L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
P.Subramaniyan vs Union Of India

2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under:

However, at the relevant time, he did not accept his promotion to the post of Chargeman Grade­II (Electrical) in the 25% LDCE quota. It appears that, thereafter, the seniority list in the cadre of Chargeman Grade­II was published considering the relevant Rule and, as per the rule position in that year, the direct recruitee was to be placed below the LDCE, as the LDCE selection process is stated as Fasttrack promotion. Respondent No. 4 was placed in the seniority list below the appellant, as respondent No. 4 was appointed in the 25% Direct Recruitment quota. Therefore, respondent No. 4 made a representation dated 12.12.2005 to respondent No. 2 stating, inter alia, that as he was appointed to the post of Chargeman Grade­II in the month of April 2000, much prior to the appellant was promoted and, therefore, there is a mistake in the selection list and he ought to have been placed in the seniority list above the appellant. That vide communication dated 20.12.2005, the representation of respondent No. 4 was rejected on the ground that he has been 4 placed at an appropriate place in the respective seniority list as per the rota­quota rule.

4. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal succeeds. The appeal is allowed accordingly and the impugned judgment and order dated 11.10.2007 passed by the High Court in W.P. No. 18958 of 2007, upholding the order passed by the learned Tribunal, as also the order dated 31.10.2006 passed by the learned Tribunal in O.A. No. 161 of 2006, are hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the original application No. 161 of 2006 preferred by respondent No. 4 herein stands dismissed. No costs.
Meg Raj (Dead) Through Lrs. vs Manphool (Dead) Thr. Lrs..

3. A few facts need mention for the disposal of these appeals, which involve a short point. The facts are taken from R.S.A. No.40/1984 which arose out of C.S. No.24­C/1979.

7. So far as C.S. No. 24­C of 1979 is concerned, it was filed by the plaintiffs in the Court of Sub­Judge III Class, Sirsa, against the defendants. In this suit, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the order dated 17.10.1978 passed by the Prescribed Authority under the Act is null and void. The Trial Court, by judgment/decree dated 06.11.1981, dismissed the suit as being barred.

8. The plaintiffs felt aggrieved and filed first appeal (C.A.421­C/83) in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sirsa. By Judgment dated 17.09.1983, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment/decree of the Trial Court. 3

11. The defendants felt aggrieved and filed first appeal (C.A.77­C/85) in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sirsa. By judgment dated 23.07.1987, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. The defendants felt aggrieved and carried the matter in 4 appeal (R.S.A. No.2712/1987) in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh.

13. By a common impugned order dated 28.01.2008, the High Court dismissed R.S.A. No. 40/1984 which arose out of C.S. No.24­C/79 and allowed RSA No. 2712/1987 which arose out of C.S. No. 62­C/1979 giving rise to filing of these appeals by special leave by the plaintiffs of both the civil suits mentioned above in this Court.

21. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellants’ suits as being barred by virtue of the bar contained in Section 26 of the Act. We 7 concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court finding no case to interfere in the impugned order in these appeals.

22. The appeals are, therefore, devoid of any merit. They are accordingly dismissed.

March 15, 2019 8
The Branch Manager National Insurance ... vs Mousumi Bhattacharjee

Section II insured the borrower against personal accidents. 3 The insured was working as a Manager of a Tea Estate in Assam. He thereafter took up employment in 2012 as a Manager of a Tea Factory at Cha-De- Magoma, District Gurue, Province-Zambezia, Republic of Mozambique. During his stay in Mozambique, the insured was admitted to the hospital on 14 November 2012. He was diagnosed with encephalitis malaria and died on 22 November 2012 due to multi-organ failure. His death certificate issued by the Republic of Mozambique spelt out the conditions and causes of death thus:

4 The heirs of the deceased filed a complaint under the Consumer Protection Act 1986 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum 3, North 24 PGS, Barasat alleging that the insurer had committed a deficiency of service in not settling the claim under the insurance cover. In the written statement filed by the appellant, it set up the plea that Section II of the policy insured the borrower of the loan against personal accident. Death due to malaria caused by a mosquito bite was, in the submission of the insurer, a result of an infection or disease and was not an accidental death under the terms of the insurance policy. 5 By an order dated 28 February 2014, the District Forum allowed the claim and called upon the insurer to pay the entire outstanding EMIs in respect of the loan to the Bank of Baroda. A statutory appeal was filed by the appellant before the State Commission4. The State Commission by its order dated 2 February 2016 affirmed the order of the District Forum, holding that a “sudden death due to mosquito bite in a foreign land” was an accident; it would be rather silly to say that it was a natural death. The order of the State Commission was assailed in revision before the National Commission. The National Commission observed thus:

22 We have been informed during the course of the hearing that the claim under the insurance policy has been paid by the insurer. We direct in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution that no recoveries shall be made. 15 We have embarked on the present exercise since the issue raised in the present case will have a bearing on similar questions of interpretation in policies of insurance envisaging an accident cover.

23 The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the National Commission shall stand set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

March 26, 2019.
Cto Anti Evasion Circle Iii Rajasthan ... vs M/S Prasoon Enterprises Jaipur

3. The appeal involves a short point as would be clear from the undisputed facts stated infra.

4. The appellant herein­State of Rajasthan (Commercial Tax Department) is the revision petitioner whereas the respondent herein is the respondent of the revision petition before the High Court out of which this appeal arises.

6. The Commercial Tax Officer (AE) [hereinafter referred to as “CTO”] conducted a survey in the respondent’s business premises on 16.03.2009 and it was noticed therein that the respondent was charging VAT at the rate of 4% on "Mobile Crane Wire Ropes”.

11. The CTO accordingly initiated the assessment proceedings against the respondent for the Assessment Year 2007­2008. By assessment order dated 16.03.2009, it was held that the respondent was liable to pay VAT at the rate of 12.5% under the 4 4 Residuary Entry of Schedule V of the VAT Act. Since the respondent had deposited the tax at the rate of 4% treating the goods in question as falling in Entry 155 of Schedule IV, the notice was issued to the respondent to pay the difference amount of VAT along with penalty and the interest payable under the VAT Act.

13. The State (CTO) felt aggrieved and filed appeal before the Rajasthan Tax Board under Section 83 of the VAT Act. By order dated 06.01.2016, the Board dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The State (CTO) felt aggrieved and filed revision petition in the High Court of Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur.

14. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the revision and upheld the order of the Board, which has given rise to filing of this appeal by way of special leave by the State (CTO) in this Court.

31. Mere perusal of the literature would go to show that the Mobile Cranes are not complete without the wire ropes. In other words, in order to use the Mobile Cranes and make them operational, the use of wire ropes is essential. If wire ropes are not fitted in the Mobile Cranes, they will not function much less effectively.

32. It is for this reason, we are of the considered opinion that the Mobile Crane Wire Rope is an essential part of the Mobile Crane and, therefore, falls in Entry 155 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act. It is, therefore, taxable at the rates prescribed for the goods specified in Entry 155.

34. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is found to be devoid of any merit and it thus fails and is accordingly dismissed.

In C.A.Nos. @ S.L.P.(c) Nos.4837­4838/2017, 4839­4840/2017 and 5981/2017

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals are directed against the common final judgment and order dated 07.10.2016 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Sales Tax Revision Petition Nos.106, 101, 99, 100/2013 and 449/2011 whereby the High Court dismissed the revision petitions filed by the appellant herein. 13 13

3. In view of the order passed above in C.A. @ S.L.P.(C) No.11937/2017, these appeals are dismissed.

March 26, 2019 14 14
Modern ... vs C.P.F. Commr. Thr. Commr. E.P.F. ...

By the aforesaid order dated 07.04.2006, the learned Single Judge of High ANITA MALHOTRA Date: 2019.03.26 17:53:37 IST Reason: Court allowed the writ petition filed by the appellants while upholding their contentions that the employees of Railways, who had withdrawn full amount of 1 provident fund while retiring and who were engaged by them on lump sum honorarium basis, should be treated as “excluded employees" for the purpose of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'/'the Act of 1952') and the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Scheme of 1952'). However, in the Letters Patent appeal preferred by the Central Provident Fund Commissioner and the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, the Division Bench of High Court totally disagreed with the learned Single Judge; and dismissed the writ petition while holding that the said employees, who retired after serving an exempted employer, would not fall within the category of excluded employees on re-employment and would be covered by the Act and the Scheme of 1952.

Explanation.-- An apprentice means a person who, according to the certified standing orders applicable to the factory or establishment, is an apprentice, or who is declared to be an apprentice by the authority specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government;"

18. For what has been discussed hereinabove, this appeal fails and is, therefore, dismissed.
Bajaj Auto Limited vs Union Of India

7. The appellant was apparently paying an automobile cess, but the NCCD, Education Cess and Secondary & Higher Education Cess were not being paid. The dispute arose on account of an audit conducted on 27/28.2.2009. The dispute pertains to the liability of the appellant to pay the unpaid three cesses referred to aforesaid.

23. We are, thus, of the view that the appellant would not be liable to pay the NCCD.

24. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the impugned orders are set 13 aside and the show cause notice dated 26.8.2011 is quashed while holding that the appellant is not liable to pay NCCD, Education Cess and Secondary & Higher Education Cess.

25. The appeal is allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

March 27, 2019.
M/S Achal Industries vs State Of Karnataka

2. The brief facts of the case which may be relevant for the present purpose are that the appellant is a manufacturer and registered dealer of the cashew kernels cashew shell oil, etc. Assessments were made for the years 1990­91 to 1999­2000 by the respective assessing authorities under Section 12(3) of the Act. Against the assessment orders of the assessing authorities, appeals/revision petitions were preferred before the appellate/revisional authority and the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant was that levy of tax under Section 6­B of the Act, on the total turnover is a misconstruction of the provision and it has to be on the “taxable turnover” which may be in conformity with Article 286 of the Constitution of India but that was neither accepted by the assessing authority nor at the appellate/revisional stage against which the present appeals have been preferred impugning the assessments made for the years 1990­91 to 1999­2000 in the instant appeals. 2

17. Consequently, in our considered view, the appeals are without substance and the same are dismissed accordingly. No costs.

18. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
Rajinder Tiwari vs Kedar Nath (Deceased) Through Lrs

3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of the appeals, which involve a short point.

4. The appellant is the plaintiff and the original respondent (now represented by his legal representatives) is the defendant in the civil suit out of which these appeals arise.

10. The defendant felt aggrieved and filed second appeal in the High Court of Delhi. By order dated 03.11.2016, the High Court allowed the second appeal, set aside the judgment of the first Appellate Court and dismissed the plaintiff's (appellant’s herein) suit. Thereafter the plaintiff filed application for re­hearing of the second appeal but the same was dismissed by order dated 26.04.2017. Against both the orders, the appellant(plaintiff) has filed the present appeals by way of special leave in this Court.

19. It is for these reasons, we are of the view that these appeals deserve to be allowed and matter is remitted to the Trial Court for deciding the civil suit afresh on merits in accordance with law.

20. The respondents herein (legal representatives of original defendant) are accordingly granted liberty to file their written statement within one month from the date of their appearance in the suit. The Trial Court will thereafter frame issues arising in the suit on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and then allow the parties to adduce their evidence in addition to the evidence already adduced. The parties will also be allowed to file additional documents, if they so wish.

22. We, however, make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the issue while having formed an opinion to remand the case to the Trial Court.

23. Let the trial be completed within one year. Parties to appear before the Senior Civil Judge (North East District), Karkardooma Courts, Delhi on 02.04.2019.

24. The appeals thus succeed and are accordingly allowed. The impugned orders are set aside and the suit is restored to its original file for being tried on merits as indicated above.

March 28, 2019 8
Susanta Dey vs Babli Majumdar

2. The appeal involves a short point as would be clear from the facts mentioned hereinbelow.

5. The appellant felt aggrieved and filed Criminal Appeal No. 7/2005) in the Court of Sessions/Magistrate. By order dated 12.07.2005, the Appellate Court allowed the appeal and while setting aside the order dated 29.06.2004 of the Judicial Magistrate remanded the case to the Judicial Magistrate for giving an opportunity to both the parties to adduce fresh evidence and then decide the complaint.

6. Respondent No.1 (complainant) felt aggrieved and filed revision in the High Court at Calcutta. By impugned order, the High Court allowed the revision and while setting aside the order of the Appellate Court, awarded simple imprisonment for 2 3 months to the appellant herein and also directed him to pay Rs. 3 Lakhs by way of compensation to respondent No.1.

14. In the light of the aforementioned three reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court committed jurisdictional error in 6 allowing the revision filed by respondent No.1. The impugned order, therefore, deserves to be set aside.

18. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order and the order dated 12.07.2005 of the Appellate Court are set aside. Criminal Appeal No. 7/2005 filed by the accused (appellant herein) is restored to its original file.

19. The Appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law on the basis of the material already on record.

21. Let the appeal be decided within six months from the date of appearance of the parties before the Appellate Court on 15.04.2019.

March 28, 2019 9
Kerala State Road Transport ... vs Akhilesh V. S.

3. The appellant is aggrieved by the direction to make appointments against 97 vacancies on the post of Blacksmith Grade II. The sanctioned cadre strength of the post was 800, of which 395 vacancies were already filled by substantive appointments. The appellant made a requisition for 405 vacancies to the Kerala Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commission’), which forwarded a recommendation with regard to 351 vacancies initially, and later for another six posts followed by twenty­three more against non­ joining vacancies. The facts, for the purpose of convenience, shall be taken primarily from Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) Diary No.21878 of 2018. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, being applicants, were empaneled at serial nos. 284 and 294 2 respectively in the rank list. Appointments were made till rank No. 278 only. The rank list has expired on 21.10.2017. The respondents did not allege discrimination or arbitrariness by violation of the rank list in making appointments. The High Court opined that the appellant was obliged to make appointments against requisitioned vacancies including those that may have arisen subsequently, but during the life of the rank list.

2. Leave granted. I.A. No.137467 of 2018, application for impleadment, is allowed.

7. Resultantly, we are unable to sustain the orders of the High Court which are accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed.

APRIL 01, 2019.
Dr.D.J.De Souza vs Managing Director Cpc Diagostics ...

5. The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, South Goa at Margao2 dismissed the complaint inter alia on the ground that the appellant 2 District Forum 2 has not placed copy of the order in support of his plea that on-board laundry was a part of the equipment. Since, there was no commitment on the part of the respondent to supply on-board laundry facility, the complaint was dismissed. Aggrieved against the order passed by the District Forum, the appellant filed an appeal before the Goa State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission3. The said appeal was dismissed on 08.07.2016 when his argument that the respondent has indulged in restrictive unfair trade practice, was not accepted. It was argued that the appellant had one 1KVA UPS purchased on 19.10.2015 but the respondent insisted on installation of Online UPS. The appellant referred to his correspondence with the manufacturer in USA that UPS purchased by the appellant is good provided that the instrument is the only item hooked up to the UPS.

9. We have heard the appellant and find no merit in the present appeals. The pre-installation requisite as reproduced above clearly stipulates that the appellant has to provide: (i) Efficiently air-conditioned room (ii) 1KVA Online UPS for running of the equipment (iii) Broadband connection for “i-track” (Remote Diagnostics Tool). The equipment will be provided with “i-track” remote facility at the time of installation.

11. In view of the above, we do not find any error in the orders passed by the Forums constituted under the Act which warrant interference in the present appeals. The present appeals are thus dismissed.

4 Act 5
Pawan Kumar vs Babulal Since Deceased Through Lrs

5. The trial court allowed said application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC and by its order dated 23.09.2016 rejected the plaint. The relevant portion of true translation of the decision of the trial court was as under:

14. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the view taken by the courts below and dismiss the application preferred by the second defendant under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Since the Suit has been pending since 2006, we direct the Trial Court to expedite the matter and dispose of the pending Suit as early as possible and preferably within six months from today. Needless to say that the merits of the matter will be gone into independently by the Trial Court.

5 (2005) 7 SCC 510 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3367 OF 2019 (@ SLP(C)NO. 36694 OF 2017) PAWAN KUMAR VS. BABULAL SINCE DECEASED THROUGH LRS AND ORS. 15

15. The appeal stands allowed in aforesaid terms. No costs.

April 02, 2019.
Nagar Ayukt Nagar Nigam vs Sri Mujibullah Khan.

3. The appellant, the Municipal Corporation, Kanpur is governed by the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 2, whereas, the respondent is an employee of the appellant. The employees in both cases claimed gratuity by invoking the jurisdiction of the Controlling Authorities under the Act. The argument of the appellant before the learned Single Bench was that the gratuity is payable in accordance with the Retirement Benefits and General Provident Fund Regulations, 19623 framed under Section 548 of the 1959 Act as amended on 11/01/1988. Such Regulations contemplate payment of gratuity at the rate of 15 days salary per month for 16.5 months. It was found by the High Court that it is the Act which is applicable, whereby, gratuity calculated at the rate of 15 days salary for every completed year without any ceiling of months or part thereof.

15. In view of the aforesaid, we find that there is no error in the orders passed by the Controlling Authorities under the Act and as maintained by the High Court. Consequently, the appeals are dismissed.
Anant Shankar Bhave vs Kalyan Dombivli Municipal Corporation

3. A few facts need mention for the disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point.

7. The respondent denied the appellant's claim and contested the suit. By judgment/decree dated 12.08.1999, the Trial Court decreed the appellant's suit. The respondent felt aggrieved and filed first appeal (No.76/1999) before the First Appellate Court.

8. By its judgment dated 29.02.2000, the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment/decree dated 12.08.1999 of the Trial Court and dismissed the appellant's suit. The appellant (plaintiff) felt aggrieved and filed Second Appeal in the High Court of Bombay.

9. By impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the second appeal and affirmed the 3 judgment/decree dated 29.02.2000 of the First Appellate Court which has given rise to filing of the present appeal by way of special leave by the plaintiff in this Court.

15. The appellant, however, did not come to the Court for claiming the aforementioned reliefs and nor he proved the aforementioned facts and instead claimed improper reliefs as mentioned above.

17. It is for these reasons, though we are inclined to dismiss the appeal finding no merit therein but grant liberty to the appellant (plaintiff) to file a fresh civil suit against the respondent to claim the proper reliefs in relation to the suit land, which we have mentioned above, by properly pleading and adducing evidence in support of his case in accordance with law.

18. We, however, make it clear that while trying the suit, the findings recorded by the Courts below in the present proceedings will not come against any party and nor will operate res judicata against any party. In other words, the issues raised in the fresh suit will be tried independently on the basis of the pleadings and evidence adduced therein.

19. With these observations and the liberty granted, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

April 02, 2019 7