The Press. — London, England, 1857-05-16 00:00:00

MAY 16,1857. trittraturt. Yarrative of the Defence of Kars. By Colonel Atwell Lake, C.B. London: Bentley. THERE is this one remarkable peculiarity in the siege of Kars, that it is an event on which both victors and vanquished can look back with almost equal pleasure. If the win ners acquired an important military post, and bore off as high a reputation for generosity and courtesy as for dogged and un flinching valour, the losers, we must remem ber, won a great battle, displayed heroic endurance, and vindicated before the world the ancient reputation of the Mussulma n arms. They gained more in the moral results of that famous struggle than they lost by its adverse termination ; and whenever the degeneracy of the Turkish character is again the theme of European politicians, the soldiers of the Crescent will point to Oltenitza and Silistria, and say that not oven these are better refutations of the charge than the bloodstained fortress of Armenia. It was generally understood when Colonel Lake's previous volume was given to the public that he was engaged upon another work of a more purely scientific character. Whether the present publication merits that epithet or not, we must leave to military men to determine. Wo can only say that we have learned nothing new ourselves from its perusal. This may he our own fault, or it may result front Colonel Lake's deficiency in graphic power. At all events, when we arrived at the conclusion of his rather bulky volume, and strove to register our gains, we found it a very brief and unsatisfactory process. Colonel Lake is not a good describer of military affairs. His narrative is confused. He cannot raise us above the din and smoke of the battle, and map out the whole field clearly before us. In this respect his account of the battle of the 29th of September contrasts most unfavour ably with that of General Kmety, published, as our readers may remember, in a pamphlet some six or eight months ago. At the same time, taken as a whole, his work is perhaps the most complete that has yet appeared upon the subject, and, from the waning interest of the events described, is very likely to be the last. We shall, therefore, notice it at rather more length than its contents might other wise have justified. On the strategy which dictated the occupa tion and defence of Kars in the first instance Colonel Lake is silent. He notices thlse who have alleged that a retreat should have been attempted at an earlier stage of the contest, in some half dozen lines (page 314) ; and perhaps it may fairly be said that the risks of remaining, diminished by the possibility of relief, were not greater than the hazard of a retreat with a dispirited army, in the face of so powerful an opponent. But this leaves the original question untouched. How far was it judicious to place the Turkish army in such a dilemma? That is the point we desire to see investigated by some competent military writer. To us Kars has alwa3s seemed to have been very much like a trap, and that if the Russians could have been enticed into it, instead of the Turks, the horrors of starva tion would have fallen upon them instead of our allies. High military authorities have pronounced against the policy of its occupa tion, and Colonel Lake's evasion of the point looks much like a confession of inability to meet it. In his account of the battle of the 29th of September, Colonel Lake says not a syllable in reply to General Kmety's charges against the English commander in-chief. The gal lant Hungarian, it will be remembered, alleged that his own share in the battle had been most unjustifiably ignored by General Williams, not only in his despatches, but also in the public speeches which he delivered on his return to this country. General Kmety's position is that he won the battle of Kars— that the last instructions given him by General Williams were as early as the month of July—that after this he was left "to dispose "of the troops and field artillery on the pla " teau of Tachmas as he might deem advisa- THE PRESS. " ble "—and that during the action he re ceived no instruction or communication from head-quarters. Seeing that General Kmety commanded at those points where the brunt of the battle fell, if the above statement be true, General Williams's account of the matter is just as incorrect as if one should describe the battle of Inkermann without mentioning the Guards. As far as Colonel Lake is con cerned, the dispute between them rests precisely where it did. We find nothing in the colonel's narrative at all incon sistent with General Kmety's. The actions attributed to General Williams are of the most commonplace character, and he is certainly the least prominent figure on the scene. Still, the colonel does what ho can for him. His position was at the English Tabias, on the hills opposite to General Kmety. When one of the posts was hard pressed, General Williams with " great promptitude " and decision" ordered up the reserve. Such was his duty, no doubt, but it is nothing very wonderful; we might as well say of a pedes trian that, when overtaken by the rain, he with great promptitude and decision unfurled his umbrella. Relief was expected by the beleaguered for tress from two quarters—from Mini Pacha at Erzeroum, and from Omer Pacha in the Crimea. The departure of the latter was long delayed by the allied commanders, at whose special interference wo do not care to inquire. As soon, however, as he could arrive at Con stantinople, Lord Staatford do Redcliffe and the Turkish War Minister, Fuad Pacha, both became converts to his plan. This was op posed by Lord Clarendon, and also, says Colonel Lake, by General Vivian, who advised that the proposed succour should be sent by way of Erzeroum and Trebizonde. We have always held that Omer Pacha was in the right. The following extract from Fund Paella's despatch to Lord Clarendon places this matter, we think, in the clearest light : It would be superfluous to say how strongly the Sublime Porte sees the necessity of saving Kars, and, in Raving Kars, of freeing Anatolia. Now the only way of effecting this is, to carry out the proposed movement from Redout Kaleh. In fact, to save Kars, a force is required at least equal to the besieging army. Now if we must send such a force in the direction of Trebizonde, seeing that the roads are extremely bad, this force, with its artillery and munitions complete, would hardly reach Erzeroum in three or four months, and in that interval the Russians would have done all that they had to do. Therefore this plan can produce no good effect. If a small force were sent, it could neither relieve Kars nor defend Erzeroum. It is certain, then, that it is not possible to relieve Kars by way of Trebizonde. The road which leads straight from Redout Kaleh to Kutais is perfectly level and easy. The goodness of the road is favourable to the transport of artillery and muni tions, and the march of a large army by this road will be rapid and free from difficulty. Independently of this, as this army will be in the rear of the Russian army, and will march straight on Tiflis, which is the very soul of the Russians in the Caucasus, as soon as it has advanced a little, the Russians will evidently be obliged to abandon Kars, and fly to the defence of Tiflis and Suram, and withdraw from Kars. His Highness the Sirdar Ekrem and all the officers of the Porte, are unanimously of opinion that there is no other plan of saving Asia but this, and there is no doubt that the military officers of the high allied Powers will be of the same opinion on this subject. As to the insalubrity of the neighbourhood of Redout Kaleh. That place will not be the permanent abode of the army. As the march of the troops will be hurried, they will make a very short stay there ; and moreover an army which is animated by a desire of saving its country will show itself determined to overcome all obstacles, and to brave all dangers. Therefore the observation on the insalubrity of the place cannot offer any obstacle to the prosecution of the plan. The survey which has been made of the coasts with a view to bases of operation, is favourable in every respect to the plan in question; that is to say, there have been found, at some hours' distance from the coast, very convenient positions with respect to climate for pitching a camp. That is to say, the relieving force must be either a small one or a large one. If a small one, it would be useless to a garrison that was only blockaded, and worse than useless to a garrison that was already starving. If a large one, sufficient to drive away the Russians, or a convoy of provisions were sent, it was impossible for them to arrive in time by the Trebizonde route. The only chance was to make such a demonstration against the Russian rear as would alarm them for their communications. It was just possible that the rainy season might be a little later than usual, and, rather than do nothing, Omer Pacha resolved to attempt it. How gallantly he persevered to the last moment is known to all the world. Lord Clarendon's objections to the Mingrelian campaign were remarkable:— It would be in the greatest degree imprudent to throw on an unwholesome coast, without means of land trans port, without any certainty of provisions, without an assured communication with the rear, without an accurate knowledge of the country to be traversed, or the strength of the enemy to be encountered, and with the probability of a hostile population, 40,000 men, hurriedly collected from various quarters, imperfectly disciplined, doubtfully armed and equipped, and as yet unorganised. and to expose them at once to all the hazards and difficul ties of a campaign against a Russian army. They would fall ill between lledout Kaleh and Kutais, and be defeated between Kutais and Tiflis. Moreover, the frag ments to be united for the purpose of composing this army are so scattered about, that the crisis, if it is to take place, would be over long before it could reach the scene of action. The result was that the Turkish army in this campaign had so few sick as to surprise even those who are acquainted with the hardihood of Ottoman troops, and that in their first and only pitched battle with the Russiane they gained a memorable victory. Crcesus was told that if he crossed the Halys he would destroy a great po‘ser. We should recommend this Downing-street oracle to imitate the ambiguity of his Delphic prede cessor when next he is consulted upon mili tary undertakings. As it was, however, ac cording to a writer in the United Service Magazine, " while thousands of baggage " animals were eating their heads off, a fort " night was wasted on the Sieva for want of a " few of them, which fortnight would have " placed the Turks in Kutais." In regard to Salim Pacha, the whole ques tion depends upon the number of troops which he had with him in Erzeroum. If he had, as he alleged, only six thousand, it would have been madness both to have marched upon Kars, and to have left Erzeroum garrisoned, with only a fraction of that number. What is the evidence upon this subject? Colonel Lake says :-- At the very time when he stated that his available force only arn3unted to between five and six thousand men, it was well known to the British officers at Erzeroutn, from private information which they obtained, that the returns furnished to the Porte showed the number to be upwards of fourteen thousand, and there was good reason for believing that a still wider discrepancy existed with regard to the horses. Pay and rations were no doubt charged to the Turkish Government according to the higher number, while the lower was put forward as an excuse fur inactivity and want of energy. But the colonel forgets that he has all along been telling us that these returns are never to be trusted, and are always greatly exaggerated. Selim Pacha's own evidence, then, is worthless either way. On the other hand, we have our selves been informed by officers of rank in Asia that his available force never exceeded eight thousand men. We may say, in conclusion, that the present work only confirms our two previous impres sions—first, that Kars should never have been held at all; and, secondly, that the only way to have retrieved this blunder was to have allowed Omer Pacha to quit the Crimea some three months earlier than lie did. But we are grateful to Colonel Lake for giving us a succinct account of operations in which these very mistakes were but the means of shedding fresh lustre on the name of Englishmen, and adding another to the list of English achieve. ments which shall rank hereafter with the melancholy glories of Corunna. Ballads and Songs. By David Mallet. A New Edition. With Notes and Illustrations, and a Memoir of the Author, by Frederick Dinsdale, Esq., LL.D., F.S.A. London : Bell and Daldy. A FRENCHMAN once made a boot extremely small and excruciatingly tight. He was asked why he had produced such a diminutive piece of goods, and he answered that he had made it in a fit of enthusiasm. We think of the story in observing the waste of typographical deco ration applied to the honour of one of the smallest of our minor poets. The volume is a curiosity of misapplied elegance and expense. It is printed on the best paper ; it has some choice engravings, executed with the highest finish ; it has facsimiles of the autographs of obscure individuals ; the n2usical arrangement