L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Kailas & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra Tr.Taluka P.S

6. In appeal before the High Court the appellants were acquitted of the offence under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act, but the conviction under the provisions of the IPC were confirmed. However, that part of the order regarding fine was set aside and each of the appellant was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- only to the victim Nandabai.

7. The prosecution case is that the victim Nandabai who belongs to the Bhil community was residing with her father, handicapped brother, and lunatic sister. She had illicit relations with PW9 Vikram and had given birth to his daughter and was also pregnant through him for a second time. Vikram belongs to a higher caste and his marriage was being arranged by his family with a woman of his own caste. On 13.5.1994 at about 5.00 P.M. when the victim Nandabai was at her house the four accused went to her house and asked why she had illicit relations with Vikram and started beating her with fists and kicks. At that time the accused Kailas and Balu held her hands while accused Subabai @ Subhadra removed her sari. The accused Subhash then removed her petticoat and accused Subabai tore the blouse and brassiere of the victim Nandabai. Thereafter the accused Subabai 4 and Balu paraded the victim Nandabai on the road of the village and at that time the four accused herein were beating and abusing the victim Nandabai.

27. It is not necessary for us to go into further details into this issue, but the facts mentioned above certainly lends support to the view that about 92% 1 people living in India are descendants of immigrants (though more research is required).

29. There are a large number of religions, castes, languages, ethnic groups, cultures etc. in our country, which is due to the fact that India is a country of immigrants. Somebody is tall, somebody is short, some are dark, some are fair complexioned, with all kinds of shades in between, someone has Caucasian features, someone has Mongoloid features, someone has Negroid features, etc. There are differences in dress, food habits and various other matters.

39. Despite this horrible oppression on them, the tribals of India have generally (though not invariably) retained a higher level of ethics than the non-tribals in our country. They normally do not cheat, tell lies, and do other misdeeds which many non-tribals do. They are generally superior in character to the non-tribals. It is time now to undo the historical injustice to them.

40. Instances like the one with which we are concerned in this case deserve total condemnation and harsh punishment.

41. With these observations the appeal stands dismissed.

5th January, 2011
Industrial Investment Bank Of India Ltd vs M/S. Jain Cables Pvt. Ltd. & Ors

2. In the year 1985, the IRBI had sanctioned a loan of rupees twenty two lakhs (Rs.22,00,000/-) in favour of M/s Jain Cables Pvt. Ltd., respondent no.1. Out of the sanctioned amount a sum of rupees twenty lakhs (Rs.20,00,000/-) was actually disbursed in the year 1991 and the balance amount of the loan was cancelled. The repayment of the loan was secured by mortgage of the immovable properties of the borrower company and by 2 creating the charge of hypothecation over its immovable properties in favour of the IRBI. The borrower company defaulted in repayment of the loan and in 1994, on its request, the IRBI granted to it an amended schedule of payment under which the last installment of the loan amount was to be paid on February 15, 1996. The respondent no.1 did not adhere even to the rescheduled payment plan.

3. On March 27, 1997, the Industrial Reconstruction Bank (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 1997 ("the 1997 Act" for short) came into force and by virtue of notification, S.O. 242 (E), dated March 25, 1997 the undertakings of the IRBI were transferred to and vested in the IIBIL with effect from March 27, 1997.

(6) Where an application is for the relief mentioned in sub- clause (iv) of sub-section (1), the High Court shall pass an ad interim order appointing a receiver in respect of the property assigned, charged, hypothecated, mortgaged or pledged and shall issue a notice calling upon the industrial concern to show cause, on a date to be specified in the notice, as to why the ad interim order appointing the receiver shall not be made absolute.

(Emphasis added) 1

12. On the basis of the provisions contained in section 4 (4) and section 13(2)(b) of the 1997 Act, we do not have the slightest doubt that the application filed by the appellant under section 40 of the 1984 Act for the enforcement of its claim against respondent no.1 was perfectly maintainable before the High Court. We, accordingly, accept the appeal and set aside the order dated November 1, 2002 passed by the High Court. As a result, S.B.C. Misc. Application No.40/99 is restored to its file and the High Court shall now proceed to examine it on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law.
State Of Kerala & Ors.Etc vs M.G.Presanna Etc

2. A Writ Petition filed by the respondent was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court, by order dated 8.4.2009. The appellants filed a review petition in regard to the said order. There was a delay of 305 days in filing the review petition. The Learned single Judge heard the application for condonation of delay and by order dated 1.3.2010 condoned the delay in filing review petition. Ultimately by order dated 9.4.2010, he dismissed the review petition. Thereafter, the appellants filed a writ appeal against the order dated 8.4.2009 of 2 the learned single Judge. A Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the writ appeal on the ground of delay of 342 days in filing the writ appeal.

5. In view of the above, we allow these appeals, set aside the order dated 22.7.2010 of the Division Bench, restore the writ appeal against the order dated 8.4.2009 to the file of the High Court, condone the delay in filing the said appeal and request the High Court to dispose of the writ appeal on merits expeditiously.
State Of U.P.& Ors vs Madhav Prasad Sharma

3) Brief facts:

(b) The Sr. Superintendent of Police (in short "the SSP"), Etah, vide order dated 23.11.2002, terminated the service of the respondent. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the respondent preferred Departmental Appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police (in short "the DIG"), 3 Agra Zone, Agra. Vide order dated 27.02.2003, the DIG rejected the appeal filed by the respondent herein.

(c) Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent preferred writ petition being C.M.W.P. No. 53909 of 2003 before the High Court which was allowed by the learned single Judge vide his order dated 17.09.2008. Against the said order, the appellants herein preferred special appeal being S.A. No. 614 of 2009 before the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court, vide its order 29.06.2009, dismissed the special appeal on the ground of maintainability. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants have preferred this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.

8) It is fairly admitted that in view of the fact that against the order of termination the delinquent availed departmental appeal to the DIG, after the order of the learned single Judge no further appeal by way of special appeal before the Division Bench would lie. The materials placed and in view of the fact that the order of the SSP was considered and disposed of by the Appellate Authority, i.e., DIG and also of the fact that the order impugned in the writ petition was passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in terms of The Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Police Officers/Employees (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"), we concur with the conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned order. However, in view of the fact that this Court issued notice in the special leave petition as early as on 20.11.2009, after hearing the arguments of either side, we intend to 8 consider the merits of the order of the learned single Judge dated 17.09.2008.

12) In such circumstances, the conclusion of the learned single Judge that the delinquent had suffered two punishments cannot be sustained. At present, we are not inclined to go into the validity or otherwise of the order of termination in this proceeding. Inasmuch as learned 14 single Judge quashed the order of termination only on the ground that it is impermissible to impose two punishments, we set aside the order of the learned single Judge dated 17.09.2008 and remit the matter to the learned single Judge for fresh disposal. Both parties are permitted to put forth their claim with regard to the outcome of the charge, order of the original and appellate authority for which we express no opinion and it is for the learned single Judge to consider and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment. Civil Appeal is allowed to this extent with no order as to costs.

JANUARY 10, 2011.
Kamleshwar Paswan vs State Of U.T.Chandigarh

On 15th January, Gurnam Singh (PW.3), a resident of House No.1 in village Kishangarh in the Union Territory of Chandigarh, had gone to meet a servant of one Milkha Singh for some personal work. As he reached the house of Pritam Singh, he found a woman standing outside shouting "killed them-killed them". PW.3, Gurnam Singh, also heard the voice of a screaming child from inside the house of Pritam Singh. PW.3 forced open the door and saw the accused/appellant Kamleshwar Paswan beating his three children with a wooden stick and Yashoda, the daughter of the appellant, lying on one side with serious injuries. He also noticed that the appellant's sons Sunil Paswan and Suraj Paswan (aged one and three years respectively) had also suffered injuries and were unconscious. Gurnam Singh PW accompanied by Sunaina (DW.2), the wife of the accused/appellant, took the children to Sharma Clinic in -2- village Kishangarh. The Doctor told them that as the children were in a serious condition they should be taken to the PGI, Chandigarh. In the meantime a vehicle from the Police Control Room reached Sharma Clinic and PW.3 and DW.2 along with the three injured children were taken to the General Hospital, Sector 16, Chandigarh which referred them further to the PGI, for treatment. In the PGI PW.3 made a statement to PW.14 SI Sunehara Singh narrating the above facts on which a First Information Report was registered under Section 307 of the IPC at Police Station, Manimajra in the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The two boys thereafter died and case under Section 302 of the IPC was added on. PW.14 also visited the place of occurrence and made the necessary investigations. A challan was ultimately filed under Sections 302 and 308 of the IPC and the appellant was committed to stand trial. The Trial Court relying on the eye witnesses account of PW.1 Vinod, PW.2-Anil Kumar, the immediate neighbours of the appellant and his family and PW.3 Gurnam Singh held that the case against the appellant stood proved beyond doubt. Sunaina, the wife of the appellant, however, appeared as a defence witness and gave a statement that the three children had received injuries accidently and that the appellant had no role to play. The Trial Court relying on evidence of the three prosecution witnesses mentioned above -3- as supported by the medical evidence given by PW.4-Dr. Dlbar Singh, who had conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead bodies and had also examined the injuries on Yashoda, convicted the appellant under Section 302 and 307 of the IPC and sentenced him to death for the murder of his two sons. No separate sentence was awarded for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC. The matter was thereafter referred to the High Court for the confirmation of the death sentence and the appellant also filed an appeal. The High Court has, by the impugned judgment, confirmed the death sentence and dismissed the appeal. The matter is before us in these circumstances.

We accordingly dismiss the appeals but commute the sentence from death to life.
Rajendra Prasad Gupta vs Prakash Chandra Mishra & Ors

It appears that the appellant was the plaintiff in Suit No. 1301 of 1997 before the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Varanasi. He filed an application to withdraw the said suit. Subsequently, it appears that he changed his mind and before an order could be passed in the withdrawal application he filed an application praying for withdrawal of the earlier withdrawal application. The second application had been dismissed and that order was upheld by the High Court. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

:1: The High Court was of the view that once the application for withdrawal of the suit is filed the suit stands dismissed as withdrawn even without any order on the withdrawal application. Hence, the second application was not maintainable. We do not agree.

:2: Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the application praying for withdrawal of the withdrawal application was maintainable. We order accordingly.

In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the Appeal is allowed. No costs.

The suit shall proceed and to be decided on merits, expeditiously .

JANUARY 12, 2011 :3:
Ghisalal vs Dhapubai (D) By Lrs

3. The pleaded case of Ghisalal was that in Baisakh of Samvat 2016 (1959) his father, Kishanlal gave him in adoption to Gopalji; that ceremonies like putting of tilak on his forehead and distribution of sweets were performed; that registered deed of adoption was executed by Kishanlal and Gopalji on 25.6.1964; that Gopalji had inherited certain agricultural lands of villages Jeeran, Arnya Barona, Kuchrod, a two storeyed house and one 3 court-yard from his father Roopji; that after adoption, he became coparcener in the family of Gopalji and thereby acquired right in the suit properties; that Gopalji executed three Gift Deeds dated 22.10.1966 whereby he transferred lands of villages Jeeran, Arnya Barona and Kuchrod to his wife Dhapubai and the latter sold a portion of land in survey No.945 of village Kuchrod to Sunderbai vide Sale Deed dated 19.1.1973; that the gift deeds executed by Gopalji in favour of Dhapubai were fraudulent and were intended to deprive him of his right in the ancestral properties and that even in his capacity as karta of the family, Gopalji could not have gifted more than 1/3rd of his share. On the basis of these pleadings, Ghisalal prayed that a decree of partition be passed and he be given one half share in the suit properties. He further prayed that Gopalji may be directed to give an account of the agricultural produce and pay him his share.

9. Dhapubai challenged the judgment and decree of the trial Court by filing an appeal under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The lower appellate Court agreed with the trial Court that the suit properties were ancestral; that the adoption of Ghisalal by Gopalji was valid and that the gift deeds executed in favour of Dhapubai were not valid. However, the findings recorded on the legality of Gift Deed dated 29.11.1944 and Will dated 27.10.1975 (both executed by Gopalji in favour of Dhapubai) were set aside and it was declared that Ghisalal is entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit properties except the land covered by Gift Deed dated 29.11.1944. The lower appellate Court also directed that whole of the land 7 situated at village Kuchrod may be given to Ghisalal as his 1/3 rd share so that there may not be any dispute between the parties in future.

12. Effects of adoption. - An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family:

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied)

28. The lower appellate Court briefly referred to the contents of the adoption deed and proceeded to observe:

(emphasis supplied)

35. In the result, Civil Appeal Nos.6375-6376 of 2002 are allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court, the lower appellate Court and the High Court are set aside and the suit filed by Ghisalal is dismissed. As a sequel to this, Civil Appeal Nos.6373-6374 of 2002 are dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
Land Acquisiton Officer Andhra Pradesh vs A.Ramachandra Reddy Andors

3. The respondents filed W.P.No.14396/1991 in the A.P. High Court seeking a direction to the appellant to pass an award. The High Court disposed of the said writ petition with a direction to pass an award before 11.2.1992 as the final notification had been published in the Gazette on 10.1.1992. The award was not be passed within the stipulated two years. The State government, being of the view that as a consequence, the acquisition had lapsed, published a fresh preliminary notification dated 9.9.1993 under section 4(1) of the Act in the A.P. Gazette dated 19.11.1993, followed by a fresh final declaration under section 6 of the Act published in the Gazette dated 16.2.1994.

6. The respondents were not satisfied with the amount awarded by the Reference Court. They therefore filed a batch of appeals before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Some of the appeals were decided by judgment dated 16.2.2005 and some were decided by judgment dated 3.1.1996 following the judgment dated 16.2.2005. The High Court was of the view that the relevant date for determination of compensation was not 3.1.1990 as the said preliminary notification was superseded by notification under section 4(1) of the Act published on 19.11.1993 and therefore the compensation had to be determined with reference to the said date. The High Court relied upon a 5 sale deed dated 12.11.1993 (Ex. A7) relating to sale of a land at a distance of about 30 yards from the acquired lands to arrive at the market value of the acquired land as on 19.11.1993. The said sale deed (Ex.A7) related to a sale of an area of 1 acre 38 guntas (a little less than two acres) in favour of an educational institution for a consideration of Rs.490,000/- (which works out Rs.250,000/- per acre). The High Court rounded off the market value to Rs. 250,000/- per acre, deducted 40% from the said value to make it a comparable transaction for determination of market value and consequently awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.150,000/- per acre. The said judgment is under challenge in these appeals by special leave by the Land Acquisition Officer.

12. In some of the counter affidavits filed in the special leave petitions by the claimants, they have alleged that their special leave petitions (challenging the judgment of the High Court and seeking higher compensation) were dismissed as barred by time and therefore, they may be permitted to make a counter claim for a higher compensation. Such counter- claims in counter-affidavits in special leave petitions are impermissible and not maintainable and cannot be entertained.

13. In view of the above, these appeals are dismissed.
Swaminathan & Anr vs State Of Tamil Nadu

O R D E R At about 9.30 a.m. on the 5th April, 1994 A.1 Ramasamy came to the wine shop of PW.3 Muthu Selvin and enquired if his uncle Velan was present in the wine shop. At that time Palanisamy deceased came riding a bicycle and dashed against A.1. The same evening at about 3.00 p.m. Palanisamy was going towards the field of Alagesan and as he was passing in front of the house of A.1., A.1 came out and shouted at him and thereafter lifted a stick and hit him on the head. A.2 Swaminathan and A.3 Raman who were standing close by picked up stones lying on the spot and hit the deceased on the cheek and forehead respectively. The incident was witnessed by PW.1 Narayanan. He went and informed Ganesan, the brother of the deceased, and thereafter returned to the place of incident and found that Palanisamy was dead. He accordingly lodged the report at Police Station Theevattipatti, and case under Section 302 was registered at about 4.30 p.m. The dead body was also subjected to a post mortem examination and nine injuries -2- were detected thereon, seven allegedly caused by a lathi and two by stones. The Doctor also opined that the death had been caused by a lathi injury and that the fatal injury was injury No.1. The Trial Court relying on the evidence of PW.1 (Narayanan), the only eye-witness, convicted the accused A.1 under Section 304 Part II and sentenced him to undergo three years' rigorous imprisonment. A.2 and A.3 were convicted and sentenced for the same offence and term with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC. An appeal was thereafter taken to the High Court which has confirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court.

We accordingly allow the appeal and order their acquittal. Their bail bonds shall stand cancelled.
M/S Saraf Trading Corporation Etc. Etc vs State Of Kerala

4. The appellants are exporters of tea. The appellants purchased tea from the tea planters directly in open auction and thereafter exported the same to foreign countries. The appellant being the exporter of the aforesaid consignment claimed for exemption on the ground that purchase was exempted under Section 5(3) of the CST Act. The said claim for exemption was found to be genuine by the Assessing Authority, and was allowed in full. The appellant also made a claim for refund of tax collected from them by the seller at the time of purchase of tea. The said claim was rejected by the Assessing authority and it was held that they cannot claim for refund under Section 44 of the KGST Act since they have not paid the tax to the Department but it was the sellers 4 who have paid the tax and therefore under the provisions of Section 44 of the KGST Act, the refund that could be made is to the dealer only and the assessee being not a dealer no such refund could be made to the appellant/assessee.

19. In the light of the said findings, the assessing Authority clearly held that the claim for exemption was genuine and the same has to be allowed in full. But so far as refund is concerned, the assessing 18 Authority held that the claim for refund cannot be allowed since the dealer has paid the tax and therefore, refund cannot be granted to the assessee/appellant who is not the dealer. Referring to the provisions of Section 44 of the KGST Act, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) i.e. appellate authority also held that it is the seller (the dealer) on whom the burden lies to prove before the assessing authority that the sale is for fulfilling an agreement or order of the foreign buyer, since Section 5(3) means or refers to the foreign buyer and not any agreement with the local party and in the present case seller was not in a position to discharge his burden and therefore, he is not entitled for refund.

20. It is established from the records that after the aforesaid findings of the assessing authority accepting the claim and allowing the 19 exemption, the next two authorities namely the appellate authority and the Tribunal agree with the said findings and that there does not appear to be any serious challenge to the said findings before the said two authorities. The High Court also does not appear to have gone into the said issue at all. In that view of the matter, we would not like to reopen the finding of fact which is recorded by the assessing authority.

27. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we find no merit in these appeals which are dismissed but without costs.

..........................................J [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma ] ............................................J 25 [ Anil R. Dave ] New Delhi, January 13, 2011.