Star. — London, England, 1809-01-14 00:00:00

!I SIR ARTHUR WELLESLET'S NARRATIVE. GENERAL SIR DAVID DUNDAS, AND MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN, Having received Ibe directions of the Judge Ad vocate General to attend you here this day, with as much detailed information, in writing, as I may think proper to offer, of my proceedings, from the time I sailed with the troops from Ireland, to the time I gave up the command to Lieutenant General Sir Harry Burrard, I have now the honour to submit to the Court of Inquiry copies of my dispatches to the Secretary of State, detailing my proceedings. As these . proceedings are fully detailed in the dis patches, which likewise contain an account of my motives for my actions at the moment I carried them into execution, I should be satisfied if the Court were to form an opinion upon a consideration of their con tents : out as the Court have expressed a desire, at the same time, to have a narrative of my proceedings, I have dawn one out principally from the dispatches. I sailed from Cork in the Donegal on the 12th of July ; I went on board the Crocodile on the 13th, and sailed to Corunna, where I arrived on the 20th of July. I there found that the French had, on the 14th, defeated the army of Castile and Gallicia under Generals Cuesta and Blake ; but having sounded the Junta of Gallicia respecting their wish to have the assistance of the army under my command, in the existing crisis of their affairs, they declared explicitly that they did not want the assistance of troops, but eventually arms and ammunition, and money imme diately. A sum of 200,0001. for their use had arrived on the 20th, and their requisition for arms and ammunition was sent home immediately. The Junta of Gallicia, at the same time, expressed the greatest anxiety that the troops under my command should be employed in driving the French out of Portugal, as they were persuaded that the Spaniards of the north and the south of the peninsula would never have any decided success independently of each other ; and could ne ver make any great simultaneous effort to remove the French from Spain, till they should be driven from Portugal, and the British troops in that kingdom should connect the operations of the northern and the southern Spanish armies. The Junta of Gallicia at the same time strongly recommended to me to land in the north of Portugal, in order that I might bring forward, and avail myself of, the Portuguese troops which the Government of Oporto were collecting in the neighbourhood of that city. I have to observe to the Court, that they will not see, in my dispatches to the Secretary of State from Corunna, the detail of the wishes and sentiments of 1 the Junta on my plan of operations, because they did not come regularly within the scope of a military dis patch ; but the subject is mentioned in my dispatch to General Spencer of the 2Gth of Jnly. I sailed from Corunna on the 22d, and joined the fleet off Cape Finisterre next day, and quitted it again at night ; and went to Oporto, in order to hold a conference with the Bishop and the General Officers in the command of the Portuguese tron7s. On my arrival at Oporto on the 24th, I received a letter from the Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, in which he recom mended to me to leave the troops either at Oporto, or at the mouth of the Mondego river, and to proceed to Lisbon in a frigate, to communicate with him be fore I should determine upon the plan of operations and the landing place. The result of the conference which I had on the night of the 24th with the Bishop and the General Officers of the Portuguese army, was an agreement,' that about five thousand Portuguese troops'should be sent forward to co-operate with me against the enemy; that the remainder of the Portuguese troops, amount ing to about fifteen hundred, and a Spanish corps of about fifteen hundred men, then on it; march from -Gallicia, and another small Spanish corps of about three hundred men, and all the Portuguese armed peasantry, should remain in the neighbourhood of Oporto, and in the province of Tralos Montes :—a part to be employed in the blockade of Almeida, and a part in the defence of the province of Tralos Mon tes, which province was supposed to be threatened by an attack from the French corps under Marshal Bes sieres, since the defeat of the Spanish armies under Blake and Cuesta at Rio Seco, on the 14th of July. The Bishop of Oporto likewise promised to supply the army under my command with mules and other means of carriage, and with slaughter cattle. I sailed from Oporto on the morning of the 25th, and joined the fleet, and settled with Captain Mal. colm that it should go to Mondego Bay ; and I left it again that night, and went to the mouth of the Tagus to confer with the Admiral. I joined him on • the evening of the 26th, and 1 there received letters from General Spencer, at Port St. Mary's, in which he informed me, that he had landed his corps in An dalusia, at the request of the .lunta of Seville, and he did not think it proper to embark it again till he should receive further orders from me ; and he ap peared to think that my presence in Andalusia, and the assistance of the troops under my command, were nocessary to enable General Castanos to defeat Gen. Du Pont. As I was of opinion that the most essential object, for the Spaniards, as well as for es, was to drive the French out of PortT . ol, anu that neither his corps nor mine were siiTeltntly :,trong when separate to he of much service any where, and that when joined they might effect tit:: object which ln:d been deemed of most importance in England and in Gallicia, I im mediately dispatched orders to General Spencer to embark his troops, unless he should be actually en gaged in an operation , A . hich he could not relinquish without loss to the Spaniards, and to joia me off the coast of Portugal. The result of the information which I received from General Spencer, of the strength of the French army in Portugal, was, that they consisted of more than twenty thousand men. The accounts of their numbers which I had received from the Admiral, and had received from the Portuguese, did not make their force so large ; but upon the whole I wac, in duced to believe that they had not less than from 16 to 18,000 men. Of this number they had from 600 to 800 in the fort of Almeida, 600 or 800 in El vas, 8(10 in Veniche, 16 or 1800 in Setuval, and the remainder were considered about 14,000 men, dis palable for the- defence of Lisbon and the forts on the Tagus. The whole of this disposable force was at tttis time in the heighbr On the Bth, Y wrote a letter to Sir Harry Burrard, which I left with Captain Malcolm of the Donegal, to be delivered to him upon his arrival at the Monde. go, detailing all the circumstances of our situation, and recommending for his consideration a plan of operation* for the corps under the command of Sir John Moore. The Court will find the copy of this letter enclosed in my dispatchto Lord Castlereagh of the Bth of August. The advanced guard marched on the 9th, support ed by the brigades under General Hill and General Ferguson, as I had heard that General La Borde had collected his own corps, and General Thomiere's, consisting of from 5 to 6000 men, in the neighbour hood of Leyria, which place he threatened, as it contained a magazine formed for the use of the Por tuguese army. On the 10th the main body followed, and the advanced guard arrived at Leyria on the 10th, and the main body on the 11th. - I received, a letter from Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle, at Cotuira ol the 10th, detailing the ineffi cient state of the Gallician army under General Blake, that that General had separated his troops, which con sisted of infantry, from the cavalry under General Cuesta, and that neither were in a condition to act offensively against Bessieres, or even to follow that General, if he should march into Portugal, or to at tack him if he should make any considerable detach meat to that quarter. At the same time I received intelligence of the retreat of Joseph Bonaparte from Mardrid on the 20th July ; and I concluded that Bessieres, instead of moving out, or detaching to -1 wards Portugal, would cover the retreat of Joseph Bonaparte towards the French frontier. - Whether ;1e did' so or not, it was obvious to me that I should have time for my operations against Junot, before Bessieres could arrive in Portugal - to interrupt them ; and it was probable that General Acland's corps or Sir John Moore's would arrive and land in Portugal before Bessieres could come from the north of Spain. Adverting therefore to the advanced state of the season, the necessity of communicating with the sea coast, and the certainty that that communication would be nearly impracticable after the month of Au-i gust, and to the still dispersed state of the French' forces in Portugal, I consi.Jered it to be important to endeavour to perform those operations to which the army was equal, and for which it was fully equip ped, without loss of time. I communicated, however, the intelligence I had received from Mr. Stuart, and my opinion upon it, to Sir Harry Burrard, in a letter which I addressed to him on the 10th of August ; a copy of which, and of a private letter to Sir Harry Burrard, the Court will find in my dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 18th of August. The Portuguese army, consisting of about 6000 men, including 500 cavalry, arrived at Leyria on the 12th, where the whole force was then assembled. The French General Loison, who I have informed the Court, had been detached across the Tagus into Alentejo on the 26th or '27th of July, with between 5 and 6000 men, had withdrawn the greatest part of f the garrison of St. Übes, consisting of - 1600 men, by which he had been joined, and he had immediately marched towards Evera, where he had defeated and dispersed a' Spanish detachment, consisting of 1000 men, and the force of the insurrection of Alentejo, collected in that town ; he then marched to Elvas, re victualled that place, suppressed the insurrection, and re-established the French authority in Alentejo, and made arrangements for the purchase and collection of the grain of that province. He crossed the Tagus again at Abrantes, and marching down that river, he arrived at Thornar,l about 16 miles to the S.E. from Leyria, on the even ing of the 11th, on which day the British army arrived) at Leyria. The corps under La Borde was, at the same time, at Alcobaca, about 16 miles from Leyria to the S.W. and the object of the French officers had evi dently been to join at Leyria before the British troops could arrive there. This town is on the high road from Lisbon to the north of Portugal, to the eastward of which, and nearly parallel to the road, there is a chain of high mountains which runs from Leyria nearly to the Tagus ; over which chain there is no good passage for carriages. In consequence of the early arrival, therefore, of the British troops at Leyria, General Loison was obliged to return to the southward before he could effect his junction with General La Borde, who was thus exposed i to be attacked when alone ; and was attacked on the 17th of August. The Court will find in my dispatch to the Secre tary of State of the 16th of August, from Caldas, an outline of the operations of Loison's corps, of which what I have here stated is a more detailed account. AU the arrangements for the march having been made and communicated to the Portuguese officers, the army marched on the 13th, in two columns, to Calveria, and on the 14th, in two columns, to Alco baca, from whence General La Borde had retreated in the course of the preceding night. The Portuguese troops had not marched from Leyria, as bad been ar ranged, and as I had expected, under the pretence that they had no provisions ; and I received, on the 13th, in the evening, a letter from Colonel Trant, who was employed by me to communicate with the Portuguese General, in which he informed me of the General's intention to halt at Leyria, unless I should consent to supply the Portugese troops with provilions from the British commissariat,. on the march to Lis ton. He also explained a plan of operations which General Freire proposed to carry into execution, by which he would have been left without any commu nication with the British army, exposed to be attack.' ed by the French army if they should choose to aban don the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, and pro ceed to the northward and eastward ; or even if they should be compelled to retire after an action wick the British troops. In my reply to this communication, 1 pointed out the impossibility of my complying with the demand for provisions, and the danger which would result from the adoption of the plan of operations proposed for the Portuguese corps. I urged the Portuguese General in the most earnest terms to co-operate with me in the deliverance of his countryfrom the French, if he had any regard to his own honour, to the honour of h's country, or of his Prince ; and I pointed out to him the resources of which he could avail himself to feed the army. I then proposed to him, that if he should not march, with his whole corps, he should send to join me one thousand regular Wappy, all his light troops and his cavalry, 'which troops I engaged to feed, as the utnius: I could undertake to perform in that way. These troops, in number 1000 regular infantry, 400 light troops, and 250 cavalry, joined me "A;. cobata, on the evening of the 14th, with Colorv , ; Trant, and remained with me during the rem ainde: of the operations. . The main body of the Portuguese corps, instead uE carrying into execution the plan of operations which I had originally proposed, or that which General Freire had substituted, adopted the measure of safety which I had recommended in the event of his de. termination not to join me, and remained at Leyria, and afterwards at Caldas and Obidos, till the 22d of August. On the arrival of the army at Alcobaoa, I lime. diatel; opened a communication with Captain Bligh of the Alfred, who had been for two days waiting with the fleet of victuallers and store-ships off Naza reth, and a supply of bread and oats was immedi. ately landed ; and I appointed Peniche, which place I intended to reconnoitre, as our next point of comma. nication. The army marched on the 15th, in two columnt, to Caldas, where it halted the 16th, to allow the Commissariat to come up and receive the supplies which had been landed at Nazareth. On the 15th, in the evening, there was a skirmish between the troops of the advanced guard of La Borde's corps and our riflemen, in which the latter sustained some loss. But we kept possession of the post at Obidos, which commands the valley of Caldas. The details of this affair are published in the Ga. zette, as are those of the action of the 17th. Throughout that day we had reason to believe that General Loison, who had moved from Rio Major on the - evening of the IGth, would be found on La Borde's right, and the disposition for the attack was made accordingly. During the action, a French offi cer, who was dying of his wounds, informed me that they had expected Loison to join them that day at one o'clock by their right, which was the reason for which they stood our attack ; that their numbers were 6000 ; and that their loss had been severe. In telligence to the same purport was received from other prisoners ; and as a small patrole of French infantry appeared at no great distance from the left of our position, on the 17th at dusk, and I heard that Loison's corps was at that moment. arriving at Bombarral, which was about five miles from the field of battle. I conclude that the junction had been intended, and was prevented only by our early attack, At all events, great caution was necessary in all the movements of that day ; and indeed the nature of the ground over which the troops were obliged to move, rendered a very rapid attack impossible. The two French corps joined on that night, and re. tired beyond Torres Vedras, which was ten miles from the field of battle towards Cabeca de Montachique. My intention was to march from Torres Vedras on the morning of the 18th, and the troops were under arms, and the orders for the march had been issued, when I received from General Anstruther an account of his arrival on the coast, and of his junction with Captain Bligh. My original intention had been to employ the corps under General Acland and General Anstruther in t'ae siege of Peniche, if I should find it necessary to undertake it ; or if I should not, to send them down the coast to effect a landing in some of the bays in the neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon, in the rear of the enemy, while I should press upon their front. But the disappointment which I experienced in the hoped for eo-operation of the Portuguese troops, which were with me in the action of the 17th, and above all the determined and gallant resistance of the enemy in that action, induced me to be of opinion, that I ought to land General Anstruther's brigade, and General Acland's when it should arrive, and to join those troops to the army. I therefore marched on the 18th to Lourinha, from whence I communicated again with General Anstrit. titer, and on the 19th to Vimiera ; which appeared, on the whole, to be the position best calculated to se cure the junction of General Ansuuther, at the Stmc time that it was a march in advance on our route. On account of the calms, the fleet, which was an chored off the Berlings, could not stand in till late on the 19th ; and General Anstruther did not land till that evening, and he formed a junction with two brigades, detachei; from our left, on the morning of the 20th, and took his position in the advanced guard. Between the 18th and 20th, • the French corps had assembled at or about Torres Vedras ; the troops last arrived under General Junot, forming the ad vanced guard, in a strong position in front of the town ; and the divisions of La Borde and Loison, the main body, in another strong position behind it. Their cavalry was very active throughout the days of the 19th and 20th ; they covered the whole coun try ; patrolled frequently up to our position ; and on the 20th, one patrole was pushed into the rear of our, right, as far as the landing-place at Manceira. Under these circumstances We could gain no de tailed information of the enemy's position, exceptive that it was very strong, and occupied by their whole force. . • My intention was to march on the morning of the 21st, and orders were issued accordingly ; I should have pushed the advanced guard as far as the heights of Mafra, and should have halted the main body about four or Eve miles from that place. By this movement the enemy's position at Torres Vedras would have been turned, and I should have brought the army into a country of which I had an excellent map, and topographical accounts, which had been drawn up for the use of the late Sir Charles Stuart; and the battle, which it was evident would be fought in a few days, would have had for its field a country of which we had a knowledge, not very distant from Lisbon, into which town, if we had been cu. cessful, we might have entered with the retreating enemy. I was informed in the middle of the day of the 20th, that General Acland's brigade was in the offing, and 1 made arrangements for their disembarkation as soon as they should arrive ; and in the evening of this day Sir Harry Burrard arrived in Marceira roads in the Brazen ; he immediately assumed the command of the army, The Court will observe that the last of my dispatches to the Secretary of State is dated on the 18th ; and the account of my proceedings on the 19th and 20th, the two last days of my command, is made from memory , assisted by reference to private letters written at thk time ; and if the Court should wish it, it can be sub stanf ated by evidence.—(To be continued.) ~ s ;httourbood of Lisbon excepting I rortuguese troops . . about 400 awn at Alcobaeo, under Gen. —I considered, with the Admiral, the propr►. carrying into execution any of the proposed Oh*. attack upon the Tagus, or upon the coast in the neigh., bourhood of the Rock of Lisbon ; and it appeared Wt, us both, that all the attacks upon the river which had been proposed to Government, were impracticable ; that the attack upon Cascaes Bay was likewise so ; that a landing in any of the small bays in the neigh bourhood of the Rock was a matter of considerable difficulty at any time; and that there was a risk, that if a part of the army, or even the whole army, were landed, the state of the surf which prevails upon the whole coast of Portugal, might prevent the disem barkation of the rear in the one case, and of the stores and provisions, which were necessary, in the other. At all events, the disembarkation would be made in the neighbourhood of the whole disposable force of the French army, and the British troops would be exposed to their attack on their landing, probably in a crippled, and certainly not in a very efficient state. By making our disembarkation in one of the bays near the Rock of Lisbon, it was certain that we should not have the advantage which, at that time, we expected to derive from the co-operation of the Portuguese troops. It appeared to us that the fort of Peniche, which was garrisoned by the enemy, would prevent the dis embarkation under the shelter of that peninsula ; and therefore it appeared to the Admiral and to me, that it would be most advisable to disembark the 'troops in the Mondego river.—l quitted the Admiral off the Tagus on the 27th, and joined the fleet of transports off the Mondego, on the 30th. I there received information from Government, dated the 15th July, that they intended to reinforce the army under my command with 5000 men under the command of Brigadier General Acland, in the first instance, and eventually, with the corps consist ing of 10,000 men, which had been under the com mand of Sir John Moore in Sweden ; and that Sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to command the army. I was likewise directed to carry into execution the instructions which I had received, if I conceived that my force was sufficiently strong. Besides these dispatches from Government, I re ceived information, on my arrival at the Mondego, of the defeat of the Frmch corps under Du Pont by the Spanish General Castanos on the 30th July, and I was convinced that General Spencer, if he did not embark immediately upon receiving intelligence of that event, would do so as soon as he should receive my orders of the 26th July. I therefore considered his arrival as certain ; and I had reason to expect the arrival of General Acland's corps every moment, as I had been informed that it was to sail from Harwich and the Downs on the 19th July. I also received accounts, at the same time, that General Loison had been detached from Lisbon across the Tagus into Alenteja on the 27th July, in order to subdue the insurrection in that province, and open the communication with Elvas. The insurgents had lately been joined by about 1000 men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and the insurrection had made considerable progress, and was become formidable in Alentejo. I therefore considered that I might commence the disembarkation of the troops, without risk of their being attacked by superior numbers, before one or both the reinforcements should arrive ; and I was induced to disembark immediately, not only be cause the troops were likely to be better equipped, and more able to march in proportion as they should have been longer on shore ; but because I had reason to believe that the Portuguese had been much dis couraged by seeing the troops so long in the ships after the fleet had arrived in Mondego Bay ; and I was certain they would suspect our inclination, or our ability to contend with the French, if they had not been disembarked as soon as I returned from the Ta gus ; I therefore determined to disembark as soon as the weather, and the state of the surf, would permit us, and we commenced the disembarkation on the 1.: of August. The difficulties of 1 aiding, occasioned by the surf, were so great, that the whole of the corps were not disembarked till the sth, on which day General Spencer arrived, and his corps on the 6th ; he had embarked at Port St. Mary's on the 21st July, when he had heard of the defeat of Du Pont by Castanos, and had not received the dispatches addressed to him by me on the 26th July. General Spencer disem barked on the 7th and Sth, on which night the whole army was in readiness to march forward. From the Ist of August to that day, the time had been usefully spent in procuring the means for mov ing with the army, the necessary stores, provisions, and baggage, and in arranging those means in the most advantageous manner to the different depart ments. The cavalry and artillery received a large remount of horses ; means - were procured for moving, with the army, a sufficient supply of air munition and military stores, and a reasonable supply of hospital stores. But I determined to march towards Lisbon by that road which passes nearest the sea -coast, in order that I might communicate with Captain Bligh of the Alfred, who attended the movements of the army with a fleet of victuallers and store-ships. The communication with this fleet, however, it was obvi ous would be very precarious, as well on account of the state of the surf on the coast, in the different points of rendezvous which had been settled, as be cause it might happen that it would be more• advan tageous to the army to take another line of march passing further inland. I therefore made arrangements for carrying with the army such a supply of the articles of first neces sity, as should render it independent of the fleet, till it should reach the Tagus, if circumstances should prevent the communication with the fleet, or should renc'er it advantageous to relinquish it. In the same period of time I also armed the Portu guese troops, and ascLrtained, as far as lay in my power, the degree of their discipline and efficiency, and recommended and superintended their organiza tion. I offered such a sum of money, as the funds of the army could afford, to defray any expence which it might be deemed necessary to incur in their equipment tor the field, which was declined by the Portuguese General Officers,. and I met those gen tlemen at Montemore Valho on the 7th, and arrang ed with them the plan of our, operations and march, which was delayed for the main body of the army till the 10th, at their desire, for the convenience of the 3 . 4 5 . . C t 1 a 1 C 1 • 1 t d Le e Is It It ;11 ; ht ry tit LC• nd on ay of hes tha the the