L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Vinod Natesan vs The State Of Kerala

3. That   the   appellant   herein   filed   a   complaint   against   the respondent accused for the offences under Section 420, 406 read with Section 34 of the IPC alleging,  inter alia,  that after entering into the agreement   by   the   Accused   with   the   Complainant   with   regard   to availing   of   intellectual   services   for   marketing   the   products   of   the complainant, the accused did not pay the amount due and payable under the agreement and paid a sum of Rs.1,50,000/­ only (Rupees One   Lakh   Fifty   Thousand   Only)   and   without   paying   the   remaining amount backed out from the agreement and thereby the accused has committed the offence as alleged.

7. In so far as the submissions made on behalf of the Appellant­ party   in   person   that   initially   the   learned   Judge   dismissed   the application   and,   thereafter   when   the   judgment   was   dictated   and pronounced,   the   learned   Judge   has   allowed   the   application   and, therefore, the impugned judgment and order passed by High Court is required to be quashed and set aside is concerned, the aforesaid has no   substance.     What   is   produced   as   P­45   is   the   docket   of   the   file, which does not bear the signature of the learned Judge.  Therefore, it cannot be said that initially the learned Judge dismissed the petition and,   thereafter,   when   the   judgment   was   pronounced   the   order   was changed   and   the   application   was   allowed.     Even   otherwise,   as observed hereinabove, we are more than satisfied that there was no criminality on part of  the  accused and a civil dispute is tried  to be converted   into   a   criminal   dispute.     Thus   to   continue   the   criminal proceedings against the accused would be an abuse of the process of law.  Therefore, the High Court has rightly exercised the powers under Sections   482   of   the   Cr.PC   and   has   rightly   quashed   the   criminal proceedings.  In view of the aforesaid and for the reasons stated above, the   present   appeal   fails   and   deserves   to   be   dismissed   and   is accordingly dismissed.
Deepu @ Deepak vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

2. The   First   Information   Report   came   to   be   lodged   against three   persons   alleging   the   offence   of   murder   and   robbery.     A charge­sheet   was   filed   against   seven   persons,   including   the accused.     The   Trial  Court  had  discharged the  appellant herein initially, along with four other accused, however, the said order of discharge of the appellant was recalled subsequently.  The order of recalling was confirmed by the High Court.  The said order of recalling came to be set aside by this Court on the ground that there is no provision to review or recall the order under the Code of   Criminal   Procedure   (for   short   ‘the   Cr.P.C.’)   by   the   Criminal Court/Sessions Court.   The earlier orders, as mentioned supra, including the order passed by this Court, reveal that the initial order   of   discharge   passed   by   the   Trial   Court   was   without reference to the  supplementary charge­sheet/additional charge­ sheet filed against the appellant, which contained ample material against   the   appellant   to   frame   charges.     The   supplementary charge­sheet also included material relating to the recovery of a 2 3 pistol used for the commission of the offence by the appellant, at the instance of the appellant.

3. During   the   trial   of   the   other   two   accused   (since   the appellant   was   discharged   at   an   earlier   point   of   time),   an application came to be filed on behalf of the prosecution under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. with regard to the appellant based on the material on record.  The Trial Court, being satisfied about the existence   of   ample   material   against   the   appellant   to   proceed against him on the basis of the supplementary charge­sheet, Test Identification   Parade,   Forensic   Science   Laboratory   report   and statements   of   witnesses   recorded   under   Section   161   of   the Cr.P.C., as well as depositions of witnesses, issued summons to the appellant herein and thereafter proceeded to frame charges against   him.   As   mentioned   supra,   the   said   order   came   to   be confirmed by the High Court.

6. For   the   reasons   aforementioned,   we   find   no   reason   to interfere   with   the   impugned   orders.     The   appeal   fails   and   is accordingly   dismissed.     However,   we   make   it   clear   that   any observation made by the Trial Court, the High Court as well as this Court during the course of this order will not come in the way of the Trial Court to decide the sessions case on merits and in accordance with law.

December 14, 2018.
V. Ravi Kumar vs The State Rep. By Inspector Of Police

2. The appellant, Shri Ravi Kumar carries on business of cotton ginning and conversion of cotton into yarn at Salem, Tamil Nadu as proprietor of “SARAVANA YARN TRADERS”.

3. The appellant as proprietor of “SARAVANA YARN TRADERS” entered into transactions with Sri. Rajendran Mills Ltd., Salem (hereinafter referred to as “the Mill”). The respondent No.2/accused No.2 is the Managing Director of the Mill and the respondent No.3/accused No.3 Sri Sundaram is its Chairman, respondent No. 4/accused No.4 Sri Sundar is the son of the Managing Director being the respondent No.2/accused No.2 and is in charge of the affairs of the Mill. The respondents/ accused Nos.5 to 13 are also responsible for administering the Mill.

4. In December 2001, the Mill requested the appellant to supply cotton lint to the Mill for conversion of the same into yarn. The appellant and the respondents entered into transactions in 2001. Later, in January 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding in writing was executed between the appellant and the Mill. 3

5. The appellant has alleged that pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding, the appellant supplied 1,03,920 Kgs of cotton lint to the Mill for conversion into yarn. The appellant has further alleged that respondent No.2/accused No.2 Shri Chokalingam had, from out of the said quantity of cotton lint, purchased lint weighing about 47,164 kgs of the value of Rs.26,93,289/- on credit basis and the balance which was worth Rs.35,26,561.69 had been entrusted to the Mill for conversion into yarn.

9. Even after orders under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the Police did not register any complaint. Thereafter, the appellant filed a petition being Crl. O.P. No.7715 of 2005 praying for direction on the Inspector of Police to register a case on the basis of the complaint made by the appellant.

10. It is stated that since the amount involved exceeded the limit for invocation of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the local Police Station, the Superintendent of Police transferred the investigation to the District Crime Branch and the same was registered as Crime No.54/2005 under Sections 420, 409 and 34 IPC on 22-06-2005.

12. By an order dated 29-08-2005, the High Court disposed of the criminal original petition by directing the respondent to file a final Report within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order.

40. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order of the High Court quashing the complaint is set aside. The first respondent shall proceed with further investigation in accordance with law.
M/S Tata Motors Ltd. vs The State Of Jharkhand Department Of ...

Since this registration is temporary for a limited duration, a fractional tax is paid by the manufacturer or dealer under Section 7(4) of the Bihar Act. Section 6, on which the fulcrum of dispute revolves, deals with those vehicles which are in possession of a manufacturer or dealer in the course of his business and are held under trade certificates. Sections 5, 6 and 7 are reproduced below in order to have an idea of the payment of these three motor vehicle taxes:

4) As is clear from the reading of these Sections, Section 5 is the charging section as per which every owner of a registered motor vehicle is under an obligation to pay tax on such vehicle, rates whereof are specified in Schedule I. Insofar as Section 6 is concerned, liability is cast on the manufacturer of motor vehicles or a dealer in motor vehicles to pay tax in respect of motor vehicles in his possession in the course of his business as a manufacturer or a dealer, under the authorisation of trade certificate granted under the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘MV Rules’). Here tax is at annual rate 4 specified in Schedule III, which is ‘in lieu’ of the rates specified in Schedule I. It clearly implies, therefore, that a manufacturer or dealer pays the tax in respect of vehicles in his possession for which he has been granted trade certificate which authorises him to possess the said vehicle before it is sold to the ultimate consumer. Obviously, the rate specified in Schedule III is much lesser than the tax which is payable by the registered owner under Section 5 of the Bihar Act.

6 (2005) 7 SCC 615 17

31) In view of the aforesaid specific legal provisions, judgment in the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. referred to by the appellants will not be applicable in the instant case. It is also to be borne in mind that while upholding the validity of Section 23 of the Act in Telco, insofar as penalty is concerned, the Court had set aside the same on the ground that before imposing the penalty, no show cause notice was issued. Permission was given to the tax authorities to take fresh decision after giving the show cause notice. It is an admitted case that show cause notices were issued and after hearing the appellants, the penalty was imposed. Taking into consideration all these aspects, the High Court in the impugned judgment dated July 22, 2003 in the case of M/s. R.K. Automotives & Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 8-12 of 2004) has repelled the challenge against imposition of penalty. We agree with the aforesaid conclusion.

32) As a result, all these appeals are dismissed.

DECEMBER 14, 2018
Hukumchandra(D) Thru Lrs. vs Nemi Chand Jain

2. The appellant is a tenant in the shop measuring 6.3 feet x 15 feet on the ground floor of a building located at Sarrafa Bazar, Muraina, Madhya Pradesh. The respondent No.1 filed a civil suit under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (the Act) seeking eviction of the appellant from the 1 suit shop on the ground of bona fide requirement to settle his son Rajendra Kumar Jain. By judgment dated 30.06.2004, the trial court dismissed the suit holding that Rajendra Kumar was already doing an independent business of utensils and he was not unemployed and also found that respondent-landlord has not established the genuine bona fide requirement. The trial court dismissed the suit by finding that there is no ground for decree of eviction against the appellant herein under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. So far as the arrear of rent is concerned, the trial court found that no ground for eviction was made out under Section 12 (1)(a) of the Act.

3. The respondent - landlord appealed against the judgment of the trial court. The first appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court by holding that the documents produced by the appellant that they pertain to the year 1996, 2000 and 2001 and those documents do not show that Rajendra Kumar was engaged in the business on the date of filing of the suit i.e. on 22.01.1992. The first appellate court held that the bona fide requirement of the suit shop is to be examined on the date of filing of the suit i.e. 22.01.1992. After referring to the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bishanswaroop v. Rajkumar Kuchata & Ors. 2015 (1) M.P.A.C.J.- 151, the first appellate court held that it would be inappropriate to 2 expect that the land owner should sit idle and not to perform any work till the suit for eviction is decided on the basis of bona fide requirement. Observing that the landlord has established the bona fide requirement for establishing business for his son Rajendra Kumar, the first appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court and allowed the first appeal.

21. In the result, the judgment passed on 25.04.2012 in Second Appeal No.279 of 2007 by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh is confirmed and this appeal is dismissed. The appellant – tenant is 14 granted three months’ time to vacate and handover the possession of the suit property. No costs.

December 14, 2018.
Management Of The Barara Cooperative ... vs Workman Pratap Singh

3. Few relevant facts need mention hereinbelow to appreciate the short controversy involved in this appeal.

4. The appellant is the Co­operative Marketing Society. The respondent was working with the appellant as a Peon from 01.07.1973. The appellant terminated the services of the respondent on 01.07.1985. The respondent, therefore, got the reference made through the State to the Labour Court to decide the legality and correctness of his termination order.

6. The appellant and respondent both were aggrieved by the award and filed writ petitions before the High Court to challenge the legality and correctness of the award passed by the Labour Court. The High Court, however, dismissed both the writ petitions. The respondent then accepted the compensation, which was awarded by the Labour Court.

10. The respondent felt aggrieved and filed writ petition in the High Court. The Single Judge by order dated 26.11.2009 allowed the writ petition and set aside the award of the Labour Court. The High Court directed re­employment of the respondent on the post of Peon in the appellant's services. The appellant­ employer felt aggrieved and filed appeal before the Division Bench.

11. By impugned order, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Single Judge, which has given rise to filing of the present appeal by way of special leave in this Court by the employer­the appellant.

25. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Impugned order is set aside and the award of the Labour Court is restored.
The State Of Jharkhand Department Of ... vs Surendra Kumar Srivastava

2. A brief factual background of this case is set out herein below:

2.2. In 1992, Smt. Shyal Devi filed Title Suit No. 153/1992 before the Additional Munsif, Jamshedpur alleging that the officials of the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation were disturbing her possession of the suit property since 1990.

The Additional Munsif vide Judgment and Decree dated 18/27.02.1999 decreed the Suit in favour of the Plaintiff – late Smt. Shyal Devi, and confirmed her possession since 1958. The Bihar State Road Transport Corporation was restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of Smt. Shyal Devi. The relevant extract of the findings of the Additional Munsif contained in the Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:

9 2.12. The Electricity Board filed a Counter Affidavit along with photographs of the construction of the Electricity Sub-station. It was submitted that almost 90% of the construction work of the Electricity Sub-station had already been completed. It was further stated that the grant of an injunction would seriously affect public interest, and the welfare scheme for providing electricity to the local populace at subsidised rates. 2.13. The learned Single Judge of the High Court vide the impugned Judgment dated 19.05.2015 allowed W.P. (C) No. 2081 of 2015 filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, and directed the parties to maintain status quo with respect to the suit property. It was clarified, that the Appellant – The General Manager, Jharkhand State Electricity Board [in S.L.P. (C) No. 24684 of 2015] was, however, at liberty to raise construction on any other land, except the disputed suit property.

6.3. The Learned Single Judge granted an order of status quo with respect to the construction of the Electricity Sub-station even though the Plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein had failed to produce any documentary evidence whatsoever to establish their title to the suit property.

6.8. The Electricity Sub-station is complete in all respects and ready to be energised, as per the documentary evidence placed before the Court. The overriding public interest of providing electricity to the local populace would far outweigh the alleged interest of Respondent Nos.1 to 3.

7. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the Civil Appeals are allowed, and the impugned Judgment dated May 19, 2005 passed by the Learned Single Judge of the Jharkhand High Court in Writ Petition No. 2081 of 2015 is hereby set aside. The impugned Judgment ordering the maintenance of 23 status quo with respect to the Suit property till the final disposal of the Title Suit No. 45/2015 stands vacated.

The findings given in this judgment are prima facie in nature given at the interim stage, and will not influence the trial of the case.

The pending applications be disposed of accordingly. Ordered accordingly.

January 03, 2019 24
Swapan Kumar Chatterjee vs Central Bureau Of Investigation

3. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are as under: 1

14. In the instant case, the case was registered in the year 1983. 29 prosecution witnesses have already been examined. The application of the prosecution to examine Mr. H.S. Tuteja was allowed in the year 2004. However, prosecution has failed to keep 6 him in court for his examination. Thereafter, multiple applications have been filed to summon him and all of them have been allowed. However, the prosecution has failed to procure his attendance in the court.

13. Where the prosecution evidence has been closed long back and the reasons for non-examination of the witness earlier is not satisfactory, the summoning of the witness at belated stage would cause great prejudice to the accused and should not be allowed. Similarly, the court should not encourage the filing of successive applications for recall of a witness under this provision.

16. On 15.09.2014, yet again, the High Court in a criminal revision application observed that since the trial is pending for a long time, steps must be taken by the trial court to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six months. Even thereafter, the trial court has allowed the application filed by the prosecution for summoning Mr. H.S. Tuteja, which order has been confirmed by the High Court. In our view, the High Court ought to have accepted the appeal and rejected the application of the prosecution for summoning the witness, Mr. H.S. Tuteja. 7

17. In the result, the appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The orders of the High Court dated 04.05.2017, as well as of the Trial Court dated 05.12.2014 are hereby quashed and the application filed by the Prosecutor for summoning Mr. H.S. Tuteja is hereby dismissed.

January 04, 2019.
Ku. Bhawana vs State Of Maharashtra .

1. The dispute in this appeal pertains to the inter se seniority of the appellant vis­a­vis 5th respondent, who were appointed as Assistant Teacher in Secondary School and their services are governed by the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter being referred to as “Rules 1981”).

2. The brief facts that culled out in a nut shell are that the appellant was appointed as Rest. (untrained) Teacher in High SUSHIL KUMAR RAKHEJA School, Smt. Sindhutai Poreddiwar, Gogaon, Distt. Gadchiroli, Digitally signed by Date: 2019.01.04 14:11:35 IST Reason:

3. The Competent Authority adverted to the rival claims of the parties and observed in its order dated 31 st March, 2003 holding that the 5th respondent was appointed on 13 th August, 1997 as a trained teacher holding the qualification of B.A. B.Ed. and at the 2 time of entry into service, he was in category table ‘C’. At the same time, the appellant although was appointed as Assistant Teacher (untrained) with effect from 15 th July, 1994 but she qualified her B.Ed on 19 th September, 1997 and became member of category table ‘C’ only on acquiring qualification of B.Ed. and accordingly the 5th Respondent became senior to the appellant in category ‘C’ to Schedule ‘F’ annexed to Rule 12 of Rules, 1981. It was upheld by the High Court under the impugned judgment which is a subject matter before us.

8 Note 9 : In the case of permanent teachers having a break or breaks in service (physical or otherwise i.e. owing to part­time service interposed) between two spans of full­time service under the same management, after being made permanent but prior to the 1st July 1970 and who may not have changed the cadre after the period of break, the Management shall condone the break (s) for period(s) not exceeding three years for the purpose of seniority by commuting retrospectively the period of absence. If the period exceeds three years and if the teachers had worked on part­time basis, the Management shall also give credit for Period (s) of part time service to the extent of half the total period, for the purpose of seniority only. Each type of such breaks shall not exceed three in number during the career of a teacher and seniority so gained shall not entitle the teacher for retrospective promotion.

14. We, therefore, find no substance in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
Sneh Lata Goel vs Pushplata

The facts lie in a narrow compass:

One of the defendants in the partition suit filed a title suit 2 before the Court of Subordinate Judge, Ranchi. On 22 July 2003, the suit was dismissed for non- prosecution. The first respondent filed a title suit 3 before the Court of Subordinate Judge at Varanasi which was dismissed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC on 12 April 2005 on the ground of being barred under Section 21A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (“CPC”). The first respondent filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 in respect of the title suit filed at Ranchi which was also dismissed as withdrawn on 19 February 2008.

16 The respondent has filed a first appeal (First Appeal No. 43/2015) where the issue of jurisdiction has been raised. We must clarify that the findings in the present judgment shall not affect the rights and contentions of the parties in the first appeal. 17 The High Court has manifestly acted in excess of jurisdiction in reversing the judgment of the executing court which had correctly declined to entertain the objection to the execution of the decree on the ground of a want of territorial jurisdiction on the part of the court which passed the decree.

19 For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The executing court shall conclude the execution proceedings expeditiously. There shall be no order as to costs.
Digi Cable Network (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs Union Of India

3. The controversy involved in this appeal lies in a narrow compass as would be clear from the facts stated hereinbelow.

5. This permission was, however, cancelled by the Government of India vide order dated 03.09.2014 on the ground that the Ministry of Home Affairs has denied issuance of “security clearance” to the appellant. In other words, since the Ministry of Home Affairs did not grant security clearance to the appellant, the permission initially granted to the appellant vide letter dated 12.06.2012 was cancelled.

19. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is found to be devoid of any merit. It is accordingly dismissed.

20. However, the appellant would be at liberty to apply for grant of fresh permission in accordance with law.

IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.121 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 33411 of 2015) In the light of our detailed order passed in Civil Appeal No. ……………of 2019 @ SLP (C) No. 33244 of 2015, this appeal is also dismissed. 9

2. However, the appellant would be at liberty to apply for grant of fresh permission in accordance with law.

January 07, 2019.