The Press. — London, England, 1857-02-07 00:00:00

FEBRUARY 7, 1857 We introduced some vague unmeaning words about the foreign occupation of the Papal States being an "abnormal state of things" and a serious evil. We pledged ourselves to those illusory words, but did we take the slightest step, or press our ally France to take the slightest step, towards putting an end to this serious and abnormal state of affairs ? I am well aware that Austria objected to the introduction into the conferences of any matter alien to their im mediate object. And I ask, has Austria no reason for entertaining diminished confidence in us in con sequence of the equivocal course we have pursued? I have always thought that, while it was no part of our business either to interfere between Austria and her Italian subjects, or to seek to disturb her in her possessions, at the same time it was not for us to go out of our way to strengthen her position in the Italian peninsula. On the contrary, a rigid good faith requires us to abstain from all kinds of such intermeddling: but I ask the noble earl opposite whether Austria has not by the acts of her allies, in the course of these negotiations, obtained a greater security than ever for the maintenance of her Italian territories? I greatly doubt whether the noble earl can answer that question in the negative. But, my lords, what did we do? Abstaining from entering into such arrangements as might satisfy the just expectations of Piedmont, we yet embarked on a policy of interference with the internal government of the kingdom of the two Sicilies, based on the pre text of a regard for the peace of Europe. What had the state of the kingdom of the two Sicilies to do with the peace of Europe ? You say, indeed, that the condition of Naples threatened to disturb the general tranquillity which had just been restored. But will the noble earl rise up on the part of the Government and gravely tell this assembly that her Majesty's Ministers had the slightest apprehension that the course of conduct adopted by the King of Naples towards his own subjects would occasion the smallest chance of any disturbance of the peace of Europe? (Hear, hear.) It is all very well to talk of the danger of Austrian interference, and of the danger of French interference, but the noble earl knows that there was nothing to fear from any con flict of opinion between France and Austria on this point. 'Die plea of any such danger was a mere plea, without any substance in it. Your interference with Naples was partly dictated by a sense of the necessity for adhering to the declarations you had previously made, and by that mischievous spirit of meddling to which the noble viscount at the head of the Government is so strongly addicted. But what were your demands upon the King of Naples ? If you are on amicable and intimate terms with any sovereign you might no doubt take the liberty to represent to him in a friendly manner that he is not pursuing a system of internal administration in his own dominions which you think calculated to advance his own interests. But were our relations with Naples based upon so close and equal a footing as to justify such an interference? Observe, my lords, that I am not supporting the tyrannical measures of the King's Government ; I am not defending him ; lam not defending the state of things at Naples or in the Papal States, made infinitely worse in the latter case by the occupation of foreign troops ; neither do I look with satisfaction upon the position of constitu tional government in Spain. But what have we to do with Spain? what have we to do with Rome? or with Naples? 0-fear, Lear.) If En2lish subjects suffer from the acts of any of these States. you are indeed bound to interfere and defend them; but, as between a sovereign and his own subjects, I say that, accor ding to every principle of international law, remon strance is going to the utmost limit to which you have a right to go, and the breaking off of friendly relations because a monarch refuses to accept your advice as to the management of his kingdom cannot be defended by any persons in the slightest degree acquainted with the principles of international law. On what ground, then, did you withdraw your am bassadors ? lam not to be told that in attacking this policy I am attacking that of the Emperor of the French. I have the profoundest respect for the Emperor of the French ; I especially admire the scrupulous fidelity with which he has observed his engagements with this country, and for the desire he has unitormly shown to maintain inviolate the friendly relations between the two nations. (Hear, hear.) lam not going too far even when I say that at this moment be is, perhaps, the only firm friend you have in Europe, but I think the Emperor of the French, acting as he does in concert with the Government of this country, is very likely to fall into error, and that be has done so in this case. What have you done? You make a demand upon the King of Naples. He answers in a manlier which you may, if you choose, consider offensive ; but he only bids you to attend to your own business. (A laugh.) Whereupon you say, " If you don't mean to govern y..ur country as we wish it to be governed, and to follow our advice in a rr atter in which we have no earthly excuse for tendering advice, we will withdraw our Ministers." Now, on this subject, just recollect the language which for It - THE PRESS. Avaeks and months was held by that portion of the press which is supposed to receive some inspiration from the noble viscount at the head of her Majesty's Government ; and that it does so the noble earl opposite (Earl of Clarendon) will hardly venture expEcitly to deny. Was there any term of vitupera tion not used in connection with the King of Naples? We were told that the British fleet was to sail, that it required nothing but the sight of our fleet to make the people of Naples and of Sicily revolt, that the King would thereupon become a fugitive upon the face of the earth, and that then God knows what was to happen. And yet the Royal Speech now refers to the "friendly oommunications " held with the King, and expresses great surprise that his Majesty refused to take the advice tendered to li iin in consequence of which England and France with drew their ambassadors. And what was the reply of the King of Naples to that? He merely said to the ambassadors, " I wish you good morning, gen • tlemen !" (A laugh.) Thus, two of the greatest nations in Europe threaten to withdraw their mis sions as a menace, and in return the ambassadors are quietly told feat they may walk downstairs. The ambassadors submit to that indignity ; they go sway without the slightest excitement on the part of any human being ; no additional precautions are taken by the Neapolitan Government ; a 'miserable attempt at insurrection in Sicily is put down in an instant ; a wretched attempt at assassination ends in the execution of the criminal ; and that is the whole result of your interference, except that, at the hands of a power like Naples, the Governments of England and France have received a well-deserved affront. (Hear, hear.) I think, then, that the interference of her Majesty's Ministers at Naples was unworthy of the policy of this country, and I think that the result is an undignified conclusion to an unjust attack. (Cheers.) My lords, I regret that the topics upon which am obliged to touch are so numerous, but I am com pelled to follow, to a certain extent, each of the sub jects upon which her Majesty invites us to pronounce an opinion or to call for explanation. Passing to another point, I confess that I see with deep regret the two petty wars in which we now appear to be in volved. I regret the state of our relations with Persia; I look with even more regret, and with even greater doubt as to the justification of our cause, upon what has taken place in China. (Hear, bear.) Assuming, as undoubtedly I do assume, that the in dependence of Herat, or rather the non-occupation of Herat by Persia (if Persia is to be considered as a country in a state of dependence upon Russia), is not a subject of indifference to this country, I am cer tainly not prepared to defend the tortuous and devious policy pursued by that State with reference to Herat. In 1852 I, or rather my noble friend (the Earl of Malmesbury), bad occasion to expresg our. selves pretty strocgly to the Court of Teheran, and we received in return from the Shah the most solemn assurances—assurances which were not ad- hered to—that no attempt should be made upon Herat. Thereupon we felt it necessary, in conse quence of the falsehood—l will use no other word— of the representations made by Persia, to suspend all diplomatic relations with the representative of that country resident here. At the same time, however, we did not on that account relax our efforts to carry out our object; and being at that time on terms of perfect amity with Russia, and the Russian Minister co-operating cordially with ours in Persia, we did obtain in 1t45:2 the abandonment of Herat by the Persians; and in 1853 an agreement was entered into between the Shah and Colonel Sheil, of which we know nothing except from the public papers ; but which, judging from what has there appeared, does not seem to have been very skilfully drawn up or expressed. Of what has passed between this country and Persia since that time I know very little, at least from official sources, because the articles of agreement to which I have alluded have never been laid 'nefore Parliament. ( Hear, hear.) But, as I understand, in that agreement Persia undertook to make no attack upon Herat, while we undertook, should there be any such attack on the part of any other power, to use moral persuasion in order to prevent the conquest of this city. Now, if I am rightly informed, there never was any Persian attack on Herat until the beginning of the year 1855, at which time our new ally and old enemy, Dost Mahomed, advanced an Affghan army to Candahar. The ruler of Herat for the time was apprehensive that Dost Mabomed was meditating a march on Herat, and had he meditated such a march it would have justified the interference of Persia. In the belief of a coming Affghan attack the ruler of Herat himself called for the interference of Persia to defend him; but as the Persians came a little nearer than he thought quite desirable, he suddenly turned round and asked the Affghan to defend him against the Persians. In the conflict which ensued the Affighans were signally defeated by the Persians, who having in the first instance advanced, as I have said, at the request of the Governor of Herat, made themselves masters of the city. Now, if the Affghans really in- 147 tended to take possession of the city, occupation of Herat by the Persians, however displeasing it might be to the British Government, was not under such circumstances a violation of the agreement. But observe what has been the state of Persia. She, a weak, powerless, but at the same time an Oriental, and therefore an astute State, has found herself sub jected to the pressure of two mighty antagonists, England and Russia. It' I have been rightly in formed, she offered, when it fist broke out, to take part in the war in the East, and to join in an alliunce offensive and defensive with England and Ft ance, by which she might secure her independence against Russia. That proposal, I believe, was d, dined, and she was required to maintain a strict neutrality. She did, in consequence, abstain from making any attack upon Turkey ; she did, I believe, maintain that strict neutrality which consists in refraining from offending either great antagonist; but at the conclusion of the war, when the predomi nance of Russia, as indicated by the capture mid abandonment of Kars, appeared to have given her the supremacy in Asia, as it undoubtedly did, at that time Persia thought that she was subjected to more danger from the hostility of Russia than she could be from the hostility 01 England, and she conse quently took no great pains to disguise her unfriendly feelings towards this country. 1 will not go into that miserable business which appears to have been the immediate cause of Mr. Murray's retirement, from Teheran, because that was only one of the petty affronts which Persia thought she might safely offer to the representative of this country. But 1 think it exceedingly natural that Russia, being at that time at war with us. should stimulate Persia to take the step she did, and should endeavour to inflame her against England. lam also persuaded, my lords, that it is at the present moment the sincere desire of Russia not to be invoived in another ear with this country—, Hear, hear)—hut to maintain friendly relations with her; and that with that view she is at the present moment exercising her whole influence to induce Persia to comply with your desires and to act in the manner which you require. Let me take the liberty of saying that I think it would be for the benefit of• England and Russia, not only now but for all time, that the two countries, Atlghanistan and Persia, should form an interval between their respective territories ; and that it is an object to be aimed at by every statesman who talks of resisting the encroachments of Russia to main tain between India and Russia the largest possible space of independent territory, and thus to prevent any contact between the two countries, and at the same time to prevent the chance of a collision. I believe that Russia herself is deeply impressed with that truth, and that although she stimulated Persia when she herself was your enemy to resist your wishes, yet at the present moment, when that is no longer the case, she is making efforts in a very dif ferent direction. For my own part, with regard to a settlement with Persia, I believe more in the efficacy of the representations of Russia than I do in the -r expedition to the Persian Gulf. I say nothing against the valour, the zeal, and the promptitude displayed by that small expeditionary force. Oaths contrary, the signal manner in which it has suc ceeded reflects the highest credit upon the Indian Government, and it.must be satisfactory to my noble and gallant trend near me (the Earl of Hardwicke) to reflect that Admiral Sir H. Leeke was one of that unfortunate class who, upon account of it being sup; posed that their age was not adapted for active service, were compelled to retire. Sir H. Leeke, then, entered the Indian service, and it must be satisfactory to my noble friend to see—to have seen it shown—that the step to which I have referred deprived England of some of her best admirals, and that among those officers who were compelled to retire were many who were capable of good and meritorious service. (Hear, hear.) I heard with dismay, and I heard with satisfaction, first, of the advance of troops on Cabul, and then of their retro grade movement. [The Earl of Clarendon was understool to deny that such a movement had taken place.] Well, then, perhaps when the papers which have been promised to us are laid upon the table they will throw some light upon the subject, and I will now only say that I should view with great anxiety any advance ou that side. There is another point of importance in a consti tutional point of view, and that is the authority by which the war with Persia was begun. I have seen the proclamation of the Governor-General of India, by which he declares war against Persia, but I have yet to learn that. the Governor General of India has any constitutional power of proclaiming war on the part of this country. I have hitherto always under stood that the proclamation of war was part of the prerogative of the Crown, and that war must be de clared by the Crown with certain formalities. If in this instance it had been intended to declare war it would have been the duty of the Government to call Parliament together, and to make them acquainted with the reason for such a proceeding. I quite an-