L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Vasanthi vs Venugopal (D) Thr. Lrs

4. As the rival assertions are integrated in the pleadings, a brief reference thereto, is indispensable. The appellant/plaintiff instituted O.S. No.172 of 1987 against the predecessor-in-interest of the present respondents i.e. Venugopal (deceased) praying for a declaration of her title in the suit property and also for recovery of possession thereof. She claimed to have purchased the same vide registered sale deed dated 26.6.1982 for the consideration price of Rs.35,000/- from the sons of Ramnathan Chettiar, the original owner, whereupon she was registered in the municipal records as the title-holder thereof. She averred that at the time of sale, the original defendant Venugopal was in possession of the property as a tenant of her vendors on payment rent of Rs.100 per month. As the defendant-Venugopal did neither accept her as his landlord nor agreed to pay the enhanced rent of Rs. 150/-, as demanded, after causing a notice to be served on him, the appellant/plaintiff filed an application before the Rent Controller, Cuddalore being R.C. O.P. No. 29 of 1986 for his eviction from the suit property.

8. Being aggrieved, the appellant/plaintiff preferred appeal being A.S. No.124 of 1990 before the High Court of Judicature at Madras and as hereinbefore mentioned, the same also met the same fate. Her Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. SR No.16958 of 2007 was dismissed as not maintainable being in the teeth of Section 100-A of C.P.C..

31. Noticeably, the sale deed executed in favour of the appellant/plaintiff and proved in evidence has not been annulled as on date and is thus valid and subsisting.

32. On an overall view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the conclusions recorded by the courts below are based on an erroneous understanding of the prescriptions of Sections 53A of T.P. Act. The determinations made thus cannot be sustained.

33. On an appraisal of the evidence on record, on the touchstone of the above legal propositions, we are thus of the considered view, that though the LPA preferred by the appellant/plaintiff is not maintainable in law, the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of the protection of Section 53A of the T.P. Act read with Section 16 of the Act, 1963.

34. In the result, civil appeal filed against the judgment and order dated 31.7.2006, rendered in A.S. No. 124 of 1990 affirming the judgment and order dated 28.4.1989 passed in O.S. No. 172 of 1987 is allowed and Civil Appeal preferred against the judgment and order dated 8.10.2007 passed in LPA SR No. 16958 of 2007 is dismissed. As a consequence, the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff is decreed, as prayed for. No costs.

MARCH 21, 2017.
Palanisamy And Ors vs K. Dhanpalan

1. The respondent filed a complaint before the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu on 02.09.1997, for initiating action against the appellants regarding their professional misconduct. The Bar Council of Tamil Nadu referred the complainant to its Disciplinary Committee vide a Resolution No. 271/1998 dated 26.10.1998. The Disciplinary Committee No. II of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu then registered a complaint bearing D.C.C. No. 57/1998. As the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council could not complete the enquiry within one year, the complaint was transferred to the Bar Council of India and came to be renumbered as Transferred Case No. 150/2000. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India proceeded with the enquiry and at the end of the enquiry found that the appellants were guilty of professional misconduct. The Committee, however, took a lenient view and merely reprimanded the appellants with strict warning that in future they should not indulge in business activities or fail to maintain proper accounts of their clients. The Committee also directed appellant Nos. 1 and 2 to pay costs of Rs. 5000/- to the respondent-complainant and to deposit a further amount of Rs. 10,000/- in the Advocates Welfare Fund of Bar Council of India, failing which they would undergo suspension from practicing as advocates for a period of 6 (six) months. This decision of the Bar Council of India is the subject matter of the present appeal.

5. These infirmities in the enquiry conducted by the Disciplinary Committee, in our opinion, are fatal. It would necessarily follow that the entire enquiry is vitiated. Ordinarily, on this finding, we would have relegated the parties before the Bar Council of India for conducting a fresh enquiry. However, considering the fact that the complaint was made in 1997, that too by none other than the brother of the appellants because of some family disputes and that the appellants have suffered ignominy for all this time due to pendency of enquiry against them and including the finding of guilt recorded by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, we are of the considered opinion that the matter must be put at rest. Accordingly, to do substantial justice, in the fact situation of the present case, we desist from relegating the parties before the Bar Council of India for a fresh enquiry.

6. This appeal succeeds. The impugned order passed by the Bar Council of India dated 05.02.2010 in BCI Tr. Case No. 150 of 2000 is set aside.

7. We make it clear that if the appellants have already deposited/paid the amount towards costs in terms of the impugned decision, they shall not be entitled for refund thereof from the respondent-complainant or the Advocates Welfare Fund of the Bar Council of India as the case may be.

8. No order as to costs.
Hakeem Khan & Ors vs State Of M.P

The incident which occurred in the present case took place in the dark on 30th January, 1990. 30 January is a dark day in world history. Charles I of England lost both his crown and his head on this day in 1649. Hitler came to power on this day in 1933. And the Father of our Nation was assassinated on this day in 1948. The backdrop of this incident occurred when one Ajij Khan and Shabbir Khan, had contested a Panchayat election. Shabbir Khan was elected as Sarpanch resulting in bad blood between the complainant party and the accused/appellants. On the date of the incident, one Chhote Khan lodged an FIR of the said incident in which he stated that one Sayeed Khan had told him that when he was coming from village Shyampur to Mukhtyar Nagar, Hafiz Khan, Jafrudeen and three to four other persons came and questioned him as to why he had raised a shoe on the aforesaid Shabbir Khan, who was the Sarpanch in the town of Sehore. Chhote Khan with three others went to lodge a report to this effect in Shyampur. Further, when they came near the Culvert of Ganda Nala at about 06:30 p.m. to 07:00 p.m. then on the way to the Culvert eight persons, namely, Hafeez Khan, Rafiq Khan, Hakim Khan, Ayyub Khan, Jafrudeen, Israil Khan, Munne Khan, and Salim khan together with 7-8 other unnamed persons armed with Lathis and Farsis started to beat five of them. This was done with the common object of causing death, because these persons were badly beaten and indeed one, namely, Ismail Khan, succumbed to his injuries. Based on the aforesaid incident an FIR was lodged. It needs to be noted at this juncture that seventeen persons were ultimately arrayed as accused in the case.

The trial court then went on to say that the incident allegedly occurred around 06:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. on 30th January, 1990 which was a dark winter day and, therefore, it would have been extremely difficult to identify the 17 persons who were supposedly the aggressors in the incident.

Apart from the three injured persons, namely Rafiq Khan, Israil and Munne Khan, the Trial Court stated that the presence of all the others at the scene of the crime was doubtful. The Trial Court also remarked on the enmity caused between the parties and subsequently went into the fact that the Sarpanch, Shabbir Khan, who was the lynchpin in this drama, and who was stated to be present by the injured eye-witnesses, was found, in fact, not to be present, and that he attended Court till 5 O’clock and reached Shyampur after 07:15 p.m. i.e. after the incident took place.

Possible.-(1) capable of existing, happening, or being achieved.

(2) that may exist or happen, but that is not certain or probable.

We have been informed that Ayub Khan is in jail for the last about 11 years. He shall be released, if not required in any other case, within a period of one week from today.

MARCH 22, 2017
M/S. Berger Paints India Ltd vs C.I.T., Delhi-V

2) In order to appreciate the issue involved in these appeals, it is necessary to state few relevant facts infra.

3) The appellant is a Limited Company engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of various kinds of paints. For the Assessment Year 1996-97, the appellant (assessee) filed their income tax return and declared the total income at Rs.3,64,64,527/-. It was, however, revised to Rs.3,58,92,771/- and then again revised to Rs. 3,57,26,644/-. The return was then processed by the Assessing Officer(in short “A.O.”) under Section 143 (1B) of the Income Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) at an amount of Rs.3,63,03,128/-.

4) A notice was issued by the A.O. to the appellant (assessee) under Section 143(2) of the Act which called upon the appellant to explain as to on what basis the appellant had claimed in the return a deduction under the head “preliminary expenses” amounting to Rs.7,03,306/- being 2.5% of the "capital employed in the business of the company" under Section 35D of the Act.

7) The appellant, felt aggrieved, filed appeals before the Commissioner of Income Tax (appeals). The Commissioner was of the view that since the "capital employed" consists of subscribed capital, debentures and long term borrowings, any "premium" collected by the appellant-Company on the shares issued by it should also be included in the said expression and be treated as the capital contributed by the shareholders. The Commissioner also was of the view that the share premium account, which is shown as reserve in the balance sheet of the Company, was in the nature of the capital base of the Company and hence deduction under Section 35D of the Act was admissible with reference to the said amount also. Accordingly, the Commissioner allowed the appeals, set aside the order of A.O and disallowance of Rs.5,08,257/- made by the A.O. and, therefore, deleted the said sum. In other words, the Commissioner allowed the deduction claimed by the appellant of the entire amount under Section 35D of the Act.

8) The Revenue, felt aggrieved, filed appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeals and reversed the view taken by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The Tribunal held that the premium collected by the appellant-Company on the share capital did not tantamount to "capital employed in the business of the Company" within the meaning of Section 35D(3) of the Act.

March 28, 2017
H.P. Financial Corp vs Anil Garg & Ors

4. The High Court erred on facts in holding that the proceedings under the Act for recovery of the trunk loan was initiated only in the year 2003, and that nothing had been done by the Appellant from 1996 till 2002 thus making the claim time barred. The recovery certificate had been issued by the Collector as far as back 3.9.1994. It was stalled by the Respondent filing writ petitions before the High Court. The High Court had granted liberty to the Appellant for proceeding afresh in accordance with law.

6. The Respondent applied for a loan of Rs.1.90 lakhs in 1989 to purchase a Swaraz Mazda truck and executed a hypothecation deed. Repayment schedule commenced from 10.1.1990 culminating on 10.7.1994. Rs.10,000/- only was repaid on 6.3.1991. The vehicle was seized on 6.5.1991 under Section 29 of the State Finance Corporation Act, 1951 and auction sold on 4.9.1991 for a sum of Rs.1.46 lakhs. A Money Suit was filed before the Senior Sub Judge, Shimla for recovery of the balance of Rs.1,25,270/- along with future interest and costs. The Suit was withdrawn on 12.12.1995 under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating that the Appellant desired to proceed under the Act. The Suit was dismissed as withdrawn. Recovery Certificate was then issued under the Act on 19.4.1996 for a sum of Rs.1,94,283/- followed by a warrant of arrest.

7. The Respondent thwarted the Certificate proceedings by filing a Suit before the Senior Sub Judge, Shimla contending that the fresh proceedings were barred due to withdrawal of the Suit without any liberty, and that the claim was time barred. An interim-order was obtained, but ultimately the Suit was dismissed for non-prosecution on 21.5.2001.

8. Another loan of Rs.30,000/- was availed by the Respondent on 15.12.1988 for a trunk industry and a hypothecation-deed executed in respect of property bearing Khata/Khatuni No.102/347, Khasra No.1014. The last installment of the loan was payable on 10.1.1996. The Respondent remitted Rs.4,000/- in May 1991 and Rs.1,000/- in November 1991. A request was made before the Collector for recovery certificate on 12.11.1992, and the Certificate was issued on 3.9.1994. The Respondent objected that no prior notice was given and that the proceedings were time barred.

22. The appeal is allowed.
Kundla Press And Oil Mill Pvt. Ltd vs State Of Gujarat And Ors

3. The facts necessary for decision of the case are that 28,176 square metres of land in Savarkundla was given on lease to the appellant Company in the year 1922 for a period of 30 years for running an oil mill. The lease expired in the year 1952. Thereafter, fresh lease deed was executed in favour of the appellant by the Administrator of the Savarkundla Municipality on 18.09.1956. In this lease deed it was mentioned that on this leased area, there are factories, residential units, warehouse (godown), press factory, expeller and office buildings etc. which were constructed by the appellant. The lease deed was granted for a further period of 30 years. Relevant portion of the lease deed reads as follows:

6. Though the Award was passed in favour of the company and the Decree in terms of the Award had also been passed, the Collector, Savarkundla cancelled the lease deed on the ground that the appellant was trying to raise construction on the land in question. Thereafter, the appellant filed a Writ Petition being Special Civil Application No. 845 of 1978. This Writ Petition was allowed and the order of the Collector was set aside. Thereafter also, no lease deed was executed since the Municipality did not have the power to execute the lease deed for more than 10 years. Finally, on 23.10.1991, the Government of Gujarat issued an order that the lease deed may be renewed for a further term of 30 years from 01.04.1982. In actual fact, this lease deed was only executed on 12.04.2007. However, this lease deed was made effective for a period of 30 years from 01.04.1982 till 31.03.2012.

12. Having regard to the rival submissions and the facts and circumstances of the case, we find no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.

....................................J. (MADAN B. LOKUR) ....................................J. (DEEPAK GUPTA) New Delhi March 28, 2017 ITEM NO.1B COURT NO.5 SECTION IX (For Judgment) S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 30727/2016 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 06/09/2016 in LPA No. 797/2016 in SCA No. 352/2013 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad) KUNDLA PRESS AND OIL MILL PVT. LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. Respondent(s) Date : 28/03/2017 This petition was called on for prouncement of judgment today.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta pronounced the non-reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur and His Lordship.

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed non-reportable judgment.

[Signed non-reportable judgment is placed on the file]
Satish Chander Aggarwal (D) By Lrs vs Shyam Lal Om Prakash, Arhti And Anr

2. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition. The First Appellate Authority reversed the finding and granted eviction, on a finding that the premises was required for the business of the landlord. It is on record that the First Appellate Authority had undertaken a spot inspection so as to satisfy himself as to the bona fide need of the landlord.

5. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the First Appellate Authority for eviction is restored. I.A. No.5 of 2017 also stands disposed of.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents submit that they are no more interested in keeping the premises, in view of the order passed as above, and hence it will be open to the appellants to take physical possession of the premises. The above submission is recorded.

7. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

8. There shall be no orders as to costs.

MARCH 30, 2017.
Karunakaran vs V. Padmini & Ors

5. The appellant herein challenged the assignment of the land in favour of Respondent No.1 by filing a petition under Rule 29(8) of the Kerala Land Reforms (Ceiling) Rules, 1970 before the District Collector, Kozhikode. The main ground raised was that Respondent No.1 had obtained the assignment in her favour by playing fraud and by total misrepresentation of facts and hence was not entitled to the assignment. He, accordingly, sought cancellation of the assignment. The Collector, vide his order dated 22.08.2003 came to the conclusion that Respondent No.1 had played fraud and misrepresented facts and reviewed the Assignment Deed and recalled the earlier order assigning the land in favour of Respondent No.1.

7. The appellant in his petition before the District Collector raised mainly four grounds, namely: (i) Respondent No.1 had claimed that she had obtained the land through an oral lease from K.P. Gopinathan in the year 1962. The appellant stated that, in fact, in the year 1962 K.P. Gopinathan was not the owner since his father K.P. Choyi was still alive. Therefore, the question of lease being executed by K.P. Gopinathan did not arise; (ii) Respondent No.1 was born in the year 1952 and, therefore, was only 10 years old in the year 1962 and hence the question of her obtaining a valid legal lease did not arise; (iii) that the Respondent first claimed tenancy rights which were rejected and, therefore, set up a false claim that she was a landless agricultural labourer; (iv) Respondent No.1 falsely stated that she was a landless agricultural labourer but in reality she was running an aluminium industry employing 9 persons and was also paying sales tax and income tax and hence the question of her being a landless agricultural labourer did not arise.

6. Thereafter, Respondent No.1 filed a Writ Petition No.28218 of 2003 before the High Court of Kerala, challenging the order of the District Collector and the learned Single Judge held that the Collector had no power to recall the earlier order. He further held that even if there was some misstatement or misrepresentation that did not amount to fraud and hence the order of assignment could not be recalled. Against this order the appellant filed a Writ Appeal No. 1335 of 2013 which has been dismissed and hence the present appeal.

...................................J. (MADAN B. LOKUR) ....................................J. (DEEPAK GUPTA) New Delhi March 28, 2017 ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.5 SECTION XIA (For judgment) S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 23266/2014 KARUNAKARAN Appellant(s) VERSUS V. PADMINI & ORS. Respondent(s) (With Interim Relief and Office Report) Date : 28/03/2017 This petition was called on for pronouncement of judgment today.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta pronounced the non-reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur and His Lordship.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed non-reportable judgment.

[Signed non reportable judgment is placed on the file]
Gauri Shankar vs Rakesh Kumar And Ors

2. The Respondents filed two separate appeals which were disposed of by the first appellate Court vide a common judgment on 03.02.2005. In the said appeal, the declaration regarding the tenancy rights of the Appellant in the suit shop was reversed on the finding that the tenancy was surrendered by one partner. The first appellate court relying on the decisions in the cases of Kanji Manji Vs. Trustee of Port of Bombay[1]; H.C. Pandey Vs. G.C. Paul[2]; and H.C. Pandey Vs. G. C Kaul[3], opined that notice of surrender of tenancy given by one of the co-tenants and a decree of possession of the tenanted premises passed on that basis will bind the other. The first appellate court found that the tenancy surrendered by one of the joint tenants, even if without the consent of the other, would bind the other joint tenant.

6. As a result, we find merit in the argument of the Appellant that the parties be relegated before the High Court for a fresh consideration of the second appeal on its own merit in accordance with law and more so, the substantial questions of law formulated by the Appellant which are as under:-

ii. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court was duty bound to address all issues and give finding therein after re-appraisal of the facts and was not competent to uphold the finding summarily as sought to be done by the judgment dated 03.02.2005 or not?

iii. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court was duty bound to deal with other issues except Issue No. 6?

8. Accordingly, we set aside the judgments and orders passed by the High Court dated 02.12.2013 and 22.08.2014 and instead restore the second appeal to the file of the High Court to its original number for fresh consideration on its own merit in accordance with law. The parties shall appear before the High Court on 17th April, 2017 when the High Court may assign a suitable date for hearing of the second appeal. We request the High Court to expeditiously dispose of the second appeal.

9. The appeals are allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs.