L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Kalegura Padma Rao & Anr vs The State Of A.P.Rep. By The Public ...

The factual position in a nutshell is as follows :

On 03.07.2003 morning, PW-1 and the deceased went to the house of the Sarpanch and told him about the incident. The Sarpanch called A-1 and enquired from him as to why he had assaulted the deceased. A-1 admitted his guilt in the presence of PWs. 9 and 10. On the same day at about 6.00 P.M., A-l to A-16 came to the house of the deceased and attacked him. A-1 beat the deceased with a stick. The deceased ran into the house and bolted the door. In the meantime, when PW-2 intervened to rescue the deceased, A-1 beat him with a stick. A-3 broke the doors and all the accused entered the house and beat the deceased. Some of the accused were armed with iron rods and axes. They beat the deceased indiscriminately. Then the deceased ran out from the house. The accused chased and beat him indiscriminately. Finally, the deceased fell down near the Gram Panchayat office on receipt of the injuries. Later, the deceased was taken in an Auto to the Government Hospital, Sulthanabad. On the advice of the Doctor, the persons who carried the deceased to the hospital went to the Police Station and gave Ex.P-1 report. On the basis of Ex.P-1, the police registered a crime for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 448, 307, 327 read with 149 of I.P.C. Thereafter, the deceased and PW-2, who received injuries, were referred to the Government Hospital, Karimnagar. The deceased, while undergoing treatment, succumbed to the injuries. The Inspector of Police took up investigation, prepared the rough sketch, observed the scene of offence, held inquest over the dead body of the deceased, seized M.Os.1 and 2 and later sent the dead body for postmortem examination. The accused were arrested and weapons were recovered. After completion of the investigation, the police laid the charge sheet. The accused denied the charges and claimed for trial.

In order to further the prosecution version the prosecution examined 22 witnesses. On behalf of the accused persons no oral evidence was adduced, but part of the statement of PW-3 recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') was marked as Ext.D-1. On consideration of the material on record the Trial Court as noted above recorded conviction. The convicted accused persons preferred appeals before the High Court and by common judgment in four appeals the impugned judgment was passed.

If the evidence on record is considered on the touchstone principles set out above the inevitable conclusion is that the proper conviction would be Section 304 Part I IPC instead of Section 302 IPC. The conviction of the appellants is accordingly altered from Section 302 read with Section 149 to Section 304 Part I read with Section 149 IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice. The findings of the guilt in respect of other offences and the sentences imposed do not warrant interference. The sentence shall run concurrently.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Vipin Kumar Gadhok vs Ravinder Nath Khanna & Ors

3. The said firm was dissolved as per deed dated 24.12.2001. It is stated that certain disputes arose between the parties in connection with certain claims by Respondents 1 and 2 on dissolution of the said firm of M/s Controls and Matchless Industries. Respondents 1 and 2 sent a communicated dated 22.8.2003 to the appellant and respondents 3 to 5 seeking 'accounts'. The fourth respondent sent a letter dated 17.12.2003 on the letterhead of 'Matchless Industries of India' stating that he would ensure that a sum of Rs.53,81,585/- is paid to respondents 1 and 2. Thereafter, respondents 1 and 2 sent a notice dated 27.6.2005 to appellant and respondents 3 to 5, claiming that the amounts mentioned therein were due to them and sought concurrence for the appointment of Mr. Abhinav Vasisht, Advocate, as sole arbitrator, to decide the dispute. The appellant sent a reply dated 21.7.2005 contending that there cannot be any arbitration as the Dissolution Deed did not contain any arbitration clause.

11. There is, therefore, no question of Arbitrator examining whether the disputes are arbitrable or not with reference to Matchless Industries of India. With the said clarification, the appeal is dismissed.
Lachhman Dass vs Jagat Ram & Ors

Allegedly, she was put in possession of the said land in purported execution of the said decree of pre-emption. A deed of gift was executed by Defendant-Respondent No.1 on 24.1.1984 in favour of Respondent Nos.3 to 7 herein, who are sons and daughters of Respondent Nos.1 and 2. They applied for mutation of their names, which was granted in their favour by an order dated 28.1.1985. Assailing the said order of mutation as also the said consent decree, a suit was filed by the appellant herein. The said suit was dismissed. As indicated hereinbefore, the first appeal as also the second appeal preferred thereagainst have also been dismissed.

The impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. Respondents shall bear the cost of the appellant. Advocate's fee is assessed at Rs.5,000/-.
P.S. Ranakrishna Reddy vs M.K. Bhagyalakshmi And Anr

Admittedly, the parties entered into an agreement for sale on 11.05.1979. The aforementioned sum of Rs. 15,000/- received by the appellant was treated to be the amount of advance paid out of the amount of consideration fixed in the said agreement of sale i.e Rs. 45,000/-. The relevant terms of the said agreement are as under :

Appellant was called upon to execute a registered deed of sale on receipt of the balance amount and as he did not agree thereto, the respondent No. 1 filed a suit for specific performance of the said agreement of sale dated 11.05.1979.

The agreement in question has been described as an agreement for sale. Appellant admittedly was owner of the property. The agreement shows that there had been negotiations between the parties as a result whereof the respondent herein had offered to buy and the appellant had agreed to sell the said property for a sum of Rs. 45,000/-. The terms and conditions stipulated therein were arrived at as a result of the negotiations between the parties.

The findings of facts by both the Courts are concurrent ones and in our opinion no case has been made out to interfere therewith by this Court.

Submission of Mr. Chandrashekhar to the effect that having regard to the rise in price of an immovable property in Bangalore, the Court ought not to have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act is stated to be rejected. We have noticed hereinbefore that the appellant had entered into an agreement for sale with others also. He had, even after 11.5.1979, received a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from the respondent. He with a view to defeat the lawful claim of Respondent No. 1 had raised a plea of having executed a prior agreement for sale in respect of self-same property in favour of his son-in-law who had never claimed any right thereunder or filed a suit for specific performance of contract. The Courts below have categorically arrived at a finding that the said contention of the appellant was not acceptable. Rise in the price of an immovable property by itself is not a ground for refusal to enforce a lawful agreement of sale. [See P.D' Souza (supra) and Jai Narain Parasrampuria (supra)] For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
State Of Manipur & Ors vs Y. Token Singh & Ors

J U D G M E N T WITH [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19110-19112 of 2005] CIVIL APPEAL NO.850 OF 2007 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19375-19376 of 2005] S.B. SINHA, J :

The Commissioner allegedly made certain appointments in the posts of Mandols, Process-Servers and Zilladars which was not within the knowledge of the State. The said appointments were made on temporary basis. Appointments were made on 11.09.1997, 22.11.1997 and 5.12.1997. A sample copy of the offer of appointment reads as under:

2. Further, they are posted at the places indicate against their names:-

In view of the aforementioned stand taken by the said Shri Tayeng, the offers of appointment issued in favour of the Respondents were cancelled by an order dated 17.02.1998. A corrigendum thereto was, however, issued on 21.02.1998 stating:

The respondents herein filed writ petitions before the High Court on 4.06.1998 questioning the said order of cancellation of their appointments. The said Shri Tayeng retired on 28.02.1998. Despite the fact that he, in his UO Note dated 12.02.1998 addressed to the Minister of Revenue, denied to have made any appointment, when approached by the writ petitioners respondents, he affirmed in their support an affidavit in the High Court stating:

The writ appeals preferred thereagainst by the appellants herein were dismissed.

The offers of appointment issued in favour of the respondents herein were cancelled inter alia on the premise that the same had been done without the knowledge of the Revenue Department of the State. No records therefor were available with the State. As noticed hereinbefore, an inquiry had been made wherein the said Shri Tayeng, the then Commissioner of Revenue stated that no such appointment had been made to his knowledge. The State proceeded on the said basis. The offers of appointment were cancelled not on the ground that some irregularities had been committed in the process of recruitment but on the ground that they had been non-est in the eye of law. The purported appointment letters were fake ones. They were not issued by any authority competent therefor.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained. They are set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed. No costs.
Chinthamani Ammal vs Nandagopal Gounder And Anr

Kesava Gounder and Respondent No. 1 were brothers. They admittedly were members of a joint family. Kesava Gounder was suffering from small pox. He died in 1943. Immediately prior to his death, he allegedly expressed his intention to severe his status as a member of the joint family.

Both the suits were heard together. The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 27.07.1984 opined that the said Kesava Gounder died in the year 1943 as a member of undivided joint family and, thus, the appellant had derived no right, title and interest in the said property by succession or otherwise. An appeal preferred thereagainst by the appellant, however, was allowed by the Subordinate Judge holding that the father of the appellant died as a divided member of the joint family as a result whereof she became entitled to claim half share. The second appeal preferred by the respondents herein from the said judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court has been allowed by reason of the impugned judgment. Mr. B. Sridhar, learned counsel appearing in support of the appellant, would submit that although the appellant at the time of her father's death was only three years old, the factum of separation was proved by DW-2 - her aunt, who in her deposition stated:

52. With respect to the High Court, we think, that, what the High Court did was what perhaps even an appellate court, with full fledged appellate jurisdiction would, in the circumstances of the present case, have felt compelled to abstain from and reluctant to do. Contention (c) would also require to be upheld."

For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Punjab State Warehousing Corp. , ... vs Manmohan Singh & Anr

The contention of the appellant is that the contract of the respondent's service was not renewed as the services of Respondent No. 1 were not required any further and, thus, by an order dated 24.12.2001 his services were terminated. Questioning the validity of the said order, a writ petition was filed by the Respondent before the High Court. The said writ petition was disposed of directing the appellant herein to consider the case of Respondent No. 1 in the backdrop of the said Scheme dated 23.01.2001. Inter alia on the premise that in view of a clarification issued by the State Government that the said scheme was not applicable to the case of contract employees, the respondent's claim for regularisation was rejected by an order dated 17.06.2004. A fresh Writ Petition was filed which by reason of the impugned judgment has been allowed.

[See also Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur v. Om Prakash Dubey 2006 (13) SCALE 266 : (2007) 1 SCC 373] For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
State Of Maharashtra & Ors vs Tukaram Tryambak Chaudhari & Ors

Relying on a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kondiba vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., referred to in paragraph 3 of the impugned judgment of the High Court, the Bombay High Court allowed all the writ applications and set aside all the impugned orders upon holding that teachers who possess B.A./B.Sc. and B.Ed. qualification are duly qualified and are eligible to continue to receive their salaries as Trained Teachers from the date on which they were appointed along with all consequential benefits and were also entitled to be paid the difference and any other consequential benefits within the period stipulated.

Aggrieved by the decision of the State Government to treat them as untrained teachers, despite their having the B.Ed. qualification, purportedly as per the Government Resolution dated 14th November, 1979, the private respondents in these appeals filed separate writ applications which, as indicated hereinbefore, were all taken up for hearing together and disposed of by a common judgment dated 6th May, 2004.

Primary teachers, falling in this category, should be given new increased pay scale on such condition that "within 5 years of their appointment in the post of increased pay scale of Rs.365- 760/-, they - at their own cost/expenses - should obtained degree by taking at least one subject which is being taught in primary schools". If this condition is not fulfilled, then for such teachers further increment in this new pay scale should be stopped till he acquires that degree.

(c) Trained primary teachers who have done graduation in other subjects (without taking any subject which is being taught in primary school) and who have also not obtained degree in Education i.e. B.Ed. Primary teachers, falling in this category, should be given new increased pay scale on such condition that "within 5 years of their appointments in the post of increased pay scale of Rs.365- 760/-, they - at their own costs/expenses - should obtained degree by taking at least one subject which is being taught in primary schools and also obtained degree in Education i.e. B.Ed. If this condition is not fulfilled, then for such teachers further increment in this new pay scale should be stopped till he acquires those degrees."

Mr. Apte submitted that the order passed by the High Court and impugned in the instant proceedings had been correctly made and no interference was called for therewith. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties. Having particular regard to the fact that though standards 5 to 7 were attached to both primary schools as well as secondary schools, these classes in fact, represented the middle schools for which different standards were being followed.

We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the decision rendered by the High Court which has been impugned in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.
National Insurance Co. Ltd vs M/S Ishar Das Madan Lal

Respondent herein carries on business in jewellery It obtained a policy known as 'Jeweller Block Policy'. A theft of 140 gms of jewellery worth of Rs.63,000/- occurred in his business premises. A First Information Report was lodged therefor. Respondent also lodged a claim with the appellant herein. The same having not been settled for a long time, an application was filed before the State Consumers Protection Commission constituted under the J & K Consumers Protection Act, 1987.

The Commission by reason of its order dated 16.12.1997, inter alia, found the said claim to be not sustainable on the ground that the loss was not covered by the said policy, stating :

We, therefore, are clearly of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court was correct. The High Court's judgment is upheld. The appeal is dismissed. We, in the facts and circumstances of this case, also direct the appellant to pay and bear the cost of the respondent throughout. Counsel's fee in this appeal is assessed at Rs.50,000/-.
Thiriveedhi Channaiah vs Gudipudi Venkata Subba Rao (D) By Lrs. & ...

The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. An Agreement of Sale was entered into by and between the parties on 19.07.1981, in terms whereof the respondent offered to sell the suit property admeasuring 2.96 cents out of 11.82 cents for Rs.44,000/- per acre in D. No. 140 situate at Agatavareppadu Village in the District of Guntur. Appellant advanced a sum of Rs. 50,000/- towards part payment of the said consideration. The balance amount of consideration was to be paid on or before 25.02.1982 whereupon a regular sale deed was to be executed. On the said date, however, another agreement was entered into by the parties in terms whereof it was agreed that on default of the appellant to pay the balance of sale consideration on or before 25.02.1982, the said amount of advnace shall be forfeited.

However, before the Deed of Sale could be executed, a notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act') was issued. Legality of the said notification was questioned by the respondent by filing a Writ Petition before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which was marked as Writ Petition No. 434/1982. A suit was also filed by him for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the State of Andhra Pradesh from interfering with his possession.

In view of the aforementioned developments, the appellant herein by a notice requested the respondent to refund the said sum of Rs. 50,000/- with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum as he was not informed about the said land acquisition proceeding. However, in reply thereto, the respondent contended that as he has failed and/or neglected to pay the balance amount, the money stand forfeited in terms of the said agreement dated 19.07.1981. The suit filed by the appellant herein, was allowed by a judgment and order dated 28.11.1998, holding :

In the aforementioned facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the respondent could not have forfeited the amount of advance. The High Court, in our opinion, committed a manifest error in that behalf in arriving at the finding that the respondent was justified in forfeiting the said amount. We, however, agree with the High Court that enforcement of agreement for sale would be inequitable.

We, therefore, direct that respondents to refund the amount of advance paid by the appellant to him. Such payment should be made within a period of 4 weeks from date; failing which the same would carry interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the said date till the date of actual payment.

The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Mohan Lal And Ors vs State Of Haryana

Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and sentence of imprisonment for life as was awarded by the trial Judge i.e. learned Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul. According to the prosecution version as unfolded during the trial, Renu (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') was set on fire by the appellants who were torturing and harassing her for dowry demand. A boil had developed under her armpit. After making arrangements for her comforts, her husband went out of station. Her mother in law- appellant No.3 told her that she was telling a lie about the boil under her armpit and she really had no problem. Her father in law (appellant No.1) wanted her to show the place where the boil was, but the deceased did not show it to him. Her brother in law- appellant No. 2 also used to harass her. On the contrary, her husband did not cause any harassment to her. On the date of occurrence i.e. 15.9.2001, the appellants confined her in a room, poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. Her father- in- law remarked that on her failure to show him the place where the boil was, she has to die by burning. They were also harassing her for dowry. Her dying declaration was recorded by Judicial Magistrate, First Class (PW-3) and was exhibited as Ex. PD/4. The learned trial Court put emphasis on the dying declaration and recorded the conviction as afore-noted.

This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence.

Looked at from any angle, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be maintained and is set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges. They will be set at liberty forthwith unless required in custody in respect of any other case. The appeal is allowed.
State Of Gujarat vs Anand Acharya @ Bharat Kumar Sadhu

c) It was also made clear in the charges framed against the respondent, that he, after getting divorce from his wife Bhavanaben and his illicit continuing relationship with Smitaben, he married Priyaben and from that wedlock, a girl child was born on 08.12.1994.

The respondent challenged the order of dismissal by way of a Special Civil Application No. 9487/1999 in the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. During the pendency of the writ application, the respondent filed a Review Application before the appellant-State on 22.10.1999, which could not be decided by the appellant-State as the matter was sub-judice before the High Court. The respondent withdrew the Special Civil Application No.9487/1999 on 13.09.2000 with a view to get his Review Application decided. The State Government finally rejected the Review Application of the respondent on 05.01.2000.

The respondent again filed a Special Civil Application No. 2479 of 2001 on 20.03.2001 before the High Court of Gujarat in which he challenges the order of dismissal from service dated 22.10.1999 and subsequent order dated 05.01.2001 whereunder his Review Application came to be rejected. The parties went to trial before the learned Single Judge of the High Court and filed their reply and counter reply. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 23.07.2004 partly allowed the Special Civil Application and set aside the impugned orders dated 22.10.1999 and 05.01.2001. The learned Single Judge concluded that as the respondent has not disclosed the fact about the criminal proceedings, which were pending before the Criminal Court in the year 1992, such act would warrant some punishment and a penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect was ordered to be imposed upon the respondent. The appellant-State was directed to reinstate the respondent in service with continuity of service but without backwages on or before 01.09.2004, failing which the respondent shall be entitled to the salary from that date.

For the above-said reasons, this appeal is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.