L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Girjesh Shriastaa & Ors vs State Of M.P. & Ors

3. Appellants are a group of Grade II and III school teachers working in Panchayat Schools as Samvida Shala Shikshak (contractual teachers). They had been appointed under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Contractual Teachers (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Rules, 2001 (hereinafter "2001 Rules"). These selection rules which had come into force on 11.07.2001 were made in 2 exercise of the powers conferred under sub-

8. With respect to WP No. 1529/2001 the High Court allowed the writ petition and ordered the cancellation of appointments, inter alia, on the grounds that appointments were illegal as members of the selection committee allowed their near relatives to appear in the selection process. It stated that on the basis of an inquiry conducted by the District Collector, show-cause notices were issued to three members of the selection committee asking them as to why did their relatives appeared as candidates in the selection.

28. More importantly, in deciding these issues, the High Court should have been mindful of the fact that an order for cancellation of appointment would render most of the appellants unemployed. Most of them were earlier teaching in Non-formal education centers, from where they had resigned to apply in response to the advertisement. They had left their previous employment in view of the fact that for their three year long teaching experiences, the interview process in the present selection was awarding them grace marks of 25 per cent. It had also given them a relaxation of 8 years with respect to their age. Now, if they lose their jobs as a result of High 22 Court's order, they would be effectively unemployed as they cannot even revert to their earlier jobs in the Non-formal education centers, which have been abolished since then. This would severely affect the economic security of many families. Most of them are between the age group of 35-45 years, and the prospects for them of finding another job are rather dim. Some of them were in fact awaiting their salary rise at the time of quashing of their appointment by the High Court.

29. With utmost respect to the High Court, we are constrained to observe that equities were not properly balanced in the exercise of discretion by the High Court.

30. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgments of the High 23 Court are quashed. The selection proceedings are upheld.

31. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
Mohd.Saud & Anr vs Shaikh Mahfooz & Ors

4. The facts have been mentioned in the impugned judgment of the High Court and hence we are not repeating the same here.

14. In the present case the LPA was filed after 2002 and hence in our opinion they are not maintainable.

18. It would be strange to hold that while two appeals will be maintainable against interlocutory orders of a District Judge, only one appeal will be maintainable against a final judgment of the District Judge.

23. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the Full Bench of the High Court has taken a correct view. Thus there is no force in these appeals, which are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 9323-9324 OF 2010 [arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.13684-85 of 2009]

24. Leave granted.

26. In our opinion, though the judgment of the learned Single Judge is a final judgment, it is in another sense an interlocutory order as it is well settled that an appeal is a continuation of the original 1 proceedings. Since the original order of the learned Additional District Judge was an interlocutory order, hence the appeal against that order and the judgment of learned Single Judge in that sense was also interlocutory.

28. For the reasons given above, we dismiss these appeals without going into the merits of the case. However, we direct the learned Additional District Judge to decide the suit expeditiously. No costs.

th 25 OCTOBER, 2010 1
Collector, Phagwara & Ors vs Brahm Dutt & Anr

2) Brief facts :

5, 46 Min. East 2-4 (KM), 47/8-0, 50/8-0, total measuring 20-K-9M, bearing Khewat No. 24, Khatauni No. 109 situated in village Bishanpur, Tehsil Phagwara, as per Jamabandi for the year 1990-91, was owned by the Punjab Government and the respondent had unauthorisedly taken possession of the same. In the petition filed against Brahm Dutt, it was stated that as per Jamabandi for the year 1975-76 land measuring Khewat No. 240 Khatauni No. 240, Khatauni No. 112, Khasra No. 37/K7 M4 38/8K-0M, 39 Min. North 2K-4M, 40 Min. North 2K-6M total measuring 19K-14M KM belongs to the Punjab Government and has been unauthorisedly occupied by the respondents.

7) When the respondents herein filed appeals before the Commissioner under Section 9 of the Act, without adverting to any of these material aspects, the Commissioner dismissed both the appeals by passing a cryptic order.

9) On going through the factual details, the stand of the respondents, their assertions, the statement of Patwari and the Office Qanungo and the entries in the relevant Jamabandi, we feel that the ends of justice would be met by directing the original authority - the Collector, Phagwara, to pass fresh order after considering the above 9 materials and after affording opportunity to all the parties concerned. Both the parties are permitted to lead fresh evidence, if any, with reference to their respective claim/stand within a period of eight weeks. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the claim/stand of both the parties and it is for the Collector to apprise and take a decision in accordance with law within a period of six months. In view of the same, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court as well as the orders of the original authority - Collector, Phagwara and the appellate authority - the Commissioner, Jalandhar.

10) In the result, the civil appeals are allowed to the limited extent. There shall be no order as to costs.

OCTOBER 25, 2010.
State Of Uttaranchal & Ors vs M/S. Khurana Brothers

2. The Divisional Forest Officer, Nainital Forest Range, Nainital notified public auction of resin at Bhuwali Forest Rest House on March 24, 2001. The writ petitioner (Khurana Brothers) participated in that public auction. Its bid in the sum of Rs. 3,90,000/- being the highest bid was accepted by the Divisional Forest Officer, Nainital and the formal contract of sale for crude resin was entered into between the competent authority of the State Government in the name of the Governor and the writ petitioner on March 24, 2001. Subsequently a letter was issued on April 7, 2001 asking the writ petitioner to lift the contracted resin within 60 days therefrom. 2

5. The buyer shall furnish the Forest Officer in writing with the names of all the agents and servants it proposes employ for it before they are employed and the Forest Officer shall be at liberty to forbid the employment of any person whom he may consider undesirable.

(i) ...........

(i) .............

Description of instrument Proper stamp duty

(a) . . . . . . . .

(b) If relating to moveable property -

15. The Division Bench travelled beyond scope of review in reviewing the judgment dated April 13, 2004. In our view, the view taken in the judgment dated April 13, 2004 did not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record justifying its review.

16. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed and the impugned judgment dated December 27, 2007 is set aside. The parties shall bear their own costs.

(P. Sathasivam) .................... J.

(R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 27, 2010.
Naushad vs State Of U.P

1. The appellant herein was apprehended by the Food Inspector on 4th August, 1981, while retailing milk. The Public Analyst in his Report dated 26th August, 1981 opined that the milk was adulterated inasmuch as that the milk contained 6.7% non-fatty solids which was below the prescribed standard of 9%. The appellant was, accordingly, tried and convicted under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. An appeal was thereafter taken to the Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffar Nagar, who vide his judgment dated 5th November, 1985, maintained the conviction and sentence. A revision CRL.A. No. 186 of 2006 2 petition filed by the appellant before the High Court was also dismissed on 28th July, 2003. This matter has been pending in this Court since the year 2004. We observe that the findings of fact call for no interference. However, in the light of the fact that the incident happened in the year 1981 and the appellant has been facing trial or court proceedings in one forum or the other for years and that he is as of now 84 years of age, we feel that keeping in mind the observations of this Court in Haripada Das v. State of W..B. & Anr. (1998) 9 SCC 678 and Bhagwan Das Motulal Navalani v. State of Maharashtra (1987) 2 SCC 645 the ends of justice would be met if the sentence is reduced to that already undergone although we are conscious of the fact that the appellant has undergone only 15 days of the sentence.

With this modification, in the orders of the courts below, the appeal is dismissed.

J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] ...........................

J [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD] NEW DELHI CRL.A. No. 186 of 2006 3 OCTOBER 27, 2010.
Amina Beevi vs Thachi & Ors

2. The facts very briefly are that Makkar Sahib was the owner of the suit property and in the year 1945-46 he made an oral lease of the suit property in favour of Kunjali on an annual rent. Pursuant to the oral lease, Kunjali obtained possession of the suit property and remained in possession of the suit property. Makkar Sahib died and on 24.07.1968, the legal heirs of late Makkar Sahib, namely, his wife Mariyumma, his daughter Kochu Pathu and his son Abdul Kadar executed a sale deed (Ext. A1) in respect of three acres of land out of the suit property in favour of Aisu and another sale deed (Ext. A2) in respect of two acres and one acre out of the suit property in favour of Fathima Beevi and Amina Beevi. On 29.07.1968, Kunjali executed a leasehold assignment deed (Ext. A3) in favour of Abdul Kadar. On 29.07.1968 Mariyumma, Kochu Pathu and Abdul Kadar executed a sale deed (Ext. A4) in favour of Kunjali in respect of 75 cents of land. The purchasers of the suit property under Exhibits A1 and A2, namely, Aisu, Fathima Beevi and Amina Beevi obtained loans from the State Bank of Travancore and mortgaged the properties purchased by them under Exhibits A1 and A2 in 3 favour of the Bank as security for the loan. When the loan was not repaid, the State Bank of Travancore filed a mortgage suit, O.S. No.131 of 1974, and obtained a decree for sale of the mortgaged property. In the year 1974, Mariyumma, Kochu Pathu and Abdul Kadar also sold some portions of the suit property to V.K. Kesavan and Janaky. Kunjali died leaving behind his wife Thachi, sons C.A. Sulaiman and M.A. Karim and daughters Aisha, Pathu and Howa. Thachi, Sulaiman, Aisha, Pathu and Howa (Plaintiffs) filed a suit, O.S. No.129 of 1980, against Mariyumma, Kochu Pathu, Abdul Kadar, Fathima Beevi, Amina Beevi, Aisu, V.K. Kesavan, Janaky and the State Bank of Travancore (defendant nos. 1 to 9) and the Trial Court decreed the suit declaring that the plaintiffs have leasehold right over the suit property and are entitled to recover possession of the suit property from defendants no. 1 to 9 and are also entitled to mesne profit from the date of suit till recovery of the possession or till expiry of period of 3 years whichever was earlier. Aggrieved, the State Bank of Travancore, Amina Beevi, V.K. Kesavan and Janaky filed three appeals, A.S. Nos. 111, 117 and 121 of 1986. By a judgment 4 and decree dated 30.10.1987, the Additional District Judge, Parur, dismissed the appeals. Against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Parur, Amina Beevi and the State Bank of Travancore filed Second Appeal Nos. 517 of 1988 and 311 of 1988 under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and by the impugned common judgment and decree dated 28.03.2007, the High Court dismissed the second appeals.

13. In the result, we hold that there is no merit in these Special Leave Petitions and we accordingly dismiss the same. No costs.
Hari Chand Roach vs Hem Chand & Ors

2. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are recapitulated as under.

4. Admittedly, Hari Ram, Kharia and Delu were brothers and they inherited an undivided share in the two joint family properties, one situated at Chak Nani measuring 55 Bigha 2 Biswas and the other situated Chak Kaljer, measuring 103 Bigha 10 Biswas.

5. Hari Ram died in 1954 without any male issue and he was survived by his widow Jamni and daughter Debku. After the death of Hari Ram, Jamni inherited the entire share of Hari Ram in both the Chaks and consequently mutation was carried out in her name in the year 1955.

7. Jamni filed an application for partition of the land in Chak Kaljer against her two brothers-in- law Kharia and Delu. A compromise was arrived at between them on 13.11.1963. As per the compromise, an oral gift was made by Jamni to Hem Chand son of Kharia by which she gifted 40 Bigha 10 Biswas of land at Chak Kaljer. As per the settlement dated 4.6.1964 between the parties, Jamni received 36 4 Bigha 6 Biswas of land at Chak Nani. Approximately 36 Bigha of land was exchanged as per the family arrangement between the parties. Jamni and her daughter Debku were shown as the owner in possession of the Jamabandi record of rights.

8. The appellant Hari Chand Roach purchased 36 Bigha 6 Biswas of land from Jamni and Debku for a consideration of Rs.40,000/- by a registered sale deed on 22.6.1979. Rs.9,000/- was paid at the time of giving possession of the land and the balance amount of Rs.31,000/- was paid in the presence of Sub Registrar and other witnesses.

9. Kharia and Delu filed a suit on 12.7.1979 for declaration and possession and prayed that the sale deed be declared void. The Trial Court i.e. the Court of Sub Judge, 1st Class, Theog, vide its judgment dated 31.12.1987 dismissed the suit holding that Jamni and Debku had a limited interest in the estate. Against the judgment of the Trial Court, appeals were filed by both the parties before the District Judge. The learned District Judge partly allowed the appeal of the present appellant on 5 15.12.1992 and dismissed the appeal filed by the respondent herein. The Trial Court judgment was affirmed by the learned District Judge.

19. On consideration of the totality of the facts 15 and circumstances of this case, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and consequently the same is set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

.....................J (DALVEER BHANDARI) .....................J (DEEPAK VERMA) New Delhi;

October 28, 2010.
Ayodha Prasad vs State

2. Kamlesh Kumari Prasad, the deceased daughter of Ayodhya Prasad P.W. 1 was married to Chandrika Prasad about two years prior to the incident in question. Kamlesh Kumari died due to 100 per cent burn injuries on the 4th September, 1989. A First Information Report was, accordingly, lodged by P.W. 1 in which he spelt out that his son-in-law i.e. Chandrika Prasad was posted in Kashmir Crl. A. 583 of 2004 2 and the appellant-Ayodhya Prasad and his wife Sarju Devi, his parents were harassing her by demanding a Vicky Motor Cycle. This demand was repeated several times in the presence of P.W. 4 Babulal, the brother of P.W. 1 as well. It is further in evidence that on account of the non- satisfaction of the demand Kamlesh Kumari was subjected to cruelty and was also denied her food. It is the prosecution story that on account of this situation she committed suicide on the day in question. The trial court by its judgment dated 6th September, 1991, held that there was no categoric evidence against Sarju Devi, the mother- in-law as the primary evidence was against the appellant herein. The trial court, accordingly, acquitted Sarju Devi and convicted the appellant for the aforesaid offences. An appeal was thereafter taken by the appellant to the High Court which has confirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed this appeal. It is in this situation the matter is before us, after the grant of special leave.

6. It has been held by this Court repeatedly that the normal period of sentence for an offence under Section 304B is seven years. The award of a sentence of ten years in the present matter is to our mind not justified. We, accordingly, while dismissing the appeal, reduce the sentence imposed on the appellant from ten years to seven years. With this modification in the sentence the appeal is dismissed. The appellant to be taken into custody forthwith to complete the remaining part of the sentence.

7. Bail bonds stand cancelled.

J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] ...........................

J [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD] NEW DELHI Crl. A. 583 of 2004 5 OCTOBER 26, 2010.
Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs Ashis Chatterjee & Anr

4. Very briefly stated the facts material for the adjudication of this appeal can be stated thus:

7. Having failed to secure bail from the Sessions Court, the accused preferred a bail application, being C.R.M. No. 272 of 2010 before the High Court under Section 439 of the Code. As stated above, by the impugned order, the High Court allowed the application, and granted bail to the accused by a short order, observing thus:

14. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The bail bond and the surety furnished by the accused in terms of the impugned order stands cancelled and it is directed that he will be taken into custody forthwith. Needless to add that observations touching the merits of the case against the accused are purely for the purpose of deciding the question of grant of bail and if in future any such application is filed by the accused, it shall be considered on its own merits untrammelled by any of these observations.

OCTOBER 29, 2010.
State Of U.P.& Ors vs Bhupendra Nath Tripathi & Ors

3. In order to appreciate as to whether the impugned judgment rendered by the Full Bench suffers from any 3 infirmities requiring our interference, few relevant facts may have to be noticed:

12. As pointed out in the instant case, the problem confronting the State of Uttar Pradesh with respect to imparting free and compulsory education appears to be a gigantic one. A scheme known as Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan was launched by the Government of India and for universalization of education, time bound goals have been ascertained. In order to achieve those goals, the State of Uttar Pradesh appointed 33,000 B.Ed. graduates in the primary schools controlled by U.P. Basic Education after the selection and successful completion of six months Special BTC Course. The State, thereafter, addressed NCTE requesting it to accord necessary recognition/consent to conduct and to select the 14 candidates for Special BTC Training 2006 as proposed by the State Government to fill the vacancies in Parshadiya School of Basic Education all over U.P. and to admit the B.Ed./L.T.B.P.Ed./C.P.Ed./D.P.Ed. trained candidates in the training. The NCTE, having considered the proposal submitted by the Government of Uttar Pradesh for Special BTC Course of six months duration granted one time approval for training candidates for being appointed as primary teachers who were already B.Ed. subject to the fulfillment of the following:

14. Before we proceed further, one important factor that is required to be borne in mind in the present case is that on the date of notification all the colleges from which the writ petitioners obtained their degrees were recognized by NCTE. We make it clear that the candidates securing the degrees from those institutions whose applications were ultimately rejected by NCTE stands entirely on different footing.

(a), pass an order refusing recognition to such institution for reasons to, be recorded in writing:

VIEW OF THE NCTE

25. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgments do not suffer from any infirmities requiring our interference.

26. As a result, the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed.
Anokh Singh vs Punjab State Election Commission

4. Civil Writ Petition No. 7727 of 2008 was filed by a Lambardar, who was seeking election to the Gram Sabha, Village Ladpur, Tehsil Amloh, Distt. Fatehgarh Saheb. He had come to know from a news item in the Daily `Ajit' dated 3.5.2008 that Lambardar and Anganwari workers have been debarred from contesting election as Member Panchayat. On enquiry, the appellant came to know that a Circular Memo No. SEC-2008/4365 has been issued conveyed to all the Deputy Commissioners-cum-District Electoral Officers in the State that Lambardars and Anganwari workers, who are ineligible to contest elections as Member of Panchayat because they hold `office of profit'. As a result of which, the appellant was debarred from contesting the election as Member Panchayat, which he intended to contest as he was otherwise duly qualified to contest the same. The prayer in the writ petition was for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned memorandum by which Lambardars and Anganwari 3 workers have been debarred from contesting the elections.

6. The High Court upon detailed consideration of the entire matter concluded that the office of Lambardars is an `office of profit' and, therefore, the Lambardar would be disqualified from contesting the election. To this extent, the impugned memorandum was held valid. Consequently, Civil Writ Petition No. 7727 of 2008 was dismissed.

31. In view of the above, the conclusion reached by the High Court that receipt of Rs.900/- is not compensatory can not be accepted. It would be preposterous to accept, in this day and age, that a sum of Rs.900/- per month would be sufficient to cover the out of pocket expenses of a Lambardar.

32 Accordingly, the Commission is of the view that the Lambardar and Anganwari workers held "office of profit" and thus are ineligible to contest.

Sd/-

34. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, in so far as it relates to Lambardars. The impugned circular dated 30.4.2008 is quashed and set aside qua the Lambardars also.

35 Civil Appeal No. of 2010 @ Special Leave Petition (C) No.10948 of 2009 :

October 29, 2010.