L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
M/S. Divya Exports vs M/S. Shalimar Video Company & Ors

3. A third agreement dated 11.12.1995 (Exhibit A-5) was entered into between respondent Nos.3 and 2 whereby and whereunder copyright for broadcasting of films through satellites, cassettes, disc, cable, wire, wireless or any other system including its transmission through cable system without restriction of geographical areas was assigned to respondent No.2 for a sum of Rs.8 lakhs. The relevant portions of the third agreement are also extracted below:

18. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and the case is remitted to the trial Court with the direction that it shall, after considering the pleadings of the parties, frame an additional issue on the validity of agreement Exhibit B.1 executed between respondent No.1 and respondent No.3, give opportunity to the parties to produce evidence and decide the suit afresh without being influenced by any of the observations made by the High Court and this Court.

19. Since the matter is sufficiently old, we direct the trial Court to dispose of the matter as early as possible but latest within nine months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this judgment. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 10.10.2011.

........J. [Asok Kumar Ganguly] New Delhi;

September 02, 2011.
Mrinal Das & Ors vs State Of Tripura

Santinagar S.B. School at the invitation of Durgapur Local Committee of Democratic Youth Federation of India (in short "DYFI"). After the meeting was over, Tapan Chakraborty, (since deceased), a leader of DYFI accompanied by Babul Dey 2 PW-1, Ganesh Kol PW-2, Nilai Das PW-3, Ramakanta Paul PW-10, Benu Ranjan Dhupi PW-11 and Prabir Biswas PW-12 reached Santinagar Ferry Ghat to cross the river on way to home, on the other side of the river. At about 6.30 p.m., when Tapan Chakbraborty and his companions disembarked from the boat, Ratan Sukladas (A-12) dragged him down and when he fell on the ground, Tapan Das (A-5) and Gautam Das (A-11) shot at him causing severe bullet injuries. After finishing their job, the assailants fled away. The victim was immediately taken to the local hospital but as he was sinking, he was referred to G.B. Hospital at Agartala for specialized treatment.

(b) On the very same day, at about 08:35 p.m, one Babul Dey (PW-1) lodged a First Information Report (in short "the FIR") being FIR No. 85/2000 with the Police Station, Kalyanpur, West Tripura, Tripura. On the basis of the FIR, a case was registered under Sections 148, 149, 326 and 307 of the IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 against eight persons, viz., Somesh Das (A-7), Mrinal Das (A-4), Tapan Das (A-5), Ashim Bhattacharjee (A-2), Pradip Das (A-9), Shailendra 3 Das (A-3), Subal Deb (A-10) and Gautam Das (A-11) and others.

c) After the death of Tapan Chakraborty, Section 302 IPC was also added against the accused persons. During the investigation, the Investigating Officer arrested 13 accused persons and on completion, filed a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") under Sections 148, 149, 326 and 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against Somesh Das (A-7), Mrinal Das (A-4), Tapan Das (A-5), Ashim Bhattacharjee (A-2), Pradip Das (A-9), Shailendra Das (A-3), Subal Deb (A-10), Gautam Das (A-11), Anil Das (A-1), Bikash Das (A-6), Uttam Shil (A-8), Ratan Sukladas (A-12) and Radha Kant Das (A-13).

40) Now, let us discuss the eye-witnesses who were present in the passenger shed.

Reliance on the hostile witness

Medical evidence:

Conclusion

51) Under these circumstances, we confirm the ultimate decision arrived at by the High Court. Consequently, both the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed as devoid of any merit.

SEPTEMBER 5, 2011.
Union Of India & Ors vs J.D.Suryavanshi

4. But the High Court was not satisfied. It got into details of railway administration and train schedule management, which were totally alien to judicial review, and beyond judicially manageable standards. We extract below a typical interim order passed on 17.12.2009:

11. The record of the case shows that Railway had made all efforts to comply with the requirements/earlier directions of the High Court. Courtesies extended by Railways should not be taken as readiness to comply with impractical suggestions and unreasonable directions. The malaise of interference in the functioning of Railway administration is a matter of concern. Courts, bureaucracy and political leaders should give up the tendency to compel or pressurize the Railway administration to cater to only parts of the country particularly to the State or area to which they belong. Any such attempt to promote only regional interests would affect the national interest. The Railways should have the freedom and independence to grow, develop, improve and serve the nation. Be that as it may.

12. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned interim order dated 5.7.2010 of the High Court is set aside. In the light of what is stated above, we request the High Court to dispose of the writ petition itself without any further directions of similar nature.
Samar Bahadur Singh vs State Of U.P. & Ors

4. The appellant herein was employed as a Constable in the Provincial Armed Constabulary (hereinafter referred to as 'P.A.C.')on 15.11.1978. He was posted in IV Bn. P.A.C., Allahabad. On 27.10.1991, he was unauthorisedly absent from the Battalion Headquarter and on that day in the evening he along with one of his friends grabbed one bottle of liquor from the wine shop forcibly and also threatened them. With regard to the aforesaid incident, a criminal case was also registered on the basis of a complaint filed by the salesman of the wine shop, Sh. Rajan Lal. The appellant was also medically examined during the course of which he was found to be under the influence of liquor. The Doctor has opined that he had consumed alcohol, but was not intoxicated.

5. The appellant was placed under suspension and a departmental proceeding was initiated against him. A memorandum of charges was issued to the appellant as against which he filed his reply. In the said departmental inquiry instituted against the appellant, an Inquiry Officer was appointed who conducted the inquiry and on completion of the said inquiry, submitted his report finding the appellant guilty of the charges framed against him.

7. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed an appeal which was considered by the Appellate Authority and by order dated 30.06.1993, the aforesaid appeal was dismissed.

6. Consequent upon filing of the aforesaid inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority, after complying with all the formalities dismissed the appellant from service by issuing an order dated 11.02.1993.

12. Now, the issue is whether punishment awarded to the appellant is disproportionate to the offence alleged. The appellant belongs to a disciplinary force and the members of such a force is required to maintain discipline and to act in a befitting manner in public. Instead of that, he was found under the influence of liquor and then indulged himself in an offence. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to interfere with the satisfaction arrived at by the disciplinary authority that in the present case punishment of dismissal from service is called for. The punishment awarded, in our considered opinion, cannot be said to be shocking to our conscience and, therefore, the aforesaid punishment awarded does not call for any interference.

13. In that view of the mater, we find no merit in this appeal, which is dismissed, but leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Sanjay Kumar Singh vs Union Of India & Ors

3. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeals are that on 13th March, 1999 the appellants and few others of the Central Reserve Police Force [for short "CRPF"] while serving under 60 Battalion stationed at Haflong were detailed to go in two vehicles, one as escort and other a water tanker for bringing water from Retezole Jatinga water point. Sanjay Kumar Singh, the driver, Jai Shankar Sharma and K.N. Paswan were in the water tanker and they were provided with an escort vehicle which was driven by Jawahar Lal and the other occupants in the said escort vehicle were Head Constable Emmanuel Herenz; L. Nk. Harendra Chowdhury; L. Nk. Jaswant Singh; Constable U.K.S. Gurung and Page 2 of 15 Constable P.S. Madhvi. While the water tanker with the escort party following was on its way to the said water point, the militants ambushed the vehicles and started firing indiscriminately as a result of which five CRPF personnel in the escort vehicle were killed, namely, Driver Jawahar Lal; L. Nk.

5. When search parties reached the spot they found Head Constable Emmanuel Herenz hiding whereas L/Nk Jai Shankar Sharma who had also got down and had run away from the place of occurrence was found out from his hiding place which was under a gorge. On the same day the Deputy Commandant, 60 Battalion lodged a First Information Report with the officer-in-charge, Haflong Police Station and on 16.03.1999 all the appellants were suspended from service pending departmental proceedings against them. The appellants were thereafter issued a chargesheet with the allegations that while the appellants were deputed to function as escort party to the water tanker, they committed disobedience of orders, committed gross misconduct and displayed cowardice in execution of their duties and in their capacity as members of CRPF. The two articles of charges framed against them read as follows: -

7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of dismissal passed against them the appellants preferred statutory appeals before the appellate authority, viz., the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF. The said appeals were however dismissed, as against which the writ petitions were filed in the Gauhati High Court which were heard by the learned single Judge and he dismissed the writ petitions.

appreciating the evidence. The findings recorded by the Benches of the High Court are concurrent findings and the same cannot be interfered with lightly.

26.In our considered opinion, to re-appreciate the evidence and to come to a different finding would be beyond the scope of Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we hold that the judgment and order passed by the High Court suffers from no infirmity.

27.Accordingly, the appeals have no merit and are dismissed but without any order as to costs.

............................................J [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma] ............................................J [Anil R. Dave] New Delhi September 6, 2011 Page 15 of 15
Ajay Kumar Das vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr

3. The informant filed a First Information Report that his daughter was married to the appellant herein in the year 2002, as per the Hindu rites and custom and that at the time of her marriage, informant had given sufficient dowry. It was stated therein that the Crl. Appeal No. 1735 of 2011 @ SLP(Crl) 10005/2009 REPORTABLE 2 informant's daughter complained about the torture meted out to her by the father-in-law and the mother-in-law to her husband, the present appellant who allegedly did not pay any heed. It was also alleged that on 29th September, 2006, father-in-law and the mother-in-law talked to the accused on telephone and in a well-planned conspiracy caused death of the daughter of the informant. On receipt of the aforesaid information a case was registered, thereafter the police started investigation. After the completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed on 14th April, 2001. An order was also passed on 17th April, 2007, by the Magistrate taking cognizance which is also assailed in the present case. The appellant was granted bail by the High Court on 10th April, 2007.

11. Keeping the aforesaid legal principles in our mind, we now proceed to examine the contentions raised by the counsel appearing for the appellant in order to ascertain and find out whether a case for quashing is made out in the facts of the present case. In the First Information Report, there is an allegation that the two other accused persons namely Ishwar Das and his wife Sunita Devi on the fateful day after talking to the present appellant over telephone in a pre-determined Crl. Appeal No. 1735 of 2011 @ SLP(Crl) 10005/2009 REPORTABLE 8 manner killed the informant's daughter Bimla Devi by pushing her into a well. Counsel appearing for the appellant even sought to counter the said allegation by referring to a document issued by the Commanding Officer to the appellant dated 19th November, 2006. In the said note, which was sent to the Superintendent of Police, it is mentioned that as per the statement of the appellant his wife Bimla Devi fell inside the well. The aforesaid document is in the nature of a defence and could be looked into by the appropriate Court at the appropriate stage and not now. What we are required to look at this stage is the allegations made in the complaint and in the First Information Report. He also referred to some of the statements made in the case diary to justify the stand that no case against the appellant is made out.

13. In terms thereof, we dismiss the appeal but with the aforesaid liberty granted to the appellant. The stay Crl. Appeal No. 1735 of 2011 @ SLP(Crl) 10005/2009 REPORTABLE 10 of further proceedings before the trial court granted vide this Court order dated 22nd October, 2010 stands vacated.
State Of U.P. & Anr vs Narendra Bahadur Singh & Ors

3. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 7th April, 2003 passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court holding that respondent no. 1 herein would be entitled to get his past services effective from 1st September, 1970 to 10th September, 1973 rendered in the office of State Agricultural Marketing Officer and the service rendered by him in Mandi Parishad effective from 11th September, 1973 to 1st May, 1975 counted alongwith the service rendered as Judicial Officer for the purpose of pension, gratuity etc.

4. The appellant was appointed as Legal Assistant in Civil Appeal No. 7662 of 2011 @ SLP(C) 19897/2004 3 the office of the State Marketing Officer and worked in the said post from 1st September, 1970 to 10th September, 1973. The respondent no.1 thereafter submitted his application for his appointment to the post of Legal Assistant which was forwarded to the Director (Mandis) in the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad. The said application of the respondent no.1 was forwarded by the State Agricultural Marketing Officer, his erstwhile office by letter dated 12th August, 1973. A copy of the said letter which was addressed to the Director (Agriculture) was also sent to the respondent no. 1 with an intimation that if he is selected to the post for which he has submitted the application in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, in that event, he would have to resign from the said post and his lien would not be maintained in the Department. Thereafter the respondent no. 1 was selected and was also appointed in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad. He then resigned from his earlier post in State Agricultural Marketing Office and joined Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad on 11th September, 1973, wherein he worked till 1st May, 1975.

7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid stand taken by the State Government, the respondent no. 1 filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court which was registered as Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 20703 of 1997. Civil Appeal No. 7662 of 2011 @ SLP(C) 19897/2004 5 The said writ petition was heard and was disposed of by the impugned judgment and order dated 7th April, 2003 rendered by the High Court. The High Court directed that the past service rendered by the appellant to the aforesaid extent be computed for the purpose of computation of his pension, gratuity etc. Being aggrieved by the said Judgment and order passed by the High Court, the present appeal has been preferred on which we have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

For the reasons recorded in the signed order, the appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated therein leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

10. The appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Commnr. Of Central Excise, Noida vs M/S. Kitply Industries Ltd

3. In order to decide the issue arising in the present case in its proper perspective, basic facts leading to filing of the present appeals are being recapitulated hereunder:

21. In terms of the above conclusions arrived at and on appreciation of the materials on record, we are of the view that the findings arrived at by the Tribunal are unjustified and cannot be accepted. The impugned judgments and orders passed by the Tribunal in both the appeals are, therefore, set aside and it would be open to the appellant to assess the respondent as per the above findings. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed but leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

CORRIGENDUM DATED 17.02.2012 Page No. 3, Line no. 9 from bottom For 44.08-Polywood, veneered panels read 44.08-Plywood veneered panels.

Page no. 6, Line no. 12, for with outer piles, read with outer plies.
Marabasappa (D) By Lrs. & Ors vs Ningappa & Ors

3. The factual matrix in brief is as follows:-

4. In her life time Parwatevva relinquished her share in R.S. No. 91 in favour of the present appellant (Marabasappa). Thereafter, subsequent to an oral partition, she gave one part of the other property bearing R.S. No. 143/1 and R.S. No. 143/2 to the respondent (Ningappa) and the heirs of Bhimappa respectively. In June 1984, Parwatevva executed a will of `stridhana' land to her daughter, Sangawwa. Parwatevva died on 08.07.1984. The present dispute is between her children and their heirs.

5. The respondents-plaintiffs filed a suit bearing O.S. No. 40/1990 before the Court of the Civil Judge, Gadag [hereinafter referred to as "the Trial Court"], inter alia alleging that the entire property mentioned above is the joint family property and the same was not the personal property of Parwatevva, and hence, a prayer for partition and separate possession of 1/3rd share was made in respect of Schedule `A' to `C' properties. Schedule `A' properties consist of agricultural lands, Schedule `B' properties consist of houses and open places and Schedule `C' properties consist of movables of all the properties held by the defendants-appellants except the plaintiffs' properties. The 3 Trial Court negatived this contention of the respondents-plaintiffs on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence and found, inter alia, that the said properties were self acquired properties of Parwatevva, accordingly, has partly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs-

6. Being aggrieved, the parties to the suit preferred Regular First Appeals. The High Court, by the impugned Judgment and Order, set aside the Judgment of the Trial Court and took the view that apart from the stridhana land, the rest of the property was a part of the joint family property purchased from the income and funds of the joint family property and, therefore, the decree, as sought by the plaintiffs, requires to be granted. Against this finding and the conclusion reached by the High Court, the appellants-defendants are before us.

15. At present, we are mainly concerned with `A' Schedule properties. The parties to the appeal have no grievance so far as 11 decree passed in respect of `B' and `C' Schedule properties are concerned.

Therefore, the findings contrary to the above view by the High Court are erroneous and cannot be sustained.

24. In the light of above discussion, we are unable to accept with the reasoning given by the High Court. We are in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the Trial Court.

25. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the Judgment and Order passed by the High Court in RFA No. 385 of 1993 dated 30.03.1999 is set aside and Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in O.S.No. 40 of 1990 dated 15.07.1993 is restored. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.
Mukhiya K. ... vs Santosh Kumar

2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties on this appeal who have taken us through the records. The respondent was engaged on contract basis as a Peon on a lumpsum salary of Rs. 2,500/- on 1.4.2003. Subsequently, an order came to be passed against the respondent on 26.6.2004. By the aforesaid order, the contract service of the respondent was terminated w.e.f. 5.7.2004.

3. The respondent being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court which was registered as 28789 of 2004. In the said writ petition filed by the respondent, a prayer was made for quashing the order dated 26.6.2004 terminating the service of the respondent. The learned Single Judge who heard the writ petition passed an order on 28.7.2004 dismissing the said writ petition holding that the engagement of the respondent on contract basis did not vest on him any legal right to regular appointment.

4. The High Court passed an order in the said appeal which was filed in 2004 which was registered as Special Appeal No. 1066 of 2004. The appeal was listed before the Division Bench nearly six years of passing of the order of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench passed the order for admitting the appeal. But peculiarly enough the High Court passed an order that the order dated 26.6.2004 passed by the appellant terminating the service would remain stayed. It was also made specific in that order that the respondent should be allowed to continue to work.

5. We fail to understand as to how the Division Bench while admitting an appeal could pass such an order so as to allow the appeal itself even at that interim stage. The respondent was not working when the suit was filed and his writ petition was dismissed. Despite the said fact not only the Division bench stayed the operation of the order after six years of filing the appeal, but directed for allowing the respondent to continue to work despite the fact that he was not working on that date.

6. Therefore, the aforesaid order passed by the Division Bench is illegal, without jurisdiction and was passed without any application of mind. We set aside the said order and remit back the matter to the Division Bench of the High Court for disposal of the appeal as expeditiously as possible. The order dated 9.8.2010 passed by the Division Bench staying the order dated 26.6.2004 and directing the appellant to allow the -3- respondent to continue to work stand quashed and would not operate in any manner till the disposal of the appeal.

7. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent in terms of the aforesaid order.
Marathwada Gramin Bk.Karmch.Sangtn.& ... vs Mangt.Of Marathwada Gramin Bank & Ors

4. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vide order dated 29.8.1981 exempted the respondent bank from complying with the statutory provisions of the Scheme with effect from 1.9.1981 and permitted the respondent bank to pay provident fund to its employees according to its own Scheme. The respondent bank contributed provident fund 2 to its employees as per its own Scheme for the period from 1.9.1981 to 31.8.1993.

7. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II issued a letter dated 13.5.1999 informing the respondent bank that 3 it cannot withdraw the benefit of paying matching employer's share without any limit to wage ceiling and directed it to continue extending the same benefit as was granted prior to 01.11.1998.

29. In our considered view, no interference is called for.

These appeals filed by the appellants being devoid of any merit are accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of these appeals, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.

September 9, 2011 15 ****