The Press. — London, England, 1855-06-16 00:00:00

Jl/24t 16, 1855. the answers to which he makes her repeat verbatim, to insure accuracy. Not to lose time, he farms with a tremendous speaking. trumpet from his door ; a proper companion for which machine is a telescope, slung in leather, for observing what they are doing. On Monday came Lady H. Hall, her two daughters and her two eons ; the latter, Captain B. Hall, a rare avis I hive long wished to see ; and Peter Tytler, son (is he not?) to the author. What a charm there is in good society and well-informed people ! what would you not have given to have heard the mass of sit, sense, anecdote, and instruc tion that Bowed incessantly ! Lady Holland feels herself forced to vindi• cate the dignity of the family chariot. She writes : The equipage alluded to in this letter requires a little •:planation. Our house was above a mile from the little Church, with roads to it of the stiffest and deepest clay, hardly passable to women in wet weather or winter, and my mother was in delicate health. We could not afford horses ; so my father, never ashamed of showing his poverty when he thought it right, hit upon this rude and cheap device, to enable his family to accompany him in all weathers to church. Ludicrous as this description may appear to the reader, yet the proprieties of life were attended to. The horse, the harness, the Immortal, and the carter, all wore their best and cleanest Sunday garb, and I think they et cited respect rather than ridicule amidst his humble con gregation. In the midst of all his contrivances Sydney was no doubt. supremely happy. The picture of his farming, directing the operations of his labourers as he stood under his door way with a speaking trumpet, and watching them through a telescope, is perfect. The com panion picture is, of course, the author in his study, clad in his rheumatic armour, writing an article for his dear Edinburgh. The won der is, how so much prudence as he mani fested through life could have consisted with so much inventive ardour. It is true that living in the country is cheap, and temptations for expenditure infrequent, and farming at that time must have been, as it is at present, so profitable a pursuit, that with ordinary cc mmon sense a man could scarcely miss his way in it. In 1828 Lord Lyndhurst, despite of oppo site politics, gave him the canonry of Bristol, and from this time the Canon's worldly cir cumstances rapidly improved. He made good use of his fortune, was always generous, and threw off the rusticity of Foston with the cir cumstances which rendered it necessary, be coming in his declining years one of the chief attractions of social circles in the metropolis. Lady Holland has executed her task so well on the whole, particularly in representing all the eccentric and most strongly-marked fea tures of her father's character, that we can have no hesitation in predicting for her book a wide and lasting popularity. All who would know what Sydney Smith really wits, how he lived, thought, felt, talked, and sported, will find their desiro gratified in this most amusing me• moir. For the second volume, however, contain ing his letters, often trivial enough, though characteristic, we can scarcely accord the praise richly merited by the first. It must be taken as a sort of make-weight; yet together two volumes have rarely appeared possessingmore intrinsic interest or presenting a finer picture of high intellect united with buoyant animal spirits, a generous nature, and thoroughly love. able human qualities. The volumes are rich in specimens of his humour, and contain many of his shrewdest thoughts as set down in his diaries. The Corning Ca►npaign. By Laurence Oliphant. London: Blackwood and Sons. WuEs Louis Napoleon, in his speech at Bor deaux, had intimated his intention of accepting the Imperial dignity, it was remarked as a pe culiarity of the French mind that his assump tion of the throne was looked upon at once as au accomplished fact. Speculation was busy, not in the details of the election or the proba bilities of opposition, but in settling the events which should take place upon his in vestment with the purple. Something of the same kind is now taking place in our own sober nation with respect to Sebastopol. The cautiousness of Caniobert has scarcely been superseded by the impetuosity of Pelissier ; the French eagles have hardly floated over the outworks of the Flagstaff, or waved upon the summit of the Mamelon ; before we trent the capture of Sebastopol as a certainty, bridge the interval that must el:Tie before its final THE PRESS. surrender, and employ ourselves in the consi deration of what should be our subsequent operations. What ate we to do when we have taken Sebastopol ? Are we to be content with our laurels and return home? Or are we to garrison the town, and leave the Russians in undisturbed possession of the interior? Or are we to incur the loss by disease as well as by the sword which an expedition during the summer season will produce, in order that we may occupy the whole peninsula of the Crimea? Or would it be hest to transfer our forces to some more inviting scene of action ? Such questions are important, and there is no better way of forming a judgment upon them than by consulting those who are ac quainted with the countries which form, or are likely to become, the theatre of war. Among the foremost of these authorities we must place Mr. Oliphant, whose work on the " Russian Shores of the Black Sea " is known to most of Our readers. and who has published in the pamphlet which heads this notice his view of the course which ought to be taken. Mr. Oliphant infringes too much upon the province of the general in his conclusions on points of military strategy, and in his asser tions respecting the practicability or imprac ticability of the country for military move ments, but his geographical knowledge is valuable, and the view which he adopts is original and worthy of attention. There are three quarters from which Russia has hitherto menaced Constantinople—viz., the Danubian principalities, Sebastopol, and the Caucasus. The danger from the principalities seems to have passed away ; that from Sebas topol is diminishing; but that on the side of Asia Minor remains as great as ever. If peace were concluded to-morrow, and Russia were at liberty to resume the development of her resources, it is here that Turkey would be most vulnerable ; and yet on no part of its frontier could the Turkish empire find a stronger natural barrier than the moun tain chain of the Caucasus, which extends from the Caspian to the Black Sea : it is almost inaccessible to a hostile army, and is inhabited by warlike tribes engaged for a quarter of a century in continual hostilities with the Rus sians. But it has been rendered nugatory as a defence of the Turkish territory by the con quest of Georgia and the occupation by the Rus sians of the long line of the eastern coast of the Black Sea from the Straits of Yenikale to the Fort of St. Nicholas. To reconquer these provinces, and restore them to the Sultan, or erect them into independent States, is the remedy which Mr. Oliphant proposes Sebastopol once taken, he thinks a campaign in the Crimea unadvisable. Few countries, he tells us, are so ill adapted for operations in the field. The southern half is mountainous, and is in the highest degree defensible. The road along the coast is scarped for the most part from overhanging precipices; and the only other road, passing through Baktchi- Serai, Simfero pol, and Kara su•Basar, is most difficult of access, full of gorges and narrow passes, and capable of being disputed inch by inch. To the north, flat grassy plains stretch away to the Isthmus of Perekop and the shores of the Putrid Sea, dry and parched in the summer months. To holi the Crimea would require strong fortifications at Perekop and Arabat : The Isthmus of Perekop at its narrowest point is about live miles broad, unapproachable by sea; by no means well supplied with fresh water ; unhealthy in its climate, and exposed to the full force of those keen northerly blasts from which our army has already in a more sheltered situation suffered so severely. The burning sun of summer, the malaria of autumn, the snows of winter, and the stench exhaled from the Putrid Sea, would render the camp at Perekop a most disagreeable place of abode at all times ; while a glance at the map will suffice to show that upon the long narrow Isthmus of Arabat troops would be exposed to still greater inconveniences. The forces at these two points, however, must necessarily he enormous, as upon them would be concentrited the whole strength of the Russian army enjoying a free end uninterrupted comma• nication with the interior. Hence he forms the conclusion that it would be better to content ourselves with garrisoning Sebabtopol and Balaklava, and to tranFport a portion of our forces to Asia Minor. Ai the country between the mountains and the coast of the 131ack Sea is only held by the Russian forts, most of which are evacuated, there will be no need of any campaign for its reduction. Georgia is the prize at which he would aim. 578 Occupying Redout Kale and Poti as the basis of operation, he would t►ansport the army for sixty miles up the navigable stream of the Rhion, and thence by a Russian road into Georgia. With a friendly population and a fertile territory, and with the communications of the Russians and their reinforcements inter cepted, the conquest would be no difficult task : It would be impossible fur the Russians to concentrate any very large force at one point, for they are compelled to scatter their army, estimated at about WOW men, over the country, in order to repress any outbreak on the part of the native population, who are only watching for an opportunity to give effectual assistance to the enemies of their hated oppressors. This inconvenience was seriously felt by them during last year's campaign against the Turks. The allied forces, provided with a good commissariat, and ample means of land transport, which a campaign in the Crimea must equally involve, would have the additional advantage here of a population more willing and able to contribute supplies, and of a country far more fertile in its resources, possessing a climate both milder in winter and healthier in summer. The consequences would be important. Turkey would be protected, Persia relieved from her present vassalage, our trade through Trebizond secured, and Russia checked in bet designs upon India. But nothing, Mr. Oli phant urges, is so necessary as territorial deprivation : But while the common object with which the war was originally undertaken, viz., the protection of the Stillwell dominions, may be thus in a great measure achieved, the humiliation of Russia is also one in which the Western powers are no less united; and this would certainly be involved by that territorial deprivation which would be the result of success in the expedition now proposed. In the present state of our political relations upon the continent of Europe, there is no portion of the Russian dominions there of which she could be permanently shorn. Finland is out of the question, because we have alienated the Fins, by blockading their coasts and burning their villages. Poland is not to be calculated upon, because we have placed ourselves in antagonism to the revolutionary element of Europe by attempting to conciliate its despots. Bess arable mast ever remain an oppressed province of Russia, for its population is deficient in vitality. The Crimea might be temporarily occupied, but to hope permanently to annex to Turkey this distant peninsula, which is now an integral portion of the Russian empire, would be as absurd as to imagine that it could be organised into an independent kingdom. But none of these objections exist in the case of the provinces beyond the Caucasus. We have not, as in Finland, given their inhabitants cause for complaint, beyond manifesting an extreme want of interest in their concerns. Nor have they, like the Poles, bat tOttidence in us, for we have not been engaged for two years in unsuccessful attempts to propitiate powers upon their frontiers whose interests are directly opposed to theirs. Their vital energies have not been crushed by a long course of Muscovite oppression, or their hopes of freedom almost extinguished, as in the leas favoured pro vince of Bessarabia. While comprising territory four times in extent to that of the Taurio peninsula, containing a population proportionately exceeding it in amount, and formed, not of dejected Tartars, but of the moat hardy and enterprising race in the world, with a frontier conterminous with that of Turkey for three hundred miles—these pro vinces are in a totally different position from the Crimea, and are capable either of independent organisation or of such arrangement with respect to Tarkey at the end of the war as may be deemed consistent with the interests of that empire, and serve at the same time as a more effectual barrier to Russian aggression in the East,—an advantage which would not be involved by the severance of the Crimea from the dominions of the Czar, even were such a project feasible, since that ,irovince is completely isolated, and touches the frontier of no other country. . . Here, at least, our efforts will be attended with definite results; we shall deprive Russia of a portion of her empire equal in extent to Prussia; we shall render her Anther aggres- sion upon Persia and Turkey impossible ; we shall utterly destroy her prestige throughout Asia—save our own transit trade, and be entirely relieved of apprehension with regard to India. We shall free an oppressed and enslaved people, in all probability capable themselves of guarding their own frontier, but with whom if it is necessary to leave a small force they will be well eared for. in a healthy climate and fertile country ; and ultimately, by means of a rigorous and bond fide blockade of her whole maritime provinces, and the adoption of such other measures as may effectually destroy her commerce, frame a basis for negotiation very different in its character from that which has been so scornfully rejected, and of which a " fifth point " should be, that between the Black Sea and the Caspian, the Terek and the Kouban do henceforward form the frontier of Russia. One difficulty Mr. Oliphant passes over. Under what Government are we to place our acquisitions? England and France could not undertake them. The system of Turkey is too corrupt to be restored. Placed between Russia, Persia, and Turkey, independence is scarcely possible, and the native population is hardly capable of self-government. Tempting as the scheme appears, it would be difficult to carry out. We can only describe it by nega tives It is more promising than the region • stitution of Poland, more practicable than a Tartar republic in tile Crimea; more easy for