The Press. — London, England, 1856-12-27 00:00:00

41:frjege:;,- (:;;; ; ,4151101604 " • T . . .1 - • ':r tit ,111 No. 191.-I‘n,.lV. LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1856. giA4I,'S,4i;;;.I7,7AVEE. fle LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1 . IT seemed only rational to expect that when the Conference was reopened at Paris it would take into consideration all those circumstances which have hindered the faithful execution of the Treaty of Peace, 30th March last, and would come to a definite understanding on the steps to be taken to give full and complete effect to the terms of the Treaty, and to pre vent further complications. The Ministerial newspapers have prepared us for a different result. They say that the Conference will assemble only to settle the two points of Bol grad and the Isle of Serpents, and will discuss no other business whatever. It will not enter upon any of those difficulties which, apart from the arrangement of the new Russian frontier, still impede a complete settlement of the Eastern question. Above all, it will make no allusion to the continued occupation of the Danubian Principalities by an Austrian army. That subject is to be scrupulously avoided. The reason for this reserve is not explained by our Ministerial prints, though it is very necessary that the public should under stand it. The Court of Vienna now—as it did during the late war—is politicly taking advantage of the difference between the Western Powers and Russia to advance its own interests, and in particular to push the influence of Austria in Southern Europe, and obtain a hold in those countries which border the mouth of the great Austrian river—the Danube. Whatever weakens Russian influence in this part of Europe must proportionally extend that of Austria. The condition of the Principalities is most favorable to the growth of foreign in- Anew*. within their confines. Their political situation is uncertain. The sovereignty of Turkey, after the protectorate of Russia was recognised, became but nominal; and whether such sovereignty shall be maintained, and if maintained what powers and privileges shall be attached to it, yet remain to he decided. While the people of the Principalities feel that their country has no definite political position, and that their fate will depend on arrange ments yet to be constituted, they are neces sarily led to rely on foreign influence. and are peculiarly open to the intrigues of neigh bouring Powers. Austria has for a period of nearly three years occupied the provinces of the Danube with her forces, and has made use of her military position to forward her poli tical views and her commercial interests, by attempting to form Austrian establishments and connections. With such ends to serve, it is naturally her desire to delay the evacuation of the Principalities by her forces, and she has found a convenient aid to her purpose in the person of Lord PaLmEasroN. Several years ago, when revolution threat ened the Thrones of the Continent, and the power of Austria seemed in danger of being materially abridged, Austrian statesmen vowed to avenge the indignities they were compelled to receive at Lord PALMERSTON'S hands. Time has brought round the opportunity for them to fulfil their vow. To make Lord PALMERS TON an instrument to forward the policy of Austria, and to advance its designs, is the sweetest kind of revenge which the statesmen of that Court could desire. As a condition of consenting to the Con ferences, and of supporting the views of the English Cabinet on the Bolgrad and Isle of Serpents questions, the Cabinet of Vienna has stipulated that only those two points shall be raised at the Conference. The far more important question of the evacuation of the Principalities will thus be postponed indefi nitely. Austria will gain her point, and the terms of the Treaty of Paris will still be as far as ever from being faithfully executed. It is not necessary for us to inquire whether this policy of Austria is defensible. Those accusations of perfidy commonly directed in this country against the Courts of the Con tinent, are worth very little. The fact is, we must look upon the policy of those Courts as normally aggressive. Their efforts are con stantly—and surely not unnaturally—directed to the growth of the power and the extension of the influence of the countries they repre sent. Austria has no colonial empire. Of all the great Powers of the world, she is the only one that cannot look beyond her imme diate vicinity for the extension of her terri tories. Except to the south, she is hemmed in by settled countries and well-defined boun daries. She has no prospect of advancing, save on the side of those countries which once constituted part of the Turkish empire, but which have gradually loosed themselves from Turkish authority. Witb the extinction of Russian power in the Danubian provinces, Austria may hape to so far extend her influence in them as to render their subjugation an easy task when a favor able opportunity shall arrive. We can con ceive that Austrian statesmen may anticipate such a contingency with great satisfaction, and we cannot wonder should they endeavour at the present moment to smooth the path of acquisition by-every means in their power. The question is not what policy the Cabinet of Vienna should legitimately follow, for that question will ultimately be decided by the policy which that Cabinet deems it mo-t for its interests to pursue. Its policy will not assuredly be affected by mere popular clamour in this country, or by the writings of jour nalists. The real question for this country is, whether our Government should favour Austrian designs, and should employ its in fluences at this particular crisis to promote their realisation. We conceive that our policy should be less ambiguous. It is not for our Government to play the game of Austrian diplomacy, through a paltry and peurile desire to spite the Court of St. Petersburg. Our.• proper course is as plain as any political course can possibly be. It is to insist on the literal and faithful execu tion of the conditions of the Treaty of Paris by all the Powers subscribing it. Instead of that, what is our Government doing? It con nives at the open and flagrant violation of the Treaty by Austria, on the pretence that diffi culties have been interposed by Russia to the settlement of her new Bessarabian frontier. Difficulties in the way of the faithful execu tion of engagements are met in very different modes by different order of minds, as the ex• perience of any person of common sense must have taught him. There is one class of mind which goes direct to its object, and whenever any obstacle is raised only considers how it may be most speedily and effectually over come. Minds of this order clear as they go ; they continually advance nearer to the end they have in view; the must complicated affairs yield to their honesty and perseverance, and eanh difficulty removed wonderfully for wards the work of final clearance. The other and opposite order of mind is distinguished by the facility with which, when a difficulty occurs, it raises other difficulties out of it. The means which it suggests for removing any complication are sure to tend to its deeper entanglement. When a fire is to be quenched it pours oil on the flames. Sometimes this is the result of incapacity—sometimes of that peculiar genius which loves perplexity for its own sake, and which, through its natural action, is always preparing disturbance, troubles, and complications, reckless of the disastrous consequences that may attend them. It is to the latter order of minds that Lord PALMERSTON belongs. When a difficulty as to the new Russian frontier was raised, the direct and simple way to remove it would have been to submit it to a tribunal of authority. This course was much too plain for Lord PALMERSTON. He denied that there was any difficulty at all, and en couraged Austria to retain military occupation of the Principalities while he sent a British squadron into the Black Sea. By this pro ceeding a very slight difficulty was raised into a very complex one. The obstacles which existed to the fulfilment of the Treaty of Peace were raised from a molehill to a mountain. This plan led to other consequences. Lord PALMERSTON took his course irrespective of the French Government. Hence a breach in the alliance of the Western Powers was effected. Their policy was no longer an united policy. They became in a measure rivals, with sepa rate objects to pursue. Tbus, from a question whether the Bessara bian frontier should turn most this way or that, there arose under Lord PALMERSTON'S dexterous management—lst, an indefinite postponement of the Austrian evacuation of the Danubian provinces; and, 2ndly, a cool ness, leading to separate action, between the French and English Governments. Each of these results is destined to be prolific of other consequences. 1. While Austria holds military occupation of the Principalities, there can be no settlement of the Eastern question. It was through the invasion of those provinces by the troops of Russia that the war began ; can it be said to be concluded while they are held by the troops of Austria, and while so material a condition of the Treaty of Peace as the entire freedom of these provinces from foreign control remains unfulfilled ? 2. The separate action of the French and English Governments is already felt in the _ _ growing difficulty Had the two Gov( solution of the q\ rested with them. natural and irresis) Prussia on one sii tion on the other. united, their jell practicable. E field as having.. of the Neufchatel ty of the Neufchatel qu,eation. ,ernments re ink' , t tik t ) question wotad • a n. They woliid . rresistible akoit side and thecS t• - " --- :Pr" Ca But bec. „ 1 " 1 int action i 4"7""' •L'" ,ngland is , :) no concern a. .e% 4 tel question, do