L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
General Manager, Indian Overseas Bank vs Workmen, All India Overseas Bank ...

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Bank advances agricultural loans to its constituents and also members of the staff. The All India Indian Overseas Bank Employees Union (in short the 'Union') raised a dispute taking the stand that the jewel appraisers engaged by the bank are part time workers of the bank. On the basis of the demand raised reference was made by the Central Government and on 19.2.1990 following dispute was referred to the Tribunal for adjudication:

Reference in that case was made on the ground that the jewel appraisers of Indian Bank were workmen and they were denied only wages and other service conditions as they were paid monthly remuneration of Rs.100/-. The said dispute was adjudicated and an award was made on 3.12.1979 holding that the jewel appraisers of Indian Bank are entitled to wages and other conditions of service applicable to regular clerical staff as part time employee of the Bank and they would be entitled to such proportionate (namely half) wages and benefits of clerical staff w.e.f. 1.4.1977 i.e. the date of reference. The award was questioned before the High Court which was dismissed. Letters Patent Appeal was also dismissed by the Division Bench and S.L.P. was also dismissed by this Court.

Union filed writ petition claiming that the Tribunal should have granted relief from 1.4.1978 i.e date of demand. Appellant-Bank questioned legality of the award by filing a writ petition. As noted above, the writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench in the LPA.

At this juncture the distinction between jewel appraisers and the regular employees of the bank can be noted.

Regular Employees Jewel Appraisers

1. Subject to qualification and age prescribed

1. No qualification/age

2. Recruitment through Employment exchange/Banking Service Recruitment Board.

2. Direct engagement by the local Manager

3. Fixed working hours

3. No fixed working hours.

4. Monthly wages

4. No guaranteed payment, only commission paid.

5. Subject to disciplinary control

5. No disciplinary control.

6. Control/supervision is exercised not only with regard to the allocation of work, but also the way in which the work is to be carried out.

6. No control/supervision over the nature of work to be performed.

7. Wages are paid by the Bank.

7. Charges are paid by the borrowers.

8. Retirement age

8. No retirement age.

9. Subject to transfer

9. No transfer

10. While in employment cannot carry on any other occupation.

10. No bar to carry on any avocation or occupation.

Therefore, the jewel appraisers are not employees of the Bank.

Above being the position, the judgment of the Division Bench affirming the views of the learned Single Judge and the Tribunal is clearly indefensible, deserves to be set aside which we direct.

The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
Dipak K. Ghosh vs State Of W.B. & Ors

This I.A.No. 4 of 2005 arises out of W.P. No.216 of 1999 with C.A.No. 6707 of 1999 disposed of on 19.11.2004 inter alia with the following directions:-

On 17.2.2006, a compliance report was filed by the Chief Secretary, on behalf of the Government of West Bengal. We need not adhere to the entire facts recited therein. Suffice it is to say that a pubic auction notice was published in two national dailies viz., The Times of India, The Statesman and in one local daily viz., Ananda Bazar Patrika. The reserve price of the house was fixed at Rs.Twenty Lakhs which is the market value fixed by the Government valuer and the reserve price of land was fixed at Rs.Four Lakhs Fifty Thousand per cattah. On 4.2.2006, public auction was held. There were two separate bids, one for the land and one for the house as per clause 26(iii) of the judgment. In the said auction there were three bidders. One Shri Pradeep Murarka offered the highest bid, Rs.20.50 Lakhs for the land and Rs.30.50 lakhs for the house. The highest bid was accepted and Shri Pradeep Murarka deposited Rs.12,01,000/- on the day of auction through pay order. On 8.2.2006, he deposited the balance amount. On 13.2.2006, the pay order of Rs.30,50,000/-, payable to Justice B.P. Banerjee (Retd.) Respondent No.8, as price of the house fetched in the public auction was collected from the Bank of Maharashtra, Bidhannagar Branch. On 14.2.2006, the pay order of Rs.30,50,000/- was sent to Justice B.P. Banerjee (Retd.) at his house FD 429, Salt Lake, Sector-III, Kolkata-700 106 through the process server, attached to the office of District Magistrate, North 24 Parganas. Justice B.P.Banerjee (Retd.) respondent No.8 was not available in his house and no body present in the house accepted this letter and pay order. On 15.2.2006, respondent No.8 wrote a letter that he was unable to accept the bid money of the building as his two applications i.e. I.A. Nos. 5 and 6 were pending in the Supreme Court and acceptance of bid money would render I.A. Nos.5 and 6 as infructous. Respondent No.8, however, undertook in the following terms:

In the facts and circumstances recited above we now dispose of I.A.No.4 in terms of our directions as quoted earlier:

With the aforesaid directions I.A.No.4 is allowed. The compliance report is accepted.

We are constrained to observe that I.A. Nos.5 to 8 were filed by respondent No.8 Mr. Justice B.P. Banerjee (Retd.) with a view to circumvent the order passed by this Court. Such practice is deprecated. Same is the fact of I.A. No.9 filed by the intervener. I.A. Nos. 5 to 9 are dismissed.

Henceforth, no application filed by either of the parties in this case shall be accepted by the Registry without leave of this Court.
Prabhakaran & Ors vs M. Azhagiri Pillai (Dead) By Lrs. & Ors

3. The said Sakkubai Ammal filed the said suit - O.S. No.1079/81 on the file of the District Munsiff, Kallakurichi on 16.11.1981 for the following reliefs : (i) a preliminary decree for redemption of the usufructuary mortgage dated 7.9.1935 in regard to the suit property, (ii) for an account in respect of the income therefrom, from the date of discharge of the mortgage; and (iii) for a final decree for redemption of the mortgage. Plaintiffs contended that the mortgage and the right of redemption were subsisting, in view of the assignment dated 12.2.1954 being an 'acknowledgement' and that the mortgage debt stood discharged by Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1979 (for short 'the Debt Relief Act'). In the said suit, Jayalakshmi Ammal and Krishnaswamy Iyenger (legal heirs of the assigneee of the mortgage) were impleaded as defendants 1 and 2. Azhagiri Pillai who was in possession, either as a licensee or lessee of Soundararaja Iyenger, was impleaded as the third defendant. As the said defendant had let out the suit property to Raghamathulla Sahib and Mayava Pandithan, they were impleaded as defendants 4 and 5.

Re : question (ii) :

Re : Question (iii) :

31. In view of the above, this appeal is allowed as follows :-
Director General Of Income Tax vs Diamondstar Exports Ltd.

3. The only question in this appeal is whether the High Court could have directed payment of interest on certain jewellery and ornaments belonging to the respondents which had been seized by the appellants on 12-1-2001. The seizure was challenged by the respondents before the High Court by filing a writ petition. The writ petition was allowed on 3-12-2004. The High Court was of the view that the search and seizure were invalid and illegal. Consequentially, all actions taken by the appellants on the basis of such illegal search and seizure were quashed. The appellants were directed to forthwith return the gold, diamond and jewellery and ornaments seized from the respondents with interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum on the value of the jewellery and ornaments which the High Court quantified at Rs. 84.68 lakhs from the date of seizure till payment.

5. Without going into the question as to value of goods found by the court to have been illegally seized, we hold that the appellants are liable to compensate the respondents at least by way of costs. The loss obviously suffered by the respondents during the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court was further aggravated by the delay in complying with the High Court's decision. In the circumstances, we direct the appellants to pay a sum of Rs. 75,000 to the respondents on account of costs which the respondents will accept in full and final settlement of the claim towards the quantum of interest under the impugned order. Such payment is to be made within a period of four weeks. In the event such payment is not made, this appeal will stand dismissed with costs.

6. The appeal is disposed of.
Haridas Das vs Smt. Usha Rani Banik & Ors

As the time for execution of the sale deed was nearing, the appellant learnt that the said Kalipada Das with a view to defeat the appellant's right was trying to sell part of the property to one Chunnilal Deb and to mortgage part of the suit property with the Housing Board of Karimganj. He started openly threatening the appellant to dis-possess him of the suit property. The appellant paid the balance amount of Rs.1,000/- and asked Kalipada to execute the registered sale deed in his favour in respect of the property. In view of threatened dispossession, the appellant with a view to protect his possession of the suit property filed Title Suit No.201/85 along with connected Miscellaneous Case No. 65/85, inter alia, seeking confirmation of possession over the suit land and premises, and for permanent injunction restraining Kalipada Das from dispossessing the appellant and from selling the suit property to any third party. In the said plaint the appellant exclusively reserved his right to file another suit for getting the sale deed executed.

By an interim order Kalipada Das was directed to maintain status quo in respect of the suit property. The suit was dismissed for default, but later was restored by an order passed by learned Munsif.

During the pendency of the said proceedings, Kalipada Das executed and registered a sale deed in favour of one Usha Rani Banik, defendant No.3 - Respondent No.1 herein, while the possession of the suit property still remained with the appellant. Immediately thereafter, the appellant filed Title Suit No. 2 of 1987 for cancellation of the said sale deed as the same was illegal, fraudulent and void. The respondent No.1 also filed a suit being Title Suit No.22/87 for declaration of her title to the suit property on the basis of the sale deed.

The order of the High Court is clearly contrary to law as laid down by this Court. The judgment of the High Court in review application is set aside. Consequently, judgment and order passed in the Second Appeal stand restored. Appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal & Ors vs K.K. Modi & Ors

The application was filed under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. Respondent No.1 filed reply to the said application. The appellants filed their rejoinder to the reply of respondent No.1 to the said application.

The learned single Judge of the High Court, vide his order dated 31.08.1994, allowed the application of the appellant seeking relief of amendment to the plaint. Respondent No.1 herein filed First Appeal against the order of the learned single Judge which was registered as FAO (OS) No. 35/2000 whereby the learned single Judge had allowed the application of the appellants seeking the relief of amendment of plaint. The Appellate Court allowed the appeal filed by respondent No.1 and dismissed the application of the appellants for amendment of plaint on the ground that the proposed amendment introduces a totally different, new and inconsistent case and that the application does not appear to have been made in good faith and at the instance of some one behind the curtain. Aggrieved against the said order, the above civil appeals have been filed.

27.08.2001 Appellate Court allowed the appeal filed by respondent No.1 and dismissed the application of the appellant for amendment of the plaint. 03.12.2001 SLP filed 18.01.2002 Notice was issued in the SLP - Further proceedings in the suit was stayed until further orders.

26.08.2002 Interim order dated 18.01.2002 shall continue to remain in operation during the pendency of the appeal.

From the above noted dates, it is clearly seen that the respondents have filed their amended written statement and the appellants their replication to the amended written statement and conducted admission and denial of documents and more so the issues were framed and despite the said fact, the High Court has allowed the appeal of the respondents and dis-allowed the application of the petitioner for amendment of the plaint.

In the result, the Civil Appeal Nos. 5350-5351 are allowed and the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in FAO (OS) No. 35/2000 and CM No.3 dated 27.08.2001 stands set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs.

The suit was filed in the year 1997. Now that the pleadings are complete and the suit is ready for trial, we request the High Court to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible and at any rate not later than 6 months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order from this Court or on production of the same by either party whichever is earlier.
State Of Haryana And Ors vs Bikar Singh

In view of the order that we propose to pass, it may not be necessary to recite all facts leading to the filing of the present appeal. The respondent herein was working as Conductor in the Haryana Roadways, Sirsa Depot. He was dismissed from service by order dated 25.8.94 by the General Manager of the Haryana Roadways. The order of dismissal is preceded by an enquiry in which the charge was found established against him. The charge against the respondent was that while he was working as Conductor in the Haryana Roadways Depot, he collected Rs. 200/- from the passenger but did not issue ticket and thereby embezzeled Rs. 200/-. Apart from that, it is also in evidence on record that the respondent prior to the dismissal of his service, was placed under suspension on several occasions and his annual increments were stopped. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, he preferred an appeal before the Additional Transport Commissioner which was dismissed on 29.6.1995. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed civil suit, namely, suit No. 1361/95 before the Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Sirsa inter alia seeking a decree of declaration that the respondent may be deemed to be in service and the orders dated 25.8.1994 and 28.6.1995 to be declared as null and void. The Trial Court framed as many as 7 issues. One of the important issue framed was issue No. 6, whether the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to try the present suit. We are dismay to note that no finding has been recorded on this issue by the Trial Court. The Trial Court, however, proceeded to examine the case on merits, without determining the jurisdiction of the court. It is now well established principle of law that a decree without the jurisdiction is a nullity. Unfortunately, all the courts below including the High Court has failed to notice this important question of law.

and Ors. v. Zakir Hussain, [2005] 7 SCC 447 in which my brother Dr. Justice AR. Lakshmanan was party, this Court after considering the various Judgments including the judgment referred above, has come to the conclusion that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such suit.

In the premises aforesaid this appeal is allowed. The order of the Civil Court and the High Court are hereby quashed and are set aside. The parties are asked to bear their own costs.
Jagat Ram vs Varinder Prakash

The facts not in dispute are as follows:

After the dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeal on 18.11.1981, Smt. Manshan filed the instant suit for recovery of possession of the suit land on 14.12.1982. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court by judgment and decree dated 24.6.1986 holding that the suit was barred by limitation. However, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was upset by the Additional District Judge by judgment and decree of 19th September, 1991. The aforesaid judgment and decree of the appellate Court was challenged before the High Court in the second appeal and the same was allowed by the High Court by its judgment dated 3rd October, 1997. The High Court held that under the compromise of 3rd August, 1945 a right was conceded in favour of Kirpi to enjoy the suit land during her life time. The High Court further held that Kirpi had no pre-existing right of maintenance, and therefore, the case was covered by Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act and not by Section 14(1). However, the High Court held that the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff on 14.12.1982 was barred by limitation since the widow had died on 5.9.1967 and the suit for possession was not filed within 12 years of her death.

We find no reason to set aside the judgment of the High Court. This appeal is therefore dismissed.
Chief Administrator Puda And Another vs Mrs. Shabnam Virk

Background facts in a nutshell, as projected by the appellants are as follows:

On 27.3.1996 pursuant to the aforesaid advertisement, a large number of applicants (including the respondent) applied for a MIG Super Category flat under the scheme in the prescribed Proforma Clause 12(ii), (iii) & (iv) of the said Proforma read as under:

Prior to the construction of the flats, the first draw for allocation of flats, was held on 7.12.1995. On the basis of this draw held prior to the construction of flats, allocation letters (including allocation letter dated 27.3.1996 issued to respondent) were issued. In the said allocation letters, the tentative cost of each flat was stated to be Rs.6.30 lacs. The said figure was purely provisional, as was made explicit by Note (i), (ii) & (iii) contained in the said allocation letter, which read as under:

On 21.10.1998 upon depositing 25% of the price of the flat as stipulated in the allotment letter, the respondent took possession of the flat. On 12.5.1999 the respondent filed complaint No. 486 of 1999 dated 12.5.1999 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Chandigarh (in short 'the District Forum') claiming, inter alia, that he was not liable to pay any amount over and above the price which was advertised while inviting applications for allotment much prior to the construction of the houses. The District Forum by order dated 17.10.2001 held that the price quoted was purely tentative and it was likely to be revised on the higher side by the time the houses are completed as there was clear condition to that effect in the advertisement. However, it directed the appellants to pay interest at the rate of 12% on the amount of Rs.1,03,000/- for a period of 1 year and 4 months on the ground that houses were likely to be completed by April, 1997 but the possession was handed over in August, 1998. Both the appellants and respondent preferred separate appeals before the State Commission, Chandigarh. The said Commission dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants and allowed the other appeal. The State Commission directed the appellant No.1Authority to charge only the price which was advertised while inviting the application for allotment and to pay interest at the rate of 12%. A revision petition was filed before the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short the 'Consumer Act'). The Commission held that there was no delay on the part of the appellant No.1Authority in handing over the possession. However it held that only the price which was advertised while inviting application for allotment could be charged. The Review Application filed was dismissed.

Above being the position the National Commission was clearly in error granting relief to the respondent. The appeals are allowed. No costs.
State Of Punjab & Anr vs Mewa Singh

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court directing appellants to allot a plot to the respondent at the rate which was prevalent in the year 1985. It was, however, directed that respondent has to pay interest @ 12% from 1985 upto the date of actual payment after adjustment of Rs.13,700/- which had already been paid as sale consideration. The order was passed in a writ petition filed by the respondent seeking a direction to the present appellants to modify the price indicated in the allotment letter dated 13.7.2001. The rate indicated was Rs.3,200/- per square yard.

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:-

The matter was carried before this Court in CA No.168/1983. By order dated 11.9.1997 the appeal filed by the present appellants was dismissed. Here again, the entitlement of respondents in the civil appeal was decided, but so far as respondent Mewa Singh is concerned, no discussion was made in view of the admitted position that his case was not pressed before the High Court. The respondent filed petition before the appellant praying for allotment. The letter written by the respondent dated 8.9.2000 related to allotment of plot against the original registration No.9895 in the oustees category. In the accompanying affidavit it was clearly indicated that he was agreeable to the prevalent rates of Punjab Urban Planning and Development (in short 'PUDA'). Accordingly on 13.7.2001 allotment letter was issued. It was clearly mentioned therein that tentative price of the plot was Rs.8,40,000/- calculated @ Rs.3,200/- per square yd. Questioning the rate fixed, the writ petition was filed and as noted above the High Court granted relief directing the rate prevalent in 1985 was to be applied.

The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.