The Press. — London, England, 1855-09-01 00:00:00

4 07 .-/ -- I . '• _ k 4 , , No. 122.—V0L. 111. LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1855. STAMPED .... STXPF.NCE. UNSTAMPED..FIVEPENCE. Ot dress. LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1855. THE proceedings of Lord PALMERSTON require watching. He is playing a dangerous games and the more dangerous from the timidity and uncertainty with which he engages in it. He is by nature an intriguer, intent on effecting secret ends by small means. When he is merely making mischief he plumes himself on working out a policy. The objection to his Administration of Foreign Affairs, and particularly to his conduct respecting the " oppressed nationalities " of the Continent, was distinctly—not that he was favourable to the emancipation of those coun tries, for on that cardinal point he never made any declaration, but that he flattered the hopes of the disaffected with vague ex- pressiona of sympathy, and thus roused the jealousy and anger of their Governments. He smiled on revolt when it was at a distance or in preparation, but discouraged it when it broke out. There is nothing in the world so dangerous to tamper with as the insurrection ary spirit, but Lord PALMERSTON has been constantly tampering with it, ever since he joined the Liberal party. His celebrated phrase of " bottle-holding " exactly indicates his policy. He has administered stimulants to the patriots of Poland, Hungary, and Italy, has whispered delusive promises in their ears, has encouraged them to fight it out, and when they have been engaged in the battle has coolly sat apart to see them bruised, mangled, and destroyed by the superior force he bad encouraged them to encounter. His game was discreditable, not only to the Minister, but to the country. It was alike mischievous and cowardly, and it has lost us the respect both of the people whom we deceived, and the Governments whom we angered. We can conceive that an English Minister, looking to the actual state of Europe, might, according to his views and political predilec tions, advocate very different lines of policy. He might say, for example, that lie considered the constitution of the Aus rian empire to be radically defective and unjust ; that the autho rity of its Government over countries essen tially distinct from it in character and language could be maintained only by military force; that such an empire, however nsiderable in point of territory and numbers, must be radi cally weak, and could bear no effective part in maintaining the equilibrium of European power; and that for all these reasons he was prepared to encourage the idea, and assist in the work of its dissolution. This policy, whatever might be thought of its prudence, would be manly and intelligible. Or he might reason that the circumstances which give to one country its superiority over the States it has absorbed or conquered, are commonly permanent, and little likely to be lastingly effected by the policy of external Governments; that the discontent of subju gated States arises naturally from imperfect amalgamation; that as time elapses, and the hope of independence is given up, differences of character wear out and interests are identi fied ; that every great European Power has been gradually consolidated by such influences as would operate peacefully within the Austrian empire, if it were freed from all fear of inter nal re volt or foreign interference; and that from these considerations the inference is un avoidable, that no worse service can be ren • dered to the inhabitants of the half-incorpo rated provinces of powerful kingdoms than to encourage in them hopes of independence which can never be realised, as their emanci pation must be worked out by themselves through the slow influences of industry and intelligence, and not by insurrectionary efforts. Lord PALDIE MON has never given in his adhesion to either of these principles. He has acted on the first till disaffection could no longer be repressed, and on the second when it burst forth in actual revolt. By his sinister intrigues he has sacrificed the liberty he affected a desire to promote, and has strengthened the despotism he was supposed willing to destroy. By fostering elements of disturbance on the Continent —more, indeed, by the language of his partisans than by any expressions of his own—he has made willing obedience on the one part, and generous sway on the other, impracticable. He is at this moment a striking example of the misfortune of placing a small, unprincipled mind in a great and responsible place. The line he is now pursuing is in strict ac cordance with his past career. He is acting against Austria not in the open and authorita tive manner which would become the Minister of a great country, but with the underhand machinations of a conspirator. He is irri• tating without attacking her, and exciting hopes in her Italian provinces which he has not the slightest intention of ever assisting to fulfil. The use he is making of the Foreign Legion scheme is eminently characteristic of his tortuous temper. It was one strong argument against this most ill-advised measure, that it must in its operation be extremely offensive to those countries which declared they would remain neutral, and with which we were on terms of amity. America and the German States could not see with indifference attempts made to enrol their subjects under a foreign banner, and engage in a quarrel to which they were no parties. We might have disputed their right to remain neutral, but, recognising their neu trality, we could not dispute their right to im pede the operation of our Foreign Enlistment Act by every means in their power. The very attempt to enlist in our service the subjects of States whose neutrality we recognised was a violation of plain principles of international equity,—sure to raise the jealousy of the Go vernments of those States, as it incited the people to break the laws and to act in oppo• sition to their authority. Armed with this dangerous weapon, Lord PAL weRsToN is unscrupulously directing it against Austria. That Power is known to be most sus ceptible on the side ofher Italian provinces, and, accordingly, Lord PALMERSTON authorises the formation of an Italian Legion. Thoroughly alarmed, Austria masses troops in her Italian provinces, strengthens her fortresses, and pro jects new defences, to make her position in Italy more secure. Her press responds to the minatory tone of our Government organs, and a new element is added to the difficulties of the Eastern question, by Austria being compelled, through the offensive action of our Government, to look to the probability of a close alliance with Russia. SL alliance was, in the opinion of the great danger which Europe had it be formed, as he prophesied with the object of partitioning the other States of Europe. closely allied, would, in his, to prevent it. Let us suppoi and still it is apparent that of Austria thrown into the Western Powers would immeasi the difficulties of their posit MERSTON'S Foreign Legion, and reernitingataff at Novara, is to that eventuality We never were amongst politicians who revelled in Austrian alliance. Wo believed DEEN to be totally mistaken that Austria was the natural try. Though her interests to our side, her sentirnen' from us. There was such _ her general policy and that of from the similarity of their government, as to convince could be brought to take weakening the great despoti.. Hence we conceived all those were made to conciliate judged. We never could __ more than that she would remai it was the true policy of this frain equally from bidding for from causelessly provoking We have done both. U DEEN we have placed her in , Principalities, and under Lord are threatening the security territory. At the commencek. she desired only to remain would not allow her to do so. to accept a bribe to incline and we now throw down to ' defiance. An advocate of observes acutely in a German military occupation by Austria palities must be viewed as the influence gained by " the " eagle" in Turkey, and will " to speak an influential word of peace are discussed. " drama." it is said, " is perhaps " less certain than is believed." The tendency of Lord PAL, is to revolutionise the Continent, this war a war of political doubt if his views extend f once observed, if we recollect Rota, that no man will go does not know whither his We believe that to be the PALMERSTON at this moment ing the way for an Austro-Russian We appeal to men, not of Co, principle merely, but of mature judgment whatever party they may belong—do t to see this country committed war of desperate extremit duration? Wars of opinion all wars the most obstinate War in Germany was a war , if we force Austria, by a line insults her pride, while it existence, to throw herself Russia, what resource shall that formidable combination l 0 F A IIL/01,11411 %If Such an alliance great NAPOLEON, the Ito dread. Should iesied it would be, ling Turkey, not all le, though ever so judgment, be able Lose him mistaken, t the military power scale against the neasurably increase sition. Lord PAL- and particularly his is surely conducing ;at those sanguine n the dream of an lieved Lord ABER- • when he declared al ally of this coun- -3 might attract her at would repel her an affinity between t of Russia, arising their principles of e us that she never 3 an active part in. tism of the North. Lose attempts which Austria to be ill- I rationally expect remain neutral, and this country to re- for her support, or her hostility. hider Lord ABER. possession of the ord PALMERSTON we y of her Lombard cement of the war Lain neutral. We io. We forced her e her to our part, her a challenge of Austrian interests ian journal that the ;trio of the Princi- i counterpoise to the trident and the will entitle Austria rd " when proposals " The end of the .haps less near and red. LLMERSTON'S conduct tinent, and to make ;al sentiment. We so far ; Lut it was llect rightly, by DE D so far as he who 5 policy is tending. he ease with Lord it. He is smooth- Russian alliance. of of Conservative mature judgment to long—do they desire :ted to a continental city and uncertain L or sentiment aseo---i, The Thirty Yeari-_, Y- Lir of opinion. Yet,.:/, line of policy which threatens her very f into the arms of dl we hate against nn but to. rail*