Star. — London, England, 1815-02-06 00:00:00

AMERICAN SvIATE PAPERS. No. VIIL 'ROM THR AMERICAN HTO TE BRITISH COMMIEBIOIIIIthi " Ghent, October It, IRI4. " The undersigned have the honour to acknowledge the re• esipt of the note of the Plenipotentiaries of his Britannic Ma. zesty, dated on the Bth instant. se Satisfied of the impossibility of persuading the world that the Government of the United States was liable to any well grounded imputation of a spirit of conquest or of injustice to. wards other nations, the undersigned, in affording explanations . on several of the - topics adverted to by the British Plenipoten tiaries during this negotiation, were actuated by the sole motive of removing erroneous impressions. " Still influenced by the Mlle motive, they will now add, that at the time when the Spanish Minister was remonstrating at Washington against the transfer of Louisiana, orders were given by his Government for its delivery to France; that it was, in fact, delivered a short time after that remonstrance; and that if the treaty by which the United States acquired it bad not been ratified, it would have become, of course, a French colony. The . undersigned believe that the evidence of the went of Spain to that transfer has been promulgated. They neither admit the alleged disability of the Spanish Monarch, nor the Inference which the British Plenipotentiaries would seem to deduce from it ; on the contrary, the assent was voluntarily given iu the year 1804, by the same King who, about the same time, ceded Trini dad to Great Britain, and prior to the time when be was again engaged in war with her. The cession by France was immedi ately communicated to Great Britain, no circumstance affecting it, and then within the knowledge of the United States, being intentionally concealed front her. She expressed her satisfaction with it, and if in soy passible state of the case she would have had a right to question the transaction, it does nut appear to the undersigned that she is now authorised to do so. " Alter stating, generally, that the Proclamations of Generals Rutland Smyth were neither authorised nor approved by their Government, the undersigned could not have expected that the British Plenipotentiaries would suppose that their statement did not embrace the only part of the proclawatious which was a aubject of consideration. " The undersigned had, indeed, hoped that by stating in their note of the 9th ult. that the Government of the United States, from the commencement of the war, had been disposed to make peace, without obtaiaing any cession of territory, and by refer ring to their linos-ledge of that disposition, and to instructions accordingly given from July, 1812, to January, 1814, they would effectually remove the impression that the annexation of Canada to the United States was the declared object of their Govern ment. Not only have the undersigned been disappointed in this expectation, but the only inference which the British Plenipoten tiaries Lave thought proper to draw from tide explicit statement, has been, that either the American Government, by not giving instructions subsequent to the pacification of Europe, or the un dersigned, by not acting wider such instructions, gave no proof eif a sincere desi7e to bring the negociations to a avourable end. " '1 he undersigned did not allude, in reference to the alleged intention to annex Canada to the United States, to any instruc tions given by their Government subsequently to January last, because asking at this time for no accession of territory, it was only of its previous disposition that it appeared necessary to pro deer any proof. So erroneous was the inference drawn by the British Plenipotentiaries , in both respects, that it was in virtue . of the instructions of June last that the undersigned were ma. bled, in their note of the 24th August, to state, that the causes of the war between the United States and Great Britain having disappeared by the maritime pacification of Europe, they had been authorised to agree to its termination upon a mutual resto ration of territory, and without making the conclusion of peace to depend on a successful arrangement of those points on which differences bad existed. " Considering the present state of the negotiation, the under signed will abstain, at this time, front adduting any evidence or remarks upon the influence which has been exerted over the Indian tribes inhabiting the territories of the United States, and the nature of those excitements which have been employed by British traders and agents. " The arguments and facts already brought forward by the undersigned respecting the political condition of those tribes, render it unnecessary for them to make many observations on those of the British Plenipotentiaries on that subject. The treaties of 1769 and 1783 were those principally alluded to by the under signed, to illustrate the practice of Great Britain. She did not admit in the first, nor require in the last, any stipulations respect ing the Indians who, In one case, bad been her enemies, and in , the o th er, her allies , and who, in both instances, fell by the peace within the dominions of that Power against whom they bad been engaged in the preceding war. " The negotiation of 1761 was quoted for the purpose of prov ing, what appears ;o be full) established by the answer of Eng . land to the ultimatum of France, delivered on the Ist of Septem ber of that year, that his Britannic Majesty would not renounce his sight of proteetiin over the Indian nations reputed to be within his dominions, that is to say, between the British Settle ment* and the Mississippi. Mr. Pitt's letter, 'cited by the Bri. • fish Pknipotentianes, tar from contradicting that position, goes • still further: it states, that " the fixation of the new limits to • Canada, as proposed by France, is intended to shorten the extent of Canada, which was to be ceded to England, and to lengthen the bound aries of Louisiana, which Frellie was to keep ; and in the view to establish what must not be admitted, namely, that • ' all which Is not Canada is Louisiana, whereby all the Interme diate nations and countries, the true barrier to each Province, • would he given vp to France." This is precisely the principle uniformly supported by the undersigned, to-wit—that the recog • nidon of a boundary gives up to the nation, in whose behalf it is made, all the Indian tribes and countries within that boundary. It was on this principle that the undersigned have confidently re- • lied on the treaty of 17e3, what fixes and recognizes the bona, dory of the United States, without making any reservation ten 'pectins Indian tribes. " But-the British Plenipotentiaries, enable to produce a soli tary precedent of one European power treating for the savages inhabiting within the dominions of another, have been compelled, in support of their principle, to refer to the German Empire, a' body consisting of several independent States, recognised as s uch by the whole world, and separately maintaining with forelp Powers the relations belonging to such a condition. • Can it be necessary to prove that there is no sort of analogy between the political situation of these civilized communities, and that of the wandering tribes of North American savages? " in referring to what the British Plenipotentiaries represent as alarming and novel pretensions, what Great Britain can never recognize, the undersigned might complain, that these alledged pretensions have opt been stated, either in terms or in substance, as expressed by themselves. This, however, is the less material, as any further recognition of them by Great Britain is not On usury nor required. " On the other hand, they can never admit, nor temples the principles or pretensions asserted in the course of this correspon dence by the British Plenipotentiaries, and which, to them, ap pear Dowel and alarming. " The article proposed. by the British Plenipotentiaries ' •in their last note , not including the Indian tribes as parties in the peace, and leaving th e United States free to effect its object in the Lade consonant with the relations which they have con stantly maintained with those tribes, partaking also of the nature of an amnesty, and being at the same time reciprocal, is not Dee ble to that objection; and accords with the views uniformly pen feared by the undersigned, of placing these tribes precisely, and hi every respect, .in the same situation as that in which they stood before the commencement of hostilities. 'llls article thus proposing only what the undersigned have so often assured the British Pleanoteniiaries would necessarily follow, if indeed it has not already, as is highly probable, preceded a peace between Great Britain and the United Duty*. The undersigned agree to admit it, in substance, as a provisional article, subject, in the Man ner originally proposed by the British Government, to. the appro. bition or injection of the Government of the United States, which, having g.veii no instructions to the underiigned on this point, eatinot be bound by any article they may admit on the subject. It will, of course, he understood, that If, unhappily, peace ebottkl not be the result of the present negotiation, the ar ticle thus conditionally agreed to shall be of no effect, and WWI tiot, in any future negotiation, be brought ierviard by ei th er party, by way of argument or precedent. " his article having been presented . ae an indispensable *inert, and being now accepted, the undersigned request the Beftleb Plenipotentiaries to communicate to them the roject of a treaty embracing alt the Feints deemed material by Great Bri tain; the undertiinieJ engaging on their part to deliver immedis • ately after a counter project with respect to all the articles to which they may not agree, and on subjects deemed material by Ow United States, and which may be omitted in the British disject. (Signed) " jean QUINCY ADAMS. j. A. BAYARD. " 11 CLAY. JON: 10,11SiLL. 111. 04 1. 1 44Teh." • (1.1 'I COURT. M4RTI4L. • MUUAY TRIACOF LTEUT.GENRRAL SIR JOHN A. _ WINCHRSTIR—PGURTEENTH DAY SATURDAY, lira. 4. Sir JOHN MURRAY made a statement in reply to the fresh evidence which had been brought against him. Admiral Hallowell had complained of his ac cusation of his having kept back the first letter from him to Sir E. Pellew. *He had never, however, made that an accusation against the Admiral; he had only said, that he had regretted that circum stance at the time, and still did regret it. As to the letter which he had written to the Admiral on the 9th, he did not know that it had any particular re ference to the last which be had received from him. At the time he wrote that letter, he did, however, disbelieve the report communicated of 2,000 French having arrived at Tortosa, and a body of their ca valry at Ampulla. He did -believe, however, that 1,000 had arrived at Tortosa (as General Copons had informed him) ; and he believed that to be the num ber also from a proposition made to him from Tor tosa, to attack that place, and that the inhabitants would endeavour to deliver up one of the gates to him during such attack. He had, however, received no such intormation as would make it necessary for him to raise the siege on the 7th or Bth, as the Judge Advocate had contended he ought to have done. As to the manner in which the dispatch of the 14th was sent off, Admiral Hallowell had waved entirely the secrecy, and had merely endeavoured to prove that , there was no hurry. He must, however, say, that he wrote the dispatch in the idea that there was gre• hurry, and for that reason he did not wait to have it regularly copied. It was purely by accident that he discovered that the Admiral had written a letter; and if it had not been for that accident, he did not believe that the Admiral would have ever made the signal he stated, of notice to the fleet that there was an opportunity of bending letters to England. Major. General Donkin was still here in attendance, and, although, from laudable motives, he had refused to an siver a question that he had asked him about those cir cumstances, yet if the Court would put the question to him, he had no doubt but that he would explain it. As to the variety of orders he was said to have given on the 12th, he could easily explain them. The first order given to General Clinton at an eatly hour in the morning, to advance three battalions of his and as many of General Whittingham's division to the Goya, was to cover a retrograde movement to be made by General Copons. That General, however, having fallen back in; the night, the order of course was countermanded, having no longer any object. As to the second and third order, they were an¢ stantially the same: the principal difference however was, that the last did not give such precise directions about keeping out of the tire of Tarragona on his march. The order for sending his baggage to a place where it could be embarked in safety, did not appear to him to be an order that could be well com plained of. As to the last order for his final em barkation, it was not surprising that he should trust some part of the arrangements to a General of such rank as Sir William Clinton. He had never recol lected so much accuracy in orders and dates as Gene ral Clinton had shewn on the present trial, which was the more remarkable, as he was deficient in his recol. lection in many other points. As • Sir William had, however, never himself commanded an army in the field, he thought that he should not put so harsh . ft: construction on the number of orders which were is. sued on the day of the 12tb. It was singular, however, that Sir W. Clinton should not be able to gain time to do what he was desired to do by those orders, but that what he was expressly desired not to do, that be did with the greatest alacrity. Ile alluded to the spiking the guns, and that strange mistake be made in not recollecting the signal which be himself had arranged with *the officer at the battery. It would have been natural to suppose that a consciousness of his own error in this respect should have inclined him to be somewhat more charitable in his construc tions on the conduct and motives of others. He was surprised at Admiral Hallowell wishing to press upon the Court a letter which he wrote on the 19th of June, when he himself had objected to his pro ducing a letter from Mr. Tupper, on the ground that it was written atter the transactions. He pro. bably ought not to have felt this surprise, as it was so much in unison with the rest of the Admiral's conduct throughout the trial. Sir John Murray then proposed to caU General I Donkin to the point he had stated. The Court, how ever, overruled the proposition, conceiving it irrele vant to the trial. Mr. LARPENT then said, that there was one obser vation in the statement of Sir J. Murray which he must explain. As to his having given private ad vice to Admiral Hallowell about the production of a letter, all he had adviced him to do was to produce it to the Court, and take there opinion on it. It was their province, and not his, to decide on what ought to be admitted. When he was,out of Court, he was as ready to give his advice to one patty as to the other ; and in point of fact, he - had given advice to Sir John Murray much oftener than to the Admiral. The JUDOS ADVOCATIL'S Reply. Mr. LARPV4T then•began his reply as to the first and second charges. He had at first :append that such reply would be unnecessary, but 'as Sir John Murray had gone into such great length of argument in answer to the observations he bad made, and as he had taken quite a new ground of defence, be found it his duty to claim the right of a prosecutor to reply. As, however, many of those arguments were an swered by his first observations, he should refer the Court to them. He was most anxious, in this case, to be considered as not wishing to press any point aping the prisoner further than his duty required of ham. Notwithstanding the compliments which had been paid him by Sir Jobn Murray, he felt that it was his duty to endeavour to do away the effect that his argument, which appeared to him fallacious, might otherwise produce. As he had not bad time for much aarangement in reply, he should follow the principal points of defence which Sir John Murray had set up.against the charges brought by him. The first point that he should take notice of was the diffi culty of which S.r John Murray complained of having been put to, from the contrariety of the first and third charges. This difficulty, he conceived, to be not from the planner the charges were framedi hut' from has own conduct. He crnild conceive that one, plain and duct answer night have peep given toi re! nv • of • r • 01 both those charges. Suppose 'that Sir Yobs Murray bad been in a condition to give this 111111WOr, W pre vious to the Tltis, I had not heard of the advance of "Sachet, but only of Decaen whom I was prepared to light; on that clay, however, I was informed of- the rapid advance and proximity of Suchet, and saw that it was not possible to save the whole, if I had .staid, without giving battle to a superior enemy, which would have risked the whole." Such an an swer would, in his .union, have been perfectly.satis factory. /f Marshal Suchet bad descended from the clouds at Perak; on the 12th of June, with twelve thousand men, when Sir John Murray had every reason to believe him on the Huccar, in Valencia. that would have been a sufficient justification for re treating at that particular time, and for leaving the guns behind. Sir John Murray had, however, proved both by his own letters, and by the evidence he brought forward, 'that he did know of the ad vance of Suchet long before the 11th. It was there fore his duty to have calculated, previous to that iime, on the means of saving his army, with its guns sachem's, in the very probable case of his being ob• liged to raise the siege of 'Tarragona. S:r J. Murray had stated, that be had brought no evidence in sup port of the first and second charges. He thought, however, that he bad brought suificient evidence in producing Sir John's own letters. His case was, that after Sir John had .formed a decisive opinion that Tarragona could not be taken, he still continued to land guns and stores. All that were exposed to risk, after this conviction was formed is his mind, were ex posed in vain. As to the approach of Decaen, Sir John appeared to be perfectly well informed of it; , and by his letter of the 23d be stated that Suchet had left the Huccar on the 7th, and arrived at Tettosa on the 9th. When he had heard of the actual arrival of one thousand at Tortosa, and of two thousand at 'Lerido, he could have no doubt but that those were advanced corps of Suchet, coming to raise the siege of Tarragona. By the 9th, all doubts of the move ment of Suchet to the North were removed from Sir John Murray's mind. What other object could Su chet have in this movement but to relieve Tarragona, and when Sir John was well informed of this move ment, and firmly believed the information, why did he not sooner calculate the time that Suchet would probably arrive, and carry off his army, with all their guns and stores I—While there was a chance of taking Tarragona, the stay of Sir John Murray in Catalonia might have been excuseable k but why should he stay there when every rational prospect of taking it had vanished t Previous to the luth enough had been done to draw Decaen from his positions in Catalonia. Enough had been done also to make a diversion in favour of the Due del Parque in Valen ,cia. He could not see any practical or moral effect that was produced by continuing the siege longer—he could really not discover nor imagine any bad moral effect that was to result from pursuing a different line . of conduct. But Sir John Murray had endeavoured to show, and as he thought fallaciously to thew, that he had no other alternative than that of pushing on the siege as late as the night of the II th, or of sud denly abandoning it. If he (Mr. Larpent) were re duced to make his choice as to which of these *mea sures he approved, he should certainly choose the lat ter, and refer to the evidence of General Donkin for an ample justification of this opinion. But there was another and a third course which in his view of the question ought to have presented itself to the judg ment of Sir John Murray. Why was the siege con tinued till the 12th, after all hopes of success had va nished, and the certain approach of la superior enemy had been known for several days before ? During these proceedings on the eastern coast of Spain, an enterprise was going on in the west, precisely similar in its objects, and in all its circumstances, except the conduct of the different Commanders. The siege of St. Sebastian had been brought to that crisis when - preparation was matured for the assault. The French General, the Duke of Dalmatia, selected this period for the purpose of making a desperate effort to relieve Pampeluna, by turning the right of the Allied army; well knowing that if he succeeded in that ob ject, the left, which supported the investment of St. fiebastian's, must be compelled also to fall back.— What was then the conduct of the Duke of Welling ton, admitted to be one of the first Generals of this or any other age ?—He immediately ordered all his heavy ordnance to be removed to a place of safety, lest he should be obliged to abandon the siege; and, although it considerably retarded his operations, he did not deem it adviseable to expose to possible loss or capture any part of his battering train: and yet, if ever there was a Commander justified in calculat ing on the favours of fortune, or in drawing on that ample stock of character which he bad previously acquired, it certainly was the Duke of Wellington, who telt that be dared not do that at St. Sebas tian's which Sir J. Murray had done at Tarragona. General Donkin's testimony furnished ample confir mation of the indecision of Sir John Murray; for how could he have been induced, unaccuubmed as he was to disclose his intentions to others, to have communi-. cated his design of raising the siege so early as the 9th to GeneralDonkin, unless his mind had actually been made up as to that measure, which he, never theless, delayed carrying into execution until the morning of the 12th ? How could he have contem plated dich a proceeding, unless assured of the cer. taw approach of Marshal Sachet's army, it being his resolution not to raise the siege, as stated is his de fence, in consequence of Uecaen's advance, but to risk, in this event, an engagement with that column et the enemy ? General Donkin, it appeared, had also then forwarned Sir John Murray respecting the possible loss of the guns ; and yet no preparations were made, no steps taken, no precautions used, up to the morning of t e 12th to guard against that dis aster. On the Ilth, Marshal Suchet was known-to be at Tortosa; but his certain advance in force, for_ the obvious purpose of relieving Tarragona, bad been known three days before by confidential and authentic communications, and the time at which he might arrive was therefore a mere matter of calcula tion for the Quarter Master General's Office. Why then did Sir John Murray act as if he was totally destitute of information I w where was the difficulty of calculating the ordinary rapidity of a French ar my, so as to event the necessity of leaving any thing behind ? Why in one case give the enemy cre dit for en almost preternatural activity, and in the other act on the supposition of a dilatoriness not to be expected from the most sluggish foe. Instead of rOtilpetlinle bar ry nition4l calculativat of probabilities, Sir John kftwray seemed to rely together on chance; and lie who chose to comn.t' himself to such direction must stand the hazard ty. the die. Another ground taken in the defence was, that all this was done from an excessive care for Edward Pellew, and a fear that his operations in tl Bay of Rosas might be impeded by not leaving Li!: guns behind at Tarragona. if this really was cm of the motives, he must really say, that it was pa., ing too high a compliment to Sir Edward Pellew, .1 the expense of the honour and character of the coin: try. He had been not a little surprised in the cow: , of the defence to hear a British General speak of ti• loss of his . guns as if it were merely the loss of much old iron, and as if it seas a matter of peci nary value, and not the wound inflicted on the r.a. tional honour, which was alone in question. Hs , now came to the second charge, at which Sir Join Murray had described himself to be equally shocked And astonished. The charge consisted of two part:_. first, with respect to the disobedience of instructive, ; and secondly, of a neglect of duty. Sir John Mia. ray had overlooked this distinction, and confined hi, defence to the accusation of disobedience. He had considered it to involve merely a question of policy, which question was not at all before the Coart.— From this doctrine he must beg leave entirely to sent. He denied too that the ease was made out, ad. mitting the trustszommitted to Sir John Murray t:, have been as discretionary as he represented. It ha 1 been urged, that there was no precise time fixed ..1 Lord Wellington's instructions - for proceedmg witli the army to Valencia, and that it wai left ta his owe judgment as a question of time and means. lin would put it, however, to any General present, arli , ther, if he were ordered by the Prince Regefit to take the command of an expedition for the accomplish ment of a specific object, he would not conceive it t be his duty to proceed to execute it with all possible dispatch ? or whether he would feel himself jos iifictl in staying some time on the way to try a little experiment of his own.? That the question was one of means, or in other words, of practicability, he could understand ; but he did not see the force of the logical distinction between means and time on this occasion. The fact was, any positive time was ut. terly out of the question; but Sir John Murray har. ing been compelled to raise the siege of Tarragona, which was the first object of his expedition, had only. to refer to his instructions to discover that his next and immediately consequent object was to land the army at Valencia. If in not thus acting Sir John Murray was not guilty of positive disobedience, he was still liable to the charge of a neglect of duty. If it was said that any advantage was to be derived by remaining, why was the embarkation from before Tarragona so hastily executed ? and why were the guns abandoned lest an action with the enemy might be hazarded ? What, when this was once the state of things, was left to Sir John Murray but to proceed immediately to Valencia, and carry into effect the other object of the expedition ? In not so doing, it WAS evident that the plan of Lord Wellington was frustrated, and every end of the campaign on the eastern coast of Spain so fat counteracted. Sir John Murray has supposed a case in his own exculpation ; which case was, however, not founded in fact. He had supposed the possibility, that after the battle of Vittoria, which happened to occur-at this period, Sa chet's retreat into France might h ave been intercep ted by the army under his command. He coull hardly suppress a smile when he thus heard this little army, which was unable to remain at Tarragona, or to move any way except towards their transports„ by a species of pantomimical metamorphosis suddenly converted Into a force competent to fight Sachet, with an army swelled in its numbers by the united strength of all his garrisons. Without, however, adverting further to any such sanguine hopes or schemes of visionary success, he should proceed to another to pic of the defence. It had been said, that a great latitude of construction had been left to Sir John Murray, in order that his discretion might remain unfettered, and his judgment dependent on events and circumstances. This was described as what in law would be called a condition precedent. 1.711, doubtedly, Lord Wellington never had supposed that Sir John Murray possessed any dominion over the elements—that he was endowed with any superna tural attributes, or that he could achieve impossibili ties. Had the elements, however, interfered to pre vent him from embarking his cannon I Was it so imperiously oecessarr to leave his' guns behind him on account of the near approach of the enemy, and yet to send his cavalry forward to the Col de Bala. goer, on the very road on which that enemy was ad vancing, to be exposed, as cavalry must always be, when contending without support against a column of infantry ? Sir John Murray had represented the in struction to proceed to Valencia as only a kind of anti. cipation of what was probable by Lord Wellington.— This construction he differed from altogether,_ and was satisfied that a simple =fertilee to the letter of his Lordship would justify his interpretation. Here the Judge Advocate remarked on Sir J. Murray's observation, that the seeontf charge would never have been framed but for Admiral Hallowell's letter. This statement was she incorrect, the charge bairn* been framed without any reference whatever to the complaint or opinion of that Aar on the subject of 'the embarkation. Sir John Murray seemed to have forgotten that his letters expressly stated the object of embarking the whole of the Infantry to be to cut off a *vision of Sachet's army at Vandillos. That at tempt appeared to him to Isnanest idle and hopeless. He must contend that Air J. Murray had acted con -wary to the instructions of thi Duke ark Wellington, ; to embark and return to Valency, and immediately join the right of the Spanieh army there, in case of failure on Tarragona. He submitted to thetCourt that the word immediately must apply to Pepe, and not togsis place in the Spanish line, as Sir John Mur ray had construed it. In that sense,' the word - would have been quite superfluous and void acne:ming.' Sit John appeared to rely in his defame, oft the word " express written orders" being -lneroduced in the charge. If the Court were, however" of *Qin that the word " express" could not be proved to be the proper deseription 'of those orders, they might find him guilty on part lithe - Charge- If even no waits had been disobeyed, they would have another part of the charge to consider, and thatwas 44 neglect ofduty." Sir John - kfurray's successes in Catalonia and Valencia were certainly not of that description that could have warranted him in ng from the meaning of the Duke Wellington's i nstruction,. it essululy did . .