L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Modern Dental College &Res.Centre; & ... vs State Of M.P. & Ors

(e) The aforesaid directions would be without prejudice to the contentions raised in course of final hearing of the matters."

By a further interim order dated 7.10.2003, the High Court also issued certain direction regarding admission to students to state quota seats in medical and dental colleges.

College, Ujjain 2 College of Dental Rs.38,500/- Rs.1,46,000/-

15. In these writ petitions, this court on 10.8.2004 issued an interim direction that the fees prescribed by the Committee shall prevail for the time being though provisional and it would be open to the Colleges to take an undertaking from the students that in case higher fee is payable, they will pay the same.

Re : Civil Appeals

24. In view of our decision in the writ petitions, the civil appeals by the Colleges do not survive for consideration.

Conclusion

26. We, accordingly, allow these writ petitions in part as follows:

The State Government shall take all steps and do everything necessary to enable the said Fee Regulatory Committee to complete the process of fee fixation expeditiously.

(c) All questions are left open and nothing stated in the several orders of the High Court or by this Court shall be considered as expression of opinion in regard to fee structure for the said academic years (2003-04 and 2004-05) and the Fee Regulatory Committee shall determine the fees with reference to the facts, figures and material placed before it.

(e) If the fee determined by the Committee is less than what has been already recovered, the concerned College shall refund the excess fee collected to the respective student.

27. As no other point is urged and all the petitioners agreed that the only point that was to be decided was in regard to the fees, the remaining issues raised are not decided (and left open) as having become infructuous.

28. As a consequence, all the civil appeals are disposed of in view of the directions given while disposing of the writ petitions.

September 08, 2010.
Manjappa vs State Of Karnataka

2) The case of the prosecution is as under:

5) In order to establish the prosecution case, apart from examining PW-1, father of the victim, PWs-3 and 4 who accompanied the policemen to Bombay, victim herself was examined as PW-2. In her evidence, she informed that at the time of occurrence in 1997 she was studying in 6th standard and her date of birth is 31.07.1985. She also narrated how these accused persons took her to Bombay on the assurance that they would get a job for her. She also explained that after reaching Bombay, A-2 and A-3 had sold her for a sum of Rs. 5,000/-. She informed the Court that A-1 used to purchase girls and engage them for immoral purposes. She asserted that A-1 used to engage her daily for prostitution against her wish. Medical Report dated 28.08.1997 (Annexure P-2) clearly shows that she is below 18 years of age. From her date of birth, it can easily be presumed that at the time of occurrence i.e. in 1997, she was below 18 years. Her father, PW-1, also explained how his daughter was taken to Bombay and the agony undergone by her. PWs 3 and 4, both accompanied the policemen to Bombay were examined as panch witnesses. Considering the prosecution witnesses, particularly, PW-2, 6 whose statement and assertion are acceptable, the High Court rightly confirmed the conviction and enhanced the sentence to 7 years with a fine of Rs. 50,000/- each. Though learned counsel for the appellants pleaded for leniency in view of the conduct of the accused/appellants in taking a minor girl to a far away place, namely, Bombay and sold her for illegal and immoral purposes, we feel that it is not a fit case for reduction of sentence. In a case of this nature, it is just and proper that a deterrent sentence is to be imposed on the accused.

6) Looking from any angle and considering the fact that the victim was below 18 years as on the date of occurrence, the sentence of 7 years with a fine of Rs. 50,000/- awarded by the High Court is quite reasonable and acceptable. There is no valid ground for interference in the quantum of sentence. Both the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed.

SEPTEMBER 8, 2010 7
Ram Naresh vs State Of U.P

2. The facts of the case are as under:

The appellant thereupon fired one shot at Ram Vilas which hit him on the head. The firing also attracted P.Ws2 and 3 to the spot. The next morning Ram Vilas along with the injured Shiv Vilas went to Police Station, Makhi and a First Information Report was lodged for an offence punishale under Sections 307/34 IPC. On the completion of the investigation the accused were charged for the above offences. The trial court and the High Court have relied on the evidence of Ram Vilas P.W. 1 and Lalu P.W. 3 as eye witnesses of the occurrence, Shiv Vilas, in the meanwhile, having been murdered in some other incident.

5. It has been finally submitted by Mr. Kishore that as the incident had happened in the year 1978 and as 32 years had passed on some reduction in the sentence may be considered. We find merit in this plea. We, accordingly, reduce the sentence of the appellant from five to three years.

6. With this modification in the sentence, the appeal is dismissed.

7. Appellant be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining period of his sentence.
Syed Ashwaq Ahmed vs Jt.Secretary & Chief Passport Ofr.& Anr

2. The Petitioner claims to have been working as a travel agent, without being a member of TAAI, and has been acting on behalf of various clients since 1997 for submitting applications for obtaining passports on their behalf. It is also the Petitioner's case that he was issued with a Travel Agent Code number by the Passport Officer, Government of India, in the Ministry of External Affairs, the Respondent No.2 herein, to whom the applications would be submitted and after the applications had been accepted, the same would be processed by the said Officer upon payment of the prescribed service charge. According to the Petitioner, 3 guidelines were issued from time to time, but the said Respondent withdrew the entire system of recommending travel agents to deal with passport work and issued instructions that in respect of travel agents who were present before the passport office earlier, even if they were not members of TAAI, they would be permitted to continue to do the work which they had been performing. In order to avail of the said benefit, the travel agents, who were similarly placed as the Petitioner, filed applications for permission to continue the work which they had been performing. However, since the said applications were rejected by the authorities, the Petitioner was compelled to file this Special Leave Petition.

5. The matter was considered in some detail by the High Court which took the view that travel agents, who were not members of TAAI, had been recognized by the Department for the issuance of passports on behalf of their clients. Ultimately, all the matters which were filed before this Court were transferred to the various High Courts and fresh guidelines came to be issued on 18th July, 2000. As a one-time concession, agents who were working prior to 1992 were given the benefit of the scheme, even though they were not members of TAAI. The scheme was formulated on 18th July, 2000, and under the scheme travel agents who had been working from before 1992 continued to be recognized as travel agents, although, they were not members of TAAI. 6 Based on the aforesaid reasoning, the High Court held that once the scheme came into operation and a one-time concession was made in respect of travel agents who were working from before 1992 but were not members of TAAI, the Petitioner who commenced business as a travel agent from 1997, was not entitled to the benefit of the scheme. The High Court dismissed the Petitioner's writ petition upon holding that since the Petitioner was not a member of TAAI and was not also recognized as a travel agent prior to 1992, he was not entitled to the benefit of the scheme promulgated on 18th July, 2000.

10. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the decision of the High Court and the Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Pyare Mohan Lal vs State Of Jharkhand & Ors

3. Consequent to the bifurcation of the State of Bihar and formation of the State of Jharkhand, the services of the petitioner were allocated to the Jharkhand State by the order of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension (Department of Personnel and Training), New Delhi dated 28th March, 2001. The petitioner was appointed as a Sub-Judge, Ranchi, vide Notification dated 21st April, 2001, issued by the High Court of Jharkhand and, subsequently, the petitioner was placed at the disposal of the State of Jharkhand as Under Secretary-cum-Deputy Legal Remembrancer and Law Officer in the Law Department vide order dated 1st August, 2001.

26. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to state that in case there is a conflict between two or more judgments of this court, the judgment of the larger Bench is to be followed. More so, the washed off theory does not have universal application. It may have 18 relevance while considering the case of government servant for further promotion but not in a case where the employee is being assessed by the Reviewing Authority to determine whether he is fit to be retained in service or requires to be given compulsory retirement, as the Committee is to assess his suitability taking into consideration his "entire service record".

27. The instant case is to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.

(ii) Promptness in disposal - Out turn Poor

(iii) Net Result - Average 1997-98 (i) Promptness in Disposal - Average

(ii) Efficiency - Average

(iii) Net result - Average officer capable of improvement 1998-99 (i) Promptness in disposal - Average

(ii) Efficiency - Average

(iii) Net result - out-turn capable of improvement 1999-2000 (i) Promptness in disposal - Average

(ii) Efficiency - Average 19

(iii) Reputation - Some whispers are there but nothing concrete could be found.

2001-02 (i) Judgment - Average i.e. B

(ii) Efficiency - Average (B)

(iii) Integrity - Seriously Doubtful

Thus, the aforesaid submission made on behalf of the petitioner is preposterous.

33. In view of the above, we do not find any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned order. The petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Union Of India & Ors vs Hari Singh

4. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are recapitulated as under:

6. The respondent Contractor had sent a legal notice 4 to the General Manager, Northern Railways, Baroda House, New Delhi immediately after receiving the entire amount in pursuance to the settlement of his full and final claim with the appellant. The legal notice sent by the respondent did not even mention the fact of entering into the supplementary agreement with the appellant and receiving the entire amount of Rs.2,07,49,099/-. The respondent deliberately suppressed the material facts and thereafter filed an Arbitration Case No.34/2004 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The court without appreciating these facts, by an impugned judgment, referred the claim of the respondent-Contractor to the two arbitrators.

16. In a celebrated book, Russell on Arbitration, 19th Edn., p.396, it is stated that "an accord and satisfaction may be pleaded in an action on award and will constitute a good defence".

18. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment is unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed accordingly. The parties to bear their own costs.

.....................J (DALVEER BHANDARI) .....................J (DEEPAK VERMA) New Delhi;

September 10, 2010.
Commissioner Of Sales Tax U.P., Lucknow vs M/S. Sanjiv Fabrics

2.Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts essential for the adjudication of these appeals are:

C.A.Nos.6382-6383 of 2004 The appellant herein (hereinafter again referred to as "the dealer") was carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of oil and oil cakes and 6 was registered under Section 7 of the Act. It appears that during the assessment proceedings relating to the assessment years 1985-86 and 1986- 87, the Assessing Authority found that the dealer had issued Form `C' for the import of oil seeds from outside the State and had availed of the benefit of concessional rate of tax by issuing Form `C' in respect of the said item, which was not included in their registration certificate. Accordingly, a notice was issued to the dealer under Section 10(b) read with Section 10A of the Act to show-cause as to why penalty under the said provisions should not be levied on them.

Dealer's first appeal to the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) pertaining to the assessment years 1985-86 was partly allowed in as much as the quantum of penalty was reduced to Rs.1075/- but on merits, appeals for both the assessment years were rejected. Being aggrieved, the dealer preferred two second appeals before the Tribunal. Inter alia, observing that apart from the fact that in the application under Section 7(1) and 7(2) of the Act in Form `A', the word `oil seed', mentioned in an inappropriate column- 7 16-GHA was deleted, the dealer was also under a bona fide belief that they were authorized to purchase oil seeds against Form `C' as the department had been regularly issuing Form `C' to them for the purchase of oil seeds, the Tribunal set aside the penalty levied on the dealer under Section 10(b) of the Act.

(Emphasis supplied by us)

(Emphasis supplied by us)

25.Under the given circumstances, we are of the opinion that the explanations furnished by the dealers in both the cases require a fresh look by the authority competent to levy penalty under Section 10A of the Act, in light of the aforesaid enunciation of law.

26.Resultantly, both the appeals are allowed; the impugned judgments are set aside and all the appeals in both the cases are remitted back to the adjudicating authority for fresh consideration as to whether on the facts and circumstances of both the cases, penalties under Section 10(b) read with Section 10A of the Act are leviable. Needless to add that the said authority shall take fresh decisions on the merits of each case untrammelled by any observation in the impugned orders or by us in this judgment. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

SEPTEMBER 10, 2010.
Ch. Narayana Rao vs Union Of India & Ors

5. Thus, his letter of appointment clearly stipulated that it was not only ad-hoc but temporary too, terminable at any time without assigning any reasons. However, he continued in service, but after few years, an apprehension arose in the mind of the Appellant and other similarly situated stenographers that their services may be terminated. Thus, C.A. @ S.L.P.(C)No.16355/07 ... (contd.)

the Appellant and others were constrained to approach the Jabalpur Bench of the Tribunal by filing Original Application, claiming that the Respondent be restrained from terminating their services and they be regularised. Tribunal vide its order dated 23.10.1989 directed that the services of the Appellant and other similarly situated stenographers, be not terminated, instead they be regularised subject to qualifying requisite test. The operative part of the order of the Tribunal is reproduced hereinbelow:-

8. Aggrieved, Appellant submitted his representation with the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhopal on 06.08.1993 praying for regularisation of service from the date of his initial appointment and treating his full ad-hoc service as qualifying service for the purpose of pensionary benefits. Since, no fruitful results came forth on the Appellant's representation, he along with another employee, similarly situated, was constrained to file another O.A. No. 413 of 1999 before the Principal Bench of the Tribunal at Delhi which came to be allowed on 11.10.1999. It appears that while the said O.A. was heard, the counsel for Respondents had remained absent. Thus, the order came to be passed ex-parte.

10. The contention of the respondents from the very beginning had been that the Appellant was one among several persons who were appointed as stenographers (OG) on purely temporary and ad-hoc basis. However, they were given their regular appointment as stenographers (OG) in the department only from the date of passing the qualifying test with approval by the Staff Selection Commission. All those who had been appointed alongwith Appellant were treated alike and were given their regular appointment only from the date of their passing the requisite test. Thus, no case of discrimination was made out by the Appellant as likes were C.A. @ S.L.P.(C)No.16355/07 ... (contd.)

9. The Department, therefore, filed M.A. No. 593 of 2000 C.A. @ S.L.P.(C)No.16355/07 ... (contd.)

arrangement and not according to rules. It is, therefore, not correct to say, that the present cases can fall within the ambit of conclusion (B), even though they are squarely covered by the corollary in conclusion (A)."

22. We are, therefore, fortified in our reasoning as adopted in the aforesaid Appeal.

24. Thus, the appeal being devoid of any merit and substance is hereby dismissed but with no order to costs.

.........J. [DEEPAK VERMA] New Delhi September 10, 2010
N.O.I.D.A vs Army Welfare Housing Organisation & Ors

2. The facts leading to these appeals are as under:-

4. The stand of the writ petitioners was controverted by NOIDA and several pleas were raised.

10. The Court then went into the merits of the controversy and observed that the lease deeds executed by NOIDA with the 7 Civil Appeal No.3625/2006 various Housing Societies which were the writ petitioners, the basic covenants were the same and related primarily to paragraphs 2 to 4 and 12 to 14 and the Societies-writ- petitioners represented the interests of the members collectively and that the members were bound by the terms of the bye-laws of the Societies which postulated that the land allotted to the Societies would be handed over to the Societies for the construction of flats/apartments and on the basis of a lease deed executed between NOIDA and the Societies only.

13. The Writ Petitions were accordingly allowed in the following terms:

25. We are, however, not inclined to examine the implication of Section 5A for the simple reason that many of those who are likely to be affected by its interpretation are not parties to the Writ Petition.

31. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and to allow the appeals and dismiss the writ petitions. We do so, however, with no order as to costs.
State Of Karnataka vs Azad Coach Builders Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

7. The assessee claimed exemption on sales of bus bodies as penultimate sales in the course of export made to their customers like Telco Bombay and others which was rejected by the Assessing Authority, treating the transactions as interstate sales, on the ground that the `bus bodies' and `buses' are two different commodities and the bus bodies as such were not exported, but complete buses. The Assessing Authority held that the transactions could not amount to penultimate sale eligible for exemption under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of CST Act.

8. Aggrieved by the assessment order dated 21.3.1995, the assessee approached the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Bangalore Division under Section 20(5) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. The appeal was rejected upholding the levy of tax by the Assessing Authority on the ground that the goods exported was different from the goods purchased and hence, the assessee was not entitled to exemption under Section 5(3) of the CST Act. The 7 matter was taken up in appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and the appeal was rejected vide order dated 14.8.1996.

27. We may also indicate that the burden is entirely on the assessee to establish the link in transactions relating to sale or purchase of goods and to establish that the penultimate sale is inextricably connected with the export of goods by the exporter to the 21 foreign buyer, which in this case the assessee has succeeded in establishing.

29. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that the assessee has succeeded in satisfying those tests and hence, eligible for exemption under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the CST Act.

30. We, therefore, find no error in the decision rendered by the High Court in declaring that the assessee is entitled to exemption under Section 5(3) of the CST Act. The Reference is accordingly answered and the appeals stand dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

September 14, 2010.
Subhan Rao & Anr vs Parvathi Bai & Ors

2. The relationship of the parties is depicted in the chart given below:

3. Shiddoji Rao was Pargana Watandar of Nagarmanoli, Chikkodi Taluk. He owned agricultural lands in Belagali and Kabbur villages of Chikkodi Taluk, Belgam District. He kept Gangubai as his mistress. Ramchandra Rao was born from that relationship. Shiddoji Rao died on 16.1.1942. About four months before his death, Shiddoji Rao executed maintenance deed Ex.P-1 (his son Sadasiv Rao joined his father in executing the deed), 3 whereby possession of Rayatawa lands situated at Belagali and Kabbur villages was given to Ramchandra Rao for his maintenance with a stipulation that in case of his death without having natural male issue, his wife shall enjoy the lands for her maintenance till her life time and the same shall revert to the executants after her death. The deed also contained a condition that Ramchandra Rao, his wife and natural heirs shall not create any encumbrance or alienate the lands. The relevant portions of Ex.P-1 are extracted below:

4. Ramchandra Rao died in 1957 and Smt. Sundrabai died in 1979. During her life time, Smt. Sundrabai executed sale deeds in favour of Smt. Parvathi Bai (defendant No.1 - respondent No.1) and S/Shri Deepak and Vinayak (defendant Nos. 2 and 3 - respondent Nos.2 and 3) in respect of some of the lands specified in Ex. P-1.

5. Subhan Rao (adopted son of Sadashiv Rao) (appellant No.1 herein) and Smt. Prafulla Devi wife of Sadashiv Rao who is now represented by her legal representatives, filed O.S. No. 62/1974 for declaration of title and for setting aside the sale deeds executed by Smt. Sundrabai, who was impleaded as defendant No.4 in the suit. After the death of Smt. Sundrabai, Smt. Ningawwa and Prakash Virupaksh Mahajan (respondent Nos. 4 and 5) were brought on record as her legal representatives on the basis of registered Will executed by the deceased. Appellant Nos.1 and 2 filed another suit being O.S. No. 116/1982 for grant of injunction to restrain the defendants from alienating the suit lands.

6. The thrust of the case set up by the appellants was that Shiddoji Rao and Sadashiv Rao executed deed of maintenance, which has also been described as `potagi patra' with a view to provide maintenance to Ramchandra Rao (illegitimate son of Shiddoji Rao) and his wife Smt. 6 Sundrabai during their lifetime and as both of them died issueless, the lands automatically reverted to the family of the executants. They also pleaded that in view of the express bar contained in Ex.P-1 against alienation of the lands mentioned therein, the sale deeds executed by Smt. Sundrabai in favour of respondent Nos.1 to 3 were nullity and they did not acquire any right on the basis of such alienation.

(emphasis supplied)

17. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own cost.