L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Sree Krishna Electricals vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dismissing the writ petitions filed by the appellant. The appellant is a dealer registered under the Tamilnadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (in short the `Act'). The appellant was assessed to tax on the sale of wet grinders. Though the appellant claimed that he was not selling wet grinder but only parts thereon, the claim was found to be untrue and tax and penalty were imposed for the Assessment years 1992-93 and 1993-94. Appellant's stand was that he was entitled to relief on the basis of a 1 judgment of the High Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Suguna Agencies (1991) 81 SCC 33). According to the Revenue authorities, the judgment was referred to in a later judgment of the High Court in S. Durai v. Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Chepauk, Madras (1994) 95 STC 372 where a different view was taken.

3. The High Court was of the view in the present case that the later decision apply to the facts of the present case. As regards the penalty the assessee took the stand that the penalty has been imposed mechanically and there was no warrant for it as the assessee had disclosed the turnover for which he had claimed exemption. The High Court was of view that there 2 was not complete disclosure and the fact that he had disclosed the sale of what he has termed as parts does not amount to full disclosure. The assessments made in the case of the assessee were in fact the best judgment assessment which permitted the imposition of penalty. Accordingly the writ petitions were dismissed.

7. So far as the question of penalty is concerned the items which were not included in the turnover were found incorporated in the appellant's accounts books. Where certain items which are not included in the turnover are disclosed in the dealer's own account books and the assessing authorities includes these items in the dealers' turnover disallowing the exemption penalty cannot be imposed. The penalty levied stands set aside.

8. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.
State Of M.P vs Laakhan @ Lakhan

The prosecution version primarily rested on the evidence of three eye- witnesses. One of them was the mother of the deceased and the other two were the injured witness. The accused persons pleaded innocence. According to them the deceased and two purported eye witnesses were causing disturbance on the polling day and therefore the members of the public were agitated and in the process they may have been beaten; but because of political rivalry the accused persons were falsely implicated. The trial court placed reliance on the three eye-witnesses and recorded conviction and imposed sentence as aforesaid. In appeal,, the stand basically taken was that there was ante dating of the first information report. The report was purportedly lodged on 11.11.1993 at about 10.50 a.m. The Elaqa Magistrate received it on 16.11.1993. The delay has not been explained. Apart from that the place of incident has been shifted. It was also pointed out that the ante dating of -3- the FIR it is evident from the fact that the admitted case of the prosecution is that the FIR was lodged on 11.11.1993 at 10.50 a.m., but strangely, the inquest report shows that the inquest was started at 10.30 a.m. The stand of the State before the High Court was that merely because there was delay in despatch of the FIR to the Elaqa Magistrate that cannot throw any doubt on the credibility of the prosecution version. There were two injured witnesses even if there was a discrepancy between the time indicated in the FIR and the inquest, that was a lapse on the part of the Investigating officer and it cannot be a factor in favour of the accused persons.

In view of judgment passed in Crl. Appeal No. 117/2003 this appeal deserves to be succeed which we direct.

In view of judgment passed in Crl. Appeal No. 117/2003 this appeal deserves to be dismissed which we direct.

In view of judgment passed in Crl. Appeal No. 117/2003 this appeal deserves to be dismissed which we direct.
Paras Nath Singh vs State Of Bihar & Ors

2. The appellant was appointed on the post of Orderly in the Department of Planning and Development in the State of Bihar and he has since retired. In 1972, more precisely on 29th of August, 1972, the appellant was promoted to the post of Machine Boy and subsequent to such promotion, he was made Routine Clerk on 13th of June, 1974 and was allowed to function as such on the said post. On 15th of April, 1995, the appellant was given provisional First Time Bound Promotion with effect 2 from 13th of June, 1984. After about 10 years, more precisely on 19th of September, 2005, the First Time Bound Promotion granted to the appellant was cancelled. In view of such cancellation of promotion, direction was issued by the State/Respondent to recover Rs. 1,01,529.50 from the salary of the appellant at the rate of Rs. 5000/- per month.

3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order directing recovery, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Patna contending that since the time bound promotion given to him was at the fag end of his employment and that the appellant, once having worked in the time bound promotional post, recovery against him was not justified. The writ petition, however, was dismissed by a learned Judge of the High Court and affirmed by a Division Bench of the High Court in a Letters Patent Appeal.

7. However, whatever amount that has already been recovered, shall not be paid back to the appellant.

8. In view of the above, the impugned Judgments of the High Court are set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant stands allowed. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
S.E.B.I vs Saikala Associates Ltd

The Respondent has acted as a sub-broker at the National Stock Exchange with 2 NSE Members, MIS PCS Securities Limited & M/S Zen Securities Ltd. without being registered as a sub-broker with the SEBI with the said Exchange for the Period from the years 2000-01, 2001-02 and from April,2002 to May, 2002 and created the value of Rs.403.29 Crores, in breach of Section 12(1) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") read with Rule 3 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Stock Brokers & Sub Brokers) Rules, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the " Rules" ) (II) C.A. No. 4640 of 2006 ( SEBI Vs SHILPA STOCK BROKERS P. LTD & M/S MEHTA VAKIL & Co ) Tribunal has recorded the fair concession of the Respondent that the Respondent registered as a broker with the SEBI while executing trades on behalf of their client Kamlesh Shroff, had dealt with M/s Jairam Enterprises, an unregistered sub-broker, which is admittedly in violation of the Circular 2 No. SMD/I POLICY /CIRCULAR/3-97 dated 31.3.1997 issued by SEBI in exercise of powers under Section 11 of the Act. As regards the second charge, the Tribunal did not uphold the finding of the Appellant SEBI.

(iii) As regards M/s. Mehta Vakil & Co P. Ltd. (Appeal No. 11 of 2000 before the Tribunal) the respondent-co. were involved in purchase of 19400 shares and Sale of 800 shares of V.B. Financial which had been transacted by the said broker on behalf of their sub-broker, namely, Akshay Dalal, who was registered as a sub broker only with effect from 14.1.2000 but had dealt with him since December, 1998 in breach of the Act, Rules Securities and Exchange Board of India Regulations & Circulars of SEBI, (Stock Brokers and Sub-Brokers) (Hereinafter referred to as "Regulation").

11. Above being the position the appeals are bound to succeed, which we direct. The orders of the Tribunal are set aside and that of SEBI stands restored.

12. Appeals are allowed.
Vijaykumar vs State By Inspector Of Police,Madras ...

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

16. In this case, the evidence of P.W.1 has not only been corroborated by the other materials referred to above but also the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3, who are independent and unrelated witnesses.

20. In the light of the above position, it can be held that even assuming that the evidence relating to the arrest and recovery is not to be acted upon, the prosecution succeeds on the basis of the evidence of ocular testimony adduced by PWs. 1 to 3. Out of these three witnesses, it is to be emphatically stated that the evidence PW.3 who is an educated, independent, not related and whose house is situated opposite to the place of occurrence would inspire confidence that what all she stated before the Court is cogent and credible.

21. Above being the position, we find no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.
Exposure Insurance Services Limited vs Larsen & Toubro Limited

This Special Leave Petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 19th July, 2007, passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No.382/07 arising out of Company Petition No. 419/06, filed by the petitioner herein. Claiming to be a Holder in Due Course of two Bills of Exchange, both dated 15th -2- December 2002, the petitioner filed the Company Petition No.419/06 for winding up of the respondent Company. The Bills of Exchange were said to have been endorsed in favour of the petitioner on 28 th January, 2003, and the same were payable on 15th March, 2003. The claim of the petitioner is on the strength of the endorsement alleged to have been made in its favour and the petitioner claims thereunder as a Holder in Due Course. Opposing the petition, the respondent Company took the defence that nothing was payable in respect of the said two Bills of Exchange on account of two Credit Notes dated 27.2.2003 having been issued by the supplier to the petitioner confirming that goods supplied to the respondent had been received back by the supplier at Dubai and that, consequently, nothing further was payable on the basis of the said Bills of Exchange. It also appears that the Bills of Exchange were not presented for a period of two years after the date of maturity and only on 4th February, 2005, Carbon Technologies Limited issued notice demanding payment on the basis thereof. On reply being sent on 7th March 2005, by the respondent Company, the said notice was withdrawn.

Subsequently, a similar notice was issued on 29th March, 2005 on behalf of a company by the name of Buxley Industries Limited. Pursuant to the similar reply being sent on behalf of the respondent company, no further proceedings have been taken although the notice issued has not been withdrawn. Thereafter, on 13th February, 2006, the present petitioner sent a notice to the respondent Company demanding payment of the said two Bills of Exchange again indicating that it was the Holder in Due Course of the same.

The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed. But this will not prevent the petitioner company from pursuing its remedy before any other forum, in accordance with law.
Union Of India & Anr vs G. Sareen

2. The respondent therefore requested the appellants to remove the encroachers and deliver possession of the plot to him. The appellants made some half- hearted attempts by filing a suit which was dismissed for non-prosecution, and 2 subsequently the appeal filed by appellants was also dismissed for non-prosecution. Ultimately, at the request of the respondent, proceedings were initiated under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and after protracted litigation, possession of the plot was secured from the encroachers in July, 2001.

3. But instead of delivering possession to the respondent, the appellants requested the respondent to produce a refugee registration certificate. The respondent pointed out that he and his father were non-displaced persons and the question of production of a refugee registration certificate did not arise. But the appellants refused to deliver possession without such a certificate. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent filed C.W.P. No. 2578/2003 seeking transfer of ownership by means of a deed of conveyance. The said petition was allowed with a direction to the appellants to convey the said plot and transfer its ownership to the respondent without delay.

4. The order of the learned Single Judge was challenged by the appellants in an intra-Court appeal. The Division Bench found that the requirement relating to production of a refugee registration certificate was not warranted and the respondent was entitled to the relief granted by the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal with costs of Rs. 25,000/-. The said order of Division Bench is under challenge in this appeal.

7. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High court. The appeal is dismissed. However, the direction for payment of costs of Rs. 25,000/- is deleted.

..........................J (R.V. RAVEENDRAN) ..........................J (HARJIT SINGH BEDI) NEW DELHI, APRIL 21, 2009.
Ramjee Prasad & Anr vs State Of Bihar

The Public Analyst in his report found that the above-mentioned food article was adulterated with starch.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the matter is settled in favour of the appellants by the cited judgment. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has, however, pointed out that no prejudice had been caused to the appellants on account of this change in the nature of the offence. In the light of what has been observed by this Court (ibidem), the prejudice is writ large more particularly as the ingredients of the two provisions are substantially different and the evidence of one cannot lead to a finding of guilt for the other. The appeal is allowed. The orders of the courts below are set aside and the appellants are acquitted. As the accused appellants are on bail, their bail bonds are discharged.

April 22, 2009.
Surendra Singh Beniwal vs Hukam Singh & Ors

2. The brief facts of the case are that respondent No.1 was appointed as Lecturer in English on 15.1.1981 in Murli Manohar Inter College Ishurteel, District Muzaffarnagar. Thereafter, respondent No. 1, on his own request, was transferred from the Murli Manohar Inter College to Panna Lal Bhalla Municipal Inter College, Hardiwar on 21.7.1997. Since then the respondent No.1 has been continuously working in the said institution as lecturer in English. The appellant was promoted as lecturer in Panna Lal Bhalla Municipal Inter College on 6.11.1989. The 2 authorities concerned issued seniority list on 26.12.2000 showing the date of appointment of respondent No. 1 as lecturer in English w.e.f. 15.1.1981 while the date of seniority of appellant was shown as 6.11.1989. The seniority list was issued after the approval of District Inspector of Schools. Appellant was given ad-hoc promotion to the post of Principal on 1.7.2001.

3. Respondent No. 1 made a representation before the authority concerned regarding his seniority and claimed that he should be placed at serial number 1 in the seniority list on the basis of his seniority as lecturer as the respondent No.1 was much senior to the appellant, but to no avail.

5. Aggrieved by the order of learned Single Judge, he appellant filed a review petition which was rejected by order dated 23.2.2007.

10. As regards the words "same cadre and category", much has been made out of it in the impugned judgment. However, we are of the opinion that the interpretation given in the impugned judgment is not correct.

12. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the Division Bench as well as of learned Single Judge are set- aside. The writ petition is dismissed. No orders.
Raman Kumar vs State Of Punjab

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The High Court after referring to the respective stand of the parties in an abrupt manner held that the acquittal of the appellant was not legal and proper. It however held that the trial Court was right in holding that the so called dying declaration stated by Sham Lal (PW-6), Smt. Surinder Kanta (PW-7) and Manoj Kumar (PW-8) was not fully reliable. The view taken was a posisble view and no interference was called so far as the acquittal of Satish, Madan and Asha Rani are concerned. As regards the present appellant it was held that though the letter Ex.PF was inconsequential but the evidence of the parents and brother of the deceased about her harassment for dowry cannot be brushed aside. Her death took place within 5 four months of the marriage and no other possible reason was put forward why she died. The plea of accidental fire was not reliable. Reference was made to the evidence of PW-7 the mother of the deceased who stated that the deceased had complained of demand of Rs.1,00,000/- and harassment for dowry. Similar version was given by Manoj Kumar (PW-8) the brother of the deceased. With this only observation the appeal of the appellant was dismissed.

17. The High Court's judgment is not only sketchy but also devoid of reasons. Various factors highlighted above would go to show that the prosecution has squarely failed to establish the accusations so far as the appellant is concerned. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct. The appellant is to be set at liberty forthwith unless to be required in connection with any other case.
Bikram Dorjee vs State Of West Bengal

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as under:

11. The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal".

12. Though life sentence in appropriate cases can be imposed in a case relatable to Section 304 Part I IPC, on the peculiar facts of the case, we are of the view that 10 years custodial sentence would meet the ends of justice. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. The appellant be set at liberty if he has served the sentence imposed.
Masroor vs State Of U.P. & Anr

3. Briefly stated, the background facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:

4. On the very same day viz. 18th September, 2007, another FIR (No.182 of 2007), pertaining to the same incident, was lodged at about 6.40 p.m. by the said Basiruddin @ Lala against 25 persons, inter alia, alleging that when he went to the shop of Anzar s/o Mehboob to buy some vegetables, he told Anzar that his vegetables were very expensive, on which Anzar and one Shahroz, who was standing there, started abusing him. When Basiruddin protested, they started beating him with legs and fists. Basiruddin then came back home but after some time, many people, including Shahroz, 4 Anzar (since deceased) and Qayyum, came to his house and started firing with an intention to kill him.

5. The persons named in the first FIR were arrested on different dates. Upon recording the statements of some eye- witnesses, including the injured witnesses, charge-sheet was filed against all the 22 accused persons named in Crime Case No.347/2007, including the second respondent, on 19th November, 2007.

16. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order granting bail to the second respondent is set aside. The bail bond and surety furnished by the said respondent in terms of the High Court's order stand cancelled and it is directed that he shall be taken into custody forthwith.

18. It goes without saying that any observations touching the merits of the case against the second respondent are purely for the purpose of deciding the question of grant of bail and shall not be construed as an expression of final opinion in the main matter.

19. We may also clarify that if in future any application for grant of bail is filed by the second respondent, it shall be considered on its own merits, uninfluenced by this order.
Kailashi Bai vs Aarti Arya & Anr

Background facts, in nutshell, are as follows:

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

There is no doubt that exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be done only in exceptional cases and where there is prima facie material trial was to be held. But on the peculiar facts of the case highlighted above, we are of the view that the High Court was right in exercising its jurisdiction under Sec.482 of the Code. Therefore, no interference is called for in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
Damodhar vs Secr.Industrial,Energy & Lab.Deptt.& ...

The appellant is working in the establishment of the Registrar, Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Mumbai. His case was referred to the Scheduled Tribe Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Nagpur Division, Nagpur, for verification of his tribe claim as Halba, Scheduled Tribe community, by a letter dated 25 th January, 2006. In order to verify the claim of the appellant, the Screening/Scrutiny Committee conducted an inquiry through the Police Vigilance Cell, which had also recorded the statement of the appellant's nephew on 7th August, 2006 regarding the socio-cultural traits, characteristics and customs, which did not seem to match those of the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The copy of the said report being served on the appellant, he 2 disagreed with the same and subsequently, the Scrutiny Committee directed him to appear before it on 18th January, 2007. When the matter was taken up for consideration by the Committee, the appellant indicated that he was withdrawing his claim as Halba Scheduled Tribe, but that he should be given the benefits of belonging to the Koshti Special Backward Category since in the meantime, an amendment had been made with regard to the categorisation of Halba Scheduled Tribe and Koshti Special Backward Classes.

On the basis of the said submissions, the Screening Committee cancelled the certificate granted to the appellant by the Executive Magistrate, Nagpur on 22 nd August, 1980 Aggrieved by the said order the appellant moved the High Court in its writ jurisdiction where apart from challenging the cancellation of the certificate granted to him, the appellant also prayed that he be given the benefits of belonging to the Special Backward Classes on account of his belonging to the Koshti community.

The writ petition having been dismissed, the appellant has filed the special leave petition (now appeal) which is now being heard.

The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Pragya Chandrakar & Ors vs State Of Chhattisgarh & Ors

The controversy in the present appeal lies within a narrow compass. The plaintiff filed a second appeal in terms of the Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (in short the 'Code') questioning the reversal of the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 243/1997 passed by a learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Puttur, by learned Senior Civil Judge, Puttur in AS No. 25/2002. The second appeal was dismissed primarily on the ground that there was no plea of adverse possession anywhere in the plaint. It was noted that on examination of the plaint the only allegation made in the plaint was that the defendants are trying to disposess the plaintiff.

A bare reading of the averments shows that the conclusion of the High Court that there are no specific pleas relating to adverse possession are factually incorrect. Therefore, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remit the matter to it for fresh -3- consideration in accordance with law.

We do not consider it necessary to express any opinion in that regard. If an application is filed before the High Court which has to hear of the second appeal, the application shall be considered it is proper perspective.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.