L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Satyawati Sharma (Dead) By Lrs vs Union Of India & Another

(ii) After constructing the building, the lessee inducted Shri Jai Narain Sharma and Dr. Ms. Tara Motihar, as tenants in two portions of the building, who started using the rented premises for running watch shop and clinic respectively.

(iv) After purchasing the property, the appellant filed Petition Nos.184 of 1980 and 187 of 1980 for eviction of the tenants by claiming that she needed the house for her own bona fide need and also for the use and occupation of the family members dependant upon her. The appellant further pleaded that she wanted to demolish the building and reconstruct the same. She also alleged that tenants have been using the premises in violation of the conditions of lease and, therefore, they are liable to be evicted.

(vi) By an order dated 17.5.1991, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dismissed the eviction petitions. He held that the appellant is owner and landlady of the suit premises, but she has not been able to prove that portions thereof were let for residential purposes; that the appellant and her dependent family members do not have suitable alternative accommodation except the one occupied by her elder son, who was under the threat of eviction and that the need of the appellant is bona fide. The Additional Rent Controller further held that the tenants are guilty of violating clause 4(c) of deed dated August 18, 1953. He, however, declined to pass order for recovery of possession by observing that under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, such an order can be passed only in respect of premises let for residential purposes. The Additional Rent Controller also rejected other grounds of eviction put forward by the appellant.

3. The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi vide its judgment dated 10.11.1998. The Tribunal agreed with the Additional Rent Controller that an order of eviction of the tenant can be passed under Section 14(1)(e) only if the premises were let for residential purposes. The Tribunal then held that the portions given to the tenants were being used for non-residential purposes and, therefore, they cannot be evicted on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord.

[Emphasis added]

38. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.

40. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is partly struck down. Section 14(1)(e) shall now read as indicated in para 39 above. Consequently, the writ petitions filed by the appellants shall stand allowed and the orders impugned therein shall stand quashed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
Kamlesh Babu & Ors vs Lajpat Rai Sharma & Ors

2. This appeal involves a dispute between the parties who are related to each other, having a common ancestor. The dispute involves a registered Will dated 5th August, 1972, executed in favour of the appellants by one Brijlal (deceased), who had four sons. Except for his youngest son, Onkar Prasad, all the other sons were allegedly separated from him and were staying separately. Brijlal was staying with Onkar Prasad and excluding the descendants of his other children executed the said Will dated 5th August, 1972, in favour of his grand-children through Onkar Prasad. Brijlal died on 5th November, 1976, and on the basis of the Will executed by him, the appellants moved an application for mutation of the bequeathed properties in their names. The respondent No. 1, who is one of the grand-sons of the testator through another son, Shanti Swarup, also filed an application for mutation, which was rejected. An appeal preferred therefrom was also dismissed. On 29th April, 1977, the Tehsildar passed an order for mutation of the properties in the name of the appellants on the basis of the aforesaid Will dated 5th August, 1972.

3. On 2nd January, 1978, the respondent No.1 herein filed a suit for declaration that the registered Will dated 5th August, 1972, had been procured by practising fraud. The suit was duly contested by the appellants herein by filing written statement. On the basis of the pleadings, in order to arrive at a decision in the suit, the following issues were framed: -

4. All the aforesaid issues were decided against the plaintiff and the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court. While deciding issue No. 6, The Trial Court also held that the suit was barred under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, because the plaintiff had failed to prove that the Will was not within the knowledge of the plaintiff within three years of the filing of the suit.

5. Aggrieved by the decision in the suit, the plaintiff- respondent No. 1 herein, preferred an appeal before the Civil Judge, Aligarh, which was allowed and the judgment of the Trial Court was reversed without deciding the question of limitation which had been decided against the plaintiff- respondent No.1 and in favour of the defendants-appellants herein.

6. The defendants-appellants herein filed a second appeal before the Allahabad High Court on 3rd October, 1983, and the same was also dismissed on 6th February, 2006, affirming the judgment and order of the Appellate Court.

19. Ms. Srivastava's submission that the plea of limitation not having been taken before the appellate forums, the same could not be taken before this Court in proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution on the ground that the question of limitation was a mixed question of law and fact, stands nullified by the fact that the suit continued to remain barred by limitation after the decisions of the appellate Courts since such finding of the Trial Court had not been set aside either in the first appeal or by the High Court in second appeal.

The appeal is accordingly allowed, but there will be no order as to costs.
Haryana State Minor Irrigation ... vs G. S. Uppal & Ors

4. The facts giving rise to the filing of these appeals are that the respondents in Civil Appeal Nos. 9244/2003 and 9248/ 2003, at the time of filing of the writ petitions, were working on the post of Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), Sub-Divisional Engineer (SDE) and Assistant Engineer (AE) with the Haryana State Minor Irrigation Tubewells Corporation Ltd. (for short 'the Corporation') appellant No. 1, which is a Government company, within the meaning of that expression under the Companies Act, 1956. The respondent in C.A. No. 9239/2003 was working as Law Officer with the Corporation. State of Haryana exercises deep and pervasive control over the Corporation. Secretary, Irrigation Department; Secretary, Agricultural Department; Secretary, Finance Department, to the Government of Haryana; Chairman, Haryana State Electricity Board and Chief Engineer (Canals), Irrigation Works, Haryana, were the exclusive shareholders in the Corporation at the time of its formation in the year 1970. The Corporation was carved out of the Irrigation Wing of the Public Works Department and since its inception in the year 1970, a number of officers have been appointed to different posts by way of deputation. There were about 27 SDOs on deputation from the Irrigation Department working in Corporation whose nature of duties and responsibilities were similar and identical to the nature and duties of the SDOs working in the equivalent post of Corporation. Their duties were inter-changeable and as such it was the case of the respondents before the High Court that there was no difference whatsoever between the duties and responsibilities expected to be shouldered by a deputationist and by an employee of the Corporation. The respondents pleaded before the High Court that there was no qualitative difference between the duties and responsibilities of persons employed on the posts of SDOs, SDEs, AEs in various departments of Haryana Government, such as Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads), Public Health Departments, various Corporations, Haryana State Electricity Board, Haryana Urban Development Authority and several other Boards. Rule 5.1 of Part V of the Service Bye-Laws of the Corporation reads as under:-

25. In the result, for the reasons stated above, we find no merit in these appeals. The appeals are dismissed accordingly. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
State Of Uttar Pradesh And Ors vs Anand Singh

It appears that in B.T.C. Entrance Examination, 2000, respondent-Anand Singh and one Dhiraj Kumar Mishra had also appeared and a waiting list was prepared. In the waiting list at serial No.1, name of the respondent was mentioned and in waiting list No.2, that of Dhiraj Kumar Mishra. A complaint was made before the learned Single Judge of the High Court that in spite of the fact that name of respondent was at Serial No.1 in the waiting list, Dhiraj Kumar Mishra, whose name was at Serial No.2., was granted admission.

Learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and directed that respondent shall be granted admission in the vacancy available in the year 2003. The said order has been confirmed by the Division Bench. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned orders are set aside and writ petition filed by respondent before the High Court is dismissed.
Dildar Singh vs State Of Punjab

2. The appellant herein was a drawing teacher in a government school where the prosecutrix was studying in Class VIII. The case of the prosecution is that on the 6th March, 1987 when the prosecutrix had gone to the school for coaching in science practical, the appellant took her to a class room and raped her. Though the occurrence took place on the 6th March, 1987 the prosecutrix did not disclose this fact to any one. Later when she experienced some pain in her abdomen she was attended to by her mother who found that the prosecutrix was pregnant. On further inquiry the prosecutrix revealed to her the fact that on 6th March, 1987 such an occurrence had taken place. Her mother informed her father who was in service, and after her father came to the village, the matter was reported to the police. It is not in dispute that the prosecutrix is below 16 years of age.

8. Having considered all aspects of the matter we find no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court. There is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
M/S. H.V. Industrial Electronics Pvt. ... vs Commissioner Of Central Excise & ...

Being aggrieved against the order-in-appeal, the Department filed an appeal before the Customs Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, West Zonal Bench at Mumbai (for short "the Tribunal"). Tribunal by the impugned order accepted the appeal filed by the Department, set aside the order of the Collector (Appeals) and restored the order of the Assistant Controller. It has been held in the impugned order that the function of "power controllers" is to provide a source of current variable at the option of the user to the load to which it is connected. That it performs individual functions and hence would fall under Heading 85.43.

The Tribunal further examined the appropriateness of the classification claimed by the assessee under Heading 85.43. It came to the conclusion that the electrical appliances or apparatus under consideration has individual functions as it does the function of controlling/regulating the electric current/power so as to feed the required quantum of current to the other equipments connected to the circuits. Its function is to provide a source of current variable at the option of the user to the load to which it is connected. We agree with both the findings referred to above by the Tribunal.

For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Golusula Ellaiah vs State Of Andhra Pradesh

2. On 25.6.1996 at about 10.30 p.m., the accused lodged a complaint with Shamshabad Police Station. In brief, its contents were : He and his wife Ponnamma were returning from Chalivendragudem village where Ponnamma's parents were living. They halted at Shamshabad for his wife's medical check-up at an hospital and thereafter proceeded on foot towards their village (Kothwalguda). At about 9 p.m. when they were passing near HUDA colony, four persons accosted them. Two of them started beating him, while the other two dragged his wife towards the bushes. He managed to escape and ran to his village and informed his elder brother and other villagers. When he returned to the spot along with his brother and other villagers, he found his wife lying in an unconscious state and her ornaments were missing (that is, half a tola of gold gundlu, half tola of gold ear studs and 35 tolas of silver anklets). She was declared dead when she was taken to a doctor.

3. The above complaint was registered as Crime No.130/96 under sections 302 and 379 IPC. A panchnama was drawn at the scene of occurrence and an inquest was held and the investigation was taken up. On 30.6.1996, the parents of the deceased approached the Investigating Officer and expressed a suspicion about the accused. The IO found that the accused had absconded after the incident. He was apprehended in his village on 3.7.1996 and brought to the Police Station, where he gave a voluntary confessional statement (Ex. P-4) in the presence of Panch witnesses. It came to light that the accused had pledged the silver anklets (MO-2) of the deceased on 15.6.1996, the gold ear studs (MO-3) on 18.6.1996 and the gold gundlu that is a string of 39 gold beads (MO-1) on 25.6.1996 with a moneylender at Shamshabad, namely, Sampathraj (PW-4). In pursuance of the information furnished by the accused, the IO seized the ornaments (MOs. 1, 2 and 3) as also pawn receipt books containing the duplicate of pawn receipts being Exhibits P-1, P-2 and P-3 from PW-4, and his statement was recorded. The accused also took the IO and the Panch witnesses to his house and produced the pledge Receipt No.8864 dated 15.6.1996 and Receipt No.8882 dated 18.6.1996 relating to the silver anklets and gold ear studs.

12. No other contention was urged. The appellant has not been able to make out any infirmity in the order of the High Court. The appeal has no merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
M/S. Amrit Paper vs Commissioner Of Central Excise, ...

The controversy lies within a very narrow compass. Appellant is engaged in the manufacture of paper and paper board falling in Chapter 48 of the Tariff. Notification No.6/2000-CE dated 1.3.2000 was issued whereby the product manufactured by the appellant was exempted from payment of duty during the month of March, 2000. Appellant availed credit as well as cleared goods under the said exemption notification. Thereafter, it suo motu reversed the credit of Rs.1,92,365/- to avail the exemption. It deposited the duty on 30.8.2000 for the month of March, 2000 and also applied for refund of the Modvat credit of Rs.1,92,365/- which was already reversed by it. The claim of refund was allowed by order dated 13.12.2001 passed by the Assistant Commissioner. Thereafter, the appellant again suo motu reversed the Modvat credit and filed the refund claim on 12.7.2001 in respect of the duty paid on 30.8.2000 for the month of March, 2000, claiming benefit under the aforesaid notification No.6/2000-CE. The claim for refund was rejected by the Assistant Commissioner. An appeal was filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) who also dismissed the appeal. An appeal was filed before the Tribunal, which was dismissed by the Tribunal by the impugned judgment.

Moreover, on the facts of the case, it is found that the manufacturer had availed of the credit at the time of the clearance of the goods and had suo motu reversed it to avail the exemption later on almost after 15 months when it claimed refund of Modvat credit, hence it was not entitled to exemption.
Sadhu Singh vs Darshan Singh & Anr

The appellant herein contested an election held on 29.6.2003 to the post of Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat of Village Bareh, Tehsil Budhlada in the State of Punjab. The appellant herein was declared elected. He won by a margin of 11 votes. The 1st respondent filed an election petition, inter alia, contending that while counting the ballot papers, 147 votes were wrongly rejected. It was further averred that the counting staff headed by the Presiding Officer intermingled about 25 ballots, which were polled in his favour in the bundles of the elected candidate and had the said votes been counted in his favour he would have been declared elected. By reason of an order dated 29.6.2004, the Election Tribunal directed recounting of the ballot papers. The validity of the said order was questioned by the appellant herein by filing a revision application before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which was numbered as Civil Revision No.3194 of 2004. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said revision application has been dismissed.

From a perusal of the election petition filed by the 1st respondent herein it appears that he obtained 1313 votes, whereas the appellant obtained 1324 votes. It was clearly averred that 147 votes were wrongly rejected. The Presiding Officer was arrayed as respondent No.2 in the election petition. The learned Tribunal opined that the direction for recounting of votes was necessary, upon satisfying himself that although no written request for recounting was made, respondent No.1 in his evidence stated an oral request clearly been made therefor, but the same had been turned down by the Presiding Officer. The learned Tribunal also took into account the fact that the appellant herein in his evidence did not state as to how many votes had been rejected due to non- affixation of stamps or how many of them had been rejected where double stamps were affixed. The Tribunal furthermore took into account the statement of the 1st respondent herein that 24-25 votes polled by him were intermingled with the votes of the appellant.

We, therefore, are satisfied that the conditions precedent necessary for a direction of recounting of votes stand satisfied. For the reasons aforementioned, no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Syed Ibrahim vs State Of Andhra Pradesh

Challenge in this Appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The trial court had found the appellant guilty of murdering his wife on 10.1.1994. The accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Accused challenged the conviction and sentence by filing an appeal before the High Court which was numbered as Criminal Appeal No. 511 of 1997. Initially by order dated 30.4.1998 a Division Bench of the High Court allowed the Appeal. The respondent-State filed an appeal before this Court. Since the order passed by the High Court was practically unreasoned, without expressing any opinion on merits, the judgment was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal. The High Court by the impugned judgment dismissed the appeal confirming the order of the conviction and sentence passed by learned Session Judge, Guntur.

The background facts, as projected by prosecution during trial in a nutshell are as follows:

To prove its case, the prosecution in all, examined 12 witnesses, namely PWs. 1 to 12 and marked Exs. P-1 and P-27 and M.Os 1 to 6. Exs.D-1 and D-2 are the contradictions marked in Section 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') statement of PW-6. After completion of trial and after hearing both sides and on considering the material available on record, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C., and accordingly convicted and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. The Trial Court found that evidence of all other so-called eye witnesses did not help the prosecution as they departed from the version given during investigation and the case hinged on the evidence of PW1. His evidence was accepted.

The High Court noticed that except PW1, the father of the deceased, no other witnesses supported the prosecution version. However, the High Court found that the evidence of PW1 i.e. the father of the deceased, was sufficient enough to fasten the guilt on the accused. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed.

Above being the position the High Court was not right in lightly brushing aside the apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies by making a general observation that the PW1 is an illiterate person. Above being the position the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The accused be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be in custody in connection with any other case.

Appeal is allowed.