The Press. — London, England, 1855-10-13 00:00:00

OCTOBER 13, 1855. Thought and Language. By B. H. Smart. London : Longmans. Ma. SMART belongs essentially to the English school of metaphysicians —that small band of anti-German thinkers who, resolutely ig noring the results or no results (we do not pretend to decide which is the more appro priate designation) due to the successors of Kant, seek to restore to mental philosophy the application of the inductive method. To what extent the marvellous progress of physical gives earnest of a more productive future to metaphysical science, when its in vestigations shall be conducted on similar prin ciples, it is difficult to say ; the utter impossi bility of experiments upon mind, and the consequent restriction of the investigator to simple observation, in itself of peculiar deli cacy and difficulty, would seem to render a science of mind, in the strict sense of the words, almost entirely inaccessible. It is true that in the most perfect of the sciences, Astronomy, experiment is as far beyond our power as in Psychology, but we are provided, in compensa tion, with means of exact quantitative verifi cation by which to decide between the claims of rival hypotheses apparently equally capable, but for the application of this searching test, of affording qualitative explanations of the facts revealed while in Mechanics, in Physics proper, in Chemistry, in Physiology, even in Politics—unhappily too often in the latter, — experiments are practicable, and more or less decisive in an inverse proportion to the greater or less complexity of the phenomena to be investigated. Mental facts are emphatically " naked " facts, and every new metaphysical tailor seems to cut out his new costume ac cording to his own taste and fancy, quite regard less of the original proportions of the model. We are debarred from experiment ; the very notion of numerical verification is absurd ; the rival hypotheses which have divided phi lc sophers since the very fist beginnings of speculation appear equally capable of explain. ing the same facts ; and there is no crucial test possible which shall overthrow one and establish another. The history of philosophy, equally in its broad outlines and its smallest details, is a his tory of oscillations; " Facts, ideas—ideas, facts" —is the wearisome sing-song which the meta physical pendulum has been droning for two thousand years, and will perhaps continue to drone for two thousand more, in spite, we feet, of the sturdy labours of thinkers like Mr, Smart. Let us take any of the great problems of philo sophy : for example, the question of grounds of necessary truth. How is it that, all our knowledge beginning from experience, a por tion of it, including the sciences of Number, Space, and Time, or Arithmetic, Geometry, and Algebra (to borrow Sir William Rowan Hamilton's definition of the latter), should monopolise a certainty which experience it self shows us itself alone cannot confer ? How is it that we can say of some truths only that they are thus or thus, while of others we can assert not only that they are what they are, but that they mutt be so and cannot be otherwise ? Are the ideas of Number, Space, Time, derived purely from experience or are they innate ? We cannot observe any mind but one which has had communication with the external world ; the comparison be tween a mind before such communication and after it—in other words an experiment—is thus impossible. Hence the various hypotheses by which, when the fact of this " necessity " is acknowledged, philosophers have sought to explain it ; while some, coming to the investi gation already in possession of a theory which refused to account for the fact, have attempted to modify or even to deny altogether the fact itself. Again, to take another example, which of the infinitely varied explanations of the fact of external perception are we to accept, and on what grounds ? Here we are in a worse position than before, when considering the question of necessary truth ; we cannot com pare together different methods of perception ; to do this, as Buffon said, we must leave our own brains and enter into those of some other being; we can: be - wheth , stand " face THE PRESS. face " or immediately, the object immediately perceived ay., mental or material ; whether, in other words, to embrace Idealism or Realism : whether, if we take a fancy to Idealism, we shall patronise that form of it which it gards the idea as a modification of the mind or no ; or, if we adhere to Realism, we are to eousider as objective all the qualities of body per ceived or only a portion of them ; or, on the other hand, if we choose to assert that we do not perceive immediately but me diately, whether the representative idea be numerically distinct from the mind or a moth fication of it ; if the first, whether it be spiritual or corporeal : if the second, whether it be identified with the percipient act or not — all these opinions, which may again be divided into subordinate species, having been ac tually held by different philosophers. The reader who is curious in such matters may see a full account of the various theories which have been held on this point in the note C. to Sir W. Hamilton's edition of Reid. Again, whether or no to agree with Mr. Smart and the Loekeists, as he represents them (though, by the way, we suspect that there is as much division between the Lockeists on this point as between the rest of philosophers upon it), in " holding that the " things of sense are, for us, related to each " other as we perceive them to be : " and yet " admit that by beings otherwise constituted " they may be otherwise perceived." We can see no reason unconnected with spirit•rapping or phrenology which should incline us more to one of these fancies than to any other of them. We divide our opinion equally between them, without favour or prejudice. It is quite conceivable that the minds of other beings may distort the realities of sense, but we cannot by any possibility know whether they do or no ; how it should be more easy to dis • cover, without a special revelation not yet vouchsafed to us (we speak all in reverence), that our minds do not and cannot, we confess we cannot comprehend : of course we du not intend to assert that they do, only we should like ,o know how an 3 human being, philoso pher more than ploughboy (we exclude clair voyants and " media"), can possibly know that they do not. To ascertain this, we must compare the reality, apart from perception, per se, if there be any such ignotum quid, with the reality perceived ; which is equivalent to saying that we must perceive and not per ceive at the same moment. Now, this seems to us something very like an absurdity. We might fill pages with examples of the divergence of philosophical opinion; some differences being mere logomachies,due to unsettled terminology, some actual errors ofobservation,but the greater and more important class arising from the entire absence of any means of arriving at a conclu sion such as we possess in those sciences which have already acquired, or are rapidly acquiring, a body of acknowledged doctrine which is above discussion. That there are in mental science many acknowledged facts we do not intend for a moment to deny ; but that there are many questions, and these thelmost interesting and the most fundamental, which are utterly inaccessible, no one who has read the history of philosopy, whether guided by Kantist or Lockeist, can have any very con siderable doubts; and the settlement of these very points has hitherto occupied almost entirely the attention of philosophers. As might be supposed, Mr. Smart is too much of a metaphysician to neglect that which is out of reach. We have, therefore, discussions on the origin of our knowledge and on necessary truth, the examples of the latter being taken for the most part from the definitions of geometry, and not from its axioms ; the conse quence of which is that his theory, as far as we understand it, applies only to analytical judgments, the necessary truths about which all the great battles of philosophy have been fought being synthetic, and the two classes incapable of identification. The chapters on the special subject of the work, the connection between thought and language, arc a re-state ment, very clearly expressed, of the author's peculiar theory of verbal expression, not gene rall• - ..itved as yet among metaphysicians 981 Embassies and Foreign Court*. A History of Diplomacy. By " The Roving Englishman." London: Routledge. THIS volume is chiefly historical, but the author has varied his compilation with aneo• dotes drawn from his own experience, and with satirical reflections on th• folly of certain diplomatic practices. He is much too smart a writer to miss the opportunities of ridicule which the formalities of diplomatic etiquette present, more especially as he can at the same time insinuate an impression of his own vastly superior capacity. His writings would be read with more pleasure if swagger and self assurance were less prominent in them. He writes towards the close of his performance : Whatever celebrity the se books have acquired from a most indulgent and large•hearted people—whatever future popularity they may win, I shall never claim them. It is enough for me to have laboured unknown to a great end, and to watch with eyes; thrice blessed a good time drawing nigher. Considering that the writer is perfectly well known, and that ho is not indifferent to the emoluments of office, this lofty, Junius-like tone of independence might as well have been dispensed with. The best chapter in the book is that on the qualifications of a diplomatist.. The observa• tion of a French philosopher, "La guerro " n'est que la mesintelligence," is the result of profound thought on the ordinary causes of quarrel between States. The author's own estimate of the qualities essential to a diplo matist is fair and skilful, but we prefer to quote his character of two of the most eminent diplomatists of France : OSSAT AND MAZARIN. The former appears to have invariably adopted the most perfect frankness and truth in all his dealings. His idea of statesmanship was based on the fair and open principle of sincerity ; and, indeed, such a policy will be found in all cases where it has been adopted to have been eminently successful. In a frank, plain statement there is always something attractive even to the most crooked-minded men. The negotiator has also told the worst, and every day softens the first effects of his communication ; whereas, if he begins by gloving over a disagreeable matter which must be discussed in its true form at last, his affairs are every day growing worse, and he has nothing to hope from a future which will certainly plunge him into deeper difficulty. Ossat believed, therefore, that it was, in the first place, necessary to state his case clearly, and then he trusted always to carry the matter in hand by appealing to the reason of his adversary, and forcibly pointing out the advantages of the measure he advocated. Nothing escaped his tine understanding and penetrating intellect, which could in any manlier contribute to so legitimate an object. The arguments he adduced in the first place were always as well considered, as just and unanswerable as possiole. All his skill, we are told, therefore, consisted in reiterating them again and again with unshaken constancy, and in an easy, agreeable manner. This made him a most perplex ing antagonist, for he always maintained his point with as much courtesy as firmness. Mavarin, however, had not been bred in so noble a school. He owes his reputation altogether to cunning and intrigue. lie was so profound a dissembler, that deception became the habit and custom of his life. It was a rule with him to treat the affairs of which he most desired the accomplishment with apparent indifference In this he seems to me to have made a capital mistake, for such a proceeding could only cool the zeal of friendship and give a troublesome confidence to opposition. Mazarin, however, had that trickster mind which has often characterised bad women in places of power, or the slaves and eunuchs of the East. He loved deceit for its own sake. He had more pleasure in decep. Lion than success, and he would have considered himself robbed of half his triumph if he had not been able to boast of the unworthy means by which he obtained it. The author, it is well known, was at one time under Lord Stratford. His enmity to that diplomatist may perhaps be traced to personal considerations, and it is with this caution that the following passages must be read: — Oh! this Russian business, what a weary and shameftd series of blunders it has been ! If one man employed had understood his dirty, this war would have been Imps- Bible. Such a statement as this may smack of presump tion, perhaps of impertinence ; hut it is true, and, by the living God, I know it! I have watched that dreadful game played out by hands so nerveless, and with lips so pale yet rash, that I have shuddered with impatience and dis gust. Any man indeed who brought a fresh and unpreju diced mind to bear on the question must have felt like a lookeron with his eyes open watching the mistakes of two blindfolded chess players. If any reader should say, it is easy to make such a statement as this, let me add, it would be easier far to pour out au indignant torrent of proofs. The only difficulty is to restrain it. Ought not, then, the torrent of proofs to he given ? If official reserve seals the writer's lips as to the proofs, should it not also have sealed them to the assertion? The following pare together different methods of perception; betw n eeo thought and language, arc a re-state- Ought not, then, the torrent of proofs to rte to do this, as Buffon said, we must leave our own ment, very clearly expressed, of the auth o r's given ? If official reserve seals the writer's brains and enter intothose of some other being; peculiar theory of verbal expression, not gene- lips as to the proofs, should it not also have • we cannot be sure whether we stand " face rally received as yet among metaphysicians sealed them to the assertion? The following to face " with external objects or whether we even of his own school. The work is well indicates the line which Lord Stnttford'a op- perceive by the mediation of an idea; whether, worthy a most careful perusal by students of portents—and they are numerous—aro deter, Uwe assume that we do perceive " face t philosophy. mined to take against him:— .