The Press. — London, England, 1857-06-20 00:00:00

JUNE 20, 1857. more than a hundred votes ! It was then a quarter to eight o'clock. M. liouher (one of the Ministers) an nounced the vote at the Palace of the Elysee, where the decision of the Assembly was waited for sword in hand. The unexpected result, however, put an end to all the preparations for resistance. " Perhaps it is better that it should be so! " replied the Prince ; and his physiognomy immediately resumed its customary serenity. On this fearful state of things M. do Cassagnac remarks : There was not a man of sound mind who had not long entertained two convictions : the first was that France could not remain in the situation in which she was with out perishing; the second that it was impossible to save her by constitutional means. The President of the lle public was literally besieged, especially at this moment, by combinations proposed by the most important men of the monarchical parties, all of which resolved themselves in various forms into a violation of the Constitution and a coup•d'etat. In verity, these monarchists were right— nothing but a coup-d'etat was possible —nay, one could not have been avoided if peuple would. But still the Prince President was anxious not to be obliged to make one alone : Faithful to his oath, as jealous as ever of the title of an honest man, the President of the Republic felt repng• nauce to any combination which should not give him the free, spontaneous cooperation of a legal majority. if the Assembly would have consented either to revise the Constitution, or to make an appeal to the people, the Prince would never have accepted or sought fur other means. And y et — The time visibly approached—the moment was not far off when the necessity of saving the country would im pose itself in an irresistible and fatal manner. The preparations of demagogy were imminent in France and Europe, and the eye of the Government watched that intensive, violent, and subversive society which had formed itself in the midst of the country. It was almost publicly established and organised, with its governmental committees, its orders of the day, its finances, its soldiers, its arsenals, its powder-magazines. Each of us could elbow it as we walked along, see its projects, listen to its menaces, and feel its muskets close to our breasts. It publicly divided our houses and fields amongst its ad herents, and in its songs named the heads that were to be struck off. On the other hand, society found danger even in the great bodies charged to conduct and defend it. Thus the legislative power, dissolved by anarchical passions, was no longer for the Executive Government—a counsel, but an adversary—a support, but an obstacle—a help, but an enemy. It did not moderate the Government—it led it astray; it did not limit it—it encroached on its powers ; it did not restrain it—it suppressed it. The press, too— that useful intermediary between the Government and the people, destined to second the former and instruct the latter, and to place at the service of both the study and the counsels of intelligence and patriotism—was a prey to the general confusion. It no longer instructed public opinion—it misled it; it no longer supported the Govern ment—it undermined it ; it no logger restrained society —it excited and rendered it furious; it was no longer an instrument of progress and civilisation, but an agent of anarchy and civil war. The spectacle of these accumulated dangers made a profound impression on the mind of the President of the Republic, and matured every day his resolution to save society. He had said in one of his speeches, " France shall not perish in my hands!" and if legality refused him its means, he was obliged at the last moment to re sign himself to the employment of others. We now arrive at that part of the book which is most important in an historical point of view—namely, that which details the pro positions for coups-detat actually made by the chiefs of certain parties. It is well known, indeed, that thosel personages, owing to the war of annihilation waged between different political sections, considered the overthrow of the Constitution indispensable for the sal vation of France, though they differed as to the best means of effecting it, and as to the consequences it was to be made to produce ; but our author is the first who has given authentic accounts, derived evide•atly from the highest authority, of what they really pro posed. He says : The necessity of a coup-d'etat, accomplished under one form or another, was recognised by all those who desired to see order and good government seriously re established in France. That it was possible to attain this object, by the means set forth in the Constitution, no one believed. Unanimous as to the necessity of escaping by an energetic and decisive measure from the bonds of legality, politi cians only varied on the character of the measure, and on the means of accomplishing it. It was thus that, during three years of the Presidency of Prince Louis Napoleon, the most important men of the party of Order imagined, suggested, offered, with a view to a restoration of the Government, schemes differing on several points, but agreeing as to the result, which was in definitive the violation of the Constitution At the head of these men were General Changarnier, M. Tillers, Count Mole, M. de Mortewart, M. de Montaleniliert, anti M. de Falloax. THE PRESS. He then goes on to tell us that General Changarnier was the first to conceive the idea, not only of a coup-d'etat, but of re-establishing the Empire. This the general did, so far back as the 29th January, 1849, a day on which the Red Republicans had planned a grand outbreak, but which they were prevented from creating by the vastness of his military preparations. Ho then, it seems, recommended the re-estab lishment of the Empire, but the President did not think such a measure opportune, and the general was vexed : The Commander•in•Chief of the Army of Paris did not disguise the regret which the moderation of the Prince caused him, and the day after, he said in his apartments in the Tuileries, in the midst of his officers, " The Presi- dent has lost a fine opportunity ! He is wrong, for he will perhaps never have such another one :" M. Thiers' plan was to prolong the powers of the President for ten years, and it, too, dates from l 84) : He formally expressed to his friends the necessity and propriety of prolonging by ten years the duration of the Presidency. "1t will cause," said he, taking the arm of one of them," a terrible journJe in Paris, but it is just and indispensable, and I am resolved on it!" Count de Mole went much farther—and our readers will notice that M. de Cassagnac states that a most sagacious and distinguished statesman of England, whom they hold in peculiar veneration, shared his opinion : In 1850 he was impressed with the necessity of re establishing Imperial institutions. He spoke of it, not' only to his friends in his own house, but to his colleagues in the Sall. des Conferences. When the Socialist elections of Paris of the I(th March, 1850, had cast a dark veil on the future, Count Mole hesitated not on the remedy neces sary for such great evils. "We must reestablish the Empire," said he ; " that alone can rescue us from this dis order. I have," he added, "iu my pocket a letter from Lord Lyndhurst which expresses the same opinion ; as for myself, it has long been mine." In September, 18M, the Count summoned a meeting of the chiefs of the monarchical parties at his chateau of Champlatreux, and a coup-d'etat was the subject of discussion:— The basis of the arrangement discussed was the re-elec. tion of the President of the Republic, the establishment of two Chambers, and energetic measures against Socialism. Nevertheless no precise form of execution was decided on; and when the scheme was submitted to the President of the Republic, he could not, though appre ciating the motives which had dictated it, pay much atten tion to it on account of its vagueness. In November, 1851, some of the leading men of the Assembly—M. de Montalembert, M. Daru, M. Fould, M. Quentin-Bauchart, and others—held a meeting, at which they dis cussed a coup-d'etat, consisting of the re-elec tion of the President, the establishment of two Chambers, &c. M. de Montalembert, the Duke de Mouthy, and the Duke de Mortemart, in the name - of a number of representatives, proposed to the President a coup-d'etat con sisting of an " appeal to the people." Another group of representatives—headed by M. F. Barrot, M. Le Verrier (the astronomer), M. Dumas (the eminent chemist), and others— proposed a coup.d'etat consisting in " an ap " peal to the people," the prolongation of the President's term of office, and two Chambers. M. de Falloux, nn the very day preceding the coup detat of the Prince President, proposed one to that illustrious personage : M. de Falloux, unlike M. Berryer, did not share all the illusiona that were entertained as to the prestige of the Assembly. M. Berryer saitl, on the Ist of December— " The l'rince will never dare to do anything against the Chamber; the chiefs of the army are not on his side, and if he were to try to make the troops attack this Assembly he would not find four men and a corporal to obey him !" But M. de Falloux, on the contrary, believed in the ap proaching eventuality of a coup-d'etat, as also in its neces sity and success. He, however, supposed that it was neces sary to give the Assembly the patronage, the initiative, and the direction of it. He caused the Prince to be told on the evening of the Ist December that, if he would attempts coup-d'e tat with the majority, he offered for his own part to ascend the tribune to strike the first blows and to appeal to his political friends. As logical and practical as he is resolute, M. de Falloux added that he would follow the Prince to the end, even to the length of employing force, if the Montagne carried resistance so far. In return for this offer of co-operation, M. de !Falloux demanded the composition of a Ministry formed of all the eminent men of the majority, which should take the en gagement before entering office to prohng the powers of the President of the Republic. The Prince remarked that it was rather late for such combinations . . . but he said to M. de Heeckeren. who was the intermediary employed by M. de Fallon:, " I am enchanted with the good news you bring me. I am, how ever, occupied at this moment. Come to see me to-morrow morning at ten o'clock, and we will talk the matter over !" The next day the coup-d'etat of the President was struck, nud I. do 4egykeren west t 9 We Elpiie, not to discuss the proposition of M. de Fallon; bat to thank the Prince for having saved France ! Thus, even supposing that the situation of the country had not imperatively called on the Prince to make a coup-d'etat, he would have been justified in doing so by the number that were planned by the majority. But it may be asked, why did ho not associate the majority in his coup•d'etat? Our author answers the question : Because none of their plans responded to the wishes or the wants of France. If the Legislative Assembly, sincerely united to the Executive Government, and rejecting the schemes and rivalities of the cld political parties, had con sented either toan appeal to the people to modify the Con stitution, or to a concert with the President of the Repub lic, so as to pass without a catastrophe through the dreaded crisis of 1852, the energetic and supreme measure of the 2nd December, 1ti.51, would not have taken place. It was therefore solely the salvation of society which influenced the Prince in his determinations. To have suddenly re-established the Empire in 1810 or 1850—when the spirit of the Assemblies had not deprived the Executive Government of all reasonable hope of ca operation, when the revision of the Constitution had not been refused to 3,000,00 petitioners and 80 Councils. General, when the proposition of the Questors had not menaced the Elect of the People with a coup•de•main and France with a Convention—would have assuredly responded to the expectation of the immense majority of the country, but it would have been prematurely to adopt violent mea sures, before having exhausted those of a pacific nature. To have addressed an Appeal to the People in the name and with the co-operation of several men who were, no doubt, important and honest, but who were divided on fundamental principles of doctrine, and smitten with various governmental combinations; to engage with them, with their opinions and theirpreferences, at least in a certain measure; to hind in advance, by anticipated engagements, the form which the country in the free disposition of itself might give to institutions; would have been to restrain the spontaneity of the popular wishes, and imprudently embarrass the future with the reserves of the past. Such were the constant principles of the President of the Republic and his fidelity to his sworn word, that any encroachment on legality which he might resolve on making must necessarily present the double character— first, of being imperatively commanded by public safety ; and next, of rendering the French people the complete and absolute disposal of their own destinies. It was for these reasons, as just as they were dis interested, that the President cf the Republic refused any decisive measure before being reduced to it by the most evident and the most urgent necessity; and it was for the same reasons that, though touched by the patriotic designs conceived towards the end of November by neatly two hundred representatives, he did not think it advan tageous to the country to associate himself in them, and to carry them out. We must reserve to another number the relations of M. de Cassagnttc concerning the manner in which the coup-d'etat was executed, and the circumstances by which it was accompanied. NOTICES OF BOOKS. " NOTHING New" (1) is a collection of tales by the authoress of "John Halifax," published originally in various leading periodicals. The three best in the series ate "Lord Erlistoun," "A Low Marriage," and "The Double House ;" the first especially, which is marked by many of the writer's most cha racteristic merits—quiet power, skilful contrasts, and the art of exciting and sustaining sympathy. The character of Mark is a good deal like that of John Halifax himself, while that of Jean, in its com bination of true womanly tenderness with resolute self-control, is one of the most successful female portraits with which we are acquainted. In " A Low Marriage " we see how a nature, coarse, but not radically bad, may under kind and judicious treat ment be elevated to a higher level, and imbued with a considerable share of refinement. The old lady mother, Mrs. Rochdale, is a fine specimen of mingled pride and generosity, and the conduct by which both are exhibited in action at the same moment is won. derfully natural and touching. "The Double House" is perhaps the most truly interesting, in the ordinary sense of that word. The mystery is skillfully maintained, and the conception of the story seems wholly original. That the incidents verge on the improbable is certainly quite true, but the details are all wotked out with so much truthfulness that we lose sight of any exaggeration in the plot. The remaining tales are not equal to the just pretensions of this very able writer, and indeed suggest a doubt how far it is expedient in an author gifted with Miss Muloch's special qualities to devote herself to the composition of short tales. It is not always that the power suitable both to such productions and also to the elaboration of a longer and more developed story, are united in the same person. For instance, Mr. Wilkie Collins' tales are among the most successful of their kind, whereas his tbree-volumd novels have hitherto been comparative failures. The converse may be found as well. But even were it not so, in a writer of such high capacities as the authoress of (1) Nothing New. Tales. By the Author of " J OetttleMaD," the QC. 9 Tots. Loudn: litue4 wad