L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Arshad Hussain vs State Of Rajasthan

2) Brief facts

(a) As per the prosecution case, on 18.12.2000, at around 10:30 p.m., Nizam (the complainant), Iqbal, Jamil and Moin were returning back to Khanji Peer, Udaipur on two scooters after having meals at Mulla Talai, Udaipur, in-laws’ house of Iqbal. At that time, when all four of them reached near the house of Ashfaq, all of a sudden, Shahjad and Mujaffar, sons of Ashfaq, came in front of their scooters and stopped them. On seeing them, Iqbal got down from the scooter and asked as to what is the matter? Immediately, Shahjad and Mujaffar shouted ‘Arshad fire’. On hearing the same, Arshad, who was standing in the verandah of his house with a gun, fired three shots which hit on the chest and shoulder of Iqbal, as a result of which, he fell down. Nizam, Jamil and Moin, who were also standing closer to Iqbal, ran away from the spot.

(b) Thereafter, Nizam (the complainant), Jamil and Moin took Iqbal to the hospital in the car of Raja@Siraj (PW-7) and submitted a written report (Exh. P-1) to Nazir Khan, Sub-Inspector of Police (PW-19), posted at P.S. Surajpol, Udaipur, on the basis of which, a First Information Report (FIR) being No. 523 of 2000 (Exh. P-52) was registered against Arshad Hussain (A-

1), Mujaffar (A-2) and Shahjad (A-3) under Sections 341, 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959. It was also stated in the written complaint that there was old enmity between Ashfaq and Iqbal and the said incident was a pre-determined plan in order to kill him and also that he had seen the gun in the hands of Arshad while running away.

(c) After filing of the chargesheet, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Udaipur which was numbered as Session Case No. 96 of 2001.

(e) Aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence, the appellant herein (A-1) and other convicted accused (A-2 and A-3) filed an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 586 of 2004 before the High Court. By judgment dated 30.04.2008, the High Court, while acquitting Mujaffar (A-2) and Shahjad (A-3) of all the charges, confirmed the conviction and sentence of Arshad Hussain (A-1).

accused were not present at the place of incident and, therefore, three important aspects of the prosecution case have not been established, namely, (a) the party of the deceased was stopped by Shahjad and Muzaffar;

(b) the deceased and his associates were stopped by Shahjad and Muzaffar near the gate of their house; and (c) Shahjad and Muzaffar had asked Arshad to open fire upon the deceased.

14) A perusal of the contents of the FIR, the statements of the above mentioned prosecution witnesses as well as the reasoning of the High Court clearly show that the incident had not taken place as alleged by the prosecution. We are satisfied that the prosecution had suppressed genesis and the manner in which the incident took place.

JULY 17, 2013.
Rajendra Sharma vs State Of West Bengal

2) Brief facts:

(d) The trial Court, by order dated 19/20.12.2005 convicted the appellant along with other co-accused under Sections 395/397 IPC and directed him to suffer rigorous imprisonment (RI) for 10 years along with a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for a period of 2 years.

(e) Being aggrieved of the above said order, the appellants therein preferred separate appeals before the High Court at Calcutta.

(f) The High Court, by impugned judgment dated 09.04.2008, dismissed the appeal of the appellant (A-1) and one Sarban Singh affirming their conviction and sentence and set aside the order of conviction and sentence of other co-accused - Ranjit Kumar.

11) In view of our conclusion on the sentence, we direct that the appellant be released forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. The appeal is disposed of on the above terms.

JULY 17, 2013.
Satya Pal Anand vs Punjabi Housing Co-Optv. Society & Ors

2. It is rather difficult to cull out the facts accurately because of the inadequacy of the record. Be that as it may, the broad and undisputed facts are as under:

3. The petitioner’s mother was allotted a plot of land (hereinafter referred to as ‘the property in dispute’) by the first respondent – the Punjabi Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. Pursuant to such an allotment, the sale-deed dated 22.03.1962 came to be executed, which deed was registered on 30.03.1962 before the Sub-Registrar, Bhopal. It appears that the petitioner’s mother died on 12.06.1988. The petitioner claims to be the sole successor-in-interest though we find from the record (from the alleged compromise deed dated 06.07.2004 executed by the petitioner herein) that he has a sister.

5. Subsequently, the first respondent executed another sale deed with respect to the property in dispute in favour of the second respondent on 21.04.2004.

7. It appears from the record that subsequently the petitioner herein raised a dispute before the Registrar under Section 64 of the M.P. Cooperative Societies Act questioning the legality of the execution of the abovementioned unilateral Extinguishment Deed and allotment of the property in dispute in favour of the second respondent. Vide order dated 1.2.2006, the Deputy Registrar passed an order injuncting the defendants from raising any construction or transferring by way of sale etc. of the property in dispute.

11. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the petitioner approached the High Court by way of a writ petition from which the present appeal arises.

12. By the impugned judgment, the writ petition was dismissed.

14. It must be remembered that the instant proceedings arise out of the interlocutory proceedings seeking appointment of the receiver at the instance of the petitioner herein. Having regard to the fact that respondent no.4 was in possession of the property in dispute at least since 13.03.2007 admittedly and also having regard to the fact that the petitioner received an amount of Rs.6,50,000/- we do not see any justification for the appointment of the receiver. We see no reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal. We accordingly dismiss the special leave petition.

July 17, 2013.
C.I.T.,Gujarat vs Vijaybhai N.Chandrani

4. Brief facts of the case are:

13. In the instant case, it transpires from the record that the jurisdictional Assessing Authority, upon having a reason to believe that the documents seized indicate escapement of income, has issued Show Cause Notices under Section 153C to the assessee for reassessment of his income during the assessment years 2001-2002 to 2006-2007. Thereafter, upon request of the assessee, the Assessing Authority has furnished him with the copies of documents seized under Section 132A. The assessee being dissatisfied with the said documents instead of filing his explanation/reply to the Show Cause Notices, has filed a Writ Petition before the High Court impugning the said notices.

17. In view of the above, without expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the construction that is placed by the High Court on Section 153C, we set aside the impugned judgment and order. Further, we grant time to the assessee, if it so desires, to file reply/objections, if any, as contemplated in the said notices within 15 days' time from today. If such reply/objections is/are filed within time granted by this Court, the Assessing Authority shall first consider the said reply/objections and thereafter direct the assessee to file the return for the assessment years in question. We make it clear that while framing the assessment order, the Assessing Authority will not be influenced by any observations made by the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition. If, for any reason, the assessment order goes against the assessee, he/it shall avail and exhaust the remedies available to him/it under the Act, 1961.

18. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.

22. Accordingly, all these appeals are disposed of with no order as to costs.

JULY 18, 2013.
Gurbinder Kaur Brar And Anr vs Uoi And Ors

6. Similar petitions were filed by other landowners whose land had been acquired for Phases-II and III of Chandigarh Technology Park. All the writ petitions were dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order.

A reading of the Notification issued on 1-11-1966 (set out in para 42) shows that in exercise of the power vested in him under Article 239(1), the President directed that the Administrator shall exercise the power and discharge the functions of the State Government under the laws which were in force immediately before formation of the Union Territory of Chandigarh. This was subject to the President’s own control and until further orders. By another notification issued on the same day, the President directed that all orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Chief Commissioner of Union Territory of Chandigarh shall be authenticated by the signatures of the specified officers. These notifications clearly brought out the distinction between the position of the Administrator and the Chief Commissioner insofar as the Union Territory of Chandigarh was concerned. Subsequently, the President appointed the Governor of Punjab as Administrator of the Union Territory of Chandigarh and separate notifications were issued for appointment of Adviser to the Administrator. The officers appointed as Adviser are invariably members of the Indian Administrative Service.

application of mind by the concerned officer to large number of substantive objections raised by the appellants under Section 5A(1). He mechanically rejected the objections and senior officers of the Chandigarh Administration accepted the report of the Land Acquisition Officer despite the fact that the same had been prepared in violation of Section 5A(2).

11. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside and Notifications dated 1.10.2002 and 29.9.2003 are quashed insofar as the same relate to the lands of the appellants. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

July 22, 2013.
Gian Chand & Ors vs State Of Haryana

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

3.15 a.m. at the Rania Police Station against the appellants-accused. After investigation, a chargesheet was filed against them and the appellants claimed trial. Hence, the trial commenced.

D. After conclusion of the trial, the appellants were convicted and sentenced as referred to hereinbefore vide judgment and order dated 2.2.2001, and the said judgment and order has been affirmed by the High Court vide its judgment and order dated 4.11.2008.

28. The principle of law laid down hereinabove is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. Therefore, mere non-joining of an independent witness where the evidence of the prosecution witnesses may be found to be cogent, convincing, creditworthy and reliable, cannot cast doubt on the version forwarded by the prosecution if there seems to be no reason on record to falsely implicate the appellants.

In view of the above, the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants in this regard, are held to be without any substance.

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30. In view of the above, the appeal does not present special features warranting any interference by this court. Appeal is devoid of any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

……………..................................J. (S.A. BOBDE) NEW DELHI;

July 23, 2013
Kaliya vs State Of M.P

4. The Trial Court as well as the High Court relied mainly upon the dying declaration made by Guddi, deceased wherein she had stated that she was subjected to harassment by her mother-in-law, present appellant, her father-in-law and her husband. So far as the incident dated 18.6.1984 was concerned, Guddi suffered 100 per cent burn injuries at her house. After hearing commotion, some neighbours reached the place of occurrence and extinguished the fire by pouring water on her body and took her to the hospital. In the hospital her dying declaration was recorded wherein she had specifically stated “I was lying on the cot then my mother-in-law by pouring kerosene oil and setting fire in my silk saree ran away”. Dr. (Miss.) Bharti Kanned who was on duty and Merry Kutti Michael, Staff Nurse (PW.5) were witnesses to the dying declaration recorded by Dr. Nirmal Kumar Gupta (PW.18). In the FIR there is a full reference of the dying declaration recorded by Dr. Nirmal Kumar Gupta (PW.18). After the death, the post- mortem was conducted wherein it was opined that she died of burn injuries. If she had been admitted in the hospital with 100% burns she would not be in a state to get her dying declaration recorded. The whole emphasis before the courts below as well as before this Court has been that the dying declaration cannot be relied upon since the original of the same had not been filed by the prosecution and the carbon copy could not have been exhibited and taken on record. It has been further contended that even if the carbon copy could be relied upon it may have been tampered with as is evident from many interpolations and cuttings.

12. Dr. Nirmal Kumar Gupta (PW.18), deposed that 100% burnt patient can also be in a fit mental and physical condition to give statement. Dr. V.K. Deewan (PW.14), who performed the post-mortem of deceased Guddi, deposed that she was completely burnt and the burn injuries were anti-mortem. She had died due to Asphyxia, due to burn injuries, her death was homicidal.

In view thereof, both the courts below were of the considered opinion that the appellant was responsible for causing the death of Guddi, deceased.

14. In view of the above, the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.

…..………………….........J. ( Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN ) ……………………….........J. ( S.A. BOBDE ) New Delhi, July 23, 2013
Akkode Jumayath Palli Paripalana ... vs P.V. Ibrahim Haji & Ors

Appellant, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act stated to be formed for the management and administration of wakf property including a Mosque situated therein, filed a suit for an injunction before the Court of Munsiff, Manjeri, which was transferred to the Court of Wakf Tribunal, Kozhikode and numbered as O.S. No.53 of 2003. The suit was contested by the respondents on merits and ultimately it was decreed by the Wakf Tribunal on 28.09.2004 and the plaintiff was given a decree for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants/respondents and their men from interfering in any manner in the administration, management and peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Mosque, namely, Akkode Juyamath Palli, the madrassa run by it and all the assets attached to the Mosque.

We are of the view that the dispute that arises for consideration in this case is with regard to the management and peaceful enjoyment of the Mosque and madrassa and the assets which relate to Wakf. Nature of the relief clearly shows that the Wakf Tribunal has got jurisdiction to decide those disputes. We, therefore, find no error in the Wakf Tribunal entertaining O.S. No.53 of 2003 filed by the appellant and the High Court has committed an error in holding otherwise. Consequently the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court to consider the revision on merits. The appeals are disposed of as above, with no order as to costs.
Devendra Kumar vs State Of Uttaranchal & Ors

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

6. Facts involved herein remain undisputed. An FIR was registered against the appellant and others under Sections 402/465/471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as `the IPC’) on 10.2.2001. In respect of the same a closure report was submitted on 16.2.2001, which was accepted by the learned Magistrate on 18.8.2001.

24. The courts below have recorded a finding of fact that the appellant suppressed material information sought by the employer as to whether he had ever been involved in a criminal case. Suppression of material information sought by the employer or furnishing false information itself amounts to moral turpitude and is separate and distinct from the involvement in a criminal case.

In view of the above, the appeal is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Lucknow K.Gramin Bank(Now)Allahabad ... vs Rajendra Singh

3. Before we point out the directions of the High Court in the impugned judgment and the grievance of the appellant thereto, it would be proper to traverse the seminal facts which are largely undisputed.

major penalty as per the aforesaid Regulations though in the impugned order, High Court has termed it as “minor punishment”

16. This, according to us, would be the harmonious reading of Obettee (P) Ltd. and Rajendra Yadav cases.

appropriate penalty on the respondents herein. We are confident that the mitigating circumstances pointed out by the respondents herein would be given due consideration by the appellate authority, keeping in view the ratio of Rajendra Yadav’s case as well. It would be open to the respondents herein to make representation in this behalf to the appellate authority on the basis of which the respondents want to contend that they should be given same treatment as meted out to other three employees. Such a representation will be given 15 days from today. Appellate Authority shall pass appropriate orders deciding the appeals afresh within 2 months from today.

19. Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.
Govinda Bala Patil (D) By Lrs vs Ganpati Ramchandra Naikwade (D) By Lrs

This appeal arises out of a proceeding under Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. One Govinda Bala Patil, since deceased, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, hereinafter referred to as “the landlord”, owned land being R.S. No. 51 admeasuring 35 gunthas at Village Pandewadi within Taluka Radhanagari in the District of Kolhapur. A proceeding under Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”, was initiated by one Rama Dattu Naikwade, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, for determination of price of the land on the plea that he shall be deemed to have purchased the land. The Additional Tahsildar & ALT, Radhanagari, at the first instance, held that the land in question was leased out for growing sugarcane and, accordingly, dropped the proceeding. However, in appeal, the said order was set aside and the matter ultimately remitted back to him to hold fresh inquiry. Accordingly, the Additional Tahsildar held fresh inquiry and again by its order dated 10th of December, 1981 reiterated its earlier finding and held that the land was leased out for growing sugarcane and the proceeding was dropped. The tenant thereafter preferred appeal which was heard by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Shahuwadi Division, Kolhapur who allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Additional Tahsildar on its finding that the landlord has failed to prove the specific purpose of the lease. The landlord then preferred revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Kolhapur, hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”, which set aside the order of the Sub- Divisional Officer and restored that of the Additional Tahsildar. While doing so, the Tribunal held as follows:

Thus, the impugned judgment of the High Court is vulnerable on both the counts and, hence, cannot be sustained.

In the result, the appeal is allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the Tribunal is restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

………………………………………………………………J (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD) ………..……….………………………………..J (V.GOPALA GOWDA) NEW DELHI, JULY 29, 2013.
D.H.B.V.N.L Vidyut Nagar, Hisar & Ors vs Yashvir Singh Gulia

3. The respondent herein who was working as an Assistant Law Officer, was served with a charge-sheet on 14.8.1992 alleging that he had exceeded his power by directing implementation of an arbitration award dated 10.9.1991 without getting approval of the superior Authorities. Respondent filed three replies to the charge-sheet and the replies submitted by the respondent were considered by the Board and it was decided to impose only a minor penalty vide its order dated 4.7.1994, the operative portion of which reads as follows:

14. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the learned District Judge as well as that of the High Court is set aside.
Sachin Pawar & Anr vs State Of U.P.& Ors

3. The complainant respondent No.3 is the brother of appellant No.2. He felt aggrieved by his sister marrying to appellant No.1. It is a marriage between two young persons belonging to two different religions, but it is a marriage to which they themselves agreed. They are both adults. A complaint was filed by respondent No.3 being Crime No.684/2012 at Meerut on 27th July, 2012, alleging that the appellant No.1 herein has kidnapped his sister (appellant No.2 herein).

4. The appellants therefore jointly filed a writ petition bearing Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.10905 of 2012 in the High Court of Allahabad to quash the said complaint. The High Court passed an order on 9.8.2012 which accepted that these two appellants are adults and they are married. It also directed stay of arrest and granted them protection. However, the High Court recorded two conditions which are in paragraphs 4 and 7 of the order on the Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition. The appellants are aggrieved by these two conditions and that is why they have filed this appeal by special leave.

6. In our view, therefore, there is no need for appellant No.1 to arrange to deposit Rs.2,50,000/- for his wife in a bank as provided in paragraph 7 of the impugned order. Similarly, there is no need for recording the statement of the second appellant under Section 161 Cr.P.C. before the Chief Judicial Magistrate as directed in paragraph 4 of the impugned order. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court to the extent mentioned in these two paragraphs.

8. Counsel for respondent No.3 states that the second appellant should come and meet respondent No.3 and his relatives. Counsel for the appellants states that both the appellants will happily meet respondent No.3 and his relatives on appropriate occasions. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

August 2, 2013.
State Of Orissa vs Kanhu Charan Majhi

3. The facts giving rise to the present litigation, in a nutshell, are as under :-

4. The re-initiation of the proceedings had been challenged by the respondent before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal even at an earlier point of time and the Tribunal had decided the same in favour of the respondent but, at this stage, we are not concerned with the earlier proceedings and therefore, we do not refer to the same.

5. Ultimately the respondent had challenged the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him as well as the decision dated 4th September, 2000, whereby the order dated 16th October, 1995 had been reviewed and it was decided to initiate departmental proceedings against the respondent. Thereafter, by an order dated 27th November, 2008, the Orissa Administrative Tribunal decided the said case in favour of the respondent and therefore, the appellant- State had filed the above referred Writ Petition (C) No. 2492 of 2010 before the High Court, which has been finally dismissed and thus, the State of Orissa has filed this appeal.

7. The case of the respondent before the Tribunal as well as the High Court was that once a decision was taken on 16th October, 1995 to drop the departmental proceedings initiated against him, the said decision could not have been reviewed on 4th September, 2000. Therefore, no proceedings could have been initiated against the respondent in pursuance of the said order dated 4th September, 2000.

19. The appeal is dismissed subject to the aforesaid direction and modification in the judgment delivered by the High Court. There shall be no order as to costs.

...J. (DIPAK MISRA) New Delhi October 28, 2013.