The Press. — London, England, 1855-12-22 00:00:00

1206 attainment of its original objects, and desiring no other glory or triumph than its necessary participation in the triumph of justice. THE FALL OF KAiis. Ir has been remarked by a keen keeial server that " one might read 04 faii of Kati " in the faces of the present Ministers," and since the landing at dallipoli liMeh to the present time it is a fact that the Whigs have never looked so grave about the consequences to themselves. They instinctively quake lest the surrender of Kars should portend the swamping of their Cabinet. Their consciences tell them that the abandonment of General WILLIAMS to his fate was a more heinous error, because more intentionally • committed, than any mistake of the Duke of NEWCASTLE. Their n.ost servile retainers cannot give them comfort about the feelings of the public mind. Some of the chiefs amongst them vainly endeavour to assume an outward serenity that is absent from their breasts. The hoarse mutter of indignation is beginning to be heard far and near throughout the land. Ac cording to the English nature, it is not loud 'at first ; but by and by, when all the dia •graceful circumstances are proclaimed, the national anger will swell forth in thundering tones, and even callous deceivers of every political connection in Parliament may shrink •as their fraudulent and ephemeral fame ;perishes before the eyes of all men. It has rteently been bitterly said with much truth that " what FEAROUS O'CONNOR was to the • " working men, the same was Lord PALMERSTON "to the middle classes." The demagogue never recovered Snigg's End ; the vogue of the present Cabinet cannot survive the surrender of Kars, necessitated by a non-enterprising War-office. For the fall of Kars is much worse than a mere military calamity. It closely approaches to the character of a grave political crime. Unlike the other untoward contin gencies of the campaign, the certain surrender of Kars, unless a relieving army was sent to :it, must have been foreseen by any statesman competent to conduct a great war. Neglect, not accident, " supineness," together with • short-sightedness, were the causes of this :grievous disaster. In vain had Ministers the best military maps, indicating at a glance the geographically important position of Kars ; in vain had they authentic intelligence of the numbers of the Rusidan hordes around the g illant WILLIAMS and the leaguered walls ; in vain was the electric telegraph at their coin mind, which might in an instant have con veyed commands for throwing an army of - , ;relief on the coast to advance against MounA- JirtEFF. Government was deliberately " supine." %.That word, coming from the steadiest sup- Alorter of the Cabinet, will adhere to the pre • sent War•otlice with as much tenacity as the terrible " too late " fastened twelve months ago by Lord DERBY OD Lord ABERDEEN and his colleagues. The results of this prodigious error are of ' threefold importance. Russia is strengthened, .1 the allied Powers suffer grievous disparage ment, and in our domestic affairs, as we shall shortly see. a further weakening of the Execu tive must take place, which bodes ill for the national honour and the glory of the Crown. That Russia gains greatly is too painfully obvinus to require comment. She has taken an army, and she has subdued a fortress whose brave defence was one of the brightest incidents in the whole war She has shown her foresight in concentrating a large amount of troops upon Kars, and maintaining the spell of her name through the eircurnjacent rlgions. Along the mountains of Circassia, by tie shores of the Caspian Sea, and on the fr mtiers of Persia, there can be no doubt that tle tall of Kars has been interpreted as pre s 'ging further disaster to the Allies. illusion is a vast power in Oriental politics, and the triumph of Russia will be vastly magnified. It will be felt in a large part of Asia Minor that the Czar has an Executive which does not deserve to be branded by any Eastern equiva lent for " supine." k "-: THE PRESS. In the conduct of the war, the Allies, by the surrender of Kars, must suffer sorely in repu tation. For months their attention has been i called to the WO4 in Asia Minor. It is well known tlikt m than one feasible plan flit .thd ~Telie Of was laid before * Scotell . Nor Sio ' hooks our War-otiii n it There Is no lit iti et about the name o 9 least vie e antlypractical English gen nil wit* offei4C,ttle War Minister a R 4 for itiisily reli s eatii ' ;nits without strain heavily on the re Ira of the army before Sebastopol. It is true, that there have been recent symptbmi, when "too late," that Ministers felt that they had committed a mis take in not accepting that plan proposed to them months ago. It is thus that they have displayed their wisdom—after the event. Their retrospective sagacity would be more ridicu lous, if it were less ruinous. For the probable —not to say possible—contingency of events they seem to claim no more responsibility than " Our own Correspondent." - But, many as have been their errors, they have never committed a graver one than in supposing that no account will be publicly demanded, " why they left Kars uusuccoured ?" It was held that the last Cabinet was respon sible for the miseries of our forces during the last winter. Kars surrendered from starvation. Brave and glorious deeds had been performed in vain by General WILLIAMS, and by his officers and troops. Why should Lord PAN MURE be excused in one case, when the Duke of NEWCASTLE was dismissed in the other? Indeed, on this head, the charges against the present Cabinet are less grave than thuse preferred against the colleagues of Lord ABERDEEN. The defence of the Duke of NEW CASTLE, that war had to bo commenced on a peace establishment, availed him much. But the present War Minister has no such plea. Forewarned but never forearmed Lord PANMURE has had abundant notice of the emer gencies of the occasion. Thus, one of the first objects of the Allies should have been to drive the Russians across the Caucasus. The opportunity presented itselt, but our rulers had neither the sagacity to see it for themselves, and, when it was forced upon their reluctant attention, they had not the energy to act. A great occasion has been scandalously lost. General MOURA VIEFF can now use his army for any strategic purpose that seems best to him. The winter season will be just as unfavorable to OMER PACHA as to the Russian General ; but if opera tions are still possible, MOURAVIEFF can either meet OMER PACHA on the front, if the latter should advance, or he can hover on his rear, if OMER should turn towards Tiflis. That such a favorable choice of contingencies should present themselves to the Russian General is entirely attributable to the absence of energy in our War-office. It must not be forgotten, also, that ever since the Allies have taken part in the war the forces of Turkey have sunk in repu tation. Our Ottoman friends have been damped instead of being encouraged. Their soldierly qualities have never received fair play, and the brilliancy of their own previous exploits contrasts painfully with the history of their arms since they have been subordi nated to the Western Alliance. The fact is indisputable, whatever may be its causes. Admiral DUNDAS did much to degrade the Turkish navy, which (whether by his own orders, or those of the Cabinet) was consigned to total inaction during the operations in the Black Sea. In March, 1854, the Commanders of the Turkish squadron were curtly refused permission to co-operate with the French and English fleets in the Euxine. Let other facts also be borne in mind in conjunction with the fall of Kars. It is now more than a year since the Turkish Govern ment wanted to land a force on the coast, but the allied Admirals prevented the proposed expedition sailing for Asia Minor Our readers will remember that we repeatedly called attention to the neglect of the struggle in Anatalia, and the adjacent provinces to the north and east of it. In last February we drew special attention to the particulars of those grave neglects, and indicated the emer gency of the case. (PRESS, ante, p. 100 ) SATURDAY, The want of a military mind in the Cabinet has been thus made more glaringly conspi cuous than ever. The Palmerston Cabinet has no reasop fbi. bollatjng littito superiority to the Aberdeeti Minhitit., ‘ All i.te illusions about i LOT 1 3 4MERSTON beiril it able to wield the thu 'et ' its of iiik Vtl, Sll in the fall of Ka ' ere nod ire t li proofs of his fore sig . o is pnerri, 2 1 ,,iif his commanding cap ty a Wit* V+ Pfis subsidised parn phl e . The, ittii.ii ent as the prisoners of wa /abandoned to MOURAVIEFF But worse still remains. For people can not help asking themselves what security is there that similar strategic " supineness" will not continue next year? Can Lord PANMURE retain the seals of the War-office in presence of the disaster at Kars? Four years ago, when Lord PALMERSTON and Lord J. RUSSELL had their parliamentary duel, the latter made a statement that he had been told by the highest personage in the realm that the late Sir ROBERT PEEL had advised the Sovereign "to consult Lord J. RUSSELL on foreign " affairs,"—showing Sir ROBERT'S distrust of the present Premier. Since then the ex Whig leader has deservedly fallen almost as low as Lord ABERDEEN. But the fall of Kars will arm Lord JOHN and his personal friends with weapons for retaliating on the " supine' Cabinet in power. Under such circumstances there must be a chronic weakening of the Executive, from which the country can be delivered only by the advent of a great national party, with vast resources in its social strength, and its com pact unity, relying not on demagogic delu sions, but on the conservative power imparted by a free people to those who rally manfully for the honour of the Monarchy and the in stitutions of the country. A party above the degrading necessity of appealing to transient " cries" can alone save the State, and herald a lasting, because honourable, peace for Europe. TREATY OF THE ALLIES WITH SWEDEN. OUR readers will peruse with satisfaction the terms of the treaty which has recently been concluded between Sweden and the allied Powers. The treaty itself, will be found in another part of our columns, but we will briefly recapitulate its leading points. They are simply these. That Sweden will cede to Russia no portion of her territory on any pre tence whatsoever ; that if any proposals of such nature shall be made from Russia to Sweden, Sweden shall instantly communicate them to the Allies; and that, if any aggression be ap prehended, the latter shall furnish such ships and soldiers as shall be judged necessary to aid in repelling it. _ _ This is undoubtedly the proper method of resisting Russia; and it is owing to the neglect of this system that so many minor States have in all ages fallen victims to their more powerful neighbours, and thereby swollen the resources of the latter till they became formidable to the liberties of the world. It is only by a resolution to preserve minor States in their integrity that the equi librium of European power can be saved. They form, as it were, the "middle class" of Europe, a bulwark against imperial domination on the one hand, and republican excesses on the other ; while in the case of the Scandinavian races we are specially fortunate in finding that the dictates of true policy are likewise those which the ties of race would recommend to us, and which their geographical situation confirms. As a matter of policy this truth is univer sally acknowledged ; its recognition is indeed the leading distinction between ancient and modern diplomacy. Formerly no great king dom ever dreamed of contending with another for the independence of a lesser one ; they fought for its conquest, and they gave no quarter. The consequence is that ancient history is but the history of particular domi nant empires, which for a certain period of years held sway over the civilised world. A community of powerful and independent ill