The Press. — London, England, 1856-03-15 00:00:00

wrote, but did not act. In the whole corre spondence Lord CLARENDON suggests not a single measure for the relief of Kars ; he takes no one step for supplying the Wants which the British Commissioner so energetically de plores. General WILLIAMS states the necesti , - ties of the army to Lora CLARstmett, who is content with stating theta to Lord gtRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE, who Is to state ihent to the Turkish Governttrentzu4rhe appoiht itemmli; goners to investigate their truth who make reports on what is to be done to the Turkish Ministers who find that they have not the means of (tarrying the recom mendations into effect. And this is the way Kars was lost. The question really raised by the Parlia mentary papers is, whether it was a wise, and under the circumstances a just, policy to leave Turkey to provide as she best could for the supply of her army in Asia, and for the de fence of Kars. If this question be answered in the affirmative—if it be urged that we were not primarily concerned in resisting the advance of Russia in that direction—if it be pleaded even that we were unable, though we had been willing, to take part in the Asian warfare, then we must accept the fall of Kars as the inevitable result of known causes. On that view of the ease the answer of the Government is easy. No one is to blame. The best defence was made that was prac ticable. The catastrophe was foreseen, and its result, so far from disparaging the wisdom of our rulers, only justified their foresight. They knew the weakness of the Turkish Go vernment, and the Government proved itself weak. They anticipated the fall of Kars, and it did fall. If the principle on which they proceeded was a just one, no objection can be made to the consequences. What Parliament will shortly be called upon to decide is, whether that principle was truly a right one. Was it proper, when the fate of so important a place as Kars was con cerned, to leave the Turkish Government to provide for its defence from its own resources, or to continually urge it by taunts and me naces to make efforts which it was in reality powerless to make ? This was the line taken by Lord CLARENDON, and consistently acted on from the appointment of General WILLIAMS in August, 1854, to his surrender to MouRA VIEFF at tho end of November, 1855. He would do nothing himself, but from his desk at the Foreign-office lie reproached the Turkish Government with not doing every thing. By his own showing, he expected the performance of impossibilities. That which the English Government could not or would not do with its unbounded resources and unlimited credit, the Turkish Government was to do with resources completely ex• hausted, and a Treasury completely empty. Lord CLARENDON must have known per• fectly well that he was demanding from the Turkish Government more than it could perform, as the communications addressed to him teem with representations of the poverty of the Porte—of the corruption and inactivity of Turkish officials—of the im practicability of getting the authorities to act with the necessary decision and vigour. He is told over and over again that the Ottoman troops in Asia are fifteen, eigh teen, twenty-two months in arrear of pay. Here is his own summary of the reports of the state of the army in Asia, which he says he received with entire confidence : That the hospitals were generally in a miserable con dition ; the medicine of the worst or most useless kind ; the surgeons who knew something of their profession re jected fur nen who knew nothing of it, but had bought their places ; that Zarif Pacha is now having his command gorged with plunder; that habitual and notorious drunken ness prevailed among the officers, to such an extent it:, to invite the enemy to surprise the army; that the soldiers were without proper clothing or shoes ; that the cauldrons in which their food was cooked was in such a state as to render it poisonous ; that the muster-rolls exceeded greatly —often one-half—the numbers really present; and lastly, when there is reason to believe that nearly 18,000 men • perished last year, through the want of ordinary care and precautions, her Majesty's Government cannot say that there has been any superfluous or exaggerated matter in the reports which have reached them during the last twelve months, and respecting which they have so often and ineffectually remonstrated with the Turkish Go ♦ernment. So because her Majesty's Government had often and ineffectually remonstrated with the Porte, they were to continue in the same ; ' 414 THE PRESS. course. A precedent had been established for useless remonstrance, which it was convenient to follow. Why, if Lord trAgatalOrr was earnestly bent on earring (Mt tiy recommendations of Gerierai Virt.LtAits, lie receive his reports without one lila th her Majesty's Goveit ment wffilld co- pers. with the Turkish Ad ministriAlon td brwgt e army info an efficient state I .L -- =ifilly wal he Ili Oht when told of tit@ arrears of the troops-=When informed that the artillerymen required 15pult1 not be found in Turkey—when told of the want of all kinds of arms and supplies, and of the means of trans port? His sole resource in all emergencies— his single remedy for all wants, neglects, and disasters, was, by his own account, " ineffectual remonstrance"; and this while WILLIAMS was continually impressing on him that " not a " day was to be lost." We have understated the case in saying that the Turkish Government was to be left to its own resources to meet the war in Asia. Its resources were to be first charged, and to their utmost extent, with the maintenance of armies to take part in the combined opera tions of the Allies. Whoever will understand the real reason of the desertion of the Asian army, and of the capture of Kars, should turn to page 171 and page 181 of this Blue-Book. No further research is required. When the difference b etween the Commis sioner and the Ambassador had been accom modated—when WILLIAMS had no longer a complaint to make of Lord STRATFORD—When his position had not only been recognised, but he had been raised to high rank in the service of the Sultan—when he had carried out all his measures of reform, the question came to be considered how the army of Asia could be raised to a state which would enable it to make head against the forces of Russia. On the sth March, 1855, General WILLIAMS wrote to Lord CLARENDON that for the Turkish army to maintain its ground, prompt reinforcements were necessary, to the amount of 15,000 in fantry, 3,000 cavalry, and '2,000 artillerymen. This letter was referred by Lord CLARENDON to the War Department, and the following was the answer returned : (Mr. PEEL JO Lord WoozHousE)l War Department, April 12, 1855. My Lord,—Having laid before Lord Panmure your l'tter of the 29th ultimo, with the copy therein inclosed of a despatch from Brigadier• General Williams, relative to the amount of reinforcements which he considers are required for the Turkish army in Asia, I am directed to request yon will state to the Earl of Clarendon that Lord Panmure is of opinion that it will be desirable to urge upon the Porte the importance of their paying attention to these requirements whenever the MORE PRESSING NEED of the services of the Ottoman troops elsewhere shall have ceased; and if Lord Clarendon should concur with his lordship that it is expedient to adopt this course. I am to request that you will move his lordship to send instructions to her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople accordingly. I am Sze. FREDERICK PEEL. _ _ _ This letter, which it seems took a fortnight to concoct, received Lord CLARENDON'S appro bation. He immediately wrote to Lord STRATFORD, inclosing a copy of it, and stating that— Her Majesty's Government consider it desirable that your Excellency should urge upon the Porte the import ance of their paying attention to the requirements men tioned by General Williams, whenever the MORE PRESSING NEED of the services of the Ottoman troops elsewhere shall have ceased. This was between seven and eight months previous to the fall of Kars. Only one con struction could be put upon the letter by either our Ambassador at Constantinople, or by the Turkish Government,—that the army at Asia must for the time being be left to its fate. What could be the value of a representation that the requirements of General WILLIAMS should be attended to after the more pressing needs of the Turkish armies in the Crimea and Bulgaria, amounting to at least 100,000 men, had been supplied? Lord CLARENDON must have perfectly well known, when he sent out this despatch, that it sealed the fate of the Asian army, and that it effectually disposed of all the urgent claims of General WILLIAM:4. The time of year was critical. If any effectual provision was to be made for the next winter, and any effectual resistance offered to the advancing Russians, then, with the spring and summer in reserve, was the time for action. The opportunity was not lost, but deliberately rejected ; the Asian army was, after mature consideration, abandoned; and it is impossi- ~~' _ s' 0 SATURDAY, ble to pretend, after this decisive evidence, that the fall of Kars was due to any other cause whatever than the decision of her Majesty's Goveittittetit tlißt no assistance should be tendered it. Yet further, when qederal WILLIAMS and Dr. SAirmktTh repketnbted the urgent want of more aurteons and dr htttpital necessarie s , and their tibspatilhei eertk forwarded by Lord CLAlthlinnti to Ltitti Pili!bitAtE, the answer returritid was that— in supplying the army under the command of his Highness Omer Pacha, and also the Turkish Contingent, with a medical staff, Lord Panniure does not see much prospect of being enabled to send medical aid to the Turkish army in that province (Anatolia), but his lord ship will endeavour to do so to a limited extent, as soon as he has provided for the other two services above re ferred to. This comforting assurance is duly forwarded by Lord CLARENDON to General WILLIAMS, but of course no medical aid was ever supplied. When Kars was invested, and it became evi dent that, unless relieved, it must f a ll, L or d CLARENDON still did nothing. The plans formed by the Turkish Government for having a considerable force on the Asiatic coast were coldly negatived by him. OMER PACHA, as the danger grew more urgent, showed th e daring and resolution of a great commander. Lord CLARENDON gave to his plan a qualified assent, and recommended it to the French Government ; but so many difficulties were in terposed, that time and opportunity were lost, and when the effort was made at last no pre paration had been made for it. After the fall of Sebastopol, Lord CLARENDON'S inactivity is unaccountable. We find only a few short despatches from him, intimating approval of all Lord STRATFORD'S suggestions and pro ceedings. The conclusion from all the evidence is, that our Government not only made no effort of any kind to save Kars, except by remon strances which they knew would be ineffec tual, but that at the critical time, when a decision had to be taken whether Turkish rein forcements should be forwarded, they discoun tenanced the notion of sending such reinforcements. Pretending to support General WILLIAMS, Lord CLARENDON in reality deserted him. His Lordship is a tolerable despatch-writer, but he is nothing more. We look through his compositions in vain for any evidence of foresight, decision, or original pur pose. He never pretends to act; he has never anything to propose. The word lie once em ployed to denote the state of our foreign policy under his rule, precisely describes the ten dency of his nature ; he is for ever " drifting." He resigns himself contentedly to circum stances, without the slightest comprehension that circumstances may be controlled by men. In the preparation of his despatches he is very careful that they shall show every one to blame but himself. The taunts he addresses to the Turkish Government are excessively ungracious. When he received the address of the Porte to congratulate the defenders of Kars, on the repulse of the Russian attack, he sneered at the expression that the sufferings of the garrison troubled the sleep and repose of the Turkish Ministers, " who, in despite of " all ordinary measures of relief, never ceased to " pray for their safety and success." This is not, we venture to think, the way in which the diplomatic correspondence of this great coun try should be conducted. We desire our Foreign Minister to be firm, but not overbear ing or captious. Lord STRATFORD, on one occasion, hints to Lord CLARENDON, that" we " should be inconsistent with ourselves if we " sought to trample down what remains of " Turkish independence." It requires no great sagacity to foresee, that if Lord CLARENDON ' s line of conduct be persevered in, we shall soon lose in Turkey the influence we have made such vast efforts to attain, and that the Go vernment of the Sultan will confide most readily in those Powers that avoid mingling insult with the remonstrances which a sense of duty compels them to prefer. THE EARL OF EGLINTOUN ON THE APPOINTMENT OF MR. WNI. KEOGH. RELIGIOUS and political causes have com- bined during the last twenty years to make political adventuring a profitable profession .a