The Press. — London, England, 1858-06-05 00:00:00

THE PRESS, JUNE 5,1858. days, has been the vote to which it suddenly and unexpectedly came, in spite of Lord l'ALmFits- TON and Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT'S remonstrances. for bringing the whole government of the army under the control of the House of Commons ! Admitting to the fullest extent the many ad vantages of " unity " as opposed to " duality " of administration, there are still objections of the gravest character to an absolute junction of the two offices of Secretary for War at.d Commander-in-Chief. These objections are of a twofold kind, constitutional and prac tical, and there was not enough of stress placed upon the first of these. We must remember that in organizing an army for any country, the habits of the people, the taste of society, and the traditions of the State, cannot be overlooked. What might do in Prussia would not succeed in England; for with us the problem is to bring our military system into harmony with the com plex state of our advanced society, and our per fectly free people. The Crown, the Lords, and the Commons have their respective claims to consideration ; and these cannot be disregarded when so delicate a topic as the practical command of the army is before us. If Captain VIVIAN'S motion could be finally carried, Parliament would have sanctioned the creation of a giganti c official, who would be intrusted with an amount of authority both dangerous and unconstitutional. He would be a Secretary of State, and virtually a Commander-in-Chief ; the promotions in the army, the distribution of forces, and the fiscal expenditure of the whole military department would be subordinated to him, and there could be no appeal from his decisions, except to Parliament itself, which, as Lord PALMERSTON truly ob served, is not competent to manage purely ad ministrative business. Let us suppose the plan adopted, and we might well recoil from the official Frankenstein that we should have made. The Lord Chancellor is the highest officer in the law, but his decisions are subject to be overruled by the Law Lords on appeal ; the Prime Minister's policy is checked by the Members of his Cabinet, and the Home Secretary in many cases cannot act without the approving co-operation of the Attorney-Gene ral ; but let the functions of the Commander in-Chief and Secretary of State for War be united in one person, and there will be no offi cial, or department, competent to check his action. The House of Commons alone will be great enough to call him to account, and the enormous evil of politico-military discussions will result from the creation of a military autocrat, for the vastness of whose power there will be neither precedent nor analogy in the other depart ments of the State. These circumstances, and the conclusions suggested by them, were not suffi ciently weighed by the House on Tuesday. There are other objections even of a weightier character. It is by means of the army alone that the political liberties of the country can be endan gered. The navy has no power of crushing opinion, or making and unmaking dynasties. There are no instances in history of the navy of a country overbearing its liberties, though there may be cases in which double-dealing admirals might compromise the national honout. " Admiral "RUSSELL," writes Mr. HALLANI, "though com "pelled to win the battle of La Hogue against "his will, took care to render his splendid vic tory as little advantageous as possible." (Con stitutional History, William III.) The danger thus indicated is the utmost we have to fear from a navy, but it is very different in the case of an army. Upon this subject the plainest words are best, and we are not prepared to submit to the command of the army being given to a purely political personage, engaged in canvassing con stituencies, and interested in the rise and fall of "party." It has been affirmed by political philosophers that our boasted constitutional system could never coexist with a vast standing army like those of continental nations. They have reasoned that the immense patronage, prestige, and power concentrated in swaying so large a force, would depress and overbalance the 531 popular departments of the State; and there is great reason in that view. A huge standing army would be an anti-constitutional excrescence; and would not a prodigious officer of State, with a train of Parliamentary followers, and with political obligations to fulfil, choosing the generals of the army, and deciding also on the number of its officers and men—would not, we ask, such a colossal administration be also essen tially unconstitutional ? Would he not in his official autocracy be a sort of rival Sovereign ? The Duke of WELLLNGToN once objected to becoming Prime Minister, on the ground avowed by him, that, "on account of his long con " nection with the army, such a post as " Prime Minister being given to him would "be liable to popular objections." Almost in spite of himself his Grace did become a Prime Minister, and the very thing that his instinctive common sense predicted came to pass. His unpopularity in 1829 and 1830 was largely augmented by his apparent possession of an autocracy. Are we, then, prepared to create a State official who shall monopolize the prestige of Court, the authority of military command, the influence of Parliamentary pre-eminence, and the power of enormous patronage ? So much for the constitutional objections ; but there are practical ones of not less importance. We must not be deceived by words on such a matter, and to be led away by " unity " would be as ridiculous as if we were to copy the perverts from Protestantism who were fascinated by the fictitious "unity "of Rome. If we made " unity" our test on this question, we might be carried to such lengths as to think that we should attain to greater " unity " if we got rid of an independent Parliament, a free press, and the right of public assemblage. Let us not try to get too much out of the mere phrase of " unity." On this subject we must recollect that when there is a natural division of duties there might be a separation of offices. The Commander-in- Chief should direct the army, the Secretary of State for War should organize it ; one must con sider the army in its internal, the other in its national relations; the discipline and the state of the several regiments, and the character of their officers, should be closely attended to by the first ; the expenditure of the whole army, its clothing, barracks, education of children, &c., may fairly fall within the province of the second ; the Commander-in-Chief should act in the name of the Crown, and the Secretary of War should supply the Crown with the proper resources for warfare and for the maintenance of the military force. The action of the army should be spe cially within the control of the Commander-in- Chief, and its special composition should be looked after by the other. People still, however, may cry for more con solidation than has yet taken place; but such objectors are not familiar with all that has been done. It is no argument, because offices were divided too much in other times, that therefore we should go to the other extreme and create a military autocrat. Lord PALMERSTON'S state ment as to what the War Department formerly was, cannot be denied : "It was quite true that formerly we had the Commander-in-Chief, who controlled the disci pline of the Line; the Master-General of the Ordnance, who was charged with that of the Artillery and Engineers ; the Secretary at War, who was at the head of the accountant branch of the army ; the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who was also Secretary of State for all the great arrangements of war ; the Treasury, which controlled the Commissariat; and the Ord nance, which had an office of account separate from that of the Secretary at War." But that is not the present state of things, and we do not think that Captain VIVIAN'S motion was decided on the merits of the existing system. Let us recollect what was done in 1855. Lord PALMERSTON observed, and with truth : "In the year 1855 we put the whole discipline of the army, including the Engineers and Artil lery, under one head, the Commander-in-Chief; the office of Secretary of State for War was separated from that of Secretary for the Colonies; that of the Secretary at War was merged in the office of Secretary of State for War, who had transferred to him the Commissariat and the entire management of the Militia, and acquired delusive scheme, he lost one-half of his sup porters. It cannot be a pleasing thing to hear from a dvanced Liberals" in the House of Commons, o r to read in ultra-Liberal journals, "W e prefer this Ministry to Lord PALMERSTON'S, be cause we expect that we shall be able to extort more from its fears." Such reasons for support ing a Conservative Government are precisely those which most annoy a Conservative's ear. And, so far as he gives credit to them, just so far is his attachment to the Ministry weakened and his fears excited. No one who has watched the recent proceed ings in Parliament can be at a loss to understand the drift of these remarks. We tremble at every symptom of a policy resembling that of Sir R. PEEL. Still, we admit that there is nothing yet to excite alarm, beyond a symptom or two which bear that appearance. A Reform Bill we have already advocated, and we fully admit that it will be an easy thing to im prove the measure of 1832. But the whole question should be taken in hand at once. We do not mean in a single Bill, but in a connected series of measures bearing upon each other. Mr. LOCKE KING'S motion for a ten-pound county franchise might be a Conservative proposal if properly carried out, and if the 100,000 electors for a county were rationally subdivided ; but the same measure, if passed in a crude state, and alone, would merely create a vast mob-consti tuency in every county. In the same way the Abolition of the I: B 7 c rerty Qualification is not a measure to be pa suddenly and alone, but a single feature in what may be a great scheme. All these proposals should now stand over, until the whole question of the representation can be properly dealt with, at the beginning of the next session. As for that ancient grievance and nuisance, the Oaths Bill, we scarcely know how to speak of it, inasmuch as we do not pretend to under stand its actual predicament. There is a talk of " the Lords giving way," and, unquestionably, two or three Noble Lords who have always hitherto opposed the admission of Jews to Par liament, did speak on Monday in a tone which savoured of concession. " Whereunto this may grow," we know not. As we have observed elsewhere, all talk of " compromise," or a" iniddle course," is mere delusion. Ibis a naked question of being admitted, or not being admitted. The only "middle course " that is conceivable is, that of being stuck fast in the doorway. But, joking apart, we must once more repeat our general caution, that a policy of concession may be more perilous than even a policy of obsti nate tenacity. The idea of gaining over oppo nents by such a policy is sheer delusion. The Whigs gladly helped Sir ROBERT PEEL to endow Maynooth and destroy the Corn Laws; and when DELILAH had sufficiently shorn the political SAMSON, the word was given, " The Philistines "are upon thee," and the once powerful Govern ment was instantly found to be as weak as water. The Whigs knew that in aiding the Conservative leader to break up his own party, they had been helping him to dig his own political grave. And while men and circumstances change, self-in terest and human passions endure and pass not away. If any stat esman cou ld now b e f oun d so blind as to tread over again the course of Sir ROBERT PEEL, he would find, at the end of that course, the same calamitous termination. CRAVINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. Foe a long time it has been a common remark, that the House of Commons was overburdened with work ; and that one thing so jostled another that it was only with the greatest difficulty that any business at all was finished. Yet it is this same assembly which seems now smitten with the disease imputed by the witty Canon of St. Paul's to "Lord JOHN." One day it requires to know why a particular clergyman was appointed to the Deanery of York. The next, on an inquiry into the manufacture of muskets, it is gravely proposed to send a committee down to the factories and workshops. that the members hay see how guns are made. But the great achievement of the House, within the last few N II I