L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Balwant Vithal Kadam vs Sunil Baburaoi Kadam

2. In order to appreciate the controversy, which lies in a narrow compass, few relevant facts need mention hereinbelow.

5. The sale consideration was fixed at Rs.10,000/-. The respondent had paid Rs.3,000/- by way of earnest money to the appellants. The sale deed was to be executed within 6 months. Since the dispute arose between the parties and no sale deed was executed, the respondent filed a suit to seek specific performance of the said agreement against the appellants in relation to the suit land.

6. The appellants contested the suit by filing their written statement. Parties adduced evidence. The Trial Court, by judgment/decree dated 29.11.1995 in R.C.S. No.265/1989, dismissed the suit.

8. Felt aggrieved, the appellants (defendants) filed second appeal in the High Court of Bombay being S.A. No. 426/2004. By impugned judgment/decree, the High Court dismissed the defendants’ second appeal, which has given rise to filing of the present appeal by way of special leave in this Court by the defendants.

23. This Court being the last Court of appeal does not, therefore, consider it proper to allow the appellant to raise such plea, for the first time, under Article 136 of the Constitution in this appeal.

27. As a result, the appeal is found to be devoid of any merit and thus it fails and is accordingly dismissed.

December 05, 2017 11
H.N. Jagannath vs State Of Karnataka

5. However, respondent no. 4 filed another suit for permanent injunction against BDA for protecting its alleged possession, before 13th Additional City Civil Court, Bangalore in O.S. No. 3551 of 1989. In the said suit also, the order of temporary injunction was granted on 10.07.1989 in favour of respondent 5 no. 4 herein. However, the Trial Court by its order dated 08.03.1990 modified the order of temporary injunction earlier granted, on an application filed by BDA and confined the order of injunction only to existing structures. The civil court while modifying the order of temporary injunction as mentioned above has noted in paragraph 6 of its order that BDA has acquired the property and has taken the possession of the property. It is also observed that the title vests with BDA.

When the facts stood thus, respondent no. 4 filed writ petition no. 17040 of 1991 (after a delay of 10 years from the date of the final declaration) challenging the preliminary and final acquisition notifications. The learned Single Judge by his order dated 28.08.1991 dismissed the said writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. Against such dismissal, the respondent no. 4 filed writ appeal no. 2798 of 1991 before the Division Bench of the High Court, which also came to be dismissed on 25.11.1991.

Respondent no. 4 did not stop at that stage. It approached the High Court once again by filing writ petition no. 31007 of 1992 praying for a direction to the State Government to consider its representation for de-notification and for re-conveyance of the land. The High Court by its order dated 09.12.1992 disposed of 6 the writ petition with the observation that the government will hear and dispose of the representation of respondent no. 4 herein in accordance with law. The State Government by its order dated 15.02.1993 rejected the representation of respondent no. 4. Challenging such order of dismissal by the State Government, respondent no. 4 filed writ petition no. 33996 of 1993 which also came to be dismissed on 09.02.1996. Respondent no. 4 in the meanwhile had approached the High Court of Karnataka by filing writ petition 25719 of 1994 praying for a direction against BDA not to form the road in the land in dispute. The said writ petition came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 02.07.1996.

6. In the meanwhile, the State Government by its order dated 17.11.1994 had permitted respondent no. 4 to run a school situated on the land in question. However, the government by its order dated 29.04.1997 modified its earlier order dated 17.11.1994. Thereafter respondent no. 4 filed yet another writ petition (5th writ petition before the High Court) being writ petition no. 1071 of 1998 to implement the government order dated 17.11.1994. On being objected to by BDA, the petition came to be dismissed on 05.10.1999.
Canara Bank vs Lalit Popli

2. Brief facts leading to this appeal are:

3. The respondent preferred Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2269 of 1995 challenging the order of dismissal, which came to be allowed by learned Single Judge of the High Court vide his order dated 7 th August, 1998 and the order of dismissal was set aside. The appellant – Bank filed an appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court being LPA No. 465 of 1998. During the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court, it was decided by the bank to withhold an amount of Rs.74,180.09, payable to the respondent, which included the gratuity and provident fund(employer’s contribution) and to keep the same in a fixed deposit with a view to adjust the said amount towards any loss caused to the bank by the respondent. LPA No. 465 of 1998, after hearing, was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court and the order of dismissal was restored. Further appeal by the respondent was dismissed by this Court by a detailed judgment on 18.02.2003 (reported as Lalit Popli vs. Canara Bank, (2003) 3 SCC

8. Rule 3(4) of Chapter VIII of the General Conduct Rules states that “an employee who is dismissed for misconduct shall not be entitled to gratuity”.

9. Thus, in our considered opinion, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the decision of the bank to recover the 9 amount of loss sustained by it from the respondent, particularly when the bank is empowered to do so, as discussed supra. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in LPA No. 553/2008 dated 12.09.2008 dismissing the appeal filed by the bank, as also, by the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowing Writ Petition(C) No.6149 of 2003 dated 30.05.2008 filed by the respondent are set aside and the Writ Petition(C) No. 6149 of 2003 filed by the respondent stands dismissed and it is held that the bank has rightly recovered the loss of Rs.1,07,000/- sustained by it from the respondent. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
Nasiruddin vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh Secretary

2) In order to appreciate the short issue arising in this bunch of appeals, it is necessary to set out few relevant facts hereinbelow.

6) So far as the connecting appeals are concerned, they pertain to other cities of U.P. but relate to the same aforementioned activities. The appellants participated in the public auction held by the Corporation. Their bids were finally accepted.

9) The Corporation, vide their letter (Annexure P-8), requested the appellants to deposit the requisite stamp duty payable under the Stamp Act whereas the Collector of Stamps requested the appellants to pay stamp duty @ Rs.70/- per thousand on the contract amount treating the contract as Lease.

21) As mentioned above, the Corporation in these cases awarded the contract to the appellants to recover the tolls (fees) from squatters, vendors, kiosks etc. and for parking the vehicles in specified places. The contract was, therefore, for recovery of tolls and created rights and liabilities in favour of contracting parties qua each other. It cannot be disputed that the expression “tolls of any description” in clause (c) would include all kinds of levy, charges, fees etc. which the Corporation is entitled to charge under its Bye-laws (41). A fortiori, the fees in question would also fall under Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act.

28) In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals are found to be devoid of any merit. They are accordingly dismissed.

December 06, 2017 16
Aftaruddin(Dead) Rep. Thr. Lrs. vs Ramkrishna Datta Alias Babul Datta

3. The suit was contested by Aftaruddin and two contentions were raised: (i) that the sale deed was never executed by him and (ii) that being an under-raiyat he could not transfer his rights to any person in view of the bar created by Section 108 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (for short the ‘TLR&LR Act’). The original sale deed was not produced on the ground that the same was destroyed in fire but a certified copy of the same was produced. The trial court held that though the sale deed had been executed, Aftaruddin could not have transferred his rights in the suit land and, therefore, dismissed the suit. The First Appeal filed was also dismissed. In the Second Appeal this concurrent finding of fact was set aside on the ground that it was a perverse finding. It was held by the High Court that in the sale deed Aftaruddin has represented himself to be a raiyat and not an under-raiyat and, therefore, Section 108 of TLR&LR Act had no application. The High Court also found that in terms of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act the subsequent vendee could not be denied their rights.

8. We are clearly of the view that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the concurrent finding of fact without any question of law much less a substantial question of law arising in the second appeal. Accordingly the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the trial court is restored. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
Barun Chandra Thakur vs Central Bureau Of Investigation

3) Brief facts:

(a) On 08.09.2017, the appellant herein dropped his son Pradyumn Thakur, aged 7 years, and his daughter, Vidhi Thakur to their School, viz., Ryan International School, Bhondsi at 8:00 a.m. At 08:10 a.m., the appellant received a phone call of his wife who asked him to immediately call Ms. Anju Dudeja of the said School. When the appellant contacted Ms. Anju Dudeja, she told him that his son had a cut on his neck and is profusely bleeding. She asked him to reach Badshahpur Hospital where he was being taken. The appellant, along with his wife, left for Badshahpur Hospital but on the way he received a call from Ms. Anju Dudeja that they were taking the child to Artemis Hospital. On reaching there, the appellant found that there was a cut on the right side of his son’s neck up to the ear and his son was in Emergency Ward. The Doctor informed the appellant that his son Pradyumn had died.

(b) On receipt of the information, the police recorded a First Information Report (FIR) being No. 250 of 2017 dated 2 08.09.2017 at Police Station Bhondsi, Gurugram and arrested one Ashok Kumar, son of Amichand, on the same day. The State Government (Haryana), issued a Notification dated 17.09.2017, requesting the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to take up the investigation. The Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension (Department of Personnel and Training) Government of India, New Delhi, vide Notification dated 22.09.2017, transferred the investigation of the case to the CBI which re-registered the FIR already registered by the police authorities as case bearing No. RC8(S)/2017/SC-III/New Delhi on 22.09.2017 itself which is a reproduction of the FIR recorded by the police authorities at Police Station Bhondsi, Gurugram.

Similar pleas have also been raised in the reply filed in petition CRM-M-35002-2017.

The appeal is dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.

DECEMBER 11, 2017.
Sudama Singh vs Deepak Mohan Spolia

3. Short facts: Four writ petitions were filed as public interest litigations before the High Court (W.P. No.8904 and connected matters). The prayer in the writ petitions were more or less the same. We shall extract one set of prayers:

63. With the above directions, these petitions are allowed.

8. Be that as it may, since the judgment was not complied with in its letter and spirit, the writ petitioners approached the High Court invoking its contempt jurisdiction.

12. The respondents are directed to implement the judgment in the light of the clarification we have given in this judgment. The needful be done within a period of three months from today. 7

13. The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above.

14. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

15. There shall be no orders as to costs.

DECEMBER 12, 2017.
Prem Giri vs The State Of Rajasthan

3) Facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. They, however, need mention infra to appreciate the short issue involved in the case.

12) In such a situation arising in this case, we instead of considering the case of the appellant on its merits in this appeal consider just and proper to remand the case to the High Court for deciding the bail application afresh on its merits and in accordance with law.

13) We, however, make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case of the appellant having 6 formed an opinion to remand the case to the High Court for deciding the bail application afresh on merits and, therefore, the High Court would decide the bail application un-influenced by any of our observations on merits except to take into account what we have said about the manner in which the bail application is required to be decided.

14) In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order is set aside and the case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the bail application of the appellant afresh on its merits.

……..................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] New Delhi;

December 14, 2017 7
M/S Sam Built Well Pvt. Ltd. vs Deepak Builders

2. The present appeal involves a notice inviting tenders (NIT) dated 16th March, 2017 by which the director of the Institute of Nano Science and Technology, Mohali, invited percentage rate composite bids from eligible firms/contractors in a two bid system for construction of the Institute of Nano 1 Science and Technology Campus at Knowledge City, Sector 81, Mohali, consisting of research, academic and administrative buildings together with hostel, residential, amenity and utility buildings. The estimated cost of the said project was Rs.162.18 crores, with earnest money payable being Rs.1.72 crores. The period of completion was stated to be 20 months and the last date for submission of tender was 10 th April, 2017. Clause 8 of the said NIT is important and states as under:

11. We have already noticed that three expert committees have scrutinized Respondent No.1’s tender and found Respondent No.1 to be ineligible. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court expressly states that no malafides are involved in the present case. Equally, while setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench does not state that the three expert committees have arrived at a perverse conclusion. To merely set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and then jump to the conclusion that Respondent No.1’s tender was clearly eligible, would be directly contrary to the judgments aforestated. Not having found malafides or perversity in the technical expert reports, the principle of judicial restraint kicks in, and any appreciation by the Court itself of technical evaluation, best left to technical experts, would be outside its ken. As a result, we find that the learned Single Judge was correct in his reliance on 12 the three expert committee reports. The Division Bench, in setting aside the aforesaid judgment, has clearly gone outside the bounds of judicial review. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restore that of the learned Single Judge.

12. Dr. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the Appellant, has stated that the Appellant is willing to match the offer of Respondent No.1. We record the aforesaid statement and order that the tender awarded to Respondent No.1 dated 20th August, 2017, based upon the Division Bench judgment, must be set aside, and the award of the tender to the Appellant must be restored. We hasten to add that it will be open to Respondent No.2 to accept Dr. Singhvi’s offer that the project will be executed at the amount indicated by Respondent No.1. 13

13. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.

December 14, 2017.
A.V.G.V. Ramu vs A.S.R. Bharathi

3. Facts of the case lie in a narrow compass so also the issue involved in the appeal is very short. It would be clear from the narration of the facts infra.

4. The appellant is the husband whereas the respondent is the wife. Both have married second time. The husband has one daughter aged around 7 years from his first marriage whereas the respondent has no issue from the first marriage or the second one. The marriage in question took place on 11.08.2013.

7. Pursuant thereto both, the appellant and respondent, filed an application under Section 13-B of the Act before the Family Court at Hyderabad on 31.12.2014 being O.P.No. 9/2015. Thereafter the case was adjourned for 06.07.2015, 07.07.2015 and 12.09.2015. The respondent, however, did not appear on any of these dates. The Family Judge, however, on 14.09.2015 took up the case on expiry of six months’ cooling period and finding that the respondent did not appear in the proceedings dismissed the application.

8. The appellant felt aggrieved and filed appeal under Section 28 of the Act in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh out of which this appeal arises. In the said appeal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent (wife) stated that her client (wife) does not give consent for dissolution of marriage. The High Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal by impugned judgment, which has given rise to filing of this appeal by way of special leave in this Court by the husband.

12. In a situation like the one arising in the case, there is no reason for us to doubt the genuineness of the Agreement/MOU and its contents. Keeping in view the conduct of the respondent and further in the light of eight reasons set out above, we find this case to be fit one where we invoke our powers under Article 142 for passing a decree for dissolution of marriage between the parties in terms of the joint petition dated 30.12.2014 (Annexure -P-8).

13. It is for all these reasons, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Impugned judgment is set aside. As a consequence, the joint petition (O.P. No.9 of 2015) filed by the appellant and the respondent under Section 13-B of the Act in the Family Court (City Civil Court) at Hyderabad is allowed. 7

14. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent performed on 11.08.2013 is accordingly dissolved by decree of divorce.

December 14, 2017 8
Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd. vs Kamat Hotels (India) Ltd .

1. After hearing the matter elaborately we arrive at the conclusion that the Special Leave Petition ought not to be entertained. However, in view of the extensive arguments at the Bar we deem it appropriate to support our aforesaid conclusion with the reasons therefor. 2

2. The brief facts are as follows:

4. It may be necessary to notice at this stage that the respondent No.1 had got its trademark 'Orchid' registered in class 42 sometime in the year 2007.

7. The IPAB, in appeal, reversed the aforesaid conclusion of the Deputy Registrar primarily on the ground that the petitioner-company had been incorporated as 'Royal Orchid Hotels Limited' after effecting a change of its name in the year 1997 pursuant to the company's resolution dated 30.09.1996 which is prior in point of time to the use of the mark of the respondent no.1.

15. If the High Court on an elaborate consideration of the materials and evidence adduced by the parties before it had thought it proper to reach a conclusion consistent with the findings of the primary authority i.e. the Deputy Registrar and the reasons for reversal of the view of the primary authority by the IPAB being summary, as noticed, the present petition really turns on the question of appreciation of the evidence on record. Having considered the matter we are of the view that the conclusions reached by the High Court cannot be said to be, in anyway, unreasonable and/or unacceptable. Rather, we are inclined to hold that the view recorded by the High Court is a perfectly possible and justified view of the matter and the conclusion(s) reached can reasonably flow from a balanced consideration of the evidence and materials on record. We will, therefore, not 10 consider the present to be a fit case for interference with the order of the High Court. Accordingly, we dismiss the Special Leave Petition and refuse leave to appeal.

(R. BANUMATHI) NEW DELHI DECEMBER 14, 2017
Macquarie Bank Limited vs Shilpi Cable Technologies Ltd

2. The facts contained in the three appeals are similar. For the purpose of this judgment, the facts contained in Civil Appeal No.15481 of 2017 will now be set out. Hamera International Private Limited executed an agreement with the appellant, Macquarie Bank Limited, Singapore, on 27.7.2015, by which the appellant purchased the original supplier’s right, title and interest in a supply agreement in favour of the respondent. The respondent entered into an agreement dated 2.12.2015 for supply of goods worth US$6,321,337.11 in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the said sales contract. The supplier issued two invoices dated 21.12.2015 and 31.12.2015. Payment terms under the said invoices were 150 days from the date of bill of ladings dated 17.12.2015/19.12.2015. Since amounts under the said bills of lading were due for payment, the appellant sent an email dated 3.5.2016 to the contesting 2 respondent for payment of the outstanding amounts. Several such emails by way of reminders were sent, and it is alleged that the contesting respondent stated that it will sort out pending matters. Ultimately, the appellant issued a statutory notice under Sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956. A reply dated 5.10.2016 denied the fact that there was any outstanding amount.

3. After the enactment of the Code, the appellant issued a demand notice under Section 8 of the Code on 14.2.2017 at the registered office of the contesting respondent, calling upon it to pay the outstanding amount of US$6,321,337.11. By a reply dated 22.2.2017, the contesting respondent stated that nothing was owed by them to the appellant. They further went on to question the validity of the purchase agreement dated 27.7.2015 in favour of the appellant. On 7.3.2017, the appellant initiated the insolvency proceedings by filing a petition under Section 9 of the Code. On 1.6.2017, the NCLT rejected the petition holding that Section 9(3)(c) of the Code was not 3 complied with, inasmuch as no certificate, as required by the said provision, accompanied the application filed under Section

(2) The corporate debtor shall, within a period of ten days of the receipt of the demand notice or copy of the invoice mentioned in sub-section (1) bring to the notice of the operational creditor—

(5) The Adjudicating Authority shall, within fourteen days of the receipt of the application under sub-section (2), by an order—

(b) a copy of an invoice attached with a notice in Form 4.

FORM 3 (See clause (a) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5) 18 FORM OF DEMAND NOTICE / INVOICE DEMANDING PAYMENT UNDER THE INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE, 2016 (Under rule 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016) [Date] To, [Name and address of the registered office of the corporate debtor] From, [Name and address of the registered office of the operational creditor] Subject: Demand notice/invoice demanding payment in respect of unpaid operational debt due from [corporate debtor] under the Code. Madam/Sir,

xxx xxx xxx

434. COMPANY WHEN DEEMED UNABLE TO PAY ITS DEBTS-

December 15, 2017.