L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Laxmi Chaudhary vs Sahib Singh Chaudhary

(3) The facts of the case in a nutshell are as follows. The respondent-plaintiff-landlord filed a suit for eviction and recovery of damages and mesne profit against the appellant- defendant-tenant (in regard to the tenanted property comprising basement and the second floor in J-1/72 in Gupta Colony, New Delhi). The Trial court by its judgment dated 21st December, 2017 decreed the suit in favour of the respondent-landlord and 2 ordered eviction. The Trial Court further awarded the damages payable to the respondent-landlord at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per month w.e.f. 17th January, 2008 till the delivery of the possession of the property. The Trial Court also granted permanent injunction in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. (4) The appellant-defendant preferred appeal before the High Court. By order dated 27th August, 2018, the High Court admitted the appeal and granted stay of the order of the Trial court subject to the appellant’s paying the damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs.7,500/- per month from 17 th January, 2008 till 31st December, 2017 and thereafter at the rate of Rs.15,000/- w.e.f. 1st January, 2018, payable by 30th day of each calendar month. The High Court also directed that in case of delay of payment, interest at the rate of 6% per annum is payable by the appellant to the respondent. The appellant could not comply with the condition as ordered by the High Court and, therefore, by the impugned Order dated 4 th December, 2018, the High Court has vacated the stay granted in favour of the appellant-defendant. Being aggrieved, the appellant-defendant has preferred this appeal. (5) By Order dated 18th January, 2019, this Court has directed the appellant to pay the arrears of Rs.10,80,000/- and also to pay Rs.15,000/- from 1st January, 2018. By Order dated 8 th February, 2019, the said order was modified directing the appellant to deposit amount of Rs.15,000/- before the High 3 Court. In compliance of the order of this Court dated 18th January, 2019, without prejudice to her contentions, the appellant has deposited Rs.10,80,000/- before the High Court. Likewise, the appellant-defendant has been depositing Rs.15,000/- as damages for use and occupation of premises viz., basement as well as the second floor and such deposit was without prejudice to her contentions in the eviction suit. (6) We have heard Mr. Rajan Kumar Chourasia, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-defendant-tenant and Mr. D.K. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff- landlord and also perused the impugned judgment and the materials on record.

(11) The appeal is allowed with the direction, as indicated above. No costs.
Atul Chandra Das(D) Tr.Lrs. vs Rabindra Nath ...

Since Bholanath failed to perform the obligation, O.S. No.171 of 1962 was filed by Atul Chandra Das for specific performance. On 30.11.1977 a decree was passed in favour of Atul Chandra Das. In terms of decree he deposited the balance consideration and finally a sale deed was 2 executed in his favour. He claimed to be the landlord of the building and alleging that defendants have no right to occupy the premises, he sought recovery of possession by evicting the defendants. The defendants filed written statement. That apart they also filed the other suit namely Suit No.1271 of 1980. Therein the following averments were made inter alia:

The title deeds were to be kept with Bholanath by way of further security. The agreement which is referred to by Atul Chandra Das as an agreement for sale in his favour dated 15.8.1960 is described as a collusive and fraudulent agreement and it was entered into before the expiry of period of redemption. The plaint schedule property comprised of a three storied building standing upon an area of 1 cottah and 8 chittackas of land and the value at the relevant time would not have been less than Rs.30,000/-, the annual municipal value being Rs.1469/- declared at that point of time. Bholanath was a mere mortgagee in a mortgage by conditional sale. The specific performance suit was described as a collusive suit. Bhattacharyas claimed to be the owners being 4 legatees under the will. The relief sought by the plaintiffs in O.S. No.1271 of 1980 is relevant. The relevant portion reads as below:-

within 2 years was on ostensible sale amounting to a mortgage by conditional sale and the sallers in the said deed of sale were mortgagors and the buyer therein was the mortgagee and the period of redemption was 2 years as provided in the said agreement for sale dt. 7.12.59.

Government or any State Government or by any local authority in West Bengal;

operative society, insurance company, life assurance company, Life Insurance Corporation of India, mutual insurance company, provident insurance society or from a provident fund;

(g) * * * *

(i) a loan or debenture in respect of which dealings are listed on any Stock Exchange;”

20. We see no merit in the appeals and the appeals stand dismissed.

APRIL 04, 2019.
Bhagwan Das Goel (Dead) Through His Lrs. ... vs Pyare Kishan Agarwal

3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point.

4. The appellants are the legal representatives of the original defendants and the respondent herein is the plaintiff of the suit out of which this appeal arises.

6. However, the disputes arose between the partners of this firm(Gupta Bus Service), which resulted in its dissolution. It was alleged that Clause 11 of the Partnership Deed provides for resolution of disputes arising out of the partnership between the parties by an Arbitrator. The respondent, therefore, prayed that an Arbitrator be appointed in terms of Clause 11 of the Partnership Deed for deciding the disputes, which have arisen between the parties relating to the partnership.

9. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the order of the Civil Judge, which has given rise to filing of this appeal by way of special leave by the defendants in this Court.

15. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the writ petition, out of which this appeal arises, afresh on merits as observed above.

16. Since we have formed an opinion to remand the case to the High Court instead of deciding the issue for the first time in this appeal on facts, we refrain ourselves from exercising the issue on merits. The High Court will, therefore, decide the 6 matter strictly in accordance with law uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned order and this order.

17. Since the matter is quite old, we request the High Court to dispose of the writ petition as expeditiously as possible preferably within six months.

April 04, 2019 7
T. Ramalingeswara Rao (Dead) Thr. Lrs. vs N. Madhava Rao

3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point.

4. The appellants herein are defendant Nos.1 and 2, respondent Nos.1­3 herein are the plaintiffs and respondent Nos.5­9 are the defendant Nos.4­8 of the civil suit out of which this appeal arises.

6. The appellants (defendant Nos.1 and 2) contested the suit whereas the remaining defendants (4 to 8) remained ex parte. The Trial Court by judgment/decree dated 20.08.2001 dismissed the suit. Respondent Nos.1­3 (plaintiffs) felt aggrieved and filed first appeal before the Additional District & Sessions Judge(Fast Track 2 Court), Visakhapatnam. By judgment dated 07.11.2005, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment/decree of the Trial Court.

19. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 (appellants herein) being the purchasers of the suit property from one of the co­sharers stepped into the shoes of their vendor (co­sharer) and, therefore, had a right to defend their title and possession against the other co­sharer.

21. As noted above, the High Court failed to appreciate the factual and legal controversy in its proper perspective and, therefore, erred in interfering in the concurrent findings of the fact without recording a finding as to why the concurrent findings of fact are bad in law and why it requires interference in its second appellate jurisdiction.

22. In view of the foregoing discussion, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and restore the judgment/decree of the Trial Court/First Appellate Court which dismissed the suit filed by respondent Nos.1­3 (Plaintiffs).

April 05, 2019 8 9
S. Kumar vs The Commissioner

3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of these appeals, which involve a short point.

5. The appellants individually claim to be carrying on their small business of selling items by setting up their shops in the premises of several temples situated in various places in the districts of the State of Tamil Nadu.

15. It is for this reason, we are inclined to allow these appeals, set aside the impugned order and grant liberty to the respondents to take recourse to the remedies provided to them against the appellants individually in relation to the controversy raised by them in these proceedings.

16. Needless to say, we have not gone into the merits of the claim raised by the appellants whether individually or/and severally. The respondents will, therefore, be at liberty to proceed in the matter in question against the appellants individually strictly 8 in accordance with law uninfluenced by any observations made by this Court.

17. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals succeed and are accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside.

April 08, 2019 9
Caretel Infotech Ltd. vs Hindustan Petroleum Corporation ...

4. The show cause notice alleged that on questions being raised about the correctness of information furnished by the appellant in the bid documents regarding running of call centres at different locations, an inquiry was made through officers and despite further information being 2 sought, the same was not forthcoming. The operative portion of the show cause notice reads as under:

8. Respondent No.3 filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court on 17.2.2018, assailing the declaration of the appellant as L-1. The purchase order in favour of the appellant confirming the terms of contract and mode of payment was issued on 21.2.2018. One day later, on 22.2.2018, the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare passed an 5 order blacklisting and debarring the appellant from participating in any tender process of the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare for two years with effect from the date of issue of the order. This order was assailed by the appellant by filing a writ petition before the Delhi High Court, which was pleased to issue notice on 9.3.2018, and we are informed that subsequently, on 12.3.2019, that petition was dismissed and a Letters Patent Appeal filed against the same is pending.

11. On 7.1.2019, notice was issued on the present appeal filed against the impugned order and an interim order was passed in the following terms:

27. On both these accounts it cannot be said that the appellant would be disentitled to the contract.

35. We, thus, are unable to sustain the impugned order even on this ground.

Epilogue:

43. The observations made aforesaid should be understood in the larger context, so as to avoid situations similar to the one we find in the impugned order.

Conclusion:

44. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the impugned order is set aside and the writ petition filed by respondent No.3 is accordingly dismissed.

45. The appeal is accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

April 09, 2019.
M/S. D.J. Malpani vs Commissioner Of Central Excise, Nashik

The appellant-assessee manufacture goods falling under Chapter 24 of the Schedule of The Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). While selling goods, the appellant-assessee charged the customers invoices for the price of goods plus Dharmada, a charitable donation. According to the appellant, the Dharmada was paid voluntarily by customers and was meant for charity. It was accordingly credited to charity.

2. However, the Superintendent, Central Excise, Nashik issued show cause notices and raised a demand of duty in respect of Dharmada, claiming it was part of the price for the sale of manufactured goods and included it for computing assessable Digitally signed by SANJAY KUMAR value.

5. Thereafter, in an appeal filed by Revenue, the Commissioner (Appeals), however, held that the Dharmada was liable to be included as a part of the assessable value and therefore the goods were liable to be assessed on the basis of their price plus Dharmada.

works prices determined ……..” and

23. In the circumstances we hold that when an amount is paid as Dharmada along with the sale price of goods, such payment is not made in consideration of the transfer of goods. Such payment is meant for charity and is received and held in trust by the seller. If such amounts are meant to be credited to charity and do not form part of the income of the assessee they cannot be included in the transaction value or assessable value of the goods.

25. The judgment of the CESTAT is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed.

The Revenue-Appellant has come in appeal against the order of the Central Excise and Service Tax Appellant Tribunal (for short “CESTAT”) dated 04.04.2007. The Respondent manufactured goods falling under Chapter 72 of The Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The Respondent manufactured Pig Iron and HR Coil Sheets. While selling the goods they raised invoices on the price of goods plus ‘Dharmada’ a charitable donation from customers. According to the Respondent, the Dharmada was meant for charity and was accordingly credited to charity.

6. In view of the judgment in the case of Civil Appeal No. 5282 of 2005, M/s D.J. Malpani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik, we hereby dismiss the present appeal.
Jvpd Scheme Welfare Trust Thr. Its ... vs The Chief Officer, M.H.A.D. .Brd Grih ...

2. The facts leading to the present appeal and the case of the appellant herein (the original writ petitioner) in nutshell are as under:

8. The submission on behalf of the appellant that as per the order passed by this Court dated 10.05.2005, the arrangement, if any, with Respondent No. 4 would be subject to the result of present writ petition and, therefore, the appellant is not required to challenge the lease in favour of Respondent No. 4, cannot be accepted. In the present appeal, there is no specific challenge to the lease in favour of Respondent No. 4. Under the circumstances of the case, we decline to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court and we decline to grant any relief to the appellant. At the same time, we observe that we have not expressed anything on the merits, on the legality and validity of the lease in favour of Respondent No. 4.

9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, the same is dismissed with the above observations. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 23

April 9, 2019
Shriram Tomar & Anr.Etc. vs Praveen Kumar Jaggi .

2.1 All these appeals arise out of the impugned common judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh) passed in Writ Appeal Nos. 1510/2007, 1509/2007, 1508/2007, 1511/2007 and 1535/2007, by which the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the said appeals, however, while dismissing the said appeals, modified the order passed by the learned Single Judge and directed that instead of preparing a fresh select list, the establishment would conduct the fresh exercise for promotion, and further directed that the establishment would be obliged to prescribe minimum necessary cut off merit marks out of 100 so that the rule of seniority­cum­merit is made applicable.

3. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as under:

However, it appears that three persons, namely, Sunil Kumar Gupta, Gopal Singh Raj and Rajesh Kumar Jain (respondents herein), though much junior in the seniority list of Scale I officers, were also included in the list of promoted officers, issued vide memo dated 9.10.2004 and three senior persons were ignored, namely, Anil Kumar Singh, K.C. Soni and N.K. Sharma. Therefore, the aforesaid three persons, namely, Anil Kumar Singh, K.C. Soni and N.K. Sharma and one another, namely, Praveen K. Jaggi filed Writ Petition Nos. 12127/2004, 5 12125/2004, 12126/2004 and 11005/2004 challenging the order dated 09.10.2004 whereby the aforesaid three persons, namely, Sunil Kumar Gupta, Gopal Singh Raj and Rajesh Kumar Jain were placed below Anil Kumar Singh, K.C. Soni and N.K. Sharma in the seniority list. Before the learned single Judge, it was the case on behalf of the original writ petitioners that promotions to the post of Scale II were solely on the basis of seniority­cum­merit and the rules provide that only those candidates who secure minimum 40% marks in the written test shall be called for interview and there being no minimum qualifying marks provided so far as marks obtained in interview and performance appraisal reports and therefore the original writ petitioners being senior and they obtained more than 40% marks in the written test, they ought to have been promoted to the post of Scale II.

13. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeals are allowed. The judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court as well as the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench are 17 hereby quashed and set aside. It is directed that the respondent­ authority shall prepare a fresh select list for promotion to the post of Junior Management Scale II and to consider the case of those candidates who crossed the benchmark of having obtained minimum 40% qualifying marks in the written test and having obtained minimum 12 marks each out of 20 marks each for interview and performance appraisal reports respectively and those candidates be promoted in the order of seniority, irrespective of anyone among them having obtained more marks.

14. The present appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.
Vijay Mohan Singh vs State Of Karnataka

During the investigation, the investigating officer recorded the statement of concerned witnesses, namely, parents of the victim, neighbours in the neighbourhood of the house of the accused. He also collected the medical evidence. The dying declaration of the victim was recorded by the Metropolitan Magistrate (PW28). After conclusion of the investigation and having found prima facie case, the police filed a charge sheet against all the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304­B, 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and Sections 3, 4 & 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. As the case was exclusively to be triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate 4 committed the case to the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Bidar, which was registered as Sessions Case No. 83/2005. The accused pleaded not guilty, and therefore, all of them came to be tried for the aforesaid offences.

5.8 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above decisions of this Court, it is prayed to allow the present appeal and quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the High Court.

In Bidar to the Police I did not say the above as my husband and my brother in law Madan Mohan Singh threatened me and asked me not to tell the truth and hence I gave a wrong statement. Now I am telling the truth. Sir please help me and save me. My child be taken care of.”
Garware Wall Ropers Ltd. vs Coastal Marine Constructions ...

3. Disputes arose between the parties, and on 02.01.2015, the appellant terminated the sub-contract. As a result, on 20.07.2016, the respondent wrote to the appellant stating that as disputes and differences had arisen between the parties, notice was given of appointment of Mr. Mihir Naniwadekar, Advocate, as sole arbitrator. The appellant replied on 17.08.2016, stating that the appointment of Mr. Naniwadekar as sole arbitrator was not acceptable as invocation of arbitration in pursuance of the agreement is premature. The respondent, therefore, filed a petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [“1996 Act”] on 10.02.2017 before the Bombay High Court. By the impugned judgment dated 09.03.2018, the Section 11 petition was allowed and Mr. Naniwadekar was appointed as sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon disputes and differences which have arisen between the appellant and the respondent in relation to the sub-contract dated 14.06.2013.

34. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc.—No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer unless such instrument is duly stamped or if the instrument is written on sheet of paper with impressed stamp such stamp paper is purchased in the name of one of the parties to the instrument:

22. We may therefore sum up the procedure to be adopted where the arbitration clause is contained in a document which is not registered (but compulsorily registerable) and which is not duly stamped:

18. In view of the above, it must be held that the dispute in question is non-arbitrable and respondent Nos. 1 & 2 ought to have resorted to the remedy of a suit. The plea of respondent Nos. 1 & 2 about the final repudiation expressed by the appellants vide communication dated 17th April, 2017 will be of no avail. However, whether that factum can be taken as the cause of action for institution of the suit is a matter which can be debated in those 36 proceedings. We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion either way in that regard.

(emphasis in original)

In the Negative” Question (2), having been answered contrary to our judgment, is held to be incorrectly decided.

28. Arguments taken of prejudice, namely, that on the facts of this case, the appellant had to pay the stamp duty and cannot take advantage of his own wrong, are of no avail when it comes to the application of mandatory provisions of law. Even this argument, therefore, must be rejected.

29. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court. The matter is remitted to the Bombay High Court to dispose of the same in the light of this judgment.

(VINEET SARAN) New Delhi;

April 10, 2019.
Shri N.K. Janu, Deputy Director, Social ... vs Lakshmi Chandra

4. The respondent again filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 43443 of 2004 after the said order was passed by this Court. The said Writ Petition was disposed of on 23.10.2008 with the following directions:

12. It is thereafter, appellants filed a Review Petition No. 313796 of 2017 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad against the order dated 07.04.2016 passed in Special Appeal No. 261 of 2016. The Review Petition along with an application for condonation of delay in filing of the Review Petition was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court for want of prosecution on 06.12.2017. It is the said application for recall of order dated 06.12.2017 which remained unsuccessful which is the subject matter of the challenge in the present appeal.

In the present case, the writ petitioners had not worked on daily wage basis for a long period of two years. This break cannot be treated to be an artificial break in the service. The writ petitioners did not satisfy the essential requirements contained in the 2001 Rules. They were, therefore, not entitled for regularisation under the 2001 Rules.”

23. In view of the above discussion, we find that the entire proceedings in Contempt Application No. 1632 of 2009 are wholly unjustified and in excess of jurisdiction vested with the Contempt Court. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the Contempt Application is dismissed.