L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Vikram Singh & Anr vs State Of Rajasthan & Ors

3. It appears that one Ummaid Singh, ancestor of the appellants submitted a return before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jalore, upon which a case was registered bearing No.13/68. During the pendency of the case, Ummaid Singh expired. His successors-in-interest were taken on record and the proceedings were completed. The S.D.O. held by an order dated September 30, 1979 that 514-1/2 standard acres of land were surplus in the hands of the agriculturists. The land was surrendered by the petitioner in pursuance of the said order and no appeal was preferred. Hence, the said order became final. The Act of 1955 was repealed by an Ordinance and thereafter by the Act of 1973, which came into force on 1.1.1973, the State Government was given power to avail the remedies under the Act of 1973 against the case decided under the old ceiling law of Chapter III-B by making provision under Section 15(2) of the Act of 1973. The old law of ceiling has been saved for this purpose by virtue of Section 40 of the Act of 1973.

4. It appears from the facts that an application was filed before the District Collector, Jalore by the Tehsildar under Section 232 of the Act of 1955 with a prayer to re-open the mutation made in accordance with the decision in Ceiling Case No.13/68 of the predecessors of the petitioners and prayed for cancellation of the said decision and to refer the matter before the Board of Revenue. On such prayer, the District Collector issued notice dated August 11, 1999 fixing a date that is September 8, 1999. The issuance of such notice had been challenged on the ground of inordinate delay in initiation of such proceedings under Section 232. In these circumstances, the appellants filed a writ petition challenging the notice dated 11.8.1999.

16. In our opinion, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court. We accept the reasoning of the High Court. The submissions made on behalf of the appellants, in our opinion, cannot be accepted by us as the same have no substance and further fraud as alleged, if proved, all steps would vitiate. On the contrary, it appears that the submissions made on behalf of the respondents have substance and we accept contentions of the respondents. In the result, we find no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed.
Tarsen Lal & Ors vs Ram Sarup & Ors

3. The factual matrix of the case is that predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, Faqir Chand, the original plaintiff filed a suit against Daulat Ram, Sukh Dev, Ram Sarup and Smt. Vidya Devi for permanent injunction restraining them from removing the pump set or interfering, in any manner, with the right of the plaintiff to irrigate his land measuring 25 Kanals 16 Marlas from well and pump set situated in land measuring 8 Marlas bearing Khasra No.114R/29 situated in village Basal, Tehsil and District Una vide Jamabandi 1981-82.

5. Further, the case of the plaintiff was that the whole of the suit land was irrigated from the well and pump set situated in Khasra No.114R/29 situated in village Basal, Tehsil and District Una. The plaintiff was given right to irrigate 25 Kanals 16 Marlas pursuant to the agreement dated 23rd August, 1968 from well and pump set situated in Khasra No.114R/29. The plaintiff, thereby, pleaded his right to irrigate the land from the well under the Act and Rules and further submitted that the defendants have no right to interfere with such right of the plaintiff. It was the case of the plaintiff that the defendants have threatened him that they would not allow the plaintiff to use the well for irrigation and, therefore, the plaintiff filed the suit.

6. The suit was contested and a common written statement was filed by the original defendants. Stand of the defendants was that the plaintiff was a lessee for a fixed term and after the expiry of the lease the plaintiff ceased to have any interest in the suit property. The defendants were within their right to refuse the plaintiff to use the well. The plaintiff filed replication to the written statement. The learned Trial Court after noticing Section 36 of the Act decreed the suit on 29th February, 1992.

15. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the judgment and decree dated 2nd May, 2008 passed by the High Court in R.S.A. No.126 of 1996 and affirm the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court as confirmed by the First Appellate Court. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
Rajasthan R.S.S. & Ginning Mills ... vs Dy. Commnr. Of Income Tax, Jaipur

2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal in a nut-shell are as under:

3. Being aggrieved by the above stated assessment orders, appeals were filed before the CIT (Appeals) and the CIT (Appeals) dismissed the said appeals. Further appeals were filed before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal but the Tribunal also dismissed the appeals.

21. We agree with the view expressed by the High Court that as there is no provision under the Act for setting off accumulated losses of the amalgamating societies against the profits of the amalgamated society, the appellant society could not have got the benefit of carrying forward losses of the erstwhile societies which were not in existence during the relevant Assessment Year.

23. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.

(Shiva Kirti Singh) New Delhi;

April 29, 2014
Commr.Of Income Tax-Xvii,New Delhi vs Punjab Stainless Steel Industries

2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, in a nutshell, are as under:

6. The assessee is a manufacturer and exporter of stainless steel utensils. In the process of manufacturing stainless steel utensils, some portion of the steel, which can not be used or reused for manufacturing utensils, remains unused, which is treated as scrap and the respondent-assessee disposes of the said scrap in the local market and the income arising from the said sale is also reflected in the profit and loss account. The respondent-assessee not only sells utensils in the local market but also exports the utensils.

26. If all accountants, auditors, businessmen, manufacturers etc. are normally interpreting the term ‘turnover’ as sale proceeds of the commodity in which the business unit is dealing, we see no reason to take a different view than the view normally taken by the persons who are concerned with the said term.

29. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the view expressed by the High Court is in conformity with the normal accounting practice followed by the traders, including the respondent-assessee and it was justified in coming to a conclusion that the proceeds generated from the sale of scrap would not be included in the ‘total turnover’.

30. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs.

31. In view of the order passed in the Civil Appeal No. 5592 of 2008, Civil Appeal Nos. 3283 of 2009, 4491 of 2009 and 4898 of 2010 are also dismissed with no order as to costs as the legal issues involved in these appeals are same.

.......................................J (ANIL R. DAVE) ........................................J (DIPAK MISRA) New Delhi May 5, 2014.
Union Of India & Ors vs M/S Hindustan Zinc Ltd

4. At this stage we would describe the manufacturing process in all three cases and the facts leading to the filing of the present appeal.

5. The respondent herein is a Public Limited Company and it was disinvested in April, 2002. The respondent is engaged in the manufacture of non-ferrous metals like zinc, lead as well as Sulphuric Acid and Copper Sulphate. The said products are chargeable under Chapter Sub-heading No. 2807.00, 7901.10 and 2833.10 respectively of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 respectively among their other products. A show cause notice was issued on 15.3.2005 to the assessee respondent for recovery of Rs. 48,39,883/- under Rule 12 of the erstwhile CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 and Rule 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules 2004 read with Section 11(e) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 along with interest and penal provisions.

27. We are also unable to agree with the submission of the learned Secretary General that judgment in GAIL's Case is not applicable. Significantly, the question as to whether Rule 57 CC will apply when by- products are cleared without payment of duty came for discussion in that case. It was held that so long as the lean gas was obtained as a by-product and not as a final product, Rule 57 CC will not apply. We are, therefore, of the view that the respondent's case is squarely covered by the judgment in GAIL's case.

29. As a result of aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in these appeals and dismiss the same with costs.
Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit & Ors vs State Of Gujarat

D. Aggrieved, the petitioners preferred Criminal Appeal No.2012 of 2006 before the High Court of Gujarat and during the pendency of the appeal, the petitioners had been enlarged on bail vide order dated 22.11.2006. The appeal was finally heard on 11.12.2013 and the court took a view that sanction of the State Government under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) was necessarily required, and in view thereof, the order was dictated in open court allowing the appeal on technical issue. However, the order dictated in open court and acquitting the petitioners vide order dated 11.12.2013 was recalled by the court suo moto vide order dated 27.12.2013 and directed the appeal to be re- heard. The order had been recalled on the ground that the court wanted to examine the issue further as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case where the accused had been police constables, the offence could not be attributed to have been committed under the commission of their duty where sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. would be attracted.

Hence, this petition.

11. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that no exception can be taken to the procedure adopted by the High Court in the instant case.

12. The petition is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Union Of India & Ors vs Shiv Raj & Ors

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:

B. Respondents - persons interested, filed their objections under Section 5A of the Act 1894. However, without considering and disposing of the same, declaration under Section 6 of the Act 1894 was made on 7.6.1985. Notices under Sections 9 of the Act 1894 were also issued on 30.12.1986 to the persons interested. It was at this stage that the tenure holders filed writ petitions before the High Court challenging the acquisition proceedings contending that proceedings could not be continued without disposing of the objections filed by them under Section 5A of the Act 1894. Admittedly, the Award No. 15/1987-88 was made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 5.6.1987.

30. In view of above, we do not see any force in these appeals even on merit and the same are liable to be dismissed. In view of the findings and particularly in view of the interpretations given to Section 24(2) of the Act 2013 in the judgments referred to herein above, it is not necessary to entertain any other ground whatsoever at the behest of the appellants. Thus, the appeals are devoid of any merit and are dismissed. No order as to costs.

(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 24305-24309 OF 2007) Union of India & Ors.

(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 208-213 of 2008) Union of India & Ors.

(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 1085-1088 OF 2008) Union of India & Ors.

(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 2533-2535 OF 2008) 3 Union of India & Ors.

1. The facts and issue involved in the abovesaid appeals are identical and have to be decided in terms of our judgment passed today in Civil Appeal Nos. 5478-5483 of 2014.

2. The appeals are dismissed in terms thereof. No order as to costs.

The appeal is dismissed in terms of Civil Appeal Nos. 5478-5483 of 2014. No order as to costs.

4. In view of the fact that the other land covered by the same notification and declaration had been the subject matter of various other writ petitions and particularly, the land belonging to one Geeta Devi, the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 4374 of 2009, the matter remained pending, thus, Review Petition etc. had been filed, which was dismissed on 27.7.2007.

6. However, keeping in view the decision rendered in C.A. Nos. 5478- 5483 of 2014, this appeal is allowed in terms thereof. No order as to costs.
Anil Bajaj & Anr vs Vinod Ahuja

3. The matter lies within a short compass notwithstanding the elaborate application filed by the respondent-tenant seeking leave duly supported by an affidavit and the detailed manner in which the appellant-landlords had contested the claim of the tenant.

4. On the aforesaid broad pleadings of the parties, the learned Additional Rent Controller thought it fit to come to the conclusion that the contentions made by the tenant are mere assertions without any basis and that no triable issue is disclosed warranting grant of leave to defend. In reversal, the High Court held that the precise relationship between the two appellants and the holding/interest of the first appellant in other items of property standing in the name of other family members require a probe for which leave ought to be granted. Hence the impugned order and the present appeal arising therefrom.

6. We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned order dated 20.09.2012 of the High Court of Delhi is not legally sustainable. We, accordingly, set aside the same and allow this appeal and restore the order dated 02.09.2011 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.
M/S Mahamaya Gen.Finance Co.Ltd vs State Of U.P. & Ors

3. Consequential Notifications under Section 6 and 17(1) of the Act were published on 23.6.1970. Possession of the acquired land was taken over on 10.09.1970 and the award was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 4.5.1972 granting compensation at the rate of Rs.1.33 per square yard. In doing so, a sale deed dated 20.1.1969 in respect of an area of about 200 square yard situated in the village Maharajpur sold for Rs.400/- was taken as the base exemplar. 33% deduction was made on account of the smallness of the area covered by the aforesaid sale deed, thereby, assessing compensation for the acquired land at Rs.1.33 per square yard.

4. The appellant sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Before the Reference Court the appellant filed sale deeds dated 13.06.1969 (Ex.1) and 16.10.1969 (Ex.2) executed by it in respect of land in the vicinity of the land acquired. The Reference Court, however, refused to accept and rely on the said sale deeds on the ground that the appellant, having come to know of the acquisition proceedings, had sold land at inflated price; the correct price was not known to the vendors who were not local residents of Meerut. The Reference Court, by order dated 26.08.1975, accordingly maintained the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer.

12. In the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the compensation awarded by the learned Acquisition Officer as affirmed by the Reference Court and the High Court by the orders under appeal. Instead, we direct that the compensation payable to the appellant shall now be computed by taking into account the average of the price, at which the two transactions by sale deeds dated 13.06.1969 (Exbt.1) and 16.10.1969 (Exbt.2) were effected, as noted above, along with solatium and interest as payable under the Act. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ghaziabad, U.P., shall make the necessary computation in terms of the present order so as to enable the appellant to receive the balance amount of compensation along with solatium and interest as payable, forthwith, and in any case within three months from the date of receipt of this order.

13. Both the appeals shall now stand allowed to the extent indicated above.

……………………....…………………………J [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA] ……………………....…………………………J [RANJAN GOGOI] NEW DELHI, MAY 08, 2014.
Brihanmumbai Electric Sup.& ... vs Maharashtra Elect.Regul.Commission & ...

1. Respondent No.3 is a consumer (hereinafter referred to as the “consumer”) of electricity (LT-II Category) whose premises are situated within area of supply of the appellant namely Brihanmumbai Electricity Supply and Transport Undertaking (BEST). In April 2009, he approached respondent No.2 i.e. Tata Power Company Limited (TPC) with a request that he be supplied the electricity by TPC. In nutshell, he wants to switch over from BEST to TPC for his electricity requirement. In response to his request, TPC advised the consumer vide letter dated 8.7.2009 to approach the BEST for its permission to use its distribution network of the BEST to enable TPC to supply electricity to the consumer using that network. The consumer, accordingly, turned to BEST requesting it to give the said permission. It was, however, denied by BEST vide letter dated 31.7.2009 and again on 10.8.2009. After receiving this rejection, the consumer approached Mumbai Electricity Regulatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “Regulatory Commission”) with petition seeking the following directions:

6. We have already stated in brief the four contentions which were raised by BEST before the Regulatory Commission. Same contentions were raised before the Appellate Tribunal, which are the submissions before us as well. Therefore, we proceed to deal with these submissions hereinafter:

7. This contention was raised primarily on the ground that there was an alternative remedy provided to the consumer to raise his grievances before the Consumer Grievances Redressal Forum (CGRF) established under Section 42 (5) of the Act. Therefore, the consumer should have approached the said Forum instead of filing petition before the Regulatory Commission. This contention is totally misconceived and rightly rejected by the authorities below. As noted above, petition was filed by the consumer seeking direction against TPC to supply electricity to him. Thus, he approached the Regulatory Commission to enforce a distribution licensee obligation under the Act. As on that date, he was not the consumer of TPC but wanted to become its consumer. In so far as CGRF is concerned, which each distribution licensee is required to set up under Section 42 (5) of the Act, it deals with the grievances of the consumer. Consumer is defined under Section 2 (15) of the Act and reads as under:

9. Before we take note of the argument of the parties on this aspect and deal with the same, some background facts need a mention. TPC is the successor of the Bombay Hydroelectric License, 1907, the Andhra Valley Hydro-electric License, 1919, the Nila Mula Valley Hydro- electric License, 1921 and Trombay Thermal Power Electric License 1953 to supply electricity to consumers in specified areas in and around Mumbai (Erstwhile Licenses). The Erstwhile Licenses were subsequently amalgamated and transferred to Tata Power on 12.7.2001.

29. We, thus, do not find any merit in any of the contentions of the appellant. As a consequence, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with cost thereby affirming the order of the Appellate Tribunal.
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation & Anr vs Ahmedabad Green Belt Khedut Mandal & Ors

D. The State Government sanctioned the development plan on 2.11.1987 which came into force on 3.12.1987 whereby the area known as ‘green belt’ was reserved for “public housing for different government organizations”.

E. The AUDA prepared draft revised development plan which was published on 29.11.1997. The land reserved for “public housing for different government organizations” was de-reserved and put under the category as “restricted residential utility services and other uses zones”.

G. The respondents herein filed a Writ Petition before the Gujarat High Court challenging the draft revised development plan and for direction to the appellants herein to acquire their lands as per the plan of 1987 within a period of 6 months failing which the plan would lapse.

H. The Act 1976 was amended on 1.5.1999 and Section 40(3)(jj) was inserted. The writ petition was amended and the vires of Sections 12 and 40(3)(jj) of the Act 1976 were also challenged. I. The AUDA vide its resolution dated 5.5.1999 approved the proposed revised development plan. Declarations were made in the year 2000 for making town planning schemes covering “restricted residential utility services and other uses zones”.

43. In view of the above, we do not think it proper to decide the cases on merits at such a premature stage. More so, there is no reason to believe that the authorities would act arbitrarily and would not take into consideration the grievance raised by the applicants.

44. In view of the above, Civil Appeal Nos.1542-44 of 2001, 1545-50 of 2001 and 1551-56 of 2001 are allowed. The judgment impugned therein are set aside to the extent hereinabove. Civil Appeal No.1864 of 2014 and Transferred Case (C) Nos.12-13 of 2010 are dismissed. However, it is clarified that any observation made herein in the transferred cases would not adversely affect either of the parties. No order as to costs.
Mosiruddin Munshi vs Md.Siraj & Anr

3. Briefly the facts are as follows : The appellant herein/ complainant was looking for a plot of land for construction of residential house in January 2005 and accused No.2, Masud Alam, a public servant represented that he could arrange for the said plot and introduced the appellant to respondent No.1/accused No.1 who stated that he had a plot of land and the appellant believing the representation made by the accused No.2 entered into an agreement for sale with respondent No.1 herein/accused No.1 and also paid a sum of Rs.5,00,001/- in cash. The respondent No.1 herein refused to hand over the necessary title documents to the appellant which led to issuance of legal notice by the appellant. All other methods to compel respondent No.1 to complete the sale having failed the appellant filed a complaint on 28.10.2005 in the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta against respondent No.1 herein/accused No.1 and accused No.2 for the offences punishable under Section 420, read with Section 120B of the IPC. The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the officer in-charge of the Amherst Street Police Station for causing investigation under Section 156(3) of Criminal Procedure Code by treating the complaint as First Information Report. Respondent No.1 herein/accused No.1 filed application under Section 482 of Cr.PC for quashing the said proceedings including the FIR. Though the appellant herein/complainant was impleaded as a party no attempt was made to serve notice on him with the result that the learned single Judge of the High Court quashed the complaint proceedings in the absence of the appellant herein. Challenging the said order the appellant herein preferred appeal to this Court in Criminal Appeal No.852 of 2008 and this Court by judgment dated May 09, 2008 allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. Thereafter the High Court heard both the parties and by impugned order dated June, 29, 2010 allowed the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C and quashed the complaint proceedings. Aggrieved by the same the complainant has preferred the present appeal.

with no intention to complete the sale deal. The averments in the complaint would prima facie make out a case for investigation by the authority.

10. The appellant, is therefore right in contending that the First Information Report should not have been quashed in this case and the investigation should have been allowed to proceed.

11. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order.

May 9, 2014