L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Bhupinder Singh & Ors vs Jarnail Singh & Anr

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.] "167 Cr.PC: Procedure when investigation can not be completed in twenty four houses.-

It would be appropriate if original photographs relied upon are filed along with the report under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C., and can be taken back with permission of the Court to be produced as and when required. Alternatively, the zerox copies can be filed along with a certificate that they can be compared with the originals, as and when so directed by the Court.

A residuary plea was taken by Mr. D.K. Garg, learned counsel for the appellant that the bail was granted on 11.2.2005 and was cancelled on 10.11.2005. It is stated that there is no allegation against that the appellant had misused the liberty of bail from the date of grant of bail upto the date of cancellation or thereafter as the order of cancellation has been stayed. At the stage of consideration of the bail application in terms of Section 167(2) there was no consideration on the merits of the case. Let the appellants surrender forthwith to custody. It is, however, open to them to move for bail which shall be considered in its own perspective. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits. The appeal is allowed.
Radhy Shyam(D)Thr. Lrs & Ors vs State Of U.P.& Ors

4. Since the appellants' land was also included in the notification, they made a representation to the Chairman-cum-Chief Executive Officer of the Development Authority (Respondent No.4) with copies to the Chief Minister, Principal Secretary, Housing and Urban Development, U.P., the 3 District Magistrate and the Special Officer, Land Acquisition, Gautam Buddh Nagar with the request that their land comprised in Khasra No.394 may not be acquired because they had raised construction 30-35 years ago and were using the property for abadi/habitation. The concerned functionaries/authorities did not pay heed to the request of the appellants and the State Government issued notification dated 19.11.2008 under Section 6 read with Section 9 of the Act.

7. The High Court negatived the appellants' challenge at the threshold mainly on the ground that the averments contained in the petition were not supported by a proper affidavit. This is evident from the following portions of the impugned order:

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied) 53

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied) 58

acquisition of land of village Makora.

(f) Numerous reputed and leading industrial units of the country want to invest in the State of Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, it is 70 extremely urgent and necessary that land is acquired immediately.

(g) If land is not made available to the incoming leading and reputed industrial concerns of the country, then they will definitely establish their units in other States and if this happens, then it will adversely affect employment opportunities in the State and will also go against the investment policy of the Government.

(h) If written/oral objections are invited from the farmers and are scrutinized, then it will take unprecedented long time and disposal thereof will hamper planned development of the area.

62. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellants is allowed. Respondent No.1 is directed to pay cost of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the appellants for forcing unwarranted litigation on them. It is, however, made clear that the respondents shall be free to proceed from the stage of Section 4 notification and take appropriate action after complying with Section 5-A(1) and (2) of the Act. It is needless to say if the appellants' feel aggrieved by the fresh exercise undertaken by the State Government then they shall be free to avail appropriate legal remedy.

April 15, 2011.
Bhavya Apparels Private Limited & Anr vs Union Of India & Anr

4. We may notice that in the earlier round of litigation when a statement was made before the High Court that the Tribunal may hear the appeal on merit without asking the appellant to make any pre-deposit, it was asked to make that prayer before the Tribunal. Pursuant thereto an application was filed. The Tribunal in terms of its order dated 14.01.2004 opined:

5. A writ application filed by the appellants questioning the correctness of the said order has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.

16. The Constitution Bench, therefore, was of the opinion that such a condition would be onerous and, thus, arbitrary if a suitor is required to deposit such an amount at the initial stage and not at the appellate stage.

17. We are not oblivious that the taxing statute must be strictly construed. [See Manish Maheshwari v. Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax and Anr. 2007 (3) SCALE 627 and Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector and E.T.I.O. and Ors., 2007 (7) SCALE 392] We are also not oblivious of the fact that only because the word "shall" is used, the same may not be construed to be imperative in character.

18. In view of our findings aforementioned, the matter, in our opinion, requires reconsideration at the hands of the Tribunal. The Tribunal failed to take into consideration the limitation of its jurisdiction under Section 129E which emanates from the custody of the goods and as a part of the goods is in the custody of the Revenue and furthermore in view of the fact that the High Court instead of considering the question as to whether direction to deposit the amount would cause undue hardship or not has gone into the merit of the matter, the interest of justice would be subserved if the impugned judgments are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal for consideration of the matter afresh. We direct accordingly. We would request the Tribunal to consider the desirability of disposing of the matter as early as possible.

20. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. No costs.
Sri Marcel Martins vs M. Printer & Ors

4. While answering the first question, the High Court referred to the evidence on record including the deposition of witnesses especially Respondent No.1 (PW-2) who had played a dominant role in obtaining the sale deed from the Corporation. This witness had stated that each one of the children had contributed Rs.5000/- whereas the rest of the amount was paid by their father Sri. C.F. Martins to make a total of Rs.48,636/- demanded by the Corporation towards the sale consideration for the premises. She also stated that the said amount was paid by a demand draft obtained from her and her husband’s joint account which fact was certified even by the bank in terms of Ex.P.2, a letter stating that the bank draft in question had been issued by debit to the account jointly held by her and her husband. The original sale deed was also in possession of the said witness as was the possession of the suit property. She had further stated that the amount of Rs.35,636/- transferred to her account in November, 1986 had been paid by their father alone and not jointly by the defendant-appellant and their father as alleged by the former.

27. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.
M/S Periyar & Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd vs State Of Kerala

3. The brief facts of the case are stated hereunder:-

Thus, looked at from any point of view, the question of payment of interest subsequent to 19-9-2001 does not arise.”

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 29463-29466/2012) M/S PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. ... APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF KERALA ...RESPONDENT(S) COMMON ORDER In view of divergence of opinion in terms of separate judgments pronounced by us in these appeals today, the Registry is directed to place the papers before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for appeals being assigned to an appropriate Bench.
Anil Ritolla @ A.K. Ritolia vs State Of Bihar & Anr

2. Parties hereto admittedly had been carrying on commercial transactions. Appellant herein was an authorised dealer of Hindustan Lever Limited. In connection with the said business transactions, appellant allegedly was required to deliver to the second respondent Form IX-C prescribed in terms of Bihar Sales Tax Rules. The Second respondent herein filed a complaint petition alleging commission of offence under Section 427, 384 and 420/34 of the Indian Penal Code, inter alia, holding :

3. A Judicial Magistrate, Madhepura, upon examining the complaint on oath and upon taking statements of the witnesses purported to have found existence of a prima facie case for taking cognizance under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellants herein. Summons were directed to be issued. They filed an application for quashing of the said criminal proceedings before the High Court of Judicature at Patna in terms of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By reason of the impugned judgment, a learned Single Judge of the said Court dismissed the said petition opining :

It is not a case where the appellants can be said to have induced the respondent to enter into a transaction so as to deceive them with a view to cause unlawful losses to them and to make unlawful gain for themselves.

12. For the reasons aforementioned, in our opinion, the High Court has committed an error in not interfering with the order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Harichand (Dead) Through Lrs vs Dharampal Singh Baba & Ors

Both the issues were decided in favour of Defendant No.1 and she was entitled to receive the rent from the State Government for the suit premises. This decision of the trial court was eventually affirmed in the second appeal and a finding was recorded that Bapu Bhaiya Temak was her agent only and entitled to receive the rent for the suit premises which belonged to Janki Bai. In order to come to this finding the High Court in second appeal relied on a decision of the Council of Regency. That suit came to an end after the finding given in second appeal. The present suit was filed in 1964. In this suit, the plaintiff- Shiv Singh challenged the sale deed dated 10.1.1963 that the same be declared not binding on the plaintiff- Shiv Singh and the respondents be injuncted permanently from interfering with the plaintiff's ownership and possession of the premises covered by the sale deed. The sale deed was executed by defendant No.2- Janki Bai and that binds her. She died during the trial of the suit and her adopted son was impleaded as respondent No.2. This suit was decreed by the trial court and aggrieved against this suit, the present appeal was filed by the legal representatives of defendant Janki Bai.

6. Consequently, we are of opinion that the view taken by learned Single Judge of the High Court is correct and there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi & Ors vs Uoi & Anr

comply with the order for payment of the compensation amount, failing which it was directed that the appellants would be entitled to 6.5% interest per annum on the award amount from the date of default.

6. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court took the view that even though the interest for the prior period had not been awarded, the Tribunal had awarded interest in case of default in compliance with the order for deposit of the compensation amount. The High Court was of the view that since the Tribunal had applied its mind while making the order and since awarding interest is the discretion of the Tribunal, there was no ground to admit the appeal only on the question of interest. The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the present appeal has been filed by the claimants, namely, the heirs of Kunhi Moosa against the order of the High Court.

Explanation II.-For the purposes of this section, a transaction is a commercial transaction, if it is connected with the industry, trade or business of the party incurring the liability.] (2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest 3[on such principal sum] from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit therefore shall not lie."

16. It is, therefore, clear that the Court, while making a decree for payment of money is entitled to grant interest at the current rate of interest or contractual rate as it deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged to be payable and/or awarded, from the date of claim or from the date of the order or decree for recovery of the outstanding dues. There is also hardly any room for doubt that interest may be claimed on any amount decreed or awarded for the period during which the money was due and yet remained unpaid to the claimants.

24. In our view, both the Tribunal, as also the High Court, were wrong in not granting any interest whatsoever to the appellants, except by way of a default clause, which is contrary to the established principles relating to payment of interest on money claims.

25. We, therefore, allow the appeal and modify the order of the High Court dated 24.5.2007 affirming the order of the Trial Court and direct that the awarded sum will carry interest @6% simple interest per annum from the date of the application till the date of the Award and, thereafter, at the rate of 9% per annum till the date of actual payment of the same.

26. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. The respondents shall pay the costs of this proceeding to the appellants assessed at Rs.25,000/-.
Union Of India & Ors vs M/S Neelam Engineering & Contruction Co

4. On 18th February, 1998, the Court directed the Arbitrator to file the Award in Court. When the matter was listed for hearing on 27th May, 1998, the Court recorded that reply had been received to the objection petition which had been filed and that the original arbitration file had been received from the Arbitrator. The case was, therefore, adjourned till 27th July, 1998, for filing rejoinder. After considering the application made by the Respondent under Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and the objection filed by the Appellant, the Civil Court rejected the said objection by holding that since the objection had been filed prior to filing of the Award, the same was premature and could not be taken note of and further that the objection had been filed beyond the period of limitation as 4 prescribed under Article 119 of the Limitation Act. The Civil Court accordingly allowed the Appellants' application under Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and ordered that the Award dated 27th January, 1996, be made a Rule of Court, and granted interest at the rate of 18% per annum thereupon from the date of order till realization.

7. Aggrieved by the order of the Appeal Court, the Appellants filed a Civil Revision in the High Court. However, the said Civil Revision was dismissed by the High Court as per the order impugned in this appeal.

15. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the Appellants and though they appear to be attractive, we are unable to accept the same.

19. We, therefore, have no option, but to dismiss the appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

_____________J.

(ALTAMAS KABIR) _____________J.

(CYRIAC JOSEPH) New Delhi Dated:10.03.2010
Pal Singh & Anr vs State Of Punjab

B. In view thereof, the investigation ensued and after completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the five accused persons including the present two petitioners under Sections 148, 302/149 and 120-B IPC. The trial was concluded and the learned Sessions Court convicted all the five accused persons including these two petitioners vide judgment and order dated 16.11.2004 for the aforesaid offences and awarded different sentences including life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC.

C. Aggrieved, all the five accused persons preferred Criminal Appeals before the High Court. Accused Pal Singh @ Amarjit Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. D-14-DB of 2005 died during the pendency of the appeals. Thus, his appeal stood abated. Accused Sarabjit Singh and Gurdev Singh @ Manga had been acquitted of the charges under Sections 148 and 302 r/w 149 IPC and the appeal of the present petitioners had been dismissed, and therefore their conviction under Section 302 IPC and the sentences awarded by the trial court remained intact.

2) Diffuse swelling 6 cm x 6 cm on the top of head. Skull bones were fractured. Laceration of brain matter was present. Cranial cavity was full of blood.

14. In view of the above, we do not find any force in the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners on this count.

The special leave petition is dismissed accordingly.
Pazhassi Raja Chritable Trust & Anr vs Union Of India & Anr

2. This matter was mentioned yesterday when the Court directed it to be listed today as Item No.1. The petitioner claims to have produced a Malyalam film of national importance, called "PAZHASSI RAJA". Its purpose is to 2 enlighten people about the heroic life history of `SHRI KERALA VERMA PAZHASSI RAJA". For wider circulation the film has been dubbed into Hindi, Tamil and Telugu and English. It is said to have been widely acclaimed. The petitioner claims that inspite of the artistic and historic importance of the film, it has been arbitrarily not accepted for screening at the International Film Festival of India - 2009. Aggrieved against the wholly arbitrary conduct and actions of the selectors at the Film Festival, the petitioner has unsuccessfully approached the Kerala, as well, Delhi High Court.

14. We are unable to discern from the aforesaid any change in the criteria. We have however refrained from expressing any opinion on the same since the writ petition filed by the petitioner is pending adjudication before the High Court.

15. We may reiterate that the facts and circumstances in the present case were not such as to permit the petitioner to bypass the normal procedure of filing, Letters Patent Appeal 13 against the order of the learned Single Judge before approaching this Court by special leave petition.

16. In view of the aforesaid we decline to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. The special leave petition is dismissed.

.........................................J (TARUN CHATTERJEE) .............................................J (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR) NEW DELHI DECEMBER 02, 2009
Jitendra Ram @ Jitu vs State Of Jharkhand

He enquired thereabout; whereupon Fagua Mahto informed him that two oxen were taken by Jitendra Ram @ Jitu Harizan, the appellant herein for thrashing paddy. He went to the house of the accused, who denied to have taken the said two oxen. Lakhan Lohar (PW-13), however, at about 07.30 P.M. on the same evening informed Lal Ranvijay Nath Sahdeo (PW-8), the cousin of the first informant that the appellant herein sold the said oxen in the market to Sahban Ansari and Hanif Ansari, who examined themselves as PW-18 and PW-19 respectively. The appellant, however, denied the sale of two oxen to the said persons and threatened the first informant. Fagua Mahto went missing. When the first informant visited the house of Hanif Ansari and Sahban Ansari, he was informed that the appellant had taken away the said two oxen and kept his cycle as a security. On suspicion that something might have happened to Fagua Mahto, a search was made and the appellant was brought to the school of the village. He was interrogated, whereupon he is said to have confessed to have murdered Fagua Mahto and concealed his dead body in a pit of 'Chamautha River Tetardaht'. Acting on the basis of the said statement of the appellant about 100 villagers are said to have reached the place of occurrence where the dead body of the said Fagua Mahto was allegedly concealed by the appellant. The appellant was thereafter handed over to Mukhia Lal Gopal Nath Sahdeo, who examined himself as PW-5. Before the said witness also the appellant is said to have confessed his guilt. A First Information Report was, thereafter, lodged. He in the trial eventually was found guilty.

The appeal preferred by him was also dismissed. He is, thus, before us.

The appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr. P.C. where his age was estimated to be 28 years. The said estimated age was recorded by the trial court again on 09.04.1999 being 28 years. In the judgment of the trial court again the aforementioned age was mentioned.

We with respect agree to the said approach.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that the determination of the age of the appellant as on the date of the commission of the offence should be done afresh by the learned Sessions Judge.

For the reasons aforementioned, this appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the learned Sessions Judge with a direction to consider the matter as regard the age of the appellant as on the date of commission of the offence and in the event, he is found to be a child and/or juvenile within the meaning of the Act and the Juvenile Justice Act to deal with the accused accordingly. If he is found not to have been a child as on the date of the commission of the offence, the present conviction will stand.
Sumit Tomar vs State Of Punjab

special barricading was set up by the police party at Basantpur Bus Stand, Patiala. At that time, the police party signaled to stop a silver colour Indica Car bearing No. DL-7CC-0654 which was coming from the side of Rajpura. The driver of the said car (appellant herein), accompanied with one Vikas Kumar (since deceased), who was sitting next to him, instead of stopping the car tried to run away, but the police party immediately blocked the way and managed to stop the car. On suspicion, the police checked the car and found two plastic bags containing ‘bhooki’ opium powder from the dickey of the said vehicle. The contents of both the bags were mixed and two samples of 250 gms. each were taken out. The remaining contraband weighing 69.50 kgs. was sealed in two bags and the samples were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for examination.

(ii) On the same day, i.e., 27.06.2004, a First Information Report (FIR) being No. 105 of 2004 was lodged by the police against the appellant herein and Vikas Kumar under Sections 8, 15, 60, and 61 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (in short “the NDPS Act”).

11) Taking note of all the materials, the evidence of official witnesses, PW-2, owner of the car which was involved in the offence, possession of commercial quantity, FSL report which shows that the contraband is poppy straw and is a prohibited item, we are in entire agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court. Further, taking note of the fact that the quantity involved is 70 kgs. of poppy straw which is more than a commercial quantity, the Special Judge rightly imposed minimum sentence and fine in terms of Section 15(c) of the NDPS Act. We are in agreement with the said conclusion.

12) In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeals, consequently, the same are dismissed.

OCTOBER 19, 2012.