Suman Sood @ Kamal Jeet Kaur vs State Of Rajasthan [Alongwith Criminal ...

4. To appreciate the controversy raised by the parties, few relevant facts may be stated.

5. It was the case of the prosecution that one Rajendra Mirdha, son of Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha was staying at 81-C, Azad Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur. He used to regularly wake up at about 6.30/6.45 in the morning and to take walk for about an hour or an hour and a half. According to the prosecution, on February 17, 1995, as usual, he left his residence for a morning walk at about 7.00 a.m. He had hardly completed two or three rounds and when again he reached at the road for further rounds, he saw a white Maruti car and one man came out of it. The said man asked Rajendra Mirdha about the location of House No. 105 or 106. Before he could reply, he was pushed into the car and was taken away. There were three persons in the car having weapons. Rajendra Mirdha did not know why he was kidnapped. After some time, Mr. Mirdha was taken in one house. The kidnappers then told Mr. Mirdha that they were the members of the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF). One of their members, Devendra Pal Singh Bhullar was arrested at the Indira Gandhi International Airport on the night of January 18-19, 1995 on his return to India after the German authorities declined to grant him asylum and the kidnappers wanted him to be released. It was also stated that the kidnappers had nothing against Rajendra Mirdha personally. It was also the case of the prosecution that at the relevant time, Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha, father of Rajendra Mirdha was heading Joint Parliamentary Committee, being a Chairman of the Committee. According to the kidnappers, Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha was thus an influential person and was in a position to get the said act done by the Government. According to the prosecution, PW 5 Udai Rani Mirdha, wife of Rajendra Mirdha received a telephonic call at about 8.40 a.m. from an unknown person who stated that Rajendra Mirdha had been made hostage and until and unless Devendra Pal Singh Bhullar was freed, they would not release Rajendra Mirdha. He further stated that neither Police should be informed nor the telephone be tapped. The caller also stated that he would again telephone Udai Rani Mirdha. Udai Rani informed the above incident and a call from unknown person to Harendra Mirdha, PW 29, younger brother of Rajendra Mirdha. Harendra Mirdha went to Ashok Nagar Police station and lodged First Information Report (FIR) about abduction of his elder brother Rajendra Mirdha. A case was registered as FIR No. 57 of 1995 (Ex.P-29) under Section 365 IPC and investigation started. During the investigation, according to the prosecution, it was revealed that accused Daya Singh, Suman Sood and other persons were involved in the abduction of Rajendra Mirdha. Necessary steps were, therefore, taken to arrest the accused. Daya Singh and Suman Sood were arrested from Minneapolis Airport, Minnesota, USA on August 3, 1995 while they were illegally trying to cross over to Canada. The United States District Judge, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division allowed the extradition of accused Daya Singh to India inter alia for offences punishable under Sections 343, 346, 353, 364A, 365, 420, 468, 471, 120A and 120B IPC as also for the offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. Likewise, extradition of accused Suman Sood was allowed for offences punishable under Sections 343, 346, 353, 364A, 420, 468, 471, 120A and 120B IPC. It appears that after the accused were brought to India, prosecution was launched against them also for offences under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 ("TADA" for short). Since the order of extradition did not mention trial of offences under TADA, Daya Singh filed a Writ Petition in this Court by invoking Article 32 of the Constitution contending that the prosecution under TADA was without authority, power and jurisdiction and no prosecution could have been launched. This Court, considering the relevant provisions of the Extradition Act, 1962, in the light of the order of extradition held the contention well-founded and allowed the petition holding that no prosecution under TADA could have been instituted. The said decision was reported as Daya Singh and Ors. v. Union of India . After the above decision, prosecution for offences under TADA was dropped, the case was transferred from the Designated Court, Ajmer under TADA to the Court of Sessions Judge, Jaipur City which was finally tried and decided by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Category No.1, Jaipur and was registered as Sessions Case No. 26 of 2003.

9. Both husband and wife were aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence and approached the High Court of Rajasthan. The State was also aggrieved by the order of acquittal of Suman Sood for offence under Section 364A, in the alternative under Section 364A read with Section 120B, IPC and preferred an appeal. As already noted earlier, appeals of both the accused were dismissed by the High Court while the appeal of State of Rajasthan against Suman Sood was allowed and she was convicted for an offence punishable under Section 364A read with Section 120B, IPC. The High Court also ordered that looking to the gravity and dastardly nature of acts and consequences, Daya Singh as well as Suman Sood "shall not be released from the prison unless they served out at least twenty years of imprisonment including the period already undergone by them".

11. On August 21, 2006, leave was granted in appeal filed by Suman Sood. Printing was dispensed with and appeal was ordered to be heard on SLP Paper Books. Parties were directed to file additional documents. It appears that an application for bail was submitted by Suman Sood stating therein that she had undergone the sentence for which conviction had been recorded by the trial Court against her and she had to remain in jail because of the order of conviction recorded by the High Court for an offence punishable under Section 364A read with 120B, IPC. She, therefore, prayed that she be released on bail. The Court, however, instead of granting prayer of bail, directed the Registry to place the matter for final hearing. Daya Singh had also preferred an appeal against his conviction. On February 6, 2007, when the appeal of Suman Sood was called out for hearing, it was stated that Daya Singh was convicted by the trial Court as well as by the High Court and he had also filed an appeal, but it was at the stage of S.L.P. and notice was issued, but no leave was granted. It was further stated that judgment of the High Court was common in both the matters, but the matter of Daya Singh was not placed on Board. The Court, therefore, directed the Registry to place the papers before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for obtaining appropriate orders so that both the matters could be placed before one Bench. Now, all the matters have been placed for hearing before us.

16. Similarly, extradition of accused Daya Singh was also allowed for offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The trial of the accused, therefore, cannot be held to be unlawful or without legal sanction.

In view of the aforesaid position in law, both on international law as well as the relevant statute in this country, we dispose of these cases with the conclusion that a fugitive brought into this country under an Extradition Decree can be tried only for the offences mentioned in the extradition decree and for no other offence and the Criminal Courts of this country will have no jurisdiction to try such fugitive for any other offence.

35. Having disposed of preliminary objections raised by the appellants, let us now come to the merits of the matter.

39. From what is stated above, in our opinion, neither the trial Court nor the High Court has committed either an error of fact or an error of law in convicting accused Daya Singh for the offences punishable under Sections 365 as also 364A, IPC. So far Suman Sood is concerned, we will deal with her involvement in the case at an appropriate stage.

43. From the above discussion and findings recorded, in our considered opinion, neither the trial Court nor the High Court has committed any error in convicting appellant-accused Daya Singh for the offences punishable under Sections 365, 364A, 343/120B and 346/120B, IPC.

(emphasis supplied)

KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM

57. Before the above section is attracted and a person is convicted, the prosecution must prove the following ingredients;

ACQUITTAL BY TRIAL COURT

65. In the facts and circumstances in their totality, by recording such finding, the trial Court has neither committed an error of fact nor an error of law.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.

70. On the facts and in the circumstances in its entirety and considering the evidence as a whole, it cannot be said that by acquitting Suman Sood for offences punishable under Section 364A read with 120B, IPC, the trial Court had acted illegally or unlawfully. The High Court, therefore, ought not to have set aside the finding of acquittal of accused Suman Sood for an offence under Section 364A read with 120B, IPC. To that extent, therefore, the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the High Court deserves to be set aside.

FINAL ORDER

71. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal filed by Daya Singh deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed and the order of conviction and sentence recorded against him by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court is upheld.

72. So far as accused Suman Sood is concerned, an order of conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court and upheld by the High Court for offences punishable under Sections 365/120B, 343/120B and 346/120B, IPC is confirmed and upheld. Her conviction and order of sentence for offence punishable under Section 364A read with 120B, IPC passed by the High Court, however, is set aside and her acquittal for the said offence recorded by the trial Court is restored.

73. Appeals are accordingly disposed of.