L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Chakarai @ Chakaravarthi vs State Rep By Inspector Of Police

3. The brief facts relating to this appeal are as under:-

On 14.5.2005, Accused No.1, along with the other 2 accused, called the deceased Ramamurthy over phone to the place of the incident on the pretext of repaying the loans. The deceased reached the place and immediately thereafter, all the accused pushed the deceased inside the Maruti van owned by one of the accused, took him away and killed him. Thereafter, the dead body was thrown near the house of an advocate at Salem.

5. The case of the prosecution is mainly based on the extra-judicial confession of the accused. Both P.W.8, who had allegedly seen the accused abducting the deceased Ramamurthy, and P.W. 11, who spoke about the alleged conspiracy, turned hostile. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are as under:-

8. Hence, we are of the opinion that the extra-judicial confession placed on record cannot be relied upon. However, even if the extra-judicial confession is to be believed, it would be unsafe to convict the accused and award life imprisonment to him based on the sole circumstance of an extra-judicial confession, more 7 particularly since all the other circumstances remain unproved, and since the Investigation Officer and P.W. 12 have not acted impartially, which is evident from the manner of recording the alleged extra-judicial confession as discussed supra.

10. Accordingly, the judgment passed by the High Court convicting the Accused No.1/Appellant stands set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. He shall be released forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.

The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
Poona Ram vs Moti Ram (D) Th. Lrs.

2. The brief facts leading to this appeal are as under:

19. The conclusion arrived at by the High Court and the reasons assigned for the same are not correct inasmuch as there is absolutely no material in favour of the case of the plaintiff to show possessory title. In order to claim possessory title, the plaintiff will have to prove his own case, and also will have to show that he has better title than any other person. Since there is no documentary proof that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property, that too for a long period, he cannot be allowed to succeed based on minor discrepancies in the evidence of the defendants. Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.

20. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 28.08.2006 and its review stands set aside and the judgment of 13 the First Appellate Court is restored. Consequently, suit stands dismissed.

January 29, 2019.
Pyarelal vs Shubhendra Pilania (Minor) Through ...

3 The family tree of the appellant is depicted below:

4 The appellant alleged that on the death of Mangalram and Rukma Devi, the agricultural land in question devolved upon respondent No. 3 and his sister Kushali Devi (mother of the Plaintiff) in equal shares. Kushali Devi died intestate and her share devolved upon her children – the appellant and respondent Nos. 7 to 10 in equal measure. The appellant and respondent Nos. 7 to 10 claim to be in possession of their share in the suit property. The appellant alleged that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 colluded with the Sarpanch of the village and got the name of respondent No. 3 recorded as the owner of the land belonging to the appellant and respondent Nos. 7 to 10. Thereafter, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 registered a gift deed dated 10 February 2011 in favour of respondent No. 1.

5 On 13 March 2012, the appellant filed a civil suit 1 against the respondents praying that the gift deed dated 10 February 2011 be declared void to the extent of the share claimed by the appellant and that respondent 1 62/2012 2 Nos. 1 to 5 be restrained from alienating the suit property. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 19082 contending that the appellant, who is not a recorded khatedar of the suit land, had filed a suit before the revenue court for the declaration of his khatedari right and the suit preferred by the appellant before the Trial court was liable to be dismissed. In reply, the appellant admitted that a suit had been filed before the revenue court for the declaration of his khatedari right but contended that the civil court had jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

The claim of the appellant to khatedari rights is pending adjudication by a revenue court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such a 13 claim. The appellant has no right to seek relief before the civil court without first getting his khatedari rights decreed by the revenue court. 23 For the above reasons, we find that there is no merit in the challenge preferred by the appellant to the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The appeals shall, accordingly stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

JANUARY 29, 2019.
The State Of Bihar vs Dr. Sachindra Narayan

2. The Institute is incorporated by the Anugraha Narayan Sinha Digitally signed by MANISH SETHI Date: 2019.01.30 Institute of Social Studies Act, 1964, (Act). The Institute has a perpetual 15:29:57 IST Reason: succession and a common seal. The Chairman of the Board of Control is 1 a nominee of the State Government. The State Government is also to nominate two persons of eminence in consultation with the Chairman; whereas, the others are ex-officio members such as Vice-Chancellor of Patna University, another Vice-Chancellor to be nominated by the State Government other than that of Patna University in rotation in alphabetical order as per names of Universities; two representatives of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi; one representative of the University Grants Commission; one faculty member not below the rank of a Professor and a Secretary to the State Government in the Department of Education and in the Department of Finance.

(3) The Fund shall be applied towards meeting the expenses of the Institute including expenses incurred in the exercise of its powers and discharge of its functions under this Act.

7. In this factual background, 27 petitioners (respondents 1 to 27 herein), in the present appeal invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court for a direction to the respondents (appellants herein) to pay the arrears as well as current pension on the month to month basis which has been stopped from the month of January 2014. The Writ Petition was dismissed on 20.06.2017 holding that the resolution of the Board dated 15.02.1985 was inconsistent with the Act and Rules, therefore, the writ petitioners were not vested with any legal right. Correspondingly, there is no legal obligation on the State to pay and that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to the authority of the State to act contrary to law. It was also held that, the payment of pension/family pension by the State for the last few years is an 6 illegality, the same cannot be directed to be perpetuated by an order of the Court.

xxx xxx xxx

The pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal vs Ratna Ashok Muranjan

3. In order to appreciate the short controversy involved in this appeal, few relevant facts need mention hereinbelow.

6. The respondents felt aggrieved and filed first appeal before the District Judge, Pune. By judgment/decree dated 10.11.2016, the first Appellate Court allowed the respondents’ (defendants’) appeal 2 and dismissed the suit. The appellant (plaintiff) felt aggrieved and filed second appeal before the High Court.

15. From the reading the impugned order, we find that, on one hand, the High Court went on interpreting the terms of the document after hearing the argument of both sides (see appearance of both parties through lawyers) and on the other hand, in conclusion, held that it does not involve any substantial question of law. It virtually, therefore, decided the second appeal bipartite like the first appeal without keeping in view the scope of its jurisdiction conferred by Section 100 (4) and (5) of the Code. In our view, the approach of the High Court while deciding the second appeal was 6 not in conformity with the requirements of Section 100 of the Code.

17. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we refrain from entering into the merits of the case having formed an opinion to remand the case and while allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned order remand the case to the High Court with a request to admit the appeal and frame appropriate substantial question(s) of law which arise(s) in the case in terms of Section 100 (4) of the Code and then decide the second appeal 7 on merits by answering the question(s) framed as per Section 100 (5) of the Code in accordance with law without being influenced by any of our observations on merits.

18. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside.

January 31, 2019.
Commissioner Of Income Tax ... vs Jagannath Gupta Family Trust

3. The respondent herein, M/s. Jagannath Gupta Family Trust, is a registered Trust under Section 12AA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, (for short ‘the Act’) and also 1 C.A.@ SLP(C)No.17428/18 approved under Section 80G(5)(vi) of the Act vide proceedings dated 16.08.2010. The trust was created with an avowed object of public and charitable purposes, namely, medical relief, education, any other causes of public utility etc. It is stated that the respondent-trust is running an Engineering College.

5. In view of such allegation, the appellant herein has initiated the proceedings for cancellation of registration and issued a show-cause notice to the respondent 2 C.A.@ SLP(C)No.17428/18 on 04.12.2015. The respondent has replied to the same and contested the proceedings. The main plank of the defence was that the procedure adopted by the appellant was contrary to the principles of natural justice. It was also the case of the respondent, that though a statement of the representative of the donor was recorded and on the said basis proceedings were initiated for cancellation of registration, but the respondent was not given any opportunity, to cross examine such representative.

14. We are of the view that such a reason assigned by the High Court is erroneous and runs contrary to the plain language of Section 12AA(3) of the Act. In view of the serious allegations made against the respondent trust, it is a matter for consideration of the issue, after giving opportunity as pleaded by the respondent but the High Court has committed error in entertaining the appeal against the remand order passed by the appellate- 10 C.A.@ SLP(C)No.17428/18 authority, and in quashing the order of cancellation of registration.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the order impugned is liable to be set aside and the same is, accordingly, hereby quashed and set aside. However, it is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits, and it is open to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions), Kolkata to consider all the issues on its own merit, uninfluenced by the observations made by the appellate authority, the High Court or in this order by this Court.

16. This appeal is allowed, with directions as indicated above, with no order as to costs.
Union Of India vs Md. Samim Azad

5. When the respondent-original writ petitioner was not appointed, having participated in the selection process, he filed abovementioned Writ Petition before High Court of Calcutta mainly on the ground that as he has continued as a halt contractor in the place of his father and having regard to guidelines issued in Circular no.99/TIV/Halts/Policy dated 17.05.1999, he is entitled for preference in appointment. The learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, by order dated 25.04.2017, by recording a finding that on the date of death of the father of writ petitioner, the contract between Railways and the deceased father of the original writ petitioner, was not existing, rejected the claim made by the respondent-original writ petitioner.

6. Against the said order, the respondent-original writ petitioner has filed intra-Court appeal before the High Court and Division Bench of the High Court has allowed the appeal by setting aside the order impugned in the petition with the direction to the Railway authorities to grant preference to the original writ petitioner in terms of clause VI of the Circular dated 17.05.1999 and to appoint him as a halt contractor at Pirtala Halt Station within a period of four weeks from the date of the order. 3 C.A.@ SLP(C)No.22212/18

6 C.A.@ SLP(C)No.22212/18

13. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the order impugned is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, same is hereby set aside. Civil appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

[R. Subhash Reddy] New Delhi February 01, 2019 7
Employees State Insurance Corporation ... vs Venus Alloy Pvt. Ltd. Thr. Managaing ...

3. 17:38:27 IST Reason: Put in brief, the relevant background aspects of the matter are that the respondent-Company had been covered under the ESI Act and had been 1 depositing the amount of contribution with reference to the wages paid to some of its employees. However, in an inspection carried out by the Appellant- Employees' State Insurance Corporation ('the Corporation'), it was observed that the respondent-Company had not made the contribution in respect of the remuneration paid to the Directors. There had been exchange of communications in regard to the liability of the respondent–Company and ultimately, by the order dated 06.04.2005, the Deputy Director of the appellant-Corporation called upon the respondent to make payment of contribution in relation to the remuneration paid to the Directors. Such a demand was questioned by the respondent- Company by way of an application under Section 75 of the ESI Act (Case No. 171 of 2005) that was considered and decided by the Employees State Insurance Court at Indore ('the ESI Court') by its order dated 24.12.2005.

7. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the record with reference to the law applicable, we are clearly of the view that the impugned orders cannot be sustained and the application filed by the respondent-Company under Section 75 of the ESI Act deserves to be dismissed.

15. In view of above, this appeal is allowed; the impugned orders are set-aside and the application filed by the respondent-Company under Section 75 of the ESI Act is dismissed.
Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. ... vs Tehri Hydro Development Corporation ...

2) The appellant herein was awarded the contract under which it was to execute certain Works. Agreement in this behalf was signed on 18th December, 1998. Some disputes arose between the parties. Since the agreement contained an arbitration clause, two claims raised by the appellant were referred for arbitration. Digitally signed by The arbitral tribunal was of three Arbitrators. This arbitration was SUSHIL KUMAR RAKHEJA Date: 2019.02.07 18:16:24 IST Reason: under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 13551 of 2013 Page 1 of 25 referred to as the ‘1996 Act’). The majority award pronounced on October 10, 2010 allowed the two claims to certain extent. On the said claims awarded, the Arbitrators also granted interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date when the arbitration was invoked, i.e., October 09, 2007, till 60 days after the award. Future interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment was also awarded.

The Clauses 50 and 51 of GCC are pari materia with Clauses 1.2.14 and 1.2.15 of GCC in THDC case. Those clauses have Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 13551 of 2013 Page 18 of 25 been interpreted by holding that no interest is payable on claim for delayed payment due to the contractor. Same construction adopted in respect of these clauses, which, in fact, is a case between the same parties, is without any blemish.

Above all, these clauses is pari materia with with Clauses 1.2.14 and 1.2.15 of GCC in THDC case which was a judgment between the same parties.

FEBRUARY 07, 2019 Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 13551 of 2013 Page 25 of 25
A Murugesan vs Smt. Jamuna Rani

5. The Trial Court, while considering the application 3 filed by the appellant herein, under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC, has considered the past events in the suit stating that the appellant is trying to protract the litigation dismissed the application by order dated 30.06.2009. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant-defendant has filed Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 15/2009 before the Additional District Court/Fast Track Court No.1, Chidambaram. Same was dismissed by order dated 13.07.2010. The matter was further carried by way of Civil Revision Petition No. 1202 of 2014 before the High Court, which also ended in dismissal by order dated 17.04.2014.

13. As the suit is for a substantive relief, i.e., for grant of decree of specific performance, and further we are satisfied that the appellant has shown sufficient cause for not appearing in the matter when the matter was called on 16.03.2009, we are of the view that it is a fit case to allow the application filed by the appellant, by setting aside the impugned orders. All the courts below committed error in rejecting the application on the grounds which are not relevant to consider the application filed under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC.

14. We are conscious of the fact that all the three courts have held against the appellant, but if we allow the impugned orders to stand, it will result in miscarriage of justice.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned orders are set aside, consequently I.A. No.117/2009 filed in O.S. No.92 of 1997 on the file of Sub-Judge, Chidambaram, stands allowed.

16. As the suit is of the year 1997, we direct the Trial Court to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from today. Both the parties shall co-operate for proceeding with the trial and for expeditious disposal in the suit.

17. It is also made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter. It is open for the Trial Court to decide the issues for consideration independently, uninfluenced by any of the observations made in the impugned order or the order passed by this Court.

18. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed, with directions as indicated above. No order as to costs.

[R. Subhash Reddy] New Delhi;

February 07, 2019
Tanu Ram Bora vs Promod Ch Das (Dead) Thr. Lrs.

3. The facts leading to the present appeal in nut and shell are as under:

11. For the reasons stated above, the present appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, as also, the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, confirmed by the first appellate Court, are hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, Title Suit No. 16 230/1995 preferred by the original plaintiff is hereby decreed in toto. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
The Municipal Corporation Faridabad vs Modern School Faridabad

4. The Municipal Corporation issued an office order on 14.06.1999 for regularisation of tubewells causing unauthorized activities of discharging of the waste water into the main sewer of the Corporation. It was decided that all private tubewell owners who have installed tubewells within the area of Municipal Corporation shall use water for domestic or industrial purposes and that water shall not be sold or used for commercial purposes. The charges were decided to be levied as per the diameter of tubewells and that such tubewells have to be registered with the Central Ground Water Board Authority.

6. Another notice was served upon the Schools on 23.10.2000 communicating that the Schools are discharging water into property vested in the Municipal Corporation, therefore, the Schools have to pay user charges for the operation of the tubewell installed privately. The notice is as under:-

194. Control of drain and sewage disposal works. –- (1) All Corporation drains, all sewage disposal works and works materials and things appertaining thereto shall be under the control of the Commissioner. (2) The Commissioner shall maintain and keep in repair all municipal drains and sewage disposal works and when authorised by the Corporation in this behalf, shall construct as many new drains and sewage disposal works as may from time to time be necessary for effectual drainage and sewage disposal.

….……….

xxx xxx xxx 8

205. Connection with water works and drains not to be made without permission.-- Without the written permission of Commissioner, no person shall for any purpose whatsoever, at any time make or cause to be made any connection or communication with any drain referred to in section 194 or any water-works, constructed or maintained by, or vested in the Corporation.”

14. In terms of Section 43, one of the obligatory functions of Corporation is- construction, maintenance and cleaning of drains and drainage works and also scavenging, removal and disposal of filth, rubbish and other obnoxious or polluted mattes. It is in exercise of such function that the Municipal Corporation has provided for the disposal of the waste water from residential, commercial and industrial areas falling within the area of Municipal Corporation into its sewer drain.

20. The water extracted by tubewells installed by the Schools is discharged into the Municipal drains, therefore, the Corporation is justified to levy user charges whereby, the waste water of the Schools is carried by the Municipal drains.

25. Consequently, the appeals are allowed. The Order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court dated 21.12.2015 and the Order dated 19.02.2015 of learned Single Judge are set aside and the Writ Petitions are dismissed.
Varinder Kumar vs The State Of Himachal Pradesh

2. The appellant is stated to have been apprehended on 31.03.1995 carrying “charas” on his scooter, in two gunny bags, with varying quantities. The Trial Court acquitted the appellant on grounds of non­ compliance with Section 100(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with regard to independent witnesses. Further, there had been non­ compliance with Sections 50, 52 and 57 of the NDPS Act, and that the 1 seal prepared at the time of seizure and handed over to PW­5, Naresh Kumar had not been produced in the court.

Attempts will be made to reopen cases which have become final.”

18. The criminal justice delivery system, cannot be allowed to veer exclusively to the benefit of the offender making it uni­directional exercise. A proper administration of the criminal justice delivery system, therefore requires balancing the rights of the accused and the prosecution, so that the law laid down in Mohan Lal (supra) is not allowed to become a spring board for acquittal in prosecutions prior to the same, irrespective of all other considerations. We therefore hold that all pending criminal prosecutions, trials and appeals prior to the law laid down in Mohan Lal (supra) shall continue to be governed by the individual facts of the case.

19. The present appeals lack merit and are therefore dismissed.

…………...................CJI.