The Press. — London, England, 1854-05-13 00:00:00

, zb t ; No. 54.—VoL. 11. LONDON, SATURDAY, MAY 13, 1854. PRICE SIXPENCE. Irtss. from his own indiscretion, and preserve the country from the consequences of his ill advised measures. LONDON, SATURDAY, MAY 13, 1804. THE despatches of • Admiral DUNDAS in last night's Gazette make known the true circum stances connected with the attack on Odessa. Our Premier is not inconstant : he remains faithful to his ancient friendship. The attack of the allied fleets was not a voluntary act. It was provoked by the Russian batteries firing on the Furious and her boat, each bearing a flag of truce. But for that circumstance we are left to suppose that no attack would have been made on the fortifications of Odessa, though " the Russians were labouring day " and night in strengthening the moles and " erecting formidable sea defences, and had " also collected between 20,000 and 30,000 men " for the protection of this military depot" The letter of the admirals to the Russian commander, requiring reparation for the out rage which had been committed, and demand ing the delivery of the vessels at Odessa, state that should a negative be returned they will be obliged to have recourse to force to revenge the insult that has been committed against the flag of ono of the combined squadrons, although the interests of hu manity lead them to adopt, wish great repel, this last resolution, of which they throw the responsibility upon him who has the right to bear it. These expressions are significant. Surely the country should by this time know for what purpose our fleets have been sent to the Euxine anti the Baltic if not to attack the enemy. What derision must our warlike de clarations and our immense armaments in spire at St. Petersburg while Lord ABERDEEN remains at the head of our Government! THE LAST BUDGET. THE debate on the CHANCELLOR of the EXCHE QUER'S last financial statement is fixed for Monday, and will probably extend over several evenings. Whatever turn it may take, we have no idea that there will be any attempt to weaken the hands of the Executive. The Government is secure from that kind of oppo sition .which would tend to impede its action or stint its means for carrying on the war with all possible vigour. The new estimates have been voted with great unanimity, and Parlia ment, no doubt, will be equally willing to grant funds to defray their cost. There is no dispo sition to shrink from any necessary increase of fixation, provided it be fairly adjusted; but Mr. GLADSTONE must not suppose that he will be quietly allowed to make the necessities of his exchequer a cloak for the gratification of his private animosities and party spleen, or that he will be suffered to tamper as he pleases with the national finances. The experience we have had of his crotchets is not of a nature to inspire that confidence in his wisdom which he has still the audacity to demand. An attempt will probably be made to save him By his own account he has been an unlucky man—but another term, in 111 C HE LI Eif a opinion, for an imprudent one. His schemes ought to have been all successful, instead of all failing. Like most ingenious persons of his class, he has plenty of reasons to show why his expec tations were disappointed. Men and nature con spired against him. Prince ME NSCHIKOFF went to Constantinople early last year, and there was a wet seed-time. The Opposition were to blame for not foreseeing the consequences of his pro jects better than himself, and for not restrain ing him from carrying them into effect. Capitalists were wrong for studying their own interest intsead of his convenience. The Bank was perverse for chargitig him interest on deficiency bills ; and the system of public accounts was thoroughly vicious for not show ing a larger balance .in the ,exchequer than actually existed. More than one-half of his speech was, occupied with this queru lous talk, which proved nothing except his ignorance of the business of his depart ment. Is it a novel practice for Government to have funds at the Bank on quarter-day to pay the public dividends? Or is it a thing unprecedented for capitalists to make the best use they can of their money? While the principle is boastingly proclaimed that the expenses Of the war shall be wholly met by increased taxation, it is violated 'by the proposal of a loan for six millions, in ad dition to the increased issue of 1,750,0001. of Exchequer Bills, 'previously voted. It may reasonably be asked how, if we cannot make our income keep pace with our expenditure at the commencement of the 'war, we shall be able to do so as it advances ? Is it not pro bable that hereafter, as sow, we shall be called on to vote increased estimates before the revenue to defray. their cost can be imposed and collected ? But, whatever may be thought of the practicability of adhering to this prin ciple, it is indispensably necessary, even to its fair trial, that we should start clear, and that no engagements should be entered into to pay back the money we now borrow within so limited a period as four years. The creation of Mr. GLADSTONE'S new form of security is defended on the ground that it resembles Exchequer Bills, which are found equally convenient both to the Government and the public. But, if analogous to the Ex chequer Bill, what is its advantage over it? A security payable at four years must bear a higher rate of interest than a security payable at a shorter period ; and, so far, this new exchequer instrument is less advantageous to the public than the old one. If it be ad mitted that only a certain amount of the bills will float in the market at a reasonable rate of interest, we have still to learn what advantage these Exchequer Bonds possess over funded debt, and particularly over that form of it which consists in terminable annuities. That single reason which might possibly render these bonds acceptable to individuals makes them dangerous to the exchequer. We mean their fixed date of payment. Our un funded debt requires at present careful ma nagement : its pressure is often found ex tremely inconvenient, and at such times its reduction is sure to entail a serious loss on the country. What says Mr. GLADSTONE him self on this point?— There are only two occasions—namely, in the hears 1839 and 1841—on which you have funded Exchequer Bills since the peace in which you have not entailed by that funding a permanent burden of from 41. to 51. for every 1001. of Exchequer Bills upon yourselves and upon posterity. Those two occasions, as I have said, were 1839 and 1841. They were not, indeed, so disadvantageous as the other occasions, the rate in 1839 being 31. Os. percent. upon 4,000,0001. funded,and, in 1841, 31. 7s. I Id. per cent. upon 8,544,0001. funded. But even these were high rates with reference to the rate of interest which you pay upon Exchequer Bills in easy times, and they have entailed a very considerable addition to the capital of the public debt of the country. These facts afford a sound argument for keeping the unfunded debt within d tie bounds ; but how do they justify the creation of a new kind of unfunded debt which may prove greatly more unmanageable than that which we possess ? Who can say what our financial condition may be in 1858? Is it wise abso lutely to burden that year with the payment of our need of 1864 ? The principle of this stipulation is so very objectionable, so likely to prove inconvenient to the public ser vice, and injurious to public credit, that we hope the Legislature will never be brought to sanction it. We cannot con ceive any form of security more likely to introduce confusion into our national accounts, and increase their complexity. The amount sought to be created, though insignificant as a portion of our debt, is yet large enough to produce great inconvenience should it fall due at an adverse time. •The additional taxes proposed might have passed without question but for the obvious injustice of one of them. Mr. GLADSTONE is introducing a new and most dangerous prin ciple in politics, by using finance as a party weapon, and employing it to load his political opponents with an undue share of the public burdens. Taxation, sufficiently grievous at all times, becomes intolerable when it is felt to be partial and unjust. It was with Mr. GLAD STONE a sufficient reason to increase the malt duty that Mr. DISRAELI had proposed its reduction. He must show his zeal for the party he has joined by striking a blow at that which he has left. The sensation which his announcement excited in the House showed how accurately he had calculated his power to wound. The venom of his project may find favour in the sight of the most unscrupulous of his allies, but must sink his character in general estimation, while it proves him to be wholly unfit fin• the office he fills. The reasons he alleged for loading this par ticular article with additional duty were scarcely specious Tobacco was not to be touched because it produced five millions, and it was wise to " let well alone." The tea duties must not be interfered with because the trade with China might be extended; but neither the very large amount already pro duced by the malt duty—upwards of five millions—nor the interest of the British grower was thought worth consideration. When he stated that the malt and beer duties taken together constituted in former times a hea vier amount of duty than he now proposed to levy, he omitted to notice that the beer duty was never paid by that large class of persons who, particularly in rural districts, brewed for them selves, and supplied their labourers from their store. To attempt to raise between seven and eight millions from this commodity alone may, per haps, push taxation to that oppressive point at which it ceases to be productive. It is a much larger sum than we raise from any single