The Press. — London, England, 1857-07-18 00:00:00

putt6ings znVartiaincnt. HOUSE OF LORDS—MoND.ty. INDIA. Lord ELLENnottorou called the attention of the house to the alarming condition of our empire in India, and complained of the small amount of official information that had been afforded on a sub ject of such paramount importance : It is now three months since the minds of the most reflective men have been directed with great anxiety to the state of the army in India, and every successive mail has tended to increase that anxiety. But, notwithstanding this state of affairs, no one word of official information has yet been given to Parliament. We have b-en left to de pend upon private letters and upon articles in the news papers, while the empire is in danger. We know nothing of the cause of the danger or the nature of the measures adopted by her Majesty's Government to suppress it. Ido not think that this is a state of things that ought to con thine. I have said that every successive mail increases our anxiety, and yet by every successive telegraphic de %patch we are told that the crisis is Fast, that the (linger is over, and that things have been at their worst. My lords, it is not so. In a case of this kind—of a dangerous and extensive mutiny—things go on from worse to worse, and so will proceed until the strong hand of power has inter fered to suppress the resistance to the authority of the Government. As yet no indication has been given of the existence on the part of the Government of India of th a t nower which is necessary to suppress the present mutiny. Toe general tendency of those who call themselves the public instructors of the country is to endeavour to induce persons to believe that this is only a passing calamity, and that slight measures indeed are required to put down the rebellion in India. It seems to me that there are many among us who resemble that sagacious animal which, when pressed by its pursuers, hides it head in the sand and thinks it is not seen because it cannot see. All Europe is regarding with the deepest interest the conduct which under the present circumstances we are pursuing. Upon that conduct depend our present character and our future position in India. I do not believe thst there exists in this house or in the other any indisposition to grant to her Majesty's Government all the means they may ask for the purpose of establishing our authority in India. If we do not do right the disgrace is with the Government, the loss of India must undoubtedly lie with us. But it depends upon the noble lord at the head of the Government whether he shall obtain for himself a reputation similar to that which was obtained under difficult and dangerous cir• cumstances by Lord Chatham, or allow his Government to go down to posterity as the most calamitous, the most disastrous, and the most disgraceful since the time of Lord North. He congratulated the Government on the judicious appointment they had made in selecting Sir Colin Campbell to succeed the late General Anson as Commander-in-Chief in India. In order, however, to give full effact to the abilities of Sir Colin Camp bell two things were necessary-Ist, that he should be completely emancipated from the thraldom of politicals ; and, 2ndly, that he should carry with him the whole weight and authority of the Governor- General. He thought also the temporary appoint ment of Sir Patrick Graut a very good one, and suggested that so able and experienced an Indian officer should be at once appointed an extraordinary member of council at CAlcutta, in order to act as military adviser to the Governor-General in this crisis. The noble earl was not disappointed at not hearing of the capture of Delhi by the present mail, for he thought it could hardly have fallen within the time that had elapsed since the last advices ; hut these advices showed that the insurgents, by ventur ing to give battle without the walls of Delhi, must have been far stronger than we anticipated. The main thing, however, for consideration was so to take measures as to have a really efficient force in the field by the Ist of November, before which time our reinforcements could hardly reach India. The noble earl anticipated what would be the position of affairs in Bengal on the Ist November :- 1 assume that we take Delhi-1 assume that our troops continue to held Delhi, Meerut, and the neighbouring stations; but 1 know the locality. No European regiments are ever stationed there, on Recount of the sickness which prevails; and at the end of the rains even the native regi inenta have from two-thirds to three fourths of their strength prostrated. Therefore, if our troops take and occupy Delhi, if they expel the King from his palace and drive out all his forces, and even if they do everything in their power to promote the health of our men, you cannot possibly expect them to be in a state to resume operations on the Ist November. All I can venture to hope is that they will be able to hold the places they occupy. In the very centre of the mutiny our troops will be like the French in Spain—they will hold what they stand upon, but little or nothing else. When the army which constitutes our strength is dissipated and gone, and the men have become, as they will do, rebels or robbers, it is impossible to believe that we shall be able to collect the revenue and administer the government. In the Punjaub things may be a little better. You have able men there who, I trust, will be able to maintain their own. They may perhaps bo able, through THE PRESS, JULY 18, 1857. the aid of the local corps, to collect a portion of the revenue, but Ido not think they can possibly do more. Certainly they will not be able to move beyond the banks of the Sutlej to render assistance to any other corps. All I can hope is that in these provinces our authorities will stand their grc.und, and that the Punjaub will be maintained. Lord Ellenborough then placed before the house a masterly plan of operations in detail for the suppres sion of the insurrection : When the insurrection first broke out we had only two regiments at Calcutta and its neighbourhood. The Go vernment sent for one regiment from Madras, and two from Bombay, which were in the Persian Gulf at the time. This, with another regiment previously ordered up, will make six regiments at Calcutta when these troops arrive. The first thing to consider is the protection of the capital, the seat of Government, where there is a treasury containing many millions, and an enormous amount of mercantile property. It is the point through which alone the Customs, the salt tax, and the opium revenue can be levied. It is essential to the maintenance of British authority in India not only that Calcutta should be held, but that there should be no possible doubt as to our holding it, and that the Government should be always able to act and legislate there in perfect security. In addition to the troops there you ought to have at least six steamers in the river to protect the Government offices, Allahabad is a most important station at th 2 junction between the Jumna and the Ganges ; while at Lucknow— the centre of a great Mahommedan population—there ought to be more than one regiment. Thus, the whole of the six regiments which will arrive at Calcutta will be required for the protection of Bengal alone, without the power of moving beyond the confines of that presidency, and therefore they will have no disposable force for retrieving affairs at the other provinces. Of these six regiments three must, at the earliest convenient moment, be sent back to their previous stations—one to Madras and two to Bombay. Consequently, of the eight regi ments which we know have now been ordered to sail for India three will be detaintd in Bengal to supply the place of a corresponding number who will return to Madras and Bombay. Thus there will remain of the entire force of which we have as yet heard only five regiments for any operations from Allahabad. I hold that five regiments are totally insufficient. And here I ought to observe that. whatever force the Government may send out the difficulties of the Governor General in affording it means of movement will not, perhaps, be insuperable, but they will be enormous ; and unless he in terferes in the business himself, looking into every detail and communicating personally with the officers intrusted with the duty of furnishing transport for the troops, our measures will entirely fail. There is no use in having men if you cannot move them. In Bengal you cannot find horses to mount the cavalry, or for the purposes of the artillery. It is absolutely necessary that the horses should be sent hence ; and it is most desirable that you should at the same time give orders in the Cape and in Australia for the furthering to India of all horses fit for the service of the city airy and artillery. But I shall assume that these five regiments have all reached Allaha bad. They will not, however, be there by the Ist of November. That is the day on which they will arrive at Calcutta ; and, having obtained the means of transport, they cannot possibly get to Allahabad before the Ist of January. This force will be wholly inadequate to enter without cavalry or artillery into a country with from 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 of inhabitants, full of disbanded troops, and containing the really military population of India—the Rajpoot population. I say that your force should consist of at least nine regiments of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and six batteries of artillery. Upon a late occasion Calcutta was left with only one battery of six guns, and, although it is contrary to all our previous notions, it will be necessary for the first time to send ar tillery to India. And now comes another difficulty. The gun carriages made here will be of no use there, and unless you send out orders to Madras and Bombay to provide gun carriages those made in this country will crack in pieces, anti your guns will be lost. My lords, I think I should fail in my duty if I did not say most decidedly that I do not think it sufficient to act on that line of operations alone. There will be on the right bank of the Sntlej a force which may maintain its own, but which will be in jeopardy in the midst of a great population very *dike and very hostile, and I hold it essential that there should be a movement of troops by the line of the Indus and the Sutlej, which may connect itself with the force from Allahatiad, and crush all opposition between those two points. And more, I hold it to be most expedient, wise, and necessary to go yet further, and to have some reserve of perhaps two European regiments —one at Allaliabrul and another on the other line of operations I have indi• cated—to which some native regiments might be joined wllo might be relied on for the purpose of completing the communications, of sending up supplies, and protecting the rear of the army. With this force, which lie would make up by diverting the regiments now destined for China, the existing rebellion might be stamped out, and by the end of April British authority firmly re-established in every part of the upper provinces. But their lordships might rely on it that the rebellion could only be extinguished by prompt and vigorous means : But if you act in a different way—if you act undeckledly —if you think there is nothing in It, and that it will die out of itself—if you are not determined to put forth your w' ole strength and crush this rebellion against your iomiuion which threatens your elistence in India as con. quelois, you may depend upon it you will have entailed upon you campaign after campaign, and the suspense which will affect the minds of the whole people of India will im• peril your rule and destroy your character and authority in India. My lords, Ido not believe there will be any Indio'. position on the part of Parliament to supplrt the Govern. went, if the Government take the right, view of the present state of things. It is for them to decide. I trust that they will prove worthy of the difficulties of their position, and of the greatness of the danger in which we are all involved, and that by cowing forward in a manner to maintain the national character and the public interests they will give permanent security to our Indian empire, as well as honour —which I shall nut grudge them—for themselves. He concluded by asking for further official informa tion connected with the Indian mutines. Lord URANVIII.E replied that the Government were only at present in possession of the telegraphic mes sage which had been already made public. Further intormation might be expected that evening or in the course of the next day, the substance of which would, of course, be published. We regard to the whole question, he could assure Lord Ellenborough that the Government were not at all inclined to treat the matter lightly, and though be could not agree with him when he talked of calamity and disgrace, and though be declined to follow him into the realms of prophecy, Lord Ellenborough might rest assured that the Government were pre pared to act with the greatest vigour in this emer gency. Lord hIxLvILLE, in an impressive speech, called the attention of the house to the bad discipline which had existed for years past in the Bengal army as distinguished from those of the other Presidencies, supported his assertion by examples derived from his Indian experiences, and called the attention of the house to the wilful neglect of the East India Directors or the Government to remedy abuses when pointed out to them by their own officers : Nobody could deny that the discipline of the Bengal army was of the worst possilile description, and in that light it had been looked upon by the late General Anson, who hail in conseqnce, ever since he had assumed the command of the arm3r in India, deemed it to he his duty to represent to the Board of Directors the absolute necessity of increas• ing the European force in India—a recommendation to which, however, so far as the Government was concerned, no sort of attention had been paid. In proof of the state ment that the discipline of the Bengal army was of the worst description he might inform the house that in the year 1819, shortly after the first occupation of the Punjaub, when he had commanded on the frontier, two Bengal regi• ments had mutinied, and when he had returned home in 1850 he had expressed the greatest disapprobation of the condition of the troops of which that army was composed. He had, however, been told that, no matter how just his opinions upon the subject might be, he must not give utterance to them in public, inasmuch as it was extremely undesirable that foreign nations should be acquainted with the real state of affairs. The result, at all events, had been that no steps had been taken in the matter by the Board of Directors, and that the discipline of the Bengal army eon tinned to be of that character to which he had drawn their lordships' attention. A few remarks from Lord ALBEIIARLE concluded the discussion. SWISS LEGION. Lord MALMESDURY presented a t etition from forty•seven officers of the Swiss Legion complaining that when enrolled they were sworn in under certain stipulations, which promised them to be enlisted for twelve months after the conclusion of peace, and that upon disbandment they should receive fifteen months' full pay. These stipulations were ignored by the Government, and an offer of three months' pay made, which the petitioners accepted under pro test. An offer of another three months' was after wards made, which the petitioners rejected. Lord Malmesbury advocated the claims of these officers with whom, he alleged, the War Department had broken faith. Lord PANMURE declared that the agreement upon which the claim of these officers was founded was forged by a member of the committee of officers and inserted into the articles without the consent of the remaining members of the committee. He utterly denied that the Government had broken faith with the Swiss Legion, towards which, on the contrary, he asserted great liberality had baen shown. Lord MALmesstmv said the point in dispute was, whether the Minister of War had the power of dis charging at the conclusion of peace or retaining for one year after the officers of the legion. He believed that the articles might be construed both ways. But, any way, those officers who had entered our service under this idea, and who had been deceived by the officials of the Government, ought, ho contended, to be indemnified and to be paid the sums which they expected to receive. The subject then dropped. Si f JAMES'S PARK. The Earl of MALMESBURY once more drew atten tion to the draining operations in St. James's-park, enlarging upon the breach of constitutional principle which he said was committed by Sir Benjamin Hall, in spending 15,0001. of the public money without parliamentary sanction. Earl GRANVILLE observed that the amount ex pended was comparatively small, and the purpose