L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Neerupam Mohan Mathur vs New India Assurance Co

2. The present appeal is filed by the claimant-appellant against the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in FAO No.693 of 1989, whereby the High Court granted a meager enhancement in the amount of compensation awarded to him by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal').

3. The facts involved in the present case are as follows:

5. The respondents contested the claim of the claimant. The Tribunal after perusing oral and documentary evidence held that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving by Driver, Pritam Singh of Bus No.DBP-805. The Issue No.1 was thus decided in favour of the claimant. While assessing the compensation under Issue No.2, the Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs.3,20,000/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

11. According to claimant the normal expectancy of life is 70 years and he was expected to earn up to the said age as a specialist in designing, refrigeration and air conditioning. After loss of the right arm due to accident he has become 100% disabled as his earning capacity has gone down to zero in doing the specialized work like designing, refrigeration and air conditioning. The accident has completely jeopardized his mastery on the subject and his chances of future promotion and professional engagements have been virtually vanished.

15. However from the award passed by the Tribunal and judgment rendered by the High Court, we find no ground shown by the Tribunal or the High Court in providing pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages at a lower rate. Against some of the heads even no amount has been allowed.

18. Having regards to the fact that the Tribunal and the High Court have not allowed reasonable amount for different pecuniary and the non-pecuniary damages, we, therefore, with a view to do complete justice to the claimant re-determined the amount of compensation on the following terms:

19. The respondent Insurance Company is directed to pay the claimant- appellant a sum of Rs.11,64,300/- minus the amount already paid pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal within three months from the date of judgment with interest @ 12%. The order passed by the High Court and Tribunal stands modified to the extent above. The appeal filed by the claimant is allowed with the above observation and direction. No separate order as to costs.
State Of M.P vs Najab Khan & Ors

3) Brief facts:

(a) On 11.08.2001, in the morning, when Mullo Bai, sister of Fida Hussain-the complainant, was passing through the field of Mohabbatdin - co- accused, at that time, Mohabbatdin abused her and told her not to pass through his field. On this, Mullo Bai assured him that she will not pass through his field in future. On the same day, in the evening, at about 7.00 p.m., when Fida Hussain, along with Ahmed Hussain, Gulabuddin and Guddu, was going to the shop of one Nawab, on their way near the hand pump, Najab Khan and Mohabbatdin having spade in their hands and Gani Khan holding a danda (stick) in his hand along with Munnawar Ali came at the spot and surrounded Fida Hussain. Fida Hussain tried to escape but could not succeed and Mohabbatdin attacked him with the spade due to which he sustained injury below his left shoulder and left arm. In order to save him, the other persons, viz., Guddu and Gulabuddin, who were accompanying Fida Hussain, intervened. After beating Fida Hussain, the accused persons fled away from the spot. Thereafter, Fida Hussain went to the Radhogarh Police Station and an FIR was lodged which was registered as Crime No. 248 of 2001.

(b) During the course of investigation, on 22.08.2011, Najab Khan was arrested and Gani Khan and Munnawar Ali were arrested on 10.09.2001. The police also got recovered the weapons (spades and stick) used in the commission of the aforesaid act.

(d) During the trial, on a compromise between the accused persons and Fida Hussain-the complainant, the accused persons were acquitted under Section 341 of IPC.

(f) Against the said order, the respondents moved an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 2006 before the High Court. The High Court, by impugned judgment dated 13.12.2011, partly allowed the appeal by maintaining the conviction of the respondents herein and reduced their sentence to the period already undergone.

6) In view of the fact that the respondents herein-accused appellants before the High Court did not challenge the conviction but only prayed for reduction of sentence awarded by the trial Court, there is no need to traverse the details regarding the conviction. The fact remains that these persons were convicted by the trial Court under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to RI for three years along with a fine of Rs. 500/- each.

16) Though it is stated that both the parties have amicably settled, in view of the fact that the offence charged under Section 326 is non compoundable and also in the light of serious nature of the injuries and no challenge as to conviction, we are of the view that the High Court is not justified in reducing the sentence to the period already undergone.

17) Accordingly, we set aside the order of the High Court and restore the sentence imposed on the respondents herein. Consequently, the appeal filed by the State is allowed and the respondents-accused (A-1 to A-3) are directed to surrender within a period of four weeks from today, failing which, the trial Judge is directed to take appropriate steps for sending them to prison to undergo the remaining period of sentence.

JULY 01, 2013.
S.Manickam vs Metropolitan Transport Corp.Ltd

4) Brief facts:

(a) On 27.01.1997, when the claimant/the appellant herein was alighting from the bus owned by the Metropolitan Transport Corporation Limited (in short “the Transport Corporation”) – respondent herein, the conductor of the bus blown the whistle without noticing him. Due to the sudden movement of the bus, the appellant fell down and the rear wheel of the bus rammed over on his right leg and he sustained severe injuries on his head, right hand and chest. After treatment, his right leg below the knee was amputated. At the time of accident, he was 45 years of age. He made a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (“the Tribunal” for short), Chennai in O.P. No. 1667 of 1997 claiming a sum of Rs. 21,00,000/- as compensation.

(b) The Tribunal, after holding that the accident was caused due to the negligence of the driver of the bus belonging to the Transport Corporation, by order dated 30.11.2000, awarded a sum of Rs. 9,42,822/- as total compensation by adopting the multiplier of 13 in terms of the second schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

(c) Dis-satisfied with the award of the Tribunal, the appellant preferred an appeal being CMA No. 150 of 2001 before the High Court praying for higher compensation, on the other hand, the Transport Corporation also preferred an appeal being CMA No. 82 of 2001 for reduction of the compensation.

7) Inasmuch as the present appeals are preferred by the victim/claimant for enhancement of the compensation, there is no need to traverse the facts leading to the accident. In other words, the finding that the accident occurred due to the negligent driving of the driver of the bus belonging to the Transport Corporation has become final.

18) In the light of the above discussion, the appellant is entitled to the following additional amount:

1,80,000/-. Further, we make it clear that altogether the appellant is entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 8,52,822/- with interest at the rate of 9% from the date of claim petition till the date of deposit.

19) The appeals filed by the claimant/appellant are allowed in part to the extent mentioned above with no order as to costs.

JULY 01, 2013.
Taranjeet Singh Mohan Singh Sawhny&Ors vs Dist. Dy.Registrar Coop.Societies & ...

4. Late Shri Mohan Singh (predecessor of the appellants) owned land measuring 4144.90 sq. mtrs. comprised in CTS Nos. 661 to 691 of Village Kole Kalyan, Taluka Andheri. On 16.10.1979, he entered into an agreement with respondent No.4 for sale of land measuring 3762.45 sq. mtrs. After execution of the agreement, respondent No.4 constructed five buildings, which were occupied by the members of three Co-operative Housing Societies, i.e., respondent Nos. 3, 5 and 6.

5. Due to non-payment of the amount in terms of agreement dated 16.10.1979, the appellants, who are the legal heirs of late Shri Mohan Singh, issued notice dated 16.3.2005 and terminated agreement dated 16.10.1979. After four years, respondent No.5 approached the appellants for purchase of 702.341 sq. mts. out of the land owned by late Shri Mohan Singh. At the asking of the appellants, respondent No.5 produced the consent of respondent Nos. 3 and 6. Thereafter, the appellants executed conveyance dated 25.8.2011 in favour of respondent No.5 and the developer – M/s. Rahul Constructions.

6. Although the appellants had terminated agreement dated 16.10.1979, respondent No.3 entered into an agreement with M/s. Raja Constructions Company (M/s. Raja Builders) for redevelopment of the buildings of ‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘E’ Wings.

13. Along with the writ petition, the appellants filed an application for interim stay. The learned Single Judge took cognizance of the assertion made in the writ petition that notice of preponement of the date of hearing was not served upon them, but refused to grant stay on the ground that the writ petition was filed after four months of the order passed by respondent No.1 and during the intervening period conveyance deed had already been registered for a sum of Rs.95 lacs and the Society and respondent No.3 had entered into development agreements with builders.

16. We have considered the respective arguments and carefully scrutinized the record.

19. As a corollary to the above findings, it must be held that order dated 12.6.2012 passed by respondent No.1 is vitiated due to violation of the rule of audi alteram partem and is liable to be set aside.

20. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order as also order dated 12.6.2012 passed by respondent No.1 are set aside and the matter is remitted to respondent No.1 for fresh disposal of the application filed by respondent No.3 for grant of certificate for unilateral execution of conveyance. Respondent No.1 shall make an endeavour to decide the application of respondent No.3 within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this judgment without being influenced by order dated 12.6.2012.
Sharanjit Kaur & Anr vs State Of Punjab

lodged by one Kahan Singh, r/o Village Chugawan Roopamali, Kathunangal, Amritsar, against Sharanjit Kaur, Mukhtiar Singh, Manjit Kaur and Kirandeep @ Mandeep Kaur, r/o Village Mann, Tehsil and District Amritsar, at P.S. Kathunangal, Amritsar under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”) alleging embezzlement of Rs. 30 lakhs on the pretext of sending his son-Gurpreet Singh to America for a permanent job for which he paid the above said amount in several instalments to the accused persons. It was also alleged in the complaint that on failure to honour the promise, the appellants issued a cheque of Rs. 30 lakhs to the complainant bearing No. 534873 dated 23.02.2012, which got dishonoured due to insufficient funds.

d) Against the said order, Manjit Kaur and Mandeep Kaur preferred Special Leave Petition No. 4932 of 2012 before this Court. Vide order dated 20.07.2012, this Court, dismissed the same.

e) Being aggrieved by the order dated 23.07.2012, the co-accused Sharanjit Kaur and Mukhtiar Singh filed Special Leave Petition No. 6746 of 2012 before this Court. Vide order dated 21.09.2012, while issuing notice, this Court stayed the arrest of the co-accused.

h) Questioning the order dated 07.11.2012, the appellants, viz., Manjit Kaur and Mandeep Kaur, filed Special Leave Petition No. 9690 of 2012 before this Court.

Provided that such an officer shall send the information to the Gram Panchayat after the conclusion of the investigation.

Provided that no fine shall exceed the maximum fine prescribed by the law for that offence…..

(D) Case Laws:

10) Learned amicus, after adverting to the various provisions of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 as well as of the Code pointed out that de hors the fact that whether the offence is triable under the ordinary criminal courts or by the Gram Panchayats, there is no bar to the police to investigate the offence and submit a report to the Magistrate. He further submitted that according to Section 45 of the said Act, Magistrate can transfer a case to Gram Panchayat at the stage of receiving a complaint under Section 156(3) or at the time of taking cognizance after filing of report by the police under Section 173 of the Code. Therefore, in view of the above, the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 in no way prohibits the investigation and arrest by the Police.

Interim protection granted earlier shall stand vacated.

JULY 01, 2013.
B.Lakshmana Etc vs Divisional Manager New India ...

2. Second respondent herein admitted that the vehicle belonged to him and he also admitted the accident. The first respondent herein-the insurer, admitted that the vehicle was duly insured. The owner did not contest the petition. However, the insurer, on permission, contested the petition. The claimants gave evidence as Pws 1 to 6 and the qualified medical practitioner-an orthopedic surgeon, who issued the disability certificate, was examined as PW7.

4. Though the insurer filed an application for calling for the medical records from the primary health centre where the appellants were initially treated, the same was dismissed since disability certificate issued by the registered medical practitioner had already been admitted in evidence. Application for reassessment of disability by a panel of doctors was also dismissed on the same ground as per common order dated 04.07.2007 of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner.

14. For the reasons stated above, the appeals are allowed, the common impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the orders dated 04.07.2007 of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner are restored.

15. There is no order as to costs.

July 1, 2013.
State Of Rajasthan vs Shvi Charan & Ors

1. These appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 20.9.2005, passed by the High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jodhpur (Jaipur Bench) in D.B. Criminal Appeal Nos.1454 and 1458 of 2002, by way of which, the High Court has converted the conviction of the respondents herein, from one under Sections 302/149 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as `the IPC’) and Section 148 IPC to another under Section 323 IPC, and the sentence awarded by the Sessions Court to life imprisonment with fine, has also been substituted by a sentence of one year.

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:

C. The trial commenced. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses in support of its case. The respondents were examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as `the Cr.P.C.’). They not only pleaded innocence but also examined one witness in defence. Upon completion of the trial, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the respondents as has been referred to hereinabove.

7. The injuries found on the person of respondent Shiv Charan were as follows:

22. In view of above, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The judgment and order impugned before us is set aside and the judgment and order of the Trial Court is restored. The respondents are directed to surrender within a period of 4 weeks from today, failing which, the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Gangapur City, is directed to take them into custody and send them to jail to serve the remaining part of the sentence. A copy of the order be sent to the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Gangapur City, for information and compliance.

……………………………...J. [DR.

[DIPAK MISRA] NEW DELHI;

July 1, 2013
State Of U.P vs Gobardhan & Anr

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

G. Aggrieved, the said convicts filed an appeal before the High Court, which was allowed by it, vide its impugned judgment and order.

10. This Court has laid down sufficient guidelines for interference by the superior court against the order of acquittal. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances to interfere and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.

11. We have considered and examined the matter most minutely. Applying the parameters of interference against the order of acquittal, we are of the considered opinion that no interference is called for. This appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

[DIPAK MISRA] NEW DELHI;

July 1, 2013
Taranjeet Singh Mohan Singh ... vs Dist. Dy.Registrar Coop.Societies & ...

4. Late Shri Mohan Singh (predecessor of the appellants) owned land measuring 4144.90 sq. mtrs. comprised in CTS Nos. 661 to 691 of Village Kole Kalyan, Taluka Andheri. On 16.10.1979, he entered into an agreement with respondent No.4 for sale of land measuring 3762.45 sq. mtrs. After execution of the agreement, respondent No.4 constructed five buildings, which were occupied by the members of three Co-operative Housing Societies, i.e., respondent Nos. 3, 5 and 6.

5. Due to non-payment of the amount in terms of agreement dated 16.10.1979, the appellants, who are the legal heirs of late Shri Mohan Singh, issued notice dated 16.3.2005 and terminated agreement dated 16.10.1979. After four years, respondent No.5 approached the appellants for purchase of 702.341 sq. mts. out of the land owned by late Shri Mohan Singh. At the asking of the appellants, respondent No.5 produced the consent of respondent Nos. 3 and 6. Thereafter, the appellants executed conveyance dated 25.8.2011 in favour of respondent No.5 and the developer – M/s. Rahul Constructions.

6. Although the appellants had terminated agreement dated 16.10.1979, respondent No.3 entered into an agreement with M/s. Raja Constructions Company (M/s. Raja Builders) for redevelopment of the buildings of ‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘E’ Wings.

13. Along with the writ petition, the appellants filed an application for interim stay. The learned Single Judge took cognizance of the assertion made in the writ petition that notice of preponement of the date of hearing was not served upon them, but refused to grant stay on the ground that the writ petition was filed after four months of the order passed by respondent No.1 and during the intervening period conveyance deed had already been registered for a sum of Rs.95 lacs and the Society and respondent No.3 had entered into development agreements with builders.

16. We have considered the respective arguments and carefully scrutinized the record.

19. As a corollary to the above findings, it must be held that order dated 12.6.2012 passed by respondent No.1 is vitiated due to violation of the rule of audi alteram partem and is liable to be set aside.

20. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order as also order dated 12.6.2012 passed by respondent No.1 are set aside and the matter is remitted to respondent No.1 for fresh disposal of the application filed by respondent No.3 for grant of certificate for unilateral execution of conveyance. Respondent No.1 shall make an endeavour to decide the application of respondent No.3 within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this judgment without being influenced by order dated 12.6.2012.
Majjal vs State Of Haryana

3. Briefly stated the prosecution case is that the complainant – Ramjani (PW-4) made a complaint with police station Punhana against the appellant and others. It was alleged in the complaint that during the night intervening 30/10/1995 and 31/10/1995 the appellant along with his sons namely Harun, Rajak, Khurshid and Bhati and other persons arrived at the house of Deen Dar with common object to kidnap Farida daughter of Deen Dar. The appellant and his associates were armed with guns and country made pistols. They tried to take away Farida on which she raised cries. Consequently Abdul Karim son of Deen Dar, Lal Khan(PW-3) and Khurshid sons of Rojdar, Deen Dar son of Chand Khan and Roshni arrived at the house of Deen Dar along with the complainant and tried to rescue Farida. At that time the appellant fired a shot at Lal Khan, Harun fired a shot at Abdul Karim and Khurshid fired a shot at Deen Dar. Injuries were caused to Roshni with lathis. Thereafter Mehboob son of Rojdar came. He was abducted by the appellant and his son Khurshid. Abdul Karim expired at the spot due to firearm injury. Deen Dar also got injured. Thereafter, the assailants fled away from the scene of occurrence.

3. On the basis of the information given by PW-4, FIR No.277 was registered under Sections 148, 149, 302, 307, 364, 323, 120B of IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act against the appellant and investigation commenced. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellant. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined as many as 16 witnesses (PW-1 to PW-16). The prosecution exhibited 29 documents (Exhibits P1 to P29) in evidence. No defence evidence was adduced.

4. Upon perusal of the evidence, the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months. The appellant was directed to pay Rs. 25,000/- as compensation to injured Lal Khan. As already stated, the appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

7. Hence, we set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 14/2/2012 and remand the appeal to the High Court. We request the High Court to hear the appeal afresh and deliver judgment in light of our above observations as expeditiously as possible as the appellant is in jail and he is stated to be 84 years of age. We make it clear that we have not considered the merits of the case. The appeal shall be disposed of independently and on merits.

8. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.