L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Acharaparambath Pradeepan & Anr. ... vs State Of Kerala Àrespondents

A chargesheet was filed under Sections 143, 147, 148, 120B, 343, 449, 302, 332, 328, 394, 397, 398 and 506(i) read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Thirty witnesses were examined by the prosecution to prove its case. Some defence witnesses were also examined. DW2 has also been relied by the High Court. During trial, A7 died. As against A1 Pradeepan, the prosecution case was said to be that on receiving signal from A2, he had hit the deceased with an iron rod thereby causing injury on the back of his head. He chased him inside the classroom and assaulted him repeatedly with his iron road on different parts of his body. All the child witnesses had seen him attacking with iron rod. He was identified by all the child witnesses in court. Whereas, the eye-witnesses saw him assaulting the deceased repeatedly, PWs 7 and 8 saw him leaving the scene after the occurrence along with A2 and A3. As noticed hereinbefore, he was identified, even in the first Test Identification Parade by PW5.

We although appreciate that in a case of this nature the witnesses must gather courage over a period of time to come out with their part of story but we are not very sure that the same standard should be applied to PWs 7 and

We, therefore, are of the opinion that it is a fit case where benefit of doubt should be given to the said appellants.

The prosecution witnesses are also supported by the medical evidence. It will bear repetition to state that 44 injuries were inflicted on the deceased. Injury Nos. 1 and 2 are as under:

We, therefore, do not see any reason to disbelieve the testimonies of PWs 3 to 6 so far as A1 is concerned.

Defective investigation by itself may not lead to a conclusion that the accused is innocent.

The question which now arises for consideration is as to whether we should uphold the death sentence imposed upon A1. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said to be a rarest of rare case warranting imposition of the extreme punishment.

While upholding the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Judge as also the High Court, we only convert the death penalty to rigorous imprisonment of life under Section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. Convictions and sentences on other charges are upheld. Criminal Appeal Nos. 1278-1279 of 2005, so far as A1 is concerned, is dismissed subject to the modification of sentence to the extent mentioned hereinbefore and that of A4 is allowed.

Other accused persons are given benefit of doubt and they are acquitted. Criminal Appeal Nos. 1280-1281 of 2005 are allowed accordingly. They are directed to be set at liberty unless wanted in any other case.
Youaraj Rai À Appellant vs Chander Bahadur Karki À Respondents

All the above three appeals raise an interesting and important question of law as to interpretation of Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). In all these appeals, facts are more or less similar. The Election Commission of India issued a notification on March 16, 2004 for holding general election to the Legislative Assembly for the State of Sikkim. Total constituencies were 32. A programme was published which provided various stages of election. April 23, 2004 was the last date for filing nomination papers, April 24, 2004 was fixed for scrutiny of nomination papers, April 26, 2004 was the last date for withdrawal of candidatures, May 10, 2004 was the date of poll, if necessary, and date of counting and declaration of results was fixed as May 17, 2004. The appellants filled in their nomination papers from 12-Wak Assembly Constituency, 14-Melli Assembly Constituency and 13- Damthang Assembly Constituency respectively on April 23, 2004. When nomination papers were scrutinized on the next date, i.e. April 24, 2004, they were found to be defective and hence all their nomination papers were rejected. The resultant effect was that on April 26, 2004 which was the last date for withdrawal of candidature, in all the three above constituencies, only one candidate was in the field. The Returning Officer, therefore, declared the first respondent in all the matters elected (un-contested). In respect of other constituencies, however, polling was held on May 10, 2004 and after counting of votes, results were declared on May 17, 2004.

For the foregoing reasons, all the appeals deserve to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed with costs.

In view of dismissal of appeals, we express no opinion on an application seeking substitution in Civil Appeal No. 8253 of 2004.
M.R. Kudva Àappellant vs State Of Andhra Pradesh Àrespondent

Appeals preferred thereagainst before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh were registered as Criminal Appeal No. 792 of 1997 and Criminal Appeal No. 894 of 1997 respectively. The appeals were dismissed by a judgments and orders dated 30.12.2004 and 20.01.2005 respectively. Special Leave Petitions filed thereagaisnt have also been dismissed by this Court by an order dated 11.05.2005. Appellant thereafter filed an application before the High Court purported to be under Sections 482/427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, praying, inter alia, therein that the sentences imposed upon him in both the cases be directed to run concurrently. The said application has been rejected by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment.

Although according to the appellant, the High Court heard both the matters almost at the same time, no such prayer appears to have been made, nor the same fell for consideration by the High Court. The Special Leave Petitions filed by the appellant, as noticed hereinbefore, have also been dismissed.

However, in this case the provision of Section 427 of the Code was not invoked in the original cases or in the appeals. A separate application was filed before the High Court after the special leave petitions were dismissed. Such an application, in our opinion, was not maintainable. The High Court could not have exercised its inherent jurisdiction in a case of this nature as it had not exercised such jurisdiction while passing the judgments in appeal. Section 482 of the Code was, therefore, not an appropriate remedy having regard to the fact that neither the Trial Judge, nor the High Court while passing the judgments of conviction and sentence indicated that the sentences passed against the appellant in both the cases shall run concurrently or Section 427 would be attracted. The said provision, therefore, could not be applied in a separate and independent proceeding by the High Court. The appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed.
M.V. Karunakaran vs Krishanan (Dead) By Lrs.

2. Three brothers, Madhavan, Bahuleyan and Karunakaran, were owners of the property. Madhavan and Bahuleyan started a partnership under the name and style of "The Trustful Daily Banking Company". Madhavan died on 26.10.1960, leaving behind Defendant Nos. 3 to 5 as his legal heirs and representatives. The partnership firm stood dissolved with his death. The legal heirs and representatives of Madhavan by reason of a registered deed of sale dated 28.05.1963 transferred the property in question in favour of Krishnan (since deceased) being predecessors in interest of the respondents herein. A money suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.312.20 was filed against the said partnership firm by a third party. The said suit was marked as O.S. No. 523 of 1964. It was decreed.

For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. No costs.
Sumangalam Coop. Housing Society Ltd vs Suo Motu, High Court Of Gujarat & Ors

Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court which suo motu registered a writ petition on the basis of the copies of documents purported to have been received from one Piyush Soni. It was alleged that there were several irregularities and illegalities in connection with the allotment of land to Sumangalam Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. The High Court entertained several other civil applications and passed the impugned judgment inter alia holding that there were several irregularities and illegalities committed in the allotment of land. The judgment of the High Court in SCA No. 10640 of 2000 is the subject matter of challenge in these appeals. Shri Altaf Ahmad, learned Senior counsel was appointed as Amicus Curiae.

On 24.11.1987 Respondent No.2 indicated that T.P. Plot 695 is designated for neighbourhood garden, play ground, library etc. and further requested that they may be granted 4000 sq. mts. of this land on condition that part of this land will be used for purposes within the meaning of "neighbourhood centre" and assured AUDA that Respondent No.2 was prepared to purchase land bearing survey Nos. 189 and 190 (Part) and survey Nos.199/1, 2, 3 of Vastrapur at the price indicated by AUDA.

The appeals are, therefore, allowed. The observations made against various officials are uncalled for and have to be treated to have been deleted.

The appeals are accordingly allowed with no orders as to cost. We record our appreciation for the fair and able assistance rendered by Mr. Altaf Ahmad, learned Amicus Curiae.
Ishikawajma-Harima Heavy Industries ... vs Director Of Income Tax, Mumbai

Applying the said principles to the facts of the present case, the Authority opined that the appellant was liable to pay direct tax even under the Treaty having regard to Articles 5 and 7 thereof as also Clause 6 of the Protocol. It was held :

Contractor shall ensure that the Facilities shall be fit and suitable for its intended purpose (including attaining the Completion and Performance Guarantees) as evidenced by, or reasonably to be inferred from, this Contract, and shall fully comply with the Contract.

The principle of this case, is again not applicable in the present scenario since the nature of the relationship between the permanent establishment, the foreign firms and the Indian firms are evidently contractual and not professional. And the transaction of sale and supply of goods offshore have not taken place with the involvement of the permanent establishment, therefore excluding this transaction from the scope of taxation in India.

Conversely, losses incurred in connection with direct transactions may not be set off against a permanent establishment's profits. Since a DTC may not increase tax liability, the USA, it is true, imposes tax at the lower amount that would ensue if the permanent establishment's business and direct transactions were combined and treated as if no DTC existed (of course, the taxpayer may, in such event, not only set off the result of individual direct transactions, which amounted to a loss against the permanent establishment's positive operating result :I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 84-17, 1984-I Cum. Bull. 308). According to that ruling, the taxpayer is in such cases entitled to elect taxation which discounts the DTC. (see surpa Art. I, at m. no.44)."

We generally agree with the said statement law.

The Authority, in our opinion, has committed an error in this behalf, as if services rendered by the head office are considered to be the services rendered by the permanent establishment, the distinction between Indian and foreign operations and the apportionment of the income of the operations shall stand obliterated.

We, therefore, hold as under :

(7) The existence of a permanent establishment would not constitute sufficient 'business connection', and the permanent establishment would be the taxable entity. The fiscal jurisdiction of a country would not extend to the taxing entire income attributable to the permanent establishment.

(9) Paragraph 6 of the Protocol to the DTAA is not applicable, because, for the profits to be 'attributable directly or indirectly', the permanent establishment must be involved in the activity giving rise to the profits.

Re: Offshore Services :

For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is allowed in part and to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. No costs.
Deewan Singh & Ors. Ã Appellants vs Rajendra Pd. Ardevi & Ors. Ã Respondents

The legislature of the State of Rajasthan enacted Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (for short "the Act"). Chapter I to IV thereof came into force on 22.10.1959. In exercise of its rule making power contained in Section 76 of the Act, the State of Rajasthan framed Rules known as the Rajasthan Public Trusts Rules, 1962 which came into force on and from 11.06.1962. Chapter V to X and XII of the Act as also the Rules applicable in relation thereto were brought into operation with effect from 1.07.1962.

When the Committee of Management, however, was not constituted within a reasonable time, Swetambers again filed a writ petition bearing No. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21 of 1981 before the Rajasthan High Court inter alia contending that as the State having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 52 and 53 of the Act exercises power coupled with duties, the failure to publish the list and to constitute a Committee would amount to dereliction of duties on its part. In the said writ petition it was prayed for:

The State in its affidavit in opposition filed in the said proceedings reiterated its position that the temple was a Hindu temple.

Review petitions filed thereagainst have been dismissed by judgment and order dated 06.02.2002.

We must, however, observe that the question as to whether the temple in question is Swetambers' or Digambers' does not fall for our consideration. Both parties have staked their own claims. It is for the State to act in terms of the statute. While doing so, it indisputably would have to give effect to the directions issued by the High Court.

While implementing the said directions, the incidental or ancillary questions which may arise for consideration before the State Government must also be determined in accordance with law.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the modifications made by the Division Bench of the High Court are not sustainable. They are set aside accordingly. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is upheld. The judgment of the High Court may be complied within four months from date. Civil Appeal Nos. 4092-4095, 4086-4089 and 4076-4079 of 2002 are allowed and Civil Appeal Nos. 4081-4084 of 2002 are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs. 50,000/- for each set of appeals.
State Of Maharashtra vs Public Concern For Governance Trust & ...

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.2707 of 2006) The above appeal was filed by Mr. Vinay Mohan Lal who is a member of the IAS, 1970 batch working in the grade of Principal Secretary in the Maharashtra Government appointed as M.D. CIDCO and presently serving as M.D. MAFCO. The High Court, while disposing off the writ petition filed by way of PIL, had made certain observations against the appellant. The appeal was argued by the appellant himself. He submitted that he was neither a party to the said proceedings nor was directed to be made a party to the PIL. The observations made by the High Court against him is quoted herein below for ready reference:

For the foregoing reasons, we have no hesitation in expunging the remarks/observations/strictures made against the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra - Shri Sushil Kumar Shinde and allow the appeal filed by the State of Maharashtra who, in our opinion, is competent to maintain this appeal and order expunction of the remarks and observations/strictures made against the then Chief Minister. The appeal stands allowed only to the above extent. We make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on merits of the rival claims made in the other special leave petition filed by the cooperative societies in special leave petition No. 336 of 2006 which will be dealt with separately.

In the result, the civil appeal arising out of special leave petition No. 18965 of 2006 stands allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.

We have already dealt with the cases and the rulings on the subject in question in the earlier part of the judgment in the appeal filed by the State of Maharashtra which, in our opinion, squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the case filed by the party in person. We, therefore, expunge the remarks/observations/strictures made against the appellant as the same has been made behind his back. We also make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the special leave petition No.336 of 2006 filed by Amey Cooperative Society which will be dealt with absolutely on merits of the rival claims by a separate judgment. The party in person has also pointed out certain findings in the judgment of the High Court. We do not propose to go into the merits of the other contentions which is the subject- matter of the special leave petition No.336 of 2006. In our opinion, when an authority takes a decision which may have civil consequences and affects the rights of a person, the principles of natural justice would at once come into play. Reputation of an individual is an important part of ones life. It is observed in 1955 American LR 171 DF Marion vs. Minnie Davis and reads as follows:-

For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the observations/strictures and remarks made by the High Court against the appellant behind his back is totally uncalled for and not warranted. We, therefore, have no hesitation to order expunction of the remarks made in para Nos. 38,139, 140 and 141 of the impugned judgment. The civil appeal is allowed only to the above extent. We order no costs.
Deewan Singh & Ors. Àappellants vs Rajendra Pd. Ardevi & Ors. Àrespondents

The legislature of the State of Rajasthan enacted Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (for short "the Act"). Chapter I to IV thereof came into force on 22.10.1959. In exercise of its rule making power contained in Section 76 of the Act, the State of Rajasthan framed Rules known as the Rajasthan Public Trusts Rules, 1962 which came into force on and from 11.06.1962. Chapter V to X and XII of the Act as also the Rules applicable in relation thereto were brought into operation with effect from 1.07.1962.

When the Committee of Management, however, was not constituted within a reasonable time, Swetambers again filed a writ petition bearing No. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21 of 1981 before the Rajasthan High Court inter alia contending that as the State having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 52 and 53 of the Act exercises power coupled with duties, the failure to publish the list and to constitute a Committee would amount to dereliction of duties on its part. In the said writ petition it was prayed for:

The State in its affidavit in opposition filed in the said proceedings reiterated its position that the temple was a Hindu temple.

Review petitions filed thereagainst have been dismissed by judgment and order dated 06.02.2002.

We must, however, observe that the question as to whether the temple in question is Swetambers' or Digambers' does not fall for our consideration. Both parties have staked their own claims. It is for the State to act in terms of the statute. While doing so, it indisputably would have to give effect to the directions issued by the High Court.

While implementing the said directions, the incidental or ancillary questions which may arise for consideration before the State Government must also be determined in accordance with law.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the modifications made by the Division Bench of the High Court are not sustainable. They are set aside accordingly. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is upheld. The judgment of the High Court may be complied within four months from date. Civil Appeal Nos. 4092-4095, 4086-4089 and 4076-4079 of 2002 are allowed and Civil Appeal Nos. 4081-4084 of 2002 are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs. 50,000/- for each set of appeals.
M/S Associated Indem Mechanical Pvt. ... vs West Bengal Small Scale Industrial ...

3. The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition by the appellant herein may be noticed in brief. The West Bengal Small Scale Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (for short "Corporation") by three different indentures of lease each for a period of 99 years demised in favour of the appellant M/s Associated Indem Mechanical Pvt. Ltd., three separate industrial sheds bearing nos.Y-76, Y-73 and Y-72 at Baltikuri Industrial Estate, Howrah on 9.2.1970, 26.5.1972 and 31.8.1977 respectively. Clauses 2(f)1, 2(j) and 3(B) of the lease deed which are relevant for the controversy in hand are being reproduced below :-

15. For the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in the appeal, which is hereby dismissed with costs. The interim order granted by this Court on 17.2.2006 is vacated.
Sheo Prasad Bhor @ Sri Prasad vs State Of Assam [Alongwith Criminal ...

3. Brief facts giving rise to these appeals are that on 8.6.1991, Smt. Rani Begum lodged a first information report that her husband, Rehmat Ali went out of the house around 8.00 a.m. for fishing and around 11.00 a.m. she was informed by Mina Begum that her husband had been killed by accused Manik Keot, Brajanath Kurmi and Jaharlal Kurmi and the dead body was packed into a gunny bag and thrown into a river. The police registered a case and during investigation the dead body was recovered from the river and thereafter it was sent for post-mortem examination. On completion of investigation, a case was registered against the accused persons under Sections 147, 302, 201 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, I.P.C.). On completion of trial, learned Sessions Judge recorded conviction under Sections 147, 149, 304 Part II and 201, I.P.C. against the accused persons and sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- each, in default to suffer further imprisonment for two years. The trial court found that it was not necessary to record any separate sentence under Sections 147/149/201, I.P.C. and sentenced the accused persons under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C. only as it was observed that it was sufficient to meet the ends of justice. Aggrieved against this order a joint appeal was filed before the High Court. Learned Single Judge of the High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence of the accused appellants.

It may be mentioned here that during the pendency of appeal, appellant Champalal Bhor and Brajnath Kurmi expired, therefore, the appeal against these two appellants stood abated. In the present appeals we are concerned with the accused- appellants, Manik Keot, Sheo Prasad Bhor and Jaharlal Bhor.