Star. — London, England, 1802-05-15 00:00:00

r 7 chants' (crake have been augmented from one hundred and eighteen thoufand to one hundred and forty-three thoufand men. Let thefe confe derations be coupled with the circumflance, that we have had during the conteft, no lefs than one hundred and twenty thoufand men employed in our navy, and it will not fail to excite the moil ardent admiration of the maritime greatnefs of the country. It mull not be palled over, that the in terference of neutral powers in the trade of Eu rope, rendered neceflary by the profecution of hoftilities, is now completely done away, and we (hall find abundant fubjeas for confidence and ex ultation in our commercial and naval pre-emi. nence. Now, Sir, permit me to elk, how deco France Rand wit h refpea to her maritime re fources? In the year 1777, (for I will go fo far back as that period) her exports, accordiam to, M. Necker, amounted to twelve millions, and her importsto nine millions, which however were after wards increafed. Towards the commencement of the late war, her exports were increafed by feven millions and a half; and her imports by four mil lions and a half. Her grofs exports were finally valued at feventeen millions, and her grefs im ports at fifteen millions.—Such was the Rate of her commerce ; but what is her lituation at prefent ? Her imports now are not more than fixty-one thoufind pounds, and her exports do not exceed eleven thnufand. In this extraordinary ftatement I fpeak from the authority of the haft official re port. So that it appears, Sir, no country was ever before plunged in fuch diftrefs, coupled with the lots of capital, and with the decay of all kinds of manufaeure. I beg Gentlemen will confider the cafe as it really is, that of two countries flut ing together with fuel van differences in their re fources, and produaive means of national opu lence and profperity. I admit that population, foil, and climate, are the great elements in making wealth ; but though France polleffes thefeclements, we are bound to confider that the has loft all during the war, and that we have advanced one-half more in the encreafe of our means. With thefe grounds before us, I confefs I have little appre henfion of what France is fuppofed to be capable of doing ; nor can I fee any caufe of alarm in the fyf. tern of commercial hoftility which the is imagined to meditate againft this country. Is it not abliird to fuppofe that the country whole capital is (mall, would with to cnnfume it in purchafing dear arti cles, while the might obtain them at a much cheaper rate ? Will the Phut up her ports againft all the world, for the purpofe of lending what little capital Rte has lef t? Can the perfuade other powers to do the fame ? Let the Houle look over the trade of England, and fee what means France poireffes to extend :Ms commercial fyftem of !tal ky to other counti ies. The faireft way would be to look to the year of the war, when it was tried with moll efficacy, when her power was moil felt, and when her armies were in poffeffion of many parts with which we traded. The general exports of Great Britain to Europe, in I Soo, were (even millions and a half; and now let us enumerate thofe countries which France could not influence. Among them we find Denmark, Rana, Sweden, Poland, &c. and out of the whole (even millions and a half it appears that no lets than five millions eight hundred thoufand pounds were exported to Acre lea* -On the other hand, if we recapi. tulate the countries over which France predomi nated, fuch as Holland, Flanders, Italy, Spain, etc. we (hall find the amount of our export to them no more than feven hundred thoufand pounds.— Thus, if even France were defirous to carry on this hoftil- fyflem againft our commerce, (he could not profecute it with any fuccefs, fence it is evi dent, that out of five millions and a halfof exports to the Continent, the could only take away one eighth of it. There is betides nothing to induce us to apprehend that (he wiffies to exclude us from the ports of Portul, for, according to the Treaty with that Power, th e exprefsly Itipulates that her manufaaures ( h all be received on the footing of thole of the mon favoured nations. For my own part, Sir, I defire no better terms, for in a fair competition of that nature we have no occafion to fear the iffue. With refpea to Italy, the influence of France cannot be decifive, as Auftria Dill re tains power in that country, and if it were, and Otte were defirous to exercife it to our complete ex elufion, it would be totally impogible for her to fupply Italy with the neceffary articles of importa tion. I (hall now. Sir, fubmit to the Houle, whe ther this country is likely to nand worfe, in a com mercial view; after the Peace, than during the War ? (Ilene was a :wend joy of sear ! hear I teed f:). He nest proceeded to thew that with re to America, the Well Indies, and the tranfit trade, there did not axift the flighteft grounds for anxiety, or gloomy anticipation, but that on the contrary, while we gave to France Tome increafe of maritime means aad aftivity, we at the fame time confiderably added to our own trade and refources. —The Noble Lord next adverted to the Rate of St. Domingo, where the population had been fe deftroyed, that it would take eighteen millions fterling to reilore it. With refpea to the general quenion of the Expedition that lately failed from France, it was a trefiion of too extended a nature to give his opinion on it then; hut he had no he fttation in raying that be Mould look upon the efta bliffiment of a Black Colony in that ifland with difmay and apprehenfion. Thefe people had a rnoft rooted mal ignit y againft all European fy Items : a fpirit of !Infinity prevailed between the govern ment of fuch perfons and all other Governments in the other islands. Befides, fuch a colony would have a molt dangerous influence among the Black Haves of the other colonies. Therefore he could not. agree with thofe who felt alarmed at the pro bable faeces of the French expedition. As to our felves, we Rood in a lituation of great fccurity ; we had flrength and refources funicient to enable us to continue the flruggle, if fuch was ncceSary. General MAITLAND began his defence of the Definitive Treaty, and at the fame time Paid, he would Date a few circumaanees from his local and praCtical knowledge. There appeared to be a, great difference in opinion among Gentlemen re (pelting the new boundaries of the French and Port ugnefe territories in South America. But the tea quarter to receive information from, on this fubjcd, was the opinion of the Contrading Parties themfelves, who had the greateft intereti in the bufinefs. It was tingular, therefore, that the Hon. Gentleman fhould he fo anxious to innold Porte. gal and Franc: as to the geographical notation of , thole countri:s, although they muff be fuppofed the befi qualiFo I to know what was moll condu cive to tar o•••n interetl. He had heard a great deal cone- -ninr the fatal confequenccs likely to wire from the ce'ffion of Louifiana to Frince, from the advaata.,..s the thoald polies by the occupa tion of th - tt c?,untry. It was neceffary to recoiled, that this was the country of projectors ; that Loui. :lane' - •-• - bottom in which the whol Miffiflippi .cheite h•d funk ; that it had formerly been in the tatenpation of France, and fince that time pof fared by Spain, who granted feveral immunities to the country, which notwithftanding, did not advance one jot towards improvement; fo that, after a century of cultivation, of which period .it was 6o years in the poffeffion of France and 40 in that of Spain, it had made lefs advances to• wards profperity than any other that could be named. But it had been laid, this country would give to the French a domineering interell in North America. He was certain that in cafe of any quarrel with the United States, the latter would have a decided advantage : in fad, he Mould Jan tertain no fears for the event of filch a conten.— As to the French fending emiffaries through this country into America, he believed they would eafily do fo again as they had already done, with out poffeffing any colony on the continent. It was laid that the borders of Louifiana were no more than three hundred miles from Mexico, and that therefore the Spauifh Settlements were in danger from the vicinity of the French. Gentlemen Who made thefe Ratements would do well to go to that country and fee the difficulty the French would have in travelling and marching an army into Mexico. In the next place it had been obferved, that our Colonies were likely to be in great dan ger from the Colonizing fyttem of France, who would rival and might ultimately hays a fape riority over us in the Weft-Indies as well as other parts of the world. But did not Gentlemen think it would be firft neceffary for France to fend a fleet and armies to thefe Colonies ? and that before they could do that, they mull have a paffport from the Lords Commiffioners of the Admiralty in Eng land : for inn:lnce, whenever we fhould think pro per to declare war againft France. every colony the had, would be immediately placed under a lock and key. What he contended was, that be fore France could make ufe of any of her Colonial polfeffions,fo as to be of any danger to this country, the whole of her nrength as a maritime country muff be changed. We might on a particular oc. cation permit her fleet to fail for the attainment of a particular object ; but it mull be impreffed on the mind of every Gentleman, that without filch per miffion the fleet could not fail. He was, therefore, much furprifed to hear a Right Hon. Gentleman, who opened the debase on the preceding day, ex prefs himfelf in the manner he did concerning the French expedition to St. Domingo. It had been very truly obferved by the Noble Lord who fpoke that evening, that it would be highly dangerous to Coffer a colony of Blacks to grow up into inde pendence in the Weft Indies : fuch a free Repub lic, or rather free Anarchy, mull be the greaten evil that could exit in the world, becaufc it was an evil againft which human wifdom could take no fort of precaution. But if any European Power timid get the better of this exifting State in the Well Indies, then the danger was over. This mull only he done by force, and when that was accomplifhed, precautions could be ufed. The cis. cumnance of our fending a force to the Well In dies equal to that which the French had there, mull do away all apprchenfions, if any could be entertained, for the fecority of our Colonies.— But as to that anarchy which the French were about to fupprefs, he hoped, and he had reafon to believe, that it would be done away much fooner than tome people imagined. There was another topic on which he would trouble the Houle with an ohferration or two : It had been Rated by thole Gentlemen who difapproved of the peace, that our Sovereignty in India was likely to be difputed by France. He would defy any man to thew in what part of the world there were poffeffions which (load in a greater Rate of fecurity than thofc belonging to Great Britain in the Eaft In dies. The power of Tippoo was completely anni hilated, and there was was not a tingle French or Dutch poffeffion along the Continent, that could become formidable as an enemy in that country. With regard to our retaining poffeffion of the Cape of Good Hope, he did not fee the neceffity of fuch a raeafure in the fame point of view with 1 a Right Honourable Gentleman, for whole talents he had the higheft opinion (Mr. Dundas), and who in other refpede had approved of the Defini tive Treaty. Thule Gentlemen who fpoke fo much againft the ccffion of Malta, had afferted that we pots: lied no port in the Mediterranean. In contradidion to that affertion, it appeared that before ever we took Malta, Lord Neifon found no fuck difficulty at the time when he annihilated the whole naval power of Prance : and when the great and gallant Sir Ralph Abercrombie was prepar ing to make a defcent upon Egypt, he did not go with his fleet to Malta, although that place was at the time in our puffeffion, but carried the whole of his army to a Turkint port; therefore the whole object of the Nat Expedition was completely carried into efeet without any at:finance derived from Malta. The more he confictered tht fubjed then before the Houle, and the more he viewed the condnd of his Majefty's /*Miners in making Peace, the more firmly was he perfuaded that it was a Peace as good, as honourable, and as like ly to be permanent as any which, under the pre , fent circumitanees of Eurpe, could be obtained for this country. Lord Ter me fpoke in reply to die arguments that had been urged on die preceding day by Lord Hawkefbury, and by Lord Catilereagh on the prefent evening. His obfervations were mollly the Fame as had been previoully made by thole who oppofed the Peace. He raid it was nor atone fin the interval between the kr thig of the two Treatlet, bat cyra Awe the ftUcatiott or the Definitive Treaty, a fpirit of aggranditement had ;again difplayed itfelf in France. The cpsellion is not, as had been improperly laid down, whether ; it was worth our while to have continued the War any longer? but whether, in the fituation in which the country was, with the great advantages the had gained, the captures the had made, and the high ground on which the Rood, the could not. have obtained better terms ? We had neither ob tained indemnity for the part nor fecurity for the future ; and if fo, the Government was not julti fied in making peace. When he fpoke of indem • nity, he did not mean the reitnburfement of our expeaces but Tome counterbalance for the raft ac ceffion of territory by France. So far from anv indemnity being obtained for Portugal, her poi- I legions were in danger of fallPag into the hands of I France ; and fuch was the of eg of French influ ence at Lifbon, that according to an account he had heard within the lall two hours, it appeared that a great indignity had lately been offered to Britifh fubjegs there ; that the Britifh (hips were driven out of the Tagus; and that our Minifter at ; the Court of Lifbon had fent home for inftrugions 1 how to aft. He wilhed to alk Minifters whether thefe fags had been communicated to them? He contended we had not gained any fecurity for the future by this Peace ; for he would appeal to the commercial part of the community, whofe fenti ments he was well acquainted with, whether the Treaty of Peace fecured to them their commercial advantages? The Noble Lord next adverted to the fubjelt of the non-renewal of Treaties ; and ob ferved,that by not renewing the Treaty with Hol land, the flag of this Country was difhonoured.— After fevejal other obfervations,he concluded with obferving that mall of thole things he complained of might Rill be got over by amicable negotiation. The MaITEII of the Rotas faid, he rote to make a few obfervations on one or two of the points in difcuffion before the Houle. He should confine himfelf to thefe, as it was impoffible to embrace the whole fubjed in any reafonable con ' pars, and as particular arrangements had been very ably explained and defended by thofe who were concerned in framing them. lb enter into details would be quite unneceffary, as, if the peace was unjnflifiable upon the principles of the Gentlemen who had oppofed it, it was liable to objeflions which no confideration of its conditions could re move. The Right Hon. Gentleman who opened the debate (hewed much ingenuity in eftablifhing pofitions which a great majority of the Hou le would have no inclination to difpute. But, fait' Sir William Grant, I am utterly at a lots to fee the conneftion between thefe opinions andthe merits of the peace. Gentlemen teem to think they have done enough when they prove that the power of France is prodigious: and that tht liberties of Europe are endangered,the y point out the lamentableeffeds of this power; but do they (hew that h is produced by the peace? Sir, it arifes from the events of the war. Do I fay that it was unwire in this country to engage in the war?? By no means. Bad as the fituation of Europe at preterit is, it would have been infinitely worfe had we remained ina&ive. The peace has not taken from France this overgrown power ; no peace could be hoped to make her refign it, and no war could have wrelled it from her: It will then be laid, " Yon were driven to make peace from neceffity." In a certain fenfe we were. With a wife man, what is prudent is necefFary. When we could gain nothing by the war, there was a moral necellity that we lhould make peace, let our phyfical firength have been ever fo great. If my Right Hon. kriend will thew me how we can change what we all molt fincercly lament, I will join my endeavours to his to urge exertion and perfeverance. I will net a(k from him a demon firation of (tweets, nor even thofe high degrees of probability which approach it. Let him (hew any rational chance on a which a fober-headed man would aft in common life and I immediately dole with slim. But, Sir, he is Purely boundto point out means which, if (kilfully employed, would be in Come meafure adequate to the purpofe he recom mends. While we had allies, Sir, it was always poflible that their fuccefles might have pot things in a more favourable fituation. At the opening of every campaign there was a chance and a hope that the balance of Europe would be reftored. We might Rill entertain this flattering profpett at the time of the rejettion of Binaparte s firlt overture. More favourable terms of peace might have been obtained then, but perhaps we would not have been ' unified in abandoning the chance of obtain. ing all that we wifhed. In fuch a Rate of things it was better to prefer war to loch a peace as this, or ' perhaps even to entering into a negotiation. It was poilible that we might have obtained much more than any treaty could have given us. Be that as it may, there is no principle of any kind on which we can carry en war for the Continent without a Continental Ally. We can affift in the deliverance of Europe, but we cannot achieve it. Mr. Burke faid it was impoffible for ns to make any impref fion upon France, except in eonjunflion with the community of Chriftendom.—This pofition is too broad. All interefts that are Britilb we can affert, and alert with effeet. With regard to others it is unqueftionably true. We can calculate our efforts ; we know that there can be no progreffion in them ; after years of war we (could not have advanced one Rep towards the emancipation of the fubjugated States. What can we do unaffifted for the independence of the Cifalpine Republic, or to nt Spain from ceding Louifiana co France. prevent is that thefe objets are not great, but that they are unattainable. The Noble Lord (Lord Hawkefbury) after whofe manly, eloquent, and unanfwerable defence of the Treaty, I ought to make an apology for at all offering my fentiments, urged the abfurdity of continuing the war to deter mine, whether Bonaparte 'hold& have a direft or indireg influence ever the Italian Republic, when we had contented to difeontinue it for the purpofe of wtefting from France the Netherlands and Hol land? A Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. T. Gres vile} replied, that it was unfair to take articles ; thus in detail, and that though not for any one, yet for altogether, we might be well ' unified in cnntinuarg the conteß. I admit the jullice of this.; reaforring, as receding. Rep by Rep we might at laR be obliged to give up Wu of our awn collages. have feverely cenfured the conduct of Gentlemen on the other fide of the Houle, who, affuming that the point on which the negotiation broke off w " the only thing in difpute, a arced, that we were ia. tithing our good and treafure for a fpice iflaud. A nation mutt draw a line in the fpirit of moderatii.n, and then firmly adhere to it. If the negociatiiiiv .!build afterwards break off, it will not be for any particular fort or ilhind, but bccaufe no reafonable terms can be procured, and you fight to avoid dilhonbur. Thus has our Government aeled. —lt has been laid, that though on account o: late events, it might have been fcarcely juftif.- able at once to break off the negotiation, yet that we ougla to have inlifled on a compenfa- Lion for the new acquifitions of the enemy. Sir, is would auk whether the retention (,1 all the Minds we have agreed to retlore woald form any balancr, to the Continental power of France? They are not things at all of the fiune fort, and the cine. would not have beets in any degree diminilliee.:— `France, from her conqnefts, gains dire& ilrengtli —not through the medium of wealth. The W e l . India 'Rands produce weaknefs iultead of ftrength. They do not increafe our means of attacking the enemy, and they enfeeble by dividing our means of defence. It was felt at Lille that the Weft In dia Elands could not be converted to this impor. cant purpofe. In that cafe, even upon my prin ciples, Government would he blameable. If they were a counterbalance in our hands, it would be moll criminal to refign them. But the abfurditv is fo apparent, that it has never occurred to any one to reafon in this ftrange manner. Sir, it sae not material to retain a greater number of our conquefts. If you had the power, you ought nit to chufe to prevent France from having a larae commerce to diftant countries. This is-the ottle hold we have upon her. Thus alone peace is hn intereft, and we are a terror to her. lam really anxious to know, Sir, what plan of operations. had thefe Gentlemen been in power, thv mea to have purfued. As yet we have heard. nothi.,g ' of this kind even hinted at. We have been to'd of nothing more definite than " Chance of Events." Without any profpea of fuccefs, we thould con tinue the war merely for the purpole of not tieing at peace. If this unknown event Ihould not hap. . pen loon, we may be fo much exhaufted, as not to be able to take advantage of it. Suppose, Sir, that it fhould never happen. We are reduced to make peace at laft on worfe terms than the prefent, as with worfe means we could not negotiate but wi:h impaired effect. There are fume Gentlemen oppofite, who will fay you have made peace wife. ly, becaufe you have abandoned the objeft of war. The °Nee of the war has too often, Sir, been purpofely confounded with the means of at taining that object. We witted to provide for our own fafety tram the immediate danger of French principles, and French power, and to pr e f erve , if poffible, the balance of power on the continent, a matter in which our fafety was materially though indirectly concerned. Can it be Paid that we have failed in the firft Sir, we are atfembled here to day, after a revolution which threatened our ex iftence, and which has elated the deltruftion qt . almoft all the furroundiug nations, debating ac cording to ancient forms, not concerning the loges we have fuftalned, not concerning ruined com merce, or curtailed dominion, but whether the ad. --- ditions to our territory are fo great as frqns our . fplendid victories we were entitled to e wee (arm: app/aufe.) In the other object of Paving Europe, we have certainly failed,but no difgrace can attach to the failure, as it is What, without the affillance of Europe, ie.. would have been madnefs to have at tempted. We cannot fee there things withont regret, but..happilY ; this regret is not embittered by the thought that we have left any thing undone to pre- • vent diem. However,the profpeft is not on all fides equally gloomy; at one time our fears of French power were al:ill:it:bed in terror of the defolating e tees ofFreneh principles. Mr. Burke obferved,that it would be better to be conquered by any other nation than to have the French as neighbours.— (The Right Honourable and Learned Gentleman here quoted the well known paffage, where Mr. Burke reprefcnts the French as having made a breach with the community of Europe, on pur pole to make all mankind fulnuit to their dominion. &c.) —lt is fotne confolation. Sir, that France (hews a fdifpolition to re-enter the pale of deltic, fociety. She is returning to order, to religion, and right principles, as fall I!; can reafonably be es. expected ; much has been done during the loft two years and a half, and a greater progrcfs Rill would probably have been made, had the career of war doled at an earlier period. I have heard it fated, that though Bonaparte was the foe of jacobiniftu in France, he was its friend in England. If he shall extirpate jacobinifin in Fraece, whatever hie deferts in other things may be, here he will prove himfeif a benefactor of the human race. When the fatal !butte from which it originally flowed is dried up, it may be hoped that it will for ever dif appear, and that the world will recover from its ravages. Sir, I cannot believe that Bonaparte is animated with that implacable fpirit towards this country. To purfue a rival with unceafing hatred and blind; rage often ends in Pelf-deftrueion. It is clearly his interest that jacobinifm filmid be every where crufhed. If it fiourifhes in England. neither France nor any other country in Europe will be, tranquil. The pride of Jacobins (not the lead diftinguifhed feature in its character) smith". be intereaed above all to re-ellablifh its throne in its original dominion. Bonaparte ought to with with eagernefs that it may be obliterated from the earth, and that its principles and modes of aflion may be forgotten for ever. While a veftige of it remains, his prefent Government mutt be infecure, and any other Government he mat defire to eta blifh. The Right Hon. and Learned Gentleman proceeded next to confider the value of Louifiana. From the obfervations of the Hon. General, evidently ufelefs as a colony; and though it was in the polreffion of France for 6o years, he did rot believe that during all that period they had gained or we had 101 l a6fhing smack the more. During the negotiations of 1761, when the country seat in a fituation to dilate terms of peace to France. Mr. Pitt (not a man unacquainted with the sire. teas of England, or apt to neglat them) no.=: