L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Suresh & Ors vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

2) Brief facts:

(d) Against the said order of conviction and sentence, Suresh and Pramod preferred appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 738 of 2000 and Dinesh preferred Criminal Appeal No. 772 of 2000 before the High Court. By common impugned judgment dated 23.08.2007, the High Court dismissed both the appeals.

In the presence of aforementioned ‘panchas’, I, the P.S. In-charge, asked the driver of Maruti Car No. D.N.C./7211 namely, Pramod Kumar s/o Raghuvir Singh by caste Gadariya, aged 20 years, r/o Chitbhawan, P.S. Ekdil, District Etawah, Suresh, s/o Rambabu Khatik, aged 18 years, r/o Village Chitbhawan, sitting with him in the case and Dinesh @ Pappu s/o Jagannath by caste Dube, aged 25 years, r/o Tikri presently at village Ballapur, P.S. Ajitmal, District Etawah, sitting on the rear seat, regarding their personal search asking them as to whether they would offer their personal search to me or to Gazetted Officer – S.D.O.P. Sahib. At this, all the three suspects gave their consent for their personal search by me, the P.S. In-charge, and they also agreed for search of the car by me. Panchnama regarding consent for search has been prepared in the presence of the ‘Panchas’.

12) We reiterate that sub-section (1) of Section 50 makes it imperative for the empowered officer to “inform” the person concerned about the existence of his right that if he so requires, he shall be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, failure to do so vitiate the conviction and sentence of an accused where the conviction has been recorded only on the basis of possession of the contraband. We also reiterate that the said provision is mandatory and requires strict compliance.

13) Though a portion of the contraband (opium) was recovered from the vehicle for which Section 50 is not applicable, if we exclude the quantity recovered from the vehicle, the remaining would not come within the mischief of ‘commercial quantity’ for imposition of such conviction and sentence. Taking note of length of period in prison and continuing as on date and in view of non-compliance of sub-section (1) of Section 50 in respect of recovery of contraband from the appellants, we set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on them by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court.

14) As a result, the appeal is allowed and the appellants are ordered to be released forthwith, if they are not required in any other case.

NOVEMBER 22, 2012.
Chairman Lic Of India & Ors vs A Masilamani

F. Aggrieved, the appellant-Corporation filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the Division Bench.

10. The second question involved herein, is also no longer res integra.

After hearing the counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the impugned judgment and order dated 10.1.2011, in Writ Appeal No. 7 of 2011, as well as the order of the learned Single Judge dated 17.2.2010, passed in Writ Petition No. 11152 of 2002, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and are therefore hereby, set aside. The present appeal is allowed. The matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority to enable it to take a fresh decision, taking into consideration the gravity of the charges involved, as with respect to whether it may still be required to hold a de novo enquiry, from the stage that it stood vitiated, i.e., after issuance of charge-sheet.

In the event the authority takes a view, that the facts and circumstances of the case require a fresh enquiry, it may proceed accordingly and conclude the said enquiry, most expeditiously.
Jasvir Kaur vs State Of Punjab

The special leave petition giving rise to the present appeal was filed both by the present appellant as petitioner No.1 and her husband - Ginder Singh as petitioner No.2. The special leave petition at the instance of the husband was dismissed and in case of the appellant, notice was issued only on the question of sentence. We, accordingly, proceed to consider the appeal to that limited extent.

According to the prosecution case Ginder Singh who was a Head Constable in the Punjab Police extracted Rs.70,000/- from the informant Angrej Singh by making the false promise that he would arrange for a job for him in the Police. The deal was struck at Rs.1,40,000/-; half of which, i.e., Rs.70,000/- was to be paid in advance and the balance half, after the employment was made. It is further the prosecution case that on September 22, 2002, the informant paid Rs.50,000/- to Ginder Singh at his quarter in the presence of his wife. Ginder Singh took the money and handed it over to his wife, the present appellant, who counted it before the informant. A few days later both the accused came to the house of the informant to collect the balance amount of Rs.20,000/-. Needless to say that neither any employment was provided to the informant nor was the money refunded to him.

The appeal is allowed to the limited extent, as indicated above.

…….,….…………...................J (Aftab Alam) ……………………..................J (Ranjana Prakash Desai) New Delhi;

November 26, 2012.
Hem Raj & Ors vs Kartar Singh (D) By Lrs. & Ors

3. Subsequent thereto, declaration was made under Section 6 of the LA Act and then the award came to be passed by the Land Acquisition Collector on November 23, 1973 fixing the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 270/- per Biswa. The respondents' land is part of the above acquisition in the award.

5. The reference court on May 17, 1980 decided the reference(s) and enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 22/- per square yard. The reference court also awarded solatium at the rate of 15% on the enhanced amount of compensation and interest at the rate of 6% from the date of dispossession till the payment was made as awarded.

19. The sentence “Admittedly, as on that date the claimants were entitled to solatium at 15% and interest at 6%” in para 7 in Swaran Singh2 is hardly a distinguishing feature. Swaran Singh2 is on all fours and is squarely applicable to the present fact situation. We have no reason, much less a justifiable reason, to doubt the correctness of law laid down in Swaran Singh2.

23. Civil Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order of the High Court dated April 1, 2003 and the order of the Additional District Judge, Karnal dated April 6, 1999 are liable to be set aside and are set aside. The execution petition filed by the respondents seeking execution of the award and decree dated April 28, 1989 stands dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.

24. In view of judgment passed in Civil Appeal 5115/2005 above, this Civil Appeal is also allowed in the same terms. The parties shall bear their own costs.

Civil Appeal No. 5096 of 2005 and Civil Appeal Nos. 5097-5098 of 2005

25. In view of the judgment passed in Civil Appeal 5115 of 2005 and Civil Appeal No. 5116 of 2005 today, these Civil Appeals do not survive and stand disposed of as such.
State Of Haryana & Anr vs Kartar Singh (D) By Lrs

3. Subsequent thereto, declaration was made under Section 6 of the LA Act and then the award came to be passed by the Land Acquisition Collector on November 23, 1973 fixing the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 270/- per Biswa. The respondents' land is part of the above acquisition in the award.

5. The reference court on May 17, 1980 decided the reference(s) and enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 22/- per square yard. The reference court also awarded solatium at the rate of 15% on the enhanced amount of compensation and interest at the rate of 6% from the date of dispossession till the payment was made as awarded.

19. The sentence “Admittedly, as on that date the claimants were entitled to solatium at 15% and interest at 6%” in para 7 in Swaran Singh2 is hardly a distinguishing feature. Swaran Singh2 is on all fours and is squarely applicable to the present fact situation. We have no reason, much less a justifiable reason, to doubt the correctness of law laid down in Swaran Singh2.

23. Civil Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order of the High Court dated April 1, 2003 and the order of the Additional District Judge, Karnal dated April 6, 1999 are liable to be set aside and are set aside. The execution petition filed by the respondents seeking execution of the award and decree dated April 28, 1989 stands dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.

24. In view of judgment passed in Civil Appeal 5115/2005 above, this Civil Appeal is also allowed in the same terms. The parties shall bear their own costs.

Civil Appeal No. 5096 of 2005 and Civil Appeal Nos. 5097-5098 of 2005

25. In view of the judgment passed in Civil Appeal 5115 of 2005 and Civil Appeal No. 5116 of 2005 today, these Civil Appeals do not survive and stand disposed of as such.
Chief Comm., Cen. Ex.&Cust.;, ... vs Prabhat Singh

5. Dissatisfied with the order dated 5.1.2006, Prabhat Singh approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as “the CAT- Lucknow Bench”), by filing Original Application no.468 of 2006. The instant Original Application filed by Prabhat Singh was disposed of by CAT-Lucknow Bench by an order dated 14.03.2008, with the direction, that the claim of Prabhat Singh for appointment on compassionate ground be re-considered against the post of Tax Assistant. While issuing the aforesaid direction, it was clarified, that the earlier order dated 5.1.2006 would not be taken into consideration, to the detriment of the applicant-Prabhat Singh.

16. Courts and Tribunals should not fall prey to any sympathy syndrome, so as to issue directions for compassionate appointments, without reference to the prescribed norms. Courts are not supposed to carry Santa Claus’s big bag on Christmas eve, to disburse the gift of compassionate appointment, to all those who seek a court’s intervention. Courts and Tribunals must understand, that every such act of sympathy, compassion and discretion, wherein directions are issued for appointment on compassionate ground, could deprive a really needy family requiring financial support, and thereby, push into penury a truly indigent, destitute and impoverish family. Discretion is therefore ruled out. So are, misplaced sympathy and compassion.

17. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the impugned order passed by the High Court dated 9.8.2011, directing the appellants to appoint Prabhat Singh on compassionate ground, against a post in the grade of Tax Assistant or any other post falling in the quota of direct recruitment, is liable to be set aside. The same is accordingly hereby set aside.

18. The instant appeal is accordingly allowed.
Chief Comm., Cen. Ex.&Cust., Luck.&Ors vs Prabhat Singh

5. Dissatisfied with the order dated 5.1.2006, Prabhat Singh approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as “the CAT- Lucknow Bench”), by filing Original Application no.468 of 2006. The instant Original Application filed by Prabhat Singh was disposed of by CAT-Lucknow Bench by an order dated 14.03.2008, with the direction, that the claim of Prabhat Singh for appointment on compassionate ground be re-considered against the post of Tax Assistant. While issuing the aforesaid direction, it was clarified, that the earlier order dated 5.1.2006 would not be taken into consideration, to the detriment of the applicant-Prabhat Singh.

16. Courts and Tribunals should not fall prey to any sympathy syndrome, so as to issue directions for compassionate appointments, without reference to the prescribed norms. Courts are not supposed to carry Santa Claus’s big bag on Christmas eve, to disburse the gift of compassionate appointment, to all those who seek a court’s intervention. Courts and Tribunals must understand, that every such act of sympathy, compassion and discretion, wherein directions are issued for appointment on compassionate ground, could deprive a really needy family requiring financial support, and thereby, push into penury a truly indigent, destitute and impoverish family. Discretion is therefore ruled out. So are, misplaced sympathy and compassion.

17. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the impugned order passed by the High Court dated 9.8.2011, directing the appellants to appoint Prabhat Singh on compassionate ground, against a post in the grade of Tax Assistant or any other post falling in the quota of direct recruitment, is liable to be set aside. The same is accordingly hereby set aside.

18. The instant appeal is accordingly allowed.
Salaha Begaum vs Special Land Acquisition Officer

2. The appellants’ land comprised in Survey No.39/MF (3 acres 6 guntas), Survey No.39/E (1 acre 23 guntas) and Survey No.39/MJI (9 acres 15 guntas) situated in Srirampuram village, Mysore Taluk was acquired by the State Government for construction of Varuna Nalla. For this purpose, notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’) was issued on 9.3.1995. After finalization of the acquisition proceedings, the Special Land Acquisition Officer passed award dated 28.11.1995 and fixed market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs.65,000/- per acre. On a reference made by the Collector under Section 18 of the Act, the Reference Court determined the amount of compensation at the rate of Rs.1,00,000/- per acre.

3. The appellants filed appeals under Section 54 of the Act and pleaded that they were entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.2,20,000/- per acre. The Division Bench of the High Court partly allowed the appeals and enhanced the amount of compensation from Rs.1,00,000/- to Rs.1,70,000/- per acre.

6. We have considered the respective arguments. Although, the lands belonging to the appellants and Sri Ugregowda were acquired by two different notifications, the purpose of acquisition was the same, i.e., construction of Varuna Nalla. It is not in dispute that in the appeal filed by Sri Ugregowda under Section 54 of the Act, the High Court relied upon sale deed dated 7.1.1993 and held that he was entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.2,20,000/- per acre. However, as Sri Ugregowda had confined his claim for compensation to Rs.2,00,000/- per acre, the High Court did not award compensation at the rate of Rs.2,20,000/- per acre.

10. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the appellants are entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.2,20,000/- per acre with benefit of 10% increase for the time gap of two years between the notification issued for the acquisition of Shri Ugregowda’ s land and the notification issued for the acquisition of their land.

11. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and it is declared that the appellants are entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.2,64,000/- per acre. The competent authority is directed to pay to the appellants the enhanced compensation together with other statutory benefits.

12. With a view to ensure that the appellants are not fleeced by the middlemen, we direct the respondent to depute an officer of the rank of Tahsildar who shall contact the appellants and ask them to open bank accounts, if they already do not have such accounts. This shall be done within a period of 8 weeks from today. Thereafter, the concerned official shall inform the respondent about the bank account nos. of the appellants. Within next 8 weeks, the respondent shall deposit the amount in the bank account of the appellants in the form of a demand draft got prepared from a nationalized bank.
State Of Karnataka & Ors vs Vivekananda M Hallur & Ors

3) Brief facts :

(a) Respondents herein are the members of Kendriya Upadhyayara Sangha (R) (in short ‘the Sangha’), Bangalore South Taluk, registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960. The Sangha was granted certain land at Jakkasandra Village, South Taluk by the State of Karnataka in order to provide house sites to its members. The sole object of the Sangha is charitable and to protect the interest of its members and not to form the sites and allot to its members with a profit motive.

(c) Under the above said Lease-cum-Sale Agreements, the lease was for a period of 10 years and after completion of the said period, respondents herein approached the Sangha and requested them to execute the Absolute Sale Deeds in their favour in respect of their sites. The Sangha agreed to execute the same and the Absolute Sale Deeds were presented for registration before the sub-Registrar, Bommanahalli. The sub-Registrar, while registering the sale deeds, has collected the stamp duty on the market value prevailing on that day of execution of the same after adjusting the stamp duty paid on Lease-cum-Sale Agreements. After registration of the documents of sale, the respondents herein approached the High Court by filing writ petitions seeking refund of stamp duty paid on the absolute Sale Deeds.

9) On these grounds, without expressing anything on merits of the claim of either party, we condone the delay in filing the writ appeals and in the light of our conclusion that the Division Bench has not adverted to any substantial grounds urged by the State, particularly with reference to the provisions of Article 5(e)(i) and Explanation (ii) of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, we set aside the order of the Division Bench impugned in these appeals and remit the same to the High Court for fresh consideration. We request the High Court to restore W.A. Nos. 1023, 1324 and 1325 on its file and dispose of the same on merits in accordance with law, after affording opportunity to all the parties including the newly impleaded respondent Nos. 4-32 herein as well as the connected writ petitions pending before the High Court, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. Once again, we make it clear that except adverting to the stand of the State, we have not expressed our views on any of the claims and it is for the Division Bench of the High Court to consider their respective claims in accordance with law as observed supra.

10) The appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

DECEMBER 07, 2012.
State Of M.P.& Ors vs Sandhya Tomar & Anr

C. The appellants contested the writ petition on various grounds, however, the writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 17.7.2006. Aggrieved, the appellants filed a writ appeal, which stood dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 5.11.2005. Hence, this appeal.

4. Shri B.S. Banthia, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the High Court committed an error in allowing the said writ petition as respondent no.1 was merely a temporary employee, and had joined another post under the alleged order of deputation, and had worked there for a period of 9-10 months. She could not join as a Project Director in the Society as she had no lien therein. She had also left the Society without obtaining any previous sanction from the appointing Authority, i.e., the District Collector. She had further, voluntarily abandoned the services of the Society on 29.7.2003 and thereafter, she filed the said writ petition on 26.5.2005, only challenging advertisement dated 16.5.2005. Hence, even though her services in the Panchayat & Rural Development Department were terminated on 29.3.2004, she approached the High Court only after lapse of a period of one year and two months. Thus, the iHHkkHigh Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition at all. The appeal deserves to be allowed.

Respondent no.1 voluntarily abandoned her job in the Society and joined another post, in another department on 29.7.2003. Therefore, her temporary employment in the Society came to an end automatically. She had chosen better employment under the Government of Madhya Pradesh, as opposed to continuing her employment in the Society on a project. Her employment in the Government of Madhya Pradesh was terminated after serving therein for a period of eight months, vide order dated 29.3.2004. In such a fact-situation, the Society was not bound to permit respondent no.1 to join the post of Project Director. As a consequence thereof, she has no right to challenge the advertisement dated 16.5.2005. At the most, if respondent no.1 was eligible for appointment as per the said advertisement, she can apply for fresh appointment. In case respondent no.1 felt that she had a right to join the services of the Government of Madhya Pradesh and that her service from there was wrongly terminated, she could have challenged the said order dated 29.3.2004, which has in fact, never been challenged by her, for reasons best known to her.

11. In view of the above, the learned Single Judge, as well as the Division Bench have misdirected themselves with respect to the actual issues involved in the case, and have decided the case upon totally irrelevant issues. The appeal therefore, succeeds, and is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, as well as that of the Division Bench, are hereby set aside. No costs.
Lahu Kamlakar Patil & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra

2. Filtering the unnecessary details, the prosecution case is that on 19.2.1988, PW-1, Chandrakant Phunde, the informant, who is the owner of a rickshaw bearing No. MCT-858, while going from Somatane to Panvel for his business, met PW-2, Janardan Bhonkar, who hired his rickshaw for Panvel. On the way, they met the deceased Shriram @ Bhau Harishchandra Patil who wanted to go in the rickshaw and with the consent of Janardan, the three of them proceeded towards Panvel. The deceased, Bhau Harishchandra Patil, went to Gemini Tailors to pick up his stitched clothes at Palaspe Phata and thereafter they stopped near Milan Hotel to have some snacks. As the prosecution story proceeds, when they were inside the hotel, 10 to 15 people entered inside being armed with swords, iron bars and sticks. As alleged, Lahu Kamlakar Patil, the appellant No. 1, had an iron bar and appellant No. 2, Bali Ram, had a sword. Bali Ram and Lahu assaulted the deceased on his head with their respective weapons and the other accused persons also assaulted him. Janardan tried to resist and got hit on his right hand finger due to the blow inflicted by the sword. As there was commotion in the hotel, people ran hither and thither, and PW-2, Janardan, also took the escape route. After the assault, the accused persons ran away and Bhau was left lying there in the hotel in a pool of blood.

3. As the facts are further unfurled, Chandrakant Phunde went to the police station, lodged an F.I.R. and handed over the stitched clothes of the deceased which were in the rickshaw to the police. On the basis of the F.I.R., a case under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 and 452 of the I.P.C. was registered and the criminal law was set in motion. In the course of investigation, the investigating agency got the autopsy conduted, seized the weapons, prepared the `panchnama’, examined the witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”) and arrested six accused persons including the present appellants. After completing the investigation, the investigating agency placed the charge-sheet before the competent Court who, in turn, committed the matter to the Court of Session and, eventually, it was tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Raigad Alibag.

4. The accused persons abjured their guilt and pleaded false implication and, hence, faced trial.

7. The learned trial Judge, after scrutiny of the evidence, found that the prosecution had been able to prove the case against the present appellants and, accordingly, convicted them for the offences and imposed the sentence as has been stated hereinbefore. As far as the other accused persons are concerned, he did not find them guilty and, accordingly, recorded an order of acquittal in their favour.

28. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Sessions Judge and affirmed by the High Court is set aside and the appellants be set at liberty forthwith unless their detention is required in connection with any other case.