The Press. — London, England, 1856-07-19 00:00:00

JULY 19, 1856. gentleman who hears me—in which he showed that Greece was iu what is called an " abnormal state," that the Roman Legations were also in an " abnormal " condition, and that the affairs of Naples were not aonormal but " exceptional." (A ►augh). Now, when those papers were placed on the table, many gentlemen, while wondering at the indiscretion c olutilitted by Count Walewski, must have felt that a Minister of experience and high character could never have i 'traduced at a conference for the settlement of terms of peace with Russia questions of this vast importance, without having previously communicated with his col leagues, and felt the pulse of the representatives of the different Courts. That was the conclusion which everybody must have drawn from the protocols of the conferences; but a short time afterwards papers were laid on our table, which completely exhibited the cause of this conduct on the part of the French Minister, and the means by which the attention of the Congress was directed to these ex• traneous and extraordinary subjects. It then appeared that on the 27th of March, ten days before the exposition of Count Waleweki, the plenipotentiaries of Sardinia placed in the hands of Lord Clarendon a memorandum which, if it be anything, is an act of impeachment against Austria and Austrian rule in Italy, which proposes secu larisation, the Code Napoleon and other remedies, and which in spirit was the basis of the observations that Lord Clarendon made on the Bth of April. Therefore it is quite clear that there was an understanding among the plenipo tentiaries in Paris that at their meeting on the Bth of April all these extraneous questions, including that of Italy, were to be brought forward, that the movement came from Piedmont, and that in the memorandum of the '27th of March may be found the motive spring of all that has oc• • irred. Now, to proceed a step further, what are the engage ments, as the nob e lord the member for the City interprets them, what are the representations—which with the laxest interpretation of the words we might call them—of Lord Clarendon? Our Foreign Secretary agrees that the state of Greece is " abnormal ;" he agrees that the condition of the Roman States also is " abnormal;" but, as regards the Neapolitan Government, He is' of opinion that it must doubtless be admitted in prin ciple that no Government has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other States, but lie considers there are cases in which the exception to this rule becomes equally a right and a duty. The Neapolitan Government seems to him to have con ferred this right and to have imposed this duty upon Europe. Now, I ask the house whether that is language that could have been used , or ought to have been used, without having some foregone conclusion as to the policy of which it was to be the indication? ( Hear, hear). Though I may not agree with the noble lord the member for the City that the language of a protocol 01 this character is an engagement which may bind us with the formality of a treaty, still it is impossible to read it without feeling that we have a right to expect from the noble lord at the head of the Govern nn.nt, without revealing the secrets of Cabinets or the mysteries of States, some explanation of the declara tions of the English plenipotentiary more satisfactory than those phrases with which the noble lord has favoured us to-night, and to which I confess I am at a loss to annex any other meaning than that which I had the misfortune, years ago, to attach to the state ments of the noble lord with respect to the affairs of Italy. The noble lord has explained to the house what is the nature of the exceptional character of the Neapo litan Government, and why there should be a departure, in the case of Naples, from that golden rule of non-inter ference to which I trust the house will adhere, or which is will never quit without the most urgent necessity. (" Hear, hear," from Mr. Bowyer.) The noble lord said tie position of Naples was remarkable, because, if the Government were to conduct itself so as to give rise to any revolutionary movement in the country, the armed forces of a great military power Austria were at hand, " and you may depend upon it," added the noble lord, " Austria would occupy Naples, thus producing a state of things that would not only endanger the peace of Europe, but might bring about calamities which it is diffi cult to measure or foresee." But when the noble lord de fends himself from the charge of doing nothing to mitigate the evils which, according to him, render the state of Naples so exceptional, and which require our interference, he intimates that, though England and France may not succeed—have not succeeded—in any way in obtaining that mitigation of Neapolitan rule which he thinks so ne cessary, yet some other influence, not less powerful, and wince will be received in a tar more friendly spirit by the Neapolitan Government, may be brought into requisition with more suc:ess. The house clearly understood the noble lord to mean the mediation of Austria. It was the action of Austria upon Naples that, according to the noble lord, was to induce the Neapolitan Government to cease from its ill doing and to adopt that remedial course which siemed so expedient. But how extremely inconsistent is it to hold Austria up to us as the power which, by its beneficent interference with Naples, is to put an end to the iniquitous rule which you deplore, and at the same time to say that, in the event of any revolutionary movement in Naples, Austria will occupy the kingdom in order to uphold the very misrule to mitigate which Austrian mediation, according ►o your own account, is now the only means to which you can resort? (Hear, hear.) Sir, I cannot have much hope that the influence of Austria will be ot• the nature which the noble• lord supposes, if, as we are assured at the same time by the noble lord, we have reason to anticipate and fear Austrian invasion in order to support the misgovernment which Austrian me• dianyn is to mitigate and remove. (Hear, hear.) But, sir, in what way, viewing this question practically, are we to put en end to the occupation of Italian States by foreign powers ? The noble lord who began the debate confined the whole of his observations to the Austrian occupation of part of the Roman States. The noble lord must have felt the extreme awkwardness of his position, because when ho THE PRESS. assured the house of his confidence that, with the aid of our great ally, Austrian occupation might be terminated in the Roman States, he must have remembered that another part of the same States was occupied by the troops of that very august ally by whose co-operation we were to pat an end to the occupation of the Legations by Austria. ( Hear, hear.) The noble lord touched very lightly —or, rather, did not touch at all—upon the fact that the capital of the Roman States is occupied by French troops —Hear, hear )—though he must be aware that nothing cau be more irrational than to address violent representa tions to Austria in order to terminate the occupation of the Legations by Austrian troops unless, at the same time, our ally is prepared to take steps by which the occupation of the Roman metropolis itself by French troops shall cease. I know that this question has been settled by Count Cavour in a very ingenious manner ; he iusistslupon it, as a first condition, that Austria should quit the Legations, and that the French army should quit Rome, but should remain in the Legations until everything is settled. Now, I ask what is die use of doing what. the noble lord has done to•night—what is the use—to employ his own language—of " rousing the passions " of Italy, unless we have a practical object before us, and unless the opinion of Parliament can support the policy of the Minister? Never is this house justified in entering into discussions upon external policy unless we are prepared to impugn the conduct pursued by the Minister as injurious to the country ; or unless we can, by the expression of our opinion, support the Minister in a policy which will be beneficial to the country and to Europe. So far as the theoretical part of the question goes, so far as sympathy for Italy goes, so far as the poetry of politics is concerned—there being but one feeling in this house-- I want to know, when we turn to the practical question, what the motion of the noble lord will do, or what any thing we can say will do, to support the policy of the Ministry? Why, sir, what is the policy of the Ministry? (Cheers.) It is the very point which throughout this whole discussion has been mysteriously withheld from us. (Hear, hear.) I don't expect the noble lord to tell us the means by which the Cabinet is to fulfil his policy ; but we ought to kncw from the noble lord what are his general opinions on the subject of the occupation of Italy by foreign troops, and whether he is prepared to take steps to put an end to that occupation or not ? Now, sir, there are two modes in which we can deal with this question, and as they are both practical modes, I will, with the permission of the house, and with as much brevity as I can command, slightly advert to them. We can go to war with Austria, no doubt; we can send a fleet to the Bay of Naples or to the Bay of Genoa ; with the con sent of our great ally, we can send a French army to some part of Italy ; and we may embark in a great struggle, the object of which will be entirely to change the phase of Italian life, to subvert its Government, to emancipate— according to our views—its people, and to effect a great revolution, which may, perhaps, be accomplished after one of those long wars like the Punic war, or the thirty years' war, or the French Revolution, or after one of those struggles which always occur when such immense conse quences are aimed at and attained. On that policy I will not presume to give an opinion, because I feel that it is a subject which would require a discussion worthy of its im portance in this house before we embarked on it. I will make only one remark with regard to it, and I say, if that be the policy of the Government of this country, they are bound frankly to announce it. ( Loud cries of " Hear, hear.") They are bound to submit such a policy to the consideration of Parliament, and, if sanctioned and ratified by Parliament, the people of this country will, at least, have the satisfaction of knowing that they have not been drawn into a great struggle, without being aware of it, and their minds will be prepared—as the mind of a nation ought to be prepared—for so great a struggle and so great a stake, by those discussions in the house of their repre sentatives which will direct their attention to the great issue before them. By this means they will be enabled to brace their energies to the occasion, and they will have no grounds for accusing the Queen's Ministers or their own representatives of having embarked in a conflict of such difficulty and duration without fair advice and warn ing. ( Hear, hear.) I think all hon. gentlemen will agree that if that be the policy of the. Ministry—that if they are prepared to go to war to emancipate Italy from Austrian rule, they are at least bound frankly to explain their policy, to appeal to Parliament, and to take the verdict of the country upon its expediency. There is another practical mode by which you may pro ceed to attain your object. I remember that at the end of the session of 1848 it was my fate, as it has been the fate of the noble lord to-night, to bring before the consideration of Parliament the question of interference in Italy. I have in my mind a perfect recollection of the events which took place in 1847 and 1848, and although the noble lord may not condescend to profit by the experience of that adven ture, I confess myself that the consequences were so sad, and have been so opposed in my opinion to the progress of Italy and to the amelioration of the condition of Italian society, that I tremble lest he should embark in a like enterprise again, and lest we should reap from that con duct the same bitter and desolating fruits. This leads me to the second practical means by which you may attempt to emancipate—as it is termed—ltaly. You may have diplomatic communications—you may have what you had in 1847—first friendly advice, and afterwards what are called " admonitions " to the ruling powers ; and I have not the slightest doubt that, without declaring war and without the active cooperation of fleets and armies, you may thus set a great portion of Italy in flames, and may reap consequences which we may all have deeply to deplore. (Hear.) I will try for a moment to trace what would be your diplomatic action under that second system upon Naples. But before Ido that, there is one observa tion which 1 cannot help impressing on the house. . . The state of Naples is declared by Lord Clarendon to be so exceptional as even to justify the violation of the golden 67 , rule of foreign policy, viz., non-intervention. Now, it would be very desirable to have before us, on authority, some description by the Government of what the state of Naples ia. ( Hear, hear.) I will, for the moment, assume that all those tales which have reached us of ruthless and savage imprisonment are perfectly authentic ; but if authentic, in all probability they are in a great degree the consequence of the panic-stricken councils of a small sovereign surrounded by jealousies and difficulties fo mented often and encouraged by foreign powers. I will admit all we hear to be perfectly authentic—the ruthless imprisonments, and the cruel and even sanguinary punishments. Well, I remember a few years ago, when there were alleged against Austria the same horrible stories of the imprisonment of citizens—the flower of the worth of Italy—in distant fortresses. (Hear, hear.) Who has not heard of the names of men in the highest walks of literature and science who have been the inmates of Austrian dungeons? I don't know whet were the parti cular causes which induced those imprisonments. If I enter into that, I enter into the internal administration of the country, and the principle of non-intervention in foreign countries is much endangered ; but I want to know what there is in the state of Naples more exceptional than there is in the case of Austria ; and if the cruel imprison ment of citizens by a sovereign is considered so excep tional a thing as to permit the violation of the cardinal principle of our diplomacy, why do we not violate it in the instance of Austria? ( Hear.) Why when we hear of those dreadful banishments to Siberia with which hon. gentlemen are so familiar do we not consider that an ex ceptional case ; and what other difference is there between Naples, and Austria, and Russia than this—that Naples is a weak power and the others are very powerful ones? I would impress upon the house, therefore, that it should be very cautious upon this head! Now, let us see what will be the action of the second practical course in the case of Naples if we pursue it. We determine not to go to open war to emancipate Italy ; but still the condition of Naples is so intolerable as to warrant interference, though not in a military form. Then, sir, we have an admonition—England and France publish an admonitory note to the King of Naples, and, perhaps, an English fleet rides in the Bay of Naples. Everybody knows what the consequence of that would be. The instant that the discontented portion of the population of that kingdom find that Naples has lost the good offices of the great Western powers, that process takes place which the noble lord has referred to—bands of the Italian population are roused. They will reason thus. They know well, when their own sovereign is lectured by England and France and an English fleet is in the offing, that if they rise, and rise successfully against their sovereign, Austria dare not interfere. I deny the proposition of the noble lord, that an insurrection in Naples is a necessary prelude to an Austrian occupation. If England and France arouse the passions of the Italian population by proclamations and by lecturing the King of Naples, and if an English fleet is in the bay, Austria will not occupy Naples. The noble lord who introduced this question seems to think that there is no eontest going on in Italy but between worn-out dynasties, and some intelligent and well-educated persons of the superior classes, who desire his great specific for all its evils—constitutional government. I do not think this is a true view of Italy. (Hear, hear.) There is in Italy a power which we seldom mention in this house, but without considering and understanding which we shall never rightly comprehend the position of Italy—l mean the secret societies. (Hear, hear.) The secret societies do not care for constitutional government. (Hear, hear.) They do not want existing society ameliorated, they want it changed ; and the objects of that change can neither be obtained nor secured by those enlightened institutions to which the noble lord refers. We know something more of these societies than we did. Since INS we have had means of obtaining a knowledge of their numbers, organi sation, principles, and objects, and without some consider ation of these it would be absolutely impossible for us to form a conception of what would be the consequence of our interference in the affairs of Italy. It is useless to deny, because it is impossible to conceal, that a great part of Europe—the whole of Italy and France and a great part of Germany, to say nothing of other countries—is covered with a network of these secret societies, just as the superficies of the earth is now heirg covered with railroads. And what are their objects ? They do not attempt to conceal them. They do not want constitutional government; they do not want ameliorated institutions; they do not want provincial councils nor the recording of votes ; they want to change the tenure of land, to drive out the present owners of land, and to put an end to ecclesiastical establishments. Some of them may go farther. Do you think that, with their complete organises tion, when Austria cannot interfere to occupy the kingdom of Naples, when the King is lectured on his throne by the Western powers, and when, as the noble lord says, the feelings of the people are roused, these societies will be quiet? (Hear.) We know what they did before. Their energy end their organisation carried everything before them. I am told that a British Minister has boasted—and a very unwise boast it was—that by holding out his hand he could raise a revolution in Italy to-morrow . I believe it is not impossible, with the means at his disposal, that he might. What would happen ? You would have a republic formed on extreme principles, and there may be many in telligent and well-meaning persons—l do not say in this house—who would say, " And what then ?" Nothing can be worse," they would say, " than the present state of Italy ; let us try a Red Republic, or even a republic of a sti 1 more fiery colour." But the question of Italian politics is not of that simple character. Rome is not far distant from Naples. The passage from Naples to the States of the Church is not difficult. You may have triumvirs again established in Rome ; the Pope may again be forced to flee ; and my hon. friend behind me ( Mr. Spooner) may say, "So much the better "-----(laughter)—and clot a