The Press. — London, England, 1857-11-14 00:00:00

. - • , 4 *-r f' rr Pt T` fI. 4,1 i I r / / eei ,".. lIP ~ _ t • . . I a .••••'''''-----' -I• I. ''' i!',• .• ' i ; •. , , ' ' I 1i • .:, 1 / 44 • N0.237.—V0L. V. dress. LONDON, SATURDAY,!NOVEMBER 14, 1857. THE news from India is of a very mixed description, in which it is difficult to say whether the good or the evil element most predominates. On the one hand,ithere is the cap ture of Delhi, which is an advantage that as far as our prestige is concerned it would be difficult to overvalue; on the other, there is the 1°43 of nearly thirteen hundred officers and men in the shape of kitled and wounded, which will be almost enough to deprive us for the present of the power of following up the advantage in any substantial shape. We mean as far as impression on the rebels is concerned ; for the two thousand men de tached under General GREATHED will probably confine themselves to the relief of Agra, to wards which their route was bent. Nor is the slaughter of the to wnspeople at Delhi, which is reported, likely to aid our cause ; on the contrary, it will stimulate other towns and other provinces to resistance, and induce them to share the fate in life, as it would seem that we have doomed them to share it in death, of the mutineers. At Lucknow, again, the rescue of the garrison, as at first represented, was a subject of general joy ; but the later news from Calcutta shows that the relief is, after all, to a certain extent illusory, as the force under HAVELOCK is unable to draw off the garrison or reduce the city without the aid of two additional brigades, and a pro portionate supply of guns. How these are to be moved up within any reasonable period we do not see. No doubt there are men enough and guns enough at Calcutta for the occasion ; but how to get them to Lucknow is the point in question. Nor is it a difficulty so easy to be surmounted as some may think. It is the difficulty in Indian warfare which we have all along pointed out. And those who may have distrusted our accuracy will do well to remem ber that, though throughout the four months during which our fate in India has hinged almost exclusively on the success of our operations at Delhi and Lucknow, we have never had less than 42,000 European troops in India, and for a great part of the time many more, and though every nerve has been strained by the Government to the uttermost, and everything done that they could do to move European troops up, yet that -i,;00 Euro peans are the most we have ever had at Delhi, and 1,700 with HAVELOCK, or 0,400 in all. How, then, the required two brigades and artillery are to be got to Lucknow at once we are unable to comprehend, unless thB com- LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 34,1857. missariat and transport arrangements at Cal cutta are very greatly improved within the last month. Nor is it very easy to see how, if the road between Cawnpore and Lucknow has been closed by the rebels, the additional force there is to be fed. The difficulty at Lucknow, as at Cawnpore, throughout, has been to supply the garrison with food ; and this, if the whole country be so completely in the hands of the rebels us it would seem to be, will be a very much greater task, owing to the addi • tional number of the garrison, than it was before. However, we can only hope for the best, and trust to PROVIDENCE for theirultimate relief. But we cannot help thinking how dif ferent might have been the state of things if an Ellenborough had been on the spot—one who not only knows how to raise the spirit of the soldiers to enthusiasm, but who is so fami• liar with all the details of Indian warfare as to be able to foresee at once, and to provide for, every possible event. We may. to be sure, come out of the contest gloriously as it is ; but it will be the merest chance if we do. And all who know anything of war know how senora Fortune smiles on those who make success dependent on her smiles alone. While such is the news from the two most important points in India, that which comes from the other provinces is far from good. The Bombay Presidency would appear to be in a state of great agitation, and if Delhi had not fallen there seems to have been every proba bility of fresh mutinies there. As it is, a native officer and a sepoy have been blown away from guns. Then, again, we are told that there has been a rising among the predatory tribes of the Punjaub, and that the frontier of Scinde is in a very disturbed state. That Dhar and Mundesore, and Amjheera are dis affected, and that Bhopawur has been burnt. That the Dinapore mutineers are marching in the direction of Banda, and that NANA SAIIIB is in the neighbourhood of Gwalior trying to effect a junction with the mutineers. That there has been a rise among the Bheels of Candeish ; that there has been an outbreak at Nassick, in which Captain HENRY, Superin tendent of Police, was killed; and that the garrison of Saugor is in a most critical posi tion, in which many European women and children are shut up. In short, that a state of things exists everywhere in India as different as possible from that which Lord PALMERSTON at the dinner at the Mansion-house pro claimed. • i How long, we ask again and ag,ain, is this state of things to be allowed to go on ? How long is the guidance of the nation's efforts during the crisis to be left to the hands of those whose ignorance and mismanagement occasioned it in the outset, and whose incom petence to deal with it is best shown by the proportions which it has now assumed ? There is the best part of India to reconquer, and we have not yet got through the two introductory operations of Delhi and Luck now. One alone of these cities has fallen ; and our check before the second will most probably lose for us almost as much in prestige as we have gained by the capture of the first. Mean time our generals and soldiers are fast sue cumbing before the almost superhuman labours that they have to undergo. Some of the best of the for►ner—Bertr&RD, and I.Aw- REN.E, and NICHOLSON, and NElLL—have gone to that bourne whence they will return no more. Others have fallen into a state from wounds and sickness that will render their b STAMPED ....SIXPENCE. UNSTAMPED..FIVEPENCE. serviceaunayailable for a long time to come. What the lciavoc made among the private sol diers haibeen, we learn from the numberless letters that have appeared 'in our columns or in those of •our contemporaries, and which have been forwarded from our several camps. In one of these it was stated that a few weeks of service only, under HAVELOCK, sufficed to reduce a body of 300 Highlanders to 100 effec tive men. and a complete regiment the Madras Fusileirs—to a couple of companies of the usual strength. Nor were the hard ships that had tthus reduced them caused by the necessity of the ease alone. Defective hospital and commissariat and transport arrangements had had their share in pro ducing this effect. But if this be so when the wants of so small a body only have to be pro vided for, what may we not expect when the full force of Europeans that we have sent to India has to take the field? The truth is, disguise it as they may, the Ministry are simply going on the system of from hand to mouth. At first they told us that the matter was insignificant, notwith standing the statements which the Earl of ELLENBOROUGH and Mr. DISRAELI. made. Then, when that absurdity was seen through, and troops were sent out, we were told, with equal gravity. that the affair would be over in a month. Still, as the rebellion gained ground, their affected confidence grew with it, and every trifling success was magnified into a final blow to it, or, as they were pleased to call it, a breaking of the rebellion's neck. If words could do this it no doubt would have been done long since ; but there is some differ ence between talking and writing claptrap and putting down such a rebellion as now rages in Hindostan. Did no worse result arise from this than a mere deception of the public at home, it might matter little what they thought or said. But a rebellion the longer it remains unquelled extends the more its ravages, till what was at one time controllable by those who understand such matters ceases to be controllable by any man on earth. That the rebellion in India is beginning now to assume such proportions as these no one who really comprehends the question can for a moment doubt. Notwithstanding the capture of Delhi, our position is now very much worse than it was in July last. We have shown what we can do, but we have proved how comparatively circumscribed are our means of action, let us exert ourselves as we will. We have shown that we can take any fortified position the rebeLs may occupy ; but we have also exhibited to them at what a cost of time, and men. and money alone this can be done. We have taught them precisely the measure of our strength ; and be that what it may, it has not operated to deter others from follow ing the example that the original rebels set. In July, again, we had as much money and credit as we required for the we are forced expenditure netary crisis specie from ' crushed e' but, if so, ii present Gov , mistakes. S T out of mil equally trig was a ma highly taxed be finally - we required for the campaign; now forced to limit ourselves to such re as the wants of the present mo- Lsis may enable us to ; • • a . tch in in home. That e • i h'. ;,A lik be !ventually, we o f t. ,. ~:, " 7 , a it will not be b t ; 4 lir l i overnment, but ‘, -: '' -; +e* [England, that uliu, o ge r * ,- 1 • ! .. - -- 0 "„, 41 . „„ , . , ~.. any perils, will, pis - , . 1 _ ~ ... -iumphanr out ; 131 , tion's prowess • .-:; 111 ..* .4 41,.., ed than ours wir iti l:;'; •4. ..1•1 accomplished; . lit rt,lf ir,, • rOtlt