L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Dhirendra Kumar @ Dhiroo vs State Of Uttarkhand

2. Case of the prosecution is that the appellant caused the death of Surat Singh deceased with a stone at 8.30 P.M. on 1st April, 1983 at Village Jantanwala. On 2 nd April, 1983 at 9.05 A.M., Mani Ram father of the deceased (who died during pendency of proceedings before the trial Court) lodged FIR to the effect that on 28th March, 1983, the Page 1 Criminal Appeal No.1848 of 2008 deceased had gone to the house of the accused to celebrate holi. In the night, the accused came to the house of the complainant to assault the deceased alleging that he had knocked the door of his aunt Kumari Sunita in the night with evil intention when she was alone in her house. With the intervention of Mani Ram and PW 7 Raj Kumari, wife of the deceased, the accused was prevented from dragging the deceased out of the house but the accused left the house with a threat. On 1st April, 1983 when the deceased went to the nearby Dehradun city, he did not return home at the night. In the morning PW2 Lal Singh told him that the deceased was seen with the accused at 7.30 P.M. in the night. Further, Lakhi Ram PW 4 and Bahadur Singh PW 3 told him that the accused was seen beating the deceased with a stone at 8.30 P.M. One Jagdish Singh told him that he had seen the dead body near the bank of the river near the field of Ratan Singh.

4. The prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses. The accused in his statement under 313 Cr.P.C. took the 2 Page 2 Criminal Appeal No.1848 of 2008 plea that he was falsely implicated as he was member of Yuvak Gram Kalyan Samiti and he had made complaint to the District Magistrate against illegal distillation of liquor which made the police inimical to him. He had also made a complaint against illegal dealings of the contractors in selling Government cement which had made contractors inimical to him. He examined his brother, DW 1 Vijendra Kumar Sharma in support of his version.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Ramakant Mishra @ Lalu Etc vs State Of U.P

2 The endeavour of the learned counsel for the Appellants is almost entirely predicated on an exculpatory Dying Declaration allegedly made by the deceased, who was the wife of the 1st Appellant and the sister-in-law of the 2nd Appellant and the 3rd Appellant. The deceased Vijay Lakshmi was married to the 1st Appellant, Ramakant Mishra, in 1989 and from that wedlock a son named Sonu was begotten. Sonu has been living with his maternal grandparents who have cared for all his requirements, without any efforts on the part of the Accused towards taking over his custody or making any contribution for his expenses. The prosecution has shown/proved that due to non-fulfillment of demands of dowry the deceased was harassed, tortured and treated with cruelty. The exact date of the marriage is not forthcoming, but it avowedly took place much before the expiry of seven years of the unnatural death of Vijay Lakshmi. On the morning of 21.9.1994 she has been shown by the prosecution to have been put on fire after sprinkling kerosene oil on her body. The husband/Appellant No.1 and the other Accused appear to have admitted her in a hospital and, thereafter, disappeared from the scene, not even being bothered to be present at her cremation. She succumbed to 90-95 per cent burn injuries at 11.30 p.m. that very day. Jagdamba, Appellant No.2 and brother-in-law of the deceased, has stated that when the deceased was preparing milk on the chulah, Sonu toppled the container of kerosene oil and its contents spilled on the floor; in her endeavour to pick up her son Sonu, her saree allegedly got caught in the chulah, resulting in the saree catching fire and her receiving 90-95 per cent burns. In the Impugned Order it has been noted that the opinion of the Doctor was that death resulted from burn injuries. The Chargesheet was submitted against four Accused named in the FIR, one of whom (the father-in-law of the deceased) has died.

12 The Appeals are dismissed in the above terms. The interim Order is recalled.

February 27, 2015.
M/S Sherali Khan Mohamed Manekia vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

3. It appears that the suit property was declared as evacuee property and the same was purchased by the appellant in an auction sale as far back as on 15.6.1964. In the year 1980, the appellant filed a suit being Civil Suit No. 37 of 1980 before the District Judge, Thane Court seeking specific performance of the sale of the property and possession and interim relief of injunction restraining the defendants therein from carrying on further construction on the suit property. The appellant further made a prayer for appointment of Receiver.

4. The trial court rejected the prayer for appointment of Receiver by order dated 3.5.1980 and against that, appellant moved the High Court in First Appeal, which was finally heard and order dated 22.7.1980 was passed appointing the Court Receiver. The High Court while making appointment of the Receiver directed to take possession of the suit property. All the persons who were in actual possession of any part of the suit property were continued to remain in possession. The Receiver was directed to collect rent and compensation as the case may be from all the persons in actual possession after verifying from them their present right to remain in possession. The High Court further directed that the Receiver should take suitable direction from the court if he was presented with any particular difficulty.

5. Indisputably, the suit was finally disposed of on 4.2.1998. While disposing the suit, the trial court gave liberty to the plaintiff-appellant to move the High Court for directions for taking possession of the suit property from the Court Receiver so appointed by the High Court.

6. As against the judgment and decree of the trial court, First Appeal was filed being F.A. No.767 of 1988, which was finally heard and dismissed by the High Court vide judgment dated 22.12.2004. The special leave petition filed against the judgment of the High Court was also dismissed on 19.2.2007.

15. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any error in the impugned order passed by the High Court. The Civil Appeals are, therefore, of no merit and are dismissed.
Anil Joshi & Ors vs State Of H.P.& Ors

4. The respondents herein are the State employees working in the Forest Department in Himachal Pradesh. They were appointed during 1989-1990 and accordingly posted as "Range Officers" in the Forest Department. Their service conditions are governed by the Recruitment & Promotion Rules for the Himachal Pradesh Forest Service (Class-II) (in short "the Rules").

5. The respondents, however, claimed that they having qualified the State Forest Service Course (Diploma Course) from different colleges were eligible to be posted as ACF (Assistant Conservator of Forest) and accordingly were eligible for being treated as "direct recruits" in the H.P. Forest Services Class II.

17. We cannot concur with the view taken by the High Court, as in our considered opinion, it is not sustainable both on facts and in law.

26. In the light of foregoing discussion, we cannot uphold the judgment/order passed by the High Court which deserves to be set aside.

27. The appeals thus succeed and are hereby allowed. The impugned judgment/order dated 15.06.2007 passed by the High Court in the writ petitions is set aside. The writ petitions filed by the respondents stand dismissed resulting in restoration of the order passed by the Tribunal, which rightly dismissed the O.As filed by the respondents.

28. In the light of the decision in C.A. Nos. 6101, 6102, 6103 and 6104 of 2009, C.A. Nos. 6097-6100 of 2009 are disposed of.

March 9, 2015.
The Revenue Div. Officer Fort Kochi ... vs Jalaja Dileep & Anr

3. These appeals arise out of the order passed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, which upheld the order passed by the learned Single Judge and thereby directing the Tahsildar to effect a change in the Basic Tax Register (BTR) and correct the nature of land from 'Nilam' (Wetland) to 'Purayidam' (Dry land). For convenience, facts in civil appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.3172 of 2014 is referred to and taken as the lead case.

5. The respondent No.1 filed a Writ Petition No.11784 of 2012, before the High Court seeking a writ of mandamus to the authorities to effect necessary corrections in the Basic Tax Register and change the nature of lands from 'wetland' to 'dry land'. Respondent No.1 averred that the disputed property is a dry land, but wrongly described as a wetland (Nilam) in their sale deed and that it was never used for any agricultural purposes. The Single Judge of the High Court vide Order dated 13.7.2012, allowed the writ petition directing that the property of the respondent No.1 will have to be classified as 'reclaimed purayidam' (dry land) in the Basic Tax Register (for short 'BTR') and further issued a direction to the Tahsildar and the Village Officer to effect appropriate correction as per the terms of the direction. Aggrieved by the Order, State preferred W.A. No.412 of 2013, wherein the Division Bench of the High Court vide impugned judgment dated 2.1.2014, upheld the order of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, the State of Kerala has filed this appeal by way of special leave assailing the impugned judgment.

22. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court in Writ Appeal No.412/2013 is set aside and the appeal is allowed. Accordingly impugned judgments in connected matters are also set aside and the appeals are allowed.

23. The respondents in all the appeals are directed to approach the competent authorities constituted under KLU Order 1967/Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act 2008 as the case may be for conversion of the land. When the respondents approach the concerned authorities constituted under the above statutes, the concerned authorities shall consider the application of the respondents in accordance with the relevant provisions of the statutes and also the notification G.O.(Rt.) No.157/2002/AD dated 5.2.2002 already extracted above in para 11 and in accordance with law keeping in view the factual position that may be brought to the notice of the authorities alongwith material to substantiate their claim. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

March 10, 2015
M/S.Premier Breveries Ltd.Karnataka vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, Cochin

3. The claim made by the assessee in the facts noted above was disallowed by the Assessing Officer by order dated 29.01.1993. The said order of the Assessing Officer was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) by order dated 29.10.1993. The assessee had moved the learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench against the aforesaid orders. The learned Tribunal took the view that the assessee was entitled to claim for deduction. The said view of the learned Tribunal has been reversed by the High Court in the Reference made to it under Section 256 (2) of the Act.

The questions reframed by the High Court were in respect of the payments made to M/s. R.J. Associates and one Golden Enterprises who, the assessee claimed, had rendered services as commission agents.

13. For the aforesaid reasons, Civil Appeal No. 1569 of 2007 has to fail and it is accordingly dismissed.

Civil Appeal No.3214 of 2011 and SLP(C) No.10080 of 2014

14. In the light of the above, Civil Appeal No.3214 of 2011 and SLP (C) No.10080 of 2014 are also dismissed.
Raj Kumar Rana vs Rita Rathore

2. Marriage between the appellant-husband and respondent-wife was solemnized on 10.5.1997 and both of them resided together as husband and wife for about nine months. Case of the appellant is that both parties were employed in District Hospital at different places. Appellant was transferred to District Hospital, Solan, Himachal Pradesh and he started living at Solan. By their joint efforts, they were able to get the respondent transferred to Solan. The respondent-wife became pregnant and she went to her parents house at Nirsu in Rampur, Himachal Pradesh. Case of the appellant is that in February 1998, respondent-wife left Solan for delivery at her parents house at Rampur and thereafter she never came back and never stayed with the appellant. Parties are said to have separated since February 1998 and a male child was born out of their wedlock at Rampur on 2.6.1998. Appellant alleged that despite his request, respondent continued to stay with her child at her parents house at Nirsu in Rampur. Inspite of being transferred to Solan, respondent refused to join the appellant at Solan and instead she got herself adjusted at IGMC Shimla. According to the appellant-husband, when he requested the respondent-wife to part ways by mutual consent, respondent and her parents demanded Rs.10,00,000/- as maintenance. The appellant filed petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act against the respondent on the ground of cruelty and desertion. Vide its judgment dated 2.1.2003, District Judge, Solan dismissed the petition both on grounds of cruelty and desertion. Regarding desertion, trial court observed that parties have strained relations for long time and are residing separately on account of exigencies of their services and not on account of hostilities and there was no animus deserendi on the part of the respondent in living separate. The appellant preferred appeal before the High Court and vide its judgment dated 10.11.2008, the High Court dismissed the appeal. In this appeal, the appellant challenges the correctness of the dismissal of his divorce petition.

5. Pursuant to the affidavit filed by the respondent-wife, taking into consideration that the relationship between the parties are strained for quite a long time, judgments of both the courts below are set aside and this appeal is allowed. In order to render justice between the parties, in exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is dissolved by mutual consent. The amount of Rs.10,00,000/- lying in this Court's deposit be invested in the name of minor son represented by the respondent in any one of the Nationalized Bank as per the choice of the respondent till he attains majority. The respondent is permitted to withdraw the periodical interest accrued thereon once in a year directly from the bank and the same shall be utilized for the welfare of the minor son. No costs. Copy of this judgment shall be sent to the District Judge, Solan, H.P. ..........................J. (V. Gopala Gowda) ..........................J (R. Banumathi) New Delhi;

March 10, 2015
Charu Kishor Mehta vs Jt.Charity Commr. Gr. Bombay Reg. & Ors

For the purpose of considering the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties in this appeal and with a view to find out whether this Court is required to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, the necessary facts are briefly stated hereunder:

2.3.2010 passed by the learned single Judge and found that the same is justified after considering that the appellant herself was a party to the above mentioned Resolution that has appointed the deceased Vijay Mehta as the Managing Trustee of the Trust. Further, no steps were taken for the cancellation of the Resolution by her as she did not even enter into the witness box before the JCC to justify her conduct that she is not a signatory to the Resolution wherein the deceased Vijay Mehta was appointed as the Managing Trustee by other Trustees who are respondent nos.2 to 9 in the present appeal. Further, the High Court held that the appellant did not object to his functioning as a Managing Trustee at the time when all the powers were being delegated to him and found that the petition was not seriously contested before the learned single Judge and rejected the appeal of the appellant.

However, the said decision cannot be applied to the fact situation of this case in view of the facts and the evidence placed on record.

For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the impugned judgment and order(s) of the High Court and the order of the JCC are legal and valid and the same cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The appeal is dismissed.

Since the appeal against the findings and penalties imposed against the deceased Vijay Mehta is pending before the Civil Court which is being pursued by his legal representatives and therefore, the Civil Court is required to examine the said case independently without being influenced by the observations and reasons assigned by us in this judgment. We would like to make it very clear that the said appeal is required to be examined in the backdrop of the legal grounds and contentions urged therein independently and dispose the same in accordance with law.

.....................................................................J. [V. GOPALA GOWDA] .....................................................................J. [C.NAGAPPAN] New Delhi, March 12, 2015 ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment COURT NO.10 SECTION IX S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s). ....../2015 arising from SLP(C) No. 4148/2011 CHARU KISHOR MEHTA Appellant(s) VERSUS JT.CHARITY COMMR. GR. BOMBAY REG. & ORS. Respondent(s) Date : 12/03/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s) * For M/s. Khaitan & Co.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan.

Leave granted.

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed Reportable Judgment.
Ramdev Food Products Private Limited vs State Of Gujarat

3. The case of the appellant-complainant in complaint filed by it before the Magistrate is that it is running business of food products and had permitted M/s. New Ramdev Masala Factory, wherein accused No.1 Mr. Jasvantbhai Somabhai Patel was one of the partners, to use the trademark "Ramdev" for seven years under agreement dated 4th June, 1990. However, M/s. New Ramdev Masala Factory was closed on 30th May, 1994. Accused No.1 executed forged partnership documents with the help of other accused and thereby committed the alleged offences.

23. We now proceed to deal with the second question of power of police to arrest in the course of investigation under Section 202 with a view to give its report to the Magistrate to enable him to decide whether a case to proceed further existed. Careful examination of scheme of the Code reveals that in such situation power of arrest is not available with the police. Contention based on language of Section 202(3) cannot be accepted.

33. In view of above, we find that the Magistrate and the High Court rightly held that in the present case report under Section 202 was the right course instead of direction under Section 156(3). The question is answered accordingly.

35. These aspects have already been discussed above and are indeed undisputed.

37. In the light of above discussion, we are unable to find any error in the view taken by the Magistrate and the High Court that direction under Section 156(3) was not warranted in the present case and the police may not be justified in exercising power of arrest in the course of submitting report under Section

38. The questions framed for consideration stand answered accordingly.

39. The appeal is dismissed.
Taramani Parakh vs State Of M.P. & Ors

3. The appellant was married to Respondent No.2 on 18th November, 2009. She lodged complaint dated 19th May, 2011 alleging that Respondent No.2 and his parents harassed her with demand of dowry amounting to cruelty. This led to registration of FIR being Crime No.15811 under Sections 498-A/34 of IPC at Police Station Hujrat Kotwali, Gwalior. After investigation, charge sheet was filed against Respondent No.2 and his parents which has been registered as Criminal Case No.163/12 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gwalior.

4. The respondents accused moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings by submitting that the behaviour of the appellant was not cordial and in spite of efforts of the accused, she failed to improve her behaviour and her father took her with him on 22nd May, 2010. The husband filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In mediation proceedings, the appellant stated that she did not want to live with her husband. Thereupon, the respondent filed a divorce petition on 26th April, 2011 which was pending. It was thereafter that the appellant filed the impugned complaint dated 19th May, 2011 which contained false allegations.

14. From reading of the complaint, it cannot be held that even if the allegations are taken as proved no case is made out.

15. There are allegations against Respondent No.2 and his parents for harassing the complainant which forced her to leave the matrimonial home. Even now she continues to be separated from the matrimonial home as she apprehends lack of security and safety and proper environment in the matrimonial home. The question whether the appellant has infact been harassed and treated with cruelty is a matter of trial but at this stage, it cannot be said that no case is made out. Thus, quashing of proceedings before the trial is not permissible.

17. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court.
P.Suseela & Ors.Etc.Etc vs Univ.Grnats Commn.& Ors.Etc.Etc

3. The facts necessary to appreciate the controversy in these appeals are as follows:-

The proviso referred to a number of new conditions relating to the maximum number of Ph.D. students at any given point of time, stringent admission criteria for a Ph.D. degree, research papers being published, the Ph.D. thesis being evaluated by at least two experts, one of whom shall be an expert from outside the State etc.

24. In SLP (C) NO.3054-3055/2014, a judgment of the same High Court dated 6th January, 2014 again by a Division Bench arrived at the opposite conclusion. This is also a matter which causes us some distress. A Division Bench judgment of the same High Court is binding on a subsequent Division Bench. The subsequent Division Bench can either follow it or refer such judgment to the Chief Justice to constitute a Full Bench if it differs with it. We do not appreciate the manner in which this subsequent judgment, (even though it has reached the right result) has dealt with an earlier binding Division Bench judgment of the same High Court. In fact, as was pointed out to us by learned counsel for the appellants, the distinction made in paragraph 20 between the facts of the earlier judgment and the facts in the later judgment is not a distinction at all. Just as in the 2012 judgment Ph.D. degrees had been awarded prior to 2009, even in the 2014 judgment Ph.D. degrees with which that judgment was concerned were also granted prior to 2009. There is, therefore, no distinction between the facts of the two cases. What is even more distressing is that only sub para 4 of the conclusion in the 2012 judgment is set out without any of the other sub paragraphs of Paragraph 104 extracted above to arrive at a result which is the exact opposite of the earlier judgment. This judgment is also set aside only for the reason that it did not follow an earlier binding judgment. This will, however, not impact the fact that the writ petitions in the 2014 judgment have been dismissed. They stand dismissed having regard to the reasoning in the judgment delivered by us today. In view of this pronouncement, nothing survives in Contempt Petition Nos. 286-287 of 2014 which are disposed of as having become infructuous. The other appeals from the Delhi, Madras and Rajasthan High Courts are, consequently, also dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

March 16, 2015.