The Press. — London, England, 1855-05-05 00:00:00

414 a distinct policy, and able earnest minds to carry that policy out. The timidity of its rulers, contrasted with the insulting attitude of the foe, may by rousing its pride, make its heart beat high with noble impulse, and clear away the film which craven counsels and ignoble intrigues have raised before Its eyes. In that case we shall be safe still, and whatever may be the duration of this contest, whatever its trials, England will *Merge from it with higher power and purer fame Or, per plexed by those vague schemes of reform which are industriously put forward to lead the mind of people from the issue they have to try, it may mistake the source of the evil it acknowledges, beat the air in vain attempts to find a remedy, still follow the lead of Whig faction, and insensibly tread the decline from which return is impossible and ruin is sure. It is upon this contingency that Russia speculates. Her statesmen believe that our Government is stricken with incurable weakness, and that Muscovy may reasonably aspire to universal dominion since England has become powerless to oppose her. THE MINISTRY OF WAR. AT particular periods the weight of Govern ment falls on individual Ministers. Lately the CHANCELLOR Of the Exeucneca was the most important member of the Ministry. Now the Minister of War is the principal. All other functions sink into insignificance com pared with his. To direct the war is to rule the country, to exalt or to depress our name, to exercise a material influence on the state of Europe, and perhaps to affect the destinies of the world for ages to come. For this post a genius essentially lofty in its scope and mili tary in its constitution is required, and we have Lord PANMURE, whose thought never reached higher than the mediocrity of routine, and whose dull faculties are now enfeebled by disease. It would be worth all the cost of a revolu tion to fling this decrepit creature from his Epost to morrow, and replace him by Lord LL ENBOROUGH. How it happens that there is often one man and no more in an age fitted by nature, and habit, and experience for a particular duty, we can no more tell than we can account for other dispensations of Provi dente. Above the level of his age the genius of Lord ELLENBOROUGH rises up conspicuously. He has the soul and the intellect of a general. It is no flattery of him to say that Such men are born to station and command When Providence means mercy to a land. His great qualities were proved in India, where he had to repair the appalling disaster of the.Affghan massacre. No man was ever so popular with the Indian army, not from any belief tint he was favorable to schemes of conquest, but because the soldiers knew them selves to be safe under his direction. Officers left his presence enlightened by his sagacity, and cheered by his protection. That noble and sublime assurance of superior guardian ship which it is recorded that WOLFE received in his last interview with CHATHAM, was im pressed on the mind of every officer who left Lord ELLENBOROUGH'S presence with a mission to fulfil. From the instant that this war began, we find him endeavouring to force on the mind of the Duke of NEWCASTLE some true conception of his duties, but in vain As well might he have tried to make a worm stand upright. The only effect of his counsel was to place on record his ideas, and show the country how much it has lost by their neglect. Were a thousand intelligent men in this country asked who was the fittest person for Minister of War, nine hundred and ninety nine of them would unhesitatingly reply,— Lord ELLENBOROUOH. He has all the qualifi the - 1 . cations for the post—vast energy, great expe- totally unable, without large reinforcements, a little too far. On this theory it would be rience, administrative capacity, and a general's to risk the assault. impossible to say when a man could be held gellErliterhip wpointment would break up The result might have been foreseen. It responsible for any acts of folly, temerity, 01) - the 1 ig ~74- h iibtly,qind it would clear away was known a month ago that the Russian stinacy, fantastic vanity. Morals are always the• tja iforekai*pf.r tine, and dispense with forces in the Crimea were not much below in danger when the broad lines of right and 1 'usesssSitt To; \ dministrative Reform 150,000 men, and that fresh troops were ex- wrong are effaced and the cobweb pleas of .. .14 originating fill s . hig incapacity, is to petted. It was notorious that the strength casuistry are suggested. Making distinctions y * I ivattgurate an agitate that may turn to Whin of the allies was scarcely so great. The is one of the refinements of a guilty conscience , unfit, and plunge :110,6 country into deeper British force was 22,000, the French was vainly trying to quell its own upbraiding,. It 6..;tilcuity. It is *AO; notorious to every clerk estimated at fb,ooo, and the Turks and is by such nice discrimination that the Jesuit iiiillikliiiiiiiiilingliiiillinillillii.llllllllllllllllll. li j ' THE PRESS. in the War-office, that the whole business of the department is breaking down under the continually accumulating weight of arrear, through the inability *I Lord PANMURE, and the 'rude attempts tiMently made to reform and .cralielidate the Wak of different office*. THE oitINIEA. IT is MOW silt months since the fire upon Sebastopol was sttspettded by the battle of Inkermann. Since *et time the efforts of the allies have been directed unceasingly to the preparations for its renewal. Siege-trains of unprecedented magnitude have been brought up, fresh batteries have been con structed, and continued labour has been ex pended in the conveyance of shot and shell. The bombardment was acknowledged to be the great operation of the siege, the only means by which we could hope to destroy the defences of the Russians, and to gain posses sion of the town. In the public mind hope was kept alive by constant accounts of the progress of the wcrk, and patience was ex haustod by the repeated announcement of its completion. At last, on the 9th of April, the mighty conflict was resumed, and the fire of 354 guns opened upon the town. The effect has been very great. So far as the detailed accounts extend the allied artillery has maintained a decided superiority. The loss of the Russian troops has been greater than our own. Their guns have been overmatched and silenced in every quarter. On the 16th ult. the Mamelon had discon tinued its fire and become almost useless ; the batteries round the Malakoff Tower had been very much damaged ; and the Redan was " more like a ridge of rubbish than a row of " embrasures" ; the Barrack Battery had also suffered seriously. By the springing of three mines and the incessant fire of the French the Flagstaff Battery had been cut to pieces ; nine-tenth , ' of its guns were hors de combat; and a very few more (lays were expected to complete its destruction. The map of Sebas topol will show the importance of these advan tages. Later news has arrived by telegraph, and announces fresh successes. On the 19th the English took by assault two of the ambus cades under the Mamelon, and the Russians had abandoned the batteries of Careening Bay. So far nothing could ba more satisfactory than the progress of the attack. At the same time we receive intelligence of a startling nature, by the authentic channel of the Government telegraph, and of ten days' later date. It announces that on the 28th the bombardment was suspended for a few days for the arrival of reinforcements. Not a syllable about any reverse. What is the reaom of the delay ? Why not advance to the assault? To discontinue the fire is to sur render the advantages that have been gained; it is to allow the Russians to repair their bat teries, and remount their guns. It is to sacrifice the effects of an eleven days' bom bardment. The sternest necessity can alone justify such a step. The telegraph is re peated, and we learn that the Russian army upon the Belbeck has been reinforced by two divisions, and that Lord RAGLAN inquires anxiously for the Sardinian Contingent. Turning to the accounts from Malta we find that, some days before, Lord RAGLAN had sent orders for the immediate despatch of all the available troops. Looking at the earlier re ports from the Crimea, we see that there were rumours of the arrival of 60,000 Russians from Simferopol, and stating that their army in the field numbered 100,000 men. We draw the conclusion that the bombardment has been suspended in consequence of the for midable demonstration on the part of the Russians, and that the allied Generals are tally unable, without large reinfor risk SATURDAY, Tartars were expected to amount to 50,000 more. To carry on a siege their united strength ought to be very superior to that of the enemy. In the preselli instance the ne cessity wit inereuseil by the immense extent of the ellied works, and tke isolation of the large body of troops at Eupatoria. It was well known that Russia fwd immense corps at het disposalb and womb, pour them down with Out fittermissioti; rid that she had actually detached a et:* siderable force from Bessarabia. An attempt to raise the siege by the sudden appearance of a relieving army is no novelty in war. In the present case it might be reekoned a certainty. What have our Ministers done? Have they acted like men who foresaw and wished to guard against the emergency ? In that case they would have strained every nerve to bring up reinforcements. They would have landed every disposable man at Balaklava They would have drained the Mediterranean gar risons. They would have hastened on the Sardinian Contingent. They would have timed the arrivals so that alt would have been ready to support the assault. But they have done just the reverse. The first division of the Sardinian army was to sail on the 24th, and would reach the camp, at the earliest, a week or so after the assault could take place. Ten thousand British troops were to join Lord RAGLAN ; but far the largest portion is yet unembarked. It is a peculiarity of the late and present Governments that they always fail their Generals just at the crisis of success. Alma was won and the flank march achieved, and Sebastopol lay open to a coup de main. It could not be attempted for want of a reserve. The bombardment went on, and everything was arranged for the assault, when Inkerniann pointed out the weakness of our force, and our hopes were again disappointed by wait of troops. Condemned, in consequence, to a winters inaction, and to privations of every kind, by incredible exertions our army opened ont a third opportunity of conquest. A third time it has been thrown away. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE. THE attempt of the Duke of NEWCASTLE to divest himself of responsibility for the Crimean horrors is one of the most audacious experiments on public patience that has yet been made. His Grace's theory upon official responsibility is at least a novelty. When referring to certain neglects of the Commis sariat, the Duke of NEWCASTLE said that " responsibility was moral and official ; " and he continued, " Morally responsible I was not, " but officially. as Minister of War, I was;" and this nice distinction, suggested by some Peelite casuist, runs through the whole of his Grace's evidence before the Committee of Inquiry ! But we can admit of no nice pleas .of this kind when trying the reputation of a public character for enormous misfortunes, griev ously increased by an infatuated ambition. •A gentleman is asked " Can you drive fourda• " hand ?" and he flippantly answers—" Only " give me the whip and reins, and then form •' your judgment." He confidently mounts the box, is in a fidget at the start, loses all his nerve, upsets the coach, kills half the com pany, while escaping himself only with a sprained ancle. He then candidly expresses his regret, begs to remind folk that he never drove before, hints that he is ready to pay the deodands to the surviving friends, but scouts the idea that he is morally culpable, when he perilled the lives and limbs of his fellow creatures. This is carrying nice distinctions thi would he