The Press. — London, England, 1854-02-18 00:00:00

150 to bring them to a successful close. Vigour and de termination exhibited at an earlier period would, he was convinced, have altogether averted war ; and he pointed out the crisis when those qualities would have been moat useful, but were, unhappily, deficient. If the fleets had sailed even so near Constantinople as the Bay of Vourla—not an interdicted port—when first summoned by Colonel Rose, he argued that the progress of Russia would have been stayed. As it was, the Men,chikoff mission proceeded, the Russian demands grew more peremptory, the question be came more and more critical, and led at last to an entanglement which seemed extricable only by war. In the course of his review of the events the Mar quis of Clanricarde remarked upon the difficult posi tion in which the strange vacillation of the Govern ment had placed Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and eulogised the ability which that ambassador had dis- played " I hope that, without being accused of partiality towards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, either on account of our re lationship or the friendship existing between us, I may venture to express my admiration of the great ability which he has displayed throughout these transactions. (Cheers.) The skill he has displayed appears to me wonderful. He had to contend with the Russian Minister and the whole Russian party in the Divan, unaided by the gold which Russia profusely disburses. He had to keep up the cou rage of the Turks on the one hand, while on the other he was unable to promise them any support. (Hear, hear.) As matters advanced he was obliged to recommend the Turks to display at once fortitude and patience. While encouraging the Turks to resist the unjust demands made upon them, he was at the same time instructed to repress any hasty warlike demonstration. Never was an ambas sador placed in more difficult circumstances, and it is greatly to the honour of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe that he has come out of them with increased reputation.. ((Therm)" Passing on to more recent eventualities, the noble marquis remarked that even now it did not appear what sacrifices we were prepared to make, or for what object we were striving. With regard to the entry of the fleet into the Black Sea, it was not a cor rect definition of our position to say, as our ambassa dor at St. Petersburg had stated, that it entered with no hostile intentions. To prevent the Russian ships from conveying reinforcements to their armies in Asia was an undoubted act of hostility; and it was equally an act of hostility to aid Turkey by convoying sup plies to her forces. It was a quibble to say that, be cause we would not allow Turkey to attack the ships or territory of Russia, we had no hostile intention to wards Russia ; especially as we had previously de Oared that the evacuation of the principalities was a sine qua non of peace. He then alluded to the sus pension of diplomatic relations with Russia, and of our preparations for war by sea and land, contending that further information on these points ought to be afforded. We had contracted new engagements and alliances for war, the nature of which ought to be laid before Parliament. He assumed that these en gagements were to defend the Turkish territory; but would that object be accomplished merely by sending a fleet into the Black Sea, and landing forces at Con stantinople? The truth was, we were waging war to resist Russian aggression. Acknowledging the ho nour and good faith with which the French Govern went had acted towards us, he was unwilling to em bark in such a war without knowing to what limits we were going, and for what objects. England could not engage in a little war with Russia : " If you intend to bring war to a permanently success ful issue, you must make efforts that are worthy of England. ( Hear, hear.) It is a great struggle in which you are about to engage, and, unless you are prepared to give way on every point, and to submit to indignity and humiliation and incur the discredit of defeat, the Govern ment must look the conflict boldly in the face, and act as other Governments have acted, by means of their great military and naval power. But the noble earl has told us that we are at peace with Russia. At peace ! If we are at peace, what is that peace ? What is the object of that peace? What is the peace which the noble earl means? I tell the noble earl that if he thinks he can maintain those treaties which have kept Europe in a constant dread, and have led to the present calamitous state of things—if no indemnity whatever is to be paid by Russia—(loud cheers)—if he thinks we are to treat with Russia now as we might have done seven or eight months ago—l tell him that Europe won't stand it and that this country will not stand it. I know that Parliament will not submit to Russian degradation. The question is not whether a despatch is to be worded this way or that ; but what the country requires, and what Europe requires, is, not a pitiful, contemptible tournament of a war, but an ample security for the future peace of Europe. (Cheers.) I.et the Government not be afraid to say that that is their object, and that they are prepared to make vigorous efforts through out the world to attain it. I know that Parliament will support them throughout in such a cause, and as to the issue of the contest I cannot for one moment entertain a doubt. (Cheers. ) The Earl of CLARENDON was not displeased at having an opportunity for explanation and defence, and opened by characterising the censure just pronounced as the product of extraordinary ingenuity and skill, without one grain of impartiality towards the Government. It was, moreover, founded, after all, upon mere opinion, on which he trusted the SATURDAY, opened the eyes of the Ministry as to the real cha racter of the Russian pretensions and the fragility of their assurances of a pacific purpose long before that conviction actually dawned upon their understand.. inv. The consequence of these errors he traced through the subsequent transactions, showing how they bore upon the conduct of the Czar, and the lane guage of the British Ministers and Envoys, and to what a serious result they had ultimately led. Ar guing that the Governtueut had totally mistaken the way of obtaining their object--namely, peace—the noble earl gave an outline of the principles on which the controversy ought to have been conducted : " They should have borne in mind that they had to deal with a man of absolute power, a man of strong feelings, of strong passions—a man who had an hereditary fixed idea firmly impressed on his mind that it was decreed that either he or his descendants should occupy Constantinople. Having to deal with a man full of these feelings and this prejudice, and of the most obstinately-determined char meter, the English Government should have seen, at the outset, that he was only to be deterred from his purpose by having it distinctly manifested to him, in the most em phatic language mod manner, that dangers greater than any glory or advantage he could hope to gain from his ob ject would inevitably befal him as the result of attempting it. (Hear, hear.) They should have made him from the very first distinctly understand that the existence of an independent Sovereign at Consta ntino p le was a political necessity to England and to France, fully equal to that which he might deem Russian possession of Constanti; uople to be, and that England and France were resolute, at all cost, to vindicate that necessity. (Hear.) Had it been timely declared to the Autocrat that England and France were resolute to defend the independence of Tur key with their last soldier and their last shilling, he would then have comprehended the gravity of the undertaking he had entered upon, when, without the least provocation, he urged upon Turkey a belies of demands which no inde pendent sovereign could with dignity accept, and which no independent nation should have heard of without utter and open indignation. (Hear, hear.)" Lord GLENELO believed that the Government bad shown a good cause in the published documents. He went on to delineate the fearful consequences of war, but with regard to the war with Russia added a warm exhortation to prosecute it vigorously, and drew a cheerful horoscope of its probable fortunes. Earl GREY considered that the radical fault of the Government consisted in their having allowed the country to be dragged into the quarrel at all. There were precedents and pleas for a far more paci fic course than that which they had pursued. We were arming to defend a phantasm ; for such had the independence of Turkey been ever since the day when Russian aid was invoked in order to protect the l'orte against her rebellious vassal. The Otto man empire was a corpse which could never be re suscitated. While the conquerors declined, the con quered race, namely, the Greeks, increased and throve amid their bondage. But though strong they were still enslaved, and required protection. Drawing a vivid picture of the oppressions inflicted on the Greek Christians in Turkey, he inquired whether the maintenance of the oppressors' domination was a worthy object for our arms and sacrifices. The ap prehensions of danger from Russian aggression, either in Europe or India, he considered utterly futile. It would have been better if Turkey had ac cepted the ultimatum, as she must have done if not sustained by promise of aid from the Western powers. By giving that promise, war, which might have been at least postponed, was rendered immediate and ine vitable, and the consequences, actual as regarded Turkey and Russia, prospective with respect to the rest of Europe, were most calamitous. The Duke of AROYLL went over the narrative of events from the beginning, compared the successive events as they arose with the Ministerial decisions formed concerning them, and argued that the policy of the Government had been justifiable and prudent throughout. He entered also into special defences of the Vienna note and the Earl of Aberdeen. The Earlof DERBY congratulated the Prime Minis ter on his finding one critic (Lord Grey) who believed him to have been too warlike, while the country at large censured him for timidity. He was ready to admit that more might have been done to preserve peace, but it should have been attempted by a very different course from the one actually pursued. Re marking upon the various definitions given by differ ent friends of the Government of our presentcon dition, he was forced to conclude that we were neithfr in a state of war, nor of peace, nor of neutrality, but drifting, and rapidly drifting, towards war. Looking at the policy of the Government in relation to their avowed purpose, and the circumstances with which they had to deal, he described it as hesitating and unsuccessful, and observed that Ministers had been led away, no doubt with the best intentions, to frustrate their own most strenuous efforts, In April last year the Prime Minister bad assured them that no disturbance was apprehended on the side of Tur key. That assurance was hazarded on the faith of Russian assertions, and Lord Derby compared various dates and documents to show how rashly it had been given and how completely it was belied by the event. So early as the 7th January the Government had THE PRESS. verdict of the country would differ from that of the noble marquis. lie proceeded to dilate on tho diffi culties by which the question had been all along surrounded, and to regret the tone in which it was now introduced to the house, tending a: it did to create disunion at a moment when all the strength was required that perfect union alone could impart to their councils. The charges against the Ministry, he complained, were formed after the event, and were based upon a comparison of their conduct at one time, with the fuller knowledge acquired at another and later period. Justice demanded a different course. The acts of the Ministry should be judged by their contemporary information; and their policy estimated, not by its results, but by the circumstances of the moment which it was designed to meet. In this light the noble earl reviewed the whole question in all its details, contending that in every turn of the contro versy their decisions had been well advised, as he as sured the house they were well intentioned. When mistaken, he argued that the mistake was excusable, if not 4 natural ; and, if they failed of succe ss, the failure was not to be attributed to any lack of effort or of skill in diplomacy. The question had been asked whether we were at peace or war. It was one very difficult to answer distinctly. War was not yet declared, yet it could not be said that we were at peace. We were, in fact, in a sort of intermediate state, where the desire for pea ce was as great as ever, 'but where the hopes of maintaining it were dwindling away and the country drifting towards war. Defending the course of the Government at the point where it had been most impugned by Lord Clanricarde, the Foreign Secretary thus explained their quiescence at the moment of the first entry of Prince Menschikoff into Constantinople : " My noble friend seems to think that the mission of Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople was, in itself, sufficient to have created alarm in the minds of her Majesty's Government, and that they ought to have acted upon that apprehension. Now, what are the facts? As soon as information reached us on the subjeCt of Prince lienschikoffs mission, we immediately demanded of the Russian Government, without a moment's delay—we asked in distinct and explicit terms—what were the real objects of that mission ? To that inquiry we received a most distinct and explicit answer. My noble friend has stated, and stated with truth, that there are, of course, certain communications that pass between the two Governments which cannot properly be made public — which cannot be imparted to the house at this moment. But I am free to observe, that, fully concurring in the remark of my noble friend ; these communications were far stronger in repudiation of aggressive intention on the part of Russia than any of those which we have thought it our duty to publish. Indeed, I may say, they placed the ques tion upon grounds which it was then impossible to doubt, and I should as soon have dreamed of doubting any of your lordships who ruse in his place in this house and affirmed a fact upon his honour, as I could doubt these assurances of Russia. From the assurances we received, therefore, my lords, it was impossible not to credit the honourable inten tions of Russia. " With regard to the future he confessed that the terms in which the Porte and the Czar respectively expressed their willingness to negotiate resembled parallel lines that could never meet. All the negotiations must consequently be considered at a close, and, though war was not declared, there was nothing that stood between the country and that ultima ratio. We had, however, excellent allies. With respect to France, the accordance of the Govern ments had been always complete. Austria and Prussia '1 recent acts had manifested their entire independence of Russian influence ; and with them it rested, not perhaps to avert war, but at all events to shorten the duration of hostilities. In conclusion, he expressed his conviction that the people of England would appreciate, now that they had the means of arriving at all the facts, the efforts which the Government had made to preserve peace, and was satisfied they would cheerfully bear whatever sacri fices might be necessary to bring the contest to a speedy and honourable issue. The Earl of ELLESMERE hoped that the diplomatic agents would not be allowed, as in times past, to cripple the energies of officers entrusted with the command of the military and naval forces. The Earl of MmarEseunv trusted that the Foreign Secretary would in justice admit that neither in the past nor present session bad he pressed for any pa pers whose publication was likely to prove injurious to the pnblic service. Looking through the docu ments now presented, however, he found several that might have been promulgated not merely ha• mlessly but with advantage to the country and credit to the Government long since. Proceeding to compare and analyse the successive despatches, Lord Malmesbury drew from them two conclusions. First, that at the beginning Russia had been deceived by the British Ministry as to their intentions, insomuch that Prince Menschikoff acted in Constantinople under the im pression that England would not oppose, and might even assist, his demands. To the Czar at the same period reason was given for suppposing that France and England could never come into perfect accord ance. Secondly, he concluded that the tenor of the despatches and the course of events ought to have