The Press. — London, England, 1854-04-29 00:00:00

t LONDON, SATURDAY, APRIL 29, 1854. No. 52.—VoL. 11. PRICE SIXPENCE. NEWSPAPER STAMPS. CONDUCT OF THE WAR. THE Return issued of Stamps supplied to Newspapers in 1853 exhibits the following comparative results : NEWSPAPERS. Britannia Examiner John Bull Leader PRESS [From May 7th to Decembei Slat—Eight Months.] Spectator Stamps Issued. 76,500 105,508 241,525 95,000 120,700 123,000 148.5001 Average Weekly Circulation. 1,470 2,029 4,664 1,826 glje Vrtss. 2,321 3,514 2,817 LONDON, SATURDAY, APRIL 29, Mt THE motives which influenced the CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, in his proposal for the issue of a new description of Exchequer Bonds, lie on the surface. An exhausted Treasury forces him at last to acknowledge that necessity for a loan which he has long and strenuously denied. The Bank, notwithstanding hint and menace, declines to depart from rules of safe trading at his bidding. He finds that De ficiency Bills are not the adequate resource which he once imagined them for meeting war expenditure, and that the just measure of his need taken at the beginning of the session (then rashly impugned by him) has been most accurately confirmed by facts. He is now compelled to raise, in some shape or other, those millions which, in pursuance of his abortive attempt at conversion, he has just finished disbursing. The amount of stock he has paid off at par could not now, probably, be replaced by a new loan at a higher rate than 85. To raise six millions sterling be would have to create upwards of seven mil lions of stock, and the loss to the public would, in consequence, amount to more than one million of pounds sterling. The calculation is easily made. No on 3 can mistake what it is to pay off money one week at par, and to borrow it the next at 15 per cent. discount. Mr. GLADSTONE may well shrink from coming before the public with the plain statement of facts which the proposal for a new loan would requ ire. The proof of his incapacity .would be too glaring to render it possible for him longer to remain at the head of the Exchequer. To avoid so mortifying an exposure, he haste el - co urse to an expedient which be hopes il mystify the public. But it is a common effect of cunning that it heightens those v . ery diffi culties which it hopes, by . its artifices, to escape. All those stock -jobbing contrivances by which, in the autumn, Mr. GLADSTONE endeavoured to mask his failure only made its ultimate exposure the more signal ; and, in the present case, it is not unlikely that his efforts to bolster up his damaged reputation will only involve him in deeper confusion. The time is not favourable for those financial experiments which Mr. GLADSTONE delights in. His theories may be excellent, but unluckily there is always a hitch in their working. The description of security he now offers is as novel as the last pattern "just out" in a draper's window. As it is quite untried, no test exists by which its value can be estimated. As yet we cannot learn that it is regarded with much favour. It is neither well adapted for the permanent investment nor for the tem porary use of money. All its conditions depart as widely as possible from established pre cedent. Thus : interest is to be allowed on instalments not paid. From the nature of the project no conjecture can be formed beforehand of its success. We do not suppose that Mr. GLADSTONE will willingly incur the risk of another failure by fixing his reserved terms above the rate at which tenders are likely to be offered, but he is groping in the dark, and may easily miss his way. There is a general impression that his bonds will not be taken at par, unless they should happen to find favour with the actuaries of insurance-offices. His miscarriages have not only raised a prejudice against him, but have itnpaired public credit. That trust which until lately was reposed in the accurate calculations and sagacity of whoever might be at the head of our finances exists no longer. With the prestige of success has departed the confidence which so largely contributed to it Supposing him, however, to be completely successful in the present instance, he will have managed by his ingenious scheming to exchange so many millions of stock bearing three per cent. interest to so many millions bearing three and a half per cent. In other words, ho will succeed in adding 30,0001. per annum to the interest of the public debt. Such an achievement, though it shows his ardour in the cause of experimental finance, will not elevate him in the rank of practical statesmanship. As the loan is to be a temporary one, he can think but lightly of the contest in which we are engaged. He proceeds on the assumption that the war is to be a mere brush, and its expense a bagatelle. With a total disregard of what our financial state may be four years hence, he decides that two millions of bonds shall then be paid off, and the same amount in each of the two years following. With this experience of his sanguine temperament, we only wonder that he does not proceed further, and provide that the whole National Debt shall be extinguished at certain fixed periods. A Treasury mandate might be as effectual for one purpose as the other. • In its littleness the scheme is in exact accordance with the whole policy of Govern ment. It ignores the fact that we are engaged in a mighty struggle, which will probably be of long duration, and will assuredly press heavily on our resources, and call for enormous expenditure. While our antagonist is preparing for a desperate and prolonged contest, our CHANCELLLOR of the EXCHEQCER thinks it sufficient to see his way for a few weeks before him, and makes provision for the cost of a European war as he would for the ex pense of an encampment at Chobham. Tax temper of the public mind at this moment is peculiar. The silence of expectation is just yielding to the mutterings of discontent. Men are beginning to openly wonder how it is that after months of preparation for war we still hear nothing of actual hostilities, and that our Euxine fleet in particular has remained idle, though opportunities of attack did not seem wanting to a vigilant commander. There has been a disposition in some quarters to blame Admiral DUNDAs for this inaction. We are sure the reproach is unjust. We are perfectly satisfied that ho has acted throughout in strict obedience to his orders, and that the Government alone is to blame for that delay which has proved so ser viceable to Russia. It could not be the Admiral's fault that he was detained at Con stantinople for want of coals, though it might very well be the fault of that particular officer of the Admiralty in whose place it was to see that the supply was amply sufficient for the requirements of the fleet. The insinuations against this distinguished commander would, indeed, be unworthy no tice if they did not indicate the dissatisfac tion with which the country is beginning to regard the conduct of the war. The Minis ters can be no strangers to this feeling, and we believe there are some among them so un scrupulous as to be anxious to shift from themselves the responsibility of their acts, and to care little on whose head the storm of popular rage may break, so that they escape its effects. While the country is impatiently expecting some decisive results from the declaration of war, each department of Administration, obe dient to its presiding influence, exercises its ingenuity in devising hindrances to a real and vigorous prosecution of hostilities. At the moment for action it is discovered that in each there is something wanting. Our troops are delayed for want of transports, and reach a foreign shore at last wanting common necessaries ; and our naval commanders, when bent on some dashing exploit, look into their instructions and find they want power to act. It is oven doubtful whether the prizes which have been taken will be con strued under the Ministerial orders to be prizes at all, and whether they will not be set free with abundant apologies for the " mistake" committed in their capture. We are, in fact, talking as if we were at war, and acting as if we were at peace. Instead of a sea•fight, we have an exchange of com mercial civilities. The recent orders in Council must in some way or other have been concerted with the Russian Court, as sub stantially the same regulations to extend the time for the free passage of ships on one side and the other, and to carry on trade between the two countries in neutral bottoms, were published almost simultaneously in London and St. Petersburg. We profess to bo anxious to engage the German States in an alliance against our foe, yet we make it directly their interest to preserve neutrality by throw ing the whole trade with Russia, which we allow to remain open, in their hands. Atlas 4