The Press. — London, England, 1856-04-19 00:00:00

' . :,-:. PPM _ ( tie Vress. LONDON, SATURDAY, APRIL 19, 1856. BY the motion of Mr. WHITESIDE, postponed till Monday week, the House of Commons will be called on to express an opinion whether her Majesty's Government is in any degree chargeable with the great military disaster of the War—the loss of Kars. The question raised is very simple, but most important ; and the discussion will be closely scrutinised. It is a great mistake to suppose that the public are indifferent to the manner in which the campaign was conducted, because the War itself is now over. On the contrary, they are eager for an explanation on circum stances which they cannot comprehend. They see that the reputation of England has in some unaccountable mode been damaged by most adverse incidents since the War com menced, and they are anxious to know whether the blame rests mainly with what is called our Administrative System, or with those men who are at the head of the System, and who have at their disposal the whole might and re sources of the nation. It is this point which it is hoped the impending debate will clear up, and hence it is anticipated with the strongest interest. The Administration is responsible to the House, but the House itself is responsi ble to the country. There are some facts which are indisputa ble. General WILLIAMS joined the army in Asia as " the Commissioner of the Queen of " England," in September, 1854, and from that date until the capitulation of Kars at the end of November, 1855, our Government was constantly and fully informed of the con dition of the Turkish army in Asia, of its wants, its deplorable inefficiency, and its danger. Lord CLARENDON and Lord PASMURE well knew that w ith ou t promp t a id an d l arge reinforcement s that army could not hold its ground against the Russian force ; they knew also that such aid was not to be expected from the Ottoman Government at Constanti nople. Either it wanted means or it wanted vigour to place the Asian army in an efficient ritate. But with thi s k now l e d ge our F ore i gn Secretary and Minister of War decided that nothing more was to be done than to make r emonstrances which they knew would be un heeded. By sending General WILLIAMS to join the army in Asia, England was directly made a party to the war in that quarter. Of this Lord CLARENDON seems to have been fully conscious. It was necessary, he wrote (Sept. 22nd, 18541, that General WILLIAMS should " have high :` Turkish rank given him to insure respect for his authority ;" and in the following October he wrote that "her Majesty's Go ' .ernment had a direct interest in the effec ! live state of the Turkish army, as it WRS likely that military operations on a large scale would be carried on in Asia next year." So far there was foresight, but it was foresight of that kind which regards the probabilit y of events, without making the slightest preparation to meet them. From the first of General WILLIAMS'S despatches to the last, their tenor is the same. Constantly and unvaryingly he complains of the wants of the Turkish army, and especially of the deficiencies at Kars. The infantry were in ragged clothing, without shoes, without stockings, without knapsacks. The cavalry had neither valises, hoots, spurs, sabres, nor carbines. The men were twenty-three months in arrears of pay. For the service of the artillery there were required horses, ammuni tion, and gunners. Entrenching tools were wanted to repair the roads ; drugs and surgeons were needed for the hospitals ; provisions and stores of all kinds were wanted for the supply of the garrison. These wants are urged not once only, but a hundred times ; they are repeated in every variety of form, and pressed in the most moving manner. Such sentences as the following are constantly recurring in General WILLIAMS'S despatches to Lord CLARENDON : I repeat it, my Lord, that not a day is to be lost ; and I urgently impress upon your Lordship the necessity of prompt, active, and ample support in the execution of my duties.—llec. 12, 1854. Lord CLARENDON recognised the justice of these representations as often as they were made. He admitted the urgency of the case. He declared it was most necessary that the wants brought to his notice should be sup plied, and that all the requirements of General WILLIAMS should be promptly fulfilled. Nearly as often as he received a despatch from the British Commissioner he wrote to Lord STRAT FORD at Constantinople, desiring that the com plaints of General WILLIANIS might be brought to the notice of the Ottoman Government, and that his requisitions might be complied with. In this manner he conveniently threw all re• sponsihility from himself. He wrote much hut lid nothing. Having made up his mind that the Turkish Government ought to do whatever was necessary in Asia, he would pay no attention to the hints he received, that he was expecting more from it than it would ever perform. He seems to have conceived that his sole duty was remonstrance ; and this duty he discharged with wonderful pertinacity. If his Lordship's expostulations could have saved Kars, we are quite ready to admit it would never have fallen. At one time he is exalted with the hope " that measures will be " taken for at length abandoning that syste " matic neglect with which the army at Kars " has been treated" (Nov. 29, 1851). And at another time he is silenced with despair at discovering that, " with the exception of some " ball-cartridges, little or nothing seems to " have been sent for the relief of the army at " Kars _ notwithstanding the re- peated and urgent remonstrances of her " Majesty's Government, which are of a date " long anterior to the departure of General " WILLIAMS from this country" (Jan. 11, 1855). His " painful duty" at being compelled to draw attention to General WILLIAMS'S re ports of misdoings at Kars (Jan. 6, 1853) is rapidly succeeded by his confident trust that "in future" the demands addressed to the Turkish Government will be better attended to (Jan 16, 1855). Often his re monstrances are dictated with that calmness of mind which a supreme reliance on the effi cacy of official routine inspires. Thus, advert ing to WILLIAMS'S despatch on the importance of nominating a vigorous Governor for Kars, Lord CLARENDON simply acquaints Lord STRAT FORD DE REDCLIFFE, " / have to state to your " Excellency that General WILLIAMS fully de " monstrates the importance of sending an effi " cient Governor to Kars " (Feb. 5, 1855). General WILLIAMS asks for a thousand artillery men, and Lord CLARENDON instructs Lord STRAT FORD " to state to the Porte that it is of urgent " importance to send this corps of artillerymen " and supply of ammunition without loss "of time." (February 9, '55). It is in vain for Lord STRATFORD to reply that :t is doubtful whether the Turkish Government can send the thousand artillerymen. When Lord CLARENDON is informed by authentic docu ments that all his " hopes" have been disap pointed, and all his " fears" have been realised, he consoles himself with being able " to state " to Lord STRATFORD, that a memo randum sent him from the Porte " is most un " satisfactory, and therefore quite consistent "with all the proceedings of the Porte as re " Bards the army of Kars " (May 13, '55). If the urgency of General WILLIAMS'S appeals be contrasted with the measures taken by Lord CLARENDON to satisfy them, a just esti mate may be formed of the amount of assist ance the British Commissioner met with from the Foreign-office. As the result of six months' continued and most urgent entreaties for sup plies, he writes, April 2, 1855 :—" Not a shoe " or knapsack for the remnant of the infantry, " not a boot or sabre for the wreaks of the " cavalry, have been sent from the Seraskierat; " not an infantry or cavalry recruit to fill up " the casualties of last year, has been sent " from the capital : in short, we are left utterly " uncared for." Well might he subsequently write that the Kars army seemed doomed to dest ruction. Yet it is on the despatches of Lord CLAREN DON—which were by his own acknowledgment futile for any good end—that the Government will ground their defence. " Admirable de spatches !" " High-toned compositions!" They amused the time that should have been occu pied in vigorous action, and which have helped to swell a bulky Blue-book in exchange for the loss of Kars ! The winter of 1854-55 was passed in diplo matic correspondence ; with the spring WILLIAMS conceived hopes that decisive ac tion might be undertaken. So early as March 5, in last year, he addressed a despatch to Lord CLARENDON, stating the prompt reinforcements which would be required to enable the army of Asia to hold its ground. He required 15,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 1,100 artil lery. In this despatch he expresses his con fident expectation of allied assistance. He was deceived. The cold answer returned to his urgent appeal by both Lord CLARENDON and Lord PANDIIIRE was, that the Porte would be urged to " the importance of paying atten " tion to the requirements mentioned by " General WILLIAMS whenever the more press " ing need of the services of the Ottoman " troops elsewhere shall have ceased " (April 13, 1855). Those despatches sealed the fate of Kars. The opportunity for reinforcing the army of Asia was lost. pletely invested, became apparen that some effort . its relief, our Go' force under 0M; But the 20,000 sufficient in March August. When Go s N;ernment un: Later, when Kars was cotn- , when the danger of its fall it, when the Porte +d must and shod Winaitekle`, rovernment dittnveitlid` • te , (ER PACHA MiM i t men which %%1704: • • ,rch were wholly - 104(00ft • the crisis caffroll Matt 'prepared for fyi • v . - s 1 1 ! .4 t) E .. 1 v'Zi0:.• , 7•47 I No. 155.—V0L. IV. LONDON SATURDAY APRIL 19,1856. STAMPED .- . SIXPENCE. UNSTAMPED..FIVEPENCE.