Star. — London, England, 1809-08-02 00:00:00

the success that may be expected to attend tut attack upon the epenty's fleet in either of the modes directed by their Lord shipsain your letter to me above-mentioned. The entity's ships a re. asekored In two lines very near each other, in a direction due Southlftom the fort on the Isle of Aix, and the ships on each line not farther apart than their own length, by wined- it appears, as I imagine, that the space for their anchorage is so confined by the shoarness of the suer, as not to admit of ships to run in and an chor dear of each other. The most distant ships of dick two lines of are within point blank shot of the works upon the Isle of Aix.— Such ships, therefore, as might attack the enemy, will be expos ed to be raked by the hot shot, &c. from the island; and should the ships be disabled in their masts, they must remain within range of the enemy's fire until destroyed, there not being a suffi cient depth of water to allow them to moor to Southward out of distance. The enemy's ships have taken their position apparently with a view not only to be protected by the strong works of the Isle of Aix, but also to have the entrance of the Charente open to them, that in case of being attacked by fire-ships and other engines of the kind, they can run up the river beyond the reach of them. The tide and wind that arc favourable to convey this kind of annoyance to the enemy, serve equally to carry them up the river. With respect to the attempt that may be made to de stroy the enemy's ships; with shells, Scc. I am not competent to give an opinion, until it is ascertained whether the bombs can be placed within range of their mortah, to the enemy's ships, with out being exposed to the fire from the Isle of Aix. I beg leave to add, that if their Lordships are of opinion that an attack upon the enemy's ships, by those of the fleet under my command, is prac ticable, I am ready to obey any orders they may be pleased to ho nour me with, however great the issue may be of the loss of men and ships. I have the honour to be.. (Signed) " Gmtsien." " The Hon. W. W. Pole. On the 27th of March I went myself in the Uni corn, with Sir "Harry Neale, the Captain of the fleet, and Captain Bedford, of the Ca l edonia, to reconnoi tre the enemy's fleet, and the fortifications of the Isle d'Aix, which appeared, notwithstanding Lord Coch rane seeks by his evidence to make a contrary impres s sion, to be of consid,erable force. Observing that the enemy were resuming their works on the Buoyart shoal, with the view of affording to titeir fleet in Alt Roads an additional protection, I sent in the Ainelia and Conflict, on the Ist of April, to disperse the*peo ple employed on these works, which service they ef fected. On the 3d of April Lord Cochrane arrived with the Imperieuse frigate, and by his Lordship I received the following directions from the Admiralty: [These directions merely stated the detention in the Downs by contrary winds, of the vessels that had been promised ; and communicated their Lordships' orders for the employment of Lord Cochrane.] That the service might proceed with the utmost celerity, I ordered eight of the largest transports then with the fleet, to be selected and prepared as fire. ships, in lieu of the six expected from Plymouth, that they might be ready to act with the twelve from Woolwich, immediately upon their arrival. These, with the Mediator, were accordingly fitted by means of rosin and tar, fortunately found on board some chasse. marees, recently captured, and other combus tible materials furnished by the fleet. This service was performed under the immediate superintendence of the Captains of the line-of-battle ships, who evinced the most unremitting activity upon the occasion.--e. Upon the 10th of April, at half-past four P. M. the Beagle arrived, with the twelve fire-ships from Eng land. When I issued orders to the Commanders of sloops and First Lieutenants of line-of-battle ships which I had prepared, it was found altogether im practicable to proceed to the attack on the night of the 10th, though much pressed by Lord Cochrane, and it may he considered a most fortunate circum stance that the attempt was deferred, for it appears by a general order found on board one of the enemy's ships, and now delivered into Court, that the French, to protect their fleet from attack, had equipped 73 launches and other boats, in five divisions, to guard it from surprise during the night, and to tow off our fire-ships on their approach, and the tranquillity of the 10th would have afforded the enemy full oppor tunity of availing themselves of this protection; - but of this they were deprived, by the very blowing weather on the subsequent night, when the fire-ships were sent in. • I have here to notice, that some days previous to the attack, I had, to deceive the enemy, adopted the precaution of ordering out of the Roads vessels of every description, that were not to be en gaged in the intended operations to assist and support the fire-ships. His Lordship then proceeds to give a detailed ac count of the plan of attack, and to shew that had he , sent the ships as desired by Lord Cochrane, they would havebevt exposed not only to thepoint blank shot from the batteries, but also to the - broadsides of the above mentioned two line of battle ships then lying in Aix Road, and which, even without assistance from the batteries, must have entirely crippled every one of our ships in their approach through-so narrow a channel ; besides which some of the grounded sliipiTw4tre_sufli ciently upright, and so situated as to enable them to bring their gums to bear upon the entrance. “ I would here submit to the Court (adds his Lord ship) whether the idea which appears to have been entertained by Lord Cochrane, that a force could not have been sent in so as to have arrived before low water in the morning, wa's not in itself preposterous and impracticable. Upon the fullest .consideration that no possible attempt could be made until the tide had flowed for some time, unless a previous change of wind should take place, all Iliad to do was to make every preparation for the attack on the enemy's grounded ships."—His Lordship then states at great length the arrangements, formed by him . ; and.after c!escribing the unfalkiiirable state of the.w eather, says; I think the Court will allow that I am completely b-Ine out in what I have stated, by.ihe sentiments liich it will be proved, were expressed to me by Lord Cochrane., when he came on board the Caledonia af t: r the iiction, that had I acted upon his signal, and 15,-nt at at that time half the fleet, he calculated upon the loss of three or four of his Majesty's line of Little sh;ps; and I have moreover to observe, that if hi 'de ti..ace of the obstruction of the other siCfps of the earn) y 1 had sent in a force before the three ships had warped (jaw Palais Shoal, it id a positive fact that it could not have advanced to the attack of those three ships, on account of the shoal water."—His Lordship next proceeds to quote the authority of AdmiralStop ford and other Officers, in respect to the impractica• batty of sending in ships of the line at the time re quired, and of course, that nothing could be effected , by them. His Lordship, after some account of the subsequent disposition of the fleet, thus proceeds : 0 , By the foregoing narrative, as w e ll as b y the log stud signal lo g - of the Caledoni a (to which, as also to e v. ry correct log of the fleet, I am as desirous to refer as Lord Cochrane may be it will, I conceive s i.een, that I fully meet the Charge which hsb ee be Freferred . against me; and if the impression aris i ng . n o It of this inquiry should prove less favourable Cuchriont than that which may have been ro e t°- . , dueed by my letter to the Lords Commission.-- the Admiralty of the 14411 of April, his k. must be sensible, that as the instigator of this Martial, he will himself have been the cause of this change of sentiment. I have been willing to grant to his Lordship the fiillest credit for his personal bra very, and for his judicious manner of approaching the ene my in the Imptrieuse, to which points the commendations expressed in my letter of the 14th of April related. For in fact, the success of. the first part of the enterprize, as I have before observed, arose from the terror excited by the appearance of the fire ships, as they failed in the principal effect they were intended to produce, and the blast of the explosion vessels under his . Lordship's most immediate direc tion, did not take place by any means so near to the enemy's ships as his Lordship had projected. The general management, however, of the attack was so successful, that, under that impression, I did not hesitate to express in my public letter, the degree of approbation which is therein marked, passing over cir cumstances not altogether satisfactory to me, and not at that,time necessary to be brought into public no. I tice. The Court is now in possession of all the facts and circumstances on phich I rest my justification, and .it remains to be considered how far they are af ! fected by the evidence produced on the part of the prosecution."—After some further remarks in respect to the evidence of the to books, he says - I have no doubt the signal made by Lord Coch rane. on the morning of the 12th April, which forms Part of .the charge against me, will, combined with other subsequent signals, appear to the Court unpre cedented, and improper; of this his Lordship seems now to be aware • from the manner in which he has expressed himsel f his evidence, and that there may be no doubt of the accuracy of the signal-book of the Caledonia, I must again call before you the signal officer, to shew that the signal on the 13th April, said to have been observed by the Imperieuse, was never made by the Caledonia, and also that the signal of the 14th, recorded in the Caledonia's log as made by the lmperieuse, ' that if permitted to remain can destroy the enemy,' is denied by Lord Cochrane ever to have been made." It now only remains for me to examine what man ner Lord Cochrane has attempted by his unsupported opinion to maintain the charge. This is to be col lected from the long narrative evidence given by his Lordship. It cannot, lam sure, be deemed necessary for me to follow him through the whole of this evi dence. In the course of his evidence Lord Cochrane in allusion to the danger which would attend his go ing with encouragement to the attack of the ships at the mouth of the Charante, says, speaking of himself, “ A heavy, a very heavy responsibility would lie upon my shoulders in case of disasters, which in military operations are sometimes unavoidable ; if I had had my cable shot away, for instance, I might have been sunk;" yet whilst on the one hand his Lordship seems to have been so sensible of the weight of responsibility imposed upon himself by the command of a frigate, and a few small vessels, he appears on the other to have been unmindful of th e f ar h eav i er degree of re sponsibility attached to my command, during so com plicated an undertaking. In alluding to the dangers, of which I must take this opportunity to mention five furnaces for heating shot, which Lord Cochrane re ported to me to have himself discovered when he went in to reconnoitre them, previous to the attack, Lord Cochrane states, that 74 gun-ships may go into an inner anchorage between the Buoyart Shoal and the Palais at any time of tide. He asserts also that the tide rises only from ten to twelve feet. By the French chart, which he produced to confirm his deposition, it appears that there is a bank to pass over before ships can get into that anchorage with from 18 to 20 feet at low water. But by the charts of the Master of the Fleet and Master of the Caledonia, who sounded up on the bank, it appears that there is only from 15 to 19 feet, and the bank full of knowlls.—Under these circumstances if Lord Cochrane's opinion be correct, relative to the rise and fall of the tide, no man in , his senses would venture a 74 over it, even in the smooth est water at less than two-fourths flood, and therefore as to the refuge that this inner anchorage would af ford a crippled ship, how little would the probability be that the opportunity of both tide and wind should offer for a crippled ship, ,at the moment in which it was most wanted, to pass over the bank, and get out of the reach of the batteries; but if .I had even previously known as much of this inner anchorage as I now do, I would not, as the wind Was at the time, have done otherwise than I did.; and if Lord Cochrane really knew what he professed to know when he was in Aix Roads, it was a duty imperiously incumbent upon him to have communicated that information on the afternoon of the 12th, to the Captains of line of battle ships which he saw in so perilous a situation, aground within point blank range of the batteries. ' Lord Cochrane has expressed an opinion, that two or three sail of the line salt in on the morning of thel2th, might, by running upon the verge °Utile Buoyart shoal, have passed to leeward of the two French ships remaining at anchor. This' I declare to have been absolutely impracticable, as well from the raking fire of the two ships afloat, and of the .up-. right one en shore; in our approach, Mid the fire of the batteries,' as from the shoal w a ter close unier their lee. The testimony of Captain Rodd, the only I witness examined on this point on the part of the pro ', mention, corroborates my opinion, which I have no doubt will be fully supported by the evidence of other competent witnesses I propose calling. With respect to the, force of the Aix batteries, I apprehended what appeared to Lord Cochrane and to the Master of hii ship as ruins of the fart were in fact materiak for improving and increasing the works. Relative to the service that had been performed, and what might possibly still be first a ted towards the destruc tion of the enemy's s i ord Cochrane states a conversation to hive passed between his Lordship and myself, on his return front Aix Roads. 131 which 'he represents me to have said 66 that if he threw blame,-it would appear like . arrogantly claiming all the .merit to myself." I however trust the Court will not conceive that the expreiltion of blame has any allu- Irian to my conduct, for, as I have before said, Lord Cochrane never expressed one syllable from which I could form the most Ag l it idea that lie felt disappoin ted at any thing resting with me. His Lordship's allu rim_ bad reference only to the senior oflicers who acted with him in Aix Roads,•upon whom he generally cast blame without giving the smallest intimation, I father by word or manner, that in his expressions of dissatisfaction lie included his Commander in Chief. Imissi%ers of Lord ' Cori , Pa 2 • " • tonne arks upon the errors of Lord Coch- TanA r intrrative.'tord Gambier said—" And it is *it falrlere to remark the fact acknowledged by Lorill Cochrane in his evidence, that he erred no less than four points of the compass in the report he made to me before the a attack of the direction in which the fleet was moored, in two lines from the port of Isle de .Aix."—Lord Gambier next made some observa tions on the statement of Lord Cochrane in respect to the state of the enemy's three grounded ships, which his Lordship assured the Court had since been ascer tained to be erroneous. His'Lordship then proceeded thus : It now only remains for me to request the atten tion of the Court to some conclusion which I think may be drawn from the whole of the statement I have submitted to the consideration of you, Sir, and the rest of the Members of this Honourable Court, and by which, with the additional evidence I have to adduce, it will, I flatter myself, distinctly appear, Ist. That ' during the time of this service, the most unwearied I attention was applied by me to its main object, the destruction of the enemy's fleet. 2d. That in no part of the service was more zeal and exertion shewn than during the whole of the 12th of April, when I had necessarily in view two objects, the destruction of the enemy's fleet, and also the preservation of that I under my command ; for the extreme difficulties in approaching an enemy closely surrounded with shos, and strongly defended by batteries, rendered cautiotEn my proceedings peculiarly necessary. 3d. That three .out of the seven of the enemy's ships aground on the Palais, were, from their first being on shore, totally out of the reach of the guns of any ships of the fleet that might have been sent in ; and that at no time whatever, either sooner or later, could they have been attacked. 4th. That the other four of the 11 ships, of which the enemy's fleet consisted, were never in a situation to be assailed after the five ships had failed m their object. " These are the points on which I rest my justifi cation, trusting that it will appear to the Court, upon their review of my whole case, that I did take the most effectual measures for destroying the enemy's fleet ; that neither neglect nor unnecessary delay did take place in the execution of this service —and, on the contrary, that it was owing to the time chosen by me for sending a force in to make the attack, that the service was accomplished with so very in considerable a loss. Had I pursued any of the measures deemed practicable and proper, in the judgment of Lord Cochrane, I am firmly persuaded the success attending this achievement would have proved more dearly bought than any yet recorded in our naval annals, and, far from accomplishing the hopes of my country, or the expectations of the Ad miralty, must have disappointed both. If such, too, were the foundation of his Lordship's prospects, it is just they should-vanish before the superior conside rations attending a service involving th e na v a l elm ' meter, and most important interests of the nation. " I conclude by observing, that the service actu ally performed has been of great importance, as well in its immediate effects as in its ultimate conse quences, for the Brest fleet is so reduced as to be no longer effective. It was upon this fleet the enemy relied for the succour and protection of their West India colonies ; and the destruction of their ships was effected in their own harbour, in sight of thousands of the French ; and I congratulate myself and my country that this important service has been effected, under PROVIDENCE, with the loss only of 10 men kill ed, 35 wounded, and one missing, and not even one of the smallest of our vessels employed has been dis abled from proceeding on any service that might have become necessary. The extent of difficulties and prospect of danger in this enterprize were extreme, and the gallantry and determined spirit of those en gaged most conspicuous. These merits, and those difficulties ought not to be depreciated on account of the inconsiderable loss sustained on the occasion. I by no means seek to arrogate to myself any merit by qiese observations ; but I make them as a tribute of praise due to the zealous services of the brave officers and men under my command, and with a view of pointing out how justly they are entitled to the grati tude of their country." [The evideace which followed was given in the STAR of yes terday.] SIXTH DAY.—TUESDAY, AUGUST 1. Captain BLIGH in continuation, examined by Lord GAMBIZR. Q. When was it that the two ineof battle ships of the enemy, that continued afloat in the morning, moved towards the Cha rante, and when did the three grounded ships that went up the Charante get off the Palais ?--A. About half past twelve t. dock the two ships that were afloat moved up the Charante, and very shortly after the three ships that had been aground also moved up the Charante. 1 Q. You mentioned yesterday th e strengt h o f t h e enemy ' s bat tery on the Isle of Aix ; did you observe that any of the fortifi cations thereOn had been blown up and destroyed ?—A. I did not. ; I think, if they had been, I was so close I must have seen it. 1 Q. Did you hear Lord Cochrane express to Captain Beresford, In Aix Roads, the probability of three or four of our line of bat tle ships being lost in attacking the enemy, and what passed on that subject ?—A. When Captain Beresford asked Lord Cochrane i his reason for making the telegraphic signal that half the fleet 1 could destroy the enemy in the morning, he said he calculated on our losing three or four of the ships, if the Commander in Chief had sent the.squadron in. Is Q. if the two line of battle ships of the enemy, which had re mained at their anchorage in the morning, had moved towards the Charente at half past eleven o'clock, could frigates alone, as -1 sisted by the smaller vessels, have succeeded in their attempt to destroy the whole of the enemy's seven ships on shore on the Palais ?—A. No; I am confident they would have made no im pression on any of the enemy's ships ; but, on the contrary, I think it would have been attended with the loss of some of our own ships. . . Q. Did it appear, th at on the morning of the 12th of April, or at any time when the enemy's ships were on shore, and the signal had been made that they could be destroyed, there was, on my part, any neglect, or unnecessary delay, in making effectual mea sures for destroying them ?—A. I have already stated, that if our ships had been sent in on the morning of the 12th, it would, in my opinion, have been sending them to inevitable destruction.— I don't think the ships could have been sent in sooner than they were ; and there did filet appear to me the smallest neglect, or µn necessary delay, on the part of the Commander in Chief. Q. (By the Coo ter.) Front the first attack up an the ships of the enemy, to the final cessation of hostilities agai.tsr them, was every thing done that could be done to effect their destruction ?—A. I . think every thing was done tha: could be done ; and indeed more than I at first expected. Q. You have said that the responsibility of taking tke Valiant into the Road of Aix, rested entirely on the Captain, the Pilot having ref.sed to take her in ; what reason did the Pilot give for not taking her in ?—A. That the water was too shoal ; and as the wind and tide then were, he thought the ship would be lost. - Q. Were all the snetay's ships, which were on shore in the Palais shoal, near enough to the British ships to he destroyed by them ?—A. No. Three ships that moved up to the Charente, lay to the southward and eastward' of the Ocean, apd s h e was Geyer within gun shotof either the Valiant or Revenge. Q. Wasit before they moved up the Charente ?—A. Yes. Q. Do you meal} that those ships wore no t wi t hi n reac h o f t h e • _ s 44 1 tune of the British fiquadroa before they - mud up the Chareate r A. They were not, in try opinion. • Q. If the Ocean was ❑ot within reach of the guns of the Re. • venge and Valiant, was she within reach of any or the other ves sels ?—A. Not where they anchored; but the frigates soi g 4 have been moved near enough to have reached them. Q. Could they have done that without being aground !_A• Yes : at about half tide, I think they might. Q. To what ship did the Calcutta strike ?—A. I have alrr !N l y stated that the Calcutta never struck : the ellicer, I think, of th, ' Beagle reported to me that he hag taken possession of her, are that the crew had abandoned her. Q. Did you give blm any orders in consequence of such report ► A. I did not :it was n intention to bave sent a party of m a ri ne , immediately to her, al she lay considerably without the reach of the enemy's batteries ; and, 1 thick,-might have been brought ow. without the loss of a man. She was upright, not &lon. She wa. set on'llre a very few minntes after, but 1 do not know by ' , how order. Mr. S-..oicrs re-examined. Q. (By Lord Gnu nt Ea.) At what time did the enemy's two ships of the line, which remained at anchor on the 12th of Apr.. in the morning, cut or slip their cables and run towards the Cha rente ?—A. The Cassard, th:aring a Commodore's broad p en d ant, slipped! or cut, and made nil fur the Charente at 10 min, par one P.M.; the Foudrnyant, bearing a Rear Admiral's flag, made sail for the Charente at 20 min. past one, 1 noted the time by my watch, and am positive as to the facts, because I made a me morandum at the time. Q. Do you remember at what ti me t h a t h ree enemy's s!iip that were o A. n To theshore best of m upon theP y al:is :is, and recollection,dwa b r au p o edo t fr o , gut fr ont thence n*: u,dock. or little after. Q. (By the COURT.) Did they remove from them.: More the ships that were at anchor ran towards the Charente ?—A. lhey did. Q. You was on board some of the British ships at their anchor. age—Were any of the enemy's ships at too great a 4sta:ice to b. destroyed by'them ?—A. I was on hard the Imperieu s e d ur i nt part of the time of the action ; all the enemy'► ships were st ton great a distance to be destroyed by our ships, except those thr, were destroyed—the. Calcutta, Aquilon, a.,d Varsovie. It wa, rather doubtful to me, whether the Revenge's shot could uot have been kited with effect on the Tonnere ; the Revenp the nearest ship to the enemy. Q. Was there any other. situation in the Road of Aix, is which the British squadron could be placed, from which they could have destroyed the other ships?—A. No: there was not. Captain BERESFORD, of the Theseus, sworn an d exam i ned Q. (By Lord GAMBIEK). Were you sent into Aix Roacls with the Theseus, in the afternoon of the 1 t:th of April ?—A. nal was made about five o'clock, to proceed into Aix Roaii>, a..! assist ships in distress, on which we instantly made bail. Q. Had I sent in line of battle ships to Aix Roads, early in th e morning of the 12th of April, were any ships o f the enemy in a position to rake and injure our ships as they advanced?—A. Two of the enemy's ships were afloat ; ore bears a flag, and the other a broad pendant ; which, in my opinion, would hate entirely crip pled any ships sent in to act. Indeed, if two of our ships bad been placed as they were, I think we could have defied an enemy's 4. proach, for the approach must have been going end on. Q. If any of our ships, advancing under such circumstance, had become crippled, either by the ships of the enemy raking them, or the fire of their batteries, could they have returned, or what would have been the consequence ?—A. Under the circumstances of the wind and tide, I do not think they could have returned; land if they could, it must have been by the greatest good for tune : the consequences would have been in my mind very se rious, if they could not have returned. Q. Could two or three line of battle ships, on the morning of the 12th of April, when two of the Enemy's ships lay afloat at their anchorage, have advanced to attack them, by putting their helms alee, their fore or main-top sails being to the mast, having thus brought their heads to N. E. would they, by these meant, been enabled to bring their gnus to bear with effect upom the enemy's ships, and be themselves out of reach of shut from the Isle of Aix ?—A. Certainly not. Q Could any line of battle ships have run to leeward of the two ships of the enemy that lay at their anchorage on the mem ing of the 12th April; have space enough to have anchored, and by these means to have attacked those ships ?—A. I should not like to have risked it myself, and it appeared to me that there r.s; scarcely room for a friend to have passed' berweet thttst Mitt It?' shoal, letting alone an enemy. I should have thought the atter t most hazardous. The tide was running strongiiostd,AOCUluoy,44 right in. Q. Did you ever understand by whose orders the Calcutta was set on fire ?—A. The only thing I know with respect to that, was by a conversation with Lord Cuchrane, in the presence of Capt. /high and others. He said it was a thousand pities the Calcutta could not be brought off. He sent a younker on board to use his own discretion, and he set fire to her. Q. Do you think she might have been brought off?—A. I was not on the spot when she was set on fire, but Lord Cochrane said she might have been brought off easy. Q. Did you go on board.the Imperieuse on the afternoon of the 12th April: what was her position ; and what passed between Lord Cochrane and you ?—.A. She was on shore. I told him I' had just come from the Caesar, which was also on shore, in a cri tical situation, within the range of shot and shell; that, in my opinion, ships of the line bad no business there; tkat Lord Gam bier seemed to me to be most anxious to act with his fleet; then if he had sent them in there, few if any would have retafned, and that it would have been madness to have done it. His Lord ship said that three sail of the line might have been lon, which in. his opinion did nut signify. My reply was, that even one sail of the line would in my opinion have disgraced the enterprize. This passed in the presence of Captains Bligh,'W'ooldridge, Maitland, and others, and Colonel Cochrane. Q. Under the circumstances of the wind, the tide and flood making, did it appear to you that on the morning of the ic:h April, or at any time when the enemy's ships were on shore, and the signal had been made that they could be destroyed, was there on my part any neglect or unnecessary delay in taking ekoctnal measures to destroy them ?—A. None whatever; and it was my opinion, en board the Caledonia, as well as theropinion of many more, that the time of tide for sending ships in was a time that would ensure their coming out in case of accidents. Q. Do you remember the signal of the Imperitsuse on the morn ing of the 12th*of April, that the enemy's ships were ou shore, and that half the British fleet could destroy them ?—A. I. did not see it made, but it was of reported to me at the time. Q. What impression did it make upon you as to its propriety? —A. I thought the signal a very impro.:er one, because it was ire possible for the fleet to :men then acted against them. Q. (By the Court.)—From the first attack upon the enemy, to the final cessation of hostilities againt them, was every thing done that could be done to effect their destruction ?—A. I think every thing was, and much more titan I ever expected to be done. Q. Are you clear in your recollection that the report made to you of the signal was that half the fleet would be sufficient to des troy the enemy ?—A. Certain of it : but previous to that I think that the report was, that the fleet coup destroy the enemy. Q. When an Admiral is informed by signal that a specific force is sufficient to execute any service, is it generally understood that the force pointed out is the greatest that can be employed, or the smallest that will be required ?—A. it requires the force pointed out. Q. Then if you had been Commander in Chief, and that sig nal had been made to you, N% hat would you have considered as the smallest force you could. have sent in ?--A. I should have sent in more than half to ensure success. Q. Do you think that or. the morning of the 12th of April it would have been prudent or proper to have sent in more than la the fleet to the Aix Road to destroy the energy?—A. I think it would have been very improper ; and, as I said before, I did not thi::k ships of the line had any right there. Captain KERR, of the Revenge, deposed to the same effect as the last witness. He said it was his firm belief that had any of the line of battle ships gone in sooner than they did, they would have been crippled, by which means the French ships would have dis covered the strength of their position, and of course remainei instead of going up the river, and have prevented the four ships that were afterwards destroyed from being so. On being asked whether he observe,: the state of the fortifica tions on the Isle of Aix, he answered in the negative, the situation of the Revenge being so critical that he was otherwise taken up. Q. Mr. RAVEN, Master of the Czsar, deposed to the circum stances which had happened when he had been in Basque Roads two years before, when Sir R. Strachan pursued the enemy's fleet thither. The rise and fall of the ride was generally 18 feet at spring tide. The enemy's ships frequently seemed to take tae ground at low water. It appeared that the anchorage was very confined. Captain DoucLas, of the Bellona, and Captain Goo) R EY, of the Etna, ckpostel to the sameefiect as the former witnesses. Lieutenant HA wits s, Signal Officer of the Caledonia, on being