L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
V.M.Satyanarayana vs The Supdt.Engr., Amrp Circle & Ors

2. The appellant's father who was working as a Senior Assistant in the Government of Andhra Pradesh, made an application on 3.2.2001 seeking permission to retire on medical invalidation as he was suffering from total blindness due to hypertension. On 22.3.2001, the Medical Board issued a certificate for medical invalidation. When the application was under

5. The appellant challenged his termination in OA No.5902 of 2003 before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the said application on 28.2.2006. The appellant challenged the order of the Tribunal in WP No.4983 of 2006. The High Court dismissed the said petition by order dated 17.3.2006 in view of the decision dated 12.10.2001 of the Full Bench in the case of D. Gopaiah (supra) The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

7. The appeal is therefore allowed. The judgment of the Tribunal dated 28.2.2006 and judgment of the High Court dated 8.3.2006 are set aside. The OA filed by the appellant before the Tribunal is allowed and the termination of the appellant's service by letter dated 1.9.2003 is set aside. As a consequence, the appellant shall be reinstated in service. On the facts and circumstances, though the appellant will be entitled to continuity of service and notional increments, he will not be entitled to any salary for the period he has not worked.
Malwa Cotton & Spinning Mills Ltd vs Virsa Singh Sidhu & Ors

3. The present appeals relate to Criminal Miscellaneous No.52153 of 2002 and connected cases. The High Court quashed the proceedings primarily on the ground that respondent No.1-Virsa Singh Sidhu in the first case had resigned from the Directorship before the cheques were issued. The other petitions were allowed on the ground that there were some general allegations that all Directors were responsible.

11. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings so far as respondent No.1 in the first case is concerned. The appeal is allowed.

12. In view of the order passed in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6049/2005, where details have been indicated, other appeals are deserved to be allowed. The impugned order of the High Court in each case is set aside.
Grid Cropration Of Orissa Ltd vs Gajendra Haldea & Ors

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

(d) Direct GRIDCO not to invite bids with the intent of selling electricity in the course of inter-state trade with a margin exceeding 4 paisa per unit.

7. Civil Appeal No.185/2007 has been filed by PTC India Ltd and the challenge is to the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 16.11.2006. Here again, the Appellate Tribunal held that the transaction of sale of surplus energy by GRIDCO to PTC was in the nature of inter-state trade attracting Regulation 2 of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Fixation of Trading Margin) Regulations, 2006 (in short `Trading Regulations'). PTC being an inter-state trader could not sell electricity purchased from GRIDCO in Orissa. Allowing electricity traders to sell electricity at unregulated price without fixing trading margins will have baneful effect on the development of the power sector. The aforesaid findings of the Appellate Tribunal are questioned in this appeal.

21. In that view of the matter, looked at from any angle the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal cannot be maintained and is set aside.

22. In view of the order passed in Civil Appeal No.5722 of 2006, other Civil Appeals are allowed, and in view of the said order passed, no separate orders are necessary to be passed in IAs and they are rejected, and SLP (C) No.11629 of 2007 filed by Haryana Power Generation Corporation Ltd. is dismissed. Costs made easy.
M/S. Sandur Micro Circuits Ltd vs C.C.E, Belgaum

2. In all these appeals common questions are involved and are directed against the judgment and final order passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (in short the `Tribunal). Since in appeals filed by the appellants common question of law is involved, there is no need to elaborately deal with the factual aspects. Question is the effect of a circular issued by Central Board of Excise and Custom (in short the `Board') i.e. Circular No. 42 of 1997 dated 19.9.1997. The CESTAT held that the Notification No. 2/95-CE dated 4.1.1995 as amended by Notifications Nos. 21/97-CE dated 11.4.1997, 100/95-CE dated 2.6.1995 and 7/96-CE dated 1.7.1996 shall have overriding effect over the Circular. It held that there is no manner of doubt that the appellant's claim of liability to pay 50% of the aggregated customs duty on the goods cleared to the Domestic Tariff Area (in short the `DTA') is not legally tenable. It was held that the Circular was in direct conflict with the Notification No. 2/95. 2

6. The appeals fail and are dismissed.
Swaran Singh & Ors vs State Tr.Standing Council & Anr

4. Appellant No. 1 Swaran Singh is the husband of appellant No. 2, Smt. Simran Kaur and father of appellant No. 3, Ms. Tarjeet. They reside on the first floor of the premises M-39, Greater Kailash-II, New Delhi. The ground floor of the said premises was occupied by one Shri Umesh Gupta, a businessman.

5. It appears that an FIR at Police Station C.R. Park, New Delhi was filed against the appellants by one Vinod Nagar. The FIR read as follows :

6. On the basis of the said FIR investigation was done and a charge-sheet dated 14.6.2005 was filed against the appellants under 4 section 3(1)(x) of The Scheduled Castes and The Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

7. Thereafter, by the order dated 14.3.2006 charges were framed against the appellants. Against the order of framing charges Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 285-287 of 2006 were filed in the Delhi High Court which were dismissed by the impugned judgment. Hence, this appeal by Special Leave.

10. It is also alleged in the FIR that Smt. Simran Kaur and her dauther Ms. Tarjeet threw dirty water on the first informant and said `Chuda-Chamar why did you come...'.

Shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine."

26. Of course, it will be open to the appellants 2 and 3 to put up their defence at the trial, and the trial court may or may not accept the correctness of the allegations in the FIR. However, at this stage we cannot quash the FIR against them and the trial must proceed.

35. The High Court in the impugned judgment has observed (in paragraph 16) that the question whether the appellants indeed uttered the offending words with intention to humiliate the 20 complainant, are matters of evidence. We fully agree with this view. Hence, we find no merit in the appeals of appellants 2 and 3, and they are accordingly dismissed. However, the appeal of appellant No.1 is allowed, and the proceedings against him are quashed. There will be no order as to costs.

August 18, 2008
Supintd. Of Police,Karnataka L. & Anr vs B. Srinivas

4. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

From the materials placed before me with the application of my mind I am satisfied that a prima facie case is made against Sri B. Srinivas U/s 13(1)(e) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

14. The inevitable conclusion is that the order passed by the High Court is indefensible and is set aside. However, it would be in the interest of justice if the trial is completed on the basis of the charge sheet filed as early as practicable preferably by the end of February, 2009.

15. The appeal is allowed.
Punjab State Electricity Board vs M/S. Siel Ltd. & Ors

2. The High Court held that the Commission had not addressed itself to the relevant parameters and, therefore, the order suffers from infirmities. The matter was remitted to the Commission to decide the issues afresh keeping in view the observations made and after eliciting the appropriate information from the appellant-Punjab State Electricity Board (in short the `Board') wherever it has been found the deficient on the part of the Board. Stress in these appeals, essentially is focused on various conclusions on specific issues.

3. The dispute relates to the period from 1.8.2002 to 31.7.2003. The annual cost requirement as per the Board was Rs.7,437.78 crores while the Commission allowed Rs.6,341.14 crores. The challenge was essentially by industrial consumers 2 before the High Court. The dispute as noted above relate to (i) estimation of agricultural consumption and transmission and distribution loss (in short `T&D Loss'), (ii) energy input and coal transportation, (iii) manpower requirement, (iv) investment and rate of return.

9. The Commission is primarily concerned with determining the annual revenue requirement (in short `ARR'). The Commission designs the tariff and by rationalizing the same is 5 sent to the Government which takes a decision annually as to the quantum of subsidy and the class of beneficiaries. Thereafter, the Commission finalises the tariff.

18. We make it clear that actual expenditure has to be the basis and not the hypothetical ideal situation. Ideal situation is essentially contemplation of the future. Additionally, the computation of input is the actual cost on the basis of per unit.

19. Since the High Court's approach is not correct and analysis was not done in the correct prospective, we set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to the Commission to examine the matter afresh keeping in view the parameters of 2003 Act in the light of what has been stated above on specific issues.

20. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Namdeo vs Tukaram

2. The appellant's prayer in the suit was to restrain the respondent from interfering with his possession of agricultural field S.No.131/2 of Ridhora village measuring 4 acres. The suit was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 31.7.2000. The appellant filed an appeal before the District Judge, Akola. During the pendency of the said first appeal before the District Judge, the appellant filed two applications. One application was for amendment of plaint, under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC. The second application was under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC to accept the certified copies of revenue extracts relating to the suit land as additional evidence.

documents had been accepted as evidence. Order 41 Rule 27 CPC contemplates that wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by the appellate Court, the court should record reasons for its admission. We find that the first appellate Court did not reject the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, nor did it assign any reasons while recording that only production of the documents was allowed. We are of the view that the procedure adopted was incorrect. The first appellate Court ought to have passed an order in respect of the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, either allowing or rejecting the application. The first appellate Court has considered the application as if it was one under Order 13 Rule 1 CPC and not under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. The High Court ought to have therefore interfered in the matter by raising an appropriate question of law. It failed to do so. The judgments, therefore, call for interference.

5. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and first appellate Court and remand the matter to the first appellate Court with a direction to consider and dispose of the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC in accordance with law and then decide the first appeal.
Leelabai Gajanan Pansare & Ors vs Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd.& Ors

4. For the sake of convenience we may state the facts of the case in SLP (C) No. 5855/07 in the case of Leelabai Gajanan Pansare & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors.

5. Appellants-landlords had let out the suit-premises admeasuring 3214 sq. ft. (approx.) in Thane to Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ("OIC" for short). The rent was Rs. 10,000/- per month. Vide notice dated 15.4.2002 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, appellant terminated the tenancy of the said Company. On failure of OIC to vacate the premises, they instituted a suit for eviction. OIC took the plea that it is not covered under Section 3(1)(b) of the Rent Act as it was "a protected tenant" under the said Rent Act, 1999 and, therefore, could not be evicted. In the said suit, the landlord pleaded that OIC is a Public Sector Undertaking and/or Corporation having a total paid up share capital of more than Rs. 1,00,00,000.

and on registration shall enjoy all the privileges, and (subject to the provisions of this section) be subject to all the obligations, of limited companies.

xxx

50. Accordingly, civil appeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 5855/07 and 16237/08 filed by Smt. Leelabai Gajanan Pansare & Ors. and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd. respectively are allowed with no order as to costs.

Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 24789-24790/07:

51. Leave granted.

54. Today, vide civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 5855/07 we have set aside the Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 20.12.2006 in the case of Smt. Leela Gajanan Pansare v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd..

55. Accordingly, we dismiss these civil appeals filed by BPCL for the reasons contained in our judgment in the case of Smt. Leela Gajanan Pansare v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) with no order as to costs.

56. Since Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. are liable to be evicted, decree against them for eviction shall not be executed for a period 7 2 of one year commencing from the date of this judgment on their giving undertaking in the usual form within a period of four weeks.

August 20, 2008.
Raman vs State Of Kerala

3. Brief facts, which led to the trial of the accused, are as follows:

5. The trial court found a prima facie case against the appellant and, accordingly, charged him for the murder of Unnikrishnan. During trial of the case, the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses. The appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure denied his involvement in the commission of the crime. He pleaded that on the day of occurrence when he was going to his house, the deceased took quarrel with him and it was PW-6 who intervened and separated them. He stated that Unnikrishnan came back from his house to the place of occurrence and he was holding a knife in his hand and suddenly held his neck. A scuffle ensued between them, in which the knife accidentally struck into the abdomen of the 5 deceased. He pleaded that due to fear he ran away from the scene of occurrence.

7. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal before the High Court, which came to be dismissed by a Division Bench. Hence, the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave questioning the correctness and legality of the judgment of the High Court.

12. In the result, for the afore-said reasons, this appeal is partly allowed to the extent of holding the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part-I, IPC, and imposing the aforesaid sentence upon him. The judgment and order of the High Court confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- shall stand modified to the extent indicated hereinabove.
Rangnath Sharma vs Satendra Sharma & Ors

Consequently, trial was held, during the course of which prosecution examined ten witnesses in support of their case. According to the prosecution, PWs 4 (Sahjanand Sharma), 5 (Sidhnath Sharma) and 6 4 (Kaushal Kishore Sharma) are eye witnesses. PW 7 - Rangnath Sharma is the informant and also an eye witness. On completion of the trial, on the basis of the evidence recorded, the trial court found the accused guilty under the above-mentioned charges and convicted and sentenced them as indicated hereinabove.

Aggrieved by the said judgment and order of the Trial Court the respondents preferred appeals before the High Court. The said appeals were allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court against which the present appeals are filed by the complainant. In the present appeals the order of acquittal has been challenged. The appeals were listed before us for final hearing on which we heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.

So far as Pankaj Sharma and Ramakant Sharma are concerned they were also instrumental in bringing the deceased from his house in the company of Satendra Sharma to the place of occurrence with the common intention. As per the F.I.R and in their depositions during trial PWs 4, 6 and 7 specifically mentioned that they saw the said two accused holding the deceased which made it possible for Satendra Sharma to fire gun shot injury on the deceased. In Israr v. State of U.P., [(2005) 9 SCC 616], wherein one of us (Dr. Arijit Pasayat) was the member, it was held that a person who was holding the deceased and restraining his movements, enabling the co- accused to inflict the knife-blows causing the death of the deceased was rightly convicted under Section 302 with the aid of S. 34 IPC. Having thus independently considered the facts and circumstances in their totality and taking holistic view of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has been able to establish that Pankaj Sharma and Ramakant Sharma shared a common intention with accused Satendra Sharma and therefore, by virtue of section 34 IPC they are liable for the same offence. 16

14.In the background of what has been stated above, we set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court. The accused-respondents shall surrender to custody to serve out the remaining sentence, failing which appropriate steps be taken for their arrest. There bail bonds stand cancelled.

15.The appeals are, therefore, allowed.
Iqbal Singh vs State Of Punjab

3. Background facts giving rise to the trial are essentially as follows:

4. Trial court took note of the fact that the appellants and the members of the complainant party are related to each other closely. The dispute arose because of conflicting claims as to the ownership of the land. It was submitted 5 that the occurrence took place when the members of the complainant party came forward and obstructed the appellant from doing the work and restrained them from pulling out the pipe. There was exchange of hot words and in the process, the occurrence, according to the prosecution, took place. In essence it was submitted that the accused were exercising the right of private defence or in the alternative the occurrence took place in the course of a sudden quarrel and therefore Section 302 IPC has no application.

6. Before the High Court it was submitted that the factual scenario has not been correctly appreciated by the trial court. The plea relating to non-applicability of Section 302 IPC was reiterated. The High Court did not find any substance. It noted that the appellants pulled out the iron 6 and plastic pipes which were installed on the land jointly owned by both the parties. Since the accused persons pulled out the pipes it was natural that the members of the complainant party who were standing at a distance of 16 to 35 feets from the appellants intervened and asked them not to pull out the pipes unless the elders take a decision. The appellants did not pay any heed. That being so the case at hand was covered by Section 302 IPC.

13. From the background facts as considered in the light of the evidence, the inevitable conclusion is that the occurrence took place in course of sudden quarrel, therefore, Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC applies. The appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part-I IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.

14. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent.

.......................................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi, August 21, 2008 11
Ram Niwas vs Raj Dulari & Ors

An appeal was preferred thereagainst. The First Appellate Court, however, allowed the said appeal and decreed the suit filed by the appellant.

Unfortunately, the High Court did not comply with the said legal requirement. As the impugned judgment does not satisfy the legal requirement, we have no other option but to set aside the same. The Second Appeal is -2- allowed and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the matter afresh. The High Court, if any objection is taken, will determine as to whether the substantial questions of law formulated on 14.3.1985 really raise any substantial question of law or not. It would, however, be open to the High Court to formulate any other substantial question of law. As the Second Appeal is of the year 1984, we would request the High Court to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order.

The appeal is allowed.
Ram Pyare Mishra vs Prem Shanker & Ors

2. Background facts as projected by prosecution in a nutshell are as follows:

Injured Ramakant Mishra was, however, interrogated on 13.7.1978 and after completing the investigation charge sheet Ex. Ka 15 was submitted against both the accused persons. 4 Dr. Vermpal conducted autopsy on the dead body of Mohan Mishra on 12-7-78 at 12 noon and following ante mortem injuries were found.

2. Incised wound l" x 1/4" x muscle deep on middle of left arm margins clean gaping present, blood clots present.

3. Punctured wound 1-1/4'' x 1/2" x chest cavity deep on right side chest 1" outer to mid line chest and 4" away and above to right nipple, lying vertically, margins clean cut gaping present, blood clots present.

In the internal examination pleura was found congested and cut underneath injury No.3, Right lung had also a cut Mark 3/4" x 1/2" pulmonary vessels had also been cut. The chest cavity 5 contained fresh blood about 520 ml. Stomach was empty while large intestines contained gases and faecal matter. In the opinion of the doctor death was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of ante mortem injuries. The postmortem report is Ex.Ka.4.

The motive for assaulting Mohan Mishra as alleged in the first information report was that on 10-7-78 Prem Shanker had made an attempt to have carnal intercourse with Rakesh, son of deceased and Rakesh told this fact to his father. Deceased accosted accused Prem Shanker whereupon the latter threatened him with dire consequences.

17. The basic question which was to be considered by the High Court was that even if the right of private defence was exercised, whether that was exceeded. In the instant case, the evidence clearly shows that though there may be at some point of time the exercise of right of private defence by the respondents existed, the same has been exceeded. The respondents are therefore convicted of offence punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC. Custodial sentence of 8 years would meet the ends of justice. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. The respondents who are on bail shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence.