L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Antonio Lobo & Anr vs Felix Fernandes & Ors

: 2 : The aforesaid prayers were founded on the pleading that the defendants (Mundkars) constructed the structure 'D' in 1978; structures 'E' & 'C' in October, 1983 and structure 'A' in December, 1987. The plaintiffs averred that the above structures, namely, 'A', 'C', 'D' & 'E' have been constructed by the defendants beyond mundkarial area; the plaintiffs asked the defendants to demolish the structures 'C', 'E' & 'D' in 1986 but the defendants refused to demolish the same and constructed another structure 'C' in November, 1987.

The defendants traversed the claim of the plaintiffs and set-up the plea that the structures 'A', 'C' and 'B' constitute one house which is ancestral house of the defendants; the said house was constructed by their ancestors more than hundred years back with the permission of the ancestors of the plaintiffs (Bhatkar); the ancestral house collapsed partly due to the heavy flood in 1945 and was re-constructed in the same year. The defendants also set-up a plea that structures 'D' & 'E' were constructed long back and the defendants and their family members have been residing there since 1974.

Against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the defendants preferred First Appeal. The First Appeal was heard by the 2nd Additional District Judge, North Goa, Panaji. After hearing the parties, the First Appellate Court, in exercise of its power under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'C.P.C.'), while dismissing the defendants' appeal, modified the judgment and decree of the Trial Court by granting the plaintiffs the decree as prayed for in the plaint.

As regards substantial question of law (a), the High Court was not convinced with the defendants' argument that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was barred in terms of Section 31(2) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Mundkar (Protection from Eviction) Act, 1975 and answered the said question accordingly.

C.A.No.190/2007 contdd..

The view taken by the High Court is, thus, in accordance with law and warrants no interference.

The Civil Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with no orders as to costs.

SEPTEMBER 28, 2011
Union Of India & Ors vs Rabinder Singh

2. The Division Bench has allowed the said petition by its impugned order and set aside the proceedings, findings and sentence of the General Court 2 Martial held during 24.6.1987 to 1.10.1987 against the first respondent by which he was awarded the punishment of Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) for one year and cashiering.

The facts leading to this appeal are as follows:-

taking was done, the non-receipt of stores and false documentation having taken place was found entered in the records.

6. Thereafter, the case against the respondent was remanded for trial by a General Court Martial which was convened in accordance with the provisions under Chapter X of the Army Act. The respondent was tried for four charges. They were as follows:-

7. The General Court Martial found him guilty of all those four charges, and awarded punishment of R.I. for one year and cashiering. The proceedings were thoroughly reviewed by the Deputy Judge-Advocate General, 5 Headquarter, Western Command who made the statutory report thereon. These proceedings were confirmed by the confirming authority on 20.6.1988 in terms of Sections 153 and 154 of the Army Act. The respondent preferred a Post Confirmation Petition under Section 164 of the Army Act which was rejected by the Chief of the Army. This led the respondent to file the Writ Petition as stated above which was dismissed but the Appeal therefrom was allowed leading to the present Civil Appeal by special leave.

20. In the circumstances, we allow this appeal and set-aside the order passed by the Division Bench, and confirm the one passed by the learned Single Judge. Consequently, the Writ Petition filed by the respondent stands dismissed, though we do not order any cost against the respondent.
Jamaluddin vs State Of J.&K. & Ors

3. Being aggrieved by that order the appellant filed the above referred Writ Petition. A Single Judge who heard the matter, noted that as per rule 7 of Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Judicial) Recruitment Rules 1967 (Judicial Services Recruitment Rules for short), the appellant was in fact overage. This rule reads as follows:-

While dismissing the petition, the Single Judge noted that by the time that matter was heard, the appellant had crossed the age of 37 years which he claimed as the permissible age for the Scheduled Tribe candidates. The Division Bench which heard the Letters Patent Appeal also accepted the view taken by the learned Single Judge, and therefore dismissed the appeal.

castes and Scheduled Tribes in the and also the relevant record. We are of Judicial Service and Minister Services. the opinion that the general rules framed by the Government of J&K in this behalf are also applicable to the Judicial Service as also to the Ministerial services of the Judicial Department; and such reservation are made accordingly.

17. For the reasons stated above the appeal stands dismissed, though there will be no order as to the costs.
Jamaluddin vs State Of J.&K.; & Ors

3. Being aggrieved by that order the appellant filed the above referred Writ Petition. A Single Judge who heard the matter, noted that as per rule 7 of Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Judicial) Recruitment Rules 1967 (Judicial Services Recruitment Rules for short), the appellant was in fact overage. This rule reads as follows:-

While dismissing the petition, the Single Judge noted that by the time that matter was heard, the appellant had crossed the age of 37 years which he claimed as the permissible age for the Scheduled Tribe candidates. The Division Bench which heard the Letters Patent Appeal also accepted the view taken by the learned Single Judge, and therefore dismissed the appeal.

castes and Scheduled Tribes in the and also the relevant record. We are of Judicial Service and Minister Services. the opinion that the general rules framed by the Government of J&K in this behalf are also applicable to the Judicial Service as also to the Ministerial services of the Judicial Department; and such reservation are made accordingly.

17. For the reasons stated above the appeal stands dismissed, though there will be no order as to the costs.
Ashok Kumar Jain vs Rajasthan Pub.Ser.Comm.Th.Its Ch. & ...

Appellant appeared as an `open market candidate' in the 1983 examination and was selected to Rajasthan Tehsildar Services (Subordinate service) and 2 was appointed as a Naib Tehsildar, a non-gazetted post on 15.10.1985. The appellant also appeared in the combined competitive examination held in 1987 and 1989 as an open market candidate. The examination for the year 1990 was held in two stages on 25.11.1990 and 22.2.1992. The appellant appeared in the said examination as an open market candidate and was unsuccessful.

3. The appellant again applied for the combined competitive examination for the year 1991, advertised on 19.10.1991. The appellant was provisionally allowed to appear in the said examination. On scrutiny of his application it was found that appellant had already availed four chances as an open market candidate in the examinations relating to the years 1983, 1987, 1989 and 1990 and he was not therefore entitled to appear for the fifth time, as the maximum number of chances for a candidate under the Rules was four. He could not also be considered as a candidate in the examination for the year 1991 under the Non-Gazetted Employees quota (for short `NGE quota'), as appellant was working as a Tehsildar, a Gazetted post, from December 1990. Therefore a notice dated 25.6.1993 was issued calling upon him to show cause why his application should not be rejected on the ground that he was not entitled to participate in the combined competitive examination for the fifth time.

10. In view of the above there is no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed.
R. Vijayan vs Baby & Anr

2. The complainant in a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (`Act' for short) is the appellant in this appeal by special leave. A cheque dated 31.3.1995 for Rs.20,000/- issued by the first respondent drawn in favour of the complainant, towards alleged repayment of a loan was dishonoured when presented for payment. The appellant sent a notice dated 20.4.1995 demanding payment. According to the complainant, the notice was served on the first respondent but the payment was not made. Therefore on 25.5.1995 the appellant lodged a complaint against the first 2 respondent, under section 138 of the Act before the First Class Magistrate

3. The first respondent challenged the said judgment and the criminal appeal filed by her was allowed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram by judgment dated 26.11.2001. The conviction and sentence imposed on the first respondent was set aside and the appellant was acquitted. The first appellate court held that the accused having denied her signature in the postal acknowledgement relating to the notice dated 20.4.1995, the appellant ought to have examined the postman who served the notice; and as the appellant did not do so, the court held that the complainant had not discharged the burden to prove that the notice was duly served on the first respondent. The appellant filed criminal appeal before the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal in part. It held that the service of notice was duly proved. As a consequence it restored the conviction entered by the learned Magistrate in reversal of the judgment of 3 the first appellate court. However the High Court held that it could only restore the fine of Rs.2000/- imposed by the Magistrate with the default sentence but not the direction for payment of compensation under section 357(3) of the Code, as it could not co-exist with the imposition of fine. Therefore, the direction for payment of compensation was not restored. The said judgment is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

x x x x x The graded scheme for imposing costs is a means to encourage compounding at an early stage of litigation. In the status quo, valuable time of the Court is spent on the trial of these cases and the parties are not liable to pay any Court fee since the proceedings are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though the impact of the offence is 1 largely confined to the private parties. Even though the imposition of costs by the competent court is a matter of discretion, the scale of costs has been suggested in the interest of uniformity. The competent Court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance. Bona fide litigants should of course contest the proceedings to their logical end."

19. The appeal is dismissed. We place on record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Dr. Rajiv Dhavan as Amicus Curiae.
Goa Housing Board vs Rameshchandra Govind Pawaskar & Anr

2. These two appeals arise out of the judgment dated 26.9.2008 in FA No.216/2003, the first by the Goa Housing Board and the second by the land owner. As the ranks of the parties differ, the Goa Housing Board (appellant in the first matter and second respondent in the second matter) for whose 2 benefit the acquisition was made will be referred to as the `Board' or the appellant. Rameshchandra Govind Pawaskar (first respondent in the first matter and appellant in the second matter) whose land was acquired will be referred to as the `respondent'. The Land Acquisition Officer (second respondent in the first matter and first respondent in the second matter) will be referred to as `the LAO'.

4. The LAO made an award dated 28.2.2003 determining the compensation payable as Rs.18 per sq.m. The respondent sought reference to the civil court for claiming a higher compensation. The Reference court by its judgment and award dated 28.2.2003 declared the compensation awarded at Rs.18 per sq.m. to be proper and reasonable and affirmed the award of the LAO. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent filed an appeal before the High Court seeking increase in compensation.

20. We may now deal with contentions of the respondent that the prohibition under section 2 of the Land Use Act is inapplicable to the acquired land.

26. Consequently we allow the appeal filed by the Board and reduce the compensation awarded for land from Rs.100/- per sq.m. to Rs.55 per sq.m. The respondent will be entitled to all statutory benefits as awarded by the 24 High Court. As a consequence the appeal filed by the landowner for increase of compensation stands rejected.

CA No. 8542 2011 [@ SLP (C) No.3723/2009]

28. We accordingly allow this appeal in part and reduce the compensation from Rs.140 per sq.m. to Rs.45 per sq.m. The respondent will be entitled to said compensation with all statutory benefits under section 23(1A), section 23(2) and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894.
Sanchit Bansal & Anr vs Joint Admission Board & Ors

2. The first appellant is the son of second appellant who is a Professor in the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT for short), Kharagpur. Admission to undergraduate courses in fifteen IITs as also IT--BHU and ISM, Dhanbad is 2 through the Common Entrance Examination known as the Joint Entrance Examination (for short IIT-JEE). The said examination is considered to be the toughest entrance examination in India, with more than 50 candidates vying for each seat in the said examination. IIT-JEE is conducted every year by a different IIT on a rotation basis and is supervised by the Joint Admission Board (JAB or the `Board'), the first respondent herein. The first appellant appeared in the IIT-JEE 2006, as a general category candidate. He secured 75 marks in Methamatics, 104 marks in Physics and 52 marks in Chemistry, aggregating to 231. The Board had fixed the cut off marks for admission as 37 for Maths, 48 for Physics and 55 for Chemistry and the aggregate cut off marks as 154. As first appellant did not secure the minimum of 55 marks in chemistry he was not qualified, even though his aggregate in the three subjects was very high.

3. The second appellant wrote a letter dated 5.9.2006 to all the IIT Chairmen/Directors alleging anomalies and inherent contradictions in the selection process. He alleged that the cut off marks were fixed arbitrarily and with malafides in a manner that a student such as the first appellant with 231 marks was found to be not qualified whereas a student who got aggregate marks of 154 was found to have qualified. The appellants also filed several 3 applications under the Right to Information Act 2005 and collected considerable data. The appellants claim that when they sought information about the procedure for computation of cut off marks for JEE 2006 the organising Chairman, JEE 2006 gave two different versions at different points of time.

2. On the basis of overall performance of candidates who appeared in all the three subjects (Mathematics, Physics & Chemistry), mean marks of each of the three subjects along with standard deviation was determined.

The cut-off in each subject was decided as mean marks minus one standard deviation. Further depending on the number of candidates required to be qualified on All India basis, the aggregate marks cut-off was obtained. The cut-off marks of individual subject and aggregate are given below for GE category candidates:-

The second response given by the organizing Chairman, JEE 2006 on 12.7.2007 was as under:

The second report dated 17.7.2009 of Prof. T.A. Abinandanan was on the analysis of candidates' performance in JEE 2006. We extract below the conclusion in the said report :

(emphasis supplied)

25. We may note that even now many feel that the current pattern of IIT-

Therefore, the appellant will have to be satisfied in being one of the many unsung heroes who helped in improving the system.

27. We find no reason for interfering with the order of the High Court.

The appeal is dismissed.
D. Ethiraj vs Secretary To Govt. & Ors

4. It is clear from the above table that the appellant had undergone sentence of 1 year and 140 days as on 5.10.2011.

ORDER On the occasion of the assumption of office of the newly elected Government in Tamil Nadu, the Government have decided to grant remission to certain classes of prisoners who have been convicted for various offences by the courts in this State and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment other than life imprisonment.

10. On an appeal being filed by the appellant vide C.A. No. 64 of 1992, the High Court by its judgment dated 7th June, 2002 dismissed the same confirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant. The special leave petition preferred by the appellant in this Court against the said judgment of the High Court came to be dismissed on 20th July, 2010.

18. We are in entire agreement with the aforesaid views taken by this Court that if it is clear from the facts of a given case that during the period the petitioner was on bail and had not at all suffered any imprisonment, he cannot get the benefit of remission in respect of that period.

20. We are unable to approve the reasoning given by the High Court that the appellant's case for remission cannot be considered in terms of the said notification as on the date of the notification, he was on bail. This is a wrong approach. A prisoner may be on bail on a particular day -- this is just a fortuitous circumstance. What the Court has to consider is the actual period of sentence undergone by the prisoner and whether by reason of the period actually undergone, the prisoner qualifies for remission. We are, therefore, constrained to set aside the judgment of the High Court.

21. We direct the appellant to make a representation afresh praying for remission attaching a copy of this judgment. In our view, the appellant is entitled to get his case of remission of sentence considered in accordance with the above mentioned G.O. We also direct the State to consider the case of the appellant in the light of the observations made in this judgment and pass an order within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the representation.

22. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
Rajendra V.Deshprabhu(D)Thr.Lrs. & ... vs Dy.Collector & Anr

owners was acquired in pursuance of preliminary notification dated 12.1.1990 (Gazetted on 1.2.1990). By award dated 27.3.1991, the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation for the acquired land at the rate of Rs.17 per sq.m. As there were three tenants, namely, Krishna Arjun Kauthankar, Keshav Bhikaji Kauthankar and Harischandra Bhikaji 2 Kauthankar and as the co-owners had admitted their tenancy rights, the Land Acquisition Officer directed that the compensation to be divided between the owners and the tenants at the rate of 50% each. The reference court, by judgment daed 22.11.2002, increased the compensation from Rs.17 per sq.m. to Rs.175 per sq.m. The appeal by the State was allowed by a division bench of the Bombay High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 14.11.2008. The High Court set aside the judgment and award of the reference court, thereby restoring the award of Rs.17/- per sq.m. by the Land Acquisition Officer, on the following reasoning:

12. In view of the above, this appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is modified by increasing the compensation for the acquired land from Rs.17 per sq.m. to Rs.78 per sq.m. All statutory benefits are also granted.
Swami Vivekanand College Of Edu.& Ors vs Union Of India & Ors

2. As per Regulation 8(4) an institution is required to be accredited with the NAAC with a Letter Grade B, whereas as per Regulation 8(5) those 2 institutions which had been granted additional intake in B.Ed. and B.P.Ed.

teacher training courses after promulgation of the Regulations, 2005 i.e. 13 th January, 2006 are required to get themselves accredited with the NAAC with a Letter Grade B before Ist April, 2010.

5. During the pendency of the present appeal the `Council' framed the "National Council for Teacher Education (Recognition Norm and Procedure) 3 Regulations, 2009 w.e.f. 31st August, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the "NCTE Regulations, 2009") but as Regulation 8(4) and 8(5) is identically worded so far as B.Ed. course, this Court by order dated 15th March, 2010 permitted the appellants to challenge the validity of new Regulation 8(4) and 8(5) of Regulations, 2009.

The aforesaid "norms and standards" were notified by NCTE Regulations 2002 and retained in the NCTE Regulations, 2005. Appendix-7 was related to "norms and standards for Secondary Teacher Education Programme".

38. Thereby, the Regulations 8(3) and 8(4) remained in force for all Teachers Education Courses, e.g. Elementary Teachers Education Programme, 22 Bachelor of Elementary Education (B.El.Ed.), Standard for Secondary Teacher Education Programme, Master of Education (M.Ed.) Programme etc., even after amended Regulations 2006, but with a rider that in case new norms are published for any such Course after notification of Regulations dated 27th December, 2005, the conditions prescribed in Rule 8(3) and 8(4) of the Regulations, 2005 dated 27th December, 2005 shall not be applicable for such course.

standard teaching, the validity of Regulation 8(4) and 8(5) cannot be questioned. In absence of any merit, the appeal is dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs.