L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Jagdamba Devi vs Union Of India And Ors

3. Briefly stated, the facts of the present case are as follows: The appellant is the widow of one Late Hari Kant Jha who had been accused and arrested in a criminal case emanating from freedom struggle movement of 9th August, 1942. The deceased took part in the freedom struggle and allegedly remained absconding in this context from 16.08.1942 to 14.10.1944. The deceased was arrested on 14.10.1944 and remained in jail till he was released on bail on 27.10.1944. He was thereafter discharged from the case on 25.01.1945. Late Hari Kant Jha filed an application seeking pension under Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980 (“the Scheme”), which was subsequently pursued by his wife that is the appellant herein. The State Government vide letter dated 06.04.1993 recommended for sanction of Freedom Fighter Honour Pension to the appellant. It was however, noted in the recommendation letter as well as the jail certificate produced by the appellant that Hari Kant Jha was detained in jail for thirteen days only. Declining the State Government’s recommendation, the Central Government vide order dated 26.07.2000 rejected the appellant’s claim on the ground that the statutory mandate of serving minimum six months in detention was not fulfilled in the case of the deceased.

5. Challenging the order dated 15.11.2006, the appellant filed C.W.J.C. No.816 of 2008. The Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 11.01.2011 disposed the writ petition on the ground that the findings of the Central Government are not in-consonance with the observations of the High Court made in its order dated 25.08.2006 while disposing of C.W.J.C. No.9903 of 2001. The said order dated 11.01.2011 passed by the Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No.816 of 2008 was challenged by the respondents by way of appeal in LPA No.1348 of 2012. The said appeal was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order holding that the Single Judge had allowed the claim of the appellant without noticing that no document was produced by the appellant proving the fact that the deceased remained underground for more than six months. The High Court further held that “….the Central Government has clearly pointed out that the applicant did not meet the eligibility criteria of either being an underground within the meaning of the scheme for more than six months nor did he claim to be in custody for more than six months and as such he was ineligible”.

18. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.

January 31, 2017
Shanti Devi Ã Appellant vs Daropti Devi & Ors. Ã Respondents

According to the appellant, the said suit was not maintainable. It was dismissed as such by an order dated 18.12.1981, holding :

The respondent filed another suit, which was marked as Suit No. 276 of 1992, for declaration and consequential relief. The said suit was also dismissed being not maintainable being hit under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned judge, however, also dealt with the other issues involved in the suit.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment should be directed to be modified. We, therefore, in modification of the impugned judgment, direct that the learned Trial Judge may allow the parties to adduce evidence, whereupon it shall return the evidence to the Appellate Court together with its findings thereupon and reasons therefor within four months from the date of communication of this order, whereupon the High Court may proceed to determine the appeal on its own merit. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
'K' A Judicial Officer vs Registrar General, High Court Of A.P

3. Pochamreddy Subba Reddy and three others (hereinafter referred to as `the plaintiffs') filed O.S. No.1 of 2009 for grant of permanent injunction to restrain Maddika Nageshwari and six others (hereinafter referred as `the defendants') from interfering with the plaint schedule properties. They also filed I.A. No.34 of 2009 for grant of temporary injunction. The defendants contested the prayer for temporary injunction by asserting that the plaintiffs 2 do not have any right over the suit property and that in the suits filed by them temporary injunction has already been granted by the trial Court restraining the plaintiffs from interfering with their possession. By an order dated 12.3.2009, the appellant, who was then holding the post of Principal District Judge, Kadapa, granted temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs and restrained the defendants from interfering with the plaint schedule property. Simultaneously, he injuncted the plaintiffs from intermeddling with the suit property. While passing the order of injunction, the appellant did take cognizance of the fact that the defendants had filed O.S. Nos. 336 of 2008 and 781 of 2008 against the plaintiffs and the concerned courts had passed order of injunction in their favour and that this fact was against the plaintiffs, but still he directed the parties to maintain status quo.

4. The defendants carried the matter to the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 420 of 2009 filed by them and set aside the order passed by the appellant mainly on the ground that while granting injunction in favour of the plaintiffs, the learned Judge totally ignored that in the suits filed by the defendants, trial Court had already passed order of injunction and restrained the plaintiffs from interfering with their possession. The Division Bench of the High Court also observed that in view of the injunction order passed in favour of the defendants, the appellant was not at all justified in directing the 3 defendants not to interfere with the possession of the plaintiffs. While allowing the appeal preferred by the defendants, the Division Bench of the High Court made scathing criticism of the appellant as a Judicial Officer and recorded highly disparaging remarks in paragraphs 10 and 11, which read as under:

14. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of judgment dated 25.6.2009 of the Division Bench of the High Court as also the direction contained in paragraph 13 thereof are set aside.
D.V.Paul vs Manisha Lalwani

4. The appellant's case is that aforementioned order of the High Court was communicated to him by his lawyer on telephone followed subsequently by the receipt of a copy of 5 the said order. The appellant's further case is that due to inadvertence he did not notice that the amount of Rs.10,000/- had to be deposited before the Trial Court. The result was that instead of depositing the sum of Rs.10,000/- before the Trial Court, the appellant got a demand draft prepared in the name of the respondent from the Bank of Baroda at Katni Branch on 24th August, 2006. A copy of the deposit slip has been produced by the appellant in support of his version that a demand draft was indeed prepared in the name of the respondent for a sum of Rs.10,000/- from the Bank aforementioned. The appellant's further case is that the demand draft was then sent by Registered Post A.D. No.6868 through the Katni Branch Post Office to the address of the respondent at Jabalpur. The registered envelop was received at the respondent's house by her maid servant Durga who made an endorsement on the receiving slip, a true copy whereof has also been enclosed as Annexure P3 to the petition. According to the appellant even in the past he had sent demand drafts to the respondent for payment of 6 rent due to her which drafts were received by her maid servant.

5. The appellant alleges that although the respondent had received the bank draft sent to her, the same was not encashed nor any acknowledgement sent to the appellant. He did not even receive any communication from the landlady pointing out that the amount had to be deposited in the Trial Court and not to be paid directly to her. The silence and inaction on the part of the respondent was according to the appellant deliberate and under the advice of her husband who is a practicing lawyer and also the power of attorney holder of the respondent.

11. Aggrieved by the above order, the appellant preferred MCC No.7148 of 2009, which was dismissed by the High Court on 30th July, 2009, relying upon the order passed by this Court on 5th May, 2009 and that passed by the High Court on 17th June, 2009. The present appeals assail the correctness of the said two orders.

24. In the totality of the circumstances, therefore, we consider it to be a fit case where extension of time for making of the deposit by the Trial Court ought to be granted. We accordingly allow the prayer for extension of time to make the deposit of Rs.10,000/- by eight weeks from today. The extension is, however, subject to payment of cost of Rs.10,000/-. We make is clear, that in case the appellant deposits a total sum of Rs.20,000/- within two months from today the suit filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed as directed by the High Court in the appeal mentioned above failing which the decree passed by the Trial Court shall revive and be executed in accordance with law.

25. These appeals are, with the above direction, disposed of.
S.Seshachalam & Ors.Etc vs Chairman Bar Council Of Tamilnadu & Ors

16. By a careful reading of Section 16, it is evident that prior to 2001 amendment, Explanation II (5) of Section 16 of the Welfare Fund Act contemplated that on the death of a member of the Fund within five years from the date of his admission to the Fund, his nominee or legal heirs was/were eligible for payment at the rate of one thousand rupees for each year of his practice. That was because under Section 16(1) of the Welfare Fund Act, the schedule payment is possible only if as an advocate he has completed five years as a member of the Fund. Explanation II (5) to Section 16 of the Welfare Fund Act stood amended with effect from 1.2.2001 as extracted above, as per which lump sum amount of two lakh rupees is payable on the death of a member of the Fund irrespective of the years of membership of the Fund. After GO. Ms. 688 dated 19.9.2012, the above financial assistance of two lakh rupees payable to the nominee/legal heirs of the deceased advocates in terms of Section 16 Explanation II (5) has been enhanced to five lakh and twenty five thousand rupees. This lump sum of two lakh rupees (as per Amendment 2001) is denied to a member of a Fund who has enrolled himself after retirement from government service or any other organization who was in receipt of pension or other terminal benefits.

27. Contrariwise, the retired employees like the appellants who are law graduates did not withstand the difficult times in the profession. They opted for some other lucrative job during their prime time of their life and lived a secured life. Others found some job and positioned themselves in a comfortable place of employment, chose to join evening college or attended part time classes and obtained law degree and having retired with comfortable retiral benefits, further securing their future, they enrol themselves as an advocate to practice. The retired employees have the substantial retiral benefits, gratuity apart from receiving pension. The availability of lump sum retiral benefits with pension makes a retired employee better placed than their counter part lawyers who struggle through difficult times.

31. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court made meticulous analysis of various provisions of the Welfare Fund Act and referred to various decisions of this Court dealing with interpretation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and rightly concluded that there is reasonable classification between the advocates who had set up practice after demitting their office from the Central/State government/Organization and advocates who have set up practice straight from the law college. It would be right to say that the retired officials who joined legal profession constitute a separate class and the disentitlement of the benefit of lump sum welfare fund to this group of advocates cannot be said to be unreasonable. We do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of the Madras High Court and the appeals are liable to be dismissed accordingly.

32. Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No. 34326/2012:

33. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed.

December 16, 2014
Board Of Trustees For Pt.Of Cal.& Ors vs Avijit Kumar Ray & Ors.Etc

4. Three hundred and twenty one trained apprentices (respondents before this Court; hereinafter referred to as `the trained apprentices') joined together and approached the Calcutta High Court in WP No. 21877(W)/99. They made the grievance that in disregard of the practice earlier followed, the Calcutta Port Trust was giving appointments only on compassionate grounds to the wards of their employees dying in harness and had completely stopped the recruitment of trained apprentices. They sought appropriate directions from the High Court asking the Calcutta Port Trust to appoint trained apprentices equal in number to those appointed on compassionate basis during the past many years so as to restore the 1:1 ratio between the two groups. At that stage the High Court did not pass any positive order in the matter but disposed of the writ petition directing the Chairman, Calcutta Port Trust to examine the claim of the trained 3 apprentices and to dispose of their representation after giving them an opportunity of hearing.

6. The trained apprentices once again went to the High Court in WP No. 9259 (W) of 2001 re-agitating their claims and challenging the order of the Chairman, Calcutta Port Trust.

8. Against the judgment of the single Judge the appellant, Calcutta Port Trust preferred an appeal (MAT 2601 of 2004) before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal was dismissed by judgment and order dated May 10, 2007 and confirming the order of the single judge the Division Bench made the following observations and directions:

25. On a consideration of the materials on record and the rival submissions we are of the view that the orders passed by High Court are 19 plainly unsustainable. We accordingly set aside the orders of the High Court and dismiss the writ petitions.

27. In the result, the appeal is allowed subject to the aforesaid observations and directions. There shall be no order as to costs.
The Associated Cement Companies Ltd vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh & Another

Appellants are inter alia engaged in the manufacture and sale of cement and have various factories in different locations in India, including a unit in the State of Andhra Pradesh for manufacturing cement. The appellants have their marketing division at Secunderabad from where sales of cement are carried on. It has its warehouses all over the State of Andhra Pradesh. Earlier the State was charging sales tax on the sale of cement at the rate of 16% as notified by the State Government, which included the value of the packing material used for packing cement. The value of packing material is also charged to sales tax on the total sales turnover. As far as second sale is concerned Sales tax is not paid on the value of packing materials, as sales tax is leviable only on the first sale of packing materials. Section 6-C was introduced by Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act (Amendment Act No.11 of 1984) which reads as under:-

This amendment was put to challenge by the appellants before the High Court. By the impugned order the High Court has rejected the challenge and upheld the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provision.

The appellants have been showing the value of cement and the value of the packing material separately while preparing their bills. The appellants' case as set out in para 4 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition reads as under:-

Moreover, as per G.O. Ms. No. 374 Rev dated 25.04.1987, tax levied in the State on the packing material used for packing the goods shall be reduced from the tax payable by a dealer at the rate applicable to cements under Section 6C on the turnover of sale of such goods and packing material. If the appellants purchased the packing material from any dealer within the State and paid tax at 16% on cement under Clause

If that be the situation, we do not find any basis to hold that such classification of the same commodity is impermissible and would amount to discrimination being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in the appeal and dismiss the same leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Andhra Kesari College Of Education vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors.

1. The present Civil Appeals and Writ Petition have been filed to challenge the vires of the Rules framed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh vide G.O.M. No. 57 dated 21.03.2005, G.O.M. No. 92 dated 16.11.2006, and G.O.M. No. 98 dated 06.12.2006 (hereinafter referred to as the “impugned G.O.Ms”), for admission to the B. Ed. Course in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and became applicable from the Academic Year 2006 – 2007. The said G.O.Ms continue to remain in force even as on date.

2. The Petitioner – Institution is a minority institution which was granted the status of a “Christian Minority Educational Institution” by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. 2 As per G.O.M. No. 55 dated 20.03.2005, minority colleges were permitted to fill up 85% of their total seats, with students belonging to the minority community, as the Management Quota.

The right of minority institutions is not absolute, and is amenable to regulation. The protection granted to Minority Educational Institutions to admit students of their choice is subject to reasonable restrictions.

the academic year 2006­2007. These G.O.Ms have remained in force ever since. All Minority Educational Institutions in the State of Andhra Pradesh, including the Petitioner Institution, have been following these G.O.Ms since the past over 13 academic years without any complaint. There is no justifiable reason why the same should be discontinued at this stage. 11 In light of the aforesaid discussion, the Civil Appeals and the Writ Petition are dismissed as being devoid of any merit. All pending Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of. Ordered accordingly.

September 25, 2019.
Mohinder Kaur vs State Of Punjab

3. The appellant had sought for protection in terms of aforesaid provision in FIR No. 105 dated 15.8.2007 registered at the Police Station Bhogpur, District Jalandhar. The complainant had alleged that she was married to Ranjit Singh, son of the appellant on 23.10.2002. The said Ranjeet Singh went abroad in February, 2002 and came back after about one year. Alleging that the complainant was harassing her for brining insufficient dowry, the complaint was lodged in the police station. The appellant filed a petition under Section 438 Cr.P.C. for protection. The High Court observed that ordinarily in such cases the court is inclined to grant protection against arrest to family members of husband of the complainant, however the facts of the present case were different. It was stated that the appellant herself was a retired police officer who was serving as an inspector of Punjab police. Her son was residing abroad and she had transferred/bequeathed her property in favour of her grand son who is born to another son who is settled abroad. No part of the immovable property has been given to grand daughter born to the complainant. The High Court, therefore, concluded that the complainant and her minor daughter were left without any source of livelihood. It was noted that serious allegations were made against the appellant. The hostile treatment meted out to the grand daughter speaks loudly that the allegations leveled carry prima facie substance. After making these observations, the High Court also accepted the contention that the appellant being a recently retired police officer, the local police were hob-nobbing with her and the investigations were not being done properly. The High Court therefore, dismissed the petition. But at the same time it directed the Senior Superintendent of Police, Jalandhar to depute a fairly senior police officer to monitor the on-going investigation and take all lawful measures to interrogate the appellant and recover the dowry articles. Her passport was also seized and she was not to be permitted to go abroad without the permission of the Court.

8. The directions regarding deputation of a senior police officer to monitor the investigation and/or recover the dowry articles to seize her passport stand deleted.

10. Keeping in view the parameters highlighted in Adri Dharan Das's case (supra), we direct in case the appellant surrenders before the concerned court and moves for bail the application shall be disposed of expeditiously preferably on the date it is filed. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the acceptability of the prayer for bail to be made in terms of the aforesaid direction.

11. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Lalitkumar V. Sanghavi (D) Th Lrs.Neetu vs Dharamdas V. Sanghavi & Ors

2. The 1st respondent is the brother of the original appellant and the other respondents are the children of another deceased brother of the original applicant. Respondents are served and they have contested both the IAs.

3. Accepting the reasons given in the applications, we deem it appropriate to condone the delay in preferring the instant SLP and also substitute the original appellant (since deceased) by his legal representatives. Both the IAs are allowed. Delay condoned. Substitution allowed. Leave granted.

4. The undisputed facts are that the parties herein are carrying on some business in the name and style of a partnership firm constituted under a partnership deed dated 20th October 1962. The partnership deed provided for the resolution of the disputes arising between the partners touching the affairs of the partnership by means of an arbitration. In view of certain disputes between the partners (details of which are not necessary for the present purpose) the original applicant filed arbitration application No.263/2002 under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, for short) before the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court which was disposed of by an order dated 21st February, 2003 by a learned Judge of the Bombay High Court, who was the nominee of the Chief Justice under the Act. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows:

(a) he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay; and

14. On the facts of the present case, the applicability of sub-clauses

16. Therefore, we are of the opinion, the apprehension of the appellant that they would be left remediless is without basis in law.

18. The appeal is dismissed.

March 04, 2014

[1] Section 32 - Termination of proceedings.

(1) The arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal under sub- section (2).

(2) The arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of the arbitral proceedings where-

(b) the parties agree on the termination of the proceedings, or

(c) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings has for any other mason become unnecessary or impossible.