Star. — London, England, 1807-03-11 00:00:00

the command, as to (hike a blow in South America. tefore the Spaniards fisould be prepared again( it In faa, as there was a neceffity foe the fquadrun un t.;er my command to touch at St. Salvadore for water, tn its paffage from Engbind to the Cape, it was na turally to be apprehended, from the cordlant commu. rication between Sr. Salvadore and the Rio de la Plata, that every ir fortrati. refpelling the naval and military force of the armament would he tranfmittad to the Governors of !quo' e Video and Buenos Ayres. Therefore, under every view of the fubjea, it war. nroll advifable not to defer the attack on the Spanifb ifiuns. Urgent, however; as thefe confiderations may appear, they were not fufficiently powerful to fir my attention altogether on the immediate execu lion of the projea referred to. Various citcumfiances remained to be weighed and examined, but nor :more p.. 1 tiJularly than the original caufe of delay limed by Z.ir Pitt, namely. the anxiety of the Emperor of Ilinfia to attach Spain to the coalition forming on the Cuutinent of Europe, at the time I failed from En- gland. " Early in February, 18c.6, I received accounts of the terrr.:natien of the war is India. in the courfe cf the fame month T airo received r!, news of Lord Nellon% glorious vific.ry off Tra- Edgar, and the account of a general coalitiou againll France, from an alliance with which power it was evident tile Emperor Alexander had not been able to detach Spain. "Towards the end of February, a Danifh veffel, which arrived at the Cape, brought Engin news ipers, givitig an account of the fare of the Auitrian as my. _ . "By the capture of the Volomaire French frigate, on the 4th of March, I learnt the defeat of the Ruf fian army at Antlerliiz ; 'that Blnaparte was in pt,fietra-,n cf Vicinut ; and that when WiilaumeL tailed from Brett, he Llt in that port no mo:e than fix (hips of war, of which three only were fit for • lereice. nns a German Officer, who was taken priconer io the Volontaire, I alto colleCied filch pie tumptive tv . dence reipeclirg the ulterior dellinatiou of Willimmez'a feinadi on, as induced me to adopt the idea that, after cruizing a ce:tain time on the Bank of Laguill•zs, Le wrmld put into the Brazils for water and tetrethri!ents, and thence proceed to the Weft Indies, e efpecially after he theold have been i"tormed that th:e Cape was aFtually taken by the Britith totces. Indeed, In Rrongly did this prefurrip•- tion operate on my mind, th it I difpatehed a copper-bottomed trndporiebrig to Admiral Cochrane, at Barbadoes, to apprize him of what I concei ed was the rooft likely coorfe to be purfned by Willaurotz, as will appeal by my letter to Mr Madden, dated— " I ail:, dilpatched the PrcteCtor gun brig to Sir Edward rnew- in Irdia, and the Rolla brig, to en deavr-ur to fall in with whatever &kiln fquadron night he employed in the blockade of the Mauritius. tt Thrfe meafures of etecautit , n evince to this Ho 'lmitable Court my extreme anxiety to communicate to the Commander in Chief of his Majelly's Naval Forces in every quarter of the globe, and on every Ration liable to attack from the enemy's flying fqua drons, fuch intelligence as might enable them to in tereepc th .fe fqoadrons, or to aO on the defenfive, and to ;,ff , ,rd every prole Lion in their power to the commerce a his Maje fly'. fabjeas. " Wilk I was empl •yed in tranfmitting this de firable ii:ft , rination to the. Eaft and Wet Inkiies, and other ;..:T tE, li! , le I inaastine that I flu:10d have been accufe.d of not affording proteCtion to the trade of his hlajetty', nicely bee:lute I did not with my flua.!ron become flationaty at the Cape, where I wzs erj-ined by my inflruCtions,or called upon by any a; ;areal neccility, t , remain. " During the Late ar, our eruizers were conflreitly either off - he mouth of the River, or abfolutely cruizing off M. , nte Video ; one of the (hit's, indeed, which had cruized o:et e was under my ct,ninnand ; ai,d ind-i - ictidently of every other confide; ation, I not only :tad due opinien cf that ref i :eet tbie officer, Capt. who was on the Cape Itati:m lall war, that Rin de Ls nit:: was c'nceived as a part of that ltat - i-ti, hut the unanimous of irir.n of every Officer under my command, fame of whnrn will, I have no doubt, give their teitimany to thi.: effeCt. I beg it, Low,. ver, to be um!erffood, that thefe opinions were exptefffd I. , ng before our arrival at the Cane. , t Does n -t this prove that the Admiralty confi• slated the Rin de la Plata as an enemy's port, which ou!-tht to be conflantly watched by f'me of the cruizers under the orders of o.e Senior Naval Officer at the Cape, and confegnently within the limits of his ccmmand ?—Bat, notwithtlanding the opinion thus poirefr-.d and enforced by a former Adariraliy Boat-I, lam brought to trial by the prelim Board for leading my fquadron to attack the Spani:h poffef fions on ttt Rio de la Plata, when I had every tea fon to believe that no French fhips of v.ar were in the vicinity ~ 1 the Cape, or likely to ariiv, thither from Envlse. "I am charged too, with having left the Cape cip•mfell to attack Ind inful: On the contrary, I stia;mmtain, that through the well istriwn zeal, abilimy • itt‘.l , 3m.:nt of Lientelmant General Sir David Baird the Caae fmfGoo..l H'pe was placed in a (late of the m •il retie& feemmrity. military difpottions of 'hat Officer were l judicious and fitil.ul, as to itmlu.im'e time firma confidence in a fitc cefsful tefdlt, even under the fuppofition that an att;:t-npt !':nuid be made to wreil this conquell from the forces, whilil his political arrangements ee. t: 4 moti general fatisfattiun to the inhabitants • vet y , Jefem ;pilot). TL garrifon bad been ltrength• en..: by a levy af native militia, and its means of def.-:nce %tete deemed fn ample and adequate by Sir D a vid 3ait d, wh I,'e opinion in fuel' a cafe I confidered suvt.:it jurCied in ad , .pting,, as he was the moil comyete.mt judge in rr.ilitary affairs, that this intelmi .-tlictir did uct hefitate to furnifh a cictachrocl of his f!atlant tcoars, in confecinence of my fubmit tirmy to him ail the informatin I had received, re f-re:l,g the c:c`...er.celefs State of Monte Video and lan:r.rs - Ayres, and n.y urgent reptefertation to him • w thse gi -at advantages which our Country was likely virticultirly at fa critical a period, fu.rn f i li a v.::.abic acquilition as the conqueti of one or th. !ices. Cezt:..in I am that it is not rm:s.cffary for me to imprefs on this honourable Court, Gat tirc ;vete; ence telt I,v the Dutch Coloniils and • .1;.e: to the. mild and folleting proteftion of the Giverninent, would dilpofe them to bliye ;el m:.,_ii moll cordial 'eriflance repellinp; a French rte. if it were potlihie to exneCt fuch a force, as in event of its fucccedinz in the attack, the Colony, would have bentre•fobjeCt to the opprefEve exaClim% and tyranny of the French Government. " But if any additional proof were wanting of tire perfect (late of fectoity in which Lieutenant Ge , mzral Sir David Baird conlidered the Cape, after he had turnilhed me with a detachment of hra gar• riton for the - expedition to Rio de la Plata, it is to be found in the circumaance of his having reinforced General Beresford by a fecond detachment of his troops. This furely furnilhes incontrovertible evi dence that Sir David Baird confidered the Cape in nn danger from the weaknefs of his garrifon, or means of defence ; and (hall I be condemned for availing myfelf of that aid which his fuperior judg ment felt could be afforded with paled &fay ? " 1 am alto charged with having left the Cape without the means of taking poffellion of auy (hips of the enemy which might have put into any of its hays or hat boors, or any of the ports adjacent. Now, Sir, 1 fubmit to the confiderairon .f this Ho nourable Court, ‘'..liether, after the retreat of Willa°. ?bees fe,iiadron from arhat may be called the Indian Seas, the redu&ion of the French naval force by Lord Nelfon's glorious via:iry off Trafalgar, and the brilliant !heed's of ancther gallant Admiral, who rendered that vitc.tory more complete, by the ea:inure of every fhip that had efcaped from the farmer feene of astion, there was the lealt probability of the arrival of any French (hips of war at the Cape, or any of the bays or harbours in its vicinity? In fait, with the exception of one Engle frigate, men• tianed in a letter to the Admiralty, by Captain Styles of the Adamant, no French (hip whatever attempt ed to enter Falfe Lay, or any other bay or harbours near the Cape. " The Cannoniere affords a folitary inftance of an enemy's fr:ip attempting to filcher herfelf, or to re connoitrf ia thc,fc pairs ; Rot) her arrival was a mere fortuito is event, of which it wot,' , l not have been in my power to take avanlage, even had I remained in Simon's Bay, with all the fquadron ; for the natural probability is, that a , loon as (he lhould difcover from her mall head our !hips lying there, (he would im mediately make a precipitate retreat into the offing, without my being able to prevent her &ape. • " B. fades, at the time when I left the Cape, the wittier feafon was about to commence, during which no flips can lie in Table Bay with fafety. Commn. dote Johntione jnlily ()bier lied, when he was lent into thole leas on a Secret Expedition, in 1781, it was Beamed uriadvilable by hitnielf and General Meadows to attack the Cape in that lealon. No attack; indeed, on this fettlement was to be apprehended from an enerny'sforee during the period in which I am charged with leaving the Cape expofed to attack at d infult. " Independently of there circumQances I would alk, how often has the Cape been- without a tingle fhip of war to XIII in its defence during the time it was in poffeflion of the Britith forces in the late war, and the Wig of the naval Commanding Officer on the (Winn left flying on board of a fmall veffel, Icarcely capable of making any refillance ? Imteed, in the immediate expe6tation of the arrival at the Cape of fome men of war from England, I left an order, dated the 13th r f April, 18c6, addrelfed ro any Naval Officer who might arrive there, and be junior to myfelf, by which order he or they were at peifeet liberty either to remain at the Cape, or to follow me to the Rio de la Plata, as Mould appear moll for the benefit his Majelly's let vice, ,41;cr a confulration with Sir .1)46d Baird on the fithjeci. Ili am alked why I was to anxious to leave the Cape in fuel) apparent hafle, as not to wait for the arrival of the men of war from England ? my anfwer is limply this; I was fearful that the delay in my departure from the Cape, added ta the probable length of the paffage from that promontory to tire eat: c• - iall of South Ame rica, might defeat ;he objet of the expedition, by re tarding toy arrival in the Rio de la Plata, until that feafon, which, from the information I was pOircired of relpeaing the L:,vigation of this river, might ren der it impetlible to fail up high enough to attack either of the fettlements of Mollie Video or Bueacs Ayres. " Another point to which I am dcfiroas to call the attention of this Hi -notable Court is this, that from the manner in which the Secretary of the Ad miralty replies to my let or of the 9th of April, wherein I apprized that Board of my intended de parture for the Rio de la Plata, tor the purpofe of attacking the Spatith pr.ffeffions, I had a just right to fur; ft that tic Admiralty Board did not dilap .prove r my having failed with the ftpladran on that I fervice; for certainly it is rational to infer, that fume exprelli of tl.eir difpleafure would have been in-I titled in Mr. Marlden's letter, acknowledging the receipt of raine of the date before mentioned. Am i I not, act efore, jullifi:d, Sir, in couttruing the lilence obfc:v::1 on this head, as at le,tlt a tacit acknow. ledgment on the part of that B:atrd which has now htnaght me to trial for having undertaken the cape dition agairili Buenos Ayres without order, that it did rot then excite their dilfatislaaion ? " But in truth the importance which the Admiralty no.c prufefs to attach to the Cape, feems extremely fingul tr when contralted with Ole opinion, which, from Mr. Marfden's letter to me of March 111, acknowledging the receipt of my account of its cap tu:e, they appe'ared to entertain of it ; in.lec4, the tame, the cold terms of that letter, would naturally induce an idea, either that the Admiralty thought the Cape of little value in or that it was of no con• ferptence comparatively with the ultimate nbjed of the expedition. Really tflimating the Cape as it de ferve, it would have been reafonable to infer from the letter, that the Admiralty were aware of, and highly p:ized that ultimate ()Ned; but it is difficult to account for their c :ndud.—When the acquifition was made, not one folitary expi of thanks was pronotinced upon thole to whom it was owing, and yet I am to be condemned for having expofed that acquilition even to imaginary hazard. The impor, lance of the capture was railed over in filence when' I might have been gratified ; but it is loudly enhanced when the object is to deprefs me. Whence thin dif ferencc, I leave it to your refledion, Gentlemen ; I leave it to the refledi3n of my country. " My letter of the 9th of April was received by the Admiralty Board in June tali, and it was not till the end of Augull that Admiral Stirling failed to fuperfede me, with an order of recta. If my con duel in having engaged in this enrerprize had been really difapproved by his blajett 's Minifler,., why, on their per uhal of my difi.atches, tt as not the Admi ralty Board direded to lend out a fait failing vette' to ligt.ify to me their dilappro'uation of my couduci in having failed to attack the enemy without fpec ifi - orders to that effeit, by which means alfo, the vifion ary expofure of the Cape would have been of near three months lefs duration ? No reafon whatever can be affigned for their having kept me fo long in fuch a Rate of anxious flit - pence, except, indeed, the un . certainty the Britifh Cabinet teems to have been in at the time refpeaing the conduit to be purl led in the event of my enterprize being crowned with fuc cefs, on account of the negociation then pending at Paris.—ln truth, Sir, it is manifen, from every view of the conduit of the Admiralty Board, that at that time, they had no intention whatever to arraign me for this furcefsful exercife of the difcretionary power with which I maintain every Commanding Officer, on a dillant Ration is veiled, and which he has a right to exert for the good of his country. The fupercef I lion I conceive was meant as the evreme meafure of punifhment. " Indeed, Sir, were not our Naval and Military Commanders empl , ,ved in foreign fervice. in diilant qua, ters, allowed a latitude for the exercife of their idifcretion, what ill confegnences would often arile to his Majefty's fervice ? To the Members comp fing this Honourable Court, the majority of whom have already filled, and all of whom are likely to fi ll, high commands on diflant Rations. it is fcarcely ne ceffary to point out the combination and the variety of unexpected circumflances which may occur, and imperioufly diaate the necedity of advantage being taken of the moment in promptly ailing againft an enemy, which circumflances may be loch, that delay might lead only to difcomfiture or difgrace ; and that no time could be fpared for confulting the fuperior authorities at home, or waiting for their orders. " Had filch extreme caution, fuch rigid regula tions as feem to prompt the prefent accufation, been hitherto enforced, that daring fpirit of enterprize, that prompt and decifive energy of aaion, which have railed the Britifh name and charaiter to fo proud and enviable a fummit of diftinaion, would not only have been checked, but in a great meaftire annihilated ; and the annals of our hiftory would not have been ditlinguifhed by fo many gallant achievements, which, though undertaken without orders, have, in general, been emiaently conducive to the intereft and glory of the country. " Numerous precedents exit which fully illuftrate the truth of this pofition, fome of which may pro bably occur to the recolleition of the Members of the Court. Amongl others which prelim themfelves to my memory at this moment, I (hall beg leave to men tion the coupdemain which put the Britifh Crown in pollitlion of Gibraltar. Sir George Rooke had no orders for undertaking that hold enterprize, nor was he arraigned by his fuperiors at home, for having exercifed his difcretion on that occafion—on the con trary, his Majetly did every honour to his enterpri zing mind. " In the American War, in 17—, Sir Peter Parker, I believe, and General Dalling, the then Naval and Military Commanders at Jamaica, concerted an ex pedition againft the Spann Settlement of Omoah' which was to a certain degree fuccefsfail. Nu blame, I underhand, was attached to either of thole Officers for having direited this attack without orders. " At the beginning of the late war, in 5793, Lord Hood entered Toulon, and afterwards attacked Cot lied, without orders, and I believe againft the opinion nf the General who would not co-operate with him. 1 't that Admiral was not brought before a Court- Martial for having fo ailed ; or was it ever known that his conduit was cenfured. " In 1795, Lord St. Vincent (then Sir John Jer. is ) fent the heroic Lord Nelfon to attack Teneriffe, in confequence of information which he received, that two Ihips had loaded their treafure there. Every petrol) :s acquainted with the iffue of that expedition, which lot to the country fa many brave men, in which if it were nor, notsr ithlianding the difailmus tefult of this intended coup de main, which was molt inconteflibly undertaken without orders from any fu perior authority, it is certain that no park inquiry was ever intlituted again!! Lord Sr. Vincent, although, if an opinion were to be formed from the event only, without confidering the motives of the enter prize,there would perhaps appear fufficient ground on which an accufation might have been expeded and fupported againa that Commander. Bur let the Court particu larly look a: the letter reccn ly pirlflifhed from that ilioitrious Officer, Lord Nelfon, to Sir Simon 1 ay ler, of Jamaica, relative to his clifcretion in going from the Medit-rranean to the \Velt Indies. " There preeeslent, Sir, will clearly prove the ex• Melee and toleration of that difcretionar y power on which I have aCted. But I have yet to cite a cafe, a cafe Hill more in point, fince the officer whom I am going to merrrion, commanded on the very Ration which I am accufed of having left unproteaed, and who aaually prepared to embark the troops on board his fquadron, with which he was ready to fail from the Cape to the Rio de la Plata, in or der to attack thofe identical fettlements, which were the objeas of my enterpr ize. The late Sir Hugh Chriftian had carried his intention fo far as I have flared, when an account reached him from India, ltating the urgent neceffity of fending the military reinforcements to our army in the Cam:erre. That intelligence compelled him to difpalch the troops to 11:dr.t, and thus was the expedition to the EAR coati of South America at that time prevented. as This lalt cal!, which I thrill endeavour to prove by the teilimony of Mr. M'Lean, then Admiral Chrif tian's Secretary, thews that that Officer confidered himfelf justified in ufing this difcretion in the manner I have defcribed ; and although the expedition did not take place, it was not hecaufe that Admiral had received no orders fur undertaking it. The real caufe of its having been relinquilhed was that which I have I already flared. " 11, then, Admiral Chriflian, without any orders from home, or previous communication on the fob. jett, thought proper to adept the neceflary meafures for undertaking an expedition to the Rio de la Plata, during the period of his commanding the fquadron at the Cape, how n.dch more urgent, and how much more jullifiable mull have been the motives which induced me to engage in that enterprize, who had ptevioully been app , trued to the (hip I commanded for the exprefs purpofe of proceeding in her to South America, and who had been confidenrially apprized of the secret views and plans of tire King's Ministers refpe•Cting it long before I left England ? " But though the intention of Admiral Chriltian to proceed to the attack of the Spanith fettlements was well known to his Majetly's Government in England, yet 1 find on enquiry that the Admlralry Board of that day expreffed no difapprobation of the matures he had purfued without their orders ; whereas I who fucceeded in the fame enterprife, executed from ex . ally the fame point of departure, and wha.. is not a little fingular, under the aufpiees of the fame military Commander, I mean Sir David Baird, am now ar raigned for my fuccefs, even at the moment when Minifters are following up the blow I [truck with all the energy in their power, by employing all the forces they well can mufter for that fervice. " I have fail, Sir, that when the Admiralty learnt by my letter of the 9th of April, that I had failed with the fquadron under my orders for the Rio de la Plata, that Board did not at firft apparently ditap. prove of my conduct, and I think I am borne out in this conclufion by the tenor of Mr. Marfden's acknowledging mine of the date lilt mentioned. The letter in quetlirn is dated Auguft 6, and is conceived in the following terms have received and communicated to my Lords Commif fioners of the Admiralty, your letter of the 9th of April lag, in forming them of your intended proceedings with the fqoadron under your orders. I am fee. WM. MARSDEN." " Now, Sir, on comparing the preceding letter with a letter from Mr. Marfden, dated the ill of March, tBo6, in anfwer to one from me, conveying a piece of intelligence, which I cannot but fuppofe mutt have been gratifying ; the two letters will prove to be written exactly in the fame llyle. The letter of the if of Match is as follows : s ia _a have received and laid before my Lords Commiftloners of the Admiralty. your letter of the r3th of January Taft, with the feveral papers therein referred to, relative to the capitulation of the tiswn and cattle of Good Hope. lam, Sir, yours, &c. (Signed) WN. moasoria. " The conclufion which I think every unprejudiced man would draw from the perufal of thefe two letters is, that if the Admiralty Board did not judge proper to exprels to me any approbation, not merely of my own condua as Commander of the naval force em ployed in the reduction of the Cape, but of that of the Officers and Seamen who contributed to this conquea, (till the Board could not well be difpleafed with it; and that by their Secretary having left me alfo in the dark, 01 rather to my own conjectures, in his replyto my let ter acquainting him of my having failed with my Irina dron to the Rio de la Plata, it was equally prefuma hie that t:ie Board did not then difappi, ye of my having proceeded on that Expedition—that is, by the tone and charaCter of the two letters, they looked upon the capture of the Cape, and the arrangement for the fquadron's failing to Rio de la Plata, pre- cifely in the fame point of view, or that one was as likely to meet their approbation, or to prove advan tageous to the country as the other." (To be coniinseed.) LONDON. WEDNESDAY, MARSH It. PRICE OF S TOCK4 THIS DAY AT ONR O'CLOCK: Confols, for motley, 64}—tor April 63I—Omniurn zi Sir Heats POPHAM'S Trial being now finifhed, we have laid before our Readers as much of the pro ceediags as our limits would admit. We have only time to add, that an Exprefs arrived in town this day, with an account that Sir Hosts was bonouralit Betides General BE NN ICS EN'S letter. which appear. ed in the Gazette Extraordinary, Government re ceived other accounts, which n , t lieing official, of comic could ^nt be publithed through that channel. The Marquis of DOUGLAS detained the Meffenger three days after the receipt of the firfl accountF, in expeaation of farther particulars. Thcfc actually arrived from General BENNIGSEN, but the Emee.. ROR, who opens his letters himtelf, not being at Pe tertburgh, their contents were not known when the Mellinger was fent off; but other letters had been received from the army, copies of which, and the fubflance of ()diets, have been received by Govern. ment. The intelligence by thefe is fame days later than the Official Dispatches. It is laid, that they contain a flatement of the further motions of General BEN. NIGSEN, who had deemed it advifable to withdraw from the Banks of the Viaula. The French are re ported to be retreating; and it is believed to be their intention to recrofs the rivers. The retreat of Ge. neral BENNIGSEN is imputed to the (late f the coon try, which is totally deflitute of provifions or forage. So far from no quarter having been given by the Ruffians, General Orders were ilfued, previous to the battle of the 7th, that no man fhould be put to death after having dropped or furrendered his arms; and that every officer fhould be held refponfible for the fafety of the prifoners who fhould have furrendered to his detachment. The fame orders menaced the pu,nament of death to all who Should be found in the at of mangling the dead, or killing the wounded, on the field of battle. General BEwNicssr4 is any thing but the favage he is repre• • fenced. He is fcarcely lefs diftinguifhed for his hu. manity than his ability. No battles whatever had as yet followed that of the Bth.—Both armies, as if by confent, were on their retreat ; and each left the other unmoletted. General BENNIGSEN has refilled the 'incorporation of the SilelianLevy %tit!' his own army. Th e Est• mos Asexandis had left every thing to his dif. cretion ; and we underhand that the Pro flian Gene nerals compmin of him much. General BENNIGCEM however, h4d vindicated himfelf t.) his Prullian Md. jelly, with whom h, is honoured with the privilege of immediate currefpondence. The refult is faid to be, that the King is better fatisfied with him than his Minillry are. PLYMOUTH, MARCH 9.—Came in the KENT, of 74 guns, from the coalt of France: it is laid that the brings an account of the lots of the ATALANTA, of 18 guns, on the French coati ; that feveral of the Officers and Men are made prifonerg, and that the Captain is on board the KINT. Advice is alfo re ceived that fix light victuallers have been driven from off Rochefort in a late gale at Eafi, and that it is fuppofed they were gone towards Newfoundland : alto that the Endeavour light tranfport, that was driven from the Downs, is 101 l on the coati of France. Came in the Etaxamm, of 38 guns, front the Chan nel Fleet. LONDON: Printed and publdhed by LEVEL KENT, (ot Can. terbury-Place, Lambeth) at :be STea•Orrtcr, N. t, Cary• ftreet. publifbed alio at the A n-0 r vie r, Tcmplr•Bar.