Star. — London, England, 1816-02-20 00:00:00

ee l , hi ,11. lead ici llt .ni..., i " it, ... _ '• . ' .;,t wain t he,pideof sncial• order ,• o* F . the s o oe ld be punished P is s het faults by a .. • sh i a d is memberment of her territory ? the • • w orld have been, that i n the latter case ~,„- - have had the whole of France against us. 7 - A lar ki aster o f France had so altered of late years i; s ive - h e r a vast predominance in Europe, n o Oak , my that the power of'Great Britain had i r ea d n an equal proport io n , which the nJ ew se i of re d uc ing France h l ass pressing or Goat Britain, in fact, a no interest in 1.• Franc e d is m embered, .. nor was there any dismemberment could prove ... ont suh 4 1. There was no man who did not feel that wire Of Russia had taken a start which made ~o w o f France appear under very different fee was. But he was pre to what it for merly . to sa y, that nothing wont_ dhave been more fa. a e general interests ofEuro pe t han to h ave to r• t he question to have been agitated res pecting teined ° O tha t of France. He thought the pro en was, to let France pre serve her coande rati a s a nation. In the station in which ter sto od, there was not a reasonable man who did 0 7 t h at s he owed to Europe a security against worlitn" of what bad happene d. But at t h e t i me , we were called on to tranquillise the a nd not to parcel out states, under abstract t i t he balance of power, at variance with the of the people, and which might have been • .; o f a new contest. That course was alone • which gave us a shield for our own security, aka us a faculty to adopt such a system, as - cooler a benefit on the virtuous people of There were two ways in which the Allies • have claimed indemnity ; they might have de. . , a large pecuniery r e c ompense , or have made pine a bstraction of her territory. It had been t h at the pecuniary levy was the most revolting t h e people of any thing that could have been adop nothing, however, was farther from the truth.— was hardly any portion of the people of France would object to part with their money. ( eflaush.) state of their finances admitted of their paying 1 kart' contribution*; for on looking at the situation France, as compared with other nations, we shall that she has derived from her profligacy an ad , . e which other nations cannot equal. By the : .of the Revolution she had been disencumbered her national debt, while the plunder she had take° other nations had placed her in a situation of .. - affluence than any other in Ettrope.—( Hear, ~hear.) He should here digress to say a word or Go t he Imperial Loan, which spas not remotely ed with the topic on which he was speaking. nom had plural:red Prussia at different times of not than 1200 millions of livres, and Austria of even a . proportion—in fact, these two monarchies were reduced, that if they were pressed to refund the. ~ y advanced by Great Britain, they would not able to put their armies on the peace establishment. ing to the subject of France, the Noble Lord .. ... ~ that nothing was more repugnant to the -lags of the people than the idea that they were bedeprived of territory ; and if a partitivn had .on to:solved ipon, he was convinced that it would ot have hem in the power , f the Allies to have per . his Chrittian iajesty to accede tosit. There however, no dii:erence of opinion amongst the lies, that we ought not to deal with France as a - , tiered country; it would have been a measure at with the greatest danger; and he would say, dralddespise that Frenchman who would not have .•,,,. indignant at the partitioning out of his ter : , , sad who would not feel that the state of ma before the Revolution, was the state in which hew was bound up. Where was the English . who would not fight for any of those possessions contributed to the power of the British Crown? pretested therefore against all dismemberment, '• did not affect the substratum of the military - of France: any other process of dismember . "old have been injustice. For if any large of her territory had been taken from her, oast have devolved over to the neighbouring ' - i this would have been a source of perpetual d, and when the difficulty of bringing back Herat powers of Europe to the aid ot Any other was considered, lie must be a presumptuous , • • , who could argue that they could come back give protection as often as any other State might their assistance. It was a fundamental maxim France to be involved in war with the Low Coon sad whenever this was the case, the burthen Is all upon the shoulders of this country. We therefore taken care to secure the dominions of . Ling of the Netherlands as much as possible any attack from France. By the precau• 7 measures, however, that were adopted, there every reason to hope and believe that France not make any hostile attempt. We had ',OOO of the best troops in the world, under a man • was justly and universzlly admitted to be the ' • teat General in the world ; and as France had • . the danger, it was but right that she should the price for watching over her tranquillity.— the whole, be had good reason to believe that the • would prove secure, even though some chew hostilities might be made by France in so long a • is the life of Man as five years. I: would have no means been wise to have taken the line of - - from France, and annexed them to the tries to which they were eoroiguous. Such a ' would have been of no advantage to these ; it might have been resisted by the French eminent, and might have created mare danger . 1 new war than the leaving of them in the posses , . of France, after the Allied Troops should be " . vb. -It was the general opinion in France, 1 0e had never erred more than in extending her • As to the territory of the King of the . . .1, he would say, that he was stronger ' his own frontiers, and by the improvement of Messes, than he would have been by the pos . of those fortresses that might have been taken _Frame. The future state of Europe depended imp being permanently settled in France, and k _Would be so by not suffering her Government he thrown backwards and forwards as it had Kai• Allies had preferred the Government it._ lll° ng, because it seemed to offer nothing ,L 7 !as lik e ly to s h a k e t h e peace o f E urope . I t was Illi store a deliberate purpose of the Allies, when Concluded the Tr ea ty of the 20th November, to away all cause for jealousy, and they bound them. ives to re‘lan the fortresses, with the few eacep. ►he I sued q n ow Vlng : m ar Li ha lt Va l Joni t for Pe, tl tion ~:kitp e alai &lad terDl :N I 1114 416d' 1111‘ 0. , " Ago .PS (114.1. Int ~~i trout specified in dui reenty.-nt tlw end of five years. But they did not bind ttlemeelve; re• tore them to ';' any but the' King'. lawful heirs and success Ors I su that if the present Di nasty shoulu by any 'Mean' be subverted, we did not pledge outolves to the - tally and absurdity of giving them up to any persons who might be at the head or the Government at that time ; but to look at what might take place, and judge whether it would be necessary I o impose sonic new restrictions. • We were pledged to support the King of France, but not to support any new Revco • lutionary Government. He was satisfied that greater securities for the durability of the Peace had-been obtained by the course pursued in the late negocia. tions, than could have been dbtained if France had been pushed into concessions with a more violent hand. If the King had not re-ascended the throne on the principle that the virtual integrity of France should be preserved, he (Lord C..stlereegh) would have had the most serious doubts of the continuance ofpeace. He felt that in that case it would have been much endangered by the irritated feelings of the French nation. But while due attention had been paid to this. consideration, the Allies had not failed to require what they thought adequate securities for the future repose of Europe. These, he trusted, it would be the opinion of the House they had obtained, when it was recollected that five fortresses of considera ble local importance had been ceded by France to the King of the Netherlands, and that the destruction of one which was. of importance had been insisted upon. Had the arrangement made for the future repose of Europe stopped here, he should have thought it in complete. Li his opinion, however, the other condi tions which had been made, combined with those to which he had just referred, would place the balance of power in Europe on a better tooting than it had obtained since the time of Joseph the Second. France was to pay to the Allies 700,000,000 of byres. Out of this sum, soo,ogo,ocx) was to be expended for the erection of strong plades to defend the Low Coun tries, which would thus be placed in a better state than they had been in for the last fifty years;. and he had no hesitation in saying, it was a much better game for England to play. to support the King of the Netherlands in his own territories, than it would be to maintain his authority in places taken from France, which that nation might reclaim whenever she felt her military power suffi.iently revived to enable her to venture on such an undertaking. He WAS anxious that the question should rest on this prin ciple, that England should rather take upon herself to defend the Netherlands than • to hold the strong places taken from France, some of which it must be diicult to maintain, and some ( Lisle for instance), it must be obvious to every person who looked at their military situation, would be rather an incum brance.than an advantage. He would now say a few words on the subject of the sacrifices of a Incuniary nature imposed upon France,* in satisfaction of the views of the Allies. Looking at the operation which these would have upon the French Government, he certainly considered what had been done in this respect was politically the most expedient course, to neutralise in the first instance, and ultimately to remedy that military spirit which had proved so fatal to the repose of Europe. If we drew from the French those re sources which might sustain a military force, and ap plied it to the support of our own, kept there for the purposes of arrevilknce, we took the best means for preventing the recurrence of those evils against which it was the object of the Allies to guard.— This he thought the wisest policy that could be pur sued to accomplish the end in view, and that which would be the least offensive, as it would be the least injurious to France herself. This persevered in for five years, be entertained sanguine hope ., would esta blish the tranquillity of France, and with it that of the rest of Europe. But he was aware that it was coteraon for Gentlemen to say the contributions which had been imposed, France could not and would not pay. In answer to this he had in the first place to slate, that she had already made very considerable payments, and these under circumstances of peculiar difficulty and embarrassment :—in the second, he would observe, she must pay them er became bank rupt in national credit :—and thirdly, it was to be remembered, that it she failed to do this, we should then stand in the same situation in which we had stood whir hi the opinion of some Gentlemen we ought to have insisted upon other terms, founded upon permanent cessions of territory to be made by France. It was now to be considered how the pay ments could be made by France, and what would be the effet of them on her trade and resources ? In speaking of the arrangements which had been made, he wished it to be distinctly understood, that when he spoke of them as being wise, he did not give them that character because he thought them ruinous to France. He protested against this doctrine altoge ther, as he WAS satisfied no arrangement could be wise, that carried ruin to one of the countries, be tween which it was concluded. He believed if both , parties had not an interest in carrying any treaty negotiated into effect, it must evidently tail. In miscalculating the point on which it could be acted upon witli mutual benefit, the advantages contended for on either side were lost. He believed France could pay the contributions which had been de manded, and that she intended paying them.— France, he maintained, was as greatly interested in seeing that military spirit subside which had prevailed within her territories so long, as it was pitssible the rest of Europe could be.—(Hedr.)— If at the end of five years she should fin/ this to have been materially—abated, and her civil energies in creased in proportion, the change thus produced would be not less beneficial to her than it would prove-to her neighbours. The contributions deman ded could be met by the revenues of that country by the sale of crown lands, by the augmentation of the capital of her national debt; she might kipeaabled honourably to fulfil her engagements without bring. on the State any extraordinary calamity. France, it had been stipnlated, should pay as an indemnity to the Allies the sum of seven hundred millions of litres (twenty-eight or twenty-nine millions of pounds ster ling) ; but this was, comparatively speaking, a very inconsiderable payment, when put by the side of the other expenses which the late ,war had thro ws u p on her. In addition to this, twenty-nine millions, France had engaged to maintain an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men belonging to the Allies for Lye years. The expense of each 1600 men could ' not be estimated at less than one million of litres per , annum t this army, therefore, would cost France . . . yearly the suns of nee httnifred and fifty rl? om this' it would be sten the sums which France 'would have to pair in live years for the maintenance of this aimy, would he seven hundred. and fifty mil ' boas of livres, making, with the seven hundred mil lions Riven to the Allies as an indemnity, a total of 1,450,000,000 livres. By 4 Convention concluded, the French Government had engaged to pay 120livres n man (about ses).on the whole force of 11,040,000 men which had marched into France to conquer peace, and the last payment due on ihisacconni lied been made. —The expense of this vast force - had been borne by France for five or six months, and this, added to the sums which he had already named, and other charges which had been thrown on her, brought the total expense of the invasion which she had sustained up to a sum of not less than 2000 millions of livres about 80 millions sterling. At first many had been disposed to say such a burden was mire than France could bear. For this idea there was no good founae tion. She had already made very considerable ad vances, and he donbted not she would be able to pay the whole, and doing this be believed there would be. as little reason for regret on the part of France as there was on that of England ; the exertions which this would call for, would not destroy the resources of the country, though for a considerable period, it would put it out of its power to make any great mi litary effort. He thought it was not necessary for him to go into any lengthened argument to induce the House to look with favour on that system which had brought the late contest to so desirable an end. The House could not feel a i k ile astonished, when they compared the question brought before them that night, with those which they had frequently had to discuss from time to time, through many a me lancholy ye - AL.—Vitae, hear, ar.) When they re , called the many debates which had taken place on the evils with which this country had been menaced, from the successes of France, it was a proud and gratifying reflection, that on 016 day they were occupied in considering how far the preserva tion of that nation, among the greet Powers of Eu rope,. was political or just. The House would also feel it to be an auspi c io us circumstance, that that great alliance which had been formed by the four great Powers of Europe most opposed to the politics of France, that that union of their councils which had been so long a desideratum, which so many ef forts had been nude to accomplish without success, and had at last been brought to bear with such happy effect, now, at the conclusion of the struggle, existed in all its former strength. He firmly believed, that had the Sovereigns been separated instead of being together on the field of action, the great business of the war could not have been so happily conducted to its termination. On this, in a great measure, he Was convinced the salvation of Europe had depended. Had they been apart, circumstances had (exerted from day to day, which, in all probability, would have shivered the Confederacy to .toms, had not the Sovereigns been on the spot to meet, sipd by conci liating opposite interests, to overcome them. Another grand feature in this Confederacy, .which must be contemplated with feelings of general satisfaction, was the spirit of moderation and temper which had distinguished - it, and which, on every great ques tion, had enabled them to carry with them the general feelings of Europe—(Hew, hear, hve).— , The character, which it had sa well deserved, gave the world confidence to look up to it still for protec tion, and discountenanced the apprehensions which had been too readily taken up by the Gentlemen op posite, of their having it in contemplation to make an attack on the civil or religious liberty of .inv country not in alliance with them. He deprecated that dis• position to arraign the intentions of the Allied Powers, which had recently been manifested, and contended these efforts to create an alarm, unfounded in the first instance, were likely (if any thing could be ex pected to .produce such an effect) to originate tin evils the existence of which those to whom he refer red affected to deplore. The friendly disposition of the Emperor of Russia towards this country had been particularly manifested in the course which he had recently taken with respect to the lonian Islands. This supplied a refutation of all the statements which had been circulated to awaken a jealousy against Russia on the part of this country. He (Lord Cas tlereagh) was not an advocate for confidence in the goodwill of any great Power, so far as to dismiss vi gilance, on the part of Ministers but at the same time he felt it necessary to throw backthe charge which had been advanced, lest it should lead to that state of things which had been( without foundation) supposed to exist. The lonian Islands, he felt it his duty to state, had been placed under the protection of England, in the first instance, in consequence of the great wish of pressed by the inhabitants of them, that such an sue 'rangement should be made : and next to this, they had been so placed under oar protection in compliance with the desires of the Emperor of Russia, who had greatly exerted himself to promote this object. He wished, on this occasion, to put at issue the arrange mints which had been nude to close the late war; these the House could discuss without going largely into the merits of what had been done by the Con- i gross of Vienna, which it might be well to leave open for consideration on a future day. That on which he now called upon the House to decide, was on the question whether, under all circumstances, Ministers had done their duty in concluding the pre sent Treaty of Peace? He renewed his congratula tions on the perfect unanimity and harmony now sub. sisting among the' Allies, and on the happy effects which these had produced, and. which still seemed likely to flow from them. If any thing were dcne by this country which at all went to separate its inte rests from those of its allies, he was convinced that we should not only give up the advantages felt from their influence, but we should do that would tend to keep up that military spirit in Europe which it was desirable to see lowered.-..(Hear, hear). Though the other Powers in Europe had not been thrown into those monstrous creations of military ef forts which bad been witnessed in France, still it could not be denied that there existed io them a war like spirit which could not immediately subside; and he went along with those on the opposite side who were of opinion, a perfect state of peace could never , be obtained till that spirit sboyld he much abated—el (Hear, hear, hear!) —till armies again became uni versally the creatures cif the State, instead of States being (as they had been seen in some instances) the 'creatures of the armies —(Hear, hear, hear.) —A. re duction of the military force of England could take . place sooner than a disarm reduction could be et. -. ted in other countries; but if we were to be preeee tate in putting this measure in operation, while ell the rest of the world were in arms, we should do that which would be likely to perpetuate that system which we wished to see changed, and which. if a dite Iferent course were pursued on our • part, we might reasonably hope would not long be upheld—(Near!) He concluded .by moving an Address teethe Prince Regent—To return' their sincere acknowledgments and thanks to his Royal Highness, for the important and satisfactory communication which he had made to them of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, coliclueed with his Majesty the King of France and Nevsrre, dated November 20, 1815, together with the various arrangements by which the blessings of peace had been restared to England. .It set forth, that teey viewed 'with equ3l admired in the unanimity and vigour with which the Allies had promptly %incest-- vetted their forces against the common enemy, in the late campaign, te which, under GOD, they attributed the early and successful termination of the war. It ' proceeded to set forth their joy and satisfaction at the prospects thus opened to the couktry, and ceu grattilated his Royal Highness on the herinciey and unanimity which comanued to subsist among the Allies, under the protection of which they trured Europe might confident' • look for consolation for their exertions in war e iu the enjoyment et Pace, and for advantages commensurate with their learner sacrifices ; and, finally, .it assured his Royal Hieli ness, that 'het_ House would most cordielly latioue to maintain the Peace thus happily concluded, ate' to cement and sustain the alliance by which it bad been gloriously accomplished. • Lord mILToN, in delivering his opinion upon the subject before the Heuse, was ready to admit dial in many of the sentiments and in many of the maxims expressed by the Noble Lord in his speech this night, he undoubtedly concurred. That Noble Lord had, however, travelled into a good deal of extraneot.s matter, which was not, upon the present queoion, Ab solutely necessary for the consideration of the Heine. '['bough it had been attempted to shew that it was a question merely upon the simple Treaty last cunt lu ded between this country and France, and that it did not involve a consideration of the Congress at Vienne, he did not see how that Treaty and the Congress could be separated. With respect to any egreemeets entered into with France, their value cauld be 'appre ciated according Cu other stipulations made for the be. nefit of Europe. The H•else, was, therefore, celled upon to Miro its judgment of the cenduct purseed by the Noble Lord, nut only in the mety he had allud d to, but of teet coodect which preceded this event es. The machinery which had been used upon this urea eion was nor that upon which the Hettae cueld ex actly decide, as they could 44 see it" only as i w .se 44 through a glass dark'y." During a code der Coe ; portion of the Noble Lord's. speech he lied dee t much upon the unanimity of the Allies—he had tale cored forth the illustri: - •us deeds of Oen- azelees, bad she,wn . the great coincidence whi:.h hid . el;sie.l between the diff.irent Powers of Eurepe, whets they directed their efforts to one object, toe peace Ind se curity of Europe. In all the t :conliums bestowed upon that great General, by whom they weir ev n tu illy led to victoty, lie (Lord hltiton) most h, r. tily occurred. thought te•dr:h:i.,s the N ale Lerd had made his case too g:;od. He had Jae ibed the :once against France at 1,110,000 men, besides those weieli wen: in reserve, am minting in the u,, 0 1e to 1,500,000 men in arms. Then, v.•:: it had here the result of all this mielay force, :me .hose peat exertions, so honourable to the nations of Europe and the Councils by 'Whom they were brought into action I Though he concurred most fully, perhaps 110 111.10 more fully, with those observations made upon tee. military deseotism cif France : but these were the 04- , jects of former statesmen, upon whom the Ne;:le Lord appeared to look down with an air of superie• racy. The Noble Lord seemed anxious to perauade the House that the only object to be attained was, that of putting an end to the military system of France. He would nut deny that the military character which France bad assumed, was one object to which the united,exertions of Europe were applied, but he was also extremely doubtful it the means employed had been adequate to the purpose. He would leave it to the consideration of that, how far the means used werelikely to occupy the reflection and the feelings of the French nation. What must be-their feelings when they saw die military force - of England and Russia in possession of the line of their for tresses ? When they saw the British and Russian flag flying upon those fortresses, where the ploughman could not go with his ploughshare to the field without witnessing those armies which were arrayed against his count') ? Did the Noble Lord imagine the contributions to be paid by France would create no regret in the n Rion ? Did the Noble Lord trial[ that the tearing down of the territor,- of France was the only injury that ci,unii y could forgive? Even the taking away the mon n merits of the arts could produce,nosatiseaction ; neithercoold the contributions paid to the English and Russiens on the frontiers of the Netherlands. The Noble Lind (Milton) proceeded to notice the policy of cutiiieg down France, and the neglect of it towards Saxony and Genoa ; he remarked also the- prudence of pro. tecting the Netherlands, Midi had always been At tended to by Statesmen of former times, arid see. ciaUy provided for in the Barrier Treaty of 17 i 5. The Noble Lord had said, that all Military men in France stated the possession of more fortresees not to be necessary; but he (Lord Milton) had rattier t the attempts of France in all former times as vuide, than the opinion of the Noble Lord's military men with whom be had been so long cognettinp, the Continent. The restoration of the Bout bout of itself was not sufficient for .the stfety of Europe. After all which had been attributed to legititeeite Government, and after the late mark of dtstine• don paid to Cardinal York (hear, hear, hear), still legitimate Government was in lard`; and moue?) be ever declared that of Bonaparte not legitimate, yet he did not therefore admit universally that leeiti mate Government was to be derived from no chentiel but that of the loins of a family. The Noble Lord had said.he would never be satisfied till he s.tw Eu rope sit down in a more civil state. He was glad to hear him say so, but 150,000 armed in. n on the troll den of France, ready to act according c the discie tion of the Duke of Wellington, if he should consider there was a. revolution in that country, was not inter to produce such a state among nations. With every admiration of that General, he did not perceive the •