L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
S.Kaladevi vs V.R.Somasundaram & Ors

4. According to the plaintiff, 1st defendant for himself, as the guardian father of 3rd defendant and 2nd defendant jointly entered into an oral agreement with her on 27.02.2006 to sell the suit property for a consideration of Rs. 1,83,000/-. It was agreed that the sale deed, in pursuance of the oral agreement for sale, would be executed and registered on the same day. The plaintiff purchased the stamp papers; paid the entire sale consideration to the defendants; the defendants put the plaintiff in possession of the suit property and also executed a sale deed in her favour. On 27.02.2006 itself, the said sale deed was taken to the Sub- Registrar's office. The Sub-Registrar, however, informed that in view of an order of attachment of the suit property the sale deed could not be registered. The sale deed, thus, could not be registered. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 then promised the plaintiff that they would amicably settle the matter with the concerned party who had obtained attachment of the suit property 2 and get the sale deed registered no sooner the attachment was raised. The plaintiff averred that she called upon the defendants to get the sale deed registered, but the defendants avoided the same by putting forth the reason that attachment in respect of the suit property was subsisting. On 04.02.2007 however, the plaintiff called upon defendant nos. 1 and 2 to cooperate in getting the sale deed registered, but instead of doing that the defendants attempted to interfere with her possession and enjoyment of the suit property necessitating action by way of suit.

6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the issues were struck. It appears that on 05.12.2007 at the time of examination of PW. 1, the unregistered sale deed dated 27.02.2006 was tendered for being marked. The counsel for the defendants objected to the said document being admitted in evidence being an unregistered sale deed. The trial court by its order dated 11.12.2007 sustained the objection and refused to admit the sale deed in evidence.

17. The result is that appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court dated 13.11.2008 and that of the trial court dated 11.12.2007 are set aside. The trial court shall mark the unregistered sale deed dated 27.2.2006 tendered by the plaintiff in 12 her evidence and proceed with the suit accordingly. The parties shall bear their own costs.
Bata India Ltd vs Commnr. Of Central Excise, New Delhi

2. The above question came up for consideration before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (for short `the Tribunal). The Member (Judicial) took the view that the product would not 2 attract duty unless it is established that the goods in question is marketable or capable of being marketed as a distinct product and that the Revenue has failed to discharge the burden to prove the marketability and dutiability of the intermediate product in the manufacture of rubber/canvas foot wear. The Member(Technical), however, disagreed with that finding and held that the Revenue has discharged its burden and took the view that the goods in question attracts duty.

6. The Collector of Central Excise (in short the Collector) noticed that during the manufacture of foot wear the assessee manufactures an excisable product called double textured fabric which is further used as upper material in the manufacture of foot wear and this double textured 4 fabric is nothing but rubberized, water proof fabric with a thin layer of rubber sandwiched between two sheets of cotton fabric in running length. As a result of that process a double textured fabric emerges as a distinct product with specific properties and character other than that of original fabric used as input which is known in commercial trade parlance as double textured fabric which is used in considerable quantities for making rain- coats, holdalls, hand bags etc.

8. The assessee filed detailed objections to the show cause notices on 22.09.1995 and 19.02.1996 respectively, and the matter was heard by the Commissioner, Central Excise who confirmed the demands made in both the show cause notices and a total amount of Rs.89,77,064 was demanded from the assessee. The Commissioner of Central Excise also imposed a penalty of Rupees 1 crore on the assessee under Section 173 Q(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. Aggrieved by the above mentioned order the assessee approached the Tribunal and the Tribunal by a majority order held that double textured rubberized fabrics / vulcanized stitched fabric is an excisable product attracting duty the correctness or 6 otherwise of that order is the issue that has come up for consideration before us.

21. In view of the above facts and circumstances, we are inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the order of the Tribunal and quash the show cause notices issued to the assessee since the Revenue had not produced any relevant materials to show the marketability of the product. We are informed that vide Notification No.143/94-CE dated 7.12.94 the product in question stands exempted if captively used for the manufacture 15 of exempted footwear. Civil appeal is, therefore, allowed as above, directing the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal without delay.

April 12, 2010
State Of Jharkhand & Ors vs M/S Misrilall Jain & Sons And Anr. Etc

3. The appellants in these appeals are State of Jharkhand and their officers (for short, `State Government'). The respondents are major mineral lease holders and minor mineral lease holders (for short, `lessees').

4. On June 17, 2005, the State Government through Department of Mines and Geology issued a Resolution regarding collection of surface rent on the area of mining leases at par with the land under commercial use whereby and whereunder the following decisions were taken:

Commissioner-cum-District Registration (should be Registrar) and it shall be collected by the District/Asst. Mining Officer from the lease holders.

6. The State Government defended their action as valid, legal and justified. According to State Government, the Resolution dated June 17, 2005 has been issued in terms of the power conferred upon them, insofar as major minerals are 3 concerned, under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short, `1957 Act') and Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (for short, `1960 Rules') and as regards minor minerals under Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 (for short, `2004 Rules').

7. The High Court by a common judgment dated May 7, 2007, allowed 46 writ petitions and quashed the Resolution dated June 17, 2005 and the demand notices. The other 6 writ petitions were allowed subsequently by following the judgment dated May 7, 2007.

(emphasis supplied)

13. Consequently, these appeals are allowed and impugned judgments are set aside. Writ petitions are restored to the file of the High Court for fresh consideration and disposal as expeditiously as may be possible. No orders as to costs.

...........................J (P. Sathasivam) .............................J (R. M. Lodha) New Delhi April 13, 2010.
Asst.Commercial Taxes Officer vs M/S. Kansai Nerolac Paints Ltd

3. We may notice necessary facts giving rise to the present appeal.

Vehicle No. RJ-19G-3661 was carrying `parchun' materials and in addition 377 pieces of drum bucket paints. These goods were transported from Ughna (Surat) to Jodhpur under Bilty No. 014951 dated 17.06.1997 issued by M/s. Deshbandhu Transport Company and the goods were consigned to M/s. Goodlass Nerolac Paints Limited. This vehicle was intercepted and checked by the Customs Enforcement Department (for short `the Department'). The competent authority during the course of the enquiry found that the nerolac paint buckets were transferred by stock transfer but the declaration form ST 18A was completely blank. Treating the consignment under the category of incomplete documents in terms of Section 78(2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 (for short `the Act') and forming an opinion that there was an intention to commit evasion of tax, a notice to show cause was issued that why penalty be not imposed. Reply thereto was filed by the owner of goods. Finding the reply without any merit and rejecting the same, the competent authority vide its order dated 23.06.1997 imposed a penalty of Rs.1,24,920/- in terms of Section 78(5) of the Act. This order of the competent authority was challenged in appeal by the owner of goods before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Commercial Taxes-II, Jaipur which, vide order dated 03.11.2003, allowed the appeal and held that the penalty against the owner of the goods could not be imposed as there was no 2 intention to commit evasion of tax and thus set aside the order of the lower authority. The Department challenged this order before the Rajasthan Tax Board, Ajmer Bench (for short `the Board'), on different grounds.

4. The appeal preferred by the Department came to be dismissed by the order of the Board dated 04.04.2005. The Board, while setting aside the order, expressed the view that prior to 22.03.2002 penalty could not be imposed on the owner of the goods under Section 78(5) of the Act besides that there was no intention to commit any evasion of tax.

5. Aggrieved by the order of the Board, the Department preferred revision petition under Section 86 of the Act before the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, and after stating the facts, the Department raised, inter alia, the following important questions of law:-

7. It will be more appropriate to reproduce the order impugned in the present appeal at this stage itself:-

10. For the reasons afore-recorded, we set aside the order dated 17.12.2007 and remit the case to the High Court with a request to hear the case de novo and pass appropriate order in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. To that extent the appeal is allowed.
Mahesh vs State Of Delhi

-P.W. 4., the first informant at about 4:15p.m. on the 24th February, 1997. A fourth person, Roopa also involved in the incident died during the trial. The trial court on a consideration of the evidence convicted the three accused and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 IPC and to a sentence of 10 years for the offence under Section 394 of the IPC, both the sentences to run concurrently. Three appeals thereafter were filed before the Delhi High Court which, by its judgment dated 08th March, 2007, dismissed the appeals. Jalvir, one of the accused thereupon filed Criminal Appeal No. 1475 of 2007 CRL. A. No. 1175 of 2009 2 which came up before this Court on 11th April, 2008. A Bench of this Court held that the only witness of the incident was P.W. 4 Seema Sharma who claimed and she knew Jalvir personally and having held as above dismissed the appeal. Mahavir also filed Criminal Appeal No. 932 of 2007 in this Court. This appeal was allowed with the positive finding that Seema Sharma - P.W. 4 had not been able to identify the accused as she was unaware of his identify and as the police had shown the accused to the witness which justified their refusal to participate in the identification parade and as such the only evidence against Mahavir was the identification by P.W. 4, Seema Sharma in Court and as this identification was a weak kind of evidence Mahavir was entitled to acquittal. Mahesh, the third accused has subsequently filed the present appeal in this Court claiming parity with the facts in Mahavir's case.

3. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. He is directed to be set at liberty if not required in connection with any other case.

Vide our separate reasoned order, we have allowed this appeal. It is stated by the learned counsel for the appellant that he is in custody and has almost undergone the complete sentence imposed for murder. The appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. We direct that the appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case.

The reasoned order is separately placed on record.

......................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] CRL. A. No. 1175 of 2009 6 ......................J [J.M. PANCHAL] NEW DELHI APRIL 15, 2010.
Assistant Commercial Tax Officer vs M/S Rijhumal Jeevandas

4. M/s. Rijhumal Jeevandas (hereinafter referred to as `the assessee') is a concern, trading in `timber' and its allied products. The Assessing Officer vide his Order dated 17th November, 2000, passed an order of assessment against the assessee wherein he levied tax at the rate of 8% i.e. Rs. 5,75,580/- on the `ballies' which, according to the Department, comes within the category of `timber' and thus, the tax ought to have been levied at the rate of 12%. On this premise, a notice was issued by the authority for amending the assessing order under Section 37 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 (for short `the Act'). Despite service of notice, none had appeared on behalf of the assessee and the differential tax at the rate of 4% was levied totaling to Rs. 23,023/-. Further, the authorities imposed surcharge of Rs. 5 2,763/- and interest of Rs. 26,302/-, and raised a total further demand of Rs. 52,088/-.

6. The aforesaid appeal was allowed. The appellate authority found that, the `ballies' comes under the category of `goods' and not under the category of `building goods'. Thus, the differential tax levied by the Tax Assessment Officer, assuming `ballies' to be `timber' was not justified. Consequently, the entire demand itself was set aside.

7. The order of the appellate authority dated 18th October, 2006 was challenged by the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Ward -III, Circle-B, Kota, before Rajasthan Tax Board, Ajmer which vide its 6 judgment dated 11th June, 2007 found that the `ballies' are not `timber' and upheld the view taken by the First Appellate Authority and dismissed the appeals preferred by the Department.
M/S. Jai Vijai Metal Udyog Pvt. Ltd vs Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P. Lucknow

Briefly stated, the material facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:

Similarly, for the assessment year 1988-89, with which we are concerned in this appeal, the Assessing Authority taxed the `properzi' rods at the rate of 2.2% vide order dated 19th August, 1992. However, subsequently proceedings under Section 21 of the U.P. Act were initiated against the Dealer on the ground that assessment in respect of the said assessment year had escaped assessment or had been under-assessed. The main reason for re-opening the assessment was that while assessing another dealer in the State, namely, M/s Hindustan Aluminium Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "HINDALCO"), who were also engaged in the manufacture of `properzi' rods and other products, the Assessing Officer had held that `properzi' rods were not `Metal' falling under Entry 24. 4

Being aggrieved, the Dealer preferred separate appeals against the assessments under the Regional Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act. Relying on the decision of this Court in Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.1, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Sales Tax, Varanasi vide his order dated 11th February, 1993, allowed both the appeals. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) found that `properzi' rods manufactured by the Dealer were not in the final shape of finished goods and were the basic raw material for the manufacture of aluminium wires and, therefore, being a primary metal, would attract tax at the rate of 2%. Aggrieved by the said order, the Revenue took the matter in second appeal to the Tribunal which, vide order dated 27th March, 1998, dismissed both the appeals.

For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court, distinguishing the case of HINDALCO from that of the Dealer, cannot be sustained.

As a result, the appeal is allowed; the impugned order is set aside and that of the Tribunal is restored leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Abu Thakir & Ors vs State Rep. By Inspector Of ...

2. The facts in brief, according to the prosecution story, are that on 28th March, 2002 one Murugesan (deceased) was murdered at about 7.30 a.m. on the way leading to Badrakaliamman temple on Kovai Pudur Road in pursuance of a criminal conspiracy hatched by the appellants herein and other accused forming themselves into unlawful assembly so 2 as to wreck vengeance of the murder that took place on 26th March, 2002 of one Sultan Meeran. Before the incident, Kanakaraj (PW 1), brother of the deceased went to the barber shop situated near the place of occurrence to have a shave, where his paternal uncle Subramani (PW 4) told him that the deceased and some other persons were quarrelling at East of Badrakaliamman temple. Immediately, Kanakaraj (PW

3. After completion of the investigation, the police filed charge sheet against the appellants and five other co- accused. The prosecution in all examined 30 witnesses (PWs 1 to 30) and got marked 77 documents in evidence. The prosecution also produced material objects which were marked as M.O. 1 to 43.

4. The trial court accepted the prosecution's case and believed the evidence of PWs 2 to 4 and based on their evidence, convicted the appellants herein under Sections 302, 120B, 148, 341, 147, 302 read with Sections 149 and 109, of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to life imprisonment and various other terms of imprisonment to run concurrently. The trial Court also convicted the other accused under various Sections of the IPC. The trial court held that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants and held them guilty of having entered into a criminal conspiracy, unlawful assembly and committing murder of the deceased. The High court, however, confirmed the conviction of the appellants only under Section 302, IPC and acquitted them of the rest of the charges and completely acquitted rest of the accused.

2) Transversely oblique stab injury over back of left side of upper chest measuring 3 cms x 1 cm x entering the left thoracic cavity. The lower medial end of the wound is 4 cms from the middle of T 3 vertebra. The wound passes forward, downwards and medially through the left third inter costal space causing a stab injury in the posterior aspect of upper lobe of left lung measuring 2 cms x 1 cm x 2 cms. The deepest part ending as a point. Both ends of the wound are pointed and the margins are regular. The length of the wound tract is about 8 cms left pleural cavity contains 400 ml of blood with clots.

12.We do not find any material on record to accept the submissions made during the course of hearing of this appeal that PW 20, did not own any lorry with him so as to be sold and the said lorry was not stationed nearby the scene of occurrence. We do not find any reason to disbelieve the statement of PWs 8 and 20 in this regard which is clear, categorical and forthcoming which we 3 1974 L.W.(Crl) 1190 2 have discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The submission is accordingly rejected.

16.We accordingly find no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
Laxmi Verma vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

and there has been complete violation of Sub-section (2) of Section 41 of the Act. Thus, no fresh election should be conducted. But in the meanwhile election programme was already announced. The election programme so announced specifically mentioned that election was subject to the decision of pending proceedings. In the fresh elections, the present Appellant Laxmi Verma was elected as Councillor and subsequently she was also elected as President of Municipal Council and is continuing as such. The Additional Commissioner decided the Revision Application of Respondent No. 6 by order dated 25.02.2009 holding that the Collector had rightly accepted the resignation of Respondent No. 6. This order was challenged by Respondent No. 6 by filing W.P. No. 1550 of 2009, which was partly allowed and the Additional Commissioner was directed to decide the Revision Application afresh after hearing both parties. Thereafter, the Additional Commissioner allowed the Revision Application filed by Respondent No. 6, set aside the order of Collector, whereby his resignation from the post of Councillor of Municipal Council, Achalpur, was accepted, thereby restoring the status of Municipal Councillor to Respondent No. 6.

21. No doubt, it is true that equity swings in favour of the Appellant but the law applicable to the facts of the case is certainly against her. Apart from the above, it is also to be recalled that fresh elections were held only subject to ultimate result of the Revision Petition filed by Respondent No. 6. Thus, Appellant was fully aware that her fate would ultimately depend on the result of the litigation, which ultimately stood decided against her and further has a seal of approval by us.

....11/-

23. In the light of this, we are of the considered opinion that no case has been made out for interference in the matter. Appeals are dismissed but with no order as to costs.
S.R. Srinivasa & Ors vs S. Padmavathamma

2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the plaintiffs claimed that Puttathayamma was wife of Sivaramaiah who pre-deceased her in 1950. Puttathayamma died on 15.11.1979. She had four children. Lalithamma (daughter) who died in 1990, was the original plaintiff. Subbaramaiah (son) who died issueless in 1973 and Smt. Kamalamma (daughter) also died issueless in 1998. She was impleaded as defendant No.4 in this suit. Smt. Indiramma was the 4th child. She also died issueless on 24.10.85. It is claimed that upon the death of Subbaramaiah, Puttathayamma inherited the suit property and became the absolute owner being class one heir of Subbaramaiah. Upon the death of Puttathayamma, the deceased plaintiff, defendant No.4, Kamalamma and Indiramma inherited her property. During her life time, Puttathayamma was living with Indiramma. Upon her death, Indiramma continued to be in possession of the property. The dispute about the property arose soon after the death of Indiramma.

9. With these pleadings parties led their evidence. Upon consideration of the entire material, the suit filed by the appellants herein was dismissed by the Trial Court.

44. In our opinion, the High Court failed to examine the entire issue in accordance with the aforesaid principles laid down by this Court. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the impugned judgment. The appeal is allowed. Judgment of the High court is set aside and the judgment of the First Appellate Court i.e. the Court of the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Mysore is restored.