The Press. — London, England, 1855-03-31 00:00:00

MARCH 31, 1855. 63rd Regiment. This regiment embarked from Ireland in July, being then upwards of 1,000 strong. By the last accounts this number had been reduced to thirty. The means by which they have been killed are, exposure, against which no adequate precautions were taken, and absence of medical assistance, of hospital provisions, and of arrangements for transport —all of which are the necessaries of life to a regiment on foreign service. When the 63rd landed in the Crimea they had with them a large regimental medicine chest. But this had to be left behind as there were no means of transport for it. The regi ment, with the exception of two nights, was without tents for three weeks, the night dews being very heavy, and the cold severe. They took a small supply of medicines with them on the march, but they had a large amount of sickness, and some of these medicines were exhausted in three or four days. The large chest was not landed up to the 12th of Decem ber, when the witness left the Crimea. The bedding for the sick remained on board the Avon. There were no means of transport provided for the sick during the march. The above sentences are a condensation of Mr. FLOWER'S evidence—the next hideous question and answer shall be given verbatim. Mr. LAYARD asks: Did you kare any sick men on the road to die A great many. The next inquiry is : If you had had waggons would you have been able to save those men whom you left behind? yes, if we could have brought them on. The witness goes on to state, that when the wet weather set in the condition of the sick before Sebastopol was " most wretched." The tents were not waterproof even when new. No preparation was made for the sick, who had to lie on the bare ground in their wet clothes. The chief medicine required was opium, and of that they were frequently short. In answer to Sir JOHN PAKINOTON, the witness added that the nurnbez of deaths on board the transports which conveyed the sick to the hospital was increased by the state of neglect in which, there also, the sick were left Thus much for Mr. FLOWER. The next wit ness is Dr. MENZIES, the Deputy-Inspector- General of Hospitals. We shall limit our selves to mere quotations from the evidence, with difficulty wrung from this unfortunate person by Mr. LAYARD, because it is evident that Dr. MENZIES will have to answer else where. His business was to attend to the condition of the hospital at Scutari. In pre paring reports for his superiors he made favorable statements that were not reconcilable with fact. The Doctor is, no doubt, one of the old school, who stick to routine and have a servile reluctance to intrude anything " un pleasant" upon the notice of their betters. Had he made to Lord STRATFORD the report which he has been forced to make to the Committee, good would have been done. But it is not with a narrow-minded underling, but with the state of things to which he testifies, that we have to do. He alleges that there was a want of shirts in the hospitals, that the men were in a filthy condition, that there was a difficulty in obtaining linen, that the ar rangements for cooking were inadequate (other and revolting evidence touching the sending up raw meat to the poor bedridden soldiers has been given), " one kitchen to cook three " meals a day for the men in three wards of " an hospital, each a mile long," but he does not think that any death occurred from the privation of food. To other still more revolt ing details elicited from this witness we can scarcely allude—suffice it to say, that Mr. STAFFORD'S terrible description of the hospital was more than verified out of the mouth of this man MENZIES. Here are two companion pictures, the one showing how the soldiers were dealt with in the field, the other how they were treated in hospital. Here are two illustrations of the merits of that War Department which even Set can find Peelite defenders, though national execration attends every mention of its name. But not even upon that miserable department, chargeable as it individually is for the wanton waste of life and the cruel sufferings described by the Sebastopol witnesses, must the entire weight of popular indignation descend. The THE PRESS. great guilt lies where the great punishment must fall, namely, upon the heads of those who, as General EVANS has distinctly stated, sent out an expedition to the Crimea, in the conviction that there would be no war. For the sake either of a political juggle or a hollow menace, the Aberdeen Administration dared to run the frightful risk of ruining the noblest army ever despatched from England. They sent it out unprovided with what we have called the necessaries of military life. It fought gloriously, despite starvation, priva tion, and the disease occasioned by the cruel treatment to which it has been exposed—it won for us three victories, whose names will die only with the name of England—and it has half perished before the eyes of an indignant nation. Neither to the voice of its deeds, nor of its blood, will the nation's ears be closed. Meantime it is well that the fearful account should be steadily and accurately made up. LORD PALMERSTON AND THE MILITIA. IN a war like the present, undertaken with small military resources against a great mili tary power, the Militia is of the utmost im portance. It affords the only means of raising an army of reserve, and of procuring the necessary supplies of men for the troops on active service. The duty of a statesman is to develop it to the utmost. He ought to embody it as early as possible, to complete its num bers to the highest complement, and to bring it into a state of the most perfect discipline and efficiency. That this has been neglected is apparent to every one, and the consequences are seen in the want of reinforcements for the Crimean army, and the weakness which ex poses us to the ridicule of Europe. During the whole period when the develop ment should have taken place the Militia was in the hands of Lord PALMERSTON. From the first stage of enrolment in December, 1852, down to the end of January last it was under his charge. Ho directed every step that was taken. Parliament assented with the utmost alacrity to every measure that he proposed. The amplest power was given, and everything was left to his discretion. How this unlimited authority was used, and into what state the Militia has been brought, we now proceed to inquire. Four points demand our especial attention : Ist. The English Militia was embodied too late. As our only reserve, it should have been called out the moment we resolved on the Eastern expedition. In the days of Prrr its embodiment was the preliminary of war. War was declared against France on the Ist of February, 1793. The Militia of England had been embodied on the Ist of December, 1792. War was declared on the 18th of May, 1803. The Militia of the United Kingdom had been called out on the 10th of March pre ceding. But what did Lord PALMERSTON do? The Russian Ambassador left London on the Bth of February, 1854; British troops em barked for Malta on the 22nd ; the warlike banquet to Sir C. NAPIER was on the 7th of March ; and war was declared on the 25th. Yet then no step was taken respecting the Militia. It was not till the Ist of May that Lord PALMERSTON introduced a bill to give power for their embodiment, and intimated his intention of calling out 15,000 men. He says that he could not embody them earlier, because the bill of 1852 did not give the ne cessary power. But he had only to ask for such power. Parliament would have passed an act in February as readily as in May. 2nd. The embodiment was too slow. Fifteen thousand men was the number asked, but it was November before they were all embodied. The first two regiments were embodied on the 13th of May. Only thirteen regiments had been embodied on the Ist of August; four more were called out before the Ist of Sep tember; and in the ensuing month another was added to the list. On the Ist of Novem ber the whole number of embodied regiments was eighteen, and their total strength 13,500 men. The news of Inkermann produced a change. In December thirty-seven fresh re giments were called up. But why was this call not made before ? Why were eighteen regiments the sole produce of tho first nine months of the war? 3rd. The ScCtch and Irish Militias were totally neglected. On the Bth of February, in the first fortnight of the session of 1854, Lord PALMERSTON pledged himself to organise these forces. On the 10th of August, two days before the close of the session, the bills were passed. Even then they were not acted on with energy. It was December before the Irish regiments began to be enrolled. They are still but half filled up. The Scotch regi ments are even in worse plight. Men and clothing are alike deficient. 4th. There is a flaw in the obligation of the men to serve. The men enlisted under the act of 1862 were only liable to embodied service in case of invasion. The act of last May com pelled them to serve in every ease of war. The terms of service were changed without their consent. A pledge was given that faith should be kept. But it was disregarded. Under the compulsory power, without taking any pre cautions for re-enlistment, and in spite of wide-spread discontent, Lord PALMERSTON em bodied sixty-five English militia regiments. What was the consequence? So flagrant a breach of faith could not be passed over. It was brought ender the notice of Parliament, and Lord PALMERSTON was compelled to an nounce that the men should be re-enlisted, and that those who were unwilling to serve should he allowed to return home. Probably one-half will return. The embodied militia is 44,000 strong, only one-third of its proper complement. The blunder may cost us 22,000. What is the result? We ought to have 138,000 embodied militiamen. We can only count upon 22,000; and this at a time of unparalled public need ! The English Militia has been mismanaged, the Scotch Militia has been mismanaged, and the Irish Militia has been mismanaged. The mismanagement could hardly be more complete. Had we been asked a year ago how the Militia could be made the least serviceable for the purposes of the war, we should have answered thus :—Embody it at late as possible. Let the embodiment be as slow as possible. Don't begin till May or June, and don't call out any number of regi ments until December. Don't pass the Scotch or Irish Militia acts till the last day of the session. Don't begin to organise the new force until Christmas. And, when public in dignation and calamity have compelled you to raise a force of thirty of forty thousand men, let some flaw appear in their enlistment ; some breach of faith which may compel you to allow one-half of them to return to their homes. So, by you want of foresight, your want of energy, and your blundering incapacity, shall you render the Militia useless, waste millions of money, and cripple the nation in the prose cution of the war. Has not all this been done? THE SARDINIAN LOAN. THZ question of the Sardinian Loan is a very simple one. Is it to be regarded as a subsidy— an aid rendered in the shape of money—or as a commercial transaction ? In other words, do we bribe Sardinia to employ her troops as we wish, or do we merely hack her bill in a friendly manner, satisfied that she is in a position to meet her engagements? In our opinion the loan is a subsidy in disguise, and a subsidy of a very bad kind too. We must be permitted to argue this ques tion quite apart from any sympathies for or against Sardinia. We admire the stand made by that State against Papal domination, and we should be happy to hail the rise of any really independent power in Italy. But how is it that the parties who are most noisy in their congratulations upon Sardinia, being ad mitted to the family of European nations by her participation in the treaty of December 2, say not a word on her exclusion from the Congress of Vienna? She has become a party to the quarrel, but is to be allowed no share in the negotiations entered on to settle it. The explanation, we imagine, is to be found in the 7 11