L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Gulab Chand Pukhraj vs R.B. Jinender Raj & Anr

3. The appellant is a tenant of the premises bearing No.7-2- 764 situated at Pot Market, Secunderabad, Andhra Pradesh. The respondents are the co-owners of two non-residential premises bearing Municipal Houses Nos.7-2-763 and 7-2-764 situated at Pot Market, Secunderabad. These two non- residential premises fell to their share by virtue of the `Will' executed by their father. The respondent landlords have been conducting the business in one shop only. The First respondent has been carrying on business of money lending in a portion of the premises 7-2-763 and the second respondent has been conducting a business in jewellery in the remaining portion of the same shop. It was the case of the second respondent that he required the premises (shop) in question from the tenant for starting the business exclusively for jewellery in a separate shop.

4. The respondent landlords filed a claim petition before the Rent Controller in R.C. No.231 of 1994 under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 [hereinafter referred to as "the 1960 Act") seeking eviction of the appellant tenant from the scheduled 3 premises namely 7-2-764 situated at Pot Market, Secunderabad.

6. The parties led evidence before the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller after recording the evidence held that the landlords are the joint owners of non-residential premises bearing nos.7-2-763 and 7-2-764. However, the landlords are in possession of only one shop in the premises bearing no.7-2-

17. Consequently, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and remit the matter to the Rent Controller for considering the objection of the tenant as well as the claim of the landlords. The Rent Controller may permit the parties to lead additional evidence.

18. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we deem it appropriate to request the concerned Rent Controller to decide the case as expeditiously as possible. We direct the parties to bear their own costs.

August 27, 2009.
Cce, Mumbai vs Rdc Concrete (India) Private Limited

It is the case of the appellant that the aforestated final order dated 4th November, 2008 passed by the CESTAT has been rectified in pursuance of the application filed by the respondent herein. The case of the appellant, in this appeal, is that under the garb of rectification, the CESTAT has modified its order dated 4th November, 2008 in such a way as if the respondent asessee had filed an appeal against the said order and the CESTAT has virtually allowed the appeal against its own order.

7. Coming to details, as to how the CESTAT exceeded its jurisdiction, the learned counsel narrated the facts in a nutshell. He submitted that the respondent-company is a manufacturer of `Unipaved Interlocking Concrete Blocks' (pavers), being excisable goods falling under chapter 68 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. In pursuance of 5 specific information received by the Department of Central Excise with regard to evasion of duty by the respondent, officers of the Head Quarters (Preventive) Wing had given a surprise visit to the factory premises of the respondent on 13th February, 2002 and had checked the company's record and recorded statements of its officers. In pursuance of investigation, it was found that the pavers manufactured by the respondent were valued by the respondent at Rs.250/- per sq. mtr. and accordingly excise duty was paid thereon. The said pavers were sold by the respondent to a related person or its inter-connected company - M/s. Unitech Ltd. (UTL) for Rs.531/- per sq. mtr. and thereafter UTL was selling the same for Rs.826.50 per sq. mtr. to Senorita Builders Pvt. Ltd. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the goods manufactured by the respondent were shown at a substantially low value only for the purpose of evasion of excise duty.

22. For the aforestated reasons, we are of the view that the CESTAT exceeded its powers and it tried to re-appreciate the evidence and it reconsidered its legal view taken earlier in pursuance of a rectification application. In our opinion, the CESTAT could not have done so while exercising its powers under Section 35C(2) of the Act, and, therefore, the impugned order passed in pursuance of the rectification application is bad in law and, therefore, the said order is hereby quashed and set aside. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

..............................................J. (ANIL R. DAVE) New Delhi August 9, 2011.
V.R. Sudhakara Rao & Ors vs T.V. Kameswari

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Since the subject matter of both the suits was one and the same, the suits were disposed of by a common judgment after recording the evidence of PW-l to PW-3, DW-l to DW-3 and after making Exs.A-l to A-3 and Exs.B-l to B-5 and the Court of first instance had believed the oral agreement of sale and had decreed the suit, O.S.No.350/82 and had dismissed the other suit filed for possession and other reliefs i.e. O.S.No. 131/82, and as already stated supra, Thangirala Venkata Avadhani was examined as PW and subsequent thereto since he died the legal representative T.A.Kameswari was brought on record and aggrieved by the said common judgment and the decree made therein the appellant had preferred appeals before the High Court and since the subject matter was considered to be one and the same, both the appeals were disposed of by the High Court by the common judgment which is assailed in the present appeals.

The plaintiff is not entitled for any relief whatsoever.

These conclusions on fact do not appear to be in any way unsustainable and on the other hand are in line with the applicable legal principles. That being so, the appeals are sans merit, deserve dismissal which we direct. No costs.
Mahesh Kumar Joshi vs Madan Singh Negi

4. The respondent-plaintiff filed suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “the Code”) on 4 th November, 2009 seeking a decree for Rs.3 lacs with costs and interest alleging that the appellant-defendant gave two cheques for Rs.3 lacs towards purchase price of Plot No.71-A, measuring 233 sq. yard situated in Ram Park Extension Colony, being Khasra No.196(Main), village Loni, District Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh which were dishonoured inspite of plaintiff having executed the requisite documents and handed over peaceful vacant possession of the plot in question. Though the summons were duly served on the wife of the appellant on 19th December, 2009, the appellant failed to enter appearance within ten days on which the trial Court passed the ex-parte decree on 24th February, 2010.

11. After due consideration, we are of the view that a debatable issue does arise for consideration and it will be fair and just to give the appellant an opportunity to contest the suit subject to the appellant depositing the entire amount claimed in the suit but without interest or costs, i.e. Rs.3 lacs.

Page 4 Civil Appeal No. of 2015 @ SLP (C) No.11191 of 2013 In pursuance of interim order dated 8 th March, 2013, the appellant claims to have deposited 50% of the decretal amount before the trial Court. On depositing the rest of the amount to make up the deficit of Rs.3 lacs within six weeks from today, the decree will stand set aside and the appellant will be entitled to leave to defend. The deposit will abide by further order of the trial Court.

12. We are conscious of the fact that setting aside of ex- parte decree under Order XXXVII Rule 4 of the Code cannot be allowed in routine and special circumstances are required to be established. However, the expression “special circumstances” has to be construed having regard to the individual fact situations. The Court has to balance the equities and while safeguarding the interest of the plaintiff, appropriate conditions can be laid down if the defendant makes out a debatable case which may prime facie show injustice if the ex-parte decree was not set aside. As already observed, in the present case, it will be in the interests of justice that the ex-parte decree is set aside but the interest of the plaintiff is safeguarded by the deposit of the amount in Page 5 Civil Appeal No. of 2015 @ SLP (C) No.11191 of 2013 question by the defendant as a condition precedent for setting aside the decree.

13. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in the above terms. It is made clear that we have not expressed any final opinion on merits and the trial Court will be free to take decision in the matter without being bound by the observations made in this order which are only for deciding this appeal.
You One Engineering And Construction ... vs National Highways Authority Of India ...

4. After the contract had been partially executed, certain disputes arose between the parties as a result of which the respondent gave a notice of termination of contract on 21.12.2004 invoking Clause 63.5 of the General Conditions & Conditions of Particular Application of the Contract Agreement dated 23.5.2001. We are not really concerned with the reasons for termination or as to their correctness or otherwise, since that was precisely the dispute between the parties. The petitioners by their reply dated 10.3.2005, controverted the right of the respondent to terminate the contract and maintained that the termination of the contract was illegal. By a letter dated 24.5.2005, the petitioners issued a notice of Arbitration to the respondent stating that "a dispute with respect to the illegal and arbitrary termination of the captioned contract and payment of consequential damages to us from NHAI have arisen between NHAI and us" and that the petitioner had appointed Mr. Justice A.K. Srivastava, a retired Judge of the High Court of Delhi, as their nominee arbitrator. By a letter dated 16.6.2005, the respondent-NHAI appointed Shri Bageshwar Prasad as its nominee arbitrator. Although the two arbitrators met once on 26.6.2005 for appointment of the third/Presiding Arbitrator, they were unable to agree on the choice of the presiding arbitrator. Since Justice Srivastava insisted on appointment of a retired Judge who was senior to him to which there was no response from Shri Bageshwar Prasad. On 6th July 2005, Shri Bageshwar Prasad, the nominee arbitrator of the respondent, intimated the respondent that he and Shri Justice Srivastava could not reach upon a consensus with regard to the choice of the presiding arbitrator and requested the respondent to move the Indian Road Congress (IRC) for appointment of the presiding arbitrator. On 20.7.2005, the respondent wrote to the IRC requesting for nominating the presiding arbitrator. On 29.8.2005, the IRC addressed a letter to the petitioners calling upon the petitioners to pay Rs. 12,500/- as their share of the processing fee which was charged to the parties for appointment of the presiding arbitrator. On 14.9.2005, the IRC addressed a letter to the respondent informing it about the appointment of Shri E.V. Narayanan, resident of 17, Raja Nagar, Neelangarai, Chennai - 600 017, as Presiding Arbitrator. Interestingly, in the said letter it was further slated: "It may be mentioned that IRC shall not be responsible for the conduct of Shri E.V. Narayanan during the Arbitral proceedings in the above dispute".

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11. In the result, I find the petitions to be without merit, the petitions are hereby dismissed.
Uco Bank & Anr vs Rajinder Lal Capoor

However, on 18.05.2007 when the judgment was to be delivered, a prayer was made to defer the pronouncement of the judgment so as to enable the appellants to place the regulations. The said prayer was declined and the judgment was pronounced. It is in the aforementioned factual backdrop, this review petition has been filed.

(f) An officer employee whose services are terminated under sub-regulation (a) above shall be paid Gratuity, Provident Fund including employer's contribution and all other dues that may be admissible to him as per rules not withstanding the years of service rendered.

regulation (a) above by preferring an appeal within 15 days to the Board of Directors of the Bank. If the appeal is allowed, the order under sub-

(e) Where an officer employee whose services have been terminated and who has been paid an amount of three months emoluments in lieu of notice and on appeal his termination is cancelled, the amount paid to him in lieu of notice shall be adjusted against the salary that he would have earned, had his services not been terminated and he shall continue the Bank's employment on same terms and conditions as if the order of termination had not been passed at all.

(Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, (2007) at pg. 87)

Unless and until, therefore, a charge sheet is drawn up, a disciplinary proceedings for the purpose of the 1976 Regulations cannot be initiated.

25. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where we should exercise our jurisdiction.

26. This petition is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
Anil Jain vs Cit

2. On 7-2-2001, appellants herein invested a sum of Rs. one crore for purchasing units of J.M. Mutual Fund. For the said purpose they invested a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs and borrowed the rest of the amount, namely, Rs. 95 lakhs. On 10-2-2001, dividend of Rs. 29,03,225 was declared. On 11-2-2001, they sold the units for Rs. 68,25,806. They stated to have incurred a loss of Rs. 1,50,771.

4. In view of the order proposed to be passed by us, it is not necessary to take into consideration all the contentions raised before us. We may, however, notice that although the Tribunal has proceeded on the premise that the transaction in question was a genuine one, the High Court in its order opined that there was no genuine business transaction and that no loss as projected was incurred by the assessee.

7. In view of the judgment of this Court in G. Venkataswami Naidu & Co.s case (supra) one of the tests which is applicable for the purpose of arriving at a finding whether the transaction was "profit and gains from business" or "adventure in the nature of trade" is that similar operation which was similar to the one carried out by the assessee would be a relevant factor. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if the judgment of the High Court as also of the Tribunal are directed to be set aside and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal for consideration of the matter afresh for consideration of that aspect of the matter. We, however, make it clear that it would be open to the parties to raise all other contentions before the Tribunal.

8. The appeals are allowed with the aforementioned observations. No costs.
M/S. Bangalore Club vs Commissioner Of Income Tax & Anr

3. The facts necessary for the purpose of appreciating the controversy involved in the appeal are as follows:

25. This brings us to the facts of the present case. As aforesaid, the assessee is an AOP. The concerned banks are all corporate members of the club. The interest earned from fixed deposits kept with non- member banks was offered for taxation and the tax due was paid. Therefore, we are required to examine the case of the assessee, in relation to the interest earned on fixed deposits with the member banks, on the touchstone of the three cumulative conditions, enumerated above.

33. In our opinion, unlike the aforesaid surplus amount itself, which is exempt from tax under the doctrine of mutuality, the amount of interest earned by the assessee from the afore-noted four banks will not fall within the ambit of the mutuality principle and will therefore, be exigible to Income-Tax in the hands of the assessee-club.

34. In light of the afore-going discussion, these appeals are bereft of any merit and are thus, liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, we dismiss all the appeals with costs.
Rajasthan State Tpt Corpn. & Anr vs Bajrang Lal

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

B. After considering the report, the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 5.8.1988 passed order of punishment of removal from the service. The respondent filed a Civil Suit on 2.9.1988 challenging the order of removal alleging that he was not supplied with the documents referred to in the chargesheets, nor was given the enquiry report nor other documents. More so, the quantum of punishment was disproportionate to the proved delinquency.

17. With all respect, we do not agree with such a conclusion reached by the High Court, as Second Appeal, in exceptional circumstances, can be entertained on pure questions of fact. There is no prohibition for the High Court to entertain the Second Appeal even on question of fact where factual findings are found to be perverse.

20. In view of the above, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent employee, that the punishment of removal from service is disproportionate to the delinquency is not worth acceptance. The only punishment in case of the proved case of corruption is dismissal from service.

21. As a result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments of the courts below are set aside and the order of removal from service passed by the Disciplinary Authority is restored. No order as to costs.
Everest Advertising Pvt. Ltd vs State, Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi & Ors

On the said complaint petitions and upon recording the initial deposition of the complainant and its witnesses under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by an order dated 24.07.1999, processes were directed to be issued by the learned Magistrate against the accused persons in terms of Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

An application was filed by them for recalling the processes so issued. By an order dated 11.07.2001, the learned Magistrate recalled the said order dated 24.07.1999 issuing summons against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Criminal Miscellaneous applications were filed by the Company thereagainst before the High Court. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said applications have been dismissed by the High Court holding:

[See also N.K. Wahi v. Shekhar Singh & Others 2007 (4) SCALE 188] The law operating in this behalf is, therefore, no longer res integra. What is, therefore, necessary is the application of law. Necessary ingredients of Section 141 have been stated in the complaint petition at more than one place. Whether the same satisfies the requirements of law or not is the question.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
Kailash @ Tanti Banjara vs State Of M.P

2. According to the prosecution on 11.4.1991 the victim P.W.4, an agricultural labourer was in the field of Moti Singh Darbar and loading the wheat on the vehicle. After the field work, she was proceeding to her village which was 1½ miles away. The appellant was following P.W.4 who was proceeding alongwith minor girl Manju, aged 10 years in his motorcycle. On the way, P.W.4 suffered thorn bite in her foot and while she was removing the thorn, Manju left her and proceeded towards her home. Taking advantage of the lonliness of P.W.4, the appellant stated to have grabbed her hand against her will, took her near the bushes at Kauve near the drain and had forcible sexual intercourse for about ½ an hour. According to the victim P.W.4, sexual intercourse was carried out by the appellant near the drain and again after taking her to his house under the threat of knife point and performed the same evil act in the house also. Subsequently at about 3.00 in the midnight, he took her in his motorcycle and dropped near the community well and after threatening her at knife point that if she reveal any of the act committed by him, she would kill her, left that place. P.W.4 felt humiliated and having ashamed of loss of modesty, jumped into the community well while the appellant stated to have fled away from that place. Though P.W.4 jumped into the well, according to her, she was able to grab the rope which was present inside the well and she cried for help. On hearing her distress call, the villagers stated to have turned up and rescued her. Thereafter, her father and grand father stated to have reached that place whereafter she was taken to her house and after change of cloth she went to the Police Station and lodged the FIR.

7 + 6

8. When we apply the above principles laid down by this Court with particular reference to the consideration made by the trial court in paragraph 14, the evidence of doctor P.W.2 as well as the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in paragraph 9, we are convinced with the conclusion that P.W.4 was in the age group of 13/14 years. Once the said conclusion cannot be altered the sexual intercourse indulged in by the appellant was with the consent of P.W.4 will be of no consequence. Having regard to the above said conclusion, we do not find any scope to find fault with the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court as confirmed by the High Court in the impugned judgment in this appeal.

The appeal lacks merit and the same is dismissed.

April 10, 2013.
Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors

2. Since its enactment in 1999, it has found favour with the law enforcement officials and has been enthusiastically applied wherever possible by the law enforcement agencies and the concerned Government.

41.We find no merit in the contention that the MCOCA, in any way, deals with punishing insurgency directly. We are of the considered view that the legislation only deals with "insurgency" indirectly only to bolster the definition of "organized crime".

65.We therefore, for the reasons mentioned above, concur with the final decision reached by the High Court in the impugned judgment and repel the challenge unhesitatingly.

66.The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed. No Costs.

67.By a separate Judgment pronounced today, the three connected Civil Appeals being C.A. Nos. 1975-1977 of 2008 have been dismissed.