L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Paneerselvam vs State Of Tamilnadu

2. A1 was Head Constable, while A2 was a Constable A3 was a Writer, and A4 was a Pere Constable. All of them were attached to Ammapet Police Station, and they were on duty on 14.12.1992 and 15.12.1992. A5 was a native of Udaiyur Kovil 2

3. After the case was committed to the Court of Sessions charges were framed since the accused persons pleaded innocence they were put to trial. In order to substantiate the charges 14 witnesses were examined. On consideration of the material on record the Trial Court recorded the conviction and imposed sentences as aforesaid.

4. Stand of the appellant before the High Court was that the deceased had put himself on fire and in fact, all the accused persons immediately quenched the fire and had taken him to the Government Primary Health Hospital, Ammapet, where PW3 doctor was available. The deceased made a voluntary statement to PW3 wherein he categorically stated that he had poured petrol on himself and set himself on fire. Thereafter the deceased with the burn injuries was taken to the Medical College Hospital where also he made a similar statement to PW4 the doctor. Subsequently, another doctor PW6 examined him where also he made a similar statement. Therefore, it 3 was submitted that the Trial Court was not justified in convicting them relying on the purported dying declaration alleged to have been given by the deceased to the Revenue Divisional Officer (PW14) on 16.12.1992 i.e. four days prior to his death. The same was nothing but a tutored one. The High Court held that the so called statements made before the doctors cannot be accepted in view of the dying declaration recorded by PW14 the RDO. The High Court did not attach any importance to the statements purportedly given before PWs, 3, 4 and 6 and also relied on the dying declaration purportedly made by the deceased before the PW14. The High Court found that the allegations against A2, A3 were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and they were entitled to acquittal. Accordingly, the appeals filed by these accused persons were allowed and those filed by the appellants in these two appeals were dismissed.

7. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness 6 in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence.

.......................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi, May 15, 2008 12 13
Ramji Gupta & Anr vs Gopi Krishan Agrawal (D) & Ors

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

H. After such remand, the suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 20.4.2001, holding that the suit property had been acquired by Gopi Krishan Agrawal, plaintiff/respondent, by virtue of the judgment in Suit No.45 of 1956, which was decided on 23.4.1958, and that the relationship of a landlord and tenant, could in fact be deemed to have been created between the parties. The appellants/defendants had hence, been in default of payment of rent.

I. Aggrieved, the appellants filed Revision No.57 of 2001 before the learned District Judge, Kanpur, which was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 13.5.2002. The said judgment and order has been affirmed by the High Court, dismissing the writ petition vide judgment and order dated 6.9.2002.

J. Aggrieved, the appellants preferred a review petition, which has also been dismissed by the impugned judgment and order dated 25.2.2003.

12. In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned judgments. The appeal lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed.

In view of the judgment in C.A. No.629 of 2004, no specific order is required in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.

20. In view of the above, the legal issues involved herein, can be summarised as under:-

21. The instant case has been examined in light of the aforesaid legal propositions. We are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and order of the High Court cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, and is hence liable to be set aside.

In view of the above, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The judgment and order impugned herein are set aside. The respondents are at liberty to seek appropriate remedy, by resorting to appropriate proceedings, as permissible in law.

April 11, 2013.
Supri Advert.& Entertainment Pvt.Ltd vs Anahita Pandole & Ors

5. In the writ petition it was alleged that permission to display mobile hoardings had been granted to different applicants which has not only caused environmental problems but had also resulted in serious damage to heritage buildings of the city, besides causing traffic hazards, even on the arterial roads of the city and disrupting the smooth flow of traffic. It may be pointed out at this stage that neither of the appellants herein had been made parties to the writ petition, but on their application they had been allowed to intervene in the proceedings.

7. The allegations made in the Writ Petition were denied on behalf of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. It was contended that the permission granted to the appellant in these appeals was in complete conformity with the provisions of the different enactments referred to in the writ petition and it was significant that apart from the complaint of the writ petitioner no other complaint had been received from any of the inhabitants of Mumbai, either with regard to environmental problems, traffic hazards or obstruction to the smooth flow of traffic on account of grant of such permission.

8. On consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and the documents produced on their behalf and the Policy Guidelines on Grant of Permission for Display of Advertisements and Similar Devices, 2007, the Bombay High Court dismissed Notices of Motion Nos.155/2008, 156/2008 and 171/2008, with the following directions:

30. Mr. Arvind Kumar urged that in addition to the above, the raised hoardings were raised above the height permitted for carrying goods on transport vehicles and created distraction for motorists which could lead to serious consequences as far as the pedestrian public was concerned.

39. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court impugned in this appeal and the directions contained therein, but we also make it clear that this will not prevent the respondent No.1 from moving the appropriate authorities regarding the modification 37 of vehicles as Mobile Hoarding Vans. We also make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion as far as the said issue is concerned and it will be within the domain of the Motor Vehicles authorities to take such decision in the matter as appears to them to be fit and proper.

40. Having regard to the nature of the case the parties shall bear their own costs in the appeal.
Naim & Anr vs State Of Uttarakhand

On 07.09.1999 at about 1.30 pm the complainant Mustafa submitted a written report in Police Station Bhagwanpur, Haridwar to the effect that in the intervening night between 6th and 7th September 1999 he along with his brother Behroj, nephew Wasim and father Ali Hassan were sleeping in the verandah and that in the night at about 1200 hrs. he woke up and saw one Sabbir armed with Palkati, his brother Kabir armed with pharsa and one Naim armed with lathi coming to the verandah. Naim allegedly asked where was Ali Hassan, whereupon Kabir stated that Ali Hassan was sleeping and exhorted that he be killed, after which Sabbir gave a blow by palkati on the neck of Ali Hassan while he was sleeping. Ali Hassan died instantaneously. Upon alarm being raised these three persons ran away and while running they were seen by Farid Akhtar and Taimur.

3. On the basis of the above report Case Crime No.147 of 1999 under Section 302/504 IPC was registered. During the investigation statements of the complainant and other witnesses were recorded. Sabbir, Naim and Kabir were arrested and their statements led to the recovery of palkati and other weapons. The post-mortem on the body of the deceased was conducted by Dr. O.P. Sharma. After completion of investigation Sabbir, Kabir and Naim were charged for having committed the offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 504 IPC.

4. The prosecution examined complainant as PW-1, his brother Behroj as PW-2, nephew Wasim as PW-4 and Taimur as PW-3. The earliest version in the form of FIR, which was within few hours of the incident naming all the three accused was reiterated by PW-1 Mustafa and supported by other three eye-witnesses, namely, PWs 2, 3 and 4. However, the trial court was of the view that the fatal blow was dealt by Sabbir and though the other two accused, namely, Kabir and Naim were present at the place of occurrence, they had not participated in the actual assault. The appreciation by the trial court in this respect is quoted hereunder:

7. In the meantime the State, being aggrieved by the order of acquittal insofar as Kabir and Naim are concerned, preferred Government Appeal No.386 of 2003. The High Court after appreciating the entire material on record found the approach of the trial court to be completely erroneous in granting the benefit to Kabir and Naim. It was observed that all three accused were armed with deadly weapons and had entered the house of the deceased at 1200 hrs. in the night and that the essence of Section 34 IPC, namely, consensus of minds of two or more persons to participate in a criminal act to bring about a particular result was fully evident. The High Court, therefore, set aside the acquittal of said Kabir and Naim and convicted them under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life.

12. We, therefore, confirm the judgment and order of the High Court and dismiss the present criminal appeal. The accused, who are in custody, shall serve the sentence awarded to them by the High Court.
Commnr. Of Income Tax, Chennai vs M/S. S. Ajit Kumar Thr. Its Managing ...

c) Pursuant to the same, the fact that the assessee having engaged the above contractor for construction of the house came out. At the same time, from the survey in the builder’s premises, the fact of the assessee having paid Rs 95,16,000/- to M/s ECIL in cash was revealed which was not accounted for.

g) Being aggrieved, the Revenue filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court, vide order dated 22.11.2006, dismissed the appeal.

16) In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the decisions relied upon by learned senior counsel for the assessee do not lay down the correct law.

17) In the result, all the appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside and the orders passed by the Assessing Officer making the Block Assessment are restored. However, the parties shall bear their own cost.

MAY 2, 2018.
Bal Kishan Giri vs State Of U.P

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

F. The High Court after completing the trial convicted the appellant vide impugned judgment and order dated 5.2.2010 and awarded the sentence as referred to hereinabove.

7. The appellant/complainant further expressed his apprehension of having no confidence and faith in any of the three Judges of the Allahabad High Court as they could pass any order at the behest of Shri V.P. Srivastava, Senior Advocate.

19. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court has not committed any error in not accepting the appellant’s apology since the same is not bona fide. There might have been an inner impulse of outburst as the appellant alleges that his nephew had been murdered, but that is no excuse for a practicing lawyer to raise fingers against the court.

21. Hence, in view of the above, the fine of Rs.20,000/- imposed on the appellant by the High Court by way of impugned judgment and order, is reduced to Rs.2,000/- and is directed to deposit the said fine forthwith.

22. We find no force in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed. The appellant must surrender to serve out the sentence forthwith, failing which, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, would secure his custody and send him to jail to serve out the sentence. A copy of the order be sent to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, for information and compliance.

In view of the judgment passed today in connected Criminal Appeal No. 555 of 2010, this appeal is dismissed. However, the fine of Rs.20,000/- imposed on the appellant by the High Court by way of impugned judgment and order, is reduced to Rs.2,000/- and is directed to deposit the said fine forthwith.

The appellant must surrender to serve out the sentence forthwith, failing which, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, would secure his custody and send him to jail to serve out the sentence. A copy of the order be sent to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, for information and compliance.
M/S. Udaipur Phosphates Fertilizers ... vs Union Of India & Anr

In the year 1982, the Government of India brought SSP under a formal price control known as the Retention Price and Subsidy Scheme (hereinafter referred to as RPS) for regulating the price and sale of SSP. The scheme had been introduced on the basis of a detailed study and recommendation of an Inter-Ministerial Working Group appointed by the Government. Under the RPS, the manufacturers were obliged to sell their fertilizers at a subsidized price fixed by the Government, which was below the cost of production. The respondent No. 2 calculated the cost of production of each unit on the basis of certain factors such as capacity, location, age of the plant, etc. and added a certain amount of notional profit, and the result was called the retention price. The difference between the retention price and the selling price as fixed by the Government was calculated and paid to the manufacturers as subsidy. Thus, while price of the fertilizers for the consumers, namely, the farmers was subsidized by the Government, the manufacturers were given an amount which was calculated by the FICC on the basis of normative cost of production of the unit which was to be calculated on the assumption that the unit performed efficiently at 90% capacity utilization.

Thereafter, the respondents asked for several verifications which were provided by the appellant. However, it is alleged that despite repeated follow-ups, after the various verifications, respondent No. 1 issued letter of approval only on 31.3.1993, i.e. three years after the appellant had applied for re-endorsement, stating that they were recognizing the appellant's enhanced capacity of 74,089 MT from the earlier capacity of 66,000 MT with retrospective effect from 1.4.1990. It was further informed that respondent No. 1 was tentatively recovering an amount of Rs. 26.55 lakhs by downward revision of the ex-works price of the appellant from 1.4.1990.

In pursuance of this Press Note the appellant made an application for re-endorsing the capacity on the basis of actual manufacture during 1st April 1988 and 31st March 1990. The 1st respondent accorded approval of re-endorsement by letter dated 31st March 1993. The said letter also indicated that in view of the higher capacity the fixed charges had been re-calculated from 1st April 1990. The letter stated that on the basis of re-calculation there would be a recovery of approximately Rs. 26.55 lakhs. A writ petition was filed challenging the re-calculation of the fixed charges and the recovery of approximate Rs. 26.55 lakhs.

We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench that once the appellant's case falls within the criteria laid down in Press Note 9 then the re-endorsement takes place automatically. Once such re-endorsement takes place on the basis of actual manufacture the fixed cost is bound to be revised and hence the subsidy is bound to be reduced.

In view of the above, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Pitambar Singh & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors

3. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by Shri Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, it is necessary to go into the facts of the case.

1); since, by that time, Bhagwati Singh, the father, had died. Still Pitambar Singh (appellant No. 1) also had a major son, Ravindra Singh. A draft statement was made and published showing that Pitambar Singh (appellant No. 1) was entitled to retain only 18 acres of land and thus, the family was holding 15.95 acres of land as surplus land. On the service of the draft statement, Pitambar Singh (appellant No. 1) filed objections under Section 10(3) of the Ceiling Act. It was pointed out that whatever may be the status on the relevant date under the Ceiling Act, when the proceedings were taken, Rabindra Kumar Singh (appellant No. 2) was major on 9.9.1970 also and as such, he also was entitled to his own share and he could not be held as a member of family of Pitambar SIngh. This objection was rejected by the order dated 31.10.1975. An appeal was preferred against this order, wherein it was decided that the appellants should be treated as two families. However, this order was recalled and the appeal filed before the appellate authority came to be dismissed by the order dated 30.6.1976. A revision was filed against this order, which stood allowed by the 4 order dated 10.5.1977, whereby the matter was remanded to the appellate authority for the purpose of determining the age of Rabindra Kumar Singh (appellant No. 2 herein) as on 9.9.1970. After the remand, the appellate authority, by its order dated 15.12.1977, recorded a finding that Rabindra Kumar Singh (appellant No. 2 herein) was major on 9.9.1970 and accordingly, he was entitled to be treated as a separate family from that of his father Pitambar Singh (appellant No. 1). It is very significant to note that this order was never challenged by the State by way of a revision and the said order attained the finality. However, a draft statement under Section 11(1) of the Ceiling Act was finally published and gazetted under Section 15(1) of the Ceiling Act, on the basis of the old orders no draft statement was published after passing of the order dated 15.12.1977, which ought to have been published noting the change made by the appellate authority, whereby Rabindra Kumar Singh (appellant No.

8. The appeal is allowed in terms of what is stated above.

October 8, 2010.
Ex. Lt. Col. R.K. Rai vs Union Of India And Ors.

The brief facts of the case are:

Release Medical Board held on 31.03.2004, found that the appellant was suffering from primary Hypertension, aggravated due to stress and strain of military service. Disability was assessed at 30%. The appellant filed O.A. No. 25 of 2013 in the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Mumbai, where he prayed for following reliefs:-

5. The claim for grant of disability element/ war injury element in affected cases will be submitted to the PSA concerned by PCDA(O) Pune/ NPO/AFCAO/ Record office along-with copy of medical board/ fresh medical board proceedings showing extent of disability applicable as on date of effect of this letter in respect of Commissioned officers/ JCOs/ ORs. It win be responsibility of PCDA(O) Pune/ NPO/ AFCAO and Record office to confirm payment/ non- payment of lump sum-compensation in lieu of disability element to Commissioned officers and JCOs/ ORs. A sanction showing extent of disability and its attributability/ aggravation due to Military service in terms of MOD letter No. 4684/DIR(PEN)/2001 dated 14.08.2001 would be issued by the Service HQrs in case of 10 Commissioned Officers and sanction would be issued by IO/ C Record office in case of JCOs/ ORs.

6. The corrigendum PPOs granting disability element/ war injury element in all affected cases will be issued by respective Pension Sanctioning Authorities.

8. Pension Regulation of all the three services will be amended in due course.

10. Hindi version will follow.

Yours faithfully Sd/-

In the Review Petition also, the appellant does not appear to have pressed the said claim. We, thus, do not find it necessary to consider the said claim in these appeals. However, liberty is reserved to the appellant to file a Review Petition before the Tribunal, in event, the claim was pressed and not considered.

16.In result, the civil appeals are allowed. Judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 20.09.2013 and 11.06.2014 are set aside. The respondents are directed to process the claim of the appellant as per 15 the Government order dated 19.05.2017 in light of the observations as made above.
Bhartiben Nayabha Ker vs Sidabha Pethabha Manke

2 The appellants are heirs and legal representatives of Nayabha Mapbha Ker who died as a result of a motor accident on 18 July 1993. He was travelling Digitally signed by DEEPAK GUGLANI Date: 2018.04.05 in a jeep bearing Registration No GBI-7896 which was being driven by the 11:45:11 IST Reason:

3 The deceased was 41 years old at the time of the accident. He had acquired a B.A. and B.Ed. qualification. For seven years, he had served as President of the Taluka Panchayat. The deceased owned agricultural land. The Tribunal assessed the annual income of the deceased at Rs.81,000 comprised of his agricultural income and income from other sources. Applying a multiplier of 12, the Tribunal computed an amount of Rs. 7.56 lakhs towards the loss of dependency. A total amount of Rs 7.78 lakhs was awarded inclusive of conventional heads. In appeal, the High Court came to the conclusion that the total income would work out to Rs 92,000 out of which one fourth would be deducted for personal expenses. Applying a multiplier of 14, the High Court 3 awarded an additional amount of Rs 33,000. However, the rate of interest has been reduced to 9% per annum.

7 The appeal is accordingly allowed by directing that the quantum of compensation shall stand enhanced to Rs 12,67,000 on which interest shall be payable at 9% p.a. from the date of the claim petition. There shall be no order as to costs.

...........................................CJI [DIPAK MISRA] ...........................................J [A M KHANWILKAR] ...........................................J [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD] New Delhi;

April 05, 2018
M/S Nathu Ram Ramesh Kumar vs Commr.Of Delhi Value Added Tax

3. The facts giving rise to the present litigation, in a nutshell, are as under :

Being aggrieved by the above mentioned assessment orders, the assessee had preferred appeals before the Commissioner of Sales Tax, which had been dismissed by an order dated 13.11.2003 and therefore, the assessee had preferred appeals before the Appellate Tribunal of Sales Tax, which had also been dismissed by a common order dated 03.11.2004.

12. We do not find any substance in the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-assessee and therefore, we are not inclined to allow the appeals for the reasons stated hereinbelow :

13. For the aforestated reasons, in our opinion, the impugned judgment delivered by the High Court is just and proper, which does not require any interference and therefore, the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.

(Dipak Misra) New Delhi;

April 9, 2014