The Press. — London, England, 1854-08-19 00:00:00

Alla-138T 19,185 . 4. THE PRESS. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN. Tin military performances of 1854 may doubtless present an inglorious blank to the historians of Eng land and France. Months of time and millions of money have been spent in preparations ; the sinews of every department connected with war, or its etathriel by land or sea, appear, at all events, to have been strained to the utmost. There has been no lack of spirit among our soldiers or seamen, of libe rality on the part of Parliament, or of loyal sympathy in the cause for which we are supposed to be fighting among the public at large. But, with all this effort and all these agencies, our governing powers have not yet succeeded even in getting an armed force "into position." The weeks are growing few during which it will this year be possible for anything to be done in the way of active hostilities, but still we can not. learn that the armies—or the fleets either— have arrived at the points where they can even at tempt to do anything worthy of their numbers, their valour, or their antecedent renown. Not, however, to follow this melancholy theme, let us turn to a more inspiriting side of the year's his tory. If, on our part, the war has progressed to its present stage without producing a single achieve ment, if it has proved negatively discreditable to our leaders or the Government which instructs and shackles them, it is some consolation to reflect that our Russian enemy has fared worse—that the results of the campaign on his side have been actively disas trous. Now that the Russian army has finally evacuated Wallachia, we may indeed ask what object it was intended to obtain on the right bank of the Danube, and what the result of its operations has been, except to lose 20,000 men by pestilence or battle ; to devastate the Danubian provinces ; to de velop the warlike spirit of Turkey in an unexpected degree ; to summon an an Anglo-French force into the Euxine and upon the Danube ; and to commit Russia to all the contingencies of a war which is daily becoming more serious ? The Russians crossed the Pruth in July lastbear. They had already established themselves in force upon the banks of the Danube, when the Porte, in September, took the bold step of declaring war. Eleven months of actual hostilities have, therefore, already elapsed, and during this interval the Russians have had plenty of time for striking a great blow, even before the approach of the combined auxiliaries, who did not arrive near the scene of warfare until June last. It was not, indeed, possible for them to repeat the campaign of Diebitsch, in 1829, by march ing from Varna to the Gulf of Bourgas, because the allied fleets kept the Russian squadron blockaded in Sebastopol; still there should have been found a plan, a goal, or, as strategists say, an "objective point," for the campaign. Now, throughout all the Russian movements during the eleven months, there is nothing to be discovered approaching to a definite and consecutive plan of operations. It appears that at first and during some consider able time the Russian generals were endeavouring to operate upon their extreme right, with the intention of crossing the Danube at Widdin, and marching upon Sophia, in order to turn the line of the Balkans. For this purpose they fomented an insurrection in Servia against the Porte, and directed the great mass of their forces upon the left flank of the Turks. As for provisions, they were brought down the Danube from Hungary or Servia, and thence conveyed by land carriage from Bulgrade towards Nissa or Sophia. The plan, no doubt, would have required two armies to carry it out effectually ; one for cffensive opera tions, the other to besiege or blockade the Turkish fortresses on the Danube. Nevertheless, it was not only formed, but persevered in to some ex tent, as was evidenced by the masses of troops con centrated at Bucharest and at Crajova, in Little Wal lachia, points which in the six campaigns that oc curred between 1808 and 1829 had played only secondary parts, and been garrisoned by little more than a few troops, comprising in all some four or five thousand men. In the campaign of 1853 4 the same district was occupied by two entire army corps. The Turks had, however, fortified Kalafat upon the Wallachian lank of the Danube. Instead of at tacking this place promptly, and forcing its garrison to retreat across the river before the works were com pleted, the Russians, by some unaccountable procras tination, afforded them time to surround this small town with formidable fortifications, which afterwards resisted all their attempts to capture it. The Turks possessed no other fortress on the left bank, but it was considered too important to be left in the rear of the Russian line of operations, and the first-formed plan of campaign was accordingly abandoned. Thenceforward the Russians appear to have had no other sy s t em th an t h a t o f occu pyi ng the whole r ine of the Danube, without pushing their operations across that river. Meanwhile, the Ottoman army had become or gan i se d w ith a ra pidity truly wonder ful: the tactics of European warfare had at last taken root amo ng it s f orces . Th e regu l ar troops ri valled those of Western nations in closeness of order and obedience to command ; and the irregulars, though almost undisciplined, were useful skirmishers, after the model of the Cossacks. Their leaders, well aware that they were not sufficiently skilful in strategy to give battle in the open field, confined themselves to defensive operations and to fighting behind walls. But there is an immense difference between an inert defence and an active defence, with offensive sallies. These last the Turks have incessantly renewed at . . every opportunity and with extraordinary spirit. During the winter of 1853-4 they encountered the ene • my in frequent skirmishes, and have never relaxed to the present moment in the system of perpetual, though partial, assaults. Often have they contested the possession of different small islands in the Da nube between Rutschuk and Giurgevo. At one time the intelligence of such engagements reached us by almost every post, and some of them were sufficiently important to be described in magniloquent bulletins by the Russians. Ultimately, however, in spite of boasting, the invader was almost reduced to a nega tive course of action, fortifying himself in Bucharest and Giurgevo without attempting further progress. The war then presented the singular spectacle of two opposing armies both acting strictly on the defensive. The initiative of all the offensive movements was almost invariably taken by the Turks. Among the numerous battles which they have subsequently fought, the most important were those of Oltenitza, Citate, and Karakal. At Oltenitza they accomplished a daring passage of the Danube in the face of the enemy, and maintained themselves for a fortnight in field entrenchments upon the left bank, retiring only upon the approach of formidable Russian masses, but without disorder,and prudently avoiding to compromise the only Ottoman army in a general engagement. At Citate, the garrison of Kalafat, in a vigorous and well executed sortie, overwhelmed the besieging division of the Russian army. At Karakal, upon the Aluta, in Little Wallachia, a corps of Russian cavalry was also discomfited with the loss of all its artillery. Still more recently the Turks took the offensive at Giur gevo, on July 7 captured that town, and fought a hot battle which did much honour to their military prow ess. No doubt the Russians have on their side ob tained advantages in many partial engagements, but they have obtained no result at all proportional to their boasted superiority in discipline, in strategy, or in the manoeuvring with artillery and cavalry. Once more the Russians seem to have changed their plan of campaign, and adopted one which is at tributed to the Emperor Nicholas himself, who com manded in person in the campaign of 1828, and which Prince Paskiewitch was now instructed to carry out. He began by contracting the front of the army, which had previously been extended along a line of eighty leagues, from Kalafat to the Lower Danube. Little Wallachia was then abandoned, and the forces concentrated upon the left, so as to occupy the Dobrudscha as far as Trejan's Wall, with the view of undertaking the siege of Silistria, according to the programme received from St. Petersburg. It is, however, not easy to assign the precise motive for at tempting this siege. By taking Silistria the Rus sians might, doubtless, have obtained a good tite-du pont upon the Danube; but any chance of turning it to account for the invasion of Turkey, as in 1829, was utterly frustrated from the moment that the al lies had commenced their disembarkation at Galli poli. It appears, therefore, that Silistria was besieged merely to make an impression upon the European public, and to prevent the long campaign from ter minating without the performance of some striking achievement. But the garrison of the fortress de fended themselves with heroic constancy for thirty nine days. Every assault of the besiegers was baffled, —even against the advanced earthwork of Arab Ta bia, where no less than four set attacks were de feated among the ruins of the entrenchments, which had been nearly obliterated by two mines and the fire of thirty pieces of cannon. Omer Pacha prudently remained during this siege in an attitude of observa• tion at Schumla, watching the progress of events, in readiness to act, but relying with justice on the ob stinate courage of the defenders. The Anglo-French army at this time began to arrive at Varna, where 50,000 men were soon assembled, with fresh rein forcements expected or received almost daily. Pre sently Marshal Pa-liewitch, being wounded, resigned the command, and the Russian army retreated with much precipitation from Silistria. The commenced evacuation of Wallachia, the sudden and purposeless return of the Russians upon the line of the Danube, and the renewal of the retrograde movements are events of very recent occurrence. A few days since Bucharest was quitted, after a useless and costly oc cupation of a whole year. Thus, at the close of a most menacing invasion and an enormous develop ment of force upon the Danube, the Russian Cabinet is now reduced to keep the defensive on its own ter ritory, where great events seem on the eve of accom plishment. A PLEAURE TRIP to the Baltic has been set on foot by a Glasgow speculator. A steamer will be dis patched from Glasgow about the 25th inst., will call at Copenhagen, Stockholm, and the station of the fleet, returning in three weeks. to operate upon their extreme right, with of crossing the Danube at Widdin, a upon Sophia, in order to turn the line of For this purpose they fomented an ii Servia against the Porte, and directed ti of their forces upon the left flank of th for provisions, they were brought dowi from Hungary or Servia, and thence land carriage from Bulgrade towards Ni The plan, no doubt, would have requir to carry it out effectually ; one for cli tions, the other to besiege or 1 Turkish fortresses on the Danube. N was not only formed, but persevered ii tent, as was evidenced by the masses I centrated at Bucharest and at Crajova, lachia, points which in the six campa curred between 1808 and 1829 hat secondary parts, and been garrisoned than a few troops, comprising in all sor thousand men. In the campaign a same district was occupied by two enti: The Turks had, however, fortified the Wallachian Sank of the Danube. tacking this place promptly, and forcii to retreat across the river before the WI pleted, the Russians, by some unaccoui tination, afforded them time to surrou town with formidable fortifications, wh resisted all their attempts to capture it possessed no other fortress on the left was considered too important to be left the Russian line of operations, and th plan of campaign was accordingly abai Thenceforward the Russians appeal no other system than that of occupy line of the Danube, without pushing tl across that river. Meanwhile, the had become organised with a rapidity ful : the tactics of European warfar taken root among its forces. The regi valled those of Western nations in clo: and obedience to command ; and the int almost undisciplined, were useful ski THE ALAND GROUP. Or this group of islands, which came into the possession of Russia in 1809, the largest is named Aland, whose total surface, including lake and morass, may be estimated at about forty-live square miles. It is upon one of , the southern inlets of this island that the fortress of Bomarsund close to Skarpniis, is constructed. The whole group con • sista of about 190 islands, of which little more than one fourth are inhabited, or habitable, by a population of from 12,000 to 13,0 10 souls, who live by breeding cattle and fishing. The character of the surface is nearly similar throughout. The rocky bottom is but thinly covered with vegetable soil. This, however, the inhabitants cultivate in such a manner as to be enabled to supply themselves with sufficient grain for their own consumption. Timber also grows with luxuriance, and the marshes supply abundant summer and winter forage for stock. The general group is separated from Sweden by the so-called Aland Channel, and from Finland by that of Skifet, which latter, in case of a serious attack by the combined fleets on Homarsund, will o: course be watched by our steamers, in order to cut off retreat either to Nystad or Abo. The principal islands contiguous to Aland are Lemband, on the south ; Simper land and Fiigle, south-east; Wardii, Kumplinge, Braude, and Euklinge, east ; and Signilskar and Ekerii, west. The largest towns on the main cluster are Saltwick, Ekerd, and Skarpens, which have markets. Winter sets in generally towards the end of October, and lasts for seven months with unabated rigour ; but from the middle of September the weather is variable, subject to sudden and violent storms, and the atmosphere loaded with dense fogs. Although the rocky sea-bottom is notoriously unequal, varying suddenly from twenty to two or three fathoms, ex cellent and safe anchorage is to be found in almost all the inlets, and especially in that running up to Skarpena. Much has been said of these islands not being tenable byWestern garrisons during long winters. Tins is absurd. Where an ill-fed Russian soldier can exist, a well•cared-for English or French man will not perish. Nor is the cold greater than that to which our troops are exposed in Canada. If navigation be interrupted, it is clear the Russians cannot make use of their vessels ; and as for marching a body of troops across the straits, over the fields of ice, such attempt falls into the domain of romance. Besides, if they could so move, it is to be supposed that the garrison would not be so much benumbed as to be incapacitated from re.• sistance. The Paris nautical journal the Moni leer de la Melte, after giving a topographical description of this group, and detailing the forces which compose the expedition against Bomarsund, appends the following remarks re specting the defensibility of the islands throughout the winter against attacks from the Russians " The most strategic point is, without contradiction, Bomarsund ; but neither the small extent of the roadstead commanded by that fortress, and in which it is said only six or eight vessels can bring their guns to bear ill broad side, nor its one hundred pieces of heavy artillery, nor its garrison of 5,01.10 men in ordinary times, and which at present must be doubled, will prevent Bomarsund from falling into the power of our admirals after a vigorous attack. Six vessels moored with their broadsides to the farts would present nut fewer than three hundred cannon, which would throw enormous masses of iron with precision and rapidity. When the forts shall have been dismantled, all, or nearly all, their pieces dismounted, and the breach , swept and rendered inoffensive, our companies of disem barkation, sailors, artillery, and marines, ►ided by the expeditionary corps, cannot meet with any serious obstacle ; the colours of France and England will float in the place of the humiliated standard of the Emperor of all the Russia'. We must not, it is true, flatter ourselves on a victory without fatigue and without peril; but neither our army nor our fleet will require, in order to make sure of the triumph, to disguise or forget the energy of the resistance. If the laurels of Aland are certain, they will cost sufficiently dear in the gathering to deserve to be called glorious. Our expeditionary army, destined probably to winter in our new conquest, will easily find abundant provisions. Without speaking of the sup plies which will be left by the fleets, the country itself will afford some. Our troops will not have to fear either famine or scarcity. Can they be exposed to a danger of another kind? Will the Russians, attempting an in vasion across the frozen sea, endeavour to dislodge them? No doubt, when the winter is very severe the straits which separate the archipelago from the continental coasts are covered during tevcral months with thick ice, and it is easy to go on foot from St. Petersburg to Stockholm. No doubt, armies have crossed the Baltic drawing the heaviest artillery ; have encamped on the ice ; and have also lighted their bivouack fires with as muck security as on land. We have not forgotten the exploits of the intrepid Charles Gustavus, who, at the head of his army, with artillery and cavalry, crossed the sound in 165$ to make war on Denmark. We can also quote a more recent fact : in February, ISO 9, the Russians went front Abo, across the ice, to seize the Aland isles. All that is certain. lint the cold of all the winters is not of equal intensity. Besides, on the other hand, if the ice creates for us a danger on the part of Russia, it will have the advantage of facilitating for us, on the part of Sweden, the arrival of supplies, and of the means of defence. Finally, fallen into our power, the fortifications of the archipelago of Aland will soon be placed in such a state of defence by our engineer officers that they will easily resist any attack whatsoever. More over, if some of our vessels could winter, as is possible, in the ice, they will constitute around our camp a cordon of impregnable fortresses." A HUGE BOA CONSTRICTOR was brought to England by the Brazilian steamer Thames a few days ago. It was as thick round as a man's leg, and about 14 feet long. It was remarkably savage. It is the property of Count Lavratlio, the Portuguese ambassador in this country. 713