L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Girdhar Gopal Gupta & Ors vs Aar Gee Board Mills Pvt.Ltd. & Ors

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Aggrieved by this and some other acts on the part of the Garg Group, Gupta Group filed CP.65/2001 under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 (in short the `Act') before the Company Law Board (for short the `Board') alleging oppression and mis-management on the part of the Garg Group. Three acts of oppression and mis-management were highlighted which are as under:

The Gupta group has preferred Co.A.(SB) No.9/2004 against that portion of the Order whereby allotment of 3943 shares is not disturbed. The Garg Group on the other hand, filed Co.A.(SB) No.11/2004 in respect of other findings which were returned in favour of the Gupta group. That is 5 how these appeals wee heard together and were disposed of by a common Order.

13. The registered office of respondents 1 and 2 was at 73, Gujarawala Town, Part-II, G.T. Karnal Road, Delhi which is the residence of the appellants. All the Board's meetings were held and resolutions therein were passed at the same registered office. Moreover, all the statutory records were kept at the registered office as mandated by Sections 193, 196(1), 303 (1), 307(5) and 209 of the Act. The company was passing through financial crises and there was need to meet the government dues and installation of an effluent treatment plant in view of the directions of this Court. The quorum under the Articles of Association was two Directors as per Clause 33 of the Article of Association. Two persons were present in the meeting. The Board of Directors allotted 3943 equity shares when the requisite quorum of 12 two Directors of the respondent group was there. In the meetings held on 25.6.1994, 20.10.1994 and 9.1.1995 at the registered office as per Clause 33 of the Articles of Association as well as under Section 287 of the Act. Auditor was appointed under Section 224 and power of attorney was signed by appellant No.1 on 4.9.1995 for which meeting was held and Balance Sheet as on 31.3.1995 was audited by the auditor on 4.9.1995 under Section 215 of the Act. Significantly, no mala fides have been imputed on the part of the auditor and no allegations of fraud or mala fide intention were imputed upon the respondents before the Board, learned Single Judge and not even before this Court.

20. Considering the nature of the controversy we do not consider this to be a fit case where any interference under Article 136 of the Constitution is called for.

21. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Mohabbat & Ors vs State Of M.P

After postmortem on the body of the deceased Yunus, Dr. Borasi (PW-10) found the cause of death as shock and hemorrhage from multiple injuries over the body especially wrist imputation and anckle joint injury. The deceased had 9 incised injuries on different parts of the body. Heart chamber was empty. The wrist of left hand was fractured and imputed, ulna, patella were fractured. Left tibia, flbula bones were fractured. Injuries were of grievous nature and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Ex.P/18 is his postmortem report. According to him, the death was within 24 hours from the time of postmortem.

3 Since the accused persons pleaded innocence trial was held. PWs 3, 4, 5 and 7 who were projected as eye witnesses by the prosecution did not support the prosecution version and resiled from the statements made during investigation. However, PW-6 the brother of the deceased who was going alongwith the deceased re-iterated the statements made during investigation. Placing reliance on the evidence of PW-6, the trial Court found the accused persons guilty.

15. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
U.P. State Road Transport Corpn vs Hanti Devi & Ors

4. The MACT noted that bus No.U.H.K.883 owned by the appellant- corporation was involved in an accident on 28.4.1988 and the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver. So far as the income of the deceased is concerned it was taken to be Rs.1,000/- p.m. and out of this Rs.500/- was deducted for personal expenses. In the post mortem report the age of the deceased was stated to be 45 years and therefore taking the annual income of Rs.6,000/- the compensation was assessed at Rs.90,000/- by applying the multiplier of 15 but deduction of 40% was made for lump sum payment. Interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of application was awarded.

5. Questioning correctness of the award, the Corporation filed an appeal and cross objections were filed by the claimants. The High Court found that the income as assessed was low and therefore enhanced the same and fixed the compensation payable at Rs.2,45,000/- with 6% interest. It was held by the High Court that the income of the deceased can be assessed at Rs.2,000/- p.m. and one-third was to be deducted for personal expenses and multiplier of 15 was adopted. Accordingly, the compensation payable was worked out.

10. In the present case the appropriate multiplier would be 11 and monthly income can be taken at Rs.1500/-. In other words, the annual income can be taken at Rs.18,000/-. Making one third deduction for personal expenses the balance is Rs.12,000/- and if multiplier of 11 is adopted the compensation works out to be Rs.1,32,000/-. The MACT and the High Court have granted 6% interest from the date of application which is in order. It is stated that certain amounts have been deposited before the MACT and a sum of Rs.50,000/- has been deposited in compliance with the order of this Court dated 17.8.2007. The balance amount shall be deposited 4 with the concerned MACT within four weeks. The mode of disbursement and amount to be kept in fixed shall be fixed by the MACT keeping in view the interests of the minors.

11. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Samarth Shiksha Samiti & Anr vs Bir Bahadur Singh Rathour & Ors

4. As will be evident from the aforesaid conditions, the Respondent No.1 was an employee, not of the School, but of the Samiti, though he was posted in the School as a Lower Division Clerk.

5. On 9th August, 1999, the Respondent No.1 was promoted as Upper Division Clerk and was posted at the same School at Hari Nagar. Such promotion being 4 ad-hoc in nature, the same was regularized on 18th September, 2000 with effect from 1st August, 2000.

6. It appears that in September, 2003, interviews were held for the post of Superintendent Grade II and a list of selected candidates was drawn up by the Selection Committee and out of the said selected candidates, only the name of one Shri Arun Kumar was recommended for the said post. According to the Respondent No.1, he too submitted a representation for promotion to the said post and, although, his case was recommended by the Manager of the School to the General Secretary of the Appellant No.1-Samiti, not only was he not granted such promotion, but by an order dated 16th July, 2005, he was transferred from the School to the office of the Appellant No.1- Samiti. Subsequently, on 9th September, 2005, in an incident involving the Respondent No.1 and one Shri Shiv Nath Pandey, an order of suspension was issued against the Respondent No.1 by the Appellant No.1 on 21st September, 2005. While the disciplinary inquiry was pending, the Respondent No.1 filed a writ 5 petition challenging the transfer order dated 16th July, 2005; the suspension order dated 21st September, 2005; the charge-sheet dated 29th September, 2005 and the letter dated 26th October, 2005, initiating the departmental enquiry against him.

(Emphasis added)

25. Consequently, in answer to the third question posed in paragraph 8 hereinbefore, it must be held that the Respondent No.1 continued to be governed by the rules of the Samiti whether his services were placed at the disposal of the school or retained by the Samiti in its central office.

26. In our view, the reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Court was erroneous as it proceeded on the premise that for all practical intents and purposes the Respondent No.1 was an employee of the school and that the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 would, therefore, apply to him. The judgment and order of the Division Bench cannot, therefore, be sustained and is set aside and the judgment of the learned Single Judge is restored.

27. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the writ petition filed by the Respondent No.1 is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

________________J.

(ALTAMAS KABIR) ________________J.

(CYRIAC JOSEPH) New Delhi, Dated: 3.2.2009
Ajab Singh & Ors vs Antram & Ors

5. The admitted facts of the case are that in the year 1981 and 1982 both Haribabu and Antram, the contesting respondent Nos.1 and 2, 2 were minors. At that time the orders dated 23.12.1981 and 29.11.1982 were passed. They filed a revision application along with an application for condonation of delay in the year 1993. In the revision application, the Deputy Director Consolidation, while relying on a number of judgments, held that the revision cannot be treated as barred by time. It appears from a decision in Onkar Nath Dubey Vs. Dy. Dir. Of Consolidation and Ors. - Civil Misc. Writ No.3066 of 1972 (R.D 1977-40 (HC), that Section 6 of the Limitation Act read with Section 341 of the said Act would be applicable in a case like this.

9. The decision of the Revisional Authority in entertaining the revision at the instance of the contesting respondent Nos.1 and 2 therefore does not suffer from any jurisdictional error. 4

14. It is a well settled legal position that unless finding of the revisional authority suffers from error of jurisdiction, the Superior Court should not interfere.

15. The order of the High Court, therefore, has correctly approved the order passed by the revisional authority. We see no reason to take a different view.

16. The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd vs Bindu & Ors

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

12. Keeping in view the parameters indicated above it would be appropriate to fix the multiplier at 13 and the rate of interest at 6% p.a. The MACT shall work out the entitlements on the aforesaid basis. It is stated by learned counsel for the appellant that pursuant to the order of this Court on 27.7.2007, a sum of Rs.7,00,000/- has been deposited. The balance amount payable in terms of this Court's order shall be deposited by the insurer with the MACT within eight weeks. The MACT shall permit withdrawal of the amount on such terms including the fixed deposit in a scheduled bank after a deposit is made, as the circumstances warrant.

13. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
M/S. Faridabad Gas Power Project,Ntpcl vs Om Prakash & Ors

3. The brief facts, which led to the filing of these appeals, are as follows:-

per sq. yard equivalent to Rs.14,81,040/- per acre for the land acquired in villages Mujheri, Neemka and Sihi respectively. In regard to the lands acquired in village Jhajru situated away from the lands at Mujheri, Neemka and Sihi, compensation at the rate of Rs.190/- per sq. yard equivalent to Rs.9,19,600/- per acre was awarded as per award dated 21.02.2000. For the land situated in village Pyala, the reference court is said to have awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.3,00,000/- per acre. In answer to the second issue, the reference court observed that the reference applications preferred by the claimants under Section 18 of the Act, could be construed as protest against the award and there was no need for them to lodge separate protest in writing before accepting the compensation. The reference court allowed the reference applications made by the claimants and accordingly, enhanced the amounts of compensation.

19. The LAC awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.1,57,000/- for Chahi lands and Rs.1,50,000/- for Gair Mumkin and Banjar Kadim lands. The reference court increased it to Rs.190/- per square yard (Rs.9,19,600/- per acre). The lands at village Jhajru are far away from the acquired lands of villages Mujheri, Sihi and Neemka. Lands at village Jhajru were also agricultural lands situated beyond Sectors 58 & 59 of Faridabad Town. The reference court relied upon the market value of Rs.155/- per square yard as determined in respect of an acquisition of land on 10.06.1988 for Sector-59. As the acquisition for NTPC was in 1995, it determined the market value as Rs.190/- per square yard, by providing an increase of Rs.5/- per year.

8.14) We will now examine the correctness and legality of the judgment of the High Court affirming the decision of the reference court, in the light of the well-settled principles and the evidence led by the parties in these cases. Re: lands at Mujheri, Sihi and Neemka

17. On an independent scrutiny of the above-referred to entire evidence placed on record, it is proved that the entire chunk of acquired land was purely agricultural in quality and of lesser potentiality. The lands acquired for Sector-II, Faridabad, as per notification dated 23.11.1992 were situated in a better developed area with greater potentiality than the lands acquired for NTPC.

Re : Lands at Jhajru

23. In view of the above, the appeals are disposed of as follows:-

ii i) In regard to the lands at village Jhajru, the appeals of NTPC are dismissed and the appeals of the land- owners of Jhajru are allowed in part and the market value is increased from Rs.190/- to Rs.205/- per square yard.

iv ) In regard to lands at village Pyala, the appeals are dismissed and the compensation determined is confirmed.

vi ) Parties are left to bear their respective costs.
Secretary, Board Of Basic ... vs Rajendra Singh & Ors

3. The appellant Board (`Board' for short) issued an advertisement dated 18.1.1997 inviting applications for the posts of Assistant Teachers in its Basic Schools. The said advertisement reiterated the aforesaid qualification of BTC, HTC, JTC certificate of teaching or other training courses recognized by state government as equivalent thereto, (prescribed under Rule 8) as eligibility criterion for recruitment.

4. The private respondents in these appeals have undergone a one year Physical Education Course and possess CPEd Certificates. The Basic Teacher's Certificate and other qualifications prescribed under Rule 8 are two years training Courses. The CPEd was never recognized by the State Government as equivalent to either BTC, HTC or JTC prescribed as qualifications for the post of Assistant Teachers/Masters. 3

5. On 23.3.1995, the State Government issued a direction under Section 13 of the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 (`Act' for short) to the Board that candidates possessing CPEd Certificate could be appointed in the schools run by the Board by treating them as untrained candidates and provide training to them during the course of their employment. The said letter further directed that the pay scale applicable to trained teachers should be extended to such appointees only after they undergo training and necessary examination. The letter also informed that the State Government had taken a decision to close training of the CPEd in the State from the 1996-97 Session.

6. The State Government issued another direction dated 28.2.1996 under Section 13 of the Act superseding the Government Order dated 24.8.1978 which had recognized the CPEd Certificates issued by Shri Hanuman Vyayam Prasarak Mandal, Amravati, Maharashtra as equivalent to CPEd Certificate issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh. Consequently, it was informed that CPEd Certificate issued by the Amrawati Institute will not be recognized.

12. The appeals are, therefore, allowed and the order of the Division bench is set aside and the writ petitions by the 9 private respondents are dismissed. The validity of the Government direction dated 11.8.1997 and consequential advertisement is upheld.

__________________J [R. V. Raveendran] _________________J [J M Panchal] New Delhi;

February 5, 2009.
M/S Precious Oil Corp. & Ors vs State Of Assam

3. The prosecution against the accused-appellants was initiated on the basis of an offence report submitted by Sir Dhiraj Choudhury, Inspector of Food and Civil Supplies, Assam, Guwahati PW-3 alleging inter-alia that on 1-10-1996 he along with two other Inspectors of Food and Civil Supplies Department visited the processing industry of lubricating oil belonging to the appellant no.2, situated near Lankeswar, Jalukbari, Guwahati and on such inspection, it was found that the concern did not possess necessary license as required under the Control Order and also proper books of account etc as required under the law were not produced. The inspecting team found that no license could be produced for the processing unit and thereby violated Clause 3 of the Control Order. The accused had failed to obtain proper license as required under law within 6 months of commencement of processing and thereby has violated clause 5(5) of the Control Order. The inspecting team collected and sent the samples of 2 lubricating oil for necessary analysis to thee approved laboratory. After such analysis, it was found that the said lubricating oil could not be considered as Automotive Lubricating Oil, thereby violating Clause 4 of the Control Order attracting punishment for sale of adulterated lubricating oil. The team seized from the appellants re-refined lubricating oil in 380 sealed tins of 1 litre each, 1,210 litres in 6 barrels containing 205 litres each, 19,475 litres of used lubricating oil in 95 barrels containing 205 litres in each, 20 kgs. of grease in one loose barrel, 920 numbers of empty tins of 1 litre capacity for TOPOL 20 W/40, one book of accounts, an extract copy of the Display Board of Stock and Prices displayed in the office premises, 3 litres of TOPOL, 20 W/46 contained in 3 sealed tins. The inspector having found prima facie violation of Clauses 3, 4 and 5(5) of the Control Order punishable under Section 7 of the Act, submitted the offence report against the appellants in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup for necessary prosecution under the law. The accused-appellant no.1 is the concern itself and the accused No.2 is the Proprietor of the concern and accused no.3 is an employee of the concern. On the basis of the aforesaid offence report, Sp1. Case No.5 of 97 was registered in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Guwahati.

15. In the current Indian conditions the probation movement has not yet attained sufficient strength to correct these intractables. Maybe, under more 9 developed conditions a different approach may have to be made. For the present we cannot accede to the invitation to let off the accused on probation.

17. Above being the position, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

J. (AFTAB ALAM) New Delhi, February 05, 2009 10
Arjun Singh vs State Of H.P

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 376, 511, 363 and 366 as well as Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years, 3 years, 4 years, 5 years and 7 years for the aforesaid offences alongwith fine with default stipulation.

Accordingly the trial court while holding the appellant guilty, acquitted co-accused. As noted above, appeal before the High Court was dismissed.

12. In the background of the facts Section 109 IPC has no application.

13. Above being the position, we uphold the conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 365, 366 and 511 IPC with the corresponding sentence as imposed by the trial court and sustained by the High Court. The convictions in terms of Sections 109 and 376 IPC are set aside. The sentences would run concurrently.

14. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Shaikh Karimullah @ Babu & Ors vs State Of A.P

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants and two others. The trial Court by its judgment dated 9.9.2004 acquitted A1 to A5 for the offence punishable under Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). However A-1 to A-3 were found guilty for the offence under Section 302 IPC and they were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1000 with default stipulation, while A-4 and A-5 were not found guilty on the second charge. A-2 to A-5 were also found not guilty for the offence under Section 324 IPC. A4 and A5 were acquitted of all the charges.

In order to prove the guilt of the accused, prosecution examined 11 witnesses- P.Ws l to 11, marked Exs. P1 to P13 and exhibited M.Os. 1 to 8. On behalf of defence relevant portions of statements of P.Ws.1, 4 and 6 under Sec. 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure were marked as Exs.D1 to D5, but no oral evidence has been let in on their behalf. Trial Court, as noted above, recorded conviction. High Court did not interfere and by impugned judgment dismissed the appeal.

8. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Anil K. Jain & Anr vs Delhi Development Authority

The appellants filed a complaint before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, [for short, `the State Commission'], claiming total compensation to the tune of Rupees thirty five lakhs and four thousand. The State Commission, instead of deciding the complaint on merits, transferred the same to the District Forum, as in its opinion, the amount of compensation was astronomically high. That order has been confirmed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission [for short, `the National Commission']. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned orders are set aside and the matter is remitted to the State Commission to decide the complaint afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties.
Ravindra Shalik Naik & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra

2. Challenge in these appeals is to the common judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, dismissing the appeals filed by the present appellants. The appellants were found guilty of offence punishable under Sections 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). The appellant Ravindra was also convicted for offence punishable under Section 324 IPC. Appellants Ravindra, Naresh and Shalikrao are hereinafter referred to as A-1, A-2 and A-3. The learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Yuvatmal had found the appellants guilty as aforenoted.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

In appeal, the primary stand was that PWs 1 and 3 should not have been relied upon and in any event the provisions of Section 302 IPC are not attracted to the facts of the case. The High Court did not find any substance in the plea and upheld the conviction and sentence as afore noted. 3 The stands taken before the High Court were re-iterated in the present appeals.

7. Considering the background facts in our considered opinion the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC. The custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.

8. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent.