L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Vedic Girls Senior Secondary School ... vs Smt. Rajwanti & Ors

The Respondent No. 1 in this appeal was appointed as Science Mistress in the Appellant School on 07.09.1988. At the time of joining her duties she was given an appointment letter on 05.7.1988 indicating that she was being appointed as Science Mistress in the school with effect from the date she joined her duties in the grade of Rs. 1400-2600/- plus usual allowances sanctioned by the Haryana Government from time to time.

Aggrieved by the order passed by the Executing Court the appellant filed Civil Revision No. 6130/2002 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the Learned Single Judge vide order dated 11.08.2003, while admitting the revision, stayed further proceedings before the Executing Court. While the revision was pending in the High Court, the Respondent No. 1 herein filed an application to vacate the interim order dated 11.08.2003 staying the execution proceedings. The stay application was taken up for hearing along with the revision application on 02.04.2004 for final disposal. On consideration of the submissions made, the Learned Single Judge dismissed the revision petition with costs of Rs. 5,000/- and directed the Executing Court to execute the decree forthwith and to complete the execution proceedings within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order.

The present appeal is directed against the said order of the Learned Single Judge dated 02.4.2004.

Having regard to the above, we have no option but to allow the appeal filed by the School authorities. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but we also make it clear that the Respondent No. 1 may approach the Trial Court for amendment of the decree in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.
M/S.Associated Journals Ltd vs The Mysore Paper Mills Ltd

The case of the appellant company has been that the sum of money claimed by the respondent in the Winding Up Petition was not outstanding inasmuch as the said sum of money had already been paid to M/s General Trading & Sales Corporation who were the mutual agent of the appellant and the respondent. Hence no debt was due and payable by the appellant to the respondent. There was, therefore, no question of the appellant company being unable to pay any debts to the respondent. The Winding Up Petition filed by the respondent was, therefore, wholly without any basis or foundation in law and hence not maintainable.

Aggrieved by the said order passed by the Company Judge, the appellant preferred Company Appeal No.1 of 1994. We have carefully perused the judgment of the Division Bench. The learned judges of the Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein and directed that after fresh affidavit as required in the order dt.10.01.1994 has been filed, the Company Petition be listed before the learned Company Judge for passing fresh orders regarding advertisement of the Company Petition. It is useful to reproduce the finding recorded by the Division Bench :-

2. The statements made in paragraphs.......of the petition herein now shown to me and marked with the letter `A', are true to my knowledge, and the statements made in paragraphs..........are based on information, and I believe them to be true.

For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the appeal has no merit and the order passed by the learned Judges of the Division Bench confirming the order passed by the Learned Company Judge does not call for any interference by this Court. The appeal stands dismissed accordingly. No costs.

The interim order passed by this Court dt.01.05.1998 granting stay of the order under challenge shall stand vacated. The Company Court is now at liberty to proceed further in accordance with Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 and dispose of the Company Petition as expeditiously as possible. We place on record our appreciation for the able assistance rendered to us by Ms.Pragya Singh Baghel, learned counsel for the respondent at the time of hearing.
State Of Uttaranchal & Anr vs Sunil Kumar Singh Negi

3) Brief facts:

9) In the light of the factual details particularly with reference to the stand taken by the Horticulture Department at length in the writ petition and in the light of the principles enunciated by this Court, namely, right to reason is an indispensable part of sound judicial system and reflect the application of mind on the part of the court, we are satisfied that the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained.

10) Under these circumstances, the order of the High Court is set aside and we remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law by a reasoned order. The appeal is disposed of. No costs. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case though we adverted to the grounds taken by the Department in their writ petition.
P. Sivanandi vs Rajeev Kumar & Ors

5. On a challenge having been raised to the selection to the Indian Police Service by some aggrieved officers, an original application was filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal), which set aside the selection for 1994-95. The Tribunal then directed a fresh selection process. The opinion expressed by the Tribunal was accepted by this Court by an order dated 20th February, 2002 in Civil Appeal Nos. 1299- 1305 of 1999 etc. (Christopher Nelson v. U.P.S.C. & Ors.).

22. Under these circumstances we uphold the decision taken by the Review Select Committee and allow these appeals by setting aside the order of the High Court. Sivanandi will be entitled to all consequential benefits.

[1] [2] P. Sivanandi v. Rajiv Kumar, MANU/TN/9878/2006 [3] [4] (2014) 13 SCC 172
Kerala State Cashew Development Corp vs Shahal Hassan Mussaliar & Anr

2. The High Court referred to the factual position in Writ Appeal No.1835/97 which was directed against the judgment of learned Single Judge, dated 4th September, 1997 in O.P. No.16424/94. The High Court noted that the factual basis in all the cases is similar except the dates and the areas involved and the location of the factories.

3. Since the grounds of challenge raised by the appellant and the responses of the respondents are common, they are taken up together. The background facts are to be noted in brief:

4. The first respondent is the owner of a factory situated in an extent of 2.29 acres of land in Kotttarakkara Taluk of Kollam District. The factory comprises several buildings like godown, office, shelling and peeling sheds, grading shed etc. with necessary machineries and equipments installed 2 therein for facilitating the work of the factory. This factory was being run by the first respondent, up to the year 1969. Sometime in the year 1969, first respondent who was managing the factory himself, desired to go abroad. So, he leased out his factory to the second respondent-Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the `Corporation'), a statutory corporation set up in the State of Kerala, for development of the cashew industry. Ext. P1 is the copy of the lease deed dated 17th July, 1970 by which the cashew factory of the first respondent was leased out to the second respondent on a monthly lease rent of Rs.1,500/-. The lease was initially for a period of three years and, on the expiry of the said terms, a fresh lease deed was executed, which too expired on 16th July, 1976. It is the case of the first respondent that, while he was running the factory, he used to provide employment to the workers for about 300 days in a year.

After the expiry of the lease deed on 16th July, 1976, the first respondent, being unwilling to further lease out the factory, called upon the second respondent Corporation to release and hand over the factory and its assets to him. The Corporation, however, did not release the factory and, in the meanwhile, the State of Kerala passed the Kerala Cashew Factories (Requisitioning) Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act'). This act 3 was passed for the following purpose, as indicted in the preamble which reads as follows:
Baban Bandu Patil vs State Of Maharashtra

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

After some time, his uncle Bandu and Accused no.2 Navnath and Accused no.1 Baban came to their thrashing floor and hurled abuses at 2 them. A-1 assaulted his father with an axe. The stroke was given on the head of Vithoba. His uncle Bandu assaulted Krishnaji and his father with a stick. Accused No. 2 Navnath also assaulted him and his father with a stick. The assailants after noticing the injuries, left for their house. He along with his father Vithoba returned to his house. On the way to their house, they were also accompanied by one Prakash Bhandane - husband of his aunt.

On 10.7.2001 Accused No. 4 showed readiness and willingness to disclose certain informations. API Deepak (PW-12) called two panchas, namely; Ravindra and Aba. Information given by Accused No. 4 Bandu was recorded in the presence of panch witnesses under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the `Evidence Act'). This memorandum of panchanama is at Exhibit 93, which led with the discovery of weapon is proved in the evidence of PW 3 Aba as well as in the evidence of API Deepak (PW 12). In pursuance of the information disclosed, the panch 4 witness and Police Officers were led by Accused No. 4 and the weapon alleged to have been used in the commission of crime i.e. stick was discovered at the instance of Accused no. 4. Said weapon was attached and seized under panchanama Exhibit 94. API Deepak (PW 12) also seized a steel bucket at the instance of Accused No.2 from his house. He also seized the stick at the instance of accused No.2 from his house.

8. Considering the background facts it would be appropriate to convict the appellant for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.

9. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Shantilal Kesharmal Gandhi vs Prabhakar Balkrishna Mahanubhav

3. The tenant of a building governed by the Bombay Rent, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Act") is the appellant before us. The landlord of the building, the respondent, filed a suit for eviction of the tenant under Section 13(1)(a), (c) and (k) of the Act. The landlord pleaded that he had let out the suit premises to the tenant for the purpose of residence and the tenant has used the premises for a purpose different from the one for which it was let by establishing a manufacturing unit therein and has thus contravened Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act and thereby rendered himself liable to be evicted under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act. By installing the machinery and by dumping of the products and the blocking of an 'Ota', the tenant had caused nuisance to the plaintiff and the other occupiers of the same building belonging to the plaintiff and had rendered himself liable to be evicted under Section 13(1)(c) of the Act. He had also failed to use the premises for the purpose for which it was let and since he is not using the premises for the purpose for which it was let, for a continuous period of more than six months immediately before the filing of the suit, he was liable to be evicted under Section 13(1)(k) of the Act. The tenant denied the plea that the building was let out to him solely for a residential purpose. He pleaded that it was let out to him for residential and commercial purposes. He denied the committing of nuisance and also the claim that he had ceased to occupy the premises for a period exceeding six months as contended by the landlord.

11. Thus, we confirm the decision under appeal and dismiss this appeal. The tenant is given a time of nine months from this date to vacate the premises on his filing the usual undertaking before this Court with a period of three weeks from today. However, there will be no order as to costs.
Pushpa Kumari & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors

3. The facts very briefly are that Millia Kaneez Fatima Women's Primary Teachers Training College, Rambag, Purnea (for short `the College') is a minority 2 institution established and maintained by the Millia Education Trust. Though the College was established in 1985 for imparting teachers training course, after seven rounds of litigation it was granted recognition by order dated 15.12.1994 by the State Government with retrospective effect for the sessions 1985-1987 to 1993-1995 pursuant to the directions of the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1304 of 1993. Appellant Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 pursued their training in the College during the sessions 1988-1990, 1991-1993, 1992-1994 and 1993-1995 respectively. In response to an advertisement dated 26.05.2007 of the Bihar School Examination Board (for short `the Board') the appellants approached the Board through the College for examination forms, but the Board did not issue the examination forms.

4. The appellants then filed C.W.J.C. No. 7321 of 2007 before the Patna High Court for a direction to the Board to release the forms and accept the fees and forms of the appellants for the teachers training 3 examination and to allow them to appear in the examination. Alongwith the Writ Petition, the appellants also filed an application for interim orders and on 13.06.2007, the learned Single Judge of the High Court passed an interim order directing the Board to accept the fees and forms of the appellants and allow them to appear in the ensuing teachers training examination. The Board, however, did not comply with the interim order. On 24.08.2007, the learned Single Judge heard the Writ Petition alongwith other Writ Petitions on merits and dismissed the Writ Petitions by common order, after holding that under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (for short `the NCTE Act'), it is only the National Council for Teacher Education (for short `the NCTE') which can grant recognition for teachers training course and the College had not applied for recognition to the NCTE. Aggrieved by the order dated 24.08.2007 the appellants filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 796 of 2007, but the same was also dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned 4 order dated 12.11.2008. The appellants then filed Civil Review No. 289 of 2008 before the Division Bench, but the same was also dismissed by order dated 06.02.2009 of the Division Bench of the High Court.

8. We accordingly allow these appeals, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge as well as the orders of the Division Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal and in the Civil Review and direct the Board to conduct the examination for the appellants as early as possible. There shall be no order as to costs.
M/S Sushila Chemicals P.Ltd.& Ors vs Bharat Coking Coal Limited & Ors

4 The appellants claim to be Units, which have been enjoying linkage for supply of coal vis-a-vis Bharat Coking Coal Limited (hereinafter referred to as "BCCL"). On 30th November, 2004, BCCL issued a notice No.BCCL/S&M/Link/04/5089, 2 requiring the linked consumers to submit detailed data/information in terms of the details mentioned in the notice along with an affidavit and the photographs of owners on or before 31st December, 2004, to enable it to cross check the genuineness of the working units regarding continuance of supply of coal for the year 2005. The said notice refers to 18 specific documents and item 19 refers to any other relevant documents. It appears that subsequently the said number of documents were reduced to 13 as will appear from clause 10 of paragraph 12 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of BCCL. The notice will, therefore, be confined to the said 12/13 documents and also any other relevant documents.

10 The appeal is disposed of.

11 There will, however, be no order as to costs.
Raja Ram vs Jai Prakash Singh

The appellant is aggrieved by the order allowing the second appeal preferred by the defendants. The High Court set aside the order of the First Appellate Court which had allowed the appeal of the appellant and set aside the order dismissing the appellants suit.

2. The plaintiff and defendant no.2 are brothers. Defendant no.1 was the wife of defendant no.2. Respondents nos.1 to 3 are sons of deceased defendant no.1. Original plaintiff no.2, another brother, Digitally signed by has chosen not to pursue the appeal. The plaintiffs alleged that the CHARANJEET KAUR Date: 2019.09.11 17:01:36 IST Reason: original defendants obtained the sale deed dated 02.03.1970 from 1 their father Vaijai, since deceased, in favour of defendant no.1, fraudulently, by deceit and undue influence because of old age and infirmity of the deceased and who was living with the defendants. The suit was dismissed. The appellate court allowed the appeal holding that the defendants had failed to discharge their burden of being in a position to dominate the will of the deceased by undue influence. The High Court reversed the order of the first appellate court and restored the dismissal of the suit.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent/defendants submitted that under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 the initial onus lay on the plaintiffs by establishing a prima facie case for undue influence and only then the onus would shift to them. The necessary pleadings in respect of the same were completely lacking. The First Appellate Court wrongly shifted the burden upon the respondents. The deceased may have been old and infirm, but he was not deprived of his mental faculties so as not to know the nature of documents executed by him. He was alive approximately for ten months after the execution of the deed, but never questioned the same. The deceased had executed another sale deed two years earlier in 1968, Exhibit 10 in favour of third persons which has not been questioned by the appellant. It establishes that the deceased was not in a condition where undue influence could be exercised over him. There can be no presumptions merely on account of his old age. DW­1 was a witness to the sale deed and was present at the time of registration. The deceased admitted before the sub­ 3 registrar having received a sum of Rs.2,000/­ earlier and Rs.4,000/­ was paid at the time of registration. The Sub­Registrar has not recorded any adverse inferences about the condition or capacity of the deceased at the time of registration. A registered instrument will carry a presumption about its correctness unless rebutted.

17. On a consideration of the entirety of the matter we find no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings arrived at by two courts. The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai vs State Of Gujarat & Anr

3) Brief facts:

b) The appellant filed an application being Criminal Misc. Application No. 9 of 2012 under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) for the release of his Eicher truck before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gandhinagar, Gujarat. Vide order dated 24.08.2012, the Judicial Magistrate rejected the said application on the ground that as per the provisions of Section 6B(3) of the Gujarat Animal Preservation (Amendment) Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as “the Amendment Act”), the vehicle shall not be released before the expiry of six months from the date of its seizure.

c) Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed an application being Criminal Revision Application No. 73 of 2012 before the District & Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar, which was also rejected on 01.09.2012

d) Dissatisfied with the order of the District & Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar, the appellant preferred Special Criminal Application No. 2755 of 2012 before the High Court. By impugned order dated 25.09.2012, the High Court dismissed the said application.

4) The vehicle or conveyance so seized under sub-section (3) shall not be released by the order of the court on bond or surety before expiry of six months from the date of such seizure or till the final judgment or the court, whichever is earlier.

(3) The vehicle or conveyance so seized under sub-section (2) shall not be released by the order of the court on bond or surety before the expiry of six months from the date of such seizure or till the final judgment of the court, whichever is earlier.

13) In the light of the above conclusion, order dated 24.08.2012, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Gandhinagar in Criminal Misc. Application No. 9 of 2012, order dated 01.09.2012, passed by the District and Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar in Criminal Revision Application No. 73 of 2012 and order dated 25.09.2012, passed by the High Court in Special Criminal Application No. 2755 of 2012 are set aside and the respondents are directed to release the vehicle - Eicher Truck bearing Regn. No. GJ-9-Z-3801 forthwith.

14) The appeal is allowed.

FEBRUARY 01, 2013.
Anisetti Veerabhadra Rao & Anr vs State Of A.P

The trial court recorded the statements of the appellants on the 17th May, 2006 by putting question Nos.88 to 94 to them with reference to the two dying declarations. The appellants stated that they were the fourth and second sons of their parents and they also filed several documents including birth certificates with respect to their identities. The trial court, however, chose not to rely on these documents as they had been produced at a belated stage and also observed that this evidence was not trustworthy. The appellants were again sentenced to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment under Section 448 and to life imprisonment under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. An appeal was thereafter filed before the High Court impugning the judgment on remand made by the Sessions Court. This appeal too has been dismissed, leading to the present appeal before us.

8. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in the appeal. Dismissed.
State Of A.P vs M. Radha Krishna Murhty

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

No:40/88-89 under Section 34 (a) of A.P. Excise Act against Burra Narsimhulu and also against the father of the complainant. Further investigation disclosed that the accused after demand and part payment sent up a preliminary report on grave crime part-I showing that accused is not traceable and he showed official favour by not mentioning the name of the father of the earlier demand, the accused demanded and accepted the balance of Rs.2,000/- as gratification other than legal remuneration on 19-6- 1989 at about 3.40 p.m. from the complainant Joginath Goud at his residence at Jogipet. Medak District in the presence of G. Anjaiah Goud and the accused was caught red-handed by the ACB in the presence of the mediators at 3.50 p.m. on 19-6-1989. The fingers of both the hands of the accused yielded positive results when subjected to Sodium Carbonate test. 3 The tainted amount was recovered from the cot in the presence of the mediators. Therefore, the Government accorded sanction for prosecution vide G.O. Ms. No:757, dated 29-8-1991 Revenue (Excise I) Department and accordingly the accused was held liable for punishment under the abovesaid sections of law.
Vishamber Sunderdas Badlani & Anr vs Indian Bank & Ors

JUDGMENT O R D E R This is a statutory appeal filed by the appellants under provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short `the Commission') dismissed the complaint filed by the appellants herein inter alia observing that disputed questions of fact and law have been involved in the matter and that serious allegations have been made as to fraud, collusion, etc. It also appears from the record of the case that criminal proceedings have been instituted by the Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I) and investigation has been ordered.

Hence, the appeal is summarily dismissed.

..2/-

It is, however, clarified that as and when an appropriate proceeding will be taken by the appellants, any observation made either by the Commission or by us will not come in the way of appellants. If any suit is filed, it is open to the appellants to make appropriate prayer on limitation and the Court will keep in mind the facts and circumstances of the case and the present proceedings initiated by the appellants. The Court will also consider Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.