Star. — London, England, 1815-04-08 00:00:00

:n Conan contrary to the intention of the Treaty. it, however,. he had any reason to complain of 'readies of the Treaty with- h;nf, lie should l i tre sip. ked to Jose lumens with Whom he made the Treaty. Altliteigii the King of France was tio direct party to iris Treaty, yet the allies lied claims upon him as well as urn Napoleon, for the observance of this freety The last tune, however, that he passed ;;,rough Paris, when he heard that Bonaparte was ,cuing cannon and provisions, on account of pecuniary lefieulties, he did apply to the French Government e i the subject, and suggested to the King, diet it ht be of the most injurious to consequenc s egive : e n any just reason to complain of breach of Treaty. a lso gave an Official letter to Colouel Camp :el, authorising him to complain of some parts of its otrduct, but the main object of the letter was to s t eal f,im front any individual pecuniary wants. I, e ,p ore, however, would not do any thing which reeN iesed the treaty, and never made any corn eents about the breach of it. He trusted, therefore, e he would he no more of this treaty having been o kee on the part of the Allies. The whole of the e eeect of Bonaparte. might be resolved into this ar. .eint decliretion, that in signing the Treaty he t e e done an act foe the deception of the Allies, but al act which, in his opinion, did not at all inveli date his legitimate rights to the throne of France. yaestion now before the House, wis nut e ; t; , peace or war, but merely as to tee neces ,ey ,t precautionary measures at the present crisis. tie believed that the H MSC would see, that the !hie of conduct which this country had to pursue lay between two alternatives. It must either em bark in a war, in conjunctien with the other Con eeeetat Powers, or it muse, in cenjunction with to nf, adopt measures of military precaution, sulfi cie.it for its protection under the present circum. a laces. He was sure that-it would not be contended in that HOUtt, that while the powers of government in France were exercised by such a man, it would Is, passible, consistent with our safety, to reduce the este blidunents of the country to that scale which might be considered sufficient under other circumstances. However senguiue he I light have been in the hope of bringing the nation back to its ancient principles end policy, yet he never did or could have supposed, like the Gentlemen on the other side of the House, that there was to be no transition between such a war as We had for so many years waged with France, and teat peace establishment which would be sufficient for the sound health of the country, in settled times, and when the hornier social resations of Europe were cunipletel y reestablished. The danger was nu re more deeply rooted, which tied arisen from a state of things that had unfortunately too long a continuance. From this state of trills, France had now become a military uation, and all other-chases of the cominimityhed be come, in that country, subordin Ate to the mi 'nary class. It was then .easy to that France couid nut break loose from that illlitatUral state to which it had been refused, without a greet danger of whet had now actueily taken place, from a re-action of the army. Although, in her political situ.itioii, France might now be prostrate at the foot of her armies, yet, who would venture to say that the return of Bonaparte was the act of the •Ftencli nation ?—( Loud cries of ILar, !rear.) —Who could hesitate to allow, that the late revolution was purely the act of the military, who saw .that if they submitted to the paternal go vernment of their King, it would be fatal to their paramount interests .as military in n accustomed to plunder other countries. It. the Ailies did not make actual war on France, there wi , uld be no alternative the Allies but to unite again, in order to prevent he ham breaking loose on other countries; but they meet...reit for the deciiet of the people of the Con- He then concluded by in vin an Address ce Regent,.approvieg of the Augmentation of ties, .and the renewal of concert with our ratee .red the ,requisite assistance to eels things enefeeff •ef• • :hi. Fa mNCIS t'T said, that it might •seeee eimitst ruspossible, from the language of the ee Lord, t.) c ry wh‘ Cher he meant peace or war. It i,e u..derst deh a there was a desire to preserve the treaty of peace, tri.icsa some act of aggression leek piece on the part of France—if he could coftsi ein the caninienication merely as information of pre. 'mein His against LI surprise, or attempt, or danger arising from the character of Bonaparte, truly or Choy ascribed to him, he should not think it neces. y to dissent Iron% the motion, but it the address vas oily an indirect mode of leading them into war, it was 11,, 'hey to oppose it. The only intelligible ground of war, as far as lie could understand, was the ie,toration of the House of Bourbon. He should vote aksiiibt such an unjustifiable piiaciple of hostile. ties—(.Hear, hear.) The question now came to this simple principle—whether. we should embark in a fresh war, which might last long, perhaps twenty )ears more, perhaps unsuccessful and ruinous in its results, for the purpose of replacing tire. Bourbons on Inc French Throne ?—(Hear, heats) He should be sorry to criticise the Bourbons, at present, with .eve. rity. Ir they were not now on the Throne, lie did mot ascriee it to our Gowen - anent respecting their at tention to the Isle of Elt,a. In the laboured Part of Um Noble Lord's speech, which referred to the de- Tulare of Bonaparte, he concurred with the Noble Lori. He WAS not our prisoner, and we had no rigid to restrain his action e any far ther titan as they traded to reproduce war in Europe. What was the fact concerning his departure from Elba, and his landing in France ? It was termed an invasion.— % tau ever heard of thirty millions of people invaded by one man. ?—(/fear, hear.) HOW was his success to be accounted for, but that this man's character 111 ° 041 so high in France, that he was generally re ceived as a deliverer?— (Hear. hear.) The Noble Lord spoke of ancient habits, but the French strewed a re pugnance to them. The real causes, he took it, were t . st there was quite a new order of things in that c..tintiy, that property was changed, and that the Preen possessors of property felt themselves insecure !id were alarmed, and that the King had net kept f . eli with the nation, and had not fully accepted the c onstitution according to the stipulations agreed to byltis brother. He would not be harsh upon the unutbons ; but their conduct seemed to have de kiired them of the Throne, and it would be hostile 10 humeri liberty, to make war upon a principle :)I forcing a Monarch on a nation, by a combinetieu litheother arbitrary Governments of Europe. (Hear.) The Congress at Vienna had made no attempts in t iMir Of liberty, and the EmFeror at France was I;tr. •• . ti. t T li. r rendered so much the stronger, because die Congress had subverted the moral feelings of Europe against him; and the Allies would, therefore, lute the ad. vantage of having the same arm to wield against him which they had used lately. Were this note of preparation intended only to prevent any aggression, he would concur in the Address ; but from all he could collect from the ambiguity of the Noble Lord, he peiceived a desire to stir np the elements of war upon the principle of maintaining what was called legitimate sovereignty. This disposition was evinced in a country which acted on an opposite principle. The title of the present reigning family to the croarn was a parliamentary recognition. Ii die princidles of the Noble Lord were right, the present family were usurpers. He still further objected to war on the score of humanity. We had already done more than could have been expected for the cause of the Bourbons. We had spent oceans of blood, and had incurred many millions of debt.—( Hear, hear.) —The principle of war for restoring the Bourbons was even disavowed by the Minister in 1793. The country was absolutely tricked into the war at first, by argu ments about the opening of the Scheldt, and other subjects. The Noble Lord had kept out of view many particulars; but he spoke strongly of the little faith or reliance that could be placed in Bona parte. The Noble Lord, however, hid negocia tions with the Ministers of Louis XVIII. on the important subject which had excited so much in terest in this country—the Abolition of the Slave Trade. He had even offered boons and sacrifices for the sake of humanity; but yet he could not succeed. Why ? All parties professed a desire to re move this odious stain upon the civilised world ; but the French Government, it was said, was afraid of the French Nation. But when Napoleon Bonaparte re turns, he, whether from policy or from virtue, or from whatever other cause, abolishes the trade at once, in despite of all consequences. (Hear, hear.) As to want of faith, Ferdinand, the Sovereign of Ar ragon, was reported to have said that words were the counters of wise men, and the money of fools. Na poleon's Decree against the slave trade was as deeply laid in policy, as it was proper in the cause of hums. nity. He wished that our own Government and other Governments were as great hypocrites, on such subjects, as Bonaparte. He abhorred war, especially in our present situation, and in the short breadline time for Europe. It we went to war for the Bour bons, what could any man of common sense say to Bonaparte's landing with a few hunched men in the South of France, among 30 millions of people, in the face of an established Government, provided with all means and resources ; none daring to repel him, and as he went on to the North, all that were sent to oppose him joining his standard ? History scarcely gave so magnanimous a test to the opiniom of a na tion. He had nothing to do with the wishes of the people of France, but he protested against the abo minable principle of interfering with their concerns. Let them settle their own affairs. The Noble Lord armed to think the present French Government weak, and the means to be 1.-ou,4lit against it so strong as to invite him to his purposes ; but he might be deceived. The Hon. Bait. stated his reasons for dissenting from the Address, because it was a men. sure leading to a war, unjust in its principles, and , which might be ruinous in its consequences. Mr. PONSONBY said it was his intention to sup. port the Address as it stood. Though, if he viewed it as the Honourable Baronet did, he should, like him, oppose it. But he could not consider the Address as at all binding the House as to the future question of peaceor war. The preparations which this Go vernment were about to ask the support of the House for, were net contemplated, because Bonaparte had contravened the Treaty of Paris ; or had the Noble ' Lord said so, as stated by the Honourable Baronet ? What he understood the Noble Lord to have said, was, that the Treaty of Paris having been entered in to with the Bourbons, gave terms more favourable to France than what the Allies would hive given her tinder Bonaparte; and therefore, now that Bonaparte came back, France could not expect the same terms. With ryspect to what the Honourable Baronet had said of the wisdom of the French people preterring the Government of Bonaparte to that of the Dour.: bons, he was of opinion the House had nothing to do with it. That was a question for the French people, and he (Mr. l'onsonby) for one, would never concur in influencing any country, either by force or other wise, in the Government which they should choose. As to what might be the future conduct of the Go vernment of this country, lie had no opinion now to give. Tire Address did not ask it. All the Address asked was the support of the House in the steps al ready taken. This support, he, for one, was ready to give. He highly approved of the country being put in a state of preparation, and ha also appoved of his Royal Highness acting in c mcert with his Allies. It was, in his opinion, always for the interest of this country to act in concert with the great Powers of the Continent whenever we could. There was one point in the Noble Lord's speech, however, in which, if he rightly understood him,. he should not agree.— The Noble Lord, as he understood him, stated that the House should place confidence in his Majesty's Ministers, and not call on them to state what they in tended.to do, but allow them now to take such steps as they thOught proper, and afterwards decide whe ther these steps were such as ought to be approved. In his (Mr. Ponsonby's) opinion, the House should be put in possession of the intentions of the Execu tive, as far as could be done with prudence, before any final determination should be come to, that his Majesty's Government might hive the advantage of the collective wisdom of Parliament at this momen. tous crisis. The Honourable Baronet (Sir Francis Burdett) had said, that he perceived an intention on the part of the Government of this country to goad the Posters of the Continent on to war. He could not see any such intention manifested by the Noble Lord and his colleagues; on the contrary, he farther considered the steps they were taking, in conjunction with our Allies, as tending to preserve the peace; and -if that object should be found unattainable, to have the country placed in the best possible state of defence. lie, however, trusted the preparations which had been made would have the salutary effect of pre sPrvitig the peace; he should continue to cherish that hop. 2 to the last; and mere espicrally as the Noble L7ird had been engaged in negociatiug peace at Chit. Itiflon last year with Bonaparte, not at all at that time contemplating the restdration of the Bourbons, and bating then thought it possible to insatiate with - bim. He trusted Ministers Would still consider it possible to do so. He did not now intend to enter• into a discussion of the popularity of lion4parte, or of the opinion of the French people. towards him, but he must be allowed to s.ay that be clold uat consider Bon iparre as being only supported by the French army. He must think, that unless he had also pos sessed some interest with the population of the coun try, he could never have reached the capital with the rapidity he had done. The Right Honourable Gen tleman concluded by giving his most cordial sup. port to the Address, which he considered as most wisely and moderately drawn up, and in terms highly honourable to the Noble Lord and those who acted with him. _ Mr. WHITBREAD said. if he could entertain the same narrow views of the Message as his Right Hon. Friend. or perceive in it any of the ambiguity . . which it assumed in the apprehension of the Honour able Baronet near him, he should feel content to ac quiesce in the Address that was proposed to the Throne. But when he perceived that nothing but a flimsy veil was attempted to be thrown over the de signs and proceedings of the Executive Government of this country, and also that the candour of his Honourable and Right Honourable Fi lends around him was to be mitered, if they chose to be ensn trod, , he could not refrain from protesting against the line of conduct which the Noble Lord wished them to adopt. He could not conceal from himself, be would not consent to conceal from the House and the coon try, the designs that we were invited to embark in, and the character of that note of preparation which Dow sounded on all sides. He was certainly most unwilling to undertake, what was extremely pto blematical at best, another crusade against France in behalf of the Bourbons, who were indebted for their transient gleam of triumph to the rashness and mad.' ness of the individual that now occupied the Throne of France. Endeavouring to pacify the French, it was taken for granted that the conditions of the Treaty of Paris were better than any which the Allies would have conceded to Nspoleon.—(Hear.)— But what would the Noble Lord say to the Declara tion of Frankfort, which held out to France, under that same Ruler, the promise of a greater territory than ever she had possessed under the Bourbons ? What would the N -isle Lord farther say to the nego ciations carried on by himself at Chatillon, cat riot on with Bonaparte or his Ministers, and which backedthe Declaration as to terms? Perhaps the Noble Lord then held out a . Treaty of precaution, like the Message he brought, only to pounce upon France at' discretion, and when opportunity might offer.— (No, whji from the Ministerial:de.) Well, he must suppose that he had fallen into an error fur this time, though, considering his opponents, it was not an extraordi nary one, since, incomprehensible to thcmse.ves, they. were likely enough t, be misconceived of by him.— Bonaparte was not always so remote from tillse who railed most against him ; be, for instance, bad ended with a ball at Elba, as the Noble Lurd had bzfore set him the example by concluding with a ball at Vienna. Still the complaint of 13 inaparte was serious in one point, namely, the stipulation for money, the infraction of which cond,tion was supposed to be justified by the plea of the year not being nut.— Wibit t petti-toggilg subterfo B e WAS this ?—(Hear.) Another sort of pretence was, that when Bonaparte did apply for money, an officer was sent over to him, instead of money, who reported that he was recruit ing in Elba, arid Was employed in collecting a I..erce that might threaten France with invasioN. Weil ! spies were most liberally paid for their good intelli gence ; the Noble Lord was himself at Vienna, sur rounded with old and sage diplomatists, and yet, though apptised of the fact of Roilaparte being in the habit of collecting troops at Elba, he is permitted to decemp with those few troops, land in France, and there regain the Throne. Diplomatic ai,eacres ! Now that " the cat was out of the bag," the Noble Lord knew what every body else knew ; he could admonish us how Bonaparte might have been kept at Elba ; or, rather, how he might be kept, it he would only just suffer us to get him back there. B. naparte was represented as nut being supported by the people of France, yet had he made his way, front North to South, without a single arm being litted l against him ; and now the only question was, whether we could overthrow the re-creation of a Monarchy which was Isenefieially designed for the French peo ple ! Let us look, for example, the Slave Trade, and we should discover that what Louis the De. sired could not do towards its Abolition, with all the fervour of the Noble Lord to boot; we should find this was accomplished by Bonaparte with a stroke of his pen. (Hear.) Whatever was the character of the chosen Ruler of France, (and, .%ith out at all intending to hurt their feelings, he conceived the interest of the Bourbons to be extinct in France, and that their misfortunes more than ever, coupled with their virtues, had a claim upon all genercus minds), still he conjured his friends net to be misled by the cautious wording of the Address now pro poled to them, on condition of iutormation to be given diem. If any kind of information was im parted, it would come upon them like a thunder clap; they would find themselves involved in a new war before they bad pledged themselves to support it, while they would be reminded of their consent by their tote of this night. Considering the late De claration of the Allied Powers as nothing less than an invitation to every man to assassinate Bonaparte, a meaiure which he would defy the casuistry of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to defeat!, be would, nevertheless, hope, that as B maparte had promised ' to keep the pence, and not pass his boundaries unless attacked, so the Christian feelings of the Noble Lord and his colleagues would not permit them to plunge this country into a state of useless and hopeless hosti. lity by aggression. But he was 2pprehensive, that the catcall talked of in the Message was no longer wanted; fur eithee the Duke of Wellington, Lord Cathcart, and Lord Stewart, deserved to be impeached, or else the Noble Lord opposite had instructed them to make war against France. Eve* ing was owing to the escape of Bonaparte, and escape was owing to the understood sort of insult( ns Which permitted him to be stopped at sea °ley is 'se of his proceeding to do mischief. All °this was exactly foe want of another understanding— one ttnierstanding in the Cabinet, which, though afraid commit itself, committed all . also. De. fence • the system to be pursed by us, and not o It bbd been observed, by Mr. Sheridan, that half of the Naiono Debt WAS incurred 01 ' curbing the eMbition of the House of Bourbon, and the-other half by attempt. to restore that the N , bl. Lord seemed to believe that noe• to. deed was the time fsir us to strike. Did the Noble Lord really think that the Sixons would again unite with Prussia? that halt- would concur witi: Austria? that Naples was in temper with as ? Supposing b:t. ter things. that whole armies invaded France, and that.B3tteparte was slain, the people of France, dis liking the B ntrbons, worth. elect an ,, ther head, and England be left in the lurch, to make peace with some new congtieror. He .sould ask whether if at any former period of the power of Napoleon B Mk. parte, we could have city.tinesi Lim within t:;e limits which he now says lie will keep, we would not have made peace with him ? He was sure there was no disinterested man in the country who would not have subscribed to such conditions.—. If, however, France steps beyond ties: limits, she then becomes the aggressor; but she ought to be left alone till she thus forfeits her claim to race. He would therefore implore the G , tvernment, as well as all his own Honourable Friends, to reflect that if the Address is supported at it now stands, the Miniiters would be implicitly sanctioned in entering upon an aggressive war.—(Hear, hear.)—‘ltich had bean said by certain writers for the diurnal press of this metro polis, in favour of such a war; ft bad long been their practice to run down Bonaparte; bat these persons must not carry their tentimerits too far; at any rate much stress ought not to be laid on what is said by : them. He should, for his own part, enter his de, tided protest against what is said lay them, as well as against the doctrines of the Noble Lard, and he should feel that he should not do has duty, if he did not vote against the Address generally.-- He, however, would agree to support as much of it as went to authorize pravisions for defence against aggression, which he should wilt to be made to the fullest extent, till we could see that the danger was over; but do not put in the hands of the Executive Power the means of making oar. With this view he would propose as an amendment, after the expres sion of concurrence in the sentiments of the Message, At the same time earnestly to implore his Royal Highness to exert every endeavour to preserve the blessing of peace, so long a); it could be maintained with safety to his Majesty's crown and dominions, and security to his Aliiec." On the question being pin. Mr FREDERICK DOUGLAS said, that as Bonaparte did not rest upon the aff...ctions of the people of France, he c . uhf aboiish the Slave Ttrade, which Louis XVIII. who did rest on their affections, could not. 'llse general policy of the country should lead it to remain in a swell peace, but that pi e. supposed that Europe should be divided into inde. pendant States. lie had heard the assertion with Astonishment, that Bonaparte had been recall:d by the voice of the people; be bad ben recalled by the vo.ce of the army, . who, long habituated to revolt, it Was natural should Jeclare.tor him.. Had even Bo naparte the imention to rem sin at peace, he had not the power, for it Was only as the representative of a war system that lie had been preferred to Louis XVIII. who in tile prospect of a state of peace would hate been prelened even by the army. France must now, ia the event of wa-, r eoceed by a system of commenter...lion, as Ilinaparte co.4 . 44Lienger rais contributions, and that was the true cause' of his Mo deration. The extirpation of the army that supported ainaparte was neces'..iry to the restoration of Europe, AS the lire of the revoletien still continued to burn in their bre tsts. Sir J. /4 LI WPO IZT supported the Address. Mr. CROKER spoke merely to a matter of fact. An Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Whitbread) had stated, that a I'rencit shin had been brought into port by an English ctuiztr, under circumstances which shelved that she had been taken either under an ambiguous order, or some secret understanding with the Ca; win of the ship. He could take upon him to assure the House that such statement was whory and entirely without foundation ; and that there mid been no order to any officer to interiere with the tri-coloured flag of France, any more than with the white flap. Mr. BANKES supported the Address:, though he thought the country ought to be very cautious as to any increase of burden on its finances. !Aid ALTIIORPE and Mr. AI3ERCROSIBY were for the Amendment. Mr. W. ELLIorr said the Address only claimed the attention of the House to those measures of pre caution which iu colleen with our Allies might be deemed necessary for the security of Europe; and as such it had his support. Mr. TIERNEY said, the message, it was true, only called on the House to pl ice the cluntry, in point of military matters, in such a state as might be necessary to secure the tranquiility of Europe—but the speech of the Noble Lord gave reason to suppose that our allies were inclined to a state of war, and if they entered on that war for the purpo3e of dethron ing Bonaparte, the idea would appal his very heart. He had heard also, that notwithstanding the appa rent moderation of the message, subsidies to our se veral Allies had already been settled and agreed on. This might be false—but if true, the amendment of his Honourable Friend seemed to him to be most de. sirable, as it threw on Ministers a greater degree of responsibility. Ile had no wish to crab mass Ministers, but as the words of the amendment were very moue rate, and did not weaken the address, he should vote for the amendment. Mr. W. SMITH supported the Amendment. spoke in favour of the Address. Mr. PLUNKET expres sed his cordial and unqua lified support to the Address, and affirmed, that there • appeared nothing in the Noble Lord ' s speedi which indicated that he had any wish or int .ution to dupe the House. For his own part, he should be very sorry to be the dupe of Ministers, but he should be much more so to be duped by the present Ruler of France. If war must be the consequence, he bad no doubt but we had a legitimate and justifiable cause for it, but that question was reserved for a futu re d ay . Lo d CASTLEREAGH replied at considerable length, contending. principally in reply to fir. Whit bread, that it did not follow. because this country had treated with Bonaparte at Chatillon. that it must be prepared to treat with him under existing circuits seances. He begged leave to state, that though the Allies did treat with bin at,Chatilion, they did not consider themeelte, called upon to accept of his pro. Pow wbeo they were likely to enter Paris. As *SI •