The Press. — London, England, 1856-05-03 00:00:00

414 question should be fully diseussed and sifted. With respect to Mr. Whiteside's speech, it was wholly irrelevant. In the first place, nothing could be more remote from truth, or at variance with fact, to assert that the English Government were responsible for the defence or fall of Kars. By sending a commis sioner into Armenia, they did not render themselves responsible for the operations of the army or its failures. Although he acknowledged that the English Government did regard the operations in Asia Minor as of some importance, yet they were felt to be inferior to the capture of Sebastopol, the real object of the war; and to have withdrawn troops from before Sebastopol to secure a merely secondary object (the safety of Kars) would have been highly impolitic in a strategical point of view; and as to the political point of view, the fall of Kars had been utterly without influence on the treaty of peace. With respect to the application of the Turkish Loan to its proper objects, Sir G. C. Lewis denied that any unnecessary delay bad taken place on the part of the allies. The loan was contracted on the 20th August, and 500,0001. had left this country by the 15th Sep tember, and on the 24th of October a meeting of the commissioners took place at Constantinople, when a memorandum arranging the securities to be given by the Turkish Government for the application of the loan solely to the purposes of the war was discussed. The Turkish Government declined to promise any detailed account of the expenditure of the moneys. The discussion was adjourned, the money remained locked up in Constantinople, and the commissioners did not meet again till 24th November,—the day Kars fell—and it was not until January that the mere erandum, after many modifications, was ulti =tab , agreed to. au• JOHN PAKINGTON was surprised at the extra ordinary line taken by Sir G. Lewis. He had laboured to prove that the capture of Kars had no influence upon the terms of the peace ; but he would find it difficult to persuade the house and the country that the terms had not been influenced by that di aster. His avowal that the Government were in no degree responsible for the defence of Kars was denied by every line in the blue-book, and by the instructions given to General Williams by Lord Clarendon, which contradicted that statement, and showed that the Government did make themselves responsible, in a very great degree, for the defence of Kars, which, with Erzeroum, was a frontier town of the highest military importance, the very key of the Bosphorus on the Asiatic side. He should not attempt, he said, to vindicate the conduct of Lord Stratford in neglect• ing General Williams, whose power and usefulness had been thereby very much impaired; but, at the same time, he was bound to deny that the conduct of the ambassador towards the general, though repre hensible, had any material effect in causing the fall of Kars, which he attributed to the subsequent con • duct—the vacillation and want of vigour and of prudence of her Majesty's Government. Lord Clarendon's despatch of the 13th July, rejecting the orga wised plan of the Porte to despatch 36,000 effective men to create a powerful diversion in Georgia by Kutais, predicted also that in case of such an expedition for the relief of Kars by Redout- Kaleh being attempted, the Turkish troops would fall ill between Redout-Kaleh and Kutais, and be defeated between Kutais and Tiflis." Besides as suming dangers to exist of which there was no proof, the despatch was written in a tone the most dis couraging and the most certain to damp the spirit of the Turks, and was one of which the Government ought really to be ashamed. To this despatch Lord Stratford replies (30th July, '55) that a" most serious dilemma" is the result of the unfavorable judgment passed by her Majesty's Government upon the Porte's plan for the relief of Kars. Two months were wasted in doubt and uncertainty, when a diver sion was at last allowed to be made by way of Georgia. How then was it possible in the face of these two letters, and the ultimate diversion made by way of Georgia, to deny the responsibility of the Government with respect to the measures adopted for the relief of Kars'— After having distinctly taken upon themselves the re sponsibility of refusing to adopt the proposition made by the Porte, I cannot understand how the right hon. gentle man can defend himself and the Government by saying that they were not responsible for the defence of Kars, and that it was altogether a Turkish affair. There is only one other point to which I will advert. It is the answer of Lord Panmure to General Vivian, dated the 14th of July, 1835, who, in speaking of this plan, calls it a wild and ill-digested plan. He says—" I place such full reliance on sour professional ability that I feel no anxiety lest you should undertake any expedition of a nature so wild and ill-digested as that contemplated by the Porte." Is the house aware that at the very time Lord Panroure was waiting this despatch to General Vivien that gallant general was writing home a letter, in which he says—" I don't entertain a doubt of the advantage of the proposed measure, provided it can be efficiently arranged." (Hear, hear) LAYARD believed that the original sin lay with Lord Aberdeen's Government, in not taking sufi• cient precautions in 1853 - 4 to prevent the inva sion of Asia Minor by the Russians. He justified THE PRESS. Lord Panmure's deceptive statements as to the state of the Turkish army in Asia on the ground that if Lord Panmure had told the truth he would have given information to Russia. The capture of Kars by the Russians would have immense political influence in that 'quarter of the world; but, although the pre sent Government deserved blame for their conduct with respect to the Turkish Loan, he did not think that Kars had fallen solely through their want of foresight and energy. Mr. MAOUIRE insisted that the great offender was Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who did not give to General Williams that countenance and support which would have saved Kars. Sir W. HEATJICOTE observtd that the position of the question was very much changed by the amend mend of Mr. Seymer, and suggested that it was more for the credit of the house to adopt it than to give a vote for or against the original motion, which might be mistaken, and an erroneous impression be thus made upon the country. Mr. WARNER reprobated what he termed the heart less inhumanity of Lord Stratford, and declined to vote for the amendment, considering that the question should be met by a direct affirmative or negative. He opposed the motion. Mr. Sergeant SHEE, having a clear conviction upon the question, advised Lord Palmerston not to adopt the amendment, if he did not wish to be regarded as a traitor to his own fame and to disappoint the just expectations of the country. Sir B. LrrroN moved the adjournment of the de bate. Lord PALMERSTON was of opinion that the house should come to a deci.ion upon the question that night, and declared that he was ready to continue the debate until the latest hour. Mr. DISRAELI observed that after the amendment of Mr. Seymer a new feature had been introduced into the debate, and he should support Sir B. Lytton in persisting in the motion for its adjourn ment. The house divided upon this motion, which was negatived by 243 to 173. Mr. MALnis then moved that the house do adjourn , whereupon Lord PALMERSTON yielded, and consented to the adjournment of the debate until Thursday, which was agreed to. The debate was resumed on Thursday. Sir BULWER LYTTON said the question was, whether among other causes a want of energy and foresight on the part of the Government had not contributed to the tall of Kars? Admitting, as he did, the ability of Lord Clarendon's despatches (and if letter-writing could have saved Kars, Lord Clarendon would have saved and the fact of Turkish maladministration, there was, he contended, one fault at.ributable to the British Government from which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had vainly endeavoured to free them ; if a moderate sum had been placed at the disposal of General Williams, a fortress acknowledged to be the key of Asia Minor, which had been conquered, not by force, but by famine, would have been saved:— I say that either by a direct grant, or by means of a Turkish loan, or—and that would have been the best and simplest mode of all—by sending money to your commis• sioner himself, expressly for the purpose of being employed in the defence of Kars—l say that by any one of these modes that city might have beeen saved. ( Hear, hear.) But when Lord Ellenborough, in the month of August, called the attention of the House of Lords to the distressed state of Kars, and the neglect of the war in Asia, Lord Panmure replied, that Turkey, in that quarter, was well able to defend herself. (Hear, hear.) Turkey able to defend herself ! That was the statement of Lord Panmure in the teeth of the information contained in these de• spatches which have been published for the purpose of showing how defenceless Turkey was at that very time; and the statement was made on the very same day— namely, the 3rd of August—on which Lord Clarendon, in a despatch to Lord Cowley, said it was clear that without assistance the whole Turkish force in Asia must be de stroyed or captured. (Hear, hear.) General Williams had stated in his despatch 23rd of June that if within four months aid did not come he saw nothing before him but starvation, and yet that aid was never sent:— When Omer Paella pressed the allied generals and admirals to consent to the adoption of his plan for the relief of Kars, and founded his arguments on the despatch of the 23rd of June, showing the urgency and the import ance of sending aid to the Turkish force in Armenia, the allied generals absolutely refused to give any opinion upon the subject, on the ground that they had no information from the ambassadors of their respective Governments at Constantinople which could lead them to suppose that the affairs of Asia were in a precarious position. That was the species of concert which seemed to prevail between our agents in the East. And yet the Government who had so signally mis managed everything, now attempted to throw the blame on Turkish maladministration. When Lord Panmure appeared upon thescene, in September, he did nothing but write to General Vivian "to uphold the British reputation." If, then, the Government were so careful in July of the British flag, why did they permit it to succumb before the Russians in SATURDAY, November. Was not the honour of the English flag concerned in the surrender of Kars ? The eyes of England—nay, the eyes of Europe —were fixed with unalloyed admiration upon the noble attitude of the brave English soldier, who, with the assistance of three or four of his countrymen, was upholding—embodying —the renown of the whole nation. (Cheers.) Kars and General Williams could not be divided in the mind of any one Kars was that Englishman, and that Engl is h man was Kan; —(loud cheers )—and to have evinced energy and foresight in preparing for the defence of Kars would have been to have closed the war with glory, not only to General Willia m s, from whose renown nothing can detract, but to England. The fact was the Government paid no attention to the applications of General Williams. He asked for money, surgical aid, and personal authority, neither of which was granted, and be was left to oonsequenees of which they were well aware. When an army was at last sent to his aid, the Government were astute in discovering objections in respect to the route, and perplexed the operations by conflicting orders. When he was asked what was the Govern ment to do, he asked in return what had they done? If he admitted that they could not have written better, he insisted that they could not have acted worse. There might he other causes for the surrender of Kars, but the main fault rested with the Minister of War. Mr. V. SMITH defended the Government, insisting that it was not to blame for the fall of Kars, which was one of those accidents of war difficult t o guar d against, however it might be regretted. Russia had nothing to pride herself on in the way of triumph, for Kars had fallen by famine, and not by force of arms. The war on the whole had been well con ducted, the peace well concluded, and he would con fidently appeal to the representatives of a generous people to allow past errors to fall into oblivion. Colone. DUNNE said that the proper mode of relieving the fortress was by a march upon the com munications of General Mouravieff, that the mute of Trebizond was not practicable for cannon, and that that chosen by Omer Pacha was a wise and proper ono, and, though commenced too late, his exi pedition very nearly succeeded. He had no doubt that the blame of the fall of Kars rested upon the War Department, which deserved, in his opinion, the censure of the house. Sir JAMES GRAHAM assumed the substance of the blame imputed to Government to be—first, having reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, they failed to recal him; and, secondly, having omitted to send timely aid to Kars. He agreed with the Attorney-General that the conduct of Lord Stratford had been reprehensi ble, and that the misunderstanding between him and General Williams was not conducive to the good of the service ; but, on the other hand, the past lite and the great services of Lord Stratford must be remem bered. With regard to the other point, there could be no doubt that there was an indisposition on the part of the French Government to diminish the force in the Crimea until the capture of Sebastopol was secured; and, although he did not say, nor would the Treasury bench maintain, that no error had been committed, in a situation of danger and difficulty, it. would be a bold measure on the part of the House of Commons, after the result, to censure the Government for an exercise of discretion. With respect to pecuniary assistance, he must say some blame did attach to the Government. He thought that if a credit had been opened in favour of General Williams, either with the Ambassador or with the Treasury in England, to the amount of 100,0001. or 200,0001., it would have amply supplied Kars with all the necessary prov;sions. He thought likewise that Omer Pacha might have been allowed to with draw the Turkish veterans, and that their place might have been supplied with the Turkish Contin gent. There was another point :—With every desire to maintain the French alliance in its full integri.7, he thought too much had, not unnaturally, been conceded to objections not well founded. He came now to the vote he should give. If the previous question had been moved, he did not know that he should not have voted for it ; but he could not re gard the amendment, which asked merely for delay, in that light. He could not consider the motion as an abstract question—if it were, Ire could not vote for it ; but it must be looked at with reference to circumstances and to time. All the principal objects of the war had been fully achieved, and it would be ungenerous to the Administration, in such circum stances and at that time, to declare them unworthy altogether of the confidence of their countrymen, and that they had failed in foresight and energy. He should, therefore, not vote for the amendment, and he should give his negative to the original motion. Mr. DISRAELI said the right hon. baronet had te►n pered justice with mercy. He spoke against the Government, but he would vote .or them. (Laughter.) He could not agree with him in his division of the subject before the house. Lord Stratford's conduct