L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Rugmini Ammal (Dead) By Lrs vs V. Narayana Reddiar & Ors

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

4. A counter-affidavit was filed in CMP No.35930 of 1998. In the counter-affidavit, it was stated that Exh. R4(a) was produced before the Government and Exh. P5 order itself goes to show that this was produced before the Government. The fabrication of Exh.R4(a) was denied. A reply affidavit was filed in which Rugmini Ammal denied the execution of certain documents signed by Reddiar and produced by the appellant in the writ appeal. The prayer in CMP No.35930 of 1998 was to conduct enquiry into the production of Exh.R4(a) forged document and made a complaint thereof and forward it to the Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction.

5. Learned Single Judge relied on the opinion given by the handwriting expert and prima facie came to the conclusion that Exts.R4(a), R4(e), R4(i) and R4(j) were fabricated and hence there is a reasonable likelihood to establish the offences punishable under Sections 463, 471, 475 and 476 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the IPC). The learned Single Judge directed the Registrar of the Court to make a complaint for the purpose in writing and send it to the Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction. Against that order the writ appeal was filed.

6. Stand of the appellant before the High Court was that proceedings under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Cr.P.C.) cannot be initiated because there was no allegation that the fabrication was made after the document was produced. Certain other stands were also taken with which we are not very much concerned.

(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and
Kare vs Brajendra

The respondent filed an application under the Rajasthan Debt Recovery Act for recovery of Rs.15,000/- from the appellant. In the application, the respondent gave the appellant's address at village Abar, tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur (Rajasthan). Notice was issued to the appellant at the address given in the application but the same was not served, apparently because the appellant was residing in the locality called Shantinagar of village Dhara, tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur (Rajasthan). On 26.8.2005, the Debt Recovery Court (Civil Judge) ordered ex-parte proceedings against the appellant and finally passed decree dated 16.12.1985 in favour of the respondent for a sum of Rs.16,687.80 payable by the appellant in by- annual installments of Rs.1,500/- each. On coming to know of the ..../2- -2- ex-parte decree, the appellant filed an application for setting aside the same by asserting that he was residing at Shantinagar, village Dhara, for last 10 years and he had not been served with the notice of the application filed by the respondent. By an order dated 26.5.1994, Civil Judge, Bharatpur dismissed the application. Appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by Additional District Judge No.1, Bharatpur vide his order dated 24.2.1999 and the High Court upheld that order by observing that the dismissal of the appellant's application for setting aside ex-parte decree does not suffer from any illegality.

....3/-

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned orders and ex-parte decree are set aside and the application filed by the respondent is restored to the file of Debt Recovery Court (Civil Judge) for fresh decision.
P.V. Nageswara Rao vs State Of A.P. & Anr

The appellant preferred this appeal against an order passed by the High Court. The appellant was formerly a judicial officer in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The appellant dealt with a criminal case as Assistant Sessions Judge, Gurazala, Guntur District and the appellant convicted an accused for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. The accused thereafter preferred an appeal before the High Court and the learned Single Judge, while disposing of the appeal preferred by the accused, made certain observations against the appellant herein. It was held by the learned Single Judge that the appellant herein, while disposing of the criminal case, relied on an inquest report as substantive evidence thereby committed a mistake and observed that the appellant did not know the fundamentals of criminal law and also directed that these remarks be communicated to the said officer. -2-

The appeal is allowed accordingly.

...................CJI (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN) .....................J (P. SATHASIVAM) .....................J (MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) NEW DELHI;

MAY 04, 2009.
Lehja Bai (D) Thru Lrs vs Sewanti Bai & Anr

3. Sewanti Bai filed a suit for partition and separate possession of her share in the joint family properties, in the year 1989. She impleaded her mother-in- 2 law Lehja Bai as the first defendant, four sisters-in-law as defendants 2 to 5 and the State of Madhya Pradesh as defendant no.6. Defendants 2 to 5 resisted the suit inter alia on the ground that the deceased Ganaram had left a will dated 22.2.1983 bequeathing the suit properties in their favour.

4. The suit was decreed by the trial court by judgment and decree dated 21.12.1999 declaring that Sewanti Bai was entitled to 7/12th share in the suit schedule properties and directing division by metes and bounds through the Revenue Authorities. The trial court also declared that the will dated 22.2.1983 was not valid nor binding on the plaintiff. Feeling aggrieved, defendants 1 to 5 filed an appeal before the District Judge, Chhindwara (MP). In the said appeal, Sewanti Bai filed cross objections contending that she was entitled to mesne profits from the date of the suit to the date of possession. The first appellate court by judgment dated 14.2.2003, dismissed both the appeal and cross objections thereby confirming the decision of the trial court.

9. As Lehja Bai died after the decision of the High Court, her one-third share will now devolve upon her four daughters equally. Consequently each of them will have another 1/12th share in addition to their 1/12th each, that is 1/6th each.

10. We accordingly allow this appeal and modify the judgments and decrees of the courts below holding that the share of plaintiff in the joint family properties is 1/3rd (one-third) and the share of each of defendants 2 to 5 is 1/6th (one-sixth). The trial court's decree for division and separate possession of plaintiff's share remains undisturbed. Draw up preliminary decree accordingly. Parties to bear their respective costs.

May 4, 2009.
Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs Daya Sapra

Respondent urged that the appellant had met her husband who was a property dealer in connection with some business who made a representation that pertaining to the same deal the police had to be bribed, whereafter on 10-08-1999 the appellant accompanied by one Ms. Malhotra, retired ACP 3 and his son came to the office of her husband and forcibly took the cheque in question from her husband since the cheque book was with him.

7. By reason of the impugned Judgment the High Court allowed the said writ petition. The High Court in arriving at its finding applied the principles of res-judicata. It also opined that the suit filed by the appellant was nothing but an abuse of the process of law.

26. Any finding in a criminal proceeding by no stretch of imagination would be binding in a civil proceeding.

27. If a primacy is given to a criminal proceeding, indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own keeping in view the evidence which has been brought on record before it and not in terms of the evidence brought in the criminal proceeding.

32. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, we have no doubt in our mind that principles of res judicata are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.

33. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.

May 5, 2009
Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia & Ors vs State Of Punjab & Ors

Appellant No.1 is the husband of the respondent No.3. The other appellants are his parents.

Almost immediately thereafter, that is, on 21.5.2000, respondent No.3 and appellant No.1 got married at Jalandhar as per Sikh rites.

Disputes and differences arose between the appellant No.1 and the respondent No.3 in the year 2003. Allegedly, she left with all her belongings and withdrew Canadian $ 24500 from the joint account of the parties.

However, differences between them were sorted out and respondent No.3 affirmed an affidavit on or about 30.9.2003 admitting her mistake, stating:

Disputes and differences again arose between the parties in the year 2006 as a result whereof they started living separately with effect from 29.3.2006.

It is only thereafter, the father of the respondent No. 3, namely Inter Pal Singh, a retired Police Inspector and permanent resident of Canada, while on a trip to India, lodged a complaint against the appellants under Section 406/420 IPC on or about 21.4.2006 along with an affidavit of respondent No.3 inter alia alleging that the appellants demanded dowry and misappropriated the dowry articles.

Indisputably, an FIR bearing No. 141 dated 30.5.2006 was registered under Section 406/420 IPC at Division No. 4, Jalandhar.

4. However, despite the same, a charge-sheet was issued. In the mean time, divorce application filed by the appellant in Canada, were allowed by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice by its order dated 19.10.2007.

7. The allegations made in the FIR show that the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 could go to Canada on joint sponsorship of the appellant No.1 as also the respondent No.3. It is only at Canada that alleged demand of a sum of Rs.5 lakhs was made on the premise that they intended to buy some property. In the FIR, it was alleged that she left her residence for attending her duties at about 0630 hrs in the morning on 29.3.2006 leaving behind her husband as also two kids aged 5 and 9 years. However, when she returned home around 1700 hrs, she found some articles missing. She was admittedly informed by the concerned police officers telephonically as regards the filing of divorce petition by the appellant and, thus, she should not bother him anymore. It is only thereafter the first informant Inder Pal Singh came to India and lodged the FIR. He is a retired police officer. In his report, he alleged: 9

Does this case come within the purview of the aforementioned dicta is the question.

16. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed.

May 5, 2009
Ram Suresh Singh vs Prabhat Singh @ Chhotu Singh & Anr

5. A xerox copy of another certificate dated 12.11.2003 was also brought on record which was issued by the Principal, Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav High School. The said certificate also shows the date of birth of the first 3 respondent to be 10.02.1987. It was proved by a teacher of the said school, Shri Raj Kumar who examined himself as PW -2 as also by the father of the accused, namely, Raj Kishore Singh.

6. The learned Magistrate, however, appointed a Medical Board. The Medical Board, in its report dated 10th February 2005, inter alia, upon taking ossification test, estimated his age to be within 20 to 22 years.

By an order dated 03rd August 2005, the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Patna held that on the date of occurrence, i.e., 10th September 2003, the age of the respondent no.1 was more than 20 years stating :

17. Even if we had to consider the medical report, it is now well known that an error of two years in determining the age is possible.

However, the medical opinion rendered in this case corroborates the entry made in the register. Admission register of the school having been proved in accordance with law, we do not see any reason as to why the same should not be taken into consideration.

22. As in this case, the date of birth entered into the school register has been proved, we are of the opinion that there is no reason as to why the same should not be given effect to.

23. We, therefore, find no legal infirmity in the order passed by the High Court. This appeal is dismissed.

May 5, 2009
State Of Chhatisgarh & Ors vs Dhirjo Kumar Sengar

6. However, despite the fact that his application for grant of compassionate appointment was rejected by the Joint Director, a purported order of compassionate appointment came to be passed in his favour by the Deputy Director (Education). The said offer of appointment, however, was cancelled by an order dated 9.06.1997, stating:

7. Respondent filed an Original Application before the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal questioning the validity of the said order dated 9.06.1997, which by reason of an order dated 5.06.2000 was dismissed, holding:

The nephew of the deceased employee, therefore, was ineligible for grant of such appointment.

(Emphasis supplied)

23. The High Court, therefore, must be held to have committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment.

25. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 10,000/-.

May 5, 2009
Union Of India & Ors vs M/S Martin Lottery Agencies Ltd

3. Respondents are agents of the State of Sikkim. The State Government floated "schemes" whereby the total number of tickets therefor was 2 prescribed. In terms of the said schemes, the respondent purchases all lottery tickets in bulk form on "all sold basis". It pays Rs.70 per ticket for the face value of Rs.100/-. In turn, it sells the ticket to its principal stockists on "outright" and "all sold basis": It makes a profit out of the margin out of the difference between the amounts received from the principal stockists and the amounts paid to the State Government. The principal stockists in turn sell the tickets to the sub-stockist and who in turn sell to the agents. The retailers purchase tickets from the agents and in turn sell the same to the ultimate participants of the draw.

However, it was concluded that the activities of the distributor are that of promotion or marketing of lottery tickets for their client (i.e. the State Governments) and, thus, would be exigible to service tax under the heading `business auxiliary service'.

Since both the parties are also solver, no interim order is called for.

The said writ petition was posted for hearing on 18.9.2007 and by reason of an order of the said date, the writ petition was allowed, directing:

26. We are informed at the Bar that, in fact, States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka have barred lottery.

19. When the Explanation seeks to give an artificial meaning 'earned in India' and bring about a change effectively in the existing law and in addition is stated to come into force with effect from a future date, there is no principle of interpretation which would justify reading the Explanation as operating retrospectively."

(Emphasis supplied)

36. It is, therefore, evident that by reason of an explanation, a substantive law may also be introduced. If a substantive law is introduced, it will have no retrospective effect.

The notice issued to the assessee by the appellant has, thus, rightly been held to be liable to be set aside. Subject to the constitutionality of the Act, in view of the explanation appended to this, we are of the opinion that the service tax, if any, would be payable only with effect from May, 2008 and not with retrospective effect.

38. For the views we have taken, we have no other option but to hold that the High Court judgment albeit for different reasons warrants no interference. This appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee assessed at Rs.1,00,000/-.

May 5, 2009
Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai And Ors vs State Of Gujarat And Ors

The High Court, however, upon taking note of the fact that at the relevant point of time, an administrator had been functioning under the direct control and supervision of the District Registrar, Co-operative Societies, in absence of any allegation that he had exercised his power mala fide, declined to interfere with the said order dated 6.7.2004, stating : 4

12. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained which are set aside accordingly. Other impugned judgments have been passed by the High Court relying on the judgment and order passed in SCRLA No.701 of 2005. It is, however, made clear that we have not entered into the merit of the matter. We furthermore make it clear that in the event the accused persons intend to question the legality of the order passed by the learned Magistrate dated 11.6.2004, they will be at liberty to take recourse to the remedies available to them in law.

13. The appeals are allowed accordingly.

May 5, 2009
Pradeep Chaudhary & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors

5. The Central Government, however, having regard to the fact that the First Schedule appended to the said Bill did not contain any particular, with a view to rectify the mistake, by a letter dated 10.3.2000 issued an amendment whereby the details to be mentioned in the First Schedule thereto were specified. It reads as under :

6. The said Bill was placed before the State Legislature of Uttar Pradesh on 30.3.2000. It came up for discussions on 6.4.2000. A resolution was adopted that the areas of Haridwar, as specified in the First Schedule of the Bill should be deleted and should not form part of the State of Uttaranchal, stating :

One of the other members Shri Bansi Dhar Bhagat stated :

Yet again, Shri Tilak Raj Behrar in his speech, stated :

Shri Ambrish Kumar, who was a Member of the State Assembly and filed a separate writ application which has been dismissed for default stated :

The term `consultation' means differently in different context. While a power to introduce the Bill is kept with the Parliament, consultation with the State Legislature although is mandatory but its recommendations were not binding on the Parliament. `Consultation' in a case of this nature would not mean concurrence. It only means to ask or seek for the views of a person on any given subject. The views of the State Legislature certainly would be taken into consideration but the same would not mean that the Parliament would be bound thereby. Substantive compliance of the said provision shall serve the purpose. What is mandatory is that the President may refer the Bill to the Legislative Assembly for obtaining its views but it will bear repetition to state that the Parliament would not be bound by the views of the State Legislature and even in a case where substantive amendment is carried out, the amended Parliamentary Bill need not be referred to the State Legislature again for obtaining its fresh views. 15

23. In view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in this application.

24. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

May 5, 2008
Omprakash & Ors vs Radhacharan & Ors

2. One Smt. Narayani Devi was married to one Dindayal Sharma in the year 1955. She became widow within three months of her marriage. Concededly, she was driven out of her matrimonial home immediately after the death of her husband. After that she never stayed in her matrimonial home. At her parental home, she was given education. She 2 got an employment. She died intestate on 11.7.1996. She had various bank accounts; she left a huge sum also in her provident fund account.

section (1) applies, then after the death of Santi, Indro can not inheritance by succession but it would go to the heirs of the pre-deceased husband of Santi."

12. For the aforementioned reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.

May 5, 2009
Chandrakant Hargovindas Shah vs The Deputy Commissioner Of Police & Anr

3. Appellant herein was a renowned sports person engaged in the sport of shooting since 1988 and has been participating in the shooting events at 2 national and international levels. He has consistently been awarded the certificate of "Renowned Shot" in the categories of small bore 10 meter rifle and pistol, 25 meter all pistol events, 50 meter rifle events, 12 bore trap and skeet events and 300 meter rifle events.

5. It further appears that during the period 1996 to 2005, he had bought and sold rifles and pistols for 36 times, the details whereof are as under :

11. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay. Having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority was not a speaking one, the Division 9 Bench of the High Court, by reason of the order dated 17th January 2006, set aside the said order and remitted the matter to the appellate authority on the premise that no reason had been assigned as to why one licence was being denied to the appellant. By reason of an order dated 19 th June 2006, the appellate authority, however, directed cancellation of both the arms licences of the appellant and thereby confirmed the order dated 04th April 2005 passed by the respondent no.1.

12. A writ petition was filed by the appellant thereagainst which, by reason of the impugned judgment, has been dismissed.

22. We, therefore, keeping in view the frequency of the transactions, are of the view that the statutory authorities were justified in passing the impugned orders cancelling the licences.

23. Ordinarily in a case of this nature, we would have remitted the matter back to the licensing authority so as to enable the appellant to satisfy it with regard to his bonafide or otherwise in respect of the transactions, but, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the same would be a futile exercise. This Court, as is well 15 known, would not pass any order which would make a statutory authority to comply with only useless formalities. We would, however, request the appellate authority to consider the question as to whether the appellant, being a sportsman, can be granted any licence so as to enable him to carry out his sporting activities. Such licence may be granted on such terms and conditions as are permissible in law, provided that an application is made in accordance with the law.

24. The appeal is dismissed with the aforementioned observations. No costs.

May 05, 2009
Shrishti Narain Jha vs Bindeshwar Jha & Ors

3. Background facts in a nutshell as project by the prosecution are as follows:

The prosecution witnesses stated that they identified the appellants by a lantern. The High Court found it highly improbable that they could identify such a large number of accused persons with the light of a lantern. Though the investigating officer during investigation did not find any lantern or sign of any lantern. The High Court ultimately concluded that the case of the prosecution is not established by cogent evidence and, therefore, it would not be desirable to place reliance on the prosecution evidence and accordingly directed acquittal.

9. The judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity. The appeal fail and are dismissed. ............