The Press. — London, England, 1856-02-23 00:00:00

FEBRUARY 23, 1856. L'Expedition de Crimie jusqu'oi la Prise Sebas topol. By the Baron de Bazancourt. Vol. I. Paris: Amyot. (Second Notice.) Os the 14th of September the English and French disembarked at about the same time in the Crimea. According to an official re turn, the respective forces were exactly the same, even to a unit-27,600 men ; but this is probably an error : the Turks were 8,000 s trong. It having been ascertained that the Russians were on the Alma, the Marshal determined on leaving Old Fort on the 17th, for "the success of the enterprise depended on the rapidity of movements, in order to " prevent too large a concentration of forces "on a given point." But on that day— The English were not in 4 position to march; an im mense quantity of impedimenta caused infinite delay in their operations. On the l tith the French were impatient to set out; but— There was a new delay on the part of the English, and the Marshal wrote to Lord Raglan to say that, whatever might be the consequences, he would leave the next morn ng at seven o'clock. On the 19th the order to march was given, and at one o'clock the French army arrived on the heights which dominate the valley of the Alma. The English army ought to have arrived at the same time ; hut the first part of it did not come up until the French had established their camp, and the second part until a late hour in the night. In the course of the day Prince Menschikotr, who with the Russian army was established on the heights opposite the valley, sent some squadrons of cavalry and some artillery to disquiet the English; but the latter " received them vigorously." A plan of attacking the Russians was drawn up by Marshal St. Arnaud and his generals, and it was decided that the French, echo were to attack on the right, should commence operations the next morning at half-past five, and the English were to take the left at six and the centres at sever► : In the evening the Marshal sent Colonel I'rochu to the English camp to communicate to the general-in•chief the plan of battle, and to inform him . of the time at which the troops were to march. Lord Raglan fully accepted, in all its details, the plan which was presented, as also the time filed, and it was agreed that Prince Napoleon and General Canrobert should come to an understanding with the English generals, in, order to operate with them simul taneously. At half-past five the next morning the French second division quitted its bivouac and ad vanced towards the heights of the Alma, and at half-past six it was already being massed in the plain. But— No movement was to be seen in the English army. General Canrobert, astonished at this inactivity, so con trary to the instructions communicated on the previous etetung, hurried to the Prince Napoleon ; and they both hastened towards the division of Sir De Lacy Evans. They found the English general in his tent, and when they ex pressed to him their astonishment at a delay which might gravely compromise the success of the day, he answered, ' I have received no orders ! " There was evidently some 'misunderstanding. Before seeking the explanation of the enigma, the first thing to be done was to stop the march of the French division which sax commanded by General Bosquet, and which, by effect ing its movement alone, might be crushed. General Canroberl hastened, without losing a moment, to the Marshal. The latter was already on horseback, and had left his bivouac, which was in the rear of the lines. As soon as he was informed of what was passing he sent in all haste an officer of the staff, Commandent Benson, to General Bosquet, to wait for the English troops who were behind time. In the meantime Colonel Trochu galloped off as fast as his horse could go to the English head quarters. It was then seven o'clock. But, great as was the haste of the colonel—he having nearly two leagues to go, over hilly ground, and which besides was occupied by bivouacs —he was half an hour in arriving. The English were still encamped, snd in no respect prepared for the march agreed on. He. however, on reaching Lord Raglan's head quarters, found his lordship on horseback. "My lord," he said, " the Marshal thought, after what you did me the hcnour to say last evening, that your troops, forming the left wing of the line of battle, were to advance at six o'clock in the morning." In am giving orders," said Lord Raglan "we are gettig ready, and shall soon l eave. P art o f my troops thly arrived at the bivouac at a late hour at night." "For heaven's sake, my lord," said the colonel, "make haste ! Every minute's delay takes from us a chance of success!" "Go and tell the Marshal," said Lord Raglan, " that t his moment ord ers are being given through all the line." hut, though this conversation took place at 'even o'clock, it was not, it seems, until THE PRESS. half-past ten that Colonel Trochu was able to announce that the English were ready to march. The consequence was, that— All these unexpected delays, and the indecision which necessarily resulted in the movements, did not permit the plan of battle to be executed as primarily conceived. The Russian army, instead of being surprised by a rapid ma • noiuvre, as it ought to have been, had time to take up strong positions on the heights, and to strengthen its centre and right. Then come twenty seven pages of descrip tion of the battle of the Alma ; and of them twenty-four are occupied by details of what the French did, and duce by those of what the English did. We translate the three pages devoted to the English : The Marshal observed the retreating movement of the Russian army, when General de Martimprey, chief of the staff, hastened up from the left with the news that the Eng lish, stopped in their march by a formidable artillery, decimated by a murderous fire, and menaced by enormous masses, found serious difficulties in carrying the positions assigned to them. The Marshal immediately gave orders to the Prince Napoleon to execute a change of front to the left, which should place his division at the crest of the ravine, at the reverse of which the English were combating with energetic solidity. The movement was executed. The order to support firmly on the left was also sent to Generals Canrobert and Bosquet. " Let us go to the English," cried the Marshal, galloping off in the direction indicated by General de Martimprey, and giving orders to the artillery in reserve to follow him, so as to take the Russian battalions in flank. Major de la Boussiniere left with Toussaint's batteries, with all the speed possible, and, approaching the heights, stopped reso lutely at about four hundred yards from the skirmishers. He immediately commenced his fire under a shower of balls and projectiles of all kinds ; for the enemy divined the injury which this artillery, placed at so short a distance, and throwing grape-shot into their large masses, would do them. General de Martimprey spoke truly : the English were fighting with heroic courage against the formidable de fences accumulated in this position. Embarrassed by the obstacles of the ground, which prevented them from executing their movement on the left, they presented them selves boldly in face of the enemy, marching in line of battle with admirable ensemble. Balls, grape-shot, bullets, and shells make gaps in their ranks, but those gaps were immediately closed up, and the human wall did not fall back a step ; it advanced slowly under this murderous fire, and left behind it long traces of blood. Brown's division did prodigies of valour : it was furiously assailed by eighteen guns of large calibre, and saw one of its regi ments ( the 23rd) almost entirely destroyed. Major North cote carried a redoubt; but, crushed himself, he was forced to fall back, when the Duke of Cambridge, who had just passed the river with all his division, hastened to support his movement. Pressed at the same time by the division of the Duke, by that of Sir lie Lacy Evans, and by that of Brown, which supported the reserve, the Russians, overwhelmed on their left, employed their last efforts on the heights which faded the burning village ; and three columns, which supported their 1 ne of battle to the right, assailed at the same time the English divisions. The latter re ceived this formidable shock with solidity, but were not able to advance a step. It was at that moment that Toussaint's battery, directed by Major de la Bonssiniere, took in flank these menacing masses. and caused disorder amongst them by its grapeshot and shells. The English redoubled at the same moment their efforts, their impetuosity, and their solidity. Whilst the brigade of Foot Guards, under the orders of Major- General Bentinek, drove back the enemy to the rear of the heights, the Highland Brigade, commanded by Major- General Sir C. Campbell, advanced in admirable order, which was not for a single moment disturbed by the re doubled fire of the Russian musketry and artilb-ry. One would have said, on seeing it so calm and precise in its movements, that it was filing off in a field of manoeuvres. It marched on the right flank of the Russian redoubt, whilst the Guards ascended by the other. Arrived within a hundred steps, the Highlanders overwhelmed the enemy by a point-blank discharge, and then attacked them with the bayonet. Heaps of dead bodies covered the ground. The light division of Sir George Brown, after having heroically surmounted all the obstacles, also appeared com plete on the top of the heights, threatening to envelop the enemy. _ • The - Marshal sent one of his aides de ramp to stop the movement of the divisions, the assistance which they were destined to give having become unnecessary. The battle was won. We have then this comment : The genius of the two peoples, the individual character of the two nations, were manifested in a very striking manner on this occasion. Whilst our soldiers and artillery, led away by indescribable impetuosity, passed all obstacles, and climbed with desperate efforts up the steepest heights, our allies, in admirable line of battle, marched at their customary pace, supporting the fire of the formidable posi tions they were to carry, without slackening or accelerating their• march, and attacking difficulties in front instead of endeavouring to turn them. Heroic error, which in scribed glorious names in annals, but inscribed them in the book of the dead ! A little further on we are told that— If the English cavalry, commanded by Lord Lucan, had not stuck fast in the bogs of the Alma, it might have been of great assistance at the end of the day, and have greatly increased th enumber of prisoners e•e took. 185 The 21st, the day after the battle, was set apart for the burial of the dead and providing for the wounded. The Marshal, however, pro posed to mulch early in the In 4 /ming of the 22nd to the Katcha, in the hope of overtaking the enemy and of beating them a second time:— But the next day our allies were not ready, and forced us to stop on the field of battle. The English, intrepid and indefatigable in fighting, do not seem to understand the immense importance of a day's or an hour's delay in a warlike operation: they either cannot or will not hurry themselves. " I have lost fewer men than they," wrote the Marshal," because I am more active ; my soldiers run where theirs march !" He also wrote to his brother on the 22nd, " The English are not et ready, and I am kept here by them as at lialtchik and Old Fort. It is fair, how ever, to say that they have more wounded than I have, and that they are farther from the sea! " And he wrote in his diary, " How slow we are in our movements ! This is not the proper way to make war! " It having been determined in a conference to attack Sebastopol by the south side, orders were given for the armies to march in the morning of the 23rd. The English, from their position, were to march the first, and the French were to start at sit o'clock. But— there is always, it will be seen, a " but " when the English have to do anything— We had to wait until the English, who carried with them immense loads of baggage, and arabas loaded beyond all reasonable limits, and dragged by oxen, bad tiled off. It was, consequently, twelve before we could effect our movement, We then have an account of the famous flank march on Sebastopol—of the alarming progress of the illness of Marshal St Arnaud— of his resignation of his command to General Canrobert—and of his death. Whilst he was on his death-bed Lord Raglan went to see him, but ho was in a lethargy. Two hours after his lordship returned, accompanied by Admiral Lyons : They entered the chamber softly. On hearing strarge steps, the Marshal opened his eyes, and, saluting thfra with a smile, held out his hand to them, and thanked them for their kind visit. His energy was such that thout.,h about to breathe his last be kept off death, and, addressing Lord Raglan, said, "I am better, my lord ; the sea air ai.a the care of my wife will soon restore me, and I shall always be with you in thought !" The English general and Admiral Lyons withdrew, and the officer who accompanied them to the door saw tears roll down their cheeks. The author afterwards gives a detailed ac count of the preparations made for taking Sebastopol, which lasted to the 18th October. He then describes at length the attack made by land and sea on the formidable fortress, on the 17th of the same month, and records that it failed, or, to use his own gentle language, that " it did not respond to the hopes which " had been formed of it." And so his volume concludes. The copious extracts we have made will enable our readers to judge for themselves of this book, which comes to them clothed with the high authority of the French Government. As good Englishmen, they will, no doubt, feel, as we have felt, not a little mortification and some shame at many of its statements respect ing the English army and fleet. But though, from the official reports of our own journals and the letters of newspaper correspondents, we know unfortunately that most of these statements are true in the main, it is but fair to withhold condemnation on the parties re• sponsible for the acts to which they refer un til we shall have received their explanations, or shall have had access to their confidential despatches and private correspondence. What we should particularly like to see ex plained at once is the allegation respecting the misunderstanding about the time the battle of the Alma was to commence. How could a misunderstanding possibly arise on such an important matter? How could General Evans be at half-past six quietly seated in his tent without orders for a great battle which had been fixed to commence at half-past five ? How could the English troops be in repose at half-past seven, when they ought to have been on the march at six? And we should further like to know how it happened that, when they were roused up at half past seven, they were not " ready to march " until half-past ten? We regret that we cannot honestly compli ment Baron Bazancourt on the manner in which be has executed the great task confided to him by the French Government. He is evidently but a " 'prentice hand " in the art of