UN General Assembly
1960

10. Despite a measure of “rapprochement” between the two sides in the negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee, the objective of general and complete disarmament remains distant so long as fundamental differences between them are not resolved. Two of the main difficulties relate to inspection measures. The first pertains to control, not control over what is to be reduced, on which agreement in principle has been reached, but the verification of armed forces and armaments, either before or after reduction in each stage. The second relates to the technical difficulties of ensuring by inspection that no undeclared stocks of nuclear weapons are concealed. It is admitted on both sides that such hidden stockpiles cannot be discovered by any means now known to either side. We note the Soviet contention that, with the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the difficulties of control, including verification of undeclared stockpiles, will disappear because all means of delivering the weapons to their targets will have been eliminated. We need a fuller and more convincing explanation of this thesis before it can be accepted as an adequate answer to the formidable difficulties which have supervened in the way of the total elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control.