The Press. — London, England, 1854-07-29 00:00:00

JULY 29, 1854. (Hear, hrar.) It is in this mighty contest that Europe is engaged ; and it were to mislead the house were I to say that, engaged with such an enemy, with a Sovereign of i mmen se power, of great influence and great talent, we could hope for a very early termination to such a contest. (Hear, hear.) But this lam sure of, that if we were to shrink from the contest, if we were to patch up a peace that was hollow and insecure —(Hear, hear)—we should lose our allies, we should lose the confidence and respect of Europe, and Russia would be placed', not in the position which she held before the outbreak of hostilities• not in the position which she held from lf+29 to VW, but in such position that her Emperor would then justly be called, that which by flattery he has already been called in some quarters, ' the arbiter of the destinies of Europe.' (Hear, hear.) It is our business to prevent that consumma tion." Declaring his assurance that Englishmen would not grudge their sacrifices in such a cause, Lord J. Rus sell passed on to a question which he was told would be raised in the course of the debate—that of bolding an autumnal session. He admitted that circum stances hereafter occurring might render such a step expedient, but contended that the discretion of the Government should not be hampered by demanding from them any pledge upon the subject. On this point he referred naturally to constitutional prece- dent:— " At the commencement of the ."entury, the Coalition Government of Lord Grenville and Lord Grey were asked by the Sovereign to bind themselves as to the advice they walla give that Sovereign with reference to a particular measure to which he felt the strongest repugnance. Lord Grenville and Lord Grey felt that it would be unbecoming in them, as advisers of the Crown, to cripple and fetter themselves by any such engagement. That engagement which these noblemen refused to enter into with the Crown we must refuse to enter into with the House of Commons. (Hear.)" The vote having been put from the chair, Mr. Atcocx criticised the mode in which the war had been carried on, censuring especially the delay that had occurred in commencing an attack on Sebas topol. Mr. BANKES urged the propriety of holding a ses sion in the autumn. Parliament ought not to leave Ministers unwatched while events of so momentous a character were proceeding, and when there were so many tokens that the opinions of the different mem bers of the Cabinet were utterly discordant respect ing the great questions at issue. Mr. Husia believed that the Coalition Government deserved well of the country, and exhorted both the Cabinet and the House to unanimity in providing for an active prosecution of the war. He hoped, however, that there would be no recurrence to the subsidy system. Mr. KNIGHT referred to the bravery of the Circas sians' and considered it of importance that they should be amply supplied with arms and secured as auxiliaries in the pending conflict. Mr. BLACKETT was convinced that amidst all the preparations for war the chief energies of the Govern ment had been expended in the diplomatic direction. He complained that the public had received no pro per account of the negotiations, and pointed to seve ral possibilities of danger and disgrace which might arise from that source. Mr. COBDEN remarked that Lord J. Russell had converted tbe house into a council of war, but even ander that aspect considered it most indiscreet in proclaiming his intention with regard to the Crimea, " always, of course, supposing that the house was not discussing the question of the occupation of the Crimea and the capture of Sebastopol after those events had been accomplished." He then referred t) the recent proofs we had obtained of the weakness of Russia as an aggressor, taking credit for having himself promulgated the same opinion long since : " The house had one great advantage in discussing the question at the present time, and that was, that they need not be under that feeling of apprehension as to the power of Russia with which they had been so long accus tomed to speak of this war. He had himself been much laughed at because he would not join in that tone, but be 'std never been in the least degree afraid of the aggres sive power of Russia, although, of course, he drew the line between the power of Itufisia for attack and for defence." Reverting to the promised occupation of the Crimea, he said : " It seemed that the Government were not now content with going to war to restore to Turkey the provinces taken from her, hut that they would continue the war until they had taken possession of a part of the Russian territory—that they would not merely attack Sebastopol, but that • • 'Hr hear.) He THE PRESS. that the war was to lead to no retrenchment of the Russian territory ? " The German powers, who appeared now to be all united, had laid down, he understood, as a fundamental principle of any negotiation with other powers that there should be no diminution of the territory of Russia as a consequence of the war. They stood on the settlement of Vienna, and he presumed that the existing relations of the Crimea and Bessarabia were fixed at the time of that treaty. Now, he begged to suggest that if England and France took the Crimea from Russia, by that act they released the German powers from their quasi alliance with them, and put themselves in antagonism with those powers. ( Hear, hear.) This would he a source of great future embarrassment to the noble lord." As the inhabitants of the Crimea had also shown mach dislike to Turkish rule, he questioned our I right, upon constitutional principles, of transferring the allegiance of the population to the Porte against their own wishes. Mr. Cobden then commented upon the course pursued by the British Government towards the Christian subjects of Turkey, and towards the supporters of Hungarian and Italian nationality. These, he declared, would vainly expect any aid from an English Ministry, and least of all, notwithstanding their persuasion to the contrary, from Lord Palmerston : "He presumed that the admirers of Kossuth would admit that he was at least as good a judge of what was for the benefit of his own people as they were. Well, that eminent chief had declared that the origin and purpose of the war was to increase the power of Austria over Hungary, and to rivet the chains by which Hungary was bound in the grasp of Austria. He wished to know the opinion of those deluded gentlemen below him this matter. (Laughter.) They had been resorting to advice which had more ingenuity than reason or logic to recommend it. They had been crying out that the Government were not carrying on the war as they ought to do, that we ought to have some other man at the head of the War Department — nay, sometimes they have even said, at the head of the Government. ( Hear, hear.) They have called out for Lord Palmerston. (Cheers.) And this was all done for the interest of Hungary and the Italians. But what said that illustrious chief to whom he bad already referred, and who, he supposed, spoke the sentiments of those down trodden nationalities? He (Mr. Cobden) had heard it, from the lips of two of' the greatest chiefs of Italy and of Hungary, declared that, so far from their hopes and aspirations resting upon that noble lord, they knew that when that noble lord had an opportunity of giving to them a moral support he would not so much as lilt up his finger in their favour. t Hcar, hear.) If there was any member in the present Government at this moment upon whom those leaders would be less disposed to rely than on any other, it was the noble lord whom these hon. and deluded gentlemen below him called upon to take the helm, in order that the war might be carried on, not in the interest of the Austrian Government, but in the interest of Italy and Hungary." Pursuing his strictures at much length, the hon. member found at many points subjects for blame or prognostics of danger, and predicted that, in six months, the English people would be as anxious for peace, on any terms, as they were now eager for war. Mr. LAYARD began by contradicting Mr. Cobden's assertions respecting the tyranny he bad alleged to be practised by the Porte against its Christian sub jects. He then assailed the Government on their conduct o f the war, and cited numerous in Lances of negligence and mismanagement: among others, the arrangements for the commissariat had been culpably defective:— " He had no desire to accuse the Government without cause ; but, when he knew that Government had been warned in the early part of the winter against all the trou bles and delays which had arisen out of the mismanage ment of our commissariat department ; when he knew that they had been advised how safely and economically to move and advance our armies in the direction it was now found it was necessary they should go ; when he knew that the very men who were known to be most efficient to attend to and most capable of supplying our troops with all they re (mired were actually named to the Government ; and per sons were also pointed out by name to whom recourse could have been had under almost any circumstances to assist the commiasariat: when he positively knew all this, it was somewhat disheartening to find that Government had seemed carefully to avoid using any advantages or adopting any one suggestion that presented itself to their notice or was offered for their acceptance. (Hear, hear.) All that Government seemed to have done was to have sent a gentleman from the Treasury over to Turkey to make certain official inquiries, and to make a report as to the same. (` Hear,' and laughter.)" Mr. Layard then passed on to Lord Aberdeen's un fortunate speech and subsequent explanations, and asked how his famous despatch of October, 1829,in which the treaty of Adrianople was so heavily im pugned, could be reconciled with another document 701 June Ist, 1821), he gave the following account of the inter view : " As he (Lord Aberdeen) was 'untainted only imperfectly with our conversation with the First Minister , ho lab o ured , when he learnt the details of it, to soften the disagreeable im pressions that might have been left upon us by his lannuace at the commencement of It, by the reiterated assurance that at no period had it entered into the intentions of England to seek a quarrel with Russia. Public opinion was pronounced against us, because generally in England it took the side of the weak — but, au trite, the British Cabinet was far from not wishing us success; ou tho contrary, it wishod us success prompt and de cisive, because It knew that it was the only means of termi nating the war, which could not be regarded except as a great misfortune, since it was impossible to foresee its results. The English Minister entered into long directions to demonstrate that we lent to him intentions that he could not have, and ended by saying that the Cabinet of London desired that the war should be terminated to the honour and advantage of Russia.' He (Mr. Layard 1 had no doubt there were then parties who believed that if Russia obtained certain successes she would be more ready to consent to a peace, but they were disap pointed, and he thought it was important thet the des patch to which he had just alluded should not escape notice. He would remind the house of the condition of the Russian army when the conversation to which he had just referred took place. It was now known, on the hest authority, that at the period in question, although '23,000 Russian troops had been marched to Adrianople, not more than 8,000 of those troops were available for sevice, and the Russian general declared, at the time, that Russia was saved by the treaty of Adrianople. The house must remember that the Porte wits said to have accepted that treaty at the persua sion of the English Minister, who was the brother of Lord Aberdeen. (Hear, hear.) Now, how far were the opinions of the noble earl warranted by the occurrences which bad taken place since the treaty of Adrianople ? The noble earl had said that Russia, so far from having inflicted evils upon Europe, had done it signal service, and he alluded to the treaty of Unkiar 'Skelessi. But the separate article of the treaty of Unkiar 'Skelessi was in favour of Russia, and compelled the Porte to close the Strait of the Dardanelles against all foreign powers." After these illustrations of past diplomacy, Mr. Layard pasedin review more recent negotiations, and expressed his belief that all our efforts in the war were frustrated or paralysed by a persistence in useless and unskilful negotiations. Austria was still made the great obstacle to our progress : "As long as Austria should continue to maintain her doubtful neutrality, we must be unable to undertake any of those enterprises to which the noble lord had that even ing alluded. The noble lord's observations respecting Austria were extremely unsatisfactory, and when lie ended his speech no one could determine whether Austria was with us or not. (Hear, hear.) Equally unsatisfactory was the noble lord's allusion to the ends which the Govern ment had in view. It would be the height of ingrati tude to desert the Circassians and leave them exposed to the vengeance of Russia. Some persons pointed to the opening of the Dardanelles as one of the objects of the war ; but if that took place before the destruction of Sebas topol and the Russian fleet there would be an end of the independence of Turkey. Had the Dardanelles been open twelve mouths ago, Russia would by this time have triumphed over Turkey. Unless we ettacked Sebastopol soon the opportunity of doing so would be lost. Admiral l)undas had reported that it was impossible for the Bntish fleet to remain in the Black Sea after a certain period t f the autumn. To Turkey was due all the success which had attended the war—( Hear)—and, although he was one of the last persons to clamour because we hail not performed great deeds in the Baltic ur Block Sea, lie must say that the country did expect that something should be dune before the end of the year." Lord DUDLEY STUART, with little circumlocution, declared that neither himself nor the country felt any confidence in the present Ministry. The public had nobly come forward to support the war, but were now beginning to inquire anxiously whether they were to have anything for their money ? " The people now looked at the manner in which the war was conducted with jealousy, apprehension, and suspi cion. The apprehension of the people was not founded on any mistrust of the gallantry of our navel and military com• menders, but on the belief that the hearts of some mem bers of the Government were not in this war. The people thought that these members of the Cabinet did not intend honestly to carry the war to a safe and satisfactory result. Among all classes the opinion prevailed that the Minister at the head of the Government was not the man who should be there during the continuance of the war. That was the fact, however placemen and Peelites might flatter them selves it was otherwise. ( .A laugh.) A public meeting at Drnry-lane would testify the feeling of the metropolis. When the people saw that nothing had been done by the great armaments which had gone from the country, they could not help suspecting that orders had been given to our commenders to prevent them employing the forces under their command." One means might have been available to restore some confidence in Lord Aberdeen, namely, a wiser selection of the War Minister : " If 'Palmerston hail been appointed to that nffice there muien rrom net, nut tnat tney woniu continue •" ~ ma &sae(' now ins ram ous I.IIIIIIIIICII Ul MA: lt,oca , 1 l•.•Ef, maa some confluence ru LIM ll AUV 1 kIICG.I, •••%••••••••., I until they had taken possession of a part of the Russian which the treaty of Adrianople was so heavily im- selection of the War Minister : territory—that they would not merely attack Sebastopol, nuaned, could be reconciled with another document , , • but that they would occupy the Crimea. (Hear, hear.) He .- - date, of which he read some extracts to 'lf 'Palmerston had been appointed to that office there Would tell the noble lord that, unless that had already been of previous . would have been a guarantee that the war would be carried accomplished, he had been guilty of a great indiscretion by refresh . the memories of hon. members on the sub• on with energy and vigour. There was no doubt that his giving notice to the enemy of the point to be attacked, ject : noble friend's name carried with it a moral force which and so informing them what place they would be required " Among the documents published was a despatchwrittln to defend." by Prince I.ieven to Count Nesselrode some time before was alone equal to an army. It was known ever y where, After showing, from Captain Spencer's "Travels," the treaty of Tt Adri h an c ople, giving an account of d th th e ptrprtaceed. and wherever it was known it was either loved or feared. mint of t e fins Tovernment. 1i apreare a nee It was. in fact, synonymous with the power and strength that the climate of the Crimea was most unhealthy, of England, hut it was rumoured that the Prime Minister Eleven in the first instance, rommnnientell with the Puke h a d d ec l are d th a t so long as he was in office hie noble , Mr. Cobden inquired bow the present announce- of Wellington, and endeavoured to induce him not to in- friend should never have the conduct of the war." went of the English Ministry could be reconciled tefere in the war carried on between Russia and the Porte. • with the declarations of German powers—to which The Prince afterwards went to Lord Aberdeen, and in a Lord Dudley then recapitulated other facts and in:: • our own Government had given an implied assent'— despatch addressed to Count Neseelrode, and dated London, ferences which warranted distrust, and led to the I . 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