L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Reserve Bank Of India vs Gen.Coop.Bank ...

3. In this case, an application for bail was made CRL.A. NO. 1486 OF 2004 REPORTABLE 2 by some of the accused in Cr. No. 121/2002 of Naranpura Police Station in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by respondent No. 3, the Ex-Chairman of the Bank, respondent No. 4. Bail was granted by the Magistrate vide order dated 22nd February, 2002. This order was challenged by the depositors before the High Court. The High Court, however, did not cancel the bail granted to respondent No. 3 but made a consequential order on 20/12/2002. This order is reproduced below:-

6. We are of the opinion that the far reaching consequences of the directions of the High Court are way beyond the scope of an application for bail filed by an accused under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal CRL.A. NO. 1486 OF 2004 REPORTABLE 4 Procedure and the High Court, as much as anyone else, must stay confined to the issues relevant to the matter before it. It was thus not open to the High Court to pass orders which could affect the working of Banks all over the country. It has been pointed out by Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, the learned senior counsel for the appellant that it is for this reason that the Reserve Bank of India had filed these appeals. We, accordingly, allow these appeals and set aside the orders dated 20th December, 2002 and dated 7th February, 2003.
State Of M.P vs Harishankar Bhagwan Pd. Tripathi

3. According to the prosecution case, the complainant, Ramavtar, submitted an application in the Office of the District Excise Officer, Shahdol, for a licence to collect Mahua. At that time, Ghanshyamdas @ G.D. Sharma had been serving as Special Inspector, Excise and the sole Respondent herein, Harishankar Bhagwan Pd. Tripathi, was serving as a Clerk in the said establishment. The complainant, Ramavtar, claimed to have deposited a sum of Rs.200/- for the licence fee in the State Bank and upon inquiry from the said Ghanshyamdas, he allegedly demanded a sum of Rs.2000/- from the 3 complainant as illegal gratification for getting the licence. Eventually, a written complaint was made by Ramavtar to the Lokayukt (Rewa) of the Special Police, Rewa, which was received by the Deputy Superintendent of Police on 04.06.1986.

7. Aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge, the prosecuting agencies filed Criminal Appeal No.294 of 1994 before the Jabalpur Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which, by its judgment and order dated 31st March, 2008, reiterated the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal upon holding that the sanction accorded by the State Government under Section 6 of the Act suffered from non- 6 application of mind, since in the sanction order only the facts of the prosecution case had been mentioned and no reason had been given for according sanction in regard thereto. In the absence of a valid sanction, the High Court dropped the proceedings against Ghanshyamdas, against whom the appeal has abated. As far as the sole Respondent, Harishankar Bhagwan Prasad Tripathi, is concerned, the High Court held that in the absence of any demand made by the said Respondent, the provisions of Section 5(1)(d) of the 1947 Act were not attracted and even the recovery of Rs.200/- from Harishankar was not sufficient to hold him guilty of the charges levelled against him. The High Court, accordingly, dismissed the appeal as against the sole Respondent, Harishankar.

14. This appeal, accordingly, succeeds. The order of the learned Special Judge, Shahdol, dated 19th May, 1993 in Special Case No. No.5/87, acquitting the accused of the charges framed against them under Section 161 I.P.C. and Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the 1947 Act and the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 31st March, 14 2008 in Criminal Appeal No.294 of 1994 are hereby set aside. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the matter is remitted to the learned Special Judge, Shahdol, for passing appropriate orders on the merits of the case.
State Nct Of Delhi vs Ajit Seth @ Ajji

O R D E R This is indeed a sorry case and indicates the hardship and inequity that can ensue to an accused, the prosecution and the victims in the case of a delayed trial or the delay in the disposal of an appeal.

It is the conceded position that the appellant has, of now, undergone more than 20 years of the sentence and has also been released in April 2010. We see that the SLP had been filed in the year 2002 and leave was granted two years later. In the light of the fact that the appellant has already completed his sentence of 20 years and has been released it would be a complete travesty of justice to allow this Appeal and to award a capital sentence -4- at this stage. We endorse the finding of the Trial Court that the crime committed by the respondent was indeed barbaric and called for no mercy but in the face of the facts given above, to send the respondent to the gallows at this stage too would be completely unjustified.

The proceedings are hereby submitted to the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi for confirmation of the death sentence passed u/s. 302 IPC and the accused is committed to the jail custody under a separate warrant."

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Indra Devi & Ors vs Bagada Ram & Anr

2. On March 31, 1999, one Ramniwas while going on a motorcycle dashed against the rear side of a truck that was headed in the same direction as the motorcycle. Ramniwas died in the accident. His heirs and legal representatives, the appellants before this Court, moved the MACT, Sojat, Branch Jaitaran, District Pali in MACT Case No.59 of 1999 against the owner of the truck and its insurer, the New India Assurance Company Ltd. for compensation in terms of section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In course of the proceedings, the appellants claimed no fault compensation under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act which was granted to them by 2 the Tribunal and the compensation amount was duly paid by the insurance company. In the main proceeding, however, the Tribunal came to find and hold that insofar as the accident is concerned there was no lapse on the part of the driver of the truck nor was it due to any mechanical fault in the truck. The accident was caused due to the careless and negligent driving of the deceased himself. On that finding, the Tribunal naturally rejected the claim of compensation on the principle of fault. But it did not stop there and went on to hold that the insurance company was entitled to the refund of the amount of no fault compensation along with interest @ 9% p.a. In the operative portion of the judgment, the tribunal ordered as follows:

7. The present appeal must, therefore, be allowed. The order of the Tribunal insofar as it permits the insurance company (respondent no.2) to 4 recover the amount of interim compensation alongwith the interest from the claimants/appellants is set aside.

8. In the result the appeal is allowed but with no order as to costs.

.....................................J (AFTAB ALAM) .......................................J (R.M. LODHA) New Delhi August 18, 2010.
State Of M.P vs Pramod Kumar Shukla & Anr

2. One single individual, a compounder in an autonomous government Ayurved college went to the High Court, complaining about his aborted transfer to another autonomous Ayurved college. The High Court while dismissing his writ petition/appeal made certain blanket prohibitory directions against the State Government. Aggrieved by those directions, the State Government is in appeal before this Court.

3. One Pramod Kumar Shukla worked as a compounder in an autonomous government Ayurved college in Ujjain. He made a representation to the Government for his transfer to the autonomous Ayurved College, Rewa. His representation was allowed and he was transferred to the college where he desired to go but two months later his 2 transfer order was cancelled and he was sent back to the Ujjain College for the reason that employees of autonomous government Ayurved Colleges were not under government control and the government had no authority or power to transfer them from one autonomous college to another autonomous college.

4. The aforesaid Shukla moved the High Court in a writ petition against the cancellation of his transfer order as a result of which he was sent back to the Ujjain College. A single judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition. He preferred an intra-court appeal. The division bench noticed the stand of the government that the autonomous colleges/institutions were governed by specific rules framed/adopted by those colleges/institutions. Further, at the time of appointment of the employees of the autonomous colleges/institutions the government had no role to play and the salaries/ wages of the employees of those colleges were not being paid by the government and the government was not the disciplinary authority of the employees of the autonomous colleges and hence, the employees of the autonomous colleges could not be held as employees of the government. Having noted the stand of the government, the division bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the aggrieved employee. 3

7. We are, accordingly, constrained to interfere in the matter and set aside the impugned directions.

8. In the result, the appeal is allowed but with no order as to costs.

....................................J (AFTAB ALAM) ....................................J (R.M. LODHA) New Delhi August 18, 2010.
Greater Mohali Area Dev. Authority & Ors vs Manju Jain & Ors

3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the respondent No.1 applied vide application No.026012, dated 27.1.1997, for allotment of a flat under a hire purchase scheme along with application money of Rs.20,000/-. After considering the application of the respondent No.1 along with other applicants, a draw of lots was held on 28.6.1997 and an M.I.G. flat was allocated to the respondent No.1 and she was informed vide letter dated 19.11.1997 about the said allocation. As per the said allocation letter, the allotment was for a tentative cost to the tune of Rs.4,79,200/-. Respondent No.1 would deposit a further 15% of the price of the flat within 30 days of the issuance of the allotment letter and the balance amount was to be deposited in equal monthly installments over a period of 13 years. It was also open for her to make payment of the balance amount in a lump sum within 60 days from the date of issue of the allotment letter. The authority issued the letter of allotment dated 9th March, 1999 in her favour, which made it clear that the price of the house was Rs.5,55,200/- and that she had to send her acceptance of the 2 allotment and deposit 25% of the amount within 60 days of the receipt of the allotment letter. She had to deposit the balance amount in monthly installment over a period of 13 years. The respondent No.1 did not make any response to the said letter nor did she deposit any amount. The appellant- authority on her query vide letter dated 28th August, 2003, informed the respondent No.1 that the allotment made in her favour stood cancelled, as she did not deposit any amount in pursuance of the allotment letter dated 9th March, 1999.

4. Being aggrieved, respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal before the Estate Officer of the appellants challenging the order of cancellation. The said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 30th March, 2006, against which the respondent No.1 preferred a revision which was also dismissed by the Revisional Authority vide order dated 31.7.2007.

12. In the writ petition filed on 25-10-2007 before the High Court, a totally new case was built up on a new factual matrix, i.e. that respondent No. 1 had never received the allotment letter and after waiting for a long time when she made a representation to the authorities, she was informed that allotment made vide letter dated 9.3.1999 has been cancelled vide order dated 28.8.2003.

The writ petition was finally allowed by the High Court within a period of 26 days of its filing without giving any proper opportunity to the present appellants to file a reply and produce material to controvert the averments made in the writ petition.

21. In view of the above, the High Court ought to have examined the issue in the correct perspective, as respondent No. 1 did not controvert the plea taken by the appellants of sending the allotment letter by Registered Post.

29. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the orders passed by the authorities under the statute are restored. No order as to costs.
State Of Bihar & Ors vs Mithilesh Kumar

2. On 5th December, 2002, after the said communication was received from the Assistant Director, Social Welfare, the Respondent was declared successful in the interview which had been held on 9th November, 2002, and despite the request made by the Assistant Director, Social Welfare, the B.P.S.C. recommended the name of the Respondent to 4 the said authority for appointment. The Respondent, in his turn, made a representation seeking appointment pursuant to the results declared by the Commission. Not receiving any response, the Respondent filed Writ Petition No.543 of 2005 before the Patna High Court on 11th July, 2005, for appropriate relief. The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition with a direction to the Director, Social Welfare, Government of Bihar, to dispose of the Respondent's representation. On 15th December, 2005, the Director, Social Welfare, considered the representation of the Respondent and rejected the same.

3. Aggrieved by the rejection of his representation, the Respondent filed a fresh Writ Petition, being CWJC No.447 of 2006, before the Patna High Court and the same was duly allowed. The order dated 15th December, 2005, passed by the Director, Social Welfare, was quashed and the 5 Secretary, Social Welfare, Government of Bihar and the Director, Social Welfare, were directed to appoint the Respondent to the post of Assistant Instructor (Electronics) in Kamla Nehru Social Service Institute and Handicapped and Rehabilitation Training Centre, Patna, after obtaining a recommendation for validation by the B.P.S.C. A direction was given to issue the appointment letter in favour of the Respondent within two weeks from the date of receipt/ production of a copy of the High Court's order.

5. The instant Special Leave Petition has been filed against the said judgment of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court.

16. While a person may not acquire an indefeasible right to appointment merely on the basis of selection, in the instant case the fact situation is different since the claim of the Respondent to be appointed had been negated by a change in policy after the selection process had begun.

17. In these circumstances, we do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 18th July, 2008, in LPA No.844 of 2007, affirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 31st 17 July, 2007, in CWJC No.447 of 2006. The Special Leave Petition is, therefore, dismissed, without any order as to costs.
M/S Sree Kamatchi Amman Constructions vs Divisional Rly.Manager/Works & Ors

2. The first respondent entrusted certain construction work to the appellant under a contract in the year 1995. Alleging breach by the first respondent (for short `Railways') the appellant invoked the arbitration Clause and the disputes were referred to an arbitral tribunal of which respondents 2 to 4 are the members. The arbitral tribunal made a non- speaking award dated 14.5.1999 in favour of the appellant. The High Court by order dated 9.1.2001 set aside the said award and remitted the matter to the arbitral tribunal with a direction to make a reasoned award after fresh 2 consideration. The arbitral tribunal accordingly passed an award dated 5.12.2001 awarding certain amounts with a direction that the award amount should be paid to the appellant by 4.1.2002 and if it failed to do so, the appellant will be entitled to simple interest at 10% per annum on the amounts awarded from 5.12002 till date of payment. That is, the arbitral tribunal awarded only future interest and refused to award the interest for pre-reference period and interest pendente lite. It may be mentioned that the award rejected two of the claims of the appellants and rejected all the claims of the Railways.

(emphasis supplied) The two claims on which amounts are awarded are with reference to claim No. (4) relating to erroneous billing and claim No. (6) relating to security deposit. Clause 16(2) in terms specifically bars payment of interest on security deposit. Insofar as claim No. (4) is concerned, the question is whether the amount awarded is an "amount payable to the contractor under the contract". Learned counsel for the appellant made a faint attempt to contend that the award relating to claim No. (4) was not in regard to an amount payable to the contractor under the contract. This contention has absolutely no merit as the award itself categorically recorded a finding that under item No.19 "the actual quantity executed by the claimant at the orders of the respondent very much becomes a part and parcel of the original agreement quantity". What was awarded for the "rate per metre of rails to be led to SLY Yard and stacked vide Agreement Schedule Item No. 19" at the rate of Rs.225 per metre. Thus claim No.4 related to a work executed by the contractor as a part and parcel of the work contemplated under the agreement. Payment directed by the arbitral tribunal for such work was also in accordance with the Agreement Schedule Item No.19. Therefore it is 6 evident that the amount awarded in regard to claim No. (4) was an amount payable to the contractor under the contract. Consequently no interest could be paid thereon having regard to the bar under Clause 16(2) of the General conditions of contract.

12. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in these appeals and they are dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.
Rattan Lal & Ors vs State Of Haryana & Ors

2. Land belonging to the appellants predecessors was acquired some time in the year 1986. It is the admitted position that on account of various interim orders made by the High Court, the appellant still remains in possession of the said land. The appellants also filed Writ Petition No. 6696/1995 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the primary issue raised was that they were entitled to allotment of plots being oustees. The High Court vide its judgment dated 2nd September, 1996, directed that the appellant should first approach the respondent-HUDA with a formal application so that a CANo. of 2010 @ SLP(C) 4907 of 2008 2 decision could be taken on their claim. An application was, accordingly, filed before the Chief Administrator on 22nd February, 2001. The application was rejected by the Screening Committee on 7th September, 2004 and the information was conveyed to the appellant on 11th October, 2004. The reason for the rejection was that the Scheme for allotment of plots to oustees had been formulated only with effect from 10th September, 1987 and as the appellants' land had been acquired prior to that date, they could not be treated as oustees. The order dated 7th September, 2004 and 11th October, 2004 were challenged by the appellants in the High Court. The High Court has vide impugned order dated 10th December, 2007 dismissed the writ petition making some observations which have no bearing on the matter and are irrelevant.

3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that issues with regard to the claim of the appellants have not been answered by the High Court and some observations not required in the writ petition have been recorded. We have, accordingly, no option but to allow the writ petition, set aside the order dated 10th December, 2007 and remit CANo. of 2010 @ SLP(C) 4907 of 2008 3 the matter to the High Court for decision afresh.

4. Parties to appear before the Registrar, High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh on 10th November, 2010. No costs.

........................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] ........................J [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD] NEW DELHI AUGUST 25, 2010.
Shalimar Chemicals Works Ltd vs Surendra Oil & Dal ...

1. This is the plaintiff's appeal arising from a suit for permanent injunction based on allegations of infringement of its registered trade mark. The appellant is a company incorporated and registered under the Companies Act. The case of the appellant is that from the year 1945 it is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of high grade coconut oil used for cooking as well as manufacturing of various toilet products under the distinctive trade mark "Shalimar". The appellant claims to be the registered owner of the trade mark "Shalimar" in Class 03 in respect of 2 coconut hair oil and in Class 29 in respect of all edible oils included in that class. Alleging that the respondents were marketing their product in infringement of its registered trade mark, the appellant filed a suit (OS No.1 of 1995) before the Third Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking permanent injunction restraining the defendants from marketing or offering for sale edible oil products bearing the name "Shalimar" on containers, labels or wrappers, or using any name identical or deceptively similar to the appellant's trade mark.

5. Once the original trade mark registration certificates were taken off the record of the case, the appellant's suit was bound to be dismissed. And that is how the division bench dealt with the appeal. It allowed the appeal of the defendant-respondent by judgment dated April 25, 2003 setting aside the judgment of the learned single judge and restoring the judgment passed by the trial court.

13. In the result, the appeal is allowed, as indicated above but with no order as to costs.
Incharge Officer And Anr vs Shankar Shetty

4. Shankar Shetty - the respondent was initially engaged as daily wager by the appellants in 1978. He worked for 57 days in that year. The respondent had also worked for 316= days in 1979, 335= days in 1980, 242= days in 1981, 33= days in 1982, 10= days in 1983, 103 days in 1984 and 50 days in 1985. According to him he was terminated from service on September 6, 1985 without following the procedure prescribed in Section 25 F of the ID Act . He raised industrial dispute relating to his retrenchment which was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court, Mysore but later on the dispute was transferred to the Labour Court, Chickmagalur. The Labour Court, Chickmagalur by its award on December 21, 1994 rejected the respondent's claim. The Labour Court held that Section 25 F of the ID Act was not attracted since the workman failed to prove that he 4 had worked continuously for 240 days in the calendar year preceding his termination on September 6, 1985. The respondent challenged the award passed by the Labour Court by filing a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court. The Single Judge of the High Court overturned the finding of the Labour Court about non-applicability of Section 25 F and held that Section 25 F of the ID Act was attracted and the procedure provided therein having not been followed, the termination of respondent (petitioner therein) was illegal. The Single Judge, accordingly, vide his judgment and order dated August 13, 2001 directed reinstatement of the respondent into service but without back wages and continuity of service. The present appellants challenged the judgment and order of the Single Judge in writ appeal before Division Bench but without any success. On December 9, 2004, the writ appeal preferred by the present appellants was dismissed by the Division Bench.

6. The appeal is allowed to the above extent. Since the respondent has not chosen to appear despite service of notice, there will be no order as to costs.

(R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI, AUGUST 31, 2010 6