L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
All India Federation Of Tax ... vs Union Of India & Ors

3. On 1.6.1998 Finance Bill, 1998 was introduced in Parliament. Clause 119 of the Notes sought to substitute Sections 65, 66 and 68 and amend Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 relating to service tax so as to levy a tax on services rendered by a practising chartered accountant, cost accountant and architect to a client in professional capacity at the rate of five per cent of the amount charged to the client. On 3.6.1998, Bombay Chartered Accountants Association made a representation to the Central Government objecting to the aforestated Bill. On 1.8.1998 the Finance Bill was however passed and the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 received the assent of the President of India. The Act came into force with effect from 1.4.1998. On 7.10.1998, Union of India issued Notification No. 57/98 inter alia exempting taxable services other than accounting and auditing. On 16.10.1998, Union of India issued another Notification No. 59/98 inter alia reducing the scope of the exemption. On 20.1.1999, Writ Petition No. 142/99 was filed by the Federation in the Bombay High Court challenging the validity of the levy of service tax. By the impugned judgment dated 22.2.2001 the Bombay High Court rejected the writ petition and upheld the legislative competence of Parliament to levy service tax.

9. Government of India in order to tap new areas of taxation and to identify the hidden one appointed Tax Reforms Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr. Chelliah in August, 1991. The recommendations made by the Committee were accepted and the Service Tax was introduced in the Budget for 1994-95 through the Finance Act, 1994. Under the said enactment, Service Tax is the tax on notified services provided or to be provided. After its introduction, the constitutional validity of the services taxed by the Central Government was challenged before the Constitution Bench of this Court which took the view that the Central Government derived its authority from Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution for levying tax on services provided.

20. On the basis of the above discussion, it is clear that service tax is VAT which in turn is both a general tax as well as destination based consumption tax leviable on services provided within the country.

(v) Significance of Article 276:

41. For the above reasons, we find no merit in Civil Appeal No. 7128 of 2001 filed by All India Federation of Tax Practitioners and ors.. We hold that Parliament has legislative competence to levy service tax by way of impugned Finance Acts of 1994 and 1998 under Entry 97 of List I on chartered accountants, cost accountants and architects. We further hold that the above position now stands fortified by the Constitution (Eighty-eighth Amendment) Act, 2003 which has inserted Article 268A and Entry 92C which clearly indicates that Entry 60 of List II and Entry 92C of List I operate in different spheres. However, we make it clear that before us there is no challenge to the Constitutional validity of the said Constitution (Eighty-eighth Amendment) Act, 2003.

42. Accordingly, the civil appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Jayanti Food Processing (P) Ltd vs Commissioner Of Central Excise, ...

20. This takes us to the next appeal which is filed by Nestle India Ltd. The appellant M/s.Nestle India Ltd., are engaged in the manufacture of wafers covered with milk chocolate under the brand name KIT KAT falling under Chapter 19 of Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. This product is a specified product under the provisions of Section 4A and is included in the notification and accordingly the duty was being paid on the said Chocolate in terms of Section 4A based upon the retail sale price after claiming the deductions on account of abatements. M/s.Nestle India entered into a contract with M/s.Pepsico India Holdings Ltd., where the agreed price of the KITKAT packet was Rs.4.80 and the chocolate so purchased at that price by M/s.Pepsico was meant for free supply of the same along with one bottle of Pepsi of 1.5 litres in pursuance of their Sales Promotion Scheme. The appellant cleared the disputed goods after payment of duty at Rs.4.80 per chocolate in terms of Section 4 of the Act after filing the due declaration on the premise that since the chocolates were being sold to M/s.Pepsico, this was not a retail sale and on such chocolates supply there was no requirement to display the maximum retail price and as such the chocolates could not be covered under Section 4A and would eventually be assessable under Section 4 of the Act. However, the Department did not accept this and it issued a show cause notice dated 14.8.2001 raising a demand of Rs.48,95,370/- along with the proposal to impose penalty upon the appellant with interest. This proposal was contested by the assessee on the aforementioned plea that it was not required to print the MRP under the provisions of SWM Act and the Rules made thereunder. The Commissioner did not accept this and confirmed the demand. The appellant having failed in its appeal before the Tribunal has now approached this Court by way of this appeal.

19. In the result the Civil Appeal No.2819 of 2002 is allowed.

We accordingly allow this appeal without any order as to costs. CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2150-2151 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NO.1144 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NO.1385 OF 2005 CIVIL APPEAL NO.3847 OF 2005 CIVIL APPEAL NO.6425 OF 2005

Civil Appeal Nos.6559-60/2005

39. In the result Civil Appeal Nos.2819/2002 and Civil Appeal No.1738/2004 are allowed and Civil Appeal Nos.2050-51/2004, 1144/2004, 4754/2004, 1385/2005, 3847/2005, 6425/2005, 2877/2005, 6168/2005, 5840/2006, 498/2006 and 6559-60/2005 are dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
Rajindera Singh (Dead) Through Lrs. & ... vs Prem Mai And Others

2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that Smt. Prem Mai and Sudha Mai filed a suit for declaration and possession of the suit land in the Trial Court being Suit No. 487/57. The said suit was decreed against the appellant herein on 21.9.63. Aggrieved against that decree, the appellant- defendant preferred an appeal which was allowed on 16.4.64 and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court was reversed by the First Appellant Court. The First Appellant Court was of the view that the defendant-appellant was in cultivatory possession of the land in dispute since before the commencement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, and the suit was barred by time in view of Section 180 U.P. Tenancy Act, and hence the defendant had become a Sirdar.

3. Aggrieved against that, the respondent herein preferred Second Appeal before the High Court which was also dismissed vide order dated 10.2.1971 and the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court was affirmed. It appears that during the pendency of the suit the Trial Court had appointed a receiver (one Pitamber Singh) who took possession of the suit land. Also, Prem Mai and Sudha Mai purported to gift the suit land to the D.A.V. College Trust. After the suit was dismissed by the First Appellate Court and the said dismissal was affirmed by the High Court, the question arose about restitution of the land in question to the defendant-appellant under Section 144 C.P.C.. However, by order dated 13.8.75 the restitution application was rejected. Aggrieved against that order, the matter was taken up in first appeal which was dismissed on 2.4.76 and then to the High Court in second appeal which was dismissed on 6.9.99. All the courts having dismissed the restitution proceedings, the appellant is before us by way of the present appeal.

7. Insofar as the present proceedings are concerned, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and allow this appeal. The appellant would ordinarily have been entitled to possession of the suit land but because of the interim order of status quo passed in Suit No. 242 of 2002, we direct that the possession of the suit land shall be subject to orders passed in those proceedings.

8. The appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.

Is this not descriptive of the situation prevailing in India today ?

11. People in India are simply disgusted with this state of affairs, and are fast losing faith in the judiciary because of the inordinate delay in disposal of cases. We request the concerned authorities to do the needful in the matter urgently to ensure speedy disposal of cases if the people's faith in the judiciary is to remain.
M.C. Chamaraju vs Hind Nippon Rural Industrial (P) Ltd

3. Short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that according to the appellant, in September, 1984, he was appointed as Supervisor by Mr. V.K. Poddar, Managing Director of Agarwal Investments, Poddar Granites and Hind Nippon Co. Ltd. According to him, he worked as Supervisor in Poddar Mines at Sira upto 1990 and thereafter was transferred to other quarry. He worked at various places like Bellary, Sira and Chamaraya Nagar. He worked till February, 1993. From March, 1993, however, he was neither paid his salary nor served with any order of termination or dismissal. On September 27, 1993, the appellant addressed a letter asking the Management to settle his dues and also to pay gratuity under the Act. But it was not paid. He, therefore, approached the Controlling Authority and Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bangalore by making an application under sub-section (4) of Section 7 of the Act read with sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the Payment of Gratuity (Central) Rules, 1972. The Controlling Authority, after hearing both the parties and perusing the materials placed before him, held that the appellant was entitled to gratuity. Accordingly, an order was passed on May 26, 2003 that the appellant was entitled to a sum of Rs.16,875/- towards gratuity. Since the respondent- employer had not paid the amount of gratuity within 30 days of the leaving of services by the workman, the payment was ordered to be made with interest @ 10% p.a. from June 12, 1993 till the date of payment.

4. Being aggrieved by the order of the Controlling Authority, the respondent-Company filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Act. The Appellate Authority vide his order dated December 20, 2004 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order passed by the Controlling Authority.

18. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is hereby set aside and the orders passed by the Controlling Authority and Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 as confirmed by the learned Single Judge is hereby restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.

19. The payment to which the appellant-workman is held entitled shall be made within a period of twelve weeks from today.
State Of Maharashtra vs Dattatraya Digamber Birajdar

2. Background facts as projected by the appellant are as follows:-

Divisional Engineer that by order dated 18.3.1986 respondent was appointed as Surveyor on contractual employment, and on 25.9.1986 he was transferred to Sub-Divisional Soil Conservation Officer, Paranda. As per order of the Commissioner, Aurangabad appointments of Surveyor on temporary establishment came to an end. Respondent examined himself in support of his claim and exhibited 3 documents. One of the documents purportedly indicated that the respondent worked in the Division till 31st August, 1986. An officer of the Sub-Divisional Soil Conservation Office, Aurangabad was examined in support of the appellant's case. The Labour Court passed an award, inter alia, holding that (1) termination of respondent with effect from 30.4.1986 was illegal; and (2) he was to be reinstated with back wages i.e. 25% of the back wages. Challenging the aforesaid order, writ petition was filed before the Bombay High Court which was dismissed by impugned order.

7. Looked at from any angle the order of the Tribunal and the Award by the Labour Court as affirmed by the High Court cannot be maintained and are set aside.

8. Appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.
Haryana State Industrial Development ... vs M/S Cork Manufacturing Co

2. The defendant in Suit No. 8 of 1995 in the court of Senior Sub-Judge, Gurgaon is the appellant in this appeal. The appellant allotted plot No. 259 on 12.3.1986 to the respondent through its sole proprietor Om Prakash Saharan. The approximate area of the plot is 1000 square meters and the tentative price was Rs. 1,20,000/-. On 12.2.1988, a formal agreement was entered into between the parties. According to the agreement, the allottee had to start construction of a building for the setting up of an industrial unit within a period of three months and had to complete the construction within one and half years from the date of issue of the letter of allotment. The construction had to be completed and the installation of the machinery had also to be completed and the commercial production was to be started within a period of two years from the date of allotment. The Agreement also provided that failing compliance with the above condition by the allottee, the plot was liable to be resumed and 10% of the cost of the plot deposited by the allottee at the time of allotment was liable to be forfeited. The letter of allotment was issued on 24.12.1987. The allottee did not fulfil the condition of starting commercial production within two years of the letter of allotment. This fact is not in dispute. The appellant thereupon issued various notices to the allottee. On 19.7.1991, the allottee requested for extension o time. That request was rejected. On 13.9.1991, according to the appellant, the appellant issued an order of resumption which specifically referred to the contravention of the terms and conditions of allotment by the allottee. According to the appellant, possession was taken back on 20.9.1991. The plot was thereafter re-allotted to M/s Insulation & Electrical Products (P) Ltd., New Delhi on 2.4.1992. Since that allottee also did not fulfil the conditions, the said allotment was cancelled on 6.1.1994.

3. The respondent, the plaintiff, filed an application for referring the dispute to Arbitration. The same was rejected. Respondent then approached the Consumer Forum, but that complaint was also dismissed.

17. Thus, on the whole, I am satisfied that the plaintiff had not made out any case for relief in the present suit. The judgments of the courts below therefore call for interference. I am satisfied that the appeal deserves to be allowed. If the decree now passed is not set aside, I apprehend that I would be failing in my duty exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. After all, the jurisdiction of this Court is a corrective jurisdiction and not a restricted one.

18. The appeal is therefore allowed. The judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff is dismissed with costs throughout.
Chacko And Another vs Mahadevan

1. These appeals have been filed against the judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 27.5.1999 in Second Appeal No.960 of 1989. That Second Appeal arose out of a suit being O.S. No.431 of 1983 filed by the present appellant Chacko and his wife Annakutty against the defendant Mahadevan. The defendant in that suit Mahadevan in his turn filed suit O.S. 437 of 1983 against Chacko and Annakutty. Both these suits were tried together. The trial court dismissed the suit filed by Chacko and Annakutty and decreed the suit filed by Mahadevan. On appeals being filed, the appellate court reversed the decrees of the trial court and granted Chacko and Annakutty a decree and dismissed the suit filed by Mahadevan. Aggrieved Mahadevan filed the second appeal before the High Court, which was allowed and hence this appeal.

3. The facts of the case are that Chacko had land of an extent of 20 cents (100 cents being equal to 1 acre). By sale deed dated 4.9.1982, Ext.A2, Chacko sold one cent out of this land for Rs.18000. Thereafter Chacko sold another three cents of this land to Mahadevan for Rs.1000 vide sale deed dated 11.7.1983 Ext.A3. The suit O.S.431 of 1983 was filed by Chacko and Annakutty seeking to set aside that sale deed dated 11.7.1983, Ext.A3, on the ground that it was vitiated by fraud and was hence null and void and for a prohibitory injunction restraining Mahadevan from entering into that property. The averment in the plaint was that Chacko was given liquor by Mahadevan and others and under that influence the sale deed was got executed. Hence it was void. The defendant Mahadevan denied the plaint's allegations.

5. Chacko and Annakutty filed an appeal before the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court held that the fact that one cent land was sold for Rs.18000 vide Ext.A2 (sale deed dated 4.9.1982) and three cent land was sold vide Ext.A3 (sale deed dated 11.7.1983) for a sum of Rs.1000, showed that this was an unconscionable transaction and hence the sale deed dated 11.7.1983 was liable to be set aside. Aggrieved Mahadevan filed a Second Appeal, which was allowed by the impugned judgment.

8. In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the First Appellate Court dated 29.6.1988 and we quash the sale deed dated 11.7.1983.

9. The Appeals are allowed. There is no order as to costs.
A.P.S.R.T.C. Rep. By Its Chief Law ... vs M. Pentaiah Chary

4. Respondent preferred an appeal thereagainst. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment granted further compensation to him for a sum of Rs. 1,62,800/- in addition to the awarded compensation of Rs. 85,000/-.

16. Furthermore, in a case of this nature, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit and proper case where we should exercise our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

17. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. Appellant shall bear the costs of the respondents. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/-.
Harishchandra Ladaku Thange vs State Of Maharashtra

2. The trial Court i.e. learned Sessions Judge, Thane in Sessions Case No.586/89 found the accused guilty of the aforesaid offences and sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and 5 years respectively with default stipulation.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

18. Above being the position, it cannot be said that the complete chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty has been established by the prosecution. The conviction cannot be maintained and is set aside. The accused-appellant is acquitted of the charges. The bail bonds executed to release him on bail stand discharged.

19. The appeal is allowed.
Mahesh Gupta & Ors vs Yashwant Kumar Ahirwar & Ors

5. We are concerned with the posts of Assistant Teacher (Science). Appellants herein belonged to the general category. They, however, suffer from disability. They are handicapped persons. Respondent No. 1 Yashwant Kumar Ahirwar, a handicapped person but also belonging to the reserved category candidate was not selected. He approached the Administrative Tribunal. The Administrative Tribunal by a judgment and order dated 27.11.1999 opined that he had no right of appointment on the post of Assistant Teacher (Science) having not been selected by the Selection Committee stating:

9. In terms of the said decision, a show cause notice was issued upon the appellants herein as to why their services shall not be terminated. The services of the appellants were terminated. Appellants filed a Special Leave Petition against the original order dated 1.05.2003. However, it is now accepted that services of some of the appellants have been terminated.

14. For the reasons aforementioned, we not only set aside the judgment of the High Court but also direct that the persons whose services have been terminated in terms of 4.02.2004 should be continued in service. We furthermore direct that they should be paid back wages as also other service benefits. Respondent No. 1 could have been considered both as handicapped persons as also Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. If all the vacancies meant for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribe had not been filled up, the State may consider appointing him. If he has already been appointed, the State may consider the desirability of creating a supernumerary post and continue his service therein.

15. The appeals are allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/- in each case.
Indian Bank & Anr vs N. Venkatramani

4. A voluntary retirement scheme was floated by the bank on 9.11.2000. Respondent requested for his voluntary retirement. It was accepted by an order dated 10.02.2001. By then, he had completed 14 years, 9 months and 17 days of service. He filed an application for grant of pension on the premise that he was eligible therefor. It was rejected on the ground that he had not completed 15 years of service. A writ petition filed by him was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court. An intra- court appeal filed thereagainst has been allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment directing:

17. In any event, it is not a case where we should exercise our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

18. For the reasons aforementioned, no case has been made out for interference of the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/-.
Commissioner Of Customs, Chennai vs M/S Hewlett Packard India Sales (P) Ltd

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench, Chennai (in short 'CESTAT') allowing the appeal filed by the respondent. By the impugned judgment CESTAT held that the Software-loaded Hard Discs are classifiable under Heading 85.24 of the First Schedule to Customs Tariff Act, 1985 (in short 'Tariff Act'). It was further held that respondent will be eligible for duty exemption under Notification No.21/2002-Cus as amended. It was held that rest of the machine would be classified under Heading 84.71.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

6. To answer the above question CTH 85.24 and CTH 84.71 need to be quoted:

12. For the afore-stated reasons, we are of the view that the imported laptops were classifiable under CTH 84.71 whereas operating software recorded on HDD imported as packaged software were classifiable under CTH 85.24 and accordingly Civil Appeal filed by the Department deserves to be allowed, and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.