The Press. — London, England, 1854-04-22 00:00:00

THE PRESS. APRIL 22, 1854. ittratiut. Bunnah. Letters and Papers written in 1852-53. By Major-General Henry Godwin. London : Bosworth. Tins posthumous vindication of General God win affords another warning against the preci pitancy of contemporary criticism, and the occasional unfairness of partisan journalists. Wisely said Lord Ellenborough in the Lords, that of all men those employed in naval and military service are the most sensitive. The cause is easy to find. Their profession in volves no perpetual conflict of antagonistic opinion, and does not, therefore, harden them against calumny and misrepresentation. In their unreasoning simplicity they are apt to expect from the baser sort of political oppo nents that justice which they would themselves show. They can allow for prejudice, and par don ignorance ; but they are unaware how skilfully prejudice can assume the mask of impartiality, and an ignorant critic display the technicalities of military knowledge. In a free country things must be so ; yet it is hard that men of sensitive feelings—and such feelings are often united with the utmost physical cou rage—should have the annoyance of foolish censure superadded to the load of responsibi lity and the labours of a campaign. Two great men—Marlborough and Washington—have left it on record how they felt these things. Even Wellington, though with his peculiar stoicism he affected to despise anonymous attacks, suffered more than the public knew from them. Our rule in this matter is simple—to hope the best, and predict the best, of military opera tions pending, content to believe that there may be causes either for action or delay, which to the public are not, nor ought to be, known. In the memorial before us, which is partly eked out from the writer's private letters, General Godwin refutes one by one the calumnies against him. It was said that the Burmese expedition of '52 had been delayed on account of the length of time he took to reach Calcutta from Umbiallah, where he had been quartered. The general replies that he travelled day and night, and the dates prove it. His departure was Feb. 21, his arrival March 2—nine days for more than 1,000 miles, over Indian roads. It was alleged that at his first interview with the Governor-General "he debated and "hesitated." This also is circumstantially denied, and the real facts stated It is true that certain parts of the proposed plan were not in accordance with my views, and I stated my objec tions firmly and honestly. These were, that if the pro posed operations were to be the commencement of extended ones in that country, we were beginning at the wrong sea son, as the rains would come on in May ; that if it was only proposed to go and destroy what we might, we should not influence the Government of Ave, as it possessed no pablic establishments ; that what we should destroy would soon be put up again; that by leaving the country, and re turning again in case the first demonstration failed to pro duce the desired results, we should have to do all over again in October; and that such a proceeding would greatly in crease the expense, as well as destroy the unity and dignity of our proceedings. To this succinct and lucid summary Lord Dal housie replied by talking about " public opi nion" and the necessity of taking some strong measure. All readers of Napier 's history re member how sharp and stern was the Duke's reproof of one who, writing firm England, counselled him to fight a battle, whether it led to any result or no, for that "public opi nion" at home required that something should be done. There is a difference between the Duke of Wellington and Lord Dalhousie ! Of course the Governor-General's opinion prevailed, and General Godwin was despatched accordingly, with orders which, to our humble apprehension, seem the most injudicious that could well have been given. He was t o cap ture Rangoon ; occupy it ; pass the rainy and hot seasons there, taking his chance of pesti lence; advance to Prome if time allowed, but no farther. Thus all the exposure, not to mention the cost, of a campaign was to be undergone, without other gain than that of a seaport which could always be had when wanted. General Godwin uniformly held to Bahoon that no thorough subjugation of urmcould occur unless Ava were occu• pied; the Duke of Wellington, as we now know, thought the same ; experience seems likely to prove them right; but "public opi nion" and Lord Dalhousie decided the other way. It is justice to the Calcutta authorities to say that everything seems to have been done for the expeditionary army that prudence could suggest : The care and provision which has been made to enable us to meet the rains is, I msy say, parental. There are to be bakehouses ; a constant supply of fresh meat ; hospitals at Amherst to relieve me, to which the sick are to be car ried round. The only difficulty I ever felt respecting the occupation of Rangoon at the setting in of the rains was, as to cover for the men. But hundreds of skeleton houses are now, and for some time have been, making at Moulmein ; so that, contrary to my first impression, I have great hopes that, if we cannot go on,we shall be able to hold the ground we shall have taken, without the losses we met with before from exposure and bad food. The grounds of Lord Dalhousie's decision to begin a campaign at the very worst time of year appear to us as unsatisfactory as the re sult. He calculated on the Burmese being overawed by the simple occupation of Ran• goon. No persuasion appears to have con vinced him that this calculation was unsound. The events of the war, briefly recapitulated in this pamphlet, are well known in England. On March 26, '52, the expedition left Calcutta ; landed on the 2nd of April; stormed the Great Pagoda and carried the town on the 12th 15th of same month ; and there, as agreed on, suspended its operations. The Burmese, as General Godwin anticipated, left the cli mate to fight their battles. No communication reached him from Ava. There were doubtless many native courtiers to remind the Monarch of Sir Archibald Campbell's invasion, where 75 per cent. of his whole force died more by disease than the sword. The season was trying, the heat terrible ; Government ex pressed satisfaction at what had been done, but already the people began to murmur, though Bassein, by a renewal of exertions, was taken in the middle of May, and Pegue in June. In July the Governor-General came, inspected the Rangoon garrison, and approved its state. On the charge of keeping his force inactive there during the rains General God win's defence is complete. In the first place, he had orders to do so ; that alone ought to suffice ; hut those orders coincided with his own judgment : The responsibility of maintaining an effective force, and the risk of using a non-effective one, were mine ; and why was I required to break up froth Rangoon? Why was I to abandon all these advantages which had answered so well, as the returns will show, and go and take up an idle position in the most pestilential swamp that is to be found in the country, where I should have no cover for the men, and that, too, in the midst of the rains? Why change the soldiers from wholesome food, and excellent health, to put them on salt rations and biscuit? This was to be done for no earthly advantage ; at the mere sugges tion of a few weak-minded, or interested, ill-informed, and irresponsible persons ; and simply because a few steamers had found their way up to a wonderful place called Prime. _ Of this last-named place the importance was absurdly exaggerated at home. Except as a depot and base of further operations it was useless. Being farther from Calcutta and the coast, its occupation could only increase the cost of supplies. As a swamp, without cover for troops, to have held it during the sickly season (or rather during the most sickly where none are salubrious) would have been a wanton waste of lives. Even in October, when the advance was made, and the town captured, the invaders came almost too soon : This is a sickly place, from the swamps which surround it, and the mortality has been very serious among the European troops. I knew that it would be so, and pointed out the objections to an occupation during this wet season. We were full early, and it is quite bad enough as it is; but, knowing what I did, I should have been unfit to command had I been moved by hints, or ignorant, imper tinent observations, or the gabbling abuse of newspaper editors. And elsewhere the writer says, "That swamp, " Prome, has already cost me many men in " hospital. . . . . It is a most direful and " unhealthy place." "Our mortality is griev " ous . . we have cholera here already, and " other bad forms of disease." This was written Feb. 7, '53. If the troops suffered in cool weather, what would they have done bad the advance taken place in summer, as pre sumptuous ignorance was perpetually urging should be done ? It is obvious that in the course of last year, some months after Lord Dalhousie's visit, 375 something had gone wrong at home. "There "is an evident wish," writes the general in February, "to see things in an unfair light." " No man can gain any credit by serving a " Government which lays itself open to receive " private communications." "I am going on " with people who never approach me with " advice, but who are listened to elsewhere." It is just to remark that these complaints seem to apply rather to Calcutta than to the Board of Control. "My position " (in March, '53) "with respect to the Governor-General " has been not so much of the nature of a dif " ference as that I have held my own." . . . " When a force is in the field, all must be sub- " servient to the man who commands." Many passages of a similar tendency occur, proving that Lord Dalhousie's one great failing—his jealous and arbitrary monopoly of power— interfered with the freedom of the commander, and injudiciously restricted operations. Why will a man personally so able refuse to see ability in any one except himself? " Either " do the work yourself, or let me," is the rea sonable remonstrance of a soldier so controlled. We should not judge thus on an ex parte state ment were this a single case; but Sir Charles Napier, and all who have served under the present Viceroy, tell the same tale, wherefore we cannot wholly disbelieve it, even were proof wanting. It is much to General Godwin's credit that he appears to have overlooked his annoyances, and that a cordial reconciliation subsequently ensued. In April, '53, the negotiations began ; and here again a blunder occurred. Terms of peace had in fact been arranged, but these were so badly drawn that the Burmese com missioners objected to sign them, as including a cession of territory 100 miles beyond what was intended. The negotiation failed ; two months' delay became inevitable ; and it was June before the arrangements actually in force were conic to. How long they may last no man knows. General Godwin, from first to last, maintained that to produce any effectual result you must strike at the capital. "To " find peace for Pegue," he repeats again and again, "you must go to Ava." He said so in the spring of '52; he repeated it in the autumn of '53 ; yet on him, his age, his vacillation, im becility, and so forth, was charged the laches of a continuance in quarters when to advance would have been sounder policy. Such is political justice ! On a calm review of the whole war, wo see sufficient reason to believe that it was badly managed, not by the general, but by his imme diate chief in India. Retrospective criticism is easy; yet no case seems made out for the occupation of Rangoon during the summer, which did not intimidate the Burmese, nor for the refusal of leave to advance on Ava, which would have done so effectually. We do not believe that the present peace, if peace it is, will last long; and, should it fail, the cause will be our reluctance to use to the utmost those military advantages which we possessed. It is allowed on all hands that a force like that of Godwin might have landed at Rangoon in October, marched straight up the country, and imposed terms at Ava, before the next hot weather set in. A treaty so enforced would not only have been honourable, it would pro bably have been durable as well. No one who knew General Godwin could have shared in the foolish belief of his physical incapacity to command. We knew him not long ago, before his appointment to Burmah, and can vouch that, while his courtesy and amiable qualities were everywhere appreciated, by few men in the prime of life could his personal activity have been exceeded. Great tempe rance, a light compact frame, cheerful spirits, and a constant habit of exercise had left him at past sixty years as fresh and buoyant as the youngest of his aides de-camp. lie had not, like Sir Charier Napier, those striking quali ties which excite the enthusiasm of armies ; the two men did not stand on the same level of greatness, nor would Godwin have claimed for himself any higher fame than that of a sen sible and practised soldier; but all who served with him will bear ready witness to the ame nity of his manners, the constancy of his tem per, the sound sense which he showed in act and deed, and the kind heart which won him love alike from officers and privates. If, as was wanted. General uroawin his opinion that no thorough subjugation of It is obvious that in the course of last year, an a aeea, ana we Jona neart W WWI Ti %Au Burmah could occur unless Ava were occu• some months after Lord Dalhousie s visit, I love alike from officers and privates. It; as was • %1 ( - • 44' h