The Press. — London, England, 1854-10-07 00:00:00

OCTOBER 7, 1854. On the spoil of Bruin's fur We may fairly plume us. No reprisals we incur, " Gaudeamus igitur Juvenes, dum sumus." Tell us, Emperor serene, Have we to thank Aberdeen ? Should we hail this glorious day Had your old ft iend had his way? Can your Highness find excuse For your situation ? Was your eagle but a goose ? Do you read the something Russo For your consolation ? Tell us, Emperor serene, Have we to thank Aberdeen? Should we hail this glorious day Had your old friend had his way ? Artfully your game was planned, But you played at random. Partners lost their self-command — Faced the chief card in their hand-- The secret memorandum. Tell us, Emperor serene, Have we to thank Aberdeen ? Should we hail this glorious day Had your old friend bad his way ? Austrian Notes, which took in some, Will be welcomed slowly oh ; Friends of forty years are dumb ; Unexpected issues come From " a mere imbroglio." Tell us, Emperor serene, Have we to thank Aberdeen ? Should we hail this glorious day Had your old friend had his way ? France and England will decide, With sincere endeavour, In their might and right allied, And, to curb your braggart pride, Muzzle you for ever. Tell us, Emperor serene, Have they to thank Aberdeen ? Should we hail this glorious day Had your old friend had his way ? MOST IMPORTANT STATE PAPER. (EXCLUSIVE.) [We have been favoured with the following document, of the authenticity of which we have no reason to entertain any doubt. It purports to be a sketch of a State paper which, immediately upon the news of the Crimean triumphs reaching London, the author conceived would speedily be necessary, and, therefore, he wisely deter mined to be prepared. The relations of the allies with Russia have been aome what differently defined by information received since the document was sketched; but as it will be, in the main, and in spirit, what will be submitted to the Cabine t, as soon as it shall ' become necessary to destroy, by diplomacy, the effect of victory, it cannot but be interesting to the public, who will do well to be prepared with their own views of the questions involved.] CONSIDERATIONS TO BE ADDRESSED TO THE COUNCIL. 1. The fall of Sebastopol puts an end to the war. Russia is power less in the Black Sea, and, therefore, there can be no reason for protracting hostilities there. On the other hand, Napier is powerless in the Baltic Sea, and the continuance of a hostile armament there, which can effect nothing, is idle, and unworthy of a great nation. 2. Therefore our fleets must be recalled, and our laud forces directed to evacuate Russian soil. 3. This, in itself, will be inadequate to the restoration of friendly relations between the Emperor of Russia and the allies. 4. As a Ministry, it will be necessary to place our arrangements in such a light that the public, incapable of really appreciating the position of affairs, may believe that we have obtained the kind of ad vantage for which the populace is greedy. This is, of course, not de ceit, but merely statesmanship. 5. Having gained a decisive victory, we can well afford to pay that deference to the feelings of the defeated Emperor which I have all along desired to render. 8. The basis of our operations, therefore, is to satisfy at once the Russian Government and the British nation. 7. Nothing can be done—not even a Ministry formed—without a sacrifice. In the present case it appears to the undersigned that few sacrifices can be deemed too great to effect our purpose. 8. The sacrifice which I now propose, with that object, is the French alliance. 9. I would approach this purpose cautiously, and so that the nip ture may appear to proceed from the French rather than from our selves. 10. Referring to consideration No. 2, I propose that the Baltic fleet return home, and that the Black Sea fleet and our army he re moved to the lonian Islands for the present. The French to be left In the Crimea, without any immediate stipulation on our part. THE PRESS. Good people, take heed Of the journals you read ! For some rogues are agreed, in a " scurrilous ' league, To rob of their glory— Their birthright in story — The statesmen who fought when they failed in intrigue. They'll tell you we stayed, Seeking Austria's aid, With excuses still made new objections to raise ; But a traitor alone Is the man who won't own That the deeds of the troops are the Cabinet s praise If the Alma is crossed, And to Russia it cost "Eighteen thousand men lost "—Who has done it but we ? For who can charge fault to The men who chose " Malta " To send the troops all to—show-soldiers to be So mind 'tis flat treason To ask us the reason We kept so long fearing the standard to raise. lie's a Muscovite spy That will dare to deny That each victory won is tho Cabinet's praise. 949 11. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe be instructed to obtain secret audience of the Turkish Minister, and to impress upon him the dis tinct views of England, that the Crimea should instantly revert to the Porte, from which it was acquired by Russia, seventy-two years ago— about the time I was born. 12. The Sultan's Government is to be cautioned by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe that France has views upon Sebastopol, which it is not the interest of England to oppose, avowedly, but which she can by no means sanction. 13. Not officially, of course, the Sultan's Government must be re minded that sudden action is the only course which can avail the Porte in the emergency about to arise. 14. Now, the course of Turkey is a matter of comparative insigni ficance. It will, if the subject have been properly submitted to and urged upon the Porte, be violent and offensive, :Iput, whether successful or not is immaterial. France will be insulted, and will insist upon re paration, refusing, of course, to withdraw from the Crimea, unless it were to occupy Constantinople. 15. The third party, England, will naturally be appealed to be tween the two other allies. _ _ IR. It will be my—our—duty to suggest that, whatever may be the question between 1 ranee and Turkey, Russia ought not to be further damnified thereby, and that France should imitate the example of England, in withdrawing. 17. France will naturally refuse this, and will menace the Otto man capital. It 3. England—l mean the nation—will never assent to see Con• stantinoplo in the hands of France. 19. At this moment, and in accordance with a signal from myself, the Emperor of Russia will conic forward and frankly concede every thing originally demanded by the allies. He will do this in a manner acceptable to Europe, and especially to England, which never likes to see a powerful and valiant enemy humiliated. The Emperor will only ask in return that all the Powers may be on an equal footing, and that France may not assume a position in Turkey denied to himself and refused by England. 20. The fleet from the lonian Islands will now enter Turkish waters, but without any intimation of its object. 21. France, comprehending the significance of this demonstra. llon, and feeling her pride stung, will instantly occupy Constantinople. It will be for our admiral to take care that he is not sufficiently near to be charged with connivance. 22. The voice of the nation will demand that she be dislodged ; but our fleet will remain stationary. Russia will then offer her services to the Porte, with whom a separate peace will easily be made by her. Austria will not oppose the entrance of another army into the Principalities. The Porte will be advised by England to accept the offer. 23. The situation thus becomes complicated ; but France will seek to disentangle it by a peremptory demand of support from England. I do not see how this demand can be complied with. 24. Russia we thus see engaged in supporting the independence she was charged with destroying. England, furious at being out of the fray in which she has gathered laurels, calls for action at any price. I trust there will be no war with France ; but an honest statesman must obey the call of his country. 25. These suggestions, with modifications, appear to me to ap proach the solution of tho problem adverted to in consideration No. 6. A. THE NEW TREASON. NOT NAMED IN 25 EDWARD III.) " Endeavouring at a moment like this to disparage the efforts of the Government to carry on the war vigorously," &c.—Second-hand"Organ" of Ministers. ■ ■ I