The Press. — London, England, 1856-10-11 00:00:00

OCTOBER 11, 1856. Nitcratur. The War. From the Death of Lord Raglan to the Evacuation of the Crimea. By W. H. Russell (the Times Correspondent). With Additions and Corrections. London: Rout ledge. THE examination of this second portion of Mr. W. H Russell's correspondence confirms us in the estimate which we formed when reviewing his previous volume. He is, un doubtedly, a gentleman with many personal resources for active literary life. He has great bodily and constitutional strength. He is a practised reporter, trained in the rough school of " the gallery " to hard work and late hours. He writes with ease, and is a profi cient in the art of panoramic description. Whatever is external, vivid, or salient can be apprehended by him with intuitive ease, and described with graphic force. But along with these merits there are serious drawbacks, which make one often wish that the Times had a more solid, though less sparkling, corre spondent at the seat of war. We shall par ticularise some of these defects, and in doing so we shall not lend ourselves to the sorry work of invidious detraction. For we must frankly say that we cannot concur with the extreme views advanced from opposite sides on the merits or demerits of Mr. Russell. One class of persons affect to deride him, saying in substance, "He is a " clever man, undoubtedly, but, after all, he " is nothing better than a reporter on stilts. 4. He records only what seems to have been the " case, and, in short, he is not a good man on " facts." The other, and vastly more nume rous, class talk in ruptures about his talents. They say " That man, sir, if he had only leisure " enough, would be one of the grandest his " torians that ever wrote." And thus they go into frantic panegyrics on the great news paper Thucydides of the Times. We hold the first class are unjust, and that the second are ridiculous. We shall, with the help of this volume, endeavour to strike a balance of Mr. Russell's shortcomings and successes. In the first place, we must say that Mr. Russell may feel satisfaction that his writings have been so effective as to challenge literary criticism at all : it is something novel that " the style " of a newspaper correspondent should be a subject for discussion. And, secondly, he may plume himself on the fact that he went through his work without break ing down, when it is notorious that several other newspaper correspondents had to retire from the Crimea. He certainly showed much personal vigour and sustained ability from first to last. But, on the other hand, we must recollect that never before had a newspaper correspondent such an opportunity, and we cannot forget (without disrespect to any of our daily contemporaries, or the many clever officials connected with them) that the posi tion of the Times correspondent had superior advantages, that it was stimulating from the myriads of its readers (independently of the special merits of the correspondent himself), and that the rewards of every kind were mare copious than those assigned to other repre sentatives of the public press. It is, we affirm, as an external describer that Mr. Russell is to be praised, and even ad mired. " Mr. Boz " has found himself over matched iu a walk which he supposed was his own. We are sure that " Pictures from Italy," or " Notes from America," by Mr. Russell would be far more brilliant and va luable than the flimsy and grotesque books of that kind which proceeded from Mr. Dickens. But a scene-painter cannot be accepted as an historical painter, nor a playwright as a dramatist; nor can an eloquent reporter, though as positive as Dr. Johnson, and as vaggering as Mr. Macaulay, be confounded with a historian. Indeed, it would be pre posterous to suppose that the most gifted author that can put pen to paper could become an extempore historian. Mr. Russell wrote for effect, though we are sure that he wished to be as accurate as time would allow. To write for effect with full leisure is productive THE PRESS. of mistakes, but Mr. nussell had to write on the moment, and from his passing impression. A historian has to examine both sides ; he must weigh characters, facts, timz, places, and disturbing causes. It would really be absurd to look for those profound qualities from any writer in such circumstances. We therefore offer no detraction from Mr. Rußsell's talents, in saying that we receive all his statements without the faith which his extravagant ad mirers claim for him. In short, we give it as our opinion, that in picturesque views of the progress of events Mr. Russell succeeded with ability and wonder ful facility. But in political views, and in sound estimate of passing men and things, we believe that Mr. Russell would find his equals and superiors in the profession to which he is an unquestionable ornament. His style was formed on an oratorical model, which gives commanding effect with the crowd, but pro vokes the criticism of the few. We are con stantly reminded of the style of Mr. Macaulay and General Napier, though he is not a mere imitator of those distinguished writers, with whom he possesses a prima-facie resemblance. Like them, he is to be read and praised for his powerful expression, his wealth of diction, and his resonant rhetoric. But, like them, he is partial in his statement of facts, and he has no repose of manner ; like them, h• stimu lates the reader until his vivacity becomes monotonous ; and, like them, he is rarely dis criminative in judging characters. Napier's " Peninsular War" has become one of the classics of the language, but few persons, if any, give faith to that brilliant composer's characterisation of individuals. Neither Lord Castlereagh, nor Mr. Canning, nor the Mar quis Wellesley, received anything like justice from General Napier. He did not make sufficient allowance for the difficulties with which the statesmen of that day had to con tend—as the necessity of procuring specie, the factiousness of the Whigs in opposition, and the immense burdens which the long conti nuance of the war threw on the country. But Napier always did justice to the achievements of the army, and never attempted to make those invidious distinctions between officers and men which make so unpleasing a feature in the compositions of Mr. Russell. Never before had a single individual such opportu nity of influencing the public mind. His let ters, through the circulation of the Times, were universally and eagerly read, and credit was given him for a desire to speak the whole truth and nothing but the truth. It was not supposed that, accompanying the army and sharing their perils, he would take advantage of his position to depreciate the merits of the superior officers, and even to expose them to ridicule. Whether this tone was adopted to gratify the malignity which is always eager to find victims to expiate disappointment, or to please the democratic spirit which, envious of all distinction of ranks, would degrade them to its own level, the effect was the same. Mr. Russell had a noble opportunity of telling the British public some wholesome truths. He might have taken a fair and dispassionate view of the action of the superior officers of the army, and, surveying the extreme diffi culties of their position, might have shown that more was expected from them than it was possible for them to perform. It was an easier course to make them personally re sponsible for all the disasters of the war, though the result has shown that those dis asters were almost or altogether inseparable from the circumstances in which they were placed. Their difficulties were immeasurably augmented by the tire of criticism kept up against them. Even the grave was no shelter from calumny ; Lord Raglan was hunted be yond it. The credit of a newspaper was be lieved to be bound up with his continued de famation ; and in this volume, every line of it written after Lord Raglan's death. his conduct is frequently sneered at, though the circum stances which have come to light since his death tend greatly to raise our opinion of his moral courage and firmness of purpose, and to show that he had grand military qualities. In a chapter of connecting narrative, written very lately we presume, Mr. Russell, speaking of the appointment of General Simpson to be commander-in-chief, says that "ho was desti- 975 " tute of those acquirements and personal " characteristics which in Lord Raglan " compensated for a certain apathy and " marble calmness which admirers extolled as " virtues." Mr. Russell takes every opportunity of attributing every disaster which occurred to the incapacity of the commanders. On the Bth August, 1855, when an attack was contem plated, ho wrote : If the attack really is to be made, heaven grant that this time no blunders may be committed, and that the blood of this gallant army may not again be fruitlessly poured by mistakes and mismanagement. This was written six weeks after Lord Raglan's death, and the inference of course is, that the army had been sacrificed to his incapacity. Mr. Russell frequently asserts that the allies might have taken Sebastopol immediately after the battle of the Alma, and in the letter from which we have quoted above he descants on this supposition : A time there was, some ten months ago, when Sebas topol might have been ours on easier terms and in better condition. . . . It is bootless to recur to past blunders and omissions However, if grievous errors have been committed, let us hope that they will in future be avoided. In opposition to his own counsel, Mr. Russell does perpetually recur to what he deems to have been " past blunders and omissions," and " grievous errors." The operation which he supposes ought to have taken place—a dash on Sebastopol after the Alma—might possibly have been successful, but, if re pulsed, it might have resulted in the total annihilation of the army. The allied com manders were ignorant of the defences of the place, and of the forces it contained. There is no reason for civilians, even on the dictum of so great a personage as " Our own Corre spondent," to doubt the conclusion of the allied commanders, that the risk of such a pro ceeding would be too great, and that it could not he justified by any rules of military art. It is remarkable that Mr. Russell, after con tinually stigmatising military prudence as " fogeyism, red-tapery, Horseguardism, rou " tine," and other strong expressions, comes to this notable conclusion : Perhaps on no occasion has the neglect of the course of regular practice Leen so severely punished, even although in the end the object has been gained, as in the siege of Sebastopol. It is the first instance on record in which such a place has been taken by the mere fire of artillery ; for it is admitted by the Russians that even if the assault on the Malakoff had been repelled, they must have abandoned a place exposed at every nook, and chink, and cranny, to such a fire that the very heavens seemed to rain shot and shell upon them. Yet. Mr. Russell was continually urging a departure from "regular practice," and to the last it is his main charge against Lord Raglan's memory that he would adhere to regular practice in spite of civilian lights and newspaper criticism. " Our own Correspon dent" does not inform us whether the artillery fire by which at last Sebastopol was conquered was in accordance with his ideas of " regular practice." If it was, what becomes of all his previous strictures? if it was not, yet the result shows that it was the surest of all means for subduing the place. We believe that Mr. Russell was not very sure of his own meaning in the above paragraph. He is even now probably in doubt whether the measures taken for the reduction of Sebastopol were the very best or the very worst that could have been adopted. At the commencement of that fearful fire (Gortschakoffs feu denfer) opened on the sth of September which resulted in overpowering the defence of Sebastopol, " Our own Corre spondent" was severe at what he termed " the " evident want of unanimity " between the allied generals, because the English fire was not opened at the same time as that of the French : It is not known why this evident want of unanimity existed, and why we did not open fire with the same vigour and rapidity as the French. General Pelissier was at our head-quarters yesterday, and had an interview with General Simpson, and it is not unlikely that the French com mander, finding that we were not quite prepared to open fire with effect, with his characteristic impetuosity, rs- solved on doing so himself, and to rely upon his own numerous and heavy ordnance and abundance of ammuni tion. lamby no means prepared to say that we were not ready to open on the day agreed upon, nor do I in- sinuate that there waa the smallest want of unanimity be tween the generals, but it is a fact that we had not the guns and ammunition required for opening a three days. fire of intensity, and that if we had plenty of a certain ..~