The Press. — London, England, 1856-03-22 00:00:00

280 mngeniture. Then, and then only, England will have taken the first step on that steep descent which precipi tates nations, through the shocks of revolutions, into the abyss of despotism. There has been as yet but one precursive symptom of if— the proposition made last year to the House of Commons by Mr. Locke King, to ootain an inquiry into the law of successions. This proposition, rejected by a considerable majority, does not seem to have found an echo, r.or to have left any serious trace. But it is a presage that foreseeing men and sincere friends of liberty in England will do well not to lose sight of, for it is through that sap that the enemies will enter the place. But the author's faith in the capacity of the English people for self-government is so strong that he supposes the nation would subsist in full force though its political institutions should be greatly changed ; and he instances the case of America, where a vigorous political society flourishes without any of the safe guards which protect it in England But we think M. de Montalembert overlooks the differ ence between an old and a new country. In his remarks on the English aristocracy we entirely concur. A more graceful sentiment never fell from patrician lips than the remark addressed by Lord Stanley to the multitude of artisans who crowded his father's park when it was thrown open to them on a holiday excur sion : I never have gone over this old domain of my father's, this park and these woodi, without thinking that some thing was wanting to their beauty, their grandeur, and their picturesque solitude: that something was the presence of a number of human faces and of joyous voices. To-day my wishes are satisfied. The attachment of M. de Montalembert to the Romish Church is a source of continual error to him, for which large allowance must be made. At the close of his eloquent essay he contrasts the state of Spain with the state of England in 1510, when the latter country, exhausted from the wars of the Roses, and without external development, was scarcely reckoned among the important powers of Europe; while Spain. governed by Ximeues, and mistress of the New World by the disco veries of Columbus, was on the verge of uni versal empire. Three centuries later Spain was nothing, while England disputed with F►ance the first place iu the affairs of the world. Protestants, says the author, have a ready answer for the change. Protestantism makes England's greatness; Catholicism (Roman) causes Spain's decline. M. de Mon talembert, on the other hand, seeks the ex planation in the political liberty which has given to England her prodigious power, while despotism in Spain has prost►ated the national strength. But can M. de Montalem bert be so ignorant as not to understand the close connection between religious and politi cal liberty, and not to know that the latter is the child of the former? It was at the close of the sixteenth century that the change in the position of the two nations commenced. Elizabeth ruled Eng land, and Philip Spain. Both were despotic sovereigns. But the one recognised the genius of civil liberty, while the other thought only of establishing the Inquisition. Elizabeth left England in a state of magnificent growth, and Philip left Spain fast falling to decay. Both nations have remained faithful to the impetus given to them at that time. Differing from M. de Montalembert on some points, we are happy to recognise in his essay noble views on genuine Conservative prin ciple. If we may venture to translate the idea of his work into few words, it is that in Governments there is the principle of order without liberty, as in despotic States ; and the principle of liberty without order, as in turbu lent democracies ; that liberty allied to order, and each prevailing in the highest degree compatible with the existence of both, and with their intimate union, realises the highest conception we can form of perfect government , and that that union is practically found in the English Constitution, and in the general weak ing of the English system of administration. Journal of Adventures with the British Army from the Commencement of the War to the Taking of Sebastopol. By G. C. Taylor, late 95th Regiment. Tw•o Vols. London : Hurst and B adieu. Or all the " T. Gs. " who visited the Crimea, Mr. Taylor seems to have been the most ad- THE PRESS. venturous and enduring. When the allies first sat down before Sebastopol he declared that he would, at any cost, be in at the death,—in other words, witness the capture of the town, — and he kept his word. Ho was in camp during the assault on the Bth of September, and next day, despite all obstacles, entered the captured city, and explored its ruins. He was at Alexandria, returning from Upper Egypt, in February, 1854, when the news came that 10,000 British troops had been ordered for Malta. As soon as Lord Raglan arrived at Constantinople he solicited employ ment, but received only au evasive answer; and, seeing no prospect of speedy hostilities, ho left for England. He makes (i., 225-6) some sensible observations on the expediency of affording to officers who have recently left the army .encouragement to re-enter it in a time of actual warfare. Officers who quit the profession in time of peace because they desire a more stirring life, would be the most desirable class when hostilities have broken out, and activity and enterprise, combined with experience, ate required. Yet, " when ex• " officers asked fur employment, their applica " tions were discouraged." The difficulty, says the author, " lies in our abominable " purchase-system." No doubt this is one of its inconveniences, as, except in peculiar cases, it would be impossible to give rank to a gentleman who had lately obtained the value of his commission. An ex captain would scarcely like, we imagine, to re-enter us an ensign ; yet he could not be granted a higher rank without injustice to % those over whose heads he would be suddenly set. . _ . The author's testimony a;.; to points of mis management is trustworthy, as he was disin terested, had military experience, had many friends in his old regiment, the 95th, and from his lengthened stay with the army, without official duty, had excellent opportunities for observation. The war, he shows, was un dertaken in a spirit of blundering or insincerity, ab initio The Government, too, although they had Sir Hamilton Seymour's correspondence with Lord John Russell staring them in the face—so that they ought to have been in no error on the subject—made no greater preparations for going to war with an empire like Russia, than if she was only a third-rate power. 'l' hey sent ten thousand men to Malta to overawe Russia! Put they took no steps to place the army Con a proper war footing—witness the absurd way in which they drafted men from one regiment to another, afterwards having to send out those very regi ments which had been deprived of numbers of their best men, and rendered comparatively inefficient. This measure alone was sufficient to show that they were not equal to the emergency. When the war began, any num ber of men might have been raised at a low bounty, and militia would have volunteered by thousands, but they were rejected. Soldiers were then cheap in the market; and the Government would not buy them—they waited until they became dear; and men could not be induced to enlist witholt increased bounty and pay. It is the deliberate opinion of the author that the accounts contained in our newspapers of the terrible sufferings of our troops during the winter of 1854-5, were not in the slightest degree exaggerated. " The wonder is, not that the men died during winter, but that any of them survive it." One is proud to read the following testimony to the fortitude of our troops : There is one thing which has been ever present to my mind from the first day I landed in the Crimea. I speak of the fortitude with which our army, officers as well as men, have sustained the great hardships and sufferings to which they have been exposed. I have never beard a tourmur ; and they submitted with cheerfulness to the greatest privations whenever they knew they were necessary or unavoidable, but they justly and naturally complained of the imbecility of those through whose igno rance and obstinacy they have undergone so much unne cessary suffering. But amid all their distress their cou rage is unsubdued. I look back with pride upon the year► I passed in the army ; and am glad to feel, though having sold my commission in a time of pr►found peace, and now, contrary to my own wishes, unemployed, I am still in spirit a soldier. The author witnessed the various opera tions of the Bth of September. His account of our failure at the Redan is, we believe, cor rect in all material points The cause of that failure is to be summed up in few words. The attack was made with the wrong troops, and the attacking party was far too weak in point of numbers. Without saying that General Simpson should have used his best troops in the first instance, there can be no doubt that he should have used troops which could be depended on. Mr. Taylor writes : SATURDAY, As all said, we had attacked the Redan with too small I force. General Windham commanded the storming p ar ty of the second division, and he with some of our men got in at the salient angle; but in rear of this was a breast. work, behind which the Russians rallied, brought up heavy reserves, and drove so small a force out again. Not only was the attacking column too week, but being nearly all wiling, very young, soldiers, they would not follow their officers, and drooped for shelter into corners of the trenches as they were advancing, into shell•holes, or behind any covers they could see : so all said, even the very officers who were themselves with the storming pa r . ties. Nor was this all. When they got into the Redan they could not be induced to advance : a panic seized them ; and a cry was raised that mines were going to b e sprung, and they retreated. Even the men in the ad. vanced trenches caught the alarm. " The Russians are coming out," was the cry. They turned and bolted.; and so great was their hurry that they did not wait to keep under the cover afforded by the trenches, but ran straight over the open ground. Some officers placed themselves in the way, and threatened to cut down any who ran ; and at last order was restored. The whole concern was a series of blunders. Why did we attack the Redan with two used•up divisions, like the second and light, who had 1, at their best men long ago, having men engaged in every battle, attack, and sortie? Moat of the regiments con. sisted of raw recruits who hardly knew their own officers. Many of the officers themselves were so young that from want of experience they were unfit to be employed on such arduous service. Being such, it was not likely they would hold the Redan. To send these two divisions—who had been so frequently expended on former occasions—to the attack, was not oily the surest means to entail failure, but was unfair to them and to the army. It did not give the survivors of so many hard-fought actions a chance of their lives. It appeared as if they were to be utterly exterminated. I have often heard men and officers of these divisions say that they hoped other divisions would come in for the next assault. They naturally wished to be spared on this occasion. The third division, whose exertions had hitherto been confined to the left attack—by far the easiest of the two—and the Cemetery affair on the 18th June, would have been glad of an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and. being mostly old soldiers, would have carried the Redan and kept it to a certainty, if they had been properly supported. The reason assigned by General Simpson in his despatch for selecting the second and light divisions, is, that they had defended the right attack for so many months, and were intimately acquainted with the ground. If this reason teas good, and warranted the selection, why was not a sufficient force employed? What an absurdity to send an aggregate force of 1,520 men at such a place, and leave them unsupported at the most critical time. The covering party was 200, the ladder party 320, and the assaulting column 1,000. Four times the number were not more than enough to do the thing properly, and make success certain. The French attacking force, with reserves, amounted I believe to 24,000 men, and they went at it en maw, instead of sending a few at a time. I have obtained the opinions of many—than whom none are more competent to decide—and I believe that had we attacked with the first and third divisions, the former of which did not labour under the disadvantage of not know ing the ground, we should have hell the Redan ; and, by bringing up lield-batteries and turning sonic of the Russian guns, have prevented the retreat of the Russians from the Karabelnaia into the main part of the town, and taken them prisoners. Our loss would of course have been greater, but our success would have been more complete ; and, as Pelissier observed, " one cannot make omelettes without breaking eggs." Mr. Taylor's volumes, though necessarily going over ground previously well-worn, are distinguished for good sense and frank speech. On the calamities of the winter 1854.5 he remarks : The only remedy against such disasters for the future is for England to have an efficient army instead of a mere collection of regiments, and a reserve which will supply something better than raw recruits in a case of emergency ; and until John Bull has his eyes opened to the real state of affairs, there is no chance of improvement. I have no patience with those people who say that, although such a thing may be true, yet it is not ad visable to publish it. I believe that no harm ever yet came of telling the truth, but that we owe a great deal of misfortune and mismanagement to a contrary policy: There are some sound suggestions in the book. One is. that there is far too much cor respondence in military matters. We quite agree with Mr. Taylor that the first duty of a commander is to be in his saddle, engaged in the real business of the field, not poring over his desk. Military secretaries should relieve him from all the trouble of correspondence. The author is of opinion that political power has iu reality departed from the race of (Minima. On this point some difference of opinion exists. We confess we think that Mr. Taylor is right. For ourselves we have con stantly spoken of the integrity of the Turkish territory as distinct from the integrity of the Ottoman empire. Through whatever muta tions the Government may be destined to pass, it is essential to the peace and safety of Europe that the present territorial limits of Turkey as an independent State should be pre served. Many curious instances of the governmental weakness of Turkey are given