L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Moti Lal And Anr. vs State Of M.P.

2. The parties were neighbours. Their houses were divided only by a wall. They bore animosity with each other. The sequence of events started with defaecation by a child- Nitin in the house of Motilal.

3. On 4.7.1999 at about 9.30 a.m. when Nitin son of deceased Munnilal was playing near a tap situated close to his house, Pushpendra son of Motilal put some mud on his clothes. Nitin went to his house and informed his father Munnilal. Munnilal came to the house of Motilal and complained in regard to the conduct of Pushpendra. Motilal, Santosh and Hariram allegedly told him that their children would act in that fashion only. Narbadiya Bai- P.W.-3 reached the spot and told them that they always picked up quarrels. Appellants herein allegedly started inflicting axe blows on Munnilal-since deceased. Narbadiya Bai tried to save him, but allegedly one Jamuna Bai inflicted a blow on her by means of an iron pipe. Appellants Kalli Bai and Guddi Bai also hurled stick blows on Narbadiya Bai. Meanwhile Baldev said to have reached at that point of time. Appellants inflicted axe blows on Baldev and Hariram gave a blow of Baka on Baldev. Appellants Kali and Guddi Bai are said to have given stick blows on Baldev. Appellant-Lachhu snatched the axe from Santosh Kumar and dealt a blow on the head of deceased Munnilal.

4. Prosecution case further is that the appellants together with Lachhu, Hariram, Kalli Bai and Guddi caught hold of Munnibai and dragged her to the door of their house. Whereas Motilal brought a cane of kerosene and sprinkled kerosene on Munnibai; Santosh put her on fire. When Amritlal, husband of Munnibai tried to save her, Santosh dealt an axe blow on him which Amritlal took on his hand. Amritlal, thereafter, ran away from the place of incident and informed the police. Munnibai in the meantime rushed towards a nearby well and jumped there into. Sita-daughter of Amritlal reached the place of occurrence. She was pushed into a drain by Santosh. Similar treatments were meted out to Devshree and other children.

21. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that it is not a case where the appellants can be absolved of the charges of murder of Munnilal, Baldev and Munnibai.

22. The appeal is dismissed. However, having regard to the fact that the State has not preferred any appeal against the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court against the said accused persons, it is not possible for us to hold that it was not a case of free fight or the other accused also had any hand therein.
M/S. Hasthimal & Sons & Others vs P. Tej Raj Sharma

3. This appeal has arisen out of a suit for redemption of the mortgage and for possession of the mortgaged property. The owner of the properties was one Jagadish, who mortgaged the property with the defendant- respondent under a registered mortgage deed dated 19.3.1980 with possession by creating an usufructuary mortgage. It appears that after the mortgage deed, a partial release deed was signed between the parties on 21.9.1981 by which Jagadish had undertaken to give the first option to purchase to the mortgagee. On demand for redemption, the defendant refused and hence the suit was filed by the plaintiff, who had purchased the property from Jagadish.

4. It appears that before the aforesaid mortgage deed dated 19.3.1980 was registered, the mortgagee was already in possession of the property as a tenant of the mortgagor. In the mortgage deed it was specifically mentioned that on redemption of the mortgage the mortgagee should become the lessee of the mortgagor automatically as previous to the mortgage.

13. In the present case, there was a specific term in the mortgage deed dated 19.3.1980 that on redemption of the mortgage, the mortgagee shall become the lessee of the mortgagor automatically as previous to the mortgage deed. Hence, there was a clear intention between the parties that the tenancy will continue when the mortgage is redeemed. Hence, on this point we cannot agree with the High Court. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside on this point. The appeal is allowed. No costs.

14. It would, however, be open to the respondent to file a suit or proceeding for eviction of the appellant-tenant which will be decided on its own merits.
Bureau Of Indian Standards vs S.K. Kanojia

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

5. The respondents were in the pay-scale of Rs.10,000- 15,200, and working as Scientist-C, with effect from 10.3.1994 and were to have been promoted to Scientist -D, after five years in 1999. The promotions were granted only in March, 2003, with effect from March, 2001. The delay was attributed by the BIS, to a contemplated change in the Service Regulations. Changes were introduced to the FCS by an Office Memorandum dated 9th November, 1998 which modified the eligibility for benefits of the FCS linked to the Annual Confidential Reports of the person concerned. Regulation 9 was amended by notification dated 3rd May, 2002, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of the Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 1986 (in short the "Act") to read as follows:

Scientist C Scientist C to 90% 80% 75% 70% 60% Scientist D Scientist D to 90% 80% 75% 70% 60% Scientist E Scientist E to . 90% 80% 75% 70% Scientist F Scientist F to . 90% 80% 75% 70% Scientist G Exceptionally meritorious candidates with all outstanding gradings may be granted relaxation in the residency period, the relaxation being not more than one year on any single occasion. Such a relaxation will be limited to a maximum of two occasions in their entire career."

22. Regulation 9 provided that the promotion of selected officers under the FCS was to be on the basis of evaluation from "time to time". That being so, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were not correct in their views. The appeals deserve to be allowed which we direct. The order of the learned Single Judge as affirmed by the High Court stands set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
Swapan Dhar & Ors vs State Of West Bengal & Ors

2. Appellants herein were working as temporary pump operator in Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority. They were transferred to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation"). They were asked to join by June 15,1978 on the post of Turn Cock which according to them was a lower post. A writ petition came to be filed by the appellants, inter alia, stating that they had a legitimate claim of being appointed as a Fitter Driver. By judgment and order dated 11.7.1986, a learned Single Judge of the High Court disposed of the said petition by directing the respondent-authorities to consider the case of the appellants from all aspects including the question of seniority and offer them suitable posts equivalent to the posts which they had been holding under the CMDA prior to their services being transferred to the Corporation.

3. It is alleged that the Deputy Municipal Commissioner (personnel) rejected the claim of the appellants by mis-interpreting the order dated 11.7.1986 passed by the High Court. Appellants filed another writ petition before the High Court. The said writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court by an order dated 8.1.1992 directing as under:

12. As would be evident from the order dated 8.1.1992 passed by the learned Single Judge that it was categorically directed therein that the appellants were to be granted service benefits from the date of presentation of the writ application and not from any earlier date. Appellants accepted the said judgment. They did not prefer any appeal against the said order. Having allowed the said part of the order to attain finality, in our opinion, the appellants, at a subsequent stage, could not have claimed a new relief only relying on or on the basis of the observations made by the Division Bench. The doctrine of merger as propounded by the learned counsel for the appellants could have been held to be applicable provided the Division Bench had said the same expressly even though no appeal was taken by the appellants from the order of the learned Single Judge. The observations made by the Division Bench was only with regard to the determination of their right to be posted in Calcutta Municipal Corporation as Fitter Driver, Grades-I and II from a particular date. As mentioned hereinbefore, the judgment of the learned Single Judge was allowed to attain finality and in that view of of the matter, it is difficult for us to accept the submissions of Mr. Ghosh that by applying doctrine of merger or otherwise the Division Bench could give any higher benefits to the appellants although no appeal was preferred by them.

13. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not see any merit in this appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
U.P. State Electricity Board vs Pooran Chandra Pandey & Others

3. By means of the writ petition, 34 petitioners who were daily wage employees of the Cooperative Electric Supply Society (hereinafter referred to as the Society) had prayed for regularization of their services in the U.P. State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Electricity Board. It appears that the Society had been taken over by the Electricity Board on 3.4.1997. A copy of the minutes of the proceeding dated 3.4.1997 is Annexure P-2 to this appeal. That proceeding was presided over by the Minister of Cooperatives, U.P. Government and there were a large number of senior officers of the State government present in the proceeding. In the said proceeding, it was mentioned that the daily wage employees of the Society who are being taken over by the Board will start working in the Electricity Board in the same manner and position.

4. Pursuant to the said proceeding, the respondents herein were absorbed in the service of the Electricity Board.

5. Earlier, the Electricity Board had taken a decision on 28.11.1996 to regularize the services of its employees working on daily wage basis from before 4.5.1990 on the existing vacant posts and that an examination for selection would be held for that purpose.

19. In the present case many of the writ petitioners have been working from 1985 i.e. they have put in about 22 years service and it will surely not be reasonable if their claim for regularization is denied even after such a long period of service. Hence apart from discrimination, Article 14 of the Constitution will also be violated on the ground of arbitrariness and unreasonableness if employees who have put in such a long service are denied the benefit of regularization and are made to face the same selection which fresh recruits have to face.

20. For the reasons aforementioned, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail vs Spl. Director, Enforcement ...

Appellant herein was served with a show cause notice by the Enforcement Directorate on 04.07.1991 for alleged contravention of the provisions of Section 9(1)(b), 9(1)(d) and 9(3) of the Act, alleging, inter alia, that during the period June 1989 to July 1990, he caused to remit various payments aggregating to Rs.2,81,73,700/- to India from United Arab Emirates (UAE) through persons other than authorized dealers. Cause was shown thereto by the appellant. The Special Director, however, adjudicated the matter and by an order dated 06.10.1993 imposed a penalty of Rs.2,50,000/- on the appellant in terms of Section 9(3) of the Act. Penalty was also imposed on one Shri Champalal Singhvi.

3. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, an appeal was preferred by the appellant before the Board. The Board allowed the said appeal, inter alia, holding :

4. Respondents herein preferred an appeal thereagainst before the High Court. The Central Government was not impleaded as a party therein. The appellate authority, namely, the Board, however, was impleaded as a party, although it should not have been.

13. An adjudicating authority exercises a quasi-judicial power and discharges judicial functions. When its order had been set aside by the Board, ordinarily in absence of any power to prefer an appeal, it could not do so. The reasonings of the High Court that he had general power, in our opinion, is fallacious. For the purpose of exercising the functions of the Central Government, the officer concerned must be specifically authorized. Only when an officer is so specifically authorized, he can act on behalf of the Central Government and not otherwise. Only because an officer has been appointed for the purpose of acting in terms of the provisions of the Act, the same would not by itself entitle to an officer to discharge all or any of the functions of the Central Government. Even ordinarily a quasi-judicial authority can not prefer an appeal being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of the appellate authority whereby and whereunder its judgment has been set aside. An adjudicating authority, although an officer of the Central Government, should act as an impartial Tribunal. An adjudicating authority, therefore, in absence of any power conferred upon it in this behalf by the Central Government, could not prefer any appeal against the order passed by the Appellate Board.

18. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court, in our opinion, should not have interfered with the findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Board; without arriving at a finding that the same was perverse or in arriving thereat, the Board ignored legal principles.

19. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Bishan Singh & Anr vs The State

His brother Ghanshyam Dutt Bhatt intervened. It was alleged that the accused persons were inimically disposed of towards the injured and had attacked him with an intention to cause his death. The injuries suffered by Harish Bhatt as per the injury report prepared by Dr. J.S. Pangti (PW-6) are as under :

4. Admittedly, all the injuries except injury no.7 were simple ones. Injury No. 7 being a fracture with dislocation of wrist joint was found to be grievous one. The injured witness examined himself as PW-5. In his deposition, he alleged :

5. The learned Trial Judge relying on or on the basis of the testimonies of the said witness as also his brother, convicted the appellants for commission of an offence under Sections 147 and 308/149 IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 147 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for four years for the offence punishable under Section 308/149 IPC.

6. Although in the First Information Report, the informant had alleged that all the six accused had earlier threatened to kill him as also burn his hut and the said attack was with an intention to kill him, but the offence recorded therein was under Sections 147 and 323 IPC. The charge-sheet was, however, submitted, inter alia, under Section 308 IPC.

13. The question now is what punishment should be awarded.

14. While imposing punishment in a case of this nature, the court is required to take into consideration the factors which may weigh with the court for taking a lenient view in the matter. The incident is of 1984. 23 years have elapsed. Appellants had all along remained on bail. It is not stated that they had ever misused the privilege of bail. The incident does not reflect any cruelty on their part or any mental depravity. They had been in custody for more than five months. In a situation of this nature, we are of the opinion that it may not be proper for this Court to send the accused persons back to prison. However, the injured had suffered pains at the hands of the appellants. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while their substantive sentence may be reduced to the period undergone, they should pay a fine of Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand) each; failing which they should undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year each. If the aforementioned amount is realized, a sum of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) out of the sum, may be paid to the informant.

15. Appellants who are in custody shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case, subject to the aforementioned conditions.

16. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent.
Accounts Officer, Jharkhand State ... vs Anwar Ali

3. The appellants had questioned correctness of the findings recorded by the District Consumer Forum, Ranchi (in short District Forum) and the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Jharkhand, Ranchi (in short the State Commission) before the National Commission.

4. The basic grievance of the respondent was that the electricity supply was discontinued without notice. Compensation of Rs.50,000/- was awarded along with 12% interest per annum by the District Forum and upheld by the State Commission. The National Commission took the view that since notice was given after disconnection, the action was clearly unsustainable.

10. In view of the fact that the National Commission has not addressed the question as to whether consumer of electricity is covered by the definition of Consumer as defined in Section 2(o) of the Act, we set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the National Commission to record a positive finding on the aspect. It shall also take into consideration the dispute raised regarding the alleged service of notice dated 20.12.1999.

11. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
Government Of A.P. And Ors vs Mohd. Taher Ali

This appeal by special leave is directed against the order dated 9.3.2005 passed by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 19690 of 2004 whereby the Division Bench has affirmed the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal whereby the Administrative Tribunal remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority for consideration of the punishment imposed in the matter. Hence the present appeal filed the State of A.P. It is not necessary to go into the detailed facts. Suffice it to say that the incumbent was a police Constable at Alwal (Halia) P.S. and he was detailed for election duty at Cuddapah Election Bandobusth duty along with other PS men with instructions to report before SDPO Miryalguda, but he did not report for duty on 2nd September, 1999 along with other PS men before SDPO Miryalguda and absented himself unauthorisedly without leave or permission with effect from 2nd September, 1999. Therefore, he was charged for the offence of desertion. The C.I. of Police, Miryalguda was appointed as Inquiry Officer to conduct the inquiry. The respondent did not file any written representation of defence in response to the charges levelled against him. Therefore, the Inquiry Officer held an Inquiry and found him guilty and submitted his report to the Superintendent of Police, Nalgonda and the Superintendent of Police on receipt of the same, sent a copy of that report to the respondent but he did not file any written representation of defence in response to that report. Therefore, the Superintendent of Police concluded that the respondent has no explanation to the charges levelled against him. It was also recorded that this is not a solitary incidence. The respondent has also earlier been found to be guilty of desertion on a couple of occassions. Hence the S.P. imposed a punishment of compulsory retirement from service with immediate effect. This was challenged before the Administrative Tribunal. The Administrative Tribunal did not interfere with the finding of the report of the Inquiry Officer but remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the question of punishment. Aggrieved by that order, the State Government filed a writ petition before the High Court. The High Court affirmed the order of the Administrative Tribunal. Henche the present appeal.

Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the view taken by the High Court as well as by the Administrative Tribunal cannot be sustained. Hence we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court as well as of the Administrative Tribunal and confirm the order of compulsory retirement for the serious lapse on the part of the respondent.

This appeal is accordingly, allowed.

No order as the Costs.
K. Prakashan vs P.K. Surenderan

(vi) The complainant contradicted himself insofar as whereas in the complaint petition he inter alia alleged that the loan was raised by him from his father as also from others; in his evidence, he did not state that he had borrowed any amount from third parties.

8. The High Court, however, by reason of the impugned judgment reversed the said findings of the learned Trial Judge holding inter alia that the appellant having not examined himself cannot be said to have discharged the burden of proof cast on him in terms of Section 139 of the Act stating:

17. We, therefore, are of the opinion that keeping in view the peculiar fact situation obtaining in the present case it cannot be said that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Judge was perverse or suffered from any legal infirmity. It was not a case where the learned Trial Judge failed to consider the evidences brought on record and/ or mis-appreciated the same.

21. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
M/S Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd vs Mandal Revenue Officer & Ors

The said judgment attained finality. Even a Special Leave Petition preferred thereagainst has been dismissed by this Court.

7. Appellant, however, despite knowledge of the said judgment and order dated 06.03.1987 allegedly made huge investments by raising construction thereupon. A notice under the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905 was issued on it on 27.04.1987, wherein the company was described as an encroacher of the land in question. Questioning the legality of the said notice, a writ application was filed by the appellant, which was marked as Writ Petition No. 5954 of 1987.

8. We may observe that during the pendency of the said writ petition, the appellant filed an application for regularization of the said land before the State, relevant recitals whereof are as under :

11. Prayer of the appellant for regularization of the land was rejected by the State by an order dated 06.12.1999. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, the appellant filed another writ application before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which was marked as Writ Petition No. 15 of 2000.

Determination :

It is submitted that the Application Scheduled land situated abutting to the Hashamathpet Road which is a link road between two National High Ways running from Hyderabad to Karimnagar and Nizamabad, and it is very valuable property and is required for public purpose. The market value of the land is Rs. 5000/- per Sq. Mts. The Respondent wrongfully using the Government land for Commercial purpose from 1985 and the Respondent is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 20/- Sq. Mts. Per month from 1985 till the date of disposal of the LGC as means profits/compensation to the Governemnt.

45. Submission of Mr. Dewan that it was obligatory on the part of the First Respondent to make averments that the appellant illegally, forcibly, unscrupulously or with criminal intention of grabbing the Government land entered upon the Government land, in our opinion, in the fact situation obtaining herein, was not necessary. Pleadings of the parties, it is now well- settled are not to be construed in a pedantic manner. [See Des Raj and Ors. v. Bhagat Ram (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. [2007 (3) SCALE 371]

48. We, therefore, are of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee assessed at Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only).