L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
A.S.V.Narayanan Rao vs Ratnamala & Anr

3. The aforementioned criminal petition was filed praying that the proceedings initiated against the appellant herein in C.C. No.600 of 2006 on the file of the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad for the offence punishable under section 304A IPC be quashed. The said petition along with another similar petition by one of the co-accused was heard and disposed of by a common order (order in appeal).

4. While the petition filed by the appellant herein was dismissed by the High Court, the other petition of the co-accused was allowed.

5. The appellant is a cardiologist. The husband of the first respondent (one Divakar) approached the appellant herein, complaining of a pain in the chest on 22.04.2002. Divakar was admitted in the hospital where the appellant was working and kept in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Thereafter, the appellant informed the first respondent that Divakar had suffered a mild heart attack. On 23.04.2002, an angiogram was conducted which showed three blocks in the vessels carrying blood to the heart. On 25.04.2002 at 9.30 a.m., the appellant unsuccessfully attempted to perform an angioplasty on Divakar. Around 1.30 in the afternoon, the appellant informed the first respondent that the angioplasty failed as the blocks were calcified. Same day at around 3.30 p.m., by-pass surgery was conducted on Divakar in the same hospital. Subsequently, various complications developed and eventually Divakar died on 09.05.2002.

6. On 14.05.2002, the first respondent lodged a complaint against the appellant and others under section 304A IPC which came to be registered as FIR No.416 of 2002.

7. The police on investigation submitted a final report on 02.02.2005 treating the case to be one of lack of evidence. The respondent filed objections before the Metropolitan Magistrate to the final report and prayed the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. The learned Magistrate by his order dated 11.12.2006 came to the prima facie conclusion that there exists material to try the accused for the offence punishable under section 304A IPC. Challenging the said order the appellant approached the High Court by way of Criminal Petition No.6506 of 2007.

15. Unfortunately, the last of the above extracted statements of Dr. Surajit Dan is not taken into account by the High Court which statement according to us is most crucial in the context of criminal prosecution of the appellant.

16. The High Court unfortunately overlooked this factor. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the prosecution of the appellant is uncalled for as pointed out by this Court in Jacob Mathew case (supra) that the negligence, if any, on the part of the appellant cannot be said to be “gross”. We, therefore, set aside the judgment under appeal and also the proceedings of the trial court dated 11.12.2006.

17. The appeal is allowed, however, there shall be no order as to costs.

September 13, 2013

The entire record adduced does not indicate as to whether A1 assessed the condition of the patient on consultation of the cardio Anasthesian and obtained the fitness certificate for going Angioplasty on the patient.
State Of Rajasthan & Anr vs Bal Kishan Mathur(D) Tr.Lrs.& Ors

3. An order of eviction dated 17.12.1980 under the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1964 was passed by the Estate Officer against the respondent (Now represented by his legal heirs). The respondent was unsuccessful in the challenge made against the said order in an appeal before the learned District Judge. Thereafter, the respondent filed an application for review which was transferred to the court of learned Additional District Judge who heard the matter and decided the same on 17.12.1993 as if he was hearing an appeal against the initial order of the Estate Officer dated 17.12.1980. The State of Rajasthan, therefore, moved Civil Writ Petition No.3503 of 1995 before the High Court which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge holding that the tenancy of the respondent could not be determined except by following the provisions of Sections 106 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as already held in another connected case.

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Raghvendra Kumar vs Prabal Kumar & Ors

3. The first respondent wanted to contest election for Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Aheta, District Jalaun and he, therefore, filed his nomination paper which was accepted. Thereafter, by an order dated 5.10.2010 passed by the Returning Officer of Block Madhogarh, District Jalaun, his nomination was cancelled in view of his conviction under Section 307 of IPC. It was argued before the High Court that the first respondent was released on bail by virtue of an order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court on 25.8.2005 in Criminal Appeal No.3676 of 2005. Apart from this order, the impugned order accepted the submission that the conviction of the first respondent did not involve moral turpitude and therefore, the order dated 5.10.2010 passed by the Returning Officer was stayed. Consequently, respondent No.1 contested the election and got elected as Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Aheta.

6. We have noted the submissions of both the counsel. In our view, the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is patently wrong. Respondent No.1 was convicted under Section 307 IPC. It is another matter that he was released on bail, but the release on bail cannot be equated with acquittal from the offence for which he was already convicted by the trial Court, and against which an appeal was pending its decision in the High Court. In the circumstances, we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. Both the counsel having made their submissions on the merits of Writ Petition No.62085 of 2010, nothing further remains to be argued in the High Court. Therefore, this writ petition shall as well stand dismissed. Consequently, the first respondent will vacate the office of Pradhan of Village Aheta Gram Panchayat, Block Madhogarh, District Jalaun. The appeal is allowed in these terms. No order as to costs. Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to Respondent No.4, District Election Officer, Jalaun, and Registrar (Judicial) of Allahabad High Court to mark the above Writ Petition No.62085 of 2010 as dismissed.

September 16, 2013.
Educare Charitable Trust vs U.O.I & Anr

3. In the year 2012, the petitioner wanted to expand the size of BDS, being desirous of increasing the capacity from 50 to 100 seats. Intention was to do so with effect from current Academic Year i.e. 2013-14. The scheme was rejected by the Government vide order dated 31.12.2012 on the ground that it did not fulfil the eligibility criteria for such an increase. Against this order of refusal of the Central Government, the petitioner had approached the High Court of Kerala seeking quashing of the said order and for issuance of Writ of Mandamus commanding the Central Government to forward the application of the petitioner for intake of students, to the DCI for technical scrutiny and further to direct the DCI to make appropriate recommendation to the Central Government for issuance of letter of permission during the Academic Year 2013-14 itself. As pointed out in the beginning of this order, the said Writ Petition has been dismissed by the High Court.

4. In order to appreciate the controversy and the grievance of the petitioner, it would be necessary to traverse few facts.

(2) The time-schedule indicated above may be modified by the Central Government, for reason to be recorded in writing, in respect of any class or category of applications.”

9. Having regard to the above, it is not possible to accede to the request of the petitioner to change the time-schedule when the last date for admitting the students, which was July 15, 2013, expired long ago. If the Central Government forwards the application to the DCI at this juncture, DCI shall hardly have any time to look into the feasibility of the scheme as per the requirements contained in Regulation 21. We have to keep in mind that in the schedule annexed to the Regulations 2006, six to eight months time is given to the DCI for this purpose. We are, thus, of the view that the High Court did not commit any error in holding that in the given circumstances mandamus could not be issued to the Central Government to exercise its discretionary powers in a particular manner to modify the time-schedule. Sanctity to the time-schedule has to be attached. It is too late in the day, in so far as present academic session is concerned, to give any direction.- This Court has highlighted the importance of cut off date for starting the professional courses, particularly medical courses, and repeatedly impressed upon that such deadline should be tinkered with. (See: Priya Gupta vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2012) 7 SCC 433 and Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila Mahavidyalaya vs. State of U.P. (2013) 2 SCC 617.

10. We, thus, do not find any error in the impugned judgment of the High Court. This petition is bereft of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.
R. Venkata Ramana & Anr vs The United India Insurance Co. Ltd.& Ors

3. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, in a nut shell, are as under:

4. After considering the evidence and looking at the injuries suffered and physical condition of the injured, namely, Rajanala Ravi Krishna, who was hardly 17 years old at the time of the accident, by way of compensation, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.18,75,800/- with interest @ 7.5 % from the date of presentation of the petition till realization of the said amount.

13. Though, the High Court has rightly followed the principle laid down in the case of Sarla Verma (supra), in our opinion, the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is more just. The Tribunal awarded a lump sum of Rs.10 lacs and the amount of expenditure incurred by the appellants for treating their son. The total amount awarded by the Tribunal was Rs.18,75,800/- which, in our opinion, is not too much and in our opinion, the said amount should be awarded to the appellants.

14. In the circumstances, we quash and set aside the judgment delivered by the High Court and restore the order of the Tribunal. The amount of compensation determined by the Tribunal along with interest @ 7.5 % from the date of presentation of the claim petition till its realization shall be paid to the appellants.

15. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
Channabasappa(Dead) By Lr & Anr vs State Of Karnataka & Ors

2. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:

4. The 2nd respondent filed Writ Petition No.4165/1988 in the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore with the prayer for a direction to the Tribunal to conduct enquiry under Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the “Land Reforms Act”) and to grant him occupancy rights. In support of his claim for having sent the application, the 2nd respondent had produced a xerox copy of a postal receipt and acknowledgment. The High Court by its order dated 5th August, 1991 remanded the matter to the Land Tribunal to consider whether in fact the 2nd respondent had filed an application in Form No.7, and if it was found that he had made such an application, then to consider it on merits in accordance with law. The said order was challenged before the Division Bench of the High Court as well as by way of Special Leave Petition before this Court unsuccessfully.

8. The appellants being not happy preferred the writ appeal in question before the Division Bench which dismissed the same by the impugned judgment on 2nd June, 2006.

14. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned order dated 2nd June, 2006 passed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.3836/2005(LR) and order dated 3rd June, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.15722/1997, order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Land Tribunal, Dharwad is restored. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Nidhan Singh (D) Th Lrs vs Santa Singh (D) Th Lrs

3. The respondent Santa Singh (since deceased) had filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement dated 19.7.1977 by which the respondent had agreed to purchase half share of the land which belonged to one Bhan Singh, brother of the appellant Nidhan Singh (since deceased), in Village Takhanwadh, Tehsil Moga. The agreed amount was Rs.60,500/- out of which a sum of Rs.3000/- was paid immediately. The brother of the appellant-defendant had created a mortgage on the land and a sum of Rs.5,000/- was due to be paid to the Bank. The respondent was to make that payment. Unfortunately, Bhan Singh, who had signed that agreement, died on 2.11.1977 and then the appellant declined to execute the agreement which led the respondent to file the suit on 22.11.1977.

7. We direct the respondents to make necessary payment to the appellants and the Bank within three months from today. The respondents will clear the amount due to be paid to the Bank at whatever rate of interest the Bank will charge, in case the amount is not paid so far. On making the payment to the Bank, Rs.5,000/- will be debited from the payable amount. In the event the amount is so paid and the Bank dues are cleared, the sale deed will be executed within four weeks thereafter, and the possession of the concerned land will be handed over to the L.Rs. of the respondent. In case there is no understanding between the parties with respect to the portion of the land to be handed over, it will be for the executing Court to decide as to which portion of the land is to be handed over to the respondents in compliance of the order of this Court. In the event the respondents fail to discharge both these obligations, it will be open to the appellants to return the amount of Rs.3,000/- with interest at 12% per annum within four weeks after the period of three months as provided above.

8. This appeal is disposed of in the above terms.

September 17, 2013.
M/S. Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd vs Jan Chetna & Ors

5. After 2 months and 20 days of rejection of the injunction application filed by Shri Ramesh Agrawal and two others, Shri Ram Kumar Agarwal and Shri Ramesh Sharma filed Writ Petition No.5534/2007 before the Chhattisgarh High Court under the name and style of “Ekta Parishad” and prayed that the State Government may be directed to conduct an inquiry into the correctness and genuineness of the Environment Impact Assessment Report prepared by respondent No.3. Later on, the writ petitioners withdrew their cause.

6. The environment clearance granted by respondent No.2 was challenged by respondent No.1 by filing an appeal under the National Environment Appellate Authority Act, 1997 (for short, ‘the 1997 Act’). On notice, respondent No.3 filed reply and pleaded that environment clearance was granted to the appellant in accordance with law. NEAA dismissed the appeal of respondent No.1 vide order dated 31.12.2008 by recording the following observations:

15. We are not suggesting that respondent No.1 had indulged in Bench hunting but it needs to be emphasised that every Bench of the High Court should scrupulously follow the relevant rules and should not violate statutory provisions specifying its jurisdiction, else the sanctity of the rules relating to distribution of causes between the Single, the Division Bench and larger Benches will be lost.

16. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The writ petition filed by respondent No.1 shall now be listed before a Single Judge of the High Court, who shall decide the same without being influenced by the observations contained in the impugned order or this order.

17. While disposing of the appeal in the manner indicated above, we consider it necessary to make it clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and the parties shall be free to advance all legally permissible arguments before the learned Single Judge of the High Court.

SEPTEMBER 19, 2013.
Manju Swarup (D) Thr. Lrs vs Bhupenshwar Prasad (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors

2. This is one of the cases which shows how miserable a decree holder becomes in the execution proceedings. This is a Second Appeal in the execution proceedings filed by the judgment debtor whose property was ordered to be sold in the execution proceedings. In pursuance of a suit, which had been filed in 1955, the final decree was passed and the property of the appellant had been attached on 21st December, 1962. The execution proceedings had been continuing since then. The facts, in a nutshell, are that the Execution Case No. 29 of 1962 was filed for recovery of the decretal amount by the decree-holder. Auction notice was published on 16th April, 1964. The appellant herein, the judgment debtor had filed an application under Order XXI, Rule 83 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘the CPC’) for postponement of the sale, as it was possible for the judgment debtor to raise the decretal amount and pay the same to the decree-holder.

8. Being aggrieved by the aforestated order dated 10th May, 1969, an appeal had been filed, which had been allowed by the order dated 5th February, 1970.

9. The validity of the aforestated order dated 5th February, 1970 was challenged by the judgment debtor by filing an Execution Second Appeal No. 742 of 1970 before the High Court of Allahabad. The High Court, by an interim order dated 11th May, 1970 gave an opportunity to the appellant/judgment debtor to pay the entire decretal amount within two months from the date of passing of the interim order, failing which it was directed that the said order would stand automatically vacated.

10. The entire decretal amount was admittedly not paid by the judgment debtor and therefore, finally by an order dated 2nd February, 2006, the Execution Second Appeal No. 742 of 1970 has been dismissed by the High Court and being aggrieved by the said order, the judgment debtor has filed this appeal.

14. The appeal stands dismissed with no order as to costs.
State Of Rajasthan vs Jamil Khan

3. The State has come in appeal contending that it is a fit case where punishment of death should be awarded to the respondent. There is no appeal by the respondent challenging the conviction and sentence as confirmed by the High Court under Sections 302, 376 and 201 of IPC.

6. The injuries present on the body of the tiny child would clearly establish the barbaric nature of the commission of the offence. The respondent had some previous acquaintance with the child when he used to visit his parents who stayed in the neigbourhood. It has come in evidence that the respondent had planned the crime. On the fateful day, he had come to the place, drunk, carrying with him a sack and a blue bag. PW2, who knows the accused, had seen him proceeding towards his house carrying a white coloured katta (sack) on his shoulder and a blue coloured bag in his hands. According to PW3, the accused had gone to his shop, bought peanuts and madhu gutka. He lured the child by offering peanuts and took her to his parents’ house. PW3 had seen the accused carrying the loaded bag on his shoulder. It is not necessary to discuss the other evidence available from the recovered articles which all have conclusively established that it was the respondent who committed the offence.

and, no order of confirmation shall be passed until the period allowed for filing an appeal has expired.

c) annul conviction;

v) Order fresh trial on charges already framed or on amended charges.

vi) May acquit the accused.

Fifthly.-Forfeiture of property;

Sixthly.-Fine.”

33. In the present case, the respondent has been awarded life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC. Under Section 376 of IPC also he has been awarded life imprisonment. The third substantive sentence is under Section 201 of IPC. All these sentences are ordered to run concurrently. The sentence of life imprisonment is till the end of one’s biological life. However, in view of the power of the State under Sections 432 and 433 of Cr.PC, in the present case, we are of the view that the sentences shall run consecutively, in case there is remission or commutation. We further make it clear that the remission or commutation, if considered in the case of the respondent, shall be granted only after the mandatory period of fourteen years in the case of offence under Section 302 of IPC.

36. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we make it clear that in the event of State invoking its powers under Section 432 or 433 of Cr.PC, the sentence under Section 376 of IPC shall not be remitted or commuted before seven years of imprisonment. In other words, in that eventuality, it shall be ensured that the respondent will first serve the term of life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC. In case there is any remission after fourteen years, then imprisonment for a minimum period of seven years under Section 376 of IPC shall follow and thereafter three years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 201 of IPC. The sentence on fine and default as awarded by the Sessions Court are maintained as such.

37. The appeal is disposed of as above.

September 27, 2013.
Poongadi And Anr vs Thangavel

2. The appellants are the wife and son of one Thangavel. By an order dated 12.01.1998 passed by the learned trial court each of the appellants have been granted maintenance @ Rs. 300/- per month w.e.f. 04.02.1993 i.e. date of filing of the application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). As the respondent-husband had not complied with the order of payment, in a miscellaneous petition, i.e., C.M.P. No. 566/1998 filed by the appellant, the trial court by its order dated 21.07.1998 had sentenced the respondent to imprisonment. The default in payment of maintenance was for the period 4.2.1993 to 4.2.1998. On 5.2.2002 another miscellaneous application (Crl.M.P. No.394/2002) was filed by the appellants claiming maintenance for the period 4.2.1993 to 5.2.2002. The same was allowed by the learned Magistrate on 31.12.2002 against which the respondent had filed Crl. R.C. No. 620/2003. The High Court by its order dated 21.4.2004 held that as Crl.M.P. No. 394/2002 was filed on 5.2.2002, under the first proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC, the appellants were entitled to claim arrears for the period of one year preceding the date of filing of the application i.e. from 4.2.2001 to 5.2.2002. Accordingly, the High Court directed the respondent (revision petitioner before it) to pay the arrears for the aforesaid period within two months failing which it was directed that an arrest warrant would be issued against the respondent and the sentence of imprisonment earlier imposed by the learned Magistrate would come into effect. As the aforesaid order of the High Court had curtailed the entitlement of the appellants to maintenance to a period of one year prior to the date of filing of the Crl. M.P. No. 394/2002, the appellants have filed this appeal.

8. In view of the above, we are left in no doubt that the order passed by the High Court needs to be interfered with by us which we accordingly do. The order dated 21.04.2004 of the High Court is set aside and we now issue directions to the respondent to pay the entire arrears of maintenance due to the appellants commencing from the date of filing of the Maintenance Petition (M.C.No.1/1993) i.e. 4.2.1993 within a period of six months and current maintenance commencing from the month of September, 2013 payable on or before 7th of October, 2013 and thereafter continue to pay the monthly maintenance on or before the 7th of each successive month. If the above order of this Court is not complied with by the Respondent, the learned Trial Court is directed to issue a warrant for the arrest of the respondent and ensure that the same is executed and the respondent taken into custody to suffer imprisonment as provided by Section 125(3) CrPC.

The appeal is allowed.