L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Karuna Kansal vs Hemant Kansal

3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of these appeals, which involve a short point.

4. The dispute, which is the subject matter of these appeals, is between the husband (respondent No.1) and his two wives (appellant and respondent No.2). It arises out of the matrimonial suit decided by the Family Court between respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

7. The appellant herein is the second wife of respondent No.1 (husband). It is the case of the appellant that after passing of the ex parte decree for dissolution of marriage of respondent No.1 with respondent No.2 and expiry of period of limitation for filing appeal, respondent No.1(husband) entered into matrimony with her (appellant). On the other hand, respondent No.2 (first wife of respondent No.1) filed the aforesaid appeal of which the appellant had no knowledge, but the fact of respondent No.1 having married the appellant was indeed stated before the High Court. However, when respondent No.1 stated 3 that she was having no problem with the appellant, the High Court set aside the ex parte decree passed on 23.08.2003 in C.S. No.09­A of 2002 and directed that, “the parties shall live together as husband and wife.” The appellant herein (second wife of respondent No.1), on coming to know of the aforesaid order dated 09.08.2011 passed by the Single Judge of the High Court in M.A. No.709/2005, filed review petition (R.P. No.48 of 2014) before the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court, by order dated 17.10.2014, dismissed the said review petition. Challenging both the orders, the appellant has filed the present appeals by way of special leave in this Court.

12. In such a situation, where the impugned order was passed without hearing the appellant and not issuing any notice of the appeal to her and yet giving 5 such directions, which may not be capable of being carried out, the impugned order, in our view, is wholly without jurisdiction and legally unsustainable and it has to be set aside on this short ground alone.

14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals succeed and are accordingly allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the miscellaneous appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law after impleading the 6 appellant herein as a party respondent in the appeal before the High Court.

15. We, however, consider it apposite to mention that admittedly during pendency of the litigation, certain events have taken place which have bearing over the rights of the parties.

17. It is only if the High Court eventually finds that the parties are not able to settle amicably for any reason, the miscellaneous appeal be decided on its merits in accordance with law without being 7 influenced by any observations made in the impugned order and in this order.

May 09, 2019 8
Anjum Hussain vs Intellicity Business Park Pvt Ltd

2. The appellant no.1 had booked an office space admeasuring about 440 sq.ft in a project consisting of residential units, shops and offices launched by the respondent. The Builder – Buyer Agreement was executed between the appellant no.1 and the Digitally signed by respondent on 02.12.2013, whereunder the respondent was to deliver ASHWANI KUMAR Date: 2019.05.10 17:00:18 IST Reason: possession of the office unit within four years. Similar such Agreements were entered into between the appellant nos.2 to 44 and CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019 ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.

the respondent in respect of various units from the same project.

16. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the Order under appeal. The application preferred by the appellants under Section 12(v)(o) of the Act is held to be maintainable. Case No.2241 of 2018 is restored to the file of the National Commission and shall be proceeded with in accordance with law. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019 ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.

17. The appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms. No costs.

May 10, 2019.
Kumud W/O Mahadeorao Slunke vs Shri Pandurang Narayan Gandhewar ...

4. The Slum Authority vide its order dated 28.11.2000 granted the permission. In an appeal arising therefrom, an order of remand was passed by the Appellate Authority. The matter was gone into by the Slum Authority afresh and by its order dated 30.05.2002 the permission was granted to the appellant to file the suit for eviction. The appeal preferred by the respondent challenging the order passed by the Slum Authority was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 31.10.2002 after giving opportunity to the parties and after scrutinising the material on record. While considering the submission made on behalf of the respondent as regards alternative accommodation, it was observed by the Appellate Authority as under:

6. On the basis of above discussion and verifying the record of lower court and provisions of Maharashtra Slum (Improvement & Re-development) Act, 1971, therefore I come to the conclusion that no substantial proof is presented by the appellant to interfere with the finding of lower court & hence I pass the following order.

ORDER The appeal is rejected and the order passed by lower court dt.30th May, 2002 is confirmed.”

11. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and Civil Appeal NO. ____ of 2019 @ SLP(C) No. 10469 of 2016 Kumud w/o Mahadeorao Salunke vs. Shri Pandurang Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors.

12. This appeal stands allowed. No order as to costs.

May 10, 2019.
Abdul Kuddus vs Union Of India

2. This order decides perceived conflict between sub-paragraph (2) to paragraph 3 and paragraph 8 of the Schedule to the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003 (“the 2003 Rules” for short). We shall also examine the alternative argument and suggestion of the appellants that this court should by way of a judicial pronouncement and in exercise of Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23127 of 2018 Page 2 of 27 power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India provide and create an appellate forum for deciding disputes regarding the citizenship status of persons residing in the State of Assam.

(4) A prayer for examination of witnesses in Court or a Commission for production of documents shall be refused if, in the opinion of the Tribunal, such prayer is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or similar purpose.

(9) After the case has been heard, the Tribunal shall submit its opinion as soon thereafter as may be practicable, to the officer or the authority specified in this behalf in the order of reference. Every case should be disposed of within a period of 60 days after the receipt of the reference from the competent authority. (10) The Tribunal’s final order containing its opinion on the question referred to need not be a detailed order as it is not a judgment; a concise statement of facts and the conclusion will suffice.

(11) Subject to the provisions of this order, the Tribunal shall have the power to regulate its own procedure for disposal of the cases expeditiously in a time bound manner.”

21. When we apply general principles of res-judicata, the contention of the appellants that the person concerned should be permitted to double-dip and be entitled to a second round of litigation before the Foreigners Tribunal notwithstanding the earlier opinion expressed by the Foreigners Tribunal is far-fetched, and completely unacceptable. The plea is fallacious and has no merit. This contention therefore must be rejected and fails.

22. As stated above, a person aggrieved by the opinion/order of the Tribunal can challenge the findings/opinion expressed by way of a 6 (2007) 2 SCC 181 Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23127 of 2018 Page 24 of 27 writ petition wherein the High Court would be entitled to examine the issue with reference to the evidence and material in the exercise of its power of judicial review premised on the principle of “error in the decision-making process”, etc. This serves as a necessary check to correct and rectify an ‘error’ in the orders passed by the Tribunal.

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23127 of 2018 Page 26 of 27

26. With the aforesaid observations, we dispose of the appeals and reject the contention of the appellants on the perceived conflict pertaining to the adjudication on the citizenship status of persons. We also reject the contention that this Court should direct the creation of an appellate forum.

MAY 17, 2019.
Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd. vs Union Of India

3. The appellant Company is stated to be engaged in the manufacture of aluminium alloys, for which they regularly import aluminium waste as a raw material for self-consumption. Imported scrap, it is accepted, falls under different code names as per specifications of the Institute of Recycling Industry. The grievance raised by the appellants is that the 2nd respondent i.e. the Principal Commissioner of Customs, Noida Customs Commissionerate and its Officers almost uniformly do not clear the consignments as per the declared transaction value in the bill of entry but insist that the appellants write a letter agreeing to pay customs duty as per the valuation by the customs authorities and compel them to forego their right to provisional assessment under Section 18 of the Customs Act, 1962 (‘the Act’, for short). The appellants, coerced and intimated, have no option but to give in and issue a letter of consent agreeing to assessment/valuation by the customs authorities to avoid delay in clearance, levy of demurrage, ground rent and container detention charges, etc. It is also alleged that the respondents without observing and contrary to the mandate of Section 14 of the Act discard the declared transactional value and recompute the consignment value in view of the Valuation Alert dated 1st December, 2016 issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (‘the Board’, for short).

(4) Subject to sub-section (5), if any refundable amount referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2) is not refunded under that sub-section within three months from the date of assessment of duty finally or re- assessment of duty, as the case may be, there shall be paid an interest on such unrefunded amount at such rate fixed by the Central Government under Section 27A till the date of refund of such amount.

21. The mandate to record reasons at the second stage of enquiry is not expressly stipulated, albeit it has been read by us by implication in Rule 12. Being conscious that this mandate if applied to past cases would possibly lead to complications and difficulties, we would invoke the doctrine of prospective application with the direction that the past cases will be decided on a case to case basis, depending upon the factual matrix and considerations like whether the importer has asked for ‘certain reasons’, whether the reasons were not communicated, whether ‘certain reasons’ can be deciphered from the assessment/valuation order, whether misdescription or false declaration was apparent, etc.

27. With the aforesaid clarification, we allow the present appeal and quash and set aside the order of Assessment dated 7th April, 2017 by issuing a writ of certiorari. In the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

MAY 17, 2019.

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 33602 of 2017 Page 30 of 30
Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S. S. Deswal vs Virender Gandhi

4. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as under:

In view of the above and for the reasons stated herein above, impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court does not call for any interference.

12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court dismissing the revision application/s, confirming the order passed by the first appellate court directing the appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation pending appeals.

The instant appeals are accordingly dismissed with the aforesaid observations and appellants are now directed to deposit the amount directed by the first appellate court within extended period of four weeks from today.
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Kalicharan .

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 18.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Judicature at Jabalpur, Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 1997 whereby the High Court has partly allowed the said appeal preferred by the original accused and set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 2 16.01.1997 passed by the learned Trial Court, whereby the learned Trial Court convicted the respondent­original accused for commission of the offence under Sections 148, 302/149, 325/149, 323/149 of the IPC and altered the conviction of the accused­Ramavtar from Section 302/149 of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of the IPC and sentenced him to five years R.I. with fine of Rs.5000/­ and set aside his conviction for the offence under Sections 148 and 302/149 of the IPC; altered the conviction of the accused­Kalicharan to offences under Sections 323 and 325 of the IPC and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone; set aside the conviction of the accused­Amar Singh, Kedar, Abhilakh and Ramgopal under Sections 148, 302/149, 325/149 and 323/149 of the IPC and acquitted them from the charges levelled against them; set aside the conviction of the accused­Tejsingh, Gangaram and Vedari under Sections 148, 302/149 and 325/149 of the IPC and convicted them for commission of the offence under Section 323 of the IPC and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone by them, the State has preferred the present appeal.

3.1 In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal succeeds in part. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court insofar as altering the conviction of the accused Ramavtar from Sections 302/149 of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo five years R.I. with fine of Rs.5,000/­ for the offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC is hereby quashed and set aside. The conviction of the accused Ramavtar (respondent No. 2 herein) is altered from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part I of the IPC and is sentenced to undergo eight years R.I. with a fine of Rs.5000/­ and in default to further undergo R.I. for six months. Four weeks’ time is granted to the accused Ramavtar (respondent No. 2 herein) to surrender to serve out the remaining portion of his sentence. Rest of the judgment and order of the High Court is hereby confirmed.
Hari Sankaran vs Union Of India

2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under:

2.4 Thereafter, by a detailed and reasoned order, the learned Tribunal vide Order dated 01.10.2018 allowed the said prayers and suspended the Board of Directors of IL&FS, and appointed the newly constituted Board to conduct the business as per the Memorandum and Articles of the companies. That the learned Tribunal issued the following directions:

Further directed that the present Board of Directors be suspended with immediate effect. The six Directors as reproduced supra shall take over the R1 company immediately. Newly constituted Board shall hold a meeting on or before 8th October, 2018 and conduct business as per the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the company and the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013. Liberty is granted to the Board of Directors to select a Chairman among themselves. Thereafter, report the roadmap to NCLT, Mumbai Bench at the earliest possible not later than the next date of hearing. The suspended directors hence forth shall not represent the R1 company as a Director and shall also not exercise any powers as a director in any manner before any authority as well.

7.7 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal, more particularly, considering the larger public interest as, in the present case, thousands of crores of the public money is involved.

15. Now insofar as the submission on behalf of the appellant that the order dated 01.10.2018 passed under Section 241/242 of the Companies Act is an interim order and the same is not a final order suspending the directors and the erstwhile board of directors of the company, and therefore the observations made in the order dated 01.10.2018 cannot be considered, has no substance. It is required to be noted that as on today the order dated 01.10.2018 suspending the erstwhile directors of the company including the appellant stands and remains in operation. The same is not challenged by way of an appeal before an appropriate appellate Tribunal/Court.

19. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 01.01.2019 passed by the learned Tribunal under Section 130 of the Companies Act for re­opening of the books of accounts and re­casting the financial statements of the Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited; IL&FS Financial Services Limited and IL&FS Transportation Networks Limited for the last five years, viz. from Financial Year 2012­13 to the Financial Year 2017­18, which came to be confirmed by the learned Appellate 42 Court vide impugned judgment and order dated 31.01.2019. Consequently, the present appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

All connected IAs are also disposed of.
Asim Shariff vs National Investigation Agency

4. The background facts giving rise to this appeal which needs to be noted are that a criminal case came to be registered as Crime No. 124/2016 on 16th October, 2016 for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC by Commercial Street Police after a complaint was filed by one Jayaram(CW­1), who stated that on 16 th October, 2016 at around 12.40 p.m. when he along with his friends namely Rudresh, Harikrishna and Kumar assembled near Srinivas Medical Stores, Shivajinagar, one person(accused) being the pillion rider of the motorcycle hacked Rudresh with a sharp edged and lethal machete on the right side of his neck and fled. Rudresh was taken to a hospital wherein he was declared brought dead.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from 12 grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”
Arshnoor Singh vs Harpal Kaur

2. The background facts in which the present Civil Appeal has been filed are briefly stated as under:

2.8. The Appellant became a major on 22.08.2003.

Dharam Singh purportedly executed the two Sale Deeds on 01.09.1999 in favour of Respondent No. 1 after the Appellant became a coparcener in the suit property.

22 Hence, the ground of legal necessity or benefit of the estate falls through.

The subsequent Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007 executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. The underlying principle of the doctrine of lis pendens is that if a property is transferred pendente lite, and the transferor is held to have no right or title in that property, the transferee will not have any title to 23 the property.7 The Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007 executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 being null and void, is hereby cancelled.

11. In view of the aforesaid discussion on law, the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court vide the Impugned Order dated 13.11.2018, being contrary to law, is set aside.

The Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 bearing Wasika Nos. 1075 and 1079 executed by Dharam Singh in favour of Respondent No. 1 are hereby cancelled and set aside. Consequently, the subsequent Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007 executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 during the pendency of proceedings is illegal, and hereby cancelled and set aside.

The name of the Appellant is to be recorded in the Jamabandis as the owner of the suit property. 25 The Civil Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. All pending Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of. Ordered accordingly.
The Executive Engineer, M.I.W. vs Vitthal Damodar Patil

3. Briefly stated, a notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on 9th July, 1998, pursuant to which the land belonging to the respondents situated at Village Pimpri, Block Dambhurni, Taluka Pachora, District Jalgaon, Maharashtra, was acquired for the stated public purpose. After following the necessary formalities, the Special Land Acquisition Officer passed an award under Section 11 of the Act on 14 th November, 2000, fixing the price at the rate of Rs.59,800/­ per hectare for Jirayat land and Rs.1,500/­ per hectare for Potkharab land. The possession of the acquired land was taken on 14th May, 1996. The respondents, however, resorted to a reference under Section 18 of the Act, which was decided by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jalgaon, vide judgment and order dated 19th September, 2015. Being dissatisfied with 3 the said judgment and order, the respondents carried the matter in appeal before the High Court which, as aforesaid, came to be partly allowed and resulted in the compensation amount being enhanced.

15. Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on the issues raised in the present appeal, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and relegate the parties before the High Court for consideration of First Appeal No.2536 of 2015 afresh, on its own merits and in accordance with law.

16. We may note that the respondents wanted to rely on new material which, presumably, was not part of the reference proceedings, in support of the argument that the witness examined by them was duly qualified and eligible to issue such valuation report. However, we make it clear that even this plea will have to be considered by the High Court on its own merits subject to just exceptions and objections available to the appellant regarding production of additional evidence, if any. All contentions available to both the parties, which can be legitimately pursued in the first appeal, are left open.

17. Appeal is allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs. All pending applications are disposed of in terms of this order.

July 01, 2019.