L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
M/S Bhagwati Prasad Pawan Kumar vs Union Of India

The factual background in which the dispute arose is as follows:-

On receipt of two letters alongwith the two cheques, the appellant wrote to the Railways two identical letters of August 20, 1993 stating that the claims were placed under PROTEST and could not be accepted and that the balance amount should be remitted within 15 days. We extract below one of the letters dated August 20, 1993:-

The High Court considered the case of Rameshwarlal Bhagchand (supra) on which reliance was placed by the Raiwlays. In that case the plaintiff-respondent, M/s. Rameshwarlal Bhagchand had transported 210 bags of groundnut through Railways, but when it took delivery, the consignments were found to be so damaged as not fit for human consumption. It was so certified by the Railway Officer concerned. The consignee served a notice on the Railway Administration claiming compensation in the sum of Rs.2,368.25 ps.. The General Manager sent a cheque in the sum of Rs.1173.19 ps. to the consignee on May 5, 1964 alongwith a letter stating that the cheque was being sent in full and final settlement of the claim. The consignee encashed the cheque but subsequently communicated to the General Manager by its letter dated July 29, 1964 that the cheque received satisfied only a part of the claim and that the balance amount should be remitted. Since the General Manager failed to make payment of the balance amount claimed by the consignee a suit for recovery of the balance amount was filed. In these facts the High Court took the view that the plaintiff having encashed the cheque without first communicating to the General Manager that it did not agree to the proposal made by him, it must be assumed in terms Section 8 of the Contract Act to have accepted the proposal by mere acceptance of the cheque. It was held that the fact that it wrote a letter on July 29, 1964 after encashing the cheque, and denying that the amount had fully settled its claim, did not alter the position. If the consignee did not agree to the offer made by the General Manager in his communication dated May 5, 1964, it should have communicated its refusal to accept the offer, before encashing the cheque. Otherwise it would be assumed that the cheque was encashed on the terms offered by the General Manager, and only later the consignee changed its mind after realizing the proceeds of the cheque.

In this view of the matter these appeals must fail. Accordingly these appeals are dismissed, but without any order as to costs. 27779
Rajinder vs State Of Haryana

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.

Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender."

The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.

When the factual background is tested on the principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the conviction under Section 302 IPC cannot be maintained and the conviction has to be in terms of Section 304 Part II IPC. Custodial sentence of 7 years would meet the ends of justice.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam & Anr vs Sham Lal

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants. By the impugned order learned Single Judge upheld the order passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur who held that the burden lies on the employer to prove that the workman had not worked for 240 days or more in the year immediately preceding the termination. The alleged date of termination is 13.11.1990. According to the respondent, he joined in November, 1989 whereas according to the appellant he joined in August, 1999. Demand for making the reference was made on 15.12.1999 i.e. after a long period of about 9 years. The workman was held to be entitled to full back wages from the date of demand notice i.e. from 25.2.1993 till his actual reinstatement as the termination of the services of the workmen with effect from 13.11.1990 was held to be illegal.

Above being the position, impugned judgment of the High Court is indefensible and is set aside.

The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs. In case the respondent has been reinstated pursuant to the order of the Labour Court or the High Court, salary and other emoluments paid to him shall not be recovered.
R. Kalavathi vs The State Of Tamil Nadu And Ors

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dismissing the Habeas Corpus Petition filed by the appellant seeking release of Rathina Raj @ Rathnavel Pandian (hereinafter referred to as the 'detenu'), who was detained under Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (in short the 'Act') as a "Goonda". The accusation against him was to the effect that he is habitually committing crime and that he had also acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and as such he is a "Goonda" as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act.

The High Court noticed that there were some differences between the English version and the Tamil version. But those were considered to be too trivial to affect the order of detention. The other grounds were also not accepted.

Judged in the background of legal position delineated above the order of detention cannot be maintained because it only refers to one act. There is also no material to justify the conclusion that the accused was habitually committing crime. There is no reference to any other crime. Therefore, the order of detention cannot be maintained. The High Court has not considered this aspect in the proper perspective. The order of detention in respect of the detenu which was passed by the Commissioner of Police, Chennai on 1.8.2005 is quashed. The order of the High Court is set aside. Detenu be released from detention forthwith unless required to be otherwise detained.

The appeal is allowed.
Devinder Singh & Ors vs State Of Haryana & Anr

Backgrounds facts in a nutshell are as follows:

On merits, it was pleaded that Jagmal son of Nanu Ram, a big land owner transferred the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs as evidenced by Civil Court decree in the year 1970, and under the provisions of the Act of 1972, the father of plaintiffs Udey Paul son of Jagmal filed the declaration form wherein he has included the plaintiffs as members of his family and he has also included the land obtained by the plaintiffs from Jagmal. The declaration form of Udey Paul was decided on 26.9.1980 by the Prescribed Authority, Sirsa and as per this order, the suit land was declared surplus and vested in the State. The order dated 26.9.1980 is final as no appeal has been preferred against it. It is also pleaded that the surplus area has been allotted by the Allotment Authority, Sirsa on 8.3.1981 and possession has been delivered to the allottees on the spot, as per rules. It is further pleaded that Jagmal who was a big land owner under the Tenures Act transferred the land in favour of plaintiffs as evidenced by Civil Court decree of 1970 which is based on collusion. It was further pleaded that since the declaration form was filed by the head of the family, there was no need to hear or give notice to the plaintiffs. Lastly, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed with special costs. Following issues were framed:

The Second appeal as noted above, was dismissed upholding view of the First Appellate Court.

The respondents filed appeals before the District Judge, Sirsa who allowed the appeal and set aside Trial's Court judgment and decree.

(8) Notwithstanding contained in Section 21, a person who files an appeal or a revision against the order declaring his land as surplus area and the appeal or revision filed by him fails, shall be liable to pay, for the period he is or has at any time been in possession of the land declared surplus to which he is or was not entitled under the law, a licence fee equal to thirty times the land holdings tax, recoverable in respect of this area.

(9) If the appeal or revision succeeds, the amount deposited or the bank guarantee furnished under sub-section (7) shall be refunded or released, as the case may be. If the appeal or revision fails, the amount deposited in cash or the amount of the bank guarantee furnished, shall be adjusted against the licence fee recoverable under sub-section (8)."

xxx xxx xxx

Above being the position, the appeal is without merit and is dismissed. No costs.
Heeralal Yadav vs State Of M.P. & Ors

The prosecution case in brief was that on 14.4.1993 at about 8.30 in the morning the deceased Gokul Singh son of Nirbhay Singh, who was a practicing advocate and his son Meharban Singh (PW-3) aged about 12 years went to their well in village Narval, District Shajapur. When the deceased went to answer the call of nature in the fields of Babulal Teli, all of a sudden, the accused Gokul Singh son of Amar Singh, Bhawarlal and Babulal armed with sword, farsi and dhariya and co-accused Lal Singh with knife, Chander Singh, Man Singh, Kalu Singh, Dhannalal and Lal Singh armed with lathis came on the spot and surrounded the deceased and assaulted him with their respective weapons. PW-3 Meharban Singh on seeing this incident ran to his house and told his grandfather PW-6 Nirbhay Singh at flour mill and his uncle PW-2 Heeralal Yadav (appellant herein) that his father Gokul Singh was being assaulted. On being told PW-2 Heeralal Yadav and Devsingh PW-4 went to the spot. They saw the accused persons assaulting the deceased. PW-6 Nirbhay Singh also went there and saw the accused persons running from the spot with their respective weapons. The deceased Gokul Singh was badly injured. He was put in a tractor and was taken to P.S. Agar where PW-2 Heeralal Yadav lodged F.I.R. at 9.05 a.m. which was recorded by A.S.I. PW-1 Dr.A.S.Khan examined the deceased Gokul Singh and found the following injuries:

5. Incised wound, 1" below injury no.4, 4" x =" x ="

6. Incised wound, 1" below injury no.5, 4" x =" x =".

9. Incised wound, 2" below injury no.8, 3" x =" x =".

On the basis of the FIR, 9 accused faced the trial for an offence under Section 302/34 before the Trial Court. The Trial Court after examining the evidence on record particularly the evidence of eyewitnesses PW-2 Heeralal Yadav, PW-3 Meharban Singh, PW-6 Nirbhay Singh along with the dying declaration recorded by PW-1 Dr.Khan convicted three accused respondents namely A-1 Gokul Singh son of Amar Singh, A-2 Bhawarlal son of Ram Singh and A-9 Badulal son of Lal Singh for an offence under Section 302/34 IPC and acquitted six other accused by giving them benefit of doubt. The High Court on appeal by the accused persons reversed the conviction of the Trial Court and recorded acquittal. Hence this appeal by special leave by the complainant, permission for which was granted by this Court.

In the view we have taken, we are clearly of the opinion, that the dying declaration of the deceased recorded by PW-1 Dr.A.S.Khan and well corroborated with other attending circumstances inspires confidence, on the basis of which conviction could be sustained. The High Court committed grave miscarriage of justice by reversing the conviction recorded by the Trial Court. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The sentence and conviction recorded by the Trial Court is restored. The appeal is allowed. Respondents are directed to be taken back into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining period of sentence. Compliance report within one month.
A.P. Foods vs S. Samuel & Ors

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows :

The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that both learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have failed to consider the basic issues. In the normal course we would have left it to the respondent to avail appropriate remedy under the Act.

As disputed questions of fact were involved, and alternative remedy is available under the ID Act, the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition, and should have directed the writ-petitioners to avail the statutory remedy.

However, because of the long passage of time (the writ petition was filed in 1996), the attendant circumstances of the case in the background noted above and in view of the agreement that this is a matter which requires to be referred to the Tribunal, we direct that the appropriate Government shall refer the following question for adjudication by the appropriate Tribunal:

Question:

The parties shall be permitted to place materials in support of their respective stands. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. The Tribunal shall make an effort to dispose of the reference within four months of the receipt of the reference from the State Government, which shall be done within three months from today.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
State Of Tamil Nadu vs Ravi @ Nehru

In the course of the Trial the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses. Exhibits P-1 to P-19 were marked and M.Os. 1 to 6 were also produced before the Court. No defense witness was examined on behalf of the accused. The plea of the accused was total denial. The Trial Court on appreciation of the evidence and documents on record found him guilty and sentenced him as aforestated. PW-2, the prosecutrix has stated in examination in chief that she was studying in UKG and on the fateful day after the school was over she went to her aunt's house (father's sister's house) at about 2 p.m. On the way the accused accosted her and took her stating that they would watch TV. She further stated that there were two other persons watching TV and the accused took her to another room and made her sit on his lap. The accused then removed his pant and brief and also removed the prosecutrix's brief. The accused pressed his sexual organ on her sexual organ. Then she started weeping and the other two brothers scolded the accused. The accused then ran away by putting his pant and shirt. Thereafter, the prosecutrix after putting her brief went to the house sobbing. She narrated the story to her mother. She also stated that on seeing her coming sobbing her mother fainted and fell down and then PW-8 Kamalam and PW-9 Rani received her clothes and drenched them in water. She further stated that PWs 8 and 9 also washed her sexual organ. Her statement was well corroborated by PWs 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9.

Thus, the High Court committed grave miscarriage of justice in recording acquittal by reversing the conviction recorded by the Trial Court. The impugned order of the High Court dated 8.7.1999 is accordingly set aside. The conviction recorded by the Trial Court is restored. This appeal is accordingly allowed. The respondent Ravi @ Nehru shall be taken back into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining part of the sentence. Compliance report within one month.
Umed Singh vs Arya Samaj Sewa Sadan

The appellant, Umed Singh, was inducted as a tenant of the suit premises by one Sewa Ram at a monthly rent of Rs.100/- for residential purposes. One Mohan Lal was also a tenant of a portion of the building. The said Sewa Ram executed a Will in favour of the respondent-society, Arya Samaj Sewa Sadan, on 15th March, 1984. Soon thereafter, on 5th June, 1984, Sewa Ram died.

On 25th March, 1994, the respondent filed ejectment suit against the appellant herein under Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent) & Eviction Act, 1973 (hereafter referred to as 'the Act') for non-payment of rent from 1st December, 1989 to 31st March, 1994 and also on the ground of bona fide requirement for starting a library in the suit premises. It may be indicated that the respondent-society also filed a suit against the other tenant, Mohan Lal, but the same was dismissed by the Rent Controller on the ground that running of a library could not be equated with the expression "use or occupation by the landlord for purposes of residence". An appeal preferred by the society against Mohan Lal was allowed and the judgment of the trial court was set aside. Ultimately, however, the High Court set aside the judgment of the Appellate Authority and restored the decision of the Rent Controller.

In view of the above, the interpretation of Section 13 (3) (a)

(i) of the Act in Mohan Lal's case was overruled. Subsequently, the Review Petition which was pending was also dismissed by virtue of the decision rendered in the Reference. These three appeals which were filed by the tenant, Umed Singh against the initial judgment of the High Court in the Civil Revision filed by the tenant and the judgment rendered by the Full Bench and the subsequent dismissal of the Review Petition, have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the reasoning of the Full Bench while considering the provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Act and, in our view, the appeals before us are devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Muklesh Ali vs State Of Assam & Anr

In pursuance of this Court's aforesaid order dated 12.5.2001, respondent No.2 by Memo dated 20.10.2001, directed the appellant to submit written statement as to why the decision intimated to the appellant vide order No. FRE.79/98/139 dated 1.11.2000 will not be reviewed asking the appellant to submit his written statement within ten days. The appellant challenged the validity and correctness of notice dated 20.10.2001 by way of filing writ petition before the learned single Judge of Gauhati High Court and the same was numbered as W.P.(C) No.8406 of 2001. The learned single Judge by his order dated 13.3.2003 dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred a writ appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court and the same was numbered as W.A. (C) No. 133 of 2003. Vide its order dated 5.5.2004, the Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal filed by the appellant. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant preferred the above appeal in this Court.

This apart, the alleged offence of dereliction of duty was not found to be willful and, therefore, proceeding was dropped by accepting the enquiry report ended in favour of the appellant being not guilty.

It is pertinent to notice that the appellant was working as Assistant Conservator of Forest attached to North Kamrup Division and the North Kamrup is not part of the Action Taken Report.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that this appeal has absolute merits and the judgment passed by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court affirming the judgment of the learned single Judge is bad in law and against the directions issued by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 202 of 1995 dated 15.1.1998 and 12.5.2001. We have, therefore, no hesitation to set aside the judgment passed by the learned single Judge and the Division Bench impugned in this appeal.

In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. However, there shall be no order as to costs. The appellant is not guilty as alleged by the respondents and as found by the High Court.

In view of the order now passed, the respondents should consider the name of the appellant for promotion and other consequential benefits at the relevant point of time. This exercise should be done within three months from the date of the receipt of this order and the appellant's seniority should be fixed at the appropriate place.
State Of Goa vs M/S. Western Builders

However in order to appreciate the controversy involve in these appeals it is necessary to give few facts for that purpose the facts given in the C.A. No. 1457 of 1004 are taken into consideration.

A dispute arose between M/s. Western Builders Bito's Compound & The State of Goa, represented by The Executive Engineer, Works Division XX (PHE), Public Works Department, Fatorda, Margoa, Goa. Mr. P.K. Mohan, Ex- Executive Engineer, Goa P.W.D. residing at House No. 1505, Dr. Rego Bag, P.O. Barbolim Complex, Goa 403202 was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator. He gave an award on 7th February, 1995 in favour of claimant and against the State of Goa and directed that the claimant is entitled to a sum of Rs. 89763/- and he further directed the State to pay simple interest on Rs. 75553/- from 4th January, 1993 at the rate of 15% per annum. This interest was payable till the date of decree of the award and till payment whichever is earlier.

Aggrieved against this order an appeal was preferred by the State of Goa before the High Court of Bombay, Panaji Bench at Goa under Section 37(1b) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This appeal came to be dismissed by the Ld. Single Judge by order dated 26.9.2002, in view of his detail reasons given in of the judgment delivered on 26.9.2002. It was held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not maintainable in view of sub-section 3 of Section 34 of the Act, 1996. Hence the present appeal.

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:

However, with regard to delay in filing objection before the principal civil court of original jurisdiction , this Court directed that the petitioner shall file objection for setting aside the award before the Court concerned within 30 days from this date, the delay in regard to filing of the petition as contemplated under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 shall be condoned by the said Court since the time consumed was bona fide in prosecution of its remedy.
Shri Balasaheb K. Thackeray & Anr vs Shri Venkat @ Babru S/O Wamanrao ...

A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice:

It was alleged in the complaint that due to the report, the reputation of the complainant was tarnished and he was defamed. After hearing arguments learned Magistrate issued process by order dated 15.9.1994. A petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') was filed before the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench which was dismissed by the judgment impugned in the appeal. The appellants filed Special Leave Petition (SLP (Crl.) No.4367 of 2003). After notice, the appeal was admitted on 3.2.2005. When the matter was taken for hearing on 31.5.2006 it was pointed out that the respondent no.1- complainant had died on 3.8.2005.

Above being the position, if any permission is sought for by the legal heirs of the deceased complainant to continue prosecution, the same shall be considered in its perspective by the Court dealing with the matter. It is brought to the notice that by order dated 13.10.2003 further proceedings before the Magistrate are stayed. In that background, Mr. Adsure submitted that the application shall be filed before this Court. If and when any application is filed the same shall be dealt with appropriately. Ordered accordingly.