The Press. — London, England, 1853-10-08 00:00:00

t4l // Ot ft 4,4 No. 23.—VoL. I. gljt V rtss. LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER N, OUR readers may remember that in our last week's muuber we stated precisely the pitch Of eotnplexity which the Eastern question had reached, and announced that Lord ABRADERS would call a Cabinet Council during the week which is now eliding. The Calbinet uuu •il met yesterday ; but, as a preliminary to this phenomenon, certain of its principal eouneillors had a private re- hearsid, which they thought fit to announce in the Timex of Tuesday last. If it was not pure hypothesis On the part of their organ, they enabled it to co►nmunicate " the intelli " genre which was the inm►ediate oeeasion " of their meeting—that on the 26th ult. the " Grand Council, a body consisting of about " one hundred and forty magnates of the "'Turkish empire, hail recinumended the " Sultan to make a deelaration of war." This intelligence was of course sufficient occasion for the Cabinet to meet ; and, in any event, it was natural that they should prepare them selves fin• the formal duties they had so long suspended and so grudgingly resumed. But it war. a novelty to announce the ►subject of Privy Conseil deliberations to the public, and to atone for a fussy reserve towards the Par liament by a frank violation of the confidence of the Crown. The Cabinet has a new theory on the sub ject of " Honour," as we suggested laz.4. Sahu•- day ; so we let this pass; fi► . their position— we say it in no odious sense—is comparatively a contemptible topic in face of the contin gencies menacing Europe. The magnates of the Turkish empire have recommended war—fir rather, we should say, they have recommended retaliation (for war commenced with the passage of the Pruth by the Russians) ; and retaliation will in natural course ensue if our Cabinet acts with its usual alacrity, and negotiates again with its former success. Farther negotiations are indeed announced, under new, and it is hoped better, conditions. The apparent energy which at List commis sioned the combined fleets to the watvrs of Con stautinople has been accompanied by it would shock too abruptly the Muscovite predilections of Lord ABERDEEN to say it has indueedl cer tain overtures on the part of the Czar. The reputed organ of one of the Ministers has told us in a jaunty air, which betrays its inspirit lion, that the fleets did not sail for Besika " Bay for a mummer's cruise, nor have Ad " minds DUNDAS and HAMMEIAN passed the " Dardanelles with their whole force for the " benefit of change of air." This information. which reassured the British public, has been considerably mitigated to Russian ears, if Lord WESTMORELAND, as is stated, told the LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1853. PRICE SIXPENCE. this naive admission, which accords with the representations of Our party clue& in Parlia ment, that distracted comic& and despairing timidity have improved this impression to the confusion which prevails. For the " moral" of this coujuneture we have no occasion to travel so far as the Minis terial :Emil , . It lies at our own door, and is not to be relegated by a stroke of the pen to Siberian latitiaktes. A combination of stihnialih tintors, some of them statesmen, has been founded Ott the abeyanee of party principles partieular views have stet their contradictories, and the ismte of the whole is a compromised ac tivity. The eapkteity of the individuals when not controlled by unnatural alliances may be clear and admitted, but a vicious influence subdues each eolkrietion, and deadekks every spontaneous impulse. The result is necessarily a political Coma. 'rhe personal weakness of Lord Aiwa komN may adapt him for democratic Or other pressure. but a medium is required to reklueo him to imbecility, and this medium is fikund in the constitution of his Cabinet. We may not forget that the formation of this Cabinet first invited the Russian menace, which it nursed into the dimensions of a general peril. From this first fruit of its tedious and torpid gestation we may infer the abortive nature of its future progeny, and forebode au internal detriment to England front her forced declen sion in the horoscope of Europe. OUR COMMERCIAL TREATIES WITH PARAGUAY. Ir was to the honour of Lord MALMENBURT'S foreign administration, that he conferred ou British commerce the great boon of a treaty which opened the Paraguay rivers. Thu new Dictator and benevolent Administrator of the Republic signalised his ueeession to power by yielding to the wishes of the British Minister. That a eounnereial treaty had been agreed to which opened the Paraguay to its for ten years was made public during the last. summer ; but, with a grudging meanness which seems to have spread from the policy to the journalism of the Coalition, not one of the organs of the Ministry the self-dubbed " friends of commerce—would notice the fact. Will this jealousy, this minister aversion to acknowledge the good done by Lord Dminv's llovenimunt, be persisted in, now it hots trans pired how much further Sir CHARLES HOTITANI has been able to carry out the original instrue tious of Lord MAINEBBERY ? Will the Minis terial journals endeavour by their milettee to conceal kotti the public, that in addition to► the rights yielded to us on the Paraguay for ten years, we now have secured to us the Parana and the Uruguay fin - ever Thi-c large and successful measure of commercial policy brings out in strong eoutnist the con duct of the real and the pretended friends of commerce. Lord NALMERRURY opet►s to us the richest and most fertile portions of the South American continent, which a jea lous and ruthless tyranny had shut out from the world during the best ►art of half a century. Lord ABERDEEN risks m the other Czar at t)lu►iitz that. '•his t ioVerllaleat would " particularly guard against n a ►king any l►ledge " of material support to► the Sultan ►n case he should declare war against Russia." But the Meets wen', at all events, present, if not with acknowledged hostile intent: and the Czar l u ►s otli•red ter►us, though not under aeknowledged pressure. Of these respective movements of the Porte for war, and of the Czar for peons., both may be sincere, and yet at this stage WOE may be imminent. lf, on the other hand, the Czar's predisposition fior an arrangement is avowed in the same sense us his acceptance of the Vienna note, war must not only be imminent hut unavoidable. If, again, the Czar is sin cerely desirous for peace, he can only attain it by withdrawing from his position. Prince IliFxscelrot i s explanation of the grounds of his refusal of the modifications of the Vienna note required by the Porto has plaeed his Majesty in this humiliating alternative—either he must consent to receive a declomition of the mean ing of the ‘'iennot note entirely contradictory to his own interpretations and that of the Porte, or he must submit to accept a fresh document framed studiously to exclude the proteetorate which he elaimed over the sub jects of the Porte through the medium of Prince Mnssemsows. In either event he 1111Dit submit to the humiliation of a withdrawal from the terms defined by his diplomatic, agent, and must admit peace as a personal confutation and reproach. The inference from this is not only patent but conclusive as to the policy which our own Cabinet has pursued. If the Czar re cedes in the face of a threatened resolve, and recedes under the lash of shame and vexation, he would not have stolvaneed had that resolve been notified at an earlier date, with English candour, English consistency, and English courage. The first defeat which Lord ANKK uEEN sustained in his own Cabinet is said to have been its resolve to empower Lord STRAT FORD to 1411111111011 the English fleet as soon as ho thought posTer. If this be true, his first defeat has been the means of his first and only, though as yet contingent, success. if the peace of Europe is still to be preserved, it is only maintainable in derision of feminine tremors which invited for a time the Cossack's threats; and thus Lord AnzausEs may °Main a respite, to leis country's and his own benefit, though in spite of himself. His organs may be premature in offering any reflections upon this paagible issue. But at all events the " moral" which they venture to deduce from this eompromising story is de signedly remote. The peace of Europe im perilled—the Funds at 110—the operations of commerce paralysed—the Balance of Power vilwating spasmodienlly—the approximation of hostile armies, and the threatened resurrer tion of revolutionary impulses in the interests of peace—all these coincident s—this complexity of hazards, requires some account, and the explanation is found solely in the ambition of the Czar. The encouragements to his ambi tion are studiously ignored ; but, as divided councils produce opposite explanations, we are told in that organ of one of the Ministers which we have already quoted, that " the truth " is, that, believing that France and England " would not art together or firmly in opposi• " tion, the Entneror of Busoos seized upon " what he imagined to be a good opportunity " for f ootifying his ambition ; ' and we add to