L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Manik Taneja & Anr vs State Of Karnataka & Anr

3. Brief facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as under:- The appellant No.1 and his wife Sakshi Jawa met with an accident with an auto rickshaw on 13.06.2013 at about 10.30 in the morning, while Sakshi Jawa was driving Maruti SX4 KA-03-MM-8646. One of the passengers, who was travelling by the auto, namely Mrs. Laxmi Ganapati, sustained injuries and she was duly admitted in the Santosh Hospital for treatment. Sakshi Jawa, the appellant No.2, is said to have paid all the hospital expenses of the injured and the matter is said to have been amicably settled between the injured and the appellants and no FIR was lodged. The Constable, who was present at the time of incident, directed the appellants to meet Mr. Kasim, Police Inspector, Pulakeshi Nagar Traffic Police Station, Bangalore City. The appellants allege that as soon as they entered the office of Mr. Kasim, he behaved in a rude manner. Further, Mr. Kasim summoned the appellant No.2 to produce her driving licence and other documents. As at that time no FIR was lodged, the appellant No. 2 questioned the Police Inspector as to why she was being asked to produce those documents. Mr. Kasim, in reply, is alleged to have threatened appellant No.2 by saying that he would drag her to court if she continued to argue and she was also thrown out of his office. On the orders of Mr. Kasim, his deputy told the appellants that they are booking them on the charge of rash and negligent driving.

Being aggrieved with the manner with which they were treated, the appellants posted comments on the Bangalore Traffic Police Facebook page, accusing Mr. Kasim of his misbehaviour and also forwarded an email complaining about the harassment meted out to them at the hands of the Respondent Police Inspector. The Respondent No.2-Police Inspector filed a complaint regarding the posting of the comment on the Facebook by the appellants and subsequently FIR was registered against the appellants for offences punishable under Sections 353 and 506 IPC on 14.06.2013.

17. In the result, the impugned order of the High Court in Criminal Petition No.252 of 2014 dated 24.4.2014 is set aside and this appeal is allowed and the FIR in Crime No.174/2013 registered against the appellants is quashed.

Crl.A. No. ......./2015 arising from SLP (Crl.) No(s). 6449/2014 MANIK TANEJA & ANR. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. Respondent(s) Date : 20/01/2015 This petition was called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today.

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Bharadwaj S. Iyengar, Adv.

Mr. Vikas Upadhyay,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Joseph Aristotle S.,Adv.

Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Gopala Gowda and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi.

Leave granted.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed Reportable Judgment.

(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
Laxmidevamma & Ors vs Ranganath & Ors

2. Appellants-plaintiffs are the owners of the revenue land bearing Survey No.1/1 of Chikmagalur village which was converted for non- agricultural purpose under the order dated 2.4.1987 of the Deputy Commissioner, Chikmagalur. Layout was formed from the above said land and the site Nos.12 and 13 and portions of site Nos.11 and 14 were sold to the first defendant by the appellants-plaintiffs by executing two sale deeds dated 11.7.1988 and 3.1.1992. To the south of the property sold to the respondents-defendants, 'A' schedule property as shown in the suit was earmarked for the purpose of road. However, the City Development Authority did not approve the same and hence no road was formed. Case of the appellants-plaintiffs is that since no road was formed, they continued to be the owners of the 'A' schedule property and they are the absolute owners of the same.

5. Upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence, the trial court decreed the suit holding that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of 'A' schedule property and entitled to possession of 'B' schedule property to an extent of 2' x 781/4' i.e. 2 feet north-south 781/4 feet east-west and defendants 2 and 3 were directed to deliver vacant possession of the said land to the plaintiffs. Being aggrieved, the defendants filed appeal before the first appellate court-Fast Track Court, Chikmagalur. The first appellate court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the appeal vide judgment dated 13.10.2006. The unsuccessful defendants preferred second appeal before the High Court, which by the impugned judgment dated 27.9.2012 allowed the second appeal in part and modified the judgment and decree passed by the courts below holding that the plaintiffs are entitled for compensation for the space which was earmarked for road if the same was acquired by the competent authority. High Court held that the plaintiffs are not entitled for a declaration that they are the absolute owners of the suit 'A' schedule property and consequently their claim for injunction was also not granted.

16. In the result, the appeal is allowed, impugned judgment in R.S.A. No. 297/2007 dated 27.9.2012 passed by the High Court of Karnataka is set aside and the judgment passed by the Addl. Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.), Chikmagalur as confirmed by the lower appellate court is restored. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

Date : 20/01/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s) Ms. Anjana Chandrashekar,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. S. N. Bhat,Adv.

Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Gopala Gowda and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the Signed Reportable Judgment.
Walter Bau Ag, Legal Successor, Of The ... vs Municipal Corp. Of Greater Mumbai And ...

4. The respondent Corporation having failed to respond to the notice dated 24th February, 2014 of the petitioner, an approach was made to the ICADR by the petitioner on 19th May, 2014. On the basis thereof, the ICADR by its letter dated 3rd June, 2014 called upon the respondent Corporation to make appointment of an Arbitrator from a panel of three names that was furnished to the respondent Corporation or to independently appoint an arbitrator. The respondent Corporation pursuant to the said communication of the ICADR appointed Mr. Justice (Retd.) A.D. Mane as its arbitrator by communication dated 3rd July, 2014. Thereafter, this application/petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short "the Arbitration Act") was filed on 21st August, 2014.

10. Consequently, we allow the present petition and appoint Shri Justice S.R. Sathe, a retired judge of the Bombay High Court as the Arbitrator on behalf of the respondent Corporation. Both the Arbitrators shall now name the third Arbitrator forthwith whereafter the arbitration proceedings will be held and concluded as expeditiously as possible. The terms of appointment of Shri Justice S.R. Sathe as the Arbitrator on behalf of the respondent Corporation will be settled in consultation with the respondent Corporation.

11. The arbitration petition is disposed of in the above terms.

(RANJAN GOGOI) NEW DELHI JANUARY 20, 2015
Delhi State Indus. Dev. .Corp.Ltd vs Ashok Kumar Madan

The brief facts of the case are stated hereunder:-

Further, the respondent had paid interest on the delayed payment, which was also accepted by the appellant-Corporation, and therefore the doctrine of equity is in his favour. Further, no action was taken against the concerned officer of the appellant-Corporation by it. Thus, in the absence of any reasonable explanation as to why the appellant-Corporation chose to enjoy the money of the respondent for a period of 4 years without any recourse to him and without taking any action for the cancellation of the allotment of the plot, can safely lead to the conclusion that the appellant-Corporation chose to accept the action of its Section Officer, Mr.R.K.Bhatia. Thus, the learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition and quashed the cancellation letter dated 30.01.2008, wherein the appellant-Corporation has cancelled the plot allotted to the respondent and further the appellant- Corporation was directed to make available an alternate plot to the respondent in case the original plot allotted to the respondent was not available, within a period of four weeks from the date of the order.

The Division Bench of the High Court also dismissed the appeal of the appellant-Corporation on the similar reasons assigned by the learned single Judge. Hence, this appeal is filed by the appellant-Corporation seeking to set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court.

On the basis of the facts pleaded, the evidence on record and the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties, we have to examine whether the appellant-Corporation is entitled to the relief as prayed for in this appeal. The answer for the same is given in the negative.

Thus, we direct the appellant-Corporation to re-allot the plot originally allotted to the respondent, i.e. Plot No.57, Pocket-I, Sector-2, Bawana Industrial Area, Delhi, and if the same is not available, an alternative plot, in the same Bawana Industrial Area or any other proximate area be allotted to him within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. The discretionary power exercised by the learned single Judge of the High Court which is confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court need not be interfered with by this Court as no case is made out. The appeal is dismissed.

(2001) 1 SCALE 420
Union Of India And Anr vs Sova Ispat Limited And Ors

2. Aggrieved by an interim order passed by the High Court of Calcutta in AST No.432 of 2014 dated 23.12.2014, the respondents 1 and 2 therein preferred the instant appeal. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows:-

3. The following are the facts relevant for the purpose of this order. The first respondent, a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 along with one M/s. Jai Balaji Sponge Ltd., secured the allotment of a coal block known as "Ardhagram Coal Block" under the memorandum of the appellant dated 6th December, 2007, which was subsequently renewed on 24.2.2014.

5. The legality of the various allotments of the coal blocks became the subject matter of public interest litigation before this Court. By judgments dated 25.8.2014 and 24.9.2014, the allocation of various coal blocks including the one allocated in favour of the first respondent was cancelled.

16. In view of the fact that the Writ Petition is pending in the High Court, we do not propose to examine the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondent, but we are satisfied that the interest of justice demands that the impugned order be set aside recording the undertaking of the learned Attorney General mentioned above. We order accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.

17. We leave open all questions of law to be agitated by the parties before the High Court.

Appeal allowed as indicated above.

January 27, 2015
Jiban Krishna Mondal & Ors vs State Of West Bengal & Ors

3. The appellants took plea before the High Court that the members of West Bengal Home Guards are in the services of the State performing the same duty like police constables who are Government employees. They are also entitled for regularization of their services and regular pay at par with the police personnel.

(vi) The Home Guards were initially paid Rs.2.50 per day which was enhanced to Rs.24.71, then to Rs.53, to Rs.117 and finally to RS.328 which is presently being paid. The payment of Rs.328 per day to them who are duly trained is a pittance and much below the minimum scale of pay of the State Government. Payment of wages below the minimum wages fixed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 amounts to forced labour within the meaning of Article 23 of the Constitution. The appellants are thus entitled to regular scale of pay from the date of their appointment.

WEST BENGAL HOME GUARDS RULES, 1962

Therefore, if the 1962 Act is read with 1962 Rules, we find that members of Home Guards are ordinarily unpaid volunteers for whom the State Government shall determine the pay and allowances when called out for duty.

For the reasons aforesaid, the State Government issued Amendment Act, 1990.

Thereby the intention of the Legislature to create a voluntary Home Guard Organization is made clear.

In that view of the matter, we hold that the appellants are not entitled for regularization of service. Further, in absence of any comparison of duties, responsibilities, accountability and status, they may not be equated with the Police Constables or personnel to claim parity with the pay or scale of pay as provided to the Police personnel. The High Court by the impugned judgment and orders rightly refused to grant regularization of their services. We find no merit in these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed.
Mount Mary Enterprises vs M/S.Jivratna Medi Treat Pvt Ltd

2. The facts giving rise to the present litigation in a nutshell are as under:

11. For the aforestated reasons, we are of the view that the amendment application should not have been rejected by the trial court and the High Court should not have confirmed the order of rejection. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment delivered by the High Court and the order dated 22nd November, 2013 of the trial court, whereby the amendment application had been rejected.

12 We allow the appeal and direct the trial court to permit the appellant-plaintiff to amend the plaint as prayed for in the amendment application so as to change valuation of the suit property. There is no order as to costs.

..............................J (ANIL R. DAVE) ..............................J (KURIAN JOSEPH) NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 30, 2015
Sh.Ajay Ramdas Ramteke And Anr vs Mahanagar Sudhar Samiti, Akola & Ors

3. Brief facts of the case are that elections were held for Akola Municipal Corporation in February, 2012, wherein 73 councillors were elected to the House. From amongst elected members, initially 23 members, and thereafter in all 26 members claimed to have formed an "aghadi" (group of persons) with the name "Mahanagar Sudhar Samiti". On 5.3.2012, within one month of the election, leader of the said group submitted an application before the Divisional Commissioner for its registration under second proviso to Section 31A(2) of the 1949 Act. It appears that in the meantime there was a controversy as to whether two of the elected members projected to be part of the group were actually members of the aghadi (respondent no.1) or another group Akola Vikas Mahaaghadi (present respondent no.6). The said issue was decided by the High court by a detailed judgment dated 08.05.2012 passed in writ petition no. 1426 of 2012 holding that the aforesaid two members were not part of either respondent no. 1 or 6. Thereafter, the Divisional Commissioner passed a detailed order on 28.08.2012 whereby the application for registration of respondent no.1 as aghadi filed in March 2012 was rejected. Said order was not challenged by any party. However, meanwhile Resolution dated 29.04.2013 was passed by the Akola Municipal Corporation whereby the present appellants and six others (present respondent nos. 9 to 14) were nominated in the Standing Committee as members thereof. The Resolution was challenged by respondent nos. 1 to 3 by filing a Writ Petition no. 2571 of 2013 before the Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of Mayor (respondent no. 4) before the High Court that the writ petition was not maintainable. Defending the Resolution dated 29.04.2013, it was stated that there was no illegality in nominating the members whose names figured in the Standing Committee constituted vide Resolution dated 29.04.2013.

4. After hearing the parties, the High Court took the view that since the application for registration, in the register maintained in Form IV as per Rule 5 of Maharashtra Local Authority Members' Disqualification Rules, 1987 (for short "1987 Rules"), was made within time, the respondent no.1 should have been treated as separate aghadi, and as such non-inclusion of names of its members for proportional representation in the Standing Committee invalidates the Resolution dated 29.04.2013. Accordingly, the High Court quashed the Resolution dated 29.04.2013 and allowed the writ petition.

21. Therefore, this appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and impugned order dated 14.8.2013 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition no. 2571 of 2013 is hereby set aside, and the Resolution dated 29.04.2013 shall stand restored. No orders as to costs.

February 02, 2015.
M/S Bennet Coleman & Co.Ltd vs State Of Bihar & Ors

4. The appellant preferred a petition before the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the same was dismissed holding that the complaint was maintainable and thus, the present appeal.

Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing in this sub-section shall prevent the Board from making recommendations for fixation or revision of rates of wages on all India basis."

22. The appeal is hence allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the complaint and order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance are quashed.

23. There will also be a direction to the Labour Court, Patna to dispose of the Case Reference No.7/2013, pending before it, expeditiously.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.270 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO.1884/2011) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.271/2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL) No. 1956/2011), CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.272/2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL) No. 1957/2011,

25. Leave granted.

26. In view of the judgment dated 10.02.2015 passed in Criminal Appeal No.269/2015 arising out of SLP (CRL) No.10134/2010, the impugned orders are set aside and the complaint and order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance are quashed and the appeals are allowed.

27. In view of the judgment dated 10.02.2015 passed in Criminal Appeal No.269/2015 arising out of SLP (Crl) No.10134/2010, nothing survives in these contempt petitions, which are, accordingly, dismissed.

FEBRUARY 10, 2015.
Raveesh Chand Jain vs Raj Rani Jain

3. The factual matrix of the case is that the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit against the defendant/appellant who is her son, for recovery of possession and damages alleging that she had purchased the suit property out of her own fund and she is the absolute owner, but part of the property was under the illegal occupation of the appellant-defendant, who opposed the suit contending that the suit property was a Hindu Undivided Family property having been purchased in the name of the respondent using the funds of his grandfather, father and himself and not purchased by the respondent as she was a housewife having no income. Appellant-defendant further pleaded that though there was a dispute regarding his ownership and possession, the same was settled between all the family members vide compromise deed dated 22.10.1997.

14. From the reading of para 7 of the order, as quoted hereinabove, it reveals that the High Court not only decreed the suit for possession but also directed the plaintiff / respondent to file an affidavit giving details of the cost of litigation since the appeal was allowed with cost.

20. However, in the instant case, at the time of admission of this Special Leave Petition, the following order was passed on 12.11.2014:-

21. In compliance of the aforesaid order, the appellant had already deposited the aforesaid amount. Hence, taking into consideration the relationship of the appellant and the respondent being mother and son, we do not think it proper to again remand the matter to the trial court for deciding the issue as to the quantum of damages the respondent is entitled to get from the appellant for his unauthorized possession of the suit property. We, therefore, hold that the amount of Rs.5,00,000/- would be just and proper so far as the claim for damages is concerned.

22. We, therefore, think it fit not to interfere with the order passed by the High Court. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, we allow the appellant to remain in possession of the suit property till 31.12.2015 on payment of Rs.10,000/- per month by way of damages for use and occupation of the suit property. It is made clear that in the event the appellant fails to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the suit property and also fails in payment of monthly damages as fixed hereinabove on or before 31.12.2015, respondent will be entitled to execute the decree for recovery of possession and also for damages.igh High Court. This appeal .....................................J. (M.Y. Eqbal) ..................................J. (Shiva Kirti Singh) New Delhi February 12, 2015.
National Thermal Power Corp. Ltd vs M/S Ashok Kumar Singh & Ors

3. The appellant-corporation floated two tenders one dated 17/10/2012 and the other dated 19/11/2012 for construction of a shed and a boundary wall. The respondent-contractor submitted two separate tenders in response to the said tender notices enclosing therewith an amount of Rs.4,41,000/- and Rs.3,34,000/- respectively towards earnest money deposit. The tenders were in two parts, one technical and the other commercial. While the technical bids were opened and found compliant, the financial bids had yet to be opened when the respondents moved an application addressed to the AGM (C&M) of the appellant-corporation at Rai Bareilly withdrawing the bids submitted by it and asking for being excluded from consideration besides praying for refund of the earnest money deposited with the bids. This was followed by a representation on 1/5/2013 whereby the respondent once again asked for the return of the earnest money deposited by them. In response to the said representation, the appellant-corporation issued a letter dated 26/4/2013 stating that although the bids offered by the respondent were not being considered, the prayer for refund of earnest money could not be considered as the same stood forfeited. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 9620 (MB) of 2013 before the High Court challenging the refusal of refund of the earnest money deposit. The said petition was opposed by the appellant herein but was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, in terms of a brief order holding that since respondent's case was not covered by condition No. 2 of the Special Conditions of contract of the appellant- corporation, the refusal of refund of the earnest money deposited by the respondent was unjustified. The High Court observed as under:

4. The present appeal assails the correctness of the above order as noticed earlier.

14. In the result this appeal succeeds and is, hereby, allowed. The order passed by the High Court is set aside and Writ Petition No.9620 (MB) of 2013 dismissed but without any order as to costs.

(ADARSH KUMAR GOEL) New Delhi;

February 13, 2015