L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of Orissa & Anr vs Aswini Kumar Baliarsingh

The respondent herein was appointed as an Assistant Teacher. The Inspector of Schools did not approve his appointment. A writ petition was filed by him, wherein by an order dated 3.9.1997 the High Court directed the Inspector of Schools to do so. The said order was carried into effect by posting him as Assistant Teacher in a school by an order dated 19.2.1999. He joined the said school. He acquired the qualification in May, 1999. He was removed from services on or about 27.5.2000 in terms of the Government Orders bearing No.11667/SME dated 24.4.2000 and No.13680/SME dated 11.5.2000 stating that he did not have the requisite qualification as on 7.6.1994. Indisputably, an original application has been filed by the respondent before the State Administrative Tribunal bearing No.1678(C)/2000, which is pending. He also filed an application for initiating proceedings under Contempt of Courts Act before the High Court, inter alia, against the Inspector of Schools for alleged disobedience of the said order dated 3.9.1997. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court set aside the said order of the Inspector of Schools dated 27.5.2000 and directed the appellants to take the respondent back in service and to give him appropriate posting within one month therefrom. It was further directed that arrears of salary should be paid to him as early as possible, preferably within six months from the date of his joining.

In the instant case, the action taken by the respondents in purported violation of the Court's order arose owing to a subsequent cause of action, namely, orders passed by the state of Orissa and unless the said orders were set aside, the Inspector of Schools can be said to have flouted the order of the High Court. The said decisions, therefore, have no application in the instant case.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Ashok Kumar Sahu vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.

1. The appellant is a member of Indian Police Service. The Joint Cadre of Assam and Meghalaya was assigned to him. However, on or about 4.6.1997, he was placed under suspension. Disciplinary proceedings were also initiated against him. Statement of imputation of misconduct was served upon him on 9.7.1997. On his completion of 20 years of service, he expressed his desire to retire from the services with effect from 1.8.1997 in terms of Sub-rule 2A of Rule 16 of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 ('the Rules', for short) by a notice dated 30.4.1997 addressed to the Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, which reads as under:

2. He, however, did not receive any communication in regard to the acceptance of the said offer before the said date either from the Union of India from the State of Assam. The Government of Assam vide its letter dated 26th May, 1997, forwarded the said request of the appellant for its approval by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Central Government referred the matter to the Joint Cadre Authority, which agreed to accept the request of the appellant to go on voluntary retirement without prejudice to the existing disciplinary proceedings against him. The resolution of the Joint Cadre Authority reads thus:

5. In terms of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules, an employee may retire from his services after giving at least three months' previous notice in writing to the State Government on the date on which he completes 30 years of qualifying service or 50 years of age or any date thereafter specified under the scheme. The proviso appended to the said Rule states that no member of the service under suspension shall retire from service except with specific approval of the State Government concerned.

17. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion, that it is a fit case where we should exercise our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It is now well settled that the court in appropriate cases may decline to exercise its jurisdiction although it would be lawful to do so. {See A. Umarani v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies and Ors. and Des Rai (Deceased) through LRs. and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. .}

18. Keeping in view the principles laid down in the aforementioned decisions, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, shall be sub-served if instead of directing reinstatement of the Appellant in service, the following directions are issued:

The Appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent and on the aforementioned terms.
State Bank Of India & Ors vs Ramesh Dinkar Punde

J U D G M E N T H.K.SEMA,J The challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 2nd August, 2002 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay whereby the imposition of penalty of removal inflicted upon the respondent, who is a bank officer, preceded by an inquiry, is set aside with a direction to the appellant to reinstate the respondent with all consequential benefits including that of back wages, to be paid within a period of three months. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows:

On the basis of the aforesaid charges, the Commissioner for Departmental Inquiries in the Central Vigilance Commission, Govt. of India was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer, after making a detailed inquiry, submitted its report dated 31.1.90 holding that the charges against the respondent stand proved. Thereafter, by an order dated 8.12.90 the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the respondent from the services of the Bank. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which was rejected by the order dated 29.10.91. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent preferred Writ Petition No. 2105/92 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay praying inter- alia to quash and set aside the order of dismissal dated 8.12.90 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and also the order dated 29.10.91 passed by the Appellate Authority rejecting his appeal and to reinstate the respondent with full back wages, continuity of service and all the consequential benefits. During the pendency of the Writ Petition before the High Court, it appears that pursuant to the observations made by the High Court, the petitioner bank reduced the punishment of dismissal to removal.

"9. Ample evidence could have been led to prove the complicity of the petitioner with Bidaye and Angane. Even in the FIR lodged with the police, there is not even a suggestion that the petitioner was in anyway involved in the commission of fraud by Bidaye and Angane. In these circumstances, we are firmly of the opinion that this is a case of no evidence of misconduct as alleged by the bank, which is not proved at all and therefore order of punishment is unsustainable. In the result the petition succeeds and it is allowed."

In the view that we have taken, this appeal deserves to be allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 2.8.2002 is, hereby, set aside. The orders of the Disciplinary Authority and that of the Appellate Authority are restored. The Writ Petition filed by the respondent stands dismissed.

The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties are asked to bear their own costs.
U.T. Of Dadra & Haveli & Anr vs Fatehsinh Mohansinh Chauhan

3. One Damabhai Lasyabhai Choudhary lodged an FIR at 8.30 p.m. on 29.4.1996 at P.S. Khanvel alleging that on the instigation of accused A-7, A-8 and A-9 accused A-1 to A-6 had assaulted the deceased Bapjibhai Bhoya and caused injuries to some others. The respondent herein Fatehsinh Mohansinh Chauhan is A-7 and he was assigned the role of instigation 'Maro Maro, Pakdo Pakdo'. After usual investigation charge sheet was submitted against all the nine accused and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. which was recorded after close of the prosecution evidence, the respondent took a plea of alibi and submitted that he is a prominent member of a political party and at the time of the incident, he was present in the chamber of Shri S.P. Marwah, Collector, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Silvassa, as a meeting had been called there. The respondent examined two witnesses, viz., DW.1 O.P. Misra, Deputy Collector and DW.2 R.N. Parmar, Executive and Sector Magistrate, Dadra, in support of his plea of alibi that he was present in the chamber of Shri S.P. Marwah. The Special Public Prosecutor, thereafter, moved an application, purporting to be one under Section 311 Cr.P.C., praying that Shri S.P. Marwah, the then Collector of Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Silvassa and currently posted as Director, Jal Nigam Board, New Delhi, may be summoned and examined as a witness. The application was opposed by respondent no.7 by filing a written reply on the ground, inter alia, that he had raised a plea of alibi at the very beginning, which was very well known to the investigating agency, but no investigation in that direction had been made and the defence taken by him in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was not a sudden or unexpected one. It was also submitted that the prosecution was not entitled to fill in a lacuna by moving an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C for the purpose of summoning a witness. The learned Sessions Judge, after referring to the authorities cited by the counsel for the parties, allowed the application moved by the Special Public Prosecutor by the order dated 12.8.2004 and the relevant part of the order which has a bearing on controversy in dispute is being reproduced below :-

15. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order dated 8.10.2004 passed by the High Court is set aside and the order dated 12.8.2004 of the learned Sessions Judge is restored. 27929
Union Of India & Anr vs K.G. Soni

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The respondent being aggrieved preferred an appeal and the Appellate Authority converted the punishment of removal into one of compulsory retirement. The said order was passed on 15.4.1997.

Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order, the respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench (in short the 'Tribunal') on 13.12.1998. The Tribunal came to hold that the application was barred by limitation and accordingly declined to entertain the same. The Tribunal recorded a finding that no application for condonation of delay has been filed.

The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Appellate Authority, the operative part of which has been quoted above, is restored.

The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.
Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy vs State Of A.P

2. The prosecution case, in brief, is as under :

2.3) On 24.4.1999, Narasimha Reddy (PW-2) brought some plastic pipes to his house in a hired tractor. Accused 1, 2 and 3 (Govinda Reddy, his wife and son Nagaraja Reddy) came to the house of Narasimha Reddy and raised a quarrel stating that the tractor unauthorizedly passed through their land and threatened Narasimha Reddy with dire consequences. This was the first incident.

2.6) Thereafter, Dilli Babu Reddy (PW-1) got a complaint (Ex.P-1) written and presented it at the Gangadhara Nellore Police Station (which was at a distance of about 4 km. from the place of incident) around 9.00 P.M. The police sent Narasimha Reddy and Dilli Babu Reddy for treatment to Primary Health Centre for examination and treatment.

4. The IV Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, took the case on file and committed accused 1, 2, & 3 to the Court of Sessions, Chittoor. Balu and Babu, the juvenile sons of accused No.1 were subjected to a separate proceeding before the Juvenile Court. In the Sessions trial, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses. Dilli Babu Reddy and his father Narasimha Reddy (PW-1 & PW-2) were the injured eye-witnesses. PW-3 to PW-6 who were examined as eye- witnesses turned hostile and stated that they did not know anything about the incident. PW-11 (Dr. S.Narasimhulu) examined Dilli Babu Reddy (PW-1) and Narasimha Reddy (PW-2) at the Primary Health Centre and issued certificates in regard to their injuries as per Ex.P-13 and P-14. Dr. P.Venkataswamy (PW-12), Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government Head-Quarters Hospital, Chittoor, conducted the post- mortem over the dead-body of Purushotham Reddy and issued a post- mortem certificate as per Ex.P-15. PW-15 and PW-16 were the Police Officers. PW-7 to PW-10, PW-13 and PW-14 were the witnesses to the inquest, and the Mahazars relating to arrest and seizure. PWs.7, 9, 13 and 14 turned hostile.

Re : Contention No.(iii)

16. We cannot accept the contention that whenever the death is on account of a single blow, the offence is one under Section 304 and not Section 302. We will briefly refer to the cases relied on by the appellant.

20. We accordingly find no reason to interfere with the decision of the High Court convicting the appellant. The appeal is dismissed.
Sudam Ganpat Kutwal P.A. Holder Of ... vs Shevantabai Tukaram Gulumkar (Dead) By ...

2.5) The landlord Anusuyabai died on 23.3.1975, and thereafter, the name of her sister Shevantabai was entered as her successor-in-title in the record of rights. The said Shevantabai filed Application No.72/1994 under Section 32P read with Section 32F of the Act on 19.1.1994 for a declaration that the deemed statutory purchase by the tenant be declared as void and ineffective, as the tenant had failed to fulfil the mandatory requirement of giving a notice of intimation of purchase within the time stipulated, under Section 32F (1A) of the Act.

3. The Agricultural Land Tribunal made an order dated 30.4.1994 accepting the contention of Shevantabai that the tenant had failed to issue a notice of purchase. The tenant was, therefore, directed to deliver possession to Shevantabai under Section 32P(2)(b) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant filed an appeal under Section 74 of the Act before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Baramati Division, in Tenancy Case No.35/1994. The appellate authority by order dated 2.6.1995, set aside the order of the Tribunal and remitted the matter to the Tribunal, to hold a detailed inquiry into the matter with reference to the earlier proceedings.

4. The Land Tribunal held an inquiry and made an order dated 30.9.1995, reiterating its earlier finding that the tenant had failed to serve a notice of purchase within the stipulated time and, therefore, had lost the right to purchase the land. The appellant challenged the said order also in appeal (Tenancy Case No.27/1995) before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Baramati. Shevantabai and the Respondent herein who was representing her then, were the respondents in the said appeal.

5. During the pendency of the appeal, Shevantabai died on 15.4.1996. The said appeal was allowed, in part, by order dated 22.4.1996. The Appellate Authority upheld the order of the Tribunal to the extent that the tenant had failed to exercise his right by issuing a notice as required under Section 32F (1A) of the Act. It, however, set aside the direction to the appellant to deliver the land to Shevantabai, as that portion of the order was passed without holding any enquiry as to landlord's right to terminate the tenancy. Consequently, the Land Tribunal was directed to hold a separate enquiry regarding the right of the landlord under section 31 read with Section 32F and then, if necessary, a separate enquiry under section 32P.

16. As a consequence, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and those of the authorities below and hold that the appellant-tenant continued to be the tenant of the land which remained with him after delivering half of the land to the landlord Anusuyabai in pursuance of the order dated 30.6.1960 made on her application under section 31(1) read with section 29 of the Act. The appellant shall be entitled to restoration, if he has been dispossessed by the respondent from any part of his land in Gat No.332 in pursuance of the order of SDO/Revenue Tribunal/High Court. Parties will also be entitled to seek benefits/reliefs referred to in para 14 above.
Electronics Corporation Of India Ltd vs Electronics Corporation Of India ...

The respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court challenging the award dated 18th August, 1995 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (in short the 'Tribunal') rejecting the reference made to it by the Government of Maharashtra under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the 'Act') on the ground that the respondent-Union was not able to establish master and servant relationship between the alleged workmen represented by the Union and the present appellant (hereinafter referred to as the 'Company'). The entire dispute arose on account of the services of the alleged workmen represented by the Union, being terminated.

According to them, the contract which labels each of them as "Retainer" was nothing but a paper arrangement between themselves and the Company who did not want to implement certain labour laws. Although the service contracts were treated as individual contracts, the Union has averred that the workmen were under the supervision of the Company and no independent decision could be taken by these employees. The employees raised a demand for permanent absorption in employment and for all other service conditions which were applicable to other employees. As this was not granted by the Company, the Union approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution') by filing Writ Petition No.2689 of 1983. This petition was dismissed as the petitioner had an alternate remedy by approaching the machinery provided under the Act. Accordingly, the Union raised a dispute against the Company which was referred for adjudication by the Tribunal. The dispute pertained to the claim of regularization as well as certain other demands including wage revision made by the Union on behalf of the employees.

Considering the rival submissions, High Court by the impugned judgment held that it was for the appellant to establish that there was no master and servant relationship between the parties and the members of the Union were not workmen within the meaning of the expression "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Act. The High Court was of the further view that the Company had not established either that the members of the Union were not workmen or that the employer employee relationship does not exist. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed and the parties were directed to appear before the Tribunal for further hearing of the reference.

In view of what has been stated, the Tribunal was right in its view that no employer employee relationship existed. Observations of the High Court to the contrary are clearly untenable because the findings and the reasons given by the Tribunal have not been discussed. No reason has been given by the High Court as to how these conclusions were erroneous and perverse. The inevitable conclusion is that the impugned judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside and that of the Tribunal to be restored and we direct accordingly.

The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Lal Chand vs Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd

Heard learned counsel appearing on either side. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 6.5.2003 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in F.A.O. No.1587 of 2002. The appellant before us is the owner of the vehicle, a truck. The respondent is the insurer of the vehicle. The vehicle met with an accident on 11.10.1998. The claim petition was filed by the claimants before the Tribunal. Accepting their claim, the Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.2.70 lakhs along with interest. The Tribunal held that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver Mam Chand and that the appellant-owner had not committed any breach of the terms and condition of the insurance policy and that the Insurance Company was liable to make the payment of compensation amount to the claimants as insurer of the truck.

Aggrieved against the order passed by the High Court, the appellant has preferred the above appeal in this Court. The above appeal was filed with a delay of 339 days. This Court issued notice on the special leave petition as well as on the application for condonation of delay. After notice, the respondent Insurance Company has also filed a counter affidavit and the matter was listed today for final hearing. At this stage no purpose would be served to dismiss the civil appeal on the ground of delay in filing the appeal. Since the notice was ordered on special leave petition and on the delay and the counter affidavit has already been filed, we condone the delay and heard the learned counsel appearing on either side, on merits of the rival claims.

We respectfully agree and following the above ruling, we allow the appeal filed by the owner of the vehicle and absolve him from any liability as ordered by the High Court. It is now brought to our notice that the entire compensation has already been deposited and the same has been withdrawn by the claimants. No other point has been urged by both sides. We, therefore, allow the appeal and order no costs.
Ganpatibai And Anr vs State Of M.P. And Ors

Written statement was filed stating that the suit was not maintainable. Certain landowners whose lands were acquired challenged the notification under Sections 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act and subsequent award passed. The High Court quashed the proceedings and the award; but clarified that the said order would be applicable only to those who had approached the High Court and not to others. By order dated 16.3.2001 learned Single Judge accepted the primary objections raised regarding maintainability and jurisdiction of Civil Court and held that the suit was not maintainable. On 20.7.2001 the writ petition was filed for quashing the notification, declaration, scheme as also the award which had been published on 08.06.2001. Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that there was gross delay in approaching the Court. As noted above in the Letters Patent Appeal filed before the High Court, view of learned Single Judge was maintained.

That being so, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were justified in holding that the writ petition was highly belated.

We find no infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench to warrant interference.

The appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.