Star. — London, England, 1815-05-24 00:00:00

greed and decided as to the line of policy to be adopted, he trusted that the British Government would not have is bring upon itself the iespensibi: lity, nay, the odidm, ,by its conduct, of counteract ing the decision and that line of policy, which. he trusted, would eventually tend to the establishment of that state of things which would ensure the gene ral peace, tranquillity, and happiness 'of Europe.— The Noble Earl 'concluded by moving an Address to the Prince Regent, corresponding with his most gra. cious Message ; and assuring him of the cordial con currence of their Lordships in enabling his Royal Highness to adopt those measures which rn:ty he ne cessary, in conjunction with his Majesty's Allies, against the common enemy. On the question, Earl GREY commenced, by observing, the Noble Earl seemed to address the House -as feeling a confi. dent anticipation of success, without taking into his view the necessary consideration, at the other side of the question ; and at the same time, lie seemed to re solve the whole into a question of feeling. He thought it rather too much to come to such a vote as was proposed, when the House did not clearly, from any thing that had fallen from the Noble Earl, know yet exactly in what state the country was placed as to the actual relations of war. The Address pro posed calling upon the House to pledge itself to sup port an interminable war, except in case of the de struction of the present Government of France. He then proceeded to discuss the question of the right of war with France on the part of this-country, which, he argued, could not exist, without a proof of its net cessity, which alone constituted the right ; and on a principle advanced by the Noble Earl himself, .repa ration or satisfaction should be demanded for real or supposed injuries, and that satisfaction refused,' before a right ie war could exist—a line of procedure which he observed was not adopted in the question between this country and France. In support of the principles he advanced, the Noble Earl quoted largely the authorities of Giotius, Vatel, and oche: writers on the law of na tions. Whot did Bonaparte say in his first proclama tion ? He clearly and expressly asserted, that from the breaches towards him of the Treaty ofFontainbleau, he, felt himself absolved from all obligations on his part, and that these violations had restored him to his throne and his rights. And he added, that he had known is to be in the contemplation of the Allies to 'seize him ui his asylum, and remove him to some other e• • • of safety. He ( Earl Grey) had no doubt that if such a project had been contemplated, the British Ministers were no parties to it, and that they would not have countenanced such a breach of the Treaty: but could they take upon themselves to as. sert t h at no such breech was in the contemplation of the Allies? In a. proclamation issued by General Des-Iles on the Bth of March, twelve days before Louis left France,'he sta:ed distinctly, that one of the causes which had precipitated this desperate attempt of Napoleon Bonaparte was his knowledge of what was in agitation towards him.—(Grin of Rear s hear!) This assertion had been made under the authority of Loins himself, and had never been contradicted. We must therefore admit that such a measure had been proposed by the Congress, and that Bonaparte WAS justified in takipg any steps to relieve himself from such a predicament. Seeing, then, that there was this strong justification for his conduct, the gum tion ought to be considered deeply before we coin. mined ourselves and our posterity by entering into new hostilities. The Noble Lord had told us to re collect " what the extent of the obligation was, which we had a right to enforce by the Treaty of Paris against the Government of Bonaparte." But he (Earl Grey) would say, that the right of nations to choose. their own Corm qf Government is generally considered and spoken or as a sacred right, and does not abrogate a Treaty with any State, unless done in violation of the terms of such Treaty; and then the contravention of it must be precise and accurate' to authorise hostilities, and must not be inferred from construction: Now, on looking at the Treaty, 'did we find any guarantee for die exclusion of any partis cular form of Government in France, or any demand for the proscription of any particular man ? Cer tainly not : therefore the people of Paris were left to choose whatever Chief or Government they pleased with the single exception of Bonaparte. In framing the Treaty of Fontainbleau, which was. virtually the same as .the Treaty of Paris, it was expressly stated,. that in consequence of the change that had taken place in the Government of France, the gue rantees which ,had been demanded-of the Govern ment that had just been overthrown had been dispen sed with. Thus, then, whatever form of govern ment the French people might choose, we had no right to interfere with them. The next question was, how far we had a right to interfere in making Bona parte an exception ? 'He conceived that the extent of right, and no more, was to re-demand those metal ties which would have been taken from him before his exclusion. We had no right to go farther, by all the principles of the laws of nations. The Noble Earl had already admitted, and in this he exactly coincided with what had been said b_y Mr. Burke, that there could be no jestification of war but the ground of necessity. Was it t h an worth while to plunge the country into all its horrors under the cir cumstances that now existed, with oar wounds still bleeding from the unparalleled and olisartrous con test of the last twenty years, a contest which had been maintained with such unexampled severity Before we entered into it we ought at least to consider the grounds upon which we adopted it, and the means we had for carrying it on. When the famous De claration of the 13th of March had been adverted ..s a resolve upon a war of extermination, the Notele Lord had stated, that it bore no such cons ate action, and that it, did not go beyond legitimate war. But the Treaty which their Lordships were this night called on to approve of, expressly refers to particular article of that Declaration, in which it is distinctly stated, that by violating the Treaty, in quittnig Elba, Bonaparte had destroyed the only le gal title on which his existence depended, and the Allied Powers in consequence declared, that he had thereby put himself beyond the pale of civil and so. cial relations,,and had rendered himself liable to public vengeance. Was this not letting loose against teolaparte any thing but the ordinary practice of le gitimate war ? lie was anxious to relieve the coun t, y trom the horrible disgrace of pronouncing a war oi extermMaiiiin against that individualt What was tee meaning of that Declaration, when it stated biro tu be put baited the pale of doll a ase4lrelatioas Was this nothing more theft to declare War in the ordinary sense ify.lwliich-he would be subject to all -those privilegls au& mitigations which modern times haveintroduced. But when vengeance was denoun ced against him, it was not easy to know, what lt m could be put to- hostile severities against him. He was exposed not only to the sword of the warrior but to the dagger of the assassin. He (Earl Grey) wished the Noble Lord would prove that this was not a fair explanation of the meaning of the Decla ration. In fact, we were giving to Bonaparte all the advantages that he would derive from knowing that we have declared a war of extermination against him and his Government. And what a condition should we be in, if, in such a war, we were not suc cesstol, but were obliged to submit after defeat, to acknowledge him and his Government. No such principle as this had ever before been proclaimed to the world, that there exists at the head of a great nation a person who must be overthrown ; and we committed ourselves by declaring that we never would make peace or truce with him. But when our Allies deserted us, as they had done on former occasions, and when those who now supported Minis ters in- that House would support them n.) longer. then they would come to the other alternative, and incur the humiliation and disgrace of making peace with the man they had proscribed.—(Bear.) — If such a man should ultimately triumph, though he might not be actuated by all those bad passions that had been attributed to Bonaparte, what hope could they have of favour from him? It would then be thought that it would have been much better to have confined ourselves to the taking of such securities as wete demanded. But he had never yet heard what these securities were; and 'he was prepared to con tend, that the most perfect .security we could have eras to be obtained by leaving France confined to the limits of her ancient power, and by the reduction of the power of Bonaparte, as her chief, by such a Treaty as that of Chaumont. If this were denied, he would ask if it had - been proved that with France, reduced to her ancient limits, we could no longer be secure against the effects of her ambition ? Respect ' ing the state of France at the present time, it was not possible even for Ministers themselves to obtain accurate information, considering the intelligence! which represents France to be in a state of distraction, tomes from persons who are interested in the over- , throw of the present Government, and who were thus induced to believe much more than the real state of things would warrant. The Noble Earl was, old enough to remember the beginning of the French Revolution, and how we were buoyed up with hopes , that the people of France would rise against the dif ferent Governments that oppressed them ; yet though wars of the most formidable nature had broken out 'against the Government of that country, from the discontents of the people, these were the very periods when the greatest military exertions were made by France against the general enemy, by calling out all the energies of the State, and applying them to the most vigorous action. This was no new pheno menon. Tie Republics of Greece and Rome, when most disturbed at home, displayed the greatest vi gour ai 4 ainst their external enemies; and the same had happened in this country at different periods of her history. France was now in the same situation as she had been before ; if then, this spirit which the Noble Lord stated to exist, should be turned into a new direction by the most triffling act of a war of aggression, like that in which we were now going to, enter, it would be likely to produce an effect very different from what was apprehended. From all the infprmation which he (Lord Grey) .had received, the effect of the re-appearance of Bonaparte was such as to lend a belief that the people, and not merely the military, were adverse to the Government of the Bourbons; and that so great was the danger before Bonaparte's return, that the general impression of the persons who visited France in the last summer was, that if that Government existed during the life of the King, it would be as long as it possibly could exist, and a new revolution would be the ,con-. sequence of his demise. M. de Chabannes has:.said that the Clergy and Nobles were for the but the military, and those who had acquired na tional property, were against him, because they were convinced of the insecurity of their property; and, considering the great proportion of people who were connected with the revolutions in the government and in favour of Bonaparte, he (Lord Grey) was not of opinion that it was a military revolution. The ra pidity of Bonaparte's march through such a vast extent of country was another proof of this important fact. He bad every whereletsented himself to the popu lace, and was received with universal acclamation, which could not have been possible it there had not been a general disposition in his favour, and an im pression adverse to the Government of the Bourbons. The Noble Earl then alluded to the promising field that the career of Bonaparte bad opened for the na tural military ambition of the French, by entering the army, which had produced the military spirit that had been attended with 'such wonderful effects; .it was no wonder, be said, that fathers of families should not object to their sons embarking in a pro leSsiou that might lead them to principalities and fortune. The return of the old and disbanded sol alien was a power of strength ; and Bonaparte proved his confidence in the partiality of the people by put ting arms into their hands, without any apprehension that they would be turned against hirfi. This was a strong argument as to what would be the fate and character of the war, and ought to impel us to give it the deepest consideration before we embarked in it ; , as it might again produce what Mr. Pitt denomi nated the resistance of an armed nation. There was not any thing which could shew the disposition on the part'of France to favour The attempts of the Al lied Armies, but the reverse, by oppressing and ex tinguishing the very spirit that was hoped for by the measutes they were about to adopt. His Lordship then alluded to the extreme apathy of the people of France towards the Bourbons, while they were last in power, and repeated that aggression and attack would be likely to cause oppression and destruction, while moderation and respect for the rights of the people could alone effect the wished-for object. We ought to consider how far our resources for carrying lon war were better or worse than they were before. He took a view of Bonaparte's proceedings from the commencement of his campaign in Russia, in 1812, and tracing his career to the battles of Dresden and in Silesia, and argued, that b' his disasters in 1812, and 1013; the Trench Government had never found itself in such straits. When .the Allies entebtl Prance it had been stated, and he believed correctly ? that .not lets than a force of 225;000' men had been cut off from affording any assistance, and that the whale 'defence of France was confided to about 165,d00. The numerical.force of the Allies united; 'could hot have been less than /1410,1:060 ; thisvas stated at the time to be their amount,without including the Swedes or Landwehr, as well as other troops left behind in garrison. But supposing this statement to have been erroneous, as calculations on paper generally are, it was fair to bell ye, that there was nt.t of the Allied Armies in France more than 34.0,0(X), wlych would be a fair deduction for exaggerations ; hut this in vading army was composed of victotious troops, against only 165,000 French, who were harassed avid worn out by the long and disastrous warfare - of the two preceding campaigns. Yet though France was attacked on all sides by mare than double her num bers, whoever recollects how much anxiety existed in this country as to the result of the invasion, and that it was by a mere accident at last that the Allies ob tained success, and esc rped from destruction, and that even after the capture of l'Atis, the Allies had suffered so much by desertion and treachery, that he could not look at the renewal of the contest, even with the same means as it had been conchuled, with _ out the deepest apprehension ? But the fact was, that we never could expect to see it renewed under cir cumstances equally favourable. The prisoners re turned to France from.this country. alone, were not less titan 170,000, and those who had returned from the garrisons might be taken at 100,000; so that there was this vast addition at once to the available force of France. This fact was prove 4 by the official statements, while it was evident that Bonaparte had found tremendous means of recruiting his army during the two months that had elapsed since his re-. turn. He would therefore, unquestionably have a regular army of at least 20,000 men, exclusive of the 172,000 stated by M. Chateaubriand to form the National Guard. What hopes,' then, had we, that the same success could attend our efforts against such a formidable arm, as had resulted from our attacks upon it when diminished and disheartened ? It ap peared horeever, that Spain,Partugal, and Sweden had :Aso - signed this Declaration, but it did not appear that either of these Powers could produce any troops. — We were to give five millions of subsidy to be divi ded between the three principal Powers ; but the Noble Lord had made no statement this night as to what farther accession of force we were to derive from these minor Powers. It teas certain, however, that we could not have their assistance without-pay ing them. All, indeed, wield be ready enough to_i share in those golden eggs which the great Goose of Europe had so long been in the habit of producing, but which, he feared, she would not he able to. pro duce much longer. The necessity of el:aiding her new acquisition of Norway might probably prevent Sweden from participating in .the war on the Conti nent. Portugal might certainly furnish 20,t;o0 brave men, but they: could not fir prodiev•ei ter Ow are campaign ; and as to• Spain, her troops, who had' done so little on their own soil, could be little calcu lated upon when withdrawn from it. But was the British army in the state in, which it was at the con elusion of the late contest ? Was the Duke ot Wel lington ,any longer at the head of those brave and in vieeible legioas which had enabled him to gain such imperishable laurels for himself, and such immor tality for his country ? No ; they were dispersed and exhausted by the impolitic war with America; and we were not able to produce under that illtearious leader more than 20,000 or 30,000 British troops, while even those were of a very different description from the heroes of the Peninsula. The army from America, after being incessantly harassed by being taken from Spain to America, might indeed be sent to Belgium ; but this wou'd mot be doing justice to such brave troops, after the fatigues they had under gone.—(Ther, /war ).—Could we again raise our stan dard in the plains of Saxony, and call on the Saxons who so gloriously contributed to the successes of the last two campaigns, to come forward again, after the fate their country had experienced ?—( Hear, /war). There were not less titan O,OW ot these brave peo., ple who participated kettle invasion of France. How did it happen that those troops were now in a situa; l tion, that Marshal Blucher had been obliged to con demn some of them to military execution, and send the rest to the rear of his line ? What assistance also could we expect from Italy, where the violation of' the promises and assurances held out to the people had rendered them disgusted ? MI these circum-' stances would cause the confederacy in France to be stronger than it was before, and those against her weaker. Who then could assert, that the allied forces could come again into the contest with the saute con fidence in each other as they possessed last year ? As to Austria she was, to all appearance, so much occupied on the side et Italy, that even if Murat were to be destroyed, as he thought it likely he. would be, still the state of Italy would. require such a diversion on the part of Austria, that she might not be able to advance again to the invasion of France '; and the allies altogether could not proceed a ithont being influenced jealoussaa , and appeetiensions to wards each other. The Noble Earl then ailusled to the letter of Lord Castlereagh to Prince Hardenberg, respecting the partition of Saxony, and accused his Lordship of setting himself up, as second Minos, to judge and proclaim justice towards whole countries, according to his own ideas of political morality, with. out any compunctious visitings of conscience at the acts to which he presumed to give his fiat. He then recapitulated many of his former observations, and trusted he had said enough to shew that after the danger from which we had escaped in France, we . ought seriously to reflect whether the s i tuation of the new confederacy was such as to enable us to enter again into war with any hopes of similar advantages to those we had lately gained. He condemned the intemperate lan guage so genera l ly used towards Bonap u a c r hil te, ae a bd t uec id sel goat soundnesst a t s l ai prevalence o ai r s i nr f c o a p w te in ( l i ti o l i d t ' ll t g e b was ar i e he m tr oifi cs to oau res sme ist the ambition of Bonaparte ; but as we could not see into the heart of man, we could not say that a change in his moral conduct was impossible..— He was nu believer in the moderation of his desires ; burif there was no change in his disposition, was it the causes not possible that there mi g h t be some change in his turn ? policy, w H i e len (Lord Grey) reflecting h not think ses of so Iri s sigl uly as former others of his advanced age; the period could not be tar simo'red when he could command the armies it petson, and this would be a considerable security fe peace. A frame of adamant must have suffered Iron a life of activity like his. He would not have then 'go about asking, like the Athenians, Is Philip sk ; but he would have them give due weight to probabl casualties. Did not Banaparte's wish for peace pray, *pacific temper, not only in the people but in the army? He did not rely muck uponconstitutions fro m e d a itrieri, like that now preparing in France; but Still bethought the Minister: of Bonaparte were so at tacked to certain principles as necessarily io exercist a controul over him. is not Bonaparte~ union %vita Carnot a proof' of his sincerity ? (land Gray ; believed that at peseta Bonaparte alai his Mina ta , were somewhat disgusted with each. other; bat tia desire of the latter to use lam to resist invasion, :ea. his desire to conciliate the nation, would mete tfaa. Was it hot nearly impious to say peace Was irtia . sible ? And was it not absurd di use defensive pie. paration as argument, when that would he Let-essay only until the consolidation of peace, w!:erair be reduced as law asunder the reign of Latta Eighteenth ? The country would, as an a former occasion of a mot glorious war, with but a jai!. ti t reduced system, be still able to meet war, if ec:a.. sary. Wh it Power had ever been reduced 100 ;r than Prussia in the year I I '2, or more splen.!,,* i 3 her military exertions in tile aears 1813 amid Is; le Let France be restrained within her ancient iiraa -, and alliances he formed again,' aaaression, and a country would have a suflici.ut :,:•curity for peace. Let the confederacy act upon honest principles, :tnd not think, as they do now, of what each may gain, and let them abandon the wish, as well as the de. Lag% to restore the Bourbons—a design now a n . practicable, when the Bourbon dynasty was in Aso. lute repulsion to the interests of society in Fiah aa _ (Hear, hear.) Was a permanent peace with Flax,: expected even last year under Louis the Eighteenth ? But this military system, says the Noble Lord, ne:.t be put down—what, by war ? This wauld cherie , not extinguish it, unless, as declared in another place, it is resolved to exterminate the whole army and fig:lt. ing population of France. But would the Noble Lord contemplate a failure, of which there was at least Ra equal chance ? What sort of peace roust he then submit to ?—a peace, endangered and embittered ay success, by ambition, and by revenge. Was it tea probable that a war with France would agai:: involve a war with America ?—(larear, hear,. 11,6 r.) The abolition of the Slave. Trade, to which lie ( Leal Grey) most sincerely rejoiced, proved that Bonaparte had no Colonial designs. lie depreCated a laar as likely to create difference , of sentinient tErougi.. out Great Britain,' as well as in the present use:ea:ea and•discontented state of Irelaad, whose people oar!.l not expect a single act to be done by the Governeitat of this country to remove the disqualifications uncle: whiclrthey laboured, and lay die foundation or tram. quillity and affection in that pal tof the Empire.-- All those circemstances,lie repeated his here, woual induce- the.Hoobe to pans: before they resolved ea plunging the country tea. .reee.--seiieable arta in terminable war. He regretted having trespassed so long tipon.their Lordships—( hear)—but differ. ing as he.now did from his Noble Friend near h;in (Lord Grenville); who was equally distinguished ihy pure and elevated principles, splendid talems, tieep :end varied - kaotrltclge, and . . long calm knee in the first rank of the public councils during the mast ar. 'shnts times r .:thus chairing froni his Noble Frienia he telt it his duty to-suite his views alias fully to th .r Lordships. He iuterfered • befeeini the Goverian ..t and a war doubtful :tad dang,:roes la its teat, Why _prefer the , ceasaisacale mints. Of war, ivtri tit a t Uncertain peace ? Who cin calculate without pr:- sumptiou upon certain success ? %Who can anticipa e what tremendous disasters a war may pioduse, and what benetits.might possibly result from peace ? What hope the never ending flight Ot future days may bring—wbat chance, whit c h ange Worth teat. log, since our present lot appears, For happy, though but il, for di not worn, If we procure not to our...lv...mute woe ? —The Noble Earl concluded by moving, as ra Amendment— " To thank his Royal Highness for his most startlers M;' sage, and to assure ins Royal Highni!ss of :IA firm deter:ll'4i tion of the House to support all rwcit ittya,ures as Lis Roy 1 Highness might think it necess.ry to enter it:to for the sate y and honour of the Crown, and the preservation of an intimate concert with his Allies to protect tit.: rights of all ; and that Ce House would, as far as possible ' enable his Royal Higllnt , s make good all the engagements his Royal Hisborts nthilit yew into with such view.; but that it woted riot be justified it; :iv ... g its approbation to those measures witch had been adtptesi ir: sequence tit the new:cations at Vienita,, and of which the li is totally uninfortmd. That while they were wilhug to ay, ! the views of his Royal Highoras la any esertton to toata...:i equilibrium of Europe, they felt 1)9U(Al to plole t 1g a: principle of a war, cAttnieuced upon the grounds of dicia!:l 't France who should he het Ru.kr, as unj :s:, fraught with 0.... ger, and admitting of no altitnative. but the utter dt street:owl Napoleon's power, or a huniiliatlng abanaanment of the obi lt of the war. f iwt the Houni lett great tspisfac:lon to t:•1 tat standing that hostinies had not yet been comintlwed, and 1.0 his Royal sequld open new neguciat:oas wirt hes fur the put of butter secariog-the safes to of the !.wet anithe interests of thy „AlLes, than by ilea: Vie:Tel:too pct.,: 13th 9f Match, or the. Treaty cauCtsJed conssqueirly cia ti.: V.Sthof the sante moot h." Earl . BATH U RST Ontencle,i; as an opinion was not called for on the eugagemcntscntcred into hi lo' Royal Highness the Pt ince Regcnt, the Antoci:oat proposed by the Noble . Eittl opposite, Was in tae present instance unnecessary. As it went to piquet the principle of proscribing an individual as the ifeteign of France, it was still more olijectionable. — Such a prnposition, it agreed to, must cause thee , &ete dissolution of the alliance now formed iteaci- Disnaparte. 'L'he great Powers had &elated ci Peace cont.! not be made with France so long as I? remained at the head of her Goverment ; t . 5 country, in departing friun dui principle, w"0" part from its Allies. Waft respect to what had said of hostilities not having yet commenced, lie; ters of marque issued, and the reference thence di that the country was not in a stee of war, Le Il..:1!;• tained the statement of his N,ible hiirnd had not t shaken by the circumstance of hostilities not hasi , yet broke out, and the issuing of letters of 1 " 4 "V". though a measure frequently resorted to in the stage of war, was not necessarily a part of war. 11. the present situatirn of things, their Lordships nu'•• consider the co un t r y i n a state of war; . and the tion now submitted to their decision was simply i'' ll " whether or n o t Mi n i sters h a d d o ne right to advise t , ie Prince Regent to place it in that state. lie p", ceeded to shew that just grounds for war liatl ci i , it and he denied that Any of the Treaties entx rm. ••• r • • .01. '• 060 1:4 1. I#.