L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Hari Shankar Shukla vs State Of U.P

4. The present cases arise out of a death that was caused on 11th July, 1992. The father and mother of the deceased, both injured eye- witnesses and the accused persons were residents of village Mamkhor. It appears that there was a dispute between the parties regarding land. It was alleged that the accused persons, three in number, had made an encroachment on a part of Sehan land of the injured eye-witnesses and had placed cattle troughs there. At about 6.00 a.m., it was alleged that the accused perons were heaping earth on the southern side of the cattle troughs and were collecting bricks. The daughter of PW-4, one Kumari Bindu, informed her father about the encroachment being made by the accused persons on the Sehan land. At this point, both PW-3 and PW-4 came out of the house and questioned the accused persons as to why they were putting soil on the land. On this, an altercation between the two sides took place. One of the accused, Gulab Shukla, exhorted his associates to assault PW-4. At this point, after this incident, the story diverges. According to one version, Hari Shankar Shukla, who is accused No.3 and the petitioner in the special leave petition before us, gave a phawra blow, whereas, according to another version Gulab Shukla gave the said blow to the deceased. In any case, it appears that there was a scuffle between the parties, at which point, accused No.3 went back to his house and came out with a country made pistol. At this point, PW-1, a family member, PW-3 and PW-4 all stated that this particular accused fired one bullet from the country made pistol, which caused the fatal death of Umesh Shukla. As stated hereinabove, PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4 were eye-witesses, PW-3 and PW-4 being injured eye-witnesses. After going into the evidence in some detail and after finding the First Information Report, which was filed by PW-2 Chowkidar doubtful, the trial Court went into various contradictions between the three eye-witnesses and arrived at a conclusion that in any case PW-1 could not be relied upon at all. PW-3 and PW-4 were injured eye- witnesses but their version being discrepant, could not be relied upon. Finally, the trial Court concluded as follows :-

12. We, therefore, find that this is a case where the conviction deserves to be upheld, but the sentence needs to be reduced to six years and fine amounting to Rs.7,000/- (rupees seven thousand only).

13. We order accordingly.

14. The appeals are allowed to this limited extent only.

15. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1159 of 2007 is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand cancelled. The appellant shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining sentence.

(PRAFULLA C. PANT) New Delhi, April 05, 2017
Ramnath Sao (Decd) Thru His Lrs & Ors vs Goberdhan Sao (Decd) Through Lrs. & Ors

2. At the outset, the following genealogical table is being set out to enable a clear and easy understanding of the facts and the findings with regard to the entitlement of the parties that would be arrived at in the course of the deliberations that follow.

4. According to the plaintiffs, they along with the defendants constituted a joint Hindu Mitakshra family which owned ancestral land recorded under Khata No.19 of village Lapanga in the district of Hazaribagh. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the joint family also acquired lands in several other villages in the name of one or other members of the joint family. According to the plaintiffs, the parties continued in joint possession of the properties, both ancestral and subsequently acquired. As the members of joint family had increased it became inconvenient to continue to remain joint. Hence the suit for a decree of partition was filed.

5. The defendants contested the suit, inter alia, on the ground that there was no unity of title and possession between the parties. According to the defendants, after the death of Mithu sao in the year 1961 or even before his death there was disruption in the family on account of the fact that Mithu Sao had married twice. There were serious differences in the family and the children of the first wife Temni separated from Mithu Sao. It is the case of the defendants that after the death of Mithu Sao the children of first wife and second wife again separated. The defendants pleaded that as there was no joint family in existence both the parties had separate earnings and only the ancestral lands of Khata No.19 are available for partition, major portion of which had been acquired by the Government and compensation amount had been evenly distributed amongst the parties according to their respective shares. According to the defendants, the other items of the Schedule property are self-acquired properties which are not liable to be partitioned.

(ASHOK BHUSHAN) NEW DELHI APRIL 06, 2017.
The State Of Maharashtra vs Nisar Ramzan Sayyed

2. The brief facts leading to present criminal appeals may be summarized as follows:

3. Law was set into motion against the respondent and his family members when FIR No.I-227 of 2010 was lodged at Police Station Newasa at the instance of one Nisar Ashraf Pathan after registration of report AD No.91 of 2010 under Section 174 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned Additional Sessions Judge while taking cognizance on the basis of charge-sheet No.12 of 2011 received on 27.01.2011 initiated Sessions Case No.18 of 2011 and vide his judgment and order dated 22nd September, 2011 convicted the respondent herein for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced him to suffer death sentence and pay a fine of Rs.2000/- . Five other accused who were family members of the respondent were, however, acquitted from all the charges.

4. The respondent herein preferred Criminal Appeal No.584 of 2011 before the High Court against the above-noted conviction order and the State of Maharashtra filed Confirmation Case No.1 of 2011 for confirmation of the death sentence awarded to the respondent by the Trial Court. The High Court vide impugned judgment quashed and set-aside the conviction order passed against the respondent herein and consequently, the death sentence confirmation case was dismissed. Hence, the present appeals before us by the State of Maharashtra.

15. Hence, the judgment and order passed by High Court is hereby set aside and that of the Trial Court is restored with regard to conviction of the accused respondent. However, in the light of the above noted discussions, the death sentence awarded by the Trial Court is hereby modified to ‘life imprisonment’ which will mean imprisonment for the natural life of the respondent herein. The criminal appeals are allowed accordingly in the afore-stated terms.

. . . . .J (Pinaki Chandra Ghose) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .J (Rohinton Fali Nariman) New Delhi;

April 07, 2017.
M/S Kaushik Coop.Building Society vs N.Parvathamma & Ors

One K. Balram and few others filed another Land Grabbing Case No.44 of 2000 before the Special Court established under the Act in respect of Land in Survey No.129/52, RS No.327, claiming that he and other members of the Hindu Joint Family, he as the manager, had purchased the disputed property under the registered Sale Deed dated 25.03.1967 from one of the legal representatives of Md. Moulana, namely, Abdul Rub. The above-noted purchaser/ assignee of the land, namely, V. Narsimha Reddy was impleaded in the said case and the applications filed by the said V. Narsimha Reddy and the appellant herein, for quashing of LGC No.44/2000 on the ground of maintainability, were dismissed vide order dated 30.04.2010.

……..………….………….J (Pinaki Chandra Ghose) ……..………….………….J New Delhi; (Uday Umesh Lalit) April 11, 2017.
The Kamrup Industrial Gases Limited vs Union Of India

5. During the course of hearing it emerged, that the main reason for the Division Bench of the High Court in accepting the appeal was, that the appellant did not produce vital documents called for by the Diesel Locomotive Works, before the Arbitrator. The aforesaid documents, were in the exclusive custody of the appellant herein – Kamrup Industrial Gases Ltd., and since the same were not produced before the arbitrator, an adverse inference was drawn by the High Court. The details of the documents sought from the appellant, have been described in the impugned order (dated 27.04.2007), which are as under :

7. The aforesaid findings recorded by the High Court, constitute the first challenge raised by the appellant, before this Court. It was the vehement contention of the, learned counsel for the appellant, that as a matter of fact, it emerges from the proceedings conducted before the Arbitrator, that all the aforesaid documents were actually produced by the appellant before the Arbitrator, during the course of its sitting held on 16.08.1989. In order to demonstrate the factual position, our attention has been drawn to the above proceedings, wherein it is inter alia recorded as under :

Allowed, in the above terms.

….....................................CJI.
Sudha Renukaiah & Ors vs State Of A.P

3. The incident took place at 04:00 PM. Deceased-1, Tirupati Rao died on spot, whereas Siva Sankara Rao, Deceased-2 and S. Venkaiahnaidu (PW.5) were immediately taken to Govt. Hospital, Ponnur at which Hospital Siva Sankara died between 05:30 PM to 06:00 PM. Venkaiahnaidu(PW.5), who was unconscious, on advice of Doctors was shifted to Govt. Hospital, Guntur. The Police came at Govt. Hospital, Ponnur and recorded the statement of Sivarama Krishnaiah (PW. 1) at 06:00PM, on the basis of which statement, the FIR was registered, as Criminal Case No. 57 of 2003 under Section 147, 148 and 302 read with 149 of IPC.

Consequently, this appeal filed by the appellant is allowed and disposed of and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.”

38. There is no merit in these appeals. Both the appeals are dismissed.
Agnigundala Venkata Ranga Rao vs Indukuru Ramchandra Reddy(Dead) By ...

2) In order to appreciate the issue involved in the appeal, which lies in a narrow compass, it is necessary to state few relevant facts taken from the appeal paper books.

5) The appellant owned several acres of agriculture lands, which also included the suit land. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (for short, “the Act”) was enacted on 01.01.1973. It came into force on 01.01.1975. The appellant being a "person" as defined under Section 3(o) of the Act and was holding the land in excess of the limits prescribed under the Act filed a declaration in respect of his holding before the Tribunal as required under Section 7 of the Act. During the pendency of his case before the Tribunal, the appellant sold the suit land vide sale deed dated 16.07.1975 to the respondents. The sale deed, inter alia, recited that the appellant has also delivered possession of the suit land to the respondents. Respondent No. 1 then mortgaged the suit land along with his other lands to the State Bank of India and obtained loan wherein the appellant had stood as the guarantor.

27) Coming to the facts of the case, we are of the considered opinion, that the appellant (plaintiff) simply abused the process of law in filing the suit for permanent injunction in relation to the suit land against the respondents. The suit, in our opinion, was misconceived and deserved dismissal on facts and in law on the grounds, which are indeed apparent on the face of the record of the case as mentioned below.

5. We, therefore, revoke the certificate. This petition of appeal may, however, be treated as a special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution and posted for preliminary hearing.”

40) We are afraid we cannot re-appreciate the documentary or/and oral evidence again in our appellate jurisdiction. Firstly, it is not permissible for want of any case made out to that effect and secondly, it is not considered necessary in the light of what we have held above.

44) In view of foregoing discussion, we uphold the conclusion arrived at by the High Court on our reasoning given supra. As a consequence, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.

45) Before parting, we consider it apposite to state that the appellant and the respondents made frantic efforts to somehow retain the suit land to them and keep the land away from the clutches of The Act. With this aim in view, they got the suit land involved in this litigation since 1976. All this was done without notice to the State Authorities.

46) We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to take up the case of the appellant on its Board and pass appropriate consequential order, if necessary under the Act keeping in view the order dated 21.08.1976 of the Tribunal passed in CC No. 2311/VKD/75 and take all remedial steps as are necessary in relation to the land held by the appellant including the suit land.

47) Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the concerned Tribunal.

April 13, 2017
Steel Authority Of India Ltd vs Designated Authority, Directorate ...

2. It may be worthwhile at the very outset to delve into the history of the taxation regime under the Act to notice the changes that had occurred from time to time.

(4)   The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated, and the respondents shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:

19. On the basis of the discussion that have preceded, it must therefore be held that before admitting an appeal under Section 130E(b) of the Customs Act, the following conditions must be satisfied:

20. The above parameters, which by no means should be considered to be exhaustive, may now be applied to the case of the parties before us to decide the primary question indicated at the outset of the present order, namely, whether this appeal deserves to be admitted.

24. The above narration clearly disclose that the findings recorded by the learned appellate tribunal on the basis of which the appeal of the present appellant has been dismissed are findings of fact arrived at on due consideration of all relevant materials on record. If that is so, on the ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of Swastic Woollen (supra) we will have no occasion to have a re-look into the matter in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction under Section 130E(b) of the Act.

25. The appeal, consequently, is dismissed by refusing admission.

(ASHOK BHUSHAN) NEW DELHI APRIL 17, 2017.
The Spl.Agr.Produce Market Commit. For ... vs N.Krishnappa & Ors

2. The controversy in these appeals relates to the acquisition of 42 acres 32 guntas of lands in village Golimangala, Sarjapur Hobli, Anchal Taluk, District Bangalore, for expansion of the Appellant's marketing yard. Noticing infirmities in the acquisition proceedings, but declining to quash the acquisition adverting to the larger public purpose, the High Court shifted the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to the date of its order i.e. 22.11.2010, for determination of compensation. Aggrieved by the order, both the Appellant and the landowners are in appeal before this Court.

9. In Barangore Jute Factory (supra) the acquisition suffered from statutory non-compliance. In view of the larger public interest involved in the acquisition, declining to set aside the acquisition the relief was moulded in the interest of justice observing:-

10. Since the contention with regard to the 2013 Act will require examination of facts with due opportunity, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the same in the present proceedings and leave it open for the aggrieved to pursue their remedies in accordance with law before the appropriate forum, if so advised.

11. All the appeals are, therefore, dismissed.
Dagadabai (Dead) By Lrs vs Abbas @ Gulab Rustum Pinjari

2) We need not burden the order by setting out the facts in detail except to the extent necessary to appreciate the short controversy involved in the appeal.

4) The dispute in this appeal relates to an agricultural land bearing G.No. 505 (old Sy. No 71) admeasuring 5 Hectare 28 R. situated at village Vardi, Taluka Chopda, District Jalgao (MH) (hereinafter referred to as, “the suit land".

They were also not perverse on facts to the extent that no average judicial person could ever record. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the second appeal did not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code to enable the High Court to admit the appeal on any such question much less answer it in favour of the defendant.

23) In this case, we find that the defendant did not admit the plaintiff's ownership over the suit land and, therefore, the issue of adverse possession, in our opinion, could not have been tried successfully at the instance of the defendant as against the plaintiff. That apart, the defendant having claimed the ownership over the suit land by inheritance as an adopted son of Rustum and having failed to prove this ground, he was not entitled to claim the title by adverse possession against the plaintiff.

26) It is for the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment is held legally unsustainable and hence deserves to be set aside.

27) The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Impugned judgment is set aside and that of the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court is restored.

April 18, 2017
Mahindra vs Sajjan Galfa Rankhamb & Ors

The High Court has, however, reversed the order of conviction while holding that no reliance could be placed on the evidence of PW-3. The High Court further held that both PW-4 and PW-10 had falsified evidences of each other. Non-examination of weapon recovered from the place of incident by the Chemical Analyzer also made the case doubtful as per the opinion of the High Court.

Thus, we see no reason to interfere with the findings of the High Court as, in our opinion, the High Court after correct appreciation of evidence has rightly acquitted the accused-respondents, giving them benefit of doubt. This appeal is devoid of any merit which is, accordingly, dismissed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .J (Pinaki Chandra Ghose) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .J (Rohinton Fali Nariman) New Delhi;

April 19, 2017.
M/S. Vedanta Limited (Formerly Known As ... vs M/S Emirates Trading Agency Llc

2. The Respondent's Suit for breach of contract and damages was decreed on 16.04.2013 by the Principal District Court, Thoothukudi in Original Suit No. 73 of 2009 for a sum of Rs.5,25,55,460/- with interest @ 8% from the date of the plaint till realisation. First Appeal by the Appellant was dismissed by the High Court on 04.02.2014. In Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.12687–12688 of 2014 preferred against the same, liberty was granted on 12.5.2014 to approach the High Court in the review jurisdiction, on the issue whether the agreement dated 26.10.2007 between the parties constituted a concluded contract or matters rested at the stage of a proposal and a counter proposal only. Liberty was further granted to approach this Court again, if aggrieved. Review application No. 160 of 2014 was dismissed by the High Court on 09.07.2015. Thus, the present appeal.

16. In absence of a concluded contract between the parties having been established by the Respondent, the claim under Section 73 of the Act was not maintainable. The impugned orders are, therefore, held to be unsustainable and are set aside.

17. The appeals are accordingly allowed.
J. Balaji Singh vs Diwakar Cole & Ors

6) The respondents filed their respective written statements and denied the appellant's claim over the suit property. The Trial Court framed issues on law and facts on the basis of the pleadings for adjudicating the rights of the parties arising in the case. The parties filed the documentary evidence and adduced oral evidence in support of their respective case.

10) By impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the first Appellate Court and dismissed the suit by restoring the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Felt aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.

15) Whereas in the other part of the judgment, the learned Single Judge did not approve the approach of the first Appellate Court in granting indulgence to the appellant to fill the lacuna by adducing evidence. Be that as it may, having observed this, the High Court proceeded to examine the case on merits and eventually allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the first Appellate Court and restored the judgment/decree of the Trial Court. The effect of the judgment of the High Court is that the plaintiff's suit stands dismissed.

April 24, 2017
Ramesh Chand And Ors vs M/S. Tanmay Developers Pvt. Ltd. And Ors

2. The appellants-herein are aggrieved by the common judgment and order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in F.A. No.1941 of 2013, dated 4th February, 2015. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order has directed refund of the earnest money by M/s. Tanmay Developers Private Ltd. Five agreements to sell were entered into between the M/s. Tanmay Developers Pvt. Ltd. and the land owners on 22.07.2006, 22.07.2006, 22.07.2006, 24.07.2006 and 21.06.2006. Out of the five agreements, earnest money of Rs.54,25,000/- was paid out of the total sale consideration of Rs,4,52,81,250/- as per agreement on 22.07.2006. As per agreement dated 22.07.2006, Rs.1,56,000,00/- was paid as earnest money out of total sale consideration of Rs.12,54,37,500/-. As per yet another agreement on 22.07.2006, earnest money of Rs.21,00,000/- was paid out of a sum of Rs.1,50,93,750/-. As per agreement dated 24.07.2006, earnest money of Rs.90,00,000/- was paid out of total sale consideration of Rs.7,71,31,250/-. As per agreement dated 21.06.2006, earnest money of Rs.2,60,000/- was paid out of a total sale consideration or Rs.14,29,687/-. Period for performance of agreement had expired in the month of September/October, 2006. The land-owners on failure of purchaser to get the sale deed executed forfeited earnest money.

15. Resultantly, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside. The land owners are entitled for disbursement of the compensation. Obviously, it will be subject to the outcome of the civil suits in which refund of the earnest money along with interest had been sought by the respondent No.1. In case the appellants fail and refund is directed in civil suits, the landowners shall have to pay it as per the judgment and decree which may be passed. No costs.
Ajit Singh vs State Of Chhattisgarh

3 The appellant was arrested on 28th September, 2016 in connection with Crime No. 865 of 2016, registered at Police Station Supela, District Durg (CG) Chhattisgarh for the offence punishable under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), 120-B, 506 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

However, he is permitted to come to the State of Chhattisgarh for attending the aforesaid case. He shall personally appear before the trial court on all the dates of hearing except under unavoidable circumstances. 2 Soon after release, he shall appear before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, and notify his address at Patna to the SSP, Patna. The SSP, Patna, shall intimate him the jurisdictional Police Station for his attendance once in a week on every Sunday between 9.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. 3 The appellant shall not tamper with the evidence during the trial in any manner. He shall not pressurize or intimidate the prosecution witnesses. The appellant shall execute a personal bond of Rupees one lakh with two sureties for the like sum to the satisfaction of the trial court.

6 The appeal is allowed accordingly.

April 28, 2017.