The Press. — London, England, 1855-01-13 00:00:00

AL - Ac _ g L-3 t r ett6,l+ No. 89.—Voi. 111. LONDON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 13, 1855. PRICE SIXPENCE. Vrtss. Prince GORTSCRAKOFF as the definition of the points of pacification previously laid down, no mention whatever was made of Sebastopol. If proof of this be required, it may be found in the ready acceptance by the Emperor of the terms proposed. It does not admit of an instant's doubt that any proposal involving a hint of the surrender or dismantling of Sebas topol would have been promptly and decisively rejected at St. Petersburg. The truth appears to be that the definition was expressed in extremely vague terms, that it might contain nothing to which Russia could justly take exception. This policy is intelligible as re gards Count Buoi., who is most anxious to avoid committing Austria to war, and as regards Lord WESTMORELAND, who represents the pacific intentions of his Cabinet, but that it should have been assented to by M. BORQUENEY, in opposition to the views of his Court, is a circumstance which, in the absence of all explanation, we do not profess to understand. Our Government, according to its organs, meditates a policy at once treacherous and desperate. A. military advantage is to be gained under cover of pacific negotiation. The reduction of Sebastopol was always in cluded in its intentions, but cannot be men tioned in any negotiations now pending, as " our diplomatists cannot stipulate for more " than our arms have conquered." We are told that while negotiations for peace are going on, the war must be prosecuted with " increased vigour and promptitude ;" and the reason given is, that some decisive success of the allied forces may be obtained against Sebastopol before the pacific negotiations at Vienna can be known there. "When " that result of the campaign is achieved, " it would be a fortunate event for the world if " this contest should cease." This peace and war programme, whether stamped with the authority of Government or nut, fur nishes the only intelligible explanation of their conduct at the present moment. They intend peace upon the same terms as were laid down in August last, previous to the invasion of the Crimea, and they hope for some success at Sebastopol which will enable them to withdraw our forces, under pretence that the purpose of the expedition has been fulfilled. But how, if the grand assault should be de layed, or should be repulsed, or should prove only partially successful, would the negotia tions in that case be protracted or postponed, to suit the events of the war? What would Russia say to such tricksy proceedings? Wlitt, would be thought of them by the whole civi lised world? Falsehood in pacific negotiation is of all kinds of falsehood the most detest able, as it tends to destroy the only means by which wars can ever be terminated. When such negotiation is entered on, it should be with distinct views and honest purpose. If ideas prevail on one side or the other, that ulterior ends may be gained, while terms are being discussed, the negotiation degene rates into a trick, and diplomacy is brought into contempt. If any real bond fide negotia tion is desired with Russia it must he brought about by plain language and straightforward aims, not by crooked courses and sinister designs. If the allies had frankly stated the only conditions they could accept, the answer of Russia, Yes or No, would have decided the question of peace or war. But the pretended definition of the diplomatists at Vienna has left the real and material points at issue exactly where it found them. The definition will need a definition. The acceptance of the Emperor NICHOLAS will have no consequence, and Austria will still maintain her neutrality while endeavouring to find a solid basis for negotiation amid the shifting quicksands of Russian intrigue and the uncertainty and vacillation of the British Cabinet. The new year, which was to open with great diplomatic and military successes — with an Austrian alliance, and the capture of Sebastopol—only discloses gloomier prospects than we have yet known. Lord JOHN Rus- SELL's forebodings of disagreement with Austria, when the conditions to be imposed on the Czar came to be really defined, seem likely to be realised. There is an essential incompatibility between the views of the French and Austrian Courts on those condi tions which it NI ill not be much longer pos sible for diplomatic strategy to conceal. The silence of the Moniteur on the proceedings at Vienna is in itself significant, but the toile of the French Government is more significant still. The Emperor NAPOLEON feels that the safety of his throne depends on his bringing the war to a triumphant conclusion. He will he no party to an arrangement intended to spare the Czar, and save him from the just consequences of his aggressive policy. He will listen to no terms of peace that do not reduce the moral and material power of Russia, and confine her empire within limits compatible with the independence of other States and the liberties of Europe. His deci sive attitude and energetic measures, his address to the Imperial Guard, the continued reinforcements sent to the Crimea, the loan of twenty millions now being raised to meet the expenses of the war, contrast singularly with the feebleness of our policy and conduct. While Lord ABERDEEN'S Cabinet amuses itself with arrangements for a new Vienna Con gress, " about the Ist of February," as the only important matter to be thought of, the Duke of NEWCASTLE'S administration of the War-office is rapidly helping on the de struction of our army. The question now is not of its diminution, but of its total loss. Its waste of life and disorganisation proceed far too rapidly to be repaired. The country may be incredulous as to the extent of the dis aster ; Lord RAGLAN will to the last endeavour to keep his force together. But we greatly fear, unless some decisive change should immedi ately take place, that the day is not distant when it will be announced that the British army in the Crimea has, for all effective pur poses, ceased to exist. LONDON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 13, 1864. THE Emperor NICHOLAS has promptly replied to the proposals of the Vienna Conference. According to the published accounts, a tele graphic message has been received from him at Vienna, accepting the interpretation placed on the four points by the Ministers of the allied Powers, and authorising Prince GORTS CHAEOFE to negotiate a treaty of peace on the terms laid down. Hence it would seem, on the surface, that no obstacle exists to the speedy or immediate cessation of hostilities. This would be true if the interpretation of the four points had embodied the whole meaning and real purposes of the allies. But it did no such thing. As if this diplomatic proceeding were intended for no other end than to excite delusion and raise false hopes, the most material points at issue were altogether avoided. In the opinion of the public there is one great difficulty in the way of pacification concerning which no expla nation has been offered, and that is—Sebas• topol. For the last four months the operations against that place have been watched with intense anxiety. They have entailed on us terrible losses. The flower of the finest army ever sent from our shores has been sacrificed in mere preliminary approaches and combats, while the work itself still remains to be done. Constantly victorious, our troops have suffered all the extremity and wretchedness of a be leaguered force. Short of utter and disgraceful discomfiture, the expedition hag' fared as badly as the best friend of Russia and worst enemy of England, either in the Cabinet or out of it, could desire. With all the reinforcements sent out, we are assured that the effective strength of our army on Christmas day was only the same as on the sth November before the battle of Inkermann, while the daily drain from sickness and exhaustion continues to be appalling. Still the heart of our people does not fail them. They know that it is the management of the war alone which is to blame. Whatever may be the faults of our character, faint heartedness is not among them. Difficulties do not appal us. We are not accustomed to turn away from a work we have once put our hand to, and in proportion to the blood this enter prise has coat us is the passionate desire of the country that it shall not be shed in vain. The Ministerial journals have constantly held that no pacification would be possible which did not include in some way or other the demolition of Sebastopol. To raze the fortifications of that stronghold was declared to be one of the great objects of the war. For this purpose the expedition to the Crimea was undertaken ; and whatever may be the wishes or intentions of our Government, that of France is resolved never to sheathe the sword until the objects for which it was drawn are com pletely accomplished. We adhere to our statement of last week, that in the memoradum drawn up by the Conference at Vienna, and communicated to THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITIA. THE policy of the Government towards the Militia has been a policy of discouragement. It is felt throughout the service that not only have they been left without reward but their just claims have been disregarded, and in the measures that have been adopted they have not been generously treated. The circumstances under which they were called out were peculiar. They were enlisted under the act of 1852, and were liable for permanent service only in the case of invasion. By the act of last May their liability was ex tended to every time of war The new responsibility was declined by none. Regis