L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
V.K. Surendra vs V.K. Thimmaiah & Ors

2. The facts of the case are as follows:

Defendant Nos.1, 2 and 4 filed a joint written statement claiming 1/5th share in the suit schedule properties, as according to them the suit schedule properties are the ancestral joint family properties. The appellant-defendant No.3 filed a separate written statement claiming the right over total 32 acres 55 cents of lands. According to defendant No.3, the suit schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of their father, late Shri Kunnaiah who bequeathed the same in his favour under a Will dated 14th June, 1991. As per the Will he is entitled for a total extent of 32 acres 55 cents of lands in respect of which the plaintiff and other defendants have no right whatsoever. The rest of the defendants did not choose to file written statement.

7. According to the appellant-defendant No.3, when late Shri Kunnaiah was a minor, his mother purchased certain properties including suit schedule properties by a sale deed dated 7th May, 1918-Ex.D-1, in the joint name of herself (Ningamma mother) and son, Kunnaiah. Later on Kunnaiah sold certain landed properties on 16th July, 1942, properties situated at Kaikere village on 19th March, 1953 and some other properties on 4th November, 1963. These sale deeds were not challenged by the plaintiff or the defendants. Since, the children of Kunnaiah were major, their names were got entered in the Revenue records by him in the year 1975 with a view to give those properties to the children. To sell some of the properties, Kunnaiah got consent of his children as their names were appearing in the Revenue records which were sold on 23rd July, 1976.

17. In the light of discussions as made above, we hold that those suit schedule properties are joint family properties of Kunnaiah along with 4 sons and the co-parceners have equal shares in the properties. Accordingly, 4 sons and Kunnaiah are entitled to 1/5th share of the total properties.

So far as 1/5th share of Kunnaiah is concerned, apart from 4 sons, i.e., defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, the daughters of Kunnaiah are entitled to 1/50th share each whereas the sons, i.e., defendant Nos.1, 2, 3 and 4 are entitled to 11/50th share each, inclusive of their respective shares. Defendant No.9 who is the son of the first daughter having succeeded the estate of his mother, a co-parcener is also entitled to 1/50th share. In this background no interference with the impugned judgment is called for. In absence of any merit the appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs.
Ram Pal @ Bunda vs State Of Haryana

1. The sole appellant is the accused who was convicted for the offences under Sections 302 and 376, Indian Penal Code (IPC). He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and 10 years rigorous imprisonment for committing rape and murder of one Devi (real name disguised). According to the prosecution, a telephonic intimation was received in the police station regarding the dead body of Devi resident of Mangalore within the jurisdiction of Shahzadpur police station, Ambala, lying in the fields of one Prithi Pal. On reaching the spot PW-14, SHO recorded the statement of PW-10 Sumitra Devi the mother of the deceased. It was learnt through her that she had two daughters, that the elder one was married while the younger one who went to the fields on 18.2.2005 at 6.30 p.m. to ease herself did not return and their intensive search was in vain. In her statement she mentioned the name of the appellant who was stated to have been found at the place of search and on being asked, he pleaded ignorance about the victim. It was her further statement that only on the next day morning in day light they were able to trace the body of the victim whose neck was wrapped with a blue shawl owned by her. The complainant PW-10 raised suspicion about the involvement of the appellant in the commission of the offence in view of his past misbehavior towards her elder daughter on which occasion he was reprimanded before the local Panchayat and was forced to tender an apology. As it was a case of circumstantial evidence, the trial Court after scrutinizing the evidence of prosecution witnesses and after taking into account the stand of the appellant in his 313 Cr.P.C. statement noted the circumstances in paragraph 17 of the judgment.

4. As far as the presence of the appellant at the scene of occurrence was concerned PW-10 in her evidence categorically explained as to how while searching for her daughter she found the appellant in the fields and that on being questioned about the whereabouts of her daughter the appellant without responding to her query ran away from the place of occurrence. Though at the instance of the appellant it was suggested that there were certain variations as compared to her statement to the police as regards the presence of the appellant, the trial Court found that such variation did not materially affect the evidence of PW-10 as regards the presence of the appellant in the place of occurrence at the relevant point of time and his running away from the scene of occurrence without responding to the queries of the complainant PW-10.

9. Having regard to our above conclusion, we are convinced that the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant by the trial Court which was also confirmed by the High Court was perfectly justified and we do not find any good grounds to interfere with the same. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

April 11, 2013
Arvind Kumar Sharma vs Vineeta Sharma & Anr

The original prayer made by the respondent No.1 before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Dehradun was that the proceedings in Original Suit No. 74 of 2009 and Original Suit No.263 of 2009 should be consolidated and tried together. This prayer was rejected by the Family Court by its judgment and order dated 27th January, 2012. Consequently, respondent No.1 filed appeal before the High Court. The High Court noticed the fact that the appellant - husband has filed two suits. In one suit, he is seeking divorce from the wife. In the other suit, he is seeking permanent injunction as well as temporary injunction, restraining the wife from entering the matrimonial home of the couple. It is also noticed by the High Court that in the second suit, ex parte ad interim ...2/-

order of injunction had been granted in favour of the husband. The aforesaid suit is still pending. Instead of deciding the issue on merits, the High Court admitted the appeal and stayed the operation of the ex parte ad interim order of injunction as well as hearing of both the suits until the appeal is heard and decided.

We are of the considered opinion that it would not be appropriate for the High Court or for this Court to make any observations on the merits of the controversy involved between the parties as the same shall have to be decided by the appropriate Court where the proceedings are pending. We, therefore, set aside the order passed by the High Court. We allow the appeal filed by the respondent before the High Court. Both the suits filed by the husband are consolidated and shall be tried together as prayed for by the respondent wife. We also direct the Court which is designated to decide the aforesaid two matters to decide the same as expeditiously as possible.

The appeals are disposed of in the above terms. No costs.

(PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE) NEW DELHI APRIL 15, 2013
Niranjan Lal Chhipa vs Ajay Kumar Joshi & Ors

4. The main grievance of the appellant is that before the impugned order was passed by the High Court quashing the order passed by the Sessions Judge in his favour, no hearing was granted to the appellant, though he was impleaded as respondent in the Criminal Revision Petition before the High Court.

5. Considering the fact that the appellant was not given a hearing by the High Court before it passed the impugned order, we set aside the impugned order dated 26.07.2012 of the High Court passed in S.B.Criminal Revision Petition No.737 of 2012 and remand : 2 : the matter back to the High Court for its fresh hearing and disposal.

Criminal Appeal is allowed accordingly.

APRIL 15, 2013
R.K.Jain vs Union Of India & Anr

3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:

5. Thereafter, the appellant preferred a second appeal before the Central Information Commission under Section 19 (3) of the RTI Act which was also rejected on 22nd April, 2010 with the following observations:-

7. In view of the above, the appeal is disallowed.”

8. In view of the above, I am not in a position to authorize disclosure of the information.”

27. The impugned order dated 12th June 2008 of the CIC and the consequential order dated 19th November 2008 of the CIC are hereby set aside. The appeals by Mr. Kejriwal will be restored to the file of the CIC for compliance with the procedure outlined under Section 11(1) RTI Act limited to the information Mr. Kejriwal now seeks.”

17. In view of the discussion made above and the decision in this Court in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande(supra), as the appellant sought for inspection of documents relating to the ACR of the Member, CESTAT, inter alia, relating to adverse entries in the ACR and the ‘follow up action’ taken therein on the question of integrity, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench whereby the order passed by the learned Single Judge was affirmed. In absence of any merit, the appeal is dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs.
Safi Mohd vs State Of Rajasthan

2. For the purpose of considering the rival legal contentions urged in this appeal and with a view to find out whether this Court is required to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court, the necessary facts are briefly stated hereunder:

3. On 26.07.1994, charges were framed against the 5 accused persons but all of them pleaded not guilty. The appellant was charged under Section 3 read with Section 9 and 5 of the Act. The learned Sessions Judge after trial convicted the appellant u/s 3 (1) (c) of the Act by order dated 09.03.2004.

18. PW-24 Yad Ram Tiwari, who was posted as SHO, Special Police Station, Rajasthan, Jaipur, has spoken about the receipt of the report from SP CID Zone Jodhpur through Constable Navneet Kumar and on the basis of which he has recorded FIR No.1/90 under Sections 3,5 and 9 of the Act and Section 120-B of IPC. Along with the report, Ex.P-1 some other secret documents were recovered vide recovery memo. He has stated in his evidence that he took the search of the house of Safi Mohd. at Jetha Chanana Railway Quarter where one blue coloured diary was recovered from the almirah of the appellant marked as article 3. One traced map was also recovered from the diary in which Pokhran, Jaisalmer, Devra Village, roads and railway track details were given. The map is marked as Ex. D-3. He has identified the appellant Safi Mohd. The search recovery memo is marked as Ex.P-28. He has also spoken about the addresses of Pakistani officials mentioned in the diary at pages 11, 13, and 21. The said witness has also spoken about the search of the house of the appellant, which was made in the presence of Khurshid and Sher Singh and the articles were seized such as (a) passport of Safi Mohd. as article 4, (b) Passport of Nazima Bano as article 5, (c) marriage card of Safi Mohd. as article 6, (d) passbook of Safi Mohd. as article 7, and (e) Card Shadi Mubarak article 8, vide search memo marked as Ex. P-28.

29. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that this is not a fit case for our interference with the impugned judgment having regard to the nature of charges made against the appellant under Sections 3, 9 and 5 of the Act as he is found to be guilty along with other accused persons and rightly convicted and sentenced them for seven years rigorous imprisonment. The appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.
Ram Bharosey Lal Gupta(D) By Lr. & Ors vs M/S Hindustan Petroleum Corp.Ld.& Anr

5. The first respondent Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. is the successor of original lessee. On 15.04.1983, the appellant (since deceased) redeemed the said mortgaged property and the same was accordingly informed to the first respondent.

6. On 13.06.1983, the appellant issued a notice under Section 106 and 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as the T.P. Act) to respondent No.1 determining the tenancy of suit schedule property and directed the first respondent to vacate the same upon the expiry of the period of the notice and to hand over vacant possession of the same to him. The first respondent never sent any reply to the said notice.

8. During the pendency of the suit, on 27.06.1984 the first respondent sent a notice to the appellant to execute the renewal of lease deed and in the said notice it had made reference about their notice dated 1.04.1980, wherein it is stated that it has sent a notice to the appellant for renewal of lease deed and undisputedly the notice was not sent to the mortgagee as the leased property was mortgaged in his favour and the rent was being paid to him and he was receiving rent upto April, 1983 in respect of the suit schedule property.

25. In view of the undisputed facts referred to supra and the clause 3 (d) of the lease deed regarding the renewal of lease for a period of 20 years after expiry of the initial period of renewal it has come to an end on 1.7.2000. Therefore, the first appellate court was right in holding that the possession of the demised property by the first respondent Corporation is holding over month to month and therefore it is a trespasser of the said schedule property and therefore invoking Section 106 of the T.P. Act by the appellant and determining the tenancy by him and filing the suit for arrears of rent and also decree of ejectment of the first respondent from the demised premises is legally justified. Further, with reference to Section 7 of the Caltex Act the action of the first respondent is unfair as there is no fairness, reasonableness and non- arbitrariness on its part to avail the right under the above provision for continuing as a tenant in respect of the demised property. Hence, we are required to set aside the impugned judgment of the second appellate court and restore the judgment and decree of the first appellate court. The first respondent Corporation is not even willing to give fair and reasonable rent as it has offered only Rs.5000/- per month whereas the rental market value of the property according to the appellants counsel is more than Rs.30,000/- per month.

26. Therefore, we are of the view that the aforesaid decision of this Court on all fours be applicable to the fact situation in favour of the appellants. Accordingly, for the reasons stated supra we set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 04.07.2007 of the second appellate court passed in Second Appeal No.1812 of 1988 and restore the judgment and decree dated 10.08.1988 of the first Additional District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 45 of 1987. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
U.P.Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Ors vs Om Prakash Sharma

7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the trial court, the first defendant filed First Appeal No.107 of 1978 before the High Court urging various legal contentions. The High Court by its order dated 20th May, 1987 after examining rival factual and legal contentions set aside the judgment and order of the trial court and remanded the matter to the trial court for its reconsideration. After the remand order passed by the High Court, the first defendant filed its additional written statement before the trial court. The trial court considered the entire pleadings, evidence on record and examined three more witnesses. Again it passed the decree in favour of the plaintiff by order dated 24.9.1993. Against the said judgment, the defendant filed first Appeal No.67 of 98 before the District Judge. The learned District Judge allowed the appeal with costs by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree of the trial court by its order dated 2.2.2000.

10. The defendants aggrieved by the said judgment filed a review application challenging the findings and reasons recorded in the impugned judgment contending that there was an error apparent on the face of the record and therefore prayed for review of the said judgment and order, which was dismissed by the High Court after hearing the parties vide its order dated 18.4.2011. Therefore, the defendants have filed these appeals urging the following legal questions and grounds:-

38. We are of the view that the findings recorded by the trial court and the second appellate court are totally erroneous both on facts and in law and therefore required to be interfered with by this Court and hence the appeals must succeed. The impugned judgment, decree and orders of the High Court are hereby set aside and the original suit No.143 of 1977 filed by the plaintiff is also dismissed. The appeals are allowed, with no order as to costs.

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Jehal Tanti & Ors vs Nageshwar Singh(D) Thr. Lrs

3. Smt. Pariya Devi contested the suit on several grounds including the one that the sale deed was illegal and was not binding on her because the same had been executed in violation of the order of temporary injunction passed on 06.05.1971 in Suit No. 49 of 1970.

5. After considering the pleadings and evidence of the parties, the trial Court dismissed the suit by holding that in view of the order of injunction passed in Suit No.49 of 1970, Bhuneshwar Tanti was not entitled to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. The trial Court held that the plaintiffs were very much aware of the order of injunction passed in Title Suit No.49 of 1970 and said order dated 6.5.1971 passed by the learned Munsif was binding on the parties and their successors.

6. The lower appellate Court adverted to the pleadings of the parties and the order of injunction passed by the learned Munsif in Title Suit No.49 of 1970 and held that once the suit was returned for being presented in the Court of competent jurisdiction, the order of injunction did not survive and the sale deed executed on 9.11.1973 cannot be castigated on the ground of violation of the injunction order. The lower appellate Court further held that the preliminary and final decrees passed in Title Suit No.13 of 1977 were fraudulent and not binding on the plaintiffs. Another finding recorded by the lower appellate Court was that sale deed dated 9.11.1973 was not hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. In view of these findings, the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal of the respondents and decreed the suit filed by them.

12. In view of the aforesaid judgments, it must be held that one of the questions of law raised in the second appeal filed by the appellants was a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100(1) CPC and the learned Single Judge committed serious error by summarily dismissing the second appeal.

14. As a sequel to the above conclusion, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the second appeal is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal. The High Court shall frame appropriate substantial question of law in the light of the observations made in this order and decide the appeal after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties with reference to the substantial question of law. If, during the course of hearing, the High Court finds that any other substantial question of law arises for its consideration then it shall be free to frame that question and decide the same after hearing the parties.

April 18, 2013.
Rattiram & Ors vs State Of M.P.Tr.Insp.Of Police

2. The factual score, as depicted, is that on 29.9.1995, deceased Dhruv @ Daulat along with Ashok Kumar, PW-5, Dheeraj, PW-6, Naresh, PW-7, and Leeladhar, PW-12, was returning home about 11.00 p.m. after attending a wrestling event which was organised at “Kher Mata” (temple) in Makronia, a village in the district of Sagar. As Ashok Kumar, PW-5, complained of pain in the stomach, all of them went to the shop of Gorelal for purchasing medicine and when they reached the shop, all the accused persons coming from the house of Chhotelal surrounded deceased Daulat and started assaulting him and despite the beseeching and imploring by the companions the accused persons continued the assault, as a result of which the deceased fell unconscious. As the prosecution story proceeds, he was taken to the hospital and, eventually, succumbed to his injuries. On an FIR being lodged, the criminal law was set in motion and after investigation the appellants were charge-sheeted under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short “the Act”), but, eventually, charges were framed under Sections 147, 148 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC. The accused persons pleaded innocence and false implication and claimed to be tried.

3. The prosecution, in order to establish its case, examined 13 witnesses and exhibited number of documents. The defence chose not to adduce any evidence.

4. The learned trial Judge, appreciating the evidence on record, came to hold that the prosecution had brought home the charges against accused, Mohan, under Sections 148 and 302 IPC and against the remaining accused persons under Sections 147 and 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC and apart from imposing separate sentences under Section 147 IPC sentenced each of them to suffer imprisonment for life as stated hereinbefore.

22. In the result, we allow the appeals in part and affirm the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded against the appellants, namely, Dhaniram, Mohan, Badri and Govardhan. Accused Mohan has been released after completing fourteen years of imprisonment on getting the benefit of remission under Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As far as Dhaniram is concerned, he is in custody. The accused-appellants, namely, Badri and Govardhan are on bail. Their bail bonds are cancelled and they be taken into custody forthwith. The accused-appellants, namely, Satyanarayan, Ramesh, Kanchedi and Rattiram are acquitted and as they are on bail, they be discharged from their bail bonds.

April 18, 2013.