L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of Tripura & Ors vs Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty & Ors

State of Tripura was desirous of amending the aforesaid Schedule IV by including certain other posts as feeder posts in “Group A” and “Group B” and a proposal to that effect was forwarded to Tripura Public Service Commission on 23.08.2011. The Commission accepted the proposal vide its communication dated 26.09.2011. On 24.11.2011, in pursuance of Rule 13 of the Rules, a Selection Committee was constituted for considering cases of eligible officers holding feeder posts in “Group A” and “Group B” of Schedule IV of the Rules for appointment to the post of Tripura Civil Service Gr.II against promotional quota. On 24.12.2011 a Notification dated 19.12.2011 was published in the Gazette amending the Rules by 28th Amendment including additional posts in Group A and Group B of Schedule IV to the Rules, which was in conformity with the proposal accepted by the Commission.

In our view, the instant case is fully covered by the law laid down by this Court in Deepak Agrawal (supra) and the High Court was completely in error in allowing the writ petition and in dismissing the writ appeals. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the judgment under appeal and dismiss the Writ Petition (Civil) Nos.104, 105,106 153 and 181 of 2012.

Before we part, we must also express that a selection contemplated in the year 2011 in which the original writ petitioners did not stand excluded has been stalled as a result of challenge raised and litigation initiated by the original writ petitioners. In our view the challenge was totally uncalled for and avoidable. However, it resulted in putting in abeyance the entire process of selection and adversely affected the administration. We, therefore, feel compelled to impose exemplary costs of Rs.10,000/- on each of the writ petitioners which shall be deposited with the High Court within six weeks from the date of this order and upon such deposit, the entire amount shall be made over to the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund for State of Tripura.
Sheila Sebastian vs R.Jawaharaj

2. The case of the prosecution giving rise to these appeals, in brief, is that the complainant Mrs. Doris Victor (deceased mother of the appellant) was the owner of a plot insurvey numbers 1777/1A, 1778/1, 1779/1 1 and 1779/2 in Valliyoor village. The complainant alleges that, accused no. 1, (R. Jawaharaj), with the aid of an imposter who by impersonating as Mrs. Doris Victor created a Power of Attorney (hereinafter ‘PoA’) in his name as if he was her agent. It was further alleged that, using the aforesaid PoA the accused no. 1, attempted to transfer the property of complainant by executing a mortgage deed in favour of accused no. 2, (Rajapandi) for a sum of Rs.50,000/-. After getting the information about the aforesaid transaction, the owner of the property Mrs. Doris Victor gave a complaint to the police which was subsequently registered as FIR dated 14.03.1998. After the completion of investigation, a final report was filed against the aforesaid accused under Sections 420, 423 and 424, IPC. The complainant Mrs. Doris Victor died after filing the complaint.

10. P.W. 1 (Narayanan Pillai), who is a document writer, stated that on 08.12.1997, both the accused accompanied a woman who identified herself as Mrs. Doris Victor and approached P.W.1 to execute a Power of Attorney in favour of accused no1. After the said document was made by P.W. 1, two witnesses put their signatures along with P.W. 1 himself. Later they 5 registered the said document in the office of Sub Registrar, Panangudi. One month thereafter, both the accused came to the office of PW 1 for the execution of mortgage deed in respect of the said property for an amount of Rs. 50,000/-. PW 1 prepared the said document which was then signed by accused no.1. The said deed was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Valliyoor wherein both the accused were present and accused no. 1 put his thumb impression on the said document.

30. In light of the above discussion, we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court, resultantly appeals stand dismissed being devoid of merits.
Deepak @ Wireless vs State Of Maharashtra

2. The genesis of the case was that on the date of occurrence, namely, 13/14.06.2004, P.W.10 A.P.I., attached to police station Pachod received a wireless message from P.S.I. Dhakne, who was on patrol duty, that some thieves had entered in that area. P.W.10, therefore, proceeded to the police station and on the way he met P.S.I. Dhakne and others and in the enquiry it came to light that the thieves had gone to the adjoining area. They started combing operation in that area and while they were going towards Aurangabad they noticed three persons fleeing on a motorcycle in high speed. The team led by P.W.10 followed those persons and that after a distance of chase those persons abandoned the motorcycle in the place called Jamkhed crossroad and started running in the open field. The police party chased them and could apprehend two out of the three persons. Out of the two persons who were apprehended, one was the appellant. The suspects were brought to the police station and in the meantime, P.W.10 received a telephone call that a theft had taken place in the house of one Vasanta Bhumre. On reaching the house of Vasanta Bhumre, P.W.10, noticed the wife of Vasanta Bhumre lying in the middle room in a pool of blood and his brother Sharad was found dead in the adjacent passage. P.W.10 arranged for sending the injured wife of P.W.2-Vasanta Bhumre to the hospital in the police vehicle and while going to the hospital P.W.9-Mirabai informed P.W.10 that about four to five assailants wearing pant and shirt caused injuries to her as well as the deceased Sharad and fled away from the scene of occurrence in a motorcycle. After admitting P.W.9 in the hospital, P.W.10 said to have returned back to the scene of occurrence and sent the dead body for postmortem after holding the inquest. P.W.10, based on the investigation stated to have learnt that the appellant and his accomplices, namely, Rahul Bhosle, Ravi Shinde, one Balaji and another unknown person (the last two were absconding) indulged in the dacoity in the house of P.W.2 on the night of 13/14.06.2004. The appellant alone was proceeded for the offences under Sections 395, 396 and 397 of IPC, since the other two were juvenile, they were dealt with separately. The prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses on its side apart from the material objects and chemical analysis report in support of the case. The Trial Court by its judgment dated 09.05.2005 convicted the appellant and imposed the punishment, as above, and the same was confirmed by the High Court, aggrieved by the same the appellant has come before this Court.

All the injuries in my opinion were caused within 6 hours, patient was referred to Govt. Medical College Hospital, Aurangabad, for further management and treatment. The certificate issued bears my signature. Its contents are correct. It is at Exh.12.”

14. Having regard to our above conclusion, we do not find any merit in this appeal, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

….…..……….…………………………...J [Swatanter Kumar] …………….………………………………J. [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla] New Delhi;

September 04, 2012
D. Sailu vs State Of A.P

3. Background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows:

4. The Village Administrative Officer gave Ex.P8 report to P.W.14, who registered the case in Cr.No. 82 of 1999 under Section 302 read with 34 IPC against Al to A4. P.W.15 took up investigation, visited the scene of offence and conducted scene of offence panchanama in the presence of P.W.10 and another and seized controlled earth from the scene. Thereafter, he proceeded to Government Hospital and held inquest on the dead body of the deceased in the presence of P.W.12 and others. He seized blood stained clothes from the body of the deceased. On inquest it was found that the deceased died as a result of the injuries sustained by him. P.W.8 is the Doctor, who conducted the autopsy, opined that the deceased died due to shock and hemorrhage due to injury to vital organ. On 13.11.1999, A-1 to A-4 were arrested by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Kondapur and produced before P.W.15. P.W.15 interrogated A-1 and A-1 gave confessional statement in Ex.P6 and in pursuance of the confessional statement, a knife was recovered under Ex.P7. As A-1 also sustained injuries, he was referred to hospital and examined by the Doctor and Ex.P.10, wound certificate was issued. After receipt of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory Report, he filed the charge sheet against A-1 and A-3 for the offence under Section 302 read with 34 IPC. As A-4 was juvenile, he was produced before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nizamabad, which is a juvenile Court. A-2 was absconding.

27. The above position is highlighted in Sandhya Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 4 SCC 653).

28. Considering the background facts, appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC and not Section 302 IPC. The conviction is accordingly altered. Custodial sentence of ten years would suffice.

29. Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Canara Bank vs C.S. Shyam .

2) Few relevant facts need mention to appreciate the controversy involved in appeal.

3) The appellant herein is a nationalized Bank. It has a branch in District Malappuram in the State of Kerala. Respondent No. 1, at the relevant time, was working in the said Branch as a clerical staff.

6) On 29.08.2006, the Public Information Officer of the Bank expressed his inability to furnish the details sought by respondent No. 1 as, in his view, firstly, the information sought was protected from being disclosed under Section 8(1)(j) of the Act and secondly, it had no nexus with any public interest or activity.

9) Against the said order, the appellant-Bank filed writ petition before the High Court. The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant-Bank. Challenging the said order, the appellant-Bank filed writ appeal before the High Court.

8) Felt aggrieved, respondent No.1 carried the matter in further appeal before the Central Information Commission. By order dated 26.02.2007, the appeal was allowed and accordingly directions were issued to the Bank to furnish the information sought by respondent No.1 in his application.

10) By impugned order, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appellant's writ appeal and affirmed the order of the Central Information Commission, which has given rise to filing of this appeal.

15) It is for these reasons, we are of the considered view that the application made by respondent No.1 under Section 6 of the Act was wholly misconceived and was, therefore, rightly rejected by the Public Information Officer and Chief Public Information Officer whereas wrongly allowed by the Central Information Commission and the High Court.

16) In this view of the matter, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and Central Information Commission and restore the orders 8 passed by the Public Information Officer and the Chief Public Information Officer. As a result, the application submitted by respondent No.1 to the appellant-Bank dated 01.08.2006 (Annexure-P-1) stands rejected.

August 31, 2017 9
D.D.A vs Gaurav Kukreja

3. Brief facts of the case which led to the filing of this appeal are as follows:- The property which is sought to be converted is comprised in Plot No.N-73, Panchsheel Cooperative House Building Society Ltd, New Delhi. DDA executed perpetual sub-lease deed dated 16.08.1967 in respect of the suit property in favour of one Sh. Jan Talwar (Defendant No.1 in the original suit). Jan Talwar by an agreement to sell dated 10.6.1986, agreed to sell the suit property to Mrs. Raymen Kukreja for a sale consideration of Rs.20,50,000/-. Jan Talwar, in respect of the same suit property, also executed a General Power of Attorney dated 10.06.1986 in favour of Lekh Raj Kukreja-husband of vendee i.e. Mrs. Raymen Kukreja. The cause of action arose in the year 1989, when Jan Talwar refused to execute the sale deed, even after receiving the complete sale consideration. This led to the filing of civil suit being CS (OS) No.2777/1989 for a decree of specific performance of the aforesaid agreement to sell. Though the agreement to sell was made in favour of Raymen Kukreja, the suit for specific performance was filed by the respondent-Gaurav Kukreja and Lekh Raj Kukreja (father of Gaurav Kukreja) against Jan Talwar and Raymen Kukreja (mother of Gaurav Kukreja). The civil suit was filed on the premise that both, the GPA holder (father of Gaurav Kukreja) and vendee (mother of Gaurav Kukreja) had surrendered their rights in favour of Gaurav Kukreja and that they had no objection if the property is transferred in the name of respondent. Jan Talwar having remained ex parte, the suit was decreed by Single Judge in terms of a compromise arrived at between the parties therein. Learned Single Judge of the High Court while deciding the CS (OS) No.2777/1989 held the entire transaction to be valid and observed that respondent and his father and mother were ready and willing to complete the sale transaction dated 10.06.1986 but Jan Talwar failed to perform his part of obligation. In the civil suit, Jan Talwar though entered appearance subsequently remained exparte. Based on the compromise decree in the original suit, Gaurav Kukreja applied to DDA for the conversion of suit property from leasehold to freehold. However, the DDA refused the conversion on the ground that as per the scheme, Gaurav Kukreja did not possess a good title.

In such cases, a surcharge of 331/3% on the conversion fee would be payable over and above the normal conversion charges (no unearned increase will be recoverable)."

19. In the result, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The respondent is at liberty to pursue the matter with DDA in accordance with law. Respondent is also at liberty to seek for return of money deposited by him/his father-Lekhraj Kukreja and when such application is made for return of money, the appellant/DDA is directed to return the same with 10% interest. No order as to costs.

March 24, 2015
U.P. Public Service Commission & Ors vs Rajeev Kumar Bansal

The appellant-U.P. Public Service Commission (UPPSC) issued an advertisement dated 16.07.1999 inviting applications for recruitment to the posts of Regional Inspectors (Tech.) and Assistant Regional Inspectors (Tech.) in U.P. Transport Department. The respondent-Rajeev Kumar Bansal was an applicant for both the posts. The said advertisement prescribed the qualifications required for the posts. There is no dispute that the respondent possessed the requisite educational qualification. The dispute is in regard to the practical experience required for the posts. Sub-clause (5) of Clause 5 of the advertisement prescribing the practical experience, is extracted below :

2. The applicant claimed that he had two and a half years experience (10.5.1994 to 22.11.1996) as Workshop Supervisor in Hindustan Automobiles which was admittedly a State Government approved institution and another two and a half years experience commencing from 1.1.1997 in a large private workshop known as Zaheer Engineering Works.

3. Nearly six months after the said advertisement, the Transport Commissioner, Lucknow issued certain guidelines in regard to what should be considered as 'large automobile workshops' for the purpose of fulfilling the requirement relating to practical experience mentioned in Clause 5(5) of the advertisement. As per the said guidelines, only (i) workshops which were approved by the State Government, (ii)Department of State Government or Central Government which has its own large automobile workshop, (iii) a corporation which has its own large workshop and (iv) workshops of authorised dealers of heavy/light vehicles manufacturers where repairs and overhauling are carried on, could be considered as large automobile workshops. The appellant considered the application of the respondent with reference to the said guidelines and found that working at Zaheer Engineering Works could not be considered as practical experience as it as not a large automobile workshop. As a result UPPSC rejected the application of the respondent on the ground that he did not have the prescribed experience.

11. We therefore dismiss this appeal as having no merit. The appellant shall declare respondent's result as selected. We make it clear that our decision will not affect any other rejection by the UPPSC which has attained finality. 6 C.A.No.2843/2005
Kakadia Builders Pvt Ltd vs Income Tax Officer Ward 1(3)

3. In order to appreciate the issue involved in these appeals, it is necessary to set out a few relevant facts infra.

4. The appellants herein are the respondents (assessee) and the respondents (Revenue) herein are the petitioners in the petitions(SCAs) before the High Court out of which these appeals arise.

5. The appellant in S.L.P. No.21139/2017 is a Private Limited Company and the appellant in SLP No.21140/2017 is the promoter Director of the said Company. On 19.01.1994, a search and seizure operation was carried out in the premises of the appellants (assessee) under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” ).

6. During pendency of the assessment proceedings, which were initiated for determination of the tax liability as a result of search and seizure operation, the appellants on 12.03.1996 and 03.09.1996 filed the settlement applications before 2 the Settlement Commission and offered to settle their tax matter in accordance with the procedure provided under Chapter XIXA of the Act.

7. On 11.08.2000, the Settlement Commission passed an order under Section 245D(4) of the Act. By the said order, the Settlement Commission made certain additions and waived interest chargeable under Sections 234A, 234 B and 234C of the Act.

8. The appellants (assessee) felt aggrieved and filed rectification applications before the Settlement Commission on 29.12.2000 for amending its order dated 11.08.2000. The Revenue (Commissioner of Income Tax) also felt aggrieved by the order dated 11.08.2000 and filed a rectification application under Section 154 of the Act before the Settlement Commission on 26.07.2002.

9. By order dated 11.10.2002, the Settlement Commission dismissed the applications filed by the appellants(assessee) and partly allowed the 3 application filed by the respondents(Revenue) rectifying its order dated 11.08.2000 insofar as it pertained to waiver of interest, which was granted to the appellants (assessee). The appellants(assessee) felt aggrieved by the order dated 11.10.2002 passed by the Settlement Commission and filed two separate petitions (SCA Nos.15097 and 15101 of 2004) in the High Court of Gujarat.

27. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court and the order dated 11.08.2000 passed by the Settlement Commission in Settlement Application Nos.10/S/095/95­96/IT & 10/S/029/95­96/IT are set aside.

28. We, however, make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the issue while having formed an opinion to remand the case to the Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission will accordingly decide the matter uninfluenced by any observations made by this Court. Let the matter be decided by the Settlement Commission within six months from the date of this order.

March 05, 2019.
Mula Devi & Anr vs State Of Uttarakhand

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

A-4. He inspected the spot, took the dead body in his possession, prepared the inquest report (Ext. A -2) and other necessary papers including sketch of the dead body (Ext. A -6), police form No. 13 (Ext. A-7), sample of seal (Ext. A-8). He also prepared the site plan (Ext. A-5). The dead body was sent for postmortem examination. Dr. P.P. Raturi (P.W.7) Medical Officer, Narendra Nagar conducted the autopsy on the dead body of Puola Devi on 01.06.1990, at 10:00 A.M., and prepared the postmortem examination report (Ext. A-11). The cause of death in the opinion of the Medical Officer was asphyxia as a result of ante mortem strangulation. He also found postmortem burn injuries. Subsequently, the investigation was taken up by, Bachchan Singh (P.W.6), Patwari, who further interrogated the witnesses and arrested the accused persons. After completion of the investigation, he submitted charge sheet (Ext.A -10) against all the three accused for their trial in respect of the offences punishable under Section 302 and 201 IPC.

17. Circumstances referred to by the trial court and the abrupt conclusions arrived at by the trial court and the High Court does not justify the conviction of the appellants. Therefore, conviction cannot be maintained and is set aside. The appellants be set at liberty forthwith unless required to be in custody in any other case.

18. Appeal is allowed.
N. Ranga Rao And Sons vs State Of Karnataka And Ors

3. The appellant is the manufacturer of branded agarabathis having its manufacturing unit at Mysore. It causes entry of various raw materials into the local area of Mysore. For the Assessment Years 1986-87 to 1989-90, the Assessing Officer ("AO") passed an order of assessment levying tax on all the items imported into the local area of Mysore. According to the appellant, packing material was not to be taxed as raw material. This was not accepted by the AO. Aggrieved by the said decision, an appeal was filed. The Appellate Authority excluded the packing material from taxation. The decision of the Appellate Authority was delivered on 28.3.1992. On 20.5.1996 a show cause notice was given to the appellant-assessee by the Additional Commissioner under Section 15(1) stating that, upon scrutiny of the records, he found the order dated 28.3.1992 to be erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue for the reason that as per serial No. 16-A of the Schedule to the 1979 Act, packing material was liable to be taxed @ 2%, which has not been noticed by the First Appellate Authority and, therefore, it had committed an error in setting aside the tax levied by the AO on the value of packing material. In the circumstances, the Additional Commissioner called upon the assessee to show cause as to why the order of the First Appellate Authority should not be set aside and restore the Assessment Order levying tax on the value of packing materials. In the show cause notice, the Additional Commissioner stated that the order of the First Appellate Authority was examined on 16.3.1996 and, therefore, the revision proceedings were within time.

8. Before concluding, we may state that, as discussed above, the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979 prescribed limitation for initiation of proceedings, it also prescribed limitation for completion of proceedings unlike some other Acts under which the limitation prescribed was only in respect of completion of proceedings. We do not wish to comment about those provisions/enactments. Our present judgment is confined strictly to the 1979 Act herein.

9. For the aforestated reasons, we find no infirmity in the impugned judgment of the Karnataka High Court and accordingly the civil appeal filed by the assessee stands dismissed with no order as to costs. As regards the merits of the case, we express no opinion as the same have not been argued before us.
Jeet Singh & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors

3. The High Court dismissed the petition as it was of the view that though the stay granted, in CWP No. 6687 of 1998, was vacated on 23rd July, 2002, the said order was communicated to the Land Acquisition Collector on 27th March, 2003 and, therefore, the award was made within the period prescribed in Section 11A of the Act.

4. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the petition and a review petition, which was filed subsequently, these appeals have been filed by the claimants whose lands have been acquired.

23. For the aforestated reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.