The Press. — London, England, 1856-02-16 00:00:00

FEBRUARY 16, 1856. Yittraturt. L'Expedititm de Crimie jusqu'd la Prise Sebas topol. By the Baron de Bazancourt. Vol. I. Paris : Amyot. TIM book, published within the last few days at Paris, is the most important one that has yet appeared on the Crimean campaign. For it is neither by " Our Own Correspondent," nor by a " T. G.," nor by an officer, sub ject as such to professional prejudice, but is by a nobleman, who was sent out with the official authority of the French Government expressly to write a history of the campaign, who was formally accredited to the French General-in-Chief by the Minister of War, who had every facility afforded by all the French commanders for observation and inquiry, and who, after his return to Paris, had confiden tial despatches and private letters and docu ments of all kinds placed at his disposal. The book, therefore, must be considered as the formal official account of the campaign which the French Government is anxious to have accepted, by contemporaries and posterity, as historically true. As such a work necessarily possesses pecu liar interest to English readers, we hasten to see what it contains. After a brief history of the diplomatic events which led to the declaration of war by Eng land and France against Russia, the author records the despatch of English and French troops to Gallipoli. the arrival of the respec tive generals-in-chief in that place, and after about a fortnight's delay their departure for Varna to have a conference with Omer Pacha as to what was to be done. On arriving at Varna— The evident active nature of Marshal St. Arnaud, and his high position in the army, naturally caused him to assume the direction of the grave discussions that were to take place. And so, at the opening of the conferences, he called on Omer Pacha to expose clearly the situation of his army, its strength and resources, and the projects which he had formed for opposing the enemy—also to tell all he knew concerning the Russian army. Thus, from the very first, the English General in-Chief subsided into a secondary position. Omer Pacha was of opinion that the allies ought immediately to assist the Turks in driving the Russians, who were then besieging Silistria, from the Danubian principalities ; but what was decided was, that a French division should occupy a position near Varna, and that an English one should proceed to Devena. The advantages of this plan were, according to Marshal St. Arnaud, to encourage the Turks, discourage the Russians, and force the Austrians, who were feeling their way, to pronounce. A day or two after, infor mation arrived that the Russians had com pletely invested Silistria, and that the fall of the place was imminent. Therefore it was determined to concentrate all the troops in the neighbourhood of Varna; and Omer Pacha said that in three weeks ho could collect 70,000 men, Lord Raglan promised in the same time 20,000 English, and Marshal St. Arnaud " hoped to be able in the same space "of time to have 35,000 men collected." We quote this to show that the French at the moment hostilities were likely to commence had not that immense numerical superiority over the English which it is the fashion on the Continent to imagine. And a few pages further on we read that when, on the 26th of May, the Marshal returned to Gallipoli, expecting to find his 35,000 men ready to leave at once, — He was plunged into consternation. He had forgotten that for an expedition so distant he might have to en counter obstacles of all kinds, some of them insurmount able, and difficulties of navigation. Artillery, engineers, stores, camp materiel, horses, everything had been em barked from France with the greatest celerity and without any loss of time; but the Marshal had not taken into ac count the seas to be traversed, and the contrary winds to be encountered. Hope is often a bad logician. The first moment of disappointment was a cruel one. The plan so laboriously combined fell down at once. The flag of France could not yet be displayed ; the Imperial eagles could not yet show their golden wings. This was the fault of no one, but the result of the precipitation with which everything had to be done. There were at Gallipoli only twenty or thirty pieces of artillery with their horses ready for use, and about 500 hones belonging to different corps. THE PRESS. The infantry, deprived of almost all the fourth division, which had been expected, but which bad not arrived, only consisted of twenty-seven disposable bamilions, and they had not marched, and were wanting in cohesion. All the rest, personnel end materiel, were detained at sea by northern winds. The English army, on its part, was not in a better condition. And so delay was inevitable. But this was not understood by the Turks, who grumbled; and, on the other hand, — Lord Raglan had entered into arrangements with his Government without foreseeing or suspecting what happened. He had made promises, given dates, and the Opposition, calendar in hand, complained that what he had promised was not fulfilled. His lordship was, besides, it is added, pestered by his generals (pousse rar lea qfficiera genenzux) to " do something." In the hope of silencing this dissatisfaction, it was determined, instead of following out the original plan, to send about 6,000 English and the same number of French to Varna, under Sir George Brown and General Canro bert. But the hope was a vain one : The situation of the English general became more diffi cult and delicate from day to day in presence of the recom mendations and complaints that were made to him. It is so easy for people to excite others to act when they have not the responsibility of events! The English Ambassador, public opinion, the exagge- rated idea which was generally entertained of the position of the allied armies, though they had only just disembarked on Ottoman soil, all contributed to urge him on to the execution of the first combinations, which consisted' in concentrating the troops, whatever they were, at Varna, to extend them towards Schumia to assist Omer Paella, and to relieve Silistria, if it were possible. But though the English general had the whole of his forces at Scutari, though he disposed of a veritable fleet of transports, the constitution of his army was far from being complete. However, after further hesitations and delays, the whole armies, which had become com plete, were sent to Varna. But then a new disappointment occurred—the Russians raised the siege of Silistria " The Russians cheat me by running away," cried the Marshal, with profound bitterness, which he took no pains to disguise He was overwhelmed. He felt the inaction that would weigh on his troops concentrated at Varna. The value of a first clmbat, a first victory, would have been inestimable, and the opportunity of meet• ing the Russians in such favorable conditions could not present itself again for a long time to come. The more he thought of the position in which he was placed by this un expected event, the more he was overwhelmed. His health, which was only supported by a perpetual fever of activity, visibly suffered most cruelly. " I shall never re cover from the blow which the disgraceful retreat of the Russians," he wrote, " has been to me. I had them in my grasp, and should have infallibly beaten them and thrown them into the Danube. We have now, again, fallen into uncertainty. I know not where they are, what they are doing, what they mean to do The whole army felt the same cruel impressions, the same profound discouragement. In spite, however, of the discontent caused by the somewhat piteous figure of the allies at Varna having no enenty to attack, we read that— The most perfect understanding prevailed between the two armies—the commanders-in•chief of one and the other were received with acclamations. Whenever the Marshal passed along the English lines the soldiers brandished their arms and raised frantic hurrahs. The mots d'ordre were—union and sympathy. It seemed that in order to cast a thicker veil over the past the two nations desired to unite more closely. " Lord Raglan and my self," wrote the Marshal, " give the example." And, again :—" I am on such excellent terms of mutual confi dence with him, that I am certain to be in accord with him on all points touching the common situation." The English troops were magnificent in appearance; their bearing was irreproachable ; they manoeuvred with rare precision, but with that reflecting and slow calm which is the stamp of the nation, and which is to be found in the soldiers as well as in the officers. The ensemble was remarkable in every respect; the discipline severe; the manner in which the officers commanded was sharp and haughty ; but never were the chiefs to be seen in a passion with their men. What a strange contrast with the bearing of our troops ! with their dashing easy gait, their martial and energetic air, the impetuosity which is stamped on all their faces! On lo3king at our soldiers we feel that ardour and impatience run through all their veins, and we can understand that in the hour of combat the unforeseen may at an instant arise from a difficult situation. In the English army, on the contrary, impassibility seems a duty ; the officer in command knows at a glance what each one of his soldiers can do, and that not one will fail him. But, on the other hand, not one by a sudden in spiration will exceed what was expected from him. Time passed on at Varna, and a terrible visitation came—the cholera. And not only did the awful malady break out amongst the troops, but those which came from Malta and from France brought it with them. The armies were disgusted with their inaction and alarmed at the cholera, and the Marshal was 159 in despair. What was to be done? Where was a blow against the Russians to be struck ? People, to be sure, talked of the Crimea, and the Marshal himself had always had his eye on Sebastopol ; but the preliminary reconnais sances were not effected, and the means of getting the armies there did not exist. At this stage the Marshal received orders from home not to go to the Danube, but to keep his army ready to be removed by the fleet ; Lord Raglan, on his part, received pressing instruc tions to prepare for a movement on the Crimea. The Marshal was afterwards left at liberty by his Government to do what he thought best, but Lord Raglan had positive orders to take good care not to enter the Dobrudscha, and to pursue the Russians beyond the Dannbo ; to reserve all his troops and all his resources lbr an expedition h. the Crimea and for a siege of Sebastopol; not to abandon that all-im- portant enterprise until after having acquired a reasonable conviction of the evident disproportion between the forces of defence and those of the attack, a disproportion, how ever, which could not fail to increase if the expedition were not sent off immediately. An Ottoman corps, commanded by French and English officers, was to be charged to seize Perekop, and to close the isthmus against the enemy, or to make a diversion in Circassia by seizing Anapa and Soukoum Kale, the only positions which the Russians had kept on that coast. Even after Lord Raglan had received these orders, the French Government was far from pressing Marshal St. Arnaud to go to the Crimea, unless he were perfectly convinced of success: The English Government, it will be seen, was very de cided on the expedition to the Crimea and on the question of the siege of Sebastopol ; the French Government was more reserved, and lett more latitude to the general in chief lt was not then, as has been said, the adventurous obstinacy of the Marshal, and his personal desire to be able to send home some glorious bulletins, which caused the expedition to the Crimea to be decided on. It is important not to confound the decision with the execution, which are two :pings essentially distinct. Still the cholera continued to rage, and amongst its victims were General the Duke d'Elchingen and General Carluccia, two young and distinguished officers. Every day, too, it became worse, and, in the language c,f the author, cried to the generals, " Act !" About this time, — Lord Raglan communicated to the Marshal a despatch which he had received from his Government, and which was explicit, pressing, such. in a word, that (as the Mar• shal wrote to the Minister of the War) his lordship consi dered it almost as an order to attack Sebastopol. It was accordingly resolved that the generals and admi rals in chief should hold a council, and one took place on the Ittith of July. In consequence of the despatches they had received, and the pressure of public opinion as ex pressed by the newspapers of London, the English chiefs voted positively for the expedition. Marshal St. Arnaud made no objection, and preparations were commenced ; but he saw great difficulties in the way, and wrote:— The capture of Sebastopol and the Crimea is more ad vantageous to England than to France; but to disembark in the Crimea and to besiege Sebastopol is en entire cam paign, and not a coup•de•main : it requires immense means, and we ought to be sure of success Sup posing that we disembark, and we can almost always dis embark, we should require more than a month's siege to take Sebastopol, which is perfectly defended. In the meantime the Russians would receive reinforcements, and I should have two or three battles to fight. It is easy to say " Take Perekop and shut up the passage," but it would be necessary to take troops to Perekop, and when there they could not disembark owing to the water being too shallow for large vessels, and besides Perekop is a pes tilential place Nevertheless, in spite of all difficulties and obstacles, and of the want of means and time, Sebastopol pleases me so much that I shall not heal. tate to go there if there be a chance of success, and I am preparing for the expedition. And still the cholera raged—and it made terrible havoc amongst the large body of French troops sent into the Dobrudscha. And then another disaster came,—the awful fire at Varna. And then, to crown all, the cholera broko out in the fleets and laid hundreds of brave fellows low : The admirals, in consternation, asked themselves if, under these circumstances, it would not be madness t o undertake the adventurous expedition of the Crimea. Doubts gained ground amongst others. But the French Generabin-Chief remained almost alone unchangeable in his resolution. Ftoin that moment he seemed, so to speak, to have personified the campaign ; he assumed all the responsibility of it by his energetic determination to act, and by bis refusal to listen to any opinions opposed to it, because, though perhaps prudent, they came too late Our allies, who had at first demanded the expedition hesitated in presence of the chances opposed to it whit accumulated every day, and by the difficulties created b unforeseen events. Awl if the chiefs did not make a open and decided opposition, they at least did not disguise their apprehensions, A