L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd. vs M/S Deccan Chronicle Holdings Ltd

3) Having given the glimpse of the transaction which was entered into between the parties and also that of the basis of the impugned judgment of the High Court, we proceed to discuss the details on which the lis is founded.

4) We may start with the narration of brief facts of the case, which are as follows:

16) In M.D. Frozen Foods the appellants had borrowed monies for their business from the respondents against security of 2 (2017) SCC Online SC 1211 Civil Appeal No. 18 of 2018 Page 14 of 42 immovable properties by creating an equitable mortgage. Loan agreement contained an arbitration clause. Since the appellant defaulted in making the payment and the account became NPA, the respondent invoked the arbitration clause on November 16, 2016. However, three months before this invocation, a notification was issued on August 05, 2016 specifying certain Non-Financial Banking Companies (NFBCs) covered under clause (f) of Section 45-I of the RBI Act, with assets of more than Rs. 500 crores and above, as financial institutions and directing that the provisions of SARFAESI Act shall apply to such financial institutions with the exceptions of provisions of Sections 13 to 19 of that Act. Sections 13 to 19 were made applicable, as per the notification, only to such security interest which is obtained for securing repayment of secured debt with principal amount of Rs.1 crore and above. The respondent was specifically covered by the said notification which was issued in exercise of powers conferred under sub-clause (iv) of clause (m) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 read with Section 31A of the SARFAESI Act. In view of the aforesaid notification, the respondent issued a notice under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act on November 24, 2016 for one of the seven properties mortgaged to it against the aforesaid loan which was advanced to the appellants.

32) After considering the aforesaid submission, we are of the opinion that entire edifice is built on the pleas which are squarely answered in M.D. Frozen Foods and there is no reason to take a different view therefrom for the reasons that follow hereinafter.

39) In view of the aforesaid judgment, argument of the respondents herein predicated on Sections 69 and 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, which weighed with the High Court, is without any substance.

44) As a result, we hold that judgment of the High Court is erroneous and set aside the same. This appeal is allowed. No orders need to be passed in the contempt petitions, which stand disposed of.

FEBRUARY 23, 2018.
Jagdish Kumar Sood vs United India Insurance Co.Ltd.

Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J 1 The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal allowed a claim for compensation filed by the third respondent. The claim arose from the death of the husband of the claimant on 4 January 2009 as a result of an accident caused by a collision with an offending truck. The Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs 4,08,000 together with interest at 6 per cent per annum. In an appeal filed by the third respondent the High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs 8,04,000. Interest @ 7.5 per cent per annum was awarded on the enhanced Digitally signed by DEEPAK GUGLANI Date: 2018.03.06 compensation.

Reason: 2 2 The Tribunal absolved the insurer on the ground that the vehicle involved in the accident was a Light Goods Vehicle. The driver had a licence to drive the Light Motor Vehicle. The Tribunal held that in the absence of a specific authorization to drive a transport vehicle, the liability could not be fastened on the insurer. The Tribunal directed the insurer to pay in the first instance and allowed it to recover the compensation from the driver and the owner. The present appeal has been filed by the owner.

5 Having regard to the above position, the Civil Appeal will have to be allowed.

6 The appeal is allowed, the order of the Tribunal absolving the insurer shall accordingly stand set aside. The liability shall jointly and severally be fastened on the insurer, in addition to the owner and driver. There shall be no order as to costs.

...........................................CJI [DIPAK MISRA] ...........................................J [A M KHANWILKAR] ...........................................J [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD] New Delhi;

March 06, 2018
Vishnu Chandru Gaonkar vs N.M. Dessai

2. The facts which are necessary to be noted for deciding this appeal are:-

(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 CrPC. This indicates that clause (b)(ii) contem- plates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any court.”

17. We thus fully endorse the view of the High Court that present is not a case where any complaint could have been proceeded with under Section 195(1)(b)(ii). We thus do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.
State Of Karnataka . vs M/S Durga Projects Inc

scheduled goods from within and outside the State and from unregistered dealers. On 31 January 2006 it made an application before the Authority for Advance Clarification and Ruling (‘AAR’) for guidance on the rate of tax applicable for the execution of civil works contracts under the KVAT Act. The AAR held by its order dated 2 August 2006 that since there was no specific entry providing for the rate of tax on works contracts up to 31 March 2006, tax on goods used in the execution of works contract should be levied in accordance with the rate of tax applicable to the sale of goods under the KVAT Act 2003. The relevant part of the order is extracted below:

17 For the above reasons, we find that there is no merit in the challenge preferred by the State of Karnataka to the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The appeal shall, accordingly, stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

23 CIVIL APPEAL NOS 812-817 OF 2018:

18 The High Court, by its impugned judgment and order dated 25 September 2014 dismissed the Sales Tax Revision Petitions filed under Section 65(1) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act 2003 against the order dated 26 August 2013 of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bengaluru. While dismissing the revisions, the High Court relied upon its earlier decision dated 29 September 2012 in M/s Durga Projects Inc v State of Karnataka (STA 72 of 2010). The appeal filed by the State of Karnataka (Civil Appeal No.811 of 2018) in the matter of M/s Durga Projects Inc. has been dismissed by this Court. No separate submission has been raised in the present appeals. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

...........................................CJI [DIPAK MISRA] ...........................................J [A M KHANWILKAR] ...........................................J [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD] New Delhi;

March 06, 2018 24
Ummer vs Pottengal Subida

3. Facts of the case lie in a narrow compass and to appreciate the short point involved in these appeals, the facts, however, need mention hereinbelow.

4. Respondent No. 1 is the wife of respondent No.6 and daughter-in-law of the appellant herein whereas respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are the children born out of the wedlock of respondent Nos. 1 and 6.

5. Respondent No. 1 (wife/daughter in law) filed a suit being O.P. 1011 of 2011 against the appellant and respondent No. 6 in the Family Court, Malappuram for realization of the gold ornaments or 2 in the alternative its value, which was alleged to have given by her parents to the appellant and respondent No. 6 in her marriage with respondent No. 6 and also for grant of maintenance under Section 26 of the Family Courts Act.

6. This suit was being contested by the appellant as one of the defendants along with respondent No. 6 before the Family Court. However, the Family Judge placed the appellant ex parte on 16.10.2014 because he failed to appear in the suit on that date. The Family Court then proceeded to pass ex parte decree against the appellant on the same day.

8. By order dated 04.03.2016, the Family Judge dismissed the applications and declined to condone the delay. As a consequence thereof, the application filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code was also dismissed without going into its merit.

17. In the light of the aforementioned undisputed facts, in our opinion, the High Court should have taken liberal view in the matter and held the cause shown by the appellant as "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and accordingly should have condoned the delay in filing the appeal.

19. In our considered opinion, having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and the cause shown by the appellant, which is duly proved by the documents, we are inclined to hold that the cause shown by the appellant for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before the High Court was/is a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the application filed by the appellant for condonation of delay of 554 days in filing the appeal deserves to be condoned. It is accordingly condoned but it is subject to the condition that the appellant shall pay cost of Rs.10,000/- to respondent No. 1.

20. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals succeed and are accordingly allowed. Impugned order is set aside. The appeal (Misc. Appeal No.653/2016) is held to have been filed within limitation. It is accordingly restored to its original number. The High Court will now decide the appeal on merits expeditiously in accordance with law.

………………………………..J (R.K. AGRAWAL) ..………………………………J. (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE) New Delhi, March 08, 2018 9
Prahlad Shankarrao Tajale vs The State Of Maharashtra Thru Is ...

3) In order to appreciate the short question involved in the appeal, few facts need mention infra.

6) By order dated 22.03.2014, the Division Bench permitted the appellants to withdraw the intra court appeal and granted them liberty to file review petition before the Single Judge against the order by which their writ petition was dismissed. 2

10) The Registrar, by his order dated 19.10.2015 further granted four weeks’ time to the appellants to cure the defects and at the same time directed that failing to cure the defects will result in refusing the registration of the Review Application, i.e., it will result in rejection of the Review application. 3

March 08, 2018 8
Abdulrasakh vs K.P. Mohammed

The facts:

presentation, the petition is stated to have been defective and was placed before the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court, who by the order dated 18.7.2017 granted one week’s time to respondent Nos.1 & 2 to cure the defects. It is thereafter that notice was issued to all the respondents in the election petition including the appellant herein.

Conclusion:

20. We are, thus, of the unequivocal view that the pleas advanced on behalf of the appellant are meritless and deserve to be rejected.

21. The appeal is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

March 08, 2018.

Civil Appeal No.10863/2017 Page 17 of 17
Sri Rameshwar Yadav vs The State Of Bihar

bailable warrant and dispensing with their physical appearance in the case. It was appellants’ case that said application was filed because appellant No.1, father of Arnesh Kumar is a retired Army Official residing in Pune with appellant No.2 and other appellants 3 were also residents of Pune, Maharashtra and they have to come from a distance. It was prayed by the accused that they be exempted from the personal appearance in the case. All the accused except Arnesh Kumar, husband of complainant were granted anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail was granted by the District and Sessions Judge, Patna on 21.06.2013 to all the accused except Arnesh Kumar, husband of the complainant. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate by order dated 13.08.2013 rejected the application filed by the accused under Section 205 Cr.P.C.

4. Challenging the order dated 13.08.2013, an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed which has been dismissed by the Patna High Court. The High Court dismissed the application taking a new ground that a prayer for exemption from personal appearance under Section 205 Cr.P.C. can only be made at the stage of first appearance of the accused. Once the accused appears before the court in person without making any application for dispensing with the personal appearance under Section 205 Cr.P.C., at a subsequent stage, such an application would not be maintainable. Aggrieved by the said order this appeal has been filed.

12. Now, we advert to the reasons given by the Magistrate for rejecting the application. As noticed above, first reason given by the Magistrate is that all the accused appear hale and hearty and there is no suffering from any type of disease which may be impediment in appearing before the court. Application was not filed by the accused on the ground that they suffer from any physical illness and hence the said reason given by the Magistrate is wholly out of place. The second reason is that accused and complainant should be present before the court on each and every date expecting good 10 sense prevail between them. We fail to see this as any valid ground for not considering actual grounds given by the accused for seeking exemption. Third ground given was regarding conciliation which requires the appearance of the accused desirable.

14. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court dated 17.04.2017 as well as order of the Sub- Divisional Judicial Magistrate dated 13.08.2013 are set aside, application filed by the appellants under Section 205 Cr.P.C. is allowed. The personal appearance of the appellants is exempted. This, however, shall not preclude the Magistrate to pass appropriate orders under Section 205(2) Cr.P.C. if and when personal appearance of the appellants is required.
Rakesh Birani (D) Thru Lrs. vs Prem Narain Sehgal

3. The brief facts in the present case are that the auction of the property was held on 14th February 2013. The appellant was the highest bidder. He offered a bid of Rs.38.30 lakhs and deposited a sum of Rs.3,90,500/- as earnest money on 1 st February 2013. He further deposited 25% of the auction amount of Rs.5.80/- lakhs on 15th February 2013 and remaining amount of Rs.8,69,500/- on 13 th March 2013. The auction purchaser claimed that he was intimated regarding confirmation of sale by the Authorised Officer of the secured creditor by letter dated 27th February 2013. As soon as he was Digitally signed by ASHOK RAJ SINGH Date: 2018.04.04 intimated of the confirmation, he further deposited the 75% of the 13:55:35 IST Reason:

4. The owner and principal borrower whose property was sold in auction questioned the same by way of filing a writ petition. The Writ Petition (Civil) No.20653 of 2013 was filed by the respondent. The Division Bench passed the order on 25 th April 2013 that as the property has already been auctioned, directed the respondent to file an appeal under the provisions of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 2002”). Thereafter, an appeal was filed that was registered as S.A. No.1133 of 2013. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad vide order dated 19th December 2013, has set aside the sale, the order was confirmed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal as well as by the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence, the present appeal by the auction purchaser.

11. The appeal is allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. No order as to costs.

MARCH 21, 2018.
Mohan Lal vs Nandlal

2. In the year 1989, the respondent herein instituted a Suit, before the District Judge, Indore seeking ejectment of his brother—the appellant herein from the suit property and also claiming mesne profits. The defendant—appellant herein contested the Suit on the ground that he got half share in the disputed property as it originally belonged to his late maternal grandfather who was survived by only two daughters. On the death of his grandfather his mother entered the succession and he has been staying with his mother in the suit property. Therefore the plaintiff—respondent cannot claim to be the sole owner of the suit property and the Suit itself is misconceived. Subsequently, the respondent—plaintiff amended the plaint to the effect that during the lifetime of his grandfather, late Goverdhanlal bequeathed the house property by executing a Will on 9th September, 1945 in favour of the plaintiff, and after the death of his grandfather in the year 1947, he has become sole owner of the Suit property. Taking into account the Will dated 9.9.1945, the trial Court decreed the Suit in favour of the respondent—plaintiff. The aggrieved defendant—appellant herein filed first appeal before the High Court. By the judgment 3 impugned herein, the High Court confirmed the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed his appeal. Hence, the appellant is before us in this appeal assailing the findings of the Courts below.

5. On behalf of the respondent-plaintiff it was submitted that at the time of execution of the Will on 9 th September, 1945 the respondent—plaintiff alone was the male child in the family and the Will was written by Late Goverdhanlal, who was an advocate by profession, in his own handwriting. At the time of death of Late Goverdhanlal, the respondent-plaintiff was about 13 years age and the appellant-defendant was born about 8 years after the death of Late Goverdhanlal. The appellant, being younger brother of the respondent, was permitted to live in the disputed property with an assurance from him that he would vacate the house and hand over vacant possession of the 5 house to the respondent when demanded. But the appellant failed to keep his promise and dishonestly got his name mutated in the records of property tax. The Courts below have rightly decided the matter after assessing the witnesses and taking the Will into consideration and therefore the appeal at hand deserves to be dismissed.

9. For all the aforesaid reasons, the appeal lacks merit and is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.
Union Of India Southern Railway General ... vs R. Sethumadhavan

Maharajah Coomar Ramaput Sing, (1871-2) Vol. XIV Moo, I.A.605 C.A. No.__________of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 5456 of 2018) Page 1 of 8 and his pension woes are being decided after 27 years and unfortunately not in his favour.

4. When the respondent retired as a Train Examiner with the Indian Railways, he was in the pay scale of Rs. 1400–2300. After the 5 th Central Pay Commission was implemented, the replacement scale for the post of Train Examiner (which was apparently abolished) became Rs.4500-7000.

5. According to the respondent the post of Train Examiner was re-designated as Junior Engineer Grade-II and the revised pay of a Junior Engineer Grade-II was recommended by the 5 th Central Pay Commission to be Rs. 5000-8000. The difference in the replacement scale of a Train Examiner as against the revised scale in the case of Junior Engineer Grade–II made a difference of about Rs. 500 per month in the pension entitlement of the respondent.

6. On 30th September, 1997 a Policy Resolution was notified by the Government of India relating to the scope and extent of the application of C.A. No.__________of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 5456 of 2018) Page 2 of 8 the recommendations of the 5th Central Pay Commission and its acceptance. This was followed by a large number of representations from pensioners and resulted in the Government of India issuing an Office Memorandum on 17th December, 1998 to the following effect:-

C.A. No.__________of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 5456 of 2018) Page 4 of 8

12. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Tribunal, the petitioner preferred W.P. No. 13207 of 2013 in the Madras High Court. By the impugned judgment and order dated 2 nd August, 2016 the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order passed by the Tribunal. It is under these circumstances that the Union of India is before us.

17. In the circumstances, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment and order of the Madras High Court and we do so accordingly. The appeal is allowed.

C.A. No.__________of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 5456 of 2018) Page 7 of 8

18. In case any payments have been made to the respondent, there will be no recovery of these amounts.

19. A copy of this order be sent to the Secretary, Department of Personnel and Training of the Government of India.

C.A. No.__________of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 5456 of 2018) Page 8 of 8
M/S. Mmc Projects India Pvt.Ltd. vs Gujarat State Electricity Corpn. Ltd

2. The matter arising out of a dispute in execution of a works contract was referred to the Arbitrator by the High Court on 4.09.2008. The Arbitrator made his Award dated 10.07.2010 in favour of the appellant. It was challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) before the Seventh Additional District Judge, Bhopal by the respondent-State of M.P. The respondent sought to amend its objections after three years which was rejected by the trial Court. On a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has allowed the said amendment.

5. We find merit in the contentions raised on behalf of the State. We proceed on the footing that the amendment being beyond limitation is not to be allowed as the amendment is not pressed.

10. Since amendment application is not pressed, the appeal is rendered infructuous. The impugned order is set aside.

The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

(3) Where the Tribunal admits the reference under sub-section (2), it shall, after recording evidence if necessary, and after perusal of the material on record and on affording and opportunity to the parties to submit their argument, make an award or an interim award, giving its reasons therefor. (4) The Tribunal shall use all reasonable dispatch in entering on and proceeding with the reference admitted by it and making the award, and an endeavour shall be made to make an award within four months from the date on which the Tribunal had admitted the reference. (5) The award including the interim award made by the Tribunal shall, subject to an order, if any made under Section – 12 or 13, be final and binding on the parties to the dispute.
Gorusu Nagaraju vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh

2. For the disposal of the appeal, few relevant facts need to be mentioned hereinbelow.

3. The appellant (A-1) along with four accused persons (A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5) were prosecuted for commission of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 201 of IPC for committing murder of one - Desineedi Venkateswararao @ Venkatesh. The IInd Additional District & Sessions Judge by his judgment and order dated 10.06.2005, convicted the appellant (A-1) and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC and further to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years under Section 201 IPC and acquitted three accused, namely, A-2, A-3 and A-5. So far as A-4 is concerned, since he was absconding, his trial was separated.

4. Against the said order, the appellant filed an appeal in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging his conviction and sentence. The State, however, did not file any appeal questioning the order in respect of acquittal of A-2, A3 and A-5 and, therefore, the acquittal order became final.

12. That apart, in our considered opinion, the seven circumstances noticed and relied on by the prosecution were material circumstances and, therefore, rightly made basis to connect the appellant with the commission of the crime in question. Indeed, the chain of events which led to death of the deceased was established without any break implicating the appellant with the chain of events.

15. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in the appeal. The appeal thus fails and is accordingly dismissed.

March 23, 2018 9