L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Yadava Kumar vs Div.Mangr.,National Insurance Co.L.& ...

5. The material facts of the case are that, the appellant, a painter by profession, was 30 years old at the time of sustaining the injury in a road accident which took place on 24th March 2003 while the appellant was standing on the side of Nagavara Ring Road to cross it from south to north. The offending Tempo bearing No.KA-04-C/6030 came at a great speed from west to east and hit the appellant as a result of which he fell down and sustained several injuries. The appellant was rushed to Al- Habeeb Hospital where he was treated. The claim petition was filed on 3rd February, 2006. 2

16. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid view of the High Court.

23. If this is added to the compensation provided by the High Court in other categories, the total compensation comes to Rs.1,22,400/- + Rs.72,000/-, that is Rs.1,94,400/-.

25. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.

There will be no order as to costs.
Grid Corpn. Of Orissa Ltd.&Ors vs Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys & Ors Etc

2. The State of Orissa enacted the said Act, to restructure and rationalize the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity in the state.

3. In exercise of the power under section 14(iv) of the Act, the State Government, by notification dated 30.3.1996, issued three licences to the appellant - the Provisional Orissa Transmission Licence 1996, Provisional Orissa Supply Licence (Bulk Supply) 1966 and the Provisional Orissa Supply Licence (Retail Supply and Distribution), 1996 -- authorising the appellant to engage in the business of transmission, bulk supply and retail supply and distribution of electrical energy within the State of Orissa, upon the terms and conditions mentioned in those licences. In pursuance of such licences, the appellant took over the transmission, distribution and supply of electricity from the Orissa State Electricity Board (`OSEB' for short) with effect from 1.4.1996. Part III of the Retail Supply and Distribution Licence (similar provisions were contained in the Provisional Transmission Licence 4 and Provisional Bulk Supply Licence also) related to "Tariffs" and it is extracted below :

The "interim tariffs in force as on 1.4.1996 issued by the state government", referred to in the said clause 9.1 were the tariffs which came into effect on 5.11.1995, contained in the Notification dated 28.10.1995 issued by the Orissa State Electricity Board, predecessor of GRIDCO.

4. By notification dated 13.5.1996, the appellant revised/prescribed the electricity charges for different categories of consumers of electricity in the State as per the tariff schedule appended to the said notification with effect from 21.5.1996, in supersession of the tariff rates prescribed in the OSEB Notification dated 28.10.1995. The tariff schedule under the Notification dated 13.5.1996, prescribed different tariff rates for (i) large industries, (ii) medium industries, (iii) small industries, (iv) irrigation pumping and agriculture, (v) public water works and sewerage pumping, (vi) commercial, 5

Re: Interpretation (i)

Re : Interpretation (iii)

22. We are of the view that the High Court was not justified in holding that the tariff rate in regard to none of the category of consumers can exceed 17% over the previous rates. We accept the explanation and interpretation of the appellant. The Commission has found that the increase in revenue, on an average, under the tariff notification dated 13.5.1996 was only 16.65% over 2 the revenue calculated with reference to the earlier interim tariff rates. We therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 30.10.1998 and dismiss the writ petitions filed by the respondents before the High Court and uphold the validity of the Tariff notification dated 13.5.1996.
Leela Gupta & Ors vs State Of U.P. & Ors

Ganga Prasad Gupta--the deceased, the husband of the first appellant and father of second, third and fourth appellant, was killed in a motor accident on July 8, 1985. He was then aged 39 and was officiating Executive Engineer in the Irrigation Department, State of Uttar Pradesh. Had he lived, it would have been 18 years or so before he reached the age of superannuation (i.e. 58 years). After superannuation, he would have qualified for pension. His wife and three children filed a claim petition under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short, `the 1939 Act') before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Mirzapur (for short, `the Tribunal') against the respondents claiming compensation in the sum of Rs. 7,00,000/-. His gross salary on the date of accident was Rs. 2,680/- per month. The Tribunal held that deceased would have contributed Rs. 2,200/- per month (Rs. 26,400/- per year) to the family and by applying a multiplier of 18, reached the finding that the pecuniary loss to widow and children would be Rs. 4,75,200/- up to the age of his retirement. The Tribunal then deducted 1/3rd of the above considering the amount being paid in lump sum and uncertainty in life and by further deducting a sum of Rs. 40,000/- towards group insurance scheme, assessed compensation to the extent of Rs. 2,76,800/-. An amount of Rs. 15,000/- having been already paid to the claimants towards no fault liability, the Tribunal in its Award dated February 24, 1987 held that claimants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 2,61,800/- and directed the respondents to pay the said amount with pendente lite and future interest thereon @ 9% per annum.

2. On appeal by the claimants, the High Court held that the claimants were entitled to Rs. 4,70,000/- as 2 compensation along with 9% simple interest per annum from the date of the claim petition until the actual payment was made. The High Court considered the matter thus :

9. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part and the compensation awarded by the High Court in the sum of Rs. 15 4,70,000/- is enhanced to Rs. 6,04,800/-. The appellants shall also be entitled to 9% simple interest per annum on the enhanced amount from the date of filing of claim petition until the date of its actual payment. The parties shall bear their own costs.
James vs State Of Kerala

3. The State Government filed an appeal against the said appellate judgment before the High Court under section 12A of the Act. (MSA No.1/1981). The High Court allowed the second appeal and reversed the judgment of the District Judge. The order of the High Court was challenged by the appellant. This Court by order dated 25.11.2003 allowed the civil appeal filed by the appellant and remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration, with the following observation : 3

7. The answers to the questions raised depend upon the scheme of chapter II of the Act relating to Reserved forests. The relevant portions of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12A and 83 of the Act are extracted below :

16. We may therefore formulate the following principles with reference to appeals :

appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the said period.

Signature Appellant(s)/Counsel for Appellant

19. In view of the above, the High Court was right in holding that the appeal under section 12A of the Act is available both in respect of questions of fact and questions of law. Therefore there is no need for the High Court to frame any substantial question of law. The appeal is dismissed as having no merit.
Grid Corpn. Of Orissa Ltd.&Ors; vs Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys & Ors Etc

2. The State of Orissa enacted the said Act, to restructure and rationalize the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity in the state.

3. In exercise of the power under section 14(iv) of the Act, the State Government, by notification dated 30.3.1996, issued three licences to the appellant - the Provisional Orissa Transmission Licence 1996, Provisional Orissa Supply Licence (Bulk Supply) 1966 and the Provisional Orissa Supply Licence (Retail Supply and Distribution), 1996 -- authorising the appellant to engage in the business of transmission, bulk supply and retail supply and distribution of electrical energy within the State of Orissa, upon the terms and conditions mentioned in those licences. In pursuance of such licences, the appellant took over the transmission, distribution and supply of electricity from the Orissa State Electricity Board (`OSEB' for short) with effect from 1.4.1996. Part III of the Retail Supply and Distribution Licence (similar provisions were contained in the Provisional Transmission Licence 4 and Provisional Bulk Supply Licence also) related to "Tariffs" and it is extracted below :

The "interim tariffs in force as on 1.4.1996 issued by the state government", referred to in the said clause 9.1 were the tariffs which came into effect on 5.11.1995, contained in the Notification dated 28.10.1995 issued by the Orissa State Electricity Board, predecessor of GRIDCO.

4. By notification dated 13.5.1996, the appellant revised/prescribed the electricity charges for different categories of consumers of electricity in the State as per the tariff schedule appended to the said notification with effect from 21.5.1996, in supersession of the tariff rates prescribed in the OSEB Notification dated 28.10.1995. The tariff schedule under the Notification dated 13.5.1996, prescribed different tariff rates for (i) large industries, (ii) medium industries, (iii) small industries, (iv) irrigation pumping and agriculture, (v) public water works and sewerage pumping, (vi) commercial, 5

Re: Interpretation (i)

Re : Interpretation (iii)

22. We are of the view that the High Court was not justified in holding that the tariff rate in regard to none of the category of consumers can exceed 17% over the previous rates. We accept the explanation and interpretation of the appellant. The Commission has found that the increase in revenue, on an average, under the tariff notification dated 13.5.1996 was only 16.65% over 2 the revenue calculated with reference to the earlier interim tariff rates. We therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 30.10.1998 and dismiss the writ petitions filed by the respondents before the High Court and uphold the validity of the Tariff notification dated 13.5.1996.
Jai Kumar vs Balhari & Anr

2. Accused, aggrieved by the order of the High Court cancelling his bail has preferred this appeal.

4. Aggrieved by the order of discharge of the mother-in- law and granting bail to the appellant, the informant Balhari filed two separate applications before the High Court which was registered as Criminal M.C. No. 3547 of 2009 and Criminal MC No. 3506 of 2009. By the impugned order dated 25th May, 2010, the order of discharge had been set aside and the order granting bail to the appellant has been cancelled.

10. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court whereby it has cancelled the bail granted to the appellant with the observation aforesaid. We make it clear that any observations made by us in this order shall have no bearing on the merits of the case.

........................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] ........................J [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD] NEW DELHI SEPTEMBER 06, 2010.
Rafeeqan (Dead) By Lrs vs Hussan Bano

2. The material facts of the case are that the respondent, a widow, filed a petition under Section 14-D of the said Act to recover immediate possession of the premises of which the appellant is a tenant in one room, kitchen, bathroom, latrine and courtyard on the first floor of property No.4899-A Gali Maulvi Abdul Rahim, Bara Hindu Rao, Dehli at a rent of Rs.100/- per month and other charges.

3. Admittedly, the respondent purchased the property in question by a registered sale deed dated 31.10.1961 and the appellant was 2 inducted as a tenant in the said property by the previous owner. In the eviction petition it was stated by the respondent- landlord that she and her family require the tenanted premises for her own residential purposes. When such eviction petition came before the Court of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi the Court recorded that nobody appeared on behalf of the appellant in spite of notice in the newspaper and no leave application was filed. However, the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi by judgment and order dated 18.3.1999 dismissed the eviction petition filed by the respondent herein, inter alia, on the ground that the tenanted premises was let out by the previous owner from whom the respondent herein purchased the tenanted premises. It was not let out either by the respondent herein or by her husband or by any of her blood relations 3 and the Additional Rent Controller held that Section 14-B of the said Act does not apply.

The parties will appear before the learned Additional Rent Controller on 25th September, 2000."

12. In view of the aforesaid clear enunciation of law by the Constitution Bench of this Court on Section 14-D of the said Act, the judgment of the Delhi High Court, extracted above, is clearly erroneous.

17. This Court, however, makes it clear that the respondent-landlord, if so advised, is at liberty to initiate eviction proceedings against the appellant in accordance with law. The appeal is, thus, allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. No order as to costs.
Main Pal vs State Of Haryana

2. An FIR was registered on 23.3.1996 on the statement of one Prakashi Devi. She stated that on the night of 22/23.3.1996, while she and her daughter-in-law Sheela Devi were sleeping in her house, around 11.30 PM, the appellant jumped over the front wall of her house and broke the bulbs and ran away; that at that time, no male member was present in the house except the children; that around 00.30 AM the appellant again came into her house and touched her daughter-in-law Sheela Devi who woke up and raised 2 an alarm; and that the appellant immediately ran away. The police investigated into the said complaint and submitted a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short `the Code'). On that basis, the following charge was framed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Karnal, against the appellant -

(emphasis supplied) When the said charged was read over and explained to the appellant, he pleaded not guilty to the said charge and claimed trial.

13. The court having charged the accused with the offence of having trespassed into the house of Prakashi Devi with intent to assault her and having further charged him for having assaulted the said Prakashi Devi by outraging her modesty, convicts him on the ground that though he did not assault or outrage the modesty of Prakashi Devi, he had outraged the modesty of Sheela Devi, that would lead to failure of justice. There was a material error in the charge as it violated the requirement of sub-section (1) of section 212 of the Code, that the charge shall contain particulars as to the person against whom the offence was committed. There were two women present at the house at the time of the alleged incident, namely Prakashi Devi and her daughter-in-law Sheela Devi. In view of the specific charge, the accused concentrated on showing that the charge was false. He did not attempt to meet the case made out in the trial that the offence was against Sheela Devi. The accused was thus clearly misled by the error in the charge which caused prejudiced to the accused thereby occasioning failure of 1 justice. Therefore, we are of the view that there should be a new trial after charging him with the offence of outraging the modesty of Sheela Devi.

14. The appeal is therefore allowed, the conviction of the accused is set aside and the matter is remitted to the trial court with a direction for a new trial after framing a charge by substituting the words "her daughter-in-law Sheela Devi" for the words "abovenamed Prakashi Devi", in the second part of the charge.

...........................J (R. V. Raveendran) .............................J (H. L. Gokhale) New Delhi;

September 7, 2010.
Mamtaj Bi Bapusab Nadaf & Ors vs United India Insurance Co. & Ors

3. Brief facts which are relevant to dispose of this appeal are recapitulated as under:

6. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the Insurance Company preferred in M.F.A. No.5843/2003 and M.F.A. No.5844/2003 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. The High Court allowed the appeals and modified the order passed by the Commissioner and the liability of the Insurance Company was set aside. However, the appellants were at liberty to recover the amount of compensation from the employer.

9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil and Anr. vs. Vatschala Uttam More, (1991) 3 SCC 530. Brief facts of that case are that a collision between a petrol tanker and a truck took place on a National Highway at about 3.00 a.m. as a result of which the tanker went off the road and fell on its left side at a distance of about 20 feet from the Highway. Due to overturning of the tanker, the petrol contained in it leaked out and collected nearby. At about 7.15 a.m. an explosion took place in the tanker causing 5 burn injuries to those assembled near it including the respondent's son who later succumbed to the injuries. The facts of this case are entirely different and are not applicable to the present case. In this case, the petrol tanker was directly involved in the accident and that all the workmen were directly connected with the accident. This case does not help the appellants in any manner.

Provided that a policy shall not be required-

13. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, on a plain reading of the above quoted Explanation, the Insurance Company cannot be held liable for the death of the workmen and therefore, the Insurance Company cannot be held liable to pay compensation to the appellants.

14. In our considered opinion, on the facts of this case, the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court seems to be justified and correct. Therefore, no interference is called for. This appeal being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties to bear their own costs.

.....................J (DALVEER BHANDARI) .....................J (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi;

September 07, 2010.
Palraj vs Div.Controller,Nekrtc

2. The sole respondent who is the Divisional Controller, North East Karnataka Road Transport 2 Corporation, being duly represented and having regard to the facts involved in the appeal, the same was taken up for final disposal at the stage of admission itself.

3. The Appellant was employed as a Bus Driver in the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. On 10th October, 1998, the vehicle being driven by the Appellant, met with an accident in which he sustained grievous injuries. The Medical Officer who examined the Appellant came to the conclusion that the Appellant had suffered 65% of total body disability and 20% of functional disability. The Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, however, took 85% as functional disability for quantifying the compensation payable to the Appellant, who was admittedly drawing a salary of Rs.15,000/- per month on the date of the accident.

19. We, therefore, maintain the order of the High Court and direct that the Appellant be provided with compensation on the basis of functional 1 disability to the extent of 35% and not 20% as indicated by the High Court.

20. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
Modern Dental College &Res.Centre & Ors vs State Of M.P. & Ors

(e) The aforesaid directions would be without prejudice to the contentions raised in course of final hearing of the matters."

By a further interim order dated 7.10.2003, the High Court also issued certain direction regarding admission to students to state quota seats in medical and dental colleges.

College, Ujjain 2 College of Dental Rs.38,500/- Rs.1,46,000/-

15. In these writ petitions, this court on 10.8.2004 issued an interim direction that the fees prescribed by the Committee shall prevail for the time being though provisional and it would be open to the Colleges to take an undertaking from the students that in case higher fee is payable, they will pay the same.

Re : Civil Appeals

24. In view of our decision in the writ petitions, the civil appeals by the Colleges do not survive for consideration.

Conclusion

26. We, accordingly, allow these writ petitions in part as follows:

The State Government shall take all steps and do everything necessary to enable the said Fee Regulatory Committee to complete the process of fee fixation expeditiously.

(c) All questions are left open and nothing stated in the several orders of the High Court or by this Court shall be considered as expression of opinion in regard to fee structure for the said academic years (2003-04 and 2004-05) and the Fee Regulatory Committee shall determine the fees with reference to the facts, figures and material placed before it.

(e) If the fee determined by the Committee is less than what has been already recovered, the concerned College shall refund the excess fee collected to the respective student.

27. As no other point is urged and all the petitioners agreed that the only point that was to be decided was in regard to the fees, the remaining issues raised are not decided (and left open) as having become infructuous.

28. As a consequence, all the civil appeals are disposed of in view of the directions given while disposing of the writ petitions.

September 08, 2010.
Dharmarth Trust J&K Jammu & Ors vs Dinesh Chander Nanda

3) Brief facts:

(a) The Respondent, a qualified, registered and licensed Architect, is engaged in his professional business in the name of M/s Nanda Designers Consortium having its office at 60 Purani Mandi, Jammu. On 19.10.1992, he was engaged by the Trust for the purpose of providing professional consultancy services as an architect for various projects at different sites in Jammu. As per the terms of the said contract, a fee of 2.5% of the total project cost was fixed for providing such services.

(b) On 14.12.1993, the appellants-Trust telephonically communicated the respondent not to work further for their projects and terminated his services as an Architect. A formal communication was also served on 16.01.1994 regarding the termination of his services.

6) The Trial Court and the High Court have held that the suit is covered by Article 119 of the Act. According to the appellants, the suit filed by the respondent-Architect is governed by Article 56 of the said Act and the same was barred by limitation on the date of its institution. On the other hand, the submission of the respondent is that the same was covered by the residuary Article 119 which provides for a period of 6 years on the ground that the nature of services provided was professional services and the remuneration for the same being termed as `fee' and the same does not fall within the expression `price' for `work done'.

16) We agree with the ratio laid down by the Allahabad and Gauhati High Court relating to Article 56 of the Indian 12 Limitation Act, 1908 that the term "price of work done" cannot be made applicable to professions where the professionals merely provides services for a "fee". We accept the claim of the respondent that the profession of an Architect is one such service, hence Article 56 is not applicable to the present case. Both the Trial Court as well as the High Court has arrived correct conclusion.

17) In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any error in the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court. Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed with no orders as to costs. We further make it clear that our conclusion is confined to the interpretation relating to limitation and we have not expressed anything on the merits of the claim made by the parties.