The Press. — London, England, 1857-08-01 00:00:00

742 calm the population and at the same time inquire into their grievances and attempt to battle their manteuvres and conspiracies? Why, the people of India, who for a long series of years, as I have endeavoured to show tonight, and l think not unsuccessfully, had been preparing for an outbreak, found that as soon as a struggle in Europe had ceased Asia was made the scene of war in mare than one quarter. (hear, hear.) The most powerful class of Maliumedans—the Shiites—heard that you were going to make war upon an Oriental monarch and that monarch the bead of their religion. There was nothing in that in• telligence which tended to remove their disaffection, and before they bad recovered from it they found there was war in China. The condition of India in 1856 has been shown to you by Lord Canning, in what may be called a wail of lamentation over the state of our Indian empire and the paucity of troops at his disposal. Nevertheless, at that very period troops were sent to Persia and to China, and the Madras army was told that it must garri son Vega. At the time when it was the policy of England to soothe and tranquillise India, and to remedy the Brie• vances occasioned by feeble government, our Ministers had the hardihood to raise the torch of war in every direction throughout the East. (Hear, hear.) I am told that only 5,000 men went away, and 5,000 came or are coming back. Do you think that the nations of India count your troops upon their fingers? They know that your troops are going away ; they hope that you may have to send more; and deciding broadly upon these facts, they do not inquire how many are going or how many are coming back; it is sufficient for them to know that you have war in Persia and in China, and that your European troops are gradually leaving the great peninsula. That being the state of the case, the time being ripe, the occasion being offered—offered by the Government of England—a pretext only was wanted ; and a pretext was soon found. Your cartridges greased in a manner to out. rage their religious belief—men lost their caste by serving the power which they had so long obeyed. I will not go into the question as to whether the cartridges complained of are the same as have always been used, as we have been told is the case. I did not suppose any one will after this discussion suppose that because the cartridges were be. lieved to be or were pretended to be believed to be greased with pig's fat or cow's fat that that was the cause of this insurrection. (Hear.) I hope at least that the rising generation in pa►liamentary life, who are now entering upon their career amid occurrences which will furnish ample materials for long discussions during many years in this house—that they will not too hastily accept such superficial ideas. I can assure them that the rise and fall of empires are not affairs of greased cartridges. (Hear, hear.) Such results are occasioned by adequate causes and by an accumulation of adequate causes. (Hear, hear.) I have now, sir, endeavoured imperfectly, lam aware, to sketch the causes which 1 believe to have led to the present condition of our Indian empire. I have omitted many things, and many of importance, from an effort to avoid over!oading the subject with details, and 1 know I have subjected myself thereby to many oh. servations in reply, which I might have avoided, had it not been for an anxious apprehension of trespassing too long upon the attention of the house. But I hope at least I have conveyed to the house with clearness the general positions I wish to establish—( Hear, hear)—by which I do not seek to gain any fleeting party triumph, but that after well and deeply considering and properly discussing this subject we may arrive at some safe conclusion for our future guidance. The right hon. gentleman then discussed the means which the Government ought to adopt to meet the present emergency A mere military mutiny may be met by a mere military effort. But if, on the contrary, what we have to deal with be an insurrection favoured by the great mass of the popu- lation, our measures must, as I think, be both in nature and degree different from those of which we have had an intimation from her Majesty's Government. Looking open this as a national revolt, I cannot arrive at a belief that the measures announced by the Government, merely military measures, are adequate to the occasion. (Hear.) I should doubt whether they were adequate for a mere military mutiny, but under no circumstance, did I believe, as the Government appear to believe, that this is a mere military mutiny, would I presume to offer any strong opinion upon their conduct. If when a mere military mutiny is to be put down the Government cannot be trusted wtth the settlement of the amount of force to be applied and the means by which success is to be achieved, what confidence could be placed in them at all ? Therefore, if I agreed that this was a military mutiny only, evert if I was of opinion that the force they recommended was not sufficient for the occasion, I should leave the responsibility to them, and if they failed in their object from want of means Parliament would be able to exact a due account. But, concluding, as I do, that this is a national revolt, I do not think that the means announced by the Govern• ment are adequate to the occasion. Let us consider what are the means with which the Government intend to save our empire. We heard at first of 14,00 t) men to be sent out, but nearly onelialf of that amount consisted of reliefs. Some 11,000 of those men are to fill up the vacancies among the European ranks in India; so that, although the total number of troops to be sent out amounts we are now told from 20,000 to 25,000, yet the additional force we shall furnish will only be 18,000 or 10,000 men. Of that number how many can be fairly estimated ever to appear in the field ? Them will be the per centage of loss from the voy age, the per centage of loss from climate, and the casualties of warfare, even before actual war has begun. You cannot expect that of those 14,000 or 19,000 men more than 15,000 fresh troops will arrive on the field in India. 'ro my mind, our efforts should be on a much greater scale. There should be not oniy an advance from Calcutta through Bengal, but also an expedition advancing up the Indus, and I am not certain that the latter is not the more impor. \ THE PRE SS, AuGust 1, 1857. taut of the two expeditions. It is only in that manner you can embrace and command your empire, and the means announced are not adequate to a demonstration of that kind, and it could not be done unless the noble lord takes much bolder steps than he seems inclined at present to adopt. I think he ought to call out the militia—not only call them out, but embody them ; and I do not understand, unless the noble lord does this, how lie can maintain the war with effect. Besides, it is of the utmost importance to establish in this country a powerful and ample reserve. (Hear, hear.) How can that be done unless you not only call out but embody the militia? The noble lord said the other night, in reply to some observations of mine, that he saw no use in calling out the militia, except to make that a means of recruiting the regular army. No doubt it is a high privilege and a noble duty for the militia to recruit the ranks of the regular army, but I cannot agree that it is the first duty of the militia. Their first duty is to defend our hearths, and I do not see, not caring to allude to the present state of Europe, but simply regarding the alarming condition of Asia, what steps can be taken for the proper maintenance of our national defences unless the militia be called out and embodied, and the noble lord comes down to the house to ask for ample means to prosecute the war in which we have embarked. I have made these observations as to force, and I should not have ventured to make any criticism upon the acts of the Government upon this subject if I had been able to agree with them as to the causes of the disturbance. Ilut to my mind that is not all that we ought to look to. Even if we do vindicate our authority with complete success— if we do revenge the insult we have received—if we rebuild the power that has been destroyed, it appears to me that we have still a very great and responsible task before us, for it is impossible, even in the moment of action, to drive from our consideration not merely the future of India, but also the present condition and feeling of the great mass of the population. We may poor our legions and our fleets up the rivers and through the provinces of India. We may be successful, but to my mind we should add to that success and doubly strengthen our force—and I am pre pared, for one, to give any support to her Majesty's Govern ment which they may require for that purpose—( Hear, hear)—if at the same time we should say to India that supposes she is aggrieved and outraged—to India perhaps despairing of pardon, " Although we will assert with the highest hand our authority —although we will not rest until our unquestioned supremacy and predominance are acknowledged, from the Punjaub to Cape Comorin—it is not merely as avengers that we appear." I think that the great body of the population of that country ought to know that there is for them a future hope. 1 think we ought to temper justice with mercy—justice the most severe with mercy the most indulgent. ( Hear, hear.) But how are you to do that? What step are you pre oared to take ? How are you going, let me ask, to govern India, when, as I have heard, it has been circulated on the highest authority that the native army in Bengal no longer exists? Has the house well considered the consequences of so easily saving that as the native army of Bengal has no longer any existence we should substitute it by English regiments? I do not wish to view the question as a ques tion of finance. This country is in that condition at the present moment which will not permit us to dwell upon such considerations. But, suppose you had 100,000 or 200,000 Englishmen in India, could you govern India with such men ? You might as well talk of governing India with a House of Commons. (A laugh.) NVhy, the supposition that you are to have an army of Europeans to govern Tndia assumes a complete revolution, both in your external policy and in your internal administration. (Cheers.) How are you to invade kingdoms like Pegu, how are you to conquer countries like the Punjaub, with men of English constitution ? How could they journey through those burning deserts and perform those actions which now are with facility performed by the native troops ? You could not do it. Look at the position of the English regiments in India. We have been obliged to guard them up to the moment of those battles which they have been called upon to fight, and which they have invariably won. Well, then, whet is to be Mill of your foreign policy? It no longer exists. You must entirely change all your relations with the States conterminous with your Indian empire. But look at your internal ad ministration. Can you levy your revenues with English troops ? (Herr, hear.) Are English troops to be put at every outpost? Are they to escort the money from your treasuries? Are they to perform all those duties which now are with facility performed by those whose nature and organisation adapt them to live and work in that country? I: is totally impossible that you can ever govern 100,000,000 of men merely by European agency. (Hear.) You must meet that difficulty boldly and completely. Well, then, the course which I recommend is this :—You must at once, whether you have received news of success or of some defeat, tell the people of India that the rela tions between them and their ruler and sovereign Queen Victoria shall be drawn nearer. (Loud cheers.) You must act upon the opinion of India on that subject imme• diately ; and you can only act upon the opinion of Eastern nations through their imagination. (Hear, hear.) You ought to have a royal commission sent by the Queen from this country to India immediately to inquire into the grievances of the various classes of that population. ( Cheers.) You ought to have a royal proclamation to the people of India, declaring that the Queen of England is not a sovereign who will countenance the violation of treaties—(cheers)—that the Queen of England is not a sovereign who will disturb the settlement of property— ( Hear, hear)—that the Queen of England is a sovereign who will respect their laws, their usages, their customs, and, above all, their religion. (Hear, hear.) Do this, and do this not in a corner, but in a mode and manner which will attract universal attention and excite the general hope of Hindostan, and you will do as much as all your fleets and armies can achieve. (Hear, hear.) But to do this you must act with vigour. You must send to that country the men who are most entitled to such office, and who shall appear in Hindostan and demand possession in the Queen's name. if that be done simul taneously with the arrival of your forces you may depend upon it that your military advances will be precipitated, and I believe your ultimate success will be insured. (Hear, hear.) Sir, no one can be more sensible than myself that I have inost imperfectly treated this great question. I may be asked why, with these convictions, I have ended these observations only with a motion for papers. It may be said that if the views of the Government and those that I have expressed appear to be so contrary, " Why don't you assert your opinions in a resolution, and call upon Perna went to sanction it ? " (Hear, hear.) I will state the reason why I have not taken that course. I thought that it was of very great importance that at this emergency the Parliament of England should not shrink from entering into a discussion upon this question. It appeared to mu that if were to return to our counties in silence we should have abdicated our functions—(loud cheers)—and lest all claim on the confidence of the people. It is at these momenta that we who are the great council of the nation should stand forward to be the guides and gusrdiana of the people of this country. The opinions of the Govern ment upon it have not been expressed in such a decided manne►—they have not been adopted so long that I can despair to find that their minds will rise with the occasion, and that they will embrace a more vigorous and larger policy than they have hitherto seemed to intimate or re commend. I cannot renounce the hope that even the dis cussion of this night, after others may perhaps have been listened to more competent than myself, may elicit from the Government a declaration which may carry some hope and confidence to the people. If they should take that course, see in what a position we should then be placed. A united Parliament and a strong Government are two circumstances most necessary in the difficult position in which we are placed. (Cheers.) That is a consideration that has influenced my mind. It is not that I myself on this or on any other subject ou which I might recommend a policy would shrink from responsibility; but I wish to show to Europe and to Asia that it is not the desire of a Parliament to overthrow a Ministry to save an empire. ( Cheers.) I trust, therefore, that this discussion will at least elicit such a declaration of policy on the part of• the Government that the only duty of the House of Commons in future will be to support it with cordial sincerity. If they do not take that course—if they adopt insufficient means, and public disaster occur—deep will he their re sponsibility. We shall meet again perhaps sooner than this house expects ; and if they neglect their duty to their country, 1, for one, will not shrink from responsibility. I will then appeal with confidence to an indignant people and to a determined Parliament, and I will ask them with united energies to save an endangered empire. (Great cheering.) Sir, I beg to move that there be laid before this house : —I. Copy of any minute or despatch addressed to the Governor General of India by his Ex cellency the Commander-in• Chief, the late Major-General the Hon, G. Anson, dated on or about March, 1856, rela tive to the state of the Bengal army. 2. Copy of a report on the organisation of the Bengal army, drawn up by the late Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Napier, and trans mitted to his Grace the Duke of Wellington, K.G. Mr. VERNON SMITH said Mr. Disraeli had repre sented the mutiny as a national revolt, but he had adduced na evidence to show that it was owing to national discontent. No native prince had been con cerned in it, and there was not a shadow of evidence of any conspiracy among the native princes. The system pursued by Lord Dalhousie in regard to adoption might be right or wrong, and before that question was decided the law of succession in each State must be inquired into ; but this subject had no connection whatever with the revolt. With regard to the distnrbanee of property, there had been a com mission to inquire into enam lands, some of which had been acquired by fraud and corruption, and this may have created a good deal of discontent among certain classes. It was impossible not to lament that such a disturbing oration should have been made. Mr. Smith denied that "warning " had been given ; and, with regard to the papers moved for, one was not in existence, and the other did not apply to the case, and its production could not consequently be of any use. As to the causes of the outbreak, it was altogether premature to pass any opinion. Mr. Smith deprecated the idea of superseding Lord Canning; but mentioned that the Government had intimated to him that, if he thought a commission of civil or of military officers would be useful, under existing circumstances, such a commission would be granted. If the house had no confidence in the Government of India, either at home or in the East, they should strike at it directly and at once ; but if they had confidence, they would then allow the Government to act upon their own judgment and responsibility. Sir ERSKINE PERRY expressed a general concur rence in the views expressed by Mr. Disraeli. Ha believed the revolt to be national rather than military, and that Lord Dalhousie's "annexation" policy was the exciting cause. Mr. WHITESIDE quoted the recorded opinions of Sir Charles Napier, and other eminent authorities, to show that as much had been said and predicted of the unsatisfactory state of the Bengal army as ought to have aroused the suspicions of the Government of l 1