The Press. — London, England, 1854-12-30 00:00:00

• ~. ~~;. t 0 _ - • , - , . .. . • . . r . 4 , l` ... PRICE SIXPENCE. No. 87.—VoL. 11. LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 30,1854. reL:b j e vttss. LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1854. IT would be premature to more than allude to an Event now in progress, which, when ripe for announcement, will excite the greatest interest in Europe, and open a new phase in the complications of the Eastern question. In the present state of the great European monarchies, it is not to be expected that dynastic considerations can be wholly sepa rated from the policy of Courts, and such considerations will soon, we have reason to believe, assume a shape to demand the gravest deliberation. The service of the Coalition is a hard one. It demands the severest of all sacrifices—the sacrifice of character. There is not a single person who has accepted under it any office of trust or responsibility, either civil or military. that has not had the pin of . witnessing the decline of his reputation, however zealous he may have been in the discharge of his duties. The most distinguished are the greatest suf ferers, and, by a singular fatality, they are accused of being deficient in those qualities which had most contributed to their fame. The bravest incur the reproach of timidity, the most prudent of thoughtlessness, the most experienced of incapacity ; and amid this wreck of established reputations w e can discern not one rising name to inspire hope for the future. How shall we explain this sudden degene racy of our most eminent public servants ? An able Administration is never in want of able officers and subordinates. If it does not find them ready to its hand, it creates them ; it instinctively discerns the peculiar talents •it requires for peculiar services, and offers to their fortunate possessors the opportunity they alone require to attain distinction. It belongs to a sagacious and clear-sighted Go vernment to make or heighten the reputa tions of those who serve under it; while, on the other hand, it is the sinister distinction of an incapable Ministry to dim the lustre of the fame which has been achieved under happier 'auspices. and to cast reproach or shame on the eminent men who have the misfortune to be called on to serve it in any capacity. Nine months ago no one doubted the courage of the hero pf Acre. Appointed to the com mand of the Baltic fleet, it was naturally sup posed that his achievements would add to the glories of the British navy ; but Sir CHARLES had the ill-luck to act under an Admiralty which had no just conception of the difficul ties he would have to encounter or the na ture of the fortresses he would have to attack. The gun - boats he requested were denied him ; his 120 - gun ships were useless amid the shallows of the Neva, and the Ministry which sent him on so boot • less an enterprise took advantage of his ab sence to secretly depreciate his conduct, and even his courage, and to represent that the safety of Croustadt was owing to his want of daring. He returns to England to find his popularity gone. The foolish vaunts with which he was sent forth are laid to his charge, and a long life of brilliant service is clouded by the results of an expedition which, from the absence of information and design on the part of those who sent it forth, could not ter minate otherwise than ingloriously. Even the blockade which he maintained was rendered next to nugatory by the Order in Council which transferred Russian commerce to Prussian ports. Intthe Black Sea are we to attribute it to the fault or• the "orders" of Admiral DIINDAS that Odessa, the main depot of the Russian army in the south, was not occupied or destroyed ? The enterprise was practicable ; it would have reflected honour on the fleet which accomplished it; and probably it would have disconcerted the plan of the Russian campaign, and have prevented those reinforce ments being poured into the Crimea which have given the enemy so great a superiority of numbers before Sebastopol. But because Odessa could be assailed with success by our navy, and the forts of Sebastopol could not, it was against the latter that Admiral DUNDAS was ordered to direct his efforts. His com mand ends in failure, and nearly forty years of active and honourable service are eclipsed by that outcry against him, which the supporters of the Ministry are not ashamed to swell. It is not our• province to vindicate com manders who were recommended to the Admiralty—if the language of the First Lord had any meaning —because they were " Re foriners," but recollecting their distinguished services in past time it is impossible not to suspect that their simultaneous failure must be owing to some other cause than to any want on their part of skill and courage. Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE, 011 e of our most seasoned diplomatists, has always been supposed to possess eminent talents for public affairs, but no sooner was he called on to re pair by his active interference at Constanti nople and Scutari the blunders of the War Department at home than even his reputation sank under the impossible task imposed on him, and disparagement was busy with his name. The most illustrious victim to Ministerial incapacity has fitly been reserved for the last. Because Lord RAGLAN could not successfully contend with greater difficulties than any British commander has ever had to struggle with before,—because he could not by his single energy remedy the shortcomings of a commissariat and hospital service radi cally defective from the first—make one soldier do the work of ten—retard the seasons — command the elements—prevent the " con nivance" by which the Russian army on the Danube was liberated for service in the Crimea —construct causeways when every man was required for the operations of the siege—and perform a thousand other impossibilities, he is to be represented as wanting in head and energy. This detraction notoriously originated in Ministerial circles. When his name has been mentioned latterly it has been with a grave face and shake of the head, and an ex pression of alarm at what " he might think " proper• to do next." It may prove convenient to the Ministry to favour the insinuation that the disasters of the campaign are attributable to its commander. In former times a dastardly Administration, with a Newcastle at its head, successfully turned public indignation from itself by shooting an admiral, but we cannot afford to sacrifice. the pupil and right-hand man of WELLINGTON, whose fortitude and courage have been equally conspicuous throughout the campaign, to shield the scan dalous mismanagement of our War Depart ments. It is currently reported that the Govern ment, hopeless of maintaining its ground on the meeting of Parliament, if the war does not assume a more favourable aspect, have sent instructions to Lord RAGLAN, urging that an assault should at once be made. The order, however inapplicable it may prove to existing circumstances, might be justified on the same ground as the invasion of tho Crimea when the proper season was passed—the necessity of doing something to save the Ministry from dis • solution. Nor need we feel surprise should the incapable ambition which has already entailed so many disasters on the country, and has cowardly sacrificed so many reputations to its need, determine in its dyingthroes to risk the safety of our diminished but still gallant and as yet invincible army on the desperate chances of a forlorn hope. THE INDEPENDENT LIBERALS. TIM position of the Independent Liberals before the country is week after week becom ing more embarassing, as the strain upon Government and the pressure on Parliament increase. The Liberal party at largo feels its honour impaired by the blunders of a Cabinet whose policy it does not sanction, and whose construction it did not originate. As the events of the campaign become darker by the sad results of official blundering, in the same proportion the reputation of the once great Liberal interest becomes clouded. The leaders of the party smart under the irre futable charge that the Peelites monopolise the greatest offices of the State. The whole extent of the campaign is in their hands. The thunderbolts of war have been given by a suicidal policy into the nerveless grasp of officials who totter under a weight for which they never were fitted by nature. And for this disastrous dispensation the country has reason to curse not only the vainglory and perverse self-sufficiency of the Peelites, but the vacillating spirit of those degenerate Whigs, who have treated their friends and followers to equal oblivion with the principles of their hereditary connection. But, unfortunately for the public interests, the evils of Peelite ascendency do not end in the humiliation of the Liberal party. If such were the only results, Conservatives could be content to sorrow over the fatuity which LIMN.