The Press. — London, England, 1858-06-19 00:00:00

office of Commander-in-Chief; directing the whole a rmy from the Horse Guards, in order to centre all military control in one Secretary of State for War, who should himself be under the direct control of Parliament—thus, in fact, taking the command of the army into its own hands. Nor is it such questions alone that the house takes upon itself to decide. The Jews, upon the strength of its sole decision, must be ad mitted to take their seats in Parliament ; the ancient right of the Church to rates must be abandoned at the bidding of what is ominously termed a "commanding majority." Thus legis lation, which our forefathers thought required a politic caution and prolonged deliberation to make it safe, is rapidly becoming a thing of po pular resolution and railroad celerity, without regard either to the danger of collision or of run ning off the line. We have made these observations, not because we are any enemies to the just rights and con stitutional powers of the House of Commons, but because we have observed in it of late a tendency to override the other estates of the realm, and to constitute its sole will the law. In the opinion of men of large experience, there never was a more uncertain and ungovernable Parliament than the present—which will become known to posterity as the Palmerston Parliament, since it was returned, not to support a principle, but an individual. Many of its members, being new to legislation, seem to think that an overweening confidence and a daring presumption are the sole qualifications for a perfect legislator. But these are only the common characteristics of ignorance combined with inexperience. To make progress is not always to improve ; to advance is not always to get nearer the destined end. The true legislator may, indeed, catch his ultimate object with an intuitive glance; but his move ments towards it will always be slow, because careful ;—deliberate, because intended to be de cisive. Time is required to produce anything solid and permanent. Patience will achieve safer results than a precipitate activity. here Nature herself is our teacher—all of whose pro cesses are slow where the products are designed to be lasting. All legislation that proceeds not upon this principle is vulgar in the conception, and perilous in the execution. Great, undoubtedly, is the rightful power of the house of Commons, and long may it be able to preserve its greatness, and the spirit that be longs to true greatness, at the full ; and it will do so as long as, instead of being a breaker of law, it is content to help in being a maker of law. The bow of power if overstrained will in evitably snap. We want a Parliament elected under the influence of some great constitutional prin ciple—not one evoked only to support one particular person. Our regret is that Mr. CARDWELL did not push his vote of censure to its decisive issue, even though the Govern ment had been beaten ' • for then we should have had a dissolution followed by a new elec tion, in which the cry would have been, not PALMERSTON, but Right—a policy of justice tempered with mercy, not a policy of ruthless confiscation. We can have no doubt how the people of England would have responded to that cry. But no House of Commons, we arc convinced, can be fully trusted till we have had another reform in that House. Nothing is made more clear by late proceedings than the necessity for this. And if the Conservatives are wise, they, we think, will be the first and the most forward in demanding Reform—a large and generous Reform, in which the intelligent middle classes of England shall be really represented. The great Conservative party need not, we are persuaded, be at all afraid to cast themselves upon the con fidence of their countrymen at large. The last RefOrm Bill was carried by the Whigs, and they made it onesided; the next Reform Bill ought to be, and it is but fair that it should be, intro duced and carried by the Conservatives, if only for th e purpose of making even the balance. The Whigs will, no doubt, if this be done, seek to avail themselves of certain popular cries, and appeal, as is their wont, to the passions, not the reason of the people. But this will not avail them so w ell now as it did thirty years ago. There is a much larger middle class, with a much larger amount of general intelligence, which will keen people from being so easily deceived. Thou- THE PRESS, JUNE 19, 1858. sands have seen the results of a Whig Reform, and grown wise. The people will understand a cry which is based upon "our power in danger." They will not need to be told that there is truth in the remark made by one who knew human nature well,—" That a Reformer who seeks " improvement, appeals to the higher ranks ; but " that he who seeks only innovation, appeals to " the lower." honesty is in all cases the best policy. Only let the Conservatives honestly bring in a honest Reform Bill, and appeal to the country, if necessary, to support them in it, and we shall not despair of yet seeing a House of Commons returned that can be at once respected and trusted. THE MILITIA. Tux people of this country, we think, rather like to be frightened. The pleasing excitement of a gentle panic is never wholly unwelcome to them. What a ghost story is to a schoolboy, rumours of wars are to the British public—a thing which they cannot make up their minds either to believe or to disbelieve—an idea at which they shudder, but which, nevertheless, has a strange fascination for them—which they pore over, like the aforesaid stripling over the " Mysteries of Udolpho," till they are frightened at their own shadows; yet, at the same time, would scarcely sacrifice the stimulant thus afforded to the imagi nation to be rid of all the terrors that dog them. Now, nothing is further from our purpose than to encourage this morbid appetite. All that we propose to say on the subject now before us is irrespective of the circumstances of the moment. We have said the same thing whenever the same question has arisen during the last two years. And the justice of our remarks has been only strengthened, and not caused, by the war in China, the rebellion in India, and our diffi culties with the kingdom of Naples. It would seem incredible, did we not know it to be the case, that any man of sense should have supposed that, with the fall of Sebastopol, Europe would return into precisely the same state that she was in before the Russian war. So great a convulsion as that by which a forty years peace was broken up, could not fail to leave disturbance behind it, even when the storm was over. The swell and heave of the ocean does not subside at once with the gale that caused it. A war at once so short and so vigorous as that which was two years ago concluded leaves behind a large residuum in the shape of unsettled minds and unsatisfied pro jects. And even had the Indian outbreak not taken place, it is our firm conviction that no English Minister would have been doing his duty who neglected to provide for a permanent reinforcement of our military re sources. Under present circumstances there cannot, of course, be two opinions on the subject. But we have penned the above observations from a sin cere hope that the Commission alluded to by Lord IIARDINGE on Monday last will conduct its inquiries without exclusive reference to the existing tax upon our energies. A commission to inquire into the best method of utilizing our Militia force is a step in the right direction, and a fresh evidence of the practical and energetic character of Lord DERBY'S Administration. We are certain that the statement of Lord HARDINGE will give universal satisfaction to the country. But we must repeat our conviction that the labours of the Commission will be only half as fruitful as they might be, if they do not lead in the direction of some perm anent settlement re specting this useful and truly national arm of our def ences. An emergency has elicited the Com mission, but the work they have to do is inde pendent of emergencies. And from the tone of 581 the various speakers last Monday, we may con clude that the House of Lords in the main saw the question in the same light. The principal point to which Noble Lords directed their attention on that occasion was whether the Militia should be regarded as a reserve force or as a nursery of recruits for the Line. Those who, like Lord GREY, seem to object to this iiirce altogether strive to reduce its advocates to the following dilemma. If the Militia, they would say, is to be a reserve force, it interferes with the regular army; if a recruit ing establishment, it is more costly than the ordinary system. Now, in the first of these statements there appears to be a double miscon ception. In the first place, few men go into the Militia who would, in its absence, have gone into the Line, and, consequently, the men so enlisted are so much clear gain to our military strength. In the second place, the Militia, be it remem bered, is as serviceable as the regular army. There is no practical difference between a regi ment of the Line and a regiment of Militia that has been embodied for two or three years. The one are as good soldiers as the other. And, con sequently, all we have to inquire is simply this, whether we get more or less men in the aggregate by calling out the Militia ; and not to which arm of the service recruits will most readily betake themselves, which is a trivial question in com parison. "Could any one," said Lord GREY, tell him why, looking at the great armed force " that we maintained during the Spanish war, " and considering the great increase in our popu " lotion, in the two years of the last war we were " only able to add to our army the contemptible " number of 37,000 ? This was mainly owing to " the Militia, which was kept up at 65,000 men." Now, how many of those 65,000 men would have gone into the army if the Militia had not been there? We suspect uncommonly few. Lord Lyrri.EroN hit the right nail upon the head when he said,— " With regard to the statement that men were not got for the army fast enough, the reason was to be found in the fact that in the army they were not paid enough, were not made comfortable enough, and had no sufficient prospect of a pro vision tbr their old age." The lower orders in this country are now a great deal better off than they were during the Peninsular war. And there are few young men indeed who cannot do better for themselves than anything which the service offers. Under these circumstances the Militia had a twofold use. From its temporary character it induced a certain class of men to give the profession of arms a trial who could not have been induced other wise; while a certain per-centage of them, owing to their gradual initiation, were persuaded to adopt it for good, and join the regular army. Such, too, seems to be the opinion of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief : " He thought it might be made useful for both the objects to which it had been turned. By good regulation he believed that Militia regi ments might be kept complete for the purposes of the defence of the country, and yet afford valuable assistance in recruiting the ranks of the regular army." The fact is, there are two ways of recruiting the regular army. Individuals or companies may be taken from Militia regiments and incor porated with regiments of the Line, or entire regiments of the former may undertake the work of the latter. When Gibraltar and the Mediter ranean can he garrisoned by Militia regiments in the highest state of efficiency, it is idle to talk of the Militia interfering with the regulars. It might just as well be said that the police force interferes with them—and so to some extent it does ; or that railways interfere with them—and no doubt to some extent they do; or any other modern means of obtaining a livelihood unknown to the poor man of fifty years ago. The question is, what work can the Militia do—either on actual service, or as a means of softening down the more unpopular features of the military pro fession at the threshold? If experience is favour able to them on these two points, it would be almost as reasonable to complain that the Line interfered with them as that they interfered with the Line. A