L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Manju Ram Kalita vs State Of Assam

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that the appellant, a Government servant, got married with Smt. Minati Das (Kalita), the complainant on 5.2.1992 as per Hindu rites. Smt. Minati Das (Kalita) gave birth to a male child on 10.3.1993. However, the relationship between the husband and wife were not cordial as it was alleged by the wife that she was being tortured mentally and physically by the Appellant. She left the matrimonial home and started living with her father and was residing therein since 1993. In 1997, she came to know that the appellant got married with one Ranju Sarma on 2.2.1997 at Tukeswari Temple. Thus, she filed an FIR against the appellant.

4. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred Appeal No.3 of 2000 which was dismissed by the Appellate Court vide Judgment and Order dated 13.10.2000 (Annexure P-13).

5. The appellant further approached Gauhati High Court by filing Criminal Revision (P) No. 578 of 2000 which has been dismissed by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 21st December, 2001. Hence, this Appeal.

14. Issue no. 2 relates to the applicability of 498A I.P.C. As it has been alleged by the complainant that she had been given physical and mental torture by the appellant and it was not possible for her to stay with the appellant after 1993 though she was having seven months' pregnancy at that time. She gave birth to a 7 male child in the hospital and the appellant did not even come to see the child. The question would arise as to whether in the facts and circumstances where the complainant had left the matrimonial home and started living with her father in 1993, could a case be registered against the appellant under Section 498A I.P.C. in 1997?

13. In view of the above, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of fact so far as the issue of bigamy is concerned nor the quantum of punishment on this count required to be interfered with.

30. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, conviction of the appellant under Section 498-A IPC and punishment for the said offence awarded by the courts below are set aside. However, conviction and sentence under Section 494 IPC are maintained.

31. Appeal succeeds to the said extent and disposed of accordingly.

29th May, 2009.
Babu vs State Of U.P

2. The prosecution case was that in between the night of 21 st and 2nd April, 1989 all these accused persons in furtherance of their common object attacked the complainant party, who were working by the side of a tubewell in their field. The attack was made by the accused persons who were armed with various weapons, like spear, Lathi, knife and Balkati (probably a sharp-edged weapon). In the said attack, as has been stated earlier, Manoj and Ramu lost their lives on the spot, whereas Devender (PW-3) survived the attack although he was severely attacked.

3. In the First Information Report, which was lodged at the instance of PW-1 Yashpal, as many as six persons were involved. However, the 6 th person Hukam Singh was not proceeded against, probably finding that he was not involved in the incident. The trial Court convicted four persons. Presently, we are concerned with the 4th accused-appellant herein.

6. Since the Trial court had accepted the case against the accused persons, namely, Sohan Lal, Reshampal, Sheoraj and Babu, it seems an appeal was filed on behalf of all of them. The High Court, however, has acquitted accused Reshampal (original accused No. 2) presumably on the ground that the allegation against him was that he attacked with a spear and that the injured person or the dead persons did not have any injuries which could be caused by a spear, like punctured wounds. The High Court has on that basis given the benefit of doubt to the accused Reshampal and acquitted him.

13. For this reason, it is not necessary for us even to refer to the evidence of other witnesses who have been examined in support of the aforementioned three witnesses. Since we are clearly of the opinion that the accused persons made the assault having common object of committing the murder, their appeal has rightly been dismissed by the High Court.

14. We do not find any merit in this appeal by accused No. 4 Babu. It is dismissed as such.

May 29, 2009.
Santosh Kumar Tripathi & Ors vs U.P.Power Corporation & Ors

1. This appeal by special leave is at the instance of a number of appellants who, more than eleven years ago, had done a term of apprenticeship in different trades with the Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board under the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961. On completion of the period of apprenticeship they claimed absorption as Junior Engineers and on different posts of Operating Staff on the basis of their apprentice training in the respective trades suitable for the posts. The Board did not accede to their claim and instead issued an advertisement on October 17, 1998 inviting applications for filling-up the vacancies of Junior Engineers, Sub-station Officers, Fitters, Draftsman Mechanical, Machinists, Lineman, Plumbers, Instrument Mechanic, Wireman, Diesel Mechanic, Boiler Operators, Electricians and similar other posts. The appellants moved the Allahabad High Court seeking a direction in their favour and asking the Board to consider them for appointment on the respective posts relating to the different trades in which they had received training as apprentices, ignoring the age bar and giving them preference over candidates who were not trained apprentices.

9. On hearing Mr. Gupta and on going through the High Court judgment and the other materials on record, we find that the High Court has taken the correct view of the matter that does not call for any interference. There is no merit in this appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed.

10. Following the dismissal of the appeal, all the impleadment applications and other interlocutory applications, if any, stand dismissed.
Commr.Of Central Excise,Pune vs M/S Skf India Ltd

2. The facts of the case are fairly simple and admitted by both sides. The respondent-assessee is engaged in the manufacture and sale of ball- bearings and textile machine parts. It sold goods manufactured by it on certain prices on payment of excise duty leviable on the price on which the goods were sold. Later on, there was a revision of prices with retrospective effect. Following the revision the assessee demanded from its customers the balance of the higher prices and issued to them supplementary invoices. At the same time it also paid the differential duty on the goods sold earlier. The Revenue took the view that the assessee was liable to pay interest on differential duty. The assessee was given a notice dated April 4, 2006 demanding Rs.95,590/- as interest on delayed payment of duty under section 11AB of the Central Excise Act and further asking it to show cause why penalty may also not be imposed on it under section 37(3) of the Act. The assessee gave its reply stating that the payment of differential duty was made 3 by it at the time of issuing supplementary invoices to the customers and, therefore, there was no question of charging interest much less any penalty. However, the Assistant Commissioner Central Excise, Pune II Division, confirmed the demand of interest by his order dated June 5, 2006 and further imposed a penalty of Rs.5, 000/- against the assessee. The assessee took the matter in appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) Central Excise, Pune I, who by his order dated August 30, 2006 allowed the appeal and set-aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner. The Revenue then brought the matter before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal but its appeal was dismissed by order dated January 3, 2008. The Tribunal, following certain decisions of the Bombay High Court held that no interest was chargeable where there was no time-gap between the payment of the differential duty and issuance of supplementary invoices to the customers on the basis of upward revision of prices in respect of the goods sold earlier.

15. For the reasons discussed above we set aside the judgments and orders passed by the Tribunal and the Commissioner (Appeals). We restore the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner in so far as charge of interest is concerned. On the facts of this case there is no question of imposition of any penalty. Hence, that part of the order of the Assistant Commissioner is set aside.

16. In the result the appeals are allowed but with no order as to costs.
Gangamma Etc vs G. Nagarathnamma & Ors. Etc

3. The dispute arose out of a partition suit filed by i) Smt. Nagarathnamma wife of late G. Srinivas and

ii) by G. Hemlata who was a minor at the time of filing of the suit in 1992. Plaintiff was the only child of the plaintiff No.1, who was her mother and natural guardian and she represented the plaintiff No.2. The plaintiffs are respondent Nos. 1 & 2 before this Court.

7. The suit properties consist of both agricultural lands and urban properties and the plaint case is they are ancestral properties belonging to the joint family. The further plaint case is though some of the properties stand in the name of first defendant, they were bought benami in her name by the late Ganganna out of the income from agricultural lands and the income of the first plaintiff's husband who was working as an accountant in a private firm and drawing salary. He also had a leather 3 business and had earning from running a taxi. Thus he was contributing seven to eight thousand every month to the family and out of such income the suit properties were purchased. The first defendant being a housewife had no income to purchase properties. However, latter on relationship between the plaintiff No.1 and her husband and defendant No.1 became strained and the plaintiff No.1 and her husband had to leave the ancestral house. The plaint case is that out of the properties those at item Nos. 1 to 4 are the joint family properties.

10. Challenging the said judgment, the present appellants filed a Regular First Appeal being RFA 617/2004 and the plaintiff - respondent filed a cross objection, as mentioned above.

19. In view of such consistent views taken by this Court on the interpretation of Section 14, we hold that Section 14(1) of the said Act would apply in respect of the properties which stand in the name of the appellant and the appellant would be the full owner of those properties.

20. Therefore the order of the High Court cannot be upheld and is set aside. The order of the Learned Trial Judge is affirmed. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There is no order as to costs.
Dalip Kaur & Ors vs Jagnar Singh & Anr

4. Inter alia, on the premise that the second respondent was unable to pay the balance amount of consideration, the appellant executed a deed of sale in favour of Balbir Singh and Mohinder Singh. Whereas the case of the appellant is that it was at the instance of the respondent No.2, the said deed of sale was executed, the latter contends that the appellant did so without calling upon him to pay the balance amount and as such he committed an offence under Section 406 and Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the agreement dated 12.05.2006, the appellant paid a sum of Rs.7,20,000 to the respondent No.2 at the time of cancellation of agreement of sale. Appellant furthermore stated that another agreement was entered into on or about 10.6.2006 pursuant whereto the parties have agreed to cancel the agreement of sale itself and it was furthermore agreed that in the event the appellant fails to refund the amount, the respondent will take recourse to law.

5. Appellants in this Special Leave Petition, in no uncertain terms, stated that they were ready and willing to pay the amount on due date.

14. As the High Court has not applied its mind with regard to the aforementioned aspects of the matter, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.

15. The matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the matter afresh.

July 7, 2009
Mallappa Siddappa Alakanur & Ors vs State Of Karnataka

1. Three appellants who were original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 have come up against the conviction for the offences under Section 302 read with Section 149, Indian Penal Code. They were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. However, the High Court allowed the appeal against their acquittal. As many as six accused persons were tried before the Principal Sessions Judge, Bijapur on the basis of the charge-sheet filed by the police on the allegation that on 22.06.1996 at about 5 p.m. they were the members of unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object thereof and committed murder of one Malakari Sidda S/o Kariyappa 2 Alakanur. They were also named in the charge-sheet for the offences under Sections 148, 302, 504 read with 149, IPC.

2. The First Information Report was given by one Ningappa Mudakappa Kamari complaining therein that the complainant's sister's husband was involved in a murder case and was in jail. The complainant had put up a hut in the land of Kariyappa Alakanur situated at Yaragatti and started cultivating it. It was further alleged that Kariyappa had three sons and the eldest was Malakari Sidda. The father of Kariyappa was involved in the murder of one Maruti Alakanur and on this account the accused persons who were the relatives of the said Maruti nurtured a grudge against Kariyappa Alakanur. It is stated that on 22.06.1996 the deceased and the son of complainant were attending to the work of preparing jaggery from sugarcane. When the work was over, his son Mahadev Ningappa Kamari and deceased Malakari Sidda went to have a bath in the canal by the side of the land of Dattapant Kulkarni. Since they did not return early the complainant went towards the said canal and saw all the accused persons near the canal who were armed with various weapons. They lifted the said Malakari Sidda and carried him for some distance and committed his murder. This was seen by his son Mahadev and he being a friend ran towards their garden hut and, thereafter, this witness came on a bicycle along with Arjun Ishwar Honamore and Sanjeev 3 Mahadev Honamore. He also mentioned that the accused persons had gone away along with blood stained sickles in their hands towards Yaragatti village. He had found that Malakari Sidda was dead and his head was almost completely severed from the trunk. The police reached the spot and found the body and conducted the necessary investigation. The dead body was sent for post-mortem where 10 serious wounds were found in it. The weapons were seized from the accused they being M.Os. 8 and 10. On the basis of the investigation the charge-sheet followed and the accused persons were charged as aforesaid.

July 7, 2009.
Olympic Industries vs Mulla Hussainy Bhai Mulla ...

3. The brief facts necessitated for the disposal of these appeals are as follows :

9. Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in passing the impugned order and in rejecting the prayer for acceptance of the additional counter statement filed on behalf of the appellant. However, such application must be allowed subject to deposit of cost which is assessed at Rs.10,000/-. Such cost must be paid or deposited in the Small Causes Court, Chennai in the name of the respondent within two months from the date of supply of a copy of this order to the Small Causes Court, Chennai and in default of deposit of the aforesaid amount within the time specified herein above, the additional counter statement filed by the appellant shall stand automatically rejected. The respondent shall be entitled to withdraw the aforesaid sum of Rs.10,000/- from the Court of Small Causes, Chennai without prejudice to his rights and contentions in the original case.

10. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and that of the tribunals below are restored. The additional counter statement filed by the appellant be accepted.

11. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
Ganesh Gogoi vs State Of Assam

2. On the benefit of doubt being extended, the other accused, namely, Premodhar Gogoi was acquitted.

3. The material facts of the case as alleged by the prosecution are that on 2.9.1991 at about 7.30 a.m., Sub-Inspector B. Kalita, who was in-charge of Naohalia Out Police Post informed the Office-in-Charge of Bordubi Police Station over telephone that on the previous day i.e. on 1.9.1991 at about 7.30 p.m. one Dinanath Agarwalla Naohalia was taken away in a Maruti car by some unknown persons and this information was entered vide General Diary Entry No. 19 dated 2.9.1991.

4. Thereafter, Prabhat Gogoi, Officer-in-Charge along with his staff reached the place of occurrence for investigation and subsequently an FIR was lodged by him.

10. The incident, as alleged by the prosecution, had taken place in September 1991. Therefore, the appellant cannot be charged for having committed an offence which was not in existence on the day of alleged commission but was brought into the statute much later.

36. This Court is, therefore, of the clear opinion that in the facts of the case no charge against the accused under the said Act could be framed, consequently he cannot be convicted 19 under the provisions of the said Act. In any way in the instant case as discussed above, there is no evidence to connect the appellant with the alleged incident. Therefore, the judgment and order of conviction is totally unsustainable in law and is set aside. The appeal succeeds and the appellant be set at liberty forthwith if he is not wanted in connection with any other case.
H. Lathakumari vs Vamanapuram Block Panchayat & Ors

2. The Vamanapuram Block Panchayat, first respondent herein, entered into a "contract agreement" dated 15.3.1999 with the appellant under which the work of "RIDF-III, Pangode Sivakshetram - Thannichal Road improvements" was entrusted to her as per the articles of agreement, plans, specifications and conditions of contract approved by the Superintending Engineer, Commissionerate of Rural Development, State of Kerala. The 2 Articles of agreement confirmed that the contractor had also signed the copy of the Madras Detailed Standard Specifications (for short `MDSS') and addenda volume thereto in acknowledgement of being bound by all the conditions of the clauses. The MDSS which thus became a part of the contract between the parties, provided for settlement of disputes by arbitration vide clause 73 which is extracted below :

3. Certain disputes having arisen in respect of the said contract, the appellant, by letter dated 28.12.2000, sought reference to arbitration of its claims aggregating to Rs.13,06,936/- in terms of the aforesaid arbitration clause contained in the MDSS forming part of the agreement. The Block Development Officer, Vamanapuram Panchayat, sent a reply dated 4.1.2001 denying the claims and informing the contractor that if she did not resume the work, the contract would be terminated at her risk and cost. The 3 respondents, however, did not deny the existence of the arbitration agreement in the said reply.

7. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the first respondent is directed to refer the disputes to the Superintending Engineer in terms of the arbitration agreement contained in clause 73 of MDSS within six weeks from today. Nothing stated above shall be construed as an expression of any opinion on the merits of the claim.
Union Of India vs Devendra Kumar Pant And Ors

The first respondent was appointed as a Lab Assistant in the Research Designs and Standards Organisation (RDSO), Ministry of Railways, in the year 1972 and was subsequently promoted as Junior Research Assistant in 1977 and Senior Research Assistant in 1983.

3. The medical classifications for various categories of non-gazetted staff of RDSO, revised with a view to rationalize the medical standards, were notified by the RDSO, Ministry of Railways, by Office Order No.4/1990 dated 19.7.1990. The annexures to the said office order stated that the Committee constituted to decide upon the standards of medical examination had followed the following guidelines in rationalising the medical standards : (i) to the extent possible, the same medical standards were fixed for all RSDO staff of same capacity, doing similar type of work; (ii) the requirements stipulated in the Medical Manual with respect to the interest of public safety and administration, as also the interests of the employee himself and his fellow workers were taken into account while fixing the medical standards; and (iii) any possibility of medical decategorisation during promotion were obviated/minimized,while deciding upon the medical standards. The Committee had also recommended that in cases where a medical category, higher than that was then being followed, was recommended, the RDSO employees in those medical categories who were in service on 1.6.1990 should be granted relaxation at the discretion of the ADG. The medical standards that was being followed till introduction of revised medical standards and the revised medical standards that was introduced by office order dated 19.7.1990, for Research Assistants, were as follows:

5. Being aggrieved, the respondent filed OA No.395/1998 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, praying that the promotion order dated 30.6.1997 to the extent it required him to produce Fit Certificate in B-1 medical category and the consequential memos/orders dated 7.7.1997, 24.11.1997 and 17.7.1998 requiring him to present himself before the concerned medical officers for examination, be quashed. He also sought quashing of the office order No.4/1990 dated 19.7.1990 insofar as it related to classification of medical category in respect of Research Assistants. The Tribunal by order dated 20.5.2005 dismissed the said application as being devoid of any merit. The Tribunal held that the rationalization of medical standards prescribed in Office Order dated 19.7.1990 was on the basis of recommendations of a Committee constituted for that purpose, keeping in view the job requirements and the interests of the employee concerned as also other employees, and therefore it did not suffer from any infirmity. It also held that unless the respondent obtained the required B-1 category fit certificate, he will not be fulfilling the required medical standard for the post of Chief Research Assistant.

20. The appeal is therefore allowed, and the order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Tribunal is restored, resulting in the respondent's original petition before the Tribunal being dismissed.