L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Uttar Pradesh Public Service ... vs Rahul Singh

4. Briefly stated, the facts necessary for the decision of this case are that the appellant U.P. Public Service Commission (for short ‘the Commission’) issued an advertisement on 22.02.2017 inviting applications for filling up vacancies in the Upper Subordinate Services of the State. The selection is conducted through a three stage test consisting of preliminary written examination, main examination and interview. Those candidates who clear the preliminary examination are entitled to appear in the main examination.

5. The preliminary examination consisted of two papers namely General Studies-I and General Studies-II. We are in this case concerned only with the General Studies-I paper which carried 200 marks and consists of 150 objective type questions with multiple choice answers. After the preliminary examination was conducted, key answers were published by the Commission. Many persons 3 including the petitioners before the Allahabad High Court contended that some of the key answers were incorrect or that some of the questions had more than one correct answer.

whether their result will be approved or disapproved by the court; whether they will get admission in a college or university or not; and whether they will get recruited or not. This unsatisfactory situation does not work to anybody’s advantage and such a state of uncertainty results in confusion being worse confounded. The overall and larger impact of all this is that public interest suffers.”

14. In the present case we find that all the 3 questions needed a long process of reasoning and the High Court itself has noticed that the stand of the Commission is also supported by certain text books. When there are conflicting views, then the court must bow down to the opinion of the experts. Judges are not and cannot be experts in all fields and, therefore, they must exercise great restraint and should not overstep their jurisdiction to upset the opinion of the experts.

15. In view of the above discussion we are clearly of the view that the High Court over stepped its jurisdiction by giving the directions which amounted to setting aside the decision of experts in the field. As far as the objection of the appellant - Rahul Singh is concerned, after going through the question on which he raised an objection, we ourselves are of the prima facie view that the answer given by the Commission is correct.

16. In view of the above discussion we allow the appeal filed by the U.P. Public Service Commission and set aside the judgment of the Allahabad High Court. The appeals filed by Rahul Singh and Jay Bux Singh and Others are dismissed. All pending applications stand disposed of.
Kishan Rao vs Shankargouda

2. Brief facts of case are:

3. A notice was issued by the complainant demanding payment of Rs.2,00,000/- which was received by the accused on 14.03.2006 to which reply was sent on 31.03.2006. A complaint was filed by the appellant 3 alleging the offence under Section 138 of the Act, 1881. Cognizance was taken by the Magistrate. Accused stated not guilty of the offence, hence, trial proceeded. In order to prove the guilt, the complainant himself examined as PW.1 and examined two other witnesses PW.2 and Pw.3. He filed documentary evidence Exhs.P1 and P6, statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, the case proceeded for defence evidence. Accused neither examined himself nor produced any evidence either oral or documentary. In the reply to the notice which was sent by the complainant, it was alleged that the said cheque was stolen by the complainant. The complainant was cross-examined by the defence. In the cross-examination defence denied accused’s signatures on the cheque. The trial court rejected the defence of the accused that cheque was stolen by the complainant. The trial court drew presumption under Section 139 of the Act, 1881 against the accused. Accused failed to rebut the presumption by leading any evidence on his behalf. The offence having been found proved, the trial court convicted the accused 4 under Section 138 of the Act, 1881 and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.2,50,000/- and simple imprisonment for six months.

4. The appeal was filed by the accused against the said judgment. The Appellate Court considered the submissions of the parties and dismissed the appeal by affirming the order of conviction.

8. Although, the respondent was served but no one appeared at the time of hearing.

23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable 18 it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction.

24. In the result, the appeal is allowed, judgment of the High Court is set aside and judgment of trial court as affirmed by the Appellate Court is restored.
Director General Crpf vs Janardan Singh

1.   Director­General,   CRPF,   the   Union   of   India   and Addittional­Director­General, group centre, CRPF, has come   up   in   this   appeal   questioning   the   judgment   of Allahabad   High   Court   dated   14.02.2008   by   which judgment the High Court dismissed Writ Petition filed by   the   appellant   upholding   the   order   of   Central Administrative   Tribunal   dated   05.11.2007   by   which claim of Special (Duty) Allowance of the respondent was accepted.

2. Brief facts of the case are:

3.   The   Order   clarified   that   allowance   to   be admissible to the personnel who were actually working in   the   North   East   Region.   The   respondents   filed Original   Application   No.778   of   2006   before   Central Administrative   Tribunal   claiming   grant   of   Special (Duty) Allowance as per the Order dated 14.12.1983. The  Central  Administrative   Tribunal  by   its   judgment and Order dated 05.11.2007 directed for sanction of Special   (Duty)   Allowance   to   the   applicants   for   the period they have actually worked in the North Eastern Region.   Against   the   Order   of   Tribunal,   appellant filed a Writ Petition in Allahabad High Court which was  dismissed   on   14.02.2008  aggreived   against   which Order the present appeal has been filed. 5

23. When the earlier classification as envisaged by Government   Order   dated   31.03.1987   itself   not   been valid to deny the benefit to those who were entitled to   the   Special   (Duty)   Allowance   on   the   ground   that 17 Government   came   with   the   clarification   only   on 03.08.2005 shall neither be equitable nor shall stand the test of equality before the law.

24. When the denial as noted above did not pass the twin   test   of   valid   classification   and   was unconstitutional   to   deny   the   said   benefit   on   the premise that Government corrected its error only on 03.08.2005,  hence,   with  effect   from  03.08.2005   only the   benefit   should   be   given   does   not   appeal   to reason.

25. In view of foregoing discussions, we do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
M/S Raveechee And Co. vs Union Of India

3. The appellant – M/s Raveechee and Co. and the respondent- Union of India entered into a contract dated 02.06.1981 for quarrying, stacking and loading stone ballast, broken stone aggregate, rubble etc. from the Western Railway quarry at Udvada at an estimated cost of Rs. 55,81,000/. Thereafter, disputes arose between the parties due to which the appellant called upon the General Manager, Western Railway to appoint Arbitrators in order to settle the dispute. The Arbitration proceedings commenced on 26.09.1988 and the award was passed on 22.03.2001.

4. The Arbitral Tribunal comprising of Shri N.K. Gupta, Chief Engineer (C&S) and Shri R.K. Sinha, Director, Finance, KRCL, awarded a total of Rs. 76,43,800/- as against the claim of Rs. 1,34,87,044/- raised by the appellant. An award for the Claim Nos. 1-12 raised by the appellant was made. The present dispute relates to the amount awarded under Claim No. 12 i.e. Interest. The Arbitrators awarded the appellant interest pendente lite at 12% on the award for damages excluding security deposits amounting to Rs. 44,92,800/- from 26.09.1988 to 22.03.2001.

5. The appellant thereafter filed a Civil Miscellaneous Application No.22 of 2001 along with the award dated 22.03.2001 in the Civil Court. The award was made a rule of the Court by an order dated 2 29.07.2004 under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act of 1940 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) by the Civil Court. The respondent challenged the order of the Civil Court dated 29.07.2004 in appeal. The High Court partly allowed the appeal and set aside the order of Arbitrators qua Claim No.12 under which the Arbitrators had awarded Rs. 44,92,800/- as interest pendente lite. The Arbitrators awarded amounts in favour of the appellant as follows: Claim No.1 – Rs. 12 lacs, Claim No.3 – Rs. 8 lacs and Claim No. 5 – Rs. 10 lacs and interest on the total amount of damages (i.e. Rs. 12 lacs + Rs. 8 lacs + Rs. 10 lacs = Rs. 30 lacs) excluding the amount of security deposits. Thus, interest on Rs. 30 lacs from 26.09.1988 to 23.03.2001 at 12 % amounting to Rs. 44,92,800/-.

The Arbitrators in their award have relied on Clause 16(3) of the contract to deny interest on the security deposit. The Arbitrators held that what was intended under Clause 16(3) barred the grant of interest on earnest money, security deposit and amounts payable to the appellant, it does not in any way bar grant of interest pendente lite.

12. We are, therefore, of the view that the Arbitrators rightly awarded interest pendente lite for the period from 26.09.1988 to 23.03.2001 which is the date of the award, on the amounts found due to the claimant. Undoubtedly, such a power must be considered inherent in an Arbitrator who also exercises the power to do equity, unless the agreement expressly bars an Arbitrator from awarding interest pendente lite. An agreement which bars interest is essentially an agreement that the parties will not claim interest on specified 6 amounts. It does not bar an Arbitrator, who is never a party to the agreement from awarding it.

19. Appeals are allowed accordingly.
Union Of India vs Col Ran Singh Dudee

2. The relevant facts in the present case are as under:-

(D) The respondent being aggrieved, preferred statutory complaint under Section 165 of the Act. During the pendency of said complaint, 4 selection for promotion to the rank of Colonel of 1988 Batch Officers was undertaken in August 2006 and appropriate selections were made. Since the respondent, by that time had stood punished in the General Court Martial, his candidature was not considered.

empanelment for promotion to the rank of Brigadier. Around this time on 30.06.2015, the respondent was granted Time Scale promotion as Colonel, on completion of 26 years of service.

(I) The respondent being aggrieved filed OA No. 260 of 2016 in the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow questioning his non- empanelment in the rank of Brigadier. It was submitted, inter alia, that:

3. Both these appeals being inter-connected and between the same parties, were taken up for hearing together. We heard Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General who appeared for the appellants while Colonel (TS) RS Dudee(Retd.) appeared in-person and made his submissions.

(i)Chairman - COAS

3. No. 2 Selection Board

11. Having considered the matter in its entirety, we cannot support the view taken by the Tribunal. According to us, the approach of the Tribunal and the assessment made by it were completely erroneous. The Tribunal was also not justified in awarding costs of Rupees five lakhs to the respondent.

13. We therefore allow both the appeals and set aside Judgments and Orders dated 17.01.2017 and 12.09.2017 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow.

14. No order as to costs.
Bhupender Singh vs Reema

2. The appellant is before this Court aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court whereby the decree of divorce granted by the Trial Court was reversed. The Trial Court granted decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty.

5. The joint application for divorce by mutual consent signed by the respective counsel along with two separate affidavits signed by the parties are taken on Board.

6. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the marriage between Bhupender Singh/appellant and Mrs. Reema/respondent is dissolved by a decree of divorce on mutual consent. The parties shall abide by the terms and conditions mentioned in the joint application dated 10.07.2018, which shall form part of this order.

7. Since the parties have settled all their disputes, they shall not initiate any fresh civil or criminal proceedings against each other and their family members on account of the matrimonial disputes and the pending litigations shall be terminated appropriately.

8. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

9. There shall be no orders as to costs.

JULY 10, 2018.
N.N. Godfred . vs Union Of India And Ors.( For Respondent ...

1.3 Pursuant   to   the   said   judgment,   the   appellants   started getting  pensionary   benefits. The pension of the appellants was   computed   on   the   basis   of   the   pay   of   a   Chief   Petty Officer.

1.4 On   February   8,   2005,   Appellant   No.   3   made   a 2 representation   to   the   Bureau   of   Sailors­Respondent   No.   3 for   a   clarification   whether   Submarine   Pay   of   Rs.   300   per month, which was being granted to them after joining the Submarine   Arm,   was   included   for   computing   the   pension payable.   It   was   submitted   that   Submarine   Pay   was   a component of their “pay”, and not an “allowance”. 1.5 On   March   29,   2005   Respondent   No.   3   rejected   the representation   stating   that   Submariners   and   Aviation Sailors   were   categorized   under   the   group   “Other   than   A”, which   is   lower   than   Group   A,   and   that   the   pensionary benefits granted were “in order”.

2. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the appellants preferred the present Civil Appeal.

2.1 The appellants have submitted that Submarine Pay would form part of their basic pay, and hence ought to be included for computation of Service Pension. This was for the reason that Sailors working in the Submarine Arm of the Indian Navy were   granted   Submarine   Pay   on   account   of   the   highly dangerous nature of the work undertaken, and the arduous conditions in which they had to function. 2.2 It was further submitted that Submarine Pay was included in the Last Pay Drawn Certificate dated August 10, 1983. In contrast,   Sailors   who   were  not   working   in  the   Submarine Arm,   were   not   being   granted   this   additional   pay.   The appellants gave the illustration of one M.V. Kumaran who was not working in the Submarine Arm. He was not being 4 granted Submarine Pay, on account of the difference in the nature of duties performed.

300/­   per   month,   which   was   distinct   from   Submarine Allowance.

5.10 In   contrast,   it   would   be   instructive  to   refer  to   the   entries 11 with respect to Aviation Sailors. Note (ii) below Appendix B of Navy Instruction No. 2/S/74 specifically excluded Flying Pay   from   being   treated   as   “pay”   for   the   computation   of pension and gratuity.

5.11 Appendix   B   of   Navy   Instruction   No.   2/S/74   specifically mentions   both   Submarine   Pay   and   Submarine   Allowance separately   at   S.   Nos.   14   and   15,   respectively.   The   terms Submarine   Pay   and   Submarine   Allowance   are   not   used interchangeably,   as   has   been   erroneously   done   in   the impugned Order.

As a result, the Civil Appeal is allowed, and the judgment and  order  dated  February 25, 2010 passed by the Principal Bench,   Armed   Forces   Tribunal,   New   Delhi   in   Transfer Application No. 492 of 2010, is hereby set aside, with no order as to costs.
Parakh Vanijya Private Limited vs Baroma Agro Product

3. Appellant-plaintiff claims to have been using the mark ‘MALABAR’ for selling Biryani Rice from 2001. The appellant filed the suit CS No.27 of 2012 for infringement and passing off special Biryani Rice under the mark “MALABAR GOLD” or other mark/trade name which is identical with and/or deceptively similar to the appellant’s trade mark ‘MALABAR’. On consideration of various features of the respondent’s then mark and other materials, the learned Single Judge vide order dated 02.07.2012 granted interim injunction observing that there was similarity between the two labels/marks and restrained the respondents/defendants from using the label mark ‘MALABAR’. The Division Bench declined to interfere with the said order by its order dated 14.09.2012.

4. While the suit and application for temporary injunction was pending before the Single Judge, the respondents/defendants filed application for vacating the order dated 02.07.2012 inter alia on various grounds contending that the appellant is relying upon fabricated documents and that the appellant cannot claim exclusive right over the mark ‘MALABAR’ and therefore, the interim order of 2 injunction has to be vacated. The learned Single Judge by its order dated 05.07.2016 which was passed with the consent of the parties gave liberty to the respondents to file a supplementary affidavit to clearly indicate the device/mark that the respondents proposed to use. The respondents filed application indicating the proposed modification in their label by changing the get-up. After hearing the parties, the interim order of injunction initially passed, was modified vide order dated 08.08.2016 to the effect that the respondents shall be entitled to use the word ‘MALABAR’ in conjunction with ‘BAROMA’ where all the words and letters must be in the same font but the word ‘MALABAR’ may be increased with font size of not more than 25% than the rest of the words or letters. Being aggrieved, the appellant-plaintiff has preferred appeal before the Division Bench. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal by the impugned order holding that the Single Judge has passed the order balancing the interest of the parties who are having a substantial turn over in their respective business.

10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. All the contentious issues raised by the parties are left open to be resolved in the suit. No costs.

July 12, 2018 6
The State Of Gujarat vs Navinbhai Chandrakant Joshi

3. Briefly stated case of the prosecution is that accused 18:14:34 IST Reason: No.1/respondent No.2 – J.D. Patel was working as a Junior Clerk in 1 Non-Agriculture Department and accused No.2/respondent No.1 – Navinbhai Chandrakant Joshi (Navinbhai) was also working in the same department. The complainant-Bhagwandas (PW-1) is a businessman dealing in the business of sugar as a wholesale retailer. The complainant/PW-1 was desirous of starting a new firm by name Purvi Monomal Pvt. Ltd. for manufacturing of acrylic monomal and for this purpose, he has purchased a plot at Village Chhatral from one Sandeep Agrawal and Manoj Agrawal. The agreement to sell was executed in December, 1990 and the sale deed was executed in March, 1991. Though the original owners of the plot had got the plot converted into non-agricultural plot for different purpose, PW-1 had to place the revised plan for necessary Non-Agricultural permission.

6. Being aggrieved, the accused preferred appeals before the High Court. The High Court, by the impugned judgment, reversed the judgment of the trial court by holding that there was no recovery from 4 accused No.1-J.D. Patel and the demand and acceptance by the accused persons has not been proved by the prosecution and acquitted the accused. Being aggrieved, the State has preferred these appeals, challenging the correctness of acquittal.

13. In so far as the sentence of imprisonment is concerned for conviction under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, the trial court imposed sentence of imprisonment of two years upon each of the accused. The occurrence was of the year 1991 that is about 27 years ago. Considering the passage of time, we deem it appropriate to reduce the sentence of imprisonment of two years to the statutory minimum imprisonment of one year.

14. In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 16.04.2015 in Criminal Appeal Nos.477-78 of 2000 is set aside and these appeals are allowed affirming the conviction of the accused Nos.1 and 2 under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. The sentence of imprisonment under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act imposed upon each of the accused is reduced from two years to one year. The respondents/accused Nos.1 and 2 shall surrender themselves to serve the remaining sentence within two weeks from today, failing which, they shall be taken into custody.

July 17, 2018 11
Indian Bank vs K. Pappireddiyar

2 In 1989, a term loan was granted by the appellant to Yelagiri Dairy Farm for setting up a dairy farm on a property ad-measuring 6.10 acres and bearing survey No. 203/2, 3, 4, 5 & 202/1A situated at Peddakallupalli Village, NH Road, Vaniambadi, Tamil Nadu. By a registered power of attorney, the first respondent appointed N K Arumugham as his attorney and authorised him to sell or mortgage the property. Arumugham was the managing partner of the partnership farm and had mortgaged the property in favour of the appellant. The first respondent was a guarantor. In 1993, building was constructed and machines were installed by the borrowers to commence business. The account became a non-performing asset. In 1995, the Bank filed a suit for recovery. It was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT-III) at Chennai and renumbered as T.A. No. 93 of 2007. On 11 June 2010, DRT-III allowed the claim of the Bank in the amount of Rs. 31,00,238/- with interest at 9 per cent per annum. A recovery certificate was issued on 10 February 2011 in the amount of Rs. 74,31,233.14/-. On 2 August 2011, the Bank issued a demand notice under Section 13(2) for Rs. 85,41,662/-. Overruling an objection that the property is agricultural in nature, it took possession on 31 October 2011. The Bank issued a sale notice on 2 April 2012. The sale notice was challenged in Original Suit No. 74 of 2012, which was 2 dismissed in default. The second respondent was the successful bidder at an auction sale held on 12 May 2012. He paid a consideration of Rs. 1.27 crores. The sale certificate was issued on 14 June 2012 and was rectified on 7 September 2012. 3 The sale certificate was challenged in writ proceedings before the Madras High Court. The petition was dismissed on 4 April 2013 with liberty to the first respondent to adopt appropriate steps. The first respondent thereupon moved DRT-III at Chennai for challenging the sale certificate. The proceeding was dismissed on 17 May 2013. On 11 September 2014, an appeal filed by the first respondent was allowed by the DRAT on the ground that the property which was sold, was agricultural and was exempt from the provisions of the Act. Both the Bank and the auction purchaser filed petitions before the High Court at Madras under Article 226. The High Court dismissed the petitions. It held that since a security interest had been created in agricultural land, the provisions of the SARFAESI Act were not attracted.

11 We accordingly allow the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 5 April 2016. The writ petition filed by the auction purchaser (writ petition No. 26633 of 2014) and the writ petition filed by the Bank (writ petition No. 32208 of 2014) are restored to the High Court. We request the High Court to endeavour an expeditious disposal.

12 In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

............................................CJI [DIPAK MISRA] …….........................................J [A M KHANWILKAR] ….............................................J [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD] New Delhi;

July 20, 2018.