L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Union Of India & Ors vs Muralidhara Menon & Anr

Respondents herein were working in different States. They filed an application for their transfer to the State of `Kerala Charge' from `Gujarat Charge' on or about 14.5.1990. Indisputably the Board has the requisite power to regulate `inter-charge' transfers wherefor it issues guidelines from time to time. One of such circulars was issued on 14.5.1990, the relevant portion whereof read as under:

5. Respondents thereafter filed representations. The request made therein was not acceded to. They filed original applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal. It may be placed on record that one of the employees, Sri Nair, had filed a similar representation which was allowed by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. Other employees who had been transferred made similar representations. Their representations having been 4 rejected, Original Applications were filed which by reason of various judgments were allowed.

16. Respondents furthermore having given an undertaking and having opted to be transferred on the post of LDC could not have resiled therefrom. 10 They could not approbate and reprobate at the same time. If an order was passed on their representations, they were bound thereby particularly when the circular letter itself suggested that an order of transfer had been passed would be final and no order for retransfer could be passed. The principle of `estoppel' would, therefore, clearly be applicable.

18. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, we, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of 11 India, direct that in view of the fact that the first respondent has been working for a long time in the post of U.D.C., he may not be reverted to the post of L.D.C. but his seniority shall be counted from the date on which he has joined in the said post. No cost.

August 4, 2009
New India Assurance Co.Ltd vs Kusum & Ors

3. We would, however, notice the fact of the matter from CA @ Special Leave Petition (C) No.3372 of 2007.

On or about 14.7.1999, respondent No.3 was traveling in a bus bearing Registration No.PB-23-0189 which met with an accident as a result of which the deceased, Sanjay Kumar, got injured and while being taken to the hospital, he succumbed thereto. The said bus was owned by New Patiala Bus Service (Regd.) Sirhind, the respondent No.4 herein.

Legal representatives of the deceased filed a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal which by its order dated 4.12.2001 awarded a sum of Rs.2,68,800 by way of compensation. The learned Tribunal held that the driver of the bus had not been possessing a valid driving licence. The primary liability to pay the said amount was held to be that of respondent No.3 and 4, the driver and owner of the bus. The appellant was directed to deposit the amount directing that the company may recover the same from respondent Nos.3 and 4. Pursuant to the said observations, the appellant company made payments to the claimants on or about 15.3.2002 by depositing a sum of Rs.3,03,552/- by cheque. 3

9. Whenever, thus, a direction has been issued by the Tribunal, it must be held to have been done in exercise of its inherent power. It would be travesty of justice, if the Insurance Company which is directed to pay the amount and then face immense difficulties in executing a decree. 10 We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned judgments cannot be sustained. They are set aside accordingly. Appeals are allowed, the executing courts are directed to proceed with the execution and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible.

August 4, 2009
Shree Baidyanath Ayurved B. Pvt. Ltd vs Praveen Bhatia & Ors

2. The company appointed M/s. S. Bhatia Enterprises, Ludhiana (Respondent No.5 herein) (for short, `the firm') of which Praveen Bhatia, Ramkishan Bhatia, Ashwani Bhatia and Promila Bhatia are partners. The agreement between the parties incorporating the terms of conditions of the said contract of carrying and forwarding agency contained an arbitration clause. Allegedly, the jurisdiction of the Court to determine the dispute between the parties was fixed at Jhansi. Respondents are said to have committed misappropriation of a huge amount which was pointed out in the audit reports of 2000 and 2001. Furthermore, they are said to have created several other forged and fraudulent credits in favour of some entities in which they had substantial interest which was allegedly detected by the Company's Account Manager.

3. Parties hereto invoked the arbitration clause contained in the said agreement. The company appointed one Shri M.P. Dixit as an Arbitrator. The respondents are said to have appeared before the said Arbitrator and filed copies of the pleadings, applications etc. and also collected a copy of the note-sheet but absented themselves from other and further proceedings before the Arbitrator. Respondent, however, alleged that the purported agreement dated 1.10.1999 is a forged one and, in fact, an agreement had been entered into by and between the company and the firm on 1.4.1999. 3

5. The Firm filed five applications under Section 9 of the Act which were marked as Application No.68, 69, 72, 73 and 74 of 2004 through its partners against the company in the Court of District Judge, Ludhiana.

16. The transfer petition, therefore, is allowed. The cases mentioned in Anexure-I thereto are directed to be transferred to Jhansi. The Court concerned should send the records of the respective cases to the District Judge, Jhansi who shall in turn transfer them to the courts having appropriate jurisdiction in this behalf. The transferee court therefore should issue notices to the parties after fixing date(s) of hearing in the matters transferred to their courts.

August 4, 2009
State Of Maharshtra vs Sayed Mohammed Masood & Anr

3. The first respondent is the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of M/s City Limouzines (India) Ltd. (hereinafter called and referred for the sake of brevity as, "the said Company"). He established the said Company. A scheme known as "Go/Vehicle on rental basis and earning by sitting at home" was floated. In terms of the said Scheme, assurances were given to the people for earning money in easy way. A public advertisement was also issued in a newspaper. They also issued pamphlets and thereby attracted huge investments. In terms of the said Scheme, Rs.97,907/- was to be invested in `rent a car' scheme wherein agreement was executed inter alia providing that the car would be purchased in the name of investor but would be used by the Company on rent to others wherefor the investor would receive a sum of Rs.4,000/- per month for a period of five years. After 60 months, i.e., at the end of the agreement, the investor may take back his car in proper working condition. It was equally provided that an investor was entitled to inspect the vehicle given on lease/rent once in three months upon giving 15 days prior notice.

5. The complainant - respondent No.2, pursuant to the said advertisement, invested a sum of Rs.97,907/-. Indisputably, he was paid 4 Rs.4,000/- per month for a period of five years. However, despite demand, he was not given the car. He was, however, given three post-dated cheques of ABN Amro Bank amount to Rs. 25,000/-, Rs.20,000/- and Rs.10,000/- although he had asked for the said amount in cash.

The Division Bench of the High Court keeping in view the various clauses in the agreement entered into by and between the complainant and the said Company opined that although the investor might have been entitled to the car at the end of the period of five years, but as there has been no intention to defraud him at the time of inception of execution of the 6 agreement and the dispute between the parties revolved on interpretation of the clauses of the agreement, no offence under Sections 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code has been made out, stating:

14. The allegation made in the FIR and the materials collected during investigation, in our considered opinion, should be allowed to be taken to its logical end.

Subject to the aforementioned directions, the Investigating Officer shall carry out the investigation in accordance with law.

17. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and particularly in view of the materials which have surfaced during investigation, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.

August 4, 2009
Narinder Kumar Malik vs Surinder Kumar Malik

2. Parties to the litigation are real brothers having spent their childhood with cheer and joy in the courtyard, are here, now fighting tooth and nail for their respective shares in a piece of plot admeasuring 3149.75 sq. yds. allotted to the partnership firm, viz., M/s. Narinder Kumar Malik & Surinder Kumar Malik at D-2, Udyog Nagar, Rohtak Road, New Delhi.

4. The respondent filed a written statement and took an objection that the property was owned by a partnership firm and thus the suit for partition was not maintainable and rather a suit for dissolution of partnership firm ought to have been filed.

6. Both the applications came to be considered by the learned trial Judge on 04th November 2004. By the said order, the application filed by the respondent under O.VII R.11, CPC came to be dismissed. However, the application filed by the appellant herein under O.XII R.6, CPC came to be allowed and a preliminary decree of partition was passed in thefollowing terms:-

8. It appears, during the pendency of the said appeal in the High Court, good sense prevailed upon the two brothers and they arrived at a settlement and pursuant thereto "Memorandum of Understanding" (hereinafter referred to as 'MOU') came to be executed between themselves on 09th February 2005 at Delhi.

A registered notice dated 22nd June 2005 was sent to the appellant by respondent's advocate Mr. Harish Malhotra mentioning therein that his client, viz., the respondent herein is ready with the balance payment as mentioned in the said MOU and despite approaching the appellant, he has not been honouring the same. Appellant replied to the said notice through his advocate Shri Anuj Sehgal on 30th June 2005 denying the averments made in the notice and calling upon the respondent to pay the balance sum of Rs.3.25 crores to him on 07th July 2005 at 10.00 a.m. at 885, East Park Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. On payment of the aforesaid amount, it was categorically mentioned by the appellant that necessary transfer documents for transfer of his share of the property in the name of the respondent or his nominee would be executed.

16. In spite of the aforesaid order, the respondent filed an application being C.M. No.12796 of 2005 before the High Court seeking a direction to the appellant to execute necessary transfer documents in terms of the MOU.

20. Appellant, feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid direction contained herein, has preferred this appeal.

24. It was also contended by him that the appellant would be required to pay unearned increase of the plot to the Delhi Development Authority and, therefore, he has taken somersault from complying with the directions.

35. Thus, judgment and decree passed by the impugned order are hereby set aside and quashed, but, with no order as to costs.

36.The appeals are allowed accordingly.

August 04, 2009.
Attar Singh & Anr vs Union Of India & Anr

2. The Land Acquisition Collector made an award on 10th August, 1983 categorizing the acquired lands in three categories, i.e. `A', `B' and `C' and fixed the market value thereof at the rate of Rs.5,800/- per; Rs.4,800/- per bigha; and Rs.2,400/- per bigha respectively.

3. The awardees not being satisfied with the said award filed applications for reference before the District Collector. References having been made, the Reference Court vide its Award dated 22nd July, 1987 assessed the fair market value of the acquired land at Rs.9,750/- per bigha.

4. Still not satisfied, the appellants preferred appeals before the High Court seeking enhancement of compensation for acquisition of their lands at the rate of Rs.27,750/- per bigha.

6. A Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated February 28, 2003, however, on the basis of its earlier decision, assessed the fair market value at Rs.11,500/- per bigha.

We have not been informed whether any appeal has been preferred against that judgment and if so, what was the result thereof. In absence of that information, we are of the opinion that the appellants should not be treated differently from Jia Ram (supra) who might not have preferred any appeal and have accepted the judgment of the High Court.

17. For the reasons stated above, there is no merit in these appeals. The same are dismissed accordingly. No costs.

.....J. [ Cyriac Joseph ] New Delhi August 4, 2009 12
Sri Yerneni Raja Ramchander @ Rajababu vs State Of A.P. & Ors

The appellant was a member of the Legislative Assembly from Kaikalur Assembly Constituency in Krishna District (Andhra Pradesh). In the year 1998, he underwent a heart operation. It is alleged that in the year 2000, he along with one Sri Veera Swamy, who is said to be an employee of the Medical Hosptal, Secretariat Hyderabad, fabricated bogus hospital records. Claiming that he underwent Cardiac Surgery in the Medicity Hospital, medical reimbursement for a sum of Rs.2,89,489 was submitted to the Government which was sanctioned vide G.O. Rt.No.569 dated 10.5.2002.

5. On or about 18/19.8.2005, Respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein levelled charges of misappropriation against the appellant on the premise that he had obtained a huge amount on the basis of false and fabricated medical bills.

7. The Ethics Committee accepted the said apology and having regard to the fact that the said amount had been refunded, recommended for withdrawal of the criminal case pending against the appellant. Pursuant to the said recommendations, the State Government issued the aforementioned 5 GO directing the District Collector to direct the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the case. Thereafter only, the Public Prosecutor filed the aforementioned application under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Trial Judge for withdrawal of the case. We may, however, place that an earlier attempt was made to the same effect but the application for withdrawal of the prosecution was dismissed.

11. Both the State as also the appellant filed Criminal Revision Petitions before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh thereagainst. During the pendency of the above Criminal Revision Petitions, Respondent Nos.3 and 4 filed a writ petition as stated hereinbefore. The High Court by way of the 8 impugned judgment, allowed the writ petition filed by Respondent Nos.3 and 4 and dismissed the Criminal Revision Petitions filed by the State as also the appellant.

21. In view of the aforementioned decision of this Court, it is directed that the learned Magistrate shall proceed to deal with the matter independently and without in any way being influenced by any observations or findings made therein as if they do not exist.

22. These appeals are dismissed.

23. We, however, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, also direct that the State shall pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- to the Andhra Pradesh State Legal Services Authority within four weeks from date.

August 4, 2009
Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan ... vs State Of Punjab & Ors

2. Appellant-ShreeBaidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Pvt. Ltd. (for short, `the Company) is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. It appointed M/s. S. Bhatia Enterprises, Ludhiana (for short, `the firm') as its Carrying and Forwarding Agent under a contract. The company through its General Manager, Y.P. Sharma, lodged a First Information Report before the 2 PS Kotwali, Jhansi on or about 2.11.2001. The case was ultimately transferred to the Court of CJM Chandigarh by this Court by an order dated 24.2.2003.

4. The respondents filed an application for regular bail before the High Court. They also sought for stay of execution of non-bailable warrants against them. Both the applications were dismissed by the High Court vide its order dated 19.8.2005.

13. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained. The appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the appellant's application for cancellation of interim bail as also the respondents' application for grant of anticipatory bail.

14. For the aforementioned purpose, the order dated 28.4.2006 permitting the respondents not to press their applications is also set aside. The High Court must consider the matter afresh and upon hearing the parties and upon 6 taking into consideration all other relevant factors dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of this order.

August 4, 2009
B.M.Malani vs Commr.Of Income Tax & Anr

3. Appellant had been carrying on money-lending business and trading in shares and securities. On or about 4.9.1994, a raid was conducted in his residential premises by the authorities in exercise of their power under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act (for short, "the Act"). Amongst others, shares worth market value of Rs. 61.38 lakhs and a demand draft worth Rs. 10 lakhs in the name of PAN Clothing Company Limited were seized. By a letter dated 15.12.1994, a declaration was made by the appellant in terms of sub-Section (4) of Section 132 of the Act, by reason whereof he opted to pay taxes from out of the seized shares and securities stating that the shares be expeditiously disposed of and the sale proceeds therefrom be appropriated towards taxes.

10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that interests of justice would be subserved if the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Commissioner of Income Tax for consideration of the matter afresh.

11. The appeal is allowed accordingly to the aforementioned extent. No costs.

October 01, 2008
State, By Inspector, Tamil Nadu vs Sait @ Krishnakumar

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court directing acquittal of the respondent. The Trial Court, i.e. the Court of Sessions, Coimbatore had found the respondent guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short `the IPC'). It is to be noted that four persons, including the respondent were tried for -2- offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, Section 392 IPC and Section 392 read with Section 397 IPC. The present respondent, i.e. A-1 was tried for offences punishable under Section 392 read with Section 397 IPC and A-2 to A-4 were tried for offences punishable under Section 392 IPC. The learned Sessions Judge found the respondent guilty of offences punishable under Section 302 as well as for offences punishable under Section 392 read with Section 397 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and seven years rigorous imprisonment for the latter offence. The High Court found the evidence to be not cogent and credible and directed acquittal.

8. The view taken by the High Court after analysing the evidence cannot be said to be a view which is not possible to be taken.

9. That being so, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed.
Municipal Corpn, Ludhiana vs Inderjit Singh & Anr

One Hira Devi was the owner of a property bearing No.B-XXI- 12652 situated at Link Road near Pratap Chowk, Ludhiana. First Respondent is her grandson. She constructed a marriage hall. Inter alia, on the premise that a part of the said construction was unauthorized, a notice dated 10.1.2001 was issued asking her to show cause as to why the purported illegal construction of shed measuring 60' x 40' should not be demolished. She was asked to file a reply to the said notice of show cause within three days. Allegedly, Hira Devi refused to accept the said notice. Another notice was issued on 1.2.2001 which was also not served. Appellant, however, contended that the respondent was fully aware of the contents thereof as an application for compounding that portion of the construction which was within the compoundable limit was filed. On an oral request made by the first respondent, a compounding fee of Rs.1,95,374/- was fixed. Allegedly, a memorandum was issued asking him to pay the said amount but he failed and/or neglected to do so.

4. A suit was filed by the respondent No.1 for permanent injunction restraining the appellant from demolishing the said property. In the plaint of the said suit, it was, inter alia, averred that there was no excess covered area in terms of the sanctioned plan and if there be any, the plaintiff was ready to pay the compounding fee. The contention of the plaintiff in this 3 behalf was that only an area of 14 sq. ft. was in excess of the legally sanctioned plan. The Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ludhiana, on an application filed by the first respondent passed an interim order on 26.3.2001, directing :

6. In the said notice, averments were made with regard to issuance of the earlier notices as also the assessment of compounding fee on a purported oral request made by him. On the premise that no cause was shown, a demolition order was issued on 21.12.2001.

7. An appeal preferred against the said order dated 14.12.2001 in the Court of District Judge, Ludhiana was allowed holding that although the first two notices dated 10.01.2001 and 01.02.2001 had not been served but in the meanwhile the alleged unauthorized construction was demolished. It was directed:

It is, therefore, not a case where one statutory order has been set aside by a higher authority. The said principle, therefore, had no application to the fact of the instant case.

18. We would, however, proceed on the basis that the plan was sanctioned. It would, therefore, be proper to direct that the appellant should be directed to restore such constructions for which order of sanction had been obtained. To the said extent the impugned order is modified.

19. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed subject to the aforementioned modifications. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the appellant will pay and bear the costs of the respondent No.1. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lacs only.) .............................J. [S.B. Sinha] .............................J. [Aftab Alam] New Delhi;

October 1, 2008
Talwara Coop.Credit &Service; Society ... vs Sushil Kumar

4. A writ petition preferred thereagainst has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.

If only the same is discharged by the workman, the onus of proof would shift on to the employer to show that the concerned employee was in fact gainfully employed.

15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the respondent was employed for a short period and that too in two different spells, viz., from 1987 to 1990 and from 1995 to 1997. Having regard to the fact that the respondent has not worked for a long period and the appellant does not have any capacity to pay as it is a sick unit, interest of justice would be subserved if in stead and place of an award of reinstatement with full back wages, a compensation for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs only) is directed to be paid. The said sum would be over and above the amount which the appellant has deposited in terms of the order of the High Court under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions. No costs.

October 01, 2008