L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti vs Prabhakar Maruti Garvali & Anr

Appellant herein, the mother of deceased filed a Claim Petition under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short, 'the Act') before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation which was registered as WCA/SR/19/2003. The vehicle being insured with the United India Insurance Company, it was also impleaded as a party.

The fact that at the time of his death, the deceased was discharging his duties is not disputed. The autopsy was conducted wherein the cause of death was opined as Cardiac arrest due to Rupture Aortic Aneurysm. No injury on his body was found. The only evidence which was brought on record was by way of deposition of Appellant. It was alleged :

The Insurer raised a plea of collusion between the employer and Appellant in its written statement. It, however, need not be adverted to.

An appeal was preferred thereagainst before the High Court by Respondent No. 3 under Section 30 of the Act. The said Appeal has been allowed by reason of the impugned judgment. The High Court opined that the findings of the Workmen's Compensation were perverse and inconsistent with the material on record as also bereft of any reason.

There is a crucial link between the causal connections of employment with death. Such a link with evidence cannot be a matter of surmise or conjecture. If a finding is arrived at without pleading or legal evidence the statutory authority will commit a jurisdictional error while exercising jurisdiction.

Circumstances must exist to establish that death was caused by reason of failure of heart was because of stress and strain of work. Stress and strain resulting in a sudden heart failure in a case of the present nature would not be presumed. No legal fiction therefor can be raised. As a person suffering from a heart disease may not be aware thereof, medical opinion therefore would be of relevance. Each case, therefore, has to be considered on its own fact and no hard and fast rule can be laid down therefor.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that ultimate conclusion of the High Court may be correct. We although would not, thus, interfere with the impugned judgment, but would direct that in event any amount has been paid to Appellant the same need not be refunded.

The Appeal is dismissed subject to the observations made hereinbefore
Gangadhar Pillai vs M/S. Siemens Ltd

Respondent has its own Engineering and Field Service department which undertakes jobs of industrial project installation, erection, commissioning of electrical/ electronic equipments which are supplied by it or the same are directly brought by its clients at various projects/ sites as per their requirements.

It, however, appears that he was temporarily appointed for different projects at Rourkela Steel Plant, details whereof are as under:

The Industrial Tribunal by an award dated 4.8.2004, however, opined:

We, therefore, do not find any reason to differ with the findings of the High Court.

We, therefore, while dismissing the appeal must express our satisfaction that Respondent has been able to provide some succour to Appellant.

For the views we have taken, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in this case. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
State Of Uttaranchal vs Rajesh Kumar Gupta

The respondent herein is an Ayurvedacharya. He operates from two clinics known as : (1) Neeaj Clinic Pvt. Ltd. (NCPL) and (2) Dr. B.S. Gupta Medical Charitable Society (BSGMCS). Advertisements were, allegedly, being issued by him in various newspapers claiming that medicines used by him were prepared from herbal plants collected from the Banks of Ganges and by application thereof patients suffering from epilepsy can be cured. The State, however, on the allegation that in his medicine, he had been using unlabelled tablets containing psychotropic substances making the unsuspecting patients addicted to the drugs, raided the premises of the said clinics. 70 kgs. pure phenobarbitone were recovered. It is alleged that through NCPL 336.88 kgs., 524 kgs., 537.32 kgs. and 117 kgs. of drugs (phenobarbitone) were sold in the years 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 (April to July) respectively and through BSGMCS 398.65 kgs., 406.88 kgs., 519.95 kgs. and 235.12 kgs. of drugs (phenobarbitone) were sold in the years 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 (April to July) respectively.

The drugs allegedly used to be dispatched by post also. Appellant was arrested on 13.8.2004 and since then he is in jail custody. Charges were framed against him under Section 8 read with Section 22 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 ('1985 Act', for short) and Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisement) Act, 1954. An application for bail was moved by him before the Special Judge. It was dismissed. He filed an application for bail, however, before the High Court on 30.7.2005, which has been granted. Special Leave Petition was filed thereagainst and by an order dated 14.11.2005, the bail application was revived. The High Court was requested to dispose of the same expeditiously. By reason of the impugned order dated 2.12.2005 the said bail application has been allowed. The State is, thus, before us.

In view of the fact that all the drugs being Item Nos. 1,2,3,4,6 & 7 being allopathic drugs mentioned in Schedules G and H of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act indisputably are used for medicinal purposes. Once the drugs are said to be used for medicinal purposes, it cannot be denied that they are acknowledged to be the drugs which would come within the purview of description of the expression "medicinal purposes".

For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
M/S. Pandey & Co. Builders Pvt. Ltd vs State Of Bihar & Anr

Disputes and differences having arisen between the parties, Appellant invoked the said arbitration clause. The Superintending Engineer of the Circle who was the named Arbitrator entered into reference. There being alleged undue delay in conclusion of the proceedings of the arbitral tribunal, a notice was served by Appellant purported to be in terms of Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short "the 1996 Act"). The named Arbitrator retired and his successor did not proceed with the reference for a long time. Another notice was issued by Appellant asking the then incumbent of the office of Superintending Engineer to proceed with the arbitration. He, however, instead of proceeding with the arbitration sought for directions in this behalf from his superior officers. On 23.8.2002, he expressed his inability to continue with the proceedings. A notice under Section 14 of the 1996 Act was again served. A proposal was made thereunder to nominate another independent person as an Arbitrator. The Irrigation Department of the State of Bihar asked the Superintending Engineer to conclude the arbitration proceedings within three months by an office order dated 20th November, 2002.

An objection, however, was filed by Appellant questioning the jurisdiction of the said Arbitrator on the premise that his nomination has already been terminated. On the said plea that the named Arbitrator in terms of Clause 23 could not have functioned as such, an application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act was filed before the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. Justice P.S. Sahay, a former Judge of the Patna High Court was appointed but the Superintending Engineer fixed a date for hearing on 12.2.2003 by an order dated 8.2.2003, to which an objection was raised by Appellant. Appointment of Justice P.S. Sahay was intimated to the said Superintending Engineer.

An award was passed by the Superintending Engineer on 20th February, 2003. In the meantime, Appellant had filed his claim before Justice P.S. Sahay. Respondents also appeared on 21.2.2004 and filed an application under Section 14 of the 1996 Act seeking termination of his mandate on the ground that the earlier Arbitrator has already given his award. The learned Arbitrator held that he had no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter.

No such anomaly arises in the instant case.

We, therefore, see no reason to differ with the High Court. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
State Of Haryana & Ors vs M.P. Mohla

Haryana Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1998 (for short "the Revised Rules") came into force on 7.1.1998 in terms whereof the pay scales were revised. In terms of the said Rules, the pay scales of the posts of Deputy Director and Joint Director/ Project Director were said to have been revised from Rs. 3000-4500 and Rs. 3000-5000 to Rs. 10000-13900 and Rs. 10000-15200 respectively.

cum-Sub Divisional Officer and alternatively the respondents may be further directed to fix the pay of the petitioner on the promotional post of Deputy Director w.e.f. 9.4.1996 on the next stage in the existing pay scale of Rs. 13500-17250 in accordance with Rule 4.4 (c)(i) of CSR Vol. I and to grant all other consequential benefits."

By an order dated 4.12.2000, the said writ petition was allowed directing:

The said review application has been dismissed by reason of the impugned order.

Submission of Mr. Jauhar, however, is that if a review petition is permitted to be filed and allowed, the same would nullify the order of this Court dismissing the special leave petition filed by Appellants. This may be so but we are of the opinion that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case it is not necessary for us to make an endeavour to reopen a binding precedent particularly when no such action arises therefor.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that this appeal has no merit and, thus, must be dismissed accordingly. However, the question as regards applicability of one or the other Rules if arises in future, the same has to be determined on its own merit in accordance with law and having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
State Of A.P vs V. Sarma Rao & Ors. Etc. Etc

The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. Lands situated in Pisinikada village in the district of Vishakhapatnam were acquired by the State of Andhra Pradesh for providing house-sites to the weaker sections of society. Awards in respect of the said acquisition were made by the Land Acquisition Collector. Reference thereagainst was made to the Civil Court at the instance of the owners of the land. A large scale fraud, allegedly, took place in awarding compensation wherein the Sub-ordinate Judge, Anakapalle, his staff, the advocates of the claimants, the advocates appearing on behalf of the State and other officials were said to be involved. Upon obtaining requisite permission from the High Court, the CBCID registered a case and investigation thereinto was carried on. In its report dated 4.5.1998, the Additional Director General of Police, CID, Hyderabad indicated about a large scale conspiracy and fraud committed by the accused persons. Allegations made as against the accused came within the purview of the offences specified under Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code as a result thereof an inquiry under Section 340 thereof was imperative. The High Court got the matter examined by a Special Committee. It was opined that an inquiry may be conducted by District Judge, Vishakhapatnam. The report of the said Committee having been approved by the Full Court of the High Court, an inquiry was made by the District Judge, Vishakhapatnam. The learned District Judge examined a large number of witnesses and ultimately filed a complaint on 1.5.1999, pursuant to the findings recorded therein. An appeal came to be filed thereagainst by respondents herein before the High Court, which was marked as Criminal Appeal No.587 of 2000. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, in view of the importance of the question involved, referred the matter to a Division Bench by an order dated 31.10.2000.

In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are, therefore, of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be said to have committed any error in passing the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. However, keeping in view the fact that the matter is pending for long time, we would request the High Court to consider the desirability of implementing the decision of the Division Bench as expeditiously as possible. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
The Shahabad Cooperative Sugar Mills ... vs Special Secretary To Govt. Of Haryana ...

Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, Appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court, which has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.

The revisional jurisdiction is akin to the appellate jurisdiction.

(Emphasis supplied) .

(From Corpus Juris Secundum)"

The 3rd respondent has already joined his services pursuant to the judgment of the High Court. He, in the meanwhile, has also superannuated. The questions as to whether during the interregnum he had been gainfully employed or not; or his resignation was rightly refused to be accepted and despite submission of resignation, he did not, in fact, get a job and never joined anywhere else, should, in our opinion, be determined by an appropriate authority. We, therefore, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India direct that the Registrar of Co- operative Societies should arbitrate in the matter and exercise its jurisdiction under Section 102 of the Haryana Act, as if the 3rd respondent has invoked the said jurisdiction. The parties hereto shall file their respective documents before the Registrar within four weeks from the date. The Registrar shall fix a date of hearing and intimate the same to the parties, on which date they may produce their witnesses before him. The 3rd respondent will be entitled to examine himself as a witness.

The Registrar shall consider the matter afresh without in any way being influenced by the report of the Enquiry Officer, the appellate order passed by the Additional Registrar or the revisional order passed by the State. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies is requested to make an Award within eight weeks from the date of entering into the reference. We furthermore direct that irrespective of the result of the dispute between the appellant and the 3rd respondent, no recovery shall be effected from the 3rd respondent in respect of any salary or emoluments paid to him during the period from 1.10.2005 to 30.6.2006 when he joined his services pursuant to the order of the High Court and date of his superannuation.

This appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations and directions. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall pay and hear their own costs.
Suresh Chandra Jha vs State Of Bihar & Ors

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Therefore, the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is restored. We have, however, make it clear that the appellant will not be entitled to any salary for the period during which the respondent no.8 has worked. For all other service benefits, the period in question shall be reckoned. The official respondents shall explore the possibility of absorbing respondent no.8 to the suitable post considering the fact that for nearly quarter of the century he has rendered services. The payment made to him shall not be recovered.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P vs M/S Mohan Brickfield, Agra

An appeal was preferred by the assessee before the Assessment Commissioner (Judicial), Range I. The said authority with reference to the material on record found as follows:

For the year 1983-84 the average sale was determined at Rs.280/- by the appellate authority. Taking that into account the sale rate was fixed at Rs.320/- for the year in question. An appeal was preferred by the assessee against the Assistant Commissioner's order before the Tribunal. The Commissioner of Sales Tax also preferred appeal. Both the appeals were taken up together. The Tribunal found that the rejection of accounts was justified. Though reliance was placed on certain decisions of the Allahabad High Court to contend that when books of accounts were produced at the time of assessment which were free from defect, it cannot be held that they were not maintained in the regular course of business, merely on the ground that at the time of survey they were not produced. Tribunal found that that was not the only reason for rejection of the accounts and other factors relating to rates and low production were reflected. However, the sale of bricks was fixed at nine lakh bricks. Accordingly the appeal filed by the assessee was partly allowed and the revenue's appeal was dismissed.

(4-B) [* * *] (4-C) No person shall tamper with any seal put under sub-section (4-A).

(6) Every person transporting goods by any public service motor vehicle or by any vessel and every forwarding agent shall submit to assessing authority of the area from which the goods are despatched, such returns, as may be prescribed, of all goods transported or forwarded him. The Assessing Authority concerned shall have the power to for and examine the books of account or other documents in the possession of such transporter or agent with a view to verify the correctness the returns submitted, and that transporter or agent shall be bound furnish the books of account or other documents, when so called.

Explanation.In calculating the period specified in sub-section the period during, which proceedings under this Act remain stayed under the orders of any Court or authority shall be excluded."

Looked at from any angle, the order of the High Court is indefensible and is set aside.

The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Ayudh Upaskar Nirmani Kalyan Samiti, ... vs Govt. Of India And Ors

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:-

per annum. A direction for refund of the amount of Rs.32,95,315/- to the appellant which had been deposited by it, was also claimed.

The Director General then sent a communication dated 4.4.2005 to the Chairman of the Managing Committee of the Secondary School conveying the directives of the Chairman which are as under:

After the decision in the aforesaid writ petition, the appellant filed a representation dated 14.6.2O05 before the Chairman of the OEF. This representation was rejected by the Board by the order dated 21.6.2005 which was impugned in the writ petition. In the order it has been observed that according to the guidelines, the Society was created by well meaning officers and staff to look after the educational requirement of the wards of the employees and allied establishment, but the rational behind the creation of the Society had lost its relevance as only 10% to 11% of the total students of the school are wards of employees and officers. Thus the decision was taken to close down the School more particularly when the Audit Department had also raised objection. In the order it was also pointed out that the School was running without there being any sanction of the Competent Authority as per the Land Lease Policy. A further observation was made that the Board has also given directions several times in the past that officers of the Organization should not involve themselves in the running of the Educational Institutions and should instead concentrate on their core activity for which they had been arrived at on wrong understanding of the relevant provisions. According to the correct calculation the lease rent shall be Rs.2,19,688/- per annum and one time premium was also to be charged. The appellant was, therefore, directed to comply with the directives contained in the communication dated 4.4.2005. This order dated 21.6.2005 was also impugned in the writ petition. By the impugned judgment, the writ petition was dismissed.

Let an undertaking be filed by the appellant to vacate the premises latest by 31.3.2008 with the further undertaking to pay the amounts to be charged by the respondents for occupation of the premises. On such undertaking being filed, appellant shall be permitted to occupy the premises till 31.3.2008.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of. However, disposal of the present appeal shall not stand on the way of the appellant moving the authorities for grant of lease of the premises in question. If such request is made the same shall be considered in its own perspective about which we express no opinion. There will be no order as to costs.
Union Of India & Ors vs S.K. Saigal & Ors

Briefly stated, the facts are as follows:

(The departmental officers in the feeder grade who are in the direct line of promotion will not be eligible for consideration for appointment on deputation. Similarly, deputationists shall not be eligible for consideration for appointment by promotion).

The maximum age-limit for appointment by transfer on deputation shall not be exceeding 56 years as on the closing date of receipt of applications."

In the result, the order dated 30.10.2002 passed by the Tribunal in OA 422/2002 and the order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 22.8.2003 in passed in CWP No. 13192 of 2003 are hereby set aside. The OA No. 422/2002, filed by the respondents, stands dismissed. The appeals are allowed. No costs.
Rajesh Ranjan Yadav @ Pappu Yadav vs Cbi Through Its Director

We have been informed that now all the prosecution witnesses have been examined and cross-examined, and only the defence witnesses have to be examined.

The material on record also shows that the jail authorities at Beur are not in a position to control the illegal activities of this respondent for whatever reasons they may be."

The above observations clearly imply that the appellant's conduct has been such that he does not deserve bail.

We are not inclined to comment on the veracity or otherwise of the statement of Ranjan Tiwari and other witnesses as it may influence the trial, but looking at the allegations against the appellant both in the statement of Ranjan Tiwari and other witnesses, we are of the opinion on the facts and circumstances of the case, that this is certainly not a case for grant of bail to the appellant, particularly since the prosecution witnesses have been examined and now the defence witnesses alone have to be examined. It would, in our opinion, be wholly inappropriate to grant bail when not only the investigation is over but even the trial is partly over, and the allegations against the appellant are serious.

It is not necessary for us to go into this aspect of the matter because we have already noted above that this is certainly not a case for grant of bail to the appellant as the facts and circumstances of the case disclose.

On the facts and circumstances of the case, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. We, however, make it clear that no further application for bail will be considered in this case by any Court, as already a large number of bail applications have been rejected earlier, both by the High Court and this Court.

While we dismiss this appeal, we direct that the trial court shall ensure that the defence witnesses are examined on a day-to-day basis in accordance with a fixed time schedule so that the trial is completed as expeditiously as possible and the judgment is delivered soon thereafter. No costs.