L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Vijay Dhanuka Etc vs Najima Mamtaj Etc

According to the allegation in the complaint petition, accused no.1 Rajdip Dey is sub-broker of Karvy Stock Broking Limited; whereas other accused persons are its officials posted at Kolkata and Hyderabad. The complainant alleged to be its investor and claimed to have purchased shares from Karvi Stock Broking Ltd. through the sub-broker, accused No. 1. According to the complaint, a dispute arose over trading of shares between the complainant and the accused persons and to settle the on-going dispute, the accused persons offered a proposal to the complainant who consented to it and accordingly, on 11th of September, 2011, accused persons visited at her residence at Raghunathganj Darbeshpara to have a discussion with the complainant and her husband. According to the allegation, the discussion did not yield any result and the accused persons started shouting at them. Some of the accused persons, according to the allegation, took out a pistol from their bag and put the same over the heads of the complainant and her husband. It is alleged that they assaulted the complainant and her husband with fists and slaps and also abused them and coerced the complainant to sign some papers and snatched away the suitcase containing some papers. The aforesaid complaint was filed on 1st of October, 2011 in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jangipur, Murshidabad. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and transferred the case to the Court of another Magistrate for inquiry and disposal. On receipt of the record, the transferee Magistrate adjourned the case to 31st of October, 2011. On the said date, the complainant and her witnesses were present. The complainant was examined on solemn affirmation and the two witnesses namely Enamul Haque and Masud Ali were also examined. Order dated 31st of October, 2011 shows that they were examined under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”). The transferee Magistrate, thereafter, adjourned the case for orders and on the adjourned date, i.e. 15th of November, 2011, he directed for issuance of summons against the accused persons for offence under Section 323, 380 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It is relevant here to state that in the complaint, the residence of the accused has been shown at a place beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

This exercise by the Magistrate, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, is nothing but an inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code. In the present case, as we have stated earlier, the Magistrate has examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and the two witnesses and only thereafter he had directed for issuance of process.

In view of what we have observed above, we do not find any error in the order impugned.

In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeals and the same are dismissed accordingly.

………………………………………………………………J (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD) ………………………………………………………………J (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE) NEW DELHI, MARCH 27, 2014.
Mangat Ram vs State Of Haryana

1. The appellant Mangat Ram, a member of SC community, married the deceased Seema, a member of the Aggarwal community on 13.7.1993 at Ambala. Few months after the marriage, on 15.9.1993, according to the prosecution, the appellant sprinkled kerosene oil on the body of the deceased and set her on fire, having failed to meet the dowry demand. On hearing the hue and cry, neighbours assembled and took her to the Civil Hospital, Gohana and, later, she was shifted to the Medical College and Hospital, Rohtak, where she died on 17.9.1993. The appellant, along with his parents and sister, were charge-sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 498- A and 304-B IPC.

2. The prosecution, in order to bring home the offences, examined PWs 1 to 7 and also produced various documents. On the side of defence, DWs 1 to 5 were examined and the accused appellant got himself examined as DW6. After the evidence was closed, the accused was questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), who denied all the incriminating statements made against him. The trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that an offence under Section 498-A IPC was made out against the appellant, but not against the other three accused persons. The trial Court also found that no offence under Section 304-B IPC was made out against the accused persons, including the appellant. However, it was held that an offence under Section 306 IPC was made out against the appellant, though no charge was framed under that section. After holding the appellant guilty, the trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- , in default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for six months. The appellant was also convicted under Section 306 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.4,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for two years.

3. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No. 592-SB of 1997, which when came up for hearing before the Division Bench of the High Court on 3.5.2007, the Court passed the following order:

5. The High Court then considered the criminal appeal and dismissed the same on merits vide its judgment dated 27.5.2008 confirming the conviction and sentence awarded against the accused by the trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, this appeal has been preferred.

29. Taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, we are of the view that the prosecution has not succeeded in establishing the offence under Section 498-A and Section 306 IPC against the appellant. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court, are set aside.
Homi Rajvansh vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

3) Brief facts:

(a) The appellant, an Indian Revenue Service Officer, joined National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. (NAFED), on deputation on 15.07.2003 as an Executive Director.

(b) On 01.10.2003, Respondent No.3 herein–Alok Ranjan took over the charge as the new Managing Director of NAFED and he approved the 1st Non- agricultural tie-up of NAFED on 13.10.2003 in order to diversify NAFED’s business activities to cope up from severe financial crunch so that income from other businesses can compensate the losses being made on trading of agricultural items. Respondent No. 3 participated in all the meetings and approved all the transactions entered into with M/s Swarup Group of Industries (SGI) for the above said purpose.

(d) In January 2006, a public interest litigation was filed against NAFED before the Delhi High Court on the allegations of misappropriation of funds by its officials in non-agricultural business. The Government of India, in its reply, stated that CBI enquiry will be conducted. In the affidavit filed by NAFED, it was again reiterated that all the transactions were bona fide.

(e) Anticipating pressure of CBI, Respondent No. 3 directed Mr. M.V. Haridas, Manager (Vigilance and Personnel) to lodge a complaint against SGI and, accordingly, a complaint was lodged before the CBI Economic Offences Wing (EOW), Mumbai.

19) In the light of what is stated above, the impugned judgment dated 29.06.2012 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 220 of 2010 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal.

20) In view of our conclusion, the appellant herein – Homi Rajvansh be impleaded as Respondent No. 4 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 220 of 2010 and we request the High Court to hear the matter afresh after affording opportunity to all the parties including the newly impleaded party, and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment.

21) The appeal is allowed on the above terms.

………….…………………………CJI.

MARCH 27, 2014.
State Of Jharkhand & Ors vs M/S. La Opala R.G. Ltd

3. The conspectus of facts is: the respondent-dealer is a Public Limited Company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 engaged in the manufacture of glass and glassware made of Opal glass. The industrial unit of the respondent-dealer is situated at Madhupur in Deoghar district, Jharkhand.

5. The State Government, in exercise of its powers under clause

7. Later, the authorities issued a letter dated 09.01.2004 to the respondent manufacturer, inter alia, directing him to deposit the tax in relation to its transactions in respect of the inter-state sales to registered and unregistered dealers at the rate of 4% and 12%, respectively. The respondent was also directed to show-cause as to why a penalty under Sections 16 and 16(9) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and the Act should not be imposed and the respondent not be directed to correct the returns and deposit tax at the rate of 4%, if the sales is effected to registered dealers and at the rate of 12% if the inter-state sale is effected to un-registered dealers.

8. The respondent-dealer had filed its reply, dated 16.01.2004, wherein it took the stand that it was liable to charge and deposit tax at the rate of 3 per cent on sale in the course of inter-state trade in respect of its products; that the returns had been correctly filed and that the tax was validly deposited at the rate of 3 per cent.

9. After the issuance of the aforesaid letter/notice, the authorities by their letter dated 13.05.2004, rejected its stand and informed that the respondent would be liable to pay tax at the rate of 4 per cent on its inter-state sales if made to a registered dealer and at the rate of 12 per cent if made to an unregistered dealer.

24. Having said that, we would now examine whether the notification would at all be applicable to the sale of product in question.

29. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court.

30. Since the matter was pending for quite some time, we direct the appellants not to levy penalty while recovering the difference of tax payable only for the assessment years 2002- 2003 to 2005-2006.

No order as to costs.

Ordered accordingly.

MARCH 27, 2014.
B.Jayaraj vs State Of A.P

3. According to the prosecution, the accused appellant was, at the relevant point of time, working as a Mandal Revenue officer (MRO) in the Ranga Reddy District of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The complainant K.Venkataiah (PW-2) had a fair price shop in Dadupally village. On 8.11.1995, the complainant, it is alleged, had approached the accused appellant for release of essential commodities against his shop for the month of November, 1995. The accused appellant, it is claimed, demanded a bribe of Rs.250/- to issue the release order. As the complainant was not willing to pay the said amount, he had approached listed witness No.9 K.Narsinga Rao, (since deceased) Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, Hyderabad on 9.11.1995 and submitted a written complaint (Exbt.P-11) before him. According to the prosecution, LW-9 after verifying the contents of the complaint registered a case and issued Exhibit P-12 (FIR). LW-9 directed the complainant to come with the bribe amount on 13.11.995. It is also alleged that LW-9 summoned PW-1, S. Hanuma Reddy, Deputy Director of Insurance to act as a panch witness and explained the details of the complaint (Exbt.P-11) to him. Furthermore, according to the prosecution, LW-9 got the currency notes treated with phenolphthalein powder and also explained to PW-1 the significance of the sodium carbonate solution test. The details of the trap that was planned was explained to all concerned including the complainant. Accordingly, the plan was put into execution and on receipt of the pre-arranged signal to the trap laying officer, the police party headed by LW-9, which also included PW-5, rushed into the office of the accused appellant. Thereafter, according to the prosecution, the sodium carbonate solution test was conducted on the right hand fingers of the accused as well as the right shirt pocket. Both tests proved to be positive. The tainted currency notes were recovered from the possession of the accused.

4. Chargesheet was filed against the accused-appellant on completion of investigation. Upon grant of sanction for prosecution, cognizance of the offences alleged was taken and charges were framed to which the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the trial 5 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution and 12 documents (Exbt. P-1 to P-12) besides 10 material objects (MOs 1 to 10) were exhibited. The plea of the accused was that on the date of the trap, PW-2, the complainant had put the currency notes in his shirt pocket with a request to have the same deposited in the bank as fee for renewal of the licence of the complainant. It was at this point of time that the police party had come and seized the currency notes after taking the same from his pocket.

10. For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot sustain the conviction of the appellant either under Section 7 or under 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. Accordingly, the conviction and the sentences imposed on the accused-appellant by the trial court as well as the High Court by order dated 25.4.2011 are set aside and the appeal is allowed.

...…………………………CJI.
Bhule Ram vs Union Of India & Anr

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

16. The instant appeal is required to be examined in light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.

19. Thus, it is evident that the High Court in the instant case awarded the compensation as per the demand of the appellant himself. There is nothing on record to show that any other argument had been advanced at his behest.

22. In view of the above, we do not think that the judgments in RFA No.416 of 1986 dated 6.10.1986, Ram Chander & Ors. v. Union of India in respect of the land situated in Jasola; and in Hari Chand v. Union of India, 91 (2001) DLT 602 in respect of the land situated in Tughlakabad have any relevance in the present appeal.

In view of the above, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.

In view of the judgment in Civil Appeal No.6251 of 2010, the abovesaid appeals and special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed.
Navneet Kaur vs State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr

2) Considering the limited issue involved, there is no need to traverse all the factual details. The brief background of the case is: By judgment dated 25.08.2001, Devender Pal Singh Bhullar was sentenced to death by the Designated Judge, Delhi. Thereafter, he preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 993 of 2001 before this Court and by judgment dated 22.03.2002, this Court confirmed the death sentence and dismissed his appeal. Against the dismissal of the appeal by this Court, the accused preferred Review Petition (Criminal) No. 497 of 2002, which was also dismissed by this Court on 17.12.2002.

anxiety, Anti-Hypertensives, Hypolipedemic, Anit-Convulsant (for Neuropathic pain) and Antacid drugs in adequate doses along with supportive psychotherapy and physiotherapy.

The above report has been signed by the Director & Chairman as well as four Members of the Medical Board. The report clearly shows that he is suffering from acute mental illness.

14) In the light of the above discussion and also in view of the ratio laid down in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra), we deem it fit to commute the death sentence imposed on Devender Pal Singh Bhullar into life imprisonment both on the ground of unexplained/inordinate delay of 8 years in disposal of mercy petition and on the ground of insanity. To this extent, the Curative Petition stands allowed.

……………………….…………………………CJI.

MARCH 31, 2014.
Manmohan Sharma vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors

11. When the matter came up again on 30th August, 2012, the report of the Secretary to Government was filed and it was submitted on behalf of the State Government that the State Government had terminated the services of 50 persons who were according to it illegally appointed as teachers. It was also submitted that such employees had questioned the order of termination before the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in writ petitions which are pending and in which the High Court had passed various orders staying the operation of their termination.

27. The appellants had been appointed and have served for nearly a decade but there are allegations that such appointments were obtained by mis- representation of facts and fraudulently. We do not consider it necessary to go into that aspect as we are informed that criminal cases have already been registered against appellants. Any observation made by us whether or not the appointments were obtained by mis-representation or by playing fraud upon the authorities concerned is bound to cause serious prejudice to the appellants. All that we need say is that in the facts and circumstances of the case we do not consider the appellants to be entitled to the relief of regularization of their services as prayed for by them. Having said that we cannot ignore the fact that the appellants will be left without any alternate avenues of employment at this stage of their lives. Subject to any finding that may be recorded by a competent Court, as regards the alleged fraudulent nature of the appointments secured by the appellants, we direct that such of the appellants as were appointed as teachers and as have now been terminated may be given a one-time concession of relaxation of the upper age limit and considered in the next selection process in relaxation of rules regarding such age limit prescribed for appointment as teachers. We make it clear that the above shall be a one-time relaxation for the appellants to try their luck in the next selection process. The appellants or such of them as wish to avail of this concession shall file an undertaking before the appointing authority concerned to the effect that the fresh appointment if any given to them pursuant to the age relaxation shall stand terminated in case they are found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment in the criminal case registered against them for obtaining a fraudulent appointment. Beyond that we do not consider the appellants to be entitled to any relief from this Court. The appeals are with the above directions disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Bishnu Biswas & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors

D. The interviews were conducted and a final result sheet was published. In pursuance thereto, appointment letters were issued to the appellants herein.

E. Challenging the said appointments, the unsuccessful candidates filed Original Application before the Tribunal which was allowed, quashing such appointments as equal marks were earmarked for both the written examination and interview which is impermissible in law and that the interview was never part of the recruitment process and thereby ordering initiation of fresh recruitment process. F. The appointees/appellants challenged the said order before the High Court. The High Court upheld the reasoning of the Tribunal but modified the order to the extent of continuing the recruitment process from the point it stood vitiated.

In view of the above, the appeals are devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
A.P.N.G.O'S Association vs Govt. Of A.P. & Ors

12. It appears from the judgment of the learned Single Judge that the said 9th petitioner also subsequently filed an application being W.P.M.P. No.21030 of 2003 seeking permission from the Court to withdraw the writ petition. However, at that stage, one Dr. S. Parthasarathy filed an impleadment petition which was allowed by order dated 10th September, 2003. A learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court by an elaborate order dated 3rd March 2004 dismissed the writ petition. The newly added petitioner Dr. S. Parthasarathy carried the matter in Letters Patent Appeal No.1034 of 2004.

14. Both the abovementioned Writ Petition and the Letters Patent Appeal came to be disposed of by the judgment under appeal herein.

15. By the judgment under appeal, the judgment of the learned Single Jude in Writ Petition No.2563 of 2002 was set aside and also G.O.Ms. No.911 was quashed.

21. In the totality of the circumstances mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the Division Bench erred in interfering with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. We, therefore, set aside the judgment under appeal, restore the judgment of the learned Single Judge and uphold the validity of G.O.Ms. No.911 dated 14.12.2000. Appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
Vinod Kumar vs State Of Kerala

3 So far as the facts are concerned, it is uncontroverted that at the material time PW2 was twenty years old and was studying in College for a Degree and that she appeared in and successfully wrote her last examination on 19.4.2000, the fateful day. Thereafter, when she did not return home from college, her father conducted a search which proved to be futile. Accordingly, on the next day, 20th April, 2000, he lodged the First Information Report, Exhibit P-1. It transpires that the prosecutrix (PW2) has since got married on 11th March, 2001 and at the time of her deposition had already been blessed with children. It is also not controverted that a document was registered with Sub-Registrar Office Kazhakoottam (SRO) which has been variously nomenclatured, including as a marriage registration. The Appellant’s case is that he had met PW2 in the University College and after some meetings and their getting to know each other better she had threatened to commit suicide if he did not marry her; that he immediately informed her that he was already married and had two children and that he had even given his marriage photographs to her, which she had entrusted to her friend, Fathima; that she asked him to divorce his wife; that she informed him that since her religion permitted a man to marry four times at least some documentation should be prepared to evidence their decision and compact to marry each other. It has been contended by the Appellant that sexual intercourse transpired post 19.4.2000 only and was with the free consent of both persons. The Trial Court had applied the Fourth Explanation to Section 375 and, thereafter, held the Appellant guilty, inter alia, of the commission of rape.

11 The Appellant is not an innocent man inasmuch as he had willy-nilly entered into a relationship with the prosecutrix, in violation of his matrimonial vows and his paternal duties and responsibilities. If he has suffered incarceration for an offence for which he is not culpable, he should realise that retribution in another form has duly visited him. It can only be hoped that his wife Chitralekha will find in herself the fortitude to forgive so that their family may be united again and may rediscover happiness, as avowedly the prosecutrix has found. 12 It is in these premises that we allow the Appeal. We set aside the conviction of the Appellant and direct that he be released forthwith.

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No(s).9014/2013 (From the judgement and order dated 17/07/2013 in CRLA No.1481/2006, of The HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM) VINOD KUMAR Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF KERALA Respondent(s) Date: 04/04/2014 This Petition was called on for pronouncement of judgment today.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vikramajit Sen pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S.Radhakrishnan and His Lordship.

Leave granted.

The appeal is allowed setting aside the conviction of the appellant and directing that he be released forthwith.