Star. — London, England, 1815-01-28 00:00:00

sence the minds of the pecplc. The evidence wbielt be Would submit, however, would best dispri‘o4lo l ssertions of the Admiral. He would not, therefoalli at this moment, attempt to confute the asnotions'it Admiral Hollowell, that there never was glkfund td believe, -that theenesnes columns. rui*wing front. ' Barcelona exceeded fi ve thothiigilien., In -ffie- 9 9d' charge BriwOuld preiVedWeifffiffielfitiirit.: He would Doer only content himself witirsbareing lbe-ettentiow of, the Court to the mows of din sainok. bp which it was intended tobe undeestood, that - neither Admiral Hallowell, the General in .command, rearany other officer whatever, had any infoomoaion thet a gnu' of greater atzength was approaching: hum ei COO* sequence to Admiral Hallowellm establisivielp weak- , nese of this column, because be entleavuunnfolorough out the whole of his dispatch, to prove, that it wits to the approach of, this column Orme,. the precoadingv which he described, were attributable: -, • ... It Vfai true the Admiral hid nOt resale Illiff•intpOr• taut point on his own assertion; he.progned se aglow quent proof of these numbers And what leas Ow nature of this 'goof ? "Captain' Stpdslart Ow a:pea sant at Torre Deinbara, of whose character hefty..lm knowledge, who told hint two things—the one that the enemy's force consisted only of five thousaod wren and five guns : the other that be had quitted the enemy's camp at Villa Franco, ot half-past seven o'clock on the morning of the 13tb, when they had no appearance of advancing." The Admiral Lid said that he had other proofs of fact, but whet bedbe produced ? Captain Bowen, it was true. saidltel4. received the same information; but it appeased shist it was derived from the same source. There was eau proof, however, that he had reported the cirri)* stance to the Admiral, when the dispatch is question was written. A letter from Colonel Lauder had, indeed, been submitted, and, as far ,as numbers went, this OVA be good; but it could form no ground for the At- 1 ral's assertionos it had not reached him . tillthe .Haya duds was dispatched. He should . iave coeceivad that the .good sense of Admiral Hallowell Would have induced him to pause before lie embodied so.' vague a report, in the form of a public dispatch; but when in opposition to probability, as well as to communication absolutely made to him, from head quarter's, his qondoct becomes indeed unaccoontabk. 'The Rear-Admiral was not content with reporting once to. the world; that the British army had fled to their ships from five thousand men, but reported twice, and twice did he state, that the garrison of Tarra gona consisted of but from twelve to fifteen hundred men. He (Sir John) would, however, call an Officer before the court, who would state, that from those, who had quitted the town after he had appeared before it, intelligence was obtained that the garrison consisted of two thousand men—and who would prow that Sir William Clinton himself bad deilared, dial the calculation ought not to be founded upon walker numbers. The Admiral, however, wished it to, be believed, that the garrison was insufficiently defends ed, and that, consequently, it was in.his ( Sirdolm Mur. r.:y's) power : whether the garrison was sufficient for' a long and vigorous defence, or not, was a matter of no importance. It was certainly of sufficient strength to sustain an attack of one day, les Ito hatier.sere the batteries open against the place. 'Allis, .however, was a point of little moment, and he would not have noticed it, but to shew the Admiral's perseverance in stating every thing which might tend to exasperate the public mind. lliothing had been omitted by him which could attain this object, and in his anxiety, be could not avoid an exaggeration of our losses ; and, as a greet of his accuracy, even descended to.deseribe the calibre of the guns. The Admiral donna merit for having corrected this, error, but it was a jint groundofecopplaint thin he had made stich statements with cool and laudable inquiry. 'The principal leatire of the Admiral's dispatch was, that the Allied Arm Y had embarked solely, and had abandoned their artillery solely on accosts( of the distant approach of 500 0 men: That such was the impression Admiral Hallow& wished : 1 7 a : onshe Court, cquld not be giristakkn, - and tht *Pig ments of Marshisl . lllAeheXhadno share in :ng the. re - e mbarkation. Tile approach of teat office; Was never hinted at till the own ofl tragonaWasclosed, and the operation at Col de. • eraninencedi 'lke Marshal's name eras te r. Mentiomd, and, throughout, all adculations of his. foroswas ntudiously t voided, 14i (Sir John murr4.o.‘loodAisopisithe Admiral's presence, however, de. he knew. that it was the combined, movements of .two cqlumns ad. vancing.en both flanks (and not single and. *un sopprirked advance of Crenerat. - de coca) Which in duced him to emhark the. army." Adrultil Hallo. wi„II knew that he hid decided : upon attacking this latter column, which he stated as 5000 men, and he kager; for he (Sir John) told him .so himself; on the night of the I.lth, Marshal Sachet would pot only pre. vent. him from carrying the plan into effect, but that it had decided him to raise the sieges and to embark the troops. Could apy man, alter this statement, call the repert which, he made fair and unprejudiced ii--.," 1 itr (mid Sir John Murray) the Admiral chose to taper' on the subject at all, he was bound, if not in justice to me, at leag in this faithfbl amnion. of the • duty he had prescrilsod to : himself, to mention avery 44twe ; but, above all, the viol CPUS. of the events op in,. wbich he though: himself called upon to address r o cs Majesty's ltsSraistess. ThO Admiral. could not hare forgotten, on the, morning of the 1444 the con versatioo I bad.wiah him, to Oa WY point, . on the . ovesieg of the I ltb, and.yet I cast in, soo ther way acconot for the conissiOn, Bet if he wasiguorant of the approach of .Marahal Boehm, oi ,wkat valet, 1 ..sk, is his aklaricaor Isis opioioe ?" Supposing aP e nemy Cifgr 01 5400:joes neat. the li f itiiii,focces, .Adiniraliclallogell, _ought, if he had been asked, recommend that the ilritiihtspops shoal* not. leitainliafki4 i bilk !tad he *lawn!: t h an 20400 v oilioiddt smkiler, divines* ill. tilcir ti tar, were. ape , putia chin& ..nfeyeJiit ie . . counselnztlavo . beanolassause- ?—.. _ -itirt rant of the tlaal tittle/5,W thitibigny, erA d itt o lier, it. -11 . GesiArs tie MA! *Ma be co of !goie l vtitte. . . 14eAdmitti 14_1' iatt4iii,4eck the ene4 *ln Act, Or the sine side. and" lie altilierrof tetttre;on tbs. othte...;.; of which Admits'. Hallo. .Under these cisounstasserao. ! - ielreotird not pTead ignorant,' it vielTdiiiite - 30: come him to have stated eathely, apt!` -nut grounds upon which-his (Sir Jahn hierray'el pro ceedings were founded: • In another part of Admiral Hallowell 's statement, le asserted that he had promised to embark the whole of the guns, provided he was allovied until eight.. this offer I have no knowledge or recollection : btit,even, if I had, I should have no hesitation in saying, that it was utterly impossible for him to have performed such an engagement. [Here a letter from Admiral Hallowell, to Sir J. Murray, was r.eed upon the above subject.] It contained, however, only advice as to the dispo sition of the troops to cover the embarkation, and did not contain any offer to carry off the guns. The wildness of the advice contained in this letter t he (Sir John Murray) sit.i.f he should prove in his defence to the third charge. The gallant General went on to state an extraor dinary instance of interference upon the part of Ad. miral Hallowell, in the arrangements of the ariny.. - It consisted in the Admiral, instead of, as he was bound to do, facilitating the junction of the Quarter.. Master-General, with- the General Commaroding,in Chief, haiing actually, by signal, repeated with a Lim, ordered the Bristol to anchor at a great distaece from the landing place at the Col de Balaguer, witb ao other view, as be (Sir John Murray) was expressly, informed ; and, as he could prove, from his own ac knowledgment, than to prevent the Quarter -Master- General repairing to head-quarteris # 4 Well, in deei, (said Sir John Murray) predict misfortune, if he proposed by this exertion of his authority,' to de prive the army of the services of one of its most ac tive and intelligent officers. and to cripple the most important of the departments by the absence of its chief 1 The fact is notorious, and I call upon Admi ral Hallotsellto assign any other reason for ordering the Bristol to anchor on the 14th of June—than that of keeping General Deakin at a distance from head quarters." Sir John Murray next remarked, that the infloence , which war ascribed to General Donkin, over his councils, by Admiral Hallowell, bad never existed. He bad no hesitation in saying, that in no one lead ing operation of the army under his orders, had Ge neral Donkin been consulted, till after his decision was formed ; and that in many instances, and parti cularly in the transactions which Were under consi deration, be proceeded in direct opposition to his opi-1 :lion. He stood alone on this occasion, and by his own responsibility was he content to stand or fall.— With respect to the general character of indecision, with which the Admiral had thought proper to ac. cute him, he should be silent. Those who best knew him, would be best able to appreciate the value of such a charge. He did give orders to suspend the embarkation of the troops till the receipt of additional information ; and after directing that the stores and ordnance should continue to be embarked, he rode out towards the Col de Balaguer, on which road he was aware that it was possible the army might be in motion. On his way bask he received a letter (ions General Copons, stating the enemy to be in motion directly 'in his front, on the road from Villa Franca, and confirming the con tinued advances in that direction. Not a moment was now to be lost in embarking the troops, which becathe an act of paramount necessity. lt was sin gular that the suspension of his fist intentions, in complinient to the Admiral himself, should now be aground of accusation against him, It was natural to yield something to the Admiral on an occasion 'where his hopes of bringing off the guns corresponded IA entirely with his (General Murray's) own earnest wishes ;and this consent was a proof of his desire to 'co-liperate, as far as possible, with the Admiral, while 'his subsequent conduct on the advance of the French, was a 'woof of the military principles on which he cued. This, however, formed no part of the charges before the Court; but if he had gone out of his way in observing upon it, it was to stew that he had no 'feeling on the subject which be was desirous of eon ,cealing. 'He believed that he could easily answer the :principal contradictions charged against him; and if -he could not at this distance of time answer some !. en of a trifling nawir, he hrped he would not on that account be condemned. lt the object he pur sued was uniform, and the result corresponded with !it, any apparent iatonsistency in the details, must De. cessarily have arisen out of events beyond his ow troul. The critical position of the armies under his commend, and the ware of his instructions, wholly occupied his mind. To receive pad understand re. ports, to distinguish between truth and fobobOodr, to act on new contingencies every hour in presence of ;superior enemy, and to watch over the safety es well as the honour of the army, Ira; .100. pesticide, pro .vinca. But what Was AdmirakldallaiVrell's W :to make Minutes of the Misuses parts of his 'hiss (for this diary wa not a jog), without-. nowUW the events which gave thew blrtbl whoa fin..wes &tie mar* than a speeustut of owlet% in, which hikOwti how ncur tvas worcoolitee4? !,olio spirit:which hit ilieeoeset Admiral, wee Aro evident os, that eery ISM Of. Chit prOd“111111r? lig* if Itikistesa Bathiist was not an addititanial proof of die fells. With directed it, Oen every dooloodotftemseuekto effect Wpm AS as ene. But it wesnet became the A 4 :urinal hmeself cascaised duals. (Genteel hiurrelif was indtatisia4tlset this Arrogation brad ham hrougbh for seltr,d, hoe . because his owo moot wee itlipoolio sod that of biejee-tutors! Deolobee).. es. be Illingbio acted , ea to pefeeswee tic it., Mot this was *imam the Ates of Admiral 1121100.11 b himmeif WV* tbld the Coin!, Whtilltindltiossii davit *epee woe "Bud) and sint =triage* Wu* neseithseted. I ifg lusaspinicisairtdcadrice to west till deglit. Meek -Wawa exhibited by tlk Admiral. This! web W r bbierbeconte lebtrwete. • Murat *tied 61 1 the epheies tl6 (auto oi.lifioseXleeeetA betweeowlicovaoll Mom* time.. Issompribit s Tbiisiwomeuebeegove arb4ogooreeiebbs stria t* loot ity if ie4lll. lot -Amy eheidisokrof dclift• oesees. sitipltiopa. elowbel for CISSeW fkitltSia NIL SA OO P Of - individuals, ',boss so4porlida *initial to the interested *IF /*dee: Ptexi iAstatil goo moment. he'-intra lieheeterceived Wit* lib hatelnce of the oneaty'ts :tsp e t ie. Nrich given toliletters Murray oh die fostnoan 712th by General Thilkin so fir m svolgOing with him en that oecatirdnerettli no dluteeledhint to pur .it quite different measures. Having said thus much, :laud ito hesitation in admitting that he did not pre. titbit to beef s) positive a disposition that his opinions or bie• plant were never to be changed. by any coun sel, however Admiral Hallowell was not per haps aware tral d t b he operations of an army must de pend On. the movements of the enemy, and the- intelli gence received : andmiserably would it be conducted, were a blind adherence to any particular line Of con duct to forest the principal feature of the Comman• der's character. It welidd ble useless to bring further' proofs of the Admiral's disposition. Without ad verting to the general tenor of his conversation to every rank that would listen to him, enough had been said to prove how little reason there was to expect a fair consideration or impartial representation of the case from Admiral Hallowell on this OCCASitoI. The AdMinil would wish the Court to be persuaded that hit dispatch was penned with an the deliberation and impartiality which so grave a subject required ; that his mind was divested of every personal feeling, and that he was merely anxious to give an accurate end consistent history of the events which then occurted. Why then, he would ask, was there so much vioreace, he might say, id much virulence in his dispatch ? Why *4 so dspgerous a precedent, destructive of all hap Mani .bettient the two services, introduced—the sending to General Mutray's Commanding Officer the copy of a criminatiug dispatch, nomutally ad; dressed .to his own Commander ? Why was an this done without General Murray's knowledge, and, he' might almost say, published to the officers under his immediate command ? He would admit the pro priety of reporting to Sir Edward Pcllew the issue of the expedition, and the share borne by the naval force in the service, and that it wall likewise equally incumbent on Admiral Hallowell, from a regard to his own character, if he conceived there was criminal neglect or misconduct on the part of General %tr.- , ray to have preferred cliarges against him through his commanding officer, Sir Edward Pelkw. This would have been at once regular and judicious, con sistent with the rules of the service, and sufficient for all the ends of national justice. Had he acted thus, he (General Murray) might have lamented the blind. ness with which he had undertaken the accusation, the preference which lie had given to the weakest sources of inforniation, and the ignorance of the true purposes of the expedition which had led him so *far out of his depth ; but he would have had to ac knowledge that hii conduct had been candid, and consistent with the usages of the service i • and how ever much these proceedings might have lessened the Admiral's claim to the character of a wise and pru dent commander, yet he (General Murray) has been the first to applaud the fair and honourable manner of his proceeding. In discussing this curios dimity document he requested the Court to observe, how widely the Admiral had travelled from the exercise of his duty in his representation. Other proofs 01 personal hostility were not wanting. He should con tent himself with laying before the Court the hot act of the Admiral's hostility. A very short time after he liad rejected the Admiral's proffered counsel of continuing the operations at the Col de Balsguer, the cemmenceenent of which he had so earnestly de. plured. He alluded to the signal made from the Malta by his orders, when Lord William Berstinck's vessel appeared in the offing. After enquiring whe ther his Lnrciehip was on board, in the face of the fleet, in the presence of the arary still under General Murray's command, the signal was made-5 , We are all delighted."--As an Admiral he was at liberty to make what signals he might choose, but lie left it to the Court if this instance was not an unbecoming abuse Of his authority, and if it had not a strong ten dency to .countenance discontent and clamour in the army still under his-command, and in which, after the arrival oq.aord Wm. Bentinek, he still continued to hold the second place ? 7 ~. F ~ M M " N ~ ~4 'N " N mosil l i ;41 Ot 440 4 1 4 1 % 0 1 . 1 'bte Ad AO regailtst chivies- the viobli) " t ops cip.tb, utbAchnew.ea tispesviOns ot,lbe partied:Al Odb3iiiiti 3 SW WOW bovii, ergot with *Mar- Geostil I s 4 ll4lscsielonlo -1103 1 .40 1 * of *PA AlPf in the *kis et to .m adal tfilbt alt Will& mare, towskii4bleo no wom a n! gili4:l,4lF vortePoirs isisineffeci. 44 bare iiiiiti tor/ ifttiminjetolitilliNsimaidient Ms filUitb.; oi kt i ilatiefiekitishipuivoll 4,0404 !Mir onsiles advaiiii4lll Stilirtarlfi WA *es. me pais 0 must be Uzi:oat:Or d . Atwell watigto ttadings FIRS r CHARGE. He new came to the consideration of the charges. Two prosecutors had appeared against him, contend ing on principles in direct opposition to each other. The Judge Advocate had felt this difficulty ; and had adduced no proofs except the documents origi• ashy famished to him. In his observations upon this evident inconsistency, he veiny truly stated that Admiral Hallowell might so conduct his Can as to mike the charges correspond with each other ; and that General Murray was open to animadversion for haying continued the siege too long, as well as for the precipitate manner-of its abandonment. This in continency did not seem to be wrathy of Admiral Hailowell's notice ; for he had made no observations on thosubjett, and instead of eo.opwating with the [-ledge Advocator he had contented himself with an ettestipt to pritvelhat no enemy was near. In the Ise charge—he began to sin on the 7th Ids crime was of course increased on the Bth.—'fo have continued on shore on the 9th, 10th, and I I th, mum naturally bon augmented the sum of his of fences, as the advance of the enemy rendered the dowser more. Framing ; and yet en the 12th the re- Irina ef tbe,piatere wee thbyleyeds and the Court wart informed that the enthariestion was them not say preaipitiek bat unneeessawy. Should-he atcempt 10 prom that obe Beath was at all times safe and plastic-41w they proofs might be urged against him in the 3d Charge, in which he was accused of a pre. cipitate desiaiest to entbark..Haniing Mee these ge neral obserratiess upon the three charges as con toasted .witb -dad) ether, he would now poriceed to the first miliWareffenne, vit. " For landing, or cond om* en : share when landed, between the 7th and lihh June / meow Tarrsigme, alarge quantity ef heavy Mainly wismuaidoo, and stores, when he bad good remen to believe that no till benefit could be derived fettlo or days as tie producing the fail of Tarn =by, *kw imam% end when he had received iro ned which he believed, that los% before that time itimperier force woad be near huh, and was *Wert that the siege must then be abandoned, know ing at the maw tame the great difficulty and dangers mending a sodden embarkation." It was not emy to meet this charge Malian enter ing; into some details Wee first seeing this charge, he had cineladed that he might rot satisfied with &frying thaterevione to the I tth.st might, any ince'. • ce whajever had reached him, on which, an his opinion, under all the circumstances of the ea - e, lie should have been warranted in abandoning the eirt. &- prize committed to his charge. He expected that to establish theeriilitary offence against him, the Judge Advocate would have attempted to prove that he 'had landed unnecessary stores, &c. ; and farther, this.she artillosy,. anutruaition. and gams,. remained on shore unnecessarily, after he had* received tr.Ti.r ! station, which he believed, :liat.long before the pus ...gilds eaplttre of tine piece, * superior force of the enemy wools' cettainly be near him. la addition to , . this he repeated that it toold have Wen proved that no advantage could: accrue from tisis,delay, and that it would have been pointed out in what manner he: had deviateti from the spirit of hit instructions. Thu whole crimes alleged . against him appeared to hhige upon his belief—that no real benefit could be eartra , ed after the 7th in continuing en shore. Heti: 110 could have wished that the charge had been men: general, that his belief and information had been omitted,' and that he had been broadly charged with having remained unnecessarily before Tarragona.— In this way the tab of the Judge Advocate would have been much more simple. It would then only have been necessary , so prove these tact% and it would not have been expeeted of bins to dive into the recesses of his breast so dlicovee what he did or ad not believe. No .:moor had bee:sailed& lb. !Rabb al t the charge by any stab evidence. Nothing was pro duced but By letters to esrahlish his belief of die ap. proach of the enemy, and constructions were put ura ahem wholly unwarranted. When lie first saw the charges, he was at a loss to conjecture why the 7th was expressly pitched on as the Jae when he ought to have desisted from the siege; but his difEcul'irs oa this subject bad been siege removed by the pro dection of his letter of the 7th et June to aae Duke of Wellington. • This letter, with the permission of the Court, he would at present read : Cillasp before Tarragona, June 7. 181 s. " My dear Lord Wellington-1 am mach afraid we have un dertaken More than We are able to perform ; but to execute your Lordship's °reef% t Win persevere as king as prudence will permit. I have as yet no certain :ate :nation of :uchet's movements, nor of De Caen to the eastward ; hut there are re ports of both, and if they /stove true, 4n five or six days I linty be attacked by a force infinitely superior, without the hope or chance of a tetreat in case of misfortune. I calcohate that Su cliet can bring ireo the field 24 or 25,000 men without tltificul-y, and my force, suppo.ing the. Spaniards really have what they say they have. wdf not exceed, elan sorts, 19,000, of iviskk I must leave 4000 at the leas to cover out guns anti mask tits garrison. To secure our kit flank; and prevent Suehet's direct march upon 'Tarragona, I have attached the Col de Balaguer. and I expect it to fall to-morrow or twat day. With realistic to the first army. I can say nothing farther at present but that they seem very willing, but very weak Your Lordship has directed that they should garrison Tarragona in case it should Ca. will diminish Vat ir numbers very considerably, and snake than unfit for any thiog. f venture, therefore, to propose to your Lordship that 3000 turn i.houtd be sell for that purpose. and if you could send some recruits for their rt gunects, I think it .would be of service, as the Canal miens desert so. much. C'l:!- atl gives me every ass'stanee in his power, but I per ceive his too little assistance in raft officers ; three or four more would be wen employed, and are Feces's:try ; money and clothes are both much required, at least they tell me so. The Admiral proposes sending a ship to Ahearn to-day, I bel=eee. I &lave just had time to. write those kw Itnesetisl have, Stu. ('isited) lain morutat." —Was there in this letter one word of the admission of the march of superior fortes of the enemy f Wa; not the whole of the latterpart of the letter founded aspon the contiugency,of the fall of Tairagona ? The (reports alluded to had been in circulation from the day of the disembarkation. Colonel Prevost, besieg fag the fort San Philippe, reported by express on the 44th, that he expected to be attacked by Marshal Su. chet in person next day ; and Admiral Hallowell, as early as the 7th, misled by these reports, actually sent an !additional naval force to check the immedi ate approach of the Marshal at the Bridge of Ant posts on the Ebro. The consequences predicted in this letter were the same as what bad been stated in a letter to the Duke of Wellington, from Castalla, of the llth of May, and were even anticipated by his Grace in his answer of the 23d of May. He did then in the most direct terms assert, that on the 7th no event had occurred upon which he was in the smallest degree authorised to abandon the enterprise. That he was never sanguine of success was must true, for before he sailed he did not expect that Ta ragoea would fall unless directly assaulted ; but no. thing had occurred up to this period to diminish his expeCiations, It became evident that nothing but some fortunate chance or some deviation from the direct line of operations, could put us in possession of the place; but these chanter. then so far front. being diminished, were materially increased in our favour ; for on that day the fort ::.an Philippe fell, the possession of which sealed the direct march of the enemy from Tortosa.—'The dif culty of relieving the place increased, and the knowledge of this difficulty might be n rArally ex pected to produce a corresponding efl...ct on the midds.of the garrison. On that day he first enter tained a ray of hope, not so much of the capture of ; Tarragona, but that the expedition would prove an effective diversion in favour of the allied army in VA. hecia. Without this acquisition of the Col de Bala goer, made on the 7th, he could not have remained after the 9th. On the Bth they were still in the same alenatioreas on the Ttli. The reports of - the 6th had been found to be false, and on the Sth many of those alluded to in the letter of the 9th bad been also found to be entirely without foundation. There was every reason to believe that these reports were invented by the enemy himself, and propagated by his partizan) and numerous spies in the camp. Yet such was tl e only foundation for assuming his belief of the advance of a superior ehenty. Those who were not respco sible. and who bad no authentic source of informa tion, :night be under the influence of such commu nicatient ; but it was the business of the General to calculate, combine, and compare these rurnours, itts his. more authentic sources of intelligenee. Ih alt armies the practice was common of labricatieg intelligence with due view of deceiving the easter -In the late war this stratagem was pushed far ther by the French Commanders than ever before. —Could he be guilty ut a military offence in not having blindly run into the snare laid e..) entrap him, and in not having followed a delusion too e. idently raised dith a view of misleading ?rim The reports in question bore every mark of Fvnefr fabrications they were contradicted by his more,aa &laic intelligence, and the nett day brought with it theittotnplete refutation. He returned to the me ti • its of the seeds between the 7th widths 12th. His observations had been hitherto directed .to the first interpretation which might be put ors theta,' nanvly•