The Press. — London, England, 1856-12-27 00:00:00

1226 is in Ministerial prints a xvarm profession of sympathy with the Switzerland Federation, Lord PALMERsTON'S Government must remain inactive, while Prussia, with the support of the great continental Powers, takes steps to assert her authority over the canton which has asserted its independence. When the great NAPOLZON was at the height of his power, the Marquis %Litst.Eir, truly discerning the •restlessness of his ambition, declared that his was an order of mind which prepared for his country great calamities. The saying was strikingly fulfilled : first, by the terrible disasters of the Moscow expedition ; and, next, by the invasion of France by the allied armies. Something of the same rest lessness, but infinitely smaller in its objects and its means, belongs to Lord PALMERSTON • His talent for disturbance and difficulty is considerable ; but it is that kind of talent which, in ordinaryatfuirs, produces what is • . termed " a muddle," which leads to no end of • perplexitv and expense, which throws traders into the Gazette, and which, when exercised at the expense of States, has the invariable result of lessening their influence while increasing their expenses, and of aggrava ting every evil with which it meddles. THE INCOME TAX. TilE arguments fur a continuance of the income tax upon a war scale proceed on the assumption that peace is not secure; that the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris remain unfulfilled ; and that it is not therefore expe dient to reduce our military and naval escab lishtuents to a peace footing. Granting that all this is true, how comes it that we are not able with peaco itself to reap the fruits of peace? Who is to blame for the uncertainty complained of? It is quite true that European politics are less settled at present than, at the commence ment of March last, we might fairly have hoped they would be in ten months time. The disturbance which exists is, however, purely diplomatic disturbance. It is fictitious in the sense that no real cause exists for it. From the moment when the Treaty of Paris was signed, all chance of further hostilities was at an end. There is not now, and there has not been since the Plenipotentiaries affixed their signatures to the Treaty, the slightest reason to apprehend any further appeal to arms. Russia accepted peace with sincerity, and gave the best proof of the change she had resolved to adopt in her policy by a consider able reduction of her army. However accept able peace might have been to France and England, we are well assured it was infinitely more acceptable to the whole Russian nation. In this respect there is a great contrast between the termination of the late war, and the cessation of hostilities in 1814 and 1815 On those occasions France was compelled to make peace, but she did so with reluctance ; she was constrained by the presence of foreign armies on her soil, and by hostile occupation of her capital. There was no surety that the war mi;_lit not break forth with fresh violence when restraint was removed, as the restored Government had no hold on the bulk of the nation, and could not consequently be truly said to represent it. No such element of inse curity exists in the ease of Russia. Her Government is firm, and the peaceful policy announced by the young Emperor on his ac cession has received the cordial assent of all classes of the people. It is too much to expect that peace will ever be so secure as to exempt nations from the necessity of guarding against its ruptur e . W e must always look for opposition of interests and sentiments between States. They will, in their international action, always have a ten dency to come into collision with each other. Were it otherwise, standing armaments might be dispensed with. Common sense admits •-their necessity, and the only practical point for each State to consider is, within what limits armaments shall be confined. There is.eertainly no more danger of hosti lities new thansve must expect to subsist at times. From rumours of wars we must THE PRESS. never expect to be free, more especially when a senior wrangler in politics is at the head of our affairs. No reason exists why our estab lishments should notinow be placed upon an ordinary peace footing What that footing should be is a question to be discussed. In past years we may have allowed too meek weight to economy, and may have carried prin• ciplcs of reduction too far. In our opinion, the Militia should never be neglected. It ' should be kept in a state of efficiency, as the surest means of recruiting our regular army. But whatever principles it is wise to adopt in the constitution of our military or naval forces, or whatever strength it is expedient to maintain, ought now to be laid before the country. There is nothing in the aspect of our foreign affairs, if we except the surrepti tious invasion of Persia from India, which should prevent us from modelling our forces npon that scale of efficiency which it is desir able should be ordinarily maintained. We know that for a !number of years pre vious to the war our ordinary expenditure was about fifty-two, fifty-three, or fifty-four millions. During the last year of war it rose to something like twice as much. We do not say that our expenditure should fall to its former limit. That is a point for Parliament to consider. We only say that now there is no longer any rational pretext for upholding war establishments, the country should have a system of peace expenditure submitted to it, and that the taxation and revenue of the country should be placed upon a settled basis. If it should be desirable on financial grounds to maintain the income tax at its existing rate of 16(1. in the pound, the tax payers will have no resource but to submit. What they exclann against now is, that an attempt is made to cheat them out of the in creased tax by a pretence little less than fraudulent. It was enacted that the increased burden should continue to the sth of April next after the Ratifications of the Treaty of Peace had been exchanged, and for one year beyond it. We must look to the reason of this enactment to determine whether, under the existing circumstances, it can fairly be carried to the extreme which the letter of the law would justify. The motive for fixing the continuance of the tax for one clear year after the sth of April following the conclusion of peace, was obvi ously to prevent the Executive from being exposed to the inconvenience of this tax ceasing almost as soon as hostilities had ceased. The Ratifications of the Treaty, in stead of being exchanged as they were a few days after the sth of April, might have been exchanged a few days before the sth, and in that case the tax would have terminated before the Administration could make other arrange ments to replenish the Exchequer. The proviso of continuance for one clear year was therefore a precautionary measure. It was not intended for the provision of a fund by which all outstanding liabilities incurred during the war could be cleared off, but as a source of income on which the Minister of Finance could rely as long as the expense of hostilities continued. The Treaty of Peace was actually signed before the sth of April last, and up to the sth of April next the Administration will have had something more than one full year to make the transition from war to peace estab lishments, and to submit a new scheme of finance to Parliament. It will be for the Go vernment to propose such financial arrange ments as they think proper. But, as a matter of good faith, we think they ought not to rely on the letter of the statute to extend the war rate of income tax beyond the period at which it might naturally have terminated. It is to be recollected that other duties were considerably increased by budgets during the war, and that many branches of trade—espe. cially that important one the building—have suffered severely both from the increase of taxation and the high rate of interest resulting from war expenditure. All classes are now anxious to know what burdens they may expect to bear in future, and upon what scale the expenditure of Government will be fixed. The movement against the income tax is one manifestation of this feeling, which it is not very likely the Ministry will venture to dis- SATURDAY, regard. More. however, is required. The time for temporary expedients is over, and the public have a right to demand a settled scheme of finiuwe from Lord PALmEasTex's Chancellor of the Exchequer. LETTERS FROM THE WAR. IT 18 not surprising that the appearance of these letters should have created a sensation in London. They are, in fact, reopening the whole question of the responsibility for Cri mean mismanagement. It was not to be sup. posed that in affairs of so vast and compli• cared a character the whole truth could be learned in a moment. We have now the other side of the picture laid before us, and we are bound injustice to regard it with equal atten• Lion. Lord RAGLAN, in our opinion, was the hero of the late war. The more we read upon the subject, the more clearly does the greatness of his character shine through the aspersions with which it has been loaded. Su far from having neglected personal inspection of the troops, he rarely allowed a day to pass without visiting them. So far frpm being a mere mili tary routinist, and the man of despatches and reports, these rare business talents were grafted on to a courage chivalrous as NELSON'S, and a resolution not inferior to that of his own great master in the art of war. When we remember that Lord RAGLAN was delibe rately charged with indifference to the suf ferings of his soldiers, and with an infe riority in military talents to the Generals of the French, and note on what superficial and hasty observations such charges have been grounded, we naturally lose all faith in the accusations brought against others, and begin to entertain a suspicion that the public have been very much misled on the whole question of the Crimean disasters. It would he very sad if this should turn out really to be the case ; and if the freedom of the press, and the ability with which the daily journals are conducted, should have led to no better result than the propagation of unfounded odium against a brave and noble-hearted old man, which probably had no small share in bring ing him to his grave. On more than one occasion was Lord RAGLAN'S opinion brought into direct collision with that of the French commander, and on each occasion was the superior sagacity of his Lordship's counsels no less conspicuous than the indomitable firmness which prompted them. It was Lord RAGLAN who resisted all advice to move the British army from their position after the battle of Inkermann It was he who urged the pursuit of the enemy after the last-named battle and the Alma; and had bis advice been followed, the assault on Sebas topol would have been renewed on the memo rable 18th of June, and three months addi tional fighting been spared to the allied army. On the contrary, had the advice of Sir DE LACY EVANS been adopted after the battle of Inker mann the consequences would have been dis astrous in the extreme. Yet there arc not wanting some to extol his military qualities above those of his late commander, and to regret that the honour of the British arms had not been intrusted to his keeping The ‘• Letters from Head-quarters" are fur thermore remarkable, as containing some strong reflections upon Lords Lecax and CARDIGAN. These it is sought to turn into a charge of in capacity against Lord RAGLAN. If he believed in the inefficiency of the cavalry officers, it is said, why did he permit them to retain their commands? There is an apparent simplicity about this way of treating the subject which is very plausible. Lord RAGLAN, of course, had nothing to do but to give the word, and the officers nominated by Government would at once cease to command ! But what power is vested in an English general to act in this summary fashion? Unless some definite act of insubordination or blundering could have been proved against them we think it doubtful how far Lord RAGLAN could have acted in the way proposed. How frequent are WELLING TON'S complaints in his despatches of the conduct of some of his officers, yet he did not exercise any such arbitrary jurisdiction as that we are alluding to. Whether Lord RAGLAN did or did not approve ou the whole