L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Sushil Kumar Dey Biswas & Anr vs Anil Kumar Dey Biswas & Anr

3. Brief facts, which led to the filing of this appeal are as follows:- Respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction being Title Suit No.196/2004 against the appellants-defendants before the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) 4th Court, Sealdah, North 24-Parganas. The eviction was sought for in respect of one room, one bath and privy on the first floor and one room on the ground floor in the western side and one shop room measuring 20' x 12' in the western side of premises No. 59, Old Nimta Road, North 24-Parganas. The appellants-defendants filed their written statement interalia contending that the suit property is the joint property of the plaintiff and the defendant Nos.1 and 2 and claiming a share in the suit property by virtue of a settlement dated 11.12.2000. The appellants contended that the respondent-plaintiff is entitled to only one third share in the suit property.

4. In the suit, trial commenced and respondent-plaintiff adduced evidence and the appellants-defendants also adduced their evidence in part. When the matter was posted for further evidence of the defendants, they filed an application under Section 151 C.P.C. on 4.1.2012, contending that the respondent took the law in his own hands in June 2011 and the appellants were forcefully dispossessed from the shop room of the suit property. The appellants alleged that they were also forcibly dispossessed from the first floor room by chopping the wooden staircase that leads to the first floor room.

8. Courts below dismissed the application filed under Section 151 C.P.C. mainly on the ground that for the alleged dispossession of the appellants from the suit property in June 2011, the application was filed only on 4.1.2012. According to the appellants-defendants, the respondent- plaintiff is a very influential person and since the appellants were threatened by the men of the respondent, they could not immediately lodge the complaint. We are not inclined to go into the merits of the rival contentions.

11. In the result, impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The respondent-plaintiff is directed to restore the staircase and the possession of one room, one bath and privy on the first floor and shop room in the ground floor to the appellants-defendants within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. On failure to restore the possession, the appellants-defendants are at liberty to approach the trial court which shall pass appropriate order for ensuring compliance with the direction of this Court. In so far as one room on the western side of ground floor, the same shall be decided alongwith the suit. We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions of the parties. The trial court shall expedite the trial of the Title Suit No.196/2004 and dispose of the same at an early date. Stay of further proceedings of the suit granted vide this Court Order dated 30.9.2013 stands vacated.

12. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties to bear their own costs.

December 3, 2014
P.Venugopal vs Madan.P.Sarathi

Learned Additional Metropolitan Magistrate upon considering the materials brought on record by the parties, including the report of a hand writing expert, opined that the signatures appearing on Exhibit P-11 (Postal Acknowledgment) was not that of the appellant. The signatures of the appellant on the said Postal Acknowledgment was compared with his signatures on the cheque. Respondent, however, examined the postal peon - BA Subramanium as PW-2.

On the aforementioned finding that the respondent had proved its case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt, a sentence of three months' simple imprisonment as also a fine of Rs. 1,55,000/- was imposed upon the appellant. Out of the said amount of fine, Rs. 1,50,000/- was, however, directed to be paid to the complainant and the remaining amount of Rs. 5,000/- was directed to be credited to the Government.

On the aforementioned finding, the appeal was dismissed. The revision application filed by the appellant was also dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.

In the aforementioned situation, we are of the opinion that the finding of fact arrived at by the Courts below cannot be said to be such which warrants interference by us.

Appellant, therefore, was aware that the respondent had been residing at Marenahalli, J.P. Nagar, Bangalore as also the fact that he had shifted from his earlier residence, namely, No. 326, 41st Cross Road, 8th Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for our interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed.

...........................J (S.B. SINHA) ...........................J (CYRIAC JOSEPH) NEW DELHI, 10 OCTOBER 17, 2008.
Karnail Kaur & Ors vs State Of Punjab & Ors

Therefore, the appellants objected to the said notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act, as the same was violative of the principles of promissory estoppel. The said objections were not decided by the Land Acquisition Officer. Thereafter, on 02.02.2001, the notification under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was published.

The High Court vide order dated 19.04.2011 dismissed writ petition No. 5512 of 2001 along with batch matters in CWP No. 4981 of 2001. Hence, the present appeal.

With reference to the above decision, he has further contended that in the above circumstances, Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 cannot be applicable to the fact situation in the present appeals and the above applications deserve to be dismissed in the interest of justice and also public interest.

The aforesaid applications are allowed in the above said terms and consequently, the appeals referred to above are also allowed by quashing the land acquisition proceedings notification in so far as the land of the appellants are concerned. No costs.

I.A. No. 6 in C.A. No.7424 of 2013 for impleadment is dismissed with liberty to approach the appropriate forum in accordance with law.

I.A. Nos. 9 and 10 in C.A. No. 7424 of 2013 for intervention and direction are dismissed as not maintainable.
Gr.Hydrabad Mun.Corp vs M.Prabhakar Rao

4. The facts briefly are that the respondent was working as a Bill Collector in the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. On 19.05.2007, he was placed under suspension by the Commissioner & Special Officer, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (for short `the competent authority), as it was reported by the Deputy Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau, C.I.U. and City Range Hyderabad, that he had demanded Rs.2,000/- from the complainant, M.R. Srinivas, for assessment of his house and had accepted the bribe. On 28.06.2001, the competent authority revoked the suspension of the respondent and reinstated him in service without prejudice to the prosecution pending against him and posted him in a non-

5. The respondent then made a representation seeking back-wages for the suspension period and other 3 consequential benefits, but the same was rejected by Memo dated 01.07.2005. The respondent filed O.A. No.3627 of 2005 before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short `the Tribunal') against such rejection of back-wages for the suspension period and by order dated 13.11.2006, the Tribunal set aside the Memo dated 01.07.2005 and remitted the matter to the authorities with a direction to re-examine the entire issue with reference to the rules and pass appropriate orders duly giving an opportunity to the respondent. The competent authority in his order dated 17.11.2008 re-examined the issue and took the view that the suspension of the respondent cannot be regarded as wholly unjustified and hence the back-wages and consequential benefits for the suspension period cannot be paid to the respondent. Aggrieved, the respondent filed O.A. No.7377 of 2008 before the Tribunal and by order dated 18.08.2009, the Tribunal allowed the O.A. and set aside the order dated 17.11.2008 of the competent authority and declared that the respondent was entitled for treating the period of suspension as on duty and for release of all consequential benefits. The appellant challenged the order 4 of the Tribunal before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1564 of 2010 but by the impugned order, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition.

10. In the facts of the present case, the Deputy Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau, C.I.U. and City Range Hyderabad, had reported that the respondent had taken Rs.2,000/-

12. In the result, we allow this appeal and set-aside the order of the Tribunal and the impugned order of the High Court and dismiss the original application filed by the respondent before the Tribunal. There shall be no order as to costs.
Samghaji Hariba Patil vs State Of Karnataka

The deceased and the accused No.1 Ningappa Bhaganna Padagaon belonged to the same village. Accused No.1 had no bullocks of his own. He allegedly borrowed the bullocks of Appellant. On 16.12.1997, while ploughing his own land, he allegedly started ploughing the land of the deceased to which he objected. P.W.2 his son, Bhaganna, P.W.3 his wife, Tangawwa and P.W.4 his daughter, Mayavva, were said to be present at that place. The incidence, allegedly, took place at about 3.00 p.m. A quarrel ensued, whereupon all the four accused are said to have assaulted the deceased. Appellant is said to have assaulted him with a hammer. P.Ws.3 and 4 were also said to have been assaulted by the other accused with bamboo sticks. Seeing the assault Kusumavva, daughter of the deceased allegedly cried for help, whereupon, the accused persons are said to have left the sticks and hammer at the spot and ran away. Some alleged independent witnesses P.W.14, Mallappa and P.W.15, Rawa Sab, were also said to be present at the spot. The distance between the place of occurrence and the police station which is situated in the town of Athani is said to be about 5 to 5= kms. P.W.5, allegedly, boarded a jeep, which was presumably being run as a taxi, went to the police station and informed about the incident to P.W.11-Nagaraj, a PSI attached to the said police station. No First Information Report was, however, lodged by him thence. The injured, allegedly, were lying unconscious for a period of about three hours. P.W.11 came to the spot and shifted all the injured persons to the Government hospital. Murugappa, the deceased, succumbed to his injuries at about 5.15 p.m on the same day. The First Information Report in relation to the said incident thereafter was lodged by P.W.2.

P.W.5-Kusumawwa, is the wife of P.W.2. She was also examined in court on the same day. According to her, on hearing her cry for help, C.Ws. 11 and 12, who examined themselves as P.W.14 and P.W.15, came at the spot and on seeing them the accused persons went away in a bullock cart. According to her, the police came at 7.00 a.m. on the next day and conducted a spot Mahazar. She also stated that she had boarded a jeep from the outskirts of the village, wherefor she had to go on foot to the said place. She had, allegedly, paid a sum of Rs.3/- by way of fare. Strangely, no complaint had been lodged at her instance. According to her, she did not know the residents of the village, although, she was a native thereof.

Mahazar report was also not legally proved. The learned Sessions Judge summed up his findings, stating :

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required in any other case.
Sh Medical Center Hospital vs State Of Kerala & Ors

3. The facts of the case in brief are stated hereunder:

5. The appellant started constructing buildings to house the hospital. Several buildings were constructed from 1987-1988 to 2002-2003 for the functioning of the hospital. On 16.10.1995 the respondent passed an order exempting the appellant from assessment of building tax. The said exemption was in connection with the main building of the hospital.

7. Thereafter, the appellant filed a detailed representation stating that since it is a charitable institution engaged in charitable activities, the appellant has to be exempted from paying building tax.

iii. What order?

17. Answer to Question Nos. i & ii:

20. In view of the foregoing, we uphold the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeal of the appellant-hospital, but without costs. The order dated 16.7.2009 of this Court granting stay shall stand vacated.
Abdul Rehman & Ors vs K.M.Anees-Ul-Haq

3. Appellant-Abdul Rehman lodged a complaint with the Crime against Women (CAW) Cell, Nanakpura, Moti Bagh, New Delhi, accusing the Respondent-K.M. Anees-Ul-Haq and four others of commission of an offence punishable under Section 406 read with Section 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The complainant's case is that the accusations made by the appellant in the report lodged with the Women Cell were totally false and fabricated. In particular, allegations regarding demand of dowry as a condition precedent for performance of Nikah between the complainant's nephew and Ms Aliya-appellant No.3 in this appeal were also false and unfounded. It was on that premise that the respondent filed a complaint alleging that the appellants had instituted criminal proceedings against him without any basis and falsely charged him with commission of offences knowing that there was no just or lawful ground for such proceedings or 3 charge and thereby committed offences punishable under Sections 211 and 500 read with Sections 109, 114 and 34 IPC.

17. In the result these appeals are allowed, and order dated 3rd February, 2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate and that passed by the High Court dated 26th February, 2008 are quashed. Criminal complaint No.180/1 of 2002 filed by the respondent shall stand transferred to the Court of competent jurisdiction seized of the charge- sheet filed against the respondents, for such orders as the Court may deem fit at the conclusion of the trial of the respondent having regard to the observations made above. 18
Senthamilselvi vs State Of Tamil Nadu And Anr

The order of detention passed in respect of Ganapathy @ Undakkuli @ Selva Ganapathy (hereinafter referred to as the `detenue') was questioned by his mother the appellant by filing a Habeas Corpus Petition before the Madras High Court. The same was dismissed by the impugned judgment.

Looked from any angle the Judgment of the High Court does not warrant interference. The appeal is dismissed.

Criminal Appeal No. 692/2006.

Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1811/2006.

Leave granted.

Factual position in this case is similar to those involved in Criminal Appeal, arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1811 of 2006. For reasons indicated in the said judgment which are applicable to the present case, this appeal stand dismissed.
Vijay . vs Nana .

2. In   order   to   appreciate   the   issues   involved   in the appeal, few relevant facts need to be mentioned hereinbelow.

18. We, however, find that the High Court instead of   deciding   the   second   appeal   on   these   six substantial questions of law framed at the time of 10 admission   allowed   the   appeal   on   two   additional substantial   questions   of   law   (see   Para   10   of   the impugned judgment) which were neither framed by the   High   Court   at   the   time   of   admission   of   the second appeal on 30.11.2002 and nor at the time of hearing the second appeal.

20. In   our   considered   opinion,   the   High   Court, therefore, committed two jurisdictional errors while deciding the second appeal.

22. As  mentioned above, the High Court had the jurisdiction to decide the second appeal only on the six substantial questions of law framed at the time of   admitting   the   appeal.   In   other   words,   the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the second appeal   was   confined   only   to   six   questions   framed and not beyond it.

27. We, however, make it clear that having formed an  opinion   to  remand the case, we have refrained from applying our mind to the merits of the case. It is now for the High Court to decide the appeal on merits.

28. In   the   light   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   the appeal   succeeds   and   is   allowed.   The   impugned judgment is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law without being influenced by any of our observations.

29. Since the appeal is quite old, the same shall be decided expeditiously.

May 11, 2018  15
A.P. State Electricity Board vs Mateti S.V.S.Ramachandra Rao

4. Civil Suit FAO (OS) No. 359/2007 has been filed in the High Court at Delhi, by virtue of the fact that the Branch Office of the plaintiff is situated at Delhi and the plaintiff is carrying on the business at Delhi. However, it is not disputed that the plaintiff’s Head Office is situated at Mumbai. The objection was raised by the defendant with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Delhi. The single Bench and the Division Bench of the High Court have upheld the objection and held that the suit should have been filed in the facts of the case, in the court at Mumbai. Hence, the impugned order has been questioned in the appeals.

5. In Civil Appeal arising out of SLP [C] No. 8253/2013 – (Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. & Anr. v. Just Lifestyle Pvt. Ltd.), the suit has been filed with respect to the infringement of the trademark. The registered office of “Vogue India” is in Mumbai. The magazine is processed and published in Mumbai. It was submitted that because the plaintiff has branch office at Delhi, it had sufficient ground for invoking the jurisdiction under section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. The plaintiff filed an application seeking an amendment in the plaint under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to indicate how the court at Delhi would have the jurisdiction. The magazine is sold and circulated to the subscribers at Delhi. The application seeking amendment has also been dismissed by the High Court as even if allowed, amended pleadings would not confer jurisdiction upon the court. Merely situation of branch office is not enough as no cause of action as per the plaint, has arisen in Delhi. The Division Bench has allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Single Bench, allowing the amendment. The said order has been impugned in SLP [C] No.8253/2013.

x x x x x

x x x x x

45. It was also submitted that as the bulk of litigation of such a nature is filed at Delhi and lawyers available at Delhi are having expertise in the matter, as such it would be convenient to the parties to contest the suit at Delhi. Such aspects are irrelevant for deciding the territorial jurisdiction. It is not the convenience of the lawyers or their expertise which makes out the territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the submission is unhesitatingly rejected.

46. It was also submitted that the suit may be ordered to be transferred to Delhi. We cannot order transfer of suit in these proceedings. In case parties so desire, they are free to file appropriate application but the suit is required to be presented in the court of competent jurisdiction only thereafter the question of transfer would be germane.
Naushad Anwar & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors

3. Apart from nearly one lac posts of teachers in primary schools, secondary schools and higher secondary schools run by Municipal Corporation, Municipal Councils, District Boards and Panchayats as many as 2596 vacancies of Librarians were advertised by the Government of Bihar in terms of a Notification dated 29th August, 2008. The time schedule stipulated in the notification required the selection process to be completed by 24th December, 2008. The selection process was to be undertaken by Selection Committees at the district levels, although the composition of such Committees and the norms and procedures governing the selection process were not very clearly spelt out in the notification.

16. In the result we allow these appeals, set aside the order passed by the High Court and allow Writ Petition 17734 of 2000 with a direction to the respondents to consider the appellants for appointment against the available vacancies by treating them eligible for such appointment. Depending upon their inter se merit vis-a-vis other candidates who may be competing for the unfilled vacancies if any out of those advertised, the respondents shall issue the appointment orders to them if they are otherwise found to be fit and suitable for such appointment. The needful shall be done by the respondents expeditiously but not later than two months from the date of this order.

17. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
Shoda Devi vs Ddu/Ripon Hospital Shimla

The case of the appellant has been that she continuously suffered excruciating pain during the entire surgical procedure and despite bringing the fact to the knowledge of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 during and after the procedure, no measures were taken to redress and reduce the discomfort suffered by her.

5. Having thus suffered the loss of limb, the appellant, apart from filing FIR under Section 338 IPC on 27.07.2006 at Police Station, Sadar, Shimla, preferred the consumer complaint on 28.09.2006, seeking compensation with the submissions, inter alia, that after several hours of complaints, the 3 respondent No. 2 attended on her with a team of doctors consisting of general physician and gynaecologist in a rather casual manner; that no proper service was provided to her; that she was shifted to IGMCH only in a taxi arranged by her husband; and that she suffered amputation only due to the medical negligence of the medicos and para-medicos of the respondent No. 1.

8. During the course of hearing of the matter, the State Commission made an order on 16.09.2008, expecting the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla and the Secretary Health Department to explore the possibility of extending a reasonable ex gratia payment to the appellant, looking to the nature of 5 disablement suffered by her and her poor and rural background. In response thereto, the Senior Medical Superintendent of DDU Hospital stated by way of affidavit that a sum of Rs. 2,93,526/- was assessed in this regard; and if accepted by the appellant, the same may be conveyed to the Director Health Services. Thereafter, the State Commission examined the matter on merits; and, with reference to the evidence of the doctors as also that of the appellant, held that no case of medical negligence was proved. Hence, the State Commission rejected the complaint. But, in view of the order previously passed on 16.09.2008 and response thereto by the Government, the State Commission directed the respondent No. 1 to make ex gratia payment to the tune of Rs. 2,93,526/- to the appellant, if she was willing to accept the same.

17. For what has been discussed and observed hereinabove and in the given set of facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the appellant deserves to be allowed further an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- towards compensation, over and above the amount awarded by the State Commission and the National Commission. Having regard to the quantum of enhancement being allowed herein, it is also considered proper to grant 3 months’ time to the respondents to make the requisite payment and else, to bear the burden of interest.

18. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The appellant is awarded further an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs) towards compensation, over and above the amount awarded by the State Commission and the National 12 Commission. The respondents shall make the requisite payment within 3 months from today failing which, the enhanced amount of compensation shall carry interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of filing of the complaint before the State Commission.