L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Tersem Singh vs State Of Punjab

2. As per the prosecution story given by Piare Lal PW his daughter Rajwinder Kaur had been married to Tarsem Singh appellant about twelve years earlier. He was present in his house in village Pandori, Masharkti (District Jalandhar) when he received a message at about 11:00p.m. on the 21st September, 2007 from village Khambra that a gas cylinder had burst in his daughter's house and that his son-in-law Tarsem Singh had Crl.A. Nos. 42-43 of 2011 2 sustained injuries and his daughter Rajwinder Kaur and his grand sons Harwinder Singh aged 8 years and Gurvinder Singh aged 10 years, had been killed. Piare Lal along with his wife and nephew Makhan Singh rushed to village Khambra and on examining the site he suspected that the appellant had killed his wife and children by inflicting injuries on them and then setting them on fire post murder. An FIR was, accordingly, lodged at the Police Station on the 22nd September, 2007 in which he further stated that the appellant had threatened a few days earlier that he would kill everyone in his family.

6. As the notice was a limited one we direct that the sentence on the appellant be commuted from death to life. With this modification in the sentence, the appeals are dismissed.
Union Of India & Anr vs B. Kishore

2. The wife of the respondent K. Janaki died on September 1, 1993, while giving birth to their 2 second child. At that time she was working as a Senior Accountant in the Office of the Directorate of Postal Accounts, Madras. On September 21, 1993, the respondent made an application for payment of her death-cum-terminal dues. A rival claim was raised by the mother of the deceased but the respondent was able to obtain the succession certificate and on that basis he got payment of a sum of Rs.71,000/- as death-cum-retirement gratuity of his deceased wife, in addition to a sum of Rs.2,998/- per month as family pension.

"(a) The family is indigent and deserves immediate assistance for relief from financial destitution; and

10. The High Court was, therefore, in error in passing the impugned order.

12. In light of the discussions made above, the order coming under appeal is wholly unsustainable.

It is set aside. The appeal is allowed but with no order as to costs.

April 6, 2011.
Kar.Indust.Areas Dev.Board & Anr vs M/S Prakash Dal Mill & Ors

2. We may now briefly notice the relevant facts which are necessary for the adjudication of the present case. The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (hereinafter referred to as `appellant No.1) had formed an industrial layout at Tarihal village in the year 1983, pursuant to which, it invited interested purchasers to make applications for allotment of industrial sites. Pursuant to the same, the respondents herein, applied for the allotment of sites. It is a matter of record that the respondents had applied for the allotment of sites at different points of time. Consequently, the appellant issued letters of intent, indicating that it had resolved to allot all respondents the sites shown in their cause titles at Tarihal Industrial Estate. The said letter also indicated the tentative price at which the land was sought to be allotted.

Pursuant to the objections filed individually by the respondents, the appellant invited them to 5 Bangalore for a discussion. According to the respondents, during the course of discussions, they had sought for the detailed break up, based on which the enhanced claim was made. The board had furnished them a statement showing the basis for enhancement of the price. In the break-ups statement, as provided by the appellant, it was shown that Rs.34.17 lakhs were indicated to be the cost of future development. The respondents having expressed their inability to pay the hiked prices, once again brought to the notice of the appellants that the proposed enhancement was unjust and arbitrary. Thereafter, the appellant No.1, on consideration of the objections raised by the respondents reduced the final allotment price marginally and issued demand notices to the respondents as follows:

10. Learned counsel further submitted that the final price fixation is in accordance with the allotment letters issued to the respondents. As per the allotment letter, the tentative price of the land had been fixed at Rs.40,500/- per acre in Tarihal Industrial Area. The allottees were to exercise option with regard to the mode of payment of the 9 purchase price. The letter clearly indicated that the price was only tentative. The final price was fixed taking into account the cost of acquisition, development expenditure, statutory charges and interest. On the basis of the above criteria, the cost of land per allotable acre worked out approximately to 2.61 lakhs per acre. Therefore, the break-ups of the same was as follows:-

d) Interest 0.32 2.61 Therefore, keeping the above cost per acre as the basis, the appellant Board, at its Board Meeting dated 18th September, 1997 resolved to fix the final price of the lands as follows:-

20. In our opinion, the High Court correctly concluded that the fixation of final price by the Board is without authority of law. It violates Article 14 of 2 the Constitution of India being arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of discretionary powers.

21. In view of the above, we find no merit in these appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
State Of J.& K. & Anr vs Ajay Dogra

4. The appellants herein issued an advertisement inviting applications for making direct recruitment to the post of Prosecuting Officers in Jammu & Kashmir Police, in the State of Jammu & Kashmir. There are altogether two such advertisement/notices, the one issued on 24.3.2000 and the other dated 5.3.2003. In the aforesaid advertisment/notices, various criterion were laid down as essential suitability 4 conditions. One such condition was with regard to age/physical qualifications to be possessed by the applicants.

14. A perusal of the writ petitions would prove and establish that the only prayer made in those writ petitions was to grant relaxation to the criteria and standard of physical conditions prescribed for and required to be fulfilled. In aforesaid writ petitions, neither the validity of Rule 176 with regard to physical conditions were challenged nor such conditions 9 prescribed in the advertisement were challenged on the ground of its validity contending inter alia that there is no nexus of the said conditions with the object sought to be achieved. We find that the physical conditions prescribed in the advertisement are in consonance with Rule 176 of the Police Rules which are statutory Rules. No where in the pleadings, it is stated that such conditions prescribed are illegal or invalid. Constitutional validity of the aforesaid Rule was never challenged in any of the writ petitions.

21. The qualifications to be possessed by the applicants have been prescribed in the Rules and also in the advertisement for the reason that some of them are required to be posted at high altitude and therefore they are required to have proper physique so as to be able to be posted to those places.

23. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was not justified to decide the validity of the aforesaid Rule and the advertisement without there being any challenge to the same.

We also hold that it was not appropriate for the High Court to set aside the said conditions which are mandatory in nature.

24. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the settled principles of law of this Court, we allow these appeals and set aside the judgments and orders passed by the High Court both by the Division Bench and by the Single Judge and dismiss the writ petitions.

............................................J [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma ] ............................................J [ Anil R. Dave ] New Delhi, April 7, 2011.

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Ramchander vs Union Of India & Ors

2. The appellant joined service as Farash in the Jodhpur Division of the Northern Railway. After seven years, he was sent on deputation in the construction organization of the Northern Railway at Bikaner and was directed to work as a Material Checking Clerk. 2 His pay was fixed in the pay scale of Rs.800-1150/-. In 1997, his service was regularised on Group `D' post. After two years, he was declared successful in the test conducted for promotion to Group `C' posts. However, he failed to clear the type test despite repeated opportunities. As a consequence, the competent authority passed an order dated 01.07.2002 for reversion of the appellant to Group `D' post.

6. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High 4 Court for disposal of the writ petition on merits. The parties may file supplementary affidavits and documents before the High Court within a period of three months.

7. Since the matter is more than 9 years old, we request the High Court to make an endeavour to dispose of the writ petition as early as possible but latest within six months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.
Mahendra Prasad Singh @ Mahendra Singh vs State Of Bihar & Ors

3. The appellant was appointed as a constable and while undergoing training at Commandant Training Centre, B.M.P.-

Thereafter, he had returned to Palamu Headquarters and had reported his arrival. Thus, he had unauthorizedly remained absent for 105 days. In view of his above stated misconduct, the departmental inquiry had been conducted and as a result of inquiry proceeding, by an order dated 14th September, 1977, his services had been brought to an end by way of punishment.

4. Being aggrieved by the order of punishment, the appellant filed an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, S.C.R., Ranchi, who did not find any substance in the appeal and, therefore, dismissed the same.

5. Thereafter, the appellant made a representation to the Director General & Inspector General of Police, Bihar at Patna for his reinstatement on 7th January, 1989. The said representation was also turned down by the Director General & Inspector General of Police, Bihar. It appears from the order dated 28th July, 1989, passed by the Director General & Inspector General of Police, Bihar, that the appellant had also made a representation earlier but the said representation had been rejected.

16. In view of the fact that the service of the appellant had been terminated by way of punishment on account of his misconduct, in our opinion, the High Court rightly dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant. We agree with the view expressed by the High Court.

19. For the aforestated reasons, we do not see any reason to interfere with the just and proper order passed by the High Court. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
M.G. University & Anr vs Jikku Paul & Ors. Etc

2. The Government of Kerala by G.O. dated 13.11.2002, accorded sanction for admitting the diploma-holders in the state, directly to the second year of the engineering degree (B.Tech) course, subject to the concurrence of the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE for short) and the universities concerned. The appellant university decided to implement such lateral entry scheme, vide its order dated 21.2.2003.

11. At this juncture, it is necessary to note that on 30.4.2010, this Court while ordering notice only to AICTE and the colleges, dispensed with the notice to students with a condition that admission of students made during the academic years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, shall not be disturbed irrespective of the result in these appeals. This Court also stayed the judgment of the High Court only with reference to the academic year 2010-2011. We therefore make it clear that the students who were admitted for 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, even if they did not possess the minimum qualifying marks in the entrance test, shall not be disturbed and shall be allowed to complete their course.

12. We therefore allow these appeals and set aside the order of the High Court (subject to the exception in the case of students mentioned in para 11 above).

April 8, 2011.
University Of Jammu vs T.S.Khan & Ors

4. Respondent No.1, who was an employee of the University, made applications both for the posts of Deputy Registrar and Assistant Registrar. The Selection Committee, constituted for the purpose, on a consideration of the merit, suitability, academic qualification, experience and performance of the candidates in the interview prepared a select list on May 26, 1996 in which respondent No.1 was placed at rank XIII. Respondents 4 and 5 were placed in the select list at ranks IV and V respectively. On the basis of the select list, prepared by the Selection Committee, respondent Nos. 4 and 5 were appointed as Assistant Registrars. About two years later, respondent No.1 filed a Writ Petition (Writ Petition No.1094 of 1998) seeking to challenge the appointments made in pursuance of the advertisement and claiming that 4 persons inferior to him in qualification and merit were appointed on the two posts.

6. On a consideration of all the material facts and circumstances, a single Judge of the High Court 5 dismissed the Writ Petition by judgment and order dated May 31, 2001.

9. On hearing counsel for the parties and on going through the materials on record, we are satisfied that the impugned order passed by the Division Bench is wholly unsustainable. It is, accordingly, set aside. The appeal is allowed but with no order as to costs.

April 8, 2011.
Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of Mumbai vs M/S Byramjee Jeejeebhoy P.Ltd.& Anr

3. The plaintiff respondent no.1 filed a suit in the court of Small Causes at Bombay registered as RAE suit no.83/197 of 1993, seeking inter alia a decree of eviction, against the defendants from the suit land admeasuring about 3273.394 square yards, situated at Santacruz Estate, Mazgaon, Bombay. According to the plaintiff-respondent no.1, the suit land was given to defendant no.1 on lease for 999 (nine hundred and ninety nine) years by the plaintiff's predecessors-in-interest under a registered lease deed dated 3 May 10, 18861. In terms of the lease deed, defendant no.1, the lessee had the right to renewal but it had no right to assign the leased out land to any third party. As a matter of fact, there was an express prohibition against assignment in clause 4 of the lease deed which is as under:

"4. That they the said Trustees their successors or assigns will not (subject never the less as hereinafter mentioned) assign the said premises or any part thereof without the licence in writing of the lessors their heirs executors administrators assigns first obtained."

[The only exception to the above prohibition was the right given to the lessee to part with and dedicate some portions, up to a specified limit, from the aggregate of the lands covered by the lease for public roads and ways with the consent of the lessors. But in that case the lessors agreed to give such consent upon the reasonable applications of the lessee from time to time and within the limit (prescribed under the lease).]

9. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed as many as 12 issues and later on, 3 additional issues. But of relevance for the present are issues 4, 5 and 7 which are as under:

The provisions aforesaid of this sub-section shall not affect in any manner the operation of sub-section (1) after the date aforesaid."

25. We find no force in this submission. Section 15(2), apart from others uses the expression `transfer of interest in any other manner'. It is sufficiently wide to include even an oral arrangement pursuant to which the sub-lessee might enter upon the land and continue in its possession. We have no manner of doubt that the initial induction of defendant no.2 on the suit land was covered by section 15(2) of the Act.

29. In light of the discussion made above, we find that the judgments and orders passed by the High Court and the two courts below are quite unsustainable. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments and orders passed 29 by the High Court and the court of Small Causes and dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent no.1.

30. The appeals are allowed but with no order as to costs.

...J ( AFTAB ALAM ) .......................................J ( R.M. LODHA ) New Delhi, April 8, 2011
Devinder Singh vs Municipal Council,Sanaur

3. The appellant was engaged by the respondent with effect from 1.8.1994 for doing the work of clerical nature. He was paid consolidated 2 salary of Rs.1,000/- per month. He continued in the service of the respondent till 29.09.1996. His service was discontinued with effect from 30.9.1996 without giving him notice and compensation as per the requirement of Section 25-F of the Act.

4. The appellant challenged the termination of his service by raising an industrial dispute, which was referred by the State Government to the Labour Court. In the statement of claim filed by him, the appellant pleaded that he had continuously worked in the employment of the respondent from 1.8.1994 to 29.9.1996; that his service was terminated without holding any enquiry and without giving him notice and compensation and that persons junior to him were retained in service. In the written statement filed on behalf of the respondent, it was pleaded that the appellant was engaged on contract basis and his service was terminated because the Director, Local Self Government did not give approval to the resolution passed for his employment. According to the respondent, the resolution passed for engaging the appellant was sent to the Deputy Director for approval, but the same was returned with the remark that the approval may be obtained from the Director, Local Self Government. Thereafter, the resolution was sent to the Director, Local Self Government but no response was received from the concerned 3 authority and, therefore, it became necessary to discontinue the service of the appellant.

26. The other reason given by the High Court is equally untenable.

28. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the award passed by the Labour Court for reinstatement of the appellant is restored. If the respondent shall reinstate the appellant within a period of four weeks from today, the appellant shall also be entitled to wages for the period between the date of award and the date of actual reinstatement. The respondent shall pay the arrears to the appellant within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of the copy of this order.
Nagarajappa vs Divnl.Manager,Oriental Ins.Co.Ld

3. The appellant filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation of Rs.5,00,000/-. The appellant was working as a coolie and claimed that he was earning a monthly income of Rs.4,500/- p.m.

5. On appeal, the High Court enhanced compensation for pain and suffering, medical expenses, future medical expenses, loss of amenities and loss of future income as against the amount awarded by the Tribunal. For loss of future income, the High Court concluded that from material on record, the age of the claimant was between 45 to 55 years. Thus, it took 50 years as the safe age and adopted a multiplier of 13, income was taken as Rs.3000/- p.m. and disability @ 20%. Accordingly, loss of future income was calculated at Rs.93,600/- (Rs.3000 X 12 X 13 X 20/100). Compensation was thus enhanced and awarded as follows:

15. xxx xxx xxx

While dealing with personal injury cases, the Tribunal should preferably equip itself with a Medical Dictionary and a Handbook for evaluation of permanent physical impairment..."

9. We are in complete agreement with the abovementioned judgment.

12. Thus, loss of future income will amount to Rs.3,18,240/- (Rs.3000 X 12 X 13 X 68/100). We also enhance the amount awarded for loss of amenities to Rs.40,000/-, as against Rs.30,000/- awarded by the High Court. We also enhance the amount awarded for future medical expenses to Rs.30,000/-, as against Rs.10,000/-
State Of Uttaranchal vs M/S. Golden Forest Co. (P) Ltd

3. One Sanjay Ghai had purchased bhumidhari land from various tenure holders in the name of Golden Forest India Limited and its sister concerns, namely, Indian Peace Foundation Trust, Mani Majra, 2 Chandigarh, Golden Forest India Limited, Golden Agro Forest Limited and Golden Forest Distributors Limited. Tehsildar, Dehradun, submitted report dated 12.08.1997 to Assistant Collector 1st Class-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate (for short "the Assistant Collector") with the finding that the purchases made in the name of the respondents were violative of the restriction contained in Section 154 (1) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short "the Act"). He suggested that action may be initiated against them under Sections 166/167 of the Act and land in excess of the ceiling may be declared to have vested in the State Government. The Assistant Collector issued notice to the respondents, gave them opportunity of hearing and passed order dated 21.08.1997 whereby he held that the disputed transactions were ultra vires the provisions contained in Section 154(1) of the Act and forwarded the matter to Collector, Dehradun for taking action under Section 167(2) of the Act.

6. The Learned Single Judge did not deal with the issue of jurisdiction and dismissed the writ petitions by observing that the conclusion recorded by the Board of Revenue, U.P. on the legality of the disputed transaction was correct.

11. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order as also the order passed by the Board of Revenue, U.P. are set aside and it is declared that the revisions filed by the respondents stood transferred to the Board of Revenue, State of Uttranchal. The Board of Revenue, U.P. is directed to transmit the record of the revision petitions to the Board of Revenue of the State of Uttrakhand which shall decide the revision petitions afresh. If there is no Board of Revenue in the State of Uttrakhand then the record shall be transferred to the corresponding adjudicating authority. The respondents shall furnish the list of allottees of plots along with their latest addresses to the Board of Revenue, Uttrakhand or any other competent adjudicating authority within a period of four weeks from today. Thereafter, the allottees be impleaded as parties to the pending revisions and appropriate order be passed in accordance with law after hearing all the parties.
Commissioner Of Trade Tax, U.P vs Varun Beverages Ltd

4. The respondent is engaged in manufacturing and sale of soft drink and beverages. The assessee - respondent applied for the grant of eligibility certificate under Section 4A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act read with notification No. 640 dated 21.02.1997. Pursuant to the aforesaid request, the respondent/assessee was granted an eligibility certificate on 26.5.2000 by the Divisional Level Committee constituted under section 4A of the Act. The exemptions were granted to the assessee for a period of ten years running from 15.4.1999 to 14.4.2009 or to the extent of 200% of the fixed capital 2 investment of Rs.53,79,49,612/-, whichever was earlier. The exemption certificate granted on 26.5.2000 stipulates that it was granted for the goods, which were manufactured by the assessee as mentioned in the eligibility certificate. Towards the end of the eligibility certificate the goods manufactures by the respondent are described, which are as under: -

24. Having held thus, we allow this appeal partly to the aforesaid extent. We uphold the order passed by the High Court so far bottles are concerned but set aside the same so far crates are concerned. In terms of the aforesaid order and observations, this appeal stands disposed of but there will be no order as to costs.
Bhanwari Devi @ Bhonri Devi & Anr vs Secr.,Deptt.Of Home Affairs,Govt.& ...

2. We had issued notice on the limited point as to whether the cost of Rs.30,000/- imposed on the appellants by the High Court was justified upon dismissal of the appellants' Habeas Corpus Petition.

-2- C.A.3222/11

4. Accordingly, we allow the appeal to the extent that cost of Rs.30,000/- imposed by the High Court, is hereby set aside.

5. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.

April 11, 2011.