L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
M/S S & S Industries & Enterprs.Ld.& Ors vs M/S Fortress Financial Services Ltd

In the present case, notice was issued to the complainant upon appellants' depositing a sum of Rupees ten lakhs, which order has been already complied with, and the aforesaid sum has been kept in fixed deposit. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants stated that his clients are ready to pay further sum of Rupees three lakhs by way of demand draft which he is having with him; as such, impugned order be set aside and further proceeding in the complaint ....2/-

cases may be dropped. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent- complainant submitted that even if the statement made in the Memorandum of Understanding is accepted to be true, his client had accepted to receive a sum of Rupees thirteen lakhs in full and final settlement of the entire claim which was in the month of July, 2007 and thereafter one more year has passed, but no payment has been made; as such, he is entitled to be compensated by payment of interest upon the aforesaid amount of Rupees thirteen lakhs for a period of one year. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that complainant should be paid further sum of Rupees one lakh, i.e., in all Rupees fourteen lakhs. Out of the aforesaid, a sum of Rupees ten lakhs has been already deposited in this Court, which has been kept in fixed deposit. The respondent shall be permitted to withdraw the same along with interest accrued thereon from this Court without any delay. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant stated that he may be permitted to deposit demand draft for Rupees three lakhs in the Registry of this Court by tomorrow, i.e., 15th July, 2008. Let it be so done. In that event, the respondent shall be entitled to withdraw this sum of Rupees three lakhs as well. Learned counsel stated that his clients undertake to pay balance sum of Rupees one lakh to the complainant by demand draft drawn in its favour upon a local bank within one month from today. The offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is compoundable. In view of the facts stated above, in our view,it would be just and expedient to permit the parties to compound the offence.

....3/-

Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and prosecution of the appellants is dropped.
C.Senthilvel vs E.S.Natarajan & Ors

The Trial Court, by its order dated 16th April, 2007, directed appointment of the appellant as a Member of the Anbanathapuram Vahaira Charities Education Committee (for short, AVC Education Committee) for a period of six years from the date of the order in the vacancy caused due to the expiry of the term of a Member of the AVC Education Committee on 8th January, 2007. Against the said order, two writ applications were filed before the High Court, out of which one was dismissed whereas another was allowed and the impugned order passed by the Trial Court has been set aside. Against the impugned order, present appeal has been filed by special leave.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the same passed by the Trial Court is restored.
Moti Lal vs State Of M.P

The said field was taken on share basis by her husband, in which gram and wheat were sown. As usual, she had gone to the field for guarding. One hut was situated there, in which she lives and cooks and eats food at that place. At the said 2 time she was alone in the hut. Her husband had gone to village Rajnagar. Accused Motilal Gadariya who was resident of same village, came there and enquired from her about her husband Barelal. She told him that he had gone to Rajnagar, and he went away. She started sweeping with broom, inside the hut. After some time, Motilal forcibly entered her hut and knocked her down on the floor. He pulled up her saree and committed sexual intercourse. She kept shouting to break free, but there was no body. Then he ran away. Being knocked down by Motilal, her bangle on the right hand had broken and ankle had bruised. When her husband returned from Rajnagar, she narrated the incident to him. Then she and her husband went to Hannu Pal and informed him about the incident. Report was lodged and on the basis of aforesaid facts offences were registered under Sections 452, 376 IPC and Section 3 of the Act. The said First Information Report (in short the `FIR') was recorded by Sub-Inspector-S.R. Rai (PW

3 The prosecutrix was sent for medical examination. Dr. Smt. Rama Parihar performed the medical examination of which the medical examination report is Ex.P.10. The then Sub-Divisional Officer, Police-S.S. Chahal (PW 11) prepared spot map Exb.P7 of the place of incident during the investigation and from the place of incident, pieces of broken bangles found were seized vide seizure Panchnama - Exb. P.5. On 18.01.2002 the statements of prosecutrix her husband Parelal, Habbu and Manua were recorded. On 19.1.2002, accused was arrested vide arrest Panchnama -Exb.P.8 and one of his used underwear which was bearing some stains was seized vide Seizure Panchnama -Exb.P.6. Accused was sent for medical examination regarding his capability of performing intercourse. The examination report is Exb.P.11. After completion of investigation, chargesheet was produced before Chief judicial Magistrate, Chhatarpur. On 18.2.2002 the case has been committed from the said court to the Court of Sessions.

The High Court on considering the evidence given by the prosecution came to hold that the accused was guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 450 IPC. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

12. The evidence on record is analysed on the basis of the principles set out above. The inevitable conclusion is that the accused has been rightly convicted and sentenced. Impugned judgment does not warrant any interference.

13. The appeal stands dismissed.

...............................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ..............................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, July 15, 2008 13 14
Shashi Mohan vs State Of M.P

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur Bench. Three persons, namely, Rameshwardayal, Shashimohan and Revimohan hereinafter described as A1, A2 and A3 faced trial for alleged commission of offence punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). Additional Sessions Judge, Morena, found them guilty and sentenced each to life imprisonment. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court A1 died and, therefore, the appeal was held to have abated so far as A1 is concerned. The present appeal is by A2. A1 and A2 were convicted and sentenced under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC while A3 was found guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

9. When the background facts are considered in the light of legal principles set out above, the position is clear that the accusations were not established so far as the present appellant is concerned. No evidence was led to show sharing of common intention. The appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct. He be set at liberty forthwith unless required to be in custody in connection with any other case.

J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ...............................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, July 15, 2008 6 7
Elumalai Naicker & Anr vs Chandran Naicker

2. The plaint averments in the suit filed in the year 2 1987, in brief, are as follows:

(b) The second plaintiff was in possession of the suit lands even prior to the sale in her favour and she had perfected her title by adverse possession also.

4. The trial court framed appropriate issues regarding title, adverse possession, possession, permanent injunction, mesne profits. The second plaintiff examined herself as PW1 and examined her vendor Rathnavelu as PW2. The defendant gave evidence as DW1 and examined one R. Ramachandran as DW2. Both sides also tendered documentary evidence. The documents exhibited by plaintiffs consisted of title deeds, Jamabandhi, Chitta and Adaugal Extracts and tax receipts. The documents exhibited by defendant consisted of house tax receipts.

5. After appreciating the evidence, the trial court decreed the suit on 16.7.1990. The first appellate court allowed the appeal by the defendant on 28.6.1991, reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the suit. The second appeal filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed by the High Court on 12.10.2001 and the decision of the first appellate court was confirmed. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs have filed this appeal by special leave.

11. The first appellate court after due consideration of the evidence has recorded a finding of fact in favour of the defendant, which has been confirmed by the High Court. We find no reason to interfere with such finding. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Commnr. Of Customs, Calcutta vs M/S. Indian Rayon & Industries

3. The goods were initially exported by the respondent-assessee, which were rejected by the foreign buyer being defective and the assessee re- imported them back to India.

4. Assessee had initially claimed in the Bills of Entry the benefit of Notification No. 158/95-Cus and also executed bonds for re-export, as required under the said notification. The Bills of Entry were assessed provisionally. The assessee could not re-export the goods due to recessionary conditions in the textile industry. It claimed before the adjudicating authority that since it was not possible for it to re-export the goods, it may be allowed the benefits of another Notification No. 3 94/96-Cus., which was in force at the time of the clearance from the factory originally.

7. The Authority-in-Original confirmed the demand against (i) Bill of Entry No. 930 in the sum of Rs.20,76,111/- and (ii) Bill of Entry No. 2440 in the sum of Rs.13,86,355.24. The assessee was given the benefit of Notification No. 94/96-Cus. in respect of Bill of Entry No. 2256 of 1998 as the goods were re-exported under Incentive Scheme, 5 i.e., Duty Exemption Entitlement Scheme (DEEC). Thus, in relation to Bill of Entry No. 2256 dated 30th April, 1998, the duty was confirmed in the sum of Rs. 4,99,188.79. The benefit was not extended to other two Bills of Entry as the goods in these cases were covered under Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme (DEPB). Contention raised on behalf of the assessee that the benefits of the Notification No. 94/96-Cus. having been given to the assessee in regard to Bill of Entry No. 2256, could not be denied on Bills of Entry Nos. 930 and 2440, was rejected.

8. The assessee being aggrieved filed an appeal against the order of the Commissioner, which has been accepted by the Tribunal by its impugned order. The Revenue being aggrieved has filed the present appeal.

(d) of Notification No. 94/96-Cus. covers these instances where goods are manufactured in India and exported without payment of duty in accordance with the procedure set out in Rule 13, as indicated above. Sl. No. 1(d) has, therefore, no relevance to exports made under Export Import Policy Schemes.

18. Since the two consignments vide Bills of Entry Nos. 930 dated 12th August, 1998 and 2440 dated 29th May, 1998 under DEPB Scheme do not get the benefit of Notification No.94/96-Cus., the order of the Tribunal deserves to be set aside and the order of 16 the Commissioner of Customs restored. Ordered accordingly. Appeal is allowed with costs.
P. Thurai Pandian vs K. Subramanian & Ors

3. Mr. P. Subramanian was the Head Master of the said school. He retired on 31st May, 2003 whereupon a vacancy to the said post occurred. The appellant as also the first respondent were not the seniormost teachers in the said school. But as the first two seniormost teachers expressed their unwillingness to be the Headmaster of the school, the School Selection Committee considered the cases of the appellant and the first respondent only for appointment to the said post. The school adopted a policy of choosing the candidate by secret ballot. The first respondent secured five votes while the appellant secured four. The School Committee appointed the first respondent in the post of Head Master.

4. Inter alia contending that he was more meritorious than the first respondent, the appellant preferred an appeal against the decision of the Selection Committee before the Joint Director of School Education. By an order dated 17th December, 2004 the appeal of the appellant was allowed.

7. The appellant preferred an intra court appeal thereagainst which, by reason of the impugned judgment, has been dismissed.

20. We are hereat not concerned with the challenge to the cancellation of order dated 15.11.2006 of the new District Educational Officer. We need not make any observations on the said matter as the said matter to the best to our knowledge is still sub judice. We would, however, request the High Court to consider the desirability of disposing of the matter pending before it, if not already disposed of.

21. We, therefore, are of the opinion that there is no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. No costs.
Kedar Singh Kushwaha vs Dhaniram & Anr

3. Respondents 1 and 2 herein contested an election for the post of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Khadoya, Block; Tehsil Pichhore. The second respondent was declared elected. Questioning the legality whereof, the first respondent filed an application for setting aside his election in the Court of Specified Officer, Pichhore. Upon hearing the parties, the Specified Officer directed recounting of all the votes polled in the said election. Relying on or on the basis of such re-counting, the election petition was dismissed.

4. Questioning the legality and/or validity of the said order, the first respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court contending that the Specified Officer had no jurisdiction to direct re-counting of votes only on the ground that no objection was raised by the parties as prior thereto and that he was required to arrive at the conclusion that sufficient evidence had been brought on record by the parties for the said purpose.

A learned Single Judge of the High Court by reason of a judgment and order dated 24.7.1996 allowed the said writ petition, setting aside the order of the Specified Officer and remitted the matter back to it directing the election petition to be decided within two months. It was furthermore directed that the Specified Officer should also decide the preliminary objections raised by the 3 respondent in the Election Petition. The parties were directed to appear before it on 19.8.1996.

5. Despite the said order, however, no action thereon was taken. Notices were issued only on 23.10.1997.

6. The High Court issued Rule Nisi on the said application. Appellant was directed to remain present in the court. It, however, stands admitted that for one reason or the other, he did not appear before the Court and bailable warrants of his arrest were issued for his appearance on 6.5.1998.

Appellant filed a show-cause in the said contempt proceedings. Upon hearing the parties, the appellant was found guilty of willful disobedience of the 4 order of the High Court and a fine of Rs.1,000/- and his detention till the rising of the court, was directed.

7. An intra-court appeal preferred by the appellant thereagainst in terms of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was dismissed by reason of the impugned order dated 17.5.2005.

12. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

August 4, 2009
Ajitkumar Narottamdas Pandya vs State Of Gujarat

4. The appellant filed a suit against the second respondent and Gunuantray Narottamdas Pandya, Chandrakant Narottamdas Pandya, Kirti Kumar Narottamdas Pandya and Naljnchandra Narottamdas Pandya, inter alia for a declaration of the title relying on or on the basis of the said Will. In the plaint of the said suit it was contended that the defendants therein had been threatening the plaintiff that they would snatch away the possession and such threat was given by defendants No. 2 to 4 on 17.7.96.

5. The Will dated 10.7.1995 was filed along with the plaint together with as many as 28 other documents. The said Will finds place at Sl. No. 17 of the list of documents filed with the plaint. An interim injunction was granted. An application for vacating the said interim injunction was filed by the respondents - defendants.

8. It furthermore appears from the record that the appeal preferred by the appellant thereagainst has been dismissed.

12. In view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of this Court, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for our interference with the impugned order. The appeal is dismissed.

13. However, it goes without saying that we have not entered into the merit of the matter and all contentions of the parties in regard thereto, including the irregularity or illegality committed by the learned Magistrate in taking cognizance, shall remain open.

..........................J (S.B. SINHA) 6 ..........................J (DEEPAK VERMA) NEW DELHI, AUGUST 6, 2009.
Syed Ashraff vs Commr. Bangalore Devt.Auth.& Anr

3. The appellant, who is a professor, was travelling in a Qualis jeep. The said vehicle collied with a truck. The appellant suffered serious injuries in his left hand and right leg. Rods had to be inserted in both the limbs. He suffered fractures also in those limbs. Permanent disability suffered by him was assessed at 35% by an orthopedic surgeon. A total sum of Rs. 1,50,137/- was awarded by the Motor -2- Accident Claims Tribunal towards the injuries sustained by him, pain and suffering as also the disability. The High Court, however, increased the said sum by way of a lump sum amount to Rs. 1,75,000/- but it did not assign any reason therefor.

6. The appeal is allowed to the extent above mentioned.
Shashi Prakash Singh vs State Of U.P.& Ors

2. At the material time, Smt. Beena, respondent No.5 herein, was the District Magistrate of Sultanpur District in the State of U.P. She, in the said capacity, was also a licensing authority in terms of the provisions of Arms Act, 1959. Appellant is working as a permanent clerk in the Kamla Nehru Institute, Sultanpur. Inter alia on the premise that she had been threatened with dire consequences by the appellant on 9.1.2007, when she refused to succumb under undue and illegal demand to divert a sugarcane purchase order to some other sugar mill outside Sultanpur District, a show cause notice under Section 17 of the Arms Act was issued to the appellant on 9.1.2007. The said show cause notice reads as under:

4. We may, however, notice that while the said show cause notice dated 9.1.2007 was issued, a copy thereof was sent to the Superintendent of Police, Sultanpur, not only to serve the said notice on the appellant but also to get his weapon deposited in the police custody and not to return the same till the disposal of the case.

5. The appellant preferred an appeal against the aforesaid order dated 16.1.2007 before the Commissioner, Faizabad Circle. By an order dated 1.2.2007, the operation of the said order was stayed directing:

The appellant is thus before us.

9. We have noticed that the District Magistrate for all intent and purport even directed the Superintendent of Police to serve the notice on the appellant and return the duplicate copy thereof before the date fixed. By reason of the said order, the Superintendent of Police was directed to seize the weapon and get it deposited in the police custody.

12. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it was a fit case where the High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the premise that the first information report suffers from the doctrine of malice in law and issued a writ of mandamus directing the officer incharge of the Police Station not to make or cause any investigation to be made pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof. There cannot be any doubt, whatsoever, that if any person intends to bring the appellant to justice, including 7 respondent No.5 herein, as has been contended by her in her counter affidavit filed before us, an appropriate action in that behalf may be taken. But only on that ground we should not refrain ourselves from exercising our jurisdiction which, according to us, appears to be mala fide on the face of it. The first information report is therefore quashed.

13. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations and directions. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

........................J (S.B. SINHA) ........................J (DEEPAK VERMA) NEW DELHI, AUGUST 6, 2009.
Boppana Surya Prakasa Rao vs Bolla Subrahmanyam Srinivas & Ors

2. The appellant is the first informant who lodged the first information report before the Sub Inspector of Police, P.S. Bhimavaram on 26.3.2006 as against the respondents herein. The said first information report is based on three suicidal notes written by Sujatha - the deceased; one to the police department and public, second to the her near relatives and third to accused No.1 who was her would be husband.

3. For the purpose of disposal of this appeal, we would only take note of certain basic facts. They are as under:

4. The deceased was a student of M.B.A.. She had done her post- graduation. Accused No.1 at the relevant time was not employed. The families of 2 the deceased and accused No.1 negotiated for marriage and engagement ceremony was held on 18.8.2006. A sum of Rs. 2,30,000/- was paid by way of dowry. Some land was also registered by the appellant in favour of the deceased as demanded by the respondents herein. After the betrothal ceremony was over, the accused No.1 obtained an employment in a factory. The marriage was to take place on 3.2.2006. Allegedly, the demand for dowry was increased. It also appears that the deceased and accused No.1 were in constant touch with each other. In fact, they had been going to places.

5. For certain reason with which we are not concerned at this stage, the engagement was broken. A sum of Rs. 30,000/- was returned and the rest of the dowry amount was promised to be returned by the end of March, 2006. The deceased committed suicide by jumping from a running train on 26/3/2006. Relying on or on the basis of the suicide note, a first information report, as noticed hereinbefore, was lodged on 26.3.2006.

16. Therefore, while taking notice of the subsequent events, which have been brought to our notice by the learned senior counsel, we are of the opinion that recourse to one of the modes above-mentioned may be taken by the learned Magistrate as also by the parties as they think fit and proper. However, there 8 cannot be any doubt whatsoever that for the reasons mentioned hereinbefore the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The same is set aside accordingly and the appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations.

17. We, however, must clarify that we have not entered into the merits of the matter nor any remedies available to the parties are foreclosed.

..........................J (S.B. SINHA) ..........................J (DEEPAK VERMA) NEW DELHI, AUGUST 6, 2009.