L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
U.T.Administration,Chandigarh & Ors vs Manju Mathur & Anr

2. The President of India in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution made the Conditions of Service of Union Territory of Chandigarh Employees Rules, 1992 with retrospective from 01.04.1991. The proviso to Rule 2 of these Rules empowered the Administrator to revise the scales of pay of persons appointed to the services and posts under the administrative control of the Administrator, Chandigarh, so as to bring them at par with the scales of pay which may be sanctioned by the Government of Punjab from time to time to the corresponding categories of employees. The Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh, notified the revised scales for the posts carrying existing scales in all classes of service by notification dated 03.01.1992 and soon thereafter, the Finance and Planning Officer, Chandigarh Administration, issued a Circular dated 08.01.1992 to all the Heads of Departments/Officers in Chandigarh Administration informing them that the revised pay scales 3 of various posts of their respective departments mentioned in the notification have been revised on the basis of corresponding posts which also exist in the State of Punjab. Respondent nos. 1 and 2, who were then working as Senior Dietician and Dietician posted in the General Hospital, Chandigarh under the Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh, made a representation dated 18.12.1992 to the Finance Secretary of the Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh, that the pay scales of Senior Dietician and Dietician have been revised to Rs.1500 - Rs.2540 and Rs.1350 - Rs.2400 respectively which were not at par with the revised pay scales of Rs.2200-Rs.4000 and Rs.1500- Rs.2640 of the corresponding posts of Dietician and Assistant Dietician respectively under the Government of Punjab. Respondents, however, were informed that they have been allowed revised pay scales as per the conversion technique.

8. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and sustain the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, and allow this appeal with no order as to costs.
Sushila Digambar Naik & Ors vs Maharashtra Housing & Ar.Dev.Authy& ...

3. Under the said agreement, the developer had agreed to provide each member/occupant, a flat with a carpet area of 345 sq. feet and a balcony/dry area of 70 sq.ft. On 9.1.2004, the first respondent (MHADA) issued a NOC for redevelopment to MHADA. However, subsequently, the appellants herein, who are 18 in number (referred to as non- co-operating members of the Society comprising the original nine plus addition nine members), opposed the development through fifth respondent. That led to the developer (fifth respondent) filing a suit against the appellants for a permanent injunction to restrain them from interfering with the development. In the said suit an interim injunction was issued against the appellants.

4. Except the appellants, the other members of the fourth respondent-Society vacated the premises and shifted to transit accommodation provided by the developer (or received an agreed sum as rent in lieu of transit accommodation). The appellants did not vacate the premises. Therefore MHADA passed an order of summary eviction against them under Section 95A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976. That order was challenged by the appellants in Writ Petition (Lodging) 10/2010. The writ petition was dismissed by a learned single Judge, by order dated 4.2.2010. The writ appeal filed by the appellants was also dismissed by the impugned order dated 12.3.2010. The said order is challenged by the appellants in this appeal by special leave.

lieu thereof (opted by some members) to which the members are entitled].

(iv) The corpus amount agreed will continue to be the same.

8. All parties submitted that the appeal may be disposed of accordingly. In view of the above, recording the said settlement, this appeal is disposed of. Each of the appellants, the Society and the developer will be entitled to enforce the above, as a decree, in the event of default/breach by the other parties to the settlement.

January 14, 2011.
B.S.Krishna Murthy & Anr vs B.S.Nagaraj & Ors

I approached Tyeb Sheth and requested and advised him to go to arbitration. I recommended him to see his counsel. I suggested to him that if an arbitrator commanding the confidence of both parties could be appointed, the case would be quickly finished. The lawyers' fees were so rapidly mounting up that they were enough to devour all the resources of the clients, big merchants as they were. The case occupied so much of their attention that they had no time left for any other work. In the meantime mutual ill-will was steadily increasing. I became disgusted with the profession. As lawyers the counsel on both sides were bound to rake up points of law in support of their own clients. I also saw for the first time that the winning party never recovers all the costs incurred. Under the Court Fees Regulation there was a fixed scale of costs to be allowed as between party and party, the actual costs as between attorney and client being very much higher. This was more than I could bear. I felt that my duty was to befriend both parties and bring them together. I strained every nerve to bring about a compromise. At last Tyeb Sheth agreed. An arbitrator was appointed, the case was argued before him, and Dada Abdulla won.

In our opinion, the lawyers should advise their clients to try for mediation for resolving the disputes, especially where relationships, like family relationships, business relationships, are involved, otherwise, the litigation drags on for years and decades often ruining both the parties.

Hence, the lawyers as well as litigants should follow Mahatma Gandhi's advice in the matter and try for arbitration/mediation. This is also the purpose of Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Let the matter be referred to the Bangalore Mediation Centre. The parties are directed to appear before the Bangalore Mediation Centre on 21.02.2011.

List after receiving report from the Mediation Centre.

JANUARY 14, 2011.
Hassan Dist.Cen.Co-Op.Bank Ltd vs Jt.Regr.Of Cooperative Societies & Anr

2. The second respondent was an employee of the appellant Bank. Rule 153 of the Staff Service Rules of the employees of the Hassan District Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., provides for compulsory retirement and relevant portion thereof is extracted below:

3. The second respondent raised a dispute under Section 70(2) of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 ('Act' for short). The Joint Registrar, by Award dated 5.11.2005, allowed the dispute holding that the appellant- bank had not followed the procedure contemplated under Rule 153 in passing the order of compulsory retirement. Consequently, he set aside the order of compulsory retirement reserving liberty to the appellant to impose any other appropriate punishment in accordance with the service rules.

4. As the said order was not implemented for more than a year, the second respondent filed W.P. No.8823/2007 seeking a direction to the appellant to reinstate him in service as ordered by the Joint Registrar and for a further direction to pay him the salary dues from 30.9.2002 .....3.

8. Therefore, we dispose of this appeal as follows:
Zuari Cements Ltd.& Ors vs A.P.Power Generation Corp.Ltd.& Ors

2. Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs) were executed between the first respondent - Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Limited and cement companies who are the appellants herein for lifting of fly ash from its Thermal Plants. Subsequently the first respondent Corporation terminated the MOUs alleging breach 2 on the the part of the appellants. However, even after such termination, the first respondent permitted the cement companies to take 80% of the fly ash from two Thermal Units.

8. It is not necessary to examine this aspect at this stage as the writ petitions are still pending. Interest of justice would be served if a suitable interim arrangement is made for supplies pending the decision in the writ petitions.

9. We, therefore, dispose of the appeals modifying the interim order already granted by directing the continuation of the interim order during the pendency of the writ petition, subject to the condition that the appellants shall make payment for the fly ash taken from the respective dates of interim orders of this Court and for future supplies during the pendency of the writ petitions, at the provisional rate of Rs.250/- per metric tonne (instead of Rs.90/- per metric tonne) subject to final accounting and final decision in the pending writ petition.

10. If the appellants fail in the writ petitions, they shall be liable to pay the difference in price based upon the highest offer received in response to the tender notice, in regard to the supplies received in pursuance of the interim orders, to the first respondent with interest on such difference at 10% per annum from the respective due dates.

11. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and continuation of the interim arrangement, we request the learned Single Judge to dispose of the pending writ petitions expeditiously, preferably within three months from today.
Salvation Army vs A. Subbian & Ors

Leave granted. We will refer to the facts and rank of the parties with reference to the first matter.

2. The appellant is an international charitable organization helping the poor. It came forward to construct 44 houses for the tsunami victims of 26th December 2004, and entered into a memorandum of understanding dated 2 3.3.2006 with the Collector, Nagapattinam, in that behalf. Out of 44 houses financed by the appellant, 15 houses were constructed by the local villagers and the remaining 29 houses by a contractor under the supervision of the support group constituted by the District Collector. All the houses were constructed at Uzhavar Street, North Poigainallur, Nagapattinam District, and were duly inspected and approved for occupation. Almost all the houses have been occupied. The fifteen appellants in the two connected appeals are the allottees of some of those houses who have been issued occupancy certificates and residing therein.

8. We therefore allow these appeals, set aside the order of the High Court and dispose of the first respondent's PIL with the following directions:

(ii) The District Collector shall have the 44 houses inspected after repairs/retrofitting, by an expert team, to find out whether they are safe and compliant with the guidelines/requirements.

(iii) If any of the houses is found to be unsafe or unfit for human occupation, even after such repairs and retrofitting, the District Collector may take such steps, including demolition, if necessary.
Amar Bahadur Singh vs State Of U.P

As per the prosecution story on the 2nd April, 1989 at about 11.45 p.m. the prosecutrix, the daughter in law of Santu, was sleeping in her in laws' house along with her daughter and other family members. Her husband was however away to the Punjab in connection with his employment. On an alarm raised by the prosecutrix all those at home woke up and saw that the appellant was committing rape on the prosecutrix. The appellant was accordingly apprehended on the spot with the help of a police party which was passing close by. It was also noticed that the prosecutrix was bleeding from her private parts. The appellant was accordingly brought to the police station where a report was lodged and a case under Section 376 of the IPC was registered.

The Trial Court relying on the evidence of PW.1 the prosecutrix, PW.2 Santu, her father-in-law, and PW.6, her sister-in-law, held that the case against the accused was made out and accordingly sentenced him to undergo R.I. for seven years. The matter was thereafter taken in appeal to the High Court and the High Court while observing that the facts of the case indicated that the prosecutrix was a consenting party thought that in the circumstance it was a fit case where the sentence ought to be reduced from seven to five years. The appeal was nevertheless dismissed with the reduction in the quantum of sentence. This appeal by way of special leave is now before us.

We find merit in this plea. We find that under the circumstance the possibility that rape could have been -3- committed on her in the presence of so many members in a small house is difficult to believe. On the contrary the findings of the High Court that the prosecutrix was a consenting party appear to be correct and it was perhaps when the accused and the prosecutrix had been caught red- handed that the story of rape had been cooked up, to salvage some of the family honour. This is often the tendency in such matters. The High Court has therefore gone completely wrong in dismissing the appeal even after its categoric observations. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant and order his acquittal. The appellant is on bail; his bail bonds are discharged.
Kanaka Rekha Naik vs Manoj Kumar Pradhan & Anr

4. The trial Court found that at the time of occurrence, the present respondent along with others obstructed the deceased and his family members at Barepanga. Thereafter, the rioters arrived there being called by them. The trial Court observed:

7. The above order is challenged on various grounds in this appeal.

14.In our considered opinion, the High Court ought to have taken the serious nature of allegations, the findings recorded by the trial Court and the alleged involvement of the respondent in more than one case, for deciding as to whether it is a fit case for suspending the sentence awarded by the trial Court and his release on bail during the pendency of the appeal. The impugned order does not record any reason whatsoever except vague observation that nature of allegations have been taken into consideration. The order clearly reflects that the High Court was mainly impressed by the fact that the respondent is a sitting M.L.A. In the circumstances, we find it difficult to sustain the order.

15.For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for its fresh consideration in accordance with law. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion whatsoever as to whether it is a fit case for the suspension of sentence of the respondent No. 1 during the pendency of 13 the appeal and for release on bail. It is for the High Court to arrive at a proper conclusion for which purpose, reasons are required to be recorded.

16.The appeal is allowed accordingly.
Daulatram & Anr vs Cbn Mandsaur, M.P

Similarly, Mangilal took the officers to the place which he had identified and another 3 kg of opium was recovered from another pit. The appellants also gave their confessions Exhibits P 16 and P17 respectively, stating therein that they had withheld the opium to sell it in the market in an unauthorised manner. 1.2 On the completion of the investigation, the appellants were charged under Section 8 read with Section 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The trial court relying on the evidence of P.W. 1 Bhanwarilal Patwari who had identified the fields as belonging to Hurdabai and in particular the evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 5 and P.W. 6 and also on the confessions made by the accused held that the case against them had been proved beyond doubt. The appellants were each sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1 lakh with a default sentence. An appeal taken Crl.A. 259 of 2006 REPORTABLE 3 to the High Court too was dismissed.

Crl.A. 259 of 2006 REPORTABLE 5

7. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
S.R. Sunil & Co vs D. Srinivasavaradan

1. A very limited prayer is made in this appeal. It arises from the order of the High Court. Admittedly a sum of Rs. 1,40,00,000/- had been borrowed by the respondent from the appellant on the 5th October, 1996. On 18th November, 1996, the respondent gave a cheque for Rs.5,38,425/- towards the interest on the aforesaid amount. This cheque was deposited in the bank on the 9th of January, 1997 which was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was, accordingly, filed and it was noticed that the only dispute was with regard to the payment of the interest as the principal amount of Rs.1,40,00,000/- had already been paid within Crl.A. 41 of 2005 2 time. The Trial Magistrate, accordingly, thought it fit that a sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- would meet the ends of justice. A revision was thereafter filed by the appellant and the same has been dismissed. The present appeal has been filed praying that the sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- was completely unrealistic and contrary to the law laid down in Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagadeeshan (2002) 2 SCC 420.

3. The appeal stands disposed of.
Ashok Surajlal Uike vs State Of Maharashtra

1. The facts of this case are as under:

On the day of the incident, the accused met her and enquired as to how she had performed in the Mathematics paper in the examination. P.W. 1 replied that she had not done too well on which the accused advised her to bring the question paper to his house. Tukaram, P.W. 2, P.W.1's father told her to go along with her younger brother Kapil, P.W. 3. The two, accordingly, went to the house of the accused which was near the school. They found that the accused was sitting outside his house and he directed them to go towards the school and told Kapil, to go out and bring some snacks from the shop of Naitam. Kapil, accordingly, left for the shop whereafter the accused held the hand of the prosecutrix Crl.A. 251 of 2006 REPORTABLE 2 and pushed her towards the verandah of the school and raped her. The shouts of alarm raised by the prosecutrix could not heard by any one on account of the operating loud speakers all around as it was the day of the Sharda Devi festival. The prosecutrix thereafter returned home and disclosed what had happened to her parents. A report was, accordingly, lodged at the police station on the 11th of October, 1997. On the completion of investigation, the accused was charged for an offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal code.

1.2 The trial court relying on the evidence of P.W. 1, as supported by the circumstantial evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 and noticing that the medical evidence was uncertain as the Doctor had opined that it was not possible to give any opinion as to the rape, nevertheless held that a case of rape had been made out. A sentence of 7 years was, accordingly, imposed on the appellant. An appeal taken to the High Court was also dismissed. It is in this situation that the matter is before us after the grant of special leave.

5. In the light of the very categoric statements of P.W. 1 as corraborated by P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 and in the light of the fact that no cause for false implication has been pointed out by the accused, we find no merit in the appeal. Dismissed. Accused is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled. He should be taken into custody forthwith to undergo the remaining part of the sentence.
Jiten Kumar Sahoo & Ors vs Chief Gen.Manager,Mcl & Ors

7. The High Court vide its judgment dated May 2, 2008, however, held that MCL ought to have filled up the newly sanctioned 51 posts of Mazdoor - Category I (I.T.I.) from the merit list prepared earlier strictly in the order of merit and no preference could have been given to those who had undertaken apprenticeship with MCL. The High Court, accordingly, directed MCL to fill up 51 posts strictly in the order of merit as per the select list prepared earlier. The High Court further directed that those who were likely to lose their job could be adjusted in suitable posts in the existing and future vacancies without asking 1 (!995) 2 SCC 1 5 them to face any recruitment test. It is this judgment and order of the High Court which is impugned in these two appeals.

8. In our judgment, these appeals have to be allowed. There is no dispute of fact that the appellants herein were not initially impleaded as party respondents in the writ petitions although primary relief in the writ petitions was to quash their selection and appointments. The appellants were impleaded for the first time after ten years or so. By that time the appellants got promoted from Mazdoor Category-I to Mazdoor Category-II and then to Mazdoor Category-III and thereafter to the posts of Fitter. In view of these circumstances, the writ petitioners were not entitled to any discretionary relief by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction.

11. For what we have discussed above, we do not think we need to deal with the merits of the issue as to whether the 7 High Court was right in holding that MCL could not have preferred to give appointments to those who had undertaken training with them.

12. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed; the judgment and order dated May 2, 2008 passed by the High Court of Orissa, Cuttack is set aside. The parties shall bear their own costs.

(R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI.

JANUARY 27, 2011 8
Parmeshwari vs Amir Chand & Ors

4. The contention of the owner of the scooter, before the High Court, was that the accident and his involvement in it was not proved and the claim petition should have been dismissed. The High Court ultimately upheld the appeal of the owner and set aside the findings of the Tribunal.

5. The material facts are that on 22.01.2003 at about 12.00 noon the appellant herein, the claimant before the Tribunal, respondent No.1 before the High Court, was going from Baganwala to Tosham on a Motor Cycle (No.HR 16C-8379), driven by Balwan with the claimant on the pillion seat. When the Motor Cycle was half a kilometer away from Baganwala, Suresh - respondent No.2 herein, came from the other direction in another scooter (No.HR 20-5793) from the wrong side and hit the right leg of the appellant as a result of which she fell down and her right leg was fractured and she received multiple injuries. The accident was witnessed by certain persons and one of them, Umed Singh, took the appellant to Dr. Punia's clinic from where she was referred to Chawla Nursing Home, Hisar, where she remained admitted till 6.2.2003. The matter was also reported to SSP, Hisar. Ultimately, the claim petition was filed by her on account of her serious injuries.

13. This Court, therefore, is unable to sustain the judgment given by the High Court and quashes the same and restores that of the Tribunal.

14. The entire payment of the compensation amount must be deposited with the Tribunal in terms of its award within a period of six weeks from today by a demand draft and thereupon the Tribunal will immediately send notice to the appellant and handover the demand draft to the appellant only within two weeks thereafter. The copy of the order may immediately be transmitted to the Tribunal.

15. The appeal is, thus, allowed with the aforesaid directions and observations.