Star. — London, England, 1802-05-14 00:00:00

.4...... r . -1 " Ai • • ' ''' it. :: -h ' ' - • ! P i e , a / r'4 l '''' , "9 . - 41r11 . 4 : : h & , ..„, - • ~; . ,:::, - .S. . 1• - 4 ....... t '. 'IV "1' .. -0 41r- 1 -1../i,l ': "O .. 31 -. 1 6 • , .°r,-1•..4' 4 * f- Il ia ‘, Alit ve 4l ). . sII 1 ' e ' --- ia.i.i -J , 4 ~ , FRIDAI, MAT 14, 1802 NI:Mi.:ER 4-2037 P.ll:!..l4.lll:iir.ißT PROCEEDINGS. IMICZ 57X-FENCE. HOUSE OF LORDS, THURSDAY, MAY t 3. Lord GRENVILLE moved the order of the day for the Houfe to take into confideration the De finitive Treaty. five fail of the line in the Weft Indies. He would not enter into the pretence, on the part of France, for fending the expedition the did fend; nor would he difcufs the queftion whether it would or would not be better for this country, if St. Domingo was under the dominion of France. He thould only obferve, that the more urgent and preffing were the willies of Bonaparte to fend that armament, in' proportion ought it to have been the policy of the negotiators on the part of this country to have in -I filled that the French fleet fhnuld not have failed till the preliminary Ar ti c l es were converte d i nto a l definitive treaty, and until he had afforded a con• viation that he had no intention of obtaining fuch a ceffion as he had fince obtained in Italy. Some thing had been faid of the time and temper in which the peace had been made on the part of France, and that it afforded a proof that the per fon at the head of the French Government had become a harmlefs, inoffenfive neighbour, and wifhed to thew how much he had been mifrepre. tented, when it had been infinuated there were no bounds to his ambition. He would leave it to any man to fay, whether, if peace depended upon the difpofition of the Republic, we lhould enjoy it even for the length of time the prefent debate would occupy ? It was evident the Definitive Treaty contained coneeMons infinitely more im portant than the Preliminary Articles; and it was no lets true,- that the conduat of the French Government evinced a defign to exclude the com merce of this country from the Continent of Eu rope. With refpeet to the fituation in which Por tugal had been placed by the Definitive Treaty, the Houfe had been merely told that it was a pity it thould be fn; and with regard to the Prince of Orange, their Lordlhips were informed by one of the fervants of the Crown, that he looked at the articles concerning that Prince with regret. The indemnity to the Prince of Orange was left in fuch a fituation by the treaty, that it depended en tirely upon France, whether he lhould ever b.: in demnified or not. As to the Cape of Good Hope, not a word had been laid, whether it would be advantageous to have it a free port or not.— Why, after having tiipulated that Malta thould be independent, and that its independence thould be guaranteed by one of the Powers of Eu rope, competent to its protthion, was it placed under the guarantee of fiz Powers, who never could be brought to agree upon the fubjeft of it? —How could Malta retain its independence ? how was it porfible that the expence of the garrifon, fibres, and charges of maintaining that fortrefs could be provided by a Power to whom no reve nues were left? The Noble Lord proceeded to thew that the expellee of providing for Malta amounted to 130,0001. while' its revenues really applicable to that expenditure did not amount to more than 20 or 25,0001. ; and the inference he drew from his flatement was, that the eleaion of the Grand Mailer mull depend upon France, and that in all probability the whole ifland would thortly fall under the power of France. He next adverted to an advantage given to the French with refpeß to the mutual carton of the colonies It was ftipulated that the French inhabitants of Cey lon and Trinidad might retire from thole Wands, while nothing of the kind was admitted into the Treaty with regard to the colonies we ceded to France. His Lordihip contended, that by the non renewal of the Treaty of Utrecht, this country had renounced the sight that France thould not acquire in Spanifh America any privileges with reference to commerce that were not granted to England. It was needlefs to urge how much more important fuch a Ripulation would have been at the prefent moment than at the period of the Treaty of Utrecht. By the Treaty of 1783, we had ceded Goree and Senegal, but at the fame time the cell lion was under a ftipulation for the liberty of car rying on the gum trade, but now the ceffion had been confirmed without the renewal of the Ripula tion ; that it was the intention of France to make war againft our commerce was evident from the circumttance of a decree having been iffued by the Government, forbidding the right of trading on the coaft of that pa r t o f Africa. He lhould be glad if the fuggeftions he had Rated could be repelled. If their Lordthips could be fatisfied that the Defi nitive Treaty would not prejudice the rights of this country, then if he could not approve of it, be fhould be ready to admit that the Preliminary Articles having been approved by Parliament, it was bound to fantion the Definitive Treaty. It had been acknowledged that the poffeffion of Italy by France would juftify a recurrence to a Rate of war—this was not his own argument, but the ad miffion of the Secretary of State. He now entreat ed the attention of the Houle to the fituation in which the Country Rood at the time of the com mencement of the negotiation. It was in a Rave of war,but under circumftancescalculated as much as pollible to alleviate its inconveniences. We had acquired the poffeflion of colonies to an immenfe extent, which were valuable, not only from their military fi tuation, but by afford ing the means of carrying on the War itfelf; the produce of the Well Indies had been 2,000,0001. annually, from which a very confiderable revenue had arifen—this refource was loft. We had by our Naval Power obtained fuch a preference, that the Fleets of France could not fir; now they had been fuffered to proceed to the Weft Indies; and we were com pelled to fend an expenfive armament to watch them. We were alfo in pc:lllation of refources ficient to have enabled us to have carried on the War, till we had obtained juft, adequate, and reafonable conditions of Peace. Had we availed ourfelves of them ? No, we had left to France the whole preponderating power of the Continent, and had confirmed her in the poffelfion of Italy. We had alfo added to France poffetfivus of contidera- was ratified by his Majelly, and the Great Seal of ] :he hingdom affixed to it, confequently it was ir revocable, and not to carry it into died would be to add difaller to ditafler--difhonour to the Ilots occalloned by the Treaty, and to impeach the national integrity. The fira propofition he Arnold make to the Houfe was, to declare to his Majefly ' their opinion that the public faith was pledged to the observance o f t h e P eace; t h at i t was an filth gam biading upon the Country to maintain it inviolable. After filch a declaration, what objcc non could poffibly he urged againli the difcuffion of the terms of the Treaty ?—what inconvenience could refult from pointing out to the Country the injurious effeets likely to proceed from them ? Why was he not to be allowed to urge the Houle to fix a mark upon thole impolitic and weak Mini fiers who' had negotiated loch a Treaty, and whofe counfels had concluded it ? It was not his with to interrupt the Treaty now it was made, but only to lay before the Houle the danzerous ten dency of its provifions, that future MiMiters might be warned againft adviling a meafiire fo difadvan tageous to the Country. The °Ned of what he fltould flate to their Lordlhipe was profpedive— it was to alcertain the flotation in which the cottio I try flood now the Peace was fettled, and its terms agreed to—it was to point out the ltate of danger in which the country seas involved by the Treaty —not for the purr of ffiunning the danger, but of exciting the country to adopt the real line of courage by preparing to meet it. Such was the I view with wWch he had defired the attendance of their Lordfitips this day :—he fhould propofe to them to lay lot Ore Majefly an addrefs, etprefe five of their determination to prcferve inviolate the Treaty ; but having done In to reprtfent to his Majcity the Elate of the country, and the means of avoiding the danger which threatened it. This was what he conceived it was the duty of their Lordlhips as Legiflators to perform, and it should be his talk to point out his rufous for doing fo. For this purpofe it was necelfary to advert to the ' arguthems which had been advanced against the Preliminary Articles, and the events which had taken place fince. lie had already flated to the 14 me his obiceliens to the Pieliroinary Treaty. If the Delieitive Tree , y h..d been conformable to the Preliminary Articles, and the relative fitua :ion cf . France and Sletin had not altered by in tervening cireumllanees, however he might have been difpofed to have protested againll the Defi- • nitive Treaty, he (hould not have thought it ne. celtary to have pro/soled to the Houfe the adop tien of any new mcalare ; but he found that all the grounds of the pretenfions on the part of - France as contaiiod iit the Preliminary Treaty, had not only been confirmed by the Definitive Treat--, but exceeded. The terms of the latter woe thereibreeinfmitely more prejudicial than the former. He could not avoid calling the attention of the Houle to what had been the arguments tiled againfl the Preliminary Articles. It had been Itazeti, that in all fZe,ecitiations for Peace there were two grounds or bales neceffitry to h: adhered to : When, after a long contell between two na. Lions, the refpedive Governments were confider ing how they might reltore the blLllings of peace and tranvility, the halls on w:;:eit the Negotia tion proceeded was either the Steeo aro . , tol:ilia, or the aftu.d fituation in which the partite, flood be fore the war, or the fituation ni which they flood at the time of the negotiation, whie:i was called the vtipeidai.. Instead of the ro;,it,ators of the De fitativeTreaty proceediog di Mil ell y upononcolthefe grounds, they bad applied both in the molt prejudi cial manner poffible to this country. They had re. ferred to tile flatus ante Lamm with regard to Eng, land, by giving, up all the had taken during the war to France ; and they had adopted the //ting e/die as to France, by leaving her in poffelllon of all :he had acquired. It was obvious that at the commencement of the Negotiation each country was is poffeflion of Dane advantage which operat ed to the difativontage of the other. It was to our dillidvantage that Flame pollefted fo much pewer on the Continent, and it was to the difad vanta;ee of France that we, by the fuperior (kill and valour of our Navy, were polkaed of the Co lonies of France and Spain. The arrangement to have been defred was, that we lhould have di mutinied the power of France upon the Continent in peopouioa to our facrifices with refped to the Cohniii.sn.re had taken. If France could not have been perfuadcd to that, then it was our duty to have extended our maritime power, for the pur -I,ufes of compelling her. As far as appeared by the 'Freely, !snifflers had made no attempt what ever to reduce the power of France on the Con tinent, but had, by canceillons abroad, given her the means of a-cake:ling our colonial flrength. This was not atlime upon the principle adopted by Lord Chatie•en at Peace of 1763. That enlightened StateiMan bad always confidered that every Preli minar7Treaty loald he as definiti yeas poflible. If the Pteliniinary Ankles of 1763 were compared its the Def.nitive, it would appear there was iearcely; any difterenee between them; while the theft contrary was the cafe with regard to the otefeilt treaty. By the incapacity of the negoci at.4.s, they had Lit thcmfelves to treat with France during tile pendency of a naval armiitice. The queflion hclOre that artniflice was, whether this country would fuffer the fleets of France, which were bleckaded in the mouths of their harbours, to ftir nut ? But what did occur immediately after the preliminary treaty? In dived oppofition to our entreaties and threats, France fent an armament to the Welt Indies, and impofed an this country, the neccflity of alto fending to the Weft Indies a naval force more than double to any we had fent Muting the war. Tints the firll fruits of the peace %VAS the neceillty of keeping an armament of thirty. ble importance in India, but had omi tte d to ltipu ! late that th ey thould not be lot titled. We had given up tollolland the Town and Pot t ofCochin; a fituation which the French would ava:l them felves of for the purpofe of intt igue—one in which we thould have moil to apprehend from the at tempts of France, and lead be able to counteract them. His Lordship maintained that it was r,t. ceifary ior the fatety of our Indian pnifeffiens, that this coontry Iheuld hive retained the Sovereignty of the Cape. In order to be able to bring home our commercial fleets flinn India, or to fend oat troops, it would be always necefiry to fend a convoy, and then we thoithl be jtifec urc. In time of war,how was a tingle regiment to be fent ? It was true, that troops might be fent diredly from Great Britain to India without touching at the Brazils or the Cape ; but in Inch Care they would not be fit for fervice fur many months after they had landed. But the advantages we polteiled in the lovereignty of the Cape was this—When the War broke out in the Myfore with Tippoo Suitaun, we fent a corvette to the Cape, from whence a force of frefh troops were difpatched fit for imme diate fervice, landed, marched tip the country, and were prefent at the liege of Seringapatam. It was not, he believed, too much to fay, that by ceding the Cape to Holland, we had in point of fad ceded it to the power of France. In the Well Indies we had reflored to France Martininae and . Felaigo ; and had facilitated the means of recovering Saint Domingq.—She was betides in poffedion of Lola. liana, and the fruitful country of Florida; for it 'vas a circumflance too plain to admit a doubt that Spain never could keep Florida while France had poffeflion of Louisiana. In addition to thefe ad vantages, the had the means of entering Mexico at any time. Such was the comparative fituation of France and England in the Eatt and Weft Indies and America. How did we (hand with refpeet to the Mediterranean, the next feat of our naval in terefl ? Our naval inperiority in the Mediterranean was moll important, but his Majefly's Minifters had placed the country filch a fituation, that he defied any one to tell him how a tingle 'hip could be tent to the Mediterranean. By this policy they had difpoffelfed the country of Majorca, Minorca, and even the Itland of Elba, which could only be Maid to Fiance for the purpofe of lexclading from Leghorn. We were thus dettituee of the means of maintaining any fleet in the Me,atett anean. His Majelly's Nlinitlers had put it out of the po%eer of the King of Sardinia to open his ports to an Englith fleet. It was owing to the affiltance afforded by the King of Naples and Sicily that Lord Nelfon had been able to refit that fleet which bad effeded the overthrow of the French armament at Aboukir, and difappointed the gigantic ambition of France. What was the return the Englifh Government had 'made to him for his aflidance ? It had procured a flipulation that France fhonld evacuate his domi nions, but had not provided that the giould not re turn whenever the thought proper. The inevi. table confequence of fuch policy would be, that France would obtain the poffellion of Naples, and in the end we Ihould find ourfelves excluded by France from the whole commerce of the Levant. Every object of importance obtained by the va lour of (oar Nave- had been furrendered by the Counfels of thofe Ministers, who had made them pats into the hands of France. Now to addrefs their Lord!hips on the fubjc of the defence made to thefe various charges—the defence retied on the ground of imperious neceflity for peace. In this defence, the Noble Lord who had advanced it was at lead contittent, becaufe he had uniformly maintained that the country was not in a condition to (train every refource to carry on the war, but his Majefly's Minifters denied the existence of any fuch neceflity. If it was ti ue that the country was under circumilances of imperious neceffity, it was not altonithing the Definitive Treaty (Mould have been agreed to ; but what fecurity had we that France would fuller us to recover from that (late of nereffity to which (he had reduced us ? Such a plea on our part would only fur nifh a pre. tence for going on front fitcrifice to facrifice—from lofs to difgrace—till at laft we had nothing to con. tend for. It was to prevent this he had brought forward the prefent motion, from which he was perfuaded every advantage would be derived. It would have the effete of declaring to the public and to the enemy, that the country was not re duced to the neceflity of making a disgraceful Peace ; in fad, fuch an argument as that found ed upon neceffity, could not be railed by any country that was not prepared to receive the yoke of a conqueror. The quetlion was, whether the advantages of the Peace were greater than the difadvantages of the War ? If it was expedient to have made this Peace, it mull have been fo from the confideration that fume advantage was obtained by it. The advantages might • potlibly be Paid to have proceeded from the ex. tention of our commerce ; or it might be by en abling the country to adopt a fyi,ent of (econo my, or it might mile from our having obtained fume fecurity for the continuance of Peace.— He fhould confider thefe points feparately. With refped to our commerce, the Peace mild evident ly have operated to the diminution of it ; in flip port of chi., proposition, he referred to many ob fervations relpe&ing the acquiti:ion of commercial power by France under the Definitive Treaty.— Upon the queltion of ceconomy, lie contended that in order to be able to hufband our revenu e it was neceflary we' fhould he able to proted it: with this view lie recommended Government to keep a large naval and military eitablithment in a con tlant date of difcipline. With regard to any naval ettab;ifh. mein in the Mediterranean, Ministers by their con• dud had rendered it impoflible to fend a fleet there. It was with peculiar fatisfadiost be underitood it Lind Srasuors requefted previoully to fay a f e w words. There were two grounds on which the order mi:4lit be oppofed ,• one by entering into a debate upon it, and the other by moving to dif charge it. Ile thculd not move the reading the order for the purpole of poftponing it. It had been Rated, no matter where, that the Definitive Treaty ought never to have been entered into— that eirenmflances had taken place between the fyiting the Preliminary and the Definitive Treaty which had entirely changed the relative fituation of the two countries as they Rood at the time the Preliminary Treaty was figned. The argument was founded principally on account of Bonaparte's having ..i painted ~.hief Magi(lrate of the n e w Italian Republic. By the argument it was taferred that this was an aft of dilhonour on the part of the Cenral, and that as he had acted dif lt in keeping the Prefidency of the New Republic, it was . not to be exp e ft e d h e wou ld hereafter act upon a different tyttem ; infatuating to the People of England, that from the charaCter of the man who was at the head of affairs in France, there was no reafon to eve& a contina. Joe , : of the Peace. He felt it his duty tosombat help an argument. He maintained that after the battles of Maro:•go and liiihenlinden, and the tub lequent Treaty with Auttria, the influence of France over Italy was complete, and whatever al vr.itions had been fince made were mere matters of form, and not of fubflance. He Ihnuld ever be ready to affert this doctrine. His reafon for wain the Order of the Day to be read, was not with a view to defer it, but that he might com municate that information to their Lordlliiiis which he thought important before the fubjed was dif cuffed. He (hould firft move the reading of the 1:1-ah (landing Order of the Houfe for the exclu. Finn cf (hangers. Meaning to jullify what he •,:ropoted to uo, he ihould move to enforce that itanding Cider. The Earl of Moitta entreated the Noble Lord lau to perfill in his motion. It would be an ceer cite of privilege which mould go abroad seith dif may to the public, and woolu be indeed highly unadvifable at a time when a meafure, the aloft important that ever was argued, was on the poita of being brought forward—a meature in woich every individual was erncerned. The quell len of ! the terms cf peace W:ls one which ought, if pot fihle, to be argued in the pretence of the whole nation. At 'call, it ought to be rendered as diffufe as eircrimilances would admit. He therefore ear nettly hoped the Noble Lord would not entoice the order. Lord STANHOPE r.,;J, the Noble Lord had been acquainted with him long enough to know that he did not form an opinion but flowiy and debbe rately ; having once formed it he did not with to give it up. It was not his defire to preclude the public from hearing the debate ; but before the qucflion was argued, he wifhed to fubmit tome ties which he could not fafely lay before their Lordfhips without enforcing the order. Lord MuLGRAVE rd.:, but was interrupted by The LORD CHANCELLOR, who Rated that the Handing order mull be enforced as a Noble Laid bad thought proper t 3 require it. Strangers were ordered to withdraw. [it is inconfinent with the Orders of the Houle to give :sty account of the Noble Earl's communication, the fubjea of which was the improved corltrudion of the French diving boat, which is now navigated under water with filch fkill and certainty as to make it even Lily fur them to blow up a fait rate man of war with only is pounds of powder. We there for.- abilain from entering into particulars of his ftatcntent.] .ht ball an hour, when Strangers were admitted, Lord GRENVILLE was fpeaking. Hs Lordthip trid, he fhould offer no apology for haying exert d endeavours that their Lordihips ac quireprevious information upon the dix,:icLit points which the Definitive Treaty referred. 'lle ne• .:eflity and propriety of his condua was fo :mpreffed on his mind, that he was ltirprid at : my inlinuation of irregularity. The faitt was, aimfelf and his Noble Friend:, had put tier .a potkfron of argurn• ats ag..inß the Tre::ty, while thole whofe duty it was to have Hated their reafor! in its favour, had nat thought proper to defend it. The unfairnefs and irregularity, if any, %vas (11 the fide of thole who had referred the .ktail of their arguments to a general debate, in which it was =panic to come to an atm on Cue various points connate(' with the fubjea.— tie was far from wifhing to impute unfitirtiefs to any of their Lordfhips. They had coniidered that dilcuiLon iitould not precede decifion—lie had thought that the moft favourable thing lie 4otild do with regard to the Houle was to coot: repeated silica:ion previous to decilion. In this fituatica the ipaeltion was now fubmitted s and he weer fuck motion as refulted :::om the r-yatmeati he entertained. In doing this, the fait argument with which lie had to contend was one which had croially been reforted to in :;nd out tf the Hoefe. It was alked what was the WC of flifenCon, new when race was conclUded ? Was it v:.fhed to overthrow the Treaty ? If not, what ber4ilr arife horn debating upon fut t jth of it ? He fhould be lorry to to forwa r d any motion, if he had it not in his power tr , meet filch an argument as that was. What ver, dirad vantages might ante to the Country from this unfortunate Treaty, he would be one of the fret to fay, it was concluded by the Power which had thn right by the Conaitution of the County! !ra conclude it, and therefore, whatever were terms, Parliament bound to accede to it.—lt