L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Surinder Singh & Ors vs State Of Punjab & Ors

2. The appellants, who are the residents of a residential area, filed a writ petition objecting to the construction of a hospital coming up in one of the plots (Plot No.39) on the ground that no hospital can come up in a residential plot in a residential area. The High Court, by interim order dated 19.1.2006, granted stay of further construction. Subsequently on 26.5.2006, while admitting the writ petition, the High Court vacated the interim stay but directed that any construction on the site shall be subject to the final decision in the writ petition. It also recorded the undertaking given on behalf of the fourth respondent that in case the appellants succeed in the writ petition, he shall demolish the construction raised by him. The Court also directed that the matter should be listed for final disposal within one year.

4. We find that the High Court itself had directed that the petition should be listed for final disposal within one year. As on date, more than two years have elapsed. In the circumstances, we feel that the interim order requires a slight modification to safeguard the interest of both parties.

5. We therefore request the High Court to hear and dispose of the writ petition early preferably within four months. Pending final decision, the respondents shall not commence any kind of activity in the building under construction even if it is completed before the decision in the writ petition. With the above modification to the impugned order, this appeal is disposed of.
Sadhna Jain & Anr vs Sheikh Khalikuzzama (D) By Lrs. & Ors

In the year 1999 the appellants herein were impleaded as parties. Both parties adduced evidence. When the Suit was fixed for argument, an application seeking permission to withdraw the suit and file a fresh suit, on the ground that the appellants have purchased the property and therefore different reliefs have to be claimed in a fresh suit, was filed. The said application was dismissed by an order dated 30.9.2003, observing:

The said appeal has been allowed by reason of the impugned judgment stating:

Although, the High Court apparently appears to have made inconsistent orders insofar as on the one hand it has allowed the appeal and on the other hand dismissed the suit but upon a fair reading of the entire order, we are of the opinion that by reason thereof, the High Court merely permitted the plaintiff- respondents to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit subject to the conditions mentioned therein.

The judgment of the High Court, in our opinion, cannot be sustained for more than one reason; firstly, no application was filed for withdrawal of the suit and secondly the plaintiff-respondents might have merely brought to its notice that it had filed such an application before the learned trial Judge but it appears from the impugned judgment that the attention of the High Court was not drawn to the fact that the application has already been dismissed and civil revision thereagainst has been filed.

In that view of the matter, the High Court could not have permitted the appellants to withdraw the suit with liberty granted to file a fresh suit until and unless a prayer therefor was made.

For the reasons aforementioned, we set aside the impugned judgment and remit the matter back to the High Court for consideration of the same afresh.

The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Union Of India & Anr vs S.Nagarajan

Leave granted. Heard both the parties.

2. The respondent was appointed as a casual employee in the Central Cattle Breeding Farm run by the first respondent. In 1992, he was arrested in connection with some criminal case. He reported back on duty on 28.2.1993. The second appellant did not allow him to join duty, as he was involved in a criminal case. The respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench in OA No.1332/1993. The said OA was dismissed by an Order dated 28.3.1995 in view of the pendency of the criminal case, with an observation that if respondent was exonerated, it will be open to appellants to re-engage the respondent.

3. In the year 2001, the respondent was acquitted in the criminal case. He gave a representation for reinstatement and grant of temporary status. As he was not reinstated with conferment of temporary status, the respondent again approached CAT in OA No.683 of 2002. That OA was disposed of with a direction to dispose of the representation. The representation was accordingly considered but rejected on 8.10.2002 on the ground that no casual workers were then being appointed. The rejection was again challenged in OA No.950/2002 which was dismissed on 9.1.2003. The rejection by the tribunal was challenged in WP No.3974 of 2003. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court has allowed the said petition in part, in the impugned order dated 15.2.2006. It has directed that the respondent should be taken into appointment within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order, retrospectively from 9.10.2003 as in the case of one M. N. Paranthaman. The High Court also directed that the respondent shall not be entitled to any monetary benefits for the past period but such past period could be taken into account for the purpose of increment and other benefits in future. The said order is challenged.

7. In view of the above, we allow this appeal and modify the order of the High Court by directing the appellants to re-employ the respondent as a fresh ad-hoc employee within three months from today, provided he makes a written application to the second appellant in this behalf. Thereafter, he shall be continued as such ad-hoc employee till a regular vacancy arises in which he can be absorbed. He will not be entitled to any benefits available to regular employees until he is regularly appointed. This shall not be a precedent. Parties to bear their respective costs.
V.N. Bharat vs D.D.A. & Anr

2. As far as the first four installments are concerned, there is no difficulty since such payments had undisputedly been made by the appellant. The problem arose in connection with the payment of the fifth and final instalment in respect of which a fresh demand letter was to be separately issued, which could include a possible escalation towards the cost of the flat.

3. Clause 13 of the Scheme provided that the allotment of specific flats would be made on the basis of "draw of lots" to be held by the DDA when the flats were completed. It was also stipulated that all persons registered under the Scheme, irrespective of the date on which they were registered, would be treated at par with each other.

17. As will be evident from what has been mentioned hereinbefore, the real controversy in this appeal appears to be whether the demand letter dated 10th September, 1996, for payment of the fifth and final installment had, in fact, been received by the appellant and as to whether non-compliance with the same resulted in termination of the appellant's allotment and whether the restoration of such 18 allotment on a representation made by the appellant would amount to a fresh or new allotment.

22. Having regard to what has been stated hereinabove, in our view the MRTP Commission erred in law in shifting the onus of proof of service of the demand notice on the appellant and in discharging the notice of inquiry and vacating the interim order issued under Section 12-A of the M.R.T.P. Act. The allegation of unfair trade practice on the part of the respondent authority stands established. The decision of the Commission is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 22

23. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment of the MRTP Commission impugned in this Appeal is set aside. The respondents are directed to accept the sum of Rs.1,63,512/-, which had been deposited by the appellant prior to receipt of the demand notice, together with interest, if any, accrued thereupon, in full and final settlement of their dues in respect of the flat allotted to the appellant and to hand over possession thereof to the appellant within a month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

24. Having regard to the facts of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.

..................J (ALTAMAS KABIR) 23 ...................J (MARKANDEY KATJU) New Delhi Dated: 02.09.2008
Radhey Shyam Rastogi vs Ashish Kumar & Anr

2. The appellant is a tenant in respect of Northern portion the premises No.124, Mohalla Chaukasi, Shahjahanpur, U.P. [in short "the disputed premises] since 1955. An application was filed by the respondent for release of the disputed premises before the prescribed authority under Section 21 [1] 1 [b] of the UP Urban Buildings (Regulation of letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short, "the Act"), inter alia, on the grounds that the building was in a dilapidated condition and was required for demolition and reconstruction. The application filed by the respondent was, however, opposed by the appellant by filing a written objection in which the ground of non-compliance of mandatory provision of Rule 17 framed in the Act was taken. However, during the pendency of the application before the prescribed authority, the respondent, without obtaining any order or direction from the prescribed authority, had filed a report obtained from a private architect who, in his report, indicated that the disputed premises was in a dilapidated and dangerous condition. Finally, on 29th of November, 1997, the prescribed authority allowed the application and passed an order of eviction against the appellant. An appeal was carried by the appellant before the learned 2 District Judge against the order of eviction passed by the prescribed authority.

7. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the High Court for a decision in the light of the observations made hereinabove. The appeal is thus allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
Madan Kishore vs Major Sudhir Sewal & Ors

2. The case made out by the original plaintiff (since deceased) in his plaint, may be summarized as follows :-

4. Defendant No. 2/respondent, in his written statement, pleaded that since he was a bonafide purchaser for value without notice, it could not be said that he had not acquired right, title and interest in the suit land. Plea of limitation and maintainability of suit was also raised. Accordingly, defendant No.2/respondent also pleaded dismissal of the suit

6. So far as Issue Nos. (i), (ii) and (v) are concerned, the Trial Court found these issues against the plaintiffs/respondents, whereas, Issue No. (iii) and (vi) were found to be in favour of defendant No. 1/appellant. So far as Issue No. (vii) is concerned, it was decided against the defendants and Issue Nos. (iv) and (ix) were held to have become redundant in view of the findings on Issue Nos. (i) to (iii). In respect of Issue No. (viii), defendant No. 3 / respondent was held to be entitled to recover the amount from defendant No. 1/appellant. Upon the aforesaid issues being decided, the Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents, which was affirmed by the Appellate Court in appeal.

23. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the appeal has no merit and accordingly it is dismissed without any order as to costs.
New India Co-Op.Housing Society Ltd vs Municipal Corpn.Of Greater Mumbai & Anr

6. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2, Mr. Sunil Gupta, submitted that since it is a judgment of affirmance, the facts and reasoning need not be 3 given. With respect we cannot agree, otherwise every Letters Patent Appeal can be dismissed by one sentence by saying that the Division Bench agrees with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The appellant court, even in a judgment of affirmance, must show that it has properly applied its mind to the case, and not acted as a rubber stamp. It must at least briefly give the facts of the case, and its own independent reasoning.

15. It is alleged in the representation that despite the `stop work notice' respondent No. 2 continued to carry out construction work illegally in violation of the terms of the Lease Deed and the original plan. However, subsequently, by the impugned letter dated 22.6.2006, respondent No. 1 withdrew the `stop work notice' dated 30.12.2005. Against this withdrawal order dated 22.6.2006, a writ petition was filed in the High Court by the appellant-Society which was dismissed by the learned Single 7 Judge and the judgment was upheld by the Division Bench on appeal. Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed before this Court.

21. As regards the observation in paragraph 3 of the impugned judgment of the Division Bench dated 1.9.2006, we are of the opinion that the dispute between the appellant and respondent No. 2 which is going on before the co-operative authorities has nothing to do with the powers of the Bombay Municipal Corporation which is a statutory body. We are concerned in this case about how a statutory body, like the Bombay Municipal Corporation should exercise its power. This has nothing to do with the dispute between the two private parties viz., respondent No. 2 and the appellant. Hence, the observation in paragraph 3 was wholly irrelevant and misconceived.

22. In view of the above, this appeal succeeds and the judgment of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, are set aside. The writ petition filed before the High Court is allowed and the order dated 22.6.2006 of the municipal authorities withdrawing the `stop work notice' is quashed. The appeal stands allowed. No costs.

02 September, 2008
State Of West Bengal vs Shyamadas Banerjee & Anr

3. On the basis of certain newspapers reports one Nikhil Kishore Roy filed a Public Interest Litigation in the Calcutta High Court against the respondent No.1, Shri Shyamadas Banerjee, alleging that he had misused his official position as M.L.A. by submitting forged and fictitious medical bills and fees for prescription for Rs.1,65,530.30 on account of the treatment of his wife and his mother between 8.9.1998 to 10.11.1998. The said Writ Petition, being No.1311 of 1999, was disposed of by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court on 3 23.6.1999, holding that the writ petitioner could have lodged a First Information Report or filed a complaint petition before the concerned Magistrate. Thereafter, on the basis of the F.I.R. lodged by Shri Nikhil Kumar Roy investigation was started under Section 468, 471, 420 and 511 of the Indian Penal Code, (hereinafter referred to as "IPC"), by the Hare Street Police Station. The respondent No.1 surrendered before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, on 17.1.2000, and was released on bail. Charge- sheet was filed on 16.1.2003, on the basis whereof the Special Court assumed jurisdiction under the Special Courts Act, 1949, against the respondent No.1 treating him to be a "public servant" and framed charges against him under Section 420/468/471 and 511 IPC.

4. Aggrieved by the order of the Special Judge 4th Court, Calcutta, taking cognizance on the basis of the charge-sheet filed, the respondent No.1 moved the High Court in revision (CRR No.1931 of 2003) alleging that the cognizance taken was illegal since no sanction had been obtained by the investigating agency to file a charge-sheet against him. The High Court disposed of the revision petition granting liberty to the trial Judge to proceed with the matter while the respondent No.1 was given liberty to adjudicate the points which had been taken by him in the revision application before the learned trial Judge. Such application was made by the petitioner on 10.9.2003, but the same was rejected by the learned trial Judge which impelled the respondent No. 1 to once again move the High Court in revision )CRR No.2364 of 2003).

9. One of the other points urged on behalf of the appellant is that the earlier writ petition filed by respondent No.1 for quashing of the FIR had been rejected on 10.12.1999, and, thereafter, on completion of the investigations charge-sheet was filed against the respondent No.1 before the 9 Special Judge 4th Court, Calcutta, who, assumed jurisdiction under the provisions of the Special Courts Act, 1949, treating the respondent No.1 to be a public servant. It was urged that since the offence complained of was said to have been committed when the respondent No.1 was a sitting M.L.A., the charge-sheet had been rightly filed before the Special Judge on which cognizance was taken and charges were framed.

28. We, accordingly, dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the High Court.
Shivaji @ Dadya Shankar Alhat vs State Of Maharashtra

2. Learned Second Additional Judge, Pune in Sessions Case No.209 of 2002 tried the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 302 and Section 376 (2)(f) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ( in short the `IPC'). By judgment and order dated 27th June, 2004, the trial court found the appellant guilty for the aforesaid offences and he was sentenced to death for the offence of murder and in respect of the other offence sentence to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay fine with default stipulation. Appellant questioned the judgment in Criminal Appeal No.574 of 2004 before the Bombay High Court which heard the same alongwith Confirmation Case No.1 of 2003 which was referred to the High Court as required under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code'), for confirmation of death sentence. The appeals were heard together, the reference was accepted but the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed. 2

Learned trial court found the evidence cogent and found the accused guilty and imposed the sentence. The appeal before the High Court was dismissed and the reference made under Section 366 IPC was confirmed.

8. Sushila (PW1), the mother of the deceased has stated that on 14th January, 2002, she had gone to the house of one Tirandaz for work. At that time her three daughters and mother were present in the house. She left the house at about 11-15 a.m. and came back at about 4.30 p.m. When she came back, her mother told her that the deceased had gone to bring fuel wood along with the accused. Since the deceased did not come back they started searching for her. Yashodabai, the grandmother of the deceased gave a missing complaint to the Junnar police on 14.1.2002. On 15th January, 2002 at 10 about 8.30 to 9.00 a.m. one Sakinabai who was residing near their house, came and informed that the dead body of the deceased was found on the hill. Sushila then gave a complaint to the police on 15.1.2002 that her daughter had left with the accused on 14.1.2002 at about 11 O' clock in the morning; that she had not returned home; that they had searched for her; that her neighbour Sakina Shaikh had told her that the dead body of her daughter was lying on the hill and that out of fear she had not gone to see the dead body.

................................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi, September 5, 2008 42
Goutam Bhavan Rep.By M.D vs Shakuntala Sahu Rep By Gpa Holder & Anr

The respondent No.1 filed a suit, which was registered as O.S. No.73/1996 (old No.617/1993) for eviction of respondent No.2, Ramesh Chandra Goutham. The same was decreed by II Addl. District Judge, Visakhapatnam vide judgment dated 24.9.1999 on the ground that respondent No.2 had committed default in payment of rent. During the pendency of that suit, the appellant, which is a partnership firm consisting of the wife and son of respondent No.2 filed a suit (O.S. No 1835/1997) for declaration that the firm is statutory tenant of the suit premises and for grant of perpetual injunction restraining respondent No.1 herein from forcibly evicting it. By judgment dated 3.5.2000, Principal Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam dismissed the suit. The Lower Appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed ...2/-

by the trial Court and decreed the suit by declaring the firm to be the statutory tenant of respondent No.1. The Lower Appellate Court also granted permanent injunction restraining respondent No.1 from evicting the appellant. Second Appeal No.876/2003 preferred by respondent No.1 against the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court was dismissed by the High Court on 5.9.2003.

In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court as well as the High Court are set aside and suit for eviction filed by respondent No.1 is dismissed.

Needless to say that this order shall not in any manner affect the right of respondent No.1 to file a properly constituted suit for eviction against the appellant in case grounds for eviction are made out.
Mahatma Gandhi University & Anr vs Gis Jose & Ors

3. It so happened that Petitioner, Gis Jose was admitted to the M.Sc. Computer Science course. She had secured only 53.3% marks in her qualifying examination against the minimum requirement of cut-off marks, which had been fixed by the university as 55%. Obviously in total derogation of this fact, the student was admitted. The error, when found by the University, the Controller of Examination wrote a letter dated 01.11.2004 to the Principal, B.P.C. College, Piravom, pointing out the irregular admission to the M.Sc. Computer Science course. It was pointed out that the student's application for Ist and IInd semester Examinations, held in April and July, 2004 respectively, were already rejected on the ground that the student had scored only 53 % marks and her admission was in violation of the Admission Rules framed by the University and still the Principal had allowed the student to continue in M.Sc. Computer Science to complete the course and to write her examination. It was pointed out that the University was viewing the matter very seriously and the Principal was further directed to cancel the admission given to the student and to report the matter within 10 days. It is obvious from this letter that the earlier applications dated 22.4.04 and 26.7.04 were also rejected by the University. A memo was ultimately sent on 25.2.2005 and the student was informed that the University had rejected her request for continuing studies in M.Sc. Computer Science in the college. This was on the basis of the Minutes of the Academic Council Meeting dated 23.12.2004 where the Academic Council had refused to allow the student to continue her studies and yet the student was allowed to continue with 3 the course in complete and total derogation of the directions given by the Controller of Examinations.

7. It was contended by Shri B.V. Deepak, learned counsel appearing for the student that the Vice Chancellor had allowed her to continue with the course. However, there is nothing on record to support this fact. Further, such permission was clearly incorrect if at all given. In the subsequent meeting of the Academic Council, the student was not permitted to continue with the course. All these factors were completely ignored by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment . Therefore, at least after the Academic Council had rejected the student's request, she could not have been allowed to continue. This did not happen and the college allowed her to take the further examinations for III and IV semesters also. We totally disapprove of all this.

11. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restore the judgment of the Single Bench dismissing the Writ Petition.

September 8, 2008.

Judgment delivered by : Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.S. Sirpurkar Nature of Judgment : Reportable