The Press. — London, England, 1855-10-27 00:00:00

t rt .i. 4 U No. 130.—VoL. 111. LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 27,1855. STAMPED .... SIXPENCE. lINSTAMPED..FIVEPENCE. C't Vrtss. LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1855. IN many of the speeches lately deliver3d on the War, a hope is expressed that the action of the country may be unanimous, and that the evils of the contest in which we are engaged may not be aggravated by divided councils. In this hope we concur. Hitherto all parties have agreed in the justice of the War, and, after a certain point, in its necessity. When the forces of the Czar were arrayed for the invasion of the Turkish empire there was no longer any question—except perhaps in Lord ABERDEEN'S Cabinet—as to the course which this country should pursue. Hence our na tional resources were placed—absolutely with out limit—at the disposal of the Government. It could not ask enough. Money, men, arma ments, supplies of every kind, were pressed upon it, with an agreement and eagerness to which there is no parallel. This devotion has not been without its reward. In spite of un accountable mismanagement and unpardon able delays, our forces have grown. Our Transport Service has assumed colossal pro portions, and our magnificent fleets in the Baltic and the Euxine have shown to the world that on the seas England maintains her unquestionable supremacy. But it is vain to expect that this unanimity will last, if the objects for which the War was undertaken are changed—if after having re pelled and chastised the aggression of Russia we are now to enter on a new war for her dis memberment. It is probable that the Cabinet which issued the Declaration of War had never definitely settled the purposes for which it was to be waged ; but the Declaration itself subsists, and there we find it expressly stated that her Majesty was compelled "to come " forward in defence of an ally whose territory " is invaded, and whose dignity and indepen " dente are assailed." Among those who concurred in the war there might have been some who had ulterior views, and hoped it would lead to European convulsion ; but we are justified in stating that by the Conservative party, the War was demanded for the t ettle ment of the Eastern Question by defining the position of Russia in the South, and by se curing the Independence of the Black Sea. If those great objects—which, notwithstanding partial obscurations, the statesmen and people of this country have never lost sight of since Russia pushed her frontier to the Euxine—can now be attained, the war ought naturally to cease; and a great party will assuredly grow up amongst us adverse to the prosecution of hostilities for aims which are either un defined, or which are chimerical or pernicious. Absolute security for the objects we pro pose must be impossible. In policy—dealing with the future and with contingencies so numerous as to defy all calculation—there is no error so great as to endeavour to attain complete certainty on points to which a degree of uncertainty must inevitably attach. By endeavouring to absolutely guard ourselves from one danger, we open the door to another. No lesson stands out more plainly in history than this —that nations should be con tent with a fair and moderate security against the dangers they apprehend, and never at tempt to push too far advantages obtained over an enemy. There is usually in all wars some point at which the very security which is desired turns into peril ; or at which resist ance is enabled to rally, and to meet attack with advantage. The War is too wide a question for the con test of Parties. It is more likely to absorb them. Matters which concern the peace of the world, and will largely influence the future destinies of England, must not be discussed in a party spirit. That different views may conscientiously be taken of the policy to be pursued is admitted, but those views must, from the gravity of the circumstances, be formed irrespective of the motives which in fluence politicians in ordinary times. Still less can it be tolerated that Class Views shall prevail in the consideration of this subject. Whether war has a tendency to raise or to lower prices is not to be taken into account. If it be necessary to continue the war, all difficulties which it involves must be met. But if no such necessity exists, War Interests must not for a moment be suffered to raise their voico in favour of its con tinuance. Those who hold that the present time is favorable for a satisfactory settlement of the Eastern Question are met by the strong objec tion that our adversary does not appear to think so. The weight of this difficulty is not to be depreciated. We recognise it in its fullest extent. Yet, after the concessions which Russia has already made, and after the defeats which her arms have sustained, we believe that she must acknowledge the force of circumstances, and that nothing can be wanting to cause her to make pacific advances but the conviction that they will be fairly received by the Allies. Even if we set aside all ideas of justice and principle—if we look upon policy only as we do upon chess—Russia cannot fail to perceive that she is playing, and must, as long as the war lasts, play a losing game. The fact is, that the alliance of the Western Powers is too strong for her to cope with. She would not be a match for either France or England singly. Attacked by both, she is certain to be defeated wherever she is assailable. What need is there of a thousand trials to decide a principle when one suffices? It is the part of political wisdom to estimate forces, and to yield when resistance would not only be impracticable but disastrous. The French Revolution of 1848 was in many respects an improvement on its predecessors. Instead of sanguinary struggles in the streets, the parties of Order and of Revolution assem bled open places, where their numbers could be seen. The minority withdrew, and the majority dictated the law. Why may not the same kind of action prevail when nations are hostile to each other? In Homer the balance of Jove decided the battle before it began, or while it was in suspense. Heroes withdrew from the field in mid-fight when they recognised his will. Is Russia so destitute of political foresight that she cannot look up, mark the poise of the beam, and yield herself to a destiny she has not power to resist ? In this country the War party is divided into two classes. There is a section loud in tongue, but weak in influence, which would carry on the war to extremity, from a belief that it will insure the triumph of Democracy all over the world, or that the destruction of Russia is necessary to the progress of civilisa tion. The other class, more moderate, would continue the War because they think its pro gress has not hitherto been quite satisfactory, and that it has not gone quite far enough. They plead for ono more campaign as a child whose appetite is but partially cloyed pleads for some tempting but dangerous luxury. This well-meaning class is at the present moment the most difficult to deal with. They do not understand that in the affairs of na tions as of men there is a tide which once lost does not return, and that to wait by the shore while it is flowing is to miss the golden opportunity afforded by the mercies of Pro vidence. At this time Russia is humbled but not conquered. The demands'of the Allies would naturally be confined to those objects essen tial to the limitation or definition of Russian power in the South, because they would not be entitled to ask for more. But if the " One further Campaign " so gently pleaded fur takes place, the positions of the belligerents might be so greatly changed as to afford no room for that Settlement which is now desirable. If we prosecute hostilities for the com plete possession of the Crimea, what shall we gain but a new element added to the diffi• culties which already beset the Eastern Question ? Even more than the fall of Sebastopol, the achievements of the allied fleets in the Sea of Azoff, and, more recently, in the Liman of the Dnieper, must convince the Court of St. Pe tersburg that the Allies have the power of enforcing terms which are indispensable to a settlement of the Eastern Question. The choice for Russia indeed is, whether she will accept such conditions as are essential to the future peace of Europe and the freedom of its commerce, or abandon the fruits of a century of progress by withdrawing from the seaboard of the E'txine, that she may concentrate her strength where it will be comparatively safe from attack. The language held by THE PRESS when Lord ABERDEEN'S Cabinet debated whether Russia should be resisted, and when organs of the Government told us that Turkey was not worth an effort to save, it holds still. War is not the greatest of evils, but Peace is the greatest of blessings. We desire it on terms which calm and impartial judgments shall recognise as wise and magnanimous. But if the War must proceed—if it is necessary to our honour or our safety, to our rank in Europe, or the fidelity of our alliances—it is not the Conservative party which will shrink from its prosecution. OUR MANIA FOR MEDDLING. Wtrry men of the world, as well as profound philosophers, have often amused themselves with contemplating the foibles of John Bull. The collective character of the English nation, and the peculiarities of our race, bristle with propensity of the ti fall into a mania is, than any other feature meter. We are strangely of each individual type of suggestive poi. r raditional to. rfitC•.:"?;lei ..., , perhaps, Cbi . . . c 45 3 ' • s .'' • • 'r me in our4i. ..... a ,' _ agely pro . 1 417, ."' 161 CD p.., 4 tie r •11 , ... E 4 4,-1.,,..:.&.: