L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Divisional Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C vs H. Amaresh

The Disciplinary Authority, after perusing the details of the inquiry proceedings, replied to the respondent to the Articles of Charge and other available material, agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and dismissed the respondent from service. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the respondent raised an industrial dispute under Section 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Court, Gulbarga to which the Corporation replied.

The Labour Court, by its Award dated 17.12.1996, held that out of 4 charges levelled against the respondent, the 4th charge regarding pilferage against the respondent stood proved. As regards punishment, dismissal from service was substituted with reinstatement and 75% backwages. Aggrieved by the award dated 17.12.1996, the appellant-Corporation filed the writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. The learned Single Judge, by his order dated 11.09.2000, upheld the findings of the Labour Court but modified the back-wages and reduced it to 25%.

For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal filed by the appellant-Corporation and set aside the orders passed by the Labour Court, learned Single Judge and also of the Division Bench as perverse and are against the proved facts and circumstances of the case. No costs.
State Of Gujarat & Ors vs Vali Mohmed Dosabhai Sindhi

The factual controversy lies within a very narrow compass. The respondent was appointed as an unarmed Police Constable on 3.10.1947. At the time of appointment his year of birth was mentioned as 1923. On this basis he was to retire with effect from 1.11.1981 on reaching the age of 58 years. Accordingly, order dated 16.2.1981 was passed by the concerned Authority. It was indicated to the respondent that he will be retiring with effect from 1.11.1981. On receiving the order, he submitted an application for making a change of his date of birth in the service record. According to him, he was born in the year 1928 and not in 1923. Since the prayer was not accepted, he filed a writ petition. Though prayer for interim relief i.e. to stay operation of the order dated 16.2.1981 was made, no interim direction was given and he retired from service reaching the age of superannuation with effect from 1.11.1981. The writ petition was allowed by order dated 30.4.1993 and it was held that the he was to retire in the year 1986 with effect from 1.11.1986. Accordingly, direction was given to the respondents in the writ petition to pay the arrears for the period from 1.11.1981 to 1.11.1986.

Learned Single Judge held that the school leaving certificate produced by the respondent deserved acceptance and on that basis he ought to have been continued till 1.11.1986. It was observed that the correctness of the school leaving certificate on which the respondent based his claim was not doubted as no counter affidavit was filed. Accordingly, the Writ Petition was allowed by order dated 30.4.1993.

The appellant preferred an LPA before the High Court which was dismissed so far as the date of controversy is concerned. However the arrears were directed not to be paid. All other salary benefits were directed to be given.

In the instant case the Rules referred to above clearly indicate the permissible area for correction of date of birth. In view of the specific provisions made, it was not permissible to effect any change.

The inevitable conclusion is that the order of learned Single Judge and impugned judgment of the Division Bench affirming it cannot be sustained. Both the orders are set aside. The appeal is allowed but without any orders as to costs.
South Eastern Coalfields Ltd vs Prem Kumar Sharma & Ors

Since the sub-Divisional officer held that he was entitled to employment, a writ petition was filed by the appellant before the High Court. The High Court held that since the land of the respondent No. 1 had been acquired, he was entitled for compensatory appointment. The High Court gave the following directions:

(iii) For the purpose of employment the Unit will be land-owner/Raiyat whose title appears in the record of rights of the particular village and will include his direct linear dependent.

Above being the legal position, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were not justified in giving impugned directions. Their orders are accordingly set aside. Appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
S. Sudershan Reddy & Ors vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding the conviction of the four appellants under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and sentence of imprisonment for life as awarded by learned Principal Sessions Judge, Kurnool.

Accusations which led to trial of the appellants was that on 27.4.1999 at about 8.30 p.m. they caused homicidal death of one Khaja Saheb (hereinafter referred to as the 'Deceased') by hacking and stabbing with sickles and knives.

In order to establish the guilt of the appellants, the prosecution examined 10 witnesses, proved 15 documents and exhibited 10 M.Os. Of the 10 witnesses examined, PWs.1, 2, 3 and 4 were cited as eye witnesses. PW1 did not support the prosecution case in full. Therefore, the prosecution cross- examined him. PW2 did not support the prosecution case at all. Mala Venkateswarulu the (PW4) auto rickshaw driver though initially supported the prosecution case in full, made a volte-face and totally resiled from his earlier version when he was recalled for further cross-examination by the defence a month after his initial examination. He was at that stage cross-examined by the prosecution.

On the contrary, stand of the State was that in the Ex. P1, complaint which was lodged immediately after the occurrence, name of PW3 as an eye witness was mentioned. Though PWs 1, 2 and 4 did not support the prosecution version, on a close reading of their evidence it is clear that the version of PW 3 is established. Further PW4 who was examined on 1.11.2001 fully supported the prosecution version. He was cross-examined by the defence. Strangely after about the month of the said cross examination, an application was filed without indicating any reason to recall him for further cross examination. The trial court without assigning any reason permitted further cross examination in which he substantially departed from what he had stated earlier.

The High Court after analyzing the evidence in detail concurred with the findings of the trial court and upheld with the conviction and sentence.

Appeal is dismissed. Looked at from any angle, the judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.
Onkar Nath Mishra & Ors vs State (Nct Of Delhi) & Anr

3. A few facts, leading to the present proceedings and necessary to dispose of the appeal are:

was registered on 4.4.1995, wherein date and hours of occurrence was mentioned as 5.12.1993 to 12.8.1994. Before the registration of the F.I.R., another statement of the complainant was recorded wherein she alleged misbehaviour on the part of her father-in-law, appellant No. 1. In the said statement, she stated that, my father-in-law and sister-in-law clearly warned him that till the time I will not bring Rs.50,000/- cash and V.C.R. they will not keep me. She also alleged that when she asked for return of the Stridhan, they refused to return the same with fraudulent intentions. After investigation by the CAW Cell, the charge-sheet was filed on 15.7.1995. In the charge-sheet, it has been recorded that despite issue of notice under Section 160 Cr.P.C. to the complainant and her father by the ASI, neither the complainant nor her father turned up to take back her Stridhan , which was alleged to be with the appellants. It has been noted that the complainant does not want to take back her Stridhan.

7. Against the said order, the State preferred Revision Petition to the Sessions Court. Vide order dated 24.1.1998, the Additional Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that a prima facie case under Sections 498A and 406 I.P.C. was made out against all the appellants. Accordingly, he directed the trial court to proceed with the case against all the appellants under Sections 498A/406/34 I.P.C. and frame the charges accordingly.

8. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed a Criminal Revision Petition before the High Court. As noted above, the said Revision Petition was dismissed. It is this order of the High Court, which is questioned in this appeal.

13. Then again in State of Maharashtra and others Vs. Som Nath Thapa and others , a three judge Bench of this Court, after noting three pairs of sections viz. (i) Sections 227 and 228 insofar as sessions trial is concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 relatable to trial of warrant cases; and (iii) Sections 245 (1) and (2) qua trial of summons cases, which dealt with the question of framing of charge or discharge, stated thus:

20. Consequently, we allow the appeal partly; quash the charge framed against all the appellants under Section 406 I.P.C.; quash the charge framed against appellant Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 498A I.P.C. and dismiss the appeal of appellant No. 3 against framing of charge under Section 498A I.P.C. Needless to add that the trial court shall now proceed with the trial untrammeled by any observation made by the Additional Sessions Judge and upheld by the High Court in the impugned order or by us in this judgment.
Government Of Karnataka & Ors vs Smt. Gowramma And Ors

3. Plaintiffs, who are the respondents in the present appeal filed a Suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.1,47,965.20 on the ground that being owners of the Trees which were transported to the Government godown on the basis of the permission granted by the present appellants, the value of the Trees has to be paid by the government.

4. The case of the plaintiff, as culled out from the averments in the plaint is that they are the owners of the suit schedule property. The plaintiffs and their predecessor had drown silver wood, jungle wood and other varieties of trees in the schedule land by spending lot of money and had cultivated the said land with coffee crop. In order to regulate the shade in the schedule property and also for cutting and felling of silver wood, jungle wood and other trees, the plaintiffs had applied for permission for cutting and felling of the silver wood, jungle wood and other trees. Before granting the felling permission of the said trees, a joint survey was carried out by the forest authorities as well as the revenue surveyors. Thereafter, the second defendant granted permission for felling of the trees situated in the schedule properties. In terms of the permission, the plaintiffs cut and felled the trees. While issuing the transport permit to the plaintiffs, the second defendant had directed issuance of transport permit for a portion of the trees and ordered to transfer 1050 CFT of timber valued at Rs.1,31,250/- to an earmarked forest depot. The firewood of 22-1/2 meters valued at Rs.10,000/- was also transported to the same depot. Therefore, the claim was made that the plaintiffs are entitled to the value of the Timber @ Rs.125/- per CFT and At Rs.150/- per CFT at the prevailing rates. Defendants took the stand that the permission was conditional and there was never any challenge to the conditional permission granted. After having accepted the permission with the conditions stipulated, it was not open to the plaintiffs to lay a claim for the value of the trees. The Trial Judge dismissed the Suit, inter alia, holding that in the absence of a challenge to the conditional permission, there was no question of the plaintiff's making a claim for value of the timber transported.

14. As noted above, there was no challenge to the conditions stipulated and it was accepted that the trees were reserved trees. What is the effect of this admission, was not examined by the High Court. Therefore, looked at from any angle, the judgment of the High Court is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. The appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.
Union Of India vs Smt. Sadhana Khanna

3. The facts of the case are that the respondent joined the Central Secretariat Service on 13.7.1983 after passing Assistants Grade Examination held in October, 1981. The respondent was allocated to the finance cadre comprising the Ministry of Finance.

4. After completion of eight years of regular service in the grade of Assistant, the respondent was granted a short-term promotion to the grade of Section Officer on 24.7.1991. The respondent continues to work in this post till date.

7. The grievance of the respondent was that her juniors were included in the select list but her name was not so included. Hence, she filed an O.A. before the Central Administrative Tribunal.

8. In the counter affidavit filed before the Tribunal the appellant herein (respondent before the Tribunal) alleged that the respondent was not eligible for inclusion in the Select List of 1991, since on 1.7.1991 she was short of the minimum eligibility service requirement of eight years by twelve days. The respondent joined as Assistant on 13.7.1983 and as such she could not be placed on the select list.

10. The appellant filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court which was dismissed and hence this appeal.

12. In view of the above there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed.
Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras vs M/S Lucas T.V.S. Ltd. Padi Chennai

3. These appeals relate to assessment years 1989-90, 1991- 92 and 1992-93. The core issue is the allowability of investment allowance under Section 32A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short the Act). The assessing officer was of the view that it is only to be allowed in one assessment year and not several assessment years. The Tribunal and the High Court appear to have proceeded on the basis that in view of Section 43A(1) of the Act the allowance was to be granted in different assessment years.

(b) The balance of investment allowance, if any, still outstanding to the amalgamating company in respect of such ship, aircraft, machinery or plant, shall be allowed to the amalgamated company in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3), so, however, that the total period for which the balance of investment allowance shall be carried forward in the assessments of the amalgamating company and the amalgamated company shall not exceed the period of eight years specified in sub-section (3) and the amalgamated company shall be treated as the assessee in respect of such ship, aircraft, machinery or plant, for the purposes of this section.

(ii) All the liabilities of the firm relating to the business immediately before the succession become the liabilities of the company; and

(iii) All the shareholders of the company were partners of the firm immediately before the succession.

7. In that view of the matter, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court, remit the matter to it for fresh adjudication after formulating the question of law involved.

8. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs.
Balasubramanian & Ors vs Ramaiah Thondaman

2) Brief facts of the case are as follows:

4) The trial Court decreed the suit on 15.10.1982. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant filed appeal in A.S. No. 146 of 1982 before the lower Appellate Court. By judgment dated 05.08.1983 on consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. Questioning the same, the plaintiff filed a Second Appeal No. 45 of 1985 before the High Court. The High Court accepted the case of the plaintiff, set aside the judgment of the lower Appellate Court and allowed the second appeal. In the meanwhile, the defendant passed away and his LRs filed the above civil appeal before this Court. The only respondent though duly served notice from this Court has not chosen to contest the appeal.

10) In the light of the above conclusion, we set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 22.03.2001 made in Second Appeal No. 45 of 1985 and confirm the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court dated 05.08.1983 passed in Appeal Suit No. 146 of 1982. The civil appeal is allowed. No costs.
Magna Publishers Co. Ltd. & Ors vs Shilpa S. Shetty

3. A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice:

4. The respondent filed a suit claiming that she is a film actress of good standing. Certain articles were published in the magazine published by the appellants called Stardust. A suit for damages of Rs.20 crores alleging that the articles are defamatory in nature and would affect her career and for injunction restraining the appellants from publishing defamatory articles was filed. Notice of motion for interim injunction was taken out. Learned Single Judge was of the prima facie view that the articles deal with the personal life and are defamatory in nature and granted interim injunction. The interim injunction reads as follows:

9. There were certain other stands relating to lack of pleadings about the reputation and character. The Division Bench found that also to be without substance. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

11. We find that the matter relates to an interim order and while granting leave, the prayer for grant of interim relief was refused. In other words, interim order passed by learned Single Judge as upheld by the Division Bench continues to be operative. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we think it proper to dispose of the appeal without interference. We, however, request the High Court to explore the possibility of early disposal of the suit No.36/2001.

12. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Union Of India (Uoi) vs Smt. Sadhana Khanna

3. The facts of the case are that the respondent joined the Central Secretariat Service on 13.7.1983 after passing Assistants Grade Examination held in October, 1981. The respondent was allocated to the finance cadre comprising the Ministry of Finance.

4. After completion of eight years of regular service in the grade of Assistant, the respondent was granted a short-term promotion to the grade of Section Officer on 24.7.1991. The respondent continues to work in this post till date.

7. The grievance of the respondent was that her juniors were included in the select list but her name was not so included. Hence, she filed an O.A. before the Central Administrative Tribunal.

8. In the counter affidavit filed before the Tribunal the appellant herein (respondent before the Tribunal) alleged that the respondent was not eligible for inclusion in the Select List of 1991, since on 1.7.1991 she was short of the minimum eligibility service requirement of eight years by twelve days. The respondent joined as Assistant on 13.7.1983 and as such she could not be placed on the select list.

10. The appellant filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court which was dismissed and hence this appeal.

12. In view of the above there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed.
Reserve Bank Of India vs M.Hanumaiah & Ors

The facts and circumstances in which the question arises are brief and simple and may be stated thus :

the Registrar may, after giving the committee an opportunity to state its objections, if any, by order in writing remove the said committee, and appoint an administrator to manage the affairs of the society for such period, not exceeding [six months], as may be specified by the Registrar. The Registrar may for the reasons to be recorded in writing extend the period of such appointment for a further period of six months at a time and in any case such extension shall not exceed one year in aggregate.

(iii) the continuance of the banking company is prejudicial to the interests of its depositors.

In light of the discussions made above, both the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench appear quite untenable. Both the orders are accordingly set aside. However, since the matter has become quite old it needs to be clarified that the order of supersession passed by the Registrar on January 31, 2002 shall not be automatically revived but in case the Reserve Bank of India is of the opinion that the situation so warrants it may issue a fresh requisition to the Registrar Cooperative Societies, Karnataka, who would on that basis pass the order of supersession as held in the judgment.

The appeal is, accordingly, allowed but with no order as to costs.
Shashi Aggarwal & Ors. Etc vs A.K. Aggarwal & Ors. Etc

As will be evident from the cause title of the said pending suits, the subject-matter of the said seven suits involve the affairs of the Vinedale Distilleries Ltd. between the persons in management. It appears that at one point of time there was a dispute regarding the management between two groups of the aforesaid company and various suits which were pending between them were transferred by this Court by its order dated 10th December 1993 passed in T.P.(C)No.304/93 etc. to the High Court of Delhi for disposal. In the order it was specified that the Chief Justice of the High Court would pass appropriate T.P.(C)No.845/06 .... (Contd.)

T.P.(C)No.845/06 .... (Contd.)

The transfer petition is allowed accordingly. Any interim orders passed by this Court shall stand vacated.
Oriental Bank Of Commerce vs Sunder Lal Jain & Anr

3. The respondents Sunder Lal Jain & another were sanctioned credit facility for Rs.20 lakhs on 12.12.1996. The respondent defaulted in repayment of the amount and their account was declared as NPA on 31.3.2001. On 21.2.2002, the appellant Oriental Bank of Commerce filed a petition against the respondents being O.A. No.21 of 2002 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal-III, Delhi (for short the DRT). The DRT passed a decree in favour of the appellant for recovery of Rs.20,27,862/- along with interest on 14.11.2003. The appellant initiated execution proceedings for recovery of the amount from the respondents and a recovery certificate was issued on 8.12.2003. The respondents did not file any appeal challenging the decree passed by the DRT. Instead, the respondents filed WP(C) No.559 of 2005 and WP(C) No.560 of 2004 before Delhi High Court praying that a direction be issued to the appellant, Oriental Bank of Commerce, to declare their account as NPA from 31.3.2000 and apply RBI Guidelines for reconciliation and settling the accounts with them. The petitions were disposed of by a short order on 17.8.2005 which reads as under :-

(iii) Payment The amount of settlement arrived at in both the above cases, should preferably be paid in one lump sum. In cases where the borrowers are unable to pay the entire amount in one lump sum, at least 25% of the amount of settlement should be paid upfront and the balance amount of 75% should be recovered in instalments within a period of one year together with interest at the existing Prime Lending Rate from the date of settlement up to the date of final payment.

11. In view of the discussions made above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order dated 17.8.2005 passed by the High Court is set aside. The appellant will be entitled to its costs.