The Press. — London, England, 1854-11-18 00:00:00

NOVEMBER 18, 1854. These are the objects we are professedly lighting to obtain. We are exerting our ener gies to the utmost to humiliate Russia that we may exalt Austria. And what has this latter Power done, or what is she doing, to warrant all this sacrifice of men and of treasure ? Her acts have been constantly in opposition to her words. She has given the allied powers her " good wishes," but refused them her co operation. That long diplomatic game, which we were over and over again assured by Lord ABERDEEN and his } oreign Secretary would result in an armed alliance with Aus- ma, has resulted in her occupation of the principalities " exclusively in tho Russian " interest," as she was careful to explain at St. Petersburg. What sort of " occupation" it is, and what miseries our Government has thus been a consenting party to inflict on the prin cipalities, every letter from Bucharest informs us only too painfully. Meanwhile the pro gress of OMER PACHA is obstructed, Bessarabia is covered, and the Czar can concentrate his troops upon the Crimea. The motives that actuate Austrian policy lie on the surface. If she allies herself with the Western Powers, her frontier becomes incon veniently exposed to Russian invasion; she must increase her army and her debt—the latter not an easy task. If she joins the Czar, unpleasant apprehensions arise about Hun gary and Lombardy (the Emperor of the FRENCH has hinted as much), and then the money question recurs again ; while by re maining quiet she incurs no expense, gains possession of the principalities, and secures by inactivity everything that she could gain by war. Her views may extend further. A few years of warfare on the colossal scale of de structiveness which has marked its commence ment, would cripple, if not exhaust, the energies of the three great Powers of Europe engaged in it, and Austria, all untouched, is " mistress of the situation." And this is the power which Lord ABER DEEN denominates " the natural ally of this " country ;" " thinks we have no points of " collision, nor subjects of difference;" " that " we can act cordially together in all the great " affairs of Europe; " " that the interests of "Austria and England are identical," &c. With such credulity, what wonder that Austria has been faithless and selfish from the beginning, is faithless and selfish now? She has new reason to congratulate herself on the result of her policy with every month the war con tinues, and she will persist in that policy as long as the Cabinet of England is the pro perty of Lord ABERDEEN. But the last week's news from the Crimea allows no more time to be wasted in fully of this dangerous kind. This indecision and weakness is no longer to be tolerated, because it is no longer safe. The struggle is fast be coming one for national safety and the com mon interests of mankind. If we continua to waste our armies and our fleets as they have been wasted, may we not see—and at no great distance either—a German-Russian league ; Austria, Russia, Prussia, and the German States united ; a new distribution of Europe, in the interest of this new northern confedera tion ; and an overwhelming force let loose upon the states of the East and the West of Europe. Unfortunately, the cause of all this imbe cility lies in the very constitution of the Cabinet. Its accession to power first set Russia in motion against Turkey. "It could " be settled in ten minutes," said the Czar to Sir H. SEYMOUR, " if I had one of your Minis " ters here—A berdeen, or instance." Its whole conduct of the war has inspired throughout Germany a profound conviction that we were not in earnest—that a Cabinet composed of men who had been in constant opposition to each other could never act cordially in union. Its divided councils and its hesitating resole tions have exposed it to the contempt of the world. The Opposition, at all events, has been no party to this miserable drivelling. Throughout the last session its business was, if pos sible, to urge the Ministers to something like a fit sense of their position. The next cannot, happily, be long delayed ; and we look anxiously to its leaders fur such a declaration THE PRESS. of its principles and policy as shall drive from office an Administration which has so grievously abused its opportunities, and place there the great English party which alone reflects the heroic determination of the coun try, and is alone equal to the carrying out of bold, able, and successful measures. SEBASTOPOL AND ITS DEFENCES. WHENEVER the history of the Crimean expedition is written, the remarkable delusion under which the press and the people of this country laboured with regard to the strength of the land defences of Sebas topol and the character of the defenders will not escape the eye of the historian. An arsenal and a fortress, the destruction of which was known to be the ulterior object of the expedition, and the plan of attack upon which was explained to the world by the leading journal of the day five weeks before the ex pedition set sail, was presumed to be comparatively defenceless upon the land side ; and, although a period of upwards of three months had been given to the enemy to prepare for the attack, it was confidently asserted and believed that there had not been suffi cient time to erect solid earth or stone works, or scientific fortifications of any sort upon the one weak point of the object of attack. In one journal the capture of the town by a coup-de-main was asserted as not only possible, but " easy of execution ; " in another, though if. was admitted as probable that some fortifications might have been thrown up for the defence of the only assailable point, still they were described as " a few hastily-constructed redoubts, " mounted by guns of small calibre, which would he " swept away by the first fire of our heavy artillery ;" in another the real difficulties were described as being not so much the capture of Sebastopol, which was "certain and inevitable," but the placing the army in the Crimea. Once there, " everything was certain ;" and, as soon as the proper position was gained on the heights commanding the town, a speedy breach, a rapid assault, and an easy conquest might be anticipated without any presumption. Even the seafront forts themselves, with their walls of eighteen feet thick, were described as " not having that strength "or solidity which they were supposed to possess ;" and the far-famed granite forts of Sebastopol would, it was said, literally " prove food for the powder of our fleets," and crumble into dust beneath their con centrated broadsides. As to the troops entrusted with the defence, they were described as inferior in quality and spirit. They were not the Russians of Preuss Eylau, Pultusk, or Borodino ; and, although something was allowed for their natural stubbornness of character, which does not know when it is beaten, yet they were described more as canaille than soldiers, poor wretched re cruits, raw and undisciplined, who would never stand fire or a charge for a moment. The generals fared but little better; they were ignorant and unskilful, and represented as unequal to the handling of such troops as they had. Such were the reasonings daily placed before the public, who were odly too eager to seize upon the lightest rumour which, in under valuing the resources of a powerful enemy, helped to strengthen hopes of an easy and rapid success. To the calm observer of events this overweening confi dence was felt to be delusive. It was not possible that an army, counting some able men among the generals, entrusted with the defence of the great stronghold of the country, the head-quarters of the army and fleet of southern Russia, and an arsenal containing such vast resources of defence as Sebas topol, should commit the incomprehensible error of neglecting to strengthen the only weak point of de fence. in the face of the fact that an expedition of 60,000 men had been for three months preparing for the attack and capture of that very town ! Such neglect was preposterous ; and, whatever might have been the previous failings of the Russian generals in points of strategy, yet we had no right hence to infer such utter absence of foresight or precaution as would have been a disgrace to the merest drummer-boy of any army. It is time to inquire how far these sanguine expec tations have been fulfilled or disappointed. We arrived in position on the heights of Balaklava on the 26th of September, and up to the oth of Novem ber we know very well that Sebastopol had not been captured. Instead of the few hastily-con structed redoubts which were to be swept away by the first fires of our artillery, we find an irregular but strongly-fortified wall, mounting in all some 130 guns of as heavy, and, in some instances, heavier, calibre than the opposing guns of the allies. Mud forts and redoubts, both inside and out-side the town, common , ' every prominent point ; and an arsenal, containing immense resources, together with a powerful defensive army , w hich, b y unremitting 1083 exertions, constantly repair "the effects of our tire," replace guns which have been dismounted, and resume tiring from works which were con sidered to have been effectually silenced,—constitute the main defences of a town which was to be carried by a coup-de.usain in a few hours. Outside the walls we find concentrated upon our right flank a powerful army, which, though unable to raise the siege, has yet the power and the determination to seriously harrass our operations. The details which we have received of the latest operations, though exhibiting the allies as still pro secuting the siege with vigour and energy, yet de clare to us that the work is exhausting the strength of our army, that the speedy capture and destruction of the town is rendered improbable by the obstinate and determined defence, and the immense resources of the enemy, and that it yet remains an open ques tion whether the siege can be continued with safety while a powerful army is hovering on our rear and flank; or whether a pitched battle is to decide the fate of this attacking army, and ensure either the cap ture or relief of Sebastopol. THE NEWSPAPER STAMP. UNDISMAYED by the war, by the certainty of largely increased expenditure, and rumours of increased taxation, the " Association for the Repeal of all Taxes on Knowledge " have opened their campaign for 1854-5 with spirit. They hint that they may want 1,0001. for their expenses next year, and, if they should, hava no doubt that the public will cheerfully grant the required supplies. The interest excited by the war has led, it appears, to the establishment of unstamped papers which confine their intelligence to matters relating to the war. By a process cf reasoning we do not understand, it is held that these journals are to be considered as class-papers, not newspapers, and may be legally issued without a stamp ; and as the Government has commenced prosecutions against some of them to try the question, the Association guarantees the expenses of the defence. It is found by experience difficult to define a newspaper with legal precision, and the Association hopes to get rid of the stamp by the old plan of driving a coach-and-six through the act imposing it. On another point their labours are more reason able. Printed papers are allowed to pass through the post as newspapers, on being entered as news papers and impressed with the newspaper stamp. The number of publications not strictly newspapers enjoying this privilege now amounts to 260, lists of the Additional Curates Society, and catalogues of bedsteads being among them. One scrupulous trader who desires that his publication may pass through the Post-office in like manner, but who objects to making a declaration that it is a news p iper when it, is no such thing (for which, he says, ne might be indicted for perjury), memorialises the Treasury that his paper may be transmitted through the post with a penny stamp affixed to it, without his being compelled to make a false declaration. This raises a question why all printed papers below the weight assigned should not be franked through ' the post by a penny stamp, as well as those which are falsely declared to be newspapers. The Association looks further. When the news paper stamp is repealed, it says, " the paper duty will "be felt as an intolerable grievance." 'l•he question, even in a fiscal point of view, thus assumes some magnitude, and the Association may defeat its object by demanding too much. However desirable it may be, both on grounds of abstract principle and prac tical utility, that these duties should cease, there is little probability that any proposal for their repeal will be listened to, while the ingenuity of financiers is racked to devise means for raising the enormously increased supplies which will be required. The ut most to be hoped for is, that means will be devised to get rid of the anomalies in connection with the newspaper stamp, which at present sorely puzzle Mr. Ttr,t,ee of the Post-office, Mr. Timm of the Inland Revenue, and numberless other Government officials. News, when it happens to be printed, is a curious commodity to specially select for taxation ; and perhaps a measure repealing this last fetter, — though lightly enough worn—on the liberty of the press, and placing all printed papers on the same footing, as regards transmission through the post, would best satisfy the public, and least interfere with the fevenue. The difficulty would be to reconcile the new regulation with " existing interests," unless the weight of pint to be covered by a peony stamp were fixed as high as the existing limit, which we imagine might be done without inconvenience to the Post-office, if it were provided that the stamp should cover only one single publication. disastrous.