L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
D. Ranganayakulu vs Superintendent Engineer Nsrc O&M; & Anr

JUDGMENT O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1087-1088 OF 2008 [Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.5721-5722/2005] Leave granted.

Briefly stated, the facts are as follows.

On 18/04/1996, a contract was awarded to the appellant by the respondents for work of lining the bed and sides of M.S. Right Main Canal. The work was to be completed within a period of six months divided into two slabs of three months each, i.e. three months in the year 1986 and three months in 1987. The work could not be completed within stipulated time for the reasons which we are not concerned here. Ultimately, the work was finally completed in 1989. A dispute arose. The appellant, by its letter dated 20/10/1990, addressed to the respondent to settle the dues. On 13/12/1990, the appellant .....2.

approached the Civil Court and filed an application praying to take up arbitration and act as arbitrator. On 13/02/1991, the Court refused to act as arbitrator and dismissed the application. On 06/06/1991, the appellant filed O.P. No. 167/1990 before the Principal Subordinate Judge, Nasaraopet under Section 8(1)(b) of Arbitration Act, 1940 for appointing arbitrator from list of names supplied by the appellant. In that application, counter was filed by the respondent herein objecting to jurisdiction of arbitrator. However, it appears from the counter that the respondent had submitted the names of Chief Engineer, Minor Irrigation, Chief Engineer, Medium Irrigation and Commissioner, CADA. The learned Judge, by its order dated 30/04/1993, rejected the names supplied by the parties and appointed Mr. Justice Punniah, retired Judge of the High Court as sole arbitrator.

In the facts and circumstances as recited above, the ..........9.

respondents waived their rights to file an objection at the time when the award was made Rule of the Court. For the reasons afore-stated, these appeals are allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside. No order as to costs.
Divl. Forest Officer, Kothagudem & Ors vs Madhusudhan Rao

4. From the materials as disclosed, it appears that the respondent herein was appointed as a "Forester" on 7.4.1994 and was posted in Section Komararam from 7.4.1994 to 24.8.1996. According to the appellants, during the said period the appellant was advanced funds to carry out different works under the Andhra Pradesh Forestry Project. Despite having received such funds, he did not undertake the said work and disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him on the following charges:

5. Aggrieved by the said order of punishment passed by the Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem, the respondent filed an appeal to the Conservator of Forests, Khammam Circle, Khammam. The said authority upon going through the materials was of the view that it was a clear case of misappropriation of Government funds which entailed more punishment than had been awarded by the Divisional Forest Officer. The respondent's case was, therefore, reopened in terms of Rule 18(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991 and a show cause notice was issued to the respondent in terms of Rule 37(2)(v) directing him to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service. Upon considering the reply submitted by the respondent, the Conservator of Forests passed order dated 11.7.2001 dismissing the respondent from service.

19. It is no doubt also true that an appellate or revisional authority is not required to give detailed reasons for agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum but, in our view, in the interests of justice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know at least the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. It is true that no detailed reasons are required to be given, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order affirming the views of the lower forum.

20. Having regard to the above, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the High Court and the appeal is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
Raghunath Anant Govilkar vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors

3. According to the prosecution, the appellant committed offences punishable under Sections 420, 465, 466, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1986 (in short 'IPC'). Before the Trial Court, the appellant filed an application for discharge in terms of Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C.') primarily on the ground that sanction was necessary for his prosecution. It was also submitted that proceedings could not have been initiated after his retirement in view of what has been stated under Rule 27 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 (in short 'Pension Rules'). The application was dismissed by the Trial Court. It was noted that the appellant was in Government service till 31.8.1989. The complaint was filed on 17.7.1989 which was treated as an FIR and, therefore, Rule 27 of the Pension Rules have no application. As regards the requirement of sanction in terms of Section 197 Cr.P.C. it was held that acts done by the accused did not fall within the ambit of official duty and, therefore, question of sanction did not arise.

26. The High Court, therefore, was in error in observing that sanction was not necessary because the expression used is "was".

27. But the question is really of academic nature because the alleged offences cannot be related to any official duty.

31. Though, we have held that view of the High Court about the need for sanction in the case of retired Government servant was erroneous, in view of the finding that the charged offences are not relatable to any official duty, the appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed which we direct.
State Of U.P. & Anr vs Rishipal

The respondent-workman (for short 'the respondent') was employed by the appellants on 01st January 1990 on daily wages as Cook helper in Upper Ganga Canal, Modernization Division-6, Roorkee. His services are alleged to have been terminated on 31st March 1992. After a gap of nearly six years, viz., in the year 1998, respondent filed an application for conciliation before Assistant Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer which was registered as Adjudication Dispute No.119 of 1998. The Labour Court, in its award passed on 29th August 1998, came to the conclusion that the respondent having approached the Labour Court after a lapse of five/six years, the right of the workman stood dissolved and held that his case had become stale and he was not entitled to any relief. For coming to this conclusion, the Labour Court relied on a judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Balwant Singh v. Labour Court, Bhatinda decided on 25.5.1995. On the basis of muster C.A.No.1180/08 .... (contd.)

A learned Single Judge of the High Court, by the impugned order dated 04th August 2005, dismissed the writ petition and agreed with the findings recorded by the Labour Court vide its award dated 31st May 2001. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants have filed the present appeal by special leave.

order under appeal as well as that of the Labour Court dated 31st May 2001 are set aside and the reference is answered in the negative, i.e., against the respondent-workman. No costs.
Basic Education Board, U.P vs Upendra Rai And Others

9. Admittedly, the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 8034/2001 (Upendra Rai) only holds a Diploma in Education (in short D.Ed.) which was awarded to him after he completed two years' course from DIET Jabalpur in M.P. He does not hold any of the certificates of training qualification referred to in Rule 8 of the Rules.

24. In our opinion the Division Bench also erred in holding that there was violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. We see no violation of Article 14 by the impugned circular or the advertisement dated 28.4.1999. This aspect of the matter has been discussed in detail in the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 19.12.1997 in writ petition no.33856 of 1997, Hira Mani vs. District Basic Shiksha Adhikari connected with writ petition no.32184 of 1997 Smt. Kiran Kumari vs. State of U.P., and we see no reason to take a contrary view. Hence, the view taken by the Division Bench, in our opinion, is not correct.

25. In view of the above, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the writ petition filed before the High Court is dismissed. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Civil Appeal Nos. 3998/2002, 153/2003 & Civil Appeal Nos./2008(@ SLP(Civil) Nos. 4819/2002, 9289/2002 & 20337/2002)

26. In view of the decision given above in Civil Appeal No. 8034/2001, these appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

27. Civil Appeal No. 1207 of 2006 was filed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Special Appeal No. 328 of 2001 which was dismissed both on merits and on the point of limitation. In the special circumstances, we condone the delay in filing the Special Appeal. The appeal is allowed in view of the decision given above in Civil Appeal No. 8034 of 2001. There shall be no order as to costs.

Civil Appeal Nos. 2796/2006, 4784/2006

28. In view of the decision given in C.A. No. 8034/2001, these appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Life Insurance Corporation Of India And ... vs Retired L.I.C. Officers Association ...

2. We may notice only the admitted facts herein.

During the period of 1st August, 1992 and 31st July, 1994 a revision of scales of pay of the offices and employees of the Corporation took place. Different cut off dates were fixed for grant of different nature of allowances as also pay by the Chairman of the Corporation in purported exercise of his power under Regulation 51 of the Regulations. Whereas 1st April, 1993 was the cut off date for revision of pay; 1st August, 1994 was fixed as the cut off date for the purpose of payment of gratuity on the basis of revised pay. However, so far as those employees who had retired prior to 1st August, 1994 are concerned, they were directed to be entitled to reduce gratuity based on the reduced scale of pay with effect from 1st April, 1993 only. The arrears of pay were directed to be paid only w.e.f. 1st April, 1993.

(1A) The basic pay and other allowance admissible from time to time to an employee belonging to Class II shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions contained in Schedule III.

10. Regulation 51 indisputably confers power upon the Chairman to fix a date from which the revision in pay shall apply. It applies to pay, dearness allowance and other allowances applicable to the employees of the Corporation. The question, as would appear from the discussions made hereinafter, is as to whether the expression "the date from which the revisions shall apply, and other matters connected therewith or incidental thereto", would also include the matter relating to payment of gratuity which is otherwise covered by Regulation 77 thereof.

24. Each word employed in a statute must take colour from the purport and object for which it is used. The principle of purposive interpretation, therefore, should be taken recourse to.

28. We, however, do not intend to lay down the law that the expression "incidental" or "connected" would be matters which are of a casual nature only, but, we reiterate that the same must have something to do with the nature of power granted to the authority concerned.

30. We, therefore, do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.25,000/-.
Patinhare Purayil Nabeesumma vs Miniyatan Zacharias And Another

4. Husband of the appellant was an agriculturist. He was in cultivating possession of five items of properties as a tenant under one Jenmi Palkodan Kunhmina Ayissa. Appellant contended that her husband had been in possession of the suit land from the date of settlement which took place in the year 1943; and in support thereof, Revenue Tax Receipts since 1955 were filed.

9. Indisputably the husband of the appellant applied for and has been granted a certificate of purchase by the Land Tribunal in the year 1976.

32. A certificate issued under Section 72-K of the Act is conclusive. Once the same is found to be conclusive, the same cannot be refused to be taken into consideration for any purpose whatsoever. The only issue which, therefore, should have been raised by the High Court was as to who was entitled thereto, keeping in view the fact that the Land Tribunal had granted certificates of assignment to both the parties. In view of the statutory scheme, both the parties could not have been given the certificates of assignment. The certificate in favour of the appellant, even otherwise, having been granted earlier and the same having not been set aside on the ground of fraud or illegality, it was conclusive even as against the Land Tribunal. The Land Tribunal, therefore, had no jurisdiction to issue a second certificate.

33. For the reasons aforementioned the impugned judgment of the High Court is unsustainable which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Balu @ Bakthvatchalu vs State Of Tamilnadu

2. Appellant was prosecuted for commission of an offence under Section 302 of the India Penal Code. The occurrence took place on 20th April, 1998. He was arrested on the charge of murder of one Ramu Maistry on 8th May, 1998. Upon completion of investigation a charge sheet was filed against him on 30th November, 1998. The learned trial court delivered a judgment on 28th April, 2000. In the said judgment his age was shown to be '18'. An application was filed for sending him to Borstal School in terms of Section 10-A of the Tamil Nadu Borstal Schools Act, which was refused. An appeal preferred by the appellant before the High Court has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.

5. The Parliament, however, enacted, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. It came into force with effect from 1st April, 2001.

16. We are, therefore, of the view that in this case the trial judge should be directed to hold the enquiry in regard to the age of the appellant on the date of commission of the offence and in the event it is found that the appellant was a juvenile within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act, he should proceed with the matter in accordance with law. It is directed accordingly.

17. The appeal is allowed on the aforesaid terms.
State Of U.P vs Jagram & Ors

4. At this juncture, it needs to be noted that the complainant Usman Ali had filed Criminal Appeal No.233 of 2004 before this Court questioning the correctness of the impugned judgment in the present appeal. This Court by its judgment date 22.3.2006 allowed the appeal with the following observations:

5. In this view of the matter, nothing further survives to be done in the present appeal. However, had the parties brought to the notice of the Bench hearing Criminal Appeal No. 233/2004 about pendency of the present appeal, it could have been taken up simultaneously. Apparently, that was not done.

6. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
P. Sankaran vs Assistant Collector Of Central Excise

Accused No.2 before the Trial Court is the appellant before us. He was prosecuted along with six other persons for commission of offences under Section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 ("the Act", for short) as also under Section 71 of the Gold Control Act. Out of the said seven accused, accused No.1 - Thisayaveerapandian, accused No.2 - P. Sankaran were working as Constables in the Tamil Nadu Police and accused No.4 - G. Gnana Thilgar, accused No.5 - P. Rajagopalan and accused No.6 - V. Sakthivel were Railway Police personnel.

Ninety Gold Bars are said to have arrived at Pullaveli Sea-shore near Tuticorin from Ceylon on 21.10.1989. Accused No.3 - A. Thangadurai and one Murugesan of Turicorin took charge of the said ninety gold bars and carried them to Tirunelveli. From that place they took them to Madras by Nellai Express on 22.10.1989. It appears that while travelling in the said train, accused Nos.3, 4, 5 & 6 on the one hand, and the other accused including the appellant herein, on the other, deliberated upon sharing of the said gold bars. However, it was found that accused No.1 and the appellant (A-2) were in possession of 80 gold bars. Accused No.3 kept 50 gold bars with him and allowed accused Nos.1 & 2 to have 30 gold bars. Accused Nos.1 & 2 were staying in Barani Hotel at Thirunelveli. Thirty gold bars were recovered from them.

In the morning of 23.10.1989, upon receiving information in that behalf, the Superintendent of Preventive Department of Customs conduced a search at Room No.208 at Barani Hotel at Thirunelveli and recovered 30 gold bars from the appellant and his companion. Appellant as also his companion (accused No.1) allegedly made a confession of commission of the alleged crime. All the seven accused, on trial, were convicted by the learned Trial Judge.

Accused Nos. 1 & 2 preferred an appeal before this Court and this Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the High Court for hearing the appeal afresh. By reason of the impugned judgment dated 17.4.2006, the High Court allowed the criminal appeal filed by the respondents and convicted accused No.1 and the appellant (accused No.2) before us.

Furthermore, the High Court in its impugned judgment does not deal with the question of grant of a valid order of sanction at all. As the learned Sessions Judge recorded a judgment of acquittal, the High Court while reversing the same was required to meet the reasonings given by the learned Sessions Judge. The same having not been done, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Fateh Singh(D) Th.Lrs vs Sahib Singh (D) Th.Lrs

The present appeal has been filed by the legal representatives of the Landlord (since deceased). The Landlord filed a suit for ejectment on the ground of non- payment of rent under Section 14(1)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). After service of notice on the Tenant- Defendant (since deceased), the Tenant-Respondent entered appearance and filed his written statement denying the relationship of Landlord and Tenant between the parties. As the relationship was denied by the Tenant-Defendant, the Additional Rent Controller while deferring passing of order under Section 15(1) of the Act directed parties to lead evidence. Ultimately by its order dated 20.1.1996, the Additional Rent Controller held that the Landlord has established his relationship with the Tenant-Defendant of landlord and tenant and thus directed the Tenant- Defendant to pay or tender the rent w.e.f. 1.1.1989 to 21.1.1996 at the rate of Rs.500/- per month within a period of one month. The Tenant-Defendant instead of depositing the rent and getting the benefit under Section 14(2) of the Act, preferred an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal. By order dated 28.2.1996 the Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the appeal but extended the time for complying with the order of the Trial Court for one month from the date of the order dated 28.2.1996. Again the Tenant did not deposit the rent and preferred a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. The High Court on 21.3.1996 passed an interim order which reads as under:-

The High Court has committed an error in accepting the reasoning given by the Rent Control Tribunal. The appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court dated 12.10.2006 as well as that of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 5.2.1998 are set aside. However, considering the fact that the Tenant has deposited the balance amount of rent on 31.5.1996, we direct that the decree for eviction shall not be executed till 31.8.2008 provided the respondents files the usual undertaking in this Court within four weeks.
C. Radhakrishna (D) By Lrs vs Narayana Raju (D) By Lrs. & Anr

The facts of this case illustrate a disquieting feature as to how the power under Order LXVII Rule 1 is being misused.

The plaintiffs filed a suit in 1981 for declaration of possession. The suit was decreed by the trial court on 25.9.1992. Aggrieved thereby the defendants filed appeal before the High Court which was dismissed on merits after recording a finding by the same Judge on 7.4.1999. Plaintiffs' Execution Petition was allowed by the Executing Court and warrant of delivery of possession was issued. After the warrant of delivery of possession was issued it appears that the defendants filed a review application under Order LXVII Rule 1 sometime in August, 1999 and by the impugned order the High Court has allowed, not only the review application but allowed the appeal which was already dismissed by the Court on 7.4.1999.

In the result, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court under challenge is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
B. Vishwanath vs State Of Karnataka

3. The appeal filed by the appellant was disposed of on 1.7.2006. There was no indication in the order as to whether the appeal was dismissed or allowed. Only certain directions were given to the Secretary, Home Department and Director General of Police to strictly comply with the observations that the Investigating Officers were to refer the blood stained articles and blood samples of the victim/accused, as the case may be, to the Medical College Hospital in the District or in the neighbouring District which have Forensic Science Laboratory to give report regarding the blood group. It was further directed that the Police Manual needs to be suitably amended to incorporate the suggested procedure for mandatory compliance in the protocol of investigation.

4. When it was pointed out to the learned Judge that there was no result of the appeal, the matter was listed under the heading "For being spoken to" and on 31.3.2007 it was observed that for the reasons and discussions made, the order of conviction and sentence is confirmed and appeal is dismissed. To say the least, the procedure adopted is clearly not appropriate.

14. The manner in which the appeal has been dealt with is not a correct way to deal with the appeal. No serious attempt appears to have been done by the High Court to appreciate the rival stand and/or to analyse the evidence in its proper perspective. Above being the situation, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration and disposal in accordance with law.

15. The appeals are allowed.