L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs Harshadbhai Amrutbhai Modhiya & Anr

Sanjay Amrutbhai Modhiya was a sales man employed by the insured Respondent No. 1. He met with an accident on 24.8.1996. His heirs and legal representatives filed an application for grant of compensation before the Workmen's Compensation Court, Godhra claiming a sum of Rs. 2,25,220/-. The Appellant herein raised a contention as regards its limited liability in terms of the contract of insurance. By an order dated 1.6.2004, the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation awarded a sum of Rs. 2,25,220/- with 9% interest thereon from the date of filing of application till realization in favour of the claimants. A direction was also issued to the Appellant to pay the said amount. The appeal thereagainst was preferred by the Appellant in terms of Section 30 of the Act which by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed relying on or on the basis of the decisions of this Court in Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi and Others [(1997) 8 SCC1] and L.R. Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. Mahavir Mahto and Another [(2002) 9 SCC 450].

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The Appellant is not liable for the interest. However, we make it clear that the employer shall be liable to pay the amount of interest to the claimant. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Icici Bank Ltd vs Sidco Leathers Ltd. & Ors

On an application for winding up of the 1st Respondent made before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, an order was passed on 16.12.1993 directing its winding up whereupon an Official Liquidator was appointed. The borrowing facilities of the said Respondent had been terminated. A suit for recovery of the credited sum was filed by the appellant along with the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein against the 1st Respondent in the High court of Judicature at Bombay, which was numbered as Suit No.2789/1995. The said suit was thereafter transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Bombay. Recovery proceedings are admittedly pending adjudication.

The Official Liquidator was one of the defendants. Liberty was granted by the Debt Recovery Tribunal to the appellant herein and the other respondents to obtain permission of the Company Court, i.e., High Court of Judicature at Allahabad to continue the prosecution of the said suit. Thereupon, an application under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 was filed by the plaintiffs in the said suit stating that they were Secured Creditors and had decided to remain outside the winding up proceedings being desirous of realizing the Security in the suit. The permission to continue the proceedings in the said Suit No.2789/95 was granted by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on 30.8.1995. In the said suit, however, the Respondent No.2 herein, PNB, was not impleaded as a party.

We agree with the said view.

For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the High Court has overlooked salient aspects of the provisions of the relevant Acts including that of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Hence, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The 1st Respondent shall bear the costs of the Appellant throughout.
Haryana State Electricity Board vs Mam Chand

On 25.11.94 notice was issued to the respondent calling upon him to deposit Rs.10,150/- as per the rules of the Nigam. The respondent did not raise any dispute whatsoever with the Nigam. In fact, he submitted an application to deposit the said amount in two instalments. He was allowed to deposit the said amount in instalments.

In 1995, however, the respondent filed Complaint Case No.42/95 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Ambala against the Nigam alleging that his electric supply was illegally disconnected without showing any cause for disconnection. This complaint was filed under section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as, 'the said 1986 Act'). In the complaint it was alleged that the concerned meter was not checked by the Nigam and, therefore, the respondent was not liable to pay the demanded penalty as claimed by the Nigam. The respondent herein denied tampering of the meter as alleged by the Nigam. According to the respondent, as a consumer he had suffered financial loss of Rs.50,000/- on account of the Nigam making a false allegation of theft against him.

By judgment and order dated 7.7.1997 the said District Forum allowed the complaint and directed the Nigam to refund the aforestated amount of Rs.10,150/- with interest at 18% per annum from the date of deposit till payment. However, the Nigam was ordered to pay Rs.500/- by way of costs.

Aggrieved by the decision given by the said State Commission, the Nigam preferred Revision Petition No.2154 of 1999 before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi. The revision was dismissed by National Commission without reasons. Hence, the Nigam has come to this court by way of special leave petition.

In our view, the contentions advanced on behalf of the Nigam require deeper consideration by the State Commission. None of the above points have been discussed by the State Commission in this case. Disputes of this nature are repeatedly arising before this court. At this stage, we do not wish to express any opinion. In our opinion, for the foregoing reasons the civil appeal filed by the Nigam deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed.

We accordingly direct the State Commission to decide the matter on facts of this case in the light of the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 read with the rules framed thereunder.

The impugned orders passed by the State Commission and National Commission are hereby set aside and the matter is remitted to the State Commission for fresh disposal of the complaint in accordance with law and on the points formulated hereinabove.

The appeal stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
Surendra Singh @ Bittu vs State Of Uttaranchal

P.W.1, the father of the deceased was not at the spot and, therefore, did not witness the occurrence. Govind Singh-P.W.2 and Kharak Singh- P.W.3 were examined by the prosecution. They allegedly have been passing through the bund of the said field at about 7.30 p.m. P.W.3 was at a distance from them. Although, in his examination-in-chief he is said to have stated that Rajendra Singh asked the appellant to kill him with a fire arm, whereupon the appellant fired a shot, but in his cross-examination he categorically stated:

The parties have their own agricultural lands adjoining each other. The prosecution case is that the cattle belonging to the appellant had damaged the standing crops of the deceased, but the Investigating Officer did not find any evidence in this behalf. Why then there had been hot exchange of words and a scuffle ensued is not known. Only one shot was fired. The Appellant was not apprehended at the spot. In a situation of this nature, therefore, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that the appellant had an intention to kill the deceased.

In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the offence, which is established as against the appellant herein, would fall under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and not under Section 302 IPC.

We, therefore, modify the conviction of the Appellant as falling under Fourth Exception to Section 300 IPC being of the opinion that the appellant has caused the death of the deceased without having any intention therefor. The appellant is, therefore, found guilty of commission of an office under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

We are, further, of the opinion that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, interests of justice would be subserved if the appellant is sentenced to undergo sentence of seven years' Rigorous Imprisonment and also pay a fine of Rs.5000/-, in default of payment whereof, to undergo further six months' Rigorous Imprisonment. We direct that the fine of Rs.5000/-, if realized, may be paid to P.W.1-Madan Singh. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent.
Anil Rishi vs Gurbaksh Singh

An agreement to sell dated 26.03.1990 was entered into by and between the parties hereto in relation to the premises bearing House No. 86, situate in Sector 18A, Chandigarh. A sale deed was executed pursuant to the said agreement to sell on 27.03.1991. However, a suit for declaration was filed by the respondent herein alleging that the said sale deed dated 26.3.1991 was a forged, fabricated and was a void document. The appellant filed his written statement in the said suit denying or disputing the allegations contained therein. On the pleadings of the parties herein, issues were framed by the learned trial Judge including the following:-

The learned Trial Judge while passing its order dated 09.02.2005 held:-

A revision application filed on behalf of the appellant herein against the said order was dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned order stating:-

Thus, point for determination of binding interests or which are the cases which come within the rule of active confidence would vary from case to case. If the plaintiff fails to prove the existence of the fiduciary relationship or the position of active confidence held by the defendant- appellant, the burden would lie on him as he had alleged fraud. The trial Court and the High Court, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be said to be correct in holding that without anything further, the burden of proof would be on the defendant.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The order reframing the issue is set aside thus reviving the issue originally framed. The Trial Court will be free to frame any additional issue if it is felt necessary.

The appeal is allowed as above.
Nagar Mahapalika (Now Municipal ... vs State Of U.P. & Ors

The following facts are not in dispute. The Respondents were appointed on an adhoc basis purported to be as apprentices on payment of apprentice allowance at the rate of Rs. 230/- per month by an order dated 20th October, 1984. Order of sanction for creation of some temporary posts was issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh which was the competent authority therefore, only on 19.12.1985. The Respondents, however, were appointed as apprentices in the Assessment Department by orders of the Administrator dated 5.11.1985 and 6.12.1985 wherefor an office order was issued on 11.12.1985.

Similar references were made with regard to the other respondents also. By an award dated 30th November, 1998, the Labour Court arrived at a finding that all the workmen had worked for more than 240 days during the period 5.11.1985 and 31.12.1986 and as their services had been terminated in violation of the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, the termination of their services was illegal. The Appellant was consequently directed to reinstate them in service. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said award, a writ petition was filed by the Appellant before the Allahabad High Court which was marked as CMWP No. 7279 of 1989 wherein the following judgment and order came to be passed:

We, however, do not agree with the High Court that as by way of an interim order the award was directed to be implemented, the same should itself form the basis for dismissing the writ petition.

In our opinion, the High Court did not adopt a correct approach in the matter.

However, there cannot be any dispute that provisions of Section 6- N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act have not been complied with. We are, however, of the opinion that in stead and in place of issuing a direction for reinstatement of service, interests of justice shall be sub- served if compensation of Rs.30,000/- per person is directed to be paid.

It goes without saying that the Respondents would be entitled to wages and other remunerations in terms of the interim order passed by the High Court so long they have actually worked. We, furthermore, hope and trust that in all future appointments, the Appellant shall strictly follow the provisions of the Adhiniyam and the Rules.

The Appeal is allowed in part and to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. No costs.
Haryana State Elctronics Development ... vs Mamni

The respondent herein was appointed initially for a period of 89 days in the post of Junior Technician (Electronics) on an ad hoc basis on or about 31.10.1990. In terms of an offer of appointment made to her, she was appointed therein. The post was purely temporary and her services were liable to be terminated without assigning any reason or notice. It was categorically stated that the respondent shall have no claim for regular appointment having worked with the appellant-Corporation on ad hoc basis. Her services were extended from time to time. In each of the offer of appointment, indisputably, similar terms and conditions were laid down. The details of such appointments are as under :

It is not in dispute that she remained absent for 19 days during the period 20th January, 1992 and 7th February, 1992 as also for a period of 11 days during the period 17.3.1992 to 27.3.1992. Her services were terminated on 7.8.1992. She raised an industrial dispute, whereupon the State of Punjab in exercise of its power under Section 10(1)(c) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 referred the said dispute for adjudication of the Labour Court. In the meanwhile, the appellant Corporation has issued an advertisement for filling up some posts on regular basis including the said post of Junior Technician. The respondent, however, did not apply pursuant to the said advertisement.

Before the Labour Court, the appellant herein has raised a plea that the appointment of the respondent being ad hoc in nature and furthermore on a contract basis as envisaged under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, her services were liable to be terminated in terms thereof. By reason of the impugned Award dated 21.5.2003, the Labour Court directed reinstatement of the respondent with back wages on the premise that she had completed 240 days of work during a period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of termination of her services and in view of the fact that the conditions laid down under Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with by the Appellant.

The Appellant-Corporation herein, being aggrieved by the said Award, filed a Writ Petition before the Punjab & Haryana High Court which was numbered as W.P. (C) No. 2464 of 2004. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said Writ Petition has been dismissed.

We, therefore, are of the view that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, interests of justice would be sub-served if in the place of reinstatement with back wages, a lump sum amount is directed to be paid by way of compensation. This order is being passed keeping in view the fact that the respondent has not worked since 1992. The post on which she may have been working must have also been filled up.

In view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore, we modify the impugned order by directing that the respondent shall be compensated by payment of a sum of Rs.25,000/- in stead of the order for reinstatement with back wages.

The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. No costs.
Nautam Prakash Dgsvc, Vadtal & Ors vs K.K. Thakkar & Ors

The ledger kept at the Vadtal Temple shall also contain separate khatas of

(c) Any expenditure incurred on account of the Acharya on official tours and other official occasions; and

The State of Gujarat was formed with effect from 1st May, 1960. However, immediately prior thereto, an Order known as the Bombay Charity Commissioner (Regional Reorganisation) Order, 1960 was issued which came into force with effect from 28th April, 1960, the relevant provisions whereof are as under:-

According to the appellant, the Trust had been rendering its accounts to the Assistant Charity Commissioner in Gujarat at Nadiad and had also been filing other documents and changed reports from time to time therein. Respondent No. 1 herein claiming himself to be a member of the trust, filed an application before the Assistant Charity Commissioner of Greater Bombay purportedly under Section 41A and 41B of the Act praying, inter alia, for appointment of proper persons and trustees of the said trust.

By an order dated 31.12.2001, the said application was allowed. The Assistant Charity Commissioner in the said order directed:-

Indisputably, the office for administration of the trust is situate in the State of Gujarat i.e. Gujarat region. Only some properties of the trust are situate in the Maharashtra region. Clause 4(c) creates a legal fiction in terms whereof the trust shall be deemed to be registered in Gujarat region whereafter no other or further inquiry is required to be conducted. The trust was already registered having its office at Baroda. The said registration, therefore, continued to have force.

The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, committed a manifest error insofar as it proceeded to hold that the appellants in view of their conduct could not question the jurisdiction of the Assistant Charity Commissioner of Bombay.

In view of the aforementioned observations and directions, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. In the facts and circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.
I.I.T. Kanpur vs Umesh Chandra & Ors

No. Designation and Pay Scale Qualifications Classification Selection Committee as per Statute 18 Chief Pilot Instructor (Rs.1500-2000) Appropriate DGCA Licence Technical 12(3)(e)

It is not in dispute that the First Respondent made a representation for up-gradation of his scale of pay from Rs.14,300-400-18300 to Rs.16,400- 450-20,000 which was approved by the Board having regard to the unique post held by him. A clarification was also issued by the Ministry of Human Resources Development on 12.06.2000 stating that the categories of employees should be classified as academic as per the Statutes and treated at par with teachers having the age of retirement on attaining the age of superannuation with effect from 31.08.1998. Whereas the age of superannuation of the academic staff was fixed at 62 years, the age of superannuation of technical, administrative and other staff in terms of the Statutes was specified as 60 years.

The First Respondent by a letter dated 05.05.2005 was informed by the appellant herein that he would reach the age of superannuation on the expiry of 31.01.2006, pursuant whereto he submitted a representation on 08.06.2005 asserting that as the post of Senior Pilot Instructor held by him was an academic post, his age of superannuation should be treated as 62 years. The Director of the Institute with a view to go into the said question, constituted a committee on 21.11.2005. However, before a decision on the said issue could be taken, a writ petition was filed by him before the Allahabad High Court. During the pendency of the said petition, the Committee opined that since the First Respondent did not belong to the academic category, his age of superannuation would be 60 years, and not 62 years . The said writ petition in view of the said order was suitably amended by the First Respondent.

In view of the above facts, the Committee recommended that Capt. Umesh Chandra be given one time personal assessment to move from the existing scale to the scale of Rs.16400-450-20000 as a special case.

Thus, the main function of the First Respondent was for providing an informal recreational avenue to the members of the Gliding and Soaring Centre in adventure sports and other aviation sport like Aero-modeling.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court is dismissed. No costs.
Municipal Council, Sujanpur vs Surinder Kumar

J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP(C ) No. 17977 OF 2004) Leave granted.

A plea was raised in the said proceedings on behalf of the appellant herein that the respondent was appointed on a supervisory post and, thus, was not a `workman' within the meaning of Section 2(S) of the Act.

It is not in dispute that the respondent was appointed on daily wages. Before the Labour Court, the appellant raised a plea that the respondent was appointed on the post of Supervisor, on the recommendation of one Shri R.S. Puri, M.L.A., Sujanpur and then a Minister in the Government of Punjab. The Labour Court by reason of the impugned award, inter alia, held that although the second respondent was appointed with the designation of a Supervisor and was expected to look after the development work being carried out by the appellant and other construction works under the Nehru Rojgar Yojana, he was merely discharging the duties of a workman.

It was held by the Labour Court that the respondent completed 240 days of work within a period of twelve months preceding his termination. The Labour Court proceeded on the basis that the workman having completed 240 days of work in a calendar year, it was the bounden duty of the Appellant to produce the entire relevant records but the same had not been done. It is not in dispute that the attendance records of March 1994 and from April 1994 to February 1996 were produced but the attendance registers from March 1996 onwards were not produced. It, however, does not appear from the impugned award that the respondent had called for the records from the office of the appellant.

The Labour Court upon arriving at a finding that in terminating the services of the respondent, the appellant had not complied with the statutory requirements contained in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act as no compensation had been paid to him in terms thereof, the respondent shall be directed to be reinstated in service with full back wages and allied benefits from the date of termination i.e. July 1997 till actual reinstatement. A writ petition filed before the High Court by the appellant herein against the said award was dismissed.

Having regard to the factual circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that grant of monetary compensation would sub-serve the interests of justice.

We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the directions of the Labour Court and direct that in place of the respondent being reinstated with back wages, the Appellant would pay monetary compensation to him, quantified at Rs.50,000/-. We make no order as to costs.
Sunny Kapoor vs State (Ut Of Chandigarh)

Inter alia relying on or on the basis of the said evidence brought on record, the appellants were found to be guilty for commission of an offence under Section 302/34, IPC. They were sentenced to imprisonment for life. An appeal preferred thereagainst by the each of the appellant was dismissed by the High Court.

For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion on the basis of such evidence, it would not be safe to uphold the judgment of conviction and sentence passed against the appellants herein. We set aside the impugned judgment. The appeals are allowed. The appellants are directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless required in connection with any other case.