The Press. — London, England, 1858-01-02 00:00:00

12 THE WEEK. IT is difficult, if not impossible, to take an accurate view of great events when we are but barely before them. For an historical, as well as an architectural perspective, a certain distance is required. Hence compiled narratives, professing to be annual reviews, aro gene rally of no authority ; but their writers should avoid p ositiv.3 errors. The retrospect for the year 1857, in the Times of Friday, teems with misstatements and exaggerations. "It was known that an attack on " the Ministry had been prepared before the disturbances at Canton " were heard of." This assertion is entirely without proof. Not only was the fact so stated positively denied by Lord Jolts RUSSELL, Mr. GLADSTONE, Mr. COBDEN, and others, but there is circumstantial evidence to prove the assertion so haz trded as being worse than an idle invention. For if there was, directly or indirectly, any evidence to prove the alleged combination, would it not long since have been given to the world? Nor does this attempt at an historical summary take proper cognisance of the " second thoughts " of the country in returning Mr. BRIGHT, Mr. CARDWELL. Mr. litssos, Mr. Fox, and many other independent members who had been excluded by the temporary Palmerston delusion. Neither is any notice taken of the fact that an appeal to the country had been carefully planned out beforehand, and that Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEY had been admitted to the Cabinet—an appointment of great significance to the initiated. Neither is there any notice taken of the fact that the Conservative party did not upon the whole lose ground at the election. It gained seats in twelve large towns, and its numerical loss at the borough elec tions was only four seats ; while any loss in counties (which reverted to Whigs with vast territorial interests) was more than counter balanced by the large gain in Ireland. When these omissions and mis takes have been made in a review of our domestic politics, we could not expect accuracy in a summary of the events of the fearful Indian crisis. No notice is taken of the long warning given to the Govern ment about the state of India. Nothing is said of the efforts of Mr. DISRAELI in 1853 to attract. the attention of Government to India, nor of the solemn warnings of Sir CHARLES NAPIER, nor of Sir ERSKINE PERRY'S motion in the House of Commons, and the way in which the Cabinet cashiered all Indian discussions. It may be said that these and many other solemn warnings occurred in other years, and should not be tabulated in a review of 1857 ; but granting that, it should never have been said " that since the Sicilian Vespers no calamity has fallen on a nation with so little warning" (!)—a most extravagant asser tion—and in the instances of " supineness. Ste ," proper notice is not taken of the neglect of the Government at home, and of the worse than ridiculous way in which Mr. VERNON SMITH and other officials toyed with an immense crisis. Such reviews, in which facts are mangled and events are overlooked, can serve no real utility. The Indian drama is far from being closed, and we have still to con sider the consequences of what is now being transacted at Calcutta and elsewhere in India. Briefly, we may say that 1857 will long be memorable in English annals as the year of the most tremendous military mutiny we ever encountered. There was much to blame in the conduct of many of our officials at home and in India, but emer gencies brought forth the resources of our race, and the calamities of the empire were almost compensated for by the sublime endurance of men and women of English blood, and by some admirable military exploits which rivalled the brightest deeds of CLIVE and WELLESLEY. British courage upheld an empire jeopardised by the culpable apathy of ajobbing electioneering Cabinet at home. But the retrospect of the year should teach the country a serious lesson on the danger of trusting to a Cabinet which is neither Conservative nor Liberal—which wants a policy, while it has only the precarious support of a party in constant fluctuation. The Calcutta mail has rather rudely shaken the pleasant illusions in which we were told to indulge last week. True it is that one part of Lucknow is at last relieved, but Lucknow itself is not yet captured, nor even occupied ; and the chances at present would appear to he rather against than in favour of Sir COLIN CAMPBELL, for there are two facts broadly stated in the intelligence received from Calcutta which are eminently unsatisfactory. We are told that Sir COLIN has urgently demanded reinforcements, and requested orders as to whether he shall retain or evacuate his position. The request for reinforcements was to be expected. Sir Col.'s, as we anticipated, at the head of a very inconsiderable force, something under 5,000 men, entered that hornet's nest of rebels at Lucknow. He reaches the Residency, and finding that he can do nothing more without incuning greater risk than it was advisable to encounter, asks for immediate reinforcements to enable him to complete the capture or demolition of Lucknow. But why, if his position be secure, should he ask for orders to retain or evacuate that position? Upon the face of it, it looks as if Sir COLIN, unwilling to be caught in the trap which so successfully shut up 0 UTRAM and HAVE LOCK, had intimated to the Government of Calcutta the necessity of a retreat unless reinforcements speedily reached him. If such a step be taken, though it be only reculer pone mieux muter, the effect will be disastrous to us througuout not only Oude, but the whole of India. The fall of Delhi, doubted yet by the natives, will be incredible to them then. Tho fidelity of the Sikhs will be shaken, for native allies are ever of little value in a retreat.; and before a fortnight has passed we may expect to hear that once more the flame of rebellion has enveloped thewholeof Southern l3engal. T here are present symptoms of mischief in every town from Calcutta to Cawnpore, as if in anticipation of some disaster to us in Oude. It is painful to reflect, when so much blood has been shed to reach the nest of these rebels, that after all these battles and butcheries we may have to evacuate the position and . once more have the work to do over again. It is worse—it is dispiriting to our troops and destructive of our prestige. There is only one way by which such a step can be averted—by the arrival of immediate reinforcements to the aid of Sir COLIN CAMPBELL. The telegram states that 1,300 troops left Cawnporo within the week after Sir COLIN had taken the field. That may or may not be true ; but one thing is certain, that whatever troops were en route to Lucknow, they had not by the latest dates joined Sir COLIN at Lucknow, or, if they had joined, were utterly insufficient for Sir Cowes purposes. Ili one word, Sir COLIN CAMPBELL, there is no concealing it, is in a very awkward position. He is not at the head of 12,000 men ; he has not battered down Lucknow ; he is not able to commence, much less undertake the conquest of Oude ; and he is unable to keep open his communications with Cawnpore. We do no say that he is hemmed in by the rebels. The rebels have had a sharp taste of his artillery, and will keep out of the range of his guns ; but then the rebels are numerous, they fight desperately behind cover, they are active as panthers, and are beaten one day only to require more beating the next. This sort of work wears out European troops. Let them catch their foe in the open field, and they will give a good account of him ; but guerilla warfare in the jungle, with mud forts and villages, defended by some of the finest and coollest shots in the world, to capture as well, is exhaustive work for a small force. When Sir Com received OUTRAM'S request for 5,000 men and 12 guns, he is reported to have exclaimed that 50,000 men and 50 guns could only do the work effectually. His present position appears to realise the sagacity of the observation. But is it possible that reinforcements can speedily reach Sir Com:0 We have never had much continence in the means of transport at Cal cutta, and at last the great truth is acknowledged. There is no more efficient carriage fur the army in November than there was in July. What it was at that period we may judge from the fact related by one of the Indian journals, that the sth Fusiliers, arriving at. Calcutta the first week in July, were pushed up country with the greatest haste, and reached Allababad the first week in September. It was the boast of the Ministerial journals a few weeks since that the troops from England had been arriving at Calcutta in large numbers. How is it that we find none of them with Sir COLIN CAMPBELL? Even the whole of the China force is not yet with Sir COLIN, and that force was despatched from England in the spring of last year ! There is no river and but very indifferent land transport for the army at Calcutta; and if Sir Court depends upon receiving immediate and powerful rein• foreements to carry out his plan of the campaign in all its integrity, ucless they reach him from some other quarter than Cal cutta, we fear that we must not yet anticipate even the complete occupation of Lucknow, let alone the subjugation of Oude, and the suppression of the revolt in that province. Filibusterism has as yet pursued its revival uninterruptedly. WALKER has landed at Greytown with 200 desperadoes " armed to the teeth," while Sir W. G. OOSELEY is settling the preliminaries of negotia tion at Washington. This question is in truth rapidly assuming very serious proportions. If the authority of the President of the United States is insufficient to check these lawless proceedings, who can suppose that the interference of a breign plenipotentiary will be of any avail? If British rights and British property are to be protected in Central America, they must owe their security to something more efficacious than the diplomacy of the present Cabinet. Anything like a rupture with the United States would be deeply deplorable. But our relations with that great empire stand on a peculiar footing. Generations, perhaps centuries, must elapse before we can he to each other what each aro to France, Austria, or Russia. As the quar rels of relations are proverbially the bitterest, so in our little dis ' putes with the Americans there is always something rather felt than expressed—a jealousy born of our propinquity which exacerbates the difference. In the next place, we must remember . that America feels towards us all that indefinable suspicion which a newly risen man i too apt to feel towards his social superior. He perhaps himself would be the first, if taxed with it, to acknowledge its groundlessness ; but he cannot shake it off. Whatever you do he thinks you are giving yourself airs, and this induces an excess of punctiliousness and irritad bility which can only be prevented from b 'rating into an open conflagre.• tion by the utmost delicacy and firmness combined. Lastly, it should be remembered that America avowedly is not careful to abide by all the niceties of international law which regulate the monarchies of Europe. She is, within her own hemisphere, an aggressive power. She almost openly nets on the principle so humorously described by Mr. TH4.CKERAY. If you stamp your foot upon your neighbour's toes he will remove them, and you put yours in his place. He will remon strate, but you will have gained your end. Again, in the vast extent of her territory, and consequent feebleness of the Executive, she has always an excuse for the ill-success of her efforts to prevent injuries like the present. The situation is a very awkward one for this coun try, and demands all the diplomatic talent and all the moral courage which England can muster to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. All we • THE PRESS, JANUARY 2, 185 S.