The Press. — London, England, 1855-05-19 00:00:00

478 of Lord Derby on Monday are of great im• portance. Before the Reform Bill, by means of the nomination boroughs, a large class of young men were introduced into public life, and they were specially trained for official service. The prizes of public life were thrown open to genius, and when Mirabeau demanded in France /a carriere ouverte aux talens, the great Tribune was thinking of what he had beheld in England, with its aristocratic privi leges and popular influences. The Radical Reformers reproached the system as giving rewards to " adventurers," and the " old old Whigs " (with their hatred to original intel lects) endorsed the accusation. In place of such " adventurers " as Burke, Canning, Sheridan, Sir Philip Francis, Tierney, Hus kisson, Grattan, Horner, Henry Dundas, each of whom was " a professional politician," we have now adventurers of the platform, or ganisers of associations fur manufacturing dis content, and intriguers for baronetcies ; sometimes even forcing their way into the Privy Council, and while gluttonous of honours for themselves showing a morbid liking for attacking the reputations of their political rivals. _ _ The contrast between the abilities of the " rising young men " of the Manchester and Marylebone schools and the intellect returned by the rotten boroughs needs no further illus tration. But it may be asked, since the boroughs are extinguished, where is the talent to be got ? It is plain that there must be official rewards given directly for men of abilities, since parliamentary honours are n)w withheld from brilliant " adventurers " of narrow means. On this question we have the advantage of knowing the sentiments of so ex perienced an administrator as Lord Metcalfe. In his remarks on " the policy of Sir George " Barlow," Lord Metcalfe writes : In a service like this, which is pursued for an indepen dence, and to which the wealthy never have recourse, and to which services cannot be rewarded with honours, merit • must be rewarded by situations uniting credit with emolu ment. It is in the nature of the human character to look to a reward. Without this hope there would be much less of zeal and public spirit than there now is. Self-love plays its part in our most disinterested acts. Every Government of the world has instituted rewards as well as punishment for the encouragement of public virtue among its citizens ; and when a Government loses sight of this principle, it will soon lose the power of rewarding any public virtue, for all virtue will be extinguished. When a man's conscience tells him that he has worked hard and merited well, he expects reward. The " honours" of parliamentary life being now withheld from the class which produced Huskissons and Tierneys, it would appear only just that " situations uniting credit with " emolument" should he given as prizes to attract talent. What follows is still more true, and should not be lost sight of in a plan of Administrative Reform : I look on the consideration of public service or public ornament to be real and very justice ; and I ever held a scanty and penurious justice to partake of the nature of a wrong. I hold it to be in its consequences the worst economy in the world. In saving money I soon can count up all the good Ido ; but when, by a cold penury, I blast the abilities of a nation, the ill I may do is beyond all calculation. Indeed, no man knows, when lie cuts off the incitements to a virtuous ambition, and the just rewards of public ser. vice, what infinite mischief he may do his country through all generations. Such saving to the public may prove the worst mode of robbing it. These sentiments came from Metcalfe at an early period of his life, but he continued to act on them throughout his distinguished and successful career. He was equally opposed to profuseness as to penury, and how little of a red-tapist he was can be seen in his remarks on the "Lord Cornwallis school " of officials : I am perhaps singular in thinking that reductions might be made with success in all branches of our civil adminis tration. The axe should be laid to our judicial system. Our revenues might be improved. Our civil expenses reduced. But nothing of this kind will be done as long as the caste of Bengal councillor shall remain unchanged— so cautious, so devoted to precedent. so fearful of alteration. At all events, Lord Cornwallis's school must first wear out, who think that all perfection is in the regulations of 1793. —[October 14, 1819.1 We have often impugned the policy and conduct of the elirectors of the East India Company. But it cannot be denied that their subordinate officials have often served them well. Copious knowledge and clear views abound in the correspondence of many Indian functionaries. Speculation and practice were not divorced in the school of officials which THE PRESS. Lord Wellesley founded, and of which Metcalfe was so eminent a pupil. To look forward, to consider eventualities, without mooting barely possible contingencies, is one of the best gifts of a wise official. Thus, on the chances of a Russian war, Lord Metcalfe wrote in 1830 : No one, I presume, expects that a Russian army is to start from the present limners of Russia, and make one continued march across Central Asia, for the purpose of attacking us in our possessions in India. Such an expedition seems next to impossible. The diffi• culties of marching a regular army through the intermediate countries, of supplying and teeding it, of repairing losses, of replacing wear and tear, of preventing the ravages of disease iu new climates—above all, in the case of Russia, the impracticability of providing the enormous funds requisite for such an undertaking—these are obstacles to the attempt with a large army which seem insurmountable. Difficulties in some respects similar, and in others of another nature, would attend the attempt by a small one. In addition to the reduction by sickness and losses by wear and tear, a small army might be resisted and destroyed by the troops of the intermediate countries ; or, if a remnant of it should reach our frontiers, we should most probably defeat and capture it, send every man down the Ganges to Calcutta, or down the Indus to Bombay, and land them all prisoners at Portsmouth. The expense of a large army could not be defrayed by Russia, and a small one we should annihilate. We must recollect that this was written twenty years ago, and the Oriental diplomacy of Russia has since been hard at work. He then proceeds to indicate an eventuality, which some persons would argue is taken out of the category of " possibilities " into that of " probabilities " : It may safely be said, I conceive, that a Russian invasion in the way supposed, while the Russian frontiers are so remote from our own, is an event so improbable, that it may be pronounced, as far as anything can, impossible. if we are ever to be troubled with a Russian invasion, it must be after an approximation of our frontiers. So early as 1833 Metcalfe foresaw the danger of our meddling with the countries beyond the Indus. When the propriety of leaving a com mercial agent at Caubul was discussed, Met calfe objected, first on commercial grounds : The professed object of the proposal is the improvement of commerce. I believe that commerce will take care of itself best without our direct interference in the form of a Commercial Agency ; add, if we sought to remove existing obstacles, our effoits would be more needed elsewhere than at Caubul, where the trade with India already receives every possible encouragement. Next on high political reasons : A commercial agent would unavoidably become, from the time of his creation, a political agent. To the extension of our political relations beyond the Indus there appears to me to be great objections. From such a course 1 should expect the probable occurrence of embarrassments and wars, expensive and unprofitable at the least, without any equi valent benefit, if not ruinous and destructive. The appointment of an agent at Caubul would of itself almost amount to an interference in the political affairs of Afghanistan. It would be a sort of declaration in favour of the chief whose power is established at Caubul, in prefe rence to his rivals at Candahar, Pesbawur, and other places. And, lastly, he sums up with vigorous pre. eibion As a commercial measure, I consider the one proposed to be unnecessary; as a political one undesirable; and, therefore, on the whole objectionable. The power of taking large views, and the faculty of coming close to the subject, can only be shown in minds of large calibre trained to special knowledge. The most penetrating intellect requires familiarity with the subject before it can pronounce decisively. A facility for generalisation becomes dangerous unless there be systematic regard to fact. A shadowy policy evolved from nebulous intellects must always end in complications. It is obvious that in the formation of any " Administrative Reform " it will be useful to look to the r esults of the system under which our Indian functionaries have been chosen. At present many think that talent is smothered in our public offices, and that there is no career for talent. Hence that all our gifted " adventurers " take to the bar, to commerce, to railway speculations, and even to literature. 'thus the public service is debilitated and deprived of "new blood." We are now suffer ing from what Lord Metcalfe called " the worst economy," as stated in our second extract. We commend this volume to all persons who like to study State papers, in which the prac tical sense of a man of the world is joined to the speculative sagacity of a philosophical statesman. To the general reader, of course, this volume will not be " interesting," but no " Indian library " should be without it. SATURDAY, Wine : Its Use and Taxation. An Inquiry into , the Operation of the Wine Duties on Con sumption and Revenue. By Sir James Emerson Tennent, K.C.S., LL D., &c. L. don: Madden. UNDER the above title we obtain the result of those inquiries into the operation of the English wine duties which the accomplished writer has steadily pursued with all the resources of his extensive information. While he is careful to disclaim any importance which others may attach to his conclusions on the ground of his official position, and proffers them, in fact, solely as his individual opinions, they have, nevertheless, that accurate and authentic impress which is only attainable by persons privileged like himself. Many of our readers will probably remember that Sir Emerson Tennent was a most efficient member of that Committee of the House of Commons which was appointed to consider this subject in 1852 ; and, as that Committee recorded no collective opinion for the guidance of the Legislature, the materials it afforded, coupled with the facilities which the writer has subsequently enjoyed, are now worthily ap plied to the solution of a fiscal problem. Can we to any considerable extent reduce the tax upon wine with advantage to the consumer and with safety to the revenue ? This is the question to which, with every desire to be able to respond affirmatively at some happier season, the writer has been nevertheless driven to the conclusion that, even under better auspices, the difficulties in the way of reduc tion are little short of insurmountable. It is a singular fact in the history of the wine duties to how slight an extent they have influenced consumption; indeed, we find that the successive alterations in their scale appear to have had anything but a similar effect to that which has ordinarily followed the like dealings with other commodities Sir Emerson Tennent has abundantly illustrated this cir cumstance with its important bearings on the question of revenue. Mr. Pitt made three great financial experiments upon these duties. In 1788 he reduced them from Bs. 9d. per gallon on French, and 4s. 2fd. on Portuguese, wines to 4s. 6d and 3s. respectively ; the re sult was, that the consumption rose 83 7-10ths per cent., while only 49 1-10th per cent. was added to the revenue on an average of the eight years succeeding the experiment. In 1795 he again raised these duties to some thing approaching the scale from which he had reduced them in 1786 ; and even these rates in the year following ho raised to 10s. 2d. and 6s. 91d. respectively. The result was indeed " striking, for the consumption, taking au " average of the five or six years following, " underwent no very serious reduction, but the " revenue increased to an extraordinary " amount." The reduction in consumption was only 17f per cent., while the increase in revenue was as much as 80 per cent. Again , between 1801 and 1805, the wine duties were further raised under war exigencies to the extremely high rate of 13s. 81d. on French, ani 9s. lid. on Portuguese, wines, and the result was even more extraordinary still, for in 1806 the consumption had increased together with the revenue. Even in 1807, with a duty threefold higher than that of the year pre ceding the war, the consumption was within 580,000 gallons of being equal to that of 1792, under the lowest scale ; while the revenue, which under the low duty had been but 1,148,755/. in 1792, rose under the high duty to 2,729,8871. in 1807. Again, the important reductions of Lord Ripon in 1825 were not satisfactory in a financial point of view, and did not even stimulate consumption to the extent anticipated. The equalisation of the duties on French and Portuguese wines in 1831, involving a slight additional tax on the gross import, affected revenue far more than consumption, but affected neither to a very large amount. The additional 5 per cent. in 1840 had proportionally a greater effect upon both ; while from a summary of all these operations combined we obtain this remarke.bhi aggregate :—Whereas, during the twenty-six years of high duties prior to 1825 the average annual consumption was 5,575,160 gallons, and the revenue 2,259,800/. ; from 1825 to 1851,