L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Inspector Of Police ... vs Surya Sankaram Karri

The respondent was an Assistant Station Master. He was working in the South Eastern Railway, Vizianagaram, Andhra Pradesh from 16.12.1961 to February, 1984. He was promoted to the post of Commercial Inspector and was working in that capacity from February, 1984 to July, 1986 and as Senior Commercial Inspector from July, 1986 to December, 1993. He was later promoted as Chief Commercial Inspector and was working in the said capacity from December, 1993. His wife, Smt. K.S. Satyeswari, who examined herself as D.W.1, was an income tax assessee. All the three sons of the respondent had been working. A raid was conducted in his house and also in the houses of his sons. Some incriminating documents were allegedly recovered.

During investigation, not only the statement of the respondent, but also that of his wife and three sons were recorded by the Investigating Officer. The investigation was admittedly carried on by P.W.41 Shri K. Biswal and P.W.42 Shri N. Vishnu. Sanction of prosecution was accorded by P.W. 37 Shri Debaraj Panda, the then Senior Divisional Commercial Manager, South-Eastern Railway.

The check period under consideration was 1.1.1986 to 9.8.1994. The prosecution proceeded on the basis that whereas the total income of the respondent and his family members was Rs.6,73,203.69p. including loans and advances during the aforesaid check period, the respondent and his family members had expended Rs.3,31,068.75p.; and acquired assets both movable and immovable worth Rs.11,66,873.84p. during the said period. It was also alleged that respondent was in possession of assets and pecuniary resources in his own name as also in the name of his wife to the tune of Rs.6,54,738.90p., which was disproportionate to his known sources of income as on 9.8.1994.

Before the learned Special Judge the respondent examined defence witnesses, including his wife (D.W.1), his three sons, namely, Shri Karri Satyanarayana Sarma (D.W.2), Shri K. Srinivas (D.W.3), Shri K. Rama Sarma (D.W.4) and one Engineer, D.W.5 Shri A. Sridhar, who submitted his report in regard to valuation of respondent's house.

When a sanction is granted by a person not authorized in law, the same being without jurisdiction, would be a nullity.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment need not be interfered with. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
Sandeep Subhash Parate vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

Indisputably, the Caste Scrutiny Committee constituted in terms of the decision of this Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil & Anr. vs. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development & Ors. [(1994) 6 SCC 241] invalidated the caste certificate granted in favour of the appellant. In the writ petition filed by him thereagainst, an interim order was passed in his favour, in terms whereof he obtained admission in the course of Bachelor of Engineering (Instrumentation Engineering) in the Government Engineering College, Pune, which is affiliated to the respondent No.4-University. The High Court allowed the writ petition and remitted the matter back to the Scrutiny Committee. His claim was rejected by the Scrutiny Committee by an order dated 30th September, 2002. In a writ petition filed by him before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court questioning the said order of 30th September, 2002, no interim relief was granted, but, the appellant continued with his studies. The said writ petition was dismissed for default, but, it was restored. He completed his studies in the year 2004. He appeared at the examination. An application was filed by him for a direction to respondent No.4-University to supply him the degree along with the marksheet. However, in the meantime, the writ petition itself was dismissed on merits. Thus, no order was also passed on the said application. The review application filed by the appellant herein has been dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned order.

The appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned hereinbefore and on the aforementioned terms. No costs.
Kishori Lal vs Sales Officer, District Land ...

The District Land Development Bank (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bank') situated at Tikamgarh in the State of Madhya Pradesh is a Co- operative Society registered under the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 ('the 1960 Act', for short). Its functions are regulated by M.P. Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Adhiniyam, 1966 ('the 1966 Act', for short). The appellant herein was an agriculturist. He obtained a sum of Rs.6,473.69p. by way of loan from the said Co-operative Society on three different occasions. The break-up of the amount of loan taken by him for three different purposes is as under :

By way of security of loan so taken, he had mortgaged with the Bank his agricultural holdings comprising in Khasra Nos. 430, 431, 432, 435, 437, 439, 441, 442, 443, 444, 446 and 447 measuring 10.59 acres. Allegedly, he failed to repay the said amount of loan. Recovery proceedings were, therefore, initiated against him by the Bank. On the date when the loan was taken, the appellant was a minor. The lands mortgaged to the Bank were sold. A sale certificate was issued in the name of auction purchaser Smt. Chandrakanta Devi. An appeal preferred by him thereagainst before the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhopal, was dismissed by an order dated 30.5.1986. A second appeal before the Board of Revenue, however, succeeded. The Sales Officer, District Land Development Bank filed a writ petition before the High Court aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith which, by reason of the impugned judgment, has been allowed.

The contentions of the appellant, which found favour with the Board of Revenue, are as under :-.

a) No notice of auction was served upon the him;

However, with a view to do complete justice between the parties, in our considered opinion, the appellant should be directed to deposit the entire auction money with interest thereupon @6% per annum. This order is being passed by us under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Such amount should be deposited within eight weeks from this date before respondent No.1, Sales Officer. On such deposit being made, the auction shall stand set aside and the possession of the property shall be restored to the appellant herein. However, in the event the appellant fails and/or neglects to deposit the said amount within the aforementioned period, these appeals shall stand dismissed.

The appeals are allowed with the aforementioned directions. No costs.
Bihar State Financial Corpn. & Ors vs M/S. Chemicot India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors

The 1st respondent herein had set up a small scale industrial unit. The appellant herein is an establishment constituted under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. An application for sanction of loan in the Corporation was submitted by the respondent-Company. It was approved. The necessary agreements for loan were executed in terms whereof the properties of the 1st respondent were mortgaged.

It was decided to expand the existing unit and procure some machinery therefor. The Respondent also placed orders for other and further equipments/machinery necessary for expansion of the said scheme. Allegedly, the Managing director of the Corporation visited the 1st respondent's factory on 29.1.1988 and having satisfied himself that there existed justification for expansion of the capacity utilization had agreed to sanction an additional term loan to the tune of Rs.15 lakhs on terms and conditions mentioned therein, some of which are as under :

The agreement was registered on 31.3.1988, although no D.G.T.D. Certificate had been furnished. According to the 1st respondent, its unit being a small one, furnishing of such certificate was not necessary and in any event, the same was not granted by the authorities concerned. The Corporation refused to advance any amount on the terms that the 1st respondent had failed to furnish the said certificate, which according to it was necessary.

We, therefore, in the peculiar facts if this case, are of the opinion that it would be futile to issue a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the Corporation to pay the aforementioned amount of Rs.15 lakhs to the respondent-Company. We may, however, hasten to add that we have not gone into the question as to whether the respondent-Company had paid any amount to the Corporation as against the loan amount which had admittedly been received by it. If the respondent-Company had not done so, the Corporation may take such steps in relation thereto, as it may be advised in this behalf but it goes without saying that it would be open to the respondent-Company to raise such contentions, including the payment of additional subsidy to it and/or effect thereof in the proceedings, which may be initiated by the Corporation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly.

The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations. No costs.
General Manager, Vijaya Bank & Anr vs Pramod Kumar Gupta

The appellant before us is the General Manager of Vijaya Bank. The respondent was employed in the bank as a clerk. According to the bank, he abstained from duty without any leave application on 12.09.1991. On 13.05.1992, the bank issued notice directing him to report for duty in 30 days time. On 11.06.1992, the respondent reported back to duty. Within ten days, i.e., on 21.06.1992, the respondent again abstained from duty without any prior intimation. On 08.09.1992, the bank issued second notice to the respondent. A copy of the said notice was also pasted on the notice board. The said notice dt.08.09.1992 was received by the respondent on 14.09.1992. According to the respondent, when he reports for duty on 12.10.1992, he was not permitted by the bank since he has not joined duty on 08.10.1992, i.e., within 30 days from 08.09.1992. The respondent after four years raised a dispute on 01.04.1996. He protested against the termination. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal in para 12 of its order has held as under :-

We, therefore, remit the matter to the High Court to consider the question of payment of back wages for the period in question. We request the High Court to consider the matter afresh on the question of back wages only. The appellant bank is also free to hold any departmental enquiry against the respondent-workman for his absence from duty during the relevant period. Since the matter is remitted to the High Court on the question of back wages only, the respondent will not be entitled for payment of any back wages during the period in question which will depend upon the ultimate order that may be passed by the High Court. The order passed by the High Court ordering reinstatement shall stand.

It is stated by Dr.R.G.Padia, learned senior counsel that the respondent has availed some loan from the bank for the purpose of purchasing a residential house. It is also stated that he has committed default in payment of instalments of the said loan to the bank. Since the matter is remitted back to the High Court, he requested this Court to direct the bank not to sell the residential house for non-payment of the instalments of the loan availed by him for the purpose of residential house till the High Court takes final decision. The request is accepted. It is ordered accordingly. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part as indicated above. No costs.
Falcon Retreat Pvt. Ltd. & Another vs Edc Ltd. & Ors

It appears from the letter of February 6, 2006 addressed to Managing Director of Respondent No.1 that the offer referred to in the letter of the Petitioner dated January 18, 2006 related to M/s Condor Polymeric. By its letter of February 6, 2006, Condor Polymeric made a formal offer to the Managing Director of Respondent No.1. This is an event subsequent to the filing of the Writ Petition.

The High Court by its impugned judgment and order dismissed the writ petition holding that Respondent No.1 had already entered into an agreement with Respondent No.3 for the sale of the assets for a sum of Rs.12.99 crores and, therefore, there was no question of the same being cancelled or set aside since it represented a concluded contract between the parties.

The Special Leave Petition, is therefore, dismissed. Consequently the interim order dated March 27, 2006 stands vacated.
M/S. Abdul Gaffar Abdul Rehman vs M/S.Shivnath Rai Harnarain (I) Ltd.& ...

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3657 OF 2006 (@ SLP(C)NO.2081-2082 of 2005) This appeal was again filed by M/s. Abdul Gaffar Abdul Rehman against the interim order dated 24.9.2004 passed by the High Court of Delhi in I.A. Nos.3966 & 6239 of 2004 in OMP No.300 of 2001. By the said order the High Court, after hearing all the respective parties, allowed the application filed by M/s. Shivnath Rai Harnarain (I) Ltd. for payment of excise and other dues. By the said order, the Registry of the High Court was directed to prepare two cheques, one in the sum of Rs.19,70,064/- in the name of the Excise Department, Yamunagar and another for Rs.2,33,800/- in the name of the Excise Department, Dehradun. The High Court also made it clear that the payment will be without prejudice to the rights and pleas of the parties in regard to their respective claims.

The appeals are accordingly disposed of with no orders as to costs.
Director General,Directorate General ... vs Anand Patwardhan & Anr

On 11.7.2003, the Prasar Bharati Board pre-viewed the documentary film and was of the opinion that the documentary film contained scenes which could promote violence, its production quality was unsatisfactory and its telecast would be violative of the policy of the Doordarshan of not screening "A" certified movies. This decision of Doordarshan was communicated to the respondent no.1 on 18.7.2003.

A contempt petition was filed by respondent no.1 alleging the disobedience of the order of the High Court dated 12.12.2001. The High Court disposed off the petition by holding that the respondent was aggrieved of the decision of Prasar Bharati Board, and it was open to him to challenge the same before an appropriate forum.

CONCLUSION:
M. Meenakshi & Ors vs Metadin Agarwal (D) By Lrs. & Ors

4. Mrs. Sharafunisa 281.62 718.38 You are advised to submit a plan showing the built up area and vacant land, as shown above, to be retained by you, as per prescribed ceiling limit."

In this case, we are concerned with a situation where the sanction, it will bear repetition to state, has expressly been refused.

The findings of the Division Bench, in our considered opinion, therefore, cannot be sustained.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall pay and bear their own costs.
Om Prakash Mann vs Director Of Education (Basic) And Ors.

Few facts may be noted:

With regard to the first ground, as noticed above, in the charges framed on 1.2.1989 he was called upon to submit a reply within three weeks from the receipt of chargesheet. It appears that he had replied to the charges on 17.2.1989 but no ground was taken that the chargesheet was vague and he was unable to effectively give reply to the charges. The appellant also participated in the disciplinary proceedings without demur and he is now estopped from raising such issue.

For the reasons aforestated, this appeal being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.
Defiance Knitting Industries Pvt. Ltd vs Jay Arts

The factual background in a nutshell are as follows:

2,07,11,475/-, out of which, an amount of Rs.1,08,29,989/- was received. The correspondences brought on record show that the meeting was held between the parties and the issue regarding incomplete work, payments and final settlement were discussed by them in the meeting as is clear from the letter addressed by the writ Petitioner dated 20.11.1998 to its Architect Mr. Qutub Mandviwala. Reference was made to possible dates for final discussion and settlement of the dues. During this period, the contractor and the Architect should discuss and settle all the payments etc. after completing the jobs as agreed.

The High Court felt that the trial court ought to have given proper reasons in support of the impugned order. But it was observed that the correspondences between the parties does show that the application submitted by the writ petitioner could not be allowed and the discretion exercised by the trial court granting leave to defend conditionally i.e. on total deposit of Rs.70,00,000/- cannot be termed to be perverse or totally erroneous. Four years had passed from the filing of the claim before the trial court and the original claim was Rs.98,81,426.63/-. As noted above writ petition was dismissed.

(3) The defendant shall not defend the suit referred to in sub rule (1) unless he enters an appearance and in default of his entering an appearance the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree for any sum, not exceeding the sum mentioned in the summons, together with interest at the rate specified, if any, up to the date of the decree and such sum for costs as may be determined by the High Court from time to time by rules made in that behalf and such decree may be executed forthwith.]

The stand of the appellant that the maximum deposit that could have been directed was fixed at Rs.20,00,000/- is on a sound footing. The order of the trial court as well as that of the High Court cannot be maintained. However as an interim measure by order dated 26.9.2005 this Court has stayed the operation of the High Court's order subject to deposit of Rs.20,00,000/-. It is stated that the deposit has already been made. Though we have held the trial Court's order and the High Court's order are not sustainable, the amount deposited pursuant to this Court's order need not be refunded. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the matter and make effort for its expeditious disposal.

Appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.
Surinder Singh Alias Chhinda And Anr vs State Of Punjab

Thereafter, accused Raja Singh, Surinder Singh and Amarjit Singh gave fist and slap blows to the complainant. Complainant raised a hue and cry. Accused persons fled away from there. Amarjit Singh son of Ram Singh, Ved Parkash and the complainant then took deceased to Civil Hopsital, Morinda, but his life could not be saved.

The motive for the commission of the offence was that some days earlier, Narinder Singh @ Nita had teased the complainant's daughter Nirmla Devi. Complainant had reprimanded him and hot words were exchanged between them. Due to this, appellants committed the murder of the deceased. On the basis of this statement, formal FIR, Ex. PJ, was registered on 11.4.1996 at 12.05 A.M. in Police Station Morinda. Special report reached the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rup Nagar on 11.4.1996 at 3.00 A.M. In order to further its case, prosecution examined thirteen witnesses. PWs 8 and 9 were stated to be eye- witnesses. Though PW-9 partially departed from his statement made during investigation, the residue was considered relevant. The trial Court on analysis of the evidence found the accused guilty and convicted the accused persons and sentenced them.

The High Court did not find any substance in the appeal and dismissed the same. Stand before the High Court was that there is no material to find the accused guilty.

Accused Amarjit and Narinder have not preferred any appeal against High Court's judgment. This appeal is by Surinder and Raja.

When the factual scenario is seen the application of Section 34 of the IPC appears to be inappropriate so far murder of the deceased is concerned. In addition, the appellants were not armed. But the evidence is clear that they restrained movement of the deceased when there was a quarrel. There is, however, no definite evidence that the common intention was murder. But the fact that two co- accused were armed with knife and lathi is of relevance and significance. They came together and left together. That being so, the conviction is altered applying the principle set out above. Appropriate conviction will be under Section 304 Part II IPC read with Section 34 IPC. Custodial sentence of seven years would meet the ends of justice.

Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Khalek Shaikh vs State Of West Bengal

The trial found him guilty and convicted him in terms of Section 46A(a)(ii) and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- with default stipulation.

The said order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court at Diamond Harbour, 24 Parganas (South) was maintained by learned Additional Sessions Judge, 6th Court, Alipore, 24 Parganas (South). The High Court also did not find any substance in the revision filed before it and dismissed the same.

The background facts leading to prosecution and culminating in conviction essentially are as follows:

[shall be punishable,-

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Som Dev & Ors vs Rati Ram & Anr

1. This Appeal is by the contesting defendants in a suit filed by Respondent No.1 herein for recovery of possession of the suit property in enforcement of a right of pre-emption claimed by him. The plaintiff claimed that a half share in the suit property had been relinquished in favour of himself and his brother by Sheoram a co-owner with the assignor of the contesting defendants and the said relinquishment had been recognised by the court by decreeing the claim made by the present plaintiff and his brother in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980. Thus, having become a co-owner with the assignor of the contesting defendants, the plaintiff was entitled to enforce a right of pre-emption and recover possession of the property from the assignee of the other co-owner. The contesting defendants resisted the suit. The contention germane to this appeal that was raised by the contesting defendants was that a right was created in the present plaintiff by the decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 which was one based on a compromise and since the decree purported to create a right in the plaintiff in a property in which he had no pre-existing right, the compromise decree required registration in terms of Section 17(1) of the Registration Act and the decree not having been registered, the plaintiff was not entitled to enforce the alleged right of pre-emption as against the contesting defendants or their assignor, the other co-owner.

(Emphasis supplied)

15. We also feel that the tendency, if any, to defeat the law of registration has to be curtailed by the legislature by appropriate legislation. In this instance, we wonder why the Transfer of Property Act is not being extended to the concerned states even now. Its extension would ensure that no transfer is effected without satisfying the requirements of that Act and of the Stamp and Registration Acts.

18. We, thus find no merit in this appeal. We confirm the judgments and decrees under appeal and dismiss this appeal. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
M/S. Sneh Enterprises vs Commnr. Of Customs, New Delhi

Sealed maintenance free lead acid batteries manufactured in Taiwan for being used in Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) were imported by the appellant at Mumbai on 16.4.2002. The goods were trans-shipped from Mumbai to Delhi. The Bill of Entry, however, was filed by the appellant with the customs authorities at Delhi on 22.5.2002.

The Central Government, in exercise of its power thereunder, issued a notification on 22.5.2002 on lead acid batteries, originating in or exported, inter alia8 from Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. The respondents, relying on or on the basis of the said notification directed payment of anti- dumping duty on the said imported goods by the appellant.

Anti-dumping duty would be payable in respect of the goods which have already entered Indian Territory and are warehoused.

For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.