L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of U.P. & Ors vs M/S. S.K. Theatre Productions & Ors

The facts of the case are that to promote film production in the State of U.P. the State Government constituted a Society named Film Bandhu in the year 2001 which was registered under the Societies' Registration Act. Various Government orders were issued to give facilities for film production in U.P. and a film policy was made. Various incentives were also declared to be given to the films made in regional languages in U.P. such as Avadhi, Bhojpuri and Braj etc. These various incentives are mentioned in the booklet entitled 'Uttar Pradesh Film Policy 2001', copy of which has been supplied to us. These include trade tax exemptions, tax incentives, subsidy, two weeks' compulsory exhibitions of regional films, etc. The respondents claim subsidy under clause 23.3 of the Film Policy. The said clause 23.3 states :-

By the impugned judgment the writ petition was allowed and hence this appeal.

We are of the opinion that if other film producers were granted subsidy of 25% of the cost of production of the film (subject to a maximum limit of Rs.10 lacs) then the writ petitioners should also be given the same benefits. However, if that was not done then the subsidy should be 25% of the cost of film processing in the lab (subject to a maximum of Rs.10 lacs) and not the entire cost of the film production.

For the reasons given above, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and remand the matter to the High Court. No cost.
Dattatray Krishnaji Ghule vs State Of Maharashtra And Anr. ...

4. The case of the prosecution against the appellants, in brief, is as under:

5. On 16th May, 2005 appellant P.S.I Hitendra Manohar Vichare (hereinafter referred to as Vichare) arrested one Sandeep Kandar and fake stamps worth Rs. 51,000/- were seized. On the same day C.R. No. 131 of 2001 was registered. Vichare investigated the case from 16th May, 2001 to 22nd May, 2001. Appellant P.I. Dattatray Krishnaji Ghule (hereinafter referred to as Ghule) took over investigations in the said case on 22nd May, 2001. On 23rd May, 2001 one Maruti Car was intercepted and a huge quantity of fake stamps was seized from the occupants of the car. Ghule was in- charge of the investigations from 22nd May, 2001 to 26th December, 2001. As a result of investigations, three charge-sheets were filed against several persons, including one Shabbir Sheikh and Abdul Karim Ladsab Telgi, head of an organised crime syndicate, engaged in unlawful activities relating to printing of counterfeit stamps and other documents and sale thereof. However, subsequently, under the orders of this Court, investigations in the case were transferred to the C.B.I. and the provisions of MCOCA were invoked. As a result of fresh investigations by the C.B.I. cases were registered against the appellants under the aforementioned provisions and they were arrested on 8th October, 2004.

12. Thus, in the light of what has been said above, what needs to be considered is whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that the appellants are not guilty of the two offences, they have been charged with and further that they are not likely to commit an offence under MCOCA while on bail.

14. Consequently, the appeals are allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside. It is directed that the appellants shall be enlarged on bail on their furnishing personal bonds in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- each with two sureties, each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Special Court, Pune. They shall also remain bound by all the conditions as stipulated in Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They shall also surrender their passports, if any, before the Special Court, Pune. Needless to add that the afore-noted observations on the merits of the allegations against the appellants are tentative, purely for the purpose of these appeals and shall not be construed as expression of a final opinion on any of the issues of fact or law, which may arise for consideration during the course of trial.
N. Suriyakala vs A. Mohandoss & Ors

Admittedly the appellant has also filed a maintenance case against the respondent. The appellant and respondent were married with each other on 14.11.1996 but the marriage did not work out. The husband had filed a petition before the First Additional Family Court, Chennai seeking a declaration that his marriage with appellant was null and void but he withdrew that petition stating that he wishes to resume marital life and that petition was dismissed by the Family Court on 9.7.2003.

In the present case we are of the opinion that this is not fit case to be entertained in exercise of our discretion under Article 136. The appellant has also filed a maintenance petition against her husband. What can she possibly get by prosecuting him as well as his family members? The appellant filed the criminal case under Section 498A etc. not only against her husband but also against her husband's father, mother, brother, sister, etc. In exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned Judgment of the High Court quashing the criminal case filed by the appellant. After all, the appellant will not get any benefit by sending her husband or his family members to jail. She is pursuing her maintenance case, and if she is so advised she can also file a suit for damages, which if filed will be decided on its own merits. With the above observations, this appeal is dismissed.
Deepa Gourang Murdeshwar Katre vs The Principal, V.A.V. College Of Arts. & ...

Background facts The Appellant applied for appointment in the college, respondent No.1, on the post of English Lecturer, pursuant to a vacancy which had arisen by leaving of an English Lecturer after the Ist term. The appellant was duly interviewed by the local selection committee and was appointed as full time lecturer in English on 22.11.1993 on temporary basis for 2nd term subject to the approval of the University. The appellant joined as Lecturer and has been working since then. The College advertised a number of vacant posts for the academic year 1994-1995 on 29.4.1994 by way of newspaper publication. One of the posts was the post of English Lecturer, but the same was reserved for Scheduled Caste candidate. The advertisement, however, provided that in case the backward class candidate was not available, then a candidate from the general category would be considered for appointment on year to year basis. No backward class candidate applied for the said post. Three general category candidates applied out of which the Appellant was selected and recommended for appointment by the Six-Members' Selection Committee on 11.7.1994.

For the 4th academic year again the post of Lecturer of English was advertised by College as reserved post for Scheduled Caste Candidate on 28.4.1997. However, no scheduled caste category candidate applied for and reported for interview. Therefore, the appellant was once again appointed on temporary basis on the said post for one academic year on 24.7.1997.

For the 5th academic year i.e. 1998-1999, the post of English Lecturer was again advertised as reserved post for Scheduled Caste candidate. It was clearly mentioned in the advertisement that this was the 5th advertisement. However, no Scheduled caste category candidate applied for and reported for interview. Therefore, the appellant was once again appointed on temporary basis on the said post for one academic year on 15.7.1998. Thus as per Government resolution and the University circular, 6th advertisement with interchangeability clause had to be issued. The draft of the said advertisement for the academic year 1999-2000 was forwarded by the College to the University on 3.4.1999. The University duly vetted the said draft advertisement and returned the same to the College on 7.4.1999 for publication. Accordingly, the 6th advertisement was published by the College in Maharashtra Times on 13.4.1999 clearly mentioning that the post was being advertised for the 6th time on interchangeability basis as per Government Rules. However, no Scheduled Caste candidate applied for and reported for interview.

In the meantime, the appellant had approached the High Court of Bombay by way of Writ Petition No. 1914 of 1999 for confirmation of her services as no candidate from backward class had appeared for even an interview after six years. Vide order dated 12.7.1999, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court granted interim relief to the appellant i.e. the appellant was not to be terminated from services.

Rule made absolute accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
Darshan Singh vs State Of Punjab

A case of embezzlement and misappropriation of Government funds was made against him and the department filed an appeal against the Respondent and he was put under suspension vide office order No. 57/E dated 24.5.1965. A criminal case was initiated against the Appellant which ultimately resulted in the acquittal of the Appellant vide judgment and order dated 9.8.1973 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar. No departmental action was taken against the Appellant and he was merely kept under suspension. The Appellant was reinstated vide order dated 12.4.1978 and it was ordered that period of his suspension be treated on duty for all intents and purposes. The Appellant was given proforma promotion as Officiating Head Clerk w.e.f. 24.9.1972 vide office order No. 55/E dated 27.4.1978. The Appellant retired after attaining the age of superannuation as Superintendent Grade-IV on 28.2.1989.

The suit of the Appellant was partly allowed by the trial court holding him entitled for an amount of Rs.60,586.75 along with interest at 12% per annum from the date the amount became due till its actual payment. The claim for crossing the efficiency bar was, however, rejected by the Trial Court being time barred.

Two second appeals which were filed by the Respondent against the common judgment of the Appellate Court were dismissed by the High Court on 12.9.1994. Thereafter the Appellant filed execution petition in the Court of Additional Civil Judge, Amritsar on 31.10.1994. The Respondent/State filed its objections. The Respondent/State thereupon filed Special Leave Petition Nos. 1527-1528 of 1995 in this Court and the same was dismissed vide order dated 3.2.1995. The Appellant replied to the objections of the State in the execution proceedings. Office Order No. 100 dated 24.3.1995 was issued by the Respondent whereby the Appellant was allowed to cross the efficiency bar. Vide Office Order No. 103/95 dated 30.3.1995, the Appellant was also granted one additional increment on consolidation of 8 years' service in the form of proficiency step up w.e.f. 1.1.1986. The Executing Court dismissed the objections filed by the Respondent/State and held that the Appellant is entitled for interest at 12% per annum with yearly rest. The Civil Revision Petition filed by the State against the order dated 15.5.1996 of the Executing Court was allowed holding that the Appellant is entitled to an amount of Rs.60,586.75 from 9.12.1992, namely, the date of decree upto the date of actual payment.

We shall now consider the above three judgments.

In our view, the impugned order dated 8.4.2005 passed by the High Court is totally erroneous and thus not sustainable in law. We, therefore, direct the Respondent/State to pay the said sum of Rs.60,586.75 with simple interest @ 12% per annum from 25.5.1965 till its realization. The entire amount due shall be paid within two months from this date failing which the Appellant will be entitled for payment with 18% simple interest per annum.

The Civil Appeal stands allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
Jakki @ Selvaraj And Anr vs State Rep. By The Ip, Coimbatore

In support of the prosecution version several witnesses were examined. The evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 13 was claimed to be of vital importance as they were described as eye witnesses. The trial Court found that PWs 1 and 2 resiled from the statements made by them during investigation. Relying on the evidence of PW-13 the conviction was recorded. A-1 to A-4 were convicted for offences punishable under Sections 148 and 302 IPC and A-5 to A-6 were convicted for offences punishable under Sections 147 and 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. All the six accused persons who were convicted preferred an appeal before the High Court which by the impugned judgment directed acquittal of four of the accused persons while confirming the conviction of A1 and A2. It was held that though the evidence of PW-13 was held to be not reliable so far as the same related to A-3 to A-6, the same was sufficient to fashion guilt on the accused appellants. It was held that his evidence was credible and cogent so far as these two accused persons are concerned.

Applying the principles set out above, it is clear that even when the testimony of a witness is discarded in part vis-`-vis some other co-accused persons, that cannot per se be the reason to discard his evidence in toto. As rightly observed by the trial Court and the High Court, the evidence of PW-13 has not been shakened in any manner though he was cross examined at length. Additionally, the trial Court and the High Court have found that the evidence of the doctor (PW-4) clearly shows existence of injuries in the manner described by PW-13 by weapons allegedly held by the appellants. In that view of the matter, the judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
Kumari Suman Pandey vs State Of Uttar Pradesh And Anr

A brief reference to the factual aspect would be necessary. On 14.5.2003 First Information Report (in short the 'FIR') was lodged by the appellant alleging murder of her younger brother-Ravish Kumar Pandey (hereinafter referred to as the 'Deceased'). At the relevant point of time the deceased was pursuing his studies in Era Medical College. In the FIR name of respondent No.2 was indicated to be the sole accused. One of the eye witnesses was stated to be one Priyanka Tiwari. She appeared before the concerned Magistrate and her statement was recorded in terms of Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). In the statement she specifically stated that murder of the deceased was committed by respondent No.2 in her presence. Charge sheet was filed on 19.11.2004. Cognizance was taken by the concerned Magistrate. Thereafter, the investigation was transferred to C.B.C.I.D. The order of the State Government was challenged by the appellant by filing a writ petition No.5874(M/B) of 2004 before the High Court. By order dated 13.1.2005 the writ petition was allowed and the order transferring investigation to CBCID was quashed by the High Court. Application for bail was filed by respondent No.2 before the High Court which was numbered as Criminal Misc. Case No.869 (B) of 2005. The said bail application was rejected by order dated 15.3.2005 with the observation that if any fresh bail application is filed, the same shall be considered after the statements of the appellant and aforesaid Priyanka Tiwari are recorded by the trial court in the trial proceedings. On 20.6.2005 appellant's evidence was recorded and she categorically stated that in her presence murder was committed. On 25.8.2005 Priyanka Tiwari who was claimed to an eye-witness was also examined and her evidence was recorded by the trial court. The cross-examination was concluded on 5.9.2005. In January, 2006 the respondent No. 2 filed the second bail application before the High Court which was numbered as Criminal Misc. Case No. 6282 (B) of 2005. The said bail application was rejected reiterating the earlier view that the application for bail can be considered after the evidence of Priyanka Tiwari as recorded or if she failed to appear for the purpose of recording her evidence. A certificate was issued by the Ministry of Health, Ukrain that the summer vacation of Priyanka Tiwari was between 3.7.2006 and 31.8.2006. This certificate was filed before the trial court. In May, 2006 respondent No.2 filed the third bail application which was number as Criminal Misc. Case No.2233(B) of 2006. The High Court by its impugned order dated 22.5.2006 has granted the bail.

On 21.8.2006 the respondent No.2 again was not present. The court had on the earlier occasion directed the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 to indicate the details of the case where he was purportedly arrested but those details were not filed and the matter was further adjourned to 21.9.2006. On 21.9.2006 also respondent No.2 did not appear.

The appeal is allowed.
Shyam vs State Of M.P. Through P.S. Bercha

Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench. On the basis of the accusations that appellant and four others were responsible for the homicidal death of one Kailash (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') on 27.10.1995, the accused persons faced trial. The learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Shajapur, found two of the accused persons i.e. Prakash and appellant herein Shyam to be guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). Each was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each with default stipulation. The other three were acquitted. The appellant and co-accused Prakash preferred an appeal before the High Court which was dismissed by the impugned order, so far as appellant is concerned. Prakash was directed to be acquitted.

Custodial sentence of 7 years was imposed. Accordingly the appeal was partially allowed.

In the aforesaid circumstances the judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity.

The appeal is dismissed.
Union Public Service Commission vs S. Thiagarajan & Ors

The first respondent was recruited as Forest Ranger and was promoted as Assistant Conservator of forest on 12.7.1982 and he was further promoted as Deputy Conservator of Forest on 20.9.1996. He was eligible for inclusion in the select list for promotion to the Indian Forest Service. Since his name was not included in the select list, he made a representation and that representation was rejected. Against this rejection the first respondent filed an O.A. before the Central Administrative Tribunal, which allowed the said application.

The contentions of the first respondent before the said Tribunal were:

The Tribunal, after careful consideration of the contentions of both the sides, allowed the O.A. in favour of the first respondent, and passed the following order in favour of the first respondent:

The High court, however, agreed with the view taken by the Tribunal and dismissed the writ petition. Hence this appeal.

Thus, if an officer against whom disciplinary proceedings are pending is considered by the Selection Committee, his name is included in the select list provisionally, if he is otherwise found suitable for inclusion. He cannot be appointed to the IFS till his inclusion is declared as unconditional and final by the UPSC. In the instant case Shri Shenabagamurthy and T. Srinivasan were included provisionally in the select list of 1998 subject to their clearance in the pending disciplinary cases as such inclusion was in consonance with the Promotion Regulations. Further, the courts below did not appreciate that under the Promotion Regulations, an officer who is included in the zone of consideration has to be considered by the Selection Committee even if disciplinary proceedings are pending against him. The name of such an officer is included provisionally in the select list, if he is otherwise found suitable for inclusion. The courts below therefore erred in hold that the names of such officers should not be considered at all.

Thus the findings of the High Court and Tribunal are without noticing the expression provisions of the statutory Regulations, in accordance with which the Selection Committee prepared the select list. Hence in our opinion there orders are vitiated.

Apart from the above we are also of the opinion that orders of the High Court and the Tribunal are liable to be set aside on the ground that the necessary parties have not been impleaded. Hence the Original Application before the Tribunal was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone vide Prabodh Verma and others, etc., etc. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, etc. [AIR 1985 SC 167].

For the reasons given above, this appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the High Court as well as of the Tribunal are set aside.

There shall be no order as to costs.
S. Sankaran vs D. Kausalya

The respondent filed a written statement contending that the will dated 24.9.1986 alleged to have been executed by Singaravelu Nayagar is a forged one and that the testator had executed a will dated 4.11.1982, much earlier to the execution of the will dated 24.9.1986 where under he bequeathed the property at No.16, Manicka Naicken Street, Purasavakkam, Madras, giving equal share to both the daughters.

No doubt the Division Bench could have reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge but it should have done so after considering inter alia the various factors which persuaded the learned Single Judge to decide in favour of the appellant herein. Since the Division Bench has not done so we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Division Bench cannot be sustained and it is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded to the Division Bench for a fresh decision after considering inter alia the various facts and circumstances of the case referred to by the learned Single Judge and also the evidence and the various case law on the point.

The Division Bench may consider the desirability of an early disposal of the case since it is pending for a long time. The appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.