L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Vidyodaya Trust vs Mohan Prasad R & Ors

4. Earlier the matter was before this Court in Civil Appeal No.3679 of 2006. The factual position as was noticed in the earlier appeal was as follows:

5. Both the orders i.e. one in the Revision Petition and the other in the Writ Petition were challenged before this Court. Taking note of the facts, the appeal was disposed of with the following conclusions:

10. The prayers (a), (b), (c) and (d) focus on defendants 2, 3 and 10 and prayer (e) which was deleted initially was for removal of defendants 2, 3, 6, 9 and 10 and for supplementing the School Management Committee with plaintiffs 1, 2, 3 and 4 and defendant No.4. Basically, the allegations are against defendants 2, 3 and 4.

19. In the result, the appeals are allowed as afore-stated. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The trial court is directed to dispose of the application for revocation of leave on merits and in accordance with law."

21. If in a given case notice has not been given and leave has been granted, it is open to the Court to deal with an application for revocation and pass necessary orders.
State Of West Bengal & Anr vs Mahua Sarkar

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

In terms of sub-Section (3) of Section 59A of the Act, action was held. The vehicle was driven by Shri Rohini Roy who was arrested and the forest produce was seized. As required under Section 59B of the Act, notice was issued and served on the owner of the vehicle to show cause as to why the vehicle in question shall not be confiscated to the State of West Bengal as provided under Section 59(A) of the Act. The owner in reply 3 stated that a family friend had taken the vehicle for a marriage ceremony. The driver had without his permission and knowledge carried the articles which later on were seized by the forest officials. After receipt of the reply, the stand taken was verified and ultimately it was found that the vehicle was used for illicit procurement of timber. An appeal was preferred before the District Judge, Jalpaiguri who dismissed the appeal and confirmed the findings of the authorized officer. Writ petition was filed before the High Court.

14. The position in law was again reiterated in State of West Bengal v. Gopal Sarkar (2002 (1) SCC 495). The High Court was not justified in setting aside the confiscation. But there is another aspect which needs to be noted. The vehicle in question was released pursuant to the High Court's order. Though the appeal is allowed, there is no point in directing restoration of the vehicle. We direct that a sum of Rs.20,000/- shall be deposited by the respondent within three months from today so that the restoration of the vehicle shall not be necessary. The amount shall be deposited with the concerned Forest department of the State of West Bengal. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs.
Prabhu Dayal vs Sadhan Sahkari Samiti Mujuri Vikas ...

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Before the Labour Court, parties entered into a settlement and an award was passed on 9.12.1988 whereunder the appellant was entitled to receive a sum of Rs.12,726/-. However, a condition was stipulated that the present appellant shall withdraw all applications and proceedings made before various authorities under the labour laws including under the Act and also under Section 6-H of the U.P. Act. The amount has been paid to the appellant. However, he did not withdraw the proceedings and wanted their continuance, and some adjudication has also been made ex-parte.

Appellant has challenged legality of the High Court's order on the ground that in any event an award made on compromise cannot be set aside.

6. Therefore, the High Court was justified in its view. But so far as award dated 9.12.1988 is concerned, the same was made on the basis of a settlement between the parties. That being so, the High Court ought not to have set aside the award. In the ultimate result, the appeal is allowed by setting aside that part of the impugned order relating to award dated 9.12.1988. There shall be no order as to costs.
M/S Kalidas Sheet Metal Industries P. ... vs State Of Kerala

2. The appellant company is a dealer registered under the provisions of the Kerala General Sales-Tax Act, 1963 (the 'Act' for short). It inter-alia deals in Copper Sheets and Brass Sheets. While completing the assessment for assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86, the Assessing Officer assessed the turnover of Copper Sheets and Brass Sheets at the rate of 8% holding that the same are covered by Entries Nos. 116A and 116D of the Schedule I to the Act which provide tax on turnover of Copper and Brass respectively. The Assessing Authority rejected the claim of the appellant that copper sheets and brass sheets are unclassified items taxable at the rate of 5%. In appeals, the Deputy-Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the rate of tax in respect of those items. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed second appeals before the Kerala Sales-Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals upholding the view taken by the Assessing Officer and the Appellate Authority. Thereupon the appellant invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court by filing T.R.C. No.467 of 2000 and 10 of 2001. The High Court has dismissed the same by giving rise to the instant appeals.

10. No case is made out by the appellant to interfere with the view taken by the High Court and therefore the appeals must fail.

11. Therefore, the appeals fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to cost.
State Of Punjab & Ors vs Basso

The facts in brief are that the respondent Smt. Basso, wife of Ajaib Singh, was operated upon on 23/2/1987 for tubectomy operation at Civil Hospital, Sardulgarh, District Mansa. After the said operation, she became pregnant and gave birth to a female child. It was alleged that she became pregnant due to defective operation conducted by the doctors of the Health Department. She claimed a compensation of Rs.3,00,000/-. However, the trial Court awarded only Rs.50,000/-. On an appeal preferred by the State, the first .......2.

In view thereof, this appeal succeeds. The order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Ravi Prakash Agarwal & Ors vs Rajesh Prasad Agarwal & Ors

3. Backgrounds facts in a nutshell are as follows:

4. An application for injunction was also filed. On 4.5.1999 ex-parte order of injunction was granted. The prayer to modify the same was rejected. On 24.11.2001 a consent order was passed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench directed disposal of the suit within six months and further directed maintenance of status quo of the suit property till its disposal on certain conditions. Subsequently, application was filed by respondent no.4 by making a grievance that her counsel was not heard. It is the stand of the appellants that her defence was struck off. In any event the order was recalled on 9.1.2002. High Court dismissed the appeal holding prayer for interim injunction.

7. We find that the order of status quo continued for considerable length of time. It would, therefore, be appropriate to direct maintenance of status quo as was originally granted by order dated 24.11.2001. We make it clear that by giving this protection it shall not be construed as if we have expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. We request the Trial Court to dispose of the suit as early as practicable preferably by the end of 2008.

8. The appeal is accordingly disposed with no order as to costs.
Moriroku Ut India (P) Ltd vs State Of U.P. & Ors

2. This civil appeal filed by M/s Moriroku UT India (P) Ltd. is directed against judgment dated 6.4.2007 delivered by Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in CWP (Tax) No. 13/04 by which, the writ petition filed by the appellant herein, seeking to restrain the AO from imposing any tax on moulds (toolings) supplied by its customer, Honda Siel Cars India Ltd., free of cost was sought to be taxed under Section 3 of U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948, stood dismissed.

3. Appellant is the company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and is a manufacturer of plastic automobile components. Appellant is manufacturing such components for use in the Honda Siel Cars manufactured in India by Honda Siel Cars Ltd. (hereinafter called the "customer"), as per designs and specifications given by it. The customer supplies tools, dies, moulds etc. (toolings) free of cost to the appellant herein to enable it to manufacture automobile components.

Explanation I.--A sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State,--

Explanation II.--Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, two independent sales or purchases shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to have taken place--

21. Accordingly, we hold that the High Court had erred in holding that the amortization cost calculated in terms of Rule 6 of the Excise Valuation Rules, 2000 is includible in the sale price of auto components sold by the appellant herein to its customer, M/s Honda Siel Cars India Ltd..

22. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and the civil appeal filed by the assessee is allowed with no order as to cost. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 9259/07:

23. In the light of the above judgment, in the case of Moriroku UT India (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors., this appeal is also allowed with no order as to costs.
Kailash vs State Of Rajasthan & Anr

4. The following facts will be necessary for our purpose. On 12.11.2003 a written report came to be made at Police Station Neem-ka- Thana, District Sikar, Rajasthan by one Rohitas Kumar, contending therein that while he was having his dinner at his home, he was attacked by Ram Prasad Kailash, Pawan Kumar, Krishan Kumar, Chameli and Manju. It was asserted therein that Chemely and Manju also assaulted his wife Maya Devi. On the basis of this report offences were registered under Sections 147, 148, 341, 452, 24/149, 323, 324/149 and 308/149 IPC. The investigation proceeded and a charge-sheet came to be filed. However, in that charge-sheet the present appellant Kailash was not arrayed as an accused. During the course of trial when the prosecution witnesses were examined, the complainant moved an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. However, that application came to be rejected. In that application, the complainant alleged that the present appellant Kailash was bound to be joined as an accused as it was clear from the records and the evidence that there was enough material against him.

7. It was this order of the Sessions Judge which was challenged by way of a Revision Petition. The Revision remained on pending and in the meantime, however, the other five accused, against whom the prosecution was going on, were acquitted of the charges under Sections 147, 148, 452, 324 or 324/149, 325 or 325/149, 308/149 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code. Only three accused came to be convicted for offences under Section 323 IPC, they were accused Krishna Kumar, Smt.Manju Devi and Chameli. They were, however, not awarded with any punishment and were given the benefit of Section 4 of the Parole Act. Very strangely, the trial was not stayed during the pendency of the Revision Petition before the High Court.

14. In the result the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the Trial Court is restored.
K.L.E Society And Ors vs Siddalingesh

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as under:

4. The complainant-respondent resisted the stand by stating that the offences are clearly spelt out.

12. When the factual scenario is examined in the background of the legal principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the complaint was nothing but an abuse of the process of law. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the proceedings in C.C.No.273/2006 pending before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gulbarga.

13. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits so far as the petition under Section 33-(C)(2) of the ID Act is concerned, which is stated to be pending.
Renu Kumari vs Sanjay Kumar & Ors

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

705), Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997 (2) SCC

259)]

11. In view of the position of law highlighted above the impugned order is indefensible and is set aside.

12. The appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.
D.G. Railway Protection Force & Ors vs K. Raghuram Babu

2. The respondent was an Inspector of the Railway Protection Force. He was placed under suspension on 18.9.1995 on the allegation that he made excess delivery of scrap worth about Rs.10,000/-. A departmental proceeding was initiated against him in which he was given opportunity of hearing in which he sought to engage a friend to defend his case.

shall, however, not be allowed to address the Inquiry Officer nor to cross-examine the witnesses".

7. We are of the opinion that the view taken by the Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment is not correct.

12. We, therefore, respectfully disagree with the Full Bench impugned judgment of the High Court and we are of the view that Rule 153(8) is constitutionally valid.

13. In view of the above, the appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
Reshma Bano vs State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court dismissing the application filed by the appellant for exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') and Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution'). The prayer in the writ petition was to quash the proceedings initiated on the basis of FIR Crime No.316 of 2007, P.S. Phoolpur, Allahabad. It was submitted before the High Court that the FIR did not disclose any offence so far as the appellant is concerned. It was pointed out that the appellant was the sister of the accused no.1 Afzal who was alleged to have committed the offence of kidnapping etc. The High Court dismissed the application holding that on reading of the FIR, cognizable offence is made out.

8. The case at hand falls within the category I of the illustrations given in Bhajan Lal's case (supra). Therefore, we quash the proceedings relatable to FIR no.316 of 2007 far as the appellant is concerned. In other words, on the basis of the existing materials the appellant shall not be treated to be accused. It is, however, open to the Investigating Agencies to examine her as a witness. It is, further made clear that we have quashed the proceedings vis-`-vis the appellant only on the basis of the existing material.

9. The appeal is allowed.
Pancham Chand And Others vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Others

3. Fourth respondent, who is said to have a political connection being a leader of Congress Party, approached the State Chief Minister directly by a letter, which reads thus :-

The application of the respondent No.4, therefore, was to be entertained alongwith other similarly situated persons.

Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older."

25. Similarly, the respondent No.2 committed a serious illegality in forwarding the same to the respondent No.3 with the purported recommendations of the Chief Minister.

27. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is allowed with costs. The impugned judgment is set aside. As a limited notice was issued, we need not pass any consequential order which is within the realm of the Regional Transport Authority.

28. We impose a cost of Rupees one lakh upon the State which may be paid to the National Legal Services Authority. The said amount may be deposited within a period of four weeks failing which it will be open to the National Legal Services Authority to realize the same with interest @ 12 % per annum.
Ganpatbhai Mahijibhai Solanki vs State Of Gujarat & Ors

4. Notification under Section 10(3) of the Act was published in the Official Gazette on 4.5.1989. A notification was also issued under Section 10(5) thereof on 23.8.1989.

Allegedly, the directions contained therein were not complied by the appellant. Possession of the properties were said to have been taken over on 20.4.1992. Surplus lands are said to have been allotted to members of the weaker sections as envisaged under Section 23 of the Act. Another round of litigation was initiated by the appellant. Another appeal was said to have been filed before the appellate authority in terms of Section 33 of the Act in the year 1995. The said appeal was entertained. By a judgment and order dated 30.3.1995, 6224 sq. meters in Survey No. 267 only was declared as surplus land.

5. Respondent-State alleged that the Tribunal was not informed about the result of the earlier appeal and the said order dated 30.3.1995 was passed ex-parte. Even the allottees were not given any notice. A Writ Petition was preferred by one of the allottees before the High Court wherein a direction was issued to allot him an alternate land. The State also filed a writ petition thereagainst which was marked as SCA No. 100 of 1996. Appellant is said to have filed two civil suits in the years 1999 and 2001 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Vadodara being Civil Suit No. 935 of 1999 and 190 of 2001 seeking injunction against the State from taking possession of the lands. The application for interim injunction was, however, dismissed. In the said interim order, allegedly a finding was recorded that the appellant had suppressed material facts and misled the Court.

6. However, in the year 1999, the Act was repealed. On the basis thereof purported statement was made by the Assistant Government Pleader in Special Civil Application No. 100 of 1996 withdrawing the said SCA No. 100 of 1996. The High Court in its Order dated 15.6.1999 recorded;

8. The allottees, filed a writ petition before the High Court. The State therein filed a counter affidavit accepting the order of the Tribunal dated 31.3.1995. However, after a few days, an application for recalling of the said order dated 15.6.1999 was filed, whereupon a notice was issued.

It is now a well settled principle that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. If an order is obtained by reason of commission of fraud, even the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with for setting aside the same.

16. An extra-ordinary situation of this nature would require an extra- ordinary order.

18. For the reasons, aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the merit of the matter as also the question in regard to adjustment of equities may be considered by the High Court. We, for the foregoing in exercise of our jurisdiction in Article 136 of the Constitution of India refuse to interfere with the impugned judgment.

The appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 10,000/-
Jyoti Prakash Rai @ Jyoti Prakash vs State Of Bihar

4. For examining the claim of the appellant that he was a juvenile as on the date of commission of the offence, two medical boards were constituted. The first medical board which examined him on 24.04.2001, opined his age to be between 18 to 19 years. The second medical board which was constituted on 29.06.2001 also opined similarly.

20. The court, therefore, had no other option but to determine the age on the basis of the Medical Reports. Both the medical reports dated 24.04.2001 and 29.06.2001 opined the age of the appellant between 18 and 19 years. In terms of first medical report, the age of the appellant came to be 18 years 5 months 8 days and in terms of the second medical report, it came to be between 18 and 19 years. The High Court opined that the appellant on 1.04.2001 was definitely above 18 years of age and not below 18 years of age.

22. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
Asstt. Commissioner Of Income Tax, ... vs Surat City Gymkhana

JUDGMENT O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4305-4306 OF 2002 The respondent-assessee claimed exemption under Section 10(23) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the Assessment Years 1991-92 and 1992-93. The said exemption was claimed on the basis that the objects of the respondent-assessee are exclusively charitable. The assessing officer rejected the claim. Appeals filed before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) were also dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the assessee filed further appeals before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ('the Tribunal'). The Tribunal, by order dated 20th January 2001, allowed the appeals filed by the respondent-assessee. The appellant filed appeals before the High Court of Gujarat. The Revenue claimed that the following two substantial questions of law arise from the order of the Tribunal :

Question No.'A' on the ground that the Revenue did not challenge the correctness of the decision in the case of Hiralal Bhagwati (supra). It appears that the fact, that Question No.'B' was also covered by the aforementioned judgment, was not brought to the notice of their Lordship and, therefore, leave was granted restricted to question No.'B'. In this view of the matter, these appeals deserve to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. No costs.
Suresh vs Yeotmal Dist. Central Co-Op. Bank Ltd. & ...

Questioning the said seniority list as also the promotion of the respondent no. 2, the appellant raised a dispute before the Cooperative Court, Amravati. Issues were framed having regard to the rival contentions of the parties.

7. Respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal thereagainst before the Cooperative Appellate Court, which by reason of an order dated 21.06.2006 was allowed, stating:

8. A writ petition preferred thereagainst by the appellant has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.

13. On that ground alone, this appeal must fail.

14. However, as the parties have addressed us at some length on the merit of the matter, we may as well deal with the contentions raised at the bar.

20. We, therefore, are of the opinion that no case has been made out for interfering with the impugned judgments of the Cooperative Appellate Court as also the High Court. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. No costs.