L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
B. Radhakrishnan vs The State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors

3. In order to appreciate the issue involved in these appeals, which lie in a narrow compass, few relevant facts need mention infra.

4. Mr. B. Radhakrishnan and Mr. K. Padmaraj, - appellants herein were enlisted in the Police Department of the Coimbatore City Police Unit in the year 1976 and 1977 respectively as Grade-II Police Constables. One Eswaran and others were recruited between 1979 and 1982 in the Tamil Nadu Special Police Battalion as Grade-II Police Constables, Category III. These persons were promoted to the post of Naik in the year 1985 and subsequently in the year 1987 to the post of Havaldar. At that time these persons were drawing higher pay than the appellants.

5. In the year 1993, Eswaran and others exercised their option as provided in the Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Service Rules 1978 and sought their transfer to the Armed Reserve, Coimbatore City Division. It was allowed.

10. Aggrieved by the refusal to step up their basic pay at par with Eswaran and others, the appellants herein preferred writ petitions being W.P. Nos. 9527 & 9528 of 2006 before the High Court. By order dated 13.09.2010, the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petitions and directed stepping up of basic pay of the appellants herein at par with Eswaran and others. This order was implemented by the respondents by issuing the order dated 08.10.2011 and accordingly the basic pay of the appellants was stepped up.

8. Aggrieved by the orders of recovery, Eswaran and others filed applications being O.A. No. 10317 of 1997 etc. etc. before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai. By order dated 06.04.2004, the Tribunal allowed the applications and set aside the orders of recovery.

18. In the light of these reasons and further keeping in view the short controversy involved in the case which is somewhat akin to the case of Shaym Babu (supra), we are of the view that similar directions, which were given in the case of Shaym Babu, can also be given in these appeals against the respondents. In other words, it shall only be just and proper not to recover any excess amount from the appellants, which has been paid to them on the basis of stepping up of their pay scale. It is much more so when as mentioned above, the appellants have given up their challenge to the respondent's main action taken against the appellants objecting for the grant of benefit of stepping up of their pay and confined their attack to the issue of recovery of excess amount from them.

19. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed in part. The impugned order is modified only to the extent of directing the respondents not to make recovery of any excess amount from the appellants in relation to the payment made to them towards stepping up of their pay scale.

November 17, 2015.
M/S. State Bank Of Patiala ... vs Commr.Of Income Tax,Patiala

3. The facts in all the cases are similar. The bank makes purchases of bills of exchange from its customers and charges commission thereon for services rendered by it. The discounted bills so purchased are then presented to the parties concerned for realization. If on presentation the bill is realized within time, no charges are levied by the bank. In case the bills are not realized in time but the other party pays the value of the bill beyond the stipulated time, a certain amount in the form of interest is charged by the bank on a fixed percentage basis for every day of default. This amount is credited by the bank in its interest account.

20. In the circumstances, we dismiss the appeals of revenue and allow the appeals of the assessees and set aside the judgments in favour of revenue.
M/S Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills vs Commnr. Of Central Excise & Anr

4. The case of the appellant is that it took a rolling mill on lease for the period from 1997 to 2000 and manufactured rerolled non-alloyed steel products. On 1.9.1997 the compounded levy scheme was introduced by way of insertion of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act. The appellant opted for the aforesaid scheme under Rule 96ZP of the Central Excise Rules. When the lease expired, the appellant surrendered its registration certificate on 1.6.2000. As stated hereinabove, on 19.8.2005 the impugned notice was issued to the appellant demanding interest for delayed payment of duty for the period 1997 to 2000.

(5) If an independent processor fails to pay the amount of duty or any part thereof by the date specified in sub-rule (3), he shall be liable to,-

On the request of M/s. A.P.S. ASSOCIATES PVT LIMITED, I visited their works at D-133, Phase V. Focal Point. Ludhiana for inspection of the INDUCTION FURNACE and assessing the capacity thereof.

43. We are in broad agreement with the Karnataka High Court view as it is clear that the load capacity of an induction furnace unit is certainly relevant material referred to in Rule 3(2) to determine the capacity of the furnace installed. It is obvious that it is not necessary to state such load capacity in terms for it to be included in Rule 3(2). Agreeing therefore with the Karnataka High Court’s view we set aside the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and declare that a Chartered Engineer Certificate dealing with the sanctioned electrical load for a furnace is a relevant consideration which can be looked at in the absence of other factors mentioned in Rule 3. This appeal is disposed of accordingly.

44. Conclusion We have declared in this judgment that the interest and penalty provisions under the Rules 96ZO, ZP, and ZQ of the Central Excise Rules, 1994 are invalid for the reasons assigned in the judgment. Accordingly, the appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed and the appeals filed by the assessees are allowed to the extent indicated above. It may be noted that in an appeal from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 8.11.2012 in SLP (C) No. 9796/2012, it has been held that the levy of penalty under the aforesaid provisions is mandatory in character. In view of what has been held by us today, this appeal will also have to be allowed in the same terms as the other assessees’ appeals which have been allowed. All the aforesaid appeals are disposed of accordingly.
Shamsher Singh Verma vs State Of Haryana

Briefly stated, a report was lodged against the appellant (accused) on 25.10.2013 at Police Station, Civil Lines, Kaithal, registered as FIR No. 232 in respect of offence punishable under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and one relating to Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2015 (POCSO) in which complainant Munish Verma alleged that his minor niece was molested by the appellant. It appears that after investigation, a charge sheet is filed against the appellant, on the basis of which Sessions Case No. 33 of 2014 was registered. Special Judge, Kaithal, after hearing the parties, on 28.3.2014 framed charge in respect of offences punishable under Sections 354A and 376 IPC and also in respect of offence punishable under Sections 4/12 of POCSO. Admittedly prosecution witnesses have been examined in said case, whereafter statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). In defence the accused has examined four witnesses, and an application purported to have been moved under Section 294 CrPC filed before the trial court with following prayer: -

Therefore, without expressing any opinion as to the final merits of the case, this appeal is allowed, and the orders passed by the courts below are set aside. The application dated 19.2.2015 shall stand allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is observed that the accused/appellant shall not be entitled to seek bail on the ground of delay of trial.

November 24, 2015.
Commercial Taxes Officer vs A Infrastructure Ltd

2. The facts giving rise to this batch of appeals are that the assessee- company is engaged in the business of manufacturing Asbestos Cement Pressure Pipe and Asbestos Cement Sheets and it had availed ITC on the purchase of raw material used in the manufacture of A.C. Sheets. The assessing authority issued notice to the assessee for the purpose of disallowing ITC on purchase of raw material used in manufacturing A.C. Sheets for the period mentioned hereinabove and pursuant to the show cause notice the assessee filed a detailed reply and eventually the assessing authority passed orders under Section 22 of the Act disallowing the ITC and charged interest. The said orders were assailed before the Appellate Authority which declined to interfere with the orders appealed against, compelling the assessee to file second appeals before the Board which placed reliance on ACTO v. M/s. Suncity Trade Agency[1] and dismissed the appeals. The Board while dismissing the appeals opined that the assessee- Company, a manufacturing unit, had not been charged on the sales of its product, as per the notification which squarely fall under the definition of exempted goods and hence, the final product was exempted, but it was not entitled to avail ITC as the notification clearly postulated that the units/institution was not exempted from the tax but the sales of its goods were exempted from tax as per the definition of “Exempted Goods”.

377. On the basis of the aforesaid analysis, the revisional Court opined that it is significant that while S.O. 371 had been issued under Section 8(2) of the Act, S.O. 372 and 377 had been issued under Section 8(3A) and (3) respectively, which provisions, as noticed hereinbefore, dealt with Schedule-I under Section 8(2) and Schedule-II under Sections 8(3) and (3A), which in turn related to exemption of goods and exemption of persons respectively, therefore, it was apparent from the notifications issued on 09.03.2007 that the intention of the State was to exempt the manufacturers of A.C. Sheets and Bricks subject to fulfillment of conditions as indicated in S.O. 377 and to take away exemption available to A.C. Sheets and Bricks as goods, as was available before the said date on account of its inclusion in Schedule-I.

29. In view of the aforesaid premised reasons, we do not find any merit in these appeals and accordingly they stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

[Prafulla C. Pant] New Delhi November 24, 2015
K.S. Soundararajan And Ors vs Commissioner Of H.R. & C.E. And Ors

2. Briefly the facts are summarized as follows : One Sundararaja Naidu had no male issues, except two daughters and his brother’s son is Kondasamy Naidu and he executed a registered Will dated 7.12.1949 bequeathing properties mentioned in Item nos.1, 2 and 3 absolutely in favour of them and directed Kondasamy Naidu to be in possession of Item no.4 and perform the charities mentioned in the Will from out of the income of the said properties and prohibited the alienation of the said item of land. Later Kondasamy Naidu alienated a portion of land in Item no.4 in the Will and claimed to have purchased some other properties from out of the sale proceeds.

10. There are no merits in the appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs.

November 24, 2015.
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd vs Niloufer Siddiqui & Ors

The facts which are required to appreciate the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties are stated in brief hereunder:

By a notice published in the daily newspaper ‘Indian Nation’ the respondent no.2 indicated his intention to transfer his share in M/s Happy Homes in favour of his wife i.e., respondent no.1 and invited objections to the same, if any. The IOCL vide its letter No. Sales/LPG/3710 dated 16.01.1978 terminated the distributorship. The relevant portions of the said letter are extracted as under:

The facts and circumstances of this case are such that we are constrained to make observation that the appellant-IOCL must be very cautious and careful while exercising its power to terminate the distributorship of this nature. For the aforesaid reasons the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

On the issue of cost, we are of the opinion that since the respondents have been litigating for a period of around 37 years, spending precious time in the courts of law seeking justice for themselves, they are entitled thereto in the facts and circumstances of the case. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 are ex-servicemen in whose favour the distributorship was awarded, the same was terminated arbitrarily and unfairly. This conduct on the part of IOCL defeats the laudable object of the scheme of the Government of India by which distributorship was allotted in favour of the ex-defence personnel, war-widows and dependants. Thus, respondent nos. 1 & 2 deserve to be awarded with costs.

Accordingly, we pass the following order-
Dr. Janet Jeyapaul vs Srm University And Anr

3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in this appeal, which lie in a narrow compass, it is necessary to set out the relevant facts.

23. In the light of foregoing discussion, we cannot concur with the finding rendered by the Division Bench and accordingly while reversing the finding we hold that the appellant's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against respondent No. 1 is maintainable.

25. In normal course, we would have been inclined to accept this submission made by learned counsel for the respondents and would have also granted liberty to the appellant to approach the Tribunal in term of the directions given by the Constitution Bench of this Court. But since in this case, the Single Judge not only entertained the appellant's writ petition but he allowed the writ petition on merits whereas the Division Bench held the writ petition as not maintainable and thus declined to examine the merits of the controversy involved in the writ petition.

26. We do not consider it proper to direct the appellant at this stage to approach the Tribunal and file a dispute before the Tribunal. Instead, we consider it just and proper to remand the case to the Division Bench of the High Court to decide the respondent's appeal on merits on the question as to whether the Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition on merits.

27. Before parting, we consider it apposite to state that we have not examined the controversy raised by the appellant in her writ petition on merits and confined our examination to the question whether the writ petition against respondent No. 1 was maintainable or not.

28. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Writ Appeal No. 932 of 2013 out of which this appeal arises is restored to its original number. The Division Bench is requested to decide the appeal expeditiously on merits in accordance with law without being influenced by any of our observations.
Lal Shah Baba Dargah Trust vs Magnum Developers And Others

2. The plaintiff, a trust called Lal Shah Baba Dargah Trust, instituted the suit before the one member Maharashtra Waqf Tribunal, Aurangabad (in short, “the Tribunal”) claiming the suit property as waqf property held by the trust, for perpetual injunction restraining defendants nos. 1 to 7 from illegally developing portion of the suit plot in City Survey No. 1/50 to 11/50 and part of C.S.No.50 situated at Tawripada, Lalbagh, Mumbai; from raising further construction; creating third party interest; from changing the nature of the suit properties as also from handing over the possession of the flats constructed therein. A separate application for temporary injunction was also filed before the Tribunal, which was partly allowed and an ad-interim injunction in those terms has been granted.

4. The High Court after hearing the parties allowed the civil revision application and set aside the order of the Tribunal holding that it has no jurisdiction. However, the High Court in the impugned order did not interfere with the interim order. The High Court finally held:-

41. We, therefore, allow all the appeals except the appeal arising out of SLP(C)No.30725/2015 and set aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court. Consequently, the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.30725/2015 is dismissed holding that the interim order passed by the Tribunal shall continue.

42. Before parting with the order we record our serious exception to the conduct of the States who have not till date issued fresh notification constituting three member Tribunal as mandate by Section 83(4) of the Act. We, therefore, direct the States to immediately take steps for constituting a three member Tribunal and notification to that effect must be issued within four months from today. Let copy of this judgment be sent to the Chief Secretaries of all the States for compliance.
Bimla Devi vs Rajesh Singh & Anr

The brief facts necessary to dispose of these appeals are that on 20.12.1998 at 4:30 PM, the informant Bimla Devi, resident of Village Mangara, P.S. Karakat, District Rohtas, recorded her statement (fardbeyan) at P.S. Karakat, alleging that at 2:00 PM, her father-in-law Kashi Nath Tiwary and her husband Lallan Tiwary were shot dead at their house by the assailants, namely, Uma Shankar Tiwary, Laloo Tiwary, Pramod Tiwary, Lala Tiwary amd Dipendra Tiwary @ Turhi and 2 other unnamed assailants. The dead body of Kashi Nath Tiwary was dumped into the well located in front of their house. The informant further alleged that the accused also snatched away the jewellery of the informant, her daughter and her sister-in-law. Out of the two unnamed assailants, one was named as Rajesh Sharma and the name of the other assailant was never known.

After investigation was concluded, the Investigation Officer submitted charge-sheet against accused Uma Shankar Tiwary, Laloo Tiwary, Kamal Narain Singh, Dipendra Tiwary @ Torhi, Pramod Tiwary and Lala Tiwary, for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 323, 452, 379, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC” for short) and Section 27 of the Arms Act. Thereafter a supplementary charge sheet was submitted against accused Rajesh Kumar Singh under the aforesaid sections and also under Section 354 of IPC. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions. During the pendency of the trial, accused Dipender Tiwary was held juvenile, his case was separated and sent to the Juvenile Justice Court. The charges were read over and explained to the accused persons, they pleaded not guilty and claimed for trial.

Four different appeals were filed before the High Court by five accused persons against the aforesaid conviction order. The sixth accused Kamal Narain Singh is absconding against which permanent Warrant of Arrest in red ink has been issued. The High Court allowed the appeal of accused Rajesh Singh and acquitted him of all the charges. However, the conviction of other four accused, namely, Uma Shankar Tiwary, Laloo Tiwary, Pramod Tiwary and Lala Tiwary was upheld by the High Court and their appeals were dismissed.

Thus, in the light of the above discussion, we find no grounds to interfere with the judgment passed by the High Court. These eight appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

…....................................J (Pinaki Chandra Ghose) …...................................J (R.K. Agrawal) New Delhi;

December 16, 2015.
Narender Kumar vs State Of Nct Of Delhi

The case of the prosecution was that on 01.08.1980 the deceased Laxman Singh alias Hanuman was picked up from the railway station of Subzi Mandi by the Police and was illegally confined in Andha Mughal Police Post till 05.08.1980. While in such custody, in order to extract confession from him he was beaten severely and on 05.08.1980 he suffered burn injuries at quarters No.4 of police post Andha Mughal from where he was taken to Hindurao Hospital and then to LNJP Hospital by PW-1 ASI. At LNJP Hospital PW-12 Doctor asked PW-2 to procure the services of Magistrate as the deceased wanted to make a declaration when he was in the last spell of his life time. After the above occurrence initially a case was registered at Subzi Mandi Police Station vide FIR No.763 of 80 for the offence under Section 309 IPC. Thereafter, a dying declaration was recorded in the presence of PW-7 Metropolitan Magistrate around 2.30 p.m. on 05.08.1980. After the recording of the dying declaration another FIR was registered under Section 307 IPC. The deceased breathed his last on 06.08.1980 whereafter the case was converted to one under Section 302 IPC. The dying declaration of the deceased revealed that he was brought to Andha Mughal Police Post by the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.484 of 2010 along with one other person by name Tyagi on 01.08.1980 from the railway station of Subzi Mandi and after bringing him to the police post he was beaten severely to extract a confession from him to the effect that he was involved in the stealing of some properties. According to the prosecution as the deceased was pleading ignorance, ultimately on 05.08.1980 around 10.30 a.m. kerosene was poured on him by the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 447 of 2010 while he was set on fire by the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.484 of 2010 by throwing ignited matchstick.

Having noted the above detailed statement made by PW-7 learned Metropolitan Magistrate, we have no doubt in our mind about the verification of the identity of the patient/deceased and, therefore, we do not find any substance in the said submission.

Having regard to our above conclusions, we do not find any merit in both the appeals. The appeals fail and the same are dismissed.

December 16, 2015
Ramakant Dwivedi vs Rafiq Ahmad And Ors

14. It is in this background that the present matters were considered by the High Court. To seek an exception to G.O. dated 31st May, 2012, the appellants contended that they had already applied in pursuance of notice dated 18th July, 2009 in accordance with Chapter II of the Rules. When the said notice was cancelled and fresh notice dated 10th August, 2010 was issued, the appellants challenged the same. They were relegated to their departmental remedy. They challenged the order passed by the department again by another writ petition and the High Court directed the matter to be considered vide order dated 10th February, 2012. As the said order was prior to 31st May, 2012, appellant acquired a right to get lease as an exception to order dated 31st May, 2012. The High Court passed an interim order in their favour which led to the grant of mining leases on 24th May, 2014 and 26th May, 2014.

7. The appeal is dismissed.

24. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in these appeals. We also do not approve the stand of the State of U.P. in supporting the appellants, as already mentioned.

25. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. Interim order granted by this Court stands vacated. The State will assess the extent of pecuniary advantage taken by the appellants under the interim order and recover the same from the appellants.