The Press. — London, England, 1855-12-22 00:00:00

/tea ! 1' ei I T (•t ". 1 - - , _ .. _ _ A 1 0 C Irt °I 1 No. 138.—VOL. 111. Eht Vrtss. STAMPED .... SIXPENCX. UNSTAMPED..FIVEPENCZ. LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 22,1855. LONDON,ISATURDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1855. THE negotiation in progress has advanced one considerable stage. Prince ESTERIIAZY has left Vienna for St Petersburg, hearing the conditions which France and England have agreed to accept as the basis of a treaty of Peace, and which Austria has engaged that she will urge Russia to accept by every means in her power short of actual hos tilities. We suppose therefore that we shall hear no more denials of the fact that negotia tions have been opened, and no more of " the canards of THE PRESS," in communicating to the public a knowledge of that fact. A. week or ten days must elapse before an answer can be received from St. Petersburg, and that answer may not be decisive. in the meantime, the great alternative of Peace or War continues to tremble in the balance. There are persons who think it wise and patriotic in this interval of suspense to declare their hope and belief that the negotiation will come to nothing, and that the terms are so framed as to exAide any rational expectation that Russia will accept them. There are other persons who deem it their duty at this parti cular time to express their predilection in favour of a war policy ; to declare that hostili ties have not gone far enough; and to assert that no peace can be what they deem "just and honourable " which is not founded on a total prostration of Russian Dower, and the accept ance by her—as matter of compulsion—of whatever terms the Allies may choose to dictate. With neither of these parties can we profess any kind of sympathy. We think that the moment of negotiation is not the moment for the expression of mistrust, of bluster, or of defiance. When we make war, let us war with all our heart and energy—when we nego tiate, let us negotiate with perfect good faith. Let our action be sincere in both cases. It would be nothing less than hypocrisy of the , grossest kind to offer terms to an enemy which we were perfectly sure beforehand that enemy would not or could not accept : and it would be a flagrant breach of the courtesy which should regulate the intercourse of nations, to offer conditions of Peace to our foe, through our Government, while we seize every possible opportunity of declaring that nothing short of his total prostration will satisfy us. On the conditions that have been offered we must of necessity remain silent until we know what they are. But we have no hesitation in reiterating our opinion that a Peace which shall secure the direct tangible objects of the War ought to be acceptable to all this country, and conceive that our enemy is to be crushed in Asia Minor, in the Baltic, and in Southern Russia, in one campaign more. We have suffered enough from underrating the re sources of Russia. Through that error Kars has been sacrificed. We do not doubt the ability of the Allies to exhaust Russia should they set themselves to the work. But let us not close our eyes to the cost of such an achievement, to the waste of blood it must entail, to the woeful destniaties it must occa sion. And if there he not Peace now, or rather if it be impossible now to conclude Peace on satisfactory conditions, nothing short of the exhaustion of Russia will enable us to extort them. The difference between the policy which THE PRESS has advocated, and that proclaimed by some speakers and writers professing to represent Conservative sentiments, amounts to this—that we believe a solid and satisfac tory Peace may now be effected by treaty with Russia. while they believe it can only be effected by the annihilation of her power. Reason as we may, the difference returns to this. They have no faith in those principles of policy and those mutual guarantees and engagements upon which the division of European power and the integrity of the boundary lines of States depend. A treaty is with them but a bit of paper, a seal but a morsel of wax. We believe, on the contrary, that it is those principles and guarantees which preserve the peace of the world ; that without them there would be perpetual war; that the progress of civilisation is towards a more solemn recognition and sacred mainte nance of treaties ; and that as they extend wider and take in outlying nations (as unhappily Turkey has been until this day). and as they are joined in by a greater number of States, there is less probability that they will be invaded, and stronger assurance that the State which attempts to violate them will be promptly restrained in its aggressive course. The parties who are forward in reproaching THE Panss for its advocacy of a pacific policy would do well to recollect that the Eastern Question never can be settled by arms alone. When arms have done all they can, we shall have to revert to pacific arrangement still. It is not as if the War concerned only a parti cular patch of territory. Arms might then solve the dispute, by the stronger party seizing, retaining, and fortifying it. But the present War concerns the navigation of a sea of most peculiar configuration, of which the gates are in the possession of Turkey, and of which the shores are nearly divided between her and her opponent. It concerns the freedom of a river, of which Austria holds the upper part, and of which one bank at its mouth is the territory of Turkey and the other of Rus sia. It concerns the internal regulations of the Ottoman empire itself, and the amount of protection and privilege which shall be accorded to the Christian populations dwelling within its borders, far exceeding in number the dominant Ottoman class. It con arranged with strict regard to the policy most equitable to the contending Powers, and most likely to preserve the peace of Europe. We think that the time for such settlement has come, if it is ever to take place, without resort to a ‘,ar of extermination. ln favour of such a war it may be said, that it will bring our enemy to our feet, that it will make him sue for peace, that it will enable us to dictate our own terms. Let us grant all these hopeful anticipations—let us suppose them realised ; and we are still prepared to contend that a Peace is much more likely to be durable which is effected by Powers meet ing on terms of equality, than a Peace which is " dictated " by one party, and accepted only through dire necessity by another. The milers at Tag PaEss do not seem to understand the ridiculous position in which they place themselves by accusing it of being actuated only by hostility to the Government. Why, so far as principles and policy are con cerned at this time, THE PRESS gives powertul support to the Government. With the Cabinet individually it has nothing to do ; but it is extremely doubtffil whether the Government would ever have assumed the attitude it has • done. had not THE Passs previously declared that terms of Peace might now be considered with due regard to the honour and interests of the country, and that the opportunity appeared favorable for attaining the objects of the War without further prolongation of it. THE PRESS is to be decried, and the Government is to be supported.! Do the people who exclaim thus, understand what is passing before their eyes? Do they know that the Government in opening pacific negotiation have acted as if they obeyed the promptings of THE PRESS ? But there is the hope that the Government may be insincere! They must have the benefit of the doubt while it lasts ; it will be time to turn against them when they are convicted of insincerity ! Their failure would be held as evidence of their capacity. It' it can be shown that they conducted the negotiation without a thought or wish for its success, they will earn the cordial support of the parties who now draw a distinction between the honest. advo cacy of !peace by THE PEERS, and what in their cunning they tak • to be the dishoneat, action of the Governme' tto disconcert,it. The recommendation. of a pacific policy would no doubt be not oily unwise, but culpa ble, if it tended to impede preparation for war, or in any way to impair or mar its efficient prosecution Some mit. Is may be incapable of understanding a policy which would always keep peace in view as the end of war, but which would at the same time collect all the agencies of war in irre: , i -tible strength as the means by which peace at, to bo attained. But that is the policy, we venture to say, which is best for the interests, and most conducive to the honour, of this country. it is the policy which we shall never cease to advocate. And whatever may be our state of preparation, or whatever advantages certain pers, among us may expect from a continuance lr of glory I until we know wnat tney are. .uto, 1. .....s. ....... —........._ ___,.._ _ . no hesitation in reiterating our opinion that a of protection and privilege which shall which wo shall never cease Lo auvocto,c. num Peace which shall secure the direct tangible be accorded to the Christian populations whatever may be our state of preparation, or objects of the War ought to be acceptable to dwelling within its borders, far exceeding in whatever advantages certain persons among all parties and classes in this country, and number the dominant Ottoman class. It con- us may expect from a continuance of war—or would be of an essentially Conservative charac- cerns the settlement of that wide and ill- whatever lures of glory and succeworici -of ter. It cannot be our policy to hazard even defined frontier in Asia Minor where the passion and ambition, may be thrown nut, igs ~ , one more campaign for the attainmen t of em p ires of Turkey and Russia are brought face tempt us onward—we shall still sax. I.lsss ~..I .: ' 7 .. s , objects which are now within our grasp; nor to face, and where the Turkish power is cannot cease too soon when its objeffis . : 7 7 -., to prolong hostilities for an indefinite pur- naturally so weak that no security exists obtained, and thattt it is impossiWe.4o :, "' I ' ' 7:, pose. But if Peace be not concluded now, against a hostile irruption, which might carry to be otherwie han honouratire-efato • ..., . . .... from any radical opposition between the views the foe within sight of Constantinople. The what the attitude of the belligeffhteit4 '^•;,'"%,', ;;;'. of the Allies and of Russia, it is not one more inherent difficulties attending the solution of when the side which haa taken ni) 1 campaign which will decide the contest. The these several points are so great that arms I right and sound policy concludes the eu .. , , c r, blindest piejudic,e, er grossest folly, can alone alone can never settle them. They must be I without advantage to itself, aintenti' ;.• -' • m.l 1 . - ---- -- - - ---- - - _. . _ . a