Star. — London, England, 1815-02-02 00:00:00

his instructions. VielienNoreiti Cn search of Sir John Murray, and met hint coming from Villoseep. I translattellieletter' id bhti verlatins, and after he had considered it welle heigitin expressed his intention of raising the siege, and added, that it must be carried into execution immediately. I requested hint to give me such orders as he should choose to have conveyed. It was then desired by Sir John Murray to send to General Clinton to desire him to call on General Whittingliam'S corps, and send them down to the beach. General Clinton was then to put his division in movement tucover this march of General Whit tingham's corps. He was previously to call in his pickets, destroy the gun carriages, anal spike the guns. As I felt the importance of this order, I repeated it, word for word, to Lieutenant Drew, in the presence of Sir John Mori ay, and asked him whether it was correct ? Sir Jahn told me it was, and I then direc ted Lieutenant Drew to proceed with these orders to General Clinton.. • • Q. Did you send Lieutenant Drew to General Mackenzie vith similar instructions as to spiking the guns in front of his position ? A. I do not believe that I sent Lieutenant Drew with any such orders. I have no recollection of Lieutenant Drew carrying any orders but those that I have stated, to be sent to General Clinten. Q. Did you receive any further orders relative to the embarkation, and what were they ? A. I did. Sir J. Murray desired me to go down to the beach, and request of the neval officers that the embarkation might be conducted in the following manner:—that the troops should be embarked first, and the horses, mules, and stores afterwards. This request was re peated by me to the naval officers, twice or thrice to the course of the day. Q. Have the goodness to state what occurred on the 12th, subsequent to your receiving this order ?-- A. Sir John Murray having perceived that the order, he bad pointed out for the embarkation was occasio .l nally deviated from, sent me twice or three times down to the beach to repeat his request. In convey ing the request of the Commander of the forces. I thought it right to acquaint some of the naval officers to whom I spoke, that they were mistaken in think ing, as they did, that the army was retiring before 5000 men only. I told them that Sir John's reasons for repeating the request were founded on the proxi mity as well as the force of the enemy that was com ing down. Sir John Murray sent him in the evening to Captain Bathurst, requesting him to discontinue tlhre embarkation of the horses and mules at the west ern extremity of the bay, and send off his boats to the centre of the hay, to take off the troops. Having delivered my official communication to Captain lia thatrsc, I then informed hint of the latest intelligence. He then asked me what was to become of tile horses and mules ? I answered that they were to be em barked after the infantry, if there was time; if not, (*course they would be destroyed. I also added, that if Decaen's corps continued moving on that day at the same rate that it had done on the preceding day, it might reech Tarragona that afternoon. The embarkation continued the whok evening, and to a late hour in the night. • • Q. Do you recollect being present at an interview between Geaeral McKenzie, Colonel•Thackery, Colo nel Adams, and myself, on the 12th. If so, state what took place at that interview ?—A. Having met those officers at the door of Sir John Murray's house, they asked me to return and accompany them, which I did. The aject of their calling on Sir John was to speak about the propriety of fighting Decaen. Co lonel Adams addressed Sir J. Murray at very consi derable length, and stated a variety of reasons for marching that day to attack Decaen. When he had finished, Colonel Thackery also addressed him to the same effect, but not at equal length. After Sir J. Murray had listened to both of them, be answered, 44 I will do no such thing. Besides, if I were inclined to attack Decaen, be would not fight me. He would naturally fall back on Barcelona, and leave me no choice but that of following him or net. If r fol lowed him, I should lease: Tarragona open in the rear for Marshal Suchet to enter; and I should find my - sell between Tarragona and Barcelona, with all my communication to the shipping cut off. If I should stop short, and return in rime to prevtnt MarslialpSu chet from trite-rm . , Tarragona, I should still have failed in my objec t bringing Decaen to action, and return against a new enemy with harassed troops." In addition to this, Sir John said that he would give them another reason, and produced a paper,of which be remembered one passage to be relative to not corn mining the safety of the army. On hearing this, Ge neral M'Kenzic, who had not spoke before, said dc there is no answering that." Those gentlemen then' retired, and he went with them. Q. Did the cadets given you on the day of the 12th appear to have been sent in endless succession ? A. 1 can curly recollect two orders that were given tome on that day. The first was with respect to the re treat of the troops to the beach ; and the second was for their embarkation. This latter order was repeated . twice or thrice, but without any variation. Q. Did you see Admiral Hallowell on the evening of the 12th, and did he say any thing to you relative tot dispatch ? A. I had no official communication with • Admiral Hallowell on that evening; and I. . must decline - giving any account of what happened on thit day, except what was in the course of my official duty or of communications. General Donkin being then asked about the num bers of the French army, produced the official state ments which he had made from the best information which he could collect, when at the head of the de partment of secret intelligence. In July, 1812, he had estimated the army of Catalonia at 30,800 in fantry, of which 7,000 afterwards marched into Va lencia to join' Suchet. This statement of his agreed within a few hundreds of the estimate that Colonel Cabanes had made of their force from other sources of information. The French disposable force in the Province of Catalonia appeared from both those state ments.to be about 13,000. -He was then asked,—Did he, front his knowledge oldie situation and equipments of the army, conceive it to be in a conditicin for active operations in the field in the month of Jane, 1813 f--. Not for any distant operations, from having few or no mules attached to the Comm•ssar bit, for carrying provisions. The ar tiacry also were inndequatele - horsed, and they had be .a small propoition of , eloussonition waggons. Above 600 artillery horses and mules were left be- I l ia et-Meant, for want of stifficiihst transports' All the Commissariat tinier were - kit behied for thosame reason. Thera TzeritAout .34amulsisittaohs4 be rst , department Wore Tatrigohai but they. i btro hired in dinUotintry .3! •vc I .1" .. Being theri.questicined.about the number tibial, q(4ut Toads between Tortola and Tarragona by die vale of the Ebro, he replied, that he knew of west roads, besides a carriagcable road by Mont Blanc . The shale of the seven roads were practicable for ca valry and infantry. Six of them were, however, not practicable for artillery, unless for light and die mounted guns. He then described the roads Ircrn Villa Franca to Tarragona, of which there were seve ral practicable for carriages. He was then questioned as to the embarkation. Q. Was the embarkation conducted with order and regularity ?—A. It was with as much order as an em barkation on an open beach, with some surf on it, could be effected. Q. Did you perceive any disorder or confusion that could bear the appearance of being discreditable or disgraceful to his Majesty's service ?—A. None. Q. Do not you conceive that it would have been highly imprudent to have left 4000 troops on the beach during the night of the 13th, for the purpose of pro tecting the guns ?—A. I should conceive it imprudent, as such a force on an open beach, without any advan tage of positiOn, might be harassed and checked by the garrison of Tarragona, until the enemy could come up in force. General Donkin then stated, at pretty considerable length, his decided opinion, that inferior as the army was both in number and quality, it would have been highly imprudent to have risked a battle with the enemy, who were in possession of the fortified place of Tarragona, within a mile and a half of the place of embarkation. He could conceive no other way of carrying off the heavy guns, but for the whole army to have stopped until they were brought doWn to the beach—He was then asked Q. Would he h a ve advised the risking the loss of any pat t of the army or its equipments, in preference to abandoning 17 spiked guns, the army having still 74. pieces of cannon in their possessirn ?-.-A. He should not have advised its he considered that it would have been highly imprudent so to do : I.e thought, besides, that it was not only a part of the army, but the whole that would have been risked. At three o'clock the Court adjourned till to-mor row (this day). 4.IIERIC.IN SIME PiIPERS. (No. IV. CONTINUED.) f° , 4 ~ : ~,,,, ...'J 15 s l t 1 4 3 ~ .. • I .:. . •J . .1 1 1 1 , THE ANIERICAN TO TILE BRITISII COMMISSIONERS. Serr. 9, 1814. di With respect to the mere question of peace with the Iniii ins, the undersigned have already explicitly assured the British Plenipotentiaries, that so fir as it depended on the United States, it would immedi ately and necessarily follow a peace with Great Bri. tain. • If this be her sole object, no provision in the treaty to that effect is necessary. Provided the In dians will now consent to it, peace will be imme diately made with them, and they will be reinstated in the same situation in which they stood before the commencement of hostilities. Should a continuance of the war compel the United. States to alter their policy towards the Indians, who may still take the part of Great Britain, they alone must be responsible for the consequences of her own act in having induced them to withdraw themselves from the protection of the United States. The employment of. savages. whose known rule of warfare is the indiscriminate torture and butchery cf women, children, and pri soners, is, itself, a departure from the principles of humanity observed between all civilized and Chris tian nations, even in war. The United States have constantly protested, and still protest against it, as an unjustifiable aggravation of the calamities and horrors of war. Of the peculiar atrocities of Indian warfare, the allies of Great Britain, in whose behalf she now demands sacrifices of the United States, have, during the present war, shewn many deplo rable examples. Among them, the massacre, in Cold blood, of wounded prisoners, and the refusal of the rights of burial of the dead, under the eyes of British officers, who could only plead their inability to controul these savage auxiliaries, have been repeat ed and are notorious to the world. " The United States might, at times, have em ployed the same kind of force against Great Britain, to a greater extent than it was in her power to em ploy it against them ; hut from their reluctance to resort to means so abhorrent to the natural feelings of humanity, 'they abstained from the use of them until compelled to the alternative of employing them velves Indians, who would otherwise have been drawn into the ranks of their enemies. _ _ 66 The undersigned, suggesting to the British Ple nipotentiaries the propriety of an article by which Great Britain and the United States should recipro cally stipulate never hereafter, if they should again be at war, to employ savages in it, believe that it would be infinitely more - honourable to the Chris tian temper of both parties, more advantageous to, the Indians themselves, and better adapted to secure their permanent peace, tranquillity, and progressive civilization, than the boundary proposed by the Bri tish Plenipotentiaries. 64 With regard to the cession of a part of the Dis trict of Maine, as to which the British Plenipoten tiaries are unable to reconcile the objections made by the undersigned with their previous declaration, they have the honour to observe, that at the conference of the 9th ultimo, the British Plenipotentiaries stated, as one of the subjects suitable for discussion, a revi sion of the boundary line between the British and American territories, with a view to prevent uncer tainty oud dispute s and that it was on the point thus stated, that th e undersigned declared that they were provided with instructions from their Government: A declaration which did not imply that they were in structed to make any cession of territory in any quar ter, or to agree to a revision of the line, or to any exchange of territory, where no uncertainty or dis pute existed. 66 The undersigned perceive no uncertainty or matter of doubt in the treaty of 1783, with respect to that part of the boundary of the District of Maine which would be affected by the proposal of Great Britain on that subject. They never have under stood that the British Plenipotentiaries who signed that treaty, had contemplated a boundary different from that fixed by the treaty, and which sequins no thing more, in order to be definitely ascertained, Ulan LI be surveyed in conformity with its provisions.— This inbjecknat /raving beep a matierof ancertalaty inidispute, the undersigned are fOll illitflieted upon it; and they cis have so asthocity to tea: any part of the siAte of Massachusetts, eyen for what the Bri tisb cove/malt aright consider:a fair equivalent. " In regard to ,the boundary of the North•westem Frontier, so soon ae the proposition of Indian boun dary is disposed of, the undersigned have no objec tion, with the explanation given by the British Pleni- , potentiaries, in their last note, to discuss the subject. " The undersigned, in their former note, stated with frankness, and will now repeat, that the two propositions--I st, of assigning in the proposed treaty of peace a definite boundary to the Indians living within the limits of the United States, beyond which boundary they should stipulate not to acquire, by purchase or otherwise, any territory 2dly, of secu ring the exclusive military possession of the Lakes to Great Britain, are both inadmissible ; and that they cannot subscribe to, and would deem it useless to refer to their Government any arrangement, even provisional, containing either of these propn;iti , ,ns.— With this understanding, the undersigned are now ready to continue the negociAtion ; and, as they have already expressed, to discuss all the points of diffe •rence, or' which might hereafter tend in any degree 'to interrupt 'the harmony of the two countries. 41 The undersgnell Nquest the British Plenipoten tiaries to accept . Ili iiiiir:mce of their, high consi- Aeration. `• • • is Au* (Amin ADAMS, - -- a JAN= A. NAYA4D, 44 JfibIATUAN 11117MELL, " To the PleuipOts.ntlaries of Lis Britannic Majesty, &c." 4 'II. CLAY, " A. GALLATIN." NO. V. TILE BRITISH TO THE AMERICAN COSIMISSIONZIIII. " Glton, Sept. 19c 1814. " The undersigned have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note addressed to ihein by the Ante . rican Plenipotentiaries on the 9th inst. " On the greater part of that note, the under signed have no intention to make comments, having proposed to themselves throughout the negociation to avoid all unnecessary discussions, more espe cially when tending to create irritation. On the question of the north western frontiers, they are happy us find that no material difficulty is likely to arise. With respect to the boundary of the district of Maine the undersigned observe with regret, that although the American Plenipotentiaries have acknowledged themselves to be instructed to discuss a revision of the boundary line, with a view to prevent uncertainty and dispute, yet, by assuming an exclusive right at once to decide what is or is not a subject of uncertainty and dispute, they have rendered their powers nuga tory or inadmissibly partial in their operation. " After the declaration made by the American Plenipotentiaries, that the limited States will admit of no line of boundary between their territory and that Of the Indian nations, because the natural growth and population of the United States would be thereby arrested, it becomes unnecessary further to insist on ' the proof of a spirit of aggrandizement affirt:eil by the purchase of Losisiana irons France, against the known conditions on which it had been ceded by Spain to that country, er the hostile seizure of a great part of the Floridas, under pretence of a dispute re specting the boundary. 44 The reason given by the American Pleniplisin daries for this declaration equally applies to the as signment of a boundary to the United•StateS. on any 'tide s with whatever views proposed; and. the unli. mited nature of the , pretensions would alone have jus tified Great Britain in seeking more .effectual , recuri ties against its application to Canada then any which the undersigned have had the honour to propose..--- Had the American Plenipotentiaries been instructed on the subject of Canada, they would not have as serted that its permanent annexation bad not been the declared object of their Government. It has been dis tincily avowed to be such at different times, parties& early by two American Generals on their respective invasions of Canada. If the declaratit n first made had been disapproved, it would not have been repeat ed. The declarations here referred to are to be foond in the proclamation of General Hull' in July, 1812, and of General Smyth in November, 1812, copies of which are hereunto annexed. " It must be also from the want of instructions that the American Plenipotentiaries have been led to assert that Great Britain has induced the Indians to withdraw from the protection of the United States. The government of the United States cannot have forgotten that Great Britain, so far from inducing the Indians to withdraw themselves from the protec tion of the Unied States, gave the earliest int"rma don of the intention of those nations to invade the United States, and exerted herself, though without suc cess, to prevent and appease their hostility. The Indian nations, however, having experienced, as they thought, oppression instead of protection from the United States, declared war against them previously to the declaration of war by that country against Great Britain. The treaty by which the Indians placed themselves under the protection of the United States is now abrogated, and the American govern ment cannot be entitled to claim, as a right, the re newel of an article in a treaty which has no longer any existence. The Indian nations are therefore no longer to be considered as under the protection of the United States (whatever may be the import of that term) and it can only be on the ground that they are regarded as subjects, that the American Plenipo tentiaries can be authorised to deny the right of Great • Britain to interfere on their behalf in the negotiation for peace. To any such claim, it is repeated, that the treaties concluded with them, and particularly that of Grenville, are in direct opposition. It is not necessary to recur to the manner in which the terri tory of the United States was at first settled, in•order to decide whether the Indian nations, the original in habitants of America, shall have some spot assigned. to them where they may be permitted to live in tran quillity ; nor whether their tranquillity can he secured without preventing an uninterrupted system of en aotchment upon them under the pretence of pur chases. If the American Plenipotentiaries are • au thorized peremptorily to deny the right of the British government to interfere with the pacification of the Indian nations, and for that reason refuse all nego ciation on the subject, the undersigned are at a loss to understand upon what principle it was, that at the conference of the 9th ultimo the American Plenipo tentiaries invited discussion on the subject, and added,. that it was not possible fur them to decide without discussion, whether an amid' could be trained which should lie mutually :satisfactory, and to' 11 Wei! they should think dmitteltet, stodgy *sir disavii?lun7 powers, warranted in acceding. "The emdetstgned must further observe, that if the American govern ment has not furnished their Plenipotentiaries with any instructions since January last, when - the general pacification of Europe could not have been inimedi. ttely in contemplation, this subsequent silence, after an event se calculated (even in the view which the American Plenipotentiaries have taken of it in their note of the 24th ult.) to influence the negociation is, to say the least, no proof of a sincere desire to brine it to a favourable conclusion. The British gnverr ment has entered into the negociation with an anxiou; wish to effect an amicable artangement. After con. vulsions unexampled in their nature, extent, and du. ration, the civilized world has need of repose. 'l'o obtain this in Europe, Great Britain has made con. siderable sacrifices. To complete the work of gene. ral pacification, it is her earnest wish to establish t. peace with the United States, and in her endeavours to acccmplisli this object, to manifest the same pine'. pies of moderation and forbearance ; but it is tittetle inconsistent with her practice and her principles eves to abandon, in her negotiations for peace, those who have co-operated with her in war. The undersigieel therefore repeat, that the British government is wiliing et) sign a ereaty of peace with the United States on terms bsmournizte to both parties. it hes not ()feted any terms which the Unitedatates can justly repre sent asdorogatoryao their honour, nor can it be in.. ductal to accede • t , , any which are injurious to its own. it is on this ground that the nedersigned at e anthorieed distinctly to . declare, -that they are ia strutted nut to sign a tieety of peace with the Pleni potent'aries of thet. United. States unless the Indian nations are included in it, and restored to all the rights, privileges, ancherritcwies which they enjoyed in the year 1811 previous to the commencement of the war, by viititz of the treatya of Grenville, and the treaties subsequently concluded between them and the United States. From this point the British Pie nipotentiaries cannot depart. They are further instructed to nffer for disco - ;. sion an article by nhich the contracting parties shall reciprocally bind themselves, accoiding to boundaries to be agreed upon, not to purchase the lands occu pied by the Indians within their respective lines of demarcation. By making this engagement, subject to revision at a given period, it is hoped that the cb. jection to the establishment of a boundary beyond which the settlements of the United States should be for ever excluded, may be effectually obviated. 66 The undersigned have never stated that the ex clusive military possession of the Lakes, however conducive they are satisfied it would be to a good understanding between the two countries, without endangering the security of the United States, was to be considered as a sine qua non in the negociation. Whenever the 4uestion relative to the pacification of the Indian nations (which,subject to the explanations alreedy given, is a sine qua non) shall be adjusted, the undersigned will be authorised to make a final proposition on the subject of Canadian boundaries, so entirely founded on principles of moderation and justice, that they feel confident it cannot be rejected. This proposition will be distinctly stated by the un dlersigned, upon receiving an assurance from the - American Plenipsnentiaeiei..thae they cnnsider them e selves authorised to conclude a provisional article en di subject, and upon their isreviousle esnuenting so iticlude the Indian oat one 4-theing:icy, 1 . 4.41 e WN' ter above described. . . _ . ? 4 , The undersigned ava'il tbeenselees of thia oppor. 'unity of renewing to the 4mericati Plenipotenttarige flue assurance of their high consideration. (Signed) 66 46 kUOIRY ontnewasn 66 WILLIAM ADAM.. 14 The Ministers Plenipotentiary and r e atraardioary of the United States, Am" HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NOVEMBER as. THi IN VEATIGATAON. Mr. Johnson, of Kentucky, from the Committee to inquire into the causes of the success of the enemy itt his invasion into this district in August last, delivered. in a report, of very great length, together with a 'go luminous mass of documents. This report (principally of a narrative .character) Mr. Johnson moved to be printed, together with the following documents, selected from the mass laid he. fore the Committee, as tending to give an impel:dal view of the whole transaction 1. A report of the army, its number and distribution, previous to Ist of July, 1814. 2. Letter of Colonel Monroe, then Secretary of State. 3. Letter of General Armstrong, late Secretary of War. 4. Letter from the Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy. S. Letters from the Hon. Richard Rush, Attorney-General. 6. Communication from the War Department, including the orders in relation to the loth Military District, the requisition of the 4th of July, and the Correspondence with the Governors of Pennsylvania, Virginikand Maryland, and with General Winder. 7. The Narrative of General Winder. S. Reports of Generals Stansbury, Smith, Young, Douglas, . gad Hengerford, Colonels Sterrett, Miner, Taylor, Laval, and Major Pinkney, and Captains Burch and Caldwell. IL Report from tbe, Navy Department, Wading the ofacid *sport of Commodore Barney. 10. Letters from General Van Nees, Dr. Catlett, and John Law. lir Reports from the Ordnance Depemmat. sit, Sentence of the Coort-Martial in relation to tptsin Dyson, and the correspondence between him and the Secretary or War. IS. Report from the Corporation of Alexandria, including the capitulation, and letter from General John Mason. 14. Report from the Superintendent of Public Banding,. 15. Letter front William Sinamone: Mr. Gaosvamon, of New York, observing the great volume of the report and documents, objected to the prihting of these papers, lest. the length of time it ',add occupy should delay a Consideration of the Repots. Mr. Witansa, of N. H. (a Metnbie the Coin• mittee of Investigation) hoped these Open would be printed: He dissented altogether from the . manner in which the report had been prepared, thou b was willing to do justice to the asiiiluify of the Man of the Committee in maturing the j I soon as the documents should be properly in session of the House, Mr. Webater said he - onl4 think it his duty to make some motion on the.subjeii. The report itself had indeed been a product of gre g : labour ; it was a sort of Chronicle:—but, in his viele, it answered no she purpose for Which the Commit* who made it had been appointed. So tar from desiring up the causes of thi failure of our arms at this place. he thought it *a* cakutai . ed g though intended, to ;over up pa=cils Kik) , and &tail . what he Onsideted a - most ttisgiiteful triinsactjon. , Mr. G . 202V nA ystladruff his .Optiositiort. • * Mr. trOifie*tnilefaim - its judg