Star. — London, England, 1815-02-03 00:00:00

I • COVArifaiRTI4IL. • -.-nuon - 4 11101U.'011 ILltstrr,ttNltitAL SIR JOIN rAtilium. - •wltlCnbrttk, THuRsD4y, isiftuAsti F.' I • • . ..TWEI.Frit DAY. The Court rnetthis day at ten o'clock; as &reedy.. General noNICIN 9 S examination continued:* • Q. When you conducted the secret intelligence department, did you collect any other information red specting the French armies of Arragon and Valen: cia ?—A. I drew up my statement from the papers Wriich I now produce, and other sources, which, as I have already stated, were the best I toit)cl Obtain.— The papers I nosVigiVe are-4 tritteMent of Lord Wellingtonk 'letter' ft'om Captain Gray—and an intercepted retiitn'Of Stieheit,, which gives a" trial of 50,719 men in Air ago.n a t ' 15thttito-' bes, 1812. • ' ..* treilmietaintinid by Mr. Lasurtii. Q. •El.orri vont of the Inforeitaditn af Sir John Murray, on the 9th of June, is knot your opinion, that he could not believe that any godd could be derived from placing the six guns and the four • -mortars on the batteries, oa the night of the 18th?— A. 1 war never made acquainted with the {tate and . .progress of the siege, nor with the construction of tl e batteries, nor with the objects for which they were -intended : this business was conducted by Sir John Murray himselt; directly with the Commandant of Engineers and Artillery ; I therefore can form no judgment with what -views the batteries were armed. As far as my information goes, I think the siege should .iot have been continued after the 10the Q. Had the two guns and mortars in question been carried down to the biach that night, is k not your opinion, that without actually commencing the em barkation, the whole of the guns might afterwards have been saved ?—A. Nos the siege not having been raised till the 12th, I think if these guns bad not been placed in the batteriei, those which Were al ready there could net have been saved without the army being on shore all the night of the 12th. . Q. Do you know of any preparations made by Sir John Murray for, raising the siege after receiving the information of Suchet's advance, on the Bth or 9th 1 —A. I do pot. - Q Do you know of any proposal having been made for that purpose ?—A. I do not, except that he (Sir John) told me himself, on the 9th, that be should be obliged to raise the siege; to which I re• plied, that it was natural to expect we should not be allowed to take the place without interruption; and that I hoped we should get off our guns before the arriwal of the enemy. This obiervation was made in ignorance of Sir John Murray's instructions and plan. Q. Do you know that Sir John Murray had it in contemplation on the Bth or 9th to raise the siege?— A. On the 9th he told me of it, and left me, as I supposed, to make arrangements about it. Q. Were you consulted respecting the landing at Balaguer I—A. I was not. Q. Do you conceive that if that measure was per severed in, it must have brought on a general ac tion I—A. Certainly not a general action : it might have brought on a partial action with Suchet's corps in the plain of the Ebro, on the western side of the range of mountains. Q. DO you know. if Suchet had not retired with elute:one, and de Caen had not retired to Vendrils, the army could have been embarked without loss 1— A. I-think it the army had not been embarked at Boiagner, it would have sustained some loss ; but the. ground being exceedingly favourable for covering etch an operation, and our being in possession of Fort St. Philippe de Balaguer, it would very muck belie kept•him in check and protected the troops. • ' Q..Do you - mean that he would have been kept ini ithieck if .Sachet had gone round by Rens and united with Caen 1--A. Yes ; because we should that base passed to the other side of the camp, leaving *elan interposed between us and the enemy. Ai - ii - ........mtanstned•lff Admiral HALcoww... Q. At what time did you first take the order.for embarkation to Admiral Hallowell on the 12th t— &I think it was about two o'clock in the afternoon, or rather sootier. Q. Do.rou recollect telling me, about nine o'clock, on the 12th, thAt it was Sir. Jobe Murray's intention , that no more horses should be embarked, bdt a few , of the staff horses I do not recollect this; but Sir John Murray told me that the troops wete.tb be embarked first, and the horses last; and it is probable I may have made such a communication. Sir John Murray's horses were not, I believe, embarked till , three o'clock, and I know my MA were not. Q. l)o. you recollect-bfing on the beach about the hour I have mentioned, and telling the officers to stop the embarkation of guns, and to embark troops! A. I recollect carrying a message from Sir John Murray to that effect; but I cannot recollect the how with sufficient precision to answer this question; bat I never carried any order to the beach but direct iron) Sir John Murray. • - .Q. As you say you received only two orders from' - . trc4ohn Murray on the 12:14 at What hour did you receive the order for the retreat of the wools: to the beach, and the other relative so the-mods of embark ation ?--A. I did not say positively I only received two orders, but that 1 believed so. The order for to march I received about one o'clock in the after. (mon' and the other for the embarkation must have fbilbved soon after. • Q. Do you not know that other orders and coon ter.orders were received by other officers besidesl yourself, that day ? A. I do not know this, nor do. I recollect bearing any such. - Q. Had you any officers of your department do• Cached about ten o'clock of the 12th, to gain inform*. tier) of the enemy ? A. I had not I that was a dtary . Sir John Murray kept exclusively in his own hen& He'maLhave detached some officers of the Quarter: Mastkokienerars detachment for that purpose . : Q. -Dtilou know of any being detached I A. I do not recollect of any. I fancy the General relied principally on General Copan' intelligence, who was ipitis front. Q. At what tin* did the Spanish officer arrive with intelbgence for General Murray, on the 12th ? A..lt must have been about eight o'cluck in the morning, to the best of my recollection. HaLLowr.u. wished General Donkin to recolitct a little. He wag with General Donkin when eir t . es e asal panials officer arrived, and it WAS then One • sa. • „Dowel said, so many stoma susce•ded 41 6 "toetti one anothei. —.lin Iss Paddies rThe AD41 1 44h oitielqi . .OM it Tug_ have,be" later, as it was moot the tone 141011 . 1 . 141 , iienefel. teturnink 'froth Mitt Sets. ' - ' °ening DOtlEnta-Yes, about that dart bat. 1 mill think it was about eight or nine o'cloekkt the morninF 4g. Q. It appears that a Spanish Officer arrival it, sigh 'o'clock with information that the French were in motion, without stating where. Did you after wards stud any officer to ascertain this, before giving the order for spiking the guns ? A. It was evident, from the officer's manner and conversation, that the troops at Villa Franca, if moving ) were pointing to Tarragona ; and this was confirmed by reading the letter, in which General Capons writes General Mur ray instructions how he was to act implying thereby, as 1 conceived, that he might be attacked in the course of the day. I do not recollect Any officer having , been sent out. Q. Did you know there were seven roads from Tarragona to l'ortosa, at the time Sir John Murray was raising : the siege of Tarimona; or did you weer visit thee?. before Sir. John. Murray poised the siqs,4 General DoN KIN said he conceived this,, cresting) was a reflection on the manner In 4vIiIA he had'eX4- cuted his duties as Qoarter-Master-Getierak • The COMM were of opinion that/this was a propel question. and it was accordingly put- • A. I did know that there were several roads, bait. I did not know that there were exactly that number; nor did I ever visit them before that period myself, thOugh I sent several officers to visit and report upon them. I did visit five ulthenrafterwards, when Lord W. Bentinck was before Tarragona. Q. Do you not conceive it discreditable to set fire to your batteries in the middle of the day, and in the face of the garrison, when you might have had notice of the enemy's approach every hour, by sending out patroles ? A. Ido not conceive it to have been dia. creditable ; the necessity for the retreat . depended on the proximity of the enemy, and if such retreat were necessary, I do not conceive it more discreditable to set fire .to batteries in the day time than at any other time. Q. When and where did you last communicate with Sir John Murray personally on the 12th of June ? A. h is impossible to answer that quest as; I my him frequently, and all day. Q. Did you see him after sun-set lA.I do not se. collect; I think not. Q. Do you know when General Clinton'. division embarked, and how long they were in embaiting after they were on the beach? A. I cannot state accu rately. General Clinton's division embarked very Lite, I believe, and was attended by Sir J. Murray in person. I cannot say how long it was embarking. Just at dark, after leaving Captain Bathurst at the western extremity of the Bay, I attempted to get round the Salun Bay in a boat, to superintend the em barkation of the advance then, but after being out a considerable time, and being nearly menet, I retnmed to the beach. It was during_ this time I lost sight of Sir John Murray, and do not remember seeing him again. It wm quite dark when I came back. Q. Were you on shore then I A. I was on shore the greater.part of the night, and we tried to walk across the promontory of Salun to get to the bay, but was so fatigued, that I could not proceed. Ido nut. know whether I was on shore or not, not knowing when General Clinton's division embarked, but I be lieve I was on shore. Q. When did you go on baud ? A. Late on the night of the 12th. After the journey 1 have before stated, I returned an much fatigued, that I went oil board a transport to repose myself, there being no troops in 'sight; next morning very early I went round Salon Bay. Q. Do you know that two of the mortars which were on the beach, and four of the howitzers which were on the Oliva on the night of the 10th, were taken up to the batteries that night ? A. I do not. Q. Do you recollect an instance of any part of General Murray's army coming in contact with the enmy from the Si to the 12th June ? A. I do not. : , _ - 7 Q; Did you think that the enemy would have been long . unacquainted with any material relaxation in ,the s iege, or of its being raised A. I think the ene my, from his numerous spies, would have soon been acquainted with . any relaxation in the siege, or xboughts of raising it. I mean by the enemy, Gene vale De Caen and - Suchet. Q. Would not such information bane We the ene my masters of their MOVIIMMIA and given encouragea ment to the besieged - army t A- Yes. Cross•examioed by Mr. LAMM. Q. U Sucher had formed a junction with De Caen .at keen, while the Allied Army was at Magner, riyield not he have lost his communication with Va lencia by the Allied Army placing themselves on the ,mountains I—A. He would have lost it if we had occupied 411 the passes, and the road by Montblanc. Crosi-exanfined by Admiral HALLOWILL. . Q. Do you not know that the advance of the Al lied Army was at Valls, on tke road to blontblanc on the lulls, Ilth, and 12th of lune, that Colonei Prevost was at Balaguer, on the road to Tortosa, and that the roadi from Villifranca to Ts:Nana were' occupied by detachments from the Catalonian army 4. I know that Colonel Adam and Colonel Prevost wen at the plates stated but Ido not know where r the Catalbntan army of Copons was.; the communi -1 cations with it were direct through General Murray and General Capons, and not through me. Q. Would it have been prudent to have delayed the embarkation till the receipt of in from telliipoon the advance, from Colonel Prevost and the Spanish army I—A., Certainly I for an Officer seat out could only have given an hour and a halPs previous notice, as may be seen by calculation. BY THE Couni.—Q. Could Suchet have obtained information of the siege being raised is lea than S. hours ?—A. Yes, if be received it as Vembils, on the 1 lth ; Wise received it on his march the time would be greater in proportion to his distance. Q. You have said that you received and opened a letter on the 12tb, given you by a Spanish officer ; at what distance from you was General Clinton, the next senior officer, then' from you ?—A. About a mile and a half; and if, on reading' the frost. I found it requited General Clinton's' interfeiniimbis. nsediately, I should have gene with it to ice. • Q. Can you elate what means of sobiletitheirig cbgt had lellich would stable him to wlth, his oar and the troop whisk Wes join . the Al 161f-11-:Pi t . Ca is aid Valmela; *bay' 10d omph 11ia2 410 44.4 41 1 44 fortified phew and I 4F 9 . 1 40 1 _ _,_dst __,„/IPTca4 th an from th e Pr MOO t o &am. ais. so many ps# of ippel for their opirittioicti; besides whit cN ffy **girl she eteantrt wail at their absolute won• trailed dispesal, and. on inhabitant or alcalde dared withhold supplies on requisition. Q. What time would it have required to embark the army at Tarragona, including the ordnance and stores left in possession of the enemy, the cavalry and artillery being sent to Bahiguer 3—A. The whole might have been embarked, if ao interruption wits given by the enemy, and the weather was lemma. ble in about a day and a half; from day - light to dark in one day, and from day-light to noon in ano ther; but this is a loose calculation, as I was unac quainted with the quantity of stone on shore. • Q. Supposing every precaution had been taken to impede the advance of the enemy to Tarragona, such a, breaking up and inundating the roads, destroying bridgra. felling trees ; could he have arrived in time iniondy - to impede the embarkation of the army on *hemming of the I3th 3 -- A. I think he could; the Meth CRUM Rut be inuadated, as the rivers were dry, and helps torrents in winter, had deep beds. . The roads over Santa cristine and the Roca de Llevrr had bath iii broken up, and so was the road by Stentblatte. le-eras hardly possible to destroy the made at -Balasttera: webs,. were rocky. Q,. Hew. map, gisiglisb pike is Villafranca from Tarr eta oppolie,aboaut 32. Q. Would the army's remaining on shore on the night of the 12th haie been attended by any risk ? A. A very considerable risk; for there was no reason to suppose that an enemy advancing by forced marches sometimes et the rate of about thirty miles a•day. from two opposite and distant points, for the express purpose of relieving Tarragona, would stop short when they were in sight, as it were. of that fortress. Q. Was any. part of the enemy's army actually in sight of that fortress t—A.' By the expression 64 as it were," I meant to illustrate their proximity, that Marshal Sachet's corps could see Tarragona, as it were, from the mountains, which were about twenty fin miles distant. Colonel Westin:, of the 27th regiment, coalman, ded a brigade in the division of General Mackenzie. He had reason to believe, on the 10th of June that the garrison of Tarragona was stronger than he had reason to believe by previous report. On the 10th of Jane be called on Sir William Clinton at the Olin, and amongst other conversation, he told him he had pod information. The JUDGE ADVOCATE stated, that General Clin, ton was the proper person to state this, as the witness Was speaking only from hearsay. The witness proceeded.—The embarkation on the 10th of June was conducted with the most perfect regularity, as it appeared to him. He observed so disorder or confusion which could bear the construe tion of disgraceful or discreditable to the setvice. Fiom the observatiop he made, it appeared that there were at least three or four days that a single batta lion could not have embarked, without difficulty ; he would say, three days. Troops at Tarragona, under the protection of ships and gunboats, could not have embarked in the face of an enemy without considerable loss. Gun-boats stationed at Tone del Ban, could not have prevented the march of a columns, even during the day. At night they certainly could not. If the enemy were at Perillo on the evening of the 11 th, or morning of the 12th, with 12,000 men, and at Villa Franca with $OOO men, the army must necessarily have made some great sacrifices. He should have certainly preferred abandoning 17 pieces of ordnance, 74 pieces being already in possession, to losing any part of the infantry, cavalry, or field artillery. He should, if his opinion had been asked on the 12th, have given it against delaying the embarkation to the 13th. • _. Q. Were you ever present when the enemy was attacked by the fire of gun-boats near Torre del Bata, to see the effect it bad upod them ? A. I never was. Q. Do you know that enemy were at Perillo on the Ilth, or did you since learn that ? A. I did not know of them, nor do I yet know it ; but Hearn from the public papers that he was there on the 12th, since these proceedings have been going on. General PAOSTrthillk, for good reasons, the lat ter =the answer ought to be taken down. 8. F. Wntrumonau, Major-General, commanding a Spanish division in the army under Sir John Murray.—Witness conducted a branch of the iaWlice department regarding the French army of ...ralgon, previous to Sir John Murray's arriving in Catalonia; witness calculated the French force in Arta from the best sources he could ob tain; his • was taken from persons on whom he could rely. From Toyama to Tarragona, by the Col de Magner, the distance is 36 English miles. It might be matched in about a day and a half ; witness first understood from Perillo, but from Tomas over the Col de Balaguer to Tarragona, the distance is about 48 tiles, two days' march. The intelligence of tailing the siege could have been con veyed by a Catalan peasant by the mountain road from Tarragona to Tortola la About 24 hours. He knew of several roads from Villa Franta to Tarra gona, going round by Santa Cristina ; and there is one beside the main road, but bow far practicable for miller/ he did not know. There was no defiect sive position whatever on the line of the Gaja to cover the siege; they might be all turned with the greatest ease. The embarkation on the 12th.of June was, be thought, conducted with reguLlety, and he saw OD Colikllloo. A. If General Demen had marched by Santa Cristina on Krum', and Suchet don* the mountain road upon the same place, he coacenred, they could have e ff ected their junction early an the morning of the 13th, and have brought the Allied Army then to action, and auy loss must depend op the- thus It would have taken for the em batkation. He should sot have thought it advisable to have recontateaded the fighting an action with the French army under the waifs of Tarragona, which must have been the consequence of deterring the embarkation to the ISth. Cross examination. Q. Vilist order, and by whom, and when deliver ed, did you Mein any order for the march of your division on the 13th ? A. I received the order to be in retdinses to march, I think, betivieem eight and nine in the morning. It mast have bees delivered oy rootlet the Staff Officer& About twelve s/clock 1 thildt amairtii as - saw erantrsbnb;th, and when &beet half the distance, I received a swat ter order to occupy the gtound whisk. wie fi sL =a.; pied on the investment new the MU. About three o'clock I received the Sail order to march down to the beach to be embarked. Q. Did yon on the ISth observe soy thing to iadi cats the approach of an enemy, except the hurried . movements of the Allied army ? A. I received no information after the night of the link, of the move. Tents of the enemy. Q. Did you know that the enemy had 12.000 men at Perin° on the 11th, or have you brad that since ? A. I was not acquainted with the arrival of the enemy at Pwillo, but only of his arrival at Tortola ; I had an opportunity of ascertaining it since. , Q. Did you know any pass from Teflon to Tar ragoea when Sir J. Murray was at Tarragon, eu ceptilty that by Fort San Mippe ?...-A; I was am acquainted with that pate of the coaatry. I haii heard of a mountain pass, but did,net know it froth my own .observation. .: Q. Do you think the enemy could have passed a column along the road from Veodrils to T notwithstanding the fire of gun-boats t.4 l L arta h rli :: luma must bare suffered some loss, but I de not think such as to prevent their advancing; and at all events, they could have advanced irr the sight. Q. Did Suchet attempt to attack oar force at Ba le/per, except by skirmishing with our cavalry jpearoles, even so late m the nth...A. General MAC. bogie commanded the advance, and can therefore astswer this better. We had no skirmishing wbatevor where I was. _ Q. Was the enemy ever seen while yotriseitat taj leper'—.A. I -did•nat seethenti. • Q. By stationing an officer at Villafrowit and Arbos, might not correct • intelligent* Alto been 'hourly received of the advance, of the many on the ;Web of June on that road N.A. I should drink that ,mosaurd officers bringing intelligence Milt have 'gained some time on the march of an:enemy, but on so good a road not exceeding - two or three hours. Gm. AUCUMUTY said this was not an answer to the question. - . The witness added—The time gained by relays" must have depended on their nusnbzr ; the whole distance is nine hours, and the whole time gained on such a distance could not be owed= the bad, that is, four hours and a half. • • Q. The question is, Whether hourly intelligence might not have been received 1.E.A:410 - doubt you might have received hourly inte • BY van Covar.—Q. - Fronviamm•imaimgense-yon ceived, at what hour and on what - day did &whet reach Zino* and in what forte ?—A. Worts the intelligence I received, which was not such as I had: been accussomed to receive in the kingdom - of Va lencia, Marshal thichet's advanced game entered Tore toss on the Bth, and thi Marshal on the liith i theft force was stated t* Ms so be /1900 men, Q. You have stated that :apposing duehet and De Caen to be the one at Perlllo and the other at Vil. lafranca on the 11th and •12th, and by joining at Reuss they might have attacked the Allied Army on the 13th in the morning '—A. General De Caen had to march about 36 miles,. and Sachet MOIR 32.,t0 faith their junction at Reuss. Q. You have stated that it wool/ have reqtrirect 36 boars to march from Perillo to Tarragona, and nine hours from Villafrauca, bow do you aecouatlbt 'the difference, the distance from the orie place being . SS miles and from the other 32 miles i—A. I take Urrigoaa to be 30 miles from Villafranca, a 611 march ; Perillo is 36 miles, I have stated thrtt it would be a day and a half's march because it could not be • done .in one day, I have stated the trot. Ulla at half a day. By the nine hours which I men. dosed before as the distance fromVillafrenca to Tar ragona, I meant the hours of the country or leagues. .1 did not mean to say an atmy could march 9 hours. Q. How long would it take to march from Villa. franca to-Reuss, by Santa Cristina, and from Tortosa .to that place f—A. From Vdlafranca to Reuss is 36 miles, and from Tortola to Reuss, by Bandillok I should judge to be about 44 miles. These are merely the absolute distances without tefereece. Q. How far is it from Ream to Tarragona NINA. About six miles. Q. De you think it would have been prudent for the enemy to attack the army at Tarragona, early in the morning of the 13th, after a march of **tiles, from the eight of the 1 lth or the morning of the 12th t—A. do not think that it would have been necessary for Marshal Suchet to have attacked immediately the allied force; his army being in presence of the allied. army, would. I should conceive, have prerented them from embarking then, and have reduced es tb the necessity of fighting. ;s:c:7) Q. How long would it take far an army of 900 men to march from Tortola to Rota by Bandilios-t , I —A. I should think they might march is is /Pare two hours, cominvi ns. ti th out any kind of 'Q. And how from lirillafratica, bai r i tnta Cristina, to Rees ? . I should think they tat ht march it in rather less time—abottt thirty-font' hobs the roads being much better, *Nigh the distance is rather longer. , Q. The evidence has stated, without baggage, the march to Rens to be forty4wo hours, Does he mean with artillery ?--A. Certainly not. Major-General Saar* was Brigadier.Golierds and in command of a belied, in the division of Cliseeel Clinton, ander Sir John Murray ; and subsecinantly commanded a division, having his head quartets in Tarragona. It would have required not less than men for the blockade of Tarragona in the event of the army marching to attack the enemy, Whilst the troops were before 1 1 - he oecasioendly rode to the beach, and he did think that the state of the weather and surf was such, at times, as to have made an embarkation, particularly of the guns and animals, if practicable, certainly extremely difilculi and slow in its progress. Troops embarking. in Of face of an enemy under the protection of ships and gun•boats, could not have elected their embarkation without considerable loss. The embarkation on the lath mac perfectly regular; and in nowise disgr4cto Earl or discreditable to his Majesty's service. Chin. boats stationed *sear Torre del Barre, fife OW of the road is within the reach of file *ems the gunboats, could not have prOyented 441 *SW of the enemy, during the night or ,day. Ui should apprehend very little mischief floor oath hoe during did day, and boat ehargite• at' bight, ....GettesarCopcd4. with bemoan tuid WOOS* 4 ~ 0t.3 13 13 13 41 • ' J j l I I