L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Hawkins Cookers Limited vs State Of Kerala [Alongwith Civil Appeal ...

3. The authority in original i.e. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment III), Ernakulam at the first instance accepted the appellant's case and held that the Hawkins Satilon Cookware manufactured by the appellant was classifiable under Entry 5 of the First Schedule to the Act. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in exercise of his suo motu powers of revision, sought to revise the assessment. A notice dated 10.9.1999 was issued under Section 35 of the Act. Appellant replied to the said notice. The Deputy Commissioner by an order dated 25.9.1999 set aside the earlier assessment and remanded the matter for fresh disposal. The Deputy Commissioner held that as the satilon coating made the goods non-stick, it would make it different from the aluminium household utensils made of aluminium, covered under Entry 5 of the First Schedule. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, the appellant filed an appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam (for short "the Tribunal"). The Tribunal by its order dated 18.4.2001 upheld the order of Deputy Commissioner.

4. Against the order of the Tribunal, the appellant filed Tax Revision case before the Kerala High Court, which has been disposed of by the impugned order. The High Court by a short order while agreeing with the findings recorded by the Tribunal, dismissed the revision and held that the products manufactured by the appellants were classifiable under the heading "similar home appliances" under Entry 104 of the Act. It was further held that the amendment to Entry 104 in the year 1999 by which the word "non-stick cookware" was added was only clarificatory in nature. The case of the appellant was that prior to the said amendment of 1.4.1999 the appellant's product would clearly fall under Entry 5 and not under Entry 104.

8. All these judgments are distinguishable on facts and would have no applicability to the facts of the present case. We have decided the point in issue on its own facts. Under the circumstances, we reject the plea of the appellants without adverting to the facts of the said cases.

9. For the reasons stated above, the appeals are dismissed.

11. Since we have upheld the order passed by the High Court in the connected Civil Appeal Nos. 6469-70 of 2002, we have no hesitation in dismissing this appeal as well. The Orders passed by the High Court and the Tribunal are upheld and the appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed. No costs.
Orient Ceramics & Inds. Ltd vs Commissioner Of Customs, New Delhi

2. Appellants imported two consignments of unglazed porcelain tiles, as per appellants, vide Bills of Entry No. 113197 dated 24.10.2000 and No. 113056 dated 23.10.2000. In these two Bills of Entry, the appellants claimed classification of the tiles under sub-heading 6907.90 of the Customs Tariff Schedule. Since goods falling under sub-heading 6907.90 were freely importable without any license, appellants sought clearance of the same on payment of appropriate customs duty in terms of para 5.1 of the Exim Policy 1997-2002. The Bill of Entry was assessed as per declaration made by the appellants. After the payment of duty so assessed, the Bill of Entry was presented in the import shed for physical examination where the goods were examined in the presence of the appellant's representative. On examination, it appeared that the goods were glazed tiles. Such tiles were classifiable under heading 6908.90 of the Customs Tariff Schedule and being restricted for importation as per classification, could not be imported without proper license. The appellants requested for the provisional release of the goods against the P.D. test bond pending finalization as per test report from Central Revenue Control Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as the "CRCL"). The request of the appellants was accepted and the goods were released to them provisionally.

3. The representative samples of the goods were drawn and sealed in their presence and sent to CRCL for test. The test report revealed that the goods had characteristics of glazed tiles. Show cause notice was accordingly issued to the appellants for the confiscation of the goods and for imposition of penalty on them. The appellants, however, contested the correctness of that notice and also submitted manufacturing process of the unglazed tiles. It was also requested by the appellants that the goods may be sent to the Central Glass and Ceramics Research Institute, Calcutta for test. The request made by the appellants for sending the goods to Central Glass and Ceramics Research Institute, Calcutta was rejected. After considering the material on record, the Commissioner of Customs, held the goods to be porcelain glazed tiles and ordered confiscation of the same having been imported without license and also imposed penalty of Rs. 10,00,000/- on the appellants.

4. Aggrieved against the order passed by the Commissioner of Customs, the appellants filed appeals before the Tribunal which have been dismissed by the impugned order.

11. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Vijya Kumar vs Sukhdev

2. The plaintiff in a suit for recovery of possession of agricultural land as fully described in the plaint [hereinafter referred to as "the suit land"] is the appellant before us. The plaintiff/appellant instituted the suit for recovery of possession of the suit land on the basis of a sale deed dated 13th of July, 1992 executed by the defendant/respondent in his favour. The respondent, however, in his written statement raised the plea that the transaction in question was not out and out sale but it was a loan in substance. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the transaction was an out and out sale.

3. In appeal, the Appellate Court, however, reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the suit. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff/appellant filed a Second Appeal in the High Court of Judicature of Bombay at Nagpur Bench, which also affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The plaintiff/appellant, feeling aggrieved by the decision of the High Court in the Second Appeal, has filed a Special Leave Petition, which on grant of leave, was heard in presence of the learned counsel for the parties.

5. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and the appeal is sent back to the High Court for decision afresh in accordance with law after framing the substantial question of law. The appeal is thus allowed to the extent indicated above. It is expected that the High Court shall decide the second appeal within a period of six months from the date of supply of a copy of this order to it. There will be no order as to costs.
Punjab National Bank By Chairman & Anr vs Astamija Dash

J U D G M E N T REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3125 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 18997 of 2005) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3126 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23155 of 2005) Astamija Dash .. Appellant Versus Punjab National Bank and another .. Respondents S.B. SINHA, J.

3. Writ Petitioner (Respondent in appeal arising out of SLP ) No. 18997 of 2005 and Appellant in the connected appeal) was appointed as a Management Trainee in the Punjab National Bank (Bank). She was duly selected by the Banking Service Recruitment Board, Delhi. An offer of appointment was made to her favour on or about 28th July, 1986 inter alia on the following terms and conditions :-

Pursuant to the condition that she must pass the confirmation test, she appeared in the said examination on 29th May, 1988. She did not pass the said examination. She was, however, again asked to appear in the examination on 1st October, 1989. By a letter dated 5th September, 1989 she expressed her inability to do so, stating :-

6. Indisputably, she had otherwise completed her period of probation. She also fulfilled the other conditions of service. Her services, however, were terminated by an order dated 9th November, 1990 stating :-

7. She preferred an appeal thereagainst before the appellate authority asking for another chance to clear the confirmation test stating thatsimilarly situated employees including one Indubala had been given another chance to appear at the examination. However, the said appeal was dismissed by an order dated 28th November, 1990.

9. The High Court rejected the first two contentions raised by the writ petitioner herein but accepted the third. The writ petition was allowed on the said premise.

49. We are not unmindful that as a positive concept, Article 14 would not apply in illegality.

53. We, for the reasons abovementioned, are not in a position to accept the submission of Mr. Mehta that it was for the employer to decide as to how many chances have to be given to each employee and the Bank cannot be deprived of such discretionary jurisdiction.

54. For the views we have taken we need not deal with the question as to whether the insistence of confirmation test is not in accordance with the Regulations.

56. For the reasons abovementioned appeal filed by the Bank is dismissed and that of the writ petitioner is allowed. The writ petitioner shall be reinstated in service forthwith. She, however, may be paid only 50 % of the back wages. This order we are passing keeping in view that her services had been terminated on 9th November, 1990. The writ petitioner is also entitled to costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.50,000/-.
Guruswamy Nadar vs P.Lakshmi Ammal(D) Through Lrs. & Ors

2. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are a suit for specific performance was filed on the basis of an agreement for sale dated 4.7.1974 under which the first defendant in the suit had through her husband and power of attorney holder contracted to sell a house property in sum of Rs.30,000/-. A sum of Rs.5,000/- was given as advance and the remaining Rs.25,000/- was to be paid before 31.7.1974. The said amount was not paid by 31.7.1974. The owner again sold the suit property to the appellant herein on 5.5.1975 for a sum of Rs.45,000/- and possession in question was handed over to the appellant herein. Therefore, the plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit for enforcement of the specific performance of contract. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the agreement was genuine but a false story was put up by the defendant/owner that he signed the agreement under the influence of liquor and it further held that the defendant who is appellant before us purchased the suit property for bona fide consideration. Therefore, no decree for specific performance could be passed in favour of the plaintiff & learned trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned Single Judge reversed the judgment and the decree passed by the trial court and decreed the suit for specific performance. Aggrieved against the order passed by learned Single Judge, an appeal was preferred by the second purchaser (the appellant herein) before Division Bench and that appeal of the second purchaser was dismissed by the Division Bench by its order dated 19.10.2000 and hence the present appeal on grant of leave.

Therefore, from this finding it is more than apparent that the plaintiff while filed the suit for specific performance of the contract was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. This argument was though not specifically argued before the Division Bench, the only question which was argued was whether the principle of lis pendens will be applicable or Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act will have overriding effect to which we have already answered. In the present case the principle of lis pndens will be applicable as the second sale has taken place after the filing of the suit. Therefore, the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court is correct and we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
Sudhir Kumar Bhalla vs Jagdish Chand, Etc. Etc

JUDGMENT O R D E R REPORTABLE CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 776 OF 2008 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.2541 of 2007] WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 780, 781, 779, 782, 777 & 778 OF 2008 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2545, 2546, 2548, 2550, 2988, 2990 of 2007] Leave granted in all the above-said Special Leave Petitions.

On 12.07.1997, the respondent filed second complaint on similar and practically the same points purported to have accrued on identical causes of action. The second complaint was entrusted to the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Amritsar, who recorded the statement/evidence of the respondent on 12.07.1997. Thereafter, the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, vide order dated 23.08.1997 issued summon to the appellant. The appellant appeared on 06.04.1998 before the Judicial Magistrate and filed an application for discharging him in the case. However, on 01.06.1998 the Judicial Magistrate dismissed the said application. After following and adopting the due procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.'), the trial court dismissed the complaint on 06.02.2002 and acquitted the appellant. Being aggrieved by the order of acquittal of the appellant by the trial court, the respondent filed five criminal appeals, two as an attorney of his wife and three on his behalf, in the High Court.

In April 1998, the appellant approached the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Ludhiana, under Section 156 of Cr.P.C. by way of two separate applications alleging fraud, cheating, tampering of the cheques by the respondent and his wife and prayed that the police be directed to register criminal cases against them. On the directions of the learned Magistrate, FIR No.93 of 1998 was registered against the respondent under Sections 420, 463, 465, 468 and 471 of the IPC, whereas second FIR No.94 of 1998 was lodged against Jagdish Chand and Smt. Ramesh Rani under Sections 420, 463, 465, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC at Police Station, Sarabha Nagar, Ludhiana. After investigation, the police filed challans in both the cases in the court. The trial court charge sheeted the respondent and his wife vide two separate orders dated 15.01.2000. They filed two revision petitions against the orders of framing charges against them, which were dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, vide separate orders dated 04.06.2001. The respondent and his wife filed two Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 29090 and 36987-M of 2001 in the High Court challenging the validity and correctness of the orders of the learned Trial Magistrate as also of the learned Sessions Judge.

The appeals shall stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
B. Desraj vs C.I.T. Salem

JUDGMENT 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3245 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12697/2007) B. DESRAJ ...APPELLANT (S) VERSUS C.I.T. SALEM ...RESPONDENT(S) ORDER Leave granted.

92. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present dispute are as follows:

In the circumstances, we are of the view that the words "business profits" in the above formula under Section 80HHC(3) would include Cash Compensatory Allowance and Duty Drawback and accordingly we direct the Assessing Officer to work out the deduction in accordance with the law as it stood during the relevant Assessment Year 1991-92.

For the aforestated reasons, the assessee succeeds and the Civil Appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
Commissioner Of Central Excise, New ... vs India Thermit Corporation Ltd. & Others

ITCL was issued a show cause notice dated 18.1.1999 demanding differential excise duty of Rs.62,60,022.42 under proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11A of the Act on the ground that it has willfully and deliberately indulged in mis-classification of various excisable goods through mis-declaration of their nature, description, suppression of facts and under-valuation of excisable goods cleared to self for rail jointing at different sites of India in an attempt to beguile the department with an intent to evade payment of excise duty. Mr. Alok Nagory, Managing Director of ITCL was also required to show cause as to why penalty should not be imposed upon him under Rule 209-A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (for short 'the Rules'). A detailed reply dated 10.11.1999 was filed by the respondents along with copies of the documents in support of their contentions.

M/s Asiatic Thermics Ltd., respondent No.3 herein, (for short 'ATL') is engaged in the manufacture of dry moulds and thermit welding equipments and classifying its products under Chapter Heading 8479.00.

For the reasons stated above, appeals filed by the revenue are dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.

We agree with the view taken by the Tribunal that even if ATL & ITCL are taken to be related persons [we are not holding so], it has not influenced the price. There is no under- valuation. ATL has been selling the product to ITCL and Indian Railways at or about the same price.

For the reasons stated above, appeals filed by the revenue are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Jagdish & Ors vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Six appellants, along with accused Dularey, were convicted by the Trial Court under Section 304 Part-II/149 of the Indian Penal Code [hereinafter referred to as "I.P.C."] and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years. They were further convicted under Sections 147 and 148 I.P.C. but no separate sentence was awarded on any of these counts. Convictions have been confirmed by the High Court on appeal being preferred by the accused persons. So far as accused Dularey is concerned, it appears that he did not move this Court whereas this appeal by special leave has been filed by the remaining six accused persons. Conviction of the appellants is based upon the evidence of Roop Lal (P.W.1) and Satrohan (P.W.2), who claimed to be eye-witnesses. These two witnesses have consistently supported the prosecution case and no infirmity could be pointed out therein. In our view, the High Court was quite justified in confirming the convictions of the appellants.

Turning now to the sentence awarded against the appellants, the maximum sentence under Section 304 Part-II I.P.C. that could have been awarded is ten years. So far as appellants, other than Ram Shankar @ Shankari is concerned, they have remained in custody for a period of more than four years. Ram Shankar @ Shankari, Appellant No.4, has remained in custody for a period of two years and he is more than seventy seven years' old. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that ends of justice would be met in case the sentence of imprisonment awarded against the appellants is reduced to the period already undergone and each one of them is directed to pay fine of Rupees ten thousand. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in-part and, while upholding the convictions of the appellants, the sentence of imprisonment awarded against them is reduced to the period already undergone and each one of them is directed to pay fine of Rupees ten thousand; in default, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one year. The fine, if realised, shall be paid to the complainant. All the accused persons, except Ram Shankar @ Shankari, Appellant No.4, are directed to be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case.

Ram Shankar @ Shankari, Appellant No.4, who is on bail, is discharged from the liability of bail bonds.
Union Of India vs Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar & Ors

3. The facts of the case are that a claim petition was filed before the Railway Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') by the husband, mother and minor son of one Smt. Abja who died on 23.5.1996 in a train accident at Varkala Railway station. The Claims Tribunal disallowed the claim, but the appeal against the said decision was allowed by the Kerala High Court by the impugned judgment dated 25.6.2001 and compensation of Rs. 2 lacs with interest @ 12% from the date of the petition till the date of payment was granted. Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed by the appellant.

4. There is no dispute that Smt. Abja was a bona fide passenger holding a second class season ticket and an identity card issued by the Southern Railway. As per the forensic report the cause of death was due to multiple injuries due to the accident. The deceased fell on to the railway track and was run over by train No.6349 Parasuram Express.

5. The Tribunal found that Smt. Abja was a bona fide passenger traveling by the train.

37. However, we are now witnessing a swing once again in favour of the principle of strict liability. The Bhopal Gas Tragedy, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the crude oil spill in 1988 on to the Alaska coast line from the oil tanker Exxon Valdez, and other similar incidents have shocked the conscience of people all over the world and have aroused thinkers to the dangers in industrial and other activities, in modern society.

50. It is recognized that the Law of Torts is not stagnant but is growing. As stated by the American Restatement of Torts, Art 1; vide D. L. Lloyd:

56. Thus, there is no force in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Union Of India (Uoi) vs Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar And Ors.

3. The facts of the case are that a claim petition was filed before the Railway Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') by the husband, mother and minor son of one Smt. Abja who died on 23.5.1996 in a train accident at Varkala Railway station. The Claims Tribunal disallowed the claim, but the appeal against the said decision was allowed by the Kerala High Court by the impugned judgment dated 25.6.2001 and compensation of Rs. 2 lacs with interest @ 12% from the date of the petition till the date of payment was granted. Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed by the appellant.

4. There is no dispute that Smt. Abja was a bona fide passenger holding a second class season ticket and an identity card issued by the Southern Railway. As per the forensic report the cause of death was due to multiple injuries due to the accident. The deceased fell on to the railway track and was run over by train No. 6349 Parasuram Express.

5. The Tribunal found that Smt. Abja was a bona fide passenger traveling by the train.

37. However, we are now witnessing a swing once again in favour of the principle of strict liability. The Bhopal Gas Tragedy, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the crude oil spill in 1988 on to the Alaska coast line from the oil tanker Exxon Valdez, and other similar incidents have shocked the conscience of people all over the world and have aroused thinkers to the dangers in industrial and other activities, in modern society.

50. It is recognized that the Law of Torts is not stagnant but is growing. As stated by the American Restatement of Torts, Art 1; vide D. L. Lloyd: Jurisprudence:

56. Thus, there is no force in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.