Star. — London, England, 1802-05-14 00:00:00

that though the caufe of difpute might lie in India, the caufe ofelf might come to be tried in Eu. ripe ; in the fame manner as the ground of a dif pine may originate in Cumberland, but the dif pine itfelf be brought to trial in Weflminfter-hall. That we had gained great and highly valuable ac ,litifitions in the Eallern World, he pretended not tai deny ; but he begged the Houle to confider, tLat France, by one unfortunate fqueeze in Ett• rope, might compel us to vomit up what we had suited in that quarter. How had they ailed in truly ? In what manner did France obtain pollee. 14 a) of Port Ferrajo ? In the firft place, they erect a test kingdom for the purpofe of turning mo : at cl: y into hurlefque, and then, that their atliimp tion of tort Ferrajo might not have the appearance of making their new King pay garnifh on his firft cotrin,; into his fpunging-houfe, they gave him a shaft upon Piedmont, by way of payment. When he contemplated the gigantic ftriues with which France milted on to univerfal monarchy, he was ftruck with furprize and horror. They abed pre. cifely on the fyflem of ancient Rome, but with greater efficacy and extent. In the courfe of ten years, they bad accomplifhed what Rome was more than Of a century in atchieving. There were fcarccly two powers left on the whole Continent that could cope with her. Ruflia, the moll pow. erful of the two, was, perhaps, more indebted for her and independence, to her dillance from France, th in to her inherent and intrinfic ftrength. A, io Au lria, it was Co crippled, fo weakened, and invited, that no man, who took a jull furvey of I.er condition, could pretend to fay, that the vv;lci of the !late would not go by the board the urn Ilium it thould have to encounter. It itli infinite fort ow he perceived a grossing f indiEtence as to tuture contingencies. —One tlaie after the other was ftiffered to be fit: erect away ; and yet [llll we teemed to be infen -111:'-: if the danger; and, perhaps, when all Europe va • gc•ne, he th old be told, o Well, peace go with h u ! ours, thank Goo! is an Wand ; in an extien.e cafe, we can take to our boat, and go furiewhere die." But where was that place of re th n ai)liim to be found ? Where, and in what bunt ter of the globe was the retreat, whether Fiance uld not be able to purfue us? Not in tI Wefiein World I for there France had placed her foot on a firm bath. In this point of view, oft c• tidal of Adminiftration, reepeeing the ex p,..d.! ion to St. Domingo, appeared to hint esti eme ly centlarable -aad dangerous. We had, in fat% thcrehy comprom/fed the fafety and independence •of the whole of our Well India iflands, but more p.irticularly . of Jamaica. France was, in fae, clablifhinga.new Breit in the Weft Indies, the el. • feels of which it would not be long, he feared, be. fore we thould have occafion of experiencing. He •believed that Minillers, in making peace, were not a little induced to that flep by the idea that the French Government would have fo much work up on their hands, and be fo deeply occupied in fet tling their new acquifitions, that they would have n • rime to interfere with our commercial great nefs ; but he begged to remind the Iloufe that Fence, as he before obterved, had never for a Tingle moment loft fight of her favourite object of • univerfal empire.. The means, the veryjwie qua non, for the attainment Vf that übjeet, was the dame lion of this country. that purpofe were all .her arts, all her efforts direacd. In this refpea lie must at Lail give the French the praife of fin eerity. They did not dif : ;ttife their intention, they slid not a& with ambiguity. On the contrary, France fpuke its fe:-timents loudly, and gave evi deo of her defigns every moment. Her whole trani artillery was levelled againft the grcatncfs of this co.atti-7, and fumy was he to add, that we 6.v mat aillicar to be duly fenfible of our fituation. Fo.e:•glt was not le l, roceffary than power for the prevention of calamity. It bchorted Rates, as arca as il4tviduals, to anticipate danger, and not' to (:el ty the means of defence till the moment of a. ta.k. !hould apply forefight, as inters did their aihnolorA to omen danger at a diftance. In this maxim, it appeared to him, we had been greatly deficient. It had been the opinion of many well arTeeed perfons, on the firft breaking out of the French Revolution, that no danger was tote apprehended to this country from the venom of French principles; that the pure gold of the Etitilh Contlitution could not be fullied nor col-. Tuded with the rrup of French Jacobinifm. Ex-1 perienee, however, had proved that we had fed ourfelves with dclufive hopes, and hugged our felvcs into a fitlfe fecurity. Experience had (hewn that even the gold of the Britifh Conftitution was not any more proof againft the virus of Jacobinifm than the baler materials of which the Contlitu tions of other countries were compofed. He was aware that on many points conneeed with the ohjc& of the late war, he entertained fentiment, not perfe&ly accordant, in their full extent, with thole entertained by forte of thole Right Hon. Friends with whom he had the honour to att.— Ccnfulering, as he did, opinions to be no chimera, and that opinion, in many reepees, conilituted a Lgitiniate objet of the late war, he might be more fanguine than others for the reftoration .o F. (rich monarchy. In this view, he was particu laxly eager for the expedition to Q2iberon, and 1111 approved highly of that enterprize, notwith funding all the clamour fo induftrioufly raifed "gain, it. In the midft of that clamour, his I ) :ght Hors. Friend, the late Chancellor of the Ex- chequer, had, with great manlinefs and candour, avnwed his readinels to take his !hare of the re- ' fponfibility, as involving the planning and projec tion of the expedition againft Qpiheron : yet fully ac , nowledging the generofity of that conduct, I ant willing to allow Mr. Pir r here rote to call the Right Hon. Gen tleman to order. He dwelt on the irregularity of tittering, in the courfe of a difcuilion on the fub ..ct of a Peace concluded by tbe prefent Admini into a review:of the hiftory of the refpec tit c ;hare taken by their precleceffors in office, in ”perations of the war. Befides being irregu -1 r. it was :lot contillent with the nature of the earn t; ken by the Right Hon. Gentleman, in 41nm , n wi t h a ll ot h er per f ons engage d i n hi s lka iTlty's Councils. Wlmiau a do not think that the obliga ' done to which my Right Hon. Friend alludes, can be underftood as preventing me from giving that fort of explanation on which I was proceeding. I was going on to fay, that I confidered the expedi tion to Qpiberon, as a m ea f ure i n w hi c h t o y Ri g h t Honourable Friend, and the majority of the cabi net, muff necelfarily have concurred, rather as a meafure of my own, prc(fed by importunity— Mr. PITT (to orekr).—l cannot admit that my Right Hon. Friend, though lie generou fly offers to undertake the whole refponfibility of the Qoibe ron expedition, has, according to my recolledion, Dated correctly the extent of the (hare which I had in that meafure. I cannot think it confident with the duty impofed upon the Ration my Right Hon. Friend filled, to divulge any confultations or opi nions,(fuppoling his flatement cornea) which mull have been exprelfed in official confidence. Mr. WI NDM A tet..--1 conceive that I was merely Rating a circumstance perfonal to myfelf, and my Right Honourable Friend would have teen by the application that my explanation could not have been confidercd as any difclofore of Rate fecrets. 1 was going to have (hewn that the country, hay. ing micjudged the war, the conduct of it naturally partook of what I conceive to have been error. What I fay of the fy Rem of war, as in my judg ment bell fuited to the circurnitances of the late contefi, is not an arraignment of my Right Ho. nourable Friend, to whofe department its con duet particularly belonged (Mr. Dundas). I can bear teiiimony to the diligence, the zeal, the ac tivity, the ardour, and all the other great quali. ties which belong to him, which my Right Honourable Friend difplayed. I do not arraign the plan of my Right Honourable Friend, nether do I divulge date fecrets. I Date what was no fccret—th.tt previous to the time when I came into public Ration, my Right Hon. Friend had marked opinions on the fubjeet of the war, and that we did differ in our views on the ftibjeet. When I was interrupted, I was labouring to (hew that the I country had not rightly, judged its &nation, and I that the mode of war puteaed contributed to con firm their error. The country never knew Cu& ciently why it was at war. It had been laid with great force and eloquence by my Right Honourable Friend (Mr. Pitt), on different occafions, that we were at war for fecurity ; we were indeed at war becaufe we could not be at peace we were at fea becaufe we could not be on (bore : yet though reminded of this, the character of the war it felf, the grand monitor, was wanting. The manner in which it was carried on did not fuffici ently mark its nature. The force was centrifu gal. It never converged enough towards the fo cus from which the danger proceeded. The quef tion, why we were at war, perpetually recurred, and people were not enough taught to fee that we were at war becaufe the French Government was fuch as to leave us no peace, and was necef lardy in perpetual hollility with every thing which, as individuals and as a nation, it was our interell 1•o defend The fame error had purfued us into the prefent Peace. If it were contended, that with refped to the objet of the war, we had not been completely fuccefsful, which he was ready to admit, Dill he would maintain that die fyftem itfelf was not wrong. He mull lament that the fame error of opinion, which obtained through. out the war, Rill exifted in too great a degree at the prefent moment ; yet, at the fame time, he hid to deplore the e ffects of that error ; (till in its application to principle and conduit, it afforded him great and jolt ground of confolation. —He exculpated the country for not difplaying more ftrenuous exertion, for however great might be the exertions of the country, when confidered feparately, when placed in view with the immense object at (lake, they were not fo pre-eminent as they ought to have been. Thus, then, though he lamented the fth, he derived confolation from the inference. Had the country been more deeply impreffed with a true fenfe of the objea of the war, it would have difplayed greater energy.— Was there ever, he would afk, a war carried on with fuch inceffant cries for Peace Was there ever a period in the former hittory of this coun try, in which the public prints would have been tolerated in crying down our fleets and armies? in depreciating the exploits and undervaluing the merits of our gallant feamen and fathers ? Had we not proof of the fad it would fcarcely be ere ' diced, that when a General Thankfgiving and Proceilion took place on account of three of the moll fplendid victories that ever graced the annals of any country, it was made a matter of doubt, whether this ad of triumph would be favourably received or not. Newfpapers aging on this prin ciple could not poffibly obtain circulation, if they did not meet with correfpondent fentiments on the part of the community. From the whole train of thefe proceedings, then, he was juflified in ar guing, that a fpirit of flatnefs, of indifference, and want of energy pervaded the country, which never obtained before. Thus much of the ob jell ; now for the means. When we talk of the greatnefs of our exertions, the queftion mull na turally be coupled and affociated with the quan tum of our means, and the magnitude of the ob. jell at ifne. If the late war had been merely a war of: experiment, in that cafe, indeed, he fhould be ready to conclude that our exertions had been immenfe. But when we (peak of a war begun and carried on for the vital interefts, nay, for the very exigence of the country, then the queftion affumes a different feature, and in that view of the fubjed he did' not think our exertions had been proportionably great, not great even when com pared with the means ; for whatever clamours might' have been railed againd the war in forme quarters, certain it was that the country had not pined under it. Our means increafed with, and .after the fame ratio as the war itfelf; fo mach In, indeed, that the enemies of the war, finding it impoffible any longer to reafon againit plain matter of fad, were obliged to (hill their ground, and from.finking the public fituation, to ring the changes on the dint-ergs of indivi duals. Individual difirefs would always keep pace with general profperity. The great poverty of in dividuals w as the natural confequence of encreaf ing public opulence. It was the fecretion una voidably retains from the full and catholic (late lAI public we thh. This, therefore, 'bowed how little fuch remarks were applicable, as a peculiar cafe, to the late war, inalmuch as they applied equally to All wars. Diftuilling, then, this topic, he v. 1,11 a itatement of us means, to open the eyes ( ~ f the country to its real fituation c—he wiihed to cure the public mind of that baneful error whit h leek men to uncle' value all that is great and noble in a national point of view. and which, when relinquillted, never fails to entail the down fal of national greatnefs. It was a lamentable confideration, that public fpirit fhoillti decline in nearly the fame proportion as commercial profpe rity and gi cat nets increafed. Superficial reafoners might not fee the deplorable confequences of filch a fyflem ; they might be milled to believe that the lots of rnblic fpirit was no ferious misfortune, fo ' long AS the country flourifhed with relpe6t to trade andcommerce. But how long would this laft ? To luppole that commercial greatnefs could en ' dure, when public fpirit fhould be extinel, was as abfurd as the remark made by one of our l‘lo narchs, when Ile was told that the people were dying through famine: a Why don't they eat their bread and cheek r' They could not get bread and cheefe to eat. How long would France leave 111 bread and checfe to eat? How long would it be before the efforts of our rival would (hackle and reduce our commerce ? He felt no hefitation in declaring, that, in his eftimatian, the fee-fimple of Fiance,, on the 3oth of September left, the day prior to the figning of the Preliminaries, was in finitely greater in value than it was fince, and as he feared, than it would be again for a long time to come. It was not his will) to difpirit, but to aroufe the country, to induce the nation to avail themfelves of the means left us, to correct' the error that had been committed. What fecurity have we that France will not re-urge the claims which (lie relinquilhed in 5733 ? He withed to fee the country placed upon its guard, not imitating the example of the ostrich, uhicli, when purfued, thrults its head into a hollow tree, and being thus prevented; from teeing its purfuers, flatters itfelf that it is out of danger. He well remembered, at the con clufion of the American war, the predi6tions of many intelligent Itatefinen, who forefaw in the lots of Amenea much ferious mifchief to Great Britain, were treated as chimerical. Beeaufe the evil confequences did not take place immediately, no credit was attached to the warning voice of thofe who foreboded them. But experience had fince verified their predietions. ; The vitality of nations was not to be calculated on the fame narrow fcale as that of individuals. But have we not felt, and that feverely, the 101 l of Ame rica throughout the whole of the late War ? Has America been of no ufe, no aid to France t Did Gentlemen tecollea the fupplies which France drew from America? Would Minifters have con cluded Peace on the prefent terms if America had been in our alliance Should we, in that cafe, have found France Rationed at the back, ready to over run America as the pleafes ? It was a praftiee, unfortunately too prevalent, and of late too much increafing, for men to run their own lives againfl that of their country ; to reafon, it will laft my time out, and let pofterity even care for itfelf. But let inch men be apprikd, that they might in the event find themfelves in a very different predicament from what they apprehended. They might find themfelves wofully deceived in their reckoning, and overtaken by misfortune before they were aware. Let them look for an example, and take warning from the fate of Spain, with many other countries, which were, in point of fats, become mere vaitals of France. He knew no inftance of a tingle Peace in which a greater variety of points were left unadjufted ; and what rendered this de ficiency the more to be lamented was, that in the fame proportion as there exited cattle for alarm, in the fame proportion were we deprived of the means of refiftance. He did not mean a fpeedy renewal of the War, becaufe he believed the power to be wanting ; bus he wilhed to do away all caufe and ground of di ftru R. In thisview fhould move, w'l hat an humble Addrefs be prefented to his Majefty, af furing him, that the Houle bad fully confidered the Definitive Treaty laid before them, and that they acknowledge theßoyal Prerogative as to the queftion of Peace or War; that they con fider it as their duty to maintain inviolate the public faith, as pledged in the raid Treaty ; yet; notwithkanding, they cannot conceal from his MAjelly the painful apprehenfions they enter t.,in as to the confequences which to them•appear likely to re fult to the countr7 from the conclufion of that Peace; nor with hold their advice to their Sovereign, in order to avert, with the affiftance of Drum c PROVIDINCE, the dangers with which the country is furrounded, as they cannot, without dread and alarm, contemplate the continued and fyfiematic projedta of aggrandifement on the part of Frank, with the large acoeffon of rower and territory made by that country, at the very mo ment of negotiation. The elafhing intercity which had been left utiadjulted, and the unavoidable difputes left open ; and, above all, the preponderance of power left in the hands of France by rclinquithing the great bulwarks of war ; by, Which , means the Britilh Government, in the event of the renewal of hoßilities, would be expofcd to greater dangers and difficulties than the neceffities of circumrtar.ces warranted, or obliged the country to Cuba* to. The Houle, therefore, relying on his MaJefty's wifdom and internal affedion for his people, humbly recommend to his Maleity to keep a vigilant eye over the actions of our late enemy. attiring his Majelly at the fame time of their =diners to co-operate with him, as refining every en croarknent anatinnovation whatever, which may hereafter be attempted on the maritime. commercial, and colonial rights of the country ; and they truft, that his Majeity will approve of their eareeit defire to fupport thole rights, by a kale of naval and military defence commenforate to the impending danger; and of thar anxiety for kenning the permanency of the tranqui lity now accompliftsed; for the more &canal accompliihment of which, they would recommend a fpeedy attempt towards an amicable adjustment o f thofe points not included in the Treaty, which might flap& ground to future doubt and dif pute, and which they have been induced to offer to his Majzf ty's notice, front the lincere love and attachment they bear to their Sovereign. and their earn& folicitude for the happinefa and welfare of the country at large, by procuring liability to a fafe and real Peace: Lord FOLKSTONa feconded the Motion, and ob ferved, that the filbjed had been fo ably and fo effectually argued by his Right Hon. Friend, that little remained for him to add to it ; he, hoWever, could not avoid remarking, that in this treaty, not only a negled, hut a direlidion of our naval rights, was apparent, and the Flag of Old England de graded. It was, therefore, impoWble to approve of fuch a treaty, and he was unable to conceal that opinion ; unable was he alto to conceal that when all other countries were fupporting 11. e faith of their ancient. and refpeaive Treaties, Great Bri tain alone was negleaful of hers, and tint when it was a firlt-rate principle with all other nations to refpea and volue, as trill as to protect thcir lies, Great ltritaia alone was regardlefs of, hers, and ungrateful to thole who f acr iff ee d even all that was dear to them as nations in her's and the gene. ral talk. We bad entered into the conteft under the avowed principle of aliening and of protefting the rights of the fleaile of Orange, and we barely deferted her; we, in form, but not in fubltance, made a thew of our attention to that illUfil it/US rhich none ought to be more relp,a ed cr valued in the eyes of this country, whole cattle the early and effeduaUy ach.,oed and hip. ported, and our return to her, in the hour of her meeffity, is a vain and empty ftipulation in words, a mere parade of notice, but nothing folid or fub flantial in it. In the cafe of Portugal, our contiud was even work, and more ungenerous; fur we were not content with negleffing and deferting her, but we committed her to the fpoliation of her bittereft foes ; though in fad it was not thefe foes who committed that fpoliation—it was this country that tore from her her territory.— There were circumflances that mult ftrike eve-y thinking mind with fhame, horror, and diigult ; but he feared very much that all he could fay up on thefe topics would have little weight there; we had of late learned fo much to appreciate the tem porary advantage of commercial confiderations, far above all other interefts, that little was to be hoped from a State Co befotted with the avaricious fentiments of fordid wealth as we were. In the fame impolitic view he beheld the furrender of Malta, and could impute it to nothing but an in fatuation in the minds of Miniflers, who, not con tent with ceding the Eaft and the Weft, and the privileges of the Britifh Flag in the North, now alio reign the Levant, and its belt and o n ly p ro . tenor, Malta, into the very hands of our ancient and mortal foe. For theft reafons he thought the Treaty difgraceful And difhonourable, and the Ad. dre/s fhould therefore have his molt decided fupport. Here the motion and the addrefs were read from the chair, and the queftion was put again. Lord HAWK ESIMRY rote, and in a fpeech evin cing great hiftorical refearch and the molt exten five acquaintance with the political and commer cial interetts of this country, addrefied the Houfe to the following purport :—" Sir, I have lillened with the inmoff attention to the obfervations of my Right Hon. Friend, and indeed it was impoflible I fhould not ; for though fome parts of his fpeech were very remotely, if at all, conneaed with the queftion before the Houk, yet from the ability and ingenuity he has exhibited throughout, he was pe culiarly entitled to attention. A good deal of the fpeech of my Right Hon. Friend confined in pre didions as to the confequences, and affertions as to the conditions of the Peace; but I will affure him, and the Noble Lord who feconded his motion, that were the Treaty fuch as they have defcribed it—and I confidered it as by any means injurious to the interefts—but particularly if it were degrad ing to the dignity of the country, no man in this Houfe, or in the Empire, would be more ready to oppofe it than myfelf, whoever the author of it might be. I however view the negociations in quite a different light from that in which my Right Hoc. Friend teems to confider it. lam of opinion, that though tome commercial queftions were not finally arranged, it was better to leave thofe queflions for a future adjuftment, than longer to defer that ne gociation. I maintain, that Peace, under all the cir cumftances, was defirable ; that it would have been extremely culpable in Minifters to have declined it ; but I would not be andel-flood to infinuate that there was no other alternative for the country, or that the Peace is to be confidered in any point of view dithonourable. It is fuch as Minifters have thought it expedient and prudent to conclude, and fuch as the Houfe and the country called for. I am glad that the whole of this queftion is at length brought before the Houfe. I have always objed ed to the difculfion of it in parts, becaufe if ever there was a fubje& which ought to be dircuffed al together, it is a Treaty of Peace. The parts muff be examined with reference to each other, and nos diftinaly ; for though in one part fomething un favourable may appear, yet that, upon a review of the whole, will perhaps turnout to be a conceffion in order to obtain Come advantage on another part. For thefe reafons have I for tome days back depre cated the pradice of Gentlemen in cavilling at par ticular provifions of this Treaty ; a mode of pro ceeding which tended to produce a falfe impreflion on the public mind, and was even calculated to prepoliefs the judgment of the Houfe ; I cannot be, nor ever was, adverfe to the difcuffion of this fubjea, point by point ; my defire was, that thole points fhould be fairly and relatively taken, not in that feparate and detached way, in which Gentle men have been endeavouring to canvas it, without 'taking into account the miles which produced the commencement and conclufion of the negociation, and the effea of the whole of the terms combined. This queftion has at length come to that fpecies of inveftigation which I wafted for—and in which, whether right or wrong, it ought to be taken. It teems to me properly to have divided itfelf into two heads: fie, whether the terms of the Definitive Treaty were confifteot with the bafis of the Pre liminary Articles? and fecondly, whether if any departure from the Preliminary Articles had taken place, that or any events which had oc curred during the negociation, were of fuch con fequence as to induce Minillers to relate to conclude the Treaty? Before I proceed to re mark on thofe heads, I beg leave to fay a few words of the circumnances in which this country was involved at the time the negociation was begun. To this Gentlemen feldom looked, though it was evidently conneded with—at lean necellary to a proper decifion on the fubjea before the Houfe. It mutt be in the recolleCtion of the Houfe, that force fhort time previous to the commencement of the negociation, the fatal battle of Hohenlinden was fought, and a vidory, as decifive as it was im. portant, was obtained by France in that conflid, the immediate confequence whereof was a peace between France and Auftria, and its refult aa. neral pacification over the whole Germanic pire, which became difmembered, dithevelled, and diverfified with various (*coat/lents, opinions, and interefts immediately fucteeding that, came an the Peace with Naples and Portugal. The who).