L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Hari Prasad Bhuyan vs Durga Prasad Bhuyan And Ors

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

15. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is allowed. The order of the trial court drawing up the decree is set aside. The parties are allowed liberty of moving the High Court under Section 152 CPC seeking appropriate rectification in the judgment of the High Court so as to clearly specify the extent and manner of reliefs to which in the opinion of the High Court the successful party was found entitled consistently with the intention expressed in the judgment. The delay which would be occasioned has to be regretted but is unavoidable. Once the operative part of the judgment is rectified there would be no difficulty in drawing up a decree by the High Court itself in conformity with the operative part of the judgment. If the rules of the High Court so require, the ministerial act of drawing up of the decree may be left to be performed by the trial Court.

6. There is no dispute regarding the assertion of the appellant that he came to know about the death of respondents 13 and 24 from the process servers report. Before this Court earlier also respondents did not disclose about their death. Since that has not been done, respondents cannot take any advantage from the belated approach by the appellant. This according to us is a clear case where the prayer for condonation of delay in seeking substitution by setting aside abatement and condonation of delay should have been accepted by the High Court. The High Courts order is set aside. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
Johar And Others vs Mangal Prasad And Another

3. The State did not prefer any appeal thereagainst. The complainant/respondent, however, filed a revision application before the High Court. The High Court went into the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution. In regard to the deposition of the official witnesses including Autopsy Surgeon it was commented :-

20. We may notice that prohibition contained in sub-section (3) of Section 421 refers to a finding and not the conclusion.

22. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in view of the fact that the judgment of the learned Trial Judge could not be termed to be a perverse one.

24. Unfortunately, the High Court did not meet the reasonings of the learned trial judge which was its bounden duty.

In any event, the judgment passed in favour of Roshan could not have been set aside indirectly which could not be done directly.

26. For the reasons abovementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
Rajendran And Others vs Shankar Sundaram And Others

2. Appellants herein were defendant Nos. 4 to 7 in the suit. Plaintiff-respondent No.1 filed the suit against them and four others. They are admittedly partners of defendant No.1 firm, M/s. AR. AS & P.V.PV , registered under the Partnership Act, 1932. Defendant No.3 P. Shankar (Respondent No.4 herein) was also a partner in the said firm.

3. Allegedly, Defendant No.2, P.V. Purushothaman (Respondent No.3 herein), who has been described as the Managing Partner of the said firm, fraudulently obtained an advance from the plaintiff wherefor a personal guarantee was furnished by the defendant No.2. Indisputably a cheque for a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs was issued in the name of the defendant No.1.

12. The application for attachment before judgment was filed by the plaintiff so as to protect his interest in the event the suit is decreed. The court exercises, in such a situation, jurisdiction under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench of the High Court merely directed the appellants herein to furnish security within the time specified thereunder. It was directed that only on their failure to do so, an order of attachment of the 2nd item on the schedule to the petition shall be issued.

15. In any view of the matter as the appellants are not seriously prejudiced if they furnish the security, this, in our opinion, is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

16. For the reasons abovementioned this appeal fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Venu @ Venugopal And Ors vs State Of Karnataka

At the instance of A-2, the gold jewellery (M.Os.2 and 3) are recovered from PW-6-Pawn broker. The Bajaj Scooter (M.O.6) was seized from A-2, A-3 and A-4. PW-13 with whom the ear- studs and the chain were pledged by A-2, testified to the said fact. PWs 2 and 3 identified A-2 to A-5 as the persons who robbed them. Prosecution claimed that the identification of accused persons by PWs 2 and 3 coupled with the recovery of jewellery at the instance of A-2 and seizure of scooter from A- 2, A-3 and A-4 clinchingly established the guilt of A-2 to A-5.

Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kolar referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, the recovery of the scooter, the recovery of stolen articles and identification thereon to conclude that accused persons are guilty and accordingly A-2 to A-5 were convicted for offence punishable under Section 395 IPC. Accused 7 and 8 were acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to find them guilty. Considering the gravity of the offence, custodial sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/- each was imposed. In appeal, the High Court found that the offence committed was covered under Section 392 IPC, but considering the gravity of the offence upheld the sentence.

11. As the provision itself provides when the highway robbery is committed, deterrent punishment is called for.

14. Above being the position, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
Sea Lark Fisheries vs United India Insurance Co. & Anr

8. An application for insuring the vehicle was filed by the Bank. It supplied some information to the agent of the Insurer being one Hemchandra Babu. He examined himself as DW-1. It has been admitted by the Bank in its representation before the Chairman and the Managing Director of Respondent No. 1 company that there had been some omissions; explanation, however, in respect thereof was sought to be furnished in the following terms:

18. It was also referred to in the plaint. We have noticed heretobefore the material part thereof.

18. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
Punjab National Bank vs M.L. Kalra And Another

2. Respondent herein was an employee of the New Bank of India. On or about 4th September, 1993 the said Bank was amalgamated with the appellant bank. A charge sheet was issued against the respondent on 19th August, 1993. He reached the age of superannuation on 30th November, 1994. Appellant, however, relying on or on the basis of Regulation 20 (3) (iii) of the National Bank (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979, continued the departmental proceedings against him. The same was completed after his retirement on 1st August, 1995. An order of punishment was passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the respondent from service on 22nd Mach, 1996, directing :-

3. An appeal preferred thereagainst by the respondent before the appellate authority was dismissed by an order dated 6th March, 1997 stating:-

(b) Nothing in clause (a) shall apply to interruption caused by resignation, dismissal or removal from service or for participation in a strike:

12. When an order of dismissal or removal is passed, clause (1) of Regulation 22 would apply. Clause (2) will have application only when an interruption in service takes place.

17. Where a proceeding is initiated for withholding or withdrawal of pension, Regulation 43 of the Pension Regulations would be attracted. But provisions of the said Regulation if read in its entirety clearly go to show that an officer would not qualify for pensionary benefits, if inter alia, he is dismissed from service.

Regulation 48 empowers the Bank to recover pecuniary loss caused to it from the pensionary benefits. Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations must be read in conjunction with the Pension Regulations. Where the employees are pension optees, Regulation 48(1) shall apply. In any event, if an officer is removed or dismissed from service under Regulation 4 of the (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, the Bank need not take recourse to Regulation 48 of the Pension Regulations as Regulation 22 thereof would be attracted.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment.

19. For the reasons abovementioned the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and it is set aside accordingly. The Appeal is allowed. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
Rajib Kumar Paul & Anr vs Gurudas Mitra & Ors

The undisputed facts are:

The aforesaid admitted facts are born out from the application dated 29.6.1993 addressed to the Municipal Commissioner, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. In the said application, the appellants prayed for regularization of the entire irregularity and requested to allow the change of use of the places from residential to commercial. The application dated 29.6.1993 speaks for itself. It is extracted:

Dated Calcutta 29th June 1993 The Municipal Commissioner, The Calcutta Municipal Corporation, 5, B.N. Banerjee Road, Calcutta 13 Dear Sir, Re: Premises No.4H, Panchanantala Road, Calcutta 700 020.

In view of the fact as stated above and under the circumstances your honour is earnestly requested to allow the change of use of the places as cited above from Residential to Commercial, so that we may continue the business legally in view of C.M.C. Act is concerned and thus make us free from hazards and encumbrances.

2. No. coloured photo showing all above converted commercial places.

The Special Officer, Building, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, after taking into account the application for regularization and the complaint, directed to demolish the unauthorized construction by its order dated 10.6.1994. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred an appeal before the Building Tribunal, which upholds the order of demolition passed by the Special Officer, Building. Aggrieved thereby, Writ Petition No.21521(w) of 1999 was preferred. The learned single Judge by its judgment and order dated 23.4.1999 although upheld the order of the Tribunal, remanded the case to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and allowed the appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court further directed the corporation authority to take immediate steps in terms of the order of the Special Officer and confirmed by the Tribunal. The authority was further directed to stop unauthorized use of the building either by guest house or by the bank or any other organization and/or firm and/or association under Section 416 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. The main thrust of arguments by the learned counsel for the appellants in C.A.Nos.6831-6833 of 2001 is that the appellants' application dated 29.6.1993 for regularization of the change of use from residential to commercial, was not disposed of by the authority. However, by an order dated 10.6.1994 the Special Officer, Building, without considering and disposing of the application dated 29.6.1993 ordered the demolition of the unauthorized construction and, therefore, the order of demolition is not tenable in law.

For the reasons aforestated, all these appeals are devoid of merits, and are, accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Santosh Kumar Singh And Ors vs The State Of Bihar And Ors

2. The factual controversy lies in a very narrow compass.

3. L.R.D.C. by order dated 14.5.1984 accepted part of the objection and ordered for exclusion of the land gifted during grace period in favour of two daughters, namely, Nirmala Kumari and Sashibala. However, rest of the objections including the objection relating to classification of land was rejected. A Ceiling Appeal was preferred and the appellate authority by order dated 10.9.1985 accepted part of the objection. Certain lands which were earlier classified as Class- I land were held not properly to have been done. However, the other part of the classification was held to be valid. The gift made in favour of the two daughters was confirmed but the claim relating to deletion of land gifted in favour of daughter- in-law, Kamla Devi and grand daughter Bageshwari Devi was rejected. Thereafter revision case No.387/85 was preferred. The revisional authority by revisional order dated 28.4.1987, rejected the same. A writ petition was filed before the High Court and the primary stand was relating to classification made to declare certain lands as surplus. Similarly, non- exclusion of the gifts in favour of Kamla Devi and Bageshwari Devi were questioned. The States stand was that the amended definition of landholder as amended in 1973 was applicable. It was pointed out that the land ceiling proceedings were not initiated against any individual but against the family. In view of the definition of the expression family, Kamla Devi, Bagehswari Devi and Chittaranjan Prasad Singh come within the definition of family and their land stood included. So far as the classification is concerned, it was submitted that after due verification and with reference to irrigational facility available the classification was made.

preferred by any person having any claim or interest in said matters shall be considered by the Collector who shall, after giving the parties a "reasonable opportunity of being heard and adducing evidence, pass such order as he thinks fit.

9. That being so, the stand that the person who wants to prefer the objection is deprived of adequate opportunity is without substance.

10. In view of the above position, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
State Of Rajasthan vs Madan Singh

3. The respondent allegedly committed rape on a minor girl aged about 10 years on 29.8.1999. There is no need to refer to the factual position in detail as the High Court has upheld the conviction. It only needs to be noted that on the basis of the evidence adduced, the trial Court found that the victim was aged about 10 years. The only point which was urged before the High Court in addition to the question of sentence was that the offence at best was one under Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC. It was submitted that the accused had suffered custody of about 6 years and, therefore, he being only bread earner of the family and being of young age, the sentence should be reduced to the period already undergone. The plea was opposed by the State stating that in view of the statutory minimum sentence provided, no leniency was called for. The High Court found that the trial Court was justified in holding the appellant guilty of offence punishable under Section 376 (2)(f) of IPC. As the victim was aged about 10 years, it held that considering the factual position after assigning reason the minimum sentence can be reduced. Having so observed, the High Court reduced the sentence to seven years and a fine of Rs.5,000/- with default stipulation with the following conclusions was imposed:

10. In view of the position in law indicated above, the judgment of the High Court reducing the sentence to 7 years is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. The sentence of 10 years as imposed by the trial Court is restored.

11. The appeal is allowed.
Ashfaq Khan And Anr vs State Of U.P. And Ors

3. The facts in a nutshell are as follows:

5. The order of the High Court does not show as to how the ratio of the decision in a batch of writ petitions disposed of had any application or relevance so far as the present case is concerned.

6. In the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter to it to consider as to how the facts involved in Writ Petition No.10500 of 2005 and/or the ratio of that decision had any relevance so far as the present dispute is concerned. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

7. The appeal is allowed.
M/S. Rattan Steel Works vs Commissioner Of Central Excise & Anr

JUDGMENT O R D E R I.A.NO.2 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.426 OF 2003 Pursuant to a show cause notice dated 11th August 1998 to the appellant and the reply having been filed by it, the Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai, imposed a duty of Rs.23,51,646/- and a penalty of Rs.5,00,000/- on the appellant-firm and Rs.1,00,000/- on its proprietor as individual penalty.

On an appeal filed by the appellant, Cutoms, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (now Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal) [CESTAT], by an order dated 17th July 2000, ordered payment of Rs.10,00,000/- as pre-deposit as a condition precedent for hearing the appeal on merits within a period of three months. It was made clear that if the said amount is not deposited, the appeal filed before it shall stand dismissed. The appellant deposited only a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-. The CESTAT, however, on 19th January 2001, extended the time to deposit the amount by two months. On 28th March 2001, the CESTAT dismissed the appeal for non-compliance of the order of pre-deposit.

Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court which was also dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 20th September 2001. However, a period of twelve weeks was granted to deposit the remaining amount of Rs.9,00,000/-.

The appellant filed an appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench, by the impugned order, dismissed the appeal, but, granted two weeks' time to deposit the amount of pre-deposit. Against the said order, the appellant filed an appeal before this Court by way of Special Leave Petition wherein leave has been granted and the appeal is pending.

Counsel for the appellant-applicant submits that the remaining amount of pre-deposit will be deposited within three weeks. In view of this statement, we accept this appeal and set aside the orders of the Division Bench of the High Court, learned Single Judge of the High Court as also that of the CESTAT and order that if the aforementioned remaining amount of Rs.9,00,000/- is deposited within the said period, the appeal before the CESTAT shall stand restored and disposed of on I.A.No.2 in C.A.No.426/03 .... (contd.)

merits. However, in case the appellant-applicant fails to deposit the said amount, the order passed by the CESTAT dismissing the appeal of the appellant shall remain in force and consequently the present appeal shall also stand dismissed. In view of the above, I.A.No.2 as also the civil appeal are disposed of.
Twenty First Century Wire Rods Ltd.& Anr vs Administrator,D.& N.Haveli Silvassa ...

By a demand notice dated 22nd September, 2003 the Administration of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, in its Electricity Department demanded a sum of Rs.1,70,58,412.00 from the appellants on account of un-metered electricity said to have been consumed by the appellants. Pursuant to the said notice, various sums were deposited by the appellants till 6th December, 2004 when by a fresh notice of even date, the appellants were directed to pay the balance sum of Rs.70,42,887 within 10 days from the date of the issue of the letter, failing which the power supply to their establishment would stand disconnected without further notice.

We, accordingly, dispose of this appeal by recording the fact that the balance amount has been paid and the power supply to the appellants establishment should not, therefore, be disconnected on this count. However, the respondents will be at liberty to -3- compute the interest, if any, payable and to raise a fresh demand in respect thereof. There will be no orders as to costs.
Gulab Singh vs Union Of India & Ors

One Hari Singh Malhiyan, elder brother of the appellant, is alleged to have deposited 80 currency notes of Rs.1000/- denomination in his capacity as Karta of a H.U.F. with the State Bank of India, Parliament Street Branch, in view of the promulgation of the High Denomination Banks Notes (Demonitisation) Ordinance, 1978. Subsequently, he filed an application for recovery of the said amount, but since the same was rejected, he filed Civil Writ Petition No.1764/1980 for quashing the orders of rejection dated 2nd February, 1980 and 4th July, 1980, passed by the Additional Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs and the Chief Currency Officer, Reserve Bank of India (Issue Department), New Delhi. A writ in the nature of mandamus was also sought for against the said respondents, to direct them to pay the petitioner Rs.80,000/- in exchange for the 80 currency notes of the denomination of Rs.1000/- each. The said writ petition was dismissed for default on 4th January, 2002, but the writ petitioner Hari Singh Malhiyan did not take any steps to restore the same. Subsequently, the present appellant filed an application for impleadment and restoration of the said writ petition which was dismissed. Without pursuing the matter further, the appellant filed a separate writ petition, being No.467 of 2006, inter alia, for a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to release his 1/5th share in the said 80 currency notes of Rs.1000/- denomination with interest @ 18% from 1978 till final payment. The said writ application came up before the Delhi High Court on 20th January, 2006 when it appears that no one was present on behalf of the petitioner and the High Court found that the appellant's earlier application for impleadment had been dismissed. Having also found that the appellant had not filed his claim on behalf of the H.U.F., the High Court held that the appellant could not at that stage claim that the currency notes in question belongs to the H.U.F. On that reasoning the High Court dismissed the writ petition and it is against such order of dismissal that the appellant has filed the special leave petition.

In that view of the matter, we dismiss the appeal, but we also observe that it will be open to the appellant to urge the points taken herein in the pending suit. There will be no orders as to costs.
School & Mass Education, Orissa vs Pravabati Rout & Ors

On 08th October 1993, respondent no.1 herein was appointed by respondent no.2 (Chairman-cum-Collector, Kendrapara Municipality) as Assistant Teacher on ad-hoc basis on a consolidated salary of Rs.500/- per month for a period of 44 days. Her ad-hoc appointment was extended from time to time. However, while extending the ad-hoc appointment, break of one day was given on completion of each 44 days. On 31st July 1995, respondent nos.2 and 3 regularised services of 8 primary school teachers working in different schools within the Kendrapara Municipal Area. On 19th August 1995, the appellant issued an order that the appointment to the post of primary school teachers will be made by the respective District Inspectors of Schools through a Selection Committee constituted for the purpose. Pursuant to the said order the services of respondent no.1 were not extended as the Municipality had no authority to do so.

Respondent no.1 filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking regularisation of her services and payment of salary and other allowances as were being paid to other similarly situated teachers.

A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition and directed that the services of respondent no.1 be regularised with effect from the date from which the services of 8 other similarly situated teachers were regularised. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant is in appeal before us.