L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Khoday Distilleries Limited (Now Known ... vs The Scotch Whisky Association And ...

Appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It manufactures whisky under the mark Peter Scot. Manufacture of the said product allegedly was started by the company in May, 1968. An application was filed by it for registration of its mark before the respondent No.3. Appellant was informed that its application was accepted and allowed to proceed with the advertisement, subject to the condition that the mark would be treated as associated with Reg. T.M. No.249226-B. A proceeding was initiated as regards registration of the trade mark. No opposition was filed by the respondent. Only one M/s. Mohan Meakins filed an opposition. The said trade mark was registered.

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 came to know of the appellants mark on or about 20th September, 1974. They filed an application for rectification of the said trade mark on 21st April, 1986. We may also notice that a suit for passing off has also been filed by the 1st respondent and others in the Bombay High Court being C.S. No. 1729 of 1987, which is stated to be still pending.

Appellant having been called upon showing its cause, by way of an affidavit affirmed by one Mr. Petern Warren explaining the manner in which the word Peter Scot was coined, stating :-

5. The Division Bench committed a serious error insofar it failed to take into consideration the aforementioned arguments of the appellant, although categorically noticed by it, so far as if the label is to be looked by in its entirety, the emblem of Rampant Lion with the words Distilled from the Finest Malt and Blended with the Choicest Whiskies by Scotch Experts under Government Supervision must be read with the word PRIDE OF INDIA and the names of the appellant and the fact that it was manufactured at Bangalore.

(4) The tribunal, of its own motion, may, after giving notice in the prescribed manner to the parties concerned and after giving them an opportunity of being heard, make any order referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). (5) Any order of the High Court rectifying the register shall direct that notice of the rectification shall be served upon the Registrar in the prescribed manner who shall upon receipt of such notice rectify the register accordingly.

Whether a misrepresentation is made or not is essentially a question of fact. It will depend upon many factors.

We, therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, are of the opinion that action of the respondents is barred under the principles of acquiescence and/ or waiver.
Bikoba Deora Gaikwad & Ors vs Hirabai Marutirao Ghorgare & Ors

4. An application for sending the said decree to the Collector was filed before the Civil Judge Junior Division, Indapur on or about 19.12.2002, which was marked as Regular Darkhast No. 34 of 2002. Appellants 2 and 3 filed applications for dismissal thereof, inter alia, on the premise that the same was barred by limitation.

The said objections filed by the appellants were rejected. A writ petition preferred thereagainst was also rejected by the Bombay High Court. Another application was filed in March 2005 by the appellants herein in terms of Section 54 of the Code whereto also an objection was filed. The said objection has also been dismissed. A writ petition filed thereagainst has been dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment.

Explanation.A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final. A decree therefore may denote final adjudication between the parties and against which an appeal lies, but only when a suit is completely disposed of, thereby a final decree would come into being.

For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court.

Any other application for which no period of limitation js provided elsewhere in this division.

However, what can be executed is a final decree, and not a preliminary decree, unless and until final decree is a part of the preliminary decree. For the reasons aforementioned, Articles 136 and 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will have no application. Even otherwise, the contention of the appellants is wholly unsustainable. Such a contention had been raised even in the earlier objections. They were rejected. The appeals preferred thereagainst have also been dismissed. In that view of the matter, the appellants could not have agitated the same issue by filing another objection.

15. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal, which is dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsels fee assessed at Rs.25,000/-.
Vimal Chadha vs Vikas Choudhary And Another

4. Upon his production, the respondent No.1 did not claim himself to be a juvenile. Charges were framed. The prosecution started adduction of evidence on or about 3rd February, 2005. Only on 31st May, 2005 respondent No.1 herein filed an application for transfer of the case to the Juvenile Board on the plea that he was a juvenile on the date of occurrence. A school leaving certificate was also produced. The Learned Additional Sessions Judge, trying the case, directed the Investigating Officer to submit a report. The report pursuant thereto reads as under :-

5. The learned Sessions Judge was not satisfied therewith. The Investigating Officer was directed to get the respondent No.1 medically examined for getting his age determined. Pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, the respondent was examined medically. A report was submitted on 9th August, 2005. It reads as under :-

6. On a revision application filed thereagainst before the High Court, it by an order dated 31st August, 2006 set aside the said order and directed :-

Considering the totality of the circumstances, I prima facisely hold that the present applicant/accused Vikas Choudhary was major at the time of occurrence. The application for sending him to the Juvenile Court stands dismissed.

2 The conclusion of the High Court that the appellant is, on 17th January, 2003, would be 17 years 5 months corroborates with the medical report that if on the date of examination his examination, respondent No.1 is taken to be 22 years of age.

The judgment of the High court is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.

Applications for modification/clarification of order dated 2.11.2007 and bail have become infructuous and are dismissed as such.
Swami Shankaranand (D) By L.R vs Mahant Sri Sadguru Sarnanand Etc. & Ors

6. Appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court of Allahabad on 15.11.1994 only, which was transferred to the Uttranchal High Court. By a reason of a judgment and order dated 19.5.2006, the said appeal has been dismissed, inter alia, on the ground that the appellant was not a person aggrieved to maintain the same.

Unfortunately, the High Court has not considered this aspect of the matter. But in view of the order proposed to be passed, it is not necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter any further.

12. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it is not a fit case for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
M.Saravana Porselvi vs A.R. Chandrashekar @ Parthiban & Ors

The parties indisputably are living separately since 1996. She allegedly filed a complaint before the All Women Police Station at Virudhunagar. An enquiry was directed to be conducted. As per the advice of the officers of the said Police Station as also the relatives of the parties, they entered into an agreement for divorce on or about 24.7.1996. It was registered in the office of the Joint Sub-Registrar, Virudhunagar being Registration No.146 of 1996. Appellant also received a sum of Rs.25,000/- towards permanent alimony which was acknowledged by granting a stamped receipt therefor. The said purported divorce is said to have taken place in terms of the custom prevailing in the community the which the parties belong.

4. Appellant, however, filed a complaint petition against the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 herein, i.e., her husband and parents-in-law in May, 2006 before the Women Cell at Chennai, inter alia, on the premise that the first respondent has married for the second time which fact she came to learn on receipt of a summons in respect of a petition filed by the first respondent under Section 13(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

5. A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged pursuant to the said complaint which was registered as Crime No.5 of 2006. Respondents were arrested.

11. We are not oblivious of the fact that there does not exist any period of limitation in respect of an offence under Section 494, as the maximum period of punishment which can be imposed therefor is seven years.

13. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
K. Sagar, M.D., Kiran Chit Fund ... vs A. Bal Reddy And Anr.

3. Though the appellant i.e. Kiran Chit Fund accepted membership of the complainant to the Chit Fund, it took the stand that the prize amount has been paid to M/s Kiwanis Finance Pvt. Ltd. as per the authorization letter of the complainant an no due certificate was also given to the complainant. There was exchange of affidavits. The District Commission proceeded on the basis that admittedly the commission was a defaulting prized subscriber. It also held that there was no scope of taking any action on the complaint. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. In appeal, the State Commission took the view that a sum of Rs.45,300/- was to be paid to the complainant. It took the view that whether the chit fund was a consumer cannot be adjudicated in the appeal. Accordingly the appeal filed by the complainant was allowed. The National Commission was of the view that in the cheque somebody had added some figures but who did the mischief was not known. However since somebody has committed the mischief, the revision petitioner before it cannot be granted any benefit. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed without cost.

8. In the aforesaid background, we are of the view that the issue relating to jurisdiction has to be decided by the forums first.

9. We therefore, set aside the impugned order of the National Commission confirming the order passed by the State Commission, and remit the matter to the State Commission to consider the question of jurisdiction. To avoid unnecessary delay let parties appear before the State Commission without further notice on 7th of July, 2008 so that the date of hearing can be fixed. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. The parties are permitted to produce certified copy of the judgment so that necessary follow up action can be taken.

10. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
K. Sagar vs A.Bal Reddy & Anr

3. Though the appellant i.e. Kiran Chit Fund accepted membership of the complainant to the Chit Fund, it took the stand that the prize amount has been paid to M/s Kiwanis Finance Pvt. Ltd. as per the authorization letter of the complainant an no due certificate was also given to the complainant. There was exchange of affidavits. The District Commission proceeded on the basis that admittedly the commission was a defaulting prized subscriber. It also held that there was no scope of taking any action on the complaint. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. In appeal, the State Commission took the view that a sum of Rs.45,300/- was to be paid to the complainant. It took the view that whether the chit fund was a consumer cannot be adjudicated in the appeal. Accordingly the appeal filed by the complainant was allowed. The National Commission was of the view that in the cheque somebody had added some figures but who did the 3 mischief was not known. However since somebody has committed the mischief, the revision petitioner before it cannot be granted any benefit. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed without cost.

8. In the aforesaid background, we are of the view that the issue relating to jurisdiction has to be decided by the forums first.

9. We therefore, set aside the impugned order of the National Commission confirming the order passed by the State Commission, and remit the matter to the State Commission to consider the question of jurisdiction. To avoid unnecessary delay let parties appear before the State Commission without further notice on 7th of July, 2008 so that the date of hearing can be fixed. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. The parties are permitted to produce certified copy of the judgment so that necessary follow up action can be taken.

10. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
Syed Peda Aowila vs Public Prosecutor, High Court Of A.P

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowing the appeal filed by the State so far as present appellant is concerned while upholding the acquittal of other accused persons. The learned IV Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur had directed acquittal of all the five accused persons who faced trial for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 and Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). The trial Court on analyzing the evidence had found that the prosecution has not been able to establish its accusations and accordingly directed acquittal. The State filed an appeal in terms of Section 378 (1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code'). The High Court by the impugned order allowed the appeal so far as the present appellant is concerned while dismissing the appeal of the State so far as the other accused persons are concerned.

7. We find that the High Court has not applied its mind to the various aspects and the position in law as highlighted above relating to the scope for interference in appeal against an order of acquittal. In the circumstances, we set aside the 6 impugned order and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law only in respect of appellant. State has not questioned, it is to be noted, the High Court's order upholding acquittal of A2 to A5 as was done by the trial Court.

8. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Shankar Pd. Ghose (Dead) vs State Of Bihar & Anr

2. In this case leave was granted on 20.4.1998 but no stay was granted. During the pendency of the appeal, appellant- Shankar Prasad Ghosh died on 15.5.2000. After about 5 years applications have been filed purportedly in terms of Section 394 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code') to bring on record the legal heirs of the deceased appellant for the purpose of continuance of the appeal. On 2 15.3.2007 it was directed that the applications shall be considered when the appeal will be taken up for hearing.

Xx xx

15. In Bondada Gajapathy Rao v. State of A.P. the appellant was convicted by the High Court under Section 302 of the Penal Code and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. He filed an appeal in this Court by special leave but died during the pendency of the appeal. His sons and daughter applied for substitution as his legal representatives contending that the conviction of their father had resulted in his removal from Government service and if the conviction were set aside the estate will be able to claim the arrears of salary from the date of conviction till the date of his death. This Court declined to permit the legal representatives to continue the appeal on the ground that the claim 7 on the strength of which they sought permission to continue the appeal was too remote. This decision is distinguishable as the appeal was not from a sentence of fine and as the interest of the legal representatives was held to be contingent and not direct. Even if the conviction were set aside, the legal representatives would not have automatically got the arrears of salary due to their father."
Habib Ibrahim vs State Of Rajasthan

accused Bagwan Sahai Sain acquitted, the other accused Smt. Sunita alias Sonu alias Nagma convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- with default stipulation.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

i. requiring him to reside in a particular place;

(g)shall be arrested and detained or confined;

(2) Any person who, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that any other person has contravened the provisions of that Act or of any order made or direction given thereunder, gives 8 that other person any assistance with intent thereby to prevent, hinder or otherwise interfere with his arrest, trial or punishment for the said contravention shall be deemed to have abetted that contravention.

As rightly noted by the courts below, the appellant had been issued a transit visa that too for Nepal for a period of six months. There was no valid document in possession of the appellant to stay in India. Therefore Section 3 read with Section 14 of the Act have been rightly applied. The conviction therefore cannot be faulted. So far as the sentence is concerned, considering the large number of infiltrators come to India without valid document, there is need for imposing stricter sentence. The reasons given by the appellant to justify his presence in India have hardly any substance. Appellant's feeble plea that he did not know that he is required to be in possession of valid document is without substance. Otherwise, he would not have obtained any transit visa for Nepal.

8. Above being the position there is no scope for interference in the appeal.

9. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Sukhdeo Jha vs State Of Bihar & Ors

2. The appellant, who is the informant, filed Criminal Revision No.599/2000 before the High Court. According to him, adequate steps were not taken by the trial Court to secure the attendance of the prosecution witnesses and that had led to a wrong acquittal. The High Court, by order dated 4/10/2002, rejected the revision petition as it found that the trial Court had taken all reasonable steps for securing the attendance of the witnesses. The said order is under challenge in this appeal by special leave.

4. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed.

JUNE 25, 2008.
State Of Haryana & Ors vs Bala Devi

The High Court allowed the petition by its judgment dated 3/4/2002. It recorded a finding that the deceased Randhir Singh was suffering from heart disease, that due to a wrong diagnosis, he was treated for tuberculosis and as a consequence he died due to heart disease. The High Court held that the above amounted to criminal negligence on the part of the prison officials. The High Court was also of the view that there was some attempt to cover up by the prison officials. Consequently, the High Court awarded a sum of Rupees Two lakhs as compensation to the widow and her minor children.

6. In view of the above, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. But on the peculiar facts and circumstances, as the compensation has already been disbursed to a poor widow and her children, we direct that the amount disbursed shall not be recovered.

JUNE 25, 2008.
Dharam Deo Sharma vs State Of U.P. & Ors

When the appellant was serving as Superintending Engineer in U.P. Electricity Board, one Vimla Devi filed a complaint on 2.2.1998, alleging that she had been engaged by the appellant as a maid servant a few days earlier, that on 1.2.1998, the appellant gave her some tablet which made her unconscious and when she regained consciousness she found that she had no clothes and that she was raped when she was unconscious. The police investigated and filed a report stating that no offence, as alleged, has been made out. The said Vimla Devi filed a protest petition. After hearing the protest petition, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur made an order on 31.8.1998 summoning the petitioner to face the charges. The appellant made an application for recalling the said order. The same was rejected by order dated 11.7.2000. The appellant filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the Allahabad High Court challenging the orders dated 31.8.1998 and .......2.

11.7.2000. The High Court dismissed the petition by order dated 21.8.2000 holding that the petition was premature and the appellant could raise all contentions at the appropriate stage. The said order is challenged in this appeal filed by special leave.

4. In the circumstance, we find no ground to interfere with the order. Therefore, we dispose of this appeal reiterating the observation that if the appellant surrenders and applies for bail, his application shall be considered and disposed of by the learned Magistrate on the same day having regard to the peculiar facts of the case.

JUNE 26, 2008.
State Of Punjab vs Jasbir Singh & Ors

2. The High Court rejected the application under Section 378(3) Cr.P.C. filed by the State seeking permission to file an appeal against acquittal of the accused- respondents by the Sessions Judge, Ludhiana in Sessions Trial No. 7 of 15.3.1999, by the following order:-

3. The appeal relates to an incident which occurred on 18.8.1998 and the State had filed the appeal before the High Court in the year 2001 with an application under Section 378(3) Cr.P.C.. In the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the appeal, interests of justice require grant of leave sought under Section 378(3) without expressing any views on merits, so that the appeal can be disposed of by the High Court on merits.

4. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the order dated 14.2.2002 passed by the High Court and grant leave to appeal sought by the State. Consequently, the High Court shall entertain the appeal and dispose it of in accordance with law.

JUNE 26, 2008.