The Press. — London, England, 1855-09-15 00:00:00

870 occupy on the Tschernaya, and that only a month back they considered themselves suffi ciently strong to attack the French and Sar dinians encamped against theni. With the retreat of the Russians from the northern for p,. the whole of the soutlrprn portion of the Crimea will be in the thralls or under the coin mand of the Allies. Another camjaign will probably be required to expel ttte Russians from the north. The report thti timer* PELISSIER had telegraphed to his Government to know what terms he should grant to the enemy on their offering to capitulate, was most likely born of that excessive presumption which captured Sebastopol a twelvemonth ago on the faith of the story of a wandering Tatar. We are yet some way from the conquest of the Crimea ; but that conquest, though com plete, would not end the war. Victory, it is admitted in theory, is valuable only as it tends to simplifly complications, and to bring belli gerents nearer to agreement on terms of peace. But practically it acts in much the same manner as success at a gaming-table. It stimulates cupidity on one side, and desire of reparation on the other, so that the game goes on until it ceases from exhaustion on one side or lassitude on both. The fall of Sebastopol seems little favorable to pacific prospects. The notion of " material guarantees " is likely to find more favour than formerly, now that we have in our hands the finest port in the Black Sea, and that the whole Crimea appears fairly within our grasp. A joint occupation of the peninsula by the French and English would be popular at pre sent, to whatever complications it might even tually lead. Not merely obscure writers in journals, but leading personages in the land — so rapidly does the passion of acquisition grow—now speak plainly of banishing the Russian flag for ever from the Crimea. There is nothing in the past history or present tem per of the Russian Court to lead us to suppose that it would ever submit to humiliating terms of peace while any power of resistance re mained. The loss of the Crimea would be to Russia the loss of a distant military colony, but would not sensibly impair her strength. If the decision be taken to weaken her by territorial deprivation, we may rely on it that she will take a great deal of beating, and that this war will take rank with the most obsti nate of times past. Statesmen are losing, if they have not lost, all control of the situation. The progress of events tends to discredit mode rate councils, and to render terms of agree ment impracticable. The future, therefore, is not encouraging. We have to look forward to the continuance of a war conducted without definite aim, which will each year demand from us new sacrifices and add enormously to our burdens. THE GALLANT SLAIN. Ttre records of the assault on the Redan show a grievous, but unavoidable, amount of casual ties. Twenty-six officers killed, and one hundred and thirteen wounded, is a serious amount of suffering to our comparatively small army. What anguish will be carried to many a home in England at the news of the husband, brother, or son being amongst those " killed," or " dangerously " or " severely" wounded ! But with the sorrow they must mingle the cheering sentiment that their dear kinsfolk have gloriously bled for Queen and country. They have upheld Old England's fame, and their families may be proud of their martial exploits and sufferings in a noble cause. In all armies it happens that some parti cular division, like the " fighting fifth" of Sir THOMAS PICTON in the Peninsula, will signalise itself beyond others. Accident sometimes gives it a more forward position, and some times the character of particular regiments contributes to this result. We believe that all our brave fellows were equally ready and anxious to do their duty, and were equally covetous of glory. But in the last, as in the early struggles of the Crimea, the Second and • • _ THE PRESS. Light Divisions have splendidly distinguished themselves as " first amongst the foremost." At the Alma the 23rd Regiment profusely contributed ti tills lilt of the slain, and at th Bei4n it di4ides With the 90 th t he hi g h As t list of 'I fou ' n" ekehalties amongst Will officerti. The , ttlii tild.her noted regimentt had seitifral ki bil, ldjilhg " four" of its brave offitierO. The tga,,llit Rifles and the famoug 88th ate suffer d held', and nobly upheld their old name for velour. The 90th Regiment also particularly digi4ei g uished itself, having " three" officers killed and eight wounded. It is certainly a mournful thing that the brave spirits who suffered so much in the trenches, and during the cholera, should not have survived to wear their laurels. But the perils of a soldier, like the trials of a martyr, are the glories of his calling : The death of a brave man in the time of victory is a sublime enthusiasm. It becomes a household me mory, and his name is fondly mentioned to the second and third generations. Even the subaltern and private amongst his friends thus obtains a posthumous distinction denied to men who pursue the safe and profitable trades and professions. His death is ennobled by the idea of " duty" done, and his example ani mates others, even after his spirit has passed to Him who gave it. THE REWARD OF MERIT. A WHIG Minister it seems can never perform without a counterpoise an act of public virtue. Either he is anxious to set forth his merits with a foil of lathes, or, buoyant with supe rerogatory goodness, he works out political indulgences by some act of capital corrup tion. Anxious, after the manner of Whigs, to avoid too great a share of merited commenda tion, Sir WILLIAM MOLESWORTH has followed up his appointment of Mr. HINCRS by an ex ercise of patronage equally injudicious and dis creditable. The office of Chief Secretary to the Government of Malta having fallen vacant, our Colonial Secretary has conferred the post on his Private Secretary, Mr. VICTOR ROULTOIC The importance of the office in question is as undoubted as Mr. Houvros's deficiency of qualification. The duties of Secretary to the Government of the small but important pos session of Malta are almost analogous to those in this country of Prime Minister and Leader of the House of Commons. The services of Mr. IL:ILTON are comprised within a space of two years and a half : viz., since his grateful master's accession to office under the Coalition Ministry. Of colonial affairs he must neces sarily be ignorant, his experience in the Co lonial-office dating from the time of Sir WIL LIAM MOLESWORTH'S nomination as Secretary of State. Of Mr. HouLToN's personal qualifi cations little is known save that he is comely in appearance, a good singer, that he perhaps paints in water-colours, and has that know ledge of modern languages usually acquired by the loungers of society. Meanwhile the colonial service is large and not ill supplied. From the Indies to the Pole are to be found men of long experience, great administrative abilities, and meritorious ser vice. These have been entirely overlooked. Sir WILLIAM MOLESWORTH is evidently afraid of giving to merit too great an encouragement. Doubtless, yielding to the remonstrances of his colleagues, he is bent on proving himself I a Whig indeed, in whom there is no guile. ADMIRAL DUNDAS AND THE BALTIC CAMPAIGN. A CORRESPONDENT has remonstrated with us on the tendency of our remarks last week upon the Baltic campaign. As we are accused of making incorrect assertions, we feel it incum bent upon us to reopen a subject which we otherwise had been content for the present to leave at rest. It is an undeniable fact that our naval chiefs have never since the beginning of SATURDAY, the war displayed that boldness of conception and active decision which from the heroic achievernehts Of the Mitt war we had as sumed to the inheritance} of our seamen. We may idbk in *aid front one hemisphere to the ether for a solitattry pei4brinance equal to the ititicitiations jntitlficA hy the vast forces at the dispcsial of our Adiiiitals. There never has been a naval war with less incident. It is true that the Russians have ingloriously shel tered their ships behind the guns of their granite batteries ; but this easy stratagem should have stimulated the ingenuity of our Admirals, and should have suggested to their invention expedients adapted to the occasion. Making all allowance for the mismanagement and wadi neglect of the home authorities, our sorry triumphs at Petropaulowski and Odessa do not allow us to hold as free from all blame the conduct of our naval commanders. But to come more immediately to Sweaborg and Ad miral In our observations of last week we had no intention of attributing to the leader, or to any of the officers of the Baltic fleet, want of personal courage. Courage is the invariable characteristic of British officers ; but what we complained of was, that the spirit which, in subordinates, quails at no personal danger, in superiors bends under the weight of responsibility. Neither have we ever called in question the seamanlike abilities of Admiral DUNDAS. On the contrary, in THE PRESS of the 25th of August we expressed our admiration of the skill shown in his dispositions. Neverthe less, we retain our belief that his subsequent conduct was not equal to the opportunity. Surprised at his own success, he failed to profit by the result of the bombard ment. Our correspondent further asserts that no "large line-of-battle ship could have " anchored close enough to Sweaborg to make " her guns tell." The Admiralty chart clearly shows that close under the islands the depth of water varies from five to eight fathoms, more than sufficient for the largest line-of battle ship. But if for any valid reason Ad miral DUNDAS felt himself precluded from thus directly attacking the forts, why could he not have attempted the expedient volunteered last year by one of the captains in tho fleet? Why could he not have forced the passage be tween the islands, taken the fortress in reverse where it is defenceless, and reduced the town of Helsingfors to ashes, or laid it under contribution ? War, to be successful, must be a series of risks. At present it would seem as though our commanders contemplated failure rather than anticipated success when decisive work was to be done. We trust that we have dwelt long enough on this subject to make our meaning clearly understood. We impugn neither the personal courage nor the professional ability of Admiral DUNDAS ; but we assert that, iu failing to follow up the suc cess achieved by his gun-boats, he has grievously disappointed the expectations of the country, and established a case for inquiry into the reasons for his inaction. He has proved himself in this his first command to be wanting in fertility of resource and energy of enterprise ; and under no circumstances do we imagine it likely that he will again be in trusted with the command of the fleet he has the doubtful merit of having shielded from all chance of injury hrough encounter with the enemy's guns. THOUGHTS AFTER TRIUMPH. THouoitTs crowd upon the mind as we reflect over the last eventful scenes in the Crimea. It is not too much to say, that within the last twelvemonth the nation has gone through more intense sensations than it experienced in the previous quarter of a century. The horrors, uncertainties, and glories of war have been realised. Foreign affairs have superseded the interest in our domestic concerns. Public opinion has oscillated between the extremes of anxiety and modest confidence. Cabinets mu m