L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs Vipin Behari Lal Srivastava

2. The controversy lies within a very narrow compass. The respondent was working as a permanent typist at the Allahabad branch of the appellant-New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Alleging that he had unauthorizedly remained absent for more than 600 days, a charge sheet was issued. An Enquiry Officer was appointed and after completion of enquiry and on consideration of the enquiry report, the respondent was removed from service by order dated 15.6.1985. Thereafter, a dispute was raised and the reference was made, as noted above. The Tribunal came to hold that during the period in question, i.e., 25.9.1982 to 5.6.1984, the respondent was suffering from Tuberculosis and he had applied for medical leave and since the management did not pass any order on his leave applications, the concerned workman cannot be held responsible and, therefore, he was not absent unauthorizedly from duty. Accordingly, the order of removal was set aside and order was passed directing reinstatement with full back wages and consequential benefits including continuity of service. The same was challenged before the High Court. By the impugned order, the High Court observed that though the respondent had remained absent, his absence with leave stood condoned by virtue of the letter dated 3.8.1984 issued by the Branch Manager of the appellant Company by which the respondent was called back to work. It was further observed that the Tribunal had also recorded that the management did not pass any order on the leave application and, therefore, it had to be implied that leave had been sanctioned. But it was noted that by virtue of a stay order passed in a writ petition, the proceedings before the Tribunal had remained stayed for about six years and, therefore, the respondent was not entitled to back wages for the whole period, but was entitled from 28.1.1998 i.e. from the date of the award. A Letters Patent Appeal was filed before the Division Bench of the High Court which dismissed holding the same to be not maintainable.

12. In view of the factual position, when tested on the touchstone of the principles of law and governing rules, the inevitable conclusion is that the impugned order of the High Court passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition, i.e. C.W.P. No. 1720/1998, by order dated 20.1.2006 cannot be sustained and is set aside. The order passed by the departmental authorities directing removal of the respondent from service is maintained.

13. The Appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.
Kasilingam vs Abharanji Chettiar

2. Brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of these appeals are that a suit was filed by the landlord-respondent herein for eviction of the tenant-appellant herein from the premises bearing Door No. 188 (Old No. 112) at Jawaharlal Nehru Street, Pondicherry on the ground that the premises is very old and in a dilapidated condition requiring demolition and that he has taken steps to get permission and approval from the competent authority for demolition and reconstruction. He filed another suit on the ground that the tenant-appellant had ceased to occupy the demised premises under Section 10(2)(vi) of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969 (hereinafter for short the 'Act'). The Trial Court decreed both the suits filed by the landlord-respondent and granted decree of eviction against the tenant-appellant herein. Aggrieved against both the said judgments and decrees of the Trial Court, the appellant herein preferred two separate appeals before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority reversed both the judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court. Aggrieved against the orders passed by the First Appellate Court, the landlord-respondent herein preferred two revision petitions before the High Court of Madras wherein a learned Single Judge has reversed the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and maintained the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Hence, the present appeals by special leave have been filed by the tenant-appellant.

7. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the High Court has under

8. Since, we have upheld the judgment and order of the High Court on the ground of Section 25 of the Act, we think no useful purpose will be served by going into another issue where the decree of eviction was granted on the ground that the appellant ceased to occupy the premises in terms of Section 10(2)(vi).

9. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we grant to the tenant- appellant time till 31st October, 2008 to vacate the suit premises subject to his filing usual undertaking before this Court within a period of four weeks from today. The appellant shall continue to pay the rent month by month to the respondent till 31st October, 2008 and clear all arrears of rent upto date.

Appeals dismissed. No order as to costs.
Board Of Trustees vs Macgregor Navire Port Equipment ...

2. The aforesaid appeal arises out of a suit filed by respondent No.1 (Macgregor Navire Port Equipment A.B.) against the appellant and also against respondent No.2, inter alia, for an injunction restraining the appellant from encashing a bank guarantee issued by the bank at the instance of the respondent No.1. After some arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, our attention was drawn to an order of this Court dated 3rd of August, 2001 from which it appears that the appellant had invoked the bank guarantee on 29th of March, 1988. However, the bank chose not to make the payment and in fact on 28th of April, 1988, the High Court granted stay of encashment of the bank guarantee. This Court in that order also noted that the bank guarantee in question had expired on 24th of February, 1989. This Court while passing the aforesaid order made the following direction :

4. With this direction, the appeal is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
J.E. Dawson vs National Museum & Ors

The question raised in this appeal is, as to whether the appellant possessed requisite qualification for the promotion to the post of Curator/Keeper(Archaeology). Undisputed facts are that the appellant was appointed as Deputy Keeper(Archaeology) on 01.04.1992. He was promoted to the post of Curator/Keeper (Archaeology) on 22.06.1999. The Rules clearly provides that for the post of Keeper(Archaeology) the appointment is made by way of promotion, failing which by direct recruits. The Tribunal also found that the requisite qualification is five years in the grade. The Tribunal has also recorded a finding that the respondent was not Deputy Keeper(Archaeology) and, therefore, he is not entitled to be promoted to the post of Curator/Keeper(Archaeology).

In that view of the matter, the conclusion recorded by the High Court and the Tribunal that the appellant did not possess requisite qualification is clearly erroneous and is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Pradeep Kumar vs Hajari Lal

2. The order under challenge has been made on a stay application moved by the tenant whose second appeal is pending in the High Court. It is clear from the record that the plaintiff-respondent has succeeded in securing a decree for eviction from both the courts below and the second appeal stands admitted, as already mentioned above. While admitting the appeal, this Court by an interim order dated 7th July 2004 stayed the execution of the decree. By the present application moved by the respondent, a prayer has been made that the mesne profits of the property in dispute which had been let out at the rate of Rs. 600/- per month 18 years ago should be suitably enhanced and that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 5 of the CPC which visualized that reasonable terms which would compensate the decree-holder for loss occasioned for delay in execution of the decree in the event of the appeal being dismissed, should be kept in mind in the light of the judgment of this Court in Atma Ram Properties Private Limited v. Federal Matters Private Ltd. . The learned Single Judge accordingly by the impugned order directed that the interim order passed on 7th July 2004 be confirmed subject to the condition that the appellant deposits/pays mesne profit of the property in dispute at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per month by the 15th day of each succeeding month. It is this direction which is under challenge in this appeal.

We accordingly dismiss the appeal.
Pulin Das @ Panna Koch vs State Of Assam

2) Brief facts, in a nutshell, are as follows:

( ii ) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine."

Except the above statement, he did not say anything about the accused persons and their activities.

24) For the reasons stated above, both the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The conviction of the appellants under Section 3(1)(2)(ii) of the TADA Act with sentence and fine thereunder is set aside. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other offence.
Pulin Das @ Panna Koch vs State Of Assam [Alongwith Criminal ...

2. Brief facts, in a nutshell, are as follows:

(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

23. For the reasons stated above, both the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The conviction of the appellants under Section 3(1)(2)(ii) of the TADA Act with sentence and fine thereunder is set aside. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other offence.
M/S Goyal Enterprises vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr

5. In the instant case proceeding was initiated on the basis of a complaint filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Jamshedpur alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short 'The Act'). The accused who is respondent No.2 in the petition was found guilty, and was accordingly, convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. He was also directed to pay by way of compensation the cheque amount of Rs.61,860/- and Rs.62, 860/- to the complainant within one month from the passing of the order. The accused filed a petition for revision before the Sessions Court. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.2, Jamshedpur, by order dated 2.3.2006 set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence as passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate. Thereafter, as noted above, application in terms of Section 378(4) Cr.P.C, was filed. The same has been dismissed summarily by a Division Bench of the High Court.

10. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the impugned judgment of the High Court is unsustainable and is set aside. We grant leave to the State to file the appeal. The High Court shall entertain the appeal and after formal notice to the respondents hear the appeal and dispose of it in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation made in the present appeal. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.
M.Noohukan vs Bank Of Travancore And Anr

2. The Bank of Travancore instituted a mortgage suit against the appellant which was dismissed by the trial court, but on appeal, the appellate court had set aside the judgment of the trial court and passed a preliminary decree. The preliminary decree, subsequently, was made final. In pursuance of the final decree, the Bank of Travancore filed an execution petition praying for an order to bring the mortgaged property to sale. By a court auction dated 29th of August, 2003, the property of the judgment debtor-appellant which was mortgaged with the Bank was sold for a sum of Rs.3,20,300/- in which the respondent No.2 was a successful bidder. The execution petition was thereafter posted on 29th of October, 2003 for passing an order confirming the sale. An application for setting aside the auction sale was filed by the appellant on 13th of September, 2003 in which the appellant prayed for setting aside the auction sale of the decretal premises and to decide the lawful amount that was required to be paid by the appellant to the Bank. The learned Subordinate Judge, Padmanabhapuram, however, dismissed the said application for setting aside the auction sale. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Kanyakumari. The learned District Judge also dismissed the appeal against which a revision petition was filed before the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court. On 24th of November, 2005, a learned Judge of the High Court had passed an order by setting aside the sale on certain terms and condition as mentioned in the said order. Subsequent to the order dated 24th of November, 2005, another application was filed for correction of the order in the calculation and for extension of time and time to deposit the amount, as directed in the aforesaid order, was to be read as 23rd of December, 2005 instead of 1st of December, 2005. On failure to make such deposit in terms of the aforesaid order of the High Court, the appellant made an application for extension of time to deposit a sum of Rs.2,43,978.65 paise from 23rd of January, 2005 to 18th of January, 2006. But by an order dated 2nd of March, 2006 of the learned Judge which is impugned in this Court, the High Court dismissed the said application for extension of time by holding that the lodgment schedule for issuing challan for payment was ordered on 23rd of December, 2005 and since the appellant had not made such deposit and not availed of the opportunity given, the application for extension of time must be rejected. Feeling aggrieved by this order, this special leave petition has been filed in respect of which leave has already been granted.

5. On the above terms and conditions, the appeal is therefore disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
National Insurance Company Ltd vs Sehtia Shoes

3. The controversy lies within a very narrow compass. Claim was lodged by the respondent who had obtained a shopkeeper insurance policy of the appellant company on 15.7.2001. A claim was lodged with the appellant stating that on account of fire insured articles got destroyed. The Surveyors and Loss Assessors assessed the net loss at Rs.2,82,301/-. It is the case of the appellant that respondent without demur accepted the sum of Rs.2,72,301/- in full and final settlement and accordingly payment of Rs.2,72,301/- was made. Thereafter a complaint was lodged before the District Forum claiming that his claim was Rs.9 lacs and he should be indemnified to the extent of Rs.9 lacs less Rs.2,72,301/- which had been received by him. Appellant objected to the complaint stating that since the respondent had accepted the amount without any protest no further claim survives and the complaint was not maintainable.

4. The District Forum noted the rival stand including the stand of the respondent that the so called settlement was signed by him under coercion and, therefore, the claim petition was maintainable. The District Forum awarded a sum of Rs.4,95,000/-. In appeal, the State Commission dismissed the appeal after noticing the rival stands which were reiteration of the stands taken before the District Forum. A revision, as noted above, was filed before the National Commission which dismissed the same holding as follows:

9. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs.
Umesh Challiyil vs K.P.Rajendran

2. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are that an election was held on 29.4.2006 to the Kerala Legislative Assembly from No.67 Kodungalloor Assembly Constituency. It was alleged in the election petition filed by the appellant that the election be declared void on the ground of corrupt practice committed either by the respondent's election agent or by some other person with the consent of the respondent or his election agent. The election petition was registered and notice was issued. The respondent was the elected candidate and he raised a preliminary objection on the maintainability of the election petition. The preliminary objections were that the affidavit in Form 25 was not affirmed, as such, the affirmation was not duly certified; the verification of the election petition was defective; the sources of information as regards the allegations of corrupt practices of which the appellant did not have personal knowledge; the allegations in the election petition were vague and lacked pleadings as regards the material particulars. It was contended by the petitioner/ appellant (herein) that there were no illegality in the verification nor the affidavit in form No.25 was defective. It was submitted that the accusations were specific and they were not vague and the facts mentioned in the election petition were duly sworn by proper affidavit.

14. However, in fairness whenever such defects are pointed then the proper course for the Court is not to dismiss the petition at the threshold. In order to maintain the sanctity of the election the Court should not take such a technical attitude and dismiss the election petition at the threshold. On the contrary after finding the defects, the Court should give proper opportunity to cure the defects and in case of failure to remove/ cure the defects, it could result into dismissal on account of Order 6 Rule 17 or Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Though technically it cannot be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act of 1951 but it can be rejected when the election petition is not properly constituted as required under the provisions of the CPC but in the present case we regret to record that the defects which have been pointed out in this election petition was purely cosmetic and it does not go to the root of the matter and secondly even if the Court found them of serious nature then at least the court should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to rectify such defects.

15. As a result of the above discussion, the view taken by learned Single Judge of the High Court is not correct and we set aside the order dated 6.12.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in E.P.No.6 of 2006 and remit this matter back to the High Court of Kerala for proceeding with the election petition of the appellant. There would be no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.
J. Ramulu vs State Of Andhra Pradesh

5. On 08.07.2000 at about 4.00 P.M., G. Janardhan along with his eldest paternal uncle G. Satyanarayana went to Ramkrishna Muth and after completing of their prayers, they came back to their residence by city bus. After getting down from the bus, G. Satyanarayana went to his house, while G. Janardhan proceeded to go to his house. A-1 and A-2 stated to have come from the rice mill road on a Scooter. A-1 was pillion rider, he sprinkled acid on the face of G. Janardhan with a Mug. G. Jandardhan shouted for help which attracted the attention of G. Raju, son (PW-1), Jamuna Rani, daughter (PW-2), G. Savithri, wife of G. Janardhan (PW-3), who were sitting in the verandah of their house. They immediately came to the spot and took G. Janardhan to Yashoda Hospital for medical treatment. G. Janardhan received burn injuries on his face, chest and neck. PW-1 went to the Police Station Chaderghat, Hyderabad and handed over complaint (Ex.P1) to Shri B. Sivaranireddy (PW-9), who, at the relevant time, was Sub-Inspector of the Police Station, Chaderghat. On the basis of the said complaint, FIR (Ex.P26) was registered under Section 307 read with Section 34 of IPC. G. Guravaiah (PW-

16. In our view, A-1 and A-2 are entitled to benefit of doubt. In the result, we allow the appeals and set aside the judgments of the High Court and the Trial Court. A-1 and A-2 are acquitted of the charges against them.

17. G. Venkatesh and J. Ramulu shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless required to be detained in connection with any other case.
Prabir Chakravarty vs State Of West Bengal & Ors

The above-mentioned appeal had been filed by All Bengal Licensees Association, Kolkata, against Raghabendra Singh, Principal Secretary, Excise Department, Government of West Bengal, and other officials of the Excise Department, against an order of a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, 3 dated 29th August, 2006, passed on a contempt petition dismissing the same.

During the pendency of the appeal, several applications were filed for impleadment in the appeal, but the same were dismissed. It appears that after the judgment and order dated 9th March, 2007, was passed by this Court, several writ petitions were filed in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution by those persons whose impleadment applications had been dismissed earlier. When the said writ petitions were listed for admission on 20th November, 2007, this Court directed the Registry to treat the writ petitions as review petitions against the judgment dated 9th March, 2007, in Civil Appeal No. 1246 of 2007 and cognate matters. The Registry was also directed to place all the Interlocutory Applications along with the Review Petitions before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate Bench. 4

That is how these matters have been placed before us. With due respect, we suspect that the entire facts were possibly not brought to their Lordships' notice.

Apart from the above, the petitioners had applied for being impleaded as parties in S.L.P.(Civil) No. 15224 of 2006 and such prayer was rejected and the impleadment 5 applications were dismissed. Now that the Civil Appeal arising out of the S.L.P(Civil) No. 15224 of 2006 stands dismissed, the impleadment applications filed thereafter for the same purpose are wholly misconceived and are liable to be dismissed. Consequentially, the review petitions which are dependent on the impleadment applications are also liable to be dismissed.

However, the petitioners cannot be left without a remedy since their writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution were not taken up for consideration in the writ jurisdiction, but were converted into petitions for review possibly on a first impression that no order could be passed in the writ petitions and that the judgment and order passed in Special Leave Petition (C) No.15224 of 2006 itself was required to be modified. But in the facts of the case as set out hereinabove, we are unable to entertain the review petitions which therefore merit dismissal.

In our view, the petitioners' remedy can only be taken up in the writ jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, while dismissing the review petitions and the connected petitions for impleadment and for hearing of the petitions in Court, we make it clear that the petitioners may file fresh writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution on the same cause of action as their earlier writ petitions were not taken up or treated as writ petitions.

There will be no order as to costs.
Commissioner Of Income Tax, Chennai vs M/S Bilahari Investment (P) Ltd

4. Assessees are private limited companies subscribing to chits as their business activities. They were maintaining their accounts on mercantile basis and they were computing profit/loss, as the case may be, at the end of the chit period following completed contract method, which was earlier accepted by the Department over several years.

17. On the other hand, percentage of completion method tries to attain periodic recognition of income in order to reflect current performance. The amount of revenue recognised under this method is determined by reference to the stage of completion of the contract. The stage of completion can be looked at under this method by taking into consideration the proportion that costs incurred to date bears to the estimated total costs of contract.

18. The above indicates the difference between completed contract method and percentage of completion method.

22. Subject to above, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court and accordingly the civil appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.