L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Londhe Prakash Bhagwan vs Dattatraya Eknath Mane And Ors

4. The facts of the case are as follows :

Provided that, where such order was made before the appointed date, such appeal may be made within sixty days from the said date.

3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Tribunal may entertain an appeal made to it after the expiry of the said period of thirty or sixty days, as the case may be, if it is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period.

4) Every appeal shall be accompanied by a fee of [Five hundred] rupees, which shall not be refunded and shall be credited to the Consolidated Fund of the State.”

8. In these circumstances, we find it is difficult for us to uphold the decision of the High Court. We are sure that the said question of inordinate delay missed out from the mind of the court at the time of sending back the matter before the Tribunal. Accordingly, we set aside the order passed by the High Court, allow the appeal and affirm the order of the Tribunal.
M/S. Dilawari Exporters vs M/S. Alitalia Cargo & Ors

Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in this appeal are M/s Omni Marg Travels (Pvt.) Ltd., General Sales Agents and M/s Fourways Movers (P) Ltd., Cargo Clearing Agents of respondent No.1 respectively.

2.The salient facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:

14.In view of the afore-going discussion, we have no option but to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order. We order accordingly and remit the matter back to the Commission for fresh adjudication of the claim preferred by the appellant on merits. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

APRIL 16, 2010.
Bhola Nath vs Monika (D) Through Lrs. And Anr

The dispute between the parties relates to plot No. 66, admeasuring 45 ft. x 80 ft. total area 3600 sq.ft situated at Jawahar Nagar Extension Colony, Mauja Bhadeni Pargana Dehat, City Varanasi. As a dispute arose between petitioner and a cooperative society, the same was referred to arbitration. In the year 1981 an award was passed in favour of the petitioner. The arbitrator directed allotment of plot No. 6 in his favour. However, treating the said plot to be 66 (instead of plot No. 6) a sale deed was executed by the cooperative society in favour petitioner for plot No. 66. Another dispute arose between the respondent and the cooperative society in relation to award of a plot in her favour. In the award made in favour of the respondent, it was directed that any of the 3 plots namely, plot Nos. 66, 91 or 15 may be allotted in her favour. As the plot Nos. 91 and 15 were not available having been allotted to other members of the cooperative society, the respondent filed an execution application for allotment of the said plot No. 66 and execution of sale deed in her favour. In relation thereto, an objection filed by the petitioner herein has been dismissed. The revision petition filed thereagainst has also been dismissed.

Petitioner sought to rely upon the docrtine of lis pendens to contend that the said execution application was not maintainable. Before us copies of the original awards have been produced for the perusal. It appears that plot No. 6 was only directed to be allotted in favour of the petitioner. If in execution of the said award a sale deed in respect of plot No. 66 has been executed, the same was evidently done by mistake and, thus, the petitioner cannot take any advantage thereof. The remedy of the petitioner would, therefore, be to initiate an appropriate proceeding for giving effect to the award passed by the Arbitrator in his favour. The appeal is devoid of any merit and is, therefore, dismissed.

No costs.
Sujaben Manubhai Solanki And Ors vs Shivsangbhai Pursangbhai Solanki & Ors

2. In a partition suit filed by the respondents herein in the year 1987, a decree was passed in favour of the respondents on 20.11.1992. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order the father of the present appellants preferred a regular appeal in the High Court on 22.02.1993. He was the sole appellant. On 06.07.2002, the father of the appellants died when the matter was pending consideration before the High Court. This fact was brought to the notice of the High Court by the counsel for the respondents, and the High Court dismissed the First Appeal on 19.01.2005 as abated.

5. Taking an overall view of the facts into consideration and the fact that normally the parties should be given a liberty to contest the matter on merits unless there is a gross callous negligence or deliberate inaction with the parties to protect trial, we are of the view that the interest of justice would be sub-served if the legal representatives are brought on record and the First Appeal No.1233 of 1993 is restored to its original number by setting aside abatement. We order accordingly. The High Court will issue fresh notices to the respondents in First Appeal indicating the date of hearing of the matter. Keeping in view the fact that the matter is pending for a long time we would request the High Court to consider the desirability of disposing of the matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of 8 months from the date of receipt of the order.

6. This appeal stands disposed of.
Union Of India & Ors vs Dileep Kumar Singh

3. The facts giving rise to these appeals are as follows:-

4. Pursuant to an order modifying the stay application, by an order dated 1st July, 2011, the respondent was relieved from service and given invalidation pension as admissible under Rule 38 of the CCS (Pension) Rules of 1972. The respondent filed a second writ petition No.42101 of 2011 challenging the aforesaid order.

25. We now come to two other contentions raised by Mr. Mahabir Singh. According to him, the exemption notification dated 10th September, 2002 will not apply for the reason that the accident took place prior to 2002. It is clear that the exemption notification will apply to all cases in which an employee's services are dispensed with. The relevant date, therefore, is the date of dispensing with service and not the date on which the disability is incurred, for Section 47 prohibits an establishment from dispensing with the service of an employee who acquires disability during his service. Since service was dispensed with on 1st July, 2011 (that is long after the date of the exemption notification), the notification will, obviously, apply.

26. The plea of discrimination sought to be made by Mr. Mahabir Singh is based on an averment made in the reply affidavit on behalf of the petitioner (respondent herein) in the Supreme Court. The averment is as follows:

28. Apart from the plea of the disabled officers mentioned being vague, for no particulars are given as to the extent of their disability, the Union has made it clear that Standing Order No.7/99 will not apply and that since the job requirements demand a high level of fitness and ability CRPF is exempted from the provisions of Section 47 of the Act. Not only has this plea not been raised before the High Court, but the plea raised before us is lacking in particulars and has to be dismissed for this reason also.

29. We make it clear that the respondent, who has been occupying official accommodation, will vacate such accommodation by 30th June, 2015. Mr. Patwalia has assured us that, given the facts of this case, no penal charges will be collected from him till the date on which he vacates the said accommodation.

30. The appeals are, therefore, allowed. The judgment of the Allahabad High Court is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
Mayandi vs State Rep.By Insp.Of Police

The brief facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as under:

We have considered the reasons given by the High Court and also considered the evidence above referred.

In this background the High Court's assertion that the death was occasioned by complications on account of the injuries caused by the appellant is not quite accurate. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the case would fall within Section 326 of the IPC and not under Section 302 of the IPC thereof.

Mr. R. Sundravardan's argument that this matter would nevertheless fall within Section 304 Part-I or Part -II of the IPC, is also rejected as there was no intention on the part of appellant to cause the death of the deceased nor could he be attributed with the knowledge that death would be caused.

We accordingly partly allow this appeal, set aside the acquittal and conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC, and alter his conviction to one under Section 326 of the IPC and award a sentence of 10 years R.I. and a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default thereof, six months R.I. The sentence under the other provisions of the IPC is maintained.

The appeal is allowed in the above terms.

July 28, 2010.
Union Of India (Uoi) vs Munshi Ram (Dead) By Lrs. And Ors.

2. Notification under Section 4(1) read with Sub-section 1 of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was published on June 18, 1984. Land measuring 3609 Kanals and 16 marlas were sought to be acquired for extension of the Hissar Cantonement Area. By his award of 31st January, 1986 the Land Acquisition Collector categorised the lands into 5 categories and granted compensation at different rates for each category. A reference was made under Section 18 of the Act. The Reference Court by its award dated 23rd October, 1988 enhanced the compensation payable to the claimants. However, it divided the lands into only two categories, namely, block A and block B.

12. In the facts and circumstances of the case, these appeals are allowed and a direction is made to the Collector under the Act to redetermine the compensation payable to the respondents in accordance with the compensation awarded by the judgment and decree of this Court dated 29th April, 1997 and pay the same to the claimants within a period of three months from today.
Nahar Singh vs Food Corporation Of India & Ors

4. One Bhoop Singh was the unit in-charge of the godown. Appellant, Rattan Singh and one Kunwar Singh were working thereat as the Assistant Grades Clerk. Shortages in the said depots were suspected. The godowns were sealed. Physical verifications were made by Physical Verification Squad (PVS). Stock checking exercises were carried out in the said godown during the period 7.1.1980 to 22.1.1980. 295 bags of wheat and 195 bags of gunnies in Unit No.1 of which Bhoop Singh was the in-charge, were found short.

The contents of the vigilance report were verified by one Shri Panchhi. Apart from Bhoop Singh, Nahar Singh and Kunwar Singh were posted there. Shortages and excesses were found in 12 stacks of wheat. The total shortages were found to be 295 bags of wheat and the excess amounted to 11 bags only. Whereas shortages were found on the top layers of the stacks which were not visible from the ground, except Stack No.4/16 and 1/11, which were from partly used stacks.

The imputation of charges drawn against the appellant were on the basis of the report of the said inspection carried out by the vigilance department as also the one submitted by Shri I.d. Nautial, Assistant Manager (Vigilance) containing compilation of the statements made by the entire staff of the Food Storage Depot, Sahibabad. Appellant was found guilty of the charges on the basis of the report of the enquiry officer which was submitted before the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority, by an order dated 18.4.1986 imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement from services of the Corporation. A departmental appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed by the Appellate Authority in September 1986. A review application filed thereagaisnt was also dismissed on 22.11.1987.

8. We may notice that the special leave petition filed by Bhoop Singh has been dismissed summarily by an order dated 12.2.2007.

This is the statement of Shri H.S. Panchhi during cross examination by Shri Suraj Bhan, AM(D) and Shri Bhoop singh Unit In-

14. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the report of the enquiry officer cannot be said to be perverse or unreasonable. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority has been affirmed by the appellate authority. A review petition filed by the appellant has also been dismissed by the appropriate authority.. The High Court also, by reason of the impugned judgment, has also rightly refused to interfere in the matter.

15. We, keeping in view the materials placed before us, are of the opinion that no cause has been made out to differ with the said findings.

16. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed but with no order as to costs.
Meenaben Pankajkumar Joshi & Ors vs New India Assurance Co.Ltd

3. The deceased Raj Kumar Joshi was a Director of a Company commonly known as Kandla Clearing Agency Private Limited. He was drawing a salary of Rs.7,500/- per month. He was, however, also running a proprietorship concern carrying on business in `Clearing and Forwarding' in the name of Ultra Clearing and Forwarding Company.

Appellants filed a claim petition before the Tribunal claiming a sum of Rs.90 lakhs as compensation in respect of the death of the said Raj Kumar Joshi who died in a motor vehicle accident and with a view to prove their case, appellants, inter alia, filed income ta returns for the assessment years 1996-97 and 1997-98 disclosing the income from salary from the Directorship in Kandla Clearing Agency Private Limited at Rs.66,000/- and Rs.90,000/- respectively. The said returns were accompanied by a certificate issued by the Manager/Accountant of the Company. In the said income tax returns, a sum of Rs.12.73 lakhs was also shown as turnover of the business for eight months in respect of the said proprietorship concern. The Tribunal passed an award for a sum of Rs.49,25,000/- with proportionate costs and interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of claim petition till 3 December 2000 and thereafter at the rate of 9% per annum. Respondent No.1 herein preferred an appeal thereagainst before the High Court questioning the correctness of the said judgment and award.

8. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if the matter relating to award of compensation is considered afresh by the Tribunal upon taking additional documents placed before us as additional evidence. The claimants unless admit or formal proof thereof is dispensed with, may prove the said documents by examining witnesses. The respondents, it goes without saying, would be entitled to cross-examine the said witnesses produced on behalf of the appellants and would furthermore be entitled to examine their witnesses in this behalf. We make it clear that all other findings arrived at by the Tribunal and as modified by the High Court shall remain undisturbed.

9. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal with the aforementioned directions and observations. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.

August 7, 2009
State Of Bihar & Ors vs Ramesh Prasad Verma (Dead)Thr. Lrs

4. The facts, as construed to be germane for the adjudication, fall in a short compass and for the sake of brevity and convenience would be lifted from the appeal corresponding to SLP(C) No.3652 of 2010. To reiterate, nothing turns on the facts with fringe differences in the two appeals and in course of the arguments as well, no marked distinguishable features have been highlighted warranting individual analysis thereof.

5. The respondent had been granted a lease for 10 years from the year 1992 under the Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) and on the expiry of the term thereof, the same had not been renewed. The lease had been accorded to win pebbles (gutika) from the basin of Pandai river. The rate of royalty, as was fixed by the Notification dated 17.08.1991 initially at the commencement of the lease, stood revised thereafter on 29.08.1994. Eventually, by the aforementioned Notification dated 24.03.2001 ushering in the amendment to the Rules, amongst others the rate of royalty for “boulder, gravel, shingles, which is used for making chips”, was prescribed to be Rs.100/- per cubic meter. The relevant excerpt from Schedule II to the Rules qua the above Minerals is extracted herein below for ready reference :

7. Be that as it may, as the recorded facts demonstrate, demand notices dated 06.09.2001 and 29.11.2001 for the terms 01.04.2001 to July, 2001 and 01.07.2001 to October, 2001 for Rs. 28,80,079/- and Rs.16,75,353/-, followed in response whereto, the appellant deposited Rs.11 lakhs and Rs.8.5 lakhs correspondingly. At that stage, the Notification dated 26.12.2001 adverted to hereinabove, was issued by the Government of Bihar, Mines and Geological Department, to the effect that boulder, gravel, shingle found in the Districts of Rohtas and Bettiah are capable of being made into stone chips, for which the royalty would be payable @ Rs.100/- per cubic meter, as fixed by the Notification dated 24.03.2001 issued under Rule 26 of the Rules. The said Notification mentioned that the districts mentioned therein had been identified on the basis of a report of a team of experts constituted for the purpose. Pleaded facts are available to the effect that the State Government on 05.05.2001 had indeed constituted an Expert Committee to notify the areas in the basin of the Pandai river, wherefrom the above minerals, if extracted, would attract the royalty @ of Rs.100/- per cubic meter, as ordained by the Notification dated 24.03.2001.

17. No other interpretation would accord with the legislative intendment contained in Rule 26 as well as the objectives of the two Notifications.

22. The appeals are thus allowed. No costs.

JANUARY 31, 2017.
Podyami Sukada vs State Of M.P. (Now Chhatisgarh)

2. According to the prosecution, on 9th December, 1999 Madvi Pali, went to the house of Madvi Mase to borrow money and when she reached there, she found her dead. She informed PW.1, Madvi Rama about the incident. Madvi Rama went to the house of Madvi Mase and found her dead with wounds at different places on the body. PW.1, Madvi Rama, according to the prosecution, convened a meeting and on enquiry, the appellant confessed in the meeting that in the night of 8th December, 1999 his mother (deceased)-Madvi Mase scolded him alleging that he wanders after consuming liquor which enraged him and he picked up a burning wooden plank and assaulted her which caused her death. On the basis of what has been disclosed in the meeting PW.1 Madvi Rama gave report to the Police Station, Tongpal.

3. On the basis of the aforesaid information, a case under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the appellant. During the course of investigation inquest 3 report of the dead body was prepared in the presence of the witnesses and the dead body sent to Primary Health Centre, Tongpal for postmortem examination. Dr. S.L. Dhangar(PW.5), a Civil Assistant Surgeon, posted at the Primary Health Centre, Tongpal conducted the postmortem examination and found a large number of burn injuries on the person of the deceased and in his opinion the death had occurred due to shock on account of burn injuries. PW.6, P.L. Nayak, the Investigating Officer of the case arrested the appellant during the course of investigation and on his statement, the wooden plank, alleged to have been used in the commission of the crime, was recovered.

5. To bring home the charge, the prosecution has altogether examined six witnesses out of whom PW.1 Madvi Rama, PW.2 Mangdu, PW.3 Aaita and PW.4 Lekhan have been declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. Besides aforesaid witnesses, prosecution has also examined P.W.5 Dr. S.L. Dhangar, the autopsy surgeon and P.W.6 P.L. Nayak, the investigating officer. The plea of the appellant is denial simplicitor and false implication but no defence witness has been examined.

12. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence of the appellant. Appellant is in jail, he be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.

...................................................J. ( HARJIT SINGH BEDI ) ..................................................J. (CHANDRAMAULI KUMAR PRASAD) New Delhi, July 23, 2010.
Hariom Agrawal vs Prakash Chand Malviya

landlord. Maganlal Jain had given the shop to the appellant for carrying out the business. On a dispute being arisen between the respondent-landlord, the original tenant Maganlal Jain and the appellant herein, an agreement was executed on 28.3.1988 by the respondent (landlord) and the appellant (subsequent tenant), whereby the landlord tenanted the shop to the appellant on payment of an advance amount of Rs.4,75,000/- which was received by the landlord in cash in front of the witnesses. The agreement further provided that in case the landlord requires eviction of the tenant from the shop he will have to give notice of 6 months to the tenant and will also refund the payment of Rs.4,75,000/- to the tenant. On the other hand, if the tenant wants to vacate the shop he will have to give prior notice of 6 months to the landlord and the landlord will pay back Rs.4,75,000/- to the tenant. This document was affixed with a notarial stamp of Rs.4/-. Under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short the Act), agreement of this nature requires affixture of a stamp of Re.1/- under Schedule I, Item 42 of the said Act.

3. On 12.5.2003 a suit for eviction was filed by the respondent-landlord before the Civil Judge, Bhopal under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, stating the bonafide need for the use of the accommodation by his elder son. It was the case of the appellant-tenant that the original copy of the agreement which was with him was stolen and thus he was unable to produce the original document dated 28.3.1988, but was in possession of a photostat copy of the agreement and made a prayer for receipt of the photocopy of the agreement as secondary evidence under Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The trial court allowed the application for admission of the photocopy of the document and admitted it as secondary evidence under Section 63 of the Evidence Act.

16. For the reasons stated above, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

17. There shall be no order as to costs.