Star. — London, England, 1816-02-21 00:00:00

Let y e by ley • nts, dty asi ty - 1 otl ... .' _ • • ;k r attnisrancr., he would - have been re. / 7 0 4 to despair. Was it then probable that the I le would be less satisfied than their' King had more re ason to be displeased than he bad, there was not a time when the Collectors of Taxes alb a mongst them, for the purpose of raising rise ea rns by which the forei g n army that governed was was to be paid , that the y would not curse fo. ,ira - • terferen Free nd that family fur which it was The ch nation had also another reason reeled.displeased, they had been despoiled of the be „ on e couection of pietnres, and dbtwitl3standing that had been said of the justice of this measure, 'c ould not approve of it. The Honourable Mem. e t h e n instanced the case of Austria, who had got os ession of the liberty and independence of Venice I dle same means by which France became pos. pie d of the Corinthian horses. They were the re fs of the same war, and yet, though Austria boast lobe strict justice of having the horses restored on i r part of France, she did not feel herself bound to I se back her possession of Venice.—(Hear, hear). — the general view of these Treaties, and from the erous precedent which they went to establish, he W o ppose the Address that sanctioned them. o r . it. WARD contended, that the conduct pur by our Government was perfectly consistent •,, t he wisest policy. After Bonaparte had been d o wn, the great object was, to erect a solid and Government in France. The first and greatest • of all was, a put him down but he denied that * g e had ever been g iven nthat Louis XVIII. at be restored, provided it could not be done • tly with the wishes of France and the safety Lope. He denied, therefore, that there had been t hing like duplicity zo France in the conduct of Allies at Vienna. It was another question, Louis XVIII had been placed on the throne France against the will of the French people. He .tended, and he believed, that the majority of the ni b people, not armed and not Jacobins, winked the return of Louis ; and when he did return, he received with acclamations. It would have been „fauna with common sense, and with justice,. the Allies to say to Louis—"" Go back to Ghent, wait there till we can ascettain whether the peo will elect you as their King " He had been on Throne a short time before, had been driven y by a Jacobin military force, and when that force put down, he had a right to come back again.— t the year 1793, when the question respecting the • of interference in the concerns of France, &cussed in that House, the opinion of Mr. ke was, that the neighbouring countries had a to abate the nuisance then existing in France, ~ which infected the whole vicinage of natioas.— Byte observed at the same time, that the case Poland had nothing to do with the question, be . the transactions in Poland did net affect any co untry, He contended then, that our Go. had a right to interfere with and endeavour imoy another Government. when the latter . • in itself the seeds that must produce the .inolution of all other Governments. Without en tering into the question of legitimacy, he would met to the argument of a young Member on the .tber sided the House, that a King was a fair object (choice, although lie might not be popular, when • bgidmacy nu founded on hereditary right, and • utterable with true policy"; but it was his firm be . tbat if the military and jacobinical spirit were re -. Louis XVIII. ascended the Throne in conse oil th i orq 1 . 1 1 , nti I Fran ing, be I e. i so 4;I C191:111 ;:tanct awe I( lycaz very b n i ai en r, Aar.' iuni ism of the free choice and wishes of the people of ram He was ready to admit, that the people of France did not rejoice in tht paying of contributions, kilt believed they rejoiced in the abolition of the re a nooary Government. The Hon. Gentleman aspoke last, bad talked of the danger likely to a horn combinations of different countries against - country, and the future consequences to our country. To this he would say, that the cons. non in question was one of self-defence and rte y; that such another combination was never yto happen unless there should be an equal ne ty ; end that England would never have OCC 4- 10 dread such a combination. It wos not an at kon the people of France, but an eff )rt to sup iss a dangerous part of a vicious and restless body,' i •binical army, which, if suffered to exist, woulkl a let the world be quiet. As to the conduct of Allies respecting the works of art, he fully coin. in the sentiments contained in the Duke of Wel lton'i'letter ; it was necessary to read to the en a great moral lesson ; it was necessary that iheirld see and witness their humility. When las in France, the people he conversed with would believe that we had ever gained a naval victory them ; they seculd not believe that Count de was taken by Lord Rodney. It was necessary they shoild see the works of are, of which they palled other nations, taken away and restored, Weir nghtful mire's. It had been said, that the y provided no security for the Netherlands.' ail the wars that had oaken place for upwards of musty, these countries had constautly been the tof attack with France. They could not de themselves, nor could Austria or Spain defend i The reason they were so defenceless was— of their being at so great a distance from the of their Government ; and the best arranxement that of placing them under a strong Govern- 1 on the spot : the Netherlands,' therefore, were to Holland, and the whole kingdom, with the lice of allies, would always be competent to its' defence. There was a powerful union in Ger which would be always ready to act in the de af Belgium. In whatever way he considered hole Treaty, there was subject for congratula., lad for praise to t h e Noble Lord, for having, in of the deliberations, contribu:ed so largely him safety of Europe—an object for the at., tof which there was now a more solid pro tium ever had been before in any period of his- In short, he never in his life gave a vote with . willingness or pleasure than he did on this oc io support of the Address. .ELLioTr said, in the discussion of this he should strictly confine himself to ten or Kilns. lie never entered on any subject with . Pain than the present, on account of his being to diffe r from many Gentlemen whom be !WI, and with whom he had generally agreed ''r respect s. T he late war was in the fi rst in directed agai nst t h e person of B onaparte, and that .l object was attained the other events that /.144 f°11 " 114 , acuul co:MC(I4OICW llits bat lepul 911,1 • . i • . object, after the overthrow of Bonaparte, undoubtedly must have been the restoration of the legitimate Sore- - ; reign of France. Louis XVIII. was the legitimate successor to Louis XVII. as he was the heir of Louis XVI. who was most unlatifullir, Unjustly, and cruelly put to death. (Hear, hear). He was far from being any' thing like an adtocate for what was called the divine right of Kings; hut in looking at the different . orders of society, he was persuaded a there was such thing as hereditary prescriptive Mo., narchy, and such a thing as hereditary prescriptive ' Nobility, not existing by divine right, but in conse• quence of human institutions. To such authorities obedience was dtie in virtue of a moral Obligition, and that obedience of course became a duty. 'There might, indeed, be eases of imperative necessity, which would oblige a peciple to take back the Government from those who held and abused it; but the strongest argument existed at all times against the doctrine of election—that doctrine which went to give to the people of a country the power of electing a Sove reign according to their will and caprice. Such a doctrine was exactly on a par with the doctrine of divine right; one extreme was as absurd as the other. But the imperative necessity he spoke of, by which I a 'people might be obliged to remove their rulers, never did exist in France. When a Revolution took ' place in our nwn country, it was directed against a King who attempted to destroy the liberties of his people ; but in France, the Revolution was directed against a King who had . been eminently layout* . We to liberty ; who, so 'far from attempting. to go vern in an arbitrary manner, !tad convoked the States General of his kingdom : that Revolution, therefore, was frunded in violence and injustice.— He was fully convinced of this fact, that a great ma jority of the French people were attached to L iuis XVIII. ; such was the disposition of the people in the Nerds and in the West of France. The very character of the Chamber of Deputies was a proof of this fact. It mattered not how the Members of that Assembly had been chosen, but such as they were, they certainly must be considered in the light of Re presentatives, and it was impossible that such an assemblage should not represent the sentiments of a very great body of the French people. When he looked upon the Monarch now restored to the throne of France in this point of view—when he beheld a revolted army disbanded—when he saw the elements of danger which arose out of a military population,, nearly suppressed, he could not consider the present situation of Europe in any other light than one of comparative security—when he saw that a great mass of military power had been dissipated as it now was, he thought there was great comparative security; but at the same time he believed there was sonic dagger, such as made great precaution neces sary. He never considered it a desirable ttiite.., that any reduction should take place in the territories o; France; there was no ground now to dread 11.1 power, and that power was not likely to be increased by the extent of territory she now possessed. The dangerous power displayed by France. since the Rs volution, arose out of toe distempered impulse of th.tt Revolution, and the persevering Steetd:llCSS as well as enthusiasm with which the Revolutionists putsaed their object. But no such daogeroos impuiies had ever arisen from the strongest ambition ul Louis Ow Fourteenth. Under her Monarchy this d tnger was never to be apprehended from France.- It w.ts not necessary then to take away Alsace or Lanai:le, or any other territory; because by so doing there would ever exist a ground of jealousy and itri• cation in France. B.;si.les, setti n g the example of spoliation once, wouid lead to dangerous spolia tion: on the part of Austria and other Powers, and no one could tell where the danger might end.— It was, in tact, essential to the liberties of gitropit that France should retain the integrity of het tern. tories. Without regard, however, to the military force kept upon the frontiers of France, that w.a., n line of policy which might be imperiously called for by the existing state of France ; the measure might be justified on the same grounds which would render it necessary for a Civil Magistrate to have a military force in readiness to call out in c ile he should stain! in need of its assistance for preserving the peace.— For this reason, he thought that the army kept on the frontier of France was at least a necessary evil. Although it was stipulated that tnis force should fir paid by France, yet it would cause sortie Mere tse of expense to us on account of the difference in exchange between French and English money. The additional expense would be equal to that of keeping use 6400 men, and that was an expense which the country ought not to grudge. A great deal had been said about ex penses, about keeping up a large establishment, and about the establishment during the peace of 1802; but must not every body know that there was the widest difference between the state of Europe of that time and at the present; that in 18u2 Bonaparte had a pre do:ninating influence over die Cola:twat of Europe, and that he was fitting out armaments iu his ports. There was no comparison, therefore, between the peace of that time and the present conjuncture, one was a period of danger, the other one of comparative security. At present we had no reason to tear the navy of any country in the world, we were at peace with all the world, and therefore our military esta blishment might be with perfect safety, and ought to boon the lowest passible scale. The military esta blishment WAS certainly too great ; it would'be insa. pity to think that we ought to be a continental power; and in time of peace, when every thing around us was so secure, he could not see any reason why we should convert ourselves into a military nation. To do so would be to cut off the vet y spring of our prosperity; it was wholly unnecessary, and it any danger should again arise, we could in a very short time rise op again in all our military strength. (Hear; hear.) — lie should now refer to another point. • There was a fatal word Called ladesusity, which had carried us into various extremes and difficulties ; and it would be still attire difficolt to apply it practically to France, nothing could be more difficult for us than to avail ourselves olany of the resources il Frante. It would even be intended with dangerous consequences, and for that reason he altogether disapproved of the part of the treaty *MO cothpelled France tO pay any con tribution& Upon the whole View of the question, there appeared to him some parts of the treaty which he disapproved of, and on that monist he should oppose the aaldtess. Mr. SMYTH (of Canibridgey considered the in. demnity as a mite trifle compared to the vast expen d dime of the cowry, He highly censured the con • Jun of Government in icept , n ip.solztge a stand . . ins army, in a period of peace, when there wee no danger,. when.no ground 'whatever existed to Call for such .an enormous establiOaiellt. He not only oh• jetted to the maintaining of SJ,00() men- in "'lance, but thou ht it highly improper that . they should , be paid by France. A most Mischievous doctsiur now got into fashion in ittlitation of the practices of the Continent; it was that of making this country a military Power, a thing wholly inconsistent with our interests, our liberties, and our Constitution. Mr. BANKES said, he did not think, that al though circumstances Might make it necessary to ic,:cp up a large establishment on the French frontier, it was necessary to keep up large military establish.' meats in other places. He cosidered the latter as a great, lavish, and unnecessary expenditure of our . resources. With respect to the Treaty, he wholly differed from those Gentlemen who said that it held dot no permanent security. • He could ,hArsili contemplate any Treaty which, altogether, gate us such a permanent and solid s y sre m of tranquillit. He was sure no party in Fr4nce was so powerful as that of the Royalists. The restoration of the Bout- bons was always an object with our Government. — This was plain from Lord Greville's famous letter during his administration. It was not entirely the ambition of Bonaparte we sere at war with ;we were also at war with the restlessness of the French armies. In - the dissolution of those arrnies, there torsi he- saw every fair prospect of a permanent peace. We were also secured against the unquiet spirit of France by the cession - of some of her fortresses. Our present distresses were only those common to the ter minatioti of all wars. As to a pre ference for the army over the navy, he was sure his Majesty's Government dict-tot conternalate any thug like it. The Honourable Oentleinan concluded a long and argumentative speed, b strongly support ing the Address. Mr. HO It NE R, in rising to express his opinion on the Treaty before the House, apologitsd for offei inn; himself at so late an hour, and on isitestinn of such great importance, and requested its indulgence to- wards him, as nothing but an anxiety rehir' lie tell that his opinion might be lumv it, because though he had no difficulty giving a negative to the Address and nn affirmative .to the Amendment or his Noble Friend, there were some principles in that Amend ment which, though they received his firm .assent, were assented to by him in adiffercut sense Irons that which hid been assigned to them by many of his aaJ even his Noble Friend ( Lord Milton) himself. Tnae was one subject which had beets touched on by every Gsntlentan, anJ on which lie east eothieg new to offer, in which lie j shied with the morninsuus aad warm feeling of the House.— Whateter opinion he entertained as to the originas non of the war—opinions ma tounisd on the prefr bilay of success, nut on other grounds—whatever opinion he enertained as to the negociationsi by which that w.tr had terminated, he was not' sins' to estiit in the glory of his Majesty's armies. Teeir ga.:ant servants, t!.? defenders of the country, had, in pet °tieing the commands of the Crown and Peril:orient, displayed a heroism which had• no elem.' ple in the history of the stolid ; under the conduct of 4 Cl.int in his own lige at least uneqoalled, brute ac e knowiedgmeat of our enemy, by the acknowledge swan of Europe, our armies had established the tact, that the infantry of England had nu Neal i• the world. This glory was a great augmentehon of our n ttiorsil streneth ; for it was a narrow and insufficient ves.v 01 the effects of military glory if we looked only es tie there momentary satistaction, add treelec:rd' the strength thus given, and which from 114 tanner source could be derived. The military strength thus seqiiired, and to thy possession of which we could not be properly said to have been entileJ before, was to be exerted in the sacred tssk of defending oar cootary, it it siettid he attacked, and also in interte. ,once iii the .flans et the Continent, in so far as that Owe:elegie: WAS lICC.'SS try to our security, and in pc:). portion as this glory was important, bbeuld we avoid us has. trd it in imhocessary quarrels, or in the ex.:la :is:4oM) of titijiist ambition. He should not discuss the diffstene (pest:oils which arose as to the transac tions of the Government bt tween the battle of Wa terloo and the neg Jciavons of which the result was then hetore them. Some were duhions ;as to others, the course which should have been adopted was ob vious, he should avoid, because they were questions of minor iaiportance than the main q iestion, viz. Wiie• Lim the security prsscnted to thelll was adequate to the pill pose of preserving peace and repose in Europe; and S.:Jly, because they were mostly mixed up with ?rend* politics, and would lead to discussions on those ques tions, which howeesr they might interest France, should be avoided by Members of a British Parlia ment. One objection which he had to the Treaty before them, was, that it implied a great degree of interierence in the affairs of France—interference net necessary to which our attention was fixed on her sufferings, and factions, and withdrawn front the proper subject of our care, the defence of our own liberties .and institutions—a subject wide enough for that House, and sufficient to engage all its attention. He objected also to the Treaty, that it did not give this country the security which it had 4 right to expect. The Ministers had at last disclosed their policy, which .they had at first thought proper to disguise—Abe determination to.torce the Bourbon family on the people of France—contrary to their unequivocal declat loos, and contrary tai the faith of the Crown pledged to the Parliament of Great, Bri tain, and to the nation et France. It must, in deed, be within the recollection of the House, that when it was put to the Noble Lord, whether the re storation of tile Bourbons was • the objet of the war, he distinctly and repeatedly disclaimed k.— It was notorious that, upon this understanding, se.. veral Gentlemen is that House voted for the war.— Yet it was now evident, from the Treaties upon the Tables that the restoration of the Bourbons, and their maintenaneeupon the throne of France, was !tally and truly the object of the war. Why then was not this object Openly and manually avowed at the out. set ? With what view was it disguised ? Why, ob. vwusly for. the purpose of obtaining votes in that Houses and practising delusion upon England, upon France, and upon Europe.— (Near, hear).—The effect of this delusion and duplicity upon France was, as he • undeittood frotu the best authority, to dispose the well-informed and the reflecting part of France, who belonged to no faction—who were M hostile so Bona /'parse as they wets indifferent to Ills Bourbon:a...to. • . • i - i .• • , ? % 4 • • , ..•a l • t,t look to the allied armies as deliverers , as about :z afford the trench nation en npportuoity of Cbusieg a Government agreeable to its nwn wishei,and itire a rests. Tae effete asee . indeed Stich as to rieutrattize a great and respe cta bl e hrpportion of the French, sell fl, illstead of supporting iloaihatrte, rather ende rvimyri.,l r•:" keep down the Spirit of tne people. and to eonfist: in the decLarations of the Allies.—(Hear, hear). -- Many Frenchmen believed those declarations, err.- firmed as they so often were by the solemn pledges ef the Ministers of England. But the believers were dupes.—For hieuelf, as well as for' several of 11:i friends, he could state that he never was duped by these declarations, or by the pledges of the Noble Lord, beciuse he always thought that to be the hole object of'the war; which events had demonstrated. But he would :irk same Gentle Men in that Heuse who ltouglit differently, who grounded their votes upen ar entire credit in the professions of the NoUe Lord, how they now felt? But he would appe ti to the whole House, to Parliament, and the county, 41414 ought to be the feeling of a proud and honest nation, tenacious of its character for good faith, urn cdmparing the pledges of its Government at the com mencement of the war with the conduc of that Gentleman at its enisitiusion.—(lfeer, hear, hear.) — Sorry he most sensioly was to observe, tat at tarp the melancholy symptoms of the times in which we lived, the bonds of good faith had lost their former strength, and it was a most aal ctiog refl:ction, par. tieularly through the conduct of the Government of 'this count' y —into the description of that conduct he did net, on this occasion, chink it necessary to eet••r, several instances in support of his observation must be fresh in the recollection of that House. But it was enough to refer to the case upon %ibid. he Fi c k been animadterting ; for it was no* manifest; not withstanding the repeated pledges of the British Mi nister and the Allies, that the war was toidertakae, nut with a view to remove Bonaparte, or to put down tile military spirit of France, but to replace and main tain the Bourbons open the French Throne. If it were preteedesi, a, he understood hid been some where said, that 0 e. aondect of the French army in itiveding the Multi:lends released the Allies from their pledges not to force a Government urn France, he would ask the Noble Loud and his col. leagues whether they, who always alleged that the French people were hostile to Bonaparte, and that he was supported only by the army, could' consistently maintain that the coectuct of that atmy could relea.6 the Allies from their solemn pledges to the people sng° force any particular Government upon them ? But yet this Qtavernmetit was imposed tipo i France, and it appeired that with a view to in:in:ant it, ce:- tain precautionary measures, as the Noble Lord termed them, were adopted. Among those met sums a large pecuniary contribution was levied, and this contribution the Noble Lord called, rather sin. gelariy, a main feature of the trenqudi•zing policy to be acted upon in rrancc. This was t zally a most extraordinary view, perhitr,s peculiar to the mind if the No:rle Lerd. For it was the first time he had heard that to subject any people to a large pecuniary contribusion was a good ...lode at prodheiog their tranquillity. Certainly the Noble Lord cou' .. nil haire learned diet doctrine in England, where a large Peru= teary contribution was not very apt to produce popu lar treuqullity. Indeed, he rather apprehended that sin oppose,- feeling would arise in this country, it that contrieution were enforced by a foreign army. Why then should the Noble Lord calcu- Inte upon a different result in France ?—(firee).... .But upon this point it seemed that according to the doctrine of some Gentlemen the contribution' raised in France, instead of taking into the pockets ea the people, and being placed under the controul of Pat- Ilan:eta, uas to become the property of the Privy- Purse, to be applied, perheps, to enable the Pope to carry home some works of art front Paris, or to erect a statue to Henry IX. (Cardinal York.) (A laugh, ivd Thar, hear.) It: (Mr. Horner) wished, how. ever, toat this novel (loco ine might now be repelled as inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of this c 'Lwy. But as a farther ptecaution.try measure to keep the Bourbons upon the throne, it appeared Olaf 15ii,000 men, compoi;ed of different nations, were placed in France.. So it was calcul uted that the pre. settee of th.s foreign lot ce, under the command of a General who was the Native of a country always the rival of France, was likely, by &gees, to reconcile the French people to the • Government which that ((Ave had imposed upon them. But what Could he the character of the minds which entertained such a calculation ? (Loud eels* of Hear, hear.) — Would not every rational being rather conclude that the presence of such a force must serve to form a perpetual fester in the breast of France—(afear, hear, hear)—instead of contributing to the tranquillity and contentment of that country ? But according to the exotesa opinion of some Gentlemen; that whin was most galling and offensive to the French, formed an argument to justify the expectation of order and re r pose. Those only, howeier, who entertained such a singular notion could, he believed, alone concur in the views of the Allies in placing an armed force in France. • And what estimate must those Gentlemen have formed of the character of the French people— distinguished as that people always were for national pride and military spirit, how, he world ask, was that proceeding likely to operate upon them, which was calculated to rouse the most stagnant sluggish nation upon earth ? Hog; were the French people t, feel towards a Sovereign twice forced upon them by an army of foreign bayonets? For when that' army was on the first instance withdrawn, that Sovereign was soon compelled to quit the country; and he would put it to the candour of any Man, if the French people were friendly to that Sovereign, wily should it be neceissiry to maintain him on the throne by the assistance of a foreign army ? The dilemnui was obvious—either the French were friendly to the King, or they were not. If the foriner, the foreign army was unnecessary to the maiatainance of the Ring; but if unfriendly, the presence of this army was calculated to augment their dislille.—(Hear.)--. For what could be more galling to a Frenchman Clan to suppose his Ling guilty of that which was the greatest treason any Sovereign could commit, namely, that of inviting the assistance of a foreign three: While the French were our active *names In war, we must rejoice in their defeat; but now that they were completely fallen, must not nay considerate man feel for a. people sd circumstanced ? ,Was there, besides, no danger to be apprehended from the result of a national movement agaiust the Fit .4 Ihe 04 1 1441 hide . i t boi (S;rl awl s beg ka l i take le chi wall rieace g dfi that 6 .y It Ef titer thi od ir ill Ei I we, at it lid slat bs ion di !hde co Merdmf lad &td good: y - oal C°°' fivi :ed doe whom t I i