Hari Bansh Lal vs Sahodar Prasad Mahto & Ors

3) Brief facts:

16) Before considering the materials relied on by the High Court, it is relevant to mention CWJC No. 924 of 2001 which was filed to ensure that persons of unimpeachable integrity alone are made members of the Board. The High Court issued an interim order holding that any 1 appointments made would be subject to the final outcome of the writ petition. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan and Mr. Sachidanand Akhauri were appointed as Chairman and Member of the Board respectively. The appellant herein was not a party to the said writ petition. By order dated 21.09.2001, the High Court allowed the said writ petition and set aside the appointment of Mr. Rajiv Ranjan and others. Certain aspects in the judgment are relevant to the present case. They are, while discussing the facts antecedent to the appointment of Mr. Rajiv Ranjan and others, the fact that the appellant herein was originally chosen by the Chief Minister for the post of Chairman of the Board was discussed and the fact that the Chief Secretary of the State noted in his objections that probably the appellant herein was suspended earlier when he was in government service and a raid was conducted was noted by the High Court in the said judgment. The High Court, however, made it amply clear at the end of the 1 judgment that its observations regarding the appellant and others is not to be construed as an opinion with respect to the correctness of those observations. It is relevant to point out that review petitions were filed by the State of Jharkhand and Sachidanand Akhauri who was one of the persons appointed to the Board and whose appointment was also quashed. By order dated 04.04.2002, the High Court allowed both review petitions, primarily on the ground that Mr. Rajiv Ranjan and Mr. Sachidanand whose appointments were quashed were not parties in the writ proceedings and they should have been heard before setting aside their appointment. When Mr. H.B. Lal filed impleadment application in the review petition in view of certain observations made about him in the original judgment, the High Court made it clear that no adverse order was passed and no adverse observations were made against him and that the judgment does not operate adversely or prejudicially against him. 1

18) It is highly useful to refer a decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, (1974) 4 SCC 3. The 2 facts are that the petitioner was a member of Indian Administrative Service. On July 11, 1969 he was posted to act on the post of Additional Chief Secretary temporarily created in the grade of Chief Secretary for one year. On November 13, 1969 he was posted to act as Chief Secretary. On April 7, 1971 he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission created temporarily for a period of one year in the grade of Chief Secretary to Government. The petitioner went on leave and even after returning from leave he did not join the said post. By order dated June 27, 1972 Government created another temporary post of Officer on Special Duty for one year in the grade of Chief Secretary to Government and the petitioner was transferred to the said post but he did not join the duties and in July, 1972 the petitioner filed the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court asking for a writ of mandamus or any writ, direction or order directing the respondent to 2 withdraw and cancel the order dated June 27, 1972.

Sd/- Indra Dev Jha Additional Secretary to Government, Electricity Department."

90. In the light of the above precedents, we have considered whether this is a fit case where this Court should issue a mandamus or remit the matter back to the State Government. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts of the case, we are of the view that having regard to our findings on Points 1 to 5 and to the continuous unfair treatment meted out to the appellant by the State of Tamil Nadu -- even as accepted by the Central Government in its comments -- this is a pre-eminently fit case requiring the issue of a mandamus. We are, therefore, constrained to exercise all the powers of this Court for rendering justice and to cut short further proceedings. The consideration of the appellant's case for the said promotion has been hanging fire and going up and down for the last twenty- five years. Disgusted with the delays, the appellant has also taken voluntary retirement. In the light of our decision on Points 1 to 5, we declare the censure in the fourth case as void and without jurisdiction and in the alternative also, as liable to be quashed under Wednesbury principles. The adverse remarks of bygone years prior to 1972 have lost all their sting. The positive factors in the appellant's favour both recorded (at the compulsion of the Central Government) and others to which we have referred to earlier as meriting consideration are, in our opinion, sufficient to entitle him for promotion to the super-time scale. The appellant's case is, in our view, no less inferior to the cases of the other officers who were conferred the similar benefit of super-time scale by the State of Tamil Nadu, details of which have been profusely given in the writ petition. For the aforesaid reasons, we quash the punishment of censure, the assessment made by the Joint Screening Committee, the Orders passed by the State and Central Government refusing to grant him super-time scale and in rejecting the appeal of the appellant and we further direct as follows:

AUGUST 30, 2010 3