L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
B.Chandramathi vs N.Prakash

3. The appellant-accused obtained a loan of Rs.4 lakhs on 22.7.2002 from the respondent-complainant on execution of 2 promissory note and agreed to repay the same with interest at 18% per annum. On 23.10.2002, the appellant issued a cheque bearing No. 069725 for Rs.2 lakhs towards the repayment of the loan amount. When the said cheque was presented to the banker the same was returned with an endorsement "Insufficient Funds." The respondent served a legal notice upon the appellant on 30.10.2002 and called upon her to pay the cheque amount. The appellant replied to the said notice on 12.12.2010 and sought three months time to repay the amount. She did not repay the amount. On the basis of the bounced cheque, the respondent filed a complaint bearing No. CC 1217/03 before the Principal JMFC Court, Davanagere. Learned JMFC convicted the appellant for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced her to simple imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-. Learned JMFC further directed the appellant to pay compensation of Rs.2,20,000/-

to the respondent. On appeal learned Additional Sessions Judge confirmed the order of the trial court. The Criminal 3 Revision Petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order. The High Court thus confirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant.

On that day, fresh notice was issued to the respondent to show-cause why the Special Leave Petition may not be disposed of by passing appropriate orders at the stage of admission after hearing both the sides. Despite service of notice, the respondent has neither appeared before this Court in person nor has he engaged any lawyer. We, therefore, proceed to dispose of this appeal.

She has two children to look after. It appears that the appellant is unwell. She is stated to have suffered from depression.

7. As of today, the appellant has undergone the sentence for a period of about 2= months before she was released on bail. Considering the fact that the appellant has deposited the amount of compensation i.e. Rs.2,20,000/- and the fact 5 that the appellant is a widow and is the only earning member in the family and considering the fact that though served with notice the respondent has not cared to appear in this Court, we are of the opinion that sentence already undergone by her should be treated as a sentence for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Order accordingly. The appellant is on bail. Her bail bond stands discharged. Needless to say that this order is passed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

8. Appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.
M/S.H.D.F.C vs Gautam Kumar Nag & Ors

3. The loan amount, along with interest at the rate of 15% per annum was to be repaid in equalised monthly instalments over a period of 180 months and in case of default, according to the terms of the loan, the outstanding would attract additional interest @ 18% per annum.

4. The defendants defaulted in payment of the EMIs and as a result, a large sum was outstanding against them. The defendants did not pay the instalments despite letters and reminders. Hence, the plaintiff invoked the guarantees vide letter dated October 22, 1998, and intimated the two respondents that in case of failure to make the payment, legal proceedings would be instituted against them. Despite the aforesaid letter and 4 legal notices sent on behalf of the appellant, the defendants did not pay the outstanding amount of Rs.4,37,350/-, and the plaintiff was thus left with no option but to institute the suit for realisation of its dues.

5. Defendant No.1 did not appear in the suit despite notice. The two defendants-respondents, however, appeared before the trial court and filed separate applications under Order XXXVII Rule 3 sub-rule (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure for permission to defend the suit.

defendant No.1 and had further made the borrower create an equitable mortgage in its favour by deposit of title deeds, they would be absolved of 5 their liability in terms of Section 139 of the Contract Act. According to the respondents, their plea gave rise to a triable issue and they, accordingly, sought permission to file their written statements and contest the suit. The trial court by its judgment and order examined all the pleas, including the one based on Section 139 of the Contract Act and found and held that none of the pleas raised by the defendants gave rise to any substantial defence against the claim of the plaintiff. Accordingly, it dismissed the petitions filed by the defendants-respondents by order dated April 29, 2005, and proceeded to decree the suit of the appellant-plaintiff for a sum of Rs.4,54,669/-

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated August 9, 2005, of the Delhi High Court by which it allowed the appeals of the two respondents (defendant Nos.2 and 3 respectively before the trial court), set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and permitted the appellants to file their written statements within four weeks from the date of the judgment, directing further that the trial court would then proceed 2 with the suit and dispose it of in accordance with law.

7. In appeal the Delhi High Court, as noted above, set aside the order and decree passed by the trial 6 court and directed it to allow the defendants-

(emphasis added)

In our view, therefore, the impugned judgment of the High Court is unsustainable and is fit to be set aside. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the order and decree passed by the trial court.

11. In the result the appeal is allowed but in the facts of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

January 20, 2012.
Arup Das & Ors vs State Of Assam & Ors

2. An advertisement dated 4th November, 2006, was published by the Director of Land Records and Survey, Assam, inviting applications for selection for admission in the Assam Survey and Settlement Training Institute in respect of 160 seats. About 12,000 candidates applied for the said advertised seats and a written test was conducted which was followed by a viva voce examination. The viva voce test was limited to only 560 candidates. The restriction of the vive voce test to only 560 candidates was challenged before the Gauhati High Court in W.P.(C)No.3419 of 2007, which was dismissed and Writ Appeal No.413 of 2007 preferred from the Order of the learned Single Judge was also dismissed. The Director of Land Records and Survey, Assam, published a select list of 160 candidates and sent the candidates for training.

Subsequently, the Director sent three more lists, hereinafter referred to as "the second, third and fourth lists", but the same were not approved by the Government. The Government's refusal to approve the second, third and fourth lists against the seats available, was again challenged in Writ Petition Nos.3812 of 2010 and 2279 of 2011 on the ground that when vacancies were available, there was no bar in the same being filled up from the Select List of 560 candidates.

13. We, therefore, are not inclined to accept Mr. Gupta's submissions, which deal with the exception and not the rule and, accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed. Consequently, the application filed by the Petitioner Nos.4 to 58 for 19 permission to file the Special Leave Petition is rejected.

14. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
Mohd. Asif vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

3. According to the appellant, his ancestors were residents of Rajnandgaon which was earlier part of the State of Madhya Pradesh and is now part of the State of Chattisgarh. According to the Certificate dated 16.12.1988 issued by the Naib Tahsildar of the Rajnandgaon, the appellant belongs to Muslim Pathan Behna Caste 2 which was recognized as OBC (Other Backward Classes) in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The appellant's family had shifted to Kamptee in the Nagpur district of Maharashtra and had become permanent residents of Nagpur district. Admittedly, caste `Behna' is recognized as a Scheduled Caste in the State of Maharashtra.

4. As per order dated 22.06.1992, the appellant was appointed as an Assistant Teacher by respondent No.2 - Municipal Council, Bhandara in Nagar Parishad Urdu High School, Bhandara (respondent No.3) run by the said Municipal Council. His appointment was in the category reserved for Scheduled Castes.

6. However, on the basis of a complaint dated 24.04.2003 filed by one Sattar Khan, President, Nagar Sudhar Nagrik Samiti, Bhandara, the Divisional Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee (for short `the Committee) conducted an inquiry regarding the caste of the appellant.

8. Thereupon, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 995 of 2007 in the Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Bombay challenging the order dated 23.11.2006 of the Director of Municipal Administration directing to start new recruitment process. There was also a prayer for a direction to the respondents to continue the services of the appellant on the same post by treating him as an open category candidate and grant him all consequential benefits. The said Writ Petition was dismissed by the High Court as per the impugned order dated 21.11.2007.

10. Therefore we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remand the matter back to the High Court with a request to consider the matter afresh and pass appropriate orders in the writ petition in accordance with law as early as possible. All contentions of the parties are left open. Till such fresh disposal of the writ petition, status quo as on today shall be maintained with regard to the appointment of the appellant.

11. The appeal is allowed to the above extent. There will be no order as to costs.

January 27, 2012.
S.M. Sharmila vs National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors

2. The appellant in all these appeals is an owner of a vehicle and her workmen had been injured in an accident while they were travelling in a 2 vehicle owned by the appellant. As the concerned respondent workmen had suffered injuries in an accident arising out of and in the course of their employment on 3rd April, 1998, they had filed cases claiming compensation before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Madurai.

5. After hearing the concerned parties, the High Court reversed the findings of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and came to a 3 conclusion that the vehicle involved in the accident was not insured with National Insurance Company Ltd. on the date of the accident and, therefore, the Insurance Company was absolved from its liability to make payment of compensation to the respondent workmen and the present appellant, owner of the vehicle, was saddled with the liability of paying compensation to the respondent workmen.

14. Looking to the facts of the case, in our opinion, no legal issue is involved in these appeals and there is no reason to interfere with the findings arrived at by the High Court, which appear to be just and proper.

15. For the aforestated reasons, we dismiss the appeals with no order as to costs. Ad-interim relief granted in favour of the appellant stands vacated in all appeals.
Jik Industries Ltd. & Ors vs Amarlal V.Jumani & Anr

2. This group of appeals were heard together as they involve common questions of law. There are some factual differences but the main argument by the appellant(s) in this matter was advanced by Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Sharp Industries Limited in SLP (Crl.) No.6643-6651 of 2010 and the facts are taken mostly from the said case.

4. The material facts of the case are that the appellant company on or about 12th May, 2005 came out with a scheme by which it was agreed that the appellant company should be revived and thereafter payments will be made to the creditors. Pursuant to such scheme the appellant company filed a petition under Section 391 of the Companies Act to the High Court. The whole scheme was placed before the High Court and according to the appellant(s), first order of the scheme came to be passed by the Hon'ble High Court by its order dated 5th May, 2005 in Company Petition No.92 of 2005. At the time the said company petition was pending, a meeting was convened by the appellant company on 1.6.05 and the same was attended by several creditors including representative of the first respondents and they opposed the scheme.

7. In the background of the aforesaid facts the contentions raised by the appellant company is that the scheme envisaged a compromise between the company and the secured creditors on the one hand and its unsecured creditors on the other hand.

50. Under the Scheme of modern legislation, non-

71. Russell on Crime (Twelfth Edition) also describes:-

(Chapter 22 - Compounding Offences, page 339)

72. Later on compounding was permitted in certain categories of cases where the rights of the public in general are not affected but in all cases such compounding is permissible with the consent of the injured party.

75. The appeals are dismissed. The judgment of the High Court is affirmed.
Mangani Lal Mandal vs Bishnu Deo Bhandari

2. The appellant - the returned candidate - contested the general Parliament election to the 15th Lok Sabha from 7, Jhanjharpur Parliamentary Constituency held on April 23, 2009. Altogether 12 candidates filed their nomination papers, including the appellant, as per the schedule fixed for conducting the said election. On May 16, 2009, the result of the above election was announced and the appellant was declared elected.

3. The respondent - Bishnu Deo Bhandari, a voter (hereinafter referred to as the 'election petitioner') - challenged the election of the returned candidate by filing the election petition before the Patna High Court. The election petitioner alleged that the returned candidate suppressed the facts in the affidavit that he filed alongwith his nomination papers that he had two wives and the dependent children by marriage with his first wife. He did not disclose the assets and liabilities of his first wife and the dependent children born out of that wedlock. The challenge to the election of the returned candidate was brought under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the 1951 Act and it was prayed that the election of the returned candidate be declared to be void.

4. The returned candidate traversed the averments made by the election petitioner and also raised diverse objections, inter alia, that the election petition did not disclose any cause of action nor it contained the concise statement of material facts.

7. The Appeal deserves to be allowed on the short ground which we indicate immediately hereinafter.

11. Civil Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned judgment dated November 25, 2011 is set aside. The election petition filed by the respondent is dismissed with costs which we quantify at ` 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh).
Bhubaneswar Development Authority & ... vs Adikanda Biswal & Ors

3. The advertisement shows that 45 plots were available for allotment on "First Come First Served" basis under the Scheme framed by BDA, having a plot size of 2400 sq.ft. (60' X 40') in Chandrasekharpur residential area at a cost of Rs.2.40 lakhs only that is at the rate of Rs.100/- per sq.ft. The advertisement further contemplates that the persons interested in out-right purchase would get priority in allotment of plot and they had to submit a bank draft drawn on Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Akash Sova Building, Bhubaneswar. It further contemplates that the Applications could be submitted on plain paper with the original Challan but general terms and conditions of allotment of plots, applicable to other schemes would be applicable to the present Scheme launched by BDA.

4. Pursuant to the aforesaid advertisement, having been issued in the three daily local newspapers of Orissa as mentioned hereinabove, on 07.01.2000, 58 applicants deposited full amount together with application and other prescribed details on out-right purchase. Three applicants submitted their applications on 08.01.2000 and one each on 10.01.2000 and 11.1.2000 along with a sum of Rs.2.40 lakhs each.

7. On 16.05.2000, Secretary of the Department of Urban Development, Government of Orissa, gave a proposal to BDA to cancel the process of allotment of plots. The matter was placed before the BDA in its 76th Authority Meeting held on 16.05.2000. It was taken up as Item No.23/76. Various pros and cons of the same were discussed by the BDA on the said date. Thereafter, a conscious decision was taken by the BDA on the same day which reads as under :

9. Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, amounts received by BDA were returned to the applicants together with interest accrued thereon. We have been given to understand that some of them have accepted the amounts under protest, some of them have not accepted it and some of them have accepted it without any protest.

23. The policy of allotment of plots on "First Come First Served"

25. We, are, however, of the view that so far as the instant case is concerned, the decision taken by the authority to cancel the process of allotment by way of "First Come First Served" basis cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary or vitiated by extraneous reasons warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

27. Appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside but there will be no orders as to costs.

................J [Deepak Verma] ....................J [K. S. Radhakrishnan) New Delhi;

February 01, 2012.

(With appln(s) for vacating stay and Intervention/Impleadment) Date: 01/02/2012 These Appeals were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
Markio Tado vs Takam Sorang & Ors

Brief facts leading to this appeal are as follows:-

It was alleged that on two polling stations viz. (i) 7-Roing and (ii) 2-Ruhi from circle Tali, boxes (containing EVMs) were illegally removed by the party workers of the appellant, and votes in favour of the appellant were cast by a single hand. The common voters were not allowed to exercise their voting rights as they were threatened for their lives by the miscreants of the appellant. It was claimed that polling agents of the first respondent at these two polling stations jointly reported about the happenings in these polling stations on 15.10.2009 to the Assistant Returning Officer. It was alleged that such incidents also took place on 6 more polling stations. In para 9 of the petition, it was stated that, it was necessary to bring the EVMs and counter foils of Form 17A (register of voters) of these 8-polling stations (mentioned in para-7 of the petition) for forensic test and other examination etc. before the Hon'ble Court for proper adjudication of the case. It was stated that the votes received by the appellant in these 8 polling stations were 3763, and if they were deleted from the votes of appellant, the first respondent would be declared as 3 elected. It was prayed that the records of (i) register of voters counterfoils (Form 17-A) of these 8 polling stations described in paragraph 7 of the petition, (ii) EVMs of these 8 polling stations, and (iii) records relating to 20 Tali (ST) Assembly Constituency be called, and appellant be directed to show cause as to why those votes cast by booth capturing in 8 polling stations in favour of the appellant should not be declared as illegal, and the election order dated 22.10.2009 be not declared as void, and why the respondent No. 1 should not be declared as elected candidate.

The learned Single Judge, therefore, was clearly in error in allowing the second application made by the first respondent.

But an order for inspection of ballot papers cannot be granted to support vague pleas made in the petition not supported by material facts or to fish out evidence to support such pleas. The case of the petitioner must be set out with precision supported by averments of material facts. To establish a case so pleaded an order for inspection may undoubtedly, if the interests of justice require, be granted. But a more allegation that the petitioner suspects or believes that there has been an improper reception, refusal or rejection of votes will not be sufficient to support an order for inspection."

25. This being the position, in our view the order passed by the learned Single Judge is illegal and unsustainable. We are, therefore, required to set-aside the same.

26. Accordingly, we pass the following order:-

aside.

(ii) The Misc. Case (E.P.) No.05(AP)/2010 is hereby dismissed.
M/S Hotel ... vs Asst.Commr.Of Commercial Taxes & Anr

2. The appellant, M/s Hotel Ashoka, is managed by India Tourism Development Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as `the Corporation'). The Corporation is having its duty free shops at all major International Airports in India. At the said duty free shops, the appellant sells several articles including liquor to foreigners and also to Indians, who are going abroad or coming to India by air. We are concerned with a duty free shops situated at an International Airport at Bengaluru. The appellant is registered as a dealer under the Act as well as under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as `the Central Act'). In the return filed under the Act as well as under the Central Act for the relevant period, the appellant had stated that though liquor, cigarettes, perfumes and food articles were sold at the duty free shops at the Bengaluru International Airport, no tax was payable by the appellant as the goods which had been sold at the duty free shops were sold directly to the passengers and even the delivery of goods at the duty free shops was made before importing the goods or before the goods had crossed the customs frontiers of India.

15. In the circumstances, they submitted that the appeal be dismissed with costs and the stay granted by this Court be vacated.

30. They again submitted that `in the course of import' means `the transaction ought to have taken place beyond the territories of India and not within the geographical territory of India'. We do not agree with the said submission. When any transaction takes place outside the customs frontiers of India, the transaction would be said to have taken place outside India.

Thus, we do not agree with the aforestated submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the Revenue.

32. Looking to the aforestated clear and settled legal position, we allow the appeal and quash the order of assessment so far as the transactions which are the subject matter of this litigation are concerned. There shall be no order as to cost.

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 10404-10412 OF 2010

33. As issues involved in the aforestated appeals and in Civil Appeal No.2560 of 2010 are same, for the reasons recorded in the judgment rendered in Civil Appeal No. 2560 of 2010, these appeals also stand allowed and the assessment orders, so far as they pertain to the subject matter of these appeals are concerned, are quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.