The Press. — London, England, 1855-04-14 00:00:00

354 measures and capacities of her Majesty's last or present Coalition? (Great laughter.) Sir G. C. L.: " My predecessor, to whose talent it is quite unneces sary for me to offer my humble testimony of admiration—(cheers and laughter)—said---" The Hon. Member then read some passages from Mr. Gladstone's speech. He next proceeded to describe the disastrous results of that Gentleman's financial arrangements, to apprise the Committee of the unsatisfactory condition of our resources, and to dilate upon the stagnation of trade, and the terrible drain of the war. He went through the items of the national account, pointed out the decrease in exports and imports, and the large deficiency in the revenue. Having sufficiently exposed Mr. Gladstone, he opened his own plans, into which it is not necessary that this report should go. They were received with occasional cheering; but towards the end of the speech, which was delivered with precision, many of the party had gone to sleep, while the more capable or less frivolous members listened in silence. The speech occupied about three hours, and con cluded with an appropriate quotation from " Cicero." (Cheers, which woke up the slumberers.) Mr. WiLsos (as the Agricultural Member): T have nothing to say, sir, to the Right Hon. Gentleman's Latin, which I do not under stand — Lord PALMERSTON : My dear Wilson, do you know that country gentlemen are educated in these days ? Mr. WILSON : But I tell you I myself don't understand it. What's eastoribus hicis!—light beaver hats? (Great laughter.) Well, sir, I don't understand his Latin. But I do understand Cocker, and with the permission of the Committee I must call attention to certain arithmetical details, in which, unless I am deceived, the Right Hon. Gentleman has led us all wrong. He states—(reads notes) —that in 1853 the excise duty amounted to eleven millions two hundred and ninety. seven thousand three hundred pounds ; and this he adds to the seven millions two hundred and fifty-three thousand nine hundred and eleven pounds of 1852—n0, I mean to the five millions four hundred SATURDAY, and sixty-eight thousand three hundred an d eleven stop—yes. He takes eleven millions two hundred and ninety-seven thousand three hundred pounds, &c. &c. &c. This lasted for about an hour. Lord PALMERSTON Not bad, but out of character. Nobody does that sort of patter except Charles Mathews and James Wilson. So you must take no notice, Lewis. Sir A. Cocxnunu (for the Opposition) : The speech of the Right Hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer is one to which we have all listened with interest. It involves too many questions to be hastily discussed, and therefore, Sir, I move that you do leave the chair, and that wo do adjourn back to Lord Palmerston's claret. Lord GRANVILLE: Let's see. I'm Bright. Yes. " Sir, the bloody and unnecessary war into which we have been thrown shall never bo supported by me with a single shilling. Build more mills, make your manufactures cheaper and better, facilitate exports, and you will have peace directly, because Russia knows her own interest, and desires to buy in the best market. I shall not vote on the Budget, and I solemnly declare my belief that everybody who votes for it will go to the devil." (Laughter). Mr. KEOGH (as a Brigadier): " Sir, the Budget is what might have been expected from an English Minister; that is to say, a mixture of contumely and oppression as regards my country. Reluctantly he yielded to any extortion. (Laughter.) Ay, jeer at Irish wrongs—your Queen owes her throne to Irish bayonets—l say he reluctantly yielded the admission which I extorted from him, that Ireland had shared in the glories of your war. But how eagerly he leaped upon the wretched Erin, how savagely he sprang upon her scanty purse (emptied by centuries of your cruelty and tyranny) when he needed her miserable earnings to make up his sheet of figures." The Honourable Attorney- General for Ireland, who is a good humorist, entertained the Committee with a series of capital imitations of Hibernian orators, and ended by seconding the motion of the Attorney-General for England, which was carried unanmiously, and the rehearsal terminated. THE PRESS. TERMS OF ebe PrESZ: Per Annum .. Half• Yearly .. Quarterly .. .. Al 6 0 .. 0 13 0 .. 0 6 6 Payable in advance. Subscribers are requested to send their Orders through thei- News Agent; if direct to the Office, accompanied by a Remit ance. Money Orders to be made payable to btr. Atsssn Ivs, 110, Strand. London. - nt it)rtgg+ LONDON, SATURDAY, APRIL 14, 1855. POSTSCRIPT. THE CRIMEAN EXPEDITION. THE official vindication of the late campaign, written under the promptings, if not by the hand, of the Emperor Napoleon, appeared at great length in the Paris Moniteur on Wednesday last. The following extracts comprise the passages of chief interest in this elaborateland carefully prepared pike justificatif . The writer begins by briefly recapitulating the cir cumstances under which the Western Powers deter mined to send an armed force to resist the aggressions of Russia upon the Ottoman territory, and then proceeds to recapitulate the "instructions" given to Marshal St. Arnaud when he was first entrusted with the chief command of the expeditionary army, and which were dated, it appears, on April 12, 1854 : In placing you, marshal, at the head of a French army, about to fight at more than six hundred leagues from its native land, my it recommendation is to bestow the greatest care on the health of the troops, to spare them as much as possible, and not to come to an engagement un less you have made sure of twothirds at least of the fa vorable chances. The peninsula of Gallipoli has been selected as the chief place of debarcation, because it is intended to be, as a strategical point, the basis of our operations—that is to say, the place dal -Ines, where we can place our depots, am bulances, and provisions, and whence we can easily ad vance or re-embark. That will not prevent you on your arrival from stationing, if ytni deem it advisable, one or two divisions in the barracks either to the west of Con stantinople or else at Scutari. So long as you are not in the presence of the enemy the dislocation of your forces will be of small moment, and the presence of your troops at Constantinople may produce a good moral effect ; but if, by chance, after advancing on the Balkans, you should be constrained to beat a retreat, it would he far more advantageous to regain the coast of Gallipoli than that of Constantinople, for the Russians would never venture from Adrianople to Constantinople, leaving as they would on their right a choice army of 60,000 men. If, nevertheless, there should be a wish to fortify the line of Karassu in front of Constantinople. it should only be done with the intention of allowing it to hi defended by the Turks alone, since, I repeat it, our posi tion will be more independent, more formidable, by being on the flanks of the Russian army, than by being blocked up in the peninsula of Thrace. - This first point established, and the Anglo• French army once united on the shores of the Sea of Marmora, you will have to come to an understanding with Omer Pacha and Lord Raglan respecting the adoption of one of the three following plans :-1. Either to march and meet the Rus sians on the Balkans. 2. Or to sieze the Crimea. 3. Or to land, say at Odessa, or at any other spot on the Russian coast of the Black Sea. In the first case, Yarns seems to me the important point for occupation. The infantry might go to it by sea, and the cavalry more easily perhaps by land. In no case ought the army ever to remove too far from the Black Sea, in order that it may have its communications constantly open with the fleet. In the second case, the one concerning the occupation of the Crimea, it is necessary above all things to be sure of the landing•place, in order that the disembarkation may be effected at a distance from the enemy, and that this place may be capable of being fortified quickly, so that it may serve as a support in case of a retreat. The capture of Sebastopol ought not to be attempted, unless you are provided with at least half a battering train and a great many sacks of earth. When you approach that place, do not neglect to seize Balaklava, a small port situate four leagues to the south of Sebastopol, and by means of which communication may be easily kept up with the fleet during the continuance of the siege. In the third case, that in which an enterprise should be resolved on in concert with the admirals against Odessa. • • • • • • • In every case my principal advice is, never to divide your army, but always to march with all your troops united ; for a compact mass of 40,000 men is always an imposing force ; broken, it is worth nothing. If, however, you are bliged to divide your army, make arrangements for reuniting it on some spot in twenty-four hours. If on the march it forms several columns, fix upon a point of reunion sufficiently distant from the enemy to prevent any column being attacked singly. If you repulse the Russians, proceed no farther than the Danube, unless the Austrians join in the movement. As a general rule, every movement ought to be concerted with the Commander-in-Chief of the English army. It is only on certain exceptional occasions, as when the safety of the army is concerned, that you should act on your own sole decision. Marshal, f have full confidence in you ; I am convinced that you will remain faithful to these instructions, and that you will bring fresh glory to our Eagles. After referring to the glorious battle of Alma, and assigning the flank march to Balaklava to an "in stinct and self-preservation which never deceives," the writer embarks into a technical description of the enormous difficulties which attended the siege of Sebastopol under the circumstances and by the forces employed on that perilous service. Compa rison was also drawn with some other memorable sieges recorded in history. The article concludes with a panegyric upon the leaders and the troops : We might multiply examples, but the foregoing will suffice to show that the Anglo-French army in the Crimea has performed there all that was to be expected from its courage and the ability of its chiefs. It has not only ex hibited constancy and firmness in the midst of sufferings and perils—by adding the glory of Inkermann to that of Alma it has raised still higher the honour of our arms. We ought to hope that the end of its noble efforts will be attained; but unanimous opinion already acknowledges, and history will one day repeat, that it has merited the ad miration and the gratitude of the world. In a future paper the writer promises to treat "with the same precision and impartiality " concern ing the negotiations, their various phases, their rea sons, and their aims. The successive movement of the allied armies are then detailed and justified. After the retreat of the Russians from Silistria the invasion of the Crimea was undertaken as the preferable alternative to doing nothing. The motives and prospects of that enter prise were these : An expedition against Sebastopol might probably hasten the catastrophe of the war. Such an expedition had a determinate end. It might possibly put into the hands of the allies a province and a fortress, which could be used as a guarantee and a means of exchange in the event of negotiation for peace. In the practical execution of the undertaking the Commander-in-Chief, however, " unfortunately" de parted from the instructions, or rather advice, he had received. As thus : The expedition having been made the subject of deli beration at Paris and London, Marshal St. Arnaud re ceived—not instructions which could not be transmitted through such long distances of space, but hints or advice of the following nature : He will make himself thoroughly acquainted with the nature and amount of the Russian forces in the Crimea ; find out whether those forces are too formidable ; and land in a spot which may serve as a basis for future operations. The best place seems to be Theodosia, called Kaffa now. This spot, however, is o bjectionable, as being forty leagues from Sebastopol : but it offers great advan tages. In the first place, the bay is large and safe. The ships of the squadron are there in perfect safety, and the same remark applies to the barques which bring supplies to the army. In the next place, our army, once established on the spot, may use it as a proper base of operations. If we occupy the extreme east of the Crimea, we can repel all the reinforcements coming by the way of the Sea of Azoff and the Caucasus. We make our way onward towards the centre of the country. at the same time that we have its resources at our command We take possession of Simferopol, the strategical centre of the peninsula, and have the road open to Sebastopol, on which probably there will be a great battle. In the event of this being against us, we may retreat upon Kars, and nothing is compromised. If it is in our favour. we eau besiege Sebastopol, and by investing it completely we shall compel it to surrender in a tolerably short interval. Unluckily this advice was not taken. Whether the generals in-chief had not sufficient troops to undertake this long journey in the Crimea, or whe ther they expected a speedier result from a bold and unexpected coup de main, they resolved, as it is now well known, to land at some few leagues distant from Sebastopol. Advices from Madrid of the Vith inst. affirm that some disturbances had broken out in that city, but which were soon suppressed by the military autho rities. Fifteen of the ringleaders were arrested. The differences between the Spanish Minister of the Interior and Lord Howden, the English Ambassador, respecting the molestation by the Roman Catholic authorities of a Protestant clergyman at Seville in the private discharge of his duties, have not been adjusted.