The Press. — London, England, 1854-09-02 00:00:00

w e //) :i`F'':~ _e. , g I= T,71 ii‘ MII ~! !1': ' 'f.i A ■ r Vii' " j4O l • ; tricorl I 1-,A, Ilt:i1:J1 iil 11 rtb; .t ° l `ha + 1e LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1854. No. 70.—VoL. 11. theVrtss. LONDON, B.4TURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1834. Tea publication of the last Vienna notes has made a strong impression on the public mind. The country knows not how to reconcile these negotiations for peace with the determination expressed to 'vigortiusly prosecute the war. It cannot understand why bases of peace and the expedition to the Crimea should have been arranged at the same time. It sees that the Cabinet is playing a double game, and it is alarmed and angry at this continued juggling of pen and sword. The mistrust lately excited by Lord ABERDEEN'S equivocal language, and stifled with difficulty by the united efforts of the Ministry and their friends, is now breaking out more fiercely than ever ; and instead of such mild terms as " credulity " and " eonni , vance," to account for the tortuous course of the- Government sincio . the Eastern quarrel • became sOrious, the /Gin word " trEaeon " spolde Trom the platform of a pui,lic meeting is eagerly caught up by a tkiciwde(L anAlitory and adopted with passionate excitetiant-, The leading Government journal labours to show that these notes have no real signifi• cance. It represents them as merely formal documents, not to be understood according to their obvious meaning, but according to some reserved intention which it is authorised to explain in a popular sense. Were this true, it would only show that the negotiation was dishonest, and that the character of our diplomacy was stained with fraud. In one important particular the terms of the exchanged notes differ from those con tained in Lord CLARENDON'S despatch of July 22. His Lordship stated as one of the four points on which " the status quo ante bellutn " must undergo important modifications" that " the privileged frontier of Russia in the " Black Sea has enabled her to establish in " those waters a naval power which, in the " absence of any counterbalancing force, is a " standing menace to the Ottoman empire." This language was in accordance with the declaration of Lord JOHN RUSSELL in the House of Commonson the very day this despatch was dated. But in the notes actually exchanged the equivalent condition is, that the treaty of the 13th of July, 1841, shall be " revised in concert " by the high contracting parties in the interest of " the balance of power in Europe." By this alteration the guarantee required by Lord CLARENDON is thrown over, and Count Bum, reserves to Austria the liberty of adhering to her original position not to consent to any alteration of the territorial status quo. It is " presumed " by . Lord ABERDEEN'S organ that the two propositions are substan tally identical, and it supposes that the contracting parties were agreed that the equilibrium of Europe could only be accom plished by the destruction of Sebastopol and the Russian fleet. But in the words em ployed there is nothing to justify this inter pretation. The condition exists without the least reference to the operations of the war 'me way or the other. Again, it is urged that Russia was in no way a party to this note, and that the only object of the Western Powers was to express the minimum of the conditions with which they might be satisfied, and the objects in which Austria concurred. The logic of this plea is contemptible. The Cabinet of Vienna was at the time in negotiation with that of St. Peters burg for the express purpose of restoring peace, and it is not to be supposed that those bases would ever have been settled unless there had been a bona fide intention of treat ing on them as soon as opportunity served. The settling them, indeed, was a plain invi tation to Russia to negotiate. Common sense suggests this conclusion from all analogous transactions. If a man at a market says he will not take less than fifty guineas for his horse, he does not positively otter to sell it for that sum, but he does intimate that he is not unwilling to part with it on some such terms, and if buyers are at hand the usual bargaining takes place. The Vienna note affirms that peace betweeh Russia and Turkey cannot be re-established on firm and durable bases except the four conditions of the note be accepted, the direct inference being that Russia by acceding to those conditions would immediately pave the way for a definite treaty of peace. The conditions are virtually those which wg announced as in contemplation on the 10th of June last. We are not surprised to hear that Russia does not regard them as inadmissible. They involve no substantial sacrifice. The islands at the mouth of the Danube are an useless possession, as it was provided by treaty that they should not be fortified, and the substitution of the protectorate of the great Powers for that of Russia alone would allow her to escape from an untenable posi tion on the most favourable terms she could expect. If these conditions were meant to be a reality, what shall we say of the efforts now made to disguise their purport, and to repre sent them as impracticable? If meant as a sham, how low must our diplomacy have sunk! We believe the truth to be that they were and are intended to serve as a basis for pacific negotiation, but that the Government aro afraid to say so. While the Crimea expedition is in suspense, they dare not acknouledge that they have been diligently preparing terms of accommodation with tho enemy. That fatal difference of sentiment among them which has constantly aggravated all the dangers of the Eastern crisis—which has precipitated them into war while struggling for peace—which has stamped their measures with the half character fatal to their efficiency—which kept our fleet in Beicos Bay when it was required in the Euxine, and landed troops at Malta which should have gone direct to the Danube— exists still to compromise the character and neutralise the force of England. While one party in the Cabinet is intriguing for peace, another is urging forward hostilities, and each regarding the movements of its colleagues with jealousy, acts as a dreg on all policy. As a natural result, we have negotiations with out sincerity, and hostilities without vigour. It is the aim of one party to achieve an armis tice before a battle, and of the other to push on a battle before an armistice. With every fresh evidence of thin disunion the public uneasiness increases. The advo cates for peace and war are equally discon tented. They can have no faith in a Govern• meat which promises both at the same time. PRICE SIXPENCE. I In consenting to retain office when peace was no longer practicable, Lord ABERDEEN Com mitted a great error. Ho might have retired with decency had he resigned to steadier hands the task of conducting the war which his weakness had rendered inevitable. He had done mischief enough when he had broken up the settlement of Europe. But he thought otherwise : his work was incomplete till he had provoked national antipathies, and had en- • larged to the widest possible extent the range of hostilities. Hitherto the only results of our negotiations have been to confer great commercial advan tages on Prussia, who adheres to our antagonist, and to vastly increase the political power of Austria, who still preserves her attitude of " armed neutrality. The suspicion with which the latter Pea er is regarded by our people is the natural consequence of the lessons taught them for years past by the politicians now in office. Even Mr. GLAusross has contributed his part to the work In his preface to FARINI'S " History of the Romai State" he wrote :—" Italian writers shot)" " busy themselves to show that Austria " really open to the charge which they ma " against her of giving countenance to &bum " winking at tyranny, discouraging imprqt " meqt, and obstructing the tentival ti l " wards owistitutional freedom in " States of Italy, in virtue of a pretended pri , " teotorate to which she has no claim." In the last volume of the work, published only a few months since, the author quotes these words with pleasure, and, to show their truth, dwells on the " flagyKant despotism which Austria exer eises." After this authority, the indignant strain in which the Newcastle meeting denounced the Austrian alliance need excite no surprise; and as little should we marvel at the coldness with which Austria receives our advances '- while profiting to the utmdst by the advan tages of her position. It is unfortunate that our Premier should be the forty-years' friend of our foe, and that our other principal .. , Ministers should have distinguished them selves either by gross attacks on the Emperor NAPOLEON, our firm ally, or on the Govern ment of Austria, whose co-operation wo are now earnestly soliciting. 1 I ....• . THE EXPEDITION TO THE CRIMEA. SEMEMDE a has now commenced under most melancholy auspices. We defy any person of ordinary sensibility to peruse the accounts that have reached us for the last six days from the seat of war without feeling grievously depressed. Journal after journal tells the same sad story of dying officers and soldiers, and a disheartened army. The dreadful circumstantiality of the public ac counts are lamentably corroborated by private intelligence, and all the narrators are fearfully unanimous in recording the prevailing gloom produced by the .disastrous inactivity which has resulted from the vacillating policy of the inexpert organisers of this ill-fated expedition. Heavy, indeed, is the Ministerial responsi• bility incurred by the procrastinating policy that has been followed. It was known that cholera was impending, and that inaction would leave the minds of the troops without the moral stimulus that sustains the nerve MN 4,. rus ikirusnip stimea as points on which " the status " must undergo important mo, " the privileged frontier of " Black Sea has enabled her " those waters a naval pow " absence of any counterbals " standing menace to the 01 This language was in accori declaration of Lord JOHN Russ] of Commonson the very day tl dated. But in the notes actual] equivalent condition is, that t 1 18th of July, 1841, shall be " r( "by the high contracting partie " the balance of power in Es alteration the guarantee rec CLARENDON is thrown over, a reserves to Austria the liberl her original position not to alteration of the territorial stn It is " presumed " by L organ that the two propositi( tinily identical, and it stir contracting parties were a equilibrium of Europe could plished by the destruction of the Russian fleet. But in ployed there is nothing to j pretation. The condition ex least reference to the operal lee way or the other. _ _ • 11