L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of U.P. & Ors vs Rekha Rani

3. The respondent has a degree of B.A.M.S.(Bachelor of Ayurvedic Medicine and Surgery). She alleged in her writ petition filed in the High Court that she had all the requisite qualifications to be appointed as Medical Officer in the U.P. State Services. She was appointed vide order dated 1.8.1997 under the Anshkalik (temporary) Scheme of the State Government and was posted at a Government Female Hospital in Bulandshahar district.

4. It is alleged in her writ petition that to avoid the claim of regular service of the writ petitioner the State Government acted against the spirit of law laid down by this Court in Rattanlal and others vs. State of Haryana and others AIR 1987 SC 478 and in Rabinarayan Mohapatra vs. State of Orissa and others AIR 1991 SC 1286 and other decisions given from time to time by this Court, declaring illegal the policy of making ad hoc appointment having time bound period and thereafter terminating the services of the appointee and after a short interval giving re-appointment. It was alleged that artificial break of service was given by the State Government which is against the spirit 3 of the aforesaid decisions of this Court. The appellant was appointed from 1.8.1987 to 31.7.1988, then from 3.8.1988 to 2.8.1989, then from 4.8.1989 to 3.8.1990 and from 7.8.1990 for a period one year. It is also alleged that the appellant's work was always found to be satisfactory, and certificates to this effect were given by the Chief Medical Officer, Bulandshahar which were marked as Annexure-4 to the writ petition filed in the High Court. It is alleged that others similarly situated were also given artificial breaks in service. It is alleged that Anshkalik doctors filed a writ petition being Civil Writ Petition No. 4886 of 1990 before the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) which was allowed on 11.2.1992 and the said judgment became final. The High Court held that there was violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, and that the claim of the writ petitioner(s) for regularization shall be considered within six months from the date of production of copy of the said judgment before the respondent (the State Government). The writ petitioner (respondent in the present appeal) has alleged that she is entitled to the benefit of the said decision, although she had not filed any individual writ petition.

9. Relying on its earlier decision the High Court allowed the impugned writ petition No. 4886 of 1990 on 11.2.1992. Hence, this appeal.

An illegality cannot be perpetuated.

14. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

30th March, 2011
Chandra Bonia vs State Of Assam

As per the prosecution story, Somra Munda and Agnash Munda, the father and brother of the first informant were murdered during the night of 7th October, 1990 in their house. The First 2 Information Report was lodged by Chukhnu Munda at Police Station Marian on the 8th October, 1990 alleging that during his absence from the house some persons had murdered his father and younger brother. During the course of the investigation, the police recorded the statement of various witnesses including PW 1 Pradip Das and PW 2 Niran Bonia (who were both declared hostile), PW 5, the Medical Officer who had conducted the post mortem on the two dead bodies, PW 6 the informant and PW 7 Baloni Bawri, who was a neighbour of the deceased, and to whom the accused had made an extra judicial confession on the date of the murder itself and PW 12 the Investigating Officer who was also a witness to the recovery of the murder weapon at the instance of the accused. The trial court and the High Court have both noticed that as the solitary eye witness had died and the other two material witnesses PW 1 and PW 2 had been declared hostile, the prosecution story rested exclusively on the confession made by the accused to PW 7 and the factum of recovery of the dao at the instance of the accused 3 before PW 12 the Investigating Officer.

On an overall assessment of the facts the prosecution story is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

We thus find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.

The fee of the Amicus Curiae is fixed at Rs.7000/-.
Deepak Agrawal & Anr vs State Of U.P. & Ors

3. The appellants were recruited through the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission on Class II posts in the Excise Department under the Excise Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh. Deepak Agarwal (hereinafter referred to as `appellant No.1') was appointed on the post of Technical Officer in the pay scale of Rs.2200-4000 by an order dated 13th August, 1991. Similarly, Jogendra Singh (hereinafter referred to as `appellant No. 2') was directly 1 (1983) 3 SCC 284 2 recruited through the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission and appointed on the post of Statistical Officer by Notification dated 8th January, 1992 in the pay scale of Rs.2200-4000. It is not disputed that both the appellants are confirmed in service. There is no adverse entry in their service record. The appellants are the only two officers recruited directly to Class II Excise Service.

6. Inspite of the representation made by the appellants, the 1983 Rules were amended on 17th May, 1999. By the aforesaid amendment, the posts of 4 Technical Officers and Statistical Officers have been excluded from the feeder cadre for promotion to the post of Deputy Excise Commissioner. This amendment came just two days before the DPC was scheduled to meet on 19th May, 1999. As a consequence of the amendment, the DPC did not consider the appellants for promotion. The justification given for the aforesaid amendment is that the State Government had taken a "conscious decision"

(h); "Substantive appointment" means an appointment, not being an adhoc appointment on a post in the cadre of the service after selection in accordance with the rules and, if there are no rules, in accordance, with the procedure prescribed for the time being by executive instructions issued by the Government;

31. With these observations, the impugned judgment is affirmed and the appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

March 31, 2011.
M/S. Siddachalam Exports Private Ltd vs Commissioner Of Central Excise ...

5. Vide letter dated 5th March, 2003, the exporter requested for provisional release of the goods on execution of bond and bank guarantee. On 12th March, 2003, one Pankaj, claiming to be an authorised representative of the said M/s Skipper International submitted his valuation letter, opining that samples of `ladies tops' and `denim shirts' were export surplus and export rejected garments having poor quality of fabric and stitching, and the market value of the said goods ranged between `40/- to `70/- per piece. Based on the said report, the customs authorities formed the opinion that the total value of the consignments was `56,04,000/- as against the declared FOB value of `4,14,63,360/- and the admissible 3 drawback should be `3,56,328/- as against the claim of `49,57,536/-.

11.Hence, the present appeal by the exporter.

20.Resultantly, for the reasons as enumerated, the appeal is allowed; the orders passed by the CESTAT and the Commissioner are set aside and the matter is remitted back to the adjudicating authority for fresh consideration in accordance with law, after affording adequate 1 opportunity of hearing to the exporter. The entire exercise, in terms of this order, shall be completed within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Needless to add that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the opinion rendered by M/s Skipper International or on the conduct of the exporter in not adducing any evidence in support of the export value stated in the shipping bills in question.

21.In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

APRIL 1, 2011.

ARS 1
K.P.Thimmappa Gowda vs State Of Karnataka

2. The facts of the case have been stated in the impugned judgment of the High Court and the trial court and we are not repeating the same except where necessary.

3. The trial court had acquitted the appellant in the criminal case, but the High Court reversed the judgment and convicted the appellant under Section 2 376 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment of 7 years and a fine of Rs.

4. The case of the prosecution is that on 4.1.1996 the appellant raped one Rathnamma aged 18 years, but he assured her that he would marry her and asked her to keep quiet. It is alleged that subsequently also the appellant had sex with Rathnamma several times and assured her that he would marry her.

Rathnamma became pregnant, but the appellant refused to marry her. Hence an FIR was registered in the police station on 4.1.1996 against the appellant under Section 376 IPC.

9. For the reasons given above, the trial court disbelieved the prosecution version and acquitted the appellant.

12. In criminal cases, the rule is that the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. If the court is of the opinion that on the evidence two views are reasonably possible, one that the appellant is guilty, and the other that he is innocent, then the benefit of doubt goes in favour of the accused.

14. For the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High court is set aside

16. The appellant is directed to give/transfer two acres of land as stated in the affidavit filed before Court to Rathnamma within three months from the date of this judgment.
Ganeshi (D) By Lrs. & Ors vs Ashok & Anr

6. It was alleged that a month before filing of the plaint, the plaintiffs came to know the that in order to deprive them of their right to inherit the suit land on the death of defendant No. 1, defendant Nos. 2 to 5 filed a collusive suit against defendant No. 1 bearing suit No. 476 of 1978 in the Court of sub-Judge, IInd Class, Palwal for declaration that they are owners of the suit land. Defendant No. 1 suffered that decree against him on his admission on 27.10.1978. It was alleged that the said decree could not extinguish the rights of ownership of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit land, and it was null and void and would not operate against the plaintiff's right of succession on the death of defendant No.1. It was further alleged that plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2 are sons of Ramgopal and the land is ancestral property. According to agricultural custom defendant No.1 could not 4 transfer the suit land in favour of defendant Nos.2 to 5 who were not his heirs to the exclusion of the plaintiffs who were his heirs. It was further alleged that, in the alternative, the said decree amounts to alienation and without consideration and legal necessity. It was alleged that defendants Nos.6 & 7 have colluded with defendant Nos.1 to 5.

16. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High court is set aside and that of the first appellate court is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.

April 04, 2011
Gurmukh Singh vs Jaswant Kaur

3. The plaintiff-appellant had filed a suit for recovery of Rs.2,31,000/-. He claimed that the defendant had executed a pronote and receipt dated 2.5.1994 whereby the defendant had borrowed a sum 2 of Rs.1,50,000/- from the plaintiff and agreed to repay the same along with interest @ 2% per annum on demand. Since the defendant had not paid the aforesaid amount, the suit was filed.

4. The defendant-respondent contested the suit and denied the execution of the pronote and receipt in favour of the plaintiff. She alleged that the aforesaid pronote and receipt were forged and fictitious documents.

7. The findings of the courts below are findings of fact and we cannot interfere with the same in this appeal. The finding is that the stamps which have been affixed were removed from other documents, and hence, it has rightly been said that such a pronote cannot be taken into consideration.

8. Thus there is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed. No costs.

April 04, 2011
U. Sowri Reddy (Dead)By Lrs vs B. Suseelamma & Ors

3. The facts have been stated in detail in the impugned order and hence we are not repeating the same here except where necessary.

4. One B. Chandrasekhara Reddy, the predecessor of the respondents herein filed suit no.23 of 1992 before the Subordinate Judge, Gooty against the appellant herein for recovery of an amount of Rs.26,720/- being the principal amount and interest due on a pronote dated 3.4.1991 executed by the appellant herein for Rs.24,000/- payable with interest at 12% per annum. That suit was decreed ex-parte by the learned Subordinate Judge, Gooty on 10.2.1995 and the plaintiff-

respondent filed an Execution Petition for realization of the decretal amount by sale of the immovable property of the appellant. On 15.9.1997 the sale was held in favour of the respondents herein. It is alleged that the property was worth of Rs.15 lacs but was sold for Rs.3,15,000/- to realize the decretal amount of Rs.40,364/-.

5. The appellant herein filed an application under Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. to set aside the sale of property. That application was dismissed by the trial court. A Civil Revision Petition No.1423 of 1998 was filed by the appellant in the High Court against that order. The High Court by order dated 10.04.1998 gave an opportunity to the judgment debtor to pay the decretal amount.

6. It is alleged that on 16.4.1998 in pursuance of the High Court order dated 10.4.1998 the appellant herein deposited the decretal amount. However, on 22.7.1998 the Executing Court dismissed the application to set aside the sale of the property in question. Against that order a Civil Revision was filed and on 9.10.1998 the High Court allowed the Civil Revision Petition No.3957 of 1998 and remanded the matter to the trial court for fresh disposal. Thereafter on 2.11.2001 the application of the appellant was allowed and the sale was set aside with a direction to the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.18,000/-. That order has been set aside by the impugned order of the High Court and hence this appeal.

8. In our opinion the High Court was not justified in interfering in a Civil Revision Petition under Section 115 C.P.C. when the amount of Rs. 18,000/- was deposited on 06.11.2001 as per order dated 02.11.2001.

9. For the reasons given above this appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside.

April 04, 2011
Local Administration Department & Anr vs M. Selvanayagam @ Kumaravelu

2. The respondent's father Meenakshisundaram worked as a Watchman in Karaikal Municipality. He died on November 22, 1988, after putting in 4 years 3 months and 25 days of service. He left behind a widowed wife and two sons, including the respondent who was 11 years old at that time. The wife of the deceased, whose age at the time of the death of her husband was 39 years, did not make any request for her appointment on compassionate grounds.

3. After about five and a half years of his father's death, the respondent passed the S.S.L.C. examination in April, 1993. And then, for the first time on July, 29, 1993, the respondent's mother made an application for his appointment on compassionate grounds. No action was possible on this application since the respondent was still a minor. Later on, another application was made for his appointment on compassionate grounds after 7 3 years and 6 months of the death of his father.

Failing to get a favourable response to his application, he filed a Writ Petition before the High Court seeking appropriate directions to the concerned authorities. That Writ Petition was disposed of by a single Judge of the High Court with a direction to the authorities to consider his claim for appointment on compassionate grounds afresh and pass an order on his application within four months from the date of receipt of that order.

Against the order passed by the single Judge, he filed an intra-court appeal which was allowed by judgment and order dated April 30, 2004, and the Municipality was given the direction to appoint the respondent within three months from the date of the order.

10. In light of the discussions made above, we find the impugned order of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court unsustainable in law. It is set aside and the appeal is allowed but with no order as to costs.

April 5, 2011.
Shanta Talwar & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors

3. For the sake of brevity and convenience we propose to take the facts of the case in the Writ Petitions filed by Pawan Singh & Ors.; Shanta Talwar and Diwan Chand challenging the acquisition proceedings of their lands for the construction of Prem Nagar Station, which is a part of Mass Rapid Transit System [for short `MRTS'], which is a project undertaken by the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation [for short `DMRC']. The aforesaid land was sought to be acquired by issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [for short `the LA Act'] on 2 16.10.2003, but by the aforesaid notification, urgency provision under Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) of the LA Act was also invoked dispensing with the enquiry inviting objections under Section 5-A of the LA Act, which was followed by issuance of Declaration under Section 6 and notice under Section 9 on 11.11.2003. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the possession of the land was also taken by the DMRC on 24.12.2003 and thereafter construction of the metro station was started, which also stand completed as of now. An award was passed in respect of the aforesaid land by the Land Acquisition Collector on 17.09.2004. Smt. Shanta Talwar and other appellants received the compensation as fixed by the Collector.

3200/08 and 3199/08, respectively. The said cases involved lands which were acquired by issuing a notification dated 10.08.2007 under Section 4 of the LA Act. Declaration was also issued in the said cases under Section 6 by issuing a notification on 01.11.2007 followed by the notice under Section 9 issued on 01.11.2007. Not only possession of the said land was taken but also award was passed on 30.10.2010. The records disclose that some of the appellants in the said cases have also received the compensation.

If any of the appellants has not filed any such application in the format prescribed, it shall be open to such appellants also to file such applications in appropriate format within three weeks from the date of this order, in which case, their applications shall also be considered along with the applications already filed by the other applicants/appellants and a decision thereon shall be taken within eight weeks from the date of receipt of such applications. Needless to say that in case, any of the appellants is aggrieved by the decisions taken by DMRC or by the other competent authority, such a decision 20 could be challenged by taking recourse to appropriate remedy as provided for under the law.

27. With aforesaid observations and directions we, find no merit in these appeals which are dismissed but giving right to the appellants herein to take recourse for their rehabilitation in terms of the circular issued by the Government of NCT of Delhi, leaving it open to the competent authority / Government to decide their cases in accordance with law.

...........................................J [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma ] ...........................................J [ Anil R. Dave ] New Delhi, April 5, 2011 21 *****
Pepsico India Holdings Ltd vs Commissioner Of Trade Tax,Lucknow

6. The High Court and the other forums below, for the reasons mentioned therein, have held that the appellant is liable to pay interest on the delayed payment of tax under section 8 (1) of the Act (i.e. @ 2 % per mensem from the date of filing of returns). Whereas, it is the appellants case that the interest is payable as per section 8 (1B) of the Act (i.e. @ 1.5 % per mensum from the expiration of the date mentioned in the assessment order which in the present case is March 15, 2002).

7. As a short question is involved we need not mention the facts of the case in great detail. In brief the facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are that the appellant is engaged in the manufacturing and selling of the beverages and is having bottling plants in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The dispute pertains to the trade tax payable on its turnover of Rupees 8.54 crores in respect of rentals by distributors of glass bottles and crates for 4 assessment year 1999-2000. The appellant disputed the liability to pay tax on such turnover as well as the interest, as according to them no tax is payable on the rental of glass bottles and crates as the same did not amount to a transfer of right to use the goods for value or consideration under section 3-F of the Act. However, the said submission was negated by the first and second appellate authority as well as, on revision, by the High Court. As mentioned hereinabove, the challenge to the liability to pay tax was dropped by the appellant in the light of the judgment passed by this Hon'ble court in Asiatic Gases Ltd. case (supra).

18.Accordingly, the present appeal dismissed but without any orders as to costs.
Ram Das vs State Of M.P

1. At about 8:30a.m. on 19th July, 1990 Raju PW-1 and his father Nand Ram hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased' were in their field guarding their crop, when the appellant Ram Das arrived at that place carrying an axe. He quarreled with the deceased asking him as to why he had dismantled a part of the mound in his field. This led to an altercation between them whereupon the appellant picked up a stone from his field and hit the deceased on his chest and when he fell down caused him 7/8 injuries with the axe which he was already carrying. On the cries raised by Raju, PW-1, Ratanlal and Tansi Pws- 2 and 3 also arrived at the spot whereafter the appellant ran away towards the village. The trial court on an examination of the evidence of Pws - 1, 2 and 3 observed that the evidence could not be believed as Crl.A. No. 817 of 2007 2 there were discrepancies inter se the witnesses. It also held that their evidence was not supported by the medical testimony inasmuch as there were only four injuries on the dead body whereas the witneses had stated them to be between 7 and 15 injuries. The trial court, accordingly, acquitted the accused. An appeal was thereafter taken by the State of Madhya Pradesh to the High Court and the High Court relying on the Pws - 1, 2 and 3 as also the medical evidence and finding that the judgment of the trial court was perverse and not possible on the evidence that had come before it, has reversed the judgment of the trial court insofar as the conviction was concerned but holding that there was no intention on the part of the appellant to cause death, as there was no pre-meditation and that it had happened in the course of a sudden quarrel, convicted him under Section 304 Part 2 of the IPC and sentenced him to 8 years rigorous imprisonment. This appeal by way of special leave is before us by the accused Ram Das.