G.M. Haryana Roadways vs Jai Bhagwan & Anr

2. Indisputably, he was continuously working from 4.8.1995. Allegedly, he abandoned the service. First Respondent's contention, however, is that his services were illegally terminated.

3. First respondent filed an application under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 praying for his reinstatement with full back wages along with continuity of service and other statutory benefits. The said application was allowed by the Labour Court. Before the Labour Court, appellant did not adduce any evidence to establish to its contention that workman himself had left his job. Apart from the fact that he was found to be working for more than 240 days during the period of 12 months preceding the date of his termination and furthermore as admittedly the mandatory requirements of Section 25F of the Act had not been complied with, the learned labour court also found that some drivers who were junior to him had been retained in service in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act. It was, therefore, directed that the respondent be reinstated on his previous post with continuity of service and full back wages from the date of service of the notice of demand.

4. The said award appears to have been implemented in part as the first respondent was reinstated in service by an order dated 10.5.2002 passed by the General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Rohtak, stating :

5. It is a matter of some significance that on the said date, namely, 10.5.2002, no writ petition had been filed. A writ petition was filed questioning the said award before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh only on 27.7.2002. It does not appear that even in the writ petition, the fact that first respondent had been reinstated in service in term of the award of the learned Labour Court was disclosed. The said writ petition was summarily dismissed by an order dated 23.9.2002.

6. Relying on or on the basis of a purported scheme for regularization, the services of the first respondent were regularized, stating :

The court notices that so as to enable it to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, the suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the Appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

13. Furthermore, the State was guilty of serious delay and latches. We, therefore, are of the opinion that for suppression of fact of such a nature and that too at the instance of the State must be viewed seriously. We hope and trust that in future the State shall take necessary measures in pursuing its matter before the Superior Court keeping in view the conduct expected of a State.

14. We, therefore, direct that not only this special leave petition should be dismissed but exemplary costs should also be awarded in the matter. The cost is quantified at Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lac only). As the respondent had not appeared today, we are of the opinion that the cost should be paid to the National Legal Services Authority. The amount may be deposited with the Member-Secretary, National Legal Services Authority within a period of four weeks failing which it would be entitled to realize the same in accordance with law with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.