Oriental Bank Of Commerce & Anr vs R.K. Uppal

2. The brief facts leading to the above questions are these :

3. On March 17, 2003, Shri M.K. Ghosh, Commissioner for Departmental Inquiries, Central Vigilance Commission, was appointed inquiring authority to inquire into the above charges levelled against the delinquent.

4. The delinquent submitted his reply and denied the charges. The inquiring authority after recording the evidence submitted its report on November 11, 2003. Charge I and Charge II were held to be partly proved while Charge III and Charge IV were held to be proved.

5. The findings and report of the inquiring authority were sent to the delinquent who in response submitted his representation on December 15, 2003. The disciplinary authority concurred with 3 the findings of the inquiring authority and keeping in view the seriousness of charges and gravity of the proved conduct, it imposed the penalty of dismissal vide order dated February 14, 2004.

6. The delinquent preferred appeal under regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations assailing his dismissal order on diverse grounds and also requested for grant of personal hearing. The appellate authority rejected the delinquent's request for personal hearing and dismissed his appeal vide its order dated June 4, 2004.

7. The delinquent challenged the order of penalty dated February 14, 2004 and also the order of the appellate authority before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The Division Bench of that Court vide its order dated January 23, 2006 allowed the delinquent's writ petition partly and set aside the order of the appellate authority and remitted the matter back to it with a direction to pass a reasoned order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is this order which is impugned in the present appeal.

19. A right of appeal is not an inherent right. None of the facets of natural justice requires that there should be right of appeal from any decision. The extent of power of an appellate forum and the mode and manner of its exercise can always be provided in the 8 AIR 1968 SC 850 15 provision that creates such right. Insofar as provision of appeal in regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations is concerned, it must be stated that the said provision affords to an employee right of appeal against an order imposing upon him any of the penalties specified in regulation 4 or against the order of suspension referred to in regulation 12. It provides for limitation within which the appeal is to be preferred. As per the said provision, the appeal must be addressed to the appellate authority and submitted to the authority whose order is appealed against. The authority whose order is appealed against is required to forward the appeal together with its comments and also the record of the case to the appellate authority. The appellate authority then proceeds with the consideration of the appeal and considers whether the findings are justified; whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and passes appropriate order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority that imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. The appeal provision in regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations does not expressly provide for personal hearing to the appellant. Is the right of personal hearing to the appellant 16 implicit in the provision? We think not. In our considered view, in the absence of personal hearing to the appellant, it cannot be said that the very right of appeal is defeated. One situation is, however, different. Where the appellate authority proposes to enhance the penalty, obviously, the appellate authority must issue notice to the delinquent asking him to show cause why penalty that has been awarded to him must not be enhanced and give him personal hearing. It is so because the appellate authority seeks to inflict such punishment for the first time which was not given by the disciplinary/punishing authority. Although there are no positive words in regulation 17, requiring that the appellant shall be heard before enhancement of the penalty, the fairness and natural justice require him to be heard.

Having discussed the matter as above, the appellate authority held that on consideration of the inquiry record and facts and circumstances of the case, the findings and the order dated February 14, 2004 passed by disciplinary authority are based on evidence brought on record of inquiry and not founded on past record or any other matter not connected with inquiry as alleged by the delinquent in the appeal. Consequently, the appellate authority concurred with the view of the disciplinary authority and found no justification to interfere with the penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority.

23. The order of the appellate authority, by no stretch of imagination can be said to suffer from vice of lack of reasons. We answer question no. (two) in the negative.

24. In our view, the High Court was clearly in error in setting aside and quashing the order dated June 4, 2004 passed by the appellate authority and in directing the appellate authority to pass a 22 reasoned order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner (respondent herein).

25. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the judgment and order dated January 23, 2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana is set aside. The parties shall bear their own costs.

(R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI.

AUGUST 11, 2011.