L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Baswant Shankarappa Swami vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

3. The appellant is a Graduate Engineer (Civil). He was selected and nominated by the Maharashtra Public Service Commission (for short `the commission') as Assistant Executive Engineer Class I in the Maharashtra Service of Engineers (Group A) in the Irrigation Department on September 11, 1989. The appellant was promoted as Executive Engineer, a Class I post, vide office order dated September 7, 1993. On March 1, 1996 the Governor of Maharashtra made the rules called the Superintending Engineer (Civil) in the Maharashtra Service of Engineers Group A, in the Irrigation Department (Recruitment Rules), 1996 (for short `the Rules'). Rules 2 and 4 thereof came into force on the date of publication of the notification in the official gazette while as regards rule 3, it was provided that it shall come into force on such date as may be notified by the State Government in consultation with the Commission. On September 30, 1999, a notification came to be issued declaring March 1, 2001 to be date for coming into force of rule 3. According to the appellant, although he completed 7 years on the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) in the month of September 2 2000 and his juniors in the cadre of Executive Engineer were promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer in 2005 but he was denied promotion having not gained experience in any one or more of the branches from each of the groups provided in rule 3. The appellant constrained thereby approached the Tribunal under Section 19 of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 for redressal of his grievance. The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of rule 3 before the Tribunal being arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

5. Not satisfied with the judgment of the Tribunal, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay and put in issue 3 specifically the correctness of the Tribunal's view and set up the ground that rule 3 was ultra vires the Constitution.

9. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed to the aforesaid extent. Writ Petition No. 6812/2008 is restored on the file of the High Court for its fresh consideration. No order as to costs.
M/S. Sonic Surgical vs National Insurance Company Ltd

It appears that there was a fire on 13-14th February, 1999 at 10.00 p.m. in the godown of the appellant at Ambala. For claiming compensation, the appellant filed a claim petition before the Consumer Commission of the Union Territory, Chandigarh constituted under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter for short 'the Act'). The said claim petition filed by the appellant herein was allowed by the Consumer Commission of the Union Territory, Chandigarh. On appeal, the NCDRC allowed the 2 appeal of the respondent herein on the ground that the Consumer Commission at Chandigarh had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the complaint. We are in agreement with the view taken by the NCDRC.

The aforesaid amendment came into force w.e.f. 15.3.2003 whereas the complaint in the present case has been filed in the year 2000 and the cause of action arose in 1999. Hence, in our opinion, the amended section will have no application to the case at hand.

For the reasons stated hereinabove, we do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned order of the NCDRC. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. No order as to the costs.

OCTOBER 20, 2009
M/S. Grasim Industries Ltd. And Anr vs M/S. Agarwal Steel

The facts in detail have been set out in the impugned judgment and hence we are not repeating the same here. Briefly stated the facts are that the appellant herein entered into an agreement with the respondent and appointed the appellant as a principal dealer for sale of its cement 'Vikram Premium Brand'. On 21.3.1997, the respondent became the consignment agent of the appellant company and in this behalf an agreement dated 1.5.1997 was 2 signed between the parties. Disputes and differences arose between the parties under the said agreement dated 1.5.1997 and the same were referred to an arbitrator. A copy of the arbitration award dated 6.8.2000 is annexed as Annexure-P/10 to this appeal. In the award the arbitrator has rejected the plea of the claimant-respondent that the signature on Ex.D-8 dated 21.10.1997 were only in lieu of a receipt. The case of the appellant was that the document Ex.D-8 was a joint statement of account. The arbitrator held that the signatures on Ex. D-8, joint statement of account, were made by the parties. However, he held that the signature on behalf of the claimant-respondent was made under a mistake and hence the same was not binding. Accordingly, the arbitrator re-examined each head of account and ultimately held the appellant liable to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs. 49.90 lakhs alongwith interest. Objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter for short 'the Act') were filed by the respondent before the IXth Addl. District Judge, Jabalpur. By his order dated 25.6.2001, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the appellant was entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 62,000/- alongwith interest @ 18%. The said order of the learned Addl. District Judge was put in challenge before 3 the High Court under Section 37 of the Act.

All questions of law and fact, except the one decided by us hereinabove shall remain open for the parties to be urged before the High Court. We make it clear that we are making our observation that there was no mistake in the document Ex. D-8, which the parties have signed.

Appeal allowed. No order as to the costs.

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7477/2004 AND 1733/2005 In terms of our order in Civil Appeal No. 5994/2004, these appeals also stand disposed of.

OCTOBER 20, 2009 5
M/S Becil vs Arraycom India Ltd.& Ors

The facts in brief are:

Respondent No.1 before us filed a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi which has been allowed by the impugned judgment and hence this appeal before us.

In our opinion, the whole controversy is about the interpretation of the second paragraph submitted by respondent No.1(Arraycom). According to the High Court, the bid of Rs.51.57 crores was an inclusive bid and no amount of central sales tax could have been added to that amount. We regret we cannot agree.

Thus, in our opinion, paragraph 2 of the bid of Arraycom is ambiguous and this is the fault of Arraycom itself by giving such an ambiguous proposal. Respondent No.1 should have given a clear cut bid either by stopping after the first sentence, or by adding another sentence after the second sentence that even if the concessional forms C/D are not given the bid of Rs.51.57 crores is an inclusive bid.

651. Moreover, the view of Prasar Bharti also appears reasonable because Prasar Bharti has to pay the amount inclusive of sales tax, since there is no concessional forms. If Prasar Bharti has taken up one possible interpretation, the High Court should not have intervened. The scope of judicial review in administrative matters is limited.

For the reasons given above, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. No order as to costs.

Civil Appeal No.6979 of 2009 @ SLP(C) No.9381 of 2009 Leave granted.

This Appeal has been filed challenging the same impugned judgment dated 02nd February, 2009 passed by the High Court of Delhi.

Since, we have allowed the Civil Appeal No.6978 of 2009 arising from S.L.P.(C) No.5461 of 2009, this appeal is also allowed on the same terms. No order as to costs.
Surender Kumar vs Union Of India And Ors

1. This appeal is at the instance of an employee who was working as Assistant Supervisor, Military Farm. He was served with chargesheet wherein it was alleged firstly that he had misappropriated about 320 Kg. of Soda-bi-carbonate; secondly, that he had failed to feed the animals in his charge with the said Soda-bi-carbonate as a result of which he had jeopardized the health of the animals and thirdly, that he had willfully disobeyed the lawful orders of his superior officer. The Officer In-charge ordered him to hand over all the charge of cattle yard section to Mr. Birbal Sharma which he failed to do. Regular departmental inquiry was conducted wherein the delinquent officer was given all the opportunities to defend himself as also all the necessary documents were supplied to him and after hearing him in full, he was found guilty on all the three counts. -2- He was awarded the punishment of compulsory retirement. An appeal was filed by the delinquent officer against the said penalty which was dismissed. Hence the delinquent officer moved the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Central Administrative Tribunal also agreed with the findings as also the punishment awarded by the department. Further a writ petition was filed before the Bombay High Court. However that writ petition was also dismissed.

We do not find any merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.
Union Of India vs T.M. Somarajan & Ors

1. It it an admitted position that the respondent No. 1 who was a member of the state police service was inducted into the Indian Police Service (IPS in short) w.e.f. 9.12.1995. At that time, his basic pay in the state cadre was Rs. 4650 p.m. + special pay of Rs. 100. Very curiously, after his entry into the IPS., his pay came to be refixed at Rs. 4250 + special pay of Rs. 200 w.e.f. 1.12.1996.

(iii) & (iv) of Schedule II of IPS (Pay) Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as "the IPS (Pay) Rules") and hence, there was no anomaly at all. Respondent No. 1 again sent a detailed representation dated 6.10.1997 wherein he had elaborately explained the facts and the relevant rules with regard to the pay fixation on his appointment to the IPS cadre on promotion from the State Police Service and the provisions regarding the power of relaxation conferred on the Union of India under Rule 6 of Section III of Schedule II of the IPS (Pay) Rules. However, that was also rejected by communication dated 4.1.1998. The respondent No.1, therefore, challenged the same by way of filing Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench and sought the following reliefs:

3. It also became apparent that few other officers similarly placed with the respondent No. 1 were not found fit to be inducted into the IPC cadre along with the respondent No. 1 and they were inducted into the IPS Cadre subsequently. It was pointed out by the respondent No. 1 that those officers were also junior to him. They were Shri Somasundra Menon, Shamsudeen, Vijayan. Yet, inspite of the fact that all these officers were junior and inducted into the IPS Cadre after the 4 induction of respondent No.1, their pay were fixed at higher level than that of respondent No. 1.

9. We have considered the order of the Tribunal in detail. We are in agreement with the Tribunal's well considered order as also of the High Court. In our opinion, after entering into the IPS cadre from the State Cadre Service, the pay of such an officer should not be reduced.

10. With these observations, we feel that there is no 8 infirmity in the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court. We do not see any merit in this appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed.
Banda Chinna Subbarayudu & Ors vs Thailam Vishwanatha Rao & Anr

3. The appellants suffered a decree for recovery of money in O.S. 458/98, in the court or Principal Junior Civil Judge, Proddatur. Pursuant to the said decree, the respondent No.1 herein, who is the plaintiff-decree-holder, filed Execution Proceedings, 352 of 2000, for sale of the property indicated in the said proceedings. On 25th November, 2003, the sale was conducted and the property in question was sold to the second respondent. On the same date, in an appeal filed by one Chennakkagari Ravindranath Reddy, being A.S. No. 10/2003, the said Execution Proceedings No. 352/2000 were stayed.

5. The application filed by the appellant/judgment-debtor was dismissed by the Executing Court on both grounds. Even in appeal, the said order was confirmed. When the matter was taken to the High Court, it found in favour of the appellant as far as the amount of deposit is concerned. However, the High Court affirmed the order of the Executing Court, as well as of the Appellate Court, on the question of limitation. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants have preferred the instant appeal.

8. The only question we are, therefore, left to answer is whether the appellants would be entitled to the benefit of the said period during which he was prevented by the Execution Proceedings in taking steps to file the application for setting aside the sale.

11. Having regard to the above, the appeal is allowed and the orders of the High Court, so far as it relates to the question of limitation and affirming the view of the lower courts, is set aside. The Executing Court is directed to proceed with the application filed by the appellants herein under Order 21 Order 89 CPC, being E.A. 333 of 2005, and dispose of the same at an early date, since the matter has already been considerably delayed.

12. Having regard to the circumstances involved, there will be no orders as to costs.
Jai Balaji Industries Ltd vs Pec Ltd.& Ors

(d) The Receiver after confirmation of sale shall handover the sale proceeds to the respondent/plaintiff. The appellant is directed to renew the said Bank Guarantee till the disposal of the suit.

7. Allegedly, the said ore did not meet the tests relating to its quality and, consequently, the appellant rejected the entire consignment and refused to take delivery thereof from the Respondent No.1-Company. That is the genesis of the dispute which arose between the parties. 6

8. The appellant filed a suit, being C.S.No.137 of 2009, in the Calcutta High Court in its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction claiming return of an advance amount of Rs.2,85,28,926/- and Rs.35,30,000/-, being the price of 100 metric tonnes, aggregating a sum of Rs.3,20,58,926/- and Rs.2,52,08,526/- paid towards various duties, charges and freight etc. The appellant also prayed for an injunction to restrain the Respondent No.1- Company from encashing the security which had been given by the appellant to the extent of Rs.20,31,25,956/- and for damages. In the suit an application for interim orders was also made for the following reliefs :

9. On 18th May, 2009, the learned Single Judge passed an interim order, as prayed for, in regard to encashment of the security deposit till 22nd May, 2009. Thereafter, the interim order was extended and the appellant herein was directed to revalidate the cheque dated 14th December, 2008, which was purported to have been given by way of security to the Respondent No.1, by another six months from the date of receipt of the order. Thereafter, the Respondent No.1-Company filed an application for vacating the interim order while the appellant sought continuance thereof.

Plaint to be served forthwith, if not already served, upon Advocates-on-Record for the defendant in the suit, by the Advocate-on-Record for the plaintiff. Written statement within 3 weeks from the date the certified copy of this judgment is made available, cross order for discovery two weeks thereafter, inspection two weeks thereafter and the suit is directed to appear in the prospective list."

11. Aggrieved thereby, the Respondent No.1 herein preferred APOT No.235 of 2009 and APOT No.249 of 2009 before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and the same were disposed of finally by the Appeal Court by its order dated 1st September, 2009, extracted hereinabove, whereby the order of the 10 learned Single Judge was set aside and replaced by the said order.

21. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the Appeal Court of the Calcutta High Court in APOT No.235 of 2009 and APOT No.249 of 2009. The appeals are, 16 accordingly, dismissed. We make it clear that the observations made in this order are only for the disposal of the appeals which have been directed against the interim orders and the Trial Court will be at liberty to proceed in the suit uninfluenced by any of the said observations.

22. There will be no order as to costs.
Kamrul Islam Alvi vs State Of M.P

2. Appellant's land admeasuring 3.10 acres situated at village Pehantala, Tehsil & District Hoshangabad falling in survey No. 15, was acquired for construction of Bagda Branch Canal. A notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short `the Act') on 9.11.1973. The Land Acquisition Officer passed an award dated 21.2.1975 determining the amount of compensation payable to the appellant. He assessed the compensation at Rs. 6,523.95. The said compensation was accepted by the appellant under protest and C.A. @ S.L.P.(C) No.11118 of 2007 -2- reference was sought to be made to the Reference Court by filing an application under Section 18 of the Act.

14. Hence this appeal.

C.A. @ S.L.P.(C) No.11118 of 2007 -9-

21. Obviously, it appears to be a bona-fide mistake on the part of the learned Government Advocate who did not notice the Order dated 5.7.1983 and the appellant's earlier application filed before the Land Acquisition Officer on 22.3.1978 wherein a specific claim was made for awarding compensation for the water reservoir and sluice gate at Rs. 6,46,579.95. That being so, we are of the opinion that looking to the matter from any angle, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in law. It is hereby set aside and quashed. The award of the Reference Court dated 20.6.1994 in Reference Case No. 46/84 (old No. 1/77) is hereby restored with all consequential benefits as mentioned therein.

22. The appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent with costs throughout. Counsel's fee Rs. 10,000/-.
Haribhai Lakhmanbhai Seedhav vs State Of Gujarat & Ors

7) Being aggrieved by the said order dated 30.3.1991, the legal heirs of the original applicant had filed Revision Application No. TEN.BA/404/91 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal as provided under Section 38 of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1961. The Tribunal vide its order dated 14.6.1993, partly allowed the revision application by holding that "except transfer in respect of 4 Sy. No. 276 (A.5 Gs. 28-3/4), the rest of the transfers are to be ignored in accordance with Sections 7 and 8 of the Act". As a result of such order, the land measuring 5 Acres 28-3/4 Gs., was ordered to be excluded from the holding of Gelabhai and the matter was remanded back to the Mamlatdar for declaration of net area of surplus land and further a direction was issued to the Mamlatdar to give an opportunity to the declarant/landholders to exercise their option regarding selection of the surplus land to be surrendered and then to take possession of the surplus land.

8) Being aggrieved by the order dated 14.6.1993, the legal heirs of Gelabhai along with others filed a writ petition before the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 806 of 1993. The High Court by its order dated 4.4.1996 dismissed the Writ Petition.

17) In view of the above discussion, we cannot sustain the impugned order passed by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court.

18) In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside.

The matter is remitted back to the High Court, with a request to 11 restore the Letters Patent Appeal No. 832 of 2006 on its board and decide the appeal on merits. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. S.L.P.(C) No. 11368 of 2006 Leave granted.

In view of the judgment in the abovesaid Civil Appeal No......../2009 arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 11281 of 2006 pronounced today by us, the appeal is allowed and the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
Ashok Kumar Sharma vs Oberoi Flight Services

3. The Appellant (for short "workman") was employed by Oberoi Flight Services-Respondent (for short "Management") as a loader on March 10, 1980. Allegedly on August 31, 1986 while returning from duty, the workman was found carrying 30 KLM soup spoons illegally in his shoe. The workman is said to have admitted his guilt in writing on August 31, 1986 itself and then again on the next day i.e. September 1, 1986. The Management acting on the said admission of guilt by the workman, vide order dated September 3, 1986 dismissed him from service. Having been unsuccessful in his representation and legal notice to the Management, the workman raised industrial dispute before the appropriate Government which was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court, Delhi on June 19, 1987.

4. The workman in his statement of claim before the Labour Court set out that being a union leader, the Management hatched a conspiracy against him for his removal and obtained confession letters under threat and coercion. He also set up the plea that without holding any inquiry and in breach of the principles of the natural justice, the order of dismissal was passed by the Management. In the written statement, the Management, on the other hand, narrated the circumstances in which the workman had stolen 30 KLM soup 2 spoons by carrying them in his shoe. The parties led evidence in support of their respective stand. The Labour Court, after hearing the parties, vide his award dated January 31, 1996 held that order of dismissal passed by the Management was contrary to law but at the same time it also held that the dismissal of the workman from the service of the Management was not unjustified. The Labour Court, however, awarded full back wages to the workman from the date of his dismissal until the date of award.

5. The workman challenged the award of the Labour Court by filing Writ Petition which was heard by the Single Judge. The Single Judge held that workman has failed to make out any ground for interference with the impugned award and, consequently, dismissed the Writ Petition on July 30, 2007.

11. In light of the aforesaid legal position, the view of the High Court that monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement of the workman would be proper cannot be said to be unjustified. However, we find that the compensation in the sum of Rs.60,000/- awarded by the Division Bench is 3 JT 2009(9)SCC396 6 grossly inadequate. Regard being had to all relevant facts and circumstances, including the nature of employment and the fact that he was a confirmed employee, in our considered view compensation of Rs.2 lacs to the appellant by the Respondent shall meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. Such payment should be made, after deducting the amount already paid, within six weeks from today failing which the same shall carry interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum on unpaid amount.

12. Appeal is allowed in part to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.

...J (Tarun Chatterjee) ...................

.....J (R. M. Lodha) New Delhi November 6, 2009.