L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Harbans Singh & Ors vs Sant Hari Singh & Ors

2. The dispute between the parties in this matter is in regard to management of Gurudwara Sant Bela Sahib Patshahi Naumin (for short, 2 "the said Gurudwara") situated in Village Kajal Majra and in Village Shergarh Bara. Sant Surjan Singh is the founder of the said Gurudwara. He had given the right of management of the said Gurudwara to Jagat Singh, who died in an accident during his life time. On or about 6.5.1982, he executed a general power of attorney appointing (1) Balu Singh s/o Talok Singh (Nabardar), (2) Harbans Singh s/o Ram Singh; and (3) Sant Nand Kaur widow of Jagat Singh as his attorneys in terms whereof they were conferred the powers to manage the whole of the property of the said Gurudwara.

3. Sant Surjan Singh died on 2.12.1983. The Managing Committee of the Gurudwara, however, passed a resolution on 18.12.1983 in terms whereof one Sant Hari Singh was appointed as Mohtmim of the said Gurudwara and In-charge of the affairs thereof. Disputes and differences having arisen between the parties as to who should manage the affairs of the said Gurudwara, two suits were filed.

5. By reason of a judgment and decree dated 11.5.2000, the suit filed by Sant Hari Singh was decreed with costs in terms whereof a decree of 4 permanent injunction was granted restraining the Managing Committee from interfering with the possession, management and control of the respondent over the land of the said Gurudwara, and consequently the suit filed by the Managing Committee was dismissed with costs.

6. Appellant herein and the Managing Committee of the said Gurudwara preferred appeals thereagainst.

13. Both the suits, as noticed hereinbefore, were consolidated. They were heard together. The disputes between the parties to both the suits were common. The issues raised therein also were common.

9. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said second appeal has been dismissed by the High Court, holding:

The said decision applies to the facts of the present case also.

16. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed accordingly. No costs.

JANUARY 13, 2009
Jharu Ram Roy vs Kamjit Roy & Ors

The First Appellate Court, however, on an appeal preferred by the contesting respondents, reversed the said findings of the Trial Court opining that 3 as the defendant-appellant was a party to the fraud perpetrated by Rajiv Lochan in so far as he was, at all material times, aware that in the year 1990, Nakho Ram was alive and not dead, he cannot take benefit of the said deeds of sale and the same were void ab initio. The High Court, as noticed hereinbefore, has affirmed the said view.

For the reasons aforementioned, this appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
Mohan Singh vs Kashi Bai & Ors

5. The learned Tribunal upon consideration of the depositions of the witnesses held that neither the truck No. MP04K 2028 was involved in the accident, nor was it caused on account of rash and negligent driving on the part of its driver. The learned Tribunal passed awards in all the three cases as under:

7. So far as the quantum of compensation is concerned, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the age of the deceased Shankarlal was 35 years. His monthly income was assessed at Rs. 1500/- per month. One-third of the said amount was deducted as his personal expenditure. Applying the multiplier of 10, it was held that the applicants were entitled to compensation of Rs. 1,20,000/-.

The deceased Ram Gopal was aged 31 years at the time of the accident. A multiplier of 12 was used in his case and the amount of compensation of Rs. 4,22,400/- was held to be payable to him on the premise that the loss of dependency was Rs. 34,200/- per annum.

8. The High Court, however, although did not interfere with these finding of facts, applied the multiplier of 17 in all the cases.

13. We, therefore, keeping in view the aforementioned peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, are of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court in applying the multiplier of 17 need not be interfered with.

14. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

January 13, 2009
V.V.G.Reddy vs Apsrtc, Nizamabad Region & Anr

3. Respondent - Corporation is constituted and incorporated under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (64 of 1950). Appellant joined its services as a conductor in the year 1981. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him. He was placed under suspension in the year 1982. In the said disciplinary proceeding, he, having been found guilty was dismissed from services.

6. He filed an Execution Petition being E.P. No. 18 of 1989 in I.D. No. 581 of 1987 before Labour Court, Hyderabad praying that his services be directed to be regularized at par with his colleagues with effect from 1.10.1983. The said Execution Petition was allowed.

7. As despite the same, his pay was not fixed at par with his colleagues and no notional increments had been granted, a legal notice was issued on his behalf by an Advocate on 2.3.1992.

8. A writ appeal was preferred thereagainst by the respondent herein. However, the said writ appeal was barred by limitation and an application for condonation of delay having not been allowed, the same was dismissed. A Special Leave Petition filed thereagainst being Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1114 of 2004 was allowed by a judgment and order dated 13.2.2007 in terms whereof the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal of the case on merit. By reason of the impugned judgment, the writ appeal preferred by the respondent herein has been allowed. 5

Provided that the payment of allowances under clauses (2) and (3) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible.

(5) In a case falling under clause (3) the period of absence from duty shall not be treated as period spent on duty unless such competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purposes."

The said decision, in our opinion, has no application to the fact situation obtaining in the present case.

18. Appellant has not been directed to be reinstated in service by reason of an Award holding that the order of termination was wholly illegal and, thus, void ab initio. On what premise, parties entered into a compromise is not known. It is possible to hold that findings of the Enquiry Officer which might have been accepted by the disciplinary authority holding him guilty of misconduct had not been set aside; the Management might have thought that denial of back wages and attendant benefits would be sufficient punishment. If that be so, appellant being not in service during the period in question, namely, 1.10.1983 to 15.2.1989, in our opinion, would not be entitled to increment.

19. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.

JANUARY 13, 2009
M/S.Tata Finance Ltd.Now Tata Motors ... vs N.Poongodi & Anr

Appellant-Company is a non-banking financial institution. Respondents had entered into four hire purchase agreements with the appellant, the details of which are given in synopsis 'D' to the S.L.P. paper book. Disputes arose between the parties which went to arbitration. Two Awards were given. Ultimately the matter came to this Court by way of Special Leave Petition and the Awards stood confirmed. In the process, a period of almost ten years elapsed. Pursuant ...2/-

On the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the Commission should frame and decide the issue of the Complaint being an abuse of the process as a preliminary issue before proceeding further in the matter. We do not wish to express any opinion on that issue or on the merits of the case. We make it clear that all contentions on the preliminary issue are kept open. Any observation made in the impugned judgment as well as herein on merits will not bind the Commission while deciding the preliminary issue.

Subject to what is stated hereinabove, the impugned ...4/-

CA @ SLP(C) 12422/08 contd...

-4- judgment is set aside and the matter stands remitted to the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to frame and decide the above issue as a preliminary issue within a period of four months.

Civil appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
B.S.N.L., Jammu vs Teja Singh

The said application was allowed inter alia on the premise that the appellant 2 had formulated a regularisation scheme in the year 1989 in terms whereof the respondent should have been given a permanent status. The High Court has upheld the said view.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the view of the learned Tribunal as also the High Court cannot be sustained. The impugned judgment is, therefore, set aside and the appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.

..........................J (S.B. SINHA) 7 ..........................J (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) NEW DELHI, JANUARY 16, 2009.
Bhagwan Sarup Nagar(D) By Lrs vs Ram Kishan

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing the appeal filed by the respondent. The appeal was filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the `CPC'). Appellant as plaintiff has filed a suit for mandatory injunction with a prayer that the defendant-respondent be directed to ensure possession to him of the demised premises description of which was given in the plaint. He also claimed Rs.3,900/- towards mesne profit for use and occupation of the property by the respondent. It was the case of the plaintiff that he was the owner of the house and the defendant was his cousin and he had inducted him as a licensee in two rooms. Thereafter, when the defendants started misbehaving, he issued a notice to him on 27.9.1991 revoking his licence. Since he failed to vacate the portion of the house in dispute, mesne profit was claimed and the occupation of the demised property was also claimed. The defendant took the plea that the property was exclusively in continuous peaceful possession of the defendant for last more than 50 years as its owners without paying rent to anybody including the plaintiff. It was also denied that he was ever inducted as a licencee. Five issues were framed by the trial court. It is to be noted that replication was filed by the plaintiff. After considering the evidence brought on record it was held that the plaintiff was the owner of the property in dispute but all the issues were decided against him. The issues were as follows:

10. Above being the position the High Court has fallen into grave error by overlooking the aforesaid conclusions and in allowing the second appeal. In the aforesaid background we are of the view that the second appeal needs to be heard afresh by the High Court. The matter is, therefore, remanded to the High Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with law.

11. Appeal is allowed. No costs.
Jagdish Bagri vs Rajendra Kumar Luhariwala & Anr

3. Since the appellant did not appear when the matter was called, the matter was taken ex-parte. The High Court noted that a sum of Rs.2,30,000/- was payable to the complainant-respondent No.1 herein by the present appellant -accused and since the payment was not made there was an agreement between the parties to stipulate the mode of payment. A sum of Rs.2,30,000/- was to be paid in 8 instalments and the first instalment was of a sum of Rs.50,000/- payable by 22.6.2002 and the 8th instalment of Rs.10,000/- was payable by 28.2.2003. As a security for the payment, the appellant issued three cheques. One of the cheques was of Rs.1 lakh and that is the subject matter of present controversy. Stand was taken that since the cheque was issued as a security, the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short the `Act') had no application. The High Court noticed that the appellant failed to pay Rs.2,30,000/- in 2 instalments as agreed to and therefore because of default of payment cheque of Rupees one lakh was presented. In that sense there is no question of any security.

7. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Hubert J. D'Souza vs Corporation Bank & Ors

By the impugned order, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission [for short, "the National Commission"] dismissed the complaint filed by the appellant, in effect and substance, on the ground that the same was barred by limitation.

A perusal of the complaint and the documents filed by the appellant shows that Respondent No.3-M/s. Rao Constructions gave a post-dated cheque bearing No.929131 dated 17th October, 1996, to the appellant on 17th April, 1996 for repayment of the loan. The Manager of Chembur Branch of the Bank guaranteed encashment of the cheque. However, on 16th July, 1996, that is a day before the due date of payment, the Branch Manager asked the appellant not to present the cheque. On the next day, cheque No.929131 was taken from the appellant and another cheque bearing No.217401 dated 17th October, 1996 was issued for Rupees twenty lakhs. The bank gave fresh guarantee to the appellant that the cheque will be ....2/-

honoured on its presentation. The appellant presented the cheque on 10th April, 1997, for encashment but it was returned on the same day with the remark "insufficient funds". The appellant represented to the bank for payment of Rupees twenty lakhs by relying upon the guarantee given on 17th July, 1996. The Chief Manager of the Bank sent communications dated November 16, 1998 and February 5, 1999 and assured the appellant that the matter is being looked into and they will get back to him within few days. After fifteen days, the Chief Manager vide his letter dated 20th February, 1999 denied the liability of the Bank to pay the amount of the cheque. Thereupon, the appellant filed complaint before the National Commission on 18th October, 1999 which, as mentioned above, was dismissed as barred by time.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the National Commission which shall now dispose of the complaint in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties, which would obviously include opportunity to adduce evidence.

No costs.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs M/S. Abhilash Jewellery

The respondent had a business establishment at Vellappad in Trissur District in the State of Kerala. It took a Jeweller's Block Policy for Rs. 1,15,00,000/-. During the currency of the policy, the complainant-respondent lodged a claim with the appellant for the loss of gold ornament weighing 587.870 grams. The claim was repudiated by the appellant on the ground that the loss of gold was occasioned as it was in the custody of an apprentice, who was not an employee.

Hence we set aside the order of the National Commission. The appeal is allowed. No orders as to costs.
Subba & Anr vs Debiya And Anr

3. The facts leading to filing of this appeal are: one Smt. Sonia resident of village Chhibab was married in Zari with Mengi. Only two daughters namely Bhagwania and Maiki were born out of the wedlock. 2 The appellants herein Subba and Sudish are the sons of Maiki. After the demise of Mengi, Sonia inherited the property in question from the deceased Mengi. It is alleged that after the death of Mengi one Teni who was working for Sonia as labourer developed illicit relations with Sonia as a result one son Debiya respondent herein was born. Be it noted, as per the version of the appellants Debiya is not the legal son of Sonia and Mengi, therefore, he could not be the legal heir to succeed the inherited property of Sonia. Teni died in the year 1956. Sonia died in April, 1977. In the year 1978, the appellants herein filed objections under the provisions of U.P. Consolidation Holdings Act, 1953 before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, Zari, District Banda for declaration as legal heirs of Sonia and their names to be recorded in the revenue records in place of Sonia. Deviya also filed his objections whereunder he claimed that the disputed property was self-acquired property of his father Teni. The Consolidation Officer vide order dated 7.7.1980 declared Debiya to be the sole legal heir of Sonia and Teni. The appellants herein being aggrieved by the said order filed Appeal No. 1838 before the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation, Jhansi Camp-Banda which was dismissed vide order dated 25.9.1980. Thereafter the appellants filed revision no. 1656 which was allowed by the Assistant Director Consolidation vide order dated 19.4.1985 setting aside the judgment and order of Settlement 3 Officer Consolidation and directed the names of the appellants to be recorded in respect of the said property left behind by Sonia. Being aggrieved by the revisional order Debiya-the respondent herein filed writ petition before the High Court. The High Court while allowing the writ petition quashed the judgment and order of Assistant Director Consolidation and restored the order of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation. Hence this appeal.

15. In our considered opinion, the High Court ought not to have interfered in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India with the decision of the Revisional Court which does not suffer from any factual and legal infirmities.

16. For all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order is set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.

January 22, 2009 10
T. Madhava Reddy & Anr vs Land Acqu.Officer-Cum-Mandal ...

The Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation in relation to the land belonging to Appellant No.1 at the rate of rupees ten thousand per acre, whereas in relation to Appellant No.2 compensation was awarded at the rate of Rupees six thousand per acre. On an application filed under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Reference Court after making a detailed analysis of the evidence produced by the parties, enhanced the compensation in relation to the land of Appellant No.1 from Rupees ten thousand per acre to rupees twenty thousand per acre, whereas, in relation to the land of Appellant no.2 from rupees six thousand per acre to rupees ten thousand per acre. On appeal, the High Court reversed that order.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order rendered by the High Court is set aside and award dated 20th August, 1990, passed by the Reference Court is restored.

No costs.
Union Of India vs Rattan Mallik @ Habul

4. Since in this appeal we propose to deal with the short question, viz. whether the High Court, while accepting the prayer for grant of bail, had kept in view the parameters of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, we deem it unnecessary to advert to the facts of the case against the respondent in greater detail. It would suffice to note that the case of the prosecution against the respondent was that he was involved in financing and trading in 14.900 kilograms of heroin, recovered from a specially made cavity above the cabin of a truck. Upon consideration of the evidence adduced, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution had successfully proved the charges against the respondent and three others. On conviction, the Trial Court sentenced the respondent to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.1 lac under Section 27A of the NDPS Act and undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and a fine of Rs.1 lac under Section 29 of the NDPS Act, with default stipulation.

5. Being aggrieved, the respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court along with an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail till his appeal was finally decided. The High Court, by the impugned order, has allowed the bail application and has ordered that the respondent shall be released on bail on his 2 executing a personal bond and furnishing two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned Court.

14. We may, however, hasten to add that while considering an application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the Court is not called upon to record a finding of `not guilty'. At this stage, it is neither necessary nor desirable to weigh the evidence meticulously to arrive at a positive finding as to whether or not the accused has committed offence under the NDPS Act. What is to be seen is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence(s) he is charged with and further that he is not likely to commit an offence under the said Act while on bail. The satisfaction of the Court about the existence of the said twin conditions is for a limited purpose and is confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail.

16. Thus, in our opinion, the impugned order having been passed ignoring the mandatory requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, it cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration of the application filed by the respondent for suspension of sentence and for granting of bail, keeping in view the parameters of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, enumerated above. We 8 further direct that the bail application shall be taken up for consideration only after the respondent surrenders to custody. The respondent is directed to surrender to custody within two weeks of the date of this order, failing which the High Court will take appropriate steps for his arrest.

17. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

JANUARY 23, 2009.
Vakil Prasad Singh vs State Of Bihar

3. The case has a chequered history and, therefore, in order to appreciate the rival stands of the parties, it would be necessary to notice the background facts in a little greater detail.

4. On 7th December, 1990, the appellant filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the Patna High Court against the order passed by the Special Judge, Muzaffarpur taking cognizance of the said offences, on the ground that the Inspector of Police, who had conducted the investigations, on the basis whereof the chargesheet was filed, had no jurisdiction to do so. Accepting the plea of the appellant, the High Court, vide order dated 7th December, 1990 quashed the order of Magistrate taking cognizance, with a direction to the prosecution to complete the investigation within a period of three months from receipt of the order, by an officer of the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or any other officer duly authorised in this behalf. No further progress was made in the case and the matter rested there till the year 1998, when the appellant filed yet another petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., giving rise to the present appeal, seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceedings pending against him mainly on the ground that re- investigation in the matter had not been initiated even after a lapse of seven and a half years of the order passed by the High Court on 7th December, 1990 and in the process the appellant had suffered undue harassment for over eighteen years. On 20th November, 1998, the petition was admitted to final hearing.

17. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the proceedings pending against the appellant in Special Case No. 29 of 1987 are hereby quashed.

JANUARY 23, 2009.