L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Union Of India & Ors vs Narendra Gupta & Ors

3. Before the Tribunal it was the case of the appellants that O.M. dated 31.3.1987 and consequentially O.M. dated 9.7.1992 were not applicable to Respondents as they were members of the permanent faculty of the Institute of Armament Technology. This plea of the Appellants was rejected by the Tribunal. The Tribunal accepted the claim of the respondents that they worked in the Naval College of Engineering, as civilian employees belonging to the Defence Research and Development Services (hereinafter referred to as `DRDS'). They were aggrieved by the fact that they were not being paid training allowance @ 30 per cent of the emoluments w.e.f. 1.1.1986 and @ 50 per cent of the emoluments w.e.f. 9.7.1992 in as much as they were employees in the I.A.T. as Scientists but are detailed as faculty members for training 3 other government officials. It was claimed that the training allowance was admissible to them as part of an incentive scheme of the Government of India set out in Department of Personnel, O.M. dated 31.3.1987. The Tribunal relied on Part 2(i) of the aforesaid O.M. which is as follows:

4. Before the Tribunal, the appellants claimed that the respondents were not entitled to the aforesaid benefit as they were permanent faculty members. The allowance was only admissible to faculty members other than permanent faculty members. It was the claim of the appellants that the respondents held cadre posts included in the DRDS and therefore were not entitled to training allowance. The Tribunal rejected the aforesaid plea. Therefore, the appellants moved the High Court by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The aforesaid writ petition was 4 dismissed by the Division Bench with the following observations:

6. In our opinion, the observations made by the High Court need reconsideration in view of the Rules now produced before this Court. Consequently, we allow this appeal and set aside 6 the Judgment and Order passed by the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.7301/02 dated 3.2.2006. The matter is remanded back to the High Court for deciding the writ petition afresh on merits after taking into consideration the Defence Research Development Service Rules, 1979. Parties are at liberty to approach the High Court for filing further pleadings that may be necessary for the complete adjudication of the issues arising in the writ petition.

7. No costs.

....J (TARUN CHATTERJEE) ......................................

...J (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR) NEW DELHI DECEMBER 15, 2009
Hdfc Bank Ltd vs J.J.Mannan @ J.M.John Paul & Anr

3. According to the Bank, the Respondent No.1 in his capacity as the Managing Director of the Mannan Construction Corporation Private Limited, a company engaged in the execution of Highway Contracts and contracts of the Public Works Department (hereinafter referred to as "the Company"), along with one M/s. Immanuel Projects Private Ltd., applied for a loan of Rs.2,03,40,000/- (Rupees Two Crores, three lakhs and forty thousand) only, for purchase of 6 Krishna Electronic Sensor Paver Finishers from one M/s. Krishna Engineering Works in Ahmedabad. The said loan was duly sanctioned and after signing of necessary Agreements and other documents, six cheques for the loan amount of Rs.2,03,40,000/-, drawn in the name of M/s. Krishna Engineering Works, were handed over to the Respondent No.1 on 9th March, 2006. Subsequently, by a letter dated 24th May, 2006, the Bank informed M/s. Krishna Engineering Works in Ahmedabad that a sum of Rs.2,03,40,000/- had been disbursed to them on account of the Respondent No.1 and requested them to confirm receipt of the same. M/s. Krishna Engineering Works wrote back to the Bank stating that it had not received any payment on account of Mr. J.M. John Paul.

5. The Bank filed a complaint with the Commissioner of Police, Egmore, Chennai-600008 on 27th May, 2006, setting out the facts relating to sanction of the loan and the handing over of the six Banker's cheques in the name of M/s. Krishna Engineering Works. The complaint also contained the manner in which the Respondent No.1 had opened a fictitious account with I.C.I.C.I. Bank, Tuticorin Branch, in the name of M/s. Krishna Engineering Works and deposited the cheques meant for supply of road construction equipment by Krishna Engineering Works of Ahmedabad. Thereafter, the said amount was encashed and transferred to M/s. Matrix Enterprises having its office at No.41, C.G.E. Colony, 5th Street, Tuticorin-628 003, which was holding an account in the Tuticorin Branch of I.C.I.C.I. Bank. The said amounts were again transferred to the account of M/s. Delta Enterprises, also having its office at No.41, C.G.E. Colony, 5th Street, Tuticorin, with the Tuticorin Branch of the I.C.I.C.I. Bank.

16. Having regard to the above, the order of the High Court dated 3rd July, 2006, is modified to the extent that the Respondent No.1 shall surrender before the Trial Court forthwith and pray for regular bail and the Trial Court shall dispose of the same on merits, in accordance with law, before proceeding further with the trial.

17. The appeal is allowed to the above extent.
Dwarika Prasad vs Nirmala & Ors

3. The relevant facts emerging from the record of the case are as under:

7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and considered the record of the case. The argument that the respondent No. 1 was not entitled to file application for restoration of the suit filed by her late father, as right to sue did not survive in favour of the respondent No. 1 has no merit. It is well settled that where the right to sue is personal to the deceased, the same does not survive for the benefit of his legal representatives. There is no manner of doubt that late father of the respondent No. 1 had filed suit for partition of the joint properties. On his death right to sue survived and the respondent No. 1 being his daughter and legal representative was entitled to continue the suit in view of the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. The deceased who was a male Hindu, claimed interest in the joint properties which are subject matter of suit for partition. The record does not indicate that he had executed a Will though the appellant claimed that he had executed a Will in favour of Vijai Kumar. It may be mentioned that the said Vijai Kumar has not applied for being impleaded as a party to the proceedings nor claimed interest in the properties of the deceased. He, having died intestate, his share in the joint 8 properties shall devolve by intestate succession as provided by Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 8 of the said Act which deals with general rules of succession in the case of males, inter alia, provides that the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve firstly upon the heirs, being relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule to the Act. A daughter is specified as one of the relatives in Class I of the Schedule. Therefore, there is no manner of doubt that the share of the deceased plaintiff in the suit properties would devolve upon her, if suit for partition is decreed. Rule 3 of Order XXII CPC, inter alia, stipulates that when a sole plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives, the Court on an application made in that behalf, should cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. Thus, the respondent No.1 was entitled to be substituted in place of her deceased father. The record shows that she came to know later on that fraud had been committed while getting Civil Suit No. 3A of 1996 dismissed as withdrawn. Hence, she was entitled to file application for restoration of the suit. Thus, it is not correct to argue that 9 the respondent No. 1 was not entitled to file application for restoration of the suit filed by her father for partition of the joint properties.

11. For the foregoing reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

December 17, 2009.
State Of U.P.& Ors vs Mahendra Nath Tewari

2. The brief facts of the case are as under : The respondent was appointed as a Constable in PAC (Provincial Armed Constabulary), U.P. on June 10, 1970. He was convicted in a criminal case. Therefore, his services were terminated by the appellant vide order dated November 25, 1975. Ultimately, he was acquitted in appeal and his acquittal was confirmed by this Court. On acquittal, the appellant should have reinstated the respondent in service but no action was taken by the appellant at all. Therefore, the respondent was compelled to file writ petition No.5224 of 1997 before the High Court for his reinstatement. The said writ petition was disposed of on September 5, 1997 with a direction to the respondent to make representation and to the appellants to consider the same. The respondent made representation which was rejected by the appellants on February 17, 1998. Therefore, the respondent filed Writ Petition No.13170 of 1999 before the Allahabad High Court. The learned Single Judge allowed the same on the basis of 3 judgment dated September 26, 1997 rendered in Writ Petition No.46061 of 1998 filed by Vijay Bahadur Singh against State of U.P. Thereupon, the appellants preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench has dismissed the appeal because it found that exhaustive judgment was delivered by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court taking into consideration all the aspects of the matter and the special leave petition filed before this Court was dismissed by order dated May 7, 2003. The judgment delivered by the Division Bench is the subject matter of challenge in the instant appeal.

5. For the foregoing reasons, it is clarified that the respondents would not be entitled to back wages at all. 5 Subject to above referred to clarification, the appeal stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

December 17, 2009.
Gangula Mohan Reddy vs State Of A.P

2. The appellant, aggrieved by the said judgment of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court upheld the judgment of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, but while affirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 306 of the Code, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of 10 years was reduced to 5 years. The appellant, aggrieved by the said judgment, approached this Court. This Court granted leave and released the appellant on bail.

3. The brief facts which are relevant to dispose of this appeal are recapitulated as under:

5. The prosecution also examined Balamma, the mother of the deceased as P.W.2. She also corroborated the statement of 4 PW1 and gave same version of the incident in her testimony. On the basis of the testimonies of P.W.1 and P.W.2, the Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 306 of the Code and his conviction on appeal was confirmed by the High Court.

22. In the light of the provisions of law and the settled legal positions crystallized by a series of judgments of this Court, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. 11 Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed and disposed of.

23. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant was released on bail. He is not required to surrender. His bail bond is cancelled and he is set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.

24. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed.

J. (A. K. Patnaik) New Delhi;

January 5, 2010.
Mohd. Laiquiddin & Anr vs Kamala Devi Misra (Dead) By Lrs. & Ors

2. It may be mentioned that during the pendency of the suit, the original plaintiff died and her legal representatives were substituted as plaintiffs before the trial court. The original defendant also died before the filing of the first appeal, and his legal representatives were brought on record as Appellant Nos. 2 to 6 before the first Appellate Court. For the sake of convenience, the Plaintiffs would be referred to as the `Appellants' and the Defendants would be referred to as `the Respondents'.

3. The case made out by the original plaintiff (since deceased) in her plaint was as follows:

6. As noted herein earlier, after the suit was decreed and before an appeal was preferred from the same, the defendant in the said suit died and his legal representatives were brought on record before the First Appellate Court.

7. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the VIIth Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, the respondents, the legal representatives of the defendant, preferred an appeal before the XIIIth Addl. Chief Judge, (Fast Track Court), City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The appellants also filed cross objections praying that it should be held there was dissolution of the firm on account of mismanagement. The First Appellate Court, by an order dated 17th of October, 2001, dismissed the appeal 8 confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court and allowed the cross objections filed by the Appellants. The issue framed by the First Appellate Court was as follows:

9. On the question of mismanagement of the accounts of the firm, the Appellate Court had allowed the cross objections preferred by the appellants. The respondents did not disclose 9 the accounts and they were ignorant of the amounts and the profits to which appellants were entitled to. The respondents also did not produce the corresponding ledger and cash books. In the light of these findings it was held that the management of the account was not proper.

3) The Respondents pleaded that in the event the court comes to a conclusion that the firm stood dissolved, the partnership deed was to be treated in the nature of license. The High Court held that the respondent could not deny their liability under the other terms of Partnership deed, at the same time, seeking benefit from the same. The respondents laid undue stress on Clause 20 of the partnership deed, which showed that the deed was one of partnership and that both parties had acted upon it. Once the issue of dissolution was already decided against him on the basis of Section 42 of the Act 1 and also Clause 20, he could not urge the Court to construe the same as a license, since both these pleas were irreconcilable with each other.

42. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in these appeals and the appeals are thus dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
National Hydroelectric Power ... vs Commr.Of Income Tax

8. According to the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR), the assessee supplied electricity at the tariff rate notified by CERC and recovered the sale price, which became its income; that, in future the said sale price was neither refundable nor adjustable against the future bills; that, the sale price (which includes AAD) was shown as "sales" in the profit and loss account; that, it 3 was received in terms of the invoice raised by the assessee and, therefore, it was "income" in the year of receipt. However, according to AAR, when it came to computation of book profit, assessee deducted the AAD component from total sale price and only the balance amount net of AAD was taken into profit and loss account and book profit. Consequently, AAR ruled (which is challenged herein) that reduction of AAD from the "sales" was nothing but a reserve which has to be added back on the basis of clause (b) of Explanation- I to Section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ("1961 Act", for short).

12. For the aforestated reasons, we hold that AAD is a timing difference, it is not a reserve, it is not carried through profit and loss account and that it is "income received in advance" subject to adjustment in future and, therefore, clause (b) of Explanation-I to Section 115JB is not applicable. Accordingly, the impugned ruling is set aside and the civil appeal filed by the assessee stands allowed with no order as to costs.

January 5, 2010.
Tameeshwar Vaishnav vs Ramvishal Gupta

4. In S.L.P.(Crl.) No.6676 of 2008 arising out of Criminal Case No.399 of 2006 pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khairagarh, the Respondent had filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Act, for dishonour of a cheque dated 16th March, 2006, bearing No.0864961 for Rs.40,000/- drawn on the Bank of Maharashtra, Khairagarh Branch, in favour of the Respondent. S.L.P. (Crl.) 3 No.6593 of 2008 is directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 27th March, 2008, in Crl. Revision No.130 of 2006 arising out of Criminal Case No.339 of 2006 pending with the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khairagarh, in respect of a similar cheque dated 20th March, 2006, bearing No.0864962 amounting to Rs.40,000/- drawn on the Bank of Maharashtra, Khairagarh Branch, in favour of the Respondent. As stated hereinabove, both the said cheques were dishonoured on the ground of insufficient funds. The cheque issued on 20th March, 2006, bearing No.0864962 was dishonoured on 22nd March, 2006, on the ground of insufficient funds. Similarly, cheque bearing No.0864961 dated 16th March, 2006, was dishonoured on 16th March, 2006. Consequently, the Respondent issued notices as contemplated under Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act asking the Appellant to make payment of the cheque amounts within 15 days. Although, the notice was duly served upon the 4 Appellant, the Respondent did not take any steps to file the complaint within the period prescribed in Section 142 of the Act. On the other hand, the Respondent sent a second notice to the Appellant in respect of the two cheques on 7th June, 2006, and, ultimately, when no response was received to the same, he filed two separate complaints before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khairagarh, District Rajanandgaon, Chhattisgarh, on which process was issued by the learned Magistrate after recording the statement of the respondent- complainant.

5. Against such order issuing process on both the complaints, the Appellant filed Criminal Revision Nos.130 and 131 of 2006 in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Khairagarh, District Rajanandgaon, on 21st November, 2006. On 19th March, 2007, the learned Additional District Judge, Khairagarh, dismissed both the Revision 5 Applications holding that the grounds raised therein could be decided after evidence was led by the parties.

18. The Appeals must, therefore, succeed and are, accordingly, allowed. The orders of the learned Magistrate dated 13th July, 2006 and 17th July, 2006, respectively, taking cognizance on the Criminal Complaint Nos.339 and 399 of 2006 along with the orders of the High Court impugned in these appeals, are set aside.
M/S. Mandvi Co-Op Bank Ltd vs Nimesh B.Thakore

7. Apart from considering the two questions the High Court also laid down, on the request of the parties, a number of guidelines (vide sub- paragraphs (a) to (r) of paragraph 45 of the judgment) in regard to the 5 procedure that the trial court, the complainant and the accused should follow in a dishonoured cheque trial on a complaint made under section 138 of the Act. We may have to refer to some of those guidelines later, at an appropriate place in this judgment.

(2) The court may, if it thinks fit, and shall, on the application of the prosecution or the accused, summon and examine any person giving evidence on affidavit as to the facts contained therein.

(ix) to provide that the Magistrate trying an offence shall have power to pass sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and amount of fine exceeding five thousand rupees;

(emphasis added)

36. In light of the above we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court was in error in taking the view, that on a request made by the accused the magistrate may allow him to tender his evidence on affidavit and consequently, we set aside the direction as contained in sub-paragraph (r) of 34 paragraph 45 of the High Court judgment. The appeal arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 3915/2006 is allowed.

37. All the remaining six appeals are dismissed.

38. There shall be no order as to costs.

....................................J (TARUN CHATTERJEE) .....................................J (AFTAB ALAM) New Delhi, January 11, 2010
M/S Vinedale Distilleries Ltd.& Anr vs Dena Bank & Ors

1. These Transfer Petitions have been filed by M/s Vinedale Distilleries Ltd. for transfer of two Original Applications pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as `the DRT'), Hyderabad, to the DRT, Jhandewalan, Delhi. While O.A. No.29 of 2000 was filed by Dena Bank against the Petitioner Company, S.A. No.157 of 2008 was filed by the Petitioner Company against Dena 4 Bank before the DRT, Hyderabad. The said applications had been made on the basis of an order passed by this Court on 4th January, 2008, in Transfer Petition (C) No.945 of 2006. While allowing the said Transfer Petition and thereby transferring various suits pending between the parties before the Civil Court in Andhra Pradesh to the Delhi High Court, this Court, on consent of the parties, also directed as follows :-

7. The Transfer Petitions are, therefore, allowed. Let O.A. No.29 of 2000, Dena Bank vs. M/s Vinedale Distilleries Ltd. & Ors., and Securitization Application No.157 of 2008, M/s Vinedale Distilleries Ltd. vs. Dena Bank, pending before the 11 Debts Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, stand transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jhandewalan, Delhi.

8. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
Union Of India vs Rakesh Kumar & Ors

2. For a considerable period during the British Rule, special laws were made applicable to certain `backward areas' in India that were predominantly occupied by tribal people. These backward regions covered an area of more than 1,20,000 square miles. However, the characteristics of these areas and their populations varied widely. By Act XIV of 1874, Santhal Parganas and Chutia Nagpur Division (now known as Chhotanagpur Division) were created and in these `Scheduled districts', tribal communities were accorded a certain degree of autonomy to regulate their affairs on the basis of their own conventions and traditions. Many of these communities chose their leaders through an informal consensus among other customary methods for selection. When the Constitution was enacted, these areas were designated as `Scheduled Areas'. Article 244 of the Constitution explicitly states that the provisions of the Fifth Schedule shall apply in respect of the administration and control of the Scheduled Areas in any State other than the States of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. The provisions of the Sixth Schedule guide the administration of tribal areas in those states.

government, a State Legislature shall ensure that the Panchayats at the appropriate level and the Gram Sabha are endowed specifically with -

31. 50% of reservation in favour of the STs in Panchayats at all the three tiers is clearly an example of `compensatory discrimination' especially in view of the fact that the scheduled areas under consideration were completely under a separate administrative scheme as per the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. In fact, 50% of reservation in favour of the scheduled tribes by itself was not challenged before the High Court. Therefore, the question that now remains is whether reservation should be made in favour of the scheduled castes and backward class for the purpose of scheduled areas. The Constitutional mandate is that the 3 scheduled castes should be given reservation at all the three tiers of Panchayats, with regard to the principle of proportionate representation.

44. In the result, the appeals filed by the Union of India are allowed and the proviso to Section 4(g) of PESA Act and Sections 21(B), 40(B) and 55(B) of Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act, 2001 are held to be constitutionally valid. We also hold that Sections 17(B)(2), 36(B)(2) and 51(B)(2) of the Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act, 2001 are constitutionally valid provisions.

45. The other appeals are also disposed of accordingly and the State Election Commission of the State of Jharkhand is directed to conduct elections for the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) as early as possible.