The Press. — London, England, 1854-02-25 00:00:00

FEBRUARY 25, 1854, that he was constantly repeating that his master, the Emperor, was determined to have some equivalent, or that some arrangement should be made compensatory to the Greeks for the privileges they had relinquished ; bat that Count NesselrMe never told us what he wanted. (Hear, hear.) Wicked Count Nesselrode! (Laughter.) Fraudu lent duplicity of Russian statesmen 1 (Laughter.) But does it not occur to the house, though it might not have occurred to the noble lord, that if he wanted to know exactly and precisely what Count Nesselrode meant he should not have waited for Count Nesselrode to tell him, but that he should have asked the question of Count Nes selrode? ( Ileur,hear.) The great complaint of the noble lord as to the conduct of Count Nesselrode, and which he has described as fraudulent, is, that he perpetually went on harping about the determination of the Empe ror of Russia to obtain some compensation for the Greek Church for the privileges which it had lost. But why could the noble lord not find the information he wanted? Why is Sir Hamilton Seymour at St. Petersburg, if he is not to ask for the information that is desired? (Hear.) Why all the envoys to Russia, the ambassadors, the ministers, and all if distracted and protracted councils in Downing street, fthe upshot of all these envoys and ambassadors and ministers, and all those deliberations is, that the noble lord has to come to us, with the country in a state of war— that war being occasioned apparently by the intentions of the Emperor of Russia—and is forced to complain to us that the Emperor of Russia never told them what he wanted —the noble lord confessing by the very observation that he never asked ? (Hear.) 1 say that at this stage of the pro ceedings—here is the gist of the matter—he ought to have said to Russia, ' The affair of the rival Churches is settled— an affair in which we never interfered—why is there still this demonstration of forces on the frontier ? You say you want an equivalent to the Greek Church for the privileges you have lost. Define what you want, expressly and expli citly, but do not continue to make demonstrations when the point for which they can only be needed is already settled. If you go on insisting that you require equivalents and compensations, why do you not define what you deem an equivalent, or what you deem a compensation ? Then we tell you that you cannot count on that which you have declared to be the great means of obtaining the peaceful attainment of your object—viz., the friendly offices of her Majesty's Government at Paris and Constantinople.' (Hear, hear.)" Mr. Disraeli proceeded to exonerate Lord John Russell from much of the responsibility subsequently incurred. A readjustment of the Administration took place, Lord Clarendon became Foreign Secre tary, and a marked change of tone immediately followed, indicating the presence of an unmistakable bias towards Russia. Pursuing his review of the Ministerial conduct, as shown by comparing their successive state papers with their contemporary acts and more recent language, he contended that, while threatening symptoms and warnings of danger came from every quarter, they had written to Sir H. Seymour that " there was no danger of peace being disturbed ; " that although they since complained of the aggression of Russia, at the time they attributed the perils of Turkey to " the unwise and reckless maladministration of the Sultan himself," and that, while denouncing Russian interference and ambition, they had themselves endeavoured to interfere in the internal government of Turkey, and at the same time counselled the Porte to a disgraceful submis sion. These proceedings extended over seven months, and involved a series of inconsistencies whose origin it was important to ascertain : " What is the motive that influenced the Government during these seven months of negotiation? My Lord Clarendon, in one of his letters, has talked of alternatives, and I shall now offer an alternative—either the Govern ment were influenced by a degree of confidence which assumed a morbid character of credulity, or they were influenced by connivance—l mean a policy that it was better in their opinion—the opinion of the Secretary of State, and of the Prime Minister, which received the compliments of the Eniperor of Russia—that it was better on the whole that the inevitable dissolution of the Turkish empire should take place by the indirect means of foreign interference, under such peculiar circumstances, than that England and France should go to war to maintain what is called the integrity or independence of the Porte. (Hear, hear.) Now, sir, this is a question it is most important to decide. Was it credulity, or was it con• nivance ? On ascertaining that point depends our also ascertaining what is the object of this war. If their con duct has been prompted by credulity they may carry on a war with success and spirit. The fact that they have been deceived we have upon the word of an Emperor. It is a lamentable circumstance, but it is an accident to which generous minds may be liable, and the very fact that they may be deceived may animate them to exertions with the view of vindicating their conduct in history. If the con duct of her Majesty's Government during the last seven months has been influenced by credulity, it is po ssible Ton may have a war — a long and a severe war; but it will be a war carried on for great objects, and may end in great public benefit. (Cheers.) Let us for a moment con template the results of the other alternative. If it has been . suggested by connivance, you may hav e a w ar ; hut it l be a war such as will be carried on by connivance—a timo rous war, a vacillatingwar--awar with no results, or rather with the exact results which were originally intended. (Laughter.) It will not be the war that will place Russia in that position which we think necessary for the security of Europe and of our country, but it will be a war which will end in transactions similar to the Menschikoff note, or the arrangement of the Vienna Conference. Now, these are two results very opposite and very different. On e, I believe, is welcome to the people ; the ot h er so entirely THE PRESS. unsatisfactory, that I think it is the duty of this house — even if we ' potter over blue books '—(a laugh )—to try to ascertain our position." Mr. Disraeli then called for an explanation of an answer given by Lord Clarendon in the House of Lords on the 25th of April last as to the object of Prince Menschikors mission, which appeared to be inconsistent with the facts, and asked _ whether in that answer the noble earl was influenced by credulity or connivance ? Passing on to the Vienna note, he drew from it another suggestion of connivance " Here all the diplomatists, all the wiseacres assembled together at Vienna. They drew up a document which Turkey and Russia both agree in ascribing the same mean ing to, and which meaning is one not intended by any of the ministers or diplomatists engaged in the drawing of it up. (Cheers and laughter.) That is the first remarkable circumstance; but the most curious thing is that the Vienna note appears, as I understand it, under the exact aspect and almost in the exact shape of the rejected Mens chikoff ultimatum which was to be a eases beili. Is that suspicious of connivance or not ? Is it the less suspicious of connivance when the note is first sent to the Emperor of Russia and accepted by him—(Hear, hear)—and then hurried to Constantinople and offered to the Sultan, with hardly time for consultation—he is apprised that time is precious—and is providentially rejected by him? And how does the noble lord treat this matter? On the hypothesis of connivance—on which I give no opinion—the afiliir is of course very easy to understand. As he intended from the first that this should be no mere shadow—the inte grity and independence of Turkey—having intended from the first that the Menschikoff ultimatum should have been accepted, those who are connivers would have been very glad of the means afforded by the Vienna Conference to have obtained their purpose. lint on the other hypothesis —the hypothesis of credulity—that really is most difficult to apply, because one can hardly imagine that any Ministry were so credulous as to suppose that Turkey, after having rejected the ultimatum of Prince Menschikoff, would have accepted the note of the Vienna Conference." The right hon. member then adverted to later trans- actions and to the Ministerial speeches delivered during the recess. Much as they talked now about the independence of Turkey, at that time, lie re marked, her cause was still represented as worthless and her condition as deplorable ; nor did Ministers seem to awaken to a better sense of the prospects and civilisation of that country until they heard of the unexampled vigour and success of the Turkish arms. Even then, indeed, there were traces discoverable of a new conspiracy carried on by means of fresh nego tiations, and which might have resulted in pros trating Turkey before the Czar but for the occurrence of the massacre of Sinope. Then the feelings of the British public were aroused, and the duty of defend ing Turkey became too urgent to be repudiated. Then the fleets were sent into the Black Sea, but were so employed when there as to make it doubtful whether the Government were more incompetent to make peace or war. Adverting to the alliance with France, he pointed out the distinction between main taining the balance of power and preserving the ter ritorial distribution of Europe, and elicited from Lord John Russell a brief statement that no scheme for the latter purpose entered into the terms of the French alliance. Mr. Disraeli proceeded to urge that the Ministry should have exacted from the Ger man powers more distinct information respecting their intended policy, and concluded by reiterating the assurance that they would meet no factious oppo sition on that side of the house : " Whatever opinion we may entertain of the conduct of the Government in the mansgeinent of those trans actions which have led to this terrible conclusion, I cannot suppose that, upon these benches, there can be any difference of opinion as to the duty we have to fulfil—to support the Sovereign and to maintain the honour of this country. (Loud cheers from the Opposition.) I can assure the noble lord that so long as the Opposition benches are filled by those who now occupy theta he will at least en counter men who will not despair, under any circum stances, of the resources and of the fortunes of their country. (Renewed cheers from the Opposition.) I can answer for myself and for my friends that no future Wel lesley on the banks of the Danube will have to make a bitter record of the exertions of an English Opposition that depreciated his efforts and ridiculed his talents. We shall remember what we believe to be our duty to this country; and, however protracted may be the war—how ever unfortunate your counsels—at least we shall never despair of the Republic. (Loud rheera.)" Lord PALMERSTON adverted by turns to the various allegations brought forward against the Ministry, and denied their force. They had not rushed hastily into war, and they bad not sacrificed unduly to the desire for peace, although clinging to every hope of preserv• ing amity so long as any existed. Respecting the charge of credulity, he contended that the Ministry were warranted in believing the representations of Russia, whose ruler and diplomatists should not lightly be suspected of doing—what it turned out they bad done—exhausting every modification of untruth in the course of the negotiations. It was said that the Emperor would have been checked if we had taken hostile steps at an earlier period• This was but an opinion; and to have acted upon it would, he considered, have been a great political mistake. Forbearance on that occasion had led to the best con• sequences as regarded the important co operation of 173 Austria and Prussia►, whose conduct would be very different if the contest began now than it would have been if the sword had been drawn in July. On this point the noble lord insisted with much emphasis : " There were many reasons why forbearance was desirable. It was of tLe utmost importance in matters affecting the great interests of Europe that, although England and France were from the first heartily, cordially, and entirely united together, n•e should endeavour to obtain the con currence of Austria and Pr►ssia. (Hear, hear.) We know that those countries had an interest in this matter far greater than we had. To Prussia and Austria it is a regular tight for existence, because if Russia were either to appro priate any large portion of Turkish territory, or even to reduce Turkey to the condition of a mere dependent state upon Russia. no man can doubt who casts a glance upon the map of Europe, and hooka at the geographical position of those powers with regard to Russia and Turkey, that any considerable accession of power on the part of Russia must be fatal to the independent action both of Austria and of Prussia. (Hear, hear.) Well, it was of great importance to get those two powers with us, and, as far as it was possible, to obtain their consent and concurrence. But neither of them could be expected to risk lightly a rupture with their great and powerful neighbour. The reasons which should lead Prussia not to wish to risk herself—the reasons, I should rather say, why those who wished well to Prussia would not desire to see her thrnet forward singly—are obvious to any man who looks merely at the map of Europe. Austria knew what her great obligations were to Russia. (Hear.) It was natural that she should be unwilling to break with Russia as long as it was possible that matters could be arranged by an amicable adj ustment; and if Austria had seen, that England was deaf' to her counsels, was unwilling to give ear to her wishes, and was hurrying on matters to a war which, by the exercise of her forbear ance, and by her influence at the Court of St. Petersburg, might have been avoided—l say, if hustria had seen such to he the conduct of England and of France, we would not have been entitled to expect her to take part in the war which is now impending. It was, therefore, of great importance to avail ourselves as much as we could of the influence which Austria possessed at the Court of St. Petersburg, and to convince Austria that we considered and consulted her interests and her position as well as our own, and that we were willing to give every possible opportunity for an amicable settlement of the differences, if by her means it could be effected. I believe I EMI not overstating the truth when I say that the conduct of England and France in that respect has been fully appreciated by Austria and by Prussia. if a war had been hurried on in the course of last summer, we should have had no reason or right to expect their co•operation; but I cannot persuade myself that, if mutters should oome to the point to which I am afraid they are likely to come, the conduct of Austria and Prussia will not be very different now from what it would have been under other circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Well, then, I say that the conduct of her Majesty's Government is not blameable, either upon the ground of precipi tation, or I think upon the ground of too much forbearance. The interests at stake were too important not to justify every possible degree of forbearance short of the sacrifice of those interests which it was our duty to protect." Adverting to the internal condition of Turkey, Lord Palmerston corroborated the assertion of its rapid improvement and development, and combatted the argument that the treatment of her Christian subjects took her out of the pale of our sympathies "We are told that it will be impossible to prevent the dissolution of the Turkish empire ; and that, because it is not in such an advanced stage of civilisation as this country, it ought, therefore, to he acquired by Russia, and blotted out from the map of Europe as an independent nation. I have been asked by the honourable member for the West Riding whether I am prepared to repeat the assertion which made last session, namely, that there is hardly any country which in the same period of time has made such material progress in its internal arrangements as Turkey has done. abide by that statement. (Hear, hear.) It is true that Turkey is still far behind England and France ; but we are not on that account to forget how much further advanced t is now than it was in the time of the Sultan Mahmond. Men who know anything of Turkey know tHat in every matter of internal arrangement, whether army, or navy, or justice, or administration, immense progress had been made since that period. But Turkey, forsooth, is not worth de fending, because the Christian subjects of the Sultan are not in all respects placed on a footmg of equality with the Museulmans. I believe that the great distinction which now exists between the two races is, that the Christians pay the harasch and are exempted from the conscription. There is also some inequality in regard to the evidence of Christians in civil castes ; in criminal cases they can already give their evidence ; but if the fact of one race in a country not being on a footing of perfect equality with another justifies you in considering the* country as undeserving of an independent political existence, what would have been said by the honourable member for the West Riding if he had lived not very long ago, talking historically in the life of nations, when there prevailed that penal code in Ireland which oppressed the Roman Catholics there and placed them in a more degraded position than that in which the Christian subjects of the Sultan now stand ? (Hear, hear.) I fancy in those times this country could boast of many men eminent in all matters of literature and science who would scarce have liked to be informed that they were living in a state of utter barbarism, and that the country ought to be acquired by France, in order that the Catholics might be put upon the same footing as the Protestants were." Efforts had, however, been made, both recently and heretofore, to obtain a more perfect equality of condition for the Christian subjects of the Sultan, and those efforts he defended against another section I