L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of M. P. & Ors vs Bharat Singh Bhati & Ors

2. In our view, this appeal can be disposed of on a very short point. The respondents, Bharat Singh Bhati & Ors. filed a writ application before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore claiming relief that a minimum of pay-scale from the respective dates of their initial appointment be paid to them as had been paid to other similarly situated persons and for other incidental reliefs.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and considering the fact that return was in fact not filed by the appellants, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in allowing the writ application without affording any opportunity of filing return to the writ application filed by the respondents. In that view of the matter, we set aside all the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition as well as in the Review Application and also the order passed in the writ appeal. The appellants shall file their return to the petition within six weeks from the date of supply of a copy of this order to the High Court and the High Court, thereafter, shall dispose of the writ application after giving hearing to the parties within a period of three months from the date of filing the return to the writ application by passing a reasoned and speaking order in accordance with law.

7. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
Huchappa @ Hucharayappa & Ors vs State Of Karnataka

4. As noted above, after the death of the deceased, another complaint was filed and the case was registered as one in relation to the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The trial court as noted above found accused 4 to 14 to be not guilty. An appeal was preferred by the appellants which, as noted above was dismissed. The High Court disposed of the appeal observing as follows:

9. Since the High Court has not applied its mind to various contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and has in a casual manner disposed of the appeal, we have no hesitation in setting aside the impugned judgment. We remit the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Since the Criminal Appeal is to the year 2001, we request the High Court to dispose of the appeal as early as practicable preferably by the end of October, 2008.

10. It is stated that an application for suspension of the sentence of the accused persons and grant of bail moved in the High Court. If the same is filed, it shall be dealt with in accordance with law.
Swarn K. Jain vs Ravi Mahajan & Ors

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

4. The High Court referred to three documents i.e. receipts dated 30.1.1974, 19.11.1973 and 23.3.1974. While appearing as PW-1, the plaintiff did not say a word as to how and under what circumstances the documents were executed. He also admitted the execution of the documents and construction of boundary wall having been done by the defendants. However, he feigned ignorance as to when the construction was raised. The height of the wall and the defendants having access to the passage were admitted. In the last line of the statement he admitted that within one or two years after receipt of the money he saw the defendants had constructed the boundary wall. The Division Bench found that the omission to give details when the cause of action arose to the plaintiff for maintaining the suit against the defendants was purposeful and intentional. Had these facts been specifically pleaded, defendants would have controverted them. Despite this omission, defendants pleaded their case and disputed the claim of the plaintiff. No replication was filed. High Court referred to Section 138 of the J & K Act which reads as follows:

10. The High Court's finding, as noted above, does not suffer from any infirmity.

12. The appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.
Hemani Malhotra vs High Court Of Delhi

2. In order to resolve the controversy raised by the petitioners in the petitions it would be advantageous to refer to certain basic facts.

3. The respondent i.e. the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi through Registrar General issued an advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates for 16 vacant posts to be filled up by direct recruitment to Delhi Higher Judicial Service. Detailed information was given in the instructions annexed with the Application Form. The relevant particulars stated in the advertisement were as under:-

Minimum qualifying marks in the written examination shall be 55% for General Candidates and 50% for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates.

6. On service of notice, Mr. Ramesh Chand, Deputy Registrar, Delhi High Court has filed reply affidavit controverting the averments made in the petition. In the reply it is stated that the writ petitions filed against prescription of minimum percentage of marks for qualifying at the viva- voce test, is not maintainable and therefore should be dismissed. It is mentioned in the reply that as far as selection made in the year 2000 was concerned, a candidate was required to get minimum of 55% marks if he belonged to the General Category and 50% marks if he belonged to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes category for passing the vive-voce test and as the petitioners who belong to the General Category did not secure the minimum marks stipulated for the vive-voce, but failed, their names were not recommended for appointment. It is mentioned in the reply that another advertisement dated May 19, 2007 was issued for recruitment to the vacant posts in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service wherein the petitioners had appeared but failed and therefore also they are not entitled to the reliefs claimed in the petitions. What is pointed out in the reply is that a candidate is required to secure the stipulated minimum marks in the written examination in order to qualify for the next stage i.e. vive-voce test and therefore the respondent was justified in prescribing cut off marks at the vive-voce test. By filing the reply the respondent has demanded dismissal of the petitions.

12. For the foregoing reasons both the petitions succeed. The respondent is directed to add the marks obtained by the petitioners in the written examination to the marks obtained by them in the vive-voce test and prepare a combined merit list along with the other selected candidates. The respondent is directed to amend the notice dated April 10, 2007 issued by the Registrar (Vig.), High Court of Delhi, New Delhi and declare the petitioners as selected for being recommended for appointment to the post in Delhi Higher Judicial Service. It is clarified that the petitioners would neither be entitled to, seniority or salary with retrospective effect. Their seniority shall be reckoned from the date of their appointment and salary as allowable be paid from that date only. Rule is made absolute accordingly in each petition. There shall be no order as to cost.
Daya Nand vs State Of Haryana

3. A synoptical resume of the prosecution case is as under:

5. Accused persons during their examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'Cr.P.C.') pleaded innocence and false implication. The Trial Court relied on the evidence of eye witnesses Shankar (PW5) and Nain Sukh (PW6). It found the prosecution evidence cogent and credible and recorded conviction of the appellant. But so far as accused Amar Singh is concerned, it was held that the evidence was not sufficient to fasten guilt on him.

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.

Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender."

21. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.

23. Considering the evidence on record in the background of the principles of law, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part II IPC. The conviction is accordingly altered.

24. Undisputedly, the accused has suffered custody of nearly 8= years. The sentence is restricted, therefore, to the period already undergone. The appeal is allowed to that extent. The accused person be set at liberty forthwith unless required in custody in any other case.
Management Of Aurofood Pvt. Ltd vs S.Rajulu

1. The facts leading to the filing of this appeal are as under:

2. The respondent, who was working as a Packer with the appellant company was put under suspension vide order dated 26th April 1981. A charge-sheet dated 28th April 1981 was thereafter served upon him alleging that on 24th April 1981 he had been found wasting his time eating biscuits near the store room and on being questioned by his superior, had answered insolently and told him that he too was dishonest and that he was not afraid to face the consequences. The respondent was then taken to one Moses, a senior officer, but he continued to use foul and filthy language and threatened Moses that if he made a report against him, he would break his legs. The respondent was also served a second charge-sheet on 11th August 1981 for another misconduct on the allegation that on 10th August 1981 he had misbehaved with one Mrs. Sasireka and used filthy language against her. A domestic enquiry was thereafter held against the respondent which indicted him on both charges. The management accepted the findings of the enquiry officer and took a tentative decision to impose the punishment of dismissal under the Standing Orders. A show-cause dated 13th October 1981 (Annexure P-

3) was also issued to him calling upon to show cause as to why the aforesaid punishment should not be imposed on him. The respondent furnished his reply which was found unsatisfactory and vide order dated 5th November 1981 he was dismissed from service on account of the gravity of misconduct and for having used abusive language, vide order appended as Annexure P-4. The respondent thereafter raised an industrial dispute. The Government declined to refer the dispute for further adjudication by its order dated 23rd August 1982. The respondent thereafter moved a representation before the Government on 1st September 1986 and the matter was referred to the Labour Court vide order dated 10th August 1987. The Labour Court rendered its award on 30th March 1993 holding that the disciplinary action initiated against the respondent was not an act of victimization, that the charges raised against the respondent stood proved and that the finding of the enquiry officer was justified ( a copy of the award has been appended as Annexure P-5). The respondent thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court. The learned Single Judge in his judgment and order dated 9th February 2001 observed that the misconduct even if held to be proved really amounted to the use of "unparliamentary language"

6. There will be no order as to costs.
United India Insurance Co.Ltd vs Suresh K.K.& Anr

2. Lacerated would (R) & (L) Legs.'' He filed a claim application in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for a sum of Rs. 2.25 Lakhs; the details whereof are as under :

The High Court, therefore, may be correct that the owner or the goods would be covered in terms of the said provision.

If the claimant had not been travelling in the vehicle as owner of the goods, he shall not be covered by the policy of the insurance. In any view of the matter in a three wheeler goods carriage, the driver could not have allowed anybody else to share his seat. No other person whether as a passenger or as a owner of the vehicle is supposed to share the seat of the driver. Violation of the condition of the contract of insurance, therefore, is approved.

The Tribunal and the High Court, therefore, in our considered opinion, should have held that the owner of the vehicle is guilty of the breach of the conditions of policy.

Keeping in view the aforementioned facts and circumstances into consideration, we are of the opinion that with a view to do complete justice between the parties, a direction should be given to the appellant to pay the amount to the claimant and realise the same from the owner of the vehicle. Such a direction would, in our opinion, serve the ends of justice.

The appeal is allowed to the above extent.

No costs.
Seenivasan vs Peter Jebaraj & Anr

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

On 10.11.1987 Execution Petition was filed to execute the decree in the aforesaid OS No. 528 of 1981. On 11.1.1988, the Executing Court executed sale deed in favour of Arunachalam. On 23.3.1988 I.A. No. 640 of 1988 was filed by Saraswathi Ammal to condone the delay in seeking to set aside ex parte decree in the suit. On 21.7.1989 the said I.A. was dismissed as not pressed. On 29.7.1989 a second application was filed i.e. I.A. 987 of 1989 to set aside the ex parte decree. On 20.6.1990, the same was dismissed on merit. On 12.10.1992 Appeal (CMA 3 of 1991) filed by Saraswathi Ammal was dismissed. On 7.11.1994 Revision Petition i.e. CRP No. 3139 of 1994 was dismissed. On 12.12.1994 the suit O.S. No. 673 of 1994 was filed by the respondents for declaration of title and injunction. The same was decreed on 26.4.1996. An appeal filed by the appellant (AS 23 of 1999) was allowed on 24.9.1999. By the impugned judgment dated 3.1.2000 second appeal filed by the respondents was allowed. The High Court held that to a proceeding of this nature Order I Rule 10 (4&5) applied and held that Saraswathi Ammal had got absolute title when sale to Anna Pushpam Ammal was made to plaintiffs' vendors under Exhibit A2 and A7 who in terms sold the same to the plaintiffs. The subsequent transferees Anna Pushpam Ammal and Lalitha Ammal are not parties to the suit and the title vests with them and the plaintiffs also got absolute title. On the date when the ex-part decree was passed, Saraswathi Ammal did not have any right to the property. It was also held that Exh. A2 & A7 were not hit by the principles of lis pendens and Saraswathi Ammal was also able to convey the title to the vendors of the plaintiffs.

10. That being so, the High Court's impugned judgment suffers from no infirmity to warrant interference.

11. Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Suresh @ Hakla vs State Of Haryana

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

3.55 PM. The investigating Officer also took into possession the medico legal report of Duli Chand and after the post- mortem examination, some pellets recovered from the dead body. Siri Chand, Prithvi and Shamsher Singh were arrested on 29.07.1996 and on Shamsher's interrogation, a.12 bore pistol and five empty and two live cartridges were recovered. Likewise, on the disclosure statement made by accused Prithvi, a.16 bore licensed gun belonging to Siri Chand and two empty and two live cartridges were recovered. Shamsher Singh also made a disclosure statement and on its basis, a .12 bore pistol, which had allegedly been used in another murder committed by him on the same day, was recovered. A case under Section 25 of the Arms Act was registered against accused Shamsher Singh as well. Accused- Makhan Singh who though not named in the FIR but found to be involved in the incident, was arrested on 7.4.1998. On the completion of the investigation, the accused were charged for offences punishable under Sections 148, 302 read with Sections 149, 307 read with Sections 149 and 395 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC') and as they pleaded not guilty, were brought to trial.

The prosecution in support of its case placed reliance, inter-alia on the evidence of Dr. Arun (PW-1) reported that no fracture had been seen in the X-ray conducted by him, Dr. B.L. Bagri (PW-2) of the General Hospital, Hisar, who had examined Duli Chand at 12.25 PM on 15.7.1996 and had found three injuries PW-3 Dr. J.S. Bhatia, the Senior Medical Officer, Government Hospital, Hisar, who had conducted the post-mortem examination and had found five gun shot injuries on the dead body, the two eye witnesses Ramesh (PW14) and Duli Chand (PW-15), the last namad being injured, SI Dharam Chand (PW-17), the Investigating Officer, and Inspector Avtar Singh (PW-21). The statements of the accused were thereafter recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and they denied the allegations leveled against them and claimed to be innocent. They also produced two witnesses in defence, Charanjit Singh DSP (DW-1), who stated Balwant had not been present at the time of the incident and the first named was entirely innocent, whereas Balwant was a part of the conspiracy which had led to the murder; and Sumer Singh (DW-2), who produced the records to depose that Shamsher accused had been held guilty vide judgment dated 9.4.2001 in another murder committed on the same day.

To undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.

All appeals were dismissed by the High Court.

10. The appeal bearing No. 1295 of 2006 is allowed. The accused be set at liberty forthwith unless his custody is required in any other case.
Megha Acharya vs Devendra Acharya

2. The petitioner in this case is the wife and she is the respondent in a petition filed under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce in the Court of ADJ, Ratlam, M.P. We are told that the petitioner-wife is now staying with her parents at Dahod (Gujarat). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner would not be in a position to defend the case at Ratlam. On the facts and circumstances, this is a fit case for transfer. We direct that the case H.M.P.No.10 A of 2007 titled as Devendra Acharya Vs. Smt.Megha Acharya pending in the Court of ADJ IV, Ratlam (M.P.) be transferred to the Court of competent jurisdiction at Dahod (Gujarat). All the records be transmitted to the Court of competent jurisdiction at Dahod (Gujarat) by the ADJ IV, Ratlam (M.P.).

3. The transfer petition is allowed accordingly.
Keya Mukherjee vs Magma Leasing Limited & Anr

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court dismissing the application filed by the appellant under Section 401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C'). Challenge in the said application was to the order dated 26.9.2006 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, 7th Fast Track Court, Calcutta in Criminal Revision No. 36 of 2006 by which the order dated 2.2.2006 passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate 11th Court, Calcutta in Case No. C-510 of 2003 was upheld. Learned Magistrate has rejected the appellant's prayer for dispensing with her examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. by examining of the pleader who was to represent her under Section 205 Cr.P.C. The proceeding was one under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short the 'N I Act'). Appellant appeared before learned Magistrate on 2.6.2003 and was released on bail. On 31.1.2004 she was examined under Section 251 Cr.P.C. Since she was absent on 3.7.2004, warrant of arrest was issued against her but on 20.7.2004 she surrendered before learned Magistrate and was released on bail. Recording of evidence was completed and 5th May, 2005 was fixed for her examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. But on that date she was absent and a prayer was made for adjournment. The date was adjourned to 12.5.2005. On that date appellant filed a petition purported to be under Section 313 (1)(b) of Cr.P.C. Another petition was filed on 23.8.2005 under Section 205 Cr.P.C. Learned Magistrate allowed the petition filed under Section 205 Cr.P.C. on 2.2.2006 subject to the condition that the appellant shall appear before the Court as and when called. But the petition under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. was rejected.

3. Learned Magistrate fixed 6.3.2006 for examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and directed the appellant to be personally present on that date. It is against this order of learned Magistrate a revision was filed before learned Additional Sessions Judge who confirmed the order. The order was challenged before the High Court, which as noted above the same was rejected.

32. Appeal is dismissed.
State Of Karnataka And Ors vs M/S Sri Chamundeswari Sugar Ltd

2. The respondent company is a dealer registered under the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (in short the 'Act') and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (in short the 'Central Act') and is engaged in the manufacture of sugar and is liable to pay tax on purchase of sugarcane. The price payable for purchase of sugarcane by a sugar factory is fixed by the Government of India in exercise of its powers under clause 3 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 (in short 'Control Order'). The price so fixed is called the Statutory Minimum Price. In addition to statutory price so fixed, the Government of Karnataka also fixes the price payable to sugarcane growers by the sugar factories as State Advised Price ('SAP' for short). The price paid by sugar factories to sugarcane growers also comprises harvesting subsidy, transportation subsidy, plantation subsidy and the advance payment towards these subsidies.

4. The orders of assessment passed by the Assessing Officer were questioned by the respondent-company by filing a Writ Petition before the High Court. Grievance of the respondent- company was that the Assessing Authority was not justified in levying purchase tax on the amount paid by the factory to the sugarcane growers over and above the statutory minimum price fixed by the Central Government. The High Court rejected the Writ Petition and held that the amount paid under the different nomenclatures required to be considered as purchase price paid by the purchaser of sugarcane to the cane growers. The respondent-company approached this Court questioning correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the High Court by filing a Special Leave Petition. The appeal was disposed of alongwith other appeals involving similar issues by order dated 8.2.1996 i.e. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. Kothari Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. (1996 (101) STC

6. The Assessing Officer after a detailed verification of the materials made available by the respondent-company came to hold that the State Advised Price paid by the respondent forms part of the purchase price paid to the sugarcane growers and, therefore, that required to be included in the turnover of the dealer for the purpose of computation of tax. The appeal filed by the respondent-company was dismissed by the First Appellate Authority, but in Second Appeal the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (in short the 'Tribunal') decided in favour of the respondent-company.

14. It is the stand of the respondent that purchase price is not defined and, therefore, the agreed price would be taken to be the purchase price. This plea is clearly unsustainable. As noted above, the basic question is what is the consideration paid for effecting the purchase.

19. The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances with no order as to costs.