L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Modern School vs Shashi Pal Sharma & Ors

2. Appellant herein is a school recognized and governed under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (for short, 'the Act') and the rules framed thereunder. First Respondent herein had, at all material times, been working as a Sanskrit teacher in the appellant school. On or about 14.03.1997, his wife made a complaint to the Principal of the school informing that the First Respondent had made fake coupons meant to be used at the fate of the school held on 15.12.1996. Several other serious allegations were made by the first respondent's wife against him. He tendered his resignation purported to be on the ground of having some domestic problems. The said letter of resignation reads thus :

4. The resignation tendered by the first respondent was accepted by the appellant and forwarded to the Director of Education in terms of its letter dated 09.03.1997, stating :

5. As no order of approval was received by the appellant from the Director of Education as was required under Section 114A, it, by its letter dated 13.05.1997, informed the said authority that they were accepting the resignation and going ahead with fresh recruitment as per the Act and the Rules. By a letter of the said date, acceptance of his resignation was communicated to the First Respondent, stating :

20. As we have noticed hereinbefore, the terms and conditions of service are governed by the statute and the statutory rules. As acceptance of the resignation of the First Respondent was communicated to him within a period of 30 days, the same would take its effect in terms thereof.

23. The Division Bench of the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment, which cannot be sustained and is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Sales Tax Officers And Ors vs Dutta Traders

3. Under notification dated 14th May, 1997, the Commissioner delegated his powers and duties under Section 16-D of the Act to the Sales Tax Officers and Inspectors of Sales Tax Department. The said notification was issued under Section 3(3) of the Act. The notifications issued indicate officers by designation who have been conferred with the powers of the Commission.

14. For the afore-stated reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. We express no opinion on the merits of the matter particularly, with regard to quantification of the amount of tax and penalty. Respondent herein would be entitled to adopt appropriate proceedings with regard to quantification of penalty and tax before the appropriate authority in accordance with law.

15. The Civil Appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs.
Jagdish & Anr vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

2. A First Information Report was lodged by one Mangal Singh (PW-1) alleging that at about 8.00 A.M. on 27.09.1987 he along with his nephew Gabbar Singh and another nephew Mansingh (deceased) went to the house of one Govindas Kurmi for borrowing his bullock cart to carry bricks. They were informed that the same was in the 'Beda' of Birjoo. He asked his son to accompany them up to the said place. While the cart was being led and they reached near the house of Mangoo Kurmi, they found him armed with ballam, Thakurdas armed with axe, Jagdish armed with axe and Devidayal armed with pharsa, were standing at the Chabootra of their house. All the four of them started abusing them saying that they would finish the deceased finally that day. Thakurdas allegedly hit the deceased Mansingh on his neck as a result whereof he fell down. He allegedly again inflicted another blow on his neck causing a big wound. Jagdish inflicted an axe blow on the his back. Devidayal inflicted a pharsa blow on the neck of the deceased and Mangoo inflicted a ballam blow on his back. They inflicted two or three more blows on the back of the deceased, whereafter they ran away.

3. Appellants, thus, along with Thakurdas and Mangoo were tried for commission of the murder of Mansingh. Before the learned Trial Judge the prosecution in support of its case, inter alia, examined Mangal Singh, (informant) as PW-1, Kailash and Dabbu, who are said to be eye-witnesses, as PW-2 and PW-4 respectively.

18. For the reasons aforementioned, the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The appellants shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case.
Aryavrat Gramin Bank vs Vijay Shankar Shukla

(5) On or about 6.2.1984, a Circular was issued by NABARD in terms whereof 33% staff had been said to have been promoted to the post of Officer. NABARD also issued a Circular on or about 31.12.1984 which was circulated amongst all the Chairmen of the Rural Regional Rural Banks, inter alia, stating as under:

(30) In any view of the matter if in terms of the select list the position of the respondent amongst the general category candidates was at serial number 47, a large number of persons were evidently above him. They might not have approached the High court but it would not change the legal position. If the appellant which is a 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution of India was to be asked by the High Court to act in terms of the select list, it would have been obligated to appoint only those persons whose names appear high on the said list. Other candidates, advisedly, did not approach the High Court for such a relief as the life of the panel had come to an end and the appellant had been enforcing the policy decision framed by the Central Government and NABARD to which it was bound to follow. (31) Whatever be the view, in our opinion, the respondent was not entitled to get any relief in the writ petition far less a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained and the same is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 10,000/-.
State Of Punjab And Ors vs Dev Raj & Ors

3. The background facts, in a nutshell, are as follows:

Writ petition was filed by the respondents with a prayer to absorb them in Government service w.e.f. 22.1.1987. A reply was filed clearly taking the stand that the names of the respondents did not exist in the staff statement which was prepared by the erstwhile management of the school at the time principle decision was taken. Subsequently, their names were included. As per the Government order, the school was taken over with staff existing on 28.6.1983. Therefore, the Government was not bound to absorb the respondents. The learned Single Judge of the High Court granted the stay and the stay order was continued. Subsequently, by order dated 29.1.2003, the learned Single Judge it was held that though the respondents were employed between 28.6.1983 to 26.1.1987, there was need for teachers and laboratory Assistants and, therefore, they should be absorbed. The appellants filed Letters Patent Appeal which, as noted above, was dismissed on the ground that the respondents were continuing since 1987.

7. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs.
Bakhtiyar Hussain (Dead) Thr. Lrs vs Hafiz Khan And Ors

1. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No.180 of 1993. The appellant-plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of his title and permanent injunction in respect of the lands. The plaintiff claimed to be bhumiswami of the land. According to him, deceased Nannu Khan and his son Hafiz Khan-respondent No.1 forcibly secured the possession of the land on 1.7.1970 and deprived him of his rights over the lands. According to him, the defendants had no right or interest to continue their possession over the suit lands. Therefore, the suit was filed. The defendants filed a joint statement and denied title of the plaintiff and pleaded that the plaintiff's right over the suit land had extinguished as they had perfected their title by adverse possession. Plaintiff used to reside in Bhopal for more than 20 years and the defendants are in possession of the suit lands openly to the knowledge of the plaintiff from 1962. Since their possession over the land was for more than 12 years, the suit is barred by limitation. The trial Court held that the possession of the defendants is not adverse but they are in permissible possession of the suit lands. Therefore, it was held that the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of possession. The first Appellate Court found that the defendants are in possession of the suit lands with the permission of the plaintiff. It was also held that the defendants have failed to prove their adverse possession. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the trial Court were affirmed.

5. Relief and costs.

9. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
Entertainment Tax Officer,Madhapur ... vs M/S Hi Tech Theatre, ...

(5) In this case the respondent filed an application in the prescribed 'Form' exercising an option under Section 5 of the Act. The cinema theatre in question is situated within Serilingampally Municipality. It is now not in dispute that in terms of a Notification dated 18.5.2001 the Municipality was upgraded to Grade II from Grade III.

(GCC increased due to enhancement of rates of admission)

3) From 15-6-2001 to 31-3-2001 is Rs.16,724/-(GCC restored to Rs.16,724/-because the licensing authority refused to grant permission for enhancement);

according to the appellant the said difference would be:

(15) The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. No costs.
Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi vs State Of Maharashtra

(2) Kamlabai, the deceased, was married to the appellant 15 years prior to the incident which took place at about 9.00 p.m. on 7.6.1990. The couple had five children - two daughters and three sons - all being minor at the material time. Appellant was not doing any work. He was said to be addicted to liquor. Deceased used to work as a labourer in Bajrang Dal Mill.

(3) It is the case of the prosecution that she had all along been ill- treated by her husband. On the fateful day of 7.6.1990, she came from work at about 6.30 p.m. She had prepared food. At about 9 p.m. when she was serving food to the appellant, he took out kerosene from the lamp, poured it on her and set her ablaze. He, thereafter, fled away from the place.

(4) On hearing her cries, the neighbours came and extinguished the fire. But she was left at lurch. It appears that somebody informed her uncle- Laxmansingh who visited her next day morning. He took her to the Civil Hospital, Jalna.

(9) We may, however, notice that the defence of the appellant was that at the relevant time he was in Bombay. In support of the said defence, however, he did not examine any witness.

(37) For the reasons aforementioned we do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
Karan Singh vs M/S Executive Engineer Haryana State ...

3. The reference made to the Labour Court by the State Government of Haryana in terms of Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the 'Act') was answered in favour of the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the 'Board') holding that the claim was highly belated and therefore dis-entitled the appellant from any relief.

4. A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice.

The respondent-Board took the stand that the services of the claimant were required as DPL as and when required and he had really not completed 240 days. A stand was taken that the claim was highly belated. It is to be noted that in the cross examination appellant had admitted that he had no proof of having worked from August 1993 to October 1994. The claim petition was filed in the year 2000. The notice dated 6.6.2000 was the first one and on failure of conciliation, reference was made on 8.2.2001. The appellant should have explained inaction on his part. Labour Court took the view that the claim was highly belated. If the appellant felt that the order of termination was illegal without following due procedure, he should have come up with demand notice within a reasonable time. It was held that though no limitation is prescribed, but it would be unequitable to re-open the closed chapter after a long time. The appellant was therefore held not to be entitled to any relief.

Writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed on the ground that the demand notice had been raised after six years.

15. In the aforesaid background, we would have normally set aside the award of the Labour Court and the High Court. But because of long passage of time, it would be inappropriate, particularly when appellant has not even offered any semblance of explanation for the delay.

16. Accordingly we direct that the respondent-Board shall pay a sum of Rs.60,000/- within a period of six weeks in full and final settlement of appellant's entitlements.

17. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There will be no order as to costs.
State Of Punjab vs Mohinder Singh & Ors

2. Background facts as projected by the prosecution during the trial are as follows:

5. Being aggrieved, accused persons filed appeal before the High Court. The stands before the trial Court were reiterated before the High Court. By the impugned judgment, the High Court found that the trial court's judgment was unsustainable and accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court and directed acquittal. Hence, State has filed the present appeals by special leave.

11. Looking from any angle the impugned judgment of the High Court directing acquittal of the respondents is clearly unsustainable. The same is set aside. The order of the trial court is restored. Respondents who are on bail shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining sentence.

12. The appeals are allowed accordingly.
Khursheed & Anr vs State Of U.P

3. Brief facts leading to the present appeal are that according to the prosecution, on May 7, 1989 at about 8.00 a.m. in the morning, one Mahmood Hassan was returning to his house after offering a prayer (namaz). He met Zahoor, Khursheed, Naseem and Islam who assaulted him. When Smt. Kulsoom @ Bhoori, wife of Mahmood Hassan attempted to save her husband, she was also assaulted. Injuries were sustained by both of them. The incident was witnessed by Islam, Waseel Ahmed and others. A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged by Gufran Ali, son of Mahmood Hassan on the same day at Jhabreda Police Station. The injured Mahmood Hassan and his wife Smt. Kulsoom were medically examined at Civil Hospital, Roorkee. The Doctor opined that all the injuries were caused by hard and blunt substance. After completion of police investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the accused persons and charge was framed for offences punishable under Sections 325 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Permission of the Court is not necessary. Since the parties have compounded, the act of compounding is in accordance with law.

13. The parties have compounded the offences. As stated in the compromise deed, Gurfan Ahmad, complainant and his mother Kulsoom @ Bhoori (injured) did not want any action against the appellants (accused). The parties are neighbours, their houses are situated adjacent to each other and they have been living peacefully for last many years and there is no dispute among them. It is further stated that to continue sweet relationship and harmony, complainant side does not want to take any action against the accused. A prayer is, therefore, made to accept the compromise.

16. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. Compounding of offence is permitted and the appellants are ordered to be acquitted.
Guriya @ Tabassum Tauquir And Ors vs State Of Bihar And Anr

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:-

It is to be noted that PWs 4 and 5 were examined on 6.1.2004 pursuant to the order in the application filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C. The petition filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was rejected by the Trial Court holding that no case was made out for putting the appellants on trial. Learned Sessions Judge was moved for revision and the same was allowed. The High Court dismissed the revision petition filed on the ground that there are materials against the appellants.

17. Above being the position, the order of the High Court and that of learned Additional Sessions Judge cannot be maintained and are set aside. The Trial Court had rightly rejected the application filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

18. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
Bhagwan Bahadure vs State Of Maharashtra

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

5. The stand taken before the trial court and the High Court was reiterated in this appeal.

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.

25. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.

28. Considering the background facts involved, the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC, and conviction is accordingly altered. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.

29. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Lagan Jute Machineries Co. Ltd vs Candlewood Holdings Ltd. & Ors

1. Challenge in these appeals is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in an appeal which was directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 23.3.2000. By the said order, the learned Single Judge in that application for execution appointed Receiver for realization of commercial charges and consolidated rates and taxes in terms of prayer (e) of column 10 of the tabular statement. The order was passed on 9.2.2000 wherein it was recorded in terms of earlier order dated 18.5.1999 that the judgment debtor did not pay any instalment and in that view the decree dated 13.10.1982 had become executable. The second order dated 9.2.2000 was not challenged in any proceedings. The application was made by the tabular statement before the learned Single Judge for execution of the decree dated 13.10.1982. The said decree was passed by consent of the parties and parties filed their terms of settlement in the Court on the basis of which the said consent decree was made. The decree was subsequently modified by consent of parties by order dated 26.4.1990 and subsequently the decree was transferred by the then decree-holder in favour of the applicant-respondent for execution proceedings. The execution proceedings were related to recovery of the immovable property and money on account of rates, taxes and commercial surcharge levied by the Municipal Corporation of Calcutta (in short 'Corporation') under the Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (in short the 'Corporation Act') which operated prospectively from 4.1.1984. An order was made in terms of prayer (b) of the tabular statement on the earlier occasion and also in terms of prayer (f) as recorded in the order dated 2.9.2000. By another order dated 30.3.2000 application was rejected.

13. The High Court has referred to all the relevant factors and has kept in view the correct position in law. That being so, there is no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.
Asha Shamkumar Patil vs Sadhana Rajan Kamble & Ors

3. The appellant was initially appointed as a Full-Time teacher in Hindi by an order of appointment dated 10th of July, 1986 on a temporary basis for a period of one year. The appointment continued, since then, every year on the same terms and conditions. On 27th of June, 1991, an advertisement in a Daily Newspaper was published by Jai Prakash Education Society, respondent No.2 herein, advertising three posts, including the post of a teacher in Hindi. A bare perusal of the advertisement would show that all the three posts advertised were reserved for candidates belonging to Scheduled Tribe/D.T and N.T. categories. The appellant was from the general category. Nevertheless, by an order dated 16th of July, 1991, she was appointed a full time teacher in Hindi to the aforesaid post reserved for Scheduled Tribe/D.T. and N.T. category candidates. The writ petitioner-respondent No.1 herein, also applied for appointment to the said post of a teacher in Hindi on the basis of the advertisement, as indicated hereinabove. The respondent No.1 was a scheduled caste candidate, which is not in dispute. However, she was appointed, by an order dated 16th of July, 1991, as a part time Hindi teacher.

4. The respondent No. 1, initially, challenged the appointment of the appellant and also her non-selection as a full time teacher, by filing an appeal before the School Tribunal, Kolhapur, Maharashtra, which was dismissed, inter alia, on the ground of limitation and jurisdiction. This order of the School Tribunal was challenged by the respondent No. 1 by way of a writ petition, which was, however, withdrawn by her on 3rd of September, 2002. Subsequent to the withdrawal of appeal, the respondent No. 1 challenged her non-selection by filing a Writ Petition No. 5652 of 2003 for declaring her as a full time teacher in Hindi on a permanent post from 16th of July, 1991 and for quashing the appointment of the appellant as a full time teacher in Hindi. By the impugned order, a division bench of the High Court allowed the same and made the following directions:

10. Such being the position, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the High Court and accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.