The Press. — London, England, 1855-10-20 00:00:00

_. _ ,_____ , . --"--: --•••?-,—."-•-•--- -, • - , -...cnt-e7vrf•-e.-- -, ---:.- -• .. ' .7-4-577.71517^W;77-7!frrw"'''"7"-r—"'"lrrlcirrir— ._ . 6: 0) ,e... i e. : 1 e t., , , . . /. - f . . . . .. . . .. . , ... 7 : f; / 1 57 "--"...' ,t 1 lort6l, t No. 129.—V0L. 111. LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20 , 1855. UNSTAMP STAM ... SIXPENCE. PED IV ED..FEPENCE. Cke tress. For these reasons we resist those wild appeals which would give to the war a new character, stimulate revengeful and implacable sentiments, and render terms of accommoda tion impracticable. The definite objects to be achieved ought never to be lost sight of; nor should we cease to connect the idea of peace with their realisation. We are totally opposed to either a " war of principles," or a war of dismemberment. We cannot afford to waste our strength in any such enterprise. The country would have cause to curse the hour in which it was undertaken, and all follies of past time would seem acts of wisdom in comparison with the madness which en gaged in such desperate and chimerical designs. The main objects of the war are still, as they were, to secure the Integrity of the Turkish Empire, the Freedom of the Danube, and the Independence of the Black Sea. The reduction of Russia is not essential to these objects. . They are to be attained by arrange ment. When they have become settled prin ciples of European policy, all Europe will have an interest in maintaining them. The same means which have prevented France frorri extending her empire to the Rhine, and from absorbing the Low Countries, will surely be efficient to restrain the encroachment of Russia. Unfortunately, the limit of her terri tory to the South has never yet been arranged in concert with other Powers of Europe. This defect has now to be rectified ; and it would add to the security of any future peace, could some plan he devised at the same time of defining her frontier to the East. It is entirely foreign to the purposes of the war to interfere with her internal government, to check the development of her resources, or to impede the development of her prosperity. If her great advantages of territory and popu lation be well employed, they will be advan tages to the whole world. Let her frankly come forward (abjuring all intent of future aggression) to take part in arrangements which will define her position in the South, and remove all pretexts for future quarrel, and she will find, we venture to say, a party in this country sufficiently strong to overrule the senseless clamour for a war of extremity, and to support terms which, as far as human skill and prudence may provide, would insure to the Allies an advantageous and lasting peace. Such a peace could not be otherwise than humiliating to Russia. The terms she has already acceded to at the Vienna Conference were humiliating. But have not other great nations recognised the force of circumstances, and signed treaties which bore on their face an acknowledgment of defeat, but which in no degree prevented those Powers from again becoming great and glorious England was humiliated by the peace which she concluded with France, recognising the independence of her American colonies ; and France was humiliated by the treaty of 1815. But where is their humiliation now, and where the jealousy they have so often entertained of each other's power? The attack of Russia on Turkey was grossly aggressive. It has been beaten back and severely chastised. With the removal of the causes of war the war itself should cease. Some period there must always be in every war when peace is felt to be practicable, or wars would he eternal. Has not such a period now arrived? Sebastopol has fallen the Euxine fleet has been destroyed—the coasts of Russia, both in the Black Sea and in the Baltic, have been ravaged almost unresistingly by the allied navies—and the powerlessness of Russian arms for aggressive warfare has been decisively established. It is remarkable that up to this time Turkish troops alone have sufficed to heat back the aggressive movements of her foe. On the Danube, at Silistria, and now at Kars, the Russian forces have had their most desperate efforts deci sively defeated by Ottoman troops. Can it be doubted that, firmly allied to the Powers of Europe, and backed with their support, Turkey would maintain her ground against any future attack of Russia, should she ever again be so ill-advised as to make the attempt? Can Russia, after what has passed, doubt the firmness and power of the Allies—their resolution to succeed in their objects—or the good faith which unites them? From first to last the war has been for her only a series of severe defeats, for the Allies a series of glorious successes, in which their constancy has surpassed even their valour. What better ground of pacification can future campaigns, however bloody and expensive, give than exists at the present moment? It is evident that members of the Democratic party in this country perceive the probability of peace, and arc making desperate efforts to avert it. They are mistaken as to the extent of their influence, though aided by those war interests which are rapidly growing up and thriving on the profuse expenditure of the Government. The country understands that it has, and can have, nothing to gain from tho war but a satisfactory settlement of the Eastern question ; and should such settle ment become practicable, we do not for a mo ment doubt what the choice of the nation will be when the question comes fairly before it of CONSERVATIVE PEACE Or DEMOCRATIC WAR. LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1855. Thosz persons who suppose that discussion on tho Policy of the War is out of place at the present time, take a very short-sighted view of the question. It is true that for the present we must be content to carry on hostilities with our utmost strength, to attack the enemy on every vulnerable point, to make him feel as severely as possible the calamities of war, and convince him by dreadful experience that those calamities will gather round him thicker, and deepen in intensity, as hostilities con tinue. But for what purpose is all this ? Shall we make war for the sake of war, or for the sake of peace ? If our aim be conquest, or the annihilation of our foe, it might be wise to pursue our end irrespective of every other consideration ; but if our aim be a solid and satisfactory Peace, it can never be amiss to discuss the terms on which it may be con cluded. There are two ways in which we may sup pose that public opinion in this country will directly influence the character and duration of the war. It will act in the first place on the temper of the Russian people and the policy of its Government ; and in the second place it will influence the conduct of our Administration almost to the extent of pre scribing the course it shall pursue. We cannot force Russia to a pacific dis position, but we can avoid embittering the contest by heaping contumelious epithets upon her, and by declaring that we will be satisfied with nothing short of her destruc tion. Our arm will not be the less strong because our head is cool, nor our will the less firm because we see distinctly the objects we contend for. If Russia understands that conciliatory ad vances on her side will be met with insulting triumph or churlish rejection, it is very un likely that she will be induced to make them. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to strike at her heart. When we have ravaged her coasts, and occupied some points of her territory, she will yet retain enormous power of resistance. Taunts will be met by taunts, and defiance by defiance. It is only by de fining the objects of the war, and by showing that we desire, not the annihilation of our enemy, but conditions essential to the peace and prosperity of all nations, that we can expect Russia to come forward and frankly accept terms which would fulfil those con ditions. We cannot invite, but is it necessary to repel her? Shall our political attitude be moderate or furious—temperate or frenzied ? Still more direct is the influence which opinion must exercise on our own Govern ment. The national will is not to be resisted; when fairly expressed, it must dictate the policy to be pursued. No peace will be possible if the word be unacceptable to the country, and if the Minister believes that he can strengthen his position by identifying himself with a reckless prosecution of hostilities. MR. GLADSTONE'S POSITION. Fon some time past the public has missed Mr. CiLtnsToNE's name from our political dis• cussions, except when it was seized hold of by persons interested in the propagation of sinis• ter rimours. In an odd address, delivered in an out•of--the-way place, the Right Honourable Gentleman has reminded the world this week of his personal existence, as well as of his political isolation amidst the conflicting par ties of the day. His speech was as stu diously retrospective and as elaborately un practical as if it were meant for a circuitous method of saying " Fuit Gladstonius." It is, indeed, impossible for any Conserva tive who recollects the promise of Mr. GLAD STONE'S early career to contemplate his present position without feelings of pain, Never did any man in our recollection, with station, ex perience, and eloquence, fall into such com plete political impotence as the gifted casuist and ineffective statesman who sits for Oxford University. Apparently taking pleasure in puzzling others, he has ended in be wildering himself. A jury selected impartially, would find a verdict as to what opinions. He is perpetuall , state ; what his next iL defies the computations . observers. He has infinite ui7 of M P.'s, selected it impossible to • •••• are Mr. cl.)!Axosli• _,,irsiii etually in 8. citilysalAit 2 p . 1 2- levelopmen i t.msz pthr44 , ,;" - -,;'"? iof the Ind"; seas s tiaa:. ;,1 , 1 ..- site talent 'At-• ~ • .... :I 'l, • jilp• - - • 1 \I °i t 3 • . Li -; -cININ I ,-