L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Dinesh Kumar Gupta vs United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors

10. On a scrutiny of the aforesaid facts, it is apparent that the learned single Judge has initiated contempt proceedings against the appellant essentially on impression and assumption that he was instrumental in ensuring that the order of stay passed in favour of the Insurance Company on 22.3.2001 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1072 of 2001 was not implemented and further the letter dated 22.12.2005 by which the appellant herein as the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) had sought the case number of the writ petition for which the order sheet was to be sent, was treated as an attempt on the part of the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) causing obstruction in the way of administration of justice. It was further inferred that he had done so in order to shield the then Judge, MACT Shri S.K. Bansal from facing the vigilance enquiry.

21. Hence, we set aside the impugned order dated 08.12.2006 passed by the learned single Judge by which the proceeding for contempt has been ordered to be initiated by registering a regular contempt proceeding against the appellant and the same shall be treated as dropped. Consequently, the appeal is allowed directing the parties to bear their cost.
Malik Mazahar Sultan Etc vs Pub.Service Commission,Uttarakhand & ...

1. By passing an order on 15.9.2010, we dismissed SLP(C) No. 12787 of 2008 which was connected with SLP(C) No. 12788 of 2008. SLP (C) No. 12787 of 2008 was dismissed as not pressed.

2. SLP(C) No. 12788 of 2008 was filed by the petitioners namely Shri Vijendra Kumar Verma and Shri Harendra Kumar Ozha. But so far as Shri H.K. Ozha is concerned, on his behalf a prayer was made to withdraw his name from the petition as he was appointed as a judicial officer in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

2 By an order passed on the same day i.e. 15.9.2010, we removed his name as petitioner from the said petition with a further direction that the aforesaid petition would be considered only so far as Shri Vijendra Kumar Verma is concerned.

4. Leave granted.

10. An advertisement was issued on 16.2.2006 inviting applications from eligible candidates for filling up 50 posts of Civil Judge (Junior Division). The appellant herein submitted his application for one of the aforesaid posts. The appellant appeared in the preliminary examination and he was declared successful in the said examination on 16.9.2006.

11. Thereafter, he was called for the Viva Voce examination also, but despite his appearance in the viva voce examination and doing reasonably well according to his own estimation, he was not selected and his name did not appear in the final list of selected candidates. The appellant, however, came to know that he received total of 576 marks together in written examination and in viva voce examination and on the basis thereof in his estimation he should have been selected as persons getting total marks of 568 were inducted into the service. The appellant 5 submitted that to his knowledge and information he was not selected because according to the respondents the appellant did not have basic knowledge of computer operation. The reason for non-selection of the appellant was also disclosed in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent No. 1 against the writ petition filed by the appellant. In the said counter affidavit, it was stated that the appellant was to put to test for determining and ascertaining as to whether he possessed the basic knowledge of computer operation. It is also stated in the said affidavit that an expert in the field of computer was associated for determining, assessing and ascertaining the aforesaid fact and it was found that the appellant did not possess basic knowledge in computer operation. Therefore, he was not selected.

31. The aforesaid procedure for testing the knowledge may not be foolproof but at the same time it cannot be said that the same was not reasonable or that it was arbitrary. Therefore, after giving very thoughtful consideration to the issues, we are of the opinion that the appellant has failed to make out any case before us for interference with the orders passed by the High Court. We find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.
Balkrishna S.Dalwale (Dead) By Lrs vs Vithabai C. Rathod(Dead)By Lrs. & Ors

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that one Smt. Ratnabai Shankar Dalwale had inherited the suit property from her father. She had four daughters, two of them namely, Champabai and Sitabai died long back i.e. prior to the date of receiving the property by Smt. Ratnabai Shankar Dalwale. The original owner, Ratnabai Shankar Dalwale died on 2.5.1965 and her husband Shankar Dalwale had died in 1952. Thus, at the time of her death, Smt. Ratnabai Shankar Dalwale had two daughters, namely Vithabai and Krishnabai, who acquired the suit properties by Will dated 24.6.1963, executed by Smt. Ratnabai Shankar Dalwale. After the death of Smt. Ratnabai Shankar Dalwale, her two daughters Vithabai and Krishnabai (respondents/plaintiffs) (hereinafter called `respondents') become absolute owners of the properties. The Will stood proved upto the High Court and attained finality. The 2 said Vithabai and Krishnabai, sisters permitted their deceased sister Champabai's son Balkrishna (appellant/defendant) (hereinafter called the `appellant') to occupy two rooms free of rent out of love and affection. Subsequently, respondents, the original owners sent a notice to said Balkrishna-appellant to vacate the said premises on 21.2.1975. However, Balkrishna-appellant vide reply dated 10.3.1975 resisted his eviction claiming ownership of the House No.621, Ganesh Peth, Pune. Respondents, the original owners of the suit property, namely Smt. Vithabai and Smt. Krishnabai filed Civil Suit No.558 of 1975 before the Civil Court, Pune in 1975 for eviction of the said Balkrishna-appellant.

Being aggrieved, the appellant-Balkrishna filed Second Appeal No.191 of 1991 which has been dismissed vide judgment and order dated 18.10.2001. Hence, this appeal.

10. In view of the above, no legal issue is involved in this appeal. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The appeal is liable to be dismissed and stands dismissed.

However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, as the appellants had been living in the suit property for the last 35 years and it may be difficult for them to get a suitable accommodation in Pune, they may hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the premises on or before 31.10.2011. The appellants shall 8 file an undertaking before this Court within a period of four weeks in this regard. There shall be no order as to costs.
Jabalpur Development Authority vs V.V. Shrivastava & Anr

2. The appellant is a body corporate constituted under Section 38 of the Act. In May 1980, the appellant decided to prepare the Scheme covering an area of 104.25 hectares including the land of the respondents comprised in khasra No. 164/2 for construction of Bus Terminus, Major Road No.4, Housing Scheme and Sites for offices of the State, Central Governments and Public Corporations. As a follow up, notification dated 4.7.1980 was issued under Section 50(2) of the Act whereby the appellant declared its intention to prepare the Scheme. The draft scheme was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette dated 19.6.1981 issued under Section 50(3) and objections and suggestions were invited from the public. The Scheme was approved by the appellant on 14.9.1982 and notification dated 29.4.1983 (Ex.D1) was published under Section 50(7).

4. Since the respondents did not reply to either of the communications sent by the appellant, the State Government was requested to acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

7. The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the lower appellate Court which expressed its agreement with the trial Court that the Scheme had not been published as per the mandate of Section 50 and, in any case, the same will be deemed to have lapsed because the land was not 5 acquired within three years of the publication of notification under Section 50(7).

14. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court with the direction that the second appeal filed by the appellant be decided afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties. The parties may, if so advised, file applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for permission to adduce additional evidence. The High Court shall first dispose of the application already filed by the appellant along with the second appeal and the applications which may be filed hereafter by either party. Thereafter, the High Court shall frame substantial questions of law as per the mandate of Section 100 CPC and decide the appeal with reference to those questions of law.
West Bengal Statewarehousing Corpn vs M/S. Indrapuri Studio Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

2. The premises belonging to respondent No.1 (covered area measuring 11,900 sq. feet and open space measuring 10,620 sq. feet) situated at N.S.C. 2 Bose Road, Tollygunge, Calcutta was requisitioned by the State Government under Section 3 of the Act. After taking possession of the requisitioned premises, the State Government transferred the same to the appellant.

3. Since the amount of compensation payable to respondent No.1 in lieu of the requisition of its property could not be fixed by agreement, the State Government appointed an Arbitrator under Section 11(1)(b) of the Act. Though, the appellant had no role to play in the matter of determination of compensation payable to respondent No.1, on being asked by Ist Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, the appellant got itself impleaded as party in the arbitration proceedings.

5. During the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, the appellant represented to the State Government for appointment of a new Arbitrator by asserting that a retired judicial officer cannot be appointed to act as an Arbitrator. Thereupon, Assistant Secretary, Land & Land Reforms Department, who might not have been aware of the factum of passing of 3 award by the Arbitrator on 1.1.2003, sent letter dated 10.1.2003 to the Managing Director of the appellant that the judicial department of the Government had already been approached for appointment of a new Arbitrator. However, no further action appears to have been taken by the State Government for appointment of new Arbitrator.

16. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Bireswar Dutta Estate Pvt. Ltd. & Ors

Premises No.32A, Brabourne Road, Kolkata, which had been requisitioned for housing the Headquarters of Traffic Police Guard in the year 1958 was derequisitioned on 25.3.1992. The possession of the property continued with the police department and it was proposed to be acquired and Preliminary Notification dated 28.9.1994 was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, ('Act' for short). The said acquisition proceedings lapsed as the final declaration was not issued within one year. Subsequently another preliminary notification dated 4.3.1996 was issued under section 4(1) of the Act. The said notification was published in the State Gazette dated 25.3.1996. The notification was published in two newspapers circulating in the locality on 9.3.1996 and 10.3.1996. As there was a misprint in the date of the Gazette, an erratum notification was published in the Calcutta Gazette on 1.4.1997. Public Notice of the substance of the said notification was published in the locality on 30.6.1997. The final declaration dated 11.8.1997 under Section 6 of the Act was published in the Gazette on 12.8.1997.

2. Respondents 1 and 2, who are the owners of property filed Civil Suit No.235 of 1996 in the Calcutta High Court against the State of West Bengal on 22.8.1996 seeking possession of the said property and mesne profits. In the said Suit, the High Court issued an interim order dated 25.9.1997 directing the parties to maintain status quo as on that date. Ultimately, the Suit was decreed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 9.9.1998, with a direction to the defendant in the suit to deliver possession and declaring the final Notification gazetted on 12.8.1997, issued under section 6 of the Act to be invalid. The learned Single Judge held that the final declaration published on 12.8.1997 was made after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the preliminary notification and therefore it was invalid. The State filed an appeal against the said judgment and in the said appeal a Division Bench of the High Court granted interim stay of the judgment dated 9.9.1998 of the learned single Judge, on 15.2.1999. Ultimately, the Division Bench allowed the appeal by judgment dated 29.7.1999 affirming the finding that appellant was bound to deliver possession, but however holding that the final declaration published on 12.8.1997 under Section 6 of the Act was valid. The appellants issued a notice under section 9 and 10 of the Act on 20.9.1999. The Award was made on 24.2.2000. Possession of the premises was taken under section 16 of the Act on 24.2.2003.

11. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the order dated 2.9.2003 of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and the order dated 18.11.2002 of learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition of respondents 1 and 2 is upheld.
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd vs All India Tea & Tradding Co. & Ors

The appellant filed an appeal before the Guwahati High Court challenging the quantum of compensation awarded to the first respondent. In the said appeal, the High Court on 4.4.2003 made an interim order staying the operation of the award subject to the appellant depositing a sum of Rupees sixty lakhs within two months, in addition to the sum of about Rupees thirty lakhs which was already received by the first respondent. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

2. On 19.5.2003, interim stay was granted by this Court while directing notice. It was ordered that the notice should indicate that the first respondent should either furnish security for the said sum of Rs. Sixty lakhs or accept only Rupees thirty lakhs without security.

3. On 25.8.2003, this Court directed the appellant to deposit Rupees thirty lakhs within two weeks with permission to the first respondent to withdraw the said amount without furnishing any security. The appellant informs that the said sum of Rupees thirty lakhs has already been deposited by the appellant and withdrawn by the first respondent.

4. On 31.10.2003, this Court further directed the appellant to deposit the remaining sum of Rupees thirty lakhs with the condition that the sum may be paid to the first respondent on furnishing a bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the High Court. It is stated that the appellant deposited the said sum also, but as the first respondent did not give security for the said sum of Rupees thirty lakhs, as per further order of this Court dated 22.7.2005, the said amount was refunded by the High Court to the appellant.

5. In view of the above, nothing survives in this appeal. All that has to be done is to dispose of the appeal in terms of the interim orders already made. Accordingly, we allow the appeal in part and modify the interim order of the High Court by directing that the deposit to be made was .......3.

6. As the matter relates to an acquisition of 1989 and the appeal itself has been pending before the High Court for about eight years, we request the High Court to dispose of the appeal expeditiously preferably within three months.
S.N.Prasad,M/S Hitek ... vs M/S Monnet Finance Ltd.& Ors

2. The second respondent company is a borrower from the first respondent. Third respondent is the Managing Director of the second respondent. The appellant, father of the third respondent, was a Director of the second respondent. The second respondent (also referred to as `borrower') after repaying an earlier loan taken from the first respondent (also referred to as the `lender'), sought a fresh loan of Rs.75 lakhs. The first respondent sanctioned the loan. The appellant by letter dated 27.10.1995 in his capacity as a Director of the second respondent, stood guarantee for the loan of Rs.75 lakhs sanctioned by the first respondent.

3. A loan agreement dated 28.10.1995 was entered between the lender, the borrower, and the third respondent as the guarantor, in regard to the lending of a sum of Rs.50 lakhs. The agreement provided that the amount advanced had to be repaid within three months with interest at 20% per annum and if there was default, the borrower was liable to pay a compound interest at the rate of 5% per month with quarterly rests. Clause 18 of the said loan agreement provided for settlement of disputes by arbitration. In addition to the loan agreement, the borrower executed an on demand promissory note for the amount borrowed and the third respondent executed a Deed of Guarantee guaranteeing repayment of the loan amount with 3 interest. Similarly, a tripartite loan agreement was entered in respect of a loan of Rs.2500,000/- on 6.11.1995, among the first respondent, second respondent and third respondent followed by a promissory note by second respondent and deed of Guarantee by third respondent. The appellant was not a party to the loan agreements nor did he execute any separate deeds of guarantee or other document in favour of the first respondent. The loan agreements did not refer to the letter of guarantee by the appellant.

4. The lender issued a notice through counsel demanding payment and proposing to refer the claims against the borrower and its guarantors for arbitration. This was followed by two applications by the lender under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (`Act' for short) for appointment of an Arbitrator. The borrower, its Managing Director-cum- Guarantor, and the appellant were impleaded as respondents in the said application.

Re : Contention (ii)

Re : Contention (iii)

Conclusion

23. In view of the above, these appeals are allowed and the impugned order of the High Court and awards of the Arbitrator are set aside in part, in so far as the appellant is concerned.
Sadaram Suryanarayana & Anr vs Kalla Surya Kantham & Anr

2. The appellants are the sons of late Smt. Sadaram Appalanarasamma while the respondents are her daughter and son-in-law. The property in dispute consisting of four eastern portions (two on the ground floor and two on the first floor) bearing door Nos.44-23-35/7, 44-23-35/6, 44- 23-35/1 and 44-23-35 situated at Railway New Colony, Visakhapatnam was originally owned by late Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma, who passed away on 5th July, 1981 leaving behind four sons besides two daughters named: Smt. Sadaram Appalanarasamma and Smt. Sadaram Ramanamma. It is not in dispute that in terms of a Will dated 4th September, 1976 executed by the deceased Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma the property mentioned at item 2 in para 6 of the Will was bequeathed in favour of her two 3 daughters mentioned above with a stipulation that the same shall after their death devolve upon their female offsprings. Smt. Sadaram Appalanarasamma mother of the first plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 (Sadaram Suryanarayana, Sadaram Eswararao, Sadaram Devanand, Sadaram Ramana, Sadaram Satyanarayana and Sadaram Ramu) died intestate on 11th January, 1990. The case of the plaintiffs is that defendants 1 to 6 i.e. sons of late Appalanarasamma took possession of suit property comprising item no.2 of the Will executed by Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma which had devolved upon plaintiff no.1 in her capacity as the daughter of late Appalanarasamma and the stipulation contained in the Will executed by Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma. The plaintiffs respondents, therefore, filed OS No.32/91 in which they sought a decree for declaration of title over the suit property and for recovery of possession thereof apart from other reliefs.

3. The defendants appellants in the present appeal contested the suit, inter alia, taking the plea that late Smt. 4 Sadaram Appalanarasamma had acquired absolute title in the property under the Will executed in her favour and that in terms of a Will dated 5th January, 1981 she had bequeathed the property in question to the defendant which they were entitled to retain in possession as owners thereof.

18. In the result this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside and that passed by the Trial Court restored. No costs.
Commnr. Of Central Excise, Chandigarh vs M/S. Shital International

4. The Commissioner (Appeals), upon consideration of the processes undertaken by the assessee came to the conclusion that these were not covered under Chapter Note 4 to Chapter 60 of the Tariff Act as neither of the processes of carding, knitting and shearing find mention in the said Chapter Note nor these processes can be covered under "any other process" mentioned in the said Chapter Note. Placing reliance on the decisions of the CEGAT as well as on the decision of 4 this Court in Mafatlal Fine Spinning And Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay1, the Commissioner allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Aggrieved by this order, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the CESTAT, which was rejected vide the impugned order.

and terry fabrics, knitted or crocheted

6001.29 - Of other textile materials 16%

- Other:

6001.99 - Of other textile materials 16%"

L of the Central Excise Act, 1944."

In this background, we find it difficult to hold that the processes of shearing or back-coating are of the same nature as other processes mentioned in the said chapter Note and therefore, would fall within the scope and ambit of "any other process."

18. In light of the foregoing discussion, we are in agreement with the Tribunal that the said processes do not amount to "manufacture" in terms of Note 4 of Chapter 60 of the Tariff Act, and hence the fabric in question is "unprocessed knitted fabric" falling under Sr. No.165 of the exemption notification No. 06/2000 dated 1st March 2000, attracting Nil rate of duty as also under notification Nos. 5/99, 9/96 and 18/96. These appeals are bereft of any merit and are, therefore, dismissed accordingly, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

OCTOBER 22, 2010 19
Sudha vs President,Adv.Assn.Chennai & Ors

3. In order to understand the controversy raised in the appeal, it would be necessary to notice certain facts emerging from the record of the case.

As per the application made in the Special Leave Petition it transpires that the Division Bench of the High Court did not consider the same and therefore application was filed before this Court seeking permission to file special leave petition.

16. The argument that the four clauses mentioned earlier are against the interest of the legal fraternity in general and against the interest of the learned Junior Members in particular who were practicing in the High Court and, therefore, fresh directions as prayed for should be given is difficult to accept. The Teller Committee had already convened a meeting pursuant to a consensus order passed by this Court. In the SLP the main grievance made was that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the internal matters of the Association and, therefore, the directions given and/or the 24 approval granted to the amended bye-laws should be set aside.

as well as Rs.2,000/- can hardly be regarded as exorbitant.

The Resolution passed on September 7, 2010 is perfectly legal and, therefore, the same is hereby upheld.

20. The net result of the above discussion is that now this Court does not find any substance in the appeal and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

21. For the foregoing reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed and there is no order as to costs.