The Press. — London, England, 1856-05-17 00:00:00

- ,•••••• . 1411 !fmt 1 P4M- -.4l4 7leAlliriNFA - 7(0 - (2 /d Ge //o ,Al-4 i' c lrit•l; I. N0.159._v0L.1V• LONDON, SATURDAY, MAY 17, 1856. STAMPED .-. STXPENCE. VNSTAMPED..FIVEPENCE. g4t V rtss. ings which have provoked it. The main justi fication of war is, that it tends to dispel such feelings ; and it does but very partially fulfil its ends when it leaves them subsisting in full force. Even more than the restoration of concord was hoped from the Paris Conferences. It was imagined that some settlement of Italy might have been devised which would free that country equally from the repressive force of foreign military occupation, and from the danger of revolutionary outbreak. It was thought that the inconveniences which had been proved to result from the last great European settlement might have been rectified at the Paris Congress. Though the settle ment of 1814-15 was not free from serious defects, it had this merit,—that it placed the peace of Europe on a firm basis. But the Peace of 1856 has raised questions of the greatest delicacy and importance only to leave them unsettled. rouse yet more strongly indignant suspicions in the mind of the Russian Court. There is another country which must feel more aggrieved by this treaty than Russia itself. Sardinia has declined to become a party to the treaty. Now that the War has ended, her interests on the Italian ques tion are antagonistic to those of Austria. She looks to France and England for support; and she finds that those Powers are closely bound to Austria by a public treaty, and by secret engagements. The feeling of a common wrong appears to be drawing Russia and Sardinia together. The one State se( a that it is distrusted, and the other that it is INDON, SATURDAY, MAY 17, 1856. THE circumstances which have come to light since the signature of the Treaty of Peace on the 30th of March are not of a nature to justify the hopes of those who anticipated from that event a permanent settlement of Europe. In the articles of Peace originally propounded, the bases of such a settlement had been laid down, but there has, from some cause or other, been wanting the spirit or the skill to take advantage of the opportunity for effecting a complete pacification of the East, and for removing causes of discontent and dis turbance in Europe. Those who desired a solid Peace, and who were most anxious that it should be accompanied by the removal of all causes of misunderstanding, and the re storation of frank and cordial intercourse, have the most reason to be disappointed with the result. We have peace, but not peace of that kind which having finally ended a quarrel makes friends of foes. For our own part, we desired less a peace of which we could be proud, than a peace with which we could be content ; but we have neither. The persons who were opposed to the con clusion of the War at the present time, and who held that the contest was not ripe for settlement, may point to the existing state of affairs in justification of their opinion. They may say that war which usually clears the political atmosphere has failed to do so in this instance; that Europe still remains unsettled ; that the attitude of the contending Powers is jealous and mistrustful ; and that Russia is preparing for new combats on the very shores of that sea which it was one of the main objects of the War to pacifieate. There is suffie:ent truth in these representations to cause uneasiness. Rarely have the politics of Europe been more confused and complicated than at the present moment, and never has it been more difficult to discover a key to the action of our Foreign-office. But this con fusion, so far as England is concerned, has arisen, not because the War was concluded in opportunely, but because Lord PALMERSTON'S Government has failed to act on any straight forward and intelligible system of policy. Had it designed to disgust the people with foreign politics, it could not have done so more effectually than by the crooked course it has pursued. It was not irrational to suppose that the Powers represented at the Paris Conferences would come to a complete and cordial under standing when the terms of Peace had been arranged. Without such understanding, a. treaty of peace can never be more than a sus pension of hostilities. More than signatures and seals are r equ i re d t o g i ve a t rea ty validity. 'These are but the outward signs of that prin ciple of amity which the treaty is supposed to embody ; and if the spirit be wanting, no great confidence can be felt in the forms. Mistrust should cease when arms are laid down. When the fight is over, it is equally unjust and impolitic to retain the hostile feel despised. Yet Lord PALMERSTON and Lord CLAREN DON still affect to be the champions of Italian liberty. The hopes of the Constitu tionalists are encouraged. Who knows ? something may yet turn up in their favour. The disgraceful game of the last five-and twenty years is still to be played. Italy must watch for a favorable opportunity for insur rection; and, when the opportunity comes, must submit. to have its hopes and efforts quenched in blood, while the English Govern ment looks on, sympathises, and leaves the in surgents to the vengeance they have provoked. This perfidious policy has been the source of grievous calamity to Italy. Sardinia has once been sacrificed to it ;—is she again to be its victim ? What can be more cruel than to flatter the Italian people with expectations of support, only to disappoint them in the hour of trial—to excite their enthusiasm merely to keep alive a popular cry in this country, or to barb a diplomatic insult,? To estrange States—to foment jealousies— to keep open old sores—to prepare new com plications—to keep Europe armed, suspicious, and disturbed,—these are the legitimate la bours which Lord PALMERSTON'S Administra tion seems to think devolves on it as the natural consequence of Peace. It requires a different and more honest policy to make Peace bear its natural fruits of reconciliation,— The preparations Russia is making for a cam paign in the Caucasus are unhappily notorious. That Power cannot be blamed for taking ad vantage of the opportunity afforded by the concentration of her military force in the south for the achievement of a conquest she has been attempting for more than a century past. But it is not less unfortunate for Russia than for Western Europe that such a temptation has been left in her path. Be it granted that the Circassians had done nothing to deserve our protection, yet it is evident that had provision been made for the neutralisation of their coast, Russia would and must have abandoned all thought of sub duing the Caucasus by arms. A great end would then have been gained. There would have been no necessity for upholding the mili tary system of the late Czar The whole empire of Russia would have been at peace, and her Go vernment would have been free to commence anew career. No better service could have been done the Court of St. Petersburg than to have insisted on a condition which would have re duced its armies to inactivity, and which it could have accepted without humiliation. We cannot believe that the people of this country will feel confidence in the security of peace while war is being waged, and immense Rus sian armies are collected, in the immediate vicinity of the Asiatic frontier of Turkey. goodwill, and milder forms of government. CAUTION TO CONSERVATIVES. WITH the conclusion of the war the country must return to the narrower, but not less weighty, interests of domestic politics. Ques tions which disappeared for a time will regain importance ; and the relations of Conserva tives and Liberals towards each other, and also to the public opinion of the country, must again be studied. The Whigs and Radicals already are preparing to assume their favorite position of aggression against the Constitu tion. As yet, they have not shown from what quarter they intend to open their fire ; but there is no doubt that they feel the cessation of the war has taken away from them a Our policy is not likely to induce Russia to lay aside her arms, or to heed those murmur ings which we are persuaded will soon arise here at a renewal of the Caucasian war. When the Treaty of the 30th of March was signed, Russia must have supposed that she re entered into relations of amity with her late antagonists, and became a trusted member of the European family. She could not have anticipated that fifteen days later a separate treaty would be signed between England, France, and Austria, guaranteeing the in tegrity of the Ottoman empire. If it be true that the Court of St. Petersburg first learnt the existence of this treaty from its publica tion in our newspapers, we need not wonder at the warmth of the remonstrances it has ad dressed to the English Government. The effect of this treaty must be to isolate Russia—to show her that no confidence is placed in her professions—and to proclaim, immediately after she has signed a Treaty of Peace, that a new alliance is necessa►y to pre vent her breaking it. Behind this transaction there are secret circumstances calculated to standing excuse for their mismanagement and jobbery. At present, but only for a brief time, there is a lull. We must be prepared to hear before long of some further revolutionary pro- jects, speciously recor of " reforms." We we see of the temr tded under the name are 4 r of A the community is perilous changes ii One of the most mentioned in the ' 44 ~.- t