Star. — London, England, 1802-05-04 00:00:00

new Kingdom, or Prefidentfhip, call it what you will, fI:4W of itfelf have operated as a fufficient rea• fun for either of the Ccntrading Parties to fay— , Here is a queftion which changes the whole ft ate of the tranfadion, and the Treaty necera illy affurnes a new face." Was there ever, at any former period, an event like that which would nut have been the caufe of a new war, or of new ftpulations ? If it has not produced a new coali tion, it is owing only to the loft !late of Europe, and to the depreffion from which the powers of the Continent have not yet recovered. If Aufiria was fo very defirous of eftablifhing a barrier be tween her and France, by the Treaty of Lune ville, what mutt the think now ? She feels all her danger, but fhe thinks it at the fame time too much to venture the attempt of extricating her !elf from the perils by which the is threatened. — The difpatching of a fleet and army to the Weft Indies is, no doubt, very different ; but I do not think I go too far in laying, that it may prove a fubjed of great and awful confideration. The power of France in that part mull be re-eftablifhed at a much earlier period than it would have other. Rife been. Delay was, with regard to us, a molt material poiat, and I may pronounce the contrary conduct one of thole political reaches calculated to injure its authors. Under the third head are com prehended thole points of the Definitive Treaty, which may be confidered as departing from the preliminary Treaty ; and firft, Sir, permit me to advert to the Article which relates to the prifo- ners here, for whom a very large fum was due to this country. We have heard that this money was to be paid—we have heard that French iflands vacre to be mortgaged for it , but the fad is, that the prifoners have been reftored, and the debt in curred by France remains unpaid. I fuppofe, for in in thisinflancc Ifpeak by conjedure,that France was determined not to pay it;and a new expedient was rcforted to. We are now not only to pay for our prifoners in France, but alfoto pay for the cloathing and arming of the Ruffian prifoners, deftined to ad there agamft ourfelves. I'he idea was thrown out by the French Government with the view of flittering the weaknefs of a late unfortunate Mo narch, by making his fubjeds, who were prifit tiers in France, the inftrurnents of his refentment againft this country. Thus, inftead of kiffing the rod, we ate called upon to pay for the rod. For I feel I am not wrong in laying that the Puflian troops were cloathed and equipped for the purpofe of being employed in an attack upon this country. —We next, Sir, come to the queftion of Malta : An expel:: ftipulation was made, that Malta fhotild be made independent of both Powers, and p: -rai under the protection of 'a third Sovereign. ,I:l.ffia was underftood ; but it is now put into the hands of a third Power, without the power of proteding it. After all this hocus-pocus, this con veying and re-conveying, this tranflation and re tranflation, I am convinced, that every one who views this fubjea %rich candour mull fee we are com pletely oufted. The fate that awaits that ifland is but too evident. Our firft objett is to afcertain how this new order of Knight', is to exilt. The revenues are certainly inadequate to their fupport. The whole of the territorial and commercial reve nues of the Mind of Malta is not more than 30,0001. all of which is ahforbed in charitable par. poles, and in maintaining the dignity of the Order. No provifion whatever is made for keeping the garrifon and repairing the works. In France, the property of the Knights is entirely confifcated ; in Spain the fame forfeiture will fhortly follow ; in Italy it is at no great diftance ; and, indeed, in font: places, has already taken place; and in Bavaria, as well as on the Banks of the Rhine, the revenues of the Order are al nsoft completely gone. So that here is a new order of Knighthood to be supported by the if of Malta, and if four-fifths of its revenues, out of the ifLaad, have been confifcated, I am furely warranted in taking by what means ? What a curious and difgraceful situation is it reduced to, when the Nobility, which conftituted its fup port, arc •.vithdrawn, and a kind of a noble demo c-atical race fubftituted in their room I (hall not dwell upon the folly of this fame, but merely ex pole the abfurdity of making that Order indepen dent which mull be chiefly compofed of the fubjeCts of the French Government—l mean from Italy. Even fuppofing the Neapolitan Government inde pendent of France, what are the provifions made for delivering the Island into hands in which we cannot confide ? At all events, we mull evacuate it at the end of three months; but then we are to deliver it to the Order. And as fome fecurity, there is an article by which the neutrality of the Order is to be proclaimed. Let us then fee how this equal neutrality would operate, should each power have the right of fending an equal number of (hips into the ports of Malta. In the cafe of war with France, the mutt have Spain and Hol land for her allies ; confequently , if we pares the privilege of fending in fix !hips, each of them will exercife the fame right, and this equal neutrality will give to France eighteen (hips to our flu. An other point of no inconfiderable importance is the Cape; and here, Sir, the article is extremely dif ferent from that in the Preliminaries. In the Pre liminary Treaty it was ftipulated, that (hips of all nations ()multi be admitted without diftindion.— But now we find the Cape is given over to Hol land in full Sovereignty, a word that in itfelf fur flats a copious index for alarm. If it be given in full Sovereignty, there certainly is nothing which can bind Holland with refped to future difpofitions and regulations, fince in making fuch difpofitions none can fairly object to the eaercife of the a& of Sovereignty. When we recolleft that Tufcany was made over to the infant Duke of Parma in full fovereignty, and that he exercifed that fovereignty by furrendering Porto Ferrajo to the French, is it not a fair fuppofition that Holland will all° fur render the Cape ? I come now to the fourth head, the omiffion of all commercial treaties e•:ifting pre vious to the war. In this orniffion there is Come thins of a gigantic nature which no man can con template without pain and dread. It is the firft inuance I ever knew or heard of, in which the ronew3l of commercial relations bas been itudionf is that we {hall gain as much as we &all lofe. I do not well underftand what thofe onerous obli gations are, which thould induce us to give up certain for uncertain advantages. France hasever been our greatelt rival in this refpett, and chore treaties which did exift were made to guard agninit the dangers likely to refult from that rivallhip.— But by palling them over, what we do by this kind of diplomatical analyfis is to let things revert to their original Rate before the formation of any of the treaties. Why not enter minutely into this fubjea, for there certainly has been fufficient time? We were not treating as at Lige in a lump; we were not treating with a perfon with a watch in his hand limiting us to a Tingle minute. Yet what ever doubts may have been ftarted on this very important topic,it is at leaft the duty of the Houle to examine and afcertain, with every poffible de gree of precifion, the fituation in which we Rand. There are alto other confiderations of weight which fhould not be negle&ed, and in certain parts of this empire, in which we have tome intereft—l mean the EaR Indies. There were, with refpat ' to this point, two great epochs of which we fhould not have loft fight, the Treaty of 1783, and the IConvention of 1787. In the former we confidered ourfelves entitled to certain privileges, and we af terwards had the good fortune to obtain the con firmation of them. The latter fettled on a firm bafis what was before uncertain, and became to us a pledge of future fecurity ; but we have now loft what we gained by the Treaty of 1783, and by the Convention of 1787. We are thrown back to the !pot where we were difadvantageoufly placed, and confequently fubjea to go over all the old grounds of litigation. The claims of both Powers are unfettled, and mug prove the fource of new disputes. We have indeed what an attorney would call a good caufe ; but I mug fay, that while I had the thing itfelf, full poffeffion or good fecu rity, I would rather keep it than Irow the titles into the fire for the purpofe of re-difputing my claim. Among the Articles not contravening I the Preliminary Treaty, but coming new to us, is the fituation of the Houfe of Orange. When we talk of immenfe power, of van extent of terri tory, of great commercial profperity, they are held out as fatisfadory pledges and fufficient fecu rities of our welfare ; but what is become of the principles by which thefe have been acquired ? Where is our good faith in proteQing thofe to whom we promifed proteaion—where is that quick and jealous tenability of honour, tholi. proud and honourable feelings which have railed us to our prefent opulence and power ? They are all paft, all dgf„asi #4O, they have made us rich and powerful, and we now give them up. What has been done for the houfe of Orange ? Not a fin gle provifion has been made for the Stadtholder, either in his public or private capacity. At the very moment that we are ftipulating at Amiens for compenfations for the Houfe of Orange, in the fame room, and at the end of the fame table, is the Dutch , Plenipotentiary firing a defeance. We talk, in deed, of indemnities, and require them, and Citi :en Schimmelpenninck kindly gives his affent, fti pulating, however, that they fhall not come from Hullata I iball pals over, without that notice which it dderves, the cafe of the King of Sar dinia; yet I cannot help remarking, that while in private life official points of honour, and perfonal points of honour, are attended to with the moll fcrupulous exaanefs, a flap on the national face, or a kick upon the public pofteriors goes for nothing. A common plaifter, a little diaculum, is fufficient to cure it. What. Sir, than the country give up all without one tingle e ff ort to preferve its honour and magnanimity ? Does France think that we have not forfeited both ? Does Holland think fo ? Of the fentiments of the latter on this fubjea, fo intimately connetted with the feelings of the na tion, we find cogent proofs in the Haerlem Ga zette • and if I had a mind to produce a voucher for the fenfe of the former, I have it in my poc ket, in a French paper of a recent date. It (peaks of the advantages gained over this country in the Treaty, and of our degradation, with confidence and precifion. It applies fo clofely to the prefent fubjea, that were t to read it to the Houle, I fear I fhould find it difficult to exculpate myfelf from the charge of plagiary. It roundly and truly aliens that fo long as the Cape and Malta I are in the hands of the Dutch and Neapolitan Go vernments, fo long they mull be in the hands of France, and argues in the fame way on all the other points.* The statements, Sir, which I have • The following is a Tranflation of the Papa alluded to : " France, reconciled with all other Governments will never be able to difarm the ankadity of thofe men who are irritated by the fpedade of her *reamers, and blinded by the fplendour of her glory. When fix months ago they faw ha in fifteen days conclude four Trades of Peace, and reftene tranquillity to fea and land. !bussed by fansuch facets, they attempted to con teft the brilliant cannot the Peace with England. They opened op a molt extenave range to the lovers of conjedure. They pretended that Garet articles balanced the advantages of the public affiliations. Time has Dawn that there were no fecret conditions. " hefting on, !know not what uptakes of the Englifh Minifters in Parliament, they contended that the merit of this peace could not be decided by the Preliminaries; that we lbould wait for the DelinidveTreaty, and then the fuperiority of Great Britain would be fan. " . • • . . The Definitive Treaty has at length been aped, and it is found to be more advantageous, more glorious to France, than the Preliminaries. " At the time when this lirft Convention appeared, it was critieffed on different grounds. Men confidered the benefit which England might derive from the cinnamon forefts of Cey lon, and particularly from the fupab port et Trincomalee, the true bulwark of India, commanding the Malabar and Coro. mandd, and all the Archlpelagonf that Oeeau. was calculated too, not what Trinidad was worth, but what it might be rendered by the fkilhd inauftry of the Englith, Ids interefted, perhaps, about the praiser of their own foil, than eager to monopolise all the commerce et the Oronoquo, and the countries adjacent. In addition to there eltimates, fo flattering for England, were adduced the dela/ lbe was to ac quire in the Myfore. conquered during the wie of the Raolu don ; and people were inclined to believe that the &With had carried to the strnoft extent of their willies, their naval and commercial ;restarts. " With this &nation of England was oppofsd that of France, mgrandifed by Belgium, Savoy, Piedmont, and pOrt of Ger many ; dEpofing without contrail of Holland, Svritan land, and Italy; fortifying heed' in the Mediterranean, by the ac quifition of Porto Ferrajo—openizt in the Wyk a Sliver fa mous for its ancient commerce, a port **bled. bi its S nation, to become the emporium of Europe t recovering Mar to. Fn.lilh raoital : Obtallnirerie SPaeilh Part brought forward, will, I Ma, be thought fuffi. ciently llrong to juilify the propofed enquiry, which, exclulively of all other confiderations, ought to take place, were it only on the ground that it is neceffary to have fome information from the proper papers and documents ; many of them are not known, and many of them have not been yet laid upon the table. This country begins al ready to recover from its indifference and apathy. The cordial drop of Peace was grateful to the public feeling; but fomething deleterious has at length been difcovered in the cup. The poifon ous mixture has not been entirely drank, and let us Rill attempt to find an antidote. Let us exa mine what yet remains of the fatal draught,and by adminificring an efficacious remedy to counteratl what has been too rafhly taken, recover our health and vigour. It was my with, Sir, to mention an early day for the difcnffion of this important fub- , jai ; but as it will be neceffary to give Come time for the production of the papers which may be re erne, I beg leave to name tomorrow fortnight. 1 therefore move that this Houfe will take into confideration to-morrow fortnight the Treaty be between his Britannic Majeßy, the French Re public, his Catholic Majefty, and the Batavian Republic, concluded at Amiens on the 27th of March, 1802. Mr. ELLIOT feconded the motion. The Cukr c s t.t.ott of the Ex c fro xgyta Paid it was tt Between theft two Odom of two States which may cede to be enemies, but acme re be rivals, it was not dillicult to pro nounce which of the two had gained moft by the war. It was dentonftrated that France had obtained an irreditible prepon , &ranee upon the continent; and that in Coffering her maritime power to fall off, the had not loft the elements of it, which conftft in her population and her territory. " Such was the dud of things Which the Preliminaries of fered ; and as they have formed the bads of the Treaty of Amiens, it may be Paid that the latter was tried by anticipation. Let us now examine whether it does not fecure tome new ad vantages to France and her Aria; whether it does not con tain certain great features (Wildcat to render it rernarkahle in hiltory? " The French were juftly alarmed at what was due to England for advances made for the maintenance of more than ao,o:>o prifoners. The ad Article of the Treaty of Amiens diminithes the debt of Franca k is agreed that, in the ac count of the refpettive advances than be stated, sot only the expellees of ad the prifooen of the two nations, but alfo thole of the foreign troops which, before being taken prifoners, were in the pay and at the &pold of either of the Conned ing Parties. Thus the expences laid out upon the 7000 pri toners given back to Rutßa will be dated is deduction from that which France owes to England. The 7th Ardele fecures to France in Guiana an sggrandlfement which the 6th Ar ticle of the Preliminaries left at lead doubtful, ash guaranteed to Portugal the integrity of her poffedions. " In the cooditions relative to Malta, that important for. trefs, which the friends of England had fo often aligned to her, every thing is favourable to France both in the portend re gulations and the definitive arrangements. As nag as the And u Ifliefelitess it will be Prestb P and to make it cede to be to will require the concurrence of all the great powers. If at one day the Maker* Lawn &add become dominant, the pa tina, the wants, the temper, the =lure of that Langue would bring it under the Influence of the French Government. " Such the* are feveral poddve Conventions which render the Treaty preferable in point of advantage for France to the Preliminaries. But It Is not what the Treaty expreires that is molt advantageous; it Is particularly what it lets as caneds which ought to form the &Ned of joy to the French and their allies. " in all former negotiations England bad fatted on the re newal of ancient Treaties, efeending upwards as far as that of Weftphalla. With t &Turkus attention did the always CfIU. merate them, date by date, and elk gave them new forte.— Every body knows that abnolkall their Treaties were onerous to the maritime powers of the Continent, and that they even contained ftipuladon. humiliating for the allies of France. There were cosht le which the Dutch were obliged, in fign of fubmilloo, to lower their leg to &mot England f. This &ame nd Mange bad never been assefted widest podndog a war. The reigns of Cromwell sod Charles 11. afoed ensng . of this truth. This fpecies of uffshge is abolithed; end what is more important to commerce, the abrogation of ancient Treaties has removed the fatiguing inconveniences which they oeca frayed to France and her allies in their navigation, In the ad mktiltration of their colonies, in their whole commercial fyitem. " If it were neceffary to give an idea of the constraint im poled by theft treaties on the States which then received the Law tram England, it would be fulkient to state thofe of 1667 and 1670 between that Power and Spain, it would then be teen how greatly the navigation of the Enid& was favoured, how greatly the authority of the power veldt which they traded was limited as to the contract of its own mesons and dudes. If we were, then, to compare the advantages enjoyed by the Emilia in their relations with the Continental Powers, with the diieltia oppofed to the latter by the famous Ad of Na. viption, we Should not any longer be furprifed at the degrada tion into which their marine had fallen even before the war. We Mould be rather aftonilhed that the Emil& navy had not borne down every thing. " The Treaty of Andean removes all irregularity, all oppref don, all rclizaint. The old Law is deftroyed ; a new public Law commences. The French and their allies have gained their naval independence : they will have the (cote to make life of it ; they will not fall into the snare of a new Treaty of Commerce ; and they may one day have their Ad of Navigation ! " It is this which diftinguithea the Treaty of Amiens from all the old tranfadions of the fame kind. It is this that would render it fo advantageous fur France, even though it did not put the bit feel to that kende of Coctinental power, which ren ders her fo formidable, and which already obliges England to [well her expenditure by augmenting her militia. " There are likewife other features which charaderife the Treaty of Amiens, end which will rave to fignalife the prefect epoch. Tbc new Conftitution of Matta, happy for France. as I have already remarked, is of Welt a political phenomenon, which doubticfs would excite much eftonftaent. if the faculty of af tonifhment were not in fame fort worn oat. It is an alliance of ariftocracy and democracy, of ancient opinions, and of new ideas, of chivalry and philtiophy. k is a coalition of two poli tical fyftems, whiclnhad kindled the mad crud war, jult as in the Treaty of Weftphalls, we fee an secommodatko between two religions which had been the peovoa.don or the pretext for long and fatal Mentions. If Come years ago there had been a State whole chivalrous fpirit could have been fuppoted capable of excluding an ands to the revolutionary principle, Malta would, beyond all doubt, have been pitched upon as that State ; and yet It is at Malta, that the revolutionary (pi* eitablilhes Mel( after it is weakened every where rife .. . To add to the whimlleal sir of thefts combinations, England has contributed, as well as France, to maintain it there. It appears certain at tuft, that having received from the inhabitants of Malta fence! plans of a Republic, the Eoglith have given tared to the pro patinas of theft !dander. in the Treaty of Amiens. Thu democratic principles have found protedion from the power that went to war to oppofe them ! " But the organization of this new Republic and its future figure cannot have any conMerable inn:Tett, except for France and England. There is in the Treaty a Bogle line reipeaing the States of Barbary, which produce a more weave, a more general inteivit for all Europe. It intimates the deign of put ting an end to the fyftens of hoftilides which fubfitts between civilized Governments and thole Governments of Africa which the fupinencfs of the former could alone have railed to the rank of powers. Religion formerly endeavoured to repair in this rcfpedt the negligence of policy. At length policy cultivates the duty of protettion. Its happy intentions are not perhaps very esfily realized. but they cannot fall into oblivion. The fiend is given. It adds to the importance of the Treaty of Amiens. It honours the negotiators whore work that Treaty is, and the Government whole cotiddence they hive juftified." " From Cape Finitterre al far no the Coat of Norway, proper and becoming in his Right Hon. Trieia, when he propofed a deviation from the etablithed praßice, to Rate the grounds upon which he felt himfelf induced to propofe filch deviation. Into thofe grounds the Right Hon. Gentleman had no doubt entered very minutely ; he had (toted them with great particularity and precifion ; but as the °hied of his motion only was to fix a day for the full difcuffion of this fubjea, be (Mr. A.) did not now think it incumbent on him to follow the Right Hon. Gentleman through the whole feries of his detail. He was ready to admit, that the conduct of his Right Hon. Friend was confiflent and can did—the communication of his purpofe wa. flank and ample. He could affure him that Minifters felt towards him no other fentiment than that of gratitude, and that they would be happy to give him any explanation or information as to the ne. gociation of the Treaty, which thould be c-aliftent with their duty to furnifh ; and they had reafon to hope from the charader of the Right Hon. Gentleman, he would be incapable of demanding any other. The Right Hon. Gentleman had di vided his arguments into four principal heads.— As to the fiet point, namely, things exifting at the time of figning the Preliminary articles, but not then known—He begged to remind the Houfe, that he had timed at the outlet, that he did not mean to enter at any length into the matter of the Right Hon. Gentleman's fpeech ; he withed mere. ly to do away the impreffion which fome of his ftatements were calculated to produce. Thc first, which related to the furrender of the Eland of Elba to the French, in direk contradidion to the Treaty of Luneville—He would alk the Right Hon. Gentleman, did he mean that as a charge on his Moiety's Minifters, which was the ad of the King of Etruria, who thought proper to ab rogate that part of the Treaty of Luneville ; and who was a Prince fully competent to make fuels change ? Surely it would not be contended that this was an event in which the Britills negociator thould interfere ; or, at leaft fuch a ene as would jullify any interruption of the negociation but thole points would be more fully difcuffed on a future day. The Right Hon. Gentleman next adverted to the extenfion of French Guiana—that however, it would be remembered, did not exceed the terms of the Treaty of Badajos, and not according to that of Madrid, as it was fo often aliened in that Houle, when to much firers had been laid on the fuppofed different conftrudion of the preliminary articles on that head in this country and France. The fad was, that Portugal fo much eftimated the condi tions of the Treaty of Badajos, that the profetled to think that it would be an extremely fortunate eircumftance, if we could be at all inttrumental in fettling the limits of Guiana as prefcribed in that Treaty. This had been done, and to in that in- Rance the obfervation of the Right Hon. Gentle man did not apply. In commenting on the code quences of the probable eltablithment of France in Louifiana, the Right Hon. Gentleman rote to a climax. Undoubtedly theindependence of America was materially conneeted with the interefts of this country, and with that of all Europe ; but could it be pretended that that independence was to be aided by the French being in poiliffion of Loui. flan; ? If the French Government was capable of entertaining the gigantic ambition of fubjugating America,had the not opportunity of attempting the execution of her plans thro' the medium of Guiana —could the not pour in her troops there i—Or when St. Domingo fhould be tranquil, would the not be enabled to turnthe facilities of that importantfettle meat to the atchicvment of this great enterprize, if America herfelf thould be incapable of firm refill once or if Great Britain and all the powerscould fit tamely by, the pat ve obfervers of the conteft. The fettlement of the French in Louifiana, was fuch an event as certainly could not be looked at without anxiety, but what he meant to argue was, that that was not the only point from which the could at tack America, if the really meditated the projeds imagined by the Right Hon. Gentleman. The fame obfervations applied to the poffetfion of Flo rida, by the French. The fecond point dwelt on by the Right Hon. Gentleman was, the events which have occurred fence the figning of the preli minary articles. Among them the moil confpicu ous was, the acceflion of the Firft Conful to the prefidency of the Cifalpine Republic ; that he would fairly admit was an event that could not be contemplated without anxiety and folicitude, by any perfon anxious for the independence of En rope, and for the interefts of this country; but the quettion to confider was, would it have been pro. per on that account to interrupt or break off the Negotiations at Amiens ? Upon the principle on which the Preliminary Articles were figned• it certainly would not—Ministers could not hold themfelves ju ft i fi able to that Houfe, or to the Country, to attempt it ; for he did not think there was an impartial individual in the empire—any one of (Ober judgment—whore feelings were not as mite/ involved in this queftion as thole of the Right Hon. Gentleman—who would think the re commencement of hoftilities even excufable for ail fuch circurnftance. The Right Hon. Gentleman Rated that this event, in times of profound peace, would be fufficient to roufe the attention of all the Powers bf Europe ; but did thofe powers ode ally feel Orly impreffion of alarm or jealoufy upon the occafion? On the contrary, they almoft ftantly recognized and approved the a. t; they did not even wait to fee what drat it might have on the progrefs of the negotiation at Amiens. He would dun ask ninety-nine out of an hundred in the country, what condud ought Ministers under filch circumftances to purfue? and he would be con• fident of receiving an anfwer recommending that which they had adopted. Much had been laid, in that Houfe, of the policy of Minifters in acceding to the French Armament's failing from Brett four: time fence for St. Domingo, but he would now appeal to the plain common fenfe of the couniry at large, whether it would not have been culpabte to have thrown any obflacle in the way—to l i v e created any delay in the failing of th at fleet . From the difficulties which bad occu rred in t.l: way of that expedition, it mutt be obvious w 1 1 3: aggravated mifchiefs would have refulted fro m farther delay. Every man who valued the co r.