L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Fakkirappa Basappa Bhairappanavar & ... vs H.F. Bhairappanavar (D) By Lrs. & Anr

The suit for partition, possession and mesne profits filed by Hanumanthappa Fakkirappa Bhairappanavar, who is now represented by his L.Rs. was dismissed by the Trial Court by recording a finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that his family and defendants are still a joint family; that plot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were purchased from joint family funds and that V.P.C. No. 276 house was constructed on it out of joint family funds. The Trial Court further held that a partition had taken place in the family in 1950 which was reduced in writing in the year 1960 and that the disputed properties are self acquired properties of defendant no.1. On appeal, the High Court reversed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and decreed the suit.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal of the appeal in accordance with law.

No costs.
Vikram Greentech (I) Ltd. & Anr vs New India Assurance Co. Ltd

2. The sequence of facts may be noticed first. Vikram Greentech (I) Ltd. came to be incorporated in 1993 with an object of setting up a floriculture project in the State of Maharashtra. In 1995, the company started negotiations with the respondent (hereinafter referred to as `Insurance Company') for a comprehensive floriculture insurance policy. On January 18,1996, the company (hereinafter referred to as `insured') submitted a proposal to the Insurance Company for a comprehensive floriculture insurance of poly-house (Rs.1.25 crore), irrigation system (Rs.25 lakh), cost of cultivation of flowers (Rs.25 lakh) and input cost from first flowering to the harvest (Rs.25 lakh). The Insurance Company issued a comprehensive Floriculture Insurance Policy (`Policy', in short) on January 23,1996, period of insurance being from January 18,1996 to January 17,1997 and charged premium of Rs. 2,31,000/-. On May 23,1996, according to the insured there was a severe storm/cyclone, which damaged the floriculture extensively and substantial damage was caused to the roofs and walls of the poly-houses. On June 18/19,1996, there was another storm/cyclone. As a result of which the floriculture project of the insured and the poly clothes and the roofs as 2 well as walls of the poly-houses were extensively damaged; certain poly-houses even collapsed completely. For the loss suffered in the first storm/cyclone, a claim for Rs.31,17,140/- was submitted by the insured with the Insurance Company. The insured submitted another claim for Rs.38,97,906/- in respect of loss suffered due to second storm/cyclone that occurred on June 18/19,1996.

6. The Insurance Company, then, appointed M/s Jupiter Claim Consultants as investigators for verification of the claim. The insured was also asked to furnish necessary documents to the said investigators. The investigators are said to have submitted their report on September 12,1997 stating therein that they were not able to submit their certification as regard the cost of poly-houses Nos. 1 to 6 and other related matters categorically for sum insured and claim thereof.

10. A rejoinder came to be filed by the insured and it was stated therein that at the relevant point of time, the size of the farm was 6.3 hectares and the entire area was covered by the Insurance Company and it was not limited to the area to 2.8 hectares as contended by the Insurance Company. 5

in other words replacement cost.

(ii) of the Proposal Form mentions Survey/Gat/Hissa no.163, 158,157,156,148,149,147 and 164 and total area 2.6 hectares. It is on this area that six poly-houses were existing on the date the proposal was made and policy issued. These six poly- houses were only covered by the policy.

23. The National Commission concluded thus:

We do not find any error in the conclusion of the National Commission.

24. In what we have discussed above, the appeal is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed with no order as to costs.

..........................J (D.K. Jain) ..........................J (R.M. Lodha) New Delhi, April 1, 2009.
Hazarat Ali vs Spl. Land Acquisition Officer & Anr

By an order dated 8.02.1972, Special Land Acquisition Officer, Saundatti, allotted plot no. 749, Block Nos. 1-2 of Rampura village District Belgaum, State of Karnataka, to the appellant by treating him as displaced person. After one month and twenty eight days, the concerned officer passed order dated 30.03.1972 whereby he revised the allotment and allotted plot no. 749 to respondent no.2 - Imamsab Mohamadsab Dupadal and one Fakiramma wife of Meerasah Pinjar. The appellant did not challenge the allotment made in favour of respondent no.2 and Fakiramma but, after more than twenty years, the Special Officer passed order dated 9.7.1992 whereby he cancelled the allotment made in favour of respondent no.2 and Fakiramma on the ground that respondent no.2 is residing at Betageri in Dharwad district and no document was produced in support of his eligibility as displaced person.

Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ appeal preferred by the appellant and confirmed the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge for invalidation of order dated 9.7.1992.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part, impugned orders are modified and it is made clear that the concerned officer shall be free to pass fresh order in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the affected persons.

No costs.
Rama Chaudhary vs State Of Bihar

3) Brief facts of the case are as follows:

e) On 12.01.2008, the prosecution has filed an application in a pending Sessions Trial No. 63 of 2004 to summon the prosecution witnesses named in the second charge-sheet. The appellant has filed a reply contending that the application filed by the prosecution is not maintainable and the same was filed with mala fide intention. By order dated 19.02.2008, the learned Sessions Judge, Special Court allowed the said application to summon the witnesses by observing that the goal of criminal trial is to discover the truth and to 3 achieve that goal the best possible evidence is to be brought on record. The learned trial Judge issued summons to the newly added witnesses and posted the case to 23.02.2008. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed Criminal Revision No. 437 of 2003 under Sections 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court. By the impugned judgment and order dated 10.12.2008, the High Court dismissed the said revision. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed the above appeal.

14) In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any valid ground for interference, consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

APRIL 02, 2009.
Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi vs M/S Woodward Governor India P. Ltd

5. The assessee filed its Return of Income on 28.1.1998 for the assessment year 1998-99 on a total income of Rs. 1,10,28,190.00. That return was processed under Section 143(1)(a) on 23.3.1999. On 16.8.1999 a notice under Section 143(2) was issued to the assessee stating that in the course of assessment proceedings under Section 143 it was noticed by the Department that the assessee had debited to its Profit & Loss Account a sum of Rs. 41,06,746.00 out of which a sum of Rs. 29,49,088.00 was the unrealized loss due to foreign exchange fluctuation on the last date of the accounting year. The AO held that the liability as on the last date of the previous year under consideration was a contingent liability, it was not an ascertained liability and consequently it had to be added back to the total income of the assessee. Accordingly, he added back Rs. 29,49,088.00 being the unrealized loss due to foreign exchange fluctuation. In other words, the debit to the P&L account was disallowed. This order of the AO was upheld by the CIT(A) vide decision dated 4 29.11.2001. Being aggrieved, the assessee went in appeal to the Tribunal. By judgment and order dated 1.4.2005 the Tribunal relying on its earlier decision in the case of M/s Woodward Governor India P. Ltd. for the assessment years 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98 held that the claim of the assessee for deduction of unrealized loss due to foreign exchange fluctuation as on the last date of the previous year had to be allowed. This decision of the Tribunal has been upheld by the Delhi High Court vide the impugned judgment dated 30.4.2007, hence, this Civil Appeal is filed by the Department.

[Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 7632/08]

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied)

Conclusion:

35. For reasons given hereinabove, we find no infirmity in the impugned judgments of the Delhi High Court and accordingly the Civil Appeals filed by the Department stand dismissed with no order as to costs.

April 8, 2009.

1.4.1999 - "X" borrows $ 100/-

- debits the loan A/c by Rs. 3500/-

(at Rs. 35/- per dollar) on the basis of prevailing market rate.

- Amount borrowed is utilized in business.

31.3.2000 - Rate of exchange fluctuated and it became Rs. 40/- per Dollar.

- Liability increased by Rs. 500/-.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.H. Kapadia pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising his Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aftab Alam.

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

The Civil Appeals filed by the Department stand dismissed in terms of the signed judgment which is placed on the file. There shall be no order as to costs.
Katari Suryanarayana & Ors vs Koppisetti Subba Rao & Ors

6. Appellant approached the High Court in the year 1997 aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court by preferring a second appeal which was marked as SA No.192 of 1997. Indisputably during the pendency of the said appeal; whereas Respondent No.3 expired on 31.5.1999, Respondent No.2 expired on 14.1.2000. No application for their substitution within the period prescribed under Order XXII Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed. Appellant filed an application for bringing on record the heirs and legal representatives of the said respondent Nos.2 and 3 only in December 2006 alleging that they had been informed thereabout by their counsel only on 19.11.2006. An application for condonation of delay in filing the said application was also filed. The said applications, as noticed hereinbefore, were barred by 2381 days and 2601 days respectively. By reason of the impugned judgment and order, the High Court refused to condone the delay in bringing on records the heirs and legal representatives of respondent 4 Nos.2 and 3. Consequently, as indicated hereinbefore, it was held that the appeal had abated.

Explanation.--Nothing in this rule shall be construed as barring, in any later suit, a defence based -on the facts which constituted the cause of 7 action in the suit which had abated or had been dismissed under this Order."

(ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement.

(iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in refiling the appeal after rectification of defects.

Appellants have pleaded about the intimation from their counsel. There is nothing on record to show whether the said intimation was written or oral.

14. In vies view of the matter, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This appeal is dismissed accordingly. No costs.

April 8, 2009
Hira Lal & Ors vs State Of U.P. & Ors

2. Appellants and the respondent No.3 (complainant) are co-sharers. Raghuvansh Tyagi, father of respondent No.3, and Tika Ram Tyagi, father of Smt. Suman Devi were co-khatedars in respect of Khasra No.59 having an area of 2.0920 hectares of land situated in village Bhangel Begampur, PS Phase II, Noida.

Father of Respondent No.3 and Suman Devi were having 3/16th share in the aforementioned khasra. According to the complainant, prior to 1997 a mutual agreement was entered into amongst the co-sharers, pursuant whereto, 2000 sq. yds. of lands was allotted for the purpose of residential house to each of the co-sharer. The complainant on his allotted land, allegedly constructed a house and started living there. He also said to have constructed 10 shops. Tika Ram Tyagi is said to have constructed two houses on 600 sq. yards of land and his sons also constructed pucca houses on the remaining 1400 sq. yds. of land in November 2006.

It is stated that Suman Devi later on executed a `Bainama' in favour of Ashok Kumar Tyagi, younger brother of appellant No.1 on the basis of the said Will. It stands admitted that in terms thereof Suman Devi got her name mutated in the Land Revenue Record on or about 26.9.2002. She, allegedly, sold nine shops in favour of Ashok Kumar Tyagi by reason of a `Bainama' dated 22.10.2002. Yet again she sold another shop on 23.10.2002 by reason of another `Bainama' in favour of Ashok Kumar Tyagi.

4. A civil suit was filed by the respondent in the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gautam Budh Nagar, inter alia, praying for cancellation of the said Will on the premise that the said Will was a forged one. The said 4 suit was dismissed by an order dated 29.3.2006. An appeal thereagainst is said to be pending.

Prior thereto, Respondent No.3 filed a complaint petition in the Court of ACJM, Gautam Budh Nagar which was marked as Complaint Case No.212 of 2003 under Section 420, 462, 467, 468 and 471 IPC, inter alia, contending that the Will dated 1.8.2006 purported to have been executed by Tika Ram Tyagi in favour of his daughter Suman Devi was a forged and fabricated document. The learned ACJM, Gautam Budh Nagar, however, dismissed the said complaint petition, stating :

16. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where cognizance of the offence could have been taken or any summons could have been issued. The impugned judgment, thus, cannot be upheld. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is, therefore, allowed.

April 8, 2009
Lakshmi & Anr vs Chinnammal @ Rayyammal & Ors

3. Parties hereto are co-sharers. Allegedly, a deed of partition was entered into by and between them on or about 28.11.2002. Questioning the genuineness of the said deed of partition, a suit for cancellation thereof was filed by the appellant therein. Indisputably, in relation thereto, a First Information Report was also lodged. During investigation, the Investigating Officer recovered the purported original deed of partition from the custody of the respondent. It was sent for examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chennai.

(2) Every application made under this rule shall (unless the Court otherwise directs) be supported by an affidavit showing how the record is material to the suit in which the application is made, and that the applicant cannot without unreasonable delay or expense obtain a duly authenticated copy of the record or of such portion thereof as the applicant requires, or that the production of the original is necessary for the purposes of justice. (3) Nothing contained in this rule shall be deemed to enable the Court to use in evidence any document which under the law of evidence would be inadmissible in the suit."

15. In view of the aforementioned pronouncements, we are of the opinion that the learned Trial Judge should have acceded to the prayer of the appellants herein.

16. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs.

April 8, 2009
Regional Manager,Central Bank Of India vs Vijay Krishna Neema & Ors

4. As he did not join his duties, a show-cause notice dated 9.2.1987 was issued as to why a disciplinary proceeding shall not be initiated against him, stating :

5. Respondent filed a representation upon receipt of the said notice.

Indisputably, respondent had taken some loan from the bank, he had shifted from 192, Jawahar Marg, Indore to 62, Vandana Nagar, Indore. A recovery suit was filed by the bank wherein the address of the respondent was stated as 62, Vandana Nagar, Indore.

7. Respondent also preferred an appeal on 2.5.1987 against the said order dated 6.4.1987. He thereafter filed a writ petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench, Indore which was marked as W.P.586 of 1988. By reason of an order dated 22.4.1997, the said writ petition was disposed of by the High Court, observing :

8. Pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, the appellate authority treated the appeal preferred before the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Bhopal as a departmental appeal. He was given an opportunity of hearing. The Appellate Authority by an order dated 24.10.1997 dismissed the said appeal, opining :

The writ petition was allowed, directing :

Learned Single Judge had furthermore given liberty to the appellant to give an opportunity of hearing to the respondent. It is also not in dispute that the respondent has been working in the bank since 2004. In the aforementioned facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

18. The appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

April 8, 2009
Rajendra & Anr vs State Of U.P

2. The prosecution case, as disclosed in the first information report lodged with the Dadari Police Station by Phoolwati (PW1), wife of the deceased Ratiram on 27.5.1981 is as under:

3. Phoolwati went to the Police Station which was about three furlongs away from the village. A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged at about 7.50 am. In the said FIR, presence of Munna (PW1), Surajbhan (PW3) and Jahangir Ram (PW4), minor son of the deceased was disclosed. The Investigating Officer came to the village. The dead body was taken out of the well at about 10.00 am and was sent for post mortem. In the post mortem, the cause of action for death was stated to be asphyxia due to drowning. No injury on the person of the deceased was, however, noticed.

18. We have been taken through the entire materials on record and addressed at length by Mr. Sushil Kumar. We place on record that although the accused were not represented before the High Court by an advocate. Mr. Sushil Kumar very fairly took the stand that this Court should dispose 13 of the entire appeal and need not remit the matter to the High Court for its consideration afresh.

19. For the reasons aforementioned there is no merit in the appeal. It is dismissed accordingly.

20. As Narpat, Appellant No.2, has expired, appeal stands abated so far as he is concerned.

April 8, 2009
Dr.B.N.Hospital & N.Hospital ... vs Commissioner Of Customs, Mumbai

On 1st March, 1988, Government of India issued a Notification No 64 of 1988 exempting import of equipments by hospitals from payment of customs duty on fulfillment of conditions prescribed therein. We quote hereinbelow the said Notification:

It appears that the impugned order was passed on 1.10.2008, however, vide Order dated 26.11.2008 in Writ Petition No. 651 of 2001, the order of cancellation of CDEC, which was an ex-parte order, has been set aside. In the circumstances, we hold that this case is not covered by the judgment in the case of Jaslok Hospital (supra). Therefore, on the date of the application for change in categorization the issue of categorization was a live issue.

On this ground alone we set aside the impugned judgment dated October 1, 2008 in Customs Appeal Nos. 52, 53 and 55 of 2008 and remit the cases to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

Accordingly, the appeals stand allowed with no order as to costs.

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).3554/2009 (From the judgment and order dated 01/10/2008 in CA No. 52/2008 of The HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY) DR.B.N.HOSPITAL & N.HOSPITAL RES.CENTRE Petitioner(s) VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, MUMBAI Respondent(s) (With appln(s) for permission to place addl. documents on record, and prayer for interim relief) WITH SLP(C) NO. 4129 of 2009 - With appln(s) for permission to place addl. documents on record, and prayer for interim relief SLP(C) NO. 4286 of 2009 - With appln(s) for permission to place addl. documents on record, and prayer for interim relief Date: 08/04/2009 This Petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
Posuram Deshmukh vs State Of Chhattisgarh

4. After investigation, charge sheet was filed. As the accused persons pleaded innocence, trial was held. Twelve witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version. PW-1 was an injured witness. The trial 5 Court placed reliance on the evidence of eye witnesses and found the appellant guilty. Questioning the conviction, the appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court. The stand taken before the High Court that the occurrence took place in course of sudden quarrel was not accepted. The appellant has filed this appeal primarily on the ground that even if the prosecution version is accepted in its totality, case under Section 302 IPC is not made out.

8. When the background facts are considered in the light of legal position elaborated above, the inevitable conclusion is that in the present case Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC applies.

9. That being so, the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part I, IPC. The conviction is altered accordingly. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.

10. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.