L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
K H Nazar vs Mathew K Jacob

1. The width and amplitude of the expression ‘commercial site’ in Section 2 (5) and Section 81 (1) (q) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (for short, “ the Act”), falls for our consideration in these Appeals. Commercial sites are exempted from the purview of the Act. The question whether a rocky land which is used for quarrying purposes can be treated as a ‘commercial site’ and thereby excluded from the applicability of the Act was answered by a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court by holding that mere blasting of rocks and 1 conversion into metals does not render the area a ‘commercial site’.1 Twenty years after the said judgment, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court took a different view. Quarrying was held to be a commercial operation involving the process of manufacture. Hence, it was held that a quarry falls within the ambit of ‘commercial site’ and is exempted from the applicability of the Act.2

17. We uphold the view of the majority that exemption of quarries by the Government under Section 81 (3) would not arise if quarries are covered by Section 81 (1)

20. The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no error in the majority opinion of the Full Bench in the impugned judgment which requires to be upheld.

21. The Appeals are dismissed, accordingly.
State Of West Bengal vs Calcutta Club Limited

1. This Appeal arises out of a reference order by a Division Bench of this Court, reported in State of West Bengal v. Calcutta Club Limited (2017) 5 SCC 356. The facts of Civil Appeal No. 4184 of 2009 are set out in the said reference order as follows: 3

9. At the very outset, we may mention certain undisputed facts. It is beyond cavil that the respondent is an incorporated entity under the Companies Act, 1956. The respondent assessee charges and pays sales tax when 5 it sells products to the non-members or guests who accompany the permanent members. But when the invoices are raised in respect of supply made in favour of the permanent members, no sales tax is collected.”

42. Looked at from another point of view, a members’ club may supply goods which are not food or drink – for example, soap, cosmetics and other household items. These items would be “goods”, but would not be within sub-clause (f) - not being food or drink, and cannot, therefore, be taxed under sub-clause (f), leading to the absurd situation of the supply of food and drink being taxable in members’ clubs, and the supply of other goods in such clubs being outside the tax net. For this reason also, it is clear that the subject matter of sub-clause (f) is entirely different and distinct from that of sub-clause (e), and cannot possibly apply to members’ clubs. In this view of the matter, the expression “in any manner whatsoever”, being part and parcel of sub-clause (f) cannot be held to extend to a supply of all goods so as to bring such goods to tax when applied to members’ clubs.

owner must be taxed.”

xxx xxx xxx

50. Having gone through the judgment and order of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal dated 3rd July, 2006 and the impugned Calcutta High Court judgment dated 1 st February, 2008, and in view of the answers to the three questions referred to the present Three Judge Bench (as listed hereinabove), we are of the view that no interference is called for in the findings of fact or declaration of law in this case. Accordingly, C.A. No. 4184 of 2009 stands dismissed.

C.A. No.7497 of 2012 and other connected matters

51. Delay condoned. Leave is granted.

54. Likewise, the Gujarat High Court by the judgment dated 25 th March, 2013, followed the judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand and declared the following:

63. Under Section 67, where service tax is chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value, it was stated:

be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner.”

xxx xxx xxx Explanation 3. For the purposes of this Chapter;- 66

October 03, 2019 76
M.Ramalingam vs State Tr.Insp.Of Police

2. The brief facts of the case are that T.Maran(A1) in all the three cases was the Branch Manager in the Indian Overseas Bank (IOB), Narikudi from 4th May, 1988 to 28th January, 1991. Accused no. 1(T. Maran) along with one Nagrajan(A2 in CC No. 04/1995) (who was the clerk­cum­typist died after filing of the charge­sheets) were the custodian of the jewel safe of the Branch. Three separate criminal cases CC No. 03/1995, 04/1995 and 05/1995 were filed against him and the allegation was that appellant(T.Maran­A1) sanctioned agricultural jewel loan of Rs. 7,000/­ in favour of M. Ramalingam(A2 in CC No. 03/1995) in AJL No. 78/89. It was alleged that the jewels deposited in AJL No. 45/81 had been used by A1 (T. Maran) for the purpose of advancing loan AJL No. 78/89 to M. Ramalingam(appellant 3 in Criminal Appeal No. 1949 of 2009). For that purpose, account no. AJL 45/81 was opened on 12th November, 1981 and closed on 26 th March, 1988.

5. It was unearthed when appellant(T. Maran­A1) went on leave from 4th October, 1990 to 6th October, 1990. PW­2 (Krishnamoorthy) became in­charge and found certain discrepancies and informed the same to the Chief Zonal Officer. The Vigilance Officer was deputed to 4 enquire into the loan accounts who, after enquiry, found serious irregularities and thereafter three separate FIR were registered and finally the charges were framed in each of them against appellant T. Maran(A1) who was charged under Section 120B, 467, 467 read with 471, 420, 477­A IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and accused M. Ramalingam(A2 in CC No. 03/1995 was charged under Section 120B, 420 IPC and accused N. Rajangam(A2 in CC No. 05/1995) was charged under Section 120B, 467 read with 471 IPC.

9. It is to be noticed that apart from the criminal case, both the employees faced departmental enquiry and after being held guilty, appellant(T. Maran­A1) was dismissed from service on 8 th July, 1992.

16. We are not able to trace out any evidence in respect of dishonesty/misuse in obtaining loan without furnishing any security. In our view the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the charges levelled against the appellant(M. Ramalingam and 11 N. Rajangam) in Criminal Appeal No. No. 1949 of 2009 and Criminal Appeal 347 of 2010 and, the conviction of appellant M. Ramalingam under Section 120B and 420 IPC and appellant N. Rajangam under Section 120B, 467 read with 471 IPC deserves to be set aside.

17. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 1949 of 2009 filed by M. Ramalingam and Criminal Appeal No. 347 of 2010 filed by N. Rajangam are allowed. The impugned judgment qua the appellants is hereby set aside and since both are on bail, their bail bonds be discharged.

18. At the same time, Criminal Appeal Nos. 2186­2188 of 2009 filed by appellant T. Maran (A1) are hereby dismissed. The appellant T. Maran was granted bail on 9th April, 2010. His bail bonds are cancelled and he is directed to surrender and undergo remaining part of the sentence.

19. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
R.Srinivas Kumar vs R.Shametha

2. That the marriage of the appellant and the respondent took place on 09.05.1993. That out of the said wedlock, the respondent gave birth to a male child on 29.08.1995. It appears that there were differences of opinion between the parties and according to the appellant­husband, cruelty was meted out to him. Up to 1997, many a times, the respondent­wife stayed at her parental house. The appellant­husband filed a divorce petition in the year 1999 being O.P. No. 157 of 1999 before the Family Court at Hyderabad. That the said petition was filed for a decree of divorce against the respondent­wife under Section 13(1) (ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. That the learned Family Court dismissed the said divorce petition by observing and holding that the appellant­husband has failed to prove the cruelty by the respondent­wife. The Family Court also refused to pass a decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the Family Court at Hyderabad dated 04.09.2003 in O.P. No. 157 of 1999 dismissing the divorce petition, the appellant­husband preferred an appeal before the 2 High Court. Before the High Court also, the appellant­husband sought a decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has dismissed the said appeal. Hence, the appellant­husband is before this Court by way of the present appeal.

3.2 Shri Guru Krishna Kumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant­husband has also stated at the Bar that the appellant­husband is ready and willing to pay a reasonable permanent alimony to the respondent­wife in case a decree of dissolution of marriage is granted to the appellant­ husband.

8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the application for divorce filed by the appellant­husband for dissolution of marriage is hereby allowed. The marriage between the appellant­husband and the respondent­wife is ordered to be dissolved in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India on the condition and as agreed by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant­ husband that the appellant­husband shall pay to the respondent­ wife a lump sum permanent alimony, quantified at 9 Rs.20,00,000/­ (Rupees Twenty Lakhs) to be paid directly to the respondent­wife by way of demand draft within a period of eight weeks from today. Till the permanent alimony as above is paid to the respondent­wife, the appellant­husband to continue to pay the maintenance as being paid to her.

9. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.
Rajasthan State Road Transport ... vs Danish Khan .

2. The Respondent’s father Mohd. Shahid who was working as a Helper in the Appellant-Corporation died in a motor accident. He was travelling in a bus of the Appellant-Corporation which collided with another bus. A claim was made by the Respondent before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Tonk (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) under Section 166 and 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’). An amount of Rs.1,35,50,000/- was claimed, but the Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs.22,95,775/-.

3. The Respondent made a representation to the Chief Manager of the Appellant-Corporation seeking compassionate appointment. The request for compassionate appointment was rejected on the ground that the Respondent was not entitled in light of Regulation 4(3) of the Regulations. Dissatisfied with the rejection of the request for compassionate appointment, the Respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High Court challenging the constitutionality of Regulation 4(3). The High Court allowed the Writ Petition by a judgment dated 29.08.2016 on the ground that Regulation 4(3) of the 2 | Page Regulations is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

11. The two categories of dependents i.e. dependents of employees who have died in an accident while travelling in a vehicle belonging to the Corporation and dependents of the employees who died while travelling in a vehicle not belonging to the Corporation are not similarly situated in respect of their claims against the Corporation. They cannot be treated as equals. Therefore, Regulation 4(3) cannot be said to be discriminatory. In the aforementioned view, we are not in agreement with the judgment passed by the High Court that Regulation 4(3) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

12. As the Respondent has received the compensation under the Act, he is not entitled for compassionate appointment under the Regulations.

13. In view of the above, the judgment of the High Court is set aside the Appeal is allowed.

Civil Appeal No. 7803 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.13139 of 2017) The application preferred by the Respondent for compassionate appointment was rejected by the Corporation as being not maintainable under Regulation 4(3) of the 9 | Page Regulations, due to the fact that the Respondent has filed a claim petition under the Act. The High Court allowed the Writ Petition as being covered by a judgment in Civil Writ Petition No.13862 of 2014. The Appeal filed by the Corporation is allowed in terms of the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 7802 of 2019 (@ S.L.P.(C) No.4772 of 2017).
Fainul Khan vs State Of Jharkhand

2. The occurrence is said to have taken place on 01.11.1983 at about 06.30 PM. The accused were variously armed with spears and lathis. P.W. 7 and 8 are stated to be injured eye witnesses. P.W 6 also claimed to be an eye witness. The police report was lodged by P.W. 8 at the hospital.

18. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the conviction of the appellants. The appeals are dismissed. The appellants are stated to be on bail. Their bail bonds are cancelled and they are directed to surrender forthwith to serve out remaining period of sentence.
Kantilal vs The State Of Gujarat

1. On 02.10.2013, Maheshwari committed suicide by jumping from Jamalpur Bridge into Sabarmati River. FIR was registered on a complaint filed by her father (PW-1) that Maheshwari was being harassed by her husband – Suhag Kantibhai Parmar and his family members for not complying their demand of dowry. He further alleged that Suhag Kantibhai Parmar had an illicit relationship with another lady. Appellant- Kantilal Laxman Parmar, father-in-law of the deceased, was also accused of physically assaulting Maheshwari. Allegations of physical and mental cruelty were made 1 | Page against Pratik @ Pintoo Kantibhai Parmar - brother-in-

2. On completion of the investigation, charges were framed against all the accused. After conducting trial, the City Sessions Court, Ahmedabad convicted all the accused under Sections 498A and 114 IPC. Accused No.2-Suhag Kantibhai Parmar was further convicted under Section 306 IPC read with Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Accused No.1- the Appellant and Accused No.3 - Pratik @ Pintoo Kantibhai Parmar were also convicted under Section 323 IPC. Accused No.2- Suhag Kantibhai Parmar was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five 2 | Page years and a fine of Rs.2000/- for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. He was further sentenced to five years for the offences punishable under Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and three years for the offence punishable under Section 498A IPC. The Appellant and Accused No.3 Pratik @ Pintoo Kantibhai Parmar were sentenced to undergo three years imprisonment for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 114 IPC and six months for the offence punishable under Section 323 IPC. Accused No.4- Bhavnaben Kantibhai Parmar and Accused No.5- Manoramaben Kantibhai Parmar were sentenced to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 498A.

6. In view of the aforesaid, the Appeal is allowed and the Appellant is acquitted of the charges under Sections 498A, 114 and 323 of the IPC. The Appellant is directed to be released forthwith if he is not required in any other case.

7 | Page
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Sabal Singh (Dead) By Lrs

2. The suit was filed by the plaintiffs/ respondents, as the successor of the Ex­Zamindar. At the time of the abolition of Zamindari, it was recorded as 'Grass’ land, in the name of their predecessor. They prayed for declaration of Bhumiswami rights and permanent injunction, restraining the defendants from interfering in their possession of the land comprised in Survey Nos.77, 83, 191, 195 2 and 799 corresponding to new Survey Nos.37, 103 and 460 total area 83 Bighas 4 Biswas situated in village Enchada, Tehsil Nateran, District Vidisha in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The defendant – State of Madhya Pradesh treated plaintiffs/respondents as encroacher of agricultural land, and they were threatened with dispossession on 1.5.1980 and 12.10.1980, whereas they have acquired the rights of Bhumiswami under provisions contained in Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code as they became Pacca tenant on the abolition of Zamindari. The plaintiffs/ respondents claimed that the land was Khud­kasht land of their predecessors; Nirbhay Singh and Pratap Singh who were Zamindars of Village Enchada.

4. The Trial Court dismissed the suit. The First Appellate Court affirmed the same; however, the High Court allowed the second appeal and decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. They have been declared to be Bhumiswami of the land, and the permanent injunction has also 3 been granted. Aggrieved thereby the appeal has been preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh.

31. Resultantly, the judgment and decree passed by the High Court deserves to be and are set aside. The judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court are restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

(M.R. SHAH) OCTOBER 14, 2019;

NEW DELHI.
Ebha Arjun Jadeja vs The State Of Gujarat

2. Digitally signed by ARJUN BISHT Briefly stated the facts of the case are that appellant no. Date: 2019.10.16 15:49:02 IST Reason:

3. The prosecution version is that on 10.04.1995, when Police Inspector C.J. Singh along with some other police personnel was doing night round in Kutiyana and was trying to keep a secret watch over bootleggers, he received some information that appellant no. 1, who was absconding in Crime No. II­3/1994, was coming to his village in a motor vehicle. The police inspector arranged two witnesses and after preparing preliminary panchnama, left Kutiyana in a Government jeep at about 1.00­ 1.15 a.m. They set up a naka and at about 2.45 a.m., one motor vehicle came from the side of village Garej. The vehicle was asked to stop and it stopped. Accused no. 1 was found sitting on the driver’s seat. The police cordoned the motor vehicle in which two other persons (appellant nos.2 and 3) were also sitting. All these three persons were asked to get down and disclose their identities. On making personal search of these three persons, following recoveries were made:

18. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed, the order of the Designated TADA Court is set aside and the appellants are discharged from the offences under TADA Act but they may be 14 proceeded against under other provisions of law, if required. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
Mani Pushpak Joshi vs The State Of Uttarakhand

2) An FIR was lodged by Harpreet Singh, father of prosecutrix (aged about 6 years), on April 19, 2017 at 1:23 p.m., about sexual assault on her daughter. The FIR reads as under:

4 for short, ‘IPC’ 5 for short, ‘POCSO Act’ 8

16) The statement of the child so as to involve a person wearing spectacles as an accused does not inspire confidence disclosing more than prima facie to make him to stand trial of the offences. Therefore, we hold that the order of summoning the appellant under Section 319 of the Code is not legal. The fact, that the prosecution after investigations has found no material to charge the present appellant is also cannot be ignored. The heinous crime committed should not be led into prosecuting a person only because he was part of the Management of the School. We have extracted the evidence led by the prosecution only to find out if there is any prima facie case against the appellant. We are satisfied that there is no prima facie case against the appellant, which warrants his trial for the offences pending before the Court.

17) Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the Trial Court to summon the appellant under Section 319 of the Code is set aside and the application is dismissed.

OCTOBER 17, 2019.
M. Hariharasudhan vs R. Karmegam

Later, aggrieved by the filing of the suit, Respondent No. 1, along with some henchmen, damaged certain construction materials on the Appellant’s property, causing damage to the tune of Rs. 2.27 lacs. The Appellant resultantly lodged the first information before the police and a crime came to be registered against Respondent No. 1, who later further 2 damaged the show-case glass at the Appellant’s hotel by pelting stones at it and damaged its automatic glass door by driving a car into the hotel. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 trespassed into the hotel and took away cash of more than Rs. 1 lac. The Appellant spent Rs. 73,000/- on medical expenses for his injured employees, and subsequently filed O.S. No. 186 of 2016.

3.2 The Trial Court decreed the suit, i.e. O.S. No. 186 of 2016, holding that the Appellant was entitled to damages of Rs. 18,28,941/- with interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the suit till the date of realization, with proportionate costs. The maintainability of the suit was not an issue before the Trial Court.

3.3 The High Court, in appeal, framed points for consideration with respect to the maintainability of the suit, non-joinder of necessary parties, and the accrual of the cause of action. Though it was held that the suit was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and was not prematurely filed, the decree was set aside solely based on the finding that the suit was not maintainable. The High Court found that there was no express bar on civil jurisdiction in the Act. However, it held that since the Act specified a particular method for claiming 3 compensation for damage to property in Sections 10 and 11 of the Act, as well as Rule 4 of the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Rules, 1994 (in short “the Rules”), all other methods for claiming compensation were excluded by implication, and thus the jurisdiction of the civil court was impliedly barred. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed the instant appeal.

17. As mentioned supra, the Trial Court, upon holding that the suit is maintainable, proceeded to decree the suit on merits. The appeal before the High Court, filed under Section 96 of the CPC, was decided only on the preliminary point pertaining to the maintainability of the suit. In view of our finding that the suit is maintainable, the matter has to be remitted to the High Court for hearing the first appeal on merits.

18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and consequently, the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court for deciding the first appeal being A.S. (MD) No. 143 of 2018 on merits.

October 17, 2019.
Naresh Kumar vs Govt.Of Nct Of Delhi

2. Brief facts of this case, relevant for the purpose of the present appeals are, that land of the appellants was sought to be acquired by a notification dated 23.05.2002 issued under Section 4 of the Act, followed by a declaration under Section 6 of the Act issued on 17.12.2002. An Award bearing no.16/03­04 dated 01.10.2003 was passed by the Land Acquisition Collector awarding compensation of Rs.1,97,08,397/­ in favour of the appellants, out of which, an amount of Rs.1,87,10,194/­ was paid to the appellants and the balance amount of Rs.9,98,203/­, along with interest, still remains to be paid.

No orders as to costs.