The Press. — London, England, 1854-11-18 00:00:00

1082 portion to the guns ; the men in camp are not in proper proportion to those in the trenches; the hours of refit are not in proper proportion to the hours of work, &c. But we have reason to doubt whether our rulers have yet discovered the fatal error which they have committed in the conduct of this campaign. They seemed to think thel by simply throwing 30,000 British troops into the Crimea they had done all that was re quired of them. But they forgot two things: the one, that the enemy whose territory was thus invaded was the absolute master of a million of soldiers ; and the other that an invading army engaged in active operations requires large and continuous supplies of men to maintain it in a really effective • state. The expedition should never have been undertaken without an army of reserve, either in the Mediterranean or on our own shores, which might he despatched forth with to the scene of action in case of need. As it is, we find it impossible to fill up the gaps which the sword and disease have made in the ranks of our brave countrymen. They have fallen by thousands, and we recruit their strength by fifties ! And it is only with the remnant of our army, reinforced by such dribblets as we have sent them, that we are now engaged in mortal strife with the greatest military monarchy which has ever threatened the liberties of Europe. That this policy of starving the war at its commencement is the surest mode of pro tracting it, is sufficiently obvious ; and we trust that the events of the last few weeks have at length opened the eyes of the nation to the formidable nature of the contest in whie tit is embarked. We must. make up our minds to an immediate and a heavy increase of expenditure. We must augment our army by at least 50,000 men. Manchester may murmur, but the honour of England is now at stake, and her existence as a nation soon may be. Our rulers have brought upon themselves a terrible amount of responsibility by ne glecting to reinforce our army in the East. They know, or ought to know, that the nation would grudge no sacrifice to effect this all important object. But there has been all along a serious obstacle in the way. The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER obstinately re flitted to borrow when he might have had money cheap, and he is loathe to confess him self in the wrong by now appearing in the market when it is dear. And thus the safety of our army has been, and is, imperilled through a crotchet of Mr. GLADSTONE'S. THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE AND THE WAR DEPARTMENT. THE inefficiency of the Duke of NEWCASTLE as head of the War Department has become so palpable, that persons who formerly had a high opinion of his talents and qualifications are now compelled to acknowledge that he is totally incompetent to the duties he has undertaken to perform. As an instance of the manner in which the affairs of that department are carried on, we may mention that, after a recent Cabinet Council, Lord ST. GERMANS informed an officer of the Grenadier Guards that the Ist battalion of that regiment was to go the Crim ea. Lord HARDINGE heard the report;, but it was not until the next after noon, after the announcement was made in the new spapers, that the Duke of NEWCASTLE came to Lord HARDINGE to tell him the decision the Government had come to. Lord HARDINGE was then compelled to show that this move ment was impossible, and other arrangements had to be made. In this way Lord HARDINGE gets blamed for vacillation through decisions being formed without his cognisance, which it is impossible to carry out. It would be a great improvement on the existing practice, if the Commander-in-Chief were summoned to the Council on occasions when details of the war are discussed, as his opinion must surely be worth at least as much as that of Lord ST. GERMANS or the Duke of NEWCASTLE. THE PRESS. IRRIGATION IN SCINDE. A PERIOD when one of the most desperate con- tests is raging that Eland has ever been engaged in may got oQnsidered an oppor tune Ow for (Ailing attention to the wants of India. Inch, however, is not our view. Toe enortnotte pecuniary qaarifices which the vigorous prosecution of the war must entail render it not only Stang, but necessary, that we should look dos* into the condition of the several parts of our empire, that we may ascertain if it be not possible, by a better ad ministration of them, to obtain some relief in aid of this vast expenditure. _ _ As at present managed, the revenue of India may be reckoned at about twenty-five millions sterling, and that wrung out of the people with difficulty, and more than counterbalanced by a wasteful and profuse expenditure. But this is less than was paid with ease by the fraction of that empire which was held by the Mogul Emperors; it is less by two-thirds than, ac• cording to our own moderate estimate, it ought to pay ; and it is but one-sixth of the amount it is calculated that it would yield by a very competent authority on such points—Colonel COTTON. And this calculation proceeds, be it remembered, not on increasing the pressure of taxation, but simply on adopting a sensible and equitable system, the direct object of which should be to improve the wealth of the country and the people's condition, and so more than proportionately increase their powers of pay- ment. One of the chief causes of India being new a burthen upon, instead of an aid to, the national resources, is that which prevents her own development, and which has repeatedly been pointed out in these columns ; we mean the system which prevents the acquisition there of freehold property in land. Besides this there are other impeding causes at work which, if less powerful, are not less active, and one of the most prominent of these is the passive, but at the same time most obstinate, resistance which is offered by the East India Company to every plan intended to provide those means of developing the resources of ' India, which on the ground of financial inability they refuse to provide themselves. We have before us papers showing the underhand opposition of the Leadenhall•street sovereigns to a company lately formed for the irrigation of Scinde. That there is a legitimate opening in India for such a company, or for ten such companies, no one who has perused Colonel COTTON'S work, or who has conversed with any competent person from India, can doubt ; yet simply because Scinde is se lected as the scene of operations, direc torial hostility has been aimed against it, though every man of sense must see that this second Egypt is the most natural and fitting locality for the operation of such enterprise, deprived as it is by nature of rain, and depen dent, therefore, entirely for the water necessary to fertilise it on artificial means. The land of Scinde is, when irrigated, perhaps the most productive in the world, yielding frequently fifty-six bushels of corn to the acre. Nor are its capabilities confined to cereals. Its peculiar natural adaptation for cotton was long since pointed out by one of the largest and most successful growers of cotton in Egypt, and his view was confirmed by the fact, at the time unknown to him, that cotton actually grows wild in the province. For the cultivation of flax, too, its soil is unrivalled ; and thus the two most important of the raw materials of our manufactures might, by the application of capital, be produced to an almost unlimited extent in this fertile country. But though Scinde by the spontaneous gift of nature possesses all these advantages, it possesses one disadvantage that more than countervails them. It was the conquest made by the late Sir CHARLES NAPIER, under the orders of the Earl of ELLENBOROUGH, and this, its original sin iu the Directors' eyes, no earthly consideration can wipe out. Thus, though it requires nothing but the application of capital to make it a far richer province than Egypt, and though abundant capital was ready to be tendered for its acceptance, the SATURDAY, proffered wealth has been cut off from it by the interference of the Directors, because the development of its resources would show tho sagacity of its couqueros, *WO its poverty and sterility afford a malignant s4tisfaction to his detractors. Nations, it is said, have no cousins, nor kings either ; but this does not hold good of the kings in I,eadonthull•strect. With them personal interest and personal feeling are everything—the interests of the State nothing, Tho foundations of their service are laid deep in nepotism, and all public measures are de cided by them accordingly as they are per sonally favourable or personally hostile to the proposers. Whether it is fitting that they should be allowed longer to deal thus with questions of the most vital public interest the Legislature must determine ; but for our parts we cannot see why we should be compelled to pay double income tax when the public income derived from India would, under proper management, be ample to relieve us from it; nor can we understand why our merchants should be forced to send gold to Russia for flax, and to depend wholly on America for cotton, when we have provinces subject to our sway in which those products are indigenous, and which would supply us with more than we could possibly consume, but for the neglect or perversion of their trust by the Court )f Directors. WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR ? DURING the last week we have received the most momentous intelligence that has startled the ears of the present generation. The ter rible, yet glorious, " mistake " of October 25 ; the hard-won victory that has added a new interest to November 5 ; the yet uncertain events of the 11th ; and all the while the certain danger that our brave troops may be at this moment slowly wearing out under the incessant attacks of a power that is prodigal of blood—that will direct its batteries un flinchingly upon a pile-mile of friend and foe, ready to sacrifice the first if it can slaughter the last—that is content to wait, and calculate with grim arithmetic how many of our victories will ensure our annihilation ;—in all this there is surely enough to make us pause, and ask ourselves, rather seriously, what it is that we are fighting for? What we have done, we know. We have doubled our income tax; have sent out muni tions of war (Lord GRANVILLE tells us) to an almost fabulous amount; we have narrowed our trade ; adjourned all measures of social improvement ; with entire forgetfulness of the past, we, the Conservatives of England, have steadily supported the Queen's Ministers in the prosecution of a war which but for the Coalition had never arisen ; and, far beyond all, we have sent out our men—the men that have made England what she is. The war has already cost us not less than 20,000 of our best and bravest hearts. At a time when there is hardly a household in the United Kingdom or in France that is not looking with wistful eye and personal anxiety for every despatch that arrives, it is full time to inquire what is the end proposed ; and whether it is worth the tremendous sacrifices we are making to attain it. Lord ABERDEEN tells us once a week that his object is " peace," and peace in his mouth means the acceptance by Russia of the much talked-of four points" which have been ar ranged in concert with Austria. These points relate almost exclusively to Austrian interests. They are of vital importance to the commerce of Austria, and to the extension of her power in Eastern Europe. Were it she, instead of the Western Powers, who, for the ends pro posed, bore the heat and burden of this war, no one would say that the stake was not worth the hazard and cost of the contest. By the four points Austria would gain the opening of the Danube and the navigation of the Euxine, and, practically, the protectorate of the principalities, and of the Christian sub• jects of the Porte.