L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of Maharashtra & Ors vs Mehamud

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench quashing the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Nagpur Bench. By the order dated 12th August, 1999 the District Magistrate had directed detention of the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the 'Detenu') under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act , 1981 (in short the 'Act'). By the said order the District Magistrate had ordered that the detenu was to be treated as a "dangerous person" and therefore there was need to detain him. The order of detention was served on the detenu on 14th August, 1999 and the period of detention was to last for one year. The order of detention was challenged before the High Court primarily on two grounds; firstly there should have been a contemporaneous or simultaneous service of the grounds on the detenu as the said grounds alone contained intimation to him that representation could be made by him to the State Government; secondly, there was no material to show that detenu was habitually committing or attempting to commit crimes mentioned in Chapters XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The High Court did not find any substance in the first plea but accepted the second plea on the ground that use of the expression "habitually commits or attempts to commit" must be established by facts. According to the High Court, expression "habitually commits"

12. As the order of detention shows the detenu was involved in fourteen cases and several cases were pending which related to offences punishable under Chapter XVI and XVII of the IPC and Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959 (in short the 'Arms Act'). Considering the nature of the jurisdiction which the detaining authority exercises, the conclusion of the High Court that there must be a conviction before it can be said that the detenu habitually commits offences is clearly unsustainable.

13. The appeal is bound to succeed. Since learned counsel for the State has fairly stated that because of passage of time there may not be any necessity for sending back detenu for detention to serve the unexpired period in the present case, the detenu did not surrender to serve the remaining period of sentence.

14. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Lala Ram vs State Of Rajasthan

1. Three appellants before the Rajasthan High Court alongwith one Giluda faced trial for alleged offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the 'IPC'). A Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench directed acquittal of the Giluda and upheld the conviction so far as the appellants before it are concerned. Each one of them was found guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. 23 persons were named in the First Information Report (in short the 'FIR') but after investigation police filed charge sheet against seven of them. The appellants before High Court along with three others, namely, Babu Ram, Raghuveer and Kailash faced trial. Said Babu Ram, Raghuveer and Kailash were acquitted by the trial court. Each of the appellants was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life each to pay fine about Rs.1,000/- with default stipulation. Only the present appellant has questioned legality of the judgment of the High Court.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

12. If the factual scenario as noted above is considered in the background of legal principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that Section 34 has been rightly applied.

14. We record our appreciation for the able manner in which Mr. Shakeel Ahmed, learned Amicus Curiae assisted the Court.

15. Appeal stands dismissed.
Heera & Anr vs State Of Rajasthan

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

3. On this report a case under Section 395 IPC was registered and investigation commenced. On completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed. Thirty seven witnesses were examined by the prosecution to further its version. Accused persons pleaded innocence and claimed trial. The trial court found evidence of witnesses to be credible and cogent. It is to be noted that in the Test Identification Parade (in short the 'TI Parade''). A1-Heera, A-6 Nopa i.e. the present appellants were identified. Recovery were also made pursuant to the information given by them in terms of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act , 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'). The TI Parade of the accused persons was conducted through Shri Mahendra Kumar, Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate. PW- 1-Prem Singh identified A1 and A6. PW-11- Bhanwar Singh identified A1- Heera. As noted above, trial Court convicted all the seven accused persons and in appeal conviction of present appellants was maintained by the High Court.

17. In the instant case the accused persons have been identified by PWs 1 and 11 and no infirmity was noticed in their evidence. Additionally, evidence of PW 22 clearly shows that all requisite formalities with regard to Test Identification Parade were adopted and followed. In that view of the matter there is no merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

18. We record our appreciation for the able manner in which Ms. Tanuj Bagga Sharma, learned Amicus Curiae assisted the Court.
Hazarilal vs State Of M.P

2. Dashoda Bai (hereinafter called as 'deceased') was the daughter of Asha Ram (PW-1) and Parvati Bai (PW-2). According to the prosecution she committed suicide by burning herself on 28.8.1989 in the house of her husband. About 10 days before the occurrence she was blessed with a son.

9. That being so, the conviction as recorded by the High Court cannot be maintained and the order of the High Court is unsustainable and indefensible.

10. The appeal is allowed. The bail bonds executed for the purpose of bail stand discharged.
State Of Haryana vs Jagat Paul & Ors

2. The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

8. Therefore, the conclusions of the High Court that the conviction would be under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC is clearly unsustainable. The trial court had rightly convicted the accused persons for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The conviction and the sentence shall stand restored. So far as the respondent -Jagat Paul is concerned the High Court has indicated the reasons for directing his acquittal. It has noted that Jagat Paul had no role to play in the occurrence. It was noted that the earlier quarrel took place between Om Prakash, son of the complainant and Ran alias Ran Singh the real brother of the accused had reasons to attack deceased and Prabhu. Jagat Paul is not related to the co-accused persons. The High Court found that he had no animosity so far as the complainant party is concerned. We find no reason to take a different view and therefore the acquittal of accused Jagat Paul cannot be faulted. The appeal stands dismissed so far as he is concerned.

9. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.
Depot Superintendent H.P.Corpn. Ltd. & ... vs Kolhapur Agri. Market Commtt. Kolhapur

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

According to the appellant, the respondent by its conduct agreed to extend the lease by accepting rent on 2nd December, 1997. On 22nd October, 1997 respondents have been noticed by the appellant-Corporation calling upon the Corporation to vacate the suit land and hand over the possession to the respondent. Respondent filed Civil Suit No. 399 of 1998 with the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division Kolhapur on 18.4.1998 inter alia praying for possession of the suit land and mesne profit on the ground that though the respondent served upon the appellant the notice of surrender of possession of land, the appellant avoided giving back the possession.

4. By order dated 2.11.2002 the amendment was allowed.

5. By order dated 4.10.2004 the Civil appeal was dismissed. Second appeal was filed by the appellant before the Bombay High Court. By the impugned order the High Court dismissed the second appeal.

8. Stands before the High Court were reiterated in this appeal.

10. As rightly observed by the High Court that there is no automatic renewal and there can be renewal only if it is so desired by the Central Government. There is no material placed before the courts below that there was any desire in that regard by the Central Government. The appeal is, therefore, sans merit and deserves to be dismissed. But in terms of the notice dated 11.4.2005 time for handing over the possession is extended up to end of June, 2009. Undertaking in that regard shall be filed within two weeks from today. If the undertaking is not filed, this order shall not be operative.

11. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
Prabhakaran vs State Of Kerala

2. The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

4. The respective stand taken before the High Court was re- iterated in this appeal.

12. Almost 1.2 million people are killed each year and 20-50 million are injured or disabled, most people are unaware that road traffic injuries are a leading cause of death and disability.

15. The human toll in such accidents is tragic. Survivors and family members are affected not only by an immediate death or disability, but also lifetime psychological and physical suffering. Crashes often result in orphans, and some victims, as young as infants, spend the rest of their lives with medical facilities.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

THIS PROBLEM IS PREVENTABLE

18. Proven interventions for developed countries require research, modification, and testing for developing countries. For example, developing countries face poorly designed and maintained roadways, unsafe vehicles, drivers under the influence of drugs or alcohol, lack of national policies, and inadequate enforcement. Success will require significant new resources supported by sustained political commitment.

19. When the factual scenario of the present case is analysed, it is crystal clear that the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 A IPC and not Section 304 Part II IPC. Conviction is accordingly altered. The maximum sentence which can be imposed for offence punishable under Section 304A is two years with fine or with both. The custodial sentence, therefore, is reduced to the maximum i.e. two years.

21. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Shaikah Bakshu And Ors vs State Of Maharashtra

The cause of death, according to the medical officer, was due to cardio respiratory failure due to superficial deep 66% burns. Anil Gaikwad (PW-6) conducted the investigation of the case. He had drawn spot panchnama and recorded statements of witnesses. All the appellants were arrested on 20.8.2001. The clothes of appellants were also seized. The seizure panchnamas are at Exhibits 42, 43 and 44. On 21.8.2001, viscera and articles seized on the spot were sent to Chemical Analyser, whose report is Exhibit 15. In viscera, no poison was detected. Kerosene was detected on the clothes of accused, which were seized. After completion of investigation, the charge-sheet was filed. The case was committed by JMFC, Parbhani, to the Court of Sessions for trial. The charges in Exhibit 10 were framed and the appellants were tried before the Court, to which they pleaded not guilty and came to be tried.

9. In view of the aforesaid infirmities the inevitable conclusion is that the accusations of prosecution have not been established.

10. The judgment of the High Court cannot be maintained and the same is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The appellants are acquitted of the charges. They be set forth at liberty if not required in any other case.
Kulwant Singh @ Kulbansh Singh vs State Of Bihar

5. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

114. Section 114 applies where a criminal first abets an offence to be committed by another person, and is subsequently present at its commission. Active abetment at the time of committing the offence is covered by Section 109. and Section 114 is clearly intended for an abetment previous to the actual commission of the crime, that is before the first steps have been taken to commit it.

14. When the factual scenario is tested on the background of principles of law set out above, it is clear that Section 109 IPC has clear application.

15. The appeal is sans merit, deserves to be dismissed which we direct.
State Of Rajasthan vs Chittarmal

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench altering conviction of the respondent from one punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') to Section 304A IPC. Two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5000/- with default stipulation was awarded.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

4. In this case the prosecution examined 15 witnesses and referred to several documents. Statement of accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'Cr. P.C.') was recorded. He stated that he has been falsely implicated in this case. He was not cultivating the field. Prosecution witnesses relating to the incident are closely related to the complainant. He has also examined Phool Chand (DW-1) in his defence.

5. On the basis of evidence produced before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, he held that due to enmity with the intention to kill Ram Kumar and his son Murlidhar, accused Chhittar fixed naked live wire of electricity on the drain for supplying water in the field in between the fields of Ram Kumar and Chhittar with the result that in the night when Ram Kumar went to his field he died due to electric current. When Murlidhar went there to give tea to his father he also came in contact with the electric wire and died on the spot. On this finding he convicted the accused under Section 302 IPC and sentenced as mentioned above.

13. In view of the analysis made by the High Court, the inevitable conclusion is that prosecution has not been able to establish the accusation under Section 302 IPC and the High Court rightly convicted the accused under Section 304A IPC.

14. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
State Of Madhya Pradesh & Anr vs Bachha Lal & Anr

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

6. The trial court held that the basic grievance of the present respondents related to action of the present appellants' officials in making search and alleged obstructions in the official duties. It was therefore held that the suit was not maintainable since permission of the State Government is required under Section 48 of the Act. Accordingly the trial court directed that suit be permitted to be withdrawn under Order 23 Rule 1(3)(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the 'CPC') with a liberty that they may institute fresh suit after obtaining necessary permission from the State Government.

(2) No suit shall be instituted against the State Government and no prosecution or suit shall be instituted against any servant of the State Government in respect of any thing done or intended to be done under this Act unless the suit or prosecution has been instituted within three months from the date of the act complained of:

13. Appeal is allowed. Costs made easy.
Balbir Singh vs State Of Delhi

2. The controversy lies within a very narrow compass and a brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice.

The appellant and one Paljit Kaur @ Richpal Kaur @ Pali wife of Paramjit Singh had allegedly committed offence punishable under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of TADA Act and Sections 25 and 26 of the Arms Act. Charge sheet was filed on 20.8.1993. The allegations related to alleged commission of offence on 5th December, 1992. By amendment to TADA Act, Section 20-A(2) was introduced with effect from 22.5.1993 i.e. prior to filing of the charge sheet. Charges were framed on 16.12.1993. Bail was granted to the appellant on 6.5.1994. Subsequently, on expiry of eight years' currency period, the term of TADA Act expired on 23.5.1995. By order dated 19.4.1997 the Designated Court held that in absence of sanction of the Commissioner of Police as required under sub- section (2) of Section 20-A of TADA Act, the proceedings were non est and the cognizance taken by the Court for offences under the TADA Act was bad in law.

3. The expression used by the concerned Court in the judgment dated 19.4.1997 was "acquittal of the accused persons for the want of sanction". Subsequently, pursuant to the order by the concerned Court goods seized were retained 3.2.1998. On 4.7.2001 sanction was accorded and the order in that regard was passed and the charge sheet was filed on 18.7.2001 and summons were issued on 2.3.2002 by the impugned order.

They are not intended to operate as hard-and- fast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made.

(6) This is an appropriate occasion to remind the Union of India and the State Governments of their constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary quantitatively and qualitatively by providing requisite funds, manpower and infrastructure. We hope and trust that the Governments shall act.

We answer the questions posed in the orders of reference dated 19.9.2000 and 26.4.2001 in the abovesaid terms."

14. The impugned order passed by the Designated Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. However, the trial Court is requested to dispose of the matter as early as practicable preferably within 6 months from the date of communication of this order.

15. The appeal is dismissed.
Ram Krishan Mahajan vs Union Territory Of Chandigarh And ...

25. Learned counsel then argued that some lands which had been earlier notified for acquisition have been released by the Government as late as on 9th January, 2004 exercising its powers under Section 48 of the Act. This fact by itself does not justify the conclusion that there was discrimination in the matter of acquisition of land. It appears from the Notification produced before us that some of the lands in Darshani Bagh had to be released in the peculiar facts of the case. It appears that the Notification for acquisition had been earlier quashed by the High Court on August 11, 1997 but on a review petition being filed by the Chandigarh Administration, the earlier order allowing the writ petition was recalled on January 31, 2003 and thereafter an award was pronounced by the Land Acquisition Officer on March 5, 2003. During the interregnum of about 10 years from the date of issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Act many constructions had come up on a portion of the acquired land. It was under these circumstances that those lands were exempted from acquisition in exercise of powers conferred by Section 48 of the Act.

24. We find that the respondents had good reasons for not acquiring lands over which there stood permanent structures which had been raised after getting building plans sanctioned from the concerned authority. The appellant has no where averred that he had raised the structure after getting a building plan duly sanctioned by the concerned authority. The mere fact that the shop was given a number is not at all relevant in the facts of the case.

26. We have considered the facts of the case and the material placed before us, since the issue raised before us was not argued before the High Court in the manner it was argued before us. That is why we find no categoric finding of the High Court on this issue. However, after considering the material on record we are satisfied that the appellant's plea that in the facts and circumstances his land should also have been exempted from acquisition has no merit.

27. We, therefore, find no merit in these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

28. I.A. Nos.2 and 3 in Civil Appeal No.2567 of 2004 are dismissed. I.A. No.4 in Civil Appeal No.2569 of 2004 is rejected but without prejudice to the right of the applicant to seek remedy, if any, in accordance with law before the appropriate forum.
Commissioner Of Income Tax, Kerala vs M/S Tara Agencies

3. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are as under:

4. Section 35B (1A) was introduced with effect from 01.04.1978 and the respondent assessee claimed entitlement to weighted deduction being a small scale exporter. The Income Tax Officer disallowed the claim of the respondent assessee.

5. The respondent assessee aggrieved by the said order preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The appeal filed by the respondent assessee was allowed on the ground that the respondent assessee was a small scale industrial unit in the light of certificate of registration granted to it by the Directorate of Industries, Kerala State. The respondent was engaged in purchasing different kinds of tea and blending the same for the purpose of export and was entitled to the weighted deduction under section 35B (1A) of the Act.

7. The Revenue challenged the judgment of the Tribunal before the High Court. The High Court upheld the judgment of the Tribunal. The Revenue, aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court, has preferred this appeal.

9. All the three stages, namely, production, manufacturing and processing of tea can be enumerated as under. The tea is produced in the tea gardens. This first stage is called production of tea. The second stage is manufacture of tea. In this stage, the tea leaves are plucked from the tea bushes and by mechanical process, tea leaves are converted to tea. This second stage is considered manufacturing of tea. The third stage is blending of different qualities of tea in order to smoothen its marketability. This third stage is considered processing of tea.

section (3);

shall be liable to pay tax under this Act, which shall be 3 per cent of his turnover. (3) The goods referred to in clause (b) of sub- section (1)

69. Consequently, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside and, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
State Of Kerala & Ors vs K. Prasad & Anr

Objections, if any, can be filed against the list published within one month from the date of publication of the list. Such objection shall be filed before the Assistant Educational Officers or the District Educational Officers as the case may be. Every objection filed shall be accompanied by a chalan for Rs.10/ remitted into the Treasury. Objections filed without the necessary chalan receipt shall be summarily rejected.

Explanation: - For the removal of doubts it is hereby clarified that it shall not be necessary to prepare the two lists simultaneously and that it shall be open to the Director to prepare only one of the lists.

(3) The Assistant Educational Officer and the District Educational Officer may thereafter conduct enquiries, hear the parties, visit the areas and send their report with their views on the objections raised to the Director within two months from the last date of receipt of the objections. The Director, if found necessary, may also hear the parties and finalise the list and send his recommendation with the final list to Government within two months from the last date of the receipt of the report from the Educational officers.

16. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Division Bench was not justified in directing the State Government to accord the same treatment which had been given to two other schools, which had been upgraded ignoring the statutory rules and upgrade the respondents' schools. In this view of the matter, decision of the High Court is clearly unsustainable and deserves to be set aside.

17. In the result, the appeal is allowed; the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and both the writ petitions are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.