The Press. — London, England, 1855-12-29 00:00:00

, j 1 4 t t l* ( + LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 29,1855• UNSTA STAMP MPED..FINED . SXPENEPE CE. ' No. 139.—V0L. 111. dress. the Allies were in possession of St. Peters burg, and if that exhaustion of men and money—which some writers assure us is iu rapid progress—were visible in the disorgani sation of her Government, and the wasting of her armies. As it is, we must—if we nego tiate at all—be prepared to frankly meet her as a great Power, having an interest like our selves in the final settlement of the question out of which the War arose, and in the precise three mightiest Powers of the workl could submit their pretensions to be judged by a knot of lesser e Governments. To solve the question whether Peace be practicable, nothing more is required than that the representatives of Russia and the Allies should meet on fair and equal grounds, animated by a desire to find a satisfactory basis of pacification. But, in the event of a Treaty being concluded, it would be very desirable that every State in Europe should be invited to adhere to it, — to share in its security and add weight to its obligations. LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1855. A TELEGRAPHIC despatch informs us that Count ESTERHAZY had reached St. Petersburg. The proposals he bears must by this time have been submitted to the Czar's Cabinet, and have probably been discussed and decided on. The Allies have opened the negotiation. It is for Russia to continue it, and we now wait her action. The German papers, quite as likely to be well-informed on the purpose of Count ESTER EAzy's mission as our own, altogether repu diate the idea that he is the bearer of a kind of ultimatum requiring for answer a mere Yes or No. Modern diplomacy does not work by such simple and severe forms. It is ridicu lous to suppose that the Minister of the Aus trian Court will proceed like an old Roman ambassador—will intimate that Peace or War depends on a shake of his coat-tail, and stand with a door-handle in his grasp until the final - word determines him to quit the Council chamber, or to take a chair by the fire. His mission is much more likely to be the com mencement of a negotiation than its end. Speculating on probabilities, it does not appear likely that Russia will churlishly reject advances made in a spirit of concilia tion ; nor is it likely that she will unreservedly bind herself to conditions, whatever they may be, which must admit of much modification in detail. We apprehend it to be more likely that she will propose discussion of them with the view of coming to an arrangement which shall be mutually satisfactory to all the par ties concerned. The question of the time is, in what spirit shall we be prepared to receive such a sugges tion? If we believed that there was any real meaning in all the clamour and abuse we have heard launched against Russia, we should deem it impossible that any such arrangement could be made. But we make large allowance for the necessities of journalism, and for the thoughtlessness and irresponsibility of popu lar oratory. We are satisfied that if any one three months ago had predicted that before the end of the year the Allies would he pro posing terms of Peace to Russia, and through the mediation of the Austrian Court—Lord PALMERSTON, the author of the Melbourne war-harangue, being atthe head of our Govern ment—the prophecy would have been received with a shout of derision. We respect the proverb, —II n'est que le premier pas qui mite. The first step has been taken, the next will be comparatively easy. In fact, unless this preliminary to negotiation be the most hollow, and in its essence the most false, that was over attempted in the affairs of great nations, and when great inte rests were at stake, we must be prepared to follow it out, and accept its consequences with sincerity. We must abandon all idea of dictating terms to Russia, and of treating her as a conquered nation dependent on our mercy. Such a tone might be appropriate if definition of the boundary lines between her empire and that of Turkey. While principles essential to the settlement of the Eastern Question are adhered to, no good purpose can be gained by positively insisting on particular details. In international differences, the ends of pacific settlement are commonly to be at tained in a variety of ways ; and to absolutely insist on the adoption of one way is to oppose unnecessary obstacles to the realisation of the object desired. The suaviter in mode may be judiciously exercised, while the fortiter in re is adhered to. It is not our aim to humiliate Russia by insisting on petty points which she is unwilling or unable to concede, but to gain by some kind of arrangement or other those ends which we know are essential to the in tegrity of the Turkish territory, and indispen sable to the safety and liberties of Europe. The War was undertaken in the view of all statesmen, not to conquer Russia, but to restrain her. It cannot end until this purpose of restraint be achieved. No one can survey the history of the last century, and doubt that the policy of Russia has been uniformly ag gressive ; but her success has been less owing to her inherent strength than to the weakness of her adversaries, and to the absence of any powerful, organised, and systematic opposi tion to her designs. The effect of such oppo sition has now to be tried. The object of the Allies is to raise up barriers to her progress. If Russia is disposed, through the stress laid upon her, to assist in the work, shall we refuse her co-operation? We hold that a Peace must be more secure which she herself willingly takes part in bringing to a conclusion, than a Peace to which she submits as matter of ne cessity for a time, but is resolved to break on the first opportunity. In the mediation of neutral States, we must confess that we have little faith. Often a narrow view of their position and interest leads them to desire a prolongation of the War which they ostentatiously profess their anxiety to close. In any great quarrel their positive influence must be small, and neither party might be willing to believe in their sin cerity or candour. When the belligerents are mighty, as in the present case, they alone can be judges in their quarrel, and can have weight to compose it. Mediators can do little more than smooth a way for their meeting, and soften the pride and asperity which keep them apart. It is from a direct and honest negotiation between the Allies and Russia that we must rationally expect a settlement to result. The proposal of a Congress, which has been set forth in Paris with a great show of au. thority, does not appear applicable to present circumstances. Such an assembly, however well-intended, must be vain when the belli gerents themselves can some to no terms, and must degenerate into a mere obstructive for mula when principles of agreement are set, tied, and details alone have to be arranged. Such an expedient is not suited to the English temper; nor do we think it possible that the LORD PANMURE'S LOSS OF KARS. As we anticipated, the fall of Kars has raised stern indignation in tho most opposite quar ters. Ardent promoters of the war are indig nant at a great opportunity having been thrown away, while, on the other hand, persons not zealous iu the present contest aro astc nished that such negligencos should have taken place under a Ministry which makes pretensions to a war of extremities. The great length of time given to our War-office for repairing the blunder adds to the serious cha racter of its " supineness." Its want of energy seems almost incredible. Unfortunately, tho forced surrender of the brave WILLIAMS and his associates is an historical event. The old stock excuse cannot be made—" Wo " acted in concert with our brave allies, and " they have been in fault just as much as our " selves." The plea would be worthless. It could not be based on truth, and even if it were, common sense would scout its reception. A similar plea was not accepted twelve months since when the country imperiously demanded why the precipitate descent on the Crimea had been made : nor even in the Parliamentary discussion of the strategies of the campaign was such a futile excuse allowed. It would be strange, indeed, if such a mode of defending blunders had been accepted by Parliament and the public. The responsibility of Ministers would in that case have become a mere delusion. In the present instance, however, there cannot be the faintest grounds for asserting that the non-relief of General WILLIAMS is also to be debited to our French allies. Let it bo remembered that the British Cabinet took personal cognisance of the defence of Kars ; for there is a most important distinction be tween the action of our Cabinet in the Tram caucasian provinces of Russia► and between its joint operation with French and Sardinian forces in defending Wallachia and Bulgaria. There were no French or Sardinians employed at Kars. But there was an English staff there in correspondence with both the Foreign and War Offices of England. What Englishmen could accomplish of Turkish troops was Silistria. Oui our clubs and popularity of the war ; and personal frieni ance with Ma j and THOMPSON, of General reverses. Yet that is first repulsed plish at the head of Turkish shown at Kars as well as at Lr shop-windows, an , ,••(; n; _ a d family circle, ~.•• o.•:;• - • • I.e ' WILLIAMS as one • • 4 . 4 many of our re .- • 'lds exulting ove • • 3.1 -10 ijor LAxx and C: • • . .• LI )N, the distingu . • ts . 3 WiLusids in 4• •• • • .r'• • vi etz not all. When Gal '; 4l • - , - the Russians from - • s