L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Trimbak vs State Of Maharashtra

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, dismissing the appeal filed before it by the appellant. The appellant was convicted for allegedly having committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and was sentenced to imprisonment for life by learned Sessions Judge Akola in Sessions Trial No. 58 of 2001. He was also found guilty of offence punishable under Section 324 IPC. Sentences of imprisonment for life and fine with default stipulation and sentence of 6 months and fine with default stipulation were imposed for the two offences. It was further ordered that if the fine amount is deposited then a sum of Rs.2,000/- was to be paid to the complainant as a compensation in terms of Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C.').

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

12. Considering the factual background of the case, in our considered view the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 (I) IPC, and custodial sentence of ten years would meet the ends of justice.

13. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
State Of Maharashtra vs Gajanan @ Hemant Janardhan Wankhede

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

6 The trial Court found that the prosecutrix was aged about 16 years and, therefore, the consent of the prosecutrix was of no consequence. The High Court held that there was consent and additionally, the girl was more than 16 years of age. With reference to the evidence of a doctor (PW-9) it was held that since the medical evidence shows that the age of the girl was above 14 years and below 16 years with an error margin of one year, the school leaving certificate and the school register were of no consequence. Accordingly, it directed acquittal as noted above.

6. The appeal is allowed.

...................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ...................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, July 9, 2008 10
Lal & Anr vs State Of M.P

(2) The parties were neighbours. Their houses were divided only by a wall. They bore animosity with each other. The sequence of events started with defaecation by a child- Nitin in the house of Motilal.

(3) On 4.7.1999 at about 9.30 a.m. when Nitin son of deceased Munnilal was playing near a tap situated close to his house, Pushpendra son of Motilal put some mud on his clothes. Nitin went to his house and informed his father Munnilal. Munnilal came to the house of Motilal and complained in regard to the conduct of Pushpendra. Motilal, Santosh and Hariram allegedly told him that their children would act in that fashion only. Narbadiya Bai- P.W.-3 reached the spot and told them that they always picked up quarrels. Appellants herein allegedly started inflicting axe blows on Munnilal-since deceased. Narbadiya Bai tried to save him, but allegedly one Jamuna Bai inflicted a blow on her by means of an iron pipe. Appellants Kalli Bai and Guddi Bai also hurled stick blows on Narbadiya Bai. Meanwhile Baldev said to have reached at that point of time. Appellants inflicted axe blows on Baldev and Hariram gave a blow of Baka on Baldev. Appellants Kali and Guddi Bai are said to have given stick blows on Baldev. Appellant-Lachhu snatched the axe from Santosh Kumar and dealt a blow on the head of deceased Munnilal.

(4) Prosecution case further is that the appellants together with Lachhu, Hariram, Kalli Bai and Guddi caught hold of Munnibai and dragged her to the door of their house. Whereas Motilal brought a cane of kerosene and sprinkled kerosene on Munnibai; Santosh put her on fire. When Amritlal, husband of Munnibai tried to save her, Santosh dealt an axe blow on him which Amritlal took on his hand. Amritlal, thereafter, ran away from the place of incident and informed the police. Munnibai in the meantime rushed towards a nearby well and jumped there into. Sita-daughter of Amritlal reached the place of occurrence. She was pushed into a drain by Santosh. Similar treatments were meted out to Devshree and other children. (5) First information report was lodged at about 11 a.m. on the same day. All the accused persons were arrested at the spot. In fact, the arrival of police saved further deterioration of the situation.

(21) In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that it is not a case where the appellants can be absolved of the charges of murder of Munnilal, Baldev and Munnibai.

(22) The appeal is dismissed. However, having regard to the fact that the State has not preferred any appeal against the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court against the said accused persons, it is not possible for us to hold that it was not a case of free fight or the other accused also had any hand therein.
Aluva Sugar Agency vs State Of Kerala

5. The appellant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Ernakulam. The appeal was dismissed and the order of the Sales Tax Officer was upheld. Aggrieved by the above order, the appellant preferred an appeal against the said order before the 3 Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in so far as it related to the rate of tax on margarine. According to the Tribunal:

the second schedule.

Second Schedule:

20. So as to simplify the conclusion, we may say that normally anything which is used for preparation of a food article is edible because ultimately it is being consumed by human beings. Though one may not consume margarine directly or may not use for normal cooking, the fact is that margarine is used for preparing bakery items which are consumed by human beings and, therefore, margarine is also edible. Having around 80% fat, and being in the nature of oil, in our opinion, it should be considered as edible oil.

22. For the aforestated reasons, we are of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal to the effect that margarine is an edible oil is correct and, therefore, the appellant is entitled to benefit of reduced rate of 4%.

23. We, therefore, allow the appeal by quashing the impugned order dated 22.9.2006 passed by the High Court. The appeal, is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
Diwani Ram & Anr vs State Of Uttarakhand

The trial Court relying on the evidence of P W.1 Bachhu Das, the father of the deceased, P W- 5 Budi Das w h o had allegedly seen the dead body being thrown into the Nandakani river by the three appellants on the 13 th June, 1989 and Jalmi Das P W.6 grand-father of the deceased w h o -3- had given an application with regard to her having disappeared and duly corroborated by the evidence of P W.4, Dr. Vinod Ku m ar who had conducted the post m orte m and opined that the death had been caused by a blunt weapo n injury on the head and not by dro w ning convicted the appellants for the offences for w hich they had been charged. The m atter was, thereafter, taken in appeal before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital. The High Court in its judg m e nt dated 25 th April, 2007 allowed the appeal qua the offence under Sec.498A of the IPC holding that no de m a n d for do wry had been m a d e but relying on the evidence affirmed the conviction and sentence with respect to the other offences. It appears that before an SL P could be filed in this Court, Ruk m a ni Devi passed away and the present appeal is thus at the instance of Gap hloo Das, the father- law of the deceased, Diwani Ra m, her husband.

Gaphloo Das was granted bail by this Court on 8/2/2008. The sa m e shall stand cancelled forthwith and he shall be taken into custody to serve out the remaining part of the sentence.

The appeal is dismissed.

.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .J . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . .

(HA RJIT SIN G H B E DI) .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .J (J.M. PA N C H A L) Ne w Delhi, July 29, 2009.
State Of Rajasthan & Anr vs C.P. Singh & Ors

1. State of Rajasthan has preferred this Civil Appeal to assail the judgment and order dated 19.3.2004 in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.136/1995. By the impugned judgment, the High Court allowed the Second Appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court and decreed the Suit of Respondent No.1 (Plaintiff) with a finding that Respondent No.1 had been illegally made to superannuate on 19.6.1974 at the age of 55 years, as prescribed under the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of 1951’). The High Court has also declared that Respondent No.1 (Plaintiff) was entitled to continue in service upto the age of 58 years, i.e., the age of retirement as per the Central Civil Service Regulations (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Regulations’). The consequent benefits like pay, increments and other service benefits have also been granted to Respondent No.1 (Plaintiff).

2. The essential facts relevant for deciding the issue raised in this appeal are not in dispute as indicated hereinafter. Respondent No.1 (Plaintiff) was appointed initially in the State of Ajmer and was governed by service conditions in the Regulations. The State of Ajmer was a Centrally Administered Part ‘C’ State till its integration with the State of Rajasthan w.e.f. 01.11.1956. Respondent No.1 was absorbed in the services of the State of Rajasthan from that date as Cane Development Assistant. Thus, his service at the time of re- organisation came to be governed generally by Rules of 1951. As provided under these Rules, Respondent No.1 was made to retire on attaining the age of 55 years on 19.6.1974.

3. Respondent No.1 filed Suit No.89/1976 at Jaipur claiming that he was illegally retired at the age of 55 years and also sought a decree that he is entitled to continue in service till 30.6.1977 under the Regulations and was entitled to consequential benefits of pay, increments, seniority, promotions etc. On contest made by the State of Rajasthan, the Suit was dismissed with a finding that the services of Respondent No.1 (Plaintiff) were governed by the Rules of 1951 which prescribed the age of retirement as 55 years.

4. On facts, there was no dispute at any stage of the Suit that Respondent No.1 was entitled to exercise option under Rule 11 of Rajasthan Services (Protection of Service Conditions) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of 1957’) and he exercised that option and elected to be governed, as regards leave and pension, by the rules applicable to him immediately before the appointed day, i.e., the Regulations in place of the Rules of 1951. The relevant part of Rule 11 is as follows :

6. Respondent No.1’s Regular First Appeal No.192/1980 came to be dismissed by the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur on 17.12.1994 and the view of the Trial Court was upheld. Second Appeal preferred by Respondent No.1 was, however, allowed by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 19.3.2004.

14. In the facts of the case, we find no merit in the Civil Appeal and it is accordingly dismissed but without costs.

April 04, 2014.
Life Insurance Corporation Of India vs Jaya Chandel

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

3. The stand of the present appellant was that the policy had lapsed due to non-payment of premium in time. This plea was not accepted by the District Forum on the ground that the cheque was claimed to have been issued on 12.7.1995, but is presumed to have been received earlier than that date. The State Commission held that in any event the amount was received within the grace period and therefore, the claim could not have been repudiated. Accordingly the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed. The National Forum dismissed the Revision holding that Section 64-VB of the Insurance Act, 1938 (in short the 'Insurance Act') was applicable where the premium is tendered by postal money order or cheque sent by post and the risk may be assumed on the date on which the money order is booked or the cheque is posted, as the case may be. Therefore, it was held that there was revival. It did not accept the stand of the appellant that the revival was not a matter of right.

8. Looked at from any angle the orders passed by the District Forum, the State Forum and National Commission cannot be maintained and are set aside.

9. Appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Union Of India vs M/S Bright Power Projects(I) P.Ltd

2. The appellant and the respondent had entered into a contract whereby the respondent had to construct certain structures, which had been more particularly described in the agreement entered into by the parties on 20th January, 1997.

3. In the course of execution of the contract, a dispute had arisen between the appellant and the respondent contractor and as agreed by the parties, the dispute had been referred to the Arbitral Tribunal. After hearing the concerned parties, the Arbitral Tribunal declared an award on 17th May, 2005, whereby it also awarded interest to the respondent contractor on the amount awarded, from the date of the reference till the date of the award.

11. Thus, it had been specifically understood between the parties that no interest was to be paid on the earnest money, security deposit and the amount payable to the contractor under the contract. So far as payment of interest on Government Securities, which had been deposited by the respondent contractor with the appellant is concerned, it was specifically stated that the said amount was to be returned to the contractor along with interest accrued thereon, but so far as payment of interest on the amount payable to the contractor under the contract was concerned, there was a specific term that no interest was to be paid thereon.

21. In the aforestated circumstances, the Arbitral Tribunal ought not to have awarded interest to the respondent from the date of reference till the date of the award.

22. For the aforestated reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment and the award so far as it pertains to payment of interest pendente lite and direct that no interest would be paid on the amount payable under the contract to the respondent from the date of the reference till the date of the award.

23. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

…………………………………………………….J (ANIL R. DAVE) …………………………………………………….J (VIKRAMAJIT SEN) …………………………………………………….J (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE) NEW DELHI;

JULY 2, 2015.
Hitesh Bhatnagar vs Deepa Bhatnagar

2) The appellant-husband and the respondent-wife got married according to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 [hereinafter referred to as `the Act'] in 1994, and are blessed with a daughter a year thereafter. Some time in the year 2000, due to differences in their temperaments, they began 1 to live separately from each other and have been living thus ever since. Subsequently, in 2001, the parties filed a petition under Section 13B of the Act before the District Court, Gurgaon, for dissolution of the marriage by grant of a decree of divorce by mutual consent.

However, before the stage of second motion and passing of the decree of divorce, the respondent withdrew her consent, and in view of this, the petition came to be dismissed by the Ld. Addl. District Judge, Gurgaon, though the appellant insisted for passing of the decree. The appellant, being aggrieved, has filed appeal No. F.A.O. No. 193 of 2003, before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The Learned Judge, by his well considered order, dismissed the appeal vide order dt. 08.11.2006. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant is before us in this appeal.

21) In other words, the power under Article 142 of the Constitution is plenipotentiary. However, it is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested by the Constitution with implicit trust and faith and, therefore, extraordinary care and caution has to be observed while exercising this jurisdiction.

25) It is settled law that this Court grants a decree of divorce only in those situations in which the Court is convinced beyond any doubt that there is absolutely no chance of the marriage surviving and it is broken beyond repair. Even if the chances are infinitesimal for the marriage to survive, it is not for this Court to use its power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage as having broken down irretrievably. We may make it clear that we have not finally expressed any opinion on this issue.

26) In the present case, time and again, the respondent has stated that she wants this marriage to continue, especially in order to secure the future of their minor daughter, though her husband wants it to end.

Though there is bitterness amongst the parties and they have not even lived as husband and wife for the past about 11 years, we hope that they will give this union another chance, if not for themselves, for the future of their daughter. We conclude by quoting the great poet 16 George Eliot "What greater thing is there for two human souls than to feel that they are joined for life - to strengthen each other in all labour, to rest on each other in all sorrow, to minister to each other in all pain, to be one with each other in silent, unspeakable memories at the moment of the last parting."

27) Before parting with the case, we place on record our appreciation for the efforts made by Shri. Harshvir Pratap Sharma, learned counsel, to bring about an amicable settlement between the parties.

28) In the result, the appeal fails. Accordingly, it is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Anand Rao Korada Resolution ... vs M/S Varsha Fabrics (P) Ltd.

4. The factual matrix in which the present Civil Appeals have been filed is as under :– 4.1 M/s Varsha Fabrics Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent No. 1), India Finance Ltd. (Respondent No. 2), Mudrika Commercial Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent No. 3), Hirakud Industrial Works 2 Ltd. (Respondent No. 4), and Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (Respondent No. 5) entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) dated 10.07.2006.

4.8 During the pendency of proceedings before the High Court in W.P. (Civil) No. 7939/2011, M/s Nandakini Contractors Pvt. Ltd – a Financial Creditor filed a Petition under Section 7 of the IBC, 2016 bearing CP (IB) No. 01/CTB/2019, before the National Company Law Tribunal, Cuttack Bench (“NCLT”) for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) against the Corporate Debtor – Respondent No. 4, since it had committed a default in paying the financial debt of Rs. 24,11,975/­.

4.10 4.11 During the pendency of the moratorium, W.P.(Civil) 7939/2011 was posted for hearing on 14.08.2019 before 5 the High Court. The Additional Government Advocate submitted that the valuation of the land in Mouza – Tara Nagar owned by Respondent No. 4 was Rs. 6,05,000/­ per acre. The High Court directed the Additional Government Advocate to file an affidavit with respect to the valuation conducted.

If the assets of the Respondent No. 4 – Company are alienated during the pendency of the proceedings under the IBC, it will seriously jeopardise the interest of all the stakeholders.

As a consequence, we set aside the impugned Interim Orders dated 14.08.2019 and 05.09.2019 passed by the Odisha High Court, as parallel proceedings with respect to the main issue cannot take place in the High Court. The sale or liquidation of the assets of Respondent No. 4 will now be governed by the provisions of the IBC.

11. Mr. C.U. Singh, Senior Advocate appeared for Respondent No. 8 – HINDALCO, which had participated in the public auction of the aforesaid chunk of land before the High Court. The Counsel raised serious objections to the stay of the auction proceedings. He sought permission to file an application before 12 the appropriate authority for deciding the objections raised by Respondent No. 8.

Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, Senior Advocate who was representing the Appellant – Resolution Professional, reserved his right to raise all pleas and contentions, including the plea of locus standi, if such an application is filed by Respondent No. 8.

The parties are granted liberty to pursue whatever remedies are available in accordance with law. The Civil Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.
State Of Rajasthan vs Parmendra Singh

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, directing acquittal of the respondent who faced trial alongwith two others namely, Smt. Keshar Kanwar and Tara Devi. They faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 498-A, 201, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). The trial Court acquitted the accused Keshar Kanwar from the charges relatable to Section 498-A, 302/34, 201/34 and 120-B IPC. The accused Tara Devi was acquitted from the charges under Section 498-A and 120-B. Respondent Parmendra Singh was acquitted from the charges under Sections 120-B and 201 read with Section 34 IPC but he was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and three years RI for the offences punishable under Section 302 and 498-A IPC respectively.

5. There is no material to show that the dying declarations were the result of tutoring or prompting. In all the dying declarations the respondent 4 has been specifically named, and the role played by him has been categorically described.

6. That being so, the High Court was not justified in directing acquittal. The same is set aside. Respondent shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence.

7. The appeal is allowed.

.....................................J (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ........................................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) New Delhi, May 04, 2009 5
Ramesh Das (Dead) Thr. Lrs. vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

2. The factual matrix leading to the suit is the claim of the plaintiff that Shri Ram Mandir situate at Dedla Village, Dhar Tehsil is a private temple which belonged to the forefathers of the plaintiff, the temple was built out of their own funds and the idol was installed by them. It is contended that the family of the plaintiff was performing the pooja for generations. It was pleaded in the suit that the said Dedla Village was a Jagir Village of the former Jagirdar. Since he was the devotee of Shri Ram Mandir the Jagirdar gifted 25 bighas of land from his jagir village of which the land in question bears Survey No.442. Prior to 3 1974 the name of Shri Ram Mandir and the name of Laxmandas, Pujari of Shri Ram Mandir had been continued in the Government records. The plaintiff on tracing the family tree has contended that he has succeeded to the said temple and the land. Being the son of the said Laxmandas he claims that having thus succeeded he is performing the pooja in the temple, he is in possession of the land and is cultivating the same. The grievance that prompted the filing of the suit is that according to the plaintiff the Sub­Divisional Officer who had no manner of right over the property, on 29 th April, 1992 issued a notice to auction the land in question for one year. The revision filed by the plaintiff was rejected by the Collector on 1 st September, 1992. In that view the plaintiff filed the suit seeking declaration of his title and ownership over the land and to hold that the defendants cannot auction or dispossess the plaintiff.

11. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit stands dismissed with no order as to costs.