The Press. — London, England, 1856-05-17 00:00:00

462 As soon as the fleet carrying the 25,000 men of the army of reserve was sighted, orders would be signalled to it to convey them to Aloushta, at a place on the coast previously selected for a disembarkation. Three thousand men would be in readiness to disembark the first, and would establish themselves three leagues from Aloushta, beyond the defile of Ayen. The remainder of the troops would remain on board until cavalry brought intelligence of the occupation of the defile. The report on this head being favorable, the advance guard would take up a good position beyond the defile, and, having intrenched itself, await there the army. The remainder of the 25,000 men would then disembark on the Aloushta coast, while, on their side, the 40,000 men assembled at Baidar would receive orders to pass along the high road which borders the sea by Yalta. In three days (two days, that is, after the disembarkation at Aloushta) the 40000 men from Balder would unite with the 25,000 under the walls of Simferopol. This town would be taken possession of, and a sufficient garrison left there, or a good position would be taken up on the road leading thereto, thus covering the rear of our army. One of two things would now happen. Either the Rus sian army before Sebastopol would abandon that formidable position to attack our army, advancing from the side of Baktchi-Serai (and in this case the first army of operation, under the orders of Lord Raglan, would press hard upon it, and possess itself of the position of Inkermaun), or else the Russians would await in their lines the advent of the army from Simferopol. In this case the latter, advancing from Baktchi•Serai on Sebastopol (resting its left upon the mountains), would effect a junction with the army of Marshal Raglan, which, advancing from Baidar upon Aloat, would repulse the enemy's forces, and drive them iuto Sebastopol or into the sea. This plan, in my view, has immense advantages. First, the army, as far as Simferopol (which is only nine leagues from Aloushta), would always be in communica tion with the sea; it would traverse an exceedingly healthy country, where there is the best waters in the Crimea; its rear would always be protected ; it would occupy hilly districts, where our deficiency in cavalry would be less felt; lastly, it would come suddenly on the Russian line of operations and cut off their provisions, probably also seizing their reserve artillery. If the Ayen defile, which would be indispensable to the success of the plan, were so fortified that it could not be taken, the re connoitring party of 3,000 men which was sent to seize it would immediately re-embark ; the army of reserve would disembark at Balaklava, and the meditated diversion at Simferopol would be made by way of Baidar, but under much leas advantageous circumstances. As to the march of the 40,00:1 men from Baidar to Aloushta, I believe it might be effected without danger, since the army would be protected by mountains, all but impassable, and the Rus sians would be at a disunce. Our army might be accom panied throughout almost the whole length of the coast road by steamers, to take up the sick.t If, on the contrary, a diversion from Eupatoria were proposed, my opinion is that nothing would be more dangerous, nothing more opposed to the rules of war and the counsels of prudence. By operating from Eupatoria you would place yourself in au unhealthy region, open and almost destitute of water, a territory where the Russian cavalry, which is very numerous, would have every chance of success ; you would undertake a march of six leagues before an enemy, who might come either from the north or the south, fall on your columns, and completely cut off your retreat. No natural obstacle offers itself to support your wings. To march from Eupatoria to Simferopol you must drag after you all the victuals and all the munitions of the troops, for, when once the army had left Eupatoria, the 15,000 Russians who surround it to-day, and who are for the most part cavalry, would harass its rear, and hinder the arrival of all kinds of convoys. If it were opposed at Simferopol, and if the Russian army during this time should, by a change of front, place itself a cheval on the road which it has traverses, your army would be either annihilated or famished. Besides, it is an absolute prin ciple that a flank march is only possible when distant from the enemy, and protected by the natural features of the country. . _ An - army operating from Eupatoria or Simferopol would have neither line of operations, nor secure flanking, nor retreat, nor favorable field of battle, nor means of provisioning itself. In addition to which, in place of being compact. composed of soldiers of the same nation, commanded by a single chief, it would be f.)rined in a great measure of Turks; and as these must be atilt(' with other troops, there would be neither unity, security, nor absolute confidence. If, instead of marching on Simferopol, the army from Eupatoria should march direct on Sebastopol, it would have to recommence under unfavorable circumstances the campaign which we began when we disembarked in the Crimea. It must carry the formidable positions of the Alma, the Katscha, and the Belbeck. This enterprise is out of the question, for it would be disastrous. Hence the necessity of leaving at Eupatoria only that number of Turks deemed indispensable for the defence of the place. Such is the plan which I should execute at the head of the brave troops which you have hitherto commanded; and it is with the profoundest grief that the most serious interests command my continued presence in Europe. The Baron de Bazancourt then gives the reasons why the Imperial plan of the campaign was not fol lowed out. First, was the want of a generalissimo holding the supreme command : : On the other hand, the Minister of War would have collected at Constantinople rations of meat, ammunition &c., in the most portable form, co that the soldiers might march with the least possible encumbrance. still carrying with them a supply for eight days, besides a shirt an 1 a capofr. The corps-d'arm be of reserve woull carry in the steamers rations for 60,000 men for eight days. The waggons, which would follow the army from Balder, would carry an equal quantity, so that the 60,000 men would be provisioned for sixteen days certain. Besides, once at Simfero. pol. the waggons might victual the army from Atonable. THE PRESS, Before the terrible and doubtful hazards of a general assault—before the perpetual menaces of the north of the town, which we could not comprise within our attack, and after so many disappointments, and so many unforeseen and contrary events, General Canrobert attached to the projected operation an importance so capital that he did not hesitate to sacrifice himself to what he regarded as the great demand of the situation. To arrive promptly at a happy result, remove difficulties, and reduce obstacles, he offered under these circumstances to give up the chief command to Lord Raglan, and, further, begged of Omer Pacha to accept his lordship's superior orders. Lord Raglan was at first astonished at this proposal, for it was an act of such self-sacrifice to the common cause as the most exalted characters often find difficult. Moreover, it involved a heavy responsibility, the sudden weight of which, perhaps, dismayed the English general. He at first refused, then wavered, then at length accepted, and afterwards called for French troops to occupy and defend the English trenches. This request General Canrobert refused, and from that time Baron de Bazancourt states there was no means of coming to an understanding between the two generals:— The first blow which fell on the cordial understanding between the English and French Commanders•in•Chief had been the recal of the Kertch expedition ; the refusal of Lord Raglan to cooperate in the plan of attack pro posed by General Canrobert was the last. In consequence of this refusal, the situation of the French general became untenable as respected both the forces he commanded and the commander of the English army General Csnrobert's determination was soon made ; and we are told he resolved on resignation. On the 16th of May he telegraphed to the Minister of War, demanding to be superseded, and assigning the state of his health as the ground of the application. To the Emperor he explained the real reasons of his desire to be superseded : The relative want of effect produced upon Sebastopol by the numerous and excellent batteries of the allies ; the absence of any attack on our outer lines by the enemy—an attack which seemed very probable, and front which I had promised myself a success not less important than that of Inkermann ; the serious difficulties which I have lately experienced in preparing the execution of your Majesty's plan of campaign, rendered almost impossible by the non co-operation of the chief of the English army ; the very false position in which the sudden recal of the Kertch ex pedition has placed me towards the English, who, as I have since learned, attached the highest importance to that undertaking ; the exceptional moral and physical fatigues to which for nine months I have been subjected— all these reasons, Sire, have wrought in my mind the con viction that I should no longer direct as chief the immense army whose esteem, affection, and confidence, I have been able to conquer. An account is then given, rather theatrical in effect, of General Canrobert resigning his command into the hands of Pelissier, who, of course, " wept," em braced his ex chief, and retired to meditate upon his position. THE CRIMEAN INQUIRY. THE board of general officers reassembled at Chelsea Hospital for the twentieth time on Wednesday. The Judge Advocate, at the opening of the pro ceedings (addressing General Airey), stated that a summons had been sent to Sir J. M'Neill to attend, and the fullowing reply had been received . Granton-house, Edinburgh, May 10, BM. Sir,—Tn reply to your letter of the Nth, requesting me to attend on Wednesday the 14th instant, at eleven o'clock a.m., in the Great Hall at Chelsea, for the purpose of being examined as a witness, I have to inform you that I am too unwell to be able to attend at that time. But although the state of my health precludes the possi- bility of complying with the request contained in your letter of the Bth, or with the suggestion contained in your letter of the 6th, I think it right, with all possible respect for the board, to add that, even if that obstacle had not existed, I could not have agreed to depart from the course 1 have hitherto taken, in the absence of any authoritative information, more definite than I have yet received, as to the precise objects and the scope of the proceedings going on at Chelsea, and as to the position occupied or expected to be occupied, relatively to the hoard and to each other, by the persons who have offered or have been invited to appear in these proceedings ; and especially whether the proceedings are intended to bear upon the manner in which the members of the late commission of inquiry in the Crimea, of whom I was one, discharged their duties; and if so, in what respect, and particularly, and to what effect—l have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient servant, JOIM M'NEn.L. The Right Non. C. P. Villiers, Judge Advocate General. The Judge Advocate also stated that. Colonel Tulloch was still too unwell to attend. The Judge Advocate then said that an impression had got abroad, owing to an expression used by him, that General Airey had conducted himself disrespectfully towards Colonel Tulloch. Nothing was further from his intention than to convey such an expression, as General Airey had conducted himself towards Col. Tulloch with all possible consideration. Sir Richard Airey disclaimed all intention of dis respect towards Colonel Tulloch. Colonel Wetherall and Captain Derriman were then briefly examined as to whether materials or SATURDAY, artificers could have been easily obtained from Con stantinople. Colonel Wetherall stated that, with respect to canvas, the Turkish Government undertook to supply sufficient of that article for the construction of 200 hospital marquees ; but in a week or two they wrote to say that they could get no canvas whatever, either from the arsenals at Constantinople or from private hands, and they begged th at cotton might be taken as a substitute. He then wanted canvas for some pontoons, but none could be got. Captain Derriman found it impossible to obt a i n any artificers himself, but applied to Lord Stratford, and through his means, early in February, procured forty-nine : These carpenters were wholly employed in the erection of huts. The ships' crews were employed in buildirg wharfs, in landing stores and provisions, and in the boat duties of the harbour. Not a man was unemployed whose services could possibly be made available. It was his opinion, as a naval man, that as many of the crews of mei. chantmen were landed and engaged in service ashore as could possibly be spared. Had tried to procure CIIIIV:13 Constantinople for the use of the ship he commanded, but found it impossible to get any. Sir Richard Airey then proceeded to sum up his case, and declared his conviction that the animad versions in the commissioners' report in connection with himself had been fully disposed of. Those ani madversions resolved themselves into two:— First, a supposed want of ingenuity in providing shel ter for the horses ; and, secondly, a supposed want of good management in the issue department. With regard to the question of shelter, it was now quite evident that the mortality among the horses had arisen, not from want of shelter, but from want of forage, while it was also plain, from the evidence of Admiral Dundas, Sir E. Lyons, and others, that the canvas suggested to be used by the com missioners could not have been procured. Engineer officers had shown that temporary shelter for the horses, formed by means of canvas, would have required a far stronger framework to support it than a wooden structure. The horses (or rather the baggage animals, as the com missioners called them) belonging to the Sappers and Miners had turned out to be oxen and mules, stabled be tween walls at Balaklava, and tolerably well covered in by an sail stretched from wall to wall. In the village of Mak shelter was possible, but on the heights of Kadikoi it was utterly out of the question. With mgard to the issue department, he (General Airey) had shown how destitute the quartermaster general's department was of all the machinery necessary to issue stores to an army. Why it was so destitute was simply because the issue was no part of the quartermaster's duty—he had only to look to the apportionment. Remarking how sincerely he regretted the illness of Colonel Tulloch, which had deprived the board of the :slue of his assistance, General Airey said he could quite understand how anxiety and mental labour had contributed to that indisposition, for be had known lately from personal experience how heavy was the labour of those engaged—night and day—in the ungrateful duty of justifying their con duct to the country. After an interval of a few minutes, during which the board adjourned, the case of Colonel Gordon, Assistant Quartermaster• General, was proceeded wit/. Colonel Gordon commenced by calling attention to discrepancies existing between the notes of his evi. dence, as furnished by Colonel Tulloch, and the ori ginal notes taken in his presence, which he had never seen until they were produced by Colonel Tulloch at the desire of the court, and then proceeded with his statement, confining his remarks to the paragraphs of the report, in the first of which the commissioners have misrepresented his evidence upon the non-issue of knapsacks, for which he now assigned what he conceived to be sufficient reasons—viz., that the com manders of regiments were generally disinclined to receive the knapsacks at the moment of an expected assault upon Sebastopol; and in the second of which he was made to assign, as a reason for the non-issue of supplies, that the men already had enough. The accuracy of this statement he unequivocally denied, for the real reason assigned by him for the non-issue of greatcoats, blankets, and rugs was, there was not a sufficient number in store to admit of such an issue. In conclusion, he stated that he did not intend to trouble the court with any witnesses. II In reply to the Judge Advocate, Colonel Gordon stated that Sir J. M'Neill acted• as principal commissioner in the Crimea, and Colonel TuHoch as his secretary, writing down or striking out answers just as Sir J. M'Neill directed him. The court then adjourned until Thursday, when the case of Mr. Filder was proceeded with. The Judge Advocate read a letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, stating that he did not think it necessary to attend. Mr. Filder proceeded with his statement, which he said was rendered necessary by certain genera l animadversions cast upnn him in the report of Colonel Tulloch and Sir J. M' Bill He was charged with supplying the troops with expea• sive, and at the same time unhealthy food, and with a general want of energy and aptitude in supplying t he army with necessaries. In reply to these charges he had to urge that any deficiencies which had existed were owing to causes over which he had no control —among other things, the distance of the army from the base of 10 I