The Press. — London, England, 1854-12-16 00:00:00

1202 Now, my lords, having touched upon those ques tions mentioned in the Royal Speech which have no reference to the war, I proceed to that much more important and all-engrossing topic to which the greater portion of the Speech from the Throne is de voted ; and, in the first place, I must be permitted to express my cordial concurrence in the language which is now in the Speech with regard to the hearty and efficient co-operation of the brave troops of our ally the Emperor of the French, and in the hope which her Majesty entertains, as well as in the con viction which she expresses, that common dangers, common perils, common glories, and common inte rests may cement more strongly the alliance which happily subsists between the two countries. (Loud cheers.) My satisfaction at this recognition on the part of 'her Majesty is increased by the knowledge that that recognition is approved by Ministers, who not very long ago entertained very different views. (" Hear, hear," and a lough.) I rejoice to think that that passage in her Majesty's Speech has been con curred in by the right hon. baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty and by the President of the Board of Control. (" Hear, hear," and laughter.) I rejoice also that the noble earl at the head of the Govern ment can feel and can acknowledge that there is a great and important advantage to be derived from an intimate alliance between this country and France, although the destiny of France may not be swayed by the house of Orleans. ( Hear, hear.) The Royal Speech refers to the gallant and cordial co-operation and the entire harmony which have prevailed between the troops of our ally and those of our own army, as well as to their heroic achievements. Private and public accounts concur in showing us that two nations, which for many years had been ac customed to regard one another with feelings of enmity, have not only laid aside altogether those feelings of enmity, but, side by side, are rivals in glory and brothers in arms on fields similar to those where they formerly encountered one another es foes. breast to breast and hand to hand. As upon those occasions former experience led each to respect the valour of the other, so present experience leads them to regard each other as brothers in arms, engaged in a rivalry without jealousy in the accomplishment of a common object, each doing honour to the courage and bravery of the other, and animated by a common feeling of glory. Words must fail to express the debt of gratitude which this country owes to those gallant and devoted men—( Loud cheers)—but doubt less comfort and satisfaction will be carried to many a gallant heart when the assembled Parliament of England record their admiration of the deeds and their gratitude for the services of our gallant troops. My lords, when I remember that, of that numeri cally small army which was sent out from this coun try a few months ago, probably not one in 100 of the privates, and probably not one in ten of the officers, had ever before heard a shot fired in anger; when I remember that they went forth, at the first outset of their campaign, to pine away in inaction, and that their ranks were thinned by disease—morally depress ing, if anything could depress their indomitable cou rage ; when I remember that an army composed of such materials, so weakened, so dispirited, was led to invade the dominions of a powerful enemy—having carried with them nothing but what was absolutely necessary for their march, and hardly sufficient for their equipment and provision ; when I remember that such a body of men, under such circumstances, found themselves in front of a force numerically su perior, intrenched upon heights, fortified with all the skill and all the power which the might of Russia could supply, and fortified upon ground the natural difficulties of which were such as to impede even an active man in the ascent, although not checked by the enemy ; when I remember that these heights were bristling with batteries, from which shot and shell were poured, which mowed down the ranks of our men as they ascended that glorious but blood stained hill; when I remember that, in the face of numbers not inferior to their own, against all the difficulties of position, against all the opposition of the most powerful artillery, they advanced, weakened in numbers, falling by scores, but the survivors closing their ranks and pressing forward with indomitable courage ; when, under these circumstances, hand to hand, that body of men who had never before heard a shot fired repulsed a veteran army from a position so fortified, from which it had been the boast of Russia that no army could dislodge them in less than three weeks, while this great success was achieved by our raw army in the course of three hours; when we remember that, within a fortnight afterwards, the position of our men being changed, they being the besieged instead of the besiegers, they were assailed by an army seven times their number; when we re collect that our troops were called to the conflict from successive and continuous labour at the in trenchments, suffering from cold, from privation, from hunger, in some cases from all but nakedness; when we remember that they were placed under the disadvantage of a surprise in the darkness of a foggy morning; when I find that these men, who won the heights of Alma in the course of three hours from a THE PRESS. numerically superior army, resisted the assault of an army seven times stronger than themselves, and for eight hours maintained the unequal contest, some times even without ammunition, our troops on those bloodstained heights being reinforced and support ed by a portion of their gallant allies ; whenl remember these deeds of arms—ay, and even the unfortunate but astounding charge made by our gallant cavalry —I say that no words can do justice to the merits of such brave and heroic soldiers. (Cheers.) I say that when we read the history of that campaign—when we read it, not as politicians, but as men and as English men—(cheers)—there cannot be a heart that does not throb with honest and generous pride that these much-enduring, all-daring, all-achieving men were our countrymen—(renewed cheers)—that they were British subjects like ourselves—(loud cheers)—and there is hardly an eye from which a tear will not spring unbidden when we reflect that so many of them are numbered with the dead. (Hear.) But I will only dwell upon that portion of the subject which relates to the glory which that gallant army achieved ; I will not dwell upon the sacrifices they have made, or the sufferings they have endured. Their country will remember them. Their country will know how to value those who still remain; and, whatever may be the honours and rewards by which this country can show its gratitude to those who, in such unequalled circumstances and under such serious difficulties, maintained, upheld, increased the glories of the British flag, those honours and those rewards will certainly be granted with no niggard hand —(loud cheers)—but with universal approba tion, and with the cordial consent of a grateful country. ("Hear," and loud cheers.) While I am speaking of honours to be conferred upon our own gallant officers and men, I know not whether I am going beyond the limits of parliamen tary license, and trenching upon that which is the prerogative of the Crown, if, when, at the head of the army of our allies, there is a general who has acted with ours in the most cordial and uninter rupted harmony, by whose advice we have benefitted, by whose assistance we have largely profittecl—l know not whether I am making a suggestion which I ought not to make, when I say I am satisfied that nothing could be more grateful to the feelings of the British army and of the country at large—nothing, I think, would be more due to the gallantry and cordiality with which the whole of the French forces have supported ours throughout this great contest than— if it were possible—to confer upon General Canro bert some mark of military honour. ("Hear, hear," and cheers.) I have now attempted to do justice to my own feelings with regard to the merits of this gallant army, and with regard to the sacrifioes and priva tions which it has had to contend with. I wish, my lords, that I could here close the observations I have to make, and I hope it may not be considered incon sistent with the determination with which I started of endeavouring not to disturb the unanimity of your lordships, when I say that it will be necessary for me to comment to a certain extent upon what appears to have been some of the shortcomings of the Government in the mode in which they have conducted the war. My object, however, is not so much to revert to the past, as to insure attention for the future. lam deeply sensible, my lords, of the responsibility attaching to every man who upon this subject utters an opinion, and I am most especially anxious that not a word should fall from me which might savour of exaggeration with respect to our apparent losses and the difficulties which our army has had to overcome. lam also anxious that not a word should fall from me which could give the slightest encouragement to that powerful adversary against whom we are at war, and against whom we ere determined to contend to the utmost of our power, even to our last man. (Hear, hear.) Nor do I intend to cavil at those minor details in which a better and more effective arrangement might have been made, though I must be permitted to say that when her Majesty's Government, in order to insure the more effectual carrying on of the war, received the assistance of an additional Secretary of State, relieved from the charge of any other department, and charged alone with the superintendence of the war, we might have expected that greater attention would have been paid to these minor details, that there would have been less omissions, and that better provisions would have been made for carrying on the war than in any former war in which this country has ever been engaged. ("Hear," and cheers.) But, my lords, lam well aware that there must be omissions in carrying on any service of so extensive a character, and I am not disposed to cavil at minor details, or to enter into discussion upon this or that matter in which I think abetter arrangement might have been made. My complaint against the Government is this— that they have from the commencement, and before the commencement of war, lived, as it were, from hand tomouth—(Hear, hear)—that they never anti• cipated in due time the contingencies of the struggle in which they were about to engage, that they never SATURDAY, considered the greatness of the undertaking upon which they were entering, and that they never made adequate and timely provision to meet, not the con tingent exigencies of the day, but those exigencies which the fortune of war rendered inevitable. (Hear, hear.) One of the first maxims of war is to leave is; little as possible to chance—to be prepared against every possible contingency, and to make those pre parations—extravagant if you will, but certainly on such a scale as to prevent anything going wrong---tinm having the effect of deranging the whole plan. I cannot but entertain a doubt, however, knowing the unwillingness and reluctance with which her Ma. jesty's Government permitted themselves to be dragged into the war—l cannot but entertain a doubt whether they had among thein any statesman capa ble and disposed to take a sufficiently comprehensive view of the great and important interests involved in this war, and of its mighty consequences and require ments, or that, if there was such a man, he was not able to impress the reflections of his own mind upon those of his colleagues. From the very first to the very last, there has been apparent in the course pursued by her Majesty's Government a want of pre vious preparation—a total want of prescience; and they have appeared to live from day to day providing for each successive exigency after it arose, and not before it arose. (Hear, hear.) " Too late" have ,been the fatal words applicable to the whole conduct of her Majesty's Government in the course of the war. (Hear, hear.) We were " too late" in our declaration of war. (Hear, hear.) We were " too late" in deciding that the passage of the Pruth was a calms belli in the first instance. We were " too late " in sending our troops to the Black Sea, and we were too complaisant to the Emperor of Russia, who thanked us for refusing to act in concert with our French allies and send a fleet into the Black Sea at a time when the French thought it desirable. Our co-operation then would have been of immense im portance, and our non-compliance extorted thanks from the Emperor of Russia as neutralising to a great extent the action of our allies. We were " too late," my lords, in declaring the war, we were " too late" in entering the Black Sea, and we allowed the massacre of Sinope to take place. (Hear, hear.) At that time the Turks were under the pledge of pro tection from this country, but in the teeth of a power ful armament Sinope was taken and destroyed ; the Turkish fleet was destroyed in its own waters, and we were standing idly by, not at Sinope, but in the Black Sea; and, for the purpose of co-operation, were either powerless or unwilling to interfere in time. (Hear.) And, my lords, when we did go to war, what was the course pursued by her Majesty's Government? It was thought flt—l know not for what reason—but it was thought fit, in the year 1854, to bring forward a financial budget at an unusual period, the 6th of March. On the 6th of March the financial budget was brought forward, and, though war was not de clared until the 27th or 28th of March, it was pro posed to take an increase of something like 10,000 men in the army, and I think a small increase was to be taken in the navy. And what was the calculation the Chancellor of the Exchequer made for the pro bable additional expense to be incurred in conse quence of the war ? The calculation was 1,250,0004 being an expense of 501. for th transport of 25,000 troops. And where' To meet the Russians? To defend Constantinople? No ; but to Malta and back again. ("Hear," and a laugh.) This was the de claration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer — namely, that the intention of the British Government was to ask Parliament for the means only of sending 25,000 men to Malta and back again, and for such an object the income tax was to be doubled for half a year. These were the provisions made upon the Bth of March, in reference to which, when proposed in the House of Commons, it was said—" When Russia sees these preparations she will, indeed, be aware of the energy and determination, the vigour and decision with which this country is about to carry on the war." (" Hear, hear," and a laugh.) Why, my lords, when the Emperor of Russia read that declaration, he could but come i o one conclusion, either that the British Government were gulling Paha ment and imposing upon British credulity, or that they were not really in earnest. ("Hear," and cheers.) These 25,000 men might go to Malta and back again ; but as to interfering with any of the military operations of Russia that was impossible. Now, my lords, what was the force that was sent out' One remembers—and remembers with mingled feelings of satisfaction and regret—the mustering of those gallant men—the elite of the British army, from. 25,000 to 30,000 strong, who were sent from this country, and with regard to whom the Govern ment took the greatest possible credit for the un paralleled exertions they had made in sending out in the course of se short a time—namely, in the months of March, April, and May, and to the beginning of June—so numerous a force. Ido not deny the exer tions of the Government, and I do not deny that during those three months the utmost activity pre vailed in every department ; but is the sending o!it of an army of 30,000 men from a country like this