The Press. — London, England, 1855-01-06 00:00:00

en. The result of the negotiations has been despatched to St. Petersburg, but not to Con stantinople. This conduct of the Conference appears the more strange, as it was through a like neglect that the negotiations at Vienna in the spring of last year proved fruitless at the moment when it was confidently announced that the dispute had been settled. The terms proposed were made known to the Czar, but not to the Sultan. At the last moment it was found that the Government of the Porte insisted on having a voice in what concerned itself so nearly, and the terms of accommodation between Russia and Turkey were blown to the winds through the small oversight of the Conference that there was such a Power as Turkey in existence. For aught that at present appears, the same forms may now be gone through that the same blunder may be re-enacted. But whatever consequence the Conference at Vienna may have—and we have spoken of probable results from conjecture alone—it is singular that we should at the same moment be waiting for intelligence of a desperate battle before Sebastopol, and of the reception given to pacific proposals at St. Petersburg. Our Government has faith neither in negotiations nor in arms alone, and they therefore try both together. The course of Austria is intelligible ; she has not yet drawn the sword. But if the negotiation on our part be not a mockery, if it be really entered on with an expectation that it will end in a pacific treaty, what is to be thought of the needless sacrifice of our sol diers in the meantime? An armistice should be the first preliminary to honest negotiation. But it suits the tortuous nature of the Coali tion to pursue the work of peace and war together, and to be earnest in neither ; nor should we be surprised to find that the assault against Sebastopol is urged on, regardless of the waste of blood, that a victory of our army may enable Lord AssainEEN's Ministry to con clude what would in reality be a hollow truce with Russia, though dignified by ,the name of peace, with a flourish of drums and trum pets. ERRORS OF THE WAR. AT this stage of the war, and at the commence ment of a new year, we presume to offer some criticisms on the Crimean campaign which we believe will be found in acordance with the judgment of the highest military authorities. IV our argument be sound, it will he seen that !the mortifying results which have taken !civilians by surprise are merely such as a cool headed and competent strategist might from the very commencement have predicted, and as in fact the majority of scientific officers did predict, when not withheld from the free utterance of their opinions by the fear of creating despondency among their less in formed comrades. The first error committed was that of going to war on a peace establishment—sending out an army unprovided with the means necessary to enable it to take and keep the field. The artillery, engineering, and oommissariat de partments were especially deficient. The troops were despatched on the instant, the materiel followed as it could be got toge ther. Thus a season was lost. The troops remained immovable at Varna, where they were of no more use than if they had stayed behind in England, while it cost infinitely more to feed them, and they were decimated by disease. By the time that sores, siege guns, and other indispensables of a cainpaigu bad reached the East, the period for active opera tions had almost gone by. The army, wearied with months of inactivity, enfeebled by death and suffering, desponding, though not de moralised, almost destitute of cavalry, and scantily supplied with the means of moving, was sent forth, late in autumn, to capture of the strongest fortresses in the world, lumerous garrison, inexhaus accessible reinforcements, and an Sebastopol is peculiar. It a harbour which serves the respect of defensive faoili- one of the strong( defended by a nu tible stores, access inclement climate. The position of is cut in two by a "4 AMMO purpose, in 44 - 4 1111111111111.11111Ift, THE PRESS. ties, as an unfordable river. It is a maxim in war that a fortified town so divided is stronger than any other, inasmuch as the investing forces on the two Sides cannot give or receive mutual assistnnae. To invest such a place completely requires double the strength whiob 'Would be otherwise necessary. And even the ordinary military rules require that the be sieging army should he at least three times as hometotil as the garrison, and should, in addition, bd supported by a separate covering force, to prevent relief, and protect the opera tions. A complete investment of Sebastopol was therefore seen by the allied generals to be l i impracticable. The place, naturally strong, was capable of receiving great additional defences ; enormous stores were known to have been deposited in its magazines and arsenals ; the guns and gunners of the fleet which it protected were likewise available for the defence. Under such circumstances, considering also the time of year and weak ness of the allied force, the undertaking of the siege was on several accounts a mistake. On the lauding of the expedition, the diffi cnities of our position were perceived. It had been intended to attack from the north side, and in pursuance of that plan the battle of Alma was fought a brilliant exploit, but barren of result, and by which the army was numerically enfeebled. The northern attack offered many advantages ; it cut off the enemy's communication with Perekop : it thereby isolated the fortress, and as that side of the harbour commands the other, its capture would probably be decisive. When, from proved want of force to attack both faces at once, and from the impossibility of finding, except on the southern coast, a proper place for the debarkation of heavy artillery and stores, the flank march towards Balaklava was decided upon, a third error was committed ; not however imputable to the allied generals as a fault, but resulting from their absolute inability with the numbers at their command to comply with the requirements of the mili tary art. Let us now examine the resources of the besiegers, and the present prospects of the siege. The fleet may be put out of question as a part of the attacking force. As a diversion, in the event of a land attack, it may do good service; it keeps the Russian ships from coming out, and it supplies men to work the guns en shore; beyond this it can accomplish nothing. If vessels are to succeed against stone walls, it can be only by coming to very close quarters, which at Sebastopol is im possible, from want of deep water in shore. The sunken Russian ships, and the configura tion of the coast, prevent the batteries from being turned, enfiladed, or attacked in rear. The garrison is able at any moment to com municate with the army of observation with out the walls. Reinforcements can pass from the one to the other. It is in the power of the Russian generals, with but little delay, to concentrate nearly their whole strength either for attack on the allied camp or for the defence of the town against an assault. It is probable that each of these two armies separately is at least equal in numerical strength to the Anglo-French forces—ex ,Auding the Turks from the calculation. The road to Perekop is unimpeded, except by weather. Severe cold, accompanied with snow, while it increases the sufferings of our troops, will facilitate the arrival of Russian rein forcements. Thht these will not be wanting may be conjectureu from the fact that Odessa, a place of infinitely small importance in com parison, is now defended by little less than 50,000 mer. On the other hand, the besieging army is spread over an extent of twelve miles ; for two mouths the trenches have been opened ; the ground is rocky and unfavourable ; and it is not yet known whether, from the nature of the soil, approaches can be carried up to the walls. If not, the assaulting force is unprotected, ex posed to a converging fire, and, even in the event of success, must incur the most frightful loss In any case, the carrying of the south side of Sebastopol neither causes the place to fall nor the garrison to capitulate. After re sisting to the utmost, Prince MENSCHTEOFF may SATURDAY, cross the harbour and hold the northern for tresses against a second siege. If he does so, it is supposed that the artillery of these fortresses, occupying a comtnandieg position, can render the southern, or captured part of the town, untenable. Or, he may destroy the whole, Ihin the army already in the field, and, with e aid of as many more troops as can be brought up from Perekop, hold his own against a force whidh, under auy circumstances, must have suffered enormously in so long a siege. The opinion of the Russian generals as regards their own position is indicated by the frequency of their sorties. In these sorties they lose, on the lowest average, four or five men to every one of ours. The fact is patent, and it would be absurd to suppose them igno rant of it. Yet they continue this unequal ex change, apparently aware that, from the faci lity with which their losses can be made good, and the difficulty of repairing ours, the ulti mate and real, though not the apparent, advantage remains with them. They thus gain the additional benefit of harassing the allies, and increasing the loss caused by excessive fatigue and consequent disease. As their troops work and fight by relays, they do not suffer similarly. And here we may remark the error into which Ministers seem to have fallen—one not unna tural in civilians planning an expedition, yet which their military advisers should have corrected. They have reasoned as if the supe rior quality of British troops could make up for deficiencies of numbers. Now, this is true in a battle, or wherever actual fighting is the work to be done ; but it does not apply either to a siege or a campaign. One man may beat back three if they are afraid and he is not; but one man, however zealous and stout, will find it impossible to do the labour of three for any length of time. The fallacy, once stated in words, is patent ; yet it seems to have per vaded the whole of the allied counsels. We pass over the painful query of late so much discussed—" How aro the soldiers to be " fed and housed during the winter ?" Our arguments are not based upon, though they may be incidentally confirmed by, the existence of administrative incompetency in camp or Cabinet. We condemn, nut a plan imperfectly carried out, but one originally faulty. Assume that the expenditure of life in the allied Crimean army is no greater than the exigencies of a siege and campaign require. Assume that the said army is kept up to--even raised somewhat above—the numbers of the original expedition at the time of landing. Assume that fresh men, fresh horses, fresh artillery, are sent out in time and in number to make the attacking force what it was meant to be when it left England. More than this neither Government nor the civilian public generally appear to contemplate. Still we maintain, unless the military art be a fable, and the lessons of experience simply delusive, the attack on Sebastopol will fail if not under taken on a scale far more extensive, and con ducted on principles wholly different. Let Eupatoria, instead of Balaklava, be selected as the base of operations , let the north side, not the south, be attacked in the first instance; let the relieving, or observing, army be driven out of the Crimea, or at least to such a dis tance as to render its presence harmless. When this is effected (and to do it will require nearer 200,000 than 100,000 men) Sebastopol may be regularly invested, and will then obey the action of those laws which render the fall of besieged places after a certain time inevita ble. As yet there has been an expedition, there has been fighting, there has been glory and loss of life ; but there has been neither a campaign nor a siege. THE QUEEN'S AUTOGRAPH LETTER. HER MAJESTY'S amiable solicitude respecting " her beloved troops," as gracefully expressed in her letter to Mrs. HERBERT, will gladden many a gallant heart in the Crimea. Civilians respect and admire their Sovereign with con stitutional loyalty; but soldiers have some thing chivalrous in their enthusiasm for their Monarch. It is for the " Queen and country