The Press. — London, England, 1855-11-17 00:00:00

NOVEMBER 17, 1855. be less than 30,000,0001. sterling. Previous to 1848, when the accidental loosening of a mill race on the Sacramento revealed the riches of the soil, the total yearly yield of gold was not estimated at more than 8,000,0001. Yet, even at that figure, Sir ROBERT PEEL thought there were good grounds for believing that the sup ply of gold, by increasing the total amount in circulation, was more than sufficient to main tain an equilibrium between money and com modities, and had a direct tendency to raise prices. If this was true with a yearly yield of 8,000,0001, how much more true must it be with a yearly yield of 30,000,0001.? Circulation and capital, though sometimes confounded, are essentially distinct. The one may be sufficiently abundant when the other is scarce, and vice versa. The price of com modities is a test of the relative scarcity or abundance of circulation ; the rate of interest is the test of the relative scarcity or abundance of capital. If we look to the present prices of com modities we assuredly see no evidence of any scarcity of the circulating medium. Wheat is at 90s. a quarter; meat at ss. a stone; sugar• a the highest figure realised for many years past. For the last few years, owing to the increase in the circulating medium, prices have advanced all over the world. We find complaints of dearness in every country with which we have any communication. Coincidently with the dispersion through Europe of the treasure brought from the New World in the sixtenth century, the chronicler HOLINSHED notices the " excessive prices " to which all commodities had risen. Precisely a similar action is taking place at the present time, from a similar cause. The rise, though perhaps conducive to general prosperity, bears hardly on many classes ; and were there to be any alteration in the currency, it should, in strictjustice, be rather of a restrictive than an expansive kind. It would be for the public vantage,—considering the height to which the upward movement in prices has already risen, and the rapidity with which it still pro gresses,—rather to check than to stimulate it . The principle of non-interference is, however, the best; as any artificial interference with the existing system, of a partial or a temporary kind, would be more likely to aggravate than diminish the evil. A total change of system — as the substitution of a gold for a paper cur rency—would have to be met by other argu ments. The paper-currency theorists are entitled to be treated with much respect. We believe their theory to be fundamentally sound. There are obvious disadvantages in making the price of all commodities which can be bought or sold depend on their relation to a metal which, from its greater scarcity or abundance, is itself liable to great fluctuation in value. Were it possible to invent some medium of exchange less liable to fluctuation, and at the same time incapable of abuse, industry and commerce might he benefited by the exchange. The paper theorists say such a medium might be found in Government notes, made receivable for taxes ; but with such power of issue there must be power of abusing it; and it cannot be pretended that there is any such necessity for the change at the present time as would justify so large and so perilous an experiment. If our circulation were not already full, prices could not be at their present height, nor can there be any reasonable fear that we shall ever need gold for our wants while the new discoveries continue so productive. Mr. JOHN TAYLOR has been called the father of the paper-currency theorists of our age. Distinguished for his learning, thought, and publications on this subject, he has yet candidly confessed that with the discovery of the new gold-fields he saw swept away all hope of the one great object of his life being carried into effect. Had the action turned the other way — had gold become more scarce instead of more plentiful—it is highly probable that necessity would have driven us to the adoption of some scheme by which we could have maintained for internal use a currency equal to our wants and consistent with our ordinary range of prices. The scarcity of capital is easy to be ac counte I for. A nation is but an aggregate of individuals. If a gentleman with ten thousand THE PRESS. a year chooses to spend three or four thousand of it in some utterly unproductive work, as in digging canals and filling them up again, he will obviously have less to spend ou more useful works. That is our case at present. Our war expenditure is proceeding at the rate of some sixty millions per annum. That ex penditure is utterly unproductive, it is taken from the aggregate of our gross income as a nation, and, being so taken, must leave a less amount for all commercial and industrial en terprises. Capital naturally becomes scarce, or comparatively scarce—there is an increased demand for accommodation—the rate of dis count rises—and, effect being mistaken for cause, an increased issue of notes is demanded to meet an evil which can only be remedied by increased economy in expenditure. High prices are very little caused by the war. At all events, there is a natural action proceeding which has a tendency to raise them, quite apart from the war. But scarcity of capital is a natural and inevitable result of that drain upon the country which the war necessitates We doubt the possibility uf re lieving it by artificial means, without (pro ducing in the end much greater evils than itself. The inevitable accompaniment of war, it must be borne as one, though not the greatest of its distresses. WEST INDIAN SQUADRON. THE reinforcement of our squadron in the West Indies is a proceeding that must rest upon one of two assumptions—either that the Americans are afraid of us, or that we are afraid of the Americans. Either we think, on the one hand, that their warlike propensities are at once to be cowed by a demonstration of vigour on our part; or that they, on the other, are sufficiently powerful and rapacious to justify our constant apprehensions of the wildest freaks of ambition Upon either hypothesis it is not difficult, we think, to show the impolicy of our present behaviour. Let us take the latter supposition first. Let us concede that the notion of a filibustering expedition against Ireland has really some existence other than in the crazy brains of a few poor Ribbon exiles. Let us admit that the American mouth is already watering for our share of the limes and sugar-canes. What better handle for hostilities could we give them than the course we are now adopting? If a bull betrays an inclination to run at us, we dont shake a red pocket-handkerchief in his face. Let our strength be in quietness and confidence, not in outward bravado, com bined with inward misgivings. But if, on the other hand, the common-sense view of this question is the true one ; if there is about as much chance of an American inva sion of Ireland, as of a Chinese invasion of America; if, so far from being just now the stronger party, our Transatlantic brethren do really feel some sort of alarm and annoyance at the presence of so large a British force in their neighbourhood,—what is likely to be the consequence? It does not, we think, require much sagacity to foresee it. If—they will reason—the slightest diplomatic difference with Great Britain is to lead to such results as these; if we cannot have a paltry dispute about fisheries, or recruits, or what not, but it is straightway to be settled by a three•dccker ; if the roar of a 32-pounder is the ultimate answer we are always to expect on these occa sions—why, we must have 32-pounders and three-deckers ourselves—•that is all. Simply, we mean that this blustering propensity, this elvis Romanus sum business, will not pay when applied to the United States. We may attri bute to its citizens what faults we please, but they are an eminently practical people; and if they once find that their principle of running the risk of loss to escape the expense of in surance is a failure, we may be certain they will not commit it twice. It is possible, then, that our practice of intimidation, or what we call assuming a firm attitude, may bring about a consummation we shall some day have to deplore, and lead to the creation of a power ful United States navy. 108 1 7 Besides, we must remember that another class of feelings is engaged in this matter. No man forgives one who is continually expo sing his weaknesses ; and national vanity is just as much a fact as individual vanity. There are some foolish traditions, too, about the last war which render the Americans more sensitive than ever to the reproach of our maritime superiority; and what they may be driven to do under pressure of these various motives it is not diffi cult ta conjecture. We should be the last to im pugn any conduct which sprang from the single• minded desire to maintain the honour of our flag. But our honour is rather compromised than vindicated by these unfortunate squabbles. This unseemly haste to parade our resources can have but a poor effect in the eyes of Europe; while to the continuance of our amity with the United States it is positively most perilous. The greatest calamity that could befal this country would be an American Navarino. Yet, dogged obstinacy on the one side, and irritated conceit on the other, might lead to such a result before the combatants well knew what they were doing. They will have much to answer for who contribute to such a catastrophe. GROWTH OF WAR PASSIONS AND INTERESTS. (Front a Correspondt t.) The obstacles to a Peace during war-time are of two kinds, external and internal—the latter continually tending to increase in mag nitude, while the former more frequently diminish, or even disappear, as the struggle goes on. I doubt if there be on record, in the history of modern Europe, a single instance in which two nations having once come to blows, be the cause of quarrel what it might, have ceased fighting when the original dispute was definitively settled. Wars have a tendency to perpetuate themselves, partly and principally because of the passions they arouse, partly also because under them interests spring up which are destroyed or injured by their cessation. I say " partly because of the passions they arouse." Not much space need be wasted on the proof of so obvious a proposition. But it is worth while to note that the circumstances of our time and country are peculiarly, even ex ceptionally, favorable to the cultivation of an aggressive disposition on the part of those who do not, or cannot, take a personal part of the operations of war. The checks which nature assigns to the exhibition of a combative spirit between citizens of different countries are various, the chief being—(l) Risk of liability to personal service ; (2) Risk of life or property by invasion; (3) Risk of loss, even amounting to ruin, by that pressure on the national finances which war creates. Of these checks no one operates on the English citizen of 1865. He cannot be impressed or seized by a conscription ; nobody talks seriously of reviving the ballot, even for militia purposes ; our naval superiority saves him from the apprehension of a Russian landing ; and the fact that modern war is to a great extent carried on by loans, both conceals and delays (alas ! it does not avert) the pecuniary pressure which would other wise be felt. The patriotic, self-satisfied, but not farsighted class who shout for " Pal merston and the war," and treat an advocate for negotiation as next door to a traitor, are, in fact, fighting Russia with the lives of other men, and at the expense of posterity. I grant that this state of affairs is inevitable—still. is it safe? If law could be had gratis, should not we all be litigants? Does not impunity, under any circumstances, tend to make men reck less ? And, these things being so, is there not at least a primd facie presumption that the tendency of the national mind will bo rather too much against, than too much in favour of, a reasonable settlement of diplomatic disputes ? But it is not only combativeness which is gratified by the continuance of hostilities; curiosity and love of excitement are inotii es less apparent on the surface, but fully ai strong. We live in a state of high civilisation, where the division of labour, bodily awl V