L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
M/S. South Konkan Distilleries & Anr vs Prabhakar Gajanan Naik & Ors

3. The facts leading to the filing of this appeal are stated in a nutshell :-

20. In view of our findings made hereinabove, that on the date of filing of the amendment petition, the claim as made by the appellants in their amendment petition was already barred, no purpose would be achieved by allowing the amendment which has already stood barred by the law of limitation.

21. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the courts below had exercised their discretion in a proper manner in the matter of rejecting the amendment of the pleadings. We, therefore, do not find any merit in this appeal Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. However, the trial court is directed to dispose of the suit as early as possible preferably within a year from the date of supply of a copy of this order to it. There will be no order as to costs.

.........................J .
Dubaria vs Har Prasad & Anr

5. The appellant as plaintiff instituted a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants-respondents from interfering with his possession in respect of a building situated in Plot No. 4934 in Village Bhavanipurva Muhal Usufzama in the District of Banda (hereinafter referred to as "suit property") in the Court of Munsif, Banda. He claimed to have purchased the suit property from one Mr. Rajjan by a sale deed dated 27th of December, 1966. When the Zamindar of the suit property objected to the said sale, the plaintiff- appellant by way of an abundant caution, once again purchased the entire building on the suit property from the Zamindar Sekh Anwar- Usufzama and thus became the owner of the entire suit property on 6th of August, 1967. Since the respondents had sought to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff-appellant in respect of the suit property, he was constrained to file the suit for declaration and permanent injunction.

6. The respondents entered appearance and contested the suit by filing a written statement inter alia denying the material allegations made in the plaint. The respondents denied that the suit property was situated on Plot No. 4934 alleged to have been purchased by the plaintiff-appellant. They further pleaded that the suit property was in 2 village Hardwali under the Zamindari of Pt. Sukhdeo Sahay Dubey. The respondents, however, admitted that the plaintiff-appellant was the rightful owner of only one room in the building on the suit property that belonged to Mr. Rajjan, which the plaintiff-appellant had purchased from him. Accordingly, the defendants-respondents sought dismissal of the suit.

14. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remit the case back to the High Court for fresh consideration in the light of the observations made hereinabove. Since the Second Appeal is of the year 1976, we request the High Court to dispose of the same on merits within three months from the date of communication of this Order to it.

15. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
Jonathan Nitin Brady vs State Of West Bengal

3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant works as a Radio Jockey at New Delhi with the Radio Channel `Red FM 93.5', a channel owned by Digital Radio (Delhi) Broadcasting Limited. During the course of regular morning show called "Morning No.1" [hereinafter referred to as `the Show'], that was broadcasted only in New Delhi from 7-11 a.m., on 24.09.2007, the appellant discussed one Mr. Prashant Tamang's victory in the Tele- Series called "Indian Idol" telecasted on Sony Entertainment Television channel.

4. On 25.09.1997, it came to the appellant's knowledge through media reports that sentiments of a certain section of the public in West Bengal were purportedly hurt given to misinterpretation of the above-said discussion on the said show.

5. On 27.09.1997, certain fans of Mr. Prashant Tamang, including one Mr. Dinesh Gurung, filed a written complaint which culminated in registration of FIR 3 No.125/2007 under Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code [for short `IPC'] against the appellant in Sadar Police Station, Darjeeling. The remarks attributed to the appellant in the FIR read as follows:-

13. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and order that in the event of the arrest of the appellant for the alleged offence, he shall be released on bail subject to the following conditions:-

15. In the result, this appeal is allowed in the above-said terms and conditions.
Inspector Of Police, Tamil Nadu vs Muthusamy & Anr

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of acquittal recorded by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court. The accused persons are the father and brother respectively of the deceased. The incident purportedly took place on 3.1.1990. Though the prosecution relied on the evidence of many persons who supposedly witnessed the occurrence, while deposing in Court, most of them resiled from the statements made during investigation. The version projected by the prosecution was that the deceased was throttled and also poison was administered to him. But the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory stated that the viscera did not contain any poison. The prosecution, therefore, gave up its stand that the deceased was administered poison by the accused persons. There were purportedly some extra-judicial confessions on which the Trial Court relied. Accordingly, the accused persons were convicted for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC'). In appeal the 2 High Court has, by the impugned judgment, directed acquittal.

We find that the High Court has referred to the extra-judicial confessions and found that they are not reliable. The witnesses gave varying version about the manner in the so-called extra-judicial confessions. Apart from that the persons who claimed to have witnessed the incident resiled from the statements made during investigation and there was practically no evidence to implicate the accused persons. To add to other factors, one more significant factor which the High Court has noticed is that there was manipulation done to show as if the Magistrate had received the report from Police Station on 3.1.1990. In reality the date of seal found on Exh. P1 and Exh. P9 of the Court of Keeranoor shows that the date was 5.1.1990. In view of these discrepancies, we are of the opinion that the High Court's judgment does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant any interference. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
Tukaram Maruti Chavan vs Maruti Narayan Chavan (Dead) By ...

2. The relevant facts leading to the filing of this appeal, as emerging from the case made out by the appellant may be summarized as follows:

3. The dispute arose out of the provision of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") relating to the land being Gat No 44, 1 measuring 5 Hectares and 24 Acres in village Malangaon, Kavathe, Mahankal Tahsil of Sangli District in the state of Maharashtra (in short "the disputed land"). Late Smt. Narmadabai who was a widow, was the original landowner of the disputed land. She died in 1964 leaving behind her two sons Ramchandra and Laxman Bhau Sutar. On 1st of April, 1957, i.e. on the Tiller's Day, the Appellant was in cultivation of the disputed land. The original tenant named Maruti died subsequently in 1994 during the pendency of the Writ Petition in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The original tenant had initiated proceedings under Section 32G of the Act before the Additional Tahsildar, Kavathe Makhanlal, and the case was decided in his favour with the purchase price of the disputed land being fixed. Thereafter, one of the heirs of the deceased landowner Narmadabai, named Laxman, preferred an appeal to Appellate Authority against the said order. After the matter was remanded back to the Additional Tehsilder, again an order affirming the previous position was passed in favour of the tenant under Section 32 G. This time, the other heir of Late Smt. Narmadabai, namely Ramchandra, challenged the said 2 order before the Sub-Divisional-Officer, Miraj, and he again by his order dated 31st of March, 1978, remanded the matter to the Tahsildar for a detailed enquiry and decision on the following points:

4. When the matter came up before the Tahsildar, he passed an Order holding the 2nd Respondent as the sole owner of the disputed land. The purchase of the disputed land by the Appellant was therefore declared to be ineffective for want of notice under Section 32- F and the disputed land was ordered to be disposed of under Section 32 P of the Act. Thereafter, the Appellant preferred a revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal but the same was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the Appellant filed a Writ Petition before the Bombay High Court on 28th of December, 1983. The 3 Bombay High Court by its impugned judgment and order dated 16th of April, 1999, dismissed the said Writ Petition on the ground that the Respondent (Ramchandra) was the sole owner of the disputed land in pursuance of the letters of administration obtained by him from the Civil Court. It is this decision of the High Court, which is impugned in this appeal in respect of which the Writ Petition was filed.

5. During the pendency of the Writ Petition before the High Court, Respondent No 2 executed a sale deed of the disputed land and though he was duty bound to inform the Court about this deed, he did not inform the same to the Court.

20. Accordingly the Appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Ajit Singh & Anr vs Jit Ram & Anr

5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, as noted herein above, the Rent Controller framed the following issues :-

The Rent Controller decided issue Nos. 1, 2 and 7 together and held that the respondents were not defaulters in payment of rent nor they were entitled to get refund of any amount from the appellant as the case made out by them that they have paid the appellant in excess. This finding arrived at by the Rent Controller by holding that the appellant had failed to produce any credible and reliable evidence, accordingly, Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 7 were held against the appellant and, therefore, no order for ejectment could be passed on the ground of non-payment of rent. Issue No.4 and 6 were also taken up together. Issue No.4 was decided against the appellants and Issue No.6 was decided in favour of the respondents. Accordingly, the Rent Controller held that 6 the ground for personal necessity was not made out and therefore, on that issue, the appellants were not entitled to evict the respondents from the said shop. So far as Issue No.5 was concerned, before the Rent Controller the said issue was not pressed. It may be mentioned here that the Rent Controller, however, held that there was relationship of landlord tenant between the parties as the respondents in their examination-in-chief admitted that the appellant No.2 was the owner of the said shop who had given the same to the appellant No.1 by way of family settlement dated 26th of August, 1998. Accordingly, the Rent Controller held that the appellants were entitled to evict the respondents only on the ground of sub-letting as the said shop was sub-let by respondent No.1 to respondent No.2 without the consent of the appellants. Upon the issues being decided in the manner indicated above, the Rent Controller finally passed the order of eviction against the respondents in respect of the said shop only on the ground of sub-letting. 7

6. Feeling aggrieved by the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, the respondents filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (in short the `Rent Act'). The Appellate Authority by its judgment and final order dated 5th of August, 2004 allowed the appeal and also the cross objections of the appellants and directed the eviction of the respondents from the said shop on the ground of personal necessity by the appellants.

16. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court is hereby set aside and the order of the Appellate Authority is restored and the eviction petition filed by the appellants stands allowed.

17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the facts that the respondents are using the said shop for commercial purposes and have been carrying on business in the same, we grant the respondents 9 months' time to vacate the same, subject to filing the usual undertaking in this Court within two weeks from this date. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
United India Assurance Co.Ltd vs A.N.Subbulakshmi & Ors

2. These appeals by the Insurance Company are on a limited issue insofar as in the order of the High Court coming under appeal the appellant is directed to make payment of the compensation amounts to the claimants 2 and then to recover from the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident excess amounts paid over and above its liability under the insurance policy by instituting appropriate actions against them.

3. The matter arises from an unfortunate accident in which two lives were lost. On 14 May, 1981 at about 6.30 in the morning a head-on collision between an Ambassador car bearing Registration No. MDO 7789 and a lorry bearing Registration No. MDR 3106 took place on the Trichy - Chennai highway near Thozhuthur. As a result of the collision the Ambassador Car was badly smashed and turned turtle. Its owner, Annamalai, who was on the driver's seat died on the spot. Another person, namely, Sigappi, aged about 24 years who worked as Annamalai's Secretary and who was sitting on the rear seat along with the latter's son was thrown out of the car and she too died on the spot. However, Annamalai's wife and daughter sitting on the front seat and his son sitting on the rear seat survived. In the accident the truck also suffered substantial damage.

5. The Tribunal by order dated 22 January, 1986 found and held that the accident was caused entirely due to the rash and negligent driving of the car driver, Annamalai. There was no mistake, rashness or negligence on the part of the driver of the lorry. He accordingly rejected the claims instituted by the heirs of the deceased Annamalai and the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased Siggapi. Further, in accordance with its finding, the Tribunal allowed the claim of the owner of the lorry but instead of Rs.58, 300/- as claimed in the petition, awarded the smaller amount of Rs.14,100/- with 7% interest to be recovered from the assets left by the deceased Annamalai in the hands of his heirs, impleaded as respondents in the claim petition.

10. The Constitution Bench decision applies to the facts of this case with full force. We accordingly hold and find that the impugned direction of the High Court is unsustainable in law. The direction as contained in paragraph 36 of the High Court judgment is therefore set aside.

11. In terms of an interim order passed in this appeal, the appellant had deposited a sum of Rs.50, 000/- before the Trial Court it will be open to the 7 claimants to withdraw that amount. The balance amount in terms of the High Court judgment would be payable by the owner of the lorry, namely, M/s. Aruppukottai Sri Jaya Vilas Pvt. Ltd., unless the judgment of the High Court is modified in any appeal preferred by the lorry's owner.

12. In the result, the appeals are allowed but with no order as to costs.
Commissioner Of Customs, New Delhi vs M/S. Siddhartha Polymers Ltd. & Anr

A Show Cause Notice was issued on 31st March, 2003 alleging that the imported consignments had been mis-declared both in regard to description and value. In the Show Cause Notice it was alleged that Prime Quality Goods (P.C. Sheets) were claimed as re- generated/recycled which goods have been under valued at around US $ 1055 per M.T. as against the normal value of over US $ 3500 per M.T. Accordingly, the notice proposed to recover -2- short levied duty of around Rs. 10 crores under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 + penalty under Section 112. The Show Cause Notice was contested by the assessees.

The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs.

In our view, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is perfunctory. It does not analyse the evidence on record. Whether the Adjudicating Authority was right or wrong is not being answered by us? Our objection is directed only to the way in which the Tribunal has disposed of the appeals filed by the assessee before it. Therefore, keeping all questions open and keeping all contentions on both sides expressly open, we set aside the impugned judgments of the Tribunal dated 19th June, 2007 and 14th August, 2007 and remit the matters to the Tribunal for de novo consideration in accordance with law, both on the question of mis-description as well as on the question of under valuation. We re- iterate that we express no opinion on the merits of the case. Accordingly, the Department's Civil Appeals are allowed with no order as to costs.

The Tribunal is requested to hear and dispose of these appeals within a period of six months from today. It is made clear that during the pendency of the matters before the Tribunal, Department shall not take any coercive steps.
Commr.Of Sales Tax vs M/S Tata Iron & Steel Co.Ltd

The Department has sought to levy sales tax on sales made by M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (TISCO) in favour of Indian buyer(s) which was challenged by the respondent-assessee on the ground that the said sale had occasioned the import and, consequently, they fell within the first limb of Section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, which reads as under:

All contentions on both sides are expressly kept open. Parties are given liberty to file additional documents, if so advised, before the High Court.

For the aforestated reasons, the Department's Appeal stands allowed. The matter stands remitted to the High Court for its decision in accordance with law and in accordance with the directions given hereinabove.

No order as to costs.
Gwalior Mahila Mandal vs State Of M.P & Ors

2. The appellant is a society running several educational institutions, one of which is a Mahila Mandal Higher Secondary School at Danaoli. The third respondent claims to be the only recognized Upper Division Teacher in the said school.

3. On the retirement of an earlier Principal of the School (Uma Gadvekar), the appellant by letter dated 29.6.2004, sought a clarification from the District Education Officer, as to whether the third respondent being 2 the senior most teacher amongst the recognized staff should be appointed to the post of Principal. The District Education Officer sent a reply on 20.7.2004 stating that after 4.1.2000 the State Government was neither filling up the vacant posts in non-governmental institutions nor providing grant for the posts that were filled up and the institution may do so and bear the cost of running the institution. The District Education Officer, however, suggested that the third respondent may be permitted to work as In-charge Principal.

4. The appellant accordingly posted the third respondent as In-charge Principal on 21.7.2004. Thereafter the appellant transferred and posted the fourth respondent as regular Principal of Higher Secondary School, Danaoli, vide order dated 3.8.2004. The fourth respondent was earlier working as Principal of the Higher Secondary School run by the appellant at Kherapati.

6. A learned Single Judge of the MP High Court allowed the petition by order dated 10.2.2006 and quashed the order dated 3.8.2004 appointing the fourth respondent as Principal of the Danaoli School. He also directed that till a regular appointment was made to the post of Principal, the third respondent may be permitted to serve as In-charge Principal. The appeal filed by the appellant against the said order was dismissed by a Division Bench by order dated 30.8.2006. The present appeal is filed challenging the said order of the Division Bench.

11. But the applicability of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha (Anudan Ka Pradaya) 6 Adhiniyam, 1978 and the Madhya Pradesh Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha (Adhyapakon Tatha Anya Karmachariyon Ki Bharti) Niyam, 1979 would depend upon the fact whether it continues as an aided institution or unaided institution. The appellant may decide whether it wants to continue as an aided institution or whether it wants to be an unaided institution and take consequential action for appointment of a regular Principal. If it becomes an unaided institution, obviously the Act or the Rules regulating appointment will not apply, subject to fulfilment of the prescribed minimum qualifications. The appeal is accordingly disposed of, without expressing any opinion on merits.

..................................J [R. V. Raveendran] 7 ...................................J [Lokeshwar Singh Panta] New Delhi;

September 16, 2008.
Vinod Kumar vs M/S. Singmalon Equipment Pvt. Ltd.& Ors

2. These appeals relate to a dispute between the appellant (a shareholder and director who holds 40% of shares in the first respondent company) and the other share holders (respondents 2 to 5 - appellant's brother 2 and his family) and directors of the said company who hold 60% of the shares. In the year 1998, the appellant filed a petition under section 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, alleging oppression, and mismanagement. By orders dated 20.8.1999, 3.11.1999 and 1.5.2000, the Company Law Board (`Board' for short) gave an option to the appellant to sell his shares to respondents 2 to 5 Group at a price fixed by an independent valuer. On exercise of the option by the appellant, M/s Price Waterhouse Coopers were appointed as the valuer for determining the fair value of shares, based on the balance-sheet as on 31.3.1998. The valuer submitted a Report on 13.12.2001 valuing the shares at Rs.2044/- per share. On objections by both, the Board directed fresh valuation. The valuer reiterated its earlier valuation. Thereafter, the Board by its order dated 05.05.2003, accepted the valuation and held that the second respondent group will purchase the shares held by the appellant-Vinod Kumar at Rs.2044/- per share. As the appellant held 7,420 equity shares of Rs.100 each the Board arrived at the amount payable for the shares as Rs.1,51,66,480/-. It also directed that the payment should be made to the appellant positively by 31.7.2003. The Board directed the first respondent company to pay the arrears of salary/perquisites to the appellant for the period upto 31.3.2002. That order of the Board was 3 challenged by both the parties before the High Court. The appellant did not receive any payment either towards value of shares or towards salary and perquisites.

6. In view of the changed circumstances and in view of the submission of the appellant that the grounds urged by him for challenging the alteration of date of valuation as 31.3.2005 no longer exists, and the challenge to the order of the Board and the order of the High Court by both 5 parties, we consider it appropriate to set aside the order of the Company Law Board dated 5.5.2003 and the order of the High Court dated 16.6.2005 and remand the matter to the Board for reconsideration and fresh appropriate decision by taking note of all events which have taken place till now and the facts and circumstances as they exist today, in accordance with law. The appeals of both sides are allowed in part accordingly, leaving open all contentions. All pending applications stand disposed of.