L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
M/S Tbea Shenyang Transformers ... vs M/S Alstom Projects India Ltd

6. Being aggrieved by the order, whereby an application under Section 9 of the Act had been rejected, the petitioner company had approached the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. The said appeal filed before the High Court had also been dismissed on 27.09.2013 and being aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court dismissing the appeal, the petitioner had filed Special Leave Petition before this Court which had also been dismissed on 07.10.2013 as this Court did not find any infirmity in the order of the High Court.

13. In the aforestated circumstances, it cannot be said that there is no dispute between the parties and therefore, in my opinion, an Arbitrator is required to be appointed as per the provisions of Section 11(6) of the Act.

14. In view of the aforestated circumstances, Mr. Justice A.P. Shah, former Chief Justice of High Court of Delhi, having his office at F-15, Hauz Khas Enclave, New Delhi-110016, is appointed as an arbitrator and the place of arbitration shall be Delhi. Remuneration to be paid shall be fixed by the learned Arbitrator. The parties to the litigation have agreed to the above appointment and they have also agreed that they would request the learned Arbitrator to complete the arbitral proceedings preferably within six months and they shall extend their cooperation to the learned Arbitrator so that the proceedings can be concluded at an early date.

15. Intimation of this order be forwarded to the learned Sole Arbitrator by the Registry of this Court.

16. The Arbitration Petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.

……………………………J. [Anil R. Dave] New Delhi;

September 21, 2015.
Sharadamma vs Mohammed Pyrejan(D) Tr.Lrs.& Anr

4. The facts, in brief, indicate that Sharadamma, plaintiff-appellant had filed Original Suit No.6020 of 1998 on 5.8.1998 for the purposes of declaration of title and for restoration of possession on the strength of registered sale deed dated 10.11.1965. The plaintiff had also claimed a sum of Rs.3,000/- towards past damages and a further sum of Rs.20/- per day as continuing damages. The suit was dismissed by the trial court against which the plaintiff had preferred regular first appeal before the High Court. The same has been dismissed on the aforesaid ground by the impugned judgment and order.

11. Application of Order to appeals.- In the application of this Order to appeals, so far as may be, the word “plaintiff” shall be held to include an appellant, the word “defendant” a respondent, and the word “suit” an appeal.”

8. Resultantly, we are of the opinion that the High Court has gravely erred in law in dismissing the appeal on the aforesaid ground. Thus, its judgment and order being unsustainable, are hereby set aside. We remit the appeal to the High Court for deciding the same afresh in accordance with law after hearing the parties. The appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.
Chintaman Namdev Patil (Dead) vs Sukhdev Namdev Patil & Anr

4. In order to appreciate the issues involved in the appeal which lie in a narrow compass, few relevant facts need mention infra.

5. The appellant (plaintiff) filed a suit against the respondents (defendants) herein in the Court of Civil Judge (junior Division) Soyagaon being Regular Civil Suit No. 14 of 2001 for declaration and perpetual injunction. The appellant sought a declaration that he is the owner of the suit land bearing no Gat No. 9 admeasuring 4 H 90 R situated at Village Ghosala, Taluka Soegaon, Dist. Aurangabad. The appellant also sought injunction against the respondents restraining them from interfering in his possession. The respondents joined issues and contested the suit by filing written statement. The Trial Court framed several issues arising out of the pleadings and parties led their evidence. The Trial Court vide judgment/decree dated 14.12.2004 dismissed the suit.

7. The respondents, felt aggrieved, filed second appeal being S.A. No. 332 of 2007 before the High Court.

20. We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the manner in which the High Court cursorily decided the appeal as we find that the impugned judgment does not satisfy the requirement mentioned above. In such circumstances, the remand of the case to the High Court appears to be proper.

21. The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The matter is remanded to the High Court for deciding the second appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law.

22. We, however, make it clear that we have not examined on the merits of the issues involved in this case and hence the High Court would decide the appeal without being influenced by any observation made in this judgment.

23. Since the case is quite old, we request the High Court to expedite its hearing and dispose of the case preferably within six months.

September 28, 2015.
Essar Teleholdings Ltd vs Cbi

2. These matters arise as a sequel to the judgment delivered by this Court on 1.7.2013 by which three writ petitions filed by Essar Teleholdings Limited, Loop Telecom Limited and Vikash Saraf were dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court.

3. The brief facts necessary to appreciate how the controversy arose before this Court are as follows.

5. On 16.12.2010, this Court passed an order reported in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2011) 1 SCC 560, directing the CBI to investigate the said FIR. On 10.2.2011, while monitoring the CBI investigation, this Court passed an order directing that no other Court shall pass any order which may in any manner impede the investigation being carried out by the CBI and Directorate of Enforcement. On 2.4.2011, and 25.4.2011, CBI filed a chargesheet and a first supplementary chargesheet against 12 accused persons for offences committed both under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is common ground that none of the petitioners before us were named or mentioned in these two chargesheets.

6. The present case arises out of a second supplementary chargesheet dated 12.12.2011 naming 8 persons as accused, alleging offences under Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC. It is relevant to mention that this second supplementary chargesheet which implicated the petitioners before us did not contain any offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The CBI mentioned in the said chargesheet that separate offences came to their notice during the investigation of FIR RC No.DAI 2009 A 0045, as a result of which the second supplementary chargesheet was being filed. They further went on to state that these charges are triable by a Magistrate of the First Class but may be endorsed to any appropriate court as deemed fit after which process may be issued to the accused persons for their appearance and to face trial as per law.

16. The immediate cause for filing of the present appeals is a judgment dated 2.9.2013 by which the Special Judge dismissed the application filed by Essar Teleholdings Ltd. asking for a joint trial.

23. We find no infirmity in the impugned judgment. As a result, the appeal and the writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed.

…………………….CJI.

September 29, 2015.
Ramesh Chand Dead Through Lrs vs Asruddin(Dead) Thr Lrs. & Anr

Brief facts of the case are that plaintiff/respondent No.1 Asaruddin entered into an agreement with defendant No. 1/ appellant Ramesh Chand on 21.06.2004, whereby the appellant agreed to sell his land measuring 12 kanals, 16 marlas, situated in Village Mohammed Nagar, Tehsil Ferozpur Jhirka, District Gurgaon, to the respondent No. 1 for an amount of rupees six lacs. An agreement for sale was executed between the parties after the appellant accepted rupees four lacs as a part of consideration. It was further agreed between the parties that the land in suit, mortgaged with defendant No. 2/respondent No. 2 Gurgaon Gramin Bank, Nagina, would be redeemed by the appellant before execution of the sale deed. It is pleaded by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 that he was and is always ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 gave notice to the appellant to execute the sale deed on 30.11.2004, and remained present with the balance amount of consideration in the Office of Sub Registrar, Nagina, and got his presence marked. But the appellant failed to turn up to execute the sale deed, as agreed between him and the respondent No. 1. Hence the suit for specific performance of contract.

In the above facts and circumstances of the case and the judicial principle discussed above, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case where instead of granting decree of specific performance, the plaintiff can be compensated by directing the appellant to pay a reasonable and sufficient amount to him. We are of the view that mere refund of rupees four lacs with interest at the rate of 8% per annum, as directed by the trial court, would be highly insufficient. In our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to direct the appellants (Legal Representatives of original defendant No.1, since died) to repay rupees four lacs along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 21.06.2004 till date within a period of three months from today to the L.Rs. of respondent No. 1 (mentioned in I.A. No. ___ of 2015 dated 07.09.2015). If they do so, the decree of specific performance shall stand set aside. We clarify that if the amount is not paid or deposited before the trial court in favour of the L.Rs. of respondent No.1 within a period of three months, as directed above, the decree of specific performance shall stand affirmed. We order accordingly.

The appeal stands disposed of. Pending I.A(s) also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.

October 06, 2015.
Jagdish Lal Gambhir vs Punjab National Bank & Ors

5. As far as Gambhir is concerned, while he was working with the Hindustan Commercial Bank, he was issued a charge-sheet on 3rd February, 1983 alleging irregularities in sanctioning of loans to the customers of the bank and a failure to take follow up steps. Gambhir replied to the charge-sheet and was thereafter administered a ‘caution’ and was asked to be more discreet in respect of granting advances and management of credit portfolio. Thereafter in 1986 another set of allegations were made against Gambhir but no final decision was taken by the Hindustan Commercial Bank until its amalgamation with the PNB.

6. In view of the above, the PNB issued a charge-sheet to Gambhir on 28th November, 1987 in which it was alleged that he had deliberately flouted the bank lending norms and accommodated some parties unauthorisedly thereby putting huge funds of the bank at stake.

9. It appears that during the pendency of the writ petition Gambhir was dismissed from service with effect from 2nd August, 1989.

15. Feeling aggrieved by the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge, Gambhir preferred an appeal before the Division Bench but that was dismissed by the impugned judgment and order dated 24th July, 2006.

21. The last contention urged by Gambhir was also rejected since the PNB was entitled to look into any final irregularity committed by the employees of the Hindustan Commercial Bank whose services were taken over by the PNB. On this basis, the Division Bench dismissed Gambhir’s appeal by the impugned judgment and order dated 24th July, 2006. It is under these circumstances that Gambhir is now before us.

26. At this stage, it may be mentioned that in Chairman, Canara Bank, Bangalore v. M.S. Jasra[4] an employee of the Lakshmi Commercial Bank (which had amalgamated with Canara Bank at the same time when Hindustan Commercial Bank amalgamated with the PNB) the contention of the employee was that the age of retirement (60 years) in Lakshmi Commercial Bank could not be varied to his disadvantage (58 years) on the amalgamation of that Bank with the Canara Bank. This contention was rejected by holding that the employee became an employee of the Canara Bank and was, therefore, entitled to the rights given to employees of the Canara Bank.

27. Applying this principle to the facts of this case, it is clear that Gambhir became an employee of the PNB and was subject to the discipline of all its rules and regulations, including those pertaining to misconduct.

29. In view of the above, we find no reason to interfere with both the judgments delivered by the Calcutta High Court. The appeal is dismissed.
South Delhi Municipal Corp vs Ravinder Kumar & Ors

The necessary brief facts are stated hereunder to appreciate the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties:

The decision of the High Court in quashing the appellant-Corporation’s decision of cancelling the earlier tender vide corrigendum dated 30.11.2012 and also the subsequent e-tender process carried out by it pursuant to notice No. 24 dated 13.12.2012 is vitiated in law and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside.

For the reasons stated supra, the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-Corporation are well founded and the same must be accepted by this Court. This Civil Appeal of the appellant-Corporation must succeed and deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, we pass the following order :-
Commissioner Of Customs And C.E.Nagpur vs M/S. Ispat Industries Ltd

3. In reply to the five show cause notices, M/s. Ispat stated that all their prices were ex-works, and that the goods were cleared from the factory on payment of central or local sales tax. Most of their sales were against Letters of Credit opened by the customer or through Bank discounting facilities. Invoices were prepared at the factory directly in the name of the customers, and the name of the Insurance Company as well as the number of Transit Insurance Policy were both mentioned. Based on the details mentioned in the invoice, the lorry receipt was prepared by the transporter and was in the buyer’s name. This receipt carried a caution notice as well a notice to the effect that deliveries were to be made to the buyer alone, and to nobody else.

Explanation 2 – For removal of doubts, it is clarified that the cost of transportation from the factory to the place of removal, where the factory is not the place of removal, shall not be excluded for the purposes of determining the value of the excisable goods.”

34. In the view of the law that we have taken as well as the facts detailed above, the statement made by Shri S.P. Dahiwade pales into insignificance as has been correctly held by the Tribunal. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.

October 7, 2015
Maqsood & Ors vs State Of U.P

Criminal Appeal No.207 of 2011 Out of the 8 appellants who have filed this appeal challenging their conviction, inter alia, under Section 325 IPC as made by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 21.05.2010, the appellant Nos.2 and 6 (Shakeel and Haneef) have died during the pendency of the present appeal. We will, therefore, be concerned with the case of the remaining appellants before us.

The learned trial court had convicted the appellants under different provisions of the Indian Penal Code including Section 308 thereof and sentenced the accused appellants to undergo RI for a period of 4 years under the aforesaid section of the Code. In appeal, the High Court while maintaining the conviction and sentence awarded for the lesser offences altered the conviction under Section 308/149 IPC to Section 325/149 IPC. The sentence of four years RI was also reduced to a period of one year. It is against the aforesaid order of the High Court that the appellants have filed the present appeal.

We have considered the medical evidence on record which shows that P.W.2 Musharraf, had suffered a fracture injury which would bring the same within the expression “grievous hurt” as appearing in Section 320 of the IPC. Punishment for the said offence would therefore be covered by Section 325 IPC which contemplates a period of imprisonment upto 7 years alongwith fine. Having regard to the above, the punishment of imprisonment of one year imposed by the High Court, in our view, is lenient enough and, therefore, will not justify our interference. The injured Musharraf (P.W.2) and Ameer Ahmed (P.W.1) who are represented in the connected appeal (Criminal Appeal No.208 of 2011) are not willing to compound the offence in question. It is also our considered view that the present case is devoid of any special circumstance which would justify invocation of the provisions of Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code or the release of accused appellants on probation by invoking the provisions of Section 360 Cr. P.C. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. Consequently the same is dismissed and the order of the High Court is affirmed.
Working Friends Coop. House ... vs State Of Punjab & Ors

7. The appellant has challenged the decision of the High Court in this Court and during the pendency of this appeal, Parliament enacted the Act which came into force with effect from 1st January, 2014. Proceedings in this Court

21. Taking into account all the facts of the appeal as well as the consistent view taken by this Court on several occasions, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that acquisition proceedings in so far as the appellant is concerned lapsed with the enactment of the Act.

22. The judgment and order passed by the High Court is consequently set aside and it is held that the acquisition proceedings initiated by the notifications dated 12th November, 1992 and 21st July, 1993 followed by the Award dated 22nd February, 1995 have lapsed only in so far as the appellant is concerned.

23. The appeal is allowed.
N.Sunkanna vs State Of A.P

The case of the prosecution is that the appellant-accused was, at the relevant point of time working as Deputy Tahsildar, Civil Supplies Mandal Revenue Officer, Kurnool in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The complainant PW- 1 K. Sudhakar Reddy had a Fair Price Shop at Narsimha Reddy Nagar Kurnool. It is alleged by the complainant that the appellant–accused used to collect Rs.50/- per month from each fair price shop dealer in Kurnool as monthly mamool and when he visited the shop of the complainant on 17.9.1993 he demanded Rs.300/- towards the monthly mamools from April 1993 by threatening to seize the stocks and foist a case against him. As the complainant was not willing to pay the said amount he had approached PW-7, Deputy Superintendant of Police, ACB, Kurnool and submitted Exh.P.1 complaint in writing on 18.9.1993 to him.

October 14, 2015
Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary vs Indira Gandhi Inst. Of M.S. Patna & Ors

3. As the facts would exposit, the appellant received the letter of appointment for the post of Chest Therapist on 14.01.1999 which mentioned that he had been selected for appointment to the sanctioned post of Chest Therapist and would be put on probation for a period of two years which could be extended at the discretion of the Director of the Institute. It also contained a condition that the services could be put an end to at any time by giving a month’s notice by either side. It also stipulated certain aspects which pertained to giving of notice and in lieu of notice, payment or deposit of certain amount as the case may be. The appellant joined the post on 20.08.1999.

4. When the appellant was continuing on the post of Chest Therapist, a complaint was received by the Vigilance Department, Government of Bihar on 3.11.2004 relating to the illegal appointment of the appellant on the post of Chest Therapist. The complaint contained that the advertisement for Physiotherapist and Chest Therapist were different because streams are different and the appointment of the appellant was absolutely illegal. In pursuance of the said complaint an enquiry was conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who submitted a report on 03.11.2004 to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna. The reports reflected on various aspects and pointed out that the appointment was illegal. On the basis of the said report the Joint Secretary in the Department of Health, vide order dated 09.03.2005 requested the Director IGIMS to initiate a proceeding for termination of the services of the appellant by giving a show cause notice. On the basis of the said communication the appellant was asked by the Director of IGIMS to show cause within three days as to why on account of illegal appointment his services should not be terminated. The petitioner sent his reply on 20.3.2005 and asked for the copy of the complaint as well as the entire report submitted by the Vigilance Department.

5. Despite the request made by the appellant all the documents were not supplied to him which the appellant considered vital. However, he submitted the reply on 08.04.2005 and on 09.04.2005 the Director IGIMS, terminated his services by stating that his appointment on the post of Chest Therapist was illegal in terms of the investigation done by the Cabinet (Vigilance Department, Bihar) and the explanation furnished by him in pursuance of the show cause notice had been found unsatisfactory.

29. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is upheld, though on different grounds. Accordingly, it is directed that the appellant be reinstated in service within a period of six weeks and he shall be entitled to 50% towards his salary which shall be paid to him within the said period. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

[Prafulla C. Pant] New Delhi;

October 15, 2015