L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Rallis India Ltd vs Poduru Vidya Bhusan & Ors

5. It may be pertinent to mention here that the Appellant herein had filed substantially similar complaints before the Criminal Courts of competent Jurisdiction at Chandigarh, Vijayawada and Jammu & Kashmir as well. The partnership firm M/s Sri Lakshmi Agency was therefore, constrained to file T.P. (Crl.) Nos. 161-171 of 2005, which came to be Crl. A. @ SLP(Crl.)No.1874 of 2008 etc. .... (Contd.)

disposed of by this Court on 03.03.2006 and all criminal cases (excluding those pending in the State of Jammu & Kashmir) filed by Appellant against Respondents were directed to be tried by Competent Criminal Court at Hyderabad as a series of composite criminal complaints. Consequently all the complaints are now pending before XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad, for disposal in accordance with law. The Respondents herein arrayed as Accused Nos. 4, 6 and 7 in the said complaints thereafter filed applications in the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for their discharge.

Needless to say, final judgment and order would depend on the evidence adduced.

quash a criminal proceeding with respect to an offence under Section 141 of the Act, must be exercised keeping this advisory note and caveat in mind.

16. On account of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge exercising the jurisdiction conferred on him under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be sustained in law. The same are hereby set aside and quashed. The trial court is directed to dispose of the Criminal complaints filed by Appellant at an early date, after giving opportunity of hearing to both sides, in accordance with law. However, the Trial Court would not be influenced by any of the observations made hereinabove and would decide the matters in accordance with law.

The appeals are allowed. Parties to bear their respective costs.
Veeran & Ors vs State Of M.P

3. In the instant case, eight accused were charged and prosecuted for commission of offences under Section 147, 148, 302 or 302/149 and 325 of the IPC. After trial, giving benefit of doubt, Suresh and Badelal - accused nos.6 & 7 respectively, were acquitted by Additional Sessions Judge, Gadarwara, Narsingpur in Sessions Case No. 21/93 vide its Judgment and Order dated 21.4.1994. Six convicted Crl.A @ S.L.P.(Crl.)No.8847 of 2009 .... (contd.)

accused preferred Criminal Appeal No. 472 of 1994 in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. During the pendency of the appeal, Accused No. 3 - Rewaram and Accused No. 4 - Lakhan Lal died. Thus, appeal in respect of these two accused stood abated. However, as regards the remaining four accused, the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court. Now, in this appeal, it is prayed before us to consider, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, whether, the four surviving convicted Appellants Veeran, Onkar, Ganesh and Ashok deserve to be convicted under Section 302/149, 147 and 148 of the IPC, who have been awarded life imprisonment and one year each respectively for the commission of the aforesaid offences or it deserves to be converted under Section 304 of the IPC.

Daddu came out of his house and at that point of time, accused Lakhan, Ashok and Ganesh also came to the spot armed with Gandasa, Farsa and Lathis. etc. All of them told Daddu that he was crossing all limits and he should behave in proper and orderly manner. After some altercation, they started beating Daddu (deceased) with the weapons they were carrying.

Narmada @ Narbadi and Mayabai also sustained injuries as they were trying to intervene. Daddu was then taken in a bullock cart to Police Station, Gotetoriya, Narsinghpur by Mayabai and others. FIR was lodged by Mayabai on 4.11.92 at 23.30 Hrs. naming all the eight accused in the same and giving details of the injuries caused by each one of Crl.A @ S.L.P.(Crl.)No.8847 of 2009 .... (contd.)

its species wherein all "murder" is "culpable homicide" but all "culpable homicide" is not "murder".

Crl.A @ S.L.P.(Crl.)No.8847 of 2009 .... (contd.)

Crl.A @ S.L.P.(Crl.)No.8847 of 2009 .... (contd.)

21. In the light of the foregoing discussion, appeal is allowed in part. Appellant No. 1, Veeran is held guilty for commission of offences under Section 304 Part I /149 and under Section 147, 148 of the IPC and awarded the sentence already undergone whereas others are held guilty for commission of offences under Section 323/149, 147 & 148 of the I.P.C. and awarded the sentences already undergone. The Appellants be thus, released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
The Commissioner, Corpn. Of Chennai vs R. Sivasankara Mehta & Anr

1. We have heard learned counsel for the parties including the learned senior counsel appearing for Chennai Metro Rail Limited. The Interlocutory Application Nos. 5-6 filed on behalf of the Chennai Metro Rail Limited for being impleaded are allowed.

3. On such a representation, the Government by an Order dated 10th March, 1995 directed the appellant-

19. Unfortunately we are of the opinion that the said ground does not make out any case of malafide exercise of power by the Government. Specific pleadings with particulars must be there to make out a case of malafide and the person against whom malafide is alleged must be impleaded. No such pleadings are at all present in this case.

conveyance is to be made that has to be done on the basis of the present market value. The purported order of re-conveyance initially made by the Government was not made on that basis either.

22. Therefore, examining the matter from all its angles, we do not find any reason to sustain the 1 impugned judgment passed by the High Court.

23. The appeals are, therefore, allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside.

24. No order as to costs.
Surendra vs State Of Rajasthan

1.3 The matter was thereafter taken in appeal. The High Court has affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Two appeals have been filed against the judgment of the High Court, one by Surendra being Criminal Appeal No. 641 of 2007 and the other by Satpal being SLP(Crl) No. 7324 of 2010. We grant leave in the above Special Leave Petition.

4. We now come to the recoveries of the alleged murder weapons. The appellants were arrested on the 11th of January, 2001 and the recoveries were made 2/3 days thereafter but the articles were sent to the laboratory on the 19th of March, 2001. Even otherwise, we are of the opinion that as the evidence of last seen itself is unacceptable the recoveries by themselves would not make any difference. Moreover even if a false plea had been taken by the accused that by itself will not be enough to maintain their conviction and as the prosecution story itself suffers from glaring infirmities the infirmities in the prosecution case Crl.A. 641 of 2007 7 cannot be filled up by a false plea of alibi. We are conscious of the fact that this is a case of double murder but in the absence of any cogent evidence, we are unable to sustain the conviction. We, accordingly, allow both the appeals and set aside the orders of the trial court as well as the High Court and direct the acquittal of the appellants.

6. We are told that Satpal is in custody. He shall be released forthwith if not required in connection with any other case. Bail bonds of Surendra stand discharged.

Vide our separate reasoned order, we have allowed these appeals. The appellant Satpal who is stated to be in custody shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case.

The reasoned order shall be separately placed on record.
Dev Singh & Ors vs State Of M.P

1. Sixteen persons in all were sent up for trial for offences punishable under Sections 148, 302/149, 326/149 and 324/149 and were sentenced accordingly for various terms of imprisonment. The incident happened at about 5:00p.m. on the 12th of November, 1997, in the Grain Market at Rajgarh. As per the allegations, the 16 accused who were armed with weapons such as knives, swords, farsas and lathis had pursuant to their common object committed the murders of Ganga Ram and Chain Singh. A First Information Report, Exhibit P-51, was lodged at Police Station Rajgarh by PW 13 Babulal himself an injured witness. As a consequence of the FIR, the Investigating Officer reached the place of incident and found that in addition to Babulal there were several other injured persons as well they being Gore Lal PW 14, Prem Singh PW 20, Kalabai PW-15, the Crl.A. No. 1415 of 2007 2 wife of PW 4, and Lalita Bai, sister of PW 1. The motive for the incident was that Kalabai had been raped by some of the appellants and Ratanlal which had led to the incident. The trial court examined the entire evidence and came to the conclusion that the participation of nine of the accused was somewhat uncertain and their involvement could not be spelt out beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court, accordingly, acquitted nine of the accused. The matter was thereafter taken in appeal by the accused. The High Court, has, by the impugned judgment, allowed the appeal qua Hari Singh and Raghunath Singh sons of Girdhari Lal, and has ordered their acquittal as well whereas the appeals of Dev Singh, Bansilal, Ratan Lal, Kailash, Kamal Singh and Devi Singh aforesaid have been dismissed. Mr. Javed Mahmud Rao, the learned counsel for the appellants was not present when these appeals last came up. We had then requested Ms. V. Mohana, Advocate to assist us as an Amicus Curiae.

3. We are therefore of the opinion that no interference is called for in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.

4. The fee of the Amicus is fixed at ` 7,000/-.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc vs Sbi Home Finance Ltd. & Ors

2. Capstone Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. (second respondent herein, for short "Capstone") and Real Value Appliances Pvt. Ltd. (respondent No.3 herein, for short "RV Appliances") are the owners of flat No.9A and 9B respectively situated at "Brighton", Napien Sea Road, Mumbai. Capstone and RV Appliances had borrowed loans from SBI Home Finance Ltd., (the first respondent herein, for short "SBI") under two loan agreements dated 3.12.1994 by securing the said two flats in favour of SBI.

Clause (8) gave the option to the appellant to pay the amount due to the SBI on behalf of the borrowers to safeguard its interest. Relevant portion of para 8 is extracted below:

The appellant claims that settlement talks were being held for some time but did not fructify into any settlement. Therefore, on 10.10.2001, the appellant took out a notice of motion praying that the parties to the suit be referred to arbitration as provided in clause 16 of the deposit agreement dated 5.4.1996 8 and consequently the suit be dismissed. The said application was resisted by the SBI.

(Emphasis supplied)

...."

(iii) The court can direct that an account be taken of what is due to the mortgagee and declare the amounts due and direct that if the mortgagor pays into court, the amount so found due, on or before such date as the court may fix (within six months from the date on which the court confirms the account taken or from the date on which the court declares the amount due), the petitioner shall deliver the documents and if necessary re-transfer the property to the defendant; and further direct that if the mortgagor defaults in payment of such dues, then the mortgagee will be entitled to final decree for sale of the property or part thereof and pay into court the sale proceeds, and to adjudge the subsequent costs, charges, expenses and interest and direct that the balance be paid to mortgagor/defendant or other persons entitled to receive the same. An arbitral tribunal will not be able to do so.

(v) The court has the power under Rule 4(2), on good cause being shown and upon terms to be fixed by it, from time to time, at any time before a final decree is passed, extend the time fixed for payment of the amount found or declared due or the amount adjudged due in respect of subsequent costs, changes, expenses and interest, upon such terms as it deems fit. The Arbitral Tribunal will have no such power.

Conclusion

The appeal is accordingly dismissed. We however make it clear that we have not recorded any finding, nor expressed any opinion, on the merits of the claims and disputes in the suit.
Janak Dulari Devi & Anr vs Kapildeo Rai & Anr

2. The case of the appellants in brief is as under : The second respondent was the owner of the suit property. The second respondent executed a sale deed dated 22.2.1988 (registered on 7.3.1988) in respect of the suit property in favour of the appellants, for a consideration of Rs.22000/-; that Rs.17,000 was paid by the appellants to the second respondent, at the time of execution and registration of sale deed; that the balance of Rs.5000 was to be paid subsequently, when the vendor requested for the said payment; that the second respondent retained the registration receipt in regard to the sale deed, agreeing to deliver it to the appellants against payment of the balance sale consideration; that on execution of the sale deed, by the second respondent, his right, title and interest in the suit property passed to the appellants and possession of the land sold was also delivered to them; that subsequently the second respondent avoided receiving the balance of Rs.5000 and failed to deliver the registration receipt; that the appellants issued a legal notice calling upon the second respondent to deliver the registration receipt so that they could collect the original registered sale deed, but the second respondent send a reply denying the receipt of Rs.17000 and stating that the entire consideration was due; and that therefore, it became necessary for the appellants to file the suit. The appellants sought a decree for a direction to the second respondent to deliver the registration receipt relating to the sale 3 deed dated 22.2.1988 by receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs.5000 and that in case the second respondent had already obtained the original sale deed from the office of the Sub-Registrar, then for a direction to deliver the same to the appellant. The said suit was valued at Rs.5000.

payment of the price, the second respondent was justified in cancelling the sale deed and selling the property to the first respondent. The second appeal filed by the appellant, was dismissed by the High Court by the impugned judgment dated 3.1.2002, affirming the finding of facts recorded by the first 6 appellate court. The said judgment is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

(emphasis supplied)

13. We may now examine the facts of this case with reference to the said principles. As noticed above the first appellate court has recorded a finding of fact that the appellants had not paid the consideration of Rs.22000 at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed. This finding of fact (accepted by the High Court in second appeal) has been recorded after exhaustive consideration of the oral evidence and is not open to challenge.

Consequently, the subsequent sale in favour of the first respondent was valid.

Re: Question (iv)

Where the purchaser is from an outstation, the vendor being entrusted with the Registration Receipt, to collect the original sale deed and deliver it to the purchaser, is common. Be that as it may.

16. In view of the above, we hold that there is no merit in this appeal and the appeal is dismissed.
Deb Ratan Biswas & Ors vs Most. Anand Moyi Devi & Ors

2. The facts have been stated in the impugned judgment and we are not repeating the same except where necessary.

3. It appears that a Title Suit No. 186 of 1984 by one Nrisingha Prasad Biswas and his four sons (who are the appellants herein) was filed against the respondents herein before the Subordinate Judge-V, Bhagalpur for partition of certain properties. While the aforesaid partition suit was pending, the defendants Smt. Pushpa Biswas and Apurva Kumar Biswas executed a General Power of Attorney on 31.7.1992 in favour of Umesh Chandra and Dr. Sanjeev Kumar Mishra and the same was registered. The terms and conditions giving the powers to the attorneys were specifically set out in the Power of Attorney itself.

4. On 30.7.1996, the parties to the suit including Pushpa Biswas and Apurva Kumar Biswas filed a compromise petition which was forwarded to the Sheristedar for scrutiny and report. On 31.7.1996, on receiving the report of the Sheristedar dated 3 30.7.1996, the Subordinate Judge-V, Bhagalpur approved the terms of the compromise and directed that a decree be passed in terms of the compromise.

6. On 7.6.2002, the learned Subordinate Judge-V, Bhagalpur held that Miscellaneous Petition filed at the instance of only one of the attorneys was not maintainable, as according to the terms of the power of attorney both the constituted attorneys were entrusted to act jointly. Hence, he dismissed the Miscellaneous Case filed by Dr. Sanjeev Kumar Mishra.

Even after executing a power of attorney the principal can act on his own.

13. For the reasons given above this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and 7 the order dated 7.6.2002 of the learned Subordinate Judge-V, Bhagalpur is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.

April 15, 2011
J.S.Yadav vs State Of U.P & Anr

3. Compendiously and concisely, the relevant facts necessary and germane to the disposal of this appeal run as under:

(E) The appellant challenged the said Notification dated 28.5.2008 by filing Writ Petition No. 27315 of 2008, mainly on the grounds that he had been appointed for a tenure of five years and that period could not be curtailed. The amendment Act 2006 could not take away the accrued rights of the appellant as he had been appointed prior to the said amendment.

(F) The appellant did not implead anyone except the State of U.P. and its Principal Home Secretary as respondents in the said writ petition. However, the vacancies on the post of the Chairperson as well as of the Members of the Commission were filled up on 6.6.2008 and, in view thereof, no interim order could be passed by the High Court.

(G) The High Court dismissed the writ petition vide impugned judgment and order dated 21.4.2009. Hence, this appeal.

Provided that neither the salary Provided that neither the salary and allowances nor the other and allowances nor the other terms and conditions of service terms and conditions of service of a Member shall be varied to of the Chairperson or a his disadvantage after his Members shall be varied to his appointment. disadvantage after his appointment.

Thus, from the above, it is evident that accrued rights cannot be taken away by repealing the statutory provisions arbitrarily. More so, the repealing law must provide for taking away such rights, expressly or by necessary implication.

31. Thus, in view of the above, we do not have any hesitation to declare that the Notification dated 28.5.2008 is patently illegal.

More so, the public exchequer cannot be burdened with the liability to pay the salary of two persons against one sanctioned post.

33. The appellant did not implead any person who had been appointed in his place as a Member of the Commission. More so, he made it clear before the High Court that his cause would be vindicated if the Court made a declaration that he had illegally been dislodged/restrained to continue as a Member of the Commission. In view of the above, he cannot be entitled for any other relief except the declaration in his favour which had been made hereinabove that the impugned Notification dated 28.5.2008 is illegal. 23

34. In view of above, the appeal is allowed to the extent as explained hereinabove. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant is entitled for cost to the tune of Rs. 1 lakh which the respondents must pay within a period of two months from today.
Bholanath Mukherjee & Ors vs R.K.Mission V.Centenary College & Ors

2. We may notice the essential facts, which would have a bearing on the determination of the issues raised in this appeal. Admittedly, there has been a controversy with regard to the special status enjoyed by the Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda 1 Centenary College at Rahara (hereinafter referred to as `respondent No.1') for a long period of time. The College was initially established in the year 1961 with a grant of Rs.2 lakhs given by the Government of West Bengal in the Education Department. The additional cost for establishing the College had been borne by the State Government.

Subsequently on 25th April, 2002, the Government of West Bengal, in order to advance collegiate education and with a view to reduce the overcrowding in good colleges in Calcutta decided to set up a three year degree college at Rahara. Such college was to be set up on the recommendations of the University Grants Commission (for short `UGC'). The college was duly established and granted affiliation to Calcutta University on 13th May, 1963. It is a fully aided college; being sponsored and financed by the State Government.

However, both the persons during the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court went on open ended leave from their respective posts. Thereafter on 14th May, 1999, by an Office Order No.RKMVCC/21/99, the college authorities elevated Swami Sukadevananda (respondent No. 3 herein) 1 Vice-Principal of the college to the post of Acting Principal with immediate effect, again without following the West Bengal Act of 1975 and West Bengal Act of 1978. He was designated as the Principal of the College on 20th March, 2001 vide Office Order No.3/RKMVCC/21/2001. The appointment of Swami Sukhadevananda, as Principal of the College led to the amendment of the writ petition incorporating a challenge to his appointment.

23. We are, therefore, unable to accept the aforesaid submission as it is tantamount to treating the writ petition as a public interest litigation.

25. Before we part with this judgment, we make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the correctness of the High Court's judgment as we have dismissed the appeal only on the ground that the concerned appellants have already retired from service and it would not be in the interest of anybody to go into the merits.

26.In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed.