L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Tushar D. Bhatt vs State Of Gujarat & Ors

3. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are recapitulated as under:-

4. On 30.9.1999, the appellant was transferred to Bhuj. However, he did not join duty at Bhuj and after a period of 20 days, i.e. on 04.10.1999, he sent a fax message of illness of his mother. Though the appellant was relieved on 05.10.1999 from Rajkot, yet he did not join duty at Bhuj and instead he entered into correspondence with respondent no.2. The appellant was given personal hearing in November 1999 by respondent no. 2. Even after his advice, he did not join duty at Bhuj.

5. The Assistant Commissioner, Bhuj again on 04.01.2000 called upon the appellant to immediately join the duty, but the appellant not comply with his direction. The appellant on 17.01.2000 filed a reply to the show cause notice and bluntly refused to join duty at Bhuj. Ultimately, by an order dated 08.03.2000 the appellant was suspended from the service pending enquiry. It was only thereafter he made a symbolic report on 27.4.2000 at Bhuj with condition in pursuance of the order of transfer dated 30.9.1999.

7. The appellant was given full opportunity to defend his case in the inquiry. The Inquiry Officer in his detailed report found the appellant guilty of all the charges levelled against him and sent his report to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority concurred with the same and the appellant was served with second show cause notice issued by respondent no. 3 calling upon him to show cause within 15 days as to why one of the punishments indicated in Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules should not be imposed. He sent his reply on 12.11.2001 followed by his second reply dated 10.12.2001. In view of the serious allegations levelled by the appellant against respondent no.2, he decided to refer the matter to the highest authority - the State of Gujarat for passing appropriate orders in the matter and after considering the replies dated 5 12.11.2001 and 10.12.2001 respondent no. 1 by his impugned order dated 22.5.2002 dismissed the services of the appellant.

14. The Division Bench was not oblivious of the fact of the limited jurisdiction which it has in the appeal but in the interest of justice they gave full length hearing to the appellant and decided every aspect of the matter.

18. In the instant case, the matter has been thoroughly examined by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and we have also examined the matter in great detail. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, no interference is called for in the impugned judgment. The appeal being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their costs.
State Of Punjab & Ors vs Inder Mohan Chopra & Ors

2. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing two petitions filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Cr.P.C.'). Respondent had made prayer that the FIR No. 152 dated 12.7.2002 registered under Section 36 of the Punjab Apartment and Property Regulations, 1995 (in short the `Regulation') at police station Sultanwind, Amritsar,should be quashed. The complaint was filed on the premises that the total area alleged to have sold was 1861.16 Sq. Yards which was jointly held by four real brothers and the individual shares comes to 465.29 Sq. Yards. It was alleged that the accused persons had sold joint family property by conveying land into an unauthorised colony in violation of the provisions of the Act and each one of them was therefore guilty of offence punishable under Section 36 of the Act read with Section 120 (B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). The respondents in the petition filed before the High Court stated that the individual shares come below 465.29 sq. yards and, therefore, there was no violation. The stand of the appellant before the High Court was that by selling 1861.16 Sq. Yards in a joint Khasra to different purchasers, the accused person had violated the provisions of the Act and, therefore, they were rightly proceeded against. Reference was made under Section 2(k) of the Act which shows that the expression `Person' includes a `company, firm, cooperative society, joint family and `body of persons' whether incorporated or not. Therefore, it was 2 pleaded that the joint holders are to be treated as one person in the eye of law in such prosecutions. The High Court accepted the stand of the respondents by holding that even if the property continued to be joint, it cannot be said that the venders had sold anything more than their respective shares.

11. It appears that the High Court has come to an abrupt conclusion that the individual shares could be less than 1000 Sq.m. That is not the relevant aspect for consideration of the issues raised. Therefore, the impugned orders of the High Court are unsustainable and are quashed. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the cases which are to be adjudicated in trial.

12. The appeals are allowed.
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs Assistant Comnr.Of Police ...

3. Since the facts in both the appeals are identical and since the same legal questions arise in both the appeals, reference is being made to the facts in the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.2359 of 2006. Appellant is a Corporation constituted and registered under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1951, indisputably, for the purpose of plying of buses on various routes falling within the State of Uttar Pradesh and National Capital Territory of Delhi. Several agreements as envisaged under sub-section (5) 3 of Section 88 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called and referred to for the sake of brevity as `the Act') were executed.

5. In the first appeal, a bus of the appellant Corporation bearing Registration No.UP 14 Q 8755, driven by one Shri Shiv Lal was found overtaking another four wheel vehicle bearing Registration No. DL 1 LD 6452 and, thus, purported to have violated the conditions as enshrined in the directions of this Court. A proceeding under Sections 3/181, 66(i)/92A of the Act was initiated.

6. Respondent, as a purported consequence of the penalty imposed upon the driver of the said vehicle, initiated a proceeding under Section 86 of the Act, directing :

9. Without preferring a Letters Patent Appeal thereagainst, a Special Leave Petition was filed. The same was dismissed as withdrawn. Thereafter a Letters Patent Appeal was filed against the said order dated 10.8.2004. It is, however, stated that another special leave petition filed in identical matter was dismissed.

C. We, direct that this Order will be carried out notwithstanding any other order or directions by any authority, Court or Tribunal, and that no authority shall interfere with the functioning of the police and transport department in so far as implementation and execution of these directions is concerned."

35. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. They are set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed and consequently the orders impugned in the writ petitions will stand quashed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

February 12, 2009
Santokh Singh vs State Of Punjab

The prosecution presentation is, thus, to the effect that it was the appellant who fired the fatal shot at deceased Gurdip Singh. The prosecution version was testified on oath at the trial by HC Surain Singh (PW 1), Dr-. Kulwant Singh (PW 2), Dr. Gurmanjit Rai (PW 3), Gurdial Singh (PW 4), Dr. Vijay Kumar Sethi (PW 5), Joginder Singh (PW 6), Satnam Singh (PW 7), Jagjit Singh Patwari (PW 8), ASI Jagdev Singh (PW

16. Considering the background facts it is clear that the appellant cannot be said to have exercise the right of private defence. However, there is substance in the plea that the occurrence took place in the course of a 12 sudden quarrel. That being so the conviction is altered from Section 302 IPC to 304 Part I IPC, custodial sentence of ten years would meet the ends of justice.

17. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

.....................................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi, February 12, 2009 13
Hindustan Coop. Housing ... vs Registrar Coop.Societies & Anr

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

On 01.07.2006 appellant society then filed a Review Petition being 268 of 2006 and on 1.9.2006 the High Court issued notice. On 19.1.2007 the High Court dismissed review petition.

3. A member who ceases to be a member of a co-operative society under sub-rule (2) shall not be entitled to exercise rights of memberships or incur liability as member with effect from the date referred to in sub-rule (2) but as from the date he becomes a creditor of the co-operative society in respect of the amount due to him on account of paid up share capital, deposit, cost of land deposited or any other amount paid by him to the co operative society as its member. As from the date of his ceasing to be a member or the society under sub-rule (2), the amount standing to his credit shall be paid to him by the co-operative society within 3 months and when the co-operative society is already under liquidation, the amount due to him will be credited as a debt due to a third party from the co-operative society.

4. If any question as to whether a member has incurred any of the disqualification referred to in sub-rule (1) arises, it shall be referred to the Registrar for decision. His decision shall be final and binding on all concerned. The power of the Registrar under this rule shall not be delegated to any other person appointed to assist the Registrar.

(Per Viscount Simonds in Barclays Bank v. IRC 1961 AC 509 (HL).

14. "Deems" means "is of opinion" or "considers" or "decides" and there is no implication of steps to be taken before the opinion is formed or the decision is taken.

[See R v. Brixton Prison (Governor), ex p Soblen 1962 (3) All ER 641, All ER p.669 C.]

15. Learned counsel for the appellant is right that normally when a statutory remedy is available, the same should be availed. In the instant case that aspect has also not been examined by the High Court. We are therefore of the 12 considered opinion that the writ petition needs to be heard by the High Court afresh to be decided keeping in view the applicable legal provision. Since no counter affidavit had been filed by the present appellant before the High Court we permit it to do so within a period of one month. If any rejoinder is to be filed the same shall be filed within a period of two weeks from the date of filing of the counter affidavit. We request the High Court to explore the possibility of disposing of the writ petition within a period of four months by fixing a definite date after a period of six weeks from today. Till the disposal of the writ petition by the High Court afresh, no third party rights in respect of the plot which is stated to have been allotted to respondent No.2 shall be created by the appellant.

16. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
Bihari Lal Rada vs Anil Jain (Tinu) & Ors

3. The facts, in brief, to be noticed for the purpose of disposal of this appeal, are that election to the Municipal Council, Hisar was held on 16.4.2005. In all there were 31 wards out of which 15 wards were reserved for the members belonging to Scheduled 2 Castes and 2 wards were reserved for Backward Class category. The respondent/writ petitioner was elected from ward no. 2 which was general category and not reserved in favour of any one of those categories mentioned herein above. The appellant herein was elected from ward no. 18 which was reserved for Backward Class category. Thereafter election was held to the office of the President, Municipal Council, Hisar on 29.8.2006. In the election held on 29.8.2006, in all 32 Municipal Councilors participated. The appellant secured 19 votes whereas the respondent got 13 votes and accordingly the appellant was declared to have been duly elected as the President of the Municipal Council, Hisar.

5. The learned Single Judge after an elaborate consideration of the matter dismissed the writ petition and upheld the election of the appellant as the President of the Municipal Council, Hisar. On appeal preferred by the respondent herein, the Division 4 Bench vide the impugned judgment set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and quashed the election of the appellant herein as the President of Municipal Council, Hisar. Hence this appeal.

(Emphasis supplied)

CONCLUSION

34. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the proceedings whereunder the appellant was declared to have been duly elected as the President of Municipal Council, Hisar. The impugned judgment is, accordingly, set aside.

35. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs.

February 13, 2009
Unison Electronics Pvt. Ltd. & Anr vs Commissioiner, Central Excise, Noida

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

11. The same principle should hold good in the matter of exemption notifications as well, for the said power is part and parcel of the enactment and is supposed to be employed to further the objects of enactment -- subject, of course, to the condition that the notification is not ultra vires the Act, and/or Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

10. The conclusions of CESTAT are essentially factual and, therefore, there is no scope for interference. In view of the factual position noted by CESTAT and the position in law indicated above, the appeals are dismissed.

No costs.
State Of U.P vs Shiv Singh Yadav & Ors

28 housing plots were allotted by the Lucknow Development Authority. Some of the persons, who have not been given allotment, filed writ petitions pointing out certain irregularities committed by the Lucknow Development Authority. We are told that those Writ Petition Nos.7040, 7577, 7327, 7519 and 7576 of 2007 are now pending before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Bench at Lucknow. Meanwhile, for cancellation of 28 plots and for constitution of Enquiry Committee, another public interest litigation was filed by one Vishwanath Chaturvedi before this Court being Writ Petition (C)No.445/2005 and the same is pending consideration. As these writ petitions, which are pending in the Lucknow Bench are similar to the Writ Petition pending before this Court and relate to the same issue, to avoid conflicting decisions being taken on the same set of facts, we direct that all the above writ petitions i.e. W.P.Nos.7040, 7577, 7327, 7519 and 7576 of 2007 be transferred to this Court. The order be communicated 2 to the Registrar General of the Allahabad High Court, Bench at Lucknow and the records be sent to this Court at an early date.

The transfer petitions are allowed accordingly.

...............CJI.

16TH FEBRUARY, 2009.
Hyd.Metrop.Water S.& S.Board & Ors vs P. Satyanarayana Rao & Ors

2. It is true that this appeal has been preferred against an order by which the appellants were not granted interim order during the pendency of the appeal.

5. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.

6. The High Court is now requested to dispose of the writ petition pending before the learned 3 Single Judge, if not already disposed of in the meantime, within a period of three months from the date of supply of a copy of this order positively without granting any unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties. We make it clear that we have not gone into the disputes raised by the parties in the writ application, which shall be decided by the learned Single Judge in accordance with law.
M. Chandru vs Chennai Metropolitan Dev. Auth. & Anr

3. Appellants herein are builders and developers and individuals who had applied for grant of permission for construction of multi-storeyed building and/or special building before the CMDA. They were asked to deposit specified sums towards IDC payable to the Sewerage Board by CMDA. Contending that CMDA had no power to collect IDC and the Sewerage Board is otherwise obligated to supply water and provide sewerage connection, they filed writ petitions before the High Court of Madras. The said writ petitions have been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.

13. It is on the aforementioned premise, the writ petition was filed which by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT

26. Even while levying a fee, a quantum jump is deprecated.

In the writ petition, State of Tamil Nadu may be impleaded as a party. The parties shall be at liberty to produce such material before the High Court for justification for levy of fee. The State of Tamil Nadu is directed 22 to file an affidavit before the High Court to justify the levy of fee. The affidavit should be filed within four weeks.

28. The impugned order is set aside. The appeals are allowed. The High Court is requested to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible. No costs.

February 17, 2009
State Of U.P vs Z.R. Siddiqui

The respondent was the General Manager of Jal Sansthan, Jhansi, at the relevant time and the short question involved in this case is whether he could be transferred to another Jal Sansthan in some other city in Uttar Pradesh. In this connection, it is stated that the Uttar Pradesh Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975, has been amended and Section 27-A has been inserted therein which envisages creation of centralised services. Accordingly, the Government of Uttar Pradesh created a centralise service by making the Uttar Pradesh Palika and Jal Sansthan Waterworks Engineering (Centralised) Service Rules, 1996 [for short, "the Rules"]. Hence, a person, who is in the centralised service, can be transferred. Rule 3 of the Rules states that a General Manager of the Jal Sansthan is in the centralised service. Hence, in our opinion, the respondent, being the General Manager, could be transferred in view of Rule 27, which states:-

...2/-

Accordingly, the civil appeal is allowed, impugned judgement of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed in the High Court is dismissed.

No order as to costs.
Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd vs Angad Kol & Ors

3. Heirs and legal representatives of Genda Bai, who died in an accident which took place on 31.10.2004, filed a claim application before the Tribunal, contending in that on the fateful day, when she had been standing near a turning known as `Hardi turning', a mini door Auto bearing registration No.MP-20G-9937 dashed against her as a result whereof she suffered injuries. She was taken to the District Hospital where she succumbed thereto on the next day.

Inter alia, on the premise that the contribution to the family by the deceased would have been about Rs.2,500/- per month and on deduction of conventional 1/3rd amount from her income, the annual loss of dependency was calculated at Rs.20,000/- per annum. The High Court applied the multiplier of 15 and, thus, awarded a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- towards loss of dependency. A sum of Rs.40,000/-was furthermore awarded under the heads of loss of estate, funeral expenses, loss of expectancy of life including a sum of Rs.10,000/- to the husband for loss of consortium.

9. Although the definition of the `light motor vehicle' brings within its umbrage both `transport vehicle' or `omnibus', indisputably, as would be noticed infra, a distinction between an effective licence granted for transport vehicle and passenger motor vehicle exists.

19. By an order dated 10.7.2008, the insurance company was directed to deposit 50% of the awarded amount. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be subserved if we, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution while directing the insurance company to deposit the balance amount before the Tribunal with liberty to the claimants to withdraw the same give right to the appellant to recover the said amount from the owner and the driver of the vehicle being Respondent Nos.6 and 7.

20. In view of the aforementioned findings, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

February 18, 2009
Bhola @ Paras Ram vs State Of H.P

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

At about 3.30 p.m Kailasho and her son Jagdish from their house noticed all the three accused giving fist blows to Fandi Ram near the school, located in front of their house, separated by a drain from the school. Kailasho shouted why her husband was being beaten and she accompanied by Jagdish rushed to the place of occurrence where her husband was being given a beating. Bhola accused in her presence gave a stone blow on the head of Fandi Ram and ran away. Remaining accused also hit him with the stone on the head. Jagdish (PW-2) intervened but the accused Dharamu and Prithu also gave beatings to him. The sleeve of the shirt of Jagdish got torn and one sleeve was left on the spot. Jagdish tied a cloth around the head of his father, which was bleeding due to injuries. They took Fandi Ram to the shop of Prehlad Chand (PW-10). On the way Sardari Lal (PW-5) who was coming from the water mill met them. He inquired about the cause of 3 injuries from his father. Fandi Ram told him of the accused beating him with stones with all the other accused due to the enmity of Panchayat elections. Then on the way to the shop of Prehlad Chand, Janam Singh, Nambardar (PW-6) met them who was also told by the deceased that he was beaten by the accused with stones due to Panchayat elections. Prehlad Chand was also told by the deceased that he was beaten by the accused, who then tried to get the matter compounded and settled for Rs.600/-. But accused did not agree to make payment. Thereafter in the shop of Prehlad Chand, Fandi Ram fell unconscious. On way a Compounder Desh Raj (PW

Trial Court did not accept the evidence to be credible and directed acquittal. State questioned the acquittal.

8. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.