The Press. — London, England, 1857-09-05 00:00:00

critical state of our Indian Empire, and in urging the remedies required to prevent that catastrophe which has overtaken us at last. At the same time we should like briefly to examine the ground for all these pavans over our good fortune in possessing a" vigorous Govern ment " in a period of peril. For months previous to last June the Go vernment were in possession of accurate information upon the critical condition of the Bengal army, and by the mail which arrived on the 28th of May last they received full details of the mutinous conduct of the 19th and 34th Regiments at Barrackpore, of • suspicious symptoms and incendiary fires at Umballah, and of the undoubted general dis affection of the entire Bengal army. This grave intelligence was coupled with expla nations from Lord CANNING of the urgent necessity for the immediate despatch of British troops from England. At that moment on the 28th of May, our unhappy countrymen, were no longer upon the verge, but were struggling in the gulf of a terrible rebellion. Mark the vigorous conduct of her Majesty's Ministers. For three weeks the Government considered the question, took no extraordinary measures in reply to Lord CANNING, and upon the 18th June despatched, in the ordinary routine, a solitary troopship with 21-1 men, " reliefs " who had been four months under orders for India. From that date to the 10th July—we beg to call attention to dates—during which the most momentous intelligence ar rived by successive mails of the massacres at Meerut, the seizure of Delhi by the rebels, and the spread of the rebellion throughout Oude into the Punjaub, three troopships, carrying out the ordinary reliefs, left our• ports with an aggregate of 034 men. Thus, at a period when not an hour was to be lost, when each wasted day brought a year of calamity to every home in the kingdom, and imperilled our empire in India, did a" vigorous Government," wavering between a rebellion they had not the sagacity to foresee, and the demands of a crisis they failed to appi-ehend, rouse themselves to a sense of their terrible responsibilities and to the magnitude of the danger which threatened our rule. In seven weeks eight hundred and fifty men were despatched to the succour of our unhappy countrymen, who, with arms in their hands and courage in their hearts, were struggling against overwhelming odds, or meeting a miserable fate with a fortitude which has excited the admiration of the world. Eight hundred and fifty men in seven weeks !—a fraction of the ordinary reliefs which for months had been under orders for India, and would have sailed under any circumstances. These were the decisive measures of our vigorous and sagacious Government. But if the measures of the Ministers failed to sustain their claims to promptitude and decision, perhaps their statements iu Parlia ment will console us for the failure. On the 9th of June Lord GRANVILLE, admit ting the mutiny as a fact, declared the reports of the then recent massacre at Meerut to be " much exaggerated ;" but the discretion of the President of the Council was two days afterwards corrected by the President of tho Board of Control, who assured us that the disaffection had been "completer- put an end to," and was so communicative as to pro mise us that " any such occurrence iu future " would, he felt sure, be suppressed "with the same promptitude and vigour." This, at 1 4 bli THE PRESS, SEPTEMBER 5,1857. least, was frank in a Minister with despatches in his pocket telling a talc of the spread of massacre and mutiny unequalled in the records of modern times. Again, upon the 29th of June, when the seizure of Delhi and its ,concomitant horrors were announced, Lord CaLksvi LLE deprecating our exhibiting " any unnecessary alarm," Mr. VERNON Small indignantly denied that our empire was "at all imperilled." Nay, ho even expressed his " satisfaction " that " the outrage " had occurred at Delhi ; for he observed, with that prescience for which he is so pre-eminent, " it is notorious that Delhi " may be easily surrounded, and that, if we " cannot reduce the place by force, we can by " famine !" and then, regretting that the mail had left a day or so too soon " to enable him " to apprise the House that the Fort (?) of Delhi " had been razed to the ground," blandly re marked, " I do not believe that any danger " does exist, further than that any outbreak " may happen periodically in India, from faint " tieism or other causes." And thus did the Government meet this terrible rebellion with promptitude and decision. They cannot screen themselves behind the " want of intelligence ;" if they do, their ex cuse will be their crime. Facts, long concealed from us, had as long been known to them. They knew that incendiaries, spread all over India for months, were striving to kindle the flames of rebellion in every corner of the empire. Acts of open insurrection had been perpetrated, mutiny and rebellion had broken out, a general massacre of Europeans had taken place, and yet this vigorous Govern ment of ours could arrive at no definite con viction, and, instead of providing for the secu rity of the lives of our brothers and sisters, speculated in perfect inactivity upon their chances of success. These " vigorous " Mi nisters continued to doubt till the mischief was not only certain, but to some extent irre parable. They held their usual Cabinet Councils twice a week ; they dawdled over the public business with creditable skill, and pooh-poohed the Indian revolt as an impotent fanatical impulse. Oh ! but it is said, this was " a prudent in action " A prudent inaction ! What a position for a Government where neglect is prudence, and where it is necessary to be indolent ! But they cannot even escape behind this quibble. It was not from prudence they acted, but from a want of sagacity to compare cause and effect, to judge of the present, and to discern the future from the past. At length, when the petty policy of conceal ment could no longer be sustained, the tio vernment, awake at last to the preservation of their places as much as to the critical position of our army in India, became inspired with the necessity of decisive measures. They resolved to make a display of force, and ordered that the remaining " reliefs" in England should at once embark and proceed to their destination! There was no selection of swift vessels, no chartering of steamers ; nothing out of the ordinary routine. Old tubs were taken up, the troops were leisurely put on board, and the ships despatched in a south-west wind, to knock about the chops of the Channel for a fortnight. Even then, as regarded any future measures, not a step was taken in advance. No military authority was consulted upon the position of the British troops in India, in the very pro bable event of the whole country rising. No ioquiries were made as to the capabilities of defence possessed by the different head quarter forts and military posts No de cision was arrived at as to the real amount of force required. Nothing was done, every ; thing was put off; when they should have acted, they talked, and, like Mr. Micawber, waited for something to " turn up." Lord PALMERSTON saw " no necessity " to put fresh troops under orders for India, or to call out the Militia, unless the " next mail " brought worse news ; and when the next mail at last made its appearance, it was again " the next" ►which would obviate all necessity for trouble or ex pense, and certainly bring us " satisfactory intelligence." As to despatching troops across the Isthmus of Suez, that was both " inconve nient and expensive.'• And so on for weeks did this "vigorous" Government, with an appal ling hazard searing them in the face, content themselves with measures as inefficient as they were ridiculous, and systematically con tinue to depreciate the real dangers enveloping our empire. And this ►was the promptitude and the decision with which they met the crisis, to say nothing of the sagacity ►which failed to foresee it ! It is impossible to offer any excuse or apology iu justification of their conduct. The resources of the country were ample, the spirit of the nation was aroused, the temper of Par liament liberal, and the Opposition were eager to give every possible aid to vigorous and decisive measures ; for it was not a party question, but one ►which involved the honour and the glory of England. It was the duty of Ministers, ►we maintain, and public opinion supports us, to have provided iu May, if not earlier, for what they could not fail to ob serve would be required. And yet nothing was done, no advantage was taken of the opportunity. And we do not hesitate to say that to this wicked neglect must be attributed many of the terrible disasters which have oc curred, and will yet happen; for if those troops despatched in August had been sent in May and June they would have reached Cal cutta in July, or soon after, and ►would have saved many a noble life whose heart's best blood now soaks into the soil of Hindostan. Upon the earliest opportunity Lord DERRT, Lord ELLF.NBOROOOH, and Mr. DISRAELI sug gested that the Militia should be called out and embodied, and urged upon the Government that this was not a mere mutiny of troops not "an affair of greased cartridges," but an organised and terrible revolt, which might threaten our existence in India. But while Lord PALMERSTON saw no necessity for calling out the Militia, the CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER declared that the rebellion was only "a sudden impulse," and Mr. VERNON SMITH assured us that the obnoxious car tridges had been withdrawn, and that India by the " next mail " would be " tranquillised." As if the withdrawal of a piece of greasy paper could pacify a province organised in con spiracy against our rule, and aided by 100,000 armed men, who, with all the fury of fana ticism and revenge, panted for the butchery and plunder of our fellow-countrymen and their families ! Unless the country be prepared to accept the word of the Government in their own favour, we apprehend that no justification or excuse they can offer for the lamentable indifference they displayed iu the earlier stages of this catastrophe—when a little of that foresight and vigour it is their boast exclusively to possess would have checked the rebellion in the bud—will be accepted by an indignant people when the time for inquiry arrives. The Ministers either de spised advice, and, deficient in foresight, ex hibited a want of penetration and judgment indispensable to the advisers of .the Crown, or they were conscious of the state of affairs, foresaw the events likely to happen, and yet wickedly persisted in depre ciating the danger. In either case they stand convicted, on the one hand of ignorance, in capacity, and presumption, and on the other of the most unparalleled indifference and the most criminal neglect. " LORD MACAULAY." WHEN MIRABEAU CAMC to England, not long after the close of the American war, he studied with profound care ede springs of political action and social life in our society. One of his main rallying words was" La carriere ouverte aux talons," which was suggested to him by