The Press. — London, England, 1858-12-18 00:00:00

THE PRESS, DECEMBER 18, 1858. n India would be viewed in a very different light from the same conduct in England. Nor was the observation confined to them; it was "to any English gentleman." Lord STANLEY'S words mean no more than what is perfectly true gene rally—that every Englishman in India is viewed as representing his native country; that the Indians will judge of England by what they see Englishmen to be ; that there, as one of " the conquering race " among a people of another race, an Englishman will be " the observed of all observers; " and that therefore to an Englishman in India there is, strictly speaking, no such thing a s "private life." Every action of his, even in his most private capacity, will have its moral effect in disposing favourably towards us, or otherwise, the minds of the natives. Hence Lord STANLEY sought to stimulate these young men to act on all occasions in a manner befitting their mother country, by warning them that they must not think that it will excuse licentious or insolent and contemptuous conduct towards the natives, to say that such and such things were done in their private capacity as men, and not in their official, as officers of the Queen. What advice could have been more suitable, or more just and true? And yet even in this some have detected a sinister design I Our readers will bear us witness that we have never put ourselves forward to defend Lord STANLEY when his language has been justly open to exception. But we should both abandon our own claim to common sense, and be guilty of great injustice to him, if we were to put such a construction as the one we have mentioned upon the address of his to which we have referred. That address might be lacking in the graver elements of religious counsel, but, viewed simply as the advice of a statesman to a number of young men whu were going out to India to fill certain offices on behalf of the State, nothing could have been more appropriate or excellent. Well would it be for the reputation of England if all Englishmen in India would act upon it. Lord STANLEY is not a man to say more than he means; he is rather one of those says what he means, and means what he says, and who never affects a pious regard which he does not feel, nor a conscientious scrupulousness which he thinks unnecessary. In this respect he puts to shame many of our pre tenders to religious zeal, who only show their zeal for what is right by the perpetual discovery in others of what is wrong. There can be no doubt that the conduct of Englishmen in India, and especially of the Go vernment officials, who have thought to excuse their flagrant violations of moral propriety by pleading their freedom in their individual capacity, has done more to prejudice the natives of India against us than all the acts of Govern ment put together. Far removed from all the restraints of public opinion in England, and the pure influences of home, they have permitted to themselves a licence of conduct which has discredited their country, though it has per haps brought little direct disgrace upon them selves. It is quite time that there should be a check put upon this; the honour and even the safety of our empire is at stake in it. Every Englishman who goes out to India now in any official capacity should be strongly and awfully impressed with the mighty, far-spreading responsibility of his every act. Every young man especially should be bridled with self-respect. The creation, in short, of a sound and healthy public opinion, as we call it at home, is now necessary in India, to act as a check upon those who are not the subjects of any higher re straints, if we would recover and preserve the respect of the native population. It is evidently this at which Lord STANLEY aims. Religious obligations he leaves to the religious. lie knows well enough, what every one must know, that young men in general are more susceptible of being moved to do what is right by an appeal to their honour or self-respect, or respect for their country, than by arguments derived from reli gion. If only outward moral propriety of con duct, and a respectful bearing towards the natives, can be secured henceforth in all our Indian offi cials, a great point will be gained. For we may rest assured that the natives of India will never have any real respect for us till we have first shown that we have a respect for ourselves. When we discover this, then shall we make the happy discovery how to govern them. gurtspontentt. INDIAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION. TO THE EDITOR OF " THE PRESS." ---- Sir,—Public attention has just been called to the new organization of the Commissariat Department at home, but no mention seems to have been made of the steps lately taken by Government for the supply of military and other stores for India. At a time when everything relating to our empire in Hin dostan is of great national interest, the following reflections on the supply of military and other stores for India may prove not uninteresting to military men. It appears that the Insoector.General of Military Stores has not only (with the sanction of the Council for India) to make the necessary arrangements, by entering into contracts, to comply with indents and requisitions sent to England by the several arsenals and departments, military, naval, and civil, and, after examining the stores, to transmit them to their des tinations, but bas, further, to examine and report on these indents and requisitions, stating his opinion as to the necessity and manner of complying with such demands, and also from time to time suggest the forwarding to India specimens of any improve. menta in arms and machinery, equipment or scien tific inventions, which may be made at home, so as to enable the various branches of the service in the Last to be kept up in the greatest state of efficiency. It seems, therefore, to be absolutely necessary, in the first place, to consider the present and probable futurd state and requirements of our military, naval, and civil establishments in the East. Her Majesty's military forces in India are at pre sent divided into throe armies, under separate corn menders, and with distinct staff, rte. A commander n-chief, nominally, is over the whole, but, from various causes, this, at least till lately, has merely been an office arrangement, the real power remaining with the local commanders. Each of these armies consists of troops of the royal army of Great Britain, of British local regiments, and of regular and irre gular native troops officered by British officers—the three last constituted the armies of the East India Company. he iate great mutiny of the Bengal native troops, which were joined by the tawalior Contingent and many local corps, has scarcely been crushed, so that the present state of the army in India must only be considered as exceptional. What the eventual re organization of the native army will be is not yet determined on, but I think it may be safely laid down that the artillery service will in future be exclusively intrusted to Europeans, and also that as soon as tranquillity is restored the whole of the Royal Artil tery and Engineers will be recalled home, where they are much required. It is also probable that the Local British Regiments in India will be increased in numbers, which will enable several of the royal infantry corps to leave India and save expense. To enable us to examine the subject, let us assume that the present military divisions will be substantially maintained. We will then have to consider the military stores, (rte., required to be sent to the arsenals and deparunents in Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. A sojourn of several years in India had long ago convinced me of what, I trust, the late mutiny and rebellion in Bengal has clearly demonstrated to all thinking men—viz., that our tenure of Hindostan is .airely a military one, and that if we wish to retain possession of that rich country we must make every thing subservient to the efficiency of our military power. By the transfer of the late East India Company's armies to the Crown, thus making the officers and troops of the three Presidencies dependent for all rewards and honours on the sovereign, the old jealousy which existed between the Royal and Company's officers will, I am per suaded, be removed ; and as her Majesty's military 'orces iu India are for the future, however sub divided, to form one service, I trust that the sense 'ess assumption of superiority by the officers of the Bengal. Presidency over those of Madras and Bombay, and which seems to have only been based m thE. fact that they were numerically more itn• portant than their brethren in arms, will disappear. I allude to this feeling, as I am persuaded it has acted prejudic'ally to the service in keeping the three armies with their arsenals and depots too separate and distinct. I shall now only mention one instance of this exclusive feeling ; the troops and arsenals which have been stationed or been established in the Punjaub since that country was conquered in 1846 have been drawn from the Bengal Presidency. As a glance at the map will -how, this province is accessible from the south, through Sinde (which is garrisoned by Bombay trool.s), by means of the nt.vigable river Indus, and its five upper branches or feeders. The convenient harbour of Kurachee on the seacoast, with Govern. went river steamers plying regularly as far as Buker, 1229 and, I believe, to Mooltan, and with the notorious fact that a large trade by native boats is actually carried on by this line, would lead one to expect that the supplies of the army, whether arms, ammunition, or European recruits, would have been forwarded direct from England by this route, especially as the Bombay troops in Sinde received theirs by this way ; but till the late outbreak such has not been the case—the exclusive or jealous feeling or the execu tive officers had made them prefer drawing all their stores from the great arsenals in Upper India, which had to be transmitted at a much greater expense from Calcutta up the country, partly by land and partly by water carriage. The excuses of this expensive folly were at times ludicrous : variety of pattern in the two armies, complication of accounts, interference with distinct heads of departments, were amongst the reasons assigned ; as if all did not belong to the same service, and should not have been actuated by the same zeal for the general welfare. This system has existed in many other parts of India : thus the small arsenal of Mhow, near Indere, was alternately supplied from C.leutta and Bombay, according as the troops stationed there were drawn from either of these Presidencies—a thousand miles of inland carriage, more or less, being deemed of less importance than the maintenance of an exclusive system. In the same way I ant persuaded that many of the Madras stations could with advantage and economy draw their supplies from the west instead of the east coast of the peninsula. It is therefore to be hoped that under the new order of things these points will be carefully attended to. But let us now assume that the military forces stationed along the valley of the Ganges and Jumna, with Central India as far south as Gwalior and Nagpore, with the provinces of Arakan and Moulmein to the east, and Umbels, Kurnal, Delhi, and Jeypoor to the west, and having to the north the Himalayas, are to draw their military scores and European recruits from Calcutta ; the eastern side of the peninsula, with China, the Straits, and perhaps part of Ceylon, from Madras; and the west coast, with Sinde, the Punjaub, and Malwa, as well as Aden, from Bombay, Kurachee, and Mangalore. The exact numbers of the British and native troops must depend on events and contingencies which it will be useless here to go into, but with respect to the prin cipal fortified arsenals we may, I think, assume them to be as follows : I. BENGAL.—Fort William (Calcutta), Dacca, Araks!), lltuapore, Allahabad, Agra, Dehii, Nagpoue, Cuttuch. 11. Bo3ll3lY.—Bombay Castle, Belgawn, Man galore, Ahmednuggur, Ahmedabad, Kerachie (Sinde), Moultan (Punjanb), Lahore (Punjaub), Rotas (Punjaub), Peahawur (Punjaub). In. MADRAS.—Fort St. George, Bangalore, Hyder abad, Jaulna, Trinchinopoli, the Straits, China. Them are the great arsenals and depots, but there are several smaller ones—in fact there must he one at each of the European camps. In my opinion too little attention has been paid to fortified posts in India as well as to forts among the coasts : tho chances of having to contend with an active enemy attacking our rich trading ports by sea seem to be quite forgotten ; even at the three Presidencies, where vast sums have been expended in fortifications, it is very doubtful whether they could stand a few hours against a coup de main. The most important means of defence have been sacrificed to the comfort or convenience of individuals. This is also the case at nearly all inland station 4, especially in the Bengal Presidency ; the detached houses or bungalows of the officers are built in large (compounds) or gardens, and occupy so much space that ►n the event of an outbreak it is impossible to afford protection to such extensive cantonments. The result is that the European troops are obliged to be concentrated near the arsenal or depot and the other buildings, and in many late instances the officers and their families have to be left to their fate, their property being burnt and plundered by the rabble from their own military bazaars. However disagreeable and inconvenient it may be to individuals, a id especially to ladies, this system should never be allowed again ; we have had a lesson which should convince us that false security entails the most disastrous consequences. Again, the gun-carriage manufactories and powder works are so stationed that the destruction or capture of one of these great establishments would para.yze the efforts of a great part of the army ; these works should, I think, be more divided, and fixed in places capable of defence, and protected by Europeans. I think that all officers who have served in India will acknow. ledge the necessity of concentrating the European troops in camps, to which, as I have stated above, must be attached fortified posts to contain their arsenals and depots. Fortunately at nearly every station there exists old native forts which, with a little alteration, are quite susceptible of resisting, with a very small garrison, the attack of any native force. The old Mahomedan forts have the repu tation of being very unhealthy for Europeans, but this is really more from neglect of eve precaution than from their real position. the repu- peans, but y sanitary If vegeta.