L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
C.M.C. Ltd vs Unit Trust Of India & Ors

1. The appellant and respondent No. 1 entered into an agreement dated 23.10.1992 for a Technology Upgrade Project of the latter. The said agreement contained an arbitration clause. The same read:

2. Disputes arose between the parties. On 16.5.2002, respondent No. 1 issued a notice invoking the arbitration clause and calling upon the appellant to refer the dispute and differences to be settled through arbitration in terms of the arbitration agreement. Respondent No. 1 named an arbitrator with the suggestion that he may be accepted as the sole arbitrator. But, if the appellant was not willing to treat him as such, it was stated that the arbitrator named by respondent No. 1 may be treated as the one appointed by it in terms of the arbitration agreement and in that event, the appellant was called upon to name its arbitrator and the said two arbitrators can then appoint a Presiding arbitrator. The appellant replied stating that the parties have agreed to follow the Rules prescribed by the Indian Council of Arbitration by incorporating the said Rules by reference in the arbitration clause and since respondent No. 1 had not acted in terms of the said Rules, the appellant regretted its inability to accept the stand of respondent No. 1 or to appoint an arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement. The appellant regretted its inability to act on the basis of the notice issued by respondent No.1.

10. The appeal is thus dismissed with the above expectation. The parties are directed to suffer their respective costs.
New Delhi Municipal Council vs Pan Singh & Ors

Some other Meter Readers who were in services of the appellant at the relevant time raised an industrial dispute purported to be on the premise that they had been discriminated against. Reference was made to the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal No. 3, Delhi for determination of inter-alia the following industrial dispute:-

The respondents were appointed after 12.2.1982 i.e during the period 1.4.1982 and 3.6.1984. They filed a Writ Petition claiming parity in the matter of grant of scale of pay by filing a Writ Petition with the Awardees before the High Court of Delhi. By reason of the impugned Judgment, the said Writ Petitions have been allowed stating that although they are not covered by the Award, the appellant being model employer must treat the employees similarly situated and, thus as the respondents had passed the test in June, 1981, they could not be denied the pay scale which has been granted to them.

There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. Respondents herein filed a Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the Court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr. [2006 (12) SCALE 347] and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing Director and Another v. K. Thangappan and Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322] Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, Writ Petition should be filed within a reasonable time.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where the High Court should have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the respondents herein.

For the reasons aforementioned, impugned Judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The Appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
M/S. Sriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd vs Mahak Singh & Ors

The respondents raised a dispute relating to their retrenchment which was ultimately referred by the State Government to the Tribunal under Section 4 K of the aforesaid Act to determine as to whether the termination of the services of the workmen by the employer was just and/or illegal. Pursuant to the said References, five separate Adjudication Cases, being Nos. 134,139,132, 129 and 127 of 1995 were registered by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (V), U.P. In support of their contention that they had been illegally retrenched, the respondents submitted that not only had they worked continuously from the date of their appointment till their services were terminated, but that they had been allowed grade number and provident fund number and other service benefits. It is also the case of the respondents that as they had demanded other benefits to which they were entitled, their services were terminated without any notice and compensation being given to them. They accordingly claimed reinstatement in service with all back wages. The case of the petitioner herein is that since the sugar industry is a seasonal industry, most of the work force are engaged as casual and temporary hands during the operational season and that this state of affairs is common to the entire sugar industry. It was also the case of the petitioner that the real dispute was not with regard to the termination of the services of the workmen, but with regard to their claim for regularisation of their services. It was also the case of the petitioner that the services of the workmen had never been terminated since none of them had worked for 240 days in the last 12 calendar months immediately preceding their alleged date of termination.

Definition of continuous service.

25B. For the purposes of this Chapter,-

(2) Where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer

(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than

(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"

In view of what has been indicated hereinabove, we are satisfied that no interference is called for with the judgment and directions given by the High Court which had been impugned in these petitions and the special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed. Interim order dated 16th August, 2005, stands vacated.

There will be no order as to costs.
Vice Chancellor, M.D. University, ... vs Jahan Singh

Although, the respondent was not in employment of the University he purported to have filed an application for his reappointment in the post of a reader of the University on 05.10.1983, which was accepted on the same day.

He joined the services of the University on 05.10.1983. He applied for grant of extra-ordinary leave without pay for a period of two years, in view of his assignment with the Zambia University and the Executive Council of the University by a resolution dated 21.11.1983 acceded to the said request. On expiry of the said period of two years, he joined the University again in August 1985. He thereafter prayed for grant of increments in the pay scale during the period he was on extra-ordinary leave. The University referred the matter to the University Grants Commission, which in terms of its letter dated 10.12.1987 opined that the matter was within the domain of the State Government, stating :

The Executive Council, however, amended the resolution on 28.11.1990.

The State Government, however, when approached refused to grant its approval in terms of its letter dated 04.02.1992, stating :

Yet again the respondent prayed for condonation of break in his service with all resultant benefits, but yet again the State Government conveyed its objection thereto.

Provided that the maximum total period for which such leave is granted shall not ordinarily exceed three years and in exceptional cases such leave may be extended so that the total period of leave, during the whole tenure of service of an employee does not exceed five years."

Clauses (a) and (b) of Regulation 26 (ii)(c) are not attracted herein. Clause (c), according to the respondent, is attracted in the instant case.

RESOLVED that the above amendment be approved.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly and that of the learned Single Judge is restored. The appeal is allowed.
U.O.I. And Ors vs Jai Prakash Singh And Anr

2. A brief reference to the factual position would suffice:

3. Respondent no.1 filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court alleging that he was not granted permission to operate Gramin PCO and his prayer was that he should have been granted such permission. Appellants who were the respondents 1 to 4 in the writ petition took the stand that according to the guidelines of the Ministry of Communication one Gramin PCOI (described in the guidelines as Village Public Telephone, in short the 'VPT') already existing in the concerned village and, therefore, the prayer of the writ petitioner could not be accepted in view of the guidelines. The High Court by a cryptic non-reasoned order held that the conditions in the guidelines "appear to be arbitrary" and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the Constitution ). Accordingly direction was granted to allot a VPT to the writ petitioner within the stipulated time.

10. The inevitable conclusion is that the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable and is set aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Commnr.Of Sales Tax, Orissa & Ors vs Crown Re-Roller (P) Ltd. & Ors

Respondent had been making purchases from the Rourkela Steel Plant of the Steel Authority of India Ltd. Admittedly, the benefit of the exemption notification in respect of such purchases have been granted to the respondent-assessee. Admittedly, Respondent had made purchases also from the registered dealers of iron scrap. However, the problem arose in obtaining the said exemption as on and from 1.1.1990 steel was made taxable at the first sale point by reason of the said notification dated 22.12.1989 issued under Section 8 of the Act. The mechanism for availing of exemption was by way of statutory declaration by the buyer/manufacturer to the taxable seller, thereby purchasing the raw material free of tax.

However, the assessing officer in its order dated 18.12.1997 upon examining the matter opined that :-

These appeals are accordingly allowed to the extent mentioned hereinbefore and with the above directions. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
All Bengal Excise Licensees ... vs Raghabendra Singh & Ors

The above appeal was filed by All Bengal Licensees Association, Kolkata against 1) Raghabendra Singh, Principal Secretary, Excise Department, Govt. of West Bengal 2) Tallen Kumar, Excise Commissioner, Excise Department, 3) Manoj Kumar Panth, District Magistrate and Collector, 24-Parganas 4) Parvez Siddique, Addl. District Magistrate, 24-Parganas as contesting respondents and 5) Pradyut Kumar Saha, General Secretary of All Bengal Excise Licensees Association, Kolkata as proforma respondent.

The background facts are as under:

In the contempt petition, rule was issued on 23.03.2005. The respondents filed an application praying for discharge of the rule issued in the contempt proceedings on 02.05.2005 North 24 Parganas Excise Licensees Assn. filed SLP (C) No. 10820 of 2005 against the order dated 15.03.2005 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The State of West Bengal filed an application for vacating the interim order dated 04.01.2005 passed in writ petition No. 2248 of 2004. On 26.07.2005, a learned Single Judge allowed the application and vacated the interim order but, however, directed the Government that they would be free to take steps in issuing license in terms of the policy but it will be mentioned in the license that it is subject to the result of the writ petition and further directed that all steps taken for issuing excise license would abide by the result of the writ petition.

For the aforementioned reasons, the contempt petition was dismissed by the High Court. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the contempt petition, the appellant preferred the above appeal arising out of SLP No. 15224 of 2006. This Court on 18.09.2006 issued notice and in the meanwhile directed that no license shall be granted on the basis of the lottery and pursuant to the circular dated 20.01.2004.

In our opinion, the judgment and order passed by the High court are bad in law and is liable to be set aside. LAW ON THE SUBJECT:
Director General, I.C.M.R vs Dr. D.K. Jain And Anr

4. The writ petition filed by the respondent herein came up for consideration before the High Court some time in 1983. During pendency of the said writ petition. The appellant herein placed before the said Court an offer so that respondent No. 1 may be reinstated in service on the following terms:

5. The said offer of the appellant having been accepted by respondent No. 1 the High Court disposed of the writ petition directing:

The petition is disposed of in terms of the above order. No costs."

8. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment has allowed the writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 herein opining that he would be deemed to be in the service of the appellant even during the aforesaid period i.e. 10.4.1974 to 11.5.1983.

14. What was, therefore, denied to him was only the back-wages for the period he was in service in some other organisation, which in our opinion cannot be construed to mean that an employee although being validly appointed and continued in service shall be deprived of the pensionary benefits during the period in question thereby.

15. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs. 5,000/-.
U.P. State Road Trasnport Corporation vs U.P. Rajya Sadak Parivahan Karamchari ...

The appellant - U.P. Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation'), has been constituted under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. The respondent which is a Trade Union of the appellant-Corporation, filed an Application before the Labour Court, Dehradun under Section 11-C of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Section 13A of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, praying for a declaration that the 15 persons who were appointed on contract basis as 'drivers' and 'conductors' as shown in the annexed chart, be declared as regular and substantive workmen of the Corporation. It was also prayed in the said Application that the concerned workmen be given all the benefits and facilities of regular employees.

It is not disputed that the concerned workmen were appointed on contract basis. Before the Labour Court, the Corporation had contended that Rule 2 of U.P.S.R.T.C Employees (Other than Officers) Service Regulations, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Regulations') clearly mentions that these regulations shall not apply to employees working on contract basis. The persons working on contract basis filed Writ Petition No. 41349/1999 Kanchi Lal and others vs. U.P.S.R.T.C before the Allahabad High Court for grant of same benefits as the regular employees of the Corporation, but the said writ petition had been dismissed. However, the objection of the Corporation was rejected by the Labour Court. It filed a writ petition thereafter before the High Court which was dismissed by the impugned judgment.

For the reasons given above, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the order of the Labour Court dated 19.9.2001 are set aside. However, it is open to the concerned workmen to raise their grievances before the concerned authority under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act or under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, as the case may be, and if the State Government refers such a dispute to the Labour Court or Tribunal, we hope that the same will be decided expeditiously. No costs.
Boc India Ltd vs Bhagwati Oxygen Ltd

In paragraph 21 of the said statement of claim, the respondent stated that under the aforesaid order, the appellant was required to supply indigenous components plants and machinery as set out in Clause 2.1.2 to 2.3.4 of the order for a sum of Rs.50 lacs. The appellant further stated that the indigenous supply was not subjected to variation as per the order. The appellant contrary to and in breach of the said order raised invoices for a sum of Rs.67,95,710/- against indigenous supply and realized an excess amount of Rs.17,95,710/- from the respondent. Therefore, the respondent claimed refund of Rs.17,95,710/- from the appellant.

=========== As noted herein earlier, the arbitrator, however, dismissed all other claims of the respondent and also the counter claim of the appellant.

1.1.8 The above price is also subject to 'General Conditions of sale and installation of Plant and Equipment'. In the event of any conflict between the clauses, one mentioned herein shall prevail. Where General Conditions are not applicable, have been marked accordingly and initiated by competent authority."
Satish Sharma vs Pinki Dhawan

The appellant herein filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Gurgaon against the respondent and another alleging that they had committed offences under Sections 448, 427 read with Sections 34, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). When the complaint was posted for preliminary enquiry, the appellant failed to appear before the Court and the complaint was dismissed. The appellant again filed a complaint on 08.02.1994 raising the very same allegations and, as part of the enquiry, the appellant gave sworn statement in support of the complaint. Two other witnesses had also given sworn statements supporting the appellant's contentions. The said complaint was posted for further steps, and on that day the appellant remained absent and the complaint was dismissed by the CJM on 11.11.1995. On 16.11.1995 the appellant again filed another complaint alleging the very same allegations against the respondent and another. On 23.11.1995 again the complainant's statement was taken and he moved an application that the statements taken previously may be taken as part of the complaint. The learned Magistrate allowed this plea and, by an order dated 13.12.1995, took cognizance of the offence under Sections 448, 427, 506 read with Section 34 IPC. Aggrieved by the issue of summons, the respondent herein filed a criminal revision before the Sessions Judge, Gurgaon. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon allowed the revision and remanded the case for trial. Aggrieved by the said order, respondent filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Petition before the High Court. The High Court by the impugned order dismissed the complaint by holding that by dismissal of the earlier two complaints by the CJM, the appellant herein was not entitled to file fresh complaint and it was an abuse of the process of the Court and, further observed that by the dismissal of the complaint by the Magistrate, the accused stood acquitted of the charges, therefore the subsequent criminal complaint was not maintainable. This order is challenged by the appellant herein.

In the result, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon is upheld. The CJM shall proceed with the complaint in accordance with law.

The Appeal is allowed accordingly.
Vijay Singh Gond & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors

8. That in view of the aforesaid constitutional provisions in the State of U.P. (prior to its bifurcation in the Year 2000) out of the total 425 seats, 92 seats had been reserved for Scheduled Castes and one seat had been reserved for Scheduled Tribes. After the division of the State of U.P. into the States of U.P. and Uttranchal, the total number of seats in the State of U.P. came down to 403 and the seats reserved for Scheduled Castes came down to 89 and the seats reserved for scheduled tribes became zero.

23. That the members of the ten castes and seven sub castes which have been shifted from list of Scheduled Castes to list of Scheduled Tribes are now faced with a grossly unfair, unjust and disadvantageous situation wherein they have now due to the enactment of the Act, on one hand lost the benefits which were available to them earlier being members of the Scheduled Castes and on the other have not been conferred with any benefits for being members of the Scheduled Tribes due to the explanation of Article 330.

To be heard with Writ Petition No. 363 of 2006.
Ashok Kumar Kapur & Others vs Ashok Khanna And Others

The facts of the case are mentioned in the judgment of my learned brother Sinha, J. and hence I am not repeating the same except where necessary.

Admittedly, the object of the Trust in question was to pay pension and annuities to the members of the Trust or dependents, including their widows and children (upto the age of 21 years), in accordance with the rules of the Trust.

The Settler (the Company) is admittedly facing severe financial crisis having become sick and proceedings are pending for its revival before the appellate authority for financial reconstruction. Hence, it would be appropriate if the funds are returned to the Company as it may help revive the Company.

In view of the aforesaid, the purpose of the Fund/Trust stood completely fulfilled and executed, without exhaustion of the Fund/Trust property, except to the extent of Rs. 3,88,55,682.00 referred to above, which amount, being a one-time payment, has been transferred to the LIC, pursuant whereafter the Trust has got no further liability/responsibility towards any of its beneficiaries. There are no existing beneficiaries of the said Fund nor is there any possibility of any further beneficiaries being created out of the instant Fund/Trust. The sum of Rs. 20,83,95,690.00 with accrued interest is, therefore, being held by the Fund under Section 83 of the Act for the benefit of the Company being the Settler of the Trust/Fund.

Hence, in view of Section 83, the money lying with the Trust fund should be returned to the Company.

In view of the above, in my opinion, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the money lying with the Trust fund should be directed to be returned to the Company forthwith. The impugned judgments of the courts below are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.