Star. — London, England, 1815-05-26 00:00:00

C :~.... of another. He felt that in proportion as every couu: try clahned the right of settling their own internal affairs, it was possible the motives of the 'Allies would be misrepresented, and they would be de scribed to have departed from those principles which first united them in arms against Bonaparte. In a case. however, so extreme as the present, they could not separate the Government from the nation, and the conduct of the individual who was placed at the head of the former, was sufficient to justify that ap peal to the sword which was about to be made. The case was however strengthened by the consideration that he had been placed at the head of the govern. ment by the French army, who considered it as es sential to their interests that their Chief should not be of a pacific disposition, and inclined to abide by those Treaties which Louis was disposed to maintain. The n hole course of events which had marked the esti aordinai y career of Bonaparte, proved that peace was not to be expected with him. Admitting his ta lents to he great, these but increased the danger, and went not only to affect the interests, but to endanger the safety of this country. if they watched him through his whole career, it would be seen that in war or peace, in prosperity or adversity, still the same perseverance and unrelenting system of policy was distinguishable. A wish to govern all countries seemed constantly to actuate him, and led him to at tempt to extend the dominion of France over all sur rounding countries. This object, it would be seen, he hart constantly pursued, even in what he called a state of peace, and greater acquisitions had been made by him while protessecily at peace, than had ever been gamed by war. It was timing peace that he had procured the annexation of Holland, of the Ligurian Republic, and virtually, though nut actu ally, Switzerland to France. The thirty-second mi. lirary division was thus added to France; and it was in peace that the greatest and most malignant acts of aggression of his whole system had been ventured upon—lie meant his attack upon the independence of Spain anti Portugal, in contempt of Treaties, and %%line bound to them by positive stipulations. It Was at Fontailibleau, a place fated to be celebrated for Treaties concluded to be annulled and neglected, that he, concluded those Treaties which preceded his entrance into the Peninsula. Adn,i'ted into Spain by a base Minister, lie had thus acquired a footing in that country, which gained, he had net hesitated to attempt to subject it to the dominion of France. This war his conduct to n country whose only fault had been that of unqualified submission to his will. Thus constantly he . had pursued the objects of his ambition, in peace as in war, and more successfully in the former than in the latter. In all circumstances the restless amlitition of this extraordinary man had been unreleptingly the same. Ever seeking a new object, it appeared that he WAS destined to run a course against the happiness of all nations. If they looked at him, the very acme. of his fortune imme diately after the peace of Tilsit, when all Europe seemed incapable of affecting his security —when he became allied with one of the most ancient families or the Continent—when in short every thing seemed to conspire to meet his wishes, instead of sitting down, satisfied with his good fortune, he remained as dis contented as ever. Nay, as if to skew how impossi ble it was for him to be at rest, when his hands were, as it would be thought, sufficiently full with the war in Spain, that moment bad he selected for the most gigantic of all his projects, that which.had ultimately turned to his ruin, the expedition to Russia. Then, though the peaceful disposition of the Russian Mo narch had inclined him to abstain from war, so long as it was possible to avoid it. Bonaparte, notwith standing the difficulties with which he had to contend Spain, had marched to annihilate the independence of the lain country that remained in Europe which bad not felt the yoke of France. If they followed his course through this contest—when. they saw him swept from' Russia, driven out of Germany, beaten la France, .and forced to fly before the Allies in his own country, still it would be found that his dispo sition was the same, and that when he treated with the Ministers of the Allied Powers at Chatilion. Ins cungiut.t was marked by Iris accustomed sacrifice of every principle, and the sanction of every diplomatic fraud that could disgrace a Sovereign. On a former night, be (Lord Castlereagh) had adverted to a do cument which had come into his possession, and which, however it might be called in question, he firmly believed to be genuine, and had therefore no hesitation in subrilitting it to the House. In this it would clearly be seen, that the object of Bonaparte, instead of giving peace to the world, was only to gain time, that he might be able to break the engagements which he 'might enter into. What his ultimate intend tions were, might be collected from his anxiety to preserve those three places which opened to him an eatrance into the heart of Germany, into the heart of Daly, and into the North of Europe, especially that part of it most connected with cur interests.— When such a man Was restored to the Government of France, by an army who felt the pacific disposi, tinn of Louis XVIII. to be incompatible with its in. terests, he a ()aid ask, whether, from, the character of , the individual, if it was not necessary to resist his retensions, if we viished to preserve our own jade pendence ? His Lordship then read the document to which he had referred, 'itemising, that the defence which it contained for the breach of faith contem plated by Bonaparte, by comparing it with what had taken plate at Dantzic and Dresden, whose garrisons had capitulated, but the capitulations had not been ratified by the Commanders, whose approbation was necessary, threw a strong light on the character of the mm, since, on these, he could feel himself justified in concluding a treaty, which he proposed to violate, though it was worthy of observation, that at Dantzic and at Dresden, the commanders concerned had taken all possible care to place the garrisons in the same situation in which they were before they surren dered, notwithstanding their sense of duty forbid them to ratify the conventions concluded without their con- eurrence. This course of reasoning, on the part of' Bonaparte, it was the more important to notice ; as, when it was seen, that on his military power he did not hesitate to annul and break any engagement he might make, how hopeless wouhrbe our situation if . our dependence was upon any thing which lie might call an engagetnent. The paper was dated 19th of March, .1814, was addressed by the Duke of Bassano to the Duke of Vicenza, and consisted of instructions from Bonaparte to the)atter. In this paper, which was written at the time'when . Bonaparte was placed in a most critical situation between the armies of Bln cher and gehwartzenburg, .Caulincourt was orefero4 not - to come to a final adjustment, but to keep things dams le bas, that he (Bonaparte) might have an oppor tunity of breaking through,: whatever arrangethents might have been agreed to. The translation of the. letter from the Duke , of Bassano to the Duke of Vi , =flea, in the cypher of the Emperor with his Mini sters, was as follows : - " MAlteir " Sta—Your Excellency will have recelved,orwdr' 14. doubtless, i in the course of to-day. receive the dispatch from Rheims, of which M. FrUCllOt was the bearer, and whisk was accompanied a letter from the Emperor. i , " The Emperor desires that you fouls, avoid explaining year self deal ly upon every thing which may rotate to delivering sip the fortresses of Antwerp, Mayence, and Alexandria; if you should be obliged to consent to these cessions. His Majesty in tending, even though be should have ratified the Treaty, to be guided by the military situation of affairs. Wait eft the last mil mint. The had faith of the Allies in respect to the capitulations of Dresden, Danizic, and Corcum, authorises as to endeavour tot to be duped. Refer, therefore, questions to a military arrangreent, as was done at Pres gh, Vienna, and Tilsit.— His M a jesty desires that you will lose sight of the disposi tion which lie will feel, not to de r iver up those three keys of France, if military events, on which be is willing still to rely, should permit him not to do so, even if he shouldisave signed the cession of all those provinces. in a word, his Majesty wishes to bei,able, after the treaty, to be guided by existing circumstan ces to the last moment. He orders you to burn tins letter as soon as you have read it He fully believed this letter to be genuine. That it would be 'denied by the enemy was a thing to be ex pected as a matter of course. Thii was a part of Bonaparte's system which was incorporated with falsehood. Fabrications and false statements were things that occurred in the ordinary course of his affairs. When he was at Lewes, on one occasion, French Papers came to hand, and lie read them to the people at one of their coffee-houses, which de scribed the enthusiasm of the people, and the great efforts which they had made in behalf ni Bonaparte's Government, though the greatest apathy had prevail ed there during the whole contest. These forgeries, howeviT, sere quite regular, and were constantly its serted in the Journals, even though the departments .troin which it. was pretended the news had come were in the possession of the Allies. But he was I aware what lie had advanced would not justify a war, unless it should appear that it might be. commenced with a rational prospect of success. The grounds on ,which success was to be looked for, he would briefly state, and it might be right to mention, that with re-' spect to economy, a war which might be short, was, to be preterred to an armed peace, which might be succeeded by a war of longer duration: But it was thought the forces of the Continental Powers had been diminished since last year, and he admitted that if this were the case, or that there was a division in the councils of the Continental Powers—that, in fact,', if they had any doubt cf , its being their interest, at once to have recourse to atms, the line of conduct •which it would be wisest for this country to pursue in that case, would be to wait for the danger, and resist it when it came. Assuming this to be the' •course which England ought to pursue, he could state, that the Allies had no doubt, for he could assure the House that England had done nothing to excite, to persuade, or to Provoke the Allies to en gage in the contest. England being the country least menaced by the danger, and possessed of the most undoubted resources to meet it, it was not for• her to incite them to action. Her language had been—" du that which you think best liar your own , interests ; if yin' determine on war we are ready to embark with you, and will never leave you ; but above all, do not divide your strength, nor look on the contest as but the struggle of a day, hut consider it as likely to be attended with great difficulties."— This was the language which had been held to the Allies on the part of this country, and they had deli berately decided on war as necessary to their exist ence. The result of all their deliberations had been this, that no safety for the world was to be hoped from negotiations with Bonaparte. There then, in these decisions, were the strongest proofs of the greatest unanimity amongst the great Powers of the Continent, perhaps, that the history of Europe had ever disclosed. AU were united •in this sentiment,' that where Bonaparte was concerned, safety could only be found in resistance. He now came to speak of the means with which the Allies were about to commence the war. To say that contest was not in the hands of PROVIDENCE, and that in this, as in other wars, the result might not baffle all calculation, would be idle, but speaking of the relative means of the parties, if success on the part of the Allies were probable in the former contest, 'that probability was now greatly increased. No man was more disposed than himself to admit the mighty efforts which a great country united, and considering itself fighting for its own. soil, might make to repel a foreign in vader. Of this they had the example of France her self, but making allowances for the success with ' which the delusions there practised might in some in stances have been crowned, he contended the situas tion of that country was not such' as to lead to those exertions whieh might formerly have been expected from • her. there was something in the state of France sus distinct from that in which she was placed ar the commencement of the former war, that any man who would infer that the conduct of the people in opposition to the confederation would be what it was then, would draw a most unwarrantable info. fence. After recalling their legitimate Sovereign, whose reign bad been one of mercy, and who had not been unmindful of the liberties of the people, a great portion of them had become sincerely attached to him, and this; notwithstanding the imposing pre. sence of the army of Bonaparte, had been manifested in a variety of instances. It was plain they were not attached to Cie present Government, and the revolu: tionary spirit on which some calculated had almost wholly died away—had perished through the horrors' to which it had given birth: From all the informs.' tion he had received, lie was satisfied that France, with all her faults, had not turned from the Monarch to whom she had sworn allegiance, sincerely to attach herself to that man, and that army by whom his power had been subverted.' France in former wars had been accustomed to calculate, not only on the extent of her own means, but on what were called her " external resources," the spoils of other nations. She could reckon on these no longer, and was there fore now in a situation widely differing from that in which she stood at the period when all her great conquests were made, and in a situation not at all better than that which she held in the last campaign. Whatever the issue of the present campaign might .it Rest be admitted the Allies were in sufficient force' to occupy a considerable portion of France.— All those places to which they might be enabled to advance would be nullified to the treasury of France, and as funds wereindispensible to the support of such a contest, every place thus occupied, or every place 'where, from the vicinity of the Allies , the inhab it ants . might be encouraged to withhold the payment of the. imposts required of them, would tend to cripple the means of Bonaparte, and many he knew there were who were far from being disposed •to support his power, though they were not brave enough to attempt its overthrow. Under these circumstances, to com ' pare the present situation of France with its former state, was to reason most hillaciously. On the other hand, a great moral feeling was spread throughout Europe. Not only the Government of all the coun tries on the Continent, but the population of each, felt that as all the misfortunes which they had had to deplore proceeded from the. ambition and wickedness of the French Government, all their hopes depended on the war being so closed, that the resources of one of the greatest countries in Europe, should no longer be left at the disposal of Bonaparte.— He (Lord Ca.tlereagh), had anxiously inquired into the spirit of the Confederation, and he found that :it no period had they ever been disposed to put forth their hostilities against France with more ardour.— Since the Treaty of Paris, circumstances had tended greatly to augment the forces of the Allies, nut only in numbers, but in every thing that could make them effective. Similar augmentations of the French ar mies had not taken place, for France being less af fected by Arrangements to be made subject tJ the signing of the Treaty, and Louis anxious to abide by his engagements, had been the first to give his nation the advantage of a state of peace. Not only were the armies of the Allies consolidated on a higher scale than eyes they had been before, but most im portant measures had been resorted to in the event of failure to guard against the recoil of the blow which they meditated against the power of Bonaparte. In the whole of the countries on the Rhine, and indeed throughout the whole of Germany, the militia, Called the Landsturm, had been called out to form a de fensive force for the protection of each country. The , allied armies were on such a scale during the pro ceedings of the Congress, that he had some times trembled to reflect, that their deliberations were car ried on in the midst of one vast camp, the armies of which, independent of those of France, he was sure he did not exaggerate in stating them to contain not fewer than a million of men in arms, all regular sol diers, under the several Potentates there assembled. These things stated, it must be felt, that if the great struggle must be made at some period or other, a time could not arrive when it could be ventured upon with less hazard. I - lad Bonaparte delayed his return ' but a single month, he believed it would have made a vast difference in the attitude of the Allies, and instead of her applying now in their hands, they ' would have to recreate their armies at an immense expense, as France was now compelled to do by Bo naparte,'-from small establishments. There was no reason to suppose the military power of Europe op posed to France in a moral and virtuous cause, as the Allies thought would not be able to act with suc cess. Such a force as they possessed must appear adequate to strike the great blow, and such arrange ments were made as would secure its being always kept up to its full complement. The population of each country, organized as it was, would be sufficient to guard against their being again overrun by Bonaparte in the event of reverses being experienced by the Al lies, and a sudden rush attempted by the French.— If the Allies were not now prepared for war, there were no grounds for thinking they would be prepared at any future period, and therefore the only alterna tive was to wait till their present means were dimi nished, or the confederation, now unanimous, should be divided in opinion—till the French Ruler, not only directed by his own armies, but encouraged by some event which for a time might alienate the Allies from each other, take advantage of such a circumstance again to fill Europe with war. He was ptepated to admit that some might consider that it was wise to go to war with France, and yet be indisposed to sup port that war by granting subsidies to foreign powers. However unsound lie might deem their policy, yet they might vote in favour of the Address to-night, without binding themselves in any manner to the other part of the question. They might differ with him on every other point, and even on thC,Treaty of Vieeaa, and yet might conscientiously vote with him. The House, he conceived, would tail in its duty, if it did not support the Continent. The amount of the subsi dies he intended to-morrow to pro pose, would shew whether the war was ours, or that of the Continental Powers ; whether it was a con test in which they thought fit to engage, provideJ we should pay the expenses ; or whether they took the greatest part of those upon themselves, and what we gave was only a matter of assistance and encou ragement. The House would then have a pledge that the efforts which they made were their own, to secure their own interests, and not the consequence of our subsidies. It was not necessary, howzver, that he should now enter into those details. They formed no part of the vote of this night, and it would be taking a most extraordinary view of the sttbject to engage in the present war, and to starve its opera tions. It had thus been his endeavour to open the general ground of the war, trusting much to the mind, the intelligence, of e Hou se , w hich had o tli e experience andfr 25 years extensive ledge dwelt oh passing events. Although painful to his feelings to make a proposition of thi s n a t ure , i nstea d o f it - 1 alining those brilliant prospects of peace and security 1 which, atter so many exertions; the country had al nu.o.etstoodn comparing owciohi o ltt u taci r gne niolgs se utr n its: t Je s o i o T u. a rfo ti r o m n right to contemplate, yet he felt much consolation in e . r vii ‘ 4' S l ' l ars t . liat M in 'e w ‘ i :•e c r i e l I power o e of isialefeteyn,ewn•iiyti.muLteat s th in e g H le ou al se t‘i l re c ollect , it y .iathireeqp urti)rs h u n t ed ! 00 e rn i oef Portugal o a or t ut ur t g h aaoltwn4 dmoment,moral wilihteyn, engaged Spain. — We had not hesitated to interpose our strong hand —we had felt bold in the n justice of our cause, and became the protectors of other countries. • This re solution had been pursued with a degree of perseve rstarnucgegwlehdictlhirdouidghhotzoeusrtotrom_the c ountry. we survived th Vb e r per h io d d e --a— of calamity, and had the satisfaction of seeing those two nations freed, and the whole of Europe confederated against France s instead of being com- limed against us. It was, therefore, evichnt, that we now started from a different point. We were doer, fighting against France, and the whole powel of Eu rope.—All Europe was now 'contending with u.. against France ; nay, a strong combination in Fran:c itself was pro!)airly termed on our side, so th at " were fighting with the Powers of the Co ntinent and a portion of France, against the ustiviiittiOn ot-lLua parte and of the army. Every thing, therefore, wi t calculated to pninidte and encont rge,rutr.effcrts to preserve that pence which 04 arms bad en, noe7:•d from the individual who once more wielded the veteign authority. It WAS on these grounds that 1 , wished the House to support the Crown in it, er,r. tinns against the conanii;n enemy, and lir.: •• question whether the Treaty of Vienna w . .:s consequence of that of nois ? Nn one c,.;;!d approach the Powers of Europe with c.inl!:•.) r•• • alter they had pronounced their dccidcd srs lc with any thing wh;ch tended to diseoo:a e r efforts. In Liet the queiti:ln would 'Ts-4ft Us( ii i.r , this, whether it ►old be thloght ►wise ourselves from the comrooit cLL,rts trade•. by e powers of rEuropi., atid recommend peaci± instea of ►w.tr ? The Noble Lord concluded by moving ai t Address to the Prince Regent, thanking his Highness for the commuo 7 cation of the Treatie.,c , responding with his gracious Islessare. and him of the concurrence of the Conimons irn etre;:.i•i his Royal Ifighne►s t!i adopt those measuri.s might be necessary, in conjunction w . th his Maje,t ; -'s Allies, against the common enemy at this is:port a: A crisis. Lord GEORGE CAVENDISH thought that the Allied Powers bad now altued thud. langua,:z. They had origin illy disclaimed any lute... Jon .1 ~,_ tethering with the internal Government of Fr4l.c.f. bHt it was now clear that their sole object was to os throw Bonaparte, and to restore the bourbons— (Near, hear.) Tui was proved by the Sth article the Treaty of Vienna. No one could have more rt. spect than he had for the fallen great, and terse. quently for Louis XV lIL but whether througli.the inability of their Minister s, or some Other cause, he thought the Bourbons had but very little chance ti be restored; but even supposing they should hare had that chance, it would be greatly impaired, it rasa destroyed by the interference of Foreign Powers. It we looked to the spirit of that country, to' tin it jea lousy of external i:;;erlerence, it would be seen 1.!...t nothing but what arose from the interior could ttr....t an alteration in the Government. He could u: t, therefore, 7,ive his consent to such an interference pleb a war. Experience ought to have instruct:•d better. When our blood and finimc‘s h.a.l hau,:ted by twenty-Eve years of war, he see much hope of success, especially when even itself had not be:n as:e to secure us all the cages which it was i had obtainel 11, should therefore cot:clude by proposing an A ment to the pre r.ent Address, expressiog the film J.- tarmination of the House to concur in such nie.vt.ii; as might be necessary to enable his k the Prince Regent to sustain the honour vt Crown, to maintain the 'safety of his dominiocs, a.:I to preserve an intimate concert with the 1' a, ot Europe—assuring him that they were ready to effect to any Treaty which he might have c.: ;ehrte,i, but that, uninformed as they were, btoh as to the principle and the object of the blipavioni entervl into at Vienna, they snottld not couc6ve themschies justified in sanctioning those stipulatina.; suggesting, that to commence a war with France for the put-pt.-se it excluding an tedividual from the Gorel!latelit of that country, al:pc:Lica to them unwise, ai,d souirig that they could nut approve of the cogagiratin which it was stipulated that the country would no: ! lay down its aims until that purpose had been atcr,r... plished ; as a war so undertaken wonid zlits • nation to the nece,sity of either protracting !.v. ~• test beyond the just txtent of its means. er the disgrace of submitting to treat eith an it.di%•-' with whom it had declared it would mate I.t. whatever. Mr. JOHN S'n - IITH rise to second the antc;t:. ment. He 'agreed that the French orniy v.., only a band of banditti, directed by that toii;;;:1 spirit which had ravaged ail Europe; but this c .• rupt military body was not to be corrected by s but by peace, during which the military fix...A'. would abandon their system of pioneer. Ili! convinced that nothing f •it a period of peace cm!,l correct their mise!ievutis dispositions. Was it possible, and even probable, that peace might co:::-• nue in France for the spas of three or tour and in that One, the military power of France decay ; duriv7, that peace our own country wont,: increase rapidly in strength. It the Noble L.- 7 J nould give to his own nauve country (fr:land) tko:e rights which a portion of its inhabitants a the Uni!ed Kingd.l) would be placvd.on a of honour and of glory it never experienced bt-tme• He conttncied, that the situation of Bonaparte wr+ much more favourable :rod much stronger at t:ai moment than it v..as at the time when he the Mine. He had got back a great part prisoners from Russia, he had got Wei; an le, soners from England ; nor could it be suppit.— l . the Allies would meet with any support ironi pie of France. They vane the m u st national pecri.::,: the world, and it was a principle with thane i.eva join a.ny foreign army against their own He wished to hear tram the Noble Lold whit reason was for having a confidence in tie our Allies: it any of them should meet witlt a ter, what security had we that such ally woui,l n.t desert us ? 'rue Noble Lord must have .a in favour of war, froal the many personal disappoi menu he had experienced mace the march at the Al lies to Paris. but he would ask the Noble Ll' whether he supposed th a t ou r finances would core sufficient to carry us through this war, partcu rly the war should be protracted beyond a year, of there was g•eat probab i lity ? A Right HonourabK Gentleman, n. .w a t t h e h ea d tire fi nance d?l'' ment, had not long since, de c lared, that, his 0 1': neon, ta t catt. n lead arrived at Its Utinest•iiMll6l.ll44 ti IIIC3S we adopted some plan of economy, it wa wastes. possible we could g o • n m uc h longer—he Del ie ! the Right Hon. Vs ntieman had then fired ila the peri ; ': A at two or those years. lie was tree to corfos , ce knew hot tauntwhat wince new taxes could Le ha d. d He certainly consulet e d that it would he A most e. Bitable din g to pm Bonaparte down, be if it coul d done—(H ear , hear!)—but was that probable ? s hotui lies one say, that at the cad of three years wt. - ir.;) A i : • • • f f S IB S.', $ •