L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
M.Mansoor & Anr vs United India Insurance Co.Ltd

3. The deceased Amjath Khan Arabu, is the son of the appellants. The deceased was travelling as passenger in a Transport Corporation Bus bearing registration no.TN-01-N-6587 to Kumbakkonam from Tambaram on the Grand Southern Trunk Road, while the bus was proceeding near the village Silavattam, a container lorry bearing registration no.TN-01-C-6248 coming rashly and negligently in the opposite direction dashed against the Corporation Bus, resulting in the instantaneous death of five persons including the son of the appellants. The parents of the deceased-Amjath Khan Arabu, filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motors Vehicle Act (for short “the Act”) for awarding of compensation to the tune of Rs.28,00,000/-. They pleaded that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the container lorry, owned by the Respondent No.1 and that, at the time of his death the age of the deceased was 24 years and he was a MBA Graduate and employed as Business Manager in Intel Comox Management India and was earning Rs.18,100/- per month.

6. In support of the claim petitions the first appellant examined himself as PW-1 and four other witnesses were also examined. PW-2 and PW-4 were travelling in the bus and witnessed the accident. According to PW-1 the first appellant, their son Amjath Khan Arabu studied MBA and has been working as the Business Manager in the Firm called Intel Comox Management India and his salary was Rs.18,100/-. Ex.A-1 to A-10 were marked as documents which included the Post Mortem Certificate, MBA Degree Certificate, - Appointment Order for the Job done, Salary Certificate and copy of the Bank Account. No evidence was let in by Respondent No.2.

own income and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependant on the father.

18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 30-4- 2010 passed by the High Court of Madras in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.676 of 2005 is set aside and the award passed by the Tribunal is modified to the extent above. The amount which has already been received by appellants/claimants shall be adjusted and rest of the amount be paid at an early date.No order as to costs.

October 03, 2013.
Vishnu (D)By Lrs vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

2. The tenders submitted by the appellant, who is now represented by his legal representatives, for Tondapur Medium Project, Jalgaon Medium Project Division, Jalgaon and Hatnoor Canal Division No.3, Chopda, District Jalgaon were accepted by the Competent Authority and five agreements were executed between the parties on 19.5.1983 and 5.10.1983 (hereinafter referred to as ‘B-1 Agreements’).

4. After four years, the appellant served notice under Section 80 CPC and then filed Civil Suit No.995/1989 before the trial Court for declaring the recovery proceedings initiated by the defendants as illegal, null and void.

5. During the pendency of the suit, the appellant filed an application under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short, ‘the 1940 Act’) and prayed that the matter may be referred to an Arbitrator by appointing the Superintending Engineer or any other Arbitrator as the sole Arbitrator in terms of Clause 30 of B-1 Agreement. The same was dismissed by the trial Court vide order dated 29.7.1994 on the ground that both the parties had not given consent for making a reference to an Arbitrator.

7. The respondents challenged the aforesaid order in Civil Revision Application No.153/1995, which was partly allowed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court and the order of the trial Court granting leave to the appellant to amend the prayer clause was set aside.

Decision of the MD of the UPSIC on all other matters shall be final

25. The aforesaid judgments fully support the view taken by us that Clause 30 of B-1 Agreement is not an arbitration clause.

31. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court had rightly held that Clause 30 of B-I Agreement is not an Arbitration Agreement and the trial Court was not right in appointing the Chief Engineer as an Arbitrator.

33. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.

..............J. (C. NAGAPPAN) New Delhi, October 4, 2013.
B.S.N.L & Anr vs G.Sarvothaman

4. The Respondent then applied for promotion under the physically handicapped person’s quota after availing all facilities of restructured Cadre on the basis of the OM No.36035/8/89-Estt.(SCT) dated 20.11.1989, which was considered and rejected by BSNL on the ground that no relaxation/reservation in promotion was permissible under schemes for physically handicapped persons as in the case of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST in short) officials. Further, it was also noticed that the respondent’s appointment was not under physically handicapped quota. The Respondent, aggrieved by the rejection order passed by the BSNL filed a complaint before the Commissioner, praying that he should be given promotion to the post of Lower Selection Grade (LSG in short) (Section Supervisors) retrospectively w.e.f. 20.11.1989 and to the upgraded clerical posts of TOA Grade-III (Senior Section Supervisors) and TOA Grade-IV (Chief Section Supervisors) w.e.f. 07.02.1996. The Chief Commissioner entertained the complaint and registered case No.1109/2001 under Section 59 of the Act of 1995. The Commissioner after hearing parties and examining various contentions passed the following order on 26.12.2002. The operative portion of the same reads as under:

13. We, for the reasons mentioned above, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the Chief Commissioner, as confirmed by the High Court. There shall be no order as to costs.
Thalappalam Ser.Coop.Bank Ltd.& Ors vs State Of Kerala & Ors

9. We notice, the issue raised in these appeals is of considerable importance and may have impact on similar other Societies registered under the various State enactments across the country.

2. For giving information for applicants government order No.8026/05/government administration department act and rule can be applicable and 10 rupees can be charged as fees for each application. Also as per GAD Act and rule and the government Order No.2383/06 dated 01.04.2006.

11. The State Government, it is seen, vide its letter dated 5.5.2006 has informed the Registrar of Co-operative Societies that, as per Section 2(h) of the Act, all institutions formed by laws made by State Legislature is a “public authority” and, therefore, all co-operative institutions coming under the administrative control of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies are also public authorities.

4. Hereafter application for information from co-operative institutions need not be accepted by the information officers of this department. But if they get such applications it should be given back showing the reasons or should be forwarded to the respective co-operative institutions with necessary directions and the applicant should be informed about this. In this case it is directed to follow the time limit strictly.

BURDEN TO SHOW:

Right to Information and the Right to Privacy

Registrar of Cooperative Societies

54. We, therefore, hold that the Cooperative Societies registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act will not fall within the definition of “public authority” as defined under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act and the State Government letter dated 5.5.2006 and the circular dated 01.06.2006 issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kerala, to the extent, made applicable to societies registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act would stand quashed in the absence of materials to show that they are owned, controlled or substantially financed by the appropriate Government. Appeals are, therefore, allowed as above, however, with no order as to costs.
Gulam Sarbar vs State Of Bihar (Now Jharkhand)

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:

7. The evidence on record and particularly the deposition of Dr. Gopal Prasad Sinha (PW.7) clearly depicts the conspiracy from the manner in which the appellants and other accused were present on the crossing and stopped the complainant and the deceased. Admittedly, there was rivalry and ill-will between Binod Kumar (accused) and Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased) as they had separated their business of running of educational institution and Sant Kumar Sinha did not like the illicit relationship between Binod Kumar (accused) and Shipra Sen Choudhery, Clerk. Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased) tried to persuade Binod Kumar (accused) to desist from the said illicit relationship and Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased) also revealed this fact to the wife of Binod Kumar (accused) and there was not only a verbal fight between the wife of Binod Kumar and Shipra Sen Choudhery but also a scuffle between them on this issue and, subsequently, the wife of Binod Kumar began living separately. Therefore, relations between Binod Kumar (accused) and Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased) had definitely been strained.

8. Both these appellants and other accused were acquainted with Binod Kumar (accused) as well as Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased) and were also known to Dr. Gopal Prasad Sinha (PW.7). They had been seen earlier in the institute with Binod Kumar (accused).

19. Thus, we do not see any reason for interfering that the prosecution witnesses have deposed falsely to implicate the appellants.

20. Thus, in view of the above, the facts and circumstances of these appeals do not warrant interference. The appeals lack merit and are dismissed accordingly.
Ongc Ltd vs M/S. Modern Construction And Co

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:

D. The plaints were returned to the respondent in the aforesaid civil suits, who instituted the same before the Civil Court at Surat on 3.2.1999 being Civil Suit Nos.56, 57 and 58 of 1999. The said suits were allowed by the 3rd Additional Senior Civil Judge vide judgment and decree dated 21.9.2006 holding that the respondent was entitled to receive an amount of Rs.1,29,138/-, Rs.1,69,757/- and Rs.58,616/- in the respective suits with a future interest @ 12% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till realisation.

E. The appellant complied with the decrees passed by the 3rd Addl. Senior Civil Judge and made the payment of decretal amount to the respondent calculating the interest on the principal sum from 3.2.1999, i.e. the date on which the respondent had presented the plaints in the court of competent jurisdiction at Surat.

F. The respondent after receiving the said amount filed Special Execution Petition Nos. 17 and 18 of 2007 on 5.3.2007 claiming interest for the period 1986 to 1999, i.e. during the period when the suit remained pending before the court at Mehsana which had no jurisdiction. The Executing Court vide order dated 28.9.2007 dismissed the Execution petition observing that respondent was entitled to interest from the date of filing of the suit at Surat and not from the date on which the plaint was presented at Mehsana.

G. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred Misc. Civil Appeal Nos.29, 30 and 35 of 2008 before the District Court at Surat and the same were dismissed vide order dated 12.3.2010.

H. Aggrieved, the respondent challenged the said order dated 12.3.2010 by filing Special Civil Application Nos.5036 and 5037 of 2010 before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad and the said applications have been allowed vide order dated 10.12.2010 holding that the respondent was entitled to interest from the date of institution of the suit at Mehsana Court.

20. In view of the above, appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree impugned are set aside. The judgments and orders of the Trial/Executing Court as well as of the Appellate Court are restored. There shall be no order as to costs.
State Of Rajasthan vs Giridhari Lal

This appeal has been preferred by the State of Rajasthan against the judgment and order dated 14th March, 2007 passed by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench. By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench partly allowed the appeal filed by the respondent-Girdhari Lal, modified the sentence and convicted him under Section 306 IPC instead of 304B IPC. For the said offence, the Division Bench sentenced him to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default he has to further suffer six months rigorous imprisonment. Since the respondent-Girdhari Lal had already undergone imprisonment for a period of more than six years, the High Court directed to release him forthwith, if not required to be detained in any other case.

2. The case of the prosecution in nutshell is that:

3. On the said complaint a case under Section 304B and 498A IPC was registered and investigation was commenced. After the investigation chargesheet was filed. In due course, the case came up for trial to the Additional Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu. The charge under Section 304B IPC framed against the respondent was denied by him who claimed trial. Altogether 9 witnesses were examined in support of the case of the prosecution. In his explanation under Section 313 Cr. P.C., the respondent claimed innocence. Two defence witnesses were also examined. The trial court on appreciation of evidence and on hearing the parties convicted the respondent under Section 304-B IPC and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.

On appeal, as noticed above, the Division Bench of the High Court partly allowed the appeal, convicted the respondent under Section 306 IPC instead of 304B IPC and sentenced him to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default he has to further suffer six months rigorous imprisonment.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the deceased-Babita died within 7 years of her marriage under unnatural circumstances and respondent did not inform the parents of the deceased regarding the incident. The burden to prove innocence lies on the respondent after the prosecution has proved that the deceased died under the unnatural circumstances within seven years of marriage. Further, according to the learned counsel for the State, the High Court has failed to appreciate that Jugal Kishore (PW.1), Nand Lal (PW.4) and Smt. Bimla (PW.7) have made statements regarding harassment and torture by the in-laws of the deceased in relation to the demand for dowry which has been corroborated by the statement of other witnesses and the documents on record. The aforesaid facts were not properly appreciated by the High Court while converting the conviction from Section 304B IPC to 306 IPC and reducing the sentence from life imprisonment to five years imprisonment.

14. We find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.
C.I.T Central-Iii vs M/S Excel Industries Ltd

4. The facts pertaining to Civil Appeal No. 125 of 2013 (M/s Excel Industries Limited for the Assessment Year 2001-02) are referred to for convenience.

5. The assessee maintains its accounts on a mercantile basis. In its return (revised on 31st March 2003) the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs.12,57,525/- under the head advance licence benefit receivable. The assessee also claimed a deduction in respect of duty entitlement pass book benefit receivable amounting to Rs.4,46,46,976/-. These benefits related to entitlement to import duty free raw material under the relevant import and export policy by way of reduction from raw material consumption. According to the assessee, the amounts were excluded from its total income since they could not be said to have accrued until imports were made and the raw material consumed.

8. The assessee took up the matter in appeal and by an order dated 15th September 2008 the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) referred to an earlier appellate order in the case of the assessee relevant to the assessment years 1999-2000 and 2000-01 and following the conclusion arrived at in those assessment years, the appeal was allowed and it was held that the advance licence benefit receivable amounting to Rs.12,57,525/- and duty entitlement pass book benefit of Rs.4,46,46,976/- ought not to be taxed in this year. Reliance was also placed on the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for the assessment year 1995-

11. The Tribunal also took the note of the fact in the assessee’s own cases starting from the assessment year 1992-93 onwards these issues had been consistently decided in its favour. It was also noted that for some of the assessment years namely 1993-94, 1996-97 and 1997-98 appeals were filed by the Revenue in the Bombay High Court but they were not admitted.

33. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss the civil appeals with no order as to costs, but with the hope that the Revenue implements its litigation policy a little more practically and a little more seriously.

…………………………J (R. M. Lodha) ..………………………J (Madan B. Lokur) …………………………J (Kurian Joseph) New Delhi, October 8, 2013
Dulcina Fernandes & Ors vs Joaquim Xavier Cruz & Anr

2. The claimants-appellants are the wife and daughters of one Nicolau Fernandes who died in a motor vehicle accident that had occurred on 29.06.1997 at Santimol, Raia while going from Margao to his village in Ilha, De Rachol. The deceased was driving a scooter and one Rosario Antao was riding Pillion. As the deceased reached Santimol Junction, one pick-up van driven by the first respondent came from the opposite direction; though the deceased tried to avoid the pick-up van which was being driven in a rash and negligent manner, the rear mudguard of the pick-up van hit the scooter as a result of which the deceased and the pillion rider fell off and suffered injuries. Due to the injuries sustained Nicolau Fernandes died on 01.07.1997.

In the aforesaid facts, the appellants, as claimants, had lodged a Claim Petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter for short ‘the Act’) before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Margao, Goa. In addition to the first respondent, the New India Assurance Company with whom the pick-up van was insured was also impleaded as a respondent in the proceeding before the Claims Tribunal.

10. Appeal of the claimants is allowed on the above terms. No order as to costs.

...………………………CJI.

[P. SATHASIVAM] .........……………………J. [RANJAN GOGOI] New Delhi, October 08, 2013.
Rajesh Talwar & Anr vs Cbi & Anr

2. The petitioners are being tried for charges of committing the murder of their daughter Arushi and their domestic helper Hemraj in their house. At the initial stage, the investigation was conducted by the U.P. Police, however, it was later transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CBI’). A closure report was submitted before the Magistrate who disagreed with it and has issued the process to the petitioners for the charge of committing the double murder.

3. The present stage of the trial is that the evidence of the prosecution is closed and the statements of the accused are being recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC. The application in question under Section 311 for examining 7 other left over witnesses was moved at this stage. Alongwith this application, another application under Section 233 Cr.PC read with Section 91 has been moved on 11.6.2013, in respect of the reports of certain tests conducted on 3 persons who at one time were suspected accused and had been in police custody, namely, Krishna, Raj Kumar and Vijay Mandal. By this application, the petitioners’ sought the following reports:

4. These applications were disposed of by the trial Court by order dated 18.6.2013 allowing them partly.

l. Accused moved application U/s 233 Cr.P.C. dated 26.09.2013 in Trial Court to send physical exhibit Khukri abroad for re-examination.

11. Thus, from the afore-stated facts, it is evident that petitioners have been adopting dilatory tactics on every moment. The impugned order was passed on 19.7.2013. This petition was filed after about two months.

12. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant any interference. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.
A.K.Singhania vs Gujarat State Fertilizer Co.Ltd.& Anr

In all these cases we are concerned with accused A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash. Several complaints were filed by Gujarat State Fertilizer Company against Esslon Synthetics Ltd., its Chairman, Managing Director and other Directors including aforesaid A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash alleging commission of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’.

We have found on fact that there is no averment that the two accused herein were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the time the offence was committed. Hence, there is no essential averment in the complaints. In view of what we have observed above, the prosecution of accused A.K. Singhania and accused Vikram Prakash cannot be allowed to continue. Accordingly, the order of the High Court quashing the prosecution of the accused Vikram Prakash is not fit to be interfered with. For the same reason the order passed by the High Court declining the prayer of A.K. Singhania for quashing of the prosecution cannot be sustained and the appeals preferred by him deserve to be allowed.

In the result, we dismiss the appeals preferred by the complainant Gujarat State Fertilizers Company Ltd. and allow the appeals preferred by A.K. Singhania and quash his prosecution in all these cases.