The Press. — London, England, 1855-11-03 00:00:00

eimPre • r Zble 1:3rt.46,5 No. 13L—VoL. 111. LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1855. STAMPED .... SIXPENCE. lINSTAMPED..FIYEPENCE Cly rtss. LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1855. WE are not aware that any Conservative statesmen have expressed opinions on the general policy of the war adverse to those which have appeared in this Journal. At the provincial meetings lately held, they have spoken with some reserve, but with great temper and moderation. They have said distinctly, that they supported the War,—not for purposes of revenge or conquest, but for the conclusion of an honourable and lasting peace. Nothing can be more satisfactory than this. Our views of the general conditions of a peace which would be certainly honourable and probably lasting have been frankly stated in this Journal. From the practical vigour of the English mind, we have a right to expect that on so vast a question as this it will not be content with generalities, nor shrink from plainly declaring its objects. If the legitimate aims of the War are to define the position of Russia in the South—and guard the line by the firmest and strongest barrier that the circumstancs will admit of—to give ab solute freedom to the commerce of the Danube and independence to the Black Sea—to bind Russia, in concert with the Western allience, to a solemn treaty by which the integrity of the Turkish territory shall be recognised, settled, guaranteed, and admitted into the code of European policy as an established principle for nations to uphold and statesmen never to lose sight of—if these intelligible, practica ble objects should form the foundation of the "lasting and honourable peace " which all parties in this country say they desire, then the present juncture appears more favorable to earnest, bonii-fide, pacific negotiation than any likely to ensue for years to come. It will certainly be otherwise should the next campaign open to expel the Russians from the Crimea. From that period a new aspect would be given to the contest. No peace would stand a chance of being perma nent which separated the Crimea from Southern Russia. It would be nothing better than a truce, and of the hollowest kind. Yet, after another year of such battles, losses, and slaughter as the last, incurred solely to obtain possession of the Crimea, would it be pos sible for France and England to treat on the terms of restoring their dearly-won conquest to their foe ? The Crimea is too large for a fortress, too small for a kingdom: to the East, the West, and the North the land is all Russian, and it never would be safe from a sudden descent of that Power, unless an enormous army to garrison it was constantly maintained. Too much or too little would be done by conquering the Crimea alone. It would be necessary to reduce Russian power in the South much farther, or suffer her to occupy the Crimea again. This conclusion will not be startling to those who believe that we are hut at the commencement of the War, and who hope that it will be prosecuted to the dismember ment of Russia or her utter overthrow ; buc to men who hoped that it might be limited to the politic objects we have indicated, it must be a source of the most serious reflection,-ae opening a prospect of lengthened hostilities. This is not a reason that we should hold our hand, if the hostile course be the only one consistent with a wise and magnanimous po licy. But it is a reason which should induce us never to protract it beyond the hour when a fair settlement becomes practicable, and never to be misled by the sophistries of mere sentiment, or by the warmth of those honester passions which war rouses in the hearts of the great body of the people, and constitute what has been well called a " wild kind of justice." There can be no fear that the military reputation of the Allies would suffer by a peace which withdrew their forces from the Crimea. The notion that supposes the capa city of States for war to be diminished with the amplest development of their commerce is a fallacy. Many of the most heroic States of antiquity were commercial. The merchant princes of the middle ages left their ledgers for the council chamber to decide the fate of distant kingdoms, and dictate the policy of Europe. For ages the men of Flanders united the characters of the warrior and the trader. The States of Italy were most powerful in arms when they were most prosperous in commerce. The small kingdom of Portugal, in her days of commercial greatness, invaded Africa with a powerful force, and firmly established her power in India by her arms. When commer cial States have declined, it has been not through exclusive devotion to pacific pursuits, or the inroads of luxury, but through their own wanton aggressions, the absence of moderation and prudence in their Govern ments, or the rash resolves of the people to engage in enterprises beyond their strength. Whenever the tsocieties of the modern world are broken up, it will probably be through the influence of analogous causes, facilitated by the establishment among them of the principle of the Funded Debt. This resource gives vastly increased power to their action for a time, but is in itself full of peril. Some States have already exhausted it, and are confessedly bankrupt ; others are pressed by the weight of their acquisitions : the finances of Austria are hopelessly em barrassed ; the public debt of France has been largely increased by her Algerine conquests; while our Indian possessions are becoming a positive drain on our Exchequer. It cannot be our policy to push the War to extremity against Russia, though we may be compelled to do so. The great question is, whether peace be now practicable? If Russia should decide for war at all hazards, the next campaign will not be for the possession of the Crimea alone. Those who now deplore the necessity for the contest, would be no parties to half measures for its prosecution, or to timid counsels on its policy. If compelled to drive Russia back from the Crimea, we must drive her back from the Danube also, from the whole sea-board of the Euxine, and, at whatever cost and sacrifice to ourselves, strip her of a century of progress, and put forth all our resources to erect an impassable barrier to the re-acquisition of the noble empire in the South won from her. The title of the Sword is supreme. If Russia challenges its issue, she must accept its arbitrement. Because the golden hour for adjustment is not yet gone—because the Policy of the War is not yet changed, though it is changinr, we admonish the visionaries who misrepresent the contest as one for the predominance of Opinion and the overthrow of Despotic Go vernment, of the mischief they are effecting by their absurd jargon. But we scarcely imagine it possible that any honourable opening for veace will be lost through the fanatical feeling raised by this democratic clamour, or that it will be rated at more than its due. _ _ The Conservative party, hopeful for the fortunes of their country, confident of its might, proud of its glories, jealous of its re putation, will not stay their hands from any work, how arduous soever, which they find to be necessary. What France has done in Algeria—what England in America, in Indio, and in Australia—may be repeated in the pro vinces now known as Southern Russia. The Allies are equal to this work, though a genera tion of warfare should be required to effect it. And should a spirit of moderation animate their councils until it be no longer possible to be retained, the justice of the mortal strife in which they finally close with their foe will 1 e more clearly vindicated to the world, and animate the two most valiant, enterprising, • and ingenious races of the earth to unflinch ingly pursue (their collossal work, and cheer fully bear all the sacrifices it must entuil on them. _ _ _ Conscious of the magnitude of those sacri fices, aware of the perils that must beset the path even of success, desiring no conquests for the Allies, having little faith in any new distribution of Continental power, we should rejoice to perceive a probability of the other alternative being adopted. The next few months must decide. A great opportunity is open to the statesmen of Europe. How will they use it ? LORD PALMERSTON AND AMERICA. THE passions of every young ;community like "the United States of America" present great difficulties to the statesmen responsible for their control. Unlike the case of old countries, the heavings of the popular mind are not balanced by institutions hoar with time, or moulded by venerable traditions. A free country in the first periods of its existence resembles the case of a young man whose im pulsive ambition is unchecked by the sobering lessons of experience. Its speculative desires spurn the warnings of prudence, and outrun its practical capacities. Hence the early annals of every country are filled by wars, and, as all history teaches, the fortunes of young nations are more often marred than made by rash appeals to the sword. Anatomists teach that the blood in the human frame sways the nervous energy—sanguis rector nervorson. There is something similar in the body politic. As boys are more excitable than men, so in a growing community, whose historical character is yet undeterr ment is not steadily current of opinion. therefore, it is doomed tutional irritability, of grows into the strength more fully-developed l;' letermined, its tempera- y ruled by a yegifiatia:•—) )4 For a eettiiipi season,t , ..*, 2 ned to dist& sonsti- ; 5 )ut of whieti l i dually 1, ngth and cantkiwer of ; 7 ,4 life. P- . , „.. , . t:- . -. 7 4,4 , 11 iv* L' il I k:Nl 4'4 " P:1