The Press. — London, England, 1855-09-08 00:00:00

nt rt No. 123.—V0L. 111. LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 8,1855. rtss. After the great war with Russia is over, the world will not be much disturbed by a little war between Austria and her Italian provinces. Smooth words butter no parsnips, and pro• mises, like pie -crust, are made to be broken. If the Italians, after all their past experience, are fools enough to believe that they will ever receive any active assistance from our Liberal Government, who will be found to compassion ate their disappointment? This may be the view of the Premier; but is it really consonant with good faith and sound policy ? Can a great nation, without loss of character, play with the patriotic passions of a people for purely selfish ends—calling them into activity only that they may be quenched in suffering? LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1855. THE partisans of Lord PALMERSTON are exciting hopes in Italy which they know to be utterly vain and delusive, or they are contemplating a struggle which must wrap all Europe in flame. Neither thoughtlessness nor party necessities oan be pleaded in excuse of a policy which directly tends to excite civil war in an empire with which we are professedly at peace, and to make the aspirations of a people for free dom a lure to compass their destruction. It is known that Italy is in a state of dis quietude. The disaffected believe that the war will eventually turn to their advantage— that it will become a war of opinion, and that the flag of Italian independence will be raised under the immediate protection of the Allies. Hence thb movements of the allied Govern.. ments are watched with-theraanguine ardour natural to the temperament.of the South, and great significance is attached to any acts which favour, in however slight a degree, the idea that the Italian people may be called upon, in opposition to their Governments, to take part in a great contest for the reconstruction of the map of Europe. At this time of expectation and ferment, when any accident may convulse the whole Italian peninsula, parties supposed to speak the sentiments of our Administration do not scruple to aver that the Sardinian alliance and the enrolment of an Italian Legion are but the commencement of a policy designed to end in the humiliation of Austria and the complete emancipation of Italy. It is said, for example, by a journal well known to be conducted by a member of the Government, that the Italian Legion will furnish a nucleus for an Italian army, and will " supply leaders, officers, and " organisers whenever the day of liberation " shall dawn, and the war of emancipation " shall begin." The Italian patriots are ad vised to " bide their opportunity," and to wait the return of the Sardinian troops, who will be more than a match for " the unpractised " regiments of Austria, and put to shame her " armies." it is not only in a weekly journal that these sentiments are put forward ; they are sedulously propagated in a variety of ways by Lord PALMERSTON'S adherents, and are boastingly proclaimed as au evidence of the reality of his Liberal policy. The Premier himself may probably regard them much in the same light as he does those placards on the wall tempting recruits to enlist by the promise of bounty which they will never receive. As we want an Italian Legion, why not hold out to the people such inducements as are most likely to influence them? The most tempting bait is the best. If the prospect of a free and united Italy has any charms for the Milanese, promise it to them by all means as the reward of service in our ranks. When the Legion has answered our purpose, and fought our battl e , l e t it s soldiers engage with Austria if they please. Do those persons who now speak and write with so much gusto on the prospects of Italian independence ever reflect on the contempt they cast upon this country? Where was their zeal when they believed that Austria was in the market, and eager biddings were made by our Government for her support? Not a whisper in favour of Italy was then heard. It is only since Austria has become reserved in her attitude that the " Italian dodge " has grown into favour. Had the despotic Court of Vienna been more compliant, we should have had no appeals to patriotic Italy. As the bayonets of the Austrianoranny ;ill not move at our summons, we must see what can be done with the populations they oppress. It is with pain that we notice the degrading position in which the adherents of the Govern ment have succeeded in representing it Every generous mind must compassionate the unfortunate condition of Italy. must sigh over her fallen fortunes, and hope that a day is not I distant when the vivid genius of her singu• larly gifted people, invigorated by the in fluences of well ordered freedom, will once more play a conspicuous part in arts and industry. But just in proportion to the real interest felt in her welfare, will be the reserve exercised in raising expectations which if not realised must inevitably darken her destiny and retard her advancement. Twice within the last forty years has Italy sustained the horrors of unsuccessful insurrection. Huma nity shrinks with horror from the thought of inciting her to renew the unequal contest, that our bottle•holding Premier may again acquire the applause of his jovial associates by his dexterity in the ring. Lord PALMERSTON is exactly one of those men adapted by nature, habit, and circum stance for carrying on a great war in a little spirit. Does any one suppose that any Italian Legion he can raise will really have any appreciable influence on the contest in which we are engaged ? That it will occasion infinite squabbling, and originate diplomatic notes ithout end, we may be perfectly sure ; but it will no more harm Russia than if Lord PALMERSTON, in playful mood, were to occupy himself in casting squibs to the North from the Treasury in Whitehall. While our fleet of unrivalled strength is lying idle in the Baltic, and the allied armies—amounting to two hun dred thousand men—are awaiting with anxiety the next movement against Sebastopol, the head of our Executive is solely intent on irri tating Austria, by threatening her with the concentration of all the vagabondage of Italy. What satire upon the folly of Governments ever' equalled this living reality now present to our sight? STAMPED .... SIXPENCE. UNSTAMPED..FIVEPENCE. It is, to speak plainly, the great interests and the great families of England which are to blame for the success of the charlatanry which is now impairing our strength and bur lesquing our policy. What has been done under the Palmerston regime f A pacific negotiation has been broken off, and a series of small intrigues have been set a-foot on the Con4inent which resemble nothing so much as those contemptible little infernal machines which some Palmerston of Russia sowed thickly in the Baltic waters• It is not by such devices that the might of England is to be shown, and the war brought to an honourable close. It is only by steadily fixing our view on some distinct objects to be ob tained that we can hope to employ our strength and resources to the best advantage. Wars without principle are sure to result in wars of exhaustion. An union of the sound heads and firm wills of the country is required to prevent this contest from degenerating into a mere brutal and destructive trial of which party can bear the most bruising. We want a Go vernment sufficiently strong in administrative capacity to devise plans and organise forces for the achievement of decisive success in the field, and sufficiently powerful in legislative support to make peace on. Wrists which will fulfil the original objects th _war. , country can fusel* only by a combination of its essential Conser vatism. Above all else it must comprehend enough of principle, sense, and resolution, to despise that claptrap by which the existing Administration endeavours to support itself, and to disregard that idle clamour which would wage war against a nation or nations merely from prejudice against the peculiar character of their Governments. CONDUCT OF SIR CHARLES NAPIER. Wx are now enabled to take a closer survey of the conduct of Sir CHARLES NAPIER, in his relations with the Admiralty. The publica tion of the " private " letters written by Sir JAMES GRAHAM in strict confidence has sup plied us with facts that explain the mis management of last year's Baltic fleet. In discussing the whole subject, we must take a distinction between the profes sional acts of Admiral NAPIER as a naval commander, and his personal conduct in con ducting his official quarrel. We shall first consider the manner in which he discharged his duties as Commander-in-Chief. Itis evident that from the outset the Cabinet of the Coalition had doubts and misgivings about the Admiral whom they appointed. Sir CHARLES had great mob popularity; he had a bold and dashing character, and he had many presumptive qualities to justify his nomina tion ; but still, even his friends were nervous about his discretion. The Admiralty through Sir JAMES GRAHAM kept continually wins= ing "caution" in his ear, and we suppose no English Admiral was so often told to take care what ho was about. This state of matters would make a man of even perament feel uncomfortable his powers, and Sir CMARLZII dently awkward under sash monitory advice. We can qt. the AdmitaVs• feelings through Menthe of lig year, and Se some sympathies - Wilt' them. Teas irritable terr- a and diflid J . : Nanzak, 1 , 4 „ repeatet AP I quite , ugh the,' )me • • , . •r e . %0 1 ‘411 .*t ""'• 1 . .