L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Yamuna Shankar Sharma Ã ..Appellant vs State Of Rajasthan & Ors. Ã .Respondents

Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur, partly allowing the Civil Special Appeal filed by the present Vice Chancellor, Mohan Lal Sukhadia University (in short the 'Union') and others questioning correctness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. By the order which was impugned before the Division Bench, the learned Single Judge held that order dated 25.4.2003 passed by the University was not sustainable and both the Vice Chancellor and the University were directed to take back the present appellant in service as Legal Assistant with all consequential benefits. The Single Judge directed the University and the Vice Chancellor to absorb the present appellant on a regular post from the date when the vacancy arose pursuant to the order of this Court dated 16.9.1992.

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Keeping in view the order passed by this Court and on the recommendation of the Committee constituted by the Board of Management, the Vice Chancellor was allowed the UGC pay scales to the appellant. An undertaking was given on 27.12.1999 pursuant to the aforesaid order. Though initially the appellant was allowed to draw the UGC pay scale, on 13.1.2003 notice was issued to show cause as to why the excess payment made was not to be recovered from him. Notice referred to the order of this Court dated 16.9.1992 by which it was directed that Research Associates were to be allowed a consolidated salary to be worked out by placing them on a basic salary of Rs.700/- per month. It was indicated that the UGC scale was wrongly allowed to the appellant which resulted in excess payment. Subsequently, Registrar of the University informed the Dean, College of law, Udaipur that the term of temporary appointment to the appellant was not extended beyond 31.3.2003 as per the decision of the Board of management. This order and the show cause notice formed subject matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge who as noted above allowed the writ petition. The order was challenged before the Division Bench which as noted above partly modified the order and held that regularization was not be granted as claimed but directed that the appellant's case was to be considered on following the criteria as per the applicable rules. It was further directed that while subjecting appellant for selection process, pass service rendered by him was to be given due weightage. It was further directed that he was not to be denied regularization on the ground that he has become overage. But no other relief was given.

The order passed by the University was on the basis of the recommendations of the Committee to pay the UGC pay scale at a particular scale which was applicable at the relevant point of time and revised pay scale. That being so, the view that he had been paid contrary to the order of this Court is not correct and cannot be maintained. Accordingly, the notice for recovery cannot be maintained. To that extent the appellant is entitled to the benefit.

The appeals are disposed of. No costs.
Yamuna Shankar Sharma À..Appellant vs State Of Rajasthan & Ors. À.Respondents

Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur, partly allowing the Civil Special Appeal filed by the present Vice Chancellor, Mohan Lal Sukhadia University (in short the 'Union') and others questioning correctness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. By the order which was impugned before the Division Bench, the learned Single Judge held that order dated 25.4.2003 passed by the University was not sustainable and both the Vice Chancellor and the University were directed to take back the present appellant in service as Legal Assistant with all consequential benefits. The Single Judge directed the University and the Vice Chancellor to absorb the present appellant on a regular post from the date when the vacancy arose pursuant to the order of this Court dated 16.9.1992.

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Keeping in view the order passed by this Court and on the recommendation of the Committee constituted by the Board of Management, the Vice Chancellor was allowed the UGC pay scales to the appellant. An undertaking was given on 27.12.1999 pursuant to the aforesaid order. Though initially the appellant was allowed to draw the UGC pay scale, on 13.1.2003 notice was issued to show cause as to why the excess payment made was not to be recovered from him. Notice referred to the order of this Court dated 16.9.1992 by which it was directed that Research Associates were to be allowed a consolidated salary to be worked out by placing them on a basic salary of Rs.700/- per month. It was indicated that the UGC scale was wrongly allowed to the appellant which resulted in excess payment. Subsequently, Registrar of the University informed the Dean, College of law, Udaipur that the term of temporary appointment to the appellant was not extended beyond 31.3.2003 as per the decision of the Board of management. This order and the show cause notice formed subject matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge who as noted above allowed the writ petition. The order was challenged before the Division Bench which as noted above partly modified the order and held that regularization was not be granted as claimed but directed that the appellant's case was to be considered on following the criteria as per the applicable rules. It was further directed that while subjecting appellant for selection process, pass service rendered by him was to be given due weightage. It was further directed that he was not to be denied regularization on the ground that he has become overage. But no other relief was given.

The order passed by the University was on the basis of the recommendations of the Committee to pay the UGC pay scale at a particular scale which was applicable at the relevant point of time and revised pay scale. That being so, the view that he had been paid contrary to the order of this Court is not correct and cannot be maintained. Accordingly, the notice for recovery cannot be maintained. To that extent the appellant is entitled to the benefit.

The appeals are disposed of. No costs.
Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd vs G. Harischandra Reddy And Anr

The facts giving rise to the above civil appeal are as follows.

On 27.11.93 Agreement bearing No.41/93 was entered into between Jala Nigam and the claimant (respondent no.1) concerning construction of Mulawad Lift Irrigation Scheme. The contract was for 36 months. It was to be completed by 26.11.96. In the course of execution of the contract, Jala Nigam entrusted to the contractor, certain extra work vide two supplementary agreements dated 11.6.96 and 7.11.98. The contract was extended up to 31.12.2003. The claimant (contractor) raised disputes, said to have arisen out of the works entrusted under the contract. By letter dated 23.3.98 the contractor called upon the Chief Engineer to act as an arbitrator under Clause 29 of the Contract which is reproduced hereinbelow:

By letter dated 26.3.98 the Chief Engineer refused to act as an arbitrator on the ground that the contract did not provide for arbitration. This led the contractor to file C.M.P. No.26/99 under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. By order dated 10.9.99 the High Court directed the Chief Engineer to act as an arbitrator. By the said order the High Court directed both the parties to file their respective claims and counter claims before the arbitrator. By letter dated 12.11.99 the Arbitrator entered upon the reference. He fixed the date of appearance of the parties. The Arbitrator gave necessary directions to both sides to file statements and counter statements. The contractor placed before the Arbitrator 11 claims in all. Jala Nigam filed its counter statement. Ultimately, on the basis of the evidence produced by the parties, the Arbitrator gave his Award on 25.6.2000 and the same was published on 14.11.2000.

Accordingly the civil appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated above with no order as to costs.
Commercial Taxation Officer, Udaipur vs M/S Rajasthan Taxchem Ltd

Being aggrieved with the above order, the respondent filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) Udaipur being Appeal No. 164/RST/1999-2000. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal of the respondent and affirmed the order passed by the Assessing Authority. Being aggrieved by the above order, the respondent filed appeal before the Rajasthan Tax Board, Ajmer which allowed the appeal filed by the respondent and set aside both the orders passed by the Assessing Authority and the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). Being aggrieved by the order of the Tax Board, the State filed a revision under Section 84 of the Act before the High Court being S.B. Civil Sales-Tax Revision No. 6 of 2005. The High Court dismissed the revision filed by the appellant while holding that diesel used by the respondent was used as raw material and affirmed the order of the Tax Board.

The respondent before us satisfy all the above tests and, therefore, the assessee-respondent, in our opinion, shall be entitled to such concessional rate as may be notified by the State Government.

The respondent-assessee used diesel as raw material for the manufacture of the end product, namely, yarn and fabric. The diesel used by the assessee is a fuel and lubricant as defined under Section 2(34) of the Sales Tax Act. In the result, we hold that the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant has no force and merit. Accordingly, we dismiss the civil appeal filed by the State arising out of SLP (C) No. 17015 of 2005. However, there will be no order as to costs.
Saroj Kumar Poddar vs State (Nct Of Delhi) & Anr

Appellant herein was a Director of a public limited company, incorporated and registered under the Indian Companies Act, known as VHEL Industries Limited (hereinafter referred to as "the Company"). The Company issued three cheques bearing Nos. 138015, 138016 and 138017 for a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/-, Rs. 2,50,000/- and Rs. 3,03,952.60, respectively in favour of Elkay International Private Limited, Respondent No. 2 herein.

The complainant Respondent No. 2 is manufacturer and supplier of chemical compounds of different kinds. It supplied its product to the Company. Allegedly, a sum of Rs. 13,36,923/- was due and payable to the complainant by the Company. The Company issued three cheques, as noticed hereinbefore, in favour of the complainant. The said cheques were deposited in a bank but were dishonoured. A complaint petition came to be filed by the complainant in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi against the appellant as also the said Company. The Managing Director of the said Company as also the other Directors were also arrayed as accused therein. It was alleged that Shri K.K. Pilania Accused No. 3 and Shri N.K. Munjal Accused No. 8 signed the said cheques for and on behalf of the Company.

Cognizance was taken against the appellant and other accused persons. Inter alia on the premise that the appellant had resigned from the Directorship of the Company before the date of issuance of the cheques and much before the deposit thereof by the drawee with its bank, and thus, he was not liable for the action of the Company, applications for quashing of the orders taking cognizance of the offence in the said complaint petitions were filed by the appellant before the High Court of Delhi which were marked as Crl. M.C. Nos. 4583, 4580 and 4575 of 2003. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said petitions have been dismissed by the High Court stating:

It was further submitted that in any event, the appellant having resigned from the Directorship of the said Company, the complaint petitions as against him were not maintainable.

For the reasons aforementioned, we have no other option but to hold that the allegations made in the complaint petitions even if are taken to be correct in their entirety do not disclose any offence as against the appellant herein. The proceedings against him, thus, should have been quashed by the High Court. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
Jameel vs State Of Maharashtra

A First Information Report could not be lodged immediately as night had set in. On the next day, the girl was taken to the 'Noor Garage' where the appellant was identified as the person who had committed the 'mischievous act' against her on the previous day. The First Information Report thereafter was lodged. The prosecutrix was medically examined by one Dr. Sheela Kadam. The medical report reads as under :

Believing the testimonies of the said witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge found the charges to have been proved as against the appellant. He was convicted under Sections 363, 376 read with Section 511 and Section 377 IPC. He was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonments for three years, five years and seven years under Sections 363, 376/511 and 377 IPC respectively and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- under Section 363 and Rs. 3,000/- each under Section 376/511 and 377 IPC respectively.

The appeal preferred by the appellant herein was dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment. Hence, the appellant is before us.

The appellant was above eighteen years of age on 01.04.2001. The 2000, therefore, cannot have any application whatsoever in the instant case. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
Virendra Kumar vs State Of U.P

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

SI Jogendra Singh (P.W.9) was handed over the investigation of this case by order of the Superintendent of Police, Kanpur Dehat dated 11.10.1982 on an application by Sheo Karan of the same date, and he commenced the investigation on 15.10.1982. After that effort was made to trace the accused persons, but they could not be arrested. As some of the witnesses were absent on that date, their statements could not be recorded and the police of Chauki Sarh was directed to produce the witnesses at the police station. On 3.11.1982 SI Jogendra Singh recorded the statements of Sheo Karan, Sahdeo, Deshraj Singh and Bhagwan Deen at the police station under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Cr. P.C'). On 24.11.1982 he recorded the statement of Prahlad and others. As he could not find the accused in spite of search, hence he obtained order under Sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. for attachment of their property on 27.11.1982. On 17.12.1982 appellant Virendra Kumar surrendered in Court. After completion of investigation. S. I. Jogendra Singh submitted the charge sheet.

Particular reference may be made to question Nos. 4,7,8,9,16 and 22 in the examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and the answers given by the appellant. The incriminating materials relating to torture, harassment and demand of dowry were specifically brought to the notice of the appellant during such examination.

Above being the position there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
The New India Assurance Company Limited vs Smt. Kalpana & Others

The High Court found that the vehicle was the subject matter of insurance with the insurer. It was not a case where the vehicle was stationary. On the contrary it was parked on a running condition without any indicator. The High Court, therefore, held that the insurer is liable to pay compensation. So far as the income of the deceased is concerned, taking into account the fact that there was no definite material to throw light on the actual income of the deceased, it was taken at Rs.4,000/- per month and multiplier of 17 was applied and accordingly the compensation was fixed.

Considering the age of the deceased it would be appropriate to fix the multiplier at 13. The MACT itself found that the income was not established. At some point of time it was stated that the income of the deceased was Rs.6,000/- per month. In the absence of any definite material about the income, monthly contribution to the family, after deduction for personal expenses is fixed at Rs.3,000/- per month i.e. annually Rs.36,000/-. Applying the multiplier of 13, the compensation works out to Rs.4,68,000/. The same shall carry interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of claim till the date of actual payment. It is stated that a sum of rupees four lakhs has been deposited pursuant to the order dated 4.4.2005. Balance shall be deposited along with interest within two months from today. Out of the total amount, 80% shall be kept in fixed deposit in a nationalised bank initially for a period of five years. But no withdrawal shall be permitted before the expiry of period. However, monthly interest shall be paid to the claimants.

The minor respondents shall be represented by their mother. Separate fixed deposits shall be made for respondent no.1, respondents 2 and 3 represented by the mother (respondent no.1) and the respondent no.4. The percentage of fixed deposit shall be as follows:-
Indian Council Of Medical Research And ... vs K. Rajyalakshmi

2. Respondent herein was appointed by reason of an offer of appointment dated 1.4.1975. The terms of appointment demonstrates that the same was also on year to year basis. The post was also on year to year basis as the grant-in-aid of the Central Government in relation to the said project was on that basis. However, the project continued for a long time for one reason or the other. Respondent prayed for regularisation of her services, but the same having been rejected, she approached High Court of Madras seeking for a direction to the respondents to regularise her services with retrospective effect from such date as it deemed fit and proper. The said writ petition was ultimately transferred to Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras, in view of a notification issued by the Central Government under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

3. The Tribunal noticed that although a decision was taken that the project should be made a permanent one and its activities should be expanded, but no such order was passed. It was in the aforementioned backdrop, the Tribunal opined that the services of the respondent herein should be directed to be regularised. It was so directed from the date of filing of the wit petition i.e. on 25.2.1998.

4. The appellants herein preferred a writ petition there against before the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The respondent also filed a writ petition questioning that part of the order whereby regularisation was directed to be made w.e.f. the date of filing of the writ petition and not from the date of her initial appointment. Both the writ petitions were heard together. By reason of the impugned judgment dated 10.2.2005 the High Court, while allowing the writ petition of the respondent, dismissed the writ petition of the appellants herein and directed that the services of the respondent should be regularised from the date of her initial appointment i.e. 1.4.1975. It has been accepted at the Bar that the respondent has since retired on 31.5.2004 on reaching the age of superannuation of 58.

8. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it is not a fit case where the impugned direction could have been issued by the Tribunal and consequently by the High Court. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside accordingly. However, we direct that any amount paid to the respondent by the appellant herein shall not be recovered. This direction we are passing in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Meharchand Das vs Lal Babu Siddique And Ors

3. The appellant herein was a tenant under the respondents. He was, however, said to be a landless person. A Parcha was purported to have been granted on or about 29.9.1969 by the Collector of Samastipur District, in terms of the provisions of Section 6 of the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947 ("the Act", for short) , the father of the respondents (Nos. 1 to 5) filed a suit for eviction against the appellant herein, purported to be one under Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1947. The said suit was dismissed on 27.5.1977. No appeal thereagainst was filed . Another suit, however, was filed in the Court of Munsif-II, Samastipur, which was marked as Title Suit No. 71/1978, on the premise that the said Parcha under Section 6(2) of the Act, was issued without jurisdiction and the same had been fraudulently obtained.

5. One of the contentions raised by the appellant herein in the said suit was that in terms of the proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act the suit was not maintainable. On a finding that the said Parcha was obtained upon committing fraud, the suit was decreed. The appeal preferred thereagainst by the appellant was dismissed. In the second appeal which was filed by the appellant, the following purported questions of law were formulated :

15. We, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that the High Court wrongly answered the substantial question of law framed by it. The judgments and decrees passed by the High Court and the Courts below are, therefore, set aside and the appeal is allowed. No costs.
A.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors vs B. Bodan Reddy (Dead) By Lrs. & Ors

Corporation to consider their cases. Aggrieved thereby, an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench. The Division Bench, however, although initially suspended the operation of the said interim order passed by the learned Single Judge, thought it fit and expedient to withdraw the writ petition itself before it and determine the same on its own merits. By reason of the impugned judgment, the writ petition had been allowed directing the appellant-Corporation to consider the cases of the respondents for promotion from the post of Security Guard to Security Head Guard from the date on which their junior had been promoted.

5. The impugned judgment, for the reason aforementioned, is set aside and the appeal is allowed. As none appears for the respondents, there shall be no order as to costs.