The Press. — London, England, 1854-06-03 00:00:00

JUNE 3, 1854. Niftratart. Locke's Philosophical Works. Tw•o volumes. Vol. I. Bohn's Standard Library. London: Bohn. THOUOH we do not agree with Mr. St. John, the editor of this new edition of Locke, that there is any danger of the author getting out of date through his works not being kept be fore the public, we are yet very glad to receive his writings in so cheap and compact a shape. The editor is of opinion that philosophy is to be regarded rather as an art than as a science, and that, therefore, little improvement is to be expected on the system of a great original master. We cannot quite agree with him. It is only rational to suppose that our knowledge of the human faculties may increase with dis cussion and experience, and that the errors and shortcomings of one mind in so vast a branch of intellectual inquiry may be corrected and supplied by the light thrown on it by subsequent investigators. From the dawn of philosophy it has been disputed whether the ideas which occupy the mind are innate or acquired, whether they are impressed on it at creation and are de veloped by circumstances, or whether they are wholly derived from experience, being received through the organs of sense. Strange to say, the two great schools into which philosophy thus diverged at its commencement subsist to this day ; and while the system of Locke, in its main features, is generally received in England, it finds a most able, eloquent, and refined opponent in M. Cousin in France. Our habits of thought and feeling are so connected with our individual consciousness— they so mainly make up what we are accus tomed to call ourselves—that it is little wonder Locke's doctrine of acquired ideas should, on the publication of his great essay, have been looked on as a novelty and have encountered much opposition. Though certainly as old as Aristotle, no one before had ever worked it out into a complete system. It is not only the leading principle of Locke's philosophy, but it is the entire foundation on which he built up what he terms his "uniform and consistent "edifice." What he calls Reflection only plays a secondary part in arranging and combining the impressions of sense ; and, on the whole, his work is calculated to give the impression that the mind is formed by the information communicated to it from the external world. Such phrases as " tabula rasa " and " a sheet of white paper" suppose that the mind is not only of itself blank but passive, and tend to make us overlook its wonderful organisation and its active capacity. Sharp and logical as Locke's intellect was, he erred in not penetrating deep enough. He began with the first story of metaphysical inquiry instead of the basement. It is the in formation of the mind which he invites us first to consider, and not the nature of the mind itself. His essay assumes that ideas which at best do but furnish or stimulate our mental capacity are more than the capacity they ini- Ulster to. As reasonably might an anatomist pretend to explain human structure by show ing how food is converted into chyle and blood, muscle, bone, and nerve. We admit the im portance of meat and drink to sustain life, but we deny that they explain the 'mystery of life, or that the taking them into our mouth will in any degree tend to explain the wonders of our structure. It is only by considering the mind—anterior to the information of sense—as an original capacity, variously endowed by its Creator, and far superior to all his other works, that we can form any just estimate of its true cha racter. It is doubtless inactive until set in motion by its appointed ministers, the senses ; but, beautifully as they are constituted, they are but its instruments—mere portals to the temple. A steam-engine is motionless until water is put into the boiler and fuel into the grate ; but who, in considering the beautiful and complicated workmanship, would set the water and the fuel above the mechanism? Neither does Locke, while combating the doctrine of innate ideas, take sufficient note of what may be called organic ideas. We are willing to allow that the mind, marvel- THE PRESS. lously as it is endowed, and beautifully as it is fitted for action, cannot act until it receives impressions from the outward world ; but those impressions will always produce effects in some degree similar, and may thus be said to constitute natural ideas, or ideas in con formity with our mental and physical structure. This will not be disputed in regard to the grosser objects of sense. Some tastes are pleasant, some offensive—so with respect to smells and sounds. Less perceptibly, some colours, hues, and shades of light please the eye, while others offend it ; and if, from these simple principles, we ascend higher, we alkali find that we are furnished with original prin ciples or ideas to which all our skill in art and wisdom in morals must be referred. In parts of his work Locke seems to sup pose that humanity is wholly at the mercy of mere accidents of its condition. Custom, he says, is more than nature ; a notion which will not bear examination, as it is difficult to conceive any custom which had not some natural groundwork in the first instance. The range of our faculties is, indeed, very wide. By the training which he receives man may rise to the virtue of an angel, or sink to the malevolence of a fiend : but in each case the character will be founded on qualities which he possesses in common with his fellow-men. Those customs among individuals or nations which we are inclined to regard as most un natural do but arise from certain principles of our nature being kept in restraint or carried to excess. Whether ceitain ideas are innate in the mind or natural to it—whether they are ante cedent to experience, or inevitably come with experience—is of no great consequence to genuine philosophy. Locke's argument often savours more of scholastic subtilty than of true wisdom. He vehemently denies, for example, that the idea of God is innate, but admits that it is an idea " naturally deducible " from every part of our knowledge." The Indian who "Bees God in clouds and hears Him in the wind " believes in Deity, because the laws of his being compel him so to believe. The earliest lesson of our sense is to instruct us in the relation of effect to cause. The savage sees that he is able to fell a tree by blows of his axe, and to burn it by means of fire. When he witnesses, therefore, the ravages of a storm and the stroke of lightning, he instantly refers those effects to a superior power, and cannot avoid doing so. In the rudest as well as in the most civilised states of life we are surrounded with evidences of design and government which impel us to recognise and worship the Ruler of the world. Those ideas which the mind has a predisposition to receive may, in some sense, be said to be innate, as the instinct of a bee is innate, though, were it deprived of its senses, we do not suppose that it would build cells or collect honey. The passionless nature of Locke, while qualifying him for abstract reasoning, ill adapted him to take a survey of the compound nature of man. His philosophy is wanting in fervour and faith. His view of the mind is highly ingenious and symmetrical, but, in en deavouring to account for its action and growth on purely rationalistic principles, he loses sight of its divine construction and en dowments, of its infinite faculties and god like apprehension. By attempting to define its qualities with mathematical precision, he seems more anxious to tie it to the earth than to connect it with heaven. For this reason we are inclined to doubt whether his writings are well-adapted to the present day. They are, however, admirably calculated to stimu late thought, and may yet serve as a stock whereon to graft fairer and better fruits than they of themselves are capable of bearing. This edition appears carefully produced, and in the notes are given passages from eminent metaphysical writers confirming or questioning the leading principles of Locke's system. The Friends, and other Poems. By Warwick Beechwood. London : Longmans. THE pseudonyme on the titlepage of this little volume is suggestive of high thoughts and pleasant hours. We scarcely expected on 519 opening it to be taken into a forensic atmo sphere, and to be reminded at every page of Themis rather than the Muses. The author's object was, he says, to Win back some sunbeams from the days gone by, To brighten hopes too weak, and ills too nigh. And in his preface he disarms criticism by telling us, iu plain prose, that his work " claims no merit beyond that of having given " employment to a few idle hours of the au " thor." As he is evidently a barrister, we are happy thus to be assured that he has but " a " few idle hours," and his present performance shows that he has abundant mental resources for enjoying books and the world. Susceptible to moral beauty, and with some perception of graphic effect, he is essentially a moralist in looking upon life and nature, and he is better suited for a thoughtful essay in prose than for a tuneful exercise in verse. His thoughts are too merely obvious, and his illustrations are often trite. Trying to excite himself into poetry, when he describes his imaginary Lady Edit, he says:— I knew to lift my eyes To Lady Eda with a glance of love Was madness ; yet I felt to gaze and love not Was scarcely human. Heaven had gifted her With beauty and benign intelligence, As two most mighty spells which she should wield Unconscious of their power. She was so fair, No eye that lighted on her face had rest Till there it glanced again. There is something of emotional vivacity in this utterance. But how insipid is the conti nuation : Not Venus' self, As shadowed forth in marble by the hand Of Phidias, that divine artificer ! Phidias and Venus, like the phcenix and the upas tree, should be shunned by young poets. There is much truth of feeling in the passage where the author glances back on the immature imaginings and crude philosophy of early manhood. Many of us must echo the feelings here expressed : Sweet were those days of manhood's early prime, When all looked fresh, and grand, and wonderful To eyes yet beaming with delight and joy ! Then doubt first rose, a presence in our hearts : Then came the thirst fur knowledge, then we first Darted inquiring eyes around the world. And heard with troubled ears its changeful cry, The sports of childhood, all our boyish mirth Had passed away ; and with them too had gone That faith which hangs on others' solemn lips With confidence implicit. Dark forebodings That what men taught might be with error tinged, That what they clung to with such jealousy, And with such angry passion dogmatised, Might yet be found delusion or deceit, Perplexed our anxious minds. How eagerly We panted then to seek the realms of Thought I Perhaps the best passages in the volume are the sketches of the characters and fates of two eminent lawyers who toiled unto death. We had occasion lately to allude to one of these—the admired and lamented Follett. The present author supplies us with a vivid sketch of the great advocate : His mind, Capacious and profound as the wide sea, Could condescend to humblest toil and learn The pleader's craft, and make its subtleties More subtle by his teaching. Eloquence, When eloquence was fitting, he displayed; And ever on his lips dwelt, like a charm, Winning persuasion not to be denied. How soft and rich the modulated tones Of his sonorous voice ! how elegant The graceful motion of his hand ! How bright The piercing flashes of his searching eyes, Themselves unsearchable ! No artifice To him unknown ; nor did he always deem Such aid superfluous. All the armoury Of rhetoric and reasoning was his own : He swayed their weapons with a master's hand. And he says, with much pathos : One monitor Alone he had, who in his quiet home Lived like a saint with vigils and with prayers, And trembling at prosperity too great, Whispered in his averted ear, Refrain ! But ere ho heeded came that messenger Whose call must be obeyed, and summoned hence To Death's dread court the now exhausted man. No vain solicitude could save, no skill Help him who helped so many : he is gone! The Temple holds his venerated dust ; And distant generations yet may gain instruction and a warning, when they view The mournful monument of Follett's fame. Warwick Beechwood does not concur with the late Justice Talfourd in thinking that Follett had " a rayless grave." We are much • •• I Y