L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Whirlpool Of India Ltd.. Bangalore vs The Deputy Commissioner Of Commercial ...

The appellant is a registered dealer under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 ("KST Act" for short). The appellant is the Licensee and registered user of the trade mark "Whirlpool" in terms of the Trade Mark & Trade Name Licence Agreement dated 24.2.1995 executed between M/s. Whirlpool Corporation, USA, which is stated to be the proprietor and owner of the said trade mark and the Appellant. The licence granted to the appellant to use the trade mark is non-transferable.

On 4.2.2003, the appellant entered into an agreement with M/s. Applicomp India Limited (for short "Applicomp" or the "Manufacturer") under which Applicomp agreed to manufacture and supply electronic products and electrical appliances such as Refrigerators, Washing Machines, Air Conditioner, etc., to the appellant on Original Equipment Manufacture basis, as per the specifications of the appellant. Relevant portions of clauses 4, 5 and 6 of the agreement are extracted below :

Aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal to the High Court, which was dismissed and hence this appeal.

In our opinion, there is no merit in this appeal and we agree with the view taken by the High Court.

Applying the above illustration to the facts of the present case, `A' would be the appellant and `B' would be Applicomp. The incidence of tax on the first sale would be on the appellant and not on Applicomp.

In the present case, the appellant is the owner of the brand name `Whirlpool' registered under the Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958. Under the agreement between the parties, the refrigerators and other consumer goods are got manufactured by M/s. Applicomp India Ltd. and as per the agreement M/s. Applicomp have to manufacture the products under the brand name `Whirlpool' and sell them exclusively to the appellant. M/s. Applicomp is not the registered user of the brand name `Whirlpool'. Moreover, the sales made by M/s. Applicomp to the appellant, are not sales to the exclusive marketing agent or distributor or wholeseller or any other dealer but are only sales of manufactured branded goods to the brand owner. Hence in our opinion the Sixth Proviso and Explanation III to Section 5(3)(a) is clearly not applicable.

Thus, there is no force in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Babu Singh And Another vs Reshampal Singh And Another

The trial court by its judgment dated 18.10.2001 convicted accused Resham Pal Singh and sentenced him to death under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, but the High Court while affirming the conviction has reduced the sentence to life imprisonment. The High Court has further directed the appellant to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- and in default to undergo further RI for a period of one year for the offence under Section 302 IPC. The High Court also maintained the sentence of imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- awarded under Section 307 IPC. In default of payment of fine the appellant had to undergo further RI for a period of two months. The amount of fine of Rs. 50,000/-, if realized from the appellant was directed to be paid to Harpreet Singh, who has lost his parents.

In our opinion, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court. The question of sentence has been considered by the High Court in detail in paragraph 36 of its judgment and, therefore, we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court. Hence, both the appeals are dismissed and the impugned judgment and order of the High Court stands upheld.
K.S. Krishnaswamy Etc vs Union Of India & Anr

We may briefly notice the scale of pay enjoyed by the employees at the time of retirement and corresponding increase in the 4th and the 5th Pay Commission.

The appellants were holding the post of Superintending Engineers in All India Radio. They retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation between 1982 to 1985. Undisputedly, at the time of retirement, they were holding the scale of pay of Rs. 1500-2000. In the 4th Pay Commission, their scale was revised to Rs. 3700-5000. In the 5th Pay Commission Report, which was accepted w.e.f. 1.1.1996, their scale was correspondingly revised to 12000-16500. The employees, who had rendered 13 years of service, were granted special grade in the pay scale of Rs. 2000-2250. This special scale of pay was confined to 20 senior incumbents. In the 4th Pay Commission, their scale was correspondingly revised to 4500-5700. In the 5th Pay Commission, this scale was correspondingly revised to 14300- 18300 w.e.f. 1.1.1996. It is undisputed that the appellants never enjoyed the special scale of Rs. 2000-2250. They claimed the pensionary benefits on the basis of scale of Rs. 14300-18300, which was rejected by the High Court.

The respondent was Technical Adviser in the Department of Women and Child Development, Ministry of Human Resource Development. He retired on 30.11.1995 in the pay scale of Rs. 3700-5000. In the 5th Pay Commission, the scale was correspondingly revised to Rs. 12000-16500. The respondent claimed the scale of Rs. 14300-18300. His claim was rejected by the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal's order was, however, upset by the High Court by the impugned order.

Therefore, when the special leave petition is dismissed by the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, the doctrine of merger is not attracted.

For the reasons aforestated, the view taken by the Madras High Court that the clarificatory Executive Instructions in O.M. dated 11.5.2001 are an integral part of the O.M. dated 17.12.1998 clarifying the Policy Resolution of the Government dated 30.9.1997 and do not over-ride the original O.M. dated 17.12.1998 is correct law and it is, accordingly, affirmed. The view taken by the Delhi High Court that O.M. dated 11.5.2001 over-rides the original O.M. dated 17.12.1998 and creates two classes of pensioners does not lay down the correct law and is, hereby, set aside. The net result is that the Civil Appeal Nos. 3174 and 3173 of 2006, preferred by the pensioners, are dismissed and the Civil Appeal Nos. 3188, 3189 and 3190 of 2006, preferred by the employer Union of India, are allowed. The Judgment and order of the Madras High Court dated 29.4.2005 is affirmed. The Judgment and Orders of the Delhi High Court dated 17.8.2005, 5.9.2005, 10.11.2005 and 3.8.2005 are set aside.

Parties are asked to bear their own costs.
State Of M.P. & Ors vs Lalit Kumar Verma

Respondent herein was appointed on daily wages. Indisputably, his recruitment was not made in terms of the statutory rules. No offer of appointment was also issued. He filed an application before the Labour Court purported to be for his classification in permanent category of workman. An Award was made on the premise that he having worked continuously for a period of more than six months, acquired a right for classification in the category of permanent clerk and in that view of the matter, his services could not have been terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He was directed to be classified on the permanent basis as clerk from two years prior to the date of his filing the application, i.e., 11th November, 1991. He was also held to be entitled to prescribed wages and thus, the amount of difference in wages of the said post and other benefits was directed to be paid. A writ petition was preferred thereagainst by the appellants before the High Court, which was also dismissed by a learned Single Judge, opining that no case had been made out to interfere therewith.

The application was filed by the respondent before the Labour Court on the premise that the order of termination dated 10.10.1991 was illegal and he should have been declared permanent on 1st April, 1987 after classification in the category of Supervisor and Clerk. Clause 2 of the Standard Standing Orders reads as under:

Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be sub-served if we direct that any benefit which has already been given to the respondent shall not be recovered. He is also directed to be paid a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- (One lakh fifty thousand) towards compensation and costs for condoning the massive delay in filing the Special Leave Petition.

The impugned judgments are set aside, subject to the directions mentioned hereinbefore. This appeal is allowed. No costs.
Dilip & Anr vs State Of M.P

Appellant was prosecuted for commission of an offence under Section 8/18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 ('the NDPS Act', for short) on the basis of a First Information Report lodged by one Shri S.S. Tomar, the Officer in-charge of P.S. Kumbhraj alleging that while he was posted as S.H.O. at the said police station, on 24.12.1996 when he came out of the gate for arresting one Shivraj Meena, he found two persons coming out at a fast speed in a scooter. They were stopped. They disclosed their names as Dilip Singh (Appellant) and Ramsharan. A search of their person was conducted. Nothing was found, but, on search of the scooter, some black coloured liquid substance contained in six big plastic bags and one small plastic bag were seen, which were said to be containing opium. Allegedly, the S.D.O.P. of the place Raghogarh, named, Shri G.S. Jadon was informed and 5 kgs. 890 gms opium was recovered.

They were arrested at the spot. Learned Sessions Judge, Guna recorded a judgment of acquittal, inter alia, holding that the search and seizure was vitiated in law as mandatory statutory requirements contained in Sections 50 and 42 the NDPS Act were not complied with. The seizure witnesses did not support the prosecution case. The informant also did not comply with the requirements of Section 57 of the NDPS Act. Sealing of the contraband materials was not carried out in accordance with law as no responsible officer fixed seal on the seized samples.

The State preferred an appeal before the High Court against the said judgment of acquittal which was registered as Criminal Appeal No.524 of 1998. The High Court reversed the said judgment of the learned Sessions Judge holding :

The witnesses of the seizure were : P.W.1 - a sweeper engaged in the police station and P.W.2 - a cycle mechanic who was carrying on his business in front of the police station. They were examined before the learned Trial Judge. They have not supported the case of the prosecution at all. They were declared hostile.

It is well known that if two views are possible, benefit of doubt should be given to the accused.

The appeal is allowed. Appellants are directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless wanted in connection with any other case.
Gagan Kanojia & Anr vs State Of Punjab

4) PW-11, before whom the purported extra-judicial confession was made, having been called to the police station as also being a witness to the recovery should not have been relied upon.

We have, therefore, no hesitation in opining that Ex. D-1 was not and could not have been written by Rajender Kumar Kanojia at the dictation of the investigating officer or otherwise. To the aforementioned extent, we find force in Mr. Singh's contention.

Keeping in view the circumstantial evidences, which have been brought on records, we are satisfied that all links in the chain are complete and the evidences led by the prosecution point out only to one conclusion, that is, the guilt of the appellants herein. They have rightly been convicted of the offences charged against them by the learned Trial Judge.

An appeal had also been preferred by the complainant for enhancing the sentence.

It is also not a case where we should exercise our extra-ordinary jurisdiction in converting the penalty of rigorous imprisonment for life to one of imposition of death sentence. We decline to do so.

For the reasons aforementioned, both the appeals are dismissed.
Vikramjit Singh @ Vicky vs State Of Punjab

Broken bangles were found scattered and the other shoe of the deceased was also found lying nearby. They went to the appellant's house and came to learn that both of them have been hospitalized. On reaching Civil Hospital, Moga, they found Meena Rani to be dead having suffered multiple stab injuries. She was wearing a gold ear ring, two gold rings, one silver ring, silver pajebs and bishue. A First Information Report was lodged by the said Amarjit Kaur alleging that the appellant murdered her by inflicting knife injuries. She suspected that the appellant had illicit relations with some other girl and had murdered her daughter in order to remove her from his way.

Twenty-three injuries were found on the person of the deceased. A few of them were stab wounds. The injuries on the person of the appellant were as under:

Some ornaments were said to have been recovered from a dicky of a scooter belonging to the co-accused Arvind Sharma. He has been declared to be a proclaimed offender.

The prosecution in support of its case examined a large number of witnesses. The complainant Amarjit Kaur was examined as PW-4. She supported the prosecution case in its entirety in her examination-in-chief which took place on 15.04.2003. Her cross-examination was deferred. It resumed after a period of five months, i.e., on 16.09.2003. She, however, turned hostile. Similarly, all the material witnesses who although supported the prosecution case in their examination-in-chief, in their cross- examination, did not support the prosecution case at all.

Maninder Singh might not have gone to the police but having regard to the fact that he had brought them to hospital, it was for the investigating officer to record his statement.
State Of Himachal Pradesh & Ors vs Surinder Singh Banolta

J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7381 of 2005) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5187 OF 2006 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22043 of 2005) S.B. Sinha, J.

Respondent herein was elected as a member of Zilla Parishad. The result of election was declared on 5.01.2001. An application was filed by Respondent No. 2 Daulat Ram before the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla District alleging that as he, having been declared an encroacher within the meaning of the provisions of Sections 4 and 7 of the Himachal Pradesh Public Premises (Rent Recovery and Land Eviction) Act, 1971 was disqualified to hold the elected post and, thus, should not be allowed to continue therein. The Deputy Commissioner took cognizance of the said complaint and by reason of an order dated 4.06.2002 declared Respondent No. 1 as disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Zilla Parishad and consequently his election was set aside.

For the reasons aforementioned, no fault can be found in the impugned judgment. It is, therefore, affirmed. The appeals are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 10,000/-
State Of Maharashtra vs Shashikant S. Pujari & Ors

Part Timer 1.9.1986 to 15.4.1987 Selection by LSC of College but no approval from University.

16.4.1987 to 30.6.1987 76 days break in service Not condoned by University Part Timer 1.7.1987 to 30.6.1992 Selection by LSC of College but no approval from University.

1.2.1993 to 19.6.1995 2 years and 139 days break in service.

It is stated at the Bar that a person is treated to be Second Class 'C' who has obtained 55% of the marks.

However, the Government of Maharashtra issued a letter on 18.06.1994, inter alia, stating :

The State Government also issued an order on 17.03.1998, inter alia, stating :

Such appointment shall be strictly according to the order of merit prepared by the Selection Committee and approved by the Vice-Chancellor.

Provided that, where the Governing Body proposes to make an appointment otherwise in accordance with the order of merit arranged by the Selection Committee, it shall record its reasons in writing and submit them to the Vice-Chancellor, who may approve the proposal or return into the Governing Body for reconsideration. After reconsideration, if the Governing Body desires to pursue its Original Proposal, it shall refer the matter again to the Vice-Chancellor for his decision which shall be final."

Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. However, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct that no recovery of any amount paid to him, shall be made. Civil Appeal No.1386 of 2006 filed by the State of Maharashtra, therefore, is allowed and Civil Appeal No. 1387 filed by Respondent herein is dismissed. No costs.
Mohammed Arshad vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

While in hospital, Kayyum gave three dying declarations one on 17.3.1999 before the attending physician, Dr. Kagane, who was examined as P.W.10. He gave a dying declaration before a Judicial Magistrate on 18.3.1999, which is very short one and is reproduced hereinafter :

Apart from the appellants and Syed Salim, it appears one Syed Maqdum was also prosecuted for commission of the said offence, although, he was not named in the dying declaration of the deceased. He, however, was acquitted. The learned Sessions Judge found the appellants herein as also the said Syed Salim to be guilty of commission of the offence under Section 302/34 IPC. The appeal preferred thereagainst by the appellants herein as also Syed Salim was dismissed. Both the learned Trial Judge and the High Court relied upon the evidence of Farukoddin (P.W.2), Mohammed Shakeel (P.W.6) and Mohammed Rais (P.W.7), as also the dying declarations of the deceased Kayyum.

He, however, stated :

We, therefore, do not find any merit in the appeal preferred by Syed Shaukat.

For the reasons aforementioned, while allowing Criminal Appeal No.1674 of 2005, Criminal Appeal No.1676 of 2005 preferred by Syed Shaukat is dismissed. Appellant Mohammed Arshad shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case.
Chatar Singh vs State Of M.P

On appeal, the High Court accepted that the prosecution could not establish that the boys were murdered by the appellant, but the finding of the learned Sessions Judge as regards involvement of the appellant for alleged commission of an offence under Section 364 was upheld, stating :

In view of the proviso appended to Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a manifest error in sentencing the appellant for 20 years' Rigorous Imprisonment. The maximum sentence imposable being 14 years and having regard to the fact that the appellant is in custody for more than 12 years. Now, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be sub- served if the appellant is directed to be sentenced to the period already undergone.

The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. The appellant shall be released forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.
G.L. Vijain vs K. Shankar

Having regard to the point involved in this matter, it is not necessary to state the fact of the matter in details. Suffice it to notice that Appellant, herein is a tenant. Respondent filed an application for fixation of fair rent before the Rent Controller. The Additional District Court, Madurai (Rent Controller) fixed rent of Rs. 15,870/- per month in respect of the tenanted premises by an order dated 4.04.2000. The said amount of fair rent determined by the Rent Controller was directed to be paid from the date of filing of the said petition, viz., 30.03.1992. An appeal was preferred therefrom before the Principal Subordinate Judge, Madurai, being the appellate authority under the Act. The appellate authority by an order dated 27.01.2004 fixed fair rent @ Rs. 12,650/- per month for the said premises and directed the appellant to pay the same from the date of institution of the application filed before the Rent Controller. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, the appellant filed a revisional application before the High Court wherein the aforementioned order was passed.

There is furthermore no dispute that the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction in appropriate cases. The revisional jurisdiction, however, in effect and substance is an appellate jurisdiction.

It is, therefore, evident that while the court can impose conditions while granting stay in exercise of its jurisdiction under Order XLI, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot pass any such order where the appellate or revisional jurisdiction is to be exercised.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and that part of the order whereby conditions have been imposed for admission of the revision application is set aside. This appeal is allowed. No costs.
State Of Haryana & Ors vs Devi Dutt & Ors

Writ petitions were filed by the respondents aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith. In the said proceedings, additional affidavits were filed. The High Court reversed the findings of fact arrived at by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court holding that as the appellants had not denied or disputed that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers from February, 1993 to January, 1996, the impugned Awards could not be sustained. The matters were directed to be remitted to the Labour Court.

The High Court ordinarily should not have interfered with the said finding of fact. We, although, do not mean to suggest that the findings of fact cannot be interfered with by the superior courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but the same should be done upon application of the well known legal principles such as :

For the reasons mentioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained, which are set aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Meghalaya State Electricity Board & Ors vs Thuleswar Barbaruah & Ors

Respondents herein joined services of the Assam State Electricity Board (the Board). The terms and conditions of their services used to be governed by the regulations framed under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 ('the 1948 Act', for short) known as Assam State Electricity Board General Regulations, 1960 ('the 1960 Regulations', for short) and Assam State Electricity Board Engineering Service Regulation, 1973 ('the 1973 Regulations', for short). Regulation 4 of the 1960 Regulations authorised the Board to prescribe the manner in which the record of services of its employees was required to be maintained, pursuant whereto the format of ACR and related guidelines were prescribed. The Board adopted the existing rules, regulations, orders and procedures of the old Board. On or about 22.1.1975, however, the Government of Meghalaya, in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 5 of the 1948 Act, constituted the Appellant Board, whereupon the Respondents herein were placed with the Appellant by the Assam State Electricity Board. The 1973 Regulations, however, were amended in 1984, pursuant whereto the Respondents were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer. In between 7.1.1987 and 14.1.1992, Respondent Nos. 1 to 8 were promoted to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer (Civil). On 19.4.1996 the Board recommended promotion of Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 to the post of Executive Engineer. On or about 18.6.1997 the inter se seniority list of Assistant Executive Engineers (Civil) was published. Appellant Board framed its own Regulations on 14.8.1997; Regulation 37 whereof provides for the eligibility for promotion. Sub-Regulation (3) of Regulation 37 reads as under :

For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed. However, as the respondents are not represented before us, there shall be no order as to costs.