The Press. — London, England, 1856-04-26 00:00:00

71 0 •••^'''!'" • • 386 increasing force, which our Administration could not easily have supplied. It. could have sent arms, it could have sent stores, it could have sent clothing, it could have sent money —it could even have arranged with the Turkish Government to send men. The question of the relief of Kars was a questios of money. A certain expenditure would eeititinly have preserved it from the enemy. Our Adminis tration would afftird Ills. direct itattolitance any way whatever, and for want of such assistance, Kars fell. Lord CLARENDON was warned over and over again, that dependence could not be placed on the Turkish Govern ment; he acknowledges himself his repeated disappointment of effectual aid from that quarter. In the spring of last year it became matter of absolute certainty, that Kars must fall without direct aid from this country ; yet it does not appear that a single cargo of stores for the use of the garrison, or a single shilling to relieve the men suffering in health and spirits from two years' arrears of pay, was ever forwarded from England. All was to he done by Turkey, though experience had conclusively established that Turkey had not means or energy to support the contest alone. Had the question came before Parliament in the spring of last year whether a grant should be made for the relief of Kars, we do not doubt that it would have been voted without opposi tion. Ministers were in possession of all the information which would have justified them in asking a supply for that express purpose. They had the reports of General WILLIAMS; they were alive to the immense importance of holding Kars to keep the Russian army in check; they had insisted on the defence of the fortress being substantially intrusted to Bri tish officers ; but they declined to adopt those measures by which it was evident the safety of the place could alone be insured. It is for this laxity, this neglect, this in difference, or by whatever other name it may be called, that the Administration is now re sponsible. Knowing what we do of the resourc s of England—knowing how slight aid directly sent from this country would have raised the spirits and augmented the resources of the Kars garrison, it will be impossible to main tain for an instant that this country could have done nothing. Why it did nothing— why the Administration closed its hand at the moment when it should have been opened widely—is the question that has to be an swered. Kars could have been saved, and was not By refusing all aid, we have effected some paltry saving—a mere drop in the ocean of our expenditure—and we have lost honour and reputation throughout the, East,and given our foe the advantage of declaring that the war his been closed on equal terms. Russia re stores Kars and the territory won in Asia, in exchange for all the conquests of the Allies on the seaboard of the Euxine. Though Kars did not fall till the end of No vemberlast, its fate was in reality determined by Lord CLARENDON and Lord PANMIIRE full a year ago. It was on the sth of March, 1855, that Ge neral WILLIAMS addressed to Lord CLARENDON a despatch, stating that it would be impos sible for the Turkish army to hold its ground against an advance of the Russian force. He expressed to the Turkish commander his strong opinion that the " Allies would not " leave them without material assistance to " bear the brunt of such an attack." Ignorant at that time, as he wrote, " of the combina " tions contemplated by the Allies for the de " fence of this important frontier," he could only say that if they had to rely on the unaided services of Turkish troops, he could not esti mate the " prompt reinforcements required " vii Trebizond, under 15,000 infantry, 3,000 " cavalry, and 2,000 artillery (barely enough to " man all the guns at our command in these " regions.") This despatch was received at the Foreign office on the 28th of March. Then was the time to consider what efficient measures should be taken to comply with the require ments of " Her Majesty's Commissioner." Had the reinforcements he demanded been promptly forwarded, Kars could never have been invested by the army of MODRAVIEFF; its communications with Erzeroum and the coast could not have been intercepted ; and even if the Russian army had escaped a de- THE PRESS. feat, Kars would certainly havo been in a con dition to resist all the efforts made for its capture. The case against the Ministers might, in deed, be advantageously narrowed to this single point. Was it, or was it not, their part to have provided General WILLIAMS with the amount of rejig qrcet-gent ho demanded ? Cal it be contenika tbstilg force of 20,000,nj eoud g lrit Iml/4 *4, boq during tented spring and stunm&• ; ftid W.ve been lan ded at Trebizond? To excuse the Adraitdstration, it must be held either that it was not expedient to de spatch such a force, or that the meat knew not where to look for it. Either Kars was not worth an effort to preserve, of it was impossible to spare a Turkish corps of 20,000 men to save it. This requirement of General WILLIAMS came before the Cabinet, and the Cabinet de cided that it was not to be complied with. The short notes between the Foreign-office and the War-office on this point are the most im portant part of the Blue Book. The despatch of General WILLIAMS was forwarded from the Foreign-office to the War•oipice with this note : No. 175. LORD WODEHOUSE TO MR. PEEL. Foreign-office, March 29, 1855. Sir,-1 am directed by the Earl of Clarendon to trans• mit to you to be laid before the Secretary of State for the War Department, copy of a despatch from Brigadier. General Williams, respecting the reinforcements required for the Turkish army at Kars. I am, iStc., (Signed) WODEHOUSE. This communication seems to have been under consideration for fourteen days, as the answer to it from the War-office does not bear date till April 12th : No. 184. MR. PEEL TO LORD WODEHOUSE. War Department, April 12, 1855. My Lord,—Having laid before Panmure your letter of the 29th ultimo, with the copy therein inclosed of a despatch from Brigadier-General Williams, relative to the amount of reinforcements which he considers are required for the Turkish army in Asia, I am directed to request you will state to the Earl of Clarendon that Lord Panmure is of opinion that it will be desirable to urge upon the Porte the importance of their paying attention to these require. ments whenever the more pressing need of the services of the Ottoman troops elsewhere shall have ceased ; and, if Lord Clarendon should concur with his lordship that it is expe dient to adopt this course, I am to request that you will move his lordship to send instructions to her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople accordingly.—l am, &c., (Signed) FREDERICK PEEL. The substance of this communication was duly forwarded by Lord CLARENDON to the British Ambassador at Constantinople : No. 181. THE EARL OF TO LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE. Foreign-office, April 13, 1855. My Lord,—l communicated to tne Secretary of State for the War Department a copy of General Williams' despatch of the sth of March, which will have passed through your Excellency's hands, and in which General Williams calls attention to the reinforcements required by the Turkish army in Asia; and I now inclose a copy of a letter from the War Department from 'vhich you will percei-.. that her Majesty's Government consider it desirable that your Excellency should urge upon the Porte the im portance of their paying attention to the requirements men tioned by General Williams, whenever the snore pressing need of the services of the Ottoman troops elsewhere shall have ceasq.—l am, dce., (Signed) CLARENDON. To allege in the face of these official notes that the fall of Kars was due to Lord STRAT FORD DE REDCLIFFE, or to any other persons, than to the chief members of her Majesty's Administration, is the part of a creature too foolish even for faction. Lord STRATFORD has much to answer for; his case demands sepa rate consideration. But the refusal of those reinforcements which would assuredly have saved Kars was the act of Lord PALMERSTON'S Cabinet alone. There are the unimpeachable documents which prove the case against them. There stands the demand of General WILLIAMS, which, if complied with, would have saved Kars; and there stand the notes which, refusing the demand, lost it. In wlYat quarter did there exist " more press " ing need for the services of the Ottoman " troops ?" There was a considerable Turkish army in Bulgaria, where there was no proba bility of the enemy appearing ; and there was a yet more considerable army in the Crimea, whose only service was to garrison Eupatoria. To say that from these, and other quarters, a SATURDAY, corps of •0,000 men could not have been col• lected for the reinforcement of the Asian army, is to make an assertion notoriously in. consistent with facts. Three months later, when the danger be came more pressing, the Turkish authorities showed how easily double the force required by cleneral WILLIA4s csohl be assembled. itiktriti l Lord Cutpxoos! hil bi despatch of July 13, objeOed ios the expedition, but pro posal Aoliiing hiatie f. An army of relief was only' decided on when relief was imprac ticable. Before Sebastopol fell, it was dis covered that a Turkish army for service in Ala goon be oared, but the thttee• WU made too late. There was nothing, save the objection of her Majesty's Government, to prevent the despatch of those troops in April, which landed on the coast of Asia. in September. Lord CLARENDON and Lord PANMURE, who had deemed it impossible to spare 20,000 Turkish troops for service in Asia when Kars could have been preserved, discovered that 40,000 or 50,000 could be spared and transported when relief was impracticable. This is the case against the Administration. The main points, we think, are 1. That her Majesty's Government afforded no direct assistance to Kars, though such assistance was practicable, and would have been of the greatest service. 2. That they absolutely forbade the Turkish Government to send to the army in Asia those reinforcements which General Wa.LiAms declared were absolutely necessary, and which the result showed the Turkish Government was in a condition to collect and to land on the Asian coast. Was there not wan of energy and foresight here? And how can it be disputed in the face of that evidence which the Government have themselves placed upon the table of the House, that the fall of Kars must mainly be laid to their charge ? LAND REVENUE OF MADRAS. IN the late debate in the Lords on tho torture question Lord ELLENBOROUGH gave utterance to a very truthful remark, and which is in entire accordance with everything we have ever written in the pages of this Journal. Speaking of the amount of assessment levied on the lands of Madras, he expressed himself as thinking it far from excessive in itself, and very much less than (in his opinion) ought to have been obtained from them. It is infi nitely less than was obtained from them nil& r the native princes without any recourse to torture whatever, and infinitely less than might be obtained from them by ourselves under a more rational system than exists at present. The mere reduction of the land tax, which is the Goverment remedy, will there fore effect nothing; and a survey of the whole, followed by a reletting, will only put the State to an enormous expense without any corre sponding benefit. It is only by inducing capitalists to invest their money in improve ments, that the land will ever prove retnunt rative to the occupier, and productive of a proper income to the State; and that can only be done by carrying into effect those changes in the tenure, and conferring that security on titles, which we have over and over again pointed out. We are glad to think that we have not pointed them out in vain, for we every day see more and more indication of a conversion iu all quarters to our views on this head. The first thing necessary to the forming a right judgment on Indian questions is to purge the mind of all absurd fallacies, and to allow ourselves to see that every principle of political economy, and of government gene rally, must necessarily be as applicable in the case of the natives of India as it is in the case of the natives of these realms. In either case the chief element of security to the Sovereign is the attachment and confidence of the people, and in either case the chief promoter of disorders would be a persistence in inir government, and an absolute refusal to redress admitted grievances and to listen to just and well-founded complaints. In either case tho wants of the great majority of the people are