The Press. — London, England, 1856-05-03 00:00:00

I MAY 3, 1856. of duty alone. There is a sense of pusillani plea which one dislikes to per may in this ce i v e, even in a political opponent. It was finely laid down by Mr. DISRAELI as an incon trovertible principle in politics, that it was the duty of a. Government to propose such measures as it believed most essential to the public interests, without reference to what the conduct of Opposition might be. What an excuse for the neglect of a Government to avail itself of the national resources, that it dreaded the criticism of Opposition !—yet this was the excuse continually put forward by the Ministerial speakers. Throughout the debate the argument was all on one side. It was established beyond dispute, that had Lord PALMERSTON'S Govern ment supported General WILLIAMS by money and supplies, Kars would have been saved ; it was proved that if his demand for 20,000 men early in the spring had been complied with, his communications could never have been cut off, while the Russians, if they had advanced, would probably have been signally defeated ; it was shown that Lord PANMURE, even so late as last August, had most glaringly violated facts well known to him, by stating that Turkey was perfectly well able to do all that was necessary for her Asian army. The criticism upon the uncertainty and blundering of our Government when the Russians had taken up their position before Kars and had cut off its communications, was, in our humble opinion, unnecessary, though not uninstructive. Kars was really lost when the determination was taken to afford it no assistance in the spring; and the deliberations in July and August, with the subsequent failure of the re • lieving expedition under OMER PACHA, only showed how fatal and irremediable were the consequences of that decision transmitted by Lord CLARENDON to Constantinople in the previous April. His sanction of projects of relief, when those projects were too late, was an admission in itself of that charge of want of foresight and energy which Mr. WHITESIDE BO conclusively made out. bited, or a greater proof afforded of the more considerate and less exhaustive nature of the system followed by the Sovereigns of native States? In point of fact, however, we shall find as examination that the surplus arising from the newly-annexed provinces is of much the same kind as the profits divided in February last by the Tipperary Bank. All the more important charges arising out of the occupation of the Punjaub and Pegu are debited, not to those provinces, but to Bengal and Madras ; while the home expenditure account is also swelled by considerable sums in excess of those which would have been necessary if those provinces had not been annexed. For instance, neither military nor marine charges appear in the balance-sheet of the Punjaub and Pegu ; but we find no less a sum than twelve hundred and seven thousand pounds to have been paid for military and marine charges, coals, stores, &c., in 1854-5, in excess of the amount disbursed for the same items in 1851-2, and the greater part of this charge was incurred on account of those provinces. Then, again, we find six hundred and twenty - eight thousand pounds paid for military buildings and roads in the Pun jaub and north-west provinces in excess of the amount disbursed for similar purposes in 1851-2; and the greater portion of this excess of expenditure also has been caused entirely by the occupation of the Punjaub. To show how the Indian accounts are at the present day doc tored, in order to vindicate a particular line of policy, we may mention a fact which it is in the power of any member of the Legislature to verify, and which is this :—The great object has been to show that Pegu is a paying pro vince, but if the cost of the additional troops absolutely required for its protection had been charged against it, the expenditure so exhi bited would have established an exactly con trary result. The Madras army was, there fore, augmented by the number of men necessary to supply the deficiency ; and while no charge whatever on this score appears in the accounts of Pegu, we find an excess over former years of a hundred and eleven thou sand pounds in the military charges of Madras. We also find an excess of thirty thousand pounds in the expenditure for mili tary buildings in that Presidency, the greater part of which is very likely to have arisen from the same cause. To disguise expenditure in this manner is simply an act of trickery and dishonesty, and the fraud is sure in the end to recoil upon the authors of it, however it may be found by them at present to serve their turn. The broad fact is not to be got over by legerdemain of this kind, that the accounts show an excess of expenditure in 1854-5 over that exhibited in 1851 2 of no less than two millions nine hun dred and fifty-three thousand pouads. Another broad fact is an equally stubborn one, that there is an annually increasing Indian deficit of almost three millions sterling. At the same time the Government confesses that the Indian revenues are incapable of expan sion; and nothing can be more true as long as the present system shall be pursued. On the contrary, remissions of revenue are talked of as the only means of drawing anything from ryots whom taxation has already reduced to the lowest state. In the meanwhile, however, the government of India must be carried on, and loans will prove, under the present cir sumstances of India, very hard to raise. The last Five per Cent. Stock is at a discount ; an increased rate of interest must be given, therefore, or no money whatever will be ob tained. Even then the matter will still be one of difficulty, for in the present impoverished state of the services the members of them have little to invest, while the great resource that formerly lay in the native princes may now be looked upon as entirely cut off. Marked out as they are openly pro claimed to be for destruction, as soon as opportunity serves, they would he worse than madmen to invest any more of their accumulations in Government loans. To do so would be to place their wealth at the mercy of a body which proclaims its right to seize and appropriate it at any moment to the providing salaries for its friends ; or, in other words, to the general purposes of the State. 411 Nor, indeed, are the native bankers and mer chants of the Mofussil likely to show much greater confidence in us now that the mask is so completely thrown off. Those who keep not faith with dependent princes will not be supposed likely to be over-scrupulous towards dependent subjects when further pressing ne cessities push them on; for an equally touch ing picture of a peasantry plundered annually by the taxgatherer to keep the public creditor in idleness might, of course, afford them an equal justification for performing another heroic act of virtue and summarily wiping out their debt. Whichever side we turn, there fore, we see the deepest occasion for anxiety, and never were India and her finances in greater peril than they at present stand. .. * -. ...." r * "."% -. ..: . _ .. ... . . . ~..„... . ) i l 1 - MAY 3, 1856. THE PRESS. • 411 o f duty alone. There is a sense of pusillani- bited, or a great er p roo f a ff or d e d o f th e more Nor, indeed, are the native bankers and mer- in ity i n this plea which one dislikes to per- considerate and less exhaustive nature of the chants of the Mofussil likely to show much se i s e, even in a political opponent. It was system followed by the Sovereigns of native greater confidence in us now that the mask is finely laid down by Mr. DISRAELI as an incon States? i e f om t r i le w t i e t l h y d th e ro e w n n de o n ff t . ri T n h ee o s se w s i who o no k t e b e e dover-scrupulous towards keep trov ertible principle in politics, that it was the In point of fact, however, we shall find oss i° not al d u ty of a. Government to propose such examination that the surplus arising from the dependentsuppose likely to P be P meas ures as it believed most essential to the newly-annexed provinces is of much the same ne- pu blic interests, without reference to what the kind as the profits divided in February last by subjects when further pressing c essities push them on; for an equally touch- conduct of Opposition might be. Wh a t an th e Tipperary Bank. All the more important inn; picture of a peasantry plundered annually excuse for the neglect of a Government to charges arising out of the occupation of the i b n i i t d h l e en taxgatherer to keep the public creditor Mil itself of the national resources, that it Punjaub and Pegu are debited, not to those e l a g t h i () e n of for o a r ff in o i r n d a thaenmo another equal justification dreaded the criticism of Opposition !—yet this provinces, but to Bengal and Madras ; while . t was the excuse continually put forward by the the home expenditure account is also swelled by considerable sums in excess of those which heroic act of virtue and summarily wiping out their debt. Whichever side we turn, Ministerial speakers. there- Throughout the debate the argument was would have been necessary if those provinces fore, we see the deepest occasion for anxiety, all on one side. It was established beyond had not been annexed. For instance, neither and never were India and her finances in present stand. they peril than at dispute, that had Lord PALMERSTON'S Govern - military nor marine charges appear in the greateri / mea t supported General WILLIAMS by money balance-sheet of the Punjaub and Pegu ; but ' and supplies, Kars would have been saved; it we find no less a sum than twelve hundred THE MILITIA. I was proved that if his demand for 20,000 men and seven thousand pounds to have been paid early in the spring had been complied with, for military and marine charges, coals, stores, WHEN it is said that the British are not a war- his communications could never have been cut ezc., in 1854-5, in excess of the amount like people, all that can be meant is that they off, while the Russians , if they had advanced, disbursed for the same items in 1851-2, love not war for its own sake; as we verily would probably have been signally defeated; and the greater part of this charge was believe certain other nations do. When war it was shown that Lord PANMURE, even so late incurred on account of those provinces. as last August, had most glaringly violated Then, again, we find six hundred and comes we fight with a tenacity and daring which fins well known to him, by stating that twenty - eight thousand pounds paid for have always rendered us victorious in the end Turkey was perfectly well able to do all that military buildings and roads in the Pun• wherever we have had a fair field. But these i was necessary for her Asian army. The jaub and north-west provinces in excess of I very virtues are not without a serious draw- criticism upon the uncertainty and blundering the amount disbursed for similar purposes in I' of our Government when the Russians had 1851-2; and the greater portion of this excess of back. This reliance on our personal qualities taken up their position before Kars and had expenditure also has been caused entirely by the has rendered us rather too contemptuous of cut off its communications, was, in our humble occupation of the Punjaub. To show how the the drudgery of warfare. We will leave opinion, unnecessary, though not uninstructive. Indian accounts are at the present day doe- to other nations their science, organi sation, Kars was really lost when the determination toyed, in order to vindicate a particular line of and vast military materiel ; we have that was taken to afford it no assistance in the policy, we may mention a fact which it is in spring; and the deliberations in July and the power of any member of the Legislature within us wo think can afford to dispense August, with the subsequent failure of the re • to verify, and which is this :—The great object with all this toilsome preparation. Has it not lieving expedition under OMER PACHA, only has been to show that Pegu is a paying pro- always been so? Why should we be wiser or showed how fatal and irremediable were the vince, but if the cost of the additional troops vi o.se than our ancestors? That these are the consequences of that decision transmitted by absolutely required for its protection had been sentiments of two-thirds of our country- Lord CLARENDON to Constantinople in the charged against it, the expenditure so exile men, modified, perhaps, but not materially previous April. His sanction of projects of bited would have established an exactly con- weakened by recent events, we make no relief, when those projects were too late, was Crary result. The Madras army was, there- manner of doubt ; and when these are fortified an admission in itself of that charge of want fore, augmented by the number of men by the opinions of the economic school, who of foresight and energy which Mr. WHITESIDE necessary to supply the deficiency ; and while object to armaments on grounds both con- so conclusively made out. no charge whatever on this score appears in scientious and pecuniary, it behoves us to con- the accounts of Pegu, we find an excess over eider in what way our late sad experience may former years of a hundred and eleven thou- be made most practically available. We sup- THE INDIAN ACCOUNTS. sand pounds in the military charges of pose, indeed, if it were clearly understood that THE Indian accounts for the year 1854.5, Madras. We also find an excess of thirty our choice lay between these two alternatives presented to Parliament in the present ses- thousand pounds in the expenditure for mili- —either to maintain a costly and extensive sion, show an estimated deficit of two million tary buildings in that Presidency, the greater military system in full working order, or to be five hundred and forty-three thousand pounds. part fr of which is very likely to have arisen disasters liable at any time to recently the same melancholy the same cause. which have Our readers will have b een p re p are d f or this, To disguise expenditure in this manner is even the Manchester gentlemen would scarcely as it is what we long since predicted would be simply an act of trickery and dishonesty, and hesitate between them. But the English the case. The reality, however, will prove the fraud is sure in the end to recoil upon the people have a kind of instinctive belief that authors of it, however it may be found by them such is not the case. They are influence d b y worse than is thus c a l cu l a t e d on , f or th ere can be no doubt th a t i n many i nstances t h e esti- at present to serve their turn. The broad fact a variety of feelings, all, however, tending to is net to be got over by legerdemain of this the same conclusion. Some think if another mate of revenue is much too high. We kind, that the accounts show an excess war broke out we should have better generals; have gone through the several items care- of expenditure in 1854-5 over that exhibited in some that we should have fairer play ; others, fully, and have no hesitation in saying that 1851 2of no less than two millions nine hun- again, that wars will grow less and less fre- t ' dred and fifty-three thousand pellicle. queue and that we really need give ourselves the actual rec e ipt s w ill f a ll s h or t o f t h e Another broad fact is an equally stubborn one, no concern about the matter. Now, as we estimated receipts by at least four hundred that there is an annually increasing Indian think it is not safe to rely upon either of these I and thirty-seven thousand pounds. The real deficit of almost three millions sterling. At suppositions, while at the same time we see defi cit will thus be close upon three millions the same time the Government confesses that clearly enough that the country will not sterling, even if the probable expenditure the Indian revenues are incapable of ex p a n- tolerate any permanent augmentation of our should not prove to have been as much under- sion; and nothing can be more true as long as military force, it may be worth while to inquire estimated as the probable receipts have been the Present system shall be Pursued. On the whether there he any method of improving our I ' ver ' e stimated—a thin not unfrequentl the contrary, remissions of revenue are talked of efficiency without violating the traditional ease If, as is said by the friends of Lord as the only means of drawing anything from prejudices of the nation. lesuousie, the whole of his annexations have ryots whom taxation has already reduced to If we regard the late campaign purely from -- gee moved moat profitable to us, how fearfully the lowest state. In the meanwhile, however, a soldier's point of view, we shall doubtless mismanaged our older provinces must have the government . of India must be carried on, consider our repulse at the Redan as the most been by him to exhibit such a result ! If the and loans will prove, under the present cir- serious misfortune of the war. How is it that gain on the former has been a million sumstances of India, very hard to raise. The the conquerors of Alma and Inkermann, where annually, then the loss on the latter must last Five per Cent. Stock is at a discount ; the Russians confesserev put forward their amount to about four millio n s ye ar ly, a nd an increased rate of interest must be given, best troops, were twice . 'beaten . back by the t hey must have been daily more and more de- therefore, or no money whatever will be ob. dispirited and war worn garrison of Sebes- annexation, terionaing in his hands. Are the advocates tamed. Even then the matter will still be one of topol? The answer is, that between the regi- ofadhere to theirper fas argument nefas, prepared to difficulty, for in the present impoverished ments who fought in the first named actions, to its e when thus pushed state of the services the members of them and the brave but unsucceesfulassailants of the that the legitimate conclusion ? Will they admit have little to invest, while the great r esource Redan, there was a wide difference, a. difference countries held longest by us are the that forme rl lin the native princes may which, in the case of a nation maintaining so most deteriorated and the deepest sunk in now be looked upon as entirely cut off. small a standing army as ours, must inevitably fin • ancuil exhaustion and embarrassment, and Marked out as they are openly pro that it is•. happen at the commencement of every war. only in the new and not yet beg. claimed to be for destruction, as so on Our few trained soldiers are killed off before we game districts seized from native princes that as opportunity serves , they would he have any more ready to take their place. w e , of can find revenue enough to cover the costs worse than madmen to invest any more of Many of the troops engaged on the 18 t h o f occupation and Each aid towards the their accumulations in Government loans. To June and 7th of Se p tember were ignorant of g en eral expenses of the Indian Government do so would be to Place their wealth at the the management of their rifles ; and what a as to enable bane nipes u sto stave off for a time the mercy of a body which proclaims its right to vast amount of rawness this single fact im- simply as„ fate? lf this be so, we would seize and appropriate it at any moment to the plies, our readers can easily understand. Indi an K whether a severer sati r e on our providing salaries for its friends ; or, in other This, then, is the one point to which we must Government could possibly be exhi- words, to the general purposes of the State. address ourselves. Our system should be so , THE INDIAN ACCOUNTS. THE Indian accounts for the year 1854.5, presented to Parliament in the present ses sion, show an estimated deficit of two million five hundred and forty-three thousand pounds. Our readers will have been prepared for this, as it is what we long since predicted would be the case. The reality, however, will prove worse than is thus calculated on, for there can be no doubt that in many instances the esti mate of revenue is much too high. We have gone through the several items care fully, and have no hesitation in saying that the actual receipts will fall short of the estimated receipts by at least four hundred and thirty-seven thousand pounds. The real deficit will thus be close upon three millions sterling, even if the probable expenditure should not prove to have been as much under estimated as the probable receipts have been over - estimated—a thing not unfrequently the e ase. If, as is said by the friends of Lord DALsousix, the whole of his annexations have pioved most pr o fit a bl e t o us, h ow f ear f u ll y mismanaged our older provinces must have been by him to exhibit such a result ! If the gain on the former has been a million annually, then the loss on the latter must amount to about four millions yearly, and they must have been daily more and more de tenorating in his hands. Are the advocates of annexation, per las et nefas, prepared to adhere to their argument when thus pushed to its legitimate conclusion ? Will they admit that the countries held longest by us are the 'est dete r i orate d and the deepest sunk in fi n is only and embarrassment, and that it only in the new and not yet beg guti red districts seized from native princes that can find revenue enough to cover the costs of occupation, and Flush aid towards the general expenses of the I n di an G overnmen t as to enable us to stave off for a time the bankrupt's fate? If this be so, we would Indian simply as k whether a severer satire on our Government could possibly be exht- THE MILITIA. WHEN it is said that the British are not a war like people, all that can be meant is that they love not war for its own Bake ; as we verily believe certain other nations do. When war comes we fight with a tenacity and daring which have always rendered us victorious in the end wherever we have had a fair field. But these very virtues aro not without a serious draw back. This reliance on our personal qualities has rendered us rather too contemptuous of the drudgery of warfare. We will leave to other nations their science, organi cation, and vast military materiel ; we have that within us wo think can afford to dispense with all this toilsome preparation. Has it not always been so? Why should we be wiser or uo. se than our ancestors? That these are the sentiments of two-thirds of our country men, modified, perhaps, but not materially weakened by recent events, we make no manner of doubt ; and when these are fortified by the opinions of the economic school, who object to armaments on grounds both con scientious and pecuniary, it behoves us to con sider in what way our late sad experience may be made most practically available. We sup pose, indeed, if it were clearly understood that our choice lay between these two alternatives —either to maintain a costly and extensive military system in full working order, or to be liable at any time to the same melancholy disasters which have recently befallen us— even the Manchester gentlemen would scarcely hesitate between them. But the English people have a kind of instinctive belief that such is not the case. They are influenced by a variety of feelings, all, however, tending to the same conclusion. Some think if another war broke out we should have better generals; some that we should have fairer play ' • others, again, that wars will grow less and less fre quent, and that we really need give ourselves no concern about the matter. Now, as we think it is not safe to rely upon either of these suppositions, while at the same time we see clearly enough that the country will not tolerate any permanent augmentation of our military force, it may be worth while to inquire whether there be any method of improving our efficiency without violating the traditional prejudices of the nation. If we regard the late campaign purely from a soldier's point of view, we shall doubtless consider our repulse at the Redan as the most serious misfortune of the war. How is it that the conquerors of Alma and Inkermann, where the Russians confesserlv put forward their best troops, were twice 'beaten back by the dispirited and war worn garrison of Sebas topol? The answer is, that between the regi ments who fought in the first named actions, and the brave but unsuccessful assailants of the Redan, there was a wide difference, a. difference which, in the case of a nation maintaining so small a standing army as ours, must inevitably happen at the commencement of every war. Our few trained soldiers are killed off before we have any more ready to take their place. Many of the troops engaged on the 18th of June and 7th of September were ignorant of the management of their rifles ; and what a vast amount of rawness this single fact im plies, our readers can easily understand. This, then, is the one point to which we must address ourselves. Our system should be so THE PRESS.