The Press. — London, England, 1858-12-04 00:00:00

Zbt Alttl,6 No. 292.—V0L. VI. Ot Alms. LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 4,185 g. POPULAR FALLACIES. A CONTEMPORARY, whose columns arc chiefly remarkable for the advocacy of an extreme change, in a democratic sense, in the constitution of the House of Commons, thus begins a sort of self-complacent song of triumph : "Why should not all who pay the taxes be represented in the House of Commons ? Why should a man who pays ten or twenty shillings lees of rent than his neighbour be deprived of a vote ? Why should three hundred electors in one part of the country have as much political power as thirty thousand in another? _ Why experience they will not make the attempt, and that the argument of the Reformers is really invulner able." Our contemporary is quite right when he dmribes these questions as being " the argument of the Reformers," and although some little time may have elapsed since they appeared, yet, as being the staple questions, they still are con stantly repeated ; and as they appear in a pub lication supposed to speak the sentiments of Mr. BRIGHT, we trust we shall do good service by giving to each and all of them a distinct reply. " Why should not all who pay taxes be re presented in the House of Commons ?" For this reason : unless these gentlemen intend to bestow the election franchise far more diffusely than the most advanced amongst them have ever been known to advocate, it is necessary to put a limit somewhere. Every man or woman who buys a glass of beer pays the excise tax on the beer, and every child who buys one pennyworth of brown sugar pays the custom tax upon it. If, then, all the women and children, from one end of the country to the other, are not to have the elective franchise, we have a ready answer to this wonderful question— " Why should not all who pay taxes be . repre sented because it is necessary to place a limit somewhere. The question where that limit is to be fixed is a totally different affair. We, should not shrink from replying to it, if it were: put; but, as it is not put, we are content only to Ore an answer to the question which is put. "Why should a man who pays ten or twenty shillings less of rent than his neighbour be deprived of his vote ?" This is a very unfair, or, if not an unfair, a very bungling form of putting the question. The logical answer to it is this : A man who pays ten shillings less rent than his neighbour is not " deprived" of his vote, because a maa cannot he " deprived " of what he never possessed; and the man referred to never had a vote, therefore he has not been " deprived " of it. Now this 111 °de of putting the question is not without its should Parliaments last seven years ? And why should votes be unprotected from corrupt in- fluence ? We cannot conceive anything more itn- portant than that such questions should meet with attention, and yit we cannot conceive any- thing less likely than that the opponents to Reform should be prepared to answer them. The experience of the last few weeks shows that LONDON, SATUR I >AY DECEMBER 4, 1858. STAMPED ....SIXPENCE. UNSTAMPED..FIVEPENCE. object. To deprive a man of any possession con veys a notion of hardship ; not to confer a privi lege conveys no notion of hardship ; all persons cannot have the same or even equal privileges : it is inconsistent with the essence of social life. at our command, to discuss at length this impor tant question ; but it is an absurdity, of which those who undertake to guide public opinion ought to be ashamed, to pretend to dispose of a great question of policy by a flippant interroga tion, and seek to impose upon their readers the foolish notion that they have asked a question which their opponents are unable to answer. This is just a specimen of the way in which the advocates of manhood suffrage would betray that manhood suffrage to its ruin—viz., by prac tising on the credulity of their admirers. " IVhy should votes be unprotected front cor rupt influences ?" For a very simple reason. Because it is impossible to protect them from it. It is per fectly obvious at what this question aims —viz., the Ballot—but here is just one of the gross fal lacies by which advocates of this stamp venture to delude their supporters. They assume as un deniable that which men of sense and fairness deny. They assume that the voter would be protected from corrupt influence by the Ballot— and, of course, there is something very fascinating in the idea of protecting a voter from such in fluence—but, amongst many objections which we entertain - to the Ballot, we entertain this one in particular, that it would not protect a voter from being corruptly influenced, for a man's motive for voting is just as likely to be a corrupt one if given in secrecy as it is if given openly. The secrecy may in some cases enable hint to lie and to break his promise, without injury to himself but the one thing that secrecy is utterly inca pable of doing is either to supply pure motives or to destroy influences whether corrupt or un corrupt. We have now replied to the questions of our contemporary, and we must be allowed to say that we conceive, first, that our contemporary will not venture to take notice of our answers; secondly, that he will repeat his questions with the affirmation that no one has yet been prepared to answer them; and lastly, that he will not follow our ready example in venturing to reply to the questions which we have put forth, on the eve of the Birmingham meeting, but which remain to this day unnoticed and unanswered. Let us, however, put the question in its logical form, lest it should be said we are dealing with the words when we ought to deal with the spirit. Why should a man paying ten shillings less rent than his neighbour not possess the privilege of voting ? We reply, because it is not for the well being of the State that ail persons who pay rent should have a vote ; for, if it be asserted that there is no good reason why he should not, then the consequence that follows is, that all the payers of rent must have votes—a principle which is equally applicable to those who pay rent for a week as for a year. In this case then, as in the last, it is ne cessary to put a limit ; and, as in that case, where that limit should be fixed is a totally distinct question from whether there should be no limits at all. _ _ _ " 'Why should three hundred electors in one part of the country have as much political power as thirty thousand in another ?" Now, if we were to ask the converse of this question viz., Why should thirty thousand electors in one part of the country have as mach political power as three hundred in another ? the answer would be pretty much the same to both. Both questions look equally imposing, and are really equally puzzling, until it is first settled on what principles the answer is to be founded. They might both be answered by another question. Why should they not? It is as reasonable to require an answer to this last question as to either of the first two. But the truth is, before either can be answered, it must first be determined whether number is, or is not, to be the one single element on which the election of Members of Parliament is to be founded. If it be decided that property, education, and all other interests are to be excluded, then we frankly admit that no satisfactory reason can be assigned why three hundred electors in one part of the country ' should return as many members as thirty thousand in another ; no more than. any satisfac tory reason could be given why twenty-nine thousand electors should return as many as thirty thousand. But we must say to those who ask this .question: this exclusive doctrine of numbers may l indeed be a very sound one, but it is one unknown to this country, and before it is intro duced, we have a fair right to require some argu ' ments in its favour, and some examples, of its success. At all events, until this is done, questions founded upon it are not to be palmed off as unanswerable, or as being such as the opponents of this species of Reform are unable to meet. " Why should Parliaments last seven yeFs,?" This question implies very great ignorance on the part of the inquirer. Has he in the course of his political reading never fallen on any argtipients —arguments at least a century old—in favour of septennial Parliaments ? We do not, of course, moan to deny that there are no arguments to' be found in favour of triennial or annual Parlia ments, or that some may think that the arguments in support of the shorter duration may not pre ponderate over those in favour of the other two. But our interrogator puts his questions as if no possible reasons ever had been, or ever- could be , . adduced to show that septenni al Parliaments are more likely to conduct the affairs or the nation with wisdom than those of shorter dUriition. It would be hopeless to attempt, in the short space [Wm A SUPPLEMENT, GRATIS. INDIRECT INFLUENCES. " Tux Head of the Church," says Cardinal W In- MAN in his "Recollections of the last Four Popes," "is not the spiritual ruler of one kingdom. His " headship extends over an entire world, " spiritually indeed, yet sensibly and effica " ciously : kingdoms and republics are equally "comprised in it." This is the theory of the Power of which Cardinal WisEmAx is the repre sentative in England. According to this theory all Temporal Princes are subject to the Pope, as Vicegerents on earth of " the KING of Kings." The right of this Supremacy to claim obedience at the hands of all Princes, Governments, and nations, is nowise affected by differences of re1f.( 1 5.. .---1,.' gious belief. The most Protestant Princes, ate " 1 ! 1 :; nations are as much subjects of the Pope &Olio Ai R . , most " Catholic." The only difference betiveed i -- them is, that whereas the latter are " faittigd 7 ., toil _. subjects, the former are subjects in a state c hellion. Neither political changes, nor lap tune, no, not even the recognition by the himself of any Dynasty . or Government op to the Papal claim of universal dominion, jl=-4Z, I ..~.: ~,~ ..~.~-9t . - • ' y ~ _~ ,~ .~..~... -~-~..w ..444AL A I