The Press. — London, England, 1855-09-08 00:00:00

SErr. 8, 1855. to call the special attention of our readers. Sir ROBERT said of diplomacy: — ft is a remarkable instrument used by civilised nations for the purpose of preventing war. Unless it be used to appease the angry passions of individual men, to check the feelings that rise out of national resentments—unless it be used for that purpose, it is an instrument not only costly but mischievous. If then your application of diplomacy be to fester every wound, to provoke instead of soothing resentments, to place a minister in every Court of Europe for the purpose, not of preventing quarrels, nor of adjusting quarrels, but for the purpose of continuing an angry correspondence, and for the purpose of promoting what is supposed to be an English interest; of keeping up contltcts with the representatives of other powers, then I say, that not only is the expenditure upon this costly instrument thrown away, but this great engine, used by civilised society for the purpose of maintaining peace, is perverted into a cause of hostility and war. No person after reflecting on these sentiments can hesitate in concluding that Sir ROBERT PEEL would have strongly disapproved, and even censured, the line followed by the Pre mier towards Austria and Prussia. That hankering after interference which is our Premier's besetting sin must have been deemed most injurious by Sir R. PEEL; and on no point would he have entertained a stronger opinion than that such a Premier as Lord PALMERSTON was a source of danger at the present crisis. THE BALTIC CAMPAIGN. Tax operations of the Baltic fleet are con cluded for the season, the campaign of '55 is over, and it is probable that in a short time Admiral DUNDAS and his liners will return to England. In summing up the operations of the fleet, it is impossible to avoid expressing the utter disappointment felt by all classes at the futile and frivolous result of the campaign. With an enormous fleet, with a vast profu sion of means, and with the whole expe rience of '54, both the Admiralty and their Admiral have contrived to achieve, in a four months' cruise, at best but one partial success. The triumphs of the year comprise the soli tary bombardment of an arsenal, the burn ing of a few balks of timber, and the cap ture of a dozen or two small trading vessels. It may be that the Home Government are se riously to blame for neither supplying mortar vessels in time, nor for providing the neces sary reserves of artillery and ammunition. But in the management of the campaign, and particularly with regard to the attack on Sweaborg, we had a right to expect from Admiral DUNDAS successes more propor tionate to the vast force at his disposal. It is now no longer doubted nor denied that the conduct of Admiral DUNDAS was reprehen sible to a degree, in personally keeping out of the fire during the bombardment, and in declining on the second day to attack the for tress. The honour of the service and of the country imperatively demand a searching in quiry into conduct so unbecoming a British Admiral. Of all faults in a commander the least excusable is timidity. There may have been circumstances which rendered neces sary such excessive caution. If so, for the honour of the fleet, and for the sake of his own reputation, such circumstances must be made known, or never again can Admiral DUNDAS rehoist his flag. With regard to Sweaborg, the Gallant Ad miral observes in his despatches that "no " attack was contemplated against the fortifi " cations of the place." But, in the name of common sense, for what purpose was he placed in command of that vast fleet, if not to destroy every link of that chain of fortifications stretched by Russia along the shores of Finland and the Baltic? The preliminary bombardment, he as serts, destroyed buildings, burnt stores, blew up arsenals, and committed every havoc. If such were his impression, it was clearly his duty to have brought up the body of the fleet lying idle out of range, and at least to have at tempted, if not to have achieved, the complete destruction of the fortress. But his sole ob• ject was, it appears, like that of his name s ike in the Black Sea, to keep with his liners out of fire. It is not even stated that to inspect operations he once during the action shifted his flag. Like NELSON'S commanders at Copen hagen, Admiral DUNDAS lay off out of range THE PRESS. during the bombardment. When the work was half done, he retired to Nargen. This is, we believe, about the first time— and we hope it may be the last—in the naval history of our country that a British admiral was ever known to retire with an uninjured fleet from before an attacked but compara tively uninjured enemy. What would have been thought of such conduct by JERVIS, NELSON, SIDNEY SMITH, EXMOUTH, or any of the heroic men whose glories yet shed lustre upon our country ? Would they have believed in it? Was this the conduct of NELSON at Copenhagen ? Of SYDNEY SMITH ill Egypt ? Of COCHRANE at Martinique? Of EXMOUTH at Algiers ? In the present day the dread of stone walls and granite batteries sits like a nightmare upon the minds of some of our naval commanders-in-chief. Their main objcet appears to be triumph without risk. Danger is deemed an ample plea for inaction. Their attempts at engagements and apologies for victories seem intended more for the instruc tion of our enemies than for the destruction of their strongholds. We correct their errors rather than punish their enmity, for we neither complete what we have undertaken, nor follow up any advantage we have gained. Sir CHARLES NAPIER last year was dismissed from his command because he had done less than it was believed his means enabled him to do, but can it he permitted Admiral DUNDAS to retain his flag in the face of the dilatory, inde cisive, and paltry results of his campaign ? The past summer was the period for decisive measures and bold action, even on so easy an opportunity as Sweaborg. The applica Lion of means to an end does not appear to have engaged the attention of Admiral DUNDAS. But we must have more decisive and imme diate results from the tremendous forces we place at the disposal of our Admirals, or we must have some satisfactory reason afforded us why those results were not obtained. The nation would readily forgive a daring error, but it will never pardon timid indecision . We say with great pain, but very delibe rately, that it is impossible longer to intrust our fleets to tho command of men who seem to look more to the shut of the enemy than to the honour of our arms and their own reputation. Discretion is an excellent virtue in a commander when combined with more active and enterprising qualities ; but a com mander all discretion, and nothing else, must needs cut a ridiculous figure. If the present system is to last we shall need a new nomen clature for our navy, and for such names as the Daring, Fury, Terrible, and Bulldog, must sub stitute the milder terms of the Discretion, the Caution, the Prudence, and the Cur. We do not want commanders so oppressed by a sense of their responsibility as to shrink from that noble daring without which nothing great iu war can be achieved. All London lately witnessed with emotion Mr. STANFIELD'S fine picture of the Victory, off Gibraltar, bearing the dead body of NELSON. The shattered ship told of the deadly strife which won the heru's triumph. Thathull was a spectacle for Englishmen to look on with swelling hearts, if with tearful eyes. It is with other feelings that we shall regard the polished sides of the returning Baltic ships. The con trast will be as great as between the senti ment felt for DUN DAS living and NELSON dead. We repeat, we have no desire to judge the Admiral unheard. His conduct may admit of satisfactory explanation, but at present our public cannot understand what is the essen tial difference between the guns of Sweaborg and the guns of Copenhagen and Algiers. They are impatient to learn whether that marked contrast between the naval tactics of the last and the present war is to be attri buted to a change in the relative value of the forces employed altogether favorable to the foe, or to the increased caution of our Ad mirals. This is a question to be submitted to the decision of a court-martial. INSURRECTION IN RAJMAHAL. THE late papers from India bring an account of an insurrection in Rajmahal As far as could be seen, it was of a local character, and not likely to spread, though risings of this 847 kind are never without danger, because ono never can be certain to what extent they may be carried. It is the misfortune of the Indian Government that the selfish policy it has adopted of late has completely isolated us, and that, in furtherance of a grasping system, it has sacrificed all hold on the natives' in- terests or affection. Excepting the people at the three Presidencies, we have scarcely a real friend throughout the length and breadth of Hindoostan; and the consequence is that every attempt against us is viewed with a secret sympathy by those who, under a better system, woull be the foremost both openly and covertly to uphold our rule. The de pendent princes, the great nobles, the large landholders, and the hereditary cultivators, would in India, as in every other part of the British empire, be the firmest supporters of law and order, if we would only allow them an interest in the country concurrent with, though subordinate to, our own. But when the mass of the cultivators are treated in the mode which the Madras Torture Commission displays, and when the princes, nobility, and large landholders see nothing in prospect but the confiscation of their estates as soon as opportunity serves, it is not to be expected that their wishes can be with us, from whom they have nothing to hope, and all to fear. To rule a country on the principle of absorb ing all property in land, and leaving no inter mediate orders between the sovereign and the serf, is to stake our all on the hazard of a military ascendancy, which mutiny may at any time undermine, or an adverse campaign, or a successful revolt, destroy. Lord METCALFE most truly said that we must lay our founda tions deeper iu the soil of India, if we would give to our sovereignty a more lasting cha racter than that of the conquerors who swept over it before us. To lay such foundations were an easy matter in the hands of any Government possessed of a proper estimate of the position and feelings of the people of Hindoostan ; but that is clearly not the case with those who sway its destinies at present. The causes of the outbreak in Rajmahal are variously stated ; some of the papers attri buting it to fiscal extortions, some to the ill treatment or abduction of female relatives by men employed on the neighbouring railway, and some to requisitions for forced labour to all unusual extent. Whatever the causes may have been, we trust that the India Board will not fail to cause a searching inquiry into them to be made. The public safety requires that risings of this kind shall be pat down with summary vigour, but public justice also de mands that those shall not escape who by their misconduct may have given birth to them. The most effectual check on abuse of authority is the knowledge that it will not be allowed to pass by unpunished, because the sufferers have, on their side, been hurried by revengeful passions into the perpetration of atrocious crimes which that very abuse of authority may have urged them to commit. It is not, however, impossible that the fault in this instance may lie rather with the system than with any judicial officer or officers who administered it. In the event of the outbreak having been caused by requisitions for forced labour, this would more especially be the case, for under the present system a magistrate has no help for himself, but is compelled to send forth his pressgangs whenever an authorised application for forced labour is made. And no matter how urgent the business of the cultivator may be at his homestead, or in his fields, he is dragged miles and miles away, often to his utter ruin, to make roads or to carry the baggage of officials or the stores of armies, and that on a pittance arbitrarily fixed by the Government, and which, after all, is rarely if ever paid. The following description of a viceregal progress, given by Sir WILLIAM NAPIER in his pamphlet headed " Wellington and Napier," as taken from an Indian raper, affords a fair account of the manner in which the peasantry of India have been dealt with by the highest Indian official, the Governor- General, and one on whom the duty of pre venting injustice to the peasantry must be deemed peculiarly imperative : ~.... - -