L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
M. Meeramytheen & Ors vs K. Parameswaran Pillai & Ors

With Civil Appeal No.7749 of 2002 O R D E R Heard learned counsel for the parties. A petition was filed before the learned Munsif, Quilon, who was exercising powers of the Rent Controller under the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, by K. Parameswaran Pillai and B. Geethadevi for eviction of the two tenants and one sub- tenant from two shop rooms which were let out in the year 1967 on a monthly rental of Rs.250/-. In 1971, the tenants undeniably created a sub-tenancy in relation to one of the two rooms in favour of S. Abdul Jabbar. Later on, a partition was effected on 12th October, 1981, in which one of the two rooms in question was allotted in the share of Premachandran and the other in favour of his sister, B. Geethadevi, Plaintiff No.2. Premachandran transferred the room, allotted in his share, under a registered sale deed executed in favour of Plaintiff No.1, ...2/-

The defendants filed written statement contesting the suit for eviction. They neither denied title of the plaintiffs nor relationship of landlord and tenant. They, however, denied that they had created any sub-tenancy as alleged by the plaintiffs.

Against the judgement of the Rent Controller, an appeal was preferred. The appellate court took the view that though initially there was a single tenancy in respect of both the rooms, as a result of the partition one each of the two shop rooms were allotted in the shares of two different co-sharers. Hence, the plaintiffs were not entitled to seek eviction in relation to both the shop rooms and they could seek eviction only in relation to ...3/-

Accordingly, Civil Appeal No.7749 of 2002 is allowed, judgement and decree passed by the appellate court as well as the High Court are modified and suit for eviction is decreed in its entirety. The tenants are, however, granted time till 30th June, 2010, to vacate the premises in question upon filing the usual undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today.

It is directed that in case the tenants fail to vacate the premises in question within the aforesaid time, it would be open to the decree holder to file an execution petition for delivery of possession and in case such a petition has been already filed, an application shall be ...5/-

Civil Appeal No.6391 of 2002 is dismissed as being devoid of any substance.

No costs.
Subhash vs Divisional Controller M.S.R.T.C. & Anr

3. Subhash Kondiba Sontakke - the appellant - came to be employed as driver in 1980 with Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (for short, 'Corporation'). He was made permanent in 1985. On September 28, 2000, the appellant was on duty on Beed-Dharur route. While driving bus (MH-20-D- 4332) on that route on that day, it is alleged that the bus ramped on the railing of the bridge near Chinchavan village due to rash and negligent driving of the appellant and that resulted in damage to the bus. The Transport Officer, Beed, held an enquiry into the accident and after receipt of the report, the disciplinary authority issued charge-sheet to the appellant on November 20, 2000. The disciplinary authority also appointed Inquiry Officer to enquire into the charge(s) against the appellant.

5. The Inquiry Officer, after conclusion of the enquiry, held that charges were proved against the appellant. The disciplinary authority, upon receipt of the enquiry report, issued notice to the appellant to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service and after getting the response from the appellant, vide order dated April 16, 2001, dismissed the appellant from service.

9. The appellant then filed a complaint under Section 28 r/w item nos. 5 and 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, `Act, 1971') before the Industrial Court, Aurangabad. The said complaint was dismissed by Industrial Court on October 15, 2005, inter alia, holding that the order of First Appellate Authority warranted no interference.

10. The appellant challenged the order of the Industrial Court in a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad. The Single Judge did not find any merit in the writ petition and dismissed the same on October 15, 2007.

12. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed in part to the extent indicated above. The order of the First Appellate Authority dated May 21, 2001 is modified and it is observed that appellant would be treated to have been reinstated with continuity in service but without back wages. The parties will bear their own costs.

........................J (Tarun Chatterjee) ........................J (R. M. Lodha) New Delhi September 17, 2009.
Jagdish vs State Of M.P

1. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the IPC for having murdered his wife, four minor daughters and a minor son all between 1 and 16 years of age and was sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge, Manasa by judgment dated 24th April, 2006. On an appeal and reference to the High Court, the conviction and sentence has been maintained leading to the present appeal. The prosecution story is as follows:

3. This Special Leave Petition first came up before this Court on the 1st September, 2006 and was adjourned to call for the records. On 25th September, 2006, when the case was again taken up, it appears that an argument was raised that the appellant had been suffering from some mental ailment at the time of the murders and the counsel sought time to go through some documents pertaining to his treatment. On 8th January, 2007, this Court made an order that the counsel should find out, if possible, the date and place where the petitioner may have been treated. On 12th February, 2007, the counsel made a statement that the appellant's family members Criminal Appeal No.338/2007 8 had been able to collect some documents which would be received by him shortly. On 12th March, 2007 leave was granted, limited however, to the question of sentence only. During the pendency of this appeal, and on the direction of this Court, yet another enquiry was made to find out if the appellant had any mental disorder and had been undergoing any treatment to this effect. Consequent to the enquiry, a report has been tendered to this Court supported by an affidavit of Shri Vineet Kumar, Additional Superintendent of Police, District Neemuch, Madhya Pradesh to the effect that no medical record which could establish that the appellant had undergone treatment for a mental or psychological problem had been found but statements of his family members and others including Mohan Lal, his elder brother and his parents Mohan Lal and Sita Devi and the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat, Achalpur which were to the effect that the appellant had been addicted to drugs, particularly to Ganja, and had become mentally disturbed and had been under treatment, and it was on Criminal Appeal No.338/2007 9 account of this mental illness that he had killed his family, had been received, were being put on record.

16. The facts of the present case; the incident happened on the 20th August 2005. The Additional Sessions Judge rendered his judgment on 24th April 2006 and the judgment was confirmed by the High Court on 27th June 2006. This matter first came up in this Court on 1st September 2006 and was adjourned repeatedly on the request of the appellant's counsel so as to find out if some material could be collected to substantiate his claim that he was unsound mind and it was on 12th March 2007 that leave was granted limited to the question of sentence only. The matter is being disposed of by us in September 2009. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no delay whatsoever in the aforesaid circumstances. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
Surendra Kumar Sharma vs Makhan Singh

4. The trial Court rejected the application for amendment of the plaint mainly on the ground that the prayer for amendment was a belated one. In revision, the High Court affirmed the order of the trial Court rejecting the application for amendment of the plaint inter alia holding that not only the prayer for amendment of the plaint made by the plaintiff/appellant was a belated 2 one, but also that the prayer, if allowed, shall change the nature and character of the suit.

6. We keep it on record that in spite of notice on the defendant/respondent, no one had contested this appeal before us.

[See B.K. N. Pillai Vs. P. Pillai and another [AIR 2000 SC 614 at Page 616]. Accordingly, we do not find any reason to hold that only because there was some delay in filing the application for amendment of the plaint, such prayer for amendment cannot be allowed.

8. So far as the second ground is concerned i.e. the prayer for amendment of plaint, if allowed, shall change the nature and character of the suit, we are unable to accept this view of the High Court. We have carefully examined the amendment prayed for and after going through the application for amendment of the plaint, we are of the view that the question of changing the nature and character of the suit, if amendment is allowed, cannot arise at all. The suit has been filed for eviction inter alia on the ground of arrears of rent. It cannot be disputed that even after the amendment, the suit would remain a suit for eviction. Therefore, we are unable to agree that if the amendment of the plaint is allowed, the nature and character of the suit shall be changed. Accordingly, the High Court was not 6 justified in holding that the nature and character of the suit shall be changed, if such prayer for amendment is allowed.

9. For the reasons aforesaid, the orders of the High Court as well as of the trial Court are set aside. The application for amendment of the plaint filed by the appellant stands allowed, subject to the payment of costs of Rs.10,000/- to the opposite party, which shall be deposited/paid within a period of six weeks from the date of supply of a copy of this order. In default of deposit/payment of such costs, the application for amendment of the plaint shall stand rejected.

10. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.

..............................,J [TARUN CHATTERJEE] ..............................,J [R. M. LODHA] NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 8
The New Bus Stand Shop Owners Assn vs Corporation Of Kozhikode & Anr

7. The State of Kerala also filed an affidavit wherein the stand is that in the New Bus Stand Building at Indira Gandhi Road, Kozhikode the said Corporation for commercial purposes let out rooms which were offered and allotted to the bidders in a public auction. An amendment was introduced in the Kerala Stamp Act which came into effect from 29.07.1996. In the light of the said amendment, the Secretary of the said Corporation directed the occupants of the rooms to execute agreements on stamp papers worth 5% of the annual licence fee for continuous occupation of the rooms. In paragraph 4 of that affidavit it has been stated that State Government vide letter No. 5 12980/E2/91/TD dated 4.7.1991 stipulated that while letting out shop rooms in shopping complex owned by local self Governments, an agreement is to be executed on stamp paper worth 2.5% of the total value of annual licence fee. The said rate was subsequently enhanced to 5% as per amendment in the Kerala Stamp Act which came into force with effect from 29.07.1996. Accordingly, pursuant to the direction by the State Government, the Corporation informed all the licensees to execute agreement at the revised rate of 5%. In paragraph 5, it has been stated even though it is actually a licence, the nomenclature is not decisive. It is also stated that agreement creates a "lease" within the meaning of Transfer of Property Act. Alternatively, it was also urged even if the said agreement does not create a lease under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, it will be covered within the definition of "Lease" under the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959 and reliance was 6 placed on Section 2(1) (iii) of the said Act.

[(Peakin v. Peakin) 1895 - 2 I.R. 359]

(Page 384-385 of the report)

31. If we apply these tests in the facts of this case, it will be clear that the agreement between the parties is one for licence and not of a lease.

34. This appeal is, therefore, allowed. Both the judgments of the High Court, of the Single Judge and of the Division Bench are quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Anubhav Gupta vs State Of Rajasthan

In view of the compromise arrived at, we quash the case registered under Section 498A/406 IPC pending before the Mahila Police Station, Bhilwada, Rajasthan; Divorce Petition No. A-1008/2008 under Section 12 (1)(c) of the Hindu Marriage Act pending before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Pune; Domestic Violence Case No. 3502/2008 filed by the mother of the husband Mrs. Asha Virendra Gupta against Shilpa Anubhav Gupta & Others pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pune and Case No. 1934/2008 titled Vinay Kumar Gupta V. Girish Chand & Ors. under Section 353, 323, 427, 500, 504 and 506 IPC pending before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Badaun, U.P. We also make it clear that in case, the respondent- husband does not make the payments as per the compromise it would be open to the parties herein or any one of them to move an application for the recall of the present order.

The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. 3 T.P. (C) NO. 58/2009 In view of the order passed in Criminal Appeal No. of 2009 arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 4248 of 2009, this petition has been rendered infructuous.

The Transfer Petition is dismissed, accordingly. as having become infructuous.

..................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] ..................J [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN] NEW DELHI OCTOBER 05, 2009.
Umapada Kayal vs State Of West Bengal

2. Briefly stated, the prosecution story, as emerging from the first information report, was that the deceased Shaktipada Kayal along with his younger brother PW 6 Kush Kumar Kayal and their few relatives had gone to the tank (pukur) for catching fish and while coming back, they saw accused persons plucking fruits from the palm tree belonging to the deceased. On questioning as to why the fruits were being plucked, the deceased and his brother PW 6 were assaulted by as many as nine persons. At once, Umapada picked up a chowki (a stick with spikes) and struck a blow on the left side of the chest of deceased. The chowki penetrated into his body. PW 6 also sustained injuries in the incident. The deceased was carried immediately to P.G. Hospital, Calcutta but did not survive. As a result, the first information report came to be lodged on the next day i.e., on 6.6.1983.

4. The judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge was challenged before the High Court. The High Court vide judgment dated 23.8.2002 dismissed the appeal against all the accused except the appellant-accused No. 1 Umapada Kayal and convicted him for offence under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo 10 years' rigorous imprisonment. The High Court relied on the evidence of the injured witness PW 6 Kush Kumar Kayal as also the other two eye witnesses PW 7 Kalipada Kayal and PW 8 Bhabesh Chandra Kayal. The High Court has also referred to the medical evidence of PW 21 Dr. Asoke Kumar Maitra who had performed the post-mortem on the deceased. Hence, the present appeal.

12. With this modification, the appeal is partly allowed. The bail bonds of the accused-appellant are cancelled. The appellant is directed to surrender within two weeks from today to serve out the remaining sentence failing which non-bailable warrants shall be issued against him. The original record be sent back immediately.
State Of M.P. & Ors vs Yogendra Shrivastava

2. The Madhya Pradesh Employees State Insurance Service (Gazetted) Recruitment Rules, 1981 (in short `the Rules') framed by the State Government came into force in the year 1982. Rule (5) of the Rules provides that classification of the service, the scales of pay attached thereto and the number of posts included in the service shall be in accordance with the provisions contained in Schedule I thereto. The scales of pay and NPA payable to different categories of Medical Officers, other than the Director of the Service, are extracted below from Schedule I to the Rules:

4. As their request was not acceded, the respondents approached the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal seeking a direction for payment of NPA in accordance with the Rules. They contended that whenever there was an increase in their basic pay, either on account of annual increments in the pay scale or on account of revision of pay scales, there should be corresponding automatic increase in the NPA in terms of the Rules which required payment of "NPA @ 25% of the pay". The Tribunal accepted the contention and allowed their applications and directed the appellant to calculate and pay NPA at the rate of 25% of the pay from the respective dates of their joining service. The State Government filed writ petitions challenging the orders of the Tribunal. The High Court dismissed those petitions, upholding the orders of the Tribunal. The 5 said orders of the High Court are under challenge in these appeals by special leave.

Re : Question No.(ii)

13. The Tribunal directed payment of the difference in NPA to respondents from their respective dates of appointment. The respondents were appointed from 1982 onwards. The respondents had approached the Tribunal 1 long after their appointment, that is, in 1998 or thereafter.

15. The appeals are allowed in part as follows:

__________________J [R. V. Raveendran] 1 ____________________J [B. Sudershan Reddy] New Delhi;

October 07, 2009.
Ram Sunder Mahto & Ors vs State Of Bihar

1. This appeal is filed by the four accused persons who have been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 395, Indian Penal Code (in short 'IPC') and have been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years. Considering their identification in the test identification parade and the evidence led before the trial court, the trial court convicted 11 persons out of 14 accused persons and awarded life sentence for their offence. These 11 accused persons having appealed before the High Court, the High Court allowed the appeal of five persons namely Panchu Mahto, Bilas Baitha, Thaga Mahto, Deo Narain Mahto and Ganeshi Mahto and acquitted them. The High Court took the view that they being very old, they should be sentenced only to suffer rigorous imprisonment which they had already -2- undergone. Two other accused were let off on undergone sentence.

3. With this modification, the appeal is dismissed. The bail bonds of the accused appellants are cancelled. The appellants are directed to surrender within two weeks from today to serve out the remaining sentence failing which the non-bailable warrants shall be issued against them by the concerned court for their arrest.
Basayya Prabhayya Hallur vs State Of Karnataka & Ors

The prosecution in support of its case examined 3 23 witnesses and got marked 26 Exhibits and 14 material objects. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the case of the prosecution in part and convicted accused Nos.1 & 4 for offences punishable under Section 304 Part-I I.P.C. and sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 each with default clause. Accused Nos.2, 3, 6 & 7 were acquitted of all the charges. Accused No.5 died during the pendency of the trial.

As regards accused Nos.2, 3, 6 and 7, the High Court by the impugned judgment, reversed the Trial Court's judgment of acquittal and convicted them under Section 324 read with Section 149 of the I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each with default clause. However, the High Court acquitted all the accused persons under Sections 302/149 and 504/149 of the I.P.C.

We find considerable force in the submission of Mr. Krishnamani, learned senior counsel who appeared for the appellant. The High Court in our considered view was not justified in reversing the judgment of acquittal in such a perfunctory manner. The impugned judgment of the High Court is clearly contrary to the well settled position of law. Consequently, the impugned judgment of the High Court qua A-3 is set aside and the appeal filed by him is allowed. A-3 is acquitted of all the charges.

The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

...................J (DALVEER BHANDARI) ...................J (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) NEW DELHI, 11 OCTOBER 7, 2009.
Baswant Shankarappa Swami vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

3. The appellant is a Graduate Engineer (Civil). He was selected and nominated by the Maharashtra Public Service Commission (for short `the commission') as Assistant Executive Engineer Class I in the Maharashtra Service of Engineers (Group A) in the Irrigation Department on September 11, 1989. The appellant was promoted as Executive Engineer, a Class I post, vide office order dated September 7, 1993. On March 1, 1996 the Governor of Maharashtra made the rules called the Superintending Engineer (Civil) in the Maharashtra Service of Engineers Group A, in the Irrigation Department (Recruitment Rules), 1996 (for short `the Rules'). Rules 2 and 4 thereof came into force on the date of publication of the notification in the official gazette while as regards rule 3, it was provided that it shall come into force on such date as may be notified by the State Government in consultation with the Commission. On September 30, 1999, a notification came to be issued declaring March 1, 2001 to be date for coming into force of rule 3. According to the appellant, although he completed 7 years on the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) in the month of September 2 2000 and his juniors in the cadre of Executive Engineer were promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer in 2005 but he was denied promotion having not gained experience in any one or more of the branches from each of the groups provided in rule 3. The appellant constrained thereby approached the Tribunal under Section 19 of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 for redressal of his grievance. The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of rule 3 before the Tribunal being arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

9. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed to the aforesaid extent. Writ Petition No. 6812/2008 is restored on the file of the High Court for its fresh consideration. No order as to costs.

Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Respondent(s) Date: 08/10/2009 This matter was called on pronouncement of judgment today.

For Petitioner(s) Mr. R. Sundaravaradan, Sr. Adv.

Mr. S.M. Jadhav, Adv.

Mr. Abdul Tamboli, Adv.

Mr. Santosh Paul, Adv.

Mr. S.N. Bundla, Adv.

Mr. C.K. Sasi, Adv.

Mr. Sudhanshu, Adv.

Mr. Naresh Kumar, Adv.

The appeal is allowed in part.