Star. — London, England, 1815-01-30 00:00:00

s, JO)! -.--. ;iffrigl#4lo/O}E•bAY, SATURDAY, JAN. 1111. General MURRAY resumed the Leading of his De fence, where he broke off yesterday, in the middle of ilie answer to the third charge. The next point to be atseuded to (he said) was the strength and equipment of the allied army ; on this subject great misrepresentations had gone abroad. Returns had been published, including corps which were never in Skiain, and other corps which, previous to the embarkation at Tarragona, had been sent back to Sicily.' The anntrOf Catalonia under his corn• wand, had been 'made as large as that under the Duke of Wellington himself. While , the numbers under hiiiit had been heightened; on the other hand, the 'ntfribers of the enemy had been diminished. But Ilte'ben contradiction of iheie tnisostatements would be afforded by returns from the Adjutant-General's uMcei,'' Aids could not be called in question. From 'these teitifhte.h sinilld appear, that' the Anglo-Siei- ' lien %troy inkii(tited i'n xu 3 ts infantry, and 698 ca.- tklrY.'% 'at 14f6 •Men or both ;armies,. of all de. seriptiaitC'arid' c'onigeed br troops .of- an 'nations. The numbers at ernbitkintbn *arid re:embarkation *ere &Fairly the;eitrieutrat hot more than'46 men in rill were killed daring the liege. Thu total included the servants, and all; ttioti -Who -*fee In the depart men% ethehosiiitils, acivitiniSsaeibt, &s '. But the coMposition ot• this evilly &Waved less then its Mini. hers. lib felt it thettlbte netesulty•toldtetarthe man. nor in which the *toy erasiretiiiillyebospisseil. •• The Brit igi - amounted to 8,-910, die Gleason to 4,710, -wed in then , rinltt weVe men of allissitions. "there Wei' two regiments of Italian dtsetteti ifrdnii the :FrOidli I 'amotrntiatto`l,96o, the Sieilaneiniscrinited to; die Calabrese •• to 490, end 'die remai n der re 4',1 '4loaniiirtl4'in Spsniitt littd - Brithh 'ply, mark ht Wart gi befireitated, lAllloitifintry The tairery ' • _ ,_ • - , tottiiiitied of 427 Bfltislir brio 978rdr the BrutieWlck hustafs, in-1011. '668. t nth- Wei the - hiteingeneOus miss of which the AnglinSiiiiiittl - ariny Ivey corn. posed. Noreinforceftients took place fronithe period of these returns,' and comiequently the numbers were never increased. This circumstance would render any - observations on-his part unnecessary. Meanly part of this force on which any reliance could be placed, was. the British and Germans ; but their numbers it would be seen, were not great. Had their numbers been even doubled, it might be doubted whether he would have been on a par with the French who had an army of 20,500 at least. But indepen deatly of. What must be apparent to every .one on a first inspection of this statement, there were other circumstances which increased the inefficiency of these troops. Success could only be expected from well equipped and steady troops. But there was no part of this army which, fully answered this. description. The British part was even not altogether efficieat, and none of the others were effstient. He had as much confidence in the gallentry of this army as any Offi cer possibly could lsave ; bat this was no reason why he should have been blind to ice &feat& To many of the corps be was willing to pay testimony to their gallantry whenever they had an opportunity of show. wg it; but even these corps were deficient in the ne cessary equipments. To the conduct of other parts of the army be could not speak in the same terms. The only other argument on this suhject which he should trouble the Court with, was the difficulty of provisioning the division of Gen. Whittinghani. On —alit point, he had-teoeived .an -expeess prohibitory order from the Duke-of Wellington. The difficulty which . thia occasioned had been -often keenly telt by him; but by this pruhibitioe, it could only be pro. witted far in the same manner with General Co ohs' army. The - nen point was the- equipment of this army. • When he took the command of this army at Alicant, he might say that it was immovable. One . great difficulty then was, the low state of the military chest. Previous, however, to the embarkation for Tirragona, thedeficiencies of this army weremuch removed:- . The artillery department had -been well equipped with horses and mules ; and the chief .de. ficiency was in the commissariat department. When • the anny landed at Tarraguea, it was in an incom plete. and inefficient state in every part. Of the com missariat equipments, little or nothing was - taken with them, as would appear by a letter Iron Mr, Da. niel, of the Commissariat. As there was a deficiency of room, preference was properly given to those things which were most essential .foe the immediate object of the expedition. It was impossible for him to increase the number or enlarge the size of the transports. There were left behind at Alieann.63ll horses and mules, and only 845 were brought with the army, being only about one third of the comple. anent. The number of tumbrils for, the guns, the _Vehicles for the conveyance of ammunition, camp •kettles, &c. were extremely deficient ; and with re. npect to waggons for the removal of the sick and wounded, and the hospital utensils, no provisioa what. ever wee made. On theispproach of an enemy, all hopes of.supply whatever loathe army vanished, for , tam had not an open annovria -their rear. He was isensibleaf the groat advaatages which he bad in the composition of the Coeliac the members of which ,Iritew the. great importance Of themarticles to anew. With such disadvantages, • and with- soolviefonna. rains as be wails possession etrespecting the number, of the enemy, would it have beets prudan_ hie ad alive met the French C o m man d er i n tho fields Ihseili adequate advantage could have been gained to com pensate fur the hazard, -and whets defeat-on his part ' would have been followed with absolute destruction The Duke of Wellington had expo-May stated to bid 'that the maces, of the campaign depended on din . safety of the whol• of the armies, and that he would pardon any thing sooner than the defeat or dispersion of any of the corps. It bad been said, that besides the Anglo-Sicilian army, he bad at his disposal ibe Spanish Catalonian army. The merits of this army ••lbaal been very highly stated by some of the evidence. ,gyp order to strew what little stress was to be laid on • /jig evidence, he would give, not his own opiaion ,Als a h respect to the composition of that army, but the ~pinion of its own commander. Surely it could not be supposed that it would be represented in a more ~,w4avourable light from this quarter than it deserved. It would be seen how far the ?pinion of i ts own o ffi. cers corresponded with that given by General Mac. kenzie. He would lay before the Court a memorial, dated the'l44ll March, 1813 .1 drawn up by Colonel C a b a nes p the chiernf GerlawCopons' staA In this Report he stated, that It was hnoossible nut to s ak ',ably of 04 bravery, of ') Malt "the t~~~ - , that army... It was tieceuary, however, to speak the truth. The army, however well adapted for the spe; cies of warfare carried on in Catalonia, displayed want of subordination and of discipline which unette it for meeting airegular army - in the field. From individual bravery of the men, and their fitness four executing rapid movements, this want of diacipliner was not so much felt when the wit was carried on its mountains. But the infantry were not instructed its manoeuvring, the cavalry were not sufficiently nume rous, the artillery wanted the means of serving with effect, the sappers were yet in their infancy, they pos sessed no magazines, and they were in want of clo thing and ammunition. Such was the state of 'hit army according to Colonel Cabanez, only ten weeks previous to the disembarkation at Tarragona. He was ready to admit the bravery of the individuals, and the skill of their commander, but from what be had stated, it must be evident to the Court, that they wanted two of the most indi.pensible requisites to in. sure victory—subordination and discipline. They were only fit for a war carried on in mountains or in detached parties. The services which could be pees formed by such an army amounted , to nothing morn thin this, that the infantry could b employed in CO: Tering the siege. The cavalry possessed enthusissisW but they were in no number.' 'With respect to theie artillery, little could be expected from than; 'thel wanted the means of, being terra*, teixikeir enemies; The department of uppers was *y, an its crecille-4 bat this was not the moment to Wait fair its maturityi The army was so composed that it had wither met Eines, clothing, nor arnmnaidon, norinopey ; a$ , soldiers had pq food but 'what. they Am4d pure se. He had introduced no obse)evotions of hii own on this subject, but confined himself to the state., %ems of this memorial. He had no written opinion ?Of General Copons himself with tespect - to his army; :%but 'this memorial might be considered as having been drawn up by his orders; and -if he had not approved of it, it certainly would never have been communicated to General Mutray. In the different conversations -which General Murray had with Cie. neral Copons, the latter always expressed himself hi nearly the same term as those of the memorial. He always stated that his army could not manoeuvre— that if they were placed in a strong position they would stand ; but unless they were placed so, or that a retreat was open for them to the mountains, he could not think of allowing them to be brought into action. He could not blame General Copoos for this precaution, for they must haire been exposed to the hazard of complete destruction on the embarks. tion of the Anglo-Sicilian army, if their retreat was cut off from the Northern part of the province. It therefore became necessary that the Spanish army should always be kept at the northern extremity of the allied army, to secure their retreat in case of raj,. sing the siege. General Murray saw the impossibi. lity of the Spanish army ever affording that co-ope ration necessary to insure success in case of attack. Another Spanish division, that of General 'Whit. tingham, was nearly in the same situation. Witt respect to the strength of the Spanish Catalonia, army, he would refer to a return which would accons. pany his address, signed by Colonel Cabanez, of the date of the 11th of June, 1813. The numbers really efficient, it appeared, only amounted ep. 5933 men, including the two regiments of the Col de Balaguer. • He had always taken Capons' army at six thousand men: The state of a gallant nation, so long over run by an enemy, was a su ffi cient apology for the state of this and other Spanish armies ; but it was no apos logy -for those who wished him to perform impossibiti. ties with such armies.' He only begged it to be recol. lected, that weak. as this army was, it could only be kept in force for two or three days, and that no caope ration could have been expected from any other armies in Spain. With respect to the state and composition of -the allied army, he had no other information to offer. —He had already pointed out the consequences which would have resulted from following the ad -vice of Admiral Hallowell. In the course of his defence he had shown that. one great object of re. maining before Tarragona was to draw Marshal Su chat from Valencia—a plan which had been particu. larly directed by his Excellency the Duke of Wel. liqgtoo. The second motive was the hope that some chance of war would have thrown the garrison into his power; and the last was, that he had reason to ,hope the operations of the enemy would have been so confused as to prevent them making a deCided move ment in anyway. All these prospects, however, teased to exist on the night of the 11th, Suchet having an. rived within one day's march of the lines of the Al. lied Army. No accident bad occurred.which af. forded a chance of the fall of Tarragona. No rein ' forcement had reached them, and the intention of 'the enemy-to advance seemed decided. Under tech circumstances, the preservation of the army entrus-. ted to his-care in that state of effectioepeee which would enable it to act in any sphere, became his first care. If his own judgment had not pointed opt this course, the instructions of his Excellency were too plain to be mistaken. The importance of the Anglo, Sicilian, army to the grand plan of the Drake of Wel . goin was in fact too manifest to be overlooked. It. existence put in activity the second and third Spa nish armies, and prevented the - first from defeat: Had these forces been dispersed or paralized, Mer lla' fincbet would have been enabled to oppose, in .Bille most decisive way, the arraargements of th e Commander in Chief, in whose oar he would have r o n moved, and thereby interrupted the suer of St. Se bastian's, and the not }eta impottant . .opera.tions at Pampeluna. The army th.Alicant, in fact. would never be considered in any other light theft -ace a di. version in favour of his Excellency, whose plant 'cue alone to be considered. He lair .Idbiz Stireetinhid no plan of his own to ciansidee,;: and behad no right to put the army placed under Ms command in a si tuation to be beaten without his Excellency's orders. With these itapressions on his mind, it would ill be come him to have listened 10 tho Weide of Admiral Hallowell, and to have beguiled' the desteuctien .61 an army upon, which so ma& - choreeded. Had be suffered his own personal feeling. 'ohm's got dieter. ter of his brudence, which, had 'be obeyed 'OM im pulse of the moment, might bare Wit the case, li{ should have indeed deserved reprobation. The pub.( lit, it wax true, might be silent; but what apolo6 could he make to the Commander in Chieff,'"ohrisei positive orders he had received ? What excise be offer for having lost the Sower of MI army, sit for the sake of saving a few guns, have heal.ther bona of the cavalry slaugbeenei on she beiVilo34l -. . ... „..-;, T :• .4 . ;•)1.....• .. And who could be rash enough to doubt 'that such woad hairelbeen the ease, vaiin the force at the Ene my advancing, independent of the garrison of 'rim; tons, was known to be 14,000 of the best troops of France ? Defeat would have been almost certain, but its probability could not be doubtedi The ex pedition to Ostend had not been forgotten, and the events at Coronae were still fresh in our recollection. The period was critical, and it was incumbent on him to avoid a delay which might have been pro ductive of the most fatal consequences. If he had remained, and attempted to take off the guns at all hazards, might not Marshal Suchet have arrived on the beach and if he had, would he have permitted the Allied Army to embark ? And it this was pre vented, he would have become master of the field, and a decided blow would have been given to the hopes Of success on the eastern coast of Spain. A few hours 'ought have been of the utmost consequence; an'd therefore his refusal to meet the wishes of Admiral. Hallowell, to wait till night, was, be trusted,. satis factorily accounted for. The enemy was on one side at Villafranca, ' and on the other at Perella ; and Irons what there - appearettlere was nothing to pre via% Them from 'Mein' at the beach *t the very me anest the embarkation Isad-ceimminced.a circum stance which would have insured them almost infal lible success. By the. operations, as they did take place, he (Sir John Murray ) wes enabled to send the cavalry to the Col de BAragoer, an Opportunity stfilch, by the delay 'oft'a few houti more, would have been lost. Upon the whole, when the import :ince of the trust reposed in him was taken into con sideration, as teeli •as , the irreparable injury which ~ would have remised from any misfortune occurraingl to the army wader his command, he was satisfieddse Court would agree with him in thinking, that he would not have been justified in playing so desperate a game as that which bad been suggested by his pro secutor. 'lt only, in fact, required . to refer to his in structions, which painted consequences of his defeat, to find the measure of his punishment. The interest of Europe was interwoven in the success of the plans of the Duke of Wellington; and these operations de. pended, in a great measure, in the safety of the Sin tan army. It was not his part to calculate That the enemy would, but what he could do—their approach seemed unquestionable, from all the wakes of information which he had; and be could only account for their re treat by ascribing it to the arrival of Lord Exmouth in the bay of Rosas. Upon this he had no light to' calculate, and nothing could be considered less pro. bable than that the enemy would retreat, after hav ing made forced marches for the purpose of obtain ing an object which seemed to be perfectly within their reach. He had embarked his troops entire, had not and left one man or one horse behind, neither had he left any one piece of field artillery, seventeen serviceable and unserviceable, nut of ninety-one pieces of ord nance, having been above lelt behind. It was true, the enemy might boast of this, to their useless price, but how much more galling would have been their boast, if they had the opportunity of proclaiming the number of the dead bodies of our soldiers, the carcases of our horses, and the list . of our artillery in their pos. session, to which trophies might be added, the colours of the Allied Army.' It such had been the case, bias. ted, indeed; Would have been the hopes of victory-in Spain ; aid well merited would have been the con demnation of the unfortunate Commander, who, tening to the advice of shallow advisers, had, in agree ing to a proposition for delay, sacrificed his own judg ment, and disobeyed the orders of his Commander. Befofe he concluded, he was desirous of correcting two errors which had crept into the former part of his defence ; the one was the statement that the British had achieved on the 14th. This should have been the 13th, and the other was attributable to the trans action. The other was, that he should have stated his officers to have seen the canny on the 17th, and not the 6th, at Vendrilla. ' The gallant General then proceeded to comment on the evidence for the prosecution ; that of Captain Withers, Stoddart, and Inglefield, all tended to the same point, and therefore only a single observation was necessary; they proved his intention .to continue the attack on the fortress up to the night of the llth, to which time, according to their evidence, the land ing of stores and guns did not cease. From the evi. dencq of Lieutenant-Colonel Williamson, the fact ap peared that the rockets ordered to be landed were lying in the boats for two days ; a circumstance which :hewed that the beach was not always practicable for landing or embarking: This made for case; and Captain Withers' evidence relative to the requisition for boats on the morning of the 12th, proved his anxiety to accelerate the embarkation when once it, had been determined on. It was also in proof 'than General Don kin spoke from himself when he an nounced the speedy arrival of the enemy ; and it was equally proved that the enemy's advance could not have been checked on the beach roads by the fire of gun-boats. He was moat anxious to rebut the charge of indecision, and be most positively denied that such a charge could be inferred from his conduct. Lieu tenant-Colonel Williamson's evidence relative to the position of the enemy, was. only a repetition of the story of the peasant, which had previously Monad to be false. ; -v.% • The General here compared the evidame oi. 010- eel Williamson with that of Generals Mackenzie an& Clinton, and said, from it was to be gathered that his orders to spike the guns were, contingent and condi tional. Colonel Thackery was the next witness called; be proved that the attack on the Puerto Reale was 'continued to the last moment that any chance existed of subduing Tarragona.' He also proved that the enemy could advance by two roads ; and, in opposi tion to the opinions of the Naval Officers, he gave it minis belief that it was impossible, by marine force, 'to intercept the enemy on those roads. In all this witness's testimony the General found nothing in ,support of the prosecution, except that the witness knew of no reason for raising the siege, and indeed it was impossible he should, unless he had possessed more information relative to the movements of the 'them/ ; but this by no means proved that no reason 'inlaid.. General Mackenzie's opinion of the brilliant inecissio be expected, in case of a conflict with the enemy, was founded on his knowledge extending only fo 'the advance of De Caen's column. He had ne libbviledge of the advance or even movements of Su eltei.' idadtted that the embarkation had been - condirOtd Wit t hout loss or confusion, which as proof uc ' • •:(.1 . - • • din it Was not so precipitate as had been &set his opinion that twelve hundred rrp. it would be sufficient to mask the garrison of Tana. gone,. was sufficient to shew the court how precip.. tately his opinions had been formed; And how little they deserved the serious attention of the Court. Of the complete state of the army and equipments he would not go the length that General Mackenzie had done, in speaking its praise; some pot of it he was well aware could ni.t be spoken of in too high terms, either as to gallantry or discipline; but this was not the case with all the troops, as might be col lected from the letters of General* Mackenzie and Ciinton, from the latter of whom he had been in lormed that the ni the batteries bad thrown away their ammunition as SOOtl as they were exposed to the fire of the enemy. Lord F. Illitinck's evidence only went to one point, and on that point he was certainly very ill informed. ‘Viien he (General Murray) saw Lord F. Bernina at hirpost he had been at the head quarters of General Copons, eight miles in advance of Lord F. Deutinck, Whose memory did nut appear to be very perfect, for ;bough he considered the ea ' valry completely covered by Copons' army, yet he sent to Lord F. It to keep t out a stronger picket. The last witnesi.called wax Ltetitenant•General Clinton, oldie asperity of whose evidence he had ample reason to complain. The tone and manner in which it was delivered equally shocked and surprised him. Gene ral Clinton was the last man from whom he had a right to expect such eviden ce; bus if the General 'complained of theendlessehange in the orders given to General Murray, he could only account for that continual change, by the lrttle attitity displayed by Ge neral Clinton in obeying and executing those orders. —lf the.Graferal complained of a want of confidence in him, Air (General Murray) was sorry for the existence - 41116th a feeling ; 'but his duty was not to conciliate theprivate feehngs of individuals, bat' to attend to poWie iertila I.a service which WAS no: alvetifti advanced ill:WO liberal • :end indiscriminate communication of secrits; The injury done by the opinions give* by iib•high a:character as General Clinton, mustlYeattlio*Fedjted, and would be deeply ; thikjilAry; JioitieXari. Woad ottlY extend to the f.PlAntt7*. it Aroid4i not ppm, that Court; hut libel the day came, .as he was sure it would, Olen a I fltirjudgment would he formed upon the whole case, theo the acrimony of the witness would become visible, hii want of information would be appal ent, and the public would learn how to estimate such evidence, evett•thoogh coming from such a character as Sir W. Clinton. But if General Clinton thought at the time thatsthe embarkation had the appearance of a dis gtaceful flight, he would ask, was it not the duty of the General to have sought Lord William lientincit 'the moment he arrived, and have called on him tb institute a Court Martial upon the spot ? It was not enough to sat, that from Admiral Hallowell's letter, he saw that - au investigation would take place ; and, indeed, he had no right to know of that letter ; but in any case he should upon such an opinion have de manded inquiry, and if he (Sir John Murray) had not done his ditty, General Clinton was the person to step forward—he was the only legitimate cham pion of the army. . • The General concluded his defence with a commen 'Vary on the last document produced by Admiral Hal lowell, and said he had only then to l.'y the documen tary evidence before the Court, which for evident twee' of convenience he should arrange as follows : he would produce in regular order all the infor mation he had received and acted upon—.secondly, he wotald lay before the Court the orders he had receivt did given—and lastly, he would bring forward the general evidence applicable to the whole case. He irould begin with the information, as the first in order. 'Sir John Murray then submitted to the Court a great variety of documentary evidence, referred to in the course of the defence; consisting of information re ceived from Spanish Officers, Magistrates, and pea sants, together with orders and instructions given and teceived by himself, and correspondence between the Duke of Wellingthn, Sir John Murray - , Admiral Hal lowell, and other British and Spanish Officers. Those cloinnients were not read, but merely pdr in ; the dates, signatures, and translations being proved by Captain Milner, Colonel Kennalt, Capt. Sharp ( Royal Navy), Colonel D'Aguila, the Judge Advocate, General Dunkin, and 'General Whittingliam. The greater part of them was rekeivtirhy the Court, though some were suspended fur the future consideration of the Court. Among the hater was one from Admiral Hal- Weir% dated the 9th of Julie. When all the docu *lents were produced; Admiral HALLowat.r. asked permission to lay before ibe Court the answer to the letter which which had been presented, as addressed by him to Sir John Mira,. He wished the anstrer to be 'plated 'tithe mac situation as the letter itself. Sir.ionu MURRAY objected to the production of this letter, or any other document from the prosecutor, after the - -Anion was closed. prosect "l i h;; ; JuDoa Anvocata said, that Yuffonfy the practice of Courts Kirtial, but of every other Court, to admit evidence from the prosecutor after he had closed his case, when that evidence went to op pose pone new matter or evidence introduced in the course of the defend% and of which the prosecutor could have no previous knowledge. If the present was deemed to be a case in point, the letter of Admi ral Hallowell would be admitted by the Court. Admiral HALLOWELL said, the letter he offered came under the description of the Judge Advocate ; it was to be opposed to the lettered evidence by Sir J. Murray, which was new matter in the defence. Sir J. MURRAY did not abject to the letter offered, from its nature, but be objected too the admitting of evidence after the Prosecutor had closed his case. The JunintAnvocare said, where new matter was introduced into a defence loosely, it was customary to reply to it merely; but where den matter set/ supported by evidence, then the prosecutor was lowed to answer such new matter by evidence; for instance, there was a case in the books on this subjoc:. When a soldier was charged with mutiny, and the charge was proved, if the prisoner in his defence gave 'evidence to prove that he was forced by others to commit the act, and that it was not done of his own voluntary agency, then the prosecutor was at liberty to produce new evidence to disprove such a statement. - General MONTRESSOR said, that the mere statement of a defence was of no importance, and made no inn peessi3n on the Court, except so far as it was sup. ported by evidence. - .. Admiral liaunwm.r. said, so many and such grh ye