L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Bhavnagar Mun.Corp.Etc vs Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha & Anr

3. The respondent, it appears, was employed as a Conductor in the Transport Department of the appellant-Corporation on daily-wage basis in October, 1987. He claims to have served in that capacity till 31st March, 1989 when his services were terminated. Aggrieved by the termination, the respondent raised an industrial dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bhavnagar who tried to resolve the same by way of conciliation but since the conciliation proceedings also failed, Reference No.459 of 1990 was made to the Labour Commissioner at Bhavnagar for adjudication of the dispute between the parties. The Labour Court allowed the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective versions and eventually came to the conclusion that the respondent had indeed worked as a Conductor with the appellant-Corporation between 3rd October, 1987 and 31st March, 1989. The Labour Court in the process rejected the appellant's case that the respondent had worked only for 58 days as Badli Conductor and was not, therefore, entitled to protection of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court placed reliance upon a Xerox copy of a certificate allegedly issued by an officer of the appellant-Corporation certifying that the respondent had worked as a Conductor for the period mentioned above. The Labour Court drew an adverse inference against the appellant-Corporation for its omission to produce relevant record to prove that the respondent-workman had worked only for 58 days hence not entitled to the benefit of any retrenchment compensation. The Labour Court on that basis held the termination of the respondent from service to be illegal and directed reinstatement with 65% back wages.

[emphasis supplied]

[emphasis supplied]

[emphasis supplied]

[emphasis supplied]

16. The case at hand, in our opinion, is one such case where reinstatement must give way to award of compensation. We say so because looking to the totality of the circumstances, the reinstatement of the respondent in service does not appear to be an acceptable option. Monetary compensation, keeping in view the length of service rendered by the respondent, the wages that he was receiving during that period which according to the evidence was around Rs.24.75 per day should sufficiently meet the ends of justice. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that award of a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs Fifty Thousand only) should meet the ends of justice.

17. In the result, we allow these appeals but only in part and to the extent that the award made by the Labour Court and the orders of the High Court shall stand modified to the extent that the respondent shall be paid monetary compensation of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs Fifty Thousand only) in full and final settlement of his claim. The amount shall be paid by the appellant-Corporation within a period of two months from today failing which the said amount shall start earning interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of this order till actual payment of the amount is made to the respondent.
Promoters & Builders Assn.Of Pune vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

4. The relevant facts may, at the outset, be alluded to.

5. The facts in the appeal filed by Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited are largely similar. In consonance with its objects, the Corporation in whose favour the grant of land was made had carried out digging activities for the purpose of widening of the water channel through which sea water is drawn for the purposes of cooling the nuclear plant in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. The Corporation categorically denies any commercial use of the extracted earth.

7. Insofar as the appeal of the Nuclear Power Corporation is concerned, apart from the common grounds of challenge as in the case of the builders, it is contended that no commercial exploitation of the excavated earth was involved in the process of repair/widening of the water channel; there was no sale or transfer of the excavated earth and the same was the incidental result of the process of repair/widening of the channel which is an activity in consonance with the grant of the land to the appellant by the State Government. The said grant was made way back in the year 1964 on freehold basis for the purpose of establishing an atomic power station and for maintenance thereof. It is further submitted that the very jurisdiction to levy penalty under Section 48(7) of the Code having been raised in the writ petition filed by the appellants, the High Court was not justified in refusing adjudication on merits.

Provided that, if the sum so determined is less than one thousand rupees, the penalty may be such larger sum not exceeding one thousand rupees as the Collector may impose."

18. For the aforesaid reasons all the appeals are allowed, however, with the direction that in the cases of the appellant-builders the respondent- State will be at liberty to proceed further in accordance with the observations contained in this order if it is so advised. So far as the appeal of the Nuclear Power Corporation is concerned the writ petition is allowed and the orders impugned before the High Court are set aside and quashed. In view of our conclusions above, we do not consider it necessary to go into the larger question raised i.e. the constitutionality of the provision of Section 48(7) of the Code which issue is left open for decision in an appropriate case.
Noushad @ Noushad Pasha & Ors vs State Of Karnataka

2. The case of the prosecution was that the accused along with 40 others formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing murder of the complainant Mahadeva (PW-11) and the deceased Lingaraju apart from committing other offences. It was alleged that with the above common object of such assembly, they also hatched a criminal conspiracy prior to 3 p.m. on 13.02.1999 and all the accused went to the shop of the deceased and the complainant, committed trespass armed with deadly weapons like swords, choppers, longs, clubs etc., with an intention to kill them and intentionally committed the murder of deceased Lingaraju by assaulting him all over his body with the use of deadly weapons possessed by them and that when the deceased Lingaraju in his injured condition tried to escape and run away towards the police station, he was further assaulted by the accused by chasing him down. The deceased Lingaraju ultimately fell down with multiple severe injuries in front of Surya Prabha Hardware shop. Thereafter, the accused alleged to have run away from the scene with the weapons in different vehicles in different directions. When the victim Lingaraju was immediately shifted to the Government Hospital, he was declared dead on examination by the doctors.

3. Exhibit P-18 was the complaint which was lodged at 3.30 pm, while the occurrence was stated to have happened at 3 p.m. on 13.02.1999. Altogether 44 accused were proceeded against. In the course of trial, A-8 died. The trial Court convicted A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-29 and rest of the accused were all acquitted. The Criminal Appeal No.787 of 2007 was preferred by the present Appellants along with A-4, A-5 and A-29 while Criminal Appeal No.1775 of 2007 was preferred by the State of Karnataka. By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court, while confirming the conviction and sentence imposed on the Appellants, allowed the appeal preferred by A-4, A-5 and A-29 and acquitted them of all the charges. As many as 49 witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution.

37. Having regard to the above analysis made by us with reference to the so-called star witness PW-11 and the other so-called eye witnesses with reference to whom the trial Court has made it clear that they were all unreliable and unbelievable, it will be wholly unsafe to rely on such evidence in order to confirm the conviction imposed on A-1 to A-3.

38. For the above stated reasons, we find force in the submission of Mr. Altaf Ahmed, learned Senior Counsel that though the very version spoken to by the said witnesses persuaded the trial Court to acquit all other accused, except A-1 to A-5 and A-29 and the High Court to acquit A-4, A-5 and A-29, for the very same reasoning, the conviction of A-1 to A-3 cannot also stand. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The conviction and the sentenced imposed on the Appellants are set aside. The Appellants shall, therefore, be set at liberty forthwith unless their detention is required in any other case.

December 03, 2014.
New India Ass. Co. Ltd vs Genus Power Inf. Ltd

The respondent has a manufacturing unit for which it had purchased a Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy ('policy' for short) from the appellant on 17.04.2009, which policy was for a period of one year and the total sum assured was Rs.91 crores and 10 lacs only. On 29.10.2009 there was a fire explosion in the adjoining Indian Oil Corporation Terminal causing extensive damage to the manufacturing unit of the respondent. On being notified, the appellant appointed a category "A" Licensed Surveyor and Loss Assessor in compliance of Section 64 UM of the Insurance Act, 1938 to assess the damage. In the assessment of the respondent and as per the claim lodged by it, the loss caused to its plant and machinery, buildings fixtures and furnitures and stocks was to the tune of Rs.28.79 crores. It appears that the Surveyor submitted his final report on 27.07.2010 and assessed the loss at Rs.6,09,77,406/-. It is contended by the appellant but denied by the respondent that the final survey report was duly communicated to the respondent on 01.11.2010.

5. The aforesaid order dated 30.05.2013 is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. Appearing for the appellant Mr. Gaurab Banerji, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the letter of subrogation was a detailed agreement which was finalized and signed after negotiations between the parties and in the presence of two witnesses. The amount agreed to was the amount recommended by the surveyor, reduced by the mandatory reinstatement premium payable under clause 15 of the policy and as such the settlement took place at the amount recommended by the surveyor. Placing reliance on the financial status of the respondent, it was submitted that its annual turnover is more than Rs.500 crores for last few years and it was quite improbable that such a company would feel financially constrained and stand coerced as alleged, in giving discharge on receipt of Rs.5.98 crores. Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent submitted that knowing that the respondent was under tremendous pressure owing to the complete destruction of its manufacturing unit and not being in a position to negotiate, the appellant by using its dominant position had forced the respondent to sign the discharge voucher and accept the payment as stated above. In support, reliance was placed on the decision of this court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab (P) Ltd.[1] by Mr. Venugopal.

10. In the circumstances, we allow the present appeal in the aforesaid terms and set aside the order of the High Court . No order as to costs.
Neeru Yadav vs State Of U P And Anr

As the factual narration would further undrape, the learned Single Judge keeping in view the aforesaid aspects passed the following order:-

Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court admitting the respondent no.2 on bail is set aside. The respondent no. 2 is commanded to surrender to custody forthwith failing which it shall be the duty of the Investigating Agency to take him into custody immediately. We may hasten to clarify that what we have stated here is only to be read and understood for the purpose of annulling the order of grant of bail and they would have no bearing on the trial. The learned trial Judge shall proceed with the trial as per the evidence brought on record.
Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors

20. On the basis of the certificate of fitness, the State of Madras preferred Civil Appeal No.39 of 1953 before this Court against the said judgment and order of the Madras High Court, which was heard by the Constitution Bench of this Court on 9.2.1954. However, the said appeal stood dismissed as the State withdrew the notification impugned therein. Relevant part of the order runs as under :

The declaration that “Dikshitars are religious denomination or section thereof” is in fact a declaration of their status and making such declaration is in fact a judgment in rem.

39. Relevant features of the order passed by the Commissioner are that the Executive Officer shall be incharge of all immovable properties of the institution; the Executive Officer shall be entitled to the custody of all immovables, livestock and grains; the Executive Officer shall be entitled to receive all the income in cash and kind and all offerings; all such income and offerings shall be in his custody; all the office holders and servants shall work under the immediate control and superintendence of the Executive Officer, though subject to the disciplinary control of the Secretary of the respondent no.6., etc.

alia that active management would rest in the committee consisting of nine members who were to be elected from among the Podhu Dikshitars (clause 4);

47. Even if the management of a temple is taken over to remedy the evil, the management must be handed over to the person concerned immediately after the evil stands remedied. Continuation thereafter would tantamount to usurpation of their proprietary rights or violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution in favour of the persons deprived. Therefore, taking over of the management in such circumstances must be for a limited period. Thus, such expropriatory order requires to be considered strictly as it infringes fundamental rights of the citizens and would amount to divesting them of their legitimate rights to manage and administer the temple for an indefinite period. We are of the view that the impugned order is liable to be set aside for failure to prescribe the duration for which it will be in force.

50. Thus, the appeals are allowed. Judgments/orders impugned are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
State Of M.P. & Ors vs Khuman Singh & Anr

4. The respondent was tried for a charge of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted under the said provision in Session Trial No.106 of 1988 and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment vide Order dated 26th July, 1989. He applied for release under the provisions of aforesaid Act and the Rules. His request was considered by the statutory Board, in compliance of the Division Bench order of the High Court in Writ Petition No.1138 of 2002 but he was not found entitled to be released. The opinion of the Board was accepted by the State Government. The said opinion and the order of the State Government are as follows :

12. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order and direct that the matter may be considered afresh by the competent authority under the provisions of the Act and the Rules in accordance with law within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order taking into account upto date developments.
Velaxan Kumar vs Union Of India & Ors

Brief facts of the case are as under:

The appellant and other land owners objected to the issuance of notification by invoking an emergency clause under Section 17 of the L.A. Act as his land is built up and falls within 50 meters of village-Abadi of Lal Dora, hence his land should be exempted/denotified from acquisition as per policy of the Government dated 02.12.1998. Thereafter, the notification was issued under Section 6 read with Section 17 of the L.A. Act on 03.04.2000 in respect of the land sought to be acquired including the land owned by the appellant.

18. In view of the above findings and reasons recorded by us with reference to the facts of the case and placing reliance upon the decisions of this Court referred to supra, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the appellant's land have lapsed. The aforesaid application is allowed in the above terms and consequently, the appeal is also allowed by quashing the acquisition proceeding notification in so far as the land of the appellant is concerned.

The applications filed in S.L.P.(C) No.16578 of 2007 for impleadment of Vijendra Singh, Brij Mohan Lal Jain and Shiv Charan as petitioner Nos. 2, 3, and 4 respectively, are disposed of with liberty to challenge the acquisition proceedings before the High Court by filing writ petitions, placing reliance upon the provision of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 and catena of decisions rendered both under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 and on merits. If such writ petitions are filed by the above applicants, the same shall be heard on merits and disposed of, keeping in view the decisions of this Court on the legal questions. There shall be no order as to costs.

.....................................................................J. [V. GOPALA GOWDA] .....................................................................J. [C. NAGAPPAN] New Delhi, December 11, 2014 ITEM NO.1B-For Judgment COURT NO.11 SECTION XIV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS C.A. No............2014 arising from SLP (C) No(s). 16578/2007 VELAXAN KUMAR Petitioner(s) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Respondent(s) Date : 11/12/2014 This petition was called on for hearing today.

For Petitioner(s) Mr. T. N. Singh,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan.

Leave granted.

I.A. No. 7 is allowed. Applications for impleadment are disposed of. The appeal is allowed in terms of signed non-reportable judgment.

(Signed Non-Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
Sudershan Kumar vs State Of H.P

These appeals arise out of common judgment dated May 03, 2011 rendered by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. The appellants in these appeals were charge-sheeted and tried for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 218 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'IPC') as well as Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'PC Act'). They were arrayed as accused 1 to 4 (A-1 to A-4). After the trial, the learned Special Judge, Solan, acquitted all the four appellants of the aforesaid charges, inasmuch as, as per his findings, the charges were not proved against these appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent-State went in appeal challenging the aforesaid verdict of the Special Judge. The High Court, by impugned order, has upturned the decision of the Special Judge holding all the four appellants as guilty of various offences under IPC as well as the PC Act and convicted them as follows:

The aforesaid, in brief, are the reasons which prompted the Special Judge to acquit the appellants.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.

appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law, but the Appellate Court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court.

Result of the aforesaid discussion is to allow these appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court. Ordered accordingly. Since the appellants are already on bail, their bail bonds shall stand discharged.

DECEMBER 18, 2014.
Diwan Singh vs L.I.C. & Ors

Briefly stated, the facts are that the appellant was a cashier with Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as "LIC") and posted at Bilaspur, District Rampur in U.P. A policy holder, Bhograj Singh, deposited with the appellant an amount of Rs.533/- towards half yearly insurance premium on 13.8.1990 but the same was not deposited with LIC nor credited in the account of the policy holder till 27.11.1990, though a receipt was issued on 13.8.1990 by the appellant. It appears that when the LIC agent did not get his commission out of the premium deposited, and made enquiries in this regard, aforesaid amount of Rs.533/- was shown deposited by the appellant with late fee of Rs.15.90/-, and entry was made in the cash register on 28.11.1990. Also, a forged entry was made in ledger sheet on back date. In connection with the above misconduct on the part of the appellant, a charge-sheet was served on him on 29.4.1991 on two counts, namely, temporary embezzlement of Rs.533/- for the period 13.8.1990 to 27.11.1990, and forging entry of Rs.533/- in the carbon copy of the ledger sheet dated 13.8.1990 between entry Nos. 12 and 13. On conclusion of the departmental enquiry, the appellant was found guilty, and served with copy of enquiry report, whereafter he was removed from service vide order dated 21.1.1992. The departmental appeal appears to have been dismissed by the authority concerned on 22.2.1992.

Challenging the order of removal from service and that of the appellate authority, the appellant filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 10308 of 1999 before the High Court which was allowed by the learned Single Judge on 6.9.1999. Aggrieved by said order of the learned Single Judge, Special Appeal was filed before Division Bench of the High Court, by the employer (i.e. - L.I.C.). The Division Bench, after hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that the appellant appears to have committed the forgery to cover his mistake, and partly allowed the appeal by substituting punishment of compulsory retirement in place of removal from service. The appellant- employee has challenged the order of the Division Bench of the High Court by way of Special Leave Petition mainly on the ground that the punishment of compulsory retirement is disproportionate, unreasonable and harsh. Leave was granted by this Court on 19.4.2010.

January 5, 2015.
Raghvendra vs State Of M.P

2. On 10th February, 1998 the informant Gulab Ahirwar (PW-3) found a dead body in his fields. He immediately informed the police and a first information report was recorded on the basis of his information. A few articles lying near the dead body were also recovered.

4. It also transpired from the investigations that the deceased Bhagwan Singh was known to Raghuvendra and his uncle. They were apparently involved in several thefts and there was some dispute about sharing the proceeds. Raghuvendra and his uncle would often visit Bhagwan Singh at his residence and they would also consume liquor together.

7. On these broad facts, a charge-sheet was filed and Raghuvendra and his uncle were charged with having murdered Bhagwan Singh and thereby having committed an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Both of them pleaded not guilty and were therefore tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khurai, District Sagar (Madhya Pradesh). Vide his judgment and order dated 5th February, 2000 in Sessions Case No.205 of 1998 the learned Additional Sessions Judge found Raghuvendra and his uncle guilty of having caused the murder of Bhagwan Singh.

9. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Raghuvendra and his uncle preferred an appeal in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which came to be dismissed by the judgment and order under appeal.

12. There is no doubt that Raghuvendra knew the deceased quite well and perhaps they were involved in some thefts. Guddi Bai and Sadhana also knew Raghuvendra since he was a frequent visitor to their house. The identification of Raghuvendra therefore is not an issue before us.

15. There is no manner of doubt, on these facts, that the death of Bhagwan Singh was caused by Raghuvendra and his uncle. No other inference is possible or even suggested.

17. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

...............................J ( Madan B. Lokur ) ...............................J ( N.V. Ramana ) New Delhi;

January 07, 2015