L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of Uttaranchal & Ors vs C.S.R.K.S. Medical Health Service

2. The applications for impleadment are dismissed as no ground for impleadment is made out.

Sd/-

H B Bhatt Additional Director”

12. In view of the above, we are satisfied that the impugned orders passed by the High Court, whereby, the above two Government Orders were quashed, deserve to be set aside. The two Government Orders dated 17.07.2004 and 08.11.2004 are hereby upheld. The instant appeals are accordingly allowed. The impugned orders passed by the High Court are therefore set aside.

OCTOBER 16, 2014.
Pradeep Kumar Maskara & Ors vs State Of West Bengal & Ors

8. Vide order dated 02.08.1983 and 17.8.1983, Proceedings No.244/1976 and No. 280/1976 were disposed of with a finding that appellant nos.1 and 2 herein were minors and hence, the lands held by them were taken into account as lands of their father Mahabir Prasad Maskara. Proceedings No.252/1976, pertaining to Mahabir Prasad Maskara, was disposed of vide order dated 24.8.1983, declaring 38.8591 acres of agricultural lands to vest in the State.

20. The short question that falls for consideration is as to whether the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal was justified in dismissing the application of the appellants and refused to make correction in the record of right in terms of the directions of the High Court.

22. After the aforesaid order was passed by the High Court, the appellants moved an application along with the copy of the order before the Tribunal for a direction to correct the revenue record by entering their names. The Tribunal dismissed the application on the ground that the decision of the High Court in Gangadhar Singh’s case (supra) is binding precedents and the earlier judgment of the High Court is no longer a good law. For better appreciation, the order dated 20.2.2002 is reproduced hereinbelow:-

23. The appellants challenged the aforesaid order of the Tribunal by filing a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court. The High Court relying on the decision in Gangadhar Singh’s case dismissed the writ petition.

28. In the aforesaid premises, the order passed by the land tribunal is erroneous in law. The High Court also fell in error in affirming the order of the tribunal, hence these orders cannot be sustained in law.

29. For the reason aforesaid, these appeals are allowed and the orders passed by the High Court and the tribunal are set aside. The tribunal is directed to follow the decision of Calcutta High Court decided in the case of the appellants.
Kuldeep Kaur vs State Of Uttarakhand

3. The prosecution case in a nutshell is that on 6.6.2001 the complainant of the case viz. Captain Jagtar Singh (PW1) lodged a report Ex.A-1 at P.S. Sitarganj, wherein it has been stated that marriage of his daughter Jagpreet Kaur was solemnized with Upkar Singh son of Harpal Singh on 1.3.2001. The complainant gave the articles in the marriage according to his capacity, but in-laws of his daughter used to demand car etc. and used to taunt and harass his daughter. It was further complained that Jagpreet Kaur told the informant that her in-laws harassed her on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry and in the intervening night of 5th/6th of June, 2001, she was compelled to commit suicide. On the basis of this complaint, case was registered against the accused persons under Section 304-B, IPC and the police took into custody a small bottle, cover of which was slightly torned, on which “Cypermethrin High Emulsifable Concentrate (Vet) Elitomin 100 E.C.” was written. Diary Ex.A-2 written by the deceased was also seized. Dead body was sent for post-mortem, where no apparent injury except ligature mark on the neck was found. According to the concerned Doctor, cause of death of the deceased was due to asphyxia as a result of ante mortem hanging.

7. On appreciation of evidence and material placed on record, the trial court held that the deceased did not commit suicide due to cruelty caused to her in connection with demand of dowry and acquitted the appellant and other co-accused of the offence punishable under Sections 498A/304B, IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. However, the appellant was held guilty under Section 306, IPC and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs.5000/-.

17. We have given our anxious consideration in the matter and analysed the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. In our considered opinion, the evidence adduced as against the appellant does not establish the case under Section 306 of the Code. On the basis of evidence of the prosecution witnesses, conviction of the appellant only cannot be sustained. Having regard to the fact of the case and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court acquitted all the accused persons except the present appellant and the said judgment was affirmed by the High Court. We do not find any strong reason to agree with the judgment of conviction passed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court as against the appellant.

18. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of conviction of the appellant under Section 306 IPC is set aside.
Huda & Anr vs Kedar Nath

3. The facts giving rise to the present litigation in a nutshell are as under :-

4. The balance amount of Rs.3 lakhs was to be paid by the respondent to the appellant authorities in 10 half yearly instalments along with interest @ 10% per annum. There was a condition in the auction sale that in case of default in payment, the respondent had to pay interest @ 10% per annum on the unpaid amount and it was also open to the appellant to impose further amount of penalty and to resume possession of the booth.

13. Finally, on 5th September, 2014, this Court had passed an order directing the respondent to pay at least Rs.13 lakhs before 10th October, 2014 and the said amount was, in fact, much lesser than the amount which was payable by the respondent even as per his own statement of accounts.

23. Upon looking at the overall facts, in our opinion, it would not be proper to grant any further accommodation to the respondent, who has admittedly not paid the amount due and therefore, we allow the appeal by quashing and setting aside the orders passed by the courts below. It would be open to the appellant to take possession of the booth in question in accordance with law.

24. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs.

………..……………….J (ANIL R. DAVE) ………..……………….J (KURIAN JOSEPH) …..…………………….J (R.K. AGRAWAL) NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 29, 2014.
B.D.Khunte vs Union Of India & Ors

Statutory remedies under the Army Act, 1950 having proved ineffective, the appellant filed OA No.5 of 2009 before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, which was heard and dismissed by the Tribunal by its order dated 27th August, 2009. The appellant then filed Writ Petition No.4652 of 2010 before the High Court of Delhi which too failed and was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 5th July, 2011. The present appeal assails the correctness of the judgment passed by the High Court and that passed by the Armed Forces Appellate Tribunal. It also challenges the conviction of the appellant for the offence of murder and the sentence awarded to him by the Summary General Court Martial.

Criminal Appeal No.2328 OF 2014 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8457 of 2014 Crl M.P. No.15455/2014) Delay condoned Leave granted.

In view of our order of even date passed in Criminal Appeal No.242 of 2012, this appeal, filed by the appellant-B.D. Khunte, also fails and is, hereby, dismissed.
Union Of India & Ors vs P.Gunasekaran

In the disciplinary inquiry, all the charges were proved and, on due procedure, the respondent was dismissed from service by order dated 10.06.1997. The said order of dismissal dated 10.06.1997 was challenged before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench in O.A. No. 805 of 1997. During the pendency of the original application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, in criminal appeal, the First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore acquitted the respondent.

The High Court set aside the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, interfered with even the finding of the enquiry officer, set aside the punishment and directed reinstatement with backwages and all service benefits. To quote:

The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report and having accepted it, after discussing the available and admissible evidence on the charge, and the Central Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view of the disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to re- appreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

The Central Administrative Tribunal, in the order dated 01.02.2001 in O.A. No. 521 of 2000, after elaborately discussing the factual as well as the legal position, has come to the conclusion that the punishment of compulsory retirement is not outrageous or shocking to its conscience, it was not open to the High Court to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings from stage one and direct reinstatement of the respondent with backwages.

The last contention is with regard to date of effect of the punishment. According to the respondent, even assuming that compulsory retirement is to be imposed, it could be only with effect from the date of order, viz., 28.02.2000. We are unable to appreciate the contention. The respondent stood dismissed from service as per order dated 10.06.1997. It was that punishment which was directed to be reconsidered. Consequent thereon only, the punishment was altered/substituted to compulsory retirement. Necessarily, it has to be from the date of dismissal from service, viz., 10.06.1997.

The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The order dated 28.02.2000 passed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench vide order dated 01.02.2001 in O.A. No. 521 of 2000 is restored.

The appeal is allowed as above. No costs.

(ANIL R. DAVE) ............................J. (KURIAN JOSEPH) New Delhi;

November 19, 2014.
Census Commissioner & Ors vs R.Krishamurthy

2. Almost half a century back Frankfurter, J.[2] sounded a note of caution:-

5. The fundamental intention of referring to the aforesaid statements may at various times in the history of law is to recapitulate basic principles that have to be followed by a Judge, for certain sayings at times become necessitous to be told and re-narrated. The present case exposits such a situation, a sad one.

7. At this juncture, to continue the chronology, it is pertinent to mention that a Writ Petition No. 21172/2009 was filed before the High Court of Judicature at Madras, which was disposed of on 21.1.2010. While disposing of the writ petition, the High Court had directed as follows:

8. Be it stated, the Registrar General and Census Commissioner was the respondent no.2 therein. After the writ petition was disposed of, the representation preferred by Mr. K. Balu, President, Advocates Forum for Social Justice, was disposed and the order was communicated to the writ petitioner. It reads as follows:-

30. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the judgments and orders dated 24.10.2008 and 12.5.2010 passed in W.P.(C) No. 25785/2005 and W.P.(C) No. 10090/2010 respectively are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

NOVEMBER 07, 2014

[1] BACON, Essays: Of Judicature in I The Works of Francis Bacon (Montague, Basil, Esq. ed., Philadelphia: A Hart, late Carey & Hart, 1852), pp. 58-59.
Collector Singh vs L.M.L.Ltd.Kanpur

3. Brief facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as follows:- The appellant was working as a semi-skilled workman since 15.8.1986 in the respondent-company, namely, M/s. L.M.L. Limited (Scooter Unit), Kanpur. The appellant was served with a charge-sheet on 18.4.1992 stating that on that date, he threw jute/cotton waste balls hitting the face of Laxman Sharma, Foreman in the said company and on objecting to the same, the appellant is alleged to have further abused him with filthy language and also threatened him with dire consequences outside the premises of their factory. On 25.4.1992, the appellant submitted an apology letter stating that he had thrown piece of jute which fell on Foreman Laxman Sharma by mistake and seeking pardon for the same. A departmental inquiry was conducted on 25.5.1992 and the appellant was given adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses as well as for putting forth his defence. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report finding that the appellant was guilty of misconduct and on the basis of the enquiry report, the appellant was dismissed from the services of the company by an order dated 24.6.1992.

4. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the appellant raised an industrial dispute which was registered as Adjudication No.178/1994 before the Labour Court, Kanpur. The Labour Court relied upon the letter of apology dated 25.4.1992 and by its award dated 17.9.1996, held that the termination of services of the appellant was justified. Aggrieved by the said order, appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court and vide its order dated 24.9.2012, High Court dismissed the writ petition upholding the award passed by the Labour Court. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has filed this appeal by way of special leave. This Court has issued notice limited to the question of quantum of punishment.

16. In the result, the impugned Order of the High Court dated 24.9.2012 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.12157/1997 confirming the award of the Labour Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The respondent-management is directed to pay the amount of compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to the appellant within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order failing which, the said amount is payable with interest at the rate of 9% per annum thereon.

November 11, 2014
State Of M.P vs Surendra Singh

3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 11.5.1998 a ward boy of Sabalgarh Hospital lodged a written report at Sabalgarh police station to the effect that one Vijay Singh of village Mangroli died in accident caused by a jeep bearing registration no.SP 7H 6045. Thereafter, case was investigated and challan was filed against the respondent-accused, who was driver of the jeep and the accident occurred due to his rash and negligent driving. After completion of trial, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sabalgarh convicted the respondent-accused for the offence punishable under Sections 279, 337, 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo six months and two years rigorous imprisonment respectively with fine of Rs.2,500/-. Aggrieved by the order of conviction passed by the trial court, respondent filed appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge, Sabalgarh, who upheld the order of conviction passed by the trial court.

16. In view of the above, we set aside the impugned order reducing sentence to the period already undergone and, to avoid miscarriage of justice, this appeal is allowed restoring the sentence imposed by the trial court. The respondent is directed to surrender within two weeks from today, failing which, the trial Judge is directed to take appropriate steps for sending him to prison to undergo the remaining period of sentence.
State Of Rajasthan vs Salman Khan

3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:-

5. According to counsel for the respondent the impugned judgment and order dated 12th November, 2013 is a reasoned order. The conviction of the respondent was suspended on the ground that the respondent is an actor and his profession requires him to travel abroad but conviction of sentence is coming in his way to travel abroad. Apart from this the High Court considered the hardship caused to the respondent and thereafter passed the order under challenge.

13. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 12th November, 2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous 11 Application No.718 of 2013 in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.905 of 2007 and remit the case to the High Court to decide the matter afresh. It would be open to the respondent to show that if the order of conviction is not stayed it will cause irreversible consequences/injustice to him which cannot be undone if he ultimately succeeds. It would be open to the State to oppose such prayer on the ground that non-suspension of conviction will not cause any irreversible consequences or injustice to the respondent and the same can be undone if he ultimately succeeds.

14. The appeal stands disposed of with aforesaid observations.
V. Kannappan vs Additional Secy & ...

The appellants in these appeals were originally inducted into the service of Bank of Madura. By virtue of a scheme of amalgamation sanctioned by the Reserve Bank of India, the Bank of Madura was merged with the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Bank (hereinafter referred to as the `ICICI Bank') with effect from 10.03.2001. Consequent upon the aforesaid merger, the appellants became the employees of the ICICI Bank.

All the appellants are retirees, having sought voluntary retirement from the ICICI Bank. Their retirement was operative with effect from 31.07.2003. The appellants' claim is for pension. The instant claim emerges from the Bank of Madura Employees' Pension Regulation, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the `1995 Regulations'). The 1995 Regulations define the voluntary retirement scheme in Regulation 2(ze). The same is being extracted hereunder:

(iv) The pension amount shall be calculated based on average emolument i.e. average of pay drawn by an employee during the last ten months of his service as per Regulation."

No further opportunity for tendering an option, for grant of pension under a voluntary retirement scheme, was sought after the amalgamation of Bank of Madura with the ICICI Bank (with effect from 10.03.2001). In sum and substance therefore, it is apparent that even after the absorption of the appellants in the employment of the ICICI Bank, the appellants never chose to be governed by Regulation 35, of the 1995 Regulations.

For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed. As a sequel to dismissal of the appeals, the applications for intervention do not survive for consideration, and the same are accordingly dismissed.
K. Srinivas vs K. Sunita

2 The marriage of the parties was celebrated according to Hindu rites at Hyderabad on 11th February, 1989. A male child was born to the parties on 8th May, 1991, after which the Respondent-Wife, as per her pleadings, started suffering from Sheehan’s syndrome. On the night of 29th/30th June, 1995, the Respondent left the matrimonial house and ever since then she has been living with her brother, who is a senior IAS officer. On 14th July, 1995, the Appellant filed an original petition praying for divorce on the ground of cruelty as well as of the irretrievable breakdown of their marriage. The Respondent-Wife retorted by filing a criminal complaint against the Appellant as well as seven members of his family for offences under Section 307 read with Sections 34, 148A, 384, 324 of the IPC, and Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. It is pursuant to this complaint that the Appellant-Husband and seven of his family members were arrested and incarcerated. The Respondent-Wife also filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal rights. On 30th June, 2000, the Learned Vth Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Hyderabad, acquitted the Appellant and his family members, and this Order has attained finality. Meanwhile, by its Judgment dated 30th December, 1999, the Family Court at Hyderabad, granted a divorce to the Appellant on the ground of cruelty as also irretrievable breakdown of marriage; it rejected the Respondent’s petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The Respondent-Wife successfully appealed against the said Judgment in the High Court, and it is this Order dated 7th November, 2005 that is impugned before us.

7 In these circumstances, we find that the Appeal is well founded and deserves to be allowed. We unequivocally find that the Respondent-Wife had filed a false criminal complaint, and even one such complaint is sufficient to constitute matrimonial cruelty.

8 We, accordingly, dissolve the marriage of the parties under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The parties shall bear their respective costs.

19th November, 2014.
Jaiminiben Hirenbhai Vyas & Anr vs Hirenbhai Rameshchandra Vyas & Anr

2. This appeal has been preferred by a wife and a minor daughter. The Family Court directed payment of interim maintenance to wife and minor daughter @ Rs. 6,000/- per month under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’). Interim maintenance was also ordered under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘H.M. Act’) @ 3,000/- per month payable to both. Eventually, the Family Court disposed the maintenance proceedings finally by the Order dated 31.01.2009. By this Order the Family Court granted maintenance in favour of daughter @ Rs. 5,000/- per month from the date of judgment. The Family Court, however, took the view that the appellant – wife would not be entitled to receive any amount more than the interim maintenance which she is receiving under the H.M. Act.

3. On the Appellant’s application for maintenance made for herself and her children, the Family Court granted maintenance in the sum of Rs 5,000/- only to her daughter under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The son was living with the father who was maintaining him and was therefore not granted maintenance. The main ground for denying maintenance to the Appellant was that she was found to have been working before her marriage and the Family Court was of the view that she could earn her living even now after the separation and therefore she was denied maintenance. This view did not find favour with the High Court, which noted that the Appellant had stopped working after her marriage and had given birth to two children. She had been only looking after the family and had therefore stopped working. The High Court thus reversed the Order of the Family Court and granted maintenance in the sum of Rs. 5,000/-. This was however granted from the date of the order.

10. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.

(2008) 9 SCC 632; Para’s 39 - 41.