L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors vs L.V. Subramanyeswara & Anr

(i) The method of filling up of the posts in the various grades of the Service, age limit and other qualifications relating thereto shall be as specified in Schedule I (In case of posts not covered in Schedule I, procedure, qualifications and similar matters shall be determined by the Commissioner). Provided that the upper age limit prescribed for direct recruitment may be relaxed in the case of candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and other specified categories of persons in accordance with the orders issued in this behalf from time to time by the Central Government.

9. As in case of one of the respondents, the judgment of the High Court directing the appellant to pay regular scale of pay having attained finality as the special leave petition filed thereagainst has been dismissed. The impugned judgment should not be interfered with. In any event, this Court taking into consideration the human element of the matter should not interfere with the impugned judgment.

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18. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The Appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Commnr. Of Central Excise, Bhavnagar vs Saurashtra Chemicals Ltd.

4. On or about 24.09.1996, the respondent imported two generator sets. We are herein concerned with the second one. Although it was received by the respondent on 24.10.1998, the same admittedly was not installed prior to 1.04.2000. In the relevant financial year, the rule which was in operation was Rule 57Q(3) of the Rules was as under:

10. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court was not correct in opining that CENVAT credit to the extent of 100% could be allowed in terms of Rule 57AC of the Rules.

12. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Commissioner Of Central Excise, Jaipur vs M/S Mahavir Aluminium Ltd

2. The facts of the case are that M/s Mahavir Aluminium Ltd., Bhiwadi (hereinafter referred to as 'the Assessee') was engaged in the manufacture of Aluminium Products falling under Chapter 76 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The assessee was manufacturing Aluminium Billets and was consuming it captively for the manufacture of Aluminium Irrigation Pipes exempted from payment of duty. The assessee was also selling the said commodity in the market by paying Excise Duty.

3. It was the case of the Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Revenue') that the assessee did not mention the facts in classification lists/declarations filed under Rule 173 B of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 nor produced record relating to production of Aluminium Billets used for captive consumption and production of Aluminium Irrigation Pipes. A notice was, therefore, issued to the assessee on January 2, 1996 to show cause why an amount of Rs.1,16,56,476/- towards clearance of Aluminium Billets for captive consumption by suppressing the fact that such consumption was for manufacture of fully exempt products should not be recovered as duty and why penalty should not be imposed along with penalty.

21. Ingots and Billets are thus two different commercial commodities. They have separate, distinct and identifiable marketability and saleability. The assessee, no doubt, used Aluminium Billets captively but is also selling in open market. We are, therefore, of the view that the Commissioner was right in holding that the assessee was liable to pay Excise Duty and CEGAT was wrong in interfering with the order-in-original. The order of the CEGAT, therefore, is liable to be set aside.

22. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The order passed by CEGAT is set aside and the order-in-original passed by the Commissioner is restored.

24. The appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
Devendra Singh & Ors vs State Of U.P. & Ors

5. The State of Uttar Pradesh as a measure of policy decision has decided to arrange the Special BTC Training Course for a period of six months to as many as 46,189 candidates possessing B.Ed./L.T. course. The National Teachers Education Board accorded its approval to the proposal submitted by the State of Uttar Pradesh for arranging the Special BTC Training Course for a period of 6 months to all those candidates with a requisite qualification of B.Ed./L.T. course. The Government order dated 14.1.2004 makes it abundantly clear it is a Special BTC Training Course, 2004 which is a programme of training for six months, including a three months practical schedule and in no manner deals with any selection and appointment of Assistant Teachers in the Basic Schools run by the U.P. Basic Education Board in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Be it noted that none of the appellants in these appeals could secure admission to Special BTC Training Course, 2004. Their case is that they should be given preference in admission to Special BTC Course inasmuch as they had already appeared for selections in Special BTC Course, 2001. Their further case is that the appointments should be made on the basis of year wise training course passed by the candidates, and the candidates who had passed the required training course earlier be placed above than those who had passed the training later.

7. The Government order dated 14.1.2004 was amended vide Government order dated 20.2.2004 even while the writ petition filed by the appellants herein pending before the learned Single Judge. The amendments made C.P.Ed., B.P. Ed. and D.P.Ed. qualified candidates also to be eligible along with B.Ed. and L.T. candidates provided they have taken training as institutional candidates from recognized universities and the State colleges, training colleges. The maximum age limit was extended to 40 years with exemption to reserved category candidates.

11. No other contention is urged.

12. For all the aforesaid reasons we find no merit in these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed.

13. We make no orders as to costs.
Noor @ Noordhin vs State Of Karnataka

4) were going on a motorcycle from Krishnapura to Ganeshpur. Allegedly, the motorcycle was stopped near Block No. II of village Kattipalla by a boy aged about 20 years. Appellant herein together with Siraj, Jubaid and Iqbal accompanied by 2-3 persons surrounded the motorcycle. They were armed with swords and cricket bats. Nooruddin, appellant herein, attacked the deceased with a sword, which he was carrying. PW-4 attempted to prevent it and in the process sustained an injury on his left hand. Udaya jumped from the motorcycle and ran towards the playground of the school. While he was climbing on the steps of the school, the appellant and his associates chased him and attacked him with swords and bats. PW-4 was also hit by a sword on his leg. He escaped and ran away.

4. PW-4 allegedly met one Ashok Shetty (PW-11) who examined himself as PW-11. They went to Suratkal Padmavathi Hospital wherein he was admitted. An information was sent to the police station. Statement of PW-4 was recorded. It was treated to be a First Information Report. However, a tense situation came into being. Even an inquest could not be conducted immediately.

5. In his statement before the police, PW-4 took the names of Siraj, Jubaid and Iqbal. However, in his deposition, he stated that he had taken their names wrongly. According to him, the real culprits are the appellant herein and Accused Nos. 2 to 7. All the accused were arrested on 21.10.2003. Some weapons were allegedly recovered.

20. The appeal filed by the appellant is allowed to the aforementioned extent and that of the State is dismissed. While setting aside the conviction under Section 304, Part I read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, his conviction under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld. As the appellant has already undergone the sentence imposed upon him by the High Court, he is directed to be set at liberty, unless wanted in connection with any other case.
State Of U.P. And Ors vs Deepak Fertilizers & Petrochemical ...

6. Finding that the exemption to NPK 23:23:0 was not allowed by the aforesaid two notifications, the respondent had written a letter to the Commissioner, Trade Tax of the State of UP requesting him to include NPK 23:23:0 in the exemption list issued under the aforesaid two notifications. On 23rd November, 1995 the Trade Tax Department of UP asked by a letter to the respondent company, "why their product be included in the aforesaid two notifications?" as the exemption to the product of the respondent was not allowed and aggrieved by the issuance of these notifications withdrawing such exemption allowed by the 1994 notification, the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad challenging the validity of the aforesaid two notifications and prayed for a direction upon the appellants not to discriminate NPK 23:23:0 and to include the same in the list of exempted items of the aforesaid two notifications.

(Underlining is ours).

23. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Commissioner Of Income Tax vs P. Mohanakala

J U D G M E N T CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2540 OF 2007 (Arising out of SLP(c) No. 17358 of 2006) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2541,2542,2543,2544,2545,2546 and 2547 OF 2007 (Arising out of SLP(C ) Nos. 17356, 17364,17365,19565,19563,21066 & 19566 of 2006 B.SUDERSHAN REDDY,J.

The appeals preferred by the Revenue Department deserve to be allowed and they are accordingly allowed. No costs.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd vs Premlata Shukla & Ors

2. Deceased Shivnandan Prasad Shukla was travelling in a Tempo Trax for going to Allahabad from Bhopal. It collided with a truck. Registration Number of truck could not be noticed. The truck also could not be traced. A First Information Report was lodged by one of the occupants of the Tempo Trax. An investigation on the basis of the said First Information Report for commission of an offence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the driver of the said truck. As during investigation the truck could not be traced out, the case was closed. A Claim Petition was filed before the Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal against the driver, owner and the Insurance Company with which the Tempo Trax was insured. The Tribunal upon analyzing the materials brought on record by the parties, including the First Information Report, arrived at a finding of fact that the driver of the Tempo Trax was not driving the vehicle rashly and negligently. It, therefore, dismissed the claim petition opining:

16. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The Appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
Benga Behera & Anr vs Braja Kishore Nanda & Ors

She was aged about 70 years when a Will was allegedly executed by her on or about 15.1.1982. She expired on 5.6.1983. The beneficiary of the Will was the first respondent herein. The testatrix was living in a math known as Bharati Math at Puri. In the Will, she disclosed her profession to be "Singer of Bhajans and Kirtans". It is not in dispute that the first respondent was a complete stranger to the family. He is a businessman. His father was one of the disciples of late Taponidhi Ramakrushna Bharati Goswamy, who had founded the Math wherein the testatrix was living.

3. A deed of sale was also executed by the said Sarajumani Dasi in favour of advocate Surendra Panda of Puri on the same day. The Will is said to have been scribed by one Banabehari Upadhyaya (PW-9), an advocate's clerk. He as well as one Chandramani Das Mohapatra who are said to be the attesting witnesses thereto also identified the testatrix before the Registering Officer. Respondent No.1 obtained the original Will from the Office of the Registering Authority on 30.1.1982.

4. As noticed hereinbefore, Sarajumani Dasi expired on 5.6.1983. In 1986, an application was filed by the first respondent in the court of the learned District Judge, Puri for grant of Letters of Administration in respect of the alleged Will with a copy of the Will annexed, in terms of Section 278 of the Indian Succession Act. Respondent No.1 claimed that he had also been residing in the said Math. She was assured of proper care by him and in consideration of the help and assistance rendered to her by respondent No.1, the said Will was executed in his favour.

5. Appellants herein are the heirs and legal representatives of the testatrix. They contested the said application, inter alia, questioning execution of the Will alleging the same to be a forged and a sham document.

8. To prove execution and attestation of the Will, the respondent No.1, inter alia, examined Banabehari Upadhyaya (P.W.9), Purnchandra Rath (P.W.4) and Surendra Panda (P.W.7).

10. P.W.9- Banabehari Upadhyaya who, as noticed hereinbefore, not only scribed the Will but also stated himself to be an attesting witness and identifier of the testatrix, in his deposition stated as under:

While registering the Will, the Registering Officer has endorsed: "Execution is admitted by the above Sarajumani Dasi who is identified by Sri Banabihari Upadhyay S/o Harihar Upadhyaya, Advocate's clerk of Bhubaneswar".

50. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.5,000/-.
S. Sethuraman vs R. Venkataraman & Ors

4. An appeal was preferred thereagainst before the Joint Director of School Education by the said respondent. The said appeal was, however, dismissed.

6. In an appeal preferred thereagainst viz., Writ Appeal No. 2058 of 1999, however, a Division Bench remitted the matter back to the Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary) by an order dated 14.07.2000 stating:-

7. By an order dated 2.11.2000, the second respondent opined that the merit and ability of both the appellant and the first respondent were equal and, therefore, since the first respondent was senior, he should be selected for the post of Headmaster as per the provisions of the Act and the Rules.

24. Most of the considerations which weighed with it were irrelevant.

788."

27. For the purpose of judging the respective merit and ability of the candidates, their extra-curricular activities may be taken into consideration, but evidently the appellate authority took into consideration a large number of irrelevant factors, we may notice some of them, which are only illustrative in nature.

(ii) Conducted Literary Association Meetings.

(iii) Involved himself in religious, musical service and human relation service.

(iv) Served in Home-guards.

(v) Acted in dramas

(vi) Undergone computer training.

30. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The matter is remitted to the Joint Director of School Education for consideration of the matter afresh strictly in accordance with law.

31. Although in terms of the High Court's Order, the appellate authority was required to consider the respective merit and ability of the appellant/first respondent at the relevant point of time namely when the post fell vacant, we are of the opinion that the same would not debar it from taking into consideration the question as to whether he has disqualified himself by any misconduct committed by him during his tenure as Headmaster of the School. The judgment of the High Court is set aside.

32. This appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
Udai Singh Dagar & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors

5. We will, however, record the facts of the matter from Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 11880 of 2006.

57. We may now consider the second limb of submissions, viz., whether the rights and privileges of the certificate holders are protected in terms of Section 67 of the Act.

71. For the reasons aforementioned, we respectfully agree with the view taken by the High Court.

74. On the first flush, the submission appears to be attractive. The liability of a person to get himself registered on the State register, in our opinion, is imperative so as to enable the State to control the profession as such. We have seen hereinbefore that the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samities Act, 1961 confers the responsibility of providing veterinary services on the Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samities. Nothing has been shown to us that any person could start practice in veterinary services without getting himself registered. Hence, in our opinion, the answer to the said question appears to be in the negative inasmuch as a legislative act must be read with the regulations framed. A subordinate legislation, as is well known, when validly framed, becomes a part of the Act.

76. Regulation 3 encompasses within its fold both the categories, viz., practitioners as also the employees.

78. For the aforementioned purpose, we are of the opinion that the statute being vague, a purposive construction thereto must be given.

82. For the reasons aforementioned, the writ petition and the civil appeal are dismissed, subject to the aforementioned observations and directions. No costs.
Commissioner Of Municipal ... vs Prem Lata Sood And Others

17. Respondent No.1 to 5 herein (hereinafter referred to as 'the respondents) intended to construct a hotel on the Mall Road in the town of Shimla. They filed an application for grant of planning permission to the Town and Country Planning Department on 27.06.1994. Such permission was approved by the Government of Himachal Pradesh by an order dated 16.01.1998.

Hence the plan is rejected and returned herewith."

26. In view of the aforementioned amendments in the regulation declaring 'core area' and 'heritage zone' within which only the respondents had filed their application for grant of sanction of the building plans, no order could be passed by the appellant.

27. In view of the aforementioned notification, the application for sanction of the building plans was ultimately rejected by the Corporation.

(iii) therein the statute used the word 'ordinarily'.

46. It is difficult to agree with the aforementioned contention of the learned Senior Counsel.

54. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
Sri Gedela Satchidananda Murthy (D) By ... vs Dy. Commnr., Endowments Deptt., A.P. & ...

Plaintiff No. 1 shifted his residence at the said property. In or about 1976, he installed statutes of Appala Swamy Naidu and Shri Veera Bhoja Vasantha Rayalu who was the guru of his father. The Guru of Appala Swamy Naidu and Appala Swamy Naidu himself had a large number of disciples. The idol of Godess Gayatri Devi was also installed. It was named as "Sri Simha Saila Puri Virat Guru Mandiram" and "Sri Simha Saila Puri Gayatri Peetam".

2. Allegedly, after the death of Appala Swamy Naidu, the said property was being managed by his brother Suryanarayana Naidu. When Smt. Atchamamba, wife of Appala Swamy Naidu died in the year 1979, her dead body was buried by the side of her husband in the same compound. A tomb was also constructed.

4. An application was filed before Respondent No. 1 for deletion of the said institution from the list of Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowment. The said application was dismissed by an order dated 14.12.1982. In arriving at the said decision, a large number of documents as also a report of the Assistant Commissioner Endowments, Anakapalli and statements of some persons including one Satyanarayana, the first cousin of the original Plaintiff No. 1, were taken into consideration.

12. While applying for water connection, admittedly, the plaintiffs categorically declared that the same was necessary for the visiting public and not for any domestic purpose. An inspection was made and it was found that the temple used to be visited regularly and the average number of visitors per day was about 30 to 40. Regular pujas are also held in the said temple.

35. Even otherwise, the principle of estoppel shall apply in this case.

The deed of trust in the present case is in the English form and the settlor has transferred the properties to trustees who are to hold them for certain specific purposes of religion and charity; that in our opinion is not decisive but is nevertheless a significant departure from the mode a private religious endowment is commonly made."

43. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Subhadra Ankush Kshirsagar And Ors. vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors. ...

3. The Division Bench of the High Court, on a consideration of the relevant materials, in the light of the pleas raised by the contesting respondents found no reason to maintain the ad interim order of status quo earlier granted and hence vacated the order protecting the rights of the appellants, in case the premises were sought to be commercially exploited by the Government. It is this order refusing interim relief to the appellants as sought for by them that is challenged in this appeal.

5. We have desisted from discussing the questions argued before us further, lest it prejudices the parties in the final disposal of the writ petition filed by the appellants before the High Court. Suffice it to say that we are satisfied that no ground is made out for interference with the order passed by the High Court.

6. We therefore confirm that order and dismiss this appeal. The order of status quo granted by this Court on 24.2.2006 will stand vacated. However, we may request the High Court to dispose of the writ petition now pending before it at an early date preferably within three months from the date of production of a copy of this judgment.

7. There is a delay of 341 days in filing this Petition for Special Leave to Appeal. We find that no sufficient cause has been made out for condoning the long delay in filing the Petition for Special Leave to Appeal. The petition is liable to be dismissed on that sole ground.

8. That apart, we have by our judgment in Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3559 of 2006 delivered today, affirmed of the High Court that is sought to be challenged in this Petition for Special Leave to Appeal. In the light of the reasons given therein also, this Petition for Special Leave to Appeal has only to be dismissed.

9. The Petition for Special Leave to Appeal is dismissed.