L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
M/S Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd vs Devki Devi And Ors

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

However, appellant decided to give work to them on contract basis by appointing them as contractor for maintenance of office records, cleaning and mopping of floors etc. on a consolidated amount. As contractors they were liable to pay provident fund and other statutory liabilities for the labourers engaged by them to carry out the contracts. The respondents were appointed as contractors from time to time. After the meeting which was held on 12.8.1988 the Head Office vide letter dated 27.5.1998 took a decision that contract labour arrangement should cease. It was also decided that in view of financial stringencies it has been decided to dispense with system forthwith and existing contractual agreements were to be reviewed.

With effect from 1.8.1998 contracts with the respondents were terminated. Respondents raised industrial dispute which was referred to the Labour Court U.P. Dehradun who gave the award against the appellant-company on the ground that the said respondents were the workmen and they were entitled to be regularized. It applied the principle of lifting the veil of contract to find out the correct position.

Against the said order, the appellant-company filed Writ Petitions which were dismissed on the ground that the minutes of the meeting dated 12.8.1988 was a settlement between the parties in terms of Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the 'ID Act') read with Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 (in short the 'Central Rules'). High Court recorded a finding that the settlement between the employer and employees acquired a statutory status, as a result of which the job contractors cannot be said to be contract labourers. In fact they are workmen in view of their engagement. Therefore, the respondents cannot be said to be contract labourers but were in reality workmen.

Above being the position, the Labour Court and the High Court were not justified in holding that the respondent in each case was a workman and/or that there was retrenchment involved. The award of the Labour Court and the judgment of the High Court are therefore set aside The appeals are allowed but with no order as to costs.
State Bank Of India & Anr vs Mula Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22576 of 2005) Leave granted.

BACKGROUND FACTS The Respondent is a cooperative society. It has a sugar factory. It entered into a contract for installation of a paper plant at village Sonai on turnkey basis so as to enable it to utilize the left over material called "bagasse" of the sugarcane with M/s. Pentagon Engineering Pvt. Ltd. (for short "Pentagaon"). The total value of the contract was Rs. 3,40,00,000/-. Pentagon furnished a performance guarantee in regard to the machinery supplied by it. The said contract contained a clause for retention of 10% of the contract price by the cooperative society in the following terms:

Pentagon, however, by a letter dated 6th April, 1985 suggested for a modification as regards the said payment clause regulating the cooperative society to waive its rights to retain the said 10% of the contract price, and in its turn proposed to have a letter of credit so that they can furnish appropriate bank guarantee; to which the cooperative society accepted stating:

THE DISPUTE Disputes and differences arose by and between the cooperative society and Pentagon. The contract of Pentagon was terminated by the cooperative society by a notice dated 17th July, 1987. A claim of Rs.3,23,28,209.10 was also raised. Pentagon not only denied and disputed its liability to pay the said sum but also, on the other hand, asserted that an amount of Rs.4,66,73,300/- was due and owing to it by a letter dated 18th July, 1987.

ORDER OF THE COURT The matter relating to passing of an interim order went upto the High Court. The High Court by an order dated 23rd February, 1988 directed that the said amount be retained by the Appellant subject to the condition that in the event, the suit is decreed the said amount would be paid with interest @ 12% per annum. The suit was dismissed. An appeal was preferred thereagainst by the cooperative society before the High Court. The High Court construing the said agreement dated 25.9.1983 to be a Bank Guarantee decreed the suit directing Appellant to pay the said sum of Rs.34,00,000/- with interest @ 14% per annum.

The said decision, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be said to have any application here.

RATE OF INTEREST Contention of Mr. Vahanvati as regards the rate of interest is also incontrovertible. The order dated 23rd February, 1988 clearly states that the amount would be repaid with an interest @ 12% and in that view of the matter, the High Court could not have directed payment of interest @ 14%.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The decree of the trial court is restored. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 5000/-.
V.N. Ratheesh vs State Of Kerala

Witnesses were questioned, statements recorded and final report was filed against him for the aforesaid offence. He pleased not guilty to the charge, whereupon prosecution examined ten witnesses, marked sixteen exhibits and MOs. 1 to 4. When questioned under Sections 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short the 'Cr.PC') he denied the incident as alleged, gave his own version and said that the deceased Tharingil Sunny (PW 2) and others never let him live in peace, that on 19.8.1994they trespassed into his house, assaulted him, his wife and children. He was hospitalized for treatment of the injuries sustained. On his complaint a case was also registered against them. He had to leave the place and take up residence in another place. On the ill-fated day he had come to Kanhangad for purchasing some articles for his pilgrimage to Sabarimala and medicines for his child. At the bus stand the seven accused persons, against whom he had filed complaint, along with Aravindakshan (PW3) and one Pappan, surrounded and attacked him. The deceased held him and he was assaulted by one Kutty. He tried to wriggle out to escape, when PW2 tried to stab him the blow accidentally fell upon the deceased. He denied that he inflicted injuries upon him as alleged, and maintained his innocence. He further stated that the local police was inimical towards him following a complaint filed by him against the then C.I. and three police constables. The investigation was one sided and biased. Exts. D1 to 3 were marked, but no witness was examined in defence.

Judged on the touchstone of the principles indicated above, the High Court's judgment is clearly indefensible. By making observations in an abstract and general manner it concluded that the discrepancies were immaterial, without even discussing the factors which weighed with the trial court to hold that the prosecution evidence was not cogent and credible. Therefore, the order of acquittal should not have been set aside in the manner as done.

The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appellant is on bail, bail bonds shall stand cancelled.
Chhanni vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

An application was filed by the appellant before the High Court which was numbered as Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.469 of 2006 for modification of the judgment and order dated 25.8.2004. Prayer was that he should be directed to be released on probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (in short the 'Probation Act') or in the alternative under Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). The High Court noted that there was no provision for permitting modification of an order and in fact the plea which was pressed into service was not urged before the High Court when the Criminal Appeal was heard. Accordingly the application was rejected.

The appeal is allowed.
Subhaga & Ors vs Shobha & Ors

2. This Appeal by Special Leave is by the legal representatives of the original plaintiff in O.S. No.1326 of 1957 on the file of the Munsif, Mohammadabad Gobarn at Azamgarh. The suit was one for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants in the suit to demolish further constructions put up by them and to fill up a well dug by them in the property claimed to belong to the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed title and possession over the suit property which was described in the plaint and got demarcated in a sketch. The claim of the plaintiff was that the construction had been put up in plot No. 1301/1 Ba in Village Sarhan Kolla Pargana Mahal, District Azamgarh. The defendants resisted the suit essentially on a plea that the constructions put up by them did not lie in plot No. 1301. They, of course, denied the title and possession claimed by the plaintiff over the portions in which the constructions and the well stood.

7. We, therefore, allow this appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree of the High Court in S.A. No. 1782 of 1976, restore the judgment and decree of the trial court in O.S. No. 1326 of 1957 as affirmed in Civil Appeal No. 112 of 1973 on the file of the Additional Civil Judges Court, Azamgarh. We make no order as to costs in this Appeal but the appellants would be entitled to their costs in the courts below.
State Of Haryana And Anr vs Shri Om Prakash

The State of Haryana calls in question correctness of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court holding that the respondent was entitled to pension in terms of Rule 4(iii) of the Punjab Government National Emergency (Concession) Rules, 1965 (in short the 'Rules'). A writ petition was filed by the respondent before the High Court claiming that he is entitled to pension taking into consideration the services rendered by him in the Armed Forces during the period when emergency was proclaimed. Placing reliance on Rule 4 (iii), the aforesaid claim of the respondent was declined by the appellant. It was stated that there was a gap of more than three years between the date of discharge from the Armed Forces and his date of appointment as Veterinary Live Stock Development Assistant.

In the writ petition filed the respondent re-iterated his claim for pension. According to him he fulfilled the conditions and therefore he was entitled to pension. The State reiterated its stand that since there was a gap of more than three years, he was not entitled to any pension. The High Court held that the respondent was entitled to pensionary benefits because the services rendered by him during the period of his military service when emergency remained proclaimed shall be counted in addition to the qualifying service rendered by him in civil employment for the purpose of determining pensionary benefits. A direction was given to work out the details and grant the benefits.

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no dispute that the date of discharge is 13.6.1967 and the appointment was made in the year 1972. But the process for selection had started in 1970. It is urged that his services were regularized from 1972 after he had undergone military service. The aforesaid plea is clearly untenable in view of the clear language of Rule 4(iii) as quoted above. There being no dispute that the appointment was made in 1972. It is irrelevant as to when the process of selection had started or when the respondent had undergone training as claimed. The language of Rule 4(iii) is very clear to the effect that the period has to be reckoned between the date of discharge upto the date of appointment. When the period is undisputedly more than three years respondent is not entitled to pensionary benefits in terms of Rule 4(iii) and the High Court erred in holding otherwise. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed. But there shall be no order as to costs.
Director, Town Planning Maharashtra ... vs Bhalchandra Vasantrao Kulkarni

The respondent was working as a Peon in the establishment of Director, Town Planning, Akola. An order of termination was passed taking note of several acts of mis- conduct by the respondent. The order of termination was passed dispensing with inquiry in terms of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution'). In the order dated 7.5.1986 fifteen charges of misconduct were referred to. The Deputy Director of Town Planning, Amravati, Division Amravati, passed the order indicating therein that the various acts of the respondent clearly demonstrated his unsuitability and the reasons as to why it would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry as is referred to in clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. Therefore, dispensing with the inquiry the concerned authority decided to terminate him from service after giving him one month's salary instead of one month's notice. It was noted that he was in police custody from 30.4.1986 to 8.5.1986. All the employees of the office were terrified due to his horrible acts and possibility his resorting to tumult and terrify members of the staff after release from police custody cannot be ruled out and suspension would not be an effective means to check his unlawful activities.

The only ground taken by respondent before the Tribunal in support of the petition was that the reasons for dispensing with departmental inquiry were not recorded prior to the passing of the impugned order dated 7.5.1986 and, in fact, it had been recorded after the passing of the impugned order. The Tribunal accepted this plea referring to the original file which was produced and the title of the order. The Tribunal observed that initially it was recorded as "Sheet showing reasons for removal of Shri B. Kulkarni" which was subsequently corrected as "Sheet showing reasons for removal of Shri B. Kulkarni, peon".

According to the Tribunal this change appears to have been made to show that it was recorded prior to passing of the order, but it was apparent that the same was corrected subsequently. Accordingly, the order of termination was set aside. The writ petition filed by the appellant before the High Court was dismissed by the Division Bench holding that the Tribunal's view was correct.

Above being the position, the order of the Tribunal as well as the impugned order of the High Court deserve to be set aside, and we direct accordingly.

The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Kushum Lata vs Union Of India And Ors

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court by which the Writ Petition styled as Public Interest Litigation (in short 'PIL') was held to be not maintainable and was dismissed.

In the instant case, the appellant has styled the petition as PIL though it relates to a tender where she herself claims to be a tenderer. In another petition, questioning legality of the auction, she is a party. The High Court was perfectly justified in dismissing the writ petition styled as a PIL. We make it clear that Writ Petition No.349/2003 which is stated to be pending shall be considered in its own perspective in accordance with law. We express no opinion on the merits of the said writ petition.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Sabbi Mallesu And Ors vs State Of Andhra Pradesh

One Kota Prasadarao who examined himself as PW-1 before the trial Court, lodged a First Information Report before the Station House Officer of Hiramandalam Police Station alleging that a dispute had occurred between Karanam Chandraiah and Vanjarapu Savariah in regard to a bund. Allegedly, with a view to settle the dispute 15 persons named, therein, including the appellants is Criminal Appeal No. 784/2004 and respondents in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl). No. 4438/2004, came to the place of occurrence and accused No. 1-Sabbi Mallesu (Appellant No. 1) beat Gade Sreeramlu (deceased No.1) with stout stick on his head. Accused No.4 (appellant No.2) is alleged to have poked with spear on his jaw. A general statement was made to the effect that the other accused persons beat him indiscriminately. Accused No. 16, Karanam Janardhanarao Pilla Ramula allegedly beat Kota Prasadarao, Kaji Asirinaidu and some others with sticks and stones as a result one Karanam Chandraiah (deceased No.2) as also Gade Sreeramulu.

Although fifteen persons were named in the First Information Report, 39 persons were put on trial. They were charged under various Sections, namely, Sections 147,148,302,324,323,341,120B and 506(2) of the Indian Pennal Code.

The prosecution in support of its case examined three alleged eye witnesses. PW-1, as noticed hereinbefore was the first informant. PW-2, Karanam Lakshmanaro and PW-3, Karam Chinnammai were to be the eye witnesses.

Before proceeding further we may notice that apart from accused before us all other accused were acquitted of the charges. On an appeal preferred by them before the High Court, the respondents in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4438/2004, Vanjarapu Boddu (accused No. 3) and Duvva Simmayya (accused No.6) were directed to be acquitted following the logic of the learned trial Judge stating:

The High Court, however, as was done by the learned Sessions Judge, relying on and on the basis of the evidence of the depositions of P.W.-1 and P.W. 2 dimissed the appeals referred by the appellants herein stating:

We are, however, of the opinion that the names of appellant Nos. 1 and 2 only having been mentioned in the First Information Report and the statements of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 in relation to the role played by them having been found corroboration from the medical evidence, the judgment of conviction and sentence as against them must be sustained.

For the reasons aforementioned Criminal Appeal No. 784/2004 is allowed in part. The appeal of appellant Nos. 1 and 2 is dismissed, whereas the appellant Nos. 3 and 4 in Criminal Appeal No. 784/2004 are given benefit of doubt and are acquitted. Appellant Nos. 3 and 4 are in jail. They are directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless they are required in any other case.

Criminal appeal No. 773/2006 (arising out of SLP (Crl). No. 4438/2004) filed by the State is dismissed.
U.P. State Road Transport Corpn vs Krishna Bala & Ors

Challenge in this Appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court which dismissed the First Appeal filed by the appellant against the Award passed by a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (XII Additional District Judge, Meerut) (in short the 'Tribunal'.) By the Award made, the Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.5,12,000/- to the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the 'Claimants'). One Rajveer Singh (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') died in a motor accident on 29.11.1990. The claimants filed a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short the 'Act'). Age of the deceased was around 36 years and he is earning monthly salary of Rs.2300/- per month. Though claim of agricultural income was made, the Tribunal did not accept the same. It adopted multiplier of 22 on the ground that the deceased had 22 years of service left. It was further noted that thereafter the deceased would have got pension. The widow of the deceased and children were awarded Rs.20,000/- towards love and affection, and Rs.5,000/- for funeral rites. After adopting a multiplier of 22 the amount was fixed Rs.6,07,200/-. After taking note of personal expenses the loss of dependency was fixed at Rs.1600 per month. In addition interest at the rate of 12% from the date of application was granted.

The Corporation questioned correctness of the award before the High Court. It, inter alia, submitted that the multiplier adopted and the rate of interest therein was high. The High Court dismissed the appeal almost summarily holding that the award was not excessive.

In both Susamma Thomas and Trilok Chand's cases (supra) the multiplier appears to have been adopted taking note of the prevalent banking rate of interest.

Considering the principles as set out above the multiplier as adopted by the Tribunal and maintained by the High Court is clearly indefensible. Considering the age of the deceased the aforesaid multiplier would be 13. Calculated on that basis by taking monthly loss of dependency at Rs.2.000/- (after adjusting for personal expenses and likelihood of increase in salary) the compensation to be awarded would be Rs.3,12,000/-. To the aforesaid sum would be added Rs.25,000/- awarded by the Tribunal for deprivation of love and affection and funeral expenses and, therefore, entitlement of the claimants is Rs.3,37,000/-. The accident took place on 29.11.1990. Therefore, the rate of interest would be 9% from the date of filing of the claim petition. Claimants would be entitled accordingly. Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No orders as to costs.
State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Santosh Kumar

A six years old child was subjected to sexual abuse by the respondent. He faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Section 376(2)(f) and Section 342 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The trial court found respondent guilty of the offences for the offence punishable under Section 372(2)(f) IPC. respondent was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for 10 years R.I. with a fine of Rs.500/- with default stipulation. He was further sentenced to undergo imprisonment of three months for the offence punishable in terms of Section 342 IPC. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. In the appeal filed before the High Court the accused did not question the conviction, but prayed for reduction in sentence. The High Court reduced the sentence for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(f) IPC to 5 years, while maintaining the sentence in respect of other offence. The State of Madhya Pradesh has questioned correctness of the judgment on the ground that the reduction in sentence was clearly uncalled for. The only ground indicated by the High Court to reduce the sentence was the young age of the accused and he being member of the Scheduled Tribe. Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the reduction of sentence as done by learned Single Judge is contrary to law as laid down by this Court in several cases. While dealing with the offence of rape which was established, the direction for reduction of sentence should not have been given on the specious reasonings indicated above.

In order to exercise the discretion of reducing the sentence the statutory requirement is that the Court has to record "adequate and special reasons" in the judgment and not fanciful reasons which would permit the Court to impose a sentence less than the prescribed minimum. The reason has not only to be adequate but also special. What is adequate and special would depend upon several factors and no strait-jacket formula can be indicated. What is applicable to trial Courts regarding recording reasons for a departure from minimum sentence is equally applicable to the High Court. The only reason indicated by the High Court is the young age of the accused and the fact that he belongs to a Scheduled Tribe. The same can by no stretch of imagination be considered either adequate or special. The requirement in law is cumulative.

Considering the legal position as indicated above the High Court's order is clearly unsustainable. Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored.

Appeal is allowed.