L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Md Zamil Ahmed vs State Of Bihar & Ors

3) In order to appreciate the short issue involved in this appeal, it is necessary to state a few relevant facts:

23) It is for this reason, we are of the view that action on the part of welfare State in terminating the appellant's service on such ground cannot be countenanced. We, therefore, disapprove the action taken by the State.

24) In the light of foregoing discussion, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned orders and in consequence allow the writ petition filed by the appellant (writ petitioner) and quash the appellant's termination order dated 23.06.2005 (Annexure -P-4 of SLP).

25) As a consequence thereof, the respondent-State is directed to reinstate the appellant in service with all consequential benefits such as payment of full back wages payable from the date of termination (23.06.2005) till the date of reinstatement in service. The appellant is also entitled to claim his seniority and notional promotions as per rules. It be fixed accordingly.

26) Let the appellant be reinstated in service within a month as an outer limit and the arrears of back wages, as directed, be paid to the appellant within three months by the respondent-State.

27) Cost of this appeal is quantified at Rs.5000/- and the same be paid to the appellant by the respondent-State along with the arrears of back wages.
Shushma Mishra vs Hem Nath Mishra

5. We direct the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) to the appellant by way of a Demand Draft within two days from today. The remaining amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) will be paid by the respondent to the appellant within another six weeks. Such payments are in full and final settlement of all the claims between the parties and there shall be no further claims.

4. Therefore, this appeal is disposed of in terms of the Settlement Agreement.

6. In terms of the settlement, Money Suit No. 06 of 2012 filed by the respondent against the appellant pending before the Court of Senior Division, Hazari Bagh, Jharkhand, shall stand dismissed as withdrawn. Similarly, Writ Petition (C) No. 2402 of 2013 filed by the respondent against the appellant, pending before the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, shall also stand dismissed as withdrawn. The Registry shall communicate a copy of this Judgment to both the Courts forthwith.

7. In view of the settlement above, the civil appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs.

May 05, 2016.
C.C.E., Raigad vs M/S. Ispat Metallics Industries ...

2. The brief facts necessary in order to appreciate the controversy at hand, taken from C.A. No.2562 of 2008, are as follows.

4. The aforesaid two companies were issued show cause notices dated 29.9.2003 and 14.10.2003 respectively. It was alleged that iron ore pellets were sold by IIL to IMIL and that the amounts recovered by IIL in the form of debit notes towards bank charges, interest, etc. were includible in the assessable value of such inputs that were cleared. The notice alleged that the reversal of credit equal to the amount paid to the supplier which was being followed by IIL was not in compliance with law.

5. The learned Commissioner upheld the show cause notices stating that the transaction between IIL and IMIL was one of sale and not transfer. Since the goods were reassessed to duty in terms of Rule 57AB(1C) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and Rule 3(4) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2001, the assessable value in terms of Section 4(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act i.e., the transaction value at the time of clearance plus any additional consideration paid by the buyer at a later stage is to be added and, therefore, the amounts mentioned in the debit note from IIL to IMIL were also includible in the assessable duty valuation as additional consideration. The extended period for limitation was also found to be available on the facts of the present case.

12. As it is clear that the present is a case of transfer and not sale of pellets, no infirmity can be found with the Tribunal’s judgment, which only follows the circular dated 1.7.2001. In addition, the Tribunal was also correct in holding that post manufacturing expenses cannot be loaded on to the amount equal to the duty of excise leviable on such goods as this amount would, then, cease to be an amount equal to the duty of excise but would be something more. On both these counts therefore, we find that the Tribunal is justified in its finding on law, which is based on its finding of fact that the present is a case of transfer and not sale. This being the case, it is unnecessary to consider any of the other submissions made by the learned counsel including the point of limitation. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

May 6, 2016
Mukul Sharma vs Orion India (P.) Ltd. Through Its ...

3. The dispute is only on a narrow compass. As per paragraph (1) of the aforesaid agreement, half of the built up area on the ground floor of the proposed North Block of the complex as per the drawing No.GBA/891/03A dated 14.12.1990 and half of the built up area on the mezzanine floor of the same building and complete built up area on the first floor in the same building, were liable to be handed over to the appellant. On a dispute as to what is the built up area, the appellant filed the civil suit. The suit was decreed. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent-defendant filed first appeal before the High Court. The following points for determination were found to arise in the first appeal :

4. As per the impugned order, the High Court has taken the view that the built up area includes the common area as understood by the parties. Reliance is placed on Ex.'H' letter dated 15.9.1997 written by the appellant-plaintiff to the respondent-defendant. As per the said letter, indisputably, the built up area has been understood to include the common area.

11. We, accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court with regard to the finding on the 'built-up area' and restore that of the trial court.

12. We find that the High Court has remanded the matter to the trial court for the purpose of calculation of the built up area to be handed over to the plaintiff-appellant. We direct the trial court to make the calculation in terms of this judgment and accordingly, dispose of the suit expeditiously.

No costs.

.........................J [KURIAN JOSEPH] ..........................J [ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN] NEW DELHI;

MAY 10, 2016.
Commr.Of I.T-I.Mumbai vs Amitabh Bachchan

3. After the assessment as above was finalized, a show cause notice dated 7th November, 2005 under Section 263 of the Act was issued by the learned C.I.T. detailing as many as eleven (11) issues/grounds on which the assessment order was proposed to be revised under Section 263 of the Act. The respondent - assessee filed his reply to the said show cause notice on consideration of which by order dated 20th March, 2006 the learned C.I.T. set aside the order of assessment dated 30th March, 2004 and directed a fresh assessment to be made. Aggrieved, the respondent – assessee challenged the said order before the learned Tribunal which was allowed by the order dated 28th August, 2007.

22. In the light of the discussions that have preceded and for the reasons alluded we are of the opinion that the present is a fit case for exercise of the suo motu revisional powers of the learned C.I.T. under Section 263 of the Act. The order of the learned C.I.T., therefore, is restored and those of the learned Tribunal dated 28th August, 2007 and the High Court dated 7th August, 2008 are set aside. The appeal of the Revenue is allowed.

23. Leave granted.

25. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.

[PRAFULLA C. PANT] NEW DELHI MAY 11, 2016
State Of U.P. And Ors vs Surendra Pratap And Ors

After the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) imposing ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, one Khairati who was Bhumidhar of Plot Nos.222 and 144 measuring area 25232.13 Sq. Meters at Village Rali Chauhan, Pargana, Tehsil & District Meerut, submitted a statement u/s 6 of the Act. On the basis of said statement, the Competent Authority after conducting necessary enquiry prepared a draft statement u/s 8(3) of the Act which was sent to the land holder inviting objections, if any. In due course, the Competent Authority proceeded to pass an order u/s 8(4) of the Act on 23.05.1983 confirming the draft statement declaring 25232.13 sq.mtrs. of land of said Khairati at Village – Rali Chauhan, Meerut as surplus land. No appeal was preferred against the order confirming the draft statement.

In the aforesaid circumstances, the view taken by the High Court in the instant case is completely unsustainable. This appeal is, therefore, allowed and the Writ Petition preferred by the respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein stands dismissed with costs.

…………………..CJI.

(T. S. Thakur) ………………..……J. (Uday Umesh Lalit) New Delhi, May 13, 2016
State Of Rajasthan vs Firoz Khan @ Arif Khan

2) Keeping in view the short point involved in the appeal, it is not necessary to state the facts in detail except few to appreciate the grievance of the appellant.

3) The respondent (accused) was prosecuted and tried for commission of an offence of murder of one Liley Khan aged around 11 years under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) pursuant to lodging of FIR No 44/2002 in Police Station Ramgarh, District Jaisalmer in Sessions Trial Case No. 48 of 2002 in the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Jaisalmer. The prosecution adduced evidence in support of their case.

7) Notice of lodgment of petition of appeal was served on the respondent but despite service of notice, the respondent has not appeared.

12) Coming now to the facts of this case, it is apposite to reproduce the impugned order in verbatim infra.

No case for grant of leave is made out. Accordingly, the leave to appeal stands dismissed.”

14) In the light of foregoing discussion, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the application made by the appellant for grant of leave to appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law keeping in view the law laid down by this Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar (supra).

15) It is made clear that we have not applied our mind to the merits of the case and remanded the case having noticed that it was an unreasoned order. The High Court will accordingly decide the application on merits uninfluenced by any of our observations made in this order.

16) Since the case is old, we request the High Court to decide the matter within three months from the date of receipt of this order. Since no one appeared in this Court for the respondent despite notice to him, the High Court will issue a fresh notice of the application for grant of leave to the respondent and then decide the application as directed.
Star Sports India Pvt Ltd vs Prasar Bharti & Ors

In view of the above statutory obligation, the appellant herein sharing the live broadcast signals with respodnent No.1 Prasar Bharati and there is no dispute about the same. The appellant, as a television broadcaster, is allowed to insert advertisements on its avenue and recoup its advertisements during a break in live play at various points during broadcast, such as, during breaks between overs in a cricket match, at the fall of a wicket, during drink breaks etc. These advertisements are not included while sharing the live broadcasting signals with Prasar Bharati. No dispute about this as well.

The problem has, however, arisen in respect of the contents shared with Prasar Bharati which, at times, include some kind of advertisements. According to the appellant, the broadcast signal of a sporting event provided by an event organiser, known as the “world feed” (as the same feed is provided to all broadcasters the world over), includes the broadcast of the live play of the event as it happens on the field as also certain “features” which enhance a view's experience, such a Hawk-eye, ball delivery speed reference, umpire naming graphics, player statistics, score cards, match summary graphics, replay graphics etc. These features are inserted at the site by or at the instance of the event organiser. Such features invariably contain logos of the event sponsors known as “On-Screen Credits” in industry parlance. These “On-Screen Credits” are, however, included while sharing the live broadcasting signals with Prasar Bharati. Prasar Bharati has taken exception to the aforesaid inclusion treating the same as “advertisements” and, thus, turning it as violative of Section 3(1) of the Sports Act. The appellant, on the other hand, has taken the position that in terms of Section 3(1) of the Sports Act, the obligation of a television Broadcaster, i.e., the appellant, is limited to sharing of the world feed which it receives from the event organizer/owner on as as-is- where-is basis without advertisements of the television broadcaster, and that the appellant is not obliged to remove any On-Screen Credits inserted by the event organizer. The appellant contested the stand of Prasar Bharati (respondent No. 1) that it is the duty of the appellant to ensure that the sponsor logos/On-Screen Credits present ion the world feed, which ios created by or at the instance of the organizer of the event, have to also be removed by the appellant.

On a plain reading of Section 3 of the Sports Act, we are inclined to agree with the submission of Mr. Rohatgi that the obligation to share such sports broadcasting signals is upon the following persons: (i) content rights owner; (ii) content holder; and (iii) television or radio broadcasting service provider. Any of these above categories of persons are not allowed to carry a live television broadcast on:

The upshot of the aforesaid discussion would be to conclude that there is no merit in the instant appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.

MAY 27, 2016.
Bhagwan Sahai vs State Of Rajasthan

1. Both the appellants have assailed the impugned judgment of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench whereby Criminal Appeal No. 1235 of 2011 was disposed of by the impugned judgment and order dated 14.1.2016. The High Court set aside the conviction of the appellants under Sections 307 and 307/34 of the IPC respectively but found them guilty under section 308/34 of the IPC. The High Court also set aside appellant’s conviction under Section 326 and 326/34 IPC respectively in view of their being found guilty under Section 308/34 of the IPC but maintained the conviction under Sections 323 and 324 of the IPC. For the offences under Section 308/34 IPC the appellants were inflicted with punishment of two years rigorous imprisonment alongwith a fine of Rs.500/- with a 1 Page 1 Crl.A. No.416 of 2016 @ SLP(Crl.)2301/2016 default clause. For offences under Sections 323 and 324 of the IPC, the lesser sentence awarded by the trial court were maintained.

9. Therefore, we have no hesitation in allowing the appeal and acquitting the appellants of all the charges. We order accordingly. They shall be released from jail custody forthwith, if not required in any other case. The appeal is allowed.

June 03, 2016.

Page 6
Punjab State Warehousing Corp vs Bhushan Chander & Anr

2. As far as the factual narration is concerned, suffice it to state that the Managing Director of the Corporation had written a letter on 28.6.1989 to the concerned police authority to register a case against the first respondent for offences punishable under Sections 409/467/468 and 471 of the IPC or any other appropriate provision of law. During investigation, the investigating agency found that the accused who was working as a Godown Assistant in the Corporation had misappropriated 11 gunny bales value of which was Rs.38,841/-; that he had tampered with the record of the department; and accordingly the police authorities filed the charge-sheet for the aforesaid offences before the court of competent Judicial Magistrate. The learned Magistrate on the basis of evidence brought on record, found that the prosecution had been able to bring home the guilt against the accused and accordingly sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years under Section 467 and 409 IPC and two years under Section 468/471 IPC with separate default clauses. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence was assailed in appeal before the learned Session Judge, Firozpur and the matter was finally heard by the learned Additional Session Judge, who appreciating the evidence on record, concurred with the conviction but modified the sentence of three years imposed under Section 409 and 467 IPC to two years.

28. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the irresistible conclusion is that the respondents are not entitled to have the protective umbrella of Section 197 CrPC and, therefore, the High Court has erred in setting aside the conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial is vitiated in the absence of sanction. Consequently, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court to decide the revision petition in accordance with law.
Dda vs M/S Kenneth Builders Developers Ltd. ...

3. In the connected appeal, the appellants (Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi or the GNCTD and its Department of Forests) are aggrieved by the same judgment and order to the extent that it has been held that the DDA is the final authority to determine land use, even though its determination pertains to the Ridge in the National Capital Territory of Delhi.

10. Kenneth Builders was the highest bidder in the auction held on 26th April, 2006 and its bid was accepted. On 15th June, 2006 a demand-cum- allotment letter was issued to it requiring payment of balance 75% of the bid amount. It is not in dispute that Kenneth Builders deposited the entire bid amount of Rs. 450.01 crores with the DDA on 11th September, 2006.

16. The objection of the Department of Forests compelled Kenneth Builders to stop all building activity on the project land and that resulted in an exchange of letters for the next several months between the DDA, the GNCTD and Kenneth Builders. To cut a long story short, the DDA insisted that the project land was “Residential” and that the project could be undertaken thereon. The GNCTD was equally clear that the project land falls within the Ridge and no construction activity could be carried out without the consent of the Ridge Management Board and the permission of this Court. On its part, the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India (or the MoEF) kept aloof from the controversy and gave environmental clearance for the project on 15th July, 2008 subject to the condition that a “consent to establish” shall be obtained by Kenneth Builders from the DPCC under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (for short the Water Act) and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (for short the Air Act) and a copy submitted to the said Ministry before the start of any construction work at the site. The relevant extract of the environmental clearance given by the MoEF reads as follows:

All the facts, documents and detailed plans have been shared and discussed in detail between the two departments, in meeting. In the light of facts been legally converted from recreational use (District Park) to residential.

In view of the facts, it is requested that the “Consent to Establish” from Delhi Pollution Control Committee under Air & Water Act be granted to the applicant at the earliest.”

41. The GNCTD and the DPCC raised an issue before us that the DDA was not the final authority in the matter of determining the land use particularly when it related to the Ridge. In the view that we have taken, it is not necessary to go into this question.

Conclusion

42. The appeal filed by the DDA is dismissed. The DDA should now refund the deposit made by Kenneth Builders with interest at 6% per annum calculated from 11th September, 2006 till realization. The question raised in the connected appeal filed by the GNCTD and the Department of Forests of the GNCTD is left open for consideration in an appropriate case.

43. There will be no order as to costs.
M/S. Sundaram Finacne Ltd vs Noorjahan Beevi & Anr

2. The brief facts necessary to be noted in this appeal are :

3. The plaintiff filed an appeal in the Kerala High Court. The Kerala High Court also affirmed the judgment of the trial court and held that suit is barred by limitation. Plaintiff has come in this appeal questioning the correctness of the judgment of the High Court.

5. The submissions which have been pressed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that last instalment was to be paid on 20th September, 1986 and the balance liability of the defendant could be ascertained only after the sale of the vehicle which took place on 30th May, 1985 and the suit was filed within three years from the date of sale of the vehicle as well as within three years from the last date of payment of instalment, hence, it could not have been said to be barred by time. The present was a case which was to be governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Courts below erred in applying Article 55. The case was fully covered by the judgment of the Madras High Court in Bell Alloys Steels Private Limited vs. The National Small Industries Corporation Limited(1980 Legal Surveyor

The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
Haryana State & Anr vs Gram Panchayat Village Kalehri

2) In order to appreciate the issues involved in the appeal, which lie in a narrow compass, few facts need mention infra.

4) The dispute in the suit relates to the land measuring 36 kanals 15 Marlas comprised in Khewat No. 361 min/350m, Khatoni No. 536 min, Khasra No 59 Gair Mumkin Nala situated in village Kalehri, Tahsil Gharaunda, District Karnal (hereinafter referred to as “the suit land").

5) The respondent filed a suit bearing Civil Suit No. 226 of 2001 against the appellants in the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Karnal. The suit was for a declaration that they are the owner of the suit land and that the appellant (State) have no right, title and interest in the suit land. The respondent also claimed prohibitory injunction against the appellants restraining the State authorities from interfering in their peaceful possession over the suit land. The respondent based their claim of ownership on several documents which, according to them, exclusively proved their superior title over every one including the State.

8) The Trial Court by judgment/decree dated 11.06.2002 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. On appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties, it was held that the respondent (plaintiff) is the owner of the suit land. Accordingly, injunction, as claimed by the respondent against the appellants, was also granted.

The impugned order is set aside. The case is now remanded to the High Court for deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with law.

19) Before parting, we consider it proper to mention here that we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the controversy but confined our inquiry only to examine whether the second appeal involved any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code. Since we have held that the appeal does involve the substantial questions of law and hence we have requested the High Court to formally admit the appeal and frame substantial questions of law and then answer them finally on merits in accordance with the law.

23) We now request the High Court to decide the second appeal in accordance with law finally on merits keeping in view the aforesaid observations and, if possible, preferably within six months.

24) Since none appeared for the respondent in this appeal despite service, we request the High Court to issue notice to the respondent for final hearing the second appeal before it is heard finally.

25) Record of the case, if requisitioned, be sent back to the High Court forthwith by the registry.