L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Poonam Kumari vs Jai Prakash Pandey & Ors

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

On being placed at no.1 in the Select List, a letter of Intent was issued on 8.11.2001 and the necessary order was handed over to the appellant. She claims to have made substantial investments in making the Retail Outlet operational. The entire infrastructure was put up by IOC including the arrangement of the land, the oil tanks were installed and certain persons were employed as members of staff and with effect from 12.11.2001, appellant started operating the Retail Outlet.

One J.P. Pandey (Respondent no.1), who was also one of the applicants and whose name did not figure in the select list, filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the selection made by the DSB. There the main allegation was that even though his father had made the land available to IOC, he was not given a preference in the matter of allotment and appointment as a dealer. In the Writ petition appellant was also impleaded as a party. However, no notice was served on her. By a judgment dated 15.1.2004 the Writ Petition was allowed and the selection made by the DSB was quashed. Since appellant claimed that no notice was served on her and she was not in a position to place her case before learned Single Judge who heard and allowed the Writ Petition, she filed LPA No.93 of 2004. On 3.2.2004 after hearing the parties, the Division Bench disposed of the LPA observing as follows:

11. Appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.
Raeesh Ahmad vs United India Insurance Ltd. & Anr

JUDGMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2869-2870 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP(C)No. 15357/2006) RAEESH AHMAD .. APPELLANT vs. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE LTD. & ANR. .. RESPONDENTS ORDER Leave granted.

2 The appellant sustained serious injuries in a motor accident involving a tempo belonging to second respondent and insured with first respondent and another tempo in which he was travelling. He was admitted to an hospital and underwent surgery twice for his fractured leg which required insertion of a rod. He was in the hospital for more than eight months. 3 He filed a claim petition before the Motors Accident Claims Tribunal claiming compensation of Rs.3,00,000/-. The Tribunal awarded Rs.48,000/- towards medical expenses and Rs.25,000/- towards future medical expenses. -2- In regard to loss of future earnings, it found the disability to be 30%. The Tribunal assessed the annual income of appellant as Rs.36,000/-; and as the appellant had suffered 30% disability, it calculated the future loss of earning with reference to a multiplier of 16, that is 30% of 36000 X 16=172800/- (rounded off to Rs.1,72,000/-). Thus, it awarded Rs.2,45,000/- in all as compensation. 4 On appeal by the first respondent, the High court reduced the compensation to Rs.99,000/-. The High court was of the view that the Tribunal ought not to have taken the permanent disability as 30% as the disability could not be said to be permanent as there was likelihood of improvement. It therefore, deleted the award of Rs.1,72,000/- towards loss of future earning capacity. It however added Rs.11,000/- as loss of income for nine months (period of treatment) and Rs.15000/- towards paid and suffering to arrive at Rs.99,000/- as compensation. The said judgment is challenged by the claimant. 5 We find that the High Court has misread the disability certificate. The certificate dated 23.2.2004 showed that disability as 30%. There is no acceptable medical evidence to show that the condition of appellant will improve or that the permanent disability will disappear.

-3- 4 Having regard to the said position, we are of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the quantum of compensation. We are of the view that the total compensation of Rs.2,45,000/- awarded by the Tribunal was just compensation. Accordingly, we allow these appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the Award of the Tribunal. ...................C.J.I. (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN) .....................J. (R.V.RAVEENDRAN) NEW DELHI;

APRIL 21, 2008.
Amisha Hinduja vs Manish Hinduja

JUDGMENT O R D E R TRANSFER PETITION(C) NO.950 OF 2007 Petitioner-wife has filed this transfer petition under Section 25 of the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking transfer of HMP Case No.88 of 2007 pending before the Family Court, Indore , Madhya Pradesh to the Family Court, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. Notice was issued to the husband-respondent and he is represented before us. Counsel appearing for the respondent-husband states that there is a danger to the respondent's life if he goes to Raipur and prays that this case be transferred to any other place than Raipur. Per contra, counsel appearing for the wife assures that no harm shall be caused to the husband on his coming to Raipur to attend the proceedings. On the assurance given by the counsel appearing for the wife, we transfer the aforesaid case No. 88 of 2007 from the Family Court, Indore, Madhya Pradesh to the Family Court, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. We make it clear that if any untoward incident happens, the respondent is put at liberty to approach this Court for transferring this case to a place other than Raipur. The transferor court is directed to transmit the entire record related to the aforesaid case to the transferee court forthwith.

The Transfer Petition is allowed in the above terms.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd vs Rajni Devi & Ors

3. Appellant herein, having been issued notice, resisted the claim, inter alia, contending that although the owner of the vehicle deposited an extra amount of Rs.50 covering his personal insurance, the same would not cover the case of the pillion rider and in any event, the owner of the vehicle is not a third party within the meaning of Section 147 of the Act. The Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal, having regard to the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues :

(3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule."

The said provision cannot be said to have any application in regard to an accident wherein the owner of the motor vehicle himself is involved. The question is no longer res integra.

11. According to the terms of contract of insurance, the liability of the insurance company was confined to Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lac only). It was liable to the said extent and not any sum exceeding the said amount.

12. To the aforementioned extent, the appeal is allowed. No costs.
Punjab State Electricity Board & Ors vs Gurmail Singh

3. The factual matrix of the matter, however, would be noticed from the case of Gurmail Singh.

4. Respondent herein was appointed as a Steno-Typist on or about 28.8.1976. There existed a common cadre of the Steno-Typist and Lower Division Clerk. He was appointed on a scale of pay of Rs.110-250 which was revised to Rs.400-600 w.e.f. 1.1.1978 and Rs.950-1800 w.e.f. 1.1.1986. On the said post, he was placed on a scale of pay of Rs.1200-2200/-. A scheme for grant of time bound promotion to a higher scale of pay was formulated by the Board wherefor a circular bearing No.17/90 was issued by its Finance Department on 23.4.1990. In terms of the said scheme, promotional scale was to be given to the employees upon completion of 9/16 years of regular service. The revision in the scale of pay of LDCs was directed by an order dated 3.10.1990 w.e.f. 1.1.1986. The said revision of scale of pay, however, was to be granted on the basis of total number of years of service as LDC in the said cadre. The same was, however, implemented in respect of three categories of employees, namely, who have not been granted any promotion despite completion of minimum 10 years of service as LDC and Senior Clerk or five years of service as LDC and remaining of the LDCs not falling in the first two categories. The ratio for grant of the said promotional scale was fixed at 40:40:20 respectively. Material part of the said circular is as under :

24. Respondent, however, it will bear repetition to state, by his letter dated 29.1.1996 opted for 9 years' time bound scale of Upper Division Clerk from 9.7.1995 to which we have adverted to heretobefore. An employee given the option to opt for one or the other induction post or one or the other scheme is supposed to know his right or benefit. An employee cannot be permitted to opt for one or the other scheme again and again. Schemes are framed for the benefit of the employees ordinarily as a one time measure. If by reason of a wrong option, an employee suffers, he himself is to be blamed therefor and not the employer.

30. Although the order of the Board cannot be said to be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction warranting interference at the hands of the High Court but, we are of the opinion that the respondents should be put at the same scale of pay from the same day which was being paid to the employees who was next below him in the post of LDC. We would, however, clarify that the respondent shall not be entitled to treat his induction post both as LDC and UDC. The amount payable to the respondent in terms of these observations may be recalculated within a period six weeks.

31. To the aforementioned extent, the appeals are allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Mg. Dir., Bangalore Metropolitan Tpt. ... vs Sarojamma & Anr

A claim petition was filed in terms of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the Act"). The Tribunal calculated the loss of dependency at Rs.3,84,000/-, wherefor the multiplier of 16 was applied. The Tribunal estimated the income of the deceased at Rs.3,000/- p.m. One-third was deducted from the said amount towards his personal expenses. An appeal was preferred thereagainst by the appellant. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court while allowing the multiplier of 15 instead of 16 increased the rate of interest from 7% to 10%. Respondent No. 1 was held to be entitled to a total sum of Rs. 3,64,500/- (Rs. 3,60,000 + 2,000 + 2,500).

14. The High Court, however, took into consideration an irrelevant factor, viz., that the claimant must have been suffering from a mental agony in determining the rate of interest as also the age of the deceased. We do not see any justification for increase in the rate of interest. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if the rate of interest payable on the awarded amount is brought down to 7%, as was directed by the Tribunal.

15. The appeal is allowed only to the aforementioned extent. No costs.
P.D. Lakhani & Anr vs State Of Punjab & Anr

3. Lakhani Rubber Udyog Ltd. Manufactures Hawai Chappel. They are registered owners of a trademark. Inter alia, on the premise that M/s. Saraswati Utpadan Pvt. Ltd., Respondent No.2 herein had been marketing inferior goods with the label 'Lakhani' illegally, a complaint was lodged by the second appellant herein to SHO, Police Station Jalandhar. He was asked to approach the Senior Superintendent of Police, Jallandhar.

4. In the body of the said complaint itself, the Senior Superintendent of Police directed one Gian Singh, to comply with the said request of the second appellant and report. When a search was sought to be carried out in the premises of the respondent purported to be on the basis of the said direction, a large number of people objected thereto. They obstructed in the proceeding of search and misbehaved with the raiding party. However, nothing objectionable was found in the factory. A report to the said effect was submitted by the aforementioned Gian Singh, In-charge, Special Cell of the CIA.

6. The Station House Officer of the Police Station, Adampur thereafter filed a complaint petition on or about 11.5.2005 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, inter alia, stating :

The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.

15. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. Appeal is allowed. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that another complaint petition would be maintainable at the instance of the appropriate authority.
Bholi (Dead) By L.Rs vs Lachhman Singh & Ors

The facts leading to the filing of the present appeal may be summarily recited. The plaintiff's suit was for declaration that he is owner of the land in question and the defendant has fraudulently got a sale deed executed in his favour. Therefore, the plaintiff prayed for cancellation of the sale deed. The trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal being preferred by the plaintiff the same was disposed of in terms of compromise arrived at between the plaintiff and the defendants. The terms of the compromise runs as under :

It appears that the defendants failed to deposit the second instalment of Rs.3,000/- on or before 30.05.1986. An application was filed under Section 147 CPC for extension of time to deposit the second instalment which was rejected by the trial court. Aggrieved thereby, the defendants filed an application under Section 115 CPC which was allowed by the High Court by extending the time enabling the defendants to deposit the second instalment. Against the order of the High Court the plaintiff filed C.A.No.3422 of 1996 before this Court which was disposed of on 30th October, 2002. The relevant portion of the order reads as under :

In the aforesaid view, we are of the view that the High Court fell in error in entertaining the second appeal by the impugned order. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Reena Pandey vs State Of U.P. & Ors

JUDGMENT O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO.2320 OF 2002 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2323 OF 2002 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2320 OF 2002 The appellant was appointed as a Junior Clerk. By an order dated 13.07.1989 she was promoted on officiating basis to the post of Stenographer. By the impugned order dated 28.04.1990 the officiating promotion of Stenographer has been cancelled and she was reverted to the post of Junior Clerk. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the Tribunal.

The Tribunal quashing the order of reversion, in our view, erroneously, and directed the reinstatement of the appellant with back wages. Aggrieved thereby, the State preferred a writ petition before the Division Bench of the High Court which was partly allowed by the High Court, holding that while the respondent (appellant herein) would be reinstated she would not be entitled to back wages. The High Court further directed the State to hold a departmental inquiry. Aggrieved by the aforesaid observation of the High Court the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.

By now, it is a well settled principle of law that a person holding a post on officiating or temporary basis has no right to the said post vide State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore (1991) 1 SCC 691. Hence he can be reverted at any time without issuing a show cause notice or holding an enquiry. The Tribunal, therefore, fell in error in upsetting the order of reversion of the appellant to the post of Junior Clerk which post she was holding substantively. Also, the High Court's order directing a departmental enquiry was totally misconceived. There is no need for holding such an enquiry while rejecting a person holding a post on an officiating basis. An enquiry would only be necessary if he was holding the post on a permanent capacity. We see no merit in this appeal and same is accordingly dismissed. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2323 OF 2002 In view of the observation made in C.A.No.2320 of 2002 this appeal is allowed. The order of Tribunal and the High Court for reinstatement is accordingly set aside.
N. Lokananandham vs Chairman, Tele-Com. Commission & Ors

Respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad questioning the said order dated 23.4.2006. By reason of the impugned order dated 16.6.2006, the said writ petition has been allowed.

For the self same reasons, the said decision also does not render any assistance to us.

18. We may furthermore notice that the appellant herein without any demur whatsoever appeared in the subsequent examination. He even did not qualify therein. The principle of estoppel would, therefore, apply in this case.

Tribunal had, thus, exceeded to its jurisdiction in passing its order dated 23.4.2004.

19. There is, therefore, no merit in the appeal. It is dismissed accordingly with no orders as to costs.
Union Of India & Others vs Inter Continental (India)

Respondent-assessee (hereinafter referred to as the 'assessee') is engaged in the business of trading in various commodities including Crude Palm Oil and Crude Palmolin of Non-Edible Grade which is imported in accordance with law. On 28.3.2001, assessee imported consignments of Crude Pal Oil and Crude Palmolin and it is alleged that the assessee got them cleared after paying concessional rate of duty at the rate of 35% as per entry 29 of the Notification No.17/2001-Customs dated 1st March, 2001 instead of clearing the same after paying duty at the rate of 75% as per entry 34 of the same notification. The goods were provisionally allowed to be cleared after taking Bank Guarantee of Rs.10 crores for the differential duty due. Provisional assessment was allowed directing the assessee to produce End-use Certificate so as to avail concessional rate of duty as per Board's Circular No.40/2001-Cus. dated 13th July, 2001.

Assessee, instead of producing the End-use Certificate, filed a writ petition in the High Court questioning the direction to produce the End-use Certificate which was to be issued by the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise having jurisdiction over last such purchaser on the ground that a new condition could not be added to the notification by issuing a circular. According to the assessee, the Board Circular seeking to impose a limitation on the exemption notification or whittling it down by adding a new condition was not binding on the assessee as it travelled beyond the said notification.

Following the aforesaid decision of this Court in Tata Teleservices Ltd.(supra), we do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Anil Kak vs Kumari Sharada Raje & Ors

2 of 1998; Anil Kak and Kumar Rampratap filed an application for grant of probate in their capacity as executors appointed under the said Will dated 4.11.1992, which was marked as Suit No. 3 of 1998. Both the suits were directed to be consolidated. The parties examined their witnesses in both the suits by adducing common evidence.

7. Whereas the Will dated 23.08.1978 was a very short document, the Will dated 4.11.1992 was a detailed one running into six typed pages besides three long appendices and two statements containing her investments in various shares within and outside the country.

19. We may at this stage notice a few stipulations made in the said Will dated 4.11.1992, which are as under:

20. The Will was purported to have been executed in presence of one Shanta Kumari Jain, a notary. Two medical certificates; one issued by Dr. S.K. Mukherjee and the other by Dr. Normal Sharma, were also annexed thereto.

According to T.N. Unni, he had drafted only pages one to six of the Will. The said Will was purported to have been executed at his residence at Indore. Geeta Sanghi and Baljeet Bawa were the attesting witnesses. Baljit Bawa, as noticed hereinbefore, was not examined. Geeta Sanghi sought to prove the testatrix's signature as also her own signatures on the Will.

27. The High Court made a distinction between the documents which are mere appendices to an otherwise complete Will and those which are part and parcel of the Will forming its integral part.

39. Furthermore, the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances.

Unlike other documents, even animus attestandi is a necessary ingredient for proving the attestation.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment.

43. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeals are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 50,000/-.
Anjani Kumar vs State Of Bihar And Anr

2. Background facts as projected by the appellant are essentially as follows:

3. According to the appellant, there was no explanation offered as to why there was delay in filing the complaint and there was no grievance that the police officials had refused to register any FIR. On 31.7.1993 an order purported to have been passed under Section 196 of the Code was passed by District Magistrate according sanction for prosecution of the appellant. On 4.8.1993 charge sheet was filed against the appellant for alleged commission of offences under Sections 465, 466, 469 and 471 IPC. Here again, there was no allegation of alleged commission of offence relating to demand of bribe which is punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short 'PC Act'). On 2.12.1993 cognizance was taken.

4. It is submitted that the District Magistrate had no authority to grant sanction purportedly under Section 196 of the Code. Further in the petition before the High Court it was categorically stated as follows:

20. When the factual background as noted above is considered on the touchstone of legal principles set out above the inevitable conclusion is that certainly mala fides were involved apart from the applicability of Section 197 of the Code. It is no doubt true that at the threshold interference by exercise of Section 482 of the Code has to be in rare cases. The present case appears to be of that nature and falls under category (7) indicated in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). The continuance of the proceedings by the prosecution would amount to abuse of the process of law. The criminal proceedings in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai in PS Case No.63/1993 are quashed. The appeal is allowed.
The Managing Director State Bank Of ... vs P. Kata Rao

6. The Appointing Authority passed an order of dismissal. An appeal preferred thereagainst by the respondent was dismissed.

A Writ Petition was also filed questioning the said order of dismissal.

11. Again an order of dismissal was passed on 2.7.1999. An appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed. Another writ petition was filed by the respondent aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith.

26. We do not see any reason keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case to disagree with the said findings, although we would like to reiterate the principles of law to which we have referred to hereinbefore.

Each case, therefore, must be determined on its own facts.

35. The appeals are dismissed. No costs.