The Press. — London, England, 1857-09-19 00:00:00

THE PRESS, SEPTEMBER 19, 1857. " advanced to within one day's march of Lucknow, had been obliged to " fall back upon Cawnpore." There is apparently no confusion of places or dates here. His advance upon the road to Lucknow is recognised, his retreat definitely stated. And yet there is an inexplicable mystery about this retreat. Why, if within twenty miles of Lucknow, should he retreat more than thirty to Cawnpore? If the rebels were too strong for him to advance they would have been close upon his rear when he retreated, and if he had cholera amongst his troops the stimulant of a battle was to be pre ferred to the depression of a retreat. We confess that we wait with as much hope as anxiety for some explanation of this telegraphic state ment. But whether he has retreated to Cawnpore or relieved Luck now, his position is equally perilous. The outbreak at Divapore and Benares will effectually prevent the advance of reinforce ments to his aid, so that, wherever he be, we fear his recent glorious successes will prove so to have exhausted his resources as to compel him to act strictly on the defensive. However, be that as it may, he has not lost his honour, nor is he less deserving of the admiration of his countrymen. A groat opera tion directed to an important object, though it fail of success, marks the genius and elevates the character of a general Nothing can be more certain than that the failure of a military operation is in itself no disgrace. A town may be besieged and captured after the most heroic resistance. Circumstances may defeat the most obstinate valour, the most enduring fortitude, and the most noble perseverance ; but what brings disgrace with it is that such noble efforts should be paralysed, and that the worthy sustainers of a country's honour, after incredible efforts and glorious successes, should be forced to capitulate or to retreat from want of resources. The infamy and the disgrace is for ever fixed upon those in office, who, underrating the danger, but boasting of their power and of the nation's resources, neglected their obvious duties, and sacrificed our interests by their folly and their incapacity. These are they upon whom the terrible respon• sibility rests for the shambles at Cawnpore, the retreat of our hero HAva Loot, and, we fear, the too probable massacre at Lucknow. We are given to understand that Recruiting for the Army does not advance with as much rapidity as might be desired in the grave emer gencies of the present crisis. Whether it is that the pressure upon the labour market, in all its various branches, is unusually severe, or that the enrolling of the militia corps, either for embodiment or fur training, has lessened the supply of that class of men who are avail able for the military service, or that the inducements to enlist in the form of bounty, pension, and similar advantages, have not been raised in proportion to the exigencies of the occasion—whether one or all of these causes conjointly and in their several degrees have contributed to the result, we know not. We are inclined to believe that. enough has not been done to render the profession of arms an object of ambi tion to the industrial population. We cannot see the use of the restric tions as to height and age which are now in force. The order of his Royal Highness the Commander in-Chief, offering free commissions to gentlemen who have enrolled a hundred men for service, does not seem so promising as it appeared at first. It is clear that, regarded merely as a business transaction, it would be the interest of any one who was anxious to enter the army to pur chase his 100 men, as he could do so at a rate which no recruiting ser geant could offer, and yet obtain his commission at a cost below regu lation price. In this way the usual channels for reinforcing our. army would be partially closed, and it is to be feared a very inferior stamp of man to the ordinary recruit would be enlisted. in an emergency of this character expedition is everything, and we are still of opinion that if our standing army must be increased, the quickest and most effective mode of doing so would be to form an auxiliary corps of such regiments of Militia as are willing, with their officers, to be enrolled in the Queen's army. It would be easy to make them distinct, if it should be thought necessary to do so, and the in ducemnents of half-pay pensions and widows' allowances might very properly be held out to them. We warn the public against the sophistries and falsehoods attempted to be palmed upon them with reference to the speedy arri val of reinforcements in India, and we du trust that the people will no longer permit themselves to be lulled into supine inactivity by the "cheerful" views and gratifying assurances of the Ministerial journals. We need not detail here those veracious assertions which for weeks past have been paraded in prominent type that we have seen " the worst phase" of this terrible rebellion now raging from Cape Como rin to the Punjaub, and that because the telegraph tells no tale of sickening massacres its intelligence may be accepted as" cheering, as " consolatory," and as proving " the neck of disaffection" to be definitely broken, and that "each day must bring fresh succour" to our worn-out garrisons. We protest against these gross misrepresentations made use of to screen the criminal neglect of Mi nisters who refused in May last to despatehi reinforcements to our struggling countrymen. It makes one writhe with impatience at the flippancy with which these journals put forward their plausible sophistries. Dates, and localities, and numbers are suppressed, a coin- c pany is magnified into a "force," three hundred men into " powerful reinforcements," and au entire regiment into "an army of reserve.' According to them, so speedily are reinforcements being collected at head-quarters, that ordinary language fails to convey to us a notion of the rapidity of their arrival. They are " streaming up the Ganges," and " pouring into Bombay," and in a few weeks will " sweep the treacherous rebels before them" from Cape Comorin THE WEEK. TEM intelligence brought by this mail is the most serious that wt, have received since the outbreak at Meerut and the seizure of Delhi. We not only have to bear the sad news of the retreat of General HAVELOCK, upon whom every hope, alas ! rested for the relief of Luck now, but the more alarming statement that the army befoio Delhi, weakened by losses and disease, has been compelled to relinquish its position and retreat before the rebels. At present this is a mere report, but, coupled with the fact that councils of war to discuss the ne cessity of such a measure have been held by our generals in camp, it bears an ominous significance. We do not wish unreasonably to excite the fears of our readers, but we warn them to prepare for the worst. On the other hand, if we turn to Bombay, there, jerked, are our worst fears confirmed. The first regiment of the Bombay army has broken out in open mutiny. Two more regiments stationed in its immediate neighbourhood are believed to have joined them, and to have raised the standard of revolt upon the confines of the Mahratta country. A vast conspiracy, having for its object the massacre of all Euro peans at Poonah, and in which the Rajah of SATTABA and many natives of influence and rank are deeply implicated, has been discovered. The attitude of Seindia and of the Southern Mahrattas is most suspicious ; and the Mahoinedan fete on the 22nd of August, we fear, will prove to have roused the whole country against us. and to show that a general spread of the rebellion, from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, so often ridiculed, at length has become a terrible fact. On the banks of the Gauges a most serious mutiny has occurred in four regiments of Bengal Sepoys hitherto implicitly relied on, but who, at a moment of vital importance to us, have thrown aside the mask they wore for weeks, and have marched direct upon Benares, in which city the seeds of revolt are full ripe. But the mutiny of these regiments, serious as it is, is yet marked by an incident of far more grave importance. Stopping to plunder the small town of Arrah, they were attacked on the banks of the Ganges by a force of 400 men of the 10th Regiment, who had been despatched in pursuit in two steamers. One vessel grounded in the Ganges, the other unhappily landed the men ; they fell into an ambuscade, and were driven back with the loss of 147 men and nine officers killed and wounded. Like the capture of Cawnpore, this transient success of the rebels will be magnified by their emissaries into a great victory. Occurring on the eve of the Mohurrum, and coupled with our inaction at Delhi, with the retreat of General HAVELOCK, and with the too probable fall of Lucknow, it is a matter for the most serious apprehension. It will obliterate all recollection of the successive defeats of NANA SAHIB, it will stimulate the waverers into action against us, and will have a sweeping effect against our prestige throughout the country. These details are of far too much importance to be passed over with the slighting indifference displayed by the Ministerial journals. We have arrived at that moment when flattery and falsehood can no longer deceive, and simplicity itself be no longer misled. Let the country beware. The contest is assuming gigantic proportions, and we cannot too seriously impress upon our readers that it demands all the strength and resources of the empire to master it with success. Encouraged by the Government, the public have too long treated this rebellion as a mere topic of conver sation. If they continue to gaze at it as some strange phenome non, they will soon have to regard it as a terrible peril. Every succeeding mail exposes to us now the lamentable position to which our struggling fellow-countrymen are reduced by the inadequate resources at their command. Communication is every where cut off, their hard-bought victories are neutralised, and their bravest efforts of no avail, though the plains of Hindostan are soddened with their blood. This is the position to which we are reduced by the sagacity of a vigorous Government. Who shall say what a day may bring forth ? We tell them now, as we have told them for weeks past, that the time for great and united action has arrived, and is passing. We must no longer speculate in inactivity upon our chances of success, for before the " Army of Retribution," as it is pompously called, reaches Calcutta, the relative position of the rebels and our selves may be materially changed, and we had better prepare at once for the complete reconquest of the country. This as no time to deal in petty schemes and contemptible expedients which dishonour a country if they fail, and confer no credit upon it if they succeed. If we wish to maintain any hold of India, we must accept the present movement in its true light : not as a " Mahomedan" con spiracy, but as a vast insurrection favoured by th e mass o f t h e popu lation. The policy to be pursued is obvious ; we must separate the cause of the people from the insurrectionists, and we must take more comprehensive measures than are proposed for the sup pression of the revolt. No praise of ours can do justice to the gallantry of General HATELocx and his heroic soldiers ; but his retreat is pitiable. Weakened by his victories, and overcome by disease, he is reported to have been compelled to retire before achieving the relief of Lucknow some sanguine minds doubt the truth of his retreat. It is possible that his return to Cawnpore after the capture of Bilitoor, in order to deposit the sixteen guns taken in that stronghold, may have been con fumed with his ultimate movemcntQ. but the telegraphic despatch appeare clear upon the point. "General HAVELOCK, after having 916