L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Suchand Bauri vs State Of West Bengal

2. Facts are these, briefly put: Jorehira-Namopara is a small village in the district of Bankura (W.B.) having about 40/50 houses. On June 21, 1986, there was a quarrel between Suchand (appellant) and Sanatan (PW-11) in respect of boundary of land. Suchand blamed that Sarbeswar (deceased) being a village Chowkidar was instigating Sanatan against him. Suchand threatened Sarbeswar that he would behead him and his son. The following day, on June 22, 1986 in the afternoon, three brothers, viz., Bisweswar, Sarbeswar and Rishi(PW-1) alongwith their family members were chit- chatting on the pathway near their house. Suchand, Fulchand, Nepal and 14 other persons armed with deadly weapons like lathi, tangi, katari, ballam, kural, etc. came there. Fulchand and Nepal started assaulting Bisweswar with lathi, tangi, etc.. As a result of which Bisweswar fell down. Sarbeswar intervened to rescue Bisweswar and at that time Suchand gave a knife blow on the chest of Sarbeswar. Few other members of the family also got injured. Sarbeswar died the next morning.

3. After completion of investigation, 17 persons including the present appellant were sent up for trial. They were tried under Sections 147, 302/149 and 307/149 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses in all; out of them PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5 were the 2 eye witnesses. Bisweswar at whose instance the first information report was lodged died during the trial and, therefore, he could not be examined.

5. A common appeal was preferred by the present appellant as well as Fulchand and Nepal before the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. On April 21, 2005, the division bench of the High Court delivered the judgment. The conviction of Fulchand and Nepal was set aside. However, the conviction of the appellant and the sentence awarded to him by the first Court was upheld.

14. Although the learned amicus curiae strenuously urged that the injury caused by the accused was without premeditation nor he took any advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, we are afraid the facts eloquently speak otherwise. The four requisites of Exception 4 are not at all satisfied in the present case.

16. In what we have discussed above, the conviction of the accused under Section 302 IPC and sentence awarded to him cannot be said to suffer from any legal infirmity.

17. The appeal must fail and is dismissed.

...........................J (S.B. SINHA) ............................J (R.M. LODHA) New Delhi April 9, 2009 12
State Of Haryana & Ors vs Indian Oil Corp. Ltd

During the assessment year 2001-02 the appellant-corporation moved HSD and SKO from Paradeep Port, Orissa to Haldia Port, West Bengal in the total quantity of 4 2,69,846.277 KL of SKO and 4,40,150.791 KL of HSD respectively. The ownership and title of the goods remained with appellant-corporation as can be seen from the Bill of ladings. The appellant-corporation furnished a declaration in terms of Form-F declaring that the movement of the subject-goods stood occasioned by stock transfer and not by inter-State Sale.

The Civil Appeal stands allowed with no order as to costs.

In the aforestated circumstances, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 16.5.08 in Writ Petition (C) No.3691 of 2007 as also the order of re- assessment dated 19.2.07 passed by the Assessing Authority. Accordingly, we remit this case to the Assessing Authority with the direction to give full opportunity to the appellant- corporation and decide the re-assessment proceedings including the jurisdictional fact as to whether reopening of assessment was at all maintainable, in accordance with law. The Assessing Authority will also consider the effect of Form-F declaration submitted by the appellant-corporation.

Accordingly, the civil appeal stands allowed with no order as to costs.
Union Of India vs R. Dhandayuthapani

The respondent was one of the four persons named in the complaints filed by the Enforcement Officer, Employees Provident Fund, Tamil Nadu under Section 14(1A) read with Section 14(A) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provision Act, 1952 (for short `the Act'), which were registered as CC Nos.97-119 and 121 to 133 of 2000. The substratum of the allegations contained in the complaints is that the employer, namely, M/s. Kominar Textiles (P) Ltd. did not deposit provident fund dues of the workers for the period from October, 1995 to May, 1997 and Managing Director, Joint Managing Director and Director of the mill, who were responsible for the conduct of the business of the establishment are responsible for the same. On being noticed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Udumalpet, the respondent filed petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings ....2/-

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The Trial Court shall now decide the complaints in accordance with law and while doing so, it shall examine all the pleas which may be taken by the respondent and others.
M.D.Thomas vs P.S. Jaleel & Anr

The Trial Court, upon conclusion of the trial, acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, [for short `the Act']. On appeal by the complainant, the High Court set aside the order of acquittal, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the Court and directed to pay the sum of rupees one lakh twenty thousand to the complainant; in default, to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of three months. Against the said order, present appeal has been filed by special leave.

In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is restored.
M/S.Foodworld Super Markets Ltd. & Anr vs H.Sujan Singh & Ors

4) The respondents herein are the landlords. They have filed a Civil Suit O.S. No. 1894 of 2007 for ejectment of the defendants from the suit schedule premises.

8) The writ court has dismissed the writ petition. Hence, this appeal.

10) In view of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned orders. Now a direction is issued to the trial court to recall the plaintiff's witness and permit the defendants/appellants to cross examine plaintiff's witness (P.W.1) in O.S. No. 1894 of 3 2007. Since the matter is pending from last two years, we direct the trial court to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible at any rate within an outer limit of six months from the date of receipt of this court's order. No order as to costs.
Pyare Lal & Ors vs State Of Haryana & Ors

The appellants are the heirs of Suraj Bhan who died on 15th September, 1996 due to fall from a Haryana Roadways bus bearing registration No.HR-46/6835 which was being driven in rash and negligent manner by its driver, Shri Raj Kumar (respondent No.3 herein). They filed a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for award of compensation to the tune of Rs.10 lakhs by stating that the deceased was receiving pension of Rs.3,228/- from the army and salary of Rs.5,000/- from Sterling International Worldwide Couriers, Bahadurgarh, with whom he was employed at the relevant time. By an award dated 1st October, 1997, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal directed the respondents to pay to the appellants a sum of Rs.1,26,000/- by way of compensation with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of filing the petition till its payment. In arriving at the figure of Rs.1,26,000/-, the Tribunal took into consideration ....2/-

The appellants challenged the award of the Tribunal by filing an appeal under Section 173 of the Act. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellants filed an application and placed on record a certificate to show that pension of late Suraj Bhan was revised by the Government of India from Rs.3,228/- to Rs.4,556/- per month with effect from 1st January, 1996. The High Court did not consider the factum of increase in the pension of late Suraj Bhan but enhanced the compensation payable to the appellant from Rs.1,26,000/- to 1,28,000/- by applying the multiplier of 11. Feeling dissatisfied, the appellants have filed this appeal by special leave.

....3/-

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part, impugned orders are modified and it is directed that the appellants shall be entitled to receive compensation of Rs.2,90,400/- from the respondent. They shall also be paid interest @ 12% per annum from the date of filing of the petition before the Tribunal till its payment.

No Costs.
Bimla Devi & Ors vs Himachal Road Transport Corpn. & Ors

3. One Jawala Ram, husband of the first appellant herein, was a Police Constable. He was posted at Police Station Dharampur. On 11.2.1997 at about 7 or 8 am, he was standing near the shop of one Chand Kishore. A bus bearing registration No.HP-14-3596 owned by the first respondent was parked there. The second respondent Vijay Kumar was the driver and the third respondent Om Dutt was the conductor of the aforementioned bus. Allegedly, the driver of the bus, Vijay Kumar, reversed the bus without blowing any horn as a result whereof Jawala Ram died on the spot. Allegedly, conductor also did not bother to check whether any person was standing behind the bus.

4. Respondents, however, denied and disputed occurrence of the said accident. According to them, the deceased died the previous evening and finding the dead body of a person wrapped in a blanket lying at some distance from the bus; they informed the police personnel, whereafter the driver was falsely implicated.

17. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

...J. [P. Sathasivam] New Delhi;

April 15, 2009
G.Sekar vs Geetha & Ors

The property in suit was owned by one Govinda Singh. He purported to have executed a Will in favour of his son, the appellant herein on 29.11.1995. His wife Sakunthala Bai predeceased him. The said Govinda Singh died on 9.01.1996 leaving behind the appellant (original defendant No. 1) and four daughters, viz., Geetha and Vijaya (plaintiffs) and Shanthi and Uma (original defendant Nos. 2 and 3).

Indisputably, the parties to the suit were residing in the premises in suit. Govinda Singh was also a government contractor. He was running a business of transport. His daughters were also partners in the firm. Inter alia on the premise that Govinda Singh died intestate and as disputes and differences arose between the plaintiffs and the defendants as regards enjoyment of the property, a suit for partition was filed on 11.03.1996 (marked as C.S. No. 153 of 1996) in the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The suit property inter alia consisted of residential premises being No. 36, First Cross Street, West C.I.T. Nagar, Madras - 600 035 as also some movable properties.

4. Defendant No. 4 Ramesh filed an application for impleadment in the said suit alleging that Govinda Singh had married one `Saroja' who was, thus, his second wife and through her he had two daughters and one son, 3 viz., Jothi, Maya and himself. It was on the aforementioned premise, Ramesh was impleaded as a party in the said suit.

7. Indisputably, the appellant also initiated a testamentary proceedings for grant of Letters of Administration with a copy of the Will annexed thereto, which was marked as O.P. NO. 329 of 1996. The plaintiffs of the suit No. 153 of 1996 entered caveat in the said proceeding; it was marked as T.O.S. No. 4 of 1998.

9. Two intra-court appeals were preferred against the said judgment and decree, which were marked as O.S.A. Nos. 196 and 197 of 2001. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said appeals have been dismissed.

Appellant stated in his evidence that one Ms. Radhai, Advocate (PW-

4) prepared the Will and that the testator gave instructions in the morning of 29.11.1995 therefor. He further stated that at the time his father gave instructions for preparation of the Will, their neighbour Vishwanathan (PW-

3) and Mrs. Radhai, Advocate were present. He further stated:

PW-4 Ms. Radhai in her examination in chief stated: 36

However, in the cross-examination, she stated:

PW-4 Ms. Radhai in the cross-examination stated:

However, she admitted:

On further cross-examination, she deposed:

However, it has been brought to our notice that the stamp paper had been purchased by PW-4 on 11.10.1995 in the name of M.K. Govinda Singh 38 from a place called Thiriuviyaru in Thanjore District which is 200 miles away from Chennai. She further deposed:

32. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

April 15, 2009
V.V.S. Rama Sharma vs State Of U.P. And Ors

3. Brief facts necessary for the purpose of disposal of present appeal are as follows:

3. On 30.07.2004, a First Information Report (in short 'FIR') bearing Crime No. 271/04 was lodged against the appellants at Police Station Bhelupura, Tehsil Sadar, District Varanasi for the offences punishable under Sections 420/409 of IPC and under Sections 64/69 of the Stamps Act in relation to the purchase of certain stamps. A perusal of the FIR shows that it was lodged on the basis of a letter bearing No. 11912/Stamps-693(P)/2002-2003(83-

4. The appellants herein approached the Allahabad High Court for quashing of the aforesaid FIR. However, the High Court on 03.08.2006 dismissed all the three writ petitions vide three separate but identical orders holding that the FIR prima facie discloses the commission of cognizable offence and there was no ground of interference.

(2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.

3. Hence, the decision of the High Court is liable to be set aside and accordingly, we set it aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
Ramrajsingh vs State Of M.P. & Anr

2. Respondent No.2-complainant was dealing in the business of transportation. The appellant was the General Manager of J.K. Utility Division of J.K. Synthetics Ltd. whereas the absconding accused Anup Chaturvedi was the Finance Manager. Both were working under the Managing Director Manoj Kumar Mathur. The non-applicant and the co- accused Anup Chaturvedi placed order No.U/QMR/Coal 96028 dated 7.8.1996 with one Vinayak Coal Corporation. In pursuance of this order, the coal was transported by Maruti Road Carrier, Indore which is owned by the appellant. The transportation charges of Rs.9,45,000/- were paid through four cheques. All the four cheques were given to the appellant by the co- accused.

3. As per the information given by the co-accused to the appellant, the appellant placed the cheques before the Bank for encashment but the same were dishonored. All the cheques were issued on Bank of Rajasthan Branch Jhalawad. The cheques were returned dishonoured with the endorsement of `Stop Payment'. On 28.11.1996, a registered notice was sent to the Company which was served by "Registered Acknowledgment Due" on 6.12.1996. Even thereafter payments were not made. Therefore, the complaint was filed by respondent No.2 against the appellant and co- 2 accused Anup Chaturvedi and Manoj Mathur and the case was proceeded against the appellant and absconding accused Anup Chaturvedi.

4. Respondent No.2 had stated in the complaint that appellant was working in the company. The order of transportation was placed by him, the material was received by him and the cheques were given to him by the appellant and co-accused Anup Chaturvedi. Out of four cheques, the complaint in regard to the cheque amount of Rs.2,00,000/- dated 12.9.1996 was not pressed because a separate complaint was filed for dishonour of this cheque.

5. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, found the appellant guilty and the appeal was dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Indore. Both the courts found the appellant guilty. The appellant's stand was that he was not in charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company and, therefore, he should not have been held guilty. The cheques were not signed by him and a notice under Section 138 proviso (b) of the Act was not given in his name. The High Court did not accept the stand and dismissed the revision application. 3

11. When the factual background of the present case is considered in the light of the principles referred to in Neeta Bhalla and N.K. Wahi cases (supra), the inevitable conclusion is that the appeal is bound to succeed. The conviction as recorded cannot be maintained. The appeal is allowed.
State Of M.P vs Sheikh Shahid

2. The respondent faced trial for alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). The respondent-accused Sheikh Shahid was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years with a fine of Rs.1,000/- with default stipulation. The conviction was recorded by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sihore, Jabalpur, who imposed the aforesaid sentences. The respondents-accused preferred an appeal (Crl. Appeal No.299/2003) in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. By the impugned judgment, the High Court directed the sentence to be reduced to the period already undergone. It noted that the learned counsel for the accused person who was the appellant before the High Court did not challenge the finding of conviction but only prayed for reduction in sentence. The High Court noticed that respondent-accused Sheikh Shahid had undergone sentence of imprisonment for a period of about six months. The only ground recorded for reducing the sentence was that the accused person comes from rural areas. That appeared to be a just and proper ground to the learned Single Judge to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone.

19. In order to exercise the discretion of reducing the sentence the statutory requirement is that the Court has to record "adequate and special reasons" in the judgment and not fanciful reasons which would permit the Court to impose a sentence less than the prescribed minimum. The reason has not only to be adequate but also special. What is adequate and special would depend upon several factors and no strait-jacket formula can be indicated. What is applicable to trial Courts regarding recording reasons for 12 a departure from minimum sentence is equally applicable to the High Court. The only reason indicated by the High Court is that the accused belonged to rural areas. The same can by no stretch of imagination be considered either adequate or special. The requirement in law is cumulative.

20. Considering the legal position as indicated above, the High Court's order is clearly unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. The respondent is directed to surrender to custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.
Guljar Singh & Ors vs Deputy Director Consolidation & Ors

3. The relevant facts, which would assist us in appreciating the controversy involved are narrated in a nutshell, which are as follows: 1

4. After remand by the High Court at Allahabad, the DDC allowed the revision petition of the appellants by his order dated 20th of October, 2004 and the entries of Bandobast and consolidation were cancelled and the shares of the parties were decided in the manner indicated in the said order. From a bare reading of this order of DDC, it would be evident that the DDC while deciding the matter afresh, all the questions directed to be considered by the Allahabad High Court in the writ petition were duly considered after appreciating the 5 evidence and the respective cases made out by the parties and the DDC finally came to the conclusion that the order of Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) must be set aside and the entries of Bandobast and consolidation must be cancelled. This is seen from the above order that all questions were duly decided and evidence, oral and documentary, were duly considered and after that the aforesaid findings were arrived at by the DDC. A thorough examination of the findings arrived at by the DDC would show that there was no question to be left out and for any reason whatsoever, the findings were not arrived at in a perverse manner or the findings were arbitrary in nature. The appellants thereafter filed a writ petition being aggrieved by the order of the DDC before the High Court of Uttaranchal, at Nainital. It may be mentioned that when the order of DDC was passed, after remand, in view of the U.P. Re-organisation Act, 2000 the writ petition then could only be filed before the High Court at Uttaranchal and accordingly the appellants, feeling aggrieved, filed a writ application impugning the order of DDC before the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital. The High Court by the impugned judgment had affirmed the order of the DDC and feeling aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal by way of a special leave in this Court under Article 136 of the 6 Constitution, which on grant of leave, was heard in the presence of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

17. It is evident from the perusal of the order of the Allahabad High Court while passing the order of remand that the several issues which were raised by the parties were fully considered and finally directed the DDC to follow the procedures for coming to a proper conclusion afresh on merits. Since the High Court at Allahabad clearly directed the DDC to decide the matter on merits and in compliance with the said direction, the DDC considered all the entire materials, oral and documentary, on record to decide the matter, we do not find any excess jurisdiction exercised either by the DDC or by the High Court in coming to a finding arrived at by them.

21. Based on the reasons mentioned above, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of the Uttaranchal High Court and thus feel it unnecessary to interfere with the same.

22. The appeals are thus dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Om Prakash Singh vs M.Lingamaiah & Ors

4. Appellant indisputably is a resident of Uttar Pradesh. The suit land is fallow. Respondents allegedly taking advantage of the death of Ram Katin Singh fabricated three fraudulent sale deeds dated 4.03.1980, 6.03.1980 and 17.03.1981 impersonating the said Ram Katin Singh. Respondents contend that Ram Katin Singh was the exclusive owner of the property and transferred his right, title and interest in favour of the respondent No. 1 herein by reason of the aforementioned deeds of sale. Respondent No. 1, in turn, transferred his right, title and interest by executing deeds of sale in favour of several persons. Respondents denied and disputed that the transactions entered into by and between Ram Katin Singh and the respondent No. 1, on the one hand, and the latter and the respondent Nos. 2 3 to 6, on the other, were bogus, sham or illegal transactions as alleged or at all.

6. Aggrieved thereby and dissatisfied therewith, the appellant filed a writ application before the High Court of Judicature at Andhra Pradesh, which by reason of the impugned judgment dated 13.12.2007 has been dismissed.

Provided that the Special Court shall by notification specify the fact of taking cognizance of the case under this Act. Such notification shall 10 state that any objection which may be received by the Special Court from any person including the custodian of evacuee property within the period specified therein will be considered by it.

Upon considering the facts, it was furthermore opined:

25. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. No costs.

April 15, 2009