L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Prabhu vs State Of M.P

5). Fourteen external injuries were found on the body of the deceased. As per the opinion of the Autopsy Surgeon, the death of the deceased was caused due to extensive hemorrhage on account of shock due to injury No.8 mainly and injury Nos. 13 and 14 causing hemorrhage. They were incised wounds. Since accused persons abjured guilt, trial was held. Each of the accused persons was convicted as noted above. Appeals were filed before the High Court. So far as the appellant is concerned, it was submitted that he could not be convicted in terms of Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC as only accused Nanhe, according to the prosecution, caused incised wounds. The appellant was holding only a stick. The High Court relied on the evidence of two eye-witnesses PWs 5 and 9 and held that the appellant cannot be held guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. It was held that the prosecution has not proved that each of the participating culprits had the same intention and each one shared the 3 intention of the other. The High Court noticed that the accused Prabhu and Jagdish had caused lacerated wounds and, therefore, the knowledge which can be inferred from the said acts is that they intended to cause grievous hurt. Accordingly, the conviction as noted above was altered.

15. Considering the principles set out above, certainly the appellant was guilty of offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC. However, in the peculiar facts of the case, the sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice.

16. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Arun B. Khanjire vs The Ichalkaranji Urban Coop. Bank & Ors

2. The petitioner is alleged to have taken loans from the respondent-Bank under 17 loan transactions either in his capacity as the principal borrower or as the Director of the firm M/s Prakash Offset Printers. According to the respondent-Bank a sum of Rs.413.16 lakhs together with interest was due to it from the 2 petitioner as on 31.12.03. The petitioner, along with the firm and its other Directors, disputed their liability to make the said payment and filed an application under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. Initially, the Co-operative Court granted an order of status-quo but vacated the same after hearing the Bank. The Co-operative Appellate Court affirmed the order of the Co- operative Court and refused to stay the recovery proceedings. Meanwhile, the respondent-Bank also initiated action for recovery under Section 101 of the aforesaid Act against the petitioner and his business concerns. Accepting the claim of the Bank, the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies issued 12 Recovery Certificates on 12.3.2004. The petitioner and his other concerns filed three writ petitions before the High Court questioning the issuance of the Recovery Certificates. The High Court also declined to grant any relief and on 30.6.2004 the Bank 3 issued demand notices to the appellant and his other concerns. A warrant of attachment was also issued.

3. On 15.7.2004, the petitioner herein filed a Misc. Complaint Application before the Divisional Joint Registrar seeking reliefs which were similar to the reliefs sought for in the writ petitions. After service of notice, the respondent-Bank entered appearance and an order or status quo was passed while fixing the matter for hearing on 22.12.2004. Although, an objection was taken on behalf of the respondent-Bank that the proceedings were not maintainable and had been commenced in violation of the provisions of Section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, the Divisional Joint Registrar set aside the Recovery Certificates against which decision the respondent-Bank filed a Writ Petition in the High Court and prayed for 4 setting aside the order of the Divisional Joint Registrar, which prayer was allowed.

17. We agree with Mr. Lalit's submission that the matter was not taken up suo-motu by the Divisional Joint Registrar, but on the basis of the application which had been filed by the petitioner here, though not in the form of a Memorandum of Appeal, and that while an appeal may be filed within the period of limitation prescribed, it could not be entertained or taken up for hearing before the pre-condition indicated in Sub-section (2A) had been complied with, which view is supported by the decisions referred to hereinabove.

18. We, therefore, see no reason to entertain the Special Leave Petition which is accordingly dismissed.

19. There will be no order as to costs. 14

________________J.

(ALTAMAS KABIR) ________________J.

(MARKANDEY KATJU) New Delhi Dated: 3.12.2008
Gullipilli Sowria Raj vs Bandaru Pavani @ Gullipili Pavani

3. Soon thereafter, on 13.3.1997, the respondent-

4. The main ground for declaring the marriage to be a nullity was mainly misrepresentation by the appellant regarding his social status and that he was a Hindu by religion, although it transpired after the marriage that the appellant and his family members all professed the Christian faith. The Family Court dismissed the said petition against which an appeal was preferred by the respondent before the High Court, which allowed the appeal by its judgment and order dated 12.9.2002 upon holding that the marriage between a Hindu and a Christian 3 under the 1955 Act is void ab initio and that the marriage was, therefore, a nullity.

5. A few months thereafter on 23.1.2003 the respondent married one Dr. Praveen. Thereafter, on 23.4.2003 the appellant filed a Special Leave Petition out of which the present appeal arises.

(Emphasis added)

23.The other question raised regarding the subsequent marriage of the respondent is of little relevance once we have held that the marriage purported to have been performed between the appellant and the respondent on 24.10.1996 was a nullity. Hence, no decision is called for in that regard and we also make no observation in respect thereof.

24.The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

25.There will, however, be no order as to costs. 16

26.We place on record our appreciation of the assistance provided by Mr. Lalit to help us to arrive at a decision in this appeal.

____________________J.

(ALTAMAS KABIR) ____________________J.

(AFTAB ALAM) New Delhi Dated: 4.12.2008
Kashiben Chhaganbhai Koli vs State Of Gujarat

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

9. In that view of the matter learned Additional Sessions Judge committed no error in holding that the accused had committed offences punishable under Section 3(1)(v) of the Atrocities Act.

13. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that an application for reduction of sentence shall be made in terms of Article 161 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the `Constitution') before the Governor of the State. We do not express any opinion in that regard. However, in view of the statement made, we direct that for a period of three months the appellant need not surrender.

14. The appeal is dismissed subject to the aforesaid observation.
Suryakant Johari vs Madanlal Chhaganlal

Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. The sole appellant was convicted by the Trial Court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay fine of Rupee five thousand; in default, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of three months. Further direction was given for payment of compensation to the tune of Rs.1,83,229/- to the complainant. The said order was confirmed in appeal and the High Court dismissed the revision application against the appellate order. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

Today, both the parties have filed a joint petition of compromise. Let the same be taken on record. We find compromise is lawful and permission is granted to the parties to compound the offence.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, conviction and sentence of the appellant is set aside in terms of the compromise.
State Of M.P. & Ors vs Visan Kumar Shivcharan Lal

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Jabalpur Bench holding that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable. Initially, the matter was agitated by the respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the `employee'), before the Labour Court under reference made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the `Act'), which was decided in favour of respondent no.1. Thereafter the writ petition was filed which was dismissed by learned Single Judge. The Division Bench, as noted above, dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal on the ground that it was not maintainable as the order was in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the `Constitution'). According to the appellant, the nomenclature is of no consequence. It is the nature of the relief sought for and the controversy involved which determines the Article which is applicable.

19. Thus, there is no manner of doubt that the orders and proceedings of a judicial court subordinate to the High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Commissioner of Commercial Tax & Ors. [2008 (13) SCALE 682].

14. In view of what has been stated above, the High Court was not justified in holding that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable. In addition, a bare reading of this Court's earlier order shows that the impugned order is clearly erroneous. The impugned order is set aside. The writ appeal shall be heard by the Division Bench on merits.

15. The appeal is allowed.
State Of Bihar & Ors vs Pandey Jagdishwar Prasad

5. The respondent, at the relevant point of time, was working as a Correspondence Clerk (class III) in the office of the Executive Engineer, Rural Engineering Organisation, Works Division, Sasaram in the State of Bihar. On 14th of August, 1973, the service book of the 3 respondent was opened and two dates of birth of the respondent viz. 11th of February, 1944, and 11th of February, 1946, were recorded simultaneously in his service book. It may be mentioned here that inspite of two dates of birth having been entered into service of the respondent, the State Authorities did not correct or delete any of the dates mentioned above for the entire period the respondent was in employment with the State Authorities. According to the first mentioned date of birth, the respondent ought to have retired on 28th of February, 2002. But he retired on 29th of February, 2004 according to the other mentioned date of birth in his service book. As noted herein earlier, on 4th of December, 2004, a reasoned order was passed vide memo no. 340, in the context of an order dated 11th of October, 2004, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 12886 of 2004, in which the respondent claimed for payment of 4 retirement benefit such as pension, gratuity, leave encashment, etc.

6. By this order, the respondent was ordered to be retired on 28th of February, 2002, on the basis of his date of birth mentioned in his service book i.e. 11th of February, 1944, which was based on his matriculation certificate. As noted herein earlier, by the order dated 4th of December, 2004, the appellant passed an order directing recovery of the excess amount drawn by the respondent.

05 dated 4th of March, 2005, made a refixation of the amount paid to the respondent under Bihar Government Employees Essential Group Insurance Scheme. Aggrieved thereafter, the respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Judicature at Patna and the High Court, by an order dated 2nd of August, 2006, dismissed the writ petition of the respondent, in which it was observed that he was not entitled to refund as he had worked beyond the date of his superannuation for which he alone was responsible.

16.Accordingly, we do not find it necessary to interfere with the order of the Division Bench of the High Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in the exercise of our power under Article 136 of the Constitution accepting the directions made in paragraph 15 of this judgment.

17.For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is dismissed subject to above directions. There will be no order as to costs.
Puttaswamy vs State Of Karnataka & Anr

4. During the hearing of this appeal, at the admission stage, learned counsel for the appellant informed the Court that the matter had been settled between the parties and a compromise petition had been executed between the appellant and the complainant. On such submission, the complainant was impleaded as a party to the present proceedings and the short point which ultimately arose during the hearing is whether the offence under Section 304-A could at all be compounded since the same is not covered by the provisions of Section 320 I.P.C.

9. What emerges from all these decisions is that even if an offence is not compoundable within the scope of Section 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure the Court may, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, reduce the sentence imposed while maintaining 7 the conviction. In the present case, the appellant has been convicted under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-. The sentence as far as conviction under Section 279 I.P.C. is concerned has been set aside by the High Court. What remains after the judgment of the High Court is the conviction under Sections 279 and 304-A I.P.C. wherein the appellant was sentenced to undergo six months simple imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.2,000/-. In our view, this is one of those cases where instead of confining the appellant in prison, the interest of justice will be better served if he is made to compensate the family of the deceased on account of the loss suffered by them.

10. Accordingly, while maintaining the appellant's conviction under Sections 279 and 304-A I.P.C., notwithstanding the agreement arrived 8 at between the parties, we increase the amount of fine from Rs.2,000/- to Rs.20,000/- to be paid by the appellant to the parents of the deceased and reduce the sentence to the period already undergone, subject to payment of the fine. The aforesaid amount is to be deposited by the appellant in the Trial Court within three weeks from date, and on such deposit, the said amount shall be made over to the parents of the deceased and the appellant shall be released forthwith. In default of such deposit, this order shall remain in abeyance for a period of four weeks and if still no deposit is made within the said period the appeal will stand dismissed.

11. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

_________________J.

(ALTAMAS KABIR) _________________J.

(MARKANDEY KATJU) New Delhi Dated: 11.12.2008
Vidyabai & Ors vs Padmalatha & Anr

By reason of an order dated 18.07.2007, the learned Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) Hubli dismissed the said applications holding that an entirely new case is sought to be made out. The contention that they had no knowledge of the facts stated therein and the respondents could not gather the materials and information necessary for drafting proper written statement earlier was rejected, stating:

It, however, took into consideration the fact that the said IAs were filed after the affidavit of evidence had been filed by the plaintiffs - appellants. Despite noticing the proviso appended to Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code, it was held;

I.A. 10 was also directed to be allowed.

The ratio in Kailash (supra) was reiterated stating that the trial is deemed to commence when the issues are settled and the case is set down for recording of evidence.

14. It is the primal duty of the court to decide as to whether such an amendment is necessary to decide the real dispute between the parties. Only if such a condition is fulfilled, the amendment is to be allowed. 14

The High Court did not deal with the contentions raised before it. It has not applied its mind on the jurisdictional issue. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. 15

18. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

December 12, 2008
Mahavir Singh vs Khiali Ram & Ors

5. Indisputably, six persons had applied for the said post. However, Appellant and Respondent No. 1 as also one Ram Kumar were found fit to be considered for appointment to the said post. Upon consideration of the respective merit of the said candidates and in particular that of the appellant and the respondent No. 1 herein, appellant was appointed being a more meritorious candidate than others, stating:

7. Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition thereagainst before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh which was marked as Civil Writ Petition No. 5582 of 2006. By reason of the impugned judgment and order dated 9.11.2006, a Division Bench of the said Court inter alia opining that the respondent No. 1 herein was a more meritorious candidate, reversed the said decision of the District Collector holding that Respondent No. 1 was also a graduate having work experience of 15 years in the Armed Forces and character certificate having been issued in his favour by the Head Master of Government Girls Primary School and the Sarpanch of Village Thurana and moreover having served in the Armed Forces that he was a dedicated and disciplined person and enjoys a good reputation.

The appointment of the appellant, on the said findings, was directed to be set aside by the High Court, stating:

15. Keeping in view the aforementioned backdrop, the correctness of the judgment of the High Court may have to be considered.

20. For the reasons aforementioned, the judgment of the High Court being wholly unsustainable is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The Collector, Hisar is directed to restore the services of the appellant forthwith. No costs.

December 12, 2008
Vaman Narain Ghiya vs State Of Rajasthan

2. Stand of appellant before the High Court was that he was discharged of offence punishable under Section 413 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') by the trial Court and therefore he was facing trial only for the offence triable by the Court of Magistrate, i.e. under Sections 457, 380 and 411 IPC. It was the stand of the appellant that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was not sufficient to secure his conviction in respect of any of the charges. It was pointed out that evidence of seven witnesses have been recorded and none of them has implicated him in the crime. There is no recovery from him and other co-accused persons similarly situated namely, Madam Mohan Agarwal and Manoj Sharma had been enlarged on bail. Out of 10 cases registered against him, he has been granted bail in six cases. He is in jail for more than 2 = years and in any case he is entitled to bail in view of the provisions contained in Section 437 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code'). The State opposed the bail application on the ground that in an identical case the application of the applicant was rejected by the Jaipur Bench and the matter was carried to this Court and no interference was made. Further the order of discharge in respect of offence punishable under Section 413 IPC was challenged by 2 filing a revision before the High Court. Considering the aforesaid aspects the prayer for bail was rejected.

20. We find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
M.D.,Balasaheb Desai Sahakari S.K.Ltd vs Kashinath Ganapati Kambale

2. Appellant herein is a Cooperative Society. It runs a sugar factory. Respondent was appointed as a peon in July 1974. On or about 1.12.1983, a show cause notice was issued seeking an explanation from him as regards some alleged misconduct on his part. He was placed under suspension. A charge sheet dated 29.12.1983 was issued against him, inter alia, in respect of the following charges:

3. A departmental proceeding was held in which he was found guilty of the said charges. He was dismissed from services by the appellant by an order dated 5.7.1984.

8. By reason of the impugned judgment, an intra court appeal preferred by the appellant has been dismissed.

18. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in this case, no back-wages should have been awarded in favour of the respondent.

We have been, however, informed by the Bar that a sum of Rs.60,000/- has already been paid to the respondent. It is, therefore, directed that any amount paid to the respondent, if any, shall not be recovered.

19. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment of the High Court is modified to the aforementioned extent. The appeal is allowed in part. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

December 12, 2008 11
B.P.Moideen Sevamandir & Anr vs A.M.Kutty Hassan

2. The appellants were the defendants in a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction. Having lost before the trial court and the first appellate court, the appellants filed a second appeal before the High Court of Kerala on 6.2.2005. The appeal was admitted and an interim stay of execution was granted in the said appeal on 1.6.2005. The pending second appeal was referred to the Lok Adalat organized by the Kerala High Court Legal Services Committee on 25.5.2007. Before the Lok Adalat, parties apparently arrived at a tentative settlement. The Lok 2 Adalat consisting of two retired Judges of the High Court purported to pass the following `award' dated 25.5.2007 in the appeal :

4. The second appeal was thereafter listed for the final hearing on 19.8.2008 before a learned Single Judge. When the matter reached hearing in the post-lunch session, an advocate attached to the office of the appellants' counsel submitted that the appeal was to be argued by his colleague Mrs. Sarita, that due to personal inconvenience she could not be present during that session, and that therefore the matter may be adjourned to the next day. The learned Single Judge rejected the request and dismissed the appeal. The operative portion of the order dated 19.8.2008 is extracted below :

16. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court are set aside. The second appeal is restored to the file of the High Court for being disposed of on merits in accordance with law. We request the Hon. Chief Justice to assign the appeal to some other learned Judge of the High Court. Whatever is stated above is not intended to be a reflection on the judicial integrity of the learned Judge, nor intended to impute any personal prejudice or bias.

_________________J [R. V. Raveendran] __________________J [D. K. Jain] New Delhi;

December 12, 2008.