Star. — London, England, 1809-10-11 00:00:00

pended upon the Continent. It was necessary to Antwerp ! The English, who for this long ;lane, ptst have not travelled upon the Continent, consul ted information collected six years ago, and imag ed that Antwerp was still ap open town as it was when it was only a trading port ; they did not take into their calculation the works of these latter years, espe cially these which the Emperor has caused to be raised, since his journey to Antwerp. , Upon esta blishing a dock yard in that town, he ordered its for tifications to be again raised ; it is now surrounded with a bastioned rampart. The ditch filled with water which covers this rarapart, has been repaired ;—the left of the town is covered by an immense inundation which removes the approaches upwards of 1500 fa thoms ; the right is supported by the citadel, which is a fine piece of fortification ; upon this front, seve ral works have been established ; among others, a fine half moon with its counterscarp. Upon the left bank of the Scheldt there arc no houses, but the Head of Flanders has been re-established, and its works are protected by an inundation of two thousand fathoms in extent. The English could not, therefore, take Antwerp without besieging it,' without methodically opening the trenches, without working on through the inundations and marshes, in short, without hav ing invested the town ; and if they must invest it on both sides, they would require to have two armies : Ist, One between the Head of Flanders and the town of St. Nicholas, opposite to Brussels and to the road of France ; indeed, we know no General bold enough to take this position with less than 80,000 infantry and between eight and ten thousand cavalry, since he must have to withstand the army which should arrive from France, and the troops should stretch out from the Head of Flanders, that is to say, the whole garri son of Antwerp, which in a combined attack, would sally out on that side ; 2d, On the side of the town, the investment could not reasonably take place with an army of less than forty thousand men, having in front a corps of observation, to keep in check the ' army of the Duke of Valmy, assembled at Maestricht, which would draw near Antwerp, and having another corps towards Bergen-op-Zoom against the Dutch. It would, therefore, have been easier for Lord Cha tham to take Brussels, to march against Ghent, and to advance as far as Flanders, leaving Antwerp and the French army behind him, than to undertake to invest Antwerp and besiege it. This much with regard to the land side. On the side of the river, the following are the ob stacles which must have stopped the English Ist. Fort Frederic and Fort Doel, each mounting fifteen 36-pounders ; after these, Fort Lillo and the Fert of Liefienshoek ; each mounting sixty 36-poun ders, and ten mortars ; and behind, a line of eighty gun-boats and pinnaces, mounting two hundred 21- pounders. Now, every sensible man who knows that there is only a distance of 600 fathoms between Fort Lillo and the Fort of Liefkenshnek, which is opposite to it, perceives th'at this passage cannot be forced.— With regard to fire-ships, it is well known that Hreships and infernal machines are ineffectual. The infernal machine which was let off at St. Malo had no effect; these sorts of explosions were never able to shake a rampart. A Stacado had been established, which secured our gun-boats from fire-ships. In fine, we had also fire-ships ; sixteen were already in readiness, and we were going to avail ourselves of the first favoura ble occasion to send them against the English. Be sides, to make use of fireships, it.would have been necessary to approach within 500 fathoms of the town, since from Lillo to Antwerp the Scheldt makes four elbows, which would have prevented fire ships from being directed from any greater distance. • On the sea side in like manner no success could be hoped for ; but admitting that by the combination of the effects of the land and sea, Lillo and Liefken shock had been carried, which supposes two regular sieges, the enemy would directly after have met with three other barriers to be forced ; the Pearl Fort, Fort St. Philip, and Fort St. Mary. All these forts are covered by inundations, and each of them arould have required a separate siege. These different operations could not have taken place without losing 40 days more, and supposing that by the 20th of October the land and sea forces had been able to approach within 2000 fathoms of Antwerp, they still required three months more to take the town. With regard to the squadron, it was entirely shut up within the town, up and down the river, protecting Antwerp,and protect ed by it. The taking of Antwerp was, therefore, a thing impossible for Lord Chatham, an operation much more difficult to be effected than the occupation of a quarter of France. _ _ FRANCE. - THE W•AR BETWEEN MIS FRIA AND FRANCE, AND THE EXPED! lON 1 0 THE SCHELDT. OBSERVATIONS. (Note from the ilLaiteur . ca Article; published in the London Papers upon the above subject.) We cannot consider the Austrian Monarchy, its Sovereign, ana its armies, so entirely humiliated as they were after the battle of Au..terlitz ; there is no talk of an intertisv in a windmill— Lty.ttln Papers. NOTE BY THE Mom-rem—lf there has been no interview, it k because the Emperor Napoleon would have none. The first interview in which the Emperor Napoleon gave Peace to his enemy having left no re- Memhrailce of gratitude in the breast of the latter, it became evident that a fresh interview would be to no purpose. With regard to the difference between the situations of A stria, after the battles of Austerlitz and Wagraro, it is this :—Alter the battle of Austerlitz, Russia was still allied with Austria ; she had upon the Vistula a second army, which she might march ; Prussia, who ha I signe.d the Convention of the 2d of November, might take part in the war ; in short, the army of Prince Charles was still untouched, and the whole of it might match. On the other hand, the important fortress of Raab and the Circles if Hungary had not been occupied ; Saxony did not yet form part of the Confede.ratiin ; and, however, the position of Dres den must be considered as of some importance : in tine, the Duchy of Warsaw belonged to Prussia, and the army of Gallicia, which now menaces Moravia, did not exist. At present, on the contrary, all the Austrian armies, all the Austrian fortresses have been attacked and vanquished There are hardly any vestiges remaining of the army which the Archduke John brought from Italy ; and if it can still muster ten thousand men under arms, most of these men are only recruits. The grand army of Prince Charles being beaten at Eggvnulh, at Ratisbon, at Esling, and at Wagram, has lost his best soldiers, and he himself, frightened at the spirit of intrigue and divi sion which reigns in the Cabinet, has thrown up the command and retired. The difference is not less great in the internal situation of the Monarchy : after the Peace of Presbarg, the French had only passed through the hereditary states ; upon the present occa sion, they have already made a stay in them of up wards of four months. At that time Austria had not made the last efforts ; her population was . still en tire ; at-present many provinces have been so much depopulated by the levies in mass, that no other inhabi• tams are to he found in the villages than women and children. At that time all the revolutionary means which had been taken existed, and might be employed; at present they have been taken, and have been taken in vain : the country is exhausted of men as well as of things. An army formidable from the number of the soldiers (we wish we could s.iy formidable from the talents of i:s Chiefs), has been sent by England and landed in Zealand.—London Paper. ' The expedition against Zealand could not have any result f:r England. It might occasion some embar rassments, some fresh burdens to the people of France; but these they do not calculate, when any proofs of zeal or devotedness are to be given to the country ; it could give the English nothing but shame ; it could he attended with no other result than to make them. lose an army, whilst it would procure a new army to the Emperor.—These prognostics have been \'per fectly verified. We say that the expedition could not be attended with any result, because it was necessary to begin by making the siege of Flushing. Flushing, provided the island of Walcheren be inundated, must be consi dered by every sensible officer, as a place impregna hb, by a regular siege, or at least as presenting diffi culties which the labour of four months would be unable to vanquish. In this instance, the wisest cal culations were baffled. Flushing, when the besiegers' trenches were still three hundred paces from the body of the fortress, when there was no breach, when the body of the fortress was untouched, surrendered by the sole effect of the terror of a bombardment. IS this cowardice ? Is it treason ? The sequel of the inquiry will prove which. • Thus, then, the sole opposition of Flushing, which detained the English expedition only twenty days, ought to havedetAincdit three months. Of all the chances of succeeding, certainly the one least expected by the English, nmst have been such a I.:CCSS obtained by a bonibardment ; they required we:l:y days for that. Now, twenty days spent in tx !sland of Walcheren, in the month of August, rntw have occasioned a number of sick, \Oriel) cannot be computed at less than one in four soldiers ; and to calculate: otherwiss, wiaikl betray a total ignorance of f that climate. When we say that twenty s spent in the Island of WalcLeren must cosz' the et the troops which land in it, we may add, the health of the oilier three quarters must be irrip::ired, and that all die weakened men nr,: or. p,:int of falling sick. It is thevefore a most attempt to laud blare soldier; in that. fatal e antry, and must consider the English army as de.,troved, or at least what remains of it, as unable to do much dory for several months to come. L'ut io.e, after the siege of Flushintr, we had to ex i -!.ect the sic of tort 11.,ti, which, eon - Lonnie:icing hr Ber?;en-op-Zoorn, and with fort St. ;`,Fart n, which the French have built oi-posite to it,• c.;:,; , .1, in like manner, not be taken, but after works and trenches carried on in a country, the climate of which is as fatal as that of Walchcren. It is • true that the English were fortunate ! A Dutch Gene ral, called Bruce, the shame of the military name, and whose head the nation must have to fall upon the scaffold, evacuated this fort through an unexempli fied panic, sx hours before the English arrived. Here then we again behold the English enjoying a good fortune upon which they could not rely : but these itunate events, purchased with the ever increasir , , di:ninution of their army, whither could they carry th2rn ? To burn the French squadron ? to effect this, it was necessary to tale Antwerp. But in tine, the French squadron being Laken and burred, it re-! mains to be knf.wn whether zilch an operation was l worth what it has cos 7, and xvliedhl. it be veryprn dent to go to an cspence ofmany men and of forty or. fifty millions, in order to occasion ne's enemy al loss of betweentifteen ar,d twenty roilliuns. nut the ships at Antwe r p cou ld not be tak en . Th ey did not depend upon the occupation of Flushing, tpon that ct Walcheren, tior of any island : they de- However, the followincr was the system of the French army ; from the I:sth of August three corps were formed. The Prince of I'onte Corvo was at Ant werp with 30,000 men, national guards, regulars, and Dutch troops. The Duke of Conegliano was at Ghent with the corps of the Head of Flanders, con sisting of 23,000 men ; the Duke of Istria .was at Lisle with 20,000 men. We should have let the English, had they seriously 'presented themselves, cross the channel of Bergen-op- Zoom, stretch out beyond the inundation of Lillo and march against Antwerp ; the Duke of Conegliano would have proceeded towards the Head of Flanders, and whilst the English would haVe been making their dispositions to invest Antwerp from fort Lillo to the citadel, the Prince of Punte Corvo and the Duke of Cornegliano, protected by the inundations and by the immense works of the town, would have waited for them, and on the day agreed upon, would have stretchcd out upon the right ; and then the English army would have terminated its destinies ; the Duke of Istria would during that time have proceeded to the island of Cadsand. On the Ist of September there were between Flanders and the Scheldt and Maastricht, twenty thousand men under arms. They were not all regulars, but they were all commanded by men who had served ; they were all volunteers, and consisted, for the most part, of former under officers, and former soldiers who bad obtained their discharges, and who had run toarms on the first signal. Lord Chatham, therefore, eharged himself with a senseless operation, and those, therefore, who pro jectcd it shelved themselves to be as ignorant of the climate as of the localities. Lord Chatham saved the English army by determining to re•embark it; but every day that he delays to execute this determi , nation, heightens the misfortunes of his expedition,' and if lie is culpable, it is not in having ordered the retreat, it is in having so long delayed to re,embark ; for durin g this delay, the Englisb troops contract fresh diseases, and become infected with fresh seeds of destruction. A 4 I ' See to sad that the Emperorom ;t i; hen he possible that he might march with 20,000 me n aga i n a r ti f . . an English army had beed landed upon .a, corps which, in his apiWan, consisted of on l y 10 - or p that recommended that' it should not be at- .19,000; but he should have gained b etter i n f ormat i on tailtiukond that we should leave the destruction of on his march, andhewceild have lear ne d t h at this corps it to the diseases, which, in that dangerous climate, of 12,000 men amotmted to 70,000. He h a d hi, r ', must do the enemy more injury than the cannon, treat cut off, and was too fortunate to be a bl e to tine); without its costing any thing to France. himself in order, to be able to cease e into imp rart i ca b le The English, in landing in Flanders, did, there- roads. General Wellesley is inexcusable for not lievi le fore, a thing contrary to all the rules of war: Ist. known that the corps of the Dukes of Dalm at i a , I l .f. Because They took for the theatre of their operations chingen and Treviso, amounted to 70,000 men : and a country so unwholesome, that they had to presume for having thought that he could cover his left flee' that a-month's stay in it would destroy their army; against this formidable army by leavingtwo battalireil that the country is covered with strong places, such at Puerto Banos. What ignorance ! as Flushing, Bergen..op.zoom' Bab a , an d Lillo ; i ac k now l e d ge t h at t h ese re a sons did ti' appear to m e suff, ::rt and on the side of the island of Cadsand, the new fort for giving up to important a post as Talavera. Napoleon, &c. &c. ; General Cuesta did right to leave Tally ,- :I—.l •ei • e. le 2. Because their principal object appeared to be to had delayed he would have been lost. He cfl:f e•re:er capture the squadron, they ought to have imagined to leave two divisions and 40 pieces of artillery o:1 t:.e‘ that the squadron depended upon Antwerp, and that Tagus : he lost them ; and this post, whic!, 1.,• : 1 ; • .1 . . Antwerp was impregnable, for its communications. rear-guard, was a post of honour. General \`....ii,e',e with France could not be cut off, except by immense ought to have occupied it. It is acknov.. e l . ~ d :: n armies, against which the whole population of France war , that an advanced guard , or a rear-gust„'., cco . ,. would have time to march. • , ding to thenperations, is the post most mu. - ell' •. i-1 ..) The result of all which is, that the English have defend. But General Wellesley had taken the 1,- i been for so many years shut out of the Continent, that and according to the laudable practice of his i.a . .. -.' -) they are no longer acquainted with jt. Every thing had left to his allies the post of danger. has changed, except their hatred against France. i The enemy stated to be 30,000 strong ; but, at .. -1 , - ~r... "airing of the corps ef Sault and Ney. i ...3,:::..-... With regard to the island of Walcheren, it is said, 0 that they mean to keep it. We should have only cause We see that, even at the time when 1 - writ. o • to applaud this resolution for m tny reasons : Ist, The English General did not know the force o f the Fro, * English, although they had twenty thousand men in . I--;e speaks only of the corps of the Duk es e l' ii.:lm t the corps of the Doke of Treviso, 25 bate:lice, se ,eie, the island of Walcheren, could not prevent it from and Elchingen, and appears to have no he ,v,;:.,: ;e , and which, since their entrance into Sp.tki, !:..‘',! :: being attacked and retaken ; 2d, Twenty thousand b. en inferior to the best troops in Europe. li . 1.'4 I English, exposed to the influence of the climate, i l Wellesley frequently commits similar error;• would experience so much loss, that' it would be ne he may one day dearly pay for them. cessary to be continually reinforcing them ; that in We had reason to expect the advance of Vic:o..'s ell Tr t- 1 7 .. the course of the year, 80,000 men would as neces sarily become victims to the climate, and it would faafvteerrafresaysuingr 15,000 Generalmen n C o ' u L l • s s g ta . c s h o ‘ ll . : lel lb 0 la!t i 11, .1,,,, :. , 1, ..; e to th 11,000 killed and wounded in its a l% 4 a n e d t : J . ::: . S li; I . t g :. ::("; p l cost them more to guard this marsh, than to preserve the East Indies ; but it is probable that time would 'not be left for them to suffer sach losses. The chats- would hair: amounted to 9.5,C00. nee between the two islands is so narrow, that bombs This is a singular calculation nhic'e Lori We 1 1 ,.. can reach from the one to the other. The 20 ships ley makes of the first and fodrth corps and the rt . of the line and the flotilla which we have in the serve. The first corps is composed of 36 battal;( as, Scheldt, would soon make us masters of that river.— the fourth of 30, the reserve of 20 battalions, and the It would not be forgotten, that four years ago, and cavalry of 40 squadrons. Lord Wellesley ha I there. with our flotilla alone, we were masters of all the fore around him 170 battalions and SO or 99 ova!- coasts ; can it be doubted, that we should be soon drons, and he expected to Conquer Madrid with 9 0,00) masters of a closed sea ? and can it, at the same time, men. We do not speak of the Spaniards, they tea; be supposed that the English would attempt to keep be reckoned as of consequence fur plundering simile Flushing without being masters of the Scheldt ? Be- persons, or for defending themselves behind a wall, sides, a flotilla is too dangerous a war for them. Such but very little account can be made of them in a re. a war is not carried on with boats alone, it is conduc- gular battle, as the English may have been coLv . :.fsd. ted with excellent troops, that is to say, with means If Lord Wellesley had had, besides his 20,000 n ee , which do not allow the English any advantage over us. the whole army of Lord Chatham, which wont :o We well know that men exist who, although con- bury itself in the marshes of the isle of Walcheren, he pletely ignorant of the art of war, have, notwithstan- could have derived nothing from his expedition bet ding, the silly habit of taking and endeavouring to disgrace, confusion, and defeat. If the English mean give counsel to those who are masters in ,it ; those to dispute Spain with France, they must land an ar. people, yet more skilful than that public speaker who my,, ,- if not equal to the French army, at least two. introduced the subject of war before Hannibal, tell thirds as strong, that is to say, of at least 159,000 you, that the English, by preserving the island of men, for the Spaniards cannot be reckoned for mule Walcheren, will make it a second Gibraltar, or ano- than one-third in a regular battle. ther Malta ;in fine, a commanding point which will Nothing can be mot e advantageous to France than render them masters of Flanders, of Holland, &c.— to have the English engage in land wars, for thy:, Poor madmen ! they cannot perceive that if the Eng- instead of conquering England by sea, we shall coo lish persist in keeplng the island of Walcheren, that quer her on the Continent. Such a contest shows to circumstance would be as advantageous for us as if admiration what those are who direct the Cabinet of they were embarrassed in the heart of Spain. London. . In general, whenever an English army lands on the Themistocles advised the Athenians to abet:lon Continent, every real Frenchman ought to rejoice. their citadels, and take refuge on board their ships. Such a contest is completely in our favour : a nation It is to be wished that the British Cabi::et may pees et, of three millions of men cannot meet man for man a as it has begun, in the plan of deserting its ships a:ltt nation of forty millions. A new army, all the ele- throwing itself upon the Continent. We have pre. meats of which are in the navy, cannot teep the field dicted the humiliation of England and peace lipEee A aeainst the veteran forces which have conquered two- year elapses. Before a year shall have expired, the thirds of Europe ; in fine; an army which can only English, oinitever efforts they may make, will he arrive by sea, has neither artillery, cavalry, nor equi- dris en out of the Peninsula, and the Imperial Eaele pages, at least it has a very great interiority in all shali wave on the fortresses of Lisbon. these means, 4 and Lord Chatham really could not At the end of the next paragraph the Met:ser mount more than 2000 cavalry ; well ! before fifteen. adds the following co :eluding note : We s:'ail rot days were elapsed, the French effective cavalry, which continue these notes, i : would be an insult to ca r :ca• were assembled on the banks of the Scheldt, amour. dens ; the falsehood o f the r port of Lot d Weliesle; ted to 4000 ! must be evident to every one. Reflecting also that our troops are not led on by a Marlbo- Lord Wellesley, without knowing the force of the rough, a Wolf, or even a Wellesley.-I.ondon Papas. enemy with whom he had to contend, without ht. L; NOTE BY THE MONITEUR.—We here see what the furnished with that which constitutes an cm v, a spirit of party is capable of.—lt is a pity that Sir vanced to Talavera. Arthur Wellesley had not the command instead of : The idea of entering . .I.elrei Arthurturned his brain. He took the French a rray he A Lord Chatham. The latter saved the English army; . army of sepoys ; he arrived at Talavera with .2.5 r the other would probably have lost it, as he has lost : 26,000 men; he was there joined by 30,000 Spaniards; that which he commanded in Spain—where he had and with these two armies he intended to . penetrate o the imprudence to entangle himself with 30,000 men, Mad] id. The Duke of Belluno manoeuvred sk' liu ,y without reflecting that he thus exposed his left wing 1 to draw him on, and formed a junction wilh tl e 1 h to the different corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia, of ! corps and the reserve, and, with de. Kia ,-, . : , at th it Elchingen, and of Treviso, who had 70,000 men head, marched against the enemy. The D. ke of under arms. He has, it is true, drawn himself out Dalmatia, with still more considerable forces than ,of this critical situation, by a precipitateflight, and those of the King, marched upon their rear. Led 1 by abandoning his hospitals, his wounded, his horses, Wellington could not eetricate himself, bat by he.tt and a part of his equipages. It was thus that Gene ran Moore, in his ridiculous expedition in the month ing separately the two armies. The Ist and 4th c ips presented him with an opportunity, since tl ey .: 1- of November last, fled from Benevento to Corunna, tacked without writing for the three corps cntnrnaold abandoning his allies, his horses, his ammunition, and by the Duke df Dalmatia. The English font;' t eeil. his equipages. Neither the one nor the other of these Th e battle of Talavera was doubtful, thoughl. than a the 1 ~ s Generals has displayed that foresight , -which is a Ilia- of the English was much more consilie racteristic so essential in war, and which prompts to ours, the French artillery was more nunrlon:. It do only what 'can be supported, and to undertake only what presents the greatest number of chances of i c ou ld 'appears from a series of multiplied faults th French not take the position on the left; but th Fog- I success. Sir Arthur Wellesley has not evinced more fish were beaten back ever time they atte mpt,:d to talent than the men who direct the Cabinet of St. : advance upon the French. When the 70,000 men 1 James's. To wish to support Spain against France, ' and to contend upon th e Continent with France, commanded by the Duke of Dalmatia were at Pla is , centie, Lord Wellesley believed there were not mole forming an enterprize which will cost dear to those who have undertaken it, and who will meet in it only than ten thousand men there, and gave himself up t 0 disasters. Conflagrations; it is true, may be kept up h the most ridiculous combinations. He perceivc . however, the folly of his calculations, his extreme Un -misfortunes may be brought on peaceable itihabi tants—rivers of blood may flow—th e people, the pro- prudence, and was s u ffi c i ent ly fortunate to save him self in Ports al with his infantry. What would h tectors of whom they ca ll th emse l ves , may be ruined —but any other result s are i m p oss ible. ~,, been the case g if manztivrine according to the princi - The Moniteur of Septembe r 28, contains the follow- A les of war, the French army had oily given bat tle ing observations, in th e f orm o f notes , on the Lodoa prevent united. Load. Wellin g ett hint fr m marching to M a • t, at says, the want of the me : ni of conveyance ' Gazette of Saturday, 2d o f September, containing the .dtid. What would have boen the consequence i! he dispatches from Lord Wellington, dated Deleytosa. "h a d m On the paragraph • marched (0 Madrid, and the Duke of atim.ttia When 1 entered Spain, I had a communication with General had aced himself between'llim and the Tagnc ?He Cuesta, &c. The Moniteur remarks— would have come with his army to France.' He Ile ' sacrificed brave men ihriiigh presumption :and igrlc. We wish LordNellington to command the English ranee, of that which a General ought aLa to be armies ; with hi s c h aract e r he will suffer some great no ran t , • catastrophe. It app ears t h at h e h as n e ither spie s nor This expedition resembles that of Gene ral ',lgor,: !.1 any accurate informati on , w hi c h is astonishing, i n a - the month of November last. But General Mo,2‘ country where Engl an d h as so m any pa r ti z an s . • was More prudent, and saved hi ms eit op•r :. J h 1,; • 1 preferrod tole from thinkiti "hat the British troops were though he suffered enormous h.s::es, t''.. 0. , fof Most Ugly to do the business tlYt.4Aoally, &c. army returned to Eeglend. Like General M: , :e, NOTE—We believe that life dispositions were made, : General Wellesley abandoned 11 7 s 11 .spitals, his b .;• for we see in one of his dis*tches, that he thOught he gage, his artillery, and arsenals in Portugal, wit ! :: I had only to do with 10Or If,ooo French ; and it w a s half pf his army. At this moment he has not IS, .00 +.