L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Commr.Of Central Excise ... vs M/S Krishna Wax (P) Ltd.

2. The facts leading to the filing of this Appeal, in brief, are as under:-

(10) The Central Excise Officer shall, after allowing the concerned person an opportunity of being heard, and after considering the representation, if any, made by such person, determine the amount of duty of excise due from such person not being in excess of the amount specified in the notice.

(a) within six months from the date of notice in respect of cases falling under subsection (1);

(13) Where the amount as modified by the appellate authority or tribunal or court is more than the amount determined under sub-section (10) by the Central Excise Officer, the time within which the interest or penalty is payable under this Act shall be counted from the date of the order of the appellate authority or tribunal or court in respect of such increased amount. (14) Where an order determining the duty of excise is passed by the Central Excise Officer under this section, the person liable to pay the said duty of excise shall pay the amount so determined along with the interest due on such amount whether or not the amount of interest is specified separately. (15) The provisions of sub-section (1) to 14 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the recovery of interest where interest payable has not been paid or part paid or erroneously refunded.

(c) Omitted.

respondent therefore could not have preferred any appeal against said Internal Order dated 15.03.2006. The Appellate Authority as well as the Tribunal, in our view, completely failed to appreciate this basic distinction.

All other terms and conditions of concerned earlier instructions will continue to apply.

16. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the appellate order dated 10.01.2007 and the order under appeal and direct that the proceedings Civil Appeal 8609/2019 [ Diary No. 17005 of 2018] Commissioner of Central Excise, Haldia vs. M/s. Krishna Wax (P) Ltd. 24

pursuant to show cause notice dated 21.03.2006 be taken to logical conclusion. The respondent shall be entitled to put in its response to said show cause notice within three weeks from the date of this judgment and shall also be entitled to place such material on which it seeks to place reliance, in support of its case. The matter shall thereafter be proceeded with in accordance with law.

17. The appeal stands allowed in aforesaid items. No costs.

November 14, 2019.
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs Sanatan Dharam Girls Secondary School ...

Brief facts in the matter are as follows:

The State Government had framed rules known as 'The Rules for payment of Grant-in-Aid to non-governmental educational, cultural and physical educational institutions in Rajasthan, 1963'.

Later in 1989 the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly passed "The Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989" which came into force from 01.01.1993. On 05.08.1997, the State Government (Finance Department) issued an order to implement the provisions of the EPF Act, 1952 on Non-Governmental aided educational institutions employing 20 or more persons. On 24.01.1998, the State Government (Educational Department) passed an order by which it transferred the existing Provident Fund amount from the State treasury to the office of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. Later on 24.08.1998, the State Government (Finance Department) passed an order about transfer of Provident Fund amount from State treasury to the Provident Fund Commissioner.

Further the learned senior counsel submitted that, the Educational Establishment covered or coverable under EPF Act, 1952 during the period from 06.03.1982 to 31.12.1992 will remain covered or coverable under Central Act of 1952 itself even after the coming into force of the State Act of 1989 or the State Rules of 1993, as RPFC has already settled the PF Accounts of their employees on retirement and has settled their pension cases, family pension cases, children and parents pension cases and monthly pension cases and paying monthly pension/family pension regularly for number of years.

We further observe that the State Government has the power of Superintendent or the authority to direct, restrict or regulate the working of the educational institutions. It was, therefore, submitted that the institutions had satisfied both the conditions (i) and (ii) mentioned above and as such they would fall within the exception contained under Section 16(1)(B) of the EPF Act, 1952.

For the foregoing reasons, all the civil appeals filed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner stand dismissed and the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court dated 16.09.2002 and all the judgments on different dates by different Division Benches stand affirmed. No costs.
Oriental Aroma Chemical Indus.Ltd vs Gujarat Indisl.Devt.Corp.& Anr

3. The appellant was allotted a piece of land for setting up an industrial unit at Ankleshwar subject to the terms and conditions embodied in agreement of licence dated 2.4.1976 which, among other things, provided for consumption of specified quantity of water by the appellant. The agreement also provided for payment of 70% of the cost of agreed quantity of water irrespective of consumption. In 1982, respondent No.1 demanded non utilization charges amounting to Rs.4068/-, which were deposited by the appellant. After some time, respondent No.1 demanded Rs.2,69,895/- towards water charges. For next 10 years, the parties entered into long correspondence on the issue of levy of water charges, etc. Finally, respondent No.1 issued bill dated 13.1.1996 requiring the appellant to pay Rs.22,96,207/- towards water charges. The appellant challenged the same in Special Civil Suit No.32 of 2001. The summons issued by the trial Court were duly served upon the respondents but no written statement was filed on their behalf to controvert the averments contained in the plaint and none appeared on the dates of hearing despite the fact that the case was adjourned on more than one occasion. The suit was finally decreed on 30.10.2004 and it was declared that the appellant is not liable to pay Rs.22,96,207/- by way of minimum charges for water for the period between 1978 and 16.4.2001 and, thereafter, till the water was supplied by respondent No.1. After few months, the appellant filed another suit which was registered as Civil Suit No.222 of 2005 and prayed that respondent 3 No.1 be directed to issue no objection certificate in its favour. The summons of the second suit were also served upon the respondents, but neither the written statement was filed nor any one appeared on their behalf. The second suit was also decreed on 12.12.2007 and respondent No.1 was directed to issue no objection certificate to the appellant. In compliance of the decree passed in the second suit, the concerned authority of the Corporation issued no dues certificate dated 9.7.2008.

On notice, a detailed reply was filed on behalf of the appellant in the form of an affidavit of its Director, Shri Sanjay Kantilal Shah, paragraphs 4.16, 5 and 6 whereof read as under:

14. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents is dismissed. As a corollary, the appeal filed by the 15 respondents against judgment and decree dated 30.10.2004 shall stand dismissed as barred by time. However, it is made clear that the disposal of this appeal shall not absolve the higher functionaries of respondent No.1 from the responsibility of conducting a thorough probe into the matter so that accountability of the defaulting officers/officials may be fixed and the loss, if any, suffered by respondent No.1 recovered from them after complying with the rules of natural justice.
M/S. Disha Constructions & Ors vs State Of Goa & Anr

3. A suit was filed by the appellants praying for payment of money which according to the appellants was due to them for undertaking the construction work on behalf of the defendants. The suit was dismissed by a judgment and order dated 12th November, 2009 by the District Judge, North Goa, Panaji, inter alia, holding that the plaint cannot be registered as it was barred by limitation as also in view of the fact that there was no compliance with Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code insofar as notice on defendant No. 2 is 2 concerned.

4. On an appeal before the High Court, the High Court was pleased to hold that the suit is barred by limitation but on the question of notice, the High Court came to a different finding and came to the conclusion that notice was served. The material facts of the case are as follows:

5. The appellants-plaintiffs entered into an agreement with respondent No. 1 for construction of a school auditorium for Fr. Agnelo High School under M.P. L.A.D. scheme. On completion of the work on 30th September, 2006 defendant No. 2 issued a certificate of completion dated 3rd October, 2006. Out of the total amount of Rs.24,26,000/- the appellants plaintiffs were paid only Rs.18,12,000/- and therefore, there was a balance amount to be paid. The appellants plaintiffs prayed for the payment of the balance amount but it was denied and the same remained unpaid from 30th September, 2006 and a suit was filed on 24th October, 2009 for recovery of a sum of Rs.9,15,550/- with interest at 18%.

17. We, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and we hold that the suit is within the period of limitation. Since, on the question of notice, the finding of the trial Court has been overruled by the High Court and the High Court has held that the notice has been served on defendant No. 1 and against such finding there is no cross objection, we are of the view that the notice in this case has been served.

18. Therefore, we direct that the suit may be heard out now on merits by the trial Court as early as possible. We, however, do not make any observation on the merits of the controversy between the parties.

19. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
K.J.S. Buttar vs Union Of India And Anr

3. The appellant is an ex-captain in the Indian Army, who was commissioned on 12.1.1969. During the course of his service, the appellant suffered serious injuries of a permanent nature and was 2 invalided out of service. The Release Medical Board held on 3.1.1979 viewed his injury `gun shot wound left elbow' as attributable to military service and assessed the degree of disability at 50% and the appellant was released from service in Low Medical Category on 10.4.1979. Accordingly, the appellant was granted Disability Pension w.e.f. 26.7.1979.

10. The stand of the respondent is that the disability of the appellant cannot be enhanced to 75% because the relevant provision being para 7.2 of Government of India, Ministry of Defence, letter dated 31.1.2001 is applicable only to those cases where the officer was invalided out of service after 1.1.1996. It is alleged that the appellant was invalided out much before the date.

17. At any event, we have held that there will be violation of Article 14 of the Constitution if those who retired/were invalided before 1.1.1996 are denied the same benefits as given to those who retired after that date.

18. The respondents submitted that the appellant was not entitled to the above benefits as he had retired on completion of his short service commission of 10 years and had not been invalided out of service. In this connection it may be mentioned that the appellant was invalided out and released in a low medical category with permanent disability assessed at 50% by the Release Medical Board. As per the Defence Service Regulation/Pension regulation for the Army 1961 where any officer is found suffering from disability attributable to or aggravated 13 by Military Service he shall be deemed to have been invalided out of service. Relavant provision (page 25 additional documents) read as under :-

In our opinion the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the above Regulation.

19. As a result this appeal is allowed and we hold that the appellant is entitled to grant of War Injury Pension w.e.f. 1.1.1996. The disability 14 element of the Disability Pension shall be commuted as 75% instead of 50% and the appellant will be granted arrears w.e.f. 1.1.1996 with an interest of 8% per annum. He will also be granted 10 years' commission service and interest as granted in C.S. Sidhu's case from the date of his release. The impugned judgment is set aside.

20. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

31st March, 2011
Mohd. Salman vs Committee Of Management & Ors

3. The appellant was appointed on 1st March, 1989 as an Assistant Teacher in the primary section of Madarsa Hanifa Ahle Sunnat Bahrul Uloom, Mau. A copy of the appointment order dated 22.2.1989 is placed on record. The said order not only states 2 that by virtue of the said order, the appellant was appointed in the said Madarsa to the post of Assistant Teacher Tahtania(primary) but it was also mentioned therein that the said appointment is purely on probationary basis. In the said letter, the appellant was further informed that his services could regularised but only if his performance during probation period was found to be good/satisfactory. It was also indicated therein that if his performance during the aforesaid period is not satisfactory, then he could be terminated from the service of Madarsa anytime without assigning any reason.

5. There is yet another letter which is also placed on 3 record which is dated 13.2.1993 wherein by referring to the earlier letter dated 10.4.1992, respondent no. 1 informed the appellant that earlier the committee extended his probation time and again to improve his performance and teaching work but it appeared to them that the appellant did not possess teaching capability at all. By the said letter, the appellant was directed to show cause as to why his service should not be dispensed with from the Madarsa.

7. The aforesaid order came to be challenged by the appellant by filing a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court which was allowed on the ground that on expiry of the two years' period of probation, there is an automatic confirmation of the service of the appellant and, therefore, the decision of this Court in the case of The State of Punjab Vs. Dharam Singh AIR 1968 1210 becomes applicable. Consequent upon the aforesaid findings, the order of termination dated 3.4.1993 was set aside with a further direction that the appellant be reinstated in service.

18. In view of the aforesaid stipulation, so long an order is not passed holding that the service of the appellant is good and satisfactory, it could not have been held that his service could be regularised automatically by a deeming provision. 10

19. In that view of the matter, we find no merit in these appeals which are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Chiranji Lal vs Prem Lal & Anr

The plaintiff is the appellant herein. He filed a suit for decree for permanent injunction. It was dismissed for default by an order dated 8.9.1986. One of the grounds taken in the application for restoration of the suit, which was prepared on 9.9.1986 and filed on 17.9.1986, was that the pairokar of the appellant could not reach the Court in time. The said application was signed by the lawyer of the appellant. No signature of the pairokar was put on the said application.

In terms of Rule 29, therefore, an application for restoration was not required to be signed by the parties to the suit.

The High Court, in our opinion, committed a serious error in entering into the merits of the dispute between the parties which were required to be determined by the trial Court after framing issues and adduction of evidence by the parties in support of their respective contentions.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained. They are set aside accordingly. We in exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, set aside the order dated 8.9.1986 and restore the suit to its original file.

The learned trial judge is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order.

The appeal is allowed.
State Of H.P vs Nishant Sareen

3. Nishant Sareen--the respondent--was posted as Drug Inspector, Bilaspur (Himachal Pradesh) in 2005. One, Dr. Ramdhan Sharma, owner of Leelawati Hospital, Ghumarwin lodged a complaint against the respondent in the Vigilance Department of the State Government that the respondent had demanded Rs. 5,000/- from him as bribe to allow him to run the said hospital without checking by the Drug Inspector. Based on the said complaint, a first information report (being No. 1/2005) was registered under Sections 7 and 13 (2) of the 1988 Act at Police Station AC Zone, Bilaspur. Thereafter, a raiding party under the supervision of Deputy Superintendent of Police, AC Zone, Bilaspur was constituted and a trap was laid on May 12, 2005. The respondent is said to have been caught red-handed on that day accepting the bribe from the complainant. The respondent was arrested and produced before the Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin and was remanded to judicial custody upto May 16, 2005. The respondent was released on bail later on. Upon completion of investigation, the Vigilance 2 Department sought for sanction under Section 19 of the 1988 Act from the Government to prosecute the respondent. It is not in dispute that the Principal Secretary (Health), Government of Himachal Pradesh is the competent authority authorized under the Rules of Business for according sanction in the matter.

4. The Principal Secretary (Health), on the basis of the material placed before her and on examination of the case, found no justification in granting sanction to prosecute the respondent. In the order dated November 27, 2007 whereby sanction was refused, it was observed as under :

5. It appears that the Vigilance Department took up the matter again with the Principal Secretary (Health) for grant of 3 sanction as in their opinion sufficient evidence existed to prosecute the respondent.

Even such application of mind does not appear from the order of sanction, extrinsic evidences may be placed before the court in that behalf. While granting sanction, the authority cannot take into consideration an irrelevant fact nor can it pass an order on extraneous consideration not germane for passing a statutory order. It is also well settled that the Superior Courts cannot direct the sanctioning authority either to grant sanction or not to do so. The source of power of an authority passing an order of sanction must also be considered."

13. Insofar as the present case is concerned, it is not even the case of the appellant that fresh materials were collected by the investigating agency and placed before the sanctioning authority for reconsideration and/or for review of the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. As a matter of fact, from the perusal of the subsequent order dated March 15, 2008 it is clear that on the same materials, 11 the sanctioning authority has changed its opinion and ordered sanction to prosecute the respondent which, in our opinion, is clearly impermissible.

15. There is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed.

(R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI, DECEMBER 9, 2010 12 13
Commnr. Of I.T., Madurai vs M/S. Sri Mangayarkarasi Mills (P) Ltd

3. The relevant facts as arising from the case made out by the parties, leading to the filing of this appeal, and which will help us in understanding the controversy involved, can be summarized as under :-

7. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, the revenue filed an appeal under section 260A of the Act before the High Court of Judicature at Madras.

21.For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, thereby restoring the judgment of the AO disallowing the claim of deduction of the respondent.

22.The appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs.