L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Union Of India vs Parmal Singh & Ors

The lands of respondents in village Mola Agri (now district Ghaziabad) were requisitioned by the Central Government in 1963 under section 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962 (for short the `Act'). The said 2 requisitioned lands were subsequently acquired under section 36 of the Act in the year 1965. The Special Land Acquisition officer, Meerut, determined the compensation payable to the respondents in the year 1966 (varying between Rs.2400 and Rs.3625 per bigha by adopting belting method of valuation). Not being satisfied with the compensation determined by him, the respondents sought reference to arbitration under section 37(2) of the Act, for determination of proper compensation. The Central Government appointed different Arbitrators to decide their claims. In one arbitration, an award dated 16.3.1979, was made awarding compensation at the rate of Rs.2.60 per sq.yd with interest at 6% per annum from the date of acquisition till date of deposit. In another arbitration, an award dated 8.9.1986 was made awarding compensation at Rs.2.60 per sq. yd. with solatium at the rate of 30% and interest at 9% per annum on the additional amount from the date of acquisition till date of payment. Not being satisfied with the compensation, respondents filed writ petitions challenging the awards of the arbitrators before the Allahabad High Court. The High Court by its orders dated 1.4.1999 increased the compensation to Rs.3.60 per sq. yd. Wherever solatium had been awarded, the High Court set aside the same. Wherever interest had been awarded at a rate in excess of six percent per annum, the 3 High Court reduced the rate and awarded a uniform interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of acquisition till the date of payment/deposit.

12. For the reasons aforesaid, we uphold the award of interest at 6% per annum on the compensation amount. The appeals are therefore dismissed. C.A. Nos.332-336/2008 and CA Nos.354 to 359/2008 12 These appeals involve the same issue. Following the decision in C.A. Nos.2319-2327/2001, these appeals are dismissed.

SLP (C) Nos. 4505-4506/2008, SLP (C) Nos. 4632-4636/2008), SLP (C) No. 4637/2008, SLP (C) Nos. 7110-7112/2008, SLP (C) Nos.9132- 9145/2008, SLP (C) Nos. 11266-11271/2008, and SLP (C) Nos. 19273- 19289/2003 Delay condoned. Leave granted. These matters are covered by the decision rendered in C.A. Nos.2319-2327/2001. Following the said decision, we uphold the award of interest and dismiss these appeals.

__________________J.
M. Viswanathan vs M/S.S.K.Tiles & Potteries P.Ltd.& Ors

Sai Sri Krishna Properties and Facilitators (P) Ltd, decided to remove the complainant from his office as Managing Director, a resolution to that effect was passed on 7.7.2005 in a board meeting conducted to the effect that the complainant was ousted from his office as Managing Director.

10. Accordingly, the prosecution was quashed holding that the grievance, if any, of the complainant will have to be redressed through the Civil Forum or the Company Law Board. He cannot prosecute the respondents on the basis of bald allegation without any basis. Accordingly, prosecution has quashed.

19. The appeal is allowed.
Manoj Ramesh Mehta vs State Of Maharashtra

3. The appellant was arrested on 11.6.2003 in connection with an FIR relating to counterfeiting stamps/stamp papers (Telgi case) for offences 2 under sections 120(B), 255, 34, 109 of IPC read with sections 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(5) and section 4 of Maharashtra Control of Organized Crimes Act, 1999 [`MCOC Act' for short]. The appellant alleges that an FIR was registered on 7.6.2002 and a charge-sheet was filed on 3.9.2002; that the charges framed were set aside by the High Court with a direction to frame fresh charges; that a fresh charge-sheet was filed on 15.9.2003; that the prosecution has cited eight hundred witnesses; that among the 68 accused, two have died, one has absconded, four have been discharged, 43 have been convicted on admission of guilt under section 229 Cr.P.C and the remaining 18 are facing trial; and that there is no likelihood of an early completion of trial.

7. The High Court has considered the matter in detail and has rightly concluded that this is not a fit case for granting bail. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.

...............................CJI [K. G. Balakrishnan] ............................J [R. V. Raveendran] .............................J [Mukundakam Sharma] New Delhi;

November 25, 2008.
State Rep.By Inspector Of ... vs Rajendran & Ors

2. Challenge in both the appeals is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court directing acquittal of the respondents who faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') so far as the respondents 1 to 4 are concerned and Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act, 1915 (in short the `Arms Act') so far as respondent Nos. 1, 3 & 4 are concerned. Learned Sessions Judge, Tirunvelli held them guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment for life for the first offence but no separate sentence was imposed for the later offence.

7. The appeals are allowed. The respondents shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence.
Man Mohan Sharma vs Depinder Singh

5. Pursuant to the aforesaid suggestion, Shri Arora wrote to the appellant on 31.8.2000 stating that the respondent had granted permission to reprint the book but had also suggested that concurrence of the appellant should be obtained. 5 Shri Arora, accordingly, requested the appellant to agree to the proposal so that he could go ahead with the reprint of the book. In reply to the said letter, the appellant on 2.9.2000 wrote back to Shri Arora as follows:

17. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and having further perused the materials on record, we find ourselves unable to agree with the decision of the learned designated Judge as also that of the Division Bench of the High Court impugned in this appeal.

20. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to sustain the order of the Division Bench of the High Court impugned in this appeal or the judgment of the learned designated Judge, and, accordingly, set aside the same. The matter is remanded to the learned designated Judge for appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement contained in paragraph 17 of the Publication 16 Agreement arrived at between the respondent and the appellant in September 1991.

21. The appeal is allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

_______________J.

(ALTAMAS KABIR) _______________J.

(MARKANDEY KATJU) New Delhi Dated: 26.11.2008
Bhuvaneshwar Yadav vs State Of Bihar & Ors

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court granting bail to Respondents 2 and 3 who were convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 (in short the `Arms Act'). Two other persons namely, Nirmal Singh and Shiv Janam Singh were also convicted in terms of Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Four other accused persons were acquitted by the Trial Court. Respondents 2 and 3 filed Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 2004 before the Patna High Court in which the present appellant, the informant has also appeared. Though prayers for bail were earlier made during the pendency of the appeal, they were rejected on 23.3.2004 and 24.8.2006. However, liberty was granted in the latter case to renew the prayer for bail after six months. It was again made on 14.3.2007 which has been allowed by the impugned order.

14. The High Court noticed that earlier the bail was rejected, but liberty was granted to renew the prayer after six months. That does not in any way show that there was entitlement for getting the bail. The impugned order of the High Court shows total non application of mind and is therefore set 6 aside. The appeal is allowed. The bail application shall be reconsidered on merits and shall be disposed of by a reasoned order. If the respondents have been released on bail, they shall surrender to custody forthwith.
Batcu Venkateshwarlu And Ors vs Public Prosecutor High Court Of A.P

On 15.5.1990, Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government Hospital, Sattenapally, (PW.29) conducted autopsy over the dead body of D2. Post mortem certificate issued by him is Ex.P7, Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government Hospital, Sattenapally, (PW.28) conducted post mortem examination over the dead body of D3 and issued Ex.P6 post mortem certificate. PW-31 examined P.Ws 1 to 11 on 14.5.1990 in the night itself and issued wound certificate Exs.P9 to P20 respectively. As per the opinion of the Doctor, the injuries noticed on the prosecution witnesses were simple in nature. But the injuries found on the person of PW.4 were of grievous nature.

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied)

Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.

42. As the manner of disposal of the appeal leaves much to be desired, we think it appropriate to remit the matter to the High Court to dispose of the appeal afresh. Needless it has to analyse the conclusions and decide whether any interference is called for and, if the answer is in the affirmative, the reason therefore.

43. The appeal is allowed.
Yogi Agarwal vs M/S Inspiration Clothes & U & Ors

3. The plaintiff filed the suit on 9.9.2003 for recovery of Rs.9,48,143 with interest allegedly due in regard to (i) price of two consignments supplied by plaintiff to the nominees of the first defendant company and (ii) value of nine samples made available by the plaintiff to defendants. In the said suit, defendants made an application dated 17.12.2005 under section 8 of the Act, for referring the parties to arbitration. To show the existence of arbitration agreement, the defendants relied upon three invoices of `Yash Traders', a proprietary concern of the second defendant (petitioner herein), dated 2.11.1999, 22.6.2001 and 11.2.2003 in regard to the sale of cotton fabric by the said Yash Traders to the plaintiff containing the following note: "All disputes pertaining to this 3 transaction if any will be subject to the Arbitration Rules & Regulations of Bharat Merchant Chamber". The defendants alleged that the said invoices were accepted by the plaintiff thus resulting in a binding arbitration agreement.

9. As there is no arbitration agreement with reference to the subject-matter of the suit filed by the plaintiff 7 (first respondent herein), rejection of the application filed by defendants under Section 8 of the Act, does not call for interference. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed both on the ground of delay and on merits.
Anusuyaben Sadashiv Jadav And Anr vs Union Of India And Ors

2. These are bail applications/applications for impleadment by the accused petitioners filed in POTA/criminal cases pending on the files of Special POTA Judge, Sabarmati, Ahmedabad and other courts in regard to POTA cases registered with Godhra police station, , Crime Branch, Ahmedabad City and Ellisbridge Police Station, Ahmedabad. In some of these cases, bail applications were rejected by the Special Judge and in some cases the same were rejected by the High Court and in some other cases by this Court.

The appeals by the relatives of victims are disposed of reserving liberty to challenge the opinions of the Review Committee, wherever they are aggrieved;

4. We, therefore, direct the POTA Special Judge, Sabarmati, Ahmedabad or other courts where the cases of applicants are pending to send all those cases to the respective Sessions Judge within a period of one month of receipt of a copy of this order. This is subject to the order, if any, that may be passed by any competent court against the opinion of Central POTA Review Committee.

5. All these petitions/applications for bail/impleadment are permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to move for bail before the concerned Sessions Court after the records are received on transfer. In the event of filing such applications, the Sessions Judge shall consider the same on merits untrammelled by the observations, if any, made by the superior courts in any bail application filed by these respective petitioners.

...............CJI.

1ST DECEMBER, 2008.
Govt.Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr vs Prem Lata

of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. The respondent was a Member (Female) of the District Consumer forum, Delhi. On 06.04.2006, applications have been invited from suitable candidates for appointment on whole time basis for the post of Member (Female) in the District Consumer Forum, Delhi. The respondent herein had submitted her application for consideration as a Member (Female) as she was entitled to be considered for reappointment under proviso of sub-section 2 of Section 10 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). The last date for submitting the application was 21.04.2006. It appears that the respondent herein got submitted her application only on 1st May, 2006, as she was out of India for sometime. The application of the respondent was recommended by the President 1 who is also the Chairman of the Selection Committee and, therefore, she was called for interview. When the panel of the selected candidates was sent to the Lt. Governor it was noticed that the application submitted by the respondent was delayed as it was sent on 1st May, 2006 i.e. beyond the stipulated date. The Lt. Governor rejected the candidature of the respondent on the ground that the application was sent late. Challenging that, the respondent has filed a Writ Petition (C) No. 61 of 2007 before the High Court and the same was considered by the High Court. By the impugned judgment, it was held that the case of the respondent was not that of appointment as envisaged under sub-section 1-A of Section 10 of the Act, but of a reappointment as contemplated under proviso of sub- section 2 of Section 10 of the Act and as the Delhi Administration nowhere denied or disputed the eligibility of the respondent for reappointment on the said post. Regarding delay in submitting her application, the High Court by pointing out the action of the President of the State Commission who was also Chairman of the Selection Committee recommended her case and she was called for interview and she being a sitting Member eligible for consideration for reappointment, allowed her writ petition and directed to declare result of the respondent. By saying so, the High Court set aside the decision of the Administration rejecting her claim on the ground of late submission of the application.

5) The appeal is disposed of on the above terms. No costs.

............................CJI.

(K.G. BALAKRISHNAN) ..................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) NEW DELHI;

DECEMBER 1, 2008.
Mohammed Yusuf vs Faij Mohammad & Ors

3. Appellant herein filed a suit for a decree for permanent injunction in the year 2002. A separate application -1- for grant of temporary injunction was also filed. Summons upon the defendants were served on 6.7.2002. The defendants appeared through their learned advocate on 19.7.2002.

4. Appellant filed an application for grant of temporary injunction which was rejected on 28.1.2004. An appeal was preferred thereagainst which was disposed of by an order dated 14.5.2004. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the defendants- respondents filed applications for extension of time for filing written statement number of times. The matter was also adjourned on one ground or the other.

6. However, on 23.9.2005, as indicated hereinbefore by reason of an order dated 24.10.2005, while rejecting the said application of the respondent, the trial Judge allowed the plaintiff to examine his own witnesses in support of his case. -2-

8. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, the respondents filed a Writ Petition which was marked as CMWP No. 45197/2007 before the High Court. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court has allowed the said Writ Petition, directing:

15. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court should not have allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent, particularly, when both the learned trial judge as also the Revisional Court had assigned sufficient and cogent reasons in support of their orders.

16. As indicated hereinbefore, the High Court allowed the writ petition and thereby set aside the orders passed by the -6- trial Court as also the Revisional Court without assigning any reason therefor. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is limited. It could have set aside the orders passed by the learned trial Court and the Revisional Court only on limited ground, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. The High Court did not arrive at a finding that there had been a substantial failure of justice or the orders passed by the trial Court as also by the Revisional Court contained error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference by a superior Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

17. For the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.

18. In this view of the matter the respondents would be entitled to withdraw the sum of Rs.10,000/- deposited by them as costs.

......................J. [S.B. SINHA] .....................J [ CYRIAC JOSEPH ] New Delhi, December 2, 2008.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd vs Santro Devi & Ors

2. One Atma Ram Sharma was the owner of a truck bearing registration No.HIN-4737. It was hypothecated to a Bank. Atma Ram Sharma died sometime in 1991. The said vehicle was insured with the appellant. Renewal of the contract of insurance, however, used to be done by the Bank. Despite the death of the said Atma Ram Sharma, no step was taken 2 either by the Bank or by his heirs and legal representatives to get the registration of the vehicle transferred in their names. The insurance policy also continued to be renewed in the name of Atma Ram Sharma.

3. The said vehicle met with an accident while being driven by Shri Chhater Singh on 15.9.1994 in which he died. The legal heirs and representatives of the said Chhater Singh filed an application for grant of compensation under Section 4 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 against the widow of the deceased Atma Ram Sharma as also the appellant- Insurance Company claiming a sum of Rs.1,22,400/-.

12. Indisputably, apart from raising a general and vague plea of fraud, no particulars thereof had been disclosed. The contract of insurance was entered into by the Bank with the appellant. The premium was paid by the bank. The contract of insurance might have been drawn in the name of the 8 deceased Atma Ram Sharma but no witness has been examined on behalf of the appellant alleging that they were not aware thereabout.

23. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.25,000/-.

December 02, 2008
Prakash R. Gupta vs Lonavala Municipal Council & Ors

The appellant is the owner of the land in dispute. His land was reserved under a development plan for a certain college but that college got disaffiliated. Thereafter, a minor modification under Section 37 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (in short, 'the Act') was issued and it was said to be allotted to the present respondent No.3.

-3- acquired within the further period of six months nor were any steps taken to acquire it. Hence, in our opinion, the reservation lapsed and the land has to be released in favour of the appellant.

In view of the above, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and direct that the land in question shall be released forthwith in favour of the appellant.

No order as to costs.
Rama Kant Verma vs State Of U.P. & Ors

1. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, directing acquittal of the respondents 2 to 5 who were found guilty of offences punishable under Section 302 read with Sections 149 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). Appellant was the informant in the case. The aforesaid accused respondents were found guilty of offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and 148 IPC and each of them was sentenced to be hanged separately till death. Since confirmation of the death sentence was required, reference was made in terms of Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Cr.P.C.'). The convicted accused preferred appeals. The present appellant filed a revision against the judgment and order of acquittal in respect of two persons namely Ram Kripal Verma and Ram Tilak Verma. The High Court allowed the appeal filed by the convicted appellants, while dismissing the revision petition filed by the informant and rejected the reference.

2. The prosecution version as unfolded during the trial is as follows:

10. In the circumstances, we deem it proper to remit the matter to the High Court for hearing the cases afresh and dispose them of in accordance with law.

11. The appeals are allowed.
K. Laxmanan vs Thekkayil Padmini & Ors

3. The present appellant was the contesting defendant being the fifth defendant and is a son of Chathu. The respondent No. 1 herein is one of the daughters of Chathu and was the plaintiff in the suit. The suit was filed by her after demise of Chathu contending inter alia that the property left behind by Chathu devolved upon the plaintiff and the defendants equally and therefore they are entitled to one fourth share each. In the plaint, suit property was mentioned as item Nos. 1 to 12. Subsequently, plaintiff also incorporated Item Nos. 13 and 14 in the plaint for division.

7. Being aggrieved by the said decision, a second appeal was filed by the fifth defendant, which was heard by the High Court of Kerala. The High Court, however, dismissed the second appeal by the impugned judgment and order which is under challenge in this appeal.

9. Narration of the aforesaid facts would thus clearly establish that execution of the Gift Deed and also of the Will are held to be suspicious and the genuineness of the same was doubted by the first appellate court as also by the High Court. That the appellant failed to dispel the suspicious circumstances by adducing satisfactory evidences, was held, mainly on the ground that the attesting witnesses to both the documents were not examined.

38.In that view of the matter, we find no reason to interfere with the findings arrived at by the High Court. The appeal has no merit and is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

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