L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of West Bengal vs Howrah Ganatantrik Nagarik Samity & Ors

3. The facts very briefly are that during the British rule, Victoria Memorial Hall was built in the memory of Queen Victoria in Central Kolkata. After independence, this monument continues to be known for its beautiful architecture and green surroundings.

To the north of the Victoria Memorial Hall is a huge stretch of land known as `the Maidan' which is covered by green grass and interspersed with a large number of trees, bushes and shrubs. At the end of about 2 kms.

of this greenery is the Esplanade where another monument known as the `Sahid Minar' stands, and by the side of the Sahid Minar is a bus terminus. To protect and preserve the Victoria Memorial Hall and its green surroundings, a public interest litigation (Writ Petition No. 7987(W) of 2002) was filed in the Calcutta High Court by the respondent nos. 1 to 5.

4. After hearing all concerned parties and considering the concerned affidavits and counter-affidavits as well as recommendations of expert bodies including the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (for short `NEERI'), the High Court inter alia directed in the impugned order that the bus terminus at Esplanade be shifted to a distant place within six months. Aggrieved by this direction in the impugned order, the State of West Bengal is in appeal before us.

3. The facts very briefly are that during the British rule, Victoria Memorial Hall was built in the memory of Queen Victoria in Central Kolkata. After independence, this monument continues to be known for its beautiful architecture and green surroundings.

10. We accordingly modify the impugned order of the High Court and direct the State Government to consider and take appropriate action on the NEERI report recommending relocation of the bus terminus 7 away from the Esplanade. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.

2. These Special Leave Petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution are directed against the orders dated 28.09.2007 and 15.02.2008 of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Writ Petition No.7987 (W) of 2002.

4. After hearing all concerned parties and considering the petitions, affidavits and counter affidavits and the recommendations of expert bodies, the High Court, inter alia, directed in the impugned order dated 28.09.2007 that parking of all cars around the compound of the Victoria Memorial Hall shown as red-

Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed these Special Leave Petitions.

6. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders of the High Court and accordingly dismiss the Special Leave Petitions with no order as to costs.
Lalrivenga & Anr vs State Of Mizoram & Ors

3. The appellants purchased land measuring 11.37 bighas from Dangliana to whom Periodic Patta No. 40/81 is said to have been granted under Rule 6 of the Mizo District (Agricultural Land) Rules, 1971. They submitted applications to Director, Land Revenue and Settlement, Mizoram (respondent No.2) who had issued order dated 18.1.1983 authorising Assistant Settlement Officer-II to decide such applications for grant of Land Settlement Certificates. After considering the applications, the Settlement Officer issued certificates bearing Nos.AZ-2279 of 1987 and AZ-2278 of 1987 in favour of the appellants under Section II of the Mizo District (Land Revenue) Act, 1956.

4. In the meanwhile, the State Government issued notification dated 14.5.1985 under Section 4(1) of the Act for the acquisition of land in villages old Beraw and Zokhawsang for a public purpose, namely, allotment to the Assam Rifles in lieu of the site occupied by them in Aizawl town. After one month, the State Government issued order dated 14.6.1985 and imposed restriction on the allotment of land to private persons along the main National Highway and the road going to old Zokhawsang Village.

15. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and the order passed by the learned Single Judge is restored. The respondents are directed to pay the amount of compensation to the appellants in terms of the order of the learned Single Judge within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
Hardev Singh vs Union Of India & Anr

2. The appellant was commissioned as an Officer in Indian Army on 17.6.1973. Over a period of time, he rose to the rank of Major General and retired on 30.4.2010. During his service tenure, he performed his duties well and he had also carried out several special assignments and he was suitably honoured by Indian Army. Being aggrieved by the aforestated order passed by the Tribunal, he has filed this appeal, as according to him, he was wrongly denied promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General.

3. The facts giving rise to the present litigation in a nutshell are as under:

7. As the appellant had not been promoted, the appellant had filed non-statutory and statutory complaints but the said complaints were not properly considered and were disposed of without assigning any reason. In the circumstances, the appellant was constrained to approach the Armed Forces Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, by filing an Original Application. The said application was thereafter transferred to the Armed Forces Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi. The said application was rejected by the judgment dated 26th April, 2010, which has been challenged in this appeal.

10. On the other hand, Mr. P.P. Tripathi, learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the judgment delivered by the Tribunal is just and proper. He submitted that Indian Army is having a pyramidal organisation and it has framed its promotion policy accordingly. Till 15th December, 2004, promotions up to the rank of Major were given on the basis of seniority whereas promotions from the rank of Major to Lieutenant General and onwards were strictly on merit and they were given promotion on the basis of recommendations of a Selection Board. However, as per the new policy, at present promotions upto the rank of Lieutenant Colonel are by time scale and 7 thereafter the promotions to higher ranks are given on the recommendation of the Selection Board.

16. For the aforestated reasons and for the reasons recorded by the Tribunal, the learned counsel submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs.

21. The above facts would make it clear that the cases of the appellant and others were never considered by the SSB in 2008 or prior to 1st January, 2009. It means that the cases were considered as per the new policy and, therefore, all submissions made on behalf of the appellant that the policy was changed after the process of selection had been started are not correct and, therefore, they are to be discarded.

22. The grievance made by the appellant with regard to non-

Similarly, in the case of Balco Employees' Union (Regd.) v.

27. For the aforestated reasons, we are of the view that no injustice had been caused to the appellant as his case was duly considered for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General by the SSB twice but as other officers were found better than the appellant, he could not be 16 promoted. In the circumstances, we do not find any substance in the appeal and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

28. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
A.P.Indstl.Infrastructure Corpn.Ltd vs Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao & Ors

2. The facts giving rise to the present litigation in a nutshell are as under:

Corporation on 16th July, 1998 and in view of the said fact, this Court had granted interim stay in favour of the appellant on 10th January, 2005 and an application made by the land owners for vacating the said stay had been rejected and it was directed to maintain status quo.

14. Looking to the facts of the present case and in the light of the law laid down by this Court, which has been referred to hereinabove, we firmly believe that the petition filed by the land owners was at a belated stage. For the said reason, we do not desire to interfere with the acquisition proceedings, which had been challenged after more than two years of declaration under Section 6 of the Act and on that ground alone we feel that appeals deserve to be allowed.

15. The impugned judgment and orders passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is quashed and set aside. The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs.
State Of M.P. & Anr vs Babulal

3. The respondents in these appeals were working as daily rated employees in a project of the Public Health Engineering Department, Respondent No.2 herein. Their services were discontinued after the completion of the project. They filed an application under the M.P. Industrial Relations Act and the Labour Court passed an order directing their reinstatement with back-wages.

4. Respondent No.2 preferred an appeal before the Industrial Court and the Industrial Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Labour Court. The respondents challenged the order of the Industrial Court before the High Court.

5. Learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents 3 and set aside the order passed by the Industrial Court and restored the order passed by the Trial Court with a modification that the appellants shall be liable to pay 25% back-wages to the respondents from the date they were discontinued.

7. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, we deem it appropriate to direct that the respondents be reinstated in service without back-wages. However, the State would be at liberty to give them employment wherever it is possible. We expect the State to ensure giving employment to the respondents workers nearer to the place of their residence.

8. The impugned order passed by the High Court 4 is modified to the extent mentioned above and the appeals are disposed of accordingly. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.

.....................J (DALVEER BHANDARI) .....................J (DEEPAK VERMA) New Delhi;

September 15, 2011.
D.M.Nagaraja vs Govt.Of Karnataka & Ors

(b) By the date of the detention order, i.e. on 22.09.2010, eleven cases had been filed against the detenue and out of them, four cases were pending trial before the respective Courts and records have been destroyed as time barred in four cases. In two cases, he has been acquitted. In pending cases, he was granted bail from the courts and in one case he has been convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of nine years by the Sessions Court, Bangalore. The detention order further shows that because of his habituality in committing crimes, violating public order by threatening the public, causing injuries to them and damaging their properties and he was not amenable and controllable by 2 the normal procedure, detained him as `goonda' under Section 2(g) of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum-Grabbers Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "the Karnataka Act") (Act No. 12 of 1985) for a period of 12 months.

(c) The appellant himself challenged the detention order before the High Court of Karanataka by filing a writ of Habeas Corpus. Before the High Court, the only contention put-forth by the appellant was that there was enormous delay in considering his representation made on 06.10.2010 to the Advisory Board for withdrawal of the detention order. While negating the said contention, the Division Bench of the High Court has gone into the validity or otherwise of the detention order and after finding that the Detaining Authority was fully justified in clamping the detention order, dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant-detenue vide order dated 28.03.2011. The said order is under challenge before us by way of special leave petition.

10) The detention order refers the activities and involvement of the appellant-detenue in as many as 11 cases. The details of which are mentioned hereunder:

17) Under these circumstances, we find no merit in the appeal. Consequently, the same is dismissed.

SEPTEMBER 19, 2011.
Rakesh & Anr vs State Of M.P

2. Facts as explained by the prosecution have been that:

B. Dr. R.K. Singhvi (PW.8), conducted the post-mortem on the body of the deceased on the same day. In his opinion, there were three incised wounds found on his body, one on the neck, one on the chest and another in the abdomen. All the injuries had been caused by sharp edged weapons and Kailash had died within three to six hours prior to conducting the post-mortem examination.

C. During the course of investigation, the appellants were arrested and the weapons used in the offence were recovered on their disclosure statements. After concluding the investigation, chargesheet was filed.

D. The case was committed for Sessions trial. The prosecution examined a large number of witnesses in support of its case. One Halle (DW.1) was examined in defence and after conclusion of the trial, all the three accused were convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC vide judgment and order dated 21.2.1997 and were awarded sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.

3. Before proceeding with the case on merit, it may be pertinent to mention here that so far as the case of the appellant Rakesh is concerned, he had already served the sentence of more than 14 years and has been granted premature release by the State. Appellant Rajesh has served about 7 -1/2 years and is still in jail. The third person Dinesh did not prefer any appeal so we are not concerned with him so far as this appeal is concerned.

The Doctor opined that Kailash @ Killu had died within 3 to 6 hours before the post-mortem examination. Anil (PW.11) relied upon by the High Court, is closely related to the deceased Kailash @ Killu and none of the independent witnesses examined by the prosecution supported its case to the extent that Anil (PW.11) could be present on the place of occurrence at the relevant time. Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

In the opinion of Doctor Singhvi, all the injuries appeared to have been caused within 3 to 6 hours by sharp edged weapons prior to the post-mortem examination.

The depositions of B.M. Dubey (PW.21) had been natural. There was no proof that the I.O. (PW.21) had any animosity or any kind of interest and closeness to the deceased. Therefore, the question of not believing the statement of B.M. Dubey, I.O. (PW.21) does not arise.

18. There are concurrent findings of fact by the two courts below.

21. In view of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion that the courts below reached the correct conclusion in accepting the 1 prosecution case. Anil (PW.11) is a natural witness and his testimony inspired confidence and is, thus, worth acceptance.

The facts and circumstances of the instant case do not warrant any interference by this Court. Appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

...J. (P. SATHASIVAM) ..............................

...J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN) New Delhi, September 19, 2011 1 1
Shivlal & Anr vs State Of Chhattisgarh

D. The weapons used for commission of the offence seized from the accused persons were sent for examination, first to the Doctor who opined that the injuries to the deceased could be caused by the recovered weapons. The said weapons were subsequently sent for chemical examination along with plain and blood stained soils. The Forensic Science Laboratory vide its report Ex.P-9 confirmed the presence of blood over all those articles.

E. After completing investigation, chargesheet was filed against fifteen accused persons in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bemetara, who in turn committed the case to the Court of Sessions Judge, Durg. The Trial Court framed the charges under Sections 147, 148 and 302/149 IPC against all the accused persons who abjured their guilt.

F. The prosecution in order to establish the charges against the accused persons, examined 13 witnesses and after completion of their depositions, the court examined all the accused persons under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called 4 "Cr.P.C."), wherein they denied their involvement and submitted that they had falsely been implicated because of the village factional rivalry. The Trial Court vide judgment and order dated 31.3.2000 acquitted nine persons of all the charges giving them benefit of doubt, however, convicted and sentenced the remaining six accused persons including the appellants.

G. The said six convicts preferred Criminal Appeal No.973 of 2000 in the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur wherein the High Court vide impugned judgment and order acquitted four persons, however, upheld the conviction and sentence of the two appellants as awarded by the trial Court.

(Emphasis added)

12. The case at hand is, by no means different from the case above referred to and in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. Appeal stands allowed. The judgments and orders of the 1 courts below dated 31.3.2000 and 25.8.2006 are set aside and the appellants are acquitted. In case the appellants are not wanted in some other case, they be released forthwith.

Before parting with the case, we would like to record our appreciation for Ms. Tanuj Bagga, learned Amicus Curiae, for rendering valuable assistance to the Court in spite of not having the full documents/papers.

...J. (P. SATHASIVAM) ..............................

...J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN) New Delhi, September 19, 2011 1
Panchmahal Vadodara Gramin Bank & Ors vs D.M. Parmar

2. The facts briefly are that D.M. Parmar was appointed in Panchmahal Vadodara Gramin Bank, ‘the Bank’ for short, as an officer by order dated 16.4.1988. He joined the bank on 25.4.1988 and was confirmed in service on 9.5.1991. He worked as a Manager at Chundadi branch of the bank during 25.3.1996 to 21.6.1997 and during this period he had granted advances, renewed various loan accounts and extended more finance to the borrowers under Crop Loan Scheme. A show cause notice dated 15/20.5.1999 was issued to him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be initiated against him for various acts of omission and commission committed during his posting as a Manager of Chundadi branch of the bank during the period 25.3.1996 to 21.6.1997. He replied saying that he was not fully experienced in handling a big branch and in discharging duties as a Branch Manager and the acts of omission and commission were on account of his inexperience. The reply furnished by him was not accepted by the bank and a charge-sheet dated 20.26.4.1999 was issued to him alleging various acts of misconduct committed by him. He submitted his reply dated 2.5.2009 and denied the charges. An Enquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the enquiry and the Enquiry Officer submitted his findings in his report dated 30.10.2000 holding that D.M. Parmar is guilty of most of the charges. The disciplinary authority thereafter gave an opportunity to D.M Parmar to make a representation against the findings of the Enquiry Officer and he submitted his representation. The disciplinary authority granted a personal hearing to him to show cause as to why the proposed punishment of dismissal should not be imposed on him. He appeared before the disciplinary authority and prayed that leniency be showed to him. The disciplinary authority, however, passed an order of dismissal dated 6.12.2000.

3. D.M. Parmar then carried an appeal against the order of disciplinary authority. The appeal was dismissed by the appellate authority by order dated 17.2.2001. Aggrieved, he filed a writ petition registered as Special Civil Application No.6260/2001 before the Gujarat High Court. The writ petition was, however, withdrawn on 2.7.2002 by D.M. Parmar to enable him to make a representation to the concerned authority of the bank. He made a representation to the bank against the order of dismissal but the representation was rejected by order dated 6.8.2002.

11. In the result, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and the learned single Judge are set aside and the writ petition filed by D.M. Parmar is dismissed. Accordingly, C.A. No.2093/2007 is allowed and C.A. NO.2094/2007 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Khem Chand vs U.O.I. & Ors

The appellant and two others, namely, Isa Nand Dubey and Satya Deo Giri were tried by the General Court Martial for the murder of Havaldar Ram Phal and Sepoy Jagannath Prasad by shooting them down near village Bhatagaon. The General Court Martial vide its verdict on January 21, 1975 convicted the appellant, Isa Nand Dubey and Satya Deo Giri for the murder of the two above named persons and sentenced them to suffer life imprisonment. The General Court Martial also recommended the dismissal of the appellant and the other two persons from service. The appellant made representation to the Chief of Army Staff against the verdict of the General Court Martial. On February 25, 1975 the Chief of Army Staff rejected the appellant's representation.

The appellant and the other two persons filed 2 separate Writ Petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and challenged the order of the General Court Martial dated January 21, 1975 and the order of the Chief of Army Staff confirming the verdict of the General Court Martial. The Writ Petition filed by Isa Nand Dubey was allowed by the Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court on April 6, 1978 and the order of the General Court Martial as well as the order of the Chief of Army Staff were set aside. The Writ Petition filed by Satya Deo Giri was also allowed by the High Court of Allahabad on October 11, 2002 and the impugned orders therein were set aside. Insofar as the appellant's Writ Petition is concerned, that was allowed by the learned Single Judge on February 10, 2003. The learned Single Judge quashed the order of the General Court Martial dated January 21, 1975 and the order of the Chief of Army Staff dated February 25, 1975.

The Civil Appeals are, accordingly, allowed; the order of the Division Bench dated December 16, 2003 is set aside and Special Appeal (No.198/2003) -Union of India & Ors. Vs. Khem Chand is restored to the file of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for proceeding afresh with the matter in accordance with law along with Appeal preferred by the Union of India against the order dated 11th October, 2002 in 4 the matter of Satya Deo Giri. No costs.

22ND SEPTEMBER, 2011
A.B.Bhaskara Rao vs Inspector Of Police,Cbi Vishakpatnam

2) Brief facts:

(d) On the same day, (PW-1) reported the matter in writing to the Inspector of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation (in short `the CBI), Vijayawada. On 14.11.1997, a trap was laid by the CBI officials along with panchas and when the accused 3 demanded and accepted a sum of Rs.200/- as illegal gratification, he was caught red handed along with the money which was recovered from the right hand side pocket of his pant.

(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine."

SEPTEMBER 23, 2011 2