L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Union Of India & Anr vs Tarsen Lal & Ors

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows :

Consequent to the deletion of the above clause, further directions were given. Learned counsel submits that the clause, which has been directed to be removed, is in accordance with the judgment of this Court in Virender Kumar, General Manager, Northern Railways, New Delhi V. Avinash Chandra Chadha & Ors. (1990 (2) SCR 769). This Court, in that case, held on principle of 'no work no pay' that the respondents will not be entitled to the higher salary as they have not actually worked in that post. The clause, which has been directed to be deleted by the Tribunal, being in consonance with the ruling of this Court, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was not right in directing the deletion of that clause. Accordingly, to that extent this appeal is allowed. The result is that the respondents will be given deemed promotion, if any, before retirement and also the benefit in the matter of fixing pension. No costs."

The orders are set aside. The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.
Ram Pravesh Singh & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors

3. By letter dated 23.4.1993, the Board recommended to the State Government, to revoke the licence granted to the Society and merge the Society with the Board, assigning three reasons : (i) The purpose for which the Society was created no longer existed. (ii) The Society was drawing electricity from multiple points in the Board's distribution network, making it difficult to ascertain the actual quantity of electricity drawn by the Society. (iii) The financial position and management of the Society was in a very bad shape and huge arrears were due from the Society to the Board, in spite of Board supplying it to the Society at 7 paise per unit (as against the Board's cost price of 90 to 115 paise per unit).

4. The State Government, after considering the matter, issued a notification dated 25.4.1995, in exercise of its power under sections 4 and 5 of the Act revoking the licence dated 24.8.1976 granted to the Society. The State Government also constituted a Committee to evaluate the assets of the society which had to be transferred to the Board. The Committee was also required to consider whether it would be useful for the Board to absorb some of the employees of the Society. At a Meeting held on 18.9.1995 (as per Minutes drawn up on 10.11.1995), the said Committee made the following suggestions :

(vi) The Board had extracted some work from the employees of the society from 25.4.1995 till May, 1996.

The State Government, in its counter, while denying the claim of the writ petitioners, however, admitted that in August, 2001, it had taken a decision that when the prohibition against recruitment in the Board is lifted and appointments are made in future, preference should be given to the eligible employees of the society if necessary by granting relaxation of the age limit.

24. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed.
State Of A.P. & Ors vs M/S. Pioneer Builders, A.P

2. Sometime in the year 1988, the Superintending Engineer, Srisailam Right Branch Canal (for short "SRBC"), defendant No.2 in the Suit, issued notice inviting tenders from pre-qualified bidders of eligible source countries, which included India, for the work of excavation, lining and construction of structures of SRBC. It was a time bound project supported by credit loans from the International Development Association and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

5. On 26.3.1992 defendant No.2 issued notice to the contractor expelling them from the contract on the ground that they had failed to maintain the rate of progress as per the approved programme. On 13.4.1992, the contractor filed an application seeking interim injunction, restraining the defendants from encashing the bank guarantees for an amount of Rs.1,26,00,000/-, furnished by them towards mobilization advance and as performance guarantee. The suit was resisted by the defendants mainly on merits though it was averred that "the plaintiff suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts". No separate reply to the application appears to have been filed. However, the application was dismissed by the subordinate Judge. Aggrieved, the contractor preferred appeal to the High Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 13.11.1992. While dismissing the appeal, the High Court observed that having regard to the language of the arbitration agreement between the parties and the fact that there was no claim for any specified amount in the petition, the suit as filed by the contractor was not maintainable. The Court, however, clarified that it would be open to the contractor to amend the plaint in accordance with law, if so advised.

7. The orders passed in the said applications were not challenged. Instead two additional written statements were filed on behalf of the defendants. On the basis of the pleadings, as many as eighteen issues were framed. None of the issues pertained to maintainability of the suit. After trial, the suit was decreed in respect of some of the claims made by the contractor with interest from the date of the filing of the suit. However, some of the claims made by the contractor were rejected.

19. We may now advert to the other aspect of the matter, viz. whether or not leave to amend the petition/plaint was granted by the subordinate Judge in accordance with the principles regulating amendments of pleadings?

21. Having briefly noted the principles governing amendment of pleadings, we may advert to the facts of the present case.

23. In the result, the appeals filed by the State are allowed to the extent indicated above. We may, however, clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the decree passed by the subordinate Judge and upheld by the High Court. We keep the issue open. It will be open to the parties to take recourse to appropriate proceedings, including revival of the present appeals, after the High Court has rendered its decision on the afore-noted issue. The parties are, however, left to bear their respective costs.
Balbir Singh & Anr vs State Of Punjab

Her parents in the meanwhile were also informed. They came to the hospital. The First Information Report was lodged at about 09.30 a.m. on the same day; whereupon a case under Sections 307/498-A of the Indian Penal Code was registered. The Investigating Officer came to the hospital and recorded a second dying declaration which was marked Ex.P-J. In the said dying declaration she not only named her husband but also her mother- in-law, inter alia, stating :

The appeal preferred by Appellants before the High Court has been dismissed by the impugned judgment.

Keeping in view the statements of Dr. R.S. Kadiyan and Dr. Anoop Kumar, in our opinion, it was also not necessary to examine Dr. Ashish Gupta. The second dying declaration was recorded by Sub Inspector Tejinder Singh (PW-10). When the second dying declaration was being recorded, he had obtained the opinion of the doctor that the deceased was fit to make her statement.

We may place on record our appreciation as to the role played by the doctors and the concern shown by them. In view of the manner in which she made her statement before the doctor, in our opinion, it is difficult to hold that her first statement was not voluntary or was tutored. For arriving at the said finding, the time factor is also significant.

We, in view of the order proposed to be passed by us, do not intend to delve into the testimony of Sub Inspector, Tejinder Singh (PW-10) as regards recording of the second dying declaration.

Effect of framing of alternative charges vary from case to case. In the peculiar facts of present case, we are of the opinion that Appellants having not raised any grievance at any stage in that behalf, they cannot be allowed to do so at this stage.

For the aforementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the appeal of Appellant No.1 which is dismissed. The conviction and sentence of Appellant No.2 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, however, is set aside. However, conviction and sentence of the Appellants under Section 498-A is upheld. Appellant No.2 is said to be in custody for four years. She would, therefore, be released forthwith. The appeal is allowed in part and to the extent mentioned hereinbefore.
Ashok Mahajan vs State Of U.P. & Ors

Background facts as projected by appellant in a nutshell are as follows:

8. In our view, the above set out provisions of the U.P. Act are very clear. Action against the guarantor cannot be taken until the property of the principal-debtor is firs sold off. As the Appellant has not sold the property of the principal-debtor, the action against the Appellant cannot be sustained. We, therefore, set aside the Recovery Notice."

It would be appropriate to direct the High Court to re- consider the matter in the light of the observations quoted above, keeping in view the factual scenario of the present case.

The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent without any order as to costs.
Pabitra Kumar Roy & Anr vs Alita D' Souza

As will appear from the facts involved in this appeal, by a registered deed of lease dated 13th January, 1969, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants let out the ground floor flat with one garage, measuring 1200 sq.ft., in premises No.29/1, Bondel Road, Calcutta 700019, to the respondent on a rental of Rs.450/-per month. The lease commenced with effect from 1st January, 1969, and was for a period of 21 years. The lease deed contained a clause which permitted the parties to terminate the lease prior to its expiry with notice from either side.

The law is clear that lease deeds for periods of twenty years or more would stand excluded from the operation of the 1956 Act except in matters relating to Sections 31 and 36 thereof, unless the same were terminable before their expiration at the option either of the landlord or of the tenant. In other words, if such a lease is terminated before its fixed period expired, the proviso to Section 3(2) would be attracted as a defence against eviction. If, however, the lease was allowed to run its full course, both the lease and the conditions contained therein would come to an end and would cease to be operative and the clause for prior determination would no longer be available as a defence against eviction. The appeal must also be allowed on the question of estoppel. Having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court under the Transfer of Property Act and having obtained relief thereunder, the respondent cannot in the present suit claim protection under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 to which she is not, in any event, entitled, in terms of the lease deed dated 13th January, 1969. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. The respondent is granted time till 31st December, 2006, to vacate the premises and make over peaceful possession thereof to the appellants subject to filing of the usual affidavit within fifteen days.
Kailash vs State Of M.P

The Appellant along with one Prakash and Babulal was prosecuted for commission of an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged by Nathuram (PW-1). He was the elder brother of the deceased Ramkishan. In the FIR, it was alleged that on 28.2.1986 at about 7.45 a.m. all the three accused persons armed with axe, lathi and musal came to their house. They asked the deceased Ramkishan not to construct wall on their land and to do so on their own. Ramkishan asserted that the land belonged to him whereupon the Appellant herein is said to have been given a blow by axe on his head. Babulal is said to have given a blow on the deceased by his musal on his chest. Savitri, wife of Nathuram (PW-3) allegedly rushed to save him. She allegedly was assaulted by Prakash by inflicting lathi blow on her head and shoulder.

The Appellant's appeal, however, before the High Court has been dismissed by the impugned judgment. The Appellant is, thus, before us.

The learned Trial Judge as also the High Court principally relied on the testimony of PW-3 Savitri. She was stated to have injuries. According to her, there was hot exchange of words as regards construction of the wall. According to her, after the assault by axe on the head of the Ramkishan allegedly caused by the Appellant, he although fell down, Babulal inflicted a musal blow on his chest due to which only he became unconscious. She further stated that Prakash came from behind and inflicted lathi blows on his back as a result whereof also he became unconscious. He allegedly started vomiting blood and bleeding from his head also started. On her intervention as also that of Ramsakhe, Nandkishore, Nathuram, Prakash is said to have inflicted a lathi blow on her head. She also in her cross- examination accepted that she had not seen whether Prakash gave a lathi blow to the deceased or not.

The learned Trial Judge in his judgment although noticed that Babulal suffered simple injuries on his person and the prosecution had not explained the same but did not proceed to consider the legal implication thereof. He also came to the conclusion that it was the Appellant who inflicted an axe blow on the head of the deceased. PW-4 although was declared hostile, in his examination-in-chief which has not been disputed, stated that prior to the actual incident, abuses were being hurled by the parties.

Applying the aforementioned principles of law, we are of the opinion that the Appellant cannot be held to be guilty of commission of an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but under Section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code. The Appellant is, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent.
Ritesh Chakarvarti vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

One Sabiha Khatun, an Inspector in Central Bureau of Narcotics (Bureau) received an information from an informer on 2.8.2000 that a person would carry around 15 kg. of opium from Indore to Mhow. The informer allegedly disclosed that the person carrying the contraband would be boarding a bus for Mhow at about 4.00 p.m. at Shivaji Vatika. The information was recorded in writing. S.K. Bajpai, Inspector and PW-5 Girwar Puri were witnesses thereto. Shivaji Vatika is almost on the other side of the Bureau. There was a pan shop just in front of the Bureau of which Girish (PW-2) was the owner. A raiding team was constituted which included Shri S.K. Bajpai, Inspector (who was then incharge of the office of the Superintendent of Police of the Bureau). Girwar Puri (PW-5) was also member of the said team. Appellant was allegedly seen proceeding to catch a bus for Mhow. He was seen having a black rexene bag in his hand. Girwar Puri, Sub-Inspector of the Bureau apprehended him. He was interrogated. He disclosed his name. He allegedly was given an option of search by a magistrate or a gazetted officer in terms of Section 50 of the NDPS Act or by the said PW-5. The search was conducted and opium weighing 1.300 kgs. was recovered. A currency note of Rs. 100 was also found on his person. A report was prepared purported to be in terms of Section 57 of the NDPS Act and was placed before the superior officer who was none other than the said Shri Bajpai. One Murali Dhamkani (PW-6) was appointed as an investigating officer. He was also a party to the raid.

Although information was received by Sabiha Khatun, she for reasons known only to the prosecution, was not examined. Inspector Shri S.K. Bajpai was also not examined. Both Premchand (PW-1) an autorickshaw driver and Girish (PW-2) owner of Pan shop, who were witnesses to the search, were declared hostile. The entire prosecution case rested on the testimony of Girwar Puri, Sub-Inspector.

The informer in his statement named Appellant stating:

Although names of Shri S.K. Bajpai, acting as Incharge of the Bureau and Girwar Puri were shown as departmental witnesses thereto, the following endorsement was made:

PW-1 Premchand in his deposition contended that his signatures had been obtained on blank papers. He was an autorickshaw driver. According to him, the search was not carried out in his presence. In answer to the questions put to him in cross-examination by the prosecution, it was stated:

An adverse inference, therefore, could be drawn for non-examination of material witnesses.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that Appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt. The appeal is allowed. He is directed to be set at liberty unless wanted in any other case.
Ghanshyam vs State Of M.P. & Others

According to the appellant, he was residing in the house situated at Company Bagh Road, Morar, Gwalior, as a tenant since the time of the grandfather of respondent no.3. Now, the landlord of the house is respondent no.3. According to the appellant, respondent no.3 attempted to illegally evict the appellant from his rented house with the help of anti-social elements who came to his house armed with weapons on 8.11.1986. Respondent No. 3 along with his men started dismantling the house of the appellant without prior permission and/or notice to him. The appellant was seriously injured when he tried to obstruct them from dismantling the house. The appellant lodged an FIR No.654/86 under Section 147/307 IPC against respondent no.3 and his men. A charge-sheet was filed against respondent no.3 and his men under Section 147/307 IPC and then the trial commenced.

The appellant is aggrieved by the order of withdrawal of the prosecution against respondent no. 3. The appellant's main grievance is that respondent no. 3, after a lapse of number of years, had filed a writ petition before the High Court and obtained an order by which the Court directed the Superintendent of Police, Gwalior to take action for registering the case and conduct an enquiry/investigation in accordance with law.

The appellant obviously was aggrieved by the said order of the High Court because he feared that now a case would be instituted against him, therefore, he had moved the High Court for recalling of the order dated 8.8.2005 passed in Writ Petition No. 1356 of 2004. The said application for recalling the order was dismissed by the High Court. The appellant is now seriously aggrieved by the judgment and order passed in the writ petition and thereafter in the application for recall respectively, has preferred these appeals before this Court.

In the backdrop of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, no interference is called for. These criminal appeals are accordingly dismissed being devoid of any merit.
Kerala State Financial Enterprises Ltd vs Official Liquidator, High Court Of ...

Appellant herein is a Government company. It is engaged in conduct of chitties. M/s Concert Capital Limited together with its sister concern M/s Concert Securities Limited took loan from it. They failed to repay the said loan. A recovery proceeding was initiated against the defaulting company under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. A notification was issued in that behalf in terms of Section 71 thereof.

The properties belonging to the defaulting company were attached. In the meanwhile, the Company went for voluntary liquidation. A provisional liquidator was appointed. Appellant was informed thereabout.

In the pending company proceeding being C.A. No. 165 of 2001, Appellant filed an application seeking leave to proceed with the sale of the properties, which was objected to, inter alia, on the premise that the charge in respect of the alleged debt was not registered with the Registrar of Companies and, thus, it was an unsecured creditor. A Counter Affidavit thereto was filed by Respondent. A prayer was also made by the Official liquidator for a direction upon Appellant to surrender the original documents. The application for leave to proceed with the revenue recovery proceeding was rejected by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by its order dated 28.11.2003.

liquidation, through its Recovery Officer but only after notice to the Official Liquidator or the Liquidator appointed by the Company Court and after hearing him.

For the reasons aforementioned, we do not think that the High Court has committed any error in refusing to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 446 of the Companies Act. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Zila Sahakari Kendra Bank Maryadit vs Shahjadi Begum And Ors

Appellant herein is a cooperative bank. It owned a jeep. The deceased was the driver of the said jeep. The jeep was requisitioned by Respondent No. 2 for election duty. Respondent No. 4 herein was the District Election Officer. The driver for all intent and purport was under his control. On 5.5.1999, the deceased while performing his duties stayed at the residence of Respondent No. 2. The work of cleaning of septic tank at his house was going on. There was a leakage of gas from the said septic tank. The deceased allegedly on instructions of Respondent No. 2 entered the septic tank to help the workers working therein. In the process, an accident took place resulting in his death.

Appellant preferred an appeal under Section 30 of the said Act in the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur. `The said appeal was numbered as Misc. Application No. 1797 of 2003. It is not in dispute that there was some delay in filing the application. The deposit of the amount in terms of Sub- section (2) of Section 30 of the Act was also made after some delay. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment did not go into the merit of the matter and dismissed the said appeal holding: .

This appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. No costs.
Col. (Retd.) B.J. Akkara vs The Govt. Of India & Ors

4. The recommendations of the Fifth Central Pay Commission were accepted and accorded sanction by the President on 24.11.1997. Consequently, the Ministry issued various circulars implementing the recommendations in regard to pensioners.

The pension of the petitioners were stepped up, re-fixed and paid accordingly.

Re : Question No. (iii)

Re : Question No. (iv)

Conclusion :

29. The Circulars dated 7.6.1999 and 11.9.2001 relate not only to pension but also family pension, the only difference being the percentage, that is, 30% is mentioned in respect of family pension instead of 50% in respect of pension. What we have discussed and held in respect of pension will apply to family pension also.

30. In view of the above, the challenge to the validity of the circular dated 11.9.2001 is rejected. These petitions (Transferred Cases) are dismissed. The Respondents, however, shall not recover the excess, if any, paid to the petitioners between 7.6.1999 and 11.9.2001. Respondents may recover the excess if any paid after 11.9.2001 in appropriate monthly instalments approximately equal to the monthly excess payment. Parties to bear respective costs.