L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Omprakash vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

6. The "caste certificate" of the appellant is in issue in the instant appeal. The appellant claims that he belongs to a community known as "Kathik" which admittedly is recognised as scheduled tribe in the State of Maharashtra. He contested and was elected as a member of Zilla Parishad from the Ambulga constituency reserved for the scheduled tribes against the fifth respondent.

10. On such remand, the fifth respondent once again, after an appropriate enquiry, passed an order dated 25.2.2009 invalidating the caste certificate and recommended to the Regional Commissioner, Aurangabad to set aside the election of the appellant herein to the Zilla Parishad.

11. Challenging the above-mentioned decision, the appellant herein once again approached the Bombay High Court, by way of writ petition No. 1633 of 2009, which stood dismissed. Hence, the special leave petition.

13. The "Scrutiny Committee" declined to place any reliance on such documents for arriving at a conclusion in favour of the appellant. The High Court recorded very cogent reasons for refusing to interfere with the conclusions raised by the "Scrutiny Committee".

16. No legal principle, which warrants interference with the conclusion reached by the High Court, is brought to our notice. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

DATED : DECEMBER 09, 2011.
Chief Information Commr.& Anr vs State Of Manipur & Anr

4. The second complaint dated 19th May, 2007 was filed by the appellant No. 2 on 19th May, 2007 for obtaining similar information for the period between 1980 - March 2007. As no response was 2 received this time also, appellant No. 2 again filed a complaint under Section 18 and the same was disposed of by an order dated 14th August, 2007 directing disclosure of the information sought for within 15 days. That order was also challenged by way of a Writ Petition by the respondents.

5. Both the Writ Petitions were heard together and were dismissed by a common order dated 16th November, 2007 by learned Single Judge of the High Court by inter alia upholding the order of the Commissioner. The Writ Appeal came to be filed against both the judgments and were disposed of by the impugned order dated 29th July 2010. By the impugned order, the High Court held that under Section 18 of the Act the Commissioner has no power to direct the respondent to furnish the information and further held that such a power has already been conferred under Section 19(8) of the Act on the basis of an exercise under Section 19 only. The Division Bench further came to hold that the direction to furnish information is without 3 jurisdiction and directed the Commissioner to dispose of the complaints in accordance with law.

44. This Court, therefore, directs the appellants to file appeals under Section 19 of the Act in respect of two requests by them for obtaining information vide applications dated 9.2.2007 and 19.5.2007 within a period of four weeks from today. If such an appeal is filed following the statutory procedure by the appellants, the same should be considered on merits by the appellate authority without insisting on the period of limitation.

46. The appeals which the respondents have been given liberty to file, if filed within the time specified, will be decided in accordance with Section 19 of the Act and as early as possible, 29 preferably within three months of their filing.

With these directions both the appeals are disposed of.

47. There will be no order as to costs.
Helios & Matheson ... vs Rajeev Sawhney & Anr

2. Respondent No.1, Rajeev Sawhney filed Criminal Complaint No.20/SW/2007 before Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 47th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120B of 2 IPC by the petitioners. The complaint set out the relevant facts in great detail and made specific allegations to the effect that petitioners had entered into a conspiracy to defraud him and for that purpose Shri Pawan Kumar, arrayed as accused No.4 in the complaint, had played an active role apart from fabricating a Board resolution when no such resolution had, in fact, been passed. On receipt of the complaint the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate recorded prima facie satisfaction about the commission of offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, read with Section 120B of IPC, took cognizance and directed issuance of process against the accused persons. Aggrieved by the said order, Revision Petitions No.449, 460, 853 of 2007 were filed by the accused persons before the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, challenging the order taking cognizance and the maintainability of the complaint on several grounds. The revision petitions were eventually allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay by his order dated 13th August, 2008 and the summoning order set aside. The Additional Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that 3 although the allegations regarding fabrication of a resolution, taken at their face value, made out a prima facie case of fraud against the accused persons yet the minutes of a subsequent meeting allegedly held on 19th July, 2005, a photocopy of which was filed along with Criminal Revision No.460/2007 ratified the resolution allegedly passed on 28th June, 2005. The Court on that premise concluded that no fraud or cheating was made out against the accused persons. The Court observed:

3. The Court also found fault with the complainant suppressing the fact of a complaint having been filed before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Bangalore and the alleged non-observance of the provisions of Section 202 of the Cr.P.C.

4. The above order was then challenged by the complainant, Shri Rajeev Sawhney before the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Revision Application No.441 of 2008.

The High Court came to the conclusion that the Additional Sessions Judge had fallen in error on all three counts. The High Court noticed that the complaint filed before the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Bangalore had been quashed by the Karnataka High Court on account of a more comprehensive complaint having been filed before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Mumbai.

13. In the result, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

The Special Leave Petitions are accordingly dismissed.
Coal Mines P.F.Commr.Tr.Board Of ... vs Ramesh Chandra Jha

In connection with the forcible occupation of a Type III quarter, a departmental proceeding was commenced against the Respondent and on 16th March, 1979, on being found guilty of the charge framed against him, the Respondent was removed from service.

3. Challenging his removal from service, the Respondent filed Title Suit No.78 of 1979 in the Court of Munsif at Dhanbad. Simultaneously, the Respondent also filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority under Regulation 37 of the Staff Regulations, which was dismissed on 4th March, 1980.

4. Meanwhile, in the suit, the learned Munsif, Dhanbad (Jharkhand) framed a preliminary issue in Suit No.78 of 1979 as to whether in the absence of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the suit was maintainable? Aggrieved by the said order, the Respondent filed Civil Revision No.341 of 1980(R) in the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court, which held that since the Appellant was not a "public officer" as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, no notice under Section 80 was required to be served upon him before the suit was filed. By its order dated 7th September, 1981, the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court set aside the findings of the learned Munsif and held the suit to be maintainable. The Appellant, thereafter, brought the matter to this Court and in Civil Appeal No.1932 of 1982 this Court by its judgment dated 31st January, 1990, reversed the finding of the Appellate Authority upon holding that the Coal Mines Provident Fund Commissioner is a "public 4 officer" within the meaning of Section 2(17) of the aforesaid Code. It was, therefore, settled upto this Court that the Appellant herein was a public officer and that notice under Section 80 was required to be given to him before the suit was filed by the Respondent.

12. As indicated hereinbefore, it is the said judgment and order of the High Court of Jharkhand which is the subject matter of the present Civil Appeal.

14. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that in view of the fact that the Coal Mines Provident Fund Commissioner has been held by this Court to be a public officer, it was necessary to join the Union of India as a party in the suit in view of the provisions of Order XXVII Rule 5A of the Code of Civil Procedure. We, accordingly, see no reason to interfere with the judgment and order appealed against and the Appeal filed by the Coal Mines Provident Fund Commissioner is dismissed, though without any order as to costs.
Munagala Yadamma vs State Of A.P. & Ors

5. The Detention Order passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District, was questioned by the wife of the detenue by way of WP No.13313 of 2011 before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which dismissed the same on the ground that under the normal laws, it would be difficult to check the activities of the detenue and, accordingly, the order of detention was justified.

11. No doubt, the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant are such as to attract punishment under the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, but that in our view has to be done under the said laws and taking recourse to preventive detention laws would not be warranted. Preventive detention involves detaining of a person without trial in order to prevent him/her from committing certain types of offences. But such detention cannot be made a substitute for the Crl.A.67/12 6 ordinary law and absolve the investigating authorities of their normal functions of investigating crimes which the detenue may have committed. After all, preventive detention in most cases is for a year only and cannot be used as an instrument to keep a person in perpetual custody without trial. Accordingly, while following the three-Judge Bench decision in Rekha's case (supra), we allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated 20th July, 2011, and also quash the Detention Order dated 15th February, 2011, issue by the Collector and District Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh.

12. This order should not in any way prejudice the outcome of the pending cases against the appellant.

January 05, 2012.
Mohd. Ayub & Anr vs Mukesh Chand

3. According to the appellants when the house in question was purchased by them the respondent was occupying two shops facing the road and two rooms situate at the rear of the said shops as a tenant of the previous landlord at the rent of Rs.35/- per month. These rooms are situated on the ground floor of the said building. The respondent continued to occupy the said rooms as tenant at the same rent. It is the case of the appellants that the first appellant is carrying on business in three small stalls situated in a shop of the Cantonment Council, the rent of which keeps increasing.

5. The Prescribed Authority dismissed the application holding inter alia that the appellants are financially sound and other properties were available to them whereas except the suit shops the respondent does not have any place for residence and business and hence, if he is evicted from the 4 shops in his occupation, he will experience more difficulty.

The appeal carried from the said judgment was dismissed by the District Court holding inter alia that financial position of the appellants is far better than that of the respondent.

They could have purchased a vacant bungalow and started business for their sons. Learned District Judge held that the appellants have purchased the building to make profit and then filed the application for eviction. According to learned District Judge, the respondent was doing business from the said shops for many years and it would be difficult for him to find a place for business. Hardship caused to the respondent would be more.

17. In the view that we have taken, the appeal succeeds.

The impugned order is set aside to the extent it permits the respondent to retain possession of three rooms out of four rooms in his occupation. The respondent is directed to 15 handover possession of all the rooms in his occupation to the appellants. He is granted six months time to vacate the premises in question on the condition that he files usual undertaking before the Registry of this Court within eight weeks from today.

18. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
State Of Punjab vs Balwinder Singh Etc

judgment and order dated 04.11.2009 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 653 and 655 of 2000 for nature of offence and quantum of sentence whereby the High Court partly allowed the revision petition and reduced the quantum of sentence awarded by the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Amritsar as upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge, 1 Amritsar under Sections 304A, 337 and 279 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short `IPC').

(PW-3), after attending the last rites of one of his relatives at Village Mustabad, Amritsar was returning to Batala along with his family members in a Jhang Transport Bus bearing No. PB-

02-D-9485. The bus was being driven at a very high speed by the driver-Respondent No. 1 herein. When the aforesaid bus reached the bus stand at Mudhal, at that time, a truck bearing No. PB-02-C-9665 which was being driven by Respondent No. 2 herein was coming from the opposite side at a very high speed. Both the drivers were driving their vehicle at a very high speed and in rash and negligent manner, as a result of which, both the vehicles collided with each other and two passengers, namely, Darshan Singh s/o Bela Singh and Banso w/o Ajit Singh died at the spot. The other passengers, namely, Sonia, Dalbir Singh and Ramandeep were taken to the Civil Hospital but later on they succumbed to their injuries.

11) While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death or injury by rash and negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. The persons driving motor vehicles cannot and should not take a chance thinking that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by 8 the Court. For lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to careless and callous driving of vehicles, the courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence if the prosecution is able to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

12) In the light of the above principles, we express our inability to accept the reasoning of the High Court in reducing the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone, that is, 15 days. Merely because the fine amount has been enhanced to Rs.25,000/- each, is also not a sufficient ground to drastically reduce the sentence, particularly, in a case where five persons died due to the negligent act of both the drivers of the bus and the truck. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months with a fine of Rs.

5,000/- each. The trial Court is directed to take appropriate steps for surrender of the accused in both the appeals to serve 9 the remaining period of sentence. The appeals are allowed to the extent mentioned above.

JANUARY 6, 2012.
Achyutanand Choudhary (D) Thr. Lrs vs Luxman Mahto & Ors

2. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to as they are arrayed in the suit.

3. The plaintiffs claim that the Suit Scheduled Property admeasuring 7.29 acres is owned by them and their ancestors and they have been in an uninterrupted possession of the same for the period of about 100 years. The instant suit is filed with the allegation that the defendants (petitioners herein), threatened to dispossess them (plaintiffs) on the ground that the Suit Scheduled Property has been recorded in the name of the defendant in the Consolidation Survey. The Relevant portion of the plaint reads as follows:-

7. The High Court dismissed the Revision by its order dated 14.1.2003 and hence the instant Special Leave Petition.

29. The Special Leave Petition is, therefore, dismissed.

January 06, 2012.
Firojuddin & Anr vs Babu Singh

The appellants purchased the open and closed area of House No.3, North Gafur Ki Bajariya, Indore by a registered Sale Deed from Smt. Kaushar Farzana daughter of Hakim Ajmal Khan of Indore. The respondent herein was residing in the two rooms constructed on the ground floor of the aforesaid house on rent since the time of Smt. Kaushar Farzana. The appellants-plaintiffs filed a suit for possession by way of ejectment of the respondent- defendant from the suit property and for payment of 2 arrears of rent under Sections 12(1)(a), (e) & (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. They contended that the respondent-defendant has defaulted in payment of rent and that they do not have any other alternative suitable residential accommodation in the City of Indore. The Trial Court, inter alia, held that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants-plaintiffs and the respondent-defendant has been proved and the respondent-defendant was held liable to pay arrears of rent. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the respondent-defendnt filed an appeal before the Court of Additional District Judge, Indore. The First Appellate Court holding that the appellants-plaintiffs have bona fide requirement of the suit property for residence, dismissed the appeal filed by the respondent-defendant. The respondent-defendant thereafter filed second appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench.

Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is restored and the appeal is allowed. Parties are directed to bear their respective costs. However, as prayed for by the learned counsel for the respondent, two years' time is granted to the respondent to vacate the premises upon filing usual undertaking in the Registry of this Court within four weeks from today.

.....................J (DALVEER BHANDARI) .....................J (DIPAK MISRA) New Delhi;

January 06, 2012.
N.C. Das vs Gauhati High Court Thr. Registrar & Ors

5. On October 7, 2010, while disposing of Interlocutory Application No. 3 of 2005, the matter was adjourned to enable the petitioner to challenge the order dated June 7, 2005 by which the benefits under Assured Career Progress were denied to him in appropriate proceedings. We are informed that the petitioner has not challenged the order dated June 7, 2005 pursuant to the above liberty.

Provided that all Judicial Officers whose date of birth is the 1st day of a month shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month on attaining the age of 58 years.

(B) Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (A) above, a Judicial Officer, who in the opinion of the High Court, have the potential to continue with his service, shall be retained in service up to 60 years.

(I) The potential for continued utility shall be assessed and evaluated by appropriate Committee of Judges of the High Court, constituted and headed by the Chief Justice and the evaluation shall be made on the basis of the Officer's past record of service, character roll, quality of judgments and other relevant matters. (II) The High Court should undertake and complete the exercise well within time before the Officer attains the age of 58 years and take a decision whether the benefit of extended service is to be given to the officer or not.

(III) In case he is found fit for being given the benefit of extended age of superannuation, the Governor shall, on the recommendation of the High Court, issue necessary order."

12. Accordingly, Writ Petition has no merit and deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed.
Azija Begum vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr

4. The material facts of the case which are necessary for us to consider for the purpose of disposal of the issues are that one Imran S/o Anwar Khan was found 2 murdered under mysterious circumstances. His dead body was found on 22nd February, 2009 at the entrance of the Government hospital. Prior to that Imran was found missing and the appellant herein went to the police station to lodge her First Information Report over that but the police sent the appellant back after recording a mere 'missing report'. Even though at that point of time, the appellant was said to have informed the police that Imran was allegedly kidnapped by one Ijani Khan, but, the police recorded a 'missing' report only.

14. Considering the aforesaid vital questions, we dispose of this appeal by directing the second respondent, the Additional Director General of Police, State CID, Pune Division, Pune, Maharashtra to order a proper investigation in the matter by deputing a senior 6 officer from his organization to undertake a thorough investigation and examine in detail the facts and circumstances of the case and then furnish a report to the trial Court within a period of three months from the date of taking charge of the investigation. The investigation is to be taken up within two weeks from the date of service of this order on the second respondent. The matter shall thereafter proceed in accordance with law. We hope and expect an impartial investigation of the case will take place.

15. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above.