The Express. — London, England, 1847-01-15 00:00:00

N in a contemplated emission of bons royaux to the amount of between 210 and 213 millions of francs. The only weak point in this statement is the , slurred-over increase of expenditure fur Algeria and the attempt to insinuate that the increasednaval expen diture is mainly, if not solely, owing to arrangements on the West Coast of Africa. We remarked some weeks ego that the steamers' stations on the West Coast of Africa appeared to have been selected by the French government more with a view to the general increase of its naval strength than to the suppression of the slave-trade. The casual incidental notice of increased military and naval expendi ture, combined with tho insinuation (not assertion) that it arises solely from operations in Algeria and for the suppression of the slave-trade, indicates a de sire silently to increase the available military means of the country. Something of the same kind may be detected in the arrangements respecting the p••((clar meric which are noticed as among the causes of the increased estimates of 1817. These two indications, coupled with the gloating proetn of the ministerial speech in praise of "sacrifices to assert the rank due" to the nation, may have no sinister me ining. but at present they cannot altogether be passed over in silence. With regard to the estimates for the public ser vices of the year 1817, it is remarkable that, with the single exception of the department of the interior, they are in excess of the original estimates in every department of government. The most remarkable of these augmentations is that rendered necessary in the war department and serriee des cult's. It would seem that the conservative policy of the French cabinet is simaltaneoutfly to augment without noise the force of their army, and conciliate the priests. But the most important Oasis of these augmenta tions is the determination evinced to increase official expenditure concurrently with general economical pressure in tile state. It is true that the present aspect of affairs in France is only a "temporary stoppage, not a retrograde movement in that march of prosperity" witnessed in France of late years : but it is not the less true that ministers seem disposed to try the real substantial character of national resources by a pretty severe test. Their estimates of income for the year 1847 give an increase of 23 millions. Their estimates of income and expenditure for 1818 show a surplus of income to the amount of 3 millions ; but the rate at which they are increasing their expen diture may soon absorb these and even larger sums. These are the remarks suggested by the ex parte statements of the French finance minister : we will hear what the opposition have to say to them. Our Paris express of Wednesday hrts arrived. The journals are occupied with eomments on the proceed ings in the Chambers on Tuesday. The Journal des Dhbats and La Presse give the diplomatic correspon dence which we printed yesterday, and continue to day. The presidents of all the bureaux in the Chamber of Deputies have been elected from the Conservative 1 411 7 - The National affirms, on the authority of a private letter from Cracow, dated sth January, that General Rudiger, with a corps of 10,030 Russians, occupied the frontiers of that ancient republic and Galicia. Austrian troops had also been ordered to the frontiers. It was Gen. Rudiger who, in the month of March last, commanded the Russians that occupied the city of Cracow, and forbid his officers to fmteniise with the Austrians. Letters from Vienna of the sth inst. say that on the thil Prince Metternich was taken suddenly indisposed during his dinner, and had since been confined to bed. His illness, however, was not considered serious. A meeting of forty deputies was held on Tuesday at the house of M. Billault to organise anew party in the Chamber of Deputies. M. Dufaure was present, and declared himself in accordance with M. Billault. Both these deputies stated their political views. They said that without separating themselves from i the * Opposition, there were several points on which they did not share its opinion they protested against all concurrence with the ministry, or with the old Conservative party. What they desired was to form a true party of the Left Centre, inviting to join it the independent deputies. Among the deputies who attended this meeting were MM. de Toequeville, Boudet, former Under Secretary of State in the ministry of M. Thies, and M. Ferd. Barrot, brother of 0. Barrot. It was said at the meeting that several members of the Left would vote for the paragraph relative to the Spanish marriages. The ministry expects that the ph will be unanimously adopted in the Cham- L ar r a firPeers, and supported by 350 voices in the Chamber of Deputies. This is the answer that M. Guizot desires to give to Lord Palmerston, and the proof which he will offer that, in this question, he is sup ported by the national scmpathie , . A general meeting of the Council of the Bank of France is to be held to-morrow, to decide on the mea sures it may be most advisable to take in the present crisis. As we anticipated in our former correspondence, it is expected that the rate of discount, hitherto per manent, of 4 per cent., will not be disturbed. It is probable, however, that bills will he discountable only at 60 and 45 days instead of 90 and 60 as hitherto. In addition to this, the Bank will make a sacrifice to relieve the present commercial pressure, by obtaining specie through its own resources. The funds and public securities on Wednesday did not recover from the fall they had previously suffered. The Three per Cents. fluctuated between 79.40 and 79.15, closing at 79.30. The Five per Cents. and the Northern shares remained as yesterday. The Madrid mails, with letters and journals of the ith. were received in Paris on Wednesday. The addresses of the Marquis de Viluma and M. Castro de Oroaco to the Queen and King-Consort, on Twelfth Day, occupied the journals. The Bourse was feeble, and little business trans acted. THE SPANISH MARRIAGES. We continue our translations from the official docu ments which have pared between the two courts, respecting the Spanish marriage‘: Y. Gl:IZOT TO TOO cotvr JAILNAC. (Official.) PARIS, Ocr. 5, I,l4s.—Monsieur le Comte.—The English ambassador, acme days since, on the 25th of September, communicated to me a despatch, which has been addressed to him by Lord Palmerston, on the 'abject of the marriage of the Queen of Spain with the infant Don Francois d'Asaise, and of the infanta Donna Luisa Fernando with the Duke de Montpensier. You will find a copy of it an nexed to this. I made the king acquainted with it in council, and I address to you the answer of the government of the king to that communication, charging you to lay it before the Principal Secretary of State of her Brilamb Majesty. Lord Palmerston says, in concluding Ids despatch, "that her Britannic Majesty's government has wished to give to the complete and authentle expression of its sentiments upon the question the most amicable form." 'You will say to Lord Palmerston that the goverment of the king also entertains towards England and her government,sentiments of the most sincere friendship, while at the same time it maintains the rights and the interests of France against the complaints and repre sentations which appear to it to have no foundation : I wish nevertheless to remove a reproach that Lord Palmerston ad dresses, at the outset, to the government of the king, and which has caused me, I contest', some surprise. He recalls to mind that we proposed not long since to the English government to listen to us and tout in concert to give advice to the court of Madrid on the marriage of the Queen Isabella. That proposal does not agree, he says, with the plans we are forming individually in Sonia, for, according to him, are shoo'd have at the same time ordered Count Bremen to use all his exertions to bring about the marriage of the queen with a particular suitor, the Infant Don Francois d'Assias; offering at the same time in !Auden to deliberate upon a question already solved by our instructions at Madrid. Th- facts recalled with certainty will put in evidence the grave ere..r of that reproach. I, in fact, proposed in the month of July last to the cabinet of London to listen to ns, and to act in concert at Madrid to forward, especially as candidates for the bend of Queen Isa bella, the two infants, sons of Don Francois do Paula. As being descendaits of Philip V., these two princes had our connexion. As Spanish princes, they had that of England. The disposition of the court of Madrid teemed to be favour able to them. I proposed at that time to the English uphold them in common with ns, and I • - that for our port we had no e princes, and that either of s Spain and to her queen, would which I said at London I said 'treason has always received in• o infants, and to say beforehand to the choice which the queen them. The ambassador of the out his instructions. What will month after ray proposal of joint sons of Don Francois de Paula, forwards me his answer. He did overture, such as it had been us to join him in forwarding the Talent Don Enrique, the despatch of the 22nd Normonby communicated to me on the 23th, to become the Queen's o hushand. to I expressed to Lord Normanby, and I beg y to express Lord Palmerston my astonishment at this exclusive choice, and the impossibility on our put of acting together, for we have always said, and we persist in saying, that the two in fanta were agreeable to us ; that it rested with the Queen of Spain to r °flounce between them ; and that we were ready to acquiesce in her choice, whatever it might he. That oar adhesion to the two infants has been particularly useful to the elder of the two, to Den Frenenis d'Assive who was, in Spain, in an upright and loyal position, and maintaining towards the queen, her government, and the qui en-mother most respectful behaviour, no one can be astonished at. The Infant Don Enrique had not taken a method so fitting for arriving at his object. The kin; himself, when that prince paced through Paris, gave him the advice of a father, reminding hem where was his position, his duty, his chances of success, offering his services at Madrid with is view to recovering them for him. The infant did not /Wow the advice of the king. No influence was sufficient to surmount the inconvenienees of the situriun in which this young prince was placed. list in truth, there is not any thing in the course of affairs which it is easy to foresee. There was no need of particular instructions ti Count Bres nan, inasmuch as the candidateshirof Iton Francois d'Assise prevailed at Madrid over that of Don Enrique. And to to the reproach of having exclusively forwarded the views of ooe of the infante, anti of having wished to force one of the two upon the choice of the Queen Isabella, to whom can it he legitimately addressed? Have not we on our side in this circumstance ohs, reed the respect due to the dignity of the queen, to the liberty of her MINI choice, and to the decorum which ought to preside? The Infant lion Enrique has had the misfortune to full under the influence of the meat pas 4ontec and blind division of the Spanish progreuista-party. This party wished to make use of the name, the aituatioe, the matrimonial chance s of this prince for s own re-esta blishment in power. It had resolved on and prepared, for the attainment of its object, intrigues of every kind, which were to rekindle in Spain i nsu rrection and civil war. The omens of the party have ele trly manifested its designs. What can be more natural than that such deeds should have produced the resolution which the Spanish government took to put a speedy end to that question of the marriage of the queen on which all parties were founding their 'peculation' and their hopes? Other reasons, no less legitimate, have con tributed also to this result From the origin of the question, the king, 11. Lord Palmerston mentions in his despatch, has made known of his own accord, that he did not pretend for either of t. is sons to the hand oftheQueen of Spain. He expressed I at the same time a firm hope that the crown of Spain would never go out of the house of Bourbon, and that the queen would choose her husband from among the deseendauts of Philip V. The government of the king has declared openly and on every flee /i10:1 that such wan its line of policy. It wished that the motives which should in ease of need direct 1 its actions should be well known beforehand to the whole of Europe and especially to Spain and England, its allies. Nothing in that language brought the least infraction on the independence of Spain, her qumn and government. We deeply respect that independence. In instructing the court of Madrid from the first moment with our every thought, we gave it, on the contrary, a mark of the high price we attach to its own, as well as of our loyal friendship. The cabinet at London, at this epoch, was struck by the motives which presided over our behaviour, and gave us to understand that it would be actuated by the same motives in its counsel to the court of Madrid. Although the combinations pees , nteel for the marriage of the Queen Isabella did not at all place in danger our well known policy. wo occupied ourselves in nothing else than in seconding such of these combinations u seemed to have a chance of success. From the time that we saw seriously combinations which made us fear that the husband of the queen would not he chosen from among the descendants of Philip V., and that the throne of Spain would go out of the house of Bourbon, we gave them to underw and, both at London and Madrid, the 27th of last February, that, if these combinations should take consistency, we should consider ourselves free front every engagement, and at liberty to de mand the hand either of the queen or the infanta for the Duke de klontpensier. We wished at that time, as at the opening of the question, to say openly and beforehand, how we should act. In the month of May last, we were informed with certain'y that the Spanish government was going to address to the reigning Duke of Saxe Coburg, then on a visit to the court at Lisbon, a meuage to the effect that he should negotiate • merriest* between Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg and Queen Isabella. We learnt at the same time, and with the same certainty, that this message bad been previously com municated to the English minister at Madrid, Mr. Buiwer, and had received his approbation. The government of the king made known immediately, both at London and Ma drid, its surprise and uneasiness. It received from Lord Aberdeen assurances which proved its entire loyalty. But a short time afterwards Lord Aberdeen quitted office, and our information dams net permit us to doubt that the labour un dertaken for the marriage of Queen Isabella with Prince Leopold of Coburg was actively pursued. It was in the midst of this eituafion, and the anxiety which it gave us, that I received by you, Count, a despatch of the 19th of July, addressed by Lord Palmer ston to Mr. Bulwer, and which you were charged to commu nicate to me confidentially. Ido not think, to reply to a re proach indicated by Lord Palmerston, that the confidential character of that communication could or ought to hinder me from giving a knowledge of it, confidentially, also, to the ambassador of the king at Madrid. to whom that knowledge was indi s pensable for his thoroughly understanding the new situation in which this despatch placed us ; and who, be side", did not mare, as he should have done, any public or official use of it. " The candidates for the hand of the Queen of Spain," say these instructions, addressed 19th July, by Lord Palmerston to Mr. Buiwer, " are reduced to three ; namely, Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg and the two sons of Don Fmneoin de Paula. I omit the Count de Tra pani and the Count de Montemolin, as they seem to have no chance of the choice felling upon either of them." According to the despatch of the 224 September, which was communicated to me, Lord Palmerston, in piecing thus Prince Leopold of Sate Coburg at the head of the three candidates, or alone remaining according to him for the hand of the queen, has only, he says " pointed nut the prince so one of these who had been spoken of in public as a possible hue nand for the Queen of Sp tin, without that implying that he was placed in advance and recommended by the British government." But in the despatch of the 19th July, imme diately after the paraeraph w'ilich I have cited above, occurs the followine paraerreph " Between the three candidates below mentioned (Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg and the two sons of Don Frangois de Paula) her Majesty's govern ment has only to express its sincere desire that her choice shall fall upon that one who can best assure the happiness of the queen, and develop the prosperity of the Spanish nation." Certainly, if one can say that the first of the paragraphs quoted mentions simply &fart, the candidate ship of Prince Leopold of Coburg, a fact which had not at all up to that time been officially announced and proclaimed, nue could not deny that by the second paragraph this candi datethip is accepted in the same manner and to the same de cree as that of the infant", eons of Don Frangois de Paula, that any objection can be raised against the one more than against the others, and that thus, for the first time, all the three are mingled together in the same proper appro bation. It may be permuted, perhaps, to say that there was there a Wu re.commendation, a manner of attaining indirectly the end which one did not wish to follow up openly. "Good faith," says Lord Palmerston, in his despatch of the 22nd of September. " requires that one should not reek to seize back again on the one side that which hen been abandoned on the other." The government of the King adheres fully te this principle. In admitting that Lord Palmerston bed no intention of placing Prince Leopold of Coburg in advance, or of recommending him, he will recognise car tend tainly himself that he said absolut nohing whic srh could to reject , him, or to discourage ely the t Spanish overn mint. What would have happened if the court of Madrid, treating to the language which, after the despatch of the 19th July, Mr. Buiwer would certainly not have failed to hold, had persisted in the offer which it had meted to be inside to the prince ? One would have said that it was free choice, the will of the Queen of Spain and of her govern ment, one would have hem able to call to mind, in the terms of the despatch of the 19th July, that the English government, who did not seek this choice, had nevertheless announced beforehand, that it had no objection to do so ; and without direct support, without active co-operation, by a s o irt w e d act of permission the deed would have been amens- I . The government of the King could not be mistaken yen that situation. To prevent the comeanences of it, it leek the most direct end legitimate means at Madrid : it appealed to the free choice, to the independent will of Queen Isabella and her government. At the side of • com bination which pursued itself evidently against its policy, it placed, it offered a different combination. It could do so, for it had openly and positively reserved to itself the right. It =for the hypothesis for which it had made that reserve, filch it had foreseen in its instructions at Madrid en well as its its declarations at London, became more and more probable. The Queen of Spain and her nimmt ats eeptedthat com bination. The Cettessravebsgenneed mese approval . The double marriage of the Queen limbeillaerillt dm Duke de Cadiz, and that of the Infante Donna Bair Ternanda with the Duke de Montpeturier, was preprandial concluded with the most entire liberty, and by the meat me gent motives. I fulfil, also, Count, an imperious duty in rejecting energetically, and still more energetically in my soul than in my words, that strange accusation of moral ate ercion exercised, says Lord Palmerston in his despatch, by the ambassador of the king at Madrid, in compliance with his instructions to force the Queen of Spain to accept the Duke of Cadiz for a husband. I could limit myself to a very short and very simple answer, and one that the entire world would receive. Nowhere, in any court, in any family, !WC the rights of the liberty of marriage and domestic life better known, and more scrupulously respected, than at the court of the Tuileries, and in the bosom of our royal family. The sentiments which animate and govern the king at Pans in the midst of his children, animate and govern him equally in his connexion with the court of Madrid and his royal nieces. And the government of the king makes a point of assuring everywhere and on all occasions, for the ties of do mestic life, the same respect of which it receives so high an I example. Bat I will recall a fact. How can one direct against us the reproach of moral coercion when a month ago they demanded of us to forward, exclusively, with the Queen Ip ear in e c e l 1 a e , ,i a d n e d nta.4 as t u h n e only tum fi ; e w e h t no c andmi her in ihnu intimacnd, a y with with the meet spirited adversaries of her government. In perfect liberty has Queen Isabella chosen the Duke de Cadiz for her husband. It was in full freedom, and after a discussion as free as solemn, that the Corter unanimously voted their adhesion to the choice of the queen. And the public tranquillity ham been as complete during this great deliberation as the liberty in the interior of the palace of the king and in the assemblies of the country. Neither commotion nor occasions for troubles were wanes at that moment in Spain. All pretensions, all ambitions, al conspiracies put themselves in motion to arouse now insur reciaon and civil was. Isolated. or combined, they have not been able to summed up to this time to commence their de- signs. What most clear peoofs of the sentiments of the great majority of the Spaiii-h people, and of its free adhe sion to the choice of the queen and the vote of its repre sentatives! " The government of her Britannic blajesty," says Lord Palmerston, in his despatch of the 22nd Septem ber, " felicitates itaelf in having taken no part in the amangementof this marriage." The government of the king MS for Spain, for her allies, for Europe, on the contrary, only reasons to be glad of it. The Duke of Cadiz ia at the *arm time • prince descended from Philip V. and a Spanish prince in birth and arntiments . He has always showed himself full of respect for constitutional rule, and for the principles of monarchy. Spain and Europe, the liberties of the peninsula, and the interests of the European order, fled, inn union with Queen Isabella, all the guaran tees a foreseeing policy can desire. In spite of the disappro bation clearly expressed at the marriage of Queen Isabella with the Duke of Cadiz, it is principally the marriage of the Dime do Montpensier with the Infanta, which, according to the despatch of the 22d September, bas rendered necessary to the eyes of the English government the communication which it has made to us, and has determined it to ad dress to us its representations and protestations. The go vernment of the king makes it always a duty to collect and discuss, in a spirit of sincere equity, the representations that another government, and to: • stronger reason, a friendly government, thinks it right to address in the name of its tomtits end policy. But protestations should be founded in rights. Due ought not to protest against an action front the simple motive that it is nut agreeable. Every protestation ought to attach itself to an anterior right. Alm the English government brings forward, as the foun dation of its protest, the treaty of Utrecht, and the rules which it instituted for the succession to the crown of Spain, In the interests of the country and the equilibrium of Europe. The government of the King thinks that the treaty of Utresht authorises in no manner such a preten sion. After the long and bloody war for the succession, and to re-catabl‘h the peace of Europe, the double end thoroughly recognised and proclaimed in this treaty was:- Ist. To assure the crown of Spain to Philip V. and his descendants. 2nd. To prevent the union of the crowns of France and Spain upon the same head was always possible. It suffices to call to mind the negotiations which brought on the treaty of Utrecht, and to read the same text (article 6) to rest convinced that such are really its sentiments and sense. By the marriage of the Infanta with the Duks de Montpensier, the crown of Spain is sure not to quit the family of the Bourbons and the descendants of Philip V., and, at the same time, the hindrances established against all possible union of the two orowns of France and Spain remain in full force. The double intention of the treaty of Utrecht is thus always accomplished. It would be strange that one should pretend to invoke against us those dispositions of the treaty which tend to hinder the union of the two crowns ; and that one should remove those which assure the crown of Spain to Philip V. and his descendants. Such, however, would be the result of the interpretation of the treaty which Lord Palmerston would give in hie despatch tf September V. Never was ouch an interpretation to this day--I will not say admitted, but only conceived and presented. The facts reject it as strongly as the text. Never has the treaty of Utrecht been considered or invoked so making an obstacle to marry between different branches of the house of the Bourbons of France and of the house of the Bourbons of Spain. Elamites of these marriages abound. I will only cite at this moment three, most near that very time when the treaty of Utrecht was concluded. 1. Louis 1., King of Spain, eldest son of Philip V., married, on 20th January, 1721, Louisa Elizabeth d'Orleans. Mademoiselle e.e Mont pensier, fourth daughter of the reigning Duke of Orleans. 2. The Infant Don Philippe, Duke de Parme, son of Philip V., married, 25th August, 1739, Louisa Elizabeth of France, eldest daughter of Louis XV. 3rd. The Dauphin, son of Louis X V., married, Feb. 23,1745, Maria Theresa Antoinette, Infanta of Spain, daughter of Philip V. The last example is very remarkable, for it was the immediate heir to the French crown who married one o the heirs of the crown of Spain. And they cannot say that the law proclaimed in 1713 by Philip V., to change in Spain the order of succession to the throne, would have deprived the Infanta, Maria Thereat Antoinette, of her eventual rights, for this law is only a half-salic law, which does not admit, it is true, the succession of women, except after the fsilure of male heirs, but which admits plainly in this case. The I nfantas,then, in the marriages 1 have cited,and Ps all other analogous marriages, bear an eventual right, but a positive one, to the crown of Spain. Nobody in Europe thought of making an objection against these in-:Triages, or of demand. ing that new stipulations should be added to the treaty of Utrecht, to guard against the consequences of them. There is not now, ti propos of the marriage of the Infanta Donna Luisa Fernanda with the Duke de Montpensier, absolutely any reason to think or act otherwise, and the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht may suffice, for the future, for the in terests of the people and the just balance of Europe, as they have been sufficient up to the present time. One cannot, then, rightly found upon that treaty neither on the text or the consequences, or its interpretation, according to facts, any legitimate protest. In support of these representations, Lord Pim:eaten does not confine himself to invoking the treaty of Utrecht. The marriage of the Duke de Montpensier with the Infanta tends, according to him, to bind, for the foreign affairs of both nations, the policy of Spain to that of France in a manner dangerous to the independence of Spain, for the equilibrium of Europe, and for the interests of other states. Spain has proved that it knew how to preserve its independence, and to play its part in the cause of European equilibrium. There is, perhaps, some want of memory and of justice to say to her that she knows not how to do it this day. She will do it much better now that she has in her posses sion a free and constitutional government; a government little favorable to the spirit of aggression and conquest, but very favorable to maintain the independence of nations even to the annulling foreign influences. The government of the king nn its mat has proved that nothing was further from its thoughts than to wish to infringe on the independence of Spain, and to meddle in Me affairs. The facts which have manifested on this point our firm resolution, are recent and brilliant; and there ts perhaps some want of memory and justice to render no account of it. But at the same time, and we hesitate not to declare it, the government of the king desires and seeks a true and soli:1 friendship between France and Spain. The geographical position of the two countries, their traditions, their manners, religion, all their essential interests, moral and material, render this friendship natural and necessary : necessarily, by no means in • political sense of aggression and extension, either of the ore or the two states at the expense of another; either of the two together against other states, but in a policy of safety and peace to the advantage of both and of the whole of Europe. The marriage of the Duke of Montpensier with the Infante, placed by the side of the marriage of Queen Isabella with the Duke of Cadiz, is at once a testimony of the' disposition of the two countries to strengthen the ties of that friendship, and is a guarantee for its duration. It will alter neither the independence of Spain and her government, nor the mist and just condi dons of the equilibrium of Europe; but it will contribute to guarantee between France and Spain those good and inti mate relationships which will work for the good of both na tions, and for the repose of Europe. It appears to us that everywhere a policy elevated and enlightened ought to greet us with this result. The government of the king does not find any grave and legitimate foundation in the represents. dons addressed to it by the British government. It cannot admit them, nor take them as a rule of conduct. But called upon necessarily to decide and to act, we have done. with the free concurrence of the Spanish government, that which was conformable to our rights, our legitimate intermits, to the natural and peaceable policy of our country ; we have done nothing which brings a stain upon our rights, le gitimate interests, or the peace", of the other states. We are convinced that France thinks on this subject as the go vernment. Everything attests that the great majority •f the Spaniel people entertain like sentiments. We trust that the sound judgment and the spirit of equity in the British government and nation, will bring them to see that the powerful end generous motives which have been so happily estalsliahed between Frence, England, tnd Spain, the good intelligence and friendship, will raise them above this parti cular disagreement, and ought to receive no alteration. I invite you to send a copy of this despatch to Lord Palmer ston, after having read it to him—Receive, &e. LORD PALMEILSToN TO To MARQUis Or NORMANDY. (Text.) FOREIGN OFFICE, OCT. 31st, 1846. —My Lord,—Her Majesty's government would willingly have allowed the communications between the twO nowernmenta on the Spanish marriages, to close with M. Oudot'e despatch of the 6th inst., a copy of which was transmitted to me by Count Jarnaconthe Bth, if it were not that there tiresome statements and some arguments in that despatch, which it is impossible for her Majesty's government to leave entirely without a reply. M. Guizot's despatch, like that from me to your ex cellency, to which it wit an answer, treats of two subjects, the of the Queen of Spain. and the marriage of the infanta With regard to the first ,I have little to say, except so far as I may have to touch upon it in treating of the second, and except to express the sincere and earnest wish of her Majesty's government that it may con duce to the happiness of the queen, and to the welfare of the Spanish nation. Her Msjesty's government, indeed, in gnawer to repeated applications from the gov, rnment of again on the subject of the queen's marriage, had instructed bass Majesty's minister at Madrid to recommend a different arrangement, and bad invited the French government to nin that recommendation. But the recommendation of bar Majesty's government was not given to the government rt ti in the spirit of dictation, as M. Guizot's despatch telmE emea to imply ; nor didher Majesty'sgovernment either mk oe meet that the government of France should exclu sively recommend the candidate whom her Majesty's govern went thought the best. We knew perfectly well, that if that candidate were not accepted by the Spanish court, the French government would recommend another; and I dis tinctly stated to Count Jarnac, in answer to a question which be put to me, that her Majesty's government, having given Its opinion, would, in the event of that opinion not prevail /If , take no part either for or against the other, a candidate whom the French government would afterwards propose. Entwhat I adverted to in awhile, to this matter in my former spat& is this that at e e latter end of Count Jarnac was holding out to me, V. Quint to your excellency, the expectation that Count Breeson would be instructed to co-operate with Mr. Bulwer in recommending the candidate whom the British government wished to point out, provided that, in the event of that candidate being rejected, Mr. Bulger would be instructed not to oppose Count Brenson in recom mending the other ; Count Breseon was at that very time already deciding the matter at Madrid against that firstcandi date, in pursuance of instructions previously sent tohira from Paris; and her Majesty's government think that the French government might as well have made those instructions known to them, instead of continuing to discuss the condition of • joint action which those instructions had put entirely out of the question. And, in regard to these matters with respect to which the French government professed, at the time, a desire for a full mutual understanding, and now seams to imply that a similar rlioposition was net equally felt by her ,nti,leety's government, it is to be Owned that her :ilajesty's government twice communicated to the French government the inatruetious which had bees sent to Mr. Butane ; the first time in eztenso, and the second time in substance ; whereas nosimilar communication was ever made to her Majesty's government of the instruc tions sent to Count Benson. But not only was the confidence thus shown by her Majesty's government tower is the govern ment of France not reciprocated, but it wee turned to pun ;ewes at verimice with the spirit in which it was made ; and though M. Guizot declares that my iustructions of the 19th July to Mr. Bulwer, of which a copy was com municated in confidence to M. Genet, and was sent immediately by him to M. Bresson, was not used by M. Bresson in any public or offi cial manner ; yet he does not deny that it was used by Count Benson in a manner unauthorised by her Majesty's government, to whom, and to whom alone, it belonged to determine what use abonlel he made at Madrid of its own instruction to her Majesty's minister at that court. M. Guizot reverts to the earlier period* of these transac tions, and admits that from the outset the King of the French spontaneously made, known that he did not pretend to obtain the hand of the Queen of Spain for any of his sons, and that he wished the Queen of Spain to choose her consort from among the descendants of Philip V., a category which, as the French government pointed out at the time, epecifically exelieled all the members of the royal family of Francs.' . Bot surely . these declarations had reference to a principle, and net simply to a person. The objection, of which Lis Majesty the King of the French by such declarations ad mitted the validity, was not that one of his sons should be the husband of Isabella of Bourbon, but that one of Lie sons should be the husband of the Queen of Spain; and the principle of that objection is, therefore, not confined in its application to the marriage of one of his sone with the reigning envereign, but 'vides*/ applies else to marriage with the immediate helms le die crown. And is this the doctrine of her Majesty's rem ment alone ? And is it only now for the first time adnneed ? Far otherwise. It is a doctrine admitted virtually by his Majesty the King of the French himself, and at an antece dent period. For M. Guizot alludes in his despatch to cer tain engagements from which the French government intf mated, on the 27th February, 1846, that they should. in • specified contingency, consider themselves freed and released. And what were those engagements They were, first, the engagement originally sud spontaneously made by hie Ma jesty the King of the French, that no son of his should marry the Queen of Spain ; and secondly, the engagement also spontaneously taken by hie Majesty, and by his minister, in September, 1845, at Eu, that in no cow should the Duke of Mentpensier marry the infants, until the Queen of Spain shoad bane married, and until, by her having had children, the prospect of • direct succession to the Spanish crown should have been assured. Does not the second of these engagements prove that the first was understood by those who made it exactly in the sense which I have given to it, and that the objection of which the King of the French ac knowledged the force and justice, was not that one of his sons should marry a particular princess of the house of Bourbon, hut that any of hie sons should be the consort of the Queen of Spain ? And his Majesty's feeling and admitting the force of that objection proposed of his own accord that the marriage which he wished to take place between his son end the infanta should be postponed until the birth of children to the queen, should in some degree have divested that marriage of the appearance of an attempt to take the chance of obtaining by indirect means, in one way, that which hue been relinquished, directly, in another. This last-mentioned engagement at Eu was obviously not suffi cient to remove the objection of the British government to the proposed marriage of the Duke of Montpensier to the infants. But that engagement, such as it was, ought to have been kept ; time would have been allowed to the two governments to disease with deliberation the various ques tions connected with the matter; and they might have endeavoured to have arrived at some amicable arrangement of their mutual views and interests with regard to it. But the object of the French government on this occasion seems to have been so to precipitate the matter as to render all an raneement and mutual nnderstandine imnoesible. This engagement, spontaneously made by the French eovernment, has been broken; and upon what plea? M. Genet, in his despatch, assigns two grounds of excuse for its viola tion. The one a circumstance which happened during the administration of her Majesty's late government; the other, some circumstances which are said to have happened since her Majesty's present government came into office. M. Genet alludes to a communication which wee made to her Majesty's late gevernuient on the 27th February of the present year; the purport of which was that the King of the French would hold himself free (ram the engagements he had taken as to the marriage of the queen and of the infanta, and would deem himself at liberty to ask the hand either of the one or of the other for the Duke of Mootpcnsier, in a certain contingency. That contingency M. Genet states in his despatch to have been defined to be, " if any combinations should acquire consistency which should make the French government fear that the consort of the Queen of Spain would be taken not from among the descendents of Philip V." This communication of the 27th February, 1846, upon which so much stress is laid, as affording a justification of the course which the French government has taken, was verbal and unofficial. There is no record of it in the Foreign-office. There is nothing to show that it was ever acquiesced in by her Majesty's late government, and the pretensions put forward and the intentions an nounced in it are at variance with the principles laid down, and with the opinions declared by her Mnii sty's late as well as by her Majesty's present administration. I never heard of this memorandum till lately. It was never even men tinned to me by Count Jarnite until otter the event had happened for which it is now quoted as a justification. It is said to have been a timely warning, the neglect of which justi fies the double knowledge; and its existence was made known to me for the first time by Count Jarnac, after the news of the double marriage had been received. About the middle of September Count Jarnac showed me an unsigned memorandum, which he said was the record of the commu nication in question. But, although I remember that the passage quoted by M. Guizot was in that memorandum, yet the specific contingency stated therein as the one which would re lease the French government from its engagements was the case M there being at any time animminent danger of a marriage either of the Queen of Spain or of the infanta with Priin Leopold of Saxe Coburg, or with any other foreign prince, not being a Bourbon and not being a descendant of Philip V. of Spain ;" and it will in such a case that the memoran dum declared that 11. M. the King of the French 'would con sider himself free to ask for the Duke of liloutpensier the hand either of the queen or of the infanta. It is to be remarked that the memorandum 'thus places both the marriage of the queen and that of the heiren presumptive to the throne in the same political category ; but if there was between those two marriages, in the opinion of the French government, this identity of political charac ter, why did that government, while it felt the propriety of endeavouring to come to an understanding with her Ma jesty's government about the one marriage, consider itself free to make a secret and surreptitious re ttlement of the other. The memorandum further assumes that each of the two princesses ought to marry a descendant of Philip V.; and that, come quently,neither of them should marry the Duke of Moetpensier, except in the case of imminent danger of one or the other of them being married out of the house of Bourbon. What, then, were the circumstances which arc mentioned as having made such an event imminent? The first circumstance hap reed, as I have observed, during the time of the Late pavement. M. Guizot says that, "in May of the present year, the French government was informed with certainty, that the Spanish government had addreased to the reigning Duke of Sazo Coburg, then on a visit to the court of Lisbon, a message for the purpose of neontiating the marriage of Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg with the Queen Isabella, and that the French government had learned at the same time, and with the same certainty, that this message had been previously communicated to Mr. Bulwer, the British minister at Madrid, and bad received his approval ; that the French government immediately ex pressed, both at London and at Madrid, its surprise and uneasiness; and that it received from Lord Aberdeen assurances which demonstrated his entire good faith." Now what is the impression which this statement is calcu lated to produce as to the course of the transaction to which it relates ? Why, evidently that the French government having, from its own sources of information, obtained a knowledge that a letter had been written by the Spanish court to the Duke of Saxe Coburg, and that it bad been seen by Mr. Bulwer before it was sent off, expressed to Lord Aberdeen its surprise and uneasiness, and received from Lord Aberdeen in reply satisfactory assurances. But the real transaction was exactly the reverse of this, as re gard.' the communication between the two governments. The first knowledge which the French government received of the letter having been written by Queen Christina, was from Lord Aberdeen himself. The first knowledge which thee had that this letter had been seen by Mr. Bulwer, was equally given to them by Lord Aberdeen. The surprise which they expressed, was surprise at whatthey learned from Lord Aberdeen ; and the first expression of that surprise is said to have been accompanied, noted much by uneasiuessaby alleged incredulity. The French government seemed unwilling to believe that much a letter could have been written, and that they should have received the first intimation of it from any other person than their own minister at Madrid. N. Guizot says that Lord Aberdeen, in reply to the communica tion of the French government, gave assurances which de monetrated his good faith. M. Guizot oueht rather to haie said that Lord Aberdeen demonstrated his good faith by spontaneously communicating to Comte St. Aulaire a fact, of which the French government represented themselves as uninformed. Lord Aberdeen thought himself bound tomake known to the French government that such a letter had been written, because he found that the letter had been shown to the British minister at Madrid, before it was sent off; and an Lord Aberdeen had said to the French government that her Majesty's government meant to take no active part In favour of the Prince of Coburg, he thought it right to inform them of what had passed, lest the bare knowledge which her Msjesty's minister at Madrid had acquired of this step, might expose her Majesty's government to the suspicion of having changed their policy, in this respect, secretly, sad without previously informing the French government that they intended to do so. It must be confessed that, as regards Lord Aberdeen, it may be said of the statement made of this transaction in M. Guizot's despatch, that " then is in it, perhaps, some want of memory or of justice." At all event., this entinp'e of scrupulous good faith on the part of Lord Aberdeen, cannot be (meted as constituting a reason why the French government should be released from the engagements which it had spontaneously taken towards the government of Great Britain. The second circumstance upon which M. Gullet's despatch founds the defence of the F re nch government in this matter, took place, as I have said, since her Majesty's present administratem came into office. M. Guizot says that soon after the above-mentioned rnmmunicetion between Lord Abe nleen sod the French government had taken place, Lord Aberdeen retired from office: and the information received by the French govern ment no longer permitted hint to doubt that the efforts which had been undertaken for the marriage of the Queen of Spain with Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg we re actively pursued, no doubt that information was correct; and it was not difficult for the French government to acquire it. Those efforts were actively pursued; but where. and to overcome what ohstarles ? Why, if her Majesty's government have notheen much misin formed, those efforts were making, especially at Part., by the Minquis of Miraflores. who had been sent lay the Spenish ooust on a particular mission to the King of the French, to endeavour to prevail upon his Majesty to withdraw the op pea tion which he hod made to a match which was stated by the marquis to be anxiously desired by the court of Madrid. But that mission, at least, the vary foundation of which scan the assumption that the Coburg marriage could not take place without the assent of the King of the French, afforded no ex ewe for a departure from the above-mentioned engagement. " But then," M. Guizot says, " in the midst of this state of thinr, and is the anxiety with which it inspired the French government," he received from. Count Jarnac my despatch of the 19. h of July to Mr. Bulwer. This despatch, he sag, enumerated for the first time Prince Leopold an one of the three remaining candidates for the queen's hand ; and that prince's name was the first mentioned in the enumeration. No preference, indeed, as M. Guizot admit', was expressed in that despatch in favour of Prince Leopold ; but, on the other band, it wan said that no objection was urged naninst him: and the passage in that despatch which stated that " Her Majesty's government have only to express thi it sincere wish that the choice may fall upon the candidate who may be most likely to secure the happiness of the queen, and to insure the welfare of the Spanish nation," wee, in the opinion of the French government, such a plain. though indirect recommendation of the prince of Coburg, that this despatch with calculated by a mere act of Zainer oiler to bring about that marriage with. out any direct support or active co-operation of the British government. And it is argued that this despatch justified the French government in taking its own measures in regard to the two marriages. Now, in the first place, it is to be observed that if the knowledge of the despatch of the 19th of July, by the Spanish court, was calculated to render the Coburg marriage probable, that knowledge was afforded to them by Couot Bresson, who shoved them the despatch, and not by Mr. Bulwer, who was told in it that her Majesty's government did not instruct hint to take any steps thereupon. In as far, therefore, as a knowledge by the Spanish court of the sentiment" expressed in that despatch constituted, in the opinion of the French govern ment, a danger, that danger was created by their own agent, and cannot be pleaded in their own defen ce. With respect to the assertion that Prince Leopold had never before been officially mentioned as one of the candidates for the queen's I hand, and that his being so mentioned in thin despatch gave him some advantage which hedid not pewee before, I would only observe that, considering that almostevery newspaper in E f t ao h u cu a a ro n t nd t P l id e d l o m a ten d e ,t m l h o b o e n r u an g r ago d wu u mo m np a l l ti re o iko f e a n :t v. h y ot e go ot n o 2 l h e ivh n t o ti eh r o ac iF ea ho., e , br l ts'. , e" lBl6 d , eri w n o g s nwasorikenioco"nstioderibi ing also that the known wishes of the Spanish court in regard to hint had later in the spring of this year been the sulejectot an official and threatening intimation given from M. Bream to the Spanish government, deemed it necessary to make as official communication to the government of England, which communication Lord Aberdeen made, on the 25th of Jan'. an official reply; and considering, moreover, that at the very moment when my despatch of July was written there was a Spanish envoy at Paris, sent expressly to negotiate with the French government about the marriage of Prince Leopold to the Queen of Spain ; it is not easy to see how the mere mention of the name of that prince, in a despatch not intended to be mode public, and meant only for the personal information of her Majesty's minister at Madrid, could in any way alter the position of Prince Leopold with reference to the marriage question. But its said that the dispatch of the 19th of July expressed no objection to Prince Leopold. Undoubtedly it did not. Her Majesty's present government, in this matter ad. hered strictly to the judicious course pursued by their pre decessors. They have been of opinion that no foreign government bad any right to object to any prince as • candidate for the hand of the Queen of Spain, unless for those political reasons connected with the maintenance of the balance of power which were stated in my despatch of the 19th of July to Mr. Bulwer; and those reasons did not apply t' Prince Leopold of Coburg. Neither the lath government. nor the present, new any ground for objecting to Prince Leopold at a candidate for the hand of the Queen of Spain. But that despatch distinctly stated that her Majesty's present govern ment were not prepared to give any active support to any of the candidates therein mentioned. Moreover, it referred Mr. Bulwer to the instructions which he had received on the marriage question from my predecessor in office; and among those instructions was the communication to him of a copy of the note addressed nn the 25th of June, 1846, by Lord Aberdeen to the Duke of Sotomayor, in which Lord Aberdeen stated that " when an alliance of the Queen of Spain with Count Trapani had manifestly become odious to the Spanish nation, the British government had ventured, although without any English candidate or English preference, to point out the Infant 1)on Enrique as the prince who appeared to them to be the most eligible, because the met likely le peeve accept able to the people of Spain." And yet the French govern ment endeavour to represent that a despatch which contained the passage first above quoted, and which referred Mr. Bul l/CT to thighs/it-mentioned exposition of the sentiments of the late British government, as having been adopted by the pre sent government, was to be cor.oidered as an indirect en couragement of an alliance of the Queen of Spain with Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg. M. Guinn ad mits that good faith requires that what is not attempted directly, should not be aimed at indi rectly; and her Majesty's government cannot refrain front expressing some surprise at the groundless insinuation con tained in the passage on which i have been remarking. see ing that M. Guizot, in the paragraph immediately following, directly admits that her Majesty's government had no inten tion to put forward or to recommend Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg. 'That admission is an acknowledgment of the exact truth. The British government has at no time put forward or recommended that prince as a candidate for the hand of the Queen of Spain, and has at no time taken any steps to promote his alliance with that sovereign. If that prince. being the object of the choice of the court of Madrid, had also been wished for by the great majority of the people of Spain, and if his union with the queen would have crested for Spain no emberrassments in her foreign relations, the British Government would cheerfully have taken any steps which it might have been competent to take, in order to facilitate such an arrangement. But being led to dnubt, by what bad passed in regard to Count Tearani, whether any foreign prince would be acceptable to the Spanish natien, and geeing that the objections expressed by the King of the French to Prince Leopold, however un reasonable, unjust, and, in public law, untenable they might ' he, might, nevertheless, in the event of that prince becoming the cousin of the queen, injuriously affect the relations of Spain with France, the British government, front the mo ment when the Trapani match was abandoned, steadfastly and constantly maintained the opinion that it was desirable for the interests of Spain that the queen's choice should fall upon a Spanish prince. It is true that when her Majesty's present ministers came into office great efforts were mails by the Spanish court to obtain from them some tepees , eion of opinion in favour of Prince Leopold ; and not only were those efforts made at Madrid, but the Duke of Sotomayor came aver from France, where he was residing on leave of absence, to urge, personally, the same request. The British government dealt with these applications as con sidering them made in good earnest, and as understanding them to express the real wishes of the Spanish court, and as ' sash with no object in view than that which was professed. My despatch of the 22nd August to Mr. Bulwer conveyed as tamer to the Spanish court ; and on the 15th August, I gave an answer to the Duke of Sotomayor, by stating to him that which I bad before more than once said to Court Jarnac, namely, that the British government had no candi date of its own ; that, considering all the difficulties con nected with the selection of Prince Leopold, that selectiim did not seem to us to be the hest; that it would he most desirable, on the whole, that a Spanish prince should become the consort of the queen; and that amongst Spanish princes Don Enrique seemed to us to be the fittest. These answers, no doubt disappointed the expectations with which those overtures bad been pressed upon her Ma jesty's government; but what was there in all this, which could justify the French government in departing from its voluntary engagement at Eu ? Even admitting for the sake of argument that her Majesty's present government were to be held bound by the memorandum of the 27th February, which the French government had never either mentioned Cr communicated to them. But M. Guizot's despatch goes on to say that " the French government was unable to deceive itself as to the state of things, and saw that there was on the part of the Spanish court se strong a desire for the Coburg alliance that if the B • h government 'liquid make no active op position to it, and should remain only passive in the matter, that marriage would certainly be concluded ; and that consequently the French government resorted at Madrid to the most direct and legitimate means, and appealed to the free choice and independent will or the queen and of her government, to Ming about a different arrangement "By the aide of a combination, which was being pursued evidently in opposition to the policy of the French government, that governmens, says M. Guizot, offered a different thimbina lion ; and this latter one was accepted by the queen and her government." The contradictions between the opposite statements contained in these passages are too obvious to re quire to be pointed out. If the Spanish court had so strong a desire for the Coburg marriage that nothing but the active and decided opposition of the British government could have prevented that marriage, how did it happen that in the absence, as M. Guizot alleges, of any such opposition, the mere and simple offer of a different arrangement by the French government sufficed to procure the immediate whip tion of that different arrangement ? And if, as M. Guizot states, the Spanish court acted in this matter with the most entire freedom, what was the reason of so sudden a transition from what is represented to hove been an almost uncontrollable determination for one arrangement, to a spontaneous and equally decided adoption of another one ? M. Guint says that this result was brought about by the most urgent motives. What' those motives were he does not explain. May it be inferred that one at least among those urgent motives was furnished by the urgency with which Count Bresson pressed the arrangement which he thus proposed to the Spanish court i And might ant another of these urgent motives have been afforded by the conviction then already obtained by the Spanish court, that the British government did not recom mend the Prince of Coburg, but thought that under all the circumstances of the case, a Spanish prince would be the fittest consort for the queen. If that conviction was felt at Madrid, and her Majesty's government have good ground for asserting that it was there felt, what becomes of the excuse put forward for the precipitate and secret settlement of the marriage of the Duke de Montpensier to the infanta, upon the plea that the engagements of Eu had been rendered void by the happening of the case of imminent danger Ted- go;errtntent to uphold them declared at the same time I objection to either of these them who seemed fitting to Si be received by us. That wh, equally to Madrid. Count Br struetions to support the two in / ithat we shall adhere fully to should make between them ' king has faithfully carried out happen, when more than a m measures in favour of the son Lord Palmerston at last forwl not adhere at all to the or made. He demanded of u exclusively at Madrid tl the only fit person . , said et lkagost, which Lord I -.Nob • , s EXPRESS, FRIDAY EVENING, JANUARY 15, 1847, tied in the uueommuniuted and, at leant by her Majesty's present goverament, unacquieweil in, memorandum ofthe 27th of k'ebruary, 1846. The imminent danger specified in that memorandum was the likelihood that either the queen or the infanta should be about immediately to maraca foreign prince, not being a descendant of Philip V. But if that like lihood had ever existed, it had at all events ceased to exist when M. Bressun demanded the hand of the infanta for the Duke of Montpensier. Not only had it then ceased to exist, but with respect to the queen, whose marriage was at that time the immediate and only subj., et of diieeinion, it had been succeeded by an impossibility. because, when Count Bresson demanded the band of the infanta for the Duke of Montpclisier, the marriage of the queen to the Infante Dun Francisco had actualiy been resolved upon and settled. Therefore the memorandum of February the 27th, 1846, cannot afford the slightest ground on which to build a justification for breaking the engagement of Eu. M. Guizot denies that the treaty and the renunciation. of Utrecht afford to the British government any ground of right fur protesting against the marriage of the Duko of Mont pensier, and against its possible a:mug:teems. Now the British government have protested against that marriage u at variance with the spirit of thu treaty of Utrecht, and against ecrtain contingent consequences of that marriage, as a violation of the letter of that treaty ; and her Majesty's goventment are of opinion thnt their protest recta upon good and sufficient grounds. M. Guitut says that the treaty of Utrecht lied a double object : the first, to secure the crown of Spain to Philp and his descendants ; the second, to pre. vent the possibility of a union of the crowns of France and Spain on one and the same head. Now, the first of theme results seas undoubtedly the erect, but is nowhere put firth as one of the objects of the treaty ; and the second was a means and not an cad. The main and real object of the treaty, besides the restoration of peace between the contrite:Mg partici, was that for which the pr ceding war had been under taken ' • and it is truly net forth in the second article of the treaty between Great Britain an 1 Spain,'which recites that: "fa guerre qu'on cunt de ter:taper heureirsesuent rur cette pax. a (te entreprine au semnieneernent, et onetinuie pi hmg.tempi tree tent d'anitnusitr • et dee depewes immeneea, mead Bien qu'aree uno errUsiun do bang inesprimable, a oder du ddirter imminent dont la liiterti , et I.s mint,• de tuute I EUTIlik a (I t' meuscee par I'union trop etroit des royaumes d'Espaigne et de France." It was a too close and intimate union between the king doms of France and of Spain which constituted that danger to the balance of power in Europe which it was the real object of the war of succession and of the transactions of Utrecht for ever afterwards to avert; and the means by which that too close and intimate union was to be prevented were the perpetual separation of the two crowns, ant perpetual exclu sion of any prince of the royal family of une of the two countries, or of any of the descendants of such prince from succeeding to the throne of the other. lier ajestj's govern ment, therefore, contend that the marriage of the Duke of Nlontpensitr to the infanta is at variance with the main object of the treaty, and that the letter and positive stipula tions of tte treaty would prevent any of the descatdants of that prince from succeeding to the throne of Spain " what ever might be the manner iu which the succession might de volve upon their line." The French government do not pretend to deny the validity of the renunciations of Utrecht. Thos: renunciations were clear, positive, explicit, and corn. prthensive. They were incorporated in the treaty, and were made part of the law both of France and of Spain. And the King of France engaged by the stipulations of the treaty " solennellement et par parole de roi," that neither he nor his heirs and successors "no (crone jarnais r➢on, nine per. mettront quo jamais it suit mien fait, capable d'emptcher lea renonciations et autres transactions susdites d'avoir leer plein et entier etfet;" ,ut that, on the contrary, "they would take sincere care and exert themselves, atilt que rica ne donne atteinte a oe fondement du s.ilut public, nine puisse Febranler." Her Majesty's government arc surprised that iu the face of such renunciations and of such stipulations and engagements, the French government should endeavour to represent, as is implied, though not directly asserted, in M. G uieot's despatch, that the descendants of the Duke of Mont pensier could relieve themselves from the positive and perpetual excludust which attaches to them from the transactions of Utrecht, by the plea that they would inherit rights from the Infanta L uisa Fernsnda. It is manifest that no claim trans mitted to them by the infant' could counterbalance or set aside the poritive disqualification which they will inherit from the Duke of Montpensier. Nothing is more common than that the disqualification inherited by children from one of their parents overrides the quelification which they inherit from the other. But it there were any value in this implied assertion of the French gdvernment, and if the marriage of the Duke of Montpellier with the infanta would really free his descendants from the disabling effects of the renunciations of Utrecht, how could the cmclusion of that mune:tee be reconciled with the above quoted engagement of the crown of France solemnly taken, " et par parole de roi," never to do, nor to permit to be done, anything which could be capable of preventing those renunciations "from haring their full and entire effect"? The French government, therefore, must either admit that the descendants of the Duke of Montpensier are excluded by virtue of the renunciations in the treaty of Utrecht, or they must ac knowledge that they have violated the en gagement in that treaty. M. Guizot, however, quotes instances of marriages of two princes of Spain with princesses of France, and of a prince of France with a prin ces. of Spain, and he says that the last instance is remark able, because it was the heir to the crown of France who married one of the heiresses of the crown of Spain. To them instances her Majesty's governm eit would reply that even if they were cases in which the stipulations of Utrecht had been overlooked, the fact of their Mime been so over looked by statesmen in the last century, would be no reason why they should not be appealed to and observed by stater men in the present century, if those stipulations see us them selves clear, positive, and indisputable. Doubtful stipulations may receive an interpretation from precedents ; but a trea ty that is plain and precise, can only be invalidated by an act as formal an itself. A law is not abrogated fir one man because another man has abstained from appealing to its enactmeuts ; and • treaty is not annulled for one generation because another generation, under circumstances essentially different, may lave allowed its stipulations to lie dormant. But the cases quoted by M. Guizot are very different from that of the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier. In all thew cases the Salk law wee in force both in France and in Spain ; and the princesses in question, instead of being imme diate heiresses to the crown of the country, to the royal family of which they respectively belong id, were in the two first in stances by the law of France altogether excluded, and in the third instance by the law of Spain excluded until all male ham should be extinct. It is obvious that while the Salic law was in force in both countries, the strict enforcement of the stipulations of Utrecht in regard to females might well be considered as less important than it has now become, sines the &eve which bas of late years been mete in the law of succession in Spain. But with respect to the cues quoted, it may be observed, as to the first, that after that marriage, the treaty between Spain and Austria in 172.5 still further confirmed and recorded the exclusion of all French prison and their descendants from the throne of Spain ; and with reepect to the third, that no descendants of that marriage have succeeded or have claimed a right to succeed to the Spanish crown. M.Guisot, indeed, says that the stipulations of Utrecht will suffice forthe future, as they have done for the past, for the interests of peace and for the balance of power in Europe. If her Majesty's government are to understand by that sentence, that whereas no French prince or hie de scendants has since the treaty of Utrecht claimed to succeed to the throne of Spain, no French prince or his descendants will ever claim so to succeed in future, H.M.'s govern ment would admit that the question at issue between the two governments was divested of much of its practical import ance. Her Majesty's government, however, cannot admit that the experience of the past, as asserted by M. Guisot, has demonstrated that foreign influence has no power of swaying the international policy of Spain. On the contrary, the history of the last century affords many examples to show how, in consequence of that intimate connexion which, not withstanding the treaty of Utrecht, continued to subsist be tween the crowns of France and Spain, Spain followed France into war, and made peace only when France did to,. It is time indeed, as M. Guizot reminds her Majesty's government, that in the present eee tury, Spain made a great and successful effort to vindicate her national independence ; and it may be remarked that the unanimity of feelings which then crowned their exertesse with success, was much strengthened by the deep imperial produced throughout Spain by the seercay and eurpnee with which those proceedings were conducted, which were la. tended to lead to the ettablishment of a Franqh prince on the Spanish throne. The British government has not, as M. Guizot seems to suppose, forgot those ciente ; nor does it fail to render justice to the patriotism then displayed by the Spanish nation ; and her Majesty's government are caw vaned, that on any analogous occasion, the same spirit would animate the whole Spanish people. But he Majesty's government would deeply lament that se7 such occasi .n should arise again to let lore on the pr insult • tempest of angry passions ; and again ts pour fourth on the soil of Spain a deluge of human blood. The calamities of such a conflict, however great they :Lb: are not too dear a price far a people to pay for the nsnce of their national independence ; and, though oda states may be involved in the evils connected with seas struggle, sound policy may lead them to cheer immediate exertions and sacrifices, rather than encounter the tater dangers which apathy and inactivity would render too few tain. But great would be the responsibility which woe weigh upon those who should wantonly have been the err of such evils • and if those evils, besides being unaseeseadig produced, ha d' their origin in breaches of treaties sad of engagements, that responsibility we -ev overwhelming. I have to instruc to M. Guisot, and to send him e (Signed; The letter teem M. r; nista . was accidentally printed yeaterday. tended, yesterday, remainder, --- engagements, that responsibility would indeed be heavy ad overwhelming. I have to instruct you to read this deepen* to M. Guiaot, and to send him officially a copy of it. I am, &c., (Signed) PALariurros. The letter fns-n M. Gaiaat to M. Jarmse, .1 ded Nov. 21, IA was amidentally printed yesterday. It Woad bar; followed the Or% • CRACOW. Our extracts from this series of despatches at- tended, yesterday, to the fourth. We now give the remainder, commencing with No. 5 : r.-11. REXENE TO M. OCIZOT. (Extract.) BERLIN, APRIL 3,1841 —Commenting on the purport of the despatch of your Excellency, M. de Canna has added: " Assuredly, we never thought of prolon g i n g beyond the Axed period, by any real necessity the occupxtioa of the ter- ritory and the town of Cracow. The Russian and Prumaiaa troops, as you already know, evacuated the town almost ia metffitely ; but everything must bit re-establishedgalm vernment no longer exists ; we cannot plac e Schindler at the head of the senate ; it is a long and plexing affair, and we feel the necessity of terminable ie. After having re-established order, we must re-establish 10. gularity ; re-compose a government which may act. nit& tranquillity his been but too lone disturbed, and the fogs . that this violent crisis has given birth to will unfortasetehi be too long a time in disappearing." EIMMMIIMErI..IIIIIIII