The Press. — London, England, 1854-09-09 00:00:00

_' ' . • • • -4".; AOl A SI ►llai ... . • : , . :,, 3-^' : , li I. ' .I' . T r . :3CI 1 - ) 1()1TT,1 t. 0 ' ) C 1 . .-ceBi lo v . _ ill•Ti s ioq :, .-, - .....-/ - _ . ;sita-s G .:. :it 5t..14.4. ' 1.1.• . ::, 41 . ' r • f .. l 1 ) . .. El? ) t rtss. LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1854. It is five weeks ago this day since the lead 5 . g Ministerial journal authoritatively announced that the allied forces had sailed, or were on the point of sailing, from Varna, to attack Sebas topol by sea and land. Notwithstanding the positive terms in which this intelligence was conveyed, it is certain that the expedition could not at that time have been near its departure. It is only this week that the tele graph has brought word that the siege artil lery of the French had arrived at Constanti nople, and, apart from the absence of this indispensable arm, the necessary preparations for the transport of so vast a force could, under no circumstances, have been completed for several weeks. The knowledge of these facts threw discredit on the whole announcement. It was incredible that the expedition could be in the state of forwardness intimated, and it seemed equally incredible that a journal often made the medium of conveying Government information to the world should have been commissioned to announce an enterprise of this important character several weeks before it could be actually commenced, and thus en danger its success, by acquainting the enemy with its object, and affording him time to pre pare for its reception. It is probable that in this instance the Government gained more credit for discretion than it deserved. It must have been in some way a party to the pub lication of the secret orders despatched to Varna, and the purpose of Russia was thus as effectually answered as if she had retained a spy_ in our Cabinet. The telegraph is a quick courier. The news of London is known in Vienna in a few hours; and at Vienna the Russian Embassy, well versed in its duties, can rapidly convey information to every part of the Russian empire. A remarkable instance of this was afforded in the capture of the Tiger. Five or six days after the event occurred, reports of it were received in the City through commercial sources via Vienna. The very circumstance of this rapid transmission caused the fact to be doubted, nor was it until more than a week later that it was confirmed through other channels of information. The pur pose of the great Varna expedition, as an nounced by Lord ABERDEEN'S favoured organ, must have been known at Sebastopol a month ago, and so long have the Russian com manders (through the friendly announcement) been allowed opportunity to concentrate their forces, and make all possible preparation for the meditated blow. Whatever may be the fate of the expedi tion,--and a few days must now decide it, — the disclosure of its design so long previous to its possible accomplishment is the gravest fault that any Cabinet could commit. We absolve from blame the journal which hoped to make a good market of the information supplied to it: probably it was unconscious of the mischievous work it was performing, and imagined that its announcement would be r _1 . • quickly followed by tidings of the event it communicated. On the Cabinet alone rests the responsibility of giving to the enemy 11111 notice of its intentions, and of perilling by so much the safety of the expedition, or, at least, of diminishing its chalice of success. Lord ABERDEEN, in this instance, must not hope to make a clerk in the Foreign-office his scapegoat. The secret must have come di rectly through his Cabinet, and the nation is entitled to know by what malignant influence it is that its interests are thus betrayed, and that, as if by a settled scheme of policy, the great Power with which we are at war is con stantly afforded time and opportunity to an ticipate our action, and given timely warn ing of our hostile purposes. It cannot' be pretended that' in this case there was any good end to be answered by publicity. The expedition was not like a scheme of reform, which must rest its hopes of success on the excitement it occasions. and the popular clamour which can be raised in its favour by the publication of its details. All the idle flourish on the force of the allied armies and fleets, and the triumph to be anti cipated from their attack, could have no other result than to make our Government ridiculous, by showing that it was unable to keep its counsel. The intention should have been made known only by the act itself. The most decisive blows are struck, more especially in the case of sieges, when an enemy is unpre pared for them ; but here a resolve is no sooner taken than it is shouted forth in a fit of giddy rapture to prove that the Ministry is not so weak and incapable as had been supposed. If this system is to be continued, sealed instruc tions and private despatches must become a farce, and the Cabinet may as •well admit re porters to its councils, that all the world may be made acquainted with its debates and de cisions. . . We repose absolute confidence in the gal lantry and skill of our coinnianclers and in the bravery of their forces. We know that, under all circumstances, they will do their duty. The question is, not of their efficiency, but of the policy of Government in suffering the 11 - t4 sea on for , opepttions 'to slip away while our forces remained inactive, and in pompously announcing the particulars of an expedition weeks before it was intended to sail. Those weeks have materially changed the relative. strength of the belligerent parties. The expeditionary force has been wofully re duced, both! in strength and numbers, by disease, while that collected for the deferke of Sebastopol must have been larg ely rein forced. Be the issue what it may, th chances of Russia are now as favourable as her best friends could wish ; nor could her interests have been better served than by the long delay and emphatic warnings which have been afforded her to complete her preparations. In one other respect she has been still more indebted to our policy. Admitting that the delay in the departure of the Crimea expedi tion was inevitable, was that a reason why our forces should have remained wholly inactive? A corps of 10,000 or 20,000 men might have been conveyed with great facility from Varna to the Asiatic coast, and, by forming a junction with the Turkish army, would have overmatched the Russians, and have entirely changed the fortunes of the war in that quarter of the world. The correspondent of a Ministe rial journal, whose letters supply the most authentic details of the lamentable defeats i. I ,r.l ..~:a'. 4 which the Turks hate sustained, expressly notices the applications made to our Grovern anent for assistance, and the consequences which have followed their neglect or re= &sail : By this defeat, this battle of Kurukdere, Turkey has lost much, but I declare that England has lost more. Aud on whom lies the blame? A great deal, certainly, on the Turkish soldiers ; but I declare solemnly still more on England. The English authorities in London and Con stantinople were well aware of the doubtful condition of this army, and had been only lately warned by the defeat of the Batonru corps. The English consular bodies in this part y Asia have never ceased impressing upon their responsi ble head the necessity of the presence here of an English or French division, however small the number. Three thousand would have sufficed, for it was needed only to en courage the Turks by their example. For the eight months that I have watched and followed this unhappy army as your correspondent I have not once ceased to write for the presence of European, and especially English, troops, and the constant repetition of this sentiment at last becomes wearisome. In my latter letters I mentioned that if a few thousand men could not be spared, at least a capable European general, with full powers, should be appointed to the command of the army of Anatolia. It was not alone the interest of England's ally that I regarded, but still more the interest of England herself—for I had Persia and the nist in view. In brief, a little energy on the part of the allies would have saved the defeats of Rayaxid and Kurukdere. A few thousand men would have been more useful than in Gallipoli or Scutari. As a measure of mili tary economy the allies have made a sad mistake ; for, whilst before a few thousand soldiers would have turned the above defeats into victories, a whole corps d'armee will now be required in Asia, and a regular campaign be under taken. In Kars we are perfectly helpless, nut knowing what dangers threaten ue.—Morning Chronicle Correspon dent. Can it be doubted that a body of our troop. would have been better employed in active operations in Asia than in remaining idle in pestilential Varna? They would have been acquiring. experience and confidence while driving the enemy before them, and, if re. quired subsequently to aid in an attack on the Crimea, could have easily been transported thither to join the expeditionary force. As It is, the Russians are masters of Armenia, and in the whole of Asia Minor no force exists capable of opposing their progress. In the diplomatic game which has been proceeding at Vienna, almost uninterrupt edly, since the Congress first 4 1 ifiembled, our Government is compelled to acknow ledge a humiliating defeat. The dream of Austrian co-operation is at an end. Russia declines to negotiate on the bases of peace proposed, but the Court of Vienna does not consider her refusal a casus belli. That Power. it is admitted, " has already obtained several " of the objects for which it had prepared to gp to war." Undoubtedly so : it has estab lished its protectorate over the principalities, and has had the navigation of the Danube, a most important point for Austria, cleared from obstruction by the good offices of the allies. Why, then, should it plunge into hostilities with Russia, with whom it has so many sym pathies in common? Hitherto the only result of our armaments and negotiations—we state an indisputable fact—has been the aggrandise • ment of Austria. THE DAY OF PRAYER AND HUMILIATION IN INDIA. WE are accustomed to see occasionally some very absurd commentaries on Indian matters in the pages of our contemporaries, arising out of their want of knowledge of the real state of affairs in India; but we have seldom seen any thing more absurd than the - No. 71.—VoL. 11. LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1854. PRICE SIXPENCE.