The Press. — London, England, 1857-12-19 00:00:00

INDIA. Tne private correspondence by the Indian mail goes far to explain much that was incomprehensible in the telegrams of last week. Sir Cohn Campbell's force at Alumbagh, after all, did not reach more than 5,500 men ; and Lucknow up to the 27th October would appear to have been perfectly safe, well provisioned, and able to hold out. Indeed, it is reported that, so con fident were all in the Residency, a secret letter from Sir James Outrarn had reached Sir Colin Campbell, begging him on no account to hurry him• self, but " to take his time," and advance with such a force as would render the capture of Lucknow certain and secure. The following is the supposed latest letter received from Lucknow FROX LIEUTENANT MOonSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT QUARTERICASTER-GENERAL TO SIR H. HAVELOCK'S Foam:. _ _ Lucknow, Oct. 27. My dearest Mother,—Xll right physically and mentally, brain, body, and limbs, to date. We relieved Lucknow from its instant peril, and are now ourselves occupying a more extended position in the town, blockaded with the garrison. Write to Inglis's, (iubbin's, and Couper's people, if possible, to say that they and theirs are all well. We have grub abundant, ammunition, good quarters, plenty of fighting men, stout hearts, and our God on our side • on the other, our enemy numerous, but cowardly, with a scarcity of iron and lead for guns. Had we not many women and children, and sick and wounded, we could walk out of the town at any moment. As it is, we can hold our own and steadily make small advances until reinforcements arrive. I tried once before to ease your anxieties by writing, but the messenger was compelled to throw away his despatches before falling into the hands of tne enemy. . . _ . . This goes through the beleaguering host; so you will, I hope, see the necessity for my writing no more fully. Mother mine ! don't deem me " down among the dead men " until you hear it on the best authority ; and with very dearest lore to all, believe me your truly affectionate son, W. B. Mooasou. It is to be regretted that the writer does not specify in what the " grub abundant " consists. The date of his letter is exactly that of one month and a day after Havelock was shut up in Lucknow, and there• fore, if the write: be accurate in his facts as regards the supply of provisions and the position held by the force, it is clear that we need not have the slightest fears for the safety of the inmates of the Resi dency. Sir Colin Campbell may take his time, for the relief of the Lucknow Residency is not a question of that pressing importance his hasty flight from Calcutta to Cawnpore at first indicated. But, unfortunately, other letters do not exactly agree with the writer of that of the 27th of October. Another writer, an officer of the filth, and on the general's staff, writes on the 27th Oct. : We are very hard up for the luxuries of life here. No snap, no beer, wine, nor spirits of any kind; nothing to drink but water; no tobacco. S—, T—, and T. C— are smoking leaves of trees. Hari times! S— says he never took the shilling to live on cold water and chu patties. Cold water and chupatties are not signs of plenty. A letter dated the Bth of October also remarks : I hope we shall he soon in our turn relieved ; the enemy have regularly blockaded us, and it would be madness to attempt to carry off six or seven hundred wounded and five hundred ladies and children with our present small force. Our loss has been very heavy. We have lost in killed and wounded sixty-six officers and nearly a thousand men. All the influential people about here are against us. ll'e are all put on rations, and if supplies do not come in soon, we shall have to turn out all our horses. Now here is a statement, made on the Bth October, which indicates anything but " grub abundant," at headquarters, and it is in some way corroborated by that aide writer in the Times, who, under the signa ture of " Civilian," occasionally conveys to US so much interesting and authentic information. "Civilian" writes by this mail—" As to Havelock, the truth is this, that, having got into Lucknow and relieved the aching hearts there, he can't get out again; but, on the contrary, is eating up, in com• pany with them, their store of provisions, insomuch that he and they together are living on the gun bullocks, as is officially admitted—on horses, as private stories go; and it is announced that the latest day to which they can hold out on these pro visions and the little flour they have is the 10th instant ;" and he goes on to say : Havelock is very much in the position of a rat in a trsp. As soon as he got in, the cansl-bridge was blown up be hind him, and he was surrounded and cut off from all connitunioation. There he has been ever since, quite safe so long as provisions last, but otherwise apparently help less. The position taken up within the city, where it is Impossible to get out or in without a mile and a half of street fighting, appears a bad one. THE PRESS, DECEMBER 19,1857. Living upon gun-bullocks and horses does not look as if the garrison were well found, and the allusion by " Civilian" to horses would appear to be correct, when taken in connection with the remark of the officer who writes on the Rth or October, that if sup plies, and with supplies of course he includes fodder, do not arrive " soon, we must turn out all our horses." That expression, too, is peculiar, for it shows the feeling then prevalent in the garrison, that the horses must be " turned out" if relief does not soon arrive. Does it not, therefore, when we find three weeks afterwards these horses not " turned out," but cut up and eaten, argue a failing supply of provision ? Possibly the writer on the Bth of October never con templated being shut up in Lucknow for three more weeks without relief. On the whole, therefore, we are not inclined to put perfect reliance on the letter of Lieutenant Moorsom ; for the facts of the gar rison being " put on rations" (and this expression is clearly used by the writer of the soli of October with reference to low rations), of the horses not having been turned out, of the " cold water and chupatties " of the officer of the filth, and all coupled with the " despe rate fighting " known to have occurred on the 18th or 19th October, would look omi nous. Why should Outram and Havelock, with forces so reduced, unless pressed for provisions hazard a day's street fighting in the city of Lucknow except it was to cut their way through to Alumbagh, where they safely surmised lay a large convoy cf provision ? A correspondent of the Harkin., after reporting the fight of the 19th October, at Lucknow, says : The object of the attack was to get possession of the city, and to effect a junction with the force at Alumbagh. The losses, however, being too great, we only succeeded in taking a small portion of the city towards the Balee Guard. Outram was now unable to take the offensive, and the Alumbagh forces cannot come to their succour until they are at least 4,00) strong. No provisions, and no fodder for the cattle. But the question is settled ere this ; and so let us turn to the more pleasant features of the affair, and contemplate the preparations for the relief of Luck now. Colonel Ilope Grant, in command of Colonel Greathed's column, reported to be 3,500 strcng, after a rapid march of nine days from Agra, crossed the Ganges from Cawnpore on the 30th of October, with 1R guns, and arrived at Alumbagh on 3rd November. They took with them 2,500 camels and 500 carts, with supplies for Lucknow. On the same day, Sir Colin Campbell arrived at Cawnpore from Calcutta. Sir Colin remained there till the 9th, when he crossed the Ganges for Alumbagh, where Grant's column was understood to be awaiting his arrival. "We do not know," writes one correspondent, "what number of troops he took with him in person" : Indeed, the fact of his crossing into Oude is as vet only known from Sir Robert Hamilton's brief telegram to Lord Elphinstone from Madras alluded to above ; but what with the 53rd, the remaining wing of the 93rd, and artillery, he may have added to the brigadier's column no fewer than 1.500 men, raising the amount of the reinforcements to 5,000, with a numerous artillery. At Alumbagh itself he would find, perhaps, 1,000 effectives, with large supplies of provisions and of ammunition conveyed thither shortly before by Major Burnston and 500 men. At the head of ao compact and well equipped a force, Sir Colin would doubtless proceed at once against the enemy. All these statements regarding the amount of force actually at Sir Colin's command are vague and general ; "he may have added," and "he would find, perhaps," are not the expressions of a writer confident in his statements. All that we know is that, in the first week of No• vember, the European reinforcements were leaving Calcutta at the rate only of 2,500 men per month. The Calcutta troops Sir Colin Campbell will have under his command must have left Calcutta in Sep tember, when the transport, bad as it was in Novem ber, was fifty per cent. worse ; and from this we may infer that, in the intervening six weeks between the advance of Havelock, on 20th September, and the departure from Cawnpore of Sir Colin Campbell, the greatest number of men which reached Cawn pore did not much exceed 2,000. Out of these Sir Colin has mainly to provide for the defence of Cawnnore against the contingency of an attack from the Gwalior rebels, not many miles off, and in force ; and it is, therefore, highly probable that he took not more than 809 or 1,600 men with him when he crossed the Ganges on the 9th November. With these he will join at Alumbagh a force of some 4,500 men, which will give him in all between 5,000 and 0,000 men to effect the relief of Lucknow—that is to say, assuming that he leaves no force at Alumbagh ; but in all pro bability he would leave there from 250 to 500 men. to be fed with detachments from Cawnpore. On the other hand, there are at least 1,000 eff•ctive men in the Residency, and Havelock and Outram will, no doubt, endeavour to co operate with Sir Colin— so that between 0,000 and 7,000 men would be avail• able for further operations in the middle of Novem ber—assuming, of course, that Sir Colin reaches the Residency without any heavy loss. 1221 As to Sir Colin's plan of operations, little is known. One Calcutta writer speculates as follows : It is understood that Sir Colin will, when all is ready, cross the Goomtee, advance on the bank opposite the town, and from that vantage ground shell the enemy out. He will then recross, and perhaps enter the Resi dency without the loss of a man. (?) Lucknow, once secure and fortified, will become his bead•quarters, whence, inch by inch, he may reconquer Oude. The plan is strikingly able, but its success depends partially upon two contingencies. The first is the time for which the garrison can hold out. That appears to be settled by the letter qucted; but an accident, the explosion of a mine, or the loss of any of the powder in store, may upset all calcula tions. Secondly, can Sir Colin silence with the guns at his disposal the batteries the rebels will erect on their own side of the river? The sepovs work their artillery well, and possess quantities inexplicable to men who forget there are 400 fortresses in ()tide, not one of which has been dis mantled since the annexation. The following extract of a letter from an officer of the 64th Regiment, on the general's staff at Luck now, to a brother officer at Cawnpore, though not very conclusive, gives a point or two of interest . Lueknow, Oct. 27. My dear M—, I dare say you thought I never an swered your last to me, but I did. It unfortunately, how ever, was obliged to be destroyed, as the bearer was stopped on his way to Alumbagh. However, there was nut much in it, so you lost nothing. We got your good news of the reinforcements this morning. lam certain the greater portion of the niggers will bolt when they hear of the Delhi column having crossed the Ganges. They are dividing their affections at present between Alumbagh and us, so we only have half the work with them, but they kick up no end of a row every morning with their bands and drums and bugles. They must be rather tired of it by this time, and, I think, will scarcely stay to get another pounding from the new column if it be as strong as report makes it. They are falling out among themselves now , and cannot have much more ammunition left. All we want is a body of troops to occupy the suburbs opposite the two bridges ; we could then easily force a passage to this side of the bridges, and thus open a communication with the country for cattle and grab again. It is generally understood that Nana Sahib has assumed the command in chief in Oude, and some profess to see traces of ability and plan in the more recent movements of the rebels. " That some idea of concentration prevails among them," writes a Calcutta correspondent, "is obvious from the manner in which the detached bodies have quitted Bengal" : It is certain, too, that they fight harder than they did. Government has published a telegram announcing a victory at a place called Hardee, near Allahabad. Captain Peel makes the best of his story, but it seems clear that the enemy fought with desperatiDn, that our loss was severe, and that it was not considered prudent to retain so ad vanced a position. At Futtehaerai again, near Agra, the rebels were dislodged by a party from the garrison on the 29th of Cle.ober. Most of them fled, but a party seized a building on the heights and died like men with the halter round their necks. Lieutenant Glubb and seventeen privates were killed. Indeed, not only do the rebels fight harder, but they appear at last to be acting on some thing in the shape of a combined plan of opera tions. Not only in Oude but in Central and Western India do we see preparing a war, to be more or less severely contested. On the banks of the Nerbudda will one battle for our supremacy have to be fought. The mutineers of Delhi, Jhansi, and Bhopal, of Indore and Mhow, are concentrating here. The Gwalior Contingent would appear to be hesitating between an attack on Cawnpore and a march down the Nerbudda. The whole of these districts are in the enjoyment of the utmost anarchy ; the rebels, " like flies in summer," are in every direction ; the country, a series of deep rivers and difficult mountain eaves, is one of the most terrible countries for a campaign, the most favourable for an active guerilla war. From the Khandeish hills on the left bank of the Nerbudda, to the parallel of Nagpore, we find no place we can call our own except Saugor, Hindle, and liosungabad ; whilst all around rebels in force threaten these isolated towns, and render the posi tion of their defenders most precarious. If we turn to the westward, we discover the enemy at Rutlam and Mundesor, or threatening Neemuch and Nus seerbad. Indeed, the whole country between the mountains of Khandeish, and from Mhow to Ajmere, to the Aranulli hills, must be reconquered from the rebels by a British army, to say nothing of the neces sity of dealing separately with the Bheels and Kolies, who infest the outlying country, are up against us, and harass our troops to death Bent on mischief and quick in thetr motions, these, and the predatory hands of Bheels, do no stand before a regular force, but fly from place to place, evading attack by taking up positions difficult of access to regular troops. The most noted chief of late has been Bhagaji I.3hangria , brother of one Rhag tjt Rhanzria, who was hanged for treason in IRIII, who, with 500 Meet followers, made tiis appearance in the hills near Alimeilimgger. A party of fifty police sent out to w itch lthangria reported that he had changed his position three times between the 29th of October and the tat of November, moving first from Yesla to a place six miles distant;_ thence to a spot in the hills, fourteen miles further, and at last to a mountain most difficult of access, called Mahadeo Donge, east of maw.