L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
National Small Industries Corp.Ltd vs State (Nct Of Delhi) & Ors

- the appellant herein, is a `government company' within the meaning of that expression under section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. Its object is to extend financial and other assistance to small scale industries. The appellant lodged a complaint in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, alleging that the second respondent company had issued a cheque drawn in favour of the appellant, towards discharge of its liability, and the said cheque was dishonoured when presented for payment. The appellant therefore prayed for summoning and punishing the second respondent and its Directors (respondents 3 and 4).

Consequently, by order dated 12.1.2007, the High Court allowed the petition and quashed the summoning order. It however made it clear that the learned Magistrate would be at liberty to record the statement of the complainant and the witnesses and thereafter take appropriate decision in the matter in accordance with section 200 of the Code. The said order is challenged in this appeal.

14. Thus, the answer to the question raised is :
Ratna Praveen Tiwari vs Praveen Pratapa Tiwari

Petitioner is the wife. The respondent-husband had filed a petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, which is pending in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Palghar, District Thane (Maharashtra). The petitioner is now staying with her parents and she seeks transfer of the case. The respondent was served with the notice and is represented by counsel. He has raised certain objections for the transfer of the case.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Petition NO.79/2006 entitled Praveen Pratap Tiwari Vs. Mrs.Ratna Praveen Tiwari, pending before the Civil Judge (S.D.), Palghar, District Thane (Maharashtra) is directed to be transferred to the Family Court at Lucknow. 2

All the records be transmitted to the transferred court. The transfer petition is allowed accordingly.

..................CJI.

17TH NOVEMBER, 2008.
Adlabs Ltd vs Rajasthan Patrika P.Ltd

This appeal is by a complainant before the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, aggrieved by non-grant of interim- relief. The appellant is a Radio Broadcaster. It wanted its advertisement to be published in the respondent's newspaper. The respondent refused to publish appellant's advertisement. The appellant therefore approached the Commission alleging that respondent's refusal amounted to a restrictive trade practice which resulted in loss to the appellant. The appellant also sought an interim direction to the respondent under section 12A of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (`Act' for short) to publish its advertisements.

3. We find that this is not a fit case for interference with the discretion exercised by the Commission in refusing interim direction. Granting the interim relief sought would virtually amount to allowing the complaint even before the matter is considered on merits. No irreparable injury or loss is made out on account of the refusal.

4. The appeal is therefore dismissed. We however request the Commission to dispose of the matter expeditiously as it raises an important issue and decision thereon may have a bearing on similar questions that may arise in future.

.......................................................J [R. V. Raveendran] .......................................................J [D. K. Jain] New Delhi;

November 17, 2008.
Mohd. Ashique vs State Of Maharashtra

The High Court found that on examination of the transit passes involved it was clear that the transit passes do not pertain to any quantity of Katsawar. Thus the timber of Katsawar which was not there in the earlier transit passes, could not have been included in the third transit pass No.001805 dated 7.1.1998 issued in lieu thereof. It was therefore apparent that alterations were made in the transit passes. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. The High Court permitted the respondent to either take the custody of the truck or to confiscate it and in the alternative to proceed to recover the amount of rupees two lakhs by invoking personal bond and the bank guarantee. It appears that the custody of the vehicle has been taken.

7. Above being the position, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. However, we make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case which is stated to be pending. However, the truck which has been taken by the respondent pursuant to the High Court's order shall be sold in public auction and the money shall be deposited by the concerned Forest Officer in fixed deposit account. Whether the money is to be confiscated or to be returned to the appellant shall be decided in the proceedings.
State Of Kerala & Ors vs T.John Rose & Ors.Etc

According to the Assistant Commissioner, the first respondent herein did not fulfil the definition of the word "Promoter", as defined in Section 2(l) of the Kerala Tax on Paper Lotteries Act, 2005. The Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax Office, took the view that the first respondent (applicant) is not a person directly authorized by the State of Arunachal Pradesh to sell their lottery tickets in the ...2/-

Civil Appeals are, accordingly, disposed of with no order as to costs.

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).24325-24326/2007 (From the judgement and order dated 11/04/2007 in WA No.631/2007 & WA No. 638/2007 of the HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM) STATE OF KERALA & ORS. Petitioner(s) VERSUS T.JOHN ROSE & ORS.ETC. Respondent(s) (With prayer for interim relief) (FOR FINAL DISPOSAL) (FOR ORDERS) Date: 18/11/2008 These Petitions were called on for hearing today. CORAM :
Vithal Pundalik Zendge vs State Of Maharashtra

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing the three appeals preferred by the present appellant and two other co-accused. Criminal Appeal No.703 of 2000 was filed by the present appellant while the co-accused Kisan filed Criminal Appeal No. 701 of 2000 and Milind Dhondu Gaikawad filed Criminal Appeal 702 of 2000. The accused persons faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 144, 148, 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). The appellant faced trial alongwith 8 others. Appellant was first accused (A-1). The trial Court held that all the accused persons were guilty and they were awarded life sentence in respect of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and different other sentences which were directed to run concurrently by the learned Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay in Sessions Case No.248 of 1996. Only three appellants questioned the conviction and the sentence and three appeals were disposed of by the impugned judgment as noted above.

On 15.01.1996, police recovered Gupti- (Art. M-8) at the instance of accused No.1 as per the panchanama Exh.P-42. On 16.01.1996, police recovered dagger (Art.M-9) at the instance of accused No.3 Kisan Pandurang Gavli as per the panchanama Exh.P-27. On 06.02.1996 police sent all the muddamal articles to Chemical Analyst. Police received report of muddemal articles which is at Exh.P-45.

On 12.2.1996 police charge sheeted all the accused before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate 13th Court, Bombay as per charge sheet and on 26.2.1996 their case was committed to the Court of Sessions. Since accused persons abjured guilt, trial was held.

12. She has deposed that she knew all the accused as they were the residents of the same locality where she lived since her birth. On 15th December, 1995 at about 11.30 p.m. when she went to attend the nature's 10 call near the public toilet, she saw accused No.4 with her brother, the deceased. The accused No.4 had kept his hand on her brothers' shoulder and they were going towards the toilet. They were talking loudly and accused No.4 was abusing her brother. Then he started assaulting her brother with a long weapon like gupti. All the other accused were standing near the garbage bin. She was near the toilet. When accused No.4 was assaulting her brother, all the other accused who were standing closeby came near her brother. They all also caught him and assaulted him with weapons in their hands. Accused Nos.7 and 8 caught his hands, accused No.6 caught him by the hand, accused Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 started assaulting him with weapons in their hands which were like gupti. This is in essence prosecution case.

15. Above being the position we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
Corporation Bank vs M/S Saraswati Abharansala & Anr

2. First respondent is a dealer in bullion gold. It entered into transactions of purchase of gold from the appellant herein during the period 6th April, 1999 and 10th December, 1999. The total transactions during the said period were for a sum of Rs.423748518/-. Indisputably the rate of tax which was prevailing at the relevant time was 1%. The amount of sales tax at the said rate was collected from respondent No.1. The amount so collected, indisputably had been deposited with the sales tax authorities. 1

The said entry, as stated above, was further amended by SRO 1075/99.

5. Appellant on or about 19th January, 2000, in view of the aforementioned Notification, requested the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, Special Circle I, Calicult to refund the excess amount of sales tax collected from the respondent No.1 amounting to Rs.20,97,763.50. The Assistant Commissioner Sales Tax, however, rejected the said prayer in terms of its letter dated 3rd March, 2000, which reads as under :-

section (2) or adjustment under sub-section (3) is not made within ninety days of the date of final assessment, or as the case may be, within ninety days of the date of receipt of the order in appeal or revision or the date of expiry of the time for preferring appeal or revision, the dealer shall be entitled to claim interest at the rate of ten percent per annum on the amount due to him from the date of expiry of the said period upto the date of payment or adjustment."

20. Article 265 of the Constitution of India mandates that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.

21. In terms of the said provision, therefore, all acts relating to the imposition of tax providing, inter alia, for the point at which the tax is to be collected, the rate of tax as also its recovery must be carried out strictly in accordance with law.

24. In view of the admitted fact that tax had been collected and paid for the period 6th April, 1999 and 10th December, 1999 @ 1 % of the price which having been reduced from 1st April, 1999 to 0.5 %, the State, in our opinion, is bound to refund the excess amount deposited with it.

28. As all the facts are admitted and the State had refused to refund the excess amount of tax realized from the appellant, in our opinion, the writ petition was maintainable.

29. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the interest of justice would be served if instead of the appellant refunding the amount to the first respondent and later claiming refund from the authorities, if the State of Kerala is directed to refund the amount of tax collected with interest at the rate of 10% per annum to the first respondent at an early date, and not later than four months from the date of communication of this order. It is ordered accordingly. If, however, the amount is not paid within the aforementioned period, the outstanding amount shall carry interest @ 15 % per annum. 12

30. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations and direction. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
Haleema Zubair Tropical Traders vs State Of Kerala

2. Appellant, Haleema Zubair, is an assessee under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (for short `the Act'). She is said to be the proprietress of two concerns, - one known as M/s. Tropical Traders and another .M/s. Poseidon Food Company.

3. The said Topical Traders is a dealer in ceramic tiles. The business of M/s. Poseidon Food Company was to render services to various exporters as regards inspection and certification of quality of the items sought to be exported. The total turnover for the purpose of payment of sales tax was disclosed on the basis of the business carried out in the name of M/s. Tropical Traders. Whereas the taxable turnover was shown as 28,20,474.97, an addition of Rs.45,80,168.09 thereto was made by the Assessing Authority assessing a sum of Rs.3,58,87,960.97 by way of total turnover. The order of assessment proceeded on the basis that receipt shown as commission amounting to Rs.45,80,168.09 from M/s. Poseidon Food Company is not supported and proved by any documentary evidence. Appellant contended that the services so rendered is not a `sale' and thus, the said order of assessment is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction..

6. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith both the parties preferred appeals before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in terms of Section 12 of the Act.

8. Revision petition filed thereagainst by the appellant has been dismissed by the High Court by its order dated 4th August, 2006,stating :-

9. A review application filed thereagainst has also been dismissed by an order dated 22nd March, 2007.

24. For the reasons aforementioned the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly.

25. The appeal is allowed. The matter is remitted to the assessing authority to consider the matter afresh on the basis of the materials placed by the appellant, namely - income tax returns, orders of assessment, certificates issued by MPEDA, Cochin etc. The other doucments filed by the appellant before the revisional authority may also be taken into consideration. The State, if so advised, may also file additional documents. No costs.
Moorthy vs State Of Tamil Nadu

2. Brief facts of the case which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are as under:-

However, while he was running, he tumbled over the steps and fell down in front of the Ward. Accused 1 and 2 chased him and after Murugan fell down, accused 1 and 2 over- powered him and repeatedly attacked on his face and hands by knives. The 3rd accused (Kuppayee) is stated to have caught hold of Murugan while the juvenile accused Senthil and Subhash stated to have caught hold of his legs by pressing them with their hands. At that time, PW2, who is grand-son of PW1 was there. He had also come to the hospital for a courtesy visit. PW1, in her testimony stated that accused 1 and 2 stabbed her son many a times simultaneously. Doctor after examining Murugan declared him dead.

13. We have not examined whether in the facts and circumstances, the High Court was justified in converting the sentence from section 302 IPC to section 304 Part I IPC because there is no appeal by the State.

14. The appellant must be convicted at least under section 304 Part I IPC. No interference is called for. The appeal being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed.

November 19. 2008 14
Hamidkhan vs Ashabi & Ors

It is not in dispute that the appellant was a nephew of the husband of the plaintiff. He was not in sound financial position. Only out of compassion, the husband of the plaintiff - respondent No. 1 permitted the appellant and his father to live in the suit premises as licensees for a short period. After his father's death, the appellant requested for some more time to vacate.

10. The second appeal filed by the appellant thereagainst has been dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment.

16. In view of the concurrent finding of fact, there is no escape from the conclusion that the defendant No. 2 - appellant was a licensee under the plaintiff. He, therefore, did not have any independent title or legal possession. Even if he and his father were in possession of a part of the property, the same was for and on behalf of the plaintiff.

Relationship of vendor and vendee between defendant No.1 and the plaintiff, therefore, continued. If that be so, the suit for specific performance was maintainable.

Although the appellant is a party to the illegality, we do not intend to deprive him of the amount which he had invested and that is the principal reason we thought that he would be fully compensated if the plaintiff - respondent No. 1 is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,25,000/- in his favour being three times of the amount that he had paid to the defendant No. 1 by way of consideration for the execution of the deed of sale dated 12.05.1988. We direct accordingly.

Appellant shall vacate the premises within one month from the date of deposit of the amount of Rs.2,25,000/- by the plaintiff - respondent No. 1 in the Court of learned Trial Judge and execute a registered deed of sale in favour of the plaintiff - respondent No. 1. In the event, appellant vacates the premises he would be entitled to withdraw the said sum failing which it would be open to the respondent No. 1 to execute the decree passed in her favour by the learned Trial Judge forthwith and in which event he would be liable to pay all costs to the plaintiff including the costs incurred by him in 19 this Court. Defendant No. 1 shall also refund the amount of earnest money of Rs. 8000/- to the plaintiff with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of institution of suit till realisation as he cannot be permitted to enrich himself unjustly.

19. For the reasons aforementioned, this appeal is allowed in part and to the extent mentioned hereinbefore as also with the aforementioned observations and directions. No costs.

November 19, 2008
Sambhaji & Ors vs Gangabai & Ors

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court dismissing the Writ petition filed by the appellants questioning correctness of the order passed by the trial court rejecting the application for setting aside the order directing that no written statement was to be accepted and also not allowing the appellants who are the defendants in RCS No.99 of 2003 filed by respondent No.1 the plaintiff to file written statement. Rest of the respondents are the defendants in the suit. Admittedly an order was passed stating that the written statement was not filed within the period of 90 days. An application was filed alongwith the written statement with two prayers; first prayer was to set aside the earlier order relating to non-filing of the written statement and second to accept the written statement along with the application. The trial court held that in terms of the amended Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the `CPC'), there was no scope for accepting a written statement filed beyond the fixed period of 90 days. The order was challenged before the High Court which noted that though the view of the trial court that it had no power to accept the written statement filed after 90 days was not correct in the circumstances of the case no case for interference was made out.

15. In the instance case the trial court proceeded on the erroneous premises that there was no scope to accept the written statement after 90 days. The High Court by the impugned order held that though it had power, no case was made out to accept the prayer. We have considered the grounds 10 indicated by the appellants seeking acceptance of the written statement filed belatedly. They cannot be considered to be trivial or without substance. In the case of this nature where close relatives are litigants a liberal approach is called for. In the circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the High Court affirming the order passed by the trial court refusing acceptance of the written statement. The matter is not very complex. We request the trial court to complete trial of the suit within the period of six months. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.
State Of Karnataka & Ors vs K. Govindappa & Anr

2. The respondent No.1, Shri K. Govindappa was appointed as a Lecturer in History in an aided private college owned and managed by the Vinayaka Rural Education Society, the respondent No.2 herein, with effect from 10th 2 July, 1994. The said college, which was situated at Hegalavadi, Gubbi Taluk, Tumkur District, applied for approval of the appointment of the respondent No.1, but such prayer was refused by the Government of Karnataka on the ground that the appointment had been made in violation of the Roster Policy and that he had been appointed in a post which was reserved for a Scheduled Caste candidate. A review petition was filed by the respondent No.1 before the Government contending that since there was only a single post of Lecturer in History in the college, the reservation policy would not apply to the said post in which the respondent No.1 had been appointed. As the claim of the respondent No.1 was rejected by the Government, he filed a Writ Petition before the Karnataka High Court praying for quashing of the orders passed by the Government and for a direction upon the concerned authorities to approve his appointment with effect from 21st July, 1994, 3 from which date he had joined his duties. Contesting the claim of the respondent No.1 the appellants contended before the Writ Court that even though the Management was running only one college, it had different disciplines for which there were several Lecturers. It was contended that the college had to maintain the Roster for the purpose of making appointments after taking into consideration the entire cadre of Lecturers, irrespective of subjects. It was also contended that in the college in question there were six posts of Lecturers and hence, the post of Lecturer in History could not be considered as a single post.

3. The submissions made on behalf of the appellants was rejected by the learned Single Judge upon holding that since the post of Lecturer in History was a single post, the reservation policy would not apply to the appointment made to the said post. The learned Single Judge quashed the orders passed by the Government upon holding that the appointment of 4 the respondent No.1 was just and legal and directed the appellants to give approval to his appointment.

22. We, therefore, have no hesitation in upholding the decision of the Karnataka High Court, in the facts of this case. The appeal, therefore, must fail, and is dismissed without any order as to costs.

23. Since the question in issue in this appeal is the same as that in Civil Appeal No. ________(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.5353 of 2007- The Government of Karnataka and another vs. Bidarambika Vidya Samasthe Regd. & others), which is being heard along with this appeal, the same is also dismissed since the decision therein was rendered in the light of the decision in Writ Appeal No.3125 of 2005, out of which the present appeal arises. The same is, 19 therefore, dismissed along with the instant appeal.

________________J.

(ALTAMAS KABIR) _________________J.

(MARKANDEY KATJU) New Delhi Dated: November 20, 2008
Union Of India & Ors vs Atam Parkash & Anr

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing the Writ Petition filed by the respondents. Prayer in the writ petition was to quash the detention order dated 10.5.1993. Stand of the writ petitioners before the High Court was that a petition for preventing the respondents in the writ petition from enforcing the said order was disposed of by order dated 19.7.2002 in Criminal Writ Petition No.1408 of 1999. The respondents in the writ petition opposed the same taking the stand that in some other cases the High Court had taken the view that once the order had become infructuous by lapse of time, a different yardstick should not have been applied. In the case at hand, the writ petition was, therefore, allowed with the following observations:

10. The impugned judgment of the High Court is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. The question is as to whether it would be desirable to take the respondents back to custody. Such a decision shall be taken by the Government within two months.

11. The appeal is allowed.