L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Satpal Singh vs Chunni Lal(D) Tr.Lrs

2) The respondent herein, had filed a suit for eviction against the appellant in the year 1993. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court on 31.1.2001, granting possession of the suit schedule premises to the respondent. 1

3) The appeal filed against the said judgment and decree was dismissed for default on 19.4.2002 by the Additional District Judge due to non- appearance of the appellant and his learned counsel. The appellant then moved an application under Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for restoration of the First Appeal No. 4 of 2001. The same was dismissed on 19.4.2002.

4) The appellant filed a second appeal challenging the correctness or otherwise of the order dated 19.4.2002 in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 759 of 2002. The appeal was dismissed vide judgment dated 23.5.2008. The Single Judge had come to the conclusion that the appellate Court was justified in dismissing the application, holding that there was no sufficient cause shown either for the condonation of delay or for setting aside the ex- parte order, and thereby confirmed the order of the appellate Court.

7) In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the High Court in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 759 of 2002 dated 23.05.2008 and the order passed by the first appellate court in Appeal No. 4 of 2001 are set aside. The first appellate court is directed to take on board the appeal and decide the appeal on merits within an outer limit of six months from the 3 date of receipt of certified copy of the order passed by this Court. No order as to costs.
Jaswant & Anr vs State Of Rajasthan

Appellants were named in a First Information Report for commission of offences under Section 302, 147, 302/149, 324, 326 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. Subsequently, a charge sheet was submitted on 12.2.1993 wherein they were shown to be absconding. It, however, stands admitted that the investigation against them was not completed. Cognizance of the offence, however, was taken. The case was also committed to the Court of Sessions in terms of Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although no cognizance was taken as against the appellants pursuant to or in furtherance of the charge sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer, relying on or on the basis of the order dated 28.4.1993, committing the case to the Sessions Judge, charges were framed against all the five accused named in the First Information Report including the appellants.

Appellants filed an application on or about 30.7.2002 that no charge be framed against them, inter alia, contending that as the court of sessions had no original jurisdiction to take cognizance of any offence for trial without commitment of the case by a Magistrate in terms of Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the purported order taking cognizance against them was illegal.

4. However, by an order dated 12.8.2002, the learned Sessions Judge rejected the said application despite opining stating that although the Sessions Court had no original jurisdiction for taking cognizance of an accused and proceed to put them to trial on the ground that purported circumstances demand the same. The said alleged circumstances are :

9. Indisputably, in the charge sheet, name of five persons, namely, (1) Ram Narayan; (2) Jaswant Singh; (3) Chand Singh; (4) Nahar Singh; and (5) Smt. Mishri Devi have been specified whereas the names of Jaswant Singh and Chand Singh (appellants herein) were shown as absconders. By an order dated 17.4.1993, cognizance of the offence had been taken only against Shri Ram Narayan, Mishri Devi and Nahar Singh. 8

22. Despite the same, we have proceeded to dispose of the matter, assuming that the decision rendered by this Court in Kishun Singh as correct. So long as the investigation is not completed or evidences are not brought on record, the learned Sessions Judge could not have exercised his jurisdiction either under Section 193 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The impugned order framing charges against the appellants for the reasons mentioned 18 hereinbefore, therefore, is liable to be set aside. We direct accordingly. We, however, keeping in view the fact that the appellants have already appeared and are no longer absconding, direct the investigating officer to submit a final form on the basis of the materials collected during investigation.

24. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations and direction. No costs.

May 13, 2009
Sucha Singh vs State Of Punjab

4. Before the learned Trial Judge, inter alia, Gurdev Chand (PW4) and Sheru (PW5) were examined to prove the prosecution's case. The learned Trial Judge noticed that although a charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) had been framed against Manga, but the first informant, in his supplementary statement had accepted that Manga was empty handed. It 3 was on the aforementioned premise that the appellant by reason of amendment of the charge had been charged under Section 302 and 307 of the IPC whereas Manga was charged under Section 302/34 and 307/34 of the IPC.

Whereas in his first statement, he stated that Sakandar had first been attacked by Sucha Singh, in his supplementary statement, he alleged that Sheru had been the first victim whereafter Sakandar ran away. He was chased for a sufficient distance and an injury was inflicted on his body with a `datar'.

5) There were contradictions in the matter of lodging of the first information report as it was said to have been lodged by Gurdev Chand after riding on a cycle for 12 kms. and the police met him at Jugial. He had stated that on his way back, the cycle had been kept in police vehicle while according to Inspector Amrik Singh (PW7), the cycle had been kept in a shop at Jugial.

7. The story advanced by the prosecution starts with a motive on the part of the complainant's mother selling of illicit liquor. In the first information report, it was alleged by the first informant that his mother brought illicit liquor and sold it to maintain her children. In his evidence, however, he stated that his mother sold only two bottles of liquor occasionally.

There is, therefore, significant contradiction in the matter of number of injuries, time of occurrence, place of occurrence, sequence of events, the manner of identification of the accused, lack of motive and false implication of Manga. P.W. 4 made vital contradictions in his FIR vis-`-vis the supplementary statement evidently keeping in view the physical condition of Manga. It is, therefore, difficult to rely upon his testimony.

10. PW4, in his evidence, even could not deny that Manga is an employee in a private company and he remains at his place of work from morning till evening.

11. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly and that of the 10 learned Sessions Judge is restored. Appellant is in custody. He would be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in connection with any other case.

12. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

MAY 13, 2009
Jagdish Singh vs Punjab Engineering College & Ors

3) The facts in brief are as under:-

4) The inquiry officer after holding the enquiry has submitted his enquiry report wherein, he has opined, that, the workman is guilty of the charges alleged in the charge memo. The disciplinary authority of the respondent-college, after receipt of the report of the inquiry officer has accepted the report and has passed an order dated 30.09.2004, imposing a major penalty of dismissal from service.

11)In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 30.09.2004 and affirmed by the High Court vide its order dated 28.08.2007. Taking the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and having due regard to unblemished record 5 of the appellant, and the reasons for which he remained absent without obtaining permission, the ends of justice would be met, if punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is modified to that of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect and further declare that he would not entitled for any monetary benefits during the period he was out of service and that period would be counted only for the purpose of his service benefits. We direct the disciplinary authority to issue appropriate orders in this regard within one month from the date of production of certified copy of this Court's order by either of the parties.

12)The appeal is accordingly disposed of. However, there will be no order as to costs.
Punjab National Bank & Anr vs M/S Imperial Gift House & Ors

Heard learned counsel for the parties. By the impugned order, in effect and substance, the High Court has quashed notice issued by the bank under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, [for short, "the Act"]. Upon receipt of notice, respondents filed representation under Section 13(3)(A) of the Act, which was rejected. Thereafter, before any further action could be taken under Section 13(4) of the Act by the Bank, the writ petition was filed before the High Court. In our view, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition against the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Act and quashing the proceedings initiated by the bank.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed before it is dismissed.
Gen. Manager,Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan vs Laxmi Devi & Ors

3. Before, however, adverting to the said legal issue, we may notice the factual matrix involved in both the maters.

However, soon thereafter, on or about 25th April, 2002 he died. Admittedly he had worked for more than 12 years till the time of his death as a daily wage labourer.

5. Respondent No.1 thereafter approached the petitioner General Manager, Kumaon Jal Sanstha for her appointment on compassionate grounds in place of her deceased husband under the U.P. Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servant Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 (for short `the Rules'). The said request was rejected on the ground that her husband being a daily wage earner, there was no provision for her appointment on compassionate grounds; the engagement of late Balam Singh being neither permanent nor was he regularly appointed. His appointment was also not against a regular vacancy.

6. Respondent No.1 filed a writ petition before High Court which was allowed by a learned Single Judge by his order dated 9 th May, 2005 directing the appellants to consider her for appointment under the Rules within a period of three months from the filing of the certified copy of the order.

7. An intra court appeal filed by the appellants against that order stood dismissed by the impugned judgment.

Soon thereafter he died on 12.09.2002. On or about 23.01.2003 the respondent made a representation for his appointment in the Sansthan under the Rules. The same was however rejected in view of the Government order dated 28.05.2002

28. Ms. Issar urged that the daily wagers are not excluded from the purview of the Rules. The said question, in our opinion, is irrelevant. The question which should have been posed is as to whether daily wagers are included within the definition of "government servant". If daily wagers are not government servants, question of applicability of the Rules does not arise.

30. Moreover, grant of appointment on compassionate ground has its own limitations as it is an exception to the mode of regular appointment. 2 0

31. For the reasons abovementioned the impugned judgments cannot be sustained. They are set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall, however, be no order as to costs.

May 15, 2009 2 1
C.B.I vs A.Ravishankar Prasad & Ors

5. On 28.3.2007 the respondents herein have settled the entire outstanding dues by paying an amount of Rs.157 crores during March 2007 and the petitions before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chennai have been dismissed as settled out of court.

35. The facts of the instant case are quite akin to Rumi Dhar (supra)'s case. In the instant case, the charge-sheet clearly reveal substantial material on record making a clear case under section 120-B read with section 420 IPC against the respondents and their connivance with the bank officials.

41. Both English and the Indian courts have consistently taken the view that the inherent powers can be exercised in those exceptional cases where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if are taken on their 22 face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

42. When we apply the settled legal position to the facts of this case it is not possible to conclude that the complaint and charge-sheet prima facie do not constitute any offence against the respondents. It is also not possible to conclude that material on record taken on face value make out no case under section 120-B read with section 420 IPC against the respondents. Prima facie, we are of the opinion that this is one case where adequate material is available on record to proceed against the respondents.

45. Quashing the proceedings at that stage was clearly an abuse of the process of the court. The court neither considered the entire material nor appreciated the legal position in proper perspective. The impugned judgment is wholly unsustainable in law and is accordingly set aside. Unfortunately, because of unnecessary interference by the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. the trial of this case could not be completed and concluded.

46. Before parting with the case we would like to observe that mere re-payment of loan under a settlement cannot exempt the accused from the criminal proceeding in the facts of this case.

48. In this view of the fact, in the interest of justice we direct that the trial be now completed as expeditiously as possible. The trial court is directed to conduct the trial on day to day basis and parties are directed to cooperate with the trial court. The trial court shall ensure that unnecessary adjournments be avoided and trial be concluded as expeditiously as possible.

49. The appeals are consequently allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeals stand disposed of accordingly.

May 15, 2009
State Of Punjab vs Sohan Singh

2. The prosecution case in brief as under is :-

3. Before the learned Special Judge besides the Complainant Jasdev Pal Singh (PW-5), his friend Sarwan Singh (PW-6) was examined to prove the 3 alleged demand and acceptance of the bribe and the recovery thereof. They supported the prosecution case. Hardial Singh (PW-7), is also a witness to the recovery of the currency notes.

4. We may, however, notice that the prosecution examined one Gurcharan Singh (PW-9), UD.C. working in the Punjab State Electricity Board, Faridkot. He produced the records in regard to the order of grant of Service Connection to the Complainant Jasdev Pal Singh. According to him, the electrical connection was given to him on 30th March, 1989. The prosecution sought to bring on record that whereas one Suckchain Singh, who was at serial number 38 in the seniority list had been granted connection on 25th January, 1989, the complainant Jasdev Pal Singh, who was at serial number 36, was given connection on 30th March, 1989. PW 9, however, in his cross-examination accepted that whereas Jasdev Pal Singh's seniority was in the High Tension connection list, the names of said Suckchan Singh and another Surain Singh were in the Low Tension seniority list. He further admitted that the seniority positions in the High Tension List and the Low Tension List are not inter-connected.

(iii) that he was falsely deposing.

18. For the reasons aforementioned there is no merit in this appeal which fails and is dismissed.
M.D.,Bhoruka Textiles Limited vs M/S Kashmiri Rice Industries

3. A partnership firm known as M/s. Kashmiri Rice Industries has its place of business at Hangal. The said firm entered into a contract for supply of paddy husk with the appellant. Inter alia, on the premise that appellant herein, despite supply of the agreed quantity of paddy husk, failed and/or neglected to pay the price therefor, the respondent filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.2,61,696/- in the Court of Civil Judge, Hangal.

4. An appeal preferred thereagainst has been dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned order. The High Court, although noticed issue No.3, did not record any positive finding thereupon.

11. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

12. However, it appears that the appellant has deposited 50% of the decretal amount. The Civil Court shall transfer the said amount to BIFR. The BIFR, if has not finalized any scheme so far, would do so as expeditiously as possible. The BIFR shall also take into consideration the decree passed by the learned Trial Judge in favour of the plaintiff. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

May 15, 2009
Delhi Gate Auto Service Station & Ors vs B.P.C.L., Agra Th. Sr.Div.Manager & Ors

The question in these appeals is regarding the correctness of the judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petitions by the appellants herein. The controversy was regarding dealership of two petrol retail outlets. The dealership was terminated by the respondent-Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., 'BPCL' for short. That termination was challenged. The matter was remanded by the High Court in the first round with an observation that the BPCL should hear the appellants and consider the objections. Accordingly, show-cause notice was issued. That show-cause notice was also replied to by the appellants by giving various reasons as to why the termination should not have been effected. Later on, the BPCL terminated the dealership. That was challenged by filing writ petitions. However, as per the terms of the agreement of dealership, the appellants also approached the arbitration. Now it is reported that arbitration is over and the award has gone against the appellants which award has also been further challenged.

2. In that view, it will not be possible for us to entertain this appeal. In fact, the writ petitions itself could not have been entertained on the ground that two parallel remedies could not have been pursued by the appellants at one and the same time. The writ petition was rightly dismissed. We do not find any merit in these appeals. They are dismissed without any order as to costs. This order should not be viewed as any expression on the merits of the matters.
Suresh Chandra vs State Of Uttranchal & Ors

2. This is an inter se dispute between these two officers who were working as engineers in the State of Uttar Pradesh. While the appellant Suresh Chandra was a directly recruited Assistant Engineer having been appointed on 2.2.1999, the other person namely Ravindra Prasad was, however, appointed as a Junior Engineer in the year 1983 on adhoc basis and was ultimately regularised in the year 1989 as Junior Engineer. Thereafter, he was promoted on 25.5.1995. However, the question is whether this was an adhoc promotion or a substantive promotion. While Shri Ravindra Prasad claims this to be a regular promotion since it was granted after his selection by the Departmental Promotion Committee, the appellant Suresh Chandra, however, claims that this was an .......2.

5. Further, we are not at all satisfied with the judgment which is extremely sketchy and skeleton like without answering number of issues which could be raised. One of the issues could be as to whether Uttar Pradesh Government and more particularly the U.P. Public Service Commission could have had the jurisdiction to decide upon the nature of promotion awarded to Shri Ravindra Prasad particularly after the State was divided and after the State of Uttar Pradesh was divested of its control over the employees. There are number of other issues arising and we find that the judgment is totally silent about various facts as also the rules including the 1954 Regulations as amended by 13th amendment and 16th amendment. Therefore, the impugned judgment appears to be wanting in all the necessary details and is liable to be set aside. We would expect the High Court to go into all the questions raised by the parties in the light of the applicable rules and give a clear cut finding as regards (i) the nature of promotion granted to Shri Ravindra Prasad, (ii) the legality or propriety of the exercise taken by the U.P. Public Service Commission as also the positions (contradictory) taken by the State of Uttranchal in the matter. We, therefore, request the High Court to dispose of the matter within six months of the writ reaching that Court. Our no expression should be understood as expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter.

6. With this, the appeals are disposed of. No order as to costs.
Union Of India & Ors vs Bishamber Das Dogra

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that respondent joined the service as Security guard in Central 2 Industrial Security Force (CISF) in August, 1980. He remained absent from duty without seeking permission or leave, thus, vide order dated 12th August, 1984, he was awarded the entry of censure for the same. Respondent was again punished for remaining absent from duty for three days vide Order dated 22 nd July, 1985 withholding one annual increment for two years. The respondent again absented himself from duty from 31st August, 1985 to 8th September, 1985 i.e. for six days for which vide Order dated 5th September, 1985, he was imposed the punishment of withholding of one annual increment for three years. The respondent again deserted the LINE for the period from 6.3.1986 to 16.3.1986 i.e. 10 days for which he was issued a Show Cause Notice under Rule 34 of CISF Rules on 22/24.3.1986. The said notice could not be served upon him as the respondent again deserted the LINE for a period of 50 days, from 21.3.1986 to 10.5.1986 and joined the service on 11th May, 1986. Therefore, he could be served the show- cause notice dated 22/24.3.1986 on 15th May, 1986. The respondent submitted his reply to the show cause notice. However, as it was not found satisfactory, a regular departmental enquiry was initiated against him. During the 3 pendency of the enquiry, the respondent again deserted the LINE for 11 days from 6.6.1986 to 16.6.1986. The Enquiry Officer concluded the enquiry and submitted the report which was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority who vide order dated 17.6.1986 imposed the punishment of removal from service. While passing the punishment Order, the Disciplinary authority also took into consideration the past conduct of the respondent.

3. Being aggrieved, the respondent preferred the Statutory Appeal which was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 19.10.1986 observing that the respondent had not completed six years in service but had deserted the LINE five times. Thus no lenient view was permissible.

5. Aggrieved, the present appellants filed F.M.A.T. No. 1370 of 1992 before the Calcutta High Court which was dismissed by the Division Bench by Judgment and Order dated 31st January, 2002. Hence, this appeal.

29. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 31.1.2002 in FMAT No.1370 of 1992 and judgment and 19 order dated 16.7.1991 of the learned Single Judge passed in Civil Order No.3885 W of 1987 are hereby set aside and the order of punishment imposed by the statutory authority is hereby restored. No costs.

26th May, 2009.

Digital Proforma

1. Case No. : Civil Appeal No. 7087 of 2002

2. Date of decision : 26.5.2009

3. Cause Title : Union of India & Ors.

5. Date of C.A.V. : 18.5.2009

6. Judgment delivered : Hon'ble Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan by

7. Nature of Judgment : Reportable whether reportable