L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Dr. M. Dakshayani vs The State Of Karnataka

2. The relevant facts for adjudication of the dispute are as follows:

3. The Tribunal held that Respondent No.2 was a beneficiary of undue benefits. The Tribunal found fault with the deputation of Respondent No.2 as a Lecturer on 14 th September, 1991 in spite of the fact that Respondent No.2 did not possess a Post-Graduate Degree. The Government was criticized by the Tribunal for permitting a change in cadre to Respondent 3 No.2 though she was ineligible. The promotion of Respondent No.2 as Assistant Professor on 6 th June, 2001 was held to be illegal. On the basis of the above said findings, the Tribunal set aside the promotion of Respondent No.2 as Assistant Professor and Professor. The Government was directed by the Tribunal to consider the Appellant for promotion with effect from the date she became eligible.

11.For the aforementioned reasons, the Appeal is dismissed. Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 716 of 2018 in Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1775 of 2012

12.The Contempt Petition has been filed for willful violation of the Orders passed by this Court on 27th January, 2017 and 8th February, 2016 in the above Appeal. While issuing notice on 27th January, 2012 an Order of status quo was passed. The Order dated 27th January, 2012 was clarified on 8th February, 2016 wherein it was made clear that the Order of status quo was restricted to the post of Professor and above and not with reference to other posts.

14.Respondent No.2 was only placed In-Charge of the post of Head of Department of Ophthalmology temporarily in the interest of administration. We do not agree with the Appellant/ Applicant that there has been any willful violation of the Interim Orders passed by this Court on 27 th January, 2012 and 8th February, 2016. Accordingly, the Contempt Petition is dismissed.
Commissioner Of Income Tax Kolkata Xii vs M/S Calcutta Export Company

3) Brief facts:-

(a) M/s. Calcutta Export Company - the Respondent is a partnership firm and is a manufacturer and exporter of casting materials having its principal place of business at Kolkata. The Respondent filed its return of income for the Assessment Year 2005-06 for Rs. 4,18,17,910/-. The case was selected for scrutiny and the assessment under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short ‘the IT Act’) was completed on 28.12.2007. The Assessing Officer, vide order dated 12.10.2009, disallowed the export commission charges paid by the assessee to M/s. Steel Crackers Pvt. Ltd. 9 amounting to Rs. 40,82,089/- while stating that the tax deducted at source (TDS) on such commission amount on 07.07.2004, 07.09.2004 and 07.10.2004 ought to have been deposited by the Respondent before the end of the previous year i.e. 31.03.2005 to get the commission amount deducted from the total income in terms of the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) of the IT Act as it stood then. But the same was deposited on 01.08.2005, hence, the Respondent cannot be allowed to claim deduction of the commission amount from the total income. The Assessing Officer revised the total income to Rs. 4,58,99,999/- with the requirement to pay the additional tax amount of Rs. 23,88,832/- by the Respondent.

(c) Being aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal being ITA No. 1487/Kol/2011 before the Tribunal which came to be dismissed on 29.02.2012.

31) In light of the forgoing discussion, we are of the view that judgment of the High Court does not call for any interference and, hence, the appeals are accordingly dismissed. In view of the above, all the connecting appeals, interlocutory applications, if any, transferred cases as well as diary numbers are disposed off accordingly. Parties to bear cost on their own.

(ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE) NEW DELHI;

APRIL 24, 2018.
Income Tax Officer Ward No.16(2) vs M/S Techspan India Private ...

2) Brief facts:-

(d) Further, on 10.02.2005, a Notice was served upon the Respondent by the Revenue for re-opening the assessment under Section 148 on the ground that the deduction under Section 10A of the IT Act has been allowed in excess and the income escaped assessment works out to Rs. 57,36,811/- in the original assessment. The Respondent filed a detailed reply objecting to the re-assessment. However, by order dated 17.08.2005, the objections were rejected and reassessment was approved by the Revenue.

14) In light of the forgoing discussion, we are of the view that impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 24.02.2006 does not call for any interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

APRIL 24, 2018.
Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi-I vs M/S. Container Corporation Of India ...

3) Brief facts:

(c) The respondent herein, being aggrieved with the aforesaid order, filed an appeal being No. 325/05-06 to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-VI, New Delhi. Learned CIT (Appeals), vide order dated 29.05.2007, partly allowed the appeal while rejecting the deduction claimed under Section 80-IA of the IT Act. Being aggrieved, the respondent herein further preferred ITA Nos. 2851 & 3680/DEL./2007, 2753 & 4477/DEL/2007 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, vide order dated 27.02.2009, partly allowed the appeal and held that the deduction under Section 80-IA can be claimed with regard to the rolling stocks of the company but not with regard to the ICDs.

23) In light of the forgoing discussion, we are of the view that judgment of the High Court does not call for any interference and, hence, the appeal is accordingly dismissed. All the connected appeals are disposed of accordingly. The parties to bear cost on their own.

APRIL 24, 2018.
B.L. Passi vs Commissioner Of Income Tax (Xi)

2) Brief facts:

57,40,360/- for the Assessment Year (AY) 1997-98 while claiming deduction of Rs. 58,87,045/- under Section 80-O of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short ‘the IT Act’) on a gross foreign exchange receipt of Rs. 1,17,74,090/- received from Sumitomo Corporation, Japan. Sumitomo Corporation was interested in supplying dies for manufacturing of body parts to Indian automobile manufacturers and entered into a contract with the Appellant under which the services of the Appellant herein were engaged by using his specialized commercial and industrial knowledge about the Indian automobile industry. Sumitomo Corporation also agreed to pay remuneration at the rate of 5% of the contractual amount between Sumitomo Corporation and its Indian customers on sales of its products so developed. The Appellant claimed to have supplied to Sumitomo Corporation the industrial and commercial knowledge, information about market conditions and Indian manufacturers of automobiles and also technical assistance as required by the Corporation.

APRIL 24, 2018.
The Commissioner vs Mahindra And Mahindra Ltd. Through M.D.

3) Brief facts:-

(a) For the proper appreciation of the issue in the case at hand, we deem it apposite to mention the gist of the facts. The 3 appellant herein is the Department of Income Tax (for brevity ‘the Revenue), on the other hand, respondent herein is Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (for brevity ‘the Respondent’) - a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956.

(b) The Respondent, way back, decided to expand its jeep product line by including FC-150 and FC-170 models. For this purpose, on 18.06.1964, it entered into an agreement with Kaiser Jeep Corporation (for short ‘the KJC’) based in America wherein KJC agreed to sell the dies, welding equipments and die models to the assessee. The final price of the tooling and other equipments was agreed at $6,50,000/- including cost, insurance and freight (CIF). Meanwhile, the Respondent took all the requisite approvals from the concerned Government Departments. The said toolings and other equipments were supplied by the Kaiser Jeep Corporation through its subsidiary Kaiser Jeep International Corporation (KJIC).

(e) On 30.06.1976 the Respondent filed its return and shown Rs. 57,74,064/- as cessation of its liability towards the American Motor Corporation. After perusal of the return, the Income Tax Officer (ITO) concluded that with the waiver of the loan amount, the credit represented income and not a liability. Accordingly, the ITO, vide order dated 03.09.1979, held that the sum of Rs 57,74,064/- was taxable under Section 28 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for brevity ‘the IT Act’). 5

17) To sum up, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High court in view of the following reasons:

APRIL 24, 2018.
Prof. Chintamani Malviya vs High Court Of Madhya Pradesh

3. The appellant was elected to Lok Sabha in the elections held in the year 2014 from Ujjain Lok Sabha Constituency. His election was challenged vide Election Petition No.33 of 2014 by one Premchand Guddu. 2 On 31.07.2014 notice was issued by the High Court in said election petition and the same was to be served upon the appellant through the District Judge, Ujjain. The next date in the petition being 01.09.2014, the notice was said to have been served upon the appellant on 16.08.2014 by one Mr. Arun Bhalerao, Process Server.

4. According to the appellant, the aforesaid notice was served on one of his employees while the appellant was in Delhi and that the appellant came to know about the pendency of the election petition only on 25.01.2015. On the other hand according to the election petitioner, the process server had served the notice on the appellant himself.

7. By its order dated 24.03.2015, the High Court allowed I.A. No.927 of 2015 preferred by the appellant for setting aside the order for proceedings ex-parte against the appellant and it allowed the appellant to participate in the proceedings. Further, by another order of the same date, the High Court allowed I.A. No.1303 of 2015 preferred by the original election petitioner and directed the Registry to register a criminal case. The Registrar was also given directions to conduct appropriate inquiry under Section 340 Cr.P.C. In compliance of said order, M.Cr.C. No.2526 of 2015 was registered on 27.03.2015 and appropriate show cause notice was issued to the appellant. In the subsequent proceedings, statement of Mr. Arun Bhalerao, Process Server was recorded who stated that the requisite notice was served on the appellant by him.

14. We are of the considered view that initiation of proceedings in the present case was not consistent with the parameters laid down by this Court. The election petition itself has been dismissed and considering the entirety of the matter, it would not be expedient to initiate proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. read with Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C. We, therefore, accept the appeal and close the proceedings. The appeal stands allowed and the judgment and order under appeal is set aside.
Chennai Port Trust vs The Chennai Port Trust Industrial ...

2. Few relevant facts need to be mentioned hereinbelow to appreciate the question involved in the appeal.

5. The Association-respondent No.1 herein filed a writ petition being W.P. No.6872 of 2001 in the High Court at Madras against the appellant herein (Chennai Port Trust) espousing the cause of their members (employees working in the Canteen) and sought a writ of mandamus against the appellant - Chennai Port Trust (respondent No.3 in the writ petition) directing the appellant to treat the employees working in the Canteen to be the regular employees of the Chennai Port Trust and accordingly pay them all attendant and monetary 3 benefits at par with the regular employees of the Chennai Port Trust.

6. According to the writ petitioner (employees concerned), they have been working in the Canteen for decades and regularly catering and fulfilling the needs of the employees of the Port Trust. According to the Association, the members of the Association - employees working in the canteen are entitled to claim the same benefit and perks which are being given to the regular permanent employees of the Chennai Port Trust. The Association also pointed out the similar instances of other government organizations wherein the benefits of this nature were given to the employees working in the organizations alike the members of the Association in question.

On the basis of the above facts, the Supreme Court arrived at the opinion that the workmen were the workmen of the management and by the same process of reasoning, the learned single Judge also came to the conclusion that the canteen workmen were the workmen of the Port Trust. We see no error in this reasoning.”

9. The appellant (Chennai Port Trust) felt aggrieved and filed intra court appeal before the Division Bench in the High Court. By impugned 5 judgment, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Single Judge, which has given rise to filing of the present appeal by way of special leave by the Chennai Port Trust.

19. We are, therefore, in agreement with the approach, reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the two Courts below.

24. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in the appeal, which fails and is accordingly dismissed.

April 27, 2018 15
A. Dharmalingam (Dead) By Lrs. vs V. Lalithambal And Ors. Etc.

4. The aforesaid suits were contested. By its common judgment and order dated 06.01.1989 the trial court decreed Original Suit No.64 of 1985 holding the appellant to be entitled to one half share in the suit property and accordingly passed a preliminary decree in that behalf. The trial court, however, declined to grant any relief of permanent injunction against the defendants. The defendants being aggrieved, filed Appeal Nos.17 and 18 of 1989 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Periyakulam. These appeals were disposed of by a common judgment dated 31.07.1991. The lower appellate court held that since four sons of Defendant No.1 were not parties to the suit for declaration and partition, insofar as branch of said Defendant No.1 was concerned the sale deed in favour of the appellant would be valid only in respect of share of said Defendant No.1. The lower appellate court held that the appellant would thus be entitled to the share of Defendant No.1 in his branch, namely 1/4 x 1/6 = 1/24 and the share of Defendant No.2. The 4 resultant share that the appellant was entitled to was, however, computed to be 5/24.

7. We, therefore, allow the present appeals only to the aforesaid extent and declare that the appellant is entitled to 7/24 share in the suit property and a preliminary decree in that behalf stands passed in favour of the appellant. 5 Since the matter has been pending in the courts below since 1985, we may also observe that the execution proceedings be expedited. No costs.
Satpal vs State Of Haryana

2. PW­7, Krishan Kumar lodged an F.I.R. on 11.09.2007 with regard to his missing nephew, the deceased Kapil Kumar who was thirteen   years   old.   The   deceased   had   gone   to   the   village   the previous evening at about 6:00 PM to deliver milk to customers. The   witness   and   his   relative   PW­9,   Richhpal   had   seen   the 1 deceased with the appellant at about 9:00 PM on the Khairpur Road, Sarangpur, going on a bicycle together. The deceased did not   return   home   at   night.   His   dead   body   was   found   the   next morning lying concealed in a heap of dry fodder in the fields of Subhash.   The appellant was stated to have had an altercation with the deceased a few days ago with regard to payment of milk. The disclosure by the appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act after his arrest, led to recovery of the atlas bicycle belonging to PW­7, and the milk can with the name of the witness inscribed on it.

10. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, we find no reason to interfere with the conviction of the appellant.

11. The appeal is dismissed.
Tularam vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

2. The appellant Tularam was accused and convicted of having committed the murder of Bhadri Lodhi during an altercation that took place on 9th June, 2002.

3. On that date, a quarrel took place between Ramnath and Raju at about 6 p.m. in the flourmill of Ramnath. The details of this quarrel are not available on record but it appears that subsequently at about 7.30 p.m. after Ramnath closed his flourmill and was returning home, he was accosted by Raju. A quarrel again ensued between the two and in the midst of that quarrel, they were joined by Bipatlal Lodhi, the grandfather Crl. A. No.663 of 2018 (@SLP (Crl.) No.7483 of 2017) page 1 of 6 of Raju who came with a lathi, Santu, the nephew of Ramnath and Bhadri Lodhi, brother of Ramnath. The quarrel escalated into the altercation and these persons were joined by Tularam, uncle of Raju who came with a ballam (this is a wooden or bamboo stick with a spear attached at the end). Another person Sakharam (also an accused but not before us) joined the fray carrying a lathi. During the course of the altercation which turned violent, Tularam pierced Bhadri Lodhi with the ballam on the left side of his chest and he fell down. Bhadri Lodhi was thereafter taken home where he was declared dead.

5. During the trial that took place as a result of the altercation and the death of Bhadri Lodhi, the prosecution examined several eye witnesses including Ramnath (PW1), Maltibai (PW-3), Mahasingh (PW-5), Shanta Bai (PW-7), Singh Singh Gond (PW-8) Jogi Lodhi PW-10) and Hori Lal (PW-11). Each of these witnesses confirmed the altercation and the fact that Tularam had pierced Bhadri Lodhi on the left side of the chest with a ballam. The injuries were confirmed after an autopsy by Dr. S.N. Bhaskar (PW17) and the post mortem report is Exh.P.32. This shows one penetrating wound having a size of 3” x ½” x ¼” on the left 5 th intercostal Crl. A. No.663 of 2018 (@SLP (Crl.) No.7483 of 2017) page 2 of 6 space, medial to left nipple.

14. In view of the evidence on record, we are satisfied that the ingredients of murder as explained in Section 300 of the IPC are missing in this case. The intention of Tularam was to cause bodily injury to Bhadri Lodhi and piercing the chest of Bhadri Lodhi with a spear was such an injury that could possibly cause his death. This knowledge must be attributed to Tularam.

15. Under the circumstances, the conviction of Tularam of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside but he is convicted of an offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC. The appellant has been behind bars for almost 14 years. His sentence is altered to the period of incarceration he has already undergone. He be released forthwith.

16. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Purushottam S/O Tulsiram Badwaik vs Anil .

4. The appellant had also executed a registered Power of Attorney on 28.12.2006 in favour of the partners. In April 2014 the respondents filed Special Civil Suit No.16 of 2014 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bhandara for declaration, damages, accounts and permanent injunction against the appellant. Soon after receipt of the notice, the appellant preferred an application under Section 8 of 1996 Act to refer the dispute to arbitration in view of aforesaid clause 15 in the Partnership Agreement. The matter was contested. The Trial Court rejected said application by its order dated 05.01.2015. It was held that aforesaid clause 15 was vague, that there was no reference as to who should be the arbitrator, that there was no mention about selection of the arbitrator and that the dispute did not form subject matter of agreement within the meaning of Section 8 of 1996 Act.

13. Accordingly, we direct that the Chief Justice of the High Court is to appoint the third arbitrator under Section 11(4)(b) of the New Act in view of the failure of the two appointed arbitrators to appoint the third arbitrator within thirty days from the date of their appointments. Direction given by the Chief Justice of the High Court is substituted to this effect.” 11

19. We therefore set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court and accept the appeal preferred by the appellant. The matter will have to be dealt with by the trial court in terms of Section 8 of 1996 Act. The parties shall appear before the trial court on 14 th May, 2018 for effectuating the arbitration agreement.

20. The appeal stands allowed in aforesaid terms. No costs.
Lok Prahari Through Its General ... vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

2. The case has a somewhat chequered history. Suffice it will be to recapitulate that as former Chief Ministers of the State of Uttar Pradesh continued to occupy their official accommodation even after demitting office, in clear breach of Section 4 of the 1981 Act as it had then existed, a writ petition was filed before the High Court of Allahabad by the present petitioner. During the pendency of the said writ petition, a set of 2 Rules namely “U.P. Ex-Chief Ministers Residence Allotment Rules, 1997” (hereinafter referred to as “the 1997 Rules”) were framed to provide for allotment of government accommodation to former Chief Ministers. The writ petition was accordingly amended to challenge the validity of the provisions of the 1997 Rules. However, the same was closed by the High Court on a statement made on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh that former Chief Ministers would be henceforth allotted only Type V bungalows and that too on payment of rent etc.

(3) A government residence shall be allotted to a former Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, at his/her request, for his/her life time, on payment of such rent as may be determined from time to time by the Estate Department of the State Government.

18. It is, therefore, axiomatic that in a democratic republican government public servants entrusted with duties of public nature must act in a manner that reflects that ultimate authority is vested in the citizens and it is to the citizens that holders of all public offices are eventually accountable. Such a situation would only be possible within a framework of equality 13 and when all privileges, rights and benefits conferred on holders of public office are reasonable, rational and proportionate.

38. Natural resources, public lands and the public goods like government bungalows/official residence are public property that belongs to the people of the country. The ‘Doctrine of Equality’ which emerges from the concepts of justice, fairness must guide the State in the distribution/allocation of the same. The Chief Minister, once he/she demits the office, is at par with the common citizen, though by virtue of the office held, he/she may be entitled to security and other protocols. But allotment of government bungalow, to be occupied during his/her lifetime, would not be guided by the constitutional principle of equality.

40. Consequently, we hold that Section 4(3) of the 1981 Act cannot pass the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and is, therefore, liable to be struck down. We, therefore, hold that the aforesaid Section 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Ministers (Salaries, Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1981 is ultra vires the Constitution of India as it transgresses the 29 equality clause under Article 14. The writ petition in question, therefore, is allowed.
Basanti Devi(D) By Lrs.. vs Rati Ram

3. This suit was dismissed by the Trial Court on 23.12.1929. The appeal filed by the plaintiffs challenging the said decree was allowed by the District Judge, Gurgaon and the decree of the Trial Court was set aside vide judgment and decree dated 21.07.1930. Sheo Lal and Makhan challenged the said decree by filing a second appeal which was allowed by the High Court in part and the case was remanded to the District Judge for fresh disposal. On remand, the parties entered into a compromise and a compromise decree came to be passed. 3

15. Resultantly, the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

May 08, 2018.