L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Leela Rajagopal & Ors vs Kamala Menon Cochran & Ors

4. Testator Late Janaki Amma had initially executed a Will dated 28.12.1981 bequeathing house property bearing No. 8, Malony Road, T. Nagar, Madras-17 in favour of the first respondent Kamala Menon Cochran and her grand-daughter Geetha (daughter of her predeceased daughter Leela). The said Will, inter alia, contained a recital that the testator had 4 sons. In the Will dated 28.12.1981 the testator had acknowledged that her sons are all well settled in life and had properties purchased in their names during the life time of their father. The testator had further stated that she had suffered extreme bereavement on the death of her daughter Leela which occurred on 02.02.1975 and therefore out of the deep attachment for her grand-daughter, Geetha, and also as her second daughter K.P. Kamala Menon i.e. respondent No. 1 aged 46 years who is a Principal in a College and a spinster she is bequeathing the house property in favour of her grand- daughter and her daughter to the exclusion of her sons. The said Will dated 28.12.1981 was superseded/revoked by a subsequent Will dated 11.1.1982 which contained similar recitals as in the first Will dated 28.12.1981 except for the fact that instead of 4 sons the testator mentioned that she had 5 living sons. After the death of Janaki Amma which occurred on 27.04.1991 the respondent No. 1 had instituted a probate proceedings which was later converted into a suit, as the Will was disputed by the sons of the deceased.

13. All the unusual and allegedly suspicious circumstances being capable of being understood in the manner indicated above, we cannot find any fault with the conclusions reached by the High Court while reversing the judgment of the learned Trial Court.

15. We, accordingly, dismiss these appeals affirm the order dated 18.08.2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Original Side Appeal No. 185 of 2001. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to cost.
Union Of India vs Raj Kumar Baghal ...

3. In the other set of acquisition, covered by notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 16th September, 1988, for the land measuring 498.03, the Collector vide award dated 27th March, 1991, awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.2 lakh per acre for the land in villages Kheri Gujran and Bir Kheri Gujran and for the land in villages Sher Majra, Haji Majra and Pasiana at the rate of Rs.1,50,000/- per acre. The Reference Court vide award dated 6th April, 1998 enhanced the compensation to Rs.2,75,000/- per acre for the land in villages Kheri Gujran and Bir Kheri Gujran. In respect of land in the revenue estate of village Haji Majra, for the land upto 500 meters on Patiala Sangrur Road, compensation was awarded at the same rate but for the rest of the land compensation was awarded at Rs.2,33,750/- per acre. For villages Pasiana and Sher Majra, the rate awarded was the same as for village Haji Majra. On further appeal, the learned Single Judge of the High Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.4,48,159/- per acre which has been affirmed by the Division Bench with slight modification by way of enhancement.

12. We, thus, do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment.

13. The appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.
S.Balachandran vs M/S Ramaniyam Real Estates Ltd

5. Let the papers of this case be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate Bench.

2. The facts necessary to decide this matter are as follows:

3. The respondent herein filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 for interim orders in the High Court of Calcutta. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta, after granting leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, passed an ad-interim ex-parte injunction order. This order was continued from time to time until it was confirmed by an order dated 10th December, 1998. Meanwhile, in an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, Justice B.P. Banerjee (retired), was appointed as an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties. A Recalling Application filed by the State was dismissed on 20th January, 2000.

4. An appeal was filed against the order dated 10th December, 1998, confirming the ad-interim ex-parte injunction. On 5th July, 2000, delay in filing the appeal was condoned and on 20th July, 2000, the interim order was stayed by the Division Bench. The Arbitrator was, however, asked to complete the proceedings before him which would go on uninterrupted.

5. Meanwhile, several orders were passed by the High Court regarding remuneration of the Arbitrator and payment of the same. The arbitration proceedings culminated in an Award dated 30th June, 2004 by which the claimant was awarded a sum of Rs.2,76,97,205.00 with 10% interest from 1st July, 1998 till the date of the Award. If not paid within four months, the same would then attract interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Costs were also awarded in the sum of Rs.50,000/-. The counter claims of the respondent were rejected.

893). As has been noticed above, the expression used in Section 42 is wider being “with respect to an arbitration agreement” and would certainly include such applications.

(f) Section 42 will apply to applications made after the arbitral proceedings have come to an end provided they are made under Part-I.

The reference is answered accordingly.

26. On the facts of the present case, nothing has been shown as to how the High Court of Calcutta does not possess jurisdiction. It has been mentioned above that leave under Clause 12 has been granted. In the circumstances of the present case, therefore, the judgment dated 11th April, 2005 passed by the High Court of Calcutta is correct and does not need any interference. Civil Appeal No.6691/2005 and Civil Appeal No.4808/2013 are hereby dismissed.
Munna vs State Of M.P

2. Case of the prosecution as per FIR is that on 19th April, 1993, when the prosecutrix (PW 1) was sleeping in her house at 1.00 A.M., the appellant along with co-accused Sahab Singh @ Mutta entered the house of the prosecutrix and both of them committed rape on the prosecutrix and then fled away. They were carrying knife which was shown to the prosecutrix to threaten her if she raised alarm. The prosecutrix narrated the incident to her husband and lodged First Information Report at the Police Station on the next day. After investigation both the accused were sent up for trial. The prosecutrix did not support the version against co-accused Sahab Singh @ Mutta. Accordingly, he was acquitted by the trial Court. Relying upon her version supported by her husband Balkishan (PW 2) and Kotwar of the village Manaklal (PW 3), the trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant which has been confirmed by the High Court.

Similarly her husband PW 2 has contradicted the prosecutrix about the presence of the accused when PW 2 arrived. According to PW 2, accused was still at the house and ran away only when he opened the door while according to prosecutrix the accused had ran away before arrival of her husband.

8. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant and acquit him of the charge.

Date : 16/09/2014 This appeal was called on for JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. C.D. Singh, Adv.

Ms. Sakshi Kakkar, Adv.

Ms. Pragati Neekhra, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Mishra Saurabh,Adv.

Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Adv.

Mr. Ankit Kr.Lal, Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda and His Lordship.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
Kailash Chandra Agrawal & Anr vs State Of U.P.& Ors

3. The case of the complainant in the FIR registered on 4th May, 2010 in the Bhelupur Police Station at Varanasi is that her marriage was solemnised on 30th April, 2005. Her brothers who lived abroad gave lot of dowry and cash in the marriage but her family could not fulfil more demands raised by the elder brother of her husband’s father, who was the head of the joint family on account of which family members of her husband were not satisfied and tortured her. On account of torture, she came to her parents house with her child on 1st March, 2009 she gave a complaint on 27th April, 2010 leading to registration of the FIR on 4th May, 2010. She also filed complaint in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi. In the said complaint, the appellants were summoned vide Order dated 30th November, 2010.

4. Aggrieved by the said summons, the appellants moved the High Court under Section 482 OF THE Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) with the plea that the summoning was not justified as neither they were named in the FIR got registered by the complainant nor any individual role was attributed to them in the criminal complaint. Their relationship with the husband of the complainant was remote as grand father of the appellant No.1 was brother of grand father of the husband of the complainant. In such remote relationship, the appellants will have no interest in raising any demand for dowry or causing any harassment to the complainant. Their implication was thus, clear abuse of the process of the Court.

5. The High Court dismissed the petition with the observation that the statement of the complainant under Sections 200 and 202, Cr.P.C. disclosed the commission of offence and thus there was no illegality in the order of summoning.

11. Applying the above tests, the proceedings in the present case are clearly the abuse of the Court’s process.

12. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and quash the proceedings against the appellants, without expressing any opinion about the case of the complainant against the other accused.

Crl.A.No......../2014 arising from Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 4656/2011 KAILASH CHANDRA AGRAWAL & ANR Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF U.P.& ORS. Respondent(s) Date : 16/09/2014 This petition was called on for Judgment today.

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Shekhar Kumar,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Ms. Shomila Bakshi,Adv.

Mrs. Mona K. Rajvanshi,Adv.

Mr. M. R. Shamshad,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda and His Lordship.

Leave granted.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.

(Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
State Of M.P vs Shivshankar

3. The case of the prosecution is that on 2nd March, 1999 after celebration of Holi festival, sugar cakes (Batase) were being distributed in front of the house of the complainant by Ramlachhin Gurjar (PW 10). Complainant Remsewak (PW 4) and his brothers Ramnaresh (PW 6), Vinod (PW 7) and deceased Satish were standing near the temple. An altercation took place on account of Mukesh taking some sugar cakes without the permission of PW 10. The respondent slapped PW 4 and his brothers. This led to further altercation between the accused and the complainant party. The accused went inside his house, brought the licensed gun of his brother and fired a shot hitting the deceased on the stomach. Apart from the accused, acquitted co-accused Shrichand and Shyamsunder had Kattas and Mukesh and Badshah were having 12 bore single barrel guns. The acquitted co- accused also fired in the air. The deceased succumbed to his injuries. Thereafter, Ramsewak lodged First Information Report. After investigation, the accused were sent up for trial. The prosecution case against the respondent was proved by three eye witnesses Ramsewak (PW 4), Ramnaresh (PW

6) and Vinod (PW 7) who were brothers of the deceased, apart from other corroborating evidence. The respondent was convicted under Section 302, IPC while others were acquitted.

4. The respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court, but in view of clear evidence of firing of gun shot by him causing death of the deceased, only challenge was to the nature of the offence. It was submitted that quarrel took place suddenly and the accused had no intention to cause the death of the deceased. Firing in the air by the co accused showed that the intention was not to cause the death. The accused fired only one shot and in the circumstances no offence under Section 302, IPC was made out.

Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial Court, i.e., 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Bhind, Madhya Pradesh in Sessions Trial No.285 of 1999. The respondent stands convicted under Section 302, IPC and sentenced to undergo Life Imprisonment and to pay fine imposed by the Courts below, in default to undergo further imprisonment as directed by the Courts below.

Crl.A. …..../2014 arising from petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 1235/2012 STATE OF M.P. Petitioner(s) VERSUS SHIVSHANKAR Respondent(s) Date : 16/09/2014 This petition was called on for Judgment today.

For Petitioner(s) Mr. C. D. Singh,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda and His Lordship.

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.

(Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
Gul Singh @ Guliya & Ors vs State Of M.P. & Anr

1. This appeal has been preferred against the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the murder of Mishribai for which they stand sentenced to life imprisonment apart from conviction and sentence of appellant Gul Singh @ Gulia under Section 376 IPC and conviction of appellants for other offences as appearing from the operative part of the order of the trial Court and the High Court which is clear from the impugned Judgment of the High Court as follows :

2. Case of the prosecution is that on the night intervening 24th /25th of May, 1998, while Girdhari had gone to the farm of his employer for driving the Tractor and other family members were asleep in his house, at 02.00 mid-night, the accused persons with a view to kidnap Parubai (PW 3), arrived, armed with weapons like Dharia, Falia and Lathi and started assaulting Setulbai, Mishribai, Mohan and Sunderlal. As a result of the deadly assault, Mishribai succumbed to the injuries on the spot, Sunderlal (PW 6) sustained a fracture in his hand, Mohan (PW 1) sustained injury on his head and both shoulders and Setulbai (PW 5) also sustained two incised wounds and two lacerated wounds,. Thereafter the accused persons dragged away Parubai (PW 3). Later, she was subjected to rape.

13. Accordingly, we do not find any ground to interfere. The appeal is dismissed.

Date : 16/09/2014 This appeal was called on for JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. V. Ramasubramanian,Adv.

Mr. A. Lakshminarayanan, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. C. D. Singh,Adv.

Ms. Sakshi Kakkar, Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda and His Lordship.

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed order.

(Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
National Textile Corporation Ltd vs Durga Trading Co. & Ors

3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:-

3.4 On 23rd June, 2000, the Estate Officer of the appellant Corporation passed an order under Sub Section (3) of Section 5A of the 1971 Act treating the subject premises as 'public premises' and directed respondent no.1 to remove the movable structures and fixtures from the said premises. Thereafter, on 17th November, 2000 the said authority issued two show cause notices to respondent no.1 u/s 4(1) and 7(3) of the 1971 Act calling upon respondent no.1 to show cause why it should not be evicted from the subject premises and why it should not be made liable to pay damages. The appellant Corporation initiated the aforesaid action against respondent no.1 on the ground that the premises were required for bona fide use. Moreover, the appellant Corporation urged before the High Court that since conveyance deed was not executed between the erstwhile owner SSML and respondent no. 1, it was merely an agreement to sell and hence, the subject premises got vested in the Central Government under the 1995 Act. 3.5 The High Court allowed the said writ petition by the impugned judgment and order dated 6th February, 2003.

8. The real issue in the present case is whether the subject premises can be said to be an asset of the SSML vested with the State.

19. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 6th February, 2003 passed by the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.1552 of 2000 and uphold notices dated 17th November, 2000 issued under Sections 4 and 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. Now, it is open to the Competent Authority/Court to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the 1971 Act and pass an appropriate order. The appeal is allowed but there is no order as to costs.

FEBRUARY 17, 2015.
Anvar P.V vs P.K.Basheer & Ors

were exhibited on 13.4.2011 as part of the election campaign of the first respondent as alleged in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the election petition and if so whether the alleged exhibition of Annexures D, E and E1 will amount to commission of corrupt practice under section 123(4) of The Representation of the People Act?

7) Whether announcements mentioned in paragraph 8 of the election petition were made between 6.4.2011 and 11.4.2011, as alleged in the above paragraph, as part of the election propaganda of the first respondent and if so whether the alleged announcements mentioned in paragraph 8 will amount to commission of corrupt practice as contemplated under section 123(4) of The Representation of the People Act?

8) Whether the songs and announcements alleged in paragraph 9 of the election petition were made on 8.4.2011 as alleged, in the above paragraph, as part of the election propaganda of the first respondent and if so whether the publication of the alleged announcements and songs will amount to commission of corrupt practice under section 123(4) of The Representation of People Act?

9) Whether Mr. Mullan Sulaiman mentioned in paragraph 10 of the election petition did make a speech on 9.4.2011 as alleged in the above paragraph as part of the election propaganda of the first respondent and if so whether the alleged speech of Mr. Mullan Sulaiman amounts to commission of corrupt practice under section 123(4) of The Representation of the People Act?

Now, we shall deal with the ground on publication of Exhibit-P1-leaflet which is also referred to as Annexure-A. To quote relevant portion of Paragraph-4 of the election petition:
Chairman Cum Md Iocl & Ors vs Sunita Kumari & Anr

The facts

6. The news item resulted in a public outcry and on 5/9 August, 2002 the Government of India passed an order cancelling all allotments for dealerships in petroleum products with effect from 1st January, 2000 including of SKO-LDO dealerships.

29. In view of our conclusion, the impugned order of the High Court directing allotment of the dealership in SKO-LDO in favour of Sunita Kumari is quashed. The appeal is allowed. No costs.

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31006 of 2012

33. Rajesh Kumar Tiwary claimed that Rangi Lal Rai was not eligible for an allotment and therefore being the third empanelled candidate the allotment should be made in his favour. On this basis he filed a writ petition in the Patna High Court being CWJC No. 18809 of 2008. A learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed Rajesh Kumar Tiwary’s writ petition by following the decision rendered in another case, that is, CWJC No. 9362 of 2009 and Mukund Swarup Mishra.

35. In view of our discussion in Sunita Kumari (supra) there is no merit in this petition and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Institute Of Law & Ors vs Neeraj Sharma & Ors

12. The High Court has erred in not appreciating that the allotment of land in favour of the appellant-Institute was made as per regular procedure adopted and being followed by Administration of Union Territory of Chandigarh for the last more than 50 years and there was no deviation whatsoever from the said procedure in allotting the land in favour of the appellant-Institute which is also non-profitable institute.

nevertheless the decision will be set aside. That is established by Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food which is a landmark in modern administrative law.’

30. We further hold that the fundamental right to establish and run an educational institution in terms of Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the State is within its competence to prohibit “commercialization of education”.

32. We, therefore, disregard the plea of charitable intention or philanthropic goal behind the establishment of the appellant educational institution as the establishment of the same does not serve any public interest and we cannot allow the allottee to make money or profiteer with the aid of the public property.

36. We thus hold that the impugned order passed by the learned puisne Judge, which was concurred by the then Chief Justice by his separate order and the order of the third nominated Judge holding that there is no difference of opinion in the orders of the Division Bench are legal and valid and do not require any interference by this Court.

37. It is needless to state that certain observations made in the impugned orders against some of the appellants and the respondents are totally unwarranted and the same are expunged.

38. In view of the foregoing reasons, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned orders in exercise of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The order dated 16.04.2007 granting stay shall stand vacated.