L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Madhuban vs State Of U.P

3. It was the case of the prosecution that in the night of November 15, 1976, Jai Ram Singh (Deceased 1) returned home from out of station. After taking meal, he went to sleep in the room with his wife and his son Akhilesh Singh @ Sanjay Singh (Deceased 2). His younger brother Sri Nath Singh (informant) was sleeping in the adjoining room. At about 12.30 a.m., i.e. early morning of November 16, 1976, Sri Nath Singh heard cries of his nephew and Bhabhi, wife of Jai Ram Singh. On opening the door between the two rooms, he saw that his brother Jai Ram Singh and nephew Akhilesh Singh were being attacked by four persons. When Sri Nath Singh tried to intervene, he was also assaulted and received injuries. Shout was raised for calling neighbours and the assailants fled away. Jai Ram Singh died on the spot. Sri Nath Singh informed the Police Station, Ayodhya and First Information Report was registered on the same day, i.e. November 16, 1976. Akhilesh Singh @ Sanjay Singh was critical. He was sent to District Hospital, Faizabad, but his condition deteriorated. He was, therefore, shifted to Medical College, Lucknow. He, however, died there on November 22, 1976. When the matter came up before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faizabad, he passed an order on May 19, 1979 of committal to the Court of Session. The learned Sessions Judge, Faizabad framed charges against the accused for offences punishable under Sections 302, 323 and 394 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'), was recorded. The learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge held that the case of the prosecution was proved against the appellant and accordingly he convicted the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302, IPC and ordered him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. He also convicted the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 394, IPC and ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and for an offence punishable under Section 323, IPC, to undergo imprisonment for nine months.

4. Being aggrieved by the order of conviction, the appellant herein preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court again considered the evidence in detail and confirmed the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court. It is this order which is challenged in the present appeal.

13. In view of the above facts and circumstances, in our opinion, ends of justice would be met if we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

15. We may observe that we have not entered into the merits of the matter and as and when the matter is placed for hearing before the High Court, the Court will decide the same on its own merits.

16. Ordered accordingly.
C.K. Prahalada & Ors vs State Of Karnataka & Ors

3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The brother of Madwaramanachar, father of the appellant, was admitted to S.D.S. TB Hospital at Bangalore. All the articles from the body of his brother were removed by the father of the appellant. After his death, the father of the appellant requested the hospital authorities to hand over the obsquecies seized wherefor a written request was made on 9.6.1981. The Superintendent of the said hospital passed an order that the articles kept by the father of the appellants must be delivered back to the hospital authorities for being kept in a safe custody so as to enable them to deliver the same to the persons entitled therefor. Delivery of the articles was insisted before handing over the dead body. The said articles were handed over to the hospital authorities wherefor an acknowledgment was issued.

4. An application for grant of succession certificate was filed by the father of the appellants on 24.8.1981. In the said proceedings, one Gowramma, wife of the deceased, was impleaded as a party. She expired during the pendency of the said proceedings. She, allegedly left behind one S. Basavarajappa, who is said to be her adopted son. By an order dated 5.7.1991, succession certificate was granted in favour of the appellant in respect of the following :

5. Despite production of the said succession certificate, the hospital authorities did not return the said articles and documents to the appellant's father, whereupon a suit in the court of Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore seeking a direction to the hospital authorities-defendants to hand over the articles to the appellants or in alternative pay the value thereof which was assessed at Rs.45,000/- was filed

(Emphasis added)

Keeping in view the nature of the order passed by the High Court, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where we should interfere with the judgment of the High Court dated 24.10.2005 which will have the effect of setting aside its order dated 1.12.2005 also. We, however, are of the opinion that the State must pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- by way of costs to the appellant. We further direct that Basavarajappa should be impleaded as a party in the suit. It will also be open to the appellant to pray for such other relief or reliefs in the suit as she may be advised in the matter.

13. The appeal is dismissed with the aforementioned directions. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
Sudhir Kumar Rana vs Surinder Singh & Ors

3. Appellant filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the Act"). The Tribunal opined that as the appellant did not possess a driving licence, he must be held to have contributed to the accident. Although a sum of Rs. 30,000/- was awarded by way of compensation, in view of the finding that he was guilty of contributory negligence on his part, found to be entitled to a sum of Rs. 12,000/- only. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment has dismissed the appeal preferred by him under Section 173 of the Act.

10. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. Appellant is entitled to the said sum of Rs. 30,000/- by way of compensation with interest at the rate of 7=% per annum from the date of the award till making of the payment. Even otherwise there is no reason as to why in view of the nature of the injuries he has suffered, he should be deprived of even the petty sum of Rs.30,000/- by way of compensation. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned direction. No costs.
National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Yellamma & Anr

The said insurance cover was issued for the period 3.9.1991 to 2.9.1992. On or about 12.9.1991, the said vehicle met with an accident. First respondent who suffered an injury therein filed a claim petition in terms of the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the Act). An award for a sum of Rs.43,000/- was made. The Tribunal, in its award, categorically held :

10. The accident took place in the State of Karnataka. Respondent No.2 is a resident of Ludhiana. The transaction in question was purported to have been entered in Ludhiana. First respondent, therefore, in our opinion, may not be in a position to enforce the award as against the respondent No.2.

11. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are, therefore, of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if we, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, direct that the awarded amount be paid by the appellant to the first respondent with liberty to it to recover the same from the second respondent by initiating an appropriate proceeding in this behalf.

12. This appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent and with the aforementioned directions. As the respondents have not appeared before us, there shall be no order as to costs.
Cochin University Of Science & ... vs Thomas P. John & Ors

2. In the Undergraduate 4 years B. Tech. Cost-Sharing Engineering Course of eight semesters started in the year 1995 by the appellant university, 10% seats were reserved for Non- Resident Indian Students (hereinafter called "NRI students"). As per the prospectus such students were required to make a deposit of US $5000 at the time of their admission towards 'development charges' and to pay in addition a fee of Rs.20,000/- per semester whereas all the other categories of students were required to pay a uniform fee of Rs.20,000/- per semester. From the academic year 1996-97, however, the University increased the fee for NRI students to US $4000 per annum whereas the other students continued to pay fee at the rate of Rs.20,000 per semester. This practice was continued for three admission years, i.e. 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99, but from the year 1999-2000 the provisions made in the year 1995- 96 i.e. confining the payment of fee to a one time payment US $5,000 and Rs.20,000/-per semester were restored. The respondents herein who had been admitted to the course in question during the years 1997-98 and 1998-99 filed representations claiming that they had been adversely treated by the appellant University and that they were entitled to claim parity vis-`-vis the fee structure for NRI students as from the years 1999-2000 onwards. As the representations bore no result, 34 of the 56 NRI students who had been admitted to the course during the two years, filed two writ petitions before the Kerala High Court. On notice, a counter affidavit was filed by the Registrar on behalf of the appellant University pointing out that the NRI students had not been admitted to the course on the basis of merit and that the B. Tech. programme conducted at the Centre was a self-financing and unaided one being run exclusively with funds collected by way of fees. The fact as to the increase and the changes made from time to time in the fee structure were broadly admitted but it was pleaded that the Syndicate of the University had reduced the fee for the batch entering the course for the year 1999-2000 before the admission process had commenced and that the writ petitioners could not claim an automatic reduction in the fee and it was essential that the fee structure designed for a particular batch should be allowed to continue as to make a change midway would lead to a complete break down of the finances of the University. The Division Bench of the High Court observed that two questions arose for consideration:

14. We therefore, find that the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be sustained. We accordingly set it aside and allow the appeals with no order as to costs.
Commr.Of Income Tax-Ii,Chandigarh vs M/S Swaraj Engines Ltd

M/s. Swaraj Engines Ltd. (respondent herein) entered into an agreement of transfer of technology know-how and trade mark with Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. under which royalty was payable it. The claim for deduction in respect of the said payment was made by the respondent. It is important to note that during the relevant Assessment Year 1995-96, royalty was paid by the assessee as a percentage of net selling price of the licensed goods products.

Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration in accordance with law. 3 The Appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
Lachhman Singh (Deceased)Through ... vs Hazara Singh (Deceased) Through Legal ...

3. A transaction of mortgage in respect of the suit property admeasuring 58 kanals 11 marlas was entered into by and between the predecessors in the interest of the parties herein. The actual date of execution of the deed of mortgage was not known to the plaintiffs-respondents. However, the said mortgaged properties were mutated in the name of the mortgagees on or about 19.3.1913.

5. The High Court, however, in the second appeal preferred thereagainst by the respondent herein, formulated the following substantial questions of law :

The said Second Appeal on the said finding was allowed.

The relationship between the parties is not in dispute. Respondents filed the aforementioned suit for a decree for redemption of mortgage on payment of a sum as may be found due to the appellants herein. The details of the mortgage were furnished but the actual date of mortgage being not known could not be furnished.

11. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the court should be loathed to entertain such an application but the respondents have herein made out adequate grounds therefor.

12. We are of the opinion that keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the respondents should be permitted to adduce evidence. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and remit the matter back to the High Court directing it to take the additional evidence on record either allowing the parties to adduce evidence before it or to prove the said documents by the trial judge in terms of Order 41 Rule 28 of the Code. Appeal is allowed to the above extent. No costs.
Jaswant Singh Lamba vs Haryana Agricultural University & Ors

The review of the said judgment was sought for by the appellant, inter alia, on the premise that the decision of the High Court, allowing a writ petition filed by respondent Nos.4 and 5 resulted in loss of his seniority. Respondent Nos.4 and 5 were appointed as Sectional Officers on an ad hoc basis on or about 11.11.1982. Respondent No.4 was appointed on a temporary post on 27.9.1984, whereas the appellant was appointed on 5.10.1984. Respondent No.5 is said to have been appointed on a temporary post by an order dated 7.6.1985. In a seniority list published on 23.12.1987, their seniority was shown from the date of their regular appointment. The said respondents, however, contended that as they were appointed in terms of the recruitment rules against permanent vacancies, they had wrongly been appointed on an ad hoc basis on and from 11.11.1982.

Their representation that they were entitled to be appointed with effect from 11.11.1982 on a regular basis was rejected. They filed a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on 2.6.1990, praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs :

3. The said writ petition was allowed by the High Court by an order dated 23.11.1992 directing that the said respondents shall be deemed to be in the service of the respondent on a regular basis from the date of their initial appointment, holding :

4. Allegedly, a seniority list was published on 18.4.1992 wherein the appellant was shown as senior to the respondent No.5 being at serial No.16 and respondent No.5 was shown as junior to him being placed at serial No.18. However, another seniority list was published on 20.5.2004 wherein they were shown as senior to the appellant. Appellant filed representations thereagainst, inter alia, on 29.5.2004 and 24.8.2004. The said representations were rejected by an order dated 1.1.2005, stating :

"The said fact of the respondent Nos.4 and 5

17. For the reasons aforementioned, the High Court, in our opinion, was right in concluding that the review application was not maintainable. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

May 6, 2008
Kotikalapudi Subba Rao vs State Of A.P. & Anr

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows: 2

Ex. P.15 and P-16 are the intimations received by him. He rushed to Government Hospital, Bapatla, recorded the statement of P.W.1 and registered a case in Cr. No.50/2001 under Sections 307 and 302 r/w 34 IPC and issued Ex.P-17 FIR. P.W.15 received the copy of FIR and took up investigation. He examined P.W.1 and recorded his statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short `Cr.P.C'). He observed the scene on 3.5.2001 at about 3 5 A.M. and prepared Ex.P.6 scene of offence panchanama. He examined PWs.2, 6 and 7 and one Kancharlapalli Naresh at the Government Hospital, Papatla and recorded their statements. He conducted inquest on the dead body of the deceased on 7.5.2001 at 8 A.M. The opinion arrived by the panchas, on hearing the statements of the witnesses examined during the inquest, came to be incorporated at Col. No. 15 of the Inquest Report. Ex.P.7 is the inquest report. P.W. 17 G. Penchalanaidu, Inspector of Police, Bapatla, took up investigation and effected arrest of Al and A2 and recovered Mos. l and 2 in pursuance of their disclosure statements. Ex.P.8 and P.9 are the admissible portions in their confessional statements. He effected the arrest of A3 on 19.5.2001 at 10.30 A.M. at the footbridge of Railway Station, Bapatla and sent him for remand. On requisition, P.W. 13 conducted test identification parade on 16.6.2001. In the test identification parade P.Ws. 1 to 3 identified A1 to A3 as the assailants of the deceased. After completing investigation, a charge sheet came to be submitted before the II Additional 6 Munsif Magistrate, Bapatla. The learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Division, Guntur as the offence u/s.302 and. 307 IPC are exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The learned Sessions Judge made over the same to II Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur for trial in accordance with law. The learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur, on hearing the prosecution and the accused, framed the following charges:

13. When the factual position is considered in the background of the legal principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be in terms of Section 304 Part I IPC and not Section 302 IPC. The conviction under Section 307 IPC does not suffer from any infirmity. The same is upheld. Custodial sentence of 10 years in respect of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC would suffice. Both the sentences shall run concurrently.

14. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Commissioner Of Income ... vs Joseph Valakuzhy

2. The respondent-assessee (for short "the assessee") is a film producer. In his income tax return for the assessment year 1992-93, the assessee claimed the benefit of carry forward of Rs.39,43,830/- as amortization expenses. The Assessing Officer allowed the claim of amortization. On appeal, the Commissioner of Income Tax, in exercise of his jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act, set aside the assessment and directed the Assessing Officer to withdraw the benefit of carry forward granted to the Assessee on the ground that, as the provisions of Section 80 of the Act are applicable, the benefit of carry forward of the expenses was not admissible to the assessee as the assessee had failed to file the income tax return in accordance with Section 139(3) of the Act. Appeal filed against the aforesaid order before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short "the Tribunal") was dismissed.

3. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer implemented the directions issued by the Commissioner of Income Tax by passing a fresh order under Section 143(3) withdrawing the benefit of carry forward of amortization expenses granted to the assessee. The assessee being aggrieved filed an appeal before the CIT (Appeals). CIT (Appeals) accepted the appeal. It was found that the computation of the amortization expenses to be carried forward, as shown by the assessee, was not correct. The assessee had claimed amortization expenses in respect of the two films, namely,

13. The rule, as it now stands, provides that in such cases, deduction of the cost of production of the film is to be allowed to the extent of the amount realized during the number of days of commercial exhibition in that year and the balance has to be allowed in the next year. Rule 9A(2) provides that where a feature film is certified by the Board of Film Censors for release in any previous year, and in that previous year the film is released for exhibition for at least 180 days, before the end of that previous year, the entire cost of production of the film shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the profits and gains of such previous year. Rule 9A(3) provides that where the film is not released for exhibition for 180 days in the previous year, deduction of the cost of production is to be allowed to the extent of the amount realized during the period of commercial exhibition in that year and the balance shall be allowed in the next year.

15. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in the present appeal and dismiss the same leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Union Of India & Ors vs C.N. Vasudevan

The respondent was working as a Regional Passport Officer. He was also assigned the duties and responsibilities of Protector of Emigrants. He filed an O.A. before the Central Administrative Tribunal praying that since the responsibilities of the Regional Passport Officer and Protector of Emigrants are quite different, he may be paid an honorarium for working in the latter capacity. His prayer was allowed by the Tribunal. The High Court, by its impugned order, affirmed the order of the tribunal. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

We agree with the aforesaid contention. Both the High Court and the Tribunal erred in law as well as in facts in granting honorarium to the respondent. The duties of Protector of Emigrants under the Emigration Act is part of the normal duties of the Regional Passport Officer. Hence no extra remuneration has to be paid for the work over and above ......3.

In the premises aforestated, the orders of the tribunal and of the High Court are set aside. This appeal is allowed. No costs.
Tarakanath Kar vs Lipika Kar

3. Background facts as projected by the appellant are as follows:

On 13.8.1997 Chandana appeared before the SDJM, Suri and filed application for being impleaded in the proceedings. On 14.1.1998 learned SDJM passed an ex-parte order of 2 maintenance in favour of the Lipika granting her maintenance @ Rs.400/- p.m. On 27.8.1999 Criminal Revision case No.308/99 was filed by the appellant against Lipika's misc. execution case no.413/1998 arising out of ex-parte order referred to above. The ex-parte order was set aside by the High Court and learned SDJM was directed to decide the matter afresh. On 10.1.2000 learned SDJM dismissed the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. filed by Lipika holding that Chandana is the legally married wife of Tarak and Lipika is not legally married of the appellant. The revision petition filed by Lipika was allowed by the learned Single Judge in CRR No.970 of 2000 and the order of learned SDJM was set aside. There were certain directions given in the said petition, the correctness of which was questioned by the appellant by filing an application for modification/clarification. It was the specific stand of the appellant that the directions in question could not have been given i.e. to initiate departmental proceedings against the appellant.

8. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ...............................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, May 7, 2008