L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Bihar State Electy Board & Ors vs M/S. Bhola Ram Steel Pvt.Ltd & Ors

2. The appeal has been preferred aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in the writ petition and the appeal, thereby quashing the demand raised by the appellant for the year 1999-2000. M/s. Bhola Ram Steel Pvt. Ltd. filed a writ application that it was an industrial unit to manufacture iron and steel structure and section like bar roll, place angle, channel, square, tor and round, general fabrication and annulling of sheets it applied as HTIS consumer for a connected load of 500 KVA. The competent authority sanctioned a load of 500 KVA vide letter dated 24.2.1998. The respondent-industry commenced production w.e.f. 28.3.1998. The appellant averred that on 23.1.1999 the premises of the respondent were inspected. Connected load was found to be 495 HP. Appellant submitted that as per the Industrial Policy of 1995 announced by the State Government, Resolution dated 3.9.1996 was passed by the Energy Department of the State Government to grant exemption from payment of minimum guarantee charges to the industrial unit having connected load of 500 KVA and accordingly in exercise of power under section 78 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 issued directives to the Electricity Board for grant of such incentives. The industrial units commencing production between 1.4.1993 and 31.8.2000 were to be exempted from payment of minimum guarantee charges for a period of 5 years from the date of commencement of production.

3. The maximum demand indicator in the Trivector meter had wrongly shown more than the contracted demand of 500 KVA. The industry also submitted that the meter stopped functioning in the month of January, 2000. It was replaced on 9.2.2000, again the meter was found to be faulty and again replaced on 21.3.2000. Thus the readings of the meter could not be relied upon.

4. The impugned bill was served on the respondent in May, 2000 which had been questioned in the writ application filed by the industry.

5. It was contended on behalf of the Electricity Board that an agreement entered into on 2.3.1988 for a contract demand of 500 KVA. Appellant installed transformer of 750 KVA. During the financial year 1999-2000 i.e. from April, 1999 to March, 2000 maximum demand of the respondent has exceeded the contract demand of 500 KVA in as many as six months. In the month of March, 2000, maximum demand reached all time high of 621.06 KVA. Since it was more than 110% of the existing contract demand of 500 KVA the contract demand as per clause 16.5 of the tariff notification dated 21.6.1993 has been taken to be 621.06 KVA.

17. In the circumstances we have no hesitation in setting aside the orders passed by the Single Bench and Division Bench of the High Court. The impugned demand is held to be legal and valid. Let the outstanding amount calculated as on today, be paid as per norms of the Board within a period of six weeks from today. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and orders are set aside and writ petition is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.
M/S. Kothari Industrial Corp. Ltd vs Tamilnadu Electricity Board & Anr

The appellant in C.A.No.9748 of 2003 M/s. Kothari Industrial Corporation Ltd. had proposed to set up a caustic soda manufacturing unit at Manali in the State of Tamil Nadu. As the manufacturing process involved high consumption of electrical power, the appellant applied for concessional tariff which was promised to it by a Government Letter dated 29.6.1976 for first five years after commencement of production. In the said letter it was specifically mentioned that the rate at which the appellants were required to pay tariff would be below the rate applicable to the other two established caustic soda units in the State for the first three years and thereafter the rates will be at par with that of the other two units in the State.

Admittedly the unit of the appellant had started commercial production with effect from January, 1979. On 23.2.1979 the Tamil Nadu Revision of Tariff Rates on supply of Electrical Energy Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) came into force.

These are questions that must be left to the State and not to the Courts to decide.

16. In the light of the above, even the contentions on the merits of the decision as advanced by the appellants are not tenable so as to invalidate the action(s) impugned in the present cases.

17. For the aforesaid reasons all the appeals are without any merit and are accordingly dismissed.

JANUARY 29, 2016.
Educational Society, Tumsar And Ors vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors

Services of respondent No. 4 were terminated by the appellants-society. This termination order was challenged by respondent No. 4 by filing an appeal in the School Tribunal, Nagpur which was pleased to set aside the termination with direction to reinstate respondent No. 4 and also pay back wages for the intervening period. Order of the School Tribunal was upheld by the High Court as the appellants and respondent No. 4 entered into a settlement whereby the appellants agreed to abide by the same. As per the direction of the School Tribunal, which has attained finality, respondent No. 4 is to be paid back wages. The issue is as to who is to ultimately bear this financial burden, namely, whether appellants are supposed to pay the back wages to respondent No. 4 out of its own pocket or is it to come from the coffers of the State which is granting financial aid to the school.

The detailed factual backdrop in which the said issue has come up for discussion needs to be traversed at this stage:

On 28.04.2011, the termination order was challenged by the respondent No. 4 before the School Tribunal, Nagpur. The School Tribunal, Nagpur was pleased to set aside the said termination order in Appeal No. A- 56/2010 with a direction to reinstate the respondent No. 4 and pay back wages. The relevant portion of the direction given by the School Tribunal in this behalf reads as under:

It is in this backdrop that the issue formulated above has to be decided in the present appeal.

For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with the orders passed by the High Court in the facts of the present case. The appeal is, thus, devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed.

FEBRUARY 01, 2016.
State Of U.P.& Ors vs Ravindra Kumar Sharma & Ors

2. The question involved in the appeal is as to the right of the appellant to verify the disability certificates issued by the Medical Board under the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Rules, 1996. The respondents applied for BTC training course under the physically handicapped category on the basis of certificates issued under the aforesaid Rules. It was claimed that they completed the training and had been offered appointment in the primary schools run and managed by the State Government. Complaint was received from Bhartiya Viklang Sangh of illegal usurpation of the quota reserved for handicapped persons on the basis of fraudulently procured certificates without suffering from the disability certified under the Rules of 1996. The State Government issued an order dated 3.11.2009 making a provision for constitution of fresh Medical Board in order to verify and assess the disability of the candidates. The candidates questioned communication dated 15.7.2010 issued by the Director, State Council for Educational Research & Training based upon the G.O. dated 3.11.2009 requiring them to appear before the Medical Board constituted in order to assess the disability. Out of the 234 candidates selected under the handicapped category on being examined by the Medical Board it was found that 21% of the candidates were not handicapped.

12. In the circumstance we set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition. However before taking any action against the individuals they shall be issued show cause in the matter and thereafter decision will be rendered in accordance with law. Let this exercise be completed within a period of four months. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Narayanrao Jagobaji Gawande Pub.Trust vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

On 11.11.1968, Mr. Narayanrao Gawande applied to respondent no.2-NIT for the development of his said open space land and gave an undertaking whereby he agreed to have the layout of the land formed as per the plans, suggestions and directions of respondent no.2-NIT. In this connection, a development agreement was executed on the same day between Narayanrao Gawande and the NIT, whereby NIT permitted him to develop the said land in a planned way in accordance with the approved scheme and as per the sanctioned layout plan. In the said layout plan, an area was reserved for primary school, which was a public utility land.

The findings recorded on the relevant contentious issues by the High Court in the impugned judgment with cogent and valid reasons are legal and justifiable. Therefore, we do not find any valid reason, whatsoever, to interfere with the said impugned judgment and order as the same, in our opinion, is a well-considered and reasoned decision. The same does not suffer from erroneous reasoning or error in law which requires interference by this Court.

For the reasons stated supra, the civil appeals are dismissed. The order dated 01.10.2009 granting status quo shall stands vacated.

…………………………………………………………J. [V. GOPALA GOWDA] ……………………………………………………….J. [AMITAVA ROY] New Delhi, February 4, 2016 ITEM NO.1B-For Judgment COURT NO.9 SECTION IX S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal 870/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 25972/2009 NARAYANRAO JAGOBAJI GAWANDE PUB.TRUST Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. Respondent(s) WITH C.A. No. 871/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 25821/2008 C.A. No. 872/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 25841/2009 C.A. No. 876-877/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s).25923-25924/2008 C.A. No. 873/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 427/2009 C.A. No. 874/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 1223/2009 C.A. No. 875/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 10246/2009 Date : 04/02/2016 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal,Adv.

Mr. Manish Pitale, Adv.

Ms. Deeplaxmi S. Matwankar, Adv.

Mr. Chander Shekhar Ashri,Adv.

Mr. Shivaji M. Jadhav,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amitava Roy.

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed Non-Reportable Judgment.

The order dated 01.10.2009 granting status quo shall stands vacated.

(Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
Suresh Narayan Kadam & Ors vs Central Bank Of India & Ors

5. With this prologue, it is necessary to state the facts of the dispute before us. The Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) had constructed some buildings for the lower and middle income groups in a complex known as Samata Nagar, Kandivli, Mumbai. Each building had twenty flats. The Central Bank of India (for short ‘the Bank’) took possession of the land and ten such buildings on 16th August, 1982 with the intention of housing the families of a total of 200 employees. Pursuant thereto, the Bank issued Circulars on 15th September, 1982 and 25th May, 1983 relating to the policy of allotment of the flats to its Class III and Class IV employees.

7. The Circular dated 25th May, 1983 made some minor modifications in the eligibility for allotment but the sum and substance, as far as the present proceedings are concerned, remained more or less the same.

“(i) 49 employees (sub staff) are occupying units spread over several buildings. Though most of the units are vacant, as some of the units are occupied, the Bank is not in a position to demolish the buildings and take up development work which it proposes. In the circumstances, out of the 49 employees, those who are allottees of quarters, will be shifted by the Bank to one or two buildings so that the Bank will be able to demolish the other buildings and take up the development.

(ii) It is made clear that if any family members of deceased allottees (who have been given compassionate appointment) are continuing in such units, they will not be entitled to alternative accommodation. Such occupants will have to vacate.

(iii) The Bank will, in the meanwhile, continue its efforts to identify alternative premises for those who are being shifted to the two buildings.”

20. The various clauses in the lease agreement that have been referred to do not in any manner involve the employees and for them to raise an issue about any alleged violation of the provisions of the lease deed is totally inconsequential. This is not a public interest litigation where the rule relating to standing can be relaxed. We are therefore not inclined to accept this submission of the employees that since the MHADA had leased out the land to the Bank for housing middle income group or lower income group employees, the Bank is disentitled from demolishing the buildings and constructing luxury apartments for their managerial level officers.

22. Under these circumstances, we find no merit in these petitions and therefore decline to grant special leave to appeal and dismiss these petitions but with no order as to costs.

24. We may also note that the Bank has demanded damages from the employees both who are still working with the Bank and those who have retired. In our opinion, since the employees were pursuing their remedies before the High Court as well as before this Court, we do not think it appropriate to direct them to pay any damages to the Bank for the use and occupation of the premises allotted nor do we think it appropriate to permit the Bank to recover the damages awarded against the employees.
Hamant Yashwant Dhage vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

6. The appellant, in the capacity of complainant, approached the learned Judicial Magistrate F.C. Court No.2, Pune who took notice of this Court's order and issued several directions in RCC No. 0402459/2008 as is evident from its order dated February 17, 2011, including relevant directions to the investigating officer. But unfortunately the learned Judicial Magistrate came to a wrong conclusion that in the absence of any specific direction of this Court, the prayer of the complainant for registration of F.I.R. had to be rejected. The complainant then approached the High Court of Bombay through Criminal Writ Petition No. 3009 of 2011 which was disposed of by the impugned order dated February 13, 2012. The High Court declined to issue a direction for registering an F.I.R. by taking the view that it was open for the petitioner to seek clarification/modification of the order from the apex Court.

11. In our considered view, the same was the import of this Court's order passed on April 12, 2010. In the light of the said earlier order; the legal position noticed above and the stand of the parties, we have no difficulty in directing the concerned Magistrate and the police officer to rectify their mistake by ensuring registration of an appropriate F.I.R. The delay in lodging of such F.I.R. occurring after April 12, 2010 shall not have any effect on the investigation already carried out by the investigating officer(s). We also direct the police to complete the investigation fairly and in accordance with law at an early date, preferably within six months. On receipt of appropriate report from the police on conclusion of investigation, the learned Magistrate will deal with the matter strictly in accordance with law on the basis of materials available on record without being influenced by orders passed by different Courts.

12. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
State Of Maharashtra vs Syed Umar Sayed Abbas & Ors

The brief facts necessary to dispose of these appeals are that on 12.8.1995, at about 3.00 P.M., Rajendra Rajaram Gupta (deceased), who was a social worker belonging to a particular political party and had a shop in Mahim area of Mumbai, was sitting in Ganesh festival Pandal and was busy talking with one Rajaram Sarfare (PW6-injured eye-witness), who was the Contractor for decoration of the Ganesh festival Pandal. As per the prosecution story, when Rajendra Rajaram Gupta and PW-6 were talking to each other while sitting on chairs in the Pandal, two unknown persons entered the Pandal from Kapad Bazaar Road, opened fire on Rajendra Rajaram Gupta and pumped many bullets in his head, chest and various parts of his body at point blank range. Allegedly, the said two assailants were escorted by three other persons. The firing noise created commotion in the Pandal and while PW6 tried to run, he was also hit by one bullet and he fell down. The assailants managed to escape. The deceased Rajendra Rajaram Gupta was taken to Hinduja Hospital immediately, where he was declared dead on arrival. The FIR came to be immediately lodged at 4:15 P.M. by one eyewitness Rajesh Tanaji Akre (PW-5), who happened to have seen the incident from the first floor gallery of his residential building which was abutting to the said Pandal.

The Trial Court convicted the accused respondents on the basis of the testimonies of five eye-witnesses - Hemant Parshuram Akre (PW1), Ganesh (PW4), Rajesh Tanaji Akre (PW5), Rajaram Sarfare (PW6) and Kishor Maniklal Damaniya (PW7), out of which PW6 was the injured eye-witness. The Trial Court found their depositions to be corroborative of each other and also in tandem with the testimonies of PW18 and PW21, the Special Executive Magistrates, who conducted the Test Identification Parade of the accused. The Trial Court held that it was conclusively established by the Test Identification Parade and eye-witness testimonies that A1 and A12 had fired on the deceased. The recovery of the weapon along with the ballistic report further strengthens the conclusion. The Trial Court found that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and hence the accused were convicted of the offences charged after being found guilty.

The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
B. Virupakshaiah vs State Of Karnataka And Ors

2. The facts of the case, as disclosed by the prosecution, are that an FIR was lodged on 22.11.2005, at Toranagallu Police Station by Sheikh Hussain Sab (PW3), stating that he and his colleague Basavana Gouda (PW2) were working as Security Guards in Aqua Minerals Factory and when they were on duty on 22.11.2005, at about 1:30 PM, while taking food they heard a bang sound from outside and immediately they went out and saw that a Bolero Jeep had dashed against Tata Indica Car on N.H. 63 in front of Acqua Minerals. They saw four unknown persons pulled out two inmates of Indica Car and assaulted on their head, face and hand with sharp edged weapons, causing heavy bleeding injuries. The four people then drove away towards Bellary. One of the deceased named Bhimaneni Kondaiah died on the spot whereas the other deceased Pavadappa died on way to the hospital.

11. Thus, in the light of the above discussion, we find no compelling and substantial reasons to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the High Court. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

…....................................J (Pinaki Chandra Ghose) …...................................J (R.K. Agrawal) New Delhi;

February 12, 2016.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose pronounced the reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.K. Agrawal.

The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
U P S R T C vs Mamta And Ors

3) In order to appreciate the short issue involved in this appeal, it is necessary to state a few relevant facts:

7) The Tribunal, by award dated 18.02.2014, partly allowed the claim petition and awarded a total sum of Rs.24,73,252/- along with interest @ 6% p.a. from date of filing till its realization to the respondents.

8) Challenging the said Award, the appellant-Corporation filed an appeal before the High Court. By impugned order dated 28.05.2014, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the award of the Tribunal.

5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.”

25) Coming now to the facts of the case in hand, we consider it appropriate to reproduce the whole order of the High Court infra:

It is for this reason, we are unable to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court.

28) The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly allowed in part. The impugned judgment is set aside.

30) However, we make it clear that we have not applied our mind to the merits of the issues involved in the case and hence the High Court would decide the appeal strictly in accordance with law on merits uninfluenced by our observations. Needless to observe, the High Court will do so after affording an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. We request the High Court to decide the appeal preferably within six months. No costs.
Shaji K Joseph vs V.Viswanath & Ors

The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that on 3rd May, 2010, the Returning Officer had published preliminary electoral roll as specified in Regulation 3(1) of the Regulations and the last date for preferring claims and objections relating to the entries or omissions in the preliminary electoral rolls was 30th July, 2010. However, the said last date was extended up to 31st August 2010. Ultimately, the Final Electoral Roll was published in the Extra-ordinary Gazette no.35 on 10th January, 2011. The election programme was notified in the Gazette on 27th January, 2011, whereby it was notified that the last date for receiving nomination papers was 7th February, 2011 and the scrutiny of the nomination papers was to take place on 9th February, 2011. The schedule prescribed the last date for withdrawal of the nomination as 16th February, 2011 and the election was to take place on 18th March, 2011. Counting was to take place on 19th March, 2011. The aforestated facts are not in dispute.

12. According to the learned counsel, the High Court had rightly intervened by setting aside the order passed by the Returning Officer of rejecting nomination paper of Respondent no.1 and therefore, the appeal deserved to be dismissed.

16. Thus, in view of the aforestated settled legal position, the High Court should not have interfered with the process of election. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and direct that the result of the election should be published. We are sure that due to interim relief granted by this Court, Respondent no.1 must not have been permitted to contest the election. It would be open to Respondent no.1 to approach the Central Government for referring the dispute, if he thinks it proper to do so. No issue with regard to limitation will be raised if Respondent no.1 initiates an action under Section 5 of the Act within four weeks from today.

17. For the aforestated reasons, we allow the appeal with no orders as to costs.

FEBRUARY 22, 2016.