The Express. — London, England, 1847-01-14 00:00:00

• These proceedings must strengthen and encourage the ultra-Montane party, hitherto in a minority in the canton, and will create. new complications in the con federation. It is said that the Vaudois government refired to allow to pass through its territory the militia of the Valais, whose aid was demanded by the council of state of Friburg. The Vorort had sent federal commi•sioners to use their good offices with the government of Fri burg to moderate its proceedings. In its cantonal character, Berne had merely taken military precau tions to prevent the violation of its territory by the Jesuitical faction. Vorort has despatched from Berne a circular to the cantons, announcing that it has taken the di rection of the federal affairs, in which it profeioes an intention of maintaining in the confederation tho ob servance or the laws g •ncral peace and public order, and of labouring for the common good; that it will also maintain the independence and neutrality of the confederation, and relations with foreign powers, founded on perfect reciprocity; that its attention will also be directed to the constitutional development of Switzerland, and to its legitimate progress. Three assurances, says La Gazelle de Bile, are certainly better than those which the Vorort of Zurich gave in 1813. The Madrid mail of the 6th January was received in Paris on Tuesday. That being the festival of Twelfth-day, or Jour des Ruis, the Chambers did not sit, and the Bourse was closed. A grand reception took place at the palace, at which the aristocracy of Madrid and public functionaries offered their felicita tions to her Majesty and family. The report that M. Olozaga would be reconducted into France, and eet at liberty, was confirmed. El Espanol observes, however, that the case of M. Olozaga is not the only one presenting difficulties. Of the several t , naigres who have been elected to the Cortes, there is another besides M. Olozuga to whose return the government is opposed. Lately, the brother of Don Pedro Gomez de la Serra, elected by the college of Orense, presented himself, accompanied by General Forms and MM. Luzuriaga and Cabillo, to the presi dent of the council, to apply for the necessary autho risation for the return of that deputy. M. Isturitz answered that he would lay the application before his colleagues and support it; nevertheless, it was decided in the council not to grant the necessary passport. PARIS, JAN. 12. Two things principally must have struck you in the King's Speech ; for the first time the King of the French made nomention ofthe state of his relations with England ; fur the first time he mentioned Russia, and that only from affectation, as the treaty he spoke of is in itself entirelyinsignificant. If any doubt could have been entertained that the position of France in its relations with Europe has been changed by the recent quarrel between M. Guizot and Lord Pal merston, that speech would prove it. As to the general character of the royal sitting, the speech is generally applauded by one side or the other. Such was the case in this instance. But the silence of the left and left centre were more marked, and the ministerial majority applauded with more vivacity than usual, as if obeying a concerted order. En thusiasm was the great thing to be got at, and that was the secret of the additional cheering. After the sitting, the Deputies of the Left and Left Centre assembled at the house of M. Odillon 13arrot. It was there decided that the Opposition would pro ceed very cautiously in the question of internal policy, and the preliminary debate in the bureaux. It is considered desirable, before a d.cisive step is taken, to know the tenor of the documents, which will no doubt be published by the English cabinet—the more so as M. Guizot has placed them on the table in an incomplete state. The schism amongst the members of the Opposition is unfortunately but too true; it extends, however, only to a few members, who side with M. Billault, such as M. de Toequeville, M. Lanjuuiais, and perhaps M. de Coreelles. Small as is their number, they are still too many. The seceders declare their intention of voting with the Opposition, but they wish to form a corps by themselves. The pretext they give for their separation is the regret they seem to perceive in the ranks of the Opposition for the English affi ance, and they praise the ministry for having broken it. The schism is deplorable, and will cause mach harm. The parliamentary history of France is like its political history. Civil war weakens opinion, and enables the enemy to gain the victory. 0 ROME, JAN.. 2. _ .... I see advertised in the usual form, and noticed by the Sped dor, a beak entitled " Christmas in Rome," by some reverend American "stranger," whose views amen and things here seem rather jaundiced, to judge from the glimpse therein given. Rome cannotbe understood by a Jonathan fresh from his conventicle. He cannot appreciate immemorial usages ; no carmen steculare brings to his ear the periodical mirth of cen turies; for him in vein descends from Prieneste and the Sabine hills the accustomed bagpiper picturesquely dight, tibieen of the festival ; in vain the grim wild boar's head (on the shambles round the Pantheon) exhibits between his tusks the suggestive lemon ; the milkwhite kid bedecked with red berries hangs alongside in unappreciated contrast ; and the linen tunic in which the Roman butcher stands arrayed strikes not his eye as the exact costume of the old sacrificial functionary. The chesnut roaster at each street corner is in vain surrounded by merry cus tomers, and beggary itself looks jocular. Such people should remain to mess at their huge boarding-houses in the Broadway, eschew the ria sacra, and never know the twee of a fig-pecker (so to Anglicise thy sweet name), oh, rare bird bonny beccaftea ! The religious celebrations of the hallowed time were held with unexampled pomp and solemnity, with pealing anthem, loud hosanna, wax lights, frankincense, and innumerable throng. Large alms were collected for the sufferers of the late inundation, and the worshippers at the British church, outside the gate, contributed munificently. On Wednesday, 20th, Pius IX. mnnnted his horse and rode off towards Ostia to inspect, personally, the ravages of the river in the low grounds below Rome. A Detect group of Roman cavaliers formed the sovereign's escort, and that day hie Holiness explored a circuit of 30 miles, giving everywhere orders for employment, pointing out tracts for drainage, and raising the wages of the labouring peasantry along his ride. Some of his equestrian cortege were hard pushed to keep up with the Pontiff, and, probably, remember their excursion yet. On that evening the students of the English college gave, after their annual dramatic performance, a grand supper in the library hall to their friends in Rome ; Sir Miller, Boott Murray, Rev. W. Newman, Revs . O. Ryder and Talbot, MK Langdale, Radcliffe, Chomley, Petre, &c., &c. The student painters, sculptors, and archi tects of the three kingdoms, to the number of 40, as sembled at their Christmas dinner in the great hall of Bertini ; Prout, pen and ink artist, in the chair. The students of the university (Sapienza) having expressed a wish to that effect, the, Pontiff has granted a new chair of political economy and three other professorships are in contemplation. Several obnoxious and jobbing police functionaries were dis missed yesterday to begin the year; and nothing could exceed the numbers and enthusiasm of the host assembled before the Quirinal palace windows on Monte Cavallo to wish his Holiness the compliments of the season. When Pius appeared on the balcony, the shouts rent the welkin, and as a cloud seemed to approach, his Holiness put on his hat,and motioned to the uncovered multitude to do likewise ; the few drops of rain which had suggested this apparently trivial kindness were sufficient to intimate deeper care for their welfare, and no " hatti-sherif" of eastern romance ever elicited such heartfelt applause. IMPORTANT OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS RE SPECTING THE SPANISH MARRIAGES AND CRACOW. We have been fortunate enough to procure the fol lowing official correspondence between the French and English governments on the subjects recently in dispute between the two courts. We have no need of pointing out their extreme importance. They were forwarded by special express by our Paris Cor respondent. SPANISH MARRIAGES, LOUD DALMBASTWT TO M. BOLITER. (Extract) FOUISION-OFPICIS, July 19, 1948.—The candidates for the hand of the Queen of Spain are reduced to three; namely, the Prtnre Leopold o' Sue Coburn, and the two sons of Don Francimo de Paula. I omit Count Trapani and Count Monteniottn, u there appear. to be no chance of the choice falling upon either of than. As between the three candidates above-mentioned, her Majesty's govcninvint have only to express their sister,' wish that the choice may Edl up m the one who may be most likely to secure th, happitte,s of the queen, and to promote the welfare of the Spaoish nation. M. OVIZOT TO TIIR COMTE DE JattNAe. (Private.) VAL DC RICHER, JULY 2U, Pl46.—The marriage of the Queen of Spain is the only question between England and France which is at present important, and may become perplexing. Let us cut short this perplexity. You were perfectly right in affirming that the sons of I). Francisco de Paula suited us. They are Bourbons, descendants of Philip V., Spanish princes, which is a real advan tage. We have no objection, nor have we ever made any, against them. We only left them aside because Queen Christina, the young queen and her government de clared that they rejected them. We have supported by avowal, and on the first suggestion of Lord Aberdeen, the candidateship of the Comte de Trapani, only because, among the descendants of Philip V., he was then almost the only possible candidate. Quern Christina wanted Idea. This idea obtained for the Queen of Spain the acknowledgment of the court of Naples. We should have supported it by as we always have done, that every other dens ndant of . Philip V. would suit us likewise. Now the Comte de Trapani appears to meet with much resistance in the popular opi nion of Spain. Queen Christina appears no longer willing to accept him she almost denies having thought of him. The Infants, ions of Don Carlos, and especially the Comte de Montemolin„ are in the minds and on the lips of many important persons both in and out of Spain. They would procure for the Queen of Spain the acknowledgments of ' the Northern courts. For our own part, remainieg still fiithful to our principles, we should not object to it. But those who are most favourable to this combination declare that it would not be possible (and even at this price they consider it to be very difficult) unless the Conde de Montemoliuo should &ban lon his pretensions, acknow ledge Isabella, reassume in her court the rank of infant of Spain, and avail himself of this title to make proposals of marriage to her. New the Conde de Montemolino has done, and seems disposed to do. nothing of the kind. Such a combination is not, then, for the present, possible. At Madrid they still speak of the Due de Montpensier. Over- I tures have been made to Prince Leopold of Coburg. We reject both these ideas, as we did from the first. Our policy is perfectly open, steady, and consistent. We wish neither to place a French prince on the throne of Spain, nor to see it occupied by any prince not of the house of Bourbon. These difficulties, these impossibilities, successively tnani rested and felt, bring again before ua the sous of Don Free. I dace de Paula. Queen Christina and the cabinet of Madrid seem a little lees decided against them. They are agreeable to England as well as to us. Let us then enter, jointly with England, on the course now newly open to us. Let us order our mgents at Madrid to act in concert favourably to this I I combination. Let the Queen of Spain marry which of the two Infants she prefers. Lot the queen, her mother, and her ministers, direct her choice at their pleasure towards one or the other. Either will be welcome to Paris and Lon don. This great question would by this means soon come to a settlement, and • definitive one and the good understanding between France and England would by such a solution be att:nded with infinitely more advantages for the tranquillity of Spain and the establish ment of the constitutional monarchy, than could arise from any other combination, for the present impossible, and which it would be necessary to wait for 'my long without even a certainty of ever attaining it. If the English cabinet approves and adopts this policy, we are ready to act in con cert with England, in order to put it efficaciously in practice. I shall not enter into particulars at present. When we are agreed as to principle, we shall easily agree in what concerns the mode of action. 1. sa. OVIZOT TO COUNT DE FLARAULT. (Private Extract.) Antartt., JOLT 4, 18-12.—The two infanta, eons of Dom Fraacis de Paula, have been brought back to Spain. They have not been allowed to take the ordinary road through France. We are assured that their return to Spain is not connected with any project of marriage, and, indeed, I think that for the present all thought of any marriage what ever is indefinitely adjourned by the Spanish government. But the infanta havebeen conducted home to Spain evidently I for the purpose of having them ready at hand in ace of need. This solution is possible, perhaps probable, and, in the name of the interests of France, we have no objection to make to it. LORD PALM/DU/TON TO LORI NORMANDY. FOREION-OFFICE, SEPT. 22,1846.—My Lord—i have had several communications with the Count de Jaunt, and a conversation of some length with M. Dumon on the subject of the intended marriages which have been announced for the Queen of Spain and for her sister the Infanta ; and in those communications and conversations I have explained fully, and without disguise the sentiments entertained by the British govern ment upon the Queen's marriage, and the strong objections felt by them to the proposed marriage of the Infanta, and I have now to instruct your excellency to bring those opinions and objections in a more formal manner under the consideration of the government of France. And first, with regard to the marriage of the Queen Isabella, her Majesty's government have good reason to believe— and it appears, indeed, by the avowal of the French government, that this marriage was brought about by the French influence at Madrid—her Majesty's government was no party to that arrangement. — Her Majesty's government might, indeed, remark that the steps thus taken at Madrid by France, singly, to bring about this marriage, were hardly consistent with the pro pont which that government states itself to have made to her Majesty's government, that the two governments should act in unison in regard to the advice to be given to the court of Madrid upon the subject of the marriage of Queen Isa bella, because it appears that at the time when the French Charge d'Affaires in London was asking the opinion of the British government upon this matter, in order, as he stool, that if the two governments could come to an agreement about it, they should each give the same recommendation, the French Ambassador at Madrid wu already in possession of instructions from his own government to endeavour to bring about the Queen's marriage with one particular candidate, and that cense quently the question about which the French Charge d'Affaires was offering to deliberate in London had been already decided by instructions which had been sent to the French Ambassador at Madrid. It is true, indeed, that no pro posal on this subject was formally or distinctly made to her Ma jesty's government by the government of France, but what passed was nearly as follows:—The day alter I had sent off my despatch (No 6) of tho 19th of July to Mr. Bulwer, I showed • copy of that despatch to the Count de Jarnac, and an explanation of the views which her Majesty's govstrunent, in the short time during which they bad been in office, bad taken of the question of tee Queen Isis. bellies marriage, and of the existing state of things in Spaia ; and I gave him the despatch to take home with him, that he might confidentially send a copy of it to his govern ment. Count Jarnac made several remarks on the despatch, and objected both to that part which related to the marriage of the Queen of Spain, and to that part which related to the political condition of Spain. Upon the latter part ho expressed apprehension that the observa tions made upon the system of rule which has of late yeses prevailed in Spain might, if made known in that country, produce bad and inconvenient effects ; but it is to be pre sumed that the French government did not share those apprehensions, because • copy of that despatch, though it had been communicated in confidence to the French government, was sent by them to M. Brawn, and was by him made known to several persons at Madrid. And upon the first part of my despatch Count Jarnac observed, that it seemed to him to put forward the Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg as a candidate for the hand of the Queen of Spain, while it excluded Count Trapani from the list • that this was inconsistent with what had passed be: tween the French government and the late British ministry, between whom it had been agreed that while on the one hand the French government should with draw the Duke of Montpensier, or any son of the King of the French from tho list of candilates, the British govern ment, on the other hand, should withdraw the Prince of Cobourg, and that some descendant of Philip V. should be recommended as consort for the Queen of Spain. I said that I found no trace in the Foreign Office of any such agreement. That what I understood to have been the ground taken by her Majesty's late government was, that unless the Queen of Spain were likely to marry a French prince, to which the British govern ment would, upon political grounds, have an unquestionable right to object, the marriage of the Queen of Spain was a Spanish question, with which no foreign government was entitled to interfere, so as to control Queen Isabella's choice, whether t hat choice might fall upon a Bour bon or upon any other prince • that the British government would make no objection therefore to selecting a descendant of Philip V., although it did not join in endeavouring to impose any such metric. tiona upon her; that Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg was not a candidate put forward or supported by the British government, and that, on the contrary, the British government thought, for many weighty reasons, that • Spanish prince would be a fitter husband for the Queen, and that among Spanish princes Don Enrique seemed to be the best suited to be her consort. I said that these views had been made known to Mr. Bulwer by my predecessor in office, and that Count Jarnac would see that, in the beginning of my despatch, I referred to and adopted the instructions which had been given on these points by her Majesty's late government that consequently it was impossible that Mr. Bulwer should suppose that the mere circumstance of the Prince of Coburg being mentioned by me as one of the candida.es for the queen's band, was to be con strued by him as an intimation that the British government intended to support or to recommend that mum. But that, moreover, my private communications to M. Bulwer would prevent the possibility of any such mis takes. But I denied that there is any such parity between the relation of the Prince of Coburg and the royal family of England, and the relation of the Duke of Montpensier to the royal family of France, as would afford any ground for such • bargain as that which Count Jarnac claimed as having been made. The Duke of Montpensier is • Frenchman, and son of the King of the French. The Prince of Coburg is not an Englishman, and is only cousin to the Queen of England, while his brother is !mimed to a daughter, and his sister to • son, of the King of the French ; the m, : f h a is , cozir lo ton . w h ith i. co th . e royal .ion f ar am ith ily th of e F ro ra4 l ois a is in th il , ere o - f England, if not more so; and that it is impossible in any point tiDw of : : thuk e ed. w a t fd o wma loo bo..t k ytn u pe piir feto hi lr m bpdy as :y a . n rr: E dee n oiti g . l c. is T h oh ca fatt n ge ohfi didateor tomake his ef withdrawald d g thee of t tie clues might have been some parity estabshed between biro and the Duke of Montpensier ; but I said that in point °f fact I had always understood that whe n about three years ago, and before the Prince of Coburg was talked of as a candidate, the French government 4` THE EXPRESS, THURSDAY EVENING, JANUARY 14, 1847. had proposed and had laid down for its own guidance the principle that the choice of the Queen of Spain should be confined to a descendant of Philip the Fifth. Thu French government itself has pointed out that by so doing it ex cluded any son of the King of the French; and therefore the decision of the King of the French, that the Duke of Montpensier should not be a candidate for the hand of the Queen of Spain was not part of any bargain about the Prince of Coburg, who had not, at that time, been mentioned as a candidate, but was the result of the sense which the King of the French sponta neously entertained of what was doe by France to the faith of the transactions of the treaty of Utrecht, and to the just value attached by other states to the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. I Raid, moreover, that in using the word candidate to designate Prince Leopold as one of the princes who had been publicly talked of sa • possible consort for the Queen of Spain, I employed teat word in its ordinary and colloquial souse; and that it did not imply that the Prince of Coburg was put forward by the British government, or even that the prince had himself taken any steps in the matter. But at the same time, I die dimity told Count Jarnac, and I afterwards repeated the same thing to him several times on other occasions, that the opinion of Lord John Russell, of myself, and of those of our colleagues who had had time to give their attention to Spanish affairs, was the same as that which had been entertained by her Majesty's late government, namely, that • Spanish prince would be the most prudent choice for the Queen of Spain, and that Don Enrique seemed to be the Spanish prince who was the fittest for the high position of being Queen lesibella'e consort. It is impossible, therefore, that either Count Janice or the French minister could, from the fleet moment when any communication took placebetween the two governments on these matters, have had any doubt as to what the opiuions of the British government were with regard to the best choice to be made by the Queen of Spain. The Count deJarese stated upon that and upon other occasions that it would afford the French government much pleasure if her lklaj esty's govern ment should instruct M. Bulwer to gis e effect to those opi nions, by recommending a prince who should fulfil the French condition of being • descendant of Philip V., while at the came time he possessed the qualification of being a Sp inish prince, to which we appeared to attach importance. He said also on a subsequent occasion, that if the British government should determine to recommend Don Enrique, he was sure that the French go vernment would be willing to unite in giving that advice; hut they hoped that if it should turn out, that at Madrid the objections to that prince were insurmountable, the British government would not afterwards oppose the choice of Don Francisco. I said that Her Majesty's government did not consider themselves to have any right to make an oppo• sition to Dun Francisco in such a case ; although for reasons which I had explained to him, they could not take upon themselves the responsibility of recommending that prince. It seems, however, that about the time when these commu nication,. with a view to an united course between the two governments were puling in London, the French embateo dor at Madrid, in pursuance of instructions which must have been sent to bias some time before, was co-operating in the employment of moral coercion, to compel the Queen of Spain to accept a prince who was not the candidate whom the British government was willing to concur with the government of France in recommending. Her Majesty's government are quite ready to admit there was no engage ment on this matter between the two governments, and that each was at liberty to give to the Spanish court such advice about the marriage of the queen as it might think fit. But her Majesty's government do not exactly see why such anxiety should have been expressed in London to ascer tain the sentiments of the British government on this matter, professedly with a view that the two governments might be enabled to take a common course, while, at the same time, such precipitation was displayed at Madrid, in hurrying on a course which the French government had been informed was one in which the co-operation of the British government was not to be expected. But the mar riage of the Queen of Spain is a matter which concerns Spain chiefly, and other countries only indirectly; and although her Majesty's government may have its own opinion as to the manner so which that marriage has been settled, they would probably not have thought it neces sary to make any official communication to the French government on that matter if it had been an insulated transaction, and had not been coupled with the pro jected marriage of the Infanta to the Duke of Montpensier; thus forming part of a most ohjectionahle political arrange ment. It is the projected marriage of the Duke of Montpen tier to the Infanta which renders the present communication necemary, and it is against that marriage that the British government must formally remonstrate and protest. Such marriage would give just cause of political jealousy to other powers, and unless accompanied by public sets in France and in Spain, of which as yet no mention has been made, might give rise to questions calculated to disturb the peace of Europe. The British government hopes that the Queen of Spain may live many years to enjoy • long and prosperous reign, and wishes that her approaching marriage may be blessed with an ample succession to the Spanish crown ; but the uncertainty of human affairs rendoei it necessary to contemplate the possibility that the crown of Spain might devolve upon the Infanta. If this should happen the Infanta being married to the Duke of Mon pensier, that prince world be placed in that very posi tion of consort to the Queen of Spain which the King of the French three or four years ago himself, as I have before stated, practically acknowledged that no son of his ought to occupy ; and thus in consequence of such a marriage that event, which the King of the French declined to arrive at by direct means, might by indirect means, be brought to pass; and it appears to her Majesty's government that good faith requires that what has been re• liuquished in one way should not he sought after in another. But if the line of Queen Isabella were to fail, and if there should at the same time exist issue of the marriage of the Infanta with the Duke de Montpen sier, a serious question might arise respecting the succession to the Spanish crown. For it is perfectly clear that by virtue of the renunciation made at the pester of Utrecht by the Duke of Orleans of that day, all his " descendants, male and female, from that time, and for ever, are excluded, dis abled,and incapacitated from succeeding to the throne of Spain, in what manner soever the succession might fall to their line," and therefore the children and descendants of the Duke of Montpensier would, in consequence thereof, be excluded from succeeding to the Spanish crown. But, however plain the words, and however positive the effect of that renuncia tion must be acknowledged to be, the children or descendants of this marriage might endeavour to set up a claim in virtue of the riohts which they might allege to have inherited from the Infanta ; and thus, unless all pretence for doubt on this point were at once removed by some valid act of renun ciation on the part of the Infanta, for herself and her descendants, the stipulation of the treaty of Utrecht might be set aside by an evasion, or the peace of Europe might be disturbed by another war on account of the sue , cession to the throne of Spain. But these considerations might also give rise to a question of more immediate prac tical application ; because there seems good ground for the assertion which has been made in Spain, that in consequence of the exclusion of the line of Orleans by the transaction of Utrecht, the marriage of the Infanta to the Duke of Montpensier would be contrary to the law and the constitu tion of Spain. Her Majesty's government can scarcely be lieve that a government so anxious, as that of France has professed itself to be, to respect the tranquillity of neighbouring states, and to preserve the peace of Europe, can insist upon the completion of a marriage which threatens immediate danger to the one, and is calculated to place in serious jeopardy the other. But even :if the objections to this marriage, which are founded upon the treaty of Utrecht, and the law of Spain, were as weak and untenable as the British government considers them strong and conclusive, the British govern ment would still protest against this marriage as inconsistent, with a due regard to the balance of power in Europe, and necessarily tending to affect injuriously the nature and character of the relations between England and France. It is impossible for the British government to look upon this marriage as a mere domestic arrangement between the royal families. It is a political transaction be tween two great European powers, and it would tend to link the policy of the one to that of the other, in regard to the foreign relations of both, in a manner which would be dan gerous to other States, The British government attaches great importance to the 'maintenance offriendly relations both with France and with Spain, and as long as the British government in its dealing with France shall have to consider only what may be justly due to the interests and honour of France, and in its dealings with Spain shall only have to show &similar respect for the honour and interests of Spain, there is reason to expect that the spirit of justice and moderation which it may be hoped will always direct the coun cils of England, will secure the continuance of peace between Great Britain and those two powers. But if Spanish inte rests are to sway the foreign policy of France, or if French interests are to sway the foreign policy of Spain, Great Britain may find herself involved in serious differences with one of those powers, without having given it any well founded cause of complaint, and may be unable to re-esta blish friendly relations with the one without submitting to what may be unreasonable and unjust demands on the part of the other. The British government considers the projected marriage of the Duke of Montpensier to the', Infants as calculated thus to link together the policy of France and of Spain ; and as Franee must be admitted, without any disparagement to Spain. to be the greatest power of the two, this marriage would tend to affect meet injuriously for the interests of other states the political independence of Spain. But the injurious effects of this marriage would not be confined to their direct operation on the foreign relations of Spain. They would be felt also through the medium of her internal concerns. Past experience does not warrant any confident expectation that Spain will in future be entirely free from those violent outbreaks which have so often taken place within her territory of late years. The French government has wisely laid it down as a rule of conduct to abstain from any armed interference in the internal affairsof Spain onthese occasions. But if this marriage should be concluded, and a more close and direct connexion should thus he established between the two reigning families, will not the chances be increased that some military interference of France in Spain may not only involve France in a struggle with the national passions of the Spanis h people, but may also lead other powers again to make Spain one of the battle-fields of Europe? It is impossible that Great Britain can be an indifferent observer of an event which may lead to ineh results, and it is not in the nature of things that an event is brought to pass, and calculated to produce such results, should not exercise a most injurious influence upon the relations between Great Britain and France. The manner in which this projected marriage has been arransted ; the po litical views in regard to the future which it discloses ; the possible consequences which it might produce, not only to the friendly relations between Great Britain and France, but, in many suppouble cases, to the peace of Europe, in duce the British government earnestly to remonstrate against it, and to express their anxious hope that it may not be concluded. Your excellency is instructed to assure the French government that the strong objections which the Bri fish government feels to this marriage do not spring from any unworthy „jealousy of the nsturvil greatness or of the just power of ranee. In a great European crisis not very long since gone by, Great Britain was the foremost to acknow ledge the great importance of maintaining the French mo narchy unimpaired as an essential element in the balance of power in Europe. The present government of Great Britain fully *hue in this respect the sentiments of their predeces sors of that day. The British government will rejoice to see France happy, prosperous, and powerful. But France possesses within her owu ample territory and in her own Immense resources, the means of maintaining that high position which providence has destined her to occupy among the nations of the world; and all attempts on her part to establish, by indirect methods, an illegitimate Influence over other states, which though not so powerful as herself, are equally entitled to perfect national independence, must, from the very nature of things, end at last in disappointment and failure. But the struggles through which that failure will be brought about, must ba productive of evil to France as well as to all the other states that may he involved in them. Her Majesty's government being desirous of giving to this communication the most friendly form which is consistent with a full and authentic expression of their sentiments, do not instruct you to cm body the substance of this despatch in a note; but I am to desire that you will read this despatch to hl. Guizot, and that you will send him officially a copy of it —I am, &c. &e. Signed, PALMERSTON. EXTRACT PROM A DESPATCR OF LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD NORMANBT, DATED AL•O 22, 1846. DELIVERED BY LORD NOUItANBT TO X. OUIZOT, AllO. 28. • • • • Don Enrique is the only Spanish prince who is fit, by his personal qualities, to become the husband of the Queen of Spain. M. LE CONTE BRESSON A M. EL IZOT. (Private Extract.) MADRID, JUNZ 2S, 1816.—1 have hastened to assist )1. Bulwer in his efforts in fdvour of the son of the Infante Don Francis, assuring him that your in structions have given me full authority. I incresse my attentions to the Infante. I presented to him yesterday the Archbishop of Bordeaux, and, on rising to de part, I took him aside, and advised him to recommend great prudence to his sons, whose chances had increased. lie has expressed to me some disquietude and some displeasure at the journey to Brussels of the Duke de Seville. " Very well," replied, "my lord, write to the king to detain him at Paris" —and behold his letter. I think you will be glad is have under your hand all the possible pretenders. MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED MARCH 4, 1846, TO LORD ABBROBBN BY W. ST. AULAIRE. PARIS, FE8.27, 1846.—T. The principle that we have sup ported and which the British cabinet has accepted as the basis of our policy respecting the marriage of the queen of Spain, has an application very difficult and uncettain. At present this is the aiturtion of the descendants of Phillip V., and of those who do or may pretend to the hand of the queen. The Prince of Lucca is married. The Count de Trappani is much c impromised—lst, by the explosion which has taken place against hint, and 2nd, by the fall of General Narvaez. The sons of the Infante don Francis de Paulo are much compro- mised-Ist, by their false proceedings ; and 2d, by their connexion with the radical party and their antipathy with the moderado : 3rd. By the ill will of the Queen Mother and of the young Queen herself. The sons of Don Carlos hitherto are impossible : let. Because of the loudly proclaimed oppo sition of all parties : 2nd. By the exclusion formally declared in the constitution : 3rd. By their own dispnaitions always s a far removed from that course which alone could give them any chance of success. The actual situation of the descendants of Philip V. in the question of the marriage is then very un favourable. _ _ 11. I have much to say upon the causes of this fact. I shall only insist on two points. We have constantly tes tified for all the descendants of Philip V., without excep tion' favourable sentiments. We have said and re peated to Queen Christina herself that the Infactes,sons of Don Francis de Paulo, would be approved of. We have done all that was in our power to render possible the sons of Don Carlos. If we have particularly supported the Count de Trappani, it is because his success appeared more probable than that of any other, in consequence of the favourable disposition of Queen Christina and of the young Queen. 2. rhe British cabinet has given us for the Trapani ar rangement no advice or efficacious support. It has observed a cold neutrality, and its inertia has given a free course to all the hostilities and all the intrigues, whether Spanish or of inferior English agents, whom its active and clear course has restrained. . _ . 111. Whatever may be the causes, the fact that the diffi culties of the marriage of one of the descendants of Philip V. with Queen Isabella, are very much aggravated is indisput able. And at the some time a very active work is prosecuted at present to marry Prince Leopold of Coburg either to Queen Isabella or Donna Fermanda. The court of Lis bon is the focus of this project. The correspondence, the Portuguese and Spanish journals evidently support it. It is affirmed Viet ?nut* Leopold of Coburg, who was to have left, Feb. 24, Lisbon for Cadiz, Gibraltar, Algiers, Malta, and Italy, will make, either secretly or publicly, a . journey to Madrid. Many circumstances render this probable. IV.—We have been, and will continue to he, faithful to the politics that we have adopted, and to the engagements we have taken as to the marriages of Queen Isabella and the Infanta Donna Liaise Fernsuda. But if the actual state of things should be prolonged and developed, we may arrive at a situa ion in 4Meh we shall be-Ist., placed under the empire of an absolute necessity to hinder the marriage either of the Queen or the Infanta, lest our policy in Spain should receive a check to which we would not submit. 2nd. Free from any engagement either with respect to one or the other mar riage. This will happen if the marriage either of the Queen or the Infanta with Prince Leopold of Coburg, or with any other prince not included in the descendants of Philip V., should become probable or imminent. In such case we should be liberated from all engagement, and free to act immediately, to parry the blow by demanding the band either of the Queen or the Infanta for the Duke of Mont. pensier. V. We desire sincerely and earnestly that things may not corns to this extremity. We only see one means of pre venting it. It is that the British cabinet should cordially unite with us, first, in setting afloat one of the deseendints of Philip V., no matter which, either the Duke of Seville, or the Duke of Cadiz, or the Count de Trapani, and to propose his marriage with the Queen. Second, To hinder meanwhile the marriage of the Infanta, either with Prince Leopold of Coburg or with any other foreign prince not included in the descendants of Philip V. We believe that by a common and decided action of the two cabinets, this double end may be attained, and we con sider it a duty to forewarn the English cabinet that without that we shall feel free to act as I have just indicated. Y. OCIZOT TO COCNT JARNAC. (Official.) Pasts, Ocr. 11, 1846.—Monsienr le Comte,—Before I forwarded the despatch I had the honour to address to you on the sth instant, I read it to the English ambassador. Lord Normanby, after having heard this document, I merely presented a few short observations, and re ferred me to the reply which Lord Palmerstor. would probably make and to the discussion which might ensue on the subject between the two govern ments. He then informed rite that he had orders to commu nicate to me, and he did then read to me a note without any date, which Mr. Bulwer is instructed to lay before the Spanish government. The British cabinet protests therein, beforehand, against the possible accession of the descendants of the Duke of Montpensier and the Infanta to the throne of Spain, declaring that it does not recognise the rights in virtue of which this acces sion would be claimed in default of issue of Queen Isabella that in this case England reserves her full liberty to take in the conteztationsthat might ensue the part thatshe might deem most expedient, and that she at once expresses that reserve in order that she may not at any future period be re proached with having allowed her opinion to remain unknown. Such is the object and the general tenor of the English note, of which I cannot, however, convey to vou with precision the terms and details. It is to the Spanish government this note is to be delivered, and it is for them to reply to it. But since it has been communicated to us we have a right, and it is our duty, to express our opinion on it. Such • protestation, presented in virtue of the treaty of Utrecht, and of the renunciations annexed to it, or more especially in virtue of the renunciation of the Duke of Orleans (1712) of his eventual claims to the throne of Spain is, in our opinion, entirely unfounded. I stated, in my despatch of the sth of this mouth, what was the real character of the Treaty of Utrecht, and what double object its authors proposed to themselves to attain by the clauses relative to the Spanish succession. It was intended on the one hand to secure the throne to the descendants of Philip the Fifth on the other, to prevent the union oa the same hea d of the crowns of France and Spain. This was the object of the renunciations demanded on the one hand of Philip the Fifth, on the other of the Dukes of Berri and of Orleans. It is consequently that which determines the real signification and legitimate extent of these renuncia tions. Thee onntain what is necessary to attain, the object of ' the treaty of Utrecht; but they cannot, and do not, in reality, extend any farther. According tothis princptle, incontestable in itself, and which besides is perfectly consonant with the text of the document in question, the renunciation of the Duke of Orleans signifies that in case the throne of Spain should become vacant by the extinction of the heirs of Philip the Fifth to which it is secured by the treaty of Utrecht, the descendants of the Duke of Orleans could in no wise claim this throne, for in exchange for the abandonment I made by Philip the Fifth tor himself and his descendants of his eventual claims to the throne of France, the Duke of Orleans abandoned his eventual claims to the crown of Spain, wishing to preserve therighta equally eventual, which his birth likewise gave him to the crown of France, and that in the interest of Europe had been judged incompatible with I the former. This the real and rational sense of the renun ciation. Does it follow that the descendants of Philip the Fifth, on whom the crown of Spain would devolve naturally, I legitimately in virtue of their own rights founded on the veil clauses of the treaty of Utrecht, should be excluded I from it, they or their posterity, because they might be, I or their ancestors might have been, married to descendants of the Duke of Orleans ? In other terms, must the certain ' incontestable right of the descendents of Philip V. perish, because they might be allied to a family that had renounced theirs ? Evidently this thesis cannot be supported, and to show the error of it, in its full light, it is sufficient to state it with precision. Such is, however, the substance of the English note reduced to its real and essential terms. On this argument and on this alone does the protestation rest. In principle then it is without any, the least, founda tion. Facts prove that Europe has hitherto been of this opinion. In my despatch of the filth of the present month, I quoted three examples of marriages concluded between descendants of Philip V. and princes of other branches of the house of Bourbon that had renounced the throne of Spain. I could multiply these examples, Never had it been, I will not say, maintained, but thought that in consequence of these, and as if the disqualification . '‘.. c resulting from the renunciations were a rontagious fact, that might be thus communicated from one hennas to the other, these descendants of Philip V. hid forfeited their rights to the crown of Spain. There is no more foundation for main taining it at present, for the situation arising out of the marriage of the Infanta with the Duke of Montpensier does not make the least alteration in that which the treaty of Utrecht has founded, and which has received, in fact and in right, the adhesion of all Europe. After twelve years war between Europe and England, the first among the European powers thought that a grandson of Louis XIV. and his descendants might, without danger to the equili brium of Europe, sit on the throne of Spain while the de scendants of Lou's XIV. were seated on the throne of France. This degree of kindred between the two Crowns,and the bonds that might result from it between the two states, were fully accepted, in the commencement of the last cen tury, by all the power.; and the guarantees, inserted in the treatyof Utrecht to prevent the union of the crownsof France and Spain on the same head, appeared to them fully to satisfy their legitimate interests. That is the public law of Europe—the situation accepted and settled in the name of the equilibrium of Europe. The marriages just concluded alter in no wi-e, I repeat, this situation. They had naught to the degree of kindred between the crowns of France and Spain. They tske away none of the guarantees stipulated by the treaties agiinst the union of these two crowns. They cannot then legitimately give rise to any protestation founded on these treaties and on the public law of Europe. You will please, Monsieur le Comte, to read this despatch to Lord Palmerston.—l am, &c. Y. OUIZOT TO TEE DEIE OF OLUCK' HERO. (Private extract ) PARIS, NOV. 11, 1813.—Doubtless the Neapolitan com bination suits us admirably, and we shah neglect nothing that may contribute to its success ; but to promote its suc cess, you, better than any one, know that it must seem to be entirely the product of the Spanish soil, and not a foreien importation. We have done much to obtain the King of Naples's consent to an acknow ledgment, because we wished that combination also to be possible, with dignity for the queen and the Spanish nation: and a greater latitude to be thus allowed to their choice. We are delighted to have succeeded. But Spain alone must decide which of the descendants of Philip V. is most ;agreeable to her; and we shall not leave the ground on which we took our stand from the beginning. Let then your language be in conformity with our determin ation on this point. We do not, however, intend to show ourselves averse to the marriage of the queen with the Duke of Cadiz or the Duke of Seville, nor will we assume with regard to that combination an atti tude that may render its success a failure for us. It is agreeable to our principles. It has many chances in its favour and the interests of France hare nothing to apprehend from, it. It is necessary, likewise, insetting forth the advantages, far Spain herself, of the Neapolitan combination, and in assisting its ratural means of success, to state that the com bination of the s•ns of Don Francisco de Pula will not en'y meet with no objection on our part, but obtain our cordial support. Y. OVIZOT TO COUNT BILESSON. (Private extract.) PA FRY, Szrr. 2, 1845.-1 find, on arriving here, your letter of the 28th of November. You have perfectly under stood the shades of distinction between the marriages. We by no means intend to renounce the Neapolitan. You must support it throughout, provided, however, it is not a con straint on the Spanish public, such as must probably result from disturbances in • country already so dis turbed from differences in a government so much rent by faction. We likewise wish it to be well known, and averred that we, France and Bourbons, on our own account, make no objection to, we place no obstacle in the way of, the Duke of Seville's candidature. That com bination satisfies and suits us ; and if, notwithstanding our continued support of the combination Trapani meet with grave obstacles in and from Spain, we shall snpport the Duke of Seville both vita Queen Christina and the Spanish cabinet. Such is our whole and undisguised thought on both hypotheses, Act in consequence. 6. N. ()MOT TO COUNT JiRNAC. (Private extract.) PARTR, AUG. 19, 1816 —The infant Don Enrique is com prised in our principle. We admit him entirely. We have no objection whatever to him, but it being always under stood that Queen Isabella, and the queen, her mother, and her government., are alone ealled on to choose between the two brothers, and are perfectly free in their choice, and if their preference should on the Duke of Cadiz, that no ob jection to him shall come from London. M. OCIZOT TO cooler BRESSON. (Private.) PARIS, Dic. 10, 1845.—The basis of our policy towards Spain in general, and especially in the question of the mar riages of the Queen and of the Infanta, is the firm desire of preventing between the two principal allies of Spain, France and England, a return of that active rivalry, of those despe rate struggles, which have done, and would still do, so much evil to Spain first, and then to Europe. This policy is in the interests of Spain as well as of France. Spain has at present two interests of a superior order dominating, to which all others must be subordinate. An interest of internal policy, which is to Five a foundation to its government and to its administration, to insure its tranquillity, its prosperity, and its internal strength. An interest of external policy, which is. I do not hesitate to say so, to unite itself intimately with France, and to regain, by so doing, its rank in Europe, by conserving its independence and its repose. For the suttees of these two interests, the cessation of all active and lively struggle between France and England, on account of Spain, is very desirable. Our policy is therefore, in its general principle, Spanish as , well as French, and conformable to the superior and COM mon interests of the two countries. When, therefore, in the special question of the marriage, either of the Queen or of the Infant, we :pat aside 'all combinations which might create a struggle between France and England, on Spanish ground, far from Spain having to complain, or be shacked at it, she ought to approve of us, and second us with all her power; for in that we have to make, and we really do make, es well as her, to the high and common interests of the two countries, the sacrifice of in terests and inclinstinns which are most dear to us, and which we would follow most willingly, if great and wholesome reasons of state did not dissuade us from it. But that this policy may be practicable and attain its end, it must be mutually accepted, and practised upon by England as by France. with the same moderation and the same sincerity. If, then, whilst we labour to avoid, by the mar riage either of the Queen or of the Infanta, all combinations which would rekindle the Anglo-French struggle in Spain, as much was not done on the other hand; if, on the con trary, the prepared is allowed to be proposed, a combine don contrary to the principles proclaimed by us (the throne of Spain must not depart from the descendants of Philip V.), a combination which would compel ns to renew ourselves the struggle which we wish to destroy, it is evident that we could not, and decidedly we should not accept of such a position. The more I examine, the more convinced I am, that in Spain and around Spain there is an active and incessant labour going on to bring about the marriage of a Prince of Coburg either with the Queen or with the Infants. The British government does not positively work at this marriage, but it does not endeavonr efficaciously either to prevent it. Jt does not express a peremptory no to a combination that would place a Prince of Coburg on the throne, as we have as regards a French prince. And on their side, Queen Christina and the Spanish government endeavour to turn to account the fear we have of a Coburg marriage, to insure the Montpensier marriage, always leaving mom for the possibility of a Coburg marriage, in case the Montpensier marriage should not succeed. We cannot act the part of dupes in this. We shall continue to follow sincerely our policy, that is to say, to avoid every combination likely to rekindle the conflict between France and England on the account of Spain. But if we perceive that on the other side they are not so precise and decided as we are . if, for example, either from want of energy of the English government, or by the doings of its partisans in Spain and around Spain, a marriage was preparing for the Queen or for the Infante, which en dangered our principle—the descendants of Philip V.—and if that combination had chances of success with the Spanish government, then we should come forward immediately, without reserve, and should demand simply and openly the preference for the Duke of Montpensier. Such is our line of conduct—it is perfectly consistent and loyal ; and, at the same time it is adapted to disconcert, either before-hand, or at the the critical moment, the Coburg combination, or any other. I confidently entrust you with its execution. You are thus armed for the present and for the future. You will, I Ism sure, only make use of your different weapons in a case of necessity, or at an opportunate moment. Follow up our policy to its end, as long as it is not rendered impossible to us by a oombinatipn against us in opposition to our principle ; and if you find yourself reduced to this extremity, stop the combination by the means I place in your hands. M. OtilLOT TO C. 7ARNAC._ rants, Nov. 22, 1846. M. le C.—l send you herewith a copy of a despatch of Lord Palmerston, dated Oct. 31, which Lord Normanbv communicated to me the 4th Nov. I have already answered mast of the arguments which have been repeated in this do cument. I shall address myself now only to the serious errors in it, to establish in truth the essential facts. This protracted dispute only serves to obscure the facts and em bitter the personalities. In supporting the rights and the interests of France and of the government, I desire sin cerely to maintain with the British government good and amicable relations. To this policy I shall be faitbfuL Lord Palmerston wishes to prove that the French govern ment has violated the engagements it has contracted in September, 1845, at the Chateau d'Eu, on the subject of the Spanish marriages, and that it has violated the treaty of Utrecht, and the obligations that this treaty imposed on it — such is the language of its last despatch. The more this lan guage is unmeasured, the more I hold myself bound to re produce it without attenuation, and to reply to it with frank ness. Lord Palmerston declared, in his despatch of 22nd September last, that he had not found at the Foreign-office, on the subject of the Spanish marriage, any convention or any arrangement between the French and English govern ments. He proclaims, at present, engagements contracted, as he says, on this subject at the Chateau d'Eu by the French go vernment, and hesays at the same time in reference to my memorandum of 27th Fcbru ,ry last, communicated to Lord Aberdeen, 4th March, that there exists no trace of it in the Foreign-office. I may ask if there exist in the Foreign-office any trace of the engagements made at the Chateau d'En ? I may be astonished that, on the one hand, it is pretended to he so well informed of engagements of which no official proof is offered, while, on the other hand, ignorance is affected of facts and documents which it is not convenient to acknow ledge. Ts there not a singular contradiction in this, and a somewhat excessive complaisance towards our own side of the question ? I will not follow a like course. I will not depart from any engagement taken at the Chateau d'Eu, merely because Lord Palmerston has not found them enrolled at the Foreign-01m. Between governments having a reciprocal confidence and respect, business is rice A transacted without referenco to official documents. Tu n are even circumstances in which such mutualconfilebee is a matter of state convenience, and eonoequently ft duty, Such is this question of the Spanish marriages. For gp.,, it is essentially a question of internal order, and one Is which her independence and her dignity were engaged, Lard Aberdeen and myself, desiring to regulate our conduct with this view, did not think that this question should be a s ubject of habitual official eo, respondence. We thought that we should act with mote conversance for Spain and for ourselves by confining me. selves to those communications which our mutual confide's, rendered natural and easy. This is the reason why Iggi Palmerston has not found at ths Foreign-offiee any trice of those communications which, in his despatch of September 22, he calls a bargain. But the engagements of the Chateau d'Eu, as well as the declarations of the memorandum of February 27, are not the less real or serious, and fa t from contesting them, I cordially admit them, and proclairi their sacred character. But I muat , at the same time, establish them in their truth and integrity. Now, in recalling do engagements taken by the French government at the CM. teau d'Eu, Lord Palmerston forgets and omits to say the these engagements were candid., al and mutual. We have never expressed them without annexing two reservations-. namely, first, that the Queen of Spain Mould choose her husband from the descendants of Philip the Fifth ; and, secondly, that the Brit* government should in commits with us, and to tas utmost of its power, promote the result. Could we, without the most culpable imprudence, restrain, on al serious a yyism tion, our freedom of conduct and action, without attachiae to our engagements clauses in conformity with the swim interests and dignity of the country ? I have openly and.* all occasions proclaimed in this respect our policy. I ham often discoursed upon it at Paris with the British ambasseder, apprising him of what we should do if the candiditeship at a prince, not included in the descendants of Phillip V., and more particularly Prince Leopold de Saxe Coburg, for the hand of the Queen, should be presented with any chance of success. The British government was therefore well aware, both of the reservations which accompanied the engage. ment, and of the support we expected from it. It has said, I confess, that it could not admit the principle of our policy, nor adopt in this question the same attitude, hold the same language ' or act in the same dine.. tioa with us ; but it promised us that it would act in concert with us, and direct its efforts to the some object. That was not a bargain. It was a course mutually agreed on, frankly and faithfully. We have always reckoned on it, According to Lord Palmerston, the Marquis de Mira flares had been sent on • mission to Paris last summer by the court of Madrid, to persuade the king and government not to oppose the marriage of Queen Isabella with the prince of Coburg. This assertion is destitute of all foundation. During the two months that the Marquis de Miratiores passed in Paris he made no communication to the govern. ment, no overtures ; he never addressed to me a word is the sense indicated by Lord Palmerston. In my despatch of the sth of October, after having shown how the MO= if Prince Leopold, placed in the instructions of the 9th of July at the head of the three candidates for the hand of the Queen, must have produced in his favour the effect of an indirect recommendatien, I has - e said •• In admitting that Lord Palmerston his not intended to pet forward or to recommend the Prince of Coburg, he will cer tainly admit that he has said absolutely nothing to remove his claims, or discourage the Spanish government from fa. vouring them." Lord Palmerston mistakes altogether the sense of this phrase—" M. Guizot thus admits positively that the government of her Majesty hid no intention to promote or recommend the Prince of Coburg. To admit that is to acknowledge the exact truth." I have neither admitted nor denied that Lord Pal- merston had not the intention of recommending the Prince de Coburg in his instructions of the 19th July. It is the effects and not the intentions that concern me, and that I must look to. I desired to show what must he, at Madrid, the effect of these instructions, even admitting hypothetically that Lord Palmerston did not intend to promote or recent mend that prince. Continuing to discuss what I said on the sth October, upon the effect of his instructions of 19th July, at Madrid, Lord Palmerston cites textually from my despatch the following passage. I place them side by side, the cite. tion and the text of the despatch. CITATION INSERTED IN raa ORIGINAL TINT. - Th. blest's government could not mistake its sitmtkin7To pre. vent the oesmequencesi of it, it adopted at Madrid the most direct and most legitimate ono,. It made an appall to the free choice, to the independent will of Queen Isabella and her government. Beside tha combination which was evidently pursued against Its pokey, it offered a different combination—it reserved openly and positively the right to do so; it must have done so, for the hypothesis fur which it bat made this reserration, and which it had for.ween in Ito imtructions to Madrid as in its declaration. at London, became more and more pro. hable. The Queen of Spain and her government acceptel this cco. binatlon. CITATION OF LORD PALMERSTON. M. Guizot's despatch goes on to soy that " the French government was unable to deceive itself as to the state of things, and saw that there was on the part of the Spanish court so strong a desire for the Coburg alliance,that if the British government should make no active opposition toil and should remain only passive in the matter, that marriage would certainly be concluded, and that consequently ths French government resorted at Madrid to the most direst and most legitimate means, and appealed to the free choice and independent will of the Queen and her government to bring about a different arrangement. By the side of a com bination which was being pursued evidently in opposition to the policy of the French government, that government, says M. Goixot, offered a different combination, and this latter one was accepted by the Queen and the government." In reading this passage I felt, I confess, an extreme oar prime. The phrases that I have underlined are not found in my despatch, and I cannot consider this intercalation N indifferent; for Lord Palmerston imputes to me palpable contradictions, and which would be real, if, as he says, all the phrases on which they rest really ex isted there. Lord Palmerston must allow me to re. pulse these contradictions, which are not my prow work. Lord Palmerston is astonished in speaking of the pro- ceedings of loot May, by the Court of Madrid, with the knowledge and concurrence of the British minister, to offer the hand of the queen to the Prince of Coburg. I had not said that I received the first notice of it from Lord Aberdeen himself. I thank him for this reproach. It is very true that Lord Aberdeen firstneve me this information, soon confirmed by the French minister at Madrid. Nothing, certainly, could be more agreeable to the French government than to publish it ; for the fact proves at the same time both the good faith of Lord Aberdeen, and the engagementthat he had taken and so faithfully observed, to assist us in setting acids the candidateship of the Prince of Coburg. But having n• aired. from Lord Aberdeen this information in a Cidw and confidential mammy, I did not know if it would be agreeable to him that I should officially declare that it had come from him. I did not feel myself at liberty to dispose of it without his consent. It is with deep satis faction that I now render this homage to the rectitude with which he has conducted on this occasion, as on many others, the policy of frank confidence and commas action, as we had mutually engaged to do. I will make a short comparison. In the month Of May, Lord Aberdeenin formed me, on the occasion of a proceeding which forth. fine time cave to the candidateship of the Prince of Coburg a caw taro character i he disavowed this candidateship, and blamed the English minister at Madrid for having associated himself in the proceeding. In the month of July following, without any notice or any previous communication with us, Lard Palmerton himself proclaimed the candidateship of the Primo of Coburg, and charged Mr. Bulwer to express the sincere desire of the English government that the choice should fall on him of the three candidates, who should be most woe able to Spain sod the Queen. And when, on the first in formation of this despatch, which was given to you after haring represented to Lord Palmerston the serious objets tiona which were raised, you asked him if it could not le reconsidered, he told you that it had been already der patched. Who will say that nothing was changed? WY will say that we ought or could close our ens on such changes, and run blindfold and passively the chances which must ensue? The clearest duty, the mod simple foresight, prescribed our conduct. We had promised in Sept. 1845 not to conclude definitively the marriage of die Duke of Montpensier until the queen should be married ad have; had issue: but provided that the queen should tab for her jsusband one of the descendants of Philip V.,ad that th% English government should help us to bring best that result.' The French government has faithfully °Werra a promise, for it has been proposed in Nov., 1845, to dank the marriage of the queen with a descendant of Philip V,* consent to the immediate marriage of the Mike of Montpen sier with the Infanta ; and this proposition was refused. We saw, in May, 1846, the hand of the queen offered to the Prince of Coburg, and in the July following this candidate ship officially avowed without any objectionor observance 11 the English government. We were obliged to consider* , marriage We have n o o f t filed ea Dukeen result of this combination as probable and imminent. WI t e o: must, to put aside this chance, consent to the immobile s M ing on le tpe da n y sie in r wi ou t r h e t n h isi e Intenh We have, on the contrary, scrupulously observed them. sub' ject to the reservations and limitewhich have been previssel laid down. The French government is not less faithful in* serving the treaty of Utrecht than its own engagements. Lord Palmerston sums up in these terms the meaning a consequences of this treaty—" The perpetual *epergne ef the two crowns of France and Spa countriesns, and the excludes of every prince of the royal family of one of these countrie s a of all the descendants of this prince from the summits M the throne of the other country, in whatever maser the said succession may present itself to them." I bare fay admitted the first of these principles, the perpetual ItpllS. lion of the two crowns. I have maintained that there did not result from it, and that no one in Europe elm , thought there resulted from it, the interdiction of the marriages between the two royal houses of France sad Spam, or the loss for the princes issuing Soo these maniagee , of their eventual rights to the crows ii Spain proceedin g from the right of Philip V. I will real to your memory but one of the facts I have already quoted.ma that I could have multiplied to prove that such was: throughout the whole of last century, the constant ad general opinion of Europe. In 1711 Louis 1., Eiell of Spain, the eon of Philip V., married /Wile de Montpensier, the daughter of the Duke of Or leans, regent—of the prince, who had himself Riess in 1712 the renunciation of the branch of Orleans to their eventual claims of succession to the throne of Spain. If king Louis I. had had children, a grandson of this saes regent would have ascended the throne of Spain. WINS would have become, In presence of this fact, accomplished is the lifetime of the persons that signed the treaty a Utrecht, of the doctrine of Lord Pahnenton ? " Bat ilk admitting even," says he in hie despatch of 31st October, " that there had beencaaes in which the stipulations of Utrecht might not have been observed, the fact of this non-observance by statesmen of the last century would not he a reason for their not being invoked and observed by the statesmen dam present century." The following is another fact of a 111011 I recent date, and the authority of which will not be contested by Lord Palmerston. In 1739 the Infant Don Philip, Duke 1 ,