The Press. — London, England, 1855-02-03 00:00:00

THE TURKISH FLEET. Ir was not Without reason that the Turks of Constantinople beheld with dismay the arrival of the noble regiments of France and England in their capital, and that, regarding their numbers, equipments, and martial bearing, . . they exclaimed, with a presentiment of coming calamity, "Who shall deliver us from our " deliverers?" Since the allies have taken an active part in the war the forces of Turkey have wofully sunk in reputation. It should have been the policy of the allied commanders to have encouraged by every means the spirit of the Turkish army and marine. Their troops and ships, if not incorporated with the allied forces, should have been treated on equal terms, should have been placed in honourable positions, and, when efficiently supported, should have been encouraged to act against the enemy. Unhappily, I directly opposite policy has been pursued : the poor Turks have been treated by their allies merely as "hewers of wood and " drawers of Water," or, worse, as beasts of burthen. It is impossible to read without indignation of the unworthy treatment to which they have been subjected at Balaklava and in the carol). It is not by such a course that the Turkish empire is to be saved, or the spirit of its native defenders animated. The direct result must be to depress the Government and the people, and to deprive both of self-respect and energy. In the treatment of the Turkish fleet the impolley of our commanders has been even more conspicuous than in the treatment of the land forces. We pledge ourselves to the liter9l accuracy of the facts stated in the fol lowing narrative ; and we conceive they este)) , lish so strong a case against Admiral Di UNDAB as to call for a parliamentary inquiry into his conduct. To whatever cause it may be attri buted, he has done his best to degrade the Turkish navy: When the French and English fleets first appeared in Turkish waters, in the autumn of 1853, they were received by the Captain Pacha with every niark of distinction and honour. They were given the best anchorage at Beycos, with the finest watering-place in the Bospho rus ; they had the unrestricted use of the Imperial dockyard, and their convenience was in every possible Way consulted in the estab lishment of hospitals, slaughter-houses, and other necessary buildings on shore. On the Turkish fleet lying at Buyukdere devolved the duty of guarding the entrance of the Bospho rus at night with steamers and boats ; and this fatiguing service, continued through the winter, seriously impaired the health of the men. While every honour was thus shown to their gallant allies, what was the return made to the Turkish fleet when the moment of action arrived, and hostilities were about to commence against the common enemy ? In dealing with this part of the case, it must be remembered that the Turks were the principals in the quar rel with Russia, and had therefore the right to demand to have accorded to them the post of danger and of honour in the coming struggle. That every attempt was made to secure for them that post by the Gallant Officer who directed their operations, is well known to all who were in the waters of the Black Sea on that occasion ; but it was all in vain, and Admiral Dux DAs, acting, we take it for granted, under orders from home (for we will not sup pose him to have been actuated by any paltry professional jealousy of the possible successes of the Turkish fleet or its commander), con signed the whole Turkish navy to the deep humiliation of almost total inaction during the whole of the naval operations in the Black • Sea, and thus lost to the cause the inestimable .advantage of resuscitating those feelings of sympathy and dependence which formerly bound the Circassians and Crim Tartars to the Ottoman empire. Few of our readers require to be reminded of what vital import ance it is to the success of an invasion to have the sympa t hy and co-operation of the in fluential inha bit an t s of the country about to be THE PRESS. nvaded ; and all must be aware that the once splendid, and now, alas ! squalid and perishing hosts of England and of France are encamped isolated on the bleak hills of the Crimea. Where are the gallant bands under the prophet warrior SOHAMYL? where are the Tartar warriors, groaning, as we were told, under Russian des potism,—rising in insurrection to assist us ? The following statement will show but too faithfully to what to attribute the isolated position of our armies in the Crimea, without friend or ally to make a diversion in their favour. When the allied fleets were preparing to leave the Bosphorus in March last, the authorities of the Turkish squadron re quested the allied Admirals that they might be allowed to co-operate with them in the Euxine. This request one would have thought would have been cheerfully acceded to, but it was curtly refused ; and, to render co-operation impossible, the mutual recognition signals, %reed upon be tween the French and English Admirals, were purposely withheld from the Turkish Admiral, although at a subsequent period the necessity of rescinding such a degrading and disgraceful resolution became inevitable. Imagining that the refusal might proceed from the risk of collision, if the Euxine was navigated by a very numerous fleet, a plan was drawn up and submitted to the Admirals for a series of operations in the lack Sea, to exercise the crews, attack the Russian forts on the Cir cassian coast, and assist the Circassians by opening a communication with them, and sup plying them with arms and ammunition. This plan was altogether discountenanced by the allied commanders. 'they proposed that a steam squadron of their own should tisit the Circassian coast, and that meanwhile the Turkish fleet should remain inactive. On the sth of May Sir EDMUND LYONS left the allied fleets with a steam squadron for the coast of Circassia, and on the fol lowing day the Turco-Egyptian fleet, which had been fitted and supplied expressly with a view to the Circassian expedition, left the Bosphorus with instructions to join the allied Admirals in the first instance. This squadron consisted of one three-decker, seven two deckers, two heavy frigates, four steam frigates, with some steam-corvettes, corvettes, and brigs, in all twenty-one sail, with stores and munitions of war of all kinds, and Circas sians of high and low degree for the coast of Circassia. On arriving in the latitude of Varna, and communicating with the town, a letter was received from Admiral bminAs stating it as the opinion of Admiral HAMELIN and himself that the squadron should not proceed to Circassia, but should cruise off the coasts of Bulgaria and Rou►nelia until the return of Admiral LYONS. and the arrival of the allied squadrons at Varna, expected about the 20th of May. The commander of the Turkish Squadron sent a superior officer to the allied Admirals to remonstrate against the course indicated. He was furnished with a memorandum setting forth the weakness of the Turkish army in Asia, and the expediency of supporting the Circas sian tribes in an attack on the Russian flank or rear. For this purpose the fleet contained a complete battery of field-pieces, with artillery officers, large stores of ammunition, 400 cases of muskets, 2,000 pistols, tents, axes, cutlasses, soup-kettles, and all other requisites for opera tions in the field. With these supplies, aided by 4,000 regular troops, and some Euro pean officers, it was supposed that the Circas sians would be able to act offensively against the enemy. But the only effect of the representa tions made to Admiral DIINDAS vas to excite his anger that his previous instructions should be disputed, and he again wrote to Vice Admiral ACHMEt DACHA directing that the Turkish commander should conform to his previous order. The fleet accordingly remained inactive, and when on the 20th of May the allied squadrons sailed past it on their way to Baltschick, the honours paid them by the Turkish Admiral received not the slightest acknowledgment. The slight was acutely felt, as the Turks are peculiarly susceptible in all matters relating to the interchange of eourteey. SATURDAY, On the 24th of May the French steamer Mogculor arrived with news of the squadron of Sir E. LYONS. He had opened communica tions with the Circassian coast and landed some Turkish soldiers at Redoubt Kale to act against Anapa, then being evacuated by the Russians. The allied Admirals thought this proceeding should be vigorously followed up, and sending forthwith for ACHMET PACK*, they ordered him to tranship the Circassians and munitions of war in the Turkish fleet to the Banspareil, British steamer, and to two Turkish steamers, and despatch them to the Circassian coast that evening. The Pacha re monstrated against this haste ; with more time the steamers of the fleet might take the line•of-battle ships in tow ; he showed that it was impossible to remove the muni tions stowed in fourteen ships as quickly as de sired, and petitioned for twenty-four hours delay. He was not listened to. The transhipment was effected in three hours' time, between eight and eleven at night, with unavoidable con fusion and personal distress to the Circas sians, and with much damage to the stores. Half the ammunition had to be left behind, and as it was the Turkish steamers were greatly overcrowded, and the powder in danger of being ignited by the careless habits of the Turks. In this way the expedition fitted out with so much care dwindled down into a mere consignment of goods. When the steamers reached the Circassian coast the officers who landed at Soukhoum Kale found no plan of action prepared for them, and remained only to smoke their pipes, while the field-pieces, ammunition, arms, &c., were hastily piled up on the coast, and would probably have to be destroyed to save them from falling into the enemy's hands. The Turkish commanders still hoped that their fleet would be allowed to sail for the Circassian coast, but ou the return of the steamers this hope was finally dis pelled. The Turkish squadron was ordered to remain at Varna, and to this day has accom plished nothing, though, had the expedition been employed as originally intended, it might have kuaterially damaged the position of the Russians in Asia Minor. That the Tartars are rife for revolt against their oppres sore, the Russians, may be inferred from the strange scene which was witnessed at Sebas topol in the autumn of 1850, when two Turkish ships-of-war were despatched to that port, under the advice of the distinguished British officer who has succeeded Sir BALDWIN WALKER as adviser to the Porte in her naval affairs. On that occasion many thousand Tartars from various parts of the Crimea flocked down to the shore and visited the ships, and some of the aged among them scarcely refrained from tears on finding them selves once again upon a Turkish deck. What Russia has not had the audacity to ask for, Admiral DUN DAs has had the simplicity to insist upon, viz., the exclusion of the Turkish fleet from that sea where alone it could give umbrage to Russia. This bare statement of facts is sufficient to show the little consideration with which the allied Admirals, and Admiral DuNDAS in particular, treated the Turkish fleet. Pro perly encouraged and supported, this et pedition might have gone far to restore the prestige of the Turkish navy in the Euxinc, by showing its flag flying in triumph on coasts from which it had long been practically ex pelled. The crews would have gained confi dence and experience—a material point, as the catastrophe of Sinope must be attri buted to the reluctance of the comman der to put to sea in bad weather; and, with the troops, supplies, and Circassians on board the fleet, the forts of Soukhoum Kale and Redoubt Kale might have been occupied, and a basis secured for further ope rations. It was most unlikely that the Russian fleet would have ventured out of Sebastopol; but even had it done so no damage which the Turkish squadron could have sustained by en gaging with the enemy could possibly have in jured it so greatly as the disorganisation caused by Admiral DUNDAS'S orders. From his conduct it would really seem that he had from the first formed a deliberate design of keeping the Turkish navy inactive, and of dts grading it by every means in his power. _. -.~.. -