L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
G. Dhanasekar vs M.D.,Metropolitan Transport ...

7. The Tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs.4,50,000/-. The Tribunal found that the appellant has contributed to the accident and, hence, the liability of the respondent was fixed at 50%. In appeal before the High Court, it was held that the contributory negligence on the part of the appellant is only 30%. The compensation was also refixed to an amount of Rs.3,20,000/-. Thus, the appellant was held entitled to Rs.2,24,000/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum.

|(ii)|After deducting 1/3rd of the total income |Rs.80,000/- | | |for personal expenses, the balance will be =| | | |[Rs.1,20,000/- - Rs.40,000/-] = | | |(iii|Add 30% towards increase in future income, |Rs.1,04,000/- | |) |as per Sarla Verma and Rajesh and Others | | | |cases (supra) = | | |(iv)|Compensation after multiplier of 13 is |Rs.13,52,000/-| | |applied = [Rs.1,04,000/- x 13] = | | |(v) |Applying the 35% functional disability, the |Rs.4,73,200/- | | |appellant will be entitled to the | | | |compensation of 35% of Rs.13,52,000/- = | | |(vi)|Reimbursement towards medical expenses = |Rs.60,000/- | |(vii|Amount towards extra nourishment, etc. |Rs.10,000/- | |) | | | |(vii|Damages to the vehicle (as awarded by the |Rs.10,000/- | |i) |High Court) = | | |(ix)|Amount towards actual loss of earning during|Rs.40,000/- | | |the period of hospitalization and thereafter| | | |during the period of rest = | | |(x) |Amount towards pain and sufferings = |Rs.10,000/- | |(xi)|Amount towards expenses on attendant = |Rs.10,000/- | |TOTAL COMPENSATION AWARDED |Rs.6,13,200/- | |[(v)+(vi)+(vii)+(viii)+(ix)+(x)+(xi)] | |

15. The amount of total compensation awarded shall carry interest @ 7% per annum from the date of filing the petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal till realization.

16. The appeals are allowed as above. There is no order as to costs.

February 12, 2014.
Hari Nandan Prasad & Anr vs Employer I/R To Mangmt.Of F.C.I. & Anr

3. Before we proceed further, we deem it appropriate to give the details of nature of employment of each of the appellants with the FCI and tenure etc. as well as the gist of the tribunal’s awards.

4. He was engaged on daily wages basis as Labourer-cum-Workman, in the exigency of the situation, at Food Storage Depot, Jasidih by the Depot In- charge, FCI, Jasidih on 1st June 1980. On the ground that services of appellant No.1 were no more required, he was disengaged w.e.f. 1.3.1983. While doing so, no notice or notice pay or retrenchment compensation was given to him. Appellant No.1 raised industrial dispute which was referred to the CGIT by the Central Government vide reference order dated 1.10.1992, with the following terms of reference:

5. The CGIT gave its award dated 12.12.1996 holding that the termination was in contravention of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The CGIT also, while ordering reinstatement of appellant No.1, held that he was also entitled to regularization of his services from the date of his stoppage from service dated 1.3.1983. Back wages to the extent of 50% were awarded. As far as direction for regularization is concerned, it was based on Circular issued by the FCI whereby any temporary worker employed for more than 90 days was entitled for regularization of his service. It was noted that as per the said Circular the Management had regularized the services of 70-75 similarly situated casual workers and therefore denying the same benefit to appellant No.1 amounted to discrimination.

6. Appellant No.2 was engaged on daily wages as casual Typist at the District Office, FCI, Darbhanga against a vacancy of Class-III post on 5.9.1986. He worked in the capacity till 15.9.1990 when his name was struck off the rolls. He also raised industrial dispute which was referred to CGIT with following terms of reference:

38. Non-regularization of appellant No.2, while giving the benefit of that Circular dated 6.5.1987 to other similar situated employees and regularizing them would, therefore, be clearly discriminatory. On these facts, the CGIT rightly held that he was entitled to the benefit of scheme contained in Circular dated 6.5.1987. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment has failed to notice this pertinent and material fact which turns the scales in favour of appellant No.2. High Court committed error in reversing the direction given by the CGIT, which was rightly affirmed by the learned Single Judge as well, to reinstate appellant No.2 with 50% back wages and to regularize him in service. He was entitled to get his case considered in terms of that Circular. Had it been done, probably he would have been regularized. Instead, his services were wrongly and illegally terminated in the year 1990. As an upshot of the aforesaid discussion, we allow these appeals partly. While dismissing the appeal qua appellant No.1, the same is accepted in so far as appellant No.2 is concerned. In his case, the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the award of the CGIT is restored. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
P.L.Tatwal vs State Of M.P

accused Shri D.L. Rangotha, the then Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation and Shri D. P. Tiwari, the then Administrator of the Corporation, the State Government and the Central Government respectively had declined to grant sanction, while they were in service. Since the prosecution was sought to be launched after their retirement, the same was challenged before the trial court and the High Court unsuccessfully. However, by order dated 21.08.2013, in Criminal Appeal No. 1213 of 2013 and Criminal Appeal No. 1214 of 2013, this Court quashed the proceedings for prosecution against Shri D. L. Rangotha and Shri D. P. Tiwari on the ground that once sanction for prosecution is refused by the competent authority while the officer is in service, he cannot be prosecuted after retirement notwithstanding the fact that no sanction for prosecution under the PC Act is necessary after the retirement of a public servant. The order was passed following the decision in Chittaranjan Das v. State of Orissa[1].

3. However, in the case of the appellant herein, sanction was granted by the Standing Committee of the Corporation while he was in service. Though the same was subsequently withdrawn, that order was set aside by the High Court holding that the order on withdrawal was passed without proper application of mind.

[pic]14.5. The adequacy of material placed before the sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order.

18. The appeal is allowed to that extent. Parties to appear before the Special Judge (P.C. Act, 1988), Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh on 05.04.2014.

February 19, 2014.
Polamrasetti Manikyam & Anr vs Teegala Venkata Ramayya & Anr

5. Value of the suit for the purposes of Court Fee and jurisdiction was shown as the value of the deed to be cancelled i.e. Rs.1 lakh. Court Fee of Rs.3,426/- was paid under Section 37 of the Court Fees Act, deposited vide Challan No.4239075 dated 29.7.2008. The Appellants/Plaintiffs filed I.A. No.374 of 2008 under Order IX Rule 1 and 2 CPC for grant of temporary injunction restraining the Respondents therein from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property and also filed I.A. No.375 of 2008 and sought an order restraining the Respondents from operating the sale deed until the disposal of the suit. During enquiry in I.A. No.375 of 2008, the Appellants/Plaintiffs got market value certificate dated 4.10.2002 as Exh.A-6 showing the market value of the property as Rs.19,36,000/- by the year 2002 and contended that the alleged sale for Rs.1 lakh was a fraudulent transaction. The Respondents raised an objection that the Civil Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the Plaintiff’s case is that the market value of the property is more than Rs.1 lakh. It was contended that for cancellation of sale deed, Court Fee has to be calculated on the current market value, but not as per value shown on the document. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Madras High Court in Kolachala Kutumba Sastri (supra) and T.S. Rajam Ammal v. V.N. Swaminathan & Ors. AIR 1954 Mad. 152, wherein it was held that in a suit for cancellation of sale deed, Court Fee payable is on the market value of the property involved as on the date of the plaint and not on the consideration recited in it.

6. Learned Civil Judge vide his order dated 25.11.2008 took the view that the Court Fee has to be calculated as per the market value on the date of presentation of the plaint and not as per the value shown on the document. Consequently, it was held that the Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the plaint was returned under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC for presentation before the proper Court.

7. The Appellants/Plaintiffs, aggrieved by the said order, filed C.M.A. No.2 of 2009 in the Court of the Judge, Family Court-cum- District and Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram. The appellate Court dismissed the appeal vide its order dated 29.10.2009 holding that the Court below has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the plaint was correctly returned for presentation before the appropriate Court holding that the Court Fee has to be calculated as per the market value of the property as on the date of presentation of the plaint and not on the value shown in the registered sale deed.

17. In such circumstances, we are inclined to set aside the judgment of the High Court and allow these appeals. Consequently, the orders passed by the appellate Court as well as the High Court would stand quashed. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the suit in accordance with law and the declaration made by this Court.

18. The Appeals are, accordingly, allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
M/S Band Box P.Ltd vs Estate Officer Punjab & Sind Bank & Anr

4. The case of the appellant is that the appellant has been occupying these premises right from 26th March, 1952 and the respondent-Bank became owner of this property only on 31.12.1978. There were some initial notices issued to the appellant to vacate the premises, but ultimately it is the notice dated 15.11.1999 with which we are concerned in the present matter. It was the notice issued by invoking the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. This was followed by the proceeding to evict the appellant which has led to the eviction order passed by the Estate Officer, and which has been confirmed, as stated above, all throughout.

11. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the Division Bench as well as by the Single Judge, by the District Judge, and the Estate Officer. The eviction proceedings initiated against the appellant will stand set aside.

12. Although, this appeal has been allowed in favour of the appellant, Mr. Vikas Singh has pointed out that when this appeal came up for consideration at an earlier stage, this Court had passed an order on 6.8.2012, that the appellant shall pay a sum of Rs.1,80,000/- per month as rent. Mr. Raval has taken instructions, and has very fairly stated that the appellant is aggreable to continue to pay this amount, though otherwise the recorded rent is only Rs.183/- per month. The appellant has been paying this amount, as per the order passed by this Court on 6.8.2012 and shall continue to pay that amount, hereinafter by way of rent. Mr. Raval has however sought that the appellant shall pay this rent regularly, but it should get some protection, inasmuch as he is agreeing to pay this substantial higher amount. Mr. Vikas Singh has taken instructions and he states that the appellant will be allowed to continue in the premises, at least, for a period of 12 (twelve) years, provided the appellant pays the monthly rent regularly, with a rider that at the end of every financial year, the respondent-Bank will have the right to revise the rent by an increase of ten per cent. Mr. Raval agrees to the suggestion of Mr. Vikas Singh. Therefore, the next revision of rent will be from 1.4.2015. We record this understanding between the parties and though this appeal is allowed, the appellant will pay the rent of Rs.1,80,000/- per month till the end of 31.3.2015, whereafter the Bank will be entitled to revise the rent by ten per cent every year. In the event of any default in paying the monthly rent, the respondent-Bank will be entitled to take the appropriate proceedings. The 12 years period will be counted from 1.4.2013. We make it further clear that after the expiry of twelve years, it will be open to the respondents to take steps under the Public Premises Act, 1971, if required.
Basappa vs State Of Karnataka

2. Appellant is the accused in C.C. No. 707 of 2004 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate First Class at Hubli, Karnataka. He was charge- sheeted under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) and Sections 187 and 196 of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘MV Act’). The accident occurred on 11.02.2004 at 02.30 P.M. when the appellant was allegedly driving a tractor with a trailer. The vehicle hit against a scooty and resultantly a two year old child travelling in the scooty fell down. The tractor ran over the child and she succumbed to the injury. PWs 1 to 11 were examined and seven documents were marked on the prosecution side. Two documents were marked on the side of the accused. The learned Magistrate, after elaborately discussing the evidence, came to the following conclusion at paragraph-22 of the Judgment dated 25.05.2005:

4. The State filed appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.PC’). The High Court re-appreciated the whole evidence and came to the conclusion that the appellant was liable to be convicted under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC. Further, it was held that “the prosecution has failed to prove the offences under Section 187 and 197 of the MV Act”. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the appellant was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months with fine of Rs.2,000/- under Section 304A and for three months with fine of Rs.500/- under Section 279 of IPC. A default sentence was also given. The sentences were to run concurrently. Thus aggrieved, the appellant is before this Court.

17. The appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment is set aside and that of the trial court is restored.

February 27, 2014.
State Of Rajasthan vs Parmanand And Anr

2. The case of the prosecution was that on 13/10/1997 during Kota Camp at Iklera, P.N. Meena, Sub-Inspector, Office of the Narcotics Commissioner, Kota received information at 1900 hours in the evening that the respondents were to handover about 10 Kg opium on 14/10/1997 in the morning between 4.00 a.m. to 6.00 a.m. at Nangdi-Tiraha, Iklera, Chhipabaraud Road to a smuggler. This information was entered by SI Meena in the diary and he forwarded it to the Investigating Officer J.S. Negi, Superintendent. J.S. Negi sent this information through Constable B.L. Meena to Assistant Narcotic Commissioner, Kota. Thereafter, raiding party was formed. The raiding party was headed by Superintendent J.S. Negi. The raiding party reached Nangdi-Tiraha by a Government vehicle. Independent witnesses Ramgopal and Gopal Singh were called by SI Qureshi. Their consent was obtained. At about 4.25 a.m., the respondents came from the village Rajpura. On seeing the raiding party, they tried to run away but they were stopped. Enquiry was made with both the respondents in the presence of the independent witnesses by SI Qureshi. The respondents gave their names. Respondent No. 1 Parmanand had one white colour gunny bag of manure in his left hand. SI Qureshi told the respondents that he had to take their search. They were told about the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. They were told that under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act, they had a right to get themselves searched in the presence of any nearest Magistrate or any gazetted officer or in the presence of Superintendent J.S. Negi of the raiding party. One written notice to that effect was given to them. On this notice, appellant Surajmal gave consent in writing in Hindi for himself and for appellant Parmanand and stated that they are ready to get themselves searched by SI Qureshi in the presence of Superintendent J.S. Negi. He also put his thumb impression. Thereafter, bag of respondent No. 1 Parmanand was searched by SI Qureshi. Inside the bag in a polythene bag some black material was found. The respondents told him that it was opium and they had brought it from the village. The weight of the opium was 9 Kg. 600 gms. Necessary procedure of drawing samples and sealing was followed. The respondents were arrested. After completion of the investigation, respondent no. 1 Parmanand was charged for offence under Section 8 read with Section 18 of the NDPS Act and respondent No.2 Surajmal was charged for offence under Section 8 read with Section 18 and for offence under Section 8 read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses. The important witnesses are PW-5 J.S. Negi, the Superintendent, PW-9 SI Meena and PW-10 SI Qureshi. The respondents pleaded not guilty to the charge. They contended that the police witnesses had conspired and framed them. The case is false.

FEBRUARY 28, 2014.
Nisha Devi vs State Of H.P.& Ors

3. By means of these Appeals the Appellant/ Petitioner assails the decision of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in C.W.P.No.4169 of 2009, whereby her appointment as an Anganwadi Worker, on 11.04.2007, was set aside. The Appeals present a picture of protracted litigation. It appears that Respondent No.5 had successfully challenged the Appellant’s appointment before the Deputy Commissioner. The Appellant’s consequent Appeal had limited success before the Divisional Commissioner as he, by Order dated 13.05.2008, had remanded the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Kullu, for fresh consideration. This time around the Appellant had succeeded upto the level of the Divisional Commissioner resulting in filing of C.W.P.No.1570 of 2009 before the High Court. The previous writ proceedings filed by Respondent No.5 succeeded inasmuch as it was held that the Divisional Commissioner had no power to review his own Order under the Scheme and Guidelines relating to ‘Anganwadi Workers’. The narration of the complicated and convoluted sequence of events is not essential for deciding the present Appeals for the simple reason that the impugned Judgments accept the Report of the Tehsildar, Kullu, which was itself predicated only on the revenue records and was arrived at without hearing the Appellant. In the said Report the Income Certificate issued to the Appellant, to the effect that her income was less than Rupees twelve thousand per annum, thereby making her eligible for appointment as a Anganwadi Worker, was cancelled on the predication that she was the owner of 1-19 Bighas of land which was in addition to her father’s ownership of 6 Bighas of land.

5. Trite though it is, we may yet again reiterate that the principle of audi alteram partem admits of no exception, and demands to be adhered to in all circumstances. In other words, before arriving at any decision which has serious implications and consequences to any person, such person must be heard in his defence. We find that the High Court did not notice the violation and infraction of this salutary principle of law. Accordingly, on this short ground, the impugned Judgments and Orders require to be set aside, and are so done. The matter is remanded back to the Divisional Commissioner for taking a fresh decision after giving due notice to the Appellant and affording her an opportunity of being heard. The Divisional Magistrate, Kullu, shall complete the proceedings expeditiously, and not later than six months from the date on which a copy of this Order is served on him.

6. The appeals are allowed in the above terms.

7. The parties to bear their respective costs.

…………………………………………J (T.S. THAKUR) …………………………………………J (VIKRAMAJIT SEN) NEW DELHI;

February 28, 2014.
Jharkhand State Elect.Board & Ors vs M/S Laxmi Business & Cement ...

4. To give a glimpse of the controversy involved, in the year 1994 HT Agreement was entered into between Bihar State Electricity Board (predecessor in interest of JSEB) and the consumers which, inter-alia, stipulated the tariff that was to be charged by the JSEB from the consumers for supply of electricity to these consumers by the JSEB. In Clause 4(c) of the Agreement there was a provision of Minimum Guarantee Charges. In the year 2003, Electricity Act was enacted. Indubitably, power to frame tariff under this Act is given to SERC. SERC passed order dated framing the new tariff schedule (‘2004 Tariff Schedule’ for short) under Section 86 of the Electricity Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The JSEB, however, continued to send the bills as per the Clause 4(c) referred to in the agreement which were paid by the consumers under protest. In May 2010, Writ Petitions were filed by the consumers for quashing of the energy bills on the ground that it had wrongly been raised as per Clause 4(c) of the Agreement which had ceased to have any effect on the framing of 2004 Tariff Schedule by the SERC. The JSEB, however, contended that the HT agreement entered into with the consumers still survived as the 2004 Tariff Schedule saves this Agreement.

20. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that even the argument based on Section 185 of the Electricity Act, 2003 would not bring any change to the results of this case. We, thus, do not fault with the judgment of the High Court appealed against.

22. In so far as delay in filing the Writ Petition is concerned, it appears from the chronology of events that the same has been duly explained. It is not in doubt that the consumers had paid the amount of bills raised by JSEB under protest because of the threat of disconnection. While doing so, they had raised specific plea with the JSEB that it was now supposed to raise the bills in accordance with the 2004 Tariff Schedule. The matter remained under consideration at the level of JSEB which kept approaching the Court as well as SERC seeking clarification of 2004 Tariff Schedule. As already pointed out above, clarification applications were filed which were dismissed by the Commission. However, as the JSEB did not judge from its stand even after the dismissal of these applications, the consumers approached the Court and filed the Writ Petitions. The Writ Petitioners have thus furnished satisfactory explanation for approach the Court.

“107. A Clarification: The situation in the case of captive consumption has not been dealt with by us in this opinion. We leave that question open.”

24. As a result, we find that the appeals are bereft of any merit and are accordingly dismissed. No costs.