The Press. — London, England, 1857-06-13 00:00:00

JUNE 13, 1857. yittraturt. Histoire de la Chute du Roi Louis Philippe, de la Republique de 1848, et du Rei tablissement de r Empire. By M. A. Granier de Cassagnac, Deputy in the Legislative Body. Paris : Plon. Or the many able writers who, according to the French phrase, have " given in their ad hesion " to the Bonapartist cause in France, none is more distinguished, more zealous, more vigorous, or more effective than M. Gra nier de Cassagnac ; and we may say for him what can be said of very few indeed of the " adhesionists," that he did not wait for the triumph of Imperialism to make his pronun ciamento for it, but undertook, with extraordi nary energy and boldness, the advocacy of it in the press, at a time when its chances of success seemed, to all but the very fervent, faint indeed, and when, consequently, he had to brave the fierce hostility of adverse parties, and run the risk of being imprisoned, exiled, perhaps shot off-hand, in the event of those parties, or any one of them, being triumphant. It is, therefore, natural that to this powerful, brilliant, and courageous penman the task of writing the definitive history of the circum stances which preceded, the causes which occasioned, and the manner in which was effected, the establishment of the second Em pire, should have been confided by the Impe rial Government ; and that it should have aided him by placing at his disposal details of facts either imperfectly known or not known at all, together with its explanations respecting or versions of those accomplished in the face of the public, and its estimate of the men, great and small, who in them played a part. The task has been executed with much skill ; and, whilst M. Granier de Cassagnac may with just pride regard it as one of his greatest lite rary efforts, the Emperor and his admirers may present it with confidence to contempo raries and posterity as the best apology for the Coup d'Etat that has been or perhaps can be made. The work consists of two volumes ; but, as the first one is occupied with an account of the fall of Louis Philippe, of the Provisional Government of the Republic, and of the dic tatorship of General Cavaignac, we turn at once to the second and more important volume, which treats of the events that occurred from the appearance of Louis Napoleon on the poli tical stage until his elevation to the Imperial Throne, and of the politicians with whom he came in contact. Louis Napoleon's introduction to the scene in 1848, and that great personage himself, are thus described : In the midst of the general and blind confidence of the old parties, the candidateship for the Presidency of the Republic of Prince Louis Napoleon broke forth all at once in workshops and in fields, spontaneously and irre• sistibly. As under Philip Augustus, as under Charles VIE., as in 1792, and as at all epochs at which the greatness of a peril moved society to its centre, the nation en masse rose and intervened. Rustic wisdom triumphed over the science of statesmen and philosophers, and the hand of Providence was displayed in the humility of the means employed to preserve civilisation. • • • • • Assuredly all the members of the Emperor's family were animated by sentiments worthy of their name; but Louis Napoleon alone had manifested an immovable faith in the monarchical destinies providentially reserved to his race. The sons of Lucien and Jerome might usefully and honourably serve the Republic; Louis Napo. Leon alone could, according to the duties the people might impose on him, restrain or replace it. It was then not a republican the more whcm the electors of four departments summoned from exile. There were already enough, if the Republic were destined to live, and too many if it were destined to die. They summoned a Prince per-onifying both the ideas which opened the revolution of 1789, and the ppslar monarchy which closed and organised it. Chief of the Imperial family and heir of the Empire by the Senatus Consultum of an XII., Prince Louis Napoleon owed much less to his title, than to the convictions and labours of all his life, this spontaneous testimony of the confidence of the people. As chill, adolescent, and man, he had always entertained a profound faith in the power of principles united to the prestige cf his name. This faith had resisted exile, the scuffs of parties, and captivity. It constituted his character and personality in the midst of his own family, and his title in the eyes of France. Thus then, according to the historian, the bulk of the French nation was evidently Im perialist, and looked to Louis Napoleon be. THE PRESS. cause, more than any of his family, he too was Imperialist. In other passages this view is developed at some length, and not without eloquence. In it we have the secret of all the subsequent policy of Louis Napoleon, and of his eventual success. And it was this sym pathy, felt but not expressed, between the nation and the Prince, which caused the latter to attempt the famous insurrections at Stras burg and Boulogne. "It was," says M. do Cassagnac, " necessary to make known to the " French nation by some striking act that " there existed an heir of the name, the doe " trines, the courage, and the rights of the " Emperor lt was principally " with the view of making such a solemn " manifestation, that in 1836 the enterprise of " Strasburg, and in 1840 that of Boulogne, " were resolved on." After being elected representative of the people, the Prince was, by a large majority, chosen President of the Republic : The sentiments imprisoned thirty years in the hearts of the people made an explosion ; and the eagles, after a long slumber, resumed their flight from steeple to steeple —indicating the approaching return of the Empire. For what was the signification of the vote of the 10th Decem ber, and what did the people mean by it ? Clearminded men then saw and said what experience has since proved —namely, that the five and a half millions of suffrages of the 10th December were given to the heir of Napoleon. The people, master of their destinies, showed to the minorities of 1815 and 1830 what, regime and what dynasty best represented in their eyes the France which 178'J had made. His election " stupefied Paris and plunged " the Assembly iato consternation." M. Marrast, president of the latter body, said to some friends who turned it into ridicule Laugh not, gentlemen ! I have talked with him an hour to day. We are lost! He knows all the power of his name ; he knows what he eau do, and all that he can do he will do ! As President, the Prince called to him the chiefs of the old parliamentary parties, and formed his first Cabinet from their ranks. But— Nothing could be more vacillating than these politicians. Most of them were plunged in profound doubt, not know • ing exactly what to think of the present, or what to hope of the future. None of them carried his view beyond the horizon of Paris, which is that of drawing rooms, of news• papers, and of coteries, and had not thought of reeking in the study of France, and of popular opinions, the veritable signification of the situation and the meaning of ill., social enigma. The men who, np to 1818, were considered to possess the firmest monarchical faith, had offered themselves in all places, as ready to labour for the establishment of republi can institutions. M. Mole and M. Thiers bad not com pletely freed themselves from the idea of becoming the Washingtons of their country. M. Odilon Barrot, who, on account of his past opinions, migbt be supposed to be more inclined to republican chimeras, was, on the con• trary, more disposed to return to monarchy, and said so to his friends. Not a soul amongst them, in short, which was not drifting helplessly, or which could tell on what shore it hoped to be cast' All these men, without exception, subsequently showed by their words and acts that they did not really understand the principle and the power of which the Elect of the 10th December was the holder and the personification. They were, neverthe less, agreed on this point, that society, under shelter of his authority, might make a halt in disorder, and give to baffled statesmen the time to recover their ideas, and to find their lest route. M. de Cassagnac laments what be calls the blindness of the eminent statesmen of the day in not seeing that Louis Napoleon was chosen by nearly six millions of suffrages because, "being the heir of the principles and " rights of the Emperor, he could revive his " traditions and recommence his policy"; in other words, that they did not think the re establishment of the Empire, or of something approaching to it, possible or desirable. The author gives a curious specimen of the advice which they offered the Prince : Two eminent statesmen, M. Moles and M. Thiers, invited the Prince, a few days before his election, to visit them at the house of M. Thiers, in order that they might make known to him the elements and tendencies of modern society in France. " The fundamental principle of modern society," said M. Thiers, "is the civil power. The military spirit is dead, and cannot be revived. You appear to have a chance of being nominated President of the Republic, and it seems desirable to us that you should prepare yourself for that eminent post, by--cutting off your ',mustachios! If M. Mole or myself were to be nominated President, neither of us would wear moustachios. It. therefore, seems to us necessary that you should shave off yours! " . - A rapid but full account follows of all the principal incidents that occurred in the early part of Ihe Prince's presidency, and shows that at first he and the majority of the Assembly 583 acted perfectly in accord, but that afterwards distrust, and with distrust illwill, sprang up between them. It was impossible, indeed, for them, after a while, to avoid dissension, for their objects were totally different, the Prince being bent on the re-establishment of the Empire, the majority of the Assembly on the restoration of constitutional monarchy, either in the Orleans or the elder Bourbon family, and, en attendant that restoration, in main taining the republican, or, at least, the parlia mentary, form of Government. But the Socialist ejections which took place at Paris iu March, it<)o, created such terror in the country, by showing the extent to which doctrines subversive of society had spread, that the necessity of a rapprochement between the President and the majority of the Assembly was strongly felt. Accordingly, the President and the chiefs of the majority had a conference to deliberate on what was to be done : The meeting which took place on the 14th March, 1830, was a solemn one. The chiefs of the majority, amongst whom were three Prime Ministers of the monarchy and two illustrious orators, were to be called on to indicate the best means of saving society, which was on the brink of an abyss. The President of the Republic opened the business by saying, " I have assembled Jon. gentlemen, in order that you may aid me by the councils of your patriotism and your enlightenment ; what do you think should be done to set aside the dangers revealed by the progress of Socialism ?" This question, which went straight to the point, was followed by a lung silence. That silence began to be em barrassing to everybody, when M. de Montalembert said : " In the ancient assemblies of the clergy, the youngest member gave his opinion first. I will give mine. I will be as frank in my reply as the Prince was in his question. In my opinion, to escape from the perilous position in which we are, the President should take the chiefs of the majority for his Ministers. That would he the most energetic and the most significant reply to the provocations of the enemies of society." The Prince replied with perfect calmness, that he was ready for his part to follow the advice of M. de Montalem bert, and turning towards the other members of the meeting he said, " What do you think gendemen ?" Count Mole spoke first, but he said precisely neither yes nor no. . . . . After M. Mole, M. Thiers in a sprightly and picturesque manner gave his opinion : To become the Minister of a government," said he, " is in my eyes to contract marriage with it. The Republic is a young woman, and it costa me a good deal to marry her. How ever, as that is perhaps the sole means of saving the country, lam ready to give my consent." The Duke de Broglie next spoke: he declined very positively to accept the proposition of M. de Montalembert, because the union in the same Cabinet of the chiefs of the Legitimist party, and of the ex• Ministers of the King Louis Philippe, ap peared to him to offer no guarantee of concord, force, or duration. The result, of course, was, that nothing was resolved on : The turn which the conference took fully confirmed the previsions of the President of the Republic. The con• ference Flaced clearly in evidence the irremediable division of the chiefs of the majority, a division founded on op posing principles and on past conflicts. They might approach accidentally to resist the common enemy, but they could not come to an understanding to govern France. Each of them had his doctrines, his hopes, and his object. The future dreamed of by M. Thiers was not that which was dreamed of by M. Berryer ; and whatever was the oath which either entered, it was certain that M. de Montalem ben would not follow him in it. Before long, however, the necessity of "doing something" having Femme evident to all, it was determined to bring in a bill to restrict universal suffrage, though the Presi dent personally was opposed to the idea of tampering with the suffrage. The presenta tion of this bill exasperated the republicans and the secret societies, and they determined to rise in insurrection. At this moment a curious incident occurred which showed that the chiefs of the majority in their bearts enter tained profound contempt for the President, and that they had already contemplated making a coup-d'etat against him, or at least without him. General Changarnier, commander-in• chief of the army and the National Guards of Paris, and who possessed all the confidence of the majority, was summoned to a Cabinet Council held by the President, and called on to state the measures he had taken to combat the anticipated insurrection : He, however, avoided giving clear and precise explana tions, on the ground that a general in-chief should never make known his plans in advance. This precaution, which is very prudent when taken in presence of the enemy, appeared exaggerated in present circumstances. Pressed to tell what his plans were, and placed in presence of the hypothesis that he might be killed during the action, General Changarnier replied that if he were killed, a sealed document setting forth his plans, and naming his ter successor, would be found. General d'llautpool, Minister