L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Sumer Builders Pvt. Ltd vs Narendra Gorani

2. The facts which are essential to be stated are that the parties to the lis entered into an agreement on 28.2.2008 for development of the land of the respondent. As per the said agreement, the appellant was required to develop a residential project and/or commercial complex and/or multiplex and/or hotels and/or malls etc. as permissible in law. The respondent had handed over the vacant possession of the land to enable the appellant to start the development work. Clause 13 of the development agreement contains an arbitration clause whereby the parties had agreed to refer the matter in respect of any difference or dispute between them with regard to the construction or the terms of the development agreement or with regard to the project undertaken for arbitration. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was entered into between the parties, which stipulates that the developer was required construct a township project consisting of one commercial building, 11 residential wings in four buildings and one club house under licence from the Indore Municipal Corporation. It was further agreed that if the MoU was terminated, the developer would not have any right, title or interest in the township project and would be required to remove his employees and machineries from the land. Clause 13 of the developer agreement was also incorporated in the MoU.

3. As disputes arose with regard to payment, the respondent terminated the MoU, forfeited the security deposit and invoked the arbitration clause by issuing a notice through his Advocate on 6.6.2013. The appellant herein replied to the termination notice by stating that it had carries out substantial construction on the property by constructing three buildings and by taking many other steps. It was also stated by the appellant that the environmental clearance certificate for the project was not obtained by the respondent and, therefore, further work was stopped. The appellant required the respondent to perform his part of the contract in obtaining the requisite environmental clearance, execute irrevocable power of attorney, refund the part of the amount payable and pay interest on the security deposit.

18. In the circumstances, the petitioners submit that the petitioners are entitled to, pending an adjudication in the proposed Arbitral proceedings and for a period of sixty (60) days after the award therein, for an order of injunction, restraining the respondent by himself or through his servants or agents from entering upon the property, subject matter of the Development Agreement and from dealing with and moving the machinery of the petitioners used in construction activity and from disturbing or interfering with the petitioners possession thereof in any manner.”

34. Resultantly, we find no substance in the appeal and accordingly the same stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Ratheesh vs State Of Kerala & Anr

6. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a Revision Petition before the High Court which was dismissed by the impugned judgment and order dated 6th September, 2013. The High Court, despite its limited revisional jurisdiction, went into the facts of the case and accepted the version of PW1 and affirmed the conviction of the petitioner. However, with regard to the sentence of imprisonment, the High Court reduced the period from seven years to two years rigorous imprisonment. With regard to the fine, it was directed that the entire fine of Rs. 35,000/- if recovered shall be paid to PW1 and in default thereof to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of six months.

5. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc-II). The first appellate court found no reason to interfere with the judgment and sentence delivered by the Trial Court and accordingly dismissed the appeal.

9. Under these circumstances, we decline to exercise our discretion and do not interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court including the punishment awarded to the petitioner.

10. The petition is dismissed.

...…………………….J (Madan B. Lokur) ...…………………….J (S.A. Bobde) New Delhi;

October 15, 2015
Veerenndra Kumar Dubey vs Chief Of Army Staff & Ors

2. The appellant was enrolled as an Operator in the corps of Artillery of Indian Army on 27th September, 1980. Having served in that capacity for nearly 12 years, he received a show cause notice pointing out that he had been awarded four red ink entries for various offences set out in the notice and that the appellant had become a habitual offender thereby setting a bad example of indiscipline in the army. The notice, on that premise, called upon the appellant to show cause as to why he should not be discharged from service under Army Rule 13(III)(v) read with Army HQ letter No.A/15010/150/AG/PS-2(c) dated 28th December, 1988.

3. The appellant submitted a reply to the show cause notice which does not appear to have cut any ice with the competent authority resulting in his discharge by an order dated 14th December, 1992. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal before respondent No.2 which proved of no avail. The authority in the meantime issued a discharge order/certificate of service on 15th October, 1993 which the appellant challenged in MP No.1980 of 1994 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. That petition was dismissed by the High Court on 18th January, 2006 on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction aggrieved whereof the appellant filed Writ Appeal No.429 of 2006 which came to be transferred to the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow and renumbered as Transferred Application No.16 of 2011. The Tribunal by its order dated 14th December, 2011 has now dismissed the transferred petition giving rise to the present appeal.

Note:-1. As far as possible, JCO, WO and OR awaiting dismissal orders will not be allowed to mix with other personnel.

15. In the result this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The order of discharge passed against the appellant is hereby set aside. Since the appellant has already crossed the age of superannuation, interest of justice will be sufficiently served if we direct that the appellant shall be treated to have been in service till the time he would have completed the qualifying service for grant of pension. No back wages shall, however, be admissible. Benefit of continuity of service for all other purpose shall, however, be granted to the appellant including pension. Monetary benefits payable to the appellant shall be released expeditiously but not later than four months from the date of this order. No costs.
Kamal @ Poorikamal & Anr vs State Of Tamil Nadu

2. One Sultan Meeran hereinafter referred to as Sultan, resident of Coimbatore fell in love with a Hindu girl, converted her to Islam and married her. Thereafter he converted another Hindu girl to Islam and married her as well. This conduct on the part of Sultan, according to the prosecution, enraged the first appellant who one month prior to the incident in question had gone to the house of the deceased. He called Sultan and stated that he was converting Hindu girls to Islam and marrying them and that there was danger to Hindu Religion because of him and that if he were to continue such conversions the things would become different and that he must save his life, if possible. At that time the father of Sultan, i.e. PW 8 Abdul Ajeezkhan was present in the house.

4. As they entered, they found the appellants sitting there. The first appellant called Sultan and spoke to him. Thereafter Sultan told PW-1 that they should go home and they came out of the club by about 10:45 p.m. PW-1 then started his motorcycle while Sultan was getting into his car. At that time the appellants came out and asked him to stop the car. The second appellant opened the door and sat in the back seat of the car of Sultan. He held both the hands of the deceased backwards and the first appellant who was standing outside, took out a knife from his trouser and repeatedly stabbed Sultan on the head and neck, stating that he had converted two Hindu girls to Islam and there was danger to Hindu Religion from him. The first appellant no.1 held the neck of Sultan and pulled him, at which point the second appellant came out, took another knife from his pocket and also stabbed him. According to the prosecution, at that stage PW-2 Ismail and PW-3 Sarvan Kumar had also reached the place of occurrence and witnessed the incident. When PWs 1, 2 and 3 tried to apprehend the appellants they were threatened that they would meet the same fate as that of Sultan and the appellants fled away.

5. Sultan in that injured condition drove the car and while he was near Raj Laxami Clinic he lost control over the vehicle and the car went into a ditch and stopped. PW-1 who was following him on his motor-cycle saw Sultan being unconscious. At that point, PW-9 Abudhaheer also came there. They managed to procure an ambulance and PW-9 took Sultan in the ambulance, followed by PW-1 on his motor- cycle. They reached Government Hospital at about 11:40 p.m. The duty doctor after examining Sultan declared him to be dead. After putting the dead body in the mortuary, PW-1 went home, wrote down complaint, Ext. P-1 and thereafter reached B-2 Police Station, R.S. Puram and lodged the complaint at about 00:30 hours on 27.03.2002. Crime No.389 of 2002 was accordingly registered for offences punishable under Sections 341, 302, 506 (ii) of the I.P.C. The FIR reached the Magistrate at 11:30 a.m. on 27.03.2002.

16. This appeal must therefore fail and is dismissed.

[1] 1997 (7) SCC 156
Kamlesh & Ors vs Attar Singh & Ors

3. The claimants Kamlesh, widow of deceased Rishi Parkash, three minor sons and mother of the deceased filed a claim petition as against the driver, owner and insurer of Maruti Car No.DL4CC -5172 and driver of three- wheeler Tempo No.HRH-3572. The compensation of Rs.12 lakhs was prayed on account of the death of Rishi Parkash in the accident dated 8.5.2003 caused due to the collision between Maruti car and tempo. Maruti car was driven by Rajinder Singh whereas the tempo was driven by Attar Singh, respondent No.4. Deceased Rishi Parkash was travelling in the tempo towards village Naina Tatarpur. As per the claimant Attar Singh was driving the tempo on his right side at a normal speed in due observance of the traffic rules. When he reached about 1.5 km. from Barwashni towards Gohana, Maruti car came from the opposite side and struck the tempo inbetween near footstep as a result of which Rishi Parkash received injuries and succumbed to them on the way to the hospital. Postmortem was conducted. Respondent No.1 Rajinder filed an FIR No.77 under section 279-304-A IPC against Attar Singh. Deceased was aged 36 years and was working as a Supervisor in Emkay & Co. He was receiving a salary of Rs.4,500 per month. Maruti car was owned by Hukam Chand and insured with Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

7. Aggrieved thereby Attar Singh preferred appeal before the High Court. The High Court on the ground that in the claim petition the negligence of Attar Singh has not been pleaded and the claimants have relied upon the evidence of Ram Parshad PW2 and Devender PW3 to prove the negligence of the driver of the Maruti car; whereas Rajinder driver of the Maruti car had lodged the first information report. As the claimants have not set up the case of negligence against Attar Singh. As such the High Court has allowed the appeal filed by Attar Singh driver of the tempo and has dismissed the claim petition. Aggrieved thereby the appeal has been preferred by the claimants.

10. In view of the aforesaid, the amount determined/awarded by the Claims Tribunal was Rs.5,81,000/- along with 6 per cent interest from the date of filing of the petition till the date of realization of the amount is upheld as no appeal for its enhancement was filed before the High Court by the claimants. It would be open to the claimants to recover the entire amount from any of the respondents, that is from owner, driver and insurer of the Maruti car or respondent No.4, driver of the tempo as their liability is joint and several with respect to claimants. It would be open to the respondents to settle their inter se liability as per the aforesaid decision of this Court. Appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.

……………………..CJI.
Union Of India & Ors vs Manoj Deswal & Ors

2. The facts giving rise to the present litigation in a nut-shell are as under:

3. On 27th August, 2005 he had been discharged from service as in view of the Commanding Officer under whom he was working, he was ‘unlikely to become an efficient soldier’. He had been discharged under the provisions of Army Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’). Before his discharge, a summary enquiry had been made as he had remained absent unauthorisedly and in the said enquiry it was found that his absence was unauthorized. Looking at the fact that Respondent no.1 had remained absent and had not resumed his duty, he was declared as deserter by an order dated 30th July, 2005.

11. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment delivered by the High Court is improper and unjust and therefore, it deserved to be set aside.

14. Upon hearing the leaned counsel, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error by setting aside the order of discharge and therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

20. In view of the aforestated facts, the High Court should not have quashed and set aside the said order of discharge which had been passed in accordance with law and therefore, we set aside the impugned judgment delivered by the High Court. The appeal stands disposed of as allowed with no order as to costs.

OCTOBER 28, 2015
Kamal Prashar vs National Airport Authority & Anr

The appellant filed Review Application No.161 of 2006 in so far as the judgment and order of the Division Bench in LPA No.21 of 2006 was concerned. Said review application was dismissed by the Division Bench vide order dated 05.05.2006. The appellant had also filed Review Application No.209 of 2006 against the judgment and order dated 07.02.2006 in so far as LPA No.314 of 2006 was concerned. Said review application was dismissed by the Division Bench vide its order dated 02.06.2006. The judgment and orders in LPA Nos.21 of 1999 and 314 of 2000 and aforesaid review applications are under challenge in these civil appeals. It may be mentioned that on 02.08.2006 the Government of India, Ministry of Civil Aviation, passed an order imposing the penalty of “dismissal from service” on the appellant.

The appellant thereafter filed Writ Petition No.4402 of 1995 in the High Court of Delhi submitting that since 04.02.1987 his services all the while were with the DGCA, that the entire disciplinary proceedings were without jurisdiction, that in any case on and with effect from 13.03.1995 his services were placed at the disposal of the DGCA and that despite such order he was not allowed to join his posting with the DGCA. The appellant therefore prayed that he be allowed to join his duty, that NAA be directed to disburse his full pay and allowances from July 1986 onwards and that the DGCA be directed to release his pay and allowances for the period from 04.02.1987. While opposing the petition, it was submitted that by virtue of the statutory scheme the appellant stood deputed with NAA but he had continued to remain absent with a view to avoid transfer out of Delhi. It was further submitted that so long as he was not relieved by NAA, the appellant continued to be in the service of NAA.

18. As the services of the appellant were deputed with NAA, it was definitely competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings for his continued absence. The order of dismissal passed on 02.08.2006 is not under challenge in these appeals. As regards the entitlement to seek disbursement of pay and allowances from NAA, in our view, the appellant is not entitled to any relief. We do not find any error in the assessment made by the High Court in the judgment and order under appeal. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals leaving it open to the appellant to raise any challenge as regards the order of dismissal, if so advised. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

………………………….J (Dipak Misra) …..………………………J (Uday Umesh Lalit) New Delhi October 28, 2015.
S.E.B.I. And Ors vs Alliance Finstock Ltd And Ors

Although the controversy relates to paragraph 4 of Schedule III, some other paragraphs are also relevant and hence these along with paragraph 4 are extracted hereinbelow :

The fees specified above shall be paid on or before the 1st day of October each year payable by draft in favour of “The Securities and Exchange Board of India” at Bombay, or at the respective regional office”.

As noted earlier the SEBI itself extended the benefit to those converting not only from 21.1.1998 but from 1.4.1997. There is nothing in paragraph 4 or in the explanation to support the stand of the SEBI that the benefits must be confined to conversions taking place after a particular date when no such date finds place in the Regulations. As a result, appeals preferred by SEBI are dismissed and the judgments and orders under appeal passed by SAT are upheld. In the facts of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.

November 03, 2015.
Unitech Ltd. & Anr vs Union Of India & Anr

2. Vidarbha Engineering Industries - Appellant No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Vidarbha Engineering’) holds on lease, three plots of land admeasuring 2595.152 sq mtrs i.e. 27934 sq ft at Dahipura and Untkhana, Nagpur (hereinafter referred to as the ‘subject land’). This land is comprised of three plots of land i.e. Plot Nos. 34, 35 and 36 obtained by Vidarbha Engineering from the Nagpur Improvement Trust. Vidarbha Engineering decided to develop the subject land and entered into an agreement for the purpose with Unitech Ltd. (herein after referred to as ‘Unitech’). The Memorandum of Understanding between them was formalized into a collaboration agreement dated 17.03.1994. Under this agreement the land holder agreed to allow Unitech to develop and construct a commercial project on the subject land admeasuring 2595.152 sq mtrs at the technical and financial cost of the latter. The parties to the agreement agreed, upon construction of the multi storied shopping cum commercial complex, that Unitech will retain 78% of the total constructed area and transfer 22% to the share of Vidarbha Engineering. Unitech agreed to create an interest free security deposit of Rs. 10 lakhs. 50% of the deposit was made refundable on completion of the RCC structure and the other 50% on completion of the project. The parties were entitled to dispose of the saleable area of their share. It was specifically agreed that this agreement was not to be construed as a partnership between the parties. In particular, this agreement was not to be construed as a demise or assignment or conveyance of the subject land. It is significant to note that the agreement does not contain any clause by which Unitech, the developer, is to pay any consideration in terms of money to Vidarbha Engineering, the land holder. The only consideration apparently provided is the entitlement of Vidarbha Engineering to 22% of the constructed area in the proposed multi storied building.

14. In the result, we find that the appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 20.02.2004 passed by the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur is set aside. Consequently, order dated 29.07.1994 passed by the appropriate authority under Section 269UD (1) of the Act is also set aside. There will be no order as to costs.

xxxxxxx

(f) “transfer”,-

(i) in relation to any immoveable property referred to in sub-clause

A transfer of property in completion of an exchange can be made only in manner provided for the transfer of such property by sale. [3] clause 4.6 : As a consideration for the SECOND PARTY agreeing to develop the said project land in phases and in the manner specified herein, the SECOND PARTY shall be entitled to retain 78% of the total constructed area of the multi-storeyed shopping-cum-commercial project and the FIRST PARTY’s share will be 22% of the same. This constructed area shall include the area in the basement, if there will be any.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-clause, “land, building, part of a building, machinery, plant, furniture, fittings and other things” include any rights therein.
All Kerala Online Lottery Dealers Ass vs State Of Kerala & Ors

2) Brief facts:

(d) Being aggrieved by the notification dated 22.04.2005 discriminating between the paper lotteries and online lotteries, the All Kerala Online Lottery Dealers Association, State of Sikkim and one Sreekala and others filed Writ Petition (C) Nos. 19582, 14495 and 16063 of 2005 respectively before the High Court.

(h) Against the said order, the appellants have preferred these appeals by way of special leave before this Court.

S.R.O. No. 73/2005 - WHEREAS Notification II G.O. (P) No. 4/2005/TD dated 13th January, 2005 published as S.R.O. No. 34/2005 in Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No. 77 dated the 13th January, 2005 prohibiting the sale of computerized and online lottery tickets in the State of Kerala.

Once such a decision is taken to have its State lottery-free zone, the entrustment of power by Parliament cannot be said to be ultra vires.

...…………….………………………CJI.

NOVEMBER 5, 2015.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.K. Agrawal pronounced the reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble the Chief Justice, His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra.

The appeals and writ petitions are dismissed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.
M/S Cochin Shipyard Ltd vs M/S Apeejay Shipping Ltd

2. The facts which are essential to be stated for the adjudication of this appeal are that an agreement was entered into between the parties on 29.11.1980. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement, the appellant, a Government undertaking, had agreed to build and deliver a cargo ship to the respondent for the price of Rs. 32.527 crores. Certain differences arose between the parties which led to an arbitration proceeding and a former Judge of this Court was appointed as the arbitrator/sole umpire to resolve the disputes between the parties. As facts would unveil, the learned arbitrator after holding series of sittings passed an award on 15.07.2009. After the award was sent to the civil court, the claimant-appellant moved the Court for passing a decree under Section 17 of the 1940 Act in terms of the award and the respondent filed O.P. (Arb.) No. 30 of 2009 under Sections 30 and 33 to set aside the award. During the pendency of the said petition, the respondent almost after expiry of two years filed an application, that is, I.A. No. 5625 of 2011 seeking permission to examine the learned arbitrator and the General Manager of the respondent as witnesses. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, vide order dated 23.12.2011, rejected the application holding that there was no justification to examine the arbitrator; that the Court while considering the objections under Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act does not sit in appeal over the arbitrator’s award; that the Court does not assess or re-appreciate the evidence; that the award passed by the learned arbitrator can only be assailed on the grounds as engrafted under Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act; and that no reason had been disclosed by the respondent, the applicant before the Subordinate Judge, to examine the witness No. 2, that is, the General Manager.

21. In view of the aforesaid premises, the appeal is allowed in part as far as it grants permission/liberty to the respondent to examine any witness in court. The learned Civil Judge would requisition the records from the learned arbitrator, if not already done, and the respondent would be at liberty to advance its arguments for pressing the factum of misconduct from the said records. There shall be no order as to costs.

[Prafulla C. Pant] New Delhi November 06, 2015