L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Manoj Kumar vs Govt.Of Nct Of Delhi & Ors

4. The third respondent issued a notice dated 20.8.2008 to the appellant calling upon him to show cause why his services should not be terminated under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 for showing his date of birth wrongly as 8.9.1988, instead of 8.11.1989, in his application for employment. The appellant submitted a reply dated 9.9.2008 stating that his correct date of birth was 8.9.1988; that the matriculation certificate contained a wrong date; and that he had already approached the authorities for correction and that he had also filed a suit in that behalf. However the third respondent did not accept the explanation and terminated the appellant's services by order dated 5.12.2008.

6. The representations dated 7.1.2009 and 21.1.2009 submitted by the appellant against the termination order were rejected by the fourth respondent, by order dated 19.3.2009. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the Central Administrative Tribunal challenging the termination. 4 The Tribunal dismissed his application on 14.5.2009. The review application filed by him was also dismissed by the Tribunal on 8.7.2009. The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court dismissed the writ petition by order dated 20.10.2009. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

10. We are therefore of the view that the termination cannot be sustained. The appeal is therefore allowed, the order of the High Court, the orders of the CAT and the order of termination are set aside. As a consequence the appellant shall be taken back into service within two months, with continuity 7 of service and permitted to complete his training. The appellant will not be entitled to any backwages.
State Of H.P.& Anr vs M/S Himachal Techno Engineers & Anr

2. The appellant (State of Himachal Pradesh represented by the Executive Engineer, I&PH Division, Hamirpur) entered into a contract with the respondent on 15.7.2002, for the construction of a water purification plant. The respondent raised a dispute in regard to the payment for extra work, which was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator made an award dated 5.11.2007 in favour of the respondent and sent it to the parties by speed post. The postal cover containing the award was received by a peon/beldar in the office of the Executive Engineer on 10.11.2007 (a Saturday) which was a 2 government holiday. 11th November, 2007 being a Sunday was also a holiday. It was received by the Executive Engineer on 12.11.2007.

Re : Question (ii)

Re: Question (iii)

Conclusion

13. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside. The delay of twenty eight days on the part of the appellant in filing the application under section 34 of the Act being within the limit of condonable delay, is condoned, as sufficient cause was shown. The matter is remanded to the High Court for consideration of the petition under section 34 of the Act on merits, in accordance with law.
Shashikant Bansal vs Gwalior Improve.Trust/Gwalior ...

2. The appellant's land comprised in Khasra Nos. 48 to 53, 60 to 63 and 65 to 67 measuring 16.04 Bighas situated in Keshobaagh, Gwalior was acquired for execution of the residential scheme framed by the respondent. The appellant was offered a sum of Rs.1,98,975/- as compensation for the land, house and wells existing over the land but he did not accept the same. Therefore, a reference was made under Section 72(3) of the Act to the Joint Tribunal of All Town Improvement Trusts of Madhya Pradesh (for short, `the Tribunal'). The Tribunal considered the rival pleadings and evidence and passed award dated 14.7.1992, the relevant portion of which reads thus:

3. Feeling dissatisfied with the market value fixed by the Tribunal, the appellant preferred an appeal under Section 147 of the Act. The Division Bench of the High Court partly allowed the appeal and fixed the market value of the land at the rate of Rs.1.50 per square feet but ordered deduction of development cost at the rate of 25%. The Division Bench rejected the appellant's claim for award of interest on solatium by relying upon the judgment of this Court in Yadavrao P. Pathade v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 2 SCC 570.

8. In the result, Civil Appeal No.9525 of 2003 is allowed and Civil Appeal No.9529 of 2003 is dismissed. The respondent is directed to pay enhanced compensation to the appellant in terms of the judgment of the High Court without making any deduction. The appellant shall also be entitled to interest on solatium. The amount payable to the appellant in terms of this judgment should be paid within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this judgment.
Ittianam & Ors vs Cherichi @ Padmini

3. The material facts on which there is not much dispute are that the testator Ippuru's first wife Kunhiri died, leaving behind daughter Molutty and son Vareed who died on 8.1.86. The wife and children of Vareed, since deceased, are the plaintiffs. The second wife of Ippuru, Kunjila, is the 7th plaintiff. She has two daughters Mariyamma, the 8th plaintiff and the other daughter is Padmini @ Cherichi, the defendant and respondent herein.

4. By a sale deed, being Exhibit-B1, dated 2.5.67, Kunjila, the second wife of Ippuru, sold to Ippuru half of her rights in respect of item Nos. 4 to 7 of the properties in the Will bequeathed by Ippuru. The other half of the property belonged to her son Vareed. Both the sale deed 2 and the Will were registered on 8.5.1967, Ippuru died on 20.7.71.

5. In the Will of Ippuru, seven items of properties were bequeathed and out of which items 1 to 3 were given to one Molutty, daughter of the testator by his first wife. Items 4 to 7 of the properties were previously owned in equal moieties by Vareed and Kunjila, the second wife of Ippuru. Kunjila, as noted above, sold her share to Ippuru on 2.5.67 but the sale deed was registered on 8.5.67, the same day when the Will was registered.

37. We fail to appreciate the relevance of the ratio in Ram Saran (supra) to the facts of the present case.

39. For the reasons discussed above the appeal is allowed. We are constrained to set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the District Judge. No order as to costs. CIVIL APPEAL NO.4432 OF 2003

40. For the reasons discussed above and in view of the order passed in Civil Appeal No. 7226 of 2002, this appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Siddanki Ram Reddy vs State Of A.P

2. The facts very briefly are that on February 28, 2005 one Komidi Sai Baba Reddy (deceased) was killed in the court premises of R.R. District at Cyberabad. The father of the deceased lodged a First Information Report (FIR) before the Station House Officer, P.S. L.B. Nagar alleging that on February 28, 2005 at 11.00 a.m. when the deceased was 2 coming to the court, Narsimha Reddy's son, Srinivas Reddy and others sprinkled chilly powder in the eyes of the deceased and cut him by an axe and all this was done due to old vengeance. After investigation, a charge sheet was filed against 15 accused persons including the appellant in the court of the Second Metropolitan Magistrate, R.R. District, Cyberabad. As accused nos. 11 to 15 were absconding, the case was split up and accused nos. 1 to 10 were tried for several charges in Sessions Case No.195 of 2005. After the trial the 5th Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) acquitted accused nos. 2 to 10 of the charges and convicted the appellant, who was the accused no.1, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- and in default to suffer Simple Imprisonment for one year.

23. In the result, we allow this appeal and set-aside the impugned judgments of the High Court and the trial court and direct that the appellant, who is in custody, be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
Gulab Singh vs State Of Punjab

In the light of the fact that the High Court has thought it fit to convict the appellants under Section 304 Part II simplicitor of the Indian Penal Code with a sentence of 10 years R.I. and also in the light of the fact that the prosecution started in the year 1993 and the appellants have already undergone more than one year of the sentence awarded to them, we think it would be appropriate to reduce the sentence to 5 years R.I. We modify the impugned order to the above extent. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

In the light of the fact that the High Court has thought it fit to convict the appellants under Section 304 Part II simplicitor of the Indian Penal Code with a sentence of 10 years R.I. and also in the light of the fact that the prosecution started in the year 1993 and the appellants have already undergone more than one year of the sentence awarded to them, we think it would be appropriate to reduce the sentence to 5 years R.I. We modify the impugned order to the above extent. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

......................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] ......................J [C.K. PRASAD] NEW DELHI JULY 27, 2010.
Gen.Manager,Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors vs Daya Singh

respondent at the relevant time in 1997-99 was working as a Manager of a Branch of Punjab & Sind Bank in Kanpur and he was directed to be dismissed for misconduct after a departmental inquiry vide order dated 6th June, 2003. The respondent had challenged this order and two subsequent orders in his writ petition to the High Court and these orders have been set aside by the impugned judgment and order. Being aggrieved by the same, this appeal has been filed by the General Manager (P) on behalf of Bank. Apart from setting aside order of dismissal, High Court directed the reinstatement of the respondent. The respondent moved a contempt petition for non-implementation thereof. This Court vide its order dated 7th May, 2007 has stayed the contempt proceedings. Subsequently, leave was granted on appellant's Special leave petition on 6th September, 2007. Mr. Rajiv Nanda, learned Counsel has appeared for the appellant. The respondent has appeared in person.

Short facts leading to this appeal

2. As stated above, the respondent was working as a Manager of the appellant's Branch (earlier an extension counter) at Guru Nanak Girls Degree College, Sunder Nagar, Kanpur. In a vigilance inspection, it was found on 8th of March, 1999 that some 20 loans to the tune of Rs.16.48 lacs were disbursed to some persons against FDRs though the FDRs were in the names of altogether different persons. It was also seen that the withdrawals which were allowed, were far in excess over the amounts in the FDRs. All those entries were in the hand-writing of the respondent.

4.The appellant Bank issued a charge-sheet to the respondent containing the following charges :

11. After considering the inquiry report, the Zonal Manager who was the disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that the respondent has committed misconduct under Clause 3(1) and 15(v) read with Regulation No.24 of the Punjab & Sind Bank Officers Employees (Conduct) Regulations 1981. He concurred with the findings of the inquiry officer. Therefore, by the order dated 6th June, 2003, he imposed the penalty of dismissal from service alongwith recovery of pecuniary loss under `Punjab and Sind Bank officer/employees (Discipline and appeal) Regulation 1997. That order has been subsequently confirmed in the internal appeal and in review.

Resultant Conclusions

20. In these facts and circumstances, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The petition filed by the respondent in the High Court will stand dismissed. Consequently, contempt proceedings initiated by him will also stand dismissed.
Rekhaben H Sheth vs Charu K Mehta & Ors

3. The aforesaid Respondents Nos.2 and 3 in SLP(C)No.35164/09 challenged the said order of the Joint Charity Commissioner in Writ Petition Nos.3849 and 3850 of 2008. By common orders passed in those writ petitions on 11th July, 2008 and 15th July, 2008, the orders impugned in the writ petitions were set aside and the Joint Charity Commissioner was directed to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. Thereafter, the Joint Charity 4 Commissioner passed an ad-interim order on 9th September, 2008, restraining the Petitioner and the Respondent Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5 herein from taking any policy decision and entering into financial transactions, without the prior approval of the Joint Administrators appointed by this Court. Aggrieved by the said ad- interim order, the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein filed Writ Petition No.5732/08, wherein the High Court modified the aforesaid order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner on 9th September, 2008. The operative part of the order of the Joint Charity Commissioner was modified to the extent that the prior approval was to be taken not from the Administrators but from the Joint Charity Commissioner.

5. In the Contempt Petition filed by the Respondent No.1 herein, it has been alleged that the Petitioner herein and the Respondents Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5 had withdrawn huge amounts from the Trust funds and had issued cheques in favour of solicitors and advocates appearing for them in the litigations pending before the various courts, including the proceedings before the Joint Charity Commissioner under Section 41D of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. Rejecting the defence of the Petitioner and the Respondents Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5 herein 6 that payment of fees to advocates and solicitors did not amount to financial transactions being undertaken by the Trust and that the services of the advocates and solicitors had to be engaged to defend the interest of the Trust, the learned Single Judge observed that the question as to whether payments to advocates were financial transactions within the meaning of the order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner, as modified by the High Court, was still at large.

17. In these circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the High Court and the Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
Hem Singh(Dead) By Lrs. & Ors vs Gianoo And Ors

The appellants herein were the plaintiffs in a suit, bearing No.123/136 of 1964/1965, filed with the prayer for a mandatory injunction in which the respondents herein were the defendants. The said suit was 2 decreed in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendants were restrained from interfering, in any manner, in Khasra No.1665 measuring 5-0-9 Bighas, situated in Village Bakarta, Tehsil Sarkaghat.

In this view of the matter, we are constrained to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. Consequently, the judgment and order dated 29.4.1989 of the First Appellate Court i.e Court of Additional District Judge, Mandi, is restored and this appeal is accordingly allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.

.....................J (DALVEER BHANDARI) .....................J (DEEPAK VERMA) New Delhi;

July 29, 2010.

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DALVEER BHANDARI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK VERMA For Appellant(s) Mr. T.N. Singh,Adv.

Mr. Shekhar Raj Sharma,Adv.

Mr. Chandra Prakash Pandey,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Himinder Lal,Adv.

UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, the judgment and order dated 29.4.1989 of the First Appellate Court i.e Court of Additional District Judge, Mandi, is restored and this appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.

(Signed order is placed on the file)
Dhondiram vs State Of Maharashtra

2. The only prayer made by the learned counsel is that the case of the appellant fell within Exception IV of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. We see from the evidence in the case that this cannot be the position in this matter. It is the admitted position that the appellant had been estranged from his wife, Archana, who had accordingly gone to live with her maternal grandmother, the deceased. It is in evidence that three days prior to the incident the appellant had gone to the home of the deceased and had insisted that his wife return with him and on her refusal to do so he had quarreled with her. It is also in evidence that the appellant had returned to the house of the deceased a little after midnight three CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 240 of 2007 2 days thereafter and caused an injury to his wife with an axe and when the deceased attempted to intervene he caused her a very severe injury on the middle of the head leading to her immediate death. The post mortem report reveals a fracture of the parietal bones across the skull. We also find that in the facts mentioned above, that the murder was pre-meditated that the appellant took undue advantage of his position and committed the murder of a helpless old woman who was in fact urging the wife of the appellant, to return to her matrimonial home. We thus find no merit in this appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed.

......................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] ......................J [C.K. PRASAD] NEW DELHI JULY 29, 2010.
Ravindra Tukaram Hiwale vs State Of Maharashtra

The appellant was married with the deceased Alka after the death of his first wife. As per the prosecution story at about 7.00 a.m. on 6th February, 1990 the deceased suffered serious burn injuries in the kitchen of the house and ultimately died of those injuries. It is the prosecution case that at about 8.30 a.m. on the 9th February 1990 she made a dying declaration to PW.10 - a Police Head Constable, in which she stated that she had a quarrel with her husband over the house-hold chores and over the feeding of the children and she had thereafter poured kerosene on herself and then burnt herself.

The Trial Court on a consideration of the evidence convicted the appellant for offences punishable under Section 498-A and to a sentence of one year and under Section 306 to a sentence of four years. The appellant thereafter filed an appeal in the High Court of -2- Bombay whereas the State of Maharashtra also filed an appeal pleading for a higher sentence. The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed. The appeal filed by the State was allowed and the sentence awarded by the Trial Court under Section 306 IPC was enhanced from four to six years. It is in this situation that the matter is before us.

We accordingly allow the appeal, quash the sentence awarded by the High Court and confirm the judgment of the Trial Court. In the meantime, we also direct that the appellant who is in custody, shall be released forthwith if not required in connection with any other case. .................J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI) .................J. (C.K. PRASAD) New Delhi, August 2, 2010.
Sulochana Chandrakant Galande vs Pune Municipal Transport & Ors

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to the present case are that the Act, 1976 was enacted to provide for imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith. The said Act prescribed the maximum ceiling to which the land can be retained by the owner and determination of the surplus land and transfer thereof in favour of the State after drawing the final statement under Section 9 of the Act, 1976, and the State would acquire the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit under Section 10 of the Act, 1976. The Act came into force on 17 th February, 1976. On the said date, the suit land was not within urban limits, however it was included in the urban area residential zone only with effect from 17.05.1976, by extending the limits of the Municipal Corporation. The suit land was acquired under the Act, 1976, in the years 1978-1979 and its possession was taken and handed over to Pune Municipal Transport (for short PMT) for establishing a bus depot and staff quarters. In 1988, the bus depot was constructed on a part of the suit land, however, the appellant preferred a revision under Section 34 of the Act, 1976, dated 6.4.1998 contending that the land ought not to have been acquired 2 under the Act, 1976, on the ground that on the date of commencement of the Act, 1976, i.e. 17.2.1976, the suit land was not within the limits of urban area. In order to substantiate the claim, reliance was placed on the Judgment of this Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2465, wherein it has been held that for the purpose of the Act, 1976, the categorization of the land in the Master Plan in existence at the time of commencement of the Act into force was a relevant factor and any subsequent change in the Master Plan cannot be taken into consideration. The said application was allowed by the Hon'ble Minister, exercising his revisional powers by order dated 29.09.1998.

In view of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion that the Revisional powers cannot be used arbitrarily at belated stage for the reason that the order passed in Revision under Section 34 of the Act, 1976, is a judicial order. What should be reasonable time, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

32. From the above, the following factual situation emerges:

35. Thus, in view of the above, the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

..................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) .............................
Bhiaru Ram & Ors vs Central Bureau Of Investigation & Ors

2) Factual Matrix On 29.09.2005, a First Information Report (in short "FIR") was registered at New Delhi bearing FIR No. RC 3A/2005/ACU(V), for offences under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against one Shri B.R. Meena, who is respondent No.3 herein. At the relevant time, respondent No.3 was posted as Commissioner of Income-Tax, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai. The substance of allegations in the FIR against Shri B.R. Meena was that he was in possession of disproportionate assets from 01.04.1991 to 31.03.2005. During the said period, he was posted at various places such as Calcutta, Ahmedabad, Jaipur and Mumbai. After carrying out the search at the official residence of Shri B.R. Meena and his family members at various places, finally, the C.B.I., on 27.03.2008, filed charge sheet before the Court of Special Judge, CBI, Greater Mumbai. In the said charge sheet, petitioner Nos. 1-9 was arrayed as accused Nos. 5-13.

3) Reasons for transfer According to the petitioners, as per the charge sheet, most of the alleged disproportionate assets/properties are situated at Rajasthan and most of the witnesses are from Rajasthan, Jaipur, in particular. As far as the petitioners are concerned, the allegations against them are of having abetted Shri B.R. Meena-Respondent No. 3 herein and Smt. Champa Devi, wife of Shri B.R. Meena, Respondent No. 4 herein, by fabricating false evidence through preparation of false Agreement to Sell in order to help them for justifying the huge cash recoveries. All the petitioners are residents of the State of Rajasthan. Most of the alleged disproportionate assets are situated at Rajasthan and FIRs were registered at Delhi, therefore, the CBI ought to have filed charge sheet at Jaipur, Rajasthan. It is also stated by the petitioners that since all of them hail from Rajasthan and most of the witnesses to be examined are also residents of Rajasthan, for convenience, 3 the case pending before the Special Judge, CBI, Greater Mumbai be transferred to Jaipur, Rajasthan.

10) In the light of the above discussion and conclusion, the transfer petition is dismissed.

AUGUST 3, 2010.