Star. — London, England, 1805-06-21 00:00:00

to his wines, while the fecond officer in Ire allowed to continue; while the fyllem of the fecond Minifter of Ireland in this Houfe (Mr. we fuppofe) is fo different from that which Hardwicke would be difpoled to adopt. Much, therefore, as has been done, yet much remains which adminiilration might accompliffi ; and Ireland . appears that part of the Empire to which it is inspoffible to look without fume anxiety, and without feel;' - that it merits our utmoft vigilance and antes- As to the Rate of the war, it will be found to as little ground of exultation as any of the to we have reviewed. The war in India m*y be ight attexception ; but on that branch, as indeed conneited with the war with France, and its dikuffed at much detail on a motion of 10f .. Friend (Mr. Francis) I than not enlarge. Let then fhortly enquire what has been the diva of the mar ; what the objeas of it, and the chances of their attainment? The general °hied, independent of the particular canfes enumerated at the time, I apprehend lye been, the neceffity of limitingthe aggrandize and reftraining the ambition of France, and T believe went in far as to infift on the neceffity ' , lcing her power. What progrefs basthen been in there °Neils ? Is the power of France re ? Has any barrier againft its increafe been nb _ ? On the contrary, has not Bonaparte placed iron crown of Italy on his bead ? Has he not cons vetted Spain from a reluaant tributary into an waive efficient ally ? Is not Portugal, becaufe we are unable to defend her, compelled to furnifh a fub fi dy, employed in the annoyance of her moll ancient moil fincere friend ? Does not Belgium Hill con. incorporated with France, and is not Holland rely under her controul ? Arc not both of them _tpelled to contribute their evasions for the dc fruition of this country ? Are not their ports filled preparations for invading us ? Is not Hanover occupied by France. and compelled to furnith Cup. for the enemies of her lawful Sovereign ? : not the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Rhine, and Ocean the boundaries of France ? And, while power on the Continent Teems both extended and confolidated, is there any profpea of an efficient coo federacy to limit her infolence and reduce her power? _ the contrary. are not the great Powers of the Con. tint , nt averfe from any C • onental war ? Does not ince occupy Italy and Switzerland, as pofitions which to fall upon Auftria? Does the not hold Hanover to watch the North of Europe ? And while her ftrength teems thus extended, and her pofitions fo formidable, is there any thing in her interioll fitua - to afford a rational profpca of relief front time accident ? Are her finances ruined, her army mu tinous, and her navy dilapidated But this year we bars had no comparifons front the Right Hon. Gen. tkman between the refources and credit of France this country I we have beatd no affertion that was on the verge, nay, in the gulph of bankruptcy, any hope whatever, that from want of moats the 'odd be compelled to give up the some. Even Sir rancis D'lvernois, perfevcring in his warfare with French Finances, affords us, at hail up to the prefent moment, little room for congratulation. The "I, Come time fusee prdented by the French Go „inment to th t i t t a l o adiflature dens that without new impofts or ex nary rekources, or loans, the war will be maintained by the revenue of thirty millions year, and that if the war were to hitt ten years. it would add nothing' to the debt of France, while that of England will be increafed four milliards. This promile refembles that made by the Minifters of this country at the beginning of the war, but I am died hitherto at lean it has teen better kept, Crate even Yraocis D'lvcrnois admits that her contributions time of war will coierthe deficiency in her reteiptc, !that her donreftk retenues and her foreign contri butions have covered bar menus. He thinks Indeed"; -t this mutt teak, Coke the fupplies front Spain are off by the vigorous policy of this Government-:.- lit'', however, which I fear this country wM have to rue, when we fee the tribute exchanged for a co-operation fo active and fo statue], as appears now • difplayed. That filth a country as France, with „Ave and ingenious population, Should be ruined . her finances, while bar expenditure is confined sithin thirty millions feeling; it were the height of abfurdity to fuppofe. If then the war were to be a -ar of finances, and allowing every thing for she fo perior induftry, capital, Ste. of this country, it amok, bo 'in to attempt to conquer France by that means, our own expenditure was little (hors of So mil and that of our opponent but so millions a year. then, we cannot mite our hopes on the approaching kruptcy of France, can we calculate upon the Rate army ? Are not its number. complete, its fpirit inbroken Is it not cononsmdad by the molt fitilful officers ? And does it not on every fide occupy the formidable pofitions r Surely this comparifon our own does not encourage any very flattering of attaining the ()Naas of the war. Is the of her navy more cookiatory to ns ? We _ added three (hips of the hie to our navy.— :lance, by extraordinary exertions, has, in the courfe of laft year, added ffects to hers. The - of France cannot now be ellimated at Ids than ips of the line the Dutch have t t fail ; Spain has 6t fail ; but, allowing a great number to fit for Service, I believe ram within the mark I fay, that S pain contributes to the navy of ice 25 !hips of the line fit for fervice. Thus ranee has in all 113 (hips of the, line at her difrokt, eight lets than the force we now have. This :oportion, indeed, is greatly incroded by the fa . iority of &ill and dikapline poffeffed by our (m -otto. But Rill wp fee that ,France, within Co Short 'pace, has wade advances towards us altogether' zpei9ed. She has contrived too, by well corn ' plans, and through the want of vigeur and in fence of our Government, twfend to fee con fi. :able expeditions. Occupying large divifions of fleets in blockades along her whole line of coon, has equipped armaments that have ekaped our lance, have gone to our diftant colonies, com ing depredations. if not to the event they might t done, depredations highly prejudicial to our in :Rs, and difgraceful to the nation. It certainly extraordinary fpedtacle at the end of two years war, undertaken to limit the aggrandizement, reduce the power of France, andthat too under :umftances, particularly as to the naval Rate of ince peculiarly favourable, to fee her now more ti t ful than ever on the Continent, growing forrni. • on the occan,tht eattaing our foreign poteSons 1 • "Iffill gaffe& to his land is allows Era or fecon, Fact we fill iLord Hardu ' therefore, as a wife admin '; I dill appears inspotrable to feeling that i I tion. As to afford as litd pics.we have thought ant not conneas I already dila. • 4 • 1, Hon. Friend Abort • then i war ; what t attainment? particular ca to have been light and re Tome T belie' of red' cing made in thel duced ? Hal tained ? 01 the iron cow versed Spait and efficient unable to de to he entplo; and moil fin tinue iacorp entirely and I I compelled *ration of 1 , 1 with prepar is occupied b] I , 1 plies for th Are not th I, the Ocean t her power c eonfolidated federacy to On the coot tinent area France occi from which Hanover to her ftrength ! formidable, , tion to affu , or accident anon:, and have had ns tleman bets and this cc Oki was on ti ' or any hops would be co Francis D'] the French prdent mot drpA foam • vernment to ;tapas or I Will be mats ' • a year, and would I sei England prangs rel country at I 1 1 that bitherts Sir Francis 1 in time of vs IN and that hes bastions ban that this mt cut off by tl e i, , *policy, ho caufe to rue co-opetatior to be difplal an naive an ' la her final 1 within shirt abfardity to • war of Soar 1 . perior induf be vain to al • while our a lions, and th lf, then, we bankruptcy of her army unbroken 1 officers ? A . . 1 Mott formid with our ow 1 lope of alt hate of be Thave added trance, by courfe of L navy of Fri 48 !hips of in all has 6 be unfit for when I fay, trance 25 1 i France has being eight difproportia periority of mEn. But .a Iface, has ' unexpeaed. , I bined plans, 411igence o • I, durable cap our fleets in She has equi 1 vigilance, h • sitting dcp i have done, tereils, and I han extrao of a war, u , I and reduce eircumitanc France peel powilful th 1 1 dable on tin i U 6 with a powerful armament, of which, though We ire ignorant of the &dilation, we are almod certain that it will go to tome quarter Where we byre not an adequate force to oppok it. The circumfianees ata tending the failing of the Toulon fleet) and its junc tion with that of Cadiz, are of themfelves fufficiently extraordinary to call for inquiry. The Toulon fleet failed twice without being met by our fleet in the Mediterranean, which not only thews our want of intelligence, but the want of a convenient Ration in that fea from which to obferve the movements of the enemy—a cirentridance by the way which may ferve to &tame the importance of Malta, to which, at the beginning of the War, fo much was attached.•-• ' It failed twice, however, without interruption, and having effefted a junction with the Spaniards at Ca• die on the gth of April, proceeded to fea again.— And is it not an extraordinary circumflance that now, on the aoth of June, we fhould be ignorant of the definition of fo large an armament, which failed from Cadiz on the gth of April, to Rri k e a blow at forme of our foreign fettleantents ? Indeed, fo ettraor &nary is this affair, that the Houfe ought not to [o perate till it be inveßigated. I mutt add too, that the cocduft of the Officer who commanded our fleet off Cadit when the French appeared, on the face of it calls for inquiry. I do not mean to fay -that Sir John Orde marnot be able to juftify hinifelf. He certainly was greatly inferior in point of numbers. We trud, on many occafions, to the fuperiority of our navy under great inequality of numbers, but no thing has more tended to create th at excellence , which judifies the confidence, than the found difere• tion exercifed in the appointment of naval comman ders, a difiretion on which the public opinion ought to have no inconfiderable weight, becaufe that opinion calls forth the merit it rewards. 1 do not blame Sir John Orde hecaufe he inßantly put to fea as loon as the French fleet appeared. He was inferior to the enemy doubtlefs ; but there are occafions when high fpirit, a Arcing feeling of the public mule, will in duce men to run great ricks for great objeas, and it is on fuch occafions when bold attempts are often crowned with tuccata, or at lead find the bed conk lation far difappointment. The firiking fad is, that Sir John Orde made a retreat from Cadia at the mo ment when a junction was to be effeided, from which the mad important confequences, and probably great difatlers to this country, were likely to collie. Sit John Orde, however, may be perfealy judiiable. I only fay that the a ffair calls for inveftigation. The Rate of his fleet may have been Inch as to make it improper for him to do that which' with a fleet in fuitable order, he would have attempted. I have fees a Paper which gives an account of the whole fleet,and of each [hip refpeetively of his fleet. The Glory is Rated to have been hurt in her malt, and otherwife out of lepair ; the Defence was leaky, and is fines gone into Dock ; the Agamemnon was likewife de. [alive in various points, fo the Polyphemus and Re nown. If this reprefeatation be correft it involves a moil ferious charge upon the Admiralty ; but why the fhips thould have wanted water, which might bays been had from the coat of Portugal or from Gibral. tar, I am at lots to fay. At any rate, however, why did not Sir John Orde leave behind tome veffels to moth, and to trace the enemy, and to give fuch in. formation either to Lord Netfon when be came down the Mediterranean, or to Government at home, that the foe might have been purfoed with a proba bility of oveitaking him? Why did not Sir John Orde, if be thought himfelf unequal in any manner to ea. gage the , enemy, Rand away to Ferrol, and joining that fluadron, °Miro& the failing of the enemy's ar mament, and perhaps defeat it > Or might he not have taken a middle Ration, to watch them till joined by fome other fquadron Thefe are all very impor tant circumßantes ; the public expects the elucidation of them ; and it is the duty of the Houfe to lead the Way in the inquiry. As to the dellination of the fleet, Jamaica appears to me the mod likely objeft, and there is a rumour in town, which at leaf may be true, that it has been attacked. After that, Brazil appears the omit probable objea, and it is one every way of walk importance.. As a military Ration it would give the enemy eie e emend of our India trade. We could not blockade Rio Janeiro; and oar India fleet mutt go tinder a convoy as lirong as the enemy ot; that Ration might be. As auxiliary to ultimate views in India; it would be of vaft confequence, and it Would fapply Chip timber it Would afford immenfe : wealth, and it would affeft our intently by depriving ps of the Brazil cotton fo (Wendel to our manufallures. If their objea, however, be the Eaft Indies, I [tall re joice, becaufe there, I am perfuaded, that though they . may do conftderable injury, they will lead a&a our permanent interells, and will hi the end mod certainly, be overcome f and with fuch officers as Sir Edward Pelle* and Sir Thomas TroW bridge in that quarter, there would be little chante of their acquiring any afkandency by fee. In every quarter to which they may gr, however, they can meet with no force adequate to tipple them, and the queflion appears to be only this, Where are they likely to do the lead damage ? /Ewe efeape we can afcribe it only to Pao ynaeaca, unlefs we calculate on the fame mifmanage ment in this that has been confpicuous in their for mer naval expeditions, which, however, in the pie fent circumftances, is not fe likely as on other occa lions. Stash then is the flotation of the war, the war that was to limit the ambition, and rgduce the power of France. But we hive refilled the threaten ed invafion ! This appears to' Me a very futile boaß. The ineafion was threatened as the beginning of the war, and it is threatened now. If it has not hitherto b een attempted : this may be afcribed, not fo much to our domellic preparation, as to the fupe riority of our navy. I, for one, never believed that the invation would immediately be attempted. It has, in a great mature, anfwered what probably was its end. It has kept the nation in perpetual alarm, and tippled us to immenfe expence, without at all advancing the objefts of the war, and all the prepa rations for the deign are, according to the info, ma tion in the King's fpcech, Rill continued. That one great objed of the enemy was to diftraft our atten tion, is highly probable ; but, if invafion ever vita the objeit, there is no reafon whatever to believe that it is abandoned. Whatever Bonaparte's cha raCier in other retpefts may be, we have not leen that as a foldier he is labial to paffion ; he it not to be inticed by taunts, to an attempt for which things arc not ready ; but if affairs here are conduded as they have been, when cur sects are fcattered in pin.- fuit of the enemy,. when our troops are difperfed in foreign Settlements, that attempt for which the prc pmatiees beet never been relaxed antrimeni, may mita beitied ; and that Bonaparte fees all there omnbinatiollithere can be no doubt. The boati of teat betel invided, is one of the molt idle and abfurd which it is poffible to conceive. Thus I . have fltewn, from anqueltionable fags, that no material improvement has taken place in our Military and Nave/ flaw; that none of the objeds of the War have been attained ; and that no progreft elhatextr has been made towards them. or is likely in f*ure. In this fiteation it is the imperious duty of the Hoof; to call upon Miniflers to give us fatale rational profped of pnrfuing:the War with fnccefs, or of ex pladning to us that Peace on equitable and honour able terms is not to be obtained. This leads me to notice the Rate of our Continental Alliance, as allud ed to in the Speech from the Throne, in the Speeches of the Minifter, and in other coatimmications. Oa this head too I fear there is nothing on which we can congratulate ourfelves. While Bonaparte'a power on the Continent remains unimpaired.: he exercifes over his neighbours an influence of policy or intimi dr- tion which at reknt leaves little roam to hope for efficient cooperation. At the beginning of the Scc • Pion we were told, Notwlehltanding there teadadteet fo twosome! to evert fen daunt of modetatlon and Jahn, I have recently 'calved a Com munication from the French Onvertunent, containing istofe&oas of a Pacific Difpoittion. I have in motequaree eleprelfed my carnet: defier to embrace the firß opportuakyof Teem* the damp of Peace, on fuch grounds as may be confiftan with the permanent fafety and littera. of my domioions—but I am erfident you will agree with me, that thofe Ojeda are daftly cormotted with the general fecurity of Europe. I have therefore not thought it right to enter into any more pastieskr explanation, without previous conunuecation With thole Powers on t h e Centigent with whom lam engaged in con fidential intercourfe and cooneEtion, with a view to that hopor. tint °llea, and dpeciany with the Emperor of Ruffle, who has given the (hong& proofs of the wife and dignified fentiments by which he is aolmated, and of the warm intereits he takes in the r fefety and independence of Europe. 'flier* is no inftance, I believe, of the Houk being dtus left Co much in the dark, not of the aaual Rate of things, but of the views and °Weds of Govern ing*. The former it may be proper to conceal ; but 'of the latter, Can it be fit that the Houle should be Ignorant. when the public is to undergo the burdens they any involve ? The communications on Inch fair& during the war have been generally of three kinds: Either they Rate, that peace through the fpi rit and ambition of the enemy is unattainable; or that pr Goons have been received, but not loch as to jullify relaxation in the coodnd of Government, or preparations for the war ; cir, laftly, they have announced negotiations, the ref Ult of which would in due time be laid before Parliament. Bat his Ma jelly's fpeech merely fays, that in anfwer to an over ture, on the face of it fair and open, no anfwer can be given, becaufe his Majefty is engaged in confiden tial intercourfe with other powers. No views what ever of the policy to which that intercourfe is direa ed ; no hint, whether it is an intercourfe pointing to arrangement for peace or for war, is given. Such was the ignorance of Parliament at the opening of the Seffion. From Come of the principles Mated in another part of the fpeech, of which I have read an extras, I am Co far from diffenting, that I am hap• py to take this opportunity of expreffing my concur rence in them to any fair confequences to which they can be carried. The fpeech lays, that the intereft of this country is connefted with that of the Continent; and that propofition is peculiarly true in the prefent circumitances of Great Britain and of Europe. I therefore diftindly avow my affent to this propotition, becaufe without a great and powerful cooperation on the Continent there can be no chance of reducing the power of France ; and becaufe, nnlefer, failing that, the great Powers take a part in Negeciation in one (lupe or other, my hope of permanent peace will be much weakened. But in faying this I mutt fay too, that unlefs the co-operation of the Continental Powers be fuch as to afford a rational profped of fix ed's, it would not be deferable. In that cafe too it appears to me that a feparate peace on moderate terms, would be preferable to a mere defenfive war. If, indeed, the enemy were to be fo unreafonable es to reject all equitable terms, the nation would then not only fubmit to a defenfive war, but to every fa aifice and privation, rather than fall down at the k feet of France. Then, indeed, it would be proper to make no peace, and the fpirit of the country would make none tilk every refource had been exhautted and every exertion tried I till we could fay in the words formerly quoted by the Right Hon.- Gentleman— Paha qun plurisna Wynn, ace. This extreme cafe is not likely to occur, but if redu ced to the neceffity of that defenfive war, which is only not worfe than an adequate peace, it would be the alatt of the Houle to fee that it was not Co con- Cinaed as to be even more dangerous than peace, and to take care that every elf- nt Mould be well direded, and every expence applied with economy. The other alternative I have mentioned is a feparate peace, in cafe the co-operation of the Continent, or the concert of other Powers in negotiation were unavailing. I hope filch a Peace will not take place. It is impoili ble to fay before-hand, however, what fuch a Peace might be, but it might be better than a mere defen five war. A great refponfibility would be on' thofe who concluded it, as to the time and the terms of it, and (-braining the bell fecurities which . circumftances would admit. But at any rate they ought to be fuch as, if violated, would at once thew, in the ftrongeft light. the injuftice and violence of the enemy. Upon there points I Droll aor dilate, as it is impoffible to anticipate either the eiremitilanees that would juftify or condemn fuch a tranfattion, whether Peace were negotiated in conjuuaion with our Allies, or tinder tare mediation or guarantee of other Powers. Lot us now, then. examine the anfwer Cent by our Go 'era:rent to Bonaparters overture. Had we at that time been engaged in alliance with Raffia, or had negotiations with that Power been fo far advanced, as to be on the eve of conclution it would have been highly proper to 'decline any neg ociation till Rufila it v>as confulted. If the negociations for alliance were in an advanced progrefs, furely they ought now to have been brought to a condemn. if they were not, might not Mindless have anfwered Bonaparte, and pointed out a sego ciation with other Powers, as.that molt likely to lead to Peace. As far as appears, there was not fulficient reafon, a. far as our inter. cburfe with Ruflia was concerned, for not giving a more direa anfv:er to; dire& overture. Tlfere is a want of information on the fubjeft, I confeft, which leaves us much in the dark in this difcufflon ; but it is to fupply that information, that the prefent motion was in part intended. Since the opening of the Sef- Lion. however, We have rectived another comatuniCa. tion—the Me/age now on Om TAIC, We ore m il, 44 That the communscations taken plate, " and ire fill depending between his M ti •Iy. and "4 fume of the Powers of the Corti nenr, have o u s 44 yet been brought to fuch a point as to enab:t I his Najaf) , to Jay the re felt .o( than : before the is Houle, or to enter into any fartlsin explaaatior. r. with the French Government, confillcotly will. * the fetstiments expretTed by his Majelit', at the orat as ing of the prefent ref on." I have raid that tit-. Speech at the opening of the fetlion left us ignnrar of the fate of the intercourfe with Ruffii, and we r e . ceived no information till on the opening of flit. Budget, the Right Hon.. Gentleman Rated. that fis t millions he propofed to roCerve to be voted aftcrwares Its Subfidies to Foreign Powell, if circomliances deresl it expedient. Five months have clapfed fince that time, and fill we hay? no ittformAtion, tither o r . the Ritual fate of the negotiation, of the objefi its except as far as it may be gathered from the Sob fidy we are called on to vote. The tooee of proceed. ing at the beginning of the legion aoitearcd unpra codented, and this Hill more fo; for we are called oo to vote money for objeCts we do not know—ignorant whether the money is io be in the Foil infante op plied to profecute the war, or only in cafe the ene ary refute reafonable terms of peace, which it may pow be intended to propore. This indeed would be to leave a large difcretion with Ministers—fuch as never before was claimed. Laf war, indeed, aOn was left at the difcretion of Minium, but it was oittr Steobjca was thoroughly known, the power to which it was granted afcertained, not to mention that the amount, a ;thing of no (mall pratlical importance, was fo .much left. But here the caufe, the meant' the profpeet of co-operation. its value, its applica tion are beforehand unknown, and it is to be left to the difcretion of the Minifter to apply five milli ns in any manner, to any puipofe, and to any paver he may think fit. Surely the Houle will octal) far ab dicate its functions, as thus blindly to vote away its effential right of controuling the application of the public fupplies ? Subfidies undoubtedly may fume times be expedient, but the policy of granting them will depend on the object to which they are :tired ed, the power that is to receive them, and its abi lity and difpofition to render a fair equivalent of fervice. The time of granting them ouyht to be confidered. But at prefent how do we know who are the powers to be fublidifed ? Can we expedt an efficient co-operation without one of the great powers, Anfria or Pruffia ? Without them, would the co-operation of Ruflia, even the greatelt of the other powers, not to fpeak of Denmark or Sweden, be worth purchafing? And what is the time ? If Ruflia be the principal power to be fubfidifed, (ball we be told in the end of June that it is neceffat y to to this vote for any efficient co operation this feafon. Let us at leaf be informed of the grounds and olo jea of the alliance with Ruffia. If the negotiation, after fo long a delay, be not ready, furely its confum motion cannot be difant, if it be at all probable.— Then let the Houfe fit till the affair be adjulled ; and whatever inconvenience might arife to individuals from a protracted feffion, it is the duty of all to at tend the bnfinefs of their country, on an occafion of fuel: magnitude, involving the higheß privileges, and molt important fumfions of a Houfe of Commons. 1 have thus laid before the Houfe at greater length than I could have wilhed, a few general outlines of the fituation of the county. critical in the opinion of all, beyond any example. Every fact which is before us, every confequence to which the lefts evidept", y lead,* fmpofe upon us the duty of invefligatio g our Rate ; and Pardanient e4oaht not to feparatt till it has afcertained the fafety of the country. If the motion of which I gave notice, Appeared to me necelfary a few days ago; it appears more fit and feafonable, in confequence of the 'hleffage prefented yelterday; and, when called upon to vole a rum of five millions, with out information of any kind, I (tuft the Houfe will helitate hefore they pledge their own credit, and the money of their constituents, in a marner fo unufual. I therefore move, 44 That an homble Addrefs be pre fented to his Majefly, that he toould be gracioufly pleafed not to prorogue his Parliament, till he is ena bled to lay before them, the refult of the Communica tions now dePendiwg betwaen his Majefy and other Powers, and Oro Views and Giles% of the fame." Lord CASTLEREAGH replied at confidetahle length to the arg uments which had been urged by the Honourable Gentleman who had juft fat down. There was much of his fpeech that he l.ad the foil faition not to differ from. Whatever he had thought fit to fay of the Rate of the array or navy, he was happy to find that the Hon. Gentleman placed a fufficient degree of confidence in the financial admi nittration of the country, not to objea to any fingle at of that department, except what he fpcke of as the addition'of thirty millions of debt ; hut he put ;t to the candour and fairnefs of that Honourable Gen tleman to fay whether this was not merely a nominal addition to that amount, which could be paid off for about half that rum. The numbers of out army had confiderably iacreafed in the difpofable force for .general fervice, both by the ordinary means of re cruiting and by the volunteering from the Militia ; and from the returns on the tableuf thole railed with in the firft four months of the year, it may be fairly calculated that if we continue to increafe ia the tame proportion fi,r the other eight months, we (hail at the end of this year have a more numerous army fur the defence of Gieat Biirain, than we ever had at any former period. As to the naval force felonging to the country, it was to he cot Cilci ai, without -my refieetion upon the condtrEt of any one, that ftveral fhipa were become old and unfit for vice, during' the pet iods that he had chofen fur hi. companion ; and 'that, nom iihilaiiiiing this, we ha.! at_pretent tact fail of Ihipi:ing in hill We Ho ! nourabit. Gentleman 11.4.1 in another p,r of his fpeech crititifed on the mode of cex.do:ft;ng the war. But, the Bottle wool(' oblerve, that the war on the part of the enemy had changed its charaaer, from neglect ing all Colonial (+lens, even the defence of their own colonies, fot the: fake of thre.:tening deltruc lion upon u, at li -me, the y had turrtd to ichemes of foreign expeditions and attempts at cetenial warfare; they had dune this. hi:v:ever, in a wet y fin comp rative degree, when ss contidered the wart fleets that we had engaged in the blockading of the different Fitts of the enemy. If they had fuccetoled by elt coping from bl , ekade Gentlemen would male I that though it might be rendered tor:madly ufeful i defeating the projeth of the ener.:f, the lyttem con( i not be carried iit:o certain effect again!! Mete tLa i Me or i‘e° - I whenever th have their Britifit fqm bad been Pi for that purl gaga of the' a knowledge crimiCal nee that any thi known ; it the Chief with Foreigi about ; and the Honour more "Avg. the intere(lt to increafe have in the a Britilh P. confidence fum, howe mod proba a reference ne th ou p beia f r p,ero n i tji c on i ri ited‘ l o,ll ; 17" ri nt whethe7 ur would be F. , It was not the kind b opened the make any with regar gaged in maintain, making th important 7ued---ths the objeEli ed that fn fidence it e ver, he was more titled to t parate; le ded with I o p t la r um o na v e i d dd f e e feol mud fay that it %v. seeding point the likely to fecution I though a objeB. anxiety 1 polition Minis et. wife in Veni,nce prorogi that (tic) tition continue veniencc