L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Punjab Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd vs Kewal Singh Dhillon

3. Certain disputes arose between the parties and the appellant by notice dated 19.3.1997 appointed its arbitrator and called upon the respondent to appoint his arbitrator. As respondent failed to comply, the appellant filed a petition under section 11(4) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (`Act' for short) on 13.6.1997 in the court of the Principal Civil Judge, Senior Division, Chandigarh (a designate of the Chief Justice of Punjab & Haryana High Court and hereinafter referred to as the `Designate').

4. The said Designate by order dated 16.2.2002 dismissed the petition holding that appointment of arbitrator was not called for as the matter had already been decided by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (for short `BIFR'). Being aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court in C.W.P. No. 9889 of 2002, for quashing the order of the Designate and for appointment of an arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.7.1986. A Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 7.7.2006 disposed of the said writ petition by the following short order:

9. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. As a consequence, Civil Writ Petition No.9889 of 2002 shall stand restored to the file, and the High Court is requested to dispose it of in accordance with law.
Kalu Ram Ahuja & Anr vs Delhi Development Authority & Anr

The Delhi Development Authority (for short, D.D.A.], issued an advertisement, which was published in the newspaper dated 21st May, 1988 for auction of Plot No.235 measuring 84.10 sq. meter situated at Padam Nagar, New Delhi. In the auction held on 21st June, 1988, the appellants participated along with other bidders. They gave the highest bid of Rs.3,00,758/-. In terms of the advertisement, the bid was required to be approved by the Vice-Chairman, D.D.A. The latter rejected the same and his decision was communicated to the appellants vide letter dated 7th July, 1988, sent by Deputy Director [O.S.D.], D.D.A. The appellants challenged the rejection of their bid by filing writ petition which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by relying on the so-called representation made by ex-Municipal Member to espouse the cause of residents of the area. The Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed by the Division Bench. Hence, these appeals by special leave.

Undisputedly, the D.D.A. had taken a conscious decision to auction the plot. It is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor any material has been produced before this Court to show that the said decision was taken by the competent authority under some mis-apprehension. It is also not in dispute that the appellants participated in the auction held on 1st June, 1988, and gave highest bid, which, as mentioned above, was rejected by the Vice-Chairman, D.D.A. The communication dated 7th July, 1988, does not make a mention of the reason which may have prompted the Vice-Chairman to reject the bid given by the appellants. No other record has been produced before the Court to show that the decision of the Vice-Chairman was based on rational and tangible reasons and was in public interest. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the decision of the concerned authority was wholly arbitrary. The learned Single Judge without property appreciating the nature of the appellants' challenge to the rejection of their bid, dismissed the writ petition. The Division Bench also committed the same error by dismissing the appeal. Therefore, the impugned orders are legally unsustainable. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, impugned orders passed by the High Court are set aside, writ petition filed by the appellants before the High Court is allowed and the decision of the Vice- Chairman, D.D.A. to reject the bid of the appellants is quashed. The appellants are directed to deposit the amount of bid along with the interest thereon at the rate of eighteen per cent from the date of bid till the ....3/-

date of actual payment within a period of three months from today. Thereafter the D.D.A. shall complete all the formalities of land and hand over possession to the appellants. The needful be done within three months from the date the amount is deposited by the appellants.
Krushnabai B. Ulwekar & Ors vs Gopal Shankar Ulwekar & Ors

Whereas the suit filed by the appellants was dismissed, the suit filed by the respondents was decreed. Two appeals were preferred thereagainst by the appellants. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said appeals have been dismissed.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that as the approach of the High Court was not correct,interest of justice would be subserved if the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the entire matter afresh confining itself to the issues framed in the suit. If, however, respondents intend to bring on record some additional documents, they may file an appropriate application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the High Court, which may be considered on its own merits.

It is accepted at the Bar that the respondents are in possession of the lands in suit. If, that be so, till any further order is passed by the High Court, the respondents shall continue to remain in possession.

We may, furthermore, notice that applications for directions have been filed by the respondents being I.A.Nos.15-16/2008. As we have not considered any of the documents filed before us by the parties, we need not pass any order on these applications.

With the aforementioned observations, the appeals are allowed. However, it is made clear that all contentions of the parties shall remain open.

......................J. [S.B. SINHA] .....................J [ CYRIAC JOSEPH ] New Delhi, August 27, 2008.
State Of H.P vs Suresh Kumar @ Chhotu

The High Court noted that there was inconsistency in the evidence of the prosecutrix. She appeared to have accompanied the accused of her own accord and the sexual intercourse alleged to have been committed was done with her consent. The stand of the prosecutrix was that as she was below 16 years of age, her consent, if any, was of no consequence. The High Court referred to the evidence of PWs. 1,2,3, and 14 and the documents relied upon i.e. the birth certificate. The High Court noted that those documents apparently were not relatable to the prosecutrix and therefore the date of birth indicated in the documents could not be that of the prosecutrix. It referred to the evidence of the mother. It was concluded that the documents could not be also relatable to the prosecutrix in view of the statement of the mother about her own age. That being so, the High Court held that the accusations were not established and the prosecutrix, as evident from the documents was more than 16 years of age at the time of occurence.

Learned Amicus Curiae supported the judgment of the High Court.

We find that the High Court was justified in its conclusions about the prosecutrix having accompanied the accused on her own and being a consenting party to the sexual acts. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the State, if the age of the prosecutrix was below 16 years, the consent would be of no consequence. But the High Court's findings as regards the age of the prosecutrix cannot be said to be without any basis. The High Court has analysed the oral evidence and the documentary evidence to come to a conclusion that the date of birth of the prosecutrix as claimed by the prosecution has not been established. That being so, we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

We record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by learned Amicus Curiae.
Hari Singh Gond vs State Of M.P

2. Background facts, as projected by the prosecution, during trial are as follows:

When he went alognwith villagers to his house then the villagers Mulloo Singh, Chamru Singh etc. caught hold of accused Hari Singh and they observed that there was a fire in the room where Harilal the father in law of Shyamlal was sleeping and his father in law was burnt and had died. Motilal the father of the Shyamlal told him that Hari Singh had slapped him at his cheek and had also kicked him at his back and by taking lathi and trishul he ran after him, then he also ran away. Then accused started beating deceased Harilal with stick and accused hit Harilal several times due to which Harilal died. Then accused put some grains on fire which were lying in that room, due to which not only the house caught the fire but Harilal was also burnt. The incident was reported by Shyam Lal in writing to police chowki Maneri of police station Bija Dandi at 9.00 A.M. in the morning and the report is Ex. P-1. On conducting the post-mortem of Harilal, the whole dead body was found to have been burnt, there were many 3 injuries on his body and there was fracture in the head and all the injuries were ante mortem.

11. The trial Court and the High Court have, on the facts of the case, rightly held that Section 84 IPC has no application.

12. It is submitted that the accused-appellant is in custody since 23.1.1996 and Section 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Cr.P.C') has application. We express no opinion in that regard.

13. Appeal is dismissed.
Rajiv Arora vs Union Of India & Ors

3. We may, before adverting to the contentions raised by the parties, notice the admitted fact of the matter.

16. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned judgment in regard to the charge Nos.1, 2 and 3 cannot be sustained. They are set aside accordingly. It has not been disputed that witnesses for proving charge Nos.4 to 7 have been examined. The General Court Martial Proceedings shall continue in respect of charge Nos.4 to 7 and not in respect of charges No.1 to 3. Appeals are allowed to the above extent with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.50,000/-. 1

August 29, 2008
National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Abhaysing Pratapsing Waghela & Ors

3. First respondent was driving a moped on 27.1.1995. An accident took place on the said date as the said vehicle was hit by a truck bearing registration No.GJ 6T 7000 which was allegedly being driven in a rash 2 and negligent manner. The said truck first dashed against an Ambassador car and then hit the moped which was being driven by the respondent as a result whereof he suffered severe injuries.

In any event, this is a case where this Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India as only a sum of Rs.46,000/- is awarded in favour of respondent No.1.

20. In our opinion, the impugned judgment does not warrant any interference. The Appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.25,000/-.

August 29, 2008
Chief Executive Officer, N.S.S.O. & Ors vs Biswa Bhusan Nandi

2. Respondent joined the Indian Air Force on 22.2.1978. He rendered more than 15 years' of service in the said organization having worked till 28.2.1993.

3. The Department of Personnel and Training issued a notification dated 12.2.1986 in terms whereof, those candidates who were matriculate 2 and having put in not less than 15 years' of service in Armed Forces etc. were to be considered for appointment to any Group - C post to which essential qualification is graduation and where experience in technical or professional nature is not essential.

An office memorandum was, however, issued on 12.2.1996 whereby he was denied appointment.

6. An original application was filed by the respondent before the Central Administrative Tribunal challenging the validity of the said order.

Despite pendency of the special leave petition, an application again was filed before the Calcutta High Court in February 2006 for extension of time. The High Court was given an assurance that the competent authorities of the appellant would certainly comply with the earlier directions of the Court. Only on the basis of the said representation, by an order dated 17.1.2006 the High Court directed :

14. We are not oblivious of the fact that filing of an application for extension of time to comply with the order of the High Court by itself would not be a bar to the appellant for filing a special leave petition; but in this case, an assurance was given to the High Court that the respondent shall be accommodated, despite filing of the special leave petition.

15. In view of the exceptions carved out, the eligibility clause and as the post is non-technical in nature and, thus, no experience on technical side was necessary, we do not think that the appellant should be permitted to come out of the representation made by it before the High Court.

We have noticed hereinbefore the tenor of the order passed by the High Court on 12.2.2006. For all intent and purport, an assurance had been given to the High Court that its order shall be complied with. The promise made was absolute and unequivocal in nature. We, therefore, do not think it to be a proper case for exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

16. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment needs no interference. The appeal is dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only).

August 29, 2008
Jammu Rural Bank vs Mohd. Din & Ors

5) In this appeal, when the Jammu & Kashmir Bank filed execution petition before the District Judge against a borrower, the District Judge, taking note of the Debt Relief Scheme applied the said Scheme and dismissed the execution petition by order dated 4.4.2002. Challenging the said order, the Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. filed Civil Revision Petition No. 77 of 2002 before the High Court and the same was dismissed on 20.5.2003. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant-Bank filed Review Petition (C) No. 8 of 2005 before the High Court contending that agricultural matters are not included within the Debt Relief Scheme as 4 matters are not included within the Debt Relief Scheme as communicated by the Reserve Bank of India. The High Court dismissed the same by an order dated 16.9.2005. Against the abovementioned orders in civil revision petition and the review petition respectively, the appellant-Bank has filed this appeal.

12) Regarding the order dated 28.9.2000 passed by the High Court in Civil Revision No. 165 of 1999, it is true that while considering the civil revision petition filed against the order passed by the executing Court, the High Court relying on the provisions in the Hand Book of instructions issued by the Reserve Bank of India that the activities i.e., dairying and rearing of sheep are allied to agriculture and, therefore, excluded from the scheme, quashed the order of the trial Court and directed the executing Court to restore to its original number and proceed with the matter in accordance with law. Learned senior counsel, by pointing out the above said order of the very same High Court, submitted that the said order passed in the civil revision petition is in consonance 13 with the Scheme and prayed for similar order in all the other appeals. For the reasons stated in the earlier paragraphs with regard to the Civil Appeals 4817-4851/2002 and Civil Appeal Nos. 4852-4854 of 2002, we are not inclined to accept the same. In view of the peculiar position as explained by both the Courts below and considering the fact that the amounts involved are less than Rs.10,000/- in most of the cases and those loans were advanced prior to 1996 during the prevalence of militancy in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, we are not inclined to interfere with any of the reliefs granted by the Courts below.

13) In the light of the above discussion, we conclude the above-mentioned questions as under:

AUGUST 29, 2008.
Lahorimal Jethanand vs Managing Officer/Tahsildar, Jalna & ...

Respondent No.4 indisputably was in possession of the said premises. A notice dated 2.4.2005 was issued asking it to vacate the said premises in terms of Section 19 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. The respondent filed a writ petition before the 2 Bombay High Court. The said writ petition was allowed directing:

The appeal as well as a revision application preferred by the appellant thereagainst have been dismissed. He questioned the validity of the said orders by filing a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. It was marked as Writ Petition No. 6762/2002. By reason of the impugned judgment dated 11.10.2005, the said writ petition has been dismissed by the High Court directing:

We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court could not have directed the appellant to file a civil suit. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside accordingly. The matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration thereof afresh on merit. The appeal is disposed of.

The respondent No.4 shall not create any third party interest in the meantime.

We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merit of the matter.

We would however request the High Court to consider the desirability of disposing of the matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order.

......................J (S.B. SINHA) .......................J (CYRIAC JOSEPH) NEW DELHI, AUGUST 29, 2008.
Jammu Rural Bank vs Mohd. Din & Ors

5) In this appeal, when the Jammu & Kashmir Bank filed execution petition before the District Judge against a borrower, the District Judge, taking note of the Debt Relief Scheme applied the said Scheme and dismissed the execution petition by order dated 4.4.2002. Challenging the said order, the Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. filed Civil Revision Petition No. 77 of 2002 before the High Court and the same was dismissed on 20.5.2003. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant-Bank filed Review Petition (C) No. 8 of 2005 before the High Court contending that agricultural matters are not included within the Debt Relief Scheme as 4 communicated by the Reserve Bank of India. The High Court dismissed the same by an order dated 16.9.2005. Against the abovementioned orders in civil revision petition and the review petition respectively, the appellant-Bank has filed this appeal.

12) Regarding the order dated 28.9.2000 passed by the High Court in Civil Revision No. 165 of 1999, it is true that while considering the civil revision petition filed against the order passed by the executing Court, the High Court relying on the provisions in the Hand Book of instructions issued by the Reserve Bank of India that the activities i.e., dairying and rearing of sheep are allied to agriculture and, therefore, excluded from the scheme, quashed the order of the trial Court and directed the executing Court to restore to its original number and proceed with the matter in accordance with law. Learned senior counsel, by pointing out the above said order of the very same High Court, submitted that the said order passed in the civil revision petition is in consonance with the Scheme and prayed for similar order in all the other appeals. For the reasons stated in the earlier paragraphs with 13 regard to the Civil Appeals 4817-4851/2002 and Civil Appeal Nos. 4852-4854 of 2002, we are not inclined to accept the same. In view of the peculiar position as explained by both the Courts below and considering the fact that the amounts involved are less than Rs.10,000/- in most of the cases and those loans were advanced prior to 1996 during the prevalence of militancy in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, we are not inclined to interfere with any of the reliefs granted by the Courts below.

13) In the light of the above discussion, we conclude the above-mentioned questions as under:

AUGUST 29, 2008.
State Of Maharashtra vs Bharat Shanti Lal Shah & Ors

4. Learned senior counsel appearing for the parties advanced elaborate arguments on the aforesaid issues, but before we deal with and discuss the same, it would be necessary for us to refer to the relevant provisions of the concerned Central and the State Legislations.

38.The objects and reasons read with the contents of the Act would indicate that the subject matter of the Act is maintaining public order and prevention by police of commission of serious offences affecting public order and, therefore as submitted, it will be relatable to Entry 1 and 2 of List II. After enacting MCOCA, assent of the President was also obtained and received on 24.04.1999. That being the position if the subject matter and the field of legislation are found to be covered under any of the entries of the Concurrent List also, the constitutional validity will have to be upheld. Thus, Entry 1, 2 and 12 of the Concurrent List would and could also be brought into operation and aid can be taken from said entries also, for the Act deals with subject matters which are relatable as well to Entries 1, 2 and 12 of the Concurrent List. 35

47.As discussed above the object of the MCOCA is to prevent the organised crime and, therefore, there could be reason to deny consideration of grant 40 of bail if one has committed a similar offence once again after being released on bail but the same consideration cannot be extended to a person who commits an offence under some other Act, for commission of an offence under some other act would not be in any case in consonance with the object of the act which is enacted in order to prevent only organised crime.

48.We consider that a person who is on bail after being arrested for violation of law unconnected with MCOCA, should not be denied his right to seek bail if he is arrested under the MCOCA, for it cannot be said that he is a habitual offender. The provision of denying his right to seek bail, if he was arrested earlier and was on bail for commission of an offence under any other Act, suffers from the vice of unreasonable classification by placing in the same class, offences which may have nothing in common with those under MCOCA, for the purpose of denying consideration of bail. The aforesaid expression and restriction on the right of seeking bail is not even in consonance with the object sought to be achieved by the Act and, therefore, on the face of the provisions this is an excessive restriction.

51.Consequential orders, if any, in terms of the observations and directions passed in these appeals, may be passed by the concerned Court(s) where any proceeding under MCOCA is pending.
Pavan Sachdeva & Anr vs S.M.S.Pharmaceuticals Ltd.& Anr

The Trial Court passed ex-parte decree in a summary suit. The appellants filed an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree and also for condonation of delay. The same was registered as I.A. No.1224 of 2000. The Trial Court, by its order dated 23rd February, 2001, allowed the application. That order was set aside by the High Court and the matter was remitted to the Trial Court for fresh disposal of I.A. No.1224 of 2000.

recorded any finding on this issue.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and the one passed by the Trial Court is restored. The Trial Court shall now decide the summary suit afresh in accordance with law.