L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
W.N. Allal Sundaram vs Commissioner H.R.

3 The case of the appellant is that the trust in respect of Sri Swamiya Dhamodara Perumal Temple is not a public trust. The Deputy Commissioner, HR and CE Administration Department issued a notice stating that the Bagyammal Trust is a public trust. The appellant claimed that the plaint schedule property had been settled in favour of Bagyammal3 by her predecessors under a Deed of Settlement in pursuance of which she was in possession and enjoyment of the property between 1928 and 1959. Bagyammal is alleged to have executed a Deed of Settlement in favour of Raju Chettiar. On his death in 1954, it was alleged that his wife Jagathambal succeeded to the property as his sole heir. Jagathambal is alleged to 1 “HR and CE” 2 “Act of 1959” 3 The High Court uses the word „Pakkiyammal‟. However, the Deed of Settlement dated 4 June 1926 marked as Exhibit-A1 uses the expression „Bagyammal‟. For the sake of convenience, this Court in the present judgment is using the term „Bagyammal‟.

4 The case of the appellant is that the trust which was created by Bagyammal is a private family trust which would not attract the provisions of the Act of 1959. A proceeding4 was instituted under Section 63(a) before the Deputy Commissioner, HR and CE Administration Department seeking a declaration to that effect. On 3 October 1986, the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the proceeding. On 21 March 1990, an appeal against the order of the Deputy Commissioner was dismissed by the first respondent. This led to the institution of a suit by the appellant under Section 70(1). On 27 October 1995, the Trial Judge decreed the suit. 5 In appeal, the learned Single Judge of the High Court reversed the judgment of the Trial Court on 27 October 2006. A Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed on the ground that it was not maintainable under Section 100(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

.……......................................................J [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud] .……......................................................J [Ajay Rastogi] New Delhi;

November 22, 2019.
The Assam Public Service Commission vs Pranjal Kumar Sarma

7. The Gauhati High Court on 22.07.2019 issued returnable notice in the W.P.(C) No. 4600 of 2019 and the Division Bench after noticing that the APSC is conducting large number of examinations made an observation that attempt would be made to dispose of the matter on the returnable date i.e. 08th August, 2019.

12. In the above backdrop, if the next segment of selection is to be conducted under the 2019 Procedure, the performance of the candidate in the aforenoted screening test to the extent of 87.8 per cent of the total marks, will determine the final selection of the candidate. The question, therefore, is whether this would be fair on the candidates when the performance of few would be determined more by lucky guess and the real merit may have no role in the aggregate score. The other relevant question is whether the method of selection should be permitted to be changed midway, by adopting the 2019 Procedure incorporated with effect from 01.04.2019 for the vacancies, which were advertised on 21.12.2018.

17. If the direction in the impugned judgment of the High Court is to be followed for conducting the next segment of the selection, for the single recruitment process the candidates will be evaluated by two different sets of procedure i.e. the 2010 Rules and the 2019 Procedure and such dual norms must not in our opinion, govern the ongoing recruitment process.

18. In view of the foregoing, we are persuaded to hold that the recruitment process initiated by the APSC through the advertisement dated 21.12.2018 for the 65 posts of Assistant Engineer (Civil), of the Water Resources Department should be finalised under the 2010 Rules. Consequently, the direction issued for application of the 2019 Procedure in the impugned judgment is found to be not merited and the same is accordingly interfered. The appeal stands allowed by permitting the APSC to complete the process of selection for the advertised posts, by following the 2010 Rules.
Jit Ram Now Deceased Through Lrs vs Satnam Singh

3. One Banta, father of Jit Ram and Sibo, died on 02.07.1992. Sibo, though married, was not staying with her husband, but used to reside with her father Banta. After the death of Banta, Sibo filed Civil Suit No.143 of Digitally signed by INDU MARWAH Date: 2019.11.28 1993 for declaration that she had become the owner and was in possession 17:21:01 IST Reason: of land admeasuring 5 kanals out of land admeasuring 9 kanals 14 marlas Civil Appeal No.9087 of 2019 @ SLP(C)No.13835 of 2019 Jit Ram now deceased through LRs. vs. Satnam Singh 2 owned and possessed by Banta on the basis of Will dated 26.06.1992 executed by Banta. Sibo also sought a decree for permanent injunction to restrain Jit Ram from interfering with her possession and from alienating the land or any portion thereof. The Suit was dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Garhshankar, by his judgment and decree dated 28.04.1998. It was held that the Will, on the basis of which the claim was raised, was highly suspicious and that Sibo had failed to prove her case.

6. Jit Ram, being aggrieved, preferred Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2011 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Hoshiarpur, which was allowed by Judgment and Decree dated 19.07.2013. The Appellate Court found that the claim of Sibo having been dismissed in the earlier round, she could not have conferred any title with respect to the property by a Will in favour of the Respondent. It was also found that the possession of the Respondent was purely permissive and that the claim on the ground of adverse possession was completely untenable.

11. In the circumstances, we allow this appeal, set aside the Judgment and Order under Appeal to the extent it held against the Appellants on the issue of adverse possession and we restore the Judgment and Decree dated 19.07.2013 passed by the Appellate Court subject to the Appellants paying Rs.50,000/- to the Respondent within four weeks from today. The amount shall be deposited in the Trial Court and shall be released to the Respondent if he vacates and hands over possession of the structure to the Appellants within two weeks after the deposit, whereafter the Respondent shall cease to have any interest in the structure. In case he refuses to vacate and hand over such possession, the Respondent shall not be entitled Civil Appeal No.9087 of 2019 @ SLP(C)No.13835 of 2019 Jit Ram now deceased through LRs. vs. Satnam Singh 6 to the sum so deposited and the sum could then be withdrawn by the Appellants, who shall then be entitled to execute the decree dated 19.07.2013 passed by the Appellate Court.

12. The Appeal stands allowed accordingly. No costs.

November 28, 2019.
M/S. Alkem Laboratories Ltd. vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

3. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows: The Appellant was the marketer of packed food article ‘Orange Tammy Sugarless Jelly’ (‘Jelly’). The Jelly was manufactured separately by one Cachet Pharmaceuticals Private Limited (‘Manufacturer’), which is not connected to the Appellant entity. On 3.10.2008, Respondent No. 2 Food Inspector, (from the Food and Drugs Administration, Bhopal District), conducted inspection in Valecha Enterprises in Bhopal, the proprietor of which is one Mr. Dinesh Valecha (‘Retailer’). Respondent No. 2 purchased three company packed jars of the Jelly, weighing 350 grams each, from the Retailer and the said samples were deposited with the State Food Testing Laboratory (‘State Laboratory’) and the Local Health Authority, Bhopal for the purpose of testing. At this stage, the Retailer did not have receipt of purchase from the Appellant/marketer and stated that they would produce it before Respondent No. 2 at a later stage.

The Local Health Authority by letter dated 26.11.2008 informed Respondent No. 2 that the Report of the Public Analyst, State Laboratory had found ‘sugar’ in the Jelly sample, hence the Jelly was misbranded. Notably, it was pursuant to this letter that, Respondent No. 2 made further query and the Retailer produced a receipt showing 3 that the Jelly was purchased from the Appellant. Respondent No. 2 sent a letter to the Local Health Authority and to the Indore branch of the Appellant company, for information as regards the Manager/Director/Partner or nominee of the Appellant. However, as the Respondents claim, the Appellant did not respond to this query and the letter was received back. The attempts of Respondent No. 2 to obtain information about the Appellant from the Office of the Deputy Director, Food and Drugs Administration and the Commissioner, Nagar Nigam, Indore also failed.

754). However the Respondents have not disputed that the shelf life of the Jelly sample would have, in all probability, expired at this stage. Hence we find that this is a fit case for quashing of proceedings against the Appellant on account of denial of their valuable right under Section 13(2).

10. The appeal is allowed, and the impugned judgment dated 11.04.2018 and the impleadment order dated 01.09.2015 are set aside, in the above terms.

November 29, 2019
Union Of India vs Ramesh Bishnoi

5. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed Writ Petition No.1310 of 2018, which was allowed by an order dated 08.03.2018 with the following directions: 4

11. For the reasons given hereinabove, we do not find any ground for interference with the orders passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed. 8 The respondent shall be entitled to all the benefits of the judgment of the writ Court within 30 days from today.

No orders as to cost.

………………………………..J (UDAY UMESH LALIT) ...…………………………….J (VINEET SARAN) New Delhi Dated: November 29, 2019
Union Of India vs Lt. Col. Sameer Singh

3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the respondent herein was commissioned in the Indian Army in 1994. He earned various promotions and while holding the post of Lt. Colonel in the Indian Army, he was posted in the DGQA. After completion of two years of service in the Collectorate of Quality Assurance, he fell in the zone of consideration of Permanent Secondment. His case was considered by the Quality Assurance Selection Board (QASB for short) held on 17.02.2016. The respondent’s case was not recommended for Permanent Secondment. On finding that his name has not been recommended, the respondent made enquiries and came to know that his case has not been recommended since in the TAR for the year 2014­15, it was found that he was ‘NOT YET FIT’ for Permanent Secondment in DGQA. In the next year, i.e. 2015­16, he was declared ‘NOT FIT’ in the TAR. Thereafter, he was reverted to the Indian Army.

5. This issues with the approval of Hon’ble Raksh Mantri.”

14. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal and uphold the judgment of the Delhi High Court. Stay stands vacated. Pending applications(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
C.C.E.,Vadodara vs Gujarat Narmada Valley Fer. Co. Ltd.

2. Consequently, the Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs, Vadodara-II (hereinafter referred to as “the Commissioner”) issued two notices to the assessee to show cause why CENVAT credit wrongly availed by it should not be recovered under Rule 12 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) read with Section 11-A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The assessee was also required to show cause why interest be not recovered on the wrongly availed CENVAT credit and why penalty be not imposed on it.

4. Feeling aggrieved, the assessee preferred two appeals before the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal at Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”). The appeals were numbered as Appeal Nos. E/2517 of 2004 and E/3672 of 2004.

19. For the above reasons, we find merit in the Department's civil appeals.”

(V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN) New Delhi;

December 03, 2019.
Harbhajan Singh . vs State Of Punjab .

2. The appellants before us are tenants in occupation of shops located in Gurudwara Singh Sabha, a gurudwara at Kukar Majra, G.T. Road, Mandi Gobindgarh, District Fatehgarh Sahib, Punjab. The appellants claim that they were inducted as tenants during the Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date: 2019.12.04 period 1965-69 by Gurudwara Singh Sabha. However, no formal 16:42:22 IST Reason:

3. In the year 1997, SGPC had filed an eviction petition against one of the appellants, Harbhajan Singh, under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (‘East Punjab Rent Act’, for short) on two grounds, viz., (i) failure to pay rent, and (ii) SGPC needed the property for construction of shops. Harbhajan Singh had, thereafter, deposited arrears of rent on the first date of hearing. The eviction proceedings, however, had remained pending and were not decided.

4. On 29th January 1998, the Religious Premises Act was enforced, and thereby introduced a summary procedure for evicting unauthorised occupants from the premises/property belonging to the religious institutions. Thereafter, SGPC had filed ejectment Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 2 of 29 petitions under the Religious Premises Act before the Collector for eviction of the appellants stating that the appellants were in unauthorised occupation. The appellants, on receipt of notices from the Collector under Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act, had filed the writ petitions challenging the vires of the enactment before the High Court, which by the impugned judgment have been dismissed. The primary challenge before the High Court was to the explanation to clause (a) to Section 3 of the Religious Premises Act on the ground that the provision creates an unintelligible classification to the disadvantage of the tenants who are otherwise entitled to equal protection as other tenants under the East Punjab Rent Act.

xx xx xx

21. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in the present appeal and the same is dismissed. However, in the facts of this case, there would be no order as to costs.

DECEMBER 04, 2019.

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 29 of 29
Mahipal vs Rajesh Kumar @ Polia

4 A First Information Report2 was lodged by the appellant on 3 December 2018 stating that his now deceased nephew – Akhilesh had visited town on leave for a month for his marriage. It was stated that at about 7.00 pm on 2 December 1 CrPC 2 FIR No. 347/2018 2 2018, the deceased and his friend Aashish left the matrimonial home to run an errand. At about 7.30 pm, the deceased and Aashish stopped their bike on the road which caused a quarrel with two accused persons – Vijay and Anil, who then hurled abuses at the deceased. At that time, five to six boys armed with dandas assaulted the deceased who was rescued by near-by villagers. It was stated that the deceased left the scene on his motorcycle only to be confronted a short distance thereafter by the accused – Anil, Ajay, Rajesh (the first respondent), Vikas and Vijay. It was alleged that the accused used rods to beat the deceased with an intention to kill him. It was alleged that after beating the deceased, the accused fled from the scene of the incident. The deceased was rushed to Jhunjhunu R & R Hospital at Chirawa. However, owing to the serious nature of the injuries, he was referred to Fortis Hospital at Jaipur where he was declared dead.

5 The post-mortem report was recorded on 3 December 2018. Twenty-seven ante-mortem injuries on the body of the deceased were noted. The first respondent was arrested on 3 December 2018. The statements under Section 161 of the CrPC of the appellant and Aashish were recorded. A charge-sheet was filed against the five accused on 10 March 2019 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code 1908.3 Cognizance was taken by the Judicial Magistrate, Pilani on 27 March 2019. As the accused were charged under Section 302, the case was committed to the Additional Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu for trial.

On the basis of the injuries, the post-mortem report concluded:

21 The High Court has erred in not considering material relevant to the determination of whether the accused were to be enlarged on bail. The order of 13 the High Court enlarging the accused on bail is erroneous and liable to be set aside.

26 The perfunctory analysis by the High Court in the present case cannot be sustained. For the reasons indicated above, the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court enlarging the first respondent on bail is set aside. 27 The connected appeals also are allowed in terms of the judgment recorded above.

(2004) 7 SCC 528 15 28 Since the accused have been released on bail during the pendency of these proceedings, we order that the bail bonds shall stand cancelled and the five accused shall be taken into custody forthwith. A copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the Additional Sessions Judge, Chirawa District, Jhunjhunu and the police station concerned to secure compliance.

29 We clarify that the present judgment shall not be construed as the expression of any opinion on the merits of the case at the trial.

.……......................................................J [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud] .……......................................................J [Hrishikesh Roy] New Delhi;

December 5, 2019.
Station House Officer ... vs B.A. Srinivasan

3. The Respondent No. 1 retired on 31.10.2012 as Assistant General Manager, Vijaya Bank. On 28.10.2013, FIR being RC 12(A)/2013 was registered pursuant to complaint given by the General Manager, Vijaya Bank, Head Office, Bangalore against the Respondent No.1 in respect of the offences mentioned hereinabove. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 31.10.2014 against the Respondent No.1 and other accused in respect of said offences. It was alleged inter alia :-

5. The Respondent No.1, being aggrieved, preferred Criminal Revision Petition No. 834 of 2015 in the High Court, which was allowed by the judgment and order presently under appeal. The High Court, thus set aside the order dated 13.04.2015 as regards the Respondent No.1 and discharged him of the offences with which he was sought to be charged.

We, thus, allow this Appeal, set aside the view taken by the High Court, restore the order passed by the Trial Court and dismiss the application seeking discharge preferred by the Respondent No.1.

16. It is made clear that we have adverted to the facts and the allegations only for the purpose of considering the basic issue pertaining to issue of sanction and we shall not be taken to have expressed any view on merits which shall be considered independently. It has been stated by the learned counsel that the matter is listed before the Special Court on 11.12.2019. The Respondent No.1 shall appear before the Special Court on that day and the matter shall, thereafter, be proceeded in accordance with law.

17. This Appeal is allowed in aforestated terms.

December 05, 2019.
Bses Yamuna Power Ltd. vs Ghanshyam Chand Sharma

1. By its order dated 26 May 2017 a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi upheld the judgement of a Single Judge dated 21 March 2017 granting pensionary benefits to the first respondent. The judgement of the Single Judge directed the appellant to pay pensionary benefits to the first respondent on the ground that he had completed twenty years of service and had „voluntarily retired‟ and not „resigned‟ from service. The appellant challenges these findings in the present appeal.

2. The first respondent was appointed as a daily rated mazdoor on 9 July 1968. His services were regularised on the post of a Peon on 22 December 1971. The first respondent tendered his resignation on 7 July 1990, which was accepted by the appellant with effect from 10 July 1990. The first respondent was subsequently denied pensionary benefits by the appellant on two grounds. First, that he had not completed twenty years of service, making him ineligible for the grant of pension. Second, in any case, by resigning, the first respondent had forfeited his past services and therefore could not claim pensionary benefits.

4. In Asger Ibrahim Amin, the appellant had resigned in 1991 after completing twenty-three years of service with the Life Insurance Corporation of India. When the appellant resigned, there existed no provision allowing for voluntary retirement. The Central Government subsequently promulgated the Life 1 (2016) 13 SCC 797 2 Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules 1995 2 setting out the conditions to be fulfilled for the grant of pension upon retirement and permitting, for the first time, employees to voluntarily retire after twenty years of service. Under the LIC Pension Rules, pension on retirement was made retrospectively applicable to employees retiring prior to 1995, however, the provisions regarding voluntary retirement were not. The LIC Pension Rules also stipulated that resignation amounted to a forfeiture of past service. In deciding whether the appellant was entitled to pension under the LIC Pension Rules, Justice Vikramajit Sen speaking for a two judge Bench of this Court held:

15. On the issue of whether the first respondent has served twenty years, we are of the opinion that the question is of no legal consequence to the present dispute. Even if the first respondent had served twenty years, under Rule 26 of the CCS Pension Rules his past service stands forfeited upon resignation. The first respondent is therefore not entitled to pensionary benefits.

16. For the above reasons, we accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court of Delhi dated 26 May 2017. There shall be no order as to costs.

.……......................................................J [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud] ..……......................................................J [Hrishikesh Roy] New Delhi;

December 5, 2019.
The State Of Telangana vs Managipet @ Mangipet Sarveshwar Reddy

4. A charge sheet was filed on 9th October, 2017 on completion of the investigations. As per the Report, the Accused Officer was said to be in possession of assets worth Rs.3,18,61,500/- alleged to be disproportionate to his known sources of income. The total worth of the property against his savings of Rs.37 lakhs was found to be approximately Rs.3,55,61,500/-. During the investigations, as many as 114 witnesses were examined. Ch. Sudhakar, DSP, CIU, ACB, Hyderabad and five more investigating officers conducted the investigations and prepared the final report.

11. Entry 2 of List II of the State List is the Police (including railway and village police) subject to the provisions of Entry 2A of List I. Therefore, various facets of Policing in the State fall within the legislative competence of the State and the re-employment of a retired personnel who was a member of Indian Police Service, falls within the executive power of the State. As a re-employed officer, he was holding a civil post as his salary was being paid from the State Exchequer. He was discharging duties and responsibilities in the Anti-Corruption Bureau.

26. Thus, we find that the orders of the High Court to quash the proceedings against the Accused Officer are not sustainable and are consequently, set aside. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the State is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the learned trial court for further proceedings in accordance with law.

20 Crl. A. (MD) No. 488 of 2018 and Crl. M.P. (MD) No. 8712 of 2018 decided on 30 th October, 2018.

38. In view thereof, we do not find any merit in the reasonings recorded by the High Court in respect of contentions raised by the Accused Officer. The arguments raised by the Accused Officer can- not be accepted in quashing the proceedings under the Act. Ac- cordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 1663 of 2019 filed by the Accused Officer is dismissed whereas Criminal Appeal No. 1662 of 2019 filed by the State is allowed.

DECEMBER 06, 2019.