L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Bank Of India & Anr vs M/S. Emmsons International Ltd. & Anr

2. Unialkem Fertilizers Limited--2nd respondent in this appeal (hereinafter referred to as `the buyer') placed a purchase order on M/s. Emmsons International Limited (hereinafter referred to as `the seller') for supply of 2000 MT of Syrian Rock Phosphate at the rate of Rs. 2100/- per metric ton for an aggregate amount of Rs.

43,86,411/-. The payment terms provided `against 180 days issuance of letter of credit'. On June 18, 1997, at the request of the buyer, a letter of credit for Rs. 43,86,411/- was established by the appellant No. 1 -- State Bank of India, Industrial Finance Branch, Bhopal (hereinafter referred to as `the issuing bank') in favour of the seller; the appellant No. 2 -- State Bank of India, New Delhi Main Branch, New Delhi being the advising Bank. The seller supplied the material vide sale invoice, high seas delivery, bills of lading, etc. and the buyer is said to have accepted the documents.

(ii) neither the description of goods nor the quantity or weight matched with each other in the above documents; (iii) the certificate of origin has been issued in favour of MMTC and not in favour of the seller; (iv) at the request of the negotiating bank, the documents were retained by it but only on collection basis in order to remit the amount after collecting the same from the buyer and (v) it has acted in accord with Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (for short, ` UCP500').

16. It needs no emphasis that a contract is concluded between the issuing bank and the seller no sooner the bank issues the credit and communicates it to the seller. Under an irrevocable credit the issuing bank gives an unequivocal and binding undertaking to the seller that it will pay against documents/bills drawn in compliance with the terms of credit.

26. In our view, the High Court failed to follow the fundamental rule governing the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that where the first appellate court reverses the judgment of the trial court, it is required to consider all the issues of law and fact. This flaw vitiates the entire judgment of the High Court. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained.

27. For the above reasons, we accept the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore First Appeal No. 225 of 2002 for re-hearing and fresh decision. All contentions of the parties are kept open to be agitated at the time of the hearing of the first appeal. No order as to costs.

(R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI.

AUGUST 18, 2011.
Uniflex Cables Ltd vs Commnr., Central Excise, Surat-Ii

2. The material facts are that the appellant is engaged in the manufacture of insulated wires and cables falling under Central Excise Tariff Sub-

According to the Authorities, the electric cables were neither parts nor 3 specially designed devices, which were necessary for manufacturing or running wind mills. For the aforestated reasons, according to the authorities, benefit under the aforestated notification could not have been availed by the appellant. Ultimately, the Commissioner, Central Excise, Surat - II by an order dated 20.2.1998, confirmed the demand of excise duty amounting to Rs. 66,92,604 and imposed penalty under Rule 173Q(1) of the Rules. The said order was challenged before the Tribunal and the Tribunal allowed the appeal by remanding the matter to the Commissioner. After hearing the appellant, the Commissioner again took the same view by his order dated 22.3.2001.

4. Being aggrieved by the aforestated order dated 22.3.01, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Tribunal which was dismissed. The Tribunal relied on its earlier order passed in NICCO CORPORATION LIMITED v.

Aggrieved by the said order dated 7.7.2005, the appellant has preferred the appeal before this Court.

5. The order passed by the Tribunal in NICCO CORPORATION LIMITED (supra) was appealed against in C.A. No 1118/2001 before this Court. This Court, vide its order dated 22.3.06 dismissed the appeal and held 4 that insulated electrical cables designed for use in wind mills would not be eligible for exemption under notification no 205/88 as amended. The said judgment is now reported as Nicco Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Calcutta 2006 (203) ELT 362(S.C.). During the pendency of the proceedings, the Authorities had issued a notice of demand directing the appellant to pay central excise duty and penalty amounting to Rs 1, 33, 85,208. The appellant, in compliance of the said notice, deposited a sum of Rs 66, 92,604 towards the excise duty payable by it. However, the amount of penalty has not been paid as stay has been granted against the said demand.

towards excise duty. As regards the second issue about the imposition of penalty, we are of the opinion that the said order cannot be justified in the facts of the case.

13. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case we are of the view that penalty should not have been imposed upon the appellant.

Consequently, we quash the order of the Commissioner imposing penalty as also the order of the Tribunal so far as it confirms imposition of penalty upon the appellant. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Nanjegowda & Anr vs Gangamma & Ors

3. According to the plaintiffs, the property originally belonged to one Ramakrishna. He had purchased the same under a registered sale deed dated 13th December, 1978. The aforesaid Ramakrishna sold the said property to Honnanna by a registered sale deed dated 5th June, 1980. According to the plaintiffs, Honnanna executed the power of attorney in respect of the suit property in favour of defendant nos.1 and 3 which came to an end on his death on 13th July, 1986. Defendant nos.1 and 3 hereinafter referred to as the defendants (appellants herein) contested the suit. They have not denied that Honnanna had purchased the property on 5th June, 1980 from Ramakrishna. However, they claim title over the property on the basis of an agreement to sale dated 27th November, 1982. It is further case of the defendants that there being a ban on registry of 3 the property, an irrevocable power of attorney was executed by Honnanna on 14th July, 1985 as also an affidavit of the same date.

(underlining ours)

11. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to the costs.
State Of Punjab & Ors vs Jagdish Kaur

2. Jagdish Kaur, the respondent in Civil Appeal No.2897 of 2006 was appointed as a Peon in the Government High School Vairwal, Tehsil Tarn Taran, District Amritsar, on February 21, 1978. Her appointment was made on compassionate grounds following her husband's death in harness on January 14, 1977. At the time of her appointment, she had passed matriculation examination in 3rd division. After joining the service, she passed the Senior Secondary School Examination from the Punjab School Education Board in 2nd division in the year 1992. According to her case, after passing the plus two examination, she became eligible for promotion to a class III post and she, accordingly, moved the concerned authorities for her promotion. However, getting no favourable response from them, she approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CWP No.11758 of 2003 seeking appropriate reliefs.

4. The writ petition filed by Jagdish Kaur was allowed by order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court on February 20, 2004. Later on the writ petition of Harjinder Singh came up before another Division Bench of the court and following the order passed in the case of Jagdish Kaur that too was allowed by order dated July, 1, 2005.

5. Following the order passed by the High Court, Harjinder Singh was given promotion and is working on a class III post since then. In the case of Jagdish Kaur, however, this Court stayed the operation of the impugned order of the High Court while issuing notice on April 18, 2005. As a result she continues to work on the class IV post.

8. As a result of the amendment the qualification of typing that earlier used to be an essential requirement for appointment ceases to be a precondition and can now be acquired within a period of one year from the date of appointment failing which no annual increments would be allowed. It 7 is, thus, clear that in case of direct recruitment to a class III post the qualification of typing in Punjabi as a requirement for appointment has been considerably relaxed.

12. In light of the above, the requirement of qualifying the test in Punjabi typewriting at the speed of 30 w.p.m. is manifestly a criterion for promotion from class IV to class III post. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the 9 orders passed by the High Court are untenable and we are constrained to set aside those orders.

15. In the result, the appeals are allowed subject to the observations and directions made above.

August 26, 2011.
M/S Shiv Cotex vs Tirgun Auto Plast P.Ltd.& Ors

2. The purchaser, who was not party to the suit but impleaded as 2nd respondent in the first appeal and was arrayed as such in the second appeal, is the appellant being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana whereby the Single Judge of that Court allowed the second appeal preferred by the plaintiff (1st respondent) and set aside the concurrent judgment and decree of the courts below and remanded 1 the suit to the trial court for fresh disposal after giving the plaintiff an opportunity to lead evidence.

4. The 1st respondent (hereinafter referred to as `plaintiff'), on February 17, 2001, filed a suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and other reliefs against the Corporation - 2nd respondent in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Chandigarh. Inter alia, the plaintiff prayed that the takeover of its assets and all subsequent sale proceedings by the Corporation be declared illegal, null and 2 void and inoperative; the direction be issued to the Corporation to charge interest at the rate of 12.5 per cent per annum (prevailing rate) on the loan from the date of commencement of production to the date of takeover and the Corporation be also directed to restore back the possession of the suit property to it.

8. On May 10, 2007 itself in light of the above order, the trial court dismissed the suit in its post lunch session.

10. Against the judgment and decree of the trial court passed on May 10, 2007, the plaintiff preferred civil appeal in the court of Additional District Judge, Chandigarh. In the appeal, the plaintiff made an application on December 21, 2007 for impleadment of the appellant and its partners as respondent nos. 2 to 5. The application for impleadment was granted and the appellant and respondent nos. 3 to 5 herein were added as parties.

11. The Additional District Judge, Chandigarh after hearing the parties, dismissed the civil appeal on March 20, 2008.

12. Being not satisfied with the concurrent judgment and decree of the two courts below, the plaintiff preferred second appeal before the High Court which, as noticed above, has been allowed by the Single Judge on September 20, 2010 and the suit has been remanded to the trial court for fresh decision in accordance with law.

17. In the result, the appeal is allowed and judgment and order of the High Court passed on September 20, 2010 is set aside.

There shall be no order as to costs.

(R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI.

AUGUST 30, 2011.
Sanjoy Narayan Ed.In Ch. Hindustan & Ors vs Son. High Court Of Allahabad Thr. R.G

3. The appellants being aggrieved by the aforesaid order had filed this appeal on which we issued notice. On service of the notice, the respondent has also entered appearance through counsel.

15. The appeal is disposed of in terms of the aforesaid directions and observations.

.......................J (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) ......................J (ANIL R. DAVE) NEW DELHI, AUGUST 30, 2011 6 ITEM NO.2 COURT NO.11 SECTION II S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No(s).4876/2011 (From the judgement and order dated 04/04/2011 in CACRL No.20/2010 of The HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD) SANJOY NARAYAN EDITOR IN CHIEF HINDUSTAN & ORS. Petitioner(s) VERSUS HON. HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD THR. R.G. Respondent(s) (With appln(s) for stay and office report) Date: 30/08/2011 This Petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM :
M/S Air Liquide North India Pvt. Ltd vs Commnr. Of Central Excise, Jaipur -I

In order to answer the aforesaid issue which arises for our consideration, it would be necessary to set out some facts giving rise to the present appeal. The appellant is engaged in the manufacture of Oxygen, Nitrogen, Carbon-di-oxide and other gases classifiable under Chapter 28 of the Act. The appellant had purchased Helium gas during the period commencing from December, 1998 to 31st March, 2001, from the market in bulk and repacked the same into smaller cylinders after giving different grades to it and then sold the same in the open market. The appellant purchased the said gas for Rs.520/- per Cum. Various tests were conducted on the gas so purchased and on the basis of the tests and some treatment given, the gas was segregated into different grades having distinct properties and sold at different rates to different customers.

3. The adjudicating authorities held that these processes undertaken by the appellants amounted to manufacture and consequently confirmed the demand with penalty. An appeal filed by the appellant before the Commissioner (Appeals) was allowed. Thereafter, an appeal was filed by the Department before the Tribunal and the Tribunal, by its impugned judgment held that the process undertaken or the treatment given by the appellant amounted to "manufacture" in terms of Chapter Note 10 of Chapter 28 of the Act. The aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is under challenge in this appeal.

15. Therefore, in our opinion, the Tribunal has rightly observed that if no treatment was given to the gas purchased by the appellant, customers of the appellant would not have been purchasing Helium from the appellant at a price 40% to 60% above the price at which the appellant was purchasing.

20. For the aforetasted reasons, we agree with the Tribunal in holding that the appellant is liable to pay excise duty for the reason that it has manufactured Helium within the meaning of the term `manufacture' as explained in terms of Chapter Note 10 of Chapter 28 of the Act.

24. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we are in agreement with the order passed by the Tribunal and dismiss the appeal but without any order as to costs.
Surendra Prasad Shukla vs State Of Jharkhand & Ors

3. The facts very briefly are that the appellant was recruited as a Constable in the Bihar State Police on 07.08.1971 and he was later on promoted to the post of Head Constable (Hawaldar). On 04.07.2004, a complaint was lodged in the Muzaffarpur Sadar Police 2 Station that three unknown persons had snatched a car, which was registered as Muzaffarpur Sadar P.S. Case No. 139 of 2004 under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code (for short `the I.P.C.'). The police recovered the stolen car on 13.07.2004 from the government quarters occupied by the appellant and arrested the son of the appellant, Raju Shukla @ Rajiv Shukla alongwith two others who were involved in the theft of the car.

The appellant was suspended and a memo of charges was served on him on 20.07.2004 charging him with the misconduct of negligence, indiscipline, conduct unbecoming of a police personnel. It was also alleged that he had harboured the accused Raju Shukla. He was asked to submit his explanation. The appellant submitted his reply on 26.07.2004 to the Superintendent of Police, Purvi Singhbhoom, Jamshedpur (for short the `disciplinary authority') stating inter alia that in the evening of 12.07.2004 he had been to Tulailadugri T.O.P. for duty and he was patrolling in that area the whole night and that when he returned to his government quarters in the morning 3 around 6:15 a.m. on 13.07.2004, he saw the police of Muzaffarpur Sadar Police Station at his government quarters, who had arrested his son alongwith two others, and had seized the stolen Matiz car. He also stated in his reply that he did not get any time to question his son and that he had no idea that his son was involved in the crime. The enquiry officer then carried out the enquiry and submitted his report holding the appellant guilty of the charges and the disciplinary authority after considering enquiry report took the view that in the circumstances it was not reasonable that the appellant should serve the police force and passed an order of dismissal against him. The appellant carried an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General, Singhbhoom, but the appeal was dismissed.

4. The appellant then filed Writ Petition (s) No. 6728 of 2006 under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Jharkhand High Court challenging his dismissal from 4 service. The learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition by order dated 30.04.2008.

7. We accordingly, allow this appeal in part and modify the punishment of dismissal from service to compulsory retirement. The L.P.A. and the Writ Petition filed by the appellant before the High Court are allowed in part. There shall be no order as to costs.
Arun Kumar Aggarwal vs State Of M.P.& Ors

3. The brief factual matrix relating to this appeal is as follows:

nor res judicata."

The expression of the personal view or opinion of the Judge is just a casual remark made whilst deviating from answering the actual issues pending before the Court. These casual remarks are considered or treated as beyond the ambit of the authoritative or operative part of the judgment.

34. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned Order and Judgment of the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 821 of 2005, Criminal Revision Petition No. 966 of 2005 and Criminal Case No. 3403 of 2005 dated 22.4.2009 is set aside.

We restore the Order of the learned Special Judge dated 26.4.2005.

35. We direct the respondents to comply with the order passed by the Trial Court within two months from this date.
Ramachandran & Ors vs State Of Kerala

2. Facts and circumstance giving rise to this appeal are that:

5 F. Being aggrieved, the appellants preferred the appeals which have been disposed of by common judgment and order dated 7.4.2005 by which the High Court modified the order of the trial court to the extent that conviction of A7, A10 and A11 under Section 302 IPC was set aside. However, their conviction and sentence for other offences have been confirmed.

(22) Incised punctured wound 3.5x1.5 x 1 cm. oblique over left buttock. The upper inner end was blunt and other end sharp. The wound was directed forwards. (23) Incised wound 1.5 x O.3xO.5 cm. over left buttock, 2 cm. below injury No.2.

Subject to the above modification, the appeal stands disposed of.
Sri Chandu Khamaru vs Nayan Malik & Ors

3. The facts briefly are that the appellant owns a house in Dag No.408, Khatiyan No.1212, Mauja Panchpara P.S. Sankrail, District Howrah, West Bengal. The house of the appellant was not being supplied with electricity whereas the house located on Dag No.409, Khatiyan No.1212, was 2 being supplied with electricity by the Calcutta Electricity Board Supply Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as `the distribution licensee'). The appellant approached the distribution licensee for supply of electricity but when the distribution licensee did not give an electricity connection for his house, he filed Writ Petition No.18220 of 2004 in the Calcutta High Court and by order dated 23.09.2004, learned Single Judge of the High Court disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the distribution licensee to effect supply of electricity to the house of the appellant within six weeks from the date of compliance of all the formalities by the appellant. Pursuant to the order dated 23.09.2004, the distribution licensee gave an electric connection and started supplying electricity to the house of the appellant.

5. Aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal being MAT No.514 of 2006 before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court but by the impugned order dated 09.05.2008, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal. The Division Bench took note of the fact that Civil Suit No.83 of 2004 filed by the appellant in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Howrah, in respect of the land was pending. The 4 Division Bench held in the impugned order that until the private dispute between the appellant and respondent Nos.

(d) the procedure and manner of consideration of objections and suggestions received in accordance with the notice 7 referred to in clause (c);

(l) the procedure for undertaking works which are not reparable by the Appropriate Government, licensee or local authority;

(o) the procedure for deposit of compensation payable by the licensee and furnishing of security; and

11. We, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned order of the Division Bench 11 and dispose of the Writ Petition of respondent nos.1 to 3 with the direction that the distribution licensee will find out whether there is any other way in which electric line can be drawn for supply of electricity to the house of the appellant, other than the disputed passage in Dag Nos.406, 407 and

409. If there is no other way to supply electricity to the house of the appellant, the distribution licensee will follow the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 67 of the Electricity Act, 2003 for carrying out the work for supply of electricity to the house of the appellant. This exercise will be completed within a period of six months from today and till the supply of electricity to the house of the appellant is effected through some other way, supply of electricity to the house of the appellant will not be disconnected. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated in this judgment. No costs.
Pirthi vs Mohan Singh & Ors

2) Brief facts:

47 and 48, Khasra No. 1043 measuring 3 bighas, 3 biswas pukhta 1058 (2-11) and Khewat No. 28 (min.), Khasra Nos.

respondents and consequently on 30-5-1990 the suit was decreed. The respondents after passing of the decree by the court of first instance deposited the purchase money as required under Order 20 Rule 14 CPC. The appeal preferred by the appellants before the first appellate court and the second 9 appeal before the High Court were dismissed and the decree of the trial court was affirmed. The appellants thereafter preferred this appeal by way of special leave petition. During pendency of the appeal, Section 15(1)(b) of the parent Act, on the basis of which the suit was filed by the plaintiff-

18) In view of the above discussion and the interpretation of the Constitution Bench in respect of substituted Section 15 introduced by the Haryana Amendment Act, 1995 in the Parent Act i.e. the Punjab Pre-emption Act, we concur with the view expressed by all the three courts including the High Court. Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.

September 2, 2011.