L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Commissioner, Bangalore Dev.Auth.& ... vs Brijesh Reddy & Anr

3) Brief facts:

(a) On 28.09.1965, a notification was issued by the State Government proposing to acquire several lands including the suit land being Survey No. 23/10 of Ejipura measuring 22 guntas for formation of Koramangala Layout. The original khatedars, who were notified were one Papaiah, Thimaiah, Patel Narayan Reddy, Smt. Rathnamma, Smt. Perumakka (Defendant No.3 in the suit), Munivenkatappa and Chickaabbaiah, the husband of 3rd defendant. After holding an enquiry, the Land Acquisition Officer passed the award on 07.09.1969. Thereafter, 10 guntas of land held by Smt. Rathnamma was taken possession on 28.11.1969 and the remaining 12 guntas held by defendant No.3 was taken possession on 22.07.1978 and then handed over the entire land to the Engineering Section. The layout was formed, sites were allotted to the intending purchasers.

(c) When the Bangalore Development Authority (in short “the BDA”) tried to interfere with the possession of the suit property, 3rd defendant in the suit filed O.S. No. 10445 of 1985 for injunction and obtained an order of temporary injunction on 15.06.1985 which was in force till 22.05.1994. Ultimately the said suit was dismissed on the ground that before filing of the suit, statutory notice had not been given to the BDA. Thereafter, another suit being O.S. No. 2069 of 1994 was filed by the third defendant on the file of the Civil Judge, Bangalore and the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 14.06.1995 with liberty to file a fresh suit.

(d) In the meantime, the respondents herein purchased the suit land from the third defendant under a registered sale deed on 15.11.1995. After the purchase of the land, the respondents were put in possession. When the BDA tried to interfere with the possession of the respondents herein, they filed a petition being W.P. No. 41497 of 1995 before the High Court, ultimately the said petition was dismissed as withdrawn by the respondents herein with a liberty to file a fresh suit.

(f) Challenging the said order, the respondents herein filed first appeal being R.F.A. No.947 of 2003 before the High Court. By impugned order dated 27.07.2005, the High Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the trial Court with a direction to dispose of the same after permitting the plaintiffs to adduce evidence on merits.

16) In the light of the above discussion, the impugned judgment dated 27.07.2005 passed by the High Court in R.F.A. No. 947 of 2003 remitting the matter to the trial Court is set aside and the judgment dated 18.06.2003 of the trial Court in O.S. No. 4267 of 1996 is restored.

17) The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

FEBRUARY 08, 2013.
Atmaram vs State Of Maharashtra

2. The facts very briefly are that a written report was lodged by Gorsing Shewa Pawar (hereinafter referred to as ‘the informant’) on 17.07.1988 in the Police Station, Pusad (Rural). In this report, the informant stated that the appellant got married for the second time to his daughter Purnabai with the consent of his first wife with a hope to get a son from Purnabai and he treated her well for the first 2 to 2½ years but when she delivered a female child, the appellant and his family members started beating and harassing Purnabai and also did not provide her with meals and on 16.07.1988, the informant received a message that Purnabai died by drowning in the well at Bhandari. The informant has further stated in the report that he reached Bhandari in the evening and came to know that Purnabai had not been given food for two days and was ill-treated with an intention to ensure that she leave the house and because of such ill- treatment Purnabai jumped into the well along with her daughter Nanda and committed suicide. On the basis of the written report, an FIR was registered under Sections 306 and 498A of the IPC and after investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant, his first wife, his father and his mother and they were all tried for offences under Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34 of the IPC in Sessions case No.29/1990.

10. PW-1 in his evidence, however, has stated that since the birth of a son from the first wife, the appellant started beating and ill-treating Purnabai and they were not providing her food and this he had come to learn from Purnabai. He has also stated in his evidence that he had gone to Paradha at the house of Shantabai before the death of Purnabai and some ladies from Bhandari had come there for grinding their grains in the flour mill and they had reported to him that the appellant and his family members were beating Purnabai severely. He has stated that he, therefore, went to the house of the appellant and found marks of Shiwal on the hands and thigh of Purnabai and he brought her to Paradha and he was going to report the matter to the Police Station, but the appellant and his family members and others came and told him that the appellant is going to give in writing that henceforth he will not beat Purnabai. PW-1 has further deposed that thereafter the appellant executed the undertaking (Ext.47) dated 17.04.1988 and Purnabai executed the undertaking (Ext.48) dated 17.04.1988 before the Panchas and Exts. 47 and 48 were kept with the Sarpanch and the Police Patil.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and the judgment of the trial court holding the appellant guilty of the offences under Sections 306 and 498A, IPC and direct that the bail bonds executed by the appellant be discharged.

Prasad) New Delhi, February 08, 2013.
Stephanie Joan Becker vs State & Ors

3. The rejection of the aforesaid two applications by the learned Trial Court as well as by the High Court is on a sole and solitary ground, namely, that the appellant, being a single prospective adoptive parent, was aged about 53 years at the relevant point of time whereas for a single adoptive parent the maximum permissible age as prescribed by the Government of India Guidelines in force was 45. Though a no objection, which contained an implicit relaxation of the rigour of the Guidelines with regard to age, has been granted by the Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA), the High Court did not consider it appropriate to take the said no objection/relaxation into account inasmuch as the reasons for the relaxation granted were not evident on the face of the document i.e. no objection certificate in question.

•      In case no suitable match is possible within 3 months, the RIPA will inform the EFAA and CARA with the reasons therefore.
Balbir Singh Bedi vs State Of Punjab & Ors

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that:

3. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has submitted that if the criteria for promotion is “seniority-cum-merit”, the question of ignoring the seniority does not arise. Additionally, recruitment to the post of Battalion Commander is governed by Rule 8 of the Punjab Home Guard, Class-I Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the `1988 Rules’), which provides that 75 per cent posts of this cadre would be filled up by promotion from the Battalion 2nd-in-Command consisting of District Commanders, the Chief Instructor, and Junior Officers at the State Headquarters, working under the control of the Commandant General, Punjab, all having a minimum work experience of 8 years. However, it prescribes that selection to the post must be made on the principle of “seniority-cum- merit”. The High Court committed an error by not giving weightage to seniority. Furthermore, as the executive instructions followed therein were issued subsequent to the date on which the vacancy occurred, the said instructions must not be applied to the present case. Appellant was given officiating charge of the post, and he performed the duties and functions on the said post, he could not be found unfit for any reason whatsoever, at a later stage. Therefore, the judgment and order impugned is liable to be set aside.

15. In view of the above, the law as regards this point can be summarised to the effect that, where a promotion is to be given on the principle of “seniority-cum-merit”, such promotion will not automatically be granted on the basis of seniority alone. Efficiency of administration cannot be compromised with at any cost. Thus, in order to meet said requirements, all eligible candidates in the feeder cadre must be subject to a process of assessment to determine whether or not an individual in fact possesses the specified minimum necessary merit, and in the event that he does possess the same, his case must be considered giving due weightage to his seniority. Furthermore, the statutory authority must adopt a bonafide and reasonable method to determine the minimum necessary merit, as is required to be possessed by the eligible candidate. It must also take into account his period of service, educational qualifications, his performance during his past service for a particular period, his written test, interview, etc. The authority must further be competent to allocate separate maximum marks on each of the aforesaid counts. Fixing such criteria, or providing for minimum necessary merit, falls within the exclusive domain of policy making. Thus, it cannot be interfered with by courts in the exercise of their judicial powers, unless the same is found to be off the mark, unreasonable, or malafide.

20. In view of the aforesaid settled legal proposition, in the facts of this case, we have no hesitation in holding that no fault can be found with the High Court’s judgment impugned before us. The appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
Rajasthan State Indst.Dev.&Inv.Corpn vs Subhash Sindhi Coop.Hsg.Society ...

E. Aggrieved, the respondent society and one khatedar filed SLPs before this Court challenging the judgment and order dated 21.8.1990. This Court vide order dated 9.9.1992 dismissed the said SLPs, however, while doing so, the Court made an observation that the dismissal of the said SLPs, would not operate as res-judicata if the society approaches the court for release of their land on the ground that lands owned by similar set of individuals or institutions, if any, has been released from acquisition. Such a direction was issued in view of the submissions made by the respondent society, stating that allotment of the said land in favour of the Company had been made fraudulently.

27. A large number of issues were agitated before the High Court, however, the High Court did not deal with any of those. The Court allowed the petition merely observing:

- Land belonging to the petitioner Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. – 17 Bighas 9 Biswas.

The petitions in which the aforesaid acquisition proceedings were challenged were dismissed by the High Court on the ground of delay and latches.

v) The first writ petition cannot be held to have been filed in good faith and the bonafides of the parties, becomes doubtful.

vi) Challenge to the acquisition proceedings attained finality so far as the khatedars are concerned, upto this court.

ix) The High Court entertained the writ petition, without comparing the actual facts of the respondent society qua other societies.

xiii) The circulars issued by the State Government, being inconsistent with the policy and the law regarding acquisition, cannot be taken note of. Issuance of such circulars amounts to committing fraud upon statutes, and further, tantamounts to colourable exercise of power. The State in exercise of eminent domain acquires the land. Thus, before completing the acquisition proceedings, it should not release the land in favour of some other person who could not have acquired title over it at any point of time.

34. In view of the above, both the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 30.7.2002 in Civil Writ Petition No. 454 of 1993 is hereby set aside. No costs.

February 12, 2013
Rajasthan State ... vs Subhash Sindhi Coop.Hsg.Society ...

E. Aggrieved, the respondent society and one khatedar filed SLPs before this Court challenging the judgment and order dated 21.8.1990. This Court vide order dated 9.9.1992 dismissed the said SLPs, however, while doing so, the Court made an observation that the dismissal of the said SLPs, would not operate as res-judicata if the society approaches the court for release of their land on the ground that lands owned by similar set of individuals or institutions, if any, has been released from acquisition. Such a direction was issued in view of the submissions made by the respondent society, stating that allotment of the said land in favour of the Company had been made fraudulently.

27. A large number of issues were agitated before the High Court, however, the High Court did not deal with any of those. The Court allowed the petition merely observing:

- Land belonging to the petitioner Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. – 17 Bighas 9 Biswas.

The petitions in which the aforesaid acquisition proceedings were challenged were dismissed by the High Court on the ground of delay and latches.

v) The first writ petition cannot be held to have been filed in good faith and the bonafides of the parties, becomes doubtful.

vi) Challenge to the acquisition proceedings attained finality so far as the khatedars are concerned, upto this court.

ix) The High Court entertained the writ petition, without comparing the actual facts of the respondent society qua other societies.

xiii) The circulars issued by the State Government, being inconsistent with the policy and the law regarding acquisition, cannot be taken note of. Issuance of such circulars amounts to committing fraud upon statutes, and further, tantamounts to colourable exercise of power. The State in exercise of eminent domain acquires the land. Thus, before completing the acquisition proceedings, it should not release the land in favour of some other person who could not have acquired title over it at any point of time.

34. In view of the above, both the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 30.7.2002 in Civil Writ Petition No. 454 of 1993 is hereby set aside. No costs.

February 12, 2013
M/S. Telestar Travels Pvt. Ltd. & Ors vs Special Director Of Enforcement

4. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority, the appellants appealed to the Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange, New Delhi. The Tribunal, as already mentioned, allowed the said appeals but only in part and to the limited extent of reducing the penalty imposed by the Adjudicating Authority by 50%. The Tribunal, upon reappraisal of the entire material on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Adjudicating Authority that the appellants had indeed committed violation of Sections 8 and 14 of the FERA 1973 as noticed earlier. The further appeals before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay by the appellants also failed and were dismissed in limine by the High Court by order dated 14th March, 2008. Hence the present appeal.

22. In the result, these appeals fail and are, hereby, dismissed with costs assessed at Rs.50,000/- in each appeal. Cost to be deposited within two months with the SCBA Lawyers’ Welfare Fund.
Aslam vs State Of U.P

2. The prosecution case in brief is as under: The prosecutrix, aged about 19 years was married and had an infant daughter at the time of the incident. On 16.01.1992, at 5:00 P.M., the accused persons, Aslam and Galli, upon finding the prosecutrix (PW-1) working alone in her field, had gagged her and committed rape on her in turns. After the accused persons had left, the prosecutrix returned home crying and immediately narrated the incident to PW-2, Pradhan of the village. Since it was dark, PW-2 suggested to PW-1 to lodge the report in the police station next morning. On 17.01.1992, PW-1’s complaint was scribed by PW-2 and FIR NO.2 of 1992 was registered against the accused persons.

10. The Trial Court, keeping in view the evidence of PW-1, has come to the conclusion that the accused persons have committed the offence falling within the parameters of Section 376 read with Section 34 of the IPC. This view of the Trial Court is affirmed by the High Court once again after re-appreciating the entire evidence on record. In our considered view, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court has committed any error, whatsoever, which would call for our interference in these appeals. Accordingly, the appeals stand dismissed.

Ordered accordingly.

FEBRUARY 13, 2013
Awani Kumar Upadhyay vs Hon.High Court Of Jud.At Allahabad ...

is posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Moradabad and, according to him, he is having unblemished service career and has successfully completed 30 years of service.

c) It is the claim of the appellant that in the Second Appeal No. 1444 of 2000, he has not rendered any judgment as trial Court Judge or as the first Appellate Court Judge. According to him, a suit bearing No. 418 of 1997 was filed by Shri Lajja Ram against the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lucknow and another and the said suit was decided by one learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ghaziabad presided over by Shri Chaturbhuj by a judgment and order dated 02.05.1997. Aggrieved by the said judgment, a first appeal was filed being First Appeal No. 105 of 1997 in the Court of Shri A.K. Aggarwal, second Additional Dist. & Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad. The first Appellate Court framed 12 additional issues and on those additional issues, the matter was remanded to the Court of the appellant as he was working as Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ghaziabad. Thereafter, in compliance with the order of the first Appellate Court, after recording the evidence of the parties, the appellant recorded the evidence of the parties and gave his findings on 31.05.1999.

Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the Judges, hence it provides appeals and revisions. Inasmuch as the lower judicial officers mostly work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under psychological pressure and they do not have the facilities which are available in the higher courts, we are of the view that the remarks/observations and strictures are to be avoided particularly if the officer has no occasion to put-forth his reasonings. Further, if the passage complained of is wholly irrelevant and unjustifiable and its retention on the records will cause serious harm to the persons to whom it refers and its expunction will not affect the reasons for the judgment or order, request for expunging those remarks are to be allowed. We, once again, reiterate that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against judicial officers and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law unless it is really for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof.

14) Under these circumstances, the adverse remarks passed in the impugned judgment and the final orders dated 01.03.2012 and 23.04.2012 insofar as the appellant is concerned are set aside. Since these appeals are confined only for expunging the strictures, the same are allowed as pointed above. No costs.

FEBRUARY 13, 2013.
Vivek Kalra vs State Of Rajasthan

2. The facts very briefly are that on 08.06.1997 at about 8.30 a.m., one Lal Singh, who was running a tea shop at By-pass Road, Sedariya Tiraha, lodged an FIR with Police Station Adarsh Nagar, Ajmer. In the FIR, he stated that at about 8.00 a.m. on 08.06.1997 one truck driver told him that ahead of Shantinath Dharm Kanta, on the wall of pulia (small bridge) one boy has been murdered and laid down and he went there to see and found that one boy, aged about 13-14 years, was lying dead in a pool of blood and several persons have gathered there. The police registered a case under Section 302, IPC, and after investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet against the appellant under Section 302, IPC.

Prasad) New Delhi, February 15, 2013.
A.Savariar vs The Secretary Tnpsc & Anr

2. The appellant joined service under the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (for short, ‘the Commission’) as Junior Assistant w.e.f. 1.9.1973. While he was posted in ‘P’ Section of the Commission, which deals with the appointment of Invigilators and Chief Invigilators for various examinations, the Commission issued Notification dated 8.8.1989 for holding competitive examination for direct recruitment of Assistant Surgeons. The main written examination was conducted on 17.2.1990 and 18.2.1990. Shri Syed Abdul Kareem, who was appointed as Chief Invigilator at Bharathiar Government Arts College for Women, North Madras, examination centre, met the Superintendent of Section ‘P’ on 15.2.1990 and requested him to appoint some other person as Chief Invigilator by saying that he was suffering from heart ailment. When the Superintendent expressed his inability to accede to his request, Shri Sayed Abdul Kareem asked for the list of persons who were to assist him. Thereupon, he was given a list of 19 persons. Some of the persons named in the list informed the Chief Invigilator on telephone that they were unable to assist him. Therefore, he again contacted the Superintendent of ‘P’ Section for appointment of substitute Invigilators. The Superintendent then asked the appellant to post five persons to assist the Chief Invigilator. The latter supplied the list of five persons including S/Shri Asir (School Assistant), Khader Baig (Officer Assistant) and R. Mahalingam to Syed Abdul Kareem to work as substitute Invigilators.

5. The Enquiry Officer appointed by the Commission submitted report dated 31.12.1990 with the finding that Charges No.1, 2, 4 and 6 have been proved against the appellant. The Controller of Examinations, who was holding charge of the post of the Secretary accepted the enquiry report and sent a copy thereof to the appellant to enable him to make representation against the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. The appellant filed detailed submissions dated 4.2.1991 and reiterated that he had not committed any misconduct. The Controller of Examinations rejected the appellant’s reply and dismissed him from service vide order dated 25.3.1991, the operative portion of which reads as under:

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State Of M.P vs Giriraj Dubey

3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts which are requisite to be stated are that on the basis of an FIR lodged by the complainant, the investigating agency laid a charge-sheet before the competent court against the accused-respondent for the offences punishable under Sections 294 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”). The learned Magistrate, on receipt of the charge-sheet, committed the matter to the Court of Session. The learned Sessions Judge, by his judgment dated 2.12.2011, acquitted the respondent herein of the charge on the foundation that there was no witness to the occurrence of the crime and further PW-2, the wife of the complainant, could not tell the exact abuses hurled at her by the accused respondent. In the application seeking leave to appeal, many a ground was urged challenging the judgment of acquittal. The Division Bench of the High Court, by the impugned order, referred to the trial court judgment and opined that the trial court, after appreciation of the evidence on record, has opined that the prosecution has failed to prove the offence against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as there was not adequate evidence to substantiate the charges against the respondent and, hence, there was no legality in the judgment of acquittal.

13. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court to pass a cogent and reasoned order relating to grant or refusal of leave. We may hasten to clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

February 19, 2013