The Press. — London, England, 1856-12-06 00:00:00

DECEMBER 6, 1856. trouble to her Majesty, without, as far as we can see, subservinc: any purpose of practical utility or check; and so onerous and useless did it appear that the provisions of the Act of Parliament are now virtually evaded, and one Royal order substituted for fifty or sixty. Mr. ANDERSON states upon this subject, in reply to question 1,002 : . - As to the miscellaneous services, it was formerly the practice, up to the last year, to have a separate order for each separate vote, but the number of votes was so much increased last year that we did not like to place before the Queen 200 or 300 Royal orders to sign at once, and we placed the whole of each class in one Royal order, so that the Queen had to sign once instead of fifty or sixty times. And in reply to question 1,004, " Could you " see any further security in multiplying the " Royal orders?" he says : None at all ; if the Crown granted one Royal order for the whole of the Civil Services it would do equally well. It ig a formal authority, but it is no check. By the clause, however, in the Exchequer Act which we have quoted, it was intended, no doubt, that the Exchequer rhould exercise a control, not only over the Treasury, but even over the Royal order under sign -manual ; and such control has been not unfrequently exer cised. Lord MONTEAOLE states, in reply to question 801, that in 1841, on the change of Government, upwards of 100 Royal orders and Treasury warrants were sent to him signed by her Majesty, upon which he declined act ing, considering their legality questionable. With the jealousy which becomes a ‘Vhig official, for the grandeur, dignity, and power of his office, even over the Crown itself, his Lordship exultingly exclaims, " Here are up " wards of 100 Royal orders and warrants, " which were all set aside by one stroke of the " pen ;" and he adds that he was justified in his objection by the law officers of the Crown. The control of the Exchequer, therefore, must be considered as a cogent one ; but its defect (and which really renders it nugatory) consists in this,—that it is only applicable and avail able as regards the granting a credit to the public officer whose function it is to pay, and that the control, or power of following out the payment, ceases the very moment the credit is given. This, as we have observed, renders the control perfectly nugatory. Mr. ANDER SON, the able and experienced clerk in the financial department of the Treasury, explains this very distinctly. As regards the Exche quer, he states (1357) : They merely issue the money to be appropriated ; they know nothing of it after it has left them. Again (1360) : When a vote is passed, a Royal order is obtained for the gross amount, and the Treasury warrant is sent to the Exchequer with the Royal order. All the legal forms are then complete. If the Treasury choose to order him to issue on the following day the whole amount of that vote, he has no discretion, he must obey. And in reply to the next question, addressed to him by Sir JAMES GRAHAM (1361), he says : T think it (the Exchequer check' is a delusion, and I think it objectionable that delusions should be continued. If there is a real check in it, or it can be strengthened and amended, let it he done ; but I can see no way in which you can strengthen that check at all. It only introduces an additional operation for every issue which materially retards and embarrasses the proper course of public business. Sit FRANCIS BARING asks (1578) : Sir Charles Trevelyan states in his memorandum, " The Paymaster• General and the Paymaster of Civil Services habitually use money belonging to one head of service in making advances for other services in the ordinary trans• actions of the daily business of their respective depart• ments." Is that a correct statement? Mr. ANDERSON answers, " Quite correct." Mr. HENLEY asks (1815) : The issue of an Exchequer credit by the Comptroller of the Exchequer is the placing of a distinct sum of money from the one general account of the Exchequer at the Bank of England under a particular name, which you call Exchequer credits, out of the control of the Comptroller of the Exchequer into the control of the Paymaster, who deals with it as he thinks fit? Yes. We could easily multiply evidence upon this point if it were necessary, but what we have above quoted is sufficient to prove that the control of the Exchequer is nominal, not real. The Exchequer (as we are told, 1037, 1848) may refuse to sanction an issue of more than 2 0,000,0001. for the army, supposing that to be the sum voted ; but the Exchequer, having sanctioned the issue of the 20,000,000/ for the army, it cannot check or prevent the Paymas- THE PRESS. ter from applying 5,000,0001. of this 20,000,0001. to the navy. That the Paymaster should have the power of applying to the navy a sum directed to be issued for the army, either under tbo authority of the Treasury, or any other Government authority, may or may not be necessary or expedient; but it is manifest from the evidence that there is nothing in the functions of the Exchequer to control or pre vent it, and therefore the control of the Ex chequer, as to actual appropriation, is in this respect defective. We shall conclude our remarks upon this subject by giving three in stances of recent occurrence which will bear out the assertions we have made. In the year 1855 no less a sum than 213,000/. was paid out of the gross revenue of the country for the purchase of the Duke of GRAFTON'S pen sion, without any authority either from Parlia ment or the Comptroller of the Exchequer. Lord NIONTEAGLE states he had no knowledge or cognisance of such a payment, and that if he had been required to make that payment out of the Exchequer, he would have refused to sanction it. We do not mean to insinuate that there was anything wrong in the redemption of this pension, or that the terms were unfa vorable for the country. This may, or may not, have been the case ; but we beg leave to ask our readers whether it can be said that an adequate or proper control exists with regard to public monies, when only a year ago, at a period of an extraordinary drain upon the resources of the country, a sum of 213,0001. could be applied to redeem a pension without any vote of the House of Commons—without any ways and means—and without any approval by the Exchequer? The next case we shall quote will be to estab lish what we cannot avoid describing as a mis• appropriation of public money. In the short session of 1852 a sum of 80,0001. was voted for the Duke of WELLINGTON'S funeral ; the whole of this sum was drawn from the Exchequer on the 4th of April, 1853, when, according to the admission of Mr. ANDERSON, not more than 15,0001. was due in respect of the funeral. The 80,0001. was placed immediately by the Paymaster to his drawing account, to be used, without reference to the proper appro priation, for the public service generally ; and at the period of the inquiry about 25,0001. re mained unapplied to its proper object. Here we have a sum of 25,0001. in the Paymaster's hands for more than three years, applicable by him, under Treasury orders, without any control on the part of the Exchequer, or any other public functionary, to any purpose what ever. Our readers, by referring to questions 744 and 1580, may learn the particulars of this transaction. The last illustration we shall give will be found by reference to 1541, 1710, 1988. It appears that the Turkish Government ad- I vP.nced a sum of 150,0001. for certain stores which they bought from our Government. Instead of being paid into the Exchequer, and being thus brought into regular account, it was paid, at the request of the Secretary of of State for Foreign Affairs, with the know ledge and consent of the Treasury, into the drawing account of the Paymaster-General, where it became available without control or question for any purpose which might suit the convenience or interest of the Government. Mr. ANDERSON admits (1710.11) that this sum of money would never come before Parlia ment, might remain in the hands of the Pay master without Parliament knowing anything of it (1712), that the House of Commons woull notwithstanding be answerable for it (1713, 1990), and, in reply to the following significant question, put to him by Sir JAMES GRAHAM— Supposing a dissolution of Parliament takes place, and— not the Financial Secretary of the Treasury, but the other Secretary—for parliamentary purposes during the dissolu tion, wants 40,0001., what is there to prevent 40,0001. out of that Turkish advance of 150,0001. being employed for forty days ? in reply to this searching and significant question Mr. ANDERSON gives the following evasive answer : There is always a danger that the Turkish Government might call for it for its own purposes ! Now, we aver that in the face of such evidence and such illustrations, it is impossible to maintain that there exists at the present time 1155 an adequate and proper check upon the ap propriation of public monies—such a control and check as was recommended and intended by the Commissioners of 1831; and we say with Mr. ANDERSON, that the control of the Exchequer, HS at present constituted, is a delusion to the public. THE SOUTHAMPTON ELECTION. WE look forward to the result of this contest with considerable interest as a kind of test whereby to gauge the yet remaining influence of the Liberal imposture. That the electors of Southampton may defeat Sir EDWARD BUTLER and return Mr. ANDREWS or Mr. WEGUELIN is of course very possible ; but what we want to know is, in the words of Sir JAMES GRAHAM, the reason why. We shall watch with great curiosity the hustings speeches of the candidates and their sup porters, being anxious to learn by what pro cess of logic a Liberal constituency will deter mine to elect a Radical burgess to support a. retrogressive Government. Of the two Liberal candidates, neither is free from this species of objection. Mr. WEGUELIN is, for all we know, a respectable man, and would probably support Lord PALMERSTON'S Government on principles wholly adverse to those on which the voters of Southampton support himself; Mr. ANDREWS, on the other hand, is an ultra-Radical, who, if he did not oppose Lord PALMERSTON, would be denying his own principles, and, if he did, would be deceiving his own party. Such is the dilemma to which the dexterously dishonest monopoly of the term Liberal by a party which has long ceased to sympathise with Liberalism has brought, and will bring, a numerous class of our consti tuencies. They cannot give effect to their principles whatever they do. For if they elect a conscientious Liberal, he cannot support Lord PALMERSTON ; and if they elect a con scientious supporter of Lord PALMERSTON, supposing such a rara avis to exist, he cannot be a Liberal. On the other hand, if the pre sent Government is not supported, a Tory Go vernment will come in ; so that, between the two fires, we may well imagine the dismay of all those who have the misfortune to entertain. sincere Radical opinions. The Premier is master of the situation. The rage and disap pointment of his supporters are perfectly im potent. He points significantly to the opposi tion benches, and the tumult is stilled. One by one do the unhappy Liberals behold their favorite convictions thrown overboard, and. their long-cherished dogmas stultified before their very eyes in mute and helpless indigna tion. At the least sign of insubordii:ation a cry that " The Tories are coming " at once excites terror and restores obedience. At that bugbear the friends of oppressed nationalities, the denouncers of aristocratic patronage, the advocates of the ballot and of universal suffrage, put their principles in their pockets, and hurry to the rescue of a Minister who be trayed the first, supports the second, and in variably sneers at the third. We are bound, however, to believe that the Liberal party will not endure for ever this anomalous and degrading servitude ; that they will at length muster courage to look a little more steadfastly at that horrible image which the Premier and his organs conjure up whenever a doubt of his stability is suggested ; that they will not permit themselves for ever to be frightened like little children by a mere name ; that they will sooner or later begin to ask themselves what would actually happen were a Conservative Government in office, or what real good they can expect to themselves from the continuance of a Liberal one ? Sooner or later these questions will be asked, and we sincerely hope the electors of Southampton may take the lead in doing so. The character and position of Sir EDWARD BUTLER, the Conservative candidate, is happily such as to afford the electors an excellent opportunity of adopting such a course. A long resident among them, heir to considerable property in the immediate neigbourhood, and a man of high character and amiable disp-1"