The Press. — London, England, 1857-08-15 00:00:00

790 militia, however, that he chiefly looked, and he had been very much disappointed when an estimate of 200,0001. only had been proposed on account of that lorce. He had heard that some time between this and Christmas 30,000 men would be embodied, and he bad also seen it stated, as a reason for not calling them out before, that it was not thought desirable to run the risk of interfering with the harvest. hut the harvest was proceeding rapidly, and in the south of England it must be nearly completed. Arrangements, therefore, ought immediately to be made for calling out the militia. As to the number under the present circumstances, not less than 50,000 ought to be embodied. He was almost afraid to mention the small number of troops of the line that we had now at home. On a former occasion, when the peace estimates were brought forward, he had pointed out that there were not above thirty-one or thirty-two battalions of the line at home, but that number was very largely diminished now. To supply the deficiency it was stated that all the battalions at home were to be raised from 840 to 1,000 men, but the number of battalions at home was so small that he was afraid that this would not give us more than :1,000 or 4,1100 men. It was also stated that ten new 2nd battalions were to be raised, and we should thus have altogether an increase of some 11,000. This increase was totally inadequate. In the present state of things, although there was a strong feeling of public security, and though no country on the Continent was at all likely to commence warlike opera- tions, yet we ought to present an appearance of complete preparation, and every means ought to be resorted to to restore our home establishment to its proper strength. Lord PALMERSTON regarded the opinions of Sir De Lacy with the respect and deference due to his high military character. The gallant general had, however, in his opinion, over-estimated the European difficulty that might be produced by the events in India : He seemed to think that foreign nations may, by seeing how large a force we have been compelled to detach to our Indian possessions, be led to imagine that we are weak and defenceless at home, and may therefore assume a higher tone, or adopt other measures with regard to us than would have been prudent under different circum stances. I think that the concluding observations of my hon. and gallant friend afford an answer to such apprehen sion. The nations of the world have seen with what unanimous spirit and energy the British people have re sponded to any call for efforts and exertions which the Government has thought it right to make upon them in moments of national peril; and any Government or any nation which thought that the particular circumstances of the present moment rendered it safe for it to assume an unusual attitude towards this country would, I am con vinced, very soon find out its mistake, and would without loss of time resume its accustomed bearing towards Eng -1 tnd. With respect to the measures taken by Government, while some 30,000 troops had been sent to India, troops were being raised at home as fast as possible; and not only was the regular army being increased by ten '2nd battalions, but a portion of the militia was about to be embodied. Recent events in India were undoubtedly serious, but, as far as Europe and foreign countries were concerned, nothing had oc curred to alter the conditions of peace : I am not aware of anything which leads to the appre hension that we are likely to be engaged in serious dif ferences with any foreign State, and therefore I think that it is more consistent with the duty of the Government to abstain from calling upon Parliament to give extraordi nary means until the moment arrives when there is a prospect that they will he required. There are two errors into which men may fall. One is to overlook a really existing danger, and the other to imagine dangers which have oo real and actual existence. It is the duty of the Government to endeavour to avoid the latter as well as not to fall into the termer. In the present state of things I do not apprehend that any circumstances are likely to arise which would place us in difficulties at a period earlier than that at which the measures which we are now taking will restore our defensive force to the amount which, at the beginning of the year, was thought to be sufficient as an ordinary peace establishment. These events in India are very afflicting; they are very serious, and will require, I fear, continuous efforts on oar part ; but, as far as Europe is concerned, nothing has happened to disturb that state of peace in which we fortunately found ourselves at the commencement of the year. In conclusion the noble lord added that orders had already been sent to the Cape to forward all the troops that could be spared to Calcutta, while ar rangements were made for collecting horses at the Cape, in Mesopotamia, and on the shores of the Persian Gulf. Bearing testimony to the courage and skill displayed universally by the English residents, civil and military, in India, Lord Palmerston de clared that the Government wore neglecting no means in their power for rein'tating the British do minion in that country upon its former basis of un questioned supremacy ; and that he did not believe that the interests of the country demanded the im position of fresh burdens to meet eAisting diffi culties. Mr. BENTINCE, Sir HARRY VERNEY, and Mr. NEW DEGATE urged upon the Government the necessity of preserving the defences of the home country in an efficient state. Mr. WurvEsrnu in forcible terms reviewed the conduct of the Calcutta Government with reference to the crisis in India, and, entering into details with reference to the Government having abruptly changed the larva of inheritance and marriage THE PRESS, AUGUST 15, 1857. showed that warnings had been received and ne glected by the Government months previous to the outbreak which took place : Thus the tiovernor-General had evidence in January, February, March, and April warning him of the mutinies among the troops on the subject of religion, and that they said they were determined to die for their religion. The idea had been disseminated ever since 1831 that the Go vernment were making war upon caste, upon the laws of inheritance, and the fundamental customs of the Hindoos, and the natives believed that the Government meant to overthrow their religion. Yet on the 7th of February, in the midst of all these warnings, Lord Canningwrote to say that three regiments might be withdrawn from India for the China war. Indian troops were also wanted for the war with Persia—a war undertaken with no other plain reason that he had ever heard except that the Shah had not modelled his epistolary correspondence on the examples of the Polite Letter Writer. Lord Canning rightly said that he could not spare more than three regiments, that he daily received communications telling him of fresh mutinies, and that he had issued repeated proclamations assuring the people that the last thing the Government intended to do was to meddle with their caste or their religion. But, un fortunately, the people would not now believe these prows tations. This was the effect of the radical blunder that had been committed. If they chose to embark in such a policy as he had described, they ought first to have collected an adequate armed force around them. He had it from high military authority that if they really meant to overthrow and root out the institution of caste, according to the re• commendation of the writer in the Tinter, they must have, not 56,0(X), but 300,000 men for the purpose. It was clear, therefore, that the nature of their policy was as important an element in this question as the number of their troops. When the hon. member for Lambeth told them they ought to be governed by the opinions of eminent military men he seemed to forget that when such men men gave their opinions they were never acted upon. They had had warnings as to the rotten condition of the Bengal army from Sir C. Napier, from Lord Melville, from Brigadier Jacob, and a dozen other high authorities ; but those warnings had remained unheeded. Even General Hearsey told them, quoting the language of Lord Metcalfe, " I fear we shall wake up some fine morning, and find that her Majesty has lost India." He maintained, then, that the Government had shown neither watchfulness, foresight, nor judgment; otherwise they would long since have dis covered the real state of things in India. Mr. V. SMITH protested with considerable warmth against the assertion, which he denied, that the Go vernment were not aware of the gravity of the events in India, but he defied Mr. Whiteside to show from the papers that " any person in India had the least suspicion of a general rising of the sepoys in the Bengal army." In conclusion, be defended the conduct and policy, as well as the judgment and vigour, displayed by Lord Canning. Mr. DISRAELI, briefly expressing his surprise at the tone adopted by Mr. Smith in replying to Mr. Whiteside, passed on at once to consider the more important question brought before the house by Sir De Lacy Evans, and observed that be could not consider Lord Palmerston's reply quite as satisfac tory as he should have wished : ' I must observe of the noble lord's reply that he under rated our position in India, and overrated the disposition of Europe; and these are very dangerous sentiments on the part of a Prime Minister of this country. I agree with the hon. baronet the member for Buckingham, that the state of affairs is most grave ; and I think it is much to Le regretted that from the first, on the part both of the Government and of the country—the country, of course, taking its tone from the Government—there has not been a due sense of the vast and imminent danger to our em pire and to our national power which in my conscience I believe to exist. and which, though it ought not to appal us, is one for which we should be thoroughly prepared. I think there is no mistake so great on the part of a Minister as to undervalue public peril. Certainly there is no greater mistake on the part of an English Minister. The English nation is never so great as in the moment of adversity. In prosperity it may be accused, and very justly, of being ostentatious and, perhaps, insolent; in its middle fortunes it may often prove itself unreasonable; but there never has been a time when a great sense of responsibility has been thrown upon the people of this country when they have not answered to the occasion, and shown that match less energy which has made, and will maintain, their position as the leading nation of the world. (Cheers.) The opinion of the noble lord, however, seems to be either ►hat the emergency is not so great as I believe, or that if it is so we shoulci veil its hideous proportions from the people of this country. In either case I think the noble lord's opinion is erroneous. The noble lord says to-night—" This is an affair of pounds, shillings, and pence. We are going to do something, but more we can not do, because we must look to the resources at our disposal." Now, that is not a proper tone to take. If the noble long really believes the empire is in danger it is not becoming in him to say that the resources at his disposal are limited, and that the measures he adopts in such a great emergency must of course Le of a proportionate character. A 1 g cursorily to the views he had expressed a few weeks since upon India, and to the acknowledged fact that the present disaffection in the army was rapidly spreading among the native people and princes, the right bon. member expressed a doubt whether the Government were adopting measures adequate to the crisis : Ile has mentioned the troops which may be expected soon to assemble in India and the resources on which he counts. He says if more should be wanted he can call Parliament together and can appeal to the House of Com mons and the country ; and no doubt he will then obtain sufficient support to undertake any other measures that may be required. But what I want to impress on the house is this,—the present year is gone. This is a Cain. paign, and, of course, from the nature of time cirenm anuices, from the surprise of the whole affair, a most disastrous campaign. The gallant general had indulged in the hope that Delhi is taken. Ido not indulge in that belief, and I think it unwise that a person of the gallant general's authority, unless he has strong reason for the conviction, should give weight to such a rumour, because I conceive that you will never get the people of this country to brace up their energies to the necessary point if they suppose that the next mail will bring intelligence of some event which will induce them to rank this affair with a Chinese or Persian war. _ SitDx L. EVANS: I did not express any confidence in the event alluded to. Mr. DISRAELI : It is not my wish to misrepresent the gallant general, but I think it is much better to have the impression that Delhi is not fallen, or will not fall easily, in order that we may be ready to meet that probable result by a preparation of our resources accordingly. We will assume, for it is probable, that in the present year we shall do nothing. The commencement of the next campaign will be in November. Now, what I wish to impress on the house and the country is that everything depends on the next campaign. All Europe and Asia will watch your efforts, and if lour efforts and energies are adequate, commencing in November, the opportunity will be at your command, and you may save your empire and establish it with renewed force and vigour. (Hear, hear.) But if in the next campaign you have varying fortunes, and nothing determined and decisive—if it is to be an affair of campaigns, and you enter into a third campaign, you will then find other characters on the stage, with whom you will have to contend, besides the princes of India. (Cheers.) The noble lord says the business of a Minister is not to underrate the danger, but at the same time he ought not to take an exaggerated view of it. That is one of those platitudes which really convey no meaning ; but I maintain that it is the duty of the Minister to make him- self thoroughly master of the circumstances with which he has to deal, and to form a sound and prescient opinion on what may occur. (Hear, hear.) We have had before great trials—we have been despoiled of rich territories and seen our empire shaken; but surely in the past we might see some vision of the future if the present is to be governed by negligence and indifference, and by a Minister who systematically depreciates the danger you have to encounter. (Cheers.) The other night 7,•0u passed a resolution to the effect that you will rally round and support the Crown in the present danger. What good does a resolution of that kind ? A resolution formed after due deliberation—formed upon ample knowledge of the subject—a resolution of such a nature doubtless gives moral support to the Minister and lends strength to the Crown ; but a resolution, the creature of perplexity and ignorance, does no !rood• to the Minister and adds no strength to the Crown. It really does harm, because it conveys throughout the country the notion that the House of Commons is doing something when in fact it is doing nothing. (Hear, hear.) At the commencement of our American troubles there never occurred a disaster or a danger but a member of Parliament was at baud to pro pose a resolution of confidence in the Minister or for the support of the Throne ; and what did it all cud in ? (Hear, hear.) The course of events will always baffle mere words, and a resolution of the House of Commons, unless it embody a policy and be the expression of an assembly which knows what it is about, gives no strength to the Minister, but only misleads the nation. (Hear, hear.) That is the position in which we are placed at the present moment. There is not in the house or in the country a due sense of the gravity of the emergency. Viewed by itself, it would respire our utmost energies to meet; but he who views the present state of affairs in an isolated manner is unworthy of being the Minister of this country. (Hear, hear.) I heard with peat pleasute from the right hon. gentle man that a large body of irregular troops was coming from the Punjaub to assist us in our campaigns. I am disposed to be generally sanguine, and I have little doubt that, under the guidance of the energetic and able men that our military force still possesses, we may expect very bene- ficial results from that movement. But if we could com bine with that movement an expedition up the Indus, then success, I think, would be certain instead of problematical; and you may rely on it that unless your operations in the next campaign, on which all depends, are on a great scale—unless you throw the lion's paw of England over the whole of the peninsula, by advancing from the Punjaub on one side, and by ascending the Indus on the other,—unless you act with that decision and on that great scale, it is doubtful 'whether you will effect your object. (Hear, hear.) I do not say that the resources you indicate will allow of operations of that kind, but I do not think that anything should be left to chance, and your expeditions should therefore be on a great scale. The noble lord says that it is difficult to induce men to enlist. The ordinary motives for enlistment are supplied by bounty and pension ; but depend on it that one means by which more than by any other you may induce men to enlist in the service of their sovereign is by impress ing on them that their country is in danger. (Hear, hear.) The moment you raise in the country a high feeling you will find that you have a motive power which will effect your purpose as forcibly as bounties or pensions. (Hear, hear.) The people of this country, however, do not understand the danger in which they are placed. The scene is remote from them ; they listen to persons in high places, from whom they naturally take their tone, and they infer that the country is not in danger. ]low was this awful busi• r ,