L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh ... vs Emp. In Relation To Mang. Of Kend.C.&Ors

4 In 2007 the Union representing the workmen filed a writ petition before the High Court (WP(L) 4915 of 2007) seeking implementation of the order dated 18 May 2004. While disposing of the writ petition on 24 September 2010 the High Court recorded the statement of the management that no vacancy had occurred in the post of Tyndal since the judgment which was rendered on 18 May 2004. However, the High Court recorded the undertaking of the management that if any vacancy arises in future and the post is advertised for which the workmen apply, they would be considered for the post and that the management would also accommodate them if there was a vacancy under any other category. Thereafter, a Review Petition was filed before the High Court based on information which was obtained under the Right to Information Act. The learned Single Judge held that the employment which was granted by the management between 2004 and 2008 (as disclosed in the response to the RTI query on 11 September 2008) indicated that the appointment was made only on compassionate grounds. Once again, while disposing of the Review Petition the statement of the management was recorded that if and when posts were advertised, the workmen would be entitled to apply and would be considered. The rejection of the Review Petition has led to the filing of these proceedings.

9 The Civil Appeal shall stand allowed in the above terms. There shall be no orders as to costs.

.........................................CJI [T S THAKUR] …..........................................J [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD] ..............................................J [L NAGESWARA RAO] New Delhi November 21, 2016.
Ramesh Verma(D) Tr.Lrs vs Lajesh Saxena (D) By Lrs & Anr

2. The parties are related as under:-

5. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, deceased Ramesh Verma preferred an appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (FA No.29/1991). Sanjeev Kumar, son of plaintiff Lajesh Saxena as also the plaintiff-Lajesh Saxena filed appeals before the High Court in FA No.30/91 and FA No.31/1999, respectively.

7. Being aggrieved, Ramesh Verma (since deceased) through his legal heirs preferred these appeals.

20. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed and they are dismissed. Parties are to bear their respective costs.

New Delhi.
Dilbagh Singh vs State Of Punjab

(3) The prosecution case unfolds with the interception of the appellant and the co-accused Ranjit Singh by the patrol party on 28.08.2007 while they were travelling in a car bearing registration No.MH-04BS-1651 at the check point at Khanauri Patran. One Baaj Singh, apart from the police party was then present. The appellant and his companion, on being interrogated, disclosed their names. Their car on search revealed six bags stuffed with Poppy Husk.

(4) The Investigation Officer, A.S.I. Satnam Singh introduced himself and apprised the appellant and the co-accused of their right to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate if they so desired but they declined and instead reposed confidence in him. After recording their consent in writing the car was searched in presence of the other members of the patrol party as well as Baaj Singh and in course thereof three bags each from the rear seat and the dicky, containing Poppy Husk were recovered. Samples were taken and sealed with specimen impression of the Investigating Officer. On weighment of the remaining Poppy Husk, the contraband weighed 34 kg. 800 gms in each bag minus the samples taken. Personal search of the appellant and the co-accused yielded currency of Rs.225/- and Rs.150/- respectively which were also seized. The information of the exercise was forwarded to the police station on which a formal FIR was lodged.

(5) The sealed samples as well as the contraband as a whole were deposited in the malkhana and were also produced before the concerned Magistrate on the next date along with the accused persons. The sample on chemical examination by the Forensic Science Laboratory disclosed the same to be of Poppy Husk. Eventually, on completion of the investigation challan was submitted and the appellant and the co-accused were made to face trial under Sections 15 and 25 of the Act, as they pleaded “not guilty”.

(19) In the wake of the above, we are of the unhesitant opinion in the face of the evidence on record, that the prosecution has been able to prove the charge against the accused persons beyond all reasonable doubt. The Courts below have appreciated the materials on record in the correct legal and factual perspectives and the findings recorded do not merit any interference. The appeal is thus dismissed. The Trial Court is hereby directed to take immediate follow up the steps so as to ensure that the sentence awarded is served out by the accused persons.

NOVEMBER 28, 2016.
Ramvilas (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Anr vs Karim Khan & Anr

3. Challenging the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the learned counsel for the appellants-defendants Mr. Puneet Jain submitted that whenever a conveyance of the property by a Sale Deed is accompanied by a separate document, it has to be taken as re-conveyance and it was not a mortgage and the Courts below erred in holding that the Sale Deed dated 14.06.1972 in favour of the appellants-defendants was a security for the loan taken by the 1st respondent-plaintiff. Learned counsel further submitted that the Sale Deed was accompanied by an Agreement Exhibit P/1 dated 14.06.1972 under which the 1st respondent-plaintiff had agreed to pay an amount of Rs.5000/- by 14.06.1973, which the 1st respondent-plaintiff did not comply with, and subsequent Agreement Exhibit P/2 dated 05.06.1974 was executed under which the 1st respondent-plaintiff paid an amount of Rs.6700/-; and after a lapse of about 17 years, the 1st respondent- plaintiff filed the suit for declaration that the Sale Deed was null and void. It was further submitted that in the absence of a prayer for cancellation of the Sale Deed dated 14.06.1972, the suit filed by the 1st respondent-plaintiff ought to have been dismissed, more so, when the suit was filed nearly after a gap of 17 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed i.e 14.06.1972. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on a number of judgments of this Court reported as Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Prasad and Anr. - (2006) 4 SCC 432, Raj Kishore (Dead) by LRs. v. Prem Singh and Ors. - (2011) 1 SCC 657 and Gauri Shankar Prasad and Ors. v. Brahma Nand Singh - (2008) 8 SCC 287.

12. Having regard to the concurrent findings of the Courts below, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.

13. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.

New Delhi.
Maharao Bhim Singh Thr.Maharao ... vs C.I.T.,Jaipur

2. In order to appreciate the issue involved in the appeal, it is necessary to state the relevant facts in brief infra.

3. The appellant was the Ruler of the princely State of Kota, now a part of State of Rajasthan. He owned extensive properties which, inter alia, included his two residential palaces known as "Umed Bhawan Palace" and "City Palace“. The appellant is using Umed Bhawan Palace for his residence. So far as this appeal is concerned, the issue involved herein centers around "Umed Bhawan Palace".

4. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 60A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), the Central Government issued an order called "The Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950" (hereinafter referred to as "The Order"). It was issued essentially to grant exemptions, reductions in rate of tax and the modifications in relation to specified kinds of income earned by the persons (Ruler and his family members) from various sources as specified therein. The Order was published in the Gazette of India, extraordinary, on 02.12.1950.

6. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the application under Section 256(1) has rightly been rejected by the Tribunal and do not deserve further consideration.”

42. Learned Counsel for the respondent (Revenue) though made sincere attempt to persuade us to uphold the view taken by the High Court but in the light of what we have held above, we are unable to accept his submissions.

45. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. As a consequence, the question referred to the High Court in the reference proceedings out of which this appeal arises is answered in favour of the appellant (assessee) and against the Revenue.
M/S Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd vs Celem S.A. Of Fos 34320 Roujan, France & ...

The facts in nutshell are that the respondents herein filed a Suit against the appellant before the English Court for infringement of patent vested in the respondents besides other reliefs. In the said suit, the appellant- defendant filed an application challenging the jurisdiction of the English Court. In that application, the reliefs sought by the appellant include the relief that the respondents—original claimants have to pay the costs to the appellant occasioned by filing the application to be summarily assessed. The English Court by its Order dated 19th October, 2006 dismissed the claim of the appellant and further directed it to pay the costs of application to the respondents—original claimants set at £ 12,229.75. Thereafter it appears that the appellant agreed to pay the costs and sought for some time. When the respondents filed a petition for execution in India, the appellant opposed it in an application on the ground that the order of English Court is not executable. The executing Court dismissed the same which was confirmed by the High Court. Hence the appellant is before us by way of this appeal.

Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the Execution Petition filed by the Respondents for execution of the order dated 19th October, 2006 passed by the English Court is maintainable under the relevant provisions. Therefore, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Sharat Babu Digumarti vs Govt Of Nct Of Delhi

2. The appellant along one Avnish Bajaj and others was arrayed as an accused in FIR No. 645 of 2004. After the investigation was concluded, charge sheet was filed before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate who on 14.02.2006 took cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 292 and 294 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (for short, “the IT Act”) against all of them. Avnish Bajaj filed Criminal Misc. Case No. 3066 of 2006 for quashment of the proceedings on many a ground before the High Court of Delhi which vide order dated 29.05.2008 came to the conclusion that prima facie case was made out under Section 292 IPC, but it expressed the opinion that Avinish Bajaj, the petitioner in the said case, was not liable to be proceeded under Section 292 IPC and, accordingly, he was discharged of the offence under Sections 292 and 294 IPC. However, he was prima facie found to have committed offence under Section 67 read with Section 85 of the IT Act and the trial court was directed to proceed to the next stage of passing of order of charge uninfluenced by the observations made in the order of the High Court.

3. Being grieved by the aforesaid order, Avnish Bajaj preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1483 of 2009. The said appeal was tagged with Ebay India Pvt. Ltd. v. State and Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 1484 of 2009). The said appeals were heard along with other appeals that arose from the lis relating to interpretation of Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, “NI Act”) by a three-Judge Bench as there was difference of opinion between the two learned Judges in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours (P) Ltd.[1].

8. After the judgment was delivered, the present appellant filed an application before the trial court to drop the proceedings against him. The trial court partly allowed the application and dropped the proceedings against the appellant for offences under Section 294 IPC and Section 67 of the IT Act, however, proceedings under Section 292 IPC were not dropped, and vide order 22.12.2014, the trial court framed the charge under Section 292 IPC.

9. Being aggrieved by the order framing of charge, the appellant moved the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 127 of 2015 and the learned Single Judge by the impugned order declined to interfere on the ground that there is sufficient material showing appellant’s involvement to proceed against him for the commission of the offence punishable under Section 292 IPC. It has referred to the allegations made against him and the responsibility of the appellant and thereafter referred to the pronouncements in P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and Anr.[2] and Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and Anr.[3] which pertain to exercise of revisional power of the High Court while dealing with propriety of framing of charge under Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

………………. J (Dipak Misra) ….……………… J (Praffula C. Pant) New Delhi December 14, 2016
Lokesh Katara And Anr vs Hon'Ble High Court Of Gujarat

Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J These proceedings have been instituted under Article 32 of the Constitution by two petitioners who are stated to be working as Systems Officers and Systems Assistants since 2009 on a contractual basis. The petitioners state that Systems Officers and Systems Assistants were engaged in the High Court and the district courts in the State of Gujarat in consonance with the National Policy and Action Plan prepared by the E- Committee. In 2013, the Government of Gujarat sanctioned posts of Systems Officers and Systems Assistants in the regular cadre. An amendment was made to the recruitment rules in 2015 for filling up these posts by direct recruitment. The existing Systems Officers and Systems Assistants working in various district courts submitted a representation seeking their absorption. An online skill test was conducted. Another representation was submitted on 16 March 2016. However, the representation for absorption was rejected on 26 May 2016. On 9 September 2016 an advertisement was published by the Registrar (Recruitment and Finance) inviting applications for thirty posts of Systems Officers and thirty posts of Systems Assistants. The Writ Petition has been instituted seeking to challenge the advertisement issued by the High Court and for a mandamus for incorporating a provision in the recruitment rules for the absorption of the petitioners and similarly placed persons.

3 The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed.

.........................................CJI [T S THAKUR] …..........................................J [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD] …..........................................J [L NAGESWARA RAO] New Delhi December 14,2016
Harjas Rai Makhija (D) Thr.Lrs vs Pushparani Jain & Anr

2. Respondent No.1, Pushparani Jain (Pushparani) was allotted Plot No.251 in Major Shopping Centre Zone - II, Habibganj, Bhopal under Scheme No.13 of the Bhopal Development Authority (for short BDA). Since she was a resident of the United States of America and had some difficulty in completing the formalities with regard to the allotment, she appointed her brother Jinendra Jain as her attorney on or about 28th August, 1981. This was communicated by her to the Chairman of the BDA by a letter of the same date.

3. On the basis of the communication sent by Pushparani to the BDA, and on the basis of the Power of Attorney given by her to Jinendra Jain, she was able to obtain possession of the plot allotted to her and complete the necessary formalities.

4. According to the appellant Harjas Rai Makhija (Makhija), another Power of Attorney had been executed by Pushparani on 30th April, 1983 in favour of Jinendra Jain. The original of this document has not been produced by anybody. Be that as it may, on the basis of the alleged Power of Attorney dated 30th April, 1983, an agreement was entered into between Jinendra Jain and Makhija on 16th October, 1988 to sell the plot allotted to Pushparani in favour of Makhija. In terms of the agreement, the sale deed was to be executed on or before 30th April, 1989.

7. Both the suits one filed by Pushparani and the other by Makhija were taken up and heard together. By a judgment and decree dated 4th October, 1999 the suit filed by Pushparani was decreed with the result that the agreement for sale dated 16th October, 1988 was declared to be illegal. It was also decreed that Makhija shall handover possession of the suit property to Pushparani and pay monthly compensation of Rs.5,000/- per month. The suit filed by Makhija was dismissed.

24. Fraud not having been proved but merely alleged, we do not find any reason to differ with the judgment and order passed by the High Court and the Trial Court.

25. The appeal is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.50,000/-.

..……………………………..J (Madan B. Lokur ) ………………………………J (Adarsh Kumar Goel ) New Delhi;

January 2, 2017

(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.
Ajay Singh And Anr And Etc vs State Of Chhattisgarh And Anr

2. The above prefatory note has relevance, a significant one, to the case at hand. To appreciate the controversy, certain facts are requisite to be noted. The marriage between the appellant No. 1 and Ruby Singh, the deceased, was solemnized according to Hindu rites on 22.06.1997. She committed suicide at her matrimonial home on 01.12.1998. Kameshwar Pratap lodged FIR No. 194/98 at Police Station Lakhanpur, Distt. Sarguja against Ajay Singh (husband), Sureshwar Singh (father-in-law), Dhanwanti Devi (mother-in-law) and Kiran Singh (sister-in-law) for offences punishable under Section 304B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and other offences. After the criminal law was set in motion, investigating agency after commencement of investigation and after completion thereof laid charge sheet under Sections 304B, 498A/34, 328 IPC read with Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against the accused persons before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambikapur, who, in turn, committed the matter to the Court of Session and eventually the matter was tried by Second Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur. We are, in the present case, not concerned with how many witnesses were examined by the trial court or how the trial continued. What needs to be stated is that the learned trial Judge passed an order in the order sheet that recorded that the accused persons had been acquitted as per the judgment separately typed, signed and dated.

27. Consequently, appeals are dismissed. The trial court to whom the cases have been transferred is directed to proceed in accordance with law.
Sri Ganesh vs State Of Tamil Nadu And Anr

Pursuant to complaint by the complainant, FIR vide Crime No.5/2010 was initially registered under Sections 417 and 506(ii) IPC on 26.03.2010 with Old Washermenpet Police Station, Chennai against the appellant, his father, mother and uncle. After carrying out necessary investigation, charge- sheet dated 18.11.2010 was filed against the appellant under Section 376 IPC and against his parents and uncle under Sections 417 read with 109 IPC and 506(ii) IPC. It was alleged that the appellant had become friendly with the victim while they had reached 10+2 standard; that this fact was known to the family of the appellant who treated the victim as their daughter-in-law; that the appellant had committed sexual intercourse with the victim on 5 to 6 occasions; and that the behavior of the family of appellant later changed and they refused to perform the marriage. It was alleged that the appellant thus committed offence under Section 376 IPC while his family members were guilty of offence under Sections 417 read with 109 IPC and 506(ii) IPC.

Appropriate charges under the aforesaid Sections having been framed, Criminal O.P. No.9823 of 2011 was filed in the High Court seeking quashing of those charges. The High Court by its Order dated 20.06.2012 quashed the charges as against the parents and uncle of the appellant but dismissed the challenge raised by the appellant. Consequently the trial proceeded only against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC. On 18.09.2012, the victim deposed before the trial court as PW-1. In her examination-in-Chief she deposed:

13. We thus find that the approach of the High Court in the present case was incorrect and completely misdirected. Even if we were to remand the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration, in our view it would be an empty formality in the face of finding of fact rendered by the trial court. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the Judgment and Order under appeal. The view taken by the trial court is restored and the matter stands disposed of in terms of the directions issued by the trial court as stated above.

14. The appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms.
The Special Land Acquisition Officer, ... vs Anasuya Bai (D) By Lrs. & Ors

Having said so, it also needs to be kept in mind that a large chunk of land was acquired by the appellants and a minuscule part thereof belonged to the respondents herein. Further, insofar as respondents are concerned, it even undertook the exercise of fixing the compensation for the acquired land, as per the provisions of the KIAD Act. Advisory Committee was constituted for this purpose. Notices were also sent to all concerned, including the respondents herein. It further transpired that the land owners (except the respondents) participated in the meeting and as per the minutes of the meeting dated 9th September, 2005, consent agreement was arrived at whereby compensation at the rate of Rs.6,50,000/- per acre was fixed. With these minutes, the Advisory Committee remained under the impression that it had accomplished its task by reaching a consensus on the quantum of compensation. Not only this, further steps were taken to pay the compensation at the aforesaid rate to the land owners, whose land was acquired. Insofar as respondents are concerned, due to the disputes inter se between them, the compensation as per the minutes dated 9th September, 2005 was even deposited with the Civil Court. The Civil Court issued notice and the respondents participated in the proceedings before the Civil Court. At that stage, respondents chose to file a writ petition for quashing of the acquisition proceedings coming out with the plea that they were not consenting parties and had not participated in the meeting dated 9th September, 2005 as even the notice was not received by them. Aforesaid facts disclose that the entire move on the part of the appellants was bonafide one, though there was an accidental slip on their part that insofar as respondents are concerned, no consent to the amount of compensation fixed was given by them. It appears that the appellants- authorities did not proceed further to determine the compensation in respect of respondents' land as they nurtured a bonafide belief that with the fixation of compensation as per the Minutes dated 9th September, 2005 all the land owners, including the respondents, had agreed with the same and, therefore, no further exercise was required. Had the appellants- authorities been more careful, they would have noticed that insofar as respondents herein are concerned, they are not the consenting parties. In that event, they could have brought them on board with other land owners by taking their specific consent as well or proceeded further under Section 29(3) of the KIAD Act.

We, thus, allow this appeal by setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restore the direction passed by the Single Judge with a direction to the appellants authorities to fix the compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 29 of the KIAD Act. The said exercise shall be done as expeditiously as possible.

No order as to cost.

JANUARY 25, 2017.

[1] (1975) 2 SCC 377