L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Pankaj Kumar vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

3. A few material facts, necessary for disposal of this appeal can be stated thus :

5. As per the chargesheet, the case of the prosecution, in brief is that the said Sayyad Mohammad Sayyad Ibrahim (accused No.1) and one Pashubhai Narsi Shah (accused No.10), father of the appellant, were friends since 1976. Accused No.10 had two concerns styled as India Trading 3 Agency, Mumbai and Dairy Equipment Industries, Mumbai, in the name of his wife (accused No.12). Accused No.1, without calling for the quotations for purchase of spare parts for the Milk Plant, got prepared from accused Nos.10 and 11, bills in small amounts of Rs.10,000/- each for purchase of spare parts valued at Rs.2,03,705; got the bills processed from the staff members (accused Nos. 2 to 9) of the said Milk Dairy Unit and made payments in cash and by way of demand drafts to the present appellant. The second accusation is that for two air compressors purchased from M/s Ingersol Rand (India), Mumbai in the year 1978, spare parts of the total value of Rs.91,469/- were again purchased from the concerns of accused Nos.10 and 11 despite the fact that quotation had been received from the original supplier. No inspection and verification of the spare parts supplied by the said concerns was carried out; bills were got processed by accused No.1 from other staff members and payment was again made to accused No.11 in cash and by demand drafts. The third accusation against all the accused is that an amount of Rs.64,100/- 4 was paid to one M/s Pankaj Chemicals, Mumbai, managed by accused No.10, the father of the appellant, for cleaning of the water softening plant supplied by M/s Ingersol Rand (India) Ltd., without actually doing any such work. The Special Judge took cognizance of the complaint and summoned all the accused.

13.Bearing in mind the above legal position, we are of the opinion that, for the reasons stated hereafter, the ends of justice require that prosecution proceedings in the instant case be quashed.

19.For the view we have taken, we deem it unnecessary to go into the merits of the accusations against the appellant as also the question of his age, at the time of commission of alleged offences.

20.Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the proceedings against the appellant in criminal case arising out of FIR No.78 of 1987 are hereby quashed.

JULY 11, 2008.
M/S Deepak Agr Foods vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors

4. The appellant, a proprietorship concern, is a dealer under the Act. For the assessment year 1995-96, an ex-parte assessment was framed on 19th May, 1998. On appeal, the order of assessment was set aside by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) vide order dated 8th June, 2000 on the ground that proper opportunity of hearing had not been granted to the appellant. In pursuance of the said order, a fresh notice was issued to the appellant for appearance on 12th February, 2002. On the said date at the request of the appellant, the case was adjourned to 14th March, 2002 and then to 23rd March, 2002, when the appellant again sought time for collecting the requisite details/ information and he was granted three months' time for the said purpose. The case was fixed on 25th June, 2002.

5. According to the appellant, he appeared before the Assessing Officer on 25th June, 2002 and requested for some more time to furnish the bank statements etc. and 3 the case was accordingly kept for 29th June, 2002. However, on 29th June, 2002, when the appellant appeared before the Assessing Officer, he is said to have been told that the assessment order had already been passed on 7th June, 2002.

6. Being aggrieved, the appellant challenged the said order by preferring a writ petition. In the writ petition, it was alleged that the assessment order was anti-dated and in fact the same was passed on 29th June, 2002, by which date the period of limitation was over. Interpolation in the order sheets dated 23rd March, 2002 and 25th June, 2002 was alleged and it was also stated that the appellant was coerced to countersign the cuttings and tempering in the order sheets. However, the writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge in limine, inter alia, on the ground that if the writ petitioner had any grievance that the proceedings had not been recorded correctly, he could have drawn the attention of the Presiding Officer towards such errors while the matter was still fresh to his mind. 4 Accordingly, the learned Single Judge directed the appellant to bring the alleged anomalies to the notice of the Assessing Officer and simultaneously, if so advised, he could challenge the assessment order by filing appeal before the Appellate Authority.

11.Having given anxious consideration to the rival stands, we are satisfied that the appeal is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed.

On a bare reading of the provision, it becomes abundantly clear that if an assessment order is set aside by an Appellate Authority, fresh assessment has to be completed within a 10 period of two years from the date of communication of the order in appeal to the Assessing Authority and not from the date of order in appeal; as is pleaded by the appellant.

19.In the conspectus of the circumstances aforesaid, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned directions given by the Division Bench of the High Court warranting interference in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appeals are devoid of any merit and are dismissed accordingly with costs throughout.

JULY 11, 2008.
State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Imrat And Anr

4. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

At the time of the incident accused Imrat had a lathi in his hand and accused Komal had a farsa with him. They caused six injuries on the complainant. On the basis of the 2 information lodged in the Police Station, investigation was undertaken and challan was filed against the accused persons for committing offence punishable under Sections 307, 324 and 506(2) IPC. However, as noted above, the trial Court convicted the accused for commission of offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC. The trial Court noted that as per the evidence of the complainant Bhajan while he was going towards his house near the well accused persons armed with lathi and farsa obstructed his way. Imrat told the co-accused that complainant has to be killed. On hearing this Komal hit the head of the complainant with farsa. Imrat gave lathi blow on the wrist of right hand and left hand and left foot. Komal hit him once more with farsa which struck him on the head. The trial Court found the evidence of the witnesses credible and cogent and on the evidence of the doctor found the accused persons guilty and convicted them as afore-noted.

16. It is seen that the High Court had arrived at erroneous hypothetical conclusions ignoring the fact that the nature of injuries were grievous and were caused by use of sufficient force by sharp edged weapons. The injuries were so serious that both the investigating agency and the doctor felt that dying declaration was to be recorded. That being so, the High Court's conclusion that the offence under Section 307 was not made out is clearly indefensible. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored.

17. The appeal is allowed.

...............................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ...............................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, July 11, 2008 10
State Of Kerala & Ors vs Ancy Phillip & Anr

the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') alleging that they had cut and removed certain trees from the forest. The respondents/accused denied the prosecution case and, during the course of the trial, they insisted that the timber, which was seized by the forest officials during the course of investigation, is to be produced in the Court. They approached the High Court by filing O.P. No. 25171 of 1999 praying to issue a writ of mandamus directing respondent Nos. 2 and 3 therein to issue pass and permit enabling the 1 first petitioner therein to transport rosewood timbers and rosewood billets as per Exts. P2 and P2 (a) from Vayaloor Pettickal in Palakkad District to Ernakulam. In the same petition, they also prayed for a direction to the Divisional Forest Officer, Agali for disposal of their representation Ext. P6 expeditiously. By order dated 02.06.2000, the learned Single Judge directed the officer, who registered the case, for production of timber in question before the appropriate Court within one month from the date of receipt of copy of the order. With the said direction, the learned Judge disposed of the writ petition.

6) The appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.

11TH JULY, 2008.
State Of Maharashtra & Ors vs Zubair Haji Qasim

3. On 22nd September, 2005, the said Abu Baker Haji Qasim (hereinafter referred to as "the detenu") filed Criminal Writ Petition No.2312 of 2005, through the respondent No.1 herein, before the Bombay High Court for quashing and setting aside the detention order dated 9th September, 2005. At the same time, in the proceedings, before the Advisory Board, the detenu made a representation for permission to be represented in the proceedings through a legal practitioner. Such representation was, however, rejected by the Advisory Board on 28th October, 2005, on the ground that under the 3 COFEPOSA Act 1974, a detenu was not entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner and consequently it was not necessary to consider such prayer. In fact, the Advisory Board rejected the prayer made on behalf of the detenu for permission to be represented by a legal practitioner upon holding that such prayer could not be considered "for some obvious reasons".

17. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the judgment and order of the High Court 12 impugned in this appeal and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

18. This judgment would also govern Criminal Appeal NO._______ (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.1975 of 2007) titled State of Maharashtra vs. Sheetal Manoj Gore.
Gauri Shankar Prasad & Ors vs Brahma Nand Singh

2. The case of the plaintiffs-appellants is that the plaintiffs were in need of money, hence, offered to mortgage their land detailed in Schedule D of the plaint with condition to repurchase the same on consideration of Rs.36,600/- The defendant-respondent, namely, Brahmanand Singh and one Dasrath Prasad Keshri were willing to purchase jointly the land of Schedule D and, accordingly, the plaintiffs executed a registered deed of sale dated 5.2.1986. The respondent and Dasrath Prasad Keshri on the same day also executed a registered deed of agreement and agreed to re-convey the purchased land to the plaintiffs on payment of consideration money to them. It has been alleged that though the deed of sale was executed by the plaintiffs-appellants in favour of the respondent and Dasrath Prasad Keshri, they always remained in cultivating possession of the lands, as described in schedule D of the plaint. It is also alleged that the plaintiffs- appellants were in need of rs.15,000/-. The respondent and Dasrath Prasad Keshari became ready to keep the land in mortgage, but only after calculating the interest thereupon at the rate of 4 per cent for three years, the price was accordingly 2 fixed at Rs.36,600/-. It is further alleged that the plaintiffs-- appellants in the first week of January, 1989, repaid Rs.5,500/- to the respondent in presence of the witnesses upon which he promised to re-convey the suit land, but even thereafter he did not re-convey the land and extended time for execution of the deed of re-conveyance Ultimately on l0.4.1992, Dasrath Prasad Keshri received consideration money of his share i.e. Rs.18,300/- and executed the deed of sale re-conveying half of the land of Schedule D in favour of the plaintiffs. It is also claimed that the plaintiffs also requested the respondent to receive his consideration money and to re-convey the schedule D land of his share but he delayed the matter, whereupon the plaintiffs sent registered legal notice to defendant No.l but even then the respondent failed to perform his part of contract and hence, the plaintiffs filed the suit.

16. The appeal is dismissed.

..............................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) .............................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, July 11, 2008 11
Punit Ahluwalia vs Gurjeewan Garewal

Before the Rent Controller, in an eviction proceeding, a petition under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [for short, "C.P.C."] was filed for stay of further proceeding before the Rent Controller till the disposal of the Title Suit pending between the parties before the civil court. The said prayer was rejected on merits after due consideration. Thereafter, instead of moving the higher court, the tenant again applied before the Rent Controller by filing a petition for grant of stay though this time the petition was labelled as a petition under Section 151 C.P.C. The said application was allowed by the Rent Controller and further proceeding before him was stayed till the disposal of the civil suit in the absence of any further material or fresh cause of action for filing the same. The said order has been unfortunately confirmed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court as well as the Rent Controller ....3/-

whereby it stayed the proceeding before it are set aside and the Rent Controller is hereby commanded to dispose of the proceeding within six months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. After disposal of the case it must report the matter to this court. It is made clear that unnecessary adjournments shall not be granted to any of the parties and all attempts made by the tenant to prolong the litigation shall be defeated.
Union Of India vs Satrohan

The trial Court found the evidence adduced to be clear and cogent and directed conviction and imposed sentence as 2 afore-noted. In appeal, the High Court directed acquittal by a practically non-reasoned order holding that there was non- compliance of Sections 42(2) and 50 of the Act. It was noted that the Narcotics Department has given licence to the father of the respondent for cultivation of opium and if there had been recovery of poppy straws it might be relatable to the ownership of father of the respondent.

7. Undisputedly, there are two different entries for opium and poppy straws. Opium appears at Sl. No.92 while poppy straws appear at Sl. No.110. The statement of the accused- respondent in terms of Section 67 throws considerable light on the controversy. In the statement recorded there was no retraction and in fact during examination under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code') while answering question No.4 it was stated that there was no confession. The confessional statement was recorded on 5 20.11.1992 and the statement under Section 313 of the Code was recorded on 6.2.1999. Therefore, there has been no retraction at any point of time. The position is also clear from Section 57 of the Code. At the time of production before the Magistrate, there was no allegation of any torture as presently submitted. In this connection a few decisions of this Court need to be noted.

16. In the confessional statement the accused has clearly stated about the ownership. So, there has been no retraction at considerable length of time.

17. Above being the position, the High Court was clearly in error by setting aside the judgment of the trial Court. We set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial Court. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

.................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) .................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, July 14, 2008 15
Shaikh Azim @ Vakil @ Kuku vs State Of Maharashtra

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Accused Sk. Azim (appellant) was holding a Stick, accused Sk. 3 Ibrahim was holding an iron rod and accused Sk. Rahim was also holding a stick in his hand. Accused Azim gave a stick blow on the head of the deceased due to which he received bleeding injury. Abdul Khaliq, son of the deceased, rushed to rescue his father. All the accused attacked him and beat him with iron rod and stick on his head and abdomen. Abdul Khaliq received injuries on his person. The persons from the locality gathered and rescued them from the accused. The deceased had become unconscious because of the blow which was given by accused no.2, the appellant on the head of the deceased. His condition was serious. Therefore, he was sent to Mayo hospital. The deceased succumbed to the injuries on the next day i.e. on 9.3.1986 at about 3.30 p.m. The dead body of the deceased was referred to the doctor for post mortem examination. Dr. Deuskar (PW4) conducted the post mortem examination and opined that the injury on the head of the deceased was sufficient in the ordinary course 4 of nature to cause death and also opined that the said injury is possible by the weapon like stick (lathi).

11. When the factual scenario is considered in the background of legal principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years should meet the ends of justice.

12. Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

.J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, July 14, 2008 10
M/S. Dharmendra Construction Co vs State Of Rajasthan & Ors

3. It has now been brought to the notice of this Court that the civil suit filed by the appellant has already been withdrawn. A copy of the same has already been filed in this 1 Court with an affidavit. In this view of the matter, the impugned order is set aside and the High Court is directed to decide the application filed by the appellant under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for appointment of an Arbitrator which was registered as S.B. Arbitration Application NO.6 of 2005 before the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench. It is expected that the said application shall be decided by the High Court as early as possible preferably within six months from the date of supply of a copy of this order.

4. We, however, make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act which shall be decided by the High Court in accordance with law.

5. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed 2 to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
P.Kunjukrishna Pillai & Anr vs D.Sreekantan Nair & Ors

2. The first respondent married one Omana on 02.9.1985. The said Omana died issueless on 19.12.1987. Omana's father had gifted suit schedule item Nos.1 to 4, 6 and 7 to her, during her life time in 1966 and 1974. The first appellant, brother of Omana, had executed a deed of gift in her favour, in regard to the suit schedule item no.5 on 31.8.1985.

5. The trial court decreed the suit holding that section 17 of the Act will apply. The contention of defendants that section 15(2)(a) will apply was rejected as none of the suit properties were inherited by deceased Omana from her parents. The said judgment dated 10.4.1995 was challenged by the 3 appellants herein (brother and sister-in-law of Omana) in AS No.41 of 1996 before the High Court of Kerala. In the said appeal, the appellants filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of their written statement and another application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for additional evidence. By the amendment application the appellants wanted to plead that the gift of suit schedule item No. 5 made by first appellant in favour of his sister Omana was neither accepted by her nor acted upon by the parties, and that the first appellant had continued in possession as owner and has been paying the taxes and, therefore, the gift was null and void and had not come into effect. The High Court held that as the application for amendment was not filed before the trial was commenced, and as there was a delay of about six years, the application deserved to be rejected. It also rejected the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC as it was not the case of the appellant that the documents had come to his knowledge only after trial had commenced. It also dismissed the appeal confirming the findings and decision of the trial court. The said judgment is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

8. We accordingly allow this appeal as follows :

..................................J [R. V. Raveendran] .................................J [Lokeshwar Singh Panta] New Delhi;

July 14, 2008.
K.K. Seena And Anr vs State Of Kerala And Ors

Tehsildar refused to grant certificate to the appellants to the effect that they belonged to the Schedule Caste, which necessitated filing of writ petition before the High Court of Kerala giving rise to O.P. No.5732 of 1985. By judgment dated 2nd August, 1985, learned Single Judge recorded a clear cut finding that the appellants belonged to Thandan Community and consequently were members of Scheduled Caste. Accordingly, the Tehsildar was directed to issue required certificate in favour of the appellants. The said order attained finality as the same was not assailed either before the High Court in appeal or this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as no review petition was filed. But in violation of the aforesaid order of the High Court, the Tehsildar again refused to grant certificate to the appellants who had no option but to take a second round by filing a fresh writ petition giving rise to ...2/-

....3/-

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed with costs, impugned order passed by the Division Bench is set aside, the same passed by the learned Single Judge restored and the present Tehsildar is hereby commanded to grant the required certificate within one month from today. Hearing fee is assessed at Rupees fifty thousand, which shall be paid by the concerned District Magistrate to the appellants by demand drafts drawn in their favour drawn upon a local bank within the same time. All concerned would see that the directions aforementioned are carried out within the time schedule so that this Court may not be compelled to take any harsh action against them.

This order shall be communicated by learned counsel appearing for the State to the Chief Secretary with a copy to the concerned District Magistrate.