State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Babulal

3. The case on hand, in our considered view, exhibits not only casual, indifferent and perfunctory approach but insensitive attitude adopted by the High Court in awarding sentence on an offender who perpetrated a heinous crime of committing rape on a married woman in broad daylight. The case of the prosecution was that respondent Babulal was residing at village Daulatpur, Tehsil Ikchavaar, District Sehore in Madhya Pradesh. On July 23, 2002, at about 12.00 noon in his own tapri, he criminally intimidated the prosecutrix-PW5, aged about 22 years, a married lady (hereinafter referred to as 'PW5-X')and committed rape on her. According to the prosecution, PW5-X was living with her husband in the house of the accused. On the day of the incident, she was washing a drum on tapri when the accused caught her from behind and threw her on the ground. The prosecutrix- PW5 shouted and resisted, but the accused threatened her with knife and committed rape on her. Even thereafter, he threatened to kill her if she reported the incident to anyone else. In the evening, PW5-X told about sexual assault to her husband and her mother-in-law Dallubai, a blind lady. PW8-Ramcharan, who was the employer of PW7-Shiv Narayan-husband of PW5 was also informed who assured that he would talk to the accused and PW5 should not leave the place due to fear. On the next day, i.e. July 24, 2002, when the elder brother of Shiv Narayan arrived, the prosecutrix (PW5-X) and her husband (PW7) went to the police station, Ikchavaar and lodged a complaint. PW5-X was then sent for medical examination, site plan was prepared and statements of witnesses were recorded. PW5 was medically examined. The accused was also sent for medical examination. It was found that he was absolutely competent to commit sexual intercourse. After completion of usual investigation, charge-sheet was submitted for offences punishable under Section 376 read with Section 506, Part II, Indian Penal Code (IPC). The accused denied the charge. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, he contended that in order to avoid repayment of loan taken from Ramcharan- PW8, the prosecutrix (PW5-X) had falsely implicated him in the case.

5. On sentence, the trial Court heard the accused who prayed for grant of probation which, in our opinion, was rightly refused by the Court. In the light of mandate in sub- section (1) of Section 376, IPC, the trial Court imposed minimum sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.2,500/- (two thousand five hundred). In default of payment of fine, the accused was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months more. The amount of fine was ordered to be paid to the prosecutrix X.

6. The aggrieved accused preferred an appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The learned counsel for the accused did not challenge the finding of conviction but prayed for mercy and leniency in sentence. The learned Judge of the High Court upheld the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant and observed that the accused was initially in custody from September 11, 2002 to October 10, 2002 and again after the pronouncement of the judgment, he was sent to jail on January 23, 2003 till he was enlarged on bail on February 26, 2003. The learned Judge also observed that the accused was an 'illiterate agriculturist from rural area' and fine of Rs.2,500/- was also imposed on him. According to the learned Judge, on the facts of the case, the imprisonment for two months and three days which had already undergone by the accused could be said to be 'just and proper' and accordingly the appeal was partly allowed.

17. In the case on hand, the defence put forward by the respondent-accused was that the husband of the prosecutrix had taken advance money from PW8-Ramcharan-employer towards labour charges and since he had no intention to return the said amount, the prosecutrix falsely implicated the accused in the case. In our considered opinion, the trial Court rightly rejected the defence. Hence, in our opinion, the order of conviction recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court cannot be said to be faulty and conviction of the respondent-accused cannot be said to be illegal.

29. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 376, IPC thus enjoins the Court if it imposes less than the minimum sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment on an offender of rape to record 'adequate and special reasons' in the judgment. Recording of reasons is, therefore, sine qua non or condition precedent for imposing sentence less than the minimum required by law. Moreover, such reasons must be both (i) 'adequate' and (ii) 'special'. What is 'adequate' and 'special' would depend upon several factors and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as a rule of law of universal application.

31. In our judgment, by passing the order impugned in the present appeal and by reducing the sentence imposed on the respondent by the trial Court to the 'period already undergone' which was only two months and three days, the learned Judge of the High Court has committed grave illegality which had resulted in 'miscarriage of justice'. There were no reasons much less 'adequate' and 'special' reasons to reduce the sentence less than the minimum required to be imposed under sub-section (1) of Section 376, IPC. The order is, therefore, liable to be set aside. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the trial Court was wholly right and fully justified in awarding rigorous imprisonment for seven years as envisaged by sub-section (1) of Section 376, IPC and there was no earthly reason to interfere with the said order by the High Court. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be allowed.

32. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal filed by the State is allowed. The order of conviction recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court is upheld. The High Court was, however, wrong in reducing the sentence and the trial Court rightly imposed rigorous imprisonment of seven years on the respondent-accused. We, therefore, restore that part of the order of the trial Court directing the respondent to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years. It goes without saying that the period of sentence already undergone by the respondent-accused will be given set off.

33. Ordered accordingly.