L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Rahul Jain vs Rave Scans Pvt. Ltd.

1. The resolution applicant (hereafter “the appellant”) is aggrieved by the decision of the National Company Law Appellate Board (hereafter “NCLAT”) in regard to its directions modifying a resolution plan accepted by the adjudicating authority (i.e. National Company Law Tribunal, hereafter “NCLT” or “the adjudicating authority”). The Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was initiated against M/s. Rave Scans Private Limited (hereafter the “Corporate Debtor”) 2 under Section 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("IBC" or “the Code” for short). The revised resolution plan submitted by the appellant was approved by the NCLT on 17th October, 2018. The second respondent, M/s Hero Fincorp Ltd. (hereafter the “Financial Creditor” or “Hero”) appealed against the NCLT’s order on grounds of discrimination between financial creditors, which resulted in the NCLAT modifying the NCLT’s final order. The question urged by the appellant is whether the finding that the financial creditor was discriminated against, leading the NCLAT to modify the adjudicating authority’s directions, and consequently imposing greater financial burdens on the resolution applicant, is justified in the circumstances.

2. The facts of the case are as follows. The CIRP was initiated on 25th January, 2017 against the Corporate Debtor under Section 10 of the IBC. The appellant was the resolution applicant of the Corporate Debtor, whose liquidation value was ascertained as ₹36 crores. Against the said amount, the appellant offered ₹54 crores to revive the Corporate Debtor in terms of the resolution plan. The resolution plan was then revised and the revised resolution plan submitted by the appellant was approved by the adjudicating authority, i.e., the Principal Bench of the NCLT. This resolution plan was challenged before the NCLAT by the second respondent in the present appeal, Hero Fincorp Ltd. as being discriminatory. Discrimination was alleged on the ground that the secured 3 financial creditors were provided with a higher percentage of their claim amounts; however, Hero had been allowed a lesser percentage of its admitted claim. Hero, who had dissented with the resolution plan, had been provided with 32.34% of its admitted claim, whereas other financial creditors had been provided with 45% of their admitted claims. The remarks column in the resolution plan showed that the plan was based on ‘Maintained liquidation value (LV) under Regulation 38 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. The reference herein was to the unamended Regulation 38, pertaining to the mandatory contents of a resolution plan.

14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order on costs.
Union Of India vs Pradeep Vinod Construction Co.

2. Brief facts which led to filing of these appeals are as under:-

3. The appellant issued a reply dated 25.07.2014 rejecting the arbitration claim of the respondent, taking the stand that the respondent had signed the final bill and also signed the supplementary agreement which clearly stipulates that it was agreed between the parties that the respondent has accepted the said sums mentioned therein in full and final satisfaction of all dues and claims under the principal agreement.

17. In the result, the impugned judgments dated 15.05.2015 and 02.02.2015 of the High Court of Delhi in Arbitration Petition No.168 of 2015 and Arbitration Petition No.531 of 2014 are set aside and these appeals are allowed. The appellant is directed to appoint the arbitrator in terms of Clause 64(3) of the agreement within a period 14 of one month from today under intimation to the respondent(s)- contractors. As soon as the communication of the appointment of arbitrator is made to the respondent(s), the statement of claim be filed by the respondent(s) within six weeks thereafter and the reply of the appellant to be filed within four weeks thereafter. The arbitrator shall proceed with the matter in accordance with law and decide the claim after affording sufficient opportunity of hearing to both parties expeditiously preferably within a period of four months.

November 14, 2019 15
Rathnamma vs Sujathamma

2. The following Genealogical Tree would be necessary to appreciate the dispute between the parties:-

3. Defendant No. 1 Sonnappa died during the pendency of the suit leaving behind two sons - Venkatarayappa and predeceased son - Hanumanthappa and three daughters - Sonnamma, Kenchamma and Lakshmamma. Sonnamma, Kenchamma and Lakshmamma have been brought on record as legal heirs of defendant No. 1. The plaintiff - Sujathamma, maternal grand-daughter of Sonnappa, claims to have married Hanumanthappa on 7th March, 1986. Hanumanthappa died on 15th October, 1986. The claim of the plaintiff is that she is entitled to the share of the estate of Sonnappa, as wife of deceased Hanumanthappa. It is the said 2 assertion which was accepted by the First Appellate Court and maintained by the High Court.

4. The plaintiff filed the civil suit with the assertion that the parties are related to each other as members of joint Hindu Undivided Family. The plaintiff asserted that the first defendant i.e. Sonnappa is her fathter-in-law. Since the property is said to be ancestral property and that property stands in the name of the first defendant Sonnappa, therefore, plaintiff claims that she is entitled to the share of Hanumanthappa as his wife.

6. The parties went to trial with one of the issues being whether the plaintiff is wife of late Hanumanthappa. To prove the said issue, the plaintiff examined herself as PW-1. PW-2 is the father of the plaintiff whereas PW-3 to PW-5 are the witnesses of an agreement to marriage dated 7th March, 1986, who were examined to prove plaintiff’s marriage with Hanumanthappa. PW-6 was examined to prove the age of the deceased Hanumanthappa. PW-7 to PW-9 are the daughters of deceased defendant No. 1. As per the birth certificate (Ex.P/30), the date of birth of Hanumanthappa is 20 th June, 1966, that makes him 19 years 9 months at the time of his marriage. On the other hand, the plaintiff in her statement stated her age as 15 years at the time of marriage. However, the defendants have produced Ex.D/3, Register of Admission of the School, by confronting PW-6, Headmaster of the School. As per Ex.D/3, the plaintiff was born on 5 th June, 1975. As per the plaintiff, an agreement of marriage was registered on 7 th March, 1986. The witnesses examined by the plaintiff have deposed that the 4 marriage was registered on the said date.

19. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed while restoring the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court.

NOVEMBER 15, 2019.
Santosh Chaturvedi vs Kailash Chandra

3. The appellant claiming to be aggrieved by the same had filed the appeal in P.A. Appeal No.1/2002 before the Appellate Authority, namely, the Special Judge, Mathura. The learned Appellate Judge on reappreciating the entire Page 2 of 20 aspect of the matter had arrived at the conclusion that the appellant herein had lawfully become the owner of the property and in that circumstance considering the predecessor of the respondents herein to be the tenant under the appellant had further examined the matter with regard to the bonafide requirement. Accordingly, the learned Appellate Judge had arrived at the conclusion that the case for release of the property is made out and had accordingly allowed the appeal. While so considering the matter, the learned Appellate Judge had also taken into consideration that an alternative shop bearing No.83/9­C situated at Chhatta Bazar, Mathura measuring 2.5 ft. x 26 ft. standing in the name of the father of the appellant which was vacant be allotted in favour of the respondents so as to mitigate the hardship, if any. In that view, the respondents were directed to vacate the premises in question by taking possession of the said alternative shop No.83/9­C within one month.

Page 17 of 20

18. In that view, for all the reasons stated above we are of the opinion that the Prescribed Authority as well as the learned Single Judge of the High Court were not justified in their conclusion. Accordingly, the judgment dated 03.08.2001 passed in Petition No. 6/2000 and the judgment dated 28.11.2007 passed in C.M.W.P. No.54204/2007 are set aside. Consequently, the judgment dated 09.10.2007 passed in P.A. Appeal No.1/2002 is restored. The respondents are granted three months’ time to vacate and handover the vacant possession of the petition subject premises bearing No.83/72­A situate in Tiwari Gali, Chhatta Bazar, Mathura to the appellant subject to an undertaking being filed before this Court within a period of three weeks. It is made clear that if such undertaking is not filed the benefit of the time granted to vacate will not be available to the respondents. Further, Page 19 of 20 the release of the premises in question shall be made irrespective of opting for the alternate premises as ordered by the Appellate Court.

19. The appeal is allowed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. All pending applications shall stand disposed of.
M/S T.C.Healthcare P. Ltd. vs Union Of India

2. The facts necessary for deciding this appeal are that the appellants, i.e. TC Healthcare and Modi Mundipharma Pvt. Ltd. (hereafter “TCH” and “Modi” respectively and “the appellants” collectively), at the relevant time, manufactured drugs. By reason of a notification dated 2nd March, 1995, the appellants were exempted from the regime of price fixation, under the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1995 (hereafter “DPCO”) as they were small scale units. Para 8 of the DPCO prescribed that if the Central Government were to fix the price of any bulk drug under Para 3, and such bulk drug is used by a manufacturer to prepare a formulation, the manufacturer must apply under Form III for price revision of such formulation, upon which the Central Government may fix or revise the price of the formulation.

3. TCH, at the relevant time, was manufacturing several drug formulations. It was registered as a small­scale unit (SSU) and therefore, exempt, by reason of Para 8 of the DPCO, from the 3 drug price control regime. Likewise, Modi too was, at the relevant time, exempt, as an SSU, from drug price control. TCH produces and distributes several formulations, including Diucontin K (20mg and 40mg) prepared from the bulk drug Frusemide. Modi on the other hand, manufactures Unicontin (400 mg and 600 mg) derived from the bulk drug Theophylline. For this formulation, (i.e in the 400 mg and 600 mg tablets) drug ceiling prices were fixed by a notification dated 11 th July, 2006. Initially, Modi filed an injunction suit; however, that was dismissed for non­prosecution. Upon receiving demand notices, it sought for quashing of the said notification (dated 11 th July, 2006) and the consequent notifications/ demands, in writ proceedings before the Allahabad High Court. Similarly, TCH’s writ petition challenged the notification dated 30 th April, 2009, whereby the ceiling price of formulations containing Frusemide and Potassium were fixed; it also questioned the consequent demands by the Central Government.

5. In the impugned judgment, the High Court negatived the challenge to the notifications on the ground that they were ultra vires Para 7 of the DPCO, observing that the material brought on record by the Central Government and other respondents revealed that a set of questionnaires were designed by the Cost Audit Branch of the Ministry of Finance to elicit information for various costs for CC, PC and PL norms, which were sent to 470 pharmaceutical producers across the country, covering a diverse 5 range of products. Further, a press release was issued and published in newspapers, informing the manufacturers about the move to revise the norms, and further seeking data and information. Such data and information was furnished by pharmaceutical manufacturers and companies, and was considered. The norms were notified on 13 th August, 2008. In that, the conversion cost, packing charges, process loss of raw materials and other norms were fixed.

**************

13. In view of the above analysis, these appeals have to fail. They are accordingly dismissed, without order on costs.
Central Bureau Of Investigation vs Ramendu Chattopadhyay

3. In compliance with the order dated 09.05.2014 passed by this Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 401 of 2013 in Subrata Chattoraj v. Union of India, the CBI registered an FIR vide Case No. RC­10(S)/2014­ CBI/SCB/Kol, dated 04.06.2014, against one Tower Infotech Ltd. (“the accused company”), and several persons in connection with the affairs of the company, including the Respondent Ramendu Chattopadhyay, the Chief Managing Director of the accused company, treating Baliapal PS (Dist. Balasore, Orissa) Case No. 85/2013 dated 15.05.2013 as the base FIR. The case of the CBI revolves around the allegation that all the accused conspired amongst themselves to run collective investment schemes in the name of the accused company; and by inducing the public to invest under these schemes with the allure of high returns, collected funds amounting to Rs. 255,91,00,541/­, but did not repay the amount to the tune of Rs. 15,69,35,003/­, thereby cheating the investors of such amount. During the course of investigation, it was prima facie established that the Respondent, the accused company, and one Ashis 3 Chatterjee, a director in several companies under the Tower Group, were liable to be chargesheeted. Though material was also found against another director of the accused company, Ranjit Mullick, no further action was taken since he had expired by then. In pursuance of the above findings, a chargesheet was filed against the Respondent, and against Ashis Chatterjee and the accused company, under Section 120B read with Sections 420 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code (“the IPC”), and Sections 4 and 6 of the Prizes and Chit Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978. Further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was kept open. The Respondent was arrested on 10.03.2016, before being released on bail by the impugned order. During the interregnum also, he was released on bail several times.

11. Consequently, the impugned order granting interim bail to the Respondent stands set aside. His bail bonds are cancelled.

12. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2019 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 462 OF 2019) Leave granted.

3. Since the facts emerging in this appeal are the same as in the criminal appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 120 of 2019, they have not been referred to again for the sake of brevity.

5. Having regard to the material on record and since large amounts of money belonging to innocent investors have been siphoned off, as well as for the aforesaid reasons, the High Court, in our considered opinion, should not have released the Respondent on bail.

6. Consequently, the impugned order granting interim bail to the Respondent stands set aside. His bail bonds are cancelled.

7. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

November 19, 2019
Baidyanath Yadav vs Aditya Narayan Roy

3. Digitally signed by ASHWANI KUMAR Date: 2019.11.19 The brief facts giving rise to these appeals are as follows:

10.2 We find ourselves unable to agree with the above conclusion of the High Court. As per the letter dated 30.05.2013 from the GAD to the Department of Agriculture, the previous year’s recommendation of Respondent No. 1’s name by the latter department had in fact been returned by the GAD for not being in consonance with the expected norms of recommendation. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that it is unclear which notings the High Court relied on to conclude that Respondent No. 1 had not been recommended because of his earlier recommendation, it is evident that the High Court erred in observing that Respondent No. 1’s recommendation from the previous year had simply remained in limbo, and that his non­recommendation the next year was therefore suspect. Thus, we are of the view that there is no hint of arbitrariness, mala fide or bias in the recommendation of two other officers, including the Appellant, by the Department of Agriculture in 2014.

12. The decision of the High Court is therefore set aside, and the instant appeals are allowed.

November 19, 2019.
Kamlesh vs Shriram General Insurance Company Ltd

2) In respect of an accident which had occurred in the night intervening 1st/2nd June, 2009 in which a truck owned by the appellant was damaged in fire, a claim was raised by the appellant. The claim was however, repudiated by the respondent-insurance company vide letter dated 9.9.2009 on the basis of a report of a Surveyor/Investigator that the fire was not natural.

3) In the circumstances, Consumer Complaint No.81/2010 was filed by the appellant before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Digitally signed by Commission (“State Commission” for short), Lucknow, U.P. alleging INDU MARWAH Date: 2019.11.19 18:30:17 IST Reason: deficiency on part of the respondent. The principal prayer made in the complaint was:

The investigator also categorically concluded in his report based upon various facts, statements and circumstances that the said incident of accident and fire is doubtful.”

5) The matter was considered by the State Commission and by its order dated 11.8.2015. The State Commission rejected the case set up by the respondent that there was no natural fire and the vehicle was set afire. It was, therefore concluded as under:

and that the National Commission ought not to have reduced the claim amount.

The second limb contemplates issuance of immediate notice to the police only in cases of theft or criminal act. In the event of an occurrence of any accidental loss or damage, the condition does not contemplate issuance of any notice to the police.

13) We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the view taken by the National Commission and restore the order dated 11.08.2015 passed by the State Commission.

14) The appeal is thus allowed without any order as to costs.
Chaitu Lal vs State Of Uttarakhand

2. The brief facts according to the prosecution are that the complainant­victim is the aunt of the accused­appellant. The accused­appellant had earlier also committed indecent behavior with the complainant­victim, which is the subject matter of another criminal proceeding. On 12.01.1991, the accused­ appellant after seeing the complainant­victim alone took advantage of the same and attempted to molest her. On the same date at around 10:00 P.M while the complainant­victim along with her daughters was sleeping in her house, the accused­appellant entered into the house of the victim in a drunken state. While the complainant­victim was getting up from her bed, the accused­appellant pounced upon her making her fall into the bed. The accused­appellant thereafter lifted her petticoat, sat upon her and attempted to commit rape. Upon hearing the noise, the daughter of the complainant­victim (P.W.2) got up and beseeched the accused­appellant to let go of her mother. Upon hearing the commotion, certain other villagers 2 interfered, accused­appellant ran away after threatening the complainant­victim. Thereafter, the complainant­victim narrated the entire incident to her husband, pursuant to which they approached the Court of the CJM to file the complaint on 16.01.1991.

12. Further, the plea of the accused­appellant regarding the delay in registering the FIR has been duly considered by both the courts below. It has been duly noted that the husband of the complainant­victim (P.W.3) was staying in Nandprayag while the incident occurred in the remote village of Salna. Subsequent to the incident, the complainant­victim first travelled to meet her husband (P.W.3). After narrating the said incident to him, she further travelled to register a complaint before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamoli, which is again far off from the place of occurrence. Considering the aforesaid factual scenario, the delay in registering the FIR does not affect the case of the prosecution adversely.

13. Considering the facts and circumstances, the guilt of the accused­appellant has been established beyond doubt. In our opinion, therefore, the courts below have rightly convicted and 8 sentenced the accused. In view of the aforesaid observations, the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.

November 20, 2019 9
Union Of India vs Ankit Ashok Jalan

3. The facts of the case in nutshell are as follows:

The detention orders were served on both the detenus on 4 02.07.2019. The detenus have been served with the relied upon documents with the list of documents on 04.07.2019. 3.3 That the detenus filed their representations dated 07.07.2019, under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India read with Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, addressed to the Detaining Authority against the impugned detention orders, through the jail authorities.

5.11 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal and quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the detention orders.

(3) If the detenu has moved for bail then the application and the order thereon refusing bail even if not placed before the detaining authority it does not amount to suppression of relevant material. The question of non­ application of mind and satisfaction being impaired does not arise as long as the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in actual custody.

11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside the detention orders and interfering with the subjective 33 satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. Consequently, the appeal preferred by the Detaining Authority, i.e., Civil Appeal arising from Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7010 of 2019 is allowed, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the detention orders is hereby quashed and set aside and the detention orders of the respective detenus are hereby restored. The detenus, i.e., Ashok Kumar Jalan and Amit Jalan shall be taken into custody forthwith by the Detaining Authority. Accordingly, the special leave petition preferred by the respondent, i.e., Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7013/2019 stands dismissed.

Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 204, 206 & 209/2019 As stated above, Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 204/2019, 206/2019 and 209/2019 have been preferred by the respective writ petitioners under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for an appropriate writ, direction or order declaring that the disjunctive ‘or’ in Section 13 of the COFEPOSA Act shall be read as ‘and’ so that only those actions which are actually done in good faith would be protected under the said Section, to enable the respective petitioners to take such further action against the Detaining Authority, as may be permissible in law. But in 34 support of the prayer(s) made in the writ petitions, during the course of hearing, no such submissions were advanced by the learned counsel for the respective petitioners.

Even otherwise, in view of our judgment rendered in Criminal Appeal arising from Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7010/2019, we find no merits in the present writ petitions and they are accordingly dismissed.