L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Bank Of Patiala vs General Secretary, Staff Union And Ors

4. The facts giving rise to the litigation, in a nutshell, are as under

5. It is an admitted fact that without getting any instruction from the Branch Manager or any higher authority, the respondent godown-keeper permitted one of the borrowers, whose goods had been pledged and kept in the godown, to take away the goods with an understanding that the said borrower would replace the said goods after some time. After the borrower removed the goods, the borrower had replaced the goods with goods of an inferior quality.

9. After examining the facts of the case and considering the evidence, the Labour Court exercised its powers under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and found the punishment imposed upon the respondent- workman to be harsh and therefore, the punishment of dismissal was substituted by a punishment of stoppage of 5 increments with cumulative effect. It was further directed to reinstate the respondent godown-keeper with back wages.

12. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment as well as the report of the inquiry officer, the Award made by the Labour Court and the order passed by the learned Single Judge, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Labour Court is not proper.

19. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the judgments confirming the Award as well as the Award and we uphold the order of dismissal passed by the appellant-Bank.

20. The appeal stands disposed of as allowed with no order as to costs. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

SEPTEMBER 30, 2016.
Syeda Rahimunnisa vs Malan Bi (Dead) By Lrs. & Anr.Etc

2. Facts of the case need mention, in brief, infra to appreciate the controversy involved in the appeals.

3. These appeals involve a short point. However, in order to appreciate the point, it is necessary to mention the relevant facts infra.

4. The two appellants – Smt. Syeda Rahimunnisa and Syed Hyder Hussaini are wife and husband whereas the respondent no. 1(a) to 1(f) are the legal heirs of one late Haji Mian being mother, wife, sons and daughters respectively.

6. The appellants filed two civil suits being O.S.No. 77 of 1994 and O.S.No 65 of 1995 against Haji Mian and others. The present respondent nos. 1(a) to 1(f) who were later added as party defendants are legal representatives of Haji Mian.

7. So far as O.S. No 77 of 94 is concerned, the appellants (plaintiffs) claimed therein eviction of the respondents from the suit-land. It was alleged that appellant no. 1 being the owner of the suit-land had inducted respondent no.1 (defendant no.1) as her tenant on a monthly rent of Rs.150/- for a period of three years on the strength of lease deed dated 01.06.1982. It was alleged that contrary to lease conditions and without appellants’ consent, the respondent no.1 erected four huts and sublet to defendant nos.2 to 6 on monthly rent. It was also alleged that respondents denied appellants’ title.

8) Whether the very approach of the lower appellate Court is essentially erroneous and its findings are liable to be set aside (AIR 1992 S.C., 1604)?

27. In our considered opinion, the aforementioned questions cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being a "substantial questions of law"

36. We, however, find no error in the judgment of the first appellate court, which in our view rightly upheld the judgment and decree of the trial court.

42. In the light of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is not legally sustainable and is accordingly liable to be set aside.

43. As a consequence, these appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and the judgment/decree of the first appellate court and that of the trial court are hereby restored.

44. The respondent no.1 to pay costs quantified at Rs.10,000/- to the appellants.

October 03, 2016
Workmen Rastriya Colliery Mazdoor ... vs Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr

4 During the pendency of these proceedings an effort was made to secure an amicable resolution of the dispute, which was unsuccessful. By an order dated 28 August 2015 the management was directed to dispose of the representation submitted on behalf of the workmen on 22 August 2011. Accordingly, a reasoned order was issued on 16 September 2015 by the Project Officer. The order notes that after the Award of the Industrial Tribunal was modified by the learned Single Judge on 18 May 2004, the workmen initiated a second round of litigation only in 2011 by filing a representation on 22 August 2011 and thereafter instituting writ proceedings. The order rejecting the representation notes that the workmen had worked in 1987-1989 with a dummy contractor and nearly 26 years had elapsed since then. BCCL, it has been stated, was until recently a sick company under the BIFR and had not initiated any regular process of recruitment after the order of the learned Single Judge dated 18 May 2004. However, it has been noted that the management would make a sincere endeavour to grant preference to the 14 workmen in case any fresh recruitment is made subject to age and physical requirements being met.

8 We accordingly direct that the Respondents shall deposit with the Central Government Tribunal (No.2) at Dhanbad an amount of Rs. Two lakhs each towards compensation payable to each one of the 14 workmen. This amount shall be in full and final satisfaction of all the claims, demands and outstandings. Upon deposit of the amount, the Award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 9 September 1996, as modified by the High Court on 18 May 2004 shall be marked as satisfied. The Respondents shall deposit the amount as directed hereinabove, within a period of two months from today before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (No.2) Dhanbad in Reference 26 of 1993. The amount shall be disbursed to the workmen concerned subject to due verification of identity by the Industrial Tribunal.

9 The Civil Appeal shall stand allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.

.......................................CJI [T S THAKUR] ..............................................J [A M KHANWILKAR] ..............................................J [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD] New Delhi October 03, 2016
Anurag Kumar Singh & Ors vs State Of Uttarakhand & Ors

An advertisement was issued by the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Second Respondent’) on 19.09.2009 for appointment to the posts of Assistant Prosecuting Officers. The number of posts notified were 38. It was mentioned in the advertisement that the number of posts may be increased or decreased by the State Government. A preliminary examination was contemplated in case there were a large number of applications. It was mentioned in the advertisement that the ‘year of recruitment’ was a period of 12 months commencing from the 1st day of July of the calendar year.

As a large number of candidates applied, a preliminary examination was conducted on 31.10.2010, the result of which was declared on 04.02.2011. The Third Respondent who was an applicant filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 seeking information about the number of posts for which the preliminary examination was conducted. The Second Respondent responded stating that the number of vacancies for which the selection was being held was 74. The Third Respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital for a direction that only 38 posts of Assistant Prosecuting Officers which were advertised on 19.09.2009 should be filled up.

Thirty seven candidates were declared successful for being appointed as Assistant Prosecuting Officers by a Notification dated 26.06.2012. It is stated in the written submission filed by the First Respondent that 31 out of 37 candidates joined and were sent for training. Two candidates out of 31 resigned and the remaining 29 candidates were assigned postings as Assistant Prosecuting Officers.

For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the High Court is upheld and the Civil Appeals are dismissed.
Gov.Body,L.P Shahi College, Patna & Anr vs Seema Mishra And Ors

2. These two appeals have been filed against the judgment of the Patna High Court dated 30.06.2011 in LPA No.364 of 2008 arising out of C.W.J.C. No.8004 of 2000 wherein Division Bench of the High Court directed the appellant-L.P. Shahi College, Patna to appoint the first respondent in the College. One appeal is by the College and the other appeal by Dr. Ramdeo Prasad Sharma who was appointed as a Lecturer in the Department of Labour and Social Welfare of the appellant-College on temporary basis, on usual scale of pay and other allowances. These two appeals shall stand disposed by this common order. For convenience, we narrate the facts from the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.32203 of 2011.

5. The learned Single Judge held that the Commission intended to recommend the two names against two posts, but the aforesaid letter of recommendation was inartistically worded. The learned Single Judge directed that the first respondent be appointed to the second post of Lecturer in the Department of Labour and Social Welfare with effect from the date when Dr. Siyaram Sharma had joined the post, with notional benefits. It was further directed that the first respondent shall not be entitled to the arrears of salary or any other monetary benefits till she joins the post; however she will be entitled to the raised salary with added increments which would have fallen due to her from the date Dr. Siyaram Sharma joined till the date she joins. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the appellant-College went before the Division Bench of the High Court by way of intra-court appeal. The Division Bench upholding the order of the Learned Single Judge, held that the Commission had violated the provision of sub-Section (9) of Section 2 of the Act and had failed in its duty in not recommending the names of persons for the second post which was advertised and was available. The Division Bench, inter alia, affirmed the other directions of the Single Judge.

17. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed.

October 05, 2016
M/S Dugar Tea Industries Pvt.Ltd vs State Of Assam & Ors

2. The facts giving rise to the present litigation, in a nutshell, are as under:

3. The appellant is a private limited company engaged in the business of blending and packing of tea. After some modernisation, it commenced its production in April, 1988. The case of the appellant-Company was with regard to availing sales tax concession declared by the respondent-State. Before going through the relevant provisions, we may record the fact that the respondent-State had notified its Industrial Policy in 1982, which had thereafter been revised in 1986. The said Policy had been framed so as to increase economic and industrial growth in the State.

6. The reason for not giving the benefits under the Act, as stated by the respondent- Authorities, was that ‘tea’ was a raw material, in respect of which no exemption was to be given and the appellant-Company was merely blending and packing tea and was not having any manufacturing activity.

7. As the sales tax exemption had been denied to the appellant-Company, the appellant-Company filed petitions before the High Court challenging denial of the tax exemption but the petitions had been rejected by a common Judgment dated 9th September, 2003 and being aggrieved by the rejection of the petitions, the appellant-Company had also filed writ appeals, which have been dismissed by a common Judgment dated 14th November, 2006, and the said judgment has been challenged in these appeals.

18. Another important thing is with regard to certificate of authorisation.

23. For the aforestated reasons assigned by the State in the impugned order passed as well as in the judgments delivered by the High Court, we cannot find fault with the impugned judgment and therefore, these appeals deserve dismissal.

24. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
Kail Ltd. Formerly Kitchen Appl.(I) Ld vs State Of Kerala Tr.Jt.Commr.(Law)

d) Aggrieved by the order dated 30.09.2004, the appellant-Company approached the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (in short ‘the Tribunal’) by filing T.A. No. 736 of 2004 which was decided in favour of the appellant-Company vide order dated 12.04.2006.

e) The respondent-State, aggrieved by the abovesaid order, preferred a revision petition being ST REV No. 36 of 2007 before the Kerala High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court, vide order dated 25.05.2010, allowed the revision filed by the respondent-State holding that the appellant-Company is the brand name holder of “Sansui”. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant-Company filed a Review Petition being No. 337 of 2011 before the High Court which was dismissed vide order dated 16.08.2011.

6) The appellant-Company is a registered dealer under the KGST Act in Kerala, engaged in marketing products like television, washing machine etc. manufactured under the brand name “Sansui”. The entire products are purchased by the appellant-Company from Videocon International Ltd. In fact, Videocon International Ltd., the holding company, brings the goods to Kerala on stock transfer and the entire goods were sold to its subsidiary, the appellant-Company, for marketing in Kerala. Even though Videocon International Ltd. returned the entire sales as first sales on which they have collected tax from the subsidiary company, the appellant-Company was assessed for sales tax by the Assessing Officer while scrutinizing the second sale exemption as claimed by the appellant-Company and found that the goods in respect of which second sale exemption was claimed by the appellant-Company were goods sold under brand name “Sansui” and so much so, tax under Section 5(2) is payable by the appellant-Company. The appellant- Company opposed the same by stating that the brand name “Sansui” is owned by Sansui Electric Ltd., Japan and is not at all related to the appellant- Company. During the course of proceedings, the Assessing Officer found that the correspondence sent to the Department was in the letter head with the trademark, logo and brand name of “Sansui”. Since the products were sold under the brand name “Sansui”, assessment was made under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act after disallowing second sale exemption as claimed by the appellant-Company.

If the above three conditions are satisfied, the sale by the brand name holder or the trade mark holder shall be the first sale for the purpose of the Act.

16) In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the tax invoking Section 5(2) of the KGST Act was rightly levied on the appellant-Company for the relevant period as it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant-Company is the brand name holder of “Sansui”. We uphold the decisions rendered by the High Court in revision petition and review petition and no interference is warranted into it.

17) Above being the position, the appeals are dismissed with no order as to cost.

OCTOBER 26, 2016.
Commr.Of Commercial Tax & Ors vs M/S Bajaj Auto Ltd.& Anr

2) Civil Appeal No. 5913 of 2008 is being treated as the leading case, hence, the facts of the said appeal are given below:-

Yours faithfully Sd/-

(K.C. Parija) DEPUTY SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES: ORISSA: CUTTACK Dated: 20.11.01 Memo No. 24808/CT III(I) 207/2000 Copy forwarded to all ACCTs/All CTOs/All Addl. CTOs of Assessment Units for information and necessary action. The CTOs are requested to circulate the above clarification of Finance Deptt. to all the Addl. CTOs of their respective circles.

Dd/-

23) In view of the forgoing discussion, the impugned judgment and order dated 05.01.2007 passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. In the result, all the appeals are allowed; however, the parties shall bear their own cost.

OCTOBER 28, 2016.
Bhupinder Singh Bawa vs Asha Devi

3. The appellant controverted the claim of bona fide requirement set up by the respondent by maintaining that the son of the landlord is employed as a Director in the company M/s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Ltd. and earns Rs.50,000/- per month. The appellant further contended that respondent’s husband is running business of marble and granite from several locations in the city which can be preferably used to accommodate the business of respondent’s son. Following premises were suggested as an alternative accommodation for running sanitary and hardware business of respondent’s son: Property No. 285-B, Basai Darapur, Sharda Puri, Ring Road, New Delhi owned by husband of the respondent, Property No. A-2/53, W.H.S., Kirti Nagar, New Delhi owned by husband of the respondent, Property No. D-201, Mansarovar Garden, New Delhi owned by husband of the respondent, Property Nos. 43, 44, 45 and 46 situated at Block-A-1, W.H.S., Kirti Nagar, New Delhi owned by the company M/s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Ltd, Property No. D- 12, Rajouri Garden, Ring Road, New Delhi which is the registered office of the M/s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Ltd.

4. On a proper appreciation of facts and evidences available on record, the Additional Rent Controller vide order dated 26.02.2014 in E. No. 249/2011, passed an eviction order in favour of the respondent and directed the appellant to vacate the suit scheduled premises in accordance with law. The Additional Rent Controller held that the respondent has established that the tenanted premise is required for her dependant son and that there is no alternative vacant accommodation suitably available for her son for his business. Aggrieved thereof, the appellant filed revision petition before the High Court challenging the order of eviction passed by Additional Rent Controller. The High Court vide impugned order dismissed the revision petition holding that no case is made out to interfere with the detailed order passed by the Additional Rent Controller decreeing the eviction petition of bona fide necessity. It was held that the respondent- Landlady and her son are at liberty to decide which premise is more suitable for running business of sanitary and hardware.

13. The concurrent findings recorded by the courts below are based on evidence and materials on record, we do not find any infirmity warranting interference with the impugned judgment.

14. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Time is granted till 31st March, 2017 to the appellant to vacate the premises on filing of usual undertaking in the Registry of this Court within four weeks from today.

November 08, 2016
State Bank Of Patiala vs Mukesh Jain & Anr

2. The facts giving rise to the present litigation, in a nutshell, are as under:

3. In the said suit, the appellant filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC contending that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the provisions of Section 34 read with Section 13(2) of the Act, which prohibits a Civil Court from dealing with the matters arising under the provisions of the Act. After considering the averments made in the application as well as the reply given by respondent no.1 and upon hearing the concerned counsel, the said application had been rejected by the trial Court by an order dated 9th February, 2004.

6. In the aforestated circumstances, the trial Court was of the view that as the DRT Act had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the order passed under the provisions of the Act, a civil suit was maintainable and therefore, the application made under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC had been rejected by the trial Court. The High Court confirmed the said view of the trial Court.

27. Thus, we hold that the Debt Recovery Tribunal constituted under the DRT Act has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal as per Section 17 of the Act even if the amount involved is less than Rs.10 lakh. But, the said appellate jurisdiction need not be misunderstood with the original jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

28. For the aforestated reasons, the impugned judgment as well as the order rejecting the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 are set aside. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
Ananthesh Bhakta Reptd. By Moter Usha A ... vs Nayana S. Bhakta And Ors

3. The brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding this appeal are:

(iv) On 25.07.2005, retirement deed was executed in which Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 were stated to have retired from partnership. The partnership deed dated 05.04.2006 was entered between late M. Gangadhar Bhakta, M. Vinayaka Bhakta, Defendant No. 5 and M. Vipin Bhakta(S/o late M. Ganesh Bhakta) and Master M. Anantesh Bhakta,1st Plaintiff. M.Gangadhar Bhakta expired and his estate is represented by the Plaintiff Nos. 2 & 3.

4. The suit for partition was filed by M. Prakaschandra Bhakta and others against M. Subhaschandra Bhakta and others, being O.S. NO. 4 of 1985. The preliminary decree was passed on 31.07.1986. M. Subhaschandra Bhakta and others filed FDP No. 24 of 1992 for preparation of final decree in which the compromise petition dated 04.04.1994 was filed and compromise decree was passed on 05.04.1994. As per the compromise decree, Item No. 1 of 'A' schedule property was allotted to M. Subhaschandra Bhakta and Item No. 2 was allotted to M. Prakashchandra Bhakta.

30. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
Saheb Reddy vs Sharanappa & Ors

3. The brief facts, which are necessary for proper appreciation of the dispute among the parties, in a nutshell, are as follows:-

5. On the demise of Shri Sharnappa Gaded in the year 1957, suit properties had devolved upon his wife Smt. Sharnappa and the aforestated three daughters in equal shares and the female heirs became absolute owners of their respective shares. No partition was effected among the four sharers and in the course of time, three daughters died during the life of their mother Smt. Sharnappa, leaving behind their respective undivided share in the suit properties, which devolved upon their respective heirs.

19. In view of the aforestated legal position, upon hearing the learned counsel, we are of the view that the High Court had committed an error by setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and therefore, we set aside the impugned judgment and restore the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court.

20. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs.
E. Subbulakshmi vs Secretary To Government & Ors

1. The detenu's mother filed a writ petition in the High Court of judicature at Madras bearing H.C.P. No.117 of 2016 challenging the Detention Order N.1227/BCDFGISSSV/2015 dated 04.12.2015. The principal contention pursued before the High Court was that the typed set of booklet furnished along with the impugned detention order to the detenu was illegible, in particular, the copy of the F.I.R. in respect of Crime No.598 of 2015 dated 18th March, 2015. The High Court negatived the said contention on the finding that the detenu did not make any representation to the Appropriate Authority nor brought the said fact to the notice of the concerned authority. Further, no such plea was taken in the writ petition. Another contention raised before the High Court that the name of the Judge has not been correctly mentioned in the remand orders supplied to the detenu, has also been rejected by the High Court on the finding that the same can be no ground to quash the detention order. No other contention was pursued before the High Court.

Sd/-

Commissioner of Police Greater Chennai Police, Chennai-7 Given under my hand and seal of this office, on this 4th day of December, 2015”

14. For the above reasons, this petition must fail and is dismissed.

NOVEMBER 17, 2016.