L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Nutan Rani vs Ajit Singh (Dead) And Ors.

Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J 1 The appeal is from a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 23 February 2011, in a first appeal against a decision of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh. 2 The appellants are the heirs and legal representatives of Ashok Kumar who died as a result of an accident on 31 March 1994. He was 30 years old at the time of the accident and worked as a commission agent/salesman with a firm in Ludhiana. The accident took place while he was travelling in a bus 2 belonging to the Chandigarh Transport Undertaking. While he was alighting from the bus, it moved abruptly which caused him to fall. The fall resulted in serious injuries and led to his death on the following day. 3 The heirs of the deceased filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the tribunal, to seek compensation of Rs.20 lakhs. The Tribunal held that negligence on the part of the bus driver was not proved. However, an amount of Rs.50,000 was awarded towards no fault liability together with interest at 12 per cent per annum. 4 In appeal, the High Court drew an adverse inference on account of the non-examination of the bus driver and awarded a total compensation of Rs 3,98,500. However, the rate of interest was reduced to 6 per cent per annum. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the heirs are in appeal. 5 The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has assailed the award of compensation by urging that:

• Income : Rs 3,000/-

• Percentage increase towards future prospects : 40% • 3000 x 40% = Rs 1,200/-

• Total income : Rs 4,200/-

• One-third deduction : Rs 1,400/-

• Income after deduction : Rs 2,800/-

• Annual income = Rs 2,800 x 12 = Rs 33,600/-

• Multiplier applied : 17 (since age of deceased was 30 years) 1 (2017)16 SCC 680 4 • Loss of dependency : Rs 33,600 x 17 = Rs 5,71,200/- • Loss of consortium : Rs 40,000/-

• Loss of estate : Rs 15,000/-

• Funeral expenses : Rs 15,000/-

• Total compensation = Rs 6,41,200/-

8 Interest is allowed on the aforesaid amount at 9 per cent per annum from the date of the petition until payment.

9 The appeal is allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.

...........................................CJI [DIPAK MISRA] ...........................................J [A M KHANWILKAR] ...........................................J [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD] New Delhi;

July 20, 2018
T.P. Murugan(Dead) Through Lrs vs Bojan

(2) The facts of the case briefly stated are as under: -

That after going through the detailed evidence adduced by the parties, the Trial Court held that the Cheques and Pronote were issued for repayment/discharge of a lawful debt. The respondent was found guilty under S. 138 of the N.I. Act, and sentenced him to undergo R.I. for six months and Fine of Rs.5000/-, failing which, he shall undergo one month’s R.I. (4) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the respondent-accused filed Criminal Appeal Nos. 437-438 of 2006 before the District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. III, 5 Coimbatore. The District and Sessions Judge held that the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act was not rebutted by the respondent. It was proved by the complainants that there were insufficient funds in the bank account of the respondent at the time of issuance of the cheques. The respondent had with mala fide intention issued “Stop Payment” instructions. The respondent failed to give any explanation as to how the Pronote came into possession of the appellant. Furthermore, the Sessions Court discarded the evidence adduced by the accused, of DW.2 Mahesh, as being an interested witness, who had falsely stated that he was an employee of N.R.R. Finances. This was rebutted by two witnesses viz. PW.2 and PW.4, who were Directors of N.R.R. Finances who deposed that DW.2 was never employed by this Company. The District and Sessions Court affirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court.

The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction, reversed the 7 concurrent findings of the Courts below, and set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence passed against the accused.

(6) Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 27.09.2013 passed in Criminal Revision Nos. 1657-1658 of 2008, the appellant-complainants filed the present Special Leave Petitions.

9. The appellants have proved their case by over-

10. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned order dated 27.09.2013 passed in Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 1657 and 1658 of 2008 is hereby set aside, and the order of Conviction and Fine passed by the Trial Court is restored.

11. The Appeals are allowed accordingly.
Union Of India vs Sunil Tripathi

3. The respondents, on the other hand, would contend that the appellants having failed to challenge the order dated 8th January, 2014 passed in Writ Petition No.5578/2013, cannot be heard to contend that CBI was not required to take over the investigation of the alleged crimes. In that, an unambiguous stand was taken by the appellants before the High Court in 4 the said writ petition that the investigation of the alleged crimes referred to in the writ petition was already entrusted to the CBI and the investigation thereof was in progress. Notably, the CBI registered three separate P.Es. on 7th, 8th and 12th of May, 2014, reflective of the offence having been committed by unknown officials of the Directorate General of Resettlement (“DGR”) and Ex-Servicemen (ESM) and including relating to undue peculiar benefit to private firms and other persons mentioned in the accused list and corresponding loss to public exchequer and Government undertakings. In light of the allegations, preliminary enquiry in respect of each of these alleged offences came to be registered against the firms and other unknown persons mentioned in the PEs. The concerned official who undertook the preliminary enquiry eventually submitted notes which were reproduced in the Status Report dated 17th October, 2016 filed before the High Court, stating thus:

5. After analysing the impugned judgment, it is noticed that the High Court allowed the writ petitions and issued directions mainly for the following reason:

servicemen. Furthermore, ensuring benefits under a special scheme of the Government.”

7. Instead of examining all these contentious issues for the first time in these appeals, we deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned judgment and relegate the parties before the High Court for reconsideration of all aspects of the matter afresh on its own merits and in accordance with law. We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion, either way, on the issues that may require adjudication by the High Court. 11

8. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and order is set aside and Writ Petition (Civil) No.12313 of 2015, Writ Petition (Civil) No.602 of 2017 and C.M. No.2775 of 2017 are restored to its original numbers on the file of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, for being decided de novo by the High Court, uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned judgment. All questions are left open.

9. The appeals are disposed of in the aforementioned terms. No costs.

.………………………….CJI.

July 31, 2018.
Dr. Sr. Tessy Jose vs The State Of Kerala

After hearing this matter on 1st August, 2018, following order was passed:

4. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that accused no. 1 had raped the victim when she was a minor in the year 2016. As a result, she became pregnant. As per victim’s mother, when the victim started complaining about pain in her stomach, thinking it to be some problem related to stomach, she brought her to the hospital where the appellants were working, on 7 th February, 2017. It was found that the victim was in advance stage of pregnancy. In fact, soon after she was brought to the hospital, she went into labour. She delivered the child. Insofar as the Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 [@SLP(Crl.) No. 3712 of 2018] Page 2 of 8 appellants are concerned, their role is that they attended to the victim. Appellant no. 1 is a 66 years’ old lady who is a Gynecologist and had conducted the delivery. Appellant no. 2 is a Paediatrician who had attended to the baby of the victim after the delivery. Appellant no. 3, is a 69 years’ old Hospital Administrative. She is roped-in in that capacity though she did not attend to the victim or the baby.

Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 [@SLP(Crl.) No. 3712 of 2018] Page 7 of 8

14. Accordingly, we are of the view that there is no evidence to implicate the appellants. Evidence should be such which should at least indicate grave suspicion. Mere likelihood of suspicion cannot be the reason to charge a person for an offence. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed and the proceedings against the appellants in the aforesaid Sessions Case No. 460 of 2017 are hereby quashed.

AUGUST 01, 2018.

Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 [@SLP(Crl.) No. 3712 of 2018] Page 8 of 8
Deepak vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh (Now ...

3. The   M.L.C.   of the injured was done at  8.45 a.m. by PW.8 Dr. S.K. Prabhakar who found an incised wound of 2½ cm x 2 cm.   The injured was deceased the same day. The post mortem was done the same day at 3.30 p.m. by PW­5 Dr. P.K. Bhatnagar, who found  “Punctured wound 2 cm x 1 cm x cavity deep just above upper border of the left lower rib on lateral side of chest 9 cm away from umbilicus at 2 O’clock position with surgical dressing”.

4. The   Trial   Court   granted   the   benefit   of   doubt   to   the Appellant.   The   High   Court   on   reappreciation   of   the evidence,   particularly   the   testimony   of   PW­4   Omwati,   an injured witness, and other eye­witnesses PW­1 Babu Ram, PW­2   Ram   Kumar   and   PW­3   Kalu   Ram,   convicted   the Appellant.

8. In   the   entirety   of   the   evidence,   the   facts   and circumstances   of   the   case,   we   are   unable   to   sustain   the conviction of the Appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. and are satisfied that it deserves to be altered to Section 304 Part­II I.P.C.   It is ordered accordingly.   Considering the period of custody   undergone   after   his   conviction,   we   alter   the sentence to the period of custody already undergone.   The Appellant may be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

9. The   appeal   is   therefore   allowed   in   part   with   the aforesaid modification of the conviction and sentence.
Pimpri Chinchwad New Township ... vs Vishnudev Cooperative Housing Society

7) The members of “Deo family” (landowners) felt aggrieved by the award dated 23.09.1986 and filed writ petition being W.P. No. 3719/1987 in the High Court at Bombay. This writ petition was dismissed by the High Court by order dated 18.07.1989. The writ   petitioners   felt   aggrieved   by   the   dismissal   of their   writ   petition   filed   review   petition   (R.P.   No. 3751/1989) before the High Court, which was also dismissed   as   withdrawn   on   08.09.1989.   Aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition and the review 4 petition,   the   landowners   filed   SLP   (c) No.12889/1989 in this Court. It was also dismissed as withdrawn on 27.11.1989.

(2)   Whenever   the   Government   withdraws from any such acquisition, the Collector shall determine   the   amount  of   compensation   due for   the   damage   suffered   by   the   owner   in consequence   of   the   notice   or   of   nay proceedings   thereunder,   and   shall   pay   such amount   to   the   person   interested,   together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land.

49) Our answer to the question is "no". It is for the reasons that First, a mere noting in the official files of   the   Government   while   dealing   with   any   matter pertaining   to  any  person is essentially  an internal matter   of   the   Government   and   carries   with   it   no legal sanctity;  Second,   once   the   decision   on   such 29 issue   is   taken   and   approved   by   the   competent authority   empowered   by   the   Government   in   that behalf,   it   is   required   to   be   communicated   to   the person concerned by the State Government.

57) In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that the High Court failed to examine the issues arising in the case in its correct perspective. We cannot, therefore, concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court   which   wrongly   upheld   the   order   dated 35 10.06.2004   passed   by   the   concerned   Revenue Minister.

58) The   appeal   thus   succeeds  and   is  accordingly allowed.   Impugned   order   is   set   aside.   As   a consequence,   the   writ   petition   filed   by   respondent No.1   stands   dismissed   with   costs   quantified   at Rs.25,000/­   to   be   payable   by   respondent   No.1   to the appellant.
Sow. Chhaya vs The State Of Maharashtra

3. The case of the prosecution in brief is that Kavita (the victim) sustained 100% burn injuries at about 7.00 a.m. on 11.2.2013 while she was in her matrimonial house at village Javla Bazar, Tq. Basmath. Immediately thereafter, she was brought to the Civil Hospital, Parbhani wherein she succumbed to her injuries at 5.50 p.m. During the course of treatment, her Dying Declaration was recorded at 3.10 p.m. in the hospital in which she implicated both the accused.

4. This Court, on 21.11.2016, while issuing notice of the appeal in so far as Accused No.2, Smt. Chhaya (sister-in-law of victim’s husband) was concerned, dismissed the appeal filed by Accused No.1 namely Gangadhar @ Baburao Nagorao Ambhore (victim’s husband). Thus, the judgment and order of conviction passed against Accused No.1 namely Gangadhar @ Baburao Nagorao Ambhore has attained finality. Accused No.2, Smt. Chhaya, is the only appellant before this Court at present.

9. In view of the same, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed by giving her the benefit of doubt, and the impugned order is set aside so far as it relates to Accused no.2 - Smt. Chhaya, appellant herein. Needless to say that the appellant be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

August 03 , 2018.
Col. Ivs Gahlot vs Union Of India .

2. The   appellant's   case   before   the   Tribunal   was that in his consideration for promotion he was denied marks   for   Ph.D.   degree   in   Anthropology   (Science) awarded   to   him   by   Berhampur   University   in   1998.   He further   questions   non   granting   of   any   mark   for   his Post   Graduate   training   qualification   obtained   from G.S.V.M. Medical College, Kanpur and further no marks 3 were   awarded   on   his   Master   degree   in   Personnel Management in 2005 obtained from Pune University. The Tribunal although accepted the claim of grant of mark for   Master   degree   in   Personnel   Management   but rejected the claim of the appellant for grant of any mark   for   Ph.D.   degree   as   well   as   Post   Graduate training in Pediatrics.

Thiruvananthapura Philosophy (Microbiology) Doctor   of Ph.D. (Patho.) Philosophy (Pathology)

23. Now,   we   come   to   the   Post   Graduate   training program   on   which   the   appellant   is   also   claiming allocation   of   marks.     Two   year   full   time   training program to be eligible for award of one mark required to fulfill following conditions:

Sd/­(Illegible) Sarla Mathur Prof.& Head”

25. The   above   certificate   does   not   indicate   that appellant   completed   full   time   structured   training programme.

27. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
Ved Pal (D) Tr.Lrs.. vs Prem Devi (D) Tr.Lrs..

2) Few   facts   need   to   be   mentioned   for   the disposal of this appeal.

4) The Single Judge of the High Court, however, by   impugned   order   dated   26.09.2006   disposed   of 2 the second appeal in the light of compromise, which is said to have been arrived at between the parties. In other words, the second appeal was not decided on merits but disposed of in the light of compromise arrived at between the parties.

6) Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal in part and set aside the order passed in the review petition and permit the appellants to file an application before the High Court   for   amending   their   review   petition,   filed   in disposed   of   second   appeal,   raising   all   their 3 grievances against the manner in which the second appeal came to be disposed of in the light of alleged compromise to enable the High Court to decide the review petition afresh.

9) In this case, we find that the High Court did not   examine   the   plea   of   the   appellants   properly keeping in view the facts alleged in the application and   while   negativing   the   attack   observed   that   the appellants   are   free   to   take   recourse   to   any   other legal   remedies.   Since   the   second   appeal   was disposed of affecting the rights of the parties in the light   of   compromise,   the   proper   Forum   to   re­ examine   the   issue,   in   our   opinion,   is   the   High Court, which disposed of the second appeal rather than any other Forum to examine the issue at this stage.   It   is   more   so   when   we   find   that   the   High Court did not go into the details in the proceedings filed by the appellants in its correct perspective. 5

10) It is for this reason, we decline to examine the several factual and legal issues urged by the parties in this appeal and leave these issues for the High Court   to   examine   afresh   on   merits   in   accordance with law and dispose of the same.

11) The   appeal   thus   succeeds   and   is   allowed   in part. The impugned order dated 29.01.2007 passed in Review Petition is set aside and the High Court is requested to decide the matter afresh on merits in accordance   with   law   without   being   influenced   by any   of   our   observations   on   merits   which   we   have refrained from entering into them having formed an opinion to remand the case to the High Court for its disposal.

13) The   appellants   are   at   liberty   to   amend   the review petition or/and file fresh application raising all   legally   permissible   grounds   to   attack   the  order impugned   therein.   The   respondents   too   are   at liberty to raise objections in accordance with law.

August 10, 2018  7
State Bank Of India vs V. Ramakrishnan

2. The factual backdrop of the present appeals is that the Respondent No.1 is the Managing Director of the corporate debtor, 1 namely, the Respondent No.2 Company, and also the personal guarantor in respect of credit facilities that had been availed from the Appellant. The Guarantee Agreement entered into between the Appellant and the Respondent No.1 is dated 22.02.2014.

3. As the Respondent No.2 Company did not pay its debts in time, the account of Respondent No.2 was classified as a non-performing asset on 26.07.2015. Consequent thereto, the Appellant issued a notice dated 04.08.2015 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act demanding an outstanding amount of Rs.61,13,28,785.48 from the Respondents within the statutory period of 60 days. As no payment was forthcoming, a possession notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act was issued on 18.11.2016.

4. As matters stood thus, an application was filed by Respondent No.2, the corporate debtor, under Section 10 of the Code on 20.05.2017 to initiate the corporate insolvency resolution process against itself. On 19.06.2017, this petition filed under Section 10 was admitted, followed by the moratorium that is imposed statutorily by Section 14 of the Code. While the said proceedings were pending, an interim application was filed by Respondent No.1 as personal guarantor to the corporate debtor, 2 in which Respondent No.1 took up the plea that Section 14 of the Code would apply to the personal guarantor as well, as a result of which proceedings against the personal guarantor and his property would have to be stayed. The National Company Law Tribunal, by its order dated 18.09.2017, held that since under Section 31 of the Code, a Resolution Plan made thereunder would bind the personal guarantor as well, and since, after the creditor is proceeded against, the guarantor stands in the shoes of the creditor, Section 14 would apply in favour of the personal guarantor as well. The interim application filed by Respondent No.1 was thus allowed, and the Appellant was restrained from moving against Respondent No.1.

xxx xxx xxx

30. For all these reasons, we are of the view that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal has to be set aside. The appeals are accordingly allowed.

August 14, 2018.
M/S Alagu Pharmacy vs N Magudeswari

3. The appellants 2 to 4 are doing business in the name and style of M/s Alagu Pharmacy i.e. the appellant No.1. The appellants claim to be tenants in the suit property owned by the respondent herein since 1998. On or about 22.02.2012 a lease agreement was entered into, which according to the appellants was signed by the respondent, extending/renewing the period of lease. On 13.11.2013 and 07.12.2013 the respondent had issued legal notices calling upon the appellants to vacate the suit property alleging inter alia that the lease agreement dated 22.02.2012 was not signed by the respondent and was a forged document, to which reply was given by the appellants on 17.01.2014. On 17.01.2014 itself a complaint (Exh.P-10) was lodged by the respondent alleging commission of forgery. According to the appellants, on 20.01.2014 the respondent alongwith her husband and some henchmen tried to evict the appellants which attempt was successfully resisted by the appellants. In the circumstances, O.S. No.135 of 2014 was filed by the appellants on 21.01.2014 seeking relief of permanent injunction against the respondent from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property save and except by due process of law. After 3 hearing the appellants, an ad interim injunction was granted by the District Munsif, Coimbatore.

4. It appears that on 29.01.2014 a compromise (Exh.P-11) was entered into between the appellants and the respondent. It is the case of the appellants that they were summoned to the police station in connection with the complaint lodged by the respondent (Exh.P-10) and under the pressure employed by the police, said Exh. P-11 was entered into. Soon thereafter an Eviction Petition i.e. R.C.O.P. No.29 of 2014 was filed by the respondent before the Principal Rent Controller-cum-District Munsif, Coimbatore for eviction of the appellants. It is the case of the appellant that they were again asked to appear before the police on 27.03.2014 and under the pressure exerted by the police a compromise deed was entered into under which the appellants agreed to vacate the suit property. Said compromise deed was presented before the Court on 28.03.2014 and following order was passed by the Rent Controller and Principal District Munsif, Coimbatore:

sheet....”

….

….

15. In the circumstances, in our considered view, the order passed by the appellate court was absolutely correct and did not call for any interference 17 on part of the High Court. We, therefore, allow the present appeals and restore the order dated 19.01.2016 passed by the appellate court in IA No.465 of 2015. The appeal shall now be heard on merits and disposed of in accordance with law. Since there was delay of more than 600 days on part of the appellants, we direct that the appellants shall pay costs of Rs.50,000/- to the respondent which shall be over and above that already imposed by the appellant court and shall be made over within six weeks from this Judgment. The appeals stand allowed in the aforesaid terms.