L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Ishwar Chandra Jayaswal vs Union Of India & Ors

2. The Division Bench was confronted with the dismissal from service of the Appellant Dr. Ishwar Chandra Jayaswal against whom three Articles of Charge had been framed. Article-I was that he demanded and accepted a sum of Rs.26/- from Shri Pyare Ram, Khalasi for issuing in his favour a Fit Certificate. Article-II, in similar vein was that the Appellant demanded and accepted a sum of Rs.34/- from Shri Nandlal, Semi-skilled Revetter for issuing him a Fit Certificate. Article-III was that the Appellant had demanded and accepted Rs.18/- from Shri Balroop, Semi-skilled Revetter for issuing of Fit Certificate. The Inquiry Officer, after duly perusing the entire evidence, returned a finding that Charges 1 and 3 had been proved. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the response of the Appellant, by its Order dated 22.1.1991 imposed the penalty of removal of the Appellant from service.

7. It is in these premises that the Appeals are accepted and the impugned Order dated 11.10.2010 is set aside. The Appellant shall be deemed to have compulsorily retired under Part-III Penalty 6(vii) of the aforementioned Railway Rules with effect from 22.1.1991. If he is entitled to retiral or other benefits on the said date, the Respondents shall make necessary payment within three months from today. This decision is restricted to the facts of the present case.
Keshar Bai vs Chhunulal

3. Briefly put, the facts are that the appellant-landlady purchased House No. 1/2, Street No. 6, Parsi Mohallah, Indore (‘the said building’) from M/s. Pyare Mohan Khar, Hari Mohan Khar, Shayam Sunder Khar and Anil Khar predecessors-in-title of the appellant by a registered sale deed dated 26/9/1991 for a consideration of Rs. 1,70,000/-. At the time of purchase of the said building, the respondent-tenant was occupying one room (‘suit premises’) situated on the rear side of the said building as tenant. The respondent was informed by the predecessors-in-title of the appellant that the appellant is the new landlady of the said building and he should pay the rent to her. The respondent agreed to pay the rent but failed to pay it. Failure of the respondent to pay the rent resulted in a notice being sent by the appellant to him on 23/11/2002, but despite the notice the respondent did not pay the rent.

5. The respondent contested the said suit and filed a written statement denying the title of the appellant as well as the grounds on which his eviction from the suit premises was sought. The respondent denied that there was any attornement between the parties and that there was a landlord- tenant relationship between him and the appellant. He claimed to be tenant of the earlier landlord Shri Khar. He contended that he had never paid any rent to the appellant. He denied the genuineness of the registered sale deed dated 26/9/1991.

16. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below that the respondent had denied the title of the appellant. We are of the view that the present case is covered by Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act. It is, therefore, necessary to restore the decree of eviction. In the circumstances, we allow the appeal. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and eviction decree passed by the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate court under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act is restored.

17. The appeal is disposed of in the afore-stated terms.

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.5126/2011 (From the judgement and order dated 03/08/2010 in SA No.756/2004 of The HIGH COURT OF M.P AT INDORE) KESHAR BAI Petitioner(s) VERSUS CHHUNULAL Respondent(s) Date: 07/01/2014 This Petition was called on for pronouncement of judgment today.

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, Adv.

Mr. A. Shukla, Adv.

Mr. Nirnimesh Dube,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Amit Pawan,Adv.

Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai pronounced the reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Her Ladyship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice J. Chelameswar.

The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

(Signed reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
M.D.Jacob vs United India Insurance Ltd.& Anr

2. The appellant was a victim of road accident on 27th July, 1997. On account of several serious injuries including amputation of complete left hand, severe injuries in head, dislocation of bones in hip and both knees and severe injuries in foot, the Doctor assessed his disability at 100%.

3. The appellant preferred a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Chennai and sought compensation of Rs.26,00,000/- (rupees twenty six lacs). The Claims Tribunal allowed a claim for Rs.14,20,000/- (rupees fourteen lacs and twenty thousand only) vide judgment dated 9.8.2000 rendered in M.C.O.P. No. 3365 of 1997. The claim allowed on different heads includes:

6. The High Court did not interfere with the multiplier and as indicated above, without good reasons treated the monthly income of the appellant to be Rs.3,000/- in place of Rs.5,000/-. Inexplicably the High court has retained loss of income for one year to be Rs.60,000/- which is possible only if the monthly income is accepted to be Rs.5,000/-. There is no reason assigned even for reducing the compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- for pain and suffering to Rs.1,00,000/- and of Rs.4,00,000/- for permanent disability to Rs.3,00,000/-.

7. Considering that the appellant had suffered 100% disability, in our view, the learned Tribunal was quite justified in allowing Rs.14,20,000/- as total compensation on the basis of monthly income of Rs.5,000/-. The judgment of the High Court under appeal is therefore set aside and the judgment and order of the Tribunal is restored. The dues payable to the appellant on account of this order should be deposited by the respondent- Insurance Company with the Tribunal within eight weeks along with interest on such amount at the rate of 9% to be paid from the date of petition i.e. 27.08.1997. The appellant shall be entitled to withdraw the said amount without any condition.

8. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs.
M/S.Mamta Surgical Cotton Industries vs Asstt. Commnr.(Anti-Evasion), ...

Accordingly, a show cause notice was issued to the assessee. The assessee took the stand that cotton and surgical cotton are not distinct commodities for the purposes of levy of tax under the Act. The said stand of the assessee was rejected by the Assessing Authority which passed an order of assessment whereby the assessee was taxed at the rate of 4% and the penalty and interest thereon, dated 28.03.2000.

5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of assessment, the assessee had carried the matter by way of an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) Commercial Tax, Ajmer. The said authority, accepted the stand of the assessee that the process adopted for making surgical cotton out of cotton purchased does not bring into existence a new commercial commodity and that surgical cotton is nothing but another form of cotton and accordingly, allowed the appeal and granted the relief to the assessee by order dated 10.10.2000.

6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the First Appellate Authority, the Revenue had carried the matter before the Rajasthan Tax Board, Ajmer (for short, “the Board”). The Board after considering the meaning of the expression 'manufacture' as defined under the Act and also placing reliance on the observations made by this Court in various decisions has come to the conclusion that the surgical cotton manufactured by the assessee is a new commercial commodity exigible to tax separately at the rate of 4% under the Act and therefore, set aside the orders passed by the First Appellate Authority and restored the orders passed by the assessing authority for the assessment years in question by order dated 28.06.2002.

Utility and Commercial use:

38. In view of the above, we cannot take any exception to the impugned judgment and order passed by the High court in so far as the Assessment Year 1992-93 is concerned.

Assessment Years 1993-94 to 1998-99:

42. Therefore, the question that falls for our consideration is whether in terms of the relevant entries for aforesaid Assessment Years “surgical cotton” is liable to tax or not.

50. Principles of Statutory Interpretation (12th Edn., 2010) by Justice G.P. Singh, at p. 181, has discussed in detail the connotations of the word “include” and emphasized on the exhaustive explanation of the word “inclusive” thus:

55. In light of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that “surgical cotton/absorbent cotton wool I.P.” is also “cotton” for the purposes of the relevant entries in the notifications for assessment years 1993-94 to 1998-99 and therefore is liable to exemption from levy of tax under the Act. In light of the same, we cannot sustain the judgment and order passed by the High Court for the assessment years 1993-1994 to 1998- 1999.

56. In the result, the appeals are allowed in part and the judgment and order passed by the High Court is confirmed for the assessment year 1992-93 and the judgment and order of the High Court so far as it relates for the assessment years 1993-94 to 1998-99 is set aside. No order as to costs.

Ordered accordingly.
Anand Agro Chem India Ltd vs Suresh Chandra & Ors

3. The facts in nutshell are as follows. Respondents 1 to 3 supplied sugarcane to the sugar mill of the appellant in the year 2007-08, for which the appellant has not paid the price in spite of several representations made by the respondents 1 to 3 herein. This led to the filing of Writ Petition in Writ-C no.14936 of 2013 by respondents 1 to 3 seeking for issuance of the Writ of Mandamus directing the appellant herein to release the sugarcane price to them. The Division Bench of the High Court after hearing both sides directed the District Magistrate, Hathras to take immediate action against the Directors and occupiers of the appellant-sugar mill against whom several orders have been passed under the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation and Supply) Act, 1913 and it further observed in the order that the District Magistrate may in exercise of his powers cause arrest of the Directors and occupiers of the sugar mill to recover the dues and in the event of such arrest, they will not be released until they have paid the entire amount due against them. The appellant-sugar mill aggrieved by the said order preferred a Special Leave Petition in SLP(C) no.16633 of 2013 and this Court by order dated 1.5.2013 dismissed the petition by observing thus :

In the above backdrop, it is not possible to find any fault with the direction given by the Division Bench of the High Court and there is absolutely no justification for this Court’s interference with the impugned order.

The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.……..” Thereafter the appellant-sugar mill filed an application in the pending Writ Petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad seeking for stay of arrest of the Directors pursuant to the order dated 26.4.2013 and the Division Bench of the High Court after -

hearing both sides and after referring to the earlier orders held that no modification/vacation of the order dated 26.4.2013 is required and, accordingly, rejected the prayer of stay of arrest. Challenging the said order the appellant-sugar mill has preferred the present appeal.

appellant for the stay of arrest and after hearing both sides rejected the said plea by the impugned order and we find no error in it.

13. The appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.

January 24, 2014.
Tapash Kumar Paul vs Bsnl & Anr

This appeal has been preferred by the appellant who succeeded in getting an order of reinstatement in his favour by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta in Reference No. 27 of 1997 dated 13th May, 2002, by which the order of reinstatement was passed in his favour. However, the Tribunal declined to grant back wages to the appellant except Rs.20,000/- to be paid by the respondent as compensation towards back wages. This Award was passed by the Tribunal since the Management had failed to produce relevant documents to disclose the actual number of days for which appellant has worked and so his termination was held to be in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

In view of this we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and restore the Award of the Tribunal and the order of the Single Judge affirming the same.

The appeal accordingly is allowed but without cost.

...........................J. (V. GOPALA GOWDA) New Delhi, January 28, 2014 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4980 OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15357 of 2013) TAPASH KUMAR PAUL .... APPELLANT VERSUS BSNL & ANR. .... RESPONDENTS O R D E R Leave granted.

In view of the two orders giving separate reasons, though concurring, the appeal is allowed.

JANUARY 28, 2014
Lachoo Ram & Ors vs Himachal Road Transport Corpn

6. According to the case of the appellants/claimants the deceased Dalip Singh lost his life immediately after the accident as a result of rash and negligent driving of a bus belonging to the Corporation driven by Lachoo Ram respondent no.2 on 12.07.1995. It is also their case that the accident occurred near traffic lights on the narrow Cart Road at the point near Gurudwara Singh Sabha and State Bus Terminal, Shimla, which is hardly 100- 150 yards from the Gurudwara. Both, the deceased on a motor cycle and the bus had stopped at the traffic light. When the light turned green, the vehicles started. The respondent no.2 allegedly moved the bus very fast in a rash and negligent manner and struck against the motorcycle by its side. The deceased fell down and was fatally wounded leading to immediate death.

12. The appeal is dismissed but without any costs.
Vishal Agrawal & Anr vs Chattisgarh State Electricity Board ...

3. The respondent, viz. Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (hereinafter to be referred as the 'Board') is the supplier of electricity in the State of Chhattisgarh. The appellants are the consumers of the Electricity and getting supply thereof through the Electricity connection provided by the Board. As per the Board, the appellants were found committing theft of the electricity which was revealed on 23.3.2006 when the Electricity meter of the appellant was inspected by the Inspection Team of the Board. It transpired that instead of the approved 55.204 KW, the appellants were using load of 59.810 KW and the meter was also tampered with. The Board made a complaint to the Station House Officer (SHO), Police Station, Civil Lines, Bilaspur. On the aforesaid allegations with request to the SHO to register a FIR against the appellants on the basis of a complaint dated 30.3.2006, the FIR was registered by the SHO on 31.3.2006 being FIR No. 227 of 2006 under Section 135/126 of the Act. After investigating into the matter, officer in-charge of the Police Station filed the challan before the Special Judge, Bilaspur who passed orders dated 30.6.2006 taking cognizance of offence under the aforesaid provisions of the Act.

5. The Board did not accept the aforesaid order and challenge the same before the High Court by filing Criminal Revision on 4.2.2007. Within four months thereof the Electricity Act was amended by inserting, inter alia, Sections 151(A) and 151(B) to the said Act with effect from 15.6.2007. The High Court has by impugned order dated 26.2.2008, reversed the orders of the Special Judge holding that as per Rule 12 of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Rules, the police has been authorised by the Central Government to forward the complaint received by the officers authorised under Section 151 of the Electricity Act to the concerned Court and, therefore, the complaint was validly instituted.

(3) The occupant of the place of search or any person on his behalf shall remain present during the search and a list of all things seized in the course of such search shall be prepared and delivered to such occupant or person who shall sign the list:

2) The police shall investigate the complaint in accordance with the general law applicable to the investigation of any complaint. For the purposes of investigation of the complaint, the police shall have at the powers as available under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(3) The police shall after investigation, forward the report along with the complaint filed under Sub-clause (1) to the Court for trial under the Act.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, every special Court may take cognizance of an offence referred to in Section 135 to 139 of the Act without the accused being committed to it for trial.”

26. As a result this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.
M/S.S.V.A.Steel Re-Rolling Mills ... vs State Of Kerala & Ors

2. The facts giving rise to the present appeals, in a nut-shell, are as under:

3. So as to put the aforestated policy in practice, the respondent-State had issued a Government Order dated 21st May, 1990 which read as under:

4. By virtue of the aforestated policy declared under the order dated 21st May, 1990, the respondent-State had assured the manufacturing units to be set up in the State of Kerala that electricity connection would be given to the projects which might be set up and they would be exempted from power cut for a period of 5 years from the date of commencement of commercial production. Such new units were also given certain exemption in relation to payment of electricity duty for a period of five years.

6. The respondent-State had thereafter passed a further order on 6th February, 1992, whereby the new units were exempted for 5 years from the payment of enhanced power tariff on certain conditions. According to the appellants, they were also entitled to benefit under the aforestated G.O. dated 6th February, 1992.

34. In view of the incentives and assurances given to the appellants along with others, who were desirous of setting up new industries, the appellants set up their new units which were much dependant upon continuous supply of electricity. One of the appellants is a Steel Re-rolling Mill. In Steel industry, when the industry is concerned with making of steel or re-rolling of steel, it requires lot of power and energy, and electricity being one of the important sources of power, the appellant was much dependent on continuous supply of electricity, which had been assured to it by the respondent-State.

37. For the aforestated reasons, in our opinion, the respondent-State was not wholly fair when it extended benefit to the appellants only for the period during which electricity supply was reduced to less than 50% on certain days.

38. We, therefore, hold that the benefit extended by the respondent State is not sufficient. The respondent-State ought to have extended the period even for the days when supply of electricity was more than 50% but not 100% as assured under G.O. dated 21.5.1990 and 6.2.1992. We, therefore, direct the respondents to give the said benefit by extending the period of incentive.

39. We, therefore, allow the appeals by quashing and setting aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and direct the respondents to calculate the period during which 100% electricity supply was not given to the appellants and extend the period of incentive accordingly. The calculation shall be made and consequential orders shall be passed within two months from today. The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs.
State Bank Of India & Ors vs Surya Narain Tripathi

(3) The brief facts of this appeal are that the one B.P. Tripathi the father of the first respondent was working in the State Bank of India from 27.12.1969 and he died while in service on 19.1.1998 after completing more than 28 years of service. At that time he was working as Assistant Manager. The respondent No.1 who is his son applied for a job on compassionate basis and his application was turned down by the Bank which led to the writ petition. The writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge and the appeal of the Bank therefrom was dismissed. Hence this appeal by special ...2/-

(5) It is the case of the Bank that as far as the present appointment is concerned all relevant factors were considered. It was noticed that the salary of the deceased at the time of his death was Rs.8,970/-. His family was given an amount of Rs.5,98,092/- plus 0.25 lakh as terminal benefits. If the said amount was to be invested properly, it would get interest at least of Rs.5,000/- p.m. This was apart from the family pension of Rs.4208+Admissible D.A. ...3/-

Besides the Bank has made appropriate financial provision at par with similar arrangement that was noted by this Court in the case of M.T. Latheesh (supra). Therefore it is not possible for us to say that the Court could have directed the Bank to consider compassionate appointment. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed. The judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench are set aside. The writ petition No.5045 of 1999 filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed.

(10) Although we are allowing this appeal, Mr. Vikas Singh very fairly stated that looking at the difficulties of the family, and that the respondent was required to go through the litigation upto the Supreme Court, the Court may consider granting appropriate litigation expenses to the respondent. We quite appreciate this gesture and order that the appellant Bank will pay an amount of Rs.1 lakh to the respondent on this count. However, we make it clear that this order on costs is made in consideration of the special facts of this case.

FEBRUARY 11, 2014.

Date: 11/02/2014 This Appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
Union Of India & Ors vs S.P.Verma

2. The dispute in this appeal relates to the validity of an order dated 18.2.1998 of dismissal passed by the appellants against respondent. The dismissal came as a measure of punishment for proved misconduct on account of the respondent having occupied a parcel of land owned by the Indian Railways with whom the respondent was employed at the relevant point of time. The dismissal order was challenged by the respondent before the Central Administrative Tribunal who quashed the same by its order dated 17.5.2007. The appellants questioned the said order of dismissal before the High Court of Allahabad in W.P. No.30501 of 2007 which was disposed of by a Division Bench of that Court by an order dated 8.2.2008. The High Court was of the view that the Tribunal committed no error in quashing the order impugned before it but gave liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to initiate departmental proceedings in accordance with law on the happening of any of the events mentioned in the order of the Tribunal. The High Court held that since the appeal filed by the respondent-employee against the order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer had not been disposed of, the appellant would be free to take further steps in the matter once the appeal is disposed of.

6. The appeal lacks merit and is dismissed.

February 11, 2014.