The Press. — London, England, 1856-01-05 00:00:00

_ IL' .. • * 44 . _,. ' . . .. • •-' .. .40 7 • _.,- . _ , 444 , -. 1 5-.4 - - 045, .. -.: 'l=ZdtZr6.-44.4• =l. . ..., ".. ~. ;......,di.._,r...7er........„xr.v..j., , t A t r: 4 T - ry 1 ~ - --5 -.)---- c.--• L L i ),.. i , • • . 1 " ' •LLL:•• .. t .yr e f.:,,o' ‘ ' !I/b.') '.• 7 !. :, .'' ;-, " u s ] . ._,.-. • - 'l. 7 r' Ali' ', 7, tg 11 "P . a.:MITT 5•'..:• ,, ' • r ' '. • • . • .( ! ."}7 . o'; :: . :,;-* WS ‘ 1 • • - A ;;.:7 . , , ( ~ , ,, , g .;.,- ; 1 1 , * !A , frl Itti" - i - riff t rt ~, ... 4 W. ar ._ •-: ~.,..•-... ....., ......, r . \ s• - 47 1 MGR VI . t, i - ,-, _ 4 io•f;s4 \ No. 140.—VoL. IV. LONDON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 1856. STAMPED .... SIXPENCE. - UNSTAMPED..FIVEPENCE. Ot Vress. course to be pursued. While Turkey is allied to the Western Powers and fortified by their support, the presence of a few Russian ships of war, more or less, in the Black Sea, can be a matter of no import whatever. It is otherwise with Russian armies. We have seen how much easier and quicker fleets can be brought into action than a land force. Two years ago the allied fleets were ready for uction in the Black Sea, but not even yet have we a land force to meet the foe in Mingrelia, nor have our troops in the Cri►nea the means of transport. Can it be doubted, then, that Turkey is less exposed to aggression on her sea-board than on her land frontier ? AVA A HERAT. THE last mail from has brought intelli gence of two severe s to our prestige— the one, the rejection o . overtures by the Court of Ava; and the other, the fall of Herat. As regards the former, it will be re membered by our readers that we condemned them from the outset, and predicted for them an ignominious failure. Our anticipations have been fully realised. The costly presents of the Governor-General have been received with contemptuous indifference; the prayers and menaces of our representative have been treated with equal disdain ; the looked-for treaty has been refused most peremptorily by the Burmese Government; and, after sub mitting to a series of indignities which the envoy of the pettiest Rajah would have dis dained to tolerate, our Embassy has returned weary and crestfallen to Rangoon. It way be truly said, all things considered, that we have not met with so severe a rebuff, and one that will lower us so much in the eyes of the natives, since we ceased to be traders and assumed the office of rulers over our Eastern empire. And the worst of the insult is, that it is one of a kind that leaves us no shadow of a pretext to avenge it, and which the Go vernment of India has brought by its folly entirely on itself. By the commonest fore sight it might have avoided the dilemma, and at the same time attained every possible diplomatic end. All it had to do was to send the Commissioner of Pegu to the frontier, The sagacity of Mr. DISRAELI has discerned the real peril of Turkey. He exposed it in his memorable speech of the Bth June, 1855, from which we lately made an extract. He considered it essential to the security of Turkey that her Asiatic frontier should be fortified, and that the channel of the Bosphorus should be fortified also. Until those pre cautions be adopted Turkey never can be secure. Much as we desire Peace—earnestly as we advocate it—we should resist an arrange ment which, while pretending to absolutely secure Turkish territory, would in reality leave it defenceless against a sudden irrup tion of her mighty and ambitious neighbour. While in any Treaty much must be left to the good faith of Russia, much may be done to raise material barriers ' against her. Let us, while depriving her of all pretext for future quarrel, remove from her also all temptation to engage in it. We may be reminded that this discussion is premature, that Peace is yet uncertain, and, in the opinion of most persons, impracticable. In that view we do not concur. We have lately had a public declaration by the Emperor of the FRENCH of the pacific disposition of his Government ; we have now a yet more formal declaration of pacific views by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. It is for the statesmen and diplomatists of Europe, with these elements of pacific settlement in their hands, to see if agreement be not practicable. If Russia be sincere in her desire to have Turkey indepen dent and her territory protected, she can have no wish to see her frontier defenceless, and can make no objection to an arrangement to render it surely guarded. It is from a direct meeting of the representatives of the belli gerent Powers that we can most reasonably expect a satisfactory solution of the various points in dispute. We can but indicate those which are of the highest importance. To the statesmen of Europe a magnificent opportunity is now open for proving their skill, their capacity, their moderation. With interests so mighty at stake, they may merge something of the peculiar policy of their respective States in .broad and generous views of the welfare of mankind. There is no State in Europe which is not raised to a sense of the importance of the crisis. A Peaco now would explode the barbarous notion that wars can only be terminated through exhaustion, and that all ideas of justice and polity must. be abandoned when the sword is drawn, and be trampled on by might. It would strengthen those principles of international law which have slowly grown up with, advancing civilisa tion; it would enlarge the range and scope of their influence, and give promise to ever member of the European family of the peace ful enjoyment of its independence. there to meet any agent whom the Govern ment of Burmah might depute. By this means every facility would have been afforded to the Burmese Government to enter into a treaty with us if so inclined, while a refusal on its part would, under such circumstances, have gained for it no triumph at our expense. In Europe, the sending a pompous embassy to a Court to obtain concessions from it with out previously ascertaining accurately the dis position of that Court, would be held a great mistake ; but in Asia the evil is tenfold, the failure being destructive to our prestige ; while it is by the force of our prestige, as much as by that of our army, that wa hold the empire of Hindostan. The capture of Herat by the Persians is another blow to us of not less significance, though it is the British, and not the Indian Government that is responsible in this in stance. Considering the immense influence that has been long exercised by Russia over the affairs of Persia, and the inimical pur poses towards which this influence has been always turned, the present crisis required that our Ambassador at the Court of Teheran should be a man of equal firmness and sagacity, and more than ordinarily fitted for his post. Instead of this, the duties were left during the earlier months of the present war in the hands of a locum tenens, who was a mere adventurer, appointed to the mission by haphazard, and who filled a consular office cf the lowest grade. Afterwards, when an am bassador ' selected and rest not the been sele and least The result mittcd or ;was appointed, a gentleman was d who, however : iniable his manners ipectable his • • :NA was certainly • person •- • 7 4 any time .11ected at A •'4 in Persia, st of ally , *tilt period. suit was,A,ll.„lrj :u.,4o4)pet ho sub- patient7`_ . iW^ . ) 1 Kshich that AA46 4. Ft 111 LONDON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 1950. Is advocating a pacific policy, we have never forgotten that we are now at war. No IN ord of ours can be tortured by the most malevo lent interpretation into willingness to with draw from the contest before the boundaries of Turkish territory are secured, and the pre ponderance of Russia in the Black Sea defi nitively terminated. Our argument has been that the objects of the War must at last be attained, and settled by Treaty, and that such treaty—if common sense is to prevail in the councils of nations—might as rationally be concluded now as after ten or twenty years of further warfare. But we have never lost sight of the fact, that while Peace is only in prospect, War is t.. present reality, demanding for its effective prosecution all the energies of the nation. Let us have Peace, if we:can have it with safety and honour. The basest of cowards is he who is afraid of the reproach of moderation. But if we cannot have Peace, let us put forth all our might in war; and, even when we speak of Peace, let our action be of that grand and energetic character which h hall prove to the world that we extend the olive branch not through servility, or weak ness, or fear—not through love of money, or dread of sacrifice—but in a spirit of mag nanimity and of that Christian justice which regards the establishment of Peace as the noblest exercise of power. In no case must the War be terminated un worthily ; but if it can be terminated worthily, it cannot be terminated too soon. Tne time has not yet come for discussing in detail the diplomatic communication in progress. But one thing is apparent. The proposals before the Cabinet of St Petersburg, so far as they are yet known, are in part beside, and in part do not meet, the questions at issue. It has not escaped the sagacity of one of the most independent of our contemporaries, that to insist on the coast of the Black Sea being freed from all fortifications would in reality be to place the Turkish territory at the mercy of Russian armies. If there is one point more than another demonstrated by the experience of the war thus far, it is that the safety of Turkey is much less threatened by the maritime than by the land forces of Russia. From the instant that the allied Cabinets decided on their policy, the Russian fleet was powe r l ess . It is now totally de• stroyed. Not so the Russian armies ; the capture of Kars proves the real danger to which Turkey is exposed. The road to Constantinople is now open to a Russian army through Asia Minor. Fortifications are in themselves, and in their . primary object, not aggressive, but defensive ivorks. They- are the natural resource of a weaker aeainst a s'tronger power. They are essential, they ale ledispensable, to the safety. of Turkey. But :for Silistria, the RusFlians might have begn e al,Constantinople, while Lord ABERDERN's Cabinet was still debating on the