L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Sr.Law Manager,Indian Oil Corp.Ld.& ... vs Guru Shakti Singh & Anr

2. The appellants (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.), issued an advertisement inviting applications for grant of LPG distributorship for Sohawal, District Faizabad, Uttar Pradesh. The Dealer Selection Committee constituted by the appellants interviewed the eligible candidates and declared a panel of three candidates, on 30.3.2005, in the following order of merit : (1) Guru Shakti Singh (first respondent); (2) Sardar Mahinder Singh; and (3) Lal Rajendra Nath Singh. As per the said selection first respondent had 2 to be granted the LPG distributorship.

2. The second candidate in the list (Sardar Mahinder Singh) filed a complaint with the appellants, alleging illegalities and irregularities in awarding marks by the Selection Committee, resulting in the first respondent being placed as the first in the merit panel. Shortly thereafter, the said Sardar Mahinder Singh filed a writ petition challenging the selection process and the panel of candidates. The said writ petition filed on 4.5.2005, was withdrawn on 18.5.2005. Sometime thereafter the said Sardar Mahinder Singh died.

3. The appellants thereafter cancelled the entire selection process on 27.10.2005, and took a decision for re- interview the candidates. The first respondent filed a writ petition for quashing the said order dated 27.10.2005 and seeking a direction to the appellant to issue him the letter of intent for Distributorship as he was the first in the merit panel. The said writ petition was allowed by the impugned order dated 6.2.2007 holding that there should be no re-interviews and the appellant should proceed with the selection as already conducted in accordance with law. The effect of the order was that the first respondent should be granted the distributorship. The said order is challenged in 3 this appeal by special leave.

5. Sardar Mahinder Singh filed a complaint alleging that he had been awarded lesser marks and first respondent had been awarded more marks. His grievances in regard to marks were as under :

8. The High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents on a rather strange reasoning. We extract below the relevant portion of the impugned order :

10. As a result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the first respondent is dismissed. The appellants are permitted to deal with the LPG distributorship as per its policy. It can either re-interview the candidates or at liberty to deal with the matter in accordance with the existing policy.
Zafruddin Khan vs A.M.U. And Ors

2. The appellant filed a Public Interest Litigation in the Allahabad High Court for a declaration that the decision of the Aligarh Muslim University (`AMU' for short), the first respondent herein, to establish special campus centres across India was illegal and for a direction to the said University not to establish a campus at Chelemala at Perinthalmanna Mallapuram Kerala. The appellant relied upon Section 5(9A) of the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 in support of his contentions. The said petition was resisted by the respondents inter alia on the ground that appellant had no locus standi to file such a petition and justifying the action by relying upon Section 12(2) of the said Act. 2

3. The said writ petition has been dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order dated 7.10.2010 on the ground that the appellant does not have any locus standi to file such public interest litigation. The High Court was of the view that only a Member of the University Senate or University Academic Council or University Court could file a writ petition for the reliefs sought by the appellant. The High Court was also of the view that the fundamental rights of the appellant were not affected by the proposed action of the University and therefore, the writ petition was not maintainable. The High Court consequently dismissed the writ petition with an observation that if any aggrieved person having a locus files a proper petition, the dismissal of the appellant's petition will not come in the way of such petition being entertained. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

5. We are of the view that having regard to the fact that the appellant was a former student and elected Member of AMU Court and is also a Donor Life Member, he has sufficient interest to file the writ petition in public interest. The High Court ought not to have dismissed the public interest litigation only on the ground of locus standi of appellant to file the writ petition.

6. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore the public interest litigation to the file of the High Court without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. The respondents will be entitled to contest the writ petition by urging all contentions open to them in law, including the contention relating to the alleged malafides of the appellant.
Surendra Koli vs State Of U.P. Ors

The appellant Surendra Koli, accused no. 2 and Maninder Singh Pandher accused no. 1 were convicted under Section 302/364/376 IPC by the Special Sessions trial no. 611 of 2007 decided on 13.02.2009 by Additional Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad, U.P. By that judgment death sentence was imposed on both these accused.

The facts of this case are gruesome and horrifying. It seems that several children had gone missing over 2 years from Sector 31, Nithari Village, Gautam Budh Nagar, Noida from 2005 onwards. Several of such children were alleged to -1- -2- have been killed by the appellant who is also alleged to have chopped and eaten the body parts after cooking them. Appellant Surendra Koli was the servant of accused no. 1 Moninder Singh, and they lived together at D-5, Sector 31, Noida.

In the aforesaid statement before the Magistrate appellant Surendra Koli has admitted in great detail how he used to kill the girls after luring them inside the House no. D-5, Sector 31, Noida by strangulating them, and he would then chop up and eat up their body parts after cooking them. Some body parts, clothes and slippers were thrown in -3- the enclosed gallery behind the house at D-5, Sector 31, Noida. He volunteered to lead the police team to the specific spot where he had kept the articles/body parts hidden. The police party reached that spot along with the appellant. On his pointing out, 15 skulls and bones were recovered, and also a knife was recovered from a water tank of a bath room in D-5, Sector 31. On 31.12.2006 during the scooping of the drain in front of D-5, bones and chappals were recovered.

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed order.

In our opinion, this case clearly falls within the category of rarest of rare case and no mercy can be shown to the appellant Surendra Koli.

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) 608 of 2010 Leave granted.

FEBRUARY 15, 2011
P.S. Somanathan & Ors vs District Insurance Officers & Anr

3. One Suresh Chandra Babu, was walking along the side of Alappuzha-Kollam National Highway near Punnapra junction on 25.07.1994, when a lorry 1 (bearing registration No. KL 4/6802) which was being driven rashly suddenly hit him. As a result of which he sustained serious injuries and died on the spot. The lorry which was insured with the first respondent was owned by the second respondent.

4. The appellants (claimants) who are the family members of the deceased filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), claiming Rs.1,75,000/- as compensation. The same was contested by the first and second respondents.

The issues to be determined by the Tribunal to arrive at the loss of dependency are:

and

(iii) the multiplier to be applied with reference of the age of the deceased.

If these determinants are standardized, there will be uniformity and consistency in the decisions. There will lesser need for detailed evidence. It will also be easier for the insurance companies to settle accident claims without delay.

25. This Court, therefore, cannot sustain the High Court judgment and is constrained to set aside the same. The award of MACT is restored.

26. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
M/S Aps Kushwaha (Ssi Unit) vs Municipal Corp.Gwalior & Ors

2. The appellant filed an application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (`Act' for short) before the Madhya Pradesh High Court alleging that on execution of an agreement in regard to "maintenance of water supply and electrical works in different parts of Gwalior Municipal Corporation area", a work order was issued to him on 1.5.2002 by the respondent; that as the bills submitted by the appellant were not paid, it filed a writ petition and that petition was disposed of on 15.2.2006 with a direction to seek reference to arbitration; that clause 29 of 2 the General Rules and directions for the Guidance of the contractor provided for settlement of disputes by arbitration; and that therefore the appellant was filing the application under section 11(6) of the Act requesting the Chief Justice to appoint an independent arbitrator to arbitrate upon the disputes. The designate of the Chief Justice by order dated 11.5.2007 allowed the said application and appointed a retired Judge of the High Court as arbitrator.

3. Before the Arbitrator, the appellant made claims aggregating to Rs.76,64,725 with interest at 18% per annum. The respondents contested the claims contending that work orders were issued only to the extent of Rs.29,72,331 and there were some irregularities in the issue of work orders and therefore the appellant was not entitled to payment of any of the bills.

10. The appeals are therefore allowed and the impugned order of the High Court dated 26.11.2009 is set aside. As a consequence the learned District Judge, Gwalior will now proceed with the consideration of the application (Misc. Application (Arbitration) No.29/2008) under section 34 of the Act on merits in accordance with law.
Meghwal Samaj Shiksha Samiti vs Lakh Singh & Ors

A village pond in village Raniwara Kalan, District Jalore, was shown as `gair mumkin nada', in the revenue records. The said pond fell into disuse and after sometime the District Collector, Jalore allotted 0.48 hectares out of the said area, on a 99 year lease to Meghwal Samaj Shiksha Samiti (`Samiti' for short), the appellant in C.A.No.821/2004, vide order dated 6.8.2001 for the purpose of construction of a students' hostel.

7. In view of the above, we dismiss these appeals making it clear that if no alternative land has been allotted by the State to the Samiti (appellant in CA No.821/2004) for the purpose of the students hostel, it shall do so within a period of four months from today as directed by the High Court.
State Of Uttarkhand & Ors vs Harpal Singh Rawat

The respondent participated in the auction held by 2 Executive Engineer, Construction Division, PWD, Haldwani (appellant No.2 herein) for grant on lease collection of toll tax for using Haldwani Bye-Pass Road, 14 K.M. (Kathgodam) Gaula bridge. The bid of Rs.22 lakhs given by the respondent was accepted by the competent authority. Thereafter, lease agreement dated 24.3.2006 was executed between the Governor of Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand) through Commissioner, Kumaon Division and the respondent whereby the latter was given exclusive right to collect toll from the vehicles using the road and Gaula bridge. As a condition for execution of lease, communication dated 25.2.2006 was sent by appellant No.2 to the respondent requiring him to deposit stamp duty of Rs.2,20,400/-. However, instead of depositing the stamp duty, the respondent filed Writ Petition No.204(M/B) of 2006 for quashing the notice issued by appellant No.2 and also for issue of a direction to the appellants to charge stamp duty in accordance with the judgments in Tejveer Sing's case and Naresh Agarwal's case by asserting that the contract executed between the parties was only a security bond and stamp duty was payable as per Article 57 of Schedule I-B of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short, `the Act'), as amended by the State of U.P. and as applicable to the State of Uttarakhand.

2.A Division Bench of this Court has also followed the aforesaid judgment, which is referred in the prayer clause of the present writ petition. The controversy raised in the writ petition is squarely covered by the aforementioned judgment as submitted by learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel. Therefore, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of the aforementioned judgment of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court."

In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. The appellants shall now be free to recover stamp duty from the respondent in terms of Notice No.775 dated 25.2.2006. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondent, the costs are made easy.
Ravi vs Badrinarayan & Ors

Badrinarayan, owned by Respondent No. 2 - Prahlad Singh and insured with Respondent No. 3 - M/s. National Insurance Company Limited, hit the victim, causing multiple injuries to him. To add to his miseries, his claim petition filed under Section 140 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter shall be referred to as 'M.V. Act') before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaipur (for short, `MACT'), registered as Claim Petition No. 865 of 2004, came to be dismissed on 19.9.2007 by C.A. @ S.L.P.(C)No.11974/08 .... (contd.)

learned Presiding Judge of the said Tribunal, mainly on the ground that formal FIR of the incident was lodged belatedly and Appellant failed to establish that on the fateful day, the said truck was involved in a motor road accident causing injuries to him.

5. Facts shorn of unnecessary details are as under:-

8. Thereafter, as mentioned hereinabove, the Appellant, being minor, filed a claim petition through his father, before MACT claiming Rs. 11 lakhs to be awarded to him as compensation.

C.A. @ S.L.P.(C)No.11974/08 .... (contd.)

C.A. @ S.L.P.(C)No.11974/08 .... (contd.)

23. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the MACT as well as High Court committed error in coming to the conclusion that lodging the FIR belatedly would result in dismissal of the claim petition.

26. On account of aforesaid injury, his permanent physical disability has been assessed at 50%. This report of the experts further shows that he is unable to control urine and suffers from continence disability which could not be cured even after surgical operation and frequent dilatation still takes place.

C.A. @ S.L.P.(C)No.11974/08 .... (contd.)

28. Thus, looking into the matter from all angles, it is clearly established that in the said accident, Appellant had suffered severe injuries of permanent nature which have not been cured till date despite several surgeries. In our most modest computation, looking into the nature of injuries which are permanent in nature, we are of the opinion that a total amount of Rs. 2,50,000 (Rs. 2.5 Lakhs) to be awarded to the Appellant payable by Respondents jointly and severally, would meet the ends of justice. The aforesaid amount would also carry interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of filing of petition till the same is actually paid. As a result thereof, award of the Claims Tribunal and judgment and order of the High Court; are hereby set aside and quashed, instead the Appellant's claim petition is allowed as mentioned above with costs throughout. The appeal is allowed accordingly. Counsel's fee quantified at Rs.

10,000/-.
K.R.Madhusudan & Ors vs Administrative Officer & Anr

3. On 4.10.1998, at about 8.55 a.m., V. Rajagopalaiah was crossing the road near Ashraya Hotel, B.M. Road, Channapatna, when a Maruti Van (owned by the first respondent) bearing registration No. KA-05-A-2535 came at a high speed and dashed against the deceased, causing 1 severe injuries. He was taken to hospital, but he succumbed to his injuries.

5. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter "MACT") found that the death of V. Rajagopalaiah was due to the rash and negligent driving of the van driver (the second respondent). The deceased was working as Senior Assistant in Karnataka Electricity Board (hereinafter "KEB") and his last drawn gross monthly salary was Rs.15,642/-

i.e. Rs.1,87,704/- annually. 1/3rd was deducted for personal expenses, after which the amount came to Rs.1,25,136/-. As deceased was 53 years of age, a multiplier of 11 was applied. The Tribunal also awarded funeral and transport expenses amounting to Rs.10,000/-, medical 2 expenses prior to death was Rs.6,000 and compensation for loss and affection at Rs.25,000/-. Accordingly, total compensation awarded was Rs.14,27,496/- along with interest of 9% p.a.

15. We are, thus, of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside for 9 it is perverse and clearly contrary to the evidence on record, for having not considered the future prospects of the deceased and also for adopting a split multiplier method.

16. The income of the deceased will be taken to be Rs.20,000/- p.m. which amounts to Rs.2,40,000/-

p.a. After deduction of 1/3rd amount for personal expenses, the loss of notional income will be Rs.1,60,000/-. The multiplier of 11 will be applied, from which the loss of dependency will amount to Rs.17,60,000/-. We also award Rs.10,000/- for funeral and transport expenses, Rs.6,000/- for medical expenses prior to death and Rs.25,000/- for loss of love and affection.

Thus, the total compensation awarded amounts to Rs.18,01,000/- which we round off to Rs.18,00,000/-.

17. The amount of compensation would thus be Rs.18,00,000/- with the rate of interest as granted by the Tribunal. The amount is to be deposited with the Tribunal within six weeks 1 from date after deducting any amount, if already deposited.

18. The appeals are, thus, allowed. No costs.
Gurjinder Singh vs State Of Punjab

2. The case of the prosecution in a nut-shell before the trial court was as under:

4, who was sitting on the back seat of the car, around 10.30 p.m. when they reached near Canal Bridge, Ladhuwala, he saw a white gypsy belonging to Harcharan Singh parked on the road. Harcharan Singh and two other unknown persons, whom he did not know but he could identify if produced before him, stopped the car of the deceased and, thereafter, Harcharan Singh came near the driver's window and fired at the deceased. The bullets injured him on his neck and temple. Those two unknown persons also fired at him and the bullets hit him on the upper side of the arm between shoulder and his elbow, then the accused and PW-4 tried to run away. Thereafter, Harcharan Singh went away in his gypsy. The accused and PW-4 had seen Sandeep Singh dead in the car. Leaving PW-4 near the dead body of the 4 deceased, he went to police station and lodged the FIR. The aforesaid version of the accused was recorded as FIR No.118 on 10th June, 2001.

6. As per the report of Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Ex. P.51, the cartridges which had been received from the spot of the offence were fired from 7.65 mm pistol and the blood which was found from the pieces of glass was human blood of Group `B'.

There was a dark black area around both the wounds. A lacerated unpunctured wound on the left side of his neck and behind the left ear lobe was also found. The fourth injury on the deceased was on the back of the neck at the level of C6 Vertebra and 3 cm. away from the middle of the left side of the neck. The cause of death was shock and hemorrhage due to injuries to brain and neck. The injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and judgment of the trial court along with evidence, we are of the view that the order of conviction passed by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court is just and proper for the reasons set out hereafter. In our opinion, the trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence and the High Court has also confirmed the order of conviction for justifiable reasons, duly incorporated in the judgment and order confirming the conviction.

23. With regard to ownership of the pistol, it has been established by the prosecution that for a sum of Rs.90,000/- the accused had purchased the pistol on 29-5-2001 whereas the offence had been committed on the night of 9th June, 2001. Thus, the pistol had already been purchased by the accused.

24. From the aforestated discussion and upon perusal of the evidence, we 13 are satisfied that the trial court as well as the High Court, while confirming the order of conviction, are not in error and the order of conviction deserves to be confirmed. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

............................................... J (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) .................................

.......J. (ANIL R. DAVE) New Delhi February 18, 2011
M/S Hussnain International vs Union Of India & Ors

3. The facts giving rise to these appeals briefly are that the appellant carries on the business of export of brass art-

Alongwith the appeals, the appellant also filed applications for stay of recovery of the penalty amounts but the appellant was intimated to make pre-deposit of Rs.5,00,000/- towards the penalties after which the appeals will be decided by the 3 Appellate Authority on merits. The appellant failed to make the pre-deposit of Rs.5,00,000/- and consequently the appeals were dismissed.

6. As the two appeals of the appellant have not been heard on merits, we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and the order of the learned Single Judge and direct that in case the appellant deposits the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as directed by the Appellate Authority within two months from today, the two appellate orders of the Appellate Authority will stand quashed and the appeal will be heard on merits afresh by the Appellate Authority.

7. With the aforesaid directions, the appeals are allowed.

No costs.
Kokkanda B. Poondacha And Ors vs K.D. Ganapathi And Anr

Appellant Nos.1 to 3 and one Parvathy filed suit, which came to be registered as O.S. No.75 of 1996, for partition and separate possession of 1/6th share each in the suit property and also for grant of a declaration that sale deed dated 10.7.1997 executed by defendant Nos.2 to 4, who were, later on, transposed as plaintiff Nos.5 to 7 (appellant Nos.4 to 6 herein), was not binding on them. Defendant Nos.5 to 7 (including respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein) filed written statement on 19.2.1998. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 filed additional written statement on 9.8.2002. After two years and seven months, they filed an application dated 11.3.2005 under Order XVI Rule 1 (1) and (2) read with Section 151 C.P.C. supported by an affidavit of respondent No.1 for permission to file the list of witnesses, which included the name of Shri N. Ravindranath Kamath, Advocate, who was representing the appellants in the suit from the very beginning.

The trial Court partly allowed the application of respondent Nos.1 and 2 and granted leave to them to file the list of witnesses but rejected their prayer for permission to cite Shri N. Ravindranath Kamath as witness No.1. The reasons assigned by the trial Court for partially declining the prayer of respondent Nos.1 and 2 are extracted below:

We may add that if the parties to the litigation are allowed to file list of witnesses without indicating the purpose for summoning the particular person(s) as witness(es), the unscrupulous litigants may create a situation where the cases may be prolonged for years together. Such litigants may include the name of the advocate representing the other side as a witness and if the Court casually accepts the list of witnesses, the other side will be deprived of the services of the advocate. Therefore, it would be a prudent exercise of discretion by the Court to insists that the party filing the list of witnesses should briefly indicate the purpose of summoning the particular person as a witness.

In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned 13 order is set aside and the one passed by the trial Court is restored. The respondents shall pay cost of Rs.50,000/- to the appellants.