L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Sub-Divisional Officer Telegraph, ... vs The Presiding Officer Central ...

Factual position which is almost undisputed is that some casual labourers raised a dispute before the Tribunal. The appellant took the stand that the concerned labourers who were casual workers had deliberately remained absent from duty for more than six months. Those six persons were engaged on daily wages basis in the Telecommunication Department under the SDO, Bijnor. When they reported back after their voluntary absence they were not given any benefit for the past service and it was decided to treat them to have joined w.e.f. 7.5.1985. The Tribunal by its award dated 17.3.1992 came to hold that there was, in fact, termination, and there was no compliance with requirements of Section 25- F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, therefore, the action of the Department was illegal and unjustified. According to the Tribunal they were entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and consequential benefits. The Department filed an Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench (in short 'CAT'). The Original Application was admitted on 5.5.1993 and stay on the direction for the payment of back wages was granted. Subsequently, it was brought to the notice of the CAT that in view of the decision of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. The Union of India & Others (JT 1997 (3) SC 589) the proceedings before the CAT were not maintainable. By order dated 17.12.1997 CAT disposed of the matter holding that the proceedings before it were not maintainable. It was, however, inter alia observed as follows:

The writ application was filed in February, 1998 and has been dismissed as afore-noted by order dated 30.4.1998.

In the circumstances without expressing any opinion on merits, we set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to it for decision on merits.

The appeal is allowed. No costs.
The Managing Director, Orix Auto ... vs Shri Jagmander Singh & Anr

The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

(Underlined for emphasis) According to the financier there was default in making payment of the monthly instalments and the hirer was requested to clear the amounts due by several letters. In spite of several requests/demands the hirer did not pay the amount due and as on 27.8.2002 he was in arrears of Rs.1,34,000/- on account of monthly instalments due excluding other charges payable on account of delay in making payment. Accordingly, the appellant repossessed the vehicle on 27.8.2002. According to the financier in view of the violation of the terms by the hirer the agreement stood terminated. Therefore, by registered letter dated 27.8.2002 the financier called upon the hirer to pay a sum of Rs.4,27,485/- which was the amount due. The notice stipulated that the amount was to be paid within 10 days from the date of the receipt of the letter. The hirer did not make any payment and on the other hand made a false complaint to the Reserve Bank of India (in short 'RBI'), and filed a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sonepat for declaration with consequential reliefs and permanent injunction along with mandatory injunction. In the said civil suit the hirer also filed application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 of the Code praying for interim relief. On receipt of the summons, written statement was filed by the appellant. The matter was taken up 13.9.2002. A prayer was made for an adjournment of the date as learned counsel for the appellant had met with an accident. The matter was adjourned for arguments on the said application on 27.9.2002. But at the same time learned Civil Judge directed the appellant to release the vehicle subject to deposit of the balance of instalments along with interest amounting to Rs.1,61,504/-. The said order was the subject- matter of challenge in Civil Revision No.4680/2002. Initially the High Court had granted stay of the operation of the order. The hirer filed an application for vacation of the order of stay. By the impugned order the High Court dismissed the Civil Revision upholding the order passed by the Trial Court.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No orders as to costs.
State Of A.P vs S. Rayappa & Ors

J U D G M E N T H.K.SEMA,J 23 accused in all were put to trial before the Trial Court under Sections 148/302/149 IPC. A-21 died before the Trial commenced. A-1 to A-20, A-22 and A-23 faced the trial. The Trial Court convicted A-2, 3, 6, 12 and 14 under Section 148 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years. The Trial Court also found A-2, 3, 6, 12 and 14 guilty under Section 302 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.2000/- in default three months rigorous imprisonment. Being aggrieved, two appeals were preferred before the High Court. Criminal Appeal No. 1727 of 1997 was preferred by Sathuluri Rayappa A-2, Sathuluri Chalapathi A- 3, Sathuluri Dibbaraju A-6 and Garapati Mastan A-12. Criminal Appeal No. 18 of 1998 was separately preferred by Satuluri Milke Raju A-14. By the impugned order the High Court acquitted all of them. Hence these appeals by special leave by the State of Andhra Pradesh.

Briefly stated the facts are as follows:

Edges clear cut. Ecchymosis present underlying tissues.

Ecchomisis present.

Ecchomosis present."

In the result, these appeals deserve to be allowed. The impugned order of the High Court acquitting the accused (respondents herein) is hereby quashed and set-aside. The order of the Trial Court convicting the respondents is restored. The respondents are directed to be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining part of the sentence. Compliance report should be sent within one month.
Balakrishnan vs Malaiyandi Konar

The background facts need to be noted in brief.

The suit was filed by the appellant on the basis of a promissory note executed by the respondent in favour of the appellant. The suit was decreed. In the proceeding for execution of the decree in his favour (E.P.No.725/1981 on the file of District Munsif, Kulithalai later renumbered as E.P.45/1983 on the file of District Munsif, Manapparai) the appellant purchased the judgment debtor's property on 8.7.1981 in Court auction after obtaining permission of the Court for a sum of Rs.7,510/-. The sale was confirmed on 22.8.1983.

Respondent filed EA 17/83 to set aside the sale on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1980 (in short the 'Debt Relief Act'). On 30.4.1983 application filed by the respondent was dismissed on the ground that the respondent has not made out a case for getting benefit under the Debt Relief Act. It was also held that apart from the property covered by the auction sale, he had got income from other properties. Respondent filed Civil Revision Petition No.3963 1983 before the Madras High Court against the order of dismissal of EA 17/83. By order dated 10.9.1987 the High Court dismissed the Civil Revision Petition upholding the findings of the Executing Court.

One year When the sale becomes absolute.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Avinash Hansraj Gajbhiye vs Official Liquidator,M/S. V. Pharma. P. ...

2. This appeal, as can be seen from paragraph 1 of the Petition for Special Leave to Appeal, challenges the order of the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench dated 18.7.2003 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court refused to review its judgment in Company Appeal No. 3 of 2002 dated 19.9.2002 dismissing the appeal. Company Appeal No. 3 of 2002 was filed by the appellant, the legal representative of an ex-Director of M/s Vidarbha Pharmaceuticals Private Limited, a company that went into liquidation and which was ordered to be wound up in Company Petition No. 7 of 1985 by order dated 9.11.1998. Though that appeal was against the order dated 16.8.2002 in Company Application No. 56 of 2001, the appellant attempted to challenge the earlier orders dated 7.9.2001 and 22.7.1999, passed during the winding up proceedings. By the order dated 7.9.2001, the Company Judge had dismissed the application No. 40 of 1999 filed by the appellant for setting aside the order dated 22.7.1999 passed by him in a misfeasance application, holding that all the ex-Directors of the Company were jointly and severally liable under Section 543 (1)(a) of the Companies Act to pay to the Company an amount of Rs.6,29,220/- with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum with effect from 6.10.1996 along with the costs of the proceedings. The order dated 22.7.1999 that was sought to be challenged was the order on the misfeasance application. The order dated 16.8.2002 was one by which the Company Judge rejected an application for review filed by the petitioner seeking a review of the order passed on 7.9.2001. The appeal was in time only as regards the order dated 16.8.2002 refusing to review the earlier orders in misfeasance proceedings passed by the Company Judge. The appeal was not accompanied by even an application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal as against the orders dated 7.9.2001 and 22.7.1999even though the challenges to them were clearly barred by limitation. The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, ordered on 19.9.2002 that the orders passed by the Company Judge on 7.9.2001 and 22.7.1999 were not amenable to scrutiny for their sustainability in the appeal filed and the appeal had to be confined to one from the order dated 16.8.2002. Thereafter, the appeal was dismissed holding that the Company Judge was justified in refusing to review the orders passed in the Misfeasance Application. The appellant then filed a petition to review the judgment in Company Appeal No. 3 of 2002. By order dated 18.7.2003, the application for review was dismissed. It is that order that is challenged in this appeal.

7. Thus, we are satisfied that no ground is made out for interference with the order of the High Court challenged in this appeal. The order of the High Court is confirmed and this appeal is dismissed.
Food Corporation Of India vs M/S Laxmi Cattle Feed Industries

The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:-

Corporation, Amritsar. On 16.2.1982 a telegram was issued by the Senior Regional Manager of the appellant-Corporation, Punjab Region requesting the respondent to immediately lift the balance stocks from Jalandhar Depot latest by 5th March, 1985 failing which, it was mentioned the stocks would be disposed of at the respondent's risk as per the terms indicated in the contract. A suit was filed by the respondent which was numbered as Suit No.310 of 1985 for recovery of Rs.99,900/- from the appellant alleging breach of contract. On 15.1.1986 written statement was filed substantially denying the allegations. It is to be noted that the plaintiff-respondent did not tender any evidence and evidence was led only by the appellant-Corporation. The Trial Court decreed the suit holding that the appellant had committed breach of the contract in refunding the balance of amount and not supplying the goods to the entire extent for which the bid was submitted by the plaintiff-respondent. Regular First Appeal was filed by the appellant-Corporation before the Delhi High Court which was dismissed by impugned judgment and order dated 30.1.2003 upholding the judgment and decree of the Trial Court.

(G) The buyer will make his own arrangements for transport and will not be entitled to claim any facility or assistance for transport from the Food Corporation of India. The things shall be placed at Food Corporation of India's cost by godown labour on buyer's trucks at the godown rates, or wagons of godowns labour or buyer will be responsible for subsequent handling including stacking of bags in the trucks/wagons."

Above being the position, the judgment and decree of the trial Court as affirmed by the High Court cannot be sustained, and are set aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
M.P. Housing Board & Anr vs Manoj Shrivastava

The Respondent was appointed on daily wages as a Sub-Engineer (Civil) on or about 7.4.1995. On the premise that his services may be terminated, he filed a writ petition whereupon by an order dated 25.4.2000, the High Court directed the Appellant Board to consider his case in the light of the purported circulars issued by the State Government for scrutiny of the daily rated employees. Upon the said direction, a scrutiny committee was appointed which found that there had been no vacancy nor there existed any sanctioned post. The Committee prior to coming to the aforementioned opinion gave an opportunity of hearing to the Respondent. He thereafter filed an application before the Labour Court purported to be in terms of Section 31(3) read with Section 64-A of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for short "the 1960 Act") praying that he be classified in the permanent category on the ground that he had satisfactorily worked for more than six months and, thus, became eligible therefor as provided under Clause 2(i) of the Standard Standing Orders. The Labour Court by an order dated 22.1.2002 allowed the said application holding:

An appeal was preferred thereagainst by the Appellants before the Industrial Court, Jabalpur and by an order dated 16.10.2003, the same was dismissed. A writ petition filed by the Appellant was also dismissed. By reason of the impugned judgment, the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the Appellant has also been dismissed.

The Appellant Board was constituted under M.P. Grih Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972 ('1972 Act'). Indisputably, the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by a statute. The State of Madhya Pradesh enacted the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 with a view to regulate the relations of employers and employees in certain matters, to make provisions for settlement of industrial disputes and to provide for matters connected therewith. In the year 1961, the State of Madhya Pradesh also enacted the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 (for short "the 1961 Act") to provide for rules defining with sufficient precision certain matters relating to the conditions of employment of employees in the State of Madhya Pradesh.

For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The order of the Labour Court will stand set aside. However, in the facts and circumstance of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
The Haryana State Agricultural ... vs Subhash Chand & Anr

After termination of his services, the appellant raised an industrial dispute. The Government of Haryana made a reference thereof purported to be in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 10(1) (c) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (herein after referred to as 'the Act') to the Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Panipat. It was registered as Reference No. 383 of 2000. Both parties filed their respective written statements before the Labour Court.

*** *** ***

(d) for patently false reasons;

In view of the aforementioned definitions of the expressions 'status' and 'privilege' it must be held that such 'status' and 'privilege' must emanate from a statute. If legal right has been derived by the respondent herein to continue in service in terms of the provisions of the Act under which he is governed, then only, the question of depriving him of any status or privilege would arise. Furthermore, it is not a case where the respondent had worked for years. He has only worked, on his own showing, for 356 days whereas according to the appellant he has worked only for 208 days. Therefore, Fifth Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has no application in the instant case. In view of the above, the dispensing with of the engagement of the respondent cannot be said to be unwarranted in law.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The Award of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court is set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
Branch Manager, M.P. State Agro ... vs Shri S.C. Pandey

The respondent herein was temporarily appointed as a Typist. He was appointed by the Branch Manager, Morena Branch of the appellant whereafter intimation thereto was given to the Regional Manager, stating:

He appears to have been appointed an daily wages. His services were terminated by an order dated 18.7.1987 with immediate effect by the Regional Manager on the ground that his services were no longer required.

On or about 23.8.1987, assailing the said order of termination, he filed an application before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. 2, Gwalior wherein an interim order was passed not to remove him from services. Although, the order had been given effect to, but in view of the said interim order, he was allowed to continue in service.

An appeal preferred by the appellant herein against the said order before the Tribunal was dismissed inter alia on the ground that the respondent was accepted as a working staff in the Morena Office and he had been transferred to Gwalior by an order of the Regional Manager himself.

The writ petition filed by the appellant-Corporation herein before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior was also dismissed. The High Court applied the principles contained in Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act and opined that the termination of services of the respondent was illegal.

In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we, therefore, of the opinion that interest of justice would be sub-served if, in place of directing reinstatement of the services of the respondent, the appellant is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- by way of compensation to him. It is directed accordingly. The orders under challenge are set aside. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions and observations.

There shall be no order as to costs.
State Of U.P vs Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava & Ors

The Appellant filed his show cause to the charges on or about 17.08.1998. He was asked to disclose the name of his witness and the documents upon which he intends to rely upon. In the said departmental inquiry, the Appellant intended to engage a lawyer, which was declined, inter alia, on the ground that the department did not engage any lawyer and the charges levelled against him were simple in nature. The Lok Ayukta took over upon himself the burden of conducting the disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant himself as the Appellant contended that no outsider should be appointed as an Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer noticed the dilatory tactics adopted by the Appellant. He had been raising new contentions from time to time. One Shri J.C. Upreti, who was the Deputy Secretary of the Office of the Lok Ayukta, at all material times, was examined on 14.10.1998. The Appellant did not cross-examine him as his request to adjourn the proceeding was declined. The Appellant did not examine himself despite several opportunities given to him. The Appellant had raised a contention of bias against the Lok Ayukta himself. The said contention as also the other contentions raised by the Appellant was dealt with by the Lok Ayukta in his report dated 13.11.1998 holding him guilty of both the charges :

Presumably in this view of the matter alone, the High Court did not go into the questions in details. In fact from the impugned judgment it does not appear that the arguments which have been advanced before us were in fact pressed.

The High Court while accepting that the appellant was rightly held to be guilty of the charges of misconduct, therefore, committed a manifest error in interfering with the quantum of punishment.

It is now well-settled that principles of law that the High Court or the Tribunal in exercise of its power of judicial review would not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment. Doctrine of proportionality can be invoked only under certain situations. It is now well-settled that the High Court shall be very slow in interfering with the quantum of punishment, unless it is found to be shocking to one's conscience.

While saying so, we are not oblivious of the fact that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in Civil Appeal No.7359 of 2003, which is dismissed and Civil Appeal No.7358 is allowed. No costs.
Sunila Jain vs Union Of India & Anr

The statement of the husband of the appellant (the detenu) in terms of Section 108 of the Customs Act was recorded. Another statement of his was recorded under the said provision on 30th January, 2003. He was also arrested on the said date. An application for bail was moved by him before the Special Economic Offences Court on the said date itself, the contents whereof are as under:

The detaining authority passed an order of detention against the detenu on 12.6.2003. Questioning the said order of detention, a writ petition praying for issuance of habeas corpus was moved before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. By reason of the impugned judgment the said writ petition has been dismissed. Before the High Court principally two contentions were raised on behalf of the detenu. (1) A copy of the application for bail having not been supplied by the detaining authority, the impugned order of detention is vitiated in law; and (2) In view of the fact that the licence granted in favour of the said firm was suspended, the question of passing an order of detention for preventing the detenu from carrying out the activities which could be detrimental to the provisions of the Customs Act did not arise. Both the contentions have been rejected by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment.

It is not disputed before us and furthermore it would appear from the impugned judgment of the High Court that the order of bail passed by the learned magistrate as also the order of remand were furnished to the detenu.

The question as to whether an offence is bailable or not is not a vital fact whereupon an order of bail can be passed. Application of mind to the averments made in a bail application may be relevant where the grounds stated therein reveal certain facts which are vital for passing an order of detention. In a case of such nature, it may be said the application for bail was necessary to be placed before the detaining authority and non-furnishing a copy thereof to the detenu would vitiate the order of detention.

We do not think that the aforementioned enunciation of law is of universal application. We would deal with this aspect of this matter a little later.

The bail petition filed by the detenu therein contained material facts which were required to be taken into consideration by the detaining authority. Such is not the case here.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the present appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.