L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Honda Siel Cars India Ltd vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, Ghaziabad

2) M/s. Honda Motors Company Limited, Japan (hereinafter referred to as “HMCL, Japan”) had entered into a joint venture dated September 12, 1995 with M/s. SEIL Ltd., a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. After getting necessary approval from the Government of India, a joint venture company in the name of the assessee was incorporated. After incorporation of the assessee as a joint venture, An agreement dated May 21, 1996 between HMCL, Japan and the assessee was entered into, known as ‘Technical Collaboration Agreement’ (for short, ‘TCA’). As per the TCA, HMCL, Japan which is engaged in the business of development, manufacture and sale of automobiles and their parts agreed to give ‘license’ and ‘technical assistance’ to the assessee. The TCA also stipulated different kinds of technical know-how and technical information which were to be provided by HMCL, Japan (as a licensor) to the assessee (as a licensee). For providing the aforesaid facilities, it was Civil Appeal No. 4918 of 2017 & Ors.

4) The assessee had filed its first return for the Assessment Year 1999-2000 (in which year, first installment was paid) showing the said expenditure as revenue expenditure. Though, in the normal assessment, the expenditure was allowed as such, thereafter a notice was issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) stating that said expenditure was capital in nature and, therefore, instalment towards royalty paid in the sum of Rs. 79602000/-, by the assessee to HMCL, Japan in that year had escaped assessment. Ultimately, orders were passed treating the same as capital expenditure. In the subsequent years, the Assessing Officer again treated the royalty Civil Appeal No. 4918 of 2017 & Ors.

5) With the aforesaid preliminary remarks about the nature of controversy, we now proceed to take note of the facts in some detail.

9. Thereafter, M/s. HMCL, Japan who held about 99% share of joint venture company/subsidiary company, i.e., Assessee, entered into an agreement on 21.5.1996 with HSCIL/Assessee which is called as “Technical Collaboration Agreement”. Agreement stipulated and termed HMCL, Japan as “licensor” and HSCIL/Assessee as licensee.”

The aforesaid distinction between the two Agreements has made all the difference in the results. As a consequence, we find no merit in these appeals which are dismissed with cost.

JUNE 09, 2017 Civil Appeal No. 4918 of 2017 & Ors.

Date : 09/06/2017 These appeals were called on for judgment today.

For Petitioner(s) Ms.Manasvini Bajpai, Adv.

Mr. R.Chandrachud, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Ms.Sadhna Sandhu, Adv.

Ms.Nivedita Nair, Adv.

Ms.Gargi Khanna, Adv.

Mr.Natkarni Nisha Bagchi, Adv.

Ms.Anil Katiyar, Adv.

Ms.Sangita Rai, Adv.

Hon'ble Mr.Justice A.K.Sikri pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr.Justice Ashok Bhushan.

The appeals are dismissed with cost in terms of the signed judgment.

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file) Civil Appeal No. 4918 of 2017 & Ors.

Civil Appeal No. 4918 of 2017 & Ors.
Allokam Peddabbayya vs Allahabad Bank .

6. Sri Kailash Vasudev, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the auction purchaser, Defendant No.2, submitted that the sale in its favour stood concluded, sale certificate issued along with possession delivered, long before the Suit for redemption was filed. There existed no mortgage to be redeemed on the date of institution of the Suit. Referring to the proviso to Section 60, it was submitted that the right of redemption stood extinguished by reason of the Decree in O.S. No.68 of 1987 and the consequent sale certificate. Reliance was placed on Mrutunjay Pani & Anr. v. Narmada Bala Sasmal & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 1353, Mhadagonda Ramgonda Patil (supra) and B. Arvind Kumar v. Government of India & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 745. Despite being aware of 5 the mortgage and auction sale, the Plaintiffs did not take steps for redemption of the mortgage and offer to deposit the mortgage money at the first instance. O.S. No.165 of 1994 was filed seeking permanent injunction only, without even impleading the Bank as Defendant or questioning the auction sale much less the sale certificate. The Suit was not filed bonafide. The sale deed of the Plaintiffs did not mention the existing mortgage, despite their being aware of the same. Under Order XXXIV CPC, the mortgagor can offer to pay at any time but before confirmation of sale. The sale having been confirmed before institution of the Suit for redemption, no right of redemption of the mortgage survived. Reliance upon Order XXXIV CPC or Section 60 read with Section 91 of the Act, in the facts of the case, is misconceived. Reliance was placed on Pawan Kumar v. Jagdeo, AIR 1947 Nagpur 210. The auction purchaser has been in physical possession of the Suit property since 02.07.1997. The concurrent findings of two Courts, therefore, call for no interference.

15. The issues regarding maintainability of a second suit for redemption or clog on the equity of redemption are not relevant to the present controversy and need not be deliberated upon. Shivdev Singh (supra), therefore, has no relevance in the present context.

and, in that event, the mortgagor cannot sue for redemption without getting the sale set aside..."

24. We find no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court. The appeals thus stand dismissed.

………………………………….J. (Ranjan Gogoi) ……….………………………..J. (Navin Sinha) New Delhi, June 19, 2017 1 ITEM NO.1 COURT NO.2 SECTION XIIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2763-2764 OF 2008 ALLOKAM PEDDABBAYYA AND ANR. APPELLANT (S) VERSUS ALLAHABAD BANK AND ORS. RESPONDENT(S) Date : 19/06/2017 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of judgment today.

For parties:
Alka Chandewar vs Shamshul Ishrar Khan

The present appeal arises from the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 27th October, 2015, in which the High Court has construed Section 27(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) in a somewhat restrictive manner. The facts necessary to appreciate the point involved in this appeal are that on 7th October, 2010, the sole Arbitrator appointed by the parties passed an interim order under Section 17 of the said Act, in which it was mentioned that no further flats were to be disposed of without the leave of the Arbitral Tribunal. In breach of this order, it is alleged that on 14th October, 2010 the respondent in fact 2 transferred five such flats. By the order passed on 22 nd March, 2012, it was held by the learned Arbitrator that the order of 7th October, 2010 had, in fact, been breached by the respondent and certain other interim directions were made by the aforesaid order. Ultimately, by an order dated 5th May, 2014, the learned Arbitrator referred the aforesaid contempt of the order dated 7th October, 2010 to the High Court to pass necessary orders thereon under Section 27(5) of the Act.

(2) the application shall specify-

49. The Commission believes that while it is important to provide teeth to the interim orders of the arbitral tribunal as well as to provide for their enforcement, the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Sri Krishan v. Anand is not a complete solution. The Commission has, therefore, recommended amendments to section 17 of the Act which would give teeth to the orders of the Arbitral Tribunal and the same would be statutorily enforceable in the same manner as the Orders of a Court. In this respect, the views of the Commission are consistent with (though do not go as far as) the 2006 amendments to Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.

Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court. The matter is remanded to decide the alleged contempt on facts. It would be open for the respondent to argue before the High Court that he has, on the facts of the case, not committed any contempt.
Manager, Corporate Educational Agency vs James Mathew

1. The appellants-minority educational institutions chose to appoint a teacher of their choice belonging Digitally signed by JAYANT KUMAR ARORA Date: 2017.12.22 to their respective community to the post of 11:07:32 IST Reason: Headmaster, ignoring the available senior teachers from the same community. The High Court interfered 2 and thus aggrieved, the appeals.

The declaration is only an open acceptance of a legal character which should necessarily have existed antecedent to such declaration. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the contention that the school can claim protection only after the 8 Government declared it as a minority school on 2-8-1994.”

“11. Functions of Commission -

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Commission shall -

(b) enquire, suo motu or on a petition presented to it by any by any minority educational institution or any person on its behalf into complaints regarding deprivation or violation of rights of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice and any dispute relating to affiliation to a University and report its finding to the appropriate Government for its implementation;

(e) specify measures to promote and preserve the minority status and character of institutions of their choice established by minorities;

(g) make recommendations to the appropriate Government for the effective implementation of programmes and schemes relating to the Minority Educational Institutions; and

11. Therefore, on all counts, the legal position is wholly covered in favour of the appellants. The impugned Judgment of the High Court is, hence, set aside and the appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

July 11, 2017.

Date : 11-07-2017 These appeals were called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KURIAN JOSEPH HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI For Appellant(s) Mr. Romy Chacko, AOR Mr. Subham Singh, Adv.

Mr. Varun Mudgal, Adv.

Mr. E. M. S. Anam, AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. Prasanth P., Adv.

Mr. C. K. Sasi, AOR Ms. Venkita Subramoniam T.R, AOR Mr. Rahat Bansal, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable Judgment. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(JAYANT KUMAR ARORA) (RENU DIWAN) COURT MASTER ASSISTANT REGISTRAR (Signed reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
Ram Murti Devi vs Pushpa Devi

3. The brief facts of the case, giving rise to this appeal are:

4. Appellant­plaintiff had filed various documentary 3 evidence and in oral evidence Ram Murthi Devi PW.1, PW.2 Vineet Kumar, Pratap Singh PW.3 and Zalim Singh PW.4 were examined. On behalf of the defendants­tenants certain documentary evidence were filed and Kishan Kumar appeared as DW.1 and Dilip Kumar appeared as DW.2. Trial Court framed several issues. Issue No. 4 was with regard to sub­tenancy, which was to the following effect:

... ... ... ... ...”

39. The above reason was also a valid consideration on which Trial Court based its decision. We are of the view that judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside and that the judgment of Judge Small Causes Court dated 21.2.2013 is to be restored.

41. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 26342/2013 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 08-04-2013 in CR No. 134/2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad) RAM MURTI DEVI Petitioner(s) VERSUS PUSHPA DEVI & ORS. Respondent(s) Date : 11-07-2017 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
P.N. Mohanan Nair vs State Of Kerala

2. The substantive appeals against convictions were dismissed as withdrawn on 09.12.2016. Liberty was however granted, to approach this court again if required. On the application made, the special leave petition was resurrected. 1

8. We have considered the respective submissions, and are of the opinion, that essentially the allegations constituted a single transaction, between the same parties for a block period, split up by the prosecution, presumably for its convenience, into three different cases. The evidence also was 4 common, and so is the conviction. Section 427(1), Cr.P.C. stipulates that where a person undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment, it shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment previously sentenced, unless the court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. The jurisdiction being discretionary must be exercised on fair and just principles in the facts of a case.

9. We do not consider it necessary to further elucidate or enter into an exposition of the law, in view of the precedents noticed above. Suffice it to observe that in the facts of the case, the exercise of discretion under Section 427(1) Code of Criminal Procedure, mandates that the substantive sentences imposed upon the appellant in the three separate prosecutions, are directed to run concurrently, except the default sentence, if the fine by way of compensation as imposed has not been paid by him. 5 The appellant would naturally be entitled to all consequential reliefs for release from custody as available in law based on the present discussion.

10. The appeals stand disposed.

………………………………….J. (Ranjan Gogoi) ……….………………………..J. (Navin Sinha) New Delhi, July 11, 2017 6 ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.4 SECTION II-B (For Judgment) S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS PETITIONS FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRL.)NOS.2034-2036/2016 ARISING OUT OF IMPUGNED FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 13/11/2015 IN CRLA NOS. 980/2005, 981/2005 AND 982/2005 PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM) P.N. MOHANAN NAIR Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF KERALA Respondent(s) Date : 11-07-2017 These appeals were called for pronouncement of judgment today.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Gogoi and His Lordship.

Leave granted.

The appeals stand disposed in terms of the signed judgment.

Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

(Signed non-reportable judgment is placed on the file.) 7
B.A. Naik Since Deceased By His Lrs vs The State Of Karnataka The Special Land ...

3. The issue pertains to the land acquisition. The appellants were awarded the compensation at the rate of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) per acre with statutory benefits. Though they attempted a review, it was dismissed.

6. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed, directing that the appellants herein shall be entitled to the land value fixed at the rate of Rs. 6.5 Lakhs per acre along with statutory benefits (including interest). However, we make it clear that the appellants shall not be entitled to any statutory benefits in respect of the period of delay, either before this Court or before the High Court, either in appeal or in review.

No costs.

July 11, 2017.
Pravind Kumar vs Radhe Ballabh Mishra

3. We have been told that during the pendency of this matter before this Court, the parties have reached an amicable settlement of the whole dispute for an amount of Rs. 4.5 Lakhs. The said amount was deposited before this Court and the same was directed to be withdrawn by the first respondent along with accrued interest. The amount covered by the cheque was only Rs. 3 Lakhs. The first respondent herein was paid the litigation expenses to the tune of Rs.25,000/-.

5. Accordingly, we direct the Judicial Magistrate I Class, Pupri at Sitamarhi Dist., Bihar, to release an amount of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) to the first respondent and the balance, along with interest, if any, on the whole amount may be released to the appellant. The court shall do the needful regarding the release of the amount within a period of one month from today.

7. Therefore, this appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence are set aside and the 3 complaint filed by the respondent before the learned Magistrate is dismissed.

July 12, 2017.
Laldhari Mistri(Dead) Thr. Lrs. vs Vijay Kumar

2) The appellant before us, having knocked at the doors of the Court, has been turned away by not less than three Courts. In that it was stated that he had both been deemed to be served with the summons in the suit as well as the fact that from the date of knowledge of the ex-parte decree, had filed the application to set it aside a year and a half later.

4) The dispute in the present case relates to a residential house situated in Munger, District Bihar. One Hira Mistry, father of the original appellant No.1 and grandfather of the appellant No.2, was the owner of the said house, which was let out to one Surendra Narayan Sinha. Eviction proceedings were 2 instituted by the said Hira Mistry against the said tenant in which eviction was ordered on 21.12.1979; then reversed in first appeal on 24.02.1986; and again reversed in second appeal on 02.04.1992.

6) At this point, the facts get a little curious. There is alleged to be an agreement to sell between Hira Mistry, the landlord and one Vijay Kumar on 17.02.1983 at a point when eviction had already been ordered against the tenant. This agreement to sell became the subject-matter of a specific performance suit filed in the year 1986 which resulted in the ex-parte decree aforesaid of 09.06.1987.

5) We have been informed at the Bar that a Special Leave Petition has also been preferred from the second appellate judgment and decree which has been dismissed. This is as far as one set of proceedings is concerned.

7) It is difficult to fault the trial Court and the Appellate Court when they dismissed the application under Order IX Rule 13. Both the grounds given cannot be said to be perverse. However, the facts of the present case are such that it has become necessary for us, in order to do complete justice, to set aside the three orders against the appellant.

10) Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice, we set aside the orders dated 11.12.2001 passed by the trial Court, 29.05.2004 4 by the Appellate Court and the impugned order dated 31.08.2005 passed by the High Court, all of which result in our setting aside the ex-parte decree dated 09.06.1987, and direct that Suit No. 14 of 1986 be set down for hearing on merits.

11) Since the suit is pending for a long time before the Sub-Judge, Munger, we direct that the said suit be heard and disposed of within a period of one year from today.

12) The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

(SANJAY KISHAN KAUL) New Delhi;

July 13, 2017.
Firdaus vs Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. .

3. Reason: On 01st September, 2003, Parvez Khan, the husband of appellant was driving the vehicle No.HR-2 G 1875 while going to Rampur from 2 Hapur. The vehicle was hit by a truck bearing No.UP 22 C-9714 coming from the opposite side and due to the accident, Parvez Khan died on the spot. Abdul Khalid, the father of deceased filed a claim for compensation before the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation, claiming an amount of Rs.4,50,000/-(Rupees Four Lakhs Fifty Thousand Only) with 12% interest and also demanded 50% of that as penalty. Respondent nos.2 and 3 to the appeal were impleaded as defendant nos.1 and 2. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. was impleaded as third defendant whereas Mohd. Anis was impleaded as fourth respondent-defendant. It was pleaded in the claim that Parvez Khan was an employee under the employment of defendant no.1, 2 and 4, who was getting Rs.4,000/- (Rupees Four Thousand Only) as salary per month. All the defendants filed their counter affidavits. The case of defendant no.1 was that the vehicle No.HR-2 G 1875 was owned by defendant no.1 which he had sold out to defendant no.4.

5. The Workmen Compensation Commissioner allowed the claim, awarding a sum of Rs.4,27,148/- (Rupees Four Lakhs Twenty Seven Thousand One Hundred and Forty Eight Only) as compensation along with 12% interest per annum, aggrieved against which, the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. filed the first appeal in the High court. 3

(c) Parvez Khan died on 01.09.2003 as result of injuries inflicted from the accident. Parvez Khan was 26 years of age and was receiving a salary of Rs.4,000/- (Rupees Four Thousand Only) per month.

7. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that whenever a vehicle which is covered by the insurance policy is transferred to a transferee, the liability of insurer does not cease so far as the third party/victim is concerned, even if the owner or purchaser does not give any intimation as required under the provisions of the Act.

17. We are thus of the opinion that the High court committed an error in setting aside the order of Workmen Compensation Commissioner. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High court dated 12.12.2014 is set aside, and that of Workmen Compensation Commissioner awarding compensation of sum 10 of Rs.4,27,148/- (Rupees Four Lakhs Twenty Seven Thousand One Hundred and Forty Eight Only) with interest @ 12 % per annum from the date of accident is restored.

18. The Workmen Compensation Commissioner shall take steps for ensuring payment of the compensation to the claimants.

JULY 14,2017.
The State Of Odisha vs Bibhisan Kanhar

2. The Revenue Divisional Commissioner requested the Employment Officer of the Employment Exchange, Cuttack to sponsor five candidates belonging to the Schedule Tribe community and five from unreserved category for selection and appointment to the posts of Farash and Peon. On the 1 basis of a caste certificate filed by the Respondent in the Employment Exchange, he was sponsored as a candidate belonging to a Schedule Tribe community (Kandha). The Respondent was appointed as a Farash in the office of the Second Respondent. As there was a doubt raised about the Respondent belonging to a Schedule Tribe, proceedings were initiated before the State Level Scrutiny Committee for verification of his caste certificate. He was also placed under suspension. After a detailed enquiry, the State Level Scrutiny Committee found that the Respondent did not belong to the “Kandha” tribe. His caste was “Pano”, which is a Schedule Caste in the State of Orissa. The State Level Scrutiny Committee directed cancellation of the caste certificate issued in favour of the Respondent and also recommended initiation of criminal prosecution against him. The Committee further requested the disciplinary authority to take appropriate action against the Respondent for removal from service. After issuance of a show cause notice, the Respondent was removed from service by the Second Appellant.

c) Though he was appointed in a post not reserved for Schedule Tribes, he would not have been in the zone of consideration if he did not produce the certificate showing that he belongs to Schedule Tribes.

e) It is clear from the facts that the Respondent fraudulently obtained a certificate showing that he belongs to Schedule Tribes community which stands cancelled by the order passed by the State level scrutiny committee.

5. For the foregoing reasons, the Appeal is allowed and the judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court are set aside. No costs.

........................................J [S. A. BOBDE] ..……................................J [L. NAGESWARA RAO] New Delhi, July 17, 2017 5
Rajeev Kumar vs Life Insurance Corporation Of India

5. It appears that the appellant has approached the High Court challenging the denial of work and initially the appellant was granted an interim relief. However, the writ petition was subsequently disposed of by holding that the remedy open to the appellant is to take recourse to the alternative remedy as per Industrial Disputes Act. According to the appellant, unfortunately the judgment was not communicated to him and, therefore, there was considerable delay in approaching the High Court, in appeal. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal Digitally signed by NARENDRA PRASAD Date: 2017.07.20 holding that there is a huge delay of more than 18:33:58 IST Reason:

JULY 17, 2017.