L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Ganpath Singh Gangaram Singh Rajput vs Gulbarga Univ.Tr.Regr.& Ors

Short facts giving rise to the present appeals are as follows:

We find substance in this submission. Ordinarily, in a case where the person appointed is found ineligible, this Court after setting aside such appointment, directs for consideration of cases of such of the candidates, who have been found eligible. It is only in exceptional cases that this Court issues mandamus for appointment. The case in hand is not one of those cases where the High Court ought to have issued mandamus for appointment of Shivanand as Lecturer in MCA. Hence, we are of the opinion that the High Court rightly held Ganpat ineligible and quashed his appointment. However, it erred in issuing mandamus for appointment of Shivanand. Accordingly, we uphold the impugned order of the High Court whereby it had set aside the appointment of the appellant herein and direct that the case of the writ petitioner Shivanand and all other candidates be considered in accordance with law. However, we make it clear that the selection already made shall be taken to its logical conclusion.

In the result, we dismiss these appeals with modification in the direction as aforesaid with cost, which we assess at Rs.50,000/-(Rupees fifty thousand) only in both the cases, payable by the appellants in both the appeals equally.

………………………………………………………….J (CHANDRAMAULI KR PRASAD) ………………………………………………………….J (KURIAN JOSEPH) New Delhi, November 01, 2013.
Venkatesh R vs Divisional Manager, Ksrtc

3. According to the appellant, he suffered injury in a motor accident and fractured his leg. He filed an application for grant of compensation and the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, by its award dated 06.06.2005, granted a compensation of Rs.50,000/- with costs and interest @ 7% p.a. from 19th March, 2004. The claimant, aggrieved by the quantum of compensation, preferred an appeal, which had been dismissed by the impugned judgment and order.

7. In that view of the matter, the order of the High Court cannot be allowed to stand.

9. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and remit the matter back to the High Court for consideration in accordance with law. No costs.

NOVEMBER 26, 2012
M/S Steel Authority Of India Ltd vs Sales Tax Officer,Rourkela-I ...

3. A brief reference to the factual aspects will be necessary.

The appellant, a Public Sector Undertaking carries on business in manufacture and sale of Iron & Steel and Chemical Fertiliser as its finished product and bi-product, surplus and rejected articles, in course of inter-state trade and commerce and export. Apart from that, the appellant- Company effects transfer of stock of goods to its branches located at various places of the country. For the assessment year 2001-02, notice was issued under Rule 12(5) of the Central Sales Tax (Orissa), Rules, 1957 (in short `Central Rules') for the purpose of assessment under Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (in short the `Act'). After examination of the books of accounts produced, an extra demand of Rs.19,25,41,763.00 was raised. The appellant-Company had disclosed net sale 2 and transfer of goods during the year under assessment in question as follows:

Accordingly tax was levied.

A few days thereafter, on 19.04.2006, the Assistant Commissioner disposed of the appeal filed dismissing the same and confirming the order of assessment. A Second Appeal was filed before the Orissa Sales Tax Tribunal (in short the Tribunal). An application for stay was also filed. By order dated 14.08.2006, the Commissioner directed deposit of Rs.15.00 Crores. The said order was challenged before the High Court and, as noted above, by the impugned order, the High Court disposed of the said petition without expressing 5 any opinion on merits but observing that the matter was under examination by this Court.

9. A bare reading of the order shows complete non- application of mind. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, this is not the way a statutory appeal is to be disposed of. Various important questions of law were raised. Unfortunately, even they were not dealt by the first appellate authority.

12. Therefore, in terms of the observations made by this Court while issuing notice on 19.10.2006, we set aside the impugned order of the Assistant Commissioner and remit the matter to him for a fresh consideration of the appeal. Needless to say, he has to dispose of the appeal by a reasoned order 12 dealing with all the points of challenge highlighted by the appellant.

13. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

14. Considering the fact that similar disputes are a recurring feature, the first appellate authority would do well to dispose of the appeal within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of our order.

15. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent without any order as to costs.

...............................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ...............................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, July 10, 2008 13
Hubli-Dharwad Urban Dev. Authority vs Shekhar Gowda Chennabsannagowda P.(D ) ...

2. The First Respondent filed the Writ Petition stating that his family owns 2 acres and 35 guntas in Survey No. 311/A/1 in Byridevana Koppa Village, Hubli Taluk in which there were bore wells, cattle sheds, residential houses and standing trees. It was averred in the Writ Petition that a Notification under Section 17(3) of the Act was issued on 06.02.2002 but no notice was personally served on him. It was also stated in the Writ Petition that a Notification under Section 19(1) of the Act was issued on 07.10.2003 which was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 17.11.2003. It was stated in the Writ Petition that the First Respondent was not aware of the publication in the Gazette and that the Notification issued under Section 17 and the declaration issued under Section 19 of the Act were not served upon him. He was also unaware of the award proceedings. The First Respondent further stated in the Writ Petition that he came to know about the preliminary Notification only in August, 2005 when the officials of the Appellant visited the site and informed him about the acquisition. The First Respondent also stated in the Writ Petition that immediately after he came to know about the acquisition proceedings he approached the authorities and found that no layout was prepared and finalized. The First Respondent averred in the Writ Petition that the preliminary Notification under Section 17(3) of the Act was prepared without complying with the provisions of Section 15(1), 16 and 17 (1) of the Act. He further stated that due to non service of the notice, he lost an opportunity to file his objections. On the basis of the averments mentioned above, the First Respondent sought for quashing of the Notification issued under Section 17(3) and the declaration issued under Section 19(3) of the Act.

3. The Appellant filed its Statement of Objections in Writ Petition No. 12654 of 2006 in which it was stated that there were no structures on the acquired land and possession of the said land was taken on 02.09.2005. A Notification under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published in the Gazette on 22.12.2006. It was also stated that personal notice was issued to the First Respondent on 11.09.2001 but he refused to receive the notice on 13.09.2001. The said notice was also published in Samyukta Karnataka Daily Newspaper on 26.07.2001 and Vijaya Karnataka Daily Newspaper on 27.07.2001. It was further averred that the First Respondent was aware of the Notification under Section 19(1) of the Act dated 07.10.2003 which is evident from the fact that he gave an application dated 30.01.2004 for dropping the acquisition proceedings. The said application was rejected on 28.02.2004. According to the Appellant, the acquisition Notification issued under Section 17(3) and the declaration issued under Section 19(3) of the Act were issued after complying with the relevant provisions of the Act and that interference by the High Court was unwarranted.

12. In view of the above, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the Appeal is allowed.
University Of Delhi vs Union Of India

3. The challenge in the writ petition was, inter alia, to MAHABIR SINGH Date: 2019.12.17 16:00:40 IST Reason: the decision dated 12.5.2011 of the Delhi Development Page 1 of 34 Authority (hereinafter referred to as the, “DDA” for short) who had allowed respondent no.13­M/s Young Builders (P) Ltd. to construct a high­rise multistory group housing society in the control zone of Zone­C in the University campus, without any height restriction. The construction permission was allowed on the plot leased out to the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the, “DMRC” for short) by permitting segregation of 2 hectares as a separate entity from the total 3 hectares of land, acquired for the metro station.

4. The principal contentions of the appellant­ University on the merits of the challenge were as follows: a) the permission sought by Respondent No. 13

Subsequently legal opinion was sought and the draft appeal and petition was prepared which was thereafter got vetted and settled by the Senior Counsel. The finalized Appeal was thereafter again considered at the highest level at the University to take the final decision, which entailed some time. On 01.03.2018, the LPA was filed before the Delhi High Court.

10. The above explanation for the delayed filing was however not accepted and the Division Bench of the High Court on 29.10.2018 dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay without considering the merits of the appeal. Thus, Page 11 of 34 aggrieved the appellant­University has filed this appeal.

Page 29 of 34

29. Therefore, taking into consideration all these aspects of the matter, we are of the opinion that not only the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the writ petition inter alia is hit by delay and laches but the decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPA on Page 33 of 34 the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and the orders do not call for interference.

30. Accordingly, the appeals being devoid of merits stand dismissed with no order as to costs. All pending applications shall stand disposed of.
Bimla Devi And Anr vs State Of J & K

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Sections 306 and 498-A of the Ranbir Penal Code (in short the `RPC') while reducing the sentence so far as the offence relatable to Section 306 is concerned. The custodial sentence and fine of Rs.500/- was confirmed. Learned Sessions Judge, Kathua had found the appellant guilty as afore-noted and had sentenced the appellant to undergo RI for 7= years and 2 years respectively and fine with default stipulation. Appellant No.1 is the mother of appellant No.2. The present appellant and one Jatinder Kumar, brother of appellant No.2 faced trial for alleged commission of offence referred to above.

11. In the said case the matter was remanded. But in the present case no useful purpose would be served in remanding matter since it is more than 20 years old and the appellant has served part of the custodial sentence. Apart from that in the present case, in the examination under Section 313 of the Code no question was put up relating to demand of dowry and abetment of suicide. That being so, the appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct. The conviction stands set aside. The bail bonds executed to give effect to the order of bail dated 9.1.2001 shall stand discharged.

12. Appeal is allowed.
Kannan (Dead) By Lrs And Others vs V.S. Pandurangam (Dead) By Lrs & Others

5. Against the aforesaid decision the plaintiff (respondent herein), filed a second appeal which was allowed by the High Court by the impugned judgment dated 17.8.2000.

4. Against the judgment and decree of the trial court the appellant herein filed an appeal which was allowed by the Additional Sub-ordinate Judge, Cuddalore on 30.12.1985. The First Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the trial court and allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit, holding that the defendant had acquired title by adverse possession over the property in dispute.

14. In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court should only be set aside on the ground of non compliance with Section 100(4) if some prejudice has been caused to the appellant before us by not formulating such a substantial question of law.

15. In the present case, we agree with the view taken by the High Court that the defendant appellant has not been able to establish that the ingredients of plea of adverse possession (nec vi, nec clam, nec precario) had been established by the defendant-appellant. Hence there is no force in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

16. Normally, we grant six months' time to the tenant to vacate the residential premises but looking to the fact that the appellants have been in possession of the suit premises for a long time, therefore, as a special case we grant to the appellants time till 31.12.2008 to vacate and hand over vacant physical possession of the suit premises subject to the appellants' filing the usual undertaking before this Court within a period of eight weeks from today.
Commnr. Of Central Excise, Chandigarh vs M/S. Stesalit Ltd

2) We herein set out the facts, in brief, to appreciate the issue involved in this appeal.

3) The respondent-a Limited Company is engaged in the manufacture of parts of Railways and Tramways stock classifiable under Chapter 86 including smoothing Reactors falling under Chapter 85.04 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The respondent also undertakes the activity of modification/up-gradation of old Smoothing Reactors received from the Railways.

5) It was, however, observed by the authority concerned that the respondent manufactured copper coils from the copper strips and used them capatively in the up-gradation of smoothing reactors. The respondent, however, neither paid any duty on the copper coil used by them capatively in their modification activity undertaken at the relevant period nor did they submit the requisite declaration under Rule 173-C of the Central Excise Rules, 1944(hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”).

8) Felt aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent(assessee) filed appeal before the Tribunal. The respondent, however, did not challenge the demand of duty but confined their challenge only to imposition of penalty and, in particular, its quantum. According to the respondent, having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, at best, nominal amount of penalty could be levied on the respondent but not the one imposed.

16) In the light of foregoing discussion, we are unable to concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal. They are not legally sustainable and, therefore, deserve to be set aside.

17) The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Impugned order is set aside and that of the order passed by the adjudicating authority is restored. No costs.

February 15, 2017
Prabhat Kumar Sharma vs Union Public Service Commission & Ors

The facts are taken from Civil Appeal No. 5483 of 2000. This appeal has been filed by a member of "Lohar" community from the State of Bihar. "Lohars" are being treated as Other Backward Classes whereas he claims to be a member of Scheduled Tribes under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order. The point in issues is concluded against the appellant by a judgment of this Court in Nityanand Sharma and Another Vs. State of Bihar and Others, 1996 (3) SCC 576. The appellant seeks to get the judgment in the case of Nityanand (supra) referred to a larger Bench by contending that the said judgment is wrong and needs reconsideration.

The appellant being aggrieved filed letters patent appeal in the High Court which has been dismissed by the impugned order.

Court would take judicial notice of Acts of Parliament and would interpret the Schedule in the light of the English version being an authoritative text of the Act and the Second Schedule."

We are in the respectfully agreement with the view taken in Nityanand's case.

For the reasons stated above we do not find any merit in the civil appeal and the writ petitions and dismiss the same with costs throughout.
State Of Rajasthan vs Ucchab Lal Chhanwal

2. Regard being had to the identic issue involved in both the appeals they were heard together and are disposed of by a common judgment. For the sake of convenience the facts from the appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 21202 of 2011 are adumbrated herein.

3. The respondent was appointed in Rajasthan Police Service (Junior Scale) after his selection through Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short “the Commission”) vide order dated 19.10.1989. As stipulated in Rajasthan Police Service Rules, 1954 (for short “the Rules”) the R.P.S. cadre is divided into four categories and the lowest category is in the junior scale. The persons from the junior Scale are promoted to senior scale and thereafter to super time scale. The Rules provide that the person who has six years experience in junior scale becomes eligible for consideration to senior scale. A seniority list was published on 19.8.1997 wherein the name of the respondent found place at serial number 51 in junior scale. In respect of vacancies in the promotional posts arising against the quota of 1996-97 a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) was convened and on the basis of recommendations of the DPC persons junior to the respondent were promoted. It is apt to mention here that the criterion for promotion was seniority-cum-merit.

5. The writ court vide order dated 5.3.2010 came to hold that the promotion of the respondent could not have been deferred as the seniority was required to be given more weightage over the merit as per the decision rendered in B.V. Sivaiah and others v. K. Addanki Babu and others[1]. Being of this view the writ court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order dated 1.12.1992 as far as it denied promotion to the respondent to the senior scale against the vacancies of the year 1996-97 and directed that he was entitled to promotion to the senior scale against the vacancy of the year 1996- 97 with all consequential benefits.

16. Consequently, the appeals are allowed in part and the order passed by the Division Bench as well as by the writ court is set aside to the extent directions have been issued granting benefit of promotion to the respondents. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

October 22, 2013.
Satyawati vs Rajinder Singh And Anr

3. Even today, in 2013, the position has not been improved and still the decree holder faces the same problem which was being faced in the past. We are concerned with the case of the appellant-plaintiff who had succeeded in Civil Appeal No. 89 of 1993 in the Court of District Judge, Faridabad on 19th January, 1996. Decree was drawn in pursuance of the aforestated judgment but till today, the appellant- plaintiff is not in a position to get fruits of his success.

5. As the decree had already been made in favour of the appellant, we need not go into the facts of the case, however it will be worth noting that by virtue of the decree, the appellant-plaintiff is entitled to possession of land admeasuring 80 sq. yard forming part of land of Khasra No.95/24/2 situated within municipal limits of Palwal town, District Faridabad. When the Execution Petition was filed, the Executing Court rejected the Execution Petition by observing that the decree was not executable because of certain contradictory reports. It is pertinent to note that the judgment in favour of the appellant- plaintiff was delivered by considering a report dated 17th September, 1989 and a sketch of land in question, which were made by the local commissioner and both are forming part of the record. It appears that some other reports were considered by the Executing Court and after considering all the reports, the Executing Court, by its order dated 16th March, 2009 came to the conclusion that the decree was not executable.

12. In our opinion, the view expressed by the Executing Court and confirmed by the High Court is not correct and therefore, we allow this appeal and quash and set aside the impugned order of the High Court passed in C.R. No. 2047 of 2010 dated 25th May, 2011, confirming the order passed by the Executing Court dated 16th March, 2009. We direct the Executing Court to do the needful for execution of the decree by taking into account the local commissioner’s report and sketch prepared by him dated 17th September, 1989.

18. We are sure that the Executing Court will do the needful at an early date so as to see that the long drawn litigation which was decided in favour of the appellant is finally concluded and the appellant-plaintiff gets effective justice.

19. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

………..................................... .....J (G.S. SINGHVI ………..................................... .....J (ANIL R. DAVE) ………...................................... ....J (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI) New Delhi 29th April. 2013
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn.Ltd vs M/S. Siba Gas Agency & Ors

2. Heard Mr. Shyam Diwan, learned senior counsel in support of this appeal and Mr. Manish Pitale, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. Both the counsel have made their submissions. The respondent No.2 herein was allotted an L.P.G. Dealership in the City of Amaravati. There were certain grievances with respect to the functioning of respondent No.2, including that the respondent had taken a partner in the business without prior permission of the appellant. It is the case of respondent No.2 that after the agency was terminated, respondent No.2 filed an appeal and thereafter she moved the High Court by filing a writ petition. It is seen that the writ petition was filed nearly 2 years after the termination of the agency. Meanwhile, no supply of L.P.G. Cylinders is being made to the respondent agency and as per usual practice, the L.P.G. consumers were assigned the other agency.

3. There is an arbitration clause for resolution of the disputes between the parties according to which, any dispute or difference shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Managing Director of the appellant Corporation or of some officer of the Corporation who may be nominated by the Managing Director. The better course now, therefore, for the parties is to go for arbitration. Respondent No.2 may approach the Managing Director of the appellant Corporation for that purpose. In view of this, we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court. The parties are relegated to the agreed remedy of arbitration.

September 2, 2013.
The Mayor Jaipur Municipal Corporation vs Thakur Shiv Raj Singh

2. Date: 2019.08.05 17:05:48 IST Reason: Brief facts of case giving rise to this appeal are:

1,13,96,175/- from the petitioners along with interest @ 18% p.a. thereon as damages for unnecessarily withholding the aforesaid amount w.e.f. date of deposit to the date of payment. The respondents may further be directed to refund the total amount as prayed hereinabove to the petitioners in the proportion viz. 30% to Thakur Shiv Raj Singh (Petitioner No.1) and 1/3rd of the remaining to each of the Petitioners No.2 to 4.

(iv) Any other order(s) as this Hon’ble High Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present writ petition be also passed in favour of the humble petitioners and against the respondents.”

If the payment is not made within a period of three months, the appellants will be entitled for interest @ 9% and difference of 3% will be recovered from the officer who has made delay in making payment.” 24

23. Although learned Single Judge made the above observation, but the judgment does not indicate that said observations were made after looking into the Master Plan which was in force at the time of submission of application by the respondents.