L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Andhra Bank Thro Reg.Manager,Visakha vs I.T.-Cum-Labour Court & Anr

2. The Central Government vide its order dated 1st July, 1971 declared Vishakhapatnam as a Group "A" city. As a consequence of the aforesaid declaration, the staff of the appellant bank claimed certain additional benefits such as house accommodation, house rent allowance etc. While some 2 of the other nationalized banks extended the benefits to their employees, the Andhra Bank declined to do so on the plea, inter alia, that it was running into huge losses and was unable to meet the additional burden. These differences led to protracted conciliation proceedings before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Vishakhapatnam, but no concrete solution was arrived at. The Central Government thereupon referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The respondent management i.e. present appellant filed a written statement before the Industrial Tribunal questioning the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the reference and further clarifying that on account of several awards such as the Shastri Award, the Desai Award and several bipartite settlements arrived at between the Bank and its employees from time to time, there was no obligation on the bank to give the benefits arising out of the declaration dated 1st July, 1971. The Industrial Tribunal held that there were two points for consideration:

5. Aggrieved by the award of the Industrial Tribunal and the judgment of the High Court, the Andhra Bank is before us in appeal.

(TARUN CHATTERJEE) .................................J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI) New Delhi Dated: May 9, 2008
Hardeep Singh And Ors. vs State Of Haryana

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

3. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed. Since the accused persons pleaded innocence, the trial was held. As noted above, the appellants were convicted while Gurcharan Singh was acquitted. Appeal was filed by the State and the present appellants and the revision was filed by the complainant.

16. We find that the evidence of PWs 7 & 8 clearly establishes the roles played by the Hardeep Singh and Harjinder Singh. It is also clear from the prosecution evidence that on hearing of the exhortation of the acquitted Gurcharan Singh, Jaswinder Singh and Harjinder Singh had given blows on the legs of the deceased. After he fell down, Hardeep Singh gave blow on the head. Similarly Harjinder Singh also gave blows on the head. After the deceased fell down Jaswinder Singh did not attack on any vital part of the deceased's body. He assaulted on the arm of the deceased. In the aforesaid circumstances, while appeal filed by the accused appellants Hardeep and Harjinder Singh is dismissed, the appropriate conviction of Jaswinder Singh would be under Section 304 Part II IPC. His conviction is accordingly altered. Custodial sentence of eight years would meet the ends of justice.

17. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
New India Assurance Co.Ltd vs Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir & Anr

3. One Majothee Salim Amadbhai was holder of a licence of a three wheeler. The licence was not meant to be used to drive transport vehicle. The vehicle was owned by one Rashmikant Natvarlal Joshi, Respondent No.2. The Tribunal correctly noticed the description of the class of vehicle, i.e., an Autorikshaw Delivery Van. It was not being used for a private purpose. It was a commercial vehicle. Respondent No.2, admittedly, entered into a contract of insurance in respect of the said vehicle. Certificate of insurance shows that the vehicle was a goods carrying public carrier within the meaning of Rule 51 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.

15. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The same is set aside accordingly. However, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct that the appellant may satisfy the award in favour of the claimants to recover the same from the owner. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions. No costs.

May 12, 2008
State Of Punjab & Ors vs Avtar Singh (Dead) By Lrs

3. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are recapitulated as under:-

4. The respondent was appointed on probation for a period of three years in the Punjab Police in 1989. In July, 1992, he was sent to Barnala, Punjab to attend a departmental enquiry. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Barnala relieved the respondent on 1.8.1992 with the direction to report at his place of posting, but the respondent did not report at his place of posting, therefore, he was marked absent from 1.8.1992 to 19.9.1992. The respondent joined the duty on 20.9.1992 after one month and two days and again remained absent from 7.10.1992. The respondent remained absent for a long period without any permission from the senior officers which is a serious act of misconduct according to the police discipline rules. In these circumstances, the respondent was dismissed from service w.e.f. 1.11.1992 under rule 12.21 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934.

7. The State of Punjab aggrieved by the said judgment and decree preferred an appeal. The said appeal was also dismissed. According to the appellants, the appeal was dismissed without considering the Punjab Police Rule 12.21. Under the said rule, an employee of disciplined forces can be removed from services any time within three years of the enrolment. The Appellate Court held that an opportunity has to be afforded to the delinquent official because the dismissal from the service carries a serious stigma.

8. The State of Punjab preferred a regular second appeal contending that the question of absence from duty without prior permission of the Senior Officer is an act of grave misconduct. The Punjab Police Rules, 1934 permit that an 4 inefficient constable may be discharged by the Superintendent of Police at any time within three years of the enrolment. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the regular second appeal on the ground that the impugned order of discharge was stigmatic and respondent was not given a fair opportunity and secondly absence from duty could not be viewed as culpable as in the same order the Senior Superintendent of Police, (for short `SSP'), Barnala has condoned respondent's absence from the duty. The State of Punjab aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court has preferred the present appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.

14. Consequently, the appeal filed by the State of Punjab is allowed, but in the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.

May 12, 2008.
M/S Sheikhar Hotels Gulmohar ... vs State Of U.P & Ors

3. The first question which was agitated before the High Court was that dispensing with requirement of Section 5-A of the Act was arbitrary. The Division Bench of the High Court after referring to couple of decisions of this Court took the view that the urgency shown for invoking Section 5-A was justified as it was necessary to remove the traffic congestion. It was also found that there was no co-relation between the argument and the pleadings contained in the writ petition. The High Court found that there was no infirmity in the impugned notifications. Hence this appeal on grant of special leave.

5. Now, reverting to the facts of this case also as pointed out above, this acquisition was made under the Master Plan prepared under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act and the same got approval of the National Capital Region Planning Board and loan was sanctioned by the Board and out of which Rs.17.42 crores have already been spent. In this given case, we are of opinion that invocation of Section 17(4) read with Section 5-A of the Act was well warranted and we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.

.....................................J [A.K. MATHUR] .................................
State Of Uttaranchal Thru. Secretary vs Sehnaz Mirza & Ors

By reason of the said Act, the new State of Uttaranchal (now known as Uttarakhand) came into being with effect from the appointed day, specified therein, i.e., 9.11.2000.

7. Respondents thereafter filed a contempt petition before the Uttaranchal High Court which was marked as Contempt Petition No. 15 of 2004, which was entertained.

13. We, as at present advised, leave the matter at that.

14. We, however, do not agree with the submission of Dr. Dubey that the State of Uttarakhand has no locus standi to maintain the application. It may be that the contempt petition has been filed against individuals. They, however, could not have maintained this appeal in terms of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act as neither any order of punishment has been passed nor any final order has yet been passed.

The State of Uttarakhand is required to comply with the order. The financial burden would be on it. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it could maintain the special leave petition keeping in view the question of law arising herein, as it is otherwise a person aggrieved.

15. The order of the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dated 29.10.2003 being not in conformity with Sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the 2000 Act, evidently, the Uttaranchal High Court could not have entertained the second contempt petition. But, setting aside the said order, by itself, would not subserve the ends of justice. Justice would be subserved if one High Court or the other goes into the merit of the contempt application. We, therefore, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, while setting aside the impugned orders as set aside the order dated 29.10.2003 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court and direct that the proceedings before the Allahabad High Court, shall stand revived. The Allahabad High Court either may continue to proceed in the matter or the Chief Justice of the said High Court may transfer the proceedings before the Uttaranchal High Court.

16. The appeals are allowed to the aforementioned extent. No costs.
Kashmir Singh vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.

2. The Act was applicable to the entire territories of the undivided State of Punjab including PEPSU. By reason of the provisions of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956, the State of Himachal Pradesh was constituted, having been carved out from the State of Punjab.

5. In terms of the provisions of the Act, the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") was constituted. Appellant was appointed as a member of the Commission in terms of a notification dated 4.07.1989. He was elected the President thereof. Along with him one S. Dara Singh and S. Raghbir Singh were also appointed as members of the Commission.

6. A new Board was constituted on 21.11.1996. While the Commission was functioning with the said members, the State of Punjab issued a notification on 6.01.1999 whereby and whereunder all the members including the appellant were removed and in their places S. Man Mohan Singh, S. Amrik Singh and S. Ajwant Singh Mann were appointed.

7. A writ petition was filed thereagainst in January, 1999. During pendency of the said writ petition, the State of Punjab issued two more notifications on or about 12.01.1999. By reason of the first notification issued under Sections 70 and 71 of the Act, the notification dated 6.01.1999 was rescinded and by reason of the second notification, the Commission was reconstituted.

13. The Five-Judge Bench heard the matter for some time and reserved its judgment on 24.05.2001. On or about 5.07.2002, however, the purported notification dated 12.01.1999 was withdrawn and the Commission was restored. Appellant herein filed an application for withdrawal of the said writ petition which having been opposed, by an order dated 16.07.2002, permission to withdraw the said writ petition was refused.

45. We are not unmindful of the opinion of the learned Chief Justice of the High Court that the term shall come to an end when no dispute would remain pending before the Commission.

56. It may be true that the Court shall not interfere with the judicial authority. It should be allowed to function independently and impartially, but at the same time it cannot be allowed to continue in perpetuity. A balance, thus, must be struck.

58. The State of Punjab, in this appeal, also opposes the appellant's contention.

65. The term `from time to time' should be given an effective and purposeful meaning. If any other meaning is assigned, Sub-section (3) of Section 70 and Sub-section (1) of Section 72 would be rendered otiose. We cannot, thus, agree with the contention of Mr. Patwalia.

68. Articles 245 or 246 or for that matter, Articles 73 and 172 of the Constitution of India will have no application.

70. For the reasons aforementioned, Civil Appeal Nos. 7024 of 2002 and 8171-8172 of 2003 are dismissed and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 20803 of 2002 as also Civil Appeal Nos. 5546 of 2003, 8169-8170 of 2003 and 3162-3165 of 2004 are allowed. No costs.
Union Of India (Uoi) vs Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. And Ors.

2. First respondent is a pharmaceutical company and is engaged in the manufacture, inter alia, of the bulk drug Pentazocine in the formulation of Pentazocine injection with the brand name `Fortwin'. Sale and marketing of the said drug is controlled by the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1995 (1995 Order). The said order has been made by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (1955 Act). We may notice some interpretation clauses in the 1955 Act, which are as under:

2(r) "price list" means a price list referred to in paragraphs 14 and 15 and includes a supplementary price list;

3. The drug in question is one of the scheduled bulk drugs being at Sl. No. 43 in the First Schedule.

6. The exemption granted in favour of the first respondent had expired on 31st October, 1999.

8. As the said reply was found to be unsatisfactory, the first respondent was asked to deposit the alleged over charged amount with interest @ 15% per annum as provided under Section 7A of the 1955 Act.

29. There is no merit in this appeal which fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 50,000/-.
Dcm Financial Services Ltd vs J.N.Sareen & Anr

First Respondent herein was a Director of a Company known as M/s. International Agro Allied Products Ltd. (the Company). It had purchased certain agricultural equipments on hire purchase/lease from on 3rd April, 1995. As a part of the said transaction some post dated cheques were issued in favour of the appellant herein towards the payment of monthly hire/rental.

First Respondent admittedly resigned from the Directorship of the Company on or about 25th May, 1996. It was accepted. One of the said post dated cheques which was issued in April, 1995 was dated 28th January, 1998 amounting to Rs.2,01,298/-, when presented to the bank by the appellant for encashment, was dishonoured. Pursuant thereto a notice for payment was issued. Amount having not been paid despite service of notice, a complaint petition was filed under Section 138 of the Act. It was inter alia averred therein :-

4. No allegation was made in the complaint petition that the 1st respondent was a signatory to the cheque or he was authorized therefor. 4

The Criminal Revision Application filed thereagainst, as indicated hereinbefore, has been dismissed.

amount to the payee within 15 days from the date of receipt of notice.

17. We are, however, concerned with a different situation hereat.

[Emphasis supplied]

22. When post dated cheques are issued and the same are accepted, although it may be presumed that the money will be made available in 17 the bank when the same is presented for encashment, but for that purpose, the harsh provision of constructive liability may not be available except when an appropriate case in that behalf is made out.

24. For the reasons abovementioned we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment.

25. The appeal fails and is dismissed.

.....J. ( Dr. Mukundakam Sharma ) New Delhi May 13, 2008
United India Insurance Co.Ltd vs Ajay Sinha & Anr

12. First respondent carries on business in electrical goods. He is an authorized distributor of Sony products. He entered into a contract of insurance with the appellant company; the period covered thereunder being 29th August, 2001 to 31st August, 2002. Allegedly, a burglary took place in his godown in the night of 18th /19th August, 2002. He lodged a First Information Report with Doranda Police Station, Ranchi. He also submitted a claim with the appellant alleging that in the said burglary, goods worth Rs.11,14,597/- had been stolen away. 9

13. Appellant denied and disputed the said claim which refuted the claims by a letter dated 12th August, 2004 interlia stating :-

15. We may, however, notice that respondent being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the purported repudiation of his claim filed an application before the District Consumer Forum claiming a sum of Rs.18,45,697.50 from the appellant. It was not entertained on the premise that deficiency in service had occurred in connection with a commercial contract.

27. The validity of the said provision is not in question. But then construction of such a provision must be given in such a manner so as make it prima facie reasonable. With that end in view let us consider the meaning of the word "relating to an offence". We will assume that in a given case the dispute between the service provider and the service 22 recipient may not have anything to do with the ultimate result of the criminal case but there are cases and cases.

39. Therefore, in the instant case, the terms "relating to" an "offence" appearing in Proviso 1 must be interpreted broadly, and as the determination before the Permanent Lok Adalat will involve the question as to whether or not an offence, which is non-compoundable in nature, has indeed been committed, this case falls outside the jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat.

41. For the reasons abovementioned the order of the High Court cannot be sustained and is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
State Of Punjab vs Prem Sagar & Ors

4. The High Court, however, by reason of the impugned judgment purported to be upon taking into consideration the fact that the offence was committed in the year 1987 and the appeal was dismissed in the year 1992, thought it fit to give an opportunity to the respondents to reform themselves, observing:

5. On the said premise, the respondents were directed to be released on probation on their executing a bond of Rs. 20,000/- with one surety each of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Judge.

12. Recently, in State of Karnataka v. Raju [2007 (11) SCALE 114], where the facts of the case were that the Trial Court imposed custodial sentence of seven years after convicting the respondent for rape of minor under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code; on appeal, the High Court reduced the sentence of the respondent to three and half years.

He also advocated:

[See Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, Second edition "Sentencing guidelines" Kevin R. Reitz]

Guidelines sentence, he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variation."

26. Although ordinarily, we would not interfere the quantum of sentence in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, but in a case of this nature we are of the opinion that the High Court having committed a serious error, interest of justice would be subserved if the decision of the High Court is set aside and the respondent is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- is imposed, in default to undergo imprisonment for a further period of one month.

27. The Appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. 21

May 13, 2008
National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Kaushalaya Devi & Ors

2. Kishan Lal (deceased) was traveling in a truck bearing registration No.HP-11-1448 on 16.3.2000. He was aged about 27 years. He was unmarried. The said truck met with an accident. 2

By reason of the impugned judgment, whereas the contention of the appellant-insurance company was upheld, having regard to the fact that the amount awarded in favour of the first respondent had already been deposited, it was directed to be released in favour of the claimant with liberty to the insurance company to recover the said amount along with interest from the owner by filing an appropriate application for 3 execution before the Tribunal without being required to file a separate suit.

The High Courts/Commissions shall now consider the mater afresh in the light of the position in law as delineated above.

14. For the reasons aforementioned, Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 10694 is allowed and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 9910 of 2006 is dismissed. If the amount deposited by the insurance company has since been withdrawn by the first respondent, it would be open to the insurance company to recover the same in the manner specified by the High Court. But if the same has not been withdrawn the deposited amount may be refunded to the insurance company and the proceedings for realization of the amount may be initiated against the owner of the vehicle. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.

May 13, 2008
Ramachandran vs R. Udhayakumar & Ors

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court on a petition filed by respondent no.1 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short `the Code'). The prayer was to direct the respondent no.2 the State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Secretary, Government of Home Department to withdraw the litigation in Crime no.39/2004 on the file of Inspector of Police, Palayanoor Police Station, Sivagangai District and to entrust the same to the file of Central Bureau of Investigation (in short `CBI'). They are respondent nos.5 and 6 in the present appeal. Respondent no.1 had filed the petition seeking for direction to re- investigate the case by the CBI in an alleged case of murder by respondent no.1. There were totally 59 witnesses in the case. The High Court disposed of the petition, inter alia, with the following directions:

7. In view of the position of law as indicated above, the directions of the High Court for re-investigation or fresh investigation are clearly indefensible. We, therefore, direct that instead of fresh investigation there can be further investigation if required under Section 173 (8) of the Code. The same can be done by the CB (CID) as directed by the High Court.

8. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. 7 ...............................