L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Chairman And Managing Director The ... vs General Secretary Fact Employees ...

3. These appeals involve a short point as would be clear from the facts stated infra.

6. On 23.01.1978, a Memorandum of Settlement was executed between appellant No.1 (PSU) and respondent Nos.1 to 10, i.e., (Trade Unions) wherein it was inter alia agreed between the parties that the existing superannuation age of 60 years will remain unchanged in respect of all the workers working in the appellant's Undertaking at Udyogamandal Division, Head Office including those who are on the rolls of the Undertaking as on the date of settlement.

7. It was also agreed that those who are recruited on and after Memorandum of Settlement in question shall retire on attaining the age of 58 years.

8. On 19.05.1998, the Central Government issued a direction to all the Public Sector Undertakings of the Central Government and directed them to increase the age of superannuation upto below board­level employees from 58 years to 3 60 years. This was made compulsory to all the PSUs. Appellant No.1 accordingly ensured its compliance and made it applicable to their employees by a resolution dated 27.05.1998.

19. The appellant (PSU) felt aggrieved and filed intra court appeals. The Division Bench by impugned order dismissed the appeals and upheld the order of the Single Judge, which has given rise to filing of the present appeals by the appellant(PSU) after obtaining the special leave to appeal from this Court.

31. In our opinion, the State had, therefore, no jurisdiction to make a reference(s) to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the ID Act to re­examine the question of age reduction made by the appellant(PSU). A fortiori, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference(s) to adjudicate the question(s) referred in the reference(s).

32. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the awards of the Labour Court, which had rightly held that it (Labour Court) had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference and nor it had the jurisdiction to answer it on merits. The High Court should have upheld the awards of the Labour Court.

34. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the appeals succeed and are accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the awards of the Labour Court are restored.

April 11, 2019 20
Ram Prakash vs Puttan Lal

2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment and Order dated 21.10.2016 and 11.08.2017 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Writ Petition (M/S) No.5459 of 2001 and Review Application No.877 of 2016 respectively, the original defendants/tenants have preferred the present appeals.

6. Hence, the present appeals are disposed of by permitting the appellants­tenants to get the building in question repaired at their own cost and the tenants shall not claim any adjustment of the expenses incurred over repairing from the rent to be paid and the appellants­tenants to get the building repaired at their own cost within the period of six months from today. We 5 direct that thereafter, the appropriate Town Planning Authority of the Corporation, to inspect the building in question and consider whether still the building is in a dilapidated condition and requires re­construction or not. If it is found that after the repairs are carried out the building is safe, in that case, nothing further is required to be done. However, if it is found by the appropriate authority that even after repair, the building is in dilapidated condition and requires re­construction, the authority may communicate their decision/Report further after inspection and giving opportunity to both the parties, and thereafter, it will be open for the landlord to initiate appropriate proceedings for release/eviction before the competent authority/court, which shall consider the same in accordance with law and on its own merits. With the above observations, the present appeals stand disposed of.
Gurdev Singh vs Union Of India

3. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under:

9. Though the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of Govt. of NCT of Delhi has tried to resist the aforesaid offer, we are of the opinion that if the appellants are directed to pay some more reasonable amount considering the fact that number of years have passed and even the price of the land has also increased, it would meet the ends of justice. At the same time, to direct the 9 appellants to pay the present market value/market price would also be unreasonable. Therefore, taking into over all facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that if the appellants are directed to pay Rs.3,66,30,000/­ towards the cost of the land and Rs.20,00,000/­ towards the cost of construction of the existing building, it will meet the ends of justice. As observed hereinabove, the appellants have deposited Rs.89 lakhs in the Registry of the High Court on 25.08.2010. It is reported that now the aforesaid amount with interest comes to Rs.1.41 crores. Therefore, the appellants are required to pay the aforesaid determined amount minus Rs.1.41 crores.

10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court by directing that on the appellants depositing a total sum of Rs.3,86,30,000/­ minus Rs.1.41 crores with the authority, within a period of four weeks from today, the respondents­authority shall sell the property in question in favour of the appellants and handover the possession to them. If any expenditure is to be incurred towards stamp duty/registration fee etc., the same shall be paid by the 10 appellants. The respondents­authority shall be permitted to withdraw the amount of Rs.89 lakhs deposited by the appellants, lying in the High Court, along with accrued interest thereon.

11. The present appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs.
Ashok Kumar Mehra vs The State Of Punjab

2. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of these appeals.

3. Appellant No.1­Ashok Kumar Mehra is the father of appellant No.2­Kushwant@Sukhwant Kumar Mehra. Both the appellants, i.e., father and son were prosecuted for commission of the offence 2 of committing murder of one Inderjit Dhiman. The Sessions Judge by judgment/order dated 06.06.2000 passed in Sessions Case No.10/1998 acquitted both the appellants.

4. The State and the Complainant both felt aggrieved and filed criminal appeal and criminal revision in the High Court. By impugned order, the High Court allowed the criminal appeal as well as the criminal revision and while reversing the judgment of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge, convicted both the appellants and awarded them life sentence, which has given rise to filing of these appeals by both the accused persons, i.e., father and son.

7. In our opinion, so far as appeal filed by appellant No.1­Ashok Kumar Mehra, i.e., father is concerned, the same stands abated on account of his death. In this view of the matter, the appeal filed by appellant No.1 is accordingly dismissed as abated.

25. Criminal Appeal hereby stands allowed and the order of the High Court affirming the conviction and sentence of the Appellant under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC is set aside. Seeing that the Appellant has already spent 6 years in imprisonment, whereas the maximum period for which a juvenile may be sent to a special home is only 3 years as per Section 15(1)(g) of the 2000 Act, and since the Appellant has already been enlarged on bail by virtue of the order of the Court dated 09.05.2014, he need not be taken into custody. His bail bonds stand discharged and all proceedings against him, so far as they relate to the present case, stand terminated.”

13. In the light of these four reasons, we are of the view that it is not necessary to hold any further inquiry on this question.

14. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that since appellant No.2 was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence and though till date he has already undergone considerable jail sentence partly as an under­trial and partly as a convict, yet the appeal filed by appellant No. 2 has to be allowed as was done in the case of Raju (supra) without going into the merits of the case and passing any other consequential order in that regard.

15. The appeal of appellant No. 2 is accordingly allowed. The impugned order qua appellant No.2 is set aside.

April 15, 2019 9
Bihari Lal vs The State Of Rajasthan

3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point.

6. The Additional Sessions Judge, by order dated 02.06.2018, accepted the argument of respondent Nos. 2 to 4(accused persons) and accordingly discharged them from the commission of the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC and proceeded to frame the charges in relation to other offences mentioned above. In other words, the Additional Sessions Judge was of the view that there is no prima facie case made out against respondent Nos. 2 to 4 (accused persons) so far as the offence under Section 307 IPC is concerned.

7. The appellant (complainant) felt aggrieved and filed a criminal revision before the High Court. By 3 impugned order, the High Court dismissed the criminal revision which has given rise to filing of this appeal by way of special leave by the appellant (complainant) in this Court.

12. Indeed, the manner in which both the Courts below proceeded to discharge respondent Nos. 2 to 4 from facing the charge of Section 307 IPC and holding that no prima facie case is made out against them is faulty and hence cannot be sustained.

14. The stage to appreciate the evidence with a view to find fault or/and inconsistencies in the two medical reports would arise only when the prosecution leads evidence by examining the doctors in support of the medical reports. That stage is yet to come in this case.

15. Mere perusal of the medical reports filed by the prosecution would prima facie show that a case under Section 307 IPC is made out against respondent Nos. 2 to 4 and, therefore, the charge under Section 307 IPC should have been framed against respondent Nos. 2 to 4 along with the other charges.

16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The Additional Sessions Judge, 6 who is seized of the trial, is directed to frame the charge under Section 307 IPC against respondent Nos. 2 to 4 herein.

17. We, however, make it clear that respondent Nos. 2 to 4 will be entitled to argue after the evidence is adduced that no case is made out against them under Section 307 IPC and the Court will decide the matter on the basis of evidence adduced by the prosecution on its merits strictly in accordance with law without being influenced by any observations made by this Court.

April 15, 2019.
Dr. R S Grewal vs Chander Parkash Soni

3 A suit for possession was instituted by the appellants and by proforma respondent no 2 against the first respondent in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ludhiana. The first respondent is a tenant inducted by Shiv Dev Kaur Grewal. The foundation of the suit was that Shiv Dev Kaur Grewal was only entitled to a life interest in the property in terms of the will executed by her father and upon her death the appellants were entitled to possession of the shop from the defendant. The plea that was set up in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the plaint was in the following terms:

4 The suit for possession was decreed and the first appeal was dismissed. The basis of the decree for possession was that Shiv Dev Kaur had only a limited right in the property which had not converted into an absolute ownership and hence on her death the property would revert back to Dr Shiv Dev Singh. The judgment of the trial Court as confirmed in appeal was the subject matter of a second appeal before the High Court. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:

The High Court while setting aside the judgment of the first appellate Court held that Shiv Dev Kaur had created a tenancy in favour of the defendant and the 6 relationship of landlord and tenant did not cease to exist on her death. The remedy of the appellants as owners was to seek eviction under prevailing rent control legislation and not by means of a suit for possession, treating the first respondent as trespasser. On this ground, the decree for possession was set aside, though with the observation that this would not preclude the appellants from seeking ejectment of the first respondent on any of the grounds available under the applicable rent control legislation.

…

17 In view of the above discussion, we have come to the conclusion that:

(ii) Under the terms of the will, Shiv Dev Kaur was entitled to settle and reside in the property and benefit from the income arising out of the rent;

(v) The statutory protection afforded to the tenant did not cease to exist upon the death of Shiv Dev Kaur;

(vi) A suit for possession on the basis that the tenant was a trespasser after the death of Shiv Dev Kaur was not maintainable; and

(vii) The remedy of the appellants was to pursue eviction proceedings on the grounds contemplated by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949. 18 For the above reasons, we are of the view that the judgment of the learned single Judge dated 21 January 2016 does not suffer from any error. The appeal shall accordingly stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Civil Appeal Nos 11087 and 11088 of 2018 19 The appeals shall also stand dismissed in the same terms and with the same directions in Civil Appeal No 11086 of 2018.

.....................................................J [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud] .....................................................J [Hemant Gupta] New Delhi;

April 16, 2019
Ashatai vs Shriram City Union Finance Ltd.

2. The factual matrix in which the present case has been filed is as under :

The insurance policy was a Group Insurance Policy issued to various borrowers, including the Appellant’s husband, whose name was at Serial No. 263 of the list. 2.2. The loan was to be serviced by the Appellant’s husband in 48 monthly instalments of Rs. 7,933/­ each. The 1 st loan instalment of Rs. 7,933/­ was paid on 07.03.2015 vide Cheque No. 433931.

2 2.3. The Appellant’s husband admittedly paid the premium of the insurance policy. The Respondent – Finance Company received a Demand Draft of Rs. 400/­ from the Appellant’s husband towards the insurance premium. The Group Insurance Policy was issued from 30.03.2015 to 29.03.2016.

2.4. On 17.03.2015 i.e. within 18 days after obtaining the loan, the Appellant’s husband suddenly passed away. 2.5. The Respondent – Finance Company issued a notice to the Appellant for payment of the loan instalments. 2.6. The Appellant requested the Respondent – Finance Company to recover the loan through the insurance policy.

2.8. The Respondent – Finance Company replied to the Legal Notice on 29.01.2016, and denied having received the Demand Draft of Rs. 400/­ from the deceased husband of the Appellant. It was further contended that the amount of Rs. 2,120/­ was deducted from the loan amount towards processing fee and stamp charges. 3 2.9. The Appellant filed a Consumer Complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Nanded. The Appellant submitted that after the loan was sanctioned on 27.02.2015, the amount was credited to the loan account after deducting the insurance premium. The Respondent – Finance Company obtained the insurance policy from its sister concern on 30.03.2015. Had the insurance policy been issued when the loan was advanced, the amount would have been recovered through the insurance policy. There was therefore a deficiency of service by the Respondent – Finance Company in delay in obtaining the insurance policy from its sister concern. The Respondent – Finance Company was not entitled to recover the loan from the Appellant.

The National Commission set aside the Order passed by the State Commission, and allowed the Revision Petition filed by the Respondent – Finance Company vide Order dated 30.11.2018.

Thus, the deduction of Rs. 2,120/­ from the loan account was towards processing of the composite transaction.

4. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Order dated 30.11.2018 passed by the National Commission in Revision 11 Petition No. 472 of 2018 is hereby set aside. The Civil Appeal is allowed.

5. The Appellant – widow has been unnecessarily dragged though legal proceedings on account of deficiency of service by the Respondent – Finance Company. We deem it appropriate to direct the Respondent – Finance Company to pay Compensation of Rs. 50,000/­, and Costs of Rs. 25,000/­ to the Appellant.

All pending Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of. Ordered accordingly.
Pr. Commissioner Of Income Tax Central 2 vs M/S A.A. Estate Pvt. Ltd

3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point.

5. The respondent­assessee is a Company engaged in the business of development and building of properties. The dispute relates to the assessment year 2008­09.

7. On 22.09.2010, the AO issued a notice under Section 148 of the Act seeking therein to re­open the assessment of the respondent­assessee which was made on 24.12.2009. This notice was issued by 2 the AO on the basis of information received from ADIT (investigation) Unit II (2).

9. The AO proposed this addition on the basis of one document (Annexure–AB­1), which was seized by the Revenue Department in their search operation carried on 30.11.2007 in the business premises of another assessee by name­M/s Ashok Buildcom Ltd.

13. The respondent­assessee felt aggrieved and filed appeal before the CIT (appeal). By order dated 21.02.2013, the CIT (appeal) dismissed the appeal and upheld the addition made by the AO. The respondent­assessee felt aggrieved and filed second 4 appeal before the ITAT. By order dated 05.02.2014, the Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the CIT (appeals).

26. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court did not decide the appeal in conformity with the mandatory procedure prescribed in Section 260­ A of the Act.

27. Fourth, the High Court should have seen that following substantial questions of law do arise in the appeal for being answered on their respective merits:

28. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we consider it just and proper to remand the case to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh to answer the questions framed above on merits in accordance with law.

29. The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax­ Mumbai afresh on merits as provided under Section 10 260­A(4) of the Act to answer the three questions framed by this Court under Section 260­A(3) of the Act.

30. The High Court will decide the appeal uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned order and in this order because having formed an opinion to remand the case, we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

April 16, 2019 11
G. Shashikala (Died) Through Lrs. vs G. Kalawati Bai(Died) Through Lr

3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of these appeals, which involve a short point.

4. The appellants herein are the legal representatives of the original defendants and the respondents are the plaintiffs of the two suits being O.S. No. 1402 of 1992 and O.S. No.432 of 1993.

16. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are unable to concur with the approach, reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in the impugned order calling for interference by this Court.

17. The appeals, therefore, deserve to be allowed and are accordingly allowed. The interim order dated 11.07.2016 by which the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code was allowed and the final order impugned herein are set aside.

April 16, 2019 7
Pr. Commissioner Of Income Tax 3 Nagpur vs Ballarpur Industries Ltd.

3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point.

5. The respondent­assessee is a Limited Company, which is engaged in the business of manufacturing of various kinds of papers. The dispute in this appeal relates to the assessment year 1993­94.

7. According to the respondent­Company(assessee), Mr. G.R. Hada and the respondent­Company were the joint promoters of one Company called M/s Andhra Pradesh Rayons Limited in which Mr. G.R. Hada was holding 10.25% shares and the remaining shares were held by other promoter shareholders with different percentage.

8. Since the dispute arose amongst the promoter shareholders, Mr. G.R. Hada filed a civil suit against the respondent­Company(assessee) and other promoter shareholders on the basis of an agreement, which was entered into amongst the promoter shareholders.

9. In the abovementioned suit, a compromise was arrived at between the respondent­Company(assessee) and Mr. G.R. Hada. Pursuant to the said compromise, 3 3 the respondent­Company(assessee) paid a sum of Rs.3.25 crores to Mr. G.R. Hada.

13. The respondent­Company(assessee) felt aggrieved and filed second appeal in the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal examined the question in Paras 26 and 27 and by its order dated 30.06.2003 allowed the appeal and directed the AO to allow the deduction of Rs.3.25 crores as claimed by the respondent­Company(assessee).

23. In such a situation like the one arising in the case and keeping in view the question involved, we are of the considered opinion that the matter deserves to be remanded to the Tribunal for deciding the appeal filed by the respondent­Company (assessee) afresh on merits because the Tribunal being the last Court of appeal on facts, its finding on the question of fact is of significance.

26. It is for this reason, we allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the High Court and the Tribunal and remand the appeal to the Tribunal for its decision afresh on merits in accordance with law uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned order, order of the Tribunal and in this order. Needless to observe, the parties will be entitled to raise all contentions in appeal before the Tribunal.

April 22, 2019 9 9 10 10