L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Mulchand Khanumal Khatri vs State Of Gujarat & Ors

2. The appellant claims to be joint owner of the land being Survey No. 11430 admeasuring 34 sq. mtr. at Palanpur, Gujarat. On April 1, 1980, a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, b�the Actb�) that proposed acquisition of the appellantb�s land and some other land for the public purpose, namely, construction of Palanpur City and taluka Police Station. The said notification was published in the Government Gazette on January 8, 1981. Later on, Section 4 notification was revised and published in the Official Gazette on September 22, 1983. The declaration under Section 6 was published on January 5, 1984. The appellant challenged the acquisition of his land through the above notifications in a Special Civil Application before the Gujarat High Court. An interim relief in the above matter was granted on April 18, 1984.

4. The Special Civil Application filed by the appellant was dismissed on January 11, 1996. The Dy. Collector made the award on August 31, 1998.

13. In view of the above legal position and the facts noticed above, we hold as we must, that the award having not been made within the period prescribed in Section 11A of the Act, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the appellantb�s land has lapsed. The High Court was clearly in error in excluding the period from January 11, 1996 to September 5, 1997. This period cannot be excluded under explanation appended to Section 11A of the Act.

14. In view of the above, Civil Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order is set aside. The entire proceedings for the acquisition concerning the appellantb�s land is declared to have lapsed. No costs.
Narsingh Prasad vs Anil Kumar Jain & Ors

Petition No. 1793 (SB) of 2011 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court quashed the Order dated 30.09.2011 of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (for short, 'the Parishad') whereby it had decided that the present appellant, a Superintending Engineer, shall hold the post of Chief Engineer on officiating basis till the regular selection was made.

4. The High Court took note of the rival submissions and opined that at no point of time, the criteria of merit had been considered before passing the Order; that in the absence of merit selection, a senior most person is entitled to hold the charge unless there is any legal impediment; that if the relevant regulations are properly understood, the Writ Petitioner would be eligible to be considered for the post of the Chief Engineer as no distinction can be made between the electrical and civil cadre; and that the Writ Petitioner was not ousted from the zone of consideration as has been admitted by the Parishad. Being of this view, the High Court axed the Order passed by the Parishad and directed that in case any officiating arrangement is to be made, the Writ Petitioner's case shall be first considered and he shall be given the charge unless there is any legal impediment till the regular selection is made. The High Court further directed that the selection shall be made within a maximum period of two months.

direction to hold a regular selection within a maximum period of 2 months.

9. Keeping in view the totality of circumstances, it is directed that till the Board takes a decision after getting the report of the selection committee, the interim order passed in this case shall remain in force.

10. In the result, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove and the order of the High Court is set aside leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.

March 27, 2012.
M.M.T.C. Of India vs Ocean Knigh Maritime Co Ltd. And Ors

2. Bereft of unnecessary details, suffice it to notice for the purposes of the present appeal that by a Charter Party dated October 14, 1987, the respondent No. 1 let its vessel 'MV Ocean Knight' to the appellant for carriage of a cargo of Rock Phosphate in bulk. The disputes arose between the parties in respect of demurrage charges. Clause 56 of the Charter Party which contains arbitration clause, reads as follows:

3. The respondent No.1 invoked the above arbitration clause and vide its letter dated May 30, 1989 communicated the appointment of Shri K.P. Patel (respondent No. 2) as its arbitrator.

4. On August 14, 1989, the appellant appointed Captain D.K. Verma (respondent No. 3) as its arbitrator.

9. The appellant contested the above petition filed by the respondent No. 1 by filing an affidavit-in-reply. Inter alia an objection was raised by the appellant that the petition was beyond the prescribed period of limitation and, was liable to be dismissed on that ground alone.

10. On November 26, 2001, the petition filed by the respondent No. 1 was dismissed in default but later on, it was restored.

20. Civil Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order dated February 4, 2005 passed by the High Court is set-aside. The Arbitration Petition (O.M.P. No. 193 of 1999) filed by the respondent No. 1 is dismissed as time barred. As the respondent No. 1 has not chosen to appear, parties shall bear their own costs.
Shobhan Singh Khanka vs State Of Jharkhand

(c) The allegations against the appellant, Chairman and other Members of the JPSC are that they provided highest marks to the candidates whom they desire to be selected or appointed by giving undue favour. The appellant is also responsible for conspiracy with the Chairman, Members of the JPSC and the candidates who were given highest marks by the Interview Board. It is also alleged that the appellant is responsible for cutting, manipulation, interpolation in the marks sheet of the Interview Board in order to provide benefit to the candidates for selection and appointment.

(d) The prosecution case in a nutshell is that an enquiry was conducted by the vigilance department regarding the irregularity committed by the Chairman, Members and officers of the JPSC in conducting Second JPSC Civil Services Examination pursuant to advertisement No. 7 of 2005 dated 12.11.2005. It is alleged by the prosecution that the examination was not held in accordance with the guidelines. The Members either have not given declaration regarding their relation appearing in the examination and those who have given declaration have not provided the required details. The further allegation of the prosecution is that there has been manipulation in the numbers awarded to the students. The prosecution examined 22 copies and it has been alleged that they have found manipulation in the answer sheets. It is the further case of the prosecution that there has been large-scale bungling, manipulation, tampering of marks, irregularity in the appointment of Examiners and Members of the Interview Board and the Chairman in connivance with the Members and also in conspiracy with the successful candidates for securing monetary gains to the officials of JPSC in utter disregard to the rules and by practicing corrupt method recommendations for appointment of various persons were made to the Government. Accordingly, a First Information Report (in short “FIR”) was lodged against several persons including the appellant.

(iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and

13) Under these circumstances, the order passed by the Special Judge as well as the High Court dismissing his petition for anticipatory bail are set aside. Accordingly, we direct that in the event of arrest, the appellant shall be released on bail in connection with PS case No. 23 of 2010 corresponding to Special Case No. 23 of 2010, Vigilance PS, Ranchi, Jharkhand subject to the following conditions:-
State Of Jharkhand & Ors vs M/S K.N.Farms & Industries(P) Ltd

2. The facts which have been culled out from the pleadings of the parties are as under:

(v). The State Government deposited Rs.81,322.68 with the District Land Acquisition Officer as the price of land, but, before the amount could be paid to the respondent, LRDC passed an order under Section 4(h) of the 1950 Act and annulled the settlement made by the ex-landlord in favour of the respondent. The appeal and the revision filed against the order of LRDC were dismissed by Deputy Commissioner, Singhabhum and Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi respectively. C.W.J.C. No. 410 of 1978 filed by the respondent was allowed by the High Court on 30.6.1986 and the order passed for cancellation of the settlement was quashed.

10. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order as also order dated 18.11.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 1546 of 2005 are set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

11. It is needless to say that we have not examined the correctness of the calculation made by the appellants of the amount payable to the respondent in terms of agreement dated 28.2.1960 and if the latter has any grievance in that regard, then this order shall not preclude it from availing appropriate legal remedy.
Jegannathan vs Raju Sigamani & Anr

The appellant herein is plaintiff No. 2. He, along with two others, namely, Gnanasoundari and George filed a Suit against the present respondent No.1 for declaration, permanent injunction and mandatory injunction.

The respondent No. 1 contested the Suit on diverse grounds. After recording evidence and on hearing the parties, the trial Court on September 16, 1999 decreed plaintiffs' Suit for the grant of permanent injunction.

The High Court, by its order dated 26th September, 2008, held that the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal was not maintainable and dismissed the appeal on that ground.

The appellant and the respondent No. 2 then filed a petition before the High Court seeking review of the order dated September 26, 2008. However, the Review Petition was also dismissed on November 12, 2009. It is from these two orders that the present appeal has arisen.

23A. Remand in other cases b� Where the Court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point, and the decree is reversed in appeal and a retrial is considered necessary, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers as it has under rule 23.

Insofar as the present case is concerned, the trial Court had disposed of the suit on merits and not on a preliminary issue. The first appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and directed the trial Court to decide the suit afresh after giving parties an opportunity to lead evidence b� oral as well as documentary. The nature of the order passed by the appellate Court leaves no manner of doubt that such order has been passed by the appellate Court in exercise of its power under Order 41 Rule 23A of the Code.

The appeals are accordingly allowed.

No order as to costs.
Bhushan Kumar & Anr vs State(Nct Of Delhi) & Anr

distribution of the assets left behind by late Shri Gulshan Kumar (of T- Series fame). On 19.02.1998, a handwritten note was executed between the appellants and Respondent No. 2 wherein distribution of certain assets and shares in different companies was provided for. Subsequently, on 21.02.1998, a fresh agreement was entered into between the appellants and the Respondent No. 2 which superseded the handwritten note.

c) However, after 4 years, due to non-materialization of the agreement dated 21.02.1998, the Respondent No. 2 got registered the present FIR under Section 420 IPC against all the other signatories to the said agreement wherein only one of the signatory was a party to it. For quashing the said FIR, the appellants herein filed Crl.M.C. No. 59 of 2005 before the High Court.

19) In the light of the above discussion, we conclude that the petition filed before the High Court under Section 482 of the Code was maintainable. However, on merits, the impugned order dated 30.07.2010 passed by the High Court of Delhi is confirmed, consequently, the appeals fail and the same are dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the appeals, MM/South East 02, Patiala House, New Delhi is free to proceed further in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation made in these appeals.

APRIL 4, 2012.
Chaugule vs Bhagwat

2. The Appellant herein was elected to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from the 240-Omerga Legislative Assembly Constituency, which was reserved for a Scheduled Caste candidate. His election was challenged by one Shri Yadavrao, son of Bhimrao Suryawanshi, who was also a Scheduled Caste candidate. In order to contest the elections, the said Shri Yadavrao had filed three nomination forms which were all rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that the proposerb�s name was not included in the votersb� list. Accordingly, the Returning Officer found Shri Yadavrao to be ineligible to contest the said elections as a candidate.

3. On 26th September, 2009, Shri Yadavrao filed Writ Petition No.6474 of 2009, challenging the rejection of his nomination form which had been submitted by him as an independent candidate. On 1st October, 2009, the High Court allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the order of the Returning Officer. The order of the High Court was challenged by the Election Commissioner before this Honb�ble Court, in which notice was issued and the impugned judgment was stayed. Consequently, Shri Yadavraob�s name was not included in the ballot paper and he was unable to contest the elections.

4. The elections were conducted on 22nd October, 2009, and the Appellant herein was declared elected from the said Constituency. Shri Yadavrao challenged the Appellantb�s election by way of Election Petition No.5 of 2009 filed before the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court on 1st December, 2009. While the Election Petition was pending hearing, on 25th November, 2010, Shri Yadavrao filed an application for withdrawal of the Election Petition filed by him. After hearing Shri Yadavrao in person, the High Court recorded the fact that the Election Petitioner was no longer interested in the Election Petition and wanted to withdraw the same. On the said materials, the High Court allowed the application filed by Shri Yadvrao, particularly when no corrupt practice had been alleged in the Election Petition. The Election Petition was, therefore, disposed of as withdrawn. At that point of time, there was no pending application from any person wanting to be substituted in place of the Election Petitioner, Shri Yadavrao son of Bhimrao Suryawanshi.

17. We, therefore, have no hesitation in setting aside the judgment and order dated 28th November, 2011, passed by the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court in Election Petition No.5 of 2009 and Civil Application No.35 of 2010.

18. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, but, there will be no order as to costs.
Delhi Administration & Ors vs Kaushilya Thakur & Anr

6. The application of Ranjodh Kumar Thakur was rejected by Joint Secretary (L&B), Delhi Administration on the ground that Khasra No.70/2 was not owned by him. This was conveyed to him vide letter dated 28.8.1989, the relevant portions of which are extracted below:

9. The appeal preferred by the appellant against the order of the learned Single Judge was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court solely on the ground that the Reference Court had accepted his entitlement to receive compensation in lieu of the acquired land which formed part of khasra No.70/2 of village Kotla. The relevant portion of the order of the Division Bench is extracted below:

11. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside and the writ petition filed by the husband of respondent No.1 is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
Maniben Devraj Shah vs Mun.Corp.Of Br.Mumbai

4. In the written statement filed on behalf of the Corporation, an objection was taken to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that notice under Section 527 of the Act had not been given by the appellants. On merits, it was pleaded that the appellants had raised construction on a portion of the road and it had become necessary to demolish the same for widening the existing road.

7. The Corporation did not challenge the judgments of the trial Court within the prescribed period of limitation and filed appeals sometime in September, 2010 along with the applications for condonation of 7 years and 108 days delay. In support of its prayer for condonation of delay the Corporation also filed the affidavits of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar, Junior Law Officer. For the sake of reference, paragraph 3 of the application for condonation of delay and paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the affidavit of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar filed in First Appeal No. 3691 of 2010 titled Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai v. Smt. Maniben Devraj Shah are reproduced below:

5. I say that though papers were misplaced and not traceable, I personally inquired with the staff of High Court (Appellate Side High Court Section of the Legal Department) on 17.8.2010, whether any appeal has been filed against the order and judgment dated 2.5.2003. I came to know on 19.8.2010, that appeal has not been filed as neither the said proceedings nor copy of order dated 2.5.2003 were put up before undersigned for drafting an appeal. I immediately directed to the concerned Managing Clerk on 19.8.2010 to file an application for certified copy of judgment and order dated 2.5.2003. Accordingly, an application for certified copy was made on 23.8.2010 and same was made available on 6.9.2010 and certified copy of order dated 2.5.2010 was also delivered on 6.9.2010 and accordingly, appeal has been filed on 16.9.2010.b�

21. The applications filed for condonation of delay and the affidavits of Shri Sirsikar are conspicuously silent on the following important points:

23. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the appeals filed by the respondent against the judgments of the trial Court are dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
Mun.Corp.Of Gr.Mumbai vs Thomas Mathew & Ors

4) Brief facts:

(b) On 17.04.1998, a notice bearing No. KW/036/AEM/OD under Section 314 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (hereinafter referred to as b�the MMC Actb�) was issued to all persons who are in occupation of the Patra structures which are constructed on foot paths and streets situated near Empire House on Veera Desai Road, Last Bus Stop, Andheri (West), Mumbai directing to remove the said Patra Sheds etc. together with their belongings within two days. On failure to comply with the said direction, the Corporation demolished the unauthorized structures raised by the respondents on 22.04.1998.

(e) On 08.01.2002, the Corporation issued another notice under Section 314 of MMC Act being KW/1138/AEM/OD directing the respondents to demolish the reconstructed structure on the very site which was demolished by the Corporation earlier on 22.04.1998. The respondents replied to the above notice through their advocate stating that the said notice was illegal and bad in law.

7) If the appellant wants to keep the site open, in public interest, we are of the view that they are bound to comply with the direction No.2 in the impugned judgment. For compliance of the above direction of the High Court, the appellant is granted six months time from today failing which the respondents are free to execute the modified judgment of the High Court at once. We are constrained to arrive at such a conclusion only because of the inaction on the part of the officers of the appellant-Corporation before the Courts below.

8) In the light of the above discussion, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Inasmuch as the first respondent i.e. Mr. Thomas Mathew, who is fighting the case on behalf of all the respondents by appearing in person in this Court, we award a cost of Rs. 25,000/- to him payable by the appellant-Municipal Corporation within a period of eight weeks from today.

APRIL 9, 2012.
Ram Dhan vs State Of U.P.& Anr

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition are that present petitioner Ram Dhan lodged an FIR dated 4.6.1995 alleging that his son Dinesh had disappeared and, subsequently, filed a complaint against Balraj alias Billu and others (respondents) under Section 364 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called IPC). The investigating agency concluded the investigation and filed a chargesheet on the basis of which trial commenced against the respondents Balraj etc. and the trial Court vide judgment and order dated 11.5.2005 convicted the respondent No.2 Balraj and others for the offences punishable under Section 364 read with Section 149 IPC and awarded sentence of 9 years rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs.5,000/-.

3. Being aggrieved, Balraj, respondent No.2 and others preferred an appeal before the High Court of Allahabad which was admitted and the respondent No.2 and other convicts were granted bail by the High Court. The petitioner’s son for whose kidnapping Balraj, respondent No.2 and others had been convicted, came back home and disclosed to the public as well as to the police that he had not been kidnapped rather had voluntarily gone to Punjab, where he worked for several years. Balraj, respondent No.2 realised that he had been wrongly enroped and convicted in the offence by the petitioner. Thus, he filed an FIR on 29.8.2009 under Sections 177, 181, 182, 195 and 420 IPC. After investigating the case, chargesheet was filed against the petitioner and others under Sections 177, 181, 182 and 195 IPC on 23.11.2009.

4. The petitioner filed an application under Section 239 Cr.P.C. before the Chief Judicial Magistrate contending that the FIR at the behest of the respondent No.2, Balraj was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 195 read with Section 340 Cr.P.C. The Chief Judicial Magistrate rejected the said application vide order dated 3.9.2011. The petitioner challenged the said order dated 3.9.2011 by filing a criminal revision before the High Court which has been dismissed vide impugned order dated 14.11.2011. Hence, this petition.

The petitioner is guilty of suppressing the material fact. Admittedly, filing of successive petition before the court amounts to abuse of the process of the court. Thus, we are not inclined to examine the issue any further.

Considering the composite nature of the offences, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned order.

The petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

April 10, 2012