L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. & Ors vs Vindhya Telelinks Ltd. & Ors

3. On entering appearance, the appellant filed applications under order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure read with Sections 5 and 8 of the Act seeking dismissal of the suits and a direction for referring the parties to arbitration (in terms of the arbitration agreement contained in the Long Term Sale & Purchase Agreements dated 23rd and 24th January, 2001). The said applications were dismissed by the trial court on 14.07.2003. The revision petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 26.08.2003. On further appeals, this court in Civil 3 Appeal Nos.6210-6211 of 2004, by order dated 7.12.2005, set aside the orders of the trial court and High Court and remanded the matters to the trial court to decide the matters afresh treating the applications filed by the appellant herein (under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC read with sections 5 and 8 of the Act) as applications under Section 45 of the Act and dispose them in terms of the decision in Aksh Optifibre Ltd.(supra). In pursuance of it, the trial court considered the applications filed by the appellant as applications under Section 45 of the Act and passed a common order dated 31.3.2006 thereon, holding that the arbitration clause on the basis of which the appellant had filed an application under Section 45 of the Act was prima facie inoperative and in such a situation, the parties cannot be referred to arbitration and the matter should be proceeded with and decided on merits by the court.

Re: Question No. (ii)

14. We therefore dismiss these appeals without going into the merits reserving liberty to the appellants to pursue their remedy in accordance with law before the High Court. It is needless to say that if and when the appellant approaches the High Court, the time spent in prosecuting the special leave petitions and appeals before this Court, will stand excluded.

__________________J [R. V. Raveendran] _________________J [Markandey Katju] New Delhi;

March 27, 2009.
Gopal vs State Of M.P

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur, upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') and sentence of imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.2,000/- with default stipulation. Appellant Gopal was arraigned in the charge sheet as A1.

Saraswati Bai was immediately taken to the Government Hospital at Gadarwara. Observing that her condition was serious, Dr. B.P. Gupta (PW11) not only admitted her for treatment but also sent a memo (Ex.P-13) to the SHO requiring him to take necessary action to get dying declaration recorded. Naib Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate R.K. Dimole (PW9), after obtaining necessary certificate as to fit state of her mind, recorded Saraswati Bai's dying declaration between 4.35 a.m. and 4.50 a.m. thereafter, at 9.10 a.m., Saraswati Bai breathed her last in the hospital. Accordingly, the case was altered to one under Section 302 IPC. 3 After inquest proceedings, dead body of Saraswati Bai was sent for post-mortem, Dr. D.S. Choudhary (PW7) found that body of Saraswati Bai, who was carrying more than 3 months pregnancy, had been burnt to the extent of 89%. According to him, the cause of Saraswati Bai's death was shock due to extensive burns. However, he preserved the remaining pieces of burnt saree and blouse, earrings, nathni, Bangles and bunch of scalp hair for forensic examination.

10. Therefore, the discrepancies make the last declaration doubtful. The nature of the inconsistencies is such that they are certainly material. That being so, it would be unsafe to convict the appellant. The conviction is set aside and appellant is acquitted of the charges. He be set at liberty forthwith unless required to be in custody in connection with any other case.

11. The appeal is allowed.
P.G.Sebastian & Anr vs State Of Kerala

Appellant No.1 was convicted by the Trial Court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"] and sentenced him to pay fine of Rs.40,000/-; in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. The appeal preferred by the appellant No.1 was partly allowed by Sessions Judge, Thrissur, who upheld the verdict of guilty and conviction of appellant No.1 but set aside the sentence imposed on him and remanded the case to the Trial Court to continue the proceedings and imposed an appropriate sentence and an appropriate direction under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. coupled with an appropriate default sentence.

Although, the complainant did not challenge the appellate judgment, by an order dated 26.9.2007 the High Court imposed substantive sentence of one week on appellant No.1 and directed him to pay compensation of Rs.40,000/-. Thereafter, appellant No.1 and complainant jointly filed a petition, which was registered as Crl. M.C. No.695 of 2008 for permission to compound the offence by stating that complainant has already received the amount of compensation. The same was dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 22.2.2008.

Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, order dated 3.3.2000, passed by the Sessions Judge, Thrissur in Criminal Appeal No.404 of 1999 and orders dated 26.9.2007 and 22.2.2008 passed by the High Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. 316 of 2000 and Criminal M.C. No. 695 of 2008, are set aside.
B. Veerabhadra Rao & Anr vs P. Dayanand

The allegation made in the complaint filed by the respondent was that while they were representing Smt. Yellamma in the litigation filed by her against Green Fields Plot Owners Association, the appellants persuaded him to enter into an agreement in partnership with their minor son and wife respectively for purchase of the land belonging to Smt. Yellamma and others and then settled the matter between Smt. Yellamma and others on the one hand and Green Fields Plot Owners Association on the other and in this manner his cause was adversely affected.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order passed by the Bar Council of India is set aside.

No costs.
Devineni Tirupathirayudu & Ors vs Surapaneni Suramma (D) By Lrs. & Ors

During the pendency of the suit, some of the defendants died and their legal representatives were brought on record. Defendant no.4 also died on 20.6.1992 but his legal representatives were not brought on record and without even bringing this fact to the notice of the trial Court, the plaintiff (respondent no.1 herein) and defendant nos. 2, 6, 7 and 13 filed a compromise petition under Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC and prayed that the suit be decreed in ....2/-

terms of the compromise. In that petition, the plaintiff gave up defendant nos. 9 to 12 and 14 to 17. By an order dated 30.6.1992, the trial court decreed the suit in terms of the compromise. Soon thereafter, the appellants herein filed two petitions, one under Order 22 Rule 4 read with Section 151 CPC for being brought on record as legal representatives of defendant no.4 and the other under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 CPC for setting aside decree dated 30.6.1992. By two separate orders dated 14.9.1992, the trial Court dismissed both the applications. Civil Revisions filed by the petitioners were dismissed by the High Court with liberty to them to pursue other legal remedies.

It is not in dispute that defendant no.4 died on 20.6.1992 and his legal representatives were not brought on record. It is also not in dispute that the trial Court decreed the suit on 30.6.1992 in terms of the compromise petition without being apprised of the factum of the death of defendant no.4. In this view of the matter, the only course open to the legal representatives of defendant no.4 (appellants herein) was to apply for recall of the compromise decree. They could not have filed independent suit challenging the compromise decree in view of the bar contained in Order 23 Rule 3A of CPC. However, without appreciating the legal position in correct perspective, the trial Court dismissed the applications filed by the appellants for their impleadment as parties and for setting aside the compromise decree and the High Court dismissed the civil revisions filed by them.

....3/-

Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, the impugned orders and the compromise decree are set aside and the suit is restored to its original file. The trial court shall now proceed in accordance with law.

Let hearing of the suit be expedited.
M/S Haabia Advertising India Pvt. Ltd vs United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr

The appellant is an Advertising Company. It is engaged in the business of putting up advertisements through hoardings and sky-signs at Visakhapatnam. In 1994, the appellant filed complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, "the Act") for award of compensation to the tune of Rs. 20 lakhs by stating that the hoardings which were insured were illegally removed by the authorities. By an order dated 8.8.2001, the Andhra Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short, `the State Commission') held that there was no deficiency of service and dismissed the complaint. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short, "the National Commission") confirmed the order of the State Commission by observing that after having availed the remedy by filing writ petition and contempt petition before the High Court, the petitioner (appellant herein) is not entitled to relief under the Act.

In our view, the reason assigned by the National Commissions for refusing to entertain the claim of the appellant is legally untenable and the impugned order is liable to be set aside because the writ petition and contempt petition filed by the appellant against the Municipal Corporation in the matter of alleged illegal removal of hoardings etc. do not have direct bearing on its claim for award of compensation.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned orders are set aside and the matter is remanded to the National Commission for disposal of the appeal filed by the appellant on merits after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties.
U.O.I vs Bal Mukund & Ors

9. The contraband recovered from the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were sent for chemical analysis. The report dated 15.07.1998 of the Assistant Chemical Examiner, Govt. Opium and Alkaloid Works shows presence of 01.68% and 02.05% of Morphine by B.P. Extraction from the first sample and the second sample, respectively.

Confessional statement of an accused, therefore, cannot be made use of in any manner under Section 138B of the Customs Act. Even otherwise such an evidence is considered to be of weak nature."

38. We, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, are clearly of the view that the purported confessions made by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 could not in absence of other corroboration form the basis of conviction.

40. There is another infirmity in the prosecution case.

42. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.

March 31, 2009
Association Of Res.Of Mhow (Rom) & Anr vs Delimitation Commn.Of India & Ors

4. The Delimitation Act, 2002 (for short `the Act') is an Act to provide for the readjustment of the allocation of seats in the House of the People to the States, the total number of seats in the Legislative Assembly of each State, the division of each State and each Union territory having a legislative Assembly into territorial constituencies for election to the House of the People and Legislative Assemblies of the States and Union territories and for matters connected therewith. The Central Government constituted the Delimitation Commission (for short `the Commission') in exercise of its power under Section 3 of the Act consisting of a retired judge of the Supreme Court as its Chairperson and other members. The Commission so set up started functioning w.e.f. 4.7.2002.

26. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal shall accordingly stand dismissed with no order as to costs.

March 31, 2009
Bhaskar Ramappa Madar & Ors vs State Of Karnataka

6. On the facts of the present case A-1 went to lodge the report. The S.I. (PW-17) registered the case and on completion of investigation charge sheet was filed by D.S.P.

9. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions were found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as "the old Code") which came up for consideration before various High Courts, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as also before this Court. Since in the present appeal, we have been called upon to decide the ambit and scope of the power of an appellate court in an appeal against an order of acquittal, we have confined ourselves to one aspect only i.e. an appeal against an order of acquittal.

(emphasis supplied)

40. The above position was highlighted in Krishnan and Anr. v. State represented by Inspector of Police (2003 (7) SCC 56) and Valson and Anr. V. State of Kerala (Criminal Appeal No.572 of 2001 disposed of on August 1, 2008)

45. Above being the position, the interference by the High Court with the order of acquittal is not correct. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The bail bonds executed pursuant to this Court's Court dated 22.3.2002 shall stand discharged. The appeal is allowed.
Chaman Lal & Ors vs State Of Punjab & Anr

2. Background facts as projected by appellants in a nutshell are as follows:

On 5.12.1989 by virtue of the aforesaid 5 SPAs dated 7.11.1989 appellant Nos.1, 2, 3 & 7 executed and registered 5 sale deeds in favour of appellant Nos.2 to 6.

On 14.06.1990 the learned Senior Subordinate Judge passed an order in the aforesaid suit, restraining the appellants from dispossessing the complainant from the said property and to maintain status quo with regard to ownership of the said property pending disposal of the suit, whereas in fact the appellants were already in possession of the said property since 07.11.1989.

On 30.6.1995 the complainant lodged a complaint with the Deputy Commissioner, Ludhiana - Shri S.S. Channi, I.A.S., who summoned the appellants at his residence and asked them to cancel the sale-deeds and concede to the claim of the complainant in the civil suit. The Commissioner also threatened the appellants with dire consequences by implicating them in false criminal cases. The said officer is related to the complainant.

On 31.08.1995 after a period of about 6 years, on a complaint lodged by the complainant, an FIR No. 183, Police Station Division No.5 District Ludhiana was registered only against Shri Sadhu Singh, Naib Tehsildar, Ludhiana and Shri Banta Singh, Patwari of Village Barewal Awana under Sections 420, 468,, 471, 120 B IPC.

12. The appeal is dismissed.
Raghuvir Singh Matolya & Ors vs Hari Singh Malviya & Ors

The deceased Puspa Matolya was travelling in a Tata Sumo on the fateful day, viz., 30.11.2002 at about 11.00 a.m. It dashed against a mango tree. She died on the spot.

8. We, therefore, are of the opinion that `Dearness Allowance' and `House Rent Allowance' payable to the deceased should have been included for determining the income of the deceased and consequently the amount of compensation.

9. For the reasons aforementioned, we direct that in calculating the amount of compensation, the dearness allowance as also the house rent allowance should also be taken into consideration.

10. The matter is remitted to the trial court. An award may be passed accordingly. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

March 31, 2009
Balkar Singh vs State Of Uttarakhand

3. In appeal the basic stand was that the case at hand is not covered by Section 302 IPC. The High Court did not accept the stand and dismissed the appeal. The stand taken before the High Court was re-iterated in this appeal.

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.

Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender."

18. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But 14 sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.

20. If the background facts are considered keeping in view the principles of law as noted above, the inevitable conclusion is that the offence is not covered by Section 302 IPC and the proper conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC. Custodial sentence of 8 years would meet the ends of justice in the peculiar facts of the case.

21. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Commnr.,Central Excise & Customs, ... vs M/S. Parenteral Drugs (I) Ltd

In the lead matter - M/s. Parenteral Drugs (I) Ltd. - the respondents were engaged in the manufacture of various types of Intravenous Fluids. They were availing the benefits of Notification No.6/2000, dated 1.3.2000. The said Notification was amended by Notification No.36/2000, dated 4.5.2000, whereby Entry No.47-A was added thereby exempting "Intravenous Fluids" from payment of excise duty. However, from 1.3.2001, the earlier notifications were replaced by Notification No.3/2001 which defined "Intravenous Fluids" as those which are used for sugar, electrolyte or fluid replenishment. In other words, open-ended exemption stood restricted by the above three qualifications.

1 Accordingly, show cause notices were issued in which it was alleged that the respondents were engaged in the manufacture of intravenous infusions of various kinds which becides the fluids included certain medicines having anti-bacterial, antibiotic and antimicrobial properties. It was alleged in the show cause notice that by addition of the following items to the Intravenous Fluids, the product attained therapeutic value and, consequently, it fell outside Notification No.3/2001 which defined 'IV Fluids' as those used for sugar, electrolyte or fluid replenishment.

Subject to what is stated above, the Department's Appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and the matters are remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration in accordance with law. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
Pradeep Kumar vs State Of Haryana

On 25.1.1997 at about 9.30 p.m., Anil Kumar (PW-3) gave a telephonic call to the complainant that Anamika had got burnt by a gas cylinder. Complainant made a telephonic call to his brother Suresh Pal and his father Rameshwar Dass at Cheeka to reach Ambala. On their arrival from Cheeka, complainant along with them left for the house of his daughter at Yamuna Nagar. On reaching there, he saw his daughter lying dead on a double-bed. Besides her were lying a gas-cylinder, match- sticks and halt burnt papers.

8. Therefore while setting aside the conviction for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, we uphold the conviction, so far as it relates to Section 304 B IPC. Custodial sentence of ten years would meet the ends of justice. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
N.S. Subbanarasimha Sastry Dead By Lrs vs N. Kamalamma (D) Thru. Lrs

The petition filed by Smt. N. Kamalamma (predecessor in interest of the respondent) under Section 21(a)(b)(f) and (j) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (for short, `the Act') for eviction of N.S. Subbanarasimha Sastry who is now represented by L.Rs. was dismissed by the Principal Munsiff, Madhugiri, by recording a finding that the petitioner has failed to prove landlord-tenant relationship between her and the non-petitioner (appellant herein). The revision filed by the respondent under Section 50 of the Act was dismissed by First Additional District Judge, Tumkur and the finding recorded by the Principal Munsiff on the issue of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties was confirmed. However, the High Court allowed the second revision preferred by the respondent and ordered eviction of the appellants herein. The review petition filed by the appellants was dismissed by the High Court. Hence, these appeals by special leave.

Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, impugned orders are set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal of the revision petition filed by the respondent in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties.

No costs.
State Of U.P vs Rama Kant & Ors

The occurrence took place on 23/10/1979. According to the prosecution, the eye witnesses were PW.1, the complainant, PW.4-the mother and PW.5 the wife of the complainant. Though PW.3 was examined as alleged eye witness, he did not support -2- the prosecution version. The defence version was that it was PW.1 who was responsible for causing death of the deceased who happened to be his brother. The trial Court, as noted above, found the evidence to be cogent and credible and recorded conviction.

In appeal the stand taken was that the presence of PW.4 was doubtful. In the First Information Report lodged, there was no mention about PW.1 and PW.4 having witnessed the occurrence. Additionally, according to the so-called eye witnesses, large number of injuries were caused by bricks bats and sharp edged weapons. The medical evidence did not disclose injuries which could have been possible by sharp edged weapons and bricks. The High Court found that there were several unexplained circumstances which cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution version and directed acquittal.

The appeal fails and is dismissed.

It is to be noted that accused No.1 has died during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court.

The bailable warrants executed in terms of the order dated 9/2/2009 shall stand discharged.
N.A. Khan vs Union Of India & Anr

3. The brief facts of the present appeal are that the appellant initially was an Income Tax Officer and a representation was made by him for promotion to Group `A' post, which was rejected by the concerned authorities and such rejection was communicated to 2 him by a letter dated 26th of February, 1992. The grounds for rejection shown by the appellant were that although remarks of the Reporting Officer for the Assessment years 1986-87 to 1989-90 were `Outstanding' and for the year 1990-91 was `Good', but these remarks were toned down by the Reviewing Officer by giving remarks as `Good' for the year 1986- 87, `Very Good' for the year 1987-88 and 1988-89, `Good' for the year 1989-90 and `Average' for the assessment year 1990-91. This was challenged by the appellant before the Central Administrative Tribunal (in short, `CAT') by way of an original application, which was disposed of by the Tribunal in the following manner :-

Feeling aggrieved, a writ petition was filed by the appellant before the Delhi High Court, which was also dismissed and a Review application in respect of the same was also rejected by the High Court. These are the two orders which are now under challenge before us.

9. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned orders are set aside. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.