The Press. — London, England, 1857-11-21 00:00:00

THE PRESS, NOVEMBER 21, 1857. 1128 guns on the esplanade of the fort, in presence of all the troops of the garrison. The crime of the prisoners con sisted in meeting for seditious purposes in a house in the bazaar. The bacon, or spiritual adviser of the Marines, gave information to the police, and these two men were watched and listened to by the Superintendent and by Cap tain Barrow, of the Marines. They spoke of a ris►ng for this very day, when the occurrence of the great Hindoo festival of the bewallee causes great display of wealth among the natives. Plunder appears to have been their main object, but they expressed themselves most disloyally towards the British Government, and openly lamented that the arrival of the ;l rd front the Mauritius had rendered it impossible to get up a massacre at the time of the Mohurrum. One other man, a native officer, is undergoing his trial for attending a fortner meeting of a similar character, and evidence is being collected against some few others. It is contemplated to remove the 10th to Poonah, where they can be better looked after, and to have down the 4th Rides, late from Persia, in their place. The sooner we gel more English troops the better. From Assam there are no very distinct statements later than Bth October, when a writer from Calcutta observes that Assam has remained quiet, and that the Assam troops have not actually risen, though they have shown that they are about to do so very shortly : - - • - • The Ist Battalion at Debroghur openly declare that they are about to set their former Rajah on his throne again, and the 2nd Battalion at Gowhatty have been sending away their wives and children, and have been discovered pl tting with Kowar Singh. Most of the Europeans. tea 'linters and others, have taken refuge in the neighbouring station of Seebsangor. The only loyal native troops in As ant are a few Ghoorkas under Major Hannay at Debrogliiir. The church there has been provisioned and fortified, and guns protect the square. Scin(le seems quiet. A letter from Kurracbee, October 12, shows how narrow was our escape from a general rising. The writer observes:— We have had difficulties in our garrisons all over Scinde, owing to the want of wore European soldiers. The panic of was beyond belief, and he would have denuded Scinde of defence had his requisitions all been available; but great caution became obviously necessary here when the various native regiments perceived our weak European resources. Instructions of the general have been admi rably carried out, and at the three large stations in Scinde (Shikarpore on the frontier, Hydrabacl on the Indus, and Kurracbee on the coast) mutiny has been arrested just in time—and only jest--for at Kurrachee, on the night of 13th September (when the 21st Native Infantry were discovered partially under arms), had not our little army, and the general with it, been down on the 21st Native Infantry lines ut midnight, this whole station, in half an hour more, was to have had confusion rushing from end to end. The intention of the rebel portion of the 21st was to rob the Treasury during the combustion of the hour (on a re markably dark night), and to carry money and aims to their disarmed friends at Hydrabad, where about a week before the artillery affair had dared up, and our good Bri gadier Morris had run the guns into IlydnibeAl fort before the men could get at them. The Shikarpore mutiny was the last to occur, and its spirit had been somewhat checked by the dire example made of the rebels here, and the utter defeat of the plot at Ilydrabad—a plot which, at tie latter place, had com menced, and if carried out would have united the 21st Native Infantry plunderers with the Artillery mutineers at Ilydrabad, also at Shikarpore, and then the robber tribes on the frontier, with innumerable horse, were to have come down to join the insurgents. The :hiefs of these horse warriors are mentioned by Sir C. Napier, " Mice Khan," and " Dhil Morita." They new have the honour of being our prisoners, on board the ship Feroze, on their voyage to Bombay. Altogether we see little reason yet to congratulate ourselves that the "all is over" assumption may be safely accepted. We have work before us yet that will tai the energies of our best men, and strain the resources of the empire, and much now depends upon money and mear s of transport. Aftet six days of open trenches, during which the Artil lery and Engineers, under their respective commanding officers, Major Gaitskell and Lieutenant-Colonel Baird Smith, vied with each other in pressing forward the work, two excellent and most practicable breaches were formed in the walls of the place, one in the curtain to the right of the Cashmere Bastion, the other to the left of the Water Bastion, the defences of those bastions and the parapets giving musketry cover to the enemy commanding the breaches, having also been destroyed by the Artillery. The assault was delivered on four points. The Ist column, under Brigadier J. Nicholson, consisting of her Majesty's 75th Regiment (300 men), the Ist European Bengal Fusiliers (2(X) men ),and the 2nd Punjaub Infantry (400 men), assaulted the main breach, their advance being almirably covered by the Ist battalion, her Majesty's 60th Rifles, under Colonel J. Jones. The operation was crowned with brilliant success, the enemy, after severe resistance, being driven from the Cashmere Bastion, the main guard, and its vicinity, in complete rout. The 2nd column, under Brigadier Jones, of her Majesty's 01st Regiment, consisting of her Majesty's Bth Regiment (250 men 1, the 2nd European Bengal Fusiliers (250 men), and the 4th Regiment of Sikhs (330 men), similarly co vered by the 60th Rifles, advanced on the Water Bastion, carried the breach, and drove the enemy from his guns,and position, with a determination and spirit which ,gave me the highest satisfaction. The 3rd column, under Colonel Campbell, of her Ma les' v's 52nd Light Infantry, consisting of 200 of his own regiment, the Kumeon Battalion (25(1 men), and the Ist Puninub Infantry (500 men), was directed against the Cashmere Gateway. This column was preceded by an explosion party, under Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, of the Engineers, covered by the 60th Rifles. The demoli tion of the gate having been accomplished, the column forced an entrance, overcoming a strenuous opposition from the enemy's infantry and heavy artillery, which had been brought to bear on the position. I cannot express too warmly my admiration of the gallantry of all concerned in this difficult operation. The reserve, under Brigadier Longfield, her Majesty's Bth Regiment, composed of her Majesty's 01st Regiment (250 men), the 4th Regiment Rifles (450 men), the Belooch Battalion (300 men), the Jheend Rajah's Auxi liaries (300 men), and 200 of her Majesty's 60th Rifles, who joined after the assault had been made, awaited the result of the attack, and on the columns entering the place, took possession of the posts I had previously assigned to it. This duty was ultimately performed to my entire satisfaction, The firm establishment of the reserve rendering the assaulting columns free to act in advance, Brigadier- General Nicholson, supported by Brigadier Jones, swept the ramparts of the place from the Cashmere to the Cebu! Gates, occupying the bastions and defences, capturing the guns, and driving the enemy before him. During the advance Brigadier-General Nicholson was, to the grief of myself and the whole army, dangerously wounded. The command consequently devolved on Brigadier Jones, who, finding the enemy in great force, occupying and pouring a destructive fire from the roots of strong and commanding houses in the city on a 1 sides, the ramparts themselves being enfiladed by guns, prudently resolvesd on retaining possession of the Cahul Gate, which his troops had so gallantly won, in which he firmly established himself, awaiting the result of the operations of the other columns of occupation. Colonel Campbell, with the column under his com mand, advanced successfully from the Cashmere Gate by one of the main streets beyond the " Chandnee Chouk, the central and principal street of the city, towards the Jimmie Mnsjid, with the intention of occupying that important post. The opposition, however, which he met from the great concentration of the enemy, at the Jumma Musjitl and the houses in the neighbourhood, he himself, I regret to state, being wounded, satisfied him that his most prudent course was not to maintain so advanced a position with the comparatively limited force at his disposal, and he accordingly withdrew the head of his column, and placed himself in communication with the reserve, a measure which had my entire approval, I having previously determined that, in the event of serious opposition being encountered in the town itself, it would be most inexpe dient to commit my small force to a succession of street fights, in which their gallantry, discipline, and organisation could avail them so little. My present position, therefore, is that which, under such a contingency, I had resolved to occupy and establish myself in firmly as the base of my systematic operations for the complete possession of the city. This embraces the magazine on one side, and the Cabul Gate on the other, with the Moree, Cashmere, and Water Bastions, and strong' intermediate posts, with secure communication along the front to the rear. From this base 7 am now cautiously pressing the enemy on all points, with a view of establishing myself in a second advanced position, and I trust before many days to have it in my power to announce to the Supreme Government that the enemy have been driven from their last stronghold in the palace, fort, and streets of the city of Delhi. Simultaneously with the operations above detailed, an attack was made on the enemy's strong position outside the city, in the suburbs of Kissengunge and Pahareepore, with a view of driving in the rebels, and supporting the main attack, by effecting an entrance at the Cabul Gate after it should be taken. The force employed on this difficult duty I intrusted to that admirable officer, Major C. Reid, commanding the Sirmoor battalion, whose distinguished conduct I have already had occasion to bring prominently to the notice of superior authority, and who was, I much regret, severely wounded on this occasion. His column consisted of his own battalion, the Guides, and the men on duty at Hindoo Rao's (the main picket), numbering in all about 1,0(X), supported by the auxiliary troops of his Highness the Maharajah itumbeir Singh, under Captain R. Lawrence. The strength of the positions, however, and the desp&wate resistance offered by the enemy, withstood for a time the efforts of our troops, gallant though they were, and the combination was unable to be effected. The delay, lam happy to say, has been only temporary, for the enemy have subsequently abandoned their positions, leaving their guns in o ur hands. In this attack r found it necessary to support Major Reid with cavalry and horse artillery, both of which arms were admirably handled respectively by Brigadier Hope Grant, of her Majesty's 9th Lancers, commanding the Cavalry Brigade, and Major H. Tombs, of the Horse Artillery, who inflicted severe punishment cn the enemy, though I regret their own loss was very heavy. The resistance of the rebels up to this time 11118 been that of desperate men, and to this must be attributed the severe loss we have sustained, amounting proximately, so far as I am able to judge, in the absence of casualty returns, to forty-six officers killed and wounded, and about titK) men. Amongst those of whose services the State has been de prived, are many officers of distinction and merit, holding superior commands, whose places cannot be supplied ; anti I have sp.mially to lament the loss which has been eus tained by that gallant corps, the Engineers, nine officers of that arm having fallen iu the gallant performance of their duty. Until I am in possession of reports from brigadiers and other commanding officers, I shall he unable to enter more fully into the details of these operations, and I trust the circumstances under which 1 write will excuse any slight inaccuracies or imperfections which my despatch may exhibit. The absence of such reports also prevents my bringing to notice Cie natues of those officers or a l men who have specially distinguished themselves. This will be my grateful duty hereafter. But I cannot defer the expression of my admiration for the intrepidity, coolness, and deter mination of all engaged, Europeans and natives, of all arms of the service.-1 nave, &c., _ A. I% iLsoN, Major-General, Commanding Field Force. A precis of the killed and wounded on the first day, from the Adjutant General Chamberlain, accom panies this despatch. Our casualties on the day of the assault were :—Europeans, killed, 8 officers, 62 rank and file; wounded, 52 officers, 510 rank and file. Natives, killed, 103 ; wounded, 310. Missing, 10 Europeans. Total, Europeans and natives, killed and wounded, 1,145. The adjutant-general adds to his letter, dated the Pith, the following important P.S., important as indicating the effect of such hoavy losses upon so small a force : P.S.-10th. During the night we advanced our left up to Abbott's house, and also Khan Mahomed's house. This gives us a strong position up to within 150 yards of the palace walla. All our mortars are bearing upon the Jumma Musjid and the southern part of the town, which is being fast evacuated, the resistance becoming much less on our right: we are also progressing by working though the houses. The King and royal family are said to have eva cuated the palace and gone to the old fort outside the city to the south. Our very small number make it necessary to be cautious in taking possession of so large a city. for frum the great nuinber we hare of sick and wounded, and our loss un the day of the assault, hare reduced us very much. THE CAPTURE OF DELHI. Comparatively very few details have appeared of the assault and capture of Delhi. The operations of the first and last days have app, , areil, but very few details concerning the six da:, s' fighting. General Wilson's despatches were en route, by way of Lahore, to Bombay : DESPATCH OF GENERAL WILSON. The following official despatch from General Wilson, detailing the operations of the first day, is the only official despatch which has yet come to hand : TO CACTAIN 11. W. NOIIYAN, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL 01 TIIE ARMY. Head-quarters, Field Force, Delhi, Sept. 16. Sir,---I have the high satisfaction of reporting, for the information of the Msjor-General Commanding in the Upper Provinces, and through him of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief and of Government., that on the morning of the 14th Matsui the force under my command buuessi ully absaulled the city of Delhi. Under present circumstances, Major-General Gowan will, I trust., allow me to withhold for a time a full and complete detail of the operations from their commence ment to their close, and to limit myself to a summary of events. THE ASSAULT. In the absence of more circumstantial details we take the following description of the assault by an eve-witness, and• originally printed in tlio Lahore Chronicle : Your readers will have understood, from the intelligence which has been from time to time published, that from the period of the arrival of our army in June last, up till very lately, the position occupied by our troops has been in effect A purely defensive one. It extended from the picket at Metclalfe's house, close to the river on the left, along the ridge facing the north side of Delhi as far as the Subzee Mundee suburb on our right, where this ridge terminates —the distance from the city wall averaging from 1,200 to 1,500 yards. We had from the first no choice as to the front of attack, our position on the north side being the only one that could secure our communications with the Punjaub, whence our supplies and reinforcements were drawn. Whether the city mig it or might not have been carried by a conpAle-main, as was contemplated first in June and afterwards in July, it is needless now to inquire; but,judg ing from the resistance we afterwards experienced in the actual assault, when we had been greatly reinforced in men and guns, it appears to me fortunate that the attempt was not made. The strength of the place was never supposed to consist in the strength of the actual defences, though these were much undervalued; but every city, even with out fortifications, is, from its very nature, strongly defensible (unless it can be effectually surrounded or bombarded ), and within Delhi the enemy possessed a magazine containing upwards of 200 guns and an almost inexhaustible supply of ammunition, while their numbers were certainly never lees than double those of the besiegers. Few will doubt, then, that the general in com mand exercised a sound discretion in refusing to allow a handful of troops, unaided by siege guns, to attack such a place, knowing as he did what disastrous results must fol low a failure. By the beginning of this month, however, we received the siege•traiu from Ferozepore and further reinforcements of European and native troops from the Punjaub, and, it being known that there was no hope of any aid from down country far a considerable time, it was resolved that the siege should be at once commenced and prosecuted with the utmost vigour. Our available force amounted, in round numbers, to 6,500 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and tie[) artillery, Europeaus 1