L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Maharashtra Housing Development ... vs Shapoorji Pallonji And Company Pvt. ...

2. The appellant – Maharashtra Housing Development Authority through its Chief Officer issued e-Tender notice inviting proposals for the work of “Technical designing, coordination and construction for rehabilitation/sale/ commercial/amenities along with construction of habitable temporary transit camps and other various works in 2 respect of redevelopment project”. The bidders were to submit their bids in two stages i.e. technical and financial. They were required to comply with the experiences and other conditions mentioned in the Request for Qualification-cum-Request for Proposal (RFQ cum RFP) document. The last date for submission of on-line bid was fixed on 17th May, 2017 which was subsequently extended from time to time and lastly extended upto 1300 hours of 27th July, 2017.

3. According to the first respondent – writ petitioner, it had uploaded its technical and financial bid at about 1216 hours on 27th July, 2017 on the website of the appellant. The first respondent – writ petitioner claimed that though it had pressed the ‘freeze button’, it could not get an acknowledgement of the bid submitted. Thereafter, correspondences were entered into/exchanged between the 3 first respondent and the appellant whereafter the first respondent was referred to National Informatics Centre (NIC) which had designed and maintained the e-portal on which bids were submitted. As the NIC took the view that the absence of acknowledgement of the submission of the bid by the first respondent – writ petitioner was on account of its omission to press the ‘freeze button’ and as there was no technical glitch in the system, amply demonstrated by the acknowledgements generated in favour of other bidders, the first respondent – writ petitioner was not entitled to any consideration of its otherwise defective bid. This had led to the filing of writ petition out of which this appeal has arisen wherein the High Court of Bombay by the impugned judgment dated 28th September, 2017 had issued the following directions:

11. In the above view of the matter, we are inclined to take the view that the High Court was not correct in issuing the directions extracted above as contained in paragraph 15 of the impugned judgment/order dated 28th September, 2017. The same are, therefore, interfered with. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

(R. BANUMATHI) NEW DELHI FEBRUARY 12, 2018
Principal,Kendriya Vidyalaya & Ors vs Saurabh Chaudhary & Ors

4. The relevant facts are few and may be stated thus. The boy, Saurabh Chaudhary, was earlier a student of Kendriya Vidyalaya (Central School), C.L.R.1 up to class VIII. Thereafter, he moved to Kendriya Vidyalaya No.2 (Central School No.2), AFS, Tambaram, Chennai because his father shifted his residence from Tiruvanmiyur to Medavakkam. He passed the class X CBSE examination from Central School No.2, AFS, Tambaram. The boy is a sports person and he is said to have won a trophy in cricket and five gold 3 and six silver medals in athletics. Unfortunately he was unable to give matching results in studies. His marks in the class X CBSE examination cannot be said to be very good by current standards. His marks were as follows:

12. In view of the above, we find it difficult to see how the appellants can avoid the application of the earlier decision of this Court in Payal.

14. Mr. Patwalia referred to `Admission Guidelines-2007' (Annexure P-

(emphasis added)

(i) There will be two distinct situations for admissions in Science and Commerce streams. One situation would be where adequate number of children are available for admission to the streams from amongst students passing Class X from KVs as well as from amongst students from other schools seeking admission in a KV with the requisite eligibility. The second situation would be where adequate number of eligible children are not available for the stream for amongst students passing Class X from KVs as well as from amongst students from other schools seeking admission in KVs with the requisite eligibility. The cut off marks for admission in both the situations would be as under :

15. Reading the 2004 and the 2007 provisions together would make it clear that any preference in favour of the school's own students that might have been assumed earlier has now been provided for expressly. But that alone, as we see in the present case does not prevent the school from denying admission to one of its own students on the ground that he/she failed to secure the cut off marks in the class X CBSE examination.

19. In the result the appeal is dismissed but with no order as to costs.
Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar Ã Appellants vs State Of Bihar & Anr. Ã Respondents

The prosecution case is when the deceased had gone upstairs with the dinner of the respondent, a sound of a gunfire was heard by the informant at the first floor. PW-3 rushed to the second floor immediately and found the deceased lying in a pool of blood in the terrace having a gun shot injury. Allegedly, he exclaimed "DIDI KO KISEE NEI GOLI MAR DIYA". Hearing these words, the parents of the deceased also rushed to the second floor and found her lying in the terrace in the pool of blood with a gun shot injury on her forehead. Respondent was seen hiding something by PW-2. When the mother of the deceased Gouri Devi (PW-2) took the deceased's head on her lap, the respondent also came out. She was brought downstairs and taken to a nursing home. Respondent was also said to have accompanied them in a rickshaw. She was declared dead. Before the deceased was taken to the nursing home, PW-2 had locked the room from outside.

The investigating officer, on opening of the lock, found a revolver from which smoke was still coming out. It was found from the bed-stead of the room.

Respondent was arrested. Principal witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution to prove the offence against the respondent before the learned Sessions Judge were PW-2, PW-3 and PW-13, mother, brother and informant - father of the deceased respectively. Indisputably, they were present in the house when the occurrence had taken place. The autopsy report was prepared by Dr. Kaushlendra Kumar (PW-1) posted at Sadar Hospital, Giridih. He found the following injuries on the person of the deceased:

On further desection subcutaneous tissues under the lacerated wound on the forehead in middle i.e. Glabella region and the underlying frontal bone consisted a circular hole =" x =" Cranial cavity deep.

On further desection the menigges and the brain were lacerated and terro posteriorly with extra cranial blood clot. On bullet was taken out from the posterior cranial fossa. The bullet was sealed and handed over the investigating agency."

Bharti Devi (PW-4) was the aunt of the deceased, i.e., the brother's wife of informant (PW-13). She was staying in the same house. She deposed that at the relevant time the respondent was staying in the house and he had come asking for Bidai of the deceased. Suresh Kumar (PW-3) is another brother of the informant living in the same house. He was informed by the informant that it was the respondent who was responsible for the death of his daughter (deceased).

The learned Sessions Judge on the basis of the aforementioned evidence found the respondent guilty of commission of murder and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.

[See also Prithvi (Minor) v. Mam Raj and Others, (2004) 13 SCC 279, State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114] For the reasons aforementioned, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the learned Sessions Judge. The appeals are allowed. The respondent is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. He may be taken in custody forthwith to serve out the sentence.
Annapurna vs State Of U.P

2. As per the prosecution case, the appellant is alleged to have poured kerosene oil on her daughter in law Santoshi and set her on fire. On hearing hue and cry of the deceased, her neighbour Ram Singh took her daughter in law to the hospital. In the hospital, two dying declarations were recorded, one by the Investigating Officer and another by Shri Ved Priya Arya, Naib Tehsildar-cum-Magistrate (PW.8). The dying declaration was recorded by the said Magistrate on 26.6.1999 after getting a certificate from Dr. P.K. Pathak that she was fit to make the statement. In her dying declaration, she had clearly stated that she had married to Satish on 4.5.1999 and she was pregnant. She was not sent to her parental house because her in laws were demanding ring and money. Her mother in law sprinkled kerosene oil on her and burnt her. She was subjected to cruelty for dowry.

(FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA) NEW DELHI;

APRIL 17, 2013
Rajendra Harakchand Bhandari & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr

4. It is from the above judgment of the High Court that the appellants have come up in appeal, by special leave.

5. Keshav Baurao Darandale (PW-8) was posted as a clerk in the Block Office of Bhenda Co-operative Sugar Factory Limited, Bhenda (Bk.) (for short, `the Sugar Factory'). On May 17, 1991 at about 11.00 a.m., Pradip Harakchand Bhandari (A-2) went to the office of the Sugar Factory and asked PW-8 to take entry of the sugarcane grown by him. PW-8 informed A-2 that he could not do that as the revenue entry relating to the land where sugarcane has been grown bears an endorsement of injunction. PW-8 told A-2 that he should take permission in this regard from the Overseer -- Lahanu Garje 3 (PW-7). On hearing this, A-2 became infuriated and abused PW-8 and beat him. Balasaheb Bhagwant Wabale (PW-5), PW-7 and few others arrived there and intervened. A-2 then went away.

7. PW-4 informed the incident to the Police Station, Nawasa. Suryakant Pansare (PW-14) -- Assistant Police Inspector -- immediately reached the scene of incident along with the staff. The complaint of PW-8 was registered. PW-14 then recorded the statement of PW-4 and also statements of few persons who were present there. The panchnama of the spot was also drawn.

16. We must immediately state that the offence under Section 307 is not compoundable in terms of Section 320(9) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and, therefore, compounding of the offence in the present case is out of question. However, the circumstances pointed out by the learned senior counsel do persuade us for a lenient view in regard to the sentence. The incident occurred on May 17, 1991 and it is almost twenty years since then. The appellants are agriculturists by occupation and have no previous criminal background. There has been reconciliation amongst parties;

18. The appeal is allowed in part to the extent above.

(R. M. Lodha) NEW DELHI, APRIL 8, 2011.
Mewar Polytex Ltd vs Union Of India & Ors

2. The assessee (appellant herein) seeks to challenge the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in Central Excise Appeal No.9 of 2006. By its judgment and order dated 26.8.2008, the High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the order of the Tribunal dated 4.7.2005, which had allowed the appeal of the Revenue and set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), who in turn had set aside the order in original. By the order in original, the 1 Assistant Commissioner had disallowed the Modvat credit of ` 5,37,799, and confirmed the recovery thereof, and also imposed a penalty of ` 50, 000 under Rule 173 Q (1) (bb) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (for short "the Rules").

3. The necessary facts, in brief are, that the show cause notice dated 15.2.1999 was issued to the assessee alleging that it had wrongly taken credit to the extent of ` 5,37,799 under Rule 57A of the Rules, during August 1998. The notice also called upon the assessee to show cause and explain as to why the aforesaid credit, wrongly taken by the assessee should not be disallowed/recovered under provisions of Rule 57-I, and also why penal action under Rule 173Q (1)(bb) should not be taken, and interest should not be charged under Section 11 AB.

5. It was alleged by the Revenue that the same was a false declaration, as the assessee has been availing Modvat credit on the inputs under Rule 57A. Likewise, in column 4 of the Form, the assessee had further declared that the export is under duty draw back, while on examination of Central excise records and R.T.12 returns of the assessee, it was found that the assessee had taken Modvat credit on the inputs used in the manufacture of exported goods, and they had not received any duty free consignment of PP Granules (Inputs) from anyone for exporting the goods on its behalf till the date of above-said exports, and that they had also 3 not reversed any credit taken on the inputs used in the goods exported vide above referred AR4s. Thus, the assessee, it was alleged, had wrongly taken credit of Modvat, to the tune of ` 5,37,799, which was not admissible.

6. The Assessing Officer confirmed the demand, which was set aside in appeal, and was reconfirmed in further stages of appeal, as delineated above.

18.In light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we find that the contentions of the assessee are without merit. We dismiss the appeal filed by the assessee, but leave the parties to bear their own costs.
Rajeev Kumar & Anr vs Hemraj Singh Chauhan & Ors

2. The appellants in these appeals are Non-State Civil Service Officers (hereinafter referred to as the "Non-SCS Officers"). They filed an impleadment application in the Delhi High Court for being impleaded as respondents in Writ Petition No.19103-04 of 2008 filed by Hemraj Singh Chauhan and Others before the High Court whereupon the High Court by an order dated 23rd 1 April 2008 allowed them to intervene and further allowed them to make submissions at the time of hearing of the writ petition. They were also given liberty to file affidavits.

3. Pursuant to the said order of the Hon'ble High Court, these appellants filed affidavits. After the High Court passed its impugned judgment dated 14.11.08 they have filed these appeals assailing the said judgment.

5. Before the C.A.T. there were three applicants namely, Hemraj Singh Chauhan, Anwarul Haque and Ram Nawal Singh who were common both in O.A. No.1097/06 and O.A. No.1137/06. Apart from those three persons, Ramesh Chandani and K.K. Shukla 2 were also applicants in O.A. No. 1137/06. Both the original applications were heard together.

6. The C.A.T. in its judgment dated 15.12.2006 held that O.A. No.1097/06 was without merit and dismissed the same and O.A. No.1137/06 was partly allowed and the respondents were directed to convene the meeting of D.P.C. Selection Committee to fill-up the posts which ultimately remain unfulfilled in 2001, 2002 and 2004 and to consider all eligible SCS Officers in the zone of consideration in the respective years including the Officers who were put in the select list of those years but could not be appointed in the absence of integrity certificate. The C.A.T. directed that the said order be complied within the period of four months.

7. However, on the said judgment being challenged before the High Court by Hemraj Singh Chauhan, the High Court set aside the judgment of the C.A.T. and the Central Government and the State Government were directed to undertake the cadre reviewing exercise with reference to the vacancy 3 position as on 1st January 2004 in the manner indicated in the High Court judgment within eight weeks from date.

19. For the reasons aforesaid the appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. No costs.
T. Nagappa vs Y.R. Muralidhar

2. Appellant is facing criminal charges before the Court of XV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore in C.C. No.6835 of 2005 purported to be under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. He is said to have issued a cheque in favour of the respondent for a sum of Rs.7,50,000/- on 8.10.2004 which on depositing in the Bank was allegedly returned unpaid. A complaint petition was filed by the respondent contending that the appellant had committed an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

examination, or the production of any document or other thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless he considers that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice and such ground shall be recorded by him in writing:

11. Ms. Suri, however, pointed out that the application of the appellant being one under Section 293 of the Code of criminal Procedure was rightly rejected. It is now a well settled principle of law that non-mentioning or wrong mentioning of provision of law would not be of any relevance, if the Court had the requisite jurisdiction to pass an order.

12. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly with the aforementioned directions. Appeal is allowed.
Nand Lal vs State Of Uttarakhand & Anr

2. The Appellant was convicted of an offence committed on 27th November, 1983, under Sections 7(1) and 2(1)(m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The Appellant was running a grocery shop near the Roadways Bus Stand in Roorkee, District Saharanpur (now within Haridwar 2 District in Uttrakhand). The Respondent No.2, who was a Food Inspector, Nagar Palika, Roorkee, at the relevant point of time, went to the Appellant's shop on the aforesaid date and found the Appellant selling and exhibiting mustard oil for sale. The Respondent No.2 purchased 375 grams of mustard oil from the Appellant and obtained a receipt from him. Subsequently, on the report of the Central Food Laboratory, Kolkata, the Appellant was charged under Section 7(1) read with Section 2(1)(m) of the aforesaid Act and on being convicted by the Special Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Roorkee, was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2,000/-, and in default of payment of such fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months.

3. The Appellant preferred an appeal against the said order of the learned Magistrate before the IVth Additional District & Sessions Judge, 3 Saharanpur, being Criminal Appeal No.168 of 1986, which was dismissed on 7th January, 1988. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, the Appellant filed a revision petition before the Allahabad High Court in 2004, being Crl. Revision No.195 of 2004. Upon bifurcation of the State, the said revision petition stood transferred to the Uttranchal High Court and was dismissed on 23rd March, 2006. The said order of dismissal of the revision petition filed by the Appellant is the subject matter of the present Appeal.

6. In that view of the matter and in the circumstances mentioned hereinabove, we allow the appeal to the extent that while maintaining the 5 conviction of the Appellant, we reduce his sentence to the period already undergone.

7. Let the Appellant be discharged from his bail bonds.
Bant Singh & Anr vs Niranjan Singh (D) By Lrs. & Anr

5. Appellants preferred an appeal thereagainst which, by a judgment and order dated 12.3.1981, was allowed.

9. The first question which we must consider is if Janardan Misra and Dharanidhar Misra had special means of knowing the disputed relationship.

23. Whether there has been a severance of the joint family property between Munshi Singh and Bakhtawar Singh is essentially a question of fact and, thus, in our opinion, the said question cannot be permitted to be reopened before us.

24. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Radhakrishna Dharmartha Pvt. Trust & ... vs Parmanand Soni(D) By Lrs

After two years and four months, the respondent filed suit for specific performance of agreement dated 12th November, 1990. The respondent pleaded that even though he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the defendants No.1 to 3 avoided receipt of the balance amount and execution of the sale deed and they sold the property to defendant Nos.4 and 5. The trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment dated 3.12.1997. It held that the plaintiff has not been able to prove the payment of balance price within the period of 6 months. The trial Court did not accept the plaintiff's version that he had paid the balance amount of Rs.30,000/- to Deohar Ram Manohar Sinha, who was a trustee but the same was returned without any tangible reason. On appeal, the High Court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreed the suit. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored. As a sequel to this, the suit filed by the purchaser shall stand dismissed.
West Bengal Central School Service ... vs Abdul Halim .

10. The Respondent No.1 has annexed Statement of Marks awarded to him by the University of Delhi in the Certificate Course examination in Bengali. It appears that he obtained aggregate of 155 Marks out of 300 Marks. The Respondent No.1 obtained 57 Marks on 100 in the 1st Paper, 53 Marks on 100 in the 2 nd paper and 45 on 100 in the 3rd paper (Oral).

Moreover the Certificate Course is not meant for candidates who have studied Bengali earlier.

36. Significantly, the Respondent No.1 has not produced any document or certificate of the Delhi University certifying that the certificate course in Bengali is of a standard equivalent to Bengali language at the post Higher Secondary level.

37. The judgment and order under appeal cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
Rajesh Kumar @ Raju vs Yudhvir Singh & Anr

2. Claimant before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is the appellant before us. On 11.8.2001, he was driving a two wheeler vehicle being a scooter. It was hit by a bus bearing Registration No.DL-1P-A- 0746. He was a motor mechanic.

In July 2003, he filed a claim in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, `the Act') claiming a sum of 2 Rs.10,00,000/- along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Allegedly, he suffered 60% total disability. His claim was based on the premise that he was earning a sum of Rs.4,500/- per month.

3. Before the Tribunal, the appellant relied upon a certificate purported to have been issued by the Civil Surgeon, Faridabad on 11.11.2003 stating that he had suffered 60% disability. The learned Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.1,68,941 by way of compensation opining that his income was Rs.3,000/- per month and he was entitled to compensation upon taking 30% of his income at the rate of Rs.900/- per month being a total sum of Rs.20,000 besides the amount of compensation towards pain and sufferings and a sum of Rs.5,000/- as general damages including conveyance, special diet etc. An interest at the rate of 7% per annum was also awarded.

4. He preferred an appeal thereagainst. The High Court awarded a further sum of Rs.84,800/-, opining :

10. We are of the opinion, that it is not a case where we should interfere in the impugned judgment of the High Court as also the award of the Tribunal. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.