The Press. — London, England, 1855-02-10 00:00:00

FEBRUARY 10, 1855. invisibility will be given to all the jobbers and intriguers who enter the public service from mercenary considerations. Corruptiouists seeking by clandestine organisation to make themselves powerful in the State, will then be allowed a full licence for realising their dark schemes. The public offices will become sinks of jobbery, and England would be ruled, without the publicity of a free country, or of that vigorous unity which is one of the palliating causes that make despbtisms tolera ble in certain states of society. Such are the results certain to follow should Parliament abdicate its functions as a court of inquiry into the greatest official mismanagement that has taken place in England since the time of the Alnerican war. On the other hand, the fact of an inquiry taking place under the Authority of the House of Commons will at once vivify the public service of the country. It will quicken the sluggards with now sense of responsibility, and it will stimulate expiring spirits with the animating sense that they do not toil in the dark, but that their work is performed under the public cognisance. In such a moment of emergency the public service of England mnst be taught by a conspicuous instance that retributive inquiry, and consequent praise or censure (as the case may be), is certain to follow when necessity demands investigation. The youngest man in the civil departments ought to be taught a wholesome dread of a Court-Parliamentary—just as the lowest pri vate in the army is compelled to have a dread of a court-martial. The pubhc out of doors, also, has a right to have its feelings consulted in this grave case. People have read what has been written against Lord RAGLAN, and they have also perused what has been offered in apology for the infatuated 6onduct of the Duke of NEW CASTLE in aspiring to rule the War Department. They desire to know exactly where the truth lies. They begin to dread lest our leaders at all sides are too much disposed to " stand by their order," and screen their associates from censure. The people of England do not want to have "things made pleasant" for those who have destroyed a noble army and left it in a " horrible and heartrending condition." Nor are these the only words of• Lord JOHN RUSSELL that deserve particular notice, when considering the subject of an inquiry into the War Department. On Thursday night Lord JOHN RUSSELL passed a marked eulogy on Lord RAGLAN, and hoped that " he would obtain from the country " the respect to which he was so justly en " titled." Now, it is certain that defamatory reports were spread about the non-efficiency of the Gallant Commander in the Crimea, nor could there be much difficulty in tracing these reports to circles in close connection with the Aberdeen Cabinet. The late Leader of the House of Commons, aware of all that had passed, praises the British General, and by doing so necessarily fastens on the War office in England the tremendous responsi bility of " the something inexplicable " in the " horrible and heartrending" state of the army. The remarks, also, of Lord JOHN RUSSELL upon the " ribald press " which had vilified Lord RAGLAN further enforce the necessity for a stringent and conclusive inquiry, which shall bring the whole truth before the country. Reason and sentiment, therefore, alike con cur in demanding that the Committee of In quiry should proceed. For the future efficiency of the public service the inquiry is required by common sense, and, as a matter of senti ment, people wish to have some satisfaction for the feelings which have been agonised by the horrors of a starving army, without clothes or shelter, on the bleak Crimean hills. The authors of those horrors, or those who largely shared in their perpetration, must be disco vered. They must not be allowed to escape in secrecy; and, not only as a punishment for their misdeeds, but as a warning for others, the in quiry must proceed. Never was there a ease where it was more necessary to apply the sound penal principle of the law, " that the " punishment of a few should take place to in " fuse wholesome fear into the hearts of all!" 127 would be immeasurably inferior to the former. In planning an expedition the cardinal virtue is foresight. In dealings with troops the chief virtue of a State is good faith. If the Mediterranean is garrisoned with irre movable Militia, where is our foresight? If wo afterwards remove them to the scat of war, where is our good faith? SIR C. NAPIER AT THE MANSION HOUSE. THOUGH the week has been fertile in events, scarcely one of them is more important than the speech of Sir CHARLES NAPIER at the Mansion-house on Tuesday night. The state ments made by the Gallant Admiral are more remarkable on account of the precipitate boasting of Mr. °swim in the House of Commons, " that no one had attacked the "Admiralty." The Secretary is fond of trite quotations, and, in perusing Sir CuAaLEs NApiza's catalogue of charges against the Admiralty, the member for Middlesex must have recollected the proverbial caution about not " hallooing until out of a wood." Never was the saying more applicable than in the present instance to the rampant and indiscreet gentleman who spoke, amidst " ironical cheers," in the memorable night when the Coalition ignominiously expiated its calamitous career. For it is quite out of the question that Sir CHARLES NAPIER'S speech can pass without the most particular notice, not only from the public at large, but from the heads of the department so openly, clearly, and specially accused. Sir JAMES GRAHAM treated the re marks of Mr. LAYARD On Admiral DUNDAS with a silence certainly supercilious, and possibly meant to be offensive. But it is impossible that a convenient taciturnity can be extended to the precise charges and pithy revelations of Sir CHARLES NAPIER. The late Commander of the Baltic fleet is not likely to be silenced. In the service of the Coalition he lost his popularity, and it is not probable that, to please any Premier, he would now forfeit his character by receding from the plain statement of facts whose narration made a turtle-fed audience gape with astonishment. Let us see how serious is the position in which both Sir JAMES GRAHAM and Sir CHARLES NAPIER stand before the country ; for until this matter is thoroughly cleared up both of these eminent persons arc awaiting a grave verdict of im mense consequence to their personal reputa tions In the first place, it is abundantly evident from the statement of Sir CHARLES NAPIER, either that the Gallant admiral was improperly selected to command the Baltic fleet, or else that he was urged to make an attack which his own mature judgment (approved of after wards by a Council of War) did not deem practicable. It is obvious that, until a conclu sion be arrived at on this plain issue, the late Coalition Ministers will remain obnoxious to the odious charge of having endeavoured to bolster up their waning reputation by urging an admiral to risk her Majesty's fleet in a hopeless case. " I have been very much con " sured by the Government," said Sir CHARLES NAPIER. " They supported the clamour " against me," and " they perverted my lan " guage." Then becoming still more distinct in his charges, he specially referred to the ex traordinary part which was played by the First Lord of the Admiralty. It seems, according to the Admiral, that Sir JAMES GRAHAM wrote telling him to "beware of " stone walls." The First Lord also reminded Sir CHARLES NAPIER that he had been accused of " want of discretion," a charge which our readers may recollect had been actually penned again tl the Admiral by that model of cautious condakt, Lord JOHN RUSSELL. We can easily imagine that the Admiral was often ember. rassed between the bold promptings of his native audacity (proved by deeds of fame) and the overpowering dose of caution administered to him by the First Lord. It appears, how ever, that Sir J. GRAHAM wrote a letter lauding Sir CHARLES NAPIER as :laving behaved with THE PRESS. THE MEDITERRANEAN RESERVE. REINFORCEMENTS Will soon be required urgently in the Crimea, and we are in danger of having a very inadequate number to send. Nlost of our available regiments have already arrived at the seat of war. The Foreign Legion is not yet in existence. The Mediterranean garrisons are below their ordinary strength, and cannot be sent on until relieved by militia regiments from home. The Foreign Enlistment Act has sign ally disappointed the expectations of its authors. According to them, a very short period would suffice to raise a large body of veteran soldiers capable of forming part of Lord Rao LAN'S army, and arriving in sufficient time to co operate in the assault of Sebastopol. Since the passing of the bill, a month and a half has elapsed, and we do not hear of the enlist ment of men enough to form a single battalion. When found, they will need a long interval of drill before they can act together and have confidence in their officers. New regiments are never fit for active service before several months' training. In the summer or autumn we may expect them to be ready for the Crimea. but scarcely before. The Militia Act is being carried out in a most dilatory manner. We were told that the requisite number of regiments could be ob tained immediately, and without the slightest difficulty. It now appears that, by neglect of recruiting, the longest embodied and most efficient regiments have been allowed to be come so weak, that only four or five out of the whole eighteen are able to raise the necessary quota of 540 bayonets. The rest have received an intimation that their services will not be required, and circulars have been despatched to a fresh batch of regiments, all of whom have been but recently embodied. Additional delay will be caused, and imperfectly-drilled soldiers will be sent out; although there can be no doubt that in time the required number will be raised, and that about April or May we may see 10,000 regular troops on their way from Malta, Gibraltar, and the lonian Islands, to join the besieging army. But we must not rest content with this. Supposing these troops to arrive when they are wanted, and to be for the time sufficient for the exigencies of the campaign, the ques tion arises, where are our next reinforcements to come from? Let two or three obstinate battles occur, or a great mortality be occa sioned by the pestilential climate, or enormous reinforcements be poured in by the Czar, or all these to happen together, whence should we draw the fresh troops to support the honour of our arms ? The whole of our disposable army would be already in the Crimea, the Mediterranean fortresses would be garrisoned by depots, and by irremovable militia regi ments, and at home we should have another collection of depots, and a large force of raw militia regiments. It must be remembered that the depOts, under the most favourable circumstances, can only keep up the strength of their own regiments. Hitherto they have not accomplished even that. Where, then, are we to find new forces ? _ _ The only possible plan would be to ask the most efficient militia regiments to volunteer for active service. Of course the regiments to be asked would be those already in garrison in the Mediterranean. Under such circum stances of national peril the request would be a command, which could not be disobeyed. The men who had gone out under a solemn engagement that they should not be sent on would find themselves in a position iu which they were compelled to go on. The public faith would be broken. But another inconvenience would ensue from the want of notice of the intention of Government. Regiments sent out with a prospect of going on would make efforts to fit themselves for warfare. Drill, fortification, and all the studies of the regular army would be prosecuted with diligence. The same would not be the case with officers sent with out a hope of active service or a prospect of rising in the profession of arms. When placed before an► enemy the latter regiments