L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Ram Preeti Yadav vs Mahendra Pratap Yadav & Ors Contemnors

2. Respondent No.1 herein appeared as a private candidate in the Intermediate Examination conducted by U.P. Board of High Schools & Intermediate Education from Janta Inter College, Azamgarh (U.P.). His result was withheld. A provisional mark-sheet was purported to have been issued to him without showing that his result for Intermediate Examination had been withheld. On the basis of the said purported provisional mark- sheet, he pursued further studies and completed his Graduation as also Post Graduation. He was also employed as a teacher. The Principal of the College informed him that his result in the Intermediate Examination has been cancelled. Questioning the said order, a writ petition was filed. The said writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. Aggrieved, the petitioner herein preferred a special appeal before a Division Bench which was summarily dismissed. Petitioner herein approached this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In Civil Appeal No. 4034 of 2001 arising out of the said special leave petition, this Court in its judgment dated 03.09.2003, while allowing the same made the aforementioned observations.

3. Indisputably, taking advantage of the said observations, Respondent- Contemnor No. 1 filed an application on 28.09.2003 before the Contemnor- Respondent No.2 with a prayer to permit him to appear at the Intermediate Examination as a private candidate. No action was taken thereupon. He filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court which was marked as CMWP No. 2088 of 2004. The same was finally disposed of, directing :

14. The certificate was issued on 14.05.2004. The decision had been taken only by the Examination Board to cancel the said certificate. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it is not a case where apology tendered by the alleged Contemnors should be accepted.

16. It is well-settled that what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly.

17. Apart from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, this Court has a constitutional duty in terms of Article 129 as also Article 142 of the Constitution of India to issue such directions, as are necessary for the ends of justice. We, therefore, are of the opinion that Contemnor-Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are guilty of commission of contempt of this Court.

18. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved, if both of them are directed to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- each. They shall deposit the amount of fine in the Registry of this Court within four weeks from date, failing which appropriate action shall be taken.

19. Contemnor-Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 admittedly are not parties to the aforementioned order. Rule against them is discharged; while making the rule absolute against Contemnor-Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

20. This Petition is allowed with the aforementioned directions.
Kirpal Kaur & Anr vs V.M. Singh & Ors

2. Allegedly, the said directions were not carried out. A contempt petition was filed by Respondent No. 1 which was dismissed. Applicant herein, viz., Shri V.M. Singh (original first respondent), however, filed an application for grant of permission to deposit the amount in question before this Court, despite the fact that no Power of Attorney had been executed in his favour pursuant to the said direction of this Court. By an order dated 28.07.2006, the applicant was permitted to deposit the money as ordered in the Civil Appeal with the Registrar General of this Court. However, by an order dated 06.09.2006, he was permitted to deposit bank draft after rectifying the defects pointed out by the Registry.

JUDGMENT O R D E R I.A. NO. 16 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6327 OF 2005 AND I.A. NO.17 IN I.A. NO. 16 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.6327 OF 2005 W I T H I.A. No.16 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.6326 of 2005 AND I.A. NO. 18 IN I.A. NO. 16 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.6326 OF 2005

9. As we are permitting the applicant to withdraw his application, the application for impleadment has become infructuous. It is dismissed accordingly. The amount deposited by Shri V.M. Singh be returned to him.

10. As the matter is pending for a long time, we would request the learned executive court to consider the desirability of disposing of the execution proceedings at an early date preferably within a period three months of the from the communication of this order.

11. Subject to the observations made hereinbefore, I.A. No.16 in both the appeals is permitted to be withdrawn and other interlocutory applications are dismissed as having become infructuous.
Mukesh Kumar vs Union Of India & Ors

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

4. An appeal was filed before the Director General, Post Office, New Delhi, wherein it was stated that the father of the appellant was getting Rs.1783/- per month, was bed-ridden for more than 11 years due to paralytic attack and the appellant had no moveable and immovable property anywhere in the country and was not employed anywhere. The appeal was rejected. The appellant moved Central Administrative Tribunal by filing an OA, which was rejected on the ground that there was inordinate delay of 15 years in filing the application. The writ petition questioning correctness of the said order, as noted above, was dismissed by the High Court.

7. There is no indication as to on the basis of which materials the conclusion was arrived at. It is also not clear as to what were the materials before the Circle Level Selection Committee to conclude that the family was not in financially indigent condition. To add to it, both CAT and the High Court proceeded on factually erroneous premises, as has been highlighted by the appellant and noted supra. Above being the position, the appeal deserves to be allowed, which we direct. The orders of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court are set aside. The matter is remitted to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench for fresh hearing. Parties shall be permitted to place materials in support of their respective stand.

8. The appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.
Mukesh Kumar vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

4. An appeal was filed before the Director General, Post Office, New Delhi, wherein it was stated that the father of the appellant was getting Rs.1783/- per month, was bed-ridden for more than 11 years due to paralytic attack and the appellant had no moveable and immovable property anywhere in the country and was not employed anywhere. The appeal was rejected. The appellant moved Central Administrative Tribunal by filing an OA, which was rejected on the ground that there was inordinate delay of 15 years in filing the application. The writ petition questioning correctness of the said order, as noted above, was dismissed by the High Court.

7. There is no indication as to on the basis of which materials the conclusion was arrived at. It is also not clear as to what were the materials before the Circle Level Selection Committee to conclude that the family was not in financially indigent condition. To add to it, both CAT and the High Court proceeded on factually erroneous premises, as has been highlighted by the appellant and noted supra. Above being the position, the appeal deserves to be allowed, which we direct. The orders of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court are set aside. The matter is remitted to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench for fresh hearing. Parties shall be permitted to place materials in support of their respective stand.

8. The appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.
Visitor & Ors vs K.S. Misra

12. The High Court has also relied upon a decision rendered by another Division Bench of the same Court in a writ petition filed by Dr. Rameshwar Tandon against Aligarh Muslim University. Dr. Tandon was permanent Lecturer in Economics in Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore and he was appointed as Reader of Economics in Aligarh Muslim University on 31.5.1991. His representation for counting his past service was rejected on the ground that he had not exercised the option within the prescribed time and had failed to deposit the gratuity amount. Dr. Tandon soon after joining the University on 31.5.1991 had written a letter to the Institute on 29.9.1991 requesting them to send the provident fund account directly to the University and had sent a copy of the letter to the University. The provident fund was received by the University, but was delayed by two years and the University demanded interest. The Institute sent the interest also which was deposited with the University. It was on these facts that the High Court took the view that Dr. Tandon had done everything under his command for complying with the provision of the Statute and the University after accepting the provident fund amount and the interest was estopped from raising the plea that he had not exercised his option within time. In our opinion, Dr. Tandon's case is entirely distinguishable on facts. Within four months of joining the University, Dr. Tandon had written to the Institute to send his provident fund account directly to the University and intimation in this regard was also given to the University. The provident fund was sent by the Institute to the University and the interest amount was also sent. The respondent can get no advantage from this case as he never exercised his option at all and never deposited the amount which he had received from Benaras Hindu University.

I am sending herewith my option-for-pension form duly completed for your record and necessary action.

14. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated 10.2.2006 is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Des Raj vs State Of Punjab

2. The appellant Des Raj is a retired police constable. Chand Singh, the complainant is a distant relative of Des Raj. Des Raj and Chand Singh with their respective families reside in adjoining houses. On 16.2.2003, both families attended the Bhog ceremony in connection with the Birth Anniversary of Baba Ravi Dass and returned home in the afternoon. Des Raj was fully drunk when he returned home. At about 4 P.M., a quarrel arose between Manjit Kaur (wife of Chand Singh) and Jaswant Kaur (wife of Des Raj), when Manjit Kaur objected to the family members of Des Raj throwing rubbish in front of her house. On hearing the quarrel, Chand Singh's brothers

2. Des Raj (accused No.1) and his six family members (accused 2 to 7) were charged and tried for offences under sections 148, 302/149, 307/149 and 114 IPC. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses. Chand Singh (PW-2) and his son Shamsher Singh (PW-3) who were injured eye-witnesses gave a graphic account of what transpired. After appreciating the evidence, the Sessions Judge, Sangrur by judgment dated 7.12.2005, convicted Des Raj under section 302 IPC for the murder of Manjit Kaur, Bhagwan Singh and Lal Singh and also convicted him under section 307 IPC for attempting to murder Shamsher Singh and Chand Singh. After hearing on the question of sentence, the trial court came to the conclusion that the sentence of life imprisonment was inadequate and having regard to the gravity of the offence, the appellant deserved sentence to death. Accused 2 to 7 who allegedly exhorted appellant, were acquitted. The trial court was of the view that as accused 2 to 7 were not armed, and as there was no evidence of any common object to kill Manjit Kaur and others, there was a possibility that the exhortation attributed to Accused 2 to 7 may be only to implicate them in the crime.

3. The reference seeking confirmation of sentence of death was registered as Murder Reference No.12 of 2005. The appeal filed by Des Raj against his conviction and sentence was registered as Criminal Appeal No.10-DB of 2006. The appeal filed by the State against the acquittal of accused 2 to 7 was registered as Criminal Appeal No.670-DBA of 2006. The revision petition filed by Chand Singh challenging the acquittal of accused 2 to 7 was registered as Cri. Revision No. 1835 of 2006. The four cases were heard together. By common judgment dated 22.12.2006, the High Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and confirmed the death sentence awarded to Des Raj. It rejected the appeal filed by Des Raj, as also the appeal filed by the State and the revision filed by Chand Singh. The High Court held that on balancing the mitigating circumstance and the following aggravating circumstances, the scales tilted in favour of death sentence :

10. We, therefore, allow this appeal in part. While confirming the conviction under section 302 IPC, we modify the sentence of death imposed on the appellant to one of life imprisonment. The conviction and sentence under section 307 IPC remains undisturbed.
A.M. Moosa vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, Trivandrum

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows. For the assessment year 1992-93, the assessee appellant had claimed deduction under Section 80-HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961, (in short, 'the Act'). The assessing officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the 'profits of the business' computed under Section 80-HHC indicated a negative figure. An appeal was preferred before Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals), Cochin Bench, hereinafter, referred to as 'the CIT(A)'. The said appellate authority also was of the same view and dismissed the appeal. The assessee appellant preferred an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, in short 'the ITAT'. By Order dated 14th September, 1995 in ITA No. 498 (Coch)/1995, the view of the assessing officer as well as of CIT(A) was affirmed. On being moved for reference, ITAT referred the following questions for adjudication by the High Court:

14. Above being the position, there is no merit in this appeal and is dismissed accordingly with no order as to costs.
Commissioner Of Central ... vs M/S. Damnet Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. Etc

2. The facts briefly stated are as follows:

3. The respondents - M/s. Danmet Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'DCPL') were manufacturing the products 'CRC 2-26 Aerosol' and 'CRC Acryform Aerosol' since 1983. They were claiming exemption under Notification No. 120/84-CE dated 11.5.1984 for the product 'CRC 2-26' and SSI exemption under Notification No. 175/86-CE dated 1.3.1986 for the product 'CRC Acryform'. In their declarations they claimed the classification of the products 'CRC 2-26' under Chapter 2710.99 and 'CRC Acryform' under Chapter 3203.40.

4. On the basis of the material gathered during the routine transit checks and other information the Department issued show cause notice dated 12.2.1993 to the respondent-assessee calling upon it to show cause as to why Central Excise duty of Rs. 56,69,872.80p should not be demanded and recovered for the period 26.2.1988 to 24.10.1992. In the said show cause notice mainly 4 issues were raised, namely:

(iv) That the respondent-assessee had suppressed the facts with intent to evade duty and therefore the proviso to Section 11A (1) of the Act had been invoked.

27. BBL admittedly does not hold any shares in respondent-company nor the respondent-company owns any shares in BBL. One of the Directors in both the companies appears to be common. The respondent- company was incorporated in 1983 and at that time Mr. N.J. Danani was only an employee of BBL and became its Director in June, 1988 and was one out of seven Directors. It is required to appreciate that the respondent first started manufacturing 'CRC 2-26' in the year 1984. The manufacture of 'CRC Acryform' was started after September, 1986 but well before Mr. N.J. Danani became Director of BBL.

20. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the Tribunal did not commit any error in holding that the extended period of limitation was not available to the Department for initiating the recovery proceedings under Section 11A (1) of the Act.

23. On the facts of the case, we hold that non-mentioning of the license agreement in the classification lists does not lead to the conclusion that there has been willful suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. The demand in respect of 'CRC Acryform' is, therefore, totally time barred.

ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the Department can impose any penalty?

24. The only ground for levying the penalty is that the respondent-assessee had suppressed the facts and had evaded the payment of duty. In view of our conclusion that there has been no suppression whatsoever, the question of imposition of penalty does not arise. The duty demanded by invoking the extended period of limitation itself is untenable and unsustainable for the aforesaid reasons. In such view of the matter no elaborate discussion on this aspect is necessary.

(b) of the Act.

(Emphasis supplied)

33. In view of our findings, it is not necessary to go into the various alternative submissions made during the course of hearing of these appeals.

34. The appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
State Of Rajasthan vs Parthu

(1) The Officer In-charge of Harmirgarh Police Station received a telephonic message that one Smt. Lali wife of Parthu, appellant herein has received burn injuries and was lying in a serious condition. An entry to that effect was made in the Rojnamcha register whereafter Head Constable P.W.-6 Narayan Singh along with some other police personnel proceeded to the spot. They took her to Mahatama Gandhi Hospital at Bhilwara for treatment. The said Narayan Singh recorded her statement which was treated as dying declaration wherein she disclosed that she was burnt by her husband. On the basis of the said statement a First Information Report for an offence under Section 307 I.P.C. was recorded by P.W.9- Shankar Singh,SHO Police Station Hamirgarh. He took up the investigation in relation to the said incident. P.W.9-Shankar Singh also recorded the statement of the deceased on 8.6.1995.

(3) Before learned trial Judge eleven prosecution witnesses were examined. Some of the prosecution witnesses who were relatives of the deceased turned hostile. (4) Respondent, however, in his cross-examination under Section 313 stated that the death of Lali was an accidental one, as when she had been pouring kerosene in the stove and lit the match stick, suddenly the fire broke out. (5) Learned trial Judge relying on or on the basis of the aforementioned two dying declarations, which were marked as Exhibit P-6 and Exhibit P-14 respectively, held the respondent guilty of commission of the said offence. The High Court, however, on an appeal having been preferred thereagainst by the respondent was of the opinion that as no statement had been made by P.W.10-Dr. Avdesh Mathur that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make a statement before the Investigating Officer P.W.6.- Narayan Singh and furthermore in view of the fact that he had not treated the deceased, was sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that no reliance could be placed on the said dying declarations.

(6) The High Court was furthermore of the opinion that keeping in view the fact that the incident took place on 27.5.1995 and the death took place on 19.6.1995, the dying declarations of the deceased should have been recorded by a Magistrate. (7) On the finding, the High Court recorded a judgment of acquittal. The State of Rajasthan, is thus, before us.

(15) For the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned trial Judge is affirmed. The respondent who is on bail shall surrender to serve out the remaining sentence. His bail bonds are cancelled.
Union Of India vs Shri Shiv Shanker Kesari

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the grant of bail by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court to the respondent who was charged for alleged commission of offence punishable under Sections 8, 15, 27A and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short the 'Act'). Allegation was that he was found to be in possession of huge quantity of poppy straw. It is the case of the prosecution that the raiding party seized nearly 400 Kg. of poppy straw from the possession of the accused-respondent. The prayer for bail made by the respondent was rejected by learned Special Judge (NDPS Act), Varanasi. The High Court by the impugned order accepted the prayer for bail on the ground that the recovery was not from the exclusive possession of the accused-respondent and other members of the family are involved in the case. It was noted that the respondent had no criminal history. Accordingly, the prayer for grant of bail was allowed.

6. As the provision itself provides no person shall be granted bail unless the two conditions are satisfied. They are; the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Both the conditions have to be satisfied. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the bar operates and the accused cannot be released on bail.

12. Additionally, the Court has to record a finding that while on bail the accused is not likely to commit any offence and there should also exist some materials to come to such a conclusion.

14. Above being the position, the impugned order is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. The bail application shall be considered afresh by the High Court keeping in view the parameters of Section 37 of the Act. The bail application shall be taken up after the accused surrenders to custody. The accused-respondent is directed to forthwith surrender to custody. The High Court would do well to dispose of the bail application expeditiously after the accused surrenders to custody.

15. The appeal is allowed.
Markfed Vanaspati & Allied Industries vs Union Of India

3. 300 MT @ Rs.24,550/- per MT by 30.9.1989 (Refined Soyabeen Oil)

4. 500 MT @ Rs.22,000/- per MT by 30.9.1989 (Rapeseed Oil).

3. The respondent-Union of India accepted the offer given by the appellant and consequently the respondent issued tender in the form of a letter dated 22nd August, 1989. The appellant failed to supply the oil as per the delivery schedule. The time for supply was extended, reserving the respondents right to levy liquidated damages. All the supplies could not be delivered. The contract was cancelled and the appellant resorted to force majeure clause.

4. The dispute was referred to an arbitrator. The sole arbitrator made and published his award on 20th June, 1995. The appellant prayed before the arbitrator that in view of the extension of time on various occasions, the time was not the essence of the contract. The appellant has admitted various delays including in furnishing security, but stated that the same were unintentional.

6. The arbitrator in the instant case gave a non- speaking award, which was made rule of the court by the order of the learned Single Judge on 21st February, 2006. The appellant preferred FAO (O.S.) No.206/2006, before the Division Bench of the High Court, which was also dismissed on 17th April, 2006. The appellant has preferred special leave petition against the said impugned judgment of the Division Bench. This Court granted leave on 14th May, 2007.

17. Whatever has been mentioned by Russell in this paragraph is equally true for Indian Arbitrators.

19. We have perused the award and the judgment of the learned Single Judge by which the award has been made the rule of the Court and the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. In our considered view, no interference is called for. The appeal being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.