L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
D.Purushotama Reddy & Anr vs K.Sateesh

3,09,000/- with interest. In the plaint, it was averred that Shri K. Balasubramanyam (father of the respondent) and Defendant No. 1 (Appellant No. 1 herein) were good friends. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had been carrying on business. They approached the plaintiff through Shri K. Balasubramanyam for financial assistance and obtained a loan of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rs. 1,00,000/- on 15.03.2001 and Rs. 1,00,000/- on 25.03.2001). Two promissory notes were also executed therefor.

A judgment of conviction and sentence against the appellant was passed therein by an order dated 15.12.2005 sentencing him to pay a sum 3 of Rs. 2,10,000 by way of fine and in default thereof to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. It was also directed that out of the said amount of fine, a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- would be paid to the complainant by way of compensation in terms of Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") and the remaining amount was to be payable to the State. In the said criminal proceedings, the appellants deposited a sum of Rs. 31,500/- on 7.02.2006, Rs. 68,500/- on 21.07.2006 and Rs. 1,10,000/- on 13.12.2006.

6. In the civil proceedings also, the appellants admittedly have deposited a sum of Rs. 1,90,000/-. An appeal was preferred thereagainst before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore marked as R.F.A. No. 1171 of 2006, which by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed.

11. We have noticed hereinbefore that whereas the judgment of conviction and sentence was passed on 15.12.2005, the suit was decreed by the civil court on 23.01.2006. Deposit of a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- by the appellants in favour of the respondent herein, was directed by the Criminal Court. Such an order should have been taken into consideration by the Trial Court.

18. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned judgment should be modified and is directed to be modified accordingly. The matter is remitted to the learned Trial Judge. The learned Trial Judge is directed to take into consideration the amount of compensation deposited by the appellants in the criminal case and for the said purpose, the learned Trial Judge should draw up a fresh decree while correcting the decree in terms of the order of this Court. The learned Trial Judge shall, while preparing a fresh decree, take into consideration the various dates on which the diverse amounts had been deposited by the appellants and calculate the interest payable thereupon.

19. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 12

August 01, 2008
Satya Narain Yadav vs Gajanand & Anr

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

3. As appears from the first information report the informant had stated that while they were harvesting the 2 wheat at the agricultural land in the morning two cow boys were grazing their goats. When loss was caused to the crops, Devi Lal asked them not to do so. They insisted that goats would be grazed and their names were Gajanand and Mahavir. When Devi Lal further asked them not to do so, Gajanand gave a blow of axe on the left side of his head and the deceased fell down. Thereafter, Mahavir assaulted with fists and the handle of the axe. Thereafter both of them fled away.

4. Charge sheet under Section 302 as well as under Section 302 read with Section 149 was filed separately against accused persons. The accused persons pleaded innocence. Sixteen witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version. Kana (PW-13) was stated to be an eye-witness. The Trial Court found Gajanand guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. Mahavir, as noted above, was acquitted. Present respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court which by the impugned judgment set aside the conviction. 3

18. The above position was highlighted in V. Subramani and Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2005 (10) SCC 358) and Genda Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. (Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1029/07 disposed of on July 9, 2008). 14

(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.

(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal.

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied)

53. Considering the background facts we are of the view that the High Court has rightly held that Gajanand was exercising the right of private defence. Therefore, there is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly.
Valson & Anr vs State Of Kerala

(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.

5. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions were found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as "the old Code") which came up for consideration before various High Courts, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as also before this Court. Since in the present appeal, we have been called upon to decide the ambit and scope of the power of an appellate court in an appeal against an order of acquittal, we have confined ourselves to one aspect only i.e. an appeal against an order of acquittal.

(emphasis supplied)

38. Reference was made by the trial Court in this context to Ext.P-12 to Ext.P-14. The trial Court's judgment appears to be bundle of confusions.
Gulbarga University vs Mallikarjun S. Kodagali & Anr

The parties filed their claims and counter claims before the said authority. A purported award was passed in terms thereof on or about 30.7.1999. However, a copy thereof was not supplied to the respondent. Respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka for 3 issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the said authority to supply it a copy of the said award. The writ petition was filed on 17.2.2000. It was allowed by an order dated 13.6.2000 whereby and whereunder the Superintending Engineer was directed to furnish a copy of his decision to the respondent. Pursuant thereto, the same was furnished on 19.8.2000.

The impugned judgment of the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The matter is remitted to the Principal Civil Court for consideration of the matter afresh in the light of observations made hereinbefore. The appeal is allowed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.

August 1, 2008
Sikka Star Satellites vs Star(I) Pvt.Ltd

3. The said Dharmendra Sikka is a promoter and director of Lucknow Entertainment Network Systems Pvt. Ltd. [for short `LENS'], a franchisee of Siti Cable Network Ltd. [for short `Siti Cable']. The appellant had shifted the said decoders supplied by the respondent to the premises of LENS. The appellant also failed to pay the subscription fee and other fees to respondent in spite of demands. Therefore, the respondent disconnected the signals with effect from 17.4.2002. More than four years later, the appellant filed a petition before the Tribunal seeking restoration of signals. In the said complaint, the appellant alleged that it had no connection with LENS or Siti Cable; that it had shifted the decoders supplied by Respondent to LENS on the request of respondent; that it was regularly paying the dues to LENS; and that it was not therefore due in any amount to the respondent.

The Tribunal held that the respondent was justified in disconnecting the supply of signals to appellant; and as the appellant had suppressed material facts and approached the Tribunal with unclean hands practicing deception, the appellant was not entitled to any relief. The said order is challenged in this appeal.

..................................J [R. V. Raveendran] ...................................J [Lokeshwar Singh Panta] New Delhi;

August 1, 2008
M/S United India Insurance Co.Ltd vs M/S Wani Carpets & Anr

The respondents filed a claim petition claiming a sum of Rs.34,90,000/- before the State Consumer Protection Commission. The J & K State Consumers Protection Commission by its judgment and order dated 8.10.2004 directed the appellant to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs.34,90,000/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum.

An appeal was preferred thereagainst by the appellant before the High Court. The said appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution on 7.9.2006. The appellant filed an application for restoration of the said appeal. The High Court by reason of the impugned order, without passing any order on the said restoration application, directed:

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and it is set aside accordingly. The High Court is requested to pass appropriate orders on the merit of the restoration application at the first instance.

The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Dinesh Kumar vs State Of Rajasthan

4. Background facts giving rise to the trial are as follows:

Chittar Lal, father of the informant (hereinafter referred to as the `deceased') enquired from the accused as to why they had entered into the house. On this, Babu Lal Nai and his wife Smt. Geeta exhorted the accused to finish them. Dinesh with the sword which he was carrying pierced abdomen of Chittar Lal. Babu Lal Nai inflicted injury on the abdomen of Chittar Lal. Uma Shanker and the informant Suresh Kumar rushed to rescue Chittar Lal. Satyanarayan inflicted blow with an iron rod on the head of Chittar Lal. Dinesh and Satyanarayan inflicted knife injury to Uma Shankar and Vinod; while Nirmala W/o Dinesh and Smt. Geeta W/o Babu Lal and Sonu @ Sunil inflicted injuries to his father and brother with lathies 3 and iron rod. Chittar Lal and Uma Shankar became unconscious on the spot. On hearing hue and cry, neighbours also gathered there. Injured Uma Shankar and Chittar Lal were taken to the hospital. Chittar Lal succumbed to the injuries while injured Uma Shankar was admitted to the hospital. On the basis of the aforesaid report, a case under Section 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 452 and 323 IPC was registered and investigation commenced. After investigation, charge sheet was filed. In due course, the case came up for trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge No.2 (Fast Tract), Kota. Charges under Sections 148, 452, 302 or 302/149, 307 or 307/149, 324 or 324/149 and 323 or 323/149 IPC were framed against the appellant and other co- accused who denied the charges and claimed trial. The prosecution in support of its case examined 18 witnesses. In their explanation under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short `Cr.P.C.') the appellant and other co- accused claimed innocence. Appellant-Dinesh got himself examined as DW-1 under Section 315 Cr.P.C. Before the Trial Court, the primary stand was that there was long standing 4 enmity between the parties and, therefore, there was false implication. It was also submitted that appellant was, in fact, assaulted by the complainant party had also suffered injuries and had lodged a cross case.

7. Above being the position, we find no merit in this appeal, which is, accordingly dismissed.
State Of M.P vs Pappu & Ajay

5. The State of Madhya Pradesh has questioned correctness of the judgment on the ground that considering 3 the gravity of the offence involved, the High Court ought not to have reduced the sentence to the period undergone which, as noted above, was less than six months.

14. The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal". If for extremely heinous crime of murder perpetrated in a very brutal manner without any provocation, most deterrent punishment is not given, the case of deterrent punishment will lose its relevance.

16. Considering the legal position as indicated above the 9 High Court's order is clearly unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. The judgment of the Trial Court is restored. The respondent shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence.

17. The appeal is allowed.
State Of Rajasthan vs Gajendra Singh

5. Respondent filed an appeal before the High Court questioning correctness of the judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.3, Bharatpur, in Sessions Case No.30 of 2002. By the impugned judgment, the High Court directed the sentence to be reduced to a period of five years rigorous imprisonment for the offence relatable to Section 376 IPC and also reduced the sentence of six month's simple imprisonment to one month's simple imprisonment in the case of Section 341 IPC, as according to the High Court, the same was the maximum sentence.

23. In order to exercise the discretion of reducing the sentence the statutory requirement is that the Court has to record "adequate and special reasons" in the judgment and not fanciful reasons which would permit the Court to impose a sentence less than the prescribed minimum. The reason has not only to be adequate but also special. What is adequate and special would depend upon several factors and no strait- jacket formula can be indicated. What is applicable to trial Courts regarding recording reasons for a departure from minimum sentence is equally applicable to the High Court.

24. The requirement in law as to adequate and special reasons is cumulative. The High Court has not recorded any reason, much less any adequate and special reasons for reducing the sentence. The High Court was, therefore, not 14 justified in reducing the sentence below the prescribed minimum.

25. In the background of what has been stated above, we set aside the judgment of the High Court to the extent that in respect of the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC, the respondent shall serve the minimum of seven years rigorous imprisonment.

26. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Jason Links(India) Pvt.Ltd vs State Bank Of India & Anr

The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission [for short, "the State Commission"] allowed the complaint and awarded compensation against which order both the parties filed appeals. The complainant filed First Appeal No.111 of 2006 for enhancement of compensation; whereas the respondent-Bank filed another appeal giving rise to First Appeal No.145 of 2006 challenging the order passed by the State Commission against it. Curiously enough, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission [for short, "the National Commission"], instead of disposing of both the appeals, which were filed against the common order, dismissed the appeal filed by ...2/-

the complainant; whereas the appeal filed by the Bank has been admitted and still pending. In our view, it will be just and expedient to set aside the impugned order and remit the matter for hearing both the appeals together.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order is set aside and the appeal is remitted to the National Commission. Upon remand, the National Commission shall hear both the appeals together and decide the same after giving opportunity of hearing to both the parties.
K. Narayanan And Anr vs S. Murali

2. The brief facts leading to the filing of these appeals may be narrated as under:

3. The appellants are engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling Banana Chips and had adopted the trade mark A-ONE with respect to the said Banana Chips in 1986. The appellants had applied for an application for registration of the trade mark A-ONE before the Trade Mark Registry at Chennai on 6th of December, 1999 with respect to the said Banana chips. The application of the appellants for registration of the trademark is still pending.

4. On 7th of February, 2000, the respondent filed O.S.No.1 of 2000 on the file of the District Judge at Coimbatore against the appellants, seeking an injunction restraining the appellants from passing off their goods using the trade mark A-ONE. The said suit was dismissed by the District Judge at Coimbatore on 23rd of December, 2001.

5. The respondent filed three trade mark applications numbered as 899359, 899360 and 899361 on 24th of January,2000 before the Trade Mark Registry at Chennai seeking registration as user of the mark A-ONE throughout India since 1995.

9. The appellants, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, preferred appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court, which was dismissed by the Division Bench by an order dated 18th of April, 2002.

29. In this view of the matter, we are, therefore, of the opinion that filing of an application for registration of a trade mark does not constitute a part of cause of action in a suit for passing off. The appellants cannot file the suit in the High Court of Madras seeking an injunction to restrain the respondent from passing off his goods using the trade mark A-ONE, based only on the claims made in the trade mark application of respondent filed before the Trade Mark Registry, since the necessary requirements of an action for passing off are absent.

30.Accordingly, there is no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of Division Bench of the High 16 Court of Madras. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeals stand dismissed with no order as to costs.
Rajbir Singh Dalal vs Chaudhari Devi Lal University & Anr

5. The respondent-university issued an advertisement for direct recruitment for various posts, including the post of Reader in Public Administration. The appellant herein, claiming to be fully eligible and qualified for the post of Reader in Public Administration, applied for the aforementioned post on the prescribed format. A Selection Committee interviewed the appellant on 18.7.2004 as per the call letter dated 8.7.2004. The appellant was selected as Reader and he joined as such on 4.4.2005.

6. Respondent No. 2 herein, Dr. Raj Kumar Siwach, who was a Lecturer in Public Administration had also applied for the post of Reader, but he was not selected and instead the appellant was selected. Hence, respondent No. 2 filed a writ petition in the Punjab & Haryana High Court being CWP No. 6642/2005 in which he alleged that the appellant herein, Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal, did not possess the requisite qualification for the post of Reader in Public Administration. It was alleged in the writ petition that the appellant was an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science and not in Public 3 Administration. Hence, it was alleged that the appellant was not eligible for being selected and appointed as Reader in Public Administration.

7. In the counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 1, the University, it was stated that Public Administration is one of the branches of Political Science, and hence the appellant herein was rightly selected by the Selection Committee consisting of eminent experts after evaluating his academic qualifications.

10. The High Court was of the view that a person is not qualified for appointment as Reader unless he has qualification in the appropriate subject. The High Court was also of the view that since the appellant had a qualification in the discipline of Political Science he could not be appointed 6 in the discipline of Public Administration. Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed by the appellant in this Court.

45. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the decision of this Court in Dr. Bhanu Prasad Panda's case (supra) cannot be read as a Enclid's formula or treated as a precedent, since it has not given any reason for holding that Political Science and Public Administration are distinct and separate subjects, and since the aforesaid decision was given on a concession.

46. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment and order of the High Court cannot be sustained and it is hereby set aside. The appeal is allowed and the writ petition filed in the High Court stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

.....................................J. (Altamas Kabir) New Delhi Dated: August 6, 2008
Alagendran Exports Pvt.Ltd vs State Of Kerala

During the Assessment Year 1998-1999, the appellant claims to have purchased cashew kernels for the value of Rs.1,92,67,236/- from the registered dealers within the State of Kerala for the purposes of export. According to the appellant, the said purchases were covered by declarations in Form 18A. The 1 appellant claims that since the said purchases were covered by declarations in Form 18A, the transactions stood covered by Section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (1956 Act, for short) and such purchases/sales were not liable to tax within the State of Kerala.

In this case, the Department had issued a pre-assessment notice dated 5th March, 2003 in which it was alleged that the appellant had failed to produce any evidence indicating payment of tax on purchases made by it from the local dealer and, consequently, the appellant was liable to pay tax under Section 5A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (1963 Act, for short). This allegation was denied by the appellant in its reply to the notice dated 5th March, 2003. By order dated 20th March, 2003, the Assessing Officer (AO) held that since the goods were either stock transferred or effected vide deemed export sales, the purchases were liable to tax under Section 5A of the 1963 Act. The AO further held that the appellant had not produced any evidence to show payment of tax on the cashewnut kernels purchased by it locally. Consequently, the Returns filed by the appellant stood rejected.

It appears from the records that the authorities below rejected the claim of the appellant on the ground that the appellant had purchased cashew kernels from unregistered dealers in the State. This allegation has been denied by the appellant. In our view, the most important aspect, which has not been decided by the AO, is whether the purchases made by the appellant were in the course of export in terms of Section 5(3) of the 1956 Act. It appears from the Memo of Appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal that the appellant had produced Trading Accounts and details of purchases for the Assessment Year 1998-1999, list of domestic purchases supported by sale bills issued by registered dealers within and outside the State against Form 18A, prior purchase orders of foreign buyers, copies of export invoices, bill of lading and other records. In such matters, it is the duty of the AO to collate the facts and ascertain whether the purchased cashew kernels worth Rs.1,92.67,236/- were effected in the course of export. Applicability of B.M.Ashraf's case (supra) would depend on the factual foundation. In this case, that factual foundation is missing.

For the afore-stated reasons, Civil Appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the Deputy Commissioner (A) to decide the afore-stated aspect once again in accordance with law.

No order as to costs.