L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Union Of India And Anr vs Harish Kumar

3. The respondent through his brother filed the writ petition in Delhi High Court on 21.11.2002 assailing the legality of the order of detention on various grounds. The only ground on which the writ petition was pressed and disposed of relates to non-consideration of the representation dated 01.10.2002 submitted to the Central Government by the detenu. It was contended that non-consideration of the said representation vitiated the order of detention being violative of the protection granted under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. The High Court, by the impugned judgment, allowed the writ petition holding that there has been a failure on the part of the Central Government in considering the representation of the detenu. The order of the High Court, however, is not clear and it may be useful to notice the operative portion thereof which reads as under:

4. We may at the outset state that in view of the fact the period of detention came to end by afflux of time and the detenu had already been released on 4.9.2003 the High Court could have simply disposed of the writ petition without going into the legality of the order of detention. The respondent appears to have pressed the writ petition in order to avoid further proceedings under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the SAFEMA"). Be it noted Section 2 of the SAFEMA provides that the provisions of the Act shall apply inter alia to every person in respect of whom an order of detention has been made under the COFEPOSA Act provided that such order of detention has not been set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction.

10. In our considered opinion the decision of this Court in Meena Jayendra Thakur (supra) is an authority for the proposition that an order of detention passed by the detaining authority on the basis of material made available for its consideration and at its satisfaction does not get vitiated because of a subsequent infraction of the detenu's right to make a representation and its disposal by the authorities. We are unable to agree with the submission of Dr. Singhvi, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent.

14. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the view that the High Court committed grave error in quashing the order of detention dated 14.6.2002. We accordingly declare that there are no legal impediment to proceed against the respondent under the provisions of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976.

15. The appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.
Mummidi Hemadri And Ors vs State Of Andhra Pradesh

In all, six accused persons faced trial. The present appeal is by accused 2, 3 and 6 (in short described as A-2, A-3 and A-6). It is to be noted that the present special leave petition so far as it relates to accused 1, 4 and 5 (in short described as A-1, A-4 and A-5) was dismissed by order dated 21.4.2006 while A-4 and A-5 were convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, A-1, A- 2, A-3 and A-6 were convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and each of the accused persons were convicted for the offence relatable to Section 148 IPC, for which they were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.100 each with default stipulation. In respect of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC each accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.300/- with default stipulation.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Dnyaneshwar vs State Of Maharashtra

1. Appellant before us is the husband of the deceased Leelabai. They were married on 31.5.2002. She was found dead at her matrimonial home on 3.4.2003.

2. On a post-mortem examination having been conducted, PW-9 Dr. Ravindra the Medical officer , civil Hospital, Jaina found the following ante-mortem injuries on her person:

4. Appellant before us as also his parents were prosecuted for commission of an offence of murder of Leelabai. The prosecution case proceeded on the basis that after the marriage; the appellant and his parents have all along been demanding a sum of Rs. 50,000/- from the parents of the deceased and was also being subjected to harassment and ill treatment.

5. First Information Report was lodged by PW.1 - Sheshrao, father of the deceased. In order toe prove the charge of harassment, apart from the father of the deceased, P.W.2-satayanarayan and P.W.5 Raghunath were examined. Relying on or/on the basis of the evidences adduced on behalf of the prosecution, the learned trial Judge held the appellant as also accused Nos. 2 and 3 guilty of commission of offences under Section 302 as well as under Section 498-A of the India Penal Code.

11. If the prosecution case in regard to homicidal nature of the death of the deceased is accepted, in our opinion, the ante-mortem injuries clearly go to show that she had been done to death. Only because P.W.9 - Dr. Ravindra failed to notice some injuries on her neck so as to arrive at a definite conclusion that the death was caused by asphyxia, we are of the opinion that the appellant in a case of this nature cannot take benefit thereof.

12. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It is dismissed accordingly.
Allahabad Ladies Club vs Jitendra Nath Singh And Ors

A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice:

Pursuant to the directions of this Court all the parties were heard and the respective stand was considered. The High Court by the impugned order which is common to these appeals held that there has been clear violation of the provisions of the Act and the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 (in short 'Development Act'). The appellants have questioned correctness of the view expressed by the High Court on several grounds. Primarily it is contended that there was no challenge to the lease granted to any of them. There was not even any prayer for cancellation of any lease. All the leases were executed long time back i.e. much before the Act and the Development Act were enacted. The appellants were impleaded in the writ petition by this Court's direction as they were not parties when the matter was earlier disposed of. There was no challenge in the writ petition to any unauthorized construction. The constructions made by the appellants were clearly authorized. The original writ petitioners have not made any grievance so far as the present appellants are concerned and the writ petition was filed making grievances to a limited extent which have nothing to do with the leases granted to the appellants. Therefore, the directions as given cannot be maintained.

We find that the High Court has unnecessarily enlarged the scope of the writ petition. Though in a public interest litigation it is permissible to take note of the necessary/connected matters; the position was not so in the present case. Challenge was not to the grant of lease. There was no averment made in petition that the constructions by the appellants were unauthorized. In the writ petition a few officers were impleaded.

Above being the position, we dispose of these appeals with the following directions.

To the aforesaid extent the appeals are allowed. Costs made easy.
Secretary Padippu K.S.Sangam Ltd vs C. Varghese

The only question arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant-society is engaged in `dairy farming'. The appellant is a co-operative Society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 and engaged in the collection of milk from its members and distribution thereof. The respondent herein is a milk user in the appellant-society whose work, according to the appellant, is mainly between 6.30 a.m. and 8.30 a.m. on all days. As per the settlement arrived at before the District Labour Officer Kasergod on September 20, 1990, the respondent was being paid a consolidated pay of Rs.350/- per month from April 1, 1990. The Assistant Labour Officer, Kasergod also informed the appellant on 25.03.1998 that the milk producing in co-operative Societies had not been included under the Minimum Wages Act by any Notification and that there was no orders fixing minimum wages for employees of such society.

During the pendency of the proceedings, the respondent was paid some salary including minimum wages. We make it clear that the amount which has already been paid shall not be recovered from the respondent. The appeal stands allowed accordingly.

No costs.
Bharat Co-Operative Bank (Mumbai) Ltd vs Co-Operative Bank Employees Union

4. Mainly aggrieved by transfer of eleven employees from one place to another, alleging it as an act of victimisation, the respondent filed a complaint against the Bank under Section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short "the MRTU & PULP Act"), along with an application for interim relief, before the Industrial Court at Mumbai. While resisting the complaint, the Bank raised certain preliminary issues of jurisdiction and maintainability of the complaint under the MRTU & PULP Act. The plea of the Bank was that as it was engaged in the business of banking and is a Banking Company as defined in Clause (c) of Section 5 of the BR Act, the appropriate government would be the Central Government and therefore, the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act, a State Act, were not applicable. The Industrial Court upheld the objection and ordered that the complaint may be returned to the respondent for seeking relief before an appropriate forum.

30. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. The appellant shall pay the costs of the respondent throughout.
Netraj Singh vs State Of M.P

The State preferred an appeal questioning the said order of acquittal. It appears that the matter was listed for hearing on 1.5.2006. There was no appearance on behalf of the present appellant who was the respondent in the appeal before the High Court when the matter was taken up for final hearing. The High Court proceeded to hear the appeal in the absence of learned counsel and reversed the order of acquittal and held the appellant guilty of charged offences.

In the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter for fresh consideration. To avoid unnecessary delay, let the parties appear before the High Court on 13th April, 2007 so that appropriate orders can be passed by the concerned bench. The name of Mr. Ashutosh Singh who was permitted to appear on behalf of the present appellant by order dated 31.1.2005 shall be indicated in the cause list and not the name of learned counsel who was earlier appearing. We make it clear that by remitting the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Zuari Industries Ltd vs Commissioner Of Central Excise & ...

Assessee is the manufacturer of fertilizers at their facility at Goa. It obtained registration of all their imports required for expansion of their fertilizer project under the provisions of the Project Import Regulations, 1986 (for short "the PIR"). In respect of the said expansion, the goods imported were entitled to the benefit of Project Import Assessment under Heading 98.01 of the Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and correspondingly the company was entitled to the benefit of customs exemption Notification No. 11/97 dated 1.3.1997. The said notification specified nil rate of duty in respect of "goods required for fertilizer plant". Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers was the duly constituted Sponsoring Authority under the said PIR. The said Ministry had issued a certificate dated 22.10.1997 (Essentiality Certificate) to the effect that the import of capital goods for expansion of the fertilizer project stood examined and the list of goods annexed to the certificate had been attested from the essentiality angle by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India. At this stage, it may be noted that in their application for issuance of essentiality certificate, the assessee had stated that on account of load shedding in the concerned area, a Captive Power Plant was essential for the substantial expansion of the fertilizer project. By the said essentiality certificate dated 22.10.1997, the sponsoring Ministry requested the Customs to exempt the customs duty on import of equipments by the assessee vide Notification No. 11/97. The said certificate indicated vide item nos. 14.a and 14.b, a 6 Mega Watt Captive Power Plant. The essentiality certificate 'recommended' the said Captive Power Plant as part of the entire capital goods required by the assessee-company for substantial expansion of the fertilizer project.

4.a) Vibrating Screen complete with static dust casting motor & other accessories M/s Chauvin S.A., 13a 25 Rue Alfred De Vigny, BP 2426- 38034 Grenoble, Cedex 2, France.

9.a) Link Chain No. 6859 R with attachments M/s Jeffrey Chain Corporation, 2307 Maden Drive, Morristown, Tennessee 37813, U.S.A. 900 Ft.
Manjuri Bera vs Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. And Anr

3. Factual position is undisputed and needs a brief reference.

On 11.5.1998 deceased lost his life in a vehicular accident and the offending vehicle, a Mini Truck registration No.WB-29/0185 belonged to respondent No.2. As the deceased had no other legal heir, a claim petition was lodged claiming compensation. Respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the 'insurer') with whom the offending vehicle was the subject- matter of insurance filed a written statement taking the stand that since the claimant was not dependant upon the deceased, there was no question of any compensation being paid. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Midnapore at Tamluk, District Midnapore (in short the 'Tribunal') dismissed the claim petition accepting the stand of the insurer.

12. Judged in that background where a legal representative who is not dependant files an application for compensation, the quantum cannot be less than the liability referable to Section 140 of the Act. Therefore, even if there is no loss of dependency the claimant if he or she is a legal representative will be entitled to compensation, the quantum of which shall be not less than the liability flowing from Section 140 of the Act. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There will be no order as to costs. We record our appreciation for the able assistance rendered by Shri Jayant Bhushan, the learned Amicus Curiae.

13. Although I agree with the operative part of the judgment proposed to be delivered by my esteemed brother Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J, I would like to give my own reasons.

18. For the above separate reasons, I agree with the conclusion, namely, the appeal be allowed with no order as to costs.
Surinder Singh vs Union Of India & Ors

Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the filing of this appeal are thus:

Shri U.S. Puria, Assistant Director General (ED), Department of Posts, New Delhi, in his counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has stated that Dharam Pal, respondent No. 4, was appointed provisionally as EDDA by the Area Sub-Divisional ASPOs with effect from 26.04.1997 on compassionate ground in place of his father Babu Ram who died on 26.04.1997 while working as EDDA, Tangore, B.O. in Kurukshetra. He stated that the appointment of respondent No. 4 was subject to the approval of Chief Post Master General, Haryana Circle, Ambala. Respondent No. 4 worked as EDDA from 26.04.1997 to 31.03.1999. The Circle Selection Committee later on has found that two sons of the deceased Babu Ram were already in employment, therefore, the claim of respondent No. 4 for appointment to the post of EDDA on compassionate grounds was rejected. The charge of EDDA, Tangore B.O., Kurukshetra was handed over to Budh Singh, a regular ED employee of Kurukshetra Division, who was on deputation to Army Postal Service and discharged from the said service on 15.03.1999. Budh Singh joined service on 31.03.1999 when respondent No. 4 was relieved from the job. However, Budh Singh absented from the duty w.e.f. 1.4.1999. Departmental proceedings were initiated against Budh Singh as per the Rules. Finally, Budh Singh was removed from the service by the Competent Authority vide order dated 15.09.1999. In these circumstances, the post of EDDA was notified to the Employment Exchange and general public by the respondent-Department. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had justified the selection and appointment of the appellant on the basis of marks secured by him in Matriculation examination, which according to them is a preferential qualification, as per the Guidelines/Norms/Instructions prescribed by the Competent Authority.

In view of the above-stated factual situation and settled position of law, the orders of the CAT as well as the High Court cannot be sustained.

For the above-said reasons, the appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The judgment and order dated 27.09.2000 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP Nos.13280-CAT/2000 confirming the order of the CAT, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh, in O.A. Nos.171 HR/2000 is quashed and set aside. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are directed to take necessary steps for facilitating the resumption of the duties of the appellant on the post of EDDA. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam And Anr vs Radhey Shyam Gautam & Anr

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court questioning correctness of the order passed by a Division Bench in the Special Appeal filed by the appellant against an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge permitting the respondent No.1 to continue in service of the appellant No.1 till attaining the age of 60 years. The case of the appellant before both learned Single Judge and the Division Bench was that the standard age of retirement of its employees is 58 years and the writ petitioner i.e. respondent No.1 was no exception. The Special Appeal was filed stating that the interim order was contrary to the view taken by a Division Bench in Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer Karmik, UP Jal, Nigam, Lakhnow and Ors. [2002 (2) UPLBEC 1511]. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal.

Regulation 31 "31. Besides the provision made under these Regulations, the pay and allowances, pension, leave, imposition of penalty and other terms and conditions of service shall be governed by such rules, regulations and orders which are equally applicable to other serving government servants concerned functioning in the State."

In Harwindra Kumar's case (supra) the Division Bench decision on which the appellant places reliance was challenged. Orders passed by the High Court dismissing the writ petitions as well as those by tile Nigam directing that the appellants of the Civil Appeals and the petitioners of the writ petitions would superannuate upon completion of the age of 58 years were set aside and it was directed that in case the employees have been allowed to continue up to the age of 60 years by virtue of some interim order, no recovery shall be made from them but in case, however, they have not been allowed to continue after completing the age of 58 years by virtue of erroneous decision taken by tile Nigam for no fault of theirs. They would be entitled to payment of salary for the remaining period up to the age of 60 years which was to be paid to them within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this Court's order by the Nigam. It appears that the High Court placed reliance on the decision in Harwindra Kumar's case (supra). Additionally, in Chairman, U.P.Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh & Anr. (JT 2006(10) SC 500) the decision was reiterated in the following terms:

In view of what has been stated above the inevitable conclusion is that the appeal is sans merit, deserves dismissal, which we direct.
Union Of India vs K. Indrasena Reddy And Anr

4. The applications of respondent No. 1 filed in this behalf in terms of the said scheme having been rejected by the appropriate Government, a writ petition was filed before High Court. By an order dated 13.11.1998 passed in writ Petition No. 33261/1998 it directed the appellants herein to take appropriate decision on the application of the said first respondent and consider his case for grant of pension under the said scheme.

(iii) he is one for whose detention, an order of arrest was issued but not served.

13. We are, therefore, satisfied that respondent No. 1 has not been able to establish that he fulfilled the eligibility criteria/conditions laid down under the said scheme.

14. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly, The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Kandaswamy vs State Of Tamil Nadu

4. The appellant questioning the correctness of the judgment and conviction and sentence as imposed by the Trial Court under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo for life imprisonment.

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.

11 Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender."

19. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.

21. When the factual scenario is considered in the background of the legal principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the end of justice.

22. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid direction.

J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ...............................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, July 17, 2008 16