The Press. — London, England, 1854-10-28 00:00:00

1010 doubt. Every week shows us that the proba bility of greatly-extended hostilities is likely to be realised. To gain soldiers for our army we must increase the inducements for recruits, and we cannot do so unless we make up our minds to raise the status of the sold* by increasing his cosnfortd and bettering-his condition. Too many amongst us, carried away by the prejudice*, of commerce, look upon the soldier as a mere serf in a red coat. He is regarded by mall of the "'mall vulgar" as a hireling, slaying his fellow-men according to contract. The grovelling persons who make a god of pecuniary gain affect to look upon military life as a menial kind of existence. Nothing but gold emits rays of glory in their eyes. The state of the Three per Cents. can alone excite their feelings. If there had not been many such folk the delusion of the Peace Society would never have existed. Even in other classes where the soldier is looked upon with more sympathy we doubt whether he receives his just measure of re spect. He is the defender of our national honour, the protector of our commerce, and the representative of our physical prowess. The British soldier is ever ready to authenti cate his descent from those who in former days raised the name of this country through out the world, and made it terrible to its foes. Courage, unshrinking fortitude, the arm that smites superior strength, and the heart that quails before neither pestilence nor barbarian hordes, these are the heroic qualities that make and keep nations great, and in these manly endowments five centuries of fame prove that the soldiery of this unconquered island are splendidly endowed. When we honour them, we respect our country and its mission amongst the nations ; when we give them but flimsy rewards, and feeble cheers, we degenerate from our sires, and disparage the chivalry of Old England. Give our soldiers, therefore, the honour that is due to them, and bestow upon them the privileges which they deserve. Let them practically feel, down to the smallest drum mer-boy, that we look upon them as the ser vants of the State, and the champions of the national flag. These eleemosynary aids, these charitable donations and pecuniarycollections by individuals, are not the best means of de monstrating our care for the heroes who do battle for us. We are convinced that a large grant from Parliament would be in all respects a more proper way of aiding the wives and orphans of those who have bled for England than a voluntary collection in which several of the narrow-minded will not assess them selves justly. A grant so given would be more honourable to our army, and more befitting the dignity of this great empire. It is all very well to leave our decayed tradesmen and re duced labourers to the voluntary system, as they have worked directly only for themselves and their immediate employers ; but our soldiers and sailors ought to be treated as the servants of the State, which they unquestion ably are, and their wives and children should not be left to platform appeals and casual philanthropy. Not only would a generous grant from the public treasury, proposed by Government and ratified by Parliament, be more dignified, but its expense would be more equitably shared amongst all classes. On this latter consideration, however, we do not place such stress as on the absolute necessity of raising the condition of the soldier, and show ing to every idle rustic, or drudging denizen of the factory, that if they join in military ranks their personal interests will be cared for, and their condition will be raised. Nothing, indeed, can be more damping to the ardour of any aspiring spirits amongst our working classes than the very sound of sub scriptions for the families of the fallen. We are sure that they will generously give their mites, and in doing so they will bless their lot in not being exposed to the double hard ships of the soldier—his life of trial, and his death-bed, far away from his family. In re flecting upon his condition, we are afraid that the lower classes (from whom our rank and file must be recruited) will exaggerate some of the evils of military life. That there are great trials to be borne is obvious, and the gains of industrial life in this wealthy nations offer temptations to make the humbler • • THE PRE .-. ranks recoil from main.) , servitttde. Ve must, therefore, if we expect our army to be recruited properly, offer abunda uce ments to gallant fellows wh ght for England's cause. Even if we admit that our soldiers are, upon the whole, better cared inr than the , military of other countries.wa should recollaet how nobly the men in seiKet cloth repay the favours of the State. If we attend better to his health, let us refine ber that the Englisl) soldies endures and fits better than the military conscript of then tinent. To keep up a constant supply of recruits we must prominently identify our soldiery with all the glop/ •44-440 .fsiate, asid we must teach those who wear the uniform of the Crown to look to Parliament, and not to private persons, foi their well-earned rewards. In the meantime, while we shall forward the. Patriotic Fund (in absence of a better system), we trust that on the assembling of the Legislature the claims of our soldiers and sailors will receive the most liberal consi deration. THE FATE OF FRANKLIN. THE details brought home by Dr. RAA are con clusive on the main point that FRANKLIN and his brave companions have met with the most cruel of all deaths—starvation. They seem to have perished about the time when, after their long hardships, they might have hoped a better destiny, as they had gained the American con tinent, and the worst part of winter was past. Two or three weeks' further travel would have brought them to some station of the Hudson's Bay Company, where relief might have been afforded them; but that effort they were unable to make. The Esquimaux from whom Dr. RAE had the particulars he relates, speak of thirty or forty of the unfortunate voyagers. Were these all who remained of the crews of the Erebus and Terror, numbering altogether 139 souls? We fear we must conclude so. Among t.he articles reco vered are some belonging to FRANKLIN, who commanded the Erebus, and to CROZIER, who commanded the Terror ; to the surgeon and the assistant-surgeon of the Erebus, and to the as sistant-surgeon of the Terror. Had the ex pedition been divided, all these officers would not have been attached to one part of it, and certainly three out of the four surgeons who went in the two ships would not have been found together. From the meagre details furnished by Dr. RAs, we are to suppose that the Esquimaux understood chat the ships were crushed by the ice. Whether they were wrecked or deserted could hardly have been explained to them, as none of FRANKLIN'S party spoke the Esquimaux language. The last memorial at Beechey Island was an inscription over a seaman's grave, who " died April 3rd, 1846, aged thirty-two years. Choose ye this day whom ye will serve ; " and no further trace of ships or men is discovered till about April of 1850, though nearly every coast and channel which it seemed likely might have told of their whereabout had been diligently explored. Where, in this long interval, could the expedition have lurked ? We think they must have stood by their ships previous to the journey which terminated so disastrously. For why thould they have remained inactive after their ships, which alone could have promised them escape from their position, were gone ? As their only chance of safety lay in travel, they would cer tainly have commenced it as soon as their preparations were made and weather permitted their moving, And it seems more probable, from the long time the expedition had been out—nearly five years—that they made their ships their home until starvation stared them in the face, than that the vessels were in any way wrecked. But, on either supposition, what could have become of the expedition from the time it left Beechy Island, some time in the summer of 1846? Dr. RAE'S discoveries at once dis prove many conjectures which have been hazarded. The ships did not return (as Cap tain Axnrnis smosed) from Beechey Island to -• . - li-'_ SATURDAY, Baffin's Bay, and were there lost, nor did they sink with all on board in any part of Lancaster Sound, or Barrow's Straits. Somewhere in the Arctic seas they mato have been, but where ? The question call only be answered by study of thy-Arctic man. Had the ships gone up Wellington Channel, the voyagers, on deserting them, would have made for Melville Island, or the entrance of Lancaster Sound ; and the same may be said had the• ships been lust or deserted in any part et the sea connecting Melville Strait with Baffin's Bay. We conceive that the ships, after leaving Beechey Island, must have taken some channel or other to the south-weat. as on this supposition alone can we account for the appearance of the party on the north shore of King Williams Island. No supposition is so probable as that the vessels feund open water leading to the south after passing Cape Walker, and got inextricably involved in the ice, between the furthest land explored in that direction and the sea known as Victoria Strait. To our mind, the sledge party under Captain OMMANEY and Lieutenant OSBORN was the most unsatisfactory result of the Austen Expe dition (1851). It determined nothing, when it might have determined everything. Lieute nant OSBORN could not, we think, have been far from falling on some traces of the missing ships when he began to retrace his steps. It was in that direction, if anywhere, that FRANK LIN was to be found, and though the search, as we now know, would have been too late at that time, yet its neglect was inexcusable. If earlier made, how different might have been the result from that which Dr. RAE has ascer tained. It was that south-west sea which FRANKLIN was most expressly ordered to explore ; and it was that course which he repeatedly and decidedly expressed his inten tion of taking. One of the latest notices we have of him in FITZJAMES'S journal relates how he gave an account of his expectation of " being able to get through the ice on the " coast of America." He obeyed his instruc tions and fulfilled his word, and might suppose that aid would seek him where he was most likely to be found. The Admiralty should not hesitate to send out Dr. RAE to collect authentic particulars of the catastrophe on the spot where it occurred. The journals of the expedition may yet be recovered, or, at least, some record of what ham been achieved and suffered may be pre served. Another duty yet more urgent must not be lost sight of. Captain COLLINSON is left, by the inconsiderate return of Sir E. BELCHER, to struggle with the intricate navi• gation of what may now be fairly termed " the " North-West Passage," without the succour which may be essential to his safety. It is Nearly five years since he left England, and nearly four years since he entered Behring s Strait ; the strength of his crew must be impaired ; and, if prompt measures be not taken for his relief, the Franklin tragedy may be repeated in his case. We know with tolerable certainty where he is to be found, but this knowledge will surely avail him nothing if it does not contribute to his relief. It is unlikely he will be able to extricate his ship ; and our Administration will be guilty of neglect, equally cruel and culpable, if it fails to send an expedition in search of him. THE "EDINBURGH REVIEW" AND THE COALITION. THE current number of the Edisburgli con tains a remarkable article on the " New Ministry of War," some of the statements in which are not likely to be read with much pleasure by certain members o f the present motley Ministry. The propriety of uniting the several military departments under one head has already been discussed, and, per haps, exhausted in interest, by the public press. It was evident, during the last sessions that it was not right views upon unity of the War-office, so much as th e presence of s resolute will and a leading mind, that Ras required in the Cabinet. With able men v ui i, the War-office, the old system might ha V