L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Bhikan Sk.Noor Mohd vs Mehamoodabee Sk.Afzal & Ors

3) We herein set out the facts, in brief, to appreciate the issue involved in this appeal.

4) The appellant herein is the first defendant and respondent No. 1 herein is the plaintiff whereas respondent Nos. 2 to 8 herein are defendant Nos. 2 to 8 in the suit.

7) According to respondent No. 1 (plaintiff), the suit property was owned by their late father Sheikh Noor Mohd. and on his death, respondent No. 1, by virtue of inheritance and being one of his legal heirs, got share in the suit property as per the shares defined in the Mohammedan Law. Respondent No.1 alleged that since her father died intestate leaving behind respondent No.1 and the appellant being sister and brother, she is entitled to claim partition of the suit property and its separate possession as tenant in common as against her brother (appellant herein).

The impugned order is set aside. The case is now remanded to the High Court for deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with law.

21) We, however, request the High Court to admit the second appeal, frame appropriate substantial questions of law as required under Section 100 of the Code, keeping in view the pleadings, findings of the two courts below and the documents (exhibits). Needless to say, the questions to be framed should be specific with reference to exhibits and the findings of the two courts below.

22) Before parting, we consider it proper to mention here that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy and confined our inquiry only to examine whether the second appeal involved any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code? 23) We have noticed that the dispute is between the members of one family. It would, therefore, be in the interest of family that efforts should be made to settle the dispute amicably. Indeed, it was also stated by learned counsel for the parties before us by giving some offer to each other. We grant this liberty to renew their respective offers before the High Court and explore the possibility for amicable settlement before finally hearing the appeal preferably within six months.

24) Record of the case, if requisitioned, be sent back to the High Court forthwith by the Registry.
Satish Kumar Gupta And Etc. Etc vs State Of Haryana And Ors. Etc

6. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court these appeals have been preferred. Contentions of the appellants are as follows:

18. Accordingly, we hold that the post-acquisition allottee has no locus to be heard in the matter and is neither a necessary nor a proper party.

22. For the above reasons, we allow these appeals and set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the High Court once again for fresh decision in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the High Court on 27th March, 2017.

FEBRUARY 21, 2017.
State Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors vs Shaik Mahibulla Sharief

4. The Tribunal held that the Respondent possessed B.Ed. degree with Telugu and Social Studies as methodology subjects and BA in Telugu literature as single subject from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University. According to the Tribunal, the Respondent was eligible for being considered for appointment as Language Pandit (Telugu) as the Rules did not disqualify a degree from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University. On the basis of the said findings, the Tribunal directed the Appellants to consider the case of the Respondent for appointment to the post of Language Pandit (Telugu) Grade- II.

8. For the abovementioned reasons, the Appeal is dismissed. No costs.

........................................J [S. A. BOBDE] ..……................................J [L. NAGESWARA RAO] New Delhi, February 22, 2017
State Of Kerala & Ors vs Yusuff & Ors

3) We herein set out the facts, in brief, to appreciate the issue involved in these appeals.

17) In the light of foregoing discussion, we allow the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment and order, restore Writ Appeal No. 198 of 2000 out of which these appeals arise and request the High Court to decide the writ appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law expeditiously.

18) We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy involved in these appeals and, therefore, the writ appeal would be decided by the High Court uninfluenced by any of our observations.

February 23, 2017
Rajagopal vs Muthupandi @ Thavakkalai & Ors

Rajagopal (PW-1) at about 2.30 p.m. on 06.11.1999, who was standing at the Kandavilai bus stop, causing at least 12 grave injuries which involved fracture of his skull, fracture of the bones of both legs as well as on the wrist. Subsequently, PW-1 suffered amputation of both legs as a consequence of the attack suffered by him.

ii) The prosecution has examined as many as 19 witnesses, and Rajagopal (PW-1), the Complainant himself, has, both in his complaint and evidence, (which was not shaken in cross-examination), stated in detail as to the role of each of the accused.

iii) It may be mentioned here that all the accused were identified by him, and accused No.1 abused him and stated “hack him to death. Let him die and get lost.” Accused No.2 hacked at his left arm left hand elbow with a sickle after which accused No.1 hit him on his head with a sickle and further injured him by hacking at the left lateral malleolus. Accused No.3, another son of accused No.1, hacked at PW-1's right loin and back and also injured him by hacking at his right lateral malleolus. Accused No.4 hit his chin with a sickle, and accused No.5 hacked at his ring and middle fingers on the left hand and ring finger on the right hand with a sickle.

10) Given the fact that stares one in the face, namely, that the High Court has not at all dealt with the direct evidence of PW-1 and given the fact that such evidence has stood the test of cross-examination, we are constrained to observe that the view taken by the High Court is not a possible view and we therefore set aside the acquittal of the five accused persons and restore the conviction and sentence imposed upon them by the Trial Court.

11) Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

12) The respondents are directed to surrender before the concerned Court within a period of two weeks from today to serve out the remainder of sentence imposed by the Trial Court.

........................J (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN) ........................J (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR) NEW DELHI;

February 28, 2017.
Chhanga @ Manoj vs State Of M.P

2. Apparently, the accused were inimical to one Gyan Singh, who was the younger brother of the informant. PW 1, the informant, Man Singh was sitting in a Bettle Shop, and the appellant came there with three other persons, one of whom, Rakesh, threw a bomb at him with intent to kill him. The bomb exploded dashing the back portion of the bettle shop, which caused injury to PW 1's left thigh, after which the said Rakesh also threw another bomb which dashed against the window of the said shop and exploded. The role of the present appellant before us is succinctly stated by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who said that the accused – Chhanga @ Manoj – the present appellant specifically stated “kill him, he should not be spared, he habitually reports”. All four accused persons came together and ran away together from the spot of the incident.

3. The deposition of injured eye-witness PW 1 was believed by both the Courts below. He was fully corroborated by PW 6, who was the father of the injured eye-witness, and PW 7, who was a third independent eye-witness. PWs 4, 5 and 9 were declared hostile, and in paragraph 11 of the Judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the statements of these witnesses were taken into account and were condemned.

9. Shri Garg also exhorted us to allow the present appeal to conclude with the sentence already undergone. Accordingly to him, the appellant is on bail since 2006, and at this distance of time, there is no point in sending him back for incarceration for a period of one year and a little over.

12. Having regard to the above, and further taking into consideration the fact that the appellant appears to have got off lightly, we see no reason to interfere in the concurrent Judgments under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

13. The appeal stands dismissed.

14. Needless to say the appellant who was granted bail pursuant to Order dated 20-3-2006 of this Court, stands cancelled and he is directed to surrender within a period of two weeks from today to serve out the remaining period of sentence.

......................J (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN ........................J (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR) NEW DELHI;

28TH FEBRUARY, 2017.
Parasa Koteswararo vs Eede Sree Hari & Ors

1) The present case involves a gruesome murder. The head was actually decapitated from the body, was put into a gunny sack, and thrown into a canal roughly 10 kms. away from the place of the murder. All this is supposed to have taken place on 15.12.2000, and suffice it to say that the Court of Sessions outlined a large number of points, all of which can be placed under five heads, namely, i) the motive for killing the deceased;

2) The Sessions Court, on a combination of the aforesaid five factors, ultimately held the two accused guilty of murder and sentenced them to imprisonment for life.

15) This, being the case, the mere fact that the two accused may have absconded immediately and the fact that false information may have been given about the whereabouts of the deceased are not enough to complete the chain of circumstances, in a case like the present one.

20) We have already stated that it is impossible for us on the fact situation in the present case to characterize the present judgment as such.

21) Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

........................J (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN) ........................J (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR) NEW DELHI;

February 28, 2017.
Jsw Infrastructure Limited And Anr vs Kakinada Seaports Limited And Ors

2. These two Civil Appeals are directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court dated 14th July, 2016, whereby Writ Petition No.4895 of 2016, filed by the consortium comprising of M/s Kakinada Seaports Limited, M/s Bothra Shipping Service Pvt. Ltd.,M/s MBG Commodities Pvt. Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the second consortium) Respondent Nos. 1-3 herein, was allowed and the High Court held that the consortium of the appellants JSW Infrastructure Limited and South West Port Limited, (hereinafter referred to as the first consortium) was not entitled to take part in the bid and, therefore, the acceptance of its bid was also held to be illegal and set aside.

3. The facts necessary for decision of these appeals are that the Paradip Port Trust, issued Request For Qualification (RFQ) on 31.10.2015 inviting global invitations for Mechanisation of EQ-1-2 and EQ-3 berths at Paradip Port Trust of 30 MTPS Capacity on BOT basis under PPP mode for concession period of Thirty (30) years. It is not disputed that in response to the said RFQ, 4 parties including the first and second consortium, submitted their bids. All the four parties were duly qualified and were asked to participate in the next stage of bid, that is, Request For Proposal (RFP) and submit their offers with regard to revenue sharing. Only two parties, i.e., the first consortium and the second consortium submitted the RFP. The bid quoted by the first consortium was 31.70% as against 28.70% bid quoted by the second consortium. Since the first consortium were the highest bidders their proposal was recommended for acceptance by the tender committee of the Paradip Port Trust on 26.02.2016. At this stage, on 27.02.16 the second consortium submitted objections to the consideration of the application of the first consortium on the ground that in terms of the Policy Clause against creation of monopoly the appellants were not entitled to take part in this entire bidding process since they were already operating one berth for dry cargo. The Clause which is subject matter of interpretation reads as follows :-

13. In view of the above discussion we are clearly of the view that the High Court erred in interpreting the Clause in the manner which it is done. As explained above, the Clause will apply only when there is single private operator operating a single berth. Once there are more than one private operators then the Clause will not apply. The decision taken by Paradip Port Trust could not be termed to be arbitrary, perverse or mala fide. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the same. In this view of the matter, both the Civil Appeals are allowed. The Judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the second consortium before the High Court is dismissed.
Faridabad Complex Administration vs M/S. Iron Master India (P) Ltd

2) We herein set out the facts, in brief, to appreciate the issued involved in this appeal.

3) The respondent is a Limited Company having their place of business in Faridabad. The appellant is a Municipal Corporation, Faridabad as defined under the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

4) The respondent is subjected to payment of various taxes including House Tax under the Act on the properties owned by them at Faridabad. The respondent filed a civil suit seeking permanent injunction against the appellant restraining them from recovering the House Tax for the years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 from the respondent on their properties. The appellant also sought a declaration that a demand notice dated 20.11.1993 raised by the appellant calling upon the respondent to pay Rs.48,599.40 towards the House Tax on their properties is illegal.

19) Since none appeared for the appellant(defendant) in this Court, the High Court would issue notice to the appellant before it is finally heard. We request the High Court to decide the appeal expeditiously.

March 07, 2017
Pawan @ Rajinder Singh And Anr vs State Of Hayrana

Prosecution story, in brief, is that Deepak (deceased) was elder brother of PW-6 Amit Kumar (complainant). Amit Kumar had a business of selling flowers, and his elder brother used to do the delivery work. Their neighbour Gola (not examined) had taken a loan of ?10,000/- on interest from accused Pawan, and he (the debtor) had returned the same except ?250/- . On 09.11.2000 at about 8.30 p.m. accused Pawan @ Rajinder Singh and his cousin accused Ajit @ Dara Singh demanded remaining ?250/- from Gola to which the deceased requested them to waive the said amount due to which some altercation took place between the deceased and the two accused. About half an hour thereafter both the accused came back on a scooter, and Deepak (deceased) also left with them but on his separate scooter bearing registration No. HR 51 E-4749. Deepak did not return till late night. On this, PW-6 Amit Kumar and his father Ram Nath started search for him. In the next morning they came to know that dead body of a person is lying near Air Force ground. Both, father and son went there and saw that it was the dead body of Deepak. Suspecting that appellants Pawan @ Rajinder Singh and Ajit @ Dara Singh had committed the murder, a report (Ex PE-1) was given to the police in the early hours of 10.11.2000 mentioning their names. On the basis of said report, First Information Report No. 803 dated 10.11.2000 (Ex.PK) was registered at Police Station, N.I.T., Faridabad.

On appeal by the convicts, High Court agreed with the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Hence this appeal before us through special leave.

Now, we come to the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory. The conclusions of the examination conducted in the Forensic Science Laboratory, Haryana, Madhuban, Karnal, are reproduced below from Ex. PF: -

……………………………………” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the conclusions given by Forensic Science Laboratory on points (1), (2) and (3), quoted above, we are of the view that the prosecution story, as narrated by PW-4 Pappu and PW-5 Surender Singh, is highly doubtful.

In the light of appreciation of evidence, as above, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC against the two accused. We further hold that the charge of offence punishable under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 against accused Ajit @ Dara Singh is also not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

The appeal is allowed. Both the accused, namely Pawan @ Rajinder Singh and Ajit @ Dara Singh, are acquitted of the charges. The appellants shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case.

March 08, 2017.
Rufina D' Souza And Ors vs Municipal Corporation Of Greater ...

2. There is a chequered history of proceedings between the appellants and the private respondents. For the nature of order that we propose to pass, it may not be necessary to advert to all those facts and proceedings.

For costs;

7. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned decision of the High Court with a further order to remand the writ petition to be heard and decided by the Division Bench of the High Court afresh. All questions are left open. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on any of the grounds and contentions available to the respective parties.

8. The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside. Instead, the writ petition is remanded and restored to the file of the High Court to its original number, to be heard by the Division Bench de novo.

9. The interim relief granted by this court during the pendency of this appeal to continue till an appropriate order is passed by the High Court either in the main proceedings or on prayer for grant of interim relief, after hearing the parties. We request the High Court to take up the writ petition expeditiously, considering the subject matter of the impugned notices issued by the corporation for demolition of the building being in dilapidated condition.

11. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.
Prassanna Venkardari Agrahar vs State Of Maharashtra

2 This appeal is directed against the order dated 15th June, 2016 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Anticipatory Bail Application No. 841 of 2016, whereby the High Court rejected the application filed by the appellant for grant of anticipatory bail. The appellant is a doctor by profession and specialized in neuro surgery. He was practicing at Ahmed Nagar but shifted to Solapur in the year 2012 and is practicing as Neuro Surgeon in Solapur. He married to Ms. Rashmi, who was also a doctor. It is the case of the appellant that his wife was suffering from chronic diabetes and was under treatment. She died on 9th July, 2015 at about 1.00 a.m. The appellant informed this fact to her parents who had come to Solapur on the next day and after due consideration and affirmation that the death of Rashmi was natural due to heart failure, they all decided to cremate her. After a passage of about one month, an anonymous letter addressed to the Commissioner of Police, Solapur stating that the appellant had extra-marital affairs with one Megh Roy Chodhuri and in order to obtain benefit of insurance policy which was in the name of the deceased Rashmi, the appellant committed her murder. It is further contended that on the basis of the said letter an inquiry had been initiated and the appellant had been summoned for inquiry. The police has been repeatedly visiting his house for interrogation and he is having apprehension that the police will register offence against him and he would be arrested. Therefore, he filed Criminal Bail Application 472/16 before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Solapur. The District & Sessions Judge by order dated 3.5.2016 rejected the application.

7 In the circumstances, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the application of the appellant. We are of the view that it is just and proper to grant an order of anticipatory bail to the appellant. Therefore, the order of the High Court in Anticipatory Bail Application No. 841 of 2016 is set aside.

8 In view of the above, we direct that in the event of arrest, the appellant shall be released on bail on execution of personal bond for Rupees one lakh with sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the investigating officer. The appellant shall not tamper the witnesses of the prosecution and shall appear before the investigating officer/court as and when required.

9 It is needless to clarify that the observations made herein are only for the purpose of disposing of this appeal and will not influence the investigation or trial.

10 The appeal is allowed in the above terms.
Imax Corporation vs M/S E-City Entertainment (I) P.Ltd

6. On 16.06.2004, the appellant filed a request for arbitration with the ICC, and claimed damages. On 08.10.2004, the ICC i.e. the chosen arbitral forum fixed London as the place of arbitration i.e. the juridical seat of arbitration, after consulting the parties.

7. On 11.02.2006, the first partial final award was made in favour of the appellant declaring that the respondent was in breach of the agreement and therefore liable for damages. The award stated that the decision on the other issues, including damages/costs would be reserved for a future award.

9. The appellant filed its statement of damages before the Arbitral Tribunal. The respondent filed its statement of defence.

The final award on the issues of interest and costs was amalgamated with the earlier awards, both of which were incorporated by reference into itself. The third final award also stated that the place of arbitration is London.

13. On 21.07.2008, the respondent challenged the aforesaid awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the Bombay High Court in India after a period of more than two years from the first partial award, more than one year from the second partial award and a period of 3 months, 24 days from the final award.

It is pertinent to reproduce the relevant portion in the respondent’s application before the ICC while objecting to the authority of the law firms representing the appellant. It stated:-

33. In view of the foregoing observations, we find that the High Court committed an error in observing that the seat of arbitration itself is not a decisive factor to exclude Part-I of the Arbitration Act. We therefore set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the petition filed by the respondent under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the Bombay High Court.

34. In the result the appeal is allowed as no order to costs.