The Press. — London, England, 1855-12-29 00:00:00

232 Local influence, local skill, and local money, will, we doubt not, amply provide for 'the erection and the maintenance of such reforma tory institutions as the locality requires. The part of the Government may then be limited to a general supervision, with an occasional transmission of such information and advice as the experience accruing from various quar ters may enable the Home Secretary to dis tribute for the common advantage. ASIA MINOR. Tna English, it is said, always require a little beating at the coi of a war, just to excite their energies—as a swordsman who despises his opponent comes off all the better for a slight flesh wound at first that puts him on his mettle. It will be some compensation for our recent miscarriages in Asia Minor if they produce a similar effect upon the public mind, and arouse us to a sense of the real importance of our operations in that quarter which we have hitherto regarded with comparative indif• ference. The two leading points which ought ever to be borne in mind in our consideration of this subject, are these :—First, that there is no Asiatic Power capable by itself of resisting Russia ; and, secondly, that her aggressions on Asiatic Powers lie beyond the ken of European statesmen, and are pushed on with a secrecy and impunity that in Europe would be impossible. It is a question, indeed, if even Turkey and Persia united could resist the whole weight of the Muscovite empire. But the presence of a Western army in Asia, which is the only event that could accomplish such a union, would also give it a solidity and a permanence, against whicn the might of Russia would dash Itself in vain. But in the meantime she advances slowly but steadily—fighting her way both by steel and by gild—and keeping her eye fixed with native tenacity on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and the treasures of our Indian empire. South of the Caucasus there is in reality no barrier against the accomplishment of these cherished visions. And it may well be that Russian statecraft has long ago seen the advantages to be derived from her aggression on the shores of the Black Sea, in the shape of a blind to her aggressions on the shores of the Caspian. But there is another obvious argument in favour of pressing on the war in Georgia ; which is this— that it is there only that auy real and permanent blow can be inflicted upon Russian power. We may in Europe repress her encroachments, but we cannot carry the war into her own country, or deprive her of any of her present possessions. Such notions are, at least, exceedingly chimerical. The only two countries that it is thought possible to dissever from her empire are Poland and Finland. But the former is now thoroughly incorporated ; and the reports of travellers on the sentiments of the Poles are con firmed by actual observations on the present war. There are few or no Polish deserters ; and the officer who wished to blow up Kinburn, in preference to surrender, was a Pole. On the other hand, Finland has been treated with singular kindness and con sideration by Russia, as being the principal nursery of her seamen; while she has recently sustained such severe injuries at the hands of the allies as will, in all probability, attach her still more to her present masters. The reverse of all this is the case in Mingrelia and Georgia. The inhabitants are burning to throw off the yoke of Russia; and a campaign that would wrest the Ti provinces from her grasp, and inflict an irreparable loss on her material power, as well as her prestige in the East, would, in all probability, cost the Allies less than one-fourth of what it would cost them to con quer the Crimea, which would inflict little loss upon either. It is most unfortunate that these truths were not earlier understood by English statesmen. They have defended Turkey all along as if they really be lieved it was no use to defend her; and that all that could be done was to prevent Russia from appro priating her European provinces. The Turks have been kept in leading strings. When they offered last spring to send a fleet and army to Circassia, which must have given a totally different turn to the Asiatic war, they were not trusted to do so. If we vote them money we superintend its expenditure, as if they were children ; and the next thing to be done will be to despatch an English tailor to make the Sultan's clothes, and send in the bill to us. This sort of thing will never do. We must treat them as men and as equals ; and in that case we shall have no reason to complain of their conduct. A large Turkish army, °filtered by Englishmen, would soon become as effective an engine as the Portuguese army under WELLINGTON. Our coun trymen seem able to perform this particular duty with greater success than the French ; and a force of this description, sent early next spring to co operate with OMER PACRA, would very soon, unless the deplorable mismanagement of our War•office is to continue, change the face of events in Asia. THE PRESS. NECESSITY OF A CONGRESS FOR PACIFYING EUROPE. BY A STATESMAN , [The following is the text of the pamphlet which has milted so much sensation in Paris. J Paris, Dec. 20. Accoantwo as the probabilities of a pacific solution assume greater consiEtency, certain organs of the English press are endeavouring by iirritating articles to endanger the effect of the sage resolutions and of the calm attitude of the allied Governments. In misrepresenting the form and the character of a document which it is the duty of the official parties to keep secret, a risk is run of offending the power which Europe has applied to for concessions, when the interest of all is to facilitate the success of the proceeding now entered on. It would be senseless to suppose that any statesman of Great Britain can behold otherwise than with the deepest regret this inconsiderate line of tactics. In the plans of arrangement now in course of negotia- tion, no one has any idea of humiliating Russia, or depre ciating the just share of influence and authority which she is called on to preserve in the councils of Europe. France and England have united together for a just war, not only because it was a just one, but because their own history proved to Russia that she could yield without dishonour. Do England and France find themselves lowered or humiliated by the obligation in which they were placed, the first to recognise the independence of the United States, and the second to renounce the conquests of the Republic and of the Empire ? The result of the present struggle proves the contrary. Yet both tin se concessions were wrested from them by force of arms. It was France who constrained England to abandon her colonies in North America, and it was England who, in a greater degree than any other nation, contributed to detach from the French ten itory Belgium and the Rhenish provinces; and yet France and England are at present closely united. Proud of their new destinies, they assuredly have a right to proclaim that, in making at present the aserifice of a policy incompatible with the peace of the world, Russia cannot decline in public estimation, but that, on the con trary, she must increase in the confidence and esteem of Europe, and perhaps prepare herself for a not distant future of new and precious alliances. In that situation, the duty of the statesman is to seek out under what form, and in what circumstances, the ac• quiescence of Russia will best he reconciled with the dignity of a sovereign who, the day on which he will have signed peace, will find in his enemies of the day before nothing else than brothers. Since the Congress of Vienna, five peat powers have governed Europe with common accord. Today, three of these powers are at war, ant the spontaneous intervention of the remaining two, either in an isolated manner, or in conferences, fails to reconcile them. Is it, then, surprising that the ordinary proceedings are insufficient to terminate a conflict of so novel a nature ? One hundred and twenty millions of men are engaged in the struggle. On one side they are dying for their faith, on the other for justice. Thousands of cannon are thun dering after forty years' peace; four thousand millions of francs have been consumed in less than fifteen months, and Europe awaits from this last holocaust of blood and gold a peace which shall have no end. Such is the present war ! When interests so noble and gigantic are at stake, can there be any chance of reconciling the belligerent parties otherwise than by a congress ? And is not that measure justified, moreover, by the incontestable fact, that at the sole announcement of the convocation of a congress the different populations would consider peace concluded ? And why is this anticipated confidence? It is because nobody is ignorant that the sole difficulty is to find a con clusion worthy of the struggle, and that after the fall of Sebastopol and the destruction of the Black Sea feet, peace became possible. In fact, a new position was created by this event, and it was pointed out with clearness in the ad dress delivered by Napoleon 111, to the exhibitors, and in the official papers of his diplomacy. As long as a decisive success had not been obtained, the allies could only think of increasing their forces on the field of battle. In pursuing, at the price of enormous sacrifices, a result which would turn to the advantage of all, they could not admit that neutrality had a useful mis sion to fulfil. But as England, France, Turkey, and Sar dinia had sufficed for the task, and as the proposed aim was attained, the position of neutrals could be looked at in a more favorable SATURDAY, It was then that the Emperor, making a solemn appeal to the pressure of public opinion with the view of termi nating the war, exclaimed--" Let Europe decide and de clare who is in the right and who is in the wrong, for that will be a grand step towards a solution." He proclaimed with conviction and truth that, in the present epoeh of civilisation, the success of armies id but temporary, and that definitively it is " public opinion that carries away the last victory." Thus, in the thoughts of the allied Governments, the last victory will be the conclusion of a peace. And it is public opinion in Europe which will have the merit and the honour, provided it interferes in the negotiations, assists at their various phases, and officially pronounces on all the minor difficulties which may issue from the discussions. A congress can alone offer the opportunity of doing this. The readiness with which the secondary States have replied to the invitation of the Emperor of the French proves that Europe is prepared for that great spectacle. Whilst Sweden was engaging herself by a treaty, the Governments of Central Europe, of the first, second, and even of the third order, were addressing to the Coprt of Russia friendly representations, by no means commina tory, but expressing in the clearest manner the necessity of making concessions which would guarantee to the Western powers the fact that the object of the war was really acquired. At the same time each of them informed France and England of the steps which it had taken, and invited them to receive with moderation the propositions that Russia might make. The majority of the sovereign Courts are consequently co-operating at this moment in the negotiations. But their co-operation is isolated, non official, and without force. Theirs are local opinions, and disjointed ; it is not the general opinion of Europe which they express. 10,1 In order that the general opinion be rendered useful and imposing, that it may carry away that last victory which shall definitively endow the world with peace from the fact that it will leave behind it neither victors nor van quished, it must necessarily be manifested 'solemnly, in an assembly of the representatives of all the States, where various modes of thinking may be conformed in one ides, and where the will of all may hare but one voice. In a coupes', Europe will be represented and per. sonitied. Ambitions will be restrained and men's minds re vivified; above all, over the powers will be suspended a supreme authority, which will ennoble the sacrifices, give to moderation the character of magnanimity, impose a salutary restraint on religious or national exigencies, over•excited by the contest, and render to each Govern ment a perfect liberty of action with respect to its subjects. It would be most desirable were the idea of a congress to proceed from Russia, and if, taking into consideration as a basis of negotiations the propositions carried to St. Petersburg by Count Esterhazy, she were to propose to deliberate on them not only in a simple conference, but in an assembly of all the sovereigns, and after solemn In: sincere declarations on the origin, the character, an.' results of the contest. Stich an overture would be a more certain in of the pacific dispositions of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg than a pure and simple acceptance of an ultimatum which might have no other aim than to retard the recal of the Austrian ambassador. It will be remembered that a simi lar acceptance preceded the first conferences at Vienna, and did not prevent their failure. If Russia were boldly to adopt this step, her language would have a character of frankness and of grandeur, which, in freeing her diploma tiste for ever from the reproach of duplicity, would mate rially facilitate the conclusion of peace. It is only necessary to open contemporaneous history to comprehend that Alexander 11. may eater on this path without humiliating Russia; and if he considers the much greater sacrifices which the other powers have been com pelled to make for the progress of civilisation, he will bless God for having reserved to his people, in a similar crisis, a privileged position. When the hour of American inde pendence sounded, England had no idea that the annihila tion of her old colonial policy was for her commerce and her navy the germ of an unlimited development. At the moment when coalesced Europe made Napoleonian France violently return within the limits of the old monarchy, no one could foresee that the resuscitated empire would find in the renunciation of her conquests the means of extend ing over the free States of Europe an influence more powerful than that of Louis XIV. or of Napoleon I. It has been necessary that the national honour of the two countries should suffer nearly half a century of humi liations before they could clearly see into their new desti. nies and frankly resign themselves, one to the loss of her North American possessions, and the other of the con• vests of the Republic and the Empire.