The Press. — London, England, 1855-05-05 00:00:00

Mir 5, 1855. SEBASTOPOL INQUIRY COMMITTEE. Sra Joari BURGOYNE, under whose design and super intendence the siege-works of the " British attack " before Sebastopol were carried out, has Leen exam ined this week. In the oourse of his evidence he said : To him were confided the formation of all the approaches to Sebastopol and the trenches to be dug by the army. In carrying out his strategical operations he could not get any thing like the quantity of work done that could be wished. The generals of divisions complained of the excessive work the men had to perform, and constant applicati ons h e made for working parties were refused because the army was not strong enough. The extent of work undertaken was greater than the force at command could accomplish with rapidity. The communication by road near lialaklava was good before the commencement of operations, although it was a mere track across the country, but when the hard weather set in the road became muddy and difficult to use for transport. It was in expectation when they arrived be fore Sebastopol that they should soon be in possession of it, and he was in hopes they would, and that they would have taken it at once : but directly he saw the fortincation he al tered his opinion, though he still thought they should take it before the bad weather set in in November; but after the cessation of the first tire, he had occasion again to chauge his view. It would have required a very large force to have made the road, which was seven or eight miles long of bad soil, and muddy. There was a great deal of lime stone to be hail, which would have contributed to make it. He &raid not say how long it would have taken a thousand men to make the road, but speaking offhand he should think it would have taken them two or three months, and it would have required a greater quantity of tools and carts than they then had, and they had not the particular de scription of tools required for that kind of work. It would have been far better to make the road, but they could not take the men from the trenches, and had not the trenches been made the Russians might have advanced ; and under these circumstances he was of opinion that it was to the advantage of the army to continue making the trenches and not the road, notwithstanding all the horrors and in conveniences that arose from not making the road, though he did not think that these horrors were so much depen dent on the mad as was imagined. If the commitment asserted that they could not supply the troops with food and the horses with fodder, in consequence of there not being a proper road, he could not say it was an exaggera tion, and no doubt the supply would have been better; but he did not think there was that deficiency in that respect that was generally supposed. The greater part of the army was never deficient at all, and that portion that was defi cient was only occasionally on half rations, and not at all in a state of general starvation. A good road would have been a great advantage for supplies and cattle, but many more of the animals might have been saved if due care had been exercised by those who had charge of them. He con sidered this want of care to be a great national defect. The materials for the huts arrived after the road was in a very bad state. He heard no complaints about the tools that were employed beyond those that were in the news papers. Some of them might have been bad, and there might be some ground of complaint in some instances. The army all wished for new tools, but the storekeepers, studying economy, distributed both old and new. The ex tent of siege operations undertaken on the arrival of the army before Sebastopol was about three miles. The number of men required daily to carry on the works in the trenches, and to act as covering parties, was two thousand. The number of the covering party was about one thousand, but it was subsequently reduced. As far as he knew, the army landed in the Crimea without any knowledge of the Russian force, but it was always evident that sooner or later the Russians could receive great reinforcements. It was thought necessary to take advantage of the impression made at Alma to commence siege operations as soon as possible, with every available means, and under these cir cumstances it was not desirable to employ the working parties in the construction of the road. It was not within the scope of his duties to make a representation to the authorities, either here or in the Crimea, to the effect that they were furnished with too small an amount of men to carry on the duties of the siege. He never made any specific representation, but was constantly applying for men to reinforce the working parties ; but the adjutant general told him he could not afford them, not having suffi cient strength at command. He did mention to Lord Raglan that he had to carry on the siege-works without an adequate working-force. Had been in the Peninsula, and had undertaken more than one siege there, but the position of things was different to that in the Crimea. Did not think that any division or clashing was the con sequence of the anomalous position lie held in the ' army. He went out in the character of an adviser, but they could not have objected to what he pro posed. To a certain extent lie was in command, and ' the siege operations were entirely under his control. Though he and Commissary Filder were at Lord Raglan's head-quarters on the Bth November, they did not know then that the army would have to winter in the Crimea; and there was no consultation as to the propriety of mak ng the road. If Lord Raglan found the force insufficient fur making the road, he could have sent home fur men. Navi gators would have been useful, and it would have been a better measure if early in November 1,500 navvies had been sent out to make the road, than the subsequent con struction of the railway. Soon after he gut before Sebas topol he found the horses of the commissariat overworked, and in bad condition. Lord Raglan could have instituted an inquiry to ascertain how bt at to provide fur all these beasts of burden, and the cominunder-in-chief had power to institute an organisation. but whether he had the means was another matter. The Duke of Welliogton frequently did this in the Peninsular war, and it was afterwards done, under dire necessity, in the Crimea, but it would have been better done at first, though difficulties existed which THE PRESS. did not now. He never made any remonstrance to Lord Raglan as to the absence of the raad. The road was one of the greatest difficulties the army sustained, and caused great delay and privation. The 'rurks were employed, but failed ; the labourers iu the surrounding country would have been as bad as the Turks. All this was the fault of our military institutions, which, in his opinion, in the field were notiriously insufficient. After the failure of the first fire before Sebastopol, Lord Raglan consulted him as to the next step to be taken, and he (Sir J. Burgoyne) was not of opinion that heavier ordnance would be required, as it was very heavy as it was. By Colonel LINDSAY.—The deficiency that existed was not in the calibre of the guns so much as their quantity. The reason they did not expect to winter in Sebastopol was the expecnition that the increased ammunition would have been successfully instrumental to its capture. When he formed the opinion they would have to stay the wiener, he communicated it to Lord Raglan. The weak state of the army, and the state of the weather and roads, prevented the batteries from opening tire, and compelled them to stay the winter. By Lord SZYMOUII.-It had been his °pi:lion some time that the whole of our military institutions were insufficient, and that they undertook the war in the Crimea under those circumstances. He considered the artillery efficient, but the engineers wanted more sappers. Tue commissariat he considered insufficient. Our military institutions were not on a sufficiently large scale, but the army was more fully provided with sappers than it had ever been. He considered the infantry and general staff perfect. The principle of selection was wade good by placing it in the hands of the commander-in-chief. He was not satisfied with the organisa tion of our cavalry force. It might be much lighter than it is. He thought, from several months' experience of it, that the commissariat was inefficiently organised. It ought to be more military. He included the land transport in his opinion of the commissariat. Sir J. Burgoyne afterwards said : If a number of officers had represented that the tools served out to the army were very deficient and bad, and if the Duke of Cambridge, General Evans, General lientinck, Captain Shakespeare, Captain Wrottealey, and Sergeant Dawson (whose evidence was read to him) had given this testimony, he could not say it was without f..undation. There might have been some particular tools that were so, bat it could not have been the case with the whole of the tools, and he thought it must have been of some acci dental or exceptional circumstance of which they spoke. The great mass of the tools was provided by the Ordnance, and under a system of contract. That system was to take the lowest tender, provided it was made by a respectable manufacturer. Many of the tools used in the Crimea came from Malta, where they had been stored for many years. He was not acquainted with the rule as to the periodical inspection of ordnance stores, or as to the replacing such as became detoriated in store. To the CliAlallAN.—lf any of the tools sent from Malta were bad, he thought the blame would lie with the store keeper there. To Sir J. PAKINOTON.—He was so far consulted as to the army going to the Crimea that he was out in the country beforehand and made a report. He was not consulted as to the chances of success of an attack on Sebastopol before the attack was made, and he gave no official opinion on that subject. He would rather not give au opinion as to the sufficiency of the allied tomes fur undertakiug the ex pedition to the Crimea. To Sir J. PAKTNOTON.—He thought that a light descrip tion of Cavalry, such as he had recently seen recommended in the newspapers, would be of great service in the field. To Mr. Laustnosn.—Balaklava is a poor village, with no good buildings in it. The house there on which Lord Raglan had his name inscribed was chiefly used by officers falling sick. Mr. Disonstoisn.—You know the house, of course, in which Lord IlAglan had his quarters? Sir John Burgoyne.—Yes, I lived in it.. Mr. DRUMMOND.—What sort of a palace was it? (A laugh.) Sir J. Burgoyne.—lt was a good building, with a good roof. Lord Raglan had only one room in it. The rest were occupied with the staff. Colonel Steele, the military secretary, slept in his office. IN A PAMPHLET published at Berlin, and pretending to semi ifficial origin, it is said that after the battle of the Alma and the march of Prince Menschikoff to Baktehi Semi ' the whole garrison of Sebastopol ccn sisted of just four battalions and the body of seamen ; at that time also none of the present outworks existed with the exception of the wall of the town. LETTERS from St. Petersburg announce that, for some weeks past, no English subject has been allowed to leave Russia. The military governors, when ap plied to, replied that, under existing circumstances, they could not grant any passport^. Some English workmen, having refused to continue their employ ment, were threatened to be sent to Siberia. THREE iS some expectation of a vacancy occurring in the representation of the City of London, by reason of one of its members (Baron ltothscliiltl) having recently contracted with Government for a loan. In that case it is said to be probab:e that the Lord Mayor, Sir Francis Moon, Bart., would become a candidate for the suffrages of the electors. THE RIGHT How. T. B. MACAULAY has been elected a member of the Royal Academy of Amsterdam, in the class of literature, languages, history, and belles lettres. Together wi th the member for Edinburgh, Jacob Grimm, the grammarian; Ranks, the hist() riau ; Lepsius, the archaeologist; and other learned men of European reputation, were elected. 421 jortign o.r.',orrtslinnbtnct. Pants, Wednesday. ALTISOUGH the chance of peace is small, yet it is equally certain that a chance still exists. It is im possible to describe the consternation produced by the late attempted assassination of the Emperor. You may rely on the following narrative. His Ma jesty was riding up the Champs Elysees on Saturday afternoon, accompanied by M. De Valabrecque and Edgar Ney: he had just passed the Rue de l'Oratoire, and Was immediately in front of the Chateau des Fleurs, when a young man, apparently about thirty years of age, stepped hastily forward towards the Emperor, as if about to present a petition, and when within four paces deliberately fired, and, grdcs d Dieu, missed the Emperor, whose horse, alarmed at the explosion, started on one side, and thus left Edgar Ney to face the second shot, which followed happily with no better success than the first. The day being fine the Champs Elysies were filled with people, who instantly crowded to the spot in a state of leartul anxiety. The coolness and sangfroid displayed by the Emperor is testified by all, and cannot be too highly praised. As soon as the second shot. leas fired, and while the police were with difficulty se straining the crown from indicting summary ven geance on the offender, the Emperor's first care was to turn to E. Ney and desire him to hasten to the Bois de Boulogne, in order to prevent the report of what had happened reaching the Empress's ears in an abrupt manner. His Majesty then turned to the crowd that thronged,stronnd him, and said, " " mss enfants, je ne suis pas blesse." Subsequently, he remarhed to M. De Valabrecque, "Mon Dieu! " comme ces Bens ne recuisseront jamais de cette " Cason; it m'a sembli que l'homme n'etait pas teal " vitu." The Emperor then continued his ride to the Bois, where he met the Empress, and, alter con versing on other subjects, told what bad happened. An eye-witness of this interesting scene assures me that her Majesty became deadly pale, "bland mat," and burst into tears. Their Imperial Majesties then returned to the Champs Elyse**, where an entlivai astic welcome awaited them. The rumour of the atteistat had been rapidly spread, and crowds had collected to testify, by waving of hats, and cries of " Vole rlitupereur," "Five mi eratrice," their ho. ror of the crime meditated and their gratitude that the assassin's purpose bad been thwarted. Their blejes ties seemed profoundly moved by the manner in which they were received, and the tears which coursed one another down the Empress's eheete produced a deep impression upon those who witnessed them. On reaching the Tuileries her Majesty was again completely overcome, and the scene is represented as most touching by all who witnessed it. The following day the Emperor again appeared on horeeback, and went the whole length of the Champs Elysies at a foot-pace, followed by the Empress in her carriage and four. The crowd was ten times greater than on the previous day, and the reception of their Majesties most enthusiastic. On is aching the Place de la Concorde, the etroits of the police to clear the way succumbed to the eagerness of the crowd, and the Imeerial cortege came to a stand-still, blocked up by masses of the people—the cries " Vivo l'Empereur," " Vivo l'lmperatrice," being mingled with " Dieu vows benisee !" " Dieu vous garde!" Al together it was an ovation and a sight not easily to be forgotten. Every day since the Champs Ely sees have been lull of those eager to catch a sight of their Majesties, and to testify their respect for the Imperial pair. The abandonment of the Emperor's projected visit to the Crimea is attributed to the influence of the Emperor of Austria, who, while he might be willing to assist the allies, would not willingly remove any securities against the break out of a revolution in France. A numerous meeting of English residents here has been held, to congratulate the Emperor on his escape. FIANLFORT, May 2. and M. de Bismarck have now to settle the dispute betwixt the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia upon the nature and rights of the Germanic Confederation, and until that is regulated Austria will not deem herself in a position entitling her to independence of action. Austria has no basis of strength within herself —she would cling to Prussia from fear of the future—she would chal lenge Prussia, aux mains, did she dare, in the very heart of the Diet--she distrusts Lombardy and Pied mont, and sulks against her old ally of England for having brought her into the present dilemma. Aus tria depends—diplomatically—on the form of adhe sion trim without, from lack of possessing that pro perty from within. Hers is a desperate game, and