L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of Kerala vs E.T.Rose Lynd & Ors

3. A certain P.C. Krishnakumar was travelling on the pillion of a motorcycle bearing registration No. KRH- 7599 which was ridden by Thomas John (respondent No. 2 herein) along Koimbatore-Palakkadu National Highway (East to West). On reaching Puthusserichellakkadu, the motorcycle dashed against the rear side of a stationary lorry which was parked at the national highway. The parking lights of the stationary lorry were not switched on and as a result of the 2 impact Krishnakumar sustained serious injuries and he succumbed to those injuries on way to Palakkadu District Hospital. Legal heirs of the deceased Krishnakumar, who are respondent Nos. 3 to 5 herein, filed a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Attingal (for short, 'the Tribunal') seeking compensation for the accidental death of Krishnakumar. In the claim petition, they alleged that the accident occurred due to the composite negligence of the owner, driver and insurer (respondents Nos. 8, 9 and 10 herein) of the truck as well as the respondent No. 2 who was riding the motorcycle.

4. The Tribunal, on consideration of the evidence on record, passed an award on June 3, 2002 in the sum of Rs. 4,76,500/- with interest at 9% per annum from November 8, 1997 till relisation in favour of the claimants. The liability was apportioned in the award as the accident was found to have occurred due to composite negligence of the two vehicles. The details of the liability are not relevant.

5. Aggrieved by the award, the present respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (owner and rider of the motorcycle) preferred appeal before the High Court of Kerala. The High Court proposed to issue some general directions to the State of Kerala and, accordingly, directed its impleadment through its Chief Secretary as respondent No. 9 in the appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court, on hearing the parties, issued the 3 following general directions in its order dated September 17, 2008 :-

7. The State of Kerala is aggrieved by the directions 3 and 5 quoted above. By direction 3, the High Court has directed the State Government to take steps for construction of Bus Bays on all road-sides in the State through which stage carriage operation is permitted within one year from the date of the order. By direction 5, the State Government has been directed to provide sufficient parking space for vehicles on road side, if required by 5 acquiring land, which should also be done within a time frame, although no time frame was fixed by the Court.

12. In view of the above, we are satisfied that directions 3 and 5 suffer from serious flaw and cannot be sustained. We set aside directions 3 and 5 accordingly.

13. The Appeal is allowed to the extent above with no order as to costs.
Office Of The Chief Post Master & Ors vs Living Media India Ltd.& Anr

Considering the peculiar facts, namely, the change of government pleader who had taken away the certified copy after he ceases to be in office, the High Court condoned the delay which was affirmed by this Court.

9) In view of the stand taken by the Postal Department as to the reasons for the delay and the serious objections of the respondents, it is desirable to extract the entire statement as placed in the form of "better affidavit" by the officer of the appellant-Department:-

11.09.2010 to On receiving the opinion of Ld. ASG the 30.09.2010 file was sent to Central Agency for drafting the Special Leave Petition.

15.11.2010 The panel counsel prepared the draft of Special Leave Petition and submitted the 12 draft Special Leave Petition with file to Central Agency Section for further steps.

5. It is submitted that it is evident from the foregoing reasons that the delay caused in filing the petition was result of all the necessary and unavoidable office formalities and was bonafide and not deliberate or intentional and the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the petition within the period of limitation.

After incorporating the above explanation, this Court refused to condone the delay by observing thus:

Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.

14) In view of our conclusion on issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of the issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs.

FEBRUARY 24, 2012.
Surendra & Ors vs State Of U.P

Five persons namely; Surendra, Narendra, Yogesh all s/o Anoop Singh, Amar Pal s/o Jagpal Singh and Anil Kumar s/o Roopchand Tyagi were tried for the murder of Ramchandra Singh under Sections 147,148,302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 2 The incident occurred on May 19, 1980 at 1.30 p.m. According to the prosecution case, Ramchandra Singh (deceased) who was on his way on that day to Siana in a buffalo cart with a cement permit and some money was waylaid by the accused persons; Surendra and 2 Narendra were armed with burri and knife respectively and other three were having lathis with them. There was a criminal litigation pending between the deceased Ramchandra Singh and the accused Surendra, Narendra and Yogesh. These three accused are real brothers. Accused Anil Kumar happens to be their brother-in-law. Surendra, at the time of incident, exhorted the other accused to kill Ramchandra Singh. In the incident, Ramchandra Singh sustained 21 injuries. He died on the next day.

4. Aggrieved by their conviction and sentence, the four convicts namely; Surendra, Narendra, Yogesh and Amar Pal filed one appeal while the fifth convict Anil Kumar filed a separate appeal before the High Court. Both the appeals were heard together. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, vide its judgment dated November 14, 2007, dismissed both the appeals.

5. Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2874 of 2008 is at the instance of accused Surendra, Narendra and Yogesh. The other Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3354 of 2008 is at the instance of accused Anil Kumar.

15. The case of the accused Anil Kumar is not at all distinct from the case of the other accused as has been sought to be canvassed by Mr. P.H. Parekh, learned senior counsel.

17. We find no error in consideration of the matter by the High Court.

18. Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.
Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar vs Dy.Collector & Competent Auth.& Ors

3. In response to the Writ Petition, a reply 2 affidavit was filed by the Additional Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, Thane before the High Court. In paragraph 3 of that affidavit, it is stated that notice under Section 10 (5) of the Act was issued to the appellant on February 25, 2005 calling upon the appellant to hand over the possession of the subject land within 30 days from the receipt of the said notice and, thus, the subject land had vested with the State Government. In paragraph 10 of the said affidavit, it is stated that the Competent Authority had already taken action under Sections 10(3) and 10(5) of the Act and, therefore, the subject land is deemed to have vested in the State Government.

12. In view of the legal position enunciated by this Court in Ritesh Tewari1 and the factual situation that the possession of the subject land has not been taken by the Government of Maharashtra, we are satisfied that the appellant was entitled to the relief in terms of para 9 (b) in the Writ Petition and the High Court ought to have declared that the proceedings under the Act in relation to the subject property stood abated. Now it is declared accordingly.

13. Appeal is allowed as above with no order as to costs.
Kishor Kumar & Ors vs Pradeep Shukla & Ors

1. These three Special Leave Petitions are directed against the judgment and order dated 2 12.7.2011, passed by the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court in C.P. No.2209 of 2009, affirming the order of the learned Single Judge which had been upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court regarding the appointment of Pharmacists in the State of Uttar Pradesh. So as to understand how the matter reached the High Court, it is necessary to set out a few facts which led to the filing of the Writ Petitions.

2. By way of an advertisement dated 12.11.2007, 766 vacancies were advertised for being filled up by diploma holders in Pharmacy. The advertisement provided that the recruitment could be done as per the U.P. Procedure for Direct Recruitment of Group `C' Posts (Outside the Purview of Public Service Commission) Rules, 2000. The said advertisement led to controversies as to how the appointments were to be filled up.

9. After the aforesaid judgment of this Court, a select list was prepared on 14.2.2011, which was again challenged by way of several Writ Petitions, of which the lead matter was Writ Petition No.1186 of 2011 filed by Pawan Kumar and others, against the State of U.P. and others. On 4.3.2011, the High Court stayed the select list prepared on 14.2.2011 and directed not to make any appointments therefrom. At the same, time, the contempt proceedings were also take up for consideration and on 12.7.2011, in the said proceedings the High Court directed the official respondents to prepare a fresh select list.

11. The submissions which had been previously urged when the earlier batch of Special Leave Petitions were disposed of, were reiterated during the hearing of these Special Leave Petitions. An attempt was made to re-open the issue by urging that the Petitioners have been over-looked, despite their better merit.

13. The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

14. All the pending applications shall stand disposed of by virtue of this judgment. As we have observed hereinabove, all candidates, who were similarly situated as the original petitioners, would be entitled to the benefit of the judgment delivered in State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Santosh Kumar Mishra & Ors. (supra).
H.P.Housing & Urban Devt.Auth.& Anr vs Ranjit Singh Rana

2. Pursuant to the agreement between the parties being agreement No. 11 of 1989-90 concerning construction of residential complex at Shimla, certain disputes arose. As per the terms of the contract, the Arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate the claims of the respondent and counter-claims of the appellants. On August 12, 1998, the Arbitrator passed the award. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed objections under Section 34(3) of the Arbitrator and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short "the Act"). The objections were accepted by the High Court to the extent that the reasons were not given by the Arbitrator and, 2 accordingly, the matter was sent back to the Arbitrator for giving reasons in support of the award.

3. After remand, the Arbitrator considered the matter and passed the award on February 14, 2001. The appellants filed objections against the award dated February 14, 2001. They also deposited the entire amount due under the award before the High Court on May 24, 2001. The objections filed by the appellants were ultimately rejected by the single Judge of the High Court on February 26, 2008. Against this order, intra- court appeal is said to be pending. The respondent, however, started execution of the Award dated February 14, 2001 by filing Execution Petition on August 12, 2008. The appellants filed objections to the Execution Petition.

12. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed in part. The impugned order of the High Court is modified and it is directed that the appellants shall be liable to pay interest @ 18% p.a. for the post-award period from the date of award until May 24, 2001. After May 24, 2001, the appellants are not liable to pay any interest on the award amount under Section 37(1)(b) of the Act.

14. No costs.
Hardeep Kaur vs Malkiat Kaur

1995 with the consent of the plaintiff. However, despite repeated requests by the plaintiff, she did not execute the sale deed. It is the plaintiff's case that she had been always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract, but since the defendant failed to perform her part of the contract, the suit for specific performance of the contract had to be filed.

7. Being not satisfied with the judgment and decree dated January 5, 2001 passed by the District Judge, Sangrur, the plaintiff preferred second appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. As noted above, the Single Judge allowed the appeal; set aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court and restored the judgment and decree of the trial court.

(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question :

Seeni Thevar and Others17.

16. In the present case, the High Court has allowed the second appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court without formulating any substantial question of law, which is impermissible and that renders the judgment of the High Court unsustainable.

17. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The second appeal (R.S.A. No. 1679 of 2001 - Malkiat Kaur vs. Hardeep Kaur) is restored to the file of the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. No order as to costs.

(R.M. Lodha) ........................

.....J. (H. L. Gokhale) NEW DELHI MARCH 16, 2012.
Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust vs Union Of India & Ors

4. On April 3, 2000, a declaration was made by the Government of Delhi under Section 6 of the Act stating that the land mentioned therein was acquired for the public purpose namely; Rohini Residential Scheme.

6. The appellant in the present appeal claims to be the owner of the land ad-measuring 14 Bighas 18 Biswas in Khasra Nos. 22 and 39 of Village Shahbad-Daulatpur 3 after the said land came to be donated to it by the erstwhile owners. The appellant further claims that a school has been set up on the above land which imparts education to a large number of students. The appellant challenged the acquisition of the above land which forms part of the above notifications before the Delhi High Court. Large number of other Writ Petitions also came to be filed before the High Court challenging the above notifications.

8. The respondents contested the group of Writ Petitions and justified their action including invocation of urgency clause and dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act.

9. The Division Bench of the High Court, on hearing the parties, was not persuaded by the contentions of the appellant and the other writ petitioners which formed part of the group matters and dismissed the Writ Petitions being devoid of merit on July 9, 2007. It is from this judgment that the present appeal has 4 arisen.

20. Where the government invokes urgency power under Section 17(1) and (4) for the public purpose like 'planned development of city' or 'development of residential area' or 'Residential Scheme', the initial presumption in favour of the government does not arise and the burden lies on the government to prove that the use of power was justified and dispensation of enquiry was necessary. In the present case, the respondents have miserably failed to show to the satisfaction of the Court that power of urgency and dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A has been exercised with justification. The action of the Lt. Governor, Delhi, in the facts of the case whereby he directed that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply, if allowed to stand, it would amount to 17 depriving a person of his property without authority of law.
M/S. Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr vs State Of U.P. & Ors

10. The present appeals assail the above order as already mentioned.

40. The second reason for applying a higher standard of proof than mere preponderance of probability is that the nature of transaction pursuant to which the goods are removed from the market area is within the exclusive knowledge of the appellants or the persons to whom such goods are being dispatched. In other words, the circumstances in which the transactions, which the statute presumes to be sales, but which the appellants claim are simple transfer of stocks are within the exclusive knowledge of the appellants. The entire evidence relevant to the transactions, being available only with the appellants and the true nature of the transactions being within their special knowledge, there is no reason why the rebuttal evidence should not satisfy the higher standard of proof and clearly and convincingly establish that the fact presumed is not the actual fact. Our answer to Question No.2 accordingly is that the evidence intended to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 17 of the Adhiniyam ought to be clear and convincing evidence showing that what is presumed under the provision is not the real fact.

Re: Question No.3

56. Suffice it to say that the Mandi Samiti appreciated each piece of evidence and found the same to be insufficient to hold that the sale transactions had, in fact, taken place outside the mandi area so that the presumption arising under Section 17(iii) of the Act stood rebutted. The Director exercising powers of the Mandi Parishad has in its order dated 25th September, 2004 once again evaluated the evidence and concurred with the view taken by the Mandi Samiti.

57. In the light of the legal position stated in the earlier part of this order, it is neither feasible for us to embark upon an exercise of re- appreciating the entire material or to substitute our own findings for those recorded by the Mandi Samiti and the Director/Mandi Parishad. So long as the finding recorded by the Mandi Samiti and the Mandi Parishad are not irrational or perverse, and so long as the view taken by them is a reasonably possible view, this Court would not interfere.

62. In the result these appeals as also W.P. (C) No.144/2005 fail and are hereby dismissed with cost assessed at Rs.15,000/- in each case.
State Of Rajasthan vs Mohan Lal & Ors

2. The facts giving rise to the filing of the charge-sheet against the respondents, their trial and conviction as also the filing of the appeal before the High Court have been set out at considerable length in the impugned judgment passed by the High Court. We need not therefore re-count the same over again except to the extent the same is absolutely necessary to understand the genesis of the prosecution case and the submissions made before us at the bar. Suffice it to say that Shambhu Lal (PW-1), Piru (PW-

7) and Lalu (deceased) all real brothers and residents of village Sewana in the State of Rajasthan were on their way back from the house of one Arjunsha Ghanava on 23rd January, 2000 at about 9.10 p.m., when they were attacked by the respondents Mohan Lal, Nathu, Suraj Mal, Laxman, Kalu and Balu Ram, also residents of village Sewana. The accused were, according to the prosecution, armed with lathis, and dhariyas (Scythes) which they used freely to cause injuries to the deceased and Shambu Lal (PW-1). The prosecution case is that Piru (PW-7) somehow managed to escape from the clutches of the respondents and rushed to the Police Station to lodge an oral report at about 11.30 p.m., on the basis whereof the police registered a case for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323 and 341 of the IPC, and hurried to the place of occurrence to take the injured Shambhu and Lalu to Pratapgarh Hospital where Lalu succumbed to his injuries on 24th January, 2000 at about 6.30 a.m. A charge under Section 302 IPC was accordingly added by the police who completed the investigation and filed a challan before the jurisdictional Judicial Magistrate. The respondents were committed to face trial to the Sessions Judge at Pratapgarh who made over the case to Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) before whom the respondents pleaded not guilty and claimed a trial.

4. Aggrieved by the Judgment and order passed by the Sessions Judge, the appellants preferred Criminal Appeal No.509 of 2001 before the High Court which has been partly allowed by the High Court by the judgment and order impugned in this appeal. The High Court upon a fresh appraisal of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defence came to the conclusion that the former had failed to establish the charge under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC framed against the respondents. The High Court observed:

9. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed ..........................................J. (T.S. THAKUR) ..........................................J. (GYAN SUDHA MISRA) New Delhi March 23, 2012
Sunil Kumar vs State Of Haryana

6. The trial court vide judgment and order dated 27.10.1999/2.11.1999 found them guilty of the said offence and awarded sentence of imprisonment for one year alongwith a fine of Rs.2,000/- each. Against the aforesaid order, the appeal of the petitioner stood dismissed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 30.7.2010. Petitioner preferred an application dated 25.7.2011 before the High Court for modifying the aforesaid judgment and order dated 30.7.2010 giving him the benefit of the provisions of Section 360 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called Cr.P.C.) and/or Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act 1958). The said application was dismissed vide impugned order dated 19.9.2011.

7. It may be pertinent to mention that against the judgment and order dated 30.7.2010, the petitioner had filed SLP (Crl.) no.1469 of 2011 on 13.10.2011 which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 27.1.2012. Subsequent thereto this special leave petition has been filed on 29.2.2012 challenging the order dated 19.9.2011. No explanation has been furnished as why the present petition could not be filed during the pendency of the earlier SLP or both the orders could not be challenged simultaneously as the order impugned herein had been passed much prior to the filing of the first SLP on 13.10.2011, and petitioner surrendered to serve out the sentence only on 13.1.2012.

19. Thus, in view of the above, the relief sought by the petitioner cannot be granted. Petition is misconceived and untenable. The petition being devoid of any merit, is accordingly dismissed with the cost of Rs.20,000/- which the petitioner is directed to deposit within a period of four weeks with the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority and file proof thereof before the Registrar of this Court, failing which the matter be placed before the Court for appropriate direction for recovery.