L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Ranjit Kumar Das & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors

The appellants executed a registered Power of Attorney in favour of respondent No.3 on 6.8.2009 giving rights to execute registered sale deed in favour of respondent No.2. Respondent Nos.2 and 3 have agreed to withdraw all pending civil and criminal proceedings filed by them against the appellants. The details of the pending proceedings as given in para are as under:

In the compromise application, it is mentioned that the appellants have agreed to give up their title, rights and interest in the house situated at Village 3 Mouza Dhouni, Khata No. 26, Khasra No. 280, Thana No.199, Village Dhauni, P.O. & P.S. Tarapur, District Mnger, Bihar, admeasuring 9 Dhoor in favour of respondent NO.3 who is the wife of respondent No.2.

We, on consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, accept the compromise which has been agreed to and signed by the 4 parties.

In this view of the matter, this appeal is disposed of in terms of the memo of compromise.

....................J (DALVEER BHANDARI) ....................J (B.S. CHAUHAN) NEW DELHI, SEPEMBER 3, 2009.
Honda Siel Power Products Ltd vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi

5. On this aspect, therefore, the Department carried the matter in appeal to the I.T.A.T. ("the Tribunal") for both the assessment years 1990-91 and 1991-92. By judgment and order dated 2.4.2002 the Tribunal held that CIT(A) had erred in allowing the enhanced depreciation as under section 43A actual payment was a condition precedent for availing the benefit under that section. According to the Tribunal, if actual payment was not made after fluctuation then the value of the asset cannot be increased by adding the increase on account of fluctuation. On facts, the Tribunal found that, in the present case, there was no actual payment after the fluctuation and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to claim the benefit under section 43A.

The submissions were duly filed on 7.2.2002. The order was passed by the Hon'ble Tribunal on 2.4.2002.

In view of the factual position explained above, it is submitted that order may be rectified accordingly.
Aarish Asgar Qureshi vs Fareed Ahmed Qureshi

3) The present case arises out of matrimonial proceedings in which certain averments have been made in anticipatory bail applications both before the Sessions Court as well as the High Court. Insofar as the anticipatory bail application before the Sessions Court is concerned, the applicants in the aforesaid application stated:

12) In Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University and Another vs. Union of India and Others, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 51, this Court referred to the facts in that case in which the Court 11 constituted a high level committee headed by a senior officer deputed by the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation with two doctors of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences as its members to go into the facts. The Committee gathered facts in great detail, as is mentioned in paras 8 & 9 of the aforesaid judgment, and ultimately came to certain conclusions after a detailed enquiry. It is in this circumstance that this Court found, after perusing the Committee’s Report, that the College in question had manufactured records brazenly in order to obtain favourable orders from the Court. It is on the basis of the aforesaid findings of the Committee that it was clear that a false statement had been made by the College on the basis of completely fabricated documents. The facts of this case are very far from the facts of the present case as there are no fabricated documents in the present case nor has there been a detailed enquiry by an independent high level committee going into facts. This case is, therefore, distinguishable from the facts of the present case.

16) In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside.

(VINEET SARAN) New Delhi;

February 26, 2019.
Jaslok Hospital & Research Centre vs Union Of India & Others

7. For the convenience of reference, the facts are taken from C.A. No.7284/2005.

8. The appellant obtained Customs Duty Exemption Certificate (for short `CDEC), from the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS), for import of various hospital equipments under Notification No.64/88-Cus. Dated 1st March, 1988 (for short the Notification). CDECs issued to the appellant relate to import of medical equipments for the period between 1988 and 1994. The CDECs certified that the appellant was covered under para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification. The same reads as under:

9. The said CDECs were cancelled/withdrawn by the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS) vide its communication bearing No. Z.37024/13/92-MG dated 14th November, 2000 addressed to the Chief Executive Director of the appellant, on the ground that the appellant- hospital had failed to comply with the conditions laid down in para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification extracted above.

14. The representation of the appellant, as stated above, was rejected by the DGHS on the ground that the State Government had recommended the appellants case only under para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification which, inter alia, stipulates that the hospital has to provide free treatment to 40 per cent of the outdoor patients and to all indoor patients whose income is less than Rs.500/- per month.

20. For the reasons stated above, we are not inclined to interfere with the orders passed by the High Court. The Civil Appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.
Triveni Engineering & Indust.Ltd vs Jaswant Singh & Anr

3. Respondent no. 1 - Jaswant Singh claims to be a workman of M/s Gangeshwar Limited, Deoband, now known as Triveni Engineering Industries Limited, which was Respondent No. 2 before the High Court and is the appellant herein. During the course of his employment, he was transferred to Ram Kola Chini Mill but as he did not join the place where he was transferred in pursuance of the said order, his services were terminated.

5. The said writ petition was registered as Writ Petition No. 8630 of 2008. Notice of the writ petition having been served on the appellant herein, it took up a plea that the Respondent is 3 not a workman. The said writ petition was disposed of, leaving the respondent at liberty to move a representation before the Labour Commissioner, Kanpur, U.P. in terms of Clause `W' of the Standing Orders applicable. A representation in terms of the said order was filed by the respondent no. 1 herein. During the pendency of the said representation, it was contended before the Labour Commissioner by the appellant that the respondent no. 1 was not a workman, and therefore, the Labour Commissioner had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the representation under the provisions of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and particularly in terms of Clause `W' of the Standing Orders.

17. Consequently, we set aside the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of 12 Allahabad High Court dated 09.09.2008 and uphold and restore the orders passed by the learned Single Judge as also by the Labour Commissioner. The present appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There will be no order as to costs.

J. [Anil R. Dave] New Delhi, August 11, 2010.
Commissioner Of Wealth Tax, Rajkot vs Estate Of Late Hmm Vikramsinhji Of G

14. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short, 'Tribunal'), while considering clause 3(2) and Clause 4 of the U.K. Trust Deeds referred to the findings of the Settlement Commission and observed that if the trusts were really intended to be discretionary, the trustees had a duty cast on them to ascertain the relative needs and personal circumstances of all the beneficiaries and to allocate the income of the trusts, among them from time to time, according to the objects of the trusts, however, the tell tale facts bring out the intention of the settlor to treat the trust property as his own. The settlor and after his death his son have been showing the income of foreign trusts in the returns of income filed from time to time. Had the trust deeds been really understood by the trustees and the beneficiaries as discretionary by virtue of the operation of clause 3, one would have expected the state of affairs to have been different. Consequently, the Tribunal held that due to failure on the part of the Maharaja to appoint discretion exercisers as per clause 3(2), clause 4 has become operative and the U.K. trusts have to be held to be specific trusts.

15. The High court, however, did not agree with the Tribunal's view on consideration of the relevant clauses of the U.K. Trust Deeds and various judgments of this Court as well as some High Courts and held that there were distinguishing features for assessment years under appeal and the previous order of the Settlement Commission and the earlier judgment of this Court.

(ii) the assessee has not received the said income and (iii) the assessee has not shown as taxable income in the returns of all the years under appeal.

19. Having regard to the above legal position about the discretionary trust which is also applied by by this Court in the earlier judgment2 and the fact that the income has been retained and not disbursed to the beneficiaries, the view taken by the High Court cannot be said to be legally flawed. Merely because the Settlor and after his death, his son did not exercise their power to appoint the discretion exercisers, the character of the subject trusts does not get altered. In view of the facts noted above, in our opinion, the two U.K. trusts continued to be 'discretionary trust' for the subject assessment years.

21. 16 Civil Appeals arising from substantive assessment under the Income Tax and Wealth Tax, accordingly, have no substance and are dismissed with no order as to costs.

22. Since the Appeals arising from the substantive assessments have no merit and have been dismissed, obviously nothing remains in Civil Appeal No. 2312 of 2007 under the Wealth Tax Act arising from 'protective assessment' for 18 assessment years, i.e, 1970-71 to 1976-77, 1978-79 to 1979-80, 1981-82 to 1989-90 and it is dismissed as well.

23. All 17 Civil Appeals are, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.
Rasheeda Khatoon (D) Through Lrs vs Ashiq Ali (D) Through Lrs

Rasheeda Khatoon, the predecessor-in-interest of present appellants, instituted regular suit No. 31 of 1975 in the Court of Civil Judge, Faizabad, seeking recovery of possession from the original defendants. The case of original plaintiff before the trial Court was that one Abdul Haq was the owner of the house No. 2868 situated in Mohalla Hayat Ganj in Tanda, District Faizabad. The only son of Abdul Haq had shifted to Pakistan at the time of Partition and there was no one to look after him. The father of Rasheeda Khatoon, Hazi Madari, was a close friend of Abdul Haq, and being a neighbour, she was looking after him for last 20 years till 24.01.1972 when he breathed his last at the ripe age of ninety. Regard being had to various aspects and fruther being pleased with her services, 7 years prior to the institution of the suit he made an oral gift of the suit house in her favour which was accepted by her and possession of the house was also handed over. Pursuant to the oral gift she lived in the premises in question and looked after him. The tenants who had been staying in the southern portion of the house, accepted her status and started paying rent to her. Prior to a year of his death being apprehensive that some others might disturb in her possession, he executed a deed of gift in writing evidencing the oral gift made earlier in favour of the plaintiff. As pleaded, within one month from the death of Abdul Haq, the defendants dishonestly moved an application under Section 145 CrPC before the SDM, Tanda with an intention to evict the plaintiff and in the said proceeding the property in question was attached, and all these circumstances constrained the plaintiff to file the civil suit for declaration that she was the owner in possession of the house in question. During the pendency of the suit, as alleged, the defendants took over possession in pursuance of the release order passed by the SDM on 12.4.1975 and thereafter the plaintiff amended the plaint and sought the relief of recovery of possession.

It is thus:-

25. In view of the aforesaid premises, we, though for different reasons, affirm the judgment and decree of the High Court and dismiss the appeal as a consequence of which the suit of the plaintiff stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

26. In view of the dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 603 of 2009 the present appeal stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

October 10, 2014
Suresh Kumar Bansal vs Krishna Bansal & Anr

3. One Shri Mohanlal Bansal (since deceased) as a plaintiff had instituted a suit for eviction and recovery 2 of arrears of rent against one Shri Bhogiram (since deceased) in respect of a shop room situated at Kampoo, Lashkar, Gwalior, M.P. (in short the `suit premises'). During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff had expired on 20th of June, 1989 and thereafter his widow, the respondent No.1 herein, filed an application for substitution as an heir and legal representative of the deceased in the pending suit. The appellant herein, the brother of the deceased plaintiff also filed an application for substitution/impleadment as heir and legal representative of the deceased plaintiff claiming the suit premises on the allegation that the deceased plaintiff had executed a Will in his favour on 11th of June, 1989. The learned Civil Judge by an order dated 22nd of February, 1991 had allowed the application for substitution/impleadment filed by the widow of the deceased plaintiff, namely, the respondent No.1 and rejected the application for substitution/impleadment filed by the appellant on the ground that the Will of the 3 deceased plaintiff did not seem to have been executed by him and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to be substituted/impleaded in the suit for eviction as he was not the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff.

11.For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the High Court as well as the trial Court had acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction in not impleading not only the natural heirs and legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff but also the appellant who is claiming his 15 impleadment on the basis of an alleged Will of the deceased plaintiff.

12.Accordingly, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the application for impleadment filed by the appellant is allowed. For this reason, the eviction proceeding shall be carried on not only by the natural heir of the deceased plaintiff, but also the appellant who claims to be a legal representative of the deceased plaintiff on the basis of a Will alleged to have been executed by the deceased plaintiff.

14.However, we also make it clear that the appellant would be entitled to obtain order of eviction of the tenants/respondents if the ground taken in the plaint 16 stand proved, but such decree for eviction shall be passed subject to grant of probate of the Will of the deceased plaintiff in favour of the appellant.

15.The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
Orient Paper & Industries Ltd vs The State Of M.P. And Ors

Background facts involved are essentially as follows:

Stand of the appellant was that when it brought the agricultural produce a demand was raised in exercise of power under the Act that it has been brought inside the market area for the purpose of process on the ground that Amlai Paper Mills is included within the area of the respondent Mandi Samiti, Budhar. A notice was issued by the Director, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Budhar to which the appellant has filed his show-cause. It was also averred that the Director, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti issued a general circular fixing the liability of persons who are liable to pay the market fee. At that juncture, the appellant moved the High Court by filing a writ petition challenging the view taken by the authorities in the matter.

The writ petition was resisted by the State and the Market Committee, inter-alia, taking the stand that the levy of market fee is in order. The High Court upheld the stand of the State and the Committee and dismissed the writ petition.

Pursuant to the directions, the Additional Director, Madhya Pradesh State Agriculture Marketing Board, Bhopal considered the matter. By order dated 7.2.2006 he held that the appellant is liable to pay market fee as process of agricultural produce.

Had it been only that the goods notified are brought into the market area to be covered by the second category then the stand of the respondents would have been acceptable. But the further condition it must be "used for processing" shows that the emphasis is on end-user. In this case that makes the difference. Therefore, the appellant is correct in its stand that levy on the notified agriculture produce being brought within market area where end-user is manufacture does not attract levy of market fee.

The appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct. In view of the order in the appeal no further order is necessary to be passed in the transfer petition. Same is disposed of. No costs.
Safety Retreading Co. Pvt.Ltd vs Comm.Of Customs & Cent.Excise,Salem

7. A demand for levy of tax on the gross value of the service rendered including the cost of materials used and transferred was raised and answered against the assessee leading to an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench at Chennai (hereinafter referred to as “appellate Tribunal”). The learned appellate Tribunal returned a split verdict with the Technical Member taking the view that the gross value of the service rendered would be exigible to tax under the Act. The third member (Technical) to whom the matter was referred held as follows:

14. We, therefore, in the light of what has been discussed above, set aside the majority order of the appellate Tribunal dated 14th October, 2011 and hold that the view taken by the learned Vice President of the appellate Tribunal is correct and the same will now govern the parties. All reliefs that may be due to the appellant – assessee will be afforded to it forthwith and without any delay. All amounts, as may have been, deposited pursuant to the order(s) of this Court shall be returned forthwith to the appellant, however, without any interest. Bank guarantee furnished insofar as the penalty amount is concerned shall stand discharged.

The appeal is allowed in the above terms.

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.6375-6376 OF 2014 AND CIVIL APPEAL NOS.6062-6063 OF 2013

15. Order of this Court passed today i.e. dated 18th January, 2017 in Civil Appeal No.641 of 2012 will govern the proceedings in Civil Appeal Nos.6375-6376 of 2014 and Civil Appeal Nos.6062-6063 of 2013. Consequently, the appeals are disposed of on the same terms.

(ASHOK BHUSHAN) NEW DELHI JANUARY 18, 2017
Lok Ram vs Nihal Singh & Anr

Background facts are as under:

2.9.2001, respondent Nihal Singh filed a complaint at the Police Station, Fatehabad (Haryana), alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and moved an application for seizure of articles purported to have been given as dowry. In the complaint it was stated that on 14.9.2001 Saroj, daughter of complainant Nihal Singh died. When his nephew Mangal Singh went to meet Saroj he learnt that she had been killed by her husband Ishwar Singh, brother in law- Bhim Singh and father in law-Lok Ram. Kerosene oil was poured on her and then she was set on fire. Police registered a case relating to offences punishable under Section 304(B) and 498 (A) read with Section 34 IPC. On the basis of the aforesaid report an investigation was started. Stand of the appellant, Lok Ram was that he was serving at a school at the alleged time of incident. Statements of various persons were recorded. During trial, complainant Nihal Singh moved an application under Section 319 of the Code. By order dated 6.9.2002 learned Sessions Judge rejected the application. On 4.12.2002, trial court convicted Ishwar Singh, Bhim Singh and their mother for commission of offences punishable under Section 304 (B) IPC and each was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years. Against the order dated 6.9.2002 a revision petition was filed. The High Court by the impugned judgment directed the trial court to proceed against the appellant by summoning him.

It is to be noted that the trial court rejected the application only on the ground that the complainant was an interested witness and therefore, sufficient ground did not exist to take action against the accused persons. As noted above though the power is an extra-ordinary and is used only if compelling reasons exist; the factor which weighed is that the trial court does not appear to be relevant and, therefore, the High Court has rightly interfered in the matter. The impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity. However, we make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. Since the matter is pending long the trial court is requested to complete the trial as early as possible.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Markfed Vanaspati And Allied ... vs Union Of India (Uoi)

3. The respondent-Union of India accepted the offer given by the appellant and consequently the respondent issued tender in the form of a letter dated 22nd August, 1989. The appellant failed to supply the oil as per the delivery schedule. The time for supply was extended, reserving the respondent's right to levy liquidated damages. All the supplies could not be delivered. The contract was cancelled and the appellant resorted to force majeure clause.

4. The dispute was referred to an arbitrator. The sole arbitrator made and published his award on 20th June, 1995. The appellant prayed before the arbitrator that in view of the extension of time on various occasions, the time was not the essence of the contract. The appellant has admitted various delays including in furnishing security, but stated that the same were unintentional.

6. The arbitrator in the instant case gave a non- speaking award, which was made rule of the court by the order of the learned Single Judge on 21st February, 2006. The appellant preferred FAO (O.S.) No. 206/2006, before the Division Bench of the High Court, which was also dismissed on 17th April, 2006. The appellant has preferred special leave petition against the said impugned judgment of the Division Bench. This Court granted leave on 14th May, 2007.

17. Whatever has been mentioned by Russell in this paragraph is equally true for Indian Arbitrators.

19. We have perused the award and the judgment of the learned Single Judge by which the award has been made the rule of the Court and the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. In our considered view, no interference is called for. The appeal being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.