L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Commissioner Of Central Excise & ... vs Suresh Jhunjhunwala & Ors

It was allegedly found that cheap garments were being exported by grossly mis-declaring the description and heavily over-invoicing the value under the said Scheme by the aforementioned two firms. The goods were intercepted at Chennai. Upon examination, it was found that all the goods were ladies nightwear shaped garments and were found to be small, uneven and unshaped which could not be worn by any person of any age including children. The goods were purchased from Bombay and sent to Hyderabad to be loaded in a vessel at Chennai for export to Dubai. They were seized.

In view of the order proposed to be passed by us, we do not intend to enter into the factual controversy of this matter any further. The Tribunal, in our opinion, should have considered the matter from another angle, namely, as to whether Respondents have violated the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation or not. As regards, the finding arrived at by the Tribunal that Respondents had not over-valued the goods, inter alia, on the ground that no expert opinion regarding the value of the export goods had been adduced, the Tribunal did not advert to the materials which had been brought on records during investigation, whereupon the Commissioner relied upon.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The matter is remitted to the Tribunal for consideration thereof afresh. No costs.
Sri Anand Hanumathsa Katare vs Additional District Magistrate & Ors

The order of detention was passed on 7.10.2005 under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act and the detenu was taken into custody that very day. Subsequently, the detenu was furnished with the grounds of detention dated 7.10.2005 which were also supplied to him that very day. The Detaining Authority submitted a report to the Government as required under law within 12 days from the date of order of detention, which passed an order approving the detention under Section 3(3) of the Act. The order of approval is dated 11.10.2005. The aforesaid order of detention was challenged before the High Court. During the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court the Advisory Board to whom the Government had referred the matter also approved the order of detention. The Government accepted the said report and passed an order in terms of Section 13 of the Act. The said order of the Government was not called in question by the detenu. Several points were urged in support of the habeas corpus petition. Primarily following points were urged in support of the habeas corpus petition. Firstly, even assuming that the detenu is a boot-legger within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act, his activities cannot be considered as likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Secondly, the detenu had submitted his reply to the Detaining Authority who rejected the same. Once the order passed under Section 3(2) has been approved by the State Government under Section 3(3), the Detaining Authority became functus officio and any representation given to the Detaining Authority ought to have been transmitted to be considered by the State Government. Thirdly, the proposals made by the Sponsoring Authority were verbatim reproduced in the grounds of detention. Fourthly, the orders of acquittal passed by the Criminal Court in respect of two cases were not supplied to him. Therefore, subjective satisfaction was affected. Fifthly, there was no report of the Forensic Department that the liquor sold or manufactured by the detenu was unfit for human consumption. Non-supply of order referred to above, rendered the order of detention vitiated. If it is held that the documents are not supplied then the Detaining Authority's decision is based on irrelevant consideration. The Detaining Authority and the State Government countered each of the contentions.

19. As noted supra, for the first time in the review application it was disclosed that the representation was made to the President of India and no representation was made to the State of Tamil Nadu or the Union of India who were arrayed in the writ petition as parties. This appears to be a deliberate attempt to create confusion and reap an undeserved benefit by adopting such dubious device. The High Court also transgressed its jurisdiction in entertaining the review petition with an entirely a new substratum of issues.

Above being the factual position, the judgment of the High Court is irreversible. The appeal is sans merit and is dismissed.
Yuvaraj Ambar Mohite vs State Of Maharashtra

PWs 3 and 4 separately came to the house of PW-1. He was awakened up and was informed that the room of the deceased was locked from inside. In the meantime, the dog of the deceased was seen out. It was brought back to the house by PW-1 and chained. They took a cup of tea there, and then came back to the place of occurrence. The deceased was found lying unconscious on the bed. Dr. Vasant Kesha Manekar (PW-5) who used to reside on the ground floor of the house was requested to examine her. He on examining declared her dead.

PW-4 was asked by the doctor to report the matter to the police. She declined whereupon Dr. Manekar himself lodged a report on the basis whereof a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged at about 1730 hrs. PW-1 in his First Information Report not only gave description of Appellant but also categorically stated that to his knowledge the boy sporting beard was facing a prosecution in the court and the deceased was a witness therein. Appellant was arrested within 12 hours from lodging of the First Information Report on the basis of his description given in the FIR.

Appellant was charged for commission of an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. He pleaded not guilty thereto. The prosecution in support of its case examined ten witnesses. PW-2 was the complainant in the case against Appellant wherein the deceased was mediating. PW-5 is the first informant who had examined the deceased and declared her dead.

The death of the deceased being of a homicidal nature is not in dispute. It has not further been disputed that at the instance of PW-2 a case under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code was pending against Appellant. It is furthermore not in dispute that the deceased was one of the witnesses in the said case. The deceased and PW-2 were autorickshaw drivers. Appellant was a teacher of Judo Karate and was teaching in School No. 9 situated at Dhule. He was well acquainted with the deceased who was mediating in the dispute between him and PW-2. On 2.9.1988, Appellant came to the hotel near S.T. Stand where the deceased and PW-2 had been taking tea and she requested him to compromise the matter pursuant whereto on 3.9.1988 PW-2 met the deceased at about 10 a.m. at the said place. She had expressed her dissatisfaction that PW-2 had not seen Appellant as promised.

The said decision cannot be said to have any application in the instant case.

We, therefore, have no hesitation in affirming the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court and hold that the circumstances brought on record by the prosecution clearly demonstrate that it was Appellant alone who committed the murder and in that view of the matter absence of motive would be immaterial. [See Mani Kumar Thapa v. State of Sikkim (2002) 7 SCC 157].

For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
Tejinder Singh Gujral vs Inderjit Singh & Anr

J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 16501 of 2005] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4562 OF 2006 [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 1134 of 2005] S.B. SINHA, J :

Lakshmanan, J. in his separate judgment, whereupon Mr. Malik has placed strong reliance, opined that the rate of interest must be just and reasonable depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and taking all relevant factors including inflation, change of economy, policy being adopted by Reserve Bank of India from time to time, how long the case is pending, permanent injuries suffered by the victim, enormity of suffering, loss of future income, loss of enjoyment of life, etc. into consideration. Grant of interest is discretionary. We do not find that the discretion exercised by the High Court was in any manner unreasonable.

The learned Single Judge has awarded interest at the rate of 12% per annum. The rate of interest now granted is 9% per annum keeping in view the drastic fall in the bank rate. We, therefore, do not intend to interfere with the said direction of the High Court.

We, therefore, do not intend to interfere with the impugned judgments. The appeals are dismissed accordingly. No costs.
Prabhat Kumar Sharma vs U.P.S.C. And Ors.

2. The facts are taken from Civil Appeal No. 5483 of 2000.

3. The appellant thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 2600 of 1992 in the High Court of Patna at Ranchi for a direction to the State Government to issue him a caste certificate as 'Scheduled Tribe' on his being a member of "Lohar" community. The Court directed the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad to issue a provisional caste certificate describing the appellant as "Lohar" belonging to the Scheduled Tribe with the stipulation that the same shall be subject to the final result of the writ petition pending in the High Court. The Bench issued an interim direction on 18.02.1993 directing the Commission to permit the appellant to appear in the examination provisionally as a member of the "Lohar" community as a 'Scheduled Tribe'. As per interim directions issued by the High Court, the Commission treated the appellant along with 4 other candidates similarly placed as belonging to Scheduled Tribe provisionally, subject to proving their claim. The performance of these candidates including the appellant in the Civil Services (Main) Examination, 1994 was assessed on relaxed standards meant for Scheduled Tribe candidates. The result of the written part of the Civil Services (Main) Examination, 1994 was declared by the Commission on 27.04.1995 and none of the five candidates including the appellant could qualify the written examination on the basis of their performance even as Scheduled Tribe candidates. The appellant had earlier failed to qualify the Civil Services (Main) Examination for the year 1993 even though he was treated as Scheduled Tribe candidate provisionally.

We are in the respectfully agreement with the view taken in Nityanand's case.

For the reasons stated above we do not find any merit in the civil appeal and the writ petitions and dismiss the same with costs throughout.
Union Of India & Anr vs S.D. Bandhopadhyay & Ors

A writ petition was filed by some Draughtsmen employed in Ordnance Factories located in the State of West Bengal before the High Court of Calcutta which was disposed of by an order dated 8th October, 1985 directing the Department to implement OM dated 13.3.1984.

The matter came up for consideration before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur wherein the Draughtsmen in Ordnance Factories who were in the pre-revised scale of 330-560 claimed revision and upgradation of the scale of pay. The Tribunal by a judgment dated 21.4.1987 opined that Respondents were at least entitled to the pay scale of Draughtsmen Grade II opining:

9. These orders shall not also apply to DGEME and OFB for which separate orders will be issued."

Respondents thereafter filed revisional application before the Central Administrative Tribunal inter alia questioning the said OMs and contending that they were entitled to the grant of pay scale of Senior Draughtsmen (Rs. 550-750) in terms of OM dated 19.10.1994. The said original application was allowed directing:

Before adverting to the contentions raised by the parties herein, we may notice that Respondents had filed special leave petition before this Court being SLP (C ) No. 14431 of 2003 but the same has been dismissed by this Court on 18.8.2003 directing:

In view of our findings aforementioned, the directions contained in paragraphs 3 and 9 of the circular dated 15.9.94 cannot be said to be vitiated in law. Whether it is issued by the Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Finance would pale into insignificancy, once it is held that the interpretation of the two OMs had correctly been made. It is furthermore difficult to accept the submission of the learned counsel that the OM of 1994 is not given effect to in its entirety, the same will result in discrimination of Respondents inasmuch as they have already got the benefits under the OM of 1994.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. This appeal is allowed. No costs.
Mr. B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd vs Nair Coal Services Ltd. & Ors

2. M/s Nair Coal Services Ltd.

3. M/s Karam Chand Thapar & Bros (CS) Ltd.

4. M/s Nareshkumar & Co. Ltd.

The bidder should submit the copies of the relevant documents to authenticate his claim towards experience.

(vii) The bidder should not be declared defaulter from any Electricity Board/Government/Semi Government/Public Power Utility Companies during last 3 (three) years."

Deviation, if any, therefore, was made by the competent authority of MAHAGENCO keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

We are not oblivious of the expansive role of the superior courts on judicial review.

Private Respondents, however, shall be paid their dues in terms of the offer made by them and accepted by MAHAGENCO. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations and directions. All the Private Respondents shall pay and bear their cost of Appellant which is quantified at Rs.50,000/- each.
Paramjeet Singh Patheja vs Icds Ltd

On 30.10.1998 the said company was registered with the Board of Industrial Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special provisions) Act, 1995. The appellant was a party to arbitration proceedings initiated by the respondents to recover amounts alleged to be due and payable from one Patheja Forgings and Auto Parts Manufactures Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'company'). The appellant was sought to be sued in his purported capacity as guarantor of the dues of the said company.

An Award was rendered therein on 26th June 2000 by the Arbitrator awarding Rs.3,81,58,821.47. However, according to the appellant, no copy of the Award was served on the appellant.

On 16.01.2002, Insolvency notice was issued under section 9(2) of the Presidency Town Insolvency Act, 1909 (PTIA) on the basis of the Arbitration Award. Section 9(2) provides that a debtor commits an act of insolvency if a creditor who has obtained a "decree or order" against him for the payment of money issues him a notice in the prescribed form to pay the amount and the debtor fails to do so within the time specified in the notice. The appellant filed a Notice of Motion in the High Court challenging the said notice, inter alia, on the ground that an Award is neither a decree nor an order for the purpose of the provisions of the Insolvency Act and that no notice can be issued under Section 9(2) on the basis of an award. This contention has been upheld in the case of Srivastava v. K.K. Modi Investments and Financial Services, 2002 (4) Mh.L.J.281, by the Bombay High Court (J.A. Patil,J.).

Order of BIFR rejecting the reference of Company was passed on 05.04.2002. On 14.06.2002, Insolvency notice was served on the appellant.

(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or

As such, no insolvency notice is liable to be issued against the appellant.

iii) Insolvency Notice cannot be issued on an Arbitration Award.

(a) that the adjudication must be given in a suit.

(b) That the suit must start with a plaint and culminate in a decree, and

(viii) In any event, award which is incapable of execution and cannot form the basis of an insolvency notice.

In the light of the above discussion, we further hold that the Insolvency Notice issued under section 9(2) of the P.T.I. Act 1909 cannot be sustained on the basis of arbitral award which has been passed under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. We answer the two questions in favour of the appellant.

In view of the above, the following two questions viz.,

(a) Whether the award dated 26.6.2000 was ever served upon the appellant; and

(b) Whether the Arbitration proceedings and resulting award are null and void in view of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1995 may not have to be decided by the High Court in view of the order passed in civil appeal by this Court. The Civil Appeal stands allowed. The order dated 19.3.2003 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Notice of Motion No.72/2002, Notice No. N/180/2001 is set aside. No costs.
Shyamal Kumar Roy vs Sushil Kumar Agarwal

By an order dated 13.4.2005, the learned Trial Judge rejected both the applications. A Revisional Application filed by Appellant before the High Court has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment dated 28.2.2006. A review petition was filed by Appellant was also dismissed by the High Court by an order dated 5.5.2006.

There is no quarrel with the aforementioned proposition of law.

Again, we are not concerned such a question in this appeal.

The said decision has also no application in the facts and circumstances of this case.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed no error in dismissing the revisional application as also the review application filed by Appellant herein. The appeal is therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee quantified at Rs.5,000/-.
State, Cbi vs Sashi Balasubramanian & Anr

Originally, there were seven accused; three out of them were the private parties, namely, M/s Best Fabrics, Shri S. Vaidyanathan and Shri Bharath Bhushan Goyal. Smt. Sashi Balasubramanian, Respondent No.1 herein, was the Deputy Director General of Foreign Trade and Shri V. Rajpriyan , Respondent No.2 herein, was the Controller of Exports and Imports. Apart from Respondents herein, two other officials were also arrayed as accused persons in the charge- sheet, namely, Shri S. Ramanathan, Assistant Collector and Shri A. Sivaram Kumar, Apprising Officer.

[See Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi (3) and Others [(2006) 4 SCC 1] We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly.

The appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside with the aforementioned observations. No costs.
M. Raja vs Ceeri Educational Society Pilani & Anr

An offer of appointment was made to him on 17.12.1996 wherein it was stated:

The respondent, however, by a letter dated 8.01.1997 offered a basic salary of Rs. 1700/- with seven advance increments as also accommodation, etc. to the appellant as he did not join and demanded for settlement of terms and conditions in service to be spelt out clearly. It appears that the wife of the appellant was also offered an appointment. In his letter dated 15.01.1997, the appellant contended:

Inter alia on the premise that the respondents were bound to protect his scale of pay keeping in view the promises made and the Management Committee backtracked therefrom, he moved the Rajasthan Non- Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur. The Tribunal allowed the said application in part holding the appellant to be entitled to pay as per the recommendations of the Fifth Central Pay Commission with effect from the date of appointment and directing the respondents to calculate the amount of difference and pay the same to him within three months. A writ petition filed by the respondents thereagainst was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. The respondents preferred an intra-court appeal and the Division Bench by reason of the impugned judgment allowed the same.

We may notice that the appellant in Ground I of Special Leave Petition stated:

In this case, only a limited notice had been issued and as the respondents are ready and willing to extend the benefit of revised scale of pay to the appellant in the event he enters into an agreement, we are of the opinion that no further order need be passed.

The Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment has assigned reasons for interfering with the findings of the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge. We do not find any legal infirmity therein.

The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Banshi Dhar vs State Of Rajasthan And Anr

The appellant preferred an appeal against the said judgment of conviction and sentence and by reason of a judgment and order dated 16.01.2001, the said appeal was allowed. The appellant, thus, stood acquitted.

In the meanwhile, i.e., in the year 1998, the appellant reached his age of superannuation. Having been acquitted in the criminal proceeding, he filed a writ petition before the High Court of Rajasthan which was marked as SB Civil Writ Petition No. 3111 of 2002. By an order dated 19.02.2003, a learned Single Judge of the High Court directed that in the event the appellant files a representation before the competent officer with regard to pension, the same may be considered within a period of three months therefrom. An appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed by reason of the impugned order passed by the Division Bench.

[See also South Bengal State Transport Corpn. v. Sapan Kumar Mitra and Others, (2006) 2 SCC 584] Even in relation to the industrial disputes, this Court, in many judgments, has held that back wages need not be granted automatically although the order of termination passed against the concerned workman was found to be invalid. [U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. and Another v. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479 and Municipal Council, Sujanpur v. Surinder Kumar, (2006) 5 SCC 173] We, therefore, are of the opinion that it is not a fit case, having regard to the fact that the appellant has been paid the retiral benefits, where we should interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Jasbir Singh vs Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors

Interestingly, Respondent Bank also filed a suit against the appellant for recovery of a sum of Rs. 25,000/-. The suit was decreed. On an appeal preferred thereagainst, the Addl. District Judge, Faridkot by a judgment and decree dated 3.3.2001, on analysis of the evidences brought on records, held that Respondent Bank miserably failed to prove that the appellant has withdrawn the said sum of Rs. 25,000/- and the allegation against him that he had embezzled an amount of Rs. 25,000/- was not proved and, thus, it was not entitled to recover the said amount.

The High Court, however, failed to take note of the decision of the civil court. It could not have refused to look into the materials on record solely relying on or on the basis of clause 19.3 (c) of Bipartite Settlement to hold that the departmental proceedings could have been initiated even after the judgment of acquittal is passed in criminal case. We, therefore, are of the opinion that impugned judgments cannot be sustained.

The judgments of both the Civil Court and the Criminal Court established that the appellant was treated very unfairly and unreasonably. For all intent and purport, a criminal case was foisted upon him. A confession, according to learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, was extracted from him by the bank officers in a very cruel manner. It is, therefore, not a case where back wages should be denied. Respondent Bank has tried to proceed against the appellant both in a civil proceedings as well as in a criminal proceedings and at both the independent forums, it failed.

We, therefore, are of the view that the impugned orders and judgments cannot be sustained. They are set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The appellant is directed to be reinstated with back wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. The respondent shall also pay and bear the costs of the appellant which is quantified Rs. 10,000/-.