L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Satwant Singh vs Malkeet Singh

2. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have taken the view that once the respondent had been granted interim bail under Section 438, Cr.P.C. as per order dated 17.02.2006, his arrest on 26.05.2007 on a charge which has been later on added under Section 307, IPC constitutes contempt.

6. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the apology tendered by the appellant has to be accepted.

7. In this view of the matter, the Appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant is set aside, accepting his sincere, genuine and unconditional apology in writing before this Court and the High Court.

8. The Appeal is allowed in the above terms.

NEW DELHI.
P. Chandrakala vs K. Narender .

2. The respondent No.1 filed a private complaint before the V Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad (Re-designated as III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad) against the appellant alleging that the appellant had borrowed a sum of Rupees five lakhs from him promising to repay the same on an agreed interest at the rate of 2.5% per annum and later the appellant did not repay 2 the amount and on repeated demands, the appellant issued post-dated cheque dated 29.8.2000 for Rupees seven lakhs and the said cheque on presentation on 8.2.2001 was returned on the ground of ‘insufficient funds’. The appellant did not pay the amount in spite of issue of statutory notice. It was, therefore, alleged that the appellant has committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the N.I. Act’).

5. The appellant challenged the said judgment of the sessions court before the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad by filing Criminal Revision No.90 of 2006. The Revision Petition was dismissed by the High Court on 12.8.2014. The 3 appellant has challenged the legality and correctness of the said order in this appeal.

7. Since the parties have settled their disputes, we allow the parties to compound the offence, set aside the judgment of the courts below and acquit the appellant of the charges against her.

8. We are of the view that since the appellant has wasted the public time, while setting aside the aforesaid orders, she should be burdened with exemplary costs, which we quantify at Rupees one lakh. The appellant is directed to pay the cost as ordered by us to an orphanage, namely, Delhi Council for Child Welfare, located at Qudsia Bagh, Yamuna Marg, Civil Lines, Delhi 110054, within four weeks from today and produce an acknowledgement for having paid the amount to the orphanage within one week thereafter. If the appellant fails to produce such acknowledgement, the order of conviction and sentence against the appellant 4 would revive and the Registrar (Judicial) shall take appropriate further action for the execution of such revival order.

9. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

July 24, 2017.
Ram Gopal Dwivedi vs M/S Kanpur Electricity Supply Co.Ltd. ...

2) We herein set out the facts, in brief, to appreciate the issue involved in these appeals.

3) The respondent is a unit of the U.P. State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”). It is known as Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Ltd. (for short KESC). The terms and conditions of the employees working with the respondent are governed by the statutory regulations framed by the Board in exercise of its powers under Section 78 (c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.

5) The respondent accordingly terminated the services of the appellant in C.A. No. 8125 of 2009 on 01.08.1989 and the appellant in C.A. No. 8126 of 2009 on 13.07.1990. This gave rise to the dispute between the appellants and the respondent, which led to making of the industrial reference to the Labour Court, Kanpur to decide as to whether the termination of the appellants from the services was legal or/and proper and, if so, what relief the appellants are entitled to?

July 25, 2017 8
Rajiv Dawar vs High Court Of Delhi

3. It is a case where the de facto complainant made an allegation that the appellant had charged exorbitant fees to the tune of Rs.7.05 Lacs, without any active assistance to the accused and also withdrawn from the case and, therefore, he prayed for a direction to the Additional Sessions Judge for refund of at least Rs.6 Lacs. However, it was the case of the appellant that for professional services rendered to the de facto complainant appropriate fees had been charged and it was not as if the amount received was for any other purpose as alleged by the complainant.

JULY 26, 2017.

Date : 26-07-2017 This appeal was called on for hearing today. CORAM :
Southern Power Distribution Company Of ... vs Gopal Agarwal

2. The City Union Bank Limited, the Second Respondent herein issued a tender/sale notice under SARFAESI Act, 2002 for sale of land, plant and machinery in Survey Nos.168/169 in Bollaram village, Medak district which belonged to M/s J.T. Alloys Private Limited. The property was brought to sale due to default in payment of the outstanding loan amount. It was stated in the tender/sale notice dated 22.02.2006 that the sale would be on “as is where is” condition. The First Respondent participated in the auction and was declared the highest bidder in respect of dry land measuring 0.36 hectares in Survey No.168, Bollaram village. A certificate of sale was issued by the authorised officer of the Respondent-Bank on 12.04.2006 and the delivery and possession of the property sold was made free from all encumbrances known to the secured creditor on receipt of Rs.1,12,50,000/-.

3. Appellant No.3, the Superintending Engineer, Operation Circle Medak, informed the Respondent-Bank that an amount of Rs.1,88,23,185/- was due towards electricity charges from M/s J.T. Alloys Private Limited. The Third Appellant requested the Bank to transfer the residual 2 amount realised from the sale for adjustment towards arrears payable by M/s J.T.Alloys Private Limited. The Bank informed the Third Appellant that there was no amount left after utilisation of the sale proceeds towards its dues.

7. The facts of this case are similar to that of NESCO v. Raghunath Paper Mills (P) Ltd., (2012) 13 SCC 479. The tender/sale notice mentioned that the property was being auctioned on “as is where is” basis. The First Respondent applied for a fresh connection and he is in no way connected to the past owner. He has also not 5 undertaken to pay the past arrears of the previous owner. In view of the above, the Appeal is dismissed.

…................................J [L. NAGESWARA RAO] .......................................J [NAVIN SINHA] New Delhi, July 27, 2017 6
Central Bureau Of Investigation vs M. Sivamani

2. Facts stated in the charge sheet filed by the appellant-CBI against the respondent are that a claim petition was filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Cuddalore seeking compensation of Rs.22,00,000/- for death of Mohamed Farooque in a road accident on 11 th October, 2002. The MACT partly upheld the claim and awarded Rs.14,97,000/-. On appeal of the National Insurance Company (Insurance Company), the Madras High Court ordered investigation by CBCID into the allegation that the claim was false. After investigation, the CBCID filed charge sheet. The matter was later taken over by CBI under the directions of the Madras High Court which led the CBI to file the impugned charge sheet under Sections 120-B r/w 182, 420, 468, 468 r/w 471 IPC and 13(2) r/w 13(i)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 r/w 511 IPC against A1 to A9. The respondent is A-5. According to the CBI, the Insurance Company was cheated by A-1 by making false claim in connivance with the other accused. Mohamed Farooque sustained injuries by falling on his own from a scooter and not in accident as alleged. Different accused were given different roles in conspiracy. The role given to the 2 respondent, who is an advocate, is of misrepresentation and producing false evidence, knowing the true facts.

12. Accordingly, we allow these appeals and set aside the impugned order. Since the matters have been hanging in fire for the last more than 15 years, it will be in the interest of justice that the proceedings are concluded as far as possible within six months.
Surekha vs Neelakanth

The records reveal that Mr. Anand (the deceased) met with an accident while driving Mahindra Temp Trax bearing Digitally signed by HEMALATHA MOHAN Date: 2017.08.04 No. KA023/M-7391 during the course of his duty and 16:52:32 IST Reason:

3. The Commissioner while assessing the compensation held that the income of the deceased was at Rs.4,000/- per month, took 50% of the same, and by adding Rs.5,000/- for funeral expenses quantified the compensation at Rs.3,94,120/- with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of expiry of one month of the award.

Aggrieved by the Award of compensation of the Commissioner, the appellants filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court assessed the income of the deceased at Rs.5,500/-. With 50% of the wages at Rs.2,750/- and by applying relevant factor of 197.06, the compensation payable was determined at Rs.5,41,915/-. Under the Provisions of Section 4(4) of the Act, the appellants are entitled to a maximum of Rs.5,000/- incurred towards funeral expenses. 3 Therefore, the High Court awarded Rs.5,46,915/- in toto with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of expiry of one month of the date when the amount was due.

or 4 an amount of *[one lakh and twenty thousand rupees], whichever is more;

7. Since the income of the deceased was at Rs.6,000/- per month, with 50% of the wages at Rs.3,000 by multiplying relevant factor of 197.06, and by adding Rs.5000/- towards funeral expenses, the net compensation payable would be Rs.5,96,180/- with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of expiry of one month from the date of death of the deceased. 6 Out of the enhanced compensation, a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- shall be deposited in the name of appellant No. 2 Varsha, the daughter of the deceased till she attains the age of majority and the excess amount shall be shared amongst the other appellants. The judgment of the High Court is modified accordingly. The appeal is allowed in part to the above extent. No costs.
P.D. Goel vs High Court Of Himachal Pradesh ...

3. As per the gradation list of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service as it stood on 1.1.2005, the date of retirement of the appellant was shown as 31.7.2007 on which date he completed the age of 60 years as provided under Rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’). The High Court issued a notification at Annexure P-16 dated 20.4.2005 holding that the appellant stands retired from service with effect from the afternoon of 31.7.2005, i.e. the last 3 day of the month in which he attains the age of superannuation, i.e. 58 years under proviso to Rule 14 of the Rules. The said Notification is as under:

11. We are of the view that the order of the Division Bench treating the recommendation of the High Court to the Governor for compulsorily retiring the appellant cannot be sustained. The order of the Division Bench to that extent is hereby set aside. Consequently, the order of the Governor dated 31.1.2017 is also set aside. The appellant is entitled to his salary, allowances and all other consequential benefits till 31.7.2007. The arrears as per above terms shall be paid to the appellant within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

12. There will be no order as to costs.

August 08, 2017.
K. Raveendranathan Nair vs Commnr. Of Income Tax .

3) The question that arose for consideration before the High Court in the impugned judgment, against which these appeals arise, was payment of fee as per the aforesaid schedule on the appeals that are filed on or after October 26, 2002. As per the State of Kerala, on all appeals which are filed against the order of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal or the Wealth Tax Appellate Tribunal on or after October 26, 2002, fee is payable as per the aforesaid amended provisions. The appellants herein, however, contend that in all those cases which were even pending before the lower authorities, i.e. the Assessing Officer, Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) or Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and orders were passed even before October 01, 1998, the right to appeal had accrued with effect from October 01, 1998 and, therefore, such cases would be governed as on the date when the orders were passed by the lower authorities and the court fee would be payable as per the unamended provisions. The High Court has not accepted this plea of the appellants and has held that any appeal ‘filed’ on or after October 26, 2002 shall be governed by Section 52A of the 1959 Act.

6) In that case, Section 22(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, provided that no appeal against an order of assessment should be entertained by the prescribed authority unless it was satisfied that such amount of tax as the appellant might admit to be due from his had been paid. This Act was amended on November 25, 1949 and Section 22(1), as amended, provided that no appeal should be admitted by the said authority unless such appeal was accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax in respect of which the appeal had been preferred. On November 28, 1947, the appellant submitted a return to the Sales Tax Officer, who, finding that the turnover exceeded two lakh rupees, submitted the case to the Assistant Commissioner for disposal and the latter made an assessment on April 08, 1950. The appellant preferred an appeal on May 10, 1950 without depositing the amount of tax in respect of which he had appealed. The Board of Revenue was of the opinion that Section 22(1), as amended, applied to the case as the assessment was made, and the appeal was preferred, after the amendment came into force, and rejected the appeal.

11) Hence, we proceed to decide the legal issue involved in these appeals.

15) We, therefore, are not able to subscribe to the aforesaid view of the High Court and set aside the same. In fine, we hold as under:

AUGUST 10, 2017.
A.P. Showkath Ali vs The State Of Kerala

5. The above Order was challenged by the appellants before the High Court of Kerala. The High Court, as per the impugned Order, dismissed the writ petition, holding that:

15. Back to the facts, in ascertaining equity and justice, the simple question to be addressed is what would happen to those thirty seven Assistant Sub- Inspectors in service, in case the exemption is not granted. For no fault on their part, should they have to continue as Assistant Sub-Inspectors only till their retirement? Is there any point, nay, does it even appeal to common sense, to subject them to the test after more than twelve years of entering service and serving in promoted posts as well? Certainly, to remedy such a situation, an equitable relief deserves to be granted to such employees in the interest of justice by invoking Rule 39. That is what has been done by the Government as per the impugned Order dated 17.11.2000.

16. Application for impleadment is allowed.

17. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, we 5 (1997) 8 SCC 522 6 Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari, (2007) 8 SCC 600 14 make it clear that we have only dealt with the issue of validity of the Government Order dated 17.11.2000 issued under Rule 39 of the Rules, and in case the appellants have other grievances, it is for them to pursue the same, if permitted under law, through appropriate proceedings before appropriate forum.

18. There shall be no order as to costs.

August 10, 2017.

Mr. S. V. Raj, Adv.

Mr. K. Vijayan, Adv.

Mr. K. Rajeev, AOR Mr. V. K. Biju, AOR Mr. Himanshu Singh Yadav, Adv.

Mr. Abhay Pratap Singh, Adv.

Mr. Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Adv.

Mr. G. Prakash, Adv.

Mr. Jishnu M.L., Adv.

Ms. Priyanka Prakash, Adv.

Ms. Beena Prakash, Adv.

Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, Adv.

Mr. Manu Krishnan G., Adv.

Mr. P. S. Sudheer, AOR Mr. V. Giri, Sr. Adv.

Mr. M. P. Vinod, AOR Mr. Atul Shankar Vinod, Adv.

Mr. Dileep Pillai, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Application for impleadment is allowed. 16 The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed reportable Judgment.

Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(Signed reportable Judgment is placed on the file) 17
Suraj Pal (D) Thr. Lrs. vs Ram Manorath

3. The admitted facts are that the suit property was land used as ‘Abadi’ and was declared ‘Chakout’ (meaning out of the consolidation scheme) after the preliminary survey was conducted. Four brothers were co-tenure holders of the land in dispute. One brother executed a sale deed of his 1/4 th share in favour of respondents-defendants. The remaining three brothers filed a suit for permanent injunction against the respondents-defendants alleging that the sale is void since no permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as envisaged under Section 5(c)(ii) was obtained. They also claimed that they are in possession of the suit property and the respondents-defendants are trying to make construction on the land and had illegally constructed a ‘kothari’ on the suit property. The respondents-defendants claimed they were in possession but denied that they had raised any structure and submitted that since the land was not subject to the consolidation scheme, no permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was necessary. The suit was dismissed by the trial court mainly on the ground that no permission of the Settlement Officer 3 (Consolidation) was required since the land was outside the consolidation scheme. The plaintiffs filed an appeal. The first appellate court allowed the appeal holding that Section 5(c)(ii) of the Act was applicable and since no permission in terms thereof had been obtained, the sale deed was void and ineffective. Thereafter, the defendants filed second appeal which was dismissed.

9. In view of the above discussion, we find no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed.

10. Status quo, granted vide order dated 07.09.2007 and continued vide order dated 19.07.2013, stands vacated. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
Union Of India vs S.Ravichandran

1. The private respondents are working in the ministerial cadre of the Border Security Force (‘BSF’ for short). They joined different posts in the ministerial cadre on different dates, which factual assertions are not denied by the appellants. There are two cadres in the BSF – (i) the General Duty cadre and (ii) the Ministerial cadre. They have different recruitment processes. The merger of the cadre takes place at the level of Assistant Digitally signed by MEENAKSHI KOHLI Commandant.

2. The Border Security Force (Assistant Commandant) Recruitment Rules, 1985, were promulgated on 28.01.1985. These rules provide that at the level of Assistant Commandant 50% of the posts would be filled up by direct recruitment and 50% of the posts would be filled up by promotion. Out of the 50% quota meant for promotion, 10% of the vacant posts were to be filled in from the combatised ministerial staff failing which entire 50% to be filled in from general duty cadre.

Consequently, the writ petition filed by the private respondents also stands dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
Azizia Bee @ Shaik Mujeeb (D)Thr.Lrs. vs Govt.Of A.P..

4) On 09.08.2017, this Court had rejected all appeals concerning Survey No. 403 part in T.S. No.19/P, Block-K, Ward No.12, situated at Road No.12, Banjara Hills, Shaikpet Village and Mandal, Hyderabad. The present appeals are from an order of the Division Bench of 16.03.2011 upsetting a single Judge Bench order of 03.12.2008.

2) The civil appeal is dismissed accordingly. CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5442-5456 OF 2015: 

13) Accordingly, we set aside the order of the Division Bench. The directions contained in the order of the single Judge in Writ Petition Nos. 18353 of 2006 and 26478 of 2006 are restored.

14) The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.

(SANJAY KISHAN KAUL) New Delhi;

August 16, 2017.
Dominic Alex Fernandes(D) Tr.Lrs.. vs Union Of India

5. The writ petition was contested by submitting that since the properties of Krishna Budha Gawde stood forfeited and vested in the Central Government free from all encumbrances, the alleged tenancy rights did not survive and the competent authority was entitled to take possession under Section 19 of SAFEMA.

21. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to the competent authority for passing an appropriate order in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the competent authority for further proceedings on 9th October, 2017.

17TH AUGUST, 2017.

Date : 17-08-2017 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of judgment today.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file) 17
Commissioner Of Income Tax, Cochin vs M/S. Travancore Cochin

2) Few facts need to be mentioned infra to appreciate the short controversy involved in the appeal.

4) By order (G.O. Ms. 576/88/RD) dated 25.06.1988, (Annexure-P-1), the State Government fixed the lease rent of the demised land payable by 2 the respondent to the State. The respondent felt aggrieved of the fixation of the lease rent made by the State as, according to them, it was on higher side. The respondent, therefore, objected to the fixation made by the State Government vide order dated 25.06.1988 and prayed for its suitable reduction. By order dated 07.11.1991, the State Government rejected the respondent's request and maintained the order dated 25.06.1988 which had originally fixed the lease rent.

9) The Revenue, felt aggrieved, filed appeal before the High Court. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal and affirmed the order of the Tribunal, giving rise to filing of the appeal by the Revenue.

17) We, therefore, at this stage refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and nor consider it proper to record any finding on the submissions urged either way except to record the submissions of the parties for appreciating the issues urged and leave it to the Tribunal to decide, its applicability and relevancy in accordance with law.

18) The appeal thus succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order and the order of the Tribunal are set aside.

19) The case is remanded to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, Cochin for deciding the appeal filed by the respondent being I.T.A. No. 673 (Coach)/1995 afresh on merits in accordance with law. Parties are, however, granted opportunity to file relevant documents in support of 12 their submissions, if they so desire, to enable the Tribunal to decide the appeal as directed.

20) Let the appeal be decided within six months from the date of the appearance of the parties. Parties to appear before the Tribunal on 18 th September, 2017.

……..................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] New Delhi;

August 17, 2017 13