The Press. — London, England, 1857-05-02 00:00:00

436 The King of France, with forty thousand men, Marched up the hill, and then marched down again. They did not care about learning, the history of the campaign ; they saw the case as it stood, and that it was not satisfactory, but they did not anticipate how Sir Charles Napier would scandalise the public service and blacken him self by publishing to the world confidential letters on her Majesty's affairs, and reveal to the gaze of the world things which should be kept concealed from the enemies of England. Sir Charles Napier made enemies of many of the Ministers in office ; and by his absence of self-respect, and by the unscrupulous use of a correspondence which, in point of fact, be longed to the Sovereign, the gallant admiral (and we cheerfully admit that he has more than an ex officio right to the conventional pre fix) alienated from himself the sympathies of all the right-feeling classes of the country. Opposed to Admiral Napier in politics, and to those who nominated him, it would be open to us to mock at the scandals of a Whig-Radi cal admiral, entertained at the Reform Club and panegyrised in the Liberal newspapers. But we have no taste for doing so. The poli• tical part of the question was discussed else where, and we shall address ourselves to the literary portions of this disagreeable volume. The future historian has not much to learn from its contents, for the reasons we have already stated. The interest has been fore stalled. There are still, however, a few bits which require attention. The voluMe thus commences : On the tith of duly, 1833, Sir Charles Napier addressed a letter to Lord Aberdeen, then at the head of Her Majesty's Government, in which letter he pointed out to his lordship the all but certainty of war with Russia, and at the same time the ill-defended condition of our coasts, in ease of war. He apprised bis lordship that Russia had in the Gulf of Finland twenty-seven sail of the line, besides frigates and smaller vessels, and that she had also a large disposable army at St. Petersburg—with all, or any of which forces, she might, in the event of war, menace the English coast at a moment when we had no available force to oppose to her. The Admiral pointed out to his lord ship that, as our trained fleet was in the Mediterranean, the only available force, to meet any sudden demonstra tion on the part of Russia. was little more than the guard ships, block•ships, and ordinaries, at the varicms naval ports, whilst these were between three and four thousand men short of their complement. He represented to his lordship that the Emperor of Russia was a bold man, who was playing a great game ; that, if he were aware of our want of means of def.mce, he might as easily make a dash at England as we could send the Mediterranean fleet to Constantinople; and that, should he do so, the confusion on our coasts would be extreme. It was thus evident that in the event of sudden war this country was not safe ; that if Russia lost her fleet in a sudden attack on our shores, she would care nothing for the loss; but that if we lost the few ships which could be opposed to her, the nation would ha ruined. This passage reminds us that Sir Charles Napier had for some years been something of au alarmist about the state of our navy, and we cannot forget that the gallant admiral ad mitted the great service of Lord Derby's Ca• binet in demanding a grant of five thousand additional seamen for the fleet. The Reform Club dinner is thus touched upon : A farewell dinner was given to the Admiral by the members of the Reform Club, at which dinner Sir James Graham took great credit to himself for the selection of Sir Charles Napier; and for this selection Sir James really deserved great credit, as it had been made in opposition to strong family interest. One Lord of the Admiralty was already in command of the Black Sea fleet. Another, Admiral Berkeley, who had never commanded a fleet at sea, or, indeed, a lineofbattle ship more than a year or two, afterwards admitted in Parliament that he " had run with Sir Charles an honest race for the command." To the great credit of Sir James Graham he disregarded such influence. and conferred the much-coveted honour on Sir Charles Napier, who never in his life did a more unwise thing than to accept the command of such a fleet, in such a sea, and under such circumstances. His patriotism must certainly have outweighed his interest. Of the " revelations" (which it must be re collected are ex part•) in the volume, the fol lowing is a specimen Though few in point of numbers, never, perhaps, had finer ships left our shores; yet never before had a squadron sailed so deplorably manned. The subsequent testimony of one of the Lords of the Admiralty on this point was, unhappily, as true as significant :—" if you find three hundred able seamen on board each ship I shall be agree- ably surprised." Nor was the following, from the same source, more satisfactory :—" The Emperor of Russia should try his strength with you while he musters double your numbers, and your bands are so miserably raw !" This description of tile squadron by those who maimed it, as frankly recorded as it was true, was by Admiral Berkeley. Thel assertion in thit , paragraph has been THE PRESS. stoutly denied, and we believe that the truth lies between the controversialists. We should like to see the context of Admiral Berkeley's letters. We doubt very much whether the Russian sailors were at all comparable even to the secondary classes of our English " tars." In speaking of things nautical it must be re collected that in England we judge by a high standard. We should be curious to see what a Russian Napier would have said of the Em peror's sailors. The statement goes on:— The fact is, that had it not been for the coastguard men, the squadron could not have got to sea. Though themselves, as a body, inexperienced as regarded the operations of fleets,—many of them much too old to have been selected for service in such a climate,—all ac customed to the comforts of home, and suddenly thrown into a position in which no adequate provision had been made for their comfort,—the conduct and example of these men were beyond all praise, acting most beneficially upon the heterogeneous mass which had been scraped together from the streets of London and elsewhere, and thus supply. ing ready obedience and a will, where otherwise none would have been found. We reply, "their hearts were in;the right place." and we have no doubt that they would have done very well if they had met an enemy. In the fleets commanded by Nelson and Jervis there were many disreputable characters taken from the gaols; and again we ask the question, by what kind of men were the Russian fleet and batteries manned ? These passages, and several others in the volume, are specimens of the fallacy of over-statement. They are con futed by assertions elsewhere. Fur example, it is said boastingly : It should have been enough, that in nineteen days after quitting England, the Admiral had, by his rapid progress, utterly paralysed the movements of Russia, and had not permitted a single ship of war to pass him into the North Sea, whereby the undefended coasts of England—then with scarcely a ship of war in her ports—would have been at the mercy of any that had escaped his vigilance. On the con trary, he had the whole of the enemy's force in front of him, inclosed, as it were, in the net of their own waters, beyond the power of external mischief either by action or political diplom.cy. This fortnight's work alone, whether nationally or diplomatically considered, was worthy of a campaign. And is no credit to be given to the crews and men, " scraped together from London streets," for this " rapid progress " and this " fort " night's work worthy of a campaign "? On the signal given by the admiral, it is stated : Before quitting the transactions of the squadron at Kioge Bay, we mast not lose sight of the signal made by the Admiral, notifying to his ships that war had been de clared against Russia, and the more so as the propriety of this signal was for the first time called in question in the House of Commons in March, 1856, two years after it had been hoisted at Kioge. The signal was as follows: " Lads, war is declared, we have a bold and numerous enemy to meet. Should they offer you battle, you know how to dispose of them. Should they remain in port, we must try and get at them. Success depends on the quick ness and precision of your fire. Sharpen your cutlasses, and the day is your own 1" This signal was purely given by way of putting the fleet in good humour, and that in terms to which sailors love to listen. Yet it had another and more definite object, viz, to give the squadron a goodnatured hint on some very material points, in which, from the inexperience of the men, it was most deficient. In the present condition of the fleet, no more judicious signal could have been made, and this appears to have been the opinion of the Admiralty, which, when it was communicated to them, found no fault with it, as they assuredly would have done had they deemed it inappropriate. But the naval portion of the Board well knew the temper of sailors, and the necessity of putting them in good humour. The tone of that signal was enough to excite vast expectations in the fleet and at home. " Sharpen your cutlasses and the day is your own " could only be interpreted by sailors as meaning that they were to be engaged on " neck or nothing " work. Admirals have not been accustomed to " put fleets in good hu mour " by such a blustering style. More than two-thirds of this volume reads like a compilation from the parliamentary debates. We cannot again argue over the whole case, of which the public is tired, and on which there is nothing new to be said. Of the public personages compromised in this volume, Admiral Berkeley comes worst off. Various passages are printed from his private letters. He wrote to Sir C. Napier:— Your survey of Cronstadt, and your judgment and dis cretion—l don't mean to play upon that word—are highly approved. You have had a difficult part to play, every tom•fool expecting yon to eat Cronstadt and the Emperor to boot. I believe+ the Government are perfectly satisfied with all your proceedings; and I can only say that I think you deserve every credit for the manner in which you have handled your Beet in such waters.—(July SATURDAY, Believe me, I fully enter into all your difficulties and all your feelings, and, let the public say what they will, I shall contend that you have acted wisely and properly in all your proceedings. It is naval men, and naval men alone, who can fancy the pressure on your nerves, and the fatigue of mind and body, in such a navigation. We serve a public who expect impossibilities, and who would hang us if we fail in anything we undertake.—(July 31st.) I am seriously thinking when it trill be time to get you out of that infernal Gulf. How long do you think it trill be right to permit those big ships to remain ? Autumn is getting on fast. lam hard up for steamers. When shall you be able to spare any ?—(August lath.) Admiral Berkeley, certainly, went too far in the House of Commons when ho mocked at the state of Sir C. Napier's " nerves." The italics in these passages are those of the compiler of this volume : John Bull, never content, expects more than is possible. I Mit sl you will not be goaded on, or beaten out of your own determinations. I have every confidence that you will attempt all that is feasible, and that you will succeed in all you do attempt.—(August 22nd.) And again Admiral Berkeley writes : We wish you—if no other operations are to be under- taken this season—to reduce your ships of the line, the French in proportion, to as many as you deem sufficient to lick the Russians when joined together from Helsingfors and Cronstadt —( August 29th.) _ _ John Bull is getting uproarious because nobody is killed and wounded. Meetings are being called to condemn the Government, because Cronstadt and Sebastopol have not been captured.—( September sth.) I suppose we may now as well begin sending for the ships home ; but we wait for the positive assurance that nothing more is to be attempted.—( September sth.) We shall have blue-books and parliamentary questions without end. The attacks foiling against you, will be lerelkd at the Board, or failing against the Board trill be lerelkd at you. The papers yesterday state that the French fleet has wholly deserted you, thus diminishing your force to thirteen ships of the line and three blockships. .S'huuld the Russians pluck up spirit to come ont, the odds, numeri cally, are too great to be pleasant; nevertheless I firmly believe you would give a good account of them. You have not looked well at the gun•vessels—they can fire both guns. Next year, if you have to bombard stone walls, I think you will find them useful.—( September 24th.) The manner of Sir Charles Wood, and his offensively curt mode of dealing with indivi duals, has repeatedly been censured. The following note was well calculated to gall a man like Sir Chailes Napier : Admiralty, July 4th, 18b1. Dear Sir,—l have recommended to her Majesty to pro mote you to the highest class of the Bath, G.C.8., and her Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve of this recommendation.—l have the honour to be, dear sir, yours faithfully, CHatizs Woon. Vice• Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B. That brief note is awkwardly penned. If not meant to offend, it should have been addressed "Deer Admiral Napier," or "Dear Admiral," or " Dear Sir Charles," but the use of the word " Sir" in the circumstances of the case was well calculated to ruffle the admiral. The mixture of the official and the familiar is very clumsy. " I have the honour to be, " yours faithfully" is a mode of concluding a letter not warranted by custom. It contrasts badly with an equally briet' but properly phrased note from the Earl of Aberdeen : Downing-street, February 2nd, 1855. Dear Sir Charles,—As the Queen has accepted my re signation, as well as that of all my colleagues, no further meeting of the Cabinet will take place. T am therefore unable to comply with yonr request to lay your statement before them.—l am, dear Sir Charles, very truly yours, ABERDEEN. Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier. The best penned letter in the volume is the long one from the Prime Minister : 91. Piccadilly, December Ist, NM. • My dear Sir Charles,—l can assure you, with the greatest truth, that the various discussions which have taken place out of Parliament and in Parliament between you and the Board of Admiralty, in regard to the naval opera tions in the Baltic while you commanded in that sea, have been witnessed by me with very great pain. have deeply regretted those discussions both from my personal regard for you, and from the interest which I take in the good of the public service. But I should not be dealing candidly and frankly with you if I were not to say, on this occasion, that if those discussions had been attended with circumstances un pleasant to your personal feelings, you have for this yourself to blame. It was you who first began the con• troversy, by what I must be allowed to characterise as a very unseemly and improper attack, made by you, on a public occasion, on Sir James Graham, then First Lord of the Admiralty. You hare often complained that you have been, without jest foundation, accused of want of discretion. I have always maintained that on all occasions on which you have been professionally employed, in executing instructions on matters connected with the department of the Govern ment which was under my charge, I had full reason to be entisfloct with ,our judgment and discretion, 1 wish II