L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Ibrahim vs Raju & Ors

5. The appellant filed a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, `the Act') and claimed compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- with interest and cost. He pleaded that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the tempo by its driver Shri Raju; that he had suffered serious injuries in the accident; that he remained in the hospital for almost one month and a half and had to spend more than Rs.80,000/- towards medical treatment, conveyance and expenses of the attendants; that at the time of accident he was a student of Class 8 and on account of the injuries he was not in a position to continue his studies.

6. The owner and the driver of the offending vehicle, who were impleaded as non-petitioners No.1 and 2 did not contest the claim of the appellant. However, the National Insurance Company, which was impleaded as non-petitioner No.3 contested the claim by asserting that the accident was not caused due to rash and negligent driving of the tempo and that the appellant was himself responsible for the accident.

4. Diet and attendant charges Rs.30,600/-

(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).

(emphasis supplied)

17. In the light of the above, we shall now consider whether the compensation awarded to the appellant is just and reasonable or the 11 Tribunal and the High Court committed an error by not awarding compensation for the future treatment, deprivation of opportunity to undertake further studies and consequential loss of earning/income which he would have derived by taking up appropriate job or doing some business as also diminution of the marriage prospects.

19. On account of the injuries suffered by him, the prospects of the appellant's marriage have considerably reduced. Rather, they are extremely bleak. In any case, on account of the fracture of pelvis, he will not be able to enjoy the matrimonial life. Therefore, the award of Rs.50,000/- under this head must be treated as wholly inadequate. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that a sum of Rs.2 lacs should be awarded to the appellant for loss of marriage prospects and enjoyment of life.

22. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is modified and it is declared that the appellant shall be entitled to total compensation of Rs.6 lacs with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition. If respondent No.3 has already paid the compensation in terms of the award of the Tribunal and the impugned judgment, then it shall pay the balance amount with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation within a period of 3 months. If the amount awarded by the Tribunal and the High Court has not been paid so far, then respondent No.3 shall pay the total amount of Rs.6 lacs to the appellant with interest at the rate of 6% per annum within the said period of 3 months.
Dayanandi vs Rukma D Suvarna & Ors

2. The suit property was owned by Singa Gujaran, father of respondent No.1, appellant and respondent Nos. 2 to 6. About 3 months and 10 days before his death, Singa Gujaran executed Will dated 25.5.1987. He bequeathed the property specified in item No.1 of the Schedule attached to the Will to one of his four daughters, namely, Kalyani (respondent No.3) and the property specified in item No.2 jointly to the other daughters, namely, Dayanandi (appellant), Rukma (respondent No.1) and Deena (respondent No.2).

7. After analyzing the pleadings of the parties and the evidence produced by them, the trial Court held that execution of Will dated 25.5.1987 is proved but observed that by virtue of the alterations made in that Will, the 5 deceased has consciously disinherited respondent No.1. The trial Court noted that the names of four persons were mentioned in Exhibit P.1 in respect of the second item of the Schedule but the name of respondent No.1 Rukma was deleted and total number of the beneficiaries was also changed. The trial Court referred to the statement of respondent No.1 that her father had shown Exhibit P.1 without any correction as also the alleged admission made by her in response to a question put in the cross-examination and observed:

The trial Court finally held that respondent No.1 was not entitled to any share in the suit property and accordingly dismissed the suit.

20. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
Govind Yadav vs The New India Insurance Co.Ltd

2. The appellant has approached this Court because he is not fully satisfied with the enhancement granted by the High Court in the amount of compensation awarded by 9th Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur (for short, `the Tribunal').

The Tribunal also awarded interest at the rate of 6% on the total compensation of Rs.2,56,800/-.

6. The appeal preferred by the appellant against the award of the Tribunal was disposed of by the learned Single Judge of the High Court by granting an enhancement of Rs.50,000/-. In the opinion of the learned Single Judge, the income of the appellant, who was working as Cleaner at the time of accident could be taken as Rs.2000/- per month i.e. Rs.24,000/- per annum and the loss of income due to 70% permanent disability would be Rs.16,800/- per annum.

(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).

(emphasis supplied) 1

16. We shall now consider whether the compensation awarded to the appellant is just and reasonable or he is entitled to enhanced compensation under any of the following heads:

After the aforesaid judgment, the cost of living as also the cost of artificial limbs and expenses likely to be incurred for periodical replacement of such limb has substantially increased. Therefore, it will be just and proper to award a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- to the appellant for future treatment. If this amount is deposited in fixed deposit, the interest accruing on it will take care of the cost of artificial limb, fees of the doctor and other ancillary expenses.

21. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and the award of the Tribunal are set aside. It is declared that the appellant is entitled to total compensation of Rs.9,53,600/- with interest @ 7% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition till the date of realization. The respondent is directed to pay the balance amount of compensation with interest within a 1 period of three months from today in the form of a Bank Draft prepared in the name of the appellant.
Chindha Fakira Patil (D) Tr.Lrs vs Spl.Land Acquisition Officer,Jalgaon

For land falling in Group I, i.e. Jirayat land, the respondent fixed market value at Rs.68,000/- per hectare. For Group II and Group I lands he fixed market value at the rate of Rs.58,000/- and Rs.54,000/- per hectare 3 respectively. For pot kharab land, market value was fixed at Rs.15,00/- per hectare.

16. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and the award passed by the Reference Court is restored. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
Union Of India & Anr vs M/S Nitdip Text. Processors (P)Ltd.& ...

4) We will take Civil Appeal No. 2960 of 2006 as the lead matter. The facts of the case, in brief, are hereunder:

46) In view of the above discussion, we cannot agree with the findings and the conclusion reached by the High Court for which, we have made reference earlier. We have also not discussed in detail the individual issues raised by the learned senior counsel for the respondent, since those were the issues which were canvassed and accepted by the High Court. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. The impugned common judgment and order is set aside. Costs are made easy.
Poonam & Ors vs Harish Kumar & Anr

3. The facts and circumstances, which are relevant to this appeal, are as under.

6. The Respondent no. 1 controverted the aforesaid averment of the appellants-plaintiffs by claiming that the suit schedule properties were not ancestral but were self-acquired by their deceased father. Further case of the Respondent No.1 is that he is the absolute owner of the said properties by virtue of a registered Will dated 18.06.2002 executed by the deceased father in his favour.

plaintiffs with costs and accordingly a decree was drawn up.

jacket about this. The discretion of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is meant to further the ends of justice and this Court has been using its discretion in appropriate cases when it is satisfied that exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court or other Tribunals has not been on sound judicial principles. It is well settled that judicial discretion shall always be exercised "according to the rules of reason and justice and not according to private opinion" [See Sharpe Vs. Wakefield (1891 AC 193)].

16. We, therefore, are constrained to set aside the order of the High Court and condone the delay.

We direct that the appeal should be restored to its file and the hearing of the appeal may proceed as expeditiously as possible.

17. However, nothing said in this judgment should be considered as expression of opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties.

The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
Anand vs Committee For S.&V. Of Tribe Claims &Ors

2. Succinctly put, the material facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:

3. In furtherance of the said order, the appellant made an application to the Caste Scrutiny Committee under Rule 11 of the Maharashtra Scheduled Tribes (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Certificate Rules, 2003 (for short "the Rules"). Along with the application, the appellant submitted several documents, including a copy of his grandfather's school leaving certificate dated 8th April, 2 1929; a copy of school leaving certificate dated 6th July, 1955, issued to his father, Nilkantha Maruti Katole; a caste certificate issued to his father on 19th June, 1969; copies of the school leaving certificates issued to the appellant on 8th May, 1978, 5th July, 1988 and 9th August, 1983; a college leaving certificate dated 9th July, 1990 and a copy of school leaving certificate issued to the real brother of his grandfather on 21st June, 1933 etc. All these documents recorded the Caste of those persons as `Halbi'.

5. A copy of the report of Vigilance Cell was supplied to the appellant by the Caste Scrutiny Committee and personal hearing was also granted.

(i) While dealing with documentary evidence, greater reliance may be placed on pre-

21. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed; the decisions of Caste Scrutiny Committee and the High Court are set aside and the case is remitted back to the Caste Scrutiny Committee for fresh consideration in accordance with the relevant rules and the aforesaid broad guidelines.

22. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

NOVEMBER 8, 2011.

ARS 17
E.P.F.Commissioner vs O.L.Of Esskay Pharmaceuticals Ltd

4. For the sake of convenience, we have culled out the facts from the record of the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 7642/2011.

6. Although, it is not clear from the record as to what happened to the sale notice, but this much is evident that after 2 years and about 4 months, the Enforcement Officer informed the appellant that the Gujarat High Court has passed order dated 11.3.2004 for winding up of the company and appointed Official Liquidator to look after its properties and clear the debts. The appellant then approached the Official Liquidator for payment of the amount determined under Section 7A of the EPF Act, but the latter did not give any response.

9. Since the impugned judgment and the order passed by the learned Company Judge are entirely based on the order passed by another Division Bench in Company Application No. 216/1997 in Company Petition No. 205/1996, it will be appropriate to notice the ratio of that order. The same is as under:

10. The factual matrix of the other appeals is more or less similar. In all the cases, applications filed by the appellant for payment of the amount due 6 from the employer were dismissed by the learned Company Judge and the appeals were dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court.

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied) 44

45. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment as also the order of the learned Company Judge are set aside and the applications filed by the appellant are allowed in terms of the prayer made. The Official Liquidator appointed by the High Court shall deposit the dues of provident 47 fund payable by the employer within a period of 3 months. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
M/S. Essel Propack Ltd vs Commnr. Of Central Excise, Mumbai

The appellant manufactured plastic tubes in its factory and supplied the same to M/s Colgate Palmolive (I) Ltd. (for short "Colgate"). After considering the reply to the show cause notices, the Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai III, passed an order dated 17th July, 1997, confirming the demand of excise duty amounting to Rs.54,30,713/- and imposing a penalty of ...2/-

(supra). Thus, if in the present case, the caps are not manufactured in the factory of the appellant but are being supplied by the customers of the appellant, the value of the caps will not form part of the assessable value of the tubes manufactured by the appellant.

On a reading of the reply to the show cause notice in the present case, we find that the appellant has stated in Para 3.3 that the appellant manufactures tubes on orders received from their customers and whenever the customers order, the appellant fixes plastic caps to the tubes and in ...7/-

:7: such cases the value of the tubes fixed with caps are also included in the assessable value of tubes, but in case such caps are supplied by the customers free of cost, such tubes are cleared without including the value of the caps in the assessable value of the tubes. The Commissioner has not recorded any clear finding as to whether for the tubes that were cleared by the appellant during the relevant periods in respect of which show cause notices were issued, the caps were supplied free of cost by the customers of the appellant and such caps were fitted to the tubes manufactured in the factory of the appellant. As we have already held, in respect of the tubes for which caps have been supplied by the customers free of cost, the assessable value of the tubes will not include the value of the caps. The Commissioner, therefore, will have to record a clear finding as to whether for the tubes cleared during the three relevant periods, the caps were supplied by the customers of the appellant free of cost and accordingly pass a fresh order.

...8/-

:8: In the result, the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above; the impugned order of the Tribunal as well as the original order passed by the Commissioner are set aside. The matter is remanded to the Commissioner for fresh decision in accordance with the observations made in this order. No costs.
Prem Parkash Pahwa vs United Commercial Bank And Anr.Uco Bank

5. The appellant, who is appearing in person, joined the service of respondent 1 in the year 1973 as a Stenographer in clerical cadre. He passed his graduation in the year 1973 from the Punjab University. He obtained Diploma in Office Organization and Procedures in the year 1979 from the said university. It is a `Post Graduate Diploma" recognized by the Academic Council of the Punjab University. Respondent 1-Bank conducted examination in the year 1979 for promotion to the officers grade. According to the appellant, weightage of three (3) marks was given to him as per the Promotion Policy of respondent 1 for the year 1975, which 3 was in vogue at that time as he had obtained Diploma in Office Organization and Procedures. But, the appellant could not qualify in the said exam because he obtained less marks under other heads. He again appeared for the same examination on 17/1/1982. His case is that the Diploma granted by the Punjab University entitled him to weightage of three (3) marks as contemplated in Clause 3.1.2 (F)(d)(ii) of the 1981 Promotion Policy of respondent 1, which held the field at that time. He was not given weightage of three (3) marks because he did not possess `Post Graduate Degree'. The appellant, therefore, filed a suit for declaration that he is entitled to the weightage of three (3) marks as he possessed `Post Graduate Diploma'. In view of Clause 3.1.2 (F)(d)(ii) read with foot note (b) of Chapter (1) of the 1981 Promotion Policy of respondent 1, the trial court decreed the suit and held that he was entitled to weightage of three (3) marks. The lower appellate court set aside the said decree.

13. It is not possible for us to accept the respondents' case.

15. In our opinion, relevant Clause 3.1.2(F)(d)(ii) of the 1981 Promotion Policy is not happily worded or rather it is worded in a manner which would create confusion rather than help the aspirant. In such a situation, in our opinion, it will have to be interpreted in favour of the appellant bearing in mind the fact that at one point of time, as per 1975 Promotion Policy, he was, in fact, given weightage of three (3) marks as he possessed `Diploma in Office Organization and Procedures of a recognized university. Unfortunately, he did not get the necessary marks under other heads and, hence, he could not get benefit of those three (3) marks.

16. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and order and hold that the appellant is entitled to weightage of three (3) marks while considering him for promotion to the Bank Officer's Cadre in Officer's Grade examination held in 1982 in view of the fact that he possessed Post Graduate Diploma in Office Organization and Procedures from Punjab University, Chandigarh, which is a recognized University.

The appeal is allowed.
National Fertilizers Ltd vs Jagga Singh (D) Th:Lrs & Ors

2. The facts relevant for deciding these appeals briefly are that the National Fertilizers Limited (for short `the NFL') is a Government of India Undertaking engaged in the business of manufacturing fertilizers and has a plant in Bhatinda in the State of Punjab. To meet the requirement of dwelling houses for the employees of NFL, the State of Punjab acquired 29.68 acres of land in village Bhatinda by notification dated 24.01.1983 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short `the Act'). The District Collector sent the market rates to the Land Acquisition Collector for different classes of agricultural or revenue land and these were for Nehri - Rs.56,000/- per acre, for Barani

We, therefore, do not find any merit in the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that a cut of 60% should have been applied to the rate as determined in Karam Singh's case considering the larger size and lower quality of the land acquired in the present case. In our opinion, the cut applied by the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment so as to reduce the value from Rs.176/- per sq. yard to Rs.120/- per sq. yard was just and reasonable in the facts of the present case.

15. In the result, we do not find any merit in these appeals and we dismiss the same and award a cost of 21 Rs.10,000/- in favour of the respondents in each of the appeals.
Gulab Das & Ors vs State Of M.P

3. Appellant No.1, Gulab Das and his brother, Veeraji are residents of village Sonasavri, District Hoshangabad in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Both of them have built their respective houses that are adjacent to each other. Three days prior to the incident Gulab Das had put up a partition fence between the two properties. On 30th September, 1994 at about 7.45 a.m. while Veeraji was shifting the partition fence, alleging that it encroached on his property, an exchange of hot words started between Gulab Das and his two sons who are appellant Nos. 2 & 3 on one hand and Veeraji, his wife and sons on the other. A free fight followed in which both the parties received injuries resulting in registration of cross cases by them in Police Station Itarsi, District Hoshangabad. While the case registered against the appellants was for offences punishable under Sections 307, 325, 323 read with Section 34 IPC, that registered against the opposite party was for the alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 325, 323, 294 read with 2 Section 34 IPC. Separate charge sheets in relation to both the cases were filed by the police before the Jurisdictional Magistrate who committed the cases to the Court of Sessions Judge, Hoshangabad. The case against the appellants was made over to the First Additional Sessions Judge, Hoshangabad, who acquitted the appellants for some of the offences while convicting them for some others with which they were charged. The operative portion of the trial Court's order was in the following words:

5. Aggrieved by their conviction and sentence the appellants appealed to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur which failed and has been dismissed by the order impugned in this appeal. The appellants have in the present appeal by special leave assailed the said order of dismissal.

8. Having said that we are of the view that the settlement/compromise arrived at between the parties can be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the quantum of sentence to be awarded to the appellants.

9. In the totality of the circumstances we are of the view that the settlement arrived at between the parties is a sensible step that will benefit the parties, give quietus to the controversy and rehabilitate and normalise the relationship between them.

10. In the result, while upholding the order of conviction recorded by the Courts below, we reduce the sentence awarded to the appellants to the sentence already undergone by them. The appeal is to that extent allowed 7 and the impugned orders modified. The appellants shall be set free forthwith if not otherwise required in any other case.
S.Loganathan vs Union Of India & Ors

2. The appellant, who was working as a Junior Clerk in the Subordinate Court at Yanam (Pondicherry), was dismissed from the service on conclusion of disciplinary proceedings by the Chief Judge, Pondicherry (for short "Chief Judge") vide order dated November 8, 2000. The appellant challenged that order before the High Court of judicature at Madras by filing a Writ Petition. His Writ Petition came to be dismissed on June 11, 2007. It is from this order that the present appeal, by special leave, arises.

3. On April 28, 1999, the appellant was issued a Charge Memo setting out therein that he was liable to be proceeded with the disciplinary action under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2 1965 (for short "CCS Rules"). Along with the Charge-Memo, Article of Charges was sent to the appellant. The Article of Charges contained ten articles. An Inquiry Officer was appointed and inquiry proceeded against the appellant. The appellant filed his response by way of defence to the Charge Memo and Article of Charges and denied the allegations levelled against him. The appellant, after some time, did not participate in the departmental inquiry. As a result of which, the departmental inquiry continued ex- parte. Subsequently, on his objection that he had not been provided adequate opportunity, ex-parte departmental inquiry was re-called and the inquiry started de novo. After full participation by the appellant thereafter in the departmental inquiry, some of the charges were found fully proved while some were held partially proved by the Inquiry Officer. The Disciplinary Authority (Chief Judge), on consideration of the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer, agreed with the findings recorded in the inquiry report and awarded to the appellant penalty of dismissal from the service.