L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
City Montessori School vs State Of U.P. & Ors

2. Appellant runs an educational institution situated at 11, Station Road in the town of Lucknow. The premises belong to one Smt. Urmila Bhalla and Smt. Sheela Kapoor. It measured 23,000 sq. ft. of land. The land together with constructions thereupon measuring about 16,000 sq. ft. was 2 given in tenancy in favour of the appellant. The rest of the area, namely, 6,000 sq. ft. was given in tenancy to Late Mr. N.K. Bhargava (predecessor- in-interest of Respondent No.8.

3. Allegedly, appellant became a defaulter in payment of rent. A suit for ejectment was filed by the landladies resulting in a decree for eviction passed against it by the learned Civil Judge, Lucknow by a judgment and decree dated 9.11.1970. A first appeal and a second appeal preferred thereagainst were dismissed by orders 4.5.1971 and 13.7.1976. The school, however, sent a requisition before the State of Uttar Pradesh for acquiring the entire 23,000/- sq. ft. of land on or about 22.7.1976. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity called and referred to as `the said Act') was issued pursuant thereto on or about 7.9.1976 and published in the Official Gazette on 6.10.1979. A declaration in terms of Section 6 of the Act was issued in respect of the entire land measuring 23,000 sq. ft on 6.10.1979.

4. Shri N.K. Bhargawa, predecessor-in-interest of the contesting respondents filed a writ petition challenging the legality and/or validity of the said notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. A Division Bench of the said Court, by a judgment and order dated 26.5.1998 found the said 3 notifications under Sections 4 and 6 to be unsustainable and quashed the same, inter alia, holding :

5. The landladies were, however, not impleaded as parties in the said writ application. They, in the meanwhile, entered into a settlement with the appellant.

Three special leave petitions were filed against the said judgment and order dated 26.5.1998 before this Court by, i.e., (1) State of Uttar Pradesh; (2) City Montessori School; and (3) Uttar Pradesh Parents Association. An interim order was passed on 3.8.1998 directing the parties to maintain status quo with regard to the possession.

8. As would appear from the affidavit affirmed by Shri Shashank Bhargava, the matter was listed on 21.7.2004 but was adjourned for two months. The matter was again adjourned on 21.9.2004 for a further period of three months taking note of the fact that the State Government had proposed to denotify the area occupied by the respondent from out of the total land acquired. In this connection, respondents have stated :

28. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.

IA NO. 6 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.6747 OF 1999

29. In view of the order passed above, no separate orders are required on this I.A. ..............................J. [S.B. Sinha] ..............................J. [Cyriac Joseph] New Delhi;

FEBRUARY 18, 2009
Commr.Of Income Tax,Dibrugarh vs Doom Dooma India Ltd

5. The facts in all these civil appeals are similar. Respondent- assessee, at the relevant time, was in the business of growing and manufacturing of tea. In this case we are concerned with the assessment year 1988-89. Applicability of Rule 8 is not in dispute. Assessee raised additional grounds before CIT(A) at the time of hearing of the appeal inter alia stating that the AO had erred in determining the opening "written down value" of the block of assets without following the provisions of Section 43(6)(b) of the 1961 Act. According to the assessee for arriving at the opening "written down value" of the block of assets, the AO erred in deducting 100 per cent of the depreciation for the preceding year calculated at the 3 prescribed rate from the opening "written down value". However, the assessee claimed that only 40 per cent of the depreciation allowed at the prescribed rate ought to have been deducted and not 100 per cent as done by the AO. In this connection reliance was placed by the assessee on Section 43(6)(b) of the 1961 Act. Accordingly, by additional grounds which were allowed to be raised, the assessee sought a direction from CIT(A) to the AO to determine the "written down value" in accordance with the provisions of Section 43(6)(b) by deducting only 40 per cent of the depreciation computed at the prescribed rate, being depreciation actually allowed. This argument of the assessee came to be rejected by CIT (A).

Deductions/allowances provided in Sections 30 to 43D are allowed in determining Gross Total Income and are not chargeable to tax because the same constitute charge on profit, whereas, deductions under Chapter VIA are allowed from Gross Total Income chargeable to tax. Therefore, the judgments rendered in the context of Section 80-HHC of the 1961 Act, both by this Court and by the Kerala High Court, stand on different footing.

18. For the aforestated reasons, we find no merit in the Department's civil appeals which are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

February 18, 2009.
Shekara vs State Of Karnataka

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

3. Primary stand before the High Court was that the victim was more than 16 years of age and she had consented to the act. The High Court did not accept the plea and upheld the conviction as recorded.

10. Considering the background facts and the position in law as indicated above, the inevitable conclusion is that the appeal is without merit deserves dismissal which we direct.

.....................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ......................................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) New Delhi, February 18, 2009 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 479 OF 2002 Shekara .. Appellant(s) Versus State of Karnataka .. Respondent(s) ORDER In paragraph 10 of judgment dated 18th February, 2009, it shall read that the appeal is allowed to the extent that the custodial sentence would be the period undergone.
S.N. Mathur vs Board Of Revenue/C.C.R.A. & Ors

This appeal relates to the stamp duty payable in regard to a deed of trust dated 9.8.1991 executed by the appellant and his two brothers. The executants paid a stamp duty of Rs. 1,325/ thereon, under Article 64 of Schedule I-B to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as amended in U.P. (`Act' for short). The registering authority being of the view that it was not duly stamped, impounded it and referred it to the adjudicating authority. The said Authority made an order that the deed also answered the definition of 2 "settlement" as defined under section 2(24) of the Act, and therefore stamp duty was payable under Article 58 of Schedule I-B of the Act on the declared value of the trust property (Rs.2,10,000/-). He directed recovery of deficit stamp duty of Rs.10,225/- and an equal amount as penalty. The said order was challenged by the appellant by filing a revision before the Chief Controller (Board of Revenue), Allahahad. The revisional authority dismissed the revision by order dated 21.5.1996. The appellant challenged the said order in Writ Petition No.54 of 2002. The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the authority under the Stamp Act did not commit any error in construing the instrument to be a "settlement" as defined under section 2(24) of the Act and that stamp duty was payable under Article 58. The said order is challenged in this appeal.

2. The title part of the instrument reads thus : "This deed of Private Trust is made on 9.8.1991 by (names of three Donor Trustees) in order to preserve, protect and manage the property known as `Mathur Atithi Shala' situated at Chitrakoot, on the following terms and conditions :" The preamble to the instrument recites that the said property was the self-acquired property of their father and he had constructed the Atithi Shala therein for housing the pilgrims, and the said property is being used for the said purpose ever since 3 then; that they (the three donor Trustees) had inherited the said property from their father and they possess and own the said `Mathur Atithi Shala' and have full disposing power; that as they were no longer able to manage the property, they decided to form a private trust consisting of the member of the family to look after the said property and have accordingly created the said trust to be known as `Shri Jamuna Janki Mathur Trust' for the due preservation, protection and management of the said property. The operative portion of the said deed states :

9. We will now examine whether the three decisions relied on by the appellant is of any assistance.

10. We therefore uphold the decision to subject the deed to stamp duty under Article 58 of the Act. We are however of the view that the case does not warrant levy of penalty equal to the deficit stamp duty. On the facts and circumstances, we reduce the penalty to Rs.5/-. The appeal is allowed in part accordingly.

__________________J [R. V. Raveendran] _________________J [J M Panchal] New Delhi;

February 18, 2009.
Ai Champday Industries Ltd vs Official Liquidator & Anr

3. Appellant was served with a notice dated 15-02-2007 by Bhatpara Municipality claiming payment of arrears of property tax amounting to Rs.47,59,597.19/- for the period from 1991-1992 and 2006-2007, stating :

Appellant on receipt of the said notice took out a Chamber Summons praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs :

22. Dues of the Municipality would also not even otherwise come within the purview of the crown debt. Even a crown debt could be discharged only after the secured creditors stand discharged.

24. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.10,000/-

February 19, 2009
A.Venkatakrishnan vs State Of T.Nadu & Ors

3. The short question which arises for determination in this Civil Appeal concerns challenge to the Constitutional validity of Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act, 1998, by which initially the rate of tax in respect of contract carriage stood increased from Rs.1500/- per seat per quarter to Rs.2000/- per seat per quarter, and subsequently the said rate stood enhanced from Rs.2000/- per seat per quarter to Rs.3000/- per seat per quarter vide Notification No.1184 dated 30.11.2001 with effect from 1st December 2001.

11. In the circumstances we permit the appellant herein to withdraw the Civil Appeal with liberty to file proper writ petition, if so advised. We make it clear that we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court which is based on the petition originally filed by the petitioners. Subject to above, Civil Appeal stands dismissed with no order as to costs. We make it clear that if a proper writ petition is filed giving requisite data to the satisfaction of the High Court, then any observation made in the impugned judgment will not come in the way of the appellant. All contentions of both sides are expressly kept open.

13. Subject to the above, the Civil Appeal is dismissed with no orders as to costs.
M/S Sorath Builders vs Shreejikrupa Buildcon Limited & Anr

2. In the present appeal what is under consideration is the construction of Veterinary College building at Navsari Agricultural University, Gujarat (hereinafter referred to as "University"). Since construction of the aforesaid building was required to be done immediately, University released the grant which was going to lapse on 31.03.2009. The University issued a Tender Notice No. 20/2008-09 on 21.11.2008 inviting tenders for construction of Veterinary College building at Navsari Agricultural University, Gujarat. The tender notice was widely advertised through publication in newspaper "Sandesh", being the largest local daily in the State of Gujarat. The tender notice was also published on the internet. The notice inviting tenders required the following from the bidders:

5. The said writ petition was placed before the Division Bench and after looking into the records and after hearing the parties the Division Bench held that the University acted arbitrarily in requiring the pre qualification documents to be sent physically so as to reach the University by R.P.A.D./Speed Post by 27.11.2008, inasmuch as it meant that the contractor had to send pre qualification documents by the aforesaid mode Page 3 of 12 by dispatching the same latest by 25.11.2008. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed and the decision of the respondent no. 2 - University dated 10.12.2008 accepting the bid of the appellant was quashed and set aside with a further direction that the University shall issue a fresh tender notice with the same terms and conditions but it would also provide seven days time for submitting the pre qualification documents after the end date for downloading the bid documents.

16. In that view of the matter, we set aside the Judgment and Order of the High Court and upheld the decision of the University in awarding the contract in favour of appellant. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed.
M/S. Kwality Manufacturing ... vs Central Warehousing Corporation

This appeal by special leave relates to the validity of an arbitration award made against the respondent. The respondent (also referred to as the `Corporation') entered into a contract dated 9.6.1984 with the appellant (also referred to as the `contractor') for supply of 32 lacs bamboo mats at a price of Rs.3.35 per mat to be supplied by the appellant, inclusive of sales- tax, F.O.R. destination. In pursuance of the said contract the respondent supplied 5,59,554 mats. The contractor sent various communications requesting for joint inspection and payment.

2. As its demands were not complied with, at the instance of the appellant, the disputes were referred to arbitration. The claims of the contractor were as follows :

3. The respondent resisted the claim. It contended that the mats supplied were of sub-standard quality and did not conform to the specifications, and therefore the entire supply was rejected; that the appellant had failed to comply with the arrangements mutually agreed in the telex dated 15.12.1984 and letter dated 2.3.1985; that the appellant did not contact the Regional Offices for joint inspection of the defective mats; and that as the 3 appellant committed breach by failing to supply mats according to the specifications and failed to act in accordance with the arrangements arrived at between the parties, it was not entitled to any relief. The respondent made a counter claim for Rs.8,16,733/70, made-up of Rs.1,78,698.68 towards the extra cost incurred for risk purchase and Rs.6,38,035.02 towards storage charges for the rejected mats, which were not removed from the warehouses of the respondent.

13. The arbitrator has not awarded any interest from the due date till the date of entering upon the reference. The appellant has not challenged the 12 said refusal. The Arbitrator has awarded interest at 11% per annum only pendent lite, that is from the date of his entering upon the reference up to the date of the award. The appellant will therefore be entitled to interest at 11% per annum on the award amount from 2.9.1985 till date of award and at the same rate from the date of award till date of payment.

14. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part and there shall be a decree in terms of the award for Rs.834,103/- with interest at 11% P.A. from 2.9.1985 till date of payment. Parties to bear their respective costs.
State Of Kerala & Anr vs Mahesh Kumar & Ors

3. The relevant facts for disposal of the appeals are as under:

5. The Government Order G.O.(MS) No. 100/2000ds)H&FWD dated 25.4.2000 was issued regarding the introduction of `direct payment system' with effect from 1.1.2000 which, inter alia, provided that `direct Page 3 of 14 payment system' can be introduced in the Padiar Memorial Homeo College, allowing the management to fill up 15% seat for BHMS as is being enjoyed by the NSS Homeo College, Kurichy if they executed an agreement to this effect as provided in the conditions stipulated in the aforesaid Government order dated 10.11.1995. This Government order authorised the Senior Principal & Controlling Officer for Homoeopathic Education to take necessary action for making the staff fixation. Consequently, on 16.11.2001 he sent a list of 40 teaching and 50 non- teaching staff having qualification according to the government rules as on 1.1.2000 and considering the department seniority for staff fixation. The Government accepted and approved the said list as per Government Order G.O. (MS) No. 99/02/ H&FWD dated 25.4.2002 relevant portion of which is reproduced hereinbelow :

7. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, by its order dated 15.9.2004, allowed the petitions filed by the respondents and quashed the said government order dated 25.4.2002 to the extent it has excluded the respondents from the list of qualified teaching staff as on 1.1.2000 while including those teachers who are juniors to the respondents and directed the Government of Kerala to include the respondents at the appropriate place in the list on the basis of their seniority thereby entitling them for the salary in the pay scale made applicable under the `direct payment system'. This order of the learned Single Judge was affirmed by the impugned judgment of the High Court.

"15. Rights of persons possessing qualifications included in the second or the third schedule to be enrolled :

Page 11 of 14

OR M.D. or M.S. or Post Graduate diploma or Degree in the subject concerned.

20.Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we direct that the aforesaid remaining 8 persons be also given the same benefit as has been given to 40 teaching and 50 non-teaching staff and they shall be so accommodated in terms of their seniority. We, however, make it clear that this order is made in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and would not, therefore, be treated as a precedent in any other matter. Page 13 of 14

21.Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed.
State Of Kerala & Anr vs Naveena Prabhu & Ors

3. Relevant facts for disposal of the appeals are as under:

5. The Government Order G.O.(MS) No. 100/2000/H&FWD dated 25.4.2000 was issued regarding the introduction of `direct payment system' with effect from 1.1.2000 which, inter alia, provided that direct payment system can be introduced in the Padiar Memorial Homeo College, allowing the management to fill up 15% seat for BHMS as is being enjoyed by the NSS Homeo College, Kurichy if they executed an agreement to this effect as provided in the conditions stipulated in the Page 3 of 10 aforesaid Government order dated 10.11.1995. This Government order authorised the Senior Principal & Controlling Officer for Homoeopathic Education to take necessary action for making the staff fixation. Consequently, on 16.11.2001 he sent a list of 40 teaching and 50 non- teaching staff having qualification according to the government rules as on 1.1.2000 and considering the department seniority for staff fixation. The Government accepted and approved the said list as per Government Order G.O. (MS) No. 99/02/ H&FWD dated 25.4.2002 relevant portion of which is reproduced hereinbelow :

8. State of Kerala being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court which was dismissed and consequently the present appeals are filed in this Court.

14.Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case we find merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly allowed. The writ petitions stand dismissed.
Pepsu Rd. Trpt. Corpn. Patiala vs Kulwant Kaur & Ors

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing the appeal filed by the respondent No.1 Kulwant Kaur. An application for review of the judgment was also dismissed. The impugned judgment was in a Letters Patent Appeal which was filed against the judgment of Learned single Judge affirming the Judgment of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (in short the MACT). The MACT has dismissed the claim petition on the ground that there was no evidence to show any loss of dependency. The claimant's lawyer in the appeal before the High Court took the stand that the claim was restricted to Rs.50,000/- as no fault liability under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short the `Act').

3. The appeal filed by the claimant was allowed. Review application filed on the ground that Rs.50,000/- was not payable, was rejected.

8. Above being the position the appeal deserves to be allowed, which we direct. The amount shall be Rs.15,000/- instead of Rs.50,000/- as directed by the Tribunal.

9. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
State Of Rajasthan vs Hanif Khan & Anr

It is to be noted that one M. Nooran also faced trial alongwith respondents. The four accused persons faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Section 376(2)(g), 302, 201 and 120 B so far as three male accused persons are concerned and in respect of accused Nooran under Section 109, 302, 201, 120(B) IPC. As noted above the present appellants had filed appeals before the High Court. There was no appeal filed by accused M. Nooran. Before the High Court primary stand was that the complainant had not stated in the complaint as to what PW2 - the alleged eye witness is supposed to have told the complainant. The High Court accepted it and without even discussing the evidence of PW2 held that PW2 did not have any knowledge of the incident. Accordingly the appeals of the respondents were allowed. Additionally, Nooran who did not prefer an appeal was held to be entitled to the benefit of doubt and her conviction was set aside.

6. We find that the judgment of the High Court is practically unreasoned and shows complete non-application of mind. The only reason which can be culled out from the impugned judgment of the High Court to direct acquittal reads as follows:

9. Above being the position, the High Court's order is clearly unsustainable and is set aside and that of the trial court is restored.

10. The appeals are allowed.
State Of Orissa & Ors vs Khirod Kumar Nayak

4. The responded no.1 filed a writ application being OJC No.6857 of 1996 before the Orissa High Court claiming that he was appointed as "fourth peon" by the management of the concerned institution, which is an "aided educational institution" as defined under the Orissa Education Act, 1969 (in short the `Act') and Orissa Education (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and Members of the Staff of Aided Educational Institutions) Rules, 1974 (in short `Recruitment Rules'). It is not in dispute that if an institution is an aided educational institution, same is governed by the Act and rules framed thereunder. The Recruitment Rules are framed under the Act. As the functionaries of the State did not approve the appointment holding the same to be beyond the prescribed yardstick, writ applications were filed for direction to the concerned authorities to accord approval to the appointment.

13. We, therefore, while allowing this appeal direct that the management of the concerned institution shall move the concerned authorities for approval to the promotional appointment of a class IV employee, as 6 "Daftry". Simultaneously, it can also recommend for appointment to the class IV post, in case approval is accorded to the recommendation for appointment of "Daftry" on promotion. The decision on both motions shall be taken within three months from the date of submission of the recommendation in accordance with law keeping in view the operative yardsticks in force at the time appointments were made. Even if there has been refusal earlier, the matter shall be reconsidered in the light of what has been stated above.

15. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.