The Press. — London, England, 1857-02-07 00:00:00

FEBRUARY 7,1857. Mr. M'lloughall deserves higher praise. His thoughtful and slow-running verses are very pleasant reading. " Summer Scenes " (15 are very effectively finished, and the metre excellent. We would pause longer in our remarks did the volume contain anything really distinctive. It does not do this ; though the author is better than a mere rhymester, and is evidently a man of some power. Of a long poem entitled " Vernon, a Tale of the Sea" (6), we are sorry we can say nothing favourable. We can only wonder that it was ever written. A single specimen will explain the character of this book better than any criticism: — In those events that we will now relate, The grossest inconsistency is seen; Mere lapse of time averts the sentenced fate Of criminals—makes Justice kick the beam. Mercy, so pond'rous in the legal scale, Smiles upon whose accessories in guilt, Swung in derision to the public rail; They murder'd were—ur blood of these was spilt. Some sixteen winters may have pass'd away Since general commotion wildly stired Our sweetest, p'raps our largest, colony ; And sound of cannon's roar was often heard; And armial men in frequent motion seen, Some richly dress'd with epaulettes of gold, In coats of red, with facings some of green ; But buff and yellow, too, you might behold : But there were others differing from these, Though not the less they seeni'd on mischief bent, Their garments torn perchance exposed their knees, Or in less delicate positions rent. Mrs., or Miss, Philipson—we have not the pleasure of knowing which—writes very pretty verses (7). The volume is dedicated to her sisters, and its contents are just of that nature to please a cultivated domestic circle. If the authoress is not a real poetess, she is at least a kind and amiable woman ; and the gentle play of the affections is not always a bad exchange for the loftiest, but frequently less agreeable and natural strains, which pro ceed from more ambitious aspirants. " Ugo Bassi " (8) is a tale of the Italian Revolution, written principally in the octo syllabic metre, evincing considerable facility in composition, and much of that refined senti ment which culture generates in minds of delicate organisation. These two qualities united will almost always succeed in the pro duction of verses so like poetry as to deceive uncritical readers, and which even those who are more exacting may skim without displea sure. Such is the character of " Ugo Bassi," which we dare say will find many readers, and a certain number of admirers. " The Rural Parsonage " (9) is the work, we should suppose, of an educated gentleman who has amused his leisure hours by commit ting to paper the pleasurable sensations which men of taste experience in a country lite. His mind is well stored with rural images, and he hits noted, with the scrutiny of real affection, the various aspects of Nature through all the seasons of the year. His descriptive epithets are often very happy, and his versification is generally smooth. The following phrase struck us a 3 singularly picturesque : Though pleasing is it even now Among the farms to roam, Anil watch the steady steering plough Rippir the level loam. " The Pleasures of Home " (10) is a poem written in the style of the " Pleasures " of " Hope" and " Memory," and displays greater mastery of the heroic measure than we are accustomed to meet with at the present day. This is its principal excellence; but it is in our opinion not a small one. In point of poetical ability all the foie• last upon our list are nearly on a par; but there is no metre so well adapted to carry off mediocrity, and to gratify by sound alone, as the heroic. Not that " The Pleasures of Home " is not full of much that is tender, and graceful, and elegant; but at the present time these words have come to mean almost as little as writing (5) Pnevin nnd Songs. Ily James M'llougludl. London: I tall, Virtue, and Co. (U) Vernon. A Poem. By 11. Bate. London: linli, Virtue, and co. (7) Era. A Romance in Rhyraz. 13y Caroline Giffurd Phi• I pion. London: Mozon. •-' '(8) Uw Bassi. By :..ikeran7.l. London : Saunders and Otlyr. (ii The nurol Parsonage. By at Clergyman. London: I fall, Virtue, and Co. (10) The Pleasures of Home. By the Boy. John Anderson. 'outrun : flail, Virtue, and Co. THE PRESS. " with ease " meant in the days of Charles 11. Clever, kind, and highly cultivated persons are now not rare, and when they write cannot fail to express themselves with some degree of polish and good feeling. 1. The Mystery; or, Evil and God. By John Young, LL.D. (Ellin.) London Longmans. 2. Dialogues on Divine Providence. By a Fellow of a College. London : J. W. Parker and Son. ALTHOUGH the ago in which we are living is too practical to appreciate the subtleties and spiritual importance of metaphysical inquiry, from time to time works are issued from the press recording the keen interest taken by isolated thinkers in the old controversy upon Necessity and Free Will. Without some defi nite apprehension of the importance of that con troversy, it is hardly possible to be a profound theologian. Ethics and metaphysics are both involved in its consideration; the Confessions of St. Augustine, the Institutes of Calvin, the profound argumentation of Jonathan Edwards, do not more strongly testify to the importance attributed by the theologians of every age to conflicting theories on this question. The character of many works in modern French literature, also, in which dramatists and novelists paint men cringing before an or dinned fatalism, or whirled along by an over mastering impulse, which he confounds with his own free will, proves that there is funda mental reality in the controversy. If as meta physicians we are less often called upon to discuss the abstract logic of this old contro versy, as readers of general literature we must admit that in a concrete form the moral ques tions depending on it are often presented to our mind. To say anything positively new upon the subject would be impossible, and we have not space to discuss its conflicting principles at length ; but there are some con siderations, suggested by the works at the head of this article, which are worth noting. It has come within our own observation that minds purely metaphysical, and habi tuated to long and strictly logical ratiocina tion, are most inclined to the eoctrine of necessity ; while those natures which have most aptitude for purely ethical inquiries, lean to free will. In high metaphysics the affections of the heart are scarcely ever stirred ; but it is difficult to reflect long upon moral problems without the sympathies being roused, and many generous illusions on the subject of human nature take captive an ardent mind, filled with extravagant conceptions of the grandeur of human destiny. Our own opinion leans to tho necessitarian side of the controversy ; but we cannot coincide with the views often enunciated by the impugners of philosophical necessity. We differ toto cm/o from those who think that the doctrine of necessity has an inevitable tendency to cause gloomy views of life or of religion. On the contrary, we believe that the idea of free will is so liable to mischievous exaggeration, that the reaction produced by experience of the world, and its severe dispensations, causes persons often to think meanly of human nature, and to despond about religion. A sober Calvinist is more likely to meet the events of life with serenity of soul than the ardent Arminian, who theorisPs about tho freedom of the human will, but who finds by experience that the world refutes every day the conceptions of his mind. One of the reasons which help to involve the controversy in such a puzzling maze is, that the tenets affirmed or denied at either side are not entities of the same nature. Ne cessity is a metaphysical, and free will is an ethical idea : the first is objective, as involving the outward scene on which man has to act ; while the second is subjective, as concerning the conduct of the individual. It was acutely observed that " time Romanist doctrine of " transubstantiation was an attempt to turn " rhetoric into logic," and the same thing may be affirmed of the supporters of free will. There can be no ignoring of the momentous fact that not only evil was permitted in the scheme of Providence, but that a liability to fall was ingrained in the nature of man. 137 " And lead us not into temptation " is the prayer of the Christian ; and that solemn aspi ration involves in itself the question of neces sity. The import of the phrase " and lead us " not" is suggestive of the most intricate problems connected with the idea of Provi dence. If the will was so free, and under such subjective control, as some reasonera contend, why should there he the prayer en treating that we should not be led into temptation ? The first of the works before us is a per formance more learned than profound. It is not easy to gather the author's meaning from what he has written. lie shifts from philo sophical speculation to religious feeling so rapidly that he seems to confound the sublime anticipations of pure faith with the intellec tual inferences of mere reason. Ho seems desirous to give his voice in favour of a system of ethico-metaphysics that would produce that moral parallelism to the true faith which, according to Bishop Berkeley, would be in itself another sort of Christianity. He contends that the ideas of continuity and constancy are not necessity, but liberty ; and he insists that man has a conscious power of choice. But he forgets that the necessitarian need not deny the "autonomy of the will." The will may be completely crushed and over borne by a pressure of circumstances; and the fact that the liability to disobey the will is part of human nature cannot be disputed. Dr. Young traverses in a cursory manner the whole field of metaphysical speculation. His volume reads like a catalogue of philoso phical names, interspersed with remarks more or less acute, but not indicative of profundity. The difficulties with which he has to deal are evaded, and not solved by him. From the complicated difficulty of an overruling Provi dence, foreseeing all things, yet permitting evil, the author escapes into the region of religious sentiment. In doing so, he only follows the example of many of his prede cessors. His work is deficient in consecutive arrangement; its matter, though apparently stated with logical method, reads in a " breaky " style, and at the end of the volume we find that we have no definite results. His attainments ►►re considerable, but when he attempts to give us his own thoughts he be comes tautologous and trivial. Surely there is much affectation and wordy rhetoric in the concluding passage of his volume. Many pages are penned in the following style : Life—mighty, energetic, silent being—is the destiny of the created moral universe; yet not absolutely dissociated from all that may be called accidental or adventitious. In the case of one order of intelligent beings, redeemed human minds, this is emphatically true. Their life, in its very source and cause, shall supply accidents hardly less pre cious than the substance itself with which they are asst• elated. Theirs is life pointing back to a death—the death of the Incarnate One. The incarnation and the cross do all but make up part of their moral being, so deeply are they connected with their moral history. Theirs is life, begotten of love, incarnate, redeeming, crucified love. It is Ufe given back from an awful perdition. It is the life of minds reunited to God after a dark apostacy. It is lite restored to the Parent Life, as it ought never to have been separated. Away from all its specialities, and in common with that of angelic natures, and with the entire being of the created moral universe, it is life from God, in God, as the stream contains the waters of the fountain— " We are made partakers of a Divine nature." It is quite possible for a metaphysician to pass from the philosophy of the mind into the ideas of humanity revealed by the Atonement; but such a logical feat is not to he accom plished by Dr. Young. We prefer the less pretentious performance of a " Fellow of a College." This volume is written in a dialogue—a form of composition, when applied to philosophical subjects, of which we do not approve, although it is recommended by some illustrious examples. The following passage has both vigour and clearness:— Providence and law are both words by which we express, or endeavour to express, certain truths about the manner in which God works. Providence implies that, in all the dealings of God with His creatures, He acts consciously, voluntarily, and knowingly, as an omniscient and omnipo tent agent. Law implies that in His works and dealings we can trace a certain amount of uniformity and resem blance, which the structure of our minds leads us to be lieve to exist in a still greater degree than we can trace it. In God, as a Being of perfect knowledge and perfect power, there is no opposition between the greatest uni formity of action and the most particular regard for the issue of etch action iu all its multiform consequences. lie