L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Naresh Kavarchand Khatri vs State Of Gujarat & Anr

3. Appellant lodged a First Information Report before the detective Crime Branch, Police Station, Vadodara City under Sections 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code against the respondents. According to the appellants, the respondent had assured that the child of the first informants would be admitted in their institution and on that pretext, collected a huge amount from them. The children of the first informant took admission after depositing the admission fee and miscellaneous charges etc. However, their admission was later on cancelled.

5. The informant was not impleaded as a party therein. No notice was issued on the said appeals. No reason has been assigned. The Court did not advert to the question as to whether it had any jurisdiction to pass the said order. Why such a concession was made by the learned APP on the very first day of hearing is not known.

The impugned order has been passed on 28th December, 2008. The first information report prima facie shows that a part of cause of jurisdiction arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Vadodara Police Station. We fail to understand as to how at such an early stage, the investigation should have been directed to be transferred, having regard to the fact that Waghodia Police Station where the `institution' in question is situated is within the jurisdiction of Vadodara (District) and is, therefore, not a case where the accused would have been even otherwise gravely prejudiced in joining investigation.

11. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it is not a case where we should refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders. Consequently, the charge sheets filed by the Wagodhia Police Station stand set aside. The concerned Police Officer of Vadodara Police Station would initiate appropriate investigation in the matter in accordance with law. 9

Any document collected as also the statements of any witnesses recorded by the officer in-charge of Waghodia Police Station, however, may be sent to the incharge of Vadodara Police Station.

12. The appeals are allowed with the aforementioned observations and directions.
Satna Stone & Lime Co. Ltd., M.P. Etc vs Union Of India & Another Etc

2. Brief facts relevant to dispose of these appeals are as under:-

3. The Railway administration on 24.8.1968 informed the appellants that the maintenance charges would be levied at the rate of 4=% per annum instead of 2=%. The respondent Railway administration raised the bills for the period 1.11.1963 to 31.3.1975. The appellants paid the bill under protest on 22.6.1976. The appellants filed an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. On the request of the appellants, the matter was referred to the Arbitration. The Arbitrator decided the claim in favour of the appellants. The objections raised by the Railways under section 30 of the 3 Arbitration Act, 1940 were rejected by the learned District Judge and the award was made the rule of the court.

4. The miscellaneous application was preferred by the Railways before the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court against the said order of the District Judge. The respondent Railways submitted that the claim of the appellants was clearly barred by limitation because the demand crystallized on 1.5.1975 and the claim was made on 8.8.1978.

20. The appeals are accordingly dismissed being devoid of any merit. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.

May 8, 2008.
State Of Rajasthan vs Udai Lal

The accused Udai Lal was arrested and a case against him under Section 8/15 of the NDPS Act was registered. During investigation, the material was found to be got loaded by one Dalchand Brahmin, as such he was also arrested under Section 8/28 of the Act. Challan against both the accused was filed in the Court.

The matter came up before the Special Judge, NDPS Cases, Chittorgarh and the parties were heard on framing of charge. Charge under Section 8/15 of the Act was framed against the accused/Udai Lal while the other accused Dalchand Brahmin was left out for the offence under Section 3 8/29 of the Act. The accused denied the charge. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined P.Ws 1 to 12 and Exh. P-1 to P-22. After closing of the prosecution evidence, when the statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of the CrP.C., he stated that neither he was driving the truck nor the poppy husk was recovered from him. He claimed himself to be innocent. In defence, the accused examined himself as D.W.1 and also examined D.Ws 2-5. The learned Special Judge, after considering the materials and hearing both sides, by judgment and order dated 02.12.2002, convicted the accused for the offence under Section 8/15 of the NDPS Act and sentenced him as mentioned above.

11) In the light of the infirmities pointed out above, we accept the State appeal, set aside the order impugned of the High Court and remit the matter for fresh disposal. The High Court is requested to restore S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 1050 of 2002 on its file and dispose of the same afresh in the light of the principles enunciated above after affording opportunity to both parties. It is made clear that the High Court is free to arrive such conclusion on consideration of the entire materials and we have not expressed anything on the merits of the case. We also request the High Court to dispose of the appeal as early as possible but not later than six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The appeal is allowed to this extent.

May 8, 2008.
Union Of India (Uoi) vs D.K. Vijh

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court. The respondent was appointed as Section Officer on 4/7/1962. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer sometimes in February 1972. On 27/8/1978, he was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer(C) on adhoc basis. The regular selection committee met on 11/4/1997 and recommended for regularisation of the respondent alongwith others w.e.f. 20/3/1997. The seniority list of Executive Engineers was published where it had been shown that the seniority of the respondent is reckoned w.e.f. 20/3/1997. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed O.A. before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The CAT allowed the application. The High Court confirmed the finding. Hence, the present appeal by special leave.

4. Accordingly, the orders of the tribunal and of the High Court are set aside. Original Application filed by the respondent stands dismissed. Appeal is allowed.

CIVIL APPEAL No. 7025 OF 2004

5. In view of our order passed in C.A. No. 7352 of 2002, this appeal is allowed. The orders of the tribunal and of the High Court are set aside. Original Application filed by the respondent stands dismissed.
Shamrao Dattu Kumbhar vs State Of Maharashtra

A headless dead body was found on the Railway track at about 6 O' clock in the morning on 22.2.1994 by PW.7, Malappa Chavan. On the dead body there were some marks of injuries on the chest. An information thereupon was given to the Station Master of the Railway Station. The dead body was removed from the Railway track. A telephonic message was received by PW.12-PSI Gandhi, who was on duty at the Railway Police Station Miraj about the discovery of the said dead body. An inquest of the dead body was made by him. An F.I.R. was also lodged under Sec.302/201 of the Indian Penal Code at his instance at about 11.50 hours on 22.2.1994.

Some suspicion in regard to his involvement was raised as against the appellant on the premise that he had illicit relationship with the wife of the deceased. Although the High Court in its judgment noticed that the appellant was arrested on 22.5.1995, it transpires that in fact the arrest took place on 25.2.1994. Allegedly at the instance of the appellant bicycle, tiffin box, the head of the deceased as also his undergarments were recovered. The head of the corpse was also identified by PW.1 as also PW.16-Rajendra Khot - the brother of the deceased. Yet at about 19.3.1994 the knife which was said to be the weapon of offence as also other blood stained clothes were recovered.

During the investigation, PW.6 Abha Shankar Khot contended that he was an eye witness to the occurrence. We may notice that his statement in terms of Sec.164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded on 24.2.1994. It may not be necessary for us to refer to the said statements or his deposition before the learned trial court as both the courts below did not rely thereupon on the premise that he had been examined by the police after about eight days.

We may now notice the other evidences brought on record by the prosecution. As indicated hereinabove the principal evidence to rope in the appellant were recoveries made at his instance.

His evidence apparently did not corroborate the postmortem report which discloses sufferance of several antemortem injuries by the deceased.

For the reasons aforementioned the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appellant is said to be in jail. He is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in connection with any other case.

The appeal is allowed.

MAY 8, 2008.
T. Krishna Reddy & Ors vs M. Bagi Reddy & Anr

2. The appellant and his predecessors-in-interest were cultivating the suit land to the extent of about 9.2 acres falling under survey No. 357 of Alwal village, Malkajgiri Mandal, Ranga Reddy District in Andhra Pradesh and an ownership certificate under section 38E of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 had also been issued in their favour. In 2 1988, the appellants, pursuant to a family partition whereby they had been put in exclusive possession of the suit land, filed an application before the Divisional Revenue Officer for the issuance of a revised ownership certificate under Section 38E and after due enquiry a revised ownership certificate was, in fact, issued. The respondents herein challenged the issuance of the aforesaid revised certificate before the Joint Collector, who dismissed the appeal by his order dated 19th June 1995 and a petition against this said order was dismissed by the High Court and the second appeal filed by the respondents against the order of the Joint Collector was also dismissed on 6th April 2000. The respondents, who are in possession of the adjoining lands being survey Nos.355 and 405, filed a civil suit on 8th April 1996 before the Subordinate Judge Court, Ranga Reddy District seeking permanent injunction against the appellants with respect to the suit land i.e. the land in Survey No.357. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the respondents herein. Aggrieved by 3 the order of the trial court, the present appellants filed an appeal and the appellate court re-appreciated the evidence and keeping in view the fact that a certificate under section 38E had been issued to the appellants which showed that they were in possession of the land, allowed the appeal. The respondents herein carried the matter in second appeal to the High Court and also filed a petition against the order dated 19th June 1995 passed by the Joint Collector confirming the validity of the certificate granted under section 38E. The High Court dismissed the petition challenging the order dated 19th June 1995 but without framing any substantial question of law, allowed the second appeal filed against the order of the Civil Court. It is in this circumstance that the present matter is before us.

4. The appeals are allowed accordingly.
Mosiruddin Munshi vs Md. Siraj & Ors

2. In the light of the order that we propose to make, only the bare facts have been given hereunder:

3. In January 2005, the appellant who was in dire need of a plot of land for construction of a residential house, was approached by respondent No.2, Masud Alam, a public servant, who represented to the appellant that he could arrange for such a plot. Respondent No.2 thereupon introduced the appellant to respondent No.1, who stated that he had a plot of land which he was willing to sell. 1 The appellant believing the representation made by respondent No.2 entered into an agreement for sale with respondent No.1 and also paid a sum of Rupees five lakhs and one in cash. Despite this payment, however, the respondent refused to honour the agreement and refused to hand over the necessary documents to the appellant. All other methods to compel the respondents to complete the sale having failed, the appellant filed a complaint on 28th October 2005 before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for offences punishable under sections 420/120B of the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the Officer In- charge of the Amherest Street, Police Station and directed that it be treated as a FIR and investigated under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After protracted legal wranglings, respondent No.1 filed an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the quashing of the proceedings. As the appellant had not been impleaded as a party, a direction 2 was issued by the High Court on 13th July 2006 to respondent No.1 to implead the appellant as a party. It appears, however, though the appellant was impleaded as a party, no attempt was made to serve a copy of the notice on him with the result that by its order dated 9th August 2006, a Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court quashed the complaint proceedings against the respondents in the absence of the appellant. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The broad facts stated above have not been denied. It, therefore, stands uncontroverted that the proceedings against the accused respondents had been quashed without notice to the appellant, who was the original complainant. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the order of the learned Single Judge impugned before us must be set aside and we order accordingly. We also remit the case to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed, 3 ................................. J.

(TARUN CHATTERJEE) .................................J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI) New Delhi, Dated: May 9, 2008 4
T. Thimmaiah (D) By Lrs. vs Venkatachala Raju (D) By Lrs.

2. The appellant herein, vide sale deed dated 27th December 1971, purchased a property bearing site No. 6 in 3rd block, Muneshwara Block, Palace Guttahalli, Bangalore-3, and as per Schedule "A" and "B" with the plaint the property was identified by specific boundaries as well. On 26th October 1993 the appellant herein filed a suit for declaration and possession of the Schedule `B' property which was in possession of the defendant respondent. The suit was contested by the defendant- respondent. The trial court however decreed the suit on 22nd January 1991. The defendant-respondent thereupon filed a first appeal in the High Court of Karnataka and the said appeal was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 16th February 1999. The respondent thereafter filed a review petition on 14th November 1999. A notice was issued to the present appellant in the review application and objections were filed thereto as well. The learned Single Judge, however, vide order dated 26th February 2001, allowed the appeal by reviewing his earlier order and dismissed the suit. It is in this circumstance that the present appeal is before us.

4. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
American Hotel & Lodging ... vs Central Board Of Direct Taxes & Ors

3. Briefly, the facts are as follows.

5. Thus, the appellant is an Institution whose objects are known as "Statement of Purposes" in US. Under the Internal Revenue Code, 1954 in the U.S. it enjoys tax exemption status as an educational institution. It is governed by an elected Board of Trustees and it offers high quality educational and training resources to enhance the professionalism of the hospitality industry worldwide.

11. By its decision dated 14.2.96 the Authority held, after reviewing the objects and Agreements with GoI, that the appellant was entitled to 7 exemption from tax under Section 10(22) of the 1961 Act. It was held that the appellant was an educational institution in terms of Section 10(22) of the 1961 Act. This decision of the Authority was accepted by the Department. It was not challenged by the Department before this Court. Thus, the Department had accepted that the appellant's income was exempt from tax under Section 10(22) of the 1961 Act inasmuch as no assessments were made and/or no demands for income-tax was raised for all years prior to the assessment year 1999-2000 (corresponding to the accounting year ending 31.3.1999).

40. In the light of what is stated above, we set aside order dated 12.10.2004 passed by CBDT, we remit the matter to CBDT for fresh consideration in accordance with law. We may clarify that, in this case, appellant has fulfilled the threshold pre-condition of actual existence of an educational institution under section 10(23C)(vi) and, therefore, on that count CBDT will not reject the approval application dated 7.4.1999.

43. In this case, the initial approval application in Form 56D was dated 7.4.1999. It was dismissed by CBDT on 12.10.2004 (after 5= years), therefore, in terms of Rule 2CA(1A) we are required to remit this matter to CBDT for fresh consideration in the light of the law discussed hereinabove.

44. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 24.11.2006 of the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 17978/04 as well the decision of CBDT F.No.197/78/99-ITA.I dated 12.10.2004 are set aside and the matter 4 is remitted to CBDT for fresh consideration in accordance with law as discussed hereinabove.

45. Accordingly, this civil appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

May 9, 2008.
Vidya Wanti & Anr vs Durga Dass

1. The 1/5th share of one Amar Nath (deceased), measuring to an area of 73 kanals 1 marla, situate in the Revenue Estate of Nadala, Tehsil Bholath, District Kapurthala is the subject-matter of dispute between the parties. On the one side is the plaintiff-respondent Durga Dass, the younger brother of Amar Nath, who claimed the latter's share in the land on the basis of a will, dated August 20, 1987 said to 2 have been executed in his favour. On the other side are the defendant-appellants Vidya Wanti (widowed wife) and Santosh Kumari (daughter) of the deceased Amar Nath. They claimed the share in the land by devolution.

2. The land (in which the 1/5th share of Amar Nath is the subject- matter of dispute) was taken in the name of Badri Dass, the father of Amar Nath and Durga Dass and two other brothers and a sister. As a matter of fact, Badri Dass had made an application for the purchase of land from the Government of India, Department of Rehabilitation under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. He died sometime in the year 1958 before any action was taken on his application. Long after his death, the conveyance deed, dated March 6, 1965 for the land came in the name of the deceased-applicant and on March 19, 1965 the transfer of the land was registered in the name of Badri Dass. The mutation in the revenue records was of course made in the names of Amar Nath, Durga Dass and the two other sons and a daughter of Badri Dass, namely, Diwan Chand, Gurbux Lal and Sumtra Rani.

5. The defendants resisted the plaintiffs' suit on grounds already noted above. In the written statement filed on their behalf the will dated August 20, 1987, forming the basis of the plaintiffs claim, was described as fake and fictitious. In addition, it was stated that Amar Nath was an educated man and apprehending some trouble from the plaintiff he, before his death, executed a legally valid registered will in favour of the defendants. Curiously, however, apart from making a mention of a later will no details in regard to its contents were stated in the written statement nor was the will produced before the trial court.

15. We have carefully gone through the order passed by the High Court and we are unable to see any infirmity therein so as to warrant any interference by this court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

17. The decision of the High Court on the materials before it warrants no interference. We find no merit in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.

..........................J. [P.P.Naolekar] .........................J. [Aftab Alam] New Delhi, May 09, 2008.
T. Thimmaiah vs Venkatachala Raju

2. The appellant herein, vide sale deed dated 27th December 1971, purchased a property bearing site No.6 in 3rd block, Muneshwara Block, Palace Guttahalli, Bangalore-3, and as per Schedule "A" and "B" with the 2 plaint the property was identified by specific boundaries as well. On 26th October 1993 the appellant herein filed a suit for declaration and possession of the Schedule `B' property which was in possession of the defendant respondent. The suit was contested by the defendant- respondent. The trial court however decreed the suit on 22nd January 1991. The defendant-respondent thereupon filed a first appeal in the High Court of Karnataka and the said appeal was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 16th February 1999. The respondent thereafter filed a review petition on 14th November 1999. A notice was issued to the present appellant in the review application and objections were filed thereto as well. The learned Single Judge, however, vide order dated 26th February 2001, allowed the appeal by reviewing his earlier order and dismissed the suit. It is in this circumstance that the present appeal is before us.

4. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
Gopaldas Dayalal Dodhia vs Kallu Dukhi Choudhary And Ors

3. Indisputably, the brother of the appellant suffered a decree of eviction. He raised a question that the hutment being in the slum area, the suit for eviction was not maintainable. However, the said plea was rejected.

4. Appeal preferred thereagainst was also dismissed. The Court has been granting time after time to the original tenant to vacate the premises. A finding of fact was recorded that the original tenant had sublet the premises in favour of the appellant. He now claims himself to be the co-tenant.

5. An application for review was filed in Writ Petition No. 4638/2005, wherein in ground (a), he purported to have claimed that the suit premises was situated in the land bearing CTS No.1786/136 to 143 of Village Dahisar. It has been brought to our notice that the slum area was declared so far as sub-plots of land in Plot No. CTS 1786 are concerned, consisting of as under:

14. Respondent waited for a long time for obtaining vacant possession of the tenanted premise and filed an execution application only on or about 5.7.2006.

16 We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the High Court. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee is assessed at Rs. 50,000/-.