L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Epuru Sudhakar & Anr vs Govt. Of A.P. & Ors

The writ petition has been filed inter alia alleging that the grant of remission (described in the writ petition as grant of pardon) was illegal, relevant materials were not placed before the Governor, and without application of mind impugned order was passed. The recommendations made for grant of remission were based on irrelevant and extraneous materials. The factual scenario has not been placed before the Governor in the proper perspective. The sole basis on which respondent No.3 asked for pardon was alleged implication in false cases due to political rivalry. In view of this Court's judgment holding the respondent No.2 guilty, the said plea could not have been even considered as a basis for grant of pardon. Since the grant of pardon is based on consideration of irrelevant materials and non-consideration of relevant materials the same is liable to be set aside.

When the principles of law as noted above are considered in the factual background it is clear that the irrelevant and extraneous materials entered into the decision making process, thereby vitiating it.

The order granting remission which is impugned in the petition is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. However, it is open to the respondent No.1 to treat the petition as a pending one for the purpose of re-consideration. It shall be open to the Governor to take note of materials placed before him by the functionaries of the State, and also to make such enquiries as considered necessary and relevant for the purpose of ascertaining the relevant factors otherwise. The writ petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.
Lallan Chaudhary & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Anr

Complaint Case No. 223C/1996 was filed before the Sub- Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sikrahana at Motihari, District East Champaran by Yogendra Prasad - the respondent herein, to the effect that on 7.6.1996 at about 6.00 PM the accused Lalan Chaudhary, Din Bandhu Chaudhary, Sanjeev Kumar @ Ghutan, Lalbabu Prasad, Bhola Shah, Nageshwar Shah, Bhagrit Raut, Joka Majhi and Suruj Raut having formed unlawful assembly and armed with Lathi, Fatta, Farsa, Nalkatwa and Rifle, illegally entered in the residential house of the complainant and indulged in 'Loot-Paat' of household articles and also teased female members of the family. When the complainant objected to the accused, the accused persons gave severe beating with slaps, fists and fatta and caused bodily injuries to the appellant. The complaint further disclosed that the accused looted away the household articles comprising utensils, gold articles, silver articles, wearing apparels etc. including cash. The total value of the loot was Rs. 19,000/-, as detailed in the complaint. In the said complaint case itself, filed before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 452, 323 and 395 were disclosed.

It appears that the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, before whom the complaint was lodged, had endorsed the complaint to the SHO, Police Station Ghorasahan, District East Champaran to register an FIR and to investigate. The SHO of the concerned Police Station, however, registered the case under Sections 452/380/323/34 IPC against the accused. Ultimately, the charge-sheet was submitted by the Police only under Sections 452/323/34 IPC. It would, therefore, clearly appear that no case was registered against the accused for offences disclosed in the complaint under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448 and 395 IPC and no investigation was carried out by the Police in respect of the aforesaid sections of law and committed grave miscarriage of justice. Section 154 Cr.P.C. reads:

In the view that we have taken, we do not see any infirmities in the impugned order of the High Court which would warrant our interference. The appeal is devoid of merits and is, accordingly, dismissed.
Indian Council Of Agricultural ... vs Santosh

The controversy lies within a very narrow compass.

Respondent filed O.A.No.291 of 2003 before the CAT making a grievance that family pension and other terminal benefits were being denied to her by the present appellant on the ground that her deceased husband was not holding permanent status in service. CAT held that though her deceased husband Durga Lal was not holding a permanent status in service, yet respondent was entitled to the family pension and other benefits by treating him to have been regularized on the date of his death.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that since the respondent has been given compassionate appointment, there was no merit in the writ petition.

Merely because compassionate appointment has been granted to the legal heir of late Durga Lal that does not in any way improve the situation so far as the respondent is concerned. That is an appointment given to a legal heir even if it is accepted to be a regular, subsequent to the death of Durga Lal and such appointment cannot alter the status of late Durga Lal in service. The impugned judgment of the High Court confirming that of the CAT cannot be sustained. Both the CAT's order and judgment of the High Court stand set aside. The appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.
B. Venkatamuni vs C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh & Ors

One Smt. B. Akkayamma, although not a highly educated lady, was carrying on the profession of money lending. She acquired considerable property. The immovable properties held and possessed by her were situate in the District of Chittoor in the State of Andhra Pradesh and at Arkonam in the State of Tamil Nadu. She was unmarried. She had, however, been living with one Shri C.D. Jai Singh. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are children of the said Jai Singh through his legally wedded wife Smt. Shyam Bai. She was original plaintiff No.4 in the suit. She, during the pendency of the suit, however, expired.

Jai Singh shifted to Arkonam from Tirupati. Akkayamma followed him. They started living together. She had, however, been visiting Chittoor and Tirupati occasionally. Plaintiffs-Respondents originally developed a disliking for Akkayamma. A suit was also filed against her, but it appears from the records that they had later reconciled and she was accepted as a member of the family. A purported Will was executed by Akkayamma on 23rd March, 1968 bequeathing her properties situate in the District of Chittoor in favour of respondent No.1 herein only. The said Will was an unregistered one. It may be, however, noticed that Jai Singh expired on 17th July, 1968. During his illness, although Akkayamma was possessed of sufficient properties both movable and immovable, but she did not spend any amount towards his treatment. Admittedly, she was of miserly nature. Surprisingly, however, she executed two deeds on 26. 9.1968 transferring her properties situate at Arkonam in favour of respondents. She expired on 29th September, 1968. Although in the Will Respondent No.1 alone was the beneficiary thereof, not only Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, but, as noticed herein before, their mother also filed an application for grant of probate in the Court of District Judge, Chittoor. Respondent No.4 herein, who is said to be the tenant in one of the premises in question, was impleaded as a party therein. Appellant herein was not initially impleaded as a party, although, he was the heir and legal representative of Akkayamma. He was impleaded at a later stage. The application for grant of probate was also amended by making an alternative prayer for grant of Letters of Administration. A caveat in the meantime had also been lodged by Appellant.

7. The signature of Akkayamma on Ex.A.1 as Akkayamma Chevralu for the first time as against her usual signature on many documents including the settlement deeds Ex. B.24 and B.25 coming out just three days prior to her death with signature as Akkayamma speaks of something unnatural in the conduct of her.

Each case, however, must be determined in the fact situation obtaining therein.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel fee assessed at Rs.10,000/-.
Appasaheb Peerappa Chandgade vs Devendra Peerappa Chandgade And Ors.

2. The case of the plaintiff- Appasaheb was that all the properties mentioned above were the joint family properties and therefore, he sought partition of the said properties. The following properties formed part of Schedule B which read as under.

3. 52/2 0-30 6-00 7,500-00

4. 73/3 8-30 Out of this 11-30 20,000-00 2-07 45-23 _________________________________________________________________ (II) The joint Hindu family house properties situated at Sadalaga Taluka Chikodi.

7. 1935 = 1669(House) Rs. 5,000-00 _____________________________________________________________________ (III) Properties situated at Belgaum

4. M.H. No. CTS No. 1551 Open Space Hindwadi, Belgaum Rs. 30,000-00 (IV) The suit undivided Hindu family business at Belgaum

2. Kiran Shop in the name and style C.S. Hukeri Rs. 1000-00 (VI) The suit undivided Hindu family movables:

The suit was contested by the defendants and they claimed that the properties mentioned in the suit Schedule are self-acquired properties and therefore, there was no question of partition. The trial court however, decreed the suit of the plaintiff as mentioned above. Aggrieved against that order the defendants filed an appeal and in the said appeal the High Court reversed the finding of the trial court and dismissed the suit.

10. As a result of our above discussion, we are of opinion since the defendants- respondents herein have failed to prove that the properties mentioned in the aforesaid transactions were acquired by them as self-acquired property, the judgment under appeal cannot be sustained. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and affirm the order of the trial court. There would be no order as to costs.
State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Mukesh & Ors

Before embarking upon the rival contentions of the parties, we may briefly notice the admitted facts. At the relevant time, 11 reservation counters were functioning at the Indore Railway Station. Reservation offices at the said place function from 0800 hours to 1400 hours and then from 1410 hours to 2000 hours. An employee works only for six hours in one reservation counter. Two of the reservation clerks were absent. The offence is said to have taken place on 2nd October, 1995, i.e., just before the ensuing Durga Puja festival. There were long queues. Ordinarily, minimum 2-3 minutes' time was required for issuance of one ticket.

Moreover, it must be borne in mind that we are dealing with a judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court. If two views are possible, ordinarily this Court would not interfere therewith. The State has not been able to show any illegality in the judgment of the High Court. We, therefore, do not intend to interfere therewith. The appeal is dismissed.
Hardev Motor Transport vs State Of M.P. & Ors

J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 22580 of 2005] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4558 OF 2006 [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 24087 of 2005] S.B. SINHA, J :

Appellants herein are holders of contract carriage permits. On allegations that they have been using their vehicles as stage carriage permits, the vehicles were detained. They were asked to pay duty as if the vehicles were being plied without any permit.

We may, however, hasten to add that even if a vehicle is roadworthy and can be plied on a road, a tax may be imposed, but if a vehicle is not capable of being plied on the road, no tax would be leviable.

For the reasons aforementioned, Clause (g) of Entry IV of the First Schedule of the Madhya Pradesh Motoryan Karadhan Adhiniyam, 1991 (for short "the 1991 Act") as amended by Madhya Pradesh Motoryan Sanshodhan Adhiniyam, 2004 read with Explanation (7) of the First Schedule is declared unconstitutional. The appeals are allowed. No costs.
Suresh Pathrella vs Oriental Bank Of Commerce

The appellant was appointed by the respondent- bank as Officer Grade Scale-I. Thereafter, he was promoted to Officer Grade Scale-II, Scale-III and Scale-IV. At the relevant time, he was working as Chief Manager at Gurgaon branch of the respondent-bank.

By an order dated 23.12.1995, the appellant was placed under suspension in contemplation of the drawing up of the disciplinary proceedings. By the memorandum dated 20th August, 1998 he was served with the charge memo on the ground that he has violated Regulation 3(1) of Oriental Bank of Commerce Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1982 ( in short the Regulations, 1982).

The Division Bench further said that Shri G.C.Luthra appeared as a witness before the Enquiry Officer. The appellant was given an opportunity to cross-examine Shri G.C.Luthra. In his complaint dated 10.1.1996 he denied his signature on the letter dated 27.1.1994. The Division Bench was of the view that all these disputed questions of fact have been considered by the disciplinary authority and the reviewing authority and it is not open to the Court in writ jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact. The Division Bench was of the view that the subsequent statements made by Shri G.C. Luthra in criminal cases would have no bearing on the concluded inquiry against the appellant. It was also brought to the notice of the Division Bench that there are three other criminal cases pending against the appellant being RC1(E)/97 SIU (X), RC 2(E)/96- SIU(X) and RC6(E)/96 SIU(X) where the amount of loss involved to the bank is stated to be Rs.1.64 crores, Rs.1.77 crores and Rs.2.55 crores, respectively.

In the result, these appeals being devoid of merits are, accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Union Of India & Ors vs B. Valluvan & Ors

The Department of Personnel and Training, Andaman & Nicobar Administration (Administration) issued a circular letter, stating :

Three vacancies for the post of Pharmacist were notified in the year 1999. Applications were invited from the eligible candidates. In the advertisement issued therefor, it was categorically stated :

The 1st Respondent together with others, pursuant to or in furtherance of the said advertisement filed application. Interviews therefor were held in 1999. A select list of three candidates was prepared on the basis of the recommendations made by the Selection Committee on 27.5.1999. The said three persons accepted the offer and joined services. The Selection Committee, however, made a list of 19 candidates for future appointments occurring if any, in the said year. The said select list, according to Appellant, was prepared in violation of the purported statutory instructions dated 26.6.1992. All the three vacancies in the post of Pharmacist having been filled up, the said panel was directed to be cancelled by an order dated 7.12.1999. Several candidates purported to be aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, filed an Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, inter alia, contending that as the panel was drawn for future vacancies, they were entitled to be appointed against the vacancies occurring thereafter. It was furthermore contended that as several new posts were likely to be created and/or likely to fall vacant in the near future, they should be directed to be appointed in such vacancies. During pendency of the said application, another advertisement was issued on 17.5.2000 for filling up of one vacancy, which occurred in the year 2000. Interview was also held on 26.6.2000 and the said vacancy had also been filled up. The said fact was brought on record by Appellants herein. By an order dated 13.9.2002, the Tribunal rejected the said Original Application, inter alia, opining :

Coming now to the plea of learned counsel that Respondent No.1 has been appointed in August, 2005, in our opinion, is not of much significance. If he has been appointed pursuant to the order of the High Court, the same invariably would be subject to the result of this appeal. Respondent No.1 did not have any legal right to be appointed even out of the said panel. His position was at Serial No.4 and not even at Serial No.1. Therefore, there were three persons in the panel above him. The High Court, therefore, committed a manifest error in issuing the impugned directions. Sympathy alone, in our opinion, cannot be a ground to allow the High Court judgment to be sustained, although, it is ex facie illegal. {See Maruti Udyog Ltd. vs. Ram Lal & Ors. [(2005) 2 SCC 638].} For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
Baldev Singh vs Shinder Pal Singh & Anr

An election for the post of Sarpanch and Panches of the Gram Panchayat, Village Ransih Khurd, District Moga was held on 29.6.2003. Total votes polled in both the elections were shown to be 836. The Returning Officer found that both Appellant and Respondent No.1 had polled 412 votes each. Respondent No.2 herein is said to have got 4 votes. 8 votes were rejected. Allegedly, a recounting was done. The result of recounting was same as that of the first one. Returning Officer recorded the said statement in the statutory Form No.IX prescribed in terms of Rule 33(2)(e) of the Punjab Panchayati Election Rules, 1994. The total number of votes polled was found to be 836 even in the election of the Panches. Indisputably, election was held under the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The State of Punjab in exercise of its power conferred upon it under the said Act, framed rules known as Punjab Panchayat Election Rules, 1994 (for short, 'the Rules'). The relevant provisions of 'the Rules' are as under :

The Returning Officer drew lots with written consent of both the candidates, i.e., Appellant and Respondent No.1. Appellant was declared elected as Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. However, immediately prior thereto, the supporters of 1st Respondent allegedly raised a hue and cry, as a result whereof, the Returning Officer could not enforce his decision. He immediately sent a fax message to the Deputy Commissioner, Moga seeking his advice in the matter stating :

An averment moreover was made that he had requested for recounting of votes, but the Returning Officer/Polling Officer did not pay any heed thereto and, thus, mandatory requirement of Rule 35 had not been complied with.

Before the learned Election Tribunal, the Returning Officer, the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, the Presiding Officer, as also the Assistant Returning Officer were examined as R.W.2, R.W.3, R.W.4 and R.W.5.

R.W.5, Ranjit Singh, was the Assistant Returning Officer. He also stated that both the candidates had polled equal number of votes and thereafter two slips were prepared for drawing lots. The same were mixed up at the consent of both the candidates. As per instructions of R.W.2, he took out the slips and when it was opened, the name of Appellant was found who was then declared elected. The learned Tribunal ignoring the aforementioned oral evidence of the responsible officers, directed recounting opining :

The necessity of "maintaining the secrecy of ballot papers" should be kept in view before a re-counting is directed to be made. A direction for re-counting shall not be issued only because the margin of votes between the returned candidate and the election petitioner is narrow."

We, therefore, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, are unable to uphold the findings of the Tribunal and the High Court. We set them aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The First Respondent shall bear costs of the Appellant, which is quantified at Rs.10,000/-.
M/S. Bay Berry Apartments Pvt. Ltd. & Anr vs Shobha & Ors

V. Papaiah Naidu owned a large number of movable and immovable properties. He had 5 sons, viz, V. Perumala Swamy Naidu, V. Sudarshanam Naidu, V. Balakrishna Naidu, V. Deena Dayalu Naidu, V. Ramakrishna Naidu and 4 daughters, viz., Rukminiyamma, Pushpamma, Hamsaveniyamma and Bhagyalakshmiyamma. He executed a Will on 14.7.1932. The said Will was a registered one. A portion of the properties was bequeathed in favour of defendant No. 1. He was then a minor. The properties bequeathed in his favour were described in Schedule E of the Will. In terms of the said Will, the sons of the testator got life interest. Only, after his death his heirs, legal representatives could inherit the same. On 3.12.1975 the original defendant No.1 and his son executed a deed of sale in favour of defendant No. 2, M. Krishna Reddy. On or about 30th January, 1982, defendant No. 2 disposed of the said property in favour of defendant No. 3. Plaintiffs-Respondents who are the daughters of original defendant No. 1 filed a suit on 30.7.1982 before the City Civil Judge, Bangalore on 30th July, 1982 inter alia praying for the following reliefs.

The plaintiffs, however, did not implead their brother as a party.

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment preferred an appeal before the High Court of Karantaka. The said appeal has been allowed by reason of the impugned judgment.

He not only gave his daughters sufficient ornaments at the time of their marriage as also some immovable properties, he bequeathed some property in favour of his daughters in law as well. The executors were enjoined with a duty to get the other daughters married. The daughters became entitled to enjoy rent obtained from the houses purchased throughout their life, subject, of course to the condition that the same shall not be alienated. The properties given to the legatees including married daughters, married daughters-in-law, the same were to be inherited by their children with full title on their death. He also saw to it that his friend who had five daughters is provided with some amount for each daughter.

An appeal is in continuation of the suit. The appellate court in view of Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure may take into consideration subsequent events with a view to mould the relief. The High Court, therefore, could not be said to have acted illegally and wholly without jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgment.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the constitution of India. This appeal is dismissed with the aforementioned directions. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors vs Sajal Kumar Roy & Ors

Appellant before us is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. It runs a chain of schools known as Kendriya Vidyalayas all over the country. An advertisement was issued in respect of eight vacancies which arose in the cadre of Lower Division Clerk (LDC) in the Silchar region. Respondent applied for recruitment to the said post pursuant to or in furtherance of the said advertisement. Written and typing tests were held. As per Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (Appointment, Promotion, Seniority) Rules, 1971 (for short, 'the Rules), the age limit prescribed therefor was 18-25 years as on 30.6.1994, which was, however, relaxable. Respondents are said to be near relatives of the employees of the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Regional Office, Silchar. The candidates who were over-aged were also permitted to appear at the examination in contravention of the Rules. Certain irregularities were also committed in the matter of conducting typing test. Higher authorities of the school were moved for cancellation of the recruitment of the LDCs.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.