L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
D.A.V. College Trust And Managing ... vs Director Of Public Instructions

2. Digitally signed by RACHNA Date: 2019.09.17 The Right to Information Act (for short ‘the Act’) was enacted by 17:54:19 IST Reason:

30. It is in the light of the aforesaid proposition of law that we now propose to examine the cases individually.

Civil Appeal No. 9828 of 2013 16

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 9844­9845 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 9846­9857 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9860 OF 2013

36. As far as these cases are concerned, we find from the judgments of the High Court that the aspect with regard to substantial financing has not been fully taken into consideration, as explained by us above. Therefore, though we hold that these bodies are NGOs, the issue whether these are substantially financed or not needs to be decided by the High Court. The High Court shall give 19 both the parties opportunity to file documents and decide the issue in light of the law laid down by us.

37. With these observations, all the appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Civil Appeal No. 9828 of 2013 is dismissed. Civil Appeal Nos. 9844­9845 of 2013, 9846­9857 of 2013 and 9860 of 2013 are remitted to the High Court for determination whether the institutions are substantially financed or not. The High Court shall treat the writ petitions to be filed in the year 2013 and give them priority accordingly.
Pradeep Singh Dehal vs The State Of Himachal Pradesh

4) Such appointment was challenged by the writ petitioner, inter alia, on the ground that he has not been given any credit of “publications” whereas, for such “publications”, he has been given credit when he was considered in pursuance of the post applied in 3 for short, ‘OBC’ 2 response to advertisement No. 3 of 2010. The High Court accepted the claim of the writ petitioner with the following directions:

5 for short, ‘Regulations’ 5

6 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217 7 reservations under Article 16(4) do not operate like a communal reservation. It may well happen that some members belonging to, say, Scheduled Castes get selected in the open competition field on the basis of their own merit; they will not be counted against the quota reserved for Scheduled Castes; they will be treated as open competition candidates.”

didates are in the nature of age relaxation, lower qualifying marks, concessional application money than the general category candi- dates.

17) In view of the said fact, we find that the selection process conducted by the University cannot be said to be fair and reasonable. Consequently, the University is directed to re-examine the selection process by constituting an Expert Committee who shall consider the “publications” of the candidates who were being considered in pursuance of advertisement No. 3 of 2011 and make 7 (2017) 1 SCC 350 8 suitable recommendations accordingly by having a joint merit list of all the categories of candidates who applied for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor. However, in such selection process, the appointment of candidates already selected will not be disturbed, except the appellant whose appointment shall be subject to the decision of the University on the basis of recommendation of the Expert Committee.

18) We hope that University will be able to finalise the revised selections within a period of six months from today.

19) The appeals are, thus, allowed in the above terms.

SEPTEMBER 17, 2019.
Sri Ganapathi Dev Temple Trust vs Balakrishna Bhat (D) Thr. Lrs. .

2. The brief facts leading to this appeal are as under:

8. We find that the reasons assigned by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment for granting relief in favour of the respondents, while setting aside the concurrent findings of the three revenue authorities as well as the order of the learned Single Judge, are unacceptable.

Hence on the basis of the materials on the record, we conclude that the entry in the respondents’ predecessors’ names in the Record of Rights was illegal and the revenue records in respect of 17 the suit property were correctly modified in the appellant’s name by the orders of the revenue authorities dated 21.05.2003, 30.07.2005 and 23.03.2006.

11. Hence the impugned judgment in Writ Appeal No. 984 of 2007 is set aside, and the appeal is allowed.
Krishan Chander vs The State Of Haryana

2. The appellants are before this Court assailing the order dated 21.10.2015 passed by the High Court for the States of Punjab and Haryana in CWP No.22656/2015. The said writ Petition was disposed of along with the writ petition bearing CWP.No.22652 and 22653 of 2015 Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date: 2019.09.17 through a common order. Through the said order the 17:06:35 IST Reason: case sought to be made out by the appellants seeking Page 1 of 15 release of the land from the process of acquisition is not considered favourably. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed by the High Court.

Page 13 of 15

13. Having taken note of all the above aspects, the fact of the possession actually having been taken would require determination at the outset based on examination of records. Secondly the aspects as pointed out relating to the deletion of similar lands and as to whether the land acquired from the appellants is lying vacant and if so whether the appellant is similarly placed as that of the other land owners whose case was considered under the Policy for deletion are aspects which are to be examined by the High Court by notifying the respondents and permitting them to file their objection statement and also after securing the records and verifying the same. Since such exercise was not undertaken by the High Court, though was required in the present facts and circumstances it would be appropriate to set aside the order and restore the writ petition to the file of the High Court for consideration in accordance with law. Any of the observations contained herein are limited to the disposal of this appeal and the High Court shall dispose of the writ petition by a considered order on its own merits. All contentions in that regard are left open. Page 14 of 15

14. Accordingly, the order dated 21.10.2015 passed in CWP No. 22656/2015 is set aside and the petition bearing CWP No. 22656/2015 is restored on board of the High Court for the States of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh for consideration afresh after affording sufficient opportunity to both parties and disposal in accordance with law.

15. The appeal is allowed in part with no order as to cost. All pending applications shall stand disposed of.
Maheshwary Handling Agency Pvt. Ltd. vs Board Of Trustees Of Kandla Port Trust ...

The appellant, Maheshwary Handling Agency Private Limited, is a private limited company engaged in the business of clearing, forwarding and transporting of cargo for import and export as a steamer agent.

15. It is obvious that the first portion of the Notification prescribing escalating rates for use of open area and sheds did not vest any right to occupy such space for unlimited period of time. This, we hold, is the exact purport of the Notes, which have been read harmoniously with the first portion of the Notification. The Traffic Manager had authority and discretion for allotment of space for storage on rent and to withdraw allotment of space depending on the availability and to ensure that the port operations were not hindered and obstructed due to congestion and shortage of space. We, therefore, would reject the contention that the Traffic Manager was not competent to fix time limit for storage. The contention is unacceptable and would be contrary to the Notes and the powers vested and given under the Regulations to the Traffic Manager.

18. For all the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs.

SEPTEMBER 17, 2019.

Civil Appeal No. 5277 of 2010 Page 17 of 17
Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave vs Asset Reconstruction Company (India) ...

2) As against the aforesaid judgment, Special Civil Application Nos. 10621-10622 were filed before the Gujarat High Court which resulted in the High Court remanding the aforesaid matter. From this order, a Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 25.03.2017.

conclusion that since the limitation period was 12 years from the date on which the money suit has become due, the aforesaid claim was filed within limitation and hence admitted the Section 7 application. The NCLAT vide the impugned judgment held, following its earlier judgments, that the time of limitation would begin running for the purposes of limitation only on and from 01.12.2016 which is the date on which the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was brought into force. Consequently, it dismissed the appeal. 3

8) This being the case, the appeal is allowed and the judgments of the NCLT and NCLAT are set aside.

(SURYA KANT) New Delhi;

September 18, 2019.
Narain Singh vs Union Of India .

2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 6.2.2015 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal Bench at Jaipur, Rajasthan in T.A. No. 2 of 2011, by which the learned Tribunal has dismissed the application preferred by the appellant herein and has confirmed the order 2 passed by the respondents discharging the appellant from service under Rule 13(3)(III)(v) of the Army Rules, 1954, original applicant has preferred the present appeals.

3. The appellant was enrolled in the Indian Army as a Driver on 15.10.1980. He was promoted as ALD and lastly granted the rank of Lance Dafedar. That the appellant suffered four red ink entries during the period between 7.6.1993 and 3.5.1994. That for every red ink entry he was separately punished. That the respondents discharged the appellant under Rule 13(3)(III)(v) of the Army Rules from the Army solely on the ground of four red ink entries. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the appellant came to be discharged when he had served for 13 years 7 months and 6 days and before he could complete the pensionable service. That the appellant was discharged from service 1 year 5 months and 24 days before he could complete pensionable service. That the appellant challenged the order of discharge before the Armed Forces Tribunal. By the impugned judgment and order, the learned Tribunal has dismissed the said application. The appellant thereafter preferred the review 3 application, which also came to be dismissed. Hence, the present appeals.

7. In the result, present appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The order of discharge passed against the appellant is hereby set aside. The appellant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits as if the order of discharge was not passed. Benefit of continuous service for all other purpose shall be granted to the appellant including pension. The monetary benefits payable to the appellant shall be released expeditiously, 10 but not later than four months from the date of this order. No costs.
Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel vs Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai

3) The appellants are sons of Chhotabhai Ashabhai Patel1 who died on December 6, 2001. During his life time, he purportedly executed a gift deed dated November 15, 1977 in favour of defendant Ramanbhai Mathurbhai Patel2.

The reason for making this distinction is undoubtedly the theory of equal ownership between the father and the son in the ancestral property which we have discussed already and which in our opinion is not applicable to the father's gifts at all. Our conclusion, therefore, is that a property gifted by a father to his son could not become ancestral property in the hands of the donee simply by reason of the fact that the donee got it from his father or ancestor.”

17) This Court further held that on reading of the Will as a whole, the conclusion becomes clear that the testator intended the legatees to take the properties in absolute rights as their own self-acquired property without being fettered in any way by the rights of their sons and grandsons. In other words, he did not intend that the property should be taken by the sons as ancestral property. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the suit for partition by the son against his father was dismissed.

xx xx xx

42) Thus, we do not find any error in the judgment of the High Court which may warrant interference in the present appeal and accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

SEPTEMBER 23, 2019.
D. Sasi Kumar vs Soundararajan

2. The appellant herein was the petitioner before the Principal District Munsif/Rent Controller in the petition seeking eviction of the respondent therein. The said proceedings resulted in an appeal filed by the appellant herein before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (sub­ Court) which upheld the decision of the Rent Controller. Digitally signed by MADHU BALA Date: 2019.09.23 Against the said concurrent orders the respondent herein 17:35:01 IST Reason: approached the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Page 1 of 12 the Civil Revision Petition. The High Court reversed the concurrent decisions, which is assailed by the appellant herein. Since the rank assigned to the parties is different in the various proceedings, for the sake of convenience and clarity the appellant herein who was the original petitioner before the Rent Control Court would be referred to as the ‘landlord’, while the respondent therein would be referred to as the ‘tenant’.

4. The Rent Control Court on having taken note of the rival contentions had framed two points for its consideration. The entire consideration revolved on the claim made by the landlord for own use and occupation as also the alternate premises available to the tenant. In order to establish the claim, the landlord examined himself as PW­1 and marked the documents at Exhibits P1 to P5. The tenant, on the other hand, examined three Page 3 of 12 witnesses and relied upon the documents at Exhibits R1 to R9. The Court of the Rent Controller on analysing the documents and the evidence of the parties arrived at the conclusion that the claim as put forth by the landlord is established and accordingly on allowing the petition had directed eviction of the tenant by granting two months time to vacate.

Page 11 of 12

13. In the result the order dated 06.03.2017 passed by the High Court in CRP (NPD) No. 3754/2013 and MP No. 1/2013 is set aside. The order dated 19.01.2011 passed by the Principal District Munsif/Rent Controller, Vellore, Vellore District in Rent Control Original Petition No.43/2004 is restored. Taking into consideration all aspects, the tenant is granted time till 31.01.2021 to vacate and handover vacant possession of the premises to the landlord subject to the undertaking being filed in four weeks, wherein it be undertaken to voluntarily vacate and handover possession on or before 31.01.2021, without creating any third­party rights or damage to the property. The rents shall also be paid without default.

14. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed with no order as to costs. All pending applications shall stand disposed of.
Kamlesh Gupta vs Mangat Rai

3. The brief facts leading to the instant appeal are as follows:

6. The Trial Court dismissed this application on the ground that the facts stated in the application were already within its knowledge.

10. We are of the opinion that by virtue of actual possession being enjoyed by Pawan Kumar, he is a necessary party to 5 the present suit. Even otherwise, he is a proper party for the reasons elucidated above.

12. For these reasons, we set aside the orders passed by the Trial Court and the High Court rejecting the application for impleadment and amendment of the plaint, and hereby allow the aforesaid application. We direct the appellant to deposit costs of Rs. 10,000 before the Trial Court within 8 weeks from today.

14. The instant appeal is thus allowed as per the aforesaid terms.

SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 7
Director Of Elementary Education, ... vs Sri Pramod Kumar Sahoo

2) The respondent was appointed under the Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme bearing order dated August 06, 1988 after death of his father Basanta Kumar Sahoo. He joined on August 10, 1988 as Primary School Teacher in pursuance of the said order in the pay scale of Rs.780/- - Rs.1140/- with D.A. as admissible. The respondent has intermediate qualification at that time and had 1 for short ‘the Tribunal’ 1 appeared for B.A. examination when he was appointed as Primary School Teacher against the Matric Teachers Certificate Post. The said pay scale is payable to Untrained Teachers having Matric qualification, whereas pay scale of Rs.840/- - Rs.1240/- is the pay scale granted to Trained Matric Teachers.

7) The appellant filed an application, inter alia, on the ground that wrong submission was made by the counsel for the appellant. Such application was dismissed on the ground that the remedy of the appellant was either by filing an application of review or modification but since such application has been filed after two years of the order having been passed by the Tribunal, the same was dismissed on the ground of laches as well as there is no error apparent on the face of the order. Thereafter, the appellant filed the review petition which was dismissed on January 22, 2015. It is thereafter the writ petition was filed which was dismissed vide the 3 order impugned in the present appeal.

3 (1994) 2 SCC 521 5 applied in a mechanical or casual manner. Classification made by a body of experts after full study and analysis of the work should not be disturbed except for strong reasons which indicate the classification made to be unreasonable. Inequality of the men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to them….”

SEPTEMBER 26, 2019.
Syeda Nazira Khatoon (D) By Lr. vs Syed Zahiruddin Ahmed Baghdadi And ...

2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows:

11. The second question to be considered is whether the daughters of the last mutawalli and Nazira Khatoon, including the Appellant herein, would qualify to be the mutawalli under the express terms of the wakf deed. For this, the term “putro poutradi korme” requires to be interpreted.

14. In view of the foregoing discussion, we uphold the impugned decision of the High Court of Calcutta dated 01.10.2008 in the revisional application C.O. No. 936 of 2006 affirming the cancellation of the appointment of Nazira Khatoon as the permanent mutawalli of the wakf estate. The instant appeal is dismissed accordingly.
Md.Abrar vs Meghalaya Board Of Wakf .

The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows: One Haji Elahi Reason:

2. Baksh (‘waqif’), who was resident of Shillong, executed a registered 2 waqf deed dated 9.11.1936 dedicating properties belonging to himself, his son Md. Shafi and his son­in­law cum nephew Haji Kammu Mia to the waqf. The relevant clauses of the waqf deed are reproduced as follows:

The Assam Wakf Board, by order dated 4.3.1973, found that under Clause 2 of the waqf deed dated 9.11.1936 (supra), the surviving mutawalli from amongst the joint mutawallis was required to nominate the successor of the deceased mutawalli from the waqif’s family line. Since the surviving mutawalli Kammu Mia had failed to do so, the Wakf Board, taking note of the fact that Respondent No. 2 was the son of the deceased mutawalli, appointed him as joint mutawalli along with Kammu Mia. It is relevant to note that this order was not challenged by any of the parties herein.

Thereafter, Respondent No. 2 Md. Sulaiman acted as the joint mutawalli along with Kammu Mia, till Kammu Mia’s death on 2.2.1980, upon which Md. Sulaiman became the sole mutawalli. However, this time it was Md. Sulaiman who failed to nominate a successor to the deceased Kammu Mia. This was even though Kammu Mia during his lifetime; by deed dated 19.2.1973 had nominated his daughter’s son Md. Taiyab as his successor, which fact was also communicated to the Assam Wakf Board.

4. In view of this Court’s observation, the appellant herein, Md. Abrar, who is the brother of Md. Zakaria and also a descendant of 7 Kammu Mia through the female line, approached the Wakf Tribunal seeking appointment as a joint mutawalli. The Tribunal by order dated 19.3.2008 dismissed the appellant’s application on the ground that the High Court order dated 25.7.2007 had attained finality and hence the question of mutawalli­ship has been decided. The appellant filed a revision petition before the High Court challenging the Tribunal order dated 19.3.2008.

The aforesaid order of the Wakf Board has not been challenged by the respondents in the present appeal at any point of time. We find it difficult to understand how it can lie to Respondent No. 2 to seek appointment as joint mutawalli after his father’s death as his father’s heir and deny the same right to the descendants of his erstwhile co­ mutawalli Kammu Mia.

14. The appeal is allowed in the above terms, and the impugned judgment is set aside.
Shivkishan vs Sujata Tarachand Makhija And Ors.

3. The facts leading to the filing of Dispute No.136 of 1989 under the provisions of Section 91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur CA Nos.7652-7653 of 2019 arising out of SLP(C)Nos.29516-29517 of 2016 Shivkishan vs. Sujata Tarachand Makhija and ors. 2

1960 (‘the Act’ for short) from which present appeal has arisen, as culled out from the decision of the Cooperative Court are as under:-

the sale deed dated 25.10.1989 executed in favour of the Appellant be set aside. It was submitted:-

depositor; that she had attended the meeting dated 18.12.1988 not in her own capacity but as representative of her husband. It was asserted:-

as alleged. It is denied that the disputant has deposited the alleged amount according to the direction of this answering opponent. It is denied that the opponent No.2 issued a letter on 6.10.1987 to the disputant, asking her to deposit an amount of Rs.2,500/- within a week for the purpose of a(a) N.A. Taxes, (b) Registration charges, (c) Membership fee and other miscellaneous expenses as alleged. It is specifically denied that the disputant has paid Rs.2,500/- in case to Opponent No.2, as Secretary of opponent No.1 Society as alleged.”

membership on that date. Upon this evidence the learned trial court has held that the disputant has proved her case that she submitted her application along with form “I” & “E” and paid the entrance fee Rs.5/- and share amount of Rs.100/- total Rs.105/- on 18-12-88. The findings have not been challenged by the opponents by filing the appeal.”

The petition is partly allowed in the above terms. In the circumstances, the parties to bear their own costs.”

16. The aforesaid judgment and order passed by the High Court was challenged by the Disputant by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 136 of 2016 which was dismissed by this Court on 15.01.2016 with following observations2 :-

The meeting ended with vote of thanks & dinner. Nagpur 18/12/88 Sd/-

Secretary”

30. In the circumstances, the conclusions drawn by the High Court that the allotment of Plot No.2 in favour of the Appellant was illegal and that the Resolution passed by the Society in its meeting dated 25.03.1990 and the sale deed executed by the Society on 25.04.1989 were required to be quashed, are absolutely correct and fully justified.

31. As regards other conclusions drawn by the High Court, we need not say anything as the Petition for Special Leave to Appeal filed by the Disputant was disposed of by this Court on 15.01.2016 with the observations as quoted hereinabove.

18.12.1988 and were not otherwise allotted any plot and had not accepted such allotment.

34. With the aforesaid directions the appeals stand dismissed. No order as to costs.

September 27, 2019.