L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Vikram Singh @ Vicky & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors

4. When the appeal initially came up before a two-Judge Bench of this Court, the same was directed to be placed before a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement especially because the appellants had been awarded a death sentence which stood affirmed by a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction. That is precisely how the matter has come up before us for final hearing.

The sentence must be “so excessive as to outrage standards of decency” and disproportionate to the extent that Canadians “would find the punishment abhorrent or intolerable”.

49. To sum up:

Courts show deference to the legislative will and wisdom and are slow in upsetting the enacted provisions dealing with the quantum of punishment prescribed for different offences.

(e) Courts, however, have the jurisdiction to interfere when the punishment prescribed is so outrageously disproportionate to the offence or so inhuman or brutal that the same cannot be accepted by any standard of decency.

(g) Courts cannot interfere with the prescribed punishment only because the punishment is perceived to be excessive.

(h) In dealing with questions of proportionality of sentences, capital punishment is considered to be different in kind and degree from sentence of imprisonment. The result is that while there are several instances when capital punishment has been considered to be disproportionate to the offence committed, there are very few and rare cases of sentences of imprisonment being held disproportionate.

52. In the result this appeal fails and is, hereby, dismissed.
Sri Malaprabha Co-Op Sugar Factory Ltd vs State Of Karnataka & Ors

2 The facts that are relevant for deciding the present Appeal, succinctly, are that the Respondent State had fixed the price of rectified spirit uniformly at [pic] 6/- per litre by Government Order dated 12.5.1992. While doing so, it had been indicated that the captive distilleries would be entitled to receive only [pic] 5/- per litre, and the balance [pic] 1/- per litre would be receivable by the Respondent State. For the period of 1.7.1992 to 30.6.1993, supplies of rectified spirit were made by the Appellant to various parties and the entire sum at the rate of [pic] 6/- per litre was recovered/received by the Appellant. It will be relevant to underscore that the supply of rectified spirit (ethyl alcohol) was made by the Appellant with full knowledge of the Government Order to which challenge has been made, namely, the payment of [pic] 1/- per litre to the State Government. The Appellant does not dispute that it is a captive distillery, since it produces molasses which is then distilled and converted into ethyl alcohol/rectified spirit/industrial alcohol. The Government Order dated 12.5.1992 has not been assailed by the Appellant at any point of time. When a demand for a sum of [pic] 13,32,000/- was raised by the Superintendent of Excise, Huballi, by letter dated 15.12.93, a challenge by way of the filing of a writ petition was initiated.

7 The Appeal is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs.

August 21, 2015.
Vaish Aggarwal Panchayat vs Inder Kumar & Ors

The facts relevant to be stated for the adjudication of the present appeal are that the contesting respondent Nos. 1 and 2 – Inder Kumar and Yogendra Kumar, had filed a Civil Suit bearing No. 806 of 1993 against Krishan Chand Gupta, respondent No. 5, and Ved Prakash, original respondent No. 3, for a decree of specific performance of agreement to sell in respect of land measuring 20 kanals with the consequential relief of permanent injunction. The suit was decreed by the learned Civil Judge (SD), Kurukshetra by judgment and decree dated 19.9.1998 and no appeal was preferred against the same. Subsequently, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 sought execution of the decree and during its pendency, the Petitioner, Vaish Aggarwal Panchayat (society), filed objections claiming that it is the owner of the suit land by way of gift deeds dated 5.3.1997 and 6.3.1997 executed by Ved Prakash and Banarsi Dass. The objections filed by the Society were rejected vide order dated 4.11.2000. Thereafter, the Society filed an application for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 19.9.1998 and for stay of the execution, which was dismissed vide order dated 19.4.2001 and the appeal filed by the society against the same was also dismissed vide judgment dated 1.10.2004.

4. Aggrieved by the above said order, the Society preferred an appeal and the learned Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and the suit CS no. 333/03 of 2001 was ordered to be restored and tried.

5. Being dissatisfied with the said order in appeal, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Revision No. 3695 of 2006 and the High Court allowed the revision petition and set aside the order dated 15.6.2006 passed by the appellate court and accordingly restored the order of the trial court.

18. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the appellate Judge is restored. The trial court is directed to proceed with the suit and dispose of the same within a period of six months hence. There shall be no order as to costs.

2. On a perusal of the order passed by the High Court, we find that the trial court as well as the appellate court have analysed the facts in detail and declined to exercise the civil revisional jurisdiction. In our considered opinion, there is no merit in the appeal and accordingly the same stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
State Of Punjab vs M/S. Bandeep Singh & Ors

1 These Appeals assail the Judgment dated 20.9.2005 of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CWP No. 9621 of 2004. The factual matrix is that pursuant to an Auction Notice dated 1.5.2004 issued by the Managing Director, Punjab State Leather Development Corporation Ltd., several properties, of which we are only concerned with two, were to be put to a public auction. The salient terms as contained in the auction Notice required the interested persons to deposit an amount of [pic]2,00,000/- as Earnest Money; the successful bidder would have to deposit twenty five per cent of the auction amount at the conclusion of the bidding, and the remaining amount within thirty days of the approval of the bid by the Government. It is not disputed that the two Respondents/Writ Petitioners had deposited the Earnest Money together with twenty five per cent of the auction bids which, admittedly, were only marginally above the reserve price fixed by the Competent Authority. In respect of the Hide Flaying and Carcass Utilization Centre, Jhabal Road, Village Fathepur, Amritsar the reserve price was [pic]45.50 lakhs and the highest (subject) bid was [pic]46 lakhs; and for Tanning Centre Jhabal Road, Village Fathepur, Amritsar the reserve price was [pic]37.25 lakhs and the highest (subject) bid was [pic]38.10 lakhs.

2 However, the notings disclose that a certain person, referred to as Mr. Walia had orally complained that the successful bidders had promised to associate him in their venture as their partner, but had thereafter resiled from this commitment. Shri Walia was obviously a disgruntled party, and any official with a modicum of experience would not require superlative sagacity to discount or ignore his complaint. This is especially so since, admittedly, Shri Walia had been called upon to file his complaint in writing, but which he declined to do.

8 The Appeals are disposed of in these terms, with no order as to costs. Stay granted by this Court on 16.1.2006 is vacated.
State Of Rajasthan vs Jainudeen Shekh And Anr

2. The facts which are necessary to be stated for adjudication of the limited issue are that on 02.11.2011, PW-5 Nemichand, SHO, PS Bhimganj along with PW4, Umrao, Constable and PW6, Om Prakash, Head Constable while carrying on patrolling duty, noticed the two accused persons together and seeing the police vehicle, accused Jainuddin speedily moved towards the kachcha passage near Mangal Pandey circle and on a query being made, he could not give any satisfactory reply. The accused was searched in presence of other persons and during the search a polythene bag allegedly containing intoxicant material was found in the back pocket pant of the accused-respondent no.1 but he had no licence for it. The polythene bag weighed 31 gram 170 milligrams. The police prepared two samples of alleged smack weighing 5 grams each and the remaining was kept in the polythene bag and sealed. Thereafter the accused-respondent no. 1 was arrested at the spot and seizure memo was prepared. At that time accused Shabbir was also taken into custody. Thereafter, an FIR was registered and after investigation, charge sheet was filed under Section 8/21(B) of the NDPS Act against the accused-respondent no.1 and under Section 8/29 of the NDPS Act against the accused Shabbir.

6. After so holding, the learned trial Judge opined that despite the Supreme Court giving the guidelines in Criminal Appeal No. 1640 of 2010 to the State Governments and Central Government that every State should have forensic science laboratory at the level of the State as well as the Division, no appropriate action had been taken by the State Government. The learned trial Judge also opined that the State Government had not been able to discharge the responsibility and there should have been an arrangement to obtain the report from the Forensic Science Laboratory within a reasonable time. Being of this view, he recorded a judgment of acquittal in favour of the accused. Thereafter the learned trial Judge referred to Section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Code’) and opined that a Court of Session can award compensation to the accused in a case of malicious prosecution and accordingly directed payment of Rs.1,50,000/- each to both the accused persons.

14. In view of the foregoing analysis, the appeal is allowed and the order of the trial Judge granting compensation and that of the High Court giving stamp of approval to the same are set aside.
Tapas Kumar Mondal And Ors. Etc vs State Of West Bengal And Ors

3. The facts of the case in brief are that the appellants-writ petitioners, who are all Doctors serving under the Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of West Bengal, had obtained M.B.B.S. Degree and were issued Registration Certificates from the West Bengal Medical Council in different years. All of them are permanent employees under the Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of West Bengal, having joined their services mostly before 2008. It is appellants’ case that the West Bengal University of Health Sciences published an Advertisement for the West Bengal Post Graduate Medical Admission Test for the years 2011- 2012. They all got rank in the test of 2011 or in the test of 2012 and after counselling, all of them were admitted to different Diploma courses and they all completed their courses in the year 2014 with Trainee Reserve Facility (T.R. Facility) following the West Bengal Medical Education Service, the West Bengal Health Service and the West Bengal Public Health- cum- Administrative Service (Placement on Trainee Reserve) Rules, 2008 (in short, “T. R. Rules of 2008”), which enabled them to study in the said courses as applicable to in-service candidates. Such T. R. facilities were allowed by the Government vide different memos issued from time to time.

9. Aggrieved appellants, therefore, immediately approached the First Bench of the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal (in short, “the Tribunal”), which dismissed their petition on the ground that Clause 9 of the T.R. Rules of 2008 had a non-obstante Clause whereby the Government had a discretionary power in matters regarding placement of Trainee Reserve candidates and that no interim orders could be passed at that stage. Appellants, thereafter, knocked the doors of the High Court by filing writ petitions, which were dismissed by the Division Bench holding that the discretion that has been exercised in the instant case does not suffer from any irregularity and it is based on logic, equality and on public policy since Rule 9 of the aforesaid Rules clearly lays down that “placement” shall be at the discretion of the Government. Thus, even if a Doctor is eligible for further Government Sponsorship, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, that such sponsorship be given to him consecutively and in short intervals by not considering others, who are in queue for a period prior to 1.4.2012.

14. From perusal of the relevant Rule, it is evident that the placement of the Doctors shall be at the discretion of the Government. Merely because the appellants were allowed in the examination and found place in the select list does not give them right as in-house Doctors to get priority above their seniors.

15. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order. However, we record the assurance given by Mr. Bandopadhyay that the appellants will be given sponsorship for the next year 2016-17.

16. For the aforesaid reason, we dismiss these appeals. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
Gurdas Singh & Ors. Etc vs State Of Punjab & Ors

3. The facts of the case in brief are that various writ petitions at the instance of teachers of two of the Sanskrit Institutes at Patiala and Nabha were filed, which were clubbed and segregated by the learned Single Judge under two heads. First, the cases in the nature of public interest that were filed by the affected teachers themselves that the Sanskrit Mahavidyalya, Patiala and Sanskrit Institute at Nabha shall not be brought down to the level of school since they conduct courses at par with colleges beyond the level of matriculation and that the institutes shall be run with teachers of college cadre. Secondly, the claims at the instance of the teachers that they are entitled to the scales of pay commensurate with the Lecturers and Professors of colleges since the syllabi for the courses are approved by the Punjabi University at Patiala and the qualifications for teachers are as prescribed by the University.

13. With regard to the issue whether these school cadre teachers have right to be retained, the Division Bench held that when it is found that the appellants are school cadre teachers, they would have not any right to remain in two institutes which have now conferred the status of colleges. They can, therefore, always be transferred to school cadres.

14. Hence, the present appeals by special leave by the aggrieved teachers.

20. The appeals are accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.
Ksh.Lakshaheb Singh And Ors vs State Of Manipur And Ors

3. The facts of the case in brief are that the appellants are Master Degree/Degree Holders serving in the Public Health Engineering Department as Section Officers Grade-I. The next higher promotional post for them is the post of Assistant Engineer, which is to be filled up in terms of the recruitment rules known as PWD, IFCD and PHED, Manipur Assistant Engineer (Civil/ Mechanical) /Assistant Surveyor of Works Recruitment Rules, 2009 (in short “Rules of 2009”). As per the aforesaid recruitment rules, 60% of the posts of Assistant Engineers are to be filled up by promotion and the remaining 40% by direct recruitment. As regards the 60% promotional quota, 50% of the vacancies thereof are to be filled by Degree Holders Section Officers Grade-I and the remaining 50% by Diploma Holders and others.

4. It has been pleaded that due to certain financial crunch faced by the State Government in the past, the State Government took a policy decision in the year 1999 by which a total ban was imposed on appointment under direct recruitment quota. Thereafter, the State Government, considering the continuing acute financial condition of the State Government, issued an order on 19.03.2001 by which all appointments made on part-time, contract, adhoc, substitute, casual basis, etc. on direct recruitment were to be terminated and various Government Departments were also subjected to downsizing of staffs.

8. Other Section Officers Grade-I also preferred writ petitions before the High Court with a prayer for direction to the respondents to keep posts vacant for the writ-petitioners. Upon this prayer, learned Single Judge of the High Court on 25.7.2014 observed that it would not be appropriate on the part of the High Court to direct that some post be kept unfilled and, therefore, refused to pass any interim order except that any appointment made in pursuance of the advertisement shall be subject to outcome of the writ application.

(V) The High Court failed to decide the issues arising in the Writ Petitions. The impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. This Court may be pleased to grant special leave, allow the appeals and direct the respondents to fill up the vacancies of 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2012 by promotion with retrospective effect and fill the remaining vacancies according to the respective quotas i.e. 60% by promotion and 40% by direct recruitment.

14. As notice above, Mr. Gupta, learned counsel, very fairly submitted that 16 vacancies for promotion against the promotion quota are available and in any case the appellants shall be considered for promotion. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. However, we dispose of the appeals holding that the appellants' case shall be considered for promotion against the promotion quota as they are much above in the seniority list. The question of law raised by the appellants shall be kept open.
Ravindra Kumar Srivastava vs State Of M.P & Ors

3. Aggrieved by the cancellation of his promotion, appellant filed a Writ Petition No.420 of 2003 challenging the order of cancellation and reversion from the post of Stenographer to the post of Steno-typist. The writ petition was dismissed by the Single Judge of the High Court vide order dated 21.04.2006 observing that the appellant was not holding the minimum eligibility criteria for the promotion to the post of Stenographer and therefore his order of promotion was rightly cancelled. Writ Appeal preferred by the appellant also came to be dismissed. The appellant assails the correctness of the dismissal of his writ petition and also the writ appeal in these appeals.

7. The High Court rightly held that the appellant did not satisfy the eligibility criteria of having continuously worked for a period of five years as Steno-typist before being promoted as Stenographer. The impugned orders do not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.

September 4, 2015
Bhanuben And Anr vs State Of Gujarat

The brief facts of the case are stated hereunder to appreciate the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties:

The complainant then filed a complaint being I.C.R. No.172 of 2006 before the Kodinar Police Station against the appellants and the husband of the deceased. Thereafter, further investigation was carried out, the panchanama of the scene was drawn, the statements of the witnesses were recorded and the accused were arrested.

We partly set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 23.02.2015 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No. 101 of 2010.

We confirm the conviction on the charge under Section 498A of I.P.C. and having regard to the facts and circumstances referred to above we direct that the period already undergone by the appellants in custody is the sentence. We modify and reduce the sentence to the period of imprisonment already undergone by them.

Since, we have stated that period already undergone is the sentence which we have modified in this judgment for the conviction under Section 498A of the I.P.C. and in pursuant to the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, the appellants have surrendered to undergo the imprisonment. Presently, they are undergoing sentence imposed by the High Court and therefore, we direct the Jail Superintendent, Rajkot Central Prison, Rajkot, Gujarat to release them forthwith, if not required in connection with any other criminal case.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Bengal Ambuja Housing Development ... vs Pramila Sanfui And Ors

The present appeals, filed separately, arise from the impugned judgment and order dated 21.11.2014 passed in R.V.W. No.78 of 2013 and judgment and final order dated 19.12.2012 passed in C.O. No.709/2010 by the High Court of judicature at Calcutta, whereby the High Court refused to interfere with the impugned judgments therein. The appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.5902-5903 of 2015 have been preferred by the Bengal Ambuja Housing Development Ltd., whereas the appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 5906- 5907 of 2015 have been preferred by the West Bengal Housing Board. Both sets of appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment.

As the facts in both the appeals are common, for the sake of convenience, we refer to the facts of the appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 5906- 5907 of 2015, which are stated in brief hereunder:

Further, in the instant case, the order of temporary injunction dated 03.07.2006 was purportedly granted by consent is also not sustainable in law. The question of consent being given by either the appellant Housing Board or the predecessors in interest who are its vendors did not arise as they were not parties to the said suit. It is a well settled principle of law that either temporary or permanent injunction can be granted only against the parties to a suit. Further the purported consent order in terms of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure is only binding as against the parties to the suit. In such a case, the order of the Subordinate Judge to grant police protection against the appellant Housing Board which is enjoying the property is erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside.

The order of temporary injunction passed in favour of the plaintiffs- respondents is accordingly set aside in so far as it relates to the property of the appellant Housing Board is concerned which property was included by way of an amendment to the plaint.

The above contention of the learned senior counsel cannot be dealt with by us, as the same is not in controversy in the present case before us. The aggrieved parties are at liberty to seek the above mentioned prayer in an appropriate proceeding.

Since we have answered the points formulated in these appeals in favour of the appellant Housing Board by recording the reasons in the judgment, we have to allow the appeals of the appellant Housing Board. We pass the following order:

In view of the appeals of the appellant Housing Board being allowed, the appeals filed by the Bengal Ambuja Housing Development Ltd. are disposed of as they are unnecessary. All Interlocutory Applications are disposed of.