L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Munusamy vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors

Appellant was the first informant. He examined himself as P.W.-1 before the learned trial Judge. The First Information Report, in question, was lodged in relation to an incident which took place on 4.3.1998 alleging that the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 came to the house of younger brother of the deceased( P.W.2) and started quarrelling with him on the premise that the deceased(wife of P.W.1) had made their sister's life miserable.

Cut injuries were caused in the front side of the head of the deceased with a sickle. Second Respondent allegedly assaulted the deceased with iron pipe on the back of her neck. The other two respondents were armed with sticks. They also, allegedly, assaulted the deceased. P.W.2 having intervened was also assaulted. The respondent No. 9 threatened P.W.7 that he would throw away her minor child into the well and at that time P.W.7 snatched her minor son and while doing so, the third respondent inflicted cut on her minor son. Respondent Nos. 6 and 8 attacked P.W.7 with sticks. When P.W.13 intervened to stop the attack on the minor child of P.W.7, his ear was cut by the third respondent with the sickle. In the said occurrence, allegedly, P.W.7 and P.W.13 were also assaulted.

The High Court, however, by reason of the impugned judgment set aside the said judgment of conviction and sentence and acquitted the respondents, inter-alia, holding; (i) presence of P.W.-1 at the place of occurrence cannot be believed as the prosecution has failed to establish the same; (ii) it is doubtful that Ex.P.1 is the real First Information Report; (iii) as P.W.-13 in his statement before the Doctor informed him that he had been attacked by two known persons and seven unknown persons, his statement before the Court that he knew all the persons from before, cannot be relied upon; (iv) the actual place of occurrence as also the genesis thereof has not been established by the prosecution.

We are, thus, of the opinion that it was obligatory on the part of the High Court to assign sufficient reasons for reversing the findings of the learned trial Judge. We are not considering the materials on record ourselves deeply at this stage as interest of justice would be subserved if the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the appeal preferred by the respondents afresh on merits.

We make it clear that we have not gone into the merit of the matter and all contentions of parties shall remain open. The High Court is requested to consider the desirability of disposing of the matter as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

The appeal is allowed.

......................J. [S.B. SINHA] .....................J [ CYRIAC JOSEPH ] New Delhi, September 17, 2008.
Commr.Of Central Excise vs M/S Shanmugananda Soapnut Works

In the present case, the investigation revealed that the respondent-assessee, M/s. Shanmugananda Soapnut Works, was engaged in the manufacture of Shikakai powder by crushing shigekai pods and 'Reeta' mixed in preparation of 10:1. Despite the said revelation made in the course of investigation, the show cause notice has not even alleged that the assessee is engaged in the manufacture of Shikakai ...2/-

We may state that there are other conjoint matters in which we are informed that the cases involved mixture of Reeta into Shikakai powder. However, as stated above, this is not the case in the present matter.

Subject to above, Civil Appeals stand dismissed with no order as to costs.
Kerala State Electricity Board vs Saratchandran P. & Anr

(3) On or about 1.4.1964, however, a separate services known as 'Board Secretariat Service' was constituted in terms whereof those employees who had been working were given a right of option with a lien to the parent wing to opt -1- therefor. Indisputably, whereas the respondent No.1 was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk on 11.5.1962, L.Radhadevi was appointed on 28.1.1963 and S. G.Rajappan was appointed on 11.3.1968. It is not in controversy that whereas the said L.Radhadevi , S.G. Rajjappan opted for the Board Secretariat services, the first respondent continued to work in the general establishment.

(7) However, the same caused heart burning amongst a section of the employees. Representations were filed in regard thereto and ultimately the Board took a decision to amend the aforesaid clause(c). On or about 7.11.1985, an amendment was carried into effect as a result whereof the said amended regulation read as under:

(23) For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. There shall, however be no order as to costs.
District Programme Co-Ordinator & Anr vs Abdul Kareem & Anr

It is now not much in dispute that some acts of omission and commission on the part of the 1st respondent were brought to the notice of the authorities of the Society and some purported oral enquiry was conducted at Bangalore in connection with some vehicle bearing No. KA-39 M-42.

Holding that as no disciplinary enquiry was conducted, the termination order dated 3.7.1998 was illegal, an award of reinstatement in service with full back wages was made. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said award the appellants filed writ petition in the High Court. The High Court while upholding the award of reinstatement in service reduced the back-wages to 30 per cent.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that as the services of the 1st respondent could be terminated on or about 31.10.1999, i.e. at the end of the tenure of the project, interest of justice will be subserved if in stead and place of upholding the award of reinstatement in service, we direct the appellants to pay a sum of Rs. 56,000/- to the 1st respondent by way of compensation which would cover the amount of honorarium to which he would have been entitled to for the period July, 1998 to October, 1999. We direct accordingly.

The said payment shall be made within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of this order, failing which the same shall bear interest at the rate 6 of 12 per cent per annum.

The appeal is allowed in the above terms.

..........................J (S.B. SINHA) ..........................J (CYRIAC JOSEPH) NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 18, 2008.
Har Singh vs State Of Uttarakhand

2. According to the prosecution, on 26th February, 1987, the deceased Bhupal Singh @ Joga Singh of village Sain Bagaria, District Almora, Uttaranchal, went to the Mela held at village Dabra on the occasion of Shiv Ratri along with his wife and two children. He had taken an amount of Rs.3,000/- with him for purchasing two bullocks and a goat. While at the Mela, he met Gusain Singh and remained at the Mela with his wife and children till 4.30 p.m. when he sent them 3 back to their village after telling them that he would return on the next day. Thereafter, Bhupal Singh and Gusain Singh came back to the Mela and found several persons, including the accused Mohan Singh, Har Singh, Ratan Singh and Lachham Singh, gambling in front of the tea stall of one Bhuwan Singh. Bhupal Singh also joined in the gambling and won Rs.200/- from Mohan Singh and Rs.600/- from Lachham Singh. When it started to get dark, Bhupal Singh stopped gambling as he had to go to Village Bhaisora with Gusain Singh.

3. It was also the prosecution case that the above-named accused persons followed Bhupal Singh and asked him to continue the gambling so that they could have a chance to recover the money which they had lost. In the alternative, they asked Bhupal Singh to 4 return the money which he had won in the gambling in front of the tea stall of Bhuwan Singh. Bhupal Singh refused to listen to either of the two proposals. Thereafter, accused Mohan Singh allegedly lifted Bhupal Singh and threw him on the ground with force. When Gusain Singh tried to intervene in an attempt to save Bhupal Singh, he was also threatened by the accused as a result whereof he ran away from the place. He has, however, come out in his evidence with the statement that while fleeing the place he had hidden in a nearby wheat field from where he heard Bhupal Singh requesting the accused not to kill him and subsequently even the said sounds ceased. When Bhupal Singh did not return to his house even after the second day, his mother, Smt. Chana Devi and Shri Soor Singh came to Gusain Singh's house on the third day to enquire about him. 5

4. On the basis of the said complaint investigations were commenced and Mohan Singh was arrested after interrogation. At Mohan Singh's instance Bhupal Singh's dead body was recovered in the presence of witnesses. The other accused were also arrested and the body of the deceased was sent for post-mortem, which was conducted by Dr. S.N. Srivastava, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Ranikhet, on 4th March, 1987. During the post mortem examination the 6 following injuries were found on the body of the deceased:

13.In that view of the matter, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court and the Appeals are, therefore, dismissed.
T. Jayakumar vs A. Gopu & Anr

3. The matter in controversy is the appointment as Extra Departmental Branch Post Master of Kadambadi village. The concerned authority issued a notice for filling up the position on 22 December 1999. The last date for receipt of applications was 5 January 2000. Respondent no.1 submitted his application that was received within time on 4-1-2000. On this application, however, he omitted to put his signature. Realising his mistake he sent another application duly filled-up and signed by him on 4 January 2000 with the request that the second application may be treated as part of the first one. The second application sent by respondent no.1 was received by the authorities after 5 January 2000, the last date for submission of applications. The concerned authorities called three candidates for interview, including the first respondent, but in the end it was the appellant who was selected and appointed as EDBPM, village Kadambadi.

6. The judgment and order passed by Tribunal was sought to be challenged by the appellant before the Madras High Court in WP no. 11229 of 2001. Apparently at the time of admission of the writ petition the High Court stayed the operation of the order of Tribunal but finally the writ petition was dismissed by judgment and order dated 1 February 2005. Against the High Court order the appellant filed the SLP giving rise to this appeal. In the SLP on 6 May 2005 this Court passed an order for 4 maintaining status quo as obtaining on that date. As a result of the interim orders passed by the High Court and by this Court the appellant has been able to continue in service since his appointment on 9 February 2000. Another fact we are unable to ignore is that now the age of the appellant is thirty eight years; in other words he has crossed the age bar for government employment.

5. The Tribunal did not accept the plea taken by the respondent authority. It upheld the claim of Respondent no.1 and by judgment and order dated 23 April 2001 allowed the OA and directed the concerned authority to accept his application as received within time and to consider his case for appointment as EDBPM.

(emphasis added)

9. We are unable to share either the view taken by the Tribunal or agree with the approach of the High Court.

13. On a careful consideration of the rival contentions and the materials on record we are unable to sustain the orders of the High Court and the Tribunal. The two orders are, accordingly, set aside.

15. This appeal is allowed subject to aforesaid observations and directions.
State Of Punjab vs Karnail Singh

3. Challenge before the High Court was to the order dated 11.5.2004 passed by learned Special Judge, Mansa, framing charges against the respondent for offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short the `Act'). The respondent was working as a Manager of Punjab Agricultural Development Bank at Budladha. The stand before the High Court was that the writ petitioner was not covered within the definition of "public servant" as the Bank was only a Co-operative Society and not receiving aid of any kind from the Government. An affidavit was filed by the Managing Director, Punjab State Co-operative Agricultural Development Bank Limited to the effect that State Government had invested Rs.50 lakhs as share capital in the Bank and Bank is controlled by the State Government. It was also argued that the Managing Director was an official of the State Government of the designation of Additional Registrar, Cooperative Societies and, therefore, the writ petitioner was a "public servant". The High Court wanted to know the total share capital of the Bank and as to whether it falls within the definition of Government Company as defined under Section 2 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. After referring to sub-clause

(ix) of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act the High Court came to an abrupt conclusion that the charges had been framed relying on the aforesaid clause, but on the facts it cannot be said that the revision petitioner falls within the definition of "public servant". Accordingly, it allowed the revision petition and Special Judge, Mansa's order dated 11.5.2004 was set aside.

7. Therefore, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter to it for fresh consideration.

8. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
Fatima Noor vs Faiyaz Ahmed

We had explored the possibility of a reconciliation between the parties but it was not successful and the petitioner-wife seeks transfer of the case filed by the respondent-husband, which is pending before the Civil Judge, 1st Class (Junior Division), Bulandsheher (U.P.) to the District Court, Delhi. We are told that the petitioner-wife is now staying in Delhi and she contends that it will not be possible for her to contest the case at Bulandsheher, in view of her financial condition. In the circumstances, we direct the case titled Petition No.309/2003- Faiyaz Ahmed Vs. Fatima Noor, pending before the Civil Judge, 1st Class (Junior Division), Bulandsheher be transferred to the District Court at Delhi. The District Judge, Delhi will try the case himself or entrust the same to any other Court having jurisdiction.

The transfer petition is allowed accordingly. All the records be transmitted to the transferred Court.

..................CJI.

22ND SEPTEMBER, 2008.
V.K. Jain vs High Court Of Delhi Through R.G. & Ors

2. Forced by circumstances, the petitioner after depositing their passports went to Hong Kong where he fell seriously ill. There was nobody to look after him at Hong Kong. Consequently, his mother and wife moved an application for releasing their passports before the learned Special Judge but their applications were dismissed vide order dated 4.3.2002 though an offer to keep the sister of the accused as another hostage was made as they offered to deposit the passport of the sister of the accused and also to furnish the bank guarantee.

3. Through this petition they have challenged not only the legality and rationality of the impugned order but its propriety and harshness. It is pertinent to mention here that since the release of accused, he has been regularly attending court proceedings even during brief sojourns to Hong Kong. More so his appearance was also exempted till the framing of charges.

9. Without tarrying further on this aspect and concept of liberty and freedom of movement of the citizens, I feel persuaded to set aside the impugned order which cannot stand even prima facie judicial scrutiny.

10. In the result the petition is allowed. The impugned order is hereby set aside. Passport of the petitioners, if deposited, shall be released to them forthwith.

The Bank guarantee, the personal bond and the surety will be to the satisfaction of the conerned court of Magistrate. The passport of the petitioner will be released to him for going abroad on terms ordered above and the same shall be deposited after the journey abroad with the concerned Magistrate.

The main petition and all pending Crl. Ms. are disposed of.

47. Mr. Mariarputham could not justify the remarks made against the appellant and submitted that this Court may pass an appropriate order.

Respondent nos. 4 and 5 sought modification only when they wanted to travel after five months of passing the order.

(c) Assuming that the order passed by the appellant was wrong or erroneous, even then the High Court ought to have either modified or set aside the order, but the High Court was not justified in passing totally unmerited, derogatory, harsh and castigating remarks against the appellant.

51. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot stand scrutiny of law as far as passing the remarks and strictures against the appellant are concerned and consequently we deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned order to the extent of expunging the remarks made against the appellant in the said order. We order accordingly.

52. The appeal is accordingly allowed and disposed of.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd vs Rakesh Kumar Arora & Ors

One Balwant Singh filed an application claiming a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs) by way of compensation for death of his son Virender Singh in -2- an accident which took place on 5.2.1997. The owner of the vehicle contested the said claim. Appellant herein, inter alia, raised a contention before the Tribunal that the driver of the vehicle, namely, Karan Arora was a minor on the date of the accident and was not holding a valid and effective driving licence and thus it was not liable to reimburse the owner of the vehicle.

In view of the authoritative pronouncement of this Court as noticed hereinbefore, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly and that of the learned Tribunal is restored. However, -11- keeping in view the admitted fact that as no stay had been granted by the High Court the appellant has deposited the entire amount which has since been withdrawn by the claimant-respondent; we direct that the appellant shall be entitled to recover the amount in question from the owner of the vehicle, namely, respondent No.1.

The appeal is allowed accordingly.

No costs.
State Of A.P vs Guvva Satyanarayana

2. Two charges were framed against the respondent. Firstly, it was alleged that the accused on 11.4.1994 at about 8.30 p.m. subjected his wife (hereinafter referred to as the `deceased') to cruelty and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 498A. Second charge was that he had committed the murder of his wife by causing her death. Accused pleaded innocence and, therefore, trial was held.

Charge sheet was filed in the Court of Additional Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Bhongir, who committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Nalgonda. The I Addl. Sessions Judge, Nalgonda, framed charges under Sections 498-A and 302 IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4

7. That being so, the order of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.

8. The appeal is dismissed.
Steel Authority Of India Ltd.& Anr vs State Of West Bengal & Ors

Workers raised a dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act in October 2001 and January 2002. On 18.11.2003, as noted above, the reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal which was challenged before the High Court by filing a writ petition. The primary stand taken was that in view of the accepted position by the Union and the employees at different points of time that the workers were contract labours, and having at no point of time pleaded that the agreement with the contractors was sham and bogus, after long lapse of time it was impermissible to raise such a 4 dispute purportedly in view of certain observations in SAIL's case (supra). The High Court rejected the plea and as noted above dismissed the writ petition. The learned counsel for the appellants have submitted that in para 125 of SAIL's judgment it was categorically held that the direction to absorb as given by the High Court was not sustainable and there is no question of any fresh absorption. It is pointed out that at all points of time the Union and the workers categorically admitted that the workers were contract labours. Earlier a writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the `Constitution') which was disposed of on 14.11.1988. Even at that point of time there was no plea that the agreement with the contractors was bogus or sham. It is pointed out that on a representation made by the appellants, the Government issued a Notification dated 15.7.1989. Even earlier in the writ petition filed there was no plea regarding the agreement being sham or bogus. The prayer was only for absorption and to quash the Notification keeping in abeyance the Notification dated 15.7.1989. In the writ petition it was 5 categorically stated that the contractors were agents of the principal employer. The direction given in the earlier writ petition filed by the respondents regarding absorption and regularization from 15.7.1989 was set aside. Therefore, for the first time the belated plea with unsupportable material should not have been accepted by the High Court.

12. Above being the position the decision of the Division Bench cannot be maintained and is set aside. The proceedings initiated pursuant to the reference made by the State Government in 2003 stand quashed.

13. The appeal is allowed.
Cosmopolitan Club vs The State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors

At this stage it may be mentioned that after the judgment of the High Court dismissing the Writ Petition, the Assessment Order was passed against which the Club has preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Authority which has also dismissed this appeal and as of today the matter, being T.A.No. 17 of 2000, is pending before the Tribunal.

We express no opinion on the merits of the matter. The judgment under appeal is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal to decide the pending appeal in accordance with law and in accordance with the directions given hereinabove. Subject to above, the Civil Appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs.

For the reasons given in our order delivered today, we grant liberty to the appellant (assessee) to prefer an appeal against the Order passed by the Assessing Officer dated 28th November, 2003 (Annexure P-2). Such appeal would be filed within a period of four weeks from today. It is made clear that the appeal shall be decided on merits. It will not be dismissed on the ground of limitation. All other directions given in our Order in Cosmopolitan Club shall equally apply to the facts of the present case.

The Civil Appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
M/S Prestige Garden Estates Pvt.Ltd vs State Of Karnataka & Ors

At this stage it may be mentioned that after the judgment of the High Court dismissing the Writ Petition, the Assessment Order was passed against which the Club has preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Authority which has also dismissed this appeal and as of today the matter, being T.A.No. 17 of 2000, is pending before the Tribunal.

We express no opinion on the merits of the matter. The judgment under appeal is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal to decide the pending appeal in accordance with law and in accordance with the directions given hereinabove. Subject to above, the Civil Appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs.

For the reasons given in our order delivered today, we grant liberty to the appellant (assessee) to prefer an appeal against the Order passed by the Assessing Officer dated 28th November, 2003 (Annexure P-2). Such appeal would be filed within a period of four weeks from today. It is made clear that the appeal shall be decided on merits. It will not be dismissed on the ground of limitation. All other directions given in our Order in Cosmopolitan Club shall equally apply to the facts of the present case.

The Civil Appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.