L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj vs Bank Of India

2. The appellant was employed with respondent No.1/Bank of India (for short ‘Bank’) as Scale II Officer when he sanctioned three loans while posted at the Lal Bangla Branch of the Bank at Kanpur. The appellant was also the recommending authority for two loans at Harsh Digitally signed by NIDHI AHUJA Nagar Branch, once again, at Kanpur. These loans were ultimately Date: 2019.04.22 17:19:51 IST Reason: 1 classified as Non-Performing Assets (‘NPAs’) and the process of granting these loans was scrutinised by the Bank when various procedural abnormalities were found, which were likely to cause a loss to the Bank of Rs.70.32 lakh.

3. In pursuance of the disciplinary proceedings initiated the appellant was visited with the major penalty of removal from service which shall not be disqualification for future employment upon the appellant. The endeavour of the appellant to assail the proceedings visiting him with these adverse consequences have throughout been unsuccessful including vide impugned order dated 25.10.2017.

9. We now proceed to analyse the facts of the present case in the contours of the aforesaid principles.

“8.2. …...It is further submitted that even in case a punishment of “Removal from service” is imposed upon the Petitioner is modified to that of “Compulsory Retirement”, he would receive 2/3 rd of the Full Pension, which is equivalent to the 2/3rd of Full Pension which he is receiving at present as a “Compassionate Allowance.””

15. We fail to appreciate that once there is no financial difference and the role is practically identical, why the respondents hesitated themselves to convert the punishment inflicted on the appellant from one of “removal from service which shall not be disqualification for future employment” to “compulsory retirement.” The only aspect is the nature of punishment which appears to tar the appellant more than the other two officers without any financial implication for the respondent-Bank.

16. In the aforesaid facts & circumstances, we are, thus, inclined to accept the plea of the appellant to convert his punishment in terms 9 aforesaid to one of “compulsory retirement.”

17. The appeal is accordingly allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

April 22, 2019.
Anil Kumar Anand vs Commissioner Of Customs (Preventive)

1. The appellant in CA No.3140/2018, M/s. Diyas Mantra Lighting Private Limited, as well as its Directors, are aggrieved by the impugned order dated 30.3.2017 of the Principal Commissioner of Customs (Preventive), New Delhi, as well as the order of the Customs, Excise & Digitally signed by NIDHI AHUJA Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short ‘CESTAT’) dated 6.11.2017, Date: 2019.04.22 17:19:50 IST Reason:

3. The aforesaid proceedings, as noticed, resulted in an adverse order against the appellant by the authorities, resulting in the imposition of differential duty of about Rs.9.53 lakhs for the consignment in question, and around Rs.1.23 crores for the past consignments. The goods were held liable for confiscation, and were ordered to be released on payment of redemption fine, with the levy of Rs.13 lakhs penalty imposed on the Directors of the appellant (appellants in CA No.3138/2018 & CA No.3139/2018). A perusal of the order shows that the valuation of the goods had been made under Rule 7 and Rule 9 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Rules’). It is this very method of valuation which is sought to be assailed by the appellants on a reasoning that the scheme of the Rules has not been correctly understood and implemented by the competent authority. In order to appreciate the contention of the appellants in the context of the Rules, we proceed to discuss the scheme 3 of the Rules.

(2) Where the costs and charges referred to in sub-rule (2) of rule 10 of these rules are included in the transaction value of identical goods, an adjustment shall be made, if there are significant differences in such costs and charges between the goods being valued and the identical goods in question arising from differences in distances and means of transport.

23. We make it clear that since we have not gone into other pleas sought to be raised by the appellant, all pleas can be raised by the appellant, as are available to the appellant in law, and the same will be 16 dealt with on merits.

24. The appeals are accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

April 22, 2019.
Maars Software International Ltd. vs Union Of India

3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of these appeals, which involve a short point.

4. Appellant No.1 herein is a Limited company having its registered office at Chennai and Appellant No.2 is its Managing Director. The appellant­ Company is engaged in the business of software exports. The appellant­Company has also specialized in the area of Enterprises Resources Planning (ERP) implementation. The appellant­ Company is offering their services to domestic and overseas customers.

5. The Enforcement Directorate, Mumbai through its Assistant Director filed a complaint, being 2 2 complaint No.T­3/536­B/2002, under Section 16 (3) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (for short “FEMA”) against the appellant­Company before the Special Director of Enforcement Mumbai (Adjudicating Authority).

6. The complaint was founded on the material collected during the course of detailed investigation made in the affairs and the dealings of the appellant­Company in their business operations. It was done pursuant to the directive issued by the competent authority on 23.11.2001 to the appellant­Company under FEMA.

13. By impugned order, the High Court allowed the appeals, set aside the order of the Tribunal and restored the order of the Adjudicating Authority. As a consequence thereof, the appellants’ writ petition was dismissed.

23. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the proper course in such a case would be to remand the case to the High Court and request the High Court to decide the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law.

24. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals succeed and are accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the appeals afresh on merits in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above.

25. We, however, make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy having formed an opinion to remand 10 10 the case to the High Court on the grounds mentioned above.

26. The High Court will decide the appeals uninfluenced by any observation made in the impugned order and in this order.

April 22, 2019 11 11
Globe Ground India Employees Union vs Lufthansa German Airlines

3. Necessary facts in brief for disposal of these appeals are that, the appellant workers’ union raised the industrial dispute which was referred by the Central Government to Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court by an order dated 1 C.A.@ SLP(C)Nos.25341-42 of 2017 04.02.2010. The question which was referred for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal reads as under:-

4. The aforesaid reference order was sent by the Government to the Presiding Officer of Tribunal and also to the second respondent herein. There was no communication of such reference to, Lufthansa German Airlines. Before the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant workers’ union filed a statement on 10.3.2010, inter alia stating that the second respondent company is a subsidiary of the first respondent and was providing ground handling and ancillary services at the Indira Gandhi International Airport and airports located in different places like Calcutta, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Chennai, Hyderabad etc. The second respondent Globe Ground Private Limited is a company, and is a joint venture formed by Globe Ground Deutschland GmbH and the Bird Group with 51% and 49% shares respectively. In December, 2008, the Bird 2 C.A.@ SLP(C)Nos.25341-42 of 2017 Group had floated another company, Bird Worldwide Flight Services Ltd. which has undertaken ground handling and ancillary services to international airlines. In the claim petition filed before the Industrial Tribunal, it is the specific case of the appellant that, the new company which has started ground handling services from January, 2009, is utilising the same equipment belonging to the second respondent. On the information furnished by the first respondent that they would stop ground handling services from the International Airlines at Delhi w.e.f. 15.12.2009, the members of the appellant’s union were issued termination notices and the same is in violation of Sections 25-F, 25-G, 25-O and 25-N and other provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is the allegation of the appellant that the first respondent has not closed down or stopped the business in India. It is also specifically alleged that the new company has retained most of the employees who worked earlier except the trade union activists. As claimed before the Industrial Court, it is the case of the appellant that management i.e. the second respondent should reinstate left out workmen in service by extending the benefit of 3 C.A.@ SLP(C)Nos.25341-42 of 2017 continuity of service and full wages. Before the Industrial Court, the second respondent herein has filed reply. In the reply filed, while denying various allegations made by the claimant, the second respondent as a fact has stated that the second respondent was providing handling services to the Lufthansa German Airlines.

17. Having regard to facts and circumstances of present case, we are of the opinion that the case law relied on by the learned senior counsel for the appellant would not render any assistance in support of the appellant’s case.

[R. Subhash Reddy] New Delhi April 23, 2019 17
Nagji Odhavji Kumbhar . vs The State Of Gujarat

2. The prosecution case is that on 1 st July 1987 at about 12 midnight in Village Prempara-Rampara, the appellants caused injuries to Bhura Govind and Lakha Arjan with spears etc and on account of Digitally signed by MANISH SETHI grievous injuries inflicted, both of them died on the spot. The FIR was Date: 2019.04.23 16:19:38 IST Reason: lodged at 7 AM on 2nd July 1987 and the appellants were arrested on 1 17th July 1987. The cause of occurrence is that the appellants were not giving right of way to the deceased. The complainant party had filed the civil suit in which injunction was granted in their favour. The appellants also lodged a cross case which is Sessions Case No. 97 of 1987.

18. The deceased had multiple stab wounds on the chest. Since there are multiple wounds, it cannot be said that the appellants have acted at the spur of the moment without pre-meditation and that the appellants are not taken any advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. It is not a case of single injury which one can infer on account of sudden fight. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the alternate argument that the appellants are entitled to be convicted under Section 304 IPC as they have given multiple injuries on the vital parts of the deceased. The learned Trial Court as well as the High Court was perfectly justified in law in convicting and sentencing the appellants for 8 the offence under Section 302 IPC. We do not find any error in the order passed which may warrant our interference in the present appeal. The criminal appeal is dismissed.

….…….……………………….J (Sanjay Kishan Kaul) ..……………………………….J (Hemant Gupta) New Delhi April 23, 2019 9
N. Ramamurthy vs State By Central Bureau Of ...

(underlining supplied for emphasis) 3.5. Thereafter, the second application seeking suspension of execution of sentence was moved on behalf of the appellant, being IA No. 1 of 2019, on the ground of his deteriorating health condition. However this application was also dismissed by the High Court by order dated 29.01.2019 while essentially relying upon the reasons assigned for declining such prayer in the previous order dated 03.01.2019. The High Court, however, ordered that the direction of the treating doctor of the appellant may be complied with. In its order dated 29.01.2019, the High Court again proceeded to observe that the appellant was awarded 45 years of imprisonment in the following3:-
Sadayappan @ Ganesan vs State Represented By Inspector Of ...

4. After an elaborate trial, the Trial Judge opined that the circumstantial evidence correlates with the accused and clearly proves that owing to prior enmity, A1 and A2, in furtherance of their common intention, committed the murder of the deceased with a gun shot from the unauthorized gun owned by accused­appellant. The Trial Court thereby found both the accused guilty and accordingly convicted the appellant herein under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment and also to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000 vide order dated 18.05.2011. Both the accused preferred an appeal before the High Court which was dismissed vide order dated December 13, 2011. Aggrieved thereby, both the accused preferred separate appeals before this Court. It is pertinent to state that the appeal of the A1 stood abated owing to his death during its pendency. Thus, we are now concerned only with the appeal preferred by A2. 4

8. Admittedly, the deceased, A1 and A2 (appellant herein) were neighbouring agricultural landowners and 5 used to go for hunting together. Further, there is no denial of the fact that around 15 years prior to the date of incident, the deceased and A1 had entered into a deal through which land was sold to the deceased, but the same was never registered. Additionally, record shows that A2—the appellant herein, whose land was adjacent to that of A1, always supported A1 in the matter of delaying the registration of land in favour of the deceased. This is the factual matrix of enmity between the accused and the deceased which serves as motive for the offence. Despite this, the deceased kept on going to the forest for hunting with the accused persons. These facts are abundantly clear from the testimonies of PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6.

14. Going by the corroborative statements of these witnesses, it is discernible that though they are related to each other and to the deceased as well, their evidence cannot be discarded by simply labelling them as 8 “interested” witnesses. After thoroughly scrutinizing their evidence, we do not find any direct or indirect interest of these witnesses to get the accused punished by falsely implicating him so as to meet out any vested interest. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the evidences of PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 are quite reliable and we see no reason to disbelieve them.

18. Thus, the High Court was justified in upholding the conviction of the appellant and did not commit any illegality in passing the impugned judgment which merits interference. Therefore, the appeal being devoid of merit stands dismissed.

APRIL 26, 2019.
S. Subramanian vs S. Ramasamy And Ors

4. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as under :

That thereafter, on appreciation of evidence, the learned Trial Court dismissed both the suits. The appeals by the unsuccessful plaintiff came to be dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court.

7.4 Making the above submissions it is prayed to dismiss the present appeals.

10 In view of the above and as per the reasons stated above, both the present appeals are allowed. Impugned common Judgment and Order passed by the High Court in S.A. Nos. 4 and 5 of 2009 is quashed and set aside and common Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court dismissing the suits are hereby restored. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Gangaram vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

2. On 14.07.2000, Head Constable Shivshankar working at Police Station Singoli, District Neemuch went to village Palasiya on duty. While coming back from village Palasiya after conducting an inquiry in a complaint 1 filed under Section 174 Cr. P.C., he found Truck No.MP- 14-/1765 parked on a road outside the village Zhantla. On checking the lorry, he found 10 bags of poppy straw, a narcotic drug under the NDPS Act, in the truck. On inquiry, the Appellant who was the driver of the truck produced permit No.198 dated 13.07.2000 issued by the District Excise Officer, Neemuch for transportation of poppy straw from the cultivators of villages Patial, Fusariya, and Dhogaon from 9:00 a.m. till 8:00 p.m. on 14.07.2000. The licence also contained names of the cultivators from the above villages. The Appellant disclosed to the Head Constable that he loaded the poppy straw from village Palasiya with the assistance of Ashish, son of Om Prakash Paliwal, resident of village Badvasa who was an agent to the contractor Bishan Singh. As Shivshankar, Head Constable did not have the power to seize poppy straw under the provisions of the NDPS Act, he took the truck driver i.e. the Appellant along with the truck to the police station. The FIR was registered in the police station Singoli, District Neemuch on 15.07.2000. The narcotic drug was unloaded from the truck and was found to be 415 kilograms in weight. Each bag was 2 marked as Article 1 to Article 10 and two samples of 250 grams from each bag were taken and sealed. The samples of poppy straw were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination in which it was found that the seized materials are pieces of poppy straw.

13. Though we have taken note of the fact that the Appellant has undergone 8 years imprisonment out of the sentence of 10 years imposed on him and that he has been on bail since the year 2010, we cannot reduce the sentence to the period already undergone by the Appellant in view of the mandatory minimum sentence provided for an offence under Section 15 (c) of the NDPS Act being 10 years.

14. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The Appellant is directed to surrender within a period of four weeks to undergo the remaining portion of the sentence.

…................................J [L. NAGESWARA RAO] ............................J [M.R. SHAH] New Delhi, May 01, 2019.
Shree Shree Ram Janki Ji Asthan Tapovan ... vs The State Of Jharkhand

The present appeal is directed against an order passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi on 07.06.2017 directing the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate and to take appropriate action at the earliest and conclude the investigations preferably within six months. The High Court held as under:-

2. The said directions were issued finding that the property of Deity Shree Shree Ram Janki Ji Asthan Tapowan Mandir 1 at Ranchi has been transferred against the mandate of the Trust Deed created by the author of the Trust to establish Shree Ram Janki Tapowan Mandir Trust 2 on 25.02.1948. The said Trust was reconstituted on 12.05.1987 by virtue of registered deed. Still further, by another deed dated 20.09.2005, there was again reconstitution of the Trust.

5. The High Court found that properties were endowed to the Deity by the Trust Deed of 1948 and that the Trustees became custodian of the same. The subsequent Trust Deed of 1987 again prohibits the Trustees from selling or transferring or settling a land of the Mandir or Deity. The Trust Deed of 1948 and that of 1987 were authored by Mahant Shri Janki Jiwan Sharan but subsequently on 20.09.2005 a new Trust Deed has been created. Mahant Shri Ram Sharan Dass registered the said Trust Deed though the founder was Late Janki Jiwan Sharan. The said Trust Deed has a clause by which landed property can be sold.

8. The Public Interest Litigation was filed by Respondent No. 8 projecting himself as a responsible and vigilant citizen of the Country and being a Hindu by faith, therefore, as under pious responsibility to protect the interest of the Deity as per his faith. The Respondent No. 8 has not lodged any report before the concerned police station making grievance of any one of the facts stated in the writ petition so as to initiate the process of investigations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19733. The writ petitioner has not made any grievance to any public authority in respect of the alleged transfers by the Trustees as well.

9. The High Court has passed an order directing investigation by Central Bureau of Investigation by casually returning a finding that permission was obtained by the Trust by misrepresentation and fraud. The High Court was again not careful to return findings on the disputed questions of fact and that too in a public interest writ petition.

*** *** ***

16 (2008) 2 SCC 409 11

22. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition is thus dismissed.
Ryatar Sahakari Sakkarre Karkhane ... vs Asst. Commissioner Of Income Tax C 1 .

4. So far as the appeals filed by the assessee were concerned, they were dismissed and so far as the appeals filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax were concerned, they were allowed. The assessee has felt aggrieved and has filed these appeals by way of special leave in this Court.

26. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court did not decide the appeal in conformity with the mandatory procedure prescribed in Section 260­A of the Act.

28. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we consider it just and proper to remand the case to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh to answer the questions framed above on merits in accordance with law.”

12. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The appeals are remanded to the High Court for hearing afresh only after framing appropriate substantial 6 question(s) of law as required under Section 260­ A(3) of the Act.

13. Having formed an opinion to remand the case to the High Court, we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the issues involved in these appeals. The High Court will, therefore, decide the appeals strictly in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned order and in this order.

May 01, 2019 7