Star. — London, England, 1815-04-29 00:00:00

i. 0 L.. I article. These right: there were persons who still confidently talked of ; and there were mighty persons (the No l?le Lord was one of them) who still called themselves.tbe-Liberators of Europe : and yet they were ready to renew war, and again make the whole Continent a scene of blood, to effect the death of one man. They still talked of their happy arrangements for the deliverance of Europe, when, in consequence of not keeping their own engagements, all Italy was up in areas, and iheir whole arrangement was likely to be broken to pieces before the war begins. The Treaty referred to the Decleratien, and that de clired the life of Bonaparte to lie at the mercy of every man, betetice he had no longer a legal title to ite-there could be neither peace nor war with him; and yet wb were some to wit with a man well whom we could nether make truce nor treaty ; nei ther, if the French supported hint, could we with them. 'Supposing Napoleon were to fall in the very first battle, the object of the war, according to the Treaty, would be at an end. The Bourbons had no hold of the French people who would not choose them to be restored ; but there were dotibtless.other persons against whom we might direct the same per sonal hatred, and who, if they were in the same situ ation to call forth their talents as this man, who had terrified us all out of our senses,. would, eeiluips, be as obnoxious ; and one of these might, perhaps, be selected to succeed Benapatte. There was Marshal Ney, whom the Drclaration of Louis XVIII. very improvidently called the second object of hate to Bo naparte. Supposing Bonaparte to fail, and his dy nasty to become extinct : did it follow that die French would choose the Bourbons ? Of all the Houses in Europe, they had the least chance of again succeed ing to the throne of France ; and if all the intelligent part of mankind were polled, there would be more votes against the policy of their succeeding than in favour of it.—(Ne, ne ! from the Ministers.) —Those who say no, would pelleips vote the other way ; and they were so used to majorities, that they could not suppose themselves in the minority; but there were many who chi:e.t.a felinisrers in the House who main tained a very chtferetit opinion out of its walls ; and there was nothin ) so different ns the language of Members on the steps of the lobbies, and their Lin guage when on the Mill Aerial Benches : but he would not be shaken in his assertion. The restoration of the Bourbons would not be the necessary consequence of even successful weir we might fight France again into that bloody Repuolie which we declared incapable of being treated with then, and whom we proscribed, as we have done Bonaparte, as one with whom no lie gociation could be entered into. That farce was acted formerly, till at length we entered into two ne gociations with tl-e Republic, both of which failed of success. He entreated the House to pause before; they plunged into a war of mere speculation, in order to afford us time to decide whether it was nut better to wait for the chance of peace. True, we heti a right to consider oursalree in a state of war by the Treaty of Paris ; but there was a difference between having and exerciria7 a tight, and there was nobody mad enough to say, that because we hid a right we should exercise it by way el establishing it. the preamble of the Treaty of Park, we learnt that the restoration of the Bourbens enabled us to give better terms to France than if she were still governed by Bonaparte s- but we haat never been told what terms would have been imposed on Bonaperti which had net on Louis. HI: had been told, indeed;that larger terms had been before rejected by Bonaparte ; tha: he once propoied to us peace with terms of larger ter ritory and circumstances of more glory .to France than Louis received ; and this. proposal being accep tally Lord Castlereagh on behalf of the British na tion, Bonaparte changed Pis mind,, and would not abide by them. There was still another material do cnment signed at Vienna, but which, not having been ratified, was not yet laid before the House : he al laded to the Treaty of Congress. •He maintained that the right of going to war with France rested solely on the declaration centeincd in the Treaty of Paris, that better terms vere given her when accept ing of the Bourbon family, than it she had eianinised under the doniinion of Bonaparte. The Allies had only to say, the: efore, let France place herself in that s. ate of restricted limittestoterritory which we thou s -ht necessary to our safety while France was unifier her present chief, and we will suffer the peace to continve. No such proposal was made by them. GO the con trary, it had been acknowledged, that Mtni.teis had received an eveiture from the French Govarnment, though no answer had been returned, and it was merely communicated to cur Allies. Whethcr the Allies ha.: taken it irtte consideration, or whether they had thrown it aside into tree of their waste-paper trunks, he knew not ; btit,eertain it Wal, the overture had rece ved no answer troth Ministers. He would ask whether, 15 months ago, when this man was in much greater power (fie n• w lie lcwkfd upon him as inferior it power), there was any body who would not have jumped at a treaty which whuld have given France her present limits ? • Waitaki it not have been' universally said, that any lelmieter was insane who, would not have advised the acceptaute of such 'a peace ? Since thi, man was at the-head!Of the Go vernment, had there been any act of aggression by France? Was she firing nut e asy armament that threatened the secure) , of this country ? - Had she' made Any irruption into the territory of her neigh bours ? You would have made peace with Bonaparte wben his power was greater than now, when he was much mot • forrxedahle; and Wouhl you now refuse. to remain at peace with him, when his acts hid at least been lietLer ? Of motives he would not speak ;; it would best bee 'nit' every man tri look into his•own good act might have a good motivteor it might have a mixed reative ; but when he saw a bad act he swab sale it could have but one. The principle, then, - on which the justice el going to war rested being so extremely narrow, he would beg leave to suggest the considcratiqn wlicother the Lifesshtil of time Were nor deserving of being mniuminedi (MOTO ilk- fatal .blow was struck, and rt was . icrol* to recede. Pee ' lieved that whhtcver might gabs been the feeling' whea Bonaparte first lauded 'at Frei* die feiton: for ear had vere iiniett abated- Vibe* ,t3uriarttte tryst landed , he Verts‘ talked of by fee earititiers ahem thb t ourbon family as x ntenster and k - Villaito who would not fail to be Bang e d ; tut in the Wherte cf bit march to Paris, and for the purpose of his'resto.'', ration, not, one cfrot of blobel hid been 'stied ; and no* when be dppleatecl io rt served, ',we* we tai AOa be bad-gnat of . 1) diughtertiled say • . that no peace was to be liejthisn ? Whervert I the financial means, he woolde.for carryings owl this colossal warfare? Wei Rossie, or Austria, or Prussia, in such a financial situation that any one of them could rely on its own resources ? The fact wine they were all of them in a-state approaching to com plete ex:aanstion, and must be remveted by stepplics from this country. What, then, was the situation of our own finances ? On this point it was sufficient to gait'. that no man, however sanguine his views, could say that the contest could be a loug one without their total ruin. Teen it should be well considered what was the probability of the Allies continuing united fur any length of time. In the new Treaty of Vi enna, there was a reference to the Treaty of Chau meet, in which he understood it was stipulated, that the Allies should maintain a defensive leagite fur •a I period of 20 years. This might be very proper ;•but let the House look back to the last 20 years, and see the political changes which had taken place ; that those Powers we new acted with had not long since been pat tners to the hostile. exclusion of our com merce from the Continent ; and that all the Powers in the progress of the contest would each have his own particular interest as serve. Even supposing, also, that the even; was as successful as the most sanguine could hope, and that the Allies were again able to march their armies under the walls of Paris, what would he the result ? They would most likely maintain the government they imposed by their con. federated arms, and the event might be fatal to the liberties of mankind. It wes now, however, obvious that the Allies could not take Bonaparte by surprise, because they could not take France by a coup-de main. He had been preparing various means of de fence; the white flag no where waved in any part of France ; and the intemperate manifesto of the Allies must have consolidated the strength of that country in his favour. Every day the chances of success be came weaker, and lies means of resistance stronger. On all these grounds he moved , e An Address to the Prince Regent, praying that he would be pleased to take such measures as mieht be necessary to prevent this country from being involved in war, on the ground that the executive power in France was vested in the hands of any particular person." Sir M. W. RIDLEY seconded the motion. It was an indisputable principle, that every nation bud a right to choose its Sovereign, and that House should be the last place where such. a principle was denied, AS it was to its exercise that we owed the privileges we possessed. He really believed, however unple4- sant it might be to Mink so, that Boneparte's Go vernment seas founded on the affections of the French people .; and he was afraid that the personal feelings of animosity wi h which that man was regarded, were in danger of banishing the better judgment the H'suse and of the country. He should out give way to these feelings, but consider as deliberately as he could the grounds of nauonal policy on which the House ought to proceed. He hoped that Ministers w.:olci that an elternative of peace still existed. He agreed, that from . past experience we had little reason to trust the promises of Dmiaparte ; but if the new Frerch Constitution was carried into effect, he was lti:cly to be less aule to interfere with the interests of tee; or other countries. Before the House launched. into a boundless expenditure, it became them to reflect upon the tioamial situation of the country. They ;lid that nir heard the declarition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer for Ireland, that taxation had reached its limits, and that no other tax but what he Mid proposed was likely to produce any thing. This was a must serious consideration, and for this and other reasons he should support the mo tion with the view of protecting the country from what he considered an unjust, unjustifiable, and unneces sary war. , Lord CASTtEREAGH said, that in any obser vations he had to make, he should certainly confine himself within as narrow limits as possible. After the conduct which the Honourable Gentleman had pur sued, he could not, certainly, feel surprised at suelea motion as the present, even from him—but he should feel surprised if the Honourable Gentleman succeed ed in inducing the House to vote in support of it.— What must be the effect of the success of such a mo tion in fettering the hands of the executive govern ment, and on the general system of our policy as it regarded our Allies ? It was impossible, he conceived, for any man to concur in the address, who had .not made up his mind" n the question, whether our secu thy was to be looked to in immediate war, or in an armed state of nominal peace, and who was not pre pared to approve that nominal peace, which must be attended with an expendituie nearly as great as war. Such a person Muse also be convinced, that in the present critical circumstance, it would be wise to adopt a course at variance with our allies. Sure he was, that no Honourable Gentleman could think it wise for the Goverement to depart from the pledges it had given, unless the safety of the world WAS t') be butighr for in separating the interests of this country le en those of the Continent. He was not surprised at the Honourable Gentleman's looking as he did to whet he called peace, rather than to the means of pet mitten and ultimate security. He was not sute ised at the gloomy picture which the Homy,* • Gentleman had drawn, when he recollected his pro. phecies on former occasions ; but it was•at . least rea sonable to add, that if the House had been unfortu nately so ill-advised as to listen to his advice, and to these predictions, the prospects even of an armed !.ease would have been very different from those wit ca the country nowenjOyed, and we should have left in the hands of the enemy most extensive and fertile districts, whose independence was most closely con•, nested with the interests of this country. Neither . ' would the Powers of the Continent have been left in that state of strength and vigotir which they now foitunately presented., and . which left at their disposer the alternative of peace or war.—(Hear, He' wished shortly to -advert to the consideration, whether the conduct of Goverment had been conttitnti•bnally Correct ? Parliament in their address of the 7th inst. lied gitferi irci pledge as to the' polity whether Of war, or peace. 'the only pledge they had given was, that the arm of the executive gavernMent should be ford tied tenth by sea and Lend ; but:Winn° way expressed w:lether the security of the countity eflobld be ben sought hy active Warfare (thy a defetesive 'system— ee mit the flritisie ionfd st9f•exercise its contendling 'studio* y. fut the Hohdurable Gentlerrtan thongl.l• .I,at his Majesty's Miiiiiters were guilty of a Oreach id duty unless they declared tacit opinisbas as to theist pieranttory EntAturet dtiith railianteut had audio.; r princ ited lo a i n ei d on the w r i e ri s c u h lts mi to ni w ste lth ha th d rf ac m ted ight w iel ere d. thtrie T he —that if'tMere avid a doubt as to the mut* to be 'firefeitince which the Powers of tile Conti pursued, then Ott line of policy should bare the s being first exposed to the danger, should deem it best to w a u d l d opt be - ;l a o r e d a s i r f m ' tfihieryourer so em ly b ee n d ri o in n g w il a i n ti t ie h t e r n s t u h p at . port. rather than separating our interests from their's. Ministers were perfectly willing to allow o u r Allies the full benefit of a deliberate review of all the circum stances of the case. To illottrrite this e lliethould ad vert to the chronology of the whole of the transac tions. When the Allies issued their declaration of the 113th of March, it was directed against an indvi dual who, in breach of the most solemn engage ments, Isas invading France, and whom they con. ceived as far from being likely at that time to exer cise the chief authority in that country. He differed from the Honourable Gentleman as to the character of that declaration, and when the time for discuioing it wrived, Le would be prepared to spew that or on no fair c eistruction was such a meaning imputable to it as the Honourable Gentleman attached, and that it gave as little countenance to assassination as many speeches he had heard from the Honourable Gentleman in that House. But to return to the sub ject more immediately before them,. he would state, that if the Powers of the Continent resolved, that their safety was best to be consulted by arms, they had come to this conviction from a consideration of the dangers with which they were individually threatened. They had not been goaded on by incite ments from this country ; for the course pursued by Ministers had le:en rather that of suggeiting the difficulties they w. re likely to encounter. Indeed, if the Continent did not feel that war was their true interest, it would have been the most unwise policy to urge them into it, as such a coalition could only be kept together by a feeling of sacred interest. Mi nisters had no hesitation in saying, that if the semi ments of the Continental Powers remained deter mined as to war, then they were prepared to en gage in their support ; but if circumstances suioe quent to the declaration had led them to hesitate and material differences of position had taken place, Ministers were perfectly desirous that these considera dons should be taken into accouat. At the time when the Ticaty was signed at Vienna,.it was known that Ney had acted the part of a traitor, and that little dependence could be placed on the army at Melun ; but it was not known that the King would be obliged to retire from his capital. Hence the Allies were called upon to see a character of greater difficulty and danger ill the events which had occurred. Something hat; been said of the little dependence that was to be pl iced on coalitions—but as tar as he had an oppor tunity of examining the principles on which the Alies acted, he was enabled to declare, that their sense of the greatness of the danger to which they were exposed had only added to their sober COD viction that they . could not take the benefit of peace in the present circumstances of Europe.— lite present circumstances bad a character more pe. culler than any thing presented in history, by that flagrant breach of treaty which had deprived Europe of all the advantages she expected from the peace which had been concluded. The return of this man to tranee, in defiance of all engagement:, was an in- Salt as 'well as an injury to all parties,. and exceeded whatever. was done by preceding Governments of France, however base and degraded. This man glorified himself on the perpetration of his bad faith. Resentment was net, indeed, to commit another ha don to ail the consequences of war; but the character of Bonaparte in these transactions was marked in distinct and legible terms. • The Hon. Member had never thought Bonaparte's character a matter of great importance: but take his previous conduct, and couple' it with the present circumstances, and a complete case was made out against any reliance upon him, and which reduced the question merely to that of power. We were fully entitled to presume that he would only preserve peace till the occasion suited him to violate it, when we had, with other na tions reduced our expenses, while he continued his labours to augment his military force. Were it sup posed that this new Constitution would be any sudi cient controul ? How many constitutions had France already received in the course of a few years ? It constituticuts on paper could coetroul Bonaparte, lie would be the most inoffensive of persons alive. The party in France with whom he at present connected himself did not entertain sentiments in general in common with him, and he viewed them only as in ' strumenteby which he could reassemble his formerly victorious bands, who were still thirsting for plunder and spoliation. Did any body think than when lie again got at the head of 400,000 troops, he %souk' `find any obj-ction or difficulty to disposing of his present Counsellors, whether Fouche or Lucien Bo naparte, if they opposed his views ? What did he say to Monsieur Labile, who was at the head of sonic assembly or other ? He told him after his return from Russiao that they talked about what they did not understand, that they might go about their busi ness, that he was born for his situation, and that the Wishes of the Preach had made him their Emperor. '--It had been said somewhere that he was now a changed Man, and that since his return he was deter mined only on the conciliation of ad Powers, Great Britain among the rest ; and as a proof of this, he q)ad taken a'measure on one Subject which particu. iarly proved his conciliatory views as they regarded 'doe opinions of Great Britain : but this measure 'he had previously oppo s ed, an d sa id h e wou ld b e t h e lid to agree to, even for the honour of France.— These opinions were not idle dreams as to what could be his conduct if his career were suffered to proceed to any great extent. What grounds were there for trusting to his keeping the peace that were donsistent with the views and expectations of the per- Aired Fri army ? His present situation might be Oiled a re-election : but it was the effort of a large dorrupfed tired of peace, dissatisfied with halt. pay, uneas u nder the wa benevolents dby thehonouitandpacfi 'elf Lour X ll pacific respect sway I. which iff the other nations. - The prospects of the soldiery drtre tiireiel'again in the plunder of other countries, and t`e; gain military promotion through war : they g sba a pe bov h e ii t c l di rei ) r du re c s t plt o iv r e di r n a g nk t s o . 4474 only Y e o d r ici r n is o in t tkiir views of pfonioiion and pillage, he was likely , o Meet the contempt of the army, and to become l 'ottiontlo them. The Noble Lord sincerely believed 'this mutt lie - lifs'course. With such a pers'on the question might surely arise, whether tle greater dr. ger was in actual contest, or in slumbering over das. gers speedily to be apprebendeel Instead ,Continental Powers being now found la the redumd. state of peace, which was their desire, di:7 v..cr e in military streneh ; and they had a just claim the French nation, who woe, stricay and r.., (4 1 1 . speaking, parties to thenratce of Paris. N. vet -a nation, under such - circitnistances, treated so veil; ; never was the .14alb of contgaerors so stripp e d , < <l , such an endeavour to appear rather as allies o foes. Those who saw Parisi at thia time, m; ; :). 1 i ti t seen that foreign interests and glory seemel for the sake of France. The ot;:er 11.0 ;„ 01 , a distinct right to call on the Frcr.c . a peopb• ; . !! , ::d to the treaty, which was f0i , d..,3 Ott th^ crab; ..; Bonaparte. It, however, the French 1,.1. , 1••• :e infatuated as to lend their-Aver to the n; ~„ p ?re, and become a party to sl gie;r:s a IA ewl: fraud, then, he must say, it was an tinfortuaatr c but it France were ix, rh Id to pm; cr war must be with France, and it ww, (.t 1;.• Europe to c , :ntend tot its own lib, rte a , :ci • He co 1 . 1 (1 .,_ eoneeivt. that Fiance. nu: • .• , Ititit,ns might peter stibmission to an lista • rat!..x than make a morisi efinrt in her own heimi‘,.l:•!.. ~; when be had restored hi, army the s mit ; but Eorore was not to suf'..t her own field of act;on- !lush;, , us, 44, .17 ~ Germany, kc. wiv• not to bc .Igat:..,, p; der and devastAtion. It was tigh! suc;, c.v t td ma k e t h e seat of war in France ':;er.t.e.f. l.ret:: profits ch andarmys pit e asn i tt „io oti n t . l i d ii thought k their right to disturb F.. 11 r.:pe, ra, A lit to teach those ,ho were so fond of wa:., not to have it exactly as they it 1. .i, rope should choose it. It was unjust t' Allied Powers wanted war. The histtry th, t i n :: private i ; nd an iv d id t u t a ie l since the French Revoluti'a spewed the ator,:ers art. sing from a confidence in the pacific inor:ssiutis of Bonaparte, who weakly I,magined theni.rlve. to be o t n h g e t l h l e o s n t . at f% e l s e , n in il: t e t i „: : : safe by the policy of peaceful relations v .' n ' n (Hear, hear.) —It was only by a departure from LIAt. te effectedm of and I.;:ray. world could not dilate an instance of equal mrAleration to that displayed by:?:: alliance. The 11-notirable Member • ' • • I spirit of defamation of the Allies, s tower:;tg the poice m character ,i the Government of his own con.'trr. When ho was cliar ! !ed with his mirsion to whatever danger might he apprehended from 0 - ,e. r..- goclafions, be t;elt it a duty tier: an con.lition , be honVde 'maintained. The neg.nc.:ilions proceeded on ttie prille;pies of the cieclirati-t: a: Frankfort ; nod it was an olyj-et to ~i:ee., that if was bad faith, the finit„,wotild l-e eith E., th ee. 1, French now subtiettvd Bona it was not tr,..ra si u i nnunii :otgnunaete wasd sys their own gent e?.•;:re, •hit Iron) t;.e ;!r4.1 power of I: he no mearc f,•:swed :hat the Allies w.:re to tic.,t wait Lim now, m: t.ly hec7.:: se they had treated v iti: him ',erne his act of firm. A treaty might h...‘.7 been ctmcludes.'. between Chai.illen arts Paris; hut :.e own proposition wid•in diver thy , . en the the very first slight success sv;ih:tl he creeileam:. The All es made ro •proelsitHll mots taveet. , :.):r than theq'reat7 of r211'5. :t sots saicrtlint parte offered more favr-,::rah.,:e sv hi s l i we re re fused. That was not the case. T.. .ne,h ter proposed such terms, he withdr.w Wirm ever terms had lacer maik coui.l not have aamit ted Bonaparte's Amb,, , :• , 11r at the C...l:vr.r as to the- settlerre:iit of Europe. A at'.: . i-g -gaimd by France, under the chanse of Goy iciaele, in the safety of admitting her M.nisler to Corp-:-. The Allies did make sacrifices Int a rencrai Whether in adversity or in prosperity, 11.1.1p4rte never neglected any step to gratify stet of bition ; no step was ever left by him to seek xtet something unpossessed ; nothing with him rya fixed except a ci natant attempt at rygrandizanat. Unless his very nature was changed, Vie s tine thiass must happen. He would only change !os meani, ip order to recover what he had 1 ,-, sr. 13.1 t llonaparic's character was peculiar to himseir; turd h i e ; i ne,v cumstances of 11;s con.itict marked by sy.tenia:i...J bad faith, and of which he had siiiicient He had an intercepted instruction horn Bonaimeat to his Minister, which was to have been &staled ii certain cases, which from accident it was not sa cloe. It disclosed a system of perfidy unparallel.d in c:e transactions of the civilized world. It was detci ' - March the 19th, when the discussions were not closed, and when he was undertaking a liazotjuus military operation, and which strit.;•ll:. be fatal to when he moved from Arcis-sett-Aubv. bawl-dice thought his success problematical, and gave oew structions in favour of concessions. The iiratiiczicrs were in the form of a secret letter, siAnt'd 1)) Duke of Bassani., addressed to Caulincourt. Tare had been many instances-of breaches in neg,cianon-:, but generally some defence was set up for th,m with respect to instructions. Tire Minister of 1; .mtpai'l was desired to conclude a Treaty, hut to ;xeP ha rk . certain parts as long as he could, the electittott them being to be delayed, notwitlistaudieg any ran fications, so that an unfair advantage ini4in. he at:" r• wards taken of them. This was a circuit:surd eonttary to all experience in such matters—W(o., There was expressed a deliberate intention E.' r. ll ‘;''' and subsequently to refuse compli an ce with the tre.i:oi and what were thine points on which tins had L ' i ' , d 3 was to turn ? Why, they were what Briar -II the three great keys of the French emil:vi aus i sufficiently shewed. what Ins objects were. The for of these keys was Antwerp, %ditch might in c died 6e key of England ; the second key was Mentz, was in fact the key of Germany ; and die thir.i which was to be kept • back evcrs alter ratiticatot, was Alessandria, which was in tact not the France, but the key of Italy. What better emit& be given of the nature of the lim n ? it w.t' clear he would break the Tit nty as soon ris ' him. Was it then turamportinit whether this nact.7 replaced in power or net' In power, he wou!si . bably soon pour a military deluge over the vv , '".. Disclaiming the notion of making war agamsl diVidual, yet there might be as much on the poll l ' character as to the case of a dirpuid ritieY a disputed succession. Might not Cie rowtrs. Europe protest against the power of an rot ip, dual, whose character would not apriY, to at the moral or social relations of lite h is LIMP' . • -. ....MM11141111111 hut to keep oacs d, the esecutiou of ri'llstsiiding any ran• nage might he alto , was a 61'001;51311a ( natters--(Neaf . ) ... intention to lance with the ore..:); which this bad tai;li 114 t Bonapaite c AL. d empire, auJ which lets were. The fug might 'ne. calledhi ch eit I was Mentz, w and the third key, alter ratilicaiwn, fact not the keY or What better rot* the man ? It w•l' as soon as stiqei vhether this min vi.ts )over, he would pro . age over the we'll 1g war agAinst all nucb on the point of disputed territory or or not the POWeri rower of an not apply to any /hie ? flits teata: