L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of M.P vs Babulal & Ors

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

20. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The Judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court restored. The respondents are directed to surrender within four weeks from today failing which the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class Bhander, Distt. Datia is directed to take them into custody and send them to jail to serve out the remaining part of the sentence. A copy of the order be sent to the learned Magistrate concerned.

……………..................................J. (S.A. BOBDE) NEW DELHI;

August 12, 2013
Kalpesh Hemantbhai Shah vs Manhar Auto Stores Thru Its Partner& Ors

3. The appellant-original plaintiff is the landlord and the respondents- original defendants are the tenants with respect to suit premises which is a shop admeasuring approximately 200 sq. ft. on the ground floor in the building named “Savita Sadan” bearing New Municipal House No. 323 (2) in New Ward No.23, Mofusil Plot, Morshi Road, Amravati.

12. In view of the aforesaid finding, we hold that the High Court had no jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with or alter a finding of fact arrived at by an Appellate Court deciding the question of personal necessity of a landlord in a landlord- tenant dispute. For the reason aforesaid, the judgment passed by the High Court cannot be upheld. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 23rd February, 2010 and 1st October, 2010, passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by the Appellate Court. The appeals are allowed.
Special Deputy Collector vs J. Sivaprakasam & Ors

3. The said lands (Sy. No.186/1 and 186/2) belonged to one V.T. Jayaraman and he was shown as the registered owner/pattadar of the said lands in the revenue records. He is stated to have died on 3.11.1978 leaving two sons and two daughters (respondents 1 to 4 herein) as his legal heirs. On the death of V.T. Jayaraman, the said lands bearing Sy. No.186/1 and 186/2 were not mutated in the names of his legal heirs but continued to be in the name of the deceased V.T. Jayaraman in the revenue records. Respondents 1 to 4 leased the said lands in favour of the eleventh respondent (a trust for running an educational institution) on 25.10.1987. Respondents 1 to 4 also sold portions of the said lands to respondents 5 to 10 who in turn, also granted a lease of their portions in favour of eleventh respondent. Thus respondents 1 to 4 were not shown as the owners/occupiers of the said lands in the revenue/municipal records, nor were they in physical possession of the said lands. It is stated that the eleventh respondent was in exclusive 3 possession of the said lands at the time of issue of preliminary and final notifications and even thereafter.

11) admitted that the eleventh respondent as also respondents 5 to 10 had 4 received a notice dated 9.6.1999 from the appellant calling upon them to appear in the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act; and that respondents 5 to 11 on learning that the lands were notified under section 4(1) of the Act, had filed their objections dated 9.7.1999 against the acquisition proposal on the ground that a school was running in the said lands and that the lands were far away from the existing market complex.

Re : Question (ii) : Validity of the acquisition

Conclusion

29. In view of the above, we are of the view that the acquisition has to be upheld. Accordingly we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the division bench of the High Court affirming the order of the learned 25 Single Judge. We uphold the acquisition and dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondents. Our observations in para 25 above regarding absence of proof of title of respondents 1 to 4 being in the context of the validity of acquisition, will not come in the way of their establishing any claim for their share of compensation, if any, in the acquired lands in accordance with law.
Haryana State Agri.Market.Board & Anr vs Raj Pal

2. The first appellant is the Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board ('Board' for short) and second appellant is the Nigdhu Market Committee ('Market Committee' for short). The Market Committee established a New Grain Market at Karnal-Pehowa Road, Nighdu, District Karnal. It gave public notice of a scheme for the open auction of plots, booths and commercial places in the market, to be held on 13.1.1999. The said auction was governed by the Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (Sale of Immovable Property) Rules 1997 (for short `the Rules').

The auction Notice also reiterated Conditions (3) and (12) extracted above.

6. The High Court allowed the writ petitions by a common order dated 15.10.2008. It referred to some of its earlier decisions where directions were issued not to charge interest or penal interest until the water, sewerage disposal and other facilities were provided. It, therefore, disposed of the petitions with the following directions:

12. We, therefore, allow these appeals in part and permit the Market Committee to issue revised Demand Notices claiming only simple interest at the rate 15% per annum. The respective respondent shall pay the interest within three months from the date of receipt of the demand notice from the Market Committee. If the amount of interest is not paid, the Market Committee will be entitled to take such action as may permissible in terms of the rules in accordance with law.
Bilaspur Raipur K.Gramin Bank And Anr vs Madanlal Tandon

3. The factual matrix of the case is that the respondent was working as a Field Supervisor in the appellant Bank since 1981. In February, 1984, a charge-sheet was issued to him for having committed misconduct and after a departmental inquiry, an order dated 5.7.1984 was passed by the Disciplinary Authority imposing punishment of stoppage of his two annual increments. Thereafter a second charge-sheet was issued to the respondent in November, 1987 alleging that the respondent had committed several financial irregularities in various loan cases. An inquiry was conducted, wherein fourteen charges were found proved against the respondent and three charges were not found proved. Consequently, the punishment of removal from service was inflicted against the respondent on 1.10.1991. Respondent preferred an appeal before the Board of Directors of the appellant Bank, but the same was dismissed.

6. The Division Bench of the High Court further observed that in the instant case neither the list of witnesses nor the list of documents was supplied to the respondent along with the charge-sheet. Though during the course of inquiry some documents were supplied to him but those documents, on which the reliance was placed by the Inquiry Officer for holding various charges proved, were not supplied to the respondent. The High Court further observed that the respondent is out of employment since 01.10.1991 and his claim for arrears of salary, as stated by counsel for both the parties, would be more than 45-50 lakhs. The Bank’s money is public money and a huge amount cannot be paid to anyone for doing no work. The principle of “no work no pay” has been evolved in view of the public interest that an employee who does not discharge his duty is not entitled to arrears of salary at the cost of public exchequer. By way of impugned judgment, the High Court, therefore, concluded that in the facts and circumstances of the case a lump-sum payment of Rs. 5,00,000/- towards the claim of salary, would be just and proper in this matter. The respondent was also held to be entitled to all other consequential benefits.

9. Indisputably, no documents were supplied to the respondent along with the charge-sheet on the basis of which charges were framed. Some of the documents were given during departmental inquiry, but relevant documents on the basis of which findings were recorded were not made available to the respondent. It further appears that the list of documents and witnesses were also not supplied and some of the documents were produced during the course of inquiry.

7. Hence, the present appeal by special leave by the appellant Bank and its Board of Directors. It is worth to mention here that the respondent has not come to this Court against the impugned judgment passed by the High Court.

11. After giving our anxious consideration, we do not find any reason to differ with the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and also the Division Bench of the High Court in writ appeal. Therefore, this civil appeal is dismissed.
State Of Haryana vs Angoori Devi

3. The victim’s father (hereinafter referred to as the ‘complainant’) lodged an FIR, pursuant to which Sessions Crime No. 9 of 29.3.1996 was commenced. It was alleged that about 1 & ¼ years ago when his daughter Babli was pregnant, her in-laws had asked her to leave the house and return only if she brought Rs.60,000/-.

4. It is alleged that the victim informed her parents about this demand and she started living with her parents. She gave birth to a daughter, after which she stayed with her parents for 5 to 6 months. Thereafter, the complainant requested the accused to take the victim back. It is stated that the victim has lived with her in-laws for about 20 days, after which she was thrown out from her matrimonial home. Her mother-in-law (Respondent No. 1) and father-in-law (Respondent No. 2) demanded gold ring and a chain. It is stated that a village Panchayat was convened after which 3 Babli was sent to her in-laws house on 29.10.1995. On 3.12.1995, the complainant came to know about the death of the victim. He came to know that the victim had been burnt to death. He went to the spot and saw the dead body.

5. According to the complaint, since the victim had died due to torture and beating by her in-laws to press their demand for dowry, the matter was reported to the Sadar Police Station, Bahadurgarh. Investigation was commenced and the body of the victim was sent for post mortem examination. The post mortem report opined that the cause of death was shock as a result of anti-mortem superficial deep burns over entire body.

6. The prosecution examined nine witnesses. No witnesses were examined on behalf of the defence. In the examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the respondent No. 3, Kartar Singh, husband of the victim, deposed that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, being his parents, resided separately.

7. The complainant who deposed as the 4th prosecution witness (PW4) stated that immediately after marriage the respondent started harassing the victim for dowry and also used to beat his daughter. The victim was thrown out of the 4 house when she was in the family way as they wanted her to bring Rs.60,000/- in cash, gold articles and a Refrigerator.

15. Considering the evidence, the Court did not find the evidence strong enough to hold the respondents guilty. We agree with the High Court that the evidence is weak, and not sufficient for conviction.

17. Under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution cannot escape from discharging its burden of proving that the harassment or cruelty was related to 7 demand for dowry soon before death. In this case, the High Court has been swayed by the fact that the evidence of the complainant, being the father of the victim, did not evince direct knowledge of demand of dowry. The judgment and order under appeal is not liable to be interfered with.

18. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Maddineni Koteswara Rao vs Maddineni Bhaskara Rao & Anr

3. The relevant facts leading to the present appeal are as follows:

4. When the aforesaid suit was pending, M.Veera Raghavaiah (since deceased) being the father of the parties, executed a registered Will on 21st of March, 1984 bequeathing his 1/4th share in respect of the plaint scheduled property in favour of the respondent and also a sum of Rs.10,000/- was allotted to his daughter/ respondent No.2 herein. M. Veera Raghavaiah died on 17th of January, 1985. While the suit was pending, more precisely on 25th of February, 1985, the respondent filed a photostat copy of the Will in the trial court praying that the 3 probate of the will bequeathing his 1/4th share in respect of the plaint scheduled property to the respondent and Rs. 10,000/- to his daughter be granted. When the photostat copy of the Will was filed by the respondent for grant of probate, it was made clear by all the parties that the parties on record were sufficient and there was no need of impleading any other legal representatives. An endorsement to this effect was also made by the counsel for the appellant stating that "no L.Rs. need be added". In view of such stand taken by the parties before the trial Court and no objection having been raised upto this Court, we refrain from going into the question whether probate can be granted to the Will in question in the absence of any other heirs and legal representatives of the deceased, if there be any.

5. On 4th of November, 1986, the appellant went in appeal before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad against the preliminary decree declaring 1/4th share each to the parties including the share in favour of the deceased father of the appellant before the High Court which came to be registered as A.S.No. 2879 of 1986 4 which was also dismissed by a learned Judge of the High Court that had confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant also filed a Letters Patent Appeal which came to be registered as LPA No.154 of 1997 before the Division Bench of the High Court. It would be evident from the record that while the LPA was pending, the respondent on 11th of February, 1988 filed an application for drawing up the final decree in respect of the plaint scheduled property in which he applied for appointment of a Commissioner to divide the plaint scheduled property into four equal shares and to allot two shares to the respondent as his father M.Veera Raghavaiah had executed a registered Will dated 21st of March, 1984. The appellant resisted the said application on numerous grounds.

17. We have already explained in this judgment that Section 97 of the CPC is not applicable to the facts and 17 circumstances of the present case and, therefore, we do not find any applicability of Paragraph 9 of the decision thereof in this decision of this Court in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

18. No other point was raised by the learned counsel for the parties before us. Accordingly we do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is thus dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Commnr. Of Central Excise, Chandigarh vs M/S. Pepsi Foods Ltd

2. The material facts are that the respondent-

assessee, M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. is engaged, inter alia, in the manufacture of edibles, marketed under the names of Potato Chips, Baked Cheetos Balls, Monster Munch, etc. These are covered under Chapter Sub-Headings 2001.10 and 1904.10 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (Act 5 of 1986). Uptill 12th January, 1998, as much as 96% of these products manufactured by the respondent, were sold to M/s. Frito-Lay India, a `related person', and the balance of 4% were sold to independent wholesale buyers. From 12th January, 1998, the sale pattern between the two was changed, wherein M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. started manufacturing the aforesaid products on behalf of M/s. Frito-Lay India.

3. By a communication dated 15th December, 1997 addressed to the Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise, Division Jalandhar, the respondent stated that it had been paying excise duty on its manufactured excisable goods after taking into account inter alia, the costs of raw materials, packing materials, conversions and their profit margin. Subsequently it calculated and paid the differential duty, on the price at which the final products were sold by M/s. Frito-Lay India to its wholesale dealers. It enclosed certificate of a chartered accountant in support of its calculations. In its submission of Annexure-A as required under Rule 173C (3A) of Central Excise Rules, 1944, it mentioned that the sale of the products occurred at its factory gate. It was also evident from the letter that the final products were entering the market stream when they were being sold by 3 M/s. Frito-Lay India to their wholesale dealers.

4. The Revenue, however, accepted the incidence of sale at the time of purchase of the final products by the whole sellers from M/s. Frito- Lay India and not, as submitted by the respondent-assessee, at the factory gate. Resultantly, a show-cause notice dated 13th November, 1998 was issued to the respondent and to that the respondent showed cause stating inter alia that the sale to the whole sellers was being effected from the depot of the related person, viz. M/s. Frito-Lay India. Dissatisfied with the reply, the Revenue demanded duty of Rs.12,26,215/-.

5. Aggrieved, the respondent moved the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals), Chandigarh. The Commissioner, however, held that the freight charges arising between the 4 factory of the respondent and the depot of the related person were to be included in the sale price as the place of removal of the goods was the depot of the related person.
Ashok Tshering Bhutia vs State Of Sikkim

(G) Being aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court by filing the Revision Petition No.4 of 1998 challenging the aforesaid order. The High Court disposed of the said petition vide order dated 26.8.1998 holding that it would be the duty of the Investigating Officer to establish its authority at the time of commencement of the trial.

(H) During the course of trial, the prosecution examined 26 witnesses and the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called Cr.P.C.) on 29.11.2001. Subsequent thereto, in support of his case the appellant also examined 4 witnesses. The Special Judge held the appellant guilty of the aforesaid charges vide judgment and order dated 30.5.2002 and awarded the punishment mentioned hereinabove.

With the aforesaid remarks, the Special Judge referred the matter back to the High Court and the High Court heard the arguments and dismissed the appeal vide impugned judgment and order. Hence, this appeal.

proportionate assets the burden shifts to the accused to prove his innocence. Mere acquisition of property does not itself constitute an offence under the P.C. Act, 1988, rather it is failure to satisfactorily account for such possession of property that makes the possession 9 thereof objectionable as offending the law. The issue of segregation of income and expenditure etc. for the periods covered by the two Acts is not required to be considered as PC Act 1947 as well as PC Act 1988 provided for the possession of assets at any time during the period of his office. Defence evidence has rightly been discarded by the courts below being not reliable. Any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction does not vitiate the trial unless a failure of justice has been occasioned thereby. Thus, the appeal is devoid of any merit and is liable to the dismissed.

14. In view of the above, the facts and circumstances of the instant case require an examination of the case on merits.

18. In view of the above, the law on the point can be summarised to the effect that additional evidence can be taken at the appellate stage in exceptional circumstances, to remove an irregularity, where the 19 circumstances so warrant in public interest. Generally, such power is exercised to have formal proof of the documents etc. just to meet the ends of justice. However, the provisions of Section 391 Cr.P.C.

cannot be pressed into service in order to fill up lacunae in the prosecution's case.

(Emphasis added)

Thus, in such a fact situation, the appellant could not be fastened with criminal liability for want of compliance of the said requirement of the Rules.
Surender Singh vs The State Of Haryana

5. The details of the acquisition, such as name of the villages and the area of the land situated in each village are setout hereinbelow 10 S.No. Name of Village Area acquired (per acre)

14. By impugned judgment, the High Court partly allowed the appeals filed by the landowners and as a consequence thereof dismissed the appeals filed by the State. The High Court while partly allowing the landowners’ appeals further enhanced the rate of acquired land from Rs.43,17,841/- per acre to Rs.62,11,700/- per acre.

15. In other words, in the opinion of the High Court, the fair market rate of acquired land should be at Rs.62,11,700/- per acre and, therefore, the 15 compensation be paid to each landowner for their acquired lands, at the rate of Rs.62,11,700/- per acre.

27. According to learned counsel, the landowners’ appeals were liable to be dismissed whereas the State's appeals deserved to be allowed by the High Court by setting aside the award of the Reference Court.

40. Taking into consideration the aforesaid infirmities, which we have noticed, we have no hesitation in holding that the trial in these cases has not been satisfactory. We cannot countenance the cursory manner in which both the Courts below proceeded to determine the market rate of the acquired land. It has certainly caused prejudice to both the parties.

41. We do not blame any party for prosecuting their case in wholly unsatisfactory manner but the fact remains that both the parties failed to adduce sufficient evidence on several material issues, as a result, both the Courts below did not record any finding on any of the material issues arising in the case.

42. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we find it difficult at this stage to determine the fair market rate of the acquired land for want of sufficient 28 evidence. If we do, it will cause prejudice to the parties. We, therefore, refrain from doing so.

43. In view of the foregoing discussion, we allow the appeals filed by the State, set aside the impugned judgment and the award of the Reference Court (Civil Courts) and remand the cases to the Reference Court for deciding all reference cases afresh on merits keeping in view our observations made supra.

44. Parties would be at liberty to adduce additional evidence in support of their respective stand both oral and documentary. The Reference Court will accordingly decide the rate of land as prevalent on the date of acquisition in the light of law laid down by this Court strictly in accordance with law uninfluenced by any finding of the High Court and this Court on the merits.

January 25, 2018 31
Syed Ahmed vs State Of Karnataka

The facts:

Thimmegowda (Nagaraja’s father) as PW4; B. Pradeep Kumar (PW5) the Police Inspector of the Lok Ayukta Police, who arranged the trap, prepared the trap mahazar and investigated the case; S.C. Rangasetty (PW7) who dealt with the complaint dated 7th June, 1993 and confirmed the settlement Exhibit P.15. The officer who seized the samples relevant to the trap and sent them to Bangalore for analysis and then received the report was examined as PW8. None of the prosecution witnesses turned hostile. Trial Court judgment:

It is while undertaking this exercise that we find from the evidence of the witnesses that there was sufficient evidence of Syed Ahmed demanding illegal gratification from Nagaraja and receiving and accepting it when given by him. On this basis, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment and order under appeal.

The appeal is dismissed.

July 31, 2012
Dahyabhai Ranchhoddas Dhobi & Anr vs State Of Gujarat & Ors

3) Brief facts:

After holding so, since the Notification under Section 4 was lastly published on 06.08.1992 in the Official Gazette and declaration under Section 6 was published in the Gazette on 05.08.1993, this Court found that the same is well within one year and accordingly dismissed the appeal of the landowners.

21) In the light of the above discussion, we are unable to sustain any of the objections raised by the appellants. On the other hand, we are in entire agreement with the stand taken by the State as well as the conclusion arrived at by the High Court. Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.

JULY 23, 2010.