L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Jyoti Harshad Mehta vs Custodian & Ors

INVOLVEMENT OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS The findings of Chartered Accountants have a major role to play in this case. We may notice that during pendency of the proceedings before the Special Court M/s Vyas & Vyas, Chartered Accountant, was appointed in respect of assets and liabilities of Harshad Metha on 16th October, 2003. They submitted a report upon auditing the Accounts of 4 Late Harshad Mehta for the financial year ending 31.03.1992 and for the period ending 08.06.1992 on 17th January, 2006. The notified parties have contested this, in an affidavit dated 28th July, 2008, by stating that the Custodian had actually received the same on 30.11.2005.

(vii) The Appellants shall file their objections to the said report, if any, within ten days thereafter. The Custodian may also take assistance and/ or further assistance from a Chartered Accountant of his choice. A reply and/ or rejoinder thereto shall be filed within one week from the date of the receipt of the copy of the objection. The parties shall file their respective documents within one week thereafter. Such documents should be supported by affidavits. Both the parties shall be entitled to inspect such documents and filed their responses thereto within one week thereafter. The parties shall file the written submissions filed before this Court together with all charts before the learned Special Judge, Special Court within eight weeks from date.

A plain reading of Section 3(3) would suggest that all properties of the notified persons on the date of the said notification would 36 automatically stand attached irrespective of the fact as to whether they had been acquired before, during or even after the statutory period. A logical corollary of this would be that all income accruing or arising from the said property even after the date of attachment would also automatically stand attached.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Judge, Special Court, for consideration thereof afresh in the light of the observations of this Court as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from the date of this judgment. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Municipal Corp.Of Greater Mumbai vs Bharat Construction & Ors

2. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai- appellant (hereinafter referred to as, `Corporation'), awarded contract for reconstruction and concretization of the road being Contract No. C-2 to the Respondent No. 1, Bharat Construction (for short, `Contractor'). The contractor under the contract was required to carry out the work in a phased manner including completion of certain preliminaries under the special directions/special conditions of the contract before commencement of the work. That there was delay in completion of work by the contractor within stipulated time is not in dispute. However, the case of the contractor is that they were given option by the Corporation to complete the work after the mansoon of 1990 and they opted to complete the work but asked for 30% rise in the contract amount which was not granted by the Corporation, as a result of which the contract stood foreclosed under the terms and conditions of the contract. The contractor invoked Clause 97 of the general conditions of contract for resolution of the dispute that arose between the parties and lodged claim for compensation, loss etc. before the sole Arbitrator.

8. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order dated July 19, 2007. Appeal No. 804 of 1999 is restored to the file of the High Court. Needless to say that all the contentions of the parties are kept open to be agitated before the Division Bench which obviously will be decided on their own merit. Since the matter is quite old, we request the High court to hear and decide the aforesaid appeal as expeditiously as may be possible and preferably within three months from the date of production of this order. We further direct that the respondent will keep the existing bank guarantee alive until the disposal of the appeal by the High Court and for a further period of one month thereafter. Parties will bear their own costs.

........................J (Tarun Chatterjee) ........................J (R. M. Lodha) New Delhi August 7, 2009.
Gurlovleen Singh vs State Of Punjab & Ors

2. A motor accident involving a scooterist and a Peter Rehra (which is a banned indigenous makeshift motorised vehicle) resulted in the death of the scooterist. In a claim petition by his legal heirs, the Accident Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.5,04,000/- and directed that 70% of the said amount should be recovered from the eight respondent (who was the driver of the Peter Rehra) and 30% should be recovered from respondents 1 to 4 (the State of Punjab and its functionaries). The State was made liable on the ground that it had failed to curb the menace of such unauthorised vehicles on the road. The said judgment was challenged by respondents 1 to 4 before the High Court on the ground that they could not be made liable to payment part of the compensation. The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 19.1.2007, did not choose to interfere with the award of the tribunal. But, while dismissing the appeal .....2.

4. We, therefore, allow this appeal and delete the last paragraph in the impugned judgement of the High Court whereby the State was directed to recover the money from the appellant (District Transport Officer).
G.V.Sreerama Reddy & Anr vs Returning Officer & Ors

3) According to the appellants, election was held on 10.05.2008 and counting took place on 25.05.2008. Initially, the Media Officer appointed by the Election Commission announced appellant No.1 as the successful candidate and declared him elected. When the election agents and counting agents of appellant No.1 had left the 2 place of counting, an application for re-counting was submitted by the second respondent and thereafter, second respondent was declared elected. The appellants filed an election petition under Section 81 of the Act on various grounds pointing out large-scale irregularities and illegalities committed by respondent-authorities in the voting and the illegalities of allowing the recounting after announcing the declaration of appellant No.1 as elected.

4) On 06.07.2008, the first appellant, through his advocate, Shri Shiva Reddy presented the election petition before the Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Karnataka. The Registry of the High Court put up an office objection that as the appellants were not present at the time of filing of the election petition, the presentation of the papers were not in accordance with Section 81 of the Act and as such there was no proper filing of the election petition. Based on the office objection, the matter was placed before the learned Single Judge of the High Court dealing with the election petition and arguments were heard. By the 3 impugned order, the learned Single Judge based on the recorded statement of Registrar (Judicial) dated 07.07.2008 that "petitioners were not present while presenting this petition" and finding that it was not a proper presentation in terms of Section 81, dismissed the election petition. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants have filed this appeal before this Court.

20) In view of the endorsement by the Registrar (Judicial) on 07.07.2008 that the election petition was presented only by an advocate and not by the election petitioners, we accept the reasoning of the High Court in dismissing 15 the election petition. We further hold that as per sub- section (1) of Section 81, election petition is to be presented by any candidate or elector relating to the election personally to the authorized officer of the High Court and failure to adhere such course would be contrary to the said provision and in that event the election petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of improper presentation. Since, the High Court has correctly dismissed the election petition, the civil appeal fails and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.

AUGUST 11, 2009.
Bank Of India & Anr vs Bhimsen Gochhayat

2. The prosecution case against the respondent was that on 17.8.1982 the Manager of the Bank of India, Balasore Branch received an inter office memorandum dated 9.8.1982 for Rs. 35,000/- purported to have been sent by the Bank of India, Lindsay Street Branch, Calcutta requesting him to open a Saving Bank Account being the housing loan disbursement in the name of 2 Babaji Nayak. Accordingly, on the same day, a Saving Bank Account No. 2255 for Rs. 35,000/- was opened in the Bank of India, Balasore Branch in the name of Babaji Nayak. On the next day i.e. on 18.8.1982, one young man identifying himself to be the son of Babaji Nayak came to the Bank of India, Balasore Branch with a bank withdrawal form bearing the signatures of Babaji Nayak. But the bank staff refused the payment as the signatures of the Babaji Nayak in the record of the bank and on the withdrawal form differed and requested him to bring Babaji Nayak who was the account holder. At that time, the present respondent Bhimsen Gochhayat was also present in the bank premises along with the so called son of Babaji Nayak.

6. On 11.5.1991, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the respondent from the service. His appeal before the Appellate Authority also failed. Therefore, he proceeded 5 to file the Writ Petition before the High Court of Orissa.

9. We are not impressed by this reasoning either. We do not find that the Bank was late or there was delay in initiating the departmental proceedings. In this view of the matter, we cannot agree with the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench.

13. With these observations, This appeal stands disposed of. No costs.
Ishwar Singh vs Satbir Singh & Ors

3. The present appellant assailed the aforesaid order of the Collector, District Bhiwani by filing an appeal before the Commissioner, Hissar Division. The Commissioner, Hissar Division did not agree with the view of the Collector, Bhiwani in respect of suitability of the present Respondent No. 1. The Commissioner, Bhiwani held :

9. Appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the judgment dated April 11, 2008 passed by the High Court is set aside. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1672 of 2008 is restored to the file of the High Court for fresh consideration and decision. Needless to say that the contentions of the parties are kept open to be agitated before the High Court which obviously would be 7 decided on their own merits. We request the High Court to decide the aforesaid writ petition as expeditiously as may be possible. Parties will bear their own costs.

........................J (Tarun Chatterjee) ........................J (R. M. Lodha) New Delhi August 17, 2009.
Noor Ali vs National Insurance Co.Ltd

The appellant is engaged in the business of motor parts. He took fire insurance policy for the period from 18th July, 2003, to 17th July, 2004 for a sum of Rupees ten lakhs. On the night intervening 3rd/4th August, 2003, at about 11.00 p.m., a fire incident took place in which the appellant's goods and shops were damaged. On receipt of intimation from the appellant, the respondent deputed a Surveyor and Loss Agent, Shri K.B. Mahajan, who after assessment, submitted report dated 15th December, 2003. Shri Mahajan assessed the loss to the appellant at Rs.1,79,111/-. Thereafter, the Insurance Company released Rs.1,21,117/- in favour of the appellant as full and final settlement of his claim. The appellant accepted the amount under protest. This was clearly recorded in the form of endorsement made on letter dated 17th March, 2004 written by the Branch Manager of the respondent to the Senior Manager, Bank of Baroda.

Feeling aggrieved by the respondent's refusal to reimburse the loss of Rupees eight lakhs which, according to the appellant, was suffered by him in the fire accident, he filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The respondent disputed the claim of the appellant and averred that in view of the report of the surveyor, he was not entitled to anything over and above what was already paid. The respondent also took up the plea that after having accepted the amount of Rs.1,29,117/- in full and final settlement of his claim, the appellant was not entitled to claim higher compensation. The appellant produced as many as twenty documents which included report of the Fire Officer, Sultanpur, the bank statement for the last three years, stock statement for the last three years along with covering letter and a list of 168 duplicate cash memos and three balance sheets for the years 2001-2003. After considering the entire record, the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Sultanpur, [for short, "the District Forum"] awarded compensation of Rs.6,70,883/- with interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum from the date of complaint, i.e., 5th May, 2004. Damages of Rs.10,000/- and litigation expenses of Rs.200/- were also awarded to the appellant with a stipulation that if the amount is not paid, then the rate of interest shall be fifteen per cent instead of twelve per cent per annum.

On an appeal preferred by the respondent, the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission [for short, "State Commission"], set aside the order of the District Forum. When the matter was taken up by the appellant in revision, National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission [for short, "National Commission"], directed the respondent to pay ...3/-

Rs.50,000/- by observing that the said amount had been deducted from the assessment made by the Surveyor's report without any justification.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned orders passed by the State Commission as well as the National Commission are set aside and the matter is remitted to the State Commission to consider the appeal in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties.
Rekh Pal vs Bhram Pal & Ors

By an order dated 12th March, 1971, the Consolidation Officer decided objections filed by different chak holders. In the process, chak initially given to the appellant's father, Shri Roop Chand, near his original plot was disturbed. He, therefore, challenged the order of the Consolidation Officer by filing an appeal under Section 11 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The same was allowed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) Meerut vide his order dated 25th April, 1971. The appellate order became subject-matter of challenge in three revisions, which were disposed of by Deputy Director of Consolidation, Meerut [for short, "Deputy Director"] by a common order dated 5th December, 1974. The Deputy Director changed the chak of the land of Shri Roop Chand with that of Karan Singh and others. In his order, the Deputy Director recorded that Shri Roop Chand had orally agreed to take the holding as per the determination made by the Consolidation Officer.

Aggrieved by the order of the Deputy Director, Shri Roop Chand filed writ petition before the High Court, inter alia, on the ground that he had neither been served with the notice of revision nor he was given opportunity of hearing by the Deputy Director. In the counter affidavit filed by some of the respondents in the writ petition, it was averred that Shri Roop Chand had participated in the proceeding before the Deputy Director and agreed to take the holding in terms of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer. Shri Roop Chand filed rejoinder affidavit. In Paragraph 10 thereof, he stated that he had never agreed to accept the chak allotted to him by the Consolidation Officer, against whose order, appeal had been filed and allowed. He also reiterated that he was not served with the notice of the three revisions and did not participate in the proceeding before the Deputy Director. In Paragraph 13, Shri Roop Chand averred that on 4th and 5th December, 1974, he was in police custody and was granted bail on 5th December, 1974. In support of this assertion, he placed on record a copy of the extract received from R/S. Masuri, which was marked as Annexure R-1.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order passed by the Deputy Director as well as the High Court are set aside and the matter is remitted to be Deputy Director to consider the matter afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties.
Vijay Narayan Thatte & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

4. The facts in brief are that a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter for short 'the Act') was issued in respect of the land in question on 29.8.2002. Thereafter a Notification under 2 Section 6 of the Act was issued on 18.6.2003. The said Notification under Section 6 was challenged and the writ petition filed by the appellants was allowed on 20.1.2004 and the Notification under Section 6 of the Act dated 18.06.2003 was quashed. Subsequently a second Notification under Section 6 dated 30.10.2006 was issued by the State Government.

16. Laughakshi Bhaskara, one of the great Mimansa writers, taking the prohibitory text 'one is not to eat Kalanja or fermented/stale food' (na kalanjam bhakshayet), explains the idiomatic force of the phrase (na bhakshayet). He explains that the suffix 'yat' means 'shall', and that the negative particle 'not' is to be taken as attached to the suffix 'yat' (shall), and not to the idea of Kalanja eating. For if it be taken as attached to the latter idea, then the sentence might mean 'you shall eat but not Kalanja'. In this case strictly there would be no prohibition. So he labours to demonstrate that the gist of the sentence is 'shall not' and therefore the object of it is to turn off from eating 9 Kalanja (fermented/stale food). This may appear to be making a hair splitting distinction, but it is of great importance from the Mimansa point of view because it indicates the mandatory nature of the negative injunction (nishedha). The explanation of a Nishedha Vidhi appears more clearly from Jaimini's Sutras on the Kalanja maxim.

25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 21.01.2008. However, it is open to the respondent-State of Maharashtra to issue a fresh Notification under Section 4 of the Act and take proceedings in accordance with law thereafter.

Appeal allowed. No order as to the costs.

AUGUST 18, 2009
Industrial Investment Bank Of India Ltd vs Bishwanath Jhunjhunwala

2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:

3. The loan agreement was entered into between the appellant and the borrower company on 03.10.1994 in respect of the first short term working capital loan of Rs.3 crores. The said loan agreement was signed on behalf of the borrower company by the respondent as a Director of the borrower company. On the same day, demand promissory note for Rs.3 crores was executed on behalf of the borrower company in favour of the appellant. The same was executed on behalf of the borrower company by the respondent as the Director of the borrower company. A deed of undertaking to create mortgage in respect of its various immovable properties was also executed on behalf of the borrower company by the respondent.

8. In view of the defaults committed by the borrower company, the appellant on 18.01.1997 issued a demand notice to the borrower company recalling the entire loans and calling upon the borrower company to pay the total sum of Rs.5.40 crores together with further interest at the rate of 17% per annum and liquidated damages at the rate of 2.1% from 1.1.1997 till repayment.

10. A notice was issued on 20.3.1997 to the respondent invoking the personal guarantee given by him and calling upon him to pay the sum of Rs.5.40 crores together with further interest and liquidated damages from 1.1.1997 till repayment.

12. The appellant on 17.7.1997 filed an application against the respondent under section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 in the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta. The appellant in the said 6 application has prayed for a certificate against the said respondent for a sum of Rs.5.40 crores along with further interest and liquidated damages.

13. The respondent on 20.3.1998 also filed an application in the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta for stay of further proceedings in the case filed by the appellant in the same Tribunal, inter alia, on the ground that the rights of the appellant against the respondent as guarantor did not crystallize till the rights of the appellant against the borrower company are established.

31. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court of Calcutta is set aside. The appellant shall be entitled to costs of Rs.50,000/-. 14

August 18, 2009.
Murli & Anr vs State Of Rajasthan

3. The prosecution story, in short, is as under.

The incident is dated 14.9.1987. Lokendra Singh (PW-1) filed a report in the Police Station that while his elder brother Virendra and one Badri Dhakar were standing at the Paan Shop of Latur Mali at Bundi Road, Heera S/o Hardev Gujjar, who was armed with Gandasa, Murli S/o Sunder Brahmin, who was armed with a Lathi and one other person, who was also armed with a Lathi came near them at Paan Shop. They abused his brother Virendra Singh, whereupon he (Lokendra Singh) and Virendra Singh asked them not to mishbehave. Just then, 6-7 persons armed with Lathies, Farsa, Gandasi and knifes cornered Virendra Singh in a lane. Murli gave a lathi blow on his head and then all of them started shouting, expressing their intention to kill him and started assaulting Virendra Singh with various weapons. Virendra Singh fell down there itself. Then also, he was assaulted by Murli and one other person, though Badri Dhakar tried to stop them, which was futile. After the incident, all of them boarded one tractor of red colour and went away towards Kota Road, shouting `Jai'. When PW-1 Lokendra Singh saw Virendra Singh, he had already died and his head and face were injured. He had seen those persons in the light and he could identify them. On this basis, the offence was registered at the Police Station. After the usual investigation, all accused persons excepting Bhanwar Lal (A-7) were arrested and the chargesheet came to be filed against the arrested accused persons, wherein Bhanwar Lal (A-7) was shown as an absconder. The investigation was kept pending against him. The matter was committed to Sessions Court, Bundi. When the trial commenced before the Sessions Judge, Bhanwar Lal (A-7) was also arrested and a chargesheet came to be filed against him after about 3 years of the first chargesheet on 2.1.1990. His case was also committed to the same Court. He was also charged for the same offences, with which the earlier accused persons were charged on 22.6.1988. The charge against Bhanwar Lal (A-7) was framed on 8.2.1990. All the accused abjured their guilt. The witnesses, who were earlier examined like Lokendra Singh (PW-1), Badri Lal (PW-2) were recalled. The evidence of all the witnesses, whose evidence was recorded earlier, was then recorded again. Ultimately, the Sessions Judge found all the accused persons guilty. The prosecution mainly relied on the evidence of Lokendra Singh (PW-1) and Badri Lal (PW-2). During the investigation, the Test Identification Parade was also held since barring the two appellants, no other name was mentioned in the First Information Report. The evidence of the Magistrate was also recorded.

Thereafter, in Column No. 9, he named the said person as Heera S/o Hardev, Caste Gujjar, R/o Gamach.

12. We, therefore, hold that the appeal has no merits and has to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed.