L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Stanly Moses vs State Of Tamil Nadu

3. The prosecution case was that the deceased John Reghu was learning auto driving from his friend PW-4 Selvan Daniel. The appellant Stanly Moses took on hire the autorickshaw owned by PW 4. When PW 4 demanded the auto rickshaw hire charges from the appellant, the deceased John Reghu supported PW 4 and asked the appellant to pay the hire charges to PW 4. The appellant objected to it and there was a quarrel between the deceased and the appellant. On the date of the incident (27.8.1996) the appellant went to the house of the deceased and inquired whether the deceased was at home. PW-1, the mother of the deceased, stated that he was not at home. The appellant went away making threats against the deceased. Later, on the same day, appellant met the deceased and there ensued a quarrel between them and the appellant stabbed the deceased who died as a result of the injury sustained. PW1 (mother of the deceased) and PW2 (sister of the deceased) were the two eye witnesses who supported the prosecution case. Their evidence was believed by the Sessions Court and the High Court. We find no reason to disbelieve their evidence as to what transpired on that day or the finding of guilt recorded by the courts below.

6. The appeal is disposed of accordingly, modifying the sentence to the extent mentioned above.
State Of Maharashtra vs Madhukar Wamanrao Smarth

3. On the basis of allegations that the respondents were guilty of having committed cheating, preparing forged and false documents for the purpose of cheating, using the said documents as genuine, abetment of crime, committing criminal breach of trust by forming criminal conspiracy in furtherance of their common intention, law was set into motion.

4. They were convicted by the trial Court, and have preferred appeals before the High Court and had prayed for grant of bail by suspension of sentence in terms of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). The High Court primarily granted bail to each of the respondents on the ground that bail was granted during trial and the liberty was not misused. Further ground indicated was that there was likelihood of delay in disposal of the appeals. In the case of respondent-Madhukar it was stated that the evidence appeared to be scanty against him.

8. The factual details involved are as follows:

J U D G M E N T CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 520-521 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 5951-5952/2007) (With Crl.A. 522 /2008 @SLP (Crl.) No. 7157/2007) (With Crl.A. 523 /2008 @SLP (Crl.) No. 7158/2007) (With Crl.A. 524-527 /2008 @SLP (Crl.) No. 7159-7162/2007) (With Crl.A. 528 /2008 @SLP (Crl.) No. 7164/2007) (With Crl.A. 529 /2008 @SLP (Crl.) No. 8114/2007) Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

(C) U/S 471 r/w 34 IPC + S. 248

(D) U/S 120B + S.248(ii) IPC Total Imprisonment (A) U/S 420 r/w S. 34 IPC (B) U/S 468 r/w S.34 IPC (C) U/S 471 r/w S. 34 IPC (D) U/s 120B r/w S.109 and S.34 IPC (E) U/s 409 IPC Total imprison- ment (A) U/S 420 r/w Sec. 34 IPC (B) U/S. 468 r/w S.34 IPC (C) U/S. 471 r/w S.34 IPC (D) U/S.120B r/w S.109 and S.34 IPC (E) U/S 409 IPC Total imprison- Ment (A) U/S 420 r/w S.34 IPC (B) U/S 468 r/w S.34 IPC (C) U/S 471 r/w S.34 IPC (D) U/S 120B r/w S.109 and S.34 IPC (E) U/S 409 IPC Total Imprison-

ment Acquittal Acquittal Acquittal Acquittal Imprisonment (A) RI for 6 years And fine of Rs.20000/-

And in default to Suffer RI for one Month (D) RI for 6 months And to pay fine Of Rs.2,000/-

And in default To suffer RI for 2 months (B) RI for 5 years And to pay fine Of Rs.15,000/-

And in default To suffer RI For 2 months (B) RI for 5 Years and to Pay fine of Rs.15,000 And in Default to Suffer RI for 2 months (C) RI for 1 Year and to Pay fine of Rs.5,000/-

And in Default to Suffer RI for 1 month (D) RI for 6 months and to pay fine of Rs.2,000 and in default to suffer RI for 15 days (E) RI for 3 Years and to Pay fine of Rs.20,000 And in Default to Suffer RI for 3 months (sentences to run consecutivel y) 12 yrs.

6 months Acquittal Acquittal Acquittal Acquittal

12. The appeals are allowed.
Drugs Inspector & Anr vs Fizikem Laboratories Pvt. Ltd.& Anr

3. The brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are that the Inspector of Drugs inspected some of the business premises of these respondents where Ozomen capsules and Ozomen forte were available for sale. He took the samples and after taking the sample he sent the same to the Government Analyst, Hyderabad for analysis. The Government Analyst submitted his report declaring that Ozomen capsules under different batches contained 45.2 mg of sildenafil citrate per capsule. The persons from whom the samples were taken were called upon to disclose the name of manufacturer and on disclosure of the name of manufacturer, prosecution was launched against the respondents for contravention of Sections 18), 18(a) (i) read with Section 17B(d) of the Act namely, prohibition of manufacture and sale of certain drugs and cosmetics which are misbranded, spurious and substituted wholly or in part by another drug or substance and the Central Government prohibited manufacturer etc. of the drugs and cosmetics in public interest under notification issued under Section 26- A, vide notification No.GSR 577(e) dated 23.7.1983 punishable under Sections 27(b)(ii), 27(c), 27(d) and 28-B of the Act. It is this action initiated by the Drugs Inspector which was challenged. The respondents were arrayed as accused for the aforesaid offences because they had no licence for the manufacture of Ayurvedic drug sildenafil citrate and they were mislabeling the Ayurvedic drugs. The sildenafil citrate is a new drug and it is patent and proprietary medicine. It is an allopathic drug used for erectile dysfunction. The respondent-accused company was holding Allopathic as well as Ayurvedic licence but the company does not hold the licence to manufacture sildenafil citrate. The information was received by the Drugs Inspector that sildenafil citrate manufactured by these companies for various medical establishments in the State of Andhra Pradesh had no licence to manufacture sildenafil citrate. Ozomen forte capsule contained 33.9 mg to 46.82 mg of sildenafil citrate per capsule. Therefore, the question was whether the respondent- company which are manufacturing Ayurvedic drug and had no licence for manufacturing sildanefil forte could be prosecuted under Chapter IV or not.

8. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct that the Inspector appointed under Chapter IV is competent to launch prosecution for the aforesaid sections against the accused. We have also been informed in the alternative prosecution has also been launched against the accused under Chapter IVA. Both the prosecution can be tagged together and the learned trial court should proceed with the matter. However, any observations made by us in disposing this appeal will not prejudice the rights of either parties.
Union Of India & Ors vs Laishram Lincola Singh @ Nicolai

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Guwahati High Court, Imphal Bench allowing the habeas corpus petition filed by the respondent. The habeas corpus petition was filed questioning the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Manipur, Imphal West, dated 23.9.2005 in exercise of powers conferred by sub- section (3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (in short the 'Act') read with Home Department's order No.17(1)/49/80-H(Pt) dated 6.9.2005, which was approved by the State Government under order No.17(1)/947/2005-H dated 5.10.2005 and again confirmed by order of State Government being No.17(1)/947/2005-H dated 7.11.2005 fixing the period of detention for 12 months from the date of detention. The order of detention was challenged primarily on the ground that there was unexplained delay in disposing of the representation made by the detenu. The High Court accepted the plea that there was an unexplained delay.

15. The grounds of detention in the present case are a long one running into 35 paragraphs which were accompanied by 82 documents running into 447 pages. The representation made by the appellant was also a fairly long one. The representation made by the appellant on 24-3-1998 was received by the Ministry on 27-3-1998. The comments of the sponsoring authority were called on 30-3- 1998 which were received on 17-4-1998. The comments were placed before the Secretary (R) through the ADG on 22-4-1998 (18th and 19th being holidays). The decision of the Central Government was taken and communicated on 29-4-1998 (25th and 26th being holidays). The representation was also considered by the detaining authority in the meantime and was rejected on 21-4-1998. In the additional affidavit filed on behalf of the sponsoring authority before the High Court, it was stated that the representation was received by them on 2-4-1998 and the comments were dispatched on 17-4-1998. During this period, there were holidays on 4th, 5th, 8th to 12th April, and only seven working days were available. Again there were holidays on 18th, 19th, 25th and 26th April. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are clearly of the opinion that the entire time taken in consideration and disposal of the representation made by the appellant has been fully explained and it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that there was any inordinate delay or unexplained delay in considering the representation made by the appellant. The challenge to the detention order made on the ground of delay in consideration of the representation made by the appellant has no substance and deserves to be rejected."

8. The order of the High Court is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. The period of detention fixed by the order of detention being over, it is open to the detaining authority to consider whether there is any need for detaining the respondent as the situation stands now.

9. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
L.N.Agarwal vs Meerajuddin N.Patel Etc. Etc

JUDGMENT O R D E R TRANSFER PETITION(CRL.) NO.172 OF 2007 These Transfer Petitions have been filed under Section 406 Cr.P.C. seeking transfer of three cases (i) FIR No. 157/2006 dated 31.10.2006 titled Meerajuddin N.Patel vs. L.N.Agarwal, pending in the Court of the Principal Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bidar, Karnataka (ii) FIR No. 67/03 titled L.N.Agarwal vs. Meerajuddin N.Patel & Anr., pending in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Humnabad as CC No.74/2003 and (iii) Criminal Complaint Case No. 762/03 titled L.N.Agarwal vs. Meerajuddin N. Patel pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Humnabad, District Bidar, Karnataka from Karnataka to any other State. State of Karnataka has not filed counter affidavit despite time. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the transfer petition and counter affidavit, we deem it appropriate to transfer the aforesaid cases from the State of Karnataka to Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh.

TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) NO.172 OF 2007 -2- We order accordingly.

The District Judge, Bidar (Karnataka) is directed to transmit forthwith the entire record relating to the aforesaid three cases to the District Judge, Hyderabad(Andhra Pradesh), who on receipt of the same may assign these cases to a court of competent jurisdiction and dispose them of together.

The Transfer Petition is allowed accordingly.
Laxmi Devi & Others vs Mohammad Tabbar & Another

2. This appeal is filed by the widow and five children of one Rajendra Singh who died in an accident on 12.4.2004 when he was riding on his bicycle and was given a dash by the offending vehicle, a Canter Truck bearing Registration No.UA-04-1486. Rajendra Singh died on the spot. The driver of the offending vehicle was caught on the spot. The claimants, therefore, filed the claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal on the basis that Rajendra Singh used to earn Rs.140/- per day and Rs.4200/- per month and that his age at the time of accident was barely 35 years. In support of the claim, three witnesses including Laxmi Devi, the wife of the deceased were examined and the Tribunal, on the basis of the evidence, held that the deceased Rajendra Singh died on account of the injuries sustained by him in the accident on 12.4.2004 which accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. As regards the income, the Tribunal assessed the same at Rs.15,000/- per annum on the basis of the notional income prescribed in Second Schedule under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. After deducting 1/3rd of the said amount as the personal expenses of the deceased, the claimants dependency was assessed at Rs.10,000/- per month and by multiplying the annual dependency of Rs.10,000/- with the multiplier of 16, the compensation was worked out to Rs.1,60,000/-. The other claims were also awarded being Rs.2,000/- for funeral expenses, Rs.5,000/- for loss of consortium to the widow and Rs.2,000/- for loss of estate. Thus a total sum of Rs.1,69,000/- was awarded as compensation to the claimants. The Tribunal directed the payment of interest on the amount of compensation at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of claim petition.

8. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. There would be no order as to costs.
State Of U.P. And Anr vs Pramod Kumar Shukla And Anr

3. Challenge in the first writ petition was to the order passed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad dated 2.8.2004 holding that respondent-Pramod Kumar Shukla had received grant in aid to the tune of Rs.21,27,551.13 between 2.4.1990 to 1.4.1995 under Government Order dated 21.7.1986 by concealing facts and by practicing fraud. It was pointed out that he had concealed the fact that he was not the owner and was not, therefore, entitled to receive the grant in aid. Therefore, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 5(3) of the U.P. Cinema Regulation Act, 1955 (in short the Cinema Act) order of recovery was given and grant in aid sanctioned to him vide office order No.299 dated 10.4.1990 was set aside. Application for renewal dated 1.7.1994 submitted by said Pramod Kumar Shukla was rejected in exercise of powers conferred under Section 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 (in short General Clauses Act). Further order was passed under Section 12(1) of the U.P. Entertainment Tax Act, 1979 (in short Entertainment Act) directing him to deposit the amount of entertainment tax collected by such cheating and fraud during 2.4.1990 and 1.4.1995 amounting to Rs.21,27,551.13.

4. Background facts which are almost undisputed run as follows:

It is the stand of the appellants that Pramod Kumar Shukla falsely represented himself as the owner and the licence was granted on the premises that Pramod Kumar Shukla was the owner of the Cinema Hall. His father Satya Prakash Shukla made a representation and, therefore, there was no renewal of the licence which operated from 30.3.1990 to 31.3.1993 both days inclusive. A show cause notice was issued on 19.6.2004 alleging that the permission granted for operating the permanent Cinema Hall was obtained by suppressing the factual position by Pramod Kumar Shukla mis-representing himself to be the owner. Notice was given to show cause as to why the amount of grant in aid which was obtained by fraud and by concealing the facts shall not be recovered under Section 12(1) of the Entertainment Act and the grant in aid sanctioned by order No.299 dated 10.4.90 should not be cancelled and the application for renewal of licence should not be rejected.

8. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
Emm Tex Synthetics vs Om Parkash & Anr

2. In spite of due service on the respondents, no one has entered appearance. At the time of hearing of this appeal also, no one has appeared before us to contest the appeal.

6. That being the position, we set aside the Judgment of the High Court and request the High Court to decide the appeal filed under Section 30 of the Act in accordance with law and after giving hearing to the parties, dispose of the same after passing a reasoned order within six months from the date of supply of a copy of this order.

7. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order is set aside. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
Orchid Employeesã† Union & Ors vs Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court allowing the Civil Revision Petition filed by the respondent. By the common order three Civil Revision Petitions were disposed of. The Civil Revision Petitions were filed against a common order of dismissal in I.A. Nos.1489 to 1491 of 2006 in OS No. 360 of 2006 dated 13.3.2007 by the Learned District Munsif Madurantagam filed by the respondent to restrain the present appellant No.1-Union and its members from assembling within 100 meters of the boundary of its company and restraining them from obstructing the ingress and egress of vehicles carrying raw material and finished products, staff bus and other vehicles into the respondent Company and also obstructing loyal workers, foreign customers and other visitors from entering into the premises of the company and getting out of the same till the disposal of the suit.

4. The present appellants and members of 17th respondent Union (before the High Court) were restrained to assemble within 100 meters of the boundary of the factory premises of the respondent company and raise slogans or obstruct the ingress and egress of the vehicles carrying raw materials and finished products, staff bus and other vehicles into factory premises, and obstruct the loyal workers, foreign customers and other visitors from entering into the respondent company and getting out of the same till the disposal of the suit or the conciliation proceedings, whichever is earlier. It was, however, observed, that the above interim injunctions will not in any way interfere with the present appellants rights to strike or with the exercise of any other rights conferred by the Industrial Disputes Act or the Trade Unions Act. Though the workers cannot be prevented from gathering or picketing beyond the limit of 100 meters, such assembling and picketing were to be peaceful and lawful and without in any manner violating the directions given.

6. In view of the aforesaid position, we find that nothing further survives to be done in the appeal which is accordingly disposed of.
Union Of India & Ors vs Chander Mohan Trikha

JUDGMENT O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1334 OF 2005 Respondent, Shri Chander Mohan Trikha, was working as Scientist B, Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory, Chandigarh. By an order dated 16/5/1991 passed in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (h) of Article 459 of the Civil Service Regulations, he was compulsorily retired. The said order was passed on the basis of a recommendation by the Review Committee. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent preferred an original petition before the Central Administrative Tribunal. His original application was dismissed by the CAT on 1/4/1999. Aggrieved thereby, he preferred a writ petition before the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court, by its impugned order, set aside the order of the CAT dismissing the original application. The High Court also set aside the order dated 16/5/1991 compulsorily retiring the respondent from service.

For the reasons afore-stated, the impugned order of the High Court is not sustainable in law. It is, accordingly, set aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Madan Mohan Abbot vs State Of Punjab

3. Notice was issued in this case on 21st August 2006 and the operation of the order was stayed in the meanwhile. A counter affidavit has been filed by the sole respondent i.e. State of Punjab and it has been pointed out, inter-alia, that the investigating officer had no information about the compromise between the parties, that the case was ripe for the recording of the prosecution evidence and that Section 406 was not compoundable as the amount involved was more than Rs.250/-.

5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings which has been dismissed by the impugned order. We notice from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the dispute was purely a personal one between two contesting parties and that it arose out of extensive business dealings between them and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the allegations made against the accused. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the proceedings in the light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact that the complainant has, on 11th January 2004, passed away and the possibility of a conviction being recorded has thus to be ruled out. We need to emphasize that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law. We see from the impugned order that the learned Judge has confused a compounding of an offence with the quashing of proceedings. The outer limit of Rs.250/- which has led to the dismissal of the application is an irrelevant factor in the later case. We accordingly allow the appeal and in the peculiar facts of the case, direct that FIR No.155 dated 17th November 2001 P.S. Kotwali, Amritsar and all proceedings connected therewith shall be deemed to be quashed.
Government Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors vs N. Subbarayudu & Ors

Briefly stated the facts are as follows.

The respondents were Lecturers in private aided college. The age of superannuation of the respondents was 60 years. By an amendment of the Education Code in 1993, the age of superannuation of the respondents has been brought down to ......2.

58 years. In the said amendment it was also provided that the respondents shall be entitled to pension with effect from 1st November 1992.

For the reasons afore-stated, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The appeals are allowed.
Golla Yelugu Govindu vs State Of Andhra Pradesh

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

5. In appeal, the appellant took the plea that PWs. 2 and 3 should not have been pleaded as they are of tender age and were child witnesses. The High Court found that PWs. 2 and 3 were children of the deceased and the accused and there was no reason as to why they would falsely implicate their father. The High Court also discarded the plea that they were under the influence of PW1, their maternal grandfather. As noted above, the appeal was dismissed.

15. Considering the factual scenario in the background of the position in law as highlighted above, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice. Appeal is allowed to that extent.