L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Jeevan Chandrabhan Idnani & Anr vs Divisional Commr.Konkan Bhavan & Ors

3. The constitution of the "Municipal Corporations"1 (in the State of Maharashtra), their powers, functions and various allied matters are regulated by the above-

mentioned Act. Section 5(2)2 of the Act declares, every "Corporation" shall consist of a definite number of elected and a few nominated councillors. The number of elected Councillors with respect to any Corporation is determined on the basis of the population of that Municipal Corporation. The case on hand pertains to the Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation, the third respondent herein, which has a total of 76 elected Councillors.

4. Election to the third respondent took place sometime in the month of February, 2007 and the Corporation was duly constituted with 76 elected Councillors. The break-

However, they decided to quit the Aghadi and form a `Swatantar Aghadi' and addressed a letter dated 23rd February, 2011 to the first respondent herein requesting the first respondent to make suitable changes in the records maintained under the Disqualification Act and the rules made thereunder.

7. The first respondent accepted the above-mentioned request. The same is evidenced by his communication dated 11th March, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as `the impugned order').

10. The High Court rejected the above-mentioned submission. On an examination of the various provisions of the Act, the Court rightly held that the appointment to the four categories of Committees specified under Sections 31A(1) takes place "at least more than once" "during the tenure of the Corporation". Therefore the High Court opined "the relative strength of the recognised parties or registered parties or groups at the time of appointments" whenever made "would be relevant". Hence, found no reason to find fault with the impugned order. The correctness of the said judgment is in issue before us.

[emphasis supplied]

29. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment under appeal, as well as the impugned order, cannot be sustained. We allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order.

January 31, 2012.
M/S Geo Miller & Co.Pvt.Ltd. vs Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan ...

2. The facts giving rise to these appeals are as follows: The respondent had floated tenders for execution of work on a water treatment plant. Three work orders dated 7.10.1979, 4.4.1980 and 3.5.1985 were assigned in favour of the appellant. The three Notice Inviting Tender (‘NIT’) documents in respect of these work orders constituted the terms and conditions of the three separate contracts between the parties. The three contracts had a common arbitration clause as follows (relevant part):

The respondent vide internal communications dated 20.11.1997 acknowledged that the matter was pending consideration with them. Thereafter by letters dated 17/18.12.1999 the respondent replied to the appellant partly allowing one claim to the extent of Rs. 1,34,359.12 and requesting details of bills/invoices of certain other claims for verification. The appellant 3 on 6.1.2000 replied stating that the bills had already been processed for payment and sent photocopies of the bills submitted earlier to the respondents.

It is further relevant to note that even the respondent’s letter dated 18.12.1999 does not completely repudiate the appellant’s claims but requests the submission of certain documents for verification. Hence it was not so radical a departure from the prevailing situation at that time so as to give a finding that the appellant could not have contemplated arbitration prior to the aforesaid letter.

We also find it pertinent to add that the appellant’s own default in sleeping over his right for 14 years will not constitute a case of ‘undue hardship’ justifying extension of time under Section 21 43(3) of the 1996 Act or show ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The appellant should have approached the Court for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8(2) of the 1940 Act within the appropriate limitation period. We agree with the High Court’s observation that the entire dispute seems concocted so as to pursue a monetary claim against the respondents, taking advantage of the provisions of the 1996 Act.

12. Hence the appeals are dismissed and the impugned judgement and order is confirmed, in the above terms.
State Of Rajasthan vs Sarjeet Singh & Anr

The State of Rajasthan made a Scheme for supply of water in the villages known as "Jal Pradyot Yojna". The State was to contribute 50% of the total costs whereas the rest 50% was to be borne by the Gram Panchayat. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the Scheme, the Gram Panchayat of Indragarh employed several persons including Respondent No. 1 herein as a pump driver. He was initially appointed for a period of six months. The term of his appointment was extended from time to time. The total period during which Respondent No.1 remained employed was from 19.9.1996 to 7.11.1997. The Scheme was to be completed upto 7.11.1997. As the Scheme came to an end, the services of Respondent No. 1 were terminated. He filed an application for his regularization of his services as a pump driver before the Labour Welfare and Conciliation Officer, Hanumagarh. In reply to the notice issued by the said authority, the Public Health & Engineering Department of the State inter alia contended that Respondent No. 1 had never been appointed by it and in fact was appointed by the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Indragarh.

In terminating the services of Respondent No. 1, we would assume that violation of Sections 25-G or 25-H occurred (although there is no factual basis therefor), but in any event, the same would not mean that the Labour Court should have automatically passed an award of reinstatement in service with back wages. We, however, although ordinarily would have set aside the impugned award and consequently the judgment of the High Court; in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct the State to pay a sum of Rs. 30,000/- to Respondent No. 1. Such payment should be made within eight weeks from date failing which the same shall carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid directions. The parties shall pay and bear their own costs.
Masood Ali Khan vs State Of U.P. & Ors

3. Background facts as projected by the complainant in FIR Case Crime No.198 of 2005 of P.S. Kotwali district, Rampur, Uttar Pradesh are as follows:

(4) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment for life, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced."

12. Looked at from any angle the order of the High Court is clearly indefensible and is set aside. Respondents 2 to 4 shall surrender to custody forthwith.

13. The appeal is allowed.
Anand vs Committee For S.&V.; Of Tribe Claims ...

2. Succinctly put, the material facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:

3. In furtherance of the said order, the appellant made an application to the Caste Scrutiny Committee under Rule 11 of the Maharashtra Scheduled Tribes (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Certificate Rules, 2003 (for short "the Rules"). Along with the application, the appellant submitted several documents, including a copy of his grandfather's school leaving certificate dated 8th April, 2 1929; a copy of school leaving certificate dated 6th July, 1955, issued to his father, Nilkantha Maruti Katole; a caste certificate issued to his father on 19th June, 1969; copies of the school leaving certificates issued to the appellant on 8th May, 1978, 5th July, 1988 and 9th August, 1983; a college leaving certificate dated 9th July, 1990 and a copy of school leaving certificate issued to the real brother of his grandfather on 21st June, 1933 etc. All these documents recorded the Caste of those persons as `Halbi'.

5. A copy of the report of Vigilance Cell was supplied to the appellant by the Caste Scrutiny Committee and personal hearing was also granted.

(i) While dealing with documentary evidence, greater reliance may be placed on pre-

21. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed; the decisions of Caste Scrutiny Committee and the High Court are set aside and the case is remitted back to the Caste Scrutiny Committee for fresh consideration in accordance with the relevant rules and the aforesaid broad guidelines.

22. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

NOVEMBER 8, 2011.

ARS 17
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Ratan Singh

2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that there was a dispute in respect of a pathway between the deceased (Devi 2 Singh) and Salag Ram. In order to resolve the dispute, the jurisdictional Tehsildar with the help of others got measured the place and found that the deceased had closed the way and consequently the way was got opened. However, the misunderstanding in respect of the earlier dispute continued. At about 9.00 am on 30.08.1991, 18 persons including the respondents, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and broke into the residential house of the complainant - Khilan Singh in order to cause injury to Devi Singh. The accused were carrying farsi (sharp edged object), lathis and other weapons. They dealt blows on the head of Khilan Singh, as a result of which he fell down. At that juncture, the deceased, Devi Singh, intervened and he was also assaulted by the accused persons with farsi and lathis, as a result of which the deceased fell down on the ground. The First Information Report (for short ‘the FIR’) came to be lodged at about 8.30 pm on 30.08.1991. The charge-sheet was filed for various offences including the offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC. As mentioned supra, the Trial Court convicted the respondents/four accused, namely, Ratan Singh S/o Gulab Singh, Chandan Singh S/o Gulab Singh, Salag Ram S/o Mohan Singh and Ramesh S/o Aman Singh for charges levelled against them and sentenced 3 them to undergo imprisonment for life. The appeal filed by the convicted accused before the High Court was allowed and they were acquitted vide the impugned judgment. Hence, this appeal by the State.

13. We find that the view taken by the High Court is one of the possible views in the facts and circumstances of the case. There is no reason to disagree with the reasons assigned and the conclusions arrived at by the High Court, more particularly when the evidence of all the eye witnesses is inconsistent, not cogent and unreliable. Hence, no interference is called for.

Thus, there is no scope for framing of issues in a criminal trial. Ordinarily, such conduct of the Trial Court would necessitate remanding the matter for trial, but given that in the instant matter, the Court also proceeded to frame charges against the accused and to give findings on the same in order to record a conviction, and given that we are inclined to affirm the decision of the High Court on merits, to set aside the conviction of the respondents, we do not find it necessary to remand the case back for trial.

15. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

September 05, 2018.
Indian Hume Pipe Co.Ltd vs State Of Rajasthan

3. Thumb nail sketch of the facts of the case is as under:-

4. Respondent/State of Rajasthan had issued notice inviting tender on 03.01.1981 and 11.02.1981 for grant of contract for laying PSC pipeline in Kota Division. Appellant herein, pursuant to the said notice submitted its tender.

5. The tender of the appellant being lowest was accepted on 18.04.1982. The agreement, thereafter, was executed between the parties on 13.12.1982. The said Agreement contained an arbitration clause, to be invoked in case of any dispute arising between the parties.

6. Since a dispute between the parties arose, the said arbitration clause was invoked and the matter was referred to three arbitrators.

7. They entered into the reference on 12.02.1995 and gave their Award on 12.12.1997.

9. Feeling aggrieved by the said award, respondent-State of Rajasthan preferred objections under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Act before District Judge, Jaipur City. The appellant herein filed its reply to the said objections and prayed that the award be made rule of the Court.

11. Since, while passing the said impugned order no direction was made by the learned District Judge to make the said award a rule of the Court and the pendente lite and future interest awarded by the arbitrators were disallowed, thus, an application for review was filed by the appellant. The same came to be heard and disposed of on 26.11.2005. The award was made rule of the Court and appellant was awarded only simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of decree of the award. It is against the aforesaid two orders and judgments passed by learned District Judge, appellant was constrained to carry the matter further before the learned Single Judge by filing Miscellaneous Appeal as mentioned hereinabove.

21. Both the aforesaid provisions make it abundantly clear that power to award interest at all stages vests with the arbitrators. Arbitrators are bound to make the award in accordance with law and if there is no embargo or legal hurdle in C.A. @ S.L.P.(C)No.14269/07 -9- awarding interest for the aforesaid three stages mentioned hereinabove then there cannot be any justifiable reason to deny the same.

23. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we allow the appeal and set aside and quash the impugned orders passed by learned District Judge in so far as they refuse to grant interest pendente lite and future and also by learned Single Judge of High Court and restore the award together with interest as awarded by the arbitrators.

24. Respondent to bear the cost of litigation throughout. Counsel's fee Rs.10,000/-.

October 19, 2009.
R.Hanumaiah & Anr vs Sec.To Govt.Of Kar.Rev.Dept.& Ors

2. The case of plaintiffs in brief is as follows : Plaintiffs are the owners of a tank called "Maistry Kere" bearing Survey No.30, (Old Survey No.25) measuring 11 acres 21 guntas and land bearing Survey No.31 (Old Survey No.26) measuring 1 acre 9 guntas situate in Jakkasandra Village, described in the plaint schedule as items 1 and 2. The said tank and land were earlier part of Block No.61 measuring 297 Acres 16 Guntas known as `Dalavai Dinne', which belonged to their Great great grandfather - Kurakalu Venkataramana Maistry. That the said Venkataramana Maistry executed a deed of settlement dated 7.1.1874 (Ex. P.2) settling the said Dalavai Dinne upon his son Chikkahanumaiah. The said Dalavai Dinne identified as Block No.61 was re-surveyed and allotted Re-Survey Nos.16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27 to

Position in this case

20. One more aspect requires to be noticed. The first appellant had earlier filed a suit (OS No.1 of 1976 renumbered as OS No.1305 of 1980) for a permanent injunction, claiming that he was in possession of Sy. No.30 (tank). That suit and appeal therefrom were dismissed by recording a finding that he failed to establish possession. The observation of the High Court while dismissing the appeal from the decision in the earlier injunction suit, that the dismissal will not come in the way of plaintiff establishing title in the subsequent suit for declaration of title, will not dilute the finding recorded by the trial court and High Court that the first appellant was not in possession, which has attained finality.

22. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no ground to interfere with the judgment and decree of the High Court. The appeals are dismissed. The application for intervention is also dismissed.
State Of Uttaranchal & Anr vs Rajendra Singh Kandwal

The respondents herein were appointed on adhoc officiating post in the year 1988 for a fixed term which was continued. They were regularised in the year 2004 under the Uttaranchal Regularization of Ad Hoc Appointments (Posts under the purview of Public Service Commission) Rules, 2002 ( for short 'the Rules'). The respondents claimed benefit of their service from 1988 to 2004 for the purpose of seniority and this has been granted by the High Court. Hence, this appeal.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5130 OF 2009 etc. -2- We are afraid, we cannot agree with the view taken by the High Court.

In the present case, Rule 7 is very clear and hence the CIVIL APPEAL NO.5130 OF 2009 etc. -3- respondents are not entitled to the benefit of their service from 1988 to 2004 for the purpose of their seniority.

Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. No costs. Civil Appeal No.1474 of 2007

In view of our order passed today in Civil Appeal No. 5130 of 2009, this appeal is also allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. No costs.
State Of M.P. And Others vs Hazarilal

2. A show cause notice was issued to the respondent as to why disciplinary action shall not be taken against him in view of the judgment of conviction passed against him in the said criminal case. By an order dated 25th November, 1993 his services were terminated by the Deputy Director, Vidisha. An appeal thereagainst was preferred by the respondent in terms of Madhya Pradesh State Services Act. However, no order was passed therein. A revision was filed by him before the Deputy Director, Public Education. During the pendency of the said revision application, his criminal revision petition filed before the High Court was dismissed. The prayer of the respondent that he be reinstated in service was rejected in terms of the order dated 11th January, 1994 passed by the Deputy Director, Public Education, Vidisha.

Provided that the Commission shall be consulted where such consultation is necessary, before any orders are made in any case under this rule."

15. Applying the said principle also, in our opinion, no interference with the impugned judgment is called for.

17. For the reasons aforementioned there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee is quantified at Rs.25,000/-.
Surjit Singh And Another vs State Of Punjab

4. The prosecution case was that the deceased Harbans Kaur was living in village Beri along with her sons Mohan Singh and Rattan Singh. It is alleged that on 21.2.1997 at about 6 P.M. Harbans Kaur went out to ease herself when the accused said some indecent words to her and she returned to her home. At that time Mohan Singh, son of the deceased Harbans Kaur was outside in the field and when he came home he found his younger brother already in the house. Mohan Singh saw the accused coming to his house and he followed them. He heard some screaming in the house and saw from the window that his mother was lying without her salwar and accused Lakhwinder Singh was in the process of wearing his trouser. All the accused were present in the said room at that time. On seeing this Mohan Singh shouted but the accused Daljit Singh is said to have pointed a pistol towards him and threatened that if he shouts he will be finished off. Surjit Singh @ Bagga, son of Kartar Singh allegedly said that in case Harbans Kaur remains alive she would implicate all the accused and hence she should be killed. It is alleged that thereupon Harinderjit Singh gave a brickbat blow on the head of Harbans Kaur, as a result of which she died. It is alleged that after throwing the body of Harbans Kaur in the courtyard the accused ran away.

8. However, we uphold the conviction of the appellants under the other provisions mentioned in the trial court judgment as there is no doubt that the appellants along with other co-accused committed criminal trespass into the house of Harbans Kaur and also formed an unlawful assembly, though such attempt was frustrated by the presence of Mohan Singh and Rattan Singh.

10. We are informed that the appellants have already served out about 4 or 5 years' imprisonment and hence we substitute the sentence awarded by the trial court and the High Court by the sentence of imprisonment for the period already undergone. The appellants should be released forthwith unless required in connection with some other case.

11. With these observations the appeal stands allowed in part.
Allahabad Bank vs A.C.Aggarwal

4. The respondent joined service as Clerk in 1961. He was promoted as an officer with effect from 10.08.1970 and was granted Middle Management Scale-III in September, 1993. After serving the appellant for almost 40 years, the respondent applied for voluntary retirement under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000. His application was accepted by the competent authority and he was relieved from service w.e.f. 30.04.2001. He was paid gratuity under the 1972 Act along with the amount of Contributory Provident Fund. The respondent made representations dated 30.7.2001, 6.10.2001 and 20.10.2001 for grant of pension but the concerned authority of the appellant did not give any response. However, in reply to the notice sent by the respondent, the appellant informed him vide letter dated 24.11.2001 that he can get benefit under the Old Pension Scheme subject to the condition of refund of the amount of gratuity already paid to him and submission of an irrevocable undertaking that he will be getting pension in lieu of the gratuity. The relevant portions of that letter are extracted below:

There is no question of comparing the said Scheme and arrive at any conclusion that what they have received was much better in terms than the benefits conferred under the Act. Reliance upon sub-section (5) of Section 4 is therefore unsustainable.

15. In our view, the High Court’s interpretation/understanding of the judgment of this Court is correct and there is no merit in the argument of Shri Nariman that the respondent, who had received gratuity under the 1972 Act, is not entitled to pension or that he must refund the amount of gratuity as a condition for payment of pension.

18. In view of the plain language of the above reproduced provision, which contains a non-obstante clause, every eligible employee is, notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment or instrument or contract is entitled to gratuity. Therefore, even if the respondent had opted for pension, he could have legitimately claimed gratuity without being required to refund the amount of pension already received by him.

19. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant is directed to implement the order of the High Court within a period of eight weeks from today.