L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
K.R.Subbaiah And Anr vs Indian Bank, Madurai

The judgment-debtors are in appeal, by special leave. Indian Bank-respondent (for short, `the bank') sued the appellants for recovery of a sum of Rs. 14,06,152.80 with interest and costs before the Principal Sub Court, Madurai. On January 7, 1986, a preliminary decree was passed by the trial court against the appellants ex-parte, as prayed for by the bank, and one month's time was given for payment. On November 12, 1986, an ex-parte final decree was passed against the appellants in terms of the preliminary decree. The bank levied 1 execution of the decree wherein two properties belonging to the first appellant were sold and a sum of Rs. 4,07,000/- was realized from that sale. During the pendency of the execution proceedings, the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short, `the 1993 Act') came into force and the execution proceedings were transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chennai (for short, `the Tribunal'). On April 26, 2000, the Tribunal issued recovery certificate in favour of the bank for a sum of Rs. 15, 66,731.49 with future interest @ 18% p.a. on Rs. 11,95,200/- from the date of decree till the date of realization with costs and for sale of the properties mentioned in the schedule. The proceedings before the Tribunal also remained ex-parte. It appears that pursuant to the recovery certificate dated April 26, 2000, initially an order of attachment of the judgment-debtors' two properties was passed on August 9, 2002 and then the order of proclamation of sale was made on October 11, 2002. The Debt Recovery Officer fixed November 15, 2002 as the date for auction of these two properties.

3. The appellants then preferred appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, Chennai and since it was barred by time, they also prayed for condonation of delay in filing the same. However, the Appellate Tribunal was not convinced by the explanation put forth by the appellants and dismissed the appeal on July 2, 2003 on the ground of delay. 3

4. The appellants then approached the High Court of Judicature at Madras challenging the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The High Court held that the Appellate Tribunal did not err in dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay and accordingly dismissed the revision petition on December 23, 2003. It is from this order that the present appeal has arisen.

13. The parties shall bear their own costs.

(Aftab Alam) .......................
Karuba Nallappagari Sreenivasappa vs State Of Ap

2. The accused appellant stands charged for offences punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code for having raped a girl aged about 9 years. P.W. 2, the victim appeared in the witness box and gave a very gruesome and pathetic story as to the manner in which she had been raped. The trial court, which in this case is the Assistant Sessions Judge, held that as the accused was about 19 years of age on the date of the incident a sentence of 7 years would meet the ends of justice. The matter was thereafter taken by way of an appeal before the Sessions Judge who confirmed the conviction and sentence of Criminal Apeal No. 1012 of 2006 2 the appellant. The High Court further in revision has also affirmed the order of the courts below. The matter is before us after the grant of special leave.

5. The appeal is dismissed.

......................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] ......................J [C.K. PRASAD] NEW DELHI AUGUST 03, 2010.
Budh Ram & Ors vs Bansi & Ors

4. The suit was contested by the present appellants. However, defendant No. 6, Smt. Parwatu did not enter appearance and did not contest the suit. The present appellants had also claimed title over the suit land by way of adverse possession. It is an admitted fact that 2 both the parties are descendants of the same ancestor Jalphu and certain mutation proceedings had been under challenge in the suit itself. On the basis of the pleadings, issues were framed and evidence was adduced. After the conclusion of the trial of the suit, the Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents and defendant No. 6, as prayed for vide Judgment and decree dated 21.12.1999.

5. Being aggrieved, the present appellants preferred Civil Appeal No. 19-NL/13 of 2000, wherein the said defendant No. 6 Smt. Parwatu was impleaded as respondent No. 4. The appeal was contested by the respondents/plaintiffs, however, Smt Parwatu remained unrepresented before the 1st Appellate Court also. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Parwatu, respondent No. 4, died on 19.11.2000. The present appellants preferred an application for substitution of the LRs of Smt. Parwatu, respondent No. 4, before the Ist Appellate Court on 16.10.2001, under order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called as, "CPC"). The said application was duly supported by an affidavit, however, no application for condonation of delay was filed along with the said application. It was after an inordinate delay that an application for 3 condonation of delay was filed on 15.11.2002 without furnishing any explanation as to why the application could not be filed along with the application for substitution of LRs.

6. The said application was contested by the respondents/plaintiffs taking a specific plea that the appellants/ applicants were fully aware of the death of Smt. Parwatu as they were residing in same village. The present appellants/applicants had taken part in the last rites of the deceased Smt. Parwatu. Thus, the respondents sought for rejection of the said application.

7. The Appellate Court considered various aspects and issues involved and reached the conclusion that there was no sufficient cause for the appellants/applicants to file an application with such an inordinate delay and, therefore, the application for condonation of delay was rejected. The Appellate Court further came to the conclusion that in view of the fact that there was a joint possession and co-ownership of the respondents/plaintiffs and Smt. Parwatu, and as the Trial Court had passed a joint decree in their favour, the appeal stood abated in toto.

21. In view of the above, the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

..................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) .............................
Nandu Prasad & Anr vs State Of Bihar & Anr

1. One Rajan died on 29th of April, 1983. According to the appellant, he was the leader of a criminal gang and accused in a large number of cases. In order to apprehend him, a police team was constituted and when they went to apprehend him he resorted to firing on police personnel, causing injuries to many of them. Police party resorted to firing in self defence in which he was injured and when being taken to the Patna Medical College Hospital, on way, he succumbed to the injuries. Aforesaid incident led to registration of Kotwali (Jakaknpur) P.S. Case No. 415 dated 29.4.1983 under Sections 307, 324/34 of the Indian Penal Crl.A. No.s. 63-64 of 2002 CORRECTED COPY 2 Code and 25(A)/27 of the Arms Act. The investigation of this case was supervised by the Superintendent of Police, who found the aforesaid story true.

2. However, the mother of said Rajan filed a complaint in the court of the Judicial Magistrate inter alia alleging that appellant No. 2 herein Kameshwar Prasad Singh and other Police Officers shot dead her son Rajan and in order to hush up the matter, a false story was cooked up that Rajan was killed in an encounter. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna by order dated 3rd of April, 1987 passed in Complaint Case no.

192(c)83 dismissed the complaint. Mother of the said Rajan i.e. complainant Savitri Devi aggrieved by the same, filed Criminal Revision No. 464 of 1988 before the High Court. The High Court by its order dated 22nd June, 1999 set aside the order of the learned Magistrate dismissing the complaint and directed to hold further enquiry. Thereafter the learned Magistrate by order dated 31st of July, 2000 took cognizance of the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and directed for issuance of non-bailable warrant of arrest against the appellants herein.

4. We are of the opinion that once the High Court in the impugned order had come to the aforesaid conclusion, it ought not to have taken into consideration the observation of the Court made earlier. The aforesaid observation was made in the revision application preferred against the order of dismissal of complaint. Said order was set aside by the High Court and it directed for further enquiry. Thereafter other Crl.A. No.s. 63-64 of 2002 CORRECTED COPY 5 materials come into existence. In the face of the same, the High Court having come to the conclusion that sanction was necessary ought not to have dismissed the application.

5. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside as also that of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 31st July, 2000 passed in Complaint Case No. 192[C] of 1983.

.........................................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] .......................................J [C.K. PRASAD] NEW DELHI AUGUST 05, 2010.
Dinesh B. Patel & Ors vs State Of Gujarat & Anr

2. The present appeal challenges the order of the High Court whereby the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the company and its directors (appellants herein) was dismissed by the High Court. The High Court took the view that the directors are responsible for the affairs of the company and, therefore, when a drug manufactured by the company was found to be defective, all the directors could be prosecuted. The High Court, however, left it to the concerned parties to prove before the Trial Court that they were not in any way responsible for the manufacture process. The High Court proceeded on the basis of specific language of Section 34(2) of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940 (for short "the Act") and proceeded to hold that the complaint filed against the directors could not be disposed of under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as it required appreciation of the facts on the basis of the evidence to be led before the Trial Court.

3. When the matter came up before this Court, the Special Leave Petition 2 filed on behalf of the company and Managing Director - Himanshu C. Patel was dismissed. However, notice was issued in case of the remaining appellants No. 3 to

9. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case and realizing the seriousness of the allegations, we would not take a technical view based on pleadings in the complaint. Mr. Raichura contended that as per the settled law by this Court in complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against company and directors also specific averment about the active role of directors in running the company has to be made, failing which the directors cannot be proceeded against. Same logic should apply even in the present case. We cannot agree. Firstly, the language of Section 34 (2) of the Act substantially differs from the language of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Secondly, here we are dealing with the offence which has the direct impact on the public health. We, therefore, would choose not to interfere with the order of the High Court. It will be open for the directors to show to the Trial Court that they had nothing to do with the manufacture process and, therefore, they should not be held liable under Section 34 (2) of the Act.

10. With these observations, the appeal stands dismissed.

New Delhi.
Prakashan vs State Of Kerala

4. This is indeed an unfortunate case. The appellant has impugned the proceedings initiated against him under Clauses 3 and 4 of the Lubricating Oils and Greases (Processing, Supply and Distribution Regulation)Order, 1987 read with Sections 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. As per the admitted position, the case had been registered on 7th September, 1987 and the charge sheet submitted on 20th June, 1999 whereas the lubricants that had been seized had been sent for analysis on the 9th June, 2005 and the report thereof had been received on 10th June, 2008. CRL.A. NO... of 2010 @ SLP(CRL) 883 of 2010 2 A period of 21 years has thus elapsed since the registration of the case.

5. In view of the delay, the continuance of proceedings would be against the interests of justice and an abuse of the process of the court. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and quash the proceedings against the appellant.
Zakiya Begum & Ors vs Shanaz Ali & Ors

4. The material facts are that the appellants are the landlords of the property bearing No. 28/1, Robertson Road, Frazer Town, Bangalore - 5, measuring 43 feet North, South 37 feet 9 inches, East 25 feet and West 25 feet, the property included 6 feet wide passage leaving from Robertson Road into the scheduled premises (herein after referred to as the said `premises'). The appellants became the owner of the scheduled premises by virtue of a Gift Deed dated 30.3.2000 executed by the husband of appellant No. 1 and the father of appellants No. 2 and 3.

5. The appellants inducted the respondents as tenants on a monthly rent of Rs.4000/- (Four Thousand Only) per month in respect of the said premises. The rent was agreed in accordance with clause 4 of the rent agreement dated 06.11.1997.

6. On or about 21.3.01 the appellants instituted an eviction proceeding being H.R.C. No. 10042/2001 against the respondents under Section 21 (1) (h) and (f) of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (herein after "the 1961 Act"), inter alia, on the grounds of default, subletting, reasonable and bonafide requirements and some other grounds.

7. Standard rent.- (1) Standard rent in relation to any premises, shall be the rent calculated on the basis of ten per cent per annum of the aggregate amount of the cost of construction and the market price of the land comprised in the premises on the date of commencement of the construction:

Before enacting this law, recommendations of Economic Administration Reforms Commission and 11 the National Commission on Urbanisation were considered.

22. From the statement of objects and reasons some of the features of the 1999 Rent Act are clear. The application of the Act is restricted to,-

30. In the instant case the agreed rent is the deemed rent since there is no dispute about the quantum of agreed rent before the coming into force of this Act.

31. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court does not find any error in the reasoning of the High Court and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
Sushil Kumar Singhal vs Regional Manager Punjab National Bank

3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to the present case are that the appellant was appointed as a Peon in the respondent-Bank, Kaithal Branch, on 01.12.1971 and stood confirmed on the said post vide order dated 28.12.1977. The appellant was handed over cash of Rs.5000/-, to deposit the same as dues for the Telephone Bill in the Post Office. However, it was not deposited by the appellant, therefore, the bank lodged FIR No. 171 under Section 409 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called "lPC") against the appellant, on 27.04.1982, in Police Station, City Kaithal. Appellant was tried for the said offence. After conclusion of trial, the appellant was convicted by the competent Criminal Court vide Judgment and Order dated 28.01.1988. The respondent-Bank issued a Show Cause Notice dated 01.03.1988 to the appellant, proposing dismissal from service and asked the appellant to show cause within a period of seven days. The appellant submitted the reply dated 08.03.1988. However, the 2 respondent-Bank dismissed the appellant from service vide order dated 09.03.1988.

25. Undoubtedly, the embezzlement of Rs.5000/- by the appellant, for which he had been convicted, was an offence involving moral turpitude. The Statutory provisions of the Act, 1949, provide that the Management shall not permit any person convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude to continue in employment.

28. Undoubtedly, the appellant was convicted by the Criminal Court for having committed the offence under Section 409 IPC and was awarded two years' sentence. The 17 appellate court granted him the benefit of Act, 1958. The Tribunal rejected his claim for re-instatement and other benefits taking note of the fact that appellant was given an opportunity by the Management to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. The appellant submitted his reply to the said show cause notice. The Management passed the order of dismissal in view of the provisions of the Act, 1949. The Tribunal also took into consideration the contents of the Bi-Partite Settlement applicable in the case and rejected the appellant's claim. The High Court considered appellant's grievance elaborately as is evident from the impugned judgment. We could not persuade ourselves, in the aforesaid fact-situation, that any other view could also be possible.

29. In view of the above, we find no force in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

..................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) 18 .............................
A. Natesam Pillai vs Spl. Tahsildar, Land Acqusition, ...

2. Before we deal with the contentions raised before us, brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are required to be stated. For providing house sites at Adi Dravidas, land measuring an extent of 3.90 acres comprised in Survey No. 118/A in Palangudi Village was acquired by the Government of Tamil Nadu by issuing a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act which was published on 3 23.9.1992. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded a sum of Rs. 1.72 per sq. ft. for the acquired land. At the instance of the aggrieved land owner, i.e. the appellant, reference was made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act before the Additional Sub Court, Trichy.

5. The High Court after consideration of the records came to the conclusion that the amount of compensation i.e. Rs. 17/- per sq. feet is on the higher side, and that the appropriate amount of compensation would be Rs. 9/- per sq. feet and accordingly reversed the order passed by the Reference Court with the aforesaid modification of the rate of compensation fixing the same at Rs. 9/- per sq. ft.

9. The Reference Court granted compensation at Rs. 17/- per sq. feet after holding that the acquired land is a potential house site being located in a very important locality and that the amount of compensation granted by the Land Acquisition Officer, i.e., 1.72 per sq. ft. was totally an unjust and inadequate amount.

25. In our considered opinion, by scaling down the rate of compensation to Rs. 9/- from Rs. 11/- per sq. ft., the High Court denied just and reasonable compensation to appellant, thereby resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

26. We, therefore, hold that the appellant shall be entitled to compensation at Rs. 11/- per sq. ft. for the acquired land which we consider to be just and fair. Needless to say that the State shall also be liable to pay additional compensation and solatium on the 24 amount enhanced and fixed in terms of this order including payment of interest in terms of the rate of interest awarded by the Reference Court. The appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent without any costs.
Rakesh Chand & Anr vs State Of Punjab

O R D E R The facts are as under:

The Trial Court relying on the evidence of Chunni Lal (PW.15), the father of the deceased, her mother Sudesh Kumari (PW.1) the complainant and Rajni Bala, (PW.16) convicted all the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B and 201 of the IPC but acquitted them of the offence of murder and they were sentenced accordingly.

In the meantime, we direct that the appellant- Rakesh Chand, who is in custody, shall be released forthwith if not required in connection with any other case. As regards Pushpa Devi, her bail bonds shall stand discharged.
Chaturbhuja Modi & Ors vs State Of Orissa & Anr

5. In this appeal, the parties have adduced limited evidence to establish their case. The records indicate that the appellants had filed two certified copies of the registered sale deeds, namely Exhibits 1 and 2, which were of course exhibited without objection from the respondent. Sale deeds were produced on behalf of the respondent - State and Land Acquisition Officer also, and they were exhibited as Exhibit B to B/3 but the same were marked as such with objection. Exhibit 1, which was produced by the appellants herein, is a certified copy of the registered sale deed dated 04.10.1982. Under the aforesaid sale deed, a total land of Acre 0.0070 4 decimals in Baharbisinabar was sold for Rs. 40,000/- i.e. at the rate of 22,500/- per gunth or Rs. 5,50,000/- (approximately) per acre.

11. After giving some variations and discount, the High Court fixed the rate of the land at Rs. 3, 00,000/- per acre, which in our considered opinion and in the light of evidence on record, seems to be just and proper. Consequently, we dismiss 8 this appeal as we find no merit in it but without any cost.
M.A.A.Annamalai vs State Of Karnataka & Anr

3. Brief facts of the case are as under:-

4. Respondent no.2 filed a complaint with the Indira Nagar Police Station, Bangalore, alleging:

- that the company had since closed its business and the amount due to the Respondent No.2 was about Rs.2,91,778/-;

5. The Respondent No.2 lodged a First Information Report on 15.10.1999 with the Indira Nagar Police Station alleging the offence under section 420 Indian Penal Code read with 3 sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Money Circulation and Banning Act, 1978." In the FIR, it was stated that the alleged offences, if any, were committed during the period between 24.05.1998 and 17.09.1999.

7. The First Information Report was lodged by respondent no.2 and consequently the then Xth Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore issued a non bailable warrants against the appellant.

8. On Company Petition filed at the instance of the creditors, the Company Court on 23.7.2002 directed the winding up of the company. In the winding up petition, nothing had been mentioned about the appellant because he was not the Director of the company at the relevant point of time.

9. The Karnataka High Court on 10.6.2004 directed quashing of the entire proceedings in Criminal Petition No.4007 of 2002 regarding the erstwhile Directors of the company. The proceedings before the Xth Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate were based on the complaint filed by respondent no.2 stating that he and his wife had invested in the Short Term Deposit Scheme with the company.

11. The learned Judge also held that material ingredients of the offence of cheating had not been made out. The appellant filed a petition before the High Court of Karnataka under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to 5 quash the proceedings initiated on the basis of the complaint registered as CC 22656 of 2001 arising out of the Crime No.425/1999 pending before the Xth Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore.

41. We have carefully considered the rival contentions. It emerges that:

b) Admittedly, there are no allegations against the appellant in the First Information Report.

c) The company had invited investment from the depositors to invest in the business/benefit funds after receiving due approval of the scheme from the Reserve Bank of India. Therefore, in any event, the element of cheating as alleged cannot be made out by any stretch of imagination.

42. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution but at the same time no person be compelled to face criminal prosecution if basic ingredients of the alleged offence against him are altogether absent.

43. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed and the proceedings initiated against the appellant on the basis of the complaint registered as CC 22656 of 2001 pending before the 24 Xth Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore, are quashed.

44. As a result, this appeal is allowed.

August 12, 2010.