L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Ramnath International Construction ... vs Union Of India

2. The appellant was awarded two contracts - the first for construction of LRMR Aircraft Hangar and Airtech Hangar and connected works; and the second for construction of roads and allied works at NAS Arakonam. In respect of the two contracts, hereinafter referred to as the Hangar Contract and Road Contract, the tenders submitted by appellant were accepted on 10.10.1988 and 3/5.1.1989 respectively. The necessary agreements were executed between the parties. Disputes arose between the parties in respect of those contracts and the matter was referred to Arbitration. The Arbitrator after examining the oral and documentary evidence made his Awards dated 20.7.1993 and 5.3.1994. Applications were filed before the learned Single Judge by the respondent herein for setting aside the Awards. The learned Single Judge by orders dated 24.8.1994 and 22.9.1995 rejected the applications and in each case made a rule of the court in terms of the award. Being aggrieved the respondent filed OSA Nos. 27/1995 and 25/1996, which were partly allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence, the present appeals by the claimant contractor.

3. It may not be necessary for us to refer to the entire facts leading to the filing of the present appeals as the substantial question of law posed requires reference to limited facts. Suffice it to say that awards of the learned Arbitrator related to claims under several heads. The controversy in these appeals relate to award in respect of item no. 24 in the Hangar contract and items 13 to 16 in respect of the road contract. The particulars thereof are extracted below :

We, therefore, answer the first question in the affirmative.

Re : Question (ii) :

15. There is no infirmity in the impugned order of the High Court. These appeals being devoid of merits are, accordingly, dismissed. Parties are asked to bear their own costs.
Ramnath International Construction ... vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr.

2. The appellant was awarded two contracts - the first for construction of LRMR Aircraft Hangar and Airtech Hangar and connected works; and the second for construction of roads and allied works at NAS Arakonam. In respect of the two contracts, hereinafter referred to as the Hangar Contract and Road Contract, the tenders submitted by appellant were accepted on 10.10.1988 and 3/5.1.1989 respectively. The necessary agreements were executed between the parties. Disputes arose between the parties in respect of those contracts and the matter was referred to Arbitration. The Arbitrator after examining the oral and documentary evidence made his Awards dated 20.7.1993 and 5.3.1994. Applications were filed before the learned Single Judge by the respondent herein for setting aside the Awards. The learned Single Judge by orders dated 24.8.1994 and 22.9.1995 rejected the applications and in each case made a rule of the court in terms of the award. Being aggrieved the respondent filed OSA Nos. 27/1995 and 25/1996, which were partly allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence, the present appeals by the claimant contractor.

3. It may not be necessary for us to refer to the entire facts leading to the filing of the present appeals as the substantial question of law posed requires reference to limited facts. Suffice it to say that awards of the learned Arbitrator related to claims under several heads. The controversy in these appeals relate to award in respect of item no. 24 in the Hangar contract and items 13 to 16 in respect of the road contract. The particulars thereof are extracted below:

14. In the view that we have taken the Arbitrator clearly misconducted himself in awarding compensation under claim no. 24 under Hangar Contract and claim nos. 13 to 16 under the Road Contract which was rightly set aside by the High Court in the order impugned herein, on the ground that the Arbitrator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction. There is no infirmity in the impugned order of the High Court. These appeals being devoid of merits are, accordingly, dismissed. Parties are asked to bear their own costs.
Supdt. Of Post Offices And Ors vs R. Valasina Babu

Respondent herein claimed himself to be a member of Scheduled Caste community known as `Mal''. He was appointed as a Postal Assistant in the office of Superintendent of Post Offices. Adilabad Postal Division on 28.7.1980 against a vacancy reserved for Scheduled Castes community. In support of his claim that he belonged to `Mala' community, he had produced a certificate dated 27.12.1980. On an information received that the respondent in fact belonged to Christian community, a disciplinary proceeding against him was initiated, During the pendency of the said inquiry proceedings, the Collector, Adilabad District also initiated a proceeding for cancellation of the Caste Certificate issued in favour of the respondent and by an order dated 28.11.1990 the Caste Certificate granted in his favour was cancelled. The said order was brought on records of the disciplinary proceedings.

The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment although noticed the said fact but agreeing with the judgment of the Tribunal dismissed the writ petition. The appellant is, thus, before us.

In view of the above and under the provisions of G.O. Ms. No. 282 SWD dated 19.12.1988 the Caste Certificate No. A8/20293/79 dated 3.10.1979 issued by the then Tahsildar karimnagar as belonging `Mala' caste in favour of Sri Ramdas Valisina Babu S/o Mallikarjuna Rao r/o Karimnagar is hereby cancelled."

In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that in a case of this nature, it might not have been necessary to initiate any disciplinary proceeding against the respondent.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
P.P. Abdulla & Anr. .. Appellant vs The Competent Authority & Ors. .. ...

The facts of the case are that the appellant was convicted under the Customs Act, 1962 in a case relating the seizure of 700 bars of foreign gold from him. Alleging that certain properties purchased by the appellant and the building constructed thereon attracted the provisions of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Ext. P1 notice was issued to the appellant under Section 6(1) of the said Act in a proceeding for forfeiture of the property. The proceedings culminated in Ext.P5 order of the concerned authority whereby he found that the appellant could not sufficiently prove that the property specified in the notice was not his illegally acquired property. It was held that the appellant could explain only to the extent of Rs.26,500/- as the source for acquiring the said property and the building thereon which was valued at Rs.1,36,134/-. Accordingly, the authority by virtue of the powers under Section 7(1) of the Act ordered forfeiture of the property to the Government of India free of all encumbrances vide Ext.P5. The appeal preferred by the appellant before the appellate authority was dismissed, upholding the order of the authority vide Ext.P6. The appellant challenged Exts.P5 and P6 orders in O.P. No.27488/2000 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Fatima Mohd. Amina (dead) through LRs. vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in (2003) 7 SCC 436, holding that since there is no allegation regarding the existence of any link or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the illegally acquired money of the detenu under the Act, the orders of forfeiture could not be maintained.

Against the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge the competent authority and Union of India filed an appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court which was allowed by the impugned judgment, hence this appeal.

Hence, in view of the decision of this Court in Fatima Mohd. Amina's case (supra), the said notice dated 15.3.1988 has to be held to be illegal. Consequently the order passed in pursuance of the said notice is declared as null and void. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the impugned orders of the High Court and the concerned Authorities are set aside. No costs.
Maharashtra State Road Transport ... vs Lalnipuii ...Respondents

Challenge in these appeals is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Guwahati High Court , Aizwal Bench at Aizwal. By the order dated 18.2.2002, the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed for default after hearing learned counsel for the respondent. Applications filed for restoration of the appeal after condonation of delay in presentation of the same also stood dismissed. Though the orders challenged in the appeals related to restoration of the appeal dismissed for default, it was felt that no useful purpose would be served by remitting the matter back to High Court for consideration on merits. The main ground taken by the appellant before the High Court was that it had no notice of the transfer of the case from the Guwahati Bench to the Aizwal Bench and therefore, there was no appearance. This plea was turned down by the High Court on the ground that sufficient notice was given to the appellant. Considering the long passage of time and, as agreed to by learned counsel for the parties, the appeals are taken up for disposal on merits of the facts involved.

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The claimant made a claim of Rs.15,00,000/-. Pursuant to the notice the appellant entered appearance and took the preliminary stand that the application was not maintainable and there was no cause of action. On the basis of the pleadings several issues were framed.

3. Deducting one third expenses if she still alive as per note under the Schedule. (-) = Rs. 5,97,760/-

The appellant filed an appeal which was originally heard by the Guwahati Bench, and was subsequently transferred to the Aizwal Bench. The Award was questioned by the appellant before the Guwahati Bench where the same was registered but the same was transferred to the Aizwal Bench. As noted above, taking into account the non-appearance of the counsel at the time of hearing, the application was dismissed. The applications for restoration and for condonation of delay in filing the said application were dismissed. Therefore, these appeals are filed.

2. According to the Schedule Rs.40,000/- annual income Total Compensation is Fixed at Rs.6,40,000/-

5. Loss of estate. = + Rs.2,500/-

Few facts need to be noted.

The appeals are accordingly disposed of with no orders as to costs.
A.P. Steel Re-Rolling Mill Ltd. vs State Of Kerala And Ors. [Alongwith ...

4. The said industrial policy of the State was accepted by the Kerala State Electricity Board, which is a body constituted and incorporated under the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, in respect of which a notification was issued on 27.3.1992. By reason of the said notification, some guidelines were also issued. The appellant herein contended that pursuant to or in furtherance of the representation made by the State of Kerala and/or the respondent-Board, they altered their position by investing a huge amount by setting up factories/new units.

The State, admittedly, at the district level constituted a 'Green Channel Clearance Committee' (GCC).

5. The appellant had applied for grant of electric power allocation to the extent of 2500 KVA. It obtained loan on 19.1.1995. As the application of the appellant had not allegedly been processed, GCC issued several reminders to the Board. On or about 17.11.1995, Appellant informed the Board that the project was at an advanced stage. It was recorded that despite recommendations by GCC, sanction for grant of electrical connection had not been issued, stating:

6. It, allegedly, imported machinery from abroad, which fact was intimated to the Board by a letter dated 24th June, 1996, stating:

7. The response of the Board thereto is to be found in the letter dated 11.2.1997, whereby sanction for power allocation was sought for by the Deputy Chief Engineer from the Chief Engineer of the Board. Having regard to the fact that there was no adequate transformer capacity at Kanjiokode Sub Station, the allocation could not be granted, as was informed to the appellant by the Board in terms of its letter dated 21.4.1997. Electrical energy was allocated for six months on trial-run basis on 24.12.1997 and a final sanction was granted on 21.12.1998. Appellant started commercial production on 10.3.1999. It evidently denied the benefit of the said incentive scheme dated 6.2.1992. A writ petition was filed by the appellant, which has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment of the High Court, inter alia, stating:

In the present case, the first Notification exempting the customs duty on PVC itself recites "....Central Government being satisfied that it is necessary in public interest to do so.... "In the Notification issued later which gave rise to the present cause of action, the same recitation is present.

28. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Shanti Devi Àappellant vs Daropti Devi & Ors. Àrespondents

According to the appellant, the said suit was not maintainable. It was dismissed as such by an order dated 18.12.1981, holding :

The respondent filed another suit, which was marked as Suit No. 276 of 1992, for declaration and consequential relief. The said suit was also dismissed being not maintainable being hit under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned judge, however, also dealt with the other issues involved in the suit.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment should be directed to be modified. We, therefore, in modification of the impugned judgment, direct that the learned Trial Judge may allow the parties to adduce evidence, whereupon it shall return the evidence to the Appellate Court together with its findings thereupon and reasons therefor within four months from the date of communication of this order, whereupon the High Court may proceed to determine the appeal on its own merit. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
S.R. Batra And Anr vs Smt. Taruna Batra

The facts of the case are that respondent Smt. Taruna Batra was married to Amit Batra, son of the appellants, on 14.4.2000.

After the marriage respondent Taruna Batra started living with her husband Amit Batra in the house of the appellant no.2 in the second floor. It is not disputed that the said house which is at B-135, Ashok Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi belongs to the appellant no.2 and not to her son Amit Batra.

It is admitted that Smt. Taruna Batra had shifted to her parent's residence because of the dispute with her husband. She alleged that later on when she tried to enter the house of the appellant no.2 which is at property No. B-135, Ashok Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi she found the main entrance locked and hence she filed Suit No. 87/2003 for a mandatory injunction to enable her to enter the house. The case of the appellants was that before any order could be passed by the trial Judge on the suit filed by their daughter-in- law, Smt. Taruna Batra, along with her parents forcibly broke open the locks of the house at Ashok Vihar belonging to appellant No. 2, the mother- in-law of Smt. Taruna Batra. The appellants alleged that they have been terrorized by their daughter-in-law and for some time they had to stay in their office.

It is stated by the appellants that their son Amit Batra, husband of the respondent, had shifted to his own flat at Mohan Nagar, Ghaziabad before the above litigation between the parties had started.

Against the aforesaid order the appellants filed an appeal before the Senior Civil Judge, Delhi who by his order dated 17.9.2004 held that Smt. Taruna Batra was not residing in the second floor of the premises in question. He also held that her husband Amit Batra was not living in the suit property and the matrimonial home could not be said to be a place where only wife was residing. He also held that Smt. Taruna Batra had no right to the properties other than that of her husband. Hence, he allowed the appeal and dismissed the temporary injunction application.

With respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court.
Acharaparambath Pradeepan & Anr. Ã ... vs State Of Kerala Ã Respondents

A chargesheet was filed under Sections 143, 147, 148, 120B, 343, 449, 302, 332, 328, 394, 397, 398 and 506(i) read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Thirty witnesses were examined by the prosecution to prove its case. Some defence witnesses were also examined. DW2 has also been relied by the High Court. During trial, A7 died. As against A1 Pradeepan, the prosecution case was said to be that on receiving signal from A2, he had hit the deceased with an iron rod thereby causing injury on the back of his head. He chased him inside the classroom and assaulted him repeatedly with his iron road on different parts of his body. All the child witnesses had seen him attacking with iron rod. He was identified by all the child witnesses in court. Whereas, the eye-witnesses saw him assaulting the deceased repeatedly, PWs 7 and 8 saw him leaving the scene after the occurrence along with A2 and A3. As noticed hereinbefore, he was identified, even in the first Test Identification Parade by PW5.

We although appreciate that in a case of this nature the witnesses must gather courage over a period of time to come out with their part of story but we are not very sure that the same standard should be applied to PWs 7 and

We, therefore, are of the opinion that it is a fit case where benefit of doubt should be given to the said appellants.

The prosecution witnesses are also supported by the medical evidence. It will bear repetition to state that 44 injuries were inflicted on the deceased. Injury Nos. 1 and 2 are as under:

We, therefore, do not see any reason to disbelieve the testimonies of PWs 3 to 6 so far as A1 is concerned.

Defective investigation by itself may not lead to a conclusion that the accused is innocent.

The question which now arises for consideration is as to whether we should uphold the death sentence imposed upon A1. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said to be a rarest of rare case warranting imposition of the extreme punishment.

While upholding the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Judge as also the High Court, we only convert the death penalty to rigorous imprisonment of life under Section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. Convictions and sentences on other charges are upheld. Criminal Appeal Nos. 1278-1279 of 2005, so far as A1 is concerned, is dismissed subject to the modification of sentence to the extent mentioned hereinbefore and that of A4 is allowed.

Other accused persons are given benefit of doubt and they are acquitted. Criminal Appeal Nos. 1280-1281 of 2005 are allowed accordingly. They are directed to be set at liberty unless wanted in any other case.
M.R. Kudva Ã Appellant vs State Of Andhra Pradesh Ã Respondent

Appeals preferred thereagainst before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh were registered as Criminal Appeal No. 792 of 1997 and Criminal Appeal No. 894 of 1997 respectively. The appeals were dismissed by a judgments and orders dated 30.12.2004 and 20.01.2005 respectively. Special Leave Petitions filed thereagaisnt have also been dismissed by this Court by an order dated 11.05.2005. Appellant thereafter filed an application before the High Court purported to be under Sections 482/427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, praying, inter alia, therein that the sentences imposed upon him in both the cases be directed to run concurrently. The said application has been rejected by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment.

Although according to the appellant, the High Court heard both the matters almost at the same time, no such prayer appears to have been made, nor the same fell for consideration by the High Court. The Special Leave Petitions filed by the appellant, as noticed hereinbefore, have also been dismissed.

However, in this case the provision of Section 427 of the Code was not invoked in the original cases or in the appeals. A separate application was filed before the High Court after the special leave petitions were dismissed. Such an application, in our opinion, was not maintainable. The High Court could not have exercised its inherent jurisdiction in a case of this nature as it had not exercised such jurisdiction while passing the judgments in appeal. Section 482 of the Code was, therefore, not an appropriate remedy having regard to the fact that neither the Trial Judge, nor the High Court while passing the judgments of conviction and sentence indicated that the sentences passed against the appellant in both the cases shall run concurrently or Section 427 would be attracted. The said provision, therefore, could not be applied in a separate and independent proceeding by the High Court. The appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed.
Youaraj Rai Ã Appellant vs Chander Bahadur Karki Ã Respondents

All the above three appeals raise an interesting and important question of law as to interpretation of Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). In all these appeals, facts are more or less similar. The Election Commission of India issued a notification on March 16, 2004 for holding general election to the Legislative Assembly for the State of Sikkim. Total constituencies were 32. A programme was published which provided various stages of election. April 23, 2004 was the last date for filing nomination papers, April 24, 2004 was fixed for scrutiny of nomination papers, April 26, 2004 was the last date for withdrawal of candidatures, May 10, 2004 was the date of poll, if necessary, and date of counting and declaration of results was fixed as May 17, 2004. The appellants filled in their nomination papers from 12-Wak Assembly Constituency, 14-Melli Assembly Constituency and 13- Damthang Assembly Constituency respectively on April 23, 2004. When nomination papers were scrutinized on the next date, i.e. April 24, 2004, they were found to be defective and hence all their nomination papers were rejected. The resultant effect was that on April 26, 2004 which was the last date for withdrawal of candidature, in all the three above constituencies, only one candidate was in the field. The Returning Officer, therefore, declared the first respondent in all the matters elected (un-contested). In respect of other constituencies, however, polling was held on May 10, 2004 and after counting of votes, results were declared on May 17, 2004.

For the foregoing reasons, all the appeals deserve to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed with costs.

In view of dismissal of appeals, we express no opinion on an application seeking substitution in Civil Appeal No. 8253 of 2004.