L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
U.P. Stte Electricity Board vs Laxmi Kant Gupta

4. The writ petition in the High Court was filed against the award of the Labour Court IV, Kanpur dated 14.11.1996 (annexure P/4 to this appeal). That award was given on a reference made by the State Government under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 regarding the termination of service of respondent, Laxmi Kant Gupta from the service of the appellant.

13. Hence, while we are not inclined to quash the reference order on the ground of delay, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court as well as the Labour Court to the extent that 6 they grant re-instatement to the respondent, and we hold that in this case compensation should have been granted instead of re-instatement. In this case the amount already paid to the respondent is more than sufficient compensation for his illegal termination of service, and no further amount need to be paid to him. However, what has already been paid to him should not be recovered from him.

14. The appeal thus stands allowed. No costs.

September 26, 2008
Balwant Singh & Anr vs Tej Singh & Ors

The said suit was decreed. The First Appellate Court, however, reversed the said judgment and decree opining that ..2/-

Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order of the First Appellate Court the appellants preferred a second appeal before the High Court.

arose for its consideration. On the said finding, the second appeal has been dismissed.

..5/-

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court has rightly arrived at a finding that no substantial question of law arose for its consideration. The appeal, is therefore, dismissed.

..........................J (S.B. SINHA) ..........................J (CYRIAC JOSEPH) NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 29, 2008.
Ramzan Khan & Anr vs National Insurance Co Ltd

This is claimant's appeal. Habib, the son of the appellants died in a motor accident which occurred on 24.11.1988. The deceased was a bachelor aged about 23 years. He was working as a driver and earning Rs.1050/- p.m. as salary apart from daily batta. The claimants who were the parents were aged 58 years and 45 years respectively. The claimants prayed for award of compensation of Rs.4,10,000/-. The tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs.50,000/-. On appeal, the High Court by its judgment dated 2.7.1998 increased the compensation to Rs.80,000/- with interest at 12% p.a. for a period of five years only. For arriving at the compensation, the High Court calculated the annual contribution to the family as Rs.7800 (Rs.650 x 12). By applying multiplier of 10, the tribunal arrived at the total loss of dependency as 2 Rs.78,000/- and by adding Rs.2000/- towards funeral expenses came to the conclusion that Rs.80,000/- should be the compensation. The judgment of the High Court was rendered on 2.7.1998. The High Court felt that the insurer was not responsible for the long pendency of litigation and therefore restricted the award of interest for a period of five years only.

5. We therefore hold that the claimants are entitled to interest from the date of claim petition till the date of payment. It is stated that the amount awarded by the High Court with interest was calculated and a sum of Rs.1,41,682 was deposited on 3.12.2002. Be that as it may.

6. We allow this appeal in part and increase the 4 compensation from Rs.80,000/- to Rs.1,11,400/- Insofar as the interest is concerned, the claimant will be entitled to interest @ 12% p.a. on Rs.80,000/- from the date of claim petition till the date of deposit. Insofar as the amount of compensation increased by this Court, namely Rs.31,400/-, it shall carry interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of claim petition till the date of payment. The insurer is given three months' time to deposit the difference amount with the tribunal. The insurer shall also pay Rs.2500/- as costs to the appellants.

September 30, 2008.
Talwara Coop.Credit &Service Society ... vs Sushil Kumar

4. A writ petition preferred thereagainst has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.

If only the same is discharged by the workman, the onus of proof would shift on to the employer to show that the concerned employee was in fact gainfully employed.

15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the respondent was employed for a short period and that too in two different spells, viz., from 1987 to 1990 and from 1995 to 1997. Having regard to the fact that the respondent has not worked for a long period and the appellant does not have any capacity to pay as it is a sick unit, interest of justice would be subserved if in stead and place of an award of reinstatement with full back wages, a compensation for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs only) is directed to be paid. The said sum would be over and above the amount which the appellant has deposited in terms of the order of the High Court under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions. No costs.

October 01, 2008
Fida Hussain Bohra vs State Of Maharashtra

4. Appellant applied for and was granted anticipatory bail by the learned Sessions Judge, Akola subject to the condition that he would attend the office of C.I.D Akola thrice a week between 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. till completion of investigation. Indisputably the said order has been complied with.

6. Prior thereto the State filed an application purported to be under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) before the High Court questioning the correctness of the said order granting anticipatory bail to the appellant on 19-12-2007. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said application has been allowed.

12. If matters relating to the involvement of the appellant in the crime vis-`-vis the other accused were required to be further probed, the Sessions Judge again could have been approached.

13. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of this case interest of justice would be sub-served if it is directed that the appellant shall in the event, any application therefor is filed by the investigation agency may be interrogated at any time suitable for the 7 Investigating Officer either alone or with other accused persons, shall be allowed. Appellant shall comply with such other direction or directions as may be issued by the learned Sessions Judge, if and when, the learned Sessions Judge passes an order at the instance of the investigating agency or otherwise relying or on the basis of these observations.

14. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.

March 3, 2009
State Of M.P vs Dhara Singh & Anr

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The trial Judge after considering the evidence on record found the accused persons guilty as noted above. In appeal before the High Court it was primarily submitted that the prosecution version is not acceptable. The evidence of the witnesses did not inspire confidence. The bullet which was 3 found on the body of the deceased was recovered and was sent for examination of the ballistic expert and his report was not placed on record. The High Court found that the name of Bhagwan Singh (PW-3) did not find place in the FIR. The State's stand was that neither of these two aspects rendered the prosecution version suspect. The High Court however held that the benefit of doubt was to be extended and directed acquittal.

5. In view of the aforesaid, the High Court was in error in directing acquittal of the respondents. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored.

6. The appeal is allowed.

March 03, 2009 6
National Insurance Co vs M/S Sajjan Kumar Aggarwalla

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, New Delhi (in short the `National Commission'). Challenge before the National Commission was to the order dated 25.7.2006 passed by State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Orissa at Cuttack (in short the `State Commission'). The appeal before the State Commission was directed against the order passed by District Consumer Dispute Redressal Forum, Angul (in short the `District Forum').

The respondent filed a complaint alleging that his claim for compensation was repudiated without any valid reason. His case was that he is owner of Maruti Car No.QR-6/D/0121. The vehicle was the subject matter of insurance with the appellant. On 23.2.2001 the vehicle met with an accident in the State of Chattisgarh and it was badly damaged. On being informed, appellant deputed a Surveyor to conduct spot survey. According to the claimant there was an agreement that the claimant would be paid Rs.1,95,000/- for the damage of the vehicle. But the appellant repudiated the claim on the ground that the driver who was driving the vehicle did not have an effective driving license at the time of accident. Before the District Forum a copy of the driving license bearing No.1149 dated 22.7.1999 issued by the licensing authority, Dhenkanal was filed by respondent. It was stated that he was issued with light motor vehicle license on 22.10.1998 2 corresponding to learning license No.2081. On 1.8.2000 he was issued with learning license and was authorized to drive heavy goods vehicle and passenger vehicle. Requisition fees has been paid and, therefore, the driver had a valid driving license. This plea was accepted by the District Forum.

6. The controversy lies, as noted above, within a very narrow compass as to the person to whom D.L. No.1149 was issued. According to respondent it was issued to Sachidananda Nayak. But according to the information supplied by investigator of the appellant-company the license in question was issued to one Santosh Kumar Maharana. In view of the aforesaid background we feel it appropriate to set aside the impugned order of the District Forum, State Commission and the National Commission and remit the matter to the District Forum to verify the necessary data by calling for records from the licensing authority. The parties shall be permitted to place materials in support of their respective claim.

7. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Riyojoddin Rafiyoddin Shaik vs State Of Maharashtra Rep.By Pp

3. Brief facts giving rise to the prosecution are as under:

3 Akberbeg came to know through his relative Rahanabi (PW-5) that the accused No.5 committed the murder of the deceased by pouring kerosene oil on her person and setting her on fire. Accused Nos.1 to 4 and 6 abetted the accused No.5 in the commission of murder of the deceased. P.W.4 Akberbeg lodged the complaint dated 25.5.1996 alleging ill- treatment to the deceased prior to 25.5.1996 and committing her murder on 24.5.1996 at about 11-00 P.M. On the basis of his complaint crime bearing No.121/1996 was registered with Parola Police station at about 1.00 p.m. M.D. Patil (PW-11) carried out the investigation of the crime. On 27.5.1996, he sent the seized articles for examination to the C.A. Aurangabad. After the completion of investigation on 14.8.1996 he submitted the charge sheet against the accused for the offences as stated above to the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class. Parola.

The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Parola by an order dated 21.8.1996 committed the case to the Additional Sessions Judge, Amalner, as the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions.

The trial Court directed acquittal of A-1 to A-4 and A-6 but held the present appellant guilty of offence punishable under Sections 302 and 498- A IPC. In appeal, as noted above the High Court found that the accusations so far as Section 498-A are concerned are not established, but the evidence was sufficient to hold the appellant guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

17. The doctor (PW-8) clearly stated that the dead body was totally burnt and was smelling of kerosene and the cause of death was due to burns and shock. It was also opined that the injuries found on the dead body were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and by pouring kerosene the injury as mentioned in Column No.17 of P.M. Notes Exh.78 would be caused. The circumstances highlighted by the prosecution as analysed in detail by the trial and High Court clearly established the guilt of the accused. That being so, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
Kausalyabai @ Akkabai vs Harishchandra Munnalal Gupta

3. Original parties to the suit were brothers and sisters. They had another brother, Dr. D.C. Gupta. The property in suit is said to be an ancestral property. Appellant became a widow in 1945. She, therefore, came to stay with her parents. Father of the original parties died in 1947. Respondent and his brother, therefore, became owner of the properties. Plaintiff-respondent was a Constable. He had been occupying a Government accommodation. Allegedly, he allowed his sister to stay in his house, inter alia, on the condition that she would vacate the same on his retirement.

10. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the matter afresh upon formulating substantial questions of law.

11. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations. No costs.

March 3, 2009
Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar vs State Of Maharashtra

3. The relevant facts as arising from the case made out by the parties, leading to filing of this appeal, and which will help us in understanding the controversy involved, can be summarized as follows.

The property in acquisition belonged to the appellant, bearing House No. 100/5 at village Deolali, Tal. & District Osmanabad (hereinafter referred to as the `acquired property'). The same was sought to be acquired by the State Respondent for the Ruibhor Medium Project. On 10th of September, 1985, the State Respondent issued a notification under section 4 of the Act regarding the need of the acquired property for purposes mentioned in the notification. This notification was published on 16th of October, 1985. On 17th of March, 1986, the State Respondent issued a notification under section 6 of the Act regarding the need of the acquired property for purposes mentioned therein. Thereafter, on 30th of March, 1988, the Land Acquisition Officer passed an award of compensation under section 11 of the Act, granting an amount of Rs.40,226/- as compensation to the appellant, the said amount being inclusive of statutory benefits under Section 23 of the Act.

(Underlining is ours)

35.The reasons given by the High Court for setting aside the order of the Reference Court were limited to inconsistency and unreliability of the testimony of the witnesses produced by the appellants and on the grounds that were clearly argued by the State Respondent.

38.Before parting with this judgment, we may also state here that the entire compensation money given by the Reference Court has been allowed to be withdrawn and therefore, this is one of the aspects that should have been kept in mind.

39.For the reasons above-stated, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, thereby restoring the 29 judgment of the Reference Court awarding enhanced compensation to the appellant.

40.The appeal is accordingly allowed. There is no order as to costs.
Jitu @ Jitender vs State Of M.P

The appellant's appeal before the High Court was dismissed. Primary stand before the High Court was that the place of occurrence has been changed, and entirely different version as to how the incident took place was given and, therefore, the prosecution version should not have been -3- accepted. The High Court found no substance in the appeal and, as noted above, dismissed it.

Considering the nature of injuries, the conviction of the present appellant is altered to one under Section 326 IPC and custodial sentence of seven years is imposed upon him. It is stated that the appellant has already undergone the sentence of more than seven years. If that be so, he shall be released from custody forthwith unless required to be in custody in connection with any other case.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Rameshwar Prasad vs State Of Rajasthan

3. Background facts need to be noted in brief.

The appellant was appointed as the Branch Manager in Central Co- operative Bank, Branch Bonli in District Sawai Madhopur. On 25.4.1982 the First Information Report was lodged by the S.H.O. of the concerned police station for alleged commission of offence punishable under Sections 408 and 462 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). Subsequently, cognizance was taken for the allegation relating to offence punishable under Section 408 IPC for alleged criminal breach of trust of certain amounts. The trial Court by order dated 11.2.2003 convicted and sentenced the appellant in the aforesaid criminal case. The appellant filed appeal against the judgment and order of the trial Court. The first Appellate Court however remanded the case for fresh trial stating that there were certain lacunae which had to be rectified and the matter was to be re- examined. Against the order dated 16.4.2004 the appellant filed a Criminal Revision before the High Court. The High Court quashed and set aside the order of remand stating that it was against the settled position of law but 2 upheld the judgment of the trial Court. In other words, the direction for remand was set aside but there was no examination on merits of the various stands taken by the appellant. An application was filed for review before the High Court stating that while setting aside the direction for remand the High Court had also dismissed the appeal not examining the appeal on merits and upheld the conviction as recorded by the trial Court. The application as noted above was dismissed.

7. The appeal is allowed.
M/S. Alex Enterprises & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors

5. As noted above the time was given to deposit Rs.42,00,000/-on or before 10.7.2002. A writ petition was filed against the order of CEGAT i.e. Writ Petition No. 4053 of 2002. The High Court disposed of the writ petition extending the time for making deposit till 30.9.2002 and directed to file compliance before the CEGAT on 7.10.2002. On 7.10.2002 an application for extension of time was filed before CEGAT stating that the appellants were taking steps to file a review/recall application of the order passed in the Writ Petition. The Review Petition is stated to have filed on 11.10.2002. On 22.10.2002 another application for extension of time was filed or stated to have been filed. The Review petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 17.12.2002.

6. It is stated by learned counsel for the appellant that liberty was granted to move another appropriate application seeking modification of the 4 order dated 2.8.2002. On 20.10.2002, CEGAT dismissed the appeal on the ground that the order passed by the CEGAT and the extended time granted by the High Court to make the deposit were not complied with. A writ petition was filed seeking restoration of the appeal which was dismissed by the High Court on 25.3.2003. A writ petition No. 2151 of 2003 was filed with a prayer to set aside/quash the entire subsequent proceedings. The same was dismissed by the High Court on 25.3.2003. The appellants filed a review petition which was numbered as RA No. 3890 of 2003 on the ground that the undue hardship aspect was not considered by the High Court. The same was dismissed by the High Court on 25.3.2003. SLP(C ) No. 12435 of 2003 was filed before this court against the said order of the High Court. The same was dismissed on 28.7.2003. On 1.8.2003 the present Civil Appeal was filed.

9. The conduct of the appellant disentitle them from any relief. Therefore this appeal is dismissed as there is no substance in the same. There shall be no order as to costs.
Forward Seamen Union Of India vs Union Of India & Ors

The appellant trade union represents "Bazarmen" that is employees of canteen/catering contractors operating in ships sailing between Calcutta/Chennai and Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The said ships belonged to the Andaman & Nicobar administration (`A&N Administration' for short) and were managed and operated by Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. (`SCI' for short). SCI had entered into contract/s, with canteen/catering contractors to run the canteens in the said ships. There were some long pending demands by Bazarmen who were members of appellant union on the one hand, with SCI as also another Trade Union -- National Union of Seafarers of India (NUSI). As the ship services were sometimes disrupted on account of such disputes, a public interest litigation (CO No.87(W) of 1997) was filed by Andaman Chamber of Commerce. 2 In that case, the High Court by an interim order dated 3.2.1998 appointed an Ad-hoc Committee consisting of Labour Commissioner of West Bengal, Regional General Manager of SCI, Principal Officer of Mercantile Marine Department of Union of India and Director of Shipping Services of A&N Administration, to amicably resolve the disputes. The Ad-hoc Committee made various recommendations as per its proceedings dated 6.4.1998. One of the recommendations related to operation of two separate lists of Bazarmen : one of a group of 69 Bazarmen and another of a group of 79 Bazarmen, by allotting duties according to their waiting seniority in the respective groups. The Calcutta High Court approved the recommendations dated 6.4.1998 by order dated 26.6.1998. By another order dated 20.11.1998, SCI was directed to discuss all issues relating to Bazarmen only with the Trade Unions recognized and approved by the Ad-hoc Committee in respect of Port of Calcutta.

3. The Bazarmen who were being employed by the then existing contractor (from the operating lists of 69 and 79 Bazarmen) were aggrieved, as their chances of appointment would be affected if preference was to be given to locals or others who were not in the list. The appellant union, on their behalf approached the Circuit Bench of the Calcutta High Court in W.P. No.40/2003 for quashing the said tender notice dated 18.11.2002.

__________________J [R. V. Raveendran] _________________J 7 [Markandey Katju] New Delhi;

March 5, 2009.
Yumnam Ongbi Tampha Ibemma Devi vs Yumnam Joykumar Singh & Ors

3. Background facts as noted by the High Court are as follows:

The primary stand before the High Court was that no issue was framed regarding the genuineness of the Will, and the requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (in short the `Succession Act') and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the `Evidence Act') were not kept in view. The High Court accepted the prayer particularly with reference to the evidence of PW 2 who claimed to be one of the attesting witnesses. The High Court allowed the appeal inter alia holding that the evidence of PW2 is vague and it cannot be said that there was due execution of the will in question. PW 2 was not even having knowledge about the death of the alleged executor more than 14 years prior to the date of his giving evidence. Though he claimed that he had reached the house of said Gouramani Singh on being summoned, there was nobody present when he had gone there. He stated that he had put the signature without understanding as to why he was putting his signature and he did not know the nature of the document on which he had put his signature. He also did not state that said Yumnam Gouramani Singh put his signature on the document or if the said Gouramani Singh said anything about his 5 signature or mark having been put on the document. He did not say anything about presence of any another person as an attesting witness in respect of any document by the said Yumnam Gouramani Singh. The High Court concluded that PW2 failed to testify anything regarding alleged due execution and attestation of the will. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

23. Each case, however, must be determined in the fact situation obtaining therein.