L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Ramesh Chandra Sharma vs Punjab National Bank & Anr

Charge No. I was sub-divided into 24 sub-charges and Charge No. III was sub-divided into two sub-charges. All these charges were proved. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated in relation thereto.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that it was permissible for the Bank to continue with the disciplinary proceedings relying on or on the basis of Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Punjab National Bank (Officers') Service Regulations, 1979.

Regulation 48 empowers the Bank to recover pecuniary loss caused to it from the pensionary benefits. Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations must be read in conjunction with the Pension Regulations. Where the employees are pension optees, Regulation 48(1) shall apply. In any event, if an officer is removed or dismissed from service under Regulation 4 of the (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, the Bank need not take recourse to Regulation 48 of the Pension Regulations as Regulation 22 thereof would be attracted.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment.

21. The High Court, however, in our opinion, posed unto itself a wrong question of law that despite applicability of Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Punjab National Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977, the Bank exceeded its jurisdiction in continuing the disciplinary proceedings after 31.1.1997 on which date the appellant reached the age of superannuation.

22. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal preferred by the appellant must be dismissed and the one preferred by the Bank must be allowed. Resultantly, Civil Appeal No. 971 of 2007 is dismissed and Civil Appeal No. 975 of 2007 is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Aashirwad Films vs Union Of India & Ors

4. Representations were made to the Government of Andhra Pradesh to withdraw the said purported discriminatory tax by the Andhra Pradesh State Film Television and Theatre Development Corporation Ltd. in terms of its letter dated 9th/11th December, 2002 addressed to the Secretary to the Government, GA (I&PR) Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad as also other bodies and parliamentarians, which was not acceded to. The decision of the State was communicated to the petitioner by the Principal Secretary to the Government in terms of its letter dated 19.9.2003 stating;

27. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned levy cannot be sustained being discriminatory in nature. It is struck down accordingly. Petitioner would, thus, be bound to pay tax at the rate at which entertainment tax has been levied in respect of Telugu films. The Writ Petition is allowed with costs. Counsel's fees assessed at Rs. 50,000/-.
Narain Prasad Aggarwal (D) By Lrs vs State Of M.P

2. The basic fact of the matter which is not in dispute is that the suit property was put in auction in or about 1859 by the ancestors of Rai Baldev Bux and Gaurabai i.e. one Ramjanaki Prasad. They, thus, became the owners of the said land, and all remained in possession thereof till their death. On or about 24.3.1986, the said land was purchased by Late Fateh Chand from Rai Baldev Bux and Gaurabai. He died in or about the year 1920. His wife, Smt. Putari Sethani, being his sole heir became the owner of the said land. She expired on 8.5.1961. It is not in dispute that she did not have any issue and the plaintiff Narain Prasad Aggarwal and defendant No. 2 Guruprasad Agarwal inherited the said property as her heirs being sons of Hira Lal, the brother of late Fateh Chand.

3. It appears from the records that a proceeding was initiated by the said Putari Sethani in connection with proceeding for assessment of enhancement of lease rent by the then Collector of Hoshangabad. An order was passed against her. The matter was taken to the Court of Commissioner of Settlements in an appeal against the order of the Collector. The said authority by an order dated 30.10.1922 passed in C.P. No. 2454/1 held :

The said order was marked as Exhibit P-3 in the suit.

4. An application was filed by the plaintiff-appellant and the defendant No. 2 for mutation of their names in the revenue records, which was allowed by an order dated 12.12.1964 but the same was set aside by an order of the appellate authority passed on 26.6.1965. By an order dated 15.3.1968, the Additional Commissioner, Bhopal opined that the land in question could not have been treated to be freehold as allegedly rent was assessed under the 1881 Land Revenue Act and 1917 Land Revenue Code and the same had not been challenged, stating :

4. Relief, costs and compensatory costs?"

(a) is not forming part of the records in the account of any village;

(b) is not recorded as Banjar, jharidar jungle, hilly and chattans, rivers, village trees or Government trees;

(c) is not recorded for Village roads, gothan, charai land, or in the shape of grazing in abadi Chargahs;

(d) is not ear-marked and reserved for development of the village or any other community development projects; or

(e) is not service land.

28. We, however, do not intend to express any opinion as to whether the State of Madhya Pradesh is otherwise entitled to receive any rent from the appellants or not. Such a question if raised may be determined in an appropriate proceedings.

29. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court as well as of the learned Trial Judge and the suit of the plaintiff shall be decreed. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/-.
Union Of India & Anr vs A.K. Narula

2. Respondent was appointed as Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF for short) on 1.12.1971. He was promoted as Assistant Commandant on 23.7.1983. Promotion from the post of Assistant Commandant to the next higher post of Second-in-Command is on the basis of selection.

Re : Question (i) :

Re : Question (ii)

Conclusion :

18. In view of our finding that the case of respondent was different from that of R.S.Virk, the decision of review DPC that the respondent did not deserve upgradation from 'good' to 'very good', deserves to be upheld.

19. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment dated 27.5.2005 passed by the High Court and dismiss the writ petition upholding the decision of the review DPC. Parties to bear their respective costs.
M/S Kamakshi Builders vs M/S Ambedkar Educational Society & Ors

3. Respondent No. 3, however, entered into a development agreement with the managing partner of the appellant and other persons on 01.04.1986. A deed of partnership was executed on 21.04.1986. Disputes and differences having arisen between the partners, the same were referred to an arbitrator. An arbitration award was passed on 22.11.1987, in terms whereof a sum of Rs.4,00,000/- was awarded in favour of Respondent No. 3. The said award was made the rule of court in terms of Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 by an order dated 29.02.1988. Allegedly, by reason of the said award, the appellant became the owner of the property. Respondent No. 1 was called upon to pay rents in respect of the suit property by a notice dated 22.11.1987. The tenancy was terminated by a notice dated 30.10.1988. On or about 08.12.1988, Respondent No. 1, in reply to the said notice, asked the appellant to furnish the particulars in regard to the ownership of the suit property. It, however, not claimed therein that it had acquired any ownership by reason of a purported oral gift made by Respondent No. 3 herein, as appears to be the case now. As it failed to vacate the premises, a suit for recovery of possession and arrears of rents and also for damages for wrongful use and occupation of the property was filed by the appellant. In the written statement filed in the suit, it was, inter alia, contended that Respondent No. 3 herein made an oral gift in its favour on or about 01.10.1975. In the alternative, it was contended that it had acquired an indefeasible title in respect of the property in question by adverse possession. Respondent No. 3 in its written statement supported the case of the appellant, inter alia, denying and disputing the claim of Respondent No. 1 herein that he made an oral gift in its favour.

4, being the Chairman of the Respondent No.1-society, his P.A. and a Chartered Accountant and friend of DW-2 respectively, no reliance can be placed upon their evidence.

15. The case that the oral gift was made on 01.10.1975 was specifically made out. The witnesses to the said oral gift were members of the Governing Council, his Personal Assistant and a Chartered Accountant, who admittedly was a friend of DW-2.

29. A claim of title by prescription by Respondent No. 1 again is not tenable. It based its claim on a title. It had, therefore, prima facie, no animus possidendi.

37. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Smt. Ass Kaur (Deceased) By L.Rs vs Kartar Singh (Dead) By L.Rs. & Ors

4. The courts below while holding that the appellant herein was daughter of Sobhi, opined that the parties were governed by the customary laws in the matter of inheritance and succession in terms whereof Raj Kaur succeeded to the estate of Relu Singh after the death of Sobhi and that her estate was enlarged into full ownership after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. The High Court held :

28. Raj Kaur, who was a widow of Hira Singh, was married to another brother just to safeguard the family property. She succeeded under the customary laws to her husband after the death of her co-widow. In that view of the matter, if the daughters who were married were to be excluded by customary law, no exception thereto can be taken.

34. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Rizwan Akbar Hussain Syyed vs Mehmood Hussain And Anr

3. The facts as projected by the appellant in a nutshell are as follows:

4. On 4th February, 2006 First Information Report was lodged by the respondent No.1 alleging that he and his friend named Girish Shetty, were attacked by the appellant and some other unidentified persons, resulting in injuries. The appellant was arrested on 4th February, 2006. He filed an application for grant of bail. By order dated 10th February, 2006 learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate 4th Court, Girgaum, Mumbai, directed release of the appellant on bail on his furnishing a surety for a sum of Rs.10,000/-. According to the appellant, respondent No.1 was not happy with the grant of bail and wanted to scare the appellant and, therefore, on various occasions threatened him. The appellant had lodged report with the police and on 21st February, 2006, his complaint was registered as N.C. complaint. Again on 4th April, 2006, the appellant was threatened by respondent No.1. Subsequently, on 19th April, 2006, appellant was served through an official of the V.P. Road Police Station a notice relating to an application for cancellation of bail which was registered as Criminal Application No.780/2006 before the Bombay High Court. According to the appellant, he was present on the date fixed for hearing, that is, 24th April, 2006. His case was listed as item No.52 in Court Room No.9 and by about 5.00 p.m. only 30 matters had been heard. On enquiry from an official of the court, he was told that his matter may be listed next week and, therefore, he left the court premises at about 5.15 p.m. On 25th April, 2006, the impugned order has been passed. In fact, believing the statement of the court official, appellant, had engaged a counsel who made enquiries in the Registry on 28th April, 2006 and was told that bail was cancelled by order dated 25th April, 2006.

9. In the circumstances of the case, we deem it proper to remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of the application for cancellation of bail. To avoid unnecessary delay, let the parties appear before the concerned court on 14th June, 2007. Learned Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to direct listing of the case before an appropriate Court.

10. The interim order dated 12th May. 2006 passed by this Court shall continue to be operative till the matter is disposed of afresh by the High Court. It is made clear that by giving this direction, it shall not be construed as if we have expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

11. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Bajrang Factory Ltd. & Anr vs University Of Calcutta & Ors

6. Indisputably, the testator executed a Codicil on 4.03.1932 in terms whereof inter alia it was provided:

7. We may, however, mention that the said Codicil, according to the testator, should be read as a part of his last Will and testament dated 4.03.1932 and thereby he also confirmed the said Will and testament.

9. An application for grant of probate in terms of the Act was filed before the original side of the Calcutta High Court and by an order dated 15.01.1943, the legatee was appointed as the sole executor and trustee of the Will. Allegedly by a registered indenture dated 27.12.1966, the legatee let out the premises in question in favour of the appellant company, a portion of the premises No. 156, Bipin Behari Ganguly Street, Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as 'the immovable property') for a period of ten years with the option to renew the same for further four consecutive periods of 10 years each in all for fifty years from the said date on the terms and conditions mentioned therein.

13. Three suits came to be filed thereafter. One of the suit was filed by the appellants herein which was marked as Suit No. 390 of 1978 praying for the following reliefs:

18. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, the appellants preferred an intra-court appeal before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. By reason of the impugned judgment dated 14.02.2003, the said appeal has been dismissed holding:

33. Clause 7, therefore, may not have any application for the purpose of construction of the Will..

35. The principles of construction of Will are well known.

Hilda Brite Mrs )"

45. In view of the findings aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the decision relied upon by Mr. Sundaram on Margaret Goonewardens (supra) cannot be said to have any application in the instant case, as in view of our findings aforementioned, clause 5 of the will is not hit by Section 113 of the Indian Succession Act.

47. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is quantified at Rs.50,000/-

48. We would request the High Court to consider the desirability of disposing of the suits filed by the parties hereto, as expeditiously as possible, keeping in view the fact that they are pending for more than 28 years from now.
Veer Kunwar Singh University Ad Hoc ... vs The Bihar State University (C.C.) ...

4. Ad hoc appointments indisputably were made by various Universities in the State of Bihar. Ad hoc teachers of Ranchi University had filed writ applications for regularization of their services, which were dismissed by the Patna High Court by a judgment and order dated 22.05.1989. A special leave petition was filed thereagainst, which was marked as Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 11078 of 1989. A writ petition was also filed before this Court, which was marked as Writ Petition No. 65 of 1989 inter alia, for a direction to the University to take steps to sanction posts against which ad hoc teachers were working for regularization of their services. An order of status quo was granted.

6. However, we may notice that allegedly during the pendency of the said matter before this Court Magadh University which was the predecessor of Appellant No.1-University had sent its proposal for creation of 1467 additional posts of lecturers to the Government, which included 426 additional posts which were required for Appellant No.1-University, which was a part of Magadh University at the relevant time. State of Bihar and the University, however, have a different story to tell.

10. Appellant No.1-University was created in the year 1992. On or about 23.11.1993, an advertisement was issued by the Bihar State University (Constituent Colleges) Service Commission for appointment of teachers in different Universities. Allegedly, at that point of time, additional posts were not sanctioned. It is furthermore not in dispute that ad hoc teachers made a representation before the Chancellor for regularization of their services. The University Service Commission had also issued a corrigendum in the said advertisement asking the candidates to appear in the Bihar Eligibility Test (BET) for appointment of teachers in different Universities/Constituent Colleges.

45. We, however, are of the opinion that it is not necessary for us to go into the said question.

46. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if it is directed that the respondents herein in filling up of the vacant posts must take into consideration the cases of all those teachers also who have the requisite qualifications, upon relaxation of age, if permissible by law along with other eligible candidates. We may, however, direct that it would be open to the State of Bihar as also the concerned Universities to forthwith terminate the services of those teachers not working against sanctioned posts or who do not fulfill the requisite educational qualifications or whose services are otherwise not required.

47. The appeals and connected interlocutory applications are dismissed with the aforementioned observations. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
S. Rathinam @ Kuppamuthu & Ors vs L.S. Mariappan & Ors

2. A private family temple known as 'Pechiamman Temple' was founded by one Palanichamy Chettiar. The genealogical table of the said Palanichamy Chettiar is as under :

4. The said decree has attained finality, pursuant whereto the branch of Shanmugam became entitled to a right of term of management for a period of two years. On or about 04.07.1956, L.P. Lakshmanan Chettiar and his two sons, however, entered into a partition deed for division of their properties including the terms of management of the suit temple and its properties. It was agreed that Lakshmanan Chettiar himself shall hold the posts of pujari as well as trustee for two years, whereas his two sons shall hold the same for a period of eight months each.

7. For framing a scheme in respect of the said properties, a suit was filed by the appellants against the said Thangam and others, which was marked as O.S. No.222 of 1975. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the said suit by a judgment and order dated 19.02.1979. An appeal was preferred there- against, which was marked as A.S. No. 661 of 1979, to which we shall advert a little later.

34. Such a nomination is also permissible being intervivos. In view of the decisions of this Court, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary for us to consider the decision of the Madras High Court, on which Mr. Prabhakar has placed strong reliance, as the said decision revolves round the question as to whether such a right is transferable or not. A will being not a transfer, the bar contained in Section 6(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, in our opinion, will have no application. We, therefore, agree with the findings of the Division Bench of the High Court that the will is valid in law.

38. Several orders have been passed by this Court from time to time. It appears that despite such directions, one party or the other claims to hold the office despite expiry of the term. In this appeal, as has been suggested by Mr. Prabhakar, it may not be practicable for us to fix any time for taking over or handing over of possession. It, however, appears that an execution case is pending before the Additional Subordinate Judge, Madurai.

39. We, therefore, in exercise of our jurisdiction, direct the learned Trial Judge, to pass an appropriate order in this behalf. The learned Trial Judge may pass an appropriate order in regard to the amount deposited by Respondent No.1 pursuant to the said order dated 07.12.2004 or any other order that may be brought to its notice.

40. This appeal is dismissed with the aforementioned directions with costs payable by the appellant in favour of Respondent No.1. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs.50,000/-
Budh Singh vs State Of M.P

2. Appellant was accused No. 1 before the trial Court. He alongwith three others namely Gulab Singh, Ashok Yadav and Kalyan Singh were tried for commission of offences under Section 302/34 and 307/34 of Indian Penal Code. The occurrence took place at Village Jonhar at about 4'o clock in the evening of 31.7.1989 near a well belonging to one Dangal Singh Yadav. The first informant was the brother of the deceased Durgsingh.

3. In the First Information Report, it was alleged that the deceased went to take bath. First Informant was also going there to take his bath. When he was at a little distance from the said well, he found him taking bath. Appellant came with a 12 bore double barrelled gun. Kalyan Singh and Ashok Yadav were also armed with guns. Kalyan Singh, Ashok Yadav and Gulab Singh surrounded the well. At the exhortation of Kalyan Singh, appellant fired a shot from his 12 bore double barrel gun on the deceased. Munnalal Yadav had also come therewith his cattle. Complainant Gyansingh and Munnalal shouted whereupon Ashok and Gulab fired on them. They, however, lay down on the ground. Other villagers came to the spot immediately thereafter. The dead body of Durgsingh was brought to Baroni Police Station at about 5.45 in the evening. P.W. 8, Virendra Singh was the head constable attached to the said Police Station. The Station House Officer was absent. On the oral report made by the first informant Gyansingh, he recorded the First Information Report. P.W. 11, Pramal Singh was in charge of Sonagir Chouki. He had come to the police station for some administrative works. As the S.H.O. had gone out of the police station and the head constable was in-charge thereof, the First Information Report was given to him. At his instance, P.W. 8 made an inquest of the dead body. It was sent for post-mortem. The dead body was received at the hospital by Dr. A.K. Sharma at about 7.55 p.m. on the same day. Post mortem examination, however, was carried out at 10.30 on the next day. The said Dr. A.K. Sharma examined himself as P.W.16.

6. The accused having been arrested, the guns, in question, at their instance, were recovered. The bullets as also the guns were sent to a ballistic expert. The bullet, in question, was found to have fired from the gun belonging to the appellant. Before the learned trial Judge, Gyansingh examined himself as P.W. 1. Munnalal also deposed as P.W. 2 before the learned Trial Judge. The accused were also seen running away from the spot by Sughar Singh, P.W. 5.

7. The learned Trial Judge convicted the appellant but acquitted the others. Against such judgment and order of acquittal, the State, however preferred an appeal before the High Court only against the judgment of acquittal acquitting Kalyan Singh. No appeal was filed against judgment of acquittal passed in favour of Babulal and Dashrath Singh.

27. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.