L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr vs P. Krishnamurthy & Ors

Background facts

2. We may briefly refer to the circumstances leading to the insertion of Rule 38A in the Rules. A public interest litigation (W.P. No.985/2000) was filed in the Madras High Court, complaining about indiscriminate illicit quarrying of sand in riverbeds. The High Court issued certain directions to curb illicit quarrying while disposing of the said writ petition. A contempt petition (Contempt Application No.561/2001) was filed complaining of non-implementation of the said directions by the State Government. In the said contempt proceedings, the High Court issued a direction to the State Government on 26.7.2002 to constitute a High Level Committee consisting of scientists, geologists and environmentalists to conduct a thorough scientific survey of the sand quarrying activities in rivers and riverbeds in the State and submit a report regarding the damage caused on account of indiscriminate illicit quarrying and to suggest the remedial measures. The High Court also suggested that a suitable regulatory legislation may be made by the State on the basis of the report of such Committee, and issued certain interim directions pending such legislation.

4. Prior to insertion of the said Rule, the State Government was granting quarrying leases, the term of such leases being three years or less, under Rule 8 of the Rules. It is stated that as on 2.10.2003, private agencies were holding 135 sand quarrying leases granted by the State Government and 52 permissions for sand quarrying in Ryotwari lands. Out of these, 19 were to expire in 2003, 102 were to expire in 2004, 33 were to expire in 2005 and the remaining 33 were to expire in 2006; and in addition, sand quarrying was carried on by some others on the authority of orders of court, even though no leases had been granted in their favour. With effect from 2.10.2003, the State Government stopped all sand quarrying by private agencies. Several writ petitions were filed in the Madras High Court by the Lessees/permission holders, challenging Rule 38A.

5. On 8.10.2003, a learned Single Judge of the High Court granted an interim stay, until further orders or till the leases granted to the writ petitioners came to an end, whichever was earlier. Being aggrieved by the interim stay, the State Government moved the matter before a Division Bench immediately which in turn issued an interim direction on the same day (8.10.2003) directing both parties not to quarry sand from areas covered by leases or court orders, until further orders. Subsequently, the writ petitions, which were pending before the learned Single Judge, were taken up for hearing by the Division Bench along with the writ appeals against the interim order, and were disposed of by a common order dated 11.5.2004.

[Emphasis supplied]

27. We, accordingly, allow these appeals in part. In place of the conditions stipulated by the Division Bench while upholding the validity of Rule 38A, we hold and direct as follows :
Hindustan Poles Corporation vs Commissioner Of Central Excise, ...

The appellants aggrieved by the said judgment have approached this Court. The appellants submitted that the impugned order of the CEGAT is contrary to a series of judgments of this Court. Reference has been made to the case of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys vs. CCE reported in (1991) Supp 1 SCC 125. The facts of that case are very akin to the facts of the case in hand. In the said case, the appellant is a manufacturer of pipes, tubes and poles made of iron and steel. These products are generally used by the telephone and telegraph departments of the Government of India, but can also be used for purposes of transmission and lighting. After Tariff Item 26-AA was introduced w.e.f. 24.4.1962 in the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 the Government of India issued a notification dated 1.3.1963 under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules by which "telegraph, telephone and electric lighting and transmission poles falling under Item 26-AA of the First Schedule of the Act" were declared completely exempt from the duty. Accordingly, the appellant was not allowed to pay duty on the goods right from 1962 till 1975. On 1.3.1975, the legislature introduced Tariff Item 68 in the First Schedule to the Act covering "goods not elsewhere prescribed". Thereafter, the Superintendent of Central Excise took the view that the poles in question manufactured by the appellant were classifiable not under Item 26-AA but under Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff and that, therefore, the appellant was liable to pay duty on all goods manufactured by it from 1.1.1975 till the date of the notice.

In view of the settled legal position the activity of the appellants of merely joining of three pipes, one with other, of different dimensions to obtain a desired length can by no stretch of imagination be brought within the category of 'manufacture'.

Consequently, these appeals are allowed and show cause notices are quashed and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal and Commissioner of Central Excise are set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.

Before we part with this case we would like to impress upon the respondent authorities that before issuance of show cause notices the Revenue must carefully take into consideration the settled law which has been crystallized by a series of judgments of this Court. The Revenue must make serious endeavour to ensure that all those who ought to pay excise duty must pay but in the process the Revenue must refrain from sending of indiscriminate show cause notices without proper application of mind. This is absolutely imperative to curb unnecessary and avoidable litigation in Courts leading to unnecessary harassment and waste of time of all concerns including Tribunals and Courts.
S. Venugopal vs A. Karruppusami And Anr.

4. The appellant-landlord claimed that he was conducting jewellery business from rented premises and he had no other non-residential premises in the city of Coimbatore. He, therefore, needed the premises in question for carrying on his own jewellery business. The respondents-tenants contended that his (the appellant's) need was not bona fide. The High Court found that the landlord was conducting jewellery business from rented premises. It was also held that the landlord did not have any other non-residential premises of his own from where he could conduct his jewellery business. However, the Page 2272 High Court laid great emphasis on one sentence appearing in the deposition of the landlord, who was examined as PW 1, which reads as follows:

Page 2274

14. We hold that the High Court was in error in setting aside the concurrent findings recorded by the Rent Controller and the appellate tribunal. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and restore that of the Rent Controller as affirmed by the appellate tribunal.

16. The appeals are allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
Sarup Singh Gupta vs S. Jagdish Singh And Ors.

2. The suit was decreed by the learned Sub Judge, Delhi by judgment and decree of 22nd October, 1983. The first appeal filed by the appellant was also dismissed, where after he preferred a second appeal which was also dismissed by the High Court by its Judgment and order dated August 1, 2002.

3. The petitioner then preferred a special leave petition before this Court, which was also dismissed subject to the liberty granted to the appellant to seek a review from the High Court by moving an application within a period of two weeks from the date of the order. Such an order was passed since it was submitted before this Court that although the plea of waiver of notice on the ground of rent having been continuously accepted by the landlord subsequent to the notice to quit was specifically raised in the High Court, it was neither noticed nor dealt with in the impugned judgment. Pursuant to the liberty given, the appellant moved the High Court by filing a review petition, which has been dismissed by the impugned order.

8. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was right In dismissing the review petition filed by the appellant. This appeal has no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.
S. Rajeswari vs S.N. Kulasekaran And Ors

We may notice only the facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal. One Mr. Nagoor was the original owner of land measuring 19.57 acres in plot Nos. 54 and 55 bearing survey No. 131/2A and 1A2 in Villivakkan Village, Chennai. The respondent no. 1 herein purchased land measuring 6 cents from one Mr. Robert who in turn had acquired the land under a deed of settlement dated 25.2.1967 from one Mr. John, who had purchased it from Mr. Nagoor on 26.11.1960. The purchase by respondent no.1 was on August 6, 1969. It appears that the said Mr. Nagoor sold lands out of the said plot to others as well, one of them being Pakairaj to whom he sold 6 cents of land on 14.5.1981.

It is not disputed that on 29.12.1998 the suit filed by respondent no. 1 was decreed. A first appeal preferred by Mr. Pakiaraj was also dismissed. The second appeal also came to be dismissed on 22.2.1990.

The appellant before us had also purchased 2970 sq.ft. of land from Deva Anbu by a registered sale deed dated 26.3.1990. Several other applications were made by the decree holder for amendment of the decree incorporating various other specifications. It is not necessary to refer to other proceedings taken. Suffice it to say that by order dated 30th March, 1999 the Trial Court passed an order for delivery of possession of suit land to the respondent no. 1 plaintiff.

The Bailiff along with police, Taluk Surveyor and the decree holder came to execute the decree on 8.4.1999. He found that the property identified by the decree holder was quite different from the land described in the decree and accordingly he made a report to the Court to the effect that since the identity of the land which was subject matter of the decree was in doubt, the warrant could not be executed. The decree holder respondent no. 1 herein also made a similar endorsement. The appellant herein submitted her written objections claiming that the land, of which possession was sought to be given to the decree holder, was the land belonging to her which she had validly acquired under a registered sale deed.

The order of the High Court cannot be sustained and accordingly this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order is set aside.

Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 1 submitted that the respondent no.1 was ill advised to prefer a revision petition before the High Court instead of an appeal. He submitted that it is still open to the respondent no.1 to move the High Court by way of an appeal. We express no opinion in the matter and we leave it to parties to seek such remedy as may be available to them in accordance with law. This appeal is accordingly allowed.
Gonchi Rajashekhar Reddy, Etc vs State Of A.P. & Ors

The High Court, in an appeal preferred by the convict- accused confirmed the conviction and sentence entered by the Sessions Court. They have filed the two instant appeals before this Court.

Brief facts of the case giving rise to these appeals are thus. There were two political groups in a small village by name Susankota. One group was under the leadership of Narasimha Reddy who had at some time been the Village Administrative Officer. The other political faction was under

In these appeals, we see no reason to take a view different than the courts below and the conviction and sentence entered against all the appellants are only to be confirmed. The appeals are without any merit and, therefore, dismissed.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla vs Tilak Singh And Ors

Respondent No. 5 Bal Krishan had insured his scooter with the appellant- insurance company for the period 7.3.1989 to 6.3.1990. For covering liability to pillion passengers endorsement of I.M.T. 70 pertaining to accident to unnamed hirer/driver/pillion passenger, is required on the insurance policy, which may be obtained by payment of additional premium. The insurance policy covering the scooter of respondent no.5. did not contain an endorsement of IMT 70.

On 23rd March 1989 the scooter was admittedly sold by respondent no.5 to respondent no.1, Tilak Raj. It is also an admitted position that the registration certificate of the scooter was transferred in the name of Tilak Raj but no notice thereto was given by the transferor respondent no. 5 to the appellant-insurance company for transfer of the insurance policy and the insurance certificate in the name of the transferee i.e. respondent no. 1. With effect from 1.7.1989 the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the `1939 Act') was repealed and the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the `1988 Act') came into force. On 31.10.1989 one Rajinder Singh, who was riding as a pillion rider while the scooter was being driven by respondent no. 1, died as a result of an accident. Respondents 2 to 4 being the legal heirs (wife and minor daughters) of the deceased Rajinder Singh moved an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation for the death of the deceased Rajinder Singh. This petition was opposed by the insurance company on two grounds (a) that the deceased was a pillion rider and the insurance policy did not cover the liability towards a pillion rider and, (b) that, although, the original insurer respondent no. 5. had sold the scooter to respondent no.1 before the accident neither was any intimation of such sale was given, nor was the insurance policy got transferred in favour of respondent no.1. Respondent no.5 denied his liability on the ground that he had ceased to be the owner of the scooter prior to the accident. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as `the tribunal') made an award dated 8.12.1992 and came to the conclusion that the accident had taken place due to rash and negligent driving on the part of respondent no.1. It also held that the claimants (respondents 2 to 4) were entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 3,89,000/- The tribunal absolved the appellant- insurance company from liability on the ground that no notice of the transfer of the insured vehicle had been given to the appellant-insurance company in the manner prescribed by the 1939 Act. Only respondent no.1 was held liable for payment of the compensation determined by the tribunal together with interest and costs.

B. The 1988 Act :

27):

For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment holding that the appellant-insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation awarded to the claimants.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. No orders as to costs.
Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd ... vs K. Thangappan & Anr

According to the appellants, the respondent did not report for duty since February, 1979 and accordingly his name was removed from the nominal muster roll. In October 1997, respondent No.1-workman addressed a letter to the Corporation and sought employment as a Mason. The request was repeated on 17.1.1998 and thereafter in June, 1998. In reply, the appellant-Corporation stated that since respondent No.1 was not working with the Corporation at the time of confirmation of other nominal muster roll employees and the matter was 20 years old, it would not be possible to consider the request for providing employment. On 18.8.1998 a writ application was filed before the Karnataka High Court praying, inter- alia, for a direction to consider the writ petitioner for the post of Ist Class Mason. Corporation filed its reply pointing out that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches. However, by order dated 18.8.1999 the writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge holding that it would be too much to expect a writ petitioner to retain copies of the communications that he had sent to the Corporation. Since the alleged acknowledgments produced had shown that some officers of the Corporation received the communications it would be desirable to accept the stand that representations were made and it would not be correct to say that the writ petitioner had slept over the matter for 18 years, as he was agitating the matter. The Writ Appeal filed by the Corporation was dismissed on the ground that Clause (4) of the Settlement clearly provided that as and when vacancy would arise, the workman would be appointed. That being the position, there was no scope for interference with the order of the learned Single Judge.

Looked at from any angle, respondent No.1-workman was not entitled to any relief. The orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench cannot be maintained and are set aside.

The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances with no order as to costs.
M.V. Bijlani vs Union Of India & Ors

The Appellant was working as a Junior Engineer at Jagadalpur in the year 1969-1970. He allegedly failed and/ or neglected to maintain a register known as ACE-8 Register. After he had handed over charge to his successor Shri K.C. Sariya, on or about 11.04.1975, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him on the following charges:

(ii) that he had failed to supervise the working of the line and utilisation of copper wire while the rules require the personnel supervision and accountability of the said wire; and

The disciplinary proceedings remained pending for a period of seven years. A report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer only in the year 1982. In the disciplinary proceeding, the first two charges were held to have been proved against the Appellant but the third charge was not proved. He was directed to be removed from service by the Disciplinary Authority by an order dated 21.12.1983. An appeal preferred thereagainst came to be dismissed by the appellate authority by an order dated 21.2.1991 i.e. after a period of seven years holding:

On the basis of the aforementioned findings of the Enquiry Officer, the High Court opined that there had been dereliction of duty which penetrates into the arena of misutilisation. The High Court rejected the contention of the Appellant that there had been a theft of copper wire, again relying upon the report of the Enquiry Officer.

For the views we have taken, the impugned judgments are wholly unsustainable.

The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The consequence of the said order would have been to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority. We, however, do not intend to do so as the charges relate to the year 1969-1970. The Appellant, due to pendency of these proceedings, has suffered a lot. He is, therefore, directed to be reinstated in service, if he has not reached the age of superannuation. However, keeping in view the fact that, he has not worked for a long time, we direct that he may only be paid 50% of the back wages. He is also entitled to costs of this appeal. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.5000/-.
Ranjit Singh vs Union Of India & Ors

A closure report was submitted by the CBI on 20th July, 2001. In the departmental proceeding, the Appellant adduced evidences on his behalf as also cross-examined witnesses examined on behalf of the Department. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report dated 26.9.1996 exonerating him from the said charges. The Disciplinary Authority, however, differed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and issued a memorandum on or about 17.2.1997 stating the reasons for his difference with the Enquiry Officer and called upon the Appellant to make his representation in his defence to the grounds of disagreement before a final decision is taken stating:

The Disciplinary Authority by an order dated 8.4.1997 directed dismissal of the Appellant from services stating:

On the first point, the Appellate Authority opined in favour of the department. On the second point, it was held:

This appeal is allowed to the afore-mentioned extent and the matter is remitted to the Disciplinary Authority for consideration of the matter afresh in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Munivel vs State Of Tamil Nadu

The High Court confirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court in respect of other offences on accused Nos.3, 4 and 5 under Sections 302, 326, 324 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC respectively.

Accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 preferred the special leave petition before this Court, but the same was dismissed.

The incident in question is not denied or disputed. Death of Babu Naidu is also not disputed. The fact that P.Ws. have received injuries on their persons, is also not disputed and otherwise stand proved. A finding of fact has been arrived at by the trial Judge, as also by the High Court that the offences, with which the Appellants herein together with other three accused persons were charged with, have been fully proved. We have noticed hereinbefore that the special leave petition filed by the main accused, namely, accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 has been dismissed.

Treatment given Referred to DAOS."

P.W.10 (Pushpa):
Gursewak Singh vs Avtar Singh & Ors

Gram Panchayat Ralla is situated in the District of Mansa in the State of Punjab. Election to the post of Sarpanch of the said Gram Panchayat was held on 29.6.2003. The Appellant and the First Respondent herein were the only two contestants, polling wherefor was held in four booths being Nos. 41, 42, 43 and 44. The Appellant was declared elected having polled 2004 votes as against 1900 by the First Respondent. 147 votes were rejected. The First Respondent herein allegedly made all attempts to disturb the counting process. He, however, did not lodge any complaint with the Returning Officer. The wife of the First Respondent incidentally was elected as Sarpanch in the earlier term.

By an order dated 2.9.2004, the writ petition was dismissed stating:

Instead of breaking the seals at one end, large number of ballots were found in loose condition. 200 ballot papers of booth No. 41 were found in the bag of booth No. 43. The Tribunal, therefore, came to the conclusion:

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court should have examined the case more closely. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is hence set aside. The appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the matter afresh. It may, however, be place on record that we have deliberately not adverted to the other contentions raised at the bar, lest it may prejudice any of the parties herein.

In view of the fact that we have set aside the judgment of the High Court and the matter is remitted back to the High Court, we direct that during pendency of the appeal before the High Court, the Appellant herein shall be reinstated as Sarpanch in the Gram Panchayat, Ralla. However, the High Court is requested to consider the desirability of disposing of the matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order.

The First Respondent shall bear the costs of the Appellant in the appeal. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 10,000/-.