L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Central Government Of India & Ors vs Krishnaji Parvetesh Kulkarni

Undisputed position is that the respondent in each case had purchased IVPs from post offices. Respondent in each case was entitled to receive maturity value on presentation of the certificate. In each case respondent lost IVPs. In Civil Appeal No.4819 of 2000 the respondent claimed to have lodged a complaint at the police station about the loss of IVPs. He also informed about the loss of IVPs to the Postal Superintendent with the request to look into the matter. The Postal Superintendent informed the respondent that there is no provision for replacement of any IVP lost, stolen, mutilated, defaced or destroyed. Therefore, the claim for duplicate IVPs was turned down. The respondent filed petition before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum taking the stand that post office was not justified in its action. Since the IVPs are transferable from one person to another like currency notes without involving the postal agency duplicated should be issued. The Consumer Forum dismissed the application. Thereafter the respondent filed a suit before the Civil Court which decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. Revision petition was filed before the High Court which was dismissed. The High Court held that since the loss of the IVPs is bona fide and there is no attempt to defeat the interest of the postal authorities and as none else had made a claim on the basis of the said IVPs., the original holder of the IVPs was entitled to payment of the IVPs on the maturity value.

In the other appeal position is somewhat similar except that the respondent had not approached the Consumer Forum. The respondent filed a suit for declaration that he was owner of the IVPs which were lost and was entitled to get payment of the maturity value. The suit was decreed. Civil revision petition was also dismissed on the ground that if the loss of the IVP is genuine and bona fide, the Central Government has a commitment to refund the amount of security.

(2.A) Where a Certificate of any denomination has been purchased on or after the 1st March, 1988 it may be encashed at any time after the expiry of a period of five years from the date of issue by presenting it before the Post Office of issue.
M/S. H.P.L. Chemicals Limited vs Commissioner Of Central Excise, ...

FACTS Appellant is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and is engaged in the manufacture of Hydrazine falling under the Chapter Heading No.28.25 of the Tariff Act. Appellant, during the course of manufacture of the final product produces residuary by-product, i.e., 'Denatured Salt'. Appellant filed classification list claiming classification of the said product under the Heading No. 25.01 carrying 'Nil' rate of duty.

Appellant in reply to the show cause notices took a number of points, relevant ones of which are:

After considering the replies filed by the appellant, the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh decided both the said notices by order in original dated 31.3.1999. By the said order the Deputy Commissioner held that the subject product was correctly classifiable under Heading No. 38.23 (now 38.24) and he accordingly confirmed the demand of duty and directed the appellant to deposit the same along with the interest. It was further held that since there was no material on record to indicate any suppression or mis-statement of facts, a case for imposing the penalty was not made out. Against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, the appellant filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), Central Excise and Customs, Chandigarh, who allowed the same by order in appeal dated 28.3.2000 by holding that the subject product was classifiable under Heading 25.01 of the Tariff Act.

The explanatory notes below Heading No.25.01 in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (in short "HSN") are reproduced below:-

For the reasons stated above, these appeals are accepted and the impugned orders are set aside with consequential effects. Parties will bear their own costs.
State Of Kerala & Ors vs Sunil Kumar S. & Ors

On 10.12.1980, one V.R. Thirumalai Swami Gawndar predecessor of the respondent herein remitted Rs.6,56,582/- at the sub treasury as penal interest for encroachment and cutting of the trees upto 31.12.1978.

On 13.09.1995, the present respondent claims to have acquired the right from Sh. G.R.Thirumalai Swami Gawndar who died on 25.12.1988. On 13.09.1995 the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition O.P. No. 8653.
S.S. Rana vs Registrar, Co-Operative Societies & ...

2.12.1993. However, the Administrator had no occasion to deal with the said appeal. By an order dated 18.11.1995, the Board of Directors of the Respondent No.2 dismissed the said appeal. He reached the age of superannuation on 30th September, 1996.

(2) The managing committee of the society shall have not less than five nor more than twenty-one members, including the Government nominee as may be fixed in the bye-laws.

rules (1) and (1-A) shall hold office till the next election of the Managing Committee or till another person is appointed in his place, whichever is earlier and shall have the right to vote. The Registrar shall either confirm their membership to the committee or shall appoint other persons in their place for the next term of the Committee.

(7) If the committee fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-rule (5), the Registrar may make an order placing such paid officer or servant under suspension from such date and for such period as he may specify in the order and thereupon the paid officer or servant, as the case may be, shall be under suspension.

(8) The officer or servant suspended under this rule shall be re-instated only after the previous approval of the Registrar."

Respondent No.1-Co-operative Society also framed its bye-laws in terms of Rule 2(c) whereof the Board would mean all Directors of the Bank or the Managing Committee.

The said decision, therefore, is of no assistance to us.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed. However in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Mst. Sugani vs Rameshwar Das & Anr

The factual background, as projected by the appellant in a nutshell is as follows:

Respondents 1 & 2 further took the stand that the sale deed dated 18.4.1977 was executed by Mahadeo and with the full knowledge of the plaintiff appellant who was the tenant. Mahadeo never signed in Hindi and used to sign in Mahajani.

The above conclusions of the trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court have not been considered by the High Court, and the appeal was accordingly allowed.

The above position was noted in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar & Ors (1999 (3) SCC 722). Looked at from any angle the impugned order of the High Court is indefensible and is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and the decree of the trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court stand restored. No Costs.
Bir Singh vs State Of Himachal Pradesh

Upon recording a judgment of conviction, the learned Sessions Judge sentenced the appellant to undergo 7 years' Rigorous Imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2,000/-. On an appeal made therefrom, the High Court maintained the said conviction, but, reduced the sentence from 7 years to 5 years, but imposed a fine of Rs.5,000/- upon him.

The statement of PW1 had been corroborated in material particulars by PW4 Devi singh and PW5 Tashi Dorje. We have not been shown any material which would throw any shadow of doubt to disbelieve the statements of the said witnesses.

For the reasons afore-mentioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant is on bail. He is directed to surrender immediately. The trial court is directed to take steps in this behalf.
State Of Rajasthan & Anr vs Kulwant Kaur

In view of the said decision of this Court, the services of all the teachers who did not possess the requisite qualification were directed to be terminated by an order dated 7.4.1994. It is not clear as to whether any order to that effect was served on the Respondent. Only on 31.5.1995 an order of termination was served on her. She again filed a writ petition, which was marked as W.P. No.2973/94 before the High Court challenging the said order of termination. An interim order of stay was passed therein. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said interim order of stay, she continued in service.

Ultimately both her writ petitions, namely, W.P.Nos.2973/94 and 1383/87 were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by an order dated 22.8.1995. Letters Patent Appeals were preferred thereagainst by the Respondent No.1 and by reason of the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court directed:

The Respondent herein did not possess the requisite qualification. Only because the order of termination of service of Respondent was directed to be stayed and in obedience of the interim orders passed by the High Court, she was allowed to continue in services, the same, in our opinion, can not lead to the conclusion that she had been validly holding the post or the order of termination was bad in law. After Shyam Lal Joshi (supra), it is not disputed that the teachers were required to possess a Short Training Certificate. As the respondent did not possess such essential qualification, she has no legal right to continue in service. The orders of termination passed, both in 1987 and 1994, which were the subject matter of the Writ Petition No.1383/87 (being against the order dated 11.5.87) and Writ Petition No.2973/94 (being against the order dated 31.5.1994), cannot, thus, be held to be bad in law.

It is also not a case where equity is in favour of the Respondent. Only because an interim order was passed in favour of the Respondent, the same would not mean that despite the fact that she did not possess requisite qualifications, her services would be allowed to continue. Even the old Rules were not applicable in her case. The matter would have been different had she acquired the requisite qualification prior to issuance of order of termination in 1994. Admittedly, she had not by then completed her training. Even at that point of time, she was not possessed of the Short Training Certificate. Her services had, thus, rightly been terminated and in that view of the matter, purported acquisition of qualification by her in 1996 would be of no significance.

For the reasons afore-mentioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained, the same are set aside. The appeals are allowed.

No costs.
Jayasingh vs K.K. Velayutham & Anr

The said decision was rendered by this Court on 21st February, 1997. A Complaint Petition was filed by the respondent No.1 herein, who is the husband of the said owner of the tea stall against the Dean of Kilpauk Medical College and Hospital, Chennai purported to be under Sections 166, 448, 427, 380, 392 and 506(II) of the Indian Penal Code on 3rd September, 1997. The Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai sent the Complaint Petition for inquiry to the police authority whereupon a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged. It is not disputed that during investigation the name of the Appellant was taken by one Thiru V. Ramarajan, Executive Engineer, P.W.D., North Presidency Division, Chepauk, Chennai, who alleged:

The revision petition filed by the respondent No.1 herein before the High Court against the said order, however, was allowed, stating:

The statement of the Executive Engineer, on the basis whereof the Appellant had been charge-sheeted, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety does not disclose an offence. The respondent No.1 herein filed a complaint. He, in view of the fact that a contempt petition was filed against the Appellant, presumably knew him personally. Despite the same, he had not been named in the complaint petition. No allegation had been made against him either in his complaint or in his statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that he had transgressed his authority or committed the alleged crime. In the aforementioned provisions, we are of the considered view that the prosecution should have obtained an order of sanction in terms of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Whether for prosecution of a public servant sanction is necessary to be obtained or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Similarly, whether in view of the allegations made in the complaint an order of sanction would be essential or not would again depend upon facts and circumstances of each case.

[See Sankaran Moitra vs. Sadhna Das & Anr. (JT 2006 (4) SC 34.] In view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements, as noticed hereinbefore, we are of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained as:

The High Court, therefore, was not correct in allowing the Revision Case filed by the respondent No.1 herein setting aside the order dated 25.8.2003 of the Metropolitan Magistrate. The impugned order is set aside. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
Amarjit Kaur & Ors vs Karamvir Singh & Ors

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:-

There was no modification of the terms of the declaration that the sale would not affect the reversionary rights of Joginder Singh after the death of Ajit Singh which in fact would mean that the property in dispute would be inherited by all the heirs of Ajit Singh. The Trial Court fell into grave error in relation to this aspect of the case and, therefore, the first Appellate Court was justified in its view.

If Joginder Singh had spent any money as claimed, that is a matter of adjustment when the actual allotment is made. Above being the position, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Pandit Vasudev Vyas (Dead) Thr. Lrs vs Board Of Mgmt, S.S.J.S. Peeth & Ors

A First Appeal being First Appeal No. 166 of 1983 was preferred thereagainst by the Appellant, Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 herein. The said appeal was dismissed by an order dated 20th January, 2000. A Letters Patent appeal was preferred thereagainst by the Appellant which has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment dated 24.4.2000.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that the matter should be directed to be considered afresh by the Division Bench of the High Court. We direct accordingly.

The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The matter is remitted to the High Court with the aforementioned directions. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Guddu @ Santosh vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

JUDGMENT ORDER The appellant herein was charged with commission of an offence under Section 376 of the IPC for committing rape on a minor girl Sushama. Her parents are labourers. They had been occupying a portion of the premises belonging to the father of the appellant herein, as tenant. On 2.1. 1995, they had gone out of their house in search of work. Sushama was all alone in the house. The appellant taking advantage of the absence of the parents of the prosecutrix, came there, took her to Tapariya, put off her Chaddi and he also pulled down his trousers and sat upon her. When her grandfather came, he fled away. When the parents of Sushama came back, they were informed about the said incident by her. The mother of the prosecutrix had seen redness in her private part as also blood coming out therefrom.

First Information Report was lodged on the next day i.e. on 3.1.1995. The prosecutrix was sent for medical examination and one Dr. Smt. Sunita Jain examined her. The said doctor was examined before the learned Trial Judge as PW-2. In her evidence she stated:

Apart from the mother and grandfather, the prosecutrix examined herself. She being below 12 years of age, the learned Sessions Judge satisfied himself that she was capable of testifying as a witness. In her evidence, the prosecutrix stated:

On the aforementioned statement she was not cross-examined.

The mother of the prosecutrix also examined herself as PW-7. In her examination-in-chief, she stated:

Yet again she had not been cross-examined on the said point.

The findings in a criminal case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the ratio laid down in both the judgments relied upon by learned senior counsel Mr. S.K. Dubey, go against the contention raised by him. There is therefore, no merit in this appeal. The High Court, however, in our opinion, comitted an error in sentencing the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10 years. The appellant has been convicted only under Section 376/511 of the IPC and thus the proper sentence that should have been awarded to him was imprisonment for 5 years.

We, therefore, in modification of the impugned order, reduce the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Marwar Gramin Bank & Anr vs Ram Pal Chouhan

A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice.

The respondent was dismissed from service under the provisions of Regulations 30(1)(f) of the Marwar Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations") having been found guilty of the charge of misconduct levelled against him while he was posted at Sarnau Branch of the appellant-Marwar Gramin Bank in District Jalore. A complaint came to be filed by some of the loanees against him alleging inter alia that he demanded bribe for providing them relief under the Agricultural Rural Bank Relief Regulations. A preliminary enquiry was conducted by Shanti Lal Sharma, who recorded the statements of the Manager, Field Supervisor and other staff members and also recorded the statements of the complainants. After conducting the preliminary enquiry, disciplinary proceedings were initiated under Regulation 30 of the Regulations. The respondent was served with a memorandum dated 6.9.1991 whereby he was informed that an enquiry is proposed against him on the charges set out in the statement of charges and explained in the statement of allegations. The charges against the respondent set out are as follows:-

Questioning the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, a writ application was filed which was dismissed by learned Single Judge. Special Appeal was allowed by the Division Bench and the orders of Disciplinary Authority and that of the Appellate Authority were quashed.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of, with no order as to costs.
P.D. Agrawal vs State Bank Of India & Ors

The Disciplinary Authority thereafter issued a charge sheet against him for his purported misbehaviour during the period 8.9.1986 to 27.9.1986 to which we have referred to hereinbefore. An Inquiry Officer was appointed to enquire into the said charges. Before the said Inquiry Officer several witnesses were examined. In relation to each of the charges, the witnesses, indisputably, were cross-examined. The Appellant also entered into defence and several documents on his behalf were exhibited.

The Disciplinary Authority, however, differed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer as regards the said charge No.2 and recommended for his dismissal from services to the Appointing Authority stating:

The Appellant herein, thereafter, preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. As regards the opinion of the Disciplinary Authority, so far as charge No.2 is concerned, he stated:

He filed a writ petition questioning the legality of the said order, which was dismissed. A Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Appellant thereagainst was also dismissed by a reasoned order.

which in itself is antithetical to justice."

We are, therefore, of the opinion that charge No.2 being severable, this Court can proceed on the basis that the charges against the Appellant in respect of charge No.2 was not proved.

[See also A. Sudhakar vs. Post Master General, Hyderabad & Anr. (JT 2006 (4) SC 68)] For the reasons afore-mentioned, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Indu Shekhar Singh & Ors vs State Of U.P. & Ors

The Respondent Nos.2, 3, 4 and 6 (the intervener) were deputed to Ghaziabad Development Authority on diverse dates, i.e., 26.6.1986, 6.5.1989, 16.10.1985 and 1.4.1984 respectively.

U.P. Jal Nigam, admittedly, is not and has never been a development authority. The employees on deputation to the development authorities from U.P. Jal Nigam, therefore, could not have been absorbed in the centralized services in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A of the Act. Options were, however, called for from the officers of U.P. Jal Nigam on deputation on various dates by the State of U.P. By letter 27.8.1987 and 28.11.1991, they were asked to communicate their acceptance stating as to whether they would like to be absorbed in the authorized centralized service subject to the conditions specified therein, e.g., their past services rendered in U.P. Jal Nigam would not be reckoned for the purpose of determination of seniority and they would be placed below the officers who had been appointed on regular basis in centralized service after their absorption. A copy of the Office order dated 3rd February, 1997 by way of example may be noticed:

The Respondents herein, admittedly, resigned from their services from U.P. Jal Nigam. The Respondent No.2 accepted the said offer of the State in terms of his letter dated 27.8.1987 stating:

Therefore, you are again requested that a decision in this regard should be taken on a sympathetic consideration. Thereafter, whatever decision is taken shall be acceptable to the applicant.

No option, however, was given to Respondent Nos.3 and 6 (the intervener). They, however, presumably opted on their own for their absorption in the authorized centralised services of the development authorities. It is not in dispute that the State issued letters of absorption, so far as Respondent Nos.2 and 3 are concerned on 18.3.1994 and so far as Respondent Nos. 4 and 6 (the intervener) are concerned on 6.4.1987. The Appellants herein were appointed in various development authorities the details whereof are as under:

Indu Shekhar Singh Shivraj Singh S.N. Tripathi S.S. Verma P.C. Pandey Rakesh Kr. Shukla Ajay Kr. Singh 14.2.83 14.5.82 24.7.79 27.6.84 12.10.84 15.5.82 24.4.82 In view of Rule 7 of the Uttar Pradesh Development Authorities Rules, 1985, the Appellants were placed above the Respondent Nos.2, 3, 4 and 6 in the seniority list. Questioning the said orders, Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 herein filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court praying, inter alia, for the following relief:

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly.

The appeals are allowed. No costs.