L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Ananda vs State Of Maharashtra

2. We are of the opinion that no fault can be found with the conviction of the appellant. The chain of events clearly show that the appellant who was a Patwari had tried to extort money for effecting a mutation on the basis of a gift deed that had been presented by the complainant, P.W.1. We, however, feel that in the light of the fact that the appellant, as of today, is 72 years of age and the matter has been pending in one Court or the other since January, 1987, and the prosecution is under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 under which a discretion is left to the Court to impose a sentence of less than one year, we deem it appropriate in the facts of the case, to reduce the sentence awarded to the appellant under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Crl.A. No. 376 o 2006 2 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code from one year to three months; all the substantive sentences to run concurrently. The appeal is dismissed with the above modification in the sentence.
State Of U.P. & Ors vs Sangam Nath Pandey & Ors

2. In order to appreciate the factual and legal controversies raised in this matter, it would be necessary to notice the various legislative provisions which govern the field of reservation in Public Services, in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Initially, the reservation in public services in the State of Uttar Pradesh was regulated through various Government orders, issued from time to time. The Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994 (U.P. Act No. 4 of 1994) (hereinafter 2 referred to as "1994 Act") was enacted by the State of Uttar Pradesh following the judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney Vs. Union of India1. The aforesaid act repealed the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Regulation for Backward Classes) Act, 1989 and the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1993 and the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the other Backward Classes) Ordinance, 1994.

Yours faithfully, Sd/-

24. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the interest of justice, in the peculiar facts of this case, demands that the course adopted by the State Government in segregating 367 posts for special recruitment ought not to be disturbed. For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to agree with the direction issued by the Division Bench in the impugned Judgment.

25. Before we part, we may also notice that all the writ petitioners have participated in the selection process and remained unsuccessful. Therefore, none of their legal rights has been infringed.

26. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The Judgment of the Division Bench is set aside. Civil Appeal No. 4381 of 2010

In view of the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 4360 of 2010, this appeal is also allowed and the Judgment of the Division Bench is set aside.

December 15, 2010.
C.C.E.C.& S.T.,Vishakhapatnam vs Jocil Ltd

3. The Chemical Examiner, Visakhapatnam reported that the goods in question were RBD Palm Stearin with an admixture of Palm Fatty Acid Distillate (in short "PFAD") and not crude palm stearin as declared by the importer. After due adjudication process, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs finalized the Bills of Entry by classifying the impugned goods as RBD Palm Stearin falling under Sub- heading No. 3823.11.12 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and demanded the differential duty along with applicable interest. Aggrieved by these orders, the Respondent preferred an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). When the dispute in this regard reached the Commissioner (Appeals), the claim of the Respondent was dismissed and the order of the Asst. 3 Commissioner upheld. However, on appeal to the CESTAT, the Tribunal allowed the same while relying on its decision in the case of M/s Jocil Ltd. & Ors v. The Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Visakhapatnam - II.

10. We are of the considered opinion that the import of the CRCL opinion and the CBEC Circular needs to be understood in proper perspective. The mere fact that the CRCL opinion and the CBEC Circular (No. 81/2002 - dated 03.12.2002) affirm 11 the chemical composition of palm stearin cannot make a case for its classification under Ch. Sub Heading No. 15 11 90 90. The essential conclusion to be drawn from these two reference documents is that palm stearin, which is obtained from the fractionation of palm oil, is comprised mainly of triglycerides of fatty acids. The question then arises as to whether it would be appropriate to categorize the triglycerides present in the oil, viz. Palm Stearin, under Chapter 15, while bracketing the free carboxylic acids derived during the refining process under Chapter 38.

15.Referring to the essential characteristics of the subject matter would not only be applying contorted logic in arriving at the correct classification but would also amount to ignoring the express identification offered in Chapter 38 of the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

16. We are of the opinion that the CBEC Circular needs to be thus harmonized with the Eight-digit First Schedule 16 introduced vide the Customs Tariff (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003. As mentioned before, the Circular had been issued prior to the coming into force of the amended Tariff Schedule and consequently, did not have the latter as its reference point. The goods, which were imported between August 2003 and November 2004, would undoubtedly be classified under the Eight Digit Tariff Schedule and on account of the aforementioned reasons, the subject matter in question will be classifiable under Chapter 38 of the same.

18.For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, we are in agreement with the contentions raised by the appellant and the appeals are allowed. By this judgment, the order of the CESTAT is set 17 aside, and the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals] affirming the order of the Assistant Commissioner is restored. However, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
Shiv Nath vs Gen.Secy.,Indian Rly.Conference ...

The appellant was an employee of Indian Railway Conference Association ('IRCA' for short), a department of the Railways. In regard to certain charges, one of which was that he seized the muster roll/attendance register and tore it, a chargesheet was issued to him and an enquiry was held. The enquiry officer, after holding an enquiry on 7.3.1980 and 8.3.1980, submitted an enquiry report holding the appellant guilty of the charges. As a consequence, the disciplinary authority terminated the appellant from service on 24.6.1980. The appellant challenged the termination by filing a suit (Suit No.955/1984) in the Court of the Munsif, Ghaziabad. The trial Court, by judgment and decree dated 20.4.1984, dismissed the suit. The appeal filed by the appellant was allowed by the first appellate Court by judgment dated 20.1.1990. It held that the enquiry was not proper and the 2 evidence that was let was not sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant. As a consequence, it declared the order of termination as illegal and further declared that the appellant continued as a khalasi under IRCA. The said judgment was challenged by IRCA in a second appeal before the High Court. The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 4.9.1992, allowed the second appeal. It held that the first appellate court could not re-appreciate the evidence produced in the domestic enquiry, as if it sat in appeal over the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry and the interference by the first appellate Court was not warranted. As a result, the judgment of the first appellate Court was set aside and the suit was dismissed. The said judgment of the High Court is under challenge in this appeal of the employee by special leave.

4. On the facts and circumstances, we are therefore satisfied that the High Court was justified in reversing the decision of the first appellate Court. We find no reason to interfere. Appeal is dismissed.
Commnr. Central Excise, Delhi vs M/S. Ace Auto Comp. Ltd

6. Aggrieved, the revenue took the matter further in appeal to the Tribunal. As stated above, vide the impugned order, the Tribunal has dismissed the appeal. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that:

bear a brand/trade name of another."

We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning in the afore-extracted paragraph.

(Emphasis supplied by us)

16.Consequently, for the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed; the impugned order is set aside and the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority is restored.

17.Before parting with the case, we place on record our deep appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Shri S.K. Bagaria, the learned Amicus Curiae.

18.There will be no order as to costs.

1 DECEMBER 16, 2010.
State Of Kerala vs Raneef

4. The facts of the case are that on 4.7.2010 soon after 8 a.m. seven assailants came in a Maruti Van and assaulted Prof. T.J. Jacob of Newman College, Thodupuzha and chopped off his right palm from the vicinity of his house when he was returning home after Sunday mass. The role attributed to the respondent is that he treated one of the injured assailants (who was injured when Prof. Jacob's son tried to protect his father) by suturing (stitching) his wound on the back after applying local anesthesia at a place 45 kms. away from the place of the incident.

6. The prosecution case is that the respondent gave medical aid to one of the wounded accused in pursuance of a previous plan that if and when any of the assailants got injured in the attack on Prof. Jacob then immediate medical treatment would be given by the respondent to the injured. The respondent stitched the back of an assailant, which is not the job of a dentist. 3 The respondent, along with the other accused is a member of the Popular Front of India, a Muslim organization, and was head of its medical committee. Certain documents, C.D.s, mobile phone, books, etc. including a book called `Jihad' were allegedly seized from his house and car.

We are of the opinion that at this stage there is no prima facie proof that the respondent was involved in the crime. Hence the proviso to Section 43D(5) has not been violated.

We respectfully agree with the above decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, and are of the opinion that they apply in our country too. We are living in a democracy, and the above observations apply to all democracies.

14. With the above observations, this appeal is dismissed.

3RD JANUARY, 2011
Brij Mohan & Ors vs Haryana Urban Devt.Auth.& Anr

3. The appellants 1 to 6 were the owners of 38 bighas and 3 biswas of land in Hudbust No.1, Kasba Karnal. Their lands were acquired for development and utilization of land as residential and commercial area of Karnal under a preliminary notification issued in 1989 followed by final notification issued in the year 1990. On making the award, possession was taken on 19.12.1990. The appellants made an application to HUDA for allotment of plots under the aforesaid oustees policy on 28.12.1990.

4. HUDA developed a layout (Sector-4 Part-II) for the benefit of general public in the acquired lands and offered the residential plots in that sector for allotment at the rate of Rs.1032/- per sq. m. (Rs.863/- per sq. yd.) for 300 sq. mtr. plots and Rs.1135/- per sq. m. for 420 sq.m. plots. As the appellants 3 were not allotted plots, they filed a writ petition (CWP No.2596/1992) seeking a direction to HUDA to allot to each of them a plot measuring 250 sq.yd. in Sector 4 or 5 which were being developed by the respondents, at cost on "no profit no loss basis". The said writ petition was disposed of by order dated 29.7.1992 recording the statement of the respondents that the case of the appellants was under consideration and they will be allotted plots, with a direction to the respondent to decide the matter expeditiously preferably within six months. As the order dated 29.7.1992 was not complied with, the appellants filed a contempt petition (COCP No.240/1993). Only thereafter, the second respondent (Estate Officer, HUDA) sent letters of allotment dated 13.9.1993 to each of the appellants allotting a plot measuring 209 sq.m. (250 sq.yd.) at a cost of Rs.280,478/- which works out to Rs.1342/- per sq.m. (Rs.1122/- per sq.yd.). In view of the said allotments, the contempt petitions were disposed of recording the submission that all the appellants have been allotted plots.

13. We therefore allow this appeal in part and set aside the orders of the division bench and the learned Single Judge of the High Court and direct the respondents to charge for the six plots allotted to the appellants at a price of Rs.1032/- per sq.m. (or Rs.863/- per sq.yd) instead of Rs. 1342/- per sq.m. Each of the appellants will be entitled to costs of Rs.2500/- from HUDA.
Commnr.Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Anr vs Laxmi Nath Mishra & Anr

2. The appellants informed the first respondent by allotment letter dated 22.3.2006 that a High Income Group House No.6A/180 had been allotted to him through draw of lots on 18.3.2006. This was followed by an amended letter of allotment dated 26.5.2006. This showed that the allotment was at a total cost of Rs.15,50,740; and that after adjusting Rs.26,250 (that is Rs.25,000 paid as registration deposit and interest thereon) the amount payable was Rs.15,24,490. He was required to pay a lump sum of Rs.7,75,390 immediately and pay the balance of Rs.7,49,100 with interest @13% per annum in 120 equated instalments of Rs.11,185 commencing from 1.4.2006.

3. The first respondent did not make the payment but filed a writ petition on 6.6.2006 seeking (a) a direction to the appellants not to cancel the allotment and to accept the amount due without any penal interest; and (b) a direction to the appellants to remove the two electrical poles in front of the allotted house before insisting upon the deposit. The appellants filed a counter contending that first respondent cannot object to the existence of electric poles in front of the house (at a distance of 1.2 M on the road from the boundary of the plot allotted to him). During the pendency of the said writ petition, the appellants cancelled the allotment on 21.4.2007, as first respondent failed to deposit the amounts due and complete the formalities. The High Court made an interim order on 18.5.2007 directing the appellants not to allot the said house to anyone else subject to the first respondent depositing a sum of Rupees five lakhs. In pursuance of it, the first respondent deposited Rupees five lakhs on 3 12.6.2007. Ultimately, the High Court disposed of the writ petition on 4.11.2008 directing that if the first respondent pays the entire sum of Rs.15,50,740 (less Rupees five lakhs paid on 12.6.2007) within eight weeks, he shall be extended the benefit of allotments and the appellant should execute the Sale Deed in his favour. The High Court held that as the first respondent wanted to pay the initial deposit of Rs.7,50,000 and the entire balance in one lump sum, he should not be burdened with any interest. In pursuance of the final order dated 4.11.2008, the first respondent is stated to have deposited Rs.10,50,750, on 12.12.2008.

7. The appellants claimed interest in terms of the contract.
Bachchu Singh vs State Of U.P. & Ors

2. Agra Development Authority, the fourth respondent herein, allotted a house to the sixth respondent and delivered possession to her on 18.9.1986.

3. The sixth respondent filed a writ petition in the year 2003 alleging that the appellant herein had illegally occupied the said house and, seeking a direction to the respondents 1 to 4 herein (State of UP, District Magistrate, Agra, Superintendent of Police, Agra and the Agra Development Authority) to evict the appellant from the house and deliver vacant possession to her. The said writ petition was allowed 2 by Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court by impugned order dated 25.11.2009. The High Court has not considered either the facts or the legal position. By a brief order, it narrates the aforesaid grievance of the sixth respondent that the appellant had trespassed into her house and consequently, directs the Collector, Agra to look into the matter personally and if the appellant herein is found to be a trespasser, to "throw him out" from the house within a period of one month provided there is no legal hurdle. The said order is challenged by the appellant in this appeal by special leave.

7. In view of the above, this appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside, the writ petition is dismissed without prejudice to the rights of the sixth respondent to 4 take such action as is available to her in law to secure possession of the house, if she has been dispossessed illegally.
Jonnalagadda Usha Rani vs Velamala Vasudeva Rao & Anr

2. The appellant, claiming to be the owner in possession, filed a suit against respondents for permanent injunction alleging that she and her husband were carrying on business in the said property from 1998 and the respondents were interfering with such possession. In the said suit, which was filed in July 2005, the defendants (respondents herein) filed an application in 2007 seeking a direction to the appellant (plaintiff in the suit) to deposit arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per month from 1.6.2005. By a non-speaking order dated 9.10.2007, the trial court allowed the said application and the revision filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the High Court by impugned order dated 19.3.2010. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

plaintiff should deposit Rs.5,000/- per month towards rent.

4. On this limited ground, this appeal is allowed and the order dated 19.3.2010 is set aside and the application filed by the respondents - defendants seeking deposit of rent is dismissed. It is made clear that this will not come in the way of the respondents taking such action as is permissible in law to establish that the appellant is their tenant and to recover rents if the appellant is the tenant. All questions left open.
Exec.Engineer,Karnataka Hng.Board vs Land Acquisition Officer & Ors

3. On a reference being made at the instance of the land owners, the Reference Court, by judgment and award dated 11.7.2003, determined the compensation for the acquired lands as Rs.2,17,372/- per acre. For this purpose, the Reference Court relied upon Exhibit P-2 which is a sale deed dated 30.7.1992 executed by the Municipal Commissioner, Gadag-Betegeri Municipality in favour of one Manikamma in regard to a plot measuring 329 sq. meters which was sold for Rs.37,600/- in an auction sale on 2.1.1989 (which works out to Rs.114.29 per sq.m). The Reference Court, therefore, arrived at the market value per acre as Rs.4,62,494/-. It deducted 53% towards development (that is, towards areas to be set apart for roads, drains 3 and vacant spaces and towards cost of development) and arrived at the market value as Rs.2,17,372/- per acre. The Reference Court referred to the evidence showing that the plot covered by Ex. P-2 was across the road from the acquired lands and was therefore a neighbouring property.

4. Feeling aggrieved, the Appellant (Housing Board) filed appeals. The land owners filed cross-objections. The High Court, by impugned judgment dated 30.1.2008, dismissed the appeals of the appellant and allowed the cross-objections filed by the land owners and increased the compensation to Rs.4,42,000/- per acre. Instead of Ex. P-2 relied upon by the Reference Court, the High Court relied upon Ex. P-19 which related to another auction sale of a smaller plot measuring 150 sq.m. by the Gadag-Betegeri municipality on 20.11.1989, for a price of Rs.24500/- (which works out to a price of Rs.163.33 per sq.m). On that basis the High Court works out the market value per acre as Rs.6,60,977/-. The High Court was of the view that the deduction/cut towards development factor should be only 33% instead of 53% adopted by the Reference Court. By deducting 33% from Rs.6,60,977/-

it arrived at the market value as Rs.4,42,875/- per acre which was rounded off to Rs.442,000/- per acre, while awarding the compensation.

as on 6.2.1992 based on Ex. P19, is unsustainable.

11. Accordingly we allow these appeals in part and reduce the compensation awarded from Rs.4,42,875/- to Rs.295,500/- per acre. The respondents will be entitled to all statutory benefits as already awarded.
Shivagangagiri Vidyabiruddi Samste vs State Of Karnataka & Ors

2. The appellant gave a representation to the State Government for permission to establish a Junior college.

The State Government, by order dated 3.8.1985, permitted the appellant to establish a Junior college from the academic year 1985-86.

3. Appellant claims that in pursuance of the said order, it has established and been running a Junior college. When the appellant applied for grant-in-aid, on the basis of an inspection made, the Government came to the conclusion that the appellant had not established the junior college prior to 1.6.1987. As a consequence, by order dated 7.10.1999, it held that as the Junior college was not started prior to 1.6.1987, the permission granted on 3.8.1985 lapsed.

4. However, on a subsequent inspection report dated 24.8.2000, the State Government made an order dated 1.1.2002 by which the cancellation order dated 7.10.1999 was withdrawn and the earlier order dated 3.8.1985 granting permission was revived. Administrative and educational approval to the said college was also granted from 1985-86.

8. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order dated 15.6.2010 of the Division Bench and the order dated 6.6.2007 of the learned Single Judge and allow the writ petition filed by the appellant before the High Court and quash the order dated 21.9.2002. As a consequence, the order dated 1.1.2002 will continue to be in force. We make it clear that the State Government, if it still wants to take any action with reference to the order dated 1.1.2002, may do so after giving due opportunity to the appellant to show cause in the matter. We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter and this order is made only on the ground that principles of natural justice were violated in issuing the order dated 21.9.2002.