The Express. — London, England, 1864-04-12 00:00:00

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT. HOUSE OF LORD& -410NDAY, APRIL 11. The LORD CILOIOILLOR took kb seat oa the woolsack eit 5 o'clock. PRTVATK BUSINFSS. The I,lnivi Valley sad Ogmore Valley Railway Cam pania* Bill wes mad a third time, acid pawed. THE GREEK PROFESSORSHIP AT OXFORD. --- The LORD CHANCELLOR. said—My lords, I rise for the purpose of presenting to your lordships a bill which I sincerely trust will most with a favourable reception from the house. It is a bill for the better endowment of the ' , regina profeasorship of Greek in the University of Geoid. By lords, you are aware that in the tame of Sing' Henry VIII. five royal professorships were founded in that university. The region professorship of Greek was one. Similar foundations were made in the University of Cam bridge. The holders of the other four rerun professorships which accompanied the resins professorship of Greek have leen more fortunate than the occupier of that chair. To every one of them has been attached either a canonry or some eceesiastical preferment, or some mastership, or other endowment. For the Greek protector, there remains nothing but the original stipend of 401. a year, a sum at that time adequate, and which still continues the only remuneration for his labours and exertions in the cause of Greek literature. To each of the resins professorships of Greek and Ilebrew in the University of en..b7idge a statute, passed io the year 1440, annexed a canonry at Ely. Year lordships are aware th►t in the ecclesiastical patronage of the Lord Chancellor are included several canonriee ; I think t' iey are twelve in number, and are in the cathedral churches of Norwich, Rochester, Bristol, and Glou cester. The avenge vacancies are generally about one every six years, and there has not been a vacaucy, I think, for four years. There would, therefore, according to the average, be a vacancy in somewhat more than &twelvemonth from tl:e present time. I °consequence of receutcircumstances to wb;.!ii I will not further allude, it appears to me that it wont' be an ►ct of justice, and also an act of general ex pedien-v, to annex one of those canocries in the patronage of the Lord Chancellor to the Greek professorship. But is brieging in a measure of this kind, I do not presume for a moment to attempt to come to any understanding, much leas to make soy bargain with the University of Oxford. Is that body and in its sense of justice I have the greatest confidence ; to it I bear the highest possible revenue and gratitude. I have no doubt that a bill which proposes to ►ccomplish this eadownruent will'be received by the university in the ems spirit in which it is offered by the crown and by the ministersof the crown ; and I may be permitted to express a hope, and even an expectation, that the University of Oxford will, if this measure passes, beaten to provide for the present professor of Greek au adequate endowment, until that canonry shall have fallen vacant, which, under the provisions of this Lill, I treat be will receive. In conchnioa I beg leave to move the first reading of the hill. The bill was thee read a first time. CHARITABLE ASSURANCES ENROLMENTS BILL. Lord CItAN WORTH, io moving the second reading of tbn bill. maid the object of it was to extend the period allowed for enrolments for two years longer. Lord REDESDALE hoped that if the bill were pasted no further extensioa would afterwards be sought. The bill was then read a wood time. DENMARK AND GERMANY. Lord CAMPBELL rose to adl the attention of the 1 , house 14 the eorreepoodence upon Denmark and Germany which has been presented to parliament ; and to move that in the opinion of this home, if the demand toads by Den mark for ninliation, according to the principle laid down in 4 the protocol of Paris, 1856, had been more decidedly sup- I ported by her Majesty's government, the bloodshed and ; the other evils already occasioned by the war in Denmark I might have been prevented, and there would bay, been less dung r than there now is of a more extensive disturbance in I the pc.oe of Europe. That, in the opioioa of this house, a cm! ,rence upon the Danish question, in order to teed to • practical result. ought to be accompanied by such steps as may ‘urince the powers of Europe that her Majesty's government adhere to the treaties in which the Duchy of Shawl: has bean guaranteed to Denmark be Great Britaiu. The noble lord stated that before proceedieg to discuss the points alluded to in the despatches, he would congratulate the noble earl at the head of the Foreign-office on his having declined to be • party to any further obstacle to a parliamentary discussion of the affairs of Denmark and Germany. If ever there was a time when, with • view to practi;:al results, such a discussion might be justified, this was, it. In the papers which had been published it I did not appear that her Majesty's government tied at tempted to enforce the observance of the protocol of 1856 which would place the present difficulties under arbitration. He would Mk the house to affirm the proposition that • • conference had no elements of • practical result unless further steps towards that end were adopted. The first question which presented itself was what great power was to be relied upon as is any manner likely to support Great Britain at the conference. They could not coast on the support of Russia. became the kussian government had declared that a concert now existed between that govern. scent and the powers of Germany. It most be clear to every oce that the avowed objects of the Russian government coiacided with those of the German powers in regard to the Polish insurrection. and that they did Pot coincide with those of Great Britain. Thu as to France. The papers lai.l on the table abounded with evidence epos the subject, and showed that the French government distrusted the effi cacy and disbelieved in the power of a conference to bring about pacification. Still less oould the government of Great /Intel 3 look to Prussia or Austria as destined to act with them, since all the indications that had come from those govatrocuts showed that a oonterecce could not start from any cammiti basis. No doubt the government of her Majesty might rely on Sweden, bat would the weight and power of Swedes be sufficient ° But ba would admit that they would he sufficient if there were a general cos vidion somegst the great European powers that Great Britain was loyally and devotedly attached to the treaty engagements by which Sleswig became a part of, and was guaranteed to the monarchy of Denmark. But no Man who looked abroad could believe that such faith existed. That it did not exist was shown in the speech of the 15th February and in the despatch of the 19th of February of the noble earl at the head of the Foreisn-oftice, in both of which that noble earl held that the language of Prussia and Austria might cover aggrenion and outrage, no matter how unsupportable, so long as it was accompanied with a disclaimer of any ultimate design . upon Denmark. A great and heavy blow was given to the Danish monarchy by the re fusal of the British government to join the °ea.:fess proposed by the Emperor of the French. The Oiject of the confereems would be the objects of Den mark and of Grut Britain, but the power most interested in the 4uccees of the contemner. was Denmark; but be could not beln thinking that their lordships would agree that the conference abounded in elements of failore, and if it did fail, the war would goat, and the result might be the d i smemberment of Denmark, which would produce a dis turbance of the balance of power in Europe, whereby new elsomet: would be produced for discussion. But if the war should be put an god to by the intervention of France, Russia. and Great Britain, those governments would be drawn into the vortex. He would again venture to main tain that the only condition upon which the conference coon eucteel was that Great Britain should inspire faith in other powers that the guarantees which bound her towards Denmark should be supported. The presence of the noble lord at the Foreign-office must be a fatal bar to the success of the expediecta which bad bees proposed. The noble lord had been associated with the despatch to which be bad referred—to the despatch of 1864 —with the refusal of the congress proposed by France, and with • further despatch, in which he reprobated the consti tution of February. He wished to guard hinveU against a geoeml 'concurrence in the language which had been used, both in that home and elsewhere, respecting the presence of ao Eoglisb fleet in the Baltic. It had been suggested that • British fleet should appear in the Baltic, with a view to the protecnonof Soederburg and Flensburg, and also to watch the A ustri in and Prussian men-of-war and control their operations. He *might the presence of • British fleet in the Little Belt would be useful to protect the island of Funen. A far more guarded, and at the name time more effective, step world he the occupation of fCiel pending the deliberations of the coatereoce. If it were once made known that Kiel was not destined to fall under the sway of Prussia, that power would cease to be more anxious than Austria for the further prosecuting of the present war of aggres sion against Lienmark. No one who looked at the position of affairs at the other side of the Atlantic' would desire to propose a courts which seemed likely to bring tins country into hostility with any part of Europe—and be believed that the course he bad indicated had no such tendency. But supposing Flensburg and Kid should be occupied by the German navy, treatise, policy, and interest would prevent Great Britain from ac quiescing in that occupation, and war would be necessary to terminete it. If the German powers were entitled to take material posseseion of land io pursuit of a shadowy and doubtful nght, surely Great Britain was entitled to take material possession of the waters, in discharge of en um doubted obligation which abe had contracted by treaty. The effect of stationing a British fleet in those waters would he to give this country a diplomatic locus which she had not at present. With our fleet in the Baltic Great Britain would be able to make her voice heard. Bat eras if the house thought it inexcedieet to affirm the proposition that oar fleet should be sent to the Baltic, lie (intended there could he no objection to declaring that the 000 Terence was not likely to be successful unless Europe were previously ecovioced that England was deter mined to guarantee the integrity of Lhe Danish mooarchy. Without that pledge he believed the conference was only calculated to bring on Denmark further wrongs, on Great Britain sew humiliation, and on the cultism% of Europe clouds still more dark than those which menaced its horizon at the present moment. The noble lord concluded by moving the resolutions of which he had given notice. The Doke of ARGYLL said it was a great mistake to suppose that it was the desire, or wish, or interest of any. government to interfere with parliamentary discussion on questious like the present. It was at all times in the power of the government, without the consent of parlia ment, to commit the honour and credit of the country, both is poem and war, and parliament was jealous of say attempt to divest them of that responsibility. Oa the dna THE EXPRESS, TUESPAY - EVENING, APRIL 12, 1864. eight of the min the arable earl opposite (Lord Derby) declared that it was the banns of the government to have • policy of their owe, and not to meek one from perhainest, and in that doctrine he fully concurred. It was no hard ship but an immense advantage to • government to be called upon to discus, these questions before parliament, and his noble friend (Lord Russell) lied always courted rather than deprecated discussion on subject. of public in terest. The present diocesans wee about to take place under very peculiar °Ornamenting. It was brought forward on the eve of the assembling of a confereuce. the object of which was to endeavour to restore peace to the north of Europe, and it would be inexcusable for the government to appear as partisans, or to say one word which would lessen the chances of the restoration of peace, and there were many parts of , the subject on which they were bound to be silent, or at all ' events so proceed with considerable caution. With respect to the motion before their lordships, lie attributed the author shipot the first resolution to his noble friend near him (Earl Gre))); the second resolution, which related to the guarantee d 1720 , was evidently that which the noble lord (Laid Stratheden) desired to pens upon the house. With respect •to the speech and the motion of the noble lord, he felt quite unable to follow him in the greater part of the arguments which he had used, and for I this reason, that they referred to the future, and to the manner in which the conference was to he comducted. He considered that it was the duty of the go vernment to avoid any discussion en the future, and to con fine the discussion to the peat. The second resolution ; asserted that which was not the fact, because the guarantee of 1720 was not a guarantee of the Duchy of Slenrig ; it was • guarantee only of that part of Sleeting which was held by the then sovereign of Denmark. • His noble friend had not given a fair representation of the state of the case, but his noble friend wished for more de eded action. What was meant by more decided action ? What his noble friend meant to ask, although he did not say so, was why we had not taken part in the war. (Hear.) His noble friend mid that if they did this thing and the other thing they would have prevented the war. Bat it was equally open to the government to say that if they had adopted a different course they most have increased the I bloodshed and misery of the war. (Hear.) What 'the government were bound to show was this, that they bad adopted some definite line of policy which they were able to stead by and to justify before the people of this country. He submitted that the government had • ready newer to the charge made, that they might have prevented the war, or that not having prevented it they ought to have taken pen in it. He must protest against the charge that prima fiscie there was any use against the government fur not having pre vented the war. We had • great position in Europe. The noble lord smiled. He meant that the couotry,under what ever government, had • great position io Europa, not merely from their material power, but from the impression that prevailed that on the continent they had no selfish interest to promote. Our interests were of a commercial character, and as regarded these they were bound up with the pros perity of the whold world. It was not true that they were the general arbiters of quarrels amongst continental nations. There might be wars of the greatest possible iojostice in their character, and yet no bosh fide case might be 01114111 against the English government for not being able to prevent it. Take the Italian war, for example. The liberal party were not then io office. The noble earl opposite (Shamesbury) did everything in his power to prevent that war taking place. No minister could have acted more earnestly and faithfully for that purpose. His hand was never off the electric telegraph wire. His messages to Vienna, Paris, and Turin jostled one another. Not only did be exercise all his influence in deprecation and remonstrance, but the noble earl at the head of the govern ment, in a very powerful speech, very nearly tbreatened the power of England in one war broke out. Noble lords would remember the intimation in that remarkable speech, that if England wee to be neutral it would be • position of armed oeutrality, and the statement that England had in terests in the Adriatic which she was bound to defend. The declaration was received with cheers on both sides of the house. Yet what was the effect of that declaration? Why it ended in nothing. The war took place. but he heard that the noble lord felt any humiliation at having failed to prevent that war. However glad of the result of that war, yet so far as international questions were concerned, he felt bound to say that there was not the slightest possible grounds for it. if there was any ease against the govern. meat in regard to the preseot war, it must seise out of their special position and obligations in respect to the belli gerent parties. If that were so, they must look to the do raiment'. Now, what were these documents! The noble lord said the obligations of England were mainly to be found iu the guarantee of 1720. He entirely denied that peopasi tion. Our position in reference to this questioo was not tolbe found in that document, but is the treaty of 1852. That treaty in the first piece was not a treaty of guarantee, but • treaty of recognition. In the second plan it was not a treaty signed by England alone, or even principally. It was • treaty in which we were cosignitanes with the other great powers of Europe and some of the smaller powers. Theta was a passage in the preamble which referred to a question of policy and not of obligation—that the existence, the integrity, and indepeudeues of Denmark were to the balance of power in Europe. To that deela:nl: B 2 the other great powers of Europe were co-eignitaries. The principle on which we take our stand is, I maintain, correct —namely, that whatever the duties and obligation of England arising out of this treaty, they wen duties and obligations which were exactly parallel with those of the other great powers, and that we had no interests and duties apart from tbon o f the other powers. The policy on which the gavernruent acted was to rally the other great powers to defence of the treaty and not to advance in front but along with them. He asked the house whether they could say conscientiously that the government failed in their duty ? (" Yea.") His noblefriend said "Yea," He defied him to the proof of it. He would show, by a reference to the documents, that his noble friend (Earl Rumen) did all he possibly could to rally the powers of Europe to maintain the treaty. When his noble friend first heard of the intention of the German Diet to take action, not only in regard to Holstein but Sleewig, he on the 25th of March, 18b2, at a time when there was little public attention directed to the subject, transmitted a despatch to the great powers calling their attention to the importance of the resolution of the German Diet, and soliciting joint action. That communication was made to the two great nos-German powers, France nil Russia ; it expressed • hope that formal intimation would he given to the German Diet of the gravity of the step they had taken. He was sorry to say that this attempt failed, because the courts of Rorie and France infused to commit themselves to such • proceeding. But it was demonstrable from this despatch that the prawn state of things was not midair to any want of vigilance on the pert of his noble friend. Then the King of Denmark died in November, upon which the question of succession arose. It was mainly owing to the exertions of his noble friend that the treaty of 101 l was recognised &e l applicable to this question. There was a marked in dication on the part of these powers that they were about to retreat from their position, and to mall': in question the whole principle of the treaty of 1852. During January in this year ha noble friend made several different attempts' to enure the more active co-operation of the two great non-German powers, Russia and France, in deprecation of the proceedings then about to take pine. I Then representations were made on the sth, 10th, and 19th of January, and the replies of the 19th and :10th of January gave the rename of France for not co-operating with us. He admitted that the government of France had the right to retain in their owe heads the issues of war or peace. Bat he mast sae that if the non-German powers had co ' operated with Lis noble friend, the dangers of war would have been obviated. But if we had taken more " decided action," as my noble friend terms it, and ' made is • casus belli if the Germans massed the Eider, we would have stood alooe without an ally on our aide. He need not detain the house by showing that such a course of policy would have been inexpedient. (Hear, hear.) With respect to the assumption that this more "dedded action" would have prevented war, he most remind the house that they were not dealing merely with goverment. alone, but with forces which took their rise in the revolu tionary passion of the time. (Hear, hear) They were in fact dealing with two fanatical democracies, and these were fans which were not so acessoble to reason. If they bad committed themselves to such an alternative as this they could not have averted war, bat would have been forced to join in it, and would thereby , have increased that bloodshed which all deplored, So long as France and England acted together, it warn a tenant's for the pesent Europe. But if they once began to take separate action, there were tendencies which might impel them more and more into opposite directions. He would be guilty of great affectation if he said be apprehended any danger to the government from the motion of his noble friend. The aspect of the benches opposite showed that the noble earl did not mean to give • very active and warm support to the 'notice, or if be did Ostend to give it his support, it was evident that his forces had been routed by the entry of Garibaldi. (A laugh.) Bat whatever might be the opinion as to the conduct of the govern meat, he hoped that all would join in deprecating the needless and lamentable waste of life which was going on. (Hear.) He believed that every object of the war might have been obtained by diplomacy. During the last ten years there had been three great wars—the war with Russia, in which we had ourselves been engaged, the Italian war, and the war in the United States. In all of these wars great issue, at all events were involved. But in the present war in the north of Europe he believed that the rights of Germany, the local liberties of Sin ! wig- Hoetein, and the integrity of the Danish 'monarchy, might all be attained without the shedding of blood. He should not like to say one word is disparagement of Denmark. The Mon were a gallant nation, and they were now fighting against overwhelming odds. (Hear, hear.) But at the same time, those who reed the diplomatic documents might doubt whether Germany had not some joist ground of oomplaict against Denmark, with regard to the common constitution for the whole monarchy, and the local liberties which were guaran teed to the people of the doehies. Bat it was equally demonstrable that promises which had been made by Germany had not been fulfilled. He (the Earl of Derby) would not repeat what had been done. if there were diplomatic engagements they were equally lauding on all parties. Now, he bad selected three distinct promisee to Denmark, all of which had been more or leas violated. The drat promise made to Denmark was this— and it went to the whole root of the matter. The promise was that the whole theory of Sleswig-ilolatainion should be entirely abandoned ; in other words, that the theory that Sleswig should be connected with Holstein, and Holstein should remain pert of Germany, should be wboll= doped. lie would ask, had German!, sad ell the powers abided by that promise? Had not this theory of Mewls beast waked day by day as • parysleal mess spinet everything Denmark held dear to itself, sod had it cot been themes, of most of the difficulties which had occurred? The seined promise to which he would refer bed been made by the Pamperer of Austria. It was to this effect—that the Austrian government would mover allow Federal power to be exeraised in Holstein in any meaner in which it might not be exercised equally in every other part of the Confede ration. Now her Majesty's government had admitted the legal right of the German Diet to put in execution into Holstein. They could not deny it ; but he would ask the German powers whether, in the circumstances Roder which that execution took place, they had faithfully adhered to i the promise held out by them words? That execution took place for the purpose of securing to the people of Slaw* certain local privileges and , tights. But were thee, not in other parts of the Genf edemtion constitutional rights which had been violated, , without execution having been followed? sad did the German Diet exercise their power in respect of that viola tion? Why should they act against the Duke of Sleewig is I • way in which they did not act against the King of Primula? Whilst they were thus acting unequally they were not eel!' breaking their promise, but they were violating every prin ciple of the Federal constitution. The object of a federation was the mutual detours of its members • but if the power ' of the majority was always to be brou ght to bear against the weaker minority, then Federal execution would become • mere instru meet of anarchy. Were they not setting spinet themselves a most dangerous precedeut by putting into force against the weaker members of the Confederation powers which they did not exercise against the steamer ? The third promise was kdistioct repudiation of any right or competence whatever of the German Confederation in Sleswig. The German Diet has sow asserted its competence, and they de• sired to go into the conference, not as partisans of cue side or the other, but impartially. Her Majesty's government desired nothing more than to preserve peace to Europe, no doubt compatibly with the local rights of the two duchies, and consistently, if possible, with the integrity and maintenance of the Danish monarchy. They had no interest but to see the balance of power maintained, and the rights of all the parties preserved. Them had been the objects of the governspent in times past, for which they avoided and deprecated war, which he believed had merited the approbation of the country, and which he trusted would obtain their support is future. Earl GREY said it was remarkable that while this country was acting as the self-constituted friend of Denmark, the strongest point of all in her case, that which entirely de prived Germany of all colour of pretence for in sisting on the repeal of the law, at all events with out allowing ample time for that repeal to be constitutionally effected, was, so far as he was swarm never outs alluded to. His noble friend (Lord Wodshouee) who was sent on • special mission to Berlin and Denmark, in his conversations with M. Bismarck alluded to the im portant deepatch of Sir Augustus Paget of the 18th of No vember. and he (Earl Grey) could not find any trace of his noble friend's (Earl Russell) having availed himself of that despatch in his arguments on behalf of Denmark. We. it fair that we should have acted this part of the candid friend towards Denceark,gi v ing up t h e beet part of berme, forcingos her had edema, and when she was subjected to an aggreamon which we considered iniquitous declining to give her any sup port, and not moving a finger in her defen ce (Hear.) Would it not have been far better to have abstained from interferiog, and thus imitate the wise and dignified conduct of Prunes, whom minister, when congratulatiog the King of Denmark on his accession, told him frankly that France did not mean to go to war, and that she had so advice to give except that Denmark should act in • conciliatory manner? He (Earl Grey) thought that this country had been lowered in the eyes of the civilised world, by going to the very verge of threats, when there was no intention of carrying them out. (Hear.) The strongest perible language had been used by her Ma jesty's government on this subject ; and the Prime Minister distinctly said in the last leellioo of parliament, that if Denmark should be attacked by Germany, she would not find herself alone. (Hear, hear.) Might not this country have required of Germany that no hostile operations should be commenced until the good office, of friendly powers had been fairly tried? He was quite aware that we mold not have held that lingua(' without being prepared for action? We nivat,ot course, have bete prepared it • necessity for it bed arisen to send a British force to the Eider to assist the Danes in der/mhos their territory. But he utterly denied that that cam would have been likely to °scar. For Germany to have commenced war against us would have been an Set of positive insanity. All that would have been necessary would have been to makeGermsny clearly anderstaod that if she attempted to cross the Danish fros tier she would find that frontier defended by Eoglish troops. There would have been no difficulty in defending that frontier. It was a frontier of lees than 50 miles, strong by nature, and defended by powerful fortificatioos ; and though the Dame would not be able to man those fortifications them selves, no great force on our part would have been neces sary to enable them to defend them. Nor would England have been alone in the matter • for even if no other great power had joined her, Sweden was prepared to do so. He was persuaded that • force such at Eft= Denmark, and Sweden could have easily • would have been amply sufficient to defend the frontier of Sleswig rimiest any force that Germany could have employed. The scene of operations was within two days steam of the Vienne ; and our interference would have been easy compared with that which was undertaken by Mr. Canning in 1825, when, under similar circumstances, • threatened aggression of Spain on Portugal was prevented by the sending, ate very brief notice, of &British expedition to the latter country. The statesmen of Austria would have reflected before they sent a larger pert of their army thee was sufficient to oppose Denmark alone to so great a distance from their own dominions to attack • British force on the Eider. They would have reflected, in fact, that the first shot fired against an English soldier would mecemarily be the signal for the appearance of • British fleet in the Adriatic ; they would have remembered that the population of Venetia was as one man diatom to rise and throw off the yoke of this new champion of the principal of nationalities. (Hear, bear.) They would have remembered that the army of Italy consisted now of :300,000 men, impatient to be allowed toadvauce to the assistance of their fellow-country men in Venetia; they would farther have remembered that Galicia was in a state of siege, that Hungary was disoom tested, and that Austrian fisatices were in seek • state that the first notion of war with England would be equivalent to a declaration of national bankruptcy. (Hear, hear.) He firmly believed that prudence would ham prevailed, and that they would not have been guilty of a measure eo con trary to common man 44 the oommencing an ag pesition obviously unjust, and in direct viola tion of the understanding of the Powers in 1856. And if Austria would not have acted thus, it was pretty certain that Prussia would not have done so single-banded. Prussia also, both from her internal and =Weal situation, had an obvious interest in preventing snob • coolest, would hardly have restored, under such circumstances, to send an army to demand for the people of Ste, wig those constitutiocal rights which she refused to her own people. But he would go farther sod say that, notwithstanding the language used by the French minister at Copenhagen, he believed Frame would have joined England to forbidding an appeal to arms if she bed been properly applied to for that purpose. Bat after expressing such an opinion on the conduct of the German powers, he must my that he was not such a partisan of Denmark as to state that in this protracted turret the wrong was entirely upon the side of the Germs powers. Far from it, for he thought that if Den mark had since 1832 governed the duchies in • more conci liatory spirit, there would have bees no pretence for the present war. (Hear, hear.) He was, however, of opinion that if Denmark was wrong on some points, he German powers were wrong on many others, and it was clear that if there were faults on both sides, it was the more nerismary that the good offices of • friendly power should be called in to deal with them. (Hear, hear.) But the correspoodeoce between Lord Cowley nd M. Drouyn de Idiom wee, so far as the sold, lord was coocerned, charm teristic of her Majesty's government, for no difficulties whatever were anticipated or provided for. But he (Earl Grey) thought it was the greatest object of • statesman's life to anticipate difficulties, and to never make • move without fully considering how it might affect the other side. The more he read the cornispoodee se the more he felt surprised at his noble friend opposite, that if he had fully determined to abstain from resorting to strong measures, he did not socceer give up the kind of language which was to be found in the papers. (Hear, hear.) Ti do the Prussian govern ment justice, they concealed nothing from her Majesty's government, and they did not expect that say measures would be taken to stop them in their course of action. M. Bismarck did not disguise in the lent that • peaceable settlement of the questioos be'did not desire, but a settle meet of them by force. Bat to return to the conduct of her Majesty's governmeot. He (Earl Grey) had shown that his nobL friend opposite did sot make any proposal which the government of France could accept—be would not say that under certain circumstance* material &sultanas should be afforded to Denmark, bat the language used was vague and undefined. Ga the 19th January last, Lord Cowley was instracted to make another application to M. Dream de Limy's for the co-operation of France, but when he was asked if his government would go further, the reply was as before. He (Earl Grey) concurred with IL broom de Lhuys in etatiog that the arrangements of 1852 were so essentially had that it would not be worth while teenier upon • great war to emforoe them. But the governemats of France and England ought to have stopped this war. They ought to have said that this was a case for • compromise, and that some other arrangement might be oome to. (Hear. bear.) He was convinced that the present state of affairs was one of great danger to Europe. The war had been begun in bad faith, and it bad been carded on in a bed spirit. (Hear, bear.) The conduct of the Germaipowers was extraordinary, for at first they said it was not war at all, and Austria even said that it was in the imterest of Denmark that she entered Rpm the occu pation of the duchies, and then because Denmark had resisted, the German authorities had removed the arms of Denmark and all the officials of I the Daniell crown, and had in some cease subjected them to personal violence. They had in fast made war against the dead, and had committed mat unheard-of and wanton outrages against the people attached to Denmark. I (Hear, bear.) Thom powers had compelled the inhabitants of the country to support their troops, sad they had levied large contributions not only of food, bated money, and they had enforced their demands by arresting some of the pee -1 cipal inkahltamte, sod by the threats of 'booties them. (Hear, hear.) Nothing could more mark the spirit in which. the ' war had been anted on by the Pruasians Ihas tho amount he had reed in the newspapers of a Danish force having captured Rome Prussian cevalry, and became they could not avenge them allies on the Danish tome, they turned spin lb. people of 1 the district in which the affair took pleas, and laid waste their property. (blear, hear.) Was that, he wield oak, the way is which honourable war should be carried on, even if it wens jest and neesuary war! (Hear, hear.) Then it appeared that the Prussians had, to mown the whole, bom barded the tows of Souderborg, without any intimatioo of i DO doing. (Haar.) His noble freed Earl Shaftesbury had denounced that transaction in the terms it deserved, and hal lEan Grey) entirely concurred with bite that it was an atrocious piece et cruelty indicted upon an unarmed popula tion. (Hear, bear.) Theo, what was now going on ? Why, i Austria wu to recd • fl eet into the North sees, and if that ehoakl be allowed the joist powers would have • superiority en water as well as upon laid. Would that his allowed, and were the Beets of Austria sad Prussia to be permitted to Mulately destroy the) fleet of Denmark! To what extent was the war to be allowed to be continneel How much longer would Europe sod England allow thei Guinea plain to use the supericinty which they possessed I far the dismemberment, and it might be the destruction, of Denmark? A very little use of moderation, but of great firmness. in the first instance, might have prevented all these evils, bat now there would be more difficulties to en , counter, seeing that the passions of the people on both sides bad been aroused. (Hear, bear.) Re was afraid that the coarse which had been pursued would forma precedent for ' the future, but he would not refer to it further than to letate that it seemed to him that the danger to the peon of Europe had been unalterably enhanced by this war. (Hear, hear.) Was it for • great nation like England to allow a suspicion to arise on the continent that she would not assist in the main terrines of the rights lied honour of other nations if it were likely to provoke hostilities in which she would have to bear a part! He was afraid that that war the opinion which was felt on the continent, and it had been increased by this correspondence, following so closely that in regard to Poland last year. (Rear, hear.) It was felt I that this country would not go to war; that she ! would rather submit to any indignity than be provoked to draw the sword. That wee the character which Eoglitod had obtained on the continent of Europe, and it was one which he was sorry to remark upon. (Hear, hear.) Our minister at Berlin had reported for the consideration of her Majesty's government that printed papers had been circulated by the Prussian government io the provinces near Kiel, din which it was distinctly asserted that England had used threats to prevent certain measures being adopted by the Prussian government, and that the threats had fallen to the ground. (Hear, Leer.) Now could oath things take place without creating further dangers! He would only add that he could not concur to the mooed part of the resolution, and that he hoped it would be withdrawn. Earl RUSSELL—My lords, my noble friends at least entitled to the same puree which he his bestowed upon the Prussian government, viz., that of being candid, because to night he has arraigned her Majesty's government, not for not having prevented a war, but for not having themselves joined io a war. (Hear, bear.) The reel substance of the arraignment of my noble friend is that we are now at peace, and that we have preserved this country from entering nue • war. My noble friend has gone into the details of some of the papers but he has °sly re ferred to those which suite d his own purpose, and which he believed militated meet against the govern ment. My noble friend said he would not eater upon the vexed questions relating to Sleswig and Holstein, but with. eut referring to thaw questions it would be difficult to see why there was any war going ou at all. It has been my task to attend to these questions, and if in 1862, when made certain proposals for an arrangement of these deputes, they had been agreed to, I think the peace of Europe would not in this respect have been disturbed for the next half century. I always considered that this war • very serious matter, which unless satisfactorily disposed of in time might lead to deplorable eventualities. In looking at the history of this question it seemed to me that the arrangements of 18:31 made between Prussia and Austria on the one side, and Denmark on the other, were most unfortunate and complicated &trans mute. They gave not only to Austria and Prussia but to the powers of Germany either the right, or at all event/ the pretext, for interference in the automat and domestic concerns of the duchies, which could not but lead, unless there was the greatest good temper and the greatest wish for conciliation on both sides, to discussions of • most angry kind, and finally to the breaking out of war. That, my lords, has been the history of these trans actions for the last 10 years. For my own part, considering carefully this subject, I will say that, with regard to this matter, as with regard to other matters of great importance in which this country is involved, I have felt it to be my duty, holding the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to divest my mind of all partisaaship, and to endea vour to look at the question between the power. that are enemies to esch other with • fair and impartial mind, to as if possible to form • clear and just judgment with respect to these matters. Nothing, Ithiek, can be more discreditable to an English statesman than to rush at once into • strong decision, either ow the one side on on the other, without a careful investigation of all the bearings of the subject. Now with regard to this treaty, the Danish government promised in 1831 that it would keep Sleswig very much as • separate state ; that it should have separate provincial states Incite own affairs, • representative body ; that it should have • minister, and that its administration should be conducted solely in Sluing. It was very difficult to keep to all those engagements. Denmark had entered into them la • marmot I of necessity when foreign troopsoccupied • part of her moil. I will not now in these times of her distress point oat in detail where, I think, her promises were not fulfilled. They will be found in the papers on your lordships table. Ger many on her aide took • most unfair advantage of what was done by Denmark, and on every occasion she put for ward propuitions which it would have been impossible for Denmark to accede to, because they would in fact have made • German majority at the very seat of the govern ment, and thus have destroyed not nominally the integrity but really the independence of Denmark. (Hear, hear.) Well, my lords, that being the unfortunate state of affairs, neither party having been all the time in the right, and neither party, I think, being able to say that she was free from all blame, the dispute wart on until on the first of October last year Germany resolved on Federal execution. In her decree for Federal execution, according to the opinion of her Majesty's government, Ger many went far beyoed what she had • right to claim. But whatever may have been the difficulties on that subject they were aggravated tenfold upon the occesiou of the death of the late king. It might have been supposed by those who were favourable to German pretensions that the late king having been governed by councillors who entertained Danish principles, and having himself • great love of his country, his judgment would have been prejudiced upon the subject; but the new king was not liable to any suspicion of that kind, and I am persuaded, eves to this moment, that if Gummy load temperately urged the claims of the German subjects of the King of Denmark to certain privileges and rights which Denmark had weed to give, the King of Denmark would have so regulated the provisions for the government of his provinces, that all real gronods of complaint would have been done away with. But the conduct of Germany was very different. And I confess it appears to me, as my noble friend who has just spoken has argued, that there was • wish in some of the states of Germany to auk • quarrel rather than • conciliatory aim. We wished above all to prevent war in Europe, and it was our object so to counsel both as to come to some conciliatory end. My noble friend finds fault with the &dun we gave to Denmark to abolish the constitution, but as the engage meet of Dennerk had been, se I have just stated, that Sleswig should have • separate constitution, sod should not pert with that constitution unless with the consent of their own States, it appeared to us upon study and exami nation, that it was inemaistent with the engagements that Denmark bad made to Germany. My noble friend Lord Wodehonas, who proceeded to Copenhagen. and who had no prejudices against Denmark, came, on examination, to the same conclusion, and urged it sa his own opinion as well as the opinion of the government which he repro sensed upon the government of Denmark. Surely it was our part to say in our oomniunitations with foreign poweratbat our opinion was that Denmark was in the right. We could hardly go to Prussia and Austria and say, Denmark is quite in the wrong, but we beg you not to insist on your claims. Therefore to enable us to make due representa tions to Germany, we proposed that the constitution should be abolished. My noble friend found great fault with our making representations without our being at once ready to follow them up with hostilities. If you have a question of honour. -where your honour has bees attacked, and you make rePtuentationat and those representations are not listened to—you must defend your honour. If you have great interests which you wish to put forward, and those interests are entirely neglected, you must defend your interests. Bat where you are only seeking peace between two other powers - where you are actuated only by a beeevoleut desire to maintain peace in Europe, and to allow each sett to pre serve its own sovereign rights, I cannot think that there is any humiliation in that—indeed, I think that there is satis faction in thinking that we have urged, over sod over again, by friendly advice, that peace should be preserved, and that these powers should not go to war. (Cheers.) Well, my lords, in viewing this subject it appean to me that noises we were to make ourselves atom the defenders of the liberties of Europe ; unless we were to take a course that none of the great states men who have adopted • European policy for England would have advocated, we were boned is • question of European policy to obtain allies. Now the allies to whom we nate. rally looked-were Frame and Russia. lam now maintain. isg that it would have been nonsense for the government of this country to commit itself to hostilities without having the assistance of the other powers of Europe. My noble friend reed • part of the correspondence which we have carried ou with the other powers, and he read op to the sth of Jaauary,when be found that Lord Cowley, having been asked by M. Drouyn de Lhuys what mom war pro posed besides • conference, was unable to answer, and said it was not necessary then to consider more than that proposition. Bat as soon et we hued that the French government desired to know what it was that her Majesty's government proposed to do, I immediately wrote a despatch cativeyieg the intentions of her Majesty's government, and I afterwards wrote a rimilee,dematch to Russia. What I said in effect was this—There is a project evidently con ceived in Germany for depriving Denmark of the States of and the Darby of Sleswig. Supposing this project to be persisted is, will you (France) wee with us is reeling material assistance to Denmark ; will you (Russia) agree with us in giving material meatuses to Noma*? That wee the very thing that my noble friend reproaches us for nct dbing. If he had had the podium and the patience to reed • few pages farther, he would have seen that despatch. Earl GREY—I expressly mentioned that despatch. It was an appliaatioa no ma, that it mild liars had no an. urn but that whirl it :mind. Earl RUSSELL—Here are the words. We asked for " the concert and co-operation of France, Russia, and Sweden, in order to give the necessary material sonatina, to Danmark in the resistance of such demands." That is what my noble friend calla vague. True, we did not specify the number of ships or of troops we proposed to give, but we proposed to gin " material assistitoce." It appears to me that nothing can be more clear than the proposal made by her Majesty's government ; and certainly the French government considered it clear, for is the first plan, M. Drouvu de Lhtirs spoke at great leoghth to Lord Cowley upon the subject, sad what he said was approved by the Emperor, and the answer will be found in the papers on the table. Well, my noble friend supposes • most extraordi nary supposition ; he says that if instead of asking France whether she would assist us is preventing the dismember ment of Denmark we had asked her to assist us in opposing Austrian and Prussian troops entering Sleswig, Emu* would probably have agreed with us. He sup poses that France would not have agreed to prevent • dismemberment but would have foe.. ass stance to prevent Austrian traps from entering Sleewig. A more extravagant supposition —one more wild and unfounded—l never heard made by any speaker in this or the other house of parliament. The answer of Russia was not so plain or distinct, but the result was as clear that she wished to preserve her liberty, sod wished to know exactly what the proposition of England was, but that she did not feel at the present boor that her resources or views of policy would justify her in giving material assirianos to Denmark. Well, the question comes to this—that which my noble friend never pot or considered—that England, France, Russia, and Sweden having made • treaty by which they did not guarantee, or agree to guarantee, the integrity of the Danish monarchy, although they agreed to respect it—whether we alone without Frame or Russia shoukl take upon ourselves the burden of supporting Des. mark. Now observe our object was to maintain the balance of power, to maintain the peace of Europe, but the balance of power and the peace of Europe are of as serious conse quence to France and Russia as they are to England. There fore it was not our business, it was not our interest for Eng land to undertake alone that defence, sod when I came to hear my noble friend explain the manner in which this should be done, 1 was sail more impressed with the anger of the alternative course which he thinks weought to pursue. In the lira place my noble friend thinks we amid have sent in January a fleet to the Baltic. It is impossible to .end • fleet to the Baltic before March. My noble friend says we had other means, because Venetia was panting to go to war, Galicia was disturbed, and Hungary was discontented. Now, only consider what the state of Germany was. It was in • state of violent enthusiasm ; and the Germans were bent upon having Siegel, sad Holstein separated from Denmark, not caring much perhaps about the Duke of Augustenberg, but putting him up as • prince who would serve their aspirations. Austria and Prussia in fact, afraid of altogether thwarting the wishes of Germany, executed them in • way which they thought would be more conducive to peace and order to Ger many—while they made Denmark suffer in their attacks. We should have had on one side Ger many—carrying Prussia at least along with her if not Austria—invading Denmark; we must have been there in order to defend it. We should have had Venetia making war in the Adriatic ; we should have had the people of Hosiery delighted to see that England was at war with Germany, and revolutionary outbreaks coming under English auspices, and all this disturbance in Europe—all this pare' war, was to be undertaken in the name of pesos, and in order to preserve Sleswig. Well, my lords, not the least consideration in all this matter is that France evi dently had taken *different view from ours. While we were considering the integrity of Denmark, France was con sidering the Interests of nationalities and what should be done for the people of Slaw* and Holstein. I make no complaint of neon having tikes that view, but it opens another danger to as, namely, that while we were sup porting Denmark, and supporting her s whether right or wrong, in those thdop that she maintained, France might have taken an opposite view, and the two countries, whose acting together is so important for the peace of Europe, might have been brought into collision—having in reality no interests that were rival, but on the contrary, the ut most interest in remaining at peace. I can only rejoice the more that we have not thrown the firebrand into Europe and have not caused the extensive isonfiagration which my noble friend has pointed out. (Heir, hear.) Now, my lords, it is necessary to consider a little what has been effected by our representations, which gentlemen at their ease hold so cheap. They have produced this effect, that oo the 31st of January, before they went into Sleswig, these powers that bad been constantly hinting and suggest ing that the maintenance of the coestitution of November had dissolved the treaty of 1852, and set those powers at liberty to take any course they liked, all those powers folding that language on the 31st of January in ormed Enema!, Frame, and Russia that they held to the treaty of 1852, and respected the integrity of Denmark. That was a very great point gained. (Haar, hear.) It appears to me that if instead of the total dismemberment of Denmark we can now go ioto ono reran with the other powers, except the Coofederatioa, clearly bound to respect that treaty, we have made a great step since the month of January. I own when I heard the language used in London—and, still more, that used In was afraid that Prussia and the German powers would &abut that the tram of 1852 was an end. It is by the finanime and modsystioa at our language that we have obtained from them that avowal respecting the treaty. My noble fraud has compared the position we were in in January with the events which took place in 1026. Well, there is a very great difference betimes the powers of Germany in 186 and in 1863. Austria. Prussia, sad the whole of Germany, with their 44 millions of people, are very different powers from the power of Spain. Bat be sides this, England was bound by treaty to defend Porta , gal, and Mr. Canine appealed to that treaty, sad said very justly that the honour of England required that we should send troops there, and that where the English standard stood [resign invasion should not come. (Hear, hear.) With regard to Spain, I recollect Mr. Canning shying, " I am told we must have war sooner or later : it that be the case I my later." The Dale lord says just the reverse. He says " we must have war sooner or late[ : if that be so I Say sooner." I say with Mr. Canning "later," and I am quite content to abide by that. I do not know that it would be right for me, as we are to have a conforeme on the subject, to actor into this martian more at large. But I believe it ought to Le the object of England to maintain peas, to modify extreme pretensions if possible, and to abets the animosities that exist between different natives; that, I believe, is the right position for England Sometime, and the object which she should endeavour to attain. If that be en I must not begin by laying too severe blame on the different parties to this war. (Hear.) I entirely agree with much that has been said by the noble lord with respect to the con dom of Austria and Prussia. We ban already declared our opinion oo this matter in despatches, and tur noble fraud at the head of the government has declared that it was an "iniquitous aggression, " and that the resistance of Den mark was justified by the conduct of Austria and Prussia. I do not know that anything stronger than this could have been said by my noble triad. With regard to this whole sub ject, I must consider our own interests, which are spread over the whole fans of the globe. The danger is that other wan may spring out of this, that our commerce may be in tercepted by privateers sailing under any name or flag, and scouring the ocean in order to destroy our commons. (Hear.) It may be • low and unworthy consideration in the eyes et my noble friend, but when 1 reflect on the magnificent ex position made the other night by my right boo. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the athatio• of this country, I am not inclined to hazard and imperil that situation with oat • clear case of honour, or of great and mighty interests to all for our intervention. We must also consider that by the side of that exposition of our flourishing trod*, of the improvement of our finances, there remains the feet which was stated then, sod must be stated every year, that there is more than 26,000,0001. of interest on debt to pay— that 26,000,000/. having been almost entirely caused by war—the greater portion of it be the two last wars is which this country w engaged. In 1764 the interest of our debt was 4,600,0001. It is now 26,200,000/. May we not be fairly unwilling and cautious before we add to that debt? There is one of those wan—the American war—which no man in these days will defend. The other of these wan the father of my noble friend (Earl Grev) most eloquently appalled as unjust and USDISSIMary. *blither these wars were justified or not, the cost sad burden of them have been immerse. While that is no reason why we should desert any came or abandon any friend whom we are under obligations to support, they are reasons why we should pursue pacific alum I imams, for my own part, that while I have the authority and adopt the policy of the great men to whom I have referred, who held that the balance of power ought to be maintained, I likewise agree with them when they courted alliances to support that balance of power, and in thinking that the destruction of one of the states of Europe is not only • great outrage, but • peril to the independenos of all the other states. But at the same time I think that , • policy the least hostile we can make it, and the least disposed to make a quarrel where it can be avoided. is the I polity which ought to be pursued by this country. I can not therefore agree with my noble friend's motion, which says. "that in the opinion of this house, if the demand made by Denmark for mediation, according to the principles laid down in the protocol of Paris, had teen more decidedly supported by her liejesty's government, the bloodshed and the other evils occasioned by the war in Denmark might have been prevented." Now, I do not believe that that is the opinion of this hones, but at all emote 1 shall feel it to be my duty to oppose that Fart of the motion. And with regard to the other part of the motion, that "such steps ought to be taken as may conviuce the powers of Europe"—it is unnecessary to take steps to canine them that we adhere I to the treaties. The treaty of 1720 is indeed one which has been disputed by men of great learning. We are not called on to assert its validity. But with regard to the treaty of 1852, it is our object to maintain it and to have it recognised by the powers of Europe, sad I think that will be the result of the conference. With regard to the policy of France I shall say this one word, that we were not ready last year to adopt the course proposed by Frame the sending of an identical note to Russia—and next te concert masons in can Roads did not agree to our proposal. We were tether satisfied with the words pro posed by Austria, which would leave on Russia the re spousitility of her refusal. We did not think it wise to go to war in the cause of Poland. We therefore informed Franc, of our deterrnioetioo. France has great sympathy with Poland, the French people hare great sympathy with the Poles. Besides there is the tie of religion which makes a close orsonexion between Frame and Poland. Again, with regard to Denmark we bare a pat feel ing for her gallant people-0 maritime 1 =1) like *Malys', and massing ths saw Therefore while France sympathies@ mete with Maud, the sympathies of England were more with Denmark, and whil e s itl l ' it h. seel m r:e gro. f a n f sussd o e c :rerod "etoyofjbaanthjoci.toitannhtnirof e FintsofwtfarleuleinpoutP"arethw.oeeriftrhprfeurardneceregufaerf'Prddordituehngainott rk os e oPe po a w ld en tb. of Pre" Eur rv o p% ought to go together, and not leave on us aloes that great task. Other matters have been alluded to. My noble friend alluded to the Austrian fleet going to the Baltic. That is a question on which her Majesty's govern ment have made representations to the government of Austria. At present the government havr promised that they have no intention of sending their fleet into the Baltic. They are about to send their fleet into the North Sea to protect Carmen commerce, which is eery extensive. That is a legitimate object. But England is quite free to act in such PASS, ad while we will not act without its being absolutely oeceisary, and while I am fully conscious of the power of England, yet we do not wish to hurry into war without necessity, and for my own part, think a pacific policy is our true policy. (Hear, bear.) The Earl of DERBY said that with regard to • question which involved the policy and the conduct of her Majesty's government, he regretted that the noble baron had not given longer notice of his intention to bring it forward, and he was confirmed in that opinion by the state of the house. He apprehended it warn not the intention of the noble baron to ask the house to pronounce any opinion on the motion, sod that his object was rather to trona his own individual opinion, and to enable other members to express theirs also, on the conduct and policy of the govern , meet with reference to the voluminous papers on the table. That being the case, the wording of the motion was of minor consideration, and in the few words he should address to the house be should not confine himself to the terns, of the motion, but to a consideration of the state of affairs es it now presented itself. He went through the dreary waste of thou papers—he plodded through th em w i t h the greatest possible patience. He went through the greater part of the 800 and odd pages of the correspondence which had taken place on this single subject in the coarse of last year, and he could assure the noble duke that the least accusation he made against the noble earl (Russell) was any want of dili gence, because be perceived that the noble earl ie the course of last year, exclusive of his other duties, wrote 170 despatches upon the subject of Denmark and Germany ; aid although be might not be struck with admiration at the style of them despatched sent, which were C1141a , ... tensed by what he considered the most forcible feeble. ness, yet be must ray that be was struck with ad. mimtion and astonishment at the persevering industry with which the noble earl bad gone spinning day by day and thread by thread this particular cobweb— spina ing, spinning, spinning, but at the same time not uniting the slightest progress towards the accomplishment of the web by which to catch a single diplomatic fiy. (Laughter.) He bad no peat fault to find with the tone or character of the noble earl's speech, and he had oo wish to increase the di Deities of the position in which her Majesty's government and Europe were placed. He concurred entirely in what the noble earl said, that the policy of the country ought to be essentially a peaceful one, in order to avoid the horrors of war. But be thought the noble earl bad bawl that policy on the lowed and humblest grounds when he based it oft commercial considerations. There were higher cossiderationa than the flourishing state of the exchequer which should im press theru with the horrors of war. There were greater evils than war—the sacrifice of the honour of the country or the abandonment of the interest, of a friend. (Hear.) But the question was, what was a warlike policy? Was the policy which the government pursued likely more to aggravate the danger or to remove from them the evils of war ? He WAS afraid the course pursued by the government was more likely to lead io the end to serious complications. and to the general disturbance of the peace of Europe, than if they bad taken, in the first instance, a more decided, straight forward, and determined course. It was impossible before. band to determine whether one entree or the other would produce this or that effect. It was open to the noble earl to say that if he had adopted • more decided policy, the danger to the general peace of Europe would be greater; but, on the other hand. it was open to others to Ely that by adopting more decided tone, there would have been lass danger of war. But what was to be deprecated was the holding out numerous threats, remonstruces, sad representations to lunge countries, and at the same time conveying to those foreign countries the„impression from which they concluded that they might safely set at defiance the threats, repre sentations, and remonstranoes of this country, because they knew that we would afford no material aid. (Hear, bear.) lie was fully alive to what was stated by the noble duke, that in this matter they bad not alone nebulae and momenta to ideal with, but other forces which were less under control and the in. Monica of mem. Them were democratic intereate and re volutionary parties, who were acting not upon reason but their passions. These parties had, in big opinion, too much influence on both sides. The revolutionary parties were anxious to create disturbances throughout Europe for selfish and revolutionary soda. They exercised great intlu ewe on the minor states of Germany. The minor states placed themselves at the head of the demo natio movement, and were fomenting and encouraging principles which were froneht with great duper to theenael vas. Primus mid Austria might defy Mete revolutionary parties. But Prussia, as they knew, was actuated by ambition. by views of aggrandisement and the desire for the acquisi tion of naval harbours. There was gnat jealousy of Austria, while Austria, on the other band, was *Enid that if Prussia was allowed to take the lead she would have a predominant influence in Germany. Thus the revolutionary party acted on the smaller tt•tee ; the smaller Metes, in their turn. acted on the mutual jealousy of Austria and Prone ; and this was the circumstance that really consti tuted the great permanent danger to the peace of Europa. (Hear.) He did sot quarrel with the way in which the sold. earl spoke of the quarrel between Germany sad Denmark, and be would not enter into the question of fileurig- Holstein, which the noble lord had slated very fairly. He believed there was faults on both aides, and the *obis earl was quite right in not throwing the weight of his iodueoce into either scale. Denmark would be placed by the coedi ting which the wee called on to fulfil in a stated permanent paralysis with regard to her tetanal agency. The argu ment ab ioconvenieoti applied in her case with greet force. Whet could be more absurd Una a monarchy divided into four party—one of them having a population of about 1,500,000, and the other three about 500,0. or • little more—each division fermis' part of one monarchy, and the legislation of the whole dependent on the anent of each separate portion. If Holstein or even Luneburg refused He meant to a law pawed by the other three divisions of the monarchy, that law was to be of no effect, not alone in that division of the monarchy which refused its aunt to it, but for the other three divisions which gave its assent to it. (Hear, bear.) Holstein. m • fief of Germany could, under such a constitution, absolutely prohibit the whole legislation of Denmark. Denmark would be at the feet of Holstein, and Holstein at the feet of Usrmaoy. (Hear, hear.) He could DOA see bow a complication of that kind wm to be settled by armaments. It was rather to be accomplished by the arbitration of friendly powers. He (the Earl of Derby) would not repeat what had been said with regard to the pressure which had been placed upon Denmark to comply with certain requisitions, and the ab volute impossibility which there was of Denmark complying with them . He tMught that course was an utterly unite tifiable one. But it was sot so moth the danger of Den mark to which he wished to draw attention as to thimourse which her Majesty's government had pursued for premetiag that danger, and the way they had interfered for the purpose of maintaining thou pacific principles which the noble earl advocated so strongly. Looking into the papers, he found that to every country her Ma jesty's government bad addressed successively repre sentation', remoostrances, threats. They had gone to the verge of declarieg that noncompliance with their requirements would be the grouad of war—for they had tiormnes the e u may leng th expect our if you you ria act aid' u 'Llesr, our h i eer ugg / e — s. they had gone to the verge of saying that norpooruphanos would be followed by was—because they had virtually said, "If you do not listen to our remonstrances you cannot expect say madames from us." (Haar, beer.) Bat would it not have been much more fair, more candid to have said, " We advise you to do so and so, but you must take the responsibility on yourselves. Yon may expect our moral support, but not any material amisneee." He (the Earl of Derby) perfectly speed that we were not bound to protect sad maintain the ialepity of Denmark. We had no right to take upon themselves the teak of maintaining the integrity of that country. But we ought not to have told Denmark that we intended to support her. We ought not to have mid that if an invasion of Denmark took place Denmark should not stand alum (Cheers.) That, was a distinct pledge given by the Prime Minister in his place in parliament. (Hear, hear.) Prom the moment that that decimetres was made the Danes said—and it was a high proof of their courage—" No matter what the odds are against us, no matter that Germuy has forte millions to our two millions, we will persevere." But they thought they had • further right to say—" We know the power of England, we have the pledge of the Prime Minister that that power will be exerted in our defence in cage of the imagon of our country ; the honour of England is happily inviolate- { bear, Marl — mid we are confident that it will be pseeervd not•roished." (Hear, bear ) But he oottkl ware the noble lord that other powers entertained views of our government much more unfavourable than those of Denmark. On the :Het of August, 1863, the noble earl wrote to say that if the Ger. man Pewees persevered in carrying out the Federal execu tion now, they +mild do so against the advise of her Majesty's government, end they most be " responsible for the 00OSACMODOOS whatever they might be." They meant absolutely nothing. It was a mere button fulmee of the noble earl, and what was the reply ? That the matter was in the hands of the Confederation, and that Austria and Prussia would not further interfere. (Hear, bear.) The seat application was one which made use of a strainer expeemin still. It was addressed to the Diet ; in the course of it the noble earl declared that her Majesty's government " would not see with indifference the military occupation of Holstein. Every owe knew that in diplomatic language the phrase " would not view with indifference" meat that the occupation would be followed by meat serious consequences, and that, at least, it would lead to action ou our part. Bet egetainly the German Diet did view that phrase with the greatest indifference. They said they were not In acoodition to take any Stllos from the com manantioo of her Majeetregoverument ; and they requested that their reply might be communicated to bar Majesty's minister. What was to be expected from this except that the sable earl should go ce to ray that her Majesty's go vermoset had emu to the emeelosios sot to make any further propesals, but that they mush leave to her Majorty's government As responsibility of provoking a general war in U 'I, `~i' 1! , •i (t