L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Markand C. Gandhi vs Rohini M. Dandekar

By the impugned order, B.C.I. recorded a finding that the appellant had committed professional misconduct and suspended him from practising as an advocate before any court or authority in India for a period of five years. While concluding the disciplinary proceeding cost of Rupees five thousand has been awarded against the appellant. It was directed that, in case the cost awarded is not paid within a period of one month, the period of suspension shall be extended for a further period of six months.

The sole respondent filed a complaint in the year 1984 before the Bar Council of Maharashtra [for short, "the State Bar Council"] for taking disciplinary action against the appellant as, according to the complainant, appellant had committed professional misconduct. As the -2- complaint could not be disposed of within the period of one year, as required under law, the same was transferred to the B.C.I. In view of the nature of the order that we propose to pass, it is not necessary to state respective cases of the parties. Suffice it to say that, on the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the Disciplinary Committee of the B.C.I.:

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order rendered by the Disciplinary Committee of the B.C.I. is set aside and the matter is remitted, for fresh consideration and decision on merits in accordance with law. Chairman of the B.C.I. will see that this case is not heard by the Disciplinary Committee which had disposed of the complaint by the impugned order and an altogether different Committee shall be constituted for dealing with this case.

We hope and trust that in future the Chairman or any other person empowered to constitute Disciplinary Committee shall act in such a manner so that the committee is manned by persons who can decide the matter with proficiency.

It is unfortunate that, though the complaint was filed before the State Bar Council in the year 1984 and transferred to the B.C.I. and numbered as Case No.107 of 1986, the matter remained pending before it for twenty two years. The Chairman of the B.C.I. would see that, in future, complaints are disposed of with reasonable despatch and not in this leisurely fashion so that people may repose confidence in the B.C.I., which is a statutory and autonomous body. The Committee shall be constituted within one month from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order and, thereupon, the re-constituted Committee shall dispose of the matter after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties in accordance with law within a period of six months from the date of its constitution.

......................J. [B.N. AGRAWAL] .....................J. [G.S. SINGHVI] New Delhi, July 17, 2008.
Central Bank Of India vs M/S. Maruti Acetylene Co. Pvt. Ltd

The respondent herein took advance from the appellant-Bank. On its failure to pay back the amount, a proceeding was initiated before the Debt Recovery Tribunal at Chennai. It was later on transferred to Coimbatore. A proposal was mooted between the parties as to whether they should enter into a One Time Settlement in terms of the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India; wherefor an application was filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, praying inter alia:

The said application was dismissed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal opining that the offer made by the respondent was on the lower side. An appeal was preferred thereagainst before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal by reason of its order dated 9th October, 2007 directed:

Pursuant thereto and in furtherance thereof the said sum of Rs. 25 lakh was deposited. The matter came up before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal again on 29.11.2007 on which date the following order was passed:

It is now accepted at the Bar that the respondent did not agree to the aforementioned proposal of the High Court that the One Time Settlement should be confined to Rs.1 crore. When the matter came up before the High Court again on 13.6.2008, by reason of the impugned judgment the appellant-Bank was directed to refund the entire amount of Rs.1 crore with interest at the same rate to which the respondent was liable to pay i.e. the contractual rate of interest, in favour of the respondent within 7 days. The appellant is, thus, before us.

Be that as it may, having regard to the fact that the Appellate Tribunal in its order directed adjustment of the aforementioned amount of Rs. 25 lakhs, which in view of the dismissal of the civil revision application has attained finality, in our opinion, at this interlocutory stage the High Court was not correct in issuing a direction in that behalf.

So far as the rest of the amount of Rs. 75 lakhs is concerned, it stands accepted that the amount was deposited in a no-lien account. 6

The High Court, therefore, should have directed refund of the said amount with interest only accruing thereupon having regard to the fact that the same was deposited in a no-lien account. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, was not correct in directing that the interest payable on the sum of Rs. 75 lakhs would be the contractual rate.

We, therefore, set aside only that part of the impugned order by which the Bank was directed to refund the entire amount with the contractual rate of interest. The High Court while hearing the matter shall consider the same on its own merit.

The appeals are allowed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.

..........................J (S.B. SINHA) ..........................J (CYRIAC JOSEPH) NEW DELHI, JULY 17, 2008.
Manjit Prakash & Ors vs Shobha Devi & Anr

2. Appellants challenge the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court cancelling the bail 1 granted to them by order dated 7.9.2006 in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 10719 of 2006. The application for cancellation of bail was filed by the respondent No.1. Appellants 1, 2 & 3 are arrayed as accused Nos. 1, 2 & 4. Five persons were granted bail by order dated 7.9.2006 in Criminal Misc. Case No. 10719 of 2006. By the impugned order the learned Single Judge directed cancellation of bail granted to the present appellants while holding that the two others being ladies there was no need to cancel the bail granted to them.

4. The appellants and the other two in respect of whom the High Court has not interfered, were granted provisional bail by order dated 3.5.2006 which came to be confirmed on 7.9.2006. It was stated that the husband and wife have been residing together in the matrimonial home. Earlier there was a suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed by appellant No. 2 who withdrew the same after the provisional bail was confirmed and instituted Matrimonial case No. 34 of 2006 for divorce. According to the complaint on 10.10.2006, there was an incident and therefore the bail was to be cancelled. The High Court, as rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellants, has not indicated the reasons for directing cancellation of bail.

14. Since the High Court has not indicated any reasons for directing cancellation of bail, the impugned order cannot be maintained and is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court to decide the matter afresh and dispose of the application filed. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

14.The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
State Of Karnataka vs Bantara Sudhakara @ Sudha & Anr

2. Background facts as projected by prosecution in a nutshell are as follows:

9-1989 and presented a written complaint Ex-P-l signed by P.W.1 which was received by P.W.26 at 6.45 p.m. On that day, PW 26 registered a case in Madikeri Rural Police Station in Cr, 3 No.233/89 and submitted FIR as per Ex-P.33. On the next day he sent them for medical examination to the District Hospital, Madikeri. PWs. 1 & 2 also produced clothes which they were wearing at the time of incident which were seized. P.W.26 went to the scene of occurrence which is the house of A-2 where the alleged rape was committed on PWs. 1 & 2, He drew up mahazar Ex-P4 in the house of PW2 in the presence of panchas and seized broken bangles MOs. 8 & 9, He also drew mahazar in the shop of A-2 as per Ex-P3 and seized the clothes given for stitching by PWs. 1 & 2. On 23-9-1989 A-1 was arrested. PW-26 recorded the statement of A-1 who led them to his house where he drew a mahazar as per Ex-P.33. Thereafter, further investigation was taken up by P.W.24, the Circle Inspector of Police. On 13-11-1989 A-2 appeared before him with order of anticipatory bail. His statement was recorded after arresting him. He also produced clothes that he was wearing at the time of incident from his house which were seized as per Ex-P.29. Both A-1 & A-2 were subjected to medical examination, Dr. G. Marulasiddappa (P.W 25) issued certificate of A-1 as per Ex-P.27 and Dr. Suryakumar (PW-3) 4 issued certificate of A-2 as per Ex P.6. After receipt of the FSL report, he filed a charge sheet. Thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, as the offence alleged against these accused persons is in respect of offence punishable under Section 376 exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. On receipt of this committal order, the Court of Sessions, Kodagu District, registered a case (S.C. No.45/90) and framed charges against the accused for the offence punishable under Sec. 376 IPC, and both the appellants denied the charges and claimed to be tried. To substantiate the case of the prosecution, it examined 27 witnesses and got marked Exs-P1 to P.34 and also MOs. 1 to 24.

8. Above being the position, judgment of the High Court is clearly unsustainable and set aside. The judgment of the trial Court is restored. The respondents shall surrender to custody to suffer remainder of sentence, if any.

9. Appeal is allowed.
Commissioner Of Income Tax,Delhi-Vi vs M/S Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd

2. In all these appeals, identical questions are involved. The assessee in each case is an insurance company and is covered by the Insurance Act, 1983 (in short the `Insurance Act'). According to the appellant every insurance company has to be assessed under Section 44 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short the `Act') as per Rule 5 of the First Schedule. An assessment was made in each case and the same was upheld by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (in short the `Tribunal') deleted the addition made. The Tribunal accepted the stand of the respondent- insurance company. Certain other connected cases were also dealt with. In all these appeals the question is whether the Department would prefer appeals and/or file petitions without obtaining clearance from the Committee of Disputes (in short `COD') constituted in terms of order of this Court. According to the High Court it was necessary to refer the matter to the said Committee. The High Court held that the same was to be done within a period of one month in terms of the order of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Collector of Central Excise (2004 (6) SCC 437). Accordingly the appeals 2 were dismissed.

8. Wherever appeals, petitions, etc. are filed without the clearance of the High-Powered Committee so as to save limitation, the appellant or the petitioner, as the case may be, shall within a month from such filing, refer the matter to the High-Powered Committee, with prior notice to the designated authority in the Cabinet Secretariat of the Government of India authorised to receive notices in that behalf. Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Additional Solicitor 4 General stated that in order to coordinate these references of the High-Powered Committee the Government proposes to nominate the Under-Secretary (Coordination) in the Cabinet Secretariat as the nodal authority to coordinate these references. The reference shall be deemed to have been made and become effective only after a notice of the reference is lodged with the said nodal authority. The reference shall be deemed to be valid if made in the case of the Union of India by its Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, and in the case of public sector undertakings by its Chairman, Managing Director or Chief Executive, as the case may be. It is only after such reference to the High-Powered Committee is made in the manner indicated that the operation of the order or proceedings under challenge shall be suspended till the High-Powered Committee resolves the dispute or gives clearance to the litigation. If the High-Powered Committee is unable to resolve the matter for reasons to be recorded by it, it shall grant clearance for the litigation."

13. The appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent. There will be no order as to costs.

...................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ..................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, July 18, 2008 9
Govt. Of A.P vs G. Venkata Ratnam

The respondent is a Technical Assistant in the Department of Archaeology and Museums, Government of Andhra Pradesh. He was posted in the Office of Director, Archaeology and Museums, Hyderabad, where he was able to stay, since his appointment in the year 1985, uninterruptedly for a period of 20 years. He was transferred from Hyderabad and posted in the Office of the Assistant Director (Technical), Archaeology and Museums, Kakinada by an order issued by the Director on 2 29 June, 2005. He challenged his transfer order before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in O. A. No. 3050 of 2005. At that time his appeal filed before the departmental authorities was pending. Hence, the Tribunal disposed of the application by order dated 4 July, 2005 with a direction to the concerned departmental authority to dispose of the appeal within four weeks. The departmental appeal was finally dismissed by order dated 3 August, 2005. The respondent once again approached the Tribunal in O. A. No. 4048 of 2005 but the Tribunal declined to interfere in the matter and dismissed the O.A. by order dated 27 December, 2005.

We are surprised to see the High Court castigating the respondent's transfer order as lacking in bona fide on such flimsy and fanciful pleas advanced by the respondent. We are more than satisfied that the High Court's finding regarding lack of bona fide in the matter on the part of the State Government is completely unfounded and untenable. The legal position regarding interference by Courts in the matter of transfer is too well established to be repeated here. The respondent's transfer neither suffers from violation of any statutory rules nor can it be described as mala fide by any stretch of imagination. We are, accordingly, unable to sustain the High Court's order. In the result this appeal is allowed, the order coming under challenge is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court is dismissed.

....................................J [TARUN CHATTERJEE] .....................................J [AFTAB ALAM] New Delhi, July 21, 2008 8
C.B.I,New Delhi vs M.N.Sharma

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

13. The above policy can be acknowledged as necessary for the efficacy and proper functioning of public offices. If so, the legal position can be laid down that when conviction is on a corruption charge against a public servant the appellate court or the revisional court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency of the appeal even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. It would be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision."

10. It is to be noted that learned Single Judge while directing suspension of conviction indicated no reasons.

11. Above being the position the order of the learned Single Judge, directing the suspension/stay of the conviction cannot stand and is set aside.

13. Appeal is allowed.
C.B.I,New Delhi vs Roshan Lal Saini

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

13. The above policy can be acknowledged as necessary for the efficacy and proper functioning of public offices. If so, the legal position can be laid down that when conviction is on a corruption charge against a public servant the appellate court or the revisional court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency of the appeal even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. It would be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision."

10. It is to be noted that learned Single Judge while directing suspension of conviction indicated no reasons.

11. Above being the position the order of the learned Single Judge directing the suspension/stay of the conviction cannot stand and is set aside.

13. Appeal is allowed.
State Of U.P. & Anr vs Nitin Agnihotiri & Anr

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Father and mother of the accused were arrested by the police on 21.6.05. The High Court by an interim order stayed the further investigation in Crime Case No.165/05. By an order dated 27.6.05 it further held that FIR against Nitin Agnihotri by respondent No.2 was filed with oblique motive. The High Court restrained the authorities and directed that they should not interfere with the peaceful living of the accused persons in connection with the FIR referred to above. The High Court also directed grant of protection to Ms. Neena Agnihotri and observed that she was free to go and stay at any place she desired. A direction was given for her appearance on 25.6.2005 under police force protection. On 28.6.2005 the High Court quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings including Crime Case No.165/05 pending before learned Special Chief Judicial Magistrate (Customs), Lucknow. The accused persons in the FIR were directed to be set free 3 and the Judicial Magistrate was directed to take cognizance under Section 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short `the Code') against respondent No.2 for filing with oblique motive the FIR. Before the said order was signed Ms. Neena Arora complained that she was being threatened by her-in-laws. The concerned Bench of the High Court was again constituted and order was passed that Shri Manoram Agnihotri and his wife were to be released, and security was to be provided to Nitin Agnihotri and his wife and the authorities were to ensure that the aforesaid persons were not harassed in any way. The High Court thereafter in the concluding para of the judgment held that it was a fit case where cost of Rs.50,000/- was to be imposed against the State and respondent No.2-the father of the girl. The High Court further observed that imposition of cost on respondent No.2 would create rift between the two families and cost should not be paid by respondent No.2 on giving an undertaking that he would re-concile to the situation.

5. We find that the impugned order of the High Court so far as it relates to the imposition of cost is founded on no basis. There is not even a finding recorded that the police officials were remiss in any way and/or had committed any lapse during investigation. In the absence of any reason having been indicated by the High Court as to why the Court felt necessary for imposing cost, the direction for payment of cost cannot be sustained and is set aside.

6. Before parting with the case, we would like to indicate that the courts should not impose cost in the manner done in the present case without recording any finding as to why imposition of cost was considered necessary. Unless any lapse 5 on the part of any authority is found and opportunity is granted to the alleged erring official, cost should not be imposed. Whenever it is felt that cost is to be imposed, the reason for such a conclusion has to be recorded.

7. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Mohammed vs Pushpalatha

2. This is an appeal from an order dated 30th of August, 2006 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RFA No. 403 of 2004. The appellant before us is a tenant in respect of the premises in question and he had filed a suit for permanent and mandatory injunction, directing the respondent to construct a toilet in the said premises on the basis of an agreement entered into by the parties. It is not in dispute 2 that under the agreement, being Exhibit No. P1 before the trial Court, the respondent agreed to reconstruct the premises in question with toilet facility. The premises in question was reconstructed, but, however, the toilet was not reconstructed according to the terms of the agreement. In the old structure of the said premises, the appellant was paying, as a tenant to the respondent, a sum of Rs. 325/- per month as rent. It would be evident from the agreement itself that the tenant had agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 1250/- per month after reconstruction in terms of the said agreement. Admittedly, under the said agreement, the respondent was liable to reconstruct the premises with toilet facility. The toilet was not constructed and accordingly, the aforesaid suit was filed by the appellant for a decree that the respondent shall construct a toilet and to declare that the tenant was liable to pay the rent at the old rate and not as per Exhibit P1 and for permanent injunction not to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment. 3

3. The trial Court decreed the suit and directed the respondent to construct the toilet as agreed to by the parties within three months from the date of the delivery of the judgment. The impugned order of the High Court discloses that the toilet has not yet been constructed. According to the appellant, the tenant is only liable to pay at the rate of Rs.1250/- per month after the toilet is constructed and given possession to him. The High Court, in Appeal, held that the appellant was liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 1250/- per month and not at the rate of Rs. 325/- per month, although, in terms of the agreement, toilet was not constructed and possession not given in respect of the same.

5. As noted herein earlier, in this case, toilet has not been constructed at all, although, the other part of the agreement, namely, reconstruction has been made and possession has been delivered to the appellant. In view of Section 51 of the Contract Act, we are of the view that the appellant is liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 1250/- per month, only after the toilet is constructed and possession of the toilet given to the appellant.

8. With the above directions, the appeal is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.