Philosophy

It is sometimes argued that the non-therapeutic, non-consensual alteration of childrenâs genitals should be discussed in two separate ethical discourses: one for girls (in which such alterations should be termed 'female genital mutilation' or FGM), and one for boys (in which such alterations should be termed 'male circumcisionâ). In this article, I call into question the moral and empirical basis for such a distinction, and argue that all children - whether female, male, or indeed intersex
           - should  be free from having parts of their genitals removed unless there is a pressing medical indication.

Female genital mutilation (FGM) and male circumcision: Should there be a separate ethical discourse? Brian D. Earp University of Oxford Abstract It is sometimes argued that the non-therapeutic, non-consensual alteration of children's genitals should be discussed in two separate ethical discourses: one for girls (in which such alterations should be termed 'female genital mutilation' or FGM), and one for boys (in which such alterations should be termed 'male circumcision'). In this article, I call into question the moral and empirical basis for such a distinction, and argue that all children-whether female, male, or indeed intersex-should be free from having parts of their genitals removed unless there is a pressing medical indication. * Note that citations are given in-text as hyperlinks in this paper, since it was first published in a slightly modified version at the University of Oxford's Practical Ethics website. Some references are provisional and may be updated. A more formal paper covering similar territory is available here: Earp, B. D. (2015). Female genital mutilation and male circumcision: Toward an autonomy-based ethical framework. Medicolegal and Bioethics, 5, 89-104. This is a published article. Author's copy. It may be cited as follows: Earp, B. D. (2014). Female genital mutilation (FGM) and male circumcision: Should there be a separate ethical discourse? Practical Ethics. University of Oxford. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/8817976/Female_genital_mutilation_FGM_an d_male_circumcision_Should_there_be_a_separate_ethical_discourse. DOI: 10.13140/2.1.3530.4967. 2 Introduction When the Canadian ethicist Margaret Somerville began to speak and write critically about the non-therapeutic circumcision of infant boys, she was attacked by some critics, accusing her of "detracting from the horror of female genital mutilation and weakening the case against it by speaking about it and infant male circumcision in the same context and pointing out that the same ethical and legal principles applied to both." When the anthropologist Kirsten Bell advanced similar arguments in her own university lectures, the reaction was "immediate and hostile ... How dare I mention these two entirely different operations in the same breath! How dare I compare the innocuous and beneficial removal of the foreskin with the extreme mutilations enacted against females in other societies!" One frequent claim is that FGM is analogous to "castration" or a "total penectomy," such that any sort of ethical comparison between it and male circumcision is altogether inappropriate. Some other common assertions are these: Female genital mutilation and male circumcision are very different. FGM is barbaric and crippling ("always torture," according to Tanya Gold), whereas male circumcision is comparatively inconsequential. Male circumcision is a "minor" intervention that might even confer health benefits, whereas FGM is a drastic intervention with no health benefits, and only causes harm. The "prime motive" for FGM is to control women's sexuality; it is inherently sexist and discriminatory and is an expression of male power and domination. Male circumcision, by contrast, has nothing to do with controlling male sexuality – it's "just a snip" and in any case "men don't complain." FGM eliminates the enjoyment of sex, whereas male circumcision has no meaningful effects on sexual sensation or satisfaction. It is perfectly reasonable to oppose all forms of female genital cutting while at the same time accepting or even endorsing infant male circumcision. Yet almost every one of these claims is untrue, or is severely misleading at best. Such views derive from a superficial understanding of both FGM and male circumcision; and they are inconsistent with the latest critical scholarship concerning these and related practices. Their constant repetition in popular discourse, therefore, is unhelpful to advancing moral debate. I aim to show why in the course of what follows. What is going on here? To see the source of the problem, we need to begin by defining our terms-"FGM" and "male circumcision." For FGM, The World Health Organization (WHO) gives us four major types, with multiple subdivisions: • Type I - Partial or total removal of the clitoris and/or the prepuce (clitoridectomy). Type Ia, removal of the clitoral hood or prepuce only; Type Ib, removal of the clitoris with the prepuce. 3 • Type II - Partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without excision of the labia majora (excision). Type IIa, removal of the labia minora only; Type IIb, partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora; Type IIc, partial or total removal of the clitoris, the labia minora and the labia majora. • Type III - Narrowing of the vaginal orifice with creation of a covering seal by cutting and appositioning the labia minora and/or the labia majora, with or without excision of the clitoris (infibulation). Type IIIa, removal and apposition of the labia minora; Type IIIb, removal and apposition of the labia majora. • Type IV - All other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes, for example: pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterization. The first thing to notice about this list is that "FGM" is not just one thing. Disturbingly, there are many different ways to nick, scratch, or cut off parts of a girl's vulva, ranging from, at the lowest end of the "harm" spectrum, pricking the clitoral hood (under anesthesia, and with sterile surgical equipment, as was proposed in the "Seattle Compromise" - note that this would qualify under FGM Type IV), up through various types of 'piercing' that do not necessarily remove tissue (of course, such piercing is common in 'Western' countries as a form of perceived "cosmetic enhancement"),* to interventions that alter the labia, but not the clitoris (the clinical term is labiaplasty – note that this is also popular in 'Western' countries), to, at the highest end, excising the (external) clitoris with a shard of glass and stitching together the labia with thorns. It is important to point out that the most severe types of FGM (such as the form just mentioned) are comparatively rare, whereas it is the more minor and intermediate forms that are more common. * Nota bene, such "cosmetic" surgeries in 'Western' countries are typically carried out under conditions of informed consent (a point to which I will return, as I think the moral analysis turns on this factor), although there is an alarming trend among some teenage girls in these countries - some as young as 13 or 14 - of having their labia reduced (or undergoing other forms of "designer vagina" surgery), apparently with the permission of their parents. Global health agencies such as the WHO, however, have been strangely silent on this issue, preferring instead to focus their FGM-eradication efforts almost entirely on the continent of Africa. In this African context, genital cutting (of whatever degree of severity) is most commonly performed around puberty, and is done to boys and girls alike. In most cases, the major social function of the cutting is to mark the transition from childhood to adulthood, and it is typically performed in the context an elaborate ceremony. Increasingly, however, African, Middle Eastern, Indonesian, and Malaysian genital alterations (again, of both boys and girls) are being carried out in hospital settings by trained medical professionals-and on infants as opposed to teenagers-on 4 the model of male circumcision in the United States. Understanding the harm It should be clear that the different forms of cutting listed above are likely to result in different degrees of harm, with different effects on sexual function and satisfaction, and different chances of developing an infection, and so on. But as Obermeyer notes in her systematic analysis of health consequences for FGM: It is rarely pointed out that the frequency and severity of complications are a function of the extent and circumstances of the operation, and it is not usually recognized that much of [our] information comes from studies of the Sudan, where most women are infibulated. The ill-health and death that these practices are thought to cause are difficult to reconcile with the reality of their persistence in so many societies, and raises the question of a possible discrepancy between our "knowledge" of their harmful effects and the behavior of millions of women and their families. Notwithstanding these gradient differences for types FGM, as well as the gradient consequences that vary along with them, all forms of FGM-no matter how sterilized or minor-are deemed to be mutilations. All are prohibited in Western democracies. Again: I am in support of the motives behind such legislation. I do not think that a sharp object should be taken to any girl's vulva unless it is to save her life or health, or unless she has given her fully-informed consent to undergo the procedure. In the latter case, of course, she wouldn't be a "girl" anymore, but rather an adult woman, who can make a decision about her own body. What about male circumcision? The story is very different when it comes to male circumcision. In no jurisdiction is the practice prohibited, and in many it is not even restricted: in some countries, including in the United States, anyone, with any instrument, and any degree of medical training (including none) can attempt to perform a circumcision on a non-consenting child- sometimes with disastrous consequences. As Davis notes, "States currently regulate the hygienic practices of those who cut our hair and our fingernails ... so why not a baby's genitals?" But just like FGM, circumcision is not a monolith; it isn't just one kind of thing. The original Jewish form of circumcision (until about 150 AD) was comparatively minor: it involved cutting off the overhanging tip of the foreskin-whatever stretched over the end of the glans-thus preserving (most of) the foreskin's protective and mechanical functions, as well as reducing the amount of erogenous tissue removed. The "modern" form is substantially more invasive: it removes one-third to one-half of the motile skin system of the penis (about 50 square centimeters of sensitive tissue in the adult organ), eliminates the gliding function of the foreskin (see here for a video demonstration), 5 and exposes the head of the penis to environmental irritation. Circumcision-and other forms of male genital cutting-are performed at different ages, in different environments, with different tools, by different groups, for different reasons. Traditional Muslim circumcisions are done while the boy is fully conscious, between ages 5 and 8, or possibly later; American (non-religious) circumcisions are done in a hospital, in the first few days of life, with or without an anesthetic (usually without), and using a range of different clamps and cutting devices; metzitzah b'peh, done by some ultra-Orthodox Jews, involves the sucking of blood from the circumcision wound, and carries the risk of herpes infection and permanent brain damage; subincision, carried out in aboriginal Australia and elsewhere, involves slicing open the urethral passage on the underside of the penis from the scrotum to the glans, often affecting urination as well as sexual function; circumcision among the Xhosa in South Africa is done as a rite of passage, in the bush, with spearheads, dirty knives, and other non-sterile equipment, and frequently causes hemorrhage, infection, mangling, and loss of the penis-see here for some disturbing pictures-as well as a very high rate of death. But even "hospitalized" or "minor" circumcisions are not without their risks and complications: in 2011, nearly a dozen boys were treated for "life threatening haemorrhage, shock or sepsis" as a result of their non-therapeutic circumcisions at a single children's hospital in Birmingham in England. Here is the important point. When people speak of "FGM" they are (apparently) thinking only-or primarily-of the most severe forms of female genital cutting, done in the least sterile environments, with the most drastic consequences likeliest to follow. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that such forms are the exception rather than the rule. When people speak of "male circumcision" (by contrast) they are (apparently) thinking only-or primarily-of the least severe forms of male genital cutting, done in the most sterile environments, with the least drastic consequences likeliest to follow, perhaps because this is the form with which they are culturally familiar. This then leads to the impression that "FGM" and "male circumcision" are "totally different" with the first being barbaric and crippling, and the latter being benign or even health-conferring (on which more in just a moment). Yet as the anthropologist Zachary Androus has written: The attitude that male circumcision is harmless [happens to be] consistent with Western cultural values and practices, while any such procedures performed on girls is totally alien to Western cultural values. [However] the fact of the matter is that what's done to some girls [in some cultures] is worse than what's done to some boys, and what's done to some boys [in some cultures] is worse than what's done to some girls. By collapsing all of the many different types of procedures performed into a single set for each sex, categories are created that do not accurately describe any situation that actually occurs anywhere in the world. So it depends on what one is talking about. Do those who oppose FGM (and that includes me) think (as I do) that even certain "minor" or "medicalized" forms of such cutting- 6 done without consent, and without a medical indication-are inconsistent with medical ethics, deeply-rooted moral and legal ideals about bodily integrity, the principle of personal autonomy, and a child's interest in an open future? Or is it only the wholesale removal of the clitoris – with a broken piece of glass – that inspires such condemnation? If the former is the case then consistency would seem to require that one be opposed to the non-therapeutic, non-consensual circumcision of boys as well: not only is it much more invasive than several "minor" (yet prohibited) forms of FGM, but it is numerically a much greater problem, occurring several millions of times per year. Cutting comes in degrees. Consequences vary. This is true for boys and for girls alike, and at some point the harms overlap. As a result of this realization, many scholars of ritual cutting are choosing to abandon the terms "FGM" and "male circumcision" (which presume a strict moral difference between them), and are using instead such terms as FGC, MGC, and IGC. These stand for female, male, and intersex genital cutting respectively; and they reflect no moral claims per se. Instead, the moral character of the genital cutting-regardless the person's sex or gender-can be assessed separately in terms of actual physical harms, as well with respect to such considerations as whether the cutting is therapeutic, consensual, or otherwise. So let us not be misled. There are many kinds of "FGM" as well as many kinds of "male circumcision" and the consequences vary for each one. But perhaps there are some other important differences between male and female forms of genital cutting – again, apart from the sex or gender of the person being cut – that could serve to justify their strict separation in terms of ethical discussion. Let us look at some further possibilities, from the set of common assertions I listed above. Male circumcision ... might ... confer health benefits, whereas FGM [has] no health benefits, and only causes harm. Both parts of this claim are misleading. First, how do we know that "FGM" (or FGC, as I'll say from now on) does not confer health benefits? Certainly the most extreme types of FGC will not contribute to good health on balance, but neither will the spearheads-and-dirty-knives versions of genital cutting on boys. What about other forms of FGC? Defenders of FGC-including some medical professionals in countries where FGC is culturally normative-regularly cite such "health benefits" as improved genital hygiene as a reason to continue the practice, and at least one study has shown a link between FGC and reduced transmission of HIV! Indeed, the vulva has all sorts of warm, moist places where bacteria or viruses could get trapped, such as underneath the clitoral hood, or among the folds of the labia; so who is to say that removing some of that tissue (with a sterile surgical tool) might not reduce the risk of various diseases? Fortunately, it's impossible to perform this type of research in the West, because any scientist who tried to do so would be arrested under anti-FGM laws (and would never get approval from an ethics review board). So we simply do not know. As a consequence of this, every time one sees the claim that "FGM has no health benefits" – 7 a claim that has become something of a mantra for the WHO – one should read this as saying, "we don't actually know if certain minor, sterilized forms of FGM have health benefits, because it is unethical, and would be illegal, to find out." Indeed, Western societies don't seem to think that "health benefits" are particularly relevant to the question of whether we should be cutting off parts of the external genitalia of healthy girls. Without the girl's consent, or a medical diagnosis, it's seen as impermissible no matter what. By contrast, a small and insistent group of (mostly American) scientists have taken it upon themselves to promote infant male circumcision, by conducting study after well-funded study to determine just what kinds of "health benefits" might follow from cutting off parts of the penis. Why is there a double standard here? (Actually, there is an answer to this question; and it hinges on prejudicial cultural influences on what constitutes science and medicine-as well as on what sorts of research questions are deemed worthy of funding, among other problematic factors.) Let us look at one example of a "health benefit" that has been attributed to MGC: a lowered risk of acquiring a urinary tract infection. When it comes to girls, who get UTIs after the age of 1 fully 10 times more frequently than boys do, doctors prescribe antibiotics and try other conservative treatments; they also encourage girls to wash their genitals and practice decent hygiene. When it comes to boys, however, circumcision apologists tout the wisdom of performing non-therapeutic, nonconsensual genital surgery, to the tune of 111 circumcisions to prevent a single case of UTI. Yet as Benatar and Benatar explain, "UTI does not occur in 99.85% of circumcised infant males and in 98.5% of un-circumcised infant boys." And when it does occur, against those odds, it is both "easily diagnosed and treatable with low morbidity and [low] mortality." So let's review: washing the genitals for girls, foreskin amputation for boys? With respect to reducing rates of HIV transmission in Africa-another health benefit that is frequently cited for MGC-remember that those studies were carried out on adult volunteers under conditions of informed consent, not on infants. I have no problem with a mature adult requesting surgery to remove a part of his own penis as a form of partial prophylaxis against HIV (in environments with very high base rates of such infection); that is certainly his right. Of course he would need to wear a condom either way to achieve any kind of reliable protection, but it's his body, and it's his decision to make. It's quite a different matter, however, to circumcise an infant-who is not at risk of HIV or other STIs unless he is molested, who cannot consent to the procedure in the first place, and who might prefer to practice safe sex strategies when he does become sexually active, rather than forfeit a part of his penis. See here, here, here, here, and here for further discussion of the "health benefits" arguments for MGC. The upshot is that they are not compelling, particularly in developed nations with functioning healthcare systems and access to soap and clean water. 8 So what other differences between FGC and MCG might justify their strict compartmentalization? Back to the assertions from above: The "prime motive" of FGM is to control women's sexualities – it is sexist and an expression of male power and domination. Male circumcision has nothing to do with controlling male sexuality. There is a lot to say here. First, female genital cutting is performed for different reasons at different times in different cultures; likewise for male genital cutting. Contrary to common wisdom, however, it is not the case that FGC is uniformly "about" the control of female sexuality. For example, in Sierra Leone: Among the Kono there is no cultural obsession with feminine chastity, virginity, or women's sexual fidelity, perhaps because the role of the biological father is considered marginal and peripheral to the central 'matricentric unit.' ... Kono culture promulgates a dual-sex ideology ... [The] power of Bundu, the women's secret sodality [i.e., initiation society that manages FGC ceremonies], suggest positive links between excision, women's religious ideology, their power in domestic relations, and their high profile in the 'public arena.' In nearly every place that FGC is performed, it is carried out by women (rather than by men) who do not typically view it as an expression of patriarchy, but who instead believe that it is hygienic (see above), as well as beautifying, even empowering, and as an important rite of passage with high cultural value. (The claim that such women are simply "brainwashed" is a gross oversimplification.) At the same time, the "rite of passage" ceremonies for boys in these societies are carried out by men; these are done in parallel, under similar conditions, and for similar reasons–and often with similar (or even worse) consequences for health and sexuality: see this discussion by Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Nevertheless, anthropological research does suggest that FGC is, in some cultures– especially in Northeast Africa and parts of the Middle East–intimately tied up with sexist expressions of patriarchal values; in these settings, the emphasis on female sexual 'purity' can more readily be discerned. As I have argued elsewhere, such an asymmetrical focus on female virginity in some corners of Islam (as expressed through genital cutting as well as through other practices) is extremely problematic and morally unjustifiable. However, it is important to note that, speaking generally: The empirical association between patriarchy and genital surgeries is not well established. The vast majority of the world's societies can be described as patriarchal, and most either do not modify the genitals of either sex or modify the genitals of males only. There are almost no patriarchal societies with customary genital surgeries for females only. Across human societies there is a broad range of cultural attitudes concerning female sexuality-from societies that press for temperance, restraint, and the control of sexuality to those that are more permissive and encouraging of sexual adventures and experimentation-but these 9 differences do not correlate strongly with the presence or absence of female genital surgeries. Indeed, in cultures where forms of FGC (and MGC) are culturally normative, many women regard the cutting as part of their cultural heritage and vigorously defend against the efforts of Western agencies, and sometimes the men in their own societies (see also here), who seek to wipe it out. Such a realization has led to the emergence of a counter-discourse among some Western feminists, who regard anti-FGC campaigns as a form of cultural imperialism. On this sort of view, the fight against FGC is inextricably bound up with a broader colonial and neo-colonial project of "white people saving brown women from brown men" (as well as from themselves). Thus as Nancy Ehrenreich writes in the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review: ... the mainstream anti-FGC position is premised upon an orientalizing construction of FGC societies as primitive, patriarchal, and barbaric, and of female circumcision as a harmful, unnecessary cultural practice based on patriarchal gender norms and ritualistic beliefs. ... Lambasting African societies and practices (while failing to critique similar practices in the United States) ... essentially implies that North American understandings of the body are "scientific" (i.e., rational, civilized, and based on universally acknowledged expertise), while African understandings are "cultural" (i.e., superstitious, un-civilized, and based on false, socially constructed beliefs). [Yet] neither of these depictions is accurate. North American medicine is not free of cultural influence, and FGC practices are not bound by culture-at least not in the uniform way imagined by opponents. Dustin Wax makes a similar argument: In the case of anti-FGC advocacy, the voice of "brown women" is almost entirely absent, literally silenced by an insistence that the horrendousness of the practice precludes any possible positive evaluation, and therefore the only valid voices are those that condemn FGC. All contradictory testimony is dismissed as the result of "brainwashing," "false consciousness," "fear of male reprisal," "antiWesternism", "ignorance," or other forms of willful or unwillful complicity. What about the other side of things? The usual claim is that male circumcision has "nothing to do" with controlling male sexuality. While it is probably true that most contemporary, Western parents who choose circumcision for their children do not do so out of a desire to "control" their sexuality (just as is true of most African parents who choose "circumcision" for their daughters), male genital cutting has been historically steeped in just such a desire, and it is implicated in problematic expressions of power to this day. Contrary to common wisdom, male genital cutting has indeed been used as a form of sexual control, and even punishment, for a very long time; the Jewish philosopher Maimonides argued that diminished sexual sensitivity was part of the point of doing circumcisions (to reduce excessive "lust" as well as "concupiscence"); circumcision was adopted into Western medicine in the Victorian period largely as a 10 means to combat masturbation (as well as other expressions of juvenile sexuality); and forced circumcision of enemies has been used as a means of humiliation since time immemorial: this practice continues among the Luo of Kenya (the Luo do not traditionally circumcise, and are often victims of such attacks), among numerous other groups. To return to the specific question of patriarchy, in Judaism, only the boys are allowed to "seal the divine covenant," so the ritual is sexist on its face. But it's different in different communities. Moreover, the "reasons" given by most parents, when asked, as to why they wish to authorize a circumcision, are not necessarily the same as the "reasons" the practice originally came about, nor the "reasons" for which it was consciously performed in previous eras (i.e., as a "cure" for masturbation). Nevertheless, as the renowned anti-FGC activist Hanny Lightfoot-Klein has stated: "The [main] reasons given for female circumcision in Africa and for routine male circumcision in the United States are essentially the same. Both promise cleanliness and the absence of odors as well as greater attractiveness and acceptability." So what are the implications here? Given that both male and female forms of genital cutting express different cultural norms depending upon the context, and are performed for different reasons in different cultures, and even in different communities or individual families, how are we meant to assess the permissibility of either one? Do we need to interview each set of parents to make sure that their proposed act of cutting is intended as an expression of acceptable norms? If they promise that it isn't about "sexual control" in their specific case, but rather about "hygiene" or "aesthetics" or something less symbolically problematic, should they be permitted to go ahead? But this is bound to fail. Every parent who requests a genital-altering surgery for their child – for whatever reason under the sun – thinks that they are acting in the child's best interests; no one thinks that they are "mutilating" their own offspring. Thus it is not the reason for the intervention that determines its permissibility, but rather the consequences of the intervention for the person whose genitals are actually on the line. So what kinds of consequences follow from FGC and MGC? Let us clear up one familiar legend: Male circumcision is "just a snip" and in any case "men don't complain." Before addressing these oft-repeated claims about male genital cutting, let us reflect on the analogous female forms that tend to dominate popular discussions. The interventions associated with extreme forms of FGC are gut-wrenching to think about. Many people find FGC to be "barbaric" and "inhumane" in part because they can call to mind grotesque and vivid images of slicing and cutting-perhaps with a shard of glass-and they react with a mix of sadness, horror, and disgust. Much less disturbing, however, are the images apparently called to mind by male circumcision, as evidenced by the widely repeated (but false) declaration that circumcision is "just a snip." Male circumcision is never "just a snip." It is a frequently traumatic intervention; it is usually extremely painful, even in hospital settings, since adequate analgesia is rarely given; the same is true in ritual settings; and indeed sometimes the excruciating pain of 11 circumcision is used as a test of masculinity. As Nelson Mandela reported about his own (tribal) circumcision: Flinching or crying out was a sign of weakness and stigmatized one's manhood. I was determined not to disgrace myself, the group or my guardian. Circumcision is a trial of bravery and stoicism; no anaesthetic is used; a man must suffer in silence [Before] I knew it, the old man was kneeling in front of me. ... Without a word, he took my foreskin, pulled it forward, and then, in a single motion, brought down his assegai [knife]. I felt as if fire was shooting through my veins; the pain was so intense that I buried my chin in my chest. Many seconds seemed to pass before I remembered the cry, and then I recovered and called out, 'Ndiyindoda!' ['I am a man!'] In infant circumcision, the "snip"-if there is one-only comes at the end: the foreskin must first be separated from the head of the penis, to which it is adhered throughout much of childhood, then it is either stretched out and sliced, or crushed, or torn, or even strangled to the point of necrosis. When any of these things is done with unsterilized equipment, by a medically untrained practitioner, in environments with limited access to healthcare, the risk of serious infection, loss of the penis, and death is dramatically increased. I suggest that readers of this commentary watch this video (of a hospitalized, American circumcision) or this one (of a traditional Muslim circumcision) or this one (of a Jewish circumcision), or this one (of a circumcision in Uganda) so that they can permanently lay to rest the idea that circumcision is "just a snip." It is time to retire this phrase; it should not be used any more. As to the notion that "men don't complain" – that is simply false. Just as some women who have undergone forms of FGC complain passionately about what was done to them without their consent, so too do some men who have undergone forms of MGC. Here are some examples of thoughtful and articulate complaints about MGC by resentful, circumcised men: here, here, here, and here. This man lost his penis. Several thousands of men are attempting "foreskin restoration" (Ron Low, personal communication), which is an arduous process of stretching skin from the shaft of the penis using weights, tapes, and other materials, in an attempt to "restore" some semblance of their pre-circumcised state. This is not an insignificant number. Of course, when men do complain, their feelings are often trivialized; but they continue to complain nevertheless – in increasing numbers, and ever more vocally as they find the courage to speak out. Many men do not complain, of course; but then many women who have undergone various forms of FGC do not complain either: in a survey of 3,805 Sudanese women, of whom 89% had experienced FGC, 96% said they would do it to their daughters and 90% favored the continuation of the practice generally. Yet it is enough that some men do complain, and that some women do as well: in both cases a healthy part of their body was removed, and without their informed permission. In Western societies, we teach our citizens that they have a right to bodily integrity: we forbid the tattooing of children, for 12 example, and we tell them that adults should not so much as touch them inappropriately. In this sort of social and legal environment, complaints about having a part of one's genitals removed without one's own consent should be treated with serious concern. Finally: FGM eliminates the enjoyment of sex, whereas male circumcision has no meaningful effects on sexual sensation or satisfaction. Again, this depends. Obviously more minor forms of FGC – such as ritual 'pricking,' some kinds of piercing, or even removal of the vaginal lips – will not eliminate erogenous sensation; however, does this make any of these interventions permissible, if they are done without consent? The answer, in my opinion, is "no." Even the risk of damaging sensitive nerve tissue with a 'prick' should be avoided unless the person taking on the risk is acting freely as an informed adult. Or what about removing "just" the clitoral hood? The clitoris might lose some sensitivity over time, as it rubs against environmental factors (just as the penile glans seems to do after male circumcision; in fact the clitoral hood and the foreskin are anatomically analogous structures), but perhaps some sensation would be preserved, and in any case sexual enjoyment cannot be reduced to stimulation of the clitoris or even ability-toorgasm. Does that make "clitoral unhooding" OK? Not if it's done without consent. Finally, what about one of the most invasive forms of FGC – the excision of the external clitoris? According to a recent review published by the reputable Hastings Center, "Research by gynecologists and others has demonstrated that a high percentage of women who have had genital surgery [including excision] have rich sexual lives, including desire, arousal, orgasm, and satisfaction, and their frequency of sexual activity is not reduced." Indeed, in one study, up to 86% of women who had undergone even "extreme" forms of FGC reported the ability to orgasm, and "the majority of the interviewed women (90.51%) reported that sex gives them pleasure." These counterintuitive findings might be explained by the fact that much of the clitoris (including most of its erectile tissue) is actually underneath the skin and is therefore not removed by even the most invasive types of FGC: only the glans of the clitoris (the "part that sticks out") can be excised. But this does not, in my view, make the surgery somehow "OK." Every girl's body is different, and the value she will end up placing on having in intact clitoral glans cannot be known in advance–even in cultures in which the glans is socially stigmatized. At the end of the day, if a fully-informed adult woman chooses genital surgery for herself, it may be permissible on some analyses. However, it is not permissible on children. What about male circumcision? The same sort of reasoning applies. While the majority of circumcised men (whose circumcisions were not seriously "botched") report that they experience sexual pleasure during intercourse, and even enjoy sex quite a lot: (a) they do not have a point of comparison, unless they were circumcised in adulthood, so 13 they cannot know what sex would feel like had they not been circumcised (the same point applies to FGC done early enough in childhood), (b) the risk that a "botch" might in fact occur means that the surgery should be undertaken voluntarily, insofar as it is non-therapeutic in nature, (c) some men whose circumcisions did not result in "botches" may nevertheless experience adverse sexual outcomes, simply through the loss of erotogenic tissue, and (d) some men's sexual experiences are hampered via psychological mechanisms, including through the resentment they may feel at having been circumcised before they could object. Scientists are divided over the "average" effect of (expertly performed, perfectly executed) circumcision on key sexual outcome variables. What is not controversial, however, is that any sensation in the foreskin itself is guaranteed to be eliminated by circumcision (just as any sensation in the labia or the clitoral glans will be eliminated by labiaplasty or excision, respectively), as are "any sexually-relevant functions associated with [the foreskin's] manipulation. In other words, a man without a foreskin cannot 'play' with his foreskin, nor can he glide it back and forth during sex. That these can be pleasurable activities, with great subjective value to genitally intact men and their partners, is uncontroversial." Finally, the most extreme forms of male genital cutting (e.g., when it leads to penile amputation) eliminate sexual capacity altogether. As Sara Johnsdotter has pointed out, there is no 1:1 relationship between amount of genital tissue removed (in either males or females), and subjective satisfaction while having sex, so "FGM" (and male "circumcision")-of whatever degree of severity- will affect different people differently. Each individual's relationship to their own body is unique, including what they find aesthetically appealing, what degree of risk they feel comfortable taking on when it comes to elective surgeries on their "private parts," and even what degree of sexual sensitivity they prefer (for personal or cultural reasons). Thus each individual should be left to decide what to do with his or her own genitals when it comes to irreversible surgery. To summarize, if "FGM" is wrong because it "destroys sexual pleasure" – then forms of "FGM" that do not destroy sexual pleasure must (on this logic) be considered permissible, or else they should be given a different name. But if "FGM" is wrong because it involves cutting into the genitals of a vulnerable child, without a medical indication and without consent, thereby exposing the child to surgical risk (without the presence of any disease), and (in some cases) removing a healthy part of her body that she might later wish she could have experienced intact, then male circumcision is equally wrong on those grounds. This is true whether sexual pleasure is "destroyed" or whether it isn't, and whether a complaint is made later or not. Explaining the double standard Given everything that has been said so far about the relevant objective "overlaps" between male and female genital cutting, why exactly have they become so compartmentalized? Rebecca Steinfeld, a political scientist at Stanford who studies 14 ritual cutting, has speculated as follows: Alongside the differences in harm and misperceptions about the contrasting settings and ages at which the procedures take place, the double standard stems from two further factors: sexism and ethnocentrism. Male bodies are constructed as resistant to harm or even in need of being tested by painful ordeals, whereas female bodies are seen as highly vulnerable and in need of protection. In other words, vulnerability is gendered. And little girls are more readily seen as victims than little boys. The consequence of this ... is that patriarchy often allows men's experiences to remain unquestioned. Familiarity also creates comfort, and since MGC has been practised in the West for millennia and been routine in English-speaking countries for a century, we're desensitised. By contrast, since FGC is geographically or culturally remote, it's more liable to be seen as barbaric. On this last point, Andrew DeLaney (unpublished manuscript) gives a similar analysis: It is safe to say that [male genital cutting] is a norm in the United States, despite any activists' efforts to raise awareness about it. In the words of one law professor describing her generation, "Everyone was circumcised." ... FGM, on the other hand, is likely a completely foreign idea to the vast majority of people living in the United States or the rest of the western world, with the only exposure to it being horrific reports that are presented based on cases or reports out of Africa. With this being the case, moral objection to the practice of FGM is taken as self-evident, with research and activism being conflated and data on FGM that is sometimes not actually investigated taken as true. All the while, [male genital cutting] occurs as a completely normalized practice. It is of course to be welcomed that ethicists, activists, and other stakeholders have been campaigning to protect the rights of girls to be free from non-therapeutic, nonconsensual cutting into their genital organs. I cannot state enough that I am in support of such efforts (although I do not favor the use of the term "FGM" for the reasons I have already given). My argument has been that they should not be stopping there. Female, male, and intersex genital cutting (for more on intersex, see, e.g., here) should be done exclusively with a medical indication or with the informed consent of the individual. Children of whatever gender should not have healthy parts of their most intimate sexual organs removed, before such a time as they can understand what is at stake in such a surgery and agree to it themselves. 15 References References are in-text as hyperlinks. They are provisional, and may be updated or replaced in later versions of this commentary. I am in the process of preparing a formal academic paper based upon the content and arguments presented in this document, in which references will be presented in the conventional fashion. Update as of 15 April, 2015 – the paper in question has now been published: Earp, B. D. (2015). Female genital mutilation and male circumcision: Toward an autonomy-based ethical framework. Medicolegal and Bioethics, 5, 89-104. About the author Brian D. Earp is a Research Fellow in Ethics at the University of Oxford. He holds degrees from Yale, Oxford, and Cambridge universities, including an M.Phil. degree in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science and medicine, focusing on male and female genital surgeries. Brian has served as a Guest Editor for the Journal of Medical Ethics, editing a special issue on the topic of childhood circumcision, and has published widely in the leading journals in his field.


Arguing About The Kalam Cosmological Argument

Philosophy

What is Dropbox? Dropbox is a free service that lets you bring all your photos, docs, and videos anywhere. Any file you save to your Dropbox will also automatically save to all your computers, phones, and even the Dropbox website. This means that you can start working on your computer at school or the office, and finish on your home computer. Never email yourself a file again! The Dropbox Folder After you install Dropbox on your computer, a Dropbox folder is created. If you're reading this guide, then that means you had no problems finding your Dropbox folder :). This folder is just like any other folder on your computer, but with a twist. Any file you save to your Dropbox folder is also saved to all your other computers, phones, and the Dropbox website. On top of your Dropbox is a green icon that lets you know how your Dropbox is doing: Green circle and check: All the files in your Dropbox are up to date. Blue circle and arrows: Files in your Dropbox are currently being updated. Dropbox Quick Start Adding files to your Dropbox Step 1 Drag and drop a file into your Dropbox folder. Step 2 The blue icon means your file's syncing with Dropbox. That's it! The green icon means that your file has finished saving to your other computers and the Dropbox website. Now that your file's in Dropbox, any changes made to it will be automatically detected and updated to your other computers. The Dropbox Right-click/Context Menu When you Right-Click (Windows/Linux) or Control-Click (Mac) a file or folder in your Dropbox, you'll see a menu that lets you do a few neat things with Dropbox: • Share a Folder Invite your friends, family and teammates to a folder in your Dropbox. It'll be as if you saved that folder straight to their computers. • View Previous Versions View a record of changes made to a file. You can choose to go back to an earlier version of a file if you'd like. • Browse on Dropbox Website View a file on the Dropbox website. • Get Link Make a link to any file or folder in your Dropbox. You can then send this link to anyone you'd like to view the file - even if they don't have Dropbox! The Dropbox Tray/Menu bar icon The Dropbox tray or menu bar icon is located on the bottom (Windows) or top (Mac/Linux) of your screen, and lets you check the status and settings of your Dropbox. The same green, blue, and red icons that appear on the files and folders in your Dropbox also appear over this icon to let you know the status of your Dropbox. Right-clicking this icon gives you a few options: • Open your Dropbox folder, the Dropbox website, or the Dropbox help center. • See which files were recently changed. • View an estimate of how long it will take Dropbox to finish updating files. • Change preferences for your connection, Dropbox folder location, and more. What do I do now? Try dragging some photos or docs into your Dropbox. Then visit the Dropbox website at https://www.dropbox.com. When you log in, your files will be waiting for you! To learn more about Dropbox, take our tour at http://www.dropbox.com/tour or visit the help center at http://www.dropbox.com/help. Frequently Asked Questions How much does Dropbox cost? Dropbox is free! If you run out of space, visit https://www.dropbox.com/plans to view our available subscriptions. How much space does my Dropbox have? Free accounts come with 2GB of space (deleted files and revisions won't count against your limit). You can always check your usage by visiting your account settings page at https://www.dropbox.com/account. How	long	until	my	files	are	fully	synced? Dropbox will download as fast or as slow as your network allows, and will try its best to not hog your connection. If you'd like to limit your upload or download rates, you can change them in Dropbox's preferences. For step by step instructions, visit the help article at https://www.dropbox.com/help/26. Dropbox	is	fast!	How	could	it	have	possibly	synced	all	of	my	files	in	that	time? Dropbox will look to see if it already has the file you're trying to upload. If it senses that it already has the file, it won't bother to upload it again. If the file has been changed recently, it will only upload/download the changes rather than the whole thing. How secure is Dropbox? Dropbox takes the security of your files and of our software very seriously. Dropbox uses Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and AES-256 encryption. AES-256 is the same encryption standard used by banks to secure customer data. Can I access Dropbox on my mobile device? The Dropbox App is available for iPhone, iPad, Android, and Blackberry. To install Dropbox on your mobile device, visit http://www.dropbox.com/mobile. You can also get to your Dropbox at any time by visiting http://www.dropbox.com from your phone.


Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, âHeidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conferenceâ

Philosophy

Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Autor: Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Edited by Mireille Calle-Gruber, Translated by Jeff Fort, Foreword by Jean-Luc Nancy, Editorial: Fordham University Press, Fecha de PublicaciÃ³n: 2016, Formato: Hardback $85.00, PÃ¡ginas: 116, Reviewed by: Facundo Bey (Universidad Nacional de General San MartÃn / CONICET-Universidad de Buenos Aires).

/11/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http://reviews.ophen.org/2017/11/22/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 1/6 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Título: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Autor: Jacques Derrida, HansJacques Derrida, HansGeorg Gadamer, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Edited by Mireille Calle-Gruber, Translated by Jeff Fort, Foreword by Jean-Luc Nancy Georg Gadamer, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe Editorial: Fordham University Press Fecha de Publicación: 2016 Formato: Hardback $85.00 Páginas: 116 Reviewed by: Facundo Bey (Universidad Nacional de General San Martín / CONICET-Universidad de Buenos Aires) On the evening of February 5, 1988, at the University of Heidelberg, three of the major and most influential figures of the 20th-century philosophy met in Heidelberg before a large audience. Fifty five years before, in the same lecture hall, Martin Heidegger, as Rector of the University of Freiburg, had given a speech that would be part of the firsts steps towards a running sore, "a wound in thought itself" [c'est une blessure de la pensée] in Maurice Blanchot's words[i], a proper caesura, entitled "Das Universität im neue Reich" [The University in the New Reich]. Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg-Gadamer, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, three unquestionable distinguished Heidegger's interpreters, came together that February of 1988 for over two days to discuss the philosophical and political implications of Martin Heidegger's thought and legacy, under a Gadamer's sign of hospitality: the encounter took place in the common linguistic territory of the French language. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference, edited by Mireille Calle-Gruber, and translated into English by Jeff Effort, collects the fruitful dialogues between these three thinkers and their exchanges with the audience during this unforgettable debate officially entitled "Heidegger: Portée philosophique et politique de sa pensée" [Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Dimensions of his Thought]. Days after the conference, once the text of the public debate was ready, Derrida, Gadamer, LacoueLabarthe, but also, Calle-Gruber-who was in charge of the presentation-and Reiner Wiehl-president 22/11/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http://reviews.ophen.org/2017/11/22/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 2/6 of the session-, all of them, agreed to defer the publication[ii]. Those were unquiet days: only a year before had been published the "spectacular" book by Víctor Farías, Heidegger et le nazisme[iii] (1987) and, by the time of the Heidelberg Conference-partially motivated by the whirlwind generated by the Farías' book-the media focus was as never before concentrated on Heidegger's documented Nazism (which was already known from the 1960s, provided by Guido Schneeberger[iv], as Gadamer remembers[v]). Both Lacoue-Labarthe[vi] and Gadamer[vii], as it is well known, had largely discussed Farías provocative book, and had considered that was written not without recourse to misrepresentations and malicious omissions. Farías also devoted himself to denounce not only Heidegger Nazism but the socalled "heideggerianism", especially what he understood as its French decline: Jean Beaufret and Jacques Derrida, both unfairly associated to Robert Faurisson and his revisionist-negationist theories regarding the non existence of gas chambers in the nazi concentration camps. Thus, the gadamerian decision that the conference be delivered in French, besides representing an act of generosity, acquires a new meaning. Derrida, Gadamer and Lacoue-Labarthe faced in this conference the complexities of the discussion on a shared ground, each resorting to their own considerations while attempting to set up a dialogue (despite the manifest intention, at least from Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe, of not giving a full account of their own most well-known published texts). To begin, Lacoue-Labarthe invoked his thesis on the confrontation, "the inmense debate", that Heidegger, after the rectorship at Freiburg, would have started with what National Socialism meant in the history of the West, through the calling of art into question and the deconstruction of Western aesthetics, that is to say, the understanding of the essence of tékhne [viii]. One of the central thesis of Lacoue-Labarthe, that is present in his participation in the conference, is that the question of art occupies a nodal place in Heidegger's self-interpretation of the enigma of his own political commitment, since it would constitute his self-confrontation with National Socialism, his own Auseinandersetzung subsequent to the experience of the Rectorship. After 1934, Heidegger introduces poetry and the poet figure as the main references for the reflection on the German identity and, in this way, Nietzsche's previous dominant influence begins its decline to give way to the new hero: Hölderlin. The terms in which the myth and the tragedy would be thus later understood will not be those of the great German mimetic dream of Greece proper to nazi Wagnero-Nietzscheanism, but those of Dichtung, Sprache and Sage, which, in turn, overflow the aesthetic determination of the poetic. Gadamer, contributed to the conference with both his irreplaceable reflections and testimonies, but also reopening the interrupted conversation started in April 1981 at the Paris Goethe Institute with Jacques Derrida. Therefore, Gadamer's intervention was focused, on one hand, in its testimony value, maybe because the questions of the audience had conducted him too much in this way. In this respect, "surprise" and "shock" are the recurrent adjectives he used for describing what was then in 1933 his reaction to Heidegger's Rectorship chair acceptation, indissociable of the latter's public nazi commitment, specially when he had seemed to Gadamer politically much closer to National-Bolshevikism[ix] (which, in the eyes of Gadamer, as political Movement, had not a biologicist discourse). The main hypothesis of Gadamer is that Heidegger really believed for a moment that the nazi revolution was the possibility of a true spiritual renovation, but once he understood Nazism had become not more than a "decadent revolution", it was for him no more his revolution, he felt no responsible at all for anything. And that would explain his great ambiguities: first of all, his silence. But also the responsibility with respect to the great number of colleagues and students who followed him in his political decision together with the disturbing contradiction of writing contemporary on the "forgetting of being", the predominance of technics and the devastating consequences of the industrial revolution.[x] On the other hand, Gadamer presented a critical point of view of Heidegger's path to the "fragmentation of metaphysical conceptualization by means of this force he exerted against words"[xi], that involved a similar consideration regarding to Derrida, and that allowed Gadamer to understand himself closer to Paul Celan and his sense of fragmentation. Derrida, for its part, during the conference superbly questioned Heidegger's own questions and avoidances, as well as the meaning of legacy and responsibility. He asserted-by way of an improvised and risky hypothesis, later shared by Lacoue-Labarthe and Gadamer-that Martin Heidegger's silence, his unforgivable silence in the face of the barbaric horror of Nazi extermination, is the legacy that has bequeathed us. In Derrida's words: 22/11/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http://reviews.ophen.org/2017/11/22/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 3/6 What I am saying here is very risky, and I risk it as a hypothesis, while asking you to accompany me in this risk. [...] with a phrase spoken in the direction of an easy consensus, Heidegger woul have closed the matter. [...] I believe that if he had let himself go for a statement, let's say, of immediate moral reaction, or of a declaration of horror, or of nonforgiveness-a declaration that would not itself be a work of thought at the level of all that he had already thought-, well, perhaps we would feel more easily spared the work that we have to do today: because we have to do this work. That is what we have inherited.[xii] This hypothesis is, ultimately, the beginning of a response, an answer to the question of responsibility of thought. On the one hand, improvisation would be a kind of responsibility by means of risking a disarmed speech.[xiii] On the other hand, to be heir to a legacy supposes always a response, the act of responding for not only a call not chosen, but also one that comes before oneself[xiv]. This is the call that Farías book wanted to mute, the path this book tried to close by doing a "case closed" out of the Heidegger nazi commitment. For this commitment was not in 1988 nor now something someone can put into question. Heidegger's Nazism is indisputable. But to be heir to a legacy in the sense Derrida expressed it means a response to the dogmatic question where Faría's book seem to lead: "is it posible yet to read Heidegger?". Somehow, today the 1988 scenario recurs. The publication for the first time of the Heidelberg Conference in 2014, in its French first edition[xv], concurrent with the beginning of the publication of the Schwartze Hefte in Germany, revealed a "dislocation" [décalage], as Jean-Luc Nancy has said[xvi], which comes not only from the very root of the problem itself, the relationship between Martin Heidegger and his political commitment with Nazism, but also from the mediatic racket generated by the very publication of the Schwartze Heftethemselves. The process, begun in 2014, of the gradual publication of the Schwartze Hefte, which are loaded with resounding anti-Semitic expressions (that occupy a new and important place in the philosophical work of Martin Heidegger, although are not the only elements of these books), challenges us today to think, demands pronouncements and explanations, in a climate of opportunism, confusion, obscurantism and controversy as it was that of the late eighties. Once again, the mass media (but not only the media) raise a false alternative that may be summarized as it follows: "If he was a great philosopher, then he was not a Nazi; if he was a Nazi, then he has not been a great philosopher"[xvii]. Thus, the task would be enormous for the heirs: none other than the terrifying and valuable mandate to think what Heidegger did not think, to say what he was not able to say[xviii], namely, the affinities and common roots among his thought, the essence of the West and Nazism; the subject of Nazism by itself; the basis for his National-Socialist engagement. Nowadays, the publication of the Schwartze Hefte came to dispel the silence, but did not liquidate the task. In any case, today there is no way to avoid the inevitable. As Donatella Di Cesare said: Even the stereotype of the philosopher lying in an impolitic conformity seems totally unmotivated. Heidegger was by no means a "conformist" and in the Black Notebooks-as in other works of the thirties-appears a politically radical philosopher. It will therefore be necessary to rewrite the chapter "Heidegger and politics" which promises to be much more complex than what has been assumed so far[xix]. That chapter today is beginning to be rewritten, little by little. To be sure, Donatella Di Cesare and Peter Trawny[xx]-editor of the Schwarze Hefte, published by Klostermann-provide today the most penetrating and accurate analysis on Heidegger's anti-Semitism (although each one from a different point of view). In particular, in direct relation to one of the main reflections that the publication of the Heidelberg Conference brings up, Di Cesare dedicated half of his Heidegger & Sons. Eredità e futuro di un filosofo (2015) to face the problem of Heidegger's legacy. Two paths seem to be shaped in the face of the intellectual inheritance of the German thinker. On the one hand, "orthodoxy", which either denies or trivializes the status of Heidegger's political statements, reacts with loyal impotence, marginalizing texts, problems, even people. On the other hand, a spectacular parade of pamphleteer whistleblowers sets out to hunt down the "Heideggerians", suspected subscribers of any action or omission of Heidegger. Of course, 22/11/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http://reviews.ophen.org/2017/11/22/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 4/6 these are false options that take us to just a single alternative: refusing to think. For, as Di Cesare affirms, "an inheritance is never something that can be either fully received or, on the contrary, totally refuted"[xxi]. We are heirs, whether we want it or not; that means having to learn to be both faithful and unfaithful[xxii]. Reading Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference will not dissipate the new questions that the publication of the Schwartze Hefteopened, but may give us both a vision of a path that must be understood as well as an understanding of some initial conclusions of three major philosophers that should be necessary overcome if we are really willing to confront once again to the challenges posed by Martin Heidegger's thought. References: Blanchot, Maurice. "Notre compagne clandestine", in Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas (Paris: J.-M. Place, 1980). Cohen, Richard A. Face to face with Lévinas (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986). Derrida, Jacques, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference (Fordham University Press, 2016). Di Cesare, Donatella. Heidegger e gli ebrei. I «Quaderni neri»(Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2014). Di Cesare, Donatella. Heidegger & sons: eredità e futuro di un filosofo (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2015). [i] Cohen, Richard A. Face to face with Lévinas (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 43. Originally in Blanchot, Maurice, "Notre compagne clandestine", in Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas (Paris: J.-M. Place, 1980), 81. [ii] Derrida, Jacques, Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference (Fordham University Press, 2016), xiii. [iii] Farías, Víctor. Heidegger et le nazisme (Paris: Verdier, 1987). [iv] Schneeberger, Guido. Nachlese zu Heidegger (Bern: Suhr, 1962). [v] Derrida, Jacques, Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference, 63. [vi] "Sur le livre de Victor Farias, Heidegger et le nazisme", in Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. La fiction du politique: Heidegger, lart et la politique (París: Christian Bourgois, [1987] 1998), 173-188. The text resumes with some modifications an article appeared in the Journal Littéraire: "Le procès Heidegger", Le Journal Littéraire, no. 2: 115-117, December 1987-January 1988. [vii] Published originally as "Zurück von Syrakus?", in Die Heidegger-Kontroverse, ed. Jürg Altwegg (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1988), 176-79; later was published in French in Le Nouvel Observateur, January 22-28, 1988, translated by Geneviève Carcopino. It was also translated into English as "Back from Syracuse?," trans. John McCumber, Critical Inquiry15, no. 2 (Winter 1989): 427-30. The English version of Gadamer's text was included in the edition here reviewed. 22/11/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http://reviews.ophen.org/2017/11/22/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 5/6 [viii] Derrida, Jacques, Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference, 37-38. [ix] Ibid., 64-75. [x] Ibid., 11-12. [xi] Ibid., 41. [xii] Ibid., 35-36. [xiii] Ibid., 16. [xiv] Ibid., 65-68. [xv] Derrida, Jacques, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Mireille Calle-Gruber. La conférence de Heidelberg, 1988: Heidegger, portée philosophique et politique de sa pensée (Paris: Lignes, 2014). [xvi] Derrida, Jacques, Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference, vii. [xvii] Di Cesare, Donatella. Heidegger e gli ebrei. I «Quaderni neri» (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2014), 3. All Di Cesare's translations by Facundo Bey. [xviii] Derrida, Jacques, Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference, 35. [xix] Di Cesare, Donatella. Heidegger & sons: eredità e futuro di un filosofo (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2015), 79. [xx] Trawny, Peter. Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 2015). [xxi] Di Cesare, Heidegger & sons, 33. [xxii] Di Cesare, Heidegger & sons, 33-34. PUBLICADO POR Facundo Bey Ph. D. Candidate in Philosophy (UNSAM). Political Scientist (UBA). Political Science Adjunct Professor (USAL). Researcher (CIF, UBA). Scholar (CONICET). 22/11/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http://reviews.ophen.org/2017/11/22/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 6/