R.Kolandaivelu(Dead) By Lrs vs Govt.Of T.Nadu & Anr

2. The appellants are the owners of lands situated in Salem Taluk No. 151, Ayothiapatnam in the district of Salem, Tamil Nadu (hereinafter referred to as "the acquired lands"). A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short "the Act") was issued on 24th of December, 1986 for acquisition of the said lands. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 23rd of December, 1987. Two writ petitions being W.P.Nos.835 and 836 of 1988 were filed questioning the validity and 1 legality of the aforesaid notification and the declaration before the High Court of Madras. In the pending writ petitions, on 11th of February, 1988, the following interim order was passed :-

The aforesaid two writ petitions finally came up for hearing before a learned Judge of the High Court who by an order dated 23rd of August, 2001 rejected the writ petitions and feeling aggrieved, the appeals were filed before the Division Bench which by the impugned order had dismissed the appeals of the appellants. The appellants, feeling aggrieved, had filed two special leave petitions which on grant of leave, were heard in the presence of the learned counsel for the parties.

8. Subsequent to the passing of this interim order, it is true that the interim order was not extended by any further order of the Court. However, the parties thought that the interim order was continuing. Keeping that in mind, the State/respondents filed an application for vacating the interim order dated 11th of February, 1988 granted by the Court.

10. As noted herein earlier, at the instance of the appellants, the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act and the declaration under Section 6 initially were stayed for four weeks on 11th of 11 February, 1988, but the Interlocutory Applications remained pending for final disposal and finally on the applications to vacate the stay order at the instance of the State/respondents, the applications to vacate the stay were disposed of, as noted herein earlier by an order which clearly shows that the order of stay granted initially for four weeks would continue pending further orders. From a perusal of the aforesaid interim order of the High Court passed on 3rd of July, 1991, it is, therefore, evident that there was an order of prohibition from dispossessing the appellants from the acquired lands pending further orders.

11. In view of our discussions made herein above and considering the nature of interim order of stay passed by the High Court finally on 3rd of July, 1991, it is abundantly clear that both the parties proceeded on the basis that the interim order of stay had been continuing and the respondents were prohibited from dispossessing the appellants from 12 the acquired lands pending further orders. If that was not the case, the question of filing an application for vacating the order of stay granted in favour of the appellants could not arise at all and there was no occasion for the appellants to contest the application for vacating the stay order on the basis that the interim order of stay was continuing and should be allowed to continue. That apart, it may be stated that although initially the interim order was passed for four weeks, the same interim order which was granted initially was made final until further orders on 3rd of July, 1991. From the above narration of facts, it must be held that no steps could be taken in view of the pending applications for grant of interim order and in view of the interim order granted pending further orders. Therefore, it cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed due to expiry of two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act relating to the acquired lands. 13

14. Such being the stand taken by us, we are, therefore, of the view that the award was passed in accordance with Section 11A of the Act, that is to say, the award was passed within two years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

16. Following the principles laid down and the observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision, with which we are in respectful agreement, we are, therefore, of the view that the State/respondent was entitled to exclude the period mentioned herein earlier and that it must also be held that if such period is excluded the period of two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act before the award is passed would not expire and accordingly, the question of holding that the entire acquisition proceeding shall lapse, cannot arise at all.

18. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court and accordingly the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

December 11, 2009.