L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Abid Hussain vs Masjid-E-Hussaini

JUDGMENT O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO. 995 OF 2008 [Arising out of SLP(C) NO.10998/2007] WITH C.A.NO.996/2008[Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 11011/2007] C.A.NO.997/2008[Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 11019/2007] C.A.NO.998/2008[Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 11020/2007] Leave granted.

By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the application for restoration. This Court on 18/7/2007 issued notice limited to the question as to why the application for restoration shall not be allowed by setting aside the order of the High Court.

The order of the High Court is set aside. The restoration application is allowed. The revision petition may be considered on merit expeditiously.

Appeals are disposed of in the above terms.
Smt. Bachahan Devi & Anr vs Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur & Anr

3. Essential facts are as follows:

4. Stand of the defendants on the contrary was that two courses were available to the Appellate Court. First was to pass the remand order after setting aside the findings. The said course has been adopted. The other course was to call for findings on the issue by remitting it to the trial court. The High Court was of the view that the order of remand should be passed rarely and in the instant case that was not the case. That being so, the High Court set aside the order of the First Appellant Court and the matter was remanded to it for decision of the appeal on merit.

24. In Ratlam Municipality v. Vardichan (1980 (4) SCC 162), some residents of Ratlam Municipality moved the Sub- Divisional Magistrate under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for abatement of nuisance by directing the municipality to construct drain pipes with flow of water to wash the filth and stop the stench. The Magistrate found the facts proved and issued necessary directions. The Sessions Court, in appeal, reversed the order. The High Court, in revision, restored the judgment of the Magistrate and the matter was carried to the Supreme Court.

35. One additional factor, which may not have an effect on the appeal is to be noted. The First Appellate Court after judgment of the High Court dated 4.2.2005 disposed of the appeal and remitted the matter to the trial Court. The stay order of this Court was passed on 7.2.2005.

37. Above being the position, the appeal by the respondents before the Allahabad High Court has been rightly allowed. In any event, the order does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. The appeal is dismissed.
V. Subbulakshmi & Ors vs S. Lakshmi & Anr

The High Court, however, estimated the income of the deceased to be around a sum of Rs. 4,000/- per month, from his agricultural operation and Rs. 3,000/- from his commission business, totalling a sum of Rs. 7,000/- per month and upon deducting 1/3rd thereof from the amount towards his personal expenses, the High Court held that his contribution to his family would come to about of Rs. 4,667/- per month. Applying the multiplier of 18, the loss of income was assessed at Rs. 10,08,072/-, instead and in place of Rs. 13,82,400/- as was found by the Tribunal.

8. We may at the outset notice that the High Court was although of the opinion that no appeal would be maintainable at the instance of an insurance company unless permission of the court was obtained by it in terms of Section 170 Act, observed that the owner of the vehicle being an appellant, the appeal would be maintainable at his instance.

16. However, in this case, the appeal preferred by the Insurance Company has been dismissed. The High Court has only entertained the appeal of the owner.

17. So far as the question in regard to the quantum of compensation awarded in favour of the appellants is concerned, we are of the opinion that the High Court has taken into consideration all the relevant evidences brought on record.

The accident took place on 7.5.1997. Income tax returns were filed on 23.6.1997.

The Income Tax Returns (Exp. P-14), therefore, have rightly not been relied upon.

19. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court should interfere with the judgment of the High Court. Appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Dharma Naika vs Rama Naika & Anr

1. The subject matter of this appeal relates to the Government granted land measuring 2 acres 20 guntas in Sy.No.365/1 (New No.685) situated at Nayakanahatti Village, Challakera Taluk, District Chitradurga in the state of Karnataka (herein after referred to as the 'scheduled land'). The certificate of grant was issued on 10th of September, 1955 in favour of one Shri Tejyanaika in which one of the conditions stipulated was that the grantee shall not alienate the granted land for a period of 15 years.

2. On 10th of September, 1970, the abovementioned period of 15 years during which the land could not be alienated as per the conditions of the certificate of grant had expired. After the expiry of the aforesaid period of 15 years, more precisely on 6th of July, 1976, an agreement to sell was executed by the legal heirs of the original grantee who, in the meantime, had expired. Under this agreement for sale, the vendors, namely, the legal heirs of the original grantee had agreed to sell the scheduled land to the father of the appellant. Subsequent to the agreement for sale and the commencement of the Act, more precisely on 13th of October, 1986, a deed of sale was executed and registered by the vendors in respect of the scheduled land. After the registration of the sale deed, the authority under the Act initiated a proceeding for resumption of the scheduled land as, according to the authorities, the sale was in violation of the provisions of the Act. This is because the sale was effected after the commencement of the Act without previous permission of the government. An order was passed by the Assistant Commissioner who had the authority to direct resumption of the land holding that the sale having taken place on 13th of October, 1986, when the Act had already come into force, the sale deed dated 13th of October, 1986 must be found to be null and void in view of the prohibition contained in Section 4 of the Act. An appeal was carried against the aforesaid order before the appellate authority which was also dismissed, inter alia, on the finding that the title of the scheduled land could not pass under the registered sale deed dated 13th of October, 1986 as, admittedly, the same was executed and registered after the coming into force of the act and therefore, in view of Section 4 (2) of the Act, the sale made without obtaining prior permission of the Government was found to be null and void. Feeling aggrieved by the concurrent orders of the Assistant Commissioner as well as the appellate authority, a writ petition was filed before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, which was dismissed by a learned Judge of the High Court and against that order of the learned Single Judge, a writ appeal was filed, which was also dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, this special leave petition was filed in respect of which leave has already been granted.

18. That being the position, we do not find any substance in the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and accordingly, this appeal fails. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
New India Assurance Company Ltd vs Ramila & Ors

Necessary facts for the disposal of these appeals are that on 15th July, 1989 Vimal Kumar was going on his scooter with Rameshchand as pillion rider. When they reached near village Tikdijogi, non-applicant/respondent came from opposite direction driving bus No. M.B.N.-1188 belonging to non-applicant No.2 Kanhaiyalal and insured with appellant New India Assurance Co. in a rash and negligent 2 manner dashed against scooter, as a result of which Vimal Kumar and Rameshchand died. The LRs of Rameshchand claimed compensation of Rs.15,02,180/-, while LRS of deceased Vimal Kumar sought compensation to the extent of Rs.7,61,000/- in claim case Nos. 83/89 and 101/89 respectively. The appellant and non-applicants/respondents filed common written statements and resisted the claim. The plea taken was that Vimal Kumar had no valid driving licence. He was driving scooter in a rash and negligent manner which caused the accident. No plea of the limited liability was taken in the written statement by the insurance company. The tribunal after appreciation of evidence granted compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- to the LRS of deceased Rameshchand and Rs.3,75,000/- to the LRS of Vimal Kumar and directed the Insurance Company as well as the driver and owner to pay the same jointly and severally.

Therefore, we dispose of these appeals and give liberty to the appellants to recover the excess amount paid by the insurance company by executing this award against the owner to the extent of such excess amount as per Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act, consequently, the appeals are disposed of with the above observations.

There will be no orders as to costs.

February 13, 2008.
Union Of India & Ors vs K.N. Prakasan

The respondent was appointed under the appellant-Union of India as Junior Engineer in the Department of Lighthouses and Lightships, Mumbai on 10/02/1983. By an order dated 01/03/1993, he was charge-sheeted with article (1) and (2) of the charge. The enquiry officer found that both the charges (1) and (2) were proved against the respondent. His services was terminated on 23/08/1993 preceded by an enquiry. In the interregnum, he filed an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority remanded his case to the disciplinary authority to pass a fresh order. Thereafter on 10/02/1994, the disciplinary authority passed a fresh order terminating the service of the respondent. The appeal was dismissed on 24/08/1994. Aggrieved thereby, he filed original petition before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay. By an order dated 7/12/2000, the tribunal again remanded the case to the appellate authority to pass an order supported by ......2.

reasons. Thereafter, a final order was passed on 26/03/2001 by the appellate authority reinstating the respondent. While reinstating the respondent, the appellate authority directed that the period from 10/02/1994 to 26/04/2001 shall not be treated as on duty. The appellate authority further directed that the respondent will be paid the pay and allowances equal to subsistence allowance and other allowance admissible under Fundamental Rule 53, for period of his absence from duty from 10/02/1994 till he takes over the charge, including the period of suspension, preceding his removal and that this period will be treated as not on duty. The pay and allowances to be paid to the respondent will further be subject to other conditions as laid down under Fundamental Rule 54(in short 'F.R. 54'). By the aforesaid order, the respondent was also given liberty to submit a representation before the competent authority.

Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the respondent joined the service on 27/04/2001. He also filed a representation as directed which was rejected by the authority on 08/06/2001. Aggrieved thereby, he preferred another O.A. before the tribunal. The tribunal, after hearing the parties, allowed the application and directed the appellant to treat the period of absence from 10/02/1994 to 26/04/2001 as on duty for all purposes including pay and allowances and directed the appellant to issue orders accordingly. The appellants writ ......3.

petition ended without any result. Hence this appeal by special leave.

In the present case, undisputedly, the order of termination of the respondent was set aside for non-compliance of the requirements of Clause (1) and (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. In that view of the matter, we are clearly of the opinion that in such a situation the provisions of F.R.54 was clearly attracted. ....5.

In the result, this appeal is allowed. The orders of the High Court and tribunal are set aside. No order as to costs.
Pachaiyappan & Others vs State By Inspector Of Police

2. The brief facts of the case are that the family of Panchiappaan s/o Manickam (since deceased) owns about 50 acres of land. Close to that, the appellants-accused also own land. About one year prior to the date of incident, the deceased Panchiappaan s/o Manickam purchased land from one Sekar and Arjunan and in that regard, the appellants-accused had a grievance. The appellants-accused took their bullock carts in the wet land of the deceased and in that regard, there had been dispute between the parties and in fact, both of them also filed civil suits. On 22.9.1999 at about 5.00 P.M., PW 1 Mummurthy, was doing some work in the field and at that time, appellant- accused No. 3 Raman drove a double bullock cart into his land. When PW 1 questioned about the conduct of appellant-accused No. 3, he told PW 1 that he would do so and in fact, pushed PW 1 on the ground and bit on his left cheek. PW 1 went home and narrated the incident to his father Panchiappaan s/o Manickam and PW 2 Sakuntala. At about 8.00 p.m., Panchiappaan s/o Manickam blocked the bullock cart in which appellants-accused were crossing in front of his house and asked appellant-accused No. 3 as to why he slapped his son PW 1. Immediately, all the appellants-accused, having deadly weapons such as axe, sickle, knife, cycle chain in their hands, got down from the bullock cart, surrounded Panchiappaan s/o Manickam and then started attacking him. Appellant-accused No. 2 Baskaran attacked Pachaiappan with axe on his left leg, appellant-accused No. 3 Raman attacked with sickle on head, appellant-accused No. 4 Raghuvaran attacked with sickle on left wrist, appellant-accused No. 1 Pachaiappan attacked with knife on right chest, appellant-accused No. 3 Raman again attacked on rear head with sickle, accused No. 5 attacked with cycle chain and accused No. 6 held PW 1 very tightly. As a result of injuries, Panchiappaan s/o Manickam fell down and succumbed to the injuries at the Government Hospital, Gingee.

3. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, appellants and accused Nos. 5 and 6 preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 24.7.2003, upheld the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellants-accused nos. 1 to 4 and accused No. 6 Parasusraman. So far as accused No. 5 Ravichandran is concerned, his conviction was upheld but sentence was reduced to the period already undergone by him.

5. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Anr vs State Of Rajasthan & Ors

3. In order to appreciate the grievance of the appellants, facts leading to the filing of the appeal are necessary to be indicated.

25th June 1975 for acquiring the land of the appellants bearing Khasra No.383 measuring 14 bighas and 16 biswas situated at Madrampura, Jaipur, Rajasthan. As per the said notice, land was sought to be acquired for improvement and purposes of Jaipur Town extension of Civil Lines Area for construction of buildings. On 23rd August 1975, another notice was issued by the State under Section 52(2) of the Act indicating the purpose of acquisition of land for extension of civil lines and planning of housing scheme. Appellants, on 08th September 1975, filed objections to the acquisition of their land. The appellants also submitted their representation from time to time. The Land Acquisition Officer, however, rejected the objections. On 08th February 1984, the Government issued declaration under Section 52(1) of the Act [which is equivalent to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894]. Pursuant to the said declaration, notice under Section 52(5) of the Act was issued asking the appellants to hand over possession of the land.

5. After these notices were issued, the appellants filed Writ Petition No.5972 of 1984 before the High Court of Calcutta. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta, while issuing rule nisi, granted stay of the acquisition proceedings and restrained the respondents from taking possession of the land. Aggrieved against the said order the respondents filed Special Leave Petition before this Court, inter alia, S.L.P.(C)No.16910 of 2006 ..... (contd.)

challenging the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court to entertain the writ petition. Since the Special Leave Petition was filed against an interim order, this Court did not go into the merits of the case and while granting leave, by order dated 08th April 1985, set aside the order of the Calcutta High Court and held that the Calcutta High Court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition in respect of a land situated in the State of Rajasthan. Thus, the proceedings before the Calcutta High Court came to an end.

S.L.P.(C)No.16910 of 2006 ..... (contd.)

S.L.P.(C)No.16910 of 2006 ..... (contd.)

17. In the present case also, the writ petition having been filed after taking over the possession and the award having become final, the same deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Accordingly, the order of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench are affirmed to the extent of dismissal of the writ petition and the special appeal without going into the merits thereof. This appeal also deserves to be dismissed without going into the merits of the case and is dismissed as such. No costs.
State Of U.P vs Ajai Kumar

Four persons faced trial for offences punishable under Sections 394, 307, 411 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The allegation was that on 15.3.1994 while the informant alongwith one Sushil Kumar, son of the owner Shri Gopal was going towards the shop after withdrawing Rs.1,25,000/- from the State Bank of India, the accused persons forcibly snatched away the money after firing shots from the pistols held by them. The informant and aforesaid Sushil Kumar suffered injuries and were taken to hospital for treatment. The first information report was lodged and investigation was undertaken and part of the money was recovered from the accused persons. Several witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version.

PWs 1 and 2 i.e. Bhagwat Narain and Sushil Kumar were stated to have sustained injuries in the incident. The trial Court directed acquittal primarily on the ground that the witnesses could not say definitely as regards the numbers on currency notes which were stated to have been withdrawn from the bank and to have been robbed by the accused persons. This was highlighted to show the fallacy of the conclusions to direct acquittal.

(Underlined for emphasis)

6. In view of the fact that the High Court's conclusion is clearly presumptuous and the mere claim that a telegram was sent by a relative of Chandesh Ravat the deceased- accused, same could not have been a ground to hold that the prosecution version was unacceptable and the trial Court had rightly directed acquittal.

9. That being so, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter to it for consideration in accordance with law.

10. The appeal is allowed.
D. Ranganayakulu vs Superintendent Engineer Nsrc O&M & Anr

JUDGMENT O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1087-1088 OF 2008 [Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.5721-5722/2005] Leave granted.

Briefly stated, the facts are as follows.

On 18/04/1996, a contract was awarded to the appellant by the respondents for work of lining the bed and sides of M.S. Right Main Canal. The work was to be completed within a period of six months divided into two slabs of three months each, i.e. three months in the year 1986 and three months in 1987. The work could not be completed within stipulated time for the reasons which we are not concerned here. Ultimately, the work was finally completed in 1989. A dispute arose. The appellant, by its letter dated 20/10/1990, addressed to the respondent to settle the dues. On 13/12/1990, the appellant .....2.

approached the Civil Court and filed an application praying to take up arbitration and act as arbitrator. On 13/02/1991, the Court refused to act as arbitrator and dismissed the application. On 06/06/1991, the appellant filed O.P. No. 167/1990 before the Principal Subordinate Judge, Nasaraopet under Section 8(1)(b) of Arbitration Act, 1940 for appointing arbitrator from list of names supplied by the appellant. In that application, counter was filed by the respondent herein objecting to jurisdiction of arbitrator. However, it appears from the counter that the respondent had submitted the names of Chief Engineer, Minor Irrigation, Chief Engineer, Medium Irrigation and Commissioner, CADA. The learned Judge, by its order dated 30/04/1993, rejected the names supplied by the parties and appointed Mr. Justice Punniah, retired Judge of the High Court as sole arbitrator.

In the facts and circumstances as recited above, the ..........9.

respondents waived their rights to file an objection at the time when the award was made Rule of the Court. For the reasons afore-stated, these appeals are allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside. No order as to costs.
Shiv Singh Chak vs Baby Jain

JUDGMENT O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO 1386 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No. 1100 of 2007) K.G.BALAKRISHNAN, CJI Leave granted. Heard learned counsel.

2. The respondent is the landlord and appellant is the tenant in regard to the petition schedule shop ('shop' for short) situated at Tundla, District Firozabad. The respondent filed an eviction petition before the Prescribed Authority, alleging that she had let out the shop when she and her family was living at Etah, that her family had subsequently shifted to Tundla and that she required the shop for her husband to carry on his business in motor parts. She further alleged that the appellant owned and possessed several shops near to the schedule shop, but had not vacated the shop belonging to her, and that he will not be put to any hardship if he is evicted as he could conveniently shift and occupy his own shop.

7. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal as having no merit, subject to the clarification about the applicability of Explanation (i) of Section 21(1) of the Act. However, the appellant is granted time till 31st May, 2008 to vacate the shop in question subject to his filing the usual undertaking before this Court within a period of four weeks from today and continuing to pay the agreed rent till 31st May, 2008.