The Press. — London, England, 1855-05-12 00:00:00

440 would have tried the weak, but they would have invigorated the strong. Difficulties would have established a more practical sys tem and more thorough efficiency in the in ternal system of the corps ; but the inglorious losses of the Militia have had a contrary result. The efficient men have disappeared in a mass, and the raw recruits alone have stayed. Discipline and organisation have been for a time at an end. Esprit de cusps has suffered a temporary annihilation. The Militia has been plunged into a state of chaos, out of which time alone can enable it completely to emerge. Such is the state of a force which ought at this moment to be almost fit for active service. To the nation it is humiliating, but to the culpable Minister it is in the highest degree discreditable. OUR INDIAN ARMY. A CONSIDERABLE personal advantage has been conferred on the Indian army by the late order granting the officers of it the rank and prece dence indicated by their commissions in her Majesty's dominions and elsewhere, instead of in India only, as their commissions run ; but, as Lord ELLENBORMIOR justly observed in the House of Lords, this will prove of little benefit to the State, unless their services be more freely employed in connection with the present war than they have been hitherto• Some of the juniors of the Indian army have, to be sure, gone out to Constantinople as bri gade majors to Lord WILLIAM PAITLET, and in the Land Transport Corps, and others have taken service in the Turkish Contingent ; but this is a division in which the element of jobbing was too rife at the outset to warrant our ex pecting it to increase or even to sustain ado quately the Indian array's ancient fame. Had we seen such names as those of Sir Huon WHEELER, and GRANT, and HANDsCoMBE, and JACK, and MAYNE, and LUMSDEN, figuring in its list of officers, we should have augured well of it ; but, from some cause or other, the flower of the service who were at home would not embark in it, and nothing, we conscien tiously believe, can be expected from it but utter failure. By-the-bye, we forgot that Lord PArimunE appointed an unknown cousin of his as aide-decamp in it—rerhaps that may, in the minds of some, redeem it. But it is not in a military capacity only, or even chiefly, that we should expect advantage to be derived from the employment of Indian officers in connection with the present war. The fact is, that many of them have served nearly all their lives in a civil capacity, and it is in that capacity that we would suggest their being engaged. The first want of an artily is a good intelligence department, with ramifications extending throughout the whole circle of country which the operations extend to, or are affected by or affect ; and that it would seem Lord RAGLAN'S army has not at present. To any one who has ever been en gaged in war it is needless to say that without such aid the operations of an army resemble at best but buffettings in the dark ; while with it every blow must tell, for with it every blow is struck with a knowledge of the exact effects that must come of it if successful, and of the precise amount of dependence one can place on the chance of making one's intentions good. It is, in fact, the business of this department to furnish the General commanding with every possible information regarding the opposing forces, the terms they stand on with the people of the country, their intentions, their stores, and their sources of supply of food, ammuni tion, transport, and forage, together with de tails regarding wells, roads, and water-courses, and generally all that may relate to their com munications and ability for carrying on the war to a successful issue. It is also the busi ness of the department to furnish him with similar information as regards ourselves. In fact, the officer politically attached to the General should be a perfect compendium of all the knowledge regarding the country that the General may require, and which such officer will have little difficulty in picking up if he is only allowed a sufficient sum for THE PRESS. secret-service money, and perfectly under stands his business. Now, for the appointment of chief of such an office in an eastern country, a well-selected Indian officer would be peculiarly fitted. There are many in the Company's service who have performed similar service in India, in Scinde, and in Affghanistan ; and who would, under proper encouragement from the War office, have no objection to proceed to Sebas topol and renew their old occupation there. A chief agent of this kind, with five or six assistants, would, we have no doubt, very soon throw that light on matters in and around Sebastopol, and the neighbouring provinces, for which, it would appear, we have been, so far, groping in vain ; and they would thus enable Lord .R►GLAN to see at a glance what he could do, and what he could not do, at any present or future moment. Such officer should not, as in India, have any control whatever over the General, for that would be to introduce the vicious part of a system which is in other respects most admirable. It is only, indeed, by the adoption of it that those nice combina tions and masterly decisions as to the moment for attack or changing ground can be adopted which give war its brilliancy and establish a General's strategetic fame. In this respect there is no army in the world that is better served than the Russian, and to the expert ness of their officers in this branch of their duty they owe far more than they do to their admitted bravery in the field. It is by the formation of such a department only, and the placing it in fitting hands, that Russian inge nuity can be met and foiied. It is by such means alone that Lord RAGLAN can be put in a position to do that justice to his army and to himself which we yet hope that he will do eventually if only adequately supplied with the necessary means from home. PUBLIC PERPLEXITY. WHEN public affairs go wrong, the popular im pulse in every age and country is to look for a culprit, to demand a victim ; and under a des potism the impulse is reasonable. The people do not manage their own affairs, and if their affairs are ill-managed they have a right to complain, and must be satisfied. In the East the despot throws them a Vizier's head—in the West he recalls a General or disgraces a Minister. But in proportion as the people take a part in the Government they must be content to share the blame of what goes wrong; and yet, perhaps for that very reason, the people under a popular form of government are the most eager to find a scapegoat on whom to lay the burden of their disasters. The Sebastopol Committee do their best to gratify the popular wish. They screen no de linquency—they seize on every clue to dis covery—but, turn where they will, responsi bility and delinquency elude their grasp. Who is to blame? They (the servants of Government), such is the popular cry, screen one another: the forms of office screen every body. It is the spirit of routine ; it is " red tapeism." A word, especially a new one, is of great use when a fact is nut to be found. Those, and they are not a few, who lay the blame on the periodical press are nearer the truth ; but the whole truth lies deeper still. The press is to blame fur sharing, for encou raging, for turning to its own account the popular errors and delusions ; but it did not create them. In truth the self-governing nation is mainly to blame for the national disasters. For years past the Government have been diminishing the army and retrenching every department connected with it. Why? Be cause the army was unpopular, and the cry for retrenchment general. When the debate with Russia became serious, no preparations for the probable result were made. No wonder the Czar refused to believe we were in earnest; and why was this? Government feared to incur the odium of laying on burdens which might, after all, be unnecessary. When war was actually declared, an army, which we could ill spare, was sent out, without any of the acces- SATURDAY, sories which are necessary to insure suc cess or to avert disaster, on an expedition no body had decided whither, to achieve nobody knew exactly what. And why was this? Be cause the popular voice had pronounced that without delay a blow must be struck—imme diate efforts must be made to produce a speedy result, and it had as yet been impossible to discover to what point these efforts could be directed with advantage. The Government undertook to invade the great est military monarchy of Europe with a peace establishment, and with the ordi nary revenue, because popular vanity had been flattered into a most irrational contempt of the enemy. In a word, in this and in every other minor detail they undertook to make bricks without straw ; and why? Because the people wished to have the bricks, and did not choose to wait for the straw or to pay for the straw. It is easy to say now that Ministers ought to have withstood popular clamour. Undoubtedly they ought: they are to blame as the press is to blame for sharing, encouraging, and turning to account the popular delusion. But, be it remem bered, the great change effected by the Reform Bill was to make the Government more depen dent on the popular will. Had Ministers en deavoured to enlighten popular opinion instead of bowing to it they would have proved their own wisiom, disinterestedness, and patriotism ; but they would have lost their places. Immediate success in arms or negotiation would have justified, or at least concealed, the rashness of the Government. But difficulty brought delay, and delay disaster. Under the most favorable circumstances there would have been blunders. War is a series of blun ders. Want of experience must have caused blunders. The want of preparation made blunders, or what passes for blunders, and those of the most enormous magnitude, in evitable ; and from previous blunders a plen tiful crop of subsequent blunders springs. Accusations and recriminations are bandied about in all directions. No one escapes. Be tween the two assertions everybody is to blame, and nobody is to blame—there is no such great difference The public, puzzled but not appeased, maintains " somebody is to " blame." And this in the minds of many is settling into a conviction that everybody and everything is to blame. Whatever is, is wrong. "Our institutions are to blame;" and this, un fortunately, is too true, but not in the sense in which the assertion is usually made ; and the remedy proposed by the City meeting (namely, that the people should take the direct control of public business) would only aggravate the evil to an incurable extent. Government is too weak to carry on the public business, because the public already exercises too immediate and too great an influence on its own affairs. Public opinion should rule, but not popular impulse. Public opinion is that opinion which, when the conflict of the dispute is over, remains the dominant and generally prevalent opinion, though for a time it may have been supported only by the enlightened few. In crease the influence of the people by a more popular representation, and anarchy en sues. The people will find the Government of their own appointment too weak to carry out the popular will ; and such Government as will then exist will be transferred from the , House of Commons to the House of Commons' masters out of doors. We yield to none in attachment to constitutional government. Let us keep it while we have it. The example of France is before us. BY CONTINENTAL TELEGRAPH. P.kms, Friday. The Moniteur of this morning contains the fol- lowing : Adviees have arrived from the Crimea dated 9th May. Nothing important had happened. We perfect our works before the place. MADRID, May 10. To-morrow will commence the payment of the coupons and obligations still in arrear.