L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Authorized Officer, State Bank Of ... vs Mathew K.C.

2. The present appeal assails an interim order dated 24.04.2015 passed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, staying further proceedings at the stage of Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, Date: 2018.01.30 15:38:03 IST Reason: 2002 (hereinafter referred as the ‘SARFAESI Act’), on deposit of 1 Rs.3,50,000/-within two weeks. An appeal against the same has also been dismissed by the Division Bench observing that counter affidavit having been filed, it would be open for the Appellant Bank to seek clarification/modification/variation of the interim order.

3. Shri H.P. Raval, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants, submits that the loan account of the Respondent was declared a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) on 28.12.2014. The outstanding dues of the Respondent on the date of the institution of the writ petition was Rs.41,82,560/-. Despite repeated notices, the Respondent failed and neglected to pay the dues. Statutory notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued to the Respondent on 21.01.2015. The objections under Section 13(3A) were considered, and rejection was communicated by the Appellant on 31.3.2015. Possession notice was then issued under Section 13(4) of the Act read with Rule 8 of The Security Interest (Enforcement) 2 Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) on 21.04.2015.

17. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.

19. The impugned orders are therefore contrary to the law laid down by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and unsustainable. They are therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed.

20. All questions of law and fact remain open for consideration in any application by the aggrieved before the statutory forum under the SARFAESI Act.
Yogesh Mahajan vs Prof. R. C. Deka Director All India ...

1. The petitioner who appears in person was initially engaged on a contract basis as a Technical Assistant (ENT) in the All India Institute of Medical Sciences in 1998. The initial contract was for a period of three months, but it was renewed from time to time, without any artificial breaks, on a quarterly or a six monthly basis. It appears that the services of the petitioner were taken on contract basis without following any laid down procedure and without adherence to any rules. The contract of the petitioner was finally extended from 1st January, 2010 to 30th June, 2010.

4. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the petitioner preferred a review petition, but that too was dismissed. Eventually, the petitioner preferred a writ petition in the Delhi High Court being W.P. (C) No. 7870 of 2011. The High Court passed a brief order recording that reliance placed by the Central Administrative Tribunal on the decision of this Court in Uma Devi was correct. It was also recorded that the learned counsel for the All India Institute of 1 (2006) 4 SCC 1 S.L.P. (C) Nos. 22475-22476 of 2012 Page 2 of 5 Medical Sciences had stated that no contract employee in the ENT Department had been granted an extension after 1st January, 2009. In these circumstances the High Court dismissed the writ petition of the petitioner by its order dated 19th December, 2011. The petitioner preferred a review petition in the High Court, but that too was dismissed by an order dated 24th January, 2012. In the circumstances, the petitioner has preferred the present petition.

9. We find no merit in these petitions and they are accordingly dismissed.

………………………J (Madan B. Lokur) ...……………………..J (Deepak Gupta) New Delhi;

January 31, 2018 S.L.P. (C) Nos. 22475-22476 of 2012 Page 5 of 5
Union Of India vs Leen Martin

2. A brief reference to the prosecution case may be necessary for disposal of this case. On 05.05.2004, the officers of Customs, Air Intelligence Unit, at Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport, Mumbai noticed that a passenger of European origin was found to be suspiciously loitering near the airline counters of Swiss Air. Observing such suspicious behavior, the airline personnel were alerted for segregating the baggage of the respondent no.1. After completing his immigration and custom formalities, respondent no.1 was intercepted by the Intelligence Officer and subjected to examination by a sniffer dog.

3. When there was an indication about the presence of narcotic or psychotropic substance, he was taken to a baggage examination area. On opening suit case his personal belongings were kept aside, even then, his suit case was found to be abnormally heavy. On examination, a false bottom was detected and when the false bottom was removed, three rectangular packets wrapped in cellophane tape were discovered containing brown colored substance which tested positive for hashish, a contraband substance. Net weight of 3 the recovered substance was found to be measuring 12.03 Kg. Later, the samples were drawn and the goods were seized under a seizure panchnama. It is to be noted that, on 06.05.2004, respondent no.1 recorded his statement under Section 67 of N.D.P.S Act. After completion of the investigation, charges levelled against him, the accused (respondent no. 1 herein) pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

In the facts and circumstances of this case exclusive reliance on the statement made by respondent no. 1 would neither be prudent nor safe; especially considering the fact that, the 7 statement of respondent no. 1 procured under Section 67 of the NDPS Act was retracted on 29.06.2004.

13. We are of the opinion that the High Court had rightly acquitted the respondent no.1 taking into consideration the aforesaid aspects.

14. In view of the above and having regard to the fact that the incident is of the year 2004, we find no reason to interfere 8 with the impugned order passed by the High Court. In the result, the appeal lacks merit and is dismissed.
Surender vs Nand Lal

2) The appellant herein is the owner of the premises situated in Main Bazar, Old Najafgarh Road, Bahadurgarh, Haryana. In these premises few shops were constructed in mid 1960s 1 by the father of the appellant and one shop each was let out by the respondents in these appeals. The premises are governed by the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) as per which tenants can be evicted only on certain specified grounds. One of the grounds for eviction is that the premises let out is in dilapidated condition and cannot be repaired/reconstructed without evicting the tenant. The appellant filed eviction petitions against the respondents before the Rent Controller, Bahadurgarh, under Section 13 of the Act on the ground that the shops which are built up on mud had become unsafe, inhabitable and were in dilapidated condition. The Rent Controller was pleased to dismiss the eviction petitions after recording a finding that tenanted premises were not in a dilapidated condition. The appeal was preferred by the appellant against the orders of the Rent Controller before the 1 Though respondents had disputed the year of construction and according to them construction was carried out 30-40 years ago only. 3 Additional District Judge-cum-Appellate Authority under the Act. These appeals were also dismissed. Thereafter, the appellant filed revision petitions, which have also been dismissed by the High Court. Identical orders are passed dismissing these revision petitions and the operative portion of order dated July 09, 2015 passed by the High Court in the revision petitions is as follows:

8) We, therefore, do not find any merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.

FEBRUARY 01, 2018.
Bengal Chemist And Druggists ... vs Kalyan Chowdhury

1) The present appeal is against an order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal dated 31.07.2017 by which the Appellate Tribunal, after setting out Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, (for short 'the Act') has dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, inasmuch as the appeal has been filed 9 days after the period of limitation of 45 days has expired and a further period of another 45 days has also expired.

11) This case again is wholly distinguishable. It applies only to a period of limitation which is given beyond which nothing further is stated as to whether delay may be condoned beyond such period. In the present case, the Section 417(3) does not merely contain the initial period of 45 days, in which case the aforesaid judgment would have applied. Section 417(3) goes on to state that another period of 45 days, being a grace period 9 given by the legislature which cannot be exceeded, alone would apply, provided sufficient cause is made out within the aforesaid grace period. As has been held by us above, it is the second period, which is a special inbuilt kind of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the special statute, which lays down that beyond the second period of 45 days, there can be no further condonation of delay. On this ground therefore, the aforesaid judgment also stands distinguished.

13) We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

February 02, 2018
Dataram Singh vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

9. On 13th January, 2016 the complainant lodged a First Information Report (FIR) No.16 of 2016 at Police Station Sahjanawa, Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh, alleging that the appellant had cheated him of an amount exceeding Rs.37 lakhs and had therefore committed an offence punishable under Sections 419, 420, 406 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. It was also alleged that the appellant had issued a cheque for Rs. 18 lakhs in favour of the complainant (returning a part of the amount of Rs. 37 lakhs) but had stopped payment of that cheque in violation of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

15. Even though the State of Uttar Pradesh has been served in the appeal, no one has put in appearance on its behalf. As far as the complainant is concerned, no reply was filed by the time the matter was taken up for consideration on 29th January, 2018. Accordingly, the matter was adjourned to 2nd February, 2018 by which date also no reply was filed by the complainant. As mentioned above, no one has put in appearance on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh to oppose the grant of bail to the appellant.

18. In our view, taking all these and other factors into consideration, it would be appropriate if the appellant is granted bail on conditions that may be reasonably fixed by the trial judge. We order accordingly. Crl. Appeal No.227/2018 (@ S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 151 of 2018) Page 8 of 9

19. We should not be understood to have expressed any opinion on the allegations made against the appellant, both in the charge sheet as well as in the complaint case filed against him.

20. The appeal is allowed.
Naveen Kumar vs Vijay Kumar And Ors

1 An accident took place at about 7:30 pm on 27 May 2009 when Smt. Jai Devi and her nephew Nitin were walking down a street in their village. A motor vehicle driven by Rakesh in the reverse gear hit them. Nitin was run over by the rear wheel of the car and died on the spot. Smt. Jai Devi received multiple injuries. Two claim petitions were filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’). One of them was by Smt. Jai Devi. The second was by Somvir and Smt. Saroj, the parents of Nitin. The vehicle involved in Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV the accident (a Maruti-800 bearing Registration DL-3CC-3684) was Date: 2018.02.06 14:45:23 TLT Reason:

2 By its award dated 6 October 2012, the Tribunal granted compensation in the amount of Rs 10,000/- to Smt. Jai Devi and of Rs.3,75,000/- on account of the death of Nitin, to his parents. The Tribunal noted that the registration certificate of the offending vehicle continued to be in the name of the First respondent. The Tribunal held the First respondent jointly and severally liable together with the driver of the vehicle. The vehicle was uninsured on the date of the accident.

.............................................CJI [DIPAK MISRA] ...............................................J [A M KHANWILKAR] …............................................J [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD] New Delhi;

February 06, 2018
Union Of India vs Pushpavathi & Ors. Etc.

3. The issue involved in these appeals is short and in order to appreciate the same, few relevant facts need mention hereinbelow.

5. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act“), the Government of Pondicherry on 22.12.1986 issued a Notification seeking to acquire land bearing Survey No.2 Pt. of an extent of 3 Hec. 83 Ares 50 Cen situated in village Pillaichavadi, Pondicherry for public purpose, namely, establishment of Central University (Phase-V). This was followed by a declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act on 12.03.1987. The acquired land included the lands belonging to the respondents herein.

6. The Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) passed an Award (No.2/1987) under Section 11 of the Act on 3 01.06.1987 and determined the compensation for the land acquired at the rate of Rs.318/- per Are.

9. Though the Collector made an enquiry, as contemplated under Section 28A of the Act, on the applications made by the respondents but no final orders were passed. The respondents, therefore, filed writ petitions (W.P No. 10649 of 1996 etc.) in the High Court at Madras.

10. The High Court, by order dated 19.08.1998 allowed the writ petitions in part and directed the Collector to dispose of the applications filed by the respondents under Section 28A of the Act. The Collector accordingly disposed of the applications by passing orders on different dates between 15.11.1994 and 22.11.1994 and re-determined the compensation payable to the respondents.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: 13

Section 34 34 Payment of interest:- When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited:

34. Likewise, we find that Sections 28 and 34, which deal with payment of interest on the awarded sum, are attracted in the case where the conditions specified under the respective sections are fulfilled by the landowner in his case.

45. Learned counsel for the appellants did not question the impugned judgment on merits, therefore, we need not examine the issue involved in the writ petitions on merits.

46. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in these appeals. The appeals thus fail and are accordingly dismissed.

In view of judgment passed in civil appeals @ S.L.P.(c) Nos.4689-4698 of 2012, these appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed.

………………………………..J (R.K. AGRAWAL) ..………………………………J. (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE) New Delhi, February 06, 2018 30
Madan @ Madhu Patekar vs The State Of Maharashtra

3. Crime No. 76/91 was registered by PSI Jadhav (PW11) against the accused. Thereafter spot panchanama was prepared, seized incriminating material such as kerosene oil tin, match box, pieces of saree, blouse etc. from the scene of offence and recorded statements of witnesses. On 16.12.1991, the victim Latabai succumbed to the burn injuries and the accused was arrested on 19.1.1992. In furtherance of investigation, postmortem on the body of the deceased was conducted, 3 chemical examiner’s report (Ext. 32) was obtained and the accused was charge sheeted. As he pleaded not guilty, learned Sessions Judge has conducted a full fledged trial resulting in the conviction of the accused/appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.100/-, in default, to further suffer imprisonment for a period of one month in addition.

4. The appellant—accused carried the matter by way of appeal to the High Court. The High Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt regarding the complicity of the accused in causing the unnatural death of Latabai by burn injuries. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Having aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the accused—appellant is in appeal before us.

13. Applying the settled legal position to the factual matrix of the case, the dying declaration of the deceased (Ext.10) was recorded by the Special Executive Magistrate (PW 1) on 14.12.1991 after obtaining the fitness condition of the victim by 9 the duty Medical Officer who issued the fitness certificate after examining the patient. There cannot be suspicion over the genuineness of the dying declaration as the deceased has described the incident and declared the name of the accused to be the culprit in clear and categorical terms. In that view of the matter, we have no hesitation to say that the dying declaration of the deceased in the instant case can form the sole basis for conviction of the accused—appellant.

15. Whereas the case on hand does not fall under any of the aforementioned categories, particularly, when the evidences of PWs 1 and 12 gets corroborated with the evidence of PW 8 (Dr. Kotkar) who confirmed his endorsement on the dying declaration (Ext. 10) which formed basis for the conviction of the accused. In such circumstances, we do not find the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court as well as the High Court as being perverse. The Courts below have taken the plausible view that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt as the dying declarations recorded by PWs 1 and 12 did not suffer from any infirmity and they inspire confidence. Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, we do not see any ground which requires our interference with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below. The appeal, therefore, fails and deserves to be dismissed.

17. The appeal stands dismissed accordingly.
Rithwik Energy Generation Pvt. Ltd. vs Bangalore Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. ...

1) The present appeals are filed by the appellant - a Generating Company, which entered into an Agreement dated 26.09.2006, with the Government of Karnataka for setting up a 24.75 MW mini hydro-electric power plant in a certain District in Karnataka. On 03.05.2007, the appellant and Respondent No.1 Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND signed a Power Purchase Agreement (for short 'the PPA'). Date: 2018.02.10 12:00:24 IST Reason: Pursuant to the Clauses of the PPA, Respondent No.1 sent the PPA to the State Commission for its approval. On 06.06.2007, the State Commission did not accord its approval to the PPA 2 and returned the same on the ground that Respondent No.1's quota of 10% under the Karnataka Regulations of 2004 had already been exhausted from other sources.

3) On 23.12.2010, the State Commission dismissed the appellant's O.P. holding that the return of the PPA did not tantamount to rejection, and this non-grant of approval, therefore, did not invalidate the PPA between the parties. An Appeal was preferred before the Appellate Tribunal, during the pendency of which a letter dated 05.05.2011 was sent by the appellant to Respondent No.1. As a great deal turns upon the effect of this letter, the relevant paragraphs are set out herein below:-

9) In appeals filed against both the 09.05.2013 order and the 17.10.2013 order, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals of the appellant, again relying upon the Appellate Tribunal's judgment dated 21.10.2011 in stating that the alleged notice dated 05.05.2011, not being in conformity with Clause 9.3.2 of the PPA, could not be said to be a default notice and that, therefore, any termination notice issued thereafter is also invalid. It also ultimately found, as a matter of fact, that so far as the Letter of Credit was concerned, since the appellant had not gone to the State Commission to remedy the same, it did 8 not find any fault with the State Commission's orders and ultimately after summarizing its findings, dismissed both the appeals.

21) It is unnecessary for us to pronounce on any further aspect, including the aspect of late payment and late opening of Letter of Credit. We are of the view that the Appellate Tribunal in the impugned judgment cannot be faulted on any score.

22) The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

February 06, 2018
M/S. Ongc Mangalore Petrochemicals ... vs M/S. Ans Constructions Limited

3) Brief facts:

(a) Respondent No. 1-the Contractee Company was awarded a Contract for “Site Grading, Construction of Roads, Water Drains and Compound Wall for Aromatic Complex at Mangalore” in Mangalore SEZ by the appellant-Contractor on 17.03.2008. The total contract value as per the Letter of Acceptance (LOA) was Rs. 163,25,68,576/- which was subsequently revised to Rs. 195,68,24,399.02/- vide letter dated 20.09.2010 and the completion period was also extended upto 30.11.2010.

(e) Vide letter dated 14.09.2013, the contractee-Company sent a notice to the appellant-Contractor for resolving the dispute between the parties through Arbitration as envisaged under Article 9.0.2.0 to the Contract and appointed Mr. K. Mohandas, Former General Manager (Law)- SBI as its 3 Arbitrator. The appellant-Contractor, vide letter dated 18.10.2013 denied the request of the contractee-Company as not tenable in law.

16) The appellant-Contractor, vide letter dated 25.07.2013, rejected the claim of the contractee-Company on the ground that the Contractee has submitted No Dues/No Claim Certificate and withdrawal of the same on the ground that it was obtained under duress and coercion is wrong, incorrect and not tenable in law. Being aggrieved by the rejection of their claim, the contractee-Company invoked the Arbitration clause under the Contract and appointed its Arbitrator. The appellant-Contractor, vide letter dated 18.10.2013, declined to nominate its Arbitrator. The contractee-Company filed a Civil Miscellaneous Petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short ‘the Act’) for the appointment of an Arbitrator in lieu of the nominee arbitrator of the appellant-Contractor so that the said arbitrator along with the nominee arbitrator already appointed by the contractee-Company agree upon the appointment of the third/presiding arbitrator for constitution of a three member Arbitral Tribunal as per the agreed terms of the Contract for adjudicating upon the dispute arising out of execution of the Contract.

The terms of settlement are drawn up and signed by both the parties and attested by the conciliator or the members of the Lok Adalat. After settlement by way of accord and satisfaction, there can be no reference to arbitration.

Conclusion:

26) In view of the foregoing discussion, we set aside the judgment and order dated 12.01.2015 passed by the High Court. The appeal is allowed.

FEBRUARY 7, 2018.