The Press. — London, England, 1856-01-05 00:00:00

A f presuming but cowardly Court is ever seeking the opportunity of showing towards those ambassadors of European nations who will tamely put up with them ; and while Russian influence has made unbounded strides, the influence of EngMO, which 9,1 1 w/g to Vp supreme there, has keeq i completetk lowered, The ostentatious milisto,v, to lge,v.mfasFF, an 4 the still more pompous embassy to St. Peterer burg, are some 2 4 (tip w i ve ostAke k iAl i e fruitt, the blunder wick our Foreign-otilee thus committed ; while the attack and capture of Herat, a capture quite as disastrous to us as that of Kars, is the material and most bitter result. With Herat falls, for the time, our influence in the East of Central Asia, as with the cap tire of Kars falls our influence in the West. It is true that, in the former case, we had no officers or troops engaged, and that the pres tige which we lose is diplomatic only. But it is idle to suppose that the effects will be the loss damaging to us on that account. Asiatic Governments seldom refuse attention to the remonstrances of Powers which have been in the ascendant until the opinion becomes gene rally prevalent that their pride has been some what lowered. Minor States, therefore, will hardly continuo to pay deference to England if the effeminate Court of Persia is seen to slight its ambassador, and treat his represen tations with contempt. The deep interest which England has long taken in the fate of Herat is known by every one throughout the E as tern world. The gallant defence of it b y ELDRED POTTINOER when formerly besieged by the Persians with Russian officers at their head ; the sums lavished by the Indian Go vernment in the payment of troops there, the purchase of stores, and the reconstruction of its walls the diversion made by us in the capture, f Karmic, which brought the Persian Court its senses when diplomatic remon strances ltad f a il e d—these are points familiar to all Central Asia, and which have long formed the theme there of story and of song. That such a fortress, which forms one of the keys of India, should be allowed to fall into the hands from which we then saved it, is a great dis aster; and it is one of double significance now that we are at war with Russia, whose hostile influence, excited through the possession of it, we so much feared. In the session about to open the Ministry will have a severe account to render to the nation for the fall of Kars ; but not less deeply responsible has been official mismanagement for allowing Persia, under Russian instigation, to capture the fort ress of Herat. THE METROPOLITAN PRESS. We are unpleasantly reminded, at the open ing of the New Year that THE PRESS stands alone among the metropolitan newspapers in the view it takes of the policy of the war. But a fair consideration of the tone adopted by THE PRESS, and by its leading contempora ries, will not, we are persuaded, result to our disadvantage. At all events we have no wish to shrink from the scrutiny. So far from hav ing anything to conceal, we only desire the fullest and frankest communication between our own mind and the mind of our readers. The Ministerial journals, including tho Times and the Post, while acknowledging that the Government is a party to the pacific kt pro osals which have been des p atched to St. etersburg, openly profess their b elief that ose proposals will not be accepted, and very plainly express their opinion that a continu ance of the war, until further decided advan tages have been gained over the enemy, would be more conducive to the honour and interest of this country. We believe we fairly state the line taken by those journals. They sup port the terms forwarded because they think them impracticable, and would much sooner see the war continued than those terms accepted. The view of THE PRESS, on the contrary, is, that no negotiation should have been opened without a reasonable prospect of success, nor without an honest desire to bring it to a pro sperous issue. If the negotiation be not sin cere, why was it commenced? If it be sincele, what is meant by the hostile and insulting THE PRESS. language directed against Russia by the Minis terial organs ? Why are we told that the tea ins are certainly such as Russia will not accept, yet that no nisy,Wica.taini of them will be sub mitted to? 1(i l w tinsps is favorable to a pacific P4tc..Y% likut AA to pß i qi . fic shams. The dip,k9,- ma cy 641tEurowa 4, nl4l di s graced by anakVT a b or tiv% negekil N ati on i ond opinion would ukt. versalV , look IR ) the word as the only possiblo arbitog. e,f the w i N44. The .horning 1118 . and the Standard, pre tending to represent conservative sentiment, arc entirely opposed to, atv accommodation with Russia until that Power shall have been morally and materially weakened. They argue that no pence can have any element of security which shall leave Russia in possession of the territory she held before the war commenced. They earnestly urge the prosecution of the war for the purpose of reducing her to extre mity—of imposing upon her terms which shall mark that her submission is forced, and that she is at the mercy of her conquerers, and which shall deprive her of some points of her territory, which, possessed by another State, shall keep her perpetually in check. These journals are prepared for all the cost and sacrifice of the struggle necessary to accom plish the ends they propose. Persisting in their view that Russia is a barbarous Power, not to be restrained by treaties, they would consistently seize what they conceive to be the present favorable opportunity for depriv ing her of the capacity for future mischief, and for destroying her influence in Europe. If this policy is to be carried out, it must not be done by halves. If Russia cannot be trusted when she is dealt with on fair and moderate terms, assuredly she cannot be trusted when the professed object is to drag her down from her station as a first-rate Power, and keep her in subjection. No nation will willingly submit to positive degradation. We must reduce her to that state of weakness from which it will be impossible for her to rise, or we must trust m uch to her gool faith and prudence. To impose upon her terms which her Government would always regard with shame and indignation, yet leave her with strength sufficient to renew the struggle on the first favorable opportunity, would be to make a truce, not a peace. No long period would elapse before the war again broke forth, and in the interval the contending Powers, instead of enjoying a time of settled prospe rity, would be preparing their forces for new conflict. Undoubtedly, there is a numerous party in this country eager to make the war with Russia a war of extremity—to listen to no terms of peace short of her absolute and un conditional submission, and of some galling and effectual restraint upon her power. But we must doubt whether this party is iu any way entitled to be regarded as Conservative, or whether Conservatives can make common cause with it except by an abnegation of their principles. If this party had its way, the war would assume a new aspect—it would be indefinite in its duration, in its extent, and in its objects. We do not say that we may not be forced into such a war, but we hold that we shall commit the greatest error in our history if we engage in it before we have convincing - proof that Russia will not submit to the rea sonable conditions required for defining her boundaries and avoiding all pretext of future quarrel. The numerous journals of the Radical party give to Lord PALMERSTON a kind of doubtful support, which a Minister of higher character would feel to be degrading. Without abso lutely confiding in him, they trust him to tho extent of believing that he will find means of extricating himself from pacific negotiation, however earnestly it may be pressed on him by statesmen at home or our Allies abroad. They conceive that his power depends on his being able to prolong the war, and thus gratify the animosity which they entertain against Russia on account of her despotic form of government. They look on his conduct with some suspicion, but they are willing to give him the benefit of their doubt, and to impress on him at the same time the necessity of con forming to their views. Thus it happens that the Conservative daily journals and the Radical journals work in the MI U SATURDAY, same direction, if they have not a common object. Should not this fact inspire our respected contemporaries with some mistrust of the eattrae jorakting,? Can it really be for th% interest Qt ilk 9 party they represent to pl,tw% this eogAry Wo a desperate and prolwAgaf t i confliet th% %eke of overthrow ing Oke soMtleineat oixf Vurqr, and of gratifying an immeawing, deb gq byr. the destruction of a particiekr for of oviernment? All forms of gy,xernment aro alike to us. We prefer that one wider which it is our privilege to live. But we have a shrewd suspicion that the es tablished Government of Russia is the ono bast calculated for the present state of that empire and its people—the one most favor able to the growth of individual liberty, and of the industrial interests of the nation. Whether our Ministry be sincere in their desire for the " vigorous prosecution of the war " or not, can make no difference in our argument with Conservative journals. We think it probable that they are, and that they blunder simply through want of capacity and vigour. It is unfortunate that THE PRESS should at this momentous juncture stand alone in advocating a policy, not of submission to Russia, not a peace at any price, but of peace on safe and satisfactory terms ; but it would be more unfortunate still if we withheld our convictions through timidity, through deference to the prevailing sentiment of the hour, or through any hypocritical pre tence of agreeing in opinions which we regard to be most advers e to the true policy and future welfare of our country. If peace cannot be concluded now, it must, according to all probability, be extremely distant. The war is at that point when its original objects need not be departed from. One more campaign may render it impossible for us to adhere to them. We think that if there is to be any negotiation, it should be conducted in a frank and conciliatory spirit, and that no worse office can possibly be ren dered to the people of this country than to persuade them, while the Allies are actually in diplomatic communication with Russia, that it can come to nothing; that it is de sirable it should be conducted in a churlish and hostile spirit; and that the Premier is a trickster intent on disconcerting a negotiation he dares not openly resist. Whether, distinct from all considerations of party, Tan Parss, or its Loudon contempo raries, adopt the most principled, rational, and prudent view of affairs, we must now leave it for our readers to decide. RESULTS OF 1853. THE close of the eventful year that has passed away compels us to look back in order to estimate our gains and losses in the great contest which we are waging. Sober examina tion of the past will aid us in calculating the eventualities of the future. In the successes which we have gained during 1.835 there is much to gratify our pride and to sustain our confidence in the gallantry of British troops ; but the results of the year teach us the useful lesson that the vicissitudes of the whole war would have been less trying if we had entered upon it with less overweening confidence. While we are justly elated at the valorous deeds of our soldiers, while we exult at the glory they have won, we must recollect that during the last two years we found our enemy far more formidable than we were taught to believe at the commence ment of hostilities. All the more honour, therefore, to our generals, officers, and men for their skill and heroism in maintaining so arduous a contest. Still, however, it is impossible to overlook the fact that, owing to the Ministerial mis guidance at the beginning of the war, wo made too light of our formidable enemy. Never did any party in office commit so grave a mistake as that of Cabinet Ministers sanc tioning the absurd Reform-Club banquet to Sir CHARLES NAPIER. Yet, in spite of the Ministerial errors, the British army in the East has added during