L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Mangoo Ram vs State Of J & K & Anr

On 3rd November, 1998, a Notification under Section 4(1) of the State Land Acquisition Act, 1990 (Act No.X of 1990) (for short, `the Act') enacted by the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was issued for acquiring 50 Kanals 16 Marlas of the land situated in Village Kallar Himati, Tehsil and District Udhampur, which included 16 Kanals of land belonging to the appellant for construction of new fruit market. On coming to know of the said Notification, the appellant filed objection dated 13th November, 1998 by pointing out that other land was available within the village which was not being cultivated and, therefore, there was no justification to acquire his land which was being cultivated by him for his own livelihood and that of his family. The Collector Land Acquisition (ACR), Udhampur without giving the appellant opportunity of hearing in terms of Section 5-A (2) of the Act and without even disposing of his objection, submitted report dated 6th March, 1999 to the Commissioner-cum-Secretary to the Government, Revenue Department with the request that declaration under Section 6 and 7 of the Act may be issued. After 4 months of ....2/-

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court are set aside. The declaration made under Section 6 of the Act by Notification dated 19th July, 1999 so far as the same relates to the appellant's land, is hereby quashed.

Needless to say that this order shall not preclude the State of Jammu and Kashmir from taking steps afresh for issuing declaration under Section 6 after the objections filed by the appellant are disposed of by the competent authority in accordance with Section 5-A of the Act. No costs.

....3/-

Since no one has appeared for the applicant, the application for impleadment is dismissed in default.
G.S. Iqbal vs K.M.Khadar & Ors

2. The appellant (hereinafter referred, `the petitioner') is an electorate of No. 7, Vellore Parliamentary Constituency, having electoral No. 555 in the electoral list. General Elections to constitute the 14th Lok Sabha took place in the months of April-May, 1 2004. To represent the said constituency, 19 candidates contested election; K.M. Khader Mohideen being one of them. The petitioner is the general secretary of Dravida Muslim Munnertra Kazhagam. This party supported AIADMK candidates in the 14th Parliamentary election in Tamil Nadu.

3. K.M. Khader Mohideen contested the 14th Lok Sabha elections, on the symbol of DMK party. The polling took place on May 10, 2004 and the results were declared on May 13, 2004. He was declared elected from No. 7, Vellore Parliamentary Constituency. We shall refer him hereinafter, `returned candidate'.

(2) A person shall be disqualified for being a member of either House of Parliament if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule".

31. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Costs quantified at Rs. 25,000/-.

..........................J (D.K. Jain) 20 ..........................J (R.M. Lodha) New Delhi, March 19, 2009.
Jagdish vs State Of M.P

The sole appellant, along with accused, Dhiran, Ram Swarup, Prakash and Champa, were tried for the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code [for short, `I.P.C.'], but were acquitted by the Trial Court. Against the order of acquittal, the State of Madhya Pradesh filed an appeal before the High Court, which upheld the acquittal of other four accused persons, but reversed the same in relation to the appellant and convicted him under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

We have been taken through the judgments rendered by the Trial Court and the High Court, apart from the evidence of P.W.1 (Naktu), the informant, who was chowkidar of the village as well as the evidence of three eye-witnesses, namely, P.W.2 (Lahori Bai), P.W.3 (Bimla Bai) and P.W. 5 (Grisham Bai). Undisputedly, the informant, before going to the Police Station for lodging first information report, met the aforesaid witnesses but none of them disclosed the name ...2/-

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court, so far the same relates to the appellant, is set aside and the order of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court is restored.

The appellant, who is on bail, is discharged from the liability of bail bonds.
M/S. Century Textiles Industries Ltd vs Deepak Jain & Anr

3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the appellant, in brief, is that it is engaged in the business of manufacture of cement. It required the services of Clearing and Forwarding Agents. Respondent No.1, namely, Deepak Jain applied for the said agency in the name of a proprietary concern `M/s. Deepak Jain' at 743, Sarafa Bazaar. In the application, he gave the reference of his father Shri S.C. Jain, Advocate, 744, Sarafa Bazaar. Both the properties, namely, 743 and 744 at Sarafa Bazaar are stated to be ancestral properties of Deepak Jain/D.K. Jain. The said respondent operated a Bank Account No. 454 with Punjab & Sind Bank for his dealings. He also had another account No. 453 with the same branch of the bank operated under the name and style of "M/s Surya Trading Company, Proprietor, D.K. Jain", respondent No.2 in this appeal.

4. According to the appellant, though the agency was in the name of a proprietary concern, styled as M/s. Deepak Jain, 2 but after sometime, Deepak Jain started dealing with them as "M/s. Surya Trading Company, Proprietor, D.K. Jain" as well. He corresponded from both the addresses, namely, 743 and 744, Sarafa Bazaar. In discharge of his liability towards the appellant, the first respondent issued a Cheque in the sum of Rs.10,68,335/- dated 2nd August, 1992 from Account No. 453 of "Surya Trading Company" as D.K. Jain. However, the Cheque was returned unpaid. The appellant filed a Civil Suit for recovery of the said amount against "M/s Surya Trading Company, Proprietor D.K. Jain". The Suit was decreed ex- parte on 10th March, 1997. On summons being issued by the Executing Court, Deepak Jain appeared before the Court and filed objections, pleading that he was neither D.K. Jain nor proprietor of M/s. Surya Trading Company and not even a resident of 744, Sarafa Bazaar. Accepting the objections preferred by Deepak Jain, by order dated 14th August, 2001, the Executing Court held that the decree could be executed only against D.K. Jain and not against Deepak Jain. Aggrieved by the order passed by the executing Court, the appellant filed a Civil Revision before the High Court. Vide order dated 21st August, 2002, the High Court disposed of the Revision Petition with the following direction: 3

5. None of the parties questioned the said order and thus it attained finality. On 2nd December, 2002, the appellant moved an application before the Executing Court disclosing and specifying the identity of the judgment debtor. The first respondent--Deepak Jain contested the said application by stating that he was not the proprietor of M/s. Surya Trading Company and that he had no connection with 744 Sarafa Bazaar as well. The Executing Court framed the following issues:

19. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside with costs, quantified at Rs.20,000/-.
Jagadguru Annadanishwara Maha Swamiji vs V.C.Allipur & Anr

Respondent No.1 was working as an Assistant Teacher in a school run by the appellant. In relation to his claim for promotion as a lecturer as he had obtained M.A. degree, he approached the school authorities. The management declined his request. Respondent No.1 then made a representation to the Deputy Director, Education who in turn asked the management to consider the case of the respondent No.1 for promotion. The Director, Pre-University, Education passed an order on 25th July, 2005 in his favour.

-2- Appellant preferred an appeal before the appropriate authority which is still pending.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned orders cannot be sustained and they are set aside accordingly. The Contempt Petition filed by the first respondent before the -7- High Court is dismissed. However, we make it clear that the other remedies available to the first respondent under any other law for the time being inforce shall remain open for redressal of his grievance.

The Appeal is allowed. No costs.
Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain & Ors vs Ramakant Eknath Jajoo

Father of the respondent was owner of four godowns and the land surrounding them admeasuring 1 acre and 4 guntas being Survey No.462, situated at Village Saikheda, Taluka Niphad, District Nasik. The said godowns were numberd as Grampanchayat No.753 to 761. 2

Indisputably, a deed of sale was executed by the father of the respondent in favour of Vimal Chand Ghevar Chand Jain & Co., a partnership firm, on or about 29.6.1974. The said deed of sale was registered at Mumbai. Respondent himself was a witness to the said deed of sale.

On or about 1.7.1978, the possession of the said property was allegedly handed over to the father of the respondent as a licensee at an agreed licence fee of Rs.1,257.50 per month. The said partnership firm was dissolved pursuant whereto the appellant became the owner of the said property. Appellants contend that the respondent had made payments towards licence fee by a cheque but when deposited, the same was dishonoured.

3. Respondent, in his written statement, denied and disputed the said transactions. We may notice some of the statements made therein :

On the said findings, the suit was dismissed.

The dealing between the parties, however, are not accordingly."

23. In view of the findings aforementioned, it is not necessary for us to enter into the question as to whether the extrinsic evidence was admissible to show that a transaction of sale was, in fact, a sham one.

24. We cannot also accept the contention of Mr. Gupta that the decree should be allowed to be sustained with reference to the aforementioned stipulation in the deed of sale that in case the plaintiffs are dispossessed, the defendants would pay compensation. Such a case had never been made out. Such a question cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time before us.

26. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff's suit should have been decreed. 30

27. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments are set aside with costs throughout. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.25,000/-.

March 23, 2009
Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale vs Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale & Ors

3. Bapurao and Shivappa were step brothers. Laxmibai was wife of Bapurao. Shivappa married one Parvatibai.

4. Bapurao and Shivappa were living separately. They had separate businesses.

They however had some joint family properties which were acquired prior to 1934. Bapurao had also self acquired properties. Allegedly Bapurao, having suffered substantial loss in his business had incurred loan in the year 1955. He owed a sum of about Rs. 35,000/- to his creditors.

5. Purportedly with a view to save the property from the creditors, on or about 2-07-1955, four registered deeds were executed. The first being a deed of partition, in terms whereof, the joint family properties were divided in equal shares (which was marked as exhibit 36) and Bapurao sold his share of joint family property for a sum of Rs. 5000/- to Shivappa . He also allegedly sold his self acquired property to Shivappa for the said sum. Two deeds of settlement on the same day were executed by 3 Shivappa, in terms whereof, the lands transferred in his favour were settled to Bapurao for enjoyment during his lifetime.

11. The learned Trial Judge on the said findings, decreed the said suits. Appeals preferred theragainst, as noticed hereinbefore, were dismissed.

We would however consider the contentions raised before us independently.

23. Furthermore for claiming title by adverse possession, it was necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove animus possidendi.

26. For the reasons above mentioned, there is no merit in the appeals. The appeals are dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only).

MARCH 23, 2009
Punjab State Electricity Board & Ors vs Jit Singh

3) The facts in nutshell are, the respondent was appointed as security guard on ad hoc basis on 27.01.1976 and his services were regularized with effect from 9.8.1978. He retired from service on 1 attaining the age of superannuation on 31.7.2000. On his retirement, the respondent has received all the pensionary benefits.

5) To take benefit of the circular issued by the Board, the respondent had made a request to the Board to count his ad hoc service in the Board before regularization of his service for the purpose of calculating the pensionary benefits. The said claim is rejected by the Board vide its order dated 5.10.2004. This issue was agitated by the respondent by filing a Writ Petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The court has granted relief to the respondent. The findings and the conclusions reached therein is the subject matter of this civil appeal.

15) Now, we come to the order passed by the Board dated 5.10.2004.

16) In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order and direct the authorities of the Board to reconsider the claim of the respondent in accordance with law.

17) The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
M.L. Lingaiah & Ors vs Town Panchayath, Arkalgud & Anr

Karnataka Housing Board (for short, "the Board") constructed 32 houses under the subsidised rental housing scheme. The same were allotted to Town Panchayat, Arkalgud, District Hasan. The said allotment was cancelled on 22.2.1992 on the ground of default in the payment of instalments by the allottee. Thereafter, the Board allotted the houses to the appellants herein. Writ Petition No. 38853/1993 filed by R.K. Ramanna and others in the name of public interest litigation was allowed by the learned Single Judge and the order of cancellation as also the intimation of the allotment issued to the appellants were quashed. Thereafter, Town Panchayat filed writ petition no. 33117/2000 for being put in possession of 32 houses. The same was disposed of by the learned Single Judge with the observation that with the quashing of cancellation of allotment, the Town Panchayath will be deemed to be in possession of the houses and it is free to take appropriate ...2/-

action against the private respondents. Writ Appeal No. 8037/2003 filed by the appellants was disposed of by the Division Bench on 22.5.2005 with the direction that pending consideration of allotment of houses, the appellants shall not be dispossessed. However, on an application made by the respondent in the writ appeal, that order was recalled and the writ appeal was placed for fresh hearing. By the impugned order, the Division Bench disposed of the writ appeal with an observation that the order passed by the learned Single Judge will only amount to recognition of the right of the Town Panchayat as the allottee and to take appropriate action against its tenants.

Since the High Court disposed of the writ appeal without considering the effect of the sale deeds, which are said to have been executed by the Board in favour of the appellants, the order under challenge is liable to be set aside with direction to the High Court to decide the writ appeal afresh.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for disposal of the writ appeal in accordance with law.

It is directed that, till the disposal of the writ appeal, the appellants shall not be dispossessed from the houses in question.
State Of A.P vs P. Khaja Hussain

2. According to the prosecution version on 2/8/1999 the accused poured kerosene over his wife Pinjari Hussain Bee (hereinafer referred to as the deceased) and set her on fire. The prosecution version primarily restrained on two dying declarations purported to have been recorded by the Magistrate and by a police official. First dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate on 2/8/1999 on 11.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 15. Later on another dying declaration Ex. P. 20 was recorded by the Head Constable PW.12 after about one hour of the first dying declaration. The High Court noticed that there was variation between the two dying declarations 1 about the manner in which the deceased was set on fire. In fact that the two dying declarations can be reconciled with each other and since no other evidence was available to connect accused with crime the conviction as recorded was held to be not sustainable. Accordingly acquittal was directed.

6. The appeals stands dismissed.
M.D.,Sonalika International Tractor ... vs Dinesh Sharma & Ors

3. Backgrounds facts as projected by the appellant are as follows:

On 25.6.2004 after more than 2 years from the date of purchase of the tractor and one year from the date of dismissal of complaint by the District Consumer Forum, Bhind, the respondent No.1 with ulterior motives filed a complaint case No.896 of 2005 before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gohad, M.P. against respondent No.3 as well as the present appellant under Sections 120B, 420 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). In the complaint the allegation made is that at the time of sale it was falsely represented by the dealer that the tractor was of 40 HP capacity. It was stated that the complainant obtained information about the power capacity of the tractor and came to know that the tractor sold to him is of 33 HP capacity and the accused persons have cheated him. In the meantime, on 20.10.2005 the report was called from Central Farm Machinery Training and Testing Institute, Tractor Nagar, Budhni by M.P. State Commission. On 19.12.2005 the State Commission allowed the appeal and directed the appellant and respondent No.3 to jointly and severally pay Rs.27,000/- to respondent No.1.

3 On 23.3.2006 the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission issued notice and granted interim stay of order dated 19.12.2005 passed by the MP State Commission. On 22.4.2006 the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class dismissed the complaint of respondent No.1. On 12.3.2007 the Additional Sessions Judge allowed the Revision Petition filed by respondent No.1 and directed the learned Magistrate to register the complaint case of the complainant under Sections 120-B, 420 and 468 IPC.

9. That being so, the complaint proceedings cannot be maintained qua the appellant and are set aside.

10. The appeal is allowed.
Rajesh Pandey vs State Of U.P

3. Background facts, as projected by prosecution in a nutshell are as follows:

The accused-appellants admitted this fact that Smt. Rekha, daughter of complainant informant, Shiv Balak Tewari was married with the accused appellant Rajesh Pandey according to Hindu rites in the year 1995. But they denied the allegation regarding demand of dowry, torture and about causing death of deceased. They further stated that all the proceedings were conducted by the police on false consideration. The accused-appellant Rajesh Pandey further alleged that Smt. Rekha was desirous of partition of ancestral house and when she failed in her designs, she committed suicide by burning herself. He further stated that the prosecution witnesses have given evidence against him under undue pressure of one Ram Bharosey Tiwari. Smt. Shanti Devi stated that she was residing separately in a temple and she did not know how the deceased died. She also stated about factum of partition of the house as alleged by her son, Rajesh Pandey. The accused- appellant, Shivdhani also took same defence as taken by his son Rajesh Pandey. Smt. Rama Devi stated that she was a married lady and had come to 5 the house of her parents and was living in a temple separately. The deceased was not even on talking terms with her. She did not know how she died.

6. High Court allowed the appeal of the co-accused persons. But the appeal was dismissed so far as it relates to the present appellant. Trial Court and the High Court have with reference to the evidence on record categorically held that it was not a case of suicide. The victim died of burns. They have referred to letter Ext.Ka-2 to conclude about the demand of dowry and the torture meted out to the deceased. The conviction as recorded cannot be faulted. However, the sentence is reduced to eight years. If the appellant has served said period of sentence he shall be released from custody forthwith unless required to be in custody in any other case.

8. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Mannulal Fomra (D) By Lrs vs State Of West Bengal & Anr

The appellants owned property bearing Nos. 83 and 84, Acharya Jagdish Chandra Bose Road, Calcutta. Pursuant to notification dated 23.4.1976 issued under Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 [for short "the Act"], possession of premises bearing no.83 and a portion of premises bearing no. 84 was taken by Calcutta State Transport Corporation for establishment of a sub-depot. After fourteen years, the premises were acquired by the State Government vide notification dated 7.4.1990 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. By an award dated 19.6.1990, the Land Acquisition Collector assessed the market value of the ...2/-

land @ Rs.72,416/- per cottah. On a reference made at the instance of the appellants, the Special Land Acquisition Judge, Alipore vide his order dated 22.2.1994 assessed the market value of the land @ Rs.2,68,990/- per cottah. He also assessed the value of the structure at Rs.3,01,924/-.

The State Government challenged the award of the reference court by filing an appeal which was registered as First Appeal No.151 of 1995. On being noticed by the High Court, the appellants filed cross-objections which came to be registered as C.O.T. No. 1423 of 1995.

By the impugned order, the High Court dismissed the first appeal by recording a finding that the determination of market value made by the reference court was legally correct and justified. Simultaneously, the cross-objections filed by the appellants were also dismissed but without assigning any reason whatsoever.

In our opinion, the impugned order is liable to be set aside only on the ground that the cross-objections filed by the appellants were dismissed by the High Court without recording any reason.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order is set aside insofar as it relates to dismissal of the cross-objections of the appellants and the matter is remanded to the High Court for disposal of the cross-objections on merits in accordance with law after giving opportunities of hearing to the parties.
Chintamani Shikshan Prasarak Mandal vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

The appellant submitted an application dated 21.10.1998 to Nagpur University, Nagpur [for short "the University"] for grant of permission to start an Arts and Commerce College at Ghugus. Respondent no.3 also made similar application on 29.10.1998. The University forwarded both the applications to the State Government though recommendation was made only in favour of respondent no.3. In July 1999, a Committee comprising of the then Chief Minister, Deputy Chief Minister and Education Minister considered various applications filed for grant of permission to set up colleges at various places in the State. For Ghugus, the Committee decided to grant permission to the appellant for starting the college from academic year 1999-2000. Thereafter, the appellant established the college and admitted students for the academic year 1999-2000.

In view of the afore-mentioned development, we do not consider it necessary to go into the merits of the impugned order, but, at the same time, we are satisfied that it would be just and expedient to set aside the impugned order so that functioning of the college established by the appellant may not be adversely affected.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order is set aside and the writ petition filed by respondent no. 3 is dismissed leaving the question of law open to be decided in an appropriate case. No costs.