The Press. — London, England, 1855-11-10 00:00:00

~,„ b 0 t • 1 No. 132.—V0L. 111. gly "dress. LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10,1855. Statesmen of Europe have set to her progress, what chance is there that Russia will be able to do so when opposed by more stringent com pacts, and more powerful alliances ? The mere limitation of the naval force of Russia in the Euxine is a point of minor importance compared with the general prin ciples which are to establish the indepen dence of that sea, and to admit Turkey into the European system. The real security of any settlement must depend, not on any pre sumption of Russia's weakness, or on her inability for aggressive movement by reason of particular limitative stipulations, but on the amount of force which can always be arrayed against her should she ever meditate a re newal of the contest. Of all the achievements of the War, the last defeat of the Russians be fore Kars is the most brilliant and satisfactory, as it shows that there is enough of vitality in the Turkish empire to make it, under-the guardianship of the Western Powers, a sure and solid barrier against Russian advance. It is not true that Russia is too strong for the peace of the world. In comparison with her extent, she is singularly weak as an aggressive Power. To continue the War now that we may provide against the possibility of its renewal twenty years hence, would show strange ignorance of the practical duties of statesmanship. The best ground that, in the nature of things, can be taken for future security, is to make such wise and moderate arrangements for present tranquillity as present circumstances admit of. Wars would be eternal, and States be for ever arrayed against each other, if they overlooked the practicability of present peace in appre hension of future quarrel. We believe that Russia is, from the very circumstances of her position, desirous of Peace. But she has to contend with the adverse incidents that the last negotiation was abruptly broken off by our Government while she was yet making conciliatory offers, and that the tone of our Ministerial party, and gene rally of our press, has been bitterly hostile and malignant, not only to her Government, but to her army and her people. She has acknowledged the desirableness of those objects which must form the basis of a solid accommodation of this great quarrel, and whatever obstacles are now opposed to its adjustment must spring rather from senti ment than policy—must be interposed by pride, or passion, or prejudice, rather than by any dictates of national or social interest, or any promptings of true honour. Animosity in the differences of nations is no more a substi Lute for policy than revenge in the civil trans actions of men is a substitute for justice. If the next campaign opens for the con quest of the Crimea, the whole aspect of the question, and of the War, becomes changed. Affairs of the greatest magnitude have com monly narrow issues, which plain sense is at no loss to comprehend. Supposing that, after a succession of bloody encounters, the Crimea is won by the Allies, what then? It is so essential a part of the mainland that it cannot, without an enormous force, be maintained independent of it. The conquest of the Crimea would entail the absolute necessity of conquering all the maritime provinces of Southern Russia. Then how are these con quests to be occupied and defended? and, after all, as regards the solidity and duration of Peace, would they form a firmer and safer barrier against Russia than we have it now in our power to raise ? STAMPED .... SIXPENCE. UNSTAMPED..FIVEPENCE. We have faith in the strength of England to achieve the reduction of Russian power, should she earnestly set herself to the work, on dis covering that no other alternative is left her. But, before engaging in such a gigantic enter prise, are we not to count the cost, and dis tinctly apprehend the objects for which we are to contend? if such a war is to be forced on us, it must be entered on in a serious spirit, and its guidance intrusted to men who, mea suring all the difficulties of the enterprise, and capable of drawing forth and wielding all the resources of our empire, are endowed with spirit and courage to bring it to a decisive and glorious issue. It is not by keeping a mere contingent in the field that we can expect to bear a principal part in breaking down the might of our enemy. Our boasts are contemp tible in presence of the shifts and expedients by which our Executive pitifully endeavours to make amends for its want of administrative capacity and vigour. Let the present system continue, and what — allowing all scope for the indomitable bravery of our troops, and the brilliant valour of our Allies—must be the inevitable result? We look forward. A dozen or a score of years of warfare have passed. Russia has been driven from the sea-board of the Euxine, some kind of frontier has been established to the North—though geographical conditions would render the establishment of such fron tier almost impossible—and there is a pause in hostilities from the exhaustion of the belli gerents. What would then be our condition ? Our debt would be increased to probably nearly double its present amount, the expense of our establishments would be enormously augmented, and we might yet feel it necessary to prepare for new cor quests, or to withdraw from those we had made. Our resources are enormous, but still they are limited. Our burdens are no longer to be diminished by a continually-increasing population. For the last fifteen years our numbers have remained stationary or declined, and whatever is the in crease of taxation must be a direct increase on every head. May not the point at last be reached which will so oppress industry as to swell the tide of emigration, and empoverish the land ? These are considerations admitting of wide argument. It is enough to glance at them. They should not be without effect in inclining us to moderate councils. Why should Russia hazard the loss of her " Italy" of which she is so proud, and why should we heavily mortgage for ever our industry and our pro perty, that a ruthless contest may he main tained when the cause for it has disappeared? Let us be as successful in it as we may, the conclusion of every rational man must be, that if long protracted, it will be nearly, if not altogether, our last great war. LORD STANLEY'S REFUSAL OF THE COLON lAL SECRETARYSHIP. THE circumstances connected with the offer of the vacant Secretaryship of STANLEY are peculiar. We pi vindicate than comment on th When Lord DERBY attempt Administration early in the Lord PALMEASTON that his thwarted. From Lord DE BB' express statement, it was r state ; *criip • , oropg. , 4 isq, %A : .. , , • i ' he:. . YW` *1:.: Pte...r,. ' ''' ( f 11 . 1', 1 1 Yt a !' ilidi , 1 4 . 5% - i r l l4 is - r .. '' MY . „1 ,44, 4 4,e,/, ‘ , Du g, , ..-,—‘, , ..' ;‘, l • :It _ .•."' LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1855. Ar length it appears to be generally admitted that if Peace be not practicable now, it will not be practicable for many years to come. There are political situations which do not admit of pacific arrangement : a way of passage is to be won through them only at the sword's point. If the next campaign is to be opened by the Allies for the conquest of the Crimea, it will be impossible for them to retreat until their object is attained. Peace then could not be thought of except on terms which would degrade, dishonour, and dismember the Russian empire. Peace is practicable now, for the very reason that those persons who are bent on prose cuting the War at all hazards declare that it ought not now to be concluded. We have gained no such decided advantages over the enemy as woull entitle us to go beyond the original objects of the War. The Allies have established the superiority of their arms. and made good a solid footing on the soil of Russia; but they cannot yet pretend to treat it as a conquered country. If it be indispen sable to Peace that we should have our foe at our feet, then undoubtedly the time for nego tiation has not yet come. But if we adhere to the policy of prosecuting hostilities for the definite and solid settlement of the Eastern Question, then the present time seems favor able to the conclusion of Peace, as the Allies would limit their demands to objects which, as we stated some weeks back, have virtually been " conceded by negotiation or won by " arms." A great difficulty felt by some persons is, that there can be no security for Turkey while the Russian empire remains so powerful as it is at present. These persons think too much of physical and too little of moral causes for the maintenance of any recognised settlement of territorial power. No small State can ever have any real positive security against the aggression of a more powerful State. There is not nearly so great a 'dative disproportion between the force of Russia and Turkey at the present moment as there is between the force of France opposed to the Rhenish provinces, or to Belgium, or to Spain ; or be tween the power of Prussia and the little German States which actually bisect her terri tory ; or between the might of Austria, or even that of Piedmont, and the little duchies of the Italian peninsula. The smaller States of Europe owe their safety to their recognition as parts of the European system ; end when Turkey is admitted into that system—a point of the very highest importance—she will enjoy the same kind of security—hut in a much higher degree, both from her own superior internal strength, and from the much greater importance which will be attached to her pre servation—that is now enjoyed by the smaller States of Europe. If the warlike, active, en terprising, and ardent genius of France has never been able in two centuries of constant effort to overleap those barriers which the 777 I