L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi & Anr vs The State Of Gujarat & Ors

An order of preventive detention was passed against the appellant under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short, "COFEPOSA Act"). He had properties at Bhadarwal, in the district Jaipur and a fixed deposit receipt of Dena Bank. The said properties were forfeited under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (for short, "SAFEMA"). He filed a Writ Petition in the Gujarat High Court questioning the said order of detention as also the order passed under SAFEMA. The said Writ Petition was allowed. A Special Leave Petition filed thereagainst by the competent authority was also dismissed. Representations were made by him for return of the said properties. An order was passed by the competent authority on or about 30.1.1996 canceling the Order dated 24.9.1979 whereby and whereunder the properties were directed to be forfeited. Allegedly, whereas the fixed deposit receipt was returned to him, the immovable properties were not. A Writ Petition was filed by the appellant. Allegations made in the said writ petition were denied and disputed. Respondent No. 4 who was impleaded as a party thereto contended that the appellant had transferred the said property in his favour. A learned Single Judge of the High Court by a Judgment and Order dated 17.1.2005 dismissed the said writ petition, holding;

See Swamy Atmananda and Ors. v Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and Others [(2005) 10 SCC 51].

There is nothing on record to show that the Division Bench while entertaining the Letters Patent Appeal intended to enter into any other question. Judges' record as is well known is final and conclusive. Any dispute in relation thereto must be raised before the same Court.

It is therefore, difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Jain that the Division Bench intended to exercise larger jurisdiction. If it intended to do so, it could have taken recourse to procedure known to law.

It allowed the appellant to withdraw the appeal. By doing so, the parties were relegated to the same position to which they had been viz. when the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition. Appellant, thus in our view could not have been placed in a worse position.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that the part of the impugned order whereby and whereunder the Division Bench refused to grant leave to the appellant to ventilate his grievances before an appropriate forum cannot be sustained. This appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. We, however, make no order as to costs.
Shiv Kant Yadav vs Indian Oil Corporation And Ors

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

se between themselves against aforesaid selection contending that candidates did not disclose the correct information in their applications and, therefore, were not qualified to get dealership. The Corporation held an enquiry on the basis of the complaint made against the appellant and relying on the report received after enquiry passed the order cancelling the selection of the appellant. Consequently, the Head Office of the Corporation directed the concerned authority to cancel the selection of the appellant and to issue LOI in favour of respondent No.4 after ensuring that there was no complaint/court case pending against the proposed allottee.

Appellant in the Writ Petition took the stand that as per the enquiry report the total income of the appellant had been fixed at Rs.1,64,000/- per annum vis-`-vis Rs.84,000/- as disclosed in his application form. The discrepancy has no bearing as the eligibility criteria was that the income should not be above rupees two lakhs in the last financial year. The complaint made by Hari Om Singh against Smt. Usha was pending and no LOI could be issued without holding an enquiry.

With reference to the application form and the undertaking the High Court held that it was obviously clear that the income was not fully disclosed. The plea that the income was less than rupees two lakhs, did not materially affect the eligibility of the appellant was not accepted and accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.

In view of the undertaking that if any factual mis- statement or declaration is made that permits cancellation of the allotment. The order of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
The Secretary, Technical ... vs Lalit Mohan Upadhyay & Anr

The undisputed facts are that Shri L. M. Upadhyay- respondent No.1 on selection as a Lecturer in Mathematics, joined his duty on 21.10.1991 in KEC, Dwarahat, District Almora. He was initially appointed on probation for a period of two years. Dr. M. C. Srivastava was the Principal of the College. On 18.03.1993, Ms. Geetanjali Gupta, a student of B.E. 2nd Year (1992-93 batch), fell seriously ill in the campus of the College. She had to be taken to the Civil Hospital, Ranikhet, for medical treatment. The Principal of the College deputed respondent No.1, Ms. Nidhi Choudhary, a classmate of Geetanjali and Ms. Hema Punetha, a Library Clerk in the College, to take Ms. Geetanjali to Civil Hospital, Ranikhet. Ms. Geetanjali was admitted in the Hospital where respondent No.1 along with Ms. Nidhi and Ms. Hema Punetha was attending her.

There cannot be any quarrel on the settled principle of law that an employee is entitled to withdraw his resignation before its acceptance by the competent authority. We have gone through the decisions of this Court in M/s J. K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur v. State of U. P. & Ors. [AIR 1990 SC 1808] and Union of India & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors. [(1978) 2 SCC 301] relied upon by the learned senior counsel for respondent No.1. He contended that before terminating the services of the respondent No.1 on the basis of the complaint of the girl student and subsequent inquiry reports of the Inquiry Officers, it was obligatory upon the Authority to hold regular departmental inquiry for the alleged misconduct and then to proceed against respondent No. 1 in accordance with relevant Rules. We are afraid to accept this submission. Admittedly, Shri L. M. Upadhyay was on probation and the Authority was empowered to judge his fitness for work or suitability to the post of teacher at the time of acceptance of his resignation. In our view, the services of Shri L.M. Upadhyay during probation period could have been terminated by the Authority, but the Principal and the Board of Governors had adopted a reasonable and fair mode of accepting his pending letter of resignation instead of terminating his services for unsuitability. For the above-said reasons, this appeal deserves to be accepted and it is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order dated 02.11.1999 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad passed in CMWP No.10058 of 1994 is not legal and justified. It is set aside accordingly. We leave the parties to bear their own costs.
Rattanlal vs State Of Jammu & Kashmir

The prosecution in support of its case examined a large number of witnesses. The learned Trial Judge, however, recorded a judgment of acquittal raising a number of doubts not only in regard to availability of sufficient light to identify the accused, but also having regard to the grave inconsistencies in the depositions of the witnesses, inconsistencies in the evidences of two medical experts in regard to number, nature and place of injuries, inconsistencies in regard to the place of occurrence and non- examination of the investigating officer.

The High Court on an appeal preferred thereagainst, as noticed hereinbefore, reversed the said judgment, opining that prosecution has led sufficient evidence establishing the charges against Appellant.

The High Court, however, while holding the appellant guilty under Section 302 R.P.C., held accused Kaku Ram to be guilty only under Section 324 R.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years, whereas Sunderdas was found guilty under Section 323 R.P.C. for causing simple injury to PW-Ramesh Chander and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for six months.

First Information Report, according to the prosecution, was recorded at 09.30 p.m. on the same day. The Investigating Officer, allegedly also recorded the statement of the first informant on the said day. There appears to be some inconsistencies in this behalf as PW-Dhano Devi stated :

In the post-mortem certificate, Injury No. 2 was shown to be 1="

We, therefore, are of the opinion that the judgment of the learned Judge cannot be said to be a view which was not possible to be taken.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. Appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
Magan vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

Deceased Indar Singh along with his brother Hari Singh (PW-2) and other persons were in their respective hutments. The accused persons came there and started shouting, on hearing of which Hari Singh (PW-2), deceased Indar Singh and Ansingh, Chandar Singh, Sayaribai and Sakru came out of their houses. Appellant was carrying a bow and arrows and other accused persons were having stones in their hands. Appellant wanted to know from the deceased as to why a complaint had been made by him in regard to cutting of Mahua tree before the Ranger. They started abusing them. Appellant shot an arrow which pierced the left side of the chest of the deceased. PW-2 and other witnesses tried to intervene, whereupon other accused persons started pelting stones. Chamru allegedly threw a stone which hit the shoulder and right parietal region of Hari Singh (PW-2). On receipt of injuries, the deceased Indar Singh tried to run away from the scene of occurrence. He took out the arrow and threw away the same. He, however, after going a few steps fell down. He was brought to the hut and after some time he succumbed to his injuries. A First Information Report was lodged by PW-2 before the Police Station which was situated at a distance of 14 k.m. from the place of occurrence. Before the learned Trial Judge, seven witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. The learned Trial Judge upon considering the materials brought on record found all the accused persons guilty of commission of murder of Indar Singh and causing voluntary hurt to PW-2, stating :

In my opinion, deceased dies due to hemorrhage shock. Death is homicidal in nature. The post-mortem report is Exhibit P-2, on which my signatures are from A to A."

For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is dismissed accordingly.
M.M.S.Investments, Madurai And Ors vs V. Veerappan And Ors

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that since the purchasers step into the shoes of the vendor, the question of readiness and willingness can be pressed into service. This plea is clearly without substance because the purchasers had to prove that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The readiness and willingness aspect will not give any relief to them. That being the position, the appeal is sans merit and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

In view of the dismissal of C.A.No.418 of 2001, no order needs to be passed in this appeal.
Commissioner Of Commercial Tax,Indore ... vs T.T.K. Health Care Ltd

On 12th March, 1996 the Assistant Commissioner, Indore, assessed sale of 'fryums' at 8% sales tax under the residuary entry referred to above. He demanded tax of Rs.1.33 lakhs (rounded off) for the Assessment Years 1.4.92 to 31.3.93. The Commissioner of Commercial Tax, in an application made under Section 68 of the 1994 Act held that 'fryums' were neither Namkeen nor 'cooked food' nor 'papad' nor 'cereals', and therefore, they were taxable under the above residual entry of Part VII of Schedule II of the 1994 Act. On 20.6.1997 the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. The matter was carried in revision. The revision was also dismissed.

For the above reasons we set aside the impugned judgment and allow this civil appeal filed by the Department with no order as to costs.
Union Of India vs Yumnam Anand M. @ Bocha @ Kora @ Suraj & Anr

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court, Imphal Bench, allowing the habeas corpus petition filed by respondent no.1. In the writ petition before the High Court the order of the District Magistrate Tamenglong passed in exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (in short the 'Act') read with Home Department's Order No.17(1)/49/80-S(Pt) dated 31.5.2005 was challenged. Though several grounds were urged in support of the application, the High Court accepted the stand that there was unexplained delay in disposing of the representation made. It is to be noted that counter affidavit had been filed giving details of the steps taken after the receipt of the representation. It was explained that some time was taken to obtain the view of the sponsoring authority. The High Court held that the views of the sponsoring authority were not necessary to be taken and, therefore, the delay had not been properly explained. Accordingly the order of detention was quashed.

The factual position needs to be noted before dealing with the contention as to desirability of obtaining views of sponsoring authority. The order of detention dated 3.9.2005 was served on respondent no.1 (hereinafter referred to as the 'detenu') on 14.9.2005. The detention was approved by the Governor of Manipur on 26.9.2005. The Ministry of Home Affairs received the representation made by the detenu against the detention on 3.11.2005. Immediately the parawise comments were called for from the sponsoring authority. The comments were received on 19.12.2005 and on 20.12.2005 the representation was rejected. On 7.11.2005 detenu filed a Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 50 of 2005 before the Gauhati High Court Imphal Bench for quashing the order of detention. It was submitted that there was unusual delay in disposing of the writ petition filed by the detenu.

In the circumstances, the High Court's impugned order is clearly indefensible and is set aside. However, the detaining authority shall decide within a period of two months if it would be desirable to take back the respondent no.1 to custody.

The appeal is allowed.
Jai Singh & Ors vs The State Of Karnataka

J U D G M E N T HARJIT SINGH BEDI,J The facts leading to this appeal by special leave are as under :

We have also considered Mr. Hegde's argument with regard to the quality of the judgment recorded by the trial court. We observe that the copy of the judgment put on record is apparently a translation from the Kannada version, and that the translation is truly abysmal and that it has taken us a great deal of time and effort to decipher it. We find that Mr. Hegde's argument the reasons which had weighed with the Trial Court for acquitting the accused have been confined to the last few pages is not quite accurate in as much that the last four pages are a summing up as the Court, has, while discussing individual pieces of evidence, ocular or circumstantial, given its comments and opinions as well. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the interference by the High Court in the judgment of the trial court was not called for as the view taken by it was justified on the evidence. We thus have no option but to allow the appeal and acquit the accused.
Union Of India (Uoi) vs Yumnam Anand M. @ Bocha @ Kora @ Suraj And ...

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court, Imphal Bench, allowing the habeas corpus petition filed by respondent No. 1. In the writ petition before the High Court the order of the District Magistrate Tamenglong passed in exercise of powers conferred under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (in short the 'Act') read with Home Department's Order No. 17(1)/49/80-S(Pt) dated 31.5.2005 was challenged. Though several grounds were urged in support of the application, the High Court accepted the stand that there was unexplained delay in disposing of the representation made. It is to be noted that counter affidavit had been filed giving details of the steps taken after the receipt of the representation. It was explained that some time was taken to obtain the view of the sponsoring authority. The High Court held that the views of the sponsoring authority were not necessary to be taken and, therefore, the delay had not been properly explained. Accordingly the order of detention was quashed.

4. The factual position needs to be noted before dealing with the contention as to desirability of obtaining views of sponsoring authority. The order of detention dated 3.9.2005 was served on respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the 'detenu') on 14.9.2005. The detention was approved by the Governor of Manipur on 26.9.2005. The Ministry of Home Affairs received the representation made by the detenu against the detention on 3.11.2005. Immediately the parawise comments were called for from the sponsoring authority. The comments were received on 19.12.2005 and on 20.12.2005 the representation was rejected. On 7.11.2005 detenu filed a Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 50 of 2005 before the Gauhati High Court Imphal Bench for quashing the order of detention. It was submitted that there was unusual delay in disposing of the writ petition filed by the detenu.

10. In the circumstances, the High Court's impugned order is clearly indefensible and is set aside. However, the detaining authority shall decide within a period of two months if it would be desirable to take back the respondent No. 1 to custody. The appeal is allowed.
Gomti vs Thakurdas & Ors

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The mere fact that during the trial, they were granted bail and there was no allegation of misuse of liberty, is really not of much significance. The effect of bail granted during trial looses significance when on completion of trial, the accused persons have been found guilty. The mere fact that during the period when the accused persons were on bail during trial there was no misuse of liberties, does not per se warrant suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. What really was necessary to be considered by the High Court is whether reasons existed to suspend the execution of sentence and thereafter grant bail. The High Court does not seem to have kept the correct principle in view.

The order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. Learned counsel for the accused-respondents stated that fresh applications shall be moved before the High Court. In case it is done, it goes without saying, that the High Court shall consider the matter in accordance with law, in its proper perspective Considering the principles set out above, we are of the view that the impugned orders of the High Court cannot be maintained and are set aside.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Rama Paswan & Ors vs State Of Jharkhand

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The charge sheet was filed on 29.9.1994. The examination of witnesses after framing of charges continued from 1994 to 2004. After examination of several witnesses on 18.5.2004 the trial court directed the production of further witnesses, if any. Since no prosecution witness was present on 18.5.2004, 28.5.2004 and 10.6.2004, evidence of prosecution was closed. On 16.6.2004 the statement of accused persons was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). The evidence of the defence witnesses was recorded between 25.6.2004 and 13.12.2004. Thereafter the matter was placed for argument. At this stage an application purported to be under Section 311 of the Code was filed for recalling of the victim for further cross examination on the ground that the parties have settled the dispute outside the Court at the intervention of the well-wishers and also the informant could not identify the persons who allegedly committed the offence due to darkness. The trial court rejected the application by order dated 1.4.2005. The trial court was of the view that in view of the circumstances indicated it would not be proper to allow the application of the accused for recalling the victim. The same was accordingly dismissed. It was noted that the case was pending for trial for more than ten years. Application in terms of Section 482 of the Code was filed before the High Court which was dismissed by the impugned order. The High Court was of the view that the compromise petition which was annexed to the petition under Section 482 of the Code referred to purported compromise between the parties. The High Court noted that Section 376 of IPC is not compoundable and when the victim was examined and cross examined during trial, the prayer to recall the victim is not acceptable. Accordingly the petition was rejected.

Considering the ambit of Section 311 of the Code, it does not appear to be a case where any interference is called for. What is the effect of evidence already recorded shall be considered by the trial court. Since Section 376 IPC is not compoundable in terms of Section 320 of the Code, the trial court and the High Court rightly rejected the prayer. We find no scope for interference in the appeal. Our non-interference shall not be construed as we have expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

The appeal is dismissed.