The Press. — London, England, 1855-02-03 00:00:00

98 individual reputations, or calculations of the few votes which they command. Undoubtedly the Derby party is in a con siderable minority in the House of Commons ; and while a chance remains that an Admi nistration can be constituted likely to command the support of the miljtfHty, oprinAite as AS elements of which it if cOthposed inttt be, afid widely as its objects AM dpinidttis may differ, his Lordship ants jtisely in declining, to assume the ,pow ilifts of flillYornmdtti. A miall* rity can only conduct the '.business of thd country by the forbearance of its opponents, or of that class known as independent mem bers ; and tho result of the experiment of 'lB6l shows ho* little that forbeftiti- hoe 6an 110 relied on, with the House of Commons con stituted as it is at present. Should it, be found that no other Administration is possi ble, the Legislature would be bound to refrain from any active opposition, and Lord Derby would be in a position to carry whatever mea sures he deemed essential for rescuing the country from its difficulties, and carrying it triumphantly through the contest in which it is engaged. In the temporary failure of Lord DERBY to effect such an arrangement as would insure the Ministry he might form a majority in the Commons, we see no ground for discourage ment. The Conservative party remains united, and in this union consists its virtue and its strength. If it suffers itself on any pretence to be divided, its power is gone, and the only solid security left us for the honest, legitimate, and effective working of our constitutional system will be lost. The party must by this time perceive its deficiencies. It has not appealed to the country with sufficient boldness, nor been nearly so active as it ought to have been in organising its forces and in testing the opinion of constituencies. It is not true that " the battle of the Constitution is to be fought "in the Registration Courts," though the registration demands much more attention than the party has given to it; but it is true that the battle is to be fought on the hustings. The contest in the Legislature comes too lat.:: votes, not reasons, then bear sway. With forty or fifty mere supporters in the Com mons, Lord DERBY'S task would have been an easy one, and if his party really hopes to bear an active part in the Government of the nation, it must shake off its lethargy, ask itself how it is that for so many years past it has been playing a losing game, and resolve to devote itself heartily to the work of in creasing by every constitutional means, its influence in the country, and its strength in the Legislature. Public spirit is the first, the second, the third requisite necessary to convert what, at worst, is just now but a check into a certain victory. The present policy of the party is, strict reserve ou the political combinations which may be attempted, and the disinterested support of measures by what ever men proposed, which are necessary to rescue the army from the miserable state in which it is plunged, and restore the country to the high position it ought to hold as a great European Power, and, in spite of all that may he said to the contrary, a great military nation. THE PROSPECTIVE CABINET. WHATEVER the composition of the new Ministry, it cannot fail to receive a fair trial from Parliament. A two years' anarchy which has plunged England in war, and lowered the prestige of our national name, leads all men to echo the joint decimation of Lord DERBY and Lord ABERDEEN, " that the one need of the " moment is a sixong Government." Such a Government was, indeed, promised in Decem ber, 's2—with what results of performance the vote of Monday shows. The Coalition, in truth, never coalesced. An under-current of intrigue pervaded its whole existence, and neutralised what energy it might otherwise THlLYbritheaSeed. The disclosures of the last •ve only made public a state of , ; .11, , previously known to exist. • • • JoHN, though with unseemly . -o.l r. aip. • . 1. ;Bt - avas.44a7v THE PRESS. alacrity, should have hastened to leap out of the sinking boat. Pledges broken, appoint ments jobbed, diplomacy blundered, war mismanaged—such is, in four sentences, the history of Lord AnsilbtEN's Administration. HA ucoessore take Office with at least op. pd thrill may haps, do better, AK by no *, ll)ili cart ey do worse. jr ,r Let ~ howe Pr, d litany, and in the spirit t Of i t, _ al 101 l rs- Of examine their chazea Of . mouP 11101111MAille Lo►d PALMS for • : reasurf, 10Pd Crazy for the War Department ; it is thtitight probable that Lord CLARENDON will retalh th 6 Foreign-office, while Mr. GrLADirrosit remains at the Exchequer. Of tlie66 fiiiir leldlirig Ministers three are mem bers of the condemned Cabinet of last week; and be it remembered that the censure of the House of Commons implicates not one official alone, but all those colleagues whose opinions were, or ought to have been, recorded on his plans. A Ministry, as such, is one and indi visible. Even a blunder purely depart mental affects, pro tanto, the entire body. How much more, then, the conduct of a European war, not a single step in which should have been taken without the concurrence of every member of the Cabi net? We advance herein no new doctrine; we simply recal attention to one which has at no tithe been disputed. A mercantile) firm becomes insolvent; is its credit restored by the junior partner becoming the head, and vice versa? Yet this is the arrangement which according to most of our contemporaries is to wipe out the stain of a parliamentary cots demnation more emphatic than any in the history of two hundred years! Lord PALMERS TON, Lord CLARENDON, Mr. GL►DSTONE, are to tell their constituents and the country, " It is " true the expedition was sent out totally un " prepared for war ; that we despatched it to " Malta without an idea of its going further; " that we allowed it to be decimated by pesti " lence at Varna, and sacrificed in a winter " campaign before Sebastopol. It is true that " the military system was faulty, and we did " not attempt to mend it; that huts, clothes, " stores, were wanted, and that we made no " effort, to supply them. But for all this we " are not to blame ; it was the Duke of NEW " CASTLE'S department ; he alone is responsi " ble ; in courtesy to a colleague, we were " obliged to let him do what he pleased ; and, " having done so, we were equally, of course, " bound to shield him from inquiry. Give us " another army. Let us have the confidence of " Parliament, and we are ready to try again." Is this the apology that Lord PALMERSTON in tends to put forward ? If it be, a more un constitutional procedure was never palliated by a feebler pretext. If not, let him find a better, and we shall he ready to consider it fairly. But it is not merely on the score of its antecedents that the prospective Cabinet appears in danger. That the Conservative party will support it so long as it prosecutes the war with vigour we cannot doubt. But the members of that party must he more or less than men if they forget that but for Lord PALMERSTON'S refusal to unite with Lord DERBY—a refusal founded on no alleged differ ence of opinion, but solely on considerations of personal ambition—a Conservative Govern ment might have been formed, which would have obtained their implicit confidence and cordial support. The friends of Lord DERBY number 260 votes in the Commons, and with out their aid no Government can be secure. Next in importance to these are the followers of Lord Joss RUSSELL, variously estimated at from 100 to 120 votes. They will, in any doubtful case, stand by their leader. Now, among Lord Smiles many good qualities, a philosophical contempt of power cannot be counted, and (to speak plainly) it is impossible to doubt the purpose of his late resignation. He has broken with the Coalition—the parting was not so amicable as to invite a reunion, and his present object is to stand aloof, gather his forces, and reconstruct the Whig party on its old basis, with some infusion of modern Libe ralism. He will of course promise Lord PAL MERSTON "an independent support," (a phrase of political diplomacy, generally understood to mean " support that cannot be depended upon") nor will he attempt prematurely to SATURDAY ) gather the pear which, as he thinks, is ripening for him; but his alliance (like that of Austria) will be little better than an armed neutrality. Other sources of pppesition or weakness may be Ante brititly Milted , The course of Mr. Bitiont and hi 4 friehtts is obvious; and this linttinh, though amall numerically, has provdttdelf active atid d rous in debate. The mini Ciitholipa of. land look with distrilikt oil One iNho ft* Or late been bidding, Itomeilliat Ostentati r for the post of ProteM*nt champio n; ignorant and noisy clamourei tff army reform expect the whole military system of England to be reconstructed in three months, exaggerated anticipations which must end In proportionate disappoint ment; and the public at large, while dwelling on the rhetorical and diplomatic performanhds of their favourite, forget the inevitable effect which the lapse of years must produce upon the most vivacious intellect. We speak of Lord PALmateron in no unfriendly spirit. We should be ashamed to denounce his policy in the terms employed by Mr. GLADSTONZ in 1850 ; but, while doing justice to his diplo matic dexterity and to his resources as a debater, we must avow our belief that he is, in this year, 1855, neither the man he was, nor the man whom his admirers take him to be. It is one thing to administer a depart ment, another to govern an empire; and, even in his best days, Lord PALMKRSTON has never baen more than a departmental Minister. He now undertakes the Premiership in his 71st year. With growing infirmities, with an over rated reputation, with a Cabinet which the House of Commons has already censured, with every continental Government his enemy, and without a. parliamentary follow ing, he stands pledged to reconcile parties, to disarm factions, to rescue an army, to form an European league, and to conduct a gigantic war. We watch the experiment with hopes indeed for its success, but with au omnious forboding of failure. LORD GREY. THE Minister designated for the War Depart. went, we are given to' understand, is Lord GREY. A few words, therefore, on the ante cedents of this statesman may not be misplaced. That his intellectual powers are considerable no candid critic will deny. His turn of mind is logical ; his habits are businesslike ; he has even some pretension to enlarged views; and, though nature denied the gifts of au orator, early training and long practice in the Com mons have made him more than respectable as a debater. It may also be pleaded on his behalf that, on the whole, his career as a par tisan has been marked by fewer changes of colleagues than that of many living statesmen. Why, then, has this career, extending over a quarter of a century, been up to the present time a signal failure ? Talent was not want ing, nor yet opportunity; for the son of a Prime Minister, the hereditary successor to the leadership of the Whig party, invested with the dignity of an illustrious position and an historical name, had surely a field ample enough to gratify a more than ordinary ambi tion. But Lord GREY, well versed as he is in the theory of politics, has always evinced a singular inaptitude for the management ble of men. As a subordinate, even the placa Lord RIPON had to complain of his im - v rac ticable and domineering temper. Admitted to Lord MELBOURNE'S Cabinet, his constantly , repeated threats of resignation Were first the annoyance, then the amusement, of his coll. leagues • and finally provoked a rebuff which! we doubt not, is still well remembered by its object. In the winter of 1845, o n the proffered resignation of Sir R. Pm., it was mainly the personal antipathy of Lord Gat , to serve as a colleague of Lord PALM ERSTO N that prevented the formation of a Whig Cabinet. Hitherto he had only shown himself unable to obey—it remained that he should be proved unfit to govern. Accordingly, the five years of his colonial administration, from '46 to '52, were marked, almost withcut an interval, by abortive