The Press. — London, England, 1856-10-18 00:00:00

, Zrb t 1) rtlt No. 181.—VoL.V. LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1856. STAMPED ...: SIXPENCE. UNSTAMPED-FIVEPENCE. Elp regard with indifference the condition of any people of Europe. Her influence must be exerted to promote good government, and to restrain ' the abuSes of authority. But, apart from this general sentiment, she has no interest in the affairs of the Italian peninsula, except to preserve its territorial limits from invasion; and this object would best be attained by insisting, as Lord CASTLEREAGH did that the principle of non-intervention should be strictly observed. LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, 185(1. AT last we have an intelligible explanation of the Ministerial policy towards Italy from a Ministerial journal. Tardy as it is, we receive it gladly. It must open the eyes of our public, if anything can, to the impolicy of the course we are pursuing. Italy, it is said, is a divided and distracted country, incapable of winning independence— or if independence were a free gift, of main taining it—torn by furious parties, and rent asunder by petty ',States. It has alternately been:subject to the domination of Austria and France, and those Powers, it is assumed, are ready at lany moment to divide the territory between them, should any insurrection give them a pretence for interference. To counter act their influence, England must play a game of her own. We are, it is argued, compelled to interfere, that the interference of France and Austria may be kept within limits. If we do not interfere, we are, as regards the Italian peninsula, reduced to political insignificance, and we throw Italy completely into the hands of her mighty neighbours. IVe must keep up a party there —not, indeed, with any confident expectation that we shall benefit the party — but that we may not ourselves be driven into a corner This is the sum and substance of the argument put forth to justify the Ministerial policy. Now, in the first place, the theory assumes • too much. Tiler:: is no just ground for sup i.posing that Austria and France regard Italy ; as a, sick man, and are ready to take joint yosseision of his effects. The interests of those Powers are so adverse that it is ex tremely unlikely they would ever come to such an agreement as is suggested. There is not the slightest reason to imagine that they contemplate such a violation of the public law of Europe. Neither Power can be very anxious to have the other for its next door neighbour. If we suffer remote contingencies • of this kind to influence our policy, we must be prepared to make every one of the minor Courts of Europe the theatre of our intrigues ; and, instead of teaching them to rest in peace under shelter of a general agreement of all European• Powers to maintain their rights and territorial bounds, we shall inspire them with dread of invasion, and tell them that they have no hope of safety but by attempting to create division on matters concerning their internal affairs among the Governments with which they have relations. To urge the principle of interference in the internal affairs of any country, is surely not the best plan to secure it from foreign invasion. If Italy is really in danger from France and Austria, does it not appen• that the policy we are pursuing is sure to aggravate that danger? Are we to assist in embarrassing the affairs of any Italian State, to assail its independence, and to promote its occupation by foreign forces, in order that we may have a finger in the pie? The apologists of our Ministry say— Yes. They assert that we have an interest in fermenting troubles in order that we may hear part in them. We must do something it is said. The something may turn out well or ill. Consequences are nothing in comparison to the necessity for action. This plea would be intelligible from an in veterate busybody intent on' meddling with everybody's affairs while neglecting his own ; or we could understand it from a habitual participator in Irish rows,: never so happy as when he got a cracked crown and his pockets tni•ned inside out. But is it a sound principle of policy for a great nation to act on ? There is not one reason urged to justify interference in Naples which has not pre viously been urged to justify interference in Spain. We can, as regards that country, test the wisdom of the principle by results. Is it possible to survey the present condition of Spain with any feeling of satisfaction? What part does British influence now play in the councils of Madrid ? It is not pretended that the Government of Lord PALMERSTON is prepared to take any de cided line towards Naples, without the aid of France. But if it be true, as is said, that France is not unwilling to take advantage of any opportunity for extending her influence in the Italian peninsula, and even fur annex ing a portion of the country, may not our policy lead directly to the result which it should be our aim to avoid ? It is the Cabinet of St. James which, in stead of deprecating intervention, points the way to it, and is urgent 'for the adoption of measures which, if productive of the results desired, would convulse the Italian peninsula, and render its occupation by foreign forces inevitable. We see and we acknowledge the peril of French or Austrian intervention, yet we urge the French Government to join us in a course which, by directly violating the prin ciple of the national sovereignty of Naples, would justify intervention in all time to come. More prudent and sagacious, the Emperor of the FRENCH declines to accede to the soli citations of our Government. He acts as a drag on the impetuosity of our Foreign-office. Great Britain is exhibited in the humiliating position of being anxious to take an activ.s part against the Government of the Two Sicilies, yet restrained by superior influence from effecting her will. The necessity for action, so much vaunted, ought surely not to preclude attention to con sequences ; and, conceding that Lord PAL MERSTON'S Administration had its way, that the French and English Legations were with drawn from Naples, that the allied fleets en tered the bay of the capital, what good conse quences could be expected to result from the demonstration ? It would undoubtedly be an invitation to insurrection, and the first result of our interference would be a sanguinary struggle in the kingdom we profess our inten tion to assist. Knowing of what materials the Neapolitan population is composed, could we rationally hope that a well-ordered system of Administration could spring from either civil war or foreign occupation ? Is it more probable that a harsher despotism would rise on the ruins of the existing system? If our Government must be active, has it not more profitable fields for the exercise of its ingenuity than this state of the Italian peninsula, with which we can, from the oppo sition of race and religion, have but slight sympathy ? Undoubtedly England never can SPANISH AFFAIRS. ANOTHER change has taken place in the Madrid Ministry. O'DONNELL, who arrived at power by a street insurrection, has ended his short administration by a sham fight. It was on Thursday, Oct. 2, that Queen Isassu.a, with the King on one side of her, and General O'DONNELL on the other, reviewed 10,000 men in the environs of Madrid, the troops being dressed in their new uniforms, one of the re wards for their prowess in the latest barricade combats. On the following Sunday, NARVAEZ arrived in Madrid, and the Premier and the Marshal exchanged visits, but it required only a week for the latter to eject O'DONNELL from office and to become, for the time being, the ruler in Spain. This time the battle for places has been without bloodshed and with out a pronunciamento. Whether this pacific result has been achieved by fair means or foul, time will show. It has been suggested that there was a compromise, and that Cuba is destined to reward O'DONNELL for his prompt surrender. Madrid letters written prior to the downfall of the General, on the other hand, hint that he is destined to be the ambassador of Spain to St. Petersburg. The Russian Minis ter passed through Bayonne last Saturday, the 11th inst., having been detained there by a telegraphic message from Madrid to await the arrival of two Cabinet couriers sent by the Queen, to prepare a grand reception on the read to the capital for the envoy of a country which has had no representative in Spain since the death of FERDINAND. The late Czar NICHOLAS was a strong Carlist, and assisted the cause by strong subsidies, which the stupidity of Spaniards did not know how to turn to the best account. Here then, in the arrival of Russian diplomacy at Madrid, will be a new element for intrigue. In the meanwhile there has been the usual amount of visionary speculation as to the ad vent of NARVAEZ, and the biography of his colleagues in the new Cabinet has been paraded with much fuss, as if it mattered at all what men arrived at place and power in Spain under the present dynasty. It is not of the smallest consequence that this political apostate, that rank renegade, this dastardly traitor, that miserable intriguer, this jobber, or that robber, obtain Ministerial sway for a brief period in Madrid. The statesmen—if such a wretched set of corrupt incapables can be dignified with such an apnetto+:— and go; and as the successi civil war on both sides haustion, so does the gradually approach. The Spain is to came. At the death of FEED . LADRON first hoisted the an appellation—come cessive results • , are hi pees l' ,1 ,- 1 eventualcha; t1,,,'W. )1 ( 0 1 4 Lie real wve t l r i.-3'.! MIV iri r .... Alt Fr: DINAND, i i : iii • 4. Carlist ii. ~ .. i • , •a• re .4 7 4a. --- .::: , i' ..`‘' .• ... lis4 !•••••• j l lllhe A 3 '4k . . "‘i diPt 7 t , - till E., ‘ 0 7. 40 -P. N