L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
N.Srihari(D) Tr.Lrs.& Ors vs N.Prakash & Ors

3. On 6th March, 1969 three documents were executed and registered. By one document Smt. N. Chandramma and Smt. N. Pentamma executed a Settlement Deed bearing Registration No. 467 in favour of Smt. Sulochana W/o Shri N. Sathaiah Goud in respect of the land to the extent of 2982 square yards from their joint holding. By another document, Smt. Chandramma transferred her life interest in the property in favour of Smt. Pentamma; and by the third document Smt. Sulochana W/o Shri N. Sathaiah Goud executed a Disclaimer Deed, disclaiming any right or interest in the properties, that stood jointly vested with Smt. Pentamma and Smt. Chandramma i.e. the land to the extent of acres 21.05 guntas.

4. The elder son of Smt. N. Pentamma, namely, Shri N. Srihari filed a suit in 1977 for partition against his mother Smt. N. Pentamma 3 and grand mother Smt. Chandramma and his brothers. However, the said suit was compromised on 20th October, 1981 after expiry of their father Shri N. Balrajaiah on 24th May, 1981.

5. In December 1984, the sons of Shri N. Sathaiah Goud claimed the entire share of Smt. N. Chandramma through a Will executed by her on 28th September, 1979 in their favour and it was found in a box after her death on 23rd April, 1984. It is on the basis of this Will dated 28th September, 1979, that Original Suit No. 456 of 1984 was filed by the respondents/plaintiffs in the court of Principal Sub-Judge, Ranga Reddy District. The said Suit was renumbered as O.S. No. 9 of 1993. In the said Suit, the present petitioners have been impleaded as defendants along with their mother Smt. N. Pentamma. They filed the written statements admitting Will dated 2.1.1956 and all other documents. However, it was contended that the Will dated 2nd January, 1956 had created only leasehold rights in favour of the beneficiaries, Smt. N. Chandramma and Smt. N. Pentamma and lost its significance once the protected tenancy rights had been converted into freehold rights as they purchased the suit property for consideration from the landlord Shri Krishnan. 4

Against the said order, S.L.P.(C) No.11716 of 2009 has been filed. In view of the order, we are going to pass in other connected matters considering the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it is not necessary to deal with this special leave petition and it is hereby rejected.

12. The remaining two special leave petitions filed by the original defendants are against the same judgment and order. They were heard together and disposed of by common order.

18. The facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant review of the impugned judgment. All the petitions lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.

.................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) ..............................

...J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN) New Delhi, October 29, 2010 12
Malayalam Plantations Ltd vs State Of Kerala & Anr

Brief facts:

(1999) 6 SCC 92 holding that such areas should not be considered for exemption in the absence of proof that they were actually used in 1971. The Government's appeal was 5 partially allowed and the appellant's Cross Appeal claiming the whole area was dismissed. Since the Cross Appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed and appeal filed by the State was allowed by the Division Bench by the impugned judgment, both the appellant and the State Government have filed the above appeals.

19. In the circumstances, the judgments of the Kerala High Court impugned in these appeals are set aside and the cases are remanded to the appropriate forest tribunals: namely, the Forest Tribunal, Manjeri with respect to Civil Appeal Nos.

106-107 of 1982; the Forest Tribunal, Palghat with respect to Civil Appeal No. 2050 of 1981; and the Forest Tribunal, Calicut with respect to Civil Appeal Nos. 557-61 and 1214- 18 of 1981. The Tribunals shall determine the extent of the lands required, as aforesaid, for fuel for the smoke-houses or factories as well as for the employees in the estates."

12) Adducing additional evidence is in the interest of justice. Evidence relating to subsequent happening or 1 events which are relevant for disposal of the appeal, however, it is not open to any party, at the stage of appeal, to make fresh allegations and call upon the other side to admit or deny the same. Any such attempt is contrary to the requirements of Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. Additional evidence cannot be permitted at the Appellate stage in order to enable other party to remove certain lacunae present in that case.

14) For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits as to whether application for reception of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC should be allowed or not, which shall be decided by the High Court in accordance with law. We also make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the claim made by both parties except the reasons indicated in the earlier paragraphs. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly, the issue is pending from 1975, we request the High Court to restore MFA No. 537 of 1995 and Cross Appeal on its file and dispose of the same at an early date preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. Civil Appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above, however, with no order as to costs.

NOVEMBER 9, 2010.
J&K National Panthers Party vs The Union Of India & Ors

2. Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party, a recognized political party in the State of Jammu and Kashmir has filed this appeal before this Court seeking to impugn the judgment of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, dated 2nd of June 2009. 1 The High Court dismissed both the writ petitions which raised identical questions. They were heard together and disposed of by the impugned judgment.

(3) The Delimitation Commission shall determine the delimitation of Assembly Constituencies in the State within such period as may be specified by the Governor."

24. Even Justice S.C. Agrawal, who partly dissented with the majority, agreed with the majority opinion on this aspect of the matter by holding as under:-

27. It is, therefore, clear that there is an express constitutional bar to any challenge being made to the delimitation law which is made under Constitutional provisions. Therefore, the substantial challenge of the appellant in this proceeding is not to be entertained by any Court, including this Court. The other aspect of the question is that the amendment to Section 47(3) of the Constitution of J & K violates 19 Basic Structure of the Constitution. This challenge is also not based on a sound principle.

part IV in toto.

(o) The balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.

(p) The Parliamentary system of government.

(q) The principle of free and fair elections.

(r) Limitations upon the amending power conferred by Art. 368.

(s) Independence of the judiciary; but within the four corners of the Constitution and not beyond that.

(t) Independent and efficient judicial system.

(v) Effective access to justice."

(see page 2236-2238)

30. Of these features `free and fair election' in Clause (r) comes closest with the question discussed in this case.

32. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court does not find any merit in the appeal and which is accordingly dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
J&K; National Panthers Party vs The Union Of India & Ors

2. Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party, a recognized political party in the State of Jammu and Kashmir has filed this appeal before this Court seeking to impugn the judgment of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, dated 2nd of June 2009. 1 The High Court dismissed both the writ petitions which raised identical questions. They were heard together and disposed of by the impugned judgment.

(3) The Delimitation Commission shall determine the delimitation of Assembly Constituencies in the State within such period as may be specified by the Governor."

24. Even Justice S.C. Agrawal, who partly dissented with the majority, agreed with the majority opinion on this aspect of the matter by holding as under:-

27. It is, therefore, clear that there is an express constitutional bar to any challenge being made to the delimitation law which is made under Constitutional provisions. Therefore, the substantial challenge of the appellant in this proceeding is not to be entertained by any Court, including this Court. The other aspect of the question is that the amendment to Section 47(3) of the Constitution of J & K violates 19 Basic Structure of the Constitution. This challenge is also not based on a sound principle.

part IV in toto.

(o) The balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.

(p) The Parliamentary system of government.

(q) The principle of free and fair elections.

(r) Limitations upon the amending power conferred by Art. 368.

(s) Independence of the judiciary; but within the four corners of the Constitution and not beyond that.

(t) Independent and efficient judicial system.

(v) Effective access to justice."

(see page 2236-2238)

30. Of these features `free and fair election' in Clause (r) comes closest with the question discussed in this case.

32. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court does not find any merit in the appeal and which is accordingly dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
Indian Oil Corp.Ltd.& Ors vs Subrata Borah Chowlek And Anr

6. As stated above, the appellants had pleaded that the delay in filing the appeal was unintentional and bona fide in as much as on receiving an uncertified copy of the judgment, they sought legal opinion from their local lawyer on 7th May 2009, which was received by them on 21st May 2009. Thereafter, the same was forwarded to the General Manager (HR), Refinery Headquarters, New Delhi on 28th May 2009. Vide his letter dated 6th June 2009, the said General Manager sought some documents, including a certified copy of the judgment. Subsequently, the General Manager forwarded the case file to the company's legal advisors at New Delhi on 18th June 2009. The said legal advisors gave their opinion on 7th July 2009, advising the appellants to file an appeal against the judgment of the Single Judge; the proposal was approved by the headquarters of the appellants; whereafter the case file was handed over to the counsel for preparing and filing the appeal, which was ultimately filed on 29 th July 2009.

12.Examined on the touch-stone of the afore-noted observations, we are of the view that in the present case, the conduct of the appellants does not indicate inaction, negligence or mala fides. The explanation furnished for the marginal delay of 59 days, in our opinion, constitutes a sufficient cause and therefore, deserves to be accepted.

13.For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are allowed; the impugned judgment is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the Division Bench of the High Court for consideration on merits. There shall be no order as to costs.

NOVEMBER 12, 2010.
Bhim @ Uttam Ghosh vs State Of West Bengal

3. Since learned counsel for the appellant has addressed us only on the question of applicability of the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care 1 and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short "the 2000 Act") to the facts of the case, we deem it unnecessary to state the facts, leading to the filing of this appeal, except to the extent that the incident, resulting in injuries to the victim took place on 6th March 1983. The first information report (for short "the FIR") was lodged and registered on 21st March, 1983 against the appellant and four other persons. Chargesheet was filed on 13th June 1983 against all the accused; who were tried for offences under Sections 306 and 148 of the IPC and ultimately, vide judgment dated 22nd February 1986, the Additional Sessions Judge, convicted the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC and acquitted the other four accused. The appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- with default stipulation.

4. Aggrieved by the order of conviction, the appellant carried the matter in appeal before the High Court. As afore-stated, the High Court, vide the impugned judgment has dismissed the appeal.

6. Vide order dated 22nd October 2010, this Court had directed the respondent-State to make inquiry so as to determine the age of the appellant. Pursuant thereto, affidavit dated 9th November 2010, has been filed by a Sub-Inspector of Police, Birbhum (West Bengal), on behalf of the State, stating that as per the records available with the Board of Secondary Education (West Bengal), the date of birth of the accused is 4th January 1968, which shows that the age of the appellant as on the date of commission of offence i.e. 6th March 1983, was 15 years, 2 months and 2 days.

17. In the instant case, according to the report submitted on behalf of the State, the appellant was about 15 years old at the time of the commission of the offence. The correctness of the report is not in question and, therefore, in light of the afore-stated legal position, the appellant has to be held to be a juvenile, within the meaning of Section 2(l) of the amended 2000 Act, and is to be governed by the provisions of the said Act.

18. Having held so, the next question for consideration is as to what order of sentence is to be passed against the appellant, who stands convicted 8 for offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, correctness whereof is not put in issue before us. The appellant is now aged about 42 years. Keeping his age in view, we feel that it would not be conducive for the environment of the special home, particularly to the interest of other juveniles housed therein, to send the appellant there or to keep him at some other place, as postulated in Section 16 of the 2000 Act for the remaining period in terms of Section 15 of the said Act.

19. Accordingly, while sustaining the conviction of the appellant, we quash the sentence awarded to him and direct his release forthwith, if not required in any other case. The appeal succeeds partly, to the extent indicated above.

NOVEMBER 12, 2010 9
Ishwar Nagar Coop House Building ... vs Parma Nand Sharma & Ors

3. The respondent-1, Dr. Parmanand Sharma was enrolled as a member of the appellant society vide membership No. 35 on 11th March 1961. In 1968, he purchased a property bearing No. A-19/A, Kailash Colony, New Delhi in the name of his Hindu Undivided Family consisting of respondent-1, his wife and two minor children in 1968 and a structure was constructed thereon in 1969. According to the appellant-society, this construction is a residence-cum-

The action of the society expelling the respondent-1 was approved by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies on 17th May 1978. On 26th February 1980, an application was filed by respondent-1 under Section 60 of the Act for reference of dispute to arbitration. The reference was dismissed on 5th November, 1980. Being aggrieved, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court, wherein the High Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 28/03/2008 3 4 held that 19/A, Kailash Colony, Delhi was being used for running a nursing home, i.e., for a commercial purpose and therefore, that would not constitute a violation of Rule 25 of the Rules. By the said order, the HC set aside the expulsion orders.

operative Societies Rules, 1950. There was no prohibition whatsoever at the relevant time for a person who was a member of the co-operative society from purchasing any property. Subsequently, on 24.4.1973, the Delhi Co-

operative society under sub-rule (2), shall not be entitled to exercise rights of memberships or incur liability as member with effect from the date referred to in sub-rule (2) but as from the date he becomes a creditor of the co-operative society in respect of the amount due to him on account of paid up share capital, deposit, cost of land deposited or any other amount paid by him to the co-operative society as its member. As from the date of his ceasing to be a member or the society under sub-rule (2), the amount standing to his credit shall be paid to him by the co-

Issue III

Issue IV

24. We have considered the facts and circumstances of the case, and analysed the arguments put forth by both parties to buttress their stand. For the reasons that we have considered herein and mentioned above, we find that the arguments raised by respondent-1 are without merit, and the appeal therefore, is to be allowed.

............................................J [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma ] ............................................J [ Anil R. Dave ] New Delhi, November 15, 2010.
M/S. Technoglobe vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors

5. Accordingly, the CTO included the entire sales turnover made by the appellant to the Corporation in the taxable turnover for the said year and subjected the same to sales tax under Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (for short "the Act"), thereby creating an additional tax demand of `26,57,388/-. In addition the CTO also imposed a penalty of `39,86,082/- under Section 12(5)(b)(v) of the Act.

7. Faced with the threat of recovery of the aforestated tax demands, the appellant issued a legal notice to the three respondents herein on 1st 3 February 1999, requesting, inter alia, the Corporation to furnish the Government Order granting sales tax exemption, as mentioned in their purchase orders and, in the alternative to pay the sales tax, penalty and surcharge levied on the appellant by the CTO. However, there was no response to the said notice from any of the respondents.

8. On 1st December 1999, the CTO served a legal notice on the appellant, stating that since the arrears of sales tax had not been paid, the house property of the proprietress was being attached, and would be brought to public auction.

9. The appellant, thereafter, approached the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal (for short "the Tribunal") praying that the Corporation be directed to pay the arrears of sales tax, surcharge and penalty levied on them. The Tribunal, vide its order dated 6th July 2000, rejected the petition of the appellant, observing that:

10. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred a writ petition before the High Court. As afore-mentioned, the High Court has rejected the writ petition of the appellant, inter alia, holding that:

6. This order issues with the concurrence of Industries Commerical Taxes and Religious Endowments, Energy and Finance Departments vide their U.O. Nos.

21. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed; the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration, particularly in light of the notification dated 27th June, 1994. The parties are left to bear their respective costs.

NOVEMBER 16, 2010.
Pepsico India Holdings Pvt.Ltd vs Food Inspector & Anr

2. On 25th October, 2006, the Food Inspector of Mobile Vigilance, Kozhikode, inspected the premises of Star Marketing, Ashoka Puram, Door No.5/1589, under Kozhikode Municipal Corporation and purchased three two-litre bottles of Pepsi on payment of the price. The said bottles were sealed and subsequently, on 26th October, 2006, one part of the sample was forwarded to the Public Analyst, Kozhikode. On 28th November, 2006, the Public Analyst submitted his report stating that upon analysis of the sample of Pepsi Sweetened 5 Carbonated Water, using the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS) method, pesticide residue- Carbofuran, to the extent of 0.001 mg per litre was detected therein. The said sample was, therefore, adulterated within the meaning of Rule 65 of the 1955 Rules and Section 2(ia)(h) of the 1954 Act.

3. Based upon the report of the Public Analyst, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kozhikode, took cognizance of the offence and issued process against the Appellants.

4. The Appellants moved the Kerala High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the aforesaid order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kozhikode. The learned Single Judge by his order dated 19th February, 2009, dismissed the said application and directed the prosecution to continue with the case. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the Appellant-Company, 6 M/s. Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd., and its Directors have filed these appeals challenging the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate on various grounds.

41. Having considered the matter in its totality and also having regard to the fact that Somesh Dahale had been nominated under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the 1954 Act to be a person in charge 44 of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business, we are of the view that the Appeals have to be allowed.

42. We, accordingly, allow the appeals and set aside the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge impugned in these proceedings and quash the prosecution of the Appellants in respect of the various complaints challenged before the High Court in its inherent jurisdiction.
M/S. Xerox India Ltd vs Commnr. Of Customs, Mumbai

2) The appellants are engaged in the trading of High Technology reproduction and Duplicating machines, printers and Multi-Functional Machines capable of discharging number of functions. During the period March, September and November, 1999, the appellants imported Xerox Regal 5799, Xerox Work Centre XD100 and Xerox work Centre XD 155df respectively and filed Bills 1 of Entry before the Customs Officer. The appellants sought classification of these imported machines under Sub-Heading 8471.60 of the Act. The Deputy Commissioner of Customs, vide his order dated 22.02.2000 classified the imported machines under Chapter Heading 8479.89 (Residual Heading) of the Act. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellants filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), Mumbai, who by his order dated 27.02.2000, rejected the appeal and thereby confirmed the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Customs. The appellants questioned the said order before Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as, "the Tribunal"). The Tribunal, by its order dated 5.11.2002, has rejected the appeal and has confirmed the order passed by the First Appellate Authority. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, the present appeal has been preferred under Section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962.

15) In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the correct classification for the imported Multi-Functional Machines involved in this case, namely models Xerox Regal 5799, Xerox Workcentre XD 100 and Xerox Workcentre XD 155df should be under Customs Tariff Chapter heading 84.71.60. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal in Appeal No. C/300/2002-B dated 05.11.2002 is set aside. Parties to bear their own costs.