The Press. — London, England, 1854-03-25 00:00:00

MARCH 25, 1854. •THE PARTITION OF TURKEY. SECRET STATE PAPERS. THE "reserved" documents and despatches which the Government have at last resolved upon revealing are now published in the shape of asupplement to the former Blue Books on the Turkish Question. The series comprises fifteen papers, all endorsed " secret and confidential, " and written during the first four months of 1853. Prated to the whole, however, is the often-mentioned "memorandum" of Count Nes selrode, embodying the communications received from the Emperor Nicholas subsequently to his visit to England in June, 1844, and founded on the con• versations which took place between his Imperial Majesty and different members of the English Go vernment. The following is a translation of this im portant document : " Russia and England are mutually penetrated with the convic tion that it is for their common interest that the Ottoman Porte should maintain itself in the state of independence and of ter ritorial possesekm which at present consututea that empire, as that political combination is the one which is most compatible With the general interest of the maintenance of omit.. ►C" Being agreed on this principle, Husks and iduglead have an equal interest in uniting their efforts In order to keep up the ex totem° of the Ottoman empire, and to avert all the dangers. which can place in jeopardy its safety. " With this object the essential point is to suffer the Porte to live In repose, without needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic blekeHngs, and without interferiag without absolute necessity in its internal affairs. " Ili order to carry out skilfully this system of forbearance, with a view to the well-understood interest of the Porte, two things must nut be lost sight of. They are these:— " In the first place, the Porte has a constant tendency to ex tricate itself from the engagements imposSil open it by the treaties which It has concluded with other powers. It hope's to do so with impunity, bemuse it reckon* on the muund jealousy of the Cabicete. It thinks that if it fails in its engagements to wards one of them, the rest will espouse its quarrel, and will screen it from all responsibility. "It Is essential not to confirm the Porte in this delusion. Every time that it fails iu its obligations towards one of the great powers, It is the interest of all the rest to make it sensible of its error, and seriously to exhort it to act rightly towards the Ca binet which demands just reparation. As soon as the Porte shall perceive that it is not supported by the other Cabinets, it will give way, and the ditierencee which have arisen will be arranged in a conciliatory manlier, without any conflict resulting from them. There is a second cause of complication which is inherent in the situation of the Porte: it is the difficulty which exi,sta in re conciling the respect due to the sovereigli authority of the Sultan, founded on the Mussulnian law, with the forbearence required by the interests of the Christian population of that empire. This difficulty is real. In the present state of feeling in Europe, the Csblitets cannot see with indifference the Christian popnlations in Turkey exposed to flagrant acts of oppression and religious intolerance. It is necessary constantly to make the Ottoman ministers sensible of this truth, and to persuade them dint they caw only reckon on the friendship and on the support of the great powers on the condition that they treat the Christian subjects of the Porte with toleration and with mildness. " While Insisting on this truth, it will be the duty of the fo reign representatives, on die other limit, to exert all their in fluence to maintain the Christian subjects of the Porte iu sub mission to the sovereign authority. " It will be the duty of the foreign representatives, guided by these principles, to act among themselves in a perfect spirit of agreement. If they address remonstrances to the Porte, those remonstrances must bear a real character of unanimity, though divested of one of exclusive dictation. " By persevering in this system with calmness and moderation, the representatives of the great Cabinets of Eittope will have the best chance of succeeding in the steps which they may take, without giving occasion for complications which might sift-et the tranquillity of the Ottoman empire, If all the groat powers frankly adopt this line of conduct, they will have a well-founded expectation of preserving the existence of Turkey. However. they must not conceal from themselves how many elements of dissolution that empire contains within itself. Un foreseen circumstances may hasten its fall, without DA being in the power of the friendly Cabinets to prevent it. "As it is not given to human foresight to settle beforehand a plan of action for such or such unlooked-for case, it would he premature to dinettes eventualities which may never be realised. "In the uncertainty which hovers over the future, a single fun damentid idea seems to admit of a really practical application : it is that the danger which may result from a catastrophe in Turkey will be much diminished,if, in the event of its occurring, Russia and England have come to an undersnuiding as to the course to be taken by them in common. ""That understanding will be the more beneficial, inasmuch as it will have the full assent of Austria. Between her and Russia there exists already au entire conformity of principles in regard to the affairs of Turkey, iu a common im.erest of conservatism and peace. " In order to render their union more efficacious, there would remain nothing to lie desired but that Etiglaud should be seen to associate herself thereto with the same view. "'flue reason which recommends the establishment of this agreement is very simple. " On land Russia exercises in regard toTurkey a preponderant action. " On sea England occupies the same position. " hoisted , the action of these two powers might do much mischief. United, it can prod a uce rel benefit ; thence the ai yentas,. of corning to a previous understanding before havingrecourse to action. " This notion was in principle agreed up m during the Empe ror's last residence in London. The result was the eventual en gagement that, if anything it .foreseen occurred in Turkey. Russia and England should previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in to:ninon. "The object for which Russia and Engliusi will have to come to an iinderstdnding may he expressed in the following manner : " 1. To seek to maintain the existence of t he Ottoma io n empire in its present state no l on g as that political combinatn shall be possible. " 2. If we foresee that it must crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert es to everything relating to the establishment of a n ew order of things, intended to replace that ehich now exists, and. In conjunction with each other. to see that the change Which May hare ocenrred in the Internal situation of that empire shell not ininriontily affect either the seditrity of their own States and the Halite which the treaties assure to thew re spectively, or the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. " For the purpose thus stated, the and of policy of Russia Austria, as we have already said, is closely united by the prin. THE ciple of perfect identity. If England, as the principal mat4tfine power, acts is coewert, with there, it is to be supposed that France will find herseU obliged to act in confonnuy with the course agreed upou between St. Petersburg, London, and Vienna. " Conflict between the great powers being thus obviated, It is to behoved that the peace of Europe will be maintained even in the midst of such serious eireuinstoncei. It is to secure this object of common interest, if the ease occurs, that, as the EM peror agreed with her Britannic Majesty's ministers diving his residenee in England, the previous anaemia/Piing which Russia and England shall establish between themselves must be directed." The next, paper, No, 1 of the series, is dated nearly nine years afterwards (Jan. 11, 1553), and contains Sir H. Seywour's account of a conversation held with the C;ar, in which the latter cautiously broke ground on the subject of the possible partition of Turkey : " The Emperor came up to me, in the most gracious manner, to sag , that he haul heard with great pleasure of her Majesty's Ctoverument having Leen definitively formed, adding that he trusted the blinistry would be of long duration. His Imperial Majesty desired me particu larly to convey this assurance to the Earl of Aberdeen, with whom, he said, he had been acquainted for nearly forty years, and for whom he entertained equal regard and esteem. His Majesty desired to be brought to the kind recollection of his lordship." After congratulating himself that there were very few points on which the two countries had disagreed, and complimenting the British Ambassador by the re mark that so long as England and Russia were " d'accord " it. was immaterial what other countries in Europe might think or do, his Majesty added in a cursory kind of way " As to Turkey, that is another question ; that country is in a critical state, dud may give us all a great deal of trouble." Sir H. Seymour begged to have these words more fully explained, wishing to obtain some assurance which might " tend to calm the anxiety with regard to the affairs of Turkey, which passing events are so calculated to excite on the part of her Majesty's Government." The Czar then replied, with some hesitation in his tone : " The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganised condi tion ; the country itself seems to Le falling to pieces (menace runie); the fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a psifectly good understanding upon those affairs, and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprised." " I observed (says Sir H. Seymour) in a few words that I rejoiced td hear that his Imperial Majesty held this len gnage; that this was certainly the view I took of the manner in which Turkish questions are to be treated." " Stay," the Emperor said, as if proceeding with his remark. " Listen ; we have on our bands a sick man—a very sick niau ; it will be, I tell you frankly, a great inis. ftirtune if one of these days he should slip away from ns, especially before all necessary arrangements were made. But, however, this is not the time to speak to you on that matter." " It was clear that the Emperor did not Intend to prolong the conversation : I therefore said, Your Majesty is so gracious that you will allow me to make one further ob servation. Your Majesty says the man is sick—it is very true—but your Majesty will deign to excuse me if I remark, that it is the part of the generous and strong man to treat with gentleness the sick and feeble man; " The Emperor then took leave of me in a manner which conveyed the impression of my having at least not given offence, and again expressed his intention of sending for me on some future day." At a subsequent interview the dying state of the Turkish empire was again alluded to. "We cannot resuscitate what is dead," said the Czar, and there would be great danger, he argued, if the death should take place before proper arrangements had been taken. He repeated more than once a wish to discuss the question with the English Minister in the spirit of a " friend and a gentleman," adding : " If England and I arrive at an understanding of this matter, as regards the rest it matters little to me; it is indifferent to me what others du or think. Frankly then, I tell you plainly, that if England thiuks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. Ido not attribute this intention to yon, but it is better on these occasions to speak plainly ; for my part I am equally disposed to take the engagement not to establish myself there, as proprietor, that is to say, fur as occupier I do not say; it might happen that circum stances, if no previous provision were made, if everything should lie lett to chance, might place me in the position of occupying Constautinople." In reporti •g this conversation in a despatch, doted Jan. 2.1., to Lord John Russell, Sir H. Seymour thus terminated his letter : " A noble triumph would be obtained by the civilisation of the nineteenth century if the void left by the extinction of 'Maliominedau rule in Europe ooidd be filled no without a n interruption of the general peace, in conacquence of the precautions adopted by the two principal tioveruments the moat interested in the destinies of Turkey." The despatch was received on February 6, and on the 9th the following reply—on which the Tinwa pro nounced so warm a panegyric—was transmitted from the Foreign Secretary : , " have received and laid before the Queen your secret I and confidential despatch of the 22nd of January. 2.71 - allitrElpflr tits ilirtipcin former • &titian, lir - lictrpy to ackuewle4g• ' the moderation, the traukuess, and the trisudly disposition of his buret lad Majesty. " Her Majesty has directed rue to reply in the same spirit of temperate, candid, and amicable discussion. "The question raised by his Imperial MWsty is a very serious one. It is, *imposing the euntingeney of the dliosolution of the Turkish empire to be probable, or even imminent, whether It Is not better to be provided bciorelaind for a contingency, than to incur the chaos, confusion, suit the certainity an Europtson war, all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior system has been aketehed: ' 'Ms is the pint,' said his Insperfel Majesty, "to which I iou desirous that yuu abotsla call the attention a& year " lit considering this grave question, the drat reflection which (wears to her Majesty's Government is that no actual crieia hes occurred which renders aeressory a solution of this vast European prublem. Disputes have arisen respecting the Holy Places, but these are without the sphere of the Internal governnieut of Turkey, turd concern Russia and France rather then the Sublime Porte. SOUP , dieturbinice of the I...lathing be tween Austria and the Porte has been caused by the Turkish attack on Montenegro; but this, again, relates rather to dampers affecting the &outlet of Austria than Gm authority end safety of the Sulmn; so that there is no auttleleut cause for intimating to the Sultan that lie cannot keep peace at home, or preserve friendly relations with his neighbour* It occurs further to her Majesty's (*averment to remark, that, the event which is contelllPlated is not (MUMMA, assd i point of awe. When William 111. and Louis XIV. disposed, treaty, of the succession of Charles 11. of Spain, they , 'Were pro viding for as event which could not be far me The infirmities of the Sovereign of Spain, and the certain end of ally Muesli life, made the contingency iu prospect both sure and user. The death of the Spanish King was in no way hastened by the treaty of partition. The same thing may be saM or tbe provision. made in the last century, for the disposal of ruesteity spun the decease of the last priuce of the house of Medici. But the coutingeney of the dissolution of the Ottoman empire is of another kind. It may happen twenty, fifty, or a hundred years henee. " In these eirtzn..eutitees it would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings towards the ;intim& which auituate the Emperor of Russia, nu less than the Queen of Great Windt), to dispose beforehand of the provinces tinder his detnitnuii. Itesides tlds consideration, Lowe rer, it must be observed, that an agree- Went made iu such a came tends very surely to hasten the con tingency for which it is intended to provide. Austria end France could not, in fairness, be kept in ignorance of the transude% nor would such concealment be consistent with the end of pre 'relating 11111 European war. Indeed, welt eotimialineut eannot be intended by his Imperial Melody. It is to be Inferred that, as soon as Great Britain and Russia should hare agreed on the course to be pursued, and have determined to enforce it, they should communicate their intentions to the great powers of blot rope. Au egrevaueut thus made. and thus communicated, would not be very lung a secret ; and, while It tviitild Islam and alienate the Sultan, the knowledge of its existenee wont.' stiMulate all his enemies to increased violence mud more obatioate conflict. They would tight with the conviction that they must ultimately triumph; while the Sultan's generals and troops wouht ferl that no immediate success could save their cense from *nal overthrow. Thus would be produced and strettotheute that very awaseby which is now feared, anu the foresight of the fileads of the pa tient would prove the cause of his death. "hoer Majesty's Government need scarcely enlarge on the dangers attendant on the execution of any similar convention. The example of the Succession War is enough to show how little ascii agreements are respected when a pi essing teuiptetion urges their violation. The position of the Emperor of Russia as depositary, but not proprietor, of Constantinople wonld be ex posed to numberless hazards, both front the long-ebertehed am bition of his own maim' and the jealousies of Europe. The ul timate proprietor, whoever he might be, would hardly be sate tied with the inert, supine attitude of the beteg of Mehemet 11. A great Influence on the affairs of Europe seems uaturelly to beloug to the Sovereign of Constantinople, holding the gates of the Mediterranean and the black Sea. " That influence might be used in thvour of Ermine; it might be need to control and curb her power. " Ills Imperial Majesty hiss justly sod wisely add, ' My coun try is so vast, :+1) happily eirctunstanceit in every way, that It would be unreasotiabki In me to desire more territttry Or more power then I pesisese.' On the contrary, he observed, • Oar greet —perhaps our only—danger is that width wouW arise from an extension given to an empire already too large: A vigorous and ambitious State, replacing the Sublime Porte, might, however, render war on the part of Russia a necessity for the Emperor or his stiecemioni. " This Euroneon eoufUet would, arise from the very means taken to prevent it; for neither England nor France, nor pro bably Austria, would be content to see Constantinople perma ftently In the hands of Russia. "Oil the part of Great Britain, her Mejegy's Governineut at once decline that they renounce all inulition or *fah to hold Constantinople. His butterfat Majesty may be quite secure on this head. They are likewise Peso to give en assurance that they will enter into no agreeineet to psvvide fur the eontingency of the fall of 'rurkey without previous comumuicadou with the Emperor of Russia. "Upon the whole, then, her Majesty. Government are per suaded that no course of policy can he adopted more wise, more disinterested, more beneficial to Europe, than that Whiell MY Im perial Majesty has so long Mitosis', and stitch will render his uaine more it usurious then that of the most famous sovereigns who have sought immortality by unprovoked emiquest and ephe meral glory. " With a view to the successor tilts policy It is desirabl that the utmost forbearance should he mullioned towards T urley; that any demands which the great powers of Europe mi 4 haVe to make should be made matter of friendly nee/Wet/ea Mbar dem of peremptory Mused ; that inilitary mad swivel d to coerce the Sultan should as much as possible be avoided; differences with respect to matters affecting Turkey, within competence of the Sublime Porte, should be decided alter Min imal concert between the greet powers, and not be forced upon the weakness of the Turkish Cmvernmeut. "To these camera her Modesty's Government wish to add that In their view It Is essential that the /Odom %tumid be ad vised to treat his Christian sub:Meta in conformity with lb. 'sr:n -(110es of equity sod religious freedom which, prevail genoirally among die enlightened nations of Europe. The more the Turk• ish Government adopts' the rifles of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of 1111.sia And it ne• cessary to apply that eixoeptional proteittiou which his Ireperial Majesty bas found so burdensome and inconvenient, thought no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty. " Von may resit this despatah to Genii Nesselectle, sod, If It ix deEmperor. sired. you may yourself place a copy of it in the hand, of the In that case you will accompany its preeentation with those assurances of friendship and confidence ren the pert of her Majesty the Queen *Met the emultiet of Ws imperial Ma. jesty was so sure to hoptru-s-1 sio, Ü bs " J. litesem." The arrival of this letter was signified to the Czar by the British Envoy on February 20, and its purport briefly explained. The Emperor was sorry to hear .....~.