L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of Haryana & Anr vs Aravali Khanij Udyog & Anr

3) As per the said decision, on 27.09.1984, the respondent- herein was advised to apply for the mining lease of ordinary sand. According to the Department, in spite of four reminders, no steps were taken by the respondent to apply for the mining lease for the ordinary sand. A notice dated 12.07.1985 was also served upon them. Finally, the mining lease was prematurely terminated on 06.05.1986. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed a revision before the Central Government. On the basis of the undertaking of the lessee, the Central Government, vide its order dated 28.03.1998, while restoring the mining lease of the respondent also directed them to apply for the mining lease of ordinary sand within 30 days of the order. Subsequent to the order of restoration, the respondent applied for the grant of mining lease of ordinary sand which was granted to them for a period corresponding with the mining lease period of silica sand i.e. up to 17.02.2000. Since the period of mining lease was to expire on 17.02.2000, the respondent submitted a representation on 01.03.1999 to the State Government requesting for extension of the mining lease by 850 days on the ground that for 850 days his mining lease remained terminated in past. Since no decision was taken by the State Government on the request of the respondent, the respondent filed a writ petition No. 602 of 2000 in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which, by order dated 16.02.2000, directed the State to take a decision on the representation of the respondent within a period of one month. Pursuant to the said direction and after hearing the counsel for the respondent herein, by order dated 03.03.2000, the Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Haryana, Mines and Geology Department rejected the representation for extension of the mining lease period.

b) after expiry of the lease, the site in question was auctioned on 20.12.2001 and given to M/s Dolphin Minerals, Guragon, who was the highest bidder. Though the said order was challenged by the respondent-herein, admittedly the writ petition was dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

c) As per the order of this Court dated 16.12.2002, the mining operation in the entire area of Gurgaon Dist. is prohibited.

11) In view of the same, the direction of the High Court granting relief in favour of the respondent-herein cannot be implemented at this juncture. However, the respondent is free to approach the appropriate court for damages/compensation if the same are permissible in accordance with law.

12) With the above observation, the appeal is allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4855 OF 2007 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12611 OF 2001)

13) Leave granted.

14) The respondent-herein questioning the order of the very same High Court dated 21.03.2001 passed in C.W.P. 14277 of 1999 against cancellation of the lease filed the above appeal by way of special leave.

15) In view of our conclusion in Civil Appeal No. 5874 of 2000, the appeal filed by the respondent-herein M/s Aravali Khanij Udyog is dismissed.
Basanti Devi vs Raviprakash Ramprasad Jaiswal

5. However, an application for amendment of the application for grant of probate was filed in the said testamentary proceedings which was allowed. On the basis of the averments made by the respondent in the amended application, citations were published only at Bombay on 28.1.1997. Respondent, however, filed an application for amendment of the petition for grant of probate on 21.03.1997, inter alia, stating :

4. The Milk shop being shop No.1/11 situated at Bharat Building Sonapur lane Chira Bazar Mumbai-2 currently infrastructure in the name & style of Mahadeo farm : together with valued at Rs. 50,000/-

7. However, no citation was made in the State of Uttar Pradesh. A probate was granted in favour of the respondent by the High Court by order dated 7.4.1997. An application for revocation of the said grant of probate was made by the petitioner herein, inter alia, on the premise that although she was one of the heirs of the said Lakhpati Devi, no citation was made. Furthermore, a Will had also been executed in her favour.

16. In the application for amendment of the application, a vague statement was made. Even therein it was not disclosed that another property is situated in the District of Pratapgarh in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the reason therefor is beyond anybodys comprehension.

Explanation.Just cause shall be deemed to exist where

(a) & (b) ...

(d) to (e) ...

Appellant had merely filed an application. The said application has not been entertained although the same, in our opinion, should have been done. The question, therefore, is as to whether the said application should have been entertained.

22. It is now well settled that an application for grant of probate is a proceeding in rem. A probate when granted not only binds all the parties before the Court but also binds all other persons in all proceedings arising out of the Will or claims under or connected therewith. Being a judgment in rem, a person, who is aggrieved thereby and having had no knowledge about the proceedings and proper citations having not been made, is entitled to file an application for revocation of probate on such grounds as may be available to him. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the application for revocation of the grant of probate should have been entertained.

23. The impugned judgment, therefore, is set aside and the appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the learned Single Judge of the Probate Court with costs. However, we make it clear that we have not entered the merit of the matter.
Prakash Chandra Yadav vs State Of Bihar & Ors

3. The factual matrix of the matter, as stated in the First Information Report, is that at about 12.30 pm on 3.2.1994, the informant, Prakash Chandra Yadav (PW-10) went to Railway Authority Club, Jamalpur to receive the Chief Railway Engineer, Eastern Railway Gorakhpur and Additional Divisional Engineer, Sonepur. He waited for the said officers but having come to learn that they would come later, left the club for his home at about 3.15 pm by his motorcycle. Mantu Kumar (PW-7) was with him on the said motorcycle.

4. Accused, Shyamdeo, named in the First Information Report as also one unknown man, were standing on the road and were allegedly noticed by the informant after coming out of the southern gate of the club. When they were proceeding towards the west, Shyamdeo ordered to kill the informant whereupon Janardan Yadav took out a bomb from his bag and hurled the same towards them. It, however, did not explode. Respondent Satya Narayan Yadav also hurled a bomb towards the informant. It exploded but the informant did not sustain any injury. Several persons assembled at the said place whereupon, Shyamdeo Yadav allegedly chased them with his licensed gun.

5. The said incident is said to have been witnessed by Suresh Yadav, Jawahar Yadav, Ram Naresh Prasad and several others. Besides Prakash Chandra Yadav (PW-10) and the informant, the prosecution examined Suresh Yadav (PW-3), who is the brother of the informant, Jawahar yadav (PW-4) cousin of the informant, Chunkeshwar (PW-2), Ram Naresh Yadav (PW-5), father of the informant and Mantu Kumar (PW-7) (who was the pillion rider) besides B.K. Mishra (PW-9), the Assistant Director, Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Muzaffarpur, the Chemical Examiner who had examined the alleged explosive substances recovered from the place of occurrence.

7. The learned Sessions Judge found the respondents guilty for commission of an offence under Section 307/109B of the Indian Penal Code but acquitted them from the charges under Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substance Act on the ground that no sanction from the appropriate authority had been obtained therefor. Janardan Yadav and Satya Naryan was convicted under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and Shyamdeo Yadav was convicted under Section 307/109 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years.

The High Courts judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the matter afresh. We, however, make it clear that we have not gone into the merit of the matter. The High Court is requested to hear and dispose of the criminal appeal expeditiously. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.
Parayya Allayya Hittalamani vs Sri Parayya Gurulingayya Poojari & Ors

2. There is a temple in the village Terdal under the Jharkhandi Taluk in the State of Karnataka, commonly known as Sri Prabhudeva Temple. Parties hereto are the hereditary poojaris of the said temple. They are entitled to bless the devotees, receive alms and other offerings made by the devotees throughout the year. The turn of worship has been amicably divided and settled, inter alia, amongst the plaintiffs and the defendants.

4. Disputes and differences having arisen between the parties in regard to right of inheritance of offering poojas in the said temple, the father of the plaintiff filed a suit which was marked as OS No.143 of 1956. Parties therein purported to settle their disputes. The consent terms were filed which were accepted by the Court. The said terms are :

8. Defendants filed a second appeal before the High Court which was marked as Revision Second Appeal No.250 of 1992. The High Court, however, was of the opinion that as both the parties would get their turns alternatively, i.e., once in 12 years, the courts below committed a mistake in mixing up that issues wrongly with the real dispute, stating :

The consent decree, appears to be meant to be operative for a limited period viz. 1956 and 1961.

23. We, however, make it clear that we have not gone into the question as to whether any offerings made in Hundies for development shall go to any of the parties or not. Such a question having not been gone into by the courts below, we refrain ourselves from doing so.

24. For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned judgment is set aside. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Swapan Kumar Pal vs Achintya Kumar Nayak & Ors

2. The parties hereto were contenders for grant of a Modified Rationing (MR) Shop. The MR shop in question situated in village Sasanga was given to one Abdul Salim who was appointed as a MR dealer. He was found to have been committed some irregularities in relation to distribution of Kerosene. An enquiry in regard thereto was conducted. His licence was suspended. He preferred an appeal thereagainst. The Appellate Authority while confirming the suspension of licence for kerosene, however, directed restoration of dealership in respect of other items like rice, wheat, sugar etc.

3. Salim filed a writ petition which ultimately came up for hearing before a Division Bench. Keeping in view the fact that in the mean time MR dealership at village Sasanga was given to the first respondent herein, the Division Bench give liberty to Salim to make him as a party in the appeal preferred before the appellate authority.

4. During the pendency of the said proceedings, a regular selection for appointment process of MR dealers at Sasanga village was conducted. There were three contenders, one of them being one Ms. Sarama Mondal left the fray in the midway. Between rest of the two, recommendations were made by the competent authority to grant MR dealership of Sasanga to Achintya. Pursuant to the said recommendations, the Collector (District Controller) granted MR dealership to the first respondent by an order dated 15.2.2002.

5. A writ petition filed by the appellant herein was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. However, on an intra-court appeal having been preferred by the first respondent herein, a Division Bench of the Court allowed the same by reason of the impugned judgment dated 9,11,2006.

20. We, therefore, are of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Ratnabali Capital Markets Ltd vs Securities & Exchange Board Of India & ...

5. For the sake of convenience, we may mention hereinafter the facts in the case of Ratnabali Capital Markets Ltd. ("RCML") which are as under.

7. SEBI adopted recommendations of Gupta Committee stating that no company whose net worth was less than rupees three crores would be allowed to trade as a broker in the derivative segment of the Stock Exchange. To meet this net worth criteria, RSL and RCML merged under the Scheme of Amalgamation sanctioned by the order of the Calcutta High Court. Under that order, all rights, licences, assets, properties and registrations of RSL stood transferred by operation of law to RCML.

19. For the aforestated reasons, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the Securities Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai. Accordingly, both the civil appeals stand dismissed with no order as to costs.
Iqbal vs State Of Kerala

4. The background facts, as projected by prosecution in nutshell are as follows:

8. Clause 'sixthly' clearly stipulates that sexual intercourse with a woman with her or without her consent when she is under 16 years of age, amounts to rape. The evidence on record clearly establishes that the victim was less than 16 years of age and, therefore, the conviction for offences punishable under Section 376 IPC cannot be faulted.

10. In the instant case, the admitted case of the prosecution is that girl had left in the company of the accused of her own will and that she was not forced to sexual intercourse with any person other than the accused. The admitted case is that she had sexual intercourse with the accused for which, considering her age, conviction under Section 376 IPC has been maintained. Since the essential ingredient that the intercourse must be with a person other than the accused has not been established, Section 366A has no application.

11. In the result, the conviction for offence punishable under Section 366A IPC is set aside while the conviction and sentence imposed in respect of offence punishable under Section 376 IPC is maintained.

12. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Union Of India (Uoi) vs Dr. Jai Dev Wig And Ors.

3. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:

5. Thus, the contrary view taken by the High Court holding both the respondents entitled for benefit of relaxation in terms of the aforesaid Office Memorandum is erroneous and cannot be sustained. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. The orders of the High Court as well as the order of the Tribunal granting benefit to the respondents shall stand set aside. We may clarify that in the meantime if any benefit of the order of relaxation has been given to Dr. Jai Dev Wig and Dr. M.S. Sekhon by the concerned authority, such benefit shall not be withdrawn from them. No order as to costs.
State Of Punjab & Ors vs Harbhajan Singh & Anr

2) The brief facts in nutshell are as under:

On 31.8.2002, the respondent served a legal notice of demand for granting him gratuity and pension in civil side by taking into consideration his service in the army. In February, 2003, the respondent filed writ petition before the High Court praying for quashing of the order dated 2.11.2001 of the Accountant General, Punjab and for counting the service rendered by him in the army. The High Court allowed the writ petition in terms its decision in Dev Dutt, ASI vs. State of Punjab & Ors., 1996 (7) SLR 807 and directed the State to re- compute the pension of the respondent herein and to make the payment within six months. Dissatisfied with the said order, the State filed the present appeal before this Court.

7) On 10.05.1988, respondents name was sponsored by employment exchange for the post of JBT teacher in Punjab Education Department. Though he was rejected on the ground that he does not fulfill educational qualification for the post, by proceedings dated 09.08.1988 Director Public Instructions declared him as qualified. Thereafter, on 29.08.1988, he submitted representation to the Recruitment Committee for considering his case based on the instruction dated 09.08.1988. When Education Department, Pubjab again invited applications, through advertisement, for appointment as JBT teachers, the respondent applied for it and on 01.08.1992, he was selected. On 31.03.1994, he was issued an appointment letter and he joined at Government Primary School, Ludhiana on 22.04.1994. It is seen from Annexure-P4 that at the time of joining, he was drawing his army pension and allowed to draw the same. Since the respondent was to retire on 31.01.2002, he submitted his pension case on 10.10.2001 to the Accountant General. By order dated 02.11.2001, Accountant General rejected his case on two grounds 1) service rendered by him on civil side was seven years nine months and nine days, which was less than 10 years as per Punjab Civil Service Rules; 2) service rendered in defence cannot be counted as there is gap of more than 3 years as per government instructions of 1982. When the said order was challenged before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, following the earlier decision in Dev Dutts case (supra) after quashing the communication of the Accountant General, necessary direction was issued.

As such any period of earlier service should be taken into account for determination of seniority in the later service only for some very compelling reasons which stand the test of reasonableness and on examination can be held to be free from arbitrariness.

Admittedly, the appellants came to be appointed not during the emergency but in the regular process.

14) In the light of the above discussion, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. No costs.
Veneet Agrawal vs Union Of India & Others

2. By the impugned judgments, the High Court of Bombay and Uttaranchal have upheld the vires and constitutionality of SEBI (Stock Brokers and Sub Brokers) Rules and Regulations, 1992 (for short the Rules & Regulations of 1992). The facts are taken from Civil Appeal No. 2565 of 2005. Although in the writ petition several other points were also taken but at the time of argument before the High Court, the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners confined his submissions to the question of vires of the rules and regulations only.

19. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in these appeals and the same are dismissed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 20,000/- in each of the appeals.
M/S. P. Vaikunta Shenoy & Co vs P. Hari Sharma

2. The plaintiff-appellant has alleged that he was carrying the business of commission agent. The defendant was having an areca nut (supari) garden and he used to supply the areca nuts to the plaintiff. The defendant used to receive money from the plaintiff off and on, which the plaintiff used to advance him to secure regular supply of the areca nuts. It was alleged by the plaintiff that defendant had borrowed Rs.72,044.43 paise as per the ledger account regularly maintained by the plaintiff. Hence the plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of this amount with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum.

14. In view of the above this appeal is allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the trial court is restored. No order as to costs
Bhudev Sharma vs District Judge, Bulandshahr & Anr

2. The appellant is a blind man. He appeared in the recruitment test held in the year 1992 for selecting candidates for Class-III Posts in Bulandshahr Judgeship in U.P. However, he was not selected and hence he filed a writ petition which was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court by his judgment dated 25.09.1997. Against that judgment the State Government filed a letters patent appeal which has been allowed by the impugned judgment by the Division Bench. Hence this appeal.

4. In this view of the matter, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and it is directed that the appellant be appointed on a Class-III Post in Bulandshahr Judgeship forthwith.

5. We are informed that the appellant is already working on the post in view of the interim order of this Court. Hence he shall be regularized and allowed to continue working as a regular Class-III employee and shall be given all the consequential benefits.
Girja Kumar & Ors vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Anr

1) The plaintiffs who succeeded before the trial Court, lower appellate Court and lost their suit before the High Court filed the above appeal.

2) Brief facts required for the disposal of this appeal are as follows:

After arriving at such conclusion on question No.1, the High Court, without going into the second question or adverting to the case of the plaintiffs i.e., adverse possession, by order dated 04.01.2000, allowed the second appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court as well as by the lower appellate Court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs as being time barred. Challenging the said order, the plaintiffs have filed the present appeal.

6) Under these circumstances, the judgment and decree dated 4.1.2000 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in R.S.A. No. 304 of 1992 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court to decide the issue relating to adverse possession. However, it is made clear that except the finding relating to limitation, we have not expressed any opinion on the conclusion of the courts below relating to the other issues; hence it is for the High Court to decide the same on merits one way or the other with the available materials. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs suit is of the year 1989 and even the RSA is of the year 1992, we request the High Court to dispose of the matter within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this judgment.

7) The appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above. No order as to costs.
Jaslok Hospital And Research Center vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. [Alongwith ...

7. For the convenience of reference, the facts are taken from C.A. No. 7284/2005.

8. The appellant obtained Customs Duty Exemption Certificate (for short `CDEC'), from the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS), for import of various hospital equipments under Notification No. 64/88-Cus. Dated 1st March, 1988 (for short 'the Notification'). CDECs issued to the appellant relate to import of medical equipments for the period between 1988 and 1994. The CDECs certified that the appellant was covered under para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification. The same reads as under:

9. The said CDECs were cancelled/withdrawn by the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS) vide its communication bearing No. Z.37024/13/92-MG dated 14th November, 2000 addressed to the Chief Executive Director of the appellant, on the ground that the appellant- hospital had failed to comply with the conditions laid down in para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification extracted above.

10. After about three years, the appellant made a representation to the Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare on 24th September, 2003, seeking categorization under para 1 (extracted below) instead of para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification.

14. The representation of the appellant, as stated above, was rejected by the DGHS on the ground that the State Government had recommended the appellant's case only under para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification which, inter alia, stipulates that the hospital has to provide free treatment to 40 per cent of the outdoor patients and to all indoor patients whose income is less than Rs.500/- per month.

20. For the reasons stated above, we are not inclined to interfere with the orders passed by the High Court. The Civil Appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.