L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Laxmi Ram Pawar vs Sitabai Balu Dhotre & Anr

2. The aforesaid question arises in this way. The first respondent--Sitabai Balu Dhotre filed a suit for declaration, possession and permanent injunction in respect of a room admeasuring 8 x 10 ft. situate in Survey No. 1001, Wadarwadi bearing Hut No. 12/161/B/P/424, Taluka Haveli, Pune (for short, `subject room') against the appellant--Laxmi Ram Pawar and the second respondent--the Executive Engineer, Shivajinagar, Sub Division, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Pune in the Court of 10th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Pune. The case set up by the first respondent was that the subject room was constructed by her in 1987; she got electricity connection in her name and has been paying taxes to the Pune Municipal Corporation. She claimed that she was having photopass in her name. According to her, she permitted the appellant being her friend to stay temporarily for two months in the subject room as she (appellant) was not having any shelter to live in. After expiry of two months, the first respondent asked the appellant to vacate the subject room but she requested the first respondent to 2 allow her to stay in that room for some more time as she was arranging for some alternative accommodation but later on, the appellant denied the first respondent's right in the subject room necessitating the legal proceedings against her. The first respondent averred that the appellant was neither tenant nor licensee but a trespasser and has no right to remain in possession of the subject room.

3. The appellant traversed the first respondent's claim and set up the case in the written statement that the subject room was constructed by her in 1987 and she was holding a photopass for the said room. She denied that she was a trespasser. She set up a plea that subject room was situate in the slum area declared under the 1971 Act and the suit filed by the first respondent was not maintainable without written permission of the Competent Authority in view of the prohibition contained in Section 22(1)(a) of that Act.

Under the title `Continuing Trespasses', page 42, it is stated:

18. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed; the judgment of the High Court dated September 20, 2004 affirming the judgment of the 8th Additional District Judge dated July 30, 2004 is set aside. The suit filed by the first respondent stands dismissed. However, this will not preclude the first respondent in instituting fresh suit or proceeding for eviction against the appellant after obtaining 15 necessary written permission from the Competent Authority. The parties shall bear their own costs.

(R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI, DECEMBER 1, 2010 16
Election Commn.Of India vs Telangana Rastra Samithi & Anr

3. Briefly stated, the facts indicate that in order to press for a separate Telangana State, a Joint Action Committee was formed with all political parties which took a decision that all the members of the Legislative Assembly of the respective political parties should resign. Consequently, 12 members submitted their resignations from the membership of the Andhra Pradesh State Legislative Assembly to the Speaker of the Assembly on 14th February, 2010. On receipt of the said resignations, the Speaker ordered that the resultant vacancies be notified. The said notification was duly published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette (Part II Extraordinary) dated 14.02.2010. The Election Commission of India issued a Press Note dated 21.06.2010 under Section 30 of the 1951 Act, notifying its decision to hold bye-elections to fill up 10 clear vacancies according to the programme indicated therein. The bye-elections to 28- Vemulawada and 29-Sircilla Assembly Constituencies were not notified on account of the fact that election petitions were pending in which the petitioners had sought to be declared elected. Accordingly, there being 10 clear vacancies in the State Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh, the Commission decided to hold bye-elections to fill up the 10 clear vacancies as per programme indicated. The decision of the Election Commission of India, hereinafter referred to as "the Commission", not to hold bye-elections in the two aforesaid constituencies was challenged in the writ petition, which was ultimately allowed.

7. On the basis of its aforesaid findings the High Court, despite the decision of this Court in D. Sanjeevayya Vs. Election Tribunal Andhra Pradesh and others [AIR 1967 SC 1211 = 1967 (2) SCR 489], held that the submissions made on behalf of the Election Commission that the provisions of Section 151A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, should be interpreted so as not to render Sections 84, 98 and 101 otiose, was unsustainable. It was also held that a Court should decide a case as per the law as on the existing date of adjudication. The High Court, therefore, allowed the writ petition and directed elections be held in the two constituencies referred to hereinabove, since in its view ignoring the provisions of Section 151A of the 1951 Act would amount to violation of Article 327 and valid law made by Parliament.

36. The Appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court is, accordingly, set aside and the writ petition filed by the Respondent No.1 herein for a direction to hold bye- elections for the 28-Vemulawada Assembly Constituency and 29-Sircilla Assembly Constituency is dismissed. Having regard to the facts involved, the parties will bear their own costs.
Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Prince Rubber Industries

2. The facts of the case have been stated in the impugned judgment of the High Court and hence we are not repeating the same here, except where necessary.

3. The Writ Petition in the High Court was filed for quashing the order dated 23.03.2001 of the Deputy Director General of Foreign Trade. By the aforesaid order dated 23.03.2001 the Deputy Director General wrote to the Writ Petitioner (the respondent herein) that its claim for grant of 8 % Cash Compulsory Support 1 premium against the advance import licence under the scheme funded by the Reserve Bank of India cannot be allowed as the scheme had been closed since 1994.

5. We see no infirmity in the impugned judgment.

8. Thus there is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed. No cost.

DECEMBER 03, 2010 2
Chatti Konati Rao & Ors vs Palle Venkata Subba Rao

1. Plaintiff No. 1 is the son of plaintiff No. 2, whereas original defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were brother and sister of the second plaintiff. Both the defendants died during the pendency of the suit. The heirs and legal representatives of the first defendant were substituted in his place and they had contested the suit.

5. Plea of defendant No. 1 further is that on 6th November, 1960 he filed an application before the Assistant Settlement Officer for correction of rough patta issued in favour of second plaintiff in 1959 and to substitute his name along with his brother's name in place of second plaintiff. In the application defendant No. 1 categorically stated that on 18th February, 1954 the Settlement Officer directed issuance of patta of the land in dispute along with other lands in their favour and he was all through waiting for the issuance of patta. However, according to defendant No. 1, in August, 1959 he came to know that a rough patta was issued to second plaintiff contrary to the decision of the Settlement Officer and thereafter he filed an application on 7th November, 1959 before the Rough Patta Correction Officer informing him about 5 variance between grant and the order and prayed that the name of the second plaintiff be deleted from the patta and in her place his name and that of his brother's name be substituted. According to defendant No. 1 he filed reminder on 6th November, 1960 but it was returned by the Assistant Settlement Officer on 22nd November, 1960 with certain objections. Thereafter the first defendant did not present the petition for substituting his name in the patta by deleting the name of the second plaintiff. Further plea of the first defendant was that he had perfected his title by adverse possession.

16. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is dismissed with cost throughout to be paid by the appellants to the respondent. Lawyers fee quantified at Rs.25,000/-.
Balbir Chand & Ors vs State Of Punjab & Anr

Certain lands belonging to the appellants, situated in the villages of Neelpur and Sayedkheri in Tehsil Rajpura, District Patiala, were acquired as additional land for grain market in pursuance of preliminary notification dated 2.9.1981. The Land Acquisition Collector had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per acre for chahi land, Rs.30,000/- per acre for gair mumkin land and Rs.4000/- per acre for barani land. The Reference Court increased the compensation to Rs.1,00,000/- per acre for chahi land and Rs.60,000/- per acre for other types of land. The High Court affirmed the same by judgment dated 17.3.2004. The appellants, not being satisfied with the compensation awarded, have filed these appeals by special leave.

the earlier acquisition would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, we determine the market value as Rs.1,87,000/- per acre.

4. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed in part increasing the compensation to Rs.1,87,000/- per acre. The appellants will be entitled to the statutory benefits and interest in terms of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Parties to bear their respective costs.
M. Sudakar vs V.Manoharan & Ors

1. Petitioner happens to be a member of Aruppukkottai Nadarkal Uravinmurai Pothu Abiruthi Trust and elected as its President for two terms i.e. 2003-2006 and 2006-2009. By a resolution of the General Body dated 7th January, 2007 he was debarred from holding any post in Aruppukkottai Nadarkal Uravinmurai Pothu Abiruthi Trust (hereinafter referred to as the `Trust') for a period of 10 years. The aforesaid resolution was sent to the Secretary to the Government, Revenue and 2 Registration Department, for its registration. Aggrieved by the same petitioner filed Writ Petition (MD)No. 3414 of 2009 before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, inter alia, praying to restrain the respondent from registering the same. Petitioner further filed Writ Petition (MD) No.3657 of 2009 for a direction to the third respondent in the writ petition to enquire into the affairs of the Trust according to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, in the light of the representations dated 5th May, 2008 and 28th September, 2008. Petitioner filed another writ application bearing W.P.(MD) No.4269 of 2009 for a direction to the third respondent to consider his representation dated 22nd December, 2008. In the representations dated 5th May, 2008 and 28th September, 2008 referred to above the petitioner questioned the resolution passed by the General Body on 7th January, 2007 and as also the authority of respondent Nos.6 and 7 of the writ petition to pass the resolution. In the representation dated 22nd December, 2008, the petitioner questioned the validity of the Governing Body itself. 3

3. Aggrieved by the same respondent Nos.4 to 7 in the writ petition preferred Writ Appeal No.366 of 2009. The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge on its finding that the petitioner filed representation to the Registrar on 5th May, 2008, that is after 16 months from the date of the resolution i.e. 7th January, 2007 and further having not approached the High Court or the Civil Court the writ petition filed in April, 2009 after 27 months of the resolution deserves to be dismissed. The Division Bench further observed that the learned Single Judge 5 having held the writ petition as infructuous ought not to have moulded the relief and set aside the resolution being contrary to bye-laws. It further observed that the issue ought not to have been decided in the writ petition and the petitioner ought to have been relegated to the remedy of civil suit. The observation of the Division Bench in this regard reads as follows:

4. The petitioner assails the aforesaid order in this petition.

12. For all these reasons the impugned order of the Division Bench cannot be sustained and it is set aside and that of the Single Judge is restored. However, this will not preclude the 12 respondents from proceeding against the appellant for removal of his membership in accordance with law.

13. In the result, the appeal is allowed the impugned order of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Commnr. Of Customs, Mumbai vs M/S. M. Ambalal & Co

2) The factual matrix in brief is as follows:

This Court, by its order dated 06.09.2002, while dismissing the Special Leave Petition, directed the Additional Collector of Customs (Preventive), Mumbai or other appropriate Assessing Officer to decide the amount of duty payable under the Customs Act in respect of seized goods. The Commissioner of Customs vide order in Original No.CCP/KPM/ADJN/M&P/27/2002, quantified the duty payable by the respondent for an amount of `2,20,50,125/- (Rupees Two Crores Twenty Lakhs Fifty Thousand One Hundred and Twenty Five only) before redemption of the confiscated diamonds. Being aggrieved by the same, the respondent herein filed appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal, by its order dated 23.06.2003, allowed the appeal and held that the exemption would be available to the goods imported by the respondent in the light of the Notification No.247/76- 4 Cus dated 02.08.1976. It is this order which is the subject matter in this appeal filed by the Revenue under Section 130E(b) of the Act.

16) The other two issues which were argued by the respondent and the revenue before the Tribunal and same was not answered since the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal by extending the benefit of the exemption notification to the respondent-firm. We are of the view that these issues now require to be considered by the Tribunal. Accordingly, while setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal, we remand the matter to the Tribunal to consider those issues after affording personal hearing to both the parties. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
State Of West Bengal & Anr vs P.K.Moitra & Ors

The respondent was appointed as an Inspector in the Food and Supplies Department in the year 1972. He was promoted to the post of Chief Inspector in the Food and Supplies Department in the year 1985 and his pay was fixed in the scale of 425-1050 under Pay Scale 11 of the Revision of Pay & Allowances Rules 1981(`ROPA Rules 1981' for short). He approached the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal in the year 1988 praying that Pay Scale 13 (Rs.470-1230) granted to Chief Inspectors in the Relief & Welfare Department should be extended to him. The said petition was disposed of on 7.9.1990 with a direction to consider his representation.

5. The Secretary, Finance Department passed a reasoned order dated 5.9.1994 rejecting the claim of first respondent for grant of higher pay scale 13, on the ground that Chief Inspector in Food & Supplies Department was not equal to Chief Inspector in Relief & Welfare Department. The first respondent filed a writ petition (No.3684/1994) in the year 1994 challenging the order dated 5.9.1994 and praying for grant of the higher pay scale for the period 1981-85 when he worked on the post of Inspector (Pay Scale No.11 of ROPA Rules 1981 corresponding to Scale 10 of ROPA Rules 1990) and for grant of the higher pay scale No.13 of ROPA Rules 1981 corresponding to pay scale 12 of ROPA Rules, 1990 for the period when he was working on the post of Chief Inspector, Food & Supplies, and consequential reliefs. The said writ petition was transferred to the Tribunal (and numbered as TA No.567 of 1997). The Tribunal by order dated 15.9.1997 allowed the said petition directing the appellants to give the first respondent the benefit of Scale 11 of ROPA Rules, 1981 for his tenure in the post of Inspector of Food & Supplies with all consequential benefits and to consider and fix an appropriate Scale of pay as Chief Inspector of Food & Supplies which must be higher than the scale of pay of Inspector of Food & Supplies. The said order purported to follow its order dated 10.7.1997 passed in the case of Pinaki Ranjan Gupta and 49 others which had in turn relied upon the decision dated 5.1.1993 in Abhijit Samaddar and another. The State filed a writ petition challenging the order and the Tribunal and the Division Bench of the High Court, by a brief order dated 23.6.1998, dismissed the writ petition, which is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

8. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and Tribunal and dismiss the application for relief.

December 09, 2010.
Naseem Ahmad & Ors vs State Of U.P.& Anr

3) The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are:

The appellants herein applied for the said posts. After interview, a select list was prepared on 19.09.2000 mentioning 22 names and the appellants were placed at S.Nos. 9, 10 and 11. Subsequent to the result, appointments were made as and when the vacancies arose. Appointment orders were issued to the appellants on 13.08.2001. The total sanctioned strength of Class IV employees in the Judgeship of Mahoba on the date of 3 advertisement was 31. In 2001, 4 more posts were created in the Judgeship of Mahoba for the outlying Court in Tehsil Charkhari. For the said newly created posts, the appointment letters were issued to the appellants herein on 13.08.2001. In the meantime, one Court of Addl. District Judge was transferred from Hamirpur to Mahoba increasing the sanctioned strength of Class IV employees in Mahoba to 37 including the outlying Court of Charkhari.

(b) On 19.09.2003, the District Judge, Mahoba passed an order that as per the provisions of G.Os. dated 27.02.1974 (Personnel), 29.07.1995 (Personnel and administrative Reforms Department, U.P. Government) and order dated 23.01.1996 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Ram Babu etc., the panel made of Class IV employees is valid for a period of one year, and thus, the appointments made after 19.09.2001 are ad hoc. He also cancelled the select list/wait list forthwith. On the basis 4 of the said order, the appointments of the appellants were treated as ad hoc.

Note--The order of names in the waiting list shall be in the order in which the candidates are admitted to it but the District Judge may at the time of appointment, choose from the list the most suitable of all the candidates for reasons to be recorded in writing."

However, the appellant No. 2 -Prakash Chandra was not re- appointed since at that time he was over aged. 1

14) In these circumstances, we hold that appellant Nos. 1 to 3 are deemed to continue in service from the date of initial selection i.e., 13.08.2001 and for all purpose and service benefits, the relevant date is date of their initial selection i.e., 13.08.2001 and they are permitted to continue as per the Rules applicable. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above. No costs.

DECEMBER 10, 2010.
M.Buggappa (D)Thr.Lrs.& Ors vs Land Acq.Officer-Cum-Mandal ...

2. The appellants' land was acquired in pursuance of preliminary notification dated 3.7.1990 and final notification dated 18.10.1990 for the public purpose of providing plots to persons belonging to weaker sections. Possession of the acquired land was however taken over on 17.11.1977. The Land Acquisition Officer, by his award dated 21.3.1991, offered compensation at Rs.110/- per sq. yard. The Reference Court, by its judgment dated 30.12.1999, affirmed the said rate of compensation. On appeal to the High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 13.10.2008, compensation was increased to Rs.160/- per sq. yard.

3. The Reference Court apart from awarding solatium, also awarded additional amount on the market value at the rate of 12% per annum from 17.11.1977 to 3.7.1990. The Reference Court awarded interest at 9% per annum from 17.11.1977 for a period of one year and at the rate of 15% per annum from 17.11.1978. The High Court while increasing the compensation as above, held that the appellants were not entitled to additional amount under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the Act', for short). The High Court also held that appellants were not entitled to interest from 17.11.1977 but only from the date of preliminary notification namely, 3.7.1990. The said judgment is under challenge in this appeal by special leave.

10. We accordingly allow the appeal in part, and award in addition to what has been awarded by the High Court, damages at 6% per annum from 17.11.1977 to 3.7.1990, on the market value determined as on 3.7.1990. The amount so due as damages shall carry interest at 6% per annum from the date of award (21.3.1991) to date of payment. The amount awarded as damages shall not carry any additional amount or solatium.
State Of A.P vs M. Sobhan Babu & Anr

2. P.W. 1-Maxwell Trevor, P.W.2-Gene Trevor and P.W. 4-Marlene Moss are brothers, whereas P.W. 5 Sherlyn Trevor is the wife of the deceased Glen Trevor. P.W. 3 Ezzard Moss is the sister of the deceased and wife of P.W. 4. The entire extended family was residing in a residential house bearing No. 12-5-188/2 Lalaguda, Secunderabad, consisting of two floors with two portions in each floor. The deceased was an employee of the Railways and he along with his wife and children was residing in the southern portion of the ground floor whereas P.W. 4 along with his wife and children was residing in the northern portion of the ground floor. P.Ws. 2,3 and 4 were residing on the first floor of the said premises. P.W. 6-D. Francis Satyanandam, was a neighbour of P.Ws. 1 to 5 with his residence on the southern side of the said premises. During the intervening night of 20th/21st November, 1991 shortly after midnight the deceased heard some footsteps and came out to investigate. He found A2 standing on the balcony of the first floor. A scuffle ensued between the two and the shouts and screams that came about in the scuffle woke up the other occupants of the building and they saw the deceased and A2 grappling with each other. As the deceased was a sportsman of some repute and physically strong he managed to pin A2 to the ground by falling on him. A2 thereupon took out a knife from the right side of his hip pocket with his right hand and stabbed the deceased on the left side of the abdomen and when P.W. 3 went to his rescue A2 stabbed him on the lower part of the right arm as well. In the meanwhile, A1 came from the side of the balcony and stabbed the deceased on both his thighs. A1 also prevented P.Ws. 1 and 3 from going to the rescue of the deceased by holding a knife at the throat of P.W. 3. A1 also stabbed P.W. 2 on his left shoulder. Despite the injuries having been caused to them, P.Ws.1 and 2 over powered A-2 and pushed him from balcony. In the meanwhile, the other neighbours arrived at the scene and got hold of A1 as well. P.Ws. 1 to 3 brought both the accused to the ground floor, where they were tied up with a rope and information was also sent to the police. In the meanwhile, P.W. 1 secured a car from his neighbour Captain P. Crlbyand and removed the injured to the Railway Hospital Lalaguda, but he succumbed to his injuries on the way. The other injured were also brought to the hospital and they were examined and given first aid for their injuries. Their injuries were found to be simple. The trial court relying on the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses as supported by the medical evidence convicted and sentenced the accused under Sections 302/34, 460 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code.

6. We, therefore, feel that the High Court's observation that the matter fell under Section 304 Part I and not under Section 302 of the IPC is erroneous. We, accordingly, set aside this part of the High Court judgment and restore that of the trial court.

7. The appeal is allowed.