L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Jagdish Chand Sharma vs Narain Singh Saini (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors

1. The genesis of the lingering dissension in the instant proceeding lies in the Will claimed by the appellant herein to have been executed on 22-10- 1973 by Nathu Singh (since deceased), the predecessor in the interest of the respondents, thereby bequeathing the property mentioned therein to him (appellant). The judgment and order dated 15-05-2007 passed in P C No. 249/1980 (re-numbered as PC No. 160/2006), by the District Judge, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi, granting Letter of Administration to him, has been reversed by the High Court of Delhi by its judgment and order dated 02-07- 2014 rendered in FAO No. 279 of 2007 as assailed herein.

3. A brief outline of the pleaded facts would portray the rival orientations. The appellant, to reiterate, filed an application under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act 1925 (for short hereinafter referred to as the Act) with the Will annexed, seeking grant of Letter of Administration. He stated that the Will had been executed by Mr. Nathu Singh on 22-10-1973, as the sole and absolute owner amongst others of Municipal House Tax No. 807 (Private No. A/152 to A/162/1) situated at Sukhdev Nagar, Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi, bequeathing the same to him. The appellant stated that the testator nursed great love and affection for him for the services rendered by him and was not favourably disposed towards his sons for their disagreeable conduct and activities. It was mentioned that the testator expired on 02-08-1980 at Delhi whereafter, Shri Harswaroop Sharma, resident of 41, Subhash Market, Kotla Mubarkpur, informed him to receive the Will lying in his custody. It was, thereafter, according to the appellant that the application for Letter of Administration was filed. In the petition, he averred the names and particulars of the sons and daughters of the deceased testator and disclosed further that the subject matter of the Will was located in New Delhi. That the Will was executed and made in Delhi was also mentioned. The appellant did provide and sign a verification declaring the correctness of the statements made therein. Further another verification subscribed by Mr. G. C. Kumar, Advocate, Delhi in the capacity of an attesting witness to the Will, was also made.

4. On the receipt of the notice of the proceedings registered on this petition, objections were filed by Mr. Jaswant Singh (since deceased) son of the testator and also by his other sons and daughters separately. For the sake of brevity the substance of the objections registered by the children of the testator would be synopsised.

47. In the wake of the determinations made herein above, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the challenge laid in the instant appeal lacks in merit.

48. The High Court, in our estimate, has appropriately appreciated the law and the facts in the right perspective and the impugned decision does not call for any interference. The appeals are dismissed.

49. No cost.
M/S. Coal Handlers Pvt. Ltd vs Commnr. Of Central Excise, Kolkata

On the facts of the present case, we find that none of the aforesaid activities are performed by the appellant. There is no role of the appellant in getting the coal cleared from the collieries/ supplier of the coal. Movement of the coal is under the contract of sale between the coal company and Ambuja companies. Even the coal is loaded on to the railway wagons by the coal company. The goods are not under any legal detention from which they need to be freed by the appellant. Not only this, destination of the goods is known to the coal company and the railway rakes are placed by the coal company for the said destinations. The destination is the factories of the principal itself, namely, Ambuja companies, where the coal is to be delivered by the coal company as per pre- determined/agreed covenants between them. Therefore, there is no occasion for Ambuja companies to instruct the appellant to dispatch/forward the goods to a particular destination which is already fixed as per the contract between the coal company and the Ambuja companies. The appellant does not even undertake any loading operation. The primary job of the appellant, as per the contract between the appellant and the Ambuja companies, is of supervising and liaisoning with the coal company as well as the Railways to see that the material required by Ambuja companies is loaded as per the schedule. At no stage custody of the coal is taken by the appellant or transportation of the coal, as forwarders, is arranged by the appellant. We are, thus, of the clear opinion that the services rendered by the appellant would not qualify as C&F Agent within the meaning of Section 65(25) of the Act.

Let us, therefore, examine whether services rendered by the appellant would qualify it as C&F Agent?

In view of the aforesaid discussion, the appeals are allowed and the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal are set aside by quashing the demand of service tax made from the appellants.

No costs.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9967 OF 2014 The Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata, is aggrieved by the orders dated August 21, 2013 passed by the High Court of Calcutta, which has dismissed the appeal of the Revenue by the impugned judgment, refusing to entertain the said appeal which was preferred by the Revenue against orders dated April 02, 2013 passed by CESTAT. In the said appeal before the CESTAT, it had taken the view, in the case of same appellant, that the appellant was not liable to pay any service tax as it was not covered by the definition of C&F Agent as contained in Section 65(25) of the Act. The appeal preferred by the Revenue was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that Civil Appeal No. 5159 of 2013 is pending in this Court. Since the said appeal of the appellant is allowed by us, as a consequence, this appeal warrants to be dismissed and it is ordered accordingly.

No costs.

MAY 05, 2015.

[1] 2002 (145) ELT 222 [2] 2006 (3) STR 321 (Tri.-LB) :: 2006 (110) ECC 634 :: 2006 ECR 634 Tri Delhi
Kirshna Texport & Capital Markets Ltd vs Ila A Agrawal & Ors

2. On 14.09.1996 a notice under Section 138 of the ‘Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881’(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) was issued on behalf of the appellant to M/S Indo French Bio Tech Enterprises Ltd (‘the Company’ for short). The notice stated that a cheque bearing No. 364776 dated 8.9.1996 drawn by the Company on Dena Bank, New Marine Lines, Mumbai in favour of the appellant was returned on 10.9.1996 with endorsement “funds insufficient”. The notice therefore called upon the addressee to make the payment of the cheque amount within 15 days of the receipt of such notice. No reply was sent to the aforesaid notice dated 14.9.1996.

3. The appellant thereafter filed Complaint Case No. 243/S/1996 before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 5th Court at Dadar, Mumbai against the Company, Mr. K.J. Bodiwala, the Chairman and Managing Director of the Company and 11 other directors including respondents 1 and 2. In so far as the directors are concerned, it was averred that they were in-charge of the business of the Company and its day to day affairs and were liable. During the pendency of said complaint case, the process issued against Accused Nos. 3 to 5, 7, 9 to 13 was recalled and due to the death of Mr. Bodiwala the proceedings as against him also abated, which left the Company and the present respondents 1 and 2 namely Ms. Ila A. Agrawal and Mr. Prafulla Ranadive, Accused Nos. 6 and 8 respectively in the array of accused.

4. It was submitted by the appellant that separate notices to the directors were additionally issued but at the stage of evidence it turned out that such individual notices to the directors were with respect to dishonour of a different cheque. The facts as found therefore were that no individual notices were given to the directors. The Metropolitan Magistrate by his judgment and order dated 30.4.2007 convicted the Company but acquitted respondents 1 and 2 of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Relying on the judgment of the Division Bench of Madras High Court in B. Raman & Ors. Vs. M/s. Shasun Chemicals and Drugs Ltd. reported in 2006 Cril. L.J. Page 4552, it was observed that statutory notice under Section 138 of the Act was required to be issued to every Director and for non- compliance of such mandatory requirement respondents 1 and 2 could not be proceeded against. .

……………………….J (Pinaki Chandra Ghose) ……………………….J (Uday Umesh Lalit) New Delhi, May 06, 2015 ITEM NO.1C COURT NO.11 SECTION IIA (for Judgment) S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Criminal Appeal No(s). 1220/2009 KIRSHNA TEXPORT & CAPITAL MARKETS LTD. Appellant(s) VERSUS ILA A AGRAWAL & ORS. Respondent(s) Date : 06/05/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Ajit Anekar, Adv.

Mr. Satyajit A. Desai, Adv.

Ms. Indu Sharma, Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit pronounced the reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose and His Lordship.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
K.S. Ravindran vs Branch Managr,New India Assurance Co ...

The relevant facts are briefly stated to appreciate the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties in this appeal:

In view of the above, the learned single Judge has rightly appreciated the facts and circumstances of the case on hand and passed an order dated 1.2.2011 quashing the award of the Labour Court and directed the respondent- Company to reinstate the appellant with all consequential benefits. Further, the learned single Judge, keeping in view that the appellant was terminated in the year 1993, directed the respondent-Company to pay 25% back-wages to the appellant.

Company is directed to reinstate the appellant in his post and pay him 50% back-wages from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement by calculating the same on the basis of revision of pay scales of the appellant and other consequential monetary benefits and pay the same to him within six weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this Judgment, failing which the back-wages shall be paid with an interest at the rate of 9% per annum after the expiry of the said six weeks. There shall be no order as to costs.
State Of U.P vs Damodar & Anr

2. According to the prosecution, marriage between the deceased Sunita and Respondent No.1 was solemnized in the year 1988 while her gona was performed in 1992 whereafter she started living in her matrimonial home. Her father Laldev had given dowry and gifts in the marriage according to his capacity but could not fulfil the demand for a gold chain and ring, because of which her husband i.e. Respondent No.1 and his family members were harassing Sunita.

3. On 01.09.1994 in the early hours a dhebri i.e. lamp is said to have fallen on the mattress on which Sunita was sleeping. She caught fire and was completely burnt. The fact that she was so burnt at 4.00 am was seen by neighbour PW4 Bachhi Devi. According to the witness Sunita’s brother in law came to her place asking for a torch stating that Sunita had suffered burns. The witness went to the house of Respondent No.1 and found Sunita in burnt condition. Sunita then stated to the witness “jo hona tha ho gaya”.

4. Sunita was taken to Primary Health Centre, Azamgarh where PW6 Dr. Om Prakash Shrivastava treated her at 7.00 AM and found that she had suffered 100 per cent burns. Since her condition was serious she was referred to Sadar Hospital but Sunita died while she was being taken to that Hospital.

The statement “jo hona tha ho gaya” attributed to Sunita is not indicative that whatever happened was a pure accident. We are conscious that the appeal itself was of the year of 2003 and left to ourselves, we would have gone into the matter and considered the merits. However, leave to appeal having been dismissed without even issuing notice to the other side, screening of the material and consideration of rival submissions at the appellate stage stood completely denied.

In the circumstances we set aside the order passed by the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court, which may be considered afresh. We request the High Court to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. We may not be taken to have expressed any opinion on merits of the matter.

The appeal stands allowed in these terms.

………………………..J. (Pinaki Chandra Ghose) ………………………..J. (Uday Umesh Lalit) New Delhi, May 06, 2015 ITEM NO.1D COURT NO.11 SECTION II (for Judgment) S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Criminal Appeal No(s). 714/2009 STATE OF U.P. Appellant(s) VERSUS DAMODAR & ANR. Respondent(s) Date : 06/05/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Pramod Swarup, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Sandeep Singh, Adv.

Mr. Anuvrat Sharma, Adv.

Ms. Alka Sinha, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Mukesh Kr. Sharma, Adv.

Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit pronounced the non-reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose and His Lordship.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed non-reportable judgment.
Union Of India & Ors vs Hanuman Industries & Anr

3. The individual facts qua the respondents marginally vary and do not demand separate dilation in the face of the common issues that need to be addressed. Common arguments have also been advanced. The pleadings pertaining to Civil Appeal No. 3962/2011, Union of India and Ors. vs Shri Hanuman Industries & Anr. would, therefore, be outlined for the factual foundation of the debate. 3.1 In the year 1997, a policy decision was taken by the Planning and Development Department, Government of India for promotion of industries in the North East Region, during the period of 9 th Plan by providing inter alia a package of incentives to create an entrepreneurial environment. With this objective, a scheme nomenclatured SPINE, as above, was launched by the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, North Eastern Council, Shilong (for short DONER). In terms of the scheme, The North Page 2 3 Eastern Council (NEC) was to provide to the newly set up industries to the extent of 25 per cent of the project cost or Rs. 50 lacs, whichever was less as deemed proper by the recommending authority on the fulfillment of the conditions stipulated therein. The Union of India, represented by the Ministry of DONER and the NEC were entrusted with the role of implementing the scheme.

4. In response to this scheme, which was apparently akin to a State policy, the respondents on various dates submitted their applications accompanied by necessary documents for setting up their industries as mentioned therein inter alia disclosing the investments made even by obtaining financial accommodation from banking institutions and otherwise. According to the respondents though their applications remained pending and they were made to understand that the same were being processed as per the norms applicable, it was noticeable, that the implementing authorities were adopting pick and choose methods in the matter of disbursement of the financial assistance to a selected few by overlooking their worthy claims.

7. At this juncture, the admitted facts need be noted. As per the procedure prescribed, the applications submitted by the respondents along with the accompanying documents were to be routed through the Department of Industries of the respective State Governments to be forwarded to the NEC by the Planning Department of the State concerned and that no proposal was to be received directly by the NEC.

Page 15 16

Page 21 22

19. For the foregoing determination, we are constrained to interfere with the impugned judgment and order which is hereby set aside. The appeals are allowed. No cost.
The Chairman & Mng.Dir., Tnhb & Anr vs S. Saraswathy & Ors

3. When the Notifications for acquisition came to be passed, two batches of writ petitions were filed before the High Court; the first batch consisted of W.P. No. 7625 of 1982 filed by P. Velu, son of V. Perumal, while the second batch included W.P. Nos. 7499 and 8328 of 1983 filed by A. S. Naidu. The former batch assailed the Constitutional validity of Sections 11(1) and 23(1) of the Act and contended that the compensation determined as on the date of publication of a notification under Section 4 of the Act was inequitable and arbitrary. The second batch laid an assault to the Notifications published under the Act in their entirety. It should be noted immediately that the statute has subsequently been amended to mandate that an Award has to be passed within two/three years, thereby substantially addressing the grievance of compensation being a pittance owing to it being calculated after several years of the Notification.

17 We are unable, for the manifold reasons stated above, to uphold the impugned common Judgments. The same are set aside accordingly. Civil Appeals stand allowed. The Writ Petitions are held to be devoid of any merit and are dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.

…….. …….. ……………………J (VIKRAMAJIT SEN) …….. …….. ……………………J (PRAFULLA CHANDRA PANT) NEW DELHI;

11TH MAY 2015.
Raj Kumar Dixit vs M/S. Vijay Kumar Gauri Shanker, Kanpur ...

M/s.Vijay Kumar Gauri Shanker, the respondent-firm herein, was carrying on the business of transporting caustic soda from M/s.Modi Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd. in Alwar, Rajasthan. For the said purpose, the respondent- firm was in possession of seven tankers which were used for transporting caustic soda from Alwar to the place of supply.

It is the case of the appellant that he was working as an accounts clerk in the respondent-establishment from the year 1994 and was looking after all the factories of the respondent-establishment. Apart from that he was in charge of maintenance of all the seven tankers in the respondent- establishment and was also looking after the transport office and court work of the respondent-employer and in return he was being paid Rs.1,800/- per month along with bonus as was being paid to other workmen of the respondent-establishment.

On 11.6.2001, when the appellant who had fallen sick approached the respondent-firm for his outstanding salary, the respondent-firm terminated him from his services. However, the workmen who were junior to him were still working in the respondent-establishment. The appellant-workman requested for reinstatement of his services in his post but the respondent- establishment refused the same which action amounts to retrenchment as they have done so without following the mandatory conditions as provided under Section 6N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter, “the Act”). Aggrieved by the order of termination, the appellant raised an industrial dispute before the Labour Court, Kanpur narrating all the relevant facts and grounds in support of his claim.

The Labour Court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and in accordance with the claim and written statements of the appellant and the respondent and on re-appreciation of the evidence on record adjudicated the existing industrial dispute between the parties and recorded its finding on the points of dispute referred to it in favour of the appellant which are extracted in the narration of the facts and based on the evidence and circumstances of the case, it held that the appellant was under the employment of the respondent-firm and terminating him from his services by the respondent-firm is in contravention to the provisions of Section 6N and other provisions of the Act which is improper and illegal. The Labour Court directed the respondent-firm to reinstate him in the said post and pay him 50% back wages from the date of termination till the date of passing of the Award.

02.07.2014 is hereby set aside and the Award passed by the Labour Court in awarding reinstatement with 50% back wages from the date of termination till the date of passing the Award by the Labour Court is restored.

We further direct the respondent-firm to pay full back wages to the workman from the date of passing of the Award by the Labour Court till the date of his reinstatement in service. The order shall be complied with by the respondent-firm within six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
C.I.T Mumbai vs M/S Sarkar Builders

We may also point out that the High Court had made observations in the context of Development Control Regulations (hereinafter referred to as 'DCRs' in short) under which the local authority sanctions the housing projects and noted that in these DCRs itself, an element of commercial activity is provided but the total project is still treated as housing project. On the basis of this discussion, after modifying some of the directions given by the ITAT, the conclusions which are arrived at by the High Court are as follows: -

Having regard to the above, let us take note of the special features which appear in these cases:

MAY 15, 2015.
Prem Ram vs M.D. Uttarakhand Pey Jal & ...

3. The appellant, it appears, was appointed as a daily-wager in the erstwhile Uttar Pradesh Pey Jal & Nirman Nigam sometime in the year 1988. Nine years later his services were terminated in February 1997. The termination, when assailed by the appellant before the Labour Court, was set aside with a direction to the respondent to reinstate the appellant with 50% back wages and continuity of service. The writ petition filed by the respondent-Jal Nigam who is the successor-in interest of the erstwhile Uttar Pradesh Pey Jal Nigam against the award made by the Labour Court succeeded only in part and to the extent that the award of back wages was deleted from the award by the Labour Court. It is common ground that pursuant to the award, the appellant was allowed to rejoin as a daily-wager and to serve the respondent-Jal Nigam till the date of his superannuation upon completion of 60 years of age.

6. Dissatisfied with the above order, the appellant preferred Special Appeal No.128 of 2011 which, as noticed earlier, has been dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The High Court held that since there was no scheme for regularization of daily-wagers and those named by the appellant in the writ petition had been regularized by the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam at a time when Uttarakhand Pey Jal and Nirman Nigam was not in existence, nothing further could be done in the matter nor any relief granted to the appellant. The present appeal assails the correctness of the said two judgments and orders of the High Court.

10. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The orders passed by the High Court are set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant disposed of in terms of the directions contained hereinabove. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.

(ADARSH KUMAR GOEL) New Delhi May 15, 2015