The Press. — London, England, 1855-09-08 00:00:00

SEPT. 8, 1855. TERMS OF :ON lOU Etc Timis: (STAMPED.) Per Annum .. .. .. .. £1 6 0 Half-Yearly .. .. .. .. 01$ 0 Quarterly .. .. • • .. 0 6 6 Payable in advance. Subscribers are requested to send their Orders through their News Agent; if direct to the Office, accompanied by a remit tance. Advertisements also must have *reference or remittance. Money Order' to be made payable to Mr. ALTAZD Iva, 110, Strand. London. (1)* :)•:. rtggs LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPT. 8, 1855. POSTSCRIPT. THE WAR. Accounts have been received, via Trieste, from Con stantinople to the 29th ult. Several English agents have left for Circassia in order to bring about a diver sion on the part of the mountaineers on the rear of the Russian army. The greater part of the troops assembled at Maslak have been sent to the Crimea. It is thought the Russians will again assume the offensive. The town of Kadikeni, on the Sea of Marmora, has been entirely destroyed by fire. France, England, and Austria will undertake in com mon the construction of the canal of the Danube. An imperial ukase was issued in St. Petersburg on the sth inst., abolishing, on the proposal of Prince Paskiewitch, the Field Commissariat of the army on active service; Commissioner General Annenkoff resuming his former charge. Count Nesselrode has received " permission to travel." Gsneral de Berg, who commands at Sweaborg, has been decorated with the Order of St. Andrew. At Moscow, on the 18th, a great fire broke out, which lasted 24 hours. From Rome, we learn that the French police was informed, some time ago, of an intended landing of about fifty Italian refugees from London, which was to have taken place at Porto d'Anzio, a small arbour now being enlarged, as the Pope intends to make it the port of the capital. Measures were taken to arrest these refugees, who were supposed to have formed a plan against the Pope's life or personal liberty, as he often visits that port; but, from the latest accounts, it would seem that they have eluded the vigilance of the Roman police, and are now concealed in the forests in the vicinity of Porto d'Anzio. According to a late letter from Vienna, all the financial plans of M. de Bruck have been rejected by the Council of the Empire, to the great consterna tion of the moneyed interest. Nevertheless, the Emperor may insist on their adoption, if he thinks fit. It, is believed at Berlin that Austria is intent upon negotiating a new loan of from 250 to 300 millions of florins. Councillor de Hock is to proceed to Paris for the purpose ; but the possibility of Austria raising such an amount of money in France is much doubted. A Madrid despatch of the sth states that the sub scriptions to the loan of 250 millions amount to 115 millions. The reform of tke tariff is being compiled. It is proposed to reduce the duty on cotton goods. The duty on paper and on wood is to be suppressed. A useful addition is about (says the Globe) to be made to the army in the shape of a new corps of "Instructors of Musketry," which is to be imme diately organised on a permanent footing. Its head quarters will be at Hythe, where there will be always stationed a commandant, with pay as staff•colonel, a captain, with an allowance of 1501. a year, a subaltern, with 100/. in addition to their ordinary regimental pay, a paymaster and quartermaster, and a surgeon, with a sergeant-major, five first-class in structors, a clerk, an armourer, and twelve privates as fatigue men. There will also be present, in the first instance, nine captains, nine subalterns, 100 first-class instructors, and 100 second-class instruc tors, who as soon as they are sufficiently experienced will be distributed among depot battalions and regi ments as the Commander-in-Chief may direct. The officers may be employed in inspecting and reporting for the inf.rmation of the authorities. The 205 in structors are to be chosen from sergeants and corporals, or occasionally privates specially recom mended by their commanding officers ; they must be intelligent, unmarried, not exceeding five years' ser ♦ice, of active habits, able to write from dictation, and with a competent knowledge of arithmetic. They THE PRESS. will, after their probation at Hythe, be sent to regi ments for the sole purpose of instructing the regi ment in musketry, will be exempt from regimental or barrack duties, and will act specially under the orders of the regimental officer instructor, who will be responsible that the system, as taught at Hythe, is efficiently carried out in the regiment to which he belongs. SIR C. NAPIER AND SIR J. GRAHAM. A VOLUMINOUS series of correspondence which passed between the late naval commander-in-chief in the Baltic, and the ex First Lord of the Admiralty during the course of the campaign of 1851, has been com municated to the public by Sir Cbarles Napier. This revelation of passages which were ostensibly designed as official mysteries, is justified by the Admiral on the ground that his professional conduct has been cen sured, and himself subjected to obloquy, by Sir James Graham, who endeavoured to shelter his own remiss ness or incompetency from public criticism, by making a scape-goat of the commander in chief. To refute the assertion of the right hon. member for Carlisle, Sir Charles publishes the letters, which prove that every step and proceeding in last year's naval cam paign in the Baltic was either prompted by definite instructions from the Admiralty, or received at the time their full concurrence. The pith of the corre spondence, to which a multitude of corroboratory letters and despatches are cited, is contained in letter from Sir C. Napier, from which, and the sub sequent rejoinders, we quote the paragraphs of chief interest. The Admiral's letter, which is dated " Kiel, October 27," was written in reply to a missive from Sir J. Graham containing the following remarks : You refer to my letters at the end of August, as con templating then the early termination of active operations in the Baltic for this year. I was not prepared, even at that time, for the immediate departure of the French army after the capture of Bomarteand, and I pointed out to you Abo, Sweaborg, and Revel as points which, with military aid, were open to attack. Much less was I prepared for the withdrawal of the French squadron from the com bined naval operations almost instantaneously with the departure of the army, so soon as Bomarsund had been destroyed. These decisions were taken on the spot, I believe, with your consent, but without any reference to the English Government. But in August we had not seen the report of General Jones on Sweaborg, which you forwarded to us from Ledsund on the 29th of August, and which was in your hands before either the French army or the French fleet had left the Aland Islands. That report is entitled to respect. It made a great impression here and raised a strong presumption that, with the aid of the military force then present with the fleet, in seven or eight days the works at Swcaborg might be destroyed, and that the month of September afforded ample time for the operation. No doubt, at the time of the equinox, there are heavy gales of wind in the Baltic ; it is a narrow sea, and there is danger to large ships in maintaining the blockade, even when at anchor. But war is not conducted without risks and dangers; and prudence consists in weighing them, and firmness in encountering them ; and nothing great by sea or land can be achieved without considerable peril, as your own experience and example have demonstrated. Sir C. Napier replied as follows : My dear Sir James,—So far back as August 29 T an nounced to you the intention of the French general to withdraw the troops. I agreed with the French general and admiral that Sweaborg could not be attacked at this season of the year, and I have no hesitation in saying, had we moved the troops and ships up to Miolo Roads, and landed 5,000 men, we should not have brought off one man, and how many ships we should have lost I cannot say. After the capture and destruction of Bomarsund till I left Nargen, there have not been three days fit for opera tions that required seven or eight ; and then the ships and transports must have lain amongst the rocks and shoals of Miolo Roads—a position that might have done for a gene ral, but certainly not for an admiral. Shortly after the troops sailed I communicated to you that the French admiral had received orders to go to Cherbourg—that they were dated the 30th of August ; so that the decision was not taken on the spot, as you sup pose. General Jones's report made no change whatever in our opinions. The truth is, the troops came too late—too many for Bomarsund, and too few for Sweaborg. The cholera got amongst them. General Jones made a proposal which the generals declined acting on. The people in England were dissatisfied, and, as some one must be blamed, the Government want to throw it on me; but I will not accept it- I ask you. Sir James, to examine the chart of Swea borg, and ask yourself if any man in his senses, at this season of the year, would anchor his ships in Miolo Roads, and commence operations that would require seven or eight days to finish, which was General Jones's proposal ; and I ask you whether any admiral would attack Sweaborg with his ships alone, contrary to his own judgment and the opinion of the admirals whom he was ordered to consult, because an engineer thought it could be done. You were angry with me when I made use of the word " mad," bat on my conscience I believe it the only word applicable to such an operation. You say General Jones's report made a great impression. I have no doubt it did. It is very easy to make a report. General Jones knew that the French general would not land a man. We all knew it ; and I. am quite certain, after the continuation of bad weather General Jones saw 859 on board the Duke of Wellington, he himself would not have landed a man. Had people considered one moment, they would have seen the impracticability of the attempt; but they thought Sebastopol was taken, and I must take Sweaborg, Revel, and Cronstailt. After the French generals had reconnoitred Sweaborg, I examined it again, and sent home my opinion as to how it ought to be attacked—by ships, batteries, gun-boats, mortar-boats, SA.—at great length; and the Admiralty, as if anxious to get up a case against me, take it into their heads that I meant to attack it with the fleet alone, and were going to send back the French squadron and Admiral Plumridge's ships ; and, though I have remonstrated, they persist in still thinking so, and you, Sir James, seem to have fallen into the same error. Had I seen the smallest chance of success, I should have attacked without the French, but 1 did not ; and surely my opinion is worth more than a general of engi neers ; but the Admiralty seem to think diffeient. The general talked of destroying Sweaborg in two hours. It is much more likely the ships would have been set fire to by red•hot shot and shells, and some of them on shore by that time. Be assured it is a most difficult place to attack, and whoever dues it, will have a hard nut to crack. No admiral hcs, as yet, ventured to attack such a fortress, defended as it is by art and nature. The sunken rocks alone, combined with the smoke from the guns and steamers, is no bad defence. You observed, Sir James, that the month of September gave ample time for the operation; all the month of Sep tember it was blowing a gale of wind, and it was all that Captain NVatson could do to keep his station. I did not wonder at the people of England expecting impossibilities, but I am surprised at the Government countenancing them at my cost. . . . . . I am quite aware that the Baltic is a dangerous sea, and that even blockading at anchor at this season is dangerous ; and I know that war is not conducted without risks and dangers, and I am as ready to encounter them as any man ; but I will not be driven by clamour to act contrary to my own judgment. All summer, Sir James, you were cautioning me, and so were the Government, not to risk my ships against stone walls, for which yon had a great respect, and praising me for the manner I had conducted the fleet; now winter is come you are dissatisfied at my not doing impossibilities ; and as the people are not satisfied, the Government are preparing to abandon me, because I will not follow the advice of a general, contrary to that of my own admirals, and diametrically opposite to the opinion of the French general of engineers, and attack a fortress at a season of the year when it is more than probable 1 should have lost half my fleet. I have gone into this explanation at great length ; it has given me much pain. lam conscious of having done my duty, and if you are dissatisfied, you can bring me to a court-martial, or remove me, as 1 before mentioned to the Admiralty. To this despatch a rejoinder was transmitted by the First Lord, addressed "My dear Admiral," in which he says : I am very unwilling to be involved in a written contro versy with you, hut you have brought it on yourself, by your report of the 25th of September, after your second reconnaissance of Sweaborg. That report appeared to me to be entirely at variance with the opinions previous 4 expressed by you, and I certainly understood you then to say, that if you had mortars, rockets, and Lancaster guns, you considered Sweaborg assailable by sea. In May you declared it to be unassailable by sea or land, and the Ad miralty did not send to you the appliances which, in Sept., you declared to be wanting, because they believed, from your account, they would be useless against a place which in the first instance you pronounced to be impregnable. I could not bring myself to believe that the want of Lan caster guns, or even of mortars, rendered a sea attack, on your plan of the 25th Sept., impossible, if you had twenty five sail of the line assembled before the place, with all their means of vertical fire. Sir Charles Napier responded in the subjoined letter, the last, in point of date, in the whole series now published : Duke of Wellington, Kiel, Nov. 6, 1854. 1 can assure you, Sir James, it is far from my wish to enter into a controversy with you, but I will not admit that I have brought it on myself; there is not a word in either my public or private letters that justifies the con struction that you and the Admiralty have thought proper to put on them. My letter in answer to their lordship' last despatch is plain enough ; but if their lordships think proper to deliberate on one part of my letter, and ignore another part, I can only protest against it ; and I am quite prepared to defend myself against any unjust attacks that are made against me. I have documents enough in my possession to justify my conduct. Enough has not been done to satisfy an impatient public, as you called them — some one must be blamed, and I am the chosen one; but I will not allow myself to be crushed, because I could not do impossibilities. All this stir has been caused by the reports of two engi neers (one French and the other English), diametrically opposed to each other ; in addition to which was the report of the capture of Sebastopol, not yet taken, though the fleet there is assisted by an army of 70,000 men, in a fine climate ; and I have been expected to take places much stronger with a fleet alone ; and the same reople who so often warned me against unnecessarily rising my fleet, are now dissatisfied because I did not expose them to certain destruction. I have gone through the world with honour and credit to myself; andjust as I am about to leave it, unworthy attempts are being made to ruin my reputation ; but they will fail, and recoil on themselves.—] remain, yours, very truly, CHABLZII Nan's. The Right Hon. Sir James Graham, Bert., G.C.8., Admiralty. lalOommem