The Press. — London, England, 1857-02-07 00:00:00

146 intercourse, and which may strengthen our friendly relations even with the King of Siam. Another paragraph of a very different character is that in which her Majesty refers to the difficulties which arose with regard to some of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. Her Majesty tells us that "those difficulties have been overcome in a satisfac tory manner, and the intentions of the treaty have been fully maintained." myi lords, as we are now at peace, and as 1 trust in Goohaizat peace .will long bek , maintained, 1 cannot but ragraleltliat the noble eaoir who opened the discussiosamilkihald haver/Waged in, some expression not. verremmiahmentart toAhe good faith of that potenterie Alb whom wee, have lately been at war, and wishowliovarve•Hbave timileemeludeti4 peace. 1 have always thought anti have always said that when we were engaged in hostilities we were bound to prosecute the war with the utmost energy and determination. 1 was not myself satin _ _ lied ;Will the rebuke of that war. I was not satisfied with that peace which apparently afforded so much satisfaction to. the noble earl opposite and to her Majesty's Government , but let. me impress upon the noble each who has, I hope, a long and useful career before him, that from the time when peace was concluded no word of bitterness should be heard to drop from any member of this house with regard to our late opponent. (Hear.) The difficulties whiehasose were certainly of a somewhat extraor dinary nature, and, though the noble earl tells us that they east suspicion on the good faith of Ilusftia, heir Majesty's Government must forgive me for say ing that they reflect no credit on their clearsighted nessand intelligence. (Hear.) The main difficulty which arose was, not upon the interpretation of some doubtful phrase, but upon the delineation of the boundary which was laid down in the map and described in the terms of the treaty ; and I am told—but it is so incredible that I shall scarcely believe it until the noble earl tells me that it is really the fact—that the map upon which the whole construction of the treaty turned, as it delineated and was the authentic re cord of that which was for the future to be the boundary of the two empires, was not para pheed—that is, the signatures of the plenipotenti aries were not affixed to it. Why, my lords, if you buy but a field, the map delineating its boundaries is always attached to the instrument of purchase and forms part of it, and yet in a question which was to settle the boundaries of empires, in which the line of demarcation was the very point of all others to which the attention of the plenipotentiaries ought to have been turned, it appears that, there is no evidence of the authenticity of the instrument upon which our plenipotentiaries had to rely in support of their interpretation of the treaty. That is a cir cumstance not very creditable to the clearsighted ness and, I may say, to the business-like habits of her Majesty'a Government. (Hear, hear.) It is a point which ought to have been carefully attended to, in order that no second conference might be necessary. But does it not strike your lordships that the language of her Majesty's Government. of the leading members of the Government, of the head of the Government in fact, when that second conference was proposed, was very inconsistent with the satisfaction now expressed at the results of that conference, (Hear, hear.) I recollect very well the tone and the language then employed. I do not mean by that portion of the press which appears to be at the disposal of her Majesty's Go vernment, but by the Ministers themselves—by the First Lord of the Treasury at Manchester. Then the Emperor of Russia was to be compelled to main tain good faith and to fulfil the treaty to the very letter, without allowing any question, any difference, or any discussion of its obligations, according to the sense in which England understood it. Thera were to be no more conferences, our fleet was to be sent into the Black Sea, and we were not to be satisfied without a strict and literal fulfilment of the terms of the treaty. That was the noble viscount's decla ration at Manchester. and it was cheered to the echo as bold, spirited, and manly. And yet., in spite of all these fine words, the noble viscount, by the advice of his allies, or it may be by something more than their advice, was compelled to refer these mat• tees to another conference, and only obtained his own construction of the treaty by the cession of territory beyond that proposed in the original con ference. This may be a satisfactory arrangement, and I trust it will be, and now that peace is restored I hope there will be on all sides an adherence to the letter and spirit of the treaty, and that we shall not hear from public men and from the public journals—who I must say do infinite mischief by their intemperance and indiscretion—a v more o f that violent abuse of those who were lately our ad versaries, which I am convinced is a serious obstacle to the preservation of good relations. (Hear.) I cannot but regret also that the noble earl should have chalacterised as a "paltry, miserable insurrec lion" the misguided efforts of those loyalists in the canton of Neufchatel who rose to restore what they THE PRESS. believed to be their lawful Government. Misguided they undoubtedly were—erroneous their views may have been—un ortunate they certainly have been. Their efforts were put down ; but I never yet heard any man throw a doubt ou the sense of allegiance and loyalty by which they were guided. Whatever their misfortunes and errors may have been, this is not the country in which to speak lightly of allegiance and loyalty. (Hem,: beam) I certainly did enter tains' hope that thiaimatterwas not only in course of being isetaled, buhnhat. itenctually bad been settlelii natisfactorily, atrial •regget.-to find from the Rood I (speech tine. that isinot ttincase. I may be permitted to say a feet worrier with nregard to the claim of the e Xing cK,PVlessie, beaannentewas at a period when I was connected with tb*,Gereagament that that pro col was signed in Londeseepon which it is said the King of Prussia now fort tidal claim. I must beg your lordships to look back for a single moment at what was then the condition of Europe. France was then in a most unquiet state. The famous words "L'Empire c'est la pais" had not then been uttered ; indeed, the empire did not then exist. The public mind in France was greatly agitated. Piedmont, Switzerland, and Belgium were looking with great alarm to the solution of the questions then pending. France was making demands upon them inconsistent with their national honour and in dependence, and the state of affairs was altogether exceedingly critical. 1 shall ever consider it a great satisfaction that the Government with which I was connected by their good offices and by the moderation of the parties concerned were instrumental in settling this question in a manner not compromising to the independence and honour of Switzerland, and at the same time satisfactory to the just demands of France. But precisely at that time we were called upon by the King of Prussia not to take any active steps on his behalf, nor to enforce the right which he claimed, but to recognise the existence de jure of certain rights, not very well defined, and perhaps not very easily reconcileable with the subsequent relations of Neufchatel. Your lordships will observe that these rights were confirmed to the King of Prussia—or rather to the Prince of Neufchatel (for Prussia as a kingdom has nothing to do with the question ; it only effects the interests of the Prince of Neufchatel, who happens to be King of Prussia also) by the treaties of 1815, which it was of the utmost impor tance at that time to the peace of Europe to preserve from initingement. They were the treaties, too, by which the independence and neutrality of Switzer land were guaranteed. The arrangement her Majesty's Government made with the King of Prussia was that the great powers of Europe on the one part should admit the existence of the rights which he claimed, while he entered into an engagement not to disturb the peace of Europe by any attempt to enforce those rights, Lut to place himself in the hands of the great powers, and to leave them to settle the question. I cannot conceive an arrangement, not only more harmless in itself as involving no ulterior consequences, but more likely to attain, first, the immediate preservation of the peace of Europe. and, next, the ultimate settlement of this question. Ido not blame the Governments which have succeeded for not having taken any steps to come to a solution of this matter. I think, indeed, when they were dealing with the affairs of other countries at a con ference, it would not have been unreasonable to take this into consideration among other causes which were likely to disturb the peace of Europe. (Hear, hear.) They did not do so. and some misguided men, misguided in their loyalty, rose for the purpose of enforcing the rights of the Prince of Neufchatel. They were immediately put down by the determined spirit of the Swiss people, and their acts were not unnaturally treated by the Swiss Confederation as acts of hostility to their Government. Under these circumstances the King of Prussia threatened to en force his nghts unless these persons were at once dismi,sed without punishment, and, indeed, without trial. To have done this without any further under standing would have been for the Swiss Confedera tion to make an admission which it was impossible for them to make—(Hear)—and consequently the only step was to have recourse to the mediation of the other powers of Europe. According to diplomatic etiquette I believe it would have been right that England, having been the power by whose mediation the protocol of IK:2 was signed, should have taken the initiative on this occasion, and that a conference should have been held at London. But the King of Prussia, it ap pears, bad placed himself unreservedly in the hands of the Emperor of the French, and a proposition was made by his Majesty to the Swiss Confederation. which was ultimately acceded to by them. For myself, I have gathered a very distinct impression that Switzerland was on the point of accepting the mediation, or rather the settlement, offered on the part of France, when the representations made to her by the British Government induced her to change her intention. And if I am correct in the assumption—and I must adhere to it until it is con- SATURDAY, tradicted—that the Swiss were encouraged in standing out and in refusing the arbitration of France by her Alejesty's Ministers, I must say that, although 1 may rejoice that endeavours are being made by our Go vernment, in concert with our august ally, to bring about a settlement of the matters in dispute, yet I cannot help feeling that if our Government had not interfered ;with the efforts of our august ally this vexed question would have been much earlier ad justed. ( Hear, hear.) The leis another poiatiwhich I trust is on the eve Of satisfacteer solution; SI mean our differences with the rthteddStates in award to Central America. Beyonel.theehonourablaieengagements that we have underteitensitowardaicertaisiledian tribes we have few inteerstepeculiarirourown to maintain in that quarter eCthe globe. It is, however, a matter of im portance to a great commerciallpeople like this, and also to the world at large, that the neutrality of the line of communication across the Isthmus o' Panama should be faithfully preserved. Our only interest in that respect is that the route may not be placed in the hands of a power capable of exercising a con trolling influence over our commerce, and I shall view any sacrifice of the islands and territory which we may make in that region—provided they are in trusted to a power adequate to prevent these front' becoming the resort of lawless and disreputable cha racters, but still not adequate to exercise a con trolling influence there to the prejudice of our inte rests—as fully compensated for by the attainment of the other objects involved in such a general arrange ment. But I wish to know in what position we shall stand in the possible, though perhaps tot very pro. bable, event of the Senate of the United States . refusing to ratify the treaty. In that case shall we not have surrendered Ruatan and the adjacent terri tory without securing a guarantee on the part of the United States for the neutrality of the passage screw the isthmus? I hope we shall be told that the two engagements stand and fall together—that we shall not be bound by the one treaty without having the equivalent advantage of the other—that the two will, in tact, form part of one general arrangement, to the whole of which the United States will be equally pledged with ourselves. (Hear, hear.) Let me turn now for a moment to the other topics of difficulty which crowd upon us in this Speech, and which I am afraid will continue to crowd upon us as long as the noble viscount (Pa►merston) remains st the head of our affairs ; because, admitting, as I do, the extraordinary• adroitness with which the noble viscount comes out of the dilemmas in which he places our foreign policy, I cannot help imagining that this very faculty of adroitness in getting out of difficulties tempts its possessor to launch us into the worst complications as frequently as possible, in order that he may have more opportunities for the exercise of his matchless skill in extricating the country from them again. (Laughter.) Whether the noble viscount is at the head of our foreign affairs or at the head of our Government, we are be coming perpetually embroiled, first with one power, and then with another—not, indeed, that his system lands us in great wars, but in what are termed diplomatic "difficulties," from wbich ww always emerge with more or less of discredit and disadvantage. It has been much the fashion to talk of the du plicity of Russia in the late transactions. Are we quite sure, my lords, that our own conduct on all occasions has been perfectly straightforward—(Hear hear)—can we say that we have held the same language to different nations, or that we have kept the spirit as well as the letter of the prumises we have made and the expectations we have excited? Are we quite certain that we have not obtained valuable support from a warlike and, if not a power ful, at ail events a brave and noble people, by en couraging them to expect our interference, if not by action, at least by moral persuasion, for the improve ment of their position in relation to the other States of Italy ? Have we not given them ground to look for our active aid in relieving them from a continual menace hanging over their heads, in securing their independence, and in enabling them to retrench those expenses which press so heavily on their finances? Are we quite sure that after we had reaped the ad vantage of their co operation we made a return to them at the final close of the Pans Conferences, in the shape of such au amount of assistance and material support as our words and acts had led them to calculate upon? My lords, I greatly doubt it. ( Hear, bear.) I have not forgotten the language of Vie Sardinian Commissioner when he referred, and referred in terms of some bitterness, to the hopes which his country had conceived, and which it had been induced to cherish, from the conduct of the British Government. I have not forgotten the evasive answer (I use the word in no offensive sense) which the noble earl opposite, after an interval of six short weeks, was compelled to give in reply to the remonstrance of the Sardinian Minister. It is true. my lords, that at the Paris Conferences we kept the word of promise to the ear, but broke it to the hope .