L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Union Of India & Ors vs Bhanwar Lal Mundan

4. Being dissatisfied with the said action, the respondent approached the tribunal which, placing reliance on the authorities in Inder Pal Yadav and others v. Union of India and others[1], Badri Prasad and others v. Union of India and others[2] and Sayed Abdul Qadir and others v. State of Bihar and others[3], quashed the order of refixation and directed the benefit of pension be extended to him on the basis of pay he was actually drawing before the retirement within three months failing which the employer would be liable to pay interest at the rate of 15% per annum.

6. On the basis of aforesaid analysis the writ court dismissed the petition.

17. Dehors the above conclusion, we are convinced that the action taken by the appellants to revise and reduce the retiral benefits payable to the respondents was ex facie arbitrary, unreasonable and unjustified and the learned Single Judge did not commit any error by declaring that the Central Government did not have the jurisdiction to unilaterally alter/change the option exercised by the writ petitioners under Section 12-A(4)(b) read with Section 12-A(4-C).”

23. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in part and the orders passed by the tribunal as well as by the High Court are set aside directing fixation of pension on the base of pay drawn by the respondent. However, as conceded to by Mr. Singh, there shall be no recovery from the excess amount paid to the respondent. There shall be no order as to costs.
Baldev Krishan vs Satya Narain

3. We have perused the Plaint, the salient averments of which are that “in order to solve his financial problem the plaintiff wants to start a business of Paapad, Badi and spices in the disputed shop to be looked after by his wife. The wife of the plaintiff also wants to do the same and the plaintiff after his retirement himself wants to pursue and continue this industry and business and keep up his source of income. In these situations since the plaintiff and his wife and children will also require place for their residence for which he wants to vacate and utilise two rooms, store and varandah as are built on the first floor which is presently with Jaiprakash on rent. The plaintiff and his wife also need rooms built at the second floor of the house for the business and industry of Paapad, Badi etc., and for their residential purposes and for other needs. In this way, the plaintiff has legitimate, reasonable and bonafide need of the disputed shop and room which is at second floor for himself and his family members.......”. After a perusal of these averments, it seems to us that it cannot be concluded that the eviction suit pleaded the bonafide need of only the subsequently deceased wife, either for commercial or residential requirement; the claimed need was of the plaintiff and his family.

9. In these circumstances, mindful of the uncertainty of which manner we may decide, the parties through their counsel have arrived at a settlement before us. It has been agreed that the rent shall stand increased to Rs.1500/- per month and that the Respondent-tenant shall be permitted to continue to occupy the tenanted premises for a further period of three years. The Appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. However, the Respondent- tenant shall hand over peaceful and vacant possession to the landlord or his legal heirs in the event of his demise on or before 31st August 2016 provided the Respondent pays all the arrears of rent till date (if any); and with effect from September 2013 pays a sum of Rs.1500/- per month towards damages for use and occupation. The usual undertaking to abide by these terms must be filed within four weeks from today failing which he shall be liable to be evicted/ejected forthwith.

10. Parties shall bear their respective costs.
I.S.Sikandar (D) By Lrs.& Ors vs K.Subramani & Ors

3. Necessary facts and legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties are stated herein with a view to find out as to whether the impugned judgment and decree in granting the relief of specific performance of the sale of the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff requires to be set aside by allowing this appeal.

9. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred Regular First Appeal before the High Court of Karnakata which was registered as RFA No. 97/2001, urging various legal contentions and prayed to set aside the same in so far as dismissal of the suit for grant of the decree for specific performance in respect of suit schedule property on the basis of sale deed is concerned.

24. We have carefully scrutinised the findings recorded by the trial court on the issue Nos.1,3,4 and 5 with reference to the pleadings of the case and legal evidence on record and the same have been erroneously set aside by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and therefore, the same cannot be allowed to sustain in law.

25. The first appellate court has committed serious error both on facts and in law in reversing the findings of fact recorded on the contentious issues by referring to the decisions of this Court in the impugned judgment on the aforesaid points which are totally inapplicable to the fact situation, and has erroneously set aside the findings of fact recorded by the trial court. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel on the basis of the findings and reasons recorded by the trial court in its judgment are well founded and the same must be accepted and accordingly we answer the point No. 3 against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant No.5.

29. Accordingly, we allow this civil appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore passed in Regular First Appeal No.97 of 2001 dated 08.12.2008 and restore the judgment and decree passed by the X1th Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City, Bangalore dated 25.09.2000 in O.S. No. 2012 of 1985, but, in the facts and circumstances of the case, no costs are awarded in these proceedings.
Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd vs Vemuganti Ramakrishan Rao & Ors

3. The appellant happens to be a Government company engaged in coal mining operations in the State of Andhra Pradesh. In terms of a notification dated 30th August, 1992 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, a large extent of land measuring 35 acres and 09 gts. in Survey Nos.285, 287 and 288 situated in village Jallaram, Kamanpur Mandal and Karimnagar Districts was notified for acquisition for the benefit of the appellant-company. A final declaration in terms of Section 6 was made on 2nd March, 1994, the validity whereof was assailed by four owners (Pattadars), respondents in this appeal in Writ Petition No.27/483 of 1995 primarily on the ground that the declaration under Section 6 had been issued beyond the period of limitation stipulated for the purpose. An application for interim stay was also moved by the writ-petitioners, in which a Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh granted an interim stay on 6th September, 1995. The writ petition was finally dismissed by the High Court by a judgment and order dated 20th July, 1999. Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal the respondent filed Writ Appeal No.1228 of 1999 which too failed and was dismissed by the Division Bench on 13th August, 1999.

6. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the appellant filed Writ Appeal Nos.1315 of 2001 and 936 of 2006 before the Division Bench of the High Court who affirmed the view taken by the Single Judge and dismissed the appeals by its order dated 7th September, 2006. The appellant- company then appears to have filed review petition No.2901 of 2008 which too failed and was dismissed by the Division Bench by its order dated 21st August, 2009 as already indicated. The present appeals call in question the said two judgments and orders.

23. The High Court was in the above circumstances perfectly justified in holding that the Award made by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer was non est and that the acquisition proceedings had elapsed by reason of a breach of Section 11-A of the Act. We, however, make it clear that the declaration granted by the High Court and proceedings initiated by the Collector shall be deemed to have elapsed only qua the writ petitioners- respondents herein. With those observations, these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.
Govt. Of Kerala & Ors vs Sudhir Kumar Sharma & Ors

3. The facts giving rise to the present litigation, in a nutshell, are as under:

4. On 29th October, 1998, the I.A. No. II had been granted by the court, whereby respondent no. 1 was granted time up to 28th November, 1998 for paying the court fee stamp and the same was paid by him on 28th November, 1998 and therefore, summons had been issued on 28th November, 1998. Thereafter, hearing had been adjourned from time to time.

7. Being aggrieved by the Order dated 3rd September, 2001, whereby the applications praying for rejection of the plaint had been rejected, the appellants had filed Civil Revision Petition No. 5189 of 2001, which was also rejected by the High Court by an order dated 20th January, 2005 and the said order has been challenged by the appellants in this appeal.

25. It is an admitted fact that no order had been passed on the application filed under Section 80(2) of the CPC. Till a final order is passed granting the said application, in our opinion, the irregularity in filing of the suit continues. If ultimately the application is rejected, the plaint is to be returned and in that event the application filed on behalf of the appellants under Order VII Rule 11 is to be granted. If the application filed under Section 80(2) is ultimately granted, the objection with regard to non issuance of notice under Section 80(1) of the CPC cannot be raised and in that event the suit would not fail on account of non- issuance of notice under Section 80(1) of the CPC.

28. As a result of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment delivered by the High Court confirming the order of the Trial Court dated 30th September, 2001 is quashed and set aside. The order of the Trial Court rejecting applications under Order VII Rule 11 is also quashed and set aside. It is directed that the trial court shall first of all decide the application filed by respondent no. 1 under Section 80(2) of the CPC and only after final disposal of the said application, the applications filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC shall be decided.

29. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

..........J. (DIPAK MISRA) New Delhi September 02, 2013
Shahid Balwa vs U.O.I. & Ors

8. The CBI submitted before this Court on 01.04.2011 that a notification had been issued under Section 6 of the Delhi Police Establishment Act by the State Government for entrusting the case relating to death of Sadiq Batcha to the CBI and the CBI had indicated that it had no objection to take up the investigation. The CBI also submitted before this Court that a Special Public Prosecutor had to be appointed to lead and supervise the prosecution of the case relating to the 2G Scam for which the CBI had suggested the name of Shri U.U. Lalit, senior advocate of this Court.

d) Sh. Shahid Usman Balwa, Director, M/s Swan Telecom Pvt. Ltd.; Sh. Vinod Goenka, Director, M/s Swan Telecom Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Swan Telecom Pvt. Ltd. (now M/s Etisalat DB Telecom Pvt. Ltd) through its Director – offences punishable u/s 420/468/471 IPC.

e) Sh. Sanjay Chandra, Managing Director, M/s Unitech Ltd. and M/s Unitech Wireless (Tamil Nadu) Pvt. Ltd. through its Director –offences punishable u/s 420 IPC.

10. The CBI, on the basis of the investigation conducted, submitted a charge-sheet against the above-mentioned persons/companies before a Special Judge on 02.04.2011 and Special Judge took cognizance of the aforesaid offences on the same day.

PUBLIC INTEREST:

COURT MONITORED INVESTIGATION

28. We also, therefore, find no basis in the contention of the petitioners that the orders dated 11.4.2011 and 9.11.2012 have the effect of monitoring the trial proceedings. No Court, other than the Court seized with the trial, has the power to monitor the proceedings pending before it. Order dated 11.4.2011 only facilitates the progress of the trial by ordering that the trial must proceed on a day-to-day basis. Large backlog of cases in the Courts is often an incentive to the litigants to misuse of Court’s system by indulging in unnecessary and fraudulent litigation, thereby delaying the entire trial process. Criminal justice system’s procedure guarantees and elaborateness sometimes give, create openings for abusive, dilatory tactics and confer unfair advantage on better heeled litigants to cause delay to their advantage. Longer the trial, witnesses will be unavailable, memories will fade and evidence will be stale. Taking into consideration all those aspects, this Court felt that it is in the larger public interest that the trial of 2G Scam be not hampered. Further, when larger public interest is involved, it is the bounden duty of all, including the accused persons, who are presumed to be innocent, until proven guilty, to co-operate with the progress of the trial. Early disposal of the trial is also to their advantage, so that their innocence could be proved, rather than remain enmeshed in criminal trial for years and unable to get on with their lives and business.

31. We, therefore, find no good reason either to frame guidelines to be followed by a constitutional court in relation to monitoring of criminal investigation or any legal infirmity in the orders passed by this Court on 11.04.2011 or 09.04.2012. Writ Petitions lack merits and they are accordingly dismissed, so also IA Nos.59, 61, 63 and 68 in Civil Appeal No.10660 of 2010.
Union Of India & Ors vs B.V.Gopinath

On 7th/8th September, 2005, whilst working on the aforesaid post, Mr. Gopinath (respondent No.1) was served with a charge sheet under Rule 14 of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as “CCS (CCA) Rules”). The said charge sheet was issued on the allegation that in 2003 the respondent was alleged to have approached one Chartered Accountant in Chennai for securing his transfer to Mumbai by offering bribe to the P.A. to the then Minister of State (Revenue). Thus, the charge levelled against the respondent was that he failed to maintain integrity; and exhibited a conduct which is unbecoming of a government servant. The respondent submitted his reply to the allegations wherein he denied the charges levelled against him. He requested for supply of certain documents. In due course, the Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer were appointed.

47. Further, it appears that during the pendency of these proceedings, the appellants have, after 2009, amended the procedure which provides that the charge memo shall be issued only after the approval is granted by the Finance Minister.

48. Therefore, it appears that the appeals in these matters were filed and pursued for an authoritative resolution of the legal issues raised herein.

50. For the reasons stated above, we see no merit in the appeals filed by the Union of India. We may also notice here that CAT had granted liberty to the appellants to take appropriate action in accordance with law. We see no reasons to disturb the liberty so granted. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.

September 05, 2013.
Nagar Panchayat,Kurwai & Anr vs Mahesh Kumar Singhal & Ors

3. The High Court held that Nagar Panchayat has no power to collect that amount and allowed the writ appeal against which the Nagar Panchayat has come up with this appeal.

4. The appellant in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 357(3) read with Section 349(2), 357 (5) and 358(4) (b) and (d) of Madhya Pradesh Municipality Act, 1961, imposed parking fee on the owners of vehicles, motors, trucks, buses, matadors etc. Following that a notice was issued by the appellant demanding Rs.20/- per day or Rs.600/- per month, imposing entry fees on motors, trucks, buses and matadors parked in the bus stand. Challenging the same, writ petition was preferred by the vehicle owners before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the above-mentioned bye-law and also for a direction to the Nagar Panchayat not to collect any fees from the petitioners. The learned Single Judge found no merit in the writ petition and same was dismissed on 10.07.2007. Aggrieved by the same, writ petitioners took up the matter in Writ Appeal No.458 of 2007, which was allowed by the Division Bench, holding that Section 349 of Act of 1961 does not confer any power to impose the licence fees for the use of bus stand and the same is not covered under Sections 358(4)(b) and (d) or (7) (m) of the Act of 1961. Respondents are merrily using the bus stand owned and maintained by the Nagar Panchayat, free of cost, not bothering about its maintenance and upkeep. The question is, can a court, on the basis of such an interpretation sideline the larger public interest and deny the right of the Nagar Panchayat to claim parking fees which can be utilized for the benefit of people?

11. Noticeably both the above-mentioned Judgments were dealing with demands made prior to the Constitutional (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 by which Part IXA was incorporated.

13. Above-mentioned Judgments, on facts as well as on law, do not apply to the facts of the present case, especially in view of to the 74th Constitutional Amendment and in view of Section 358(7)(m) of the M.P. Municipality Act, which was not properly addressed in those cases.

15. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur disposed of the Writ Appeal No.147 of 2010 placing reliance on the Judgment of this Court in Municipal Council, Bhopal (supra). The facts of Civil Appeal No.7822 of 2013 @ SLP(C) No.18332 of 2010 are also identical. Since we have found no illegality in demanding the parking fee in using the Bus stand in Civil Appeal No. 7821 of 2013 @ SL(C) No.20997 of 2008, Civil Appeal No.7822 of 2013 @ SLP(C) No.18332 of 2010 is liable to be allowed. Consequently, both the appeals are allowed. The judgments of the High Court are accordingly set aside and the Resolution passed by the appellants imposing the bus stand fee is upheld. However, there will be no order as to costs.
Punjab School Education Board vs Dalip Chand & Ors

3. The respondent-herein was recruited as clerk by the Punjab Subordinate Service Selection Board on 07.04.1965 and he was posted in the Department of Education, Punjab. Later he was appointed as a lecturer in Political Science in Government Senior Secondary School, Valtoha, District Amritsar where he served upto 1970. He had worked as an assistant in Education Department from June 1970 to 08.08.1979.

7. The High Court did not find any merit in the contention of the Board, allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned orders passed by the Board on 06.07.2005 and 29.09.2005 and directed the Board to reckon the service of the respondent in the Education Department as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. Aggrieved by the same, the Board has come up with this appeal

9. We are of the view that the said notification would equally apply to the respondent in this case as well. The respondent had already put in more than eight years of service in the Board, consequently, he is also entitled to get the benefit of notification dated 17.03.2011. In the circumstances, the appeal lacks merit and the same is dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.
Bhanwar Lal & Anr vs Rajasthan Board Of Muslim Wakf & Ors

3. The facts around which the controversy is involved do not require big canvass and are re-capitulated herein below:

4. The Petitioners filed the written statement and contested the suit raising number of defences. The Trial Court, i.e. the Additional District Judge, framed the following issues on 4.8.1984:

9. We have already mentioned the subject matter of the suit filed by the Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 herein, which is predicated on the plea that the suit property is Wakf Property. On this basis it is pleaded in the suit that the sale deed in favour of the Petitioners is null and void as Mr. Naimuddin who purportedly executed sale deed dated 22.9.1983 in favour of the Petitioner No. 2 had no authority to do so. As a consequence, the Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 maintain that the petitioners are in unauthorized possession of the Property. Possession of the said property alongwith rendition of accounts are the other reliefs claims in the suit.

24. We, thus, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court thereby dismissing the application filed by the respondent under Order 7 Rule 10 of the C.P.C. with the direction to the civil court to decide the suit.

25. No costs.
Jaina Wines Pvt. Ltd. & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

4. Leave granted.

6. The appellants before us are the wine manufacturers who have obtained license for manufacturing wine in Sangli District in the State of Maharashtra. The Government of Maharashtra has introduced a policy for the grape growing producers in all areas of Maharashtra majorly for the highest grape producing districts of Sangli and Nashik. The policy so framed by State Government was introduced so as to protect the grape growing farmers from sudden financial losses and to encourage the production of grapes within the state.

11. Aggrieved by the main order as well as the order passed in the Review Petitions, some of the wine manufacturers are before us in these appeals.

13. In our considered view, the High Court has not committed any error whatsoever which would call for our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the Civil Appeals are dismissed.

14. However, we clarify that if for any reason the respondents/other authorities had issued notice(s), inter alia, directing the appellants and other wine manufacturers to deposit the excise duty which according to the respondents is collected by the manufacturers, it is for the manufacturers to file appropriate reply thereby bringing it to their notice that they have not collected such excise duty and the same is also reflected in their books of account. If such a reply is filed by the wine manufacturers, it is for the authority to consider the same and pass an appropriate reasoned order. If for any reason the appellants are aggrieved by the order that may be passed by the authority considered, they would be at liberty to ventilate their grievances before an appropriate forum.

Ordered accordingly.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2013.