Star. — London, England, 1816-02-20 00:00:00

77,7rri ,-„- . ' _ . . --,----.7--- - limilibb ittiefortieb 1 . ' 4-- sea, or In pity an eqftliiideet op. treiciosey. The force which we had Woughtinto the field; in Hanoverian. 'and English, both ioillsaly . aad Flanders, Was rather better than 90.000. mat. By our astergetwint we were therefore to pay for.. 80.000 more, bet the Powers agreed to tura•thst payment ieCts •ffiskly for the'inferior States. With • l ist the exception - King ofl Holland did titiC be a subsidy, and those of Swit teeland, that sum was paid to the inferior Stites at the rite of £ll per nom Through the exertions of Europe, .and s the Wens, with which they bed been crowned, the war had been so quickly ended, that still Dine-fourth of the subsidy remained in the hands of t3Overninent tincialecir fora By the means they had employed, they had contributed . to bring into the field a eonfedersey,so great and powerful, that disaster itself Could not have fruitrated* its ultimate object. Nay, had the battle of Waterloo. instead of a glorious triumph, proved a day of defeat and ruin. • the contest might have been protracted, but not changed in its termination.—(Hear.)— The means of the Confederacy were so immense, that they would not fail. • The House would feel of what importance it was to avoid delays which would have served to augment the difficulties with which we had to contend. It was proper, that in her own cause against usurpation, Europe should act with such au thotity and power, as to undeceive the French nation,. whose pride in military glory was so strong, that if they could have fancied that the war was brought to a conclusion by some, accidental occurrence, and not by the irresistible man of foreign power, would have retained their disposition to rise again and disturb the world. But the battle of Waterloo had made Franco know what it was to provoke the indigna. thin of Europe, and to bring her strong arm upon herself. That inundation of power alone could have shewn her the reality of her own feebleness.' In 1814 sheind unfortunately mistaken the generosity of the Allies for a sense of weakness. To want of means she had attrilmted the respect they had displayed to. ward her feelings. It was, therefore, important to teach her a lessors of such a nature, that no-French ' man himself should be able to entertain a doubt on the subjict. She bad now been taught that the armies of two powers, with some auxiliaries, had been sofficient to overwhelm her force—and what force? Never in hisowy was France known to send to the fi,•ld as army stranger in numbers, discipline, and moral feeling; an army' mere. resolved to COll - or to die, than that which Napoleon led to en counter the Allies in Belgium.—Neither did he wish to &maze from the hem ;a of the French army:— ease bad osier conducted itselt with rune mower.. than teat army; yet those of the Duke of Welling. ten are: Marshal Blucher had put down those exer tioes in a manner :red with results the aeon decisive. Vilest rafter battle had ever been fought that had . pereludei an army, even alter the loss of two-thirds of its numbers, from again presataing itself to Gee its rypnaeats I What other army had been so dis persed,. as to allow its pursuers to advance for 14 days through its territory without opposition, to take possession of the capital of the country with only 90,000 men, 'and to compel the individual who had -desolated Europe to seek a refuge in the country which be had sletignated for rainy Th . at battle bort a character at:parallel:al in war. It had destroyed the very sy te. t against which we fought, and placed the individual who was its soul, into the hands which be had devoe:d to destruction. He trusted, that on Cis branch cif the Tit-aim the House would feel no difference of opinion, and would be disposed to go 'MA Lim to the Throat to express dick approval of all that had bees atchirved. Never had such a con federacy, in extent of military strength and ardour of exertion, been witnessed. It appeared by returns, taken act the time when the British army occupied Paris, that there was an allied force in the French territory of 1,1444000 men The numbers had been most scrupulously checked by the Duke of Welling. ton, who was charged with arrangements with toe French Commissioners for their subsistence, and his Grace declared that the numbers had not been exag irg. Besides these, there was a reserve of , t fi e rt Azurites* snoring against• France, the head of With column was already in Bavaria. Another resume of 150,0f0 Russiani bad then passed the, Elbe and entered Franconia. He should take this opportunity of refuting the opinions which had been advanced, respecting a reputed jealousy on the part of a great Power. In the course of the events and aeociations which had taken place, he had found in that Empire evhy disposition to agree with this country, and - in nothing more heartily than in the iripulation with respect to the Italian Islands. It was a fair tribute to Russia ter state,. that although the had only obliged herself by treaty to bring 150,000 men, she had led 250,000 into France. Pile Duke 9f Wellington had seen 151.,000 Russian troops under arms in t)w plains of Vertos, besides the corps of Langeron, which was in another quarter, and his Grace had declared that he had never beholden a finer army. Without any attempt on the part of this country to enter into a new pecuniary arrangement with his Majesty, the Emperor of Russia had moved his reserve forward, and it was not until they bad passed the boundaries of his doininions that any ar rangement had been negotiated, to pay no more than bad been granted to the lesser Powers. All idea of jealousy in that (pater was therefore unfounded. He trusted the House would agree that Government had made the most effectual arrangement for the attainment of the great European object. Besides the force brought into action, had the war continued two months longer, 100,000 Austrians, 250,000 Russians, 70,000 Spaniards, and other contingents, would have entered France, which would have then contained not less thitt 1,500,000 foreign troops, combating in the cause of Europe . It had been doubted whether such a force could be brought to. gether without working its own destruction; bat the utmost attention bad been paid at Paris to introduce order among that immense nurnber of men. It was impossible, in the first instance, that at the arrival of • such a force, there should not have been just cause' of complaint in the districts invaded; but these were. chiefly occasioned by the disposition which the pea.' • sentry evinced to abandon their houses, and afford no accommodation. But after order had been intro duced, it was to the credit of the Allies that he did - lot recollect any mark of indiscipline. There was not an innance of a mass of 1,200,000 men being thrown into a country, with such general good Com . duet. They had Iced certai nl y at this expellee ef - Franee3 bestaltlseush thiltleelines might be exis ,l=7the in and desolati. , n of their own • they had constantly displayed a spirit of Mildness and commiseration towards the 'reach. — HO should 'new regret tbe t Lienersus policy. which had .dictated the peace of preeilin4 year. If when the Allies had arrived before Paris and con quered pate; when the whole French nation, as through an electric feeling, seemed ready to throw themselves into the arms of the victors, - and of their restored Monarch, exulting - at their liberation from' the tyrant by whom they fad b een so long opprese- 1 ed, an illiberal policy had been adopted towards An. naparte : if the tar had been continued, to seize and remove his perion, add; the war, as it would have done, had become a civil contest, he had no doubt . Ministers and the Allies would have been charged with attempting to dbud that horizon which appear ed then so ilong and se beautiful. It ought to be the character of a great confederacy of Powers to act on enlarged views. In their career they had only acted on such. In a confederacy which might be considered as the representative force of Europe, Once it put forth at once one million of men, scarcely any view of self interest, ambition, or spoliation, could be introduced that would not find its own corrective. It was. a Confederacy, Ponderibus Nbrata soh." In clositig the war of 1814, they had readily retired from hance, not only without taking any thing for themselves, but leaving her a greater extent of terri uiry than she possessed before the Revolution. He should continue to rejoice at such conduct, even though it had given rise to the subsequent war, be cause it had inspired the world with a Moral confi dence in t'.e moderation and justice of the great Eu ropean Powers. Any other course would, besides, have only served to protract an intestipe war. Bin after the second contest, it would have been childish ness in the confederacy to have indulged the libera lity of their feelings to the same extent. In examen. tog the question, he was desirous to meet what he rather supposed would be stated by an Honourable and Learned Gentleman, whom he did not now see in his place (Mr. Horner was understood), as a spe cies of plea and bar to the course adopted by Govern ment, that 66 we had no right to interfere with the internal concerns and government of France."— Mere were two mbJes of viewing that question : the , first, whether, on general principles, such an interfe rence could not be sustained ? the second related to the peculiar situation in which the British Govern ment stood, whether that did not debar it from the right of interfering ? He believed that it would be pressed by that Honourable Gentleman that we had abandoned the principle on which we should act, in meddling with the Government of France, and adop ted a course of unwise policy and error. He might defend the conduct of Government, by asking Wiw i/ter an independent State has not the right of mixing in the politics of another nation, and building its se curity upon the peculiar nature of its formation ? but he should first consider what had fallen from an Ho. asorable and Learned Gentleman on a f ormer n i g h t , hand whichhe had founded on a passage in a letter of Lord Clancarty, a supposition of indifference on the part of the British Government to the person who should reign in France. If the Honourable and Learned Gentleman had read that sentence in con utiction with the next to it, he would have certainly found that the abject of the oar was not to impose any particular form of goverommt upon Ft ranee.— But if we objected to Bonaparte on the ground of our own security, did it result from that, that we should be as indifferent to the restoration of an ami able and unfortunate Sovereign, as to the elevation of some other adventurer who might grow out of the army ? He denied that any meaning of that kind Could be wrested out of ooh political professions. He referred the House to our Declaration of May, on ratifying the Treaty of the 25th of March, in which, although we had stated that we should not consider the imposing of any particular Government upon France a sine qua 110 e, as a condition of peace, yet we distinctly expressed how desirous we should be to see the Bourbons restored. This was not a mark of in ; dtfference, but sheered, that although, on the certain exclusion of Bonaparte, we might have acknow ledged some other individual, yet we had a warm and decided preference in behalf of the King of France. That was the only avowed policy put in 'view in all our documents, and it was therefore in. credible that Lord Clancarty, writing on the 12th of May, in explanation of the Declaration issued on the 24th of April, in ratifying the Treaty of the 25th of March, should have written any thing in a different senses as, besides his own judgment, and abilities, that Nobleman was not without his instructions. He therefore asked the House to ermine the documents commencing with the Declaration of the Allies of the 13th of March, the Treaty of the 25th Of the same month, and our explanatory Declaration of the '24th of April, and it would be found, that to disc. vow the restoration of the Bourbons had never been our object. As an abstract question, he was ready , to acknowledge that nothing was more improper titan to interfere in the internal arrangements of other nations, or to be captious about. their modes of Government ; but would any Gentleman say that any State has felt itself so tied up as not to have the right of interfering in the conduct of foreign nations, when any one of tlxm attacked the security and esta blishments of the rest ? Certainly not I for this prin. ciple was as fully rectognized as any other great lead ing point of policy. There was no situation which more deeply involved the peace and security of states than that in which they were placed when there was any question about the right of succession to the throne, and when a civil contest arose as to whether the supreme power should remain in one family, or be transferred to Another'? If we were to try the question by the former practice of Europe, he appre. heeded we should not bear so many loose opinions' about the right of every people to change their form of government —a theory that has arisen out of the corrupted and jacobinized principles set afloat. by the horrible Drench Revolution. If we looked hack at the practice of this country, and referred to the best authorities, we. should find that the principle in ques. Lion was laid down and established by the Whigs themselves.--(Near, hear.) , —He meant the Whigs of earlier times, tram whose principles those of modern days had certainly swerved in no small degree. If we wanted a precedent for interfering in the Govern.- Melt Ot a foreign nation, respecting the lemon and . 111phOlding of its legitiateteAyesety. we had it Ili our country about a century ago.. TheTripli Alli ance was formed for this purpose on 1717. and in die following year another Power (Austria).acceded to it, and the object of it was to secure the Prot estant Dynasty on the British Throne. He would 'read a few words from that Treaty, which be apprehruded would prove a more pregnant precedent than Gentle men opposite would be disposed to admit. By the 7th Article of the Treaty of Alliance, it is expresdy stated, that if the Kings of any countries or provinces who joined the Alliance should be disturbed by into . tine quarrels or rebellions, on account of the sum sion, they should have a right to demand the succours of their Allies to assist in suppressing them. The same stirilatinn was made in regard to France iu the Treaty of Utrecht. These precedents fully tilled us in combining and interfering to put down that accursed military despotism in France which the Jacoleins and Whigs of modern times had sci strenu ously lent themselves to uphold. By the Quadruple Alliance, the contracting parties pledged themselves *to act against all persons whatever who should at tempt t 7 subvert :heir respective Governments. The precedent was additionally strong, when we found our own Mina looking particularly into their own situation, and malting two Treaties with the States-• General of the Netherlands to support our PIONS tam succession against all enemies whatever. It the modern notiens about a numerical majority of the country being against such ititerference, had pre vailed at that day, he imagined it would have been extremely di ffi cult to ascertain whether the majority of the people were in favour of the reigning dynasty or not. But it was deemed necessary to provide for the security of the nations by such strong and judi citrus treaties, in order to prevent renewed scenes of anarchy and rebellion, and it - was the honest W%lig principles of those days that led to and attained the object. By the Treaty signed at the Hague in 1709, the States-General of the United Provinces engaged to recognise the British succession, to assist the right ful heirs in taking possession of the throne, it thir had not already got it, and to oppose all who might resist them. The Whigs prided themselves in having stipulated in favour of the Princess Sophia of Ha.. nover ; and the Treaty of Utrecht 'expressly states, that no person has any right to call in question any arrangement made with Great Britain in this respect, or endeavour to oppose the right of succession of the Princess Sophia. 'Phis was a sufficient proof of the marked disonction between the principles of the an cient and mothen Whigs— a proof of the practice of the progenitors of these .of the present day. They denied the tight of nations to interfere, w ith a view to put &ova the despotism and anarchy of another, which disturbed their own happiness and repose, tb 'ugh this might he done on the broad ground of public security. But for one ambitious individual to interfere with the Governments of other nations, and that contrary to all the rights and interests of man kind, was perfectly within the pale of modern whig gism. Having now at least strewn what was in fa vour of the principle of interference, he had disem barrassed himself of that considerable feature of the argument that denied our tight to interfere; we had a right to take the henefit of the principle upon such broad grounds as existed for it in the late contest, or in fact on any occosios, provided we did not carry it too far, or misapply it. In order to establish the tact that we had done so, it was only necessary to examine whether the particular pore) , we bad adopted was consistent or inconsistent with the good faith between us and Louis XVlll,—whether the line we had fol lowed was a:onsistent with sound policy, or whether the dispositions of Great Britain to purchase the safety of Europe by such interposition was censura ble or praisewotthy. He was aware that extreme views would be taken of the question. Some Gentle men might say that we were tied up hand and foot in the late campaign, and had nothing to do but fol low the Treaty of the preceding year. This, how ever, he totally denied. The first question was, whe ther We were so bound by that Treaty as to have no option left to us at all, but to expel Bonaparte and to re-establish literati IN the Treaty of Peace of the pre ceding year. It was certainly true, that if we looked at the stipulations of the Treaty of the 25th March, they furnished very strong arguments in favour of this question; for the only view *the Allied Powers had at the time of framing it, was to defend France or any other countries against the invasion which Bo naparte attempted to .practise. His invasion of France was the cause of this Treaty ; and he (Lard Castlereagh) had no Imitation in saying, that if the King had been enabled to remain in France, and to repel the invader, the Treaty of the 25th of March would have bound us in good faith and honour to have made a Treaty of Peace, as to tenitotial ar rangements, the same as that of the preceding year. He would go a step further, and say, that it the King had been driven out of France by his rebellious • army, and had ceased to be, de facto. King of France, though he could not have ceased to be so, de jure ; if the nation had !isen against Bonaparte and los army, as the Dutch rose against the French, and replaced their King on the 'Throne, it would have been bad faith to have adopted any other policy than that of the Treat . ) , of Paris. But the Allies were opposed, not certainly by the whole weight of the nation, but by the whole power of the army ; for if it !rad been a question between the Allies and France, it would have been too much to presume that we should not have had a vast deal more to encounter. When, however, the people were so supine as to their os a rights, that they bad no confidence in themselves, and the state of things beinic such that the King found it necessary even to rastram the exertions of his friends, insomuch that the Loyalists of LaVendee were obliged up the cause before the war could be said to atb. an end, he would contend that the case im posed on the Allies the adoption of the course they ,had followed, in justice to their own subjects. They had deemed it necessary to require from the King a satisfaction in mitigation of the charges they had in ,curred„ and a precautionary security against the re currence of such an outrage in future. When the Treaty of the 25th of March was concluded, it was known that Bonaparte had made some progress, in Francs, but it was not known th at the King had' left Paris. No accession had taken place on the part of the King of France to this Treaty ; conse quently, if we looked at the diplomatic law, it would be acknowledged that it held the King of France un- 1 lee no obligation ;7htte,' on the other hand, them was within to preclude the Mies from wing in the manner they had thoudit pr per contendiatt in the same cause, audacious military authority in' assed the security of all the re; was necessary that we shr)ted interests at tbe King with those sores which we thought it proper of every other nation. The AV' from imposing those obligatiom the• King returned and resumed victories which the Allies hat' He would beg the licuse to I which France was at that tits; only by such a view that any been come to could be di cited first point was, what course of King of France himself, in 1,1 that country. He had suffered but the whole course of his co; tion had Manifested the spiri peace. The next topic was °lei branch et' nations, whrte eff iris and. thirdly. we had to tonsil' branch Of the French :mem, the eternal enemy of Europe, cessary to suppress, and effectu, there could be any peace that to, or al,' dynasty that could I e!an t mporary or insecure. theuglo, that if the army of . loved atorin, the present clyi.a, late Government of France w merit ; it was Wholly WM Patin aild led by. the erns', and obli, ell its open- scions. He kit tht now look for repose under the beets adep:ed, it was eniy by t. of time these operations, by di military three. Unless f r tit this leoly, jilt the miiitat y spin tinct, the peace celiol hot be . on which his Majesty's G mermen; of war or peace te billge, was army of the Aides France. solution of the army of lions taken place, he shoot.; think I the attention of that House, it avow that his tstiesty's G.; Louis XVIII. was at Ghent, diimental and positive prinei should be totally dissolve d been liable to the charge of resurrection of that army, if le mite extinction. But this ei and it only remiined I.‘r us time in its state of dissele;i.o posed it had ceaslel to esl.e, isted an parade, he knew well principles of Jacoonosm by wilted from the coneiteacette career. It was a ! , art at hi that it was distinctly scaled e that if he did not do th is act Allies would deem it their upon themselves ; and diet local authorities had net the do it, the Allies woald put %Nell they justly censichaed ; neral safety. IVe had cadet; this army, because We were pi till he could raise ani•thcr I; and well dispilse I pat e of his I not insisted on this effort bein; cation in sayiog, that we shot King into the power of liis The Noble Lord etnaissi,inF A merit of the military eniispir. served Viet he never had been duals who had depreciated would say, that if that arm' exist, it would have been whether Bonaparte were cons not have been difficult to fir have soon led it into its fount fore, was at issue, was, whet , again be betrayed and sectifici tism, as it formerly had beet mities that had grown out of arisen from that disordereJ st by the detestable principles (Heardaear.) If Bonaparte with more mod e ration, he tai fecied and established this de rity was the cause of'his dt that one of the lint acts he pi this despotism, was to order list of all the unman ied km, order that wives might be 10 In fact he omitted nothing to their lusts and avarice, that throne by their protection, ti again for war and desolation, with any teasonable man in dere that they had always tary system, as a tyram:y tr, wished to escape. In fact, would have perpetually kept The State was nothing mare in its hands, instead of its be; hands of the St4e. lie had ment of regret from aiiy Fret duct in France, except one," not push cur interference fi heard any complaint .t.,!air.st disposed to suopert Len s ag. the only complaint was, that our protection their Constiloi fee! ourselves authorised to 121 tee to . them. Having stated' in view, that et providing ter by the demoli:ion of the II( I followed, that what we bad inevitable. 13at wh , aevt. lity with which this gnat part of the !Miles w.,s elf,cte , to put sue a tine of viefitceive great moral distimtion. France, as' a na.ian, th a the . against France in a :evolutional military Jecobinisru which hi the civil Jacobins ; while in able engagemeots towards the to bleed our policy with a coot ation. 'there was a broad 1 man could mistake. It we / suppose that the gassuun t g ! a te t rocno3t FEioarnloti ti those w . to nn cause, to pu t . 1 ." 4 1t . it Yi Fran ce, w h ' • d comh; ne t i e ; r stion,„ proper to take I tL,' to Aries wen n :sumrd his an hers free •.t pr;Ley 'es'enit.edt:::`;:s'l.fatl:;',l6it't,, PC s had so bein,„ lo °l 4 in his ;e right of Viotti ~r te . l4 '. fi ifFered farm th e LA nit comluct af.er :irit of t c fr g o s e s tr c eff : :6"; ci t . fleet r d :ens, wliich wa s trope, and w'ai,h it M 11%7 'that ti e cottrotycouli. ould b, consid tm 4 - et ore. IL c , uld L 7 of Jac. bin, of Fr uy.•a•ty cote.' si l k - nee was entii ay impelled, d obliged to itaswerut clt that 1 ,„ • ~r the !man 4entrotsthit ••• y by sezonding f tna , by the presence pi a r t• • Ale un t o:0 10R att k o y spirit of jaciit.mi on , - • at be secure. The p• • iverment hit the was the ciintiiitiane t i mice. But respeetin g ,h t . ' 13tionpitte, which 1 4! think hirncelf Ise, it I.e : I; . :et pre ,. • 3 • s Lint, .a tit. bent, I iJ is dow t i Al c princi:ite, that d iat Iv( d ; a.id he should tcctwxy4 y, if he h ,d met insiLtrd q his giaild point win • .'r us to watch over i t 14 tic loin ; frr if any site riot, U:'Citulie it noltsrr ah 3 by vita.. h it' had b ctk acement of its din ot his justiticatioa to led . to Louis . act of justice ni Emi t , their duty to take dig timt on a given dab t t h e pewer r inclionita put Nue, a 1•. tied incouse,: , :nt pltbQt ailed or. the K ; ng MCI prep.ir,...l t o rant her Ito:n anton,lll4 it his übj-c4; t being mt.le, he :Was,. e sliotnd bate trepaakii Lis enemies. (ties, 1. mg Jo dei.c.et on 1. et : otsioirato:s t . f.! ad been one ot the 6, inted his alliiitles.-he army bad been suieni been perfectly' unt :confined or not, for it • to find a chits who former career. What, , wheti.er the world acrificed to a military • I been, atter see ng the on of it. This depotiso reJ state ot the world, !ples ot modern pbtiosc • pare had conducted he might in time bat • this despotism ; but los • his drswt,fall. it woe he performed to iitfi •‘ seder the esefects to - I ft.'s:l,l4.sta their district be fouzicl for his sthittw ring that could be •• !, that be might maintait on, till the time came lation. He had never o in Fcattee, wqr, did tit -ayes looked at tL it ova t:y :rout t4/I:ich they - . 4 fact, it se is .1 monger kei.t ail Earape is mare than ,t mere ~ I • its being an instrumeoli fe 15a..1 never heard y Frenchman, as toot . , one, which side, O W" !re farther. He had i.,tair,st the tot s s against the Jacobin , that we did not take nstinstinn t wliscli we did to lat.:dere with and tated thesund tibial 5 3 ig Int the IL Lupcy Ee:i by Jacobin ni ra, • it tuts: had done w.:.;; , . 4 tiobk rti I);igilt h4Lt: t, '0 ihr r,iat course of Fl:cy li , cted, it u .5 neceswit dive p.,fi c y, b e t 10 fiats 1, that it was 1. 01 t the Allies were at seat, 4utionary scii.e—again g tic , ' h. . 1 L. g iven its un Le in Ll:e staiit of outlive :ds the fie weir 0 4 a muse o: personal :0 road bac of policy rii•!•" we had bidicied W Wits W Fr•w c , i e babel' s he Sl'".l . ..