L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Neebha Kapoor vs Jayantilal Khandwala & Ors

The writ of summons in the summary suit was served upon the respondents. They appeared on 14.08.2006. An application for a judgment in the said suit was applied for by way of Summons for Judgment on 07.12.2006, which by reason of the impugned judgment has been disposed of.

We, however, are of the opinion that the question as to whether the respondents should be put to any terms or not should be determined afresh by the High Court as the High Court did not address itself on the aforementioned question. We, however, express no opinion thereupon.

14. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment warrants no interference at this stage. The appeal is dismissed accordingly, subject, however, to the aforementioned observations. No costs.
M/S Anis Ahmad And Sons vs Commissioner Of Income Tax ...

3. The facts in short are as under:-

5. The appellant-assessee filed income tax return for the assessment year 1984-85 declaring Rs. 1,32,830/- as its total income as Commission Agent. The Income Tax Officer, Circle II, Kanpur, vide assessment order dated 13.03.1987 framed under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has treated the appellant-assessee as a Trader and not as a Commission Agent and assessed its total income Rs.4,06,810/- for payment of income tax. He issued penalty notice under Section 271(1)(a) and 271(1)(c) and 273(2)(a) of the Act, separately.

6. Being aggrieved, the appellantassessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The Commissioner of Income Tax vide order dated 04.04.1988 partly allowed the appeal. The appellantassessee and the respondentIncome Tax Department feeling aggrieved against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax filed two separate appeals before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal by order dated 19.08.1993, without going into the merits of the case, set aside the assessment order and remanded the file back to the Assessing Officer to re-scrutinise the entire accounts after giving the appellant-assessee an opportunity of being heard and also giving the appellant- assessee an opportunity of filing any evidence in support of its claim that there was no discrepancy in its accounts as pointed out by the Assessing Officer or as found out by Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) in his order dated 04.04.1988.

9. The Revenue, feeling aggrieved, preferred an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal by its order dated 15.01.2004 allowed the appeal and held that the appellantassessee has failed to produce any evidence that the transactions, in question, were not conducted by the appellantassessee as Vyapari but the transactions were conducted on commission basis. Being aggrieved against the said order, the appellantassessee filed Income Tax Appeal before the High Court. The High Court, as noticed above, has concurred with the findings recorded by the Assessing Authority as confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal and dismissed the appeal in limine. Now, the appellantassessee is before this Court.

14. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, this appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court dated 01.11.2004 passed in I.T.A. No. 94/2004 upholding the order dated 15.01.2004 of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, in ITA No. 1170/Alld/1997 for the Assessment Year 1984-85 and the original order of the Income Tax Officer dated 29.03.1996 holding the appellantassessee as Trader and not Commission Agent are quashed and set aside and as a result thereof, the order dated 09.06.1997 recorded by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) II Kanpur, in Appeal No.CIT(A)II/5/ITO.2(7)/96-97/67 shall stand restored. The parties, however, are left to bear their own costs.
Rakesh Kumar Joshi vs Narendra Kumar & Ors

2. An appeal was preferred thereagainst by the respondents. The Appellate Authority, however, reversed the said findings of the Rent Controller, inter alia, holding :

(b) where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application;

(c) the greater the existing business of the landlords own, apart from the business proposed to be set up in the leased premises, the less the justification for allowing the application, and even if an application is allowed in such a case, the prescribed authority may on the application of the tenant impose the condition where the landlord has available with him other accommodation (whether subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for his own proposed business but may serve the purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall let out that accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the prescribed authority ;

11. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. This appeal is allowed and the matter is directed to be considered afresh. We would, however, request the High Court to consider the desirability of disposing the appeal as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the copy of this Order. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
State Of Chhattisgarh & Ors vs Ramavtar Road Constructions Pvt. Ltd

JUDGMENT O R D E R (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 3942/06) Leave granted.

What is equally significant is the fact that out of the six applications the State of Chhattisgarh chose to prefer this Special Leave Petition in respect of only one of six applications and appear to have accepted the order of the High Court as far as the other five matters are concerned. In our view, the present appeal is also not maintainable on that score as well.

We, accordingly, see no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court and the appeal is, therefore, dismissed, but without any order as to costs. The interim order passed in the Special Leave Petition is vacated.
Shakeel vs State Of M.P

1. Twelve accused persons including the appellant stood charged with offence under Sections 148, 307/149 and 324/149 of the Indian Penal Code. Out of the twelve accused persons, the Sessions Judge acquitted 6 accused persons and convicted 6 accused persons. Each convicted accused was sentenced for two years' rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 148 IPC and fine of Rs.500/-; five years' rigorous imprisonment for offence under Section 307/149 IPC and fine of Rs.500/-; and 3 years' rigorous imprisonment for offence under Section 324/149 IPC and fine of Rs.500/-. In case of default of payment of fine, the accused persons shall undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 6 months under Section 148 IPC, one year under Section 307/149 IPC and 6 months under Section 324/149 IPC.

2. The convicted accused persons filed an appeal before the High Court and the High Court by its judgment dated 10.2.2005 affirmed the conviction and sentence of all the six accused persons but reduced their sentence under Section 307/149 IPC from 5 years to 4 years.

4. The case of the prosecution is that on 8.4.1997 at about 4.00 p.m. when complainant Bharat Kumar (PW.1) with his mother Leelabai (PW.2), brother Naresh Kumar and father were sitting in their house at Village Tagore Bedi, all the accused persons attacked them and as a result of which they suffered injuries. In support of its case, the prosecution had examined PW.1 Bharat Kumar (complainant) and PW.2 Leelabai. PW.1 in his statement has not named Shakeel as the person who had attacked him. In paragraph 16 of his deposition he has stated that when he reached at the Police Station, Shakeel was standing there and informed PW.1 that first he (PW.1) should get his brother treated and thereafter should lodge a report. PW.2 Leelabai in her statement has admitted that she did not know any of the accused persons and the name of Shakeel was informed to her by her son. There is no test identification parade conducted by the police to lend support to the identification of the accused persons. In the absence of any evidence against Shakeel, the Sessions Judge and the High Court have wrongly convicted the accused-appellant.

5. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the trial court as well as that of the High Court are set aside. The accused appellant shall be set at liberty immediately, if not required in any other case.
Kewal Krishan vs State Of Punjab

2. Both convicts-accused filed an appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Ferozepur dated 16th January, 1988 whereby they were convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.

3. The High Court by its judgment and order dated 22nd August, 2005 partly allowed the appeal. The conviction and sentence awarded to Vijay Kumari was set aside and she was acquitted of the charges. However, in the case of the appellant herein, his conviction under Sections 304-B, 306 and 498- A IPC was upheld but his sentence was reduced from ten years to seven years under Section 304-B IPC.

6. Considering all these facts, we set aside the conviction of the accused- appellant by giving the benefit of doubt and the judgment of the trial court as well as that of the High Court are set aside. The appeal is allowed. The accused appellant shall be set at liberty immediately, if he is not required in any other case.
Basayya I. Mathad vs Rudrayya S. Mathad & Ors

The first appellate Court, relying upon the opinion of the High Court, held that the suit land was granted for the benefit of the entire family and the plaintiff is entitled to claim his share and allowed the appeal on 14.12.1998. Questioning the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the appellant preferred R.S.A. No. 131 of 1999 before the High Court. The learned single Judge, basing reliance on his opinion in the earlier second appeal i.e. R.S.A. No. 105 of 1997, which is binding and final, dismissed the second appeal in limine. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the High Court, the appellant filed the present appeal before this Court.

(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.

(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:

(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission. It is clear that parties to the lis are not entitled to produce additional evidence as of course or routine but must satisfy the conditions stated in sub-clauses

10) Though Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for the respondents reiterated his earlier stand that the decision in R.S.A. 105 of 1997 cannot be gone into in the absence of appeal against the same, in the light of our above- mentioned discussion, reasons thereon coupled with the infirmities pointed above and the earlier decision is not in terms of Section 100 as well as Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, we are unable to accept the said objection and pass the following order:-

Our above conclusion mainly relates to the illegality or irregularity in the order of the High Court in allowing the second appeal (RSA No. 105 of 1997)

7. Taking note of the fact that suit for partition was instituted even in the year 1989 and yet to reach its finality, we request the Civil Judge, Gokak to dispose of the appeal, as directed above and in accordance with law within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment.

11) The civil appeal is allowed on the above terms. No costs.
Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik (Dead)Through ... vs Appasaheb Dattatraya Pawar

3) Brief facts in a nutshell are:

5) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), on 23.02.1993, after finding that the defendant has failed to prove that time was the essence of contract and the plaintiffs were and are ready and willing to perform their part of contract decreed the suit as prayed for. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the trial Court, the defendant filed First Appeal No. 743 of 1993 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The learned Single Judge of the High Court not in agreement with the conclusion of the trial Court and finding that plaintiffs failed to substantiate their plea allowed the appeal of the defendant and dismissed the suit. Questioning the judgment and order of the High Court, the plaintiffs have filed the present appeal by way of special leave. During the pendency of the appeal before this Court, Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik/first plaintiff died and his legal representatives were brought on record as per order dated 19.09.2006 in I.A. No. 3 of 2005.

14) In the light of what has been stated above, we set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and confirm the decree granted by the trial Court. In view of the said conclusion, the appellants/plaintiffs are directed to deposit the balance amount of sale consideration i.e., Rs.1,92,500/- in the trial Court within a period of eight weeks whereupon the respondent/defendant shall execute the sale deed of the suit lands Block No. 208 admeasuring 0.60 R and Block No. 209 admeasuring 0.40 R of Village Nagaon, Tahsil Hatkanangale as per the agreement dated 31.07.1985. In case of failure of the defendant to execute the sale deed, the plaintiffs shall be entitled to get the sale deed executed through Court.

15) The civil appeal is allowed on the above terms. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Ajay Kumar Shah Jagati vs Commnr. Of Income Tax

Assessee entered into an agreement to sell 7000 sq.ms. vacant land to M/s. Kumaon Constructions Ltd., Nainital, for Rs.25.00 lacs. The agreement was registered with Sub-Registrar, Nainital, and Rs. 2.00 lacs were received as advance.

Unfortunately, in the present civil appeals the basic facts are not on the record. It appears from the agreement dated 25.4.1988 that the assessee had agreed to sell to M/s. Kumaon Construction Ltd., Nainital, land admeasuring 7000 sq.ms.. That agreement is subsequently rescinded. However, between 25.4.1988 and the date of rescisson (22.10.1990) the plot admeasuring 7000 sq.ms. stood sub-divided. The sub-divided 24 plots were conveyed by the assessee to the nominees of M/s. Kumaon Construction Ltd.. None of the saledeeds have been produced by the assessee before the Department. In such cases it is very essential to look into the recitals mentioned in the sale deeds.

The assessee then preferred second appeal before the Tribunal which was allowed by the Tribunal observing that the approach of Revenue was erroneous. According to the Tribunal the order of AO was based upon mis-conception of legal principles. According to the Tribunal in the period relevant to the Assessment Year under consideration, assessee had transferred 24 plots to different persons -3- (nominees of M/s. Kumaon Construction Ltd.) for total consideration of Rs.15,20,900/- and therefore the assessee was not liable to return capital gains on the sum of Rs.25.00 lacs. This appears to be the reason given by the Tribunal for upholding the contention advanced on behalf of the assessee.

Aggrieved by the said decision, the Department carried the matter in appeal under Sec. 260A to the Uttaranchal High Court which has upheld the judgment of the Tribunal. Hence these civil appeals.

For the aforesaid reasons, we remit the matters to the Tribunal for fresh consideration in accordance with law. We make it clear that the assessee shall file all -5- relevant documents including conveyance(s) in favour of the nominees of M/s. Kumaon Construction Ltd., the relevant plan indicating sub-division of plots, copy of the application made to the competent authority for sub- division of the plots and lastly the Municipal and Revenue records in which the relevant entries made regarding possession. Basically, the question would be how many plots have been conveyed, how many are retained, whether possession of the entire land was ever handed over to Kumaon Construction and how was cost calculated by the assessee.

For the aforestated reasons, the appeals stand allowed and the impugned judgments of the High Court and the Tribunal are set aside. The matters are remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
K. Sharada Bai & Anr vs Shanshunnisa & Ors

During the pendency of the application, the Special Court appointed an Advocate-Commissioner to inspect and measure the disputed land and the Commissioner filed a report before the Court which is filed as Annexure P-1 along with the S.L.P. On 15.10.1997, the Special Court by a common judgment allowed both the L.G.Cs holding the appellants herein as land grabbers and directed to deliver the vacant possession of 12.5 guntas of land to the 1st respondent. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants filed Writ Petition Nos. 29675 and 29712 of 1997 before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions holding that the Special Court has not committed any error in allowing the L.G.Cs. Questioning the same, the appellants filed the above appeals by way of special leave.

5) Though in the grounds of appeal an objection was raised about the jurisdiction of the Special Court constituted under the Act, no argument was advanced with regard to the same. On the other hand, the appellants challenged the merits of the impugned orders and the ultimate conclusion arrived. The contesting respondent filed an application under Section 8(1) of the Act to declare the appellants herein as land grabbers and evict them from an extent of 15 guntas of land forming part of Sy. No. 30 of Taranagar Village. She filed counter contending that she is bona fide purchaser and she is in possession and enjoyment of her property since the date of purchase and perfected title to the schedule property by adverse possession. Before the Special Court, common evidence was recorded. On behalf of the petitioners, PWs 1 & 2 were examined and Ex. A-1 to A-21 were marked. On behalf of the respondents, RW 1 was examined and EX. B1 to B-14 were marked. The Special Court examined CW-1 and Ex. C1 to C-8 were marked. The Special Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, found that the applicant before it is the owner of 12= guntas of land forming part of Sy. No. 30 as specifically shown in the sketch of the Commissioner and declared the respondents as land grabbers and directed to deliver possession as far as L.G.C. No. 162 of 1994 is concerned and granted permanent injunction to an extent of 27= guntas of land in S.No. 30 against the respondents in L.G.C. No. 133 of 1995. The said order was confirmed by the High Court.

Consequently, both the appeals are liable to be dismissed, accordingly, we do so. No costs.
Commissioner Of Customs, Kolkata vs M/S. Initiating Explosives Systems I ...

JUDGMENT O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO.2237 OF 2002 The present appeal has been filed by the Revenue under Section 130A of the Customs Act, 1962 (the Act) against the final order being Order No.A-704/Kol/2001 dated 09th August 2001 in Appeal No.C/V-296/2001 passed by the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Eastern Bench, Kolkata, (for short 'the Tribunal') whereby the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the respondent-assessee. M/s. Initiating Explosives Systems India Ltd., the respondent herein, had been importing "Orange Shock Tube" from M/s. The Ensign Bickform Co., 660, Hopmeadow Street, USA (hereinafter referred to as, 'the exporter') at a unit price of US$ 15.00/1000 ft. (0.015/ft.) which was the declared value of the tubes till November 2000. In November 2000, the price was reduced to US$ 0.0141/ft. (14.10/1000 ft.). The said reduction in the price was attributed to the increase in the import by the importer. The Department accepted the said reasoning.

metres during the year 1998-1999, 1.31 crore metres during the year 1999-2000 and 1.90 crore metre during the year 2000-2001. It is manifest from the said period that the volume of import was increased substantially by the importer. The said increase in the volume of import may have been the reason for decreasing the price. This can be a valid consideration. Revenue has failed to place any contemporaneous imports of identical goods by any other importer during the material time showing the purchase to be more than US$ 10/1000 ft. The burden to prove that the goods in question were under-valued by the respondent lies on the Revenue which the Revenue has failed to discharge. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Harbansh Lal vs Brij Rani

4. The aforesaid interim order passed on 10th December, 2002 was, according to the appellant, complied with and by virtue of compliance, he has deposited the rent of the disputed premises till January, 2008.

9. Considering the aforesaid orders having been complied with by the appellant and considering the reasons for not appearing at the time the writ petition was dismissed for default, we are of the view that the impugned order should be set aside and the writ petition should be restored for hearing.

10. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the High Court rejecting the application for restoration and allow the same. Consequently, the writ petition is restored to its original file. The High Court is now requested to dispose of the writ application positively within three months from the date of supply of a copy of this order to it after giving hearing to the parties and after passing a reasoned order in accordance with law.

11. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
S. Ratna vs Sri Sri Sri Shivakumar & Another

2. S. Jayanth and S.Reshma, son and daughter of appellant had filed a Suit being O.S. No. 350 of 1993 for partition of the suit property against their father P. Satyananda and grand-parents C.V. Chinnaiah and C.V. Parvathamma. During the pendency of the suit, S.Reshma-plaintiff and three defendants namely; P. Satyananda, Chinnaiah and Parvathamma expired. After the death of S. Reshma-plaintiff, her mother S. Ratna was brought on record as legal heir.

5. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remand the matter to the High Court to hear Regular First Appeal No. 1353 of 2004 afresh in accordance with law. Appeal is, accordingly, allowed with costs of Rs. 10,000/- which shall be paid by respondent No. 1.