M/S Stanzen Toyotetsu India P.Ltd vs Girish V & Ors

3. The appellant-company is engaged in the manufacture of automobile parts in the name and style of M/s Stanzen Toyotetsu India Pvt. Ltd. while the respondents are workmen engaged by the appellant in connection with the said business. It is not in dispute that the employees of the appellant- company including the respondents are governed by Standing Orders certified under Industrial Employees (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.

4. The appellant’s case is that on 19th March, 2011 at about 10.30 p.m. the respondents with the help of other Trade Union functionaries stage managed an accident making it appear as if an employee by the name of Mr. Kusumadhara had slipped and fallen in the press area. The incident was, it is alleged, used as a ruse by the respondents who rushed to the place of alleged fall only to create a ruckus. Appellant’s further case is that although Mr. Kusumadhara had not sustained any injury, he was sent to the hospital in the ambulance of the appellant-company and that instead of resuming the work after the alleged incident, the respondents stopped the production activity and started abusing their superiors, damaged property of the company and even assaulted senior managerial personnel. These acts of indiscipline created an atmosphere of fear and tension in the factory and brought the production activity to a grinding halt. Senior managerial personnel injured in the incident were, according to the appellant, unable to report for work for about 15 days on account of assault on them.

8. Misc. Appeals No.56/2011 and 61/2011 filed by the appellant against the said order before the Principal Senior Civil Judge and CJM Ramanagara having failed, the appellant filed Writ Petitions No.8487-8491 of 2012 (GM- CPC) and W.P. No.9381 of 2012 (GM-CPC) before the High Court of Karnataka which petitions too failed and have been dismissed by the High Court in terms of a common order dated 15th June, 2012 impugned in the present appeals. In the result the disciplinary enquiry pending against the respondents remained stayed pending conclusion of the criminal trial. The present appeals, as noticed earlier, assailed the correctness of the said judgment and orders.

16. In the circumstances and taking into consideration all aspects mentioned above as also keeping in view the fact that all the three Courts below have exercised their discretion in favour of staying the on-going disciplinary proceedings, we do not consider it fit to vacate the said order straightaway. Interests of justice would, in our opinion, be sufficiently served if we direct the Court dealing with the criminal charges against the respondents to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible but in any case within a period of one year from the date of this order. We hope and trust that the Trial Court will take effective steps to ensure that the witnesses are served, appear and are examined. The Court may for that purpose adjourn the case for no more than a fortnight every time an adjournment is necessary. We also expect the accused in the criminal case to co-operate with the trial Court for an early completion of the proceedings. We say so because experience has shown that trials often linger on for a long time on account of non- availability of the defense lawyers to cross-examine the witnesses or on account of adjournments sought by them on the flimsiest of the grounds. All that needs to be avoided. In case, however, the trial is not completed within the period of one year from the date of this order, despite the steps which the Trial Court has been directed to take the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondents shall be resumed and concluded by the Inquiry Officer concerned. The impugned orders shall in that case stand vacated upon expiry of the period of one year from the date of the order.

17. In the result, we allow these appeals but only in part and to the extent indicated above. The parties are left to bear their own costs.