L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Central Bank Of India vs Jagbir Singh

3. Brief facts of the case, giving rise to this appeal, are that respondent Jagbir Singh purchased a tractor bearing registration No. HR-14B-3913, after getting loan sanctioned from the appellant-Bank. In terms of conditions of loan the respondent was making deposits of the loan instalments of loan to the Bank. The vehicle was initially insured as required under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but no premium of insurance was paid by the respondent for the period after 25.5.2005. On 24.9.2007 at about 11.50 a.m., an accident occurred between the above vehicle and motorcycle bearing registration No. DL-3S-AY-0421, in which Pankaj son of Babu Ram Garg, died due to rash and negligent driving on the part of Diwan Singh, driver of the tractor owned by respondent Jagbir Singh. The parents of the deceased filed claim petition No. 208/11/2007 before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, which was allowed by said Tribunal, vide its order dated 17.11.2012 awarding compensation to the tune of Rs.4,01,460/- with 7.5% interest per annum, against driver and owner of the vehicle. It has not been disputed between the parties that on the date of accident the vehicle No. HR-14B-3913 was not insured with any of the insurance companies, as required under Section 146 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

4. The respondent filed complaint (No. 157 of 208) before District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Jhajjar, praying that the Central Bank of India (appellant), i.e., the creditor bank should be made liable to pay the compensation, awarded against him by the Tribunal. The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, vide its order dated 11.11.2009, held that the Bank (present appellant) is liable for the legal consequences for not getting the insurance renewed. The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Haryana, Panchkula, before whom the Central Bank of India (creditor bank) filed First Appeal No. 40 of 2010, vide its order dated 18.10.2012, dismissing the appeal on the ground that in terms of loan agreement the Bank has a right to recover insurance premium, held that the Bank cannot escape its liability. It appears that the Bank finally approached NCDRC by filing Revision Petition No. 3648 of 2013, but same was filed with delay of 230 days, and NCDRC in its wisdom did not find the explanation advanced for condonation of delay as sufficient, as such, the revision petition was dismissed as barred by limitation. Hence, this appeal through special leave.

9. In view of the above discussion and the principle of law laid down by this Court, the impugned order passed by the NCDRC and the orders passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Haryana and the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Jhajjar, are liable to be set aside.

10. Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the impugned order and the order passed by the authorities under Consumer Protection Act, 1986, in the present case, are set aside. No order as to costs.
H. Lakshmaiah Reddy & Ors vs L. Venkatesh Reddy

A common written statement was filed by the defendant stating that the suit property was purchased in the name of Guramma under registered sale deed dated 14.11.1959 and sale consideration was paid by the first defendant and after the death of Guramma, the first defendant married Jayamma in 1973 and defendants 2 to 5 were born out of the wedlock and the plaintiff as well as the first defendant being the legal heirs of Guramma had succeeded to the suit property and the first defendant gifted a portion of suit property measuring 5 acres in favour of defendants 2 to 5 by registered gift deed dated 12.12.2003 and the suit is liable for dismissal. The trial court framed seven issues and after consideration of oral and documentary evidence dismissed the suit. On the appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the lower appellate court held that the plaintiff and the first defendant being class-I heirs of deceased Guramma are entitled to half share each in the suit property and decreed the suit in part. Challenging the same the plaintiff preferred second appeal and the High Court allowed the same by setting aside the judgment of the lower appellate court and decreed the suit in full as prayed for. Aggrieved by the same the defendants have preferred the present appeals. For the sake of convenience, the parties are described in this judgment as arrayed in the suit.

In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in concluding that the 1st defendant by his conduct had acquiesced and divested himself of title of his half share in suit property and the said erroneous conclusion is liable to be set aside.

11. We are not in a position to appreciate this contention. The High Court misdirected itself and committed serious error warranting our interference with the impugned judgment.

12. In the result the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is restored and the appeals are allowed in the above terms. No costs.

Civil Appeal No(s)............../2015 @ SLP (C) Nos. 3377-3378/2011 H. LAKSHMAIAH REDDY & ORS. Appellant(s) VERSUS L. VENKATESH REDDY Respondent(s) Date : 17/04/2015 These matters were called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Rajesh Mahale,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. P. R. Ramasesh,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda and His Lordship.

Leave granted.

The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed Reportable Judgment.

(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
Makhan Singh vs State Of Haryana

3. Briefly stated case of prosecution is that on 27.07.1994, the police officials during patrolling, when talking with one Manjeet Singh-PW1 and Gamdur Singh-DW2, saw the suspicious 'fitter-rehra' (a vehicle) driven by the appellant. Police intercepted the vehicle and questioned the appellant about his whereabouts, and found some dubious bags lying in the vehicle. Before searching the bags, police intimated to the appellant that instead of being searched by police whether he wishes to be searched by a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and the appellant declined to be searched by them and a consent memo (Ext.PA) was drawn. Then, the police in the presence of independent witnesses, i.e. Manjeet Singh and Gamdur Singh, conducted the search and during the search, three bags containing commercial quantity of poppy husk (120 kgms.) were recovered from the appellant's vehicle. Police seized the bags, took sample of 200 grams from each of the bag and sealed them separately, and then sealed the remaining quantity in separate parcels and deposited the same with MHC. The sealed samples were sent to Chemical Examiner, who vide his report (Ext. PK) found the samples to be 'Powdered Poppy Husk'. On completion of investigation, police laid the chargesheet against the appellant under Section 15 of NDPS Act.

18. The conviction of the appellant and the sentence imposed on him is set aside and this appeal is allowed. Fine amount of Rs.1,00,000/-, if paid, is ordered to be refunded to the appellant. The appellant is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other case.

April 21, 2015.
M/S. Cochin Port Trust vs State Of Kerala

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order(s), the assessee had preferred T.A. No. 479 of 1998 for the assessment year 1990-91 before the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short, “the Tribunal”). The assessee had contended that in the instant case the assessee-Trust is a statutory body merely discharging its functions of rendering port activities and not engaged in any trading activity or “business”. The transactions herein are merely causal and incidental sale transactions which only attract sales tax if the registered dealer is otherwise carrying on business under the Act, which is not the case herein and therefore, the assessee cannot be classified as a “dealer” under Section 2(viii) of the Act. Reliance was placed by the assessee on the dictum of this Court in State of T.N. v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Madras, (1999) 4 SCC 630 (Madras Port Trust case). By the order dated 24.09.2001, the Tribunal rejected the aforesaid stand adopted by the assessee and held that the assessee is a “dealer” engaged in activities of sale under the Act and thus, exigible to sales tax.

We are of the considered opinion that the High Court has not committed any error, whatsoever, and therefore, the civil appeal being devoid of any merit requires to be dismissed.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the judgment and order passed by the High Court is confirmed. No costs.

Ordered accordingly.
Commnr.,Customs & Cent.Excise ... vs M/S. Roofit Industries Ltd

2) It is the case of the Revenue that on the basis of general intelligence collected, respondent/assessee was indulging in evasion of central excise duty by not computing the assessable value of finished goods properly to the extent that it was deducting the amount of freight, insurance and unloading charges from the price excisable goods though the place of removal of finished goods was different from the factory gate. The preventive party visited the factory premises of the assessee on 25.03.2000, conducted enquiries and resumed the records for further scrutiny. After scrutiny of various records and documents, it was revealed that the assessee had received work orders from various Government authorities and private contractors and the agreements entered into by the assessee with the above mentioned parties were for designing, manufacturing, providing at site, laying, jointing and testing of PSC pipes of specified sizes. The agreement entered, therefore, entailed upon the assessee, for delivery of the finished goods and not at the factory gate. It was found that no sale took place till the goods reached the test of the projects.

3) A show cause notice dated 02.11.2011 was issued as to why the differential central excise duty amounting to Rs.43,56,318/- for the period of 01.01.1996 to 30.06.2000 should not be recovered from them under proviso to Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act read with Rule 9(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1994 and why penalty under Section 11AC and interest under Section 11AB should not be imposed. The assessee replied and was given personal hearing. Learned Adjudicating authority vide its order in original confirmed the demand to extent of Rs.36,16,318/- on account of under valuation and on the ground that place of removal finished goods was the buyer's premises and not at the factory gate.

16) As a result, order of the CESTAT is set aside and present appeal is allowed restoring the order passed by the Adjudicating authority.

APRIL 23, 2015.
Fatehji & Company & Anr vs L.M. Nagpal & Ors

Briefly the facts are as follows : The perpetual lease hold right in respect of the suit land as vacant plot was granted in favour of original lessee Col. A.N. Kapur by registered lease deed dated 16.4.1962 by the Government of India and he built two storied building with barsati and he sold his rights in the said property to the first defendant-Firm by registered sale deed dated 6.5.1963. The first defendant entered into a written agreement of sale dated 2.7.1973 in respect of the suit property with Smt. Ram Pyari. As per the terms of the agreement the possession of the suit property including the building was handed over to Smt. Ram Pyari Nagpal on the date of agreement itself. The date for execution of the sale deed was fixed for 2.12.1973. Extension of time for execution of sale deed on the plea of obtaining permission to sell the property from the lessor was sought by the defendants by way of letters and the last of such extension was sought for six months w.e.f. August 1976. The sons of second defendant in July 1985 filed a suit seeking for declaration that the suit property is joint family property and the sale made by defendants in favour of plaintiffs be declared as null and void, was filed against defendants 2, 3 and the plaintiffs and on contest the same was dismissed on 5.4.1989. According to the plaintiffs the final cause of action accrued and arose after August 1991 when the defendants began hiding themselves and avoiding the plaintiffs and they filed the suit on 29.4.1994 seeking for a decree for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 2.7.1973 against the defendants.

8. Yet another circumstance was pointed out to prove the laches on the part of the plaintiffs. The sons of the second defendant filed a suit in July 1985 against defendants 2, 3 and the plaintiffs seeking for declaration that the present suit property is their ancestral joint family property and the sale made by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs be declared as null and void. The plaintiffs herein contested the said suit and it came to be dismissed on 5.4.1989. The suit for specific performance was not filed within three years from the said date also.

10. We are of the view that the High Court committed manifest error in reversing the well considered order of the Trial Court rejecting the plaint as barred by the law of limitation and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Trial Court is restored. No costs.

April 24, 2015
Vinod Kumar Subbiah vs Saraswathi Palaniappan

2 The Appellant and the Respondent were married on 28.6.2004 and moved to the U.S. on 9.7.2004. They visited Chennai in October 2005 and June 2006. During the latter visit, the Respondent was three months pregnant and left for her parental home in Madurai on 10.6.2006 where she gave birth to a male child on 5.12.2006. The Appellant subsequently filed for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act on 30.4.2007.

3 The case put forward by the Appellant is that the Respondent was verbally abusive; she would insult his family; she would threaten to lodge false police complaints; and she would threaten to commit suicide placing the blame on the Appellant and his family. After she left for her parental home in June 2006, the Appellant attempted to bring her back to her matrimonial home but she refused. The Appellant claims that he has been put through intolerable mental agony and can no longer continue to be married to the Respondent.

4 The Respondent denied these allegations and claimed that she and the Appellant lived happily in the U.S., and she only went to her parental home in June 2006 for her child to be born there. She has pleaded that she returned to Chennai with her child from March to April 2007, that the divorce petition was completely unexpected and was the result of a misunderstanding between her family and that of the Appellant. She subsequently filed a petition seeking restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, praying that the Appellant be directed to take her back to her conjugal home, which she pleaded is in the U.S. She alleged that her husband is living a wayward life, that her father-in- law misbehaved with her, and that her parents-in-law were negligent with her infant child and asked her to leave the house when she questioned them about this. She also filed a maintenance petition seeking Rs. 2 lakhs per month as maintenance.

8 We thus allow these Appeals and set aside the Impugned Order, but desist from imposing costs. The Trial Court’s decision granting dissolution of the marriage between the parties is hereby restored.

9 We allow the Respondent’s Application for disbursement of the amount deposited by the Appellant towards her legal expenses in pursuance of the Order dated 4.7.2013.

April 24, 2015.
Golbar Hussain & Ors vs State Of Assam & Anr

2. The brief facts of the case, as per the prosecution story, are that on 5.1.2001 at about 6:10 p.m. at Chapra Beparipara which is under Chapar Police Station, the accused persons formed an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of the common object of such assembly, committed the murder of Hasen Ali. Amir Hussain, son of the deceased (PW-3) lodged an Ejahar about the incident at Chapar Police Station on 5.1.2001 at about 10:00 p.m. On receipt of the Ejahar, F.I.R. No.3/2001 was registered by Chapar Police Station and started investigation. The police arrived at the place of occurrence and called the Executive Magistrate who prepared the inquest on the dead body and the inquest was sent for post-mortem examination to Dhubri Civil Hospital. The police found one bag containing one dagger and two hand-made bombs lying near the dead body. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341 and 302 of the IPC. On 29.6.2001, the said charge-sheet was received by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri. Since the offence was triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the Chief Judicial Magistrate by his order dated 15.3.2002 committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. During the course of trial the prosecution examined 10 witnesses to bring home the charges levelled against the appellants. The defense adduced no evidence and took a plea of total denial.

10. Therefore, in the light of the above conclusions on the issues for consideration, the view taken by the Trial Court was reasonable and probable on the facts of the present case. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court should not have set aside the acquittal of the appellants. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside. The appellants are accordingly directed to be set free from incarceration, if not required in any other case.

….....….……………………J (Pinaki Chandra Ghose) ….....…..…………………..J (R.K. Agrawal) New Delhi;

April 28, 2015.
M/S. Escorts Ltd vs Commnr. Of Central Excise, Faridabad

1. The present case raises an interesting question as to whether excise duty is payable on an intermediate product, namely, Transmission Assembly which comes into existence during the manufacture of tractors made by the appellant. The period involved is January 1996 to May 1998. The tractors that are manufactured have engines that are below 1800 CC and are covered by an exemption notification 162/1986. We are informed, however, that after 1.6.1998 this exemption has gone and even tractors of an engine capacity of less than 1800 CC now have to bear excise duty.

2. By a show cause notice dated 31.1.2001, the Department for the period aforesaid relied upon evidence in the form of statements made by various officers of the appellant and other documentary evidence to show that Transmission Assemblies of tractors was a commodity known to the market as such and, therefore, came into the category of excisable goods. The respondent by their reply dated 1.10.2001 denied this stating that no separate product known as Transmission Assemblies came into existence which is known to the commercial community as such and, therefore, there was neither manufacture nor marketability of the same. In the reply, however, various statements were made which, in fact, amount to admissions, that Transmission Assembly of a tractor is, in fact, known to the market as such. These admissions are set out hereinbelow:

However, they have been supplying the transmission assembly to their own units at Nagpur and Rudhrapur for manufacturing tractors.

Civil Appeal Nos.9469-9470 of 2010

assemblies manufactured (as per Annexure-I and II), and used in the Tractors which are exempt for the period from April, 1997 to May, 1998.

22. In view of what is stated in Civil Appeal No.6561 of 2004, the part of the order in original and the CESTAT order on merits have to be set aside. However, for the self-same reasons as are contained in Civil Appeal No.6561 of 2004, we hold that the extended period of limitation is not available as we are satisfied that the reply extracted above of the respondent shows that the respondent bona fide believed that Transmission Assemblies were not dutiable. In the circumstances, the appeals of the revenue shall stand dismissed on this ground.

April 29, 2015.
Nicholas Piramal India Ltd vs Harisingh

For the purpose of considering the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties in this appeal and with a view to find out whether this Court is required to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, the necessary facts are briefly stated hereunder:

The Labour Court, on the basis of the rival legal and factual contentions urged on behalf of the parties, framed the following issues for its determination:-

The Labour Court after re-consideration of the case, has partly allowed the application of the respondent-workman and set aside the order of dismissal dated 30.7.2001 passed against the respondent-workman and the appellant-Company was directed to reinstate the respondent-workman in the service with 50% back wages. The Labour Court however, denied him the remaining 50% back wages, treating the same as penalty imposed upon him in place of the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority of the appellant-Company.

With reference to the aforesaid rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties and the evidence on record, we have carefully examined the following points to find out as to whether the impugned judgment and Award warrant interference in this appeal :-

For the reasons stated supra, we do not find any good reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and Awards of the High Court as well as the Appellate Court and the Labour Court. The appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. The order dated 28.8.2009 granting stay of the impugned order shall stand vacated.

Since, the matter has been pending before various courts for the last 14 years, we direct the appellant-Company to reinstate the workman within 4 weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment and compute 50% back wages payable to him from the date of his dismissal from the service till the date of passing of the Award, as per the periodical revision of the same and pay full salary from the date of the passing of the Award till the date of reinstatement.