The Press. — London, England, 1855-11-17 00:00:00

70‘e/ • bt rt 6,5 No. 133.—V0L. 111. LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 185 5 • STAMPED . SIXPENCE. UN STAMPE . FIV D..EPENCE. Ely Vrtss. LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1855. Is discussing the Policy of the War, and the conditions on which an advantageous and lasting Peace might be founded, we have 'hitherto been met by the objection that it was useless to debate the question of terms, as no opening for pacific arrangement existed. It was urged that, while Russia showed no dis position to make concessions, and the bellige rents maintained their hostile attitude, our arguments indicating a pacific settlement of the points in dispute must fall to the ground altogether, or only have the effect of encourag ing the enemy by leading him to suppose that our resolution was failing us. To one part of this objection we had 'no difficulty, in replying, that it was always wise • for a nation to keep stcadily in view the plain :and practical ends for which it Was contending, and that, as regards the effect produced on, the mind of an enemy, he is more likely to be im pressed with the firm moderation which de cisively declares the least and lowest conditions that justice and policy will allow it to accept (those conditions being at the same time of a nature to be irresistibly enforced), than by the bravado which aims at uncertain or impractica ble objects, and which confessedly is content to adapt its deinands and its policy to the fortune of the War. Still, as regarded the objection that the question of terms had not, since the fall of Sebastopol, assumed any practical shape, we had no other answer to make than that discussion might probably tend to encourage a moderate and conciliatory spirit in the councils of the belligerent Powers, and make Russia more ready to extend the olive branch, and the Allies more willing to accept it. The objection we have had to contend with applies no longer. Very recently the question of Peace, and the conditions on which it may be concluded, has assumed a practical shape. The question has been considered by the Em. peror of the FRENCH, and by him has been pressed on the attention of the English Govern. ment At the Councils which our Cabinet has recently pield, this subject has been debated, and on the decision taken it• must depend whether we are to expect a prompt Peace or prolonged War. It cannot have escaped the sagacious mind of the Emperor of the FRZNOR, that if the War is to extend beyond its present limits, it must be f..ir objects with which France has no con cern, and with which he individually has no sympathy. However greatly Russian power may be re duced in the South, France has nothing to gain from such reduction. She can have no desire to establish settlements on the shfireS of the Euxine, or to complicate still further the Eastern Question by bringing the Western Powers into immediate contiguity with the Turkish territory. Still less can it be her wish to protract a bloody and expensive war for the narrow and questionable object of re storing the Crimea to Turkey, or of placing it in the custody of some minor European [LATEST EDITION.] Power, whose weakness would be a perpetual temptation to Russia to renew the War, that she might regain the territory she had lost. The Emperor of the FRENCH must know that the stability of his throne will depend less on any transient popularity he may gain by the success of French arms (unattended with solid advantages) on a distant theatre of operations, than on the wisdom and firmness of his internal administration. Empty vic tories on Russian soil would be dearly pur chased by the conscription falling with greater severity on the people, and by lasting embar rassment to the French finances. __ _ The Emperor has never concealed his oppo sition to those schemes for revolutionising Europe, —or, at. least, for overthrowing the absolute monarchies of the Coutinent,—which find so much favour with the War Party in this country, and constitute, indeed, their principal motive for urging on a continuance of hostili ties. The quietude of the Continent at the present time must be mainly attributed to his influence. Even when Naples was threatened with disturbance, he hastened to declare that his Government would not depart from its loyal policy, and that the agitators must expect no favour from France. It has been his constant aim to confine the War to its legitimate pin.- poSe of securing the Turkish empire, and of forming an effectual barrier against Russian aggression in the South. If the English people are bent on prosecuting the War for such high-sounding but visionary aims as securing the liberties of Europe by the destruction of despotic forms of government, they will cer tainly have no right to count on the continued assistance of France for their Quixotic enter prise. It was, probably, the known sentiments of the Emperor of the FRENCH that induced Baron de BORQUENEY, the French . Ambassador at Vienna, to transmit to his Imperial Master the assurances he received that Russia was disposed to make such concessions as would remove all obstacles to a pacific and honour able settlement of the Eastern Question. We are enabled to assert that the Emperor of the FRENCH considered the proposals he received to be of a satisfactory character, and that as such he forwarded them to our Government, with a pressing recommendation that they should be favorably considered. We can conceive that to our Cabinet this communica tion has been a source of great embarrassment. Lord PALMERSTON has so recklessly committed himself to a belligerent policy, and has so completely identified himself with the War Party, that he is in no position to receive pacific proposals of a character which would merely fulfil, however satisfactorily and com pletely, the objects for which the War was originally commenced. His Cabinet is of so negative a kind, that he is not likely to meet with any decided resistance to his will from any of its members. The communication of the Emperor of the FRENCH will probably, therefore, be coldly received ; and some formal pretext be found for disposing of the subject for the present. The important point, however, is that, VI the opinion of the F'rench Government, a basis has been found on which pacific negotiation may now be opened' with every reasonable prospect of success Those persons who are most anxious that our national honour should he upheld, must concede that the Emperor of the FRENCH is little likely to favour a Peace ' which would not be honourable to the Allies in every respect, and which would not give the fairest promise of permanency thathuman arrangements admit of. Though not disposed to interfere with the existing Governments, and territorial arrangements of Europe gene rally, he is compelled by the necessities of his position, and by the foundation of his throne on the will and opinion of the French people, to thoroughly complete any work to which h• has once set his hand. It would add greatly to his reputation if, after so short a period of decisive and glorious warfare, he can take a leading part in settling that Eastern Question which for nearly a century past has at different times engaged the attention and excited th• fears of the statesmen of Europe. But it is essential that the settlement be secure. Ad mitted into the family of European nations, protected by the alliance of powerful Statee, and guarded by that common law which secures the existence of territorial bounda ries when once defined and ratified, Turkey would possess sufficient internal strength to present a firm and lasting barrier to the aggression of Russia, should she ever be so ill-advised as to renew the attempt which on the present occasion has ended for her in so . disastrous a manner. It has been less from the power of Russia than from the neglect of statesmen that Turkey has been so far weakened as she has been. To the Emperor of the FRENCH Mat he ascribed the merit of being the first states man—we do not say to perceive the vast im portance and true bearings of the Eastern Question—but the first to decide on a bold and intelligible policy for its settlement. Though his views may for a time be overborne by Lord PALMERSTON'S Cabinet, it is impossible to suppose that this adverse influence will long prevail. Other circumstances than those we have mentioned must incline the Emperor of the FRENCH to favour a pacific policy as soon as it becomes consistent with large and noble views of the course most advantageous and honour able to the Allies. A settled form of govern ment is urgently required for the Danubian Principalities. Restored to Turkey they would add to her strength, and, endowed with an Administration adapted to their wants, their natural resources would be rapidly developed, and they would augment the pros perity of the Ottoman empire. But such an arrangement is incompatible with the Austrian occupation ; nor does it appear how that oc cupation can be dispensed with so long as the War exists. Again, the War must press heavily on the resources of Turkey, must burden her with debt, and, by so much, weaken that internal force which it is the interest of the Western Powers to maintain and extend. Such con ditions of Peace as the Allies at the present time may reasonably expect to conclude would put an end to the anomalous condition in which the Turkieh Government is now placed, and would afford it all' the security it needs to prosecute the internal improvements which are necessary to its strength and prosperity. From that moment when hostilities are no longer necessary for great objects at issue. still insist on a con' be in danger of Man expect Franee to join her Government has choose to embark in ---- absolute monarchies for the attain . the ue, this otottritrEfi_st9 it ktinuaneec4, az v iii, 4 .. ode banding4o no' , .41 ~,.. An us in ftp alley with wilth if .... has no a 'wrathy. e zi , e g 10. nan en errant) against en sof th ositimat, fot `~ I