L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Uttam Kumar vs State Of M.P. (Now Chhattisgarh)

1. The solitary accused stands convicted for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code with a sentence of imprisonment for life and fine for having murdered his wife Meena Bai on the 5th July, 1998 at about 12 noon in the family home. It appears that the relations between the appellant and his wife was strained as he suspected that she was not of good character. On the intervention of the family members, however, Meena Bai who had left the matrimonial home and gone to her parents, was persuaded to return. The appellant nevertheless assaulted Meena Bai on the day in question with a tangia (an agricultural weapon easily available in all farming families) on which she cried out in pain whereupon her sister-in-law P.W. 7 Sulesan Crl.A. No. 550 of 2007 2 Bai who was preparing the food close by came running to the spot. She saw Meena Bai lying in a pool of blood and the appellant standing by carrying a tangia in his hand. The appellant also told Sulesan Bai that he had caused injuries to his wife and that he would go to the police station to lodge a report. Suleshan Bai thereupon conveyed the information to Derhin Bai P.W. 9, the step mother of the appellant, and Derhin Bai also saw the appellant leaving the house carrying his tangia. On enquiry from him he told her that he was going to the police station. A short while later Dauwa Ram P.W. 10, the father of the appellant, also reached the place and was told by Sulesan Bai and Derhin Bai that the appellant had killed his wife Meena Bai and had left for police station, Kasdol at about 6:10p.m. 24 kms. away from the village. It is admitted position that the appellant never reached the police station. He was, however, arrested and was ultimately brought to trial.

5. The appeal is dismissed for the aforesaid reasons.

6. Fee of the Amicus is fixed at `7,000/-.
Sunil vs State Of Haryana

Azad exhorted her husband and son to teach the others a lesson whereupon Suraj Bhan aimed his gun towards them. Ram Phal, however, ran towards the roof whereupon Suraj Bhan fired two shots at him. Sunil thereafter took the gun from his father and fired two shots towards them but as Satbir Singh and the others had taken shelter behind a parapet no injury was suffered by them. The accused thereafter ran away from the spot.

1.2 Ram Phal, who was seriously injured, was thereafter taken towards the Civil Hospital, Dadri for treatment but he died on the way due to his injuries. On the basis of the statement made by Satbir to Sub Inspector Amrik Singh, S.H.O., Police Station Dadri, at 8:40p.m. Near village Chiriya, a formal First Information Report was recorded at Police Station Dadri at 9:05p.m. and the Special Report delivered to the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Charkhi Dadri at about 10:40p.m., the same night. On the completion of the investigation Suraj Bhan, his wife Azad and their son Sunil were brought to trial. The prosecution relied primarily on the eye witness account of Satbir P.W. 4 and his brother Zile Singh, P.W. 5 as also SI Amrik Crl.A. No. 1299 of 2006 3 Singh - P.W. 6 as well as the medical evidence of P.W. 2

4. On the last date of hearing that is, on the 12th January, 2011, Mr. Jain had raised an argument that the appellant was less than 18 years of age on the date of Crl.A. No. 1299 of 2006 5 the incident and in this view of the matter he could not have been brought to trial along with his co-accused. We had, accordingly, adjourned the matter seeking a report from Bhiwani. Mr. Satish Ahlawat, Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhiwani has sent a report dated 28th February, 2011 and we have perused the same. It reveals that on the date of the incident i.e. 2nd February, 1993 the appellant was 18 years 9 months and 26 days of age. He was, therefore, clearly not a juvenile. We, accordingly, find no merit in the appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed.
Union Of India & Anr vs Ram Singh Thakur & Ors

The facts have been set out in the impugned judgment dated 15.09.2003 as well as in the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 30.05.2001 and hence we are repeating the same here.

:2: CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 200 OF 2007 & Civil Appeal NO. 1197 of 2007 For the reasons stated above, the Appeal stands allowed and the impugned judgments of the High Court as well as the order of the Tribunal are set aside. No costs. Civil Appeal No. 1197 of 2007

The facts have been set out in the impugned judgment and in the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 28.03.2002 and hence we are not repeating the same here.

In our opinion, a direction regarding regularisation in service is a purely executive function and such a direction cannot validly be given by the judiciary. :3: CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 200 OF 2007 & Civil Appeal NO. 1197 of 2007 Consequently, this Appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgment as well as the judgment of the Tribunal are set aside. No costs.
Union Of India & Ors vs Jujhar Singh

2) Brief facts:

Subsequently, he was admitted in Military Hospital, Dehradun and after treatment was placed in medical category BEE (Permanent) and percentage of disability was ascertained as 20%. After he joined the duty, he was kept under observation by the Medical Board and his disability was assessed as 60% for two years. The Medical Board also opined that the disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by the military service.

(b) The respondent was superannuated from service w.e.f. 01.07.1998 and he was granted normal service pension. He made a representation before the authorities claiming disability pension on the ground that he was having disability on the date of retirement. The representation was rejected by the authorities.

(d) Challenging the said order, the appellants herein preferred L.P.A. No. 5 of 2002 before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench, by impugned judgment dated 04.01.2002, dismissed the appeal in limine. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants preferred this appeal by way of special leave petition before this Court.

It is seen that when the respondent was on annual leave, he met with a road accident at his native place and 4 sustained grievous injuries resulting in permanent disability. It is further seen that after treatment and returning from his leave, he continued in military service and w.e.f. 01.07.1998, the respondent was superannuated from service and he was granted normal service pension.

According to the respondent, since on the date of retirement, he was permanently disabled, he is entitled for disability pension for which he made a representation which was rejected by the authorities.

In view of the same, the injuries sustained cannot be held to be attributable to the military service.

18) In view of our discussion, the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench are set aside. We make it clear that the respondent is entitled to "full normal pension" which he is already getting as per the Regulations, but not entitled to "disability pension".

The appeal is allowed. No costs.

July 15, 2011.
Jalandhar Improvement Trust vs Vinod Kumar & Ors

4. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are that the land in dispute belongs to the State. It is averred by the respondents that they have occupied the land in dispute in the year 1947, measuring 2-1/2 kanals in Khasra No. 16693/6729 in the 55.0 Acres Development Scheme as they were displaced persons from Pakistan. On the other hand the appellant - Improvement Trust Jalandhar has stated that respondents encroached the said land which belongs to the Government.

21. The respondents have not challenged the award and therefore the aforesaid Award has become final and binding.

Therefore, we set aside the order passed by the High Court and hold that the proceedings initiated against the respondents under Sections 5 and 7 of the Eviction Act would be allowed to be continued and the same shall be brought to a logical end as expeditiously as possible.

Therefore, in our considered opinion the proceedings to Page 11 of 13 adjudicate upon and decide as to whether or not respondents are authorised or unauthorised occupants of the land in dispute should be completed and brought to an end. As to whether or not the respondents are encroachers would also be decided in the said proceeding. All other claims regarding entitlement of alternative plot or rehabilitation and whether or not such land is already allotted as rehabilitation package could be raised by the respondents only after the proceeding initiated under the Eviction Act is finalised and also depending on its outcome.

23.Six months time is granted to the competent authority to complete proceedings initiated under Sections 5 and 7 of the Eviction Act, so that, the matter is disposed of as expeditiously as possible as the same is pending for a very long time.

24. Therefore, the present appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court accordingly stands quashed. We leave the parties to bear their own costs.

...................................................J Page 12 of 13 [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma] ...................................................J [Anil R. Dave] New Delhi, July 15, 2011.
M/S Sms Tea Estates P.Ltd vs M/S Chandmari Tea Co.P.Ltd

The averments made in the said application in brief were as under :

12. We may therefore sum up the procedure to be adopted where the arbitration clause is contained in a document which is not registered (but compulsorily registrable) and which is not duly stamped :

Re : Question (iii)

Conclusion

21. In view of the above this appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the learned Chief Justice of Guwahati High Court to first decide the issue of stamp duty, and if the document is duly stamped, then appoint an arbitrator in accordance with law.
Munilal Mochi vs State Of Bihar & Anr

Programme (in short "NREP") executed between the years 1982-83 by the officers posted at Piro, District Ara with the assistance of some executing agents/agencies came under the scan of the Vigilance Department. Enquiries including re-

measurement of the Schemes/works executed under these Schemes revealed that some local officers posted in the Block in connivance with agents appointed for few Schemes fraudulently withdrew and misappropriated the Government funds in relation to those schemes and created official records/documents to cover up such defalcation.

(b) On 14.09.1983, one Hem Raj Prasad, Dy. S.P. Cabinet (Vigilance) Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, made a written complaint before the Office-in-charge, Vigilance Police Station, Patna, alleging that in Piro Block of District Ara, under NREP, six Schemes viz., Scheme Nos. 27/1982-83, 28/1982-83, 25/1982-83, 21/1982-83, 22/1982-83 and 2 14/1982-83 were executed and in those Schemes after preliminary enquiry, it was detected that Junior Engineer/agents of concerned Department/Agency have misappropriated government money in the said Schemes and as such the persons have committed an offence under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471(A) of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as "the IPC") and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the P.C. Act"). On the basis of the said complaint, police lodged a First Information Report (in short "the FIR") and registered a Vigilance P.S. Case No. 18 of 1983 under the aforesaid sections. According to the appellant, his name was not mentioned in the FIR.

JULY 21, 2011.
District Primary School Council,Wb vs Mritunjoy Das & Ors

3. The contesting respondents herein got themselves admitted for a training course, for obtaining the Primary Teachers' Training Institute certificate, which is pre-requisite and mandatory in order to get appointment as Assistant Teacher in primary schools in West Bengal. The contesting respondents herein obtained certificates after completing their training course. Thereafter, Page 1 of 6 they also submitted their candidature for such appointment as Assistant Teacher in primary school in which they were selected and were consequently appointed as teachers. However, subsequently, it was found that they had taken admission in the aforesaid training course for Primary Teachers' Training Institute Certificate by inflating their marks. It is pointed out that in the said institute, where they got admission for undergoing training, the minimum marks that one had to obtain for admission in that particular year was 600. Both the contesting respondents inflated their marks. In one case, it was 621 as against 430 marks actually obtained and in the other case, it was 614 as against actual obtained marks of 425. After the aforesaid fact came to light, the appellant herein issued show cause notice to the contesting respondents and the contesting respondents were also called for a personal hearing. However, none of the contesting respondents availed the opportunity of personal hearing given to them despite the fact they submitted their replies to the show cause notices. The appellant thereafter passed orders dismissing the contesting respondents from service.

4. Being aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the contesting respondents herein filed writ petitions in the Calcutta High Court Page 2 of 6 which were dismissed. On appeals filed by the contesting respondents before the Division Bench of the High Court, the same were allowed as against which the present appeals have been filed.

There is, therefore, no violation of the principles of natural justice in the present case. If a particular act is fraudulent, any consequential order to such fradulent act or conduct is non est and void ab initio and, therefore, we cannot find any fault with the action of the appellant in dismissing the service of the contesting respondents. In this context we refer to the decision of this Court in Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education and Others reported in (2003) 8 SCC 311 for the proposition that no person should be allowed to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud.

8. In view of the aforesaid position, we set aside the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and restore the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court.

9. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
District Primary School Council,Wb vs Mritunjoy Das & Ors

3. The contesting respondents herein got themselves admitted for a training course, for obtaining the Primary Teachers' Training Institute certificate, which is pre-requisite and mandatory in order to get appointment as Assistant Teacher in primary schools in West Bengal. The contesting respondents herein obtained certificates after completing their training course. Thereafter, they also submitted their candidature for such appointment as Assistant Teacher in primary school in which they were selected and were consequently appointed as teachers. However, subsequently, it was found that they had taken admission in the aforesaid training course for Primary Teachers' Training Institute Certificate by inflating their marks. It is pointed out that in the said institute, where they got admission for undergoing training, the minimum marks that one had to obtain for admission in that particular year was 600. Both the contesting respondents inflated their marks. In one case, it was 621 as against 430 marks actually obtained and in the other case, it was 614 as against actual obtained marks of 425. After the aforesaid fact came to light, the appellant herein issued show cause notice to the contesting respondents and the contesting respondents were also called for a personal hearing. However, none of the contesting respondents availed the opportunity of personal hearing given to them despite the fact they submitted their replies to the show cause notices. The appellant thereafter passed orders dismissing the contesting respondents from service.

4. Being aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the contesting respondents herein filed writ petitions in the Calcutta High Court which were dismissed. On appeals filed by the contesting respondents before the Division Bench of the High Court, the same were allowed as against which the present appeals have been filed.

8. In view of the aforesaid position, we set aside the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and restore the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court.

9. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Umerkhan vs Bismillabi @ Babulal Shaikh & Ors

Umerkhan and two daughters--Bismillabi and Aminabi. Both daughters were minor at the time of the death of their father. They got married later. Bismillabi (hereinafter referred to as, `plaintiff') filed a suit for partition and separate possession to the extent of 1/4th share in the above property against her brother Umerkhan (hereinafter referred to as, `1st defendant') and her sister Aminabi (hereinafter referred to as, `2nd defendant'). The plaintiff's case in the plaint was that as per the Muhammadan Law, the 1st defendant has 1/2 share while the 2nd defendant like her has 1/4th share in the suit property.

4. The 1st defendant contested the suit on diverse grounds.

7. The plaintiff challenged the judgment and decree of the first appellate court in the second appeal before the High Court. In the course of second appeal, 2nd defendant died and her legal representatives were brought on record. The High Court allowed the second appeal and, as noticed above, set aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court.

17. The above three judgments have been relied upon in Sasikumar and Ors. v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair and Ors.4 and C.A. Sulaiman and Ors. v. State Bank of Travancore, Alwayee and Ors.5 and this Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and the matters were remanded to the High Court for disposal of second appeal in accordance with law.

19. In light of the above, the appeal is allowed and impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The second appeal No. 528 of 2001, Bismillabi v. Umerkhan and Ors., is restored to the file of the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. No order as to costs.

(R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI.

JULY 28, 2011.
Bihar State Housing Board & Ors vs Asha Lata Verma

2) Brief facts:

(b) On 25.03.1991, the husband of the respondent died and in the year 1992, she sought for transfer of the Flat in her name. The flat was transferred in the name of the respondent after furnishing the details of payment and other required documents to the Board vide letter No. 1459 dated 05.05.1998.

(d) Against the said demand notice, the respondent filed writ petition bearing CWJC No. 11753 of 2007 before the High Court of Patna for quashing the same on the ground that the payment of the flat had already been made in 144 equal instalments and that the Board is not justified in raising such demand and not entitled to re-determination/re-fixation of the price after delivery of possession. The learned single Judge, by order dated 07.02.2008, allowed the writ petition and quashed the demand notice and directed the Board to grant permission for transfer of the flat in favour of Ms. Meera Verma, daughter-

11) In the light of the above discussion, we are satisfied that the direction relating to inquiry by the Vigilance Department and subsequent orders and directions by the learned single Judge cannot be sustained. While confirming the order of the learned single Judge relating to the relief granted to the respondent, all other directions relating to the Board and its officials are set aside. However, it is made clear that if there is any specific complaint with facts and figures against any of the officer of the Board, it is for the person concerned to move the appropriate prosecuting agency and if any such complaint is made, the agency is free to proceed in accordance with law.

12) The civil appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above.

There shall be no order as to costs.

JULY 28, 2011.
Glaxosmithkline Pharmacet. Ltd. & Anr vs State Of M.P

3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

D. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chattarpur, took cognizance and issued summons to all accused persons including the appellants. The appellants filed an application under Section 25(3) of the Act 1940 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chattarpur, with a prayer that sample of Betnesol tablets be sent for chemical analysis to the Director, Central Drugs Laboratory for being tested as per I.P.1996 on 1.10.2007. The said application stood rejected vide order dated 5.5.2008. The appellants approached the High Court by filing Misc.

8. In view of the fact that the appellants did not express an intention to adduce evidence to controvert the analyst report within the statutory limitation period of 28 days, further delay in filing the complaint becomes immaterial. Even otherwise, expiry date of the medicine was March 1998 i.e. only after 4 months of submission of the reply by the appellants, and they did not fulfill their burden of expressing intention to adduce evidence in contravention of the report. Therefore, they cannot raise the grievance that the complaint had been lodged at a 7 much belated stage. So far as the application of I.P. 1985 or I.P. 1996 is concerned, such an issue can be agitated at the time of trial.

12. As explained hereinabove, the appellants and other co-accused did not give any option to adduce evidence in contravention of the analyst's report within statutory limitation period. Even if there was inordinate delay in launching the criminal prosecution or filing the complaint, it is thereby of no consequence. We do not find any ground 10 to interfere with the well reasoned judgment of the High Court. The appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
C.C.E.,Mangalore vs M/S.Pals Microstystems Ltd. Mangalore

4. The respondent, a limited company, is a holder of Central Excise Registration and is a manufacturer of data processing machines and is also availing benefits under Modvat Scheme. On 25.10.1996, Superintendent of Central Excise visited the factory premises of the respondent-assessee for verification of the stock of inputs on which Modvat credit was availed. It was noticed that there was a vast difference between physical stocks available and that shown in RG23A Part 1 Register. The Managing Director of the respondent-assessee, in his statement dated 25.10.1996 given before the Superintendent of Central Excise, West Range, Mangalore, admitted that the actual physical stock of inputs and entries in the RG23A Part 1 Register did not tally because the respondent-assessee had removed the Modvatable inputs for sales and warranty replacements. The Managing Director of the respondent-

assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner(Appeals) but the Commissioner(Appeals) dismissed the appeal, vide order dated 23.1.2006.

13. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the High Court, the Appellant-Revenue has filed this appeal before this Court.

15. Upon hearing the counsel appearing for the appellant and upon perusal of the judgment of the High Court and other orders passed by the authorities, we are of the view that the impugned judgment does not need any interference.

In the set of facts, the judgment delivered in the case of Nizam sugar 7 (supra) would squarely be applicable. In view of the aforestated facts, we are of the view that the judgment delivered by the High Court cannot be interfered.

18. For the aforestated reasons, we do not see any substance in this appeal and, therefore, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.