L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Nimmagadda Prasad vs C.B.I., Hyderabad

Brief facts:

16) According to the CBI, the appellant (A-3) had been a Director in M/s Indus Projects Ltd., which was awarded many projects/contracts by the Government of Andhra Pradesh during the period between 2004 and 2009.

19) In the status report, it is also mentioned that M/s Indus Projects Limited suddenly came into picture claiming to be the holding company of M/s Lepakshi Knowledge Hub Private Limited and availed loans amounting to Rs. 790 crores from different banks/NBFCs by mortgaging about 4,397 acres of land. It is the assertion of the prosecution that all the funds were misappropriated by M/s Indus Projects Ltd. for their real estate activities and other business needs. According to the CBI, so far, the investigation has revealed that at least Rs. 88 crores out of the above funds have come back to M/s Indus Projects Ltd. through hawala channels/fake work orders/forged RA bills. It is the grievance of the CBI that the investigation so far has revealed that after more than four and a half years, the project has failed to take off and no job has been generated so far. It is also the allegation of the CBI that the Banks/NBFCs adopted an average market value of Rs. 20 lakh per acre while disbursing loans to M/s Indus Projects Ltd. which were given to the company at a price ranging between Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 1,75,000 lakh per acre. According to the CBI, the value of 8,844 acres of land dishonestly alienated to a private company would be around Rs. 1,768 crores approx. Though they secured loan documents from various banks, yet they are awaiting similar documents from Punjab National Bank, Bank of India, UCO Bank, Kotak Mahindra Bank and State Bank of India.

MAY 9, 2013.
State Of M.P.& Ors vs Sanjay Nagayach & Ors

4. The Board of Directors of the Bank was elected to Office on 16.10.2007 and while in office they were served with a show-cause-notice dated 2.3.2009 issued by the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies under Section 53(2) of the Act containing 19 charges. Detailed replies were sent by the Board of Directors on 6.5.2009 and 16.5.2011 stating that most of the charges levelled against them were related to the period of the previous Committee and the rest were based exclusively on an Audit Report dated 25.9.2008. It was pointed out that the Board of Directors on receipt of the Audit report took necessary action and a communication dated 5.12.2008 was sent to the Branch Managers of Primary Societies to take immediate follow-up action on the basis of the Audit report. After filing the detailed reply, nothing was heard from the Joint Registrar but due to political pressure and extraneous reasons after two and half years of the show cause notice, an order of supersession was served on the Board, followed by the appointment of an Administrator in gross violation of the second proviso to Section 53(1) of the Act.

The Registrar may, by order in writing remove the Board of Directors an appoint a person or persons to manage the affairs of the society for two months which may be extended by him for such period not exceeding six months for reasons to be recorded in writing:

Registrar/Joint Registrar and External Influence:

30. The Registrar/Joint Registrar, while exercising powers of supersession has to form an opinion and that opinion must be based on some objective criteria, which has nexus with the final decision. A statutory authority shall not act with pre-conceived notion and shall not speak his masters’ voice, because the formation of opinion must be his own, not somebody else in power, to achieve some ulterior motive. There may be situations where the Registrar/Joint Registrar are expected to act in the best interest of the society and its members, but in such situations, they have to act bona fide and within the four corners of the Statute. In our view, the impugned order will not fall in that category.

Judicial Precedents

34. In such circumstances of the case, we are inclined to dismiss both the appeals with costs directing re-instatement of the first respondent Board of Directors back in office forthwith and be allowed to continue for the period they were put out of office by the impugned order which has been quashed. We also direct the State of Madhya Pradesh to pay an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- to the Madhya Pradesh Legal Services Authority within a period of one month by way of costs and also impose a cost of Rs.10,000/- as against the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Sagar, the officer who passed the order, which will be deducted from his salary and be deposited in the Panna DCB within a period of two months from today. Ordered accordingly.

35. Further, we are inclined to give the following general directions in view of the mushrooming of cases in various Courts challenging orders of supersession of elected Committees:
State Of M.P vs Dal Singh & Ors

18. In the dying declaration recorded by P.K. Chaturvedi (PW.12), it is stated that the mother-in-law of Kusumbai had set her on fire by throwing kerosene oil on her, and that her father-in-law had also set her on fire. Her husband Chandrabhan, had closed the door. While she screamed in pain, her uncle Hakam Singh had brought her out by opening the door. While lodging the FIR, it was recorded by R.S. Parmar (PW.14), that her father-in-law Dal Singh had said, ‘burn this bitch’. Her father-in-law had then lifted the kuppi of kerosene oil, and had poured the same on her, after which he had told his wife to set her ablaze. Thereafter, her mother-in-law had lit a matchstick and set her on fire. She had started to scream because of pain. Her husband Hallu had then closed the door of the room. After hearing the hue and cry raised by her, a person from the village had informed her family who lived closeby. Her father Nirpat Singh, uncle Hakam Singh and several other persons had come there, and her uncle Hakam Singh, had opened the door and had brought her out. There is thus, some discrepancy in both the dying declarations.

There is thumb impression of the deceased on the FIR also. We have carefully seen the thumb impression of the deceased on the said dying declaration. The same has ridges and curves.

27. We cannot accept the submissions made on behalf of the respondents stating that Kusumbai had been tutored by her parents, as the evidence on record clearly reveals that the tractor had been brought at the instance of the respondents, and that they had been present in the trolley with her parents and other relatives throughout. Therefore, her parents and other relatives could have had no opportunity to implicate the respondents, or to tutor her.

28. Thus, in view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order impugned before us, passed by the High Court is set aside, and the judgment and order of the trial court is restored. The respondents are directed to surrender within a period of four weeks from today, failing which the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Damoh, Madhya Pradesh, shall take them into custody and send them to jail to serve out the remaining part of their sentence. A copy of the order be sent to the CJM by the registry.
Yogendra @ Yogesh & Ors vs State Of Rajasthan

However, they have been acquitted of the charge under Section 148 IPC. The appeals of the other accused persons, namely, Ratan Singh, Kalwa, Ghambhir Singh and Paras Ram were allowed.

3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:-

B. During the course of the investigation, Veer Pal succumbed to his injuries and therefore, Section 302 IPC was also added. His dead body was subjected to an autopsy, and necessary memos had been prepared. Statements of witnesses were recorded. The accused persons were arrested, and on completion of the investigation, a chargesheet had been filed. Upon conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court had convicted the appellants alongwith several others, as has been mentioned hereinabove, vide judgment and order dated 8.4.2003. C. Aggrieved, they preferred Criminal Appeal No. 583 of 2003 which was disposed of vide impugned judgment dated 3.12.2007, which acquitted a few people, but the conviction of the appellants with certain modifications was upheld, as has been referred to hereinabove.

Ghambhir Singh (appellant) sustained simple injuries that were incorporated in injury report (Ex.D.15).”

12. The High Court, after re-appreciating the evidence on record, has rightly rejected the contention of self-defence that had been raised, and acquitted some of the convicted accused, giving them the benefit of doubt. In light of such a fact-situation, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The present appeal thus lacks merit, and is accordingly dismissed. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds are cancelled, and they are directed to surrender within a period of four weeks from today, failing which the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bharatpur shall take them into custody, and send them to jail to serve out the remaining part of their sentence. A copy of this order be sent to the CJM, Bharatpur by the registry for information and compliance.
Sri. Sujit Biswas vs State Of Assam

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

16. Undoubtedly, the FIR lodged has disclosed the previous statement of the informant which can only be used to other corroborate or contradict the maker of such statement. However, in the event that the informant is a person who claims to know the facts, and is also closely related to the victim, it is expected that he would have certainly mentioned in the FIR, all such relevant facts. The omission of important facts affecting the probability of the case, is a relevant factor under Section 11 of the Evidence Act to judge the veracity of the case of the prosecution. (Vide: Ram Kumar Pandey v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1026).

18. The present case is required to be examined in light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. The instant is one of circumstantial evidence, and only two circumstances have appeared against the appellant, namely, I. That he had been able to point out the place where Sima Khatoon was lying, after his demand for Rs.20/- had been accepted; and II. That subsequently, he had left the said place and boarded a bus immediately.

In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and orders passed by the courts below impugned before us, are set aside. The appellant has been in jail for the last six years, he must be released forthwith, unless wanted in some other case.
S.R.Tewari vs Union Of India & Anr

D. On being sought, the Union Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as ‘UPSC’) gave its advice regarding the punishment on 20.8.2010. The Central Vigilance Commission (hereinafter referred to as ‘CVC’) also gave its advice in respect of the charges against the appellant on 18.2.2009. After considering all the material, the Disciplinary Authority passed the order of punishment of dismissal from service on 8.9.2010.

E. Aggrieved, the appellant challenged the said order of dismissal by filing OA No.3234 of 2010 before the Tribunal. It was contested and opposed by respondent no.1. The Tribunal set aside the order of punishment dated 8.9.2010 vide judgment and order dated 11.2.2011 and directed for reinstatement of the appellant in service with all consequential benefits.

G. Appellant filed Review Petition No. 102 of 2012 against the order dated 1.2.2012, however, the same was rejected vide order dated 15.2.2012.

H. Aggrieved, respondent no.1 filed SLP(C) No.14639 of 2012, challenging the said order of the High Court of Delhi dated 1.2.2012. However, the same was dismissed by this Court on 9.5.2012.

I. The appellant challenged the same order of the High Court dated 1.2.2012 by filing these appeals. In the meanwhile, respondent no.1 re-instated the appellant on 23.5.2012 and tentatively formed a decision to impose a suitable penalty on the said two charges in view of the order of the High Court dated 1.2.2012, a penalty of withholding two increments for one year without cumulative effect. The respondent no.1 sought advice from the UPSC, which vide letter dated 13.8.2012 advised that the appellant be compulsorily retired. The advice given by the UPSC was served upon the appellant and he was asked to make a representation on the same.

Hence, where there is evidence of malpractice, gross irregularity or illegality, interference is permissible.

In view thereof, we do not want to proceed with the contempt petitions. The appeals as well as the contempt petitions stand disposed of accordingly.
State Of Maharashtra Tr.C.B.I vs Mahesh G.Jain

2. At the very outset, it is condign to state that as we are only dealing with a singular issue it is not necessary to state the facts in detail. Suffice it to state one Satish P. Doshi, proprietor of Shree Travels, the complainant, had given his vehicles to State Bank of India on contract basis and was entitled to receive hire charges for his vehicles periodically. The complainant experienced certain difficulties in getting his cheques and Tax Deducted at Source certificates. When he approached the accused-respondent, he demanded illegal gratification which was not acceded to by the complainant. Despite consistent refusal by the complainant, the demand of the accused was persistent which constrained the complainant to approach the CBI with a written complaint. The CBI took up the investigation and the raiding party carried out a trap operation, seized the bribe amount of Rs.1000/-, sent the seized article to the CFSL, obtained the sanction order and ultimately on 5.10.2000 filed the charge-sheet before the learned Special Judge. After the trial was over the learned Special Judge adverted to all the issues and answered all of them in the affirmative against the accused but acquitted him solely on the base that the sanction order was defective and illegal and that went to the very root of jurisdiction of the court.

14. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles it is to be seen whether the order of sanction granted by the sanctioning authority withstands scrutiny or not. For the aforesaid purpose it is necessitous to reproduce the order of sanction in entirety: -

20. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court and the conclusion of the learned trial Judge pertaining to the validity of sanction are set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court. As we have not dealt with any other finding recorded by the learned trial Judge, it has to be construed that there has been no expression of opinion on the merits of the case on those counts. The High Court shall be well advised to consider all the aspects barring what has been dealt with in this appeal while dealing with the application for grant of leave.

May 28, 2013.
Ravirala Laxmaiah vs State Of A.P

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

D. The police had recovered the dead body of Balamani, and had got the autopsy performed upon it. The appellant had been absconding, and thus could be arrested only on 15.7.2003. On the basis of the disclosure statement that was made by the appellant, the ornaments of Balamani, deceased, had been recovered in the presence of two panch witnesses, namely, Ganjai Niranjan (PW.8) and Syed Aktharali (PW.9). After completion of the investigation, a chargesheet was filed on 28.10.2005. Charges were framed on 17.8.2006 against the appellant, for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 404 IPC.

E. After the conclusion of the trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant vide impugned judgment and order dated 5.2.2007, as has been referred to hereinabove.

F. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court, which was dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 13.7.2010.

24. A bare perusal of the opinion of the learned author by itself does not lead to the conclusion that fracture of hyoid bone, is a must in all the cases.”

20. In view of the above, we do not find any cogent reason to interfere with the judgments and orders of the courts below. The appeal lacks merit, and is accordingly dismissed.

……………………………...J. [DR.

[DIPAK MISRA] NEW DELHI;

MAY 28, 2013
State Of Rajasthan vs Bheru Lal

2. The broad essential facts leading to trial of the respondent are that on 4.4.2001 about 5.45 p.m. Parveen Vyas, temporary in-charge S.H.O., Police Station Chittorgarh, received information from a reliable informer that the respondent would come with illegal opium on his Hero Honda Motor Cycle No. 5902 from Phkhliya towards Chittorgarh and would sell it to some person. The information was entered into Daily Diary at report No. 146 and dispatched to higher officers through Constable Davender Singh. Thereafter, Parveen Vyas, along with other police officials and independent witnesses, namely, Abdul Kareem and Haider Ali laid a trap at Sarhad Kheri Road and when the respondent came to the spot with a plastic bag, he was informed about his right to be searched by a gazetted officer or a Magistrate and, thereafter, after proper search two polythene bags containing 3 Kgs. opium in each bag were seized. Following due procedure, the samples were sent for chemical analysis and, after completing the investigation, charge-sheet was placed for the offences punishable under Sections 8/18 of the Act.

4. The prosecution to bring home the charges examined Abdul Raheem, PW- 1, Parveen Vyas, PW-2, Rais Mohammad, PW-3, Narayan, PW-4, Madan Lal, PW-5, Arjun Lal, PW-6, Mithu Lal, PW-7, RodSingh, PW-8, Rameshwar Prasad, PW-9, Davender Singh, PW-10, and Kailash, PW-11. The accused examined Bheru Lal, DW-1, and Shanti Lal, DW-2.

6. Challenging the conviction and sentence an appeal was preferred by the respondent before the High Court. The principal contention that was raised in appeal was that Parveen Vyas was not authorised under Section 42 of the Act to search, seize or arrest a person and hence, the whole trial was ab initio void. The High Court, scanning the statutory provision and the notification issued by the Government, came to hold that Parveen Vyas was not the Station House Officer of Police Station, Chittorgarh, as Rameshwar Prasad was the only Station House Officer and hence, Parveen Vyas did not have the authority to conduct any search, seizure and arrest and, therefore, the whole trial was vitiated. Being of this view, the learned single Judge dislodged the judgment of conviction and acquitted the accused.

15. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the appeal is allowed, the judgment passed by the High Court is set aside and the judgment rendered by the learned trial Judge is restored. The learned trial Judge is directed to take steps for arrest of the respondent so that he can undergo rest of the sentence.

May 28, 2013.
Sanchari Devi & Ors vs Ara Municipal Corporation & Ors

3. The facts very briefly are that Ramashish Prasad and Vishwanath Ram were working with the Ara Municipal Corporation. Ramashish Prasad superannuated on 31st August, 1996 and Vishwanath Ram superannuated on 31st March, 1999. While they were working in the Ara Municipal Corporation, the Bihar Municipal Officers and Servants Pension Rules, 1987 (for short 'the Rules') came into effect. The Rules were to apply to all permanent employees of the Municipalities and Notified Area Committees in the State of Bihar. The Ara Municipal Corporation, however, did not give effect to the Rules until 19th June, 2004 on which date it adopted resolution to give pensionary benefits to its employees who had retired from service from the year 2000 onwards in accordance with the Rules.

9. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and direct that the appellants will be given the pensionary benefits including pension and family pension, as the case may be, in accordance with the Rules within three months from today.

10. We make it clear that this judgment has been delivered in the facts of the present case and will not be treated as a precedent applicable to all other cases the facts of which are not before this Court.

11. The appeals stand allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
S.Iyyapan vs M/S United India Insurance Co.Ld.& Anr

2. The right of the victim of a road accident to claim compensation is a statutory one. The Parliament in its wisdom inserted the relevant provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act in order to protect the victims of road accident travelling in the vehicle or using the road and thereby made it obligatory that no motor vehicle shall be used unless the vehicle is compulsorily insured against third party risk. In this background, can an Insurance Company disown its liability on the ground that the driver of the vehicle although duly licensed to drive light motor vehicle but there was no endorsement in the licence to drive light motor vehicle used as commercial vehicle. This is the sole question arises for consideration in this appeal.

4. On 23.5.1998, at about 8.30 P.M., when the deceased named Charles was riding his bicycle from east to west and reached in front of one house, one Sivananayaitha Perumal (driver of the vehicle who remained ex parte in the proceedings) came from west to east direction driving a Mahindra van at high speed and dashed against Charles and ran away without stopping the vehicle. Charles, who was admitted in a hospital, succumbed to the injuries sustained by him. It is evident from the Motor Vehicle Inspector’s Report that the accident did not occur due to mechanical defect. On the claim petition filed by deceased’s wife (respondent No.2 herein), the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Principal District Judge) at Kanyakumari (in short, “Tribunal”), after considering the evidence on record, awarded a compensation of Rs.2,42,400/- with interest at 12% p.a. from the date of petition – to be paid by the respondents before the Tribunal jointly and severally. The Tribunal was of the view that the person possessing licence to drive light motor vehicle is entitled to drive Mahindra maxi cab.

19. In the instant case, admittedly the driver was holding a valid driving licence to drive light motor vehicle. There is no dispute that the motor vehicle in question, by which accident took place, was Mahindra Maxi Cab. Merely because the driver did not get any endorsement in the driving licence to drive Mahindra Maxi Cab, which is a light motor vehicle, the High Court has committed grave error of law in holding that the insurer is not liable to pay compensation because the driver was not holding the licence to drive the commercial vehicle. The impugned judgment is, therefore, liable to be set aside.

20. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and hold that the insurer is liable to pay the compensation so awarded to the dependants of the victim of the fatal accident. However, there shall be no order as to costs.