L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
District Collector,Srikakulam & Ors vs Bagathi Krishna Rao & Anr

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this Appeal are that the respondents herein filed Original Suit No.26/94 for seeking declaration of title and possession of the suit land admeasuring 1 Ac.8.90 cents situate within the erstwhile jamindari of Tarla Estate in Srikakulam District and for other consequential relief, i.e. permanent injunction from interfering in any manner with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit land, before the Senior Civil Judge at Sompeta. The appellants/defendants filed written statement contending that the suit land being forest land had vested in the State of Andhra Pradesh and in order to substantiate the said averment it annexed the copy of the Gazette Notification, G.O. No.650 dated 25.9.1975 according to which possession and enjoyment of land in dispute was shown to be in favour of the Forest Department. The Ld. Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 28.7.2000 decreed the suit. Being aggrieved, the appellants preferred Appeal Suit No.121/2000 before the First Additional Judge, Srikakulam District mainly on the ground that the plaintiffs/respondents were not in possession and enjoyment of the suit land and it was a Government land in physical possession of the Forest Department. However, the appeal preferred by the appellants stood dismissed vide judgment and order dated 15.4.2005. Being aggrieved, the appellants preferred Second Appeal before the High Court which has also been dismissed vide impugned Judgment dated 10.04.2006. Hence, this 2 appeal.

14. In view of the above, State of Andhra Pradesh was necessary party. Thus, the Second Appeal filed by the officials was not maintainable.

16. In view of the above, we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court passed in Second Appeal No.122/06 dated 10.4.2006 10 and remand the case to the High Court to decide afresh after framing the substantial question of law. The appellants are permitted to file an application for impleadment of the State of Andhra Pradesh as appellant and if such an application is filed, the High Court shall be at liberty to consider it in accordance with law. With these observations, the appeal is allowed. No costs.

J. (SWATANTER KUMAR) New Delhi, June 2, 2010 11
M/S.Bhanwarlal Dugar & Ors vs Bridhichand Pannalal & Ors

2. This is a landlord's appeal by Special Leave against the order of the High court reversing the concurrent decree of eviction from commercial premises at Guwahati in Assam. The Trial Court, the Appellate Court concurrently found that the respondent was a wilful defaulter and liable to be evicted. They have also found that the appellants herein required the premises for their own business purpose. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure reversed the concurrent findings of facts and accordingly dismissed the suit for eviction filed by the appellants against the respondents.

6. The appellants in their plaint in clear and categorical terms pleaded that the schedule premises is bona fide required by them "for their own use as they and their sons have to do their own business from the schedule premises,............." The respondent in the written statement pleaded that the schedule premises is not required bona fide by the appellants for their own use. That apart, it was further pleaded that the appellants already started new business in the year, 1997 in their own premises. "Besides this, the plaintiffs have a number of tenants under them such as Canara Bank, Madan Electricals etc. in the same building, but no case has been filed against them for vacating the premises which shows that the plaintiffs are not in need of premises for their own use and occupation.........." Plaintiff No.2 examined himself as PW-1 in the present case. It is specifically stated by him that the premises is required for starting new business for own sons for which purposes they have sufficient funds and also can manage required resources from the financial institutions for starting new business. In the cross-examination it was suggested to PW-1 that he did not state in the plaint as to what type of business the plaintiffs intended to start in that premises. It was not suggested that the appellants did not possess the financial 3 resources for commencing their own business in the suit premises. It was however, suggested that many other premises were under the occupation of the tenants which suggestion was accepted by PW-1.

WILFULL DEFAULT :

10. Considering all the facts and circumstances as noticed above, we are constrained to hold that the order of the High Court cannot be sustained and as such we set aside the same and remit the matter to the First Appellate Court (Appellate Court of the Civil Judge No. 2, Kamrup, Guwahati) for hearing the appeal afresh for its disposal in accordance with law. It is needless to observe that the Appellate Court shall re-hear the matter and decide all the issues that arise for its consideration by properly re-appreciating the evidence available on record. The appeal shall be heard and disposed of within six months from today.

11. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed without any order as to costs.
State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Nurul Amin

2. The respondent made two applications to the State Transport Authority, West Bengal (`Authority' for short) for grant of permanent stage carriage permit, the first on 7.11.1997 for a permit for the route Dhulian Bazar to Kolkata (via Raghunathganj and Barasat), and the second on 30.11.1998 for a permit for the route Raghunathganj to Kolkata (via Barasat). As the said applications were not disposed of, the respondent approached the High Court by filing separate writ petitions and the said petitions were disposed of with a direction to the Authority to consider and dispose of the pending applications of the respondent. Thereafter, the Authority, by communications dated 18.12.2000 and 3.11.2000, offered permits for the routes Dhulian Bazar to Barasat and Reghunathganj to Barasat respectively, by curtailing/excluding the last portion of the two applied routes from Barasat to Kolkata (26 kms.).

3. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent filed two writ petitions which were disposed of by a learned Single Judge by orders dated 5.3.2001 and 13.2.2001 respectively. The orders directed the Authority to consider the applications of the respondent afresh as the communications of the Authority did not give reasons as to why the permits were not granted up to Kolkata. The Authority was also directed to pass reasoned orders after giving an opportunity of hearing to the respondent.

15. In view of the subsequent events, the question of directing the Authority to consider the applications of respondent afresh does not arise. 10 These appeals are allowed, the orders of the High Court are set aside, the orders of the Authority are restored and the curtailment of routes is upheld.
Shivjee Singh vs Nagendra Tiwary & Ors

3. The appellant's son, Ajay Kumar Singh is said to have been killed by respondent Nos.1 to 4 on 1/2.1.1997. The appellant lodged First Information Report on the same day at Police Station, Isuapur. After conducting investigation, the police submitted final form on 3.9.1998 with the finding that they had no clue about the culprits. Thereupon, the appellant filed a protest petition accusing the police of not conducting the investigation properly due to political pressure and prayed that the accused persons be summoned and punished. By an order dated 3.9.2002, the learned Judicial Magistrate accepted the final form submitted by the police but, at the same time, directed that the protest petition be registered as a separate complaint. He also directed the complainant (appellant herein) to produce his witnesses. The appellant examined himself and two out of four witnesses cited in the protest petition-cum-complaint but gave up the remaining two witnesses because he thought that they had been won over by the accused. After considering the statements of the appellant and two witnesses, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saran passed an order dated 3 13.12.2006 whereby he took cognizance against respondent Nos.1 to 4 for offence under Section 302 read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act and directed issue of non bailable warrants against them.

203. Dismissal of complaint.- If, after considering the statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation (if any) under Section 202, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the complaint, and in every such case he shall record his reasons for so doing.

(emphasis supplied)

16. As a sequel to the above discussions, we hold that examination of all the witnesses cited in the complaint or whose names are disclosed by the complainant in furtherance of the direction given by the Magistrate in terms of proviso to Section 202(2) is not a condition precedent for taking cognizance and issue of process against the persons named as accused in the complaint and the High Court committed serious error in directing the Chief Judicial Magistrate to conduct further inquiry and pass fresh order in the light of proviso to Section 202(2).

17. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Since the matter is more than 12 years old, we direct the concerned Magistrate to pass appropriate order in terms of Section 209 within one month from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. We further direct that after committal of the case, the Sessions Judge to whom the matter is assigned shall conduct and complete the trial within a period of 9 months. A copy of this order be forwarded to the Registrar General, Patna High Court, who shall place the same before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of that High Court.
Vijaya Bank vs Shyamal Kumar Lodh

3. It is not in dispute that the appropriate Government in relation to an employee is the Central Government and the employee had filed the application before the Labour Court constituted by the State Government. It is further not in dispute that the Labour Court before whom the employee had filed the application has not been specified by the Central Government. On the application so filed the Labour Court issued notice to the appellant-employer. The appellant appeared before the Labour Court and questioned its jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute on the ground that the said Court having not been specified by the Central Government under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. 3

4. The Labour Court by its order dated 19th August, 1995 over-ruled that objection and held that its jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute is not ousted. Employer aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 19th August, 1995 preferred writ application which was registered as Civil Rule No. 3735 of 1995. A learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court by its judgment dated 22nd August, 1995 passed in Civil Rule No.3735 of 1995 upheld its contention and while doing so observed as follows :

6. Employee, aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of the Single Judge, preferred separate appeals, which were registered as Writ Appeal No. 381 of 2001 and Writ Appeal No. 11 of 2002. Both the appeals were heard together and a Division Bench of the High Court by its common judgment dated 10th January, 2007 allowed the appeals and set aside both the orders of the Single Judge. While doing so it concurred with the Single Judge that as the Labour Court at Dibrugarh has not been specified by the Central Government, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition preferred by the employee. However, on its finding that claim of subsistence allowance falls within Section 10A(2) of the Industrial Employment(Standing Order) Act, and the Branch of the Bank where the employee was working, fell within the limits of jurisdiction of Labour Court in question, it shall have jurisdiction to decide the claim. While doing so, it observed as follows :

17. As the matter is pending before Labour Court since long, it shall make endeavour to finally decide the dispute within 6 months from today. Appellant as also respondent are directed to appear before the Labour Court, within four weeks from today.

18. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed with cost, quantified at Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the appellant to the respondent.
Kandla Port Trust vs Goodrich Maritime Pvt.Ltd.& Anr

4. Since the goods were not as per the description given in the bills of lading, the same were confiscated by the Customs Department. Respondent No.1 made representations to the appellant for release of the containers after de-stuffing the goods. The appellant sent communications to Superintendent of Police, Bhuj and General Staff Officer, 11 Infantry Division, APO, Ahmedabad to take possession of the war material/explosives but both the authorities declined to do so by citing the grounds of lack of power to do so or non availability of resources. On 6.6.2006, the appellant issued bills to respondent No.1 for levy of container storage charges and ground rent. Respondent No.1 challenged the same in Special Civil Application 3 Nos.17403/2006 and 17404/2006. The learned Single Judge summarily dismissed both the special civil applications by relying upon an order passed by the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No.104 of 2000, wherein it was observed:

10. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal of the letters patent appeals in accordance with law.

12. The Registry is directed to send the sealed envelope containing a copy of the decision of the Government of India to the office of the learned Solicitor General.

July 06, 2010.
Commnr. Of Income Tax, Gujarat vs M/S.Saurashtra Cement & ...

3. The reference pertains to the Assessment Year 1974-75 for which the relevant previous year ended on 30th June, 1973. The factual background in which the issue, covering both the questions, has arisen, is as follows :

4.The supplier defaulted and failed to supply the plant and machinery on the scheduled time and, therefore, as per the terms of contract, the assessee received an amount of Rs.8,50,000/- from the supplier by way of liquidated damages. 4

6.Being dissatisfied with the decision of the Tribunal, as stated above, at the instance of the Revenue, the Tribunal referred the afore-noted questions of law for the opinion of the High Court. The reference having been answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee, the Revenue is before us in this appeal.

(1952) 22 I.T.R. (Suppl.) 1 9

14.We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs.

JULY 9, 2010.
H.Srinivas Pai & Anr vs H.V. Pai (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors

2. The first respondent filed a suit for partition in the year 1991. In the said suit, the appellant filed an application for stay of proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (`old Act' for short). The said application under Section 34 was dismissed on 15.3.1995 on the ground that the appellant had acquiesced to court's jurisdiction. The appeal filed by the appellants, as also a further revision by them, were dismissed in 2000 and 2001.

The appellants filed a review petition which was dismissed on 17.4.2009. The said orders dated 3.11.2008 and 17.4.2009 are challenged in this appeal by special leave.

7. In view of the above, we dispose of these appeals without disturbing the dismissal of the revision by the High Court. We, however, set aside the observation of the High Court in paragraph 4 of its Judgment (extracted in para 3 above) holding that the Act will not apply to `civil disputes'. We request the trial Court to dispose of the suit expeditiously not later than three months from today.
Shyamvati Sharma & Ors vs Karam Singh & Ors

3. The Tribunal by its award dated 17.1.2003 held the respondents liable and directed the insurer to pay to the appellants, Rs.14,44,600/- as compensation, with simple interest at 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition (21.2.2002) till realization. The Tribunal arrived at the said compensation in the following manner : It deducted one third from the gross monthly salary of Rs.13,794/- towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased and determined the contribution to the family as Rs.9,196/- per month or Rs.1,10,352/- per annum. It applied the multiplier `13' and arrived at the loss of dependency as Rs.14,34,576/- rounded off to Rs.14,34,600/-.

4. Feeling aggrieved the claimants filed an appeal. The High Court started with the gross salary as Rs.13,794/- per month. Drawing an assumption that the deceased would have at least got one promotion or gone to the next higher grade if he had completed the remaining 24 years of service, and taking note of the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission and the annual increments, it inferred that by the time the deceased would have retired, he would have been earning a minimum gross income of Rs.22,000/- per month. The average of the actual monthly income (Rs.13794/-) and the projected monthly income at the time of retirement (Rs.22000), that is Rs.17,897/-, was taken as the monthly income. The High Court deducted 30% thereof towards `deductions from salary' (income-tax etc.) and arrived at the net monthly income as Rs.12,528/-. It further deducted one fourth thereof towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased and arrived at the contribution to the family as Rs.9,396/- per month or Rs.1,12,752/- per annum. By applying the multiplier of 13, it calculated the loss of dependency as Rs.14,65,776/-. As a consequence, it increased the compensation awarded by the Tribunal by Rs.32,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of claim petition till the date of payment.

9. We accordingly allow the appeal and increase the compensation from Rs.14,66,600/- to Rs.19,70,250/-. The increased amount shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of claim petition to the date of payment. The parties to bear their respective costs.

__________________J.

(R. V. Raveendran) __________________J.

(H. L. Gokhale) New Delhi;

July 13, 2010.
Tej Singh & Ors vs State Of M.P

2. As per the prosecution story the two deceased, Lakhan Singh and his brother Jagdish, were agriculturists with a land holding in village Dadoi, Police Station Satanvada. On 7th September, 1990, Babu Singh P.W. 8 took some rice to Jagdish in village Dadoi. Jagdish was the owner of some buffaloes. The two deceased accompanied by Babu Singh then took the buffaloes out from the village for grazing and as they came out of the village on to the banks of the river Sindh they were waylaid by Tej Singh, appellant armed 2 with a luhangi, Pappu armed with an axe, Dashrath with a lathi and Hanumant Singh with a Barchhi. Pappu who was subsequently declared a juvenile (and is being dealt with separately) opened the attack on the two deceased and all the accused caused them several injuries with their weapons. Babu Singh P.W., overtaken by fear, hid himself behind some bushes and saw the entire incident. On hearing the noise Bhola, Komal and Angad P.Ws. also reached the spot. They found that Lakhan Singh was dead and Jagdish was alive, though grievously injured. On an enquiry by Kok Singh- P.W. 10 who had also been attracted to the place Jagdish narrated the entire incident to the aforesaid witnesses inasmuch that he had been beaten by the three sons of Anantram and Tej Singh and having made the dying declaration died soon after. The investigation was thereafter initiated on the basis of the FIR registered at the police station and on the completion of the trial conviction as aforesaid was recorded by the trial court. This has been affirmed by the High Court.

6. We see absolutely no reason to disbelieve P.W.

8. Admittedly he bore no animosity with the appellants which could motivate him to make a false statement against them. He has also clearly stated that he had witnessed the incident from behind the bushes close by and has in his statement given graphic a blow by blow account of the participation of each of the accused. Likewise, we are of the opinion that oral dying declaration given by Jagdish inspires confidence. P.W. 2 Bhola and Komal Singh P.W. 3 have categorically deposed that on the prodding of Kok Singh, Jagdish had made a dying declaration naming the accused as the assailants. No animosity whatsoever had been suggested by the defence against these two witnesses as well. In this view of the matter, we find no merit in the appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed.
United Bank Of India vs Satyawati Tondon & Ors

After considering the reports of the two Committees and taking cognizance of the fact that as on 30-9-1990 more than 15 lakh cases filed by public sector banks and 304 cases filed by financial institutions were pending in various Courts for recovery of debts, etc. amounting to Rs.6000 crores, the Parliament enacted the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short, `the DRT Act'). The new legislation facilitated 3 creation of specialised forums i.e., the Debts Recovery Tribunals and the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunals for expeditious adjudication of disputes relating to recovery of the debts due to banks and financial institutions. Simultaneously, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was barred and all pending matters were transferred to the Tribunals from the date of their establishment.

9. After one year and six months, the appellant sent letter dated 6.5.2006 to respondent Nos.1 and 2 pointing out that repayment of loan was highly irregular. After another one year, the account of respondent No.2 was classified as Non- Performing Asset. On 19.7.2007, the appellant sent separate letters to 14 respondent Nos. 1 and 2 requiring them to deposit the outstanding dues amounting to Rs.23,78,478/-. Thereupon, respondent No.1 deposited a sum of Rs.50,000/- and gave written undertaking to pay the balance amount in instalments. However, she did not fulfil her promise to repay the remaining amount. This compelled the appellant to issue notice to respondent Nos.1 and 2 under Section 13(2) requiring them to pay Rs.23,22,972/- along with future interest and incidental expenses within 60 days. Upon receipt of the notice, respondent No.1 offered to pay a sum of Rs.18 lakhs for settlement of the loan account, but the appellant did not accept the offer and filed an application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, which was allowed by District Magistrate/Collector, Allahabad vide his order dated 25.8.2008. Thereafter, the appellant issued notice dated 21.1.2009 to respondent Nos.1 and 2 under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.

16. The facts of the present case show that even after receipt of notices under Section 13(2) and (4) and order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, respondent Nos.1 and 2 did not bother to pay the outstanding dues. Only a paltry amount of Rs.50,000/- was paid by respondent No.1 on 29.10.2007. She did give an undertaking to pay the balance amount in installments but did not honour her commitment. Therefore, the action taken by the appellant for recovery of its dues by issuing notices under Section 13(2) and 13(4) and by filing an application under Section 14 cannot be faulted on any legally permissible ground and, in our view, the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error by entertaining the writ petition of respondent No.1.

29. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Since the respondent has not appeared to contest the appeal, the costs are made easy.