The Press. — London, England, 1854-12-02 00:00:00

LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 2,1854. PRICE SIXPENCE. No. 83.—VoL. 11. __ .. _ . . . _.... s. ... • ~, dci--Ae-. A I !‘" ° / (t/ t- / Q V 1 ,// e :el ri 4'4 .is i ..-4 # A : li - . _ . - - --- • --- - 4 .1' . -: --' •-m-r• - . , . ...e - -.--. 4 , --... , • 4 . . . .. • r : ..i...- 4 I ) . ' - riel . ~... r ,„„.„,, b ( 0. ...„ "VikICE. ~ ie Vress. success hereafter, he could yield only as the conquered Monarch of a young, a mighty, and an ambitious empire, which has never yet accepted defeat as a basis of pacification. The Opposition will, we conceive, be en titled to ask, and the country to learn, by what unfortunate combination of circum stances it is, that the golden opportunity which presented itself of seizing an advantage from which peace might fairly have been ex pected to result, has been so totally lost,—and how it is that, for the last eighteen months at least, every act of a Government warmly ex pressing its desire for peace, has only led to new complications, and involved us more inextricably in war. Every pound saved in the outfit of the Crimea expedition iu the first instance may cost us hundreds or thou sands, and for every man the Ministry stinted to send forth then, the necessity may be laid on us of furnishing a battalion. One consideration alluded to by a corre spondent in this journal last week is not to be passed over. If we overlook the impolicy of sending out an insufficient force for so great an enterprise, what is to be thought of its in. humanity ? British troops are not to be con quered, but they are to he slain ; and to ex • pose them to such fearful odds as they have lately had to contend against, is to command them to sacrifice their lives for no better object than to prove their heroism. There are some practical points upon which we conceive the country is fairly entitled to explanation from the Government, as, while they remain unexplained, it is impossible to place the slightest reliance in the discretion or ability of the members of Administration. And, in the first place, how came it that the purpose of the expedition wan distinctly an nounced several weeks before it was in a con dition to sail ? It would be easy to show, from the practice and express declarations of the latest and greatest masters in the art of war, NAPOLEON and WELLINGTON, that they esteemed secrecy as to the destination of their arms the most essential requisite to success. But we do not press this point; we urge only that ex planation should be given of the agency by which a public print is placed in possession of those important decisions of the Cabinet which it is for the interest of the public should remain strictly secret. In cases like this one, to give information to the public is to give it to the enemy. Should it be alleged, as it has been, that the failure of the expedition is duo to the reserve of Russia on the strength and movements of its armies, what a reproach is cast upon the giddy imprudence of a Cabinet which openly boasts of its intentions long be fore it is prepared to carry them into effect ! If this system is to continue, no member of the Cabinet will consider silence on its deli berations a part of his duties, and there will be a race which shall first gain discreditable notoriety by making them public. Next, the country is surely entitled to know why the work of reinforcing our army in ear nest has been delayed until winter has set in. Our troops will not only now depart under every disadvantage, and with exposure to the casual ties of storm and wreck. but will arrive at the Crimea at a season when, in all probability, the active operations of warfare must perforce be suspended, and will have to remain cooped up on hostile ground throughout the try ing months of winter. It cannot be pretended that the Government were ignorant of the diffi culties to be encountered after Alma. What is being done now might have been done with far better effect then. AVhy the delay? Was the Ministerial mind taken as the measure of the mind of the country, and was it supposed that nothing but the last extremity of danger, nothing but the imminent peril of the remnant of our army being driven from the heights of Balaklava into the ocean, could induce this great—we speak in truth, not in flattery—this generous and magnanimous nation to recog nise the necessity of exceeding Mr. GLAD STONE'S estimate ? Again, it was evident from the moment that the difficulties of the enterprise became known—and no one could be so fully aware of them as her Majesty's Government—that our troops must winter in the Crimea ; yet not until winter has actually set in, with unusual severity, was there a thought of provi ding our soldiers with shelter and clothing. The wooden houses which have just been ordered to be built can hardly arrive be fore Christmas ; and we hear of no means being taken for supplying the troops with sufficient fuel, which most necessary article we know cannot be obtained in the Crimea, and the want of which, by the latest accounts, was severely felt. If these obvious duties were neglected at a time when there was ample leisure for preparation, we can hardly expect that they will be ade►luately performed now, when the whole energies of our rulers are absorbed with matters of even greater moment. NELsoN said once that the secret of all his success in life consisted in his ever being half an hour before his time. It is the dir. tinctive characteristic of our Ministers that in all which concerns the safety of our army, and the success of our enterprises, they are months too late. Totally destitute of fore thought, they acknowledge the necessity of providing against evils only when their pre sence is felt with irrestible force. Other objects will demand the serious con sideration of Parliament. When Austria took possession of the Principalities by virtue of a treaty with the Porte, which our Ministers acknowledged they were cognisant of, it was supposed that that Power must have relations with France and England which would gra dually bring her into close alliance with their policy But it is now found that she was permitted to occupy the Danubian provinces without stipulations of any kind, and that she is endeavouring to turn the advantages of her position to purely selfish ends. Should this have been allowed? Was it politic to allow Austria to gain the position she ardently de sired without forcing her to declare her ulti mate intentions ? LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1854. THE time is near at hand when the country will expect a temperate but clear and firm expression of its sentiments from the voice of the Opposition in Parliament. We per fectly admit the truth that an Opposition has responsibilities,—it has also duties, and it grieviously fails to perform them, when it omits to take account of governmental errors most adverse to the interests and most dan gerous to the safety of the country. Since the Parliament was prorogued, the most important event of the last forty years has occurred. An expedition has been sent forth for the capture of the great military and naval stronghold of Russia in her southern territory. Through causes yet unexplained, that expedition has proved too weak for its object, and has been unsupported by any reserve. The country expected that a deci sive blow would be rapidly and successfully struck, which by convincing our enemy of the great superiority of the allies—not only by sea, but on the mainland, when they chose to concentrate their forces for attack—would induce him to desist from a contest which he must feel to be hopeless, and willingly accept terms of peace which would require from him no greater sacrifices than sufficient securities against further aggression. That was the hope entertained, and had the expedition been of sufficient force to achieve its object, our moderate expectations might possibly have been fulfilled. But, because it was resolved to confine the war within the narrow limits of petty capaci ties and economical theories, the expedition was sent forth in insufficient numbers, imper fectly equipped, and without that reserve of strength which would have enabled it, without rashness, to act with daring vigour. The cau Lion of WELLINGTON has been practised by Lord RAGLAN, but he has never had the com mand of a force which could have enabled him to emulate the nobler part of WELLING TON'S genius, and strike his foe with the cele rity and force of lightning. instead of being able to prove his superiority in the field against the Russians, he has been compelled to fortify himself from their attack. Whatever may be the issue of this expedition, the results ex pected from it three months back can never be realised. On the favourable supposition that in the end, after a vast expenditure of life, we prove completely successful, the con test must be embittered by the very continu ance of this deadly strife, and a quarrel, essen tially diplomatic in the first instance, will be changed into a war of national hatred. The Emperor NICHOLAS might, without humilia tion, have yielded to the surprise of an over whelming force, but, on the supposition of our We are admitting the produce of our enemy without let or hindrance, and thus supplying him with financial means to indefinitely pro long the war. Is Parliament prepared to sanction a continuance of this system? We are much mistaken if the country, in its present temper, would submit to any display of factious temper either in Parliament or out of it. But it requires fairly to be informed of the principles on which the war is to be con ducted ; and it demands an assurance of vigour, capacity, and earnestness on the part of those entrusted witlt the powers—at this time practically unlimited—of Government. It cannot afford to overlook vital errors in tho past, as only from the known conduct of the Administration can a judgment be formed on its fitness to deal with tho great emergency which has arisen. I