L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Union Of India & Ors vs Vikrambhai Maganbhai Chaudhari

2) Brief facts:

Later, Mr. K.H. Gamit, Assistant Post Master, Bardoli and his immediate supervisor instructed him to accept the above said Money Orders in writing through office order book but the respondent did not obey the orders.

Accordingly, departmental action was initiated against him and he was suspended by order of Superintendent of Post Office, Bardoli vide Memo No. B-1/PF/VMC/2000.

Accordingly, a notice was issued to the respondent.

(d) Challenging the proceedings, the respondent filed Original Application No. 333 of 2004 before the Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench, Ahmedabad. By order dated 20.04.2005, the Tribunal allowed the application filed by the respondent. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants herein filed Special Civil Application being No. 3 16575 of 2005 before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. The High Court, by impugned order, dismissed the application filed by the appellants herein.

(2) No proceeding for revision shall be commenced until after

(i) the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal, or

(ii) the disposal of the appeal, where any such appeal has been preferred."

If we go further it shows that while no period is mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv), sub-Clause (v) refers to a period of six months from the date of order proposed to be revised. Since order was passed by exercising power under sub-Clause (vi), we have to see whether in the Notification specifying an authority a time limit has been mentioned or even in the absence of the same, the outer limit can be availed by exercising power under sub-Clause (v). According to learned ASG, there is no need to specify the period in the Notification authorizing concerned authority to call for the record for any enquiry and revise any order made under the Rules. We are unable to accept the said claim for the following reasons.

There must be specified period and the power can be exercised only within the period so prescribed.

8) Inasmuch as the Notification dated 29.05.2001 has not specified any time limit within which power under Rule 29(1)(vi) is exercisable by the authority specified, we are of the view that such Notification is not in terms with Rule 29 and the Tribunal is fully justified in quashing the same. The High Court has also rightly confirmed the said conclusion by 8 dismissing the Special Application of the appellants and quashing the Notification on the ground that it did not specify the time limit. Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.

JULY 1, 2011.
National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Shyam Singh & Ors

3. The factual matrix of the case is that Respondent No. 3 and 4 are parents of one Yogendra Kumar Pathak, who was 19 years of age and on 01.11.2007 while on his way to his village Kor Gaon, he alongwith his sister were travelling in jeep No. MP 19-A 930. The said jeep wasbeing driven by Respondent No. 1 and met with an accident near Dhal Factory General Road due to rash and negligent driving by the Respondent No. 1which resulted in his death on the spot.

4. It was stated in the claim petition that before his death, the deceased was a young man of robust health and was working as mechanical fitter in Priya Engineering Prism Cement Factory on the salary of Rs. 4500/- per month and in total 2 was getting Rs. 6000/- a month inclusive of salary and over time allowance and was supporting his parents financially.

Considering the age of the parents which was 56 and 55 years, applied the Multiplier of 9, and awarded a total compensation of Rs. 1,72,000/- (Rs. 1,62,000/- towards the loss of dependency + Rs. 10,000/- towards conventional heads) along with 6 % interest per annum from the date of claim petition. Being aggrieved, the Respondent No. 3 and 4 preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 4867 of 2009 before the High Court for enhancement of amount of compensation stating that the income of the deceased was Rs. 4500/- and not Rs. 3000/- as determined by the Tribunal, and a multiplier of 16 instead of 9 was supposed to be applied. The 3 High Court relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another (2009) 6 SCC 121, enhanced the multiplier to 18 instead of 9 and granted expenses to the tune of Rs. 15000/- under conventional heads. Accordingly, the High Court enhanced the amount of compensation from Rs. 1,72,000/- to Rs. 3,39,000/-

Accordingly, we hold that the Tribunal had rightfully applied the multiplier of 8 by taking the average of the parents of the deceased who were 55 and 56 years.

11. Thus, the present appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent and the award passed by the Tribunal is restored. No costs.

............................................J [ Dr. Mukundakam Sharma ] ............................................J [ Anil R. Dave ] New Delhi, July 4, 2011.
Commissioner Of Customs, Calcutta vs G.C. Jain & Anr

2. As per the facts on record the Respondents, M/s. Sanghvi Overseas imported 14 consignments of Butyl Acrylate Monomer (hereinafter referred to as `BAM') between April and December, 1997 and cleared the same against advanced licenses by availing the benefit of customs Notification Nos.

(Rupees six lakhs). Further penalty of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs) was imposed upon M/s. Sanghvi Overseas in relation to the importation of the goods under the above two bills of entries. Penalty of Rs. 65,00,000/- (Rupees sixty-five lakhs) was imposed on the second Respondent Shri R.K. Jain on the findings that he was the main person behind the imports which led to evasion of huge amount of customs duty and was an adviser to the importers. It was also observed that the evidence on record showed his active and financial involvement in the matter.

Goods in packed condition are of no use. It can only be used when it is opened and put to use. We are, therefore, to consider as to whether for all practical purposes BAM is an adhesive. It is admitted in the Show Cause that end-use of BAM is adhesive in leather industry. However, a distinction is sought to be made in the present case that until monomer becomes polymer, it is not adhesive. It is alleged that in Monomer form, BAM is not adhesive. By putting such an interpretation, an attempt has been made by the appellant to divest BAM from the coverage of adhesive. The issue is whether the requirement of opening the container, allowing BAM to contact with air, light and heat and even putting a catalyst could detract from its being an adhesive.

"Emulsion Polymerization: Emulsion polymerization is the most important industrial method for the preparation of acrylic polymers.

The principal markets for aqueous dispersion polymers made by emulsion polymerization of acrylic esters are the print, paper, adhesives, textile, floor polish, and leather industries, where they are used principally as coatings or binders.

Copolymers of either ethyl acrylate or butyl acrylate with methyl methacrylate are most common. (Vol. 1, page 328)"

23.When it is found that the licences produced entitle the Respondent to clear the ex-bond goods free of duty, there are no reasons for them to have mis-declared the values since the goods are duty free. There appears no incentive to do so. There is no allegation that the licences produced will not cover the quantity of values, even after the alleged loading of values as 16 declared. Therefore, this court upholds the decision of the Tribunal.

25.Therefore, the present appeals are dismissed but without any orders as to costs.

............................................J [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma ] ............................................J [ Anil R. Dave ] New Delhi, July 4, 2011.
Binabai Bhate vs State Of M.P.& Ors

3. The appellant is Bhuswami of certain lands situated at Tehsil Khandwa, District East Nimar, Madhya Pradesh. A draft development plan was published under the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (hereafter referred to as "The Act"). The apellant came to know that the draft development plan included some portion of her land with the intention of making it available for Navchandi Mela. However, the land was ancestral and he appellant intended to transfer it by a will duly registered and already executed.

5. In spite of the resolution passed by the committee, by a notification dated 28.02.2001 published in Madhya Pradesh Raj Patra, the Appellant came to know that the State Government had included certain lands belonging to the appellant in the modified development plan. The Appellant filed review Petition under section 23(A) of the Act before the State Government which was rejected by order dated 24.07.2002 stating that there is no provision for review of the order in the Act.

Since the Letter Patent jurisdiction was abolished, the appellant filed Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the Special Leave Petition the provision of Letter Patent jurisdiction was revived. The Special Leave Petition was allowed to be withdrawn for filing Letters Patent Appeal in the High Court.

17. In the present case, the development plan as prepared under Section 14 was approved by the State Government without any modification and therefore there was no question of inviting any further suggestions as no modification was suggested to the said development plan. In view of the said position also, there was no question of giving any hearing to the appellant in the present case, and therefore the issue raised with regard to alleged violation of the principles of natural justice is without any merit.

21. We, therefore, find no error in the judgment passed by the High Court. The impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. The present appeal is, therefore, dismissed as without any merit. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

............................................J Page 11 of 12 [ Dr. Mukundakam Sharma ] ............................................J [ Anil R. Dave ] New Delhi, July 4, 2011.
Pallavi Bhardwaj vs Pratap Chauhan

4. The case is based on very peculiar facts. The grievances of the appellant are that there is no marriage between him and the respondent but the respondent in order to defame her in society filed a suit for restitution for conjugal rights, inter alia, on the ground that marriage between them took place on 28th October, 2007. It is an admitted position that there is no valid document evidencing marriage. Nor is there any acceptable evidence of marriage. The Principal Judge, Family Court, Meerut in his judgment and order dated 01.04.2008 has elaborately discussed the facts.

The Family Court, therefore, dismissed the said petition with cost of Rs.2 lacs.

Since no marriage has been established, directions given by the High Court are wholly inappropriate.

6. Therefore, the order of the High Court is set aside and we restore the judgment of the Family Court with cost of Rs.2 lacs to be paid by the respondent within 3 months in favour of Supreme Court Mediation Centre, New Delhi.

7. The appeal is thus allowed with costs of Rs.2 lacs as aforesaid.
M/S Khiviraj Motors vs M/S The Guanellian Society

2. The appellant alleges that a joint development agreement dated 18.2.2007 was entered into between "Father A.John Bosco, President, The Gaunellian Society" as the owner, and the appellant as the developer, in regard to three acres of land and that clause 18 of the said agreement provided for settlement of disputes arising out of the said agreement by arbitration. It is further alleged by the appellant that on 20.2.2007, the said Father A. John Bosco, President, The Guanellian Society, executed a power 2 of Attorney in favour of the appellant in connection with the development of the said property with power to enter into agreements of sale and also to transfer and convey an extent of 70% undivided share in the said property.

3. The Gaunellian Society, (`Society' for short) the respondent herein, at its Extraordinary Meeting held on 10.1.2008, passed a resolution that the Managing Committee of the Society had not authorized its President to deal with the property and therefore the joint development agreement and general power of attorney executed by him were null and void and not binding on the Society. On 17.4.2009 the respondent Society filed an application under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (`Act' for short) for appointment of an arbitrator for resolution of the disputes between the Society and the appellant.

11. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs of Rs.25,000/- payable by the appellant to the respondent. We find that the arbitration has been delayed for nearly one and a half years on account of the pendency of this special leave petition. We therefore request the Arbitrator to proceed with the matter expeditiously.
Spl.Land Acquisition Officer & Anr vs M.K.Rafiq Saheb

3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred to as `SLAO') passed an award on 26.9.1995 granting compensation at Rs.1,30,000/-

per acre along with statutory benefits. The SLAO concluded that the lands were agricultural and no sale transactions relating to the same were available. Sale transactions were available in respect of non-agricultural lands but they could not be adopted for determining the valuation of agricultural land. Therefore, the SLAO chose to rely on acquisition proceedings in respect of lands in the vicinity for determining land value.

Accordingly, it was found that in the neighbouring villages of Benniganahalli, B. Narayanapura and Kaggadasapura villages, land had been acquired in favour of DRDO complex where the government had 2 approved awards fixing land value at Rs.1,30,000/-.

4. Possession of the land was taken on 11.4.1996.

Narayan v. Land Acquisition Officer, (1980) 2 KLJ 441, by which land value came to Rs.3,73,000/- per acre. However, the Reference Court found that the land had more potentiality and was situated in the midst of a heavy industrial area and in the immediate vicinity of an already 5 developed residential locality. It was also in the vicinity of a road known as Old Madras road as well as the road leading to the airport. Hence, the Reference Court was of the opinion that the respondent was entitled to a higher market value than Rs.3,73,000/- per acre. Thus, the Reference Court held that Rs.4,00,000/- per acre would be reasonable and fair market value in the instant case.

15. We reject this contention of the appellant.

24. In the present case, the land acquired is 34 guntas and the notification under section 4 of the Act was issued on 17.7.1994. We have already held that for the purposes of determining compensation, the acquired land should be considered to be non-

26. Thus, we are of the opinion that the sale deed Ex. P-5 was rightly relied upon by the High Court in determining compensation.

27. The High Court made a 50% deduction since the sale instance Ex. P-5 related to a smaller piece of land. We are of the considered view that the said 17 deduction should be increased to 60%, which we find fair, just and reasonable in the circumstances.

28. Hence, the judgment of the High Court is modified to the extent of the abovementioned deduction. All other findings of the High Court are sustained.

29. The appeal is thus dismissed with the aforesaid modification.

30. No order as to costs.
Union Of India & Anr vs Arulmozhi Iniarasu & Ors

6.On 14th January, 2008, the office of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai Zone, issued a notice inviting applications for recruitment to 40 (37 GC & 3 OBC) posts of Sepoy (General Central Service Group D Post). As per the recruitment rules, the age limit prescribed for the post as on 1st January, 2008, was 27 years for general candidate, 32 years for SC/ST candidates and 30 years for OBC because of relaxation of age limit by five years and three years in the cases of SC/ST candidates and OBC candidates respectively. In the recruitment process, thus initiated, initially the respondents were permitted to participate but later on, realising that the respondents (all SC/ST and OBC candidates) had crossed the prescribed age, they were not called to participate in the further selection process. Their applications were rejected as age barred.

The High Court disposed of both the writ petitions with modification of the order of Tribunal to the effect that relaxation in the age limit could be up to 3 years for OBC candidates and 5 years for SC/ST candidates, subject to the condition that it would be applicable to those candidates who were actually erstwhile employees of the department. Hence, the present appeals.

22.Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the facts of the case, in our opinion, the doctrine of legitimate expectation, as explained above, is not attracted in the instant case. The argument is rejected accordingly.

24.In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside and the appeals are allowed accordingly.

However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

JULY 6, 2011.

ARS 1
Commnr. Of Central Excise, Chandigarh vs M/S. Doaba Steel Rolling Mills

9. Vide letter dated 13th September, 1999, the respondent requested the Commissioner for re-determination of annual production capacity of their unit in terms of Rule 4(2) of the 1997 Rules on the ground that they have changed some of the parameters of their mill. The request was acceded to and vide order dated 27th January 2000, the Commissioner, applying the formula as laid down under Rule 3(3), determined the annual capacity of the mill at 7328.435 MT but relying on Rule 5, he again computed the annual capacity at 11961.135 MT, being equal to the actual production of the mill during the financial year 1996-97.

10. Aggrieved by the said order of the Commissioner, the respondent filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, vide order dated 6th April, 2000, allowed the appeal and held that Rule 5 of the 1997 Rules cannot be applied in view of change in technical parameters of the rolling mill.

Provided that the Commissioner may determine the annual capacity of the hot re-rolling unit on provisional basis pending verification of the declaration furnished by the hot re-rolling mills and pass an order accordingly. Thereafter, the Commissioner may determine the annual capacity, as soon as may be, and pass an order accordingly.

on the part of the officers concerned.

25. For the foregoing reasons, the orders impugned in these appeals cannot be sustained. All these orders are set aside and that of the Commissioners of Central Excise are restored. The appeals are allowed accordingly with costs, quantified at `50,000/- in each set of appeals.

JULY 6, 2011.

ARS 1
Mathai M Paikeday vs C.K.Anthony

3) The brief factual matrix relating to these appeals :- The appellant had filed two suits for recovery of money against the respondent, who is a retired Deputy Conservator of Forest drawing a pension of `10,500/-. These suits were decreed in favour of the appellant.

4) Subsequently, the High Court after conducting the inquiry into the means and financial capacity of the respondent, has permitted the respondent to prosecute Regular First Appeals as 2 an indigent person vide its order dated 11.08.2008. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant is before us in these appeals.

Explanation III.--Where the plaintiff sues in a representative capacity, the question whether he is an indigent person shall be determined with reference to the means possessed by him in such capacity."

20) In the light of above discussion and facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondent cannot be declared as an indigent person in order to prosecute Regular First Appeals before the High Court. Accordingly, the present appeals are allowed and the impugned final order of the High Court dated 11.08.2008 is set aside. However, the respondent is granted 45 days time from today to deposit the court fee if he desires to prosecute Regular First Appeals filed before the High Court.

Costs are made easy.
Deepa Panels vs State Of Kerala

4. The contention of the appellant was that the appellant is eligible for exemption from payment of tax in respect of purchase of rubberwood from unregistered dealers. For the assessment year 1998-99, 1996-97, the assessing authority completed the assessments and granted exemption even from payment of purchase tax. However, after the aforesaid Page 1 of 7 assessment orders were passed, action was taken for re- opening of the assessment for the aforesaid assessment years in question and a notice to that effect was issued to the assessee who in receipt of the aforesaid notice filed its reply contending, interalia, that in view of the exemption certificate granted by the General Manager, District Industries Centre, the assessee is entitled for exemption from payment of purchase tax. The assessing authority considered the records including the objections taken by the assessee and thereafter it held and passed an order of assessment that the assessee is not entitled from exemption of levy of purchase tax under Section 5A of the Karnataka General Sales Tax Act [for short "KGST Act"].

11. We are also of the opinion that the assessee could be said to be entitled for exemption only on goods manufactured and sold but it cannot claim any exemption from payment of purchase tax.

Page 5 of 7

12. Having held thus, we find no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

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Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen vs State Of Rajasthan

2. The trial court vide its judgment and order held the Appellants guilty for commission of offence under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (in short 'IPC') and awarded life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine further three months simple imprisonment and under Section 4/25 of the Arms Act one year R.I. and fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to further suffer one month imprisonment.

5. Facts giving rise to the prosecution story, ultimately resulting in conviction of the Appellants, are as under:-

6. On inquiries being made P.W.3 - Ashok Kumar, present at the place of occurrence informed Diwakar that the name of the deceased was Ram Pal Yadav. He further informed that the murder of Ram Pal Yadav has been caused by Mustkeem, Nandu and one other person by inflicting injuries on his person with sword and knife. The third person was later identified as Arun Joseph. On receiving the said information SHO recorded the Parcha Bayan of P.W.3 - Ashok Kumar and registered a case under Section 302/120B of the IPC. Thus the investigation machinery was set into motion. Dead Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008 5 body was sent for autopsy, necessary memos were drawn, statements of witnesses were recorded, accused were arrested and on completion of investigation charge sheet was filed.

31. As regards scope of interference against concurrent findings of fact, powers under Article 136 of the Constitution can be exercised, in the manner described in para 14 of the aforesaid judgment reproduced hereinbelow:-