The Press. — London, England, 1855-02-10 00:00:00

134 MANSION-HOUSE BANQUET. THE Lord Mayor on Tuesday evening gave his cus tomary annual banquet to the aldermen and other civic dignitaries at the Mansion house. The occa sion, however, derived its chief interest from the presence of Admiral Sir C. Napier and Lord Cardigan, who had been invited as guests, and both of whom made speeches after dinner, in which they referred to the momentous operations wherein they had been respectively engaged. The gallant admiral spoke first, and began by contrasting the positions which himself and Lord Cardigan occupied in public opinion. He said : If an officer having returned from a foreign service like my noble friend, after having performed prodigies of valour, and been received in the manner in which he has been this day, must feel proud on this occasion, how must I feel, who have returned from my command having scarcely performed any service at all, and been censured by the Government, and dismissed from my command ? (Cries of " No, no.") I repeat, dismissed from my com mand. I have no doubt it will be expected by the present company that some account should be given of the very small services performed in the Baltic by that magnificent fleet which was sent out from this country. (Hear, hear.) The fleet was magnificent, certainly, to a degree. It was very badly manned, and worse disciplined ; but, however, we managed to take it to the Baltic without pilots, without charts—all the officers being perfectly unacquainted with the Baltic and the difficulties of the navigation ; and we succeeded in getting there in perfect safety. Now, the first object I had in view was to endeavour, if possible, to satisfy the wishes of the people of this country. I was quite aware, when I went there, that one-tenth part of what was expected could never be performed ; but never theless I was determined to do the best I possibly could under the circumstances. When we first went out my view was to give the Russians every chance of putting to sea. I divided my fleet into two squadrons—l left one in the Gulf of Finland, and the other not very far off from the island of Gothland. However, the Russians did not think proper to come out. Our next object was to go to Cronstadt and see what was to be done there. We accord ingly proceeded, with the assistance of a French squad ron, to do all that we possibly could in order to attack the enemy. But we found the thing totally impracti cable. In the first place, there was not depth of water enough for the ships, and in the next place the batteries were of such strength that it was impossible to attempt to attack the place without the certainty almost of destruction to our fleet. I think, therefore, that I acted the prudent part in the course I pursued. The French admiral entirely concurred in my opinion, and we returned to our former anchorage, and thence went to I.3omarsund. 1 had written before to the English Government, proposing to attack Bomarsund. I wanted no other troops to enable me to go there—l had troops enough ; but the French admiral thought it more proper to have some. The French Go vernment sent out ten thousand troops accordingly. I re peat that I did not want them—they would much better have been employed at Sebastopol. I only asked for one or two thousand men to make the thing more sure ; but I could have done the work without them; and I wrote home to that effect. However, they sent us out ten thou sand men. It is needless for me to say how quickly the thing was accomplished. (A laugh.) Bomarsund was taken in no time, with little loss, and a great fortification was destroyed—or rather a series of fortifications which extended a considerable distance over the Baltic. In vindication of what had been represented as his subsequent inactivity during the remainder of the s mson in the Baltic, Admiral Napier added:— I now come to a matter of greater consequence, and I think it my duty to make it known as much as I can do here, because lam not in Parliament. I have been very much censured by the Government. Great clamour has been raised against me, and instead of the Government discountenancing that clamour, they have actually sup ported and encouraged it. The moment it was known in England and France that the French army intended to return home, seeing that it was impossible at that season of the year to perform any further service without risking her Majesty's fleet, the Government became dissatisfied, and they ordered a council of war to be held. I dare say nobody ever heard yet of a council of war fighting. (Laughter.) However, we did not want that to drive us on. But the whole subject was carefully and thoroughly examined by a marshal of France, a French admiral, a general of French engineers, and also by no less than three British admirals; and they all unanimously decided that it was perfectly impossible to proceed further ; and that had we done so we should have encountered the risk of almost certain defeat and loss. The British Admiralty was not satisfied with that, but they listened to the advice of an officer of engineers, and I was ordered to hold another council of war, to ascertain whether French admirals and English officers would abandon their own opinion and adopt that of the Admiralty. The English officers felt insulted at that proposal ; they thought it was not necessary to hold another council of war, and the French admiral very properly refused to join in such a proceeding. He said, " I have already given my opinion, and it is not the opinion of any general of engineers, whether he be English, French, German, of of any other country, that will make me change my opinion of an attack purely naval in its character." The Government at home was not satisfied with that. The French general of engineers sent home another report, still more bare than the first, and it is unnecessary for me to state that we all concurred in condemning that opinion also, and the French army returned to France. I believe, and have no hesitation in saying, that had they gone up the Gulf of Finland again, instead of returning home, our fleet would have been totally lost. Not satisfied however with that, I _~ THE PRESS. went up, determined to have another survey of that forti fication, which is one of the strongest in Europe. That was in the month of September, and that month in the Baltic corresponds in severity with November here and among the Channel Islands. I then sent home a report of the survey I had taken with great care and deliberation, and with the determination to do all that a man could do to satisfy, if possible, the expectations of the people of Eng land. The moment it was first reported (erroneously) that Sebastopol was taken, it was also said " Why does not Admiral Napier go and take Cronstadt and St. Peters burg?" In fact, I was asked, "Why don't you go and take Moscow'?" (Laughter.) Now, I never did expect that the Admiralty would have been so mean and des. picable as to join in that clamour, in order to bring odium on a naval officer who had done all in his power to bring honour and credit to his country. (Hear, hear.) What did Ido ? Why, I sent home to the Admiralty a clear and detailed account, stating my opinions and what appliances were necessary in order to take Sweaborg, You will not expect me to state what those opinions were. (Hear, hear.) Suffice it to say that 1 had given two separate opinions, one of which, if followed, I believed, was certain to insure success, and the other, certain to bring destruction on the fleet. The subsequent treatment which he received from the Admiralty Sir C. Napier thus described : What did the Admiralty then do? I mention this in order that there may be no mistake whatever, because if the Government have the least spirit about them they will immediately discharge me, and turn me out of the service. (Laughter.) 1 say that the Admiralty perverted my lan guage. They not only did that, but they sent to me the most goading letters which they possibly could write. They asked me why I did not take Sweaborg, and why I did not do this, that, and the other? They received my letter, giving them an account of how Sweaborg might be taken, on the 4th of October, the very day on which the first intelligence reached England of the capture of Sebastopol. On the Nth of October—five days afterwards—the news arrived that Sebastopol was not taken ; but the Admiralty had not the plain, straightforward dealing, or the honesty, to write to me and apologise. No; but what they did was this—they perverted what I had written, giving them a plan for the taking of Sweaborg. My Lord, I was not going to stand that—jaughter and cheers)—l am not the man to put up with an insult. 1 remonstrated most strongly, but after all my remonstrances they still persisted in saying that I had led them astray. Well, what could I do? I was not going to be driven into all this, particu- larly as Sir J. Graham, during the whole period I was in the Baltic, had written to me admonishing me to beware of stone walls; telling me not to risk her Majesty's fleet against them ; that these stone walls were not to be trusted; and reminding me that when I was first known to be going out to the Baltic I had been accused by certain persons of want of discretion, but assuring me that now, in his opinion, I had proved myself a consummate com mander-in-chief. After that came the most insulting and degrading letters to me ever addressed to an officer; and I mention this particularly in the hope that it will go forth to the world, and that Sir J. Graham will be prevented from ever sitting in the Administration again as First Lord of the Admiralty. I state it to the public, and I wish them to know that had I followed the advice of Sir J. Graham I should most inevitably have left the fleet behind me in the Baltic. I will prove this before all the world; and if Sir J. Graham has ono single spark of honour in him he will never again take his seat at the Admiralty until this matter is cleared up. On the other hand, I will say that 1 have no right ever to be employed again, and I ought, in fact, to be scratched off the Navy List if I am not telling the truth in what I now state. ( Cheers.) lam taking the first opportunity of making this statement publicly, and I am perfectly ready to answer for my conduct before the House of Commons whenever they choose to call upon me to do so. (Cheers.) Lord CARDIGAN afterwards rose to return thanks for " The Army," and entered into an interesting re capitulation of the services on which he had been employed, first ir4 Turkey, and afterwards in the Crimea. He said:— It was my good fortune, when in Turkey, in the first instance, to be sent forward by the commander of the forces towards the enemy's outposts with the light cavalry. It was not well known where the Russians were at the time the siege of Silistria was proceeding. I was, there. fore, ordered to ascertain the position of their army and its outposts. I had to patrol the whole of the country by means of detachments of the troops under my command. Shortly after this, I received from head-quarters a pe. remptory order, which was by no means unsatisfactory to me, that I should immediately proceed with a strong body of cavalry to discover what had become of the Russian army ; for the siege of Silistria had then been raised, and the British Commander•in-Chief was totally ignorant whether the Russians were about to proceed towards Varna to attack our position, or intended to retreat towards their (wn country. You can easily imagine that this eas rather an anxious undertaking, and one that required the exercise of considerable caution on my part. We might have come at any moment upon the Russian army—upon the Russian outposts. We travelled over the country, which I may call a perfectly wild desert for a distance of 300 miles. My orders were to proceed 130 miles as far as Trajan's Wall, on the confines of the Dobrudscha. We did so, and marched 120 miles without ever seeing a human being. There was not a single house in a state of repair, or that was inhabited along all this route, nor was there an animal to be seen except those that exist in the wildest regions. Having ascertained that the Russian army had returned by Itabadagh, and given information to the Commander in-Chief upon that subject, I then proceeded on a very interesting march, patrolling along the banks of the Danube to Rutachuk and Silistria, and returned thence SATURDAY, by that great fortress Schumla, which has been often at tacked, but never taken—it being, in fact, as I believe, perfectly impregnable. After our return from those quarters to Varna, then came the order to proceed to the Crimea ; and here I must say that that expedition was a noble undertaking, and had in view an object worthy of the ambition of two great nations. (Cheers.) On our first landing in the Crimea, I was em ployed within two hours afterwards, with a strong body of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, in endeavouring to cut cff some Russian cavalry, which were supposed to be marching towards Simferopol. I am sorry to say that I did not suc ceed in this task, for I never could find the Russians. (Laughter.) A few days afterwards came that glorious affair, the battle of Alma ; and here 1 must say that, according to my humble judgment, nothing could be so perfect as the pre parations which were made by a great army for that attack. The columns of our infantry, which bad marched in perfect order for the attack, instantly deployed into three lines, and advanced straight down the hill, crossing and fording the river, then ascended the hill on the opposite bank, and, marching straight into forts and batteries which ap peared to be impregnable, they drove out at the point of the bayonet a Russian army of 40,000 men in the short space of two hours and a half. (Cheers.) The arm of the force in which I served had not the honour of being engaged in anything important on that occasion. We sat upon our horses under a heavy fire for a long period, and in that position we witnessed the glorious exploits of our brother soldiers. Shortly after this was fought the battle of Balaklava, and unfortunately our allies, the Turks, abandoned their posi tion in a very short time, without maintaining any contact with the enemy. It was late in the afternoon when I re ceived an order to attack the Russian forces posted in the valley, which consisted of a long line of guns drawn up in the form of batteries. I received that order and I obeyed it. ( Loud Cheers.) I delivered that order myself to the brigade under my command. I ordered them to march. I ordered them to advance. I ordered them to attack the Russians in the valley ; but I must say this, that on that occasion, it being my duty to give the order to my men, I did give it, though I deeply regretted it at the time, and I am sure I should have much more deeply regretted it afterwards if anything had prevented my performing the rest of my duty, which was to share the dangers that those brave men so boldly faced. (Cheers.) We advanced down a gradual descent of more than three quarters of a mile with the batteries vomiting forth upon us shells and shot, round and grape, with one battery on our right flank and another on the left, and all the interme diate ground covered with the Russian riflemen ; so that when we came within fifty yards from the mouths of the artillery which had been hurling destruction upon us, we were, in fact, surrounded and encircled by a blaze of fire, in addition to the lire of the riflemen upon our flanks. As we ascended the hill the oblique fire of the artillery poured upon our rear ; so that we had thus a strong fire upon our front, our flank, and our rear. We entered the battery —we went through the battery—the two leading regiments cutting down a great number of the Russian gunners in their onset. (Cheers.) In the two regiments in which I had the honour to lead every officer, with one exception, was either killed or wounded, or had his horse shot under him, or injured. Those regiments proceeded, followed by the second line, consisting of two more regiments of cavalry, which continued to perform the duty of cutting down the Russian gunners. Then came the third line, formed of another regiment, which endeavoured to complete the duty assigned to our brigade. I believe that this was achieved with great success, and the result was that this body, com posed of only about 670 men ,succeeded in passing through the mass of Russian cavalry of (as we have since learned) 5, 4 2A10 strong ; and, having broken through that mass, they went, according to our technical military expression " threes about," and retired in the same manner, doing as much execution in their course as they possibly could upon the enemy's cavalry. Upon our returning up the hill which we had descended in the attack, we had to run the same gauntlet and to incur the same risk from the flank fire of the Tiralleurs as we had encountered before. Numbers of our men were shot down—men and horses were killed, and many of the soldiers who had lost their horses were also shot down while endeavouring to escape. But what was the feeling and what the hearing of those brave men who returned to the position ! ( Here the noble and gallant officer's voice faltered, and he spoke with very evident emotion.) Of each of these regiments (he continued) there returned but a small detachment, two-thirds of the men engaged having been destroyed ; and those who sur vived, having arrived at the summit of the lull whence they had commenced the attack but a short time before, could not refrain from giving three ringing cheers of triumph and rejoicing at the exploit which they themselves had per formed—(cheers)—for they had ridden over a formidable Russian battery and attacked a countless body of Russian cavalry in the rear. I understand it has been stated that the British cavalry are of a very inferior description, and require a thorough reform ; that they are badly officered, being commanded by gentlemen of too high a rank in the country, and that they ought to be better officered. I can only say that Ido not think you will find any body of officers more careful of their men than those officers who now exist, and per form their duties better in the cavalry regiments, or that you will find any regiments in the world where there is such a mutual attachment between officers and men as is the case in the British cavalry. The officers are at all times perfectly ready to assist and to attend to the comforts of their men. The men, likewise, are so attached to their officers that wherever those officers lead them in the cause of honour and glory there those men are always sure to follow them. (Cheers.) In conclusion, I will only say that in the minds of those who escaped the dangers of that terrible attack to which I have referred there exist reflections of which they cannot divest themseves. I think