L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
D.M.Premakumari vs The Divl.Commnr. Mysore Divn & Ors

3) The Deputy Director of Public Instructions, Mysore, after appointment of the appellant, had sought for verification of caste and income certificate from the District Committee for Backward Classes and minorities for issue of certificate. The Committee, vide its proceedings dated 08.04.1996, was of the view that the `Telugu Balija' caste has been transferred to Group `D' category and as the appellant had sought reservation in Group `B' category, she would not be entitled to retain the post of Primary School Teacher as a person belonging to Group `B' category.

16)In view of the above discussion and keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we dispose of this appeal, without going into the merits of the case. In order to do complete justice, we direct the respondents herein, not to dislodge the appellant from the post of primary school teacher. This order of ours shall not be treated as a precedent in any other case.

17)The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
Prasad @ Hari Prasad Acharya vs State Of Karnataka

4. It was the prosecution case that on 30.4.2003 around midnight both the accused persons went to the house of the victim, the prosecutrix (PW-1). They called out her husband. He came out after lighting the kerosene lamp and found the accused persons. The prosecutrix was compelled by the accused persons to follow them to the jungle and she was threatened that if she did not do so her hut would be set on fire. When she refused, they forcibly took her about 100 ft. away from the hut and forcibly committed rape on her and threatened not to disclose to anybody. Thereafter, they fled away. PW-2 and PW-3 are the husband and the daughter of PW-1 respectively. After the incident PWs 1 and 2 went and informed one Santosh Hegde (PW-7) who told them to give a police complaint. On 1.5.2003 at about 9.00 p.m. First Information Report was lodged. The prosecutrix was subjected to medical examination and the same indicated that she was subjected to sexual intercourse around 12 hours prior to the time of examination. The trial Court found that the evidence of the prosecutrix and the husband is sufficient to fasten guilt on the accused persons and accordingly convicted them. In appeal, the High court by the impugned judgment upheld the conviction.

10. We are dismayed at the casual manner in which the criminal appeal has been disposed of. In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned judgment and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. As the matter is pending since long we request the High Court to explore the possibility of early disposal of Criminal Appeal No.693 of 2005.

11. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
D. Shanmukha Sundaramma vs D. Suneetha & Ors

5. The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

8, Stand of the claimant before the MACT and the High Court appears to be that the present appellant is being maintained by her son, but she has no one to depend upon.

9. Though there appears to be some substance in the plea of the insurer regarding the rate of interest, in the absence of any appeal by it, there is no scope for interfering with the rate. Had there been any appeal, there would be certainly scope for interference.

10. The only issue in the present appeal is the amount to which the present appellant i.e. the mother of the deceased would be entitled. Considering the peculiar facts of the case, the age of the widow and that of the present appellant, we think it would be appropriate to grant a sum of Rs.1,25,000/- (Rupees One Lakh and Twenty Five Thousand only) to the appellant and the balance to the claimant-wife i.e. the widow of the deceased.

11. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent without any order as to costs.
Binay Krishna vs Bihar State Housing Board

In response to an advertisement issued by the respondent-Bihar State Housing Board (for short, "the Board"), in 1978, the appellant deposited a sum of Rs.5,000/- for allotment of a plot. After thirteen years, he was informed about allotment of plot measuring 1825 sq. ft. and was asked to deposit Rs.35,530/-. The appellant deposited the required amount on 28.10.1991, but possession of the plot was not given to him. The complaint filed by the appellant was disposed of by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bihar (for short, "the State Commission") vide its order dated 6th July, 1995 whereby the Board was directed to pay interest on the amount of Rs.35,530/- @ 18% per annum from the date of deposit till the delivery of possession of the plot. The Board was also directed to pay Rs.30,000/- by way of compensation and Rs.1,000/- towards litigation cost. The Board challenged that order by filing an appeal before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short, "the National Commission") which was registered as ...2/-

On 2.1.2006, this Court, after taking note of the statement made by the appellant that he is very much interested in the plot because at the age of 76 years he has no shelter, directed him to approach the National Commission by filing appropriate application. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application for modification of order dated 4th July, 2005. The same was dismissed by the National Commission vide its order dated 11th August, 2006.

First Appeal No. 494/1995. By an order dated 8th February, 1996, the National Commission declined to stay the award of interest, but directed that the payment of Rs.30,000/- as compensation will not be enforced till disposal of the appeal, if the Board pays a sum of Rs.15,000/- within one month along with interest.

As the Board failed to comply with the aforesaid interim order, the National Commission by its order dated 29th November, 2001, dismissed the appeal. That order was set aside by this Court in C.A. No.2304 of 2004 and the National Commission was directed to dispose of the appeal on merits in accordance with law.

After remand, the National Commission passed the impugned order wherein it came to be recorded that the appellant made a statement that he was not interested in the allotment of plot. The National Commission reduced the rate of interest from 18% to 5% albeit without assigning any reason. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order passed by the National Commission on 4th July, 2005 in First Appeal No. 494 of 1995 and order dated 11th August, 2006, dismissing the application for modification are set aside and the appeal filed by the respondent-Board before the National Commission is dismissed. Consequently, the order passed by the State Commission is restored.
State Of Karnataka & Anr vs Ravi Kumar

The respondent claims that he was appointed as a cleaner on daily wage basis on 26.10.1979 in the office of the Assistant Executive Engineer, MLB Canal Ramdurg Sub-Divison. According to him he continued as a daily wager till 14.11.1984 when his services were dis-continued without any written order.

The respondent did not protest nor challenge the alleged termination. After 14 years he filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking a declaration that his termination from service was in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947('Act' for short) and for re-instatement as a cleaner with back wages from the date of his termination till date of reinstatement with continuity of service and other consequential benefits. The learned Single Judge of the High Court by order dated 16.3.1998 dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable, with an observation that the respondent may give a representation to the State Government and the State 2 Government may consider whether the dispute should be referred under Section 10(1)

Taking advantage of the said observation, respondent sought reference and the State Government made a reference to the Labour Court, Hubli. The respondent filed a claim before the Labour Court reiterating the reliefs claimed in the writ petition. The State Government was not a party before the Labour Court. The Asstt. Executive Engineer who was the sole respondent inter alia contended that the reference was stale having been made after 14 to 15 years and denied that respondent had served in his office. The Labour Court rejected the reference by its award dated 30.07.2001. The said award has been set aside by the High Court in a writ petition filed by the respondent, by order dated 23.03.2006 with a direction to the State Government and the Asstt. Executive Engineer to reinstate the respondent without any back wages. The said order is under challenge in this appeal by special leave.

We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court and restore the order of dismissal by the Labour Court, though on different grounds.
Krishna Kant Singh @ Baristar Singh vs Sasaram Bhabua Central Coop.Bank ...

By the impugned order the complaint filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the Commission on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The Commission has noted that the claim made on the Bank was lastly on 16th May, 1994 and the complaint was filed on 26th August, 1996, which was obviously beyond the period of limitation.

:2: period of about eight months and was released on bail only on 4th February, 1995 and therefore, he was prevented by a sufficient cause in not preferring the complaint within time.

We do not find any infirmity in the impugned order warranting our to interference. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
State Of U.P vs Gajadhar Singh & Ors

1. Challenge in the present appeals is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court allowing the appeal filed by the respondents. The respondents were found guilty of offence punishable under Sections 302, 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') by the trial Court. It is to be noted that two appeals were filed before the High Court by the convicted accused persons. Criminal Appeal No.2007/1997 was preferred by Gajadhar Singh (respondent No.1) and Criminal Appeal No.1963/1997 was preferred by Janardan Singh, Sarvajit Singh, Suresh Singh, Umesh Singh, Mritunjai Singh and Haribhan Chaudhury. The High Court dismissed the appeal of respondent No.1-Gajadhar but set aside the conviction so far as appellants in the other appeal before it. However, so far as Gajadhar is concerned his conviction in terms of Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC was altered and he was convicted under Section 323 read with Section 149 IPC. So far as other appellants are concerned their convictions under Section 302 and 307 both read with Section 149 IPC were set aside and instead they were convicted under Section 323 read with Section 149 IPC. The conviction under Section 147 IPC was affirmed.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

5. It is to be noted that conviction of Gajadhar for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC has been affirmed and the conviction for offence in terms of Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC has been altered. The appeal filed by the State of U.P. so far as accused Gajadhar-respondent No.1 is concerned appears to be without any substance. So far as other accused persons are concerned, the High Court has in great detail referred to the evidence and directed acquittal of the other accused persons.

7. In view of the aforesaid factual position, we are not inclined to interfere in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.
M. Gopalakrishnan vs State By Addl. S.P. Cbi, Bs&Fc Bangalore

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

18. On the basis of the above conclusions the claim of the accused that he should be discharged for want of sanction is not acceptable at present and the matter should be left open to be decided later on.

19. The High Court held that the question whether the appellant is removable from service by the Reserve Bank or the Central Government is really an academic interest because it is yet to be established that the impugned acts were done by the appellant in position of his official duty.

21. Above being the position, the High Court's view does not suffer from infirmity to warrant interference. The appeals fail and are dismissed.
Chinnaponnu vs State Of Tamil Nadu

4. The accused faced trial for alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. It was the prosecution version that in the course of sudden quarrel, the accused attacked Lakshmi (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') who was stated to be the second wife of one Samuvel. On 10.12.1994 the occurrence occurred. The accused faced trial and as noted above was convicted by the trial court. The appeal before the High Court was admitted considering the various grounds of challenge raised by the appellant. It appears from the impugned order of the High Court that the appellant's counsel did not appear when the matter was taken up and after hearing learned Additional Prosecutor, the appeal was disposed of.

9. We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. We set aside the impugned judgment and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh hearing.

10. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
M. Gopalakrishnan vs State By Addl. S.P. Cbi, Bs&Fc; ...

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

18. On the basis of the above conclusions the claim of the accused that he should be discharged for want of sanction is not acceptable at present and the matter should be left open to be decided later on.

19. The High Court held that the question whether the appellant is removable from service by the Reserve Bank or the Central Government is really an academic interest because it is yet to be established that the impugned acts were done by the appellant in position of his official duty.

21. Above being the position, the High Court's view does not suffer from infirmity to warrant interference. The appeals fail and are dismissed.
Vadamalai vs Syed Thastha Keer

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Accordingly, the complainant went to the Police Station. 2 In the Police Station, Ranganathan (Al), the Sub Inspector of Police enquired from a woman by the name Selvi in the Police Station about the complainant. Then the Sub Inspector of Police asked the complainant as to what happened to the jewels sold by the said Selvi to him. The complainant said he neither received nor purchased any jewels from her. Then, Al beat him with lathi on the back of his neck, back, etc. and A2 also beat him with lathi on his left thigh, back etc. Thereupon, as directed by Al, A2 put marble on the palm of the complainant and the same was pressed with force. Despite the torture, the complainant maintained that he was innocent. He was detained in the Police Station for about four days illegally.

Thereafter, he was brought back to the Police Station. On knowing this, his other three brothers came to the Police Station and requested Al to 3 release him. Al stated to them that unless the jewels were returned, the complainant would not be released and they would also be detained. On that day also, the complainant was beaten.

(2) According to the defence, on the complaint for theft registered on 14.4.1988 the complainant was interrogated on being identified by Selvi, the accused in that case at his shop and he voluntarily gave the gold ingot and the same was recovered from him in the presence of mahazar witnesses and as such there is no torture. This is the submission of A1 who was examined himself as DW1.
State Of Karnataka vs Ningappa @ Bhyrappa @ Ningegowda & Anr

4. Nine persons faced trial for alleged commission of offence punishable under Sections 143, 148, 149, 324, 114 read with Section 302 IPC. The prosecution related to an incident on 29.9.1995. The respondents were charged for alleged intentional commission of murder of one Venkatesha Gowda (hereinafter referred to as `deceased'). In order to substantiate the offence six witnesses were examined. The trial Court after analyzing the evidence on record, inter alia, concluded as follows:

5. The present respondents filed an appeal before the Karnataka High Court which was disposed of by the impugned judgment. We were shocked to find that the learned Single Judge by a cryptic and practically non- reasoned order has set aside the conviction of the respondents in respect of their conviction in terms of Section 304 Part-I and 304 Part-II respectively. There is practically no analysis of the evidence, more particularly of the eye-witness PWs. 1 to 3 and 9 and 10. They also claimed to have suffered injuries in the incident.

7. The Sessions Judge's order shows that he had analysed the evidence in great detail. The High Court did not make an effort to indicate as to how the conclusions were erroneous and/or contrary to evidence on record. The manner in which the appeal has been disposed of leaves much to be desired. 3 Such casual disposal of appeal setting aside the conviction, is neither proper nor desirable.

8. In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the High Court for a fresh consideration on merits. Needless to say, the High Court shall dispose of the appeal in accordance with law by a reasoned order.

9. The appeal is allowed.
Narayanan Rajendran And Anr vs Lekshmy Sarojini And Ors

3. The facts which are necessary to dispose of the appeal are recapitulated as under:

Historical Perspective:

Arrears:

Rationale behind permitting second appeal on question of law:

66. When Section 100 C.P.C. is critically examined then, according to the legislative mandate, the interference by the High Court is permissible only in cases involving substantial questions of law.

68. The High Court seriously erred in interfering with the findings of facts arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the first appellate court.

69. The scope of interference by the High Court in second appeal under section 100 CPC after 1976 Amendment is strictly confined to cases involving substantial questions of law. The High Court would not be justified in dealing with any second appeal without first formulating substantial question of law.

71. It is a matter of common experience in this court that despite clear enunciation of law in a catena of cases of this court, a large number of cases are brought to our notice where the High Court under section 100 CPC are disturbing the concurrent findings of fact without formulating the substantial question of law. We have cited only some cases and these cases can be easily multiplied further to demonstrate that this court is compelled to interfere in a large number of cases decided by the High Courts under section 100 CPC. Eventually this court has to set aside these judgments of the High Courts and remit the cases to the respective High Courts for deciding them de novo after formulating substantial question of law. Unfortunately, several years are lost in the process. Litigants find it both extremely expensive and time consuming. This is one of the main reasons of delay in the administration of justice in civil matters. 38

72. We have once again undertaken this exercise and tried to crystallize the legislative intention by referring to a number of cases decided by this court with the hope that now the High Courts would refrain from interfering with the concurrent findings of fact without formulating substantial question of law.

73. In this view of the clear legal position which emerges by the legislative intention and ratio of the judgments of aforementioned cases, the impugned judgment of the High Court is wholly unsustainable in law and is accordingly set aside and consequently the findings of the trial court as upheld by the first appellate court are restored.

74. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.

February 12, 2009.
Punjab State Electricity Board & Ors vs Jagjiwan Ram And Ors

2. With a view to give relief to the employees who were stagnating in particular positions for a long period of time, the Punjab State Electricity Board [for short, "the Board"] introduced a scheme for giving time bound promotional scales/increments on completion of 9/16/23 years of regular service. The same was circulated vide office order dated 23rd April, 1990, the relevant portions of which are extracted below:-

3. The respondents, who were engaged as work charged employees in the service of the Board between 18.11.1971 and 23.10.1993 and were appointed on regular basis on different dates between 7.11.1979 and 26.5.1999, filed writ petitions for issue of a direction to the Board and its officers to count their work charged service for the purpose of grant of time bound promotional scales/promotional increments from the date of completion of 9/16/23 years service.

with "continuous service". In our considered opinion under the terms and conditions of the circulars dated 2-6-1989 and 16-5- 1990, the respondent Rakesh Kumar would be entitled for being considered to have the selection grade on completion of 12 years from 29-1-1982 on which date he was duly appointed against a temporary post of Assistant Engineer on being selected by the Public Service Commission and not from any earlier point of time. The conclusion of the majority judgment in favour of Rakesh Kumar, therefore, cannot be sustained."

16. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned orders are set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
J.Kumaradasan Nair & Anr vs Iric Sohan & Ors

The said decree was put in execution by Fanuval Stephen, the Decree holder in Original Suit No.150 of 1965 being Execution Petition No.705 of 1977. Fanuval Stephen died on or about 28.3.1985. Respondent Nos.1 to 5 herein, being his heirs and legal representatives, were impleaded as 3 additional decree holder Nos.2 to 6 therein. The said execution petition was dismissed by an order dated 8.7.1996.

6. By an order dated 6.9.2005, the said objection petition was rejected. An appeal was preferred thereagainst on or about 3.10.2005 which was 4 marked as AS No.301 of 2005. The said appeal was held to be not maintainable by the learned First Appellate Court by an order dated 5.10.2005. However, the merit of the matter was also considered therein.

7. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order dated 6.9.2005, the appellants preferred an Execution Second Appeal before the High Court which was marked as Execution Second Appeal No.17 of 2005. By reason of a judgment and order dated 13.6.2008, the High Court disposed of the said second appeal opining that the First Appellate Court was not correct in entering into the merit of the matter despite holding that the appeal was not maintainable. The said appeal was disposed of, directing :

8. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said observations, a Revision Application was filed by the appellant on 30.6.2008 which was marked as C.R.P. No.593 of 2008(B). Along with the said application, an application for condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Act was also filed. However, later on the said application was withdrawn and an application under Section 14 thereof was filed. An affidavit was affirmed in support thereof, inter alia, stating :

15. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration thereof on merits. However, we would request the High Court to dispose of the revision application filed by the appellants herein as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order. We are making this unusual request keeping in view the fact that the respondents have obtained a decree as far back as in 1969. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

February 12, 2009