The Press. — London, England, 1858-01-16 00:00:00

r 7 f7o -- 3Eittraturt. Political Progress not necessarily Democratic; or, Relative Equality the True Foundation of Liberty. By James Lorimer, Esq., Advocate London : Williams and Norgate. Tuxe work is of no ordinary ability, and, if we mistake not, will attract considerable atten tion when Lord Palmerston redeems his pledge of giving the country a new Reform Bill. Our author, like all other publicists, is not proof against the seductions of system. He has his theory, which he maintains in an ab solute and uncompromising sense, which, as is the case with all absolute theories on politics, it requires only a practical view of the subject to see is greatly overstrained. His theory is, that legislation is determined by the spirit of the people, and not in any degree vice versa. "Law, then," he says, " and the institutions of the State being the " result of the national spirit, to endeavour to "regulate this spirit by legislation is to mis " take an effect for a cause." Before discuss ing the soundness of this theory it is as well to come to an understanding as to the use of the terms employed : By the expressions " United Will," " Spirit of the People," "Common Consciousness," and the like, the writers whose opinions we have adopted are very far from meaning the will, the opinion, or even the feeling of right and wrong, of the numerical majority of the inhabitants or even of the citizens of the State. On the contrary, it is quite consistent with their views, and is indeed contem plated by both, that the sum of the influences, instead of coinciding with, should stand over against the sum of indi vidual sentiments, and still that the institutions of the State should be the expression of the former, not of the latter. But (says our author), as the State can never take cognisance of individual importance directly, the principle of classification becomes indispensable. Now, without going further, we have here, we think, materials out of the author's own mouth to circumscribe the unlimited scope of his theory. The " sum of the influences " that is to say, the rum of individual impor tances--constitute, he says, the spirit of the people. Now, here is something which is to take cognisance of them. This something— this State—must therefore be different from the spirit of the people ; and as it has to take cognisance of it, it must be, if not of superior authority, at least independent of it ; and as it is only after cognisance is taken by some "principle of classification" that the spirit of the people comes into existence, the " State " must be anterior in point of time to it, and, a fortiori, to all legislation, which being the effect of the spirit of the people presupposes its existence in a state of recognised activity. SLortly after Mr. Lorimer says : By this recognising the identity of the sovereignty and the general will, we get rid of all those troublesome ques tions regarding the limits of State interference which have so much divided political i nqu i rers . But these troublesome questions are not so easily laid; and as it is clear that the " Sove reignty" here means simply the " State," Mr. Lorimer cannot get rt 3 of the questions in the way he proposes, for, so far from identifying the sovereignty and the general will, he has demonstrated their separate existence. And this separate existence ones determined can never be logically destroyed the two may harmonise in their influence, but they never theless remain two agents. Moreover, the harmony betwixt the spirit of the people or the general will and the State varies with the stage of civilisation ; and in the earlier history of all nations it is the antagonism betwixt the two, rather than their agreement, which is the leading feature in history. But, instead of mystifying ourselves with philosophical terms, lei, us adopt plain lan guage. Let us call the State, th e G overnmen t, the spirit of the pe o pl e , p u bli c op i n i on , an d legislation the Acts of Parliament passed from session to session : then it is plain that none of these influences are omnipotent, but that they act and react on one another. Undoubtedly in general public opi n i on l ea d s th e wa y an d Ministers profess to follow it ; b u t so m e ti mes . with or without the concurrence of Parliament, Government goes in the teeth of public opulion, which afterwards turns round and h\ib. THE PRESS, JANUARYI6,IbSB. approves of their independence. And as for the Acts of Parliament, many of them are forced upon Government by the Opposition, and some of them even are enacted by the Opposition and Government combined against the wishes of three-fourths of the sum of all the wills, of all the intelligence, and of all the virtue of the nation ; and it is matter of history that measures so passed have exer cised no little influence in modifying opinion. Furthermore, almost every great political question has been at first in a minority, and even when it ultimately triumphed it did not necessarily follow that there was more than a bare majority of opinion in its favour, if even that. To erect, therefore, such a shifting and intangible fiction into the ruling principle of political philosophy seems an expedient very likely to get rid of all philo sophy on the subject, and to leave the deter mination of right or wrong in political action to the sole test of ultimate success—success very often dependent upon some lucky chance. But it is only to the absolute and un compromising way in which Mr. Lorimer states his theory that we object. Under cer tain limitations and restrictions it is the true theory of politics, for all laws to be useful must be popular—that is to say, must chime in with the prevailing phase of public opinion, formulating it into statute, and giving the sanction of the State to principles which have already obtained the sanction of the majority of the thinking portion of the citizens. Legis lation in any other direction may occasionally be right, and ultimately be sanctioned by the public opinion in the face of which it at first proceeded ; but such laws are the inspirations of great statesmen—the anticipations of genius in advance of the current reason of the times. To say that they are impossible is to negative the possibility of farsighted and gifted states manship—to ignore the lives of a Strafford, a Chatham, a Burke, or a Brougham ; to say that they are common is to assert the vul garity of genius. Admitting as we do the paramount, though denying the exclusive and arbitrary, influence of public opinion in determining the destiny of nations, it becomes a most important ques tion whether the general tendency of what we call public opinion is favourable to national stability or the reverse. This, as our author says, is the " problem of politics." It is not to be solved by the ancient method, which sought to determine the one best form of government, for the plain reason that no one form could suit the infinite diversity of cir cumstances among which nations are placed. Neither, he maintains, is it to be solved by the modern Liberal method of lowering the quali fication attached to the exercise of political suffrage. Mr. Lorimer maintains that the end in view will only be gained by organisations of increasing complexity as civilisation ad vances : Instead of equalising to a common level, the remedy is only to be found in an accurate cognisance of the various claims of the different orders of society, by a just and impartial recognition of actually existing social d.s tinctions, not by the annihilation of all distinctions what soever. liy widening the circle of those who are directly to par ticipate in political influence, we can nolonger, as formerly, feel assured that we are thereby giving more ample ex pression to the spirit of the people and the time ; on the contrary, by ignoring altogether every other principle by which this spirit may be measured except that of mere enumeration, we are tending towards a state of matters in which there is danger of a large portion of the whole social influences of the community being first denied all constitu tional expression, and then ceasing to exist in any other form than that in which, by conforming itself to the cha racter, it can find expression by the mouths of the numerical majority. It is still exclusion, it is still disfran chisement. against which we have to struggle ; bnt the claims which come upon us now are of a very different kir d from those which arise from the simple fact of the claimant being a human being, subject to our laws, and not having violated them. Intelligence, industry, wealth, power, the elements not of similarity, but of dissimilarity amongst men, are those which now are clamorous for re cognition ; and the task which is imposed upon us is the reconciliation of these new claims with that of naked man hood, which we have already admitted. These doctrines Mr. Lorimer illustrates at considerable length from ancient and modern history. This is the most interesting part of his book, and displays a copiousness of know ledge, a judiciousness of selection, and a con ciseness in statement which remind us more of Sir James Macintosh than of any recent writer. We regret we have not space to quote some of these illustrations. We can only state as the result that there are no hi s . torical precedents upon which in speculating on the future of England we can with certainty rely, because no nation has gone through the stage of political progress into which we ha ve entered. Historical precedents are not encou raging, and, according to our author, concur in establishing the cycle of Polybius, from which no State as yet has escaped. " The first " order," says Polybius, " is monarchy, which " is established by the bare work of nature, " without preparation or design. From me. " narchy rises royalty, when art has been " applied to correct the views of the former; " and when royalty has degenerated into its " congenial evil, which is tyranny, the destrue " Lion of the latter gives birth to aiistocracy. " This again being changed according to the " natural order of things into oligarchy, the " subjects, roused to vengeance by oppres " sion, resist the injustice of their governors " and establish democracy. And, in the last place, when the people themselves become " haughty and untractable, and reject all law, " to democracy succeeds in the course of time " the government of the multitude (ochlocracy). " The next and last step leads to utter politi " cal disorganisation, analogous to the savage " condition which preceded the commence " meat of political life." We have seen more clearly in modern times how ochlocracy leads back to despotism. The question therefore remains to be deter mined whether we shall escape the cycle. "Is political progress necessarily democratic '? Is the cycle to be escaped by allowing the pre sent tendency to proceed unchecked, by giving full scope to democracy, and more especially by extending the franchise through means of a reduction of the qualification ? Here, then, we find ourselves landed in a discussion on the principles of the now Reform Bill. Mr. Lorimer—as may already have been gathered from the sketch we have given of his opinions—is against the Liberal method, hold ing that it would only precipitate the march to an ochlocracy, " there being no historical ex " ample of a State which has thus stopped " short on the high road to democracy." We need not say that we perfectly concur with this opinion. We in vain try to discover any stand-point where we could stop, and say we refuse to go farther. So long as the suffrage is conceded purely on democratic principles there seems no stand-point short of the abyss—that is, short of universal suffrage. But if we refuse to be guided by the democratic principle, there is an old con servative principle which may serve our pur pose. We mean the constitutional doctrine that representation should be based on pro perty. As such a system, while it al lows of the extension of the suffrage —provided the democratic element which would thus be introduced into the Con stitution be balanced by giving additional votes to property—satisfies both progress and order, it seems to solve the problem of politics. Our author, however, is not an advo cate of this scheme. He says that property is already adequately represented through means of the House of Lords ; and he apprehends that a graduated property franchise would be unpopular with the " advocates of equality " " that a cry would be raised that the people " (which in the mouths of such persons means " the mob) were being defrauded of their " rights, and we should find ourselves at once " in presence of the final struggle between an , " equal and an unequal univ e rsal suffrage. There is some truth in this. No doubt the Chartists could not be hoodwinked to the consequences of such a scheme ; but provided it could be carried through the House of Com mons, their resentment might be braved with out any serious danger. Now, in our opinion, if the option is given to the Commons of a simple reduction of the franchise, or the adop tion of the principle of graduation, here are very cogent reasons why they should prtster the latter. They cannot shut their eyes to the fact that the new voters under a reduced frau• chise would be the majority of the electoral body ; and they cannot be certain that their re-elections would be at all secure under the Pace to We can no hi s . :ulatin g ?rtainty igh the ke have encou- , neur in I which Le first , which nature, om mo- s been former; into its lestrue- Locraey. to the Lily, the oppres- vernors :he last become all law, of time acmes). r politi- savage Lmence- Mt more y leads o deter- [e. "Is rutic'? the pre- .ed, by l more .hrough n? Led in a Reform o been n of his d, hold- Larch to ical ex- itopped. r." We ur with rer any .nd say as the tocratie t short liversal ided by Id eon- mir pur- loctrine on pro- it al- suffrage which e Con- ditional Iry gre ss )lein of n advo- perty is 1 means rehends ould be tli ty "-- L people s means their at once %Ten au itirage." uht the to the rovided )f Corn- ,d with- ins of a ,e adop- Jere alre 1 prefer s to the ed frau• lectoral at their der the Ara. t