The Press. — London, England, 1858-02-20 00:00:00

186 held by them in perfect execration. Of course Marshal Marmont labours with all the talent and ingenuity which he possessed in an emi nent degree to palliate, and even to explain away altogether, this questionable act. But it has been considered advisable by the French Government that he should not be allowed to succeed in his design—first, because to do so would be to violate historical truth ; next because if he were relieved from the obioquy, of treason which attaches to his name, his aspersions and slanders would obtain a cer tain degree of credit. Accordingly M. Rapetti, a gentleman who for many years possessed the proud distinction of being a Professor of the College de France, who is now intrusted with a leading share in the labours of the commis sion charged to publish the correspondence of Napoleon T , and who withal is of considerable literary repute, was charged to write in the official Moniteur a series of articles demon strating Maimont's guilt. It is a reprint of these articles, carefully revised, which consti tutes the volume before us. We have seldom seen a demonstration more complete than that which M. Rapetti makes. From the testimony of numerous contempo raries, from the mouth of Napoleon himself, from letters, proclamations, and despatches, from newspapers, pamphlets, and books, from the language and conduct of the allied sove reigns who were then in Paris, from the in trigues of the Bourbon party in that city, from negotiations with the diplomatists and gene rals of the allies, from strategic movements, from the vox populi, from songs and anecdotes, and, lastly, from tile conduct of Marmont after the downfall of the Empire, he shows that in April, IMI4, Marmont was a traitor to Napo leon—his sovereign, his friend, his benefactor. The following extracts from the preface will show the spirit by which the author is ani mated : What is Mannont ? A man who has caused an entire generation of heroic soldiers to shed tears of blood. And yet this man has threatened, by a book (his Memoirs) in which he has deposited all the spite and vengeance of his dual impenitence, to raise his head amongst ne, not as a condemned, who demands a tomb, pardon, and forgetful. ness, but as an accuser, as a jnilge of contemporary history. He hoped that so strange and supreme a triumph of the calpable passions and treasons of 1814 could be accom plished without obtaining any other reception amongst us than the discreet murmur of approbation ! In the life of Mormont there are many incidents, uncer tain merits, misadventures and failings, bat there is only one grave, decisive, important act. In Egypt, in Dal matia, in Germany after Wagram, in Spain, in the cam paign of France, under the Restoration, at Paris in -July 1410, he failed in various ways and in special circum stances in energy, ability, sagacity, or luck. But in all these circumstances he only failed in displaying himself to more or less advantage in positions subordinate to general actions of which he had not the initiative. On one single day it was given to him to exercise an Initiative in events, and that was at Essonne in 1814. I have thought it right not to occupy myself with secondary finite, which, even if proved, do not suffice to condemn a man, but to attach myself solely to the act which of rtself makes of Marmont, not a general of intermittent ability, an administrator of suspected probity, a politician whose sigacity is questioned, an historian inspired by envy and hatred, but a traitor—a man degraded by the most cub nable defection at a moment of extreme peril for national Independence. Here, however, M. Rapetti does Marmont some injustice. He displayed ability in the field when opposed to Wellington. He was a brave soldier, and the fact of his being wounded early i❑ the day at Salamanca con ttibuted to the completeness of the English victory. In an appendix to his book, M. Rapetti gives a great many very curious documents, of which most have never before been published. Amongst the latter arc letters of Napoleon to or about Marshal Marmont, one of the present Duke de Broglie to Marmont, details about the events of lt!tl.t, the original text of the abdication of Napoleon, and a letter in French from the Duke of Wellington to Marmont. As any unpublished document of Wellington can not fail to be interesting to English readers, we translate the letter:— Brussels, 4th Juno, Ikls. M nm flattered by the confidence which you repose in me by your letter of the Ist, to which I will r. ply with an much frankness as you have displayed in w. sting it.. 'f he principle you adopt is, generally speaking, true and go , I—an honest man cannot serve in the ranks of the e-emies of his country. But Ido not believe that such is the point in your case. For France has no enemies THE PRESS, FFBRUARY 20, that I know of, and so far as I know merits none. We are the enemies of a single man and of his adherent., and that man has exercised his influence over the French army to overthrow the throne of the King, in order to subjugate France, and to resuscitate fur all of us the days of mis fortune which we believed we had escaped from. We are at war with him because we all feel that we cannot be at peace. It is a misfortune for France that she should become the theatre of the war which this man necessitates, an I of which he is the cause and the object. But it must not be believed that this war is directed against her. On the contrary, the King of France, whom you desire to see restored to the throne and to serve, is the ally of all Europe in this conflict—in which he also is, as I believe, the ►rue representative of the sentiments and wishes of the nation. The situation in which we are about to bind ourselves cannot then be called a state of war against France, but in reality a war on the part of all Europe, including France, against Bonaparte and against his army—the bad conduct of which will be the cause of the misfortunes which are about to happen and which we all deplore. But, though I regard the state in which we are all about to be placed in a point of view different to that in which you have regarded it, I am not certain that I should not act for the moment as you propose to do. I was not at Paris when the misfortune which we all regret happened. I do not know all the details of it, and I cannot judge it exactly. I am, however, disposed to believe that the cause of the evil was that the King was not, and never had been, master of the army which was called his; and that, in spite of the best precautions, the same events would have happened a little sooner or a little later, with very little difference in their details. But a man like you, knowing public business and capable of judging it, may have reason to complain, if his counsels be neglected in a moment of crisis, and especially if the misfortunes which he foresaw have come to pass ; and disgust on his part, and his retirement, ought to be expected as the natural consequence of a want of regard for his counsels. But I will add that, for the present, Ido not see that, the King has the means of employing you in a manner becoming your rank or your talents, or which gives you the f icility of rendering those services to your country of which you are capable. But, although I admit with you that you do well to retire for the moment, I advise you very strongly not to do it for a long time. When the allies shall enter France, France cannot re main neutral between them anti Bonaparte and his army. Everything causes it to be believed that the sound part of the nation will range itself under the flag of the King on the side of good principles; and if this hope be accom plished, and a great effort be made, that will be the moment at which a man like you should put himself forward, to raise, organise, form, and command the French army which should place and maintain the King on his throne. Notwithstanding,then, the demand that I have addressed to the King of the Netherlands to allow your Excellency to go into Holland, I counsel you not to leave Aix-la-Cha pelle, and not to announce your intention of retiring, until you shall have positive news as to what may occur in France after the entrance of the allies. —I have the honour to be, Marshal, your very faithful servant, WELLINGTON. On this letter•, M. Rapetti makes these re marks : We do not possess the letter which Marshal Marmont wrote to the Duke of Wellington, but from the latter's reply we can make some conjectures as to what it was. The Duke of Wellington, in according that an " honest man " does not fight against his own country, endeavouts to prove that the European coalition was not making war against France, and that consequently a Frenchman could follow that coalition without tearing to fail in what was due to himself and his country. Marshal Marmont must consequently have written to the Duke of Wellington to express scruples and repugnances which were very honourable, and which the Duke attempts to appease and deceive by ingenious sophisms. But why choose a hostile general, leading an army against France, to make known to her that s Frenchman may feel scruples in marching against his country with its enemies? " We are not enemies," the Duke of Welling. ton hastens to say; and such an assurance was to be expected. Astonished himself at being taken for the confidant and judge of such delicate sentiments, the Duke of Welling ton, like an able man, suspects, under cover of the corn munication addressed to him, a secret proposition which it is desired to make him understand without expressing it too freely ; and that is, that Marshal Marmont asks his intervention in obtaining from King Louis XVIII. an im portant command in the operations which are being pre pared against France. The Duke of Wellington believes the more in this indirect demand from the fact that Marshal Marmont complains in his letter of the small account that was taken of him during the first Restoration. His advice was then disregarded ; faults of which he hod vainly foreseen and predicted the results were committed ; but, as he cannot reconcile himself to the idea of bearing arms against his country, as he believes it useless to remain attached to a cause which will not accept his services, and as he cannot remain inactive at the age of forty-three, he desires to take service under some Government not at war with France—perhaps in :he colonial possessions of England, perhaps in India. Such is probably the subject of his letter, and it is on that he asks for the counsels of the Duke of Wellington. But the Duke is not the dupe of this ambitious despair. All that he sees is that Marshal Marmont entertains a violent de sire to be employed by King Louis XVIII. and by the allies in accordance with his own idea of the high military talents he possesses and the political intelligence he 1858. thinks be has. On this point the Duke is sagacious and coldly polite. He has understood, and he intimates that he has done so; but he will not do what Marshal Mar. mont so ardently desires ; it does not suit him, besides, to sae that Maimont doubts somewhat of the success of the allies against the Emperor Napoleon; nevertheless, this doubt, by which he is not flattered, partly dictates him his reply, and he counsels Marmont to remain trail. quil at Aixda•Chapelle to await events, King Louis XVIII. and the allies having no command to give him. Then Marshal Marmont confides to a foreigner what he thinks of the policy of the King his master, and what he thinks is ill; be obliges that foreigner to give him a lesson of propriety by telling him that he exaggerates the faults of the Restoration, and that he does so from personal considerations. He intimates to a hostile general, leading an army against France, the scruples he entertains against bearing arms against his country, and he affords to that hostile general the opportunity of expressing on France, on ber army, and on the intentions, half friendly hostile, of the allies, a theory and appreciations which are at least sarcastic. Lastly, he exposes himself to causing that foreigner, that enemy, to believe that he has need of his help, that he asks for his intervention to regain the favour of the King of France ; and yet all that lie obtains is a polite and positive refusal. It is impossible to be more awkward and more unfortunate than the Duke de Ragusa. The fact, however, is that there are positions in which it is very difficult for a man to maintain himself with any dignity ; talent alone does not suffice—honour is required as well. But it is true to say that men of honour do not fall into this sort of pesition, in which they can only act wildly between the reprobation of those they betray and the disdain of those fur whom they have ruined themselves. The letter which we have literally produced, in spite of the embarrassed French style in which it is written, dis- plays the character of the eminent personage who wrote it. He, though called by the English the I•on Duke, had not that stiffness which does not yield to the obstacles and vicissitudes of life ; he possessed really the suppleness and the tact which, united to firmness, render it more circum spect and more efficacious. In this letter, the Duke of Wellington mocks and dismisses unsatisfied Marshal Mar. moat ; but he remains noble and friendly, and he does not abuse the confidence of the man whom an inconsiderate step has placed at his discretion. The Duke's arguments were not sophisms at all. In the case of civil war, neither party can be said to be fighting against their coun try ; nor is secession from chic party to another treason. Of treason to Nanoleon in person, Marmont may have been guilty ; but to charge him with treason to France is unjus•. On the whole, it may be said that M. Rapetti's essay contains an able argu ment on a delicate case, and that he has executed his task with remarkable skill. His copious and varied materials are presented with the clearness of the logician, are grouped with that regard to effect which distinguishes the practical advo cate, and are adorned with the graces of the literary artist. To conclude, we should say that the book is destined to be not only eagerly read by conteinporaries, hut to remain per manently in French literature as an ines timable contribution to the history of a most eventful epoch, The History of Ilerodotus. A New Eng!ish Version, Edited with Copious Notes and Appendices. By George Rawlinson, M.A. Assisted by Colonel Sir Henry 11.1wlin son, K.C.8., and Sir J. G. Wilkinson, F.R.S. In Four Vols. Vol. I. London : Murray. ALTHOUGH " seven years have elapsed since " this work was first promised to the public," no one, probably, who reads it will regret that the delay has taken place. So many fresh pieces of information bearing on its subject have during its progres3 been encited from the Mesopotamian discoveries, that both the plan and contents of the work have no doubt been greatly enlarged since it was first under taken. Even now we should imagine it likely that future researches would involve consider able additions, if not modifications, in a sub sequent edition. The present volume contains only the First Book of Herodotus, but in dith culty of elucidation, copiousness of materials, and breadth of subject this is fully equal to one-fourth, if not more, of the entire work. The Second Book, on Egypt, may be expected to occupy almost as much space as the ono before us ; the remaining seven will doubtless afford an easier and shorter task. Of the translation itself little need be said, except to note that it is executed with great spirit and freedom It is by far the best we have met with. Beloc's version is rattier , a paraphrase than a translation, and Mr. Cary 's