The Press. — London, England, 1857-03-21 00:00:00

268 porters? We know the yielding disposi tion of the Noble Viscount. Would he not he placed at their head in spite of himself, and carried triumphantly over the breach he might at heart have preferied to defend? On the other hand, there is no danger to be apprehended by any party in the Church from the ascendancy of Lord DERBY. The Conser vatives, while eminently a Church party, are eminently free from subservience to any one party in the Church. They represent the great clerical middle class, and for his own (Bs. like of extreme views Lord DERBY has spoken for himself. The Church will be told that Protestantism is in danger, and therefore she must support Lord PALmEasToN, or that Church principles are in danger, and therefore she must oppose Lord DERBY. These cries will be unsparingly used. But let the Church look to herself. Let her observe from whieh quarter the real danger threatens, and regulate her conduct accordingly. THE LAST LIBERAL DUPE. How conies it that at the very time when Lord PALMERSTON appeals to the country for a seven years' vote of confidence in his Admi nistration, facts of the most dainnatory kind transpire, proving the falsehood and treachery of that system of foreign policy which his adherents pretend is to excuse all the blots and blunders of his domestic Administration? Can any one take up the papers of the day, and fail to observe that his own acts are light ing against him? We have alluded in another article to the case of Naples. If it be not true that the Premier was willing to enter into an engage ment with France to repress the free action of the Neapolitan people, and to bombard Naples should a Republican Government be established—why are not the suppressed pa pers made public? What reason can there be ter their concealment, if Lords PALmEasToN and CLARENDON are not afraid or ashamed to disclose their proceedings ? On another most important point of their Italian policy not the slightest uncertainty exists. It is well known how the English Cabinet encouraged Sardinia to expect assist ance against Austrian ascendancy in Italy. The inconsistency of such professions when the English Cabinet was drawing closer its relations with that of Austria was manifest ; but that a British Government after the part taken by Piedmont in the war against Itu , sia, and atter the recorded declarations of Lord CLARENDON in the Paris Protocols, could deli• berately intend to sacrifice Sardinia to the Austria❑ alliance, seemed too monstrous for beiief. Now, what are the facts? For some mouths past the relations betweer. Austria and Sardinia have assumed a threat ening, if not directly hostile, attitude ; and exactly as Lords PiamEasToN and CLARENDON have drawn closer the ties of their Austrian alliance has the opposition between the Cabi• nets of Vienna and Turin become more menacing. Ic his speech in the House of Lords on Monday, Lord GRANVILLE referred with com placency to the improved and stiengthened relations of this country with Austria. IVe give the Noble Lord's own words : With regard to Austria, while I confess that we have no right to claim any particular merit to ourselves fur the friendly character of our relations with that Power, yet I may refer to it as an agreeable consideration, that, at the very time our relations with her have been strengthening and improving, the Enopern. of Austria has been giving encouragement to a more liberal system of government in his Italian dominions. The just commentary on that remarkable statement is bupl.lied by a telegraphic announcement in the Times of yesterday : SARDINIA AND AUSTRIA. VIENNA, Thursday, March 19, Noon. Count Pear has received eiders to quit his post, if he cannot obtain from the Turin Cabinet the satisfaction demanded. In other words, Austria will take the first step to a declaration of war against Sardinia, unless her arbitrary demands be complied with and her supremacy be recognised, at the very moment when, according to the express decla ration of the Ministerial Leader in the House cf Lords, it is " an agreeable consideration" that our relations with Austria are "strength " ening and improving." THE PRESS. egrrtSpOlatlltt. THE CHINA QUESTION. TO TEE EDITOR or ' 6 THE PRESS." Sir,—There is one feature of the China question which seems to have been overlooked by speakers in both Houses. I mean the risk, should we succeed in the military objects of the war, of so weakening and disorganising the Chinese empire as to produce in those regions of the world a diplomatic complica tion similar to that from which we have just escaped in the case of Turkey. It is impossible to doubt that the war of 18-10 did much to shake the stability of the Tartar dynasty. By it the military prestige of the ruling race was destroyed in the eyes of its subjects : the treasury was exhausted ; to repair that exhaustion money had to be extorted from the people; and offices which had hitherto been reserved as the rewards of merit (though of merit tested after a pedantic fashion) were openly sold to the highest bidder. Thus external weakness and administrative corruption went together; the desire to rebel became stronger at the same time that the spectacle of weakness presented by the autho rities justified an expectation that rebellion might prove successful. The result is a civil contest, of which the issue yet remains doubt ful ; one thing only being certain in regard of it—namely, that the conquering party will require many years of repose to reconsolidate its power,—a power, in any case, necessarily obnoxious to a large minority of the people. Is it the interest of England to throw still farther into confusion a nation so circuit'. stanced ? I assume that the idea of territo rial acquisitions in China is not seriously en tertained by any Englishman resident in Europe, although with a part of the Indian press that idea has found favour. What we want is simply facility of trading ; and be it observed, that when a trade has once been set free, it tends, like water, to enlarge for itself the channel in which it flows. Access to, and courteous treatment from, the highest native authorities, we are entitled to demand : every demand beyond this is superfluous, tending perhaps to gratify national pride, but not to promote national interests. But other Governments have relations with China besides our own. I say nothing of the Ame ricans, since their form of polity is ill suited for the conquest and retention of distant de pendencies ; and with a practically unlimited power of extending their dominion south wards, there seems no reason to anticipate that they will attempt to imitate our proceed ings in India by founding an Asiatic empire of their own. But the case of Russia is different. Her territory borders on that of China. Her desire and determination to extend that territory in some quarter is noto • rious. It is certain that she cannot extend it in the direction of Europe. In Central Asia there is no land worth conquering, except as I stepping stone to more remote acquisitions. China is precisely that part of th 3 world best suited for the furtherance of her aggressive designs. The Chinese empire is not yet in cluded in the diplomatic system of Europe. It is remote from the great centres of political power—London, Paris, Washington. It is accessible from Russia, and from Russia only, by land. The annexation of a million of square miles in Tartary, if the moment be judiciously chosen, will cause less sensation in England than the accidental arrest of a British subject by Italian or Austrian police. In fact, the free navigation of the Amour was actually gained, and with it the possession of a vast territory on the northern bank of that river, without a rumour of the transaction reaching Europe. I do not hesitate to say that, looking at the policy of Russia, at the geographical position of China, and at the present situation of that empire, the conquest by a Russian army of the northern half of it is an event not beyond the limits of possibility. Exclude the chances of interference by France, England, America, and the possibility would become a certainty. "But," I may be told, "such interference would certainly take place." Probably it would ; and SATURDAY, on that fact I base my argument. Where is the wisdom of weakening a Power which you may, within a generation, be called upon to strengthen and protect? We are doing at this moment with China what we did with Turkey when we destroyed the Turkish fleet at Navarino. The results of that " untoward event" are now clearly seen. Sinope was one of them. Must former experience always he lost upon us ? Are we always to act from passion, and never from policy? Out of evil, by skilful use of opportunities, good may be brought. This war will have answered one useful end, if it leads us seriously to consider the necessity of estab• lisping an organised diplomatic system beyond Europe, as well as within it. Let France, England, the United States, and Russia, if she will join—the foul Powers really interested in Chinese affairs—agree on a policy by which all shall pledge themselves to abide. Let the in tegrity of the Chinese territory be guaranteed, as is that of Turkey. Let every case of alleged wrong by the Chinese Government be decided by the four Powers jointly, acting on that Government, and not by the representative of any one of them singly. And as regards the existing civil war, let all four agree to observe a strict neutrality, in fact as well as in name. Thus, and thus only, may we arrest for the future such disreputable transactions as that which has given rise to the present quarrel. To terminate that quarrel will be almost useless, if we leave in existence the causes which have brought it about. ONE OF THE MAJORITY OF MARCH 3RD. London, March 18, 1857. A CONSERVATIVE PROGRAMME. TO THE EDITOR OF " THE PRESS." Sir,—l believe there is a general feeling among Conservatives in favuur of a political programme containing a definite and explicit statement of the practical political opinions entertained by the Con servative pasty. I need not state that I have no authority to set forth suc'i a programme, yet I feel at the same time that it is a desideratum, and that it would be of great advantage in the approaching appeal to the country. But the drawing up of a confession of political faith which would in any way deserve the name of a party programme is attended at present with peculiar difficulties. In the first place, the opposite party profess the most motley creed which has ever in the history of England been held by any body of public men acting in common—a fact at once verified and illustrated in the person of its political chief, Lord Palmerston, who, after having professed most political opinions, now expresses convictions in direct opposition to the historical creed of his own party. Now, an Opposi tion programme must state opinions contradistin guished from those held by the Ministerialists ; but how is this to be done when it is impossible to state what Ministerial opinions are ? In the second place, it cannot be denied that this is a transition period, when the old party opinions are undergoing a gradual and unavoidable modification to adapt them to the extensive changes which have been introduced, not only in the Constitution, but in the general frame work of society ; and as this process is still going on, the attempt to stereotype political opinion into party forms is premature. It is, therefore, with a full appreciation of the perhaps insuperable difficulties in the way of a full solution of the problem at the present moment, that I venture to suggest the heads of a confession of political faith, which may at least serve as a prepara tion for that more complete programme which time may develop into a permanent bond of union for the Conservative party. I give no prominence in my programme to the peculiar question whic'i led to the defeat of the Ministry. Adopting with respect to it the simple and noble language of the legitimate head of thcl Liberal party in his address to the constituency of London, I consider it of importance principally as having, on the one hand, afforded an opportunity to Lord Palmerston, by his unhesitating adoption of Sir John Bowring's proceedings, to formally.avow those principles of international policy which have been so often alleged by the Conservatives as afford ing sufficient ground fur the withdrawal from him of the national confidence ; and, on the other hand, by affording the Conservatives an opportunity of enun ciating the new foreign policy which they seek to inaugurate —a policy of conciliation and moderation governed by a loyal adherence not simply to the letter, but rather to the spirit of treaties, and seiured by a real and frank maintenance of the principles of non-intervention. But the Chinese tragedy seems to me to demon strate the necessity of a new principle in our foreign policy which I should hope the Conservative party