L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Devisingh Meena vs Union Of India

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. His claim relates to the post of Senior Administrative Grade. He filed OA 245 of 2001 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench (for short the 'Tribunal'). Before that he had moved OA 8639 of 1997 making the grievance that he was not granted the post of Chief Commercial Manager, Senior Administrative Grade from 1995. His stand was that the Minister of Railways had approved his promotion in the said grade, but the same was not given effect to by the respondents. OA was decided on merits by order dated 15.1.1999. While dismissing the OA, Tribunal had observed that the applicant was not entitled for promotion to the post of Chief Commercial Manager in the grade w.e.f. 1.1.1995. The appellant had preferred Special Civil Application No.10899 of 2000 before the Gujarat High Court and while dismissing the same, learned Single Judge had directed the respondents to decide the pending representation of the applicant for his promotion in the light of existing rules and regulations.

8. Thereafter, DPC put up a detailed note indicating the reasons as to why the name of the appellant can not be included for promotion to Senior Administrative Grade. The Minister accepted the reasons given by the DPC for non- inclusion and further approved the panel which did not figure appellant's name.

11. That being so, there is no scope for interference with the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court. The appeal is without merit and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
M/S. Rattna Oil Mills/Rice Mills vs Paramjit Singh & Ors

3. The Collector, Fazilka by his order dated 11th of January, 1977 determined the ceiling of the original owner Munshi Singh and held 8.0804 Hectares of land as surplus in the hands of Munshi Singh. Feeling aggrieved, the original owner Munshi Singh filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Ferozepur and the Commissioner by an order dated 5th of May, 1980 modified the order of ceiling of the Collector to the extent that the lands mentioned in the said order equivalent to 4.8187 hectares were excluded from the surplus pool and the matter was remanded back to the Collector, Fazilka for fresh decision. By an order dated 19th of August, 1982, the Collector, Fazilka determined the ceiling limit and declared 1.7849 hectares of land as surplus. The land in dispute measuring 12 Kanals 8 Marlas, sold to M/s. Ahuja Oil and Chemicals was declared surplus though no notice was given to them. Feeling aggrieved, M/s. Ahuja Oil & Chemicals filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Ferozepur claiming that since the aforesaid surplus land was purchased by them from Manjit Singh, they ought to have been heard and notice ought to have been served upon them and accordingly, the order of the Collector must be set aside. During the pendency of this appeal, the respondent No. 5 sold the said land in which a factory is situated to the appellant herein by a registered sale deed dated 11th of June, 1985. The appellate authority viz. the Commissioner, Ferozepur dismissed the appeal of M/s. Ahuja Oil and Chemicals on 14th of October, 1985 on the ground that M/s. Ahuja Oil & Chemicals were not entitled to prosecute the appeal in view of the fact that the land in dispute was already sold by it to the appellant. The appellant herein, being the purchaser from M/s. Ahuja Oil & Chemicals filed an application before the Commissioner, Ferozepur, which was also rejected by the order dated 6th of July, 1987. Thereafter, the order dated 6th of July, 1987 was also challenged by the appellant herein in revision before the Financial Commissioner but the revision petition was also dismissed on the ground of locus standi of the appellant herein to challenge the same. A writ petition filed before the Punjab & Haryana High Court by the appellant herein was also rejected on the ground that the appellant herein was not entitled to any hearing of the proceeding for determination of surplus land under Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972. It is this order of the High Court, which is now under challenge before us.

7. Such being the position, we set aside the order of the High Court rejecting the writ petition and also the order of the appellate authority Commissioner, Ferozepur and restore the appeal for fresh disposal.

8. For the reasons aforesaid, the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority Commissioner, Ferozepur for decision on merits and in accordance with law. The appellate authority Commissioner, Ferozepur shall decide the appeal within 3 months from the date of supply of a copy of this order to it.

9. The appeal is thus disposed of to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
Devisingh Meena vs Union Of India (Uoi)

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. His claim relates to the post of Senior Administrative Grade. He filed OA 245 of 2001 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench (for short the 'Tribunal'). Before that he had moved OA 8639 of 1997 making the grievance that he was not granted the post of Chief Commercial Manager, Senior Administrative Grade from 1995. His stand was that the Minister of Railways had approved his promotion in the said grade, but the same was not given effect to by the respondents. OA was decided on merits by order dated 15.1.1999. While dismissing the OA, Tribunal had observed that the applicant was not entitled for promotion to the post of Chief Commercial Manager in the grade w.e.f. 1.1.1995. The appellant had preferred Special Civil Application No.10899 of 2000 before the Gujarat High Court and while dismissing the same, learned Single Judge had directed the respondents to decide the pending representation of the applicant for his promotion in the light of existing rules and regulations.

8. Thereafter, DPC put up a detailed note indicating the reasons as to why the name of the appellant can not be included for promotion to Senior Administrative Grade. The Minister accepted the reasons given by the DPC for non-inclusion and further approved the panel which did not figure appellant's name.

11. That being so, there is no scope for interference with the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court. The appeal is without merit and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
M/S. L&T Komatsu Ltd vs N. Udayakumar

3. Undisputed background facts are as follows:

4. Learned Single Judge noted that there were proved cases of misconduct of unauthorized absentism for 15 times but the workman had not improved his conduct. Notwithstanding this finding, learned Single Judge held that at the relevant point of time the workman was not well and was taking treatment at St. Martha Hospital. Accordingly it was held that the order of termination is harsh under the facts and circumstances of the case but looking into the past history directed reinstatement without continuity of service and without back wages. By the impugned order the Division Bench allowed the appeal filed by the respondent while dismissing the appeal filed by the present appellant.

12. When the factual background is considered in the light of principles indicated above, the inevitable conclusion is that the Labour Court and the High Court were not justified in directing the reinstatement by interference with the order of termination. The orders are accordingly set aside. The Order of termination as passed by the concerned authority stands restored. The appeal is allowed with no orders as to costs.
M/S Quality Inn Southern Star vs The Regional Director, Employees State ...

2. Background facts are as follows:

3. According to the appellant, the basic question was whether the service charge collected by the hotel management from the customers and distributed amongst the employees amounted to "wages" within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Act. According to the appellant this did not constitute wages. The respondent contended that the appellant runs a three-star hotel and the establishment is covered under the Act. Undisputedly, 10% of the total bill amount is compulsorily collected as services charges and is included in the bills. The service charges so collected are distributed amongst the employees of the appellant quarterly. The collection of service charges is essentially what is called as "tips" and paid at the option of customers. The ESI Court held that looking at the nature of the service charges, these are not directly paid by the customers to the employees but form part of the bills which the customers are obliged to pay without any option and this amount so collected is paid or distributed to the employees equally once in three months. According to the ESI Court the appellant had total control and power of distribution of the amount and this is distinguishable from "tips". This was treated in any event covered by the expression "additional reimbursement". The High Court in appeal upheld the view.

10. In view of the above-said office memorandum and the view taken by the Madras High Court in Sathianathan's case (supra) the orders of the ESI Court and the High Court cannot be maintained and are accordingly set aside.

11. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.
M/S. L&T; Komatsu Ltd vs N. Udayakumar

3. Undisputed background facts are as follows:

4. Learned Single Judge noted that there were proved cases of misconduct of unauthorized absentism for 15 times but the workman had not improved his conduct. Notwithstanding this finding, learned Single Judge held that at the relevant point of time the workman was not well and was taking treatment at St. Martha Hospital. Accordingly it was held that the order of termination is harsh under the facts and circumstances of the case but looking into the past history directed reinstatement without continuity of service and without back wages. By the impugned order the Division Bench allowed the appeal filed by the respondent while dismissing the appeal filed by the present appellant.

12. When the factual background is considered in the light of principles indicated above, the inevitable conclusion is that the Labour Court and the High Court were not justified in directing the reinstatement by interference with the order of termination. The orders are accordingly set aside. The Order of termination as passed by the concerned authority stands restored. The appeal is allowed with no orders as to costs.
Mohd. Akram Ansari vs Chief Election Officer & Ors

3. The facts of the case are that the appellant contested the election to the Delhi Legislative Assembly in 2003 but lost. The respondent Haroon Yusuf was declared elected. At the time of the election Haroon Yusuf was also the Chairman of the Delhi Waqf Board.

15. Since no other point except the point of office of profit has been dealt with in the impugned judgment of the High Court, the presumption is that no other point was pressed before the High Court, even though the point may have been contained in the election petition. Hence we do not allow these points to be raised here.

16. With the observations made above, the appeals are dismissed. No costs.
Harpal Singh vs State Of Punjab

2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 12.3.1992 Kamaljit Singh, SHO, Santokh Singh, SI and some other police personnel were going from village Kukar Pind to village Raipur in connection with investigation of a case bearing FIR No. 31 under Section 302/34 IPC, Section 25 Arms Act and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as 'TADA'). When they reached on Byen Bridge in village Kukar Pind, they saw a person coming on foot. On seeing the police party he tried to run away but he was apprehended after a chase and on inquiry he disclosed his name as Harpal Singh (appellant in this appeal). On his personal search explosive powder wrapped in a glazed paper was recovered from the "jhola" (bag) which he was having in his right hand. The bag contained one kilogram explosive powder which was taken into possession. A ruka was sent to the police station on the basis of which FIR was registered against the appellant.

3. After investigation and receipt of the sanction and report of the Forensic Science Laboratory charge-sheet was submitted in the court on 24.2.1994 for prosecution of the appellant under Sections 4, 5, and 9B(b) of the Explosives Act, 1884. There was no mention of any offence under TADA or under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The charge-sheet was submitted in the Designated Court which took cognizance of the offence and proceeded with the trial of the appellant. Ultimately the Designated Court acquitted the appellant for the offences under TADA and the Explosives Act, 1884, but convicted him only under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and sentenced him to 5 years R.I. and a fine of Rs.1,000/-.

12. In view of the discussion made above there cannot be any escape from the conclusion that the Designated Court had no jurisdiction to try and convict the appellant under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 in view of the fact that it could not have taken cognizance of the offence under TADA for lack of sanction by the competent authority under Section 20-A(2) of TADA. In view of the fact that the Designated Court could not try the offence under TADA being debarred from taking cognizance thereof on account of want of sanction by the competent authority under the mandatory provisions of Section 20-A(2), it could not try any offence under any other Act as well.

13. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the conviction of the appellant under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and the sentence imposed thereunder are set aside. The appellant shall be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case.
Sangam Spinners vs Regional Provident Fund ...

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur dismissing the Special Appeal filed by the appellant. Challenge in the Special appeal was to the judgment of a learned Single Judge whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed upholding the decision of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (in short the 'Commissioner'). It was held that Section 16(1)(d) of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') was omitted from the statute by Act No.10 of 1998 with retrospective effect i.e. from 22.9.1997. In other words, it was held that the infancy protection shall not be available to the appellant factory after 22.9.1997.

2. The factual scenario lies into a very narrow compass. Appellant started production on 1.9.1995 and according to it, it was entitled to benefit under Section 16(1)(d) of the Act from that day. From August, 1998 appellant started to comply with the provisions of the Act as the three year fledging period as envisaged under Section 16(1)(d) of the Act came to an end. On 26.3.1999 enquiry under Section 7A of the Act was initiated to secure the compliance of the Act from September, 1995 to July, 1998. By order dated 27.7.2000 the Commissioner recorded a specific finding that the company was a new unit and was eligible for exemption under Section 16(1)(d) of the Act but since it was effaced from the statue from 22.9.1997 the benefit was available till that date and not thereafter. The writ petition filed was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, so was the special appeal.

20. In view of the above position in law, the judgments of the Commissioner and the High Court are indefensible and are set aside. The appellant shall be entitled to the protection for the period of three years starting from the date the establishment was set up irrespective of the repeal of the provision for such infancy protection.

21. Appeal is allowed. No costs.
Naresh Govind Vaze vs Govt. Of Maharashtra & Ors

9. The representation made by the appellant was rejected by the disciplinary committee in its meeting dated 22nd November, 2005. A decision was taken to impose upon him a major penalty of compulsory retirement from service as prescribed under Rule 5(1)(vii) of the Maharashtra Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 (for short "the said Rules"). It was furthermore decided that 2/3rd compulsory retirement pension as admissible under Rule 100 of Maharashtra Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1982 be given to him.

11. Appellant filed a writ petition being W.P. No. 8640 of 2005 on 17th November, 2005 before the High Court. The same, however, was withdrawn on 21st December, 2005.

12. He filed another writ petition on 28th February, 2006 which was marked as WP No. 1354 of 2006 claiming a large number of reliefs. By an order dated 2.05.2006, the Division Bench of the said Court issued a limited notice in regard to the prayers made in clauses (h), (k), (t) and (z) and the first part of prayer (y) of para 17 of the writ petition.

13. The said writ petition has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.

23. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only).
Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare ... vs State Of U.P. And Others

2,3 and 4 to get recovery of amount due against the members of Petitioners society through due process of law other than recovery the same as arrears of land revenue"

In the said counter-affidavit, it has further been disclosed that after being unsuccessful in their attempt to stall the recovery proceedings against the Samiti, a fictitious welfare Sanstha, namely, Udhyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha was started by Appellant No. 2.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that the attempt on the part of the appellants herein must be termed as 'abuse of the process of law'.

15. A writ remedy is an equitable one. A person approaching a superior court must come with a pair of clean hands. It not only should not suppress any material fact, but also should not take recourse to the legal proceedings over and over again which amounts to abuse of the process of law.

16. For the reasons aforementioned, there is not merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel's fee quantified at Rs. 50,000/-
Sheikh Abdul Rashid & Ors vs State Of J&K & Ors

They were promoted on officiating basis on 19.05.1979.

4. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir, however, on or about 01.08.1985 issued a notification directing their promotion with retrospective effect ignoring the seniority of the appellants herein inter alia stating:

5. Realising that the said order may be held to be illegal by a court of law, by an order dated 3.12.1985 the same was cancelled. On the same day, however, by an order No. 1263 of 1985, promotions were directed to be granted with retrospective effect from 25.04.1978, i.e., from the date on which the respondents were brought on promotion List E.

in the ratio and in the manner specified against each post in Schedule II.

14. Recruitment by promotion (1) There shall be a Departmental Promotion Committee constituted by the Government from time to time who shall examine the promotion cases.

20. Maintenance of seniority lists Seniority of the members of the service shall be regulated under the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956. The Administrative Department shall maintain an up to date and final seniority lists in each grade of the service."

20. Similarly, although the statute provides for grant of officiating promotion, but the same is not conducive in the sense that even after getting officiating promotion, one may be reverted to the original post held by him. We do not mean to say that the seniority would be reckoned from the date of confirmation but we only intend to point out that the Rules having been provided for officiating promotion, the learned Single Judge was correct in taking that factor also into consideration for the purpose of determining the validity of the impugned order before the High Court. The said order dated 3.12.1985 even otherwise appears to be mala fide having been passed for unauthorised purpose. If the said order dated 3.12.1985 is read with the earlier one being dated 1.08.1985, the intention of the Government to favour the private respondents herein becomes explicit. It is not expected of a government to brazenly favour one set of employees so as to defeat the bona fide claim of the other set of employees. We, therefore, are of the opinion, that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed.

21. However, in exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct that despite this order if any monetary benefit has been conferred upon the private respondents, the same may not be recovered.
Niranjan Cinema vs Prakash Chandra Dubey & Anr

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Evidence was led to show that there was no termination of service and the respondent could join at any time. The Tribunal in its award held that the termination was illegal and reinstatement with back wages was directed on the ground that even if respondent had started a betel shop, he could not be said to be gainfully employed. Subsequent to the award the appellant again offered respondent the option to resume duty pending challenge to the award in the writ petition. Respondent refused to resume duty. On 8.5.1999 as noted above writ petition was filed before the High Court challenging the Award. On 26.5.1999 High Court directed the appellant to deposit the wages with the Tribunal and the respondent to report for duty. On 13.7.1999 appellant asked the respondent to join duty. Respondent again refused to join duty. Subsequently also the appellant asked the respondent to resume duty and on 29.7.1999 deposited 50% of the back wages with the Tribunal. Appellant requested the Deputy Labour Commissioner to depute an Inspector with a direction to direct the respondent to resume duty. On 6.7.2000 the Assistant Labour Commissioner persuaded the respondent to join duty. The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the termination was illegal and that the respondent had not been gainfully employed after termination of service because self-employment cannot be treated as gainful employment.

6. It is also relevant that there was no averment in the claim petition that the earnings from the betel shop were not sufficient to make both ends meet. Therefore, the view expressed by the High Court in that regard is not legally sustainable. But it has not been shown as to how much the respondent earned from the betel shop. In view of this factual position, we direct that 50% of the back wages which has been deposited with the Tribunal, be released to the respondent. His entitlement is accordingly determined. It needs to be noted that the issues in the present appeal were restricted to the question of back wages. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order to costs.