himself towards the Duke D'Enghien, or to any other person, who had opposed his interest, and whom he had got within his power. This, he con ceived, was a proof that they ought to consider Bo naparte as a man, whose conduct, like that of other Then, was altered by circumstances. But, was Bona parte the only man in the world on whom the lessons ofsexperience were lost ? Hew did be formerly lose that power which fie had stow regained ?":He lost it by the immeasurable extravagance, by the blind insa nity of his ambition. Because, if it were not that the intoxication of success—the vanity of hewing arrived at a height of power, widish, in his 'early years, he never co;ild have hoped to obtain—led him to make, the Russian campaign—to advance to the walls of 14 qscew—no reasnnable hope of his overthrow could 1 71 ye been e nterta i ne d. Then, if he lost everything 1, iydulging in a wild and lawless ambition, were ttity rot now to suppose, since he had again ascended the throne, that he would endeavour to preserve his authority, by pursuing a contrary course ? There 'fluid be no good reason for thinking, that he was not fond of power, of net to be anxious to rant those ',ems which seemed best calculated for securing it I Cot there was another circumstance, to which he 'emits of necessity, bend—to which he was compelled '0 rend —that was the power of nature herself. Bo tiparte was not now at a petiod of life, when tune 'n° l 4o remained to him to realise those wild. and, mid sch.mcs of conquest icith"which he set.out. lie vas levy fusty-five or forty-sin years el age—ea period lifr—theogh one hi itself that had nut perhaps finch impaired his actual rawers at this moment, yet most inevitably, in the course of a few tears, render i mPoSsible for him to make those exertions which me had heretofore done. Therefore, if he were not h r more insane than he was ever before supposed n hes he must limit his ambition and his views of ee l" power, to that bisundary which natdre herself i mPineds He ( Mr. Ponsonby) would not rely on Faith, moderation, or rnannatsimity of Bonaparte -..snd the Noble Lord coOld nit Ergs, him with ever having spoken in favour of that state ; Of things s which it was the object, of Bonaparte's am bition to produce. But suppose none of the circum stances which affected ordinary men had any weight with him—suppose he was determined to follow the line of conduct which the Noble Lord had described— then it appeared to him (Mr. Pensonby) that the most effectual means to enable him to carry his- pro. jects into effect, would be afforded by adopting the course pursued by the Noble Lord. (Hear, lesar,,)— Did the Noble Lord mean to say, that Bonaparte had no support 'but that of the military ?. Was not a great portion of the people of France devoted to him ? The Noble Lord observed, that he was kept in check by a large party in France, who were desiroui of peace, and who wished to see a better state of things est-- Wished in that country. He asserts (and it was the most extraordinary assertion ever made), that Napo leon at present complied with the views of that party, in order to extract from France such an army as was necessary to carry on his projects. The Noble Lord said this, after telling the House that all Bonaparte's hopes depended on the present malt-try force. After ibar declaration, he informed them, that Bonaparte was obliged to throw himself into the arms ot those lovers of peace and constitutional liberty, in order that they might enable him to get a sufficient army about him. Let him, if he can, reconcile this con. Aradiction. The Noble Lord next stated, that our Allies considered their safety to consist rather in a state of war with France, under existing circum stances, than of peace. He was one of those who conceived that this country ought to bind up its in terests, as much as possible, 'with those of the great Continental Powers; and this feeling would in duce him to go very far with them, if the course they were now about to adopt, was not one which, in, his soul and conscience, he thought most likely io defeat 'the object (that ot giving permanent tranquillity to Europe) which they had now in view. The Noble Lord said, " If the French people support Bonaparte the war must be waged against them ; hostilities must be carried into France." But perhaps the war would not be carried into France—( Hear, hear.) Was it so very clear that the Allied army could penetrate into France? He conceived that their progress in that quarter was extremely doubtful. But suppose the experiment was made, and that it filed—what would then be the situation of Europe?— (Cties of Hear, hear.) He had heard persons, in private conversation, ob serve, that peace could be made after the experiment was tried. But let no man flatter himself with such a hope—let no man think, that a short ex periment could be made on this subject. If the effort failed, let no man suppose that Europe would return to the same state in which it was before the exertion was made. Then, indeed, the power of France • would be most formidable—then, indeed, surrounding nations would have just cause to dread it. For. if the Allied Powers avowedly made war against France, to compel them to abandon the exist ing Government, what mould prevent them, in the event of a failure, from retaliating ? What would prevent them from visiting, on other nations, as far as their means would permit, the same system that bad been acted on towards them ? The picture of Europe, under such circumstances as these, would be the most melancholy shot could -Rai* he imagined. The Noble Lord had stated one thing, for the pur. pose of consoling them, which he could not pass over in silence. He stated, that the assistance which this epuntry would be called on to give to the Allied Powers, was of such a nature as would prove, that no att.tmpt had been made to goad them into the con test-=which they had agreed to undertake, with their oven free will,as the best way of securing their interests. He was very glad to hear this—but let the House mark the possible consequences. Those Powers were to make their utmost efforts. Now, undoubtedly, to a certain degree, they were sustained and put in motion by the application of the resources of this coontry ; and, it their efforts failed in the first instance, how would those powers be able to continue the contest afterwards ? They would, in that event, be utterly incompetent to maiutain their armies on foot, without great - financial exer tions on the part of this country. The Noble Lord stated, that this was not an effort to replace the House of Bourbbn on the throne of France. No man regretted more than be did the change that had taken place in the situation of that family—no man would be more happy to see them at the head-of the French Government. Ile said this, not from any motive of personal affection, for he was not acquainted with any of them—but because he thought all Eu rope had an interest in their remaining. ThitTreaty, did however, contrary to the statement of the Noble Lord, bind the contracting parties, in effect, to place the House of Bourbon on the throne of France. (Hear, hear.)—To destroy the power of Bonaparte, and to restore the Bourbons, was declared to be a most desirable and eligible object—one to which all *the efforts of the Allies were to be directed.—although it was said that it would sot be made the sine qua non of peace with' France. No—but the French nation mould come to this conclusion..." If we are obliged to abandon the power of Bonaparte, we shall be compelled to accept the House of Bourbon in his piste." Whatever the Noble Lord might say • On • this point, there was not a man in France who would not consider the placing of the Bourbons on the French throne, as the inevitable consequence of banishing Bonaparte from it. Now, was it prudent to undertake a war in Etarope, forthat which the people of France must consider a double cause—to place the Government under the Bourbons, and to withdraw it from Bonaparte ? He was by no means a •triend to the character of' Napoleon. "His talenrs and fits abilities, every man must admit, were of a very extraordinary, of a very formidable descrip tion. Certainly he never had displayed those moral qualities, without which no man could be considered truly great—or could conciliate the esteem of man kind. But was he the only individual that ever vio- I4ted treaties? Was he the only person who had ever broken public promises ? By the stipulations of the Treaty now before the House, this country was bound to maintain all that the Congress had done, and all that they might hereafter do, with respect to Europe, (Near, hear). —This was the contract, this was the ex- 1 pm stipulation of the Treaty. We must maintain the cession of Genoa(Hear, hear), —we must main. tan) the alterations made in Germany—we must maintain the new division of Italy.--t Hea r! hear). We must be ready to support many other novel ar . . rangemmts. of le/siciti sty ' yeti we kat* nothings. Di the Noble Lord beieve, that there were no per. sons, in those countries, thus partitioned, who had as great reason to complain of breach of faith, as those individuals had who were wronged by Bonaparte ? But, in point of fact, the Treaty entered Into with him was first broken. No than could deny it. In Vie discussion on the Treaty of Fontainbleau, it was stated by many, it was admitted liy all, it was denied by none, that Several of its stipulations were not ful filled. It was observed, as a matter of praise to the British Government, and he joined in considering it a praise -worthy act, that the English Minister re monstrated with the Government of France on one breach of the stipulations. Therefore, let the charac ter of Bonaparte be ever so perfidious, he could not consider that a * legitimate reason for making war against him. The Noble Lard observed, that the French people were a party to the contract, entered into by the Treaty of Paris, and, if they did not per form what they had stipulated, they deserved to be punished. If they loved war, they should have it— but not as they pleased and when they pleased. They should not carry hostilities into the neighbour. ing countries, but war should be brought to their own doors. This, however, would depend on the success of the war. But let the House look to the situation in which they were about to place the country ? They were undertaking to dictate to the French people rho; conduct they should pursue—what Government they should obey. This was clearly what was meant. For they could. not avoid seeing, that the Declara tion, which said they would not interfere with the in ternal concerns of France (and he did not mean to speak it offensively) was mere nonsense. How could it be contended that no interference was meant, when war was declared against that person whom the French people desired to be their Ruler? This was a most untenable principle on which to found hostilities. It was one, in opposition to which, if it were exer cised against this country, every man who heard him would sacrifice his fortune and his life. But it would he said, England is a virtuous nation,- and sacredly regards every promise—but France is a vicious na tion, and does not keep faith with any power, He knew of no instance, in the history of mankind, where a war was carried on to make a nation more moral and less vicicus than it was—and, he was sure, if a contest were undertaken for that purpose, it would be unsuccessful. He was not competent to say, what the power of the Allies was, nor what force Bonaparte could oppose to them. But if the people of France were as much attached to him as they seemed to be, it was infinitely more probable that the Allies should fail than that they should succeed. ' The Right Hon. Gentleman then touched on the advantages which this country might derive, even from a peace of short duration (for he denied that it would be useful only to Jsooapirte) and con clueed by expressing his concurrence in the Address of his Hon. Friend. Mr. W. ELLIOTT opposed the Address. He was not sufficiently informed on the subject to recom mend war—neither was he ready, and he hoped the House would join with him in the feeling, to recom mend a negociation with Bonapute, and a with •drawal from that confederacy which the country was pledged to support. The Right Hon. Gentleman then divided the questiod into two points—first, our right to go to war—and, secondly, the expediency of that measure. To prove that a right existed, under certain circumstances, to interfere with the Govern ment of another country, he referred to the Grand Alliance, to prevent the Crowns of France and of Spain being placed on one head—to the 'Triple Alliance—to the Qiiadruple Alliance—and, finally, to the Pragmatic Saqction. With respect to the ex pediency of war, he argued, with much ability, that direct hostilities were to be preferred to a feverish and unsettled peace. Sir J. NEWPORT contended, that all the dangers which his Right Honourable Friend apprehended, would be infinitely aggravated, by that state of war, to which he appeared to have made up his mind. It was most clear, that it was intended to place the Bourbons ei the throne of France. But, when that object was accomplished, how was it proposed to secure it Did the Confederated Powers mean to keep up an army in France fot that purpose The Right Hon. Baronet argued at great length, to prove the iMpolicy of plunging this country, with dilapi dated resources, into a war with France—and con cluding by stating' his Concurrence in the Address, which did not recommend peace, but proposed nego tiation, as far as was consistent with the security and honour of the country. Mr. WILBERFORCE declared that he saw so many difficulties and dangers on each side of the question, that he never found• himself so much at a loss to make up his opinion. He felt the full advan. tage of acting in co-operation with the great mass of strength to which we were allied, and he felt the danger of a systeni which would place . a great mili tary leader on the throne of Frances At the same time, the long experience he had bad of the uncer. tainty of the results of war, made him apprehend that the prospects which now appeared so promising mi gh t be overcast. After all that had been supposed toave been achieved by the allied forces, we now found that all the work was to be dose over again. He certainly did not place much faith in what was said about the alteration of Bonaparte's principles. He believed there was still in his mold a fund of mis chief unexhausted, and which was capable if pro ducing the greatest calamities. He thought that any peace with lionaparte would only be a peace in name. He, nevertheless felt serious apprehensions, when he considered the uncertainty Hof all wars. As to the particular question, he supposed that his Honourable Friend (Mr. Whitbread) would not be anxious to press it. ‘ l . l. had probably brought the motion for ward, merely . to give the House an oppectunity of de. littering their sentiments on the general question of peace or war. Mr. TIERNEY said, that if it was a proof of wis. dom to balance the difficulties on all sides, without coming to any conclusion, the Hon. Gentleman who spoke last had given abundant' proof of that wisdom. It certainly would be of great advantage to any Gen. &mark who came late into the House, to have heard the Hon. Gentleman stating all the arguments both for and against the question. He regretted to say, that in all the experience he had of the parliamentary conduct of that Hon. Gentleman, the leaning of his mind appeared always to incline to the Opposition,but his vote was afterwards given to the Government, (a • leso).Ai to Our right of going to war with Bonaparte, • . that was a question • that he should not now enter into; but as to its expediency, he must trouble the House with a thew 'observations. H e must, however, confess in the grit Place, that the breach of the treaty of Fontainebleau appeared to him to be by no means the greatest of his offences. He had been driven from his throne by bayonets at his throat, and it was very natural for hi' to wish to get back again. He was sure the Honourable Gentlemen at the other side of the House must confess that if they were removed from power and from office, it would be very natural for them to wish to get back again. (.//augh.)—lie was not convinced that France was at present a mili tary Government, nor did he know that it was by the military alone that he had been brought back to power. He admitted that there might be some danger in peace, from the character of Bonaparte ; but as he thought there was equal danger in war, he should rather try the chances of peace than the chances of war. —Ti was well known that our Allies were perfectly exhausted in their finances, and that we were so much reduced as not to be able to go on long at a war ex penditure. 'lf, then, the war should prove unsuccess ful, after we had exhausted our resources, he could not see what was to save the country from absolute ruin. When the Bourbons were on the throne of France, the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed a peace establishment of ndt less than 19 millions.— Now, it did appear to him worth trying, whether such a peace might not be made with Bonaparte, as would not require so large an establishment. France might, perhaps, be induced to diminish her armies, and enable other Powers to do the same. He en treated the House to consider that this might, per- Imps, he their very last opportunity of expressing their opinions on this great question, and of averting the calamities with which this country was threatened. Mr.' ROBINSON believed that those who in France had once been the strongest advocates for liberty, had afterwards been the basest sycophants to Bonaparte. He did not attach much value to the support - they now gave, as he supposed they would be again ready to change, if circumstances changed. It had ben asked, wliy we should not now be content with the peace of Paris This peace of Paris had only been concluded on the supposi lion that Bonaparte had for ever abdicated his pretensioni to the Throne of France. There un doubtedly was much uncertainty in the results of any war ; but if this argument was now relied on, it might as well be urged on the occasion of any other war. If this argument was to be Conclu. sive, the country must never make any efforts at aU. If we were to have been terrified by the uncertainty. of the result, we should not have defended Portugal, supported the =Se of the Spaniards, or assisted in the successful campaign of last year. It was true that many coalitions had failed ; but all had not failed, 'ls was proved•ln the last year. The present coali tion had at least as much chance of success now as it bad then. Between forty and fifty fortresses, then garrisoned by French troops, were now in the posses sion of the Allies. This circumstance would give the Allies a very considerable advantage now, which then they did not possess. He saw no reason for de spairing of success. • Mr. PHILLIPS deprecated the want of precau tion upon our part to prevent the return of Bonaparte to France, and censured the general policy of Minis- • ten throughout.—(This stretch was occasionally interrufs. fed with cries of Question ! Question 1) Mr. WELLESLEY PULE, at that late hour, had only one appeal to make to the Hon. Gentleman opposite ( Mr. Whitbread), and one declaration to communicate to him, which, he hoped, would give as much satisfaction to that Hon. Gentleman as to every man else. In the animadversions on the declaration of the 15th March, repeated to-night, lie had stated it as sanctioning the murder and assassination of 80. naparte; and be had lamented that the name of Wel lington should have been disgraced by signing such a paper. He happened to be with the Duke of Wel lington when the report of the Honourable Gentle man's speech reached him ; and never was a man so shocked as he then was; that one of his countrymen, one who had either 'known, seen, or heard of him, should have supposed that lie had signed a paper, bearing such a construction, or suppose that he could possibly give it such a construction. —(Hear !) His only understanding was, that Bonaparte had for feited all his political rights. At the time it was not known whether it was Bonaparte's intention to en. deavour to regain the throne of France—or whether he had put himself at the head of a banditti to dis turb any other country ; and he never thought that any man, much less a British Senator, could have suspected that he would have signed a paper with . such a meaning. They conceived that he hat) for feited his political rights, and that he was a rebel and a traitor ; but they never intended to sanction hire's sassination. [This speech was received throughout with loud cheers.] Mr. QUIN had yet heard nothing to persuade him that the people had any share in the return of Bona. parte ;—he had seen an active army and a passive people. —Mr. GORDON supported the motion. Sir FREDERICK FLOOD had never consulted on this iubject with Ministers, inside or outside of the House. He was for peace, if peace we could have on fair and honourable terms ; but a rebel and ad outlaw could 'support no peace, but in war ia; V lauzli.)—This was a delicate question. — (A ) —Yes, a terrible war was, to be sure, a delicate goes ind then, in GOD'S ;Dames let us g ti o on h — an ( d if iti lav eih— ad), with all hearts, into it.—(Laughing). Mr. COKE (of Norfolk) thought that those who were abettors of the war with France, on the present •occasion, were the enemies, and not the friends of their country. Mr. WHITBREAD, in reply, said, notwith standing the explanation of the Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. W.. Pole), he confessed that he was still of opinion that it would have been Lot more to the credit of the Duke of Wellington net to have signed the Declaration. in question, even with the in. terpretation which had been given to Ina Friend, and by him communicated to the House. The character of the Duke of Wellington was part of the property of this country I Who was not proud of the name And no person had ewer shewn himself more willing to pay the tribute of applause which was due to his great actions than Himself; and when he had so expressed himself he hardly thought that his sincerity could be called in question —(Near, hear.) —Dut was it because the Duke of Wellington had