The Press. — London, England, 1856-06-28 00:00:00

JUNE 28, 1856. WALPOLE gained an immense advantage by carrying the Address to the Crown, and that Address is not rescinded. But we cannot give our approval of the course followed on Monday night by the highly respectable gen tlemen of the minority who voted for Mr. GROGAN'S amendment. Mr. WALPOLE did not proceed in this grave business without con sulting high ecclesiastical personages, whose opinions on Protestantism are revered by the overwhelming majority of Irish Protestants. In their conviction, deliberately expressed, the motion of Mr. FORTESCUE was not incon sistent with the address of Mr. WALPOLE. The words of a considerable part of Mr. FORTESCUE'S resolution were actually similar to certain affirmations of many eminent Protestant pre lates in 1812 and 1814, who were then engaged upon Irish education. But, besides, the case urged by the Church Education Society was that they did not desire to subvert the National Board. Consistently with that avowal, it would have been better policy to have adopted Mr. FORTESCUE'S resolution as recommended with Mr. WALPOLE'S clear expla nation. Instead of doing so, the minority moved an impracticable amendment which, of course, could not be carried, and its failure (so obviously inconsistent with the National Board) considerably weakened the effect of the success achieved by Mr. WALPor.E's concilia tory tact. _ _ Surely, the accomplished gentlemen of the minority, who are entitled to all respect, must, on reflection, perceive that their course was altogether impracticable. In politics nothing is so fatal to success as the notion of imprac ticability. It is because that character too much appertains to Irish politics that, in spite of the genius and eloquence applied to them, discussion has of late Sears become so unpo pular in England. Unless ideas can be realised, they become mere chimeras of the brain. Sincerely desirous that the Church Education Society should be helped, and con• vinced of the justice of its claims, we should be sorry to see its interests jeopardised by impracticable proposals from over-zealous friends. 2. Independently of the fact of Maynooth having been a legacy to the empire from the exclusively Protestant Parliament of Ireland (a fact which increases the difficulty of deal ing with it), there are present reasons which make it most impolitic to take a retrograde course about it. The two religious bodies in Ireland, if not in complete unity, at least are not arrayed against each other now in that internecine warfare which left such ruinous results in former times. The ravages of the great famine have still to be repaired, and a policy which should again array Protestants and Roman Catholics against each other, and exasperate their animosities, cannot possibly be encouraged. No friend to Ireland, no loyal subject of the empire, would at this time re commend a renewal of that fierce strife which injured the sister country so much in former years. In saying that, we are far from echo ing the cant of indifferentism. On the con trary, we rejoice that Ireland has the security of a Protestant Church Establishment, and its clergy never stood so high in public estima tion as now. Seeing that there is only one Roman Catholic (Lord EDWARD HOWARD) retained in the English representation, we have no fear that the existence of May nooth will endanger our Protestant institu tions If Maynooth were an endowment, there might be a serious danger in having it stand ; but that distinguished jurist Mr. NAPIER, with the candour that honourably characterises him, admitted on Wednesday " that he had never heard Maynooth de " fended as an endowment." Nor is it so ; Maynooth rests only upon an arrangement, confirmed by an Act of Parliament, and we, as Protestants, are in nowise permanently com mitted to it upon a plea of constitutional en dowment. Some of our friends, we are aware, differ from us upon these points; but we are satisfied to leave our views to future expe rience. In much of the spirit of Sir JOHN PAKINOTON'S remarks on Wednesday we agree, though some of his expressions, used possibly in the hurry of debate, do not exactly coincide THE PRESS. with our views. But we rejoice to see that his sound sense and practical understanding recognised the impropriety of " interfering " with the status of the Established Church in " Ireland," which rests upon the Act of Union in point of law, and upon its civilising in fluence in point of political utility. OMER PACHA AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THAT the campaign of OMER PACHA in Min grelia was ably designed, and, as far as the season would permit, brilliantly executed, we have hitherto imagined to be universally ad mitted facts. Nor is it our present intention to allude to the origin and strategy of that ex pedition, any further than to notice the cir cumstance that rumours unfavorable to the Pacha's reputation have began to circulate in society, which, taken in connection with the facts we are about to adduce, cannot fail, we think, to be suggestive of very disagreeable reflections. The nature of these rumours we shall not discuss; it is sufficient to say that they are such as to throw the failure of the campaign entirely on the shoulders of the Turkish commander. Starting, however, from the commonly received opinion that OMER PACHA is both a gallant soldier and a skilful general, as well as an honourable man, we cannot help feeling some degree of surprise at the little recogni tion of his services by the English Govern ment. Since the Danubian campaigns, OMER PACHA has received no one single mark of Queen VICTORIA'S approbation ; though it is an undeniable fact that, in many respects, his expedition for the relief of Kars has, from the number of English officers engaged in it, and the devotion with which they were followed by the Turkish troops, exercised a most powerful effect in impressing the Eastern races with our qualities for command. But not only has the Pacha himself been treated with this apparent neglect, but he has ex perienced what to a truly generous mind is even still more galling—the steady disregard of all his commendations bestowed on the British officers under him. In the despatch which the Pacha wrote to his own Government after the battle of the Ingour, published in the Journal de Constantinople of the 3rd of December last, two English officers —Colonel SIMMONS and Colonel BALLARD—are spoken of in the most flattering terms. To the former, in conjunction with AHOY PACHA, the whole glory of the victory is attributed ; and he is stated to have " shown himself " worthy, not only of the thanks of the Im " perial Government, but also of the con " gratulations of his own Government." Of Colonel BALLARD, it is said that he distin guished himself in a most remarkable manner, and equally deserves to be rewarded for his conduct before the enemy. The latter officer is still only a lieutenant in the Indian army; and Colonel SIMNIONS, after repeated applica tions to Lord CLARENDON, has failed to obtain a single step of promotion for his conduct in Asia. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel on the 12th of December, 1554, for previous services, but for the much more important ones rendered by Lim subse quently, and after a recommendation which, had it come from an English commander-in chief, would infallibly have insured instan taneous promotion, he has received literally nothing. There is more behind. By the influence of the British Government SELIM PACHA has been dismissed from the governorship of Erzeroum, because he did not march to the relief of General WiLtiAms. We are not par tial to the criticisms of civilians on military matters ; still there are certain features in the ease of SELIM PACHA which, viewed by the light of common sense, render his dismissal on the above-mentioned charge a question able proceeding. his whole force never exceeded from six to eight thousand men, of which he must have left at least four thousand in Erzeroutn ; and even that, accord - ing to competent judges, would have been highly dangerous. Now, to march with a long convoy of provisions, escorted by 4,000 men, a distance of upwards of one hundred miles, and to attempt to break through an enemy with 20,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, does not, from any point of view, appear a practicable proceeding. It is a question, doubtless, for professional men to decide. At all events, it appears hard that an officer should be disgraced be cause in the exercise of his discretion he did not choose to hazard a valuable portion of the Turkish army in undertaking so desperate a movement. These three cases—the slight upon OMER PACHA, the neglect of the two officers he spe cially recommended for promotion, and the dismissal of SELIM PACHA—are remarkable, as all tending towards one result—to bring discredit upon the efforts of the Turkish army for the relief of Kars. Whether there are any persons in power interested in producing such an impression on the public mind, we cannot pretend to say ; but we call attention to the present aspect of the case. The people of this country believe that great services and gallant actions were performed by certain men in Mingrelia, and that if Kars could have been saved by OVER PACHA, OMER PACHA would have saved it. On this hypothesis that officer him self, as well as his subordinates, are entitled to acknowledgment and reward by the British Government. On the other hand, the British Government itself has been charged with contributing to the fall of that ill-fated fort ress by their own neglect and incapacity. We need scarcely point out the deduction that, assuming the Government to be guilty, any recognition of OMER PACHA and his English officers would tend to corroborate that charge, while any punishment of a Turkish general for alleged misbehaviour in the matter would tend to exculpate them. A final decision on the merits of this question is probably re mote. At present the burden of proof rests on the Government ; and unless they can come forward and say they are in possession of in formation which justifies them in offering this studied indignity to the Turkish commander, and this apparent injustice to Colonels SIM MONS and BALLARD, they must he content to remain under very unpleasant imputations. THE NAWAB OF SURAT'S TREATY BILL. THERE could not be a better specimen of the way in which India is governed than that afforded by the discussion on this Bill, and by the manner in which the question has been treated by the Company throughout. From beginning to end the whole difficulty has been caused by the personal activity :of an individual holding successively offices in which his influence had the fullest opportu• nity for operating to his opponents' disad vantage. We do not go the length of saying that he deliberately violated his trust for the furtherance of his private enmity ; it is, however, notorious that a feeling of private enmity has from first to last existed in the breast of the most influential of those with whom the decision of the case rested. The facts of the case are briefly these : There was, many years ago, at the Court of the Guicowar, the native Sovereign of Baroda, an influential Minister, named MEER SUR AFRAZ ALI, while the assistant to the Com pany's Resident at the Court was a young Englishman, of considerable talents, great application, and most indomitable will. His chief characteristic, however, was the entire devotion with which he pursued the objects on which he had set his heart. It happened that this young Englishman was brought into hostile collision with MEER SUR AFRAZ ALI, and did his utmost to effect his ruin ; but the footing of the MEER at his Court was too powerful, and the attempt failed. MEER SURAFRAZ ALT was the father of MEER JAFFIR ALI, the present claimant on be half of his children of the pension guaranteed by treaty to the heirs of the Nawab of SuaAT. Being a Syud, or, in other words, a descen dant of the Arabian Prophet, his blood was A