The Press. — London, England, 1854-12-16 00:00:00

DECEMBER 16, 1854. The Duke of NEWCASTLE began by confessing to the committal of very serious blunders : I am not about to make what might be called an out and-out defence of the policy of the Government, or of the administration of the department to which I have the honour to belong. lam far too sensible of my own short comings, and of the difficulties of administration, to be prepared to say that everything that has been done has been done in the best possible way, or that no mistakes have occurred, or that, if we were now to begin again, on the 28th of March, with the knowledge and experience we have acquired, the same things exactly would be done in the same manner; but, on the contrary, I can say that some things not done then would now be done, and some things done then would now be omitted. He then embarked upon an explanation of the Ministerial policy and a defence of their conduct, touching in the course of his speech upon a variety of points, and recapitulating a great multiplicity of details. Respecting military operations, the invasion of the Crimea had not been rashly underte.ken:— From the very first the invasion of the Crimea was con templated, and I only wish that it were consistent with my duty to lay before your lordships the despatches between Lord Raglan and myself with reference to the conduct of this war; but this is not a fitting time for the production of such documents, and if I were to produce them it would be dangerous for the public service ; but the production of these documents would prove that which I now ask you to believe on my authority, that on the very day on which in structions were first given to Lord Raglan instructions were also given in a separate despatch to make inquiry with reference to the reduction of Sebastopol, the forces in the Crimea, the means of invasion, and the best mode of carrying it out; and when the noble earl says that the orders for the invasion of the Crimea were given in spite of the opinion (of the generals, I deny that they were given in spite of the opinion of any general at all, but that, on the contrary, as far as any military opinions were received, they were in favour of undertaking the expe dition. On the head of preparations and supplies the Duke of Newcastle dilated at great length, enumerating the precise quantities of ammunition, provision, clothes, huts, medical stores, and every other mentionable article of equipment or subsistence; but he admitted having largely miscalculated the enemy's strength and capabilities : That events have turned out differently from what was contemplated in more respects than one I have already admitted. Undoubtedly, we did not expect the Russian power in reinforcing troops before Sebastopol would be so great. We did not doubt her military power. We were aware of that ; but undoubtedly we did not expect that an army could be moved from Odessa to Sebastopol with the marvellous rapidity with which that movement was effected ; and, probably, some of your lordships will be surprised to hear that, through the extraordinary efforts of the Russian Government, through the means they were able to com mand of an unlimited number of cars and cattle, that march was effected at such a rapid rate that on one day a march of forty-two miles was actually effected. We did not cal culate on the powers of the Russian Government to send reinforcements to Sebastopol in time for the battle of Inkermann, and I believe that there are few in this country —few in any other country—who did expect it. (Hear, hear.) I can only say that we did not form our opinions on any haphazard or guesswork, but we took the best opinions we were able to obtain in this country—of those who could inform ns as to the capabilities of the Russian forces and the character of the country they would have to traverse. Regarding the recruiting service, he observed:— With regard to voluntary enlistment, it has been practically found hitherto, and it is now more especially evident, that men in this country are more anxious to enlist when success has been somewhat retarded, when increased energy appears to be necessary, and not when all is proceeding with every probability of being brought to an early and successful issue. This theory, if theory it be, has been completely established by the experience of the last few months. At the first de claration of war recruits came forward freely; but they soon relaxed, and during the summer month they were few in deed in number—so much so as to cause very considerable anxiety on the part of the Government. But as soon as it appeared evident that the siege of Sebastopol was likely to beorotracted, and that the undertaking was one of greater hazard and difficulty than had been supposed —from that moment, when the energy of the people was aroused, the zeal and readiness of the young men of the country to enlist also increased, and week by week it has been pro- gressing, until last week, I believe, we more than doubled the number of any previous week since the commencement of the war, and enrolled six or seven fold the number which we had the power of recruiting some five or six weeks ago. Hear, hear.) Concluding with a reference to the glorious conduct of the army and our allies, he stated: — About a fortnight or three weeks ago I received her Majesty's command to convey to Lord Raglan her inten tion to confer the order of the Bath on General Canrobert, and to convey that determination either to the ambassador of the Emperor of the French, or to the Emperor himself, and that has been delayed because it was not felt that the compliment would be complete to him if not offered at the same time as our own soldiers. (Hear.) Earl GREY considered the vindication offered on behalf of the Government altogether insufficient, and concurred with Lord Derby in believing that one great and fatal error had run through the whole of THE PRESS. their proceedings, in that everything bad been done too late. _ _ _ The Duke of ARGYLL reproduced a few of the War Minister's arguments in defence of the Ministerial capacity. The Earl of HARDWICKE believed that the outcome of the debate was this. Ministers confessed that at the beginning they had not been prepared to carry on the war properly, but had since become alive to the magnitude of the struggle to which the country was committed, and better experienced in the means for prosecuting it vigorously. He vindicated the honour of the navy, and declared that he " wholly absolved Sir Charles Napier from anything like misconduct or neglect." The Earl of CARLISLE was convinced that the Ministry would show all possible energy in conduct ing the war, being sure that the popular spirit was so roused that only under such conditions could they remain Ministers. The PREMIER spoke a few words in magnification of the enterprise undertaken against Sebastopol, and explained the grounds that justified his expectations of its success. The address was then agreed to, and the house adjourned at twelve o'clock. In the Commons, the speeches moving and second ing the Address were delivered by Mr. H. HERBERT and the Hon. E. T. LEVESON GOWER. Sir R. PEEL defended the course pursued by the Government, and complained of the attacks made upon our allies by M. Kossuth, which he appealed to Lord Palmerston to find some means of stopping. Mr. S. HERBERT entered upon an elaborate defence of the Government, contending that every thing possible had been done in concert with our ally the Emperor of the French. In reply to the charge that the Government had no policy or plan in the war, he asserted that there was a plan, the first object of which was the defence of Constantinople, the second to defend the Balkan, and the third to give a severe blow to the power of Russia in the Black Sea. The right hon. gentleman then entered into detailed statements similar to those made by the Duke of Newcastle in the Upper House, and contended that, if the reinforcements were insuffi cient, it was owing to the policy adopted by Parlia ment for some years back to keep down to the very lowest point the military resources of the country. Notwithstanding this, the total army sent to Lord Raglan, including those now ready to embark and those on their way, amounted to no less than 54,730, a larger British army than had ever been sent to any part of the world. It had been asked why they had gone to Sebastopol? The reason was because it was the fortress upon which the Russian power in the Black Sea depended, and if not taken now it would be hopeless to expect success hereafter. He also observed that our losses in the operations in the East had been greatly exaggerated. By the last returns he had received our actual losses were : By disease, including 150 who died of their wounds, 2,783 ; and 1,350 killed in battle ; making a total of 4,130. However severe this loss might be, it was by no means so great as had been supposed. Sir J. PAKINGTON had no serious objection to the Address, nor to the speeches by which it was intro duced, and trusted her Majesty would meet with the support of every party in that house in obtaining all the requisite means for carrying on the war with energy and vigour. Speaking in the name of the great Conservative party, he could say that so far from objecting to the increase of the army demanded, their only disappointment was that the demand had been so long delayed. The fact appeared to be that within the last month the Government had awakened as from a dream, and was now, indeed, putting forth energies which should long since have been called into action. It was only lately that they appeared to be conscious of the difficulties of the struggle upon which they had entered. The house was not in fault if the war had been conducted inefficiently:— In the last session of Parliament. whatever demands the Government made were freely and liberally granted, and the noble lord opposite, on more than one occasion,frankly admitted the spirit in which they were met. It was, there fore, not from any want of support from that house that the army was not sooner augmented. ( Hear, hear.) But he believed he might trace what he called the crippled state of our military armaments mainly to the financial arrangements of the Government during the past session, and to that attempt announced on the part of the Chan cellor of the Exchequer—to the principle of which he and his friends took no exception, but of the impossibility of which they warned him—that in so great a struggle they were to pay for the expenses of the war entirely from the revenue of the year. (Hear, hear.) Sir. J. Pakington then adverted to the paragraphs in the Royal Speech speaking of the conduct of the British army in the East and of its French allies. On these topics he enlarged in fervent language, and dwelt particularly upon the loss which the house had suffered by the death of one of its most respected members, Colonel Blair, and the severe illness of another, the gallant General Sir De Lacy Evans. He then proceeded to review the successive clauses 1205 of her Majesty's Speech, and with great distinctness and force urged those charges against the Ministry, of vacillation, delay, and want of foresight, which were dwelt on by Lord Derby in the other house. On the want of sufficient reinforcements, and of a reserve, he spoke with great power : From the time that the army sat down before Sebas topol, it was left there —numbers falling daily in the trenches, besides the loss experienced in the battle of Baliddava--decimated by disease and sutfering from change of climate and exposure to cold and fatigue, with out any reinforcements whatever, except some few draughts which were sent out to various regiments from time to time, but which in the aggregate made no serious addition to the army until the day that the .10th Regiment landed. Under these circumstances that gallant band of men dwindled away day by day, until on the sth of November they were attacked at Inkennann by the Russian forces. What was the actual force with which we had fought at Inkermann ? '27,000 men were landed originally in the Crimea, 3,000 men were landed a few days afterwards, but on the sth of November—on the day of Inkermann—had they 20,000 men present? Had they 18,000, or even 15,000 men, along the whole position from Balsklava to the heights before the town? lie believed not; but this at least was certain, that the men who resisted the Russian army did not exc e ed 8,000 men. (Cheers.) We ought to thank God that the British forces were not destroyed at lnkermann. ( Hear.) But it was not to the credit of the British Government that there should have been only 8,000 men to resist the Russian force. (Hear, hear.) The valour of our soldiers—and, as the Royal speech said, history hardly recorded such a struggle as that—alone saved us; and it was, indeed, little less than marvellous—it was only by the mercy of God, in fact—that that gallant band had been able to withstand the power of the Russian forces. (Hear, hear.) Their valour was, indeed, such as to claim the highest credit. It, was no common valour; it was not the mere courage of wan fighting against man ; but it was an enduring, indomitable courage rarely witnessed that enabled this band of heroes, hour after hour, to struggle against those heavy masses of Russians that were hurled upon them. 'Twas nothing less than miraculous that we were now able to congratulate ourselves upon their victory, instead of having to mourn over the loss of our whole force. (Hear, hear.) But how was it that there were only 8,000 men left to sustain this conflict? This, indeed, was a grave matter for explanation. Ilia firm persuasion was that, if the Government had shown a proper degree of foresight, if they had been up to their own undertaking, if they had formed proper reserves for the army, if they had taken means to fill up the vacancies which occurred, and to keep up the army even to its original number of .27,(00 men, no battle of lnkermann would ever have been fought. (Hear, hear.) To parody a trite phrase well known in the sister country, " England's weakness was Russia's opportunity." The Russians had gathered together all their reinforce. ments, they had learnt the weakness of the British army. and, brave as they knew the British soldiers to be, they had hoped to overpower them, and it was under this feeling that the attack was made. (Hear.) This he firmly believed they never would have done had we been there in that strength which common prudence and foresight would have told us we ought to have been. But what had been the suf ferings of our men since that time'? They had Leen on those bleak heights under canvas in the worst weather, the ground impassable around them, exposed unprotected to the severity of the climate, and to the fury of that awful hurricane which had been so fatal to our shipping. But why was it so? By the improvidence of her Majesty's Ministers. (Hear, hear.) He thought he had a right to ask the Govern ment to explain why this was so. The House of Commons had found them with supplies and furnished them with the means of sending forth this great army, and it had a right to ask why the Government had left this army un cared for to perish of cold, exhaustion, and even of hunger? ( Hear, hear.) The right hon. baronet concluded : They would be abandoning their duty if they did not call upon the Government to explain these things. They had a right to call for an explanation, not only in the name of the people of this country, but also in the name of the army which was undergoing these sufferings. If the Go vernment would give a satisfactory explanation, if they would show that hereafter the House of Commons might rely, not only on their good intentions—which he had never doubted—hut also on their exercising that prudence and foresight which hitherto had not been manifested, they would have nothing to fear from the Conservative party. ( Hear, hear.) Hon. gentlemen on that side of the house were not the Whigs of 1703—(rheers)—nor were they the Coalitionists of 1853. (Loud cheers.) They de sired nothing but the honour of their Sovereign and the welfare of their country. If the Government asked for supplies they should have them granted with no niggard hand; if they asked for parliamentary support, they should be met with no factious spirit ; but if this concess io n were made on the one hand, this condition must be made on the other—that the war should be conducted with vigour, wisdom, and foresight greater than that which bad hitherto been displayed. For this explanation, therefore, he asked, and the Government was bound, in duty to the country, to give it. He asked them what was to be their future course, and by their answer it must be judged whether the House of Commons would be justified in supporting them, and whether the people could be satisfied that the future con duct of public affairs should rest in the hands of the ex isting Administration. (Hear, hear.) Mr. LAvARD commenced by acknowledging the re luctance and sense of responsibilty with which he undertook to criticise the conduct of the war, and then reverted to the subject of home mistakes and blunders : He had last year warned them of the calamities which were sure to attend the line of policy adopted by the Ge- _,