L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Udho Dass vs State Of Haryana & Ors

7. On a reference under Sec. 18 of the Act to the Additional District Judge, Sonepat, the compensation was enhanced to Rs.125/- per sq. yard for the land behind the E.C.E. factory situated away and on the left side of the Sonepat Bahalgarh road and Rs.150/- per square yard on the right side abutting the aforesaid road. In arriving at these different figures the Reference Court held that the land on the left side did not abut the road and it had therefore less potential value vis-a-vis. the land on the right side which touched the road.

8. The High Court in first appeal further enhanced the compensation from Rs.125/- to Rs.135/- for land on the left side and to Rs.160/- from Rs.150/- on the right side on the principle applied by the Reference Court. The present set of appeals at the instance of the landowners have been filed impugning the judgments of the courts below.

19. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the above sale instances relied upon by the parties do not accurately reflect the potential of the acquired land and the award of the High Court in the case of Jamalpur Kalan granting a sum of Rs.250/- per square yard as compensation is the minimal proper base.

21. We are, therefore, of the opinion as the said award pertained to the year 1992, a sum of Rs.225/- per square yard which would come Rs. 10,89000/- per acre would be the adequate compensation in the present case and for arriving at this figure not only have we computed the value of the land on the date of the Notification under Section 4 but have also recognized its potential on the basis of evidence of development in the area around the Bahalgarh-Sonepat road.

23. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow these appeals and award a sum of Rs.225/- per square yard as compensation for the entire acquired land and further direct that the appellants will have all statutory benefits that they would be entitled to as a consequences of this order. We also direct the respondent State of Haryana or the beneficiaries, as the case may be, to pay the compensation as enhanced by us by the end of this year.
National Council For Teacher Education ... vs Committee Of Management & Ors

The first respondent herein is an institution which imparts teachers' education. The appellant is a statutory body. It was created under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 ('the Act', for short). The Act was enacted with a view to achieve a planned and coordinated development of the teacher education system throughout the country, regulate and provide maintenance of norms and standards in the teacher education system and for matters connected therewith. The appellant-Council was constituted in terms of Section 3 of the said Act.

As the appellant, despite receipt of the said letter refused to accord recognition to the first respondent-Institution for the academic year 2005- 2006, the respondent herein filed a writ petition before the Uttaranchal High Court praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs:

For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment is set aside. The appeal is allowed.

No costs.
Rajiv Modi vs Sanjay Jain & Ors

3) The admitted facts are, that, on 1.4.1999 M/s. Dhriti Agro Farms Private Limited (DAFPL), a company owned by the appellant, had entered into an agreement with Rajasthan Breweries Limited (RBL), a company owned by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The agreement provides for appointment of DAFPL as their C&F Agent for the State of Rajasthan. It also provides the payment that requires to be made by the appellant for supply of raw materials to the suppliers of the respondents on behalf of the respondents and the respondents would supply the finished goods to the appellant for sale in Rajasthan.

9) The High Court by the impugned order has quashed the proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate primarily on the ground that no cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Chief Judicial Magistrate at Patna, and while elaborating on this issue, the Court has also observed that although there is an allegation that the respondents had induced the appellant to part with huge amount of money, but no such inducement was made at Patna or the appellant parted with any part of his money at Patna or the respondents were required to account for any property at Patna or any agreement was executed within the jurisdiction of Patna and even if it is accepted that the Letter of Appointment was handed over by the respondents to the appellant at Patna, it does not constitute any part of cause 4 of action. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant is before us in this appeal.

(Para 8)
M/S. Kcp Ltd vs Commnr. Of Central Excise, Chennai

1. Being aggrieved by the Final Order Nos. 301 & 302/2003 dated 2.5.2003 passed by the Custom, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CEGAT’), South Zonal Bench, Chennai, the instant two civil appeals have been filed by the appellant-assessee. As facts of both the appeals are similar, these have been heard and finally decided together.

2. The circumstances in which the appeals have arisen, in a nutshell, are as under:

3. The appellant-assessee entered into a contract with M/s Vina Sugars, Vietnam for supply and installation of a sugar plant at Vietnam with a capacity of 1250 TCD (Tons crushed per day). For the said purpose, the appellant had manufactured certain machines in its own factory which were to form part of the sugar plant and certain machinery, including electric cables etc., which were necessary for the plant were purchased by the appellant from other dealers-manufacturers and the said machines-equipments- cables etc., which had been purchased from others, along with appellant’s manufactured items, had been put in a container and the containers were transported to Vietnam so that the different parts of the machinery can be assembled and the plant can be set up at Vietnam.

4. In the course of its business, the appellant had availed the MODVAT credit on certain goods under the provisions of Rule 57 Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) declaring them as ‘capital goods’ which had been purchased by the appellant from other manufacturers-dealers in the country and had sent to Vietnam along with other parts of machinery manufactured by the appellant.

26. Moreover, it is also clear that the appellant-assessee did not pay any excise duty on the sugar plant set up by it in Vietnam and therefore, there cannot be any question of availing any MODVAT credit.

27. For the aforestated reasons as well as for the reasons stated by the Tribunal in the impugned order, we are of the view that the Tribunal had come to a correct conclusion and the conclusion so arrived at by the Tribunal does not require any interference.

28. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.

...J. (ANIL R. DAVE) New Delhi September 03, 2013
Mohd. Sartaj And Anr vs State Of U.P. And Others

Meanwhile, the appellants acquired B.T.C. in 1993 and 1995 respectively and continued with their service. Before their appointment, on 28.1.85 the Special Secretary to the U.P. Government by letter informed all heads of departments and Chief Officers, U.P. that Hon'ble Governor had approved such candidates who were qualified as Moallim-e-Urdu from Jamia Urdu, Aligarh and got the experience of teaching at Higher Secondary School as eligible for employment in the State services / educational institutions. Similarly, on 21.10.88 the Special Secretary to the U.P. Government passed an order to inform all head of departments and Chief Officers of U.P. that the candidates with the degree of Moallim-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh, and those who had got the experience of teaching upto Higher Secondary level had been directed to be appointed as teachers in State services. On 13.9.94 the Secretary of U.P. Government by his order informed all authorities of education that Hon'ble Governor had granted sanction to Moallim-e-Urdu for teaching Urdu in junior and senior schools and it was given equivalent status of B.T.C.. Thus by this Circular, degree of Moallim- e-Urdu from Jamia Urdu, Aligarh was given equivalent status of B.T.C. Certificate.

In our opinion, on the above facts no prejudice has been caused to the appellants by not serving notice of giving hearing before the order of cancellation was issued.
Union Of India & Ors vs Satya Brata Chowdhury & Ors

5. Respondents appointed as Time Keepers at Liluah and Kancharpara Workshops were, however, being treated as Clerical Grade employees. Indisputably, the concerned workers filed an Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, which was marked as T.A. No.1585 of 1996, praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs : 3

7. Indisputably, the Central Government constituted the Fifth Pay Revision Committee. It made its recommendations. The said recommendations were enforced as regards clerical staff with effect from 1.1.1996. By an office order dated 18.2.2000, the Railway Board directed implementation of the said revised pay with effect from 18.2.2000, in the case of respondents, stating :

(i) Induction at the level of Junior Time Keepers should continue in accordance with the existing pattern, which includes direct recruitment through RRBs to the extent of 66 from amongst candidates possessing qualification of matriculation;

As noticed hereinbefore, writ petitions preferred thereagainst by appellant were dismissed by the High Court.

21. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and orders. The appeals are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.25,000/-.

December 17, 2008
Amal Kumar Jha vs State Of Chhatisgarh & Anr

As per the prosecution case, the appellant was in-charge of Patthalgaon Hospital, District Raigad where on 1.1.1995 L.T.D. operation of Runiabai was conducted by Dr. A.M. Gupta. Thereafter she was sent home. As Runiabai vomited Dr. A.M. Gupta was approached. He sent one Aklu Ram to administer some treatment. However on 2.2.1995 she was brought to the Primary Health Centre, Patthalgaon where she was admitted and died at 2 p.m. Her post mortem was conducted. After 25 days, First Information Report was lodged and ultimately Police filed chargesheet under section 304-A IPC on 16.10.1996 in the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dharamjaigarh, as against appellant A.K. Jha, Dr. A.M. Gupta and Aklu Ram. Charges under section 304-A were framed as against Dr. A.M. Gupta and the appellant. Both of them filed an application for discharge under section 197 Cr.PC on the ground that sanction to prosecute was required and they could not be prosecuted without previous sanction. Vide order dated 27.6.2001 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, the application filed by Dr. A.M. Garg had been allowed. However, the application filed by the appellant was rejected on the ground that he was in-charge of the Primary Health Centre and he failed to provide Government jeep for shifting the patient Mrs. Runiabai to District Hospital, Raigad whereas the appellant himself travelled in the jeep to attend an official monthly meeting at Raigad which was District Headquarters. The Primary Health Centre did not have ambulance. Thus, negligence was attributed to the appellant for not providing the said vehicle for shifting the patient to District Hospital, Raigad. A revision was preferred against the rejection of prayer and thereafter a petition was filed under section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court, the same having been dismissed, the appellant is before us.

18. In sum, the sine qua non for the applicability of this section is that the offence charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be one which has been committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under colour of the office held by him.” (emphasis in original)” In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the omission complained of due to which offence is stated to have been committed, was intrinsically connected with discharge of official duty of the appellant, as such the protection under section 197 Cr.PC from prosecution without sanction of the competent authority, is available to the appellant. Thus, he could not have been prosecuted without sanction. It would be for the competent authority to consider the question of grant of sanction in accordance with law. In case sanction is granted only then the appellant can be prosecuted and not otherwise. Resultantly, the impugned orders are set aside, the appeal is allowed.
Bhadragiri Venkata Ravi vs Public Prosecutor H/C Of A.P

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

H. Aggrieved, the State preferred Criminal Appeal No.863 of 2004 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. The court dismissed the appeal against the parents of the appellant at the stage of admission itself. The appeal was admitted only qua the appellant. The appeal of the State has been allowed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 13.9.2006, convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC and awarding the sentence to undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, to undergo further S.I. for a period of one year. Appellant was acquitted of all other charges.

9. Satyavarapu Anasuya (PW.1), mother of the deceased has deposed that Ratna (deceased) used to tell her that she was harassed by her husband to bring dowry, though she had given sufficient dowry at the time of marriage. She came to know about the burn injuries of her daughter on 15.4.2000 and immediately went to the Government Hospital. There she found the appellant and his parents. On being asked, Ratna Kumari told her that she suffered the burn injuries by accident. Ten days later, she told the witness that the appellant poured kerosene on her and pushed her on a burning stove, that is why she sustained burn injuries. That her another daughter was a police constable and therefore, the appellant apprehended some action by the police against him and his parents. She has further deposed that prior to the death of her daughter, the appellant had developed illicit relationship with another woman just after Sankranthi festival and she had been informed about this by her daughter that appellant wanted to marry that woman.

18. This court has time and again laid down parameters for interference by a superior court against the order of acquittal. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.

20. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The judgment and order of the Sessions Court is restored. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds stand discharged.
S.Sarojini Amma vs Velayudhan Pillai Sreekumar

4. The appellant is a childless widow aged 74 years whose husband expired on 06.06.2015. The respondent is the nephew of the appellant (brother’s son). In the expectation that the respondent will look after the appellant and her husband and also for some consideration, the appellant executed a purported gift deed in favour of the respondent. The gift deed clearly stated that the gift would take effect after the death of the appellant and her husband.

7. On 12.05.2000, the appellant and her husband filed the written statement in the suit being O.S. No. 32/2000 filed by the respondent. On 25.07.2000, the defendants in O. S. No. 97/2000 filed their written statement contending that the registered document No. 687/2000 was executed for consideration.

9. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed First Appeal being A.S. No. 30/2007 before the District Court Kollam. The defendants in O.S. No. 97/2000 filed their First Appeal before the District Court Kollam. By an order dated 23.09.2010, the Additional District Judge III, Kollam allowed the application being A.S. No. 30/2007 filed by the appellant and dismissed A.S. No. 77/2000 filed by the respondent in O.S. No. 97/2000.

126. When gift may be suspended or revoked.- The donor and donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part, at the mere will of the donor, is void wholly or in part, as the case may be.

15. A conditional gift with no recital of acceptance and no evidence in proof of acceptance, where possession remains with the donor as long as he is alive, does not become complete during lifetime of the donor. When a gift is incomplete and title remains with the donor the deed of gift might be cancelled.

19. In the instant case, admittedly, the deed of transfer was executed for consideration and was in any case conditional subject to the condition that the donee would look after the petitioner and her husband and subject to the condition that the gift would take effect after the death of the donor. We are thus constrained to hold that there was no completed gift of the property in question by the appellant to the respondent and the appellant was within her right in cancelling the deed. The judgment and order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be 8 sustained.

20. The appeal is allowed and the judgment and order under appeal is set aside.
Bairon Singh vs State Of M.P

7. The accused was charged and tried for the offences punishable under Sections 304B, 306 and 498A, IPC and under Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The prosecution in support of its case examined seven witnesses namely, Ghuman (PW-1), Prakash Chand (PW-2), Dr. Sunil Kumar Pandya (PW-3), Brindavan (PW-4), Krishan Murari (PW-5), N.P. Rajoriya (PW-6) 7 and Lalaram (PW-7). The accused also examined three witnesses, namely, Bala Prasad (DW-1), Surat Singh (DW-2) and Hanumat Singh (DW-3).

9. The accused challenged the judgment of the trial court in appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The High Court set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 but maintained the conviction and sentence under Section 498A, IPC.

17. We hold, as it must be, that there is not an iota of evidence which can be admitted in law to be used against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 498A, IPC.

18. Consequently, the appeal has to be allowed and is allowed and the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant 14 under Section 498A, IPC is set aside. The accused be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

........................J (D.K. Jain) ........................J (R.M. Lodha ) New Delhi, May 29, 2009 15
Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd vs M/S Kala Emporium Pvt.Ltd

2. By an order dated 12th December, 2001, passed in Complaint No.17 of 2000, the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh, [for short, `the State Commission'] set aside the repudiation of the respondent's claim by the appellant-Insurance Company and directed it to assess the compensation payable to the former. The appellant challenged that order by filing an appeal before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission [for short, `the National Commission'], but the respondent did not do so. The National Commission did not advert to the merits of the case, but, by simply placing reliance upon two letters dated 11th June, 1999 and 25th November, 1999, allegedly written by the respondent to the officers of the appellant, concluded that the Insurance Company had agreed to settle the matter for a ....2/-

sum of Rs.6,41,908/- and, accordingly, set aside the order passed by the State Commission and directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.6,41,908/- to the respondent with interest @ 9 per cent per annum from the date of filing the complaint.

6. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order passed by the National Commission is set aside and the one rendered by the State Commission is restored. No costs.
Omkar Prasad Verma vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

Appellant is a teacher in a government school. Vimala was a student reading in the said school. She alleged that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her on putting her to fear that she would be failed in her classes. In fact, she was studying in class VII for three years. A First Information Report was lodged. She became pregnant. Appellant took her to a hospital at Satna where an abortion took place. In the meantime a missing diary was recorded on 1.02.1997. On 11.02.1997, the prosecutrix herself came back and gave a statement before the Investigating Officer. She alleged that at the relevant time she was only 13= years old.

The said allegations were not found to be correct in the trial. A finding of fact was arrived at by the learned Trial Judge that she was a consenting party. She was found to be more than 18 years of age. On the basis of the said findings, it was categorically held that the accused was not guilty of the offence of commission of rape. The learned Trial Judge, however, was of the opinion that as the school, in question, was a government school, the appellant was a public servant. The prosecutrix was a student, and thus, in that capacity, was in his custody and in that view of the matter he was guilty of commission of an offence under Section 376B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo 2 years R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1000/- in default thereof to undergo sentence of 6 months R.I. An appeal preferred by the appellant herein has been dismissed by reason of the impugned Judgment by the High Court.

Consent of a girl, therefore, although would not take the offence outside the purview of Section 376(2), but therefor other ingredients thereof must be found to be existing.

We, therefore, are clearly of the opinion that the ingredients of the offence under Sec. 376B of the Indian Penal Code are not satisfied in the instant case.

For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is allowed. Appellant is on bail. He is discharged from the bail bond.