L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Jagdamba Prasad (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors vs Kripa Shankar (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors

2. The appellants filed objections before the Consolidation Officer for the deletion of the name of one Bhukhali (father of the respondents) since the appellants allege that this name has been fictitiously mentioned in the revenue records pertaining to Khata no. 63 of Village Badhaiya, Pargana Kewai. The plot Nos. 552, 570 and 574 in the present case, are registered in the names of the landowners Mahadev, Shambhu Nath and Bhukhali respectively. Mahadev and Shambhu Nath belong to the same family whereas Bhukhali was the resident of another village.

4. Objections were however, filed by the Respondent nos. 1 and 2 who are the son and daughter of Bhukhali and are his legal heirs who are the beneficiaries of the ‘Will’ executed by Bhukhali in their favour. However, the said ‘Will’ was never produced by the Respondent nos. 1 and 2 at any stage before the authorities/court.

5. The Consolidation Officer vide order dated 13.7.1971 accepted the objections of the appellants and deleted the name of Bhukhali from the revenue records by declaring that the entry of his name in the records was forged since Respondent nos. 1 and 2 failed to produce the alleged ‘Will’ executed by Bhukhali in their favour. The respondents failed to produce any other document to prove their title on the land in question.

10. The learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellants on the ground that the appellants have not been able to prove the ownership and title over the land on expunction of the name of Bhukhali from the revenue records. The learned Single Judge further observed that the rights of Bhukhali in respect of the land in question cannot be negatived on the basis of the documents pertaining to Auction Sale of 1934 produced by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 before the Revisional Authority in favour of Bhukhali.

15. According to the legal principle laid down by this Court in the case mentioned above, the power of the Revisional Authority under Section 48 of the Act only extends to ascertaining whether the subordinate courts have exceeded their jurisdiction in coming to the conclusion. Therefore, if the Original and Appellate Authorities are within their jurisdiction, the Revisional Authority cannot exceed its jurisdiction to come to a contrary conclusion by admitting new facts either in the form of documents or otherwise, to come to the conclusion. Therefore, we answer point no. 1 in favour of the appellants by holding that the Revisional Authority exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 48 of the Act by admitting documents at revision stage and altering the decision of the subordinate courts.

17. Having answered point nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the appellants, it is now pertinent to mention as to what relief the appellants are entitled to.

On the basis of the factual and legal material evidence produced on record, we uphold the decision of the Appellate Authority rendered by the Assistant Settlement Officer and set aside the Orders of both the Revisional Authority and the High Court. The appeal is allowed accordingly, but without costs.
Shiv Murat (D) By Lrs vs Satyawati & Ors

5. The appellant challenged the compromise as fraudulent on two grounds, firstly, the appellant could not have entered into such compromise which goes entirely against his favour and secondly, the compromise deed filed before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation purports to bear the signature of the appellant which was attested by one Shri Prabhakar Nath Advocate. However, Shri Prabhakar Nath Advocate was the lawyer of the respondent in appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. The appellant never instructed on the compromise deed. The appellant claimed that he had no knowledge of the compromise deed. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation passed the ex-parte order dated 31.1.1983 and disposed of the appeal filed by the respondent. As a result of this Order, the entire property was recognized in the name of the respondent.

8. Against the said Order, the appellant filed a Revision Petition being Revision Petition No. 10 before the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation. The same was dismissed vide Order dated 11.12.1984.

9. The appellant filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9899 of 1985 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad which was also dismissed vide order dated 3.8.2004.
Karnataka Power Trans. Cor. Ltd & Anr vs M/S Deepak Cables (India) Ltd

2. The controversy involved in these appeals, preferred by special leave, being similar, they were heard together and are disposed of by a common judgment. For the sake of convenience, we shall state the facts from Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition 29011 of 2013.

3. The appellant No. 1 is a company wholly owned by the Government of Karnataka and, being a State transmission utility, is a deemed licencee in the State. It invited tenders for establishing 2x8 MVA, 66/11 Sub-stations at Tavarekere in Channagiri Taluk, Davanagere District, which included the supply materials, erection and civil works on partial turnkey basis. The respondent-company participated in the bid and it was successful in the tender and, accordingly, a letter of intent was sent to it. After taking recourse to certain procedural aspects, a contract was entered into between the appellant- company and the respondent. During the performance of the contract, the respondent raised a claim before the engineer as per clause 48 of the general conditions of the contract and called upon the engineer to settle certain disputes arising in connection with the contract. As the concerned engineer did not do anything within the prescribed period of thirty days as provided under clause 48.2, the respondent filed CMP No. 62 of 2011 under Section 11(5) and (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity “the Act”) before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore for appointment of an arbitrator.

Decision of the MD of the UPSIC on all other matters shall be final

25. Consequently, the appeals are allowed and the judgments and orders passed by the High Court are set aside. However, regard being had to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

April 07, 2014.
Gopakumar B.Nair vs C.B.I & Anr

4. It is the further case of the prosecution that A-1, without being authorised to do so, sanctioned cash credit facility of Rs. 17 lakhs to one M/s. Focus Infotainments of which the accused-appellant is the proprietor and in this regard had obtained inflated value of the collateral security offered by the accused-appellant from deceased accused, A-3. According to the prosecution in the valuation report submitted by A-3 the value of the property offered as a collateral security by A-2 was shown at Rs.17,34,675/- though the subsequent valuation thereof by an approved valuer was for Rs.8,56,600/-. The prosecution had also alleged that after sanction of the said loan, A-1 wiped out the over draft facility of Rs. 13,94,000/- given to the accused-appellant without any authority by transferring the said amount from the cash credit account which was not only against the banking procedure but had also caused undue pecuniary advantage to the accused-appellant to the extent of Rs. 23,57,887/-. On the aforesaid facts, commission of offences under Section 120-B IPC read with Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 420/471 IPC was alleged insofar as the accused- appellant is concerned.

...…………………………CJI.
Metal Powder Company Ltd vs Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd

2. The facts, which are not in dispute, are as follows:-

3. While in transit the ship caught fire on 18.10.1983. The first intimation of the mishap was communicated to the plaintiff on 05.01.1984 by Richard Hoggs International Limited, Greece who appear to be the agents of the owners of the vessel “Palm Trader”. By the aforesaid intimation, the plaintiff was informed that the estimate of the cost of repairs to the ship are much higher than the ship’s insured value and, therefore, the ship owners consider the vessel as a total loss and had given notice of abandonment of the ship to the underwriters. The aforesaid facts were very promptly communicated to the defendant insurance company by the plaintiff on 06.01.1984 which was followed by a claim to indemnify the plaintiff for the value of the goods insured i.e. Rs. 2,65,000/-. Thereafter, it appears that the defendant repudiated its liability on 15.07.1985 on the ground that the ship was abandoned by its owners due to bankruptcy and, therefore, the claim made by the plaintiff was covered by an exclusion clause i.e. Clause 4.6 of the Institute Cargo Clauses which formed a part of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy. Clause 4.6 is to the following effect:

4. Following the repudiation of its claim legal notice was issued on behalf of the plaintiff and as the same was not responded to the suit in question was filed claiming the value of the goods insured i.e. Rs. 2,65,000/- alongwith interest @ 18% per annum calculated from 21.03.1984 to 30.09.1985 which was quantified at Rs.73,053/-.

6. The learned Trial Court decreed the plaintiff’s suit for an amount of Rs. 3,38,053/- inclusive of interest at 18% per annum upto 30.09.1985. Aggrieved, the Insurance Company filed a regular first appeal before the Madras High Court which was allowed by the impugned judgment and order dated 28.04.2006 on the ground that as per the terms and conditions of the policy, the plaintiff was not entitled to its claim as “the liability of the Insurance Company is excluded when the ship owners are declared as insolvent.” Aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed by the plaintiff.

10. Under the Policy the risks covered are :

13. In view of the above, we set aside the judgment and order dated 28.04.2006 passed by the High Court of Madras and restore the judgment and decree dated 28.04.1989 passed by the learned Trial Court. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. If the amount has not been paid till date, naturally, the same will carry interest at the rate awarded by the learned Trial Court, namely, 18% per annum till date of payment.

...…………………………CJI.
L.K.Pansare & Ors vs B.B.Ithape & Ors

3. The facts giving rise to the present litigation, in a nutshell, are as under :

9. In our opinion, without appropriate appreciation of the evidence, the High Court should not have dismissed the appeal and therefore, we allow the present appeal and remand the matter to the High Court so that after hearing the concerned parties, the High Court would take a fresh decision. As the agreement with regard to sale of the land had been executed before several years, we hope that the High Court would hear and decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible.

10. The impugned judgment is quashed and set aside with no order as to costs.
Nagar Palika Parishad, Mihona And Anr vs Ramnath And Anr

3. The case of the appellant–Nagar Palika is that on finding that respondent No.1 – plaintiff has made encroachment on a public road, namely, Khitoli Road, a notice under Section 187 of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred o as “Act, 1961”) dated 26th November, 1982 was issued to respondent No.1–plaintiff calling upon him to remove the encroachment from Khitoli Road at Mihona, District Bhind, M.P. (hereinafter referred to as “suit land”). As respondent No.1 – plaintiff refused to comply with the aforesaid notice and also failed to show any title over the encroached land, another notice was issued on 23rd December, 1982, intimating respondent No.1–plaintiff that if the encroachment is not removed by him it shall be removed by the appellant, in exercise of power conferred under Section 109 read with Section 223 of the Act, 1961.

4. Instead of complying with the aforesaid notices, respondent No.1 – plaintiff filed Civil Suit No.79/90 in the Court of 1st Civil Judge, Class- I, Lahar, District Bhind for declaration of his title and permanent injunction for restraining the appellants from interfering in his possession over the suit land contending that the suit land was his ancestral property. The aforesaid suit was contested by the appellant by filing written statement contending, inter alia, that the suit land is a public road which the appellants intend to make a Pakka (Road) in consonance with the public policy and public interest due to which the action for removal of encroachment has been taken and that the suit was not maintainable for want of notice under Section 319 of the Act, 1961.

II.

11. In view of our finding, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 11th April, 2012 passed by the High Court in second appeal as also the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court and the trial court. It will be open to the appellant to proceed in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observations.

APRIL 9, 2014.
State Of Rajasthan vs Manoj Kumar

3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the police recorded the statement of deceased Anirudh Mishra at Sri Kalyan Hospital Sikar on May 26, 1998 who had stated that around 8:30 p.m. on that day he along with his brother Basant Mishra, PW 4, and Mahesh Kumar Saini, PW 3, had gone to the vacant plot belonging to him and his brother situated at Lisadia ka Bas being apprehensive that that sons of Ram Niwas and Shanti Prasad would take possession of the plot. At that point of time sons of Ram Niwas and Shanti Prasad were present at the house of Phoolji Lisadiya situate adjacent to the plot. As per his version, they first abused him and thereafter opened fire as a result of which he had sustained a gun shot injury on the right side of his chest and his brother Ramesh @ Umesh, PW 5, had brought him to the hospital. On the basis of his statement the concerned police officer registered FIR No. 243 of 1998 for the offences punishable under sections 307 and 149 of IPC. However, after the death of Anirudh, the offence was converted to one under section 302 IPC and investigation commenced. During the course of investigation, Raju and Hemant were arrested and Manoj was declared as an absconder. A charge sheet was filed against Raju and Hemant for the offences under sections 302, 302/34 IPC and for offences under Section 3/25, 3/27 and 3/33 of the Arms Act and it became the subject matter of S.C. No. 34 of 1998. After Manoj was arrested, a charge sheet was submitted against him for the offence under Section 302/34 of IPC and he faced a separate trial in S.C. No. 8 of 2002.

4. The accused persons abjured their guilt and pleaded false implication because of property dispute and animosity. In order to prove its case the prosecution in the first trial examined as many as sixteen witnesses and got marked thirty-seven documents and also brought eight articles on record. In the second trial, the prosecution examined as many as twelve witnesses and similar numbers of documents were exhibited. In the second trial the defence produced one witness and tendered four documents in support of its plea.

5. The witnesses in both the trials are common and the prime witnesses, as mentioned in first trial are, Anjani Kumar, PW 1, brother of the deceased, Mahesh Kumar Saini, PW 2 an eye witness, Basant Kumar, PW-4, brother of the deceased, PW 5, Ramesh @ Umesh, another brother of the deceased, Dr. V.K. Soni, PW 6, who had examined the deceased and prepared the x-ray report, Dr. G.R. Tanwar, PW 10, who had conducted the post-mortem and Bhagwan Singh, PW 12, the Investigating Officer. After examining the oral and documentary evidence the learned trial Judge convicted Raj Kumar under section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and also under Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, and Hemant for the offences under Section 302/34 IPC. In the second trial, accused Manoj was convicted under Section 302/34, IPC.

18. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we do not perceive any merit in these appeals and, accordingly, they are dismissed.

April 11, 2014.
Kakali Ghosh vs Chief Secy. A & N Administration & Ors

4. The appellant initially applied for CCL for six months commencing from 5th July, 2011 by her letter dated 16th May, 2011 to take care of her son who was in 10th standard. In her application, she intimated that she is the only person to look after her minor son and her mother is a heart patient and has not recovered from the shock due to the sudden demise of her father; her father-in-law is almost bed ridden and in such circumstances, she was not in a position to perform her duties effectively. While her application was pending, she was transferred to Campbell Bay in Nicobar District (Andaman and Nicobar) where she joined on 06th July, 2011. By her subsequent letter dated 14th February, 2012 she requested the competent authority to allow her to avail CCL for two years commencing from 21st May, 2012. However, the authorities allowed only 45 days of CCL by their Office Order No. 254 dated 16th March, 2012.

16. In fact, Government of India from its Ministry of Home Affairs and Department of Personnel and Training all the time encourage the government employees to take leave regularly, preferably annually by its Circular issued by the Government of India M.H.A.O.M. No. 6/51/60-Ests. (A), dated 25th January, 1961, reiterated vide Government of India letter dated 22/27th March, 2001. As per those circulars where all applications for leave cannot, in the interest of public service, be granted at the same time, the leave sanctioning authority may draw up phased programme for the grant of leave to the applicants by turn with due regard to the principles enunciated under the aforesaid circulars.

17. In the present case the respondents have not shown any reason to refuse 730 days continuous leave. The grounds taken by them and as held by High Court cannot be accepted for the reasons mentioned above.

18. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 18th September, 2012 passed by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, Circuit Bench at Port Blair and affirm the judgment and order dated 30th April, 2012 passed by the Tribunal with a direction to the respondents to comply with the directions issued by the Tribunal within three months from the date of receipt/production of this judgment.

19. The appeal is allowed with aforesaid directions. No costs.
Ranjan Kumar vs State Of Bihar & Ors

2. We need not state the facts in detail. Suffice it to say that in pursuance of an advertisement issued by the concerned department of the State Government, 182 persons were appointed on the post of MLT. The writ petitioners who participated in the interview could not be selected as they obtained lesser marks than the successful candidates. Their failure necessitated them to knock at the doors of the High Court and the learned Single Judge, as has been stated hereinbefore, accepting the grounds put forth, quashed the selection.

12. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, we are disposed to think that in such a case when all the appointees were not impleaded, the writ petition was defective and hence, no relief could have been granted to the writ petitioners.

17. Thus, the twin contentions proponed by the learned counsel for the appellant deserve acceptation and, accordingly, we allow the appeals and, ex consequenti, the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench in the batch of appeals and the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 2130 of 1999 are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

April 16, 2014.
Sidhartha Sarawgi vs Board Of Trustees For Port Of ...

10. Having analysed the legal position as above, we shall now deal with the factual position in these cases. The challenge is on the judgment dated 28.01.2013 of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The issue pertains to the determination of leases granted by the Kolkata Port Trust to the petitioners. In the case of Universal Autocrafts Private Limited, they were granted lease of a plot of land for 30 years, on 19.08.1990. The lease deed was executed by the Land Manager of the Kolkata Port Trust. On 05.02.2008, a letter was issued to the said petitioner to demolish an alleged unauthorized construction and eject the sub-tenants from the premises. The petitioner submitted its reply on 02.05.2008. Not satisfied with the reply, on 30.01.2009, a notice terminating the lease was issued. The ejectment notice was signed by the Land Manager. The main contention is that the ejectment notice issued by the Land Manager is illegal and without jurisdiction as he is not competent to issue such ejectment notices. In the case of Siddhartha Sarawgi, the leases were terminated during the subsistence of the renewed period of 30 years, on the ground of sub-letting without consent of the Kolkata Port Trust. In his case also, the ejectment notices were issued by the Land Manager and, hence, it is contended that there can be no eviction on the basis of ejectment notice issued by a person who is not competent to do so, the same being without jurisdiction. The said ejectment notices were challenged by both the petitioners before the Calcutta High Court. In the case of Universal Autocrafts Private Limited, the learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the Land Manager was not competent to issue the ejectment notice. In the writ petition filed by Sidhartha Sarawgi, the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court found a conflict between two earlier decisions and referred the matter to a Division Bench. The Division Bench vide common judgment dated 28.01.2003 held in favour of the Kolkata Port Trust in the case of both the petitioners, which is challenged in these Special Leave Petitions.

April 16, 2014.

REPORTABLE
Shamsher Singh & Ors vs Rajinder Kumar & Ors

3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:

4. The defendants filed their written statement contending in that they had never entered into any agreement to sell the suit land to the plaintiffs. It was also contended that the alleged agreement to sell was a product of forgery and fabrication and so, it was null and void. The Trial Court having considered the contention of both the parties, partly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs on 13th May, 2009 and directed the defendants to pay [pic]3,00,000/- to the plaintiffs along with simple interest @9% per annum from the date of execution of the agreement to sell till the date of payment.

11. An extremely important aspect of this case is the compromise, Ex. P-8 which had been arrived at between the parties to the suit, and has also been brought on record as evidence. The Trial Court relied on the same to show that the defendants have agreed to the agreement of sale and at the compromise arrived at by the parties at the Police Station, the condition agreed upon was that the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 would return the earnest amount. The said compromise also bears the thumb impressions of the defendants. The Trial Court held that the compromise is an important document that contradicts the version put forth by the defendants, as it has been stated in the compromise that the defendants had expressed their willingness to execute the sale deed uptil 25.07.2002. The defendants cannot then do a u-turn and deny the existence of the agreement of sale. Thus, on this ground too, we have to hold that since the defendants had agreed to return the amount as per the compromise, the judgment of the Trial Court decreeing return of an amount of [pic]3,00,000/- with 9% simple interest from the date of execution of the agreement of sale till the date of payment, must be upheld and that of the appellate courts decreeing specific performance be rejected.

Answer to point no.3

15. For the foregoing reasons, these appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit no.755 of 2003 is modified in the aforesaid terms. We thereby, order and direct the defendant Nos.1 to 3 to repay the plaintiff an amount of [pic]2,00,000/- with interest @6% per annum within six weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment.