L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Nisha Priya Bhatia vs Union Of India And Ors

2. During the course of arguments, the petitioner repeatedly referred to the fact that she had been sexually intimidated by her senior colleagues in office and that they had misused their positions and amassed huge fortunes. She also emphasized that it was on account of her attempts to highlight the misconduct of these officers that she had been harassed & hounded time and again and had even been denied her service dues.

5. We also see from paragraph No.18 of the petition that some over-lapping matters are pending before the Delhi High Court. For all these reasons, we are unable to grant any relief to the petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. She may however pursue her remedies before the Delhi High Court or elsewhere.

6. The Writ Petition is dismissed for the above reasons.
Kaka @ Tilak Raj(Minor) Tr.Father & Anr vs State Of H.P. & Ors

(d) Requisite direction be issued to the respondent No.1 for lodging an FIR against the Respondent Nos.2 to 7 under Section 193, 211, 341, 342, 447, 504, 506 and 34 IPC in the concerned police station and to record the statement of the persons present more than 100 on the date of forcibly taken out the petitioners in the police custody by dragging from the field to the main road in order to ascertain the complete truth of the alleged illegal action of the respondents No.2 to 7 ;

5. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, dismissed, but with liberty to the petitioner to pursue his remedies before the Criminal Courts.
State Of Maharashtra & Ors vs M/S. Narmada Estates Pvt. Ltd. & Ors

2. First respondent claims to be the owner of property bearing No.1300-1303, Village Yerawada, Pune District. First respondent claims that the said property bearing Nos.1300-1303 as also adjoining property bearing Nos.1304-1305 were requisitioned by the State Government from the then owners on 20.9.1942. Thereafter the properties were allotted and handed over to Yerawada Mental Hospital on 1.4.1945.

3. The Yerawada Mental Hospital found the area insufficient and shifted to a larger premises in or about 1990. Ever since then, property bearing No.1300-1303 is not in use. In fact the state government de-requisitioned and surrendered back the adjoining premises No.1304-1305 2 to its owners. On 27.2.1994, the first respondent purchased premises No.1300-1303 from the previous owners. The first respondent filed W.P.No.2310/1996 praying for a direction to the state government to derequisition the said property. However, the said writ petition was withdrawn on 23.7.1996 with liberty to file a suit. Thereafter, the first respondent filed a civil suit (No.40 of 1997) in the Court of Small Causes Court, Pune, for possession against (i) the State Government, (ii) Dy. Director of Health Services, (iii) Yerawada Mental Hospital, and (iv) the Collector of Pune. The legal heirs of previous owners were also impleaded as defendants 5(a) to (f) and 6(a) to (e). The said suit is still pending.

8. In view of the above, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order dated 17.2.2005 and consequently writ petition will stand restored to file of the High Court. The High Court may grant an opportunity to the parties to amend their pleadings, if necessary, and then decide the matter in accordance with law. Having regard to the fact that the matter relates to a requisition made in 1942 and the submission that from 1990, the property has not been used and that the property is in a very dilapidated condition, we request the High Court to dispose of the matter expeditiously. All contentions are left open.

___________________J.

January 15, 2010. (Surinder Singh Nijjar)
Surendra Nath Pandey & Ors vs U.P.Cooperative Bank Ltd. & Ors

2. The appellants were appointed during 1978-1981 on daily wage basis by the first respondent (UP Co-operative Bank Ltd., (for short `the Bank'), by way of stop gap arrangement. Upto 30.6.1981, they were on daily wages. From 1.7.1981, they were paid consolidated salary of Rs.368/- per month which was increased to Rs.575/- per month from 1.4.1982. From 1.7.1983, they were extended the benefit of the minimum in the pay scale applicable to regular employees, i.e. Rs.325/- per month, with allowances, but without yearly increments.

3. On 30.7.1985, the UP Regularisation of Ad-hoc appointments (on posts within the purview of the Uttar 2 Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Service Board)Regulations, 1985 were notified and came into force. In terms of the said rules, the appellants were regularised on different dates -- 1.10.1985, 9.12.1985, 24.4.1986 and 29.9.1986 and they were also extended the benefit of regular pay scales with all allowances. In the year 1990, they approached the Allahabad High Court by filing a writ petition seeking the benefit of regular pay scale, allowances and other benefits which were extended to regular employees, with effect from the date of their stop gap or ad-hoc appointment.

8. In view of the above, we are of the view that the appellants are not entitled to any relief based on the decision in Jai Kishan. The Division Bench of the High Court was justified in reversing the decision of learned Single Judge which extended the benefit of Jai Kishan to the appellants. The appeal has no merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

___________________J.
Nantu Ranjan Paul vs Steel Authority Of India Ltd. & Ors

The brief facts which are necessary in these two appeals are recapitulated as under:

The appellant preferred these appeals by way of special leave petitions against the judgment of the Division Bench.

We find no serious infirmity with the impugned judgement of the Division Bench. However, the appellant has been facing inquiry and Court proceedings for almost twenty five years and at this stage remitting the matter to the learned Single Judge would be very harsh to the appellant.

adjudicated. We, accordingly, put a quietus to the entire dispute after balancing the equities.

The appeals are, accordingly, disposed of. The parties to bear their own costs.
Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors vs A.G.Syed Mohideen & Ors

3. Appellants 2 to 4 herein filed a memo before the District Court stating that having regard to the decision of the Madras High Court in P. S. Subramanian v. K. L. Lakshmanan - 2007 (5) Mad. L.J. 921, the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain any suit under section 92 of the Code and therefore the suit may be transferred to the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. The learned District Judge rejected the said memo by order dated 1.8.2007 holding that he had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as the value of the suit was Rs.10 lakhs. The revision filed by the appellants, challenging the said order of the District Court, was dismissed by the Madras High Court by the impugned order dated 25.4.2008. The said judgment is challenged in this appeal by special leave. The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether a District Court in the State of Tamil Nadu, does not have jurisdiction to try a suit under section 92 of the Code. 3

11. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed. The learned District Judge will proceed to decide the suit expeditiously.

____________________J.
Babli @ Rajwanti vs State Of Haryana

1. Six persons, Rohtas, his wife Phoolwati, Babli @ Rajwanti, Sadhu Ram, Pada @ Jai Singh and Har Krishan were tried for offences punishable under Section 302/149 IPC for having committed the murders of Om Prakash, his wife Satwanti, and their four children, Rekha, Ajit, Dharmender and Rakesh on the late evening of 20th June, 1996 in village Jhanswa Kalan, Police Station Sahlawas, District Rohtak, Haryana. 2.1 The trial court in its judgment dated 10th April, 1997, Sessions Judge, Rohtak, convicted Rohtas, Sadhu Ram, Pada @ Jai Singh and Har Krishan for the aforesaid offences and sentenced them to death whereas the other accused were sentenced to imprisonment for life. The CRLA 1265 of 2006 REPORTABLE 2 accused thereupon filed an appeal in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana whereas the matter was referred under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Sessions Judge for the confirmation of the death sentence. The High Court vide the impugned judgment dismissed the appeal but also declined the murder reference thereby reducing the sentence on Sadhu Ram, Pada and Har Krishan to life as well. The present appeal has been filed at the instance of Babli @ Rajwanti alone as it appears that the other accused have accepted their conviction and sentence. 2.2 The case was initiated on the statement of P.W. 3 - Manju, the only surviving child of Om Prakash and Satwanti and the only one who witnessed the incident from outside the house as she was returning home after watching TV in the house of Ram Chander Brahman who lived just across the road. She, accompanied by Pradhan Suraj Bhan, went to police Station Sahlawas and lodged a report at about 11:45p.m. in which the names of the accused, the weapons that they were carrying and the injuries caused by them were given. On the completion of the investigation, the accused were brought to trial and convicted and sentenced as mentioned above. The trial court as well as the High Court have, perforce, relied almost exclusively on the CRLA 1265 of 2006 REPORTABLE 3 statement of P.W. 3 - Manju.

9. For the reasons given above, we are not inclined to interfere in this matter. The appeal stands dismissed.
Haridwar Development ... vs Raghubir Singh, Etc

3. The Land Acquisition Collector made an award dated 9.5.1994. He divided the acquired lands into three belts and awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.26.25 per sq.ft. for the lands falling in the first belt, Rs.17.50 per sq.ft. for lands falling in second belt and Rs.13.12 per sq.ft. for the lands falling in the third belt. The Reference Court however limited the division of the acquired lands into only two categories, that is lands falling within 500 metres from the National Highway and lands falling beyond 500 metres from the National Highway. In regard to the first category, it awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.26.25 per sq.ft. and for the second category Rs.17.50 per sq.ft. Feeling aggrieved, both sides filed appeals. The High Court awarded a uniform rate of Rs.26.25 per sq.ft. for all the acquired lands and rejected the belting system adopted by the collector and the categorization adopted by the Reference Court. The High Court also confirmed that claimants will be entitled to all statutory benefits, that is additional amount under section 23(1A), solatium under section 23(2) and interest under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (`Ac' for short).

Re : Question (iii)

14. In view of the above, the appeals filed by the Authority are dismissed. The appeals filed by the claimants - landowners are allowed and the compensation is increased from Rs.26.25 per sq.ft. to Rs.29.50 per sq.ft. We reiterate that the claimants will be entitled to all the statutory benefits, that is additional amount under section 23(1A), solatium under section 23(2) and interest under section 28 of the Act. Parties to bear their respective costs.
State Of M.P vs Balram Mihani & Ors

2. The Station House Officer, Itarsi moved applications before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Itarsi for initiating proceedings against the respondents herein under Chapter VII-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") for attachment and forfeiture of the properties of the respondents. According to the applications, the said properties were derived from or used in commission of offences and were acquired from the criminal activities. The police 2 further urged that the respondents were involved in the criminal activities since long and had accumulated huge wealth derived directly or indirectly by or such criminal and unlawful activities. According to the police some of these properties were in the names of their relatives which were clearly traceable to the respondents herein. The prayer thus was made under Section 105-D of the Code for authorization to take all necessary steps to trace out and identify such properties and further for the forfeiture and vesting thereof. Some other applications were also filed on identical facts against some other respondents also. The Trial Court having passed an order in pursuance of these applications allowing the same, the respondents challenged the same by way of a petition under Section 482 of the Code. Finding that there were divergent opinions on the tenability of the applications amongst two learned Single Judges of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the matter was referred to the Division Bench and the Division Bench by the impugned order quashed the proceedings holding that the provisions of Chapter VII-A were not applicable to such local offences complained of. It is this order which is in challenge before us at the instance of the State Government in these appeals.

12. Lastly we see the provisions of Section 105-L which are clear that the Central Government may by notification in the official gazette, direct that the application of this chapter in relation to a contracting State with which there are reciprocal arrangements would be subject to some conditions, exceptions and qualifications as would be specified in the said notification. It is, therefore, clear that the whole chapter is specific chapter relating to the specified offences therein and has nothing to do with the local offences or the properties earned out of those.

14. If such a construction as claimed by the petitioner is given then it would mean that even for the offences which are local in nature and committed within the State, still the property connected with those offences 11 shall be forfeitured to the Central Government. That would obviously be an absurd result.

15. Lastly, we cannot ignore the likely misuse of the provisions in Chapter VIIA if the whole Chapter is made applicable to the local offences generally. Such does not appear to be the intendment of the Legislature in introducing Chapter VII A.

16. In view of the above we approve the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and confirm the same. The appeals are dismissed.
Industrial Development Corpn.,Orissa ... vs M/S. Visa Steel Ltd. & Ors

By order dated 17.06.2008, this Court extended the time till 15.09.2008 for complying with the directions of this Court. The applicant enumerated various steps that were taken after the said order till the date of filing of the present application. By pointing out those steps/deliberations, the applicant has prayed for extension of time by another two months.

8) On going through the materials placed by the applicant, we intend to extend further time and we make it clear that we have not expressed anything either on the conduct of the IDCOL or State Government or the merits of the objection of the Jindal in this application.

9) Without expressing any opinion on the above mentioned issues, we extend the time by 15.03.2010 for compliance. The applications are disposed of accordingly.

6 FEBRUARY 1, 2010.
Tukaram S.Dighole vs Manikrao Shivaji Kokate

6. In support of the case, one of the documents placed on record by the appellant was a VHS Cassette which, according to him, was obtained from the Election Commission of India and contained a true reproduction of the speeches delivered by the respondent and his supporters during the election campaign. Out of the 20 documents produced, only 3 documents viz. FIR dated 12th October, 2004 (Ex. P2), complaint dated 29th October, 2004 (Ex.P3) and a special supplement issued in the newspaper "Gavkari" on 3rd September, 2004 (Ex.P4) were exhibited. No other documents, including the VHS Cassette, were exhibited. The appellant and the respondent examined themselves as witnesses in support of their respective stands. No other witness was examined.

22. In R. Vs. Maqsud Ali6, it was said that it would be wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded are properly identified. Such evidence should always be regarded with 5 (1967) 3 SCR 720 6 (1965) 2 ALL E.R. 464 17 some caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances of each case.

26. For the afore-going reasons, we see no merit in this appeal.

We, therefore, affirm the decision of the Tribunal and dismiss the appeal with costs, quantified at Rs.20,000/-.

FEBRUARY 5, 2010 19
State Bank Of India & Anr vs Raj Kumar

2. The respondent's father employed as a Messenger in the Appellant Bank, died on 1.10.2004. Respondent's mother made applications dated 6.6.2005 and 14.6.2005 requesting for his appointment on compassionate grounds. When the applications were being processed and verified, the compassionate appointment scheme was substituted by the "SBI Scheme for payment of ex-gratia Lumpsum Amount" with effect from 4.8.2005. The new scheme abolished the old 2 scheme for compassionate appointments and instead provided for payment of an ex gratia lumpsum amount as per its terms. Clauses 14 and 15 of the new scheme relevant for our purpose are extracted below:

3. As the old scheme came to be abolished and compassionate appointment was no longer permissible after the new scheme came into force, the Bank on 31.1.2006 advised the family of the deceased to make an application under the new scheme for ex-gratia payment. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent filed a writ petition before the 3 Allahabad High Court. A learned single Judge of the High Court by order dated 8.5.2008 directed the appellant to reconsider the case of the respondent for appointment on compassionate grounds, holding that the old scheme applied and the new scheme was only prospective in operation. The said order was affirmed by the Division Bench by order dated 1.9.2008, which is under challenge in this appeal by special leave.

13. We therefore allow this appeal in part as follows:

____________________J.

(R.V. RAVEENDRAN) ____________________J.

(K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN) New Delhi;

February 08, 2010.
S.Narahari Rao vs Sathyanarayana & Ors

The background facts in which this Civil Appeal has been filed are that the appellant filed a suit being O.S. NO.1150 of 2009 in the City Civil Court, Bangalore, along with an application for temporary injunction (I.A.No.1 of 2009) for restraining the respondents from putting up any construction on the suit property. On 18.02.2009, the City Civil Court, Bangalore, while issuing summons/notices to the respondents, directed the parties to maintain the status quo in respect of the suit property. In response to the summons/notices, the respondents appeared in the suit and filed I.A. No.2 of 2009 praying to the City Civil Court to vacate the order of status quo on the ground that the entire dispute was pending before this Court in S.L.P. (C) No.10352 of 2007 and other connected SLPs filed against the common judgment dated 22.12.2006 of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court. The Trial Court took the view that since the entire dispute is pending before this Court, this Court alone has jurisdiction to consider grant of interim relief and by its order dated 02.04.2009 rejected the application for temporary injunction. The appellant thereafter filed Miscellaneous First Appeal No.2519 of 2009 before the Karnataka High Court against the order dated 02.04.3009 of the City Civil Court, but the Karnataka High Court by its order dated 08.06.2009 also dismissed the Miscellaneous First Appeal on the ground that the subject-matter of the suit was also the subject-matter of S.L.P. (C) No.10352 of 2007 before this Court.

Since we have decided the dispute pending before this Court, we set aside the impugned order dated 08.06.2009 passed by the Karnataka High Court in Miscellaneous First Appeal No.2519 of 2009 and the order dated 02.04.2009 passed by the City Civil Court, Bangalore, in I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2009 and remand the matter to the City Civil Court, Bangalore, to hear the parties and decide the application for temporary injunction and the suit in accordance with our judgment delivered today in Civil Appeal Nos.3038 of 2007 and other connected Civil Appeals.

The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. No costs. A copy of the judgment passed today in Civil Appeal Nos.3038 of 2007 and other connected Civil Appeals be sent to the City Civil Court, Bangalore.
Daljit Singh & Ors vs U.T.Chandigarh & Anr

3. On the basis of highest bid of Rs.80 lacs given by them in the open auction conducted by the Chandigarh Administration, residential site No.1199, Sector 19-B was sold to the appellants subject to the conditions enumerated in letter dated 3.1.2005 issued by the Estate Officer, Union Territory, Chandigarh (respondent No.2). The appellants deposited Rs.20 lacs representing 25% of the bid money. They took physical possession of the site on 25.1.2005 (in the impugned order, the date of delivery of possession has been mentioned as 22.2.2005) but surrendered the same on 3.3.2005 by stating that due to unavoidable reasons they were not in a position to retain the site. Upon receipt of the appellants' request for surrender, respondent No.2 issued letter dated 24.3.2005 and called upon them to show cause as to why penalty @ 2.5% of premium may not be imposed and recovered under Rule7-A of the Rules. The appellants did not contest the notice. Rather, appellant No.1 appeared before respondent No.2 and pleaded that the request for surrender be accepted subject to the condition specified in the notice. Thereupon, respondent No.2 passed order dated 20.4.2005 whereby he accepted the surrender of the site and imposed penalty in terms of the show cause notice.

4. After 2 years and 6 months, respondent No.2 issued notice dated 5.11.2007 to the appellants requiring them to deposit Rs.3,38,082/-. This 3 was done on the premise that inadvertently penalty @ 2% of the premium had been imposed at the time of acceptance of surrender of the site, though in terms of Rule 7-A(2) of the Rules, penalty @ 5% of the premium ought to have been imposed. Appellant No.1 submitted reply dated 16.11.2007 and contested the demand by asserting that notice had been issued by the concerned officer without taking cognizance of the fact that surrender had already been accepted. Simultaneously, he prayed for withdrawal of the request of surrender by stating that he was ready to deposit 25% premium. The relevant portions of the reply submitted by appellant No.1 are extracted below:

12. In the result, the appeal is allowed. While approving the view taken by the High Court on the interpretation of Rule 7-A (1) and (2) of the Rules, we accept the prayer made by the appellants and quash the demand raised by respondent No.2 vide notices dated 5.11.2007 and 26.12.2007. The parties are left to bear their own costs.