L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of Rajasthan And Anr vs Mohammed Ayub Naz

The respondent-herein joined the services of the Government of Rajasthan in the Cooperative Department. He was promoted as UDC in March, 1965. He applied for 3 days leave while he was working as UDC. According to him, he became sick and could not attend the office for the period from 09.01.1978 to 19.01.1981. He was charge-sheeted under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958. The enquiry was held and the respondent attended the enquiry. It is his further case that he was not allowed to join duty even though he was marking his presence from 13.08.1984 to 23.08.1984. His services were terminated by way of publication in newspaper "Dainik Navjyoti dated 27.08.1984. He filed the appeal which was dismissed vide order dated 08.03.1988. It is also his case that notice which was sent to the respondent was deliberately sent on wrong address. Aggrieved against the orders dated 15.11.1984 and 08.03.1988, the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court in the year 1991 i.e. after a gap of about 3 years.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that a Government servant who has wilfully been absent for a period of about 3 years and which fact is not disputed even by the learned Single Judge of the High Court has no right to receive the monetary/retrial benefits during the period of question. The High Court has given all retrial benefits which shall mean a lumpsum money of lakhs of rupees shall have to be given to the respondent. In our opinion, considering the totality of the circumstances, and the admission made by the respondent himself that he was wilfully absent for 3 years, the punishment of removal imposed on him is absolutely correct and not disproportionate as alleged by the respondent. The orders passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2239/1991 dated 24.08.2001 and of the order passed by the Division Bench in LPA No. 1073 of 2001 dated 13.12.2001 are set aside and the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is restored. However, there shall be no order as to costs. The appeal stands allowed.
State Of Karnataka & Ors vs Kgsd Canteen Employees Welfare ...

It, furthermore, appears that the Government had sanctioned grant in aid from time to time. The management of the said canteen was handed over to the Respondent Association. Constitution of the Managing Committee was being changed on a regular basis. In the order dated 27.7.2000 issued by the Government of Karnataka, it was stated :

Keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of this case as also the principle of law enunciated in the above referred decisions of this Court, we are, thus, of the opinion that recourse to writ remedy was not apposite in this case.

SUBSEQUENT EVENT Subsequent events which had taken place is also worth taking note of. The fact remains that the canteen now is closed. The judgment and order of the High Court, thus, otherwise also cannot be implemented. The employees concerned, therefore, cannot be directed to be reinstated in service. We have noticed, hereinbefore, that other proceedings have been initiated by them. The said proceedings may be disposed of in accordance with law.

CONCLUSION For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. Consequently the appeals filed by the State Government being Civil Appeal Nos. 224-226 of 2003 and 449-468 of 2003 are allowed and that of the First Respondent being Civil Appeal Nos. 4180-82 of 2003 are dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties shall bear their own costs.
Regional Manager, S.B.I vs Rakesh Kumar Tewari

After the respondent ceased to serve with the appellant on 5th October, 1982, the respondent raised a demand under Section 33-C (2) of the Act before the Labour Court praying for an amount of Rs. 148.74 towards his wages for 8 days holidays (including Sundays) which occurred during the period of his employment. The appellant accepted the demand and paid an amount of Rs. 155.23 to the respondent which was accepted by the respondent in full and final satisfaction of his claim. About one year later, in 1984, the respondent raised an industrial dispute claiming that his services had been wrongfully terminated by the appellant. The Central Government referred the following disputes to the Industrial Tribunal:

The appellant challenged the decision of the High Court by way of a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution. While issuing notice on 17th November, 2003, this Court stayed the operation of the High Court's order. In the meantime and during the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court the appellant has paid the respondent a sum of approximately Rs. 3.80 lakhs under Section 17-B of the Act.

Both civil appeals arising out SLP(Civil) No. 20653 of 2003 and SLP(Civil) Nos.20003-20004 of 2004 which are referred to respectively as the first and second appeal, are disposed of by this judgment.

We see no reason to take a contrary view particularly when the facts in Raja Ram's case are materially indistinguishable from those in the appeals now before us.

Besides in the second appeal admittedly several persons had been appointed prior to the respondent on a temporary basis. They would have prior rights to reemployment over the respondent on the basis of the principles contained in Sections 25G or 25H.

In the circumstances, the award of the Tribunal and the decision of the High Court holding that the respondent's services were wrongfully terminated were both incorrect. They are accordingly set aside. There is as such no question of payment of any back wages. Additionally the only other reason given by the High Court for directing reinstatement of the respondent in the second appeal was based on an equitable consideration of the respondent having allegedly been reinstated. The factual basis for this conclusion was erroneous. Both appeals are accordingly allowed. However the appellant has paid sums to the respondents in both the cases which sums shall not be recoverable from the respondents by reason of the allowing of these appeals. There will be no order as to costs.
Municipal Corporation, Jaipur vs Shankarlal

A brief reference to the factual aspects would be necessary for deciding the controversy involved.

The respondent filed a Writ Petition for a direction to the appellant-Corporation to regularize the land i.e. plot No.113, Near Central School, Bajaj Nagar, Tonk Road, Jaipur. It was the case of the writ petitioner that the regularization was to be done in view of the decision taken by the Jaipur Development Authority (in short 'JDA') dated 6.11.1989. It is to be noted that the land originally belonged to the Jaipur Urban Improvement Trust, which body was succeeded by the JDA and finally by the appellant-Corporation. The respondent stated that he had filed an application for regularization before the JDA on 18.9.1984.

The inevitable result is that orders of learned Single Judge are to be set aside, which we direct. It is however directed that the application dated 27.9.1996 filed by the respondent shall be dealt with by the appellant-Corporation in accordance with law. The amount which is stated to have been deposited shall be adjusted against the amount, if any, fixed by the appellant-Corporation, if it chooses to regularize the land in question. However, if it decides not to regularize the land the amount shall be returned to the respondent with interest at the rate of 9% from the date of deposit till the amount is refunded.

The appeals are disposed of. No costs.
Kallu @ Masih & Ors vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

2. The case of the prosecution is that on 5.7.1993, at about 6 p.m., an unlawful assembly of 27 persons, including Kallu, Safi, Madaniya and Bhuria (appellant nos.1 to 4 herein) and one Anwar, came to the house of Sadruddin (PW-4), armed with swords, Ballams, lathis, hockey sticks, farsas and dharias, shouting "kill/cut Sadruddin". Kallu dealt a blow on the head of Sadruddin with a sword. Madaniya also dealt a blow with a sword on his hand. Shafi gave a blow of sword injuring his forehead, nose and jaw. Bhuria gave a blow with a spear injuring his thigh and calf. On seeing Sadruddin being attacked, Sabdar Bano (PW-6), Noorbano (PW-7), Baby (PW-9) and Annobai (PW-10) rushed to the rescue of Sadruddin. They were also beaten up by the appellants and their associates. Sabdarbano received injuries on her head and body. Annobai received injuries on the head. Baby and Noorbano received injuries on their hands. By then, a Police van came near the spot. On seeing it, the appellants and others took to their heels. Kanizbano (PW-3) who was sitting outside her house and who witnessed the entire incident, along with some others, took the injured persons to the hospital. Kanizbano also lodged an FIR (Ex. P-28) within half an hour of the incident in Police Station, Dhar, naming all the 27 persons. They were tried by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Dhar, for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 307/149, 324/149 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code. Appellant Nos.1 and 2 and one Nazir Khan were also charged under Section 25/27 of the Arms Act.

4. The State filed an appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No.874 of 1995. Leave to appeal was granted by the High Court under section 378(3) of Cr.P.C. in regard to five accused (the four appellants and one Anwar) who were specifically named in the evidence as persons who attacked and injured PWs. 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10. Thus, the acquittal of other 22 who were not named by any of the witnesses and to whom no specific overt act was attributed, attained finality.

[Emphasis supplied]

20. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
Raj Kumar And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr.

1. The writ petitions in this group arise from the same set of facts and seek the same relief. They can conveniently be disposed of by a common judgment.

2. For the purpose of facts, it would be sufficient to refer to the facts narrated in Writ Petition (C) No. 569/2001. The petitioners were holding different posts under the Border Security Force (hereinafter referred to as "the Force"), constituted under The Border Security Force Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as "the BSF Act"). The First Respondent is the Union of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Second Respondent is the Director General of the Border Security Force.

6. Further, on 17.10.1998 the Deputy Director (Personnel) issued a circular conveying that those personnel whose resignations had been accepted alter the circular dated 27.12.1995 under Rule 19 of the BSF Rules under mistaken impression of their entitlement to pensionary benefits but who had not yet been granted pension, should be called back to rejoin Page 0098immediately, It was conveyed that in their cases the period of absence would be treated as an Earned Leave/ Half Pay Leave as due and the remaining period as leave without pay (EOL) as a special case, but that such personnel would have to refund the GBF and other dues paid to them. They would however, retain their seniority. Individual Registered/AD letters were sent to all such persons whose resignation had been accepted pursuant to circular dated 27.12.1995 conveying the aforesaid decision of the Director General BSF. This circular in terms stated that if a member of the Force was not interested to rejoin the Force, he would not be entitled to any pension. Initially the first cut-off date for rejoining was 30.4.1999, which was later extended up to 30.6.1999 and, finally, up to 31.8.1999.

16. We find that the cases before us can be divided into the following categories:

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18. We have made the aforesaid directions in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution in order to do complete justice to a section of the personnel who would otherwise be placed in an inequitable situation for which the authorities are also partly to blame, It is open to this Court to mould the relief by safeguarding the interest of the parties even while declaring the law. The paramount consideration in such cases should be to ensure that there is no injustice caused (see in this connection Deb Narayan Shyam and Ors. v. State of W.B. and Ors. , para 26 and 29 and State of Bihar and Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Ors. , para 36 Barring this limited relief no other relief is due to the petitioners before us. Subject to the aforesaid limited relief all the petitions are dismissed.
Raj Kumar And Ors vs Union Of India And Anr

The writ petitions in this group arise from the same set of facts and seek the same relief. They can conveniently be disposed of by a common judgment.

For the purpose of facts, it would be sufficient to refer to the facts narrated in Writ Petition (C) No. 569/2001. The petitioners were holding different posts under the Border Security Force (hereinafter referred to as "the Force"), constituted under The Border Security Force Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as "the BSF Act"). The First Respondent is the Union of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Second Respondent is the Director General of the Border Security Force.

2. The amount of GPF and other dues paid to you are required to be refunded.

Further, on 17.10.1998 the Deputy Director (Personnel) issued a circular conveying that those personnel whose resignations had been accepted after the circular dated 27.12.1995 under Rule 19 of the BSF Rules under mistaken impression of their entitlement to pensionary benefits but who had not yet been granted pension, should be called back to rejoin immediately. It was conveyed that in their cases the period of absence would be treated as an Earned Leave/ Half Pay Leave as due and the remaining period as leave without pay (EOL) as a special case, but that such personnel would have to refund the GPF and other dues paid to them. They would, however, retain their seniority. Individual Registered/AD letters were sent to all such persons whose resignation had been accepted pursuant to circular dated 27.12.1995 conveying the aforesaid decision of the Director General, BSF. This circular in terms stated that if a member of the Force was not interested to rejoin the Force, he would not be entitled to any pension. Initially the first cut-off date for rejoining was 30.4.1999, which was later extended up to 30.6.1999 and, finally, up to 31.8.1999.

We find that the cases before us can be divided into the following categories:

Having considered the peculiar facts arising in each of these groups, we make the following orders:-

We have made the aforesaid directions in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution in order to do complete justice to a section of the personnel who would otherwise be placed in an inequitable situation for which the authorities are also partly to blame. It is open to this Court to mould the relief by safeguarding the interest of the parties even while declaring the law. The paramount consideration in such cases should be to ensure that there is no injustice caused (see in this connection Deb Narayan Shyam and Ors. v. State of W.B. and Ors3 and State of Bihar and Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Otrs.,4. Barring this limited relief no other relief is due to the petitioners before us. Subject to the aforesaid limited relief all the petitions are dismissed.
Anjaleem Enterprises Pvt. Ltd vs Commissioner Of Central Excise, ...

Vide show-cause notice (for short 'SCN') dated 2.4.1993 the Assistant Collector (AC) stated that the programmed memory chip was an integral part of STD-PCO unit, without which the unit was non- functional. According to the SCN, the programme recorded in the memory chip, EPROM, could be used with STD-PCO unit only in a particular telecom region and, therefore, the said chip was an essential component of the STD-PCO unit. According to the SCN, the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of exemption as the said chip was not covered under CH 85.24 as claimed by the appellant. According to the department, the said chip was classifiable as an integral part of STD-PCO unit under CH 85.17. Accordingly, the department called upon the appellant to show cause as to why duty amounting to Rs.21.50 lacs for the above period should not be recovered under section 11A of the Act.

The controversy on classification, therefore, is :

The above discussion, therefore, shows that EPROM cannot be compared to a floppy. As stated above, floppy is a dumb box. That is not the case with EPROM. EPROM is basically an integrated circuit or a chip. We agree with the department. EPROM is, therefore, classifiable as an integrated circuit under tariff item 85.42.

Before concluding, we reiterate that in the present case, the levy is on a computer based embedded system. The software embedded in the programmed EPROM, which is an IC chip, constitutes the "brain" of the system. The programmed EPROM is an integral part of the system. The levy is on the unit. The levy is not on the programmed EPROM. The programme embedded is not an easily removable. Hence, it will not fall in the category of recorded media under tariff item 85.24 and remains an IC under tariff item 85.42.

For the aforestated reasons, we do not find any merit in this civil appeal which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
M/S Bharat Coking Coal Ltd vs Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh

As the controversy involved in both the cases was the same, the Tribunal heard them analogously and answered the references in favour of the workmen declaring them to be workmen of the principal employer, namely, the Management of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'management') and directing for their reinstatement in service with effect from the dates of references with 75% back wages. Being aggrieved by the said combined Award, the management filed two writ petitions before the Patna High Court, being CWJC No.859/1993 (R) and CWJC No. 856/1993 (R), which were dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 10th August, 1998. Not being satisfied with the judgment of the learned single Judge, the management has filed two appeals under clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent without any order as to costs.
Om Parkash vs State Of Haryana

The prosecution in support of its case examined three witnesses. Ganeshi Lal (PW-2) is the complainant. According to him, after accepting the money, he prepared a sealed parcel bearing the seal of GLY. He further stated that the DSP, Shri Jagwant Singh (PW-4) came to his residence and recorded the statement of other witnesses and also recorded his supplementary statement. The DSP further took into possession the sealed parcel containing currency notes. In his cross-examination, he, however, could not give details about the principal suspects in the aforementioned murder of Kallu Ram. He also could not say how many suspected persons he had interrogated and how many of them were called by him in connection therewith. Even he could not give the number of such suspects interrogated and detained by him. He accepted that Sham Singh, son of the deceased was chargesheeted in the said case. He further accepted that although he had interrogated Umrao Singh and his relations in the presence of villagers, it did not give rise to any suspicion against them as otherwise he would have arrested them. He accepted that the Appellant had met him earlier. He further admitted that the DSP came around 11.30 a.m. and till then allegedly everybody remained at the spot. The accused persons were not arrested by him but according to him were arrested by the DSP. The DSP remained at the spot upto 2.30 p.m. Admittedly, the DSP did not sign the sealed packet. The Police Station, Narnaul was at a distance of only 50 yards from his residence and office of CIA was at a distance of two kms. from bus stand Narnaul. It has further been accepted that no entries about the coming and going of the prosecution witnesses were made in roznamcha in CIA.

In view of the aforementioned discrepancies in the prosecution case, we are of the opinion that the defence story set up by the Appellant cannot be said to be wholly improbable. Furthermore, it is not a case where the burden of proof was on the accused in terms of Section 20 of the Act. Even otherwise, where demand has not been proved, Section 20 will also have no application. [Union of India Thr. Inspector, CBI v. Purnandu Biswas, 2005 (8) SCALE 246 and T. Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2006 (1) SCALE 116].

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the Appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt and, thus, the judgment of conviction and sentence passed against the Appellant is set aside and he is acquitted. If the Appellant is on bail, he is discharged from his bail bond. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.
Kanchan And Ors vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal And ...

Challenge in these appeals is to a composite order of a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petitions filed by the present appellants. The basic question before the High Court was whether the permits granted to the appellants by the State Transport Authority, U.P. Lucknow (in short `the S.T.A.') could be legally sustained. It is to be noted that on a revision filed by the non-official respondents, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P., Lucknow (in short `the Tribunal') set aside the grant of permits and held that the the action of STA was mala-fide; it had acted in clear contravention of the statutory requirements and, therefore, the grant of permit was an exercise which had no legal sanction. This order of the Tribunal was the subject mater of challenge in the writ petitions. The High Court essentially came to record three findings; (a) in respect of notified routes, the permits could not have been granted; (b) action of the STA in taking over the route was impermissible, mala-fide and (c) the exercise of power by the STA in granting the permits was equally unsustainable, being mala-fide.

An application for intervention has been filed taking a stand that certain observations made by this Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation through its Chairman v. Omaditya Verma and Ors., [2005] 4 SCC 424 are not correct. We do not consider it necessary to deal with that question in this application. The application for intervention is, therefore, rejected.
Union Of India & Ors vs Flight Cadet Ashish Rai

On 12/13.5.2000 the respondent in a drunken condition physically assaulted co-trainees, used abusive language and terrorized a large number of trainees by his violent behavior. On 12.6.2000 he was involved in another criminal case in having misused credit card of the other Cadets. First information report was lodged, cognizance was taken and warrants were issued. Since he failed in final examination he was assessed to be unsuitable for further training by the Review Board on 29.5.2000 and on 14.6.2000 his training was terminated because of his failure in academics and for maintaining low standard of discipline. The report was forwarded to the Air Force Headquarters, he was "routed home" and order of termination of Cadetship was passed.

Para 19 of the AFO provides that before passing an adverse order every time a Training Review Board consisting of four members shall be constituted and the TRB will give opportunity to the Cadet, will record statements and will propose an action to be taken against the Cadet.

Training Command Air Staff Instructions (in short TCASI) deals with the procedure to be followed for periodic assessment.

Para 11 of the TCASI Provides that the assessment shall be made on the basis of marks of the Examination and on the basis of assessing the Officer like Qualities (OLQ) in the cadet. The cadet is required to pass such and every paper with minimum 50% marks, and any lesser marks shall be assessed as 'Failed'.

The judgment of the Division Bench affirming that of the learned Single Judge is clearly unsustainable and is quashed.

Appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.