L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of Rajasthan vs Mohal Lal & Ors

3. The prosecution version in a nutshell that on 4.11.1995 Balusingh (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) was assaulted by the present respondents and the two acquitted accused persons and in the process Balu Singh lost his life. Information was lodged by Madan Singh Yadav (PW9) who was the son of the deceased. After investigation, charge sheet was filed and since the accused persons pleaded innocence, trial was held. As noted above, the present respondents were found guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The convicted person preferred an appeal before the High Court which as noted above directed their acquittal. The High Court found the evidence of so-called eye-witness PW1, 2,5 and 9 to be not credible and cogent and therefore directed the acquittal.

7. The High Court found that the conduct was not only unnatural but also proved that their presence at the place of occurrence doubtful. The view taken by the High Court is a plausible one, we find no reason to interfere in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
State Of Rajasthan vs Shankar Lal

2. The respondent raised a dispute regarding his termination before a Conciliation Officer at Rajasthan by application dated 13th of September, 1998. The dispute 2 was referred to the Labour Court for consideration. The Labour Court, by its order dated 26th of June, 2000, directed reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 but not granted back wages from 30th of May, 1983 to 13th of September, 1993, but granted 30% back wages from 13th of September, 1993.

3. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Labour Court, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan. The Division Bench of the High Court, by an order dated 18th of October, 2004, directed the petitioner to remove the defects in filing the appeal within one week from that date, failing which, the appeal shall stand dismissed. Admittedly, the defects were not removed by the petitioner and accordingly, the special appeal stood dismissed.

4. For restoration of the writ appeal, the application was filed by the petitioner along with an application for condonation of delay and the High Court, by the impugned order, rejected the same.

6. Considering the fact that the poor workman, for not fault of his, could not get the fruit of the contested award passed in his favour and, in our view, the reasons given for restoration of the appeal were not satisfactory and considering the findings made in the impugned order that the State-appellant had unnecessary dragged the matter, we are of the view that the impugned order, holding that no sufficient cause was shown for restoration of the appeal, cannot be disturbed and therefore, we do not find any ground to interfere with the same.

7. Accordingly, this Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

There will be no order as to costs.
Bhupendra Singh & Ors vs State Of U.P

4. After completion of investigation chargesheet was filed. As accused persons pleaded innocence, trial was held. The trial court as noted above found the accused persons guilty and convicted and sentenced them. In appeal the primary stand taken before the High Court was that evidence of the so called witnesses are of no consequence. It was also submitted that Section 149 has no application to the facts of the case. It was also submitted that the prosecution did not lead specific evidence as to which member of the alleged unlawful assembly did which or what act. The High Court found no substance in the plea and upheld the conviction.

19. Above being the position the trial court and the High Court were justified in holding the appellant guilty. We find no reason to interfere in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
State Of Rajasthan vs Mohan Lal

2. The Stand of the State was that the presumption under Section 20 of the Act has not been kept in view. It is pointed out that money was recovered from the almirah of the respondent. It is to be noted that the trial Court acquitted the respondent only on the ground that the prosecution version was not credible.

4. There were two complainants; one of them was not examined and the other did not support the prosecution version. The independent witness also did not support the prosecution. PW-11 the then Superintendent of Police stated in his statement that on 22.11.1996 the complainant Ram Pal submitted a complaint Ex.P-21 before him and about this report Motbirs were informed. Then the complainant admitted the report to be correct 2 before Motbir witnesses. Strangely none of the Motbir witnesses corroborated this statement of this witness. A witness stated that this is correct to say that he did not hear any conversation between the complainant and the accused and he also did not see any transaction. Narpat Singh (PW-

7. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions were found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as "the old Code") which came up for consideration before various High Courts, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as also before this Court. Since in the present appeal, we have been called upon to decide the ambit and scope of the power of an appellate court in an appeal against an order of acquittal, we have confined ourselves to one aspect only i.e. an appeal against an order of acquittal.

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied)

Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

24 (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.

39. In the aforesaid view of the matter no interference is called for in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly as the views expressed by the trial court and the High Court are reasonable and possible views and there is no perversity therein.
Govt. Of A.P. And Ors vs P.Chandra Mouli & Anr

2. Challenge in this appeal is by the State of Andhra Pradesh questioning the judgment passed a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent No.1. The proceedings initiated by the Director General of Police (in short the `DGP')placing respondent No. 1 under suspension pending conclusion of disciplinary proceedings were quashed. Cost of Rs.10,000/- was imposed to be paid by the DGP and the Commissioner of Police.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

On 10.2.2005 the Respondent No.1 had also filed a separate O.A. No.589/ 2005 before the Tribunal to which the State of Andhra Pradesh, the respondent No.2 by name was impleaded as respondents besides the Director General of Police, Commissioner of Police and Dy. Commissioner of Police, West Zone were also impleaded as respondents.

On 02.03.2005 the Respondent No.1 herein had filed a writ of Mandamus in W.P. No. 4247 of 2005 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh against the order dated 24.2.2005 in O.A. No. 589 of 2005 in which notice was issued only to the Director General of Police. 3 On 7.3.2005 in reply to the said show cause notice, the Director General of Police filed a detailed counter affidavit on 7.3.2005.

On 24.3.2005 High Court by its impugned judgment and order has allowed the Writ Petition No. 4247 of 2005 filed by the Ist respondent for a Writ of Mandamus by going into the merits of the case and setting aside the order of suspension dated 1.2.2005 passed by the Director General of Police and imposed Rs.10,000/- as costs on the Director General of Police and Commissioner of Police holding that it was malafide. According to appellants the order was passed without even issuing notice and providing an opportunity of hearing to other respondents i.e. Commissioner of Police and Dy. Commissioner of Police, West Zone, Hyderabad.

7. It further appears that the respondent No.1 challenged the charge memo dated 6.2.2005 before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The same was dismissed for default on 13.9.2008. On 31.3.2008 respondent no.1 has been allowed to retire without prejudice to the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. 5

12. Added to that a writ petition was filed on 2.3.2005 and notice was issued only to the DGP (not by name but by official designation) but the allegations of malafides were made in his personal name. The reply was filed on 7.3.2005 and the impugned order was passed on 24.3.2005.

14. It is not a case where the High Court should have entertained the writ petition when the Tribunal had disposed of the OA only on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. The impugned order is set aside. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

15. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
Gamparai Hrudayaraju vs State Of A.P.Tr.Pub.Pros

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

5. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that though the prosecution failed to establish a strong motive for the appellant to cause the death of the deceased, in view of the circumstantial evidence held that the death of the deceased was homicidal. Since only the appellant and the deceased were staying in the house at the relevant point of time, it found the appellant guilty, convicted him and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and SI for three months for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 203 respectively.

19. That being so, the prosecution has failed to establish the accusations, and the conviction cannot be maintained and is set aside. The appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith unless required to be in custody in connection with any other case.

20. The appeal is allowed.
Estate Manager, M.P. Housing Board vs Rajesh Kumar Gupta

Disputes Redressal Forum, Indore (in short the 'District Forum') making a grievance that the present appellant Board cannot charge 10% extra charge for a corner plot and 5% extra charge for best location plot. According to the complainant these amounts are not payable as the appellant Board had accepted the amounts payable without such charges. The District Forum accepted the complaints and directed that the charges levied and demanded cannot be collected. Questioning the correctness of the orders passed by the District Forum the State Commission was moved by way of appeal by the present appellant. The appeal was allowed. It was specifically noted that the District Forum had not kept in view the fact that there is a provision in the manual issued by the Board in the year 1978 about such levy. The State Forum also referred to various documents like the Board's advertisement relating to registration for Higher Income Group Houses, Indore. The order of District Forum was set aside by the State Forum. Questioning the correctness of the orders passed by the State Commission revision petitions were filed before the National Commission which was allowed by the impugned order.

The appeal is allowed.

SLP(C) No. 2557/2005, 2625/2005, 2702/2005, 2775/2005, 2785/2005:
Ram Deen Maurya vs State Of U.P.& Ors

7) The Director of Education by his letter dated 20.09.2005 sought clarification from the President of the Committee of Management of DAV Post Graduate College, as to out of two No objection certificates issued by them to two applicants, which No Objection Certificate should be accepted by him to make his recommendation to 6 the State Government for transfer of the applicants to their institution.

18) We cannot have any quarrel with the aforesaid principle of law.

24) For the reasons herein before mentioned, the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.

Cont..Pet. No.90 of 2008 In S.L.P.(C) No.22330/2007 In view of the orders passed in Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.22330 of 2007 and S.L.P.(C ) No.11423 of 2008, nothing further survives in this contempt petition which is, accordingly, disposed of.
Union Of India & Ors vs M/S Onkar Nath Bhalla & Sons

3) The facts in brief are: - the appellant, Engineer-in-Chief, had entered into a contract agreement with respondent/contractor. The contract was completed on 20.9.2002. A final bill was prepared, settling all claims, by the respondent and was forwarded to the appellants. Respondent after receiving payment of final bill signed the same, without any protest or reservation on 27.3.2001. Again after two years, respondent submitted a list of 20 claims to the appellants. Appellants in their reply stated that as per condition 65 of IAFW 2249 (General Conditions of Contracts) forming part of CA, no further claim shall be made by the contractor after submission of final bill and the claim now submitted are deemed to have been waived and extinguished. Respondent then approached E-in-C for appointment of arbitrator on 17.8.2003. Appellants did not appoint an Arbitrator as no dispute existed. Respondent went before the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Amritsar on 19.9.2003. Civil Judge transferred the same to the Distt. Judge, which was further transferred to Punjab & Haryana High Court.

4) High Court allowing the application of the respondent, stated, that, as per the arbitration clause, as no affidavit has been filed with in the stipulated period of the notice invoking the arbitration clause, the appellants have 2 forfeited their right to appoint the Arbitrator. Aggrieved by the said order, appellants are before us by this special leave petition.

8) The condition 65 of General conditions of contract IAFW-2249 states that no further claim shall be made by the contractor after submission of final bill and these shall be deemed to have been waived and 4 extinguished. Also condition 70 states that, all dispute between the parties to the contract shall after written notice by either party to the contract, be referred to the sole arbitration of a serving officer having degree in Engineering or equivalent.
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board vs Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. & Ors

The appellant entrusted certain construction work to the first respondent. On account of non-settlement of its claims, the first respondent raised some disputes which were referred to arbitration. Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 appointed as arbitrators, entered upon the reference on 20.5.1992 and made an award dated 19.6.1998. The arbitrators suo motu filed their award before the High Court on 26.10.1999. It was registered as O.P No. 150/2000.

7. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed.

..........................J (R.V. RAVEENDRAN) ..........................J (HARJIT SINGH BEDI) NEW DELHI, APRIL 21, 2009.
Food Corporation Of India & Ors vs Raja Ram

2006 passed by the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No.167 of 2005, which was directed against the order of the learned Single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.25150 of 2004, filed by the respondent herein. 3 The respondent, Raja Ram, is the son of one Nanku Ram, who was working as Handling labourer in the depot of the Food Corporation of India, Agra Cantonment. On 16th June, 1999, he applied to the Senior Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India, Regional office, Lucknow, for permission to retire on medical 2 grounds and also asking that his son, the respondent herein, be allowed to work in his place, as there was no other person, other than him, to look after the family in the light of the assurance given by him that he would take care of the applicant worker after his retirement. The said application was supported by an affidavit, wherein in paragraph 3, the said Nanku Ram indicated as follows:

4 Apart from the said paragraph, in paragraph 4, the said Nankoo Ram has also gone on to indicate that his wife had died earlier and his daughter was already married and that he had no other heir and hence, he wanted the respondent herein to be taken in service in his place since he would take care of the applicant and his family, if taken into service in his place. The said prayer made by the late father of the respondent was accepted partly on 24th July, 2000, when by an Office Order, his prayer for being allowed to retire from service was accepted and he was relieved from the service of the appellant on 25th July, 2000. However, as far as the second part of his prayer for appointment of his son in his place on compassionate grounds is concerned, the same was rejected on 2nd September, 2002. 3 5 The respondent filed the writ petition indicated hereinbefore, against the said order and the same came to be allowed by the learned Single Judge by his judgment and order dated 14th December, 2004, with a direction to the appellant to appoint the respondent as Handling Labourer forthwith, without any delay. The said order of the learned Single Judge was taken in appeal by the appellant before the Division Bench in the Special Appeal referred to hereinabove and the same was dismissed on 21st July, 2006 by the Division Bench simply by agreeing with the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge.

15 In such circumstances, we allow the appeal and set aside the orders 7 passed by the Division Bench and the learned Single Judge, without any order as to costs.
U.P. State Sugar & Cane Development Ltd vs Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. & Ors

1. These appeals arise out of a common judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the two appeals, one by U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. and other by Raja Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. and Ors. The cross appeals were filed against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court on 18.8.1988 partly decreeing the suit in respect of certain properties involved in the suit while dismissing the suit in relation to other properties.

3. The factual background in a nutshell is as follows:

11.Above being the position, the appeals filed by the
Petine Shipping Inc.Of Monorovia vs Minerals & Metals Trading Cor.Of (I)Ltd

3) The facts leading to this Special Leave Petition are: the appellant is a Liberian Shipping Company carrying on business through their protecting agents M/s. G.A.C. Shipping India Ltd. The respondent is a government company, which by charter party dated 2.6.1989 chartered the appellants vessel M.V. Animar to carry Rock Phosphate from Togo to West Coast India. The respondent chose Mumbai as the port of delivery. The dispute resolution clause of the charter party provided that each party may appoint one arbitrator, who in the event of disagreement shall appoint an umpire, whose decision shall be final. The arbitrators and the umpire were required to be commercial men.

4) When a dispute arose in 1990, the appellant vide letter dated 29.5.90 nominated Mr. A. K. Khandwala and the respondent vide telegram dated 18.6.90 appointed Justice Deshpande (Retired Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court). The appellant intimated the respondent by letter dated 9.7.90, that since their nominee was not a commercial man as required under the charter party clause; Mr. Khandwala would be the sole arbitrator. The respondent filed Arbitration Petition before the 2 Delhi High Court, for a declaration that their nomination of Justice Deshpande as arbitrator was valid. During pendency of the said petition, Justice Deshpande expired. Vide letter dated 14.8.92, the respondent appointed Mr. K. Parthasarthi, as Arbitrator, and on 18.8.92 the petition of the respondent was dismissed as having become infructuous. The court has not passed any other order in the petition filed by respondent.

5) The Arbitrators could not arrive at a unanimous decision and they appointed Mr. R. C. Cooper as the Umpire. When Mr. Cooper sought to proceed with the matter, the respondent inter alia raised objection as to the validity of the appointment of the umpire and the umpire vide letter dated 10.7.95, informed the parties that it would be prudent to approach the appropriate court for orders before proceeding further with the matter.

6) The appellant moved the High Court of Bombay, inter alia with a prayer for conformation/appointment of Mr. Cooper as Umpire and to enlarge the time for making the award. The Single Judge as well as Division Bench in Arbitration Petition dismissed the appellant's petition and appeal respectively, solely on the ground that in view of 3 Section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and in view of the Arbitration Petition filed by the respondent earlier before the Delhi

20)Therefore, the High Court of Bombay, in our view, is not correct in rejecting the Arbitration Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

21)In view of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The application filed under Section 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for extension of time for making the Award is restored on the Board of the Bombay High Court. The court is requested to consider the application on merits as early as 9 possible at any rate within an outer limit of six months from the date of receipt of the orders. No order as to costs.
Seema vs Sudhir

This is an application for transfer of Original Petition, being M.O.P. 136 of 2007, titled Seema Vs. Sudhir S. and O.P. 197 of 2007, titled Sudhir S. Vs. Seema, pending before the Family Court at Palakkad, Kerala, to the Family Court at Bangalore, State of Karnataka. Admittedly, the proceedings have been initiated before the Family Court at Palakkad by the petitioner wife for divorce. However, according to the petitioner, after her separation from the respondent, she has been forced to take up an employment in Bangalore, where she is living with her minor daughter, aged about 5 years. The minor daughter is also attending school in Bangalore.

Despite the difficulties expressed on behalf of the respondent, mainly on account of examination of witnesses, we are inclined to allow the transfer petitions mainly on account of the fact that the minor girl child is with her mother. Apart from the fact that it would be difficult for the petitioner to leave the child to attend to the court proceedings in Bangalore, it would also be difficult to take her minor child with her for the said purpose. Besides, it would also lead to disruption of the child's studies in school. It is on the said grounds that we allow the transfer petitions.

Let the Original Petition, being M.O.P. 136 of 2007, and O.P. 197 of 2007, pending before the Family Court at Palakkad, Kerala, be transferred to the Family Court at Bangalore, Karnataka.