L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Jagdish Chand vs State Of Haryana

2. The FIR in the present case was lodged by one Kalu Ram, father of the deceased, who was working as a Clerk in Government Girls High School, Pataudi. According to the complainant, the marriage between his daughter Shanti Devi and accused Raj Kumar, son of the appellants, Jagdish Chand and Mishri Devi, was solemnised on 19.4.1988. Immediately after the marriage and despite giving of sufficient gifts by the complainant to the accused party, there were demands of further dowry including demands for a scooter and television. As the complainant was unable to fulfil the demands, the deceased was turned out from the matrimonial home whereafter she stayed with her parents. This had happened on several occasions. According to the complainant, on all such occasions, the deceased returned to her matrimonial home only to be turned out again. Finally, in the night intervening 6th and 7th December, 1994, death of Shanti Devi on account of burn injuries had occurred leading to institution of the FIR in question.

8. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.

[NAVIN SINHA] New Delhi;

January 07, 2019.
State Of Rajasthan vs Gram Vikas Samiti,Shivdaspura

3. The State and its authorities are the appellants herein. They are the defendants whereas the respondent is the plaintiff in a civil suit out of which this appeal arises.

4. The respondent claiming to be the Society filed a civil suit against the State and its authorities in relation to the suit land. The suit was for grant of relief of permanent injunction restraining the appellants (defendants) from interfering in the respondent's (plaintiff’s) possession over the suit land. It was contested by the appellants (defendants).

5. The Trial Court by judgment/decree dated 26.09.2002 in Civil Suit No.38 of 2000 decreed the suit and granted permanent injunction to the 2 respondent (plaintiff) and against the appellants (defendants) in relation to the suit land. The defendants (State) felt aggrieved and filed first appeal before the Additional District Judge, Jaipur being Regular Civil Appeal No. 37 of 2003. By Judgment dated 15.07.2006, the first Appellate Court dismissed the State's appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court giving rise to filing of the Second appeal by the State before the High Court.

9. In our considered opinion and as would be clear from the mere perusal of the order quoted above, the High Court did not discuss nor dealt with any issues 4 arising in the case nor dealt with any submissions urged by the appellant (State) with a view to show as to how and on what basis the findings impugned in the second appeal were bad in law and why the appeal did not involve any substantial question(s) of law.

14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding Second Appeal No. 186/2007 afresh on merits.

16. We, however, make it clear that we have not applied our mind to the merits of the controversy having formed an opinion to remand the case to the High Court. The High Court will, therefore, decide the second appeal uninfluenced by any of our observations.

17. Since the appeal is quite old, we request the High Court to decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible.

18. Since no one appeared for any of the parties in this appeal, we request the High Court to issue notice to the parties for their appearance in the Second appeal so as to enable the High Court to dispose of the appeal finally as directed above.

January 07, 2019 8
Birla Institute Of Technology vs The State Of Jharkhand

2. The controversy involved in this appeal is a short one as would be clear from the facts stated infra.

3. The appellant is a premier technical educational institute of repute in the country. It is known as “Birla Institute of Technology” (BIT).

5. Respondent No.4 then made a representation to the appellant and prayed therein for payment of gratuity amount which, according to respondent, was payable to him by the appellant under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short called “The Act”). The appellant, however, declined to pay the amount of gratuity as demanded by respondent No.4.

23. As a result, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. As a consequence, the application made by respondent No.4 before the controlling authority under the Act against the appellant is dismissed as not maintainable.

January 07, 2019 14
Ragini Sinha vs State Of Bihar

2) The controversy involved in these appeals lies in a narrow compass as would be clear from the few facts mentioned hereinbelow.

3) Two persons, namely, Santosh Kumar and Hira Singh filed their claim petitions before the competent authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (for short “the Act”) against the appellant herein being case Nos. MW (2) ­ 19/93 and MW (2) ­ 20/93.

4) In these claim petitions, the respondents claimed that they had worked with the appellant on her land for the period from 01.01.1991 to 30.10.1992 but she did not pay them their legitimate wages despite rendering their services for her.

6) The appellant contested the matter. An enquiry was accordingly held. Report from the concerned authority was also called for. By order dated 29.10.1995 the competent authority allowed the claim petitions of the two workers and accordingly directed the appellant (employer) to pay them wages as determined along with the penalty amount awarded by the authority.

7) The appellant felt aggrieved and filed appeal before the appellate authority under the Act. By order dated 08.10.1996, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the competent authority.

18) In the light of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in these appeals. The appeals thus fail and are accordingly dismissed.

19) The appellant is directed to calculate the entire amount payable to the two workers (since dead) in terms of the impugned orders and the same be paid to the legal representatives of the two workers 8 within three months from the date of this order. Let the compliance report be submitted by the appellant within three months to this Court and also to the concerned competent authority.

20) A copy of this order be sent to the concerned competent authority and one copy of this order be sent on the addresses of the two deceased workers which are mentioned in the record of the case for the information of their legal representatives so that they are able to implement this order against the appellant for recovery of the awarded sum in their favour.

January 07, 2019 9
Punjab Financial Corporation vs M/S Paulbro Leathers Pvt. Ltd.

6. Since the dispute arose even after settlement between the parties as to what is the actual and precise liability determined and was eventually worked out between the parties in the settlement and against the determined liability, how much amount the respondent has paid, the appellant, as per their calculation, raised a demand of Rs.49,86,713/­ (Annexure­P­11 to the writ petition) on the respondent and called upon them to pay the said amount. The respondent, however, denied their liability.

7. It is this demand, which gave rise to filing of the writ petition by the respondent in the High Court against the appellant out of which these 3 appeals arise and sought its quashing. The appellant contested the writ petition.

14. The need to remand the case to the High Court has occasioned because we find that the High Court essentially proceeded to allow the writ petition on the ground that since the whole issue was settled with consent and no objection was raised by the appellant at any point of time, the issue now can not be allowed to be re­opened at this stage.

15. We do not agree with this reasoning of the High Court for more than one reason.

16. First, parties only agreed to settle the dispute in terms of one time settlement policy of the appellant­Corporation and, therefore, one Chartered 6 Accountant was appointed by the Court to go into the question and submit his report.

19. We accordingly allow the appeals, set aside both the orders passed by the High Court, restore the writ petition to its original number and request the High Court to decide the writ petition filed by the respondent afresh on merits in accordance with law.

20. Since the issue involved public money, the High Court is requested to decide the writ petition as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months.

January 07, 2019.
Punjab State Electricity Board And Anr. vs Thana Singh And Ors.

3. Brief facts of the case are as follows:-

5. The appellant-Board filed counter affidavit stating that the Board is not bound to pay the same pay scale to the respondents- Sub Fire Officers as are given by the Punjab Government to its employees holding the same post. It was averred that Punjab State Electricity Board is a statutory body constituted under the Electricity 3 Supply Act governed by its own regulations. It was averred that the respondents-Sub Fire Officers cannot claim parity with other categories viz. Head Clerks, Head Clerk-cum-Divisional Accountants, Internal Auditors, etc. because all these posts belong to different cadre than the cadre of the respondents-Sub Fire Officers as the nature of work, duties, responsibilities and initial qualifications for recruitment to these posts are different.

7. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant-Board holding that there is no basis for differently treating the Sub Fire Officers included in Group XII. The Division Bench has referred to the letter dated 25.03.1991 of the 4 Superintendent Engineer, GNDTP, Bhatinda stating that the cadre of Sub Fire Officers is a small one with limited chances of promotion to the higher posts i.e. Fire Officers and that by revising the scale of Sub Fire Officers on par with others, there will not be much financial burden on the Board. Being aggrieved, the appellant-Board is before us.

25. In the writ petition, the respondents have taken the plea that they are entitled to the scale of pay on par with the employees of the Punjab Government in parity of the wages. Nature of work performed by those in the service of Punjab Government are different from those in service of the Board, the learned Single Judge rightly refused to accept the plea of the respondents claiming parity with the employees of the State Government.

28. In the result, the impugned judgment dated 28.09.2010 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in LPA No.713 of 2010 is set aside and this appeal is allowed. Pursuant to the interim order of the Supreme Court, if any amount over and above the salary payable has been paid, the same may not be recovered from the respondents and other Sub Fire Officers.

January 08, 2019 18
Ex.Lac Yogesh Pathania vs Union Of India

2. The appeal before the Tribunal was directed against the findings and the sentence awarded by District Court Martial (for short ‘DCM’) on 01.02.2010 confirmed on 09.03.2010 and also against rejection of his statutory complaint under Section 161 (2) of the Air Force Act, 1950 by the Chief of Air Staff. The DCM was initiated on account of an incident on the intervening night of 22.05.2009 and 23.05.2009 wherein a breach of good order of Air Force discipline was created by Module II airmen trainees attached to NTTI and Accounts Conversion Course trainees in the TV Room, over the change of TV channel on 22.05.2009 between 2150 hrs to 2210 hrs.

3. The incident pertaining to the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant happened after 2240 hrs in Dakota ‘A’ Block and at the main gate. A Court of Inquiry was conducted followed by summary of evidences. Thereafter the appellant was tried by DCM on seven charges of misconduct. The DCM has found the appellant guilty of charge nos. 3, 5 and 7 which read as under:
Sukh Bilash Thakur vs The Bihar State Electricity Board

2. The appellant is aggrieved by his order of reversion dated 09.08.2007 from the post of Bill Clerk to that of Khalasi. The High Court declined interference with the same and thus the present appeal.

3. The appellant was appointed as a Bill Clerk on 03.02.1981. After Digitally signed by R NATARAJAN passing the departmental examination and having completed 18 years Date: 2019.01.09 15:59:50 IST Reason:

5. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we consider the order of reversion issued nearly twenty­five years later to be highly unjust, inequitable and arbitrary suffering from the vice of unreasonableness. Consequently, it is held to be unsustainable. We also notice that the appellant has already retired from service. The impugned order of reversion is therefore set aside. The appellant shall be entitled to pensionary benefits in accordance with law as if the order of reversion had never been passed. Pensionary benefits and other retiral dues shall be paid to him within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt and/or presentation of a copy of this order. 3 The dues shall carry interest at the rate of 15 per cent till the date of actual payment.

6. The appeal is allowed.
Sau. Saraswatibai vs Lalitabai

3. That the appellant herein­original Complainant filed a Criminal Complaint against the private Respondents herein­ the original accused before the learned Magistrate alleging, inter alia, that the complainant purchased a plot from Respondent No.1 by way of a registered sale deed in the year 2005. After sale of the plot, the original owner­accused No.1 fraudulently resold the plot in 2010 in favour of Accused No.2 by re­designating as “Plot No.24”. It is required to be noted that the plot which was sold to the complainant was numbered as “Plot No.1” in ” Survey No.121”. It was alleged that the very plot which was sold to the complainant was sold by the owner by changing the Number and by re­designating the same as “Plot No.24”. It was alleged that the second purchaser Respondent No.2­Accused No.2 was none other than the husband of the original Respondent No.1­ Accused No.1. It was further alleged that Respondent No.2 thereon sold the very Plot/property in 2011, in favour of the Respondent No.3­Accused No.3. Therefore, it was alleged that the all accused persons and one another have committed offences under Sections 420, 464, 465, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 34 of IPC. That the learned Magistrate passed an order for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. That the police lodged an FIR for the aforesaid offences. That the accused 3 thereafter approached the High Court to quash the FIR by way of a Petition under Section 482 of Cr.PC.

4.3 In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeals succeed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court dated 22.11.2013 passed in Criminal Application No.1113/2012 is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the prosecution against the Accused to proceed further in accordance with law, and on its own merits. 8

5. The appeals are allowed accordingly.
The State Of Kerala vs Mohammed Basheer

2. The respondent herein filed a petition in the Forest Tribunal, Palakkad under Section 8 of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (for short 'the KPF Act') for settlement of the dispute in relation to land measuring Digitally signed by about 2 acres bearing R.S No. 1200, Muppenad (now in Vellar mala village) SUSHIL KUMAR RAKHEJA Date: 2019.01.22 17:56:53 IST Reason: Vythiri Taluk, Wynad district (for short 'the land'). In the petition, it was contended 2 that one K.C. Kunji Moosa had orally leased the land in favour of the respondent's father in the year 1962 and that his father was personally cultivating the land; after the death of his father, he was personally cultivating the land. It is not a private forest as defined under Section 2(f) of the KPF Act; the land was principally planted with coffee long before the appointed day; thus, it had not vested in the government under Section 3 of the KPF Act; he was issued a certificate of purchase under Section 72K of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (for short 'the Land Reforms Act') by the Land Tribunal in respect of the said land. It was further contended that on 25.02.1987, the officials of Social Forestry Department entered the land and destroyed the coffee plants. In this connection, he had complained to the local police and the Village Officer, and that till 25.02.1987, there was no obstruction for cultivating the land from the forest officials.

4. The Tribunal, by its order dated 30.06.1990, dismissed the petition. The respondent challenged the said order by filing an appeal before the High Court. The High Court, by its order dated 18.09.2001, allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of the Tribunal. The review petition filed by the appellant-State was dismissed by the High Court on 06.02.2007.

(emphasis supplied)

23. The appeals are devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed without order as to costs.

January 22, 2019.
Mohammed Salim (D) Through Lrs. vs Shamsudeen (Dead) Through Lrs.

2. The facts leading to this appeal are that a suit for partition and possession of 14/16th share in the Plaint Schedule ‘A’ property and half the rights over Plaint Schedule ‘B’ property was filed by the Respondent No. 1 herein (original plaintiff). Defendant No. 1 in the suit, Mohammed Idris, is the brother of Mohammed Ilias, the father of the plaintiff, and Defendant Nos. 2 to 7 are the children of Mohammed Idris. Both the plaintiff’s father and Defendant No. 1 are the sons of Zainam Beevi, who expired in 1955. Both Plaint properties belonged to her. Plaint Schedule ‘A’ property was gifted to Mohammed Ilias, based on a gift deed executed by Zainam Beevi.

The case of the plaintiff is that Defendant No. 8 namely Saidat, was the first wife of Mohammed Ilias, and no issue was born out of the said wedlock. Thereafter, Mohammed Ilias married Valliamma in 1120 M.E. (as per the Malayalam Calendar, which corresponds to 1945 AD in the Gregorian system). Valliamma was a Hindu at the time of her marriage with Mohammed Ilias. Both Mohammed Ilias and Valliamma lived together as husband and wife at Thiruvananthapuram. Later, Valliamma was renamed Souda Beebi. Out of the said wedlock, Shamsudeen (the plaintiff) was born. Subsequent to the death of 2 Mohammed Ilias in 1947 AD, Valliamma (Souda Beebi) married Aliyarkunju.

4. As mentioned supra, the trial Court decreed the suit and the first appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit by setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. However, the High Court by the impugned judgment set aside the 3 judgment passed by the first appellate Court and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Hence, the instant appeal was filed by the original defendants and the legal representatives of those among them who have since died.

254);

(c) a marriage with a woman undergoing iddat (§

257);

Accordingly, the appeal fails and stands dismissed.

January 22, 2019.
Malaichamy vs The State Of Tamil Nadu

4. It is also the case of the prosecution that Muniasamy requested P.W.1 to take him as a partner in his liquor shop business but the same was refused by P.W.1. Accused No.2 got employment in a Fair Price Shop run by the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation on the recommendation of P.W.1. However, the service of Accused No.2 was terminated due to misconduct, and though P.W.1 was requested to intervene yet again, he declined to do so.

7. There are no eye witnesses to the incident in question and the case of the prosecution rests solely upon circumstantial evidence.

16. Thus, the accused are entitled to get the benefit of doubt and are entitled to be acquitted.

17. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and the judgment dated 29.08.2001 passed by the First Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai in S.C.No.250 of 2000 as affirmed by the High Court is set aside, and the appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

JANUARY 23, 2019.
Commissioner Of Customs vs M/S. Atul Automations Pvt Ltd.

3. In appeal before the Tribunal, the respondents did not contest that the import was in violation of the Foreign Trade Policy having been made without the necessary prior authorisation. The Tribunal held that the MFDs did not constitute “waste” under Rule 3(1)(23) of the Waste Management 2 Rules and had a utility life of 5 to 7 years, as certified by the Chartered Engineer. Release of the consignment was directed under Section 125 of the Customs Act as the respondents were held to have substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 13 of the Waste Management Rules read with Schedule VIII Entry 4(j) except for the country of origin certificate. The Tribunal further noticed that earlier also similar consignments of the respondent and others had been released at the Calcutta, Chennai and Cochin ports upon payment of redemption fine. The redemption fine was reduced as also the penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act was reduced including that on the Director also. The penalty under Section 114AA was done away with.

13. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the impugned orders. In the statutory scheme of the Foreign Trade Act as discussed, we further find no error in the penultimate direction to the respondents for deposit of bond without sureties for 90% of the enhanced valuation of the goods leaving it to the DGFT to decide whether confiscation needs to be ordered or release be granted on redemption at the market value, in which event the respondents shall be entitled to set off.

14. The appeals are dismissed.

………............................CJI.
Dev Wati vs The State Of Haryana

3. By the impugned judgment, the application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) filed by the complainant was allowed and consequently the appellants herein were summoned by the Sessions Court to face trial in Sessions Case No. 54/2010.

4. The brief facts arising out of this appeal are that a missing complaint came to be lodged by the brother of the deceased (PW­9, Harkesh). After two days of such complaint, the dead body of the deceased Suraj was found. Accused Rajpal @ Rajua, Prem Pal and Devender @ Deven were put to trial for the commission of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’), apart from other offences. When the evidence was being recorded, PW­9, Harkesh deposed before the Sessions Court implicating the appellants herein, i.e. Appellant No.1, Smt. Dev Wati, the wife of the deceased, Appellant Nos. 2 and 3, Surinder Singh and Badan, her brothers, Appellant No. 4, Smt. Amarwati, her sister and Appellant Nos. 5 and 6, Raju and Kalu, two sons of her sisters. Thereafter, an application came to be filed by the complainant under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. before the Sessions Court, which came to be allowed on the ground that on the insistence of 2 Raju and Kalu, the deceased had gone along with them on their motorcycle on being told that the appellants herein and one Omi (being the wife of the deceased and her relatives) had called him for a compromise in the matrimonial litigation pending between the deceased and his wife. It is relevant to note here that the deceased had allegedly been threatened by his wife and some of her relatives with respect to the ongoing matrimonial dispute. Maintenance proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. as well as a complaint for the offences punishable under Sections 498­A and 506 of the IPC were also pending against the deceased. The said proceedings were initiated by the wife of the deceased. In addition to the same, two other criminal cases were also lodged for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 324 and 504 of the IPC. Be that as it may, in short it can be said that there was a serious dispute between the deceased and his wife in which the wife’s relatives were supporting her.

9. In view of the above, we decline to interfere with the impugned judgment. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed.

JANUARY 24, 2019.