L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
M/S. Craft Interiors Pvt. Ltd vs Commissioner Of Central ...

In pursuance of the above said activities, the appellant also manufactures furniture as part of the above mentioned activities.

The Commissioner vide his order dated 24.9.2003 held that items like storage units, running counters, large reception tables etc. are classifiable under Chapter 9403 as furniture and liable to excise duty. Aggrieved by the said order the appellants filed an appeal to the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore which agreed with the findings of the Commissioner that although these items emerge on a piece by piece fabrication, the commodity is known in the market by name of table, storage counters etc. and as such are classifiable as furniture under Sub- heading 9403 of the Central Excise Tariff as furniture. Aggrieved, the appellants have filed the present appeal.

Several of the items in question in the present case e.g. kitchen overhead and below counters, storage units are, in our opinion, clearly not 'furniture' and hence not excisable under Sub- heading 9403 as furniture.

In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that these appeals have to be allowed. We hold that items which are ordinarily immovable or which ordinarily cannot be removed without cannibalizing e.g. storage units, running counters, over- head unit, rear and side unit, wall unit, pantry unit, kitchen unit and other items which are ordinarily immovable or cannot be removed without cannibalizing are not furniture. However, items like tables, desks, chairs etc. are furniture and hence excisable.

Similarly, the word `furniture' has a meaning in common parlance which every layman understands. It commonly refers to chairs, desks, tables, beds, etc. Hence we should give it this popular meaning.

* The appeals are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal to pass a fresh order after hearing the parties preferably within three months from the date of receipt of this order, in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. No costs.
Manish Ratan & Ors vs State Of M.P. & Anr

Appellant No. 1 was married with Meena, Respondent No. 2 herein at Niwari, Distt. Tikangarh. They were living at their matrimonial home at Jabalpur. Allegedly, a complaint was lodged by father-in-law of Appellant No. 1 with the police station, Jabalpur on 19.04.1997 alleging that the appellants have been ill-treating his daughter and demanded dowry.

Meena allegedly lodged another First Information Report against the appellants at the Police Station, Datia on 25.05.1997 whereupon a criminal case was registered. In the said complaint, the place of incident was said to have taken place in House No. 151, Adarsh Nagar Narbada Road, Jabalpur. The period during which the incident took place was said to be before November, 1995 till 25.08.1997. It was alleged:

The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.

Our attention was drawn to the fact that no criminal case was lodged at Jabalpur. Our attention was further drawn to the fact that the investigation of the case is complete.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that, interest of justice would be subserved, while setting aside the order of the High Court, if in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur. We accordingly do so.

Although the complainant has filed an application before us for impleading herself as a party, nobody has appeared on her behalf. We, therefore, direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to issue notice to her. Keeping in view of the fact that Respondent No. 2 is residing at Datia, we would request the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to accommodate her in the matter of fixing the date (s) of hearing as far as possible.

The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.
Shri Shekhar Ghosh vs Union Of India & Anr

Appellant was appointed as Khalasi at Kota Railway Station of Western Railway Administration in the year 1981. On 8th February, 1985, he was promoted as a Junior Clerk. A test was conducted by Chief Works Manager (Wagon Repair Shop) of Western Railway, Kota. He qualified in the same test. The Western Railways Administration started one Railway Electrification Project and he was transferred thereto in September 1985. While working there as a Junior Clerk, he was promoted as a Senior Clerk on 24.4.1987 on an ad hoc basis. On completion of the project, he was repatriated to his original office. Although he was posted in the office of the Kota Railway Station of Western Railway Administration, he was kept in the said workshop. A request for change of his name was agreed to by the competent authority, namely, the second Respondent herein and his request for absorption on the said post was also accepted.

Appellant filed an Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The operation of the order was stayed by an interim order dated 1.11.1996. However, by an order dated 17.11.1996, the Administrative Tribunal noticing that his name in the seniority list had been included by way of mistake, it was opined that there was no illegality or infirmity in the action taken in repatriating the appellant.

A Writ Petition filed by Appellant questioning the said order had been dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court by an order dated 26.10.2004. The High Court arrived at its findings, inter alia, on the premise that a finding of fact had been recorded by the Tribunal that Appellant had been holding the post of a Clerk on regular basis was accepted under a mistake, holding:-

The Tribunal or the High Court did not consider these aspects of the matter. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained.

For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.
Regional Manager, Sbi vs Mahatma Mishra

Inter alia on the premise that the respondent was engaged as temporary messenger which, according to the Labour Court, was not of a casual nature but of permanent one and, furthermore, having regard to the fact that he was appointed on 3.5.1982 and his services were terminated on 3.9.1982, it was opined that unfair labour practice had been resorted to by the management. The Labour Court further noticed that one Basudeo was appointed after termination of the services of the respondent. The Labour Court inter alia held that as no written notice was served on the respondent before terminating his services, the same was illegal and upon referring to the bipartite settlement by and between the Bank and the workmen, it was held:

Furthermore, the High Court, in our opinion, committed a serious error in passing an order only on the basis of sympathy although it was held that the respondent was not entitled to any relief.
State Of U.P. & Ors vs Harihar Bhole Nath

3. The aforesaid officer Shri Harihar Bholenath Misra will submit his written explanation, in his defence, to the Enquiry Officer, within the period prescribed by the said Enquiry Officer.

A writ petition came to be filed by Respondent questioning the said order of recovery dated 7.1.2000, which was dismissed by an order dated 19.7.2000 on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. He filed an original application before the U.P. State Public Services Tribunal, which by reason of an order dated 18.1.2002 was dismissed. A writ petition questioning the said order of the Tribunal was filed by Respondent in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in March 2002, which was registered as Writ Petition No.435/2002. The respondent made the following prayers therein :

Provided that in cases where the authority sanctioning pension is other than the appointing authority, no order regarding reduction in the amount of pension shall be made without the approval of the appointing authority. Note: For the purpose of this Article 'appointing authority' shall mean the authority which is competent to make substantive appointment to the post or service from which the officer concerned retires."

It was opined that the State is competent to direct reduction in pension after affording hearing to the Government Servant.

But the said Rules read with the Proviso and the Explanation appended thereto construed in their entirety clearly postulate that the proceeding initiated before the delinquent officer reached his age of superannuation would be valid.

By order of his Excellency Governor, Sd/- T.P. Arya (illegible) Principal Secretary"

Such is not the position herein. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, as the other contentions raised by Respondent have not been determined in the writ petition, the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration on the merit in respect of the other contentions raised by Respondent.

No costs.
Shyamali Das vs Illa Chowdhry & Ors

The appellant filed a suit bearing suit No. 57 of 2001 claiming title over the said property on 7.09.2001 in the Court of 9th Civil Judge, Sr. Division inter alia for passing a decree for mandatory injunction restraining the defendants therein from taking any money from the Land Acquisition Collector and for declaration that the appellant was the rightful owner of the properties described in the Schedule appended thereto and also for a decree for recovery of possession. The said suit is still pending.

Although an award had been made, the appellant filed two applications, one under Sections 11 and 11-A of the Act on 5.08.2004 before the Collector and another under Sections 5 and 5-A thereof objecting to the acquisition of the land thereby. Concededly, the said applications were not maintainable at that stage.

The applications filed by Respondent No. 1 under Article 227 were allowed by reason of the impugned judgment.

We may also notice that prima facie the appellant cannot be said to have any right title and interest in the property but we do not intend to express our final opinion thereupon as the matter is pending consideration before the Civil Court.

A disputant is entitled to an interim order, provided he is a party thereto. If for one reason or the other, he cannot be impleaded as a party to the proceeding, the Court would have no jurisdiction to pass any interim order in his favour.

If the impleadment application was not maintainable, it was, required to be dismissed in limine. It could not have been entertained only for pressing an interim order. Law does not contemplate exercise of such a jurisdiction by a court of law. Any such order passed is coram non judice.

We, therefore, do not find any merit in this appeal. However, before parting with this matter, we may only observe that although contention of Mr. Ghosh is that the civil suit was not maintainable in view of a decision of this Court in Laxmi Chand & Ors. v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia & Ors. [JT 1995 (8) SC 195], it is not necessary for us to express any opinion thereupon. We may furthermore place on record that a contention has been raised by Mr. Ghosh that the suit has been dismissed. We in this matter are not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the said statement.

For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 10,000/-.
Vithal vs State Of Maharashtra

The prosecution in support of its case examined ten witnesses.

PW-5 Jalinder was said to be an eye-witness. He, however, did not support the prosecution case wholly. He was declared hostile. The learned Sessions Judge, while discarded the dying declarations as contained in Exhibits 19, 25 and 32 in arriving at a conclusion that the appellant was guilty of commission of murder of said Vishwanath, relied upon the dying declaration dated 27.11.1991 (Ex. 34). The reasons assigned for discarding the said dying declarations were:

The High Court, however, held the said dying declarations to be reliable. It upheld the judgment of the learned Trial Judge holding the appellant to be guilty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.

For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
B. Noha vs State Of Kerala And Anr

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Coming to the question of sentence, it is to be noted that the minimum sentence for offence relatable to Section 7 is six months while that relatable to Section 13(1)(d) is one year. Considering the nature of the accusations, it would be appropriate to reduce the sentence to the minimum prescribed under the statute. In other words it shall be six months and one year respectively to run concurrently. The amount of fine is also reduced to Rs.10,000/- with default stipulation of six months rigorous imprisonment.

The appeal is dismissed except to the extent of modification of sentence as noted above.
M/S Hotel Kings & Ors vs Sara Farhan Lukmani & Ors

Leave granted in both the special leave petitions. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in both the special leave petitions are the owners of a plot of land measuring about 2739.50 sq.yds. bearing survey No. 37, situated at Juhu, Greater Bombay. The said land was leased to one M/s.H. Bloch Engineering Pvt. Ltd. by a registered deed of lease dated 3rd November, 1966. By a deed of assignment dated 8th June, 1970, the said lessee transferred and assigned the demised property to M/s. Yashdhir Hotels Pvt. Ltd., a company registered under the Companies Act. The original lease was for 98 years commencing from 1st November, 1966. By virtue of the deed of assignment dated 8th June, 1970, M/s.Yashdhir Hotels Pvt. Ltd. became the lessee of the said land for the unexpired period of the lease and became a tenant under the respondent Nos. 1 to 4. The lease rent was initially fixed at Rs.3,215/- per month, but was thereafter increased to Rs.3,450/- per month. As M/s. Yashdhir Hotels Pvt. Ltd. defaulted in payment of rent for more than six months, the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 issued a notice dated 1st February, 1983 to M/s. Yashdhir Hotels Pvt. Ltd.. It appears that on receipt of the notice, M/s. Yashdhir Hotels Pvt. Ltd. tendered rent to the lessors for a period of fourteen months but the same was refused as the same did not constitute the entire arrears of rent payable by the lessees. It was also the claim of the lessors that the lessee had unlawfully sublet the demised property.

The lessors preferred an appeal against the said order of the learned trial judge which was numbered as Appeal No.76/1997. In the appeal, the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, came to a conclusion that the rent for the demised premises was payable every month and not after six months as held by the trial court. Holding further that the notice terminating the defendants' tenancy was legal and valid, the appellate court decreed the suit for possession on the ground mentioned in Section 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent Act.

The argument advanced on behalf of the lessee that notwithstanding the said stipulation, since the lessee was required to pay the rates and taxes which formed part of the permitted increase and was, therefore, a part of the rent payable, does not appeal to us. The consequential submission made in this regard that since the rates and taxes were payable either annually or after every six months, and the same formed part of the rent, it must be held that the rents were payable not each month but after every six months, does not also appeal to us.

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP ) No.7400/06 is, therefore, dismissed, while Civil Appeal arising out of SLP ) No. 7186/06 is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court as well as High Court is affirmed as far as Civil Appeal arising out of SLP ) 7400/06 is concerned, and is set aside as far as it relates to the appellants in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP ) 7186/06.

In the facts of the case, the parties will bear their respective costs.
Raythara Sahakari Bank Ltd vs Chandrakala R. Das

Background facts giving rise to the present appeal in a nutshell are as follows:

delivery of gold ornaments amounting to Rs.25,000/- and litigation expenses of Rs.10,000/-. On 28.5.2004, the appellant-Bank filed its statement of defence and denied its liability to pay the amount with interest. There was no default of service and non-delivery of the jewel was on account of the admitted theft in the Bank for which criminal case has been instituted and insurance claim has been lodged. Subsequently, the appellant-Bank filed an affidavit before the District Forum stating that it is willing to pay at the rate fixed for all the jewel loan borrowers. The District Forum held that the value of the gold was to be computed at the rate of Rs.573/- per gram which was the claim, though the price of gold prevailing on the date of order was Rs.593/- per gram. Accordingly, it was held that value of gold payable was Rs.67,041/-. Appellant preferred an appeal before the State Forum which by a short order held that there was no illegality or irregularity in the order of the District Forum and if there was any insurance policy covering the theft, it was open to the appellant-Bank to lodge a claim and pursue the remedy available. The revision petition filed before the National Commission as noted supra was dismissed.

Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
Jagannath Amin vs Seetharama (Dead) By Lrs. And Ors

Challenge before the High Court was to the order passed by learned First Additional Civil Judge, Junior Division, Mangalore, holding that Section 35(1) of the Karnataka Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act, 1958 (in short the 'Act') was applicable and not Section 35(2) of the said Act in a suit for partition relating to agricultural land. Originally the suit was filed by the appellant's mother. She had filed the suit for partition of the scheduled property claiming that the same should be divided into two equal shares by meets and bounds through the process of Court. Plaintiff had filed suit under Section 7(2)(d) of the Act and paid court fee of Rs.200/- under Section 35(2) of the Act. Four defendants filed written statement. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 also filed written statement separately. After hearing the appellant, learned First Additional Civil Judge framed several issues on 19.12.1998. Appellant contended before the trial court that being a co- owner under the law she is presumed to be in constructive possession of the property and as such court fee is to be paid on the deemed market value and not on actual market value. Plaint scheduled property being agricultural property as such court fee is valued under Section 7(2)(d) of the Act and she cannot be compelled to value the said under Section 35(1) of the Act being a co-owner in respect of the plaint scheduled property along with the defendants. Defendants took the stand that the property is not agricultural property and is a house site and as such court fee under Section 35(1) of the Act is to be paid on the actual market value and not on deemed market value.

The order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.
State Of Kerala vs Kurissum Moottil Antony

To further the prosecution version, 11 witnesses were examined. The accused pleaded innocence. On consideration of the evidence on record, learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, found the accused guilty and convicted and sentenced as aforesaid noted. An appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, Kelpetta did not bring any relief to the accused. Revision was filed before the High Court which by the impugned order set aside the order of conviction and sentence. The primary ground on which the High Court directed acquittal was the absence of corroboration and alleged suppression of a report purported to have been given before the FIR in question was lodged.

Appeal is allowed.
Chairman, U.P.Jal Nigam & Anr vs Jaswant Singh & Anr

All these respondents are the employees of the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam ( hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Nigam') and they were retired on attaining the age of superannuation at 58 years. Some of them filed writ petitions in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad challenging the retirement of the employees of the Nigam on attaining the age of 58 years whereas the State Government employees were allowed to continue up to the age of 60 years and therefore, they should also be allowed to continue up to the age of 60 years. The writ petitions filed before the High Court failed and against that Civil Appeal No.7840 of 2002 and batch of other appeals were filed before this Court. This Court disposed of the case of Harwindra Kumar along with other appeals and held that employees of Nigam are entitled to continue up to 60 years. This has been reported in (2005) 13 SCC 300. The operative portion of the said judgment reads as under :

It is submitted that contempt petitions were filed before the High Court. In view of the order passed in this batch of appeals, the contempt petitions will not survive and the same are dismissed.
Jaswant Singh Gill vs M/S. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors

A chargesheet was issued against him on the allegation of shortage of stock of coal in Lodna area of Respondent No. 1. During pendency of the departmental proceeding, the appellant was allowed to retire. He applied for payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short "the Act") in the year 1998 which was denied. He, therefore, filed an application before the Additional Labour Commissioner, Dhanbad for payment of gratuity on 4.01.2000. Notices having been issued by the said authority, Respondent No. 1 filed reply thereto inter alia contending that the gratuity amount payable to the appellant had been withheld for the purpose of making of adjustment, in the event recovery from the said amount is directed to be made in the disciplinary proceedings. The controlling authority on the said premise allowed the disciplinary authority to proceed in the matter. Upon conclusion of the departmental enquiry, the disciplinary authority by an order dated 5.07.2000 opined:

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The appellant shall also be entitled to costs. The counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/-.