The Press. — London, England, 1858-10-09 00:00:00

but I will, with the permission of your hon. committee. sta te the grounds upon which those convictions rest, and describe the course of policy which I have pursued in dealing with the rebellion in Oude. If, when I have done s o, it shall be deemed that t hat p olic y has been erro neo' as, or that, not being erroneous, it has been feebly and ineffectually curried out, or that for any reason the confi dence of those who are responsible for the administration of Indian affairs in England should be withheld from me, I make it my respectful but urgent request, through your hon. committee, that I may be relieved of the office of Governor-General of India with the least possible delay. 7. I desire to say that 1 shall in that case resign my great charge into the bands of the Hon. Court of Direc tors, with a deep and abiding sense of gratitude for the generous support, the unreserved confidence, and the considerate courtesy which I have at all times received from therm I have nothing more to add upon the personal part of this question. 8. Rut, before I speak of the proclamation, I beg to call the attention of your hon. committee to certain paragraphs of the despatch before me, which are pregnant with a signification far more momentous than the cen sure of any recent act or policy of the Governor- Ueneral of the day. These paragraphs are numbered from 10 to 14 inclusive, and I believe that I shall not misrepresent their import by describing it as follows :- 9. They begin by pointing out a doubt whether the British Government was justified in taking possession of the kingdom of Oude. The doubt is pointed out, but is not resolved, nor is a distinct opinion expressed upon it. 10. Certain facts are then referred to which, though they do not directly affect the question of our right to take possession of Oude, are cited as leading, in con junction with the doubt above mentioned, to the con clusion that the hostilities which the people of Oude have been carrying on against us have rather the cha racter of legitimate war than that of rebellion, and that the people of Onde should be regarded with indulgent consideration. 11. It is altogether beyond my duty to discuss whether the course pursued by the British Government in taking possession of Chide was a lawful and justifiable one; still less does it belong to me to say what line of con duct the British Government ought to follow if it be now determined that that course was not lawful or justifiable. Bet as to the indulgence due to the people of Oude, your hon committee will, I am sure, do me the justice to admit that no misgiving as to the character of our dealings with the Oude State was necessary to induce me to declare, without any Injunction from yourselves, that the talook data and landholders of Oude must be viewed in a very different light from that in which rebels in our old pro vinces are to be regarded. I found sufficient reason for this in the facts that the allegiance of these men, when they broke into rebellion, was little more than a year old, and that they had become British subjects by no act of their own ; that our rule had brought loss of property upon many of them, and upon sortie an unjust loss ; and that it had diminished the importance and arbitrary power of a'L I considered these facts to be a palliation of rebellion even where hostility to us had been most inveterate, and :there fore I put aside altogether the punishments of death, trans portation, and imprisonment, and while marking those who had rebelled with the penalty which in India, as elsewhere, has been again and again recognized as a fitting punishment of rebels—namely, the forfeiture of their rights in the soil, —I promised indulgence to those who should make . . prompt submisaion. I felt that considerations of policy and mercy, and the newness of our rule, prescribed this course. I recorded this in a paper already in the hands of your hon. com— . . mittee; and I hope, before closing this despatch, to show that the indulgence has been accorded promptly and liberally. 12. But it is my first duty earnestly to beg your hon. committee to consider the effect which will be produced upon the province of Oude when it shall become generally known that the British Government speaks hesitatingly of its right to rule that country. I cannot but fear that it will make a turbulent and warlike people more impatient then ever of subjection to authority and order. I fear that it will furnish a pretext for resistance to the Government of which many had spirits will not be slow to avail them selves now and hereafter. 13. But more especially do I fear its immediate effect. It cannot have escaped the notice of your hon. committee that, although the rising against oar authority in Oude has been general, almost universal, it has been singularly devoid of a national character. Except fur the pur pose of reducing our garrison in Lucknow, and after wards of holding the city against as, there appears to have been no common cause among our assailants. Since the capture of Lucknow we have bad against us the party of the liegum and her son, claiming to represent the royal family of Oude ; the party of the Monlvie, a Mahomedan fanatic; the party of the natal, an adventurer without rights or property in the province ; the sepoys, who have Passed from one leader to another according as they have been able to extort the highest pay ; and a number of the talooltdars and zemindars, some few of whom, at the bead of bands of their own, have plundered and oppressed their enemies ant those whom they believed to be our friends, while others, generally of less influence, have been tempted or coerced into joining the ranks of the Begum or the Moulvis. There is little concert or cohesion between any of these Parties. Indeed, between those of the Begum and the lonlvie there has been not only complete separation but open hostility. 14. I cannot think that this want of unity will long con tinue if it shall once become manifest that the British government hesitates to declare its right to possess Oude, and that it regards itself as a wrongful intruder into the place of tae dynasty which the Begum claims to represent. I believe that this would draw to the side of the Began' many who have hitherto shown no sympathy with the late E PRESS, OCTOBER 9, 1858. ruling family, and that it is jnqt what is wanting to give a national character to her cause. 15. An uncompromising assertion of our authority in Oude is perfectly compatible with a merciful exercise of it; and I respectfully submit that if the Government of India is nut supported in making this assertion, and in declaring that the recent acts of the people of Oude are acts of rebellion, and that they may in strict right be treated as such, a powerful temptation will be offered to them to maintain their present struggle or to renew it. 16. 1 now proceed to offer some remarks upon the pro clamation, and 1 believe that the spirit in which the pro clamation was conceived and has been acted upon will be best shown by the following statement. 17. When in January last, about the time at which the I army of the cominander-iirchief began to concentrate upon Lucknow, I left Calcutta for Allahabad, one of my chief motives for doing so was the obtaining full, accurate, and recent information in regard to the temper and disposition of the chiefs and people of Oude ; the extent to which they felt themselves aggrieved by the Government; how far that feeling was just ; the nature of the influences at work among them ; and other points requiring consideration before a decision could be taken as to the mode of dealing with the province. These were matters upon which formal refe rences and reports would have thrown very tardy and in adequate light, seeing the condition to which our archives and official establishments had been reduced, and therefore, in addition to the information received by Government from the usual civil and military sources, I sought information and opinions from those who, from having filled posts withiu the province or upon its frontiers, had had opportunities of becoming personally and. in some cases, intimately acquainted with the talookdara and zemindars and their followers. _ _ 18. The conclusions at which I arrived were, firstly, that all question of punishing with death, or even with transportation or imprisonment, rebels who, however in veterate and unceasing their hostility had been, were free from the stains of murder, should be set aside. I need not at present defend this decision, although at the time it was very far from meeting with general approval. 19. Secondly, that the one declared punishment for re bellion should be the confiscation to the State of pro prietary rights in the soil. I have already said that this is a punishment which has been repeatedly enforced against rebels in India, as well by native rulers as by the British Government. It is one ' which admits of being easily tempered and relaxed with more or less of lenity, according as considerations of policy or mercy, and the past or future conduct of the persons to be punished, may prescribe. It in no way affects the honour of the most sensitive Rajpoot or Brahmin. It would provide the Government with the means of rewarding in the manner which is most accept able to the natives of India the services of those who should be found to deserve reward. It would teni to the final settlement of many of those disputes respecting landed rights which have been the source of so much strife and animosity in Oude. 20. Finally, I came to the conclusion that if a procla mation were issued on the capture of Lucknow (a point upon which I entertained doubts up to the last moment), it should be one not threatening confiscation as a possible contingency, but declaring it, pointing out, however, the means by which relaxation and indulgence might be obtainable ; and, further, that no attempt should be made to indicate the measure of relaxation and indulgence which might be conceded in particular cases. 21. 1 will offer a few words in explanation of these last points. I believe that the issue of proclamations is not the surest or safest mode of influencing the natives of India. The experience of the past year has furnished examples of the ingenuity with which the meaning of such documents can be perverted or their language misrepresented by the enemies of the State ; and it is a fact, several instances of which have come to my knowledge of late, that the word of an English officer of the Government, even though a stranger, is more trusted than a printed paper. I should therefore have preferred to take in Oude the course which was afterwards taken in Rohilcund, and to place instruc tions in the hands of the officers attached to the columns which marched through the country, leaving it to them to carry out those instructions, and to explain in each district through which they passed the spirit in which the Govern ment desired to deal with the people. But I knew it to be very probable that no columns would be available for the purpose in Oude, and that in that case mach time might elapse before English officers would be able to penetrEe the province. I therefore had recourse to a proclamation which might be disseminated by native agency. 22 That proclamation was made to declare the confisca tion, and not to threaten it, because the natives of India, while they attach much weight to a distinct and actual order of the Government, attach very little to a vague threat, whether conveyed by proclamation or otherwise, while it might safely be assumed that the spirit in which the clause treating of indulgence would be acted upon in the districts which should be recovered would gradually become known throughout the province, and have conciliatory effect. Precaution was taken against per►ersion and mistrans lation by publishing in the first instance none but verna• cular versions of the proclamation. 23. I have said that the proclamation should not attempt to point out the different measures of indulgence which would be conceded in different cases. This and some other preceding observations will be best explained by a brief reference to the recent condition of the talookdars and other landholders, as reglrols their rights in the soil. 24. When we assumed the government of Oude in 1856, the greater part of the province was held by talookdars, who represented its aristocracy. They have been called the " barons of Oude," but this term applied to them as a class is misleading. Some had received tides from the Kings of Onde for services rendered, or by Court favour. Some few are the representatives of ancient families, but 973 the majority are men distinguished neither by birth, good service, or connection with the soil, who, having held office under the native Goverriment as nazi us (i.e., governors) or chuckledars (i.e., collectors of Government rents), or having ferruled the revenue of extensive tracts, had taken advantage of the weakness of the native Government, and its indifference to all considerations of jastice so long u it received revenue ; had abused the authority confided to them by that Government; and, by means of deeds of sale, sometimes extorted by violence, sometimes obtained by fraud, had become the nominal proprietors and the actual possessors of the villages, or the majority of the villages, which formed what they called their talookas se estates. 25. Owing to the ascendancy which the men of this class acquired, the weakness of the native Government, the venality of the courts, and the absence of justice, the sore damn of the actual occupants of the soil of the province was one of unparalleled depression. Their rights had ceased to exist, or were reduced to a mere shadow ; they could get no protection from the Government ; they were completely in the power of the talookdars, and were sub ject to every kind of oppression, tyranny, and exaction . In numberless instances they were compelled by the ta lookdars to execute deeds of sale, alienating whatever pro prietary right they nominally possessed ; and they lost but little by the act, for the practical fruition of proprietary right they had scarcely known. 20. Such being the condition of things in Oude, the Government of India, perhaps with more of chivalrous justice than political prudence, determined at once to reinstate these proprietary occupants of the soil in what were believed to be their hereditary rights, and to restore the ancient village communities ; and upon the annexa tion of the country, the Chief Commissioner was instructed to make the settlement of the land revenue with the pro prietary occupants of the soil, to the exclusion of middle men. This instruction was carried into execution in some districts with undue baste, harshly, and upon insufficient evidence; and where this took place, injustice was done to the talookdars, some of whom were deprived of villages which had long been attached to their talookas, and their titles to which were not satisfactorily disproved. The injustice might, and probably would, have been cor• rected in making the revised settlement ; but this does not excuse or palliate the wrong. 27. The mutinies broke out. It might have been ex pected that when insurrection first arose in Oude, and before it had grown to a formidable head, the village occupants who bad been so highly favoured by the British Government, and in justice to whom it had initiated a policy distasteful to the most powerful elms in the pro vince, would have come forward in support of the Go vernment who had endeavoured to restore them to their hereditary rights, and with whose interests their interests were identical. Such, however, was not the case. So far as I am yet informed, not an individual dared to be lojal to the Government which bad befriended him. The vil lage occupants, as a body, relapsed into their former sub jection to the talookdar, owned and obeyed his authority as if he had been their lawful suzerain, and joined the ranks of those who rose up in arms against the British Go vernment. The endeavour to neutralize the usurped and largely-abused power of the talookdars by recognizing the supposed proprietary rights of the people, and thus arous ing their feelings of self-interest and evoking their grati• tede, had failed utterly, 28. 'I he time arrived when it became necessary to con. Bider how the province should be dealt with upon the re establishment of our power and authority in its capital. On the one hand was the patent fact that those whom we bad desired to benefit, and had to our thinking benefited, did not value the rights which we had restored to them, and that, far from standing up in defence of those rights, and in support of the Government which had been the means of reviving them, they had acted in complete sub ordination to the talookdars, and had been no less forward than these latter in their efforts to subvert the authority o f that Government, and to expel its officers. On the oth • hand was the no less certain fact that, with but few hone able exceptions, all the talookdars—many who had not as fered in the smallest degree by our fiscal measures, an some who had benefited hy them, having been allowed at the settlement to retain all, or nearly all, the villages com posing their talookas on reduced assessments—had taken up arms against the British Government, had either them selves participated or had sent their retainers to aid in the relentless attacks on the Lucknow Residency, had forcibly resumed the occupation of their talookas, and had in many ways manifested their malignant hostility to the British Government. 29. In these circumstances, to have recalled the con dition of things which existed immediately before the rebel lion, thereby renewing the experiment which had been at tempted in 1858, and restoring the occupants of the soil to the position of proprietary landholders, which they had but just pr)ved themselves wholly unfit and unprepared to maintain, would have been to court failure; and, on the other hand, to have reverted to the state of affairs as we found them upon taking possession of the country, and thus to have acknowledged in the talookdars, after they had, as a body, risen in arms against us, and helped to subvert our authority, rights which had been denied, and in most cases justly denied, when our power was un questioned and unresisted, would have been to concede a victory to rebels and to put a premium on insurrection— s course which would have lowered the character of the Government, and destroyed its influence, not only in Gude but throughout India. 30. Regard toeing had to the history of tenures in Oude, to the failure of the efforts made by the Government in 1856 to set up those who were believed to be the heredi tary prcprie•ors of the soil, to their nnworthy reception of the benefits bestowed upon them, to the rebellions spirit manifested by nearly all the talookdars of the province, and to the inconceivable difficulties which would have attended the adjudication of claims to proprietary