L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Jile Singh vs State Of U.P.& Anr

2. A certain Bharat Lal Sharma was done to death on October 26, 2008. His father (respondent No. 2 herein) informed the Police Station Kosikalan on the next day, i.e., October 27, 2008 at 8 a.m. that he received an information in the morning at about 7 a.m. that his son Bharat Lal Sharma had been murdered and his dead body was lying in the agricultural field of Ghure son of Gaisi, 'Jat' resident of Tumaura. On receipt of this information, he (respondent No. 2 herein ) went to the spot and found that the body of his son was lying in blood. His son was killed with some sharp edged weapon the previous night. He requested the police to register First Information Report CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 121 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 3592 of 2011) 2 (FIR) against unknown accused persons and take appropriate action in the matter. On this information, an FIR was registered and investigation commenced. On conclusion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet naming one Hari Singh as an accused having committed the murder of Bharat Lal Sharma. On the basis of the material collected by the Investigating Officer, no case was found out against the present appellant-Jile Singh and the Investigating Officer concluded that the appellant has been falsely named in the course of investigation.

3. On May 2, 2009, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mathura, committed the accused-Hari Singh to the Court of Sessions Judge, Mathura for trial. It was then that the complainant-respondent No. 2 herein filed a private complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Code') in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Mathura, against the present appellant and one Jayveer Singh for the murder of his son Bharat Lal Sharma.

4. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mathura, after recording the statements under Section 202 of the Code, issued summons to the appellant on January 3, 2011. Aggrieved by that order, the appellant filed Criminal Revision before the Allahabad High Court which came to be CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 121 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 3592 of 2011) 3 dismissed on March 10, 2011. It is from this order that the present Appeal, by special leave, has arisen.

11. We, accordingly, allow this Appeal and set aside the order of the High Court dated March 10, 2011 impugned in this present Appeal and the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mathura, dated January 3, 2011.

12. Needless to say that in the course of trial, on the basis of the evidence if it appears to the Sessions Judge that any person not being the accused in the trial has committed the offence and the case is made out for exercise of power under Section 319 of the Code for proceeding against such person, it will be open to the Sessions Judge to proceed accordingly and the present order will not come in the way in exercise of his power under Section 319 of the Code.
J.Samuel & Ors vs Gattu Mhesh & Ors

22.08.1985, the Retired Diocesan Treasurer and Property Secretary, Karimnagar, issued a publication in the paper to auction the land bearing Survey No. 43, admeasuring Ac. 3.31 gts. situated at Mission Compound, Dharmapuri Road, Jagtial and the last date to receive the tenders was fixed as 05.09.1985. On 13.09.1985, the sealed tenders were opened and Gattu Mahesh-Respondent No. 1 herein and Kotha Mohan-Respondent No. 2 herein, Managing Partners in M/s Jagath Swapna & Co. put tenders for an amount of Rs. 24,55,569/- along with a DD for an amount of Rs.2,45,556/- which is 10% of the EMD. They being the highest bidders, their tenders were accepted.

After stiff resistance by the litigants and the members of the bar, again Order VI Rule 17 was re-introduced with proviso appended therein. As per the said proviso, no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced.

13) Due diligence is the idea that reasonable investigation is necessary before certain kinds of relief are requested. Duly diligent efforts are a requirement for a party seeking to use the adjudicatory mechanism to attain an anticipated relief. An advocate representing someone must engage in due diligence to determine that the representations made are factually accurate and sufficient. The term `Due diligence' is specifically used in the Code so as to provide a test for determining whether to exercise the discretion in situations of requested amendment after the commencement of trial.

17) In the light of the above discussion, we are in entire agreement with the conclusion arrived by the Trial Court and unable to accept the reasoning of the High Court. Accordingly, the order dated 08.02.2011 passed in Civil Revision Petition No. 5162 is set aside.

18) The civil appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

JANUARY 16, 2012.
Archaeological Survey Of India vs Narender Anand And Ors

(respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in C.A. No.2430 of 2006 and appellants in C.A. No. 2431 of 2006) to raise construction up to the height of 55 feet on plot No.14, Janpath Lane, New Delhi was set aside and Writ Petition No.2635 of 2002 filed by Heritage and Cultural Forum was disposed of with a direction to the Central Government to review notification dated 16.6.1992 issued under Rule 32 of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Rules, 1959 (for short, `the Rules').

20B. Declaration of regulated area in respect of every protected monument.-(1) Every area, beginning at the limit of prohibited area in respect of every ancient monument and archaeological sites and remains, declared as of national importance under sections 3 and 4 and extending to a distance of two hundred metres in all directions shall be the regulated area in respect of every ancient monument and archaeological sites and remains:

(2) The Authority shall consist of,--

(b) such number of members not exceeding five whole-time members and five part-time members to be appointed, on the recommendation of the Selection Committee referred to in section 20G, by the Central Government, having proven experience and expertise in the fields of archaeology, country and town planning, architecture, heritage, conservation-

architecture or law.

(c) the Director-General as member, ex officio."

31. The appeal of respondent Nos.1 and 2 is wholly meritless.

The High Court's interpretation of the prohibition contained in notification dated 16.6.1992 is correct and the distance of 100 meters has to be counted from the outer boundary wall of Jantar Mantar which has protected area of 5.39 acres and not the physical structures of the observatory. The High Court has given detailed reasons for rejecting the plea of respondent Nos.1 and 2 that the provisions of the DDA Act would prevail over those contained in the 1958 Act and we entirely agree with it.

33. In the result, Civil Appeal No.2430 of 2006 is allowed and the direction given by the Division Bench of the High Court for review of notification dated 16.6.1992 is set aside. However, it is made clear that in future the Central Government or the Director General shall not take action or pass any order under Section 20A(3) and 20C except in accordance with the observations made in this judgment. Civil Appeal No.2431 of 2006 is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
C.Shakunthala & Ors vs H.P.Udayakumar & Anr

b) Late M. Channappa initiated eviction proceedings against both the said tenants and Kachu Krishna Achari came to be evicted pursuant to the decree granted by the competent court. The order of eviction was challenged by P.V. Lingaiah in HRRP No. 559 of 1996 before the High Court of Karnataka which came to be dismissed on 29.02.2000 granting two years time to vacate the tenanted premises subject to filing an undertaking by him.

d) Mr. Lingaiah failed to adhere to the undertaking given by him to vacate the premises within two years, instead in collusion with his son L. Suresh and H.P. Udayakumar, respondent No.1 herein, he created a sale deed dated 22.02.2001 whereby respondent No.1 is purported to have acquired a portion of the tenanted premises. Significantly, respondent No.1 is the business partner of L. Suresh, son of Lingaiah.

Being aggrieved with the order of the High Court, late Channappa filed an appeal before this Court for enhancement of the sentence awarded to Mr. Lingaiah which is still pending.

n) The High Court, by final impugned judgment dated 18.06.2008 dismissed Crl. CCC No. 32 of 2005 and acquitted the respondents by holding that the grounds made out in the second application is under different circumstances, the identity of the property is disputed and that the respondents cannot be attributed with unlawful intention for abuse of the process of the court.

9) In the light of what is stated above, the impugned order of the High Court dated 18.06.2008 made in Crl. CCC No. 32 of 2005 is set aside and the matter is remitted to it for fresh disposal. We request the High Court to restore Crl. CCC No. 32 of 2005 on its file and dispose of the same on merits in accordance with law by passing a speaking order after affording opportunity to both the parties. The appeal is allowed to this extent.

JANUARY 16, 2012.
Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika vs State Of Gujarat & Ors

3. The appellant, thus, lost his tribal certificate and the Fair Price shop that was allotted to him on that basis. He has now brought the matter to this Court making the grievance that the High Court order does not impact him alone but as a result of the order of the High Court his children too, though undisputedly born to a tribal mother, are bound to lose their tribal identity.

15. Once again it is to be seen that the judgment by the two judges went into the facts of the case in detail and considered the effect of the evidences led (or rather not led!) by the respondent in support of his case. And again it was on a finding of fact that the Court held that the respondent failed to establish his scheduled caste status. The judgment by two judges, like the decision in Sobha Hymavathi Devi, did not proceed on the basis that the respondent would get his caste from his father and his father being admittedly Kurmi the respondent could not have a caste status other than Kurmi. The Court did not disallow the respondent from taking the plea that he was the child of a Pasi mother and, thus, belonged to a scheduled caste. But in that endeavour the respondent failed on a finding of fact.

34. We fully endorse the view taken by the Bombay High Court and we feel that in the facts of the case that was the only correct view.

36. It is also clear to us that taking it to the next logical step and to hold that the off-spring of such a marriage would in all cases get his/her caste from the father is bound to give rise to serious problems. Take for instance the case of a tribal woman getting married to a forward caste man and who is widowed or is abandoned by the husband shortly after marriage. She goes back to her people and the community carrying with her an infant or may be a child still in the womb. The child is born in the community from where her mother came and to which she went back and is brought up as the member of that community suffering all the deprivations, humiliations, disabilities and handicaps as a member of the community. Can it still be said that the child would have the caste of his father and, therefore, not entitled to any benefits, privileges or protections sanctioned by the Constitution.

37. Let us now examine how the issue has been dealt with by some of the High Courts.

40. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Kerala High Court.

46. In the result, the appeal is allowed but in the facts of the case there will be no order as to costs.

.................................................. ...J (Aftab Alam) ....................................................J (Ranjana Prakash Desai) New Delhi;

January 18, 2012
Regionl P.F.Commissioner vs Hooghly Mills Co.Ltd.& Ors

4. The material facts of case are not much in dispute.

6. The respondent company comes under Item No. 5 of the notification. Initially the case of the respondent company is that after the grant of exemption it framed a scheme and created a Trust and appointed a Board of Trustees from the Management of the said Trust fund and was thus enjoying exemption under Section 17(1A) (a) of the Act. It is also common ground that there were defaults on the part of the respondent company in making timely payment of dues towards provident fund for the period between October 1999 to October 2000 and then again from November 2000 to July 2002. In view of such admitted defaults, proceedings were initiated against the respondent company and by notices dated 10.9.2003 and 11.10.2003 enclosing therewith the detailed 4 statement of delayed remittance of provident fund and allied dues. As contemplated under Section 14(B) of the Act, respondent was offered an opportunity to represent their case on several dates by the authorities under the Act and their case was listed for hearing but nobody appeared on their behalf on several dates. Thereafter, on the basis of some representation on their behalf the matter was heard and the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner II, Sikkim and Andaman & Nicobar Islands by a detailed order directed the respondent company to remit an amount of Rs.32,62,153/- by way of damages to the respective accounts, failing which, it was stated that further action as provided under the Act and the Schemes framed thereunder shall be initiated.

Provided that no such exemption shall be made except after consultation with the Central Board which on such consultation shall forward its views on exemptions to the appropriate Government within such time limit as may be specified in the Scheme.

44. If we look at sub-section (a) which has been set out hereinbefore, we will find that sub-clause

45. Thus, the sweep of the second part of clause

57. For the reasons aforesaid, we are not inclined to accept the interpretation of the High Court and we are constrained to overrule the judgment of the Single Bench as also of the Division Bench.

58. We hold that in a case of default by the employer by an exempted establishment, in making its 36 contribution to the Provident Fund Section 14B of the Act will be applicable.

59. The appeal is allowed. However, parties are left to bear their own costs.
Assam Urban Water Supply & Sew. Board vs M/S. Subash Projects & Marketing Ltd

Two contracts were entered into between the appellants and the respondents - (i) for construction of Tezpur Town Water Supply Scheme and (ii) for construction of Tinsukia Town Water Supply Scheme. Certain disputes arose between the parties concerning these contracts and to resolve such disputes, sole arbitrator was appointed by the Chief Justice of Gauhati High Court on March 26, 2002 under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, '1996 Act'). On May 10, 2002 the appellants filed application under Section 16 of the 1996 Act questioning the jurisdiction of the sole arbitrator as according to the appellants there was no arbitration clause in the agreement. This application came to be rejected by the sole arbitrator.

4 The appellants challenged the above orders of the Districted Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati, in the Gauhati High Court in two separate Arbitration Appeals, being Arbitration Appeal Nos. 6 of 2004 and 7 of 2004. The Division Bench of that Court upheld the view of the District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati and dismissed the above Arbitration Appeals.

11. The facts in the present case are peculiar. The arbitral awards were received by the appellants on August 26, 2003. No application for setting aside the arbitral awards was made by the appellants before elapse of three months from the receipt thereof. As a matter of fact, three months from the date of the receipt of the arbitral award by the appellants expired on November 26, 2003. The District Court had Christmas vacation for the period from December 25, 2003 to January 1, 2004. On reopening of the court, i.e., on January 2, 2004, admittedly, the appellants made applications for setting aside those awards under Section 34 CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2014 OF 2006 6 of the 1996 Act. If the period during which the District Court, Kamrup, Guwahati, remained closed during Christmas vacation, 2003 is extended and the appellants get benefit of that period over and above the cap of thirty days as provided in Section 34(3), then the view of the High Court and the District Judge cannot be sustained. But this would depend on the applicability of Section 4 of the 1963 Act. The question, therefore, that falls for our determination is

- whether the appellants are entitled to extension of time under Section 4 of the 1963 Act in the above facts.

14. Seen thus, the applications made by the appellants on January 2, 2004, for setting aside the arbitral award dated August 26, 2003 were liable to be dismissed and have rightly been dismissed by the District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati, as time barred.

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2014 OF 2006 8

15. The dismissal of the Arbitration Appeals (6 of 2004 and 7 of 2004) by the High Court, thus, cannot be legally flawed for the reasons we have indicated above.

16. The Appeal has no force and is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Shanmughan vs State Of Kerala

The material facts as appearing from the judgments are that one Raji, wife of the appellant died as a result of poisoning on having been administered cyanide on the night of 2nd March, 1992. In this case, there are certain admitted facts:

PW 7 Dr. N. Rajaram, Lecturer in Forensic medicine, Medical College, Thrissur who conducted the post mortem examination on the body of the deceased found the following injuries on the body of the deceased. The injuries are set out herein below: 3

its lower end 21.5 above hip.

In the instant case, at the time of his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C also, the attention of the accused - appellant was specifically drawn by the trial court to the injuries on the deceased. To that the appellant did not give any answer.

Therefore, taking all these facts and also the concurrent findings of the two courts, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The appellant is to serve 11 out the remaining sentence.

.................J (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) ...................J (T.S. THAKUR) New Delhi;

Dated: JANUARY 19, 2012 12 13
Horil vs Keshav & Anr

4. The defendants (respondents 1 and 2 before this Court) filed a written statement in which they questioned the maintainability of the suit as well.

Against the order passed by the Munsif, the appellant preferred an appeal (M.C.A.No.21 of 1985) which was allowed by the judgment and order dated April 14, 1987 passed by the Additional District Judge, Karwi, (Banda). The Additional District Judge rightly pointed out that the suit filed by the appellant was based on the allegation that the decree passed by the Assistant Collector was based on a fraudulent compromise petition and it did not involve any adjudication of rights or interests in the agricultural lands. Hence, the suit was maintainable before a civil court. It, accordingly, set aside the order passed by the Munsif and directed him to proceed with the suit in accordance with law.

5. When the matter came before the Munsif on remand, the defendants once again objected to the maintainability of the suit, this time raising the contention that it was barred under the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil 5 Procedure. The Munsif by his order dated January 7, 1988 dismissed the objection and found and held that the suit was maintainable. The defendants-

respondents took the matter in revision (Civil Revision No. Nil of 1988) which was dismissed by the District Judge, Banda, by his order dated February 17, 1988. Against the orders passed by the Munsif and the District Judge, the defendants preferred a writ petition before the High Court and the High Court, as noted above, allowed the writ petition holding that the suit was not maintainable. It is a brief order in which the High Court referred to the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3-A, and relying upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition.

13. In our view in the facts of the case the provision of Order XXIII shall not act as a bar against the suit filed by the appellant. We, accordingly set aside the order of the High Court.

As a consequence, the suit will be restored before 1 the Munsif who is directed to accord it priority having regard to the fact that for the last 31 years it is stuck up on the issue of maintainability. The trial court should try to dispose of the suit without any delay, and in any case, not later than one year from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.

14. In the result, the appeal is allowed but with no order as to costs.

January 20, 2012.
State Of U.P. & Ors vs Ambrish Tandon & Anr

Charan Singh and the respondents herein in respect of the property situated at 17/1 Ashok Marg, Lucknow measuring 11,029 sq. ft. and registered as Sale Deed Document No. 5341 of 2003. The total value of the property was computed as Rs.

b) The District Magistrate, Lucknow made a spot inspection of the property in question on 21.07.2003. During inspection, the land has been found having an area of 12,099 sq. ft. with a two storey building having an area of 5,646.3 sq. ft. at ground floor and an area of 5192.3 sq. ft. at the first floor. In the inspection report, the property in question has been valued for Rs. 3,87,74,097/- and the stamp duty on the said property has been calculated by the competent authority as Rs. 38,78,000/-. However, at the time of purchase, respondents herein paid Rs. 15,53,000/- as Stamp duty, 2 hence a deficiency of Rs. 23,50,000/- has been pointed out by the authorities. The District Magistrate, vide report dated 26.07.2003, directed to register a case against the respondents herein

c) On the basis of the aforesaid report, Case No. 653 Stamp-2003 under Sections 47A/33 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (in short `the Act') was registered. Vide order dated 27.09.2004, the Additional Collector (Finance & Revenue) Lucknow directed the respondents to make good the deficiency in the stamp duty and also imposed a penalty amounting to Rs. 8,46,000/- for such tax evasion. On 20.01.2005, for failure to deposit the aforesaid amount, a demand notice claiming an amount of Rs. 38,30,500/- plus 10% recovery charges was issued and the respondents herein were directed to pay the said amount within a period of seven days.

9) Under these circumstances, we find no valid ground for interference with the impugned order of the High Court.

Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.

JANUARY 20, 2012.