L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Govt. Of U.P vs Preetam Singh & Ors

1. The Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (hereinafter referred to as the 'Vikas Parishad') is a corporate body. It came into existence, consequent upon the promulgation of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the '1965 Act'). The employees of the Vikas Parishad were members of a Contributory Provident Fund Scheme. The Vikas Parishad desired to grant its employees better retiral benefits. A proposal was made, to extend pensionery benefits to the employees of the Vikas Parishad, in place of the existing Contributory Provident Fund Scheme. In furtherance of the aforesaid objective, a resolution dated 21.2.1995 was passed, proposing to replace the existing Contributory Provident Fund Scheme, to the Pension/Family Pension and Gratuity Scheme. Before implementation of the resolution dated 21.2.1995, the Vikas Parishad considered it expedient to consult the State Government. In response to the afore-mentioned consultation, the State Government through a communication dated 16.5.1996 approved the afore-stated substitution conditionally. The conditions depicted in the aforesaid approval dated 16.5.1996, are being extracted hereunder:

2. Consequent upon the receipt of the aforesaid approval from the State Government, the Vikas Parishad circulated a letter dated 9.7.1996 requiring its employees to submit their options, as to whether they were desirous of shifting to the Pension/Family Pension and Gratuity Scheme, in place of the existing Contribution Provident Fund Scheme.

3. At the instant juncture, a very vital letter came to be issued by the State Government on 30.09.1997. Relevant extract of the aforesaid letter is being reproduced hereunder:

4. Based on the conditional approval granted by the State Government through its communication dated 16.5.1996, and also the clarificatory letter issued by the State Government on 30.09.1997, the Vikas Parishad passed a resolution on 5.11.1997 approving the Pension/Family Pension and Gratuity Scheme. In granting the aforesaid approval, the Vikas Parishad followed the pensionery scheme applicable to civil servants of the State of Uttar Pradesh.

7. Based on the recommendations of the sub-Committee (in its meeting dated 2.2.1999), the State Government passed an order dated 14.9.1999, withdrawing its ban/restriction on the implementation of the Pension/Family Pension and Gratuity Scheme. Relevant extract of the letter dated 14.9.1999 is being reproduced below:

15. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in this appeal, and the same is accordingly dismissed.

…..................…....................J. SEPTEMBER 23, 2014. [ARUN MISHRA] ITEM NO.1 COURT NO.7 SECTION XI S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s). 6307/2010 GOVT. OF U.P. Appellant(s) VERSUS PREETAM SINGH & ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for exemption from filing O.T. and permission to file additional documents and office report) Date : 23/09/2014 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
Surinder Singh vs Punjab State Elect.Board,Patiala & Ors

1. On 16.07.2002, the Punjab State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the 'Board') took a decision to fill up 21 posts of Accounts Officer. The above posts were to be filled up by way of direct recruitment. The appellant earned 164 marks in the process of selection. He made the grade, by way of merit, from amongst “backward class” candidates. It is therefore, that he came to be appointed as Accounts Officer, by direct recruitment.

2. Respondent No.4-Anil Kumar Uppal, had also applied for appointment by way of direct recruitment, in response to the same advertisement (in furtherance whereof, the appellant was selected and appointed). His candidature was, however, not accepted. It is therefore, that respondent no.4 approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as the 'High Court') seeking an appropriate direction to the Board, requiring it to allow him (respondent no.4) to participate in the process of selection. By an interim order passed by the High Court, respondent no.4 was allowed to participate in the process of selection.

3. On considering the candidature of respondent no.4, the Selection Committee awarded him 146 marks. It is therefore apparent, that in terms of merit, respondent no.4 could not march over the superior claim of the appellant. This was so because, whilst the appellant had been awarded 164 marks in the process of selection, respondent no.4 had been awarded only 146 marks.

5. The High Court, while disposing of Writ Petition No. 7660 of 2004, vide the impugned order dated 2.3.2009, arrived at the conclusion, that the appellant actually belonged to the “creamy layer”, and as such, was dis- entitled to be considered as a “backward class” candidate. In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the High Court took into consideration the income of the appellant himself, to declare that he belonged to the “creamy layer”. The aforesaid determination was rendered by reading down the policy instructions issued by the State Government, on the basis whereof, the backwardness of a candidate had to be adjudged. The aforesaid policy instructions were read down, to include the income of the person concerned, along with the income of the parents of the person, contemplated by the policy instructions.

In the above view of the matter, the instant special leave petition is also disposed of in terms of the order passed by this Court in Surinder Singh's case(supra).

(With appln.(s) for Interim Relief and Office Report) Date : 25/09/2014 This appeal/petition were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
Nirmal Singh & Etc.Etc vs State Of Haryana Tr.Collector

3. Being unsatisfied with the award of the Collector, the appellant-land owners filed objections claiming a market value of their land at Rs.60,00,000/- per acre. The Collector made a reference to the Addl. District Judge, Kurukshetra which is the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act for determination of the correct market value of the acquired land. The learned Addl. District Judge vide his order dated 28.08.2006, on the basis of material evidence on record assessed the value at Rs.6,60,000/- per acre besides other statutory benefits under Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act.

15. Sale instances in relation to small pieces of land situated near the acquired land can be considered, subject to (i) reasonable deductions for developmental costs that will be incurred in the future as per the cases referred to supra and (ii) the evidence that these lands can be compared to the acquired land in terms of its vicinity and the comparable benefits and advantages.

18. All the appeals are allowed accordingly in the above terms. Since the land of the appellants were acquired in the year 2002, the respondents are directed to pay the compensation awarded in favour Page 20 21 of the appellants by way of demand draft after proper calculation made within eight weeks from the receipt of copy of this Judgment and Award. There shall be no order as to costs.

………………………………………………………J. [V.GOPALA GOWDA] ………………………………………………………J. [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL] New Delhi, September 26, 2014 Page 21 22 ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment COURT NO.13 SECTION IV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s). 3982-3987/2011 NIRMAL SINGH & ETC.ETC. Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA TR.COLLECTOR Respondent(s) WITH C.A. No. 7916-7918/2011 C.A. No. 10207/2011 C.A. No. 7547-7549/2013 C.A. No. 7707-7709/2013 Date : 26/09/2014 These appeals were called on for JUDGMENT today. For Appellant(s) Ms. Jaspreet Gogia,Adv.

Mr. Vipin Gogia, Adv.

Mr. Brijendra Singh, Adv.

Mr. Sanjay Bansal, Adv.

Mr. Ajay Choudhary,Adv.

Mr. Sachin Jain, Adv.

Dr. Kailash Chand,Adv.

Mr. Dinesh Verma, Adv.

Mr. Rajat Sharma, Adv.

Mr. Subhasish Bhowmick,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Ms. Anubha Agrawal,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel.

The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed order.

(Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file) Page 22
General Motors (I) Private Limited vs Ashok Ramnik Lal Tolat & Anr

3. In the complaint, filed before the District Forum, Ahmedabad (Rural) (for short “the District Forum”), the prayer of the respondent-complainant was as follows :

4. The case of the complainant is that he had passion for driving and dream to visit Leh Ladakh, Jammu & Kashmir and Nepal by driving a motor car. By surfing the internet, he read advertisement given by the appellant as follows :

5. Relying upon the same, he visited the agents of the appellant and was given a book titled “for a special journey called life”. He was assured that the vehicle offered for sale will realise his dream. The brochure also assured that “the vehicle in question is an SUV to end all SUVs. And …………… it will put the four corners of the earth within your each and ……….. it won’t just get you their every time. But get you’re there in unmatched comfort, by road, off-road or no road”. He was also shown visual presentation of the vehicle and was also given a copy of the VCD. Accordingly, he purchased the vehicle on 1st May, 2004 for Rs.14 Lakhs and got accessories worth Rs.1,91,295/- fitted and also got the vehicle insured and registered.

7. The said order of the District Forum was challenged by the appellant before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad (for short “the State Commission”). The State Commission held that the vehicle had no mechanical or manufacturing defect but the advertisement that car was SUV amounted to “unfair trade practice”. Accordingly, in substitution of the order of the District Forum, the complainant was held entitled to Rs.50,000/- as compensation which included costs of litigation. But at the same time, the complainant was required to pay Rs.5,000/- towards costs for undeserving claim. The appellant was directed not to describe the vehicle in question as SUV in any form of advertisement, website, literature etc. and to make the correction that it is a passenger car as mentioned in the manual.

11. After recording the above finding the National Commission proceeded to consider the relief to be given. It was held that the State Commission was not justified in reversing the direction of the District Forum once the commission of “unfair trade practice” was established, even as per finding of the State Commission. Accordingly, the National Commission restored the relief given by the District Forum with slight modification as follows :

and

21. Accordingly we allow these appeals and set aside the order of the National Commission to the extent of award of punitive damages.

Date : 09/10/2014 These appeals were called on for JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Vikram Shokalia, Adv.

For M/s. Dua Associates For Respondent(s) Caveator-in-person Ms. Aparna Jha,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda.

The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed order.

(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
Vinod Kumar vs Gangadhar

4) In order to appreciate the short issue involved in this appeal, it is necessary to state a few relevant facts:

to the respondent towards part payment of the sale consideration, but he declined to accept the amount and avoided to perform his part of the agreement. This led to the serving of notice by the appellant to the respondent calling upon him to perform his part of the agreement and execute the sale deed of the suit house in the appellant’s favour. Since the respondent failed to ensure compliance of the legal notice, the appellant filed the aforementioned civil suit against the respondent seeking specific performance of the agreement in question. It was alleged that the appellant was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement but it was respondent who failed to perform his part and hence this suit.

6) The respondent filed the written statement denying allegations made in the plaint. According to the respondent, there was no concluded agreement between the parties and in any event, the appellant having failed to perform his obligations, which were agreed upon in the alleged agreement, he was not entitled to seek enforcement of such agreement against the respondent in relation to the suit house.

5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.”

21) Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the case, we find that the High Court while deciding the first appeal failed to keep the principle in consideration and rendered the impugned decision. Indeed, it is clear by mere reading of para 4 of the impugned order quoted below:

Needless to observe, the High Court will do so after affording an opportunity of hearing to both the parties and especially to the respondent because no one appeared today for him and hence, the High Court would send the respondent a fresh notice of the final hearing of the appeal.

28) Since the case is quite old, we request the High Court to expedite its hearing.

October 13, 2014.
Guttikonda Venkataramaiah vs Godvarthy Venkateswarlu & Anr

5. The facts giving rise to the present litigation, in a nutshell, are as under:

6. Thereafter, the execution proceedings had been initiated by respondent no.2 for sale of immovable property – agricultural land belonging to the principal debtor – respondent no.1 herein and the sale was conducted on 30th May, 2011. The property had been sold for Rs.13,05,000/- in an auction and the said amount had been paid by the appellant, who is the auction purchaser.

7. Subsequently, respondent no.1 had filed Civil Revision Petition No.2610 of 2011 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh pointing out certain irregularities in the execution proceedings. The said civil revision petition had been disposed of on 22nd July, 2011 as it was open to him to file an application under Rule 90 of Order XXI of the CPC. In pursuance of the aforestated order passed by the High Court, E.A. No.426 of 2011 had been filed by respondent no.1. However, the same had been dismissed for default on 22nd February, 2012. An effort to get the said application restored to file had also been failed.

12. Once again, on 4th August, 2014, we granted further time to respondent no.1 to make payment of the aforesaid amount to the appellant before 15th September, 2014. However, in spite of this additional time granted to respondent no.1, he did not pay the amount to the appellant and on 15th September, 2014, respondent no.1, who was personally present in the Court had expressed his inability to pay the aforestated amount to the auction purchaser. We are narrating the said fact so as to show that the principal debtor was not only careless at an earlier point of time while defending his case, but even after losing his case and after getting his property sold in an auction, he was not even prepared to pay back the amount to the auction purchaser. It was also clarified at that time that upon payment of the said amount to the auction purchaser, respondent no.1 was entitled to withdraw the amount which had been deposited by the auction purchaser with the Court while purchasing the property in question. The aforestated directions were given by this Court from time to time so as to know the bona fides of respondent no.1 – the principal debtor.

20. For the aforestated reasons, in the interest of justice, we feel that the impugned judgment delivered by the High Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. If the auction purchaser is not in possession of the property in question or if there is obstruction by respondent no.1, such obstruction shall be removed and the appellant shall be put in possession of the property in question.

21. For the aforestated reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is quashed and set aside, however, with no order as to costs.

......…………………….J (ANIL R. DAVE) ...…...…………………..J (UDAY UMESH LALIT) NEW DELHI OCTOBER 13, 2014.
R.N.Agarwal vs R.C. Bansal & Ors

3. The brief facts of the case are that in the year 1983, a Society named Maharani Avanti Bai Co-operative Society was formed and from time to time members were enrolled by its Managing Committee. Upto the year 1989 there were 90 members of the Society and thereafter further enrolment of members was stopped. However, no land was allotted to the Society for many years and in the meantime its members became disinterested in the running of the Society as the cost of the flats to be constructed had gone very high and beyond their reach. The society thus became dormant.

4. Some persons who were not members of the Society but were far-sighted and clever minded became interested to take over its management and got the land allotted from Delhi Development Authority (in short, ‘DDA’) to be utilized for the benefits of their own persons. They forged certain records of the Society to show that many of the original members of the Society had resigned and a new Managing Committee had been constituted. By forged resignation letters of the original members of the Society, new members were shown to have been enrolled and the forged records were submitted in the office of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies after entering into some kind of criminal understanding with the officials in that office. It is alleged that based on the forged documents, which included minutes purporting to be of the illegally constituted Managing Committee of the Society comprising of all new members and also of General Body Meetings which were never held, DDA was approached for allotment of land with the assistance rendered by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies by certifying that all the meetings were duly held and a list of new members of the Society was forwarded to DDA. Accepting the same, DDA allotted a plot measuring 600 sq. meters to the Society in Dwarka for the benefit of the 90 members of the Society in the year 1998. All these facts emerged during the investigation by CBI.

117.3. In view of the above position the word “evidence” in Section 319 CrPC has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.

117.4. Considering the fact that under Section 319 CrPC a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an [pic]event under Section 319(4) CrPC the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination.”

32. For the reasons aforesaid, we allow these appeals and quash the order passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by the Special Judge except the direction issued to the CBI as indicated above.
Raunaq Education Foundation vs State Of Haryana & Ors

3. The case of the petitioner is that it gave a proposal on 1st April, 1972 to start a educational complex for the benefit of the residents of the State of Haryana. Accordingly, the State of Haryana released 76 acres of land from the Forest Department and acquired the same under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vide notifications dated 15th May, 1972 and 28th August, 1972 under Sections 4 and 6 respectively. Award for compensation was given on 21st February, 1973. Possession was delivered to the petitioner on 24th January, 1974 subject to certain conditions including the requirement to make construction within the specific time. Since the land was not utilized as expected, in terms of agreement dated 18th February, 1988 under which the land was given to the petitioner subject to certain conditions, the Village Panchayat sought return of the land by passing a resolution dated 20th October, 1989. On that basis, after due enquiry, resumption Order dated 18th September, 1998 came to be finally passed after various proceedings holding that the petitioner failed to comply with the conditions subject to which land was given to it. It was held that the petitioner failed to utilize the land for the purpose for which it was given, except a part of it.

14. Thus, the proposal put forward cannot be taken at its face value and cannot be the basis for interfering with the impugned orders. The land has to be utilised by the competent authority in a transparent manner as per applicable policy and law.

The special leave petitions are dismissed.
B.L. Wadhera vs U.O.I. & Ors

3. The case of the petitioner is that it gave a proposal on 1st April, 1972 to start a educational complex for the benefit of the residents of the State of Haryana. Accordingly, the State of Haryana released 76 acres of land from the Forest Department and acquired the same under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vide notifications dated 15th May, 1972 and 28th August, 1972 under Sections 4 and 6 respectively. Award for compensation was given on 21st February, 1973. Possession was delivered to the petitioner on 24th January, 1974 subject to certain conditions including the requirement to make construction within the specific time. Since the land was not utilized as expected, in terms of agreement dated 18th February, 1988 under which the land was given to the petitioner subject to certain conditions, the Village Panchayat sought return of the land by passing a resolution dated 20th October, 1989. On that basis, after due enquiry, resumption Order dated 18th September, 1998 came to be finally passed after various proceedings holding that the petitioner failed to comply with the conditions subject to which land was given to it. It was held that the petitioner failed to utilize the land for the purpose for which it was given, except a part of it.

8. He submitted that the petitioner is ready and willing to construct and run a school for 500 poor and under privileged children of the area at its cost, within the time frame as may be laid down and subject to appropriate conditions. The petitioner will bear the education cost, fees etc. of such poor and under privileged children for all times to come.

14. Thus, the proposal put forward cannot be taken at its face value and cannot be the basis for interfering with the impugned orders. The land has to be utilised by the competent authority in a transparent manner as per applicable policy and law.

The special leave petitions are dismissed.
K.R.Sundram@ Sundararajan & Ors vs The Land Acquisition Officer& ...

3. The Collector, vide Award dated 25th November, 1988, determined the compensation @ Rs.200/- per cent. The Reference Court gave six separate awards. In four of the awards, compensation was determined @ 6,000/- per cent. In fifth award, the rate fixed was Rs.400/- per cent while in the sixth award, the rate fixed was Rs.7,000/- per cent. High Court determined market value to be Rs.2,000/- per cent, apart from other statutory benefits.

9. We are of the opinion that even if mistake pointed out by the High Court that value of transaction at Sr. No.124 was wrongly mentioned as Rs.1,71,211/- instead of Rs.1,21,212/- which worked out to Rs.6,06,060/- per acre was correct, the view taken by the Reference Court in determining compensation @ Rs.6,000/- per cent did not call for any interference.

10. Accordingly, we allow these appeals and enhance the compensation for the acquired land to Rs.6,000/- per cent in addition to statutory benefits.

11. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.