Star. — London, England, 1809-07-28 00:00:00

. . . . • . . .. ----- so_ . away,or to cause theta to break from the confusion rise; ha d nd . orders t o act otherwise; for, I did imsgin, Ota; .as. 'destroy -these, but those also which were i n to which they were thrown. The confusion of the it possible, though not at all likely, that thelsignahof Tying Bt /wave, No. 2e 'he distance was such that ~ y forced the Varsovie ashore, and thereby pre- recal had been made without our seeing it. The bomb I might lie therefor a, week and not have hit twice... ree f e d die,escape o f t h ese two ships, which were the and brigs seeing the Imperieuse at anchor, and the Q.. You said, that after a time they might put their! lot , With theexception of the Aquilon, which vessel, Pallas bringing up, .anchored likecise, where we lay helms up and run under the stern of the ships it an.' I a l t hough. near; was a little further up, and they on out of shot or shell insafashoms water, at the dead of chor, and engage teeth these ships and the ships that bard the Aqttilon were in such confusion, that It was ebb , then being spring-tide, and there was anchorage as were on shore, was that a situation in which any of board the Aquilosi were in such confusion, that it was ebb s then b.ing spring.ti4e, and there was anchorage as Were on shore, wa that a situation in which any of upaards of en hour and a half before they could get Ihave already stated,for ; agleast 6 sail of the line. I wish our ships were .atany time placed ?—A. I have said, On e single gun out of the stern ports of that vessel. also to call the attention of the Court to my reit. that provided I 'found it more. expedient, I would ee . r e e w h o le of the eeemy's ships of war were, at son, after the Imperieuse weerefitted on the evening have done 60 ; the Valiant and ships that joined the I two o'clock, in the position shewn in Chart No. 3, of the 13th, and after the receipt of the letter marked Imperieuse about three o'eldeft P. M. on, the 12th , w hich I shall present to the Court; and the British A, for not during the evening of that day, or in t h e April,- pl ac ed th emse l v e s ', or rather passed iheposi: fleet are there p e edown, as it appeared from the Im- morning following previous to the second signal are. tion alluded to, and Went on towards the end dt tlic I perieuse, from the a nchora g e which she took u p , and , call being made, for•not having, with that ship and shoal, which in the case stated in the question, would'. i n which anchorage she cony nued until one o'clock, , the Pallas, attacked the enemy,. that I felt, after the not have bees necessary. close to the I3uoyart shore, just within the longest drop ' letter above alluded to, expressing my opinion with Q. Yotir Lordship having stated that if two or of s !lells. The Eagle, although nearest, did not fire Lord Gambier, and the other Captains who had come three sail of the line, in comm in, had borne close oh et a ll (produces the chart:). • The reasons, if there are from the inner anchorage, that a ver y heavy r e sp on - the Buoyart, had laid their main and fore-topsails' ' al ly, why the frigates might not, previous to the hour - sibility would lie on my shoulders insoase of any aback, and taken the tide Under their lee, so as to en- i a - he y- pas t eleven o'clock, have attacked the enemy, disaster, svhich s in military operations, are :sometimes able them to bear r 'nod and go up to the enemy's' will b e found in the preceding narration , wherein unavoidable. I think there is nothing further which i two line-of-battle sOips, then afloat, was there space I i t a ppears that two sail of the line continued I immediately recollect, except the orders given by I enough for either cne, two, or three sail'of the line to . at anchor u ntil half past eleven, which two ships, Captain Wolfe, who superseded me in the inner :et-' have taken up an anchorage, with even part of their it appear ed to my mind, would have been better to chorage, with full powers, by any means, to effect the broadsides to bear on those two ships, without taking attack by opposing .to them two or three sail of the destruction of the enemy. The order was dated also the ground ? li n e, instead of a great number of frigates, although ;by mistake (1 believe) the 13th April, but actually A. I did not consider the tide under the lee as a ' it was me opinion t hat the fri g ates themselves would ! given on the 14th. The order was shewn to me on point essential to -the bearing up. There Was sufficient have been quite equal to the task. The enemy's two the 14th by Captain Wolfe, who on that day super- room. I can speak With positive certainty, for we in ships were employed all the morning, attempting to ! seded me. the Imperieuse, when working out from the position ' eet t h e i r to pmasts op, which in the course of six 1 Q. When did your Lordship first discover in the I which we occupied, asshewn b chart, No, S, tacked hours from day - light in the morning, Ido not think ;Inner Road of Aix, that there was anchorage suffi- I repeatedly, and traversed all the space between the iley bad quite effected at the time that they made i ciently capacious to contain six sail of the line to ride, : shoal cf the Buoyart and die buoys of the enemy's sa a on the approach of the British fleet, and ran !, without being in range of shot or shell ?—A. I have ; ships, where they had . been anchored in line, and . : a ground in tie middle of the channel leading to the ' been in possesson of the French charts, which I have i thirai which they bad tut. I should not have stood LI 'Naha about half enehour efteethesßris not found defective in any material points, for a pe, , so far towards these bititi,.. hid. it not been that the :7Z e t eaehoted. This gave rise she MY oplhion, "nod' of years ; and froth these charts I have at all #hnenta - seemettlittle incline& to disturb us, which I ' t hat they were not in a state to fight. • times drawn conclusion with respect to the depth of not only attributed to ruinous state of their works; Q. I t being stated in ; 'the log of the %Forfeits°, the water and other circumstances which relate to I but concluded that they were in want of powder or [ that about foist o'clock P. N. on the 13th, the signal navigation upon the enemy's coast ; and on them, in, other military stores. I should not have chosen, `llVas made the inshore squadron to work onto[ the this case, as in all others, I placed my dependance. ; however, any distant station, but should probably ebb tide, that a signal of recal was also made to you, I went in ;on my way I found them c-'rrect. I knew i have brought up along-side of them, and on that side • Wr ic h you answered by a telegraphic communication, by the chart, when in pursuit of the.Calcue ta, I was directly opposite to Aix. The three-decker and other •and it not appearing by the log of the Caledonia that to find a bank. We found it, and this I did, knowing ships on shore, two of -which afterwatds appeared to ; su d s s ignal w as made : state whether such signal was what I was about. Upon my track ere. :1 , the I have their masts locksg together, could have given no inade for recalling, and whether the inshore squa. Buoyart I found it correct ; and, in I os, I had con.. imaterial disturbance in such a position, and these three &on came out in consequence thereof, and what was fidence in the chart, by which it has -ig appeared to might have been destroyed by one 74, had she ; the purport of the telegraphic signal you made to the me that this anchorage might, it hie übject was in been sent to attack them, or even by a frigate ot ! it oihmander in Chief ?—A. On the morning of the in view, be taken. a two, while the two . French line-of-battle ships were' 13th April, the ships of the line, one of them bearing Q. In t he c hart y our Lord •lip consulted on this occupied at their anchors as is above supposed : t h e flag o f Admiral Stopford, weighed and worked occasion, are the soundings so ma: k-d ;Wit as to afford when I arrived .at the outer anchorage I men.' out o f t h e inn e r anchorage by order, to the best of my a space sufficient for six sail, not within range of shot tinned to Lord Gambier that as there could he Tull belief, front Admiral Stopford, whose ship shewed and shell ?—A. That conviction '"is upon my mind; jealousy with respect to Admiral Stopford, it would' - s ome lights, which I understood was a signal for that but on referring to the chart, which is exactly the be a matter essential to the service to send the to the line of battle ships. Most of these same as others which have been in my possession, I Admiral in with the frigates and other vessels, which E ir g e continued until low water in situations in find that no soundirgs are wanted ; but the Court can, ever . his Lordship thought best, as his zeal for the "which it wat known by the chart, that there was not by referring thereto, decide the question. serv:ee would accomplish what I considered yet Water enough. The signal of recal was reported to Q. When veu found, ley expecienceecal going into moor creditable them any thing that had been done; me about four oriveeelock in the afternoon, to have Aix Roads, by the soundings you found in the chart I apclogised for the freedom which I used with his t e a made by the Caledonia, and I answered by to you made use of were correctly set clown, and from Lordship, and stated that I took that The-o- .. a' keraphic signal, that the enemy could be destroyed, thence you drew a conclusion that there was safe an- friend, for it would be impossible, things remain and I was the further confirmed in this opinion, by an chorage for six sail of the line, did you make any ing as they were, to ; prevent "i noise being made official letter, directed, 4 4 on service," which I hold communication of that important fact to the Corn- about it in England. I said, "My Lord, you desired in my hand, directed to me from his Lordship, or- mander-in-Chief ?—A. The Commander-in-Chief had Ime to speak candidly to you, and I have used that frede daring the Icitperieuse, together with the bomb, and the same charts, I believe, as I was in possession of : ; dom. I have no wish or desire. butsfor the service of dated on the loth, writzen, to the best of my belief, upon which, as I have already stated, I formed my l our country,"—to which his Lordship replied, that-if fit hi e Lo r dship's ova hand, and which I beg may be conclusions respecting the anchorage above alluded I I threw blame, it would appear as arrogantly claim mad to - the Conn.—The letter was then read, in sub- to. He had also French pilots on board, in whoseling all the merit to myself. 1 assured his Lordship I - staici nearly as follows t-- reports, from previous experience, I knew the Corn- ' had no such intention, and- mentioned at the same ' • " Caledonia, April la. mender-in-Chief to rely above all other anthority. time that it was not my design to carry dispatches, ni " *dear Lord—Yon bare done your part so admirably that On reconnoitering the fleet the first day, we were to go to London with Sr Harry Neal upon the °cc-a rum Ids eider you to urnish it by attempting imposaibilities.— so near as to induce the enemy to open his fire from sion. His Lordship immediately sifter delivered to YOUXAnt therefore join me as soon as you can with the bomb, almost his whole line. I reported to the Commander me an order dire ess .g the above. When I weighed, 3:e.ts I *WWI to hare some information from y'ou before 1 close . . . .,. . iliy dispateha. I At, ice." in Chief the ruinous state of Aix, its fortincations I had the satisfaction . of hearieg that the signal had -.pe e wee,' bare ordered three brigs and two bona* to join being completely blown up and destroyed, which ,I been made for Admiral Stopford, but whether to exe rt' in the attempt l bin I don't think it will succeed. Yon must might easily ascertain from the deck with perfect pre. cute the above purpose by the frigates, or. by other come to mein the turn of the tide, as IRMA. to send you to Eng- Icision, not only as to the side towards us, but also as means, I know not. . ludas siatiti as possible." . 'I o which I replied by the following letter, also dated the lstb, Ito the opposite side, from the main-top of the ship.— Lord Getman declined asking LOrd Cocht-ane any Ind with whiCh letter I sent a Commissioned Officer : There were only thirteen guns mounted upon that questions et present. . „ Imperieuse, e epru ele side on which I had formerly seen, to the best of my Admiral STOPFORD sworn and examined. .. emy Lords - -1 hew - jest received your L•rdshiles letter :w e 'recollection, about fifty. In making these observe- Q: Having heard the order from the Admiralty to WI destroy the enemy's ships on shore, of which I hope yon will i dons to his Lordship for his information, he stated: r Lord Gambier to attack the fleet in Basque Roads, approve. tams &c. (Signed) " COCIIRANE:' I his perfect reliance upon the opinion of the Pilots,. • state to the Court any neglect you know in the attack Lord Cochaerohcontinued.—l did not on.the 14th l and assured me that the Isle d'Aix was exceedingly, of the enemy's ships, or any defect or unnecessary • repeat the signal that—" the enemy could be de- 1 strong, and that 1 think it had three tier of guns delay on the part of his Lordship, between the 10th , 1 seroyeir—and having the day before conveyed to his I mounted towards the shi pp in g . I then observed to' March and 17th April,and whether he used every 1 Lordship my firm opinion, both by signal and by let- I h is Lordshi p that the circumstances which I then re- means in his power to carry into effect the above- ; I ter, thought repetition (although I continued of the ++ late ` were within thy own observation, which did not/ mentioned orders ? i same way of thinking) would have appeared to his ; alter his Lordship's opinion. I A. Under all the circumstances of the case, viewed in Lordship disrespectful ; I therefore made the interro- Q. Can the shipi of the line arrive at that anchor-' ever) point cf which lam capable, and giting to the 1 gatory signal, conceiving his Lordship would under - age et all tittles of the tide ? , 1 .. ! Commeeder in Chief the exercise of that discretion , ! stand it—e Shall we unmoor ?"—and was answered, A. By following the track which I judged best in'' which every Commander in Chief mtiseliave , in elm- ; 25 I bare ahtady stated, in the affirmative, or I think taking in th e Imperieuse, that being farthest off from : cation of measures for which he alone is responsible, by the direction to 'weigh. - • the fire of the enemy'. Ido belitive that ships of the; Ido not thank there was any delay or deficiency en 1 11 It appears fain' the log of the Imperieuse, that line may pass in at any time of the tide. I sat on ' the part *I" the Commander in Chief, in execuung the at three P.M. the Etna, with brigs in company, was l the netting, attending . to the leads, during the time i service entrusted to his Lordship ' S care. bombarding the enemy's ships in the Chenncl ; when we Were going in ;it was there high water, and hav e ! . Q. (By the Coerce.) hyasehefleet in Basque Roads were the recalled , and by whose orders ?—A. I sent 1 i n marked that the rite and fall of the tide was sta." unmoored on the day previous to the going in of the them i n to bombard the-enemy.: • I believe they came ted at tee feet, the iinpresieli upon my Mind Seasiefrigates h—A. Yes, the ship; were unmoored on the • oat after the Imperieuse had weighed, and the Eagle that I should not With a Ship of the line hesitate tosillth. . . , had taken hit anchorage. I told them the day bore go in. I dtiok my impression at the same time was; I • .Q. Do you know w were unmoored ?-e-A, hy they to come out on the ebb tide; but they did so is little that at low water it would not be proper to take ono! From a converietion I had with the Commander ii% j after high water. Or the heaviest shipi iri, .thhith was not necessary. I i Chief before tinniooring, 1 understood it was for the' Q. In yo Or Loedthip't letter to Mr. Pule, in answer don't think we had less than a 40 gLin ship. We . purpose of being ready to take advantage of anefa- fa to his letter, and requesting you to State to the Lords passed so close to the Buoyart , I Could have thrbw n , i vourahle 'circumstance- I must also add, there was of the Admihelty, yes* grounds for objeeting to the a penny piece on it. . ; I some conversation which had no practical effect, re- Vote of Minas, you 'referred generally : to the log. Q. All the informition your Lordship has of the ispotting the fleet making a show of getting under You are requested tb state whethet you meant to tieing and falling Orthe water was obtained froth the I weigh to deceive the enemy, for the purpose of pee dratv their Loidships i attention to more than the do.' charts only, and without any cellar information ? 1 venting the en e my's boats coming out to intercept twitches isoW stated, , and oil Which you liotiegiten A. I had remarked, when before on that coast; ' the fire-shipi, , ' . your se nt ithe n se ?= A. Their apedel l ipe ha ' ,•de- the rise and fall of the tide at a place not far distant, I Q. Wei the fleet mo ored again iri the cotirse Of that sired hue to explain My reasoill; named their' • ,tb b€ Abut tan Or twelve feet, at the higheit tide, and', day ?-4. The signal was made, and the fleet mooted ships to the l o gs and signahlogs elf the ' ' • 1I I thought ► a f te r wa rds , els, when the Frehch shipe lay! *gain, abont sunset, eecept the Ciesai. •- . i considering those, under etrery cithuirittante; the. I around; that they stood abOut twelve feet. The :.Q. Do you InioW what induced die Coinmendeei sources whence their LoidshiPs ledghi possibly derive 1-Mbilon had sunk about ten feet; and it must .have : ia . Chietf . to order the fleet to Inver a gain, or if you do I information. It was not My desire, unless I had been I been at the dead of low water when I went oft bobiel• net know his reason; e did you She or know an . y sufficis ! !eat cause.for its, being dOtie?—A. The commander I pressed, to have drewh their Lo rdships' attention to lOf her:. . . s any part of these, or ally bthei doitnents. I eon- I•• ' Q; ton said t h at ships of the line Might hate in Chief did not at the dine commtini . eat! to me his ; .idered the affair hi Basque Roads in every respect as brought to, with their heads to theN.E. near the &toy- reason for iniecirihg; but froth the ache order in Which ! past, and whatever my o pinion m ight hare been, in.. art Shoal, and might have engaged the two French some hone part . Of. the ° fleet was originally Moored, and 1 capable of all remedy. Had it been *matter in which ships that remained at anchor, vtitliOtit &tiger from ! Considering the strength of the tide, .I think there the future interests of my etonntrl were i n e o ti. e di I shot or shell frem the Isle.of Aix; .ivotild they have : Might have betni some risk of the ships nearest to each I should not have hesitated otie moment in calling ` been nearer to tie Isle of Aix titan they would to : Other etting on board of each other had they conti their attention to every Part of these documents, an , . 1 hued *so closer: .• • those ships ? of any ethers which I Might po ssess : .I have now also i.A. I should tuit bath thought of bridging any I Q. The morning efter the fire-ships were ?Ora in, to call the attention of the Cbtrt, that had the frigates ' •' communications were ships broads id e to an epenly, when at a distance so • some signals and telegraphic in the meriting of th e ISth, instead Of leaving the inner great as from the Isle d ' Aix to the BUOyart,..but ' Made f r o th the liepetieuse to the Commander in i • - anchorage iu company with ships Of the lineerenhained : continued oil the settle course that should have there, full opportunity offered those lisplisp to destroy se- i W o uld do itt going to the inner anchorage, until the ! fe es I must sp eak more from recol l ection , than from vital sail of the enemy which were not out of reach , enemy 'S diet begati to tell, and then I should have I any- thing I saw myself. • I can speak to those which of vend s prope r ly placeds at propet times of the tide, , brought the broadsideof the ships to beer, in the man- were - officially reported to me by the Captain of the or of smaller vessels, duting every part of the tide ; i nor before described; liaying their heads towards the .Cosar. The first signal reported tri e re to be mad e , and I see no cause to alter my Opinion. I ham also I north and east, or if their shot did not tell, so as ma- by the Imperieuse, was " seven sail of e enemy s h Idprobably' to call the attention of the Court to the circumitatace • terially to injure , I thou have proceed- . ships on shore, die fleet can destroy them." Soon that Captain Seymour; of the Pallas, hailed in passing led t" bring th e larboird guns to hear by p a ssing • after signal repeated, "that half the fleet could destroy the Imperieuse, to know if he should remain in the on the side opposite to• Isle d'Aix, till I placed my' them." Between half-past six and eight o'clock, i s hip s or s hips, in such a situation as not only to cap- do pot fCCIACCt any o th e r i hrlhl glade by the NV" i inter anchorage, and was directed by me to do . so, if ' • noose t — dtherw - ean bait-past tweive sum one vaa.a.., sage slay,..and standing in towards the enemy. Th e Imperieuse made signal that the enemrs . shipi viei superior to the chasing ship, but inferior to the fleet unitaid '". als o that-the linperieuse was in distress and wanted assistance. Q.. Did you see, or was it officially reported to you in the course of that day, that the lanOe.rieuse had informed the Commander in Chief by tetegraph. that two. sail of the line,woold be sufficient toAdestroy the enemy ?—A. No such signal was repotted tom e even to have been made. .. . . . .. Q, Wasan , o ffi cial information given to you of , the . • r ilk Chief having recalled the ' lu p e ... s rieuse on, the, morning of the I,2th ?.--A. No such communiatiiip was ever mane to Me., . Q. Ilia, Revenge, Theseus, Valiant, and Cam, arc stated to have been scut into die Road of 'Aix.— Did thentain ?—A. They went in at different times of the siat, The Caesar some hours after the Valiant. Q. :. Were they recalled by signal or otherwise,. by the Commander in Chief ?-4. They were recalled hy no order, from the Commander in Chief; but part of them, the C.ksar, Theseus; and Valiant; came out by orders from me. . , - . ~ • . Q. What was yonr reasons , for calling Pose ships from the service on which they svere ordered without directions from the Commander in Chief ?—A. The imminent said inevitable danger the ships were exposed to by-continuing, in that ,station ; also the certainty that they could not be employed with effect in the further destination of the enemy's ships. . Q. Did you consider the danger to which they wci 4be exposed from the enemy's batteries, or bad ne..s.orreads; or both ?.—A. From both., The even. inglireteding it, when the . CFsar was going in, she got onshore for three hours,. in range of the enemy's shot; and this contrary to my expectations, being told hi , the pilot there was sufficient water. The Captains of the Theseus and Valiant also informed me that their ships had been agrourid. O. On what shoal was the Caesar aground ?- 1 -A. A continuation of the Buoyart, or a separate bank in the same line with the Buoyart. At the time the Caesar gotashore it was nearly dark, and the enemy ; did not perceive her situation. If it had been day light, I should have despaired of getting her oft 1 Q. Did you know that within the road of Aix, i there 4 , as,an anchorage capable of containing six siil , of the line,.perfecily out of re*h of shot and shells ! from any of the enemy's batteries ?---A. Previous to iour frigates going in I certainly did not know it, al ! though some Pilots were of. opinion that there was, '• otheri, that there was not. With respect to the num ber, I understood it never contained more than four shipS - in five fathom, without range of shells. Had I knoWn of that anchorage before I went in I should hak , e expected. to derive little good from any ships going there, as it was quite out of the line of annoy. i mg any of the enemy's ships that were onshore. iQ. One of the reasons yeu have given for with. . drawing.the ships from the road of Aix was, that they could not annoy the, enemy's siiips. Were you before ', it was dark, in a situation from which you could see the enemy's ships so as to feel quite satisfied ships of the line could do them no more mischief ?—A. Before II went in, anti in going. in, I observed the enemy's ( ships close under the batteries, and I was so little I acquainted with that anchorage, that I was of opini on, both with respect to the navigation as well as the i exposure to the batteries; ships could not be employed t without imminently risking their safety. ~ t : Q. You have commanded A Squadron for a consi derable time .in l3aaque Roads; have you been able to ascertain how high the, tide rises and falls at spring tides?--A. Generally from 18 to 21 feet, according to the set of the wind; the N. W. wind m a k es a higher tide. . . . Q. When the Imperieuse made the signal that the enemy's ships were on shore, and the fleet might destroy them, would you, with .the experience you have as a flag officer, ha4e thought it prudent or pro per to send or lead in * fleet to. destroy them ? . 1. 1 a A. In my opinion the OIS o gment from the ancho rage of the enemy's ships by fire-ships, removed but la ;Mall part of_ the obstacles. This is not only my opinion, but that of ,others who preceded in the com mand. The difficolties_ of the navigation, and an imperfect acquaintance. with the anchorage, world, -I ! think, have made me unworthy of a command, where the enemy had all the advantage, and ours bad all the loss, 7„,.." • . ~ . • Q. When the signal vas made by the Imperieuse, that half of the fleet could have destroyed the en.: my, would you have, conducted half the fleet for that pnr ' pose, with the wind and weather as it then was ? A. In thiS, as in-the former answer, I Must take the state of: the wind only : with the wind as it then w ts, and the broadside of their ships still commanding the passage; yze.should have been • so crirpled in going in and in working ont. a passage a little more th ln a mile, I think f should not have risked the ships, had they been under my command. Q. The Imperieuse made the signal of being in djStresi,, and wanting immediate assistance—w: re ;toy ships immediately sent to assist her ?—A. I will not pretend ,to say whether the frigates were ordered in before or afterwards by the Commander in Chid, but there re several ships near at the time. Idu not recollect any signal being made immediately in an s wer to the signal from the Imperieuse. Adjourned until to-morrow. • - Tuesday. se'nnight, Mr. Murray, tenant in Ferney bTae., a farm belonging to the Earl of ERROL, had i. one to-die summit of one of the highest rocks be tween Shins Castle and Peterhead, in order to tether of reinove some sheep, which he had stationed upon a Very deep declivity near the rocks, and his foot slip ping, he was precipitated from a height of nearly 100 feet, *nd killed on the spot, his skull being fractured, limbi biaoleaa, &c. . . CORN-MARKET, MARK-LANZ, JULY 28.—The mar ket today is in the same state as in our late reports, until the embargo is taken off. So few buyers attend, or sales effected, that the prices are considered almost nominal ; but Flour supports the late advance; and • fine American 50s. to 525. per barrel. GIMERAL CURRIN6r AS ONDSILS ' Wheat, 721.801. 961. Beans, 57,. 635. Fine ditto, 98s. 1045. Tick ditto, 455. 50s. Rye, 435. 521. Oats, 945. Us. S2s. 'Barley; 375. 416.44 Polasidsitee, sag. as. ; Malt, 70s. 78s. Potato: ditto, 40s. Witite Peas (boilers)94l.lo4s. Rape Seetl,44l. se SOL i Gr./440,43s Hs. ills flour, 751. te 80s0.-See r 701 755.