L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Hakam Singh vs State Of Haryana And Others

4. Without going into the facts in detail, these appeals can be disposed of on a very short point. It is an admitted position that an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (In short "CODE") for acceptance of additional evidence was filed before the High Court in the aforesaid First Appeals, which were dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order. However, the application for acceptance of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CODE was not considered by the High Court while disposing of the appeal.

5. That being the position, without going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order of the High Court passed in the aforesaid appeals, we set aside the same and remit back the cases to the High Court for decision of the Appeals afresh on merits and in accordance with law along with the application for acceptance of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CODE.

6. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside. The High Court is requested to dispose of the First Appeals in the light of the observations and directions made hereinabove within three months from the date of supply of a copy of this Order along with application for acceptance of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CODE.

7. It is expected that the parties shall not be entitled to ask for adjournments on unsatisfactory grounds.

8. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
Hakam Singh vs State Of Haryana And Ors. [Alongwith ...

4. Without going into the facts in detail, these appeals can be disposed of on a very short point. It is an admitted position that an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (In short "CODE") for acceptance of additional evidence was filed before the High Court in the aforesaid First Appeals, which were dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order. However, the application for acceptance of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CODE was not considered by the High Court while disposing of the appeal.

5. That being the position, without going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order of the High Court passed in the aforesaid appeals, we set aside the same and remit back the cases to the High Court for decision of the Appeals afresh on merits and in accordance with law along with the application for acceptance of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CODE.

6. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside. The High Court is requested to dispose of the First Appeals in the light of the observations and directions made hereinabove within three months from the date of supply of a copy of this Order along with application for acceptance of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CODE.

7. It is expected that the parties shall not be entitled to ask for adjournments on unsatisfactory grounds.

For the reasons aforesaid, the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
Cadila Healthcare Ltd vs Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. & Anr

2. Initially, an interim order was granted by the trial court against which the appeal was taken. The appeal was, however, admitted by the appellate authority but it refused to grant any interim order during the pendency of the appeal. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant before us filed an appeal before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad which by the impugned order refused to grant any interim order to the appellant, but direction was made to proceed with the suit and dispose of the same at an early date. It is this order of the High Court which was challenged in this Court by way of a special leave petition. While issuing notice on 15th of March, 2008, this Court passed the following order:-

5. Accordingly, this appeal is disposed of with the above direction. There will be no order as to costs.
Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd vs Commissioner Of Income Tax,Trivandrum

However, as a result of various tax concessions and incentives certain companies making huge profits and also declaring substantial dividends, have been managing their affairs in such a way as to avoid payment of income-tax.

and claimed the refund of Rs.8,62,730/- pre paid as tax. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Asst.), Special Range, Kottayam rejected the figures returned by the assessee and assessed the total income at Rs.47,26,270/- and imposed a tax of Rs.25,99,448/- as well as a surcharge of Rs.1,29,972/- totaling Rs.27,29,420/-. After adjusting advance tax paid, as well as the TDS deducted, the Assessing Officer created a total demand of Rs.26,83,327/-. It is relevant to mention here that since the provision of section 80VV stood deleted with effect from 01.4.1988 the claim made under that section was rejected.

Consequently, the appeals are allowed and the impugned order of the High Court is accordingly set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
M/S. Godavari Finance Co vs Degala Satyanarayanamma And Others

3. Ch. Praveen Kumar, fourth respondent, was the owner of a vehicle being a mini truck of 'Mahendra Nissan' make purchased by him having been financed by the appellant for a sum of Rs.50,000/-. The said loan was discharged by him by the end of 1995.

4. Indisputably the said vehicle had all along been in possession and control of the fourth respondent herein. It met with an accident on 29th May, 1995. In the said accident one Degala Balakrishana died. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed an application claiming compensation alleging rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the said vehicle.

5. On or about 18th June, 1998, the appellant herein was impleaded in the proceeding on the premises that it was the financer of the said vehicle.

6. The name of the appellant as a financer indisputably was incorporated in the Registration Book of the vehicle. However, the extract of Registration Book revealed that the vehicle was registered in the name of the 4th respondent only w.e.f. 3rd June, 1992. It further revealed that the said vehicle was held under a Hire Purchase Agreement with the appellant w.e.f. 6th February, 1995 which was cancelled on 10th November, 1995.

7. Appellant herein filed a written statement stating that on the date of accident the ownership of the vehicle was solely with the 4th respondent and not with the appellant. The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal by a judgment dated 28th October, 1998 awarded a sum of Rs.2,08,000/- in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The objection of the appellant that it was not liable to pay any amount of compensation together with the owner of the vehicle, driver and insurance company was rejected by the Tribunal stating:-

The legal principles as noticed hereinbefore, clearly show that the appellant was not liable to pay any compensation to the claimants.

19. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
M/S. Mauri Yeast India Pvt. Ltd vs State Of U.P. And Another

JUDGMENT REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2720 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11744 of 2007) AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2721 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12775 of 2007) M/s.Kothari Fermentation and Biochem Ltd. Appellant Versus State of U.P. and another . Respondents S.B. SINHA, J.

Yet again on or about 1st March, 2003 a Notification was issued, entry

Appellants carry on business of manufacturing and sale of yeast which is used for the purposes of manufacturing bread etc. They had been filing returns before the sales tax authorities treating 'yeast' to be a 'chemical' within the meaning of the aforesaid entry for a long time. The said returns had been accepted and orders of assessment were passed relying on or on the basis thereof.

7. For the Assessment Year 2003-2004, a notice was issued to the appellant on 9th March, 2006 directing it to show cause why tax shall not be imposed on sale of 'yeast' @ 10 % as an unclassified item.

(Emphasis added)

36. For the purpose of determining the question, the chemical composition of yeast is relevant. Determination of and what is there in 'yeast' would also be relevant.

The circular does not deal with such types of balls. Thus, the circular does not mention Chapter Note 6. The circular therefore has no application.

48. We, therefore, are of the opinion that if there is a conflict between two entries one leading to an opinion that it comes within the purview of the tariff entry and another the residuary entry, the former should be preferred.

50. In our opinion 'yeast' is a chemical within the meaning of the entry in question.

51. For the views we have taken, it is not necessary for us to consider the other contentions raised by the parties.

52. For the reasons abovementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only).
U.P.C.U.E.F. Ltd vs Cane Commissioner & R.C.C.S. & Ors

3. The relevant facts leading to the filing of this appeal are as under. The appellant is a registered Trade Union of the workmen employed by Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti Ltd, Shamli, respondent no. 4 herein. Before the High Court, one Late Shri. Niranjan Singh was the writ petitioner No. 2 along with the appellant and was a permanent seasonal clerk of the respondent No. 4 but he expired during the pendency of the writ petition.

It is the case of the appellant that due to this amendment, the length of the employment of the seasonal workmen and also their wages was affected. Further, all the seasonal workmen were placed in the same position as prior to 1975 regulations, which made their employment at the whims and fancies of the employer exposing the workmen to all vulnerable tactics of the employer. Since a lot of work is required to be done before actual crushing starts and comes to an end, like management of movement of sugarcane, extension of loans to the cane growers, supply of fertilizers, recovery of loans, etc. hence employment of seasonal workers could not be made limited to the crushing period only. On these grounds, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad challenging the order dated 17th of May, 1993 and the order dated 14th of July, 1993 whereby the services of Late Shri. Niranjan Singh (writ petitioner no. 2 before the High Court) were terminated. The High court, as noted herein earlier, rejected the writ petition of the appellant. It is this order of the High Court, which is impugned in this appeal in respect of which leave has already been granted.

10. In view of our discussions made hereinabove, we, therefore, hold that the orders dated 17th of May, 1993 and 14th of July, 1993 could not have been passed without giving any notice in compliance with Section 4-I read with the Third Schedule of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1956, as mentioned herein earlier. In view of our finding made hereinabove, it is, therefore, not necessary to deal with Question No. 2 regarding power of respondent No. 1 to frame and amend regulations under Section 122 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965.

11. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed to the extent indicated above. The appeal is thus allowed without any order as to costs. However, it would be open to the respondent to amend the definition of "Crushing Season" in accordance with law.
Union Of India vs Chandalavada Gopalakrishna Murthy & ...

In view of the order that we propose to pass, it is not necessary to recite the entire facts leading to the filing of the present appeal. Suffice it to say that a contract was entered into between the appellant and the respondent regarding the construction of laboratory, Officers' room and class room at Indian Railway Institute, Secunderabad. Agreement was entered into on 31.01.1981. According to the agreement, the contract was to be completed within a period of 9 months i.e. upto 27th October, 1981. It is stated that -2- on request made by the contractor/respondent extension of time was granted under clause 17(3) of the general conditions of the contract. Ultimately, the contract was completed on 31st August, 1983. A dispute arose between the parties and the the respondent made various claims under 7 heads and demanded for arbitration. The arbitrator granted Award under all 7 heads. The Award was filed before the City Civil Court. The City Civil Court made the award a rule of the court in respect of claim No.2 to 6 but set aside the Award regarding item No. 1 and 7. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court and by the impugned order the Division Bench maintained the order of the Civil Court with regard to item No.7. However, the Division Bench allowed the claim under item No.1. Hence, the present appeals.

The appeals are allowed.

No costs.

.........................J (H.K. SEMA) .........................J (MARKANDEY KATJU) New Delhi;

April 10, 2008.
Ponusamy vs State Of Tamil Nadu

3. PW-10 then requested PW-11 to inform PW-2 about the matter. On receiving the said information an attempt was made to lodge a First Information Report at Sathyamangalam police station. The First Information Report was refused to be registered thereat in the absence of any dead body or any other evidence with regard to the murder. A search was conducted for the dead body. On the bank of L.B.P. canal dead body was found on 14th March, 1997 which fell within the jurisdiction of Kadathur police station. A complaint was made before Ramasamy, Inspector of Police, PW-13, at 10.30 a.m. on the same day, whereupon a First Information Report was registered under Section 302 and Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. Investigation was taken up by PW-22, the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Gobichettipalayam.

4. PW-1 identified the dead body on the basis of a talisman, which was found on her hand, as also on identification of her saree. A key was found tagged in the saree. The key was removed. On a query enquiry made by PW-22, in regard to the lock for which the key was used, it was stated that the lock was fitted to a trunk. The trunk was brought. The key was fitted in the lock of the trunk. It was opened with the said key.

24. A bare perusal of the opinion of the learned Author by itself does not lead to the conclusion that fracture of hyoid bone, is a must in all the cases.

25. We must also take into consideration the fact that the dead-body was decomposed with maggots all over it. Other marks of strangulation which could have been found were not to be found in this case. The dead body was found after a few days. We are, therefore, of the opinion that medical evidence does not negate the prosecution case.

28. We have been taken through the evidence of PW-10 and PW-18. We have no reason to differ with the findings of the learned trial Judge as also the High Court that the extra judicial confession was voluntary or truthful. We, therefore, are of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly.
M/S Sahara India (Firm),Lucknow vs Commissioner Of Income Tax,Central-I & ...

J U D G M E N T REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2783 OF 2008 Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.20209 of 2006 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2784 OF 2008 [Arising out of S.L.P.(C) NO. 20212 OF 2006] D.K. JAIN, J.:

30. In the result, both the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Pradip J. Mehta vs Commissioner Of Income Tax,Ahmedabad

3. Brief facts of the case culminating into filing of the present appeal, are as under:

4. The assessee was appointed as Marine Engineer by Wallem Shipping Management Ltd., Hong Kong on 5th October, 1976 and, during the course of his employment, he was posted to work on high seas and paid abroad for many years. The assessee while filing his return for the assessment year 1982-83 (for short "relevant year") claimed the status of "not ordinarily resident in India" as defined in Section 6(6)(a) of the 1961 Act and to exclude income accruing outside India under Section 5(1)(c ) of the 1961 Act, which provides that in the case of a person not ordinarily resident in India within the meaning of sub-section (6) of Section 6, the income which accrues or arises to him outside India shall not be so included in his total income.

9. Assessee being aggrieved by the order of the Assessing Officer, filed an appeal before the CIT (Appeals), who, by his order dated 13th of August, 1985 while concurring with the view taken by the Assessing Officer, dismissed the appeal. Further appeal filed by the assessee before the Tribunal was also dismissed on 24th of July, 1987.

11. Accordingly, the aforesaid two questions were referred to the High Court for its opinion. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order upheld the orders impugned before it and answered the reference in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

Thus, a person will be "resident and ordinarily resident" if both these conditions are satisfied but he will be "resident but not ordinarily resident" if either of those conditions is not satisfied."

30. Accordingly, this appeal is accepted. The order passed by the High Court and the Authorities below are set aside. It is held that the High Court in the impugned judgment has erred in its interpretation of Section 6(6) of the Act and the view taken by Patna High Court, Bombay High Court and Travancore-Cochin High Court has laid down the correct law. The two questions of law referred to above are answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. No costs.
Sudarshan Silks & Sarees vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, Karnataka

2. The assessment years involved in the present Appeals are 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88.

3. A search was conducted on the premises of the assesses on 14th and 15th of October, 1987 and incriminating documents evidencing concealment of income by the assessee were unearthed apart from cash and jewellery found at the time of search. It was found that the appellant was maintaining double set of books and was accounting for only 50% of sales in the regular set of books. This fact was admitted by Shri J.S. Ramesh, a partner of the firm in the statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Act. Shri J.S. Ramesh is the person-in-charge of the entire group. The total turn over suppressed by the assessee for the assessment year 1987- 88 was found to be to the tune of Rs.44,07,783/-. These have been discussed in detail in the order of assessment. Assessing Officer estimated that the sales of the assessee were Rs.50,000/- per day, whereas the accounted sales were not found even 50% of the total sales. Apart from this, it was found that certain purchases were also not being accounted for. Similarly certain payments made were not being accounted for. All these were pointed out to the assessee. The assessee came forward with offer of additional income. Assessee filed a revised return on 31st March, 1989 declaring a total income for this year at Rs.3,74,226/- as against the earlier amount of Rs.43,650/-. This was accepted and after verification the assessment was completed on 29th December, 1989.

4. During the course of recording the statement under Section 132(4) of the Act, Shri Ramesh agreed to declare such additional income as had been estimated by the search party in the office of the appellant and its sister concerns. On the basis of these calculations, revised returns were filed by the appellant for all the years under appeal. The income as per revised returns were also accepted in toto. In the course of assessment proceedings, penal action under Section 271 (1) (c ) of the Act was initiated and, after considering the reply filed by the appellant, the learned Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax / Assessing Officer chose to levy maximum penalty under Section 271 (1) (c ). While levying the penalty, the Assessing Officer repelled the contention of the appellant that a promise had been made not to levy the penalty, as there was no evidence to this effect on record. It was also held that the appellant was not entitled to the immunity given under Section 132(4) read with Section 271 (1) (c ) of the Act.

6. On the basis of these findings, the CIT (Appeals) accepted the appeal and set aside the orders of the Assessing Officer. It was held that in the facts and circumstances of the case, no case for levy of penalty under Section 271 (1) (c ) was made out.

(Emphasis supplied)

17. Accordingly, the Orders under appeal are set aside and that of the CIT (Appeals) and Tribunal restored. It is held that in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was not exigible. The appeals are accepted with costs.
Mahendra Singh Saini vs State Of Uttrakhand & Anr

3. Appellant was elected as Gram Pradhan of Village Salempur in the year 1989 and remained on the said post till 1995. Indisputably, 95 persons, most of whom belonged to the Scheduled Caste, had been occupying the land of the Gram Panchayat. In or around March 1993, the appellant purported to have granted settlement of the lands occupied by them, after taking Rs. 10,000 from each of the allottees. He, however, in the meanwhile had initiated a 2 proceeding for their eviction and they were evicted from the lands occupied by them.

7. By an order dated 15.7.1998 cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. Appellant herein filed an application for recall of the said order, inter alia on the premise that the said order was barred by limitation. The said application was rejected by order dated 5.7.2000.

11. It was not the case of the first informant, namely, the respondent No.2 herein, that he was aware of the alleged commission of offence by the appellant in March 1993. He came to know thereabout when the persons concerned, keeping in view the change in the office of Gram Pradhan, made a complaint to the Governor of the State, with a copy forwarded to the Sub Divisional Magistrate.

18. In the circumstances, therefore, an order taking cognizance, whether barred by limitation or not would depend upon various factors.

20. We do not find any error in the said approach of the learned Magistrate. We would, however, like to observe that in the event the findings of fact arrived at by the learned 8 Magistrate appears to be incorrect at an appropriate stage of the trial, it would be open to the appellant to urge the said ground. The appeal is dismissed with the aforementioned observations.

..........................J (S.B. SINHA) ..........................J (MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) NEW DELHI, APRIL 15, 2008.