L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Abdul Rahim & Ors vs Sk.Abdul Zabar & Ors

5. Indisputably, Razak also filed T.L. Case No. 7 of 1976 for grant of temporary lease in respect of the said small patch of Govt. land which along 4 with the suit land formed a compact area. The deed of gift was also produced in the said proceedings. Respondent No.1 objected to the prayers made by the appellant. By an order dated 6.4.1977, Tahasildar, Bhadrak while holding that the objection raised by the respondent No.1 was without any merit, recommended renewal of the licence in favour of Razak.

6. Respondent No. 1 filed a suit being O.S. No. 112 of 1980 on or about 2.9.1980 in the court of Subordinate Judge, Bhadrakh inter alia praying for a declaration that the said deed of gift dated 21.2.1973 was illegal, void and inoperative.

The trial court dismissed the suit opining that the cause of action for filing the suit having arisen on 6.4.1977, the suit was instituted beyond the period of limitation as prescribed by Article 59 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963. It was furthermore held that as Razak had been 5 collecting the house rent from the tenants for the suit lands in his own capacity and not as an agent of his father and also having regard to the order of mutation in his favour, the deed of gift dated 21.2.1973 was valid in law.

7. Respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal thereagainst. The High Court allowed the said appeal inter alia holding that as Razak had been realising rent from the tenants even prior to the date of death of his father and as there was no material brought on record to show that Haji Sk. Abdullah had divested himself of the title of the said property and Razak was in possession thereof. The High Court furthermore opined that the respondent No. 1 came to know of the fact of execution of the deed of gift in favour of Razak only in the year 1980.

17. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court committed a serious error in opining that the possession had not been handed over to Razak by the donor.

19. A suit for cancellation of transaction whether on the ground of being void or voidable would be governed by Article 59 of the Limitation Act. The suit, therefore, should have been filed within a period of three years from the date of knowledge of the fact that the transaction which according to the plaintiff was void or voidable had taken place. The suit having not been filed within a period of three years, the suit has rightly been held to be barred by limitation.

20. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment is set aside. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.25,000/-.

MARCH 06, 2009
State Of Up & Anr vs Radhey Shyam Rai

These training centers, as noticed hereinbefore, were being run by the Cane Development Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Management of the said training centers was transferred to the Sansthan. The expenses thereof were to be met from U.P. Sahkari Ganna Samiti Sangh and Sakkar Vishesh Nidhi.

4. Respondent was appointed in the post of Computer Officer/ Data Processing Officer. The Governing Council of the Sansthan in its meeting held on 28.04.1997 resolved to abolish the posts created and to cancel the appointments made, pursuant whereto the services of the respondent were dispensed with by an order dated 17.05.1997.

5. The writ petition filed by the respondent came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court. It noticed an earlier decision of another Division Bench of the said Court wherein it was opined that the appellant No. 2 is not a `State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. However, a different view was taken.

The functions of the Sansthan are public functions.

16. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 50,000/-.

March 06, 2009
Inspector Of Customs, Akhnoor J & K vs Yash Pal & Anr

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Paramjit Singh did not appear before the Custom authorities. Evidence was collected and complaint was presented before Sessions Judge (Special Judge) by the Inspector of Customs. Accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and were put to trial. The third accused was proceeded against separately. The learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence led by the parties came to the conclusion that accused have committed the offences punishable under Sections 8 and 21 of the Act and recorded conviction and sentence.

4. The trial Court as noted above found the accused respondents guilty and recorded the conviction and imposed sentence. 4

29. Above being the position, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment to warrant interference. The appeal is dismissed.
Samira Khanum vs Md.Asfar Towheed And Anr

So the complainant herself went to Hyderbad and in spite of atrocities on her, she along with the respondent no.1 on 14.9.2003 returned to America where he continued his torture and on 22.3.2004 she was forcibly sent to India and since then she was living in Patna. It is also alleged that when she returned to India the respondent no.1 sent E-mail to her not to return to America without his permission and also directed her to cancel the return ticket. The complainant on 2.7.2004 through E-mail requested the respondent no.1 to reconsider his decision but to no effect and suddenly replied that unless his parents' desire was fulfilled no question of sympathy arises and on 10.9.2004 asked her father to make payment of Rs.5 lacs to his parents by the next month positively and on that date her father talked to the father and mother of the respondent no.1 and showed his inability.

7. Therefore, the order of the High Court is clearly indefensible and is, accordingly, set aside. However, we make it clear that we have expressed no opinion on the merits of the case which are to be adjudicated.

8. The appeal is allowed.
Abhimanyu Dass Jain (D) Thr. Lrs.&Anr vs Board Of Revenue, & Ors

By order dated 14th april, 1982, the Additional Collector (Finance), Meerut, cancelled the allotment of plot made in favour of the appellants. While doing so, the Additional Collector observed that the allottee has not appeared despite notice. It is borne out from the records that two days before the passing of the order dated 14th April, 1982, the appellants had made an application for being afforded an opportunity of hearing. However, that application was not considered and the order of cancellation was passed. When the appellants applied for setting aside the ex-parte order, their application was dismissed by the Additional Collector (Finance), Meerut, vide his order dated 25th June, 1982. Thereafter, the appellants filed revisions before the Additional Commissioner, Meerut Division, and the ...2/-

Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and perused the records, we are of the view that the Additional Collector (Finance), Meerut, was not justified in disposing of the petition against the order cancelling the allotment by an ex-parte order. The Additional Commissioner, Meerut, the Board of Revenue and the High Court also committed grave error by confirming order of cancellation passed by the Additional Collector. Hence, the appeal is allowed, impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Additional Collector (Finance), Meerut, who shall decide the matter afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties. The matter shall be decided expeditiously.
Pappu vs Sonu & Anr

3. In support of the claim he relied on various records as well as the statements of his father and mother. Objections were filed by the State and the informant stating that the applicant was a major on the date of occurrence and, therefore, the application was liable to be rejected. The learned Additional Sessions Judge did not rely on the educational records and the statements of the mother as well as of the medical opinion. It was concluded that the applicant was not juvenile. The High Court in the revision petition accepted that the school records produced by the applicant were not reliable and the statement of his mother also did not support his case. But solely on the basis of a certificate issued by the doctor it was concluded that he was below 18 years of age on the date of occurrence and, therefore, in terms of Rule 22(5) of Uttar Pradesh Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2004 the applicant was to be treated as a juvenile.

9. The appeal is allowed.
Kamala Kom Mahabaleshwar Warkar vs Krishni Kom Pundalik S.(D)Rep. By Lr

By the impugned order, the High Court, after taking note of the fact that Defendant No.2 had raised construction on the land belonging to plaintiff-appellant, directed him to pay a sum of Rupees thirty five thousand to the plaintiff-appellant. The suit was filed in the year 1974. At that time, valuation of the suit property was between Rs.10,000 and 15,000.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in-part and the impugned order is modified to the extent that defendant No.2 is directed to pay Rs.1,50,000/- to the appellant within a period of six months from today.
Uma Nath Pandey & Ors vs State Of U.P.& Anr

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing the Revision Petition filed by respondent no.2. Though various points were urged it is not necessary to go into those in detail as the revision petition was allowed even without issuing notice to the present appellants and to the other parties.

20. Above being the position, we set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the High Court to consider the matter afresh after issuance of notice to the respondents in the Criminal Revision Petition No.2163 of 2007 which will stand restored.

21 The appeal is allowed.
New India Assurance Co.Ltd vs Satpal Singh Muchal

3. Background facts as projected by the appellant are as follows:

Another notice was issued on 2.7.2002 calling upon the appellant to pay the 2 claim of the respondent. Appellant replied to the notice. Again respondent issued notice to the appellant stating that he was suffering from kidney trouble for about last two years. The appellant was of the view that there was concealment of the fact of the pre existing disease at the time of taking the policy of the insurance. It was clear that the insurance cover was taken by concealment of material facts and, therefore, the insurance policy was terminated and the respondent was intimated. The respondent was refunded pro rata premium of Rs.2782/- by cheque dated 6.8.2002. Respondent submitted an application for renewal of the policy. The respondent was intimated by letter dated 11.3.2003 that because of pre-existing disease and adverse claim ratio, the policy of insurance has been cancelled and therefore the request of renewal cannot be considered. Respondent filed a complaint before the District Forum. Stand of the appellant before the District Forum was that every policy whether it is a renewal or a fresh one is purely based on a contract. Since the respondent was suffering from kidney trouble even prior to the taking of the first policy, there was concealment of material particulars. In four years the respondent had been paid as claimed amount of Rs.95,925/- as against the premium of Rs.17,182/- and even in the year 2003-04 a sum of Rs.49,894/- was paid which indicated adverse claim experience and as such in terms of clause 5.9 of the policy, the same had 3 been rightly cancelled. The District Forum directed revalidation of the policy and also directed consideration of the claim of the respondent.

4. Against the said order an appeal was preferred before the State Commission which as noted above, dismissed the same. Revision was carried before the National Commission which dismissed the same.

11. That being so, we remit the matter to District Forum to consider the matter afresh, taking into account the consequences flowing from the factum of concealment and the applicability of clause 5.9 to the facts of the case. The appeal is allowed, but there shall be no order as to costs.
Heeralal vs State Of M.P

3. The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Relationship of the deceased was not cordial with the appellant because she was not beautiful. Beside that her brother-in-law attempted to commit rape on her and a Panchayat was convened by the deceased. The father-in-law and uncle-in-law of accused executed an agreement Exhibit (P-4) and assured that no such incident shall occur in future. Consequently, the deceased on 18-6-1992 came back to her husband house. On 19-6-1992, a quarrel took place between the appellant and the deceased. Consequently, the appellant sprinkled kerosene oil on the deceased and set her ablaze. On 20-6-1992, deceased was taken to Londhi hospital wherefrom she was referred to District Hospital, Chhatarpur, where she died on 18-7-1992. FIR 2 was lodged. The dying declaration of deceased was recorded, investigation was triggered off and after completion of investigation, the appellant was charge sheeted. The case was committed to the court of Sessions for trial.

The prosecution examined seven witnesses while the accused appellant examined eight witnesses in defence. After hearing the parties and on consideration of the evidence and material on record, the trial court convicted the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC as noted above. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence, an appeal was filed before the High Court where the primary stand was that there was a lot of difference in the statements made. There are two dying declarations (Exh.D4 and Exh.D3). Therefore the trial court was not justified in holding the appellant guilty. The stand of the State on the other 3 hand before the High Court was that the first Dying Declaration (Exh.D4) was a result of pressure and therefore the same has been rightly discarded. The High Court upheld the contention of the State and dismissed the appeal.

7. The conviction is set aside. The appeal is allowed. Let the appellant be released from custody forthwith unless he is required to be in custody in connection with any other case.
Union Of India & Ors vs M/S Jayant Oils & Derivatives Ltd & Ors

3. It appears from the record that the petitioners were required to file process fee and copies of the Transfer Petition and the Amendment Petition with correct addresses of all the respondents for effecting service of notice on the respondents. However, Petitioners filed an application before this Court seeking an exemption from filing spare copies of annexures attached to the Transfer Petition. The application for exemption was disallowed by this Court by an order dated 8th of May, 2007. Accordingly, the petitioners were directed to take steps to file the process fee and spare copies. Since the petitioners did not comply with the office report dated 8th of May, 2007, directing the petitioners to file process fee and to furnish correct and latest address of the some of the respondents, the matter was placed before Hon'ble The Chamber Judge on 24th of July, 2008 when the following order was passed :- 3

4. Subsequent to this order, the petitioners filed an application seeking extension of time to comply with the office report dated 22nd of April, 2008 and the order dated 24th of July, 2008. However, the said application was not listed because it was barred by time by four days. Since the petitioners have not complied with the office report dated 22nd of April, 2008 i.e. for want of correct addresses of the respondents, the Transfer Petition stood dismissed for non-compliance of the said office report.

7. Accordingly, the application for restoration is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
State Of H.P.& Anr vs Anjana Devi & Ors

5. By circular dated 11.12.1987, the state government applied the instructions contained in the circular dated 23.5.1975 (referred to in para 3 above) to the ex-servicemen appointed against un-reserved posts in technical services with effect from the date the 1985 Rules came into force. Thus the ex-servicemen appointed to general unreserved technical service vacancies, after the 1985 Rules came into effect (3.5.1983), were given the option to accept any reservation vacancy occurring subsequent to his appointment.

6. Rakesh Chand Sood and Sukh Dev, as noticed above, were appointed against general vacancies in a technical service on 1.1.1983 and 15.1.1983. At the time of their appointment, there was no reservation for ex-servicemen in technical services, which began only from 3.5.1983. Therefore, they were not given the benefit of seniority and fixation of pay in terms of the circular dated 3.5.1983 or the 1985 Rules which replaced the circular. Their 5 representation purporting to exercise option to accept a reserved vacancy and seeking the relief of counting their approved military service for purposes of fixation of pay and seniority was rejected by the Chief Engineer on 7.10.1992. Feeling aggrieved, they approached the State Administrative Tribunal in OA No.1555/1993. The Tribunal, by its order dated 26.9.2001 (by a majority of 2:1 on reference to Chairman on difference between two members) allowed the application on the following terms :

7. The said order of the Tribunal was challenged by the state government before the High Court and the High Court has dismissed the writ petition on 2.4.2007. The High Court was of the view that the circular dated 11.12.1987 restricting the benefit to only those who were appointed on or after 3.5.1983, left out ex-servicemen who were appointed before 3.5.1983 from the benefit of option, thereby creating an impermissible classification without any rationale, between ex-servicemen appointed 6 within the same technical service. The High Court held that the classification excluding those appointed before 3.5.1983 was arbitrary and discriminatory and violative of Article 14 as it was not founded on any intelligible differentia having a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the 1985 Rules.

11. We are of the view that the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court are not in accordance with law. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the orders of the High Court and the Tribunal and dismiss the original applications.

_________________J.

[R. V. Raveendran] __________________J [Markandey Katju] New Delhi;

March 17, 2009.
Balram Sharma vs Union Of India & Anr

The appellant was served with a Memorandum dt.29.07.2000 stating that since he has not reported for duty at NRBC, Jammu after availing usual joining time after 01.12.1999, therefore, he was being treated as unauthorisedly absent from his duty with effect from 01.12.1999. The respondent wanted to invoke provisions of Rule 14(5) of ONGC Leave Rules, 1995 read with Rule 14(2) and 14(4) of the said Rules. He was also directed to give his explanation about his absence.

The said order was served on the appellant only after 15.11.2000. The appellant earlier had reported for duty to DGM (Exploration), NRBC, Jammu. However, he was not allowed to join the duty. The appellant then wrote to the Director (Personnel), ONGC that his joining report was not accepted. A fresh representation was made but the same was not considered favourably. Ultimately, the appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court challenging the order directing his deemed resignation. The petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The Letters Patent Appeal was also dismissed and that his how the appellant came before us.

With this observation, the appeal is disposed of. No costs.

We appreciate the initiative taken by the respondent-Corporation in the interest of sport.

MARCH 17, 2009.
M/S Godrej Sara Lee Ltd vs Asst. Commissioner (Aa) & Anr

3. The State of Kerala, by Notification being SRO No.82/2006 dated 21st January 2006, notified the list of goods specified therein to be taxable at the rate of 12.5%. Item no.66 of the said Notification reads as under :

And

v) To grant such other and further reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, including the cost of this proceeding to the petitioner."

C.A.No.1888/09 @ S.L.P.(C)No.113 of 2008 .... (contd.) -7- (1998) 8 SCC 1] and Committee of Management & Anr. v. Vice Chancellor & Ors. 2008(16) SCALE 310].

18. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case where the High Court should have entertained the writ petition. The impugned order is set aside accordingly and the appeal is allowed.

19. The appellant may be permitted to amend the prayer portion of the writ petition.

20. We, however, make it clear that we have not gone into the merit of the matter and all the contentions of the parties, both on facts and in law, shall remain open.

Sd/-

..........................J. [R.M. LODHA] New Delhi.

March 18, 2009.
Canara Bank By Its M.D vs Damodhar Govind Idoorkar & Ors

2. Respondent No.1 Damodhar Govind Idoorkar was an employee of the appellant - Canara Bank. The services of respondent No.1 was terminated on the ground that he had secured employment in reserved category by producing a false caste certificate. The order of termination was challenged by way of a writ petition filed by respondent No.1. A 2 learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court had allowed the said writ petition and quashed the termination order and directed the reinstatement of respondent No.1 without any consequential benefits such as payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge also directed the Tehsildar to conduct an enquiry to ascertain whether respondent No.1 belonged to scheduled caste category or not. By a subsequent order, it was clarified that the Bank was free to take whatever action on the basis of the enquiry to be conducted by the Tehsildar on the question of caste certificate of the respondent No.1. The respondent No.1 had challenged the aforesaid order by filing an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court in so far as it denied him consequential relief of back wages. When the said appeal was pending before the Division Bench, the Tehsildar, in compliance with the order of the learned Single Judge, after hearing the respondent No.1, had passed the order holding that respondent 3 No.1 was not a scheduled caste, but it was held that respondent No.1 belonged to Baandhi community which was a backward class.

3. The order of the Tehsildar, after remand, was again challenged by respondent No.1 by filing a writ application. In this background, the Division Bench by the impugned order directed the Bank to pay full back wages to respondent No.1, which had accumulated during the pendency of his termination. It is this order, which is under challenge before us.

6. Accordingly this appeal is disposed of with the above modification. There will be no order as to costs.