Star. — London, England, 1801-02-20 00:00:00

?c:: !la r, i• • rend •,1 l'i:t marked, leman'; u:iend tan two hue fur immand whether n officer to take helloa. reafons Ilona he le array indigea ap. y : and; oldiers, toms of flquiryt I them occeded men of h priva. vc as an : mvince ng ; and aring of tad been DO men, ter have .owcver, FM 1 w : e Nhat the hour to ces, the , ed from on that krongett r,ret, the detailed he Hon. :of there man un. onfe the Ire with. lowed to .] The om Gea as blunt tie intea ithor be !Jour of hat this e of the s of the poke to , win be to make le very 'our TIO- L myfelf re, on a , I (Ai: trent.— e doors, • all the miLliout inr,nus. Houle :ions to r it the ins me le moil lecaum 10We VC! lac my a Date- - . Iy's in. Ilea de• portant ns RCM tray in rtrcti railed. ckarly Honk, enabled :1 &all 11 eve- Fend. mill• 7 - 7: tar y.operation ; .that they are of .2 nature, hew. ever , hazarclaus, frequently connected with the •WS of this country, and abfolutely necelfary to b attempted on many occafions, I am thoroughly conv inced I but at the fame time that. I feel the neceffity and propriety of fuch attempts, 1 nine be permitted to fay, that he would indeed ill ere cute his duty to his country, whodid no: feel in the ftrongell manner, the danger of the ferviee on which he was embarking, anti the rick of the en. terprize he was about to undertake. The nature of this rifle, and of that danger, is a.point upon', the prefent occafion in be mow ferionfly attended to. It will not be conceived that I mean in the froallefl degree the danger, or rick of losing a cer tin number of men, mare or LA, which, how- 1 ever to be lamented, is the inevitable fortune of -ear ; but what I allude to, applies to that eaten tire view f the fable& which falls to the confide ration of the Commander in Chief, who mutt re gard the danger and rifle as connected with the general prefervation of his corps, and confider whether the obje& to be gained is of fufficient magnitude to warrant that rifle. Had I conceived that the chance of taking . Ferrol came within any fair calculation, and had refrained from the attack merely from a contidcration of the lois of zoo men, fpoken of by the Honourable Gen tleman, or even of a much greater number, I fhould have felt that I had been wanting in my duty to my country, and I deferred much of the imputation which has been fpread abroad... But when, after mature deliberation, I found that an attack prefented no rational chance of fuccers, and that a failure involved not Merely the lora of thofe who might fall in any attack or liege, but even tually the lots of a confiderable part, if not the whole, of the corps under my orders, I certainly found it my duty not to hazard an enterprise, where the chance of fuceefs appeared to be defpe. rate, and the event of a faihre would have com promifed the general fafety of the corps 1 had the honour to command. For without entering into the tenor of my initrnetions, Gentlemen may eafily imagine, that it never could be the intention df any Government, to expofe to imminent Inward abody of troops, the lots of which would net only:have defeated every other object tifthe campaign, but would have been a revere blase to the country, and a material diminution of Its effettive force. The grounds upon which I formed this opinion, I oin explain in a very few words, and in a manner which I troll will be clearly underflood by every Gentleman, however little he may have turned his mind to military fubjeas. In to doing, I 'Gall only mention notorious fa&s, or in every thing material rill upon fuch documents, and ufe Inch means of information as are in the power of every Member of the Houle, without claiming the finallell credit for any affertion of-my own. It will be needlefs to Rate to the Houih the forcers with which our landing was effeeted ; that has been already mentioned by the Hon. Gentlemant for the fame reafan it is needlefs to Rare, ! hat all op polition in our progrefs to the heights above Fer rol was defeated by the gallantry of his Majelly's troops. The poffeffion ofthofe heights gave me a full opportunity next morning of obferving the whole fituation, and the refult of that obfervatinn was, decidedly, not to hazard any attack, as I found that the works of the place were of a nature, in my opinion, to defeat the poffibility of a coup de wain, and I found that the troops to defend there works were more numerous than I had expelled. The number of troops which I myfelf ohferved, and from the reports of other officers, and infor mation of prifoners, afcertained to be oppofed to ns, in the morning, I mean in and out of the town, uncounted to at leall 6uoo men a nuMber much greater than was neceffary, completely, to defend the works round Ferrol. This was the number I mentioned in a private letter written to the Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Dundas), the day after we re-embarked. As to my oblervation of thc town, I law that it was covered on three tides by the lea, or arms of the lea the fourth fide, which has an extent of only i6OO or iSoa yards, is regularly fortified in mafonry, having in that f ace fix ballions, and as many final l ravelins, or rather rfdans. The haftions have a great eleva tion, and upon the curtain which conneas there works is railed a parapet of mafonry, or rather a tione wall of confiderable height. There works are in the belt order, haling been lately conftruacd. Although upon thole fides which are covered by arm: of the lea, the (bore is formed by a ridge of fleep rock which fermi to make all precaution Ull. necefrary, yet the rock has bean (carped away, and every opening built up with the utmoß labour and attention. I mention this circumflance, though not very important in itfelf, becaufe it may ferve in forming a judgment of the tell of the works, and what every one had an opportunity of obferving. Such being the aCtual fituation of Ferrol, and the force to defend it amounting to the number I have mentioned, independent of other corps which could have been thrown in before night, there ap peared to me, morally rpeaking, no chance of file eels in any attempt again ft it. Perfealy convinced, Sir, as I was at the time of the accuracy of the obrerratians I then made, I have had thc oppor tunity fine of having m y opinion confirmed in every point by authorities from perftins wholm•no Ilan can fuppefe to he deeply inturelled, either in Lapp offing the charafter of his Maielly's arms, or :Uilaining my individual reputation. -1 mean I. Ni..j e ll y ' s enemies. I allude to an official 're ran publithed in France, Signed by the Officer :vim gave it, and connterfigned by the Maritime l'refeit at Brea. It begins thus " sate of the place at tie montane of debarkation. • The Garrifon was eompofeil of part M . a kutallon of the nyintent of Africa, and of madam of lanora. :AO fuliliers tb 111..1ini. midi a battalion of chentilitia of itenfj. . If we to this fmall number of troops, thofe compollng eAC try log "TIP of Soria, amountin7 to lOC/ nun, and that of Ares. *minket of a bsttallqo of tbf resins at. Ithtnanorisl dd Ref. •'.l another of thefc two camps arc Amsted, learnt aoJ a h4f trnm kerrll,) we Oral for Orr the total tithe 'coops which could be collected ittnnintc.l to 4o:c) or ayoo nuts It we take away %hut were woreary to card the forts tart the town, there will r. =la about ISco a:pufable men." The concluding part of this paragraph is aline fnificient to decide the whole quellion, as to any farpaCed facility of raking the place. 4. 11 t , ke attar what is secctrary to guard the forts and the town, ' there will remain about i Soo difirerelde men." That is, the enemy had xBOO men more than were neceffary, and more than they wanted for the defence of the place. This was the hate of the troops at the moment of our landing. Now, Sir, the account proce e d s to i n f orm u s , that there waeaftenvards landed from the Spanifit fleet, an other regiment, that of Aflurias , and the refl of . i dle marines, of which only zoo were reckoned be . fore.—The above mentioned account alfo after wards makes mention of a third camp, that of ?ilia, whirit might have been drawn into the town if wanted. Its firength is not mentioned, but the ' grenadiers and chalk:us arc fah{ to have made a very formidable aopearance. 'chef,: reached the neighbourhood of the town about two o'clock: probably, like the others, it confifted of woo or tgoo men. Betides this, we kern from another account published at Madrid, that i battalion of the regiment of Africa, and the Volunteers of A r ragoir, came from Corunna. Thefe battalions were quite dillina from all the other troops; they arrived about i i o'clock on the forenoon of the 26th. It appears that making the loweft calcifie d= for thefe corps, the enemy mull have had, in and dole to the town, upwards of 7000 men. The account publifbed at Madrid enters into no detail of numbers. The letter of the French Am balcador who tranfitits it, talks of 4303 difpotable men, and Come Militia, which clearly means the number of Men beyond lsofe neceffary to guard the town and forts ; -aad the account itfelt lays, the gerrifon of the'place amounted to 3000 men, which, if-there is any thing to be drawn from it at all, gives the fame refult u to numbers with thc for mer account. This account in another mine& confirms the former one, by mentioning the Ge neral of Filing Camps, although it takes r.o no floe of the camps themfelves. I hope after this I shall not hear it faid that the town of Ferrol was defencelefs, or deficient in point of garrifon. 1 truft it will not be argued. here, or hated without doors, twat the:place was affailable by a couneie main, which even the enemy, with all their natu ral folicitude to diminifirtheir numbers and means of defence, have acknowledged to have be..n over-gar 'Limed. .And, Sir, there is the firongell confirma lion poffible of the moil material part ofshis ac canoe in the condua of the enemy. For there awnless who came to oppofe :or attack us, were notifortnedftsetween us and the town, but were feed round brwater, Co as to put us in Come degree between thelovverrand them which•clearly fhew,cl that the enemrehotight ;hemfelves fafilciently Wong to defend .the town without the allifialice of that corps.— . .-So much for the numbers of the ene my. Now, Sir, was Feirol defencele l s in point of works? ltis queltion• is in point of fa& deckled with the former one by the enemy themfelves. If ificso men could be fpared, and looked upon as difpofable out of . goo, or even ggoo, it follows I n that the place wits in itfelf; It therefore ap pearsthat the eteeniy emfelves confirm in the a gett 'dinner my idea of the nature of the works e and of the force to defend thole works, and that of murk it cannot be laid I either proceeded on grounds lightly.taken up, or which have proved ultimately erroneous. • Before' I leave this fubjoft there is one cireumflance More which may de mand a fhort explanation. It has been Paid by the Honourable Gentleman, and it • is hated in one of the accounts, that the enemy were unpre pared in many refpeas, and had not a cannon mounted. 'Phis affertion, allowing it to be true, applies only to the 'situation of the enemy the even ing of the 256, via. the moment the corps under my orders were landing. That landing was not completed, and the troops ma, chest to the heig hts, till five next morning, and I troll no one wi ll ar. fert that either there was a moment loft in the landing or in the march of the troops. We then had only an opportunity ofobferving the place ortthe 26th in the morning, at which time I can affureihe Honourable Gentleman, that I myfelf law cannon upon the ramparts, the enemy were bufily bring ing up more, and there could not be the (mailed doubt that before night, (for it is to be kept in view that there never was an idea of efcalading the town in the day time,) they would be amply provided in this refpea. It appears from the Ma drid account, that the nceelfery preparations for the defence of the town were made, and the 1800 men above-mentioned detached by nine o'clock in the evening of our landing. Though I take the whole refpofibility of the retreat on myfelf, hill I fhould have thought myfelf much to blame, if I had not attempted to profit by the knowledge and 1 advice of the relPeffahle General Officers who AC• cempanied .me. I therefore (poke With them in dividually and colleiftively on the fubjec. They approached and .attentively viewed the place, and they were of opinion that an attack offered no ade quate profpea of (betels, with the exception of one General Officer, who had not at that time fuffici ently made up his mind on the fubjea, but who has informed me that from what be then few, and what he has force learnt, he is confident that the attack would have failed. The Hon. Gentleman has (poke much of an Officer of Engineers of high rank—him alfo I confulted, and he laid, that he thonglit the place might be taken by crealade in the night ; that there was no doubt confider able Mk of failure, but that fuip an attempt might iheiced. NOW, Sir, it is not at all my intention to argue this point, particularly as there is no one hen: to argue it with me; I have only to fay, that my opinion was, and is entirely different, and • that Ferrol did appearto me to be, though certainly not a 'throng fortified place, as much in fafety agitinil what is called a map Jr Labe, or immediate &Muth, as any &linger fortified town, particular ly when it is . eositldered, that the girrifon was doable what was sectary to defend the wm.ks, and that we could not be fupplied with the means for inch an stnempt ; whickun army making a re hatar campaign on the Continent would naturally ve pmvided. It may not be improper to oh.- reeve upon this occafion, that if any env,ineer of rank had propofcd any plan for a ficge, if he had offered a calculation ache time fuch an operation would take, or of the means necelfary to be em ployed, his opinion es an eng:neer would un doubtedly have hatkeeat weight ; but an ercalatle is an operation of a very different nature, and one of which any other officer of experience molt be jult as good a judge as an engineer.—l do not therefore mean to detrain in the (lighteft degree, . from the merits of the officer then with me at the head of that department—when I fay, that upon ,a queftion of that nature, the opinion of any other officer of rank ought to have equal weight with his. We have all of us, I believe (fpeaking of the perfons into-cited), had the benefit of as much experience, and of more general fervice, than that officer, mot in regurd to the particular point of an clealade, we were certainly upon a footing, nor do I believe that there is an officer in the IBlritilh army who ever Ikw fuch au operation attempted, except perhaps in the all Indies, or on tome trifling fcale of no extent whatever. Having no profpeet of fuccefs in an immediate affitult, the only other thing to be coon:l:red was, whether it was pollible to get poffeffion of the place by a re- gular liege ? As no one at the time ever propofed ; fuch a meafure, (and as ftr as I have Lunt, it has never become a fobjed of auimadverfion lime) it will not be neceffiry for ma to take - up i much of the time of the Houfe, in explaining why I judged fuch.an attempt at the time, and why I (till confider it, as totally impracticable. I mutt in 1 the firft - place, have got poffelhion of the f:veral ; forts commanding the entrance of the harbtoir on I both fides, but principally of Fort Sr. Philip, which could not be done without bringing heavy' cannon, and opening batteries againft it. And in this point, the opinion of the principal Enineer, fo often alluded to by the Honourable Gentleman,' coincided with that of every other officer of rank who tow it. From the nature of the coat}, which is formed of deep mountains, without roads of any kind, at lean far ca;oiages, the tranfoorts of heavy cannon molt have been a work of confider. able time, and until we had poffefilon of the Forts, the Fleet mull have lain in an open bay, or rather on the open coall, in a fituatim fo hazardous, that it could not have remained there a moment, whenever the wind, which was then along fhore, changed to the weftward, as was obvious to thole :he lean acquainted with naval affairs. But, Sir, copiloting us to have .get the forts, and to have brought the fleet into a place of greater fafety, it is felt evident I mutt have occupied both tides of the harbour to protea ir, 1% - itotit enter ing into any nice calculation, I am fore I do not over-rate the detachment neceffary for this purpoie ' when 1 fay, that after covering the Beet, and keeping up the nectflary communications, I eculd not have had above 7000 or 8000 men to ferve as a belieging and covering army. i have (hewn that this was nearly the number eh:: enemy had in or clofe to the town the day alter we landed. The whole force of the province, perhaps of other pro vinces, was naturally in movement; I know as a fatt that the troops from Vigo, which I believe is the moll remote garrifon in Gallieitt front Ferrol, were adually upon the murch, and i am confident that.l fptak within bounds when I fay, that they could have Rambled to,ooo or i 2,0n0 men, in ad dition to the garrifon, beferel thoutd haveadmon Opened the tionches. Toon:rapt a liege againft equal numbers is a very unufual operation in war. The calculation in common cat.., is to hive three times the number of the garrifon, but to attempt it againft 'lnch a fuperiority as this, is entirely out of the qucflion. After all, hlr. Speaker, there has been as you arc well aware, much clamour on the fubjea of Ferrol, the greater part confining, as one might naturally fuppdfe, of general and vogue language, • proceeding from the • ignorance of ft queftirm,,whish fe* indeed had the means of undernanding The place was defencelefs ; there were only aao men; the governOr came running out with tut keys ; the admiral offered to take it with the marines and fenmen only. It is far from my intention to take up the time of the Houfe' in attempting to refute fuch palpable nonfenfe ; but there arc one or two points, to which I beg leave 'hardy to advert. It has been Ctid that an univerfal panic and eon ninon prevailed among the enemy. Gentlemen are extremely apt to nreteh points fo as to fop port the opinions they may adopt., As fariehnw ever, as the enemy Mewed themfelves in the field, no one rani fay they difplayed any fymptom of panic or confufion. In the town they fecund to be extremely bury in making arrangements for their detince, which we had the rare opportunity of tieing, as we took the whole of the work in reverie. Could the flrongel town in Europe, un- I der fimilareircumnances, be obfcrvcd from a cont. mending height, and taken in reverie, the fame appearances might load officers of zeal, but in experience, to judge that to be panic, which in the eyes of thofe of real experience, molt appear to be occalioned by the very contrary rcatoa, a de. termination to ufe every means of defence. The march of troops, the dragging of guns, and the . univerfal movement in every quarter, we all know mull be the natural confequence of an apprehend ed attack, but how k is to be conftrncd into the tired of panic and confufion, I own I had not then, nor have I now, ingenuity. to difcover. The frightened merchants,, who had fled to Lifbon, whom the Hon. Gentleman had mentioned, might indeed have fo defcribed the difPofition of the in habitants of Fermi, in confufion and fear, not unwilling to furrender, but that could have no material conneflion with the defence of the gar. rifon, particularly as the works were detached from the town, and neither officers or foldiers Were fo liable to be influenced by the temper of the inhabitants. It has been Paid that Fort St. Philips was not occupied by the enemy on our firft landing, and might therefore have been taken pof. feffioa of. It happens that we landed upon the oppofite fide of the mountain from Fort St. Phi lips, that the troops which difputed the heights with us in the evening came from Fort St. Philips,' and retired to it again, and were thofe troops no doubt for whom the boats, mentioned in the naval officer's letter produced by the Hon. Gentleman, were in preparation, in order to carry them actors the harbour. It has been fait that the Admiral remonnrated grit& the retreat, and, that the na vy offered to do theme with the flair, if I would only take the forts. The Adnifrat um". made the (lighten ohjetion to the =mat, oor did? c, or any other naval officer, mike to the at mirtinte,:any 1 ,, 0pol:el wha:ever to •mike 'Le attack with the fleet, nor did any converlation I had held with the Admiral before, nor any thing which paffecLat the time, convey to me the kart idea that he could have any fuch intention. The Houle may be af lured that I am far from vvithing to throw the fmalleft refleCtion on the di flin guilbed Officer who commanded the- fleet, who I am confident was right in the line of condo& he adopted-on the cation, of making nooproporal to the on the tub. kid. There is another report, which ought neut rally to have been clatled with thole unworthy-cf reply, but I am induced to tihe particular notice of it from my refped for the iiluftrious perfon whole name has been moll improperly introduced. It has been raid, that I retreated in coal - sequence of private orders from the Commander in Chief. How or with what intention any one could hTzard an infinuation fo wicked, lb falfe, and in abfurd, I ihail not pretumc to fay. If doue with a view to apologize for my conilue, I want no loch apology. If with a vier. , to throw oditim on the charader of the iiluili ions per' n alluded to, the : uniform tenor of his lite offers the molt unanfwer. able tellimotry,* that he never could give any 1 orders to any Officer *hieh did not tend to the in , tere fl s of his cerantry, and to fitprort the charatler lof his Majefty's arms. I have' heard the names • of Offi-ers q uoted on the ..albjed of Errol, who - I am confi dent have not given loch opinions as ! thole which are imputed to them. But the reports which have been tpread did probably originate with tome of the Officers who were prefent on the occafton, by whom the letters produced by the Hon. Gentleman were written ; but they muff have been written by inferior Officers."----[Mr sturt role, and repeated " inferior Oflicers !"]— Sir James returned, I mean Officers below the rank of General Officers or Admirals. In regard to the Navy, from whom it is well underflood that thefe reports principally proceeded, lam fortunate ly not called upon to examine whether the Officers belonging to that fervice, are or ate not the belt judges of military operations, becaufe it fo hap pens, that, with the exception of one Officer of rank, who never has, and cannot be quoted on the occa 7 lion, not one ofthern ever law the place, cr came near it, or could pefilhly have a fingle idea upon roe fubjeCt. The Officers of the Navy were pro perly employed in attending to their own bufinefs, which they executed, as I have Dated in my public letter, and as I again repeat, extremely well, cer tainly without meaning to infer from thence, that they are competent judges of the military point of defence of any place, far lets of the Or, ngth cf a place they never faw. The fituation of the Offi cers of inferior rank in the Army, in refped to the means of forming a judgment upon this Operation, differed from that of the Officers of the Navy more in appearance titan in reality. They undoubtedly law or might have fen the place, but alrnoll all of them at a conliderable unfuriiffied with any plan, information, or previous notibix bra the (Wiled, and occupied in the fubordinate duties cif their fituations, could only have a view of it, as lit tle to be relied on as their previous information mull have been it:interred. No man can, or might to be more unwilling than myfelf, to dere& from the merits of the gallent and high-fpirited Offi cers of the Army; but I may undoubtedly fay, that they are not universally judges either of the management cf a large body of troops, or of the nature of the attack and defence of forti fied places; and it is at all events quite certain, that under the circumfthnces I have before Dated, it is impoffible they could from any found judgment on the fubjed. I have not made there remarks from fuppofing that many Officers of the Army have given into the fort of clamour which hat been made about Ferrol ; but I think it right to thew upon every fuppofition how little that clamour ought to have been attended to. I began by (biting how the queftion flood in point of fie, and I have now (laud how it refits, if it is to be derided ler authority. 'That is, whether the high and experienced Ofdcers of the Army, having ap proached the place with a view of examining it, fumiffied. with previous information, and taking all the eircumftances of the cafe under confideta. don, are or are not better judges than thofe of a different profeffion, who never law the place at all, or than thofe of inferior rank and kfs expe rience—.if lush have given any opinion. who net being called upon to dr c ide, ntot totally unfumillicd with the material. Kant which a indiment was to be formed, (peal: (torn a ditiant and calital view of the town. Now, Sir, it will naturally be Mkt:, how came reports In unfounded to be generally believed ? and that idea may perhaps leave aline of floating doubt in the minds of thole who have not turned their thoughts to fubjcas of this kind. I think I can explain this in a few words, and thcfe will not be in other refpcds inapplicable to the cubic& I may without any difelolure of the &teas of Government, fairly affert what is publicly known, that the Expedition spina Ferrol was not the only fervice on which the corps under my orders wits defined to be employed t a confideration which undoubtedly did, as it ought, weigh much with me throngii the whole bonnets, and a confideration of ifreat magnitude, that mien t nearly in itfelf have induced me to adopt the line I followed, had even the nature of the works, and the force of the place been to a certain degree of a different Complexion from what I found them to be. This conlideration particularly tended to confirm me in what ought to he the fixed deterMination ofevery officer upon fueb a Cervices to attack the town if I thought it asiviiible fo to do, but if not, to re-embark without a mo ment's delay. Unneceffary and lots, merels for the fake of oppear.tace., I was determined to avoid—Being convinced in my own mind, that there was little or nn chance of comfy I Amid have thought rnyfelf highly culpable if 1 had hcfi tated a moment about re-embarking the troops.— In the tirft place, every hour's delay might Lave rendered the re-embarkation impoffible by change of wind. Secondly, every movement of the troops might have been attended with tome lots, twilit to that we had experienced; and leafy, the place of re-embarkation was the moll unfavourable that can be imagined for that purpnfe, and where ss ii 11 ,1 , 1 . c i q