L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
C. Cheriathan vs P. Narayanan Embranthiri

3. Respondent herein was owner of the land in question. He took the said land on lease with one Cheriathan jointly from one Gopalan Nair by reason of a deed of conveyance dated 21.12.1967. They made improvements. They constructed buildings thereupon. Half of the said leasehold rights was sought to be conveyed in favour of the appellant by reason of the said deed. Indisputably, the first respondent executed a deed of assignment in favour of the V. Devaki Amma in respect of his half share for a consideration to repurchase the same by a document dated 27.10.1969. She, by a deed of assignment dated 2.3.1976, transferred her right, title and interest being half of the property to the appellant and, thus, according to him, he became the full owner thereof.

19. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.

December 18, 2008
Shiv Ram vs State Of H.P. & Ors

2. About 11.9 bighas of land situated in two villages, Kasumpati-Junga and Patii-Rihana was notified for acquisition under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the "Act") in the official Gazette 2 on 2nd April 1988, 23rd July 1988 and 28th September 1988. The Collector by his Award dated 28th July 1988 granted a sum of Rs.43,330/- per bigha for the acquired land. The claimant thereafter filed a reference before the District Judge, Shimla, who vide his order dated 11th June 1992 determined the market value at Rs.70,000/- per bigha rejecting the claimant's plea for the award of Rs.1,75,000/- per bigha. The matter was taken to the Division Bench of the High Court in First Appeal and the Bench vide its judgment dated 30th December 1999 confirmed the compensation awarded by the District Judge on reference but granted enhanced interest and solatium as per the entitlement of the claimant. The first appeal filed by the State Government seeking a reduction in the compensation granted by the District Judge was, however, dismissed. The present appeal at the instance of the claimant is before us against the judgment and order of the Division Bench aforementioned.

5. These statements of the State's witnesses clearly fortify Mr. Agrawala's submission that the land subject to the two acquisition i.e. in 1980, and 1988 were of the same quality and situation and potential for use and were situated adjacent to each other and belonged to the same villages. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the observations of the Division Bench that no evidence had come on record to justify the payment of compensation at Rs.1.75 lakh per bigha minus 30 per cent are not justified.

owner/appellant before the High Court. We notice that the claimant had sought compensation at Rs.1.30 lakh per bigha and paid court fee on this figure. We are, therefore, of the opinion notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Agrawala is hesitatingly asking for Rs.5,00,000/- per bigha or atleast Rs.1.75 lakh per bigha nothing more than the amount claimed in the first appeal before the High Court is admissible. As already mentioned above, the land acquired by the Notification of 1980, 7 compensation at Rs.1.75 lakh per bigha had been awarded with 30% cut towards development charges etc. In view of the fact that the present acquisition was made some 8 years later and a claim of Rs.1.30 lakh per bigha has been made, we allow this appeal and direct that compensation at Rs.1.30 lakh per bigha shall be payable to the appellant. In addition to the enhanced compensation, the claimant-appellant shall also be entitled to solatium and interest on the enhanced amount. We, further, direct that the entire sum payable to the appellant under this judgment will be defrayed to him within a period of 4 months from the date of the supply of a certified copy of this judgment to the respondent. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
Chetu & Anr vs State Of M.P

2. The deceased Godha was father of Prakash (PW3). The accused Chintu was his uncle.

The prosecution case in brief is that when the complainant Prakash came back to his house from Ashok Nagar, an altercation took place between Godha (the deceased) on the one hand and Chintu, Chetu and Lalu on the other. Chintu was armed with an axe and the appellants herein were armed with lathis. They began to assault Godha. They put him in a room and locked him from outside. The portion of the house in which Prakash and his father were living was set on fire by Chintu as a result whereof the house was burnt. On enquiry from Jot Singh (PW11) and Navela (PW7), Alfo (PW8) wife of Chintu disclosed that he had been put inside the room. 3

3. The First Information was lodged by Prakash on 29.9.1991 before the Assistant Sub-Inspector, Ashok Nagar Police Station. On the basis of the said purported information, the said Shri Mahesh Singh Shukla (PW12) procured the key from the wife of Chintu and recovered the dead body. On completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions.

4. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined 12 witnesses. All material witnesses including the first informant - Prakash turned hostile. His sister Lakshmibai was examined as a defence witness.

15. The approach of the learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court cannot be appreciated. Despite the clear discrepancies in the evidence of so called eye-witnesses which we have noticed hereinbefore, the High Court, in our opinion, committed a serious error in holding that as the defence could not prove its case, the prosecution must be held to have proved its case. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly.

16. The appeal is allowed. Appellants are directed to be set at liberty unless wanted in connection with any other case.

December 18, 2008
Kopargaon S.S.K. Ltd vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

7. The demand was held to be illegal. Following the said decision, the writ petition filed by the appellant was allowed, holding : 3

Concededly, the said orders were not appealed against. They attained finality.

12.11.2003 and that the officer would be recovering the supervision charges as per the order of this Court dated 28.9.2000 as passed in Writ Petition No.4092/2000. In other words, the 8 demand for interest has been withdrawn and consequently the Respondents cannot demand interest from the Petitioners. The only demand can be in respect of the supervision charges, which has been upheld by this Court by the impugned order referred to earlier. Considering that the letter dated 20.5.2003 has been withdrawn, nothing further survives. In so far as to claim any charge with retrospective effect and interest thereon, nothing further survives in this petition. Rule in both the Petitions discharged. There shall be no order as to costs."

18. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned order dated 23.09.2003 and judgment dated 13.11.2003 cannot be sustained which are set aside accordingly. The demand notices impugned in W.P.No.3050 of 2003 are quashed. The appeals are allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.25,000/-.

December 18, 2008.
Lalitaben Jayantilal Popat vs Pragnaben Jamnadas Kataria & Ors

12. A perusal of the Will shows that the said Mavajibhai Virajibhai was made an executor of the Will. The Will, however, has been produced from the custody of Ranjit Singh. How he came in custody of Will has not been explained. The recital that no other Will had been executed appears to have been made as if the executor was not sure thereabout. The Will is supposed to have been executed in presence of both the witnesses. A declaration is made by the testator that he had signed before both the witnesses and only before him both the witnesses had put their signatures.

is an expression in a short form, of a reasonable probability, and of the propriety in point of law on acting on such probability. The maxim expresses an inference which may reasonably be drawn when an intention to do some formal act is established. In Blake v. Knight Sir Herbert Jenner Fusty observed Is it absolutely necessary to have positive affirmative testimony by the subscribed witnesses that the Will was actually signed in their presence, or actually acknowledged in their presence? Is it absolutely necessary, under all circumstances that the witnesses should concur in stating that these acts took place? Or is it absolutely necessary, where the witnesses will not swear positively, that the Court should pronounce against the validity of the will. I think these are not absolute requisites to the validity of the will. Consequently, "where the evidence of attesting witnesses is vague or doubtful or even conflicting the Court may take into consideration the circumstances of the case and judge from them collectively whether the requirements of the Statute were complied with; in other words the Court may, on consideration of other evidence or of the whole circumstances of the case, come to the conclusion that their recollection is at fault, that their evidence is of a suspicious character, or that they were willfully misleading the Court, and accordingly disregard their testimony and pronounce in favour of the will."

The said decision, therefore, is of no assistance to us.

Yet again, recently in Anil Kak v. Kumari Sharada Raje & Ors. [(2008) 6 SCALE 597], it was opined :

17. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.

December 19, 2008
Sharon Michael & Ors vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr

5. The buyer company by an email refused to accept the shipment on the premise that on a random checking too many defects disqualifying the goods to be shipped were found and, thus, the goods being sub-standard, were not acceptable. They asked the company to pick up the goods from their warehouse. Respondent No.2, however, did not make any attempt to re-export the said goods from Germany to India.

On or about 18.3.2005, it filed a complaint petition with the Superintendent of Police, Coimbatore to help it to recover dues from the appellant company.

6. A first information report was lodged by respondent No.2 before the Coimbatore Police Station on or about 4.6.2005, inter alia, requesting the officer in charge of the Police Station to take legal action for the alleged offences committed by the appellants and help it to recover the amount from them. Thereupon Crime No. 32 of 2005 was registered.

13. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The impugned summons issued to the appellants are quashed. 15

December 19, 2008
Aqeel Ahmad vs State Of U.P

So far as accused Chaudhary Aleem and Irfan are concerned it is submitted that they have died during the pendency of the matter before this Court.

2. Background facts leading to the trial of accused persons as projected by the prosecution is as follows:

After the investigation he submitted the charge sheet against the accused persons. Since the accused persons abjured guilt they were put on trial. To establish the accusations prosecution examined 12 witnesses, out of whom PW-1 is the informant and father of the deceased. PWs 2 and 3 were stated to be eye-witnesses. The two deceased persons are Favad and Shahood and as noted above are described as D1 and D2. Placing reliance on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the trial Court found the accused persons guilty. Out of 6 accused persons, accused Shakir absconded and he had not faced trial. The trial Court had found the evidence of eye witnesses clear, cogent and trustworthy and recorded the conviction as noted above. While the accused Aqeel Ahmad was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to death, the other accused persons Irfan, Chaudhary Aleem, Ashiq Ali and Shakir were convicted for offence punishable under 5 Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Each of the accused persons were also convicted under Section 148 IPC and sentenced to two years imprisonment. Before the High Court in the appeals and the Reference for confirmation of sentence, the basic stand of the accused persons was that there was unexplained delay in lodging the FIR. The presence of PW-1 has not been established. There was no evidence that the special report was sent to the Magistrate. Since Shah Alam who was stated to be an injured witness was not examined, the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 cannot be believed. The investigation was tainted. Appropriate questions were not put under Section 313 of the Code. There was no evidence to show that death was on account of appellants' firing and in any event the ingredients of Section 302 are not made out and at the most even if the prosecution version is accepted in its totality, the offence would be under Section 304 Part I IPC.

The High Court did not find any substance in these pleas. The appeals were dismissed but the death sentence was altered to life sentence in case of accused Aqueel Ahmad, as noted above.

15. Therefore, the appeals filed by the accused persons are without merit, deserve dismissal which we direct.

16. So far State's appeal as regards sentence is concerned, it is to be noted that number of deaths in a case would not be the determinative factor for awarding the death sentence. Even in the case of single victim death sentence can be awarded taking into consideration the circumstances of the case. In the instant case looking to the background facts it cannot be said that the High Court by altering the sentence from death to life has acted inappropriately. We, therefore, dismiss the State's appeal also. All the appeals are dismissed.
Harendra Nath Chakraborty vs State Of West Bengal

4. The State of West Bengal apart from the aforementioned 1968 Order made West Bengal Declaration of Stocks and Prices of Essential Commodities Order, 1977 (for short, "the 1977 Order")

7. Manik Lal Das, a Sub-Inspector of Police conducted a raid in the shop of the appellant on 28.1.1991. Several irregularities were found. A first information report was lodged inter alia alleging:

9. Two independent witnesses, namely, (i) Ashok Kumar Mullick (P.W.1) and (ii) Sk. Kashem (P.W.2) who were examined before the Court and proved the seizure of articles during the said raid, were declared hostile. Ravindra Nath Mondal (P.W.6), Investigating Officer, however, examined himself.

All the documents as also the material objects which were seized were duly approved.

On point No. 1, it was held that the stock of kerosene was not displayed on the display board. Thus, the condition No. 6 of the licence issued to him under the 1968 Order was found to have been violated. The learned Judge held:

We may notice the question Nos. 6, 7 and 8 in this behalf: 13

19. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case and the nature of allegations made against appellant, we are of the opinion that no failure of justice has occasioned nor the trial was in any way unfair.

26. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed. Appellant shall surrender before the learned Special Judge for serving out the remaining sentence.

December 19, 2008
Premkumar & Ors vs State Of Kerala

The Inspector of Police, Courtallam submitted a report before the Sub- collector and Revenue Divisional Officer stating that Jeeja committed suicide on account of her mental illness. The investigation pursuant to the report under Section 174, Cr.P.C. was stopped stating :

17. In a case of this nature and following the aforementioned decisions and particularly in view of the fact that the police at Courtallam, Tamil Nadu had already been informed, although stricto sensu, the same cannot be construed to be an FIR within the meaning of provisions of Section 154, 14 Cr.P.C., and, thus, F.I.R. lodged at Kadakkavoor Police Station was maintainable, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if the investigation and consequent trial is transferred to Police Officer in charge of Courtallam Police Station, Tamil Nadu. All the materials collected by Kadakkavoor Police Station, Kerala shall be transferred to the officer incharge of Courtallam Police Station, Tamil Nadu. The officer incharge of Kadakkavoor Police Station, Kerala, must ensure that in the event a charge-sheet is filed and cognizance of offence under Section 304B, IPC is taken, witnesses who are available within his jurisdiction shall be produced.

We have passed this unusual order keeping in view the specific defence raised by the appellants that the deceased had been suffering from some mental illness. However, with a view that a fair investigation is carried out we would direct that the Superintendent of Police of the concerned district at Tamil Nadu shall himself make an investigation and/or cause the same to be made by a highly responsible officer.

18. The appeal stands allowed to the aforementioned extent accordingly.

December 19, 2008.
Ramdeo Kahar & Ors vs State Of Bihar

The learned Sessions Judge relying upon the evidences of P.W.1 - Inderdeo Yadav, P.W.2 - Ramjee Yadav, P.W. 3 - Lakhan Yadav, P.W. 4 - Dwarika Yadav, P.W. 5 - Ramadhin Yadav, P.W. 8 - Sanjib Yadav (informant) as also the evidences of the injured witnesses P.W. 6 - Anil Yadav and P.W. 7 - Ragho Yadav; held that the prosecution had proved its case.

4. The learned Sessions Judge, however, while recording a judgment of conviction against the appellants herein acquitted the other eight accused persons, stating:

5. It has, however, been brought on record that a First Information Report (for short, "FIR") was also lodged by Accused No. 5 against the prosecution witnesses under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, "the I.P.C.") for causing injury to him and Nagina Paswan. What has happened to the said case, however, is not known.

13. Indisputably, thereafter all the accused fled away together and while doing so they made indiscriminate firing from their weapons. The injured witnesses P.W. 6 and P.W.7 described the entire occurrence in great details. We need not refer to their evidences as veracity thereof is not seriously in question.

We, therefore, agree with the findings of the courts below that death of Mauji Yadav and the injuries suffered by the P.W.6 and P.W. 7 took place in the manner stated by the prosecution.

23. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court. The appeals are dismissed.

December 19, 2008
Punjab National Bank & Anr vs O.N.Sharma & Ors

The only question which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the respondent was entitled to a personal hearing at the appellate stage when he had filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority against the order of the Disciplinary Authority, by which he had been awarded punishment of withdrawal of special pay as Special Assistant for 2 years under Clause 6(g) of the Bipartite Settlement arrived at between the management and the workmen. Mr. Mehta, appearing in support of the appeal, has drawn our attention to the procedure for taking disciplinary action, as was indicated in the Bipartite Settlement and has laid special emphasis on paragraph 14 of the same which indicates that at the appellate stage, if an employee, who has been dismissed from service, asks for personal hearing, such prayer could be granted by the Appellate Authority. In other cases, no such provision has been made.

We, accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration with leave to the respondent to raise the other questions taken in the writ petition, which do not appear to have been gone into by the High Court, since the submissions before the High Court were confined only to the question as to whether the respondent was entitled to a personal hearing before the Appellate Authority. -4-

The Civil Appeal is allowed in the above terms.

There will be no order as to costs.
Admn.Officer,Munic.School ... vs K.T.K.K.S.& S.Mandal & Ors

2. The appellant is the Municipal School Board, Kagal, ('the Board', for short). Sant Rohidas Vidyamandir, the fourth respondent, is one of the schools run by the Board. The said school, which was running classes from first to fourth standards, started fifth standard classes (Standard V Division) from the session 2007-2008. The first respondent, which runs a secondary school (V Standard to X Standard) in the Zila Parishad area adjoining the municipal area, filed W.P. No.8261/2007 seeking a direction to the State of Maharashtra, the appellant and the Deputy Director of Education, Kolhapur Region to close down the V Standard started in the fourth respondent school and a further direction not to grant any recognition or permission to the fourth respondent school to start Standard V Division. They also sought an interim direction restraining the fourth .......2.

3. In the said writ petition, the High Court, while issuing rule on 8.4.2008 issued an interim direction to the fourth respondent to close down the V Standard and transfer the students of V Standard to other schools as per the desire of the students and their guardians, and issue school leaving certificates to the students to enable them to get admissions in other authorised schools. The Deputy Director of Education and the petitioner were also directed by way of interim order to ensure that the V Standard classes opened by the fourth respondent was closed down and the students were transferred to other schools. The said interim order is challenged by the appellant Board which runs the fourth respondent school.

4. We find that the High Court has virtually allowed the writ petition by the interim order, that too by an irreversible peremptory direction that the students be shifted to other schools. The students were not parties before the High Court and they have been asked to take school leaving certificates from the fourth respondent school and shift to other schools. Such a peremptory irreversible step should not normally have been granted by way of interim relief, unless ......3.

extraordinary or special circumstances exist. We find that there are no such special circumstances.

8. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the interim order. The fourth respondent school run by the appellant can, therefore, have V, VI and VII Standards, subject to the final decision in the writ petition. We are told that the issue as to whether Standards V to VII can be part of primary ......5.

schools, is causing considerable confusion in the State. In view of it, we request the High Court to dispose of the Writ Petition expeditiously.