Star. — London, England, 1809-01-03 00:00:00

L or d Collingabeett of Cadiz, and on (he 19th wit!; Admiral Sir C. Cotton off the Tagus; from whom he r eceived information of the army under Sir A. Wel lesley, then landed in Portugal, and also that Briga dier. General Ackland, with his brigade, was on the coast, looking for an opportunity to join him. Sir H. I)alrymple sailing along the coast with an intention o f making Mondego Bay, heard of the action of the 21st; and that Sir H. Burraid was arrived ; this de.. l terrnin..-.1 him to inake for Maceira Bay, where trans. ' , ports w ere at anchor. He landed in Maceira Bay early in the forenoon of the 22d, proceeded to Vi rneira, about two miles and a quarter distant, and af ter a Short conversation with.his two predecessors in command, whose instructions were those by which he' was to act, he ordered the army to march early in the morn ing of the 23d, undoubtedly as soon as it could be put in motion after his arrival. I t appear s that in this situation of things the French G ene ral Kellerman arrived about noon of the 22d at Vimeira, with, proposals for a Suspension of Arms, in order to settle a definitive Convention for the eva cuation of Pbrtugal by the French army. Lieute rantßurrard and Sir A r thu r Generals 81 rBarrY U'ellesley assisted the ,commander of the Forces in t he discussions that took place on this subject, and it a ppearing to them,. Under all circumstances, as com manding a force setkirhtidlee avitll the Sovereign of Fortngat .and combating , in their own country, (f ro m whence we then derived no material assistance) a gainst an enemy in actual , possession of their capi tal, their fortresses, and, in a military point of view, of their kingdom, that a Convention, or Capitulation, if t h e opportunity offered, which should speedily and honourably expel the French army from Portugal, was expedient andAvisable,aseseationof arms was agreed u pon, to terminate at . 48 hours notice. The leading articles of a Convention were also settled, and Gene ral Kellerman returned towards Lisbon, about nine at night, with the iitsittnneta stated in the Extra Ga zette of the 16th of September, but not to be consi dered as effectual without the concurrence of Admi ral Sir C. Cotton. Early oti the 23d in the morning, Lieutenant-CoL Murray, Quarter -Master-General, set out with the pro red a tto procure the concurrence of the Aclmi and returned in the night of the 24th, with Sir Charles Cotton's answer, that he could not accede, but that he would eater into treaty with the Russian Admiral. It appears tha • t'S'ir Charles Cotton having declined to sanction the Russian article, the Commander of the Forces conceived the Armistice to end, and deter mined on sending Lieutenant-Colonel Murray to an nounce the recommencement of hostilities, at the end of 48 hours, in order, if General JunOt chose it, that we might treat on the remaining articles as a basis.— This Officer had power to treat-without delay. He had the Commander of the Forces' letter of the 25th, and certain memoranda of Sir Arthur Wellesley, as laid before the Board, which shewed the exact foot ing on which he was to act, as also General Keller-, man's sentiments on the Russian'question. Early on the 27th, communication was hadfrom GeneralJunot and Lieut Col. Murray, that a treaty was in agita tion, which was answered. _ _ I It appears that when the proposed treaty (ratified. by General Junot) of the 28th August, was brought by Capt. Dalrymple on the 29th to head-quarters nt Ramathal, all the Lieutenant-Generals (Burrapd, Moore, Hope, Fraser, Wellesley) were present, Lord Paget excepted (because not king previously sum moned). The proposed treaty was, however, formally. discussed. Minutes of proposed alterations were taken by Sir A. Wellesley, as laid before the Board, and the Commander of the Forces has no reason to believe that. Sir J. Moore, or any of the' Lieutenant- Generals that came with him, expressed any disappro bation of the state and terms of the negociation. The treaty, with the alterations proposed, were re transmitted to Lieut. Col. Murray. It appears when the treaty concluded by Lieut. Col. Murray on the 30th, was brought by him to Torres Vcdras on the 31st for ratification, the 14-leu tnant-Generals present were convened, and Sii„.4. Wellesley was sent for. Lord Paget, who was at a distance, did not come, nor did Sir A. Wellesley, his carps having marched that Morning. The other Lientenant-Generals met.(Burrard, .Moore-, Fraser; and hope), the alterations made by Lieut. Colonel b.:31..1y were approved, and the treaty then ratified b:- the Commander of the Forces Sir Hew Dalrym ft,) with the approbation of the Lieutenant-Generals present. Some of the articles of the treaty of the 28th, he- 1 fore objected to by the Lieutenant-Generals, were' altered in that of the 30th, and some other good al. terat:ons had been inserted, not before suggested. A comparison of the treaty of the'2B6, and that ratified, will shew the alterations. The meetings'bf the Lieut. Generals, the Com -1 wander of the /Forces did not call, er consider as .re gular councils of war. He sought to benefit from their talents and experience, by consulting them on exigent cases, and by pursuing the measures he might himself deem mast for the good of your Majesty'e; service, a f ter availing .himself of the advantage b e might draw from their reasonings, And. be does not recollect there was any dissentient opinioallon the 31st, as to the ratification of the Convention. • It appears that Sir J. Moore's corps having arrived at Mo n d ego B ay on the 20t h o f A ugust , began to disembark ; that they re-embarked, and arrived off Maceira Bay on the 24th ; that from the 26th to the I 29th they landed under considerable difficulties, and successively joined the army at Torres Vedras, It appears that some of the principal advantages to arise from the Convention were in the contempla tion of the Generals. That it immediately liberated the kingdOin of Por tugal from the dominion of the French, thereby resto; ling to the inhabitants their capital and fortresses, their principal sea ports, •their personal liberty, pro. Peaty, religion, and established goverftmeet. • • That it relieved a great extent of Spanish :frontier from all apprehension of an enemy, and the whole of pain from that of having an enemy behind them, and allow e d a ll part ; o f Spain - to talce more effective measures for its general defeAce, as well as-permitted Portugal imtnedtately to contribute for their mutual support. • That it en a bl e d the l3ritjsh army Immediately to enter Spain, if reqtlired, by central routes, while it transported the Fresh force to a very distant part of their o wn coast , f ar removed. fipm t i S,panisla.fron tier. - • That it immediate* releasoPfeer thousand spa- f nish soldiers, and sent.them to t he d e f ence o f Cata lonia; it al.;e, releancl.frorn the Portuguese fmntier another body.oftw9 thousand Spanish troops. The I Portuguese army also became disposable for the com mon cause. To the men of war and transports which at this season .of the year with great difficulty could keep their station near the coast, and on whose presence the supplies and operations of the army depended, the opening of the Tagus afforded an iMmediate shelt2r. It is further urged by the Generals as much more than probable, that if the trierny had been required to lay down their arms and surrender prisoners of war, they would not have complied ; but if driven to extremity, that they would have retired upon Lis- I bon, reinforced by 6000 Russians, who must have been thus com p e ll e d to s h are their fate ; and, in the temporary attack of this city, much calamity and de struction must have ensued. Also, that masters of the Russian fleet and of the boats and shipping in the Tagus, the passage of the river was ensured to them ; that they could have de fended for a considerable time its east bank, and pre vented the occupation of the Tagus by our fleet ; that with the strong fortress of Alentejo in their posses sion, they could have protracted a destructive war, to the great detriment of Portugal and the Spanish I lcause, by finding employment for the greater part of the British army, for the remainder of the year, and whose difficulties and losses in such operation must have been very considerable. It appears, that the forts on the Tagus were taken possession of on the 2d of September by the British troops; and the port was then opened to our shipping : That on the sth, the army had its right at St.Julien's and its left on the heights of Bellas : That on the Bth or 9th a British corps marched into Lisbon to ensure the tranquillity , of that city during the embarkation of the enemy, who were all sent off (except the last division, purposely detained) before the end of the month, and part of the British army was then actu ally on its route towards the Spanish frontier. It appears that, during the discussion, and after wards during the execution of the Convention, much firmness was shewn in resisting the pretensions and interpretations of the enemy ; every stipulation being restricted to its fair, honourable, and grammatical meaning, and the French not allowed to carry off, but obliged to disgorge plunder, which they affected to consider as private property. It appears that pains were taken to misrepresent and raise a clamour in Portugal against this Conven tion ; but when it was generally known, and its ef fects felt, the people of Lisbon, and of the country, seem to have expressed their gratitude and thanks for the benefits attending it. It has been urged by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and al lowed by Major-General Spencer, that in Egypt, in 1801 (after the victory of the 21st of March, the French having thrown their whole force into Alexan dria and Grand Cairo, about 10,000 men in each place), that at the siege of Alexandria, in August, the country was in the full possession of the British and Turks. The garrison, , cut off from every possibility of relief, could only have held out some days, when a capitulation was granted to it, September the 2d, as favourable as the Convention of Cintra to the army of Junot (of 24,000 French, and 6000 Russians), and perfectly similar in all the chief articles of men, baggage, artillery, convey ance, Sm.; so, that the same terms hd been re • viousl y grante al d to the garrison of Cairo a , uncki mu p ch the same circumstances. By these two Conventions, or Capitulations, above 20,000 : French evacuated Egypt, and the British army was left disposable for other purpos 25. On the whole it appears, that the - operations of the army under Sir Arthur Wellesley, from his lazid ing.in Mondego Bay on the Ist of August, until the conclusion of the action at Vimiera, the 21st of Au gust, were highly honourable and successful, and such as might be expected from a distinguished Ge r.neral, at the head of a British army of 13,000 men, ' augmented on the 20th and 2lst to 17,000, deriving only some small aid from a Portuguese corps (1600 men), and against whom an enemy, not exceeding 14,000 men in the field, was opposed ; and this be fore the arrival of a very considerable reinforcement from England, under Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, which, however did arrive and join the army, from the 25th to the SOth of August. It appears a point on which no evidence adduced can enable the Board to pronounce, with confidence, whether or not a pursuit after the battle of the 21st, could have been of : nor can the Board feel confident to determine on the expedience of a for ward movement to Torres Vedras, when Sir Harry BUrrard has stated weighty considerations against such a measure. • Further, it is to he observed, that so many collateral circumstances could not be known in the moment of the enemy's repulse, as afterwards became clear to the army, and have been repre sented to the Board. And considering • the e;traor .ciinary circumstances under which two new Com manding Generals arrived from the ocean, and joined .the army (the one during; and the other immediately after, a battle, and those successively superceding each other, and both the original Commander within the space 0f.24 hours), it is not surprising that the' army was not carried forward, until the second day! l ' i lfter the action, from the necessity of the Generals +being acquainted With the actual state of things, and of their many, and pioceedirox accordingly. It appears that the Convention of Cintra in all its progress and conclusion, or at least all the principal articles of it, were not objected to by the five distin guished Lieutenant-Generals of that army ; and other General Officers who were on that service, whom we have had-an apportunity to examine, have also eon owed in the great advantagesthat were immediately gained, to the country of Portugal, to the army and navy, and to the general service, by the conclusion of the Convention at that time. On a consideration - qf all -circumstances, as set forth in this Report, we most hintiblt submit our opinion, that no further military proceeding is necessary on the subject. Because, howsoever some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the , Convention in the relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout to have been lezhiSited by, Lieutenant-Generals Sir Hew Dairym pie, Sir Harry Borrard, aud Sir Arthur Wellesley, as will at that the ardour and gallantry of the rest of •. .• • • • • the. allots . soldiers, 43u ovary. occasion Juane this expedition, have d on e honour to the troops, and , reflected lustre on your Majesty's arms. All which is most dutifully submitted. (Signed) DAVID DV RIDAS, General. MOlRA,Gererni. PETER CRAY, Oencral. Tll II:: ID, General, Pr: AI R E, NI2 GEN r, 0 t .Nacou.s, Lieut. Leoeral. Judge Advocate Genecara Office, Dec. 27, ISOR. In consequence of the folloWing letter from his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, to Genera/ Sir David Dundas, as President, viz, _ December S 2, 1808. Horse GuarJe Dec. C 5, 180 R. Stn—The Judge Advocate General having deli vered to me to b e laid before his Majesty, the several papers and documents, containing all the examina tions and proceedings taken before the Board %of In quiry, of whi c h y ou are t h e President, together with your report and opinion upon the whole of the late operations of his Majesty's forces in Portugal, as con nect:4 with the Armistice and subsequent Convention of Cintra, I think it incumbent on me to state to you, that although the report is fully detailed, and per-: fectly explanatory of all the transactions as they ap peared in evidence before you ; yet, upon a due con sideration of the whole matter, it certainly appears that your opinion upon . the conditions of the Armis tice and Convention, which the words of his Majesty's warrant expressly enjoin should be strictly examined, inquired into, and reported upon, has been altogether, omitted. I feel it my duty, therefore, to call yonrattention to these two principal features of this important case, the Armistice and Convention, and to desire that you may be pleased to take the same again into your most setious consideration, and subjoin to the opinion which you have already given upon the other points submitted to your examination and inquiry, whether, under all the circumstances which appear in evidence before you, 'on the relative situation of the two armies, on the 22d of August, 1808, it is your opinion that an armistice was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that armistice were such as ought to have been agreed upon ; and whether upon a like consideration of the relative situation of the two armies subsequent to the armistice, and when all the British forces were landed, it is your opinion , that a Convention was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that Convention were such as ought to have been agreed upon? I am the more desirous that you - ahold resume the consideration of these two points, the ArMistice and Convention, as it appears upon the face of your Report, that a difference of opinion exists among the Members of the Board, which may probably produce a dissent from the majority upon these very ques tions. You will be pleased, therefore, to desire such of the Members as may be of a different opinion Trcm the majority upon these two questions, to record upon the face of the proceedings their reaLdus for such dis sent.—l am, Sir, yours, (Signed) FREDERICK Gen. Sir D. Dundas, K. B. Commander-in-Chief. The Board met this day at the Judge-Advocate- General's Office, when the said letter having been read, they agreed that the following questions should be put to each of the Members of tne Board APPROVE. 0 you, or do you) DisArtiton. Lt.-Gen. Nicolls • not approve of the I Earl of Moira Lt.-Gen.SirG. Nugent Armistice as con- Earl of Pembroke eluded on the 22d Lord Heathfield of Aug. 1808, in General Craig the relative situa- Gen. Sir D. Dundas tion of the two armies ? APPROVE. Do you, or do you Lt.-Gen. Sir G. Nugent not approve of the Gen. Lord Heathfield Convention, as General Craig concluded upon Gen. Sir D. Dundas the Slit of Aug. 1808, in the rela tive situ.ltion of the two armies ? (Signed) DAVID DUNDAS, President. DISAPPROVE. Lt.-Gen. Nicolls Earl of Pembroke Earl of Moira My reason for considering the Armistice as advisa ble on the 22d of August was, because the enemy had been able to retire after the battle of the 21st, and take up a strong defensive position: OL. /sltcou.s, L. G, I think, considering the great increase of our force from the first suspension of hostility to the definitive signing of the Convention, added to the defeat the enemy had suffered, Sir Hew Dalrymple was fully entitled to have insisted upon more favourable terms. OL. Nicoll.% L. G. • I approve of the Armistice after a due consideration of the relative situations of the two armies on the evening of the 22d of August, but I cannot fully ap prove of the whole of the Convention, after a duo consideration of the relative situation of the two ar mies at that time; because it does not appear to me thiit in the progress of the negociation, sufficient stress was laid upon the great advantages which had resulted, or were likely to result, fi om the former succ,ssful operations of the British army in the field, from the considerable reinforcements which had joined it, sub sequent to the commencement of the negociation, from the cause in which the British army was engag ed being the cause of Portugal, which gave good reason to reckon upon the good-will, if not upon the active assistance, of the majority of the inhabitants ; and, also, from the unusual readiness which, as it ap pears to me, was manifested by General Junot to enter into negociation, and by the French negociatcr to ac cede to terms as they were proposed, and to such con struction as Lieutenant General Sir H. Dalrymple put upon them in some instances, where they might have borne a difference of interpretation. I therefore think it probable, for tile above reasons, that if less favourable terms to the French army had been insis ted upon, they would have been acceded to. PEMBROKE, Lieut. Gen. I feel less awkwardness in obeying the order to de tail my sentiments on the nature of the Convention, because that I have already joined in the tribute of applause due in other respects to the Officers con. cerned. My opinion, therefore, is only opposed to their's on a question of judgment, where their talents are likely to have so much more weight, as to render , the profession of my difference, even on that point, somewhat painful. The duty is, however, imperious on me not to disguise or qualify the deductions which I have made during this investigation. An Armistice simply might not have been objec - I tionable, because Sir Hew Dalrymple, expecting hourly the a2riva! of S r John Nacre's division, tnikkht see more advantage tOr himself in a short susiensioa . I -hristilfues,' thawsaat the French,cctild dotatimili f Bit ' as die . .Eiregiiiie v inoolved, and in fact' est*. klished the whole principle Of 'the Convention I cast. not separate it froM the latter; , iir A. Wellesley has siated e. that he considered his force, at the cprnmincetnetit.of 'the march from the Mondego River, as sufficient te'arlie the Fritts ch from their positions on the Tagus. That' force is sub. sequently joined - by above 4000 British troops, under Generals Anstruther and Ackland. The French make an attack with their whole disposable - strengtlt, and are repulsed with heavy loss, thihigkliut' f a pa: of the British army is brought into action, rt ficult to conceive that the prospects which'Sir Arthur Wellesley entertained could he unfavourably altered 1 by these events, even had not the certainty. of speedy , reinforcements to the Britisharmy'existed. It is urged, that had the French been puihed to' . extremity, they would have crossed the Tagns, and" have protracted the campaign in such a manner as'to have frustrated the most important view of the British'. Generals—namely, sending succours into Spain. This measure. must have been equally feasible for the 'French irno victory had been obtained over them, but I confess that the chance of,such an attempt seems to me assumed againit probability. Sir Hevi Dal; rymple notices what he • calls the critical and em barrassed state of Junot," before that General has been pressed by the British army , . and, in explanal.; tion of that expressi on , observes, that the, surreodv, of Dupont, the existence of the' vlctoriotis . Ipan)iti 4 army in Andalusia, which cut off retreat of this French - in that:direction, and the universal hostility. of the Portuguese, made the situation of Junot one 010 great distress. No temptation for the translation,or thE s wit irito - Alentejo presents itself fronvhis picture, - nor does any other represe n t at i on g i ve groun d to sup- ' pose th at Junot could have contemplated the measure as holding forth any prospect brit ultimate ruin, after' mutt} preliminary distress and di sgrace . Th e strongest of al l proofs as to . Junot's opinion, arises.from his sending the very morning after the battle of Vimiera, to propose the evacuation ofPitirtue • a#tep sufficiently indicated that , satisfied he could not only make no effectual defence, but could - not even prolong the contest to take thechance-ofaccidtnts. He seems, indeed,' to have been without any real resource. It appears in evidence, - thif of the troops left by. him in 'Lisbon - and' the forts; a considerable propos' tion were of very doubtful qua li ty . Those Troops on' whose fidelity he could confide, had been dismayed by at signal defeat, and they were sensible that they, had no succour to look to from abroad. To the, British Generals it was known, when the Armistice was granted, that 10,000 men under SirJ. Moore, as well as the 3d and 42d reg i ments o f f oot, with the 18th dragoons, might be immediately reckoned upon ; and although much advantage had not been drawn !, from the Portuguese troops, their support and the general violence of the country against the French,' cannot be laid out of this calculation. The disparity of force and of circumstances was, then, such as could . leave no doubt that the. issue: • must be favourable to us. Ido not omit' advertence, to the difficulties urged as possible 'to occur in fur., nishing . the British army with bread. But, put• ting aside the obvious solution, that suck a tom' porary privation is not ruinous to an army where tattle ,can be procured in the country,. this fiaulty cannot be well pleaded, if admission is to . be given to the speculation, that the heivy cannon t necessary for battering forts St. Julien and Cascaes were to be got ashore in the Bays of the Rock of Lis: bbn.—The question then comes to this,: whether thi. Convention did (as has been asserted) s o ecure all t objects which were proposed , in the Eli&ditien ? I it. did not, it was not w h a t his Majesif Was entitle to expect from the relative situation of the two aiMies: I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to re gard the emancipation of Portugal from the Frenchl as the sole or the principal object of theexpeditiori.l • Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it must be a prominent object in the struggle to de.' stroy their resources, and to narrow their' means Oft injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the • Convention, that the trims appear to have extricated Junot's army from a situation of infinite distress, • which it was wholly out of play, and - to hairebrenght it in a state of entire equipment, into immediate 'cur: rency, in a quarter too, where it must interfere with our most urgent and interesting concerns. Had it Been impracticable to reduce the French army to lay down its arms unconditionally, still an ob.: ligation not to serve for a specified time mighth avebeen insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been presciitied as the place at which they should be landed, in order to prevent the possility of their reinforcing (at least for a long time) the armies employed for the subjuga tion of Spain. Perhaps a stronger consideration than the merit of those terms presents itself. Opinion re lative to the British arms was of the hi g h e S t i mpo r- e tance, as it might influence the confidence of the - . Spaniards, or invite the nations groaning under the yoke of France, to appeal to this country, and co-ope. ; rate with it for their delive rance . Th e adiantagei • ought, therefore, to have been morethan gteat,, • which should be deemed sufficient to balance the ob: jection of granting to a very inferior army, hopeless in circumstances, and broken in spirit, such terms as might argue, that, notwithstanding its disp a rity . - in numbers, it was still fo r mid a bl e to its-victors.' —No advantages seem• to have been' gained' that' would not have equally followed from forcing the enemy to a more marked submission. The gain of time as to sending succours into Spain cannot be act• witted as a plea; because it appears that no arrange. ments for the reception of our troops In Spain hid been undertaken - previous to the Convention . ; and thill is without reasoning on subsequent facts. - - The Convention in Egypt, which has been advanced as a parallel case, appears to rue inapplicable. No ob ject beyond the dislodgment of the Freneli from Egypt,; was there in question. In the present instance, the operation of the Convention upon the affairs of Spaittl ' was a considei ation of primary interest';' and in that's • - view, the inevitable effect of rune of the aeticlea • fers itself to my mind as liable to material objection, I trust that these reasoni will vindicate me' froth': the charge elptesumption, in maintaining nn opinion' contrary to that professed by to - m - any most respecta-- i hie Officers ; kw; even if the reasons be essentially erroneous, it they are conclusive to my mind (as Im!:!st conscientiously f,tirm them to.be), .. it is a, necei serf • enrislq' o 4 uenee:7. . - th io at 9o l - ,nicst - disaypro u ve o l i e , p . p 11