The Press. — London, England, 1854-12-16 00:00:00

DECEMBER 16, 1854. an achievement to be looked upon with national pride? Ido no:, deny the activity which prevailed during two or three months, but why was not that activity anticipated by two or three months ? (Hear, hear.) What did you do ? You sent out from 25,000 to 30,000 men, and having done that you held your hands and said, " We have done all that is necessary." Yon exhausted every available means to send out these 25,000 or 30,000 men, and you then had to depend upon a raw militia and to your recruiting power for making a slight increase to the army. And when you sent out these men in conjunction with the French army did you suppose that neither disease, nor the sword, nor casualties would have the slightest im pression upon that small force of 25,000 ? (Hear, hear.) If so, where were your Mediterranean garri sons? Why were they not increased beyond their ordinary and very insufficient strength? And where was your second army of reserve ? Hear, hear.) Where were your reinforcements' You had them not. You had nothing in the shape of an army of reserve except the reserves you had in England, which were unavailable in case of disaster, and con sequently you launched forth your army to depend upon its own resources without sufficient provision being made for them, or due foresight exercised upon the part of the British Government. ("Hear, hear," and cheers.) Perhaps it may be said that the object for which the troops were sent out was the defence of Con stantinople and the support of the army of Omer Pacha, in preventing the Russians from penetrating further into the principalities. Setting aside the very subordinate condition in which that hypothesis places the British army, I say that, from the first, that was not the declaration of the British Govern ment of the intention and object of the war. Nor was it possible for the war to be limited to such an object. I remember that on the 19th of June, in answer to my noble and learned friend, who is not now in his place (Lord Lyndhurst), the noble earl opposite declared, as he had declared before, that the object of the war was not merely to afford pro tection to Constantinople, but to settle at once and for ever that question of Russian supremacy which had been growing in importance for years, not to say centuries—which had been forced upon us, and which was to be settled once and for ever. (Hear, hear.) That was the declaration made by the noble earl on the 19th of June, and it was made in almost similar terms on the 31st of March, the day on which the Queen's message announcing the declara tion of war was delivered. It may be said that when the principalities were relieved from Russian inva sion the whole course of the campaign was altered — that, in fact, the allies assumed the offensive, and gave up the defensive. I can understand that argu ment, but I don't admit it, because I consider that before the siege of Silistria was raised you were bound to ulterior objects, to attain which a force of 25,000 men was entirely inadequate. (Hear.) But when the siege of Silistria was raised, what had you to say ? The siege of Silistria was raised about the 23rd of June, the Turkish troops had been victorious, and by their own unassisted efforts had repelled the invaders, who, from strategical reasons had retraced their steps and withdrew from the principalities. Then, my lords, some alteration of your c ourse fol lowed upon that altered state of affairs, and indeed we have from the declaration of the Government them selves, an intimation that towards the middle of July the expedition to the Crimea was decided upon. The President of the Council on the 24th of July made a most remarkable statement in the House of Commons, in which he declared that there could be no hope of a just and honourable peace so long as Russia was permitted to hold the menacing position she occupied in Sebastopol. (Hear, hear.) I remember that when a noble and learned friend of mine referred to the conduct of the war and to an expedition to the Crimea, the noble earl at the head of her Majesty's Government reproached him as indiscreet, observing that he was only affording the Emperor of Russia an opportunity of fortifying and strengthening the works of Sebastopol. I don't think the Emperor of Russia required any such warning. On the contrary, he seems to have been much more alive to the exigencies of the case than her Majesty's Govern ment, and for years he seems to have been incessantly labouring in fortifying Sebastopol, and rendering it as impregnable as possible. Well, my lords, on the '24th of July, Lord John Russell, in the other House of Parliament announced that Russia could no longer be permitted to hold her menacing position in the Crimea, and we knew, from the explanations that took place at that period, that an expedition to the Crimea had been decided upon. And decided upon by whom ? It was decided upon by the Government at home. I have here a state ment made by the noble earl opposite (Earl Gran ville) to the Staffordshire yeomanry, at the beginning of October. He said : Government did not conceal from themselves the great responsibility of their urging on the commanders of both services an attack upon Sebastopol ; they were not ignorant of the opinion entertained by many distinguished officers THE PRESS. of every country in Europe, that, if not impregnable, the attempt was of a most difficult nature; but they did feel that the independence and integrity of Turkey was a mere joke so long as that fortress was deemed impreima ble. . . . And they (the Government) did think that, with the assistance of the French, those two forces, acting in co-operation, could achieve all that it was pos sible for men to accomplish. Lord John Russell on the 27th of October observed — Immediately after the siege of Silistria was raised it became a question both with the Government at home and with the generals, what should be done on the shores of the Black Sea. I should have thought that even before the raising of the siege of Silistria it had Keen considered what should be done next, supposing the siege to be raised. It appears, however, that only in the event of the siege of Silistria being raised did the Government determine what to do next. (Hear.) The noble lord continues, — The Government at home thought the time was come to occupy the Crimea and capture Sebastopol. The in structions of the Governments of England and Francis were received at Varna about the middle of July; a meet ing of the generals of the allied forces took place, and the expedition was resolved upon. Thus, by the confession of two noble lords, one in this and one in the other House of Parliament, it ' was the Government at home, notwithstanding the representations made by generals of high distinction of the almost insuperable difficulties of an attack upon Sebastopol, who urged on the commanders of the allied forces the necessity of making the attempt. It was not the act of the generals in command of the army, but it was urged upon them by the Govern ment at home, and, being so urged, it became doubly the duty of the Government at home to see that no single circumstance was omitted, and no provision neglected, which was calculated to contri bute to the success of the war. (" Hear, hear," and cheers.) Well, my lords, what steps were taken? What steps were taken from the middle of June, when you received intelligence of the raising of the siege of Silistria, and when you began to consider " what next?" What steps were taken to reinforce your army of 25,000 men? What were the extensive operations which you in your wisdom determined upon? I believe that reinforcements were sent out of something like 5,000 men, and from that time till after the battle of Inkermann—l don't mean to say that driblets here and there may not have gone out —but from that time till after the battle of Inker mann, when the 46th arrived in the field, the army, which was originally composed of from 25,000 to 30,000 men, was left without reinforcements. (Hear, hear.) The battle of Inkermann was fought by not more than 8,000 out of from 14,000 to 15,000 British bayonets, which was all the force then left in the Crimea. (Hear, hear.) In calling attention, then, to the course which Government pursued, I cannot refrain from saying that they took steps in the dark without calculating the consequences of their actions, and without making provision to secure success. (Hear.) I have now to mention a subject which, perhaps, I ought to have mentioned before. Her Majesty's Government sent out these troops originally to Varna, and I must ask your lordships' permission to read to you a statement from an eye-witness, a gallant friend of mine, well known to your lordships, but whose name I am not permitted to mention at present, who was anxious that in the discussion this day justice should be done to the merits of the army, and no undue reproaches cast upon them. My gallant friend says:— I have no idea what line you intend to pursue, but I do hope that there is to be no reproach of delay at Scutari or Varna. From too close an economy we had given up all those necessary appendages for a field army without which it can neither take care of itself nor move against the enemy. We had regiments, and very good ones, but no thing else. No commissariat, no staff corps, no waggon train, no medical establishment for the field. All this, and, still more important, a transport system fbr cavalry and artillery, bad to be formed and organised in a country affording absolutely nothing to help you; and I protest, when I look back on the work done in the organisation of the army at Scutari and Varna, I am enre that nothing but the spirit and zeal of English officers could have carried it out. The chief blundering was in the shipment of stores without method or order, by which no one knew where to find them. One day I had 100 men searching the Turkish Custom-house for missing tent•poles, which were found after eight hours' labour. What was the consequence of all this ? That the army was incapable of movement, that it was detained in inaction, amid the pestiferous atmosphere of Varna, and there, "night by night," says my correspon dent, Those dreadful graves, fifty or sixty feet long, were dug of an evening on the hill near Varna for the poor fellows sere to die in the night. Surely these are circumstances which raise to the highest pitch the indomitable courage and energies of the men. It might be necessary, my lords, that when the army marched to the banks of the Alma, or even when it marched from Alma to Balaklava and Inkermann, 1203 it should carry with it a small amount of baggage. It would hardly be possible to carry with it any super fluities, but certainly it ought to have had medical supplies and comforts for the hospitals at Varna and Scutari. If such advances as have been made were to be attempted, these supplies ought to have been at hand. The Government had ample means of taking them, and every arrangement ought to have been made to secure them. At one time it was denied that there was any want of medical attendance ; we were told that there was a larger proportion of medical officers than ever had been known upon any previous expedition sent out by this country. I re member seeing two or three columns occupied in one of the newspapers full of particulars as to the amount of stores, and when public charity and sympathy came forward with otters of assistance—of stores of all descriptions, linen, rags, and other appliances for the wounded—they were t old that there was abun dance of everything, that there was no want of sup plies, that there was abundance both of medicines and of medical officers. . Well, a lady has been sent out under the sanction of the Government—a lady to whose heroism and that of her companions it is impossible for language to do justice—(cheers)—who, giving up all the com forts and luxuries of life, devoted themselves with noble self-devotion to the mitigation of suffering and to the supervision of those overcrowded hospitals. What was the account contained in the very first demand made by these ladies sent out under the sanction of Government? Why, it was an ardent, an almost importunate request to the British public to send out that which the Government said was already supplied in profusion; and this was accom panied by the statement that in one day eleven men had sunk from exhaustion, in consequence of not having a bottle of wine to restore them, (Heat, hear.) Now, this is a subject in regard to which, I say, a heavy responsibility devolves upon the Govern ment. (Hear.) I cannot tell how far these charges are correct, but I know they are in every man's mouth ; and I felt, consequently, that it was my duty as a peer of Parliament, and as one deeply interested in the welfare of the brave men whom we have sent out to fight our battles, to comment upon what is generally said ; and I therefore ask the Government not only to deny, but to disprove these statements, if disprove them they can. (Hear, hear.) Well, then, you have lately sent out—" too late," again !—(Hear, hear)—you sent out on the 15th of October, for the first time, a supply of winter cloth ing for the troops, who were absolutely in rags and about to encounter the horrors of a Crimean winter. On the 15th of October you sent out to Balaklava an abundant supply of winter clothes. You embarked them on board a magnificent vessel, how manned and commanded, I ask the noble duke to explain You sent out also large stores of ammunition, toge ther with this supply of warm winter clothing, as well as medicines and medical comforts. The medi cal stores ought to have been landed at Scutari, but when the vessel arrived there it was found that all these stores, although first directed to Scutari, were deposited in the hold beneath piles of ammunition and shot, so that it was impossible to get at theta without discharging and unloading the whole of the ammunition and general stores. (Hear, hear.) Ul timately the vessel went on to Balaklava. At Bala klava Bay, if I am not misinformed, this vessel, after losing two of her anchors, was for seven days allowed to drag outside, although having on board a cargo of inestimable value—in money value, I believe, some thing like half a million, but, of a value at that ma. ment net. to be measured by money. (Hear, hear.) Yes, I am told—but I can hardly believe it—that for seven days that vessel was dragging in thirty-fathom water in the open sea outside the roads of Balaklava —that she was not taken inside ; and the conse quence was the loss of that vessel, of her cargo, am munition, warm clothing, and medical stores. (Hear, hear.) And now there is another question I wish to ask the noble earl and her Majesty's Government. I should be sorry to cast any unjust or undeserved stigma upon those who are no longer living to be made responsible to the country ; but I am told (and I have it on authority which I believe to be valid) that representations had been made to the First Lord of the Admiralty to the effect that the com mander of the ship to which I am referring, the Prince, to which you were intrustmg such a priceless cargo, was wholly incompetent to take such a trust, and had proved himself so incompetent upon his voyage to the Baltic, that, in the opinion of a dis tinguished officer, if that vessel were sent out under the command of that captain she would be lost upon her voyage. Moreover, I am told that the officer whose opinion was thus expressed was asked if he would commit this statement to writing; that he did so; that that statement was handed to the First Lord of the Admiralty, and, notwithstanding such a state ment was received on such an authority, this vessel, purchased by the Government, was not sent out under the command of an officer in her Majesty's