Star. — London, England, 1815-04-08 00:00:00

n•I the Tvaty signe at Paris at that period; also. Earl I Lettre to I •rd Bectinek, with the correspon d -tct 11..te-n him (Lord eastlers4h) and that B. Aids Em y. ".1 ,- AV irrir EaD wished to know' whethet the Noble Lord hive my -bleed.* to produce a piper which lie intended h...e movel for yesterday. but had forgotten. pi e meatitthe .r.ttlon homed by the Allies. and signed by thrieniputen tie •on the 3 , 11 of March at 'Vienna. He sh 'aot detain :•te t hy nitro - iv for it now; but the Nohlt. Lord would y • ' wh -oh rit was -0 be col. • .1. , -ed a 4 authvott.: ? I err., t' iTt.naliAGH wished the lion. ilrotienip to COR• s'd e that piper a. authentic. and to aryete on it as such.on foe It s t woule .r hero pre +e *tea with the rest had any motirtol eon he. made. Mr. tstIIsISONBY thought that although the House eouhl not elven it should be prevented to-tiight, it toisht peohably sun the N,,b'el.ord's convenience to lay it before the iton.e en Ithinday. wi-tel to know Whether are would have any ohj.ctinn to T....mince a copy of the Declaration hutted by the Allies it the breaking up of the negoriationa at Chatillon lain! CAS EAGII would hace no objection, as he did not think that communication would he prejudicial to the public *tarot. PRINCE REGENT'S MESSAGE. 'Vie Order of the Day for taking the Regent's Message into consideretion saving bceu toad, as well as the Message itself, by the Speaker; lend CAS'ILER EAGH rose. He assured the House, that at too periad of his political eustence, he had more deeply felt the impotence of the cons,- earations to which he bad to call their attention than at the present moment, when discussing those which arose out of the momentous events that had taken place in a neighbouring kingdom, and the councils which throe events were likely to produce. It had been his lot, in the course of the late discussions of the House, to endeavour to direct its attention to events of a very different nature ; events which had led to an order of things, by which we might flatter ourselves the worli would be delivered from a recur reitee of the calamities and danger; through which it had passed, and brought to au orderly state, which, it not exactly its former political constitution), would have a tendency to coaduct tai that ancient social and poslitical statiun, from which it had only been torn by grate! convulsion. Whatever difference of opinion might hove existed on Kith sides of the House, with respect to the arrangements made to form the Body Po'itic of Fur , pe, yet all must have evened. that as the proposed diraosition would present a mass of in dependent Pavers, possessing all the charactetistics of iudependeuce, and capable of Maintaining them. staves and their relations towards each other, it was likely that the world would be goa caned by a ba lanced system of political equality, instead of being oppressed by a ntibury authority that would keep down or etc:tabor up every other. It was inspossiale n - a to feel that the late vegans in France, if they did not menace with iunant destenceion die work of the last twelve years, or take away the reward of all our exertions and those of the Allier! Powers. world c ill their ultimate security into question. It a milk try Chief, whose only e seetial pretension to the empire was forward en dr attartaireut of an 'limy, for he contended that the Revolution had been imputed up o n die people by the army, if tact Chief and a rolirary aparm were rtoreaablished in France, becate.e the army found the start: of peace of Europe incompati ble with their. intexere, then it only remained at pre sent. ur at a mate remote period. either that all the calamities which die had alteoety experienced should again fat indicted on Europe. or else that she should turn barb to that system from which die had emerged, • arta continue to exist in a military character—{ Hoar, Asar.)-1c that case, we must abstain hum giving up t euselvee to the natural CUOStittainUS of State% and revert to measures tuna uncongenial to oar late tests. He felt all the importance of such considera tions, and the iminense and awful nature of the sub ject. After an arduous struggle of tiventyataree or' twentraour years, to paean the idea of war, even in in west indifferent skape, to the aspect of the House, valid not Lail to prove most uopleastug ; but when it was resolved into dies great question, whe ther we should have war, or enter into a peace.of ramie,,;? bee"...le all the morel considerations involved iu the subject. be conceived that the necessity vif de kberatitig was most serious and awful. if he telt the question was as seal a state. that be could present views, of it which he ueliered would guide the judg went of the ticitiv, he would not safer the Councils of the State to be precipitated without calling fur and oinaiiiing the sense of. Parliament. But as the ques tem was not yet in that forward state, and he cuald asoc opal all its considerations, he was disposed to follow the sugeemion of a Right Hon. Gentleman opposite. nud to confine hiuvA It comber points. The aleseoge stated that the late events had taken place in direct COatrarentiart rot oet.y tne eugigements fern col at Fontainebleau, lout of these contemplated fa. the Allies in the ponce et Paris. This in itself 211eCtS at Si, inielicJ d just:id:tide CAW! of Al against Ira:tee; it Gorer .41Ciat. our Allies, atter eutering tato every coafiaeretiou ut prudeater, should think ;o a t a s tep proper. Tied it called for measures of eauliart all agreed; and no man would deny that ereasuies of vi oar should be taken in concert with our Albes. 'f •!!! nature of this concert would re. Mai@ to Jr communicated to Parliament at another • iveriOd. He Was sure that the auntie would not en. deavout at present to di aw from Bursters what it oar, or how far it extended. For if it Was desired ru peorve entire the autiunity of the House over the Erecutive Savants of the Crown, %bast the litter should feel they could not attempt any thiog assent- Coned by the principles of the Constitutimo, nothing could be more inconsisthat with the advantage anti Lei time of the cutlet: l y, than that Parliament should attempt, on grounJs of imperfect information, to assume that authority whirr Uelonged to the Crown, and to judge of mearees which they could only know perfectly when they had arrived at a certain stage. The events in hence had created a state in Europe so menacing to the tranquillity of things as sealed by the Treaty of Paris, that it was ilapoiabie the British nation shush! not be found in arms at this . morneat.. All he would ask of the Nouse would be, tisat it should be proposed to tii4e the measures neces bay to support the Esatutive, reserving to itself the right of expressing its opittioin afterwards on the na one of' the mitastnes themselves. ' GeOer al considera. taws unatt aeigh to deterini4e isollgther we should en gage is a war of vigour, or corirdirde a peace of can. 'O3ll l •He %mild 'relieve the House and the rat I s om any misconceptions which he knew bad -taken ki,se; Au inefitsbiou bad ginic abrade which, net eta nil:lath/4; 0)41 be iellaAtriuntious ; that aCCord. tai aire state vt things ruouiriehleau, the "1 meaty coachiskel at diet plece had 40 , 41 ilapreiely el#Liard iota: That it was au excess of searoArt - and a total want of policy th at has g ranted it, and that the Allies were responsible to the world tor the calamities with which it was now threatened in conse quence of the falsecottacilswhicligaided their decision. He apprehended that the greater part of the persons with whom he had conversed, had been inclined to throw blame upon those Princes, as having exercitei their authority improperly in that instance, and to conceive that Treaty had been concluded gratuitously on A principle of generosity. in consequence of A hich it had been so easily abused. 'lnstead of taking ad. vantage of the apologies supplied him by those who blamed the treaty, or represented its stipulations as net having been fulfilled—Bonaparte, in his arro gance had again displayed his contempt of all trea ties, and roved that the only limits to his invasion of other countries were to be found in his means and not his will. He had placed himself boldly, and if morality were not to be consulted, he would say ho nestly, on the only pedestal to which he had any claim, that of power, and proclaimed himself the le. gitimate Emperor of the French, as he impiously said, by the race of God," boasting that this autho rity was not unpaired by any previous act ; that, hi order to spare the effusion of a drop of French Mood, lie had abdicated with an intention to deceive, a that he did not return, even in consequence of being recalled, but in virtue of his full and unimpaired right. Such was the situation in which he now., stood. But this subject had carried him (Lord Cast kteagh) out of his petit. The general opinion was, that the Allies had made a aenereus sacrifice of their interests at Funtainbleau. Whatever calamities might prove the result of theii conduct, he should never la ment that the principle which accompanied them to die gates of Path should have !seen that of deference to the people. He was confident that feeling would be the last in a British Parliament. Nothing had been omitted on the part of this country and her Al lies, to recognize and act up to all moral principles. He should not regret if there had been any error that it should have becalm' the side of national generosity, and he felt, that if any blame was to be imputed, it was wholly on the right tide. Conqtiering Europe had left France not only in ixissession of her old limits, but aggrandized. None of these heavy contributions. laid on all countries by the French armies, had been inn- ' posed upon her. In order ko soothe her for the oca cupatitui of her capital by foreign hosts. all those , works of art were left her, which might have been considered as the badges and pledges of her invasion of other countries. The fact was, that when the Treaty of Fontainbleau had been signed, the situa tion of Napoleon was not such as had been represen ted. Protracted waesnight at hest have ended by his capture, his flight, or his evasion ou: of the country. When the question came before the Allied Powers, the papers would shew, and be spoke with the more confidence, as it was 11040 A his own side, not having brat a party to thearrangement in its origin, the ch.. cunistances of the use were of such necessity as to auiiori.se the steps which were taken, and he trusted the, House would sic both their policy and their pro priety. Napoleon then returning towards Paris with the mass of his army, was still at the head of a vety considerable number of troops, prepared to act Wat 1 7 in his support. He had not merely this army, but there was every reason to presume that all the other corps in the .different Provinces o( Ft-awe cwt re equally disposed to act with him. The occupation of the capital might only have affected a few, and even the troops which Marshal Marmont had para lyseJ for a time, might have resumed the offensive in, his cause. In fact, the spirit and temper of the whole French army were such, that the Allies *mid not decide otherwise than they had done. The idea had even been taken from the Provisional Government of France, then acting in favour of the Bourbons. That G °raiment had recommended the adoption of some means to terminate the contest without a civil war.— When he (Lord Castlereagh) arrived, he found the question decided, in consequence of commuaieaitais made and assurances given to Boaaparte respecting the terms of the Treaty. He felt that placing him who had exercised the sovereign authority in a situa tion Irons whence he could overlook France, and ano ther country (Italy) which might be supposed to con tain many of his partisans, was not unattended with danger. He there! ire conceived it his duty to oppose such an arrangement, but was soon convinced of the difficulty of fiadiug another place which should meet, with Bonaparte's approbation. For the latter did not conceive there was any tither situatioo in which he could cwsider himself in perfect security, and rtly on his own conduct for its continuance. Oa find ing what assurances had been given him, and - consi. eletiug the advautages and policy of terminating ale war a:::!cably, C istlereaghj had felt it his , duty t : . : ereaire his uppositlon. The question had not Leen decideei the fact of Napoleon being in the power of the Atiies, but in a situation w hich, as sisted by all the corps ut the army, and some insur rection in the provinces, he might have prolonged the co:Aest fur a ccusiderable time. With respect to his situation at Elisa, he owned, that whatever he might • originally have aliougheof it, the arrangements being made, he was of aipinion that it ought to be kept as iaithlt.dy as any other treaty. It never formed any part of the convention of Fontainbleau, that Napo.' lean should be con s id er ed a prisoner at Elba. andl that it he should leave it, the Allies should have a right to seize and arrest him. It was not to be made a tower for his captivity. It was never iatended that he should have no freedoms on or round that island. Such a construction was totally unfounded, and if such stipulations had been introduced into the treaty, he bad no doubt but they would now be brought for ward to justify the present events, in the same man liter as some insinuations had already been thrown out respecting the alleged non-fulfilment of some ar. ticks of the Convention. The next question was, whether any precaut:uns, not infringing the treaty, had been omitted to prevent the occurrence of the preaeut calamity Government had never undertaken or contemplated any police or espionage in or out of die island of Elba to prevent Bonapatte from leaving its Ames. With respect to any police out of the Wand, one of the reasons why it was not attempted was, that not only in their judgment but in that of prefessiottal persona, it was absolutely and physically impossible that it should be tarried into execution.— The circumvallatioo of even such a place as Elba, was beyond the powerof the whole British.navy.— The weadser might at any, time break the line, and open a way for &gbh Bat even had the whole Bri dalf navy bleu sbers; they Odd ask ban wet with- . . out breaking the Treaty. It might be said that such a Treaty should not have been concluded, or that Bonaparte's situation ouiht to have been mere redu ced, both in point of revenue and freedom. Flowerer this might be, az Treaty kft him to his own posses. sions, to govein them in supreme authority as he thought proper. It assigned to him, not voiced a formidable navy, hot a corvette, to protect his com munications with all the posts of th e Mediterranean, i fort was not uncommon to see his flag on the waves, end no critiz:rs of any nation had a right to v i olate his colours. Though an island, Elba was nut a de serted place. It had a very considerable commerce with all the Mediterranean ports. It was not by the force or his armament, or of the Imperial Guar& that he was conveyed to Antibes, uhere he was chased on his way by a British vessel, which could not overtake him. If Bonaparte had come in any disguise, un connected with a political enterprise, and had landed in any part of Europe, he must and would have been treated as any oilier individual. On the !part of the French Government he could say, that they had never undertaken to exercise any po- Ike in the island of Elba. It was certainly desirable to know what was passing in that island, and as 1 , there was no regular Iltitish resident there, Colonel' Campbell had been allowed to remain either at Elba or Leghorn, after he had fulfilled the whole of his duty, which consisted in conveying Boa a aparte to his residence. He never was to exercise an police what- ever over that individual, and it he had been, he could not have effected it, as in a short time his con duct gave offence, and lie received strong hints that his absence would be agreeable. He twat: those hints, but even had he remained on shore, he c0n!..1 not have even attempted to prevent his escape. LI: would have been treatedin the same Manner as Mr. Ritchie, acting as British Consul at Elba, which con-. ',tined three considerable harbours. Ni, sooner 'Ned Napoleon begun his preparations than 'Jo Rep darmes were ordered to watch t h at gentleman, i did not quit him till the embarkation had sailed.— The same would have happened to Colonel Camp bell. It was an extraordinary circumstance, though not an incredible one, that even General Bertrand, who was considered as NapoLon's confidant, did tint know Iris master was going, until the orders tar shut ting the ports arrived, about five (o'clock in the after noon of the 26th rebtuary. In due: hours they hid all en:harked, and at night the expedition had No preparation had Leen wade beyond the ordinary repair , ; of the corvette recognized by the Convention. With respect to the odder vesseis, ti.ere was no pre vious preparation. They happerad to be in the port for commercial purposes, and had been zeize.l. One of them was a trench merchantman hut just arrived, which also shared the snf..- fate. If there were any reason to suppose that or left t`:.: Vitt: any si ratter ittreetions, it was the duty of the 'a• • I of fi cer Ito give him chace acrd to stop him, as it. •::•••,:d be Considered a breach of the Treaty ; but if the:. • no reason to suppose any such intention,.no"no lesza tion was to be offered to him. 'nor.: was thereiOre a great deal of misunderstanding with regard to the treatment which it was supposed ought to be adopt cot too-Ards him, unless he was so fully under the con triml of the Allied Powers, .is that he could be con signed to wfu otevei restraint et confinement they 11..ti10l choose. Butt he never was in such a st a te as to b: sub ject to any police %mutations from this comury or any of the Allied Powers. If, moreover, thk coun try were in actual rossession of the krat, it watad" hardly be possible to preveroc his leaving it. 'I here was nothing in the beginning to excite to suspicion on the part of Colonel Campbell; and [attest), B parte had involved luitrodt so much to has toyerial ,cafe, that there was great difficulty in obtaining ac cess to him. There were no risks gratuitoosly in curred by the Treaty of Fontainblean. The articles were made such as circumstances required u:ieni t o be. But those articles he (Lord Castlereagh) should be prepared at any time to contend, were nut ia fringed by any of the Allies. loonaparte, it was:aid, complained that the pecuniary part of tlenn was 'lot observed: bet he could not complain v.:do airy jus tice, as the money was to he paid annually io Wm; and the year had not nearly elapsed. B:stdcs, thole was much mischief to be apprehended front Iris being srpplied with money unnecessarily. He was said to be raising men in C asicut.. He (Lord Castlereagh) had communicated tlis to Tatleyrand, who had writ ten on the subject to his Government : but the treaty was not between Bonaparte and the King of France, but between Bonaparte and the Allies. When it was said Bonaparte was selling his cannon, be made a representation on the subject to the French Govern ment, and represented, on his return through Paris, how impolitic it would be to give Bonaparte any such grounds of complaint. Tire French Govern mentohough they felt that he was engaged 'or a con. spiracy to return and resume the throne, sent a gen_ ueman to take care that he should suffer no personal want. He himself (Lord Castlereagh) had also against i n ba d un i v i i i d ice u or a ne l itpul p rai r ii i ain v t a t tu i ti o n t i r de s ea . e t th l.h e r g o o a v p e a dir t f t l e nri u util l given directions to Colonel Campbell to protect bun 'Treaty id not o t n F b nia r l a e li a k c u e e , , on the broad principle of right. Tbis was act which broke all ties towards hint, and there fore he (Lord Castlereagh) could not but t len e was a sufficient case made to justify his 111...Foy's IMislitnmeisterntss in n f extending country, dleinnlavianl taking; steps con. military estals ni:nlajsecestiyir'ist curtad i V n o d h n a with n E te f u v a r e o s r p a d e i his r a s Allies , to place tIIIS security against a y roeasion the altered circumstances of France may give birth to. g h e e r , m fo ig r h o t n a e t , " :o f u r t o d m not the regret, dra t ' all prest.llt situ", those who had acted together in the public cause, could only be now accused of an excess of deference to the feelings of the French people, aAn • d sire of conciliation. If they had area guilty of error, it was on the tide of national generosity, and that was an emor which he conceived a British Parliament would not lightly condemn. He conceived, that the French, as well as every other nation, was eatilied to expect hoiid j vaolguenntearroiluyspflraecae themselves tment foonr inus,such un less a Slitia they s tion that we could not be generous to them, without being unjust to ourselves. France could not now suP- Pete, that the nations of Europe had any deliberate wish either to injure her, or to do any ungracious act, revolting to her feelings. She was allowed to preserve her ancient limits, and her boundaries were is NM points extended. Whatever might have been the rights which the war had sg.ieen the Allies, no gtievous military toctsibution Was impnred 17 . 1 France. Evers th.c; had been &vie to c ,,.„„, liate the French n tot ia ;: and in order to . ~t i i their feelings whic.:l must have been co ,j,, 1 by the presence of in how.:le army, they were •%- I ' sittrered to retain dto e monuments of the arri, r:•,, I were the signs of their former triumphs, and 1::,.,. 1 they had obtained from the plunder of other cisi 4. . tries. A t t h. f . tinie, however, that the • P reity of Fontainbleatt was executed, he was by n . . n ,.., m; prepared to say, that the protract; itt of the ,„..„ would have pot us in possession ot the p ri,,, n ,i Bonaparte. Ile might have protract 41 the au et the south for, per:laps, a coesideiable time, .. n d ~.e might ultimately have escaped out of •hecooi,,,,y_ As to the priociph.: of that treaty. h , • yeas not palm. fatly resoomilde, as it had been agree! to b: tor t SI., Came t , . 1. 1 4 . 1%. The F.rriperor of Rusts coct-is,l that, toad r all the citelliiht inces of the ear..., sod t treaty was ad.' % ttilt:. It ...as ti• ret,ire tint to sr, rt. s'afered a; merely r...a act tot gerverns.ty, h it as An 41 iif policy also. Th.. fact was, that wi le •IS map., I fedi, tied into the ntighboarh od of Paris, .i. a r ., . 4 the head of a Ciplibißrable ti .!y of t e ,.., i , s t h at wore then di.pos•.:.•l to stand b. him. it Vr 4% also in e e co:itemphti iiiii of the F. tii•ortfor of Rm—ts, that 7 4 ci c the war should he protracted, the other bo , liesot the French army that were in *Abel- parts of us, v.r....,0, territorr would also submit to hit dir.ctio , m. •r „ was even no absolute assot .nci• that the trx.y c.: mops whieh Nl•arshal Nlatarto t hait pa-allmf, w,, ti i; contimat, t..l):lili to their new engagement.. 'llter, seas tri ri:a• • II 1") ..n1 p se that a h• ttcr arran7entra. could. a , . VII :t tone, have b•en mule ; awl the Ai owl...you:la sefn..ll yeas oti le, hod the pet!ect ..i.ri:i escciice of the pint/is:taut govfootntt.t which e: 4 , pi ,. established in Fraitce ; and in their opinian, thit, 'nth; of ttling it • was tar better thin taking the chance t*. tracting the war. By a the tone he •riv.d , l e this question was, in fact, &titled. Ile s a :.• . se great datii,...er and inconvenieece of placing cud: nun in Elba. in the immediate iteiyheieithie,j ot ;,, e nr enee emehe, and of another comitry, titrt n.:g: be bnppnted to entente in similar feelings towards oil., Ile accordiagly felt it lois they to oppose the arraee ment, in the nest instance. Upon further examin.,:sa o! the 6:abject, he was, however, aware of tee ilta • culty of tiading any other place for an its)loste ti him. valitch he would have accepted of; and ar. , other place could be found wohicis was not new . to the shine dangars, he withdrew his opposities.-- -It was by no means certain, that the result (4 yr • tracting the a..r would be to put the Allies in peat - shin of the person of Bonapatte. The great pee Wit, then was, that when he himself had, by his., diction, dissolved the relations between himself At.: his army. and that when that army and die vatic had sweats to support the Kiag, that it e 11.‘ been no longer possible for Lim to t!istttili t: settlerneiit of France or the recce of Europe. T, • ,nuation was not decide!,. oor could it be decided t. seesposition that Botoaparte was AbSolatelf iu t: powte • ' The Allies. He certaialy was is a situ tee to have j.rotracted the war tier same time latest., The arras -er-!evot having exert once agreed to, it r. certainly 11 . 4 that a ought to be canat t it exectit:on with as moth Übe: ality and good tiny other tteaty. Any body that would tail trouble ot reading tt.e treaty would see, Oa• by no means expressed, neither was it at .. 1 .1 iirAt that Bonaparte was to be considared cs a ptisuroe ' the Isle f Elba. Certainly. it nny nt ti. "et; Powers toad met him oat cot the isiame in a sotteno that left no ikubt of his hostile ionto:tiont, might hare detaioaed La We 161.fild U. . :1 4!) le Was, Ilawcver, in perfect freedom. He ie the neighbourlioed el it, as long toile e: not seek to break vie treaty that had ev:i chided w;th him. it was, therefore. q :le a take to consider his set:item as if he had I .tt in tower or is prison, gnat dud by the tr . psef tht. Ala! He had now no lu %OA:ion in ansaeting the q •e4lo put to him on ei former regla ; acd he shoult , press!! thane. that Itos GOrvi'llirrn.9ll nevet did a dettake, coetemplate, the teal:astir:tent al et police tot enntrnad hint in the. isle of Lb.', Mr naval pchce arote.d .t tue complete ask of the ishitel Elea, •o as . to ;gaunt tto-f Witty of his escaping ft am *amid ba hey-nel . power of the whole navy of Britate. The cotta: to blockade him in his island would have been Ail fraction Of the Treaty with him, which would usoß give him some tight to consider its obligations longer hiiidite; upon him. He could have done mere than I.vai done ley Mr. Grattan, jun. who coo municated the intelli i .,encce as soon as passible to la horn. The fact Was. that no great preparaceas an necessary for the embiukation of so small a tome accompatiied Bonaparte on his et.teditton. A hums was quite sufficient for the purpose. Those s. accompanied bins were principally emhatkei elven that canoe to Ellia 1 r commercial purposes. A cot view n a y 41 hleckaale of tie island avoid' have he impt Ct. C 4 . 01 The French Government, bower partly appreliellSiVe of hi. d es i g ns. h e ed ,ipprepeto two frigates to cruise from Leghorn to Corsica , .‘ to pay particular attention to _what passed ta neighbourhood of Etna. Admiral Hailoweli also communicated to Government. that it should meet Bonaparte on the seas he would bold of him. lie had, no doubt. informed offsets of his intention, as it Amos that a tish frigate did *tinnily chase tuts expedition. ti ir o t i V n As tli, t o ot 4nizy uC i hto suppose. that the danger at e c.al which has lately taken piece, etaittotuusiy incurred by tae exce , sve the Ailles, or by the retnissciess of this Goveneuv. None of the foreigners. or of the Englishmen who sited the Isle of Etba, ever n 'messed any rePara l which could induce them to suppose that lean'' medic tied any escape from the island. The Fri: wens wete, in tact, so sudden, that General 13erli himself. who must he supposed to be the most in centidence, did not know it the dty before. A: Colonel Campbell, he latterly expel:cartel the greg ditliculoy in getting cotes; to him. 13 ioaearte tt7elyturli i riltil i end ... e n d weo h r in r ::alf so 'much with ail die itte o occasionsehat Colonel C il' . a ti L ot i e t linr e°oltilYdigiPet;fierc;: him. As to the money part et the arraogtmo always appeared, to hOo, that it would be prep with great misdeal, of a could be alleged, that was any breach of the Treaty in this resptct allies certainly considered that there has breaches of the Treaty on his part. both utt..e t ber of guards which he kept up. And in his maw • : .• , , , • I . • rt , • • • • • • • r i • r. r. • • L • II . a K. ti CH ti * I . 1 ;. IP. rt . el ! . at ;in a • a • :••• • h • r I: 'Oll S: :0 1 ‘ , I 111• - lsie Lc. ty • acs 10 1 Iti' , tra t ciao' Le 1 1 C et' ! vot dui Ta bef nor chic.