L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Sify Ltd vs First Flight Couriers Ltd

3. The facts giving rise to the filing of this appeal may be briefly stated as follows.

4. The appellant company is engaged in the business of providing service in setting up of Networks and other value added services in the field of information and technology. The respondent company is engaged in the business of providing Courier services. The respondent hired the services of the appellant as the service provider for the connection of its Networks across India, which included Internet Access and Virtual Private Network (VPN). It is the case of the appellant that the respondent committed defaults in making payments in respect of the services provided by the appellant to the respondent. In view of the continued failure of the respondent to clear the outstanding dues in respect of invoices, the appellant filed a summary suit, being SS No. 1576 of 2004, under O. 37 R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short the CPC) against the respondent seeking recovery of a sum of Rs. 25,73,793/- along with 18 % interest p.a. in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The appellant, thereafter, filed the summons for judgment, being SJ No. 652 of 2004, in the afore said suit claiming Rs. 25,73,793/- and further interest at 18 % on the principle amount Rs. 23,18,797/- till payment. The respondent filed its reply to the summary suit and the summons for judgment seeking unconditional leave to defend the suit. It was the case of the respondent that there was deficiency in service provided by the appellant and that the appellants suit was based on accounts and not on invoices. The learned Single Judge, as noted herein earlier, disposed of the application for leave to defend the suit filed by the appellant holding that the respondent shall be entitled to defend the suit on condition of deposit of Rs. 15 Lacs. The learned Single Judge, therefore, granted leave to defend the suit to the respondent on the aforesaid condition. It is an admitted position that the respondent had deposited the sum of Rs. 15 Lacs in the court within the time specified in the aforesaid order. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent preferred an appeal being Appeal No. 1128 of 2005 which, as noted herein earlier, was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay holding that the respondent was entitled to defend the suit without any condition. It is this order of the Division Bench, which is challenged before us by way of a special leave petition in respect of which leave has already been granted.

11. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the order of the Division Bench and restore the order of the learned Single Judge by which the learned Single Judge had granted leave to defend the suit to the respondent on the condition of deposit of Rs. 15 Lacs in the court. As the amount of Rs. 15 Lacs has been withdrawn by the respondent, we grant 2 months time to the respondent to deposit the aforesaid amount in the High Court of Bombay and in default of such deposit, the leave granted to the respondent to defend shall stand refused. The appeal is thus allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
State Of Rajasthan vs Babu Lal

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of acquittal passed by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Bench. The respondent was convicted for offence punishable under Section 8/21 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter refeerred to as 'the Act'). The respondent was found in possession of a huge quantity of Brown Sugar and the Trial Court held that all the requisite procedure was followed and, therefore, according to the Trial Court, the prosecution version was established. The High Court found that there was non-compliance with the requirement of Section 42(2) of the Act. -2- Various factual aspects have been highlighted by the High Court to come to this conclusion.

We find that the High Court after referring to the various factual aspects came to the conclusion that provisions of Section 42(2) were not complied with. The documents required to prove the receipt of oral information were not brought on record. That being so, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The appeal fails and it is dismissed accordingly.
Surinder Kumar Khanna vs Intelligence Officer Directorate Of ...

4. The prosecution, in support of its case examined four witnesses. After hearing submissions, the trial court convicted and sentenced all three accused. The appellant was convicted under Section 21(c) read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 12 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1 lakh, in default whereof to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three years. Similar orders for conviction and sentence were recorded against other two accused namely Raj Kumar @ Raju and Surinder Pal Singh. All three convicted accused preferred appeals; namely Criminal Appeal No.D-955-DB-2013 was filed by Raj Kumar @ Raju and Surinder Pal Singh while Criminal Appeal No.D-798-DB-2014 was preferred by the appellant. Both these appeals were heard together by the High Court.

14. In the present case it is accepted that apart from the aforesaid statements of co-accused there is no material suggesting involvement of the appellant in the crime in question. We are thus left with only one piece of material that is the confessional statements of the co-accused as stated above. On the touchstone of law laid down by this Court such a confessional statement of a co-accused cannot by itself be taken as a substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and can at best be used or utilized in order to lend assurance to the Court. In the absence of any substantive evidence it would be inappropriate to base the conviction of the appellant purely on the statements of co-accused. The appellant is therefore entitled to be acquitted of the charges leveled against him. We, therefore, accept this appeal, set aside the orders of conviction and sentence 12 For example: State vs. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253, paras 424 and 704 13 and acquit the appellant. The appellant shall be released forthwith unless his custody is required in connection with any other offence.
V.Sriharan @ Murugan vs Union Of India And Others

5) Initially, the mercy petitions were filed before the Governor of Tamil Nadu on 17.10.1999 and the Governor, on 27.10.1999, rejected the same. Subsequently, the said rejection was challenged before the Madras High Court in W.P. Nos. 17655-17658 of 1999 on the ground that the mercy petitions were decided without consulting the Council of Ministers, which is unsustainable in law. Accordingly, by order dated 25.11.1999, the Madras High Court set aside the order of rejection of mercy petitions by the Governor and directed to reconsider the mercy petitions afresh. Thereafter, on 25.04.2000, the Governor again rejected the mercy petitions.

6) Consequently, the mercy petitions were forwarded to the President on 26.04.2000 for consideration under Article 72 of the Constitution. The President, on 12.08.2011, rejected these mercy petitions after a delay of more than 11 years. The rejection of the aforesaid petitions was communicated to the petitioners on 25.08.2011. Subsequently, the said rejection was also challenged in W.P. Nos. 20287-20289 of 2011 before the Madras High Court on 29.08.2011. Later, by order dated 01.05.2012, in Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos. 383-385 of 2011 and 462-464 of 2011, this Court transferred all the three writ petitions to this Court in the interest of justice. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the Madras High Court transmitted the original records to this Court, which have been registered as Transferred Case (Criminal) Nos. 1-3 of 2012. All the petitioners are currently lodged in the Central Prison, Vellore, Tamil Nadu and they are in incarceration since 1991, i.e., for more than two decades.

16) Exorbitant delay in disposal of mercy petition renders the process of execution of death sentence arbitrary, whimsical and capricious and, therefore, inexecutable. Furthermore, such imprisonment, occasioned by inordinate delay in disposal of mercy petitions, is beyond the sentence accorded by the court and to that extent is extra-legal and excessive. Therefore, the apex constitutional authorities must exercise the power under Article 72/161 within the bounds of constitutional discipline and should dispose of the mercy petitions filed before them in an expeditious manner.

Conclusion:

31) In the light of the above discussion and observations, in the cases of V. Sriharan @ Murugan, T. Suthendraraja @ Santhan and A.G. Perarivalan @ Arivu, we commute their death sentence into imprisonment for life. Life imprisonment means end of one’s life, subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which, in turn, is subject to the procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and further substantive check in Section 433-A of the Code. All the writ petitions are allowed on the above terms and the transferred cases are, accordingly, disposed of.

……….…………………………CJI.

FEBRUARY 18, 2014.
Abdul Gafur & Anr vs State Of Uttarkhand & Ors

4. On 4th July, 2005, Tek Chand (respondent No.4) preferred a Writ Petition challenging the validity of Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. It appears that on 27th March, 2006, a clarification was issued by the State Government, 2 respondent No.1, to the effect that the possession of the passage to the Hospital shall remain with them; the Government would be making financial contribution in its construction and the public would be entitled to use the same. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government in the Writ Petition it was reiterated that the road was not going to be used exclusively by the Hospital. Ultimately, the Writ Petition was dismissed. Special Leave Petition filed by Tek Chand against the said order was also dismissed on 15th September, 2006. Licence deed in respect of the said land was executed in favour of the Hospital on 16th November, 2006 and construction of the road commenced some time in November, 2006.

7. During the pendency of the appeals, Tek Chand filed yet another Writ Petition on 11th March, 2007, inter alia, alleging that the acquisition was fraudulent. While entertaining the Writ Petition, exercising its power under Section 24 of the Code, vide an ex-parte order dated 20th 4 March, 2007, the High Court transferred both the said suits as well as the civil appeals to itself in order to get the dispute settled between the parties. In the said order, the High Court directed that both the lower courts shall give notices to all the parties in the suit and the appeals, informing them that the suits and appeals stand transferred to the High Court and they were required to appear in person before the Court on 28th March, 2007. On the said order being communicated to the appellants, they filed Misc. Application No. 499 of 2007 in the said Writ Petition seeking recall of order dated 20th March, 2007.

8. When the Writ Petition came up for consideration, on 29th March, 2007, the High Court dismissed both the suits and the appeals by passing the following short order:

19. On a conspectus of the factual scenario and in view of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed; the impugned order, dated 29th March, 2007, is set aside and the two suits and the appeal, dismissed in terms of the said order, are restored to the file of the High Court for fresh adjudication and disposal in accordance with law. The High Court may also pass appropriate orders on the appellant's prayer for restitution, for which purpose I.A. No.7 of 2007 shall stand transferred to the High Court. We may clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the two suits or the appeals, which shall be considered and disposed of on their own merits, uninfluenced by any observation in this judgment. 15

20. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.

AUGUST 11, 2008.
Amol Singh vs State Of M.P

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') and sentence of imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.2,000/- with default stipulation. Appellant Amol Singh was arraigned in the charge sheet as A2.

On being enquired, she revealed that both the appellants had sprinkled kerosene over her body and set her ablaze. According to her, A2 was enraged by her act of taking land belonging to his adversary Raju Seth for cultivation as Bataidar (crop-sharer).

Saraswati Bai was immediately taken to the Government Hospital at Gadarwara. Observing that her condition was serious, Dr. B.P. Gupta (PW11) not only admitted her for 3 treatment but also sent a memo (Ex.P-13) to the SHO requiring him to take necessary action to get dying declaration recorded. Naib Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate R.K. Dimole (PW9), after obtaining necessary certificate as to fit state of her mind, recorded Saraswati Bai's dying declaration between 4.35 a.m. and 4.50 a.m. thereafter, at 9.10 a.m., Saraswati Bai breathed her last in the hospital. Accordingly, the case was altered to one under Section 302 IPC.

It was upon the report (Ex. P-1) lodged by Kotwar Prahlad Singh (PW1) and ASI Balram (PW8) registered a case under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC against the appellants. He along with Prahlad proceeded to the spot and recorded Saraswati's dying declaration (Ex.P-3) in the presence of Chhidami Lal (PW3), Kaliram (PW5), Babulal and Chandra Bhushan.

10. Therefore, the discrepancies, make the last declaration doubtful. The nature of the inconsistencies is such that there are certainly material. That being so, it would be unsafe to convict the appellant. The conviction is set aside and appellant is acquitted of the charges. He be set at liberty forthwith unless required to be in custody in connection with any other case.

............................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) 8 New Delhi, May 15, 2008 9 10
Sherish Hardenia & Ors vs State Of M.P. & Anr

1. Leave granted. These appeals assail the Judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur delivered in Crl. Revision Nos.1400 and 1445 of 2004 passed on 6.5.2008. The learned Single Judge was called upon to decide two Revision Petitions against the Order dated 26.08.2004 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal in Sessions Trial No.83 of 2004. Amrish Hardenia, the Petitioner in Cr.R.No.1445/2004 stood charged with offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Four other accused namely, his parents, Shri Lajja Shankar and Smt. Meera, as also his brother and sister-in-law Shri Sherish Hardenia and Smt. Sangeeta have been similarly charged by the prosecution. The First Additional Sessions Judge, however, favoured the view that no case worthy of trial had been made out against the latter four persons, and therefore had discharged them. Proceedings against Amrish Hardenia, husband of late Archana Hardenia had been ordered to continue. In these circumstances, the father of the deceased, Dr. R.K. Sharma had approached the High Court in Criminal Revision No.1400 of 2004 challenging the legal propriety of the said Order of the Sessions Judge discharging his deceased daughter’s parents-in-law and borther-in-law and his wife. Amrish Hardenia, widower of the deceased Archana who was the daughter of Dr. R.K. Sharma, had filed Cr.R. No.1445 of 2004 asserting in essence that no case worthy of trial had been disclosed against him either. We must recognise, at the threshold, that the impugned Order manifests a comprehensive marshalling of the facts and of the law applicable to the controversy.

8. Accordingly, the appeals fail and are dismissed being devoid of merits. We would have imposed exemplary costs on the Appellants in these proceedings but for the fact that the impugned Order reverses the order passed by the Sessions Court. In other words if we had been confronted with concurrent findings punitive costs would have followed.

.......J. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN] New Delhi December 13, 2013.
The Kelvin Jute Co.Ltd.Wors.P.F.. vs Krishna Kumar Agarwala

5. The Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, accordingly, passed an order dated 26.08.2016 under Section 7A of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The Provident Fund Commissioner determined the amount due as Rs.1,94,98,363.00. The determination was made on the basis of the available records.

In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed to the above extent.”

14. Having regard to the judgment dated 15.03.2002 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 4312 of 1993, which has been affirmed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and by this Court in the judgment dated 21.01.2016, we are afraid any application for 11 recall/modification which has the effect of reviewing the original judgment in the Writ Petition cannot be entertained by this Court. The main contention of the applicants seem to be that writ petitioners had played fraud on Court and that the basis of the judgment of the High Court has been obtained by misleading that Court. If that be the position, nothing prevents the applicants from approaching the High Court and seeking a review of the judgment. We make it clear that in the event of such a review being filed on the ground of fraud, the High Court will be free to examine the same and the judgment of this Court dated 21.01.2016 shall not stand in any way of the High Court looking into that aspect of the matter. Without prejudice to such liberty and making it further clear that such applications may not be dismissed on the ground of delay in case they are filed within thirty days from today, M.A. No. 2363 of 2018 (previously I.A. No. 6 of 2016) in C.A. No. 2593 of 2006 and M.A. No. 2364 of 2018 (previously I.A. Nos. 9 and 10 of 2016) in Civil Appeal No. 2591 of 2006 are dismissed.

15. We make it clear that we are not otherwise expressing any opinion on the merits of the applications or their objections. It will be open to both sides to take all available 12 contentions before the High Court.

16. The amount of Rs.1.95 Crores deposited with the Provident Fund Commissioner pursuant to order dated 10.05.2016 along with accrued interest shall be transferred to the non-applicant Trust without prejudice to the contentions available to the parities. However, we make it clear that the transfer as above shall be subject to any orders which may be passed by the High Court in the review petitions.

OCTOBER 25, 2018.
State Of U.P vs Ram Balak & Anr

1. The State of U.P. is in appeal questioning the correctness of judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court which directed acquittal of the respondents. The learned 5th Additional Sessions Judge found the respondents guilty of offence punishable under Sections 376, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). Each was sentenced to death sentence for the offence relatable to Section 302 IPC, life imprisonment for the offence relatable to Section 376 IPC and 7 years for the offence relatable to Section 201 IPC. The appellants preferred appeal before the High Court and a reference was made by the Trial Court under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code') for confirmation of the death sentence. The High Court by the impugned judgment found that the accusations have not been established by the prosecution and therefore directed acquittal. Capital reference was rejected.

20. Above being the position, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
Chief Soil Conservator Punjab & Ors vs Gurmail Singh

The brief facts of the case are that respondent no.1-workman was appointed as Buldozer Operator with the petitioner-management on 1.11.1990. Since his appointment was on 89 days basis, the same was extended from time to time till 5.7.1996. Thereafter, his services were not extended. The workman raised an industrial dispute on the ground that his services were terminated by the management on 15.7.1996 without any notice, charge sheet, enquiry or compensation and that the juniors to him are still in service of the management and new persons were also appointed by the management after terminating his services. The government referred the 2 dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the `Act') and the Labour Court on 23.9.2004 made the award, which was challenged before the High Court.

7. In the normal course, we would have remitted the matter to the Labour Court for consideration of the relevant aspects. But considering the passage of time we do not consider it appropriate to do so. The order of 5 stay was passed on 7.8.2006. In the peculiar facts of the case we direct that the respondent will pay a sum of Rs.60,000/- in full and final settlement of his claim. We make it clear that we have not decided the issue as to whether the appellant is an industry.

8. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.