L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Union Of India & Anr vs S.K. Goel & Ors

The Union of India through Secretary, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi is the first appellant in this appeal. The second appellant is the Department of Personnel and Training through its Secretary, Ministry of Personnel & Pension, New Delhi. The first respondent is the contesting respondent. Respondent Nos. 2-5 and the first respondent joined the Indian Customs and Central Excise Service as a Grade A Officer on probation and was promoted as Assistant Collector of Central Excise after selection by the UPSC. Respondent No.1 and other respondents were confirmed in Group A service. In the order, the proforma respondents were placed higher in order of seniority. Thereupon respondent No.1 was promoted as Deputy Collector of Central Excise on an ad hoc basis in the year 1983 and the said appointment was regularized as Deputy Collector of Customs and Central Excise, vide order dated 16.7.1985. The Government of India, Ministry of Finance issued an Office Order No. 187 of 1997 for the ad hoc promotion of respondent No.1 and proforma respondents to officiate in the grade of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise. The Departmental Promotion Committee (for short "the DPC) was constituted for considering officers for promotion to the post of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise in April, 1997 and February, 1998. Respondent No.1 represented against the seniority assigned to him and he claimed that his ACR's for the year 1994-1995 had not been properly graded or considered by the DPC and the lower grading given to him by the Reviewing Officer on one ACR was not proper and DPC ought to have considered the higher grading given by the reporting Officer.

The Office Order No. 11 of 1999 was issued on 12.1.1999 by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance whereby promotions of these officers were made on the post of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise. Office Memorandum No. F. No.Q-32012/10/97- AO-II Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue was issued whereby the representation of respondent No.1 was rejected for the following reasons stated as under:

Case law on the subject

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the DPC enjoyed full discretion to devise its method and procedure for objective assessment of suitability and merit of the candidate being considered by it. Hence, the interference by the High Court is not called for. Accordingly, the Civil Appeal stands allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
P.R. Murlidharan & Ors vs Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar & Ors

The respondent herein claimed himself to be a Sansyasi in the tradition of "Sree Chattambi Swamy Thiruvadikal" and Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan of Parama Bhattara Gurukula Seva Sangham, popularly known as "Vadayampadi Asharamam". The respondent filed a suit in the Court of Munsiff, Kolencherry being O.S. No. 71 of 2000 for a declaration that he was entitled to continue in the said capacity and he was not allowed to discharge his duties attached to the said office in terms of the purported order dated 20.1.1996 of Kailasanatha Theertha Padar. The said suit was dismissed for default. An application for restoration of the said suit was filed which was also dismissed.

Kailasanatha allegedly served as Sthiradhayakshan since 1996 onwards. It was stated that while he was on pilgrimage, the first respondent claimed himself to have taken over the office of Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan of the Ashram, although he had allegedly no qualification therefor.

It is not in dispute that in relation to the affairs of the trust a suit being O.S. No. 30 of 2002 is pending in the Court of Munsif, Kolencherry. The said suit has been filed by one G. Parameswaran Nair, founder member of the Ashram questioning the aforementioned purported resolution dated 7.1.2001. An interlocutory application has been filed by Brahmasree Kailasa Nadananda Teertha Padar for getting himself impleaded as a party. The said applicant in his impleadment application alleges that as per the bye- laws, he had admittedly been serving in the said capacity since 1995 and, thus, in law continues to be the Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan. Indisputably, the said applicant as also the first respondent herein are parties in the suit being O.S. No. 30 of 2002.

Thought the suit filed by the first respondent was dismissed, he filed a writ petition before the Kerala High Court at Ernakulam praying for police protection which was marked as WP (C) No.16047/04. A Division Bench of the said High Court went into the question as to whether the first respondent was entitled to hold the office of Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan for the purpose of issuing an appropriate direction as regard grant of police protection. The High Court opined that 'the State and the police officials have got a legal obligations to give protection to the life and properties of the appellant upon arriving at a finding of fact that he was entitled to hold the said office. The High Court proceeded to determine the said purported question in the light of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and opined:

For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. However, in the event, the first respondent feels that he as a person should receive protection to his life he may make an appropriate representation to the Superintendent of Police who after causing an inquiry made in this behalf may pass an appropriate order as is permissible in law. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
Rishabh Choudhary vs Union Of India And Ors

5. Consequent upon the permission granted by the State of Chhattisgarh to conduct examinations, the College issued an advertisement inviting applications on 28th January, 2016 and eventually conducted the examination on 3rd April, 2016. The examination called CGMAT-2016 was monitored by the State of Chhattisgarh and according to the College as well as the State there were no irregularities in the conduct of the examination.

15. The question before this Court is not who is to be blamed for the present state of affairs - whether it is the students or the College or the State of Chhattisgarh. The question is really whether the rule of law should prevail or not. In our opinion, the answer is unambiguously in the affirmative. The College and the State of Chhattisgarh have not adhered to the law with the result that the petitioner became a victim of circumstances giving him a cause of action to proceed against the College and the State of Chhattisgarh being a victim of their maladministration. The plight of the petitioner is unfortunate but it cannot be helped.

16. We were told during the course of submissions that some similarly placed students participated in NEET and qualified in the examination. Those students like the petitioner who did not participate in NEET and placed their trust only in the College and the State of Chhattisgarh took a gamble and that gamble has unfortunately not succeeded. While our sympathies may be with the petitioner and similarly placed students, we cannot go contrary to the orders passed by this Court from time to time only for their benefit.

17. Under the circumstances, we find no ground has been made out for granting relief to the petitioner. There is no merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. However, we make it clear that the petitioner is at liberty to proceed against the College and the State of Chhattisgarh in any appropriate manner.

W.P. (C) No. 862 OF 2016

18. We find no reason to entertain this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and it is accordingly dismissed.

19. In view of the order passed in the writ petition the application for impleadment stands disposed of.
M/S. Supreme Industries Ltd vs M/S. Ranisati Pipe Industries And Ors

Accordingly, with the dismissal of the original Writ Petition No.1046/2006, the status quo ante as prevalent on ...2/-

In view of the above statement made by the learned counsel, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench as well as the judgment of the learned Single Judge stands set aside as the original Writ Petition stands dismissed as withdrawn.

the date of filing of the said Writ Petition shall stand restored.

Civil Appeal is, accordingly, disposed of with no order as to costs.

In view of our order passed today in the case of M/s. Supreme Industries Ltd. Vs. M/s. Ranisati Pipe Industries & Ors., Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8750/2007, nothing survives in this Petition filed by M/s. Farmers Tractors. The reason is that petitioners-M/s. Farmers Tractors were intervenors in the High Court. They had opposed the original Writ Petition filed by respondent No.5 herein- M/s.Ranisati Pipe Industries. Since the original Writ Petition sands dismissed as withdrawn, nothing survives in this Special Leave Petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed as infructuous.

No orders as to costs.

...................J. (S.H. KAPADIA) ...................J. (B. SUDERSHAN REDDY) New Delhi, July 17, 2008.
Gurnam Singh (D) Thr. Lrs & Ors vs Gurbachan Kaur (D) By Lrs

3) The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass so also the controversy involved in the appeal is short. However, only relevant facts to appreciate the question involved are mentioned infra.

4) One Surjan Singh(defendant No.1) was the original owner of the suit land bearing Khasra Nos. 1806, 1807, 1808 and 1809 (new numbers 91R/2/3, 12, 9, 10, 11, 90R/6 and 15) measuring 43 Kanals 4 Marlas situated in village Rasulpur, Tahsil/District Amritsar (hereinafter referred to as "the suit land”).

5) On 06.05.1974, Surjan Singh entered into a contract to sell the suit land to one Gurbachan Kaur(plaintiff) for Rs.10,000/- per Killa. In terms of the contract, the sale deed of the suit land was to be executed by Surjan Singh in favour of Gurbachan Kaur on or before 28.01.1975.

7) By judgment/decree dated 29.08.1980, the Trial Court dismissed the suit insofar as it pertained to grant of relief of specific performance of contract was concerned but decreed the suit by granting money decree for Rs.7000/- in plaintiff's favour. In this way, the suit was partly decreed and partly dismissed.

compliance of Rules 3(2) and 4(3) of Order 22, therefore, came into operation resulting in dismissal of second appeal as abated on the expiry of 90 days from 10.05.1994, i.e., on 10.08.1994. The High Court, therefore, ceased to have jurisdiction to decide the second appeal which stood already dismissed on 10.08.1994. Indeed, there was no pending appeal on and after 10.08.1994.

23) The appellants are the legal representatives of defendant Nos. 2 and 4 on whom the right to sue has devolved. They had, therefore, right to question the legality of the impugned order inter alia on the ground of it being a nullity. Such objection, in our opinion, could be raised in appeal or even in execution proceedings arising out of such decree. In our view, the objection, therefore, deserves to be upheld. It is, accordingly, upheld.

24) In the light of foregoing discussion, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment/decree.
Radhey Shyam Garg vs Naresh Kumar Gupta

3. Respondent filed a complaint petition in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi on or about 7.6.2004 which was marked as Criminal Complaint Case No.882/1 of 2004 for commission of an alleged 2 offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, `the Act'). Pre-summoning evidence by the complainant was recorded by way of an affidavit. Cognizance of the offence was taken and summons was directed to be issued by an order dated 9.6.2004. Post-summoning evidence was also adduced by the complainant on 26.3.2007 by way of an affidavit.

4. It now appears that respondent examined himself and was cross- examined at length. His cross-examination started 12.9.2008. It runs into nine typed pages. Indisputably, prior to offering himself for cross- examination, appellant proved his affidavits which were marked as Exhibits CW1/A to CW1/1. A large number of questions were asked to the deponent on the contents of the affidavits.

5. It, however, appears that an application purported to be under Section 145(2) of the Act was filed by the appellant on 7.3.2008 which by reason of an order dated 14.3.2008 was dismissed. Appellant filed an application before the High Court purported to be under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for setting aside the said order.

17. We, therefore, do not find any justification for arriving at a finding that a witness can again be summoned for his examination in chief in the court despite affirming affidavit in that behalf.

19. We do not find any merit in this appeal. It is dismissed accordingly. However, keeping in view the fact that there appears to be an apparent dissimilarity in the signatures of the deponent appearing at pages 39 and 61, we are of the opinion that there exists a necessity for conducting an enquiry in this behalf. We, therefore, direct the Registrar (Judicial) to conduct an enquiry in terms of Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and submit a report to this Court. We, however, make it clear that trial of the matter shall go on before the court below.

20. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.25,000/-.

May 5, 2009
Accountant General Of Orissa And Anr vs R. Ramamurty And Anr

Challenge in these appeals is to a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No.8532 of 2003. The said writ petition had been filed by the appellants questioning correctness of the decision rendered by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench (in short the 'CAT') in O.A.No. 1345 of 2001. The basic issue which arose for consideration in the writ petition was "what is the mode of calculating of restoration of pension in respect of employees covered by Rule 37A of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 (in short the 'Rules'). According to the appellants, a conjoint reading of Rules 37 and 37A as operated upto 31.3.1995 has not been kept in view. The High Court modified the order of the CAT and held that in a case where an employee had commuted minimum permissible pension i.e. 1/3 and even where lesser portion is commuted, the pro rata commuted portion has to be deducted from the basic pension to arrive at restorable pension, but however, he will get dearness relief, interim relief etc. on full basic pension.

The High Court arrived at the aforesaid conclusion after considering Rules 37 and 37A.

In view of what has been stated in the said case, more particularly in the quoted paragraphs, there is no substance in the appeals which we accordingly dismiss. No costs.
K. K. Tiwari & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors

2. Facts relevant and necessary leading to the filing of this appeal may be stated.

5. A Circular dated 29.07.1997 was issued by respondent No.2 in which it was stated that as on 1.4.1997 out of the then sanctioned strength of 445 posts of EEs, 354 posts (as against 297 posts) were occupied by those employees who have been promoted from the cadre of AEEs, while 76 posts (as against 148 posts) by those who belong to the cadre of AEs. It was also stated in the said Circular that the total demand for the year 1997-98 to the cadre of EEs was 58 posts, which were directed to be filled in by promotion from amongst AEs only.

6. The private respondents herein challenged the order dated 29.07.1997 of the Engineer-in-Chief respondent No. 2 before the CAT, Principal Bench, Allahabad. The Tribunal by its order dated 08.02.2000 partly allowed the O.A. and directed respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to fill up the vacancies by promotion in the ratio of 2/3rd from AEEs and 1/3rd from AEs in accordance with the provisions of the relevant rules.

26. On evaluation of the findings recorded by the High Court and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, we do not find any manifest error or perversity in the judgment of the High Court warranting interference in this appeal.

27. In the result, the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.
Amalendu Sahu vs Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd

2. This appeal has been filed challenging the judgment and order dated 13.10.2008 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter, `National Commission') which upheld the concurrent finding of the District and State Consumer Forums that the car at the 1 time of the accident was being driven on hire and was outside the scope of the insurance policy.

3. The appellant who is the original complainant had taken a comprehensive insurance policy in respect of his private car being No. WB-34C/1919 vide policy No.311701/3/99/7172 of 1999 and the complainant paid the insurance premium duly.

4. As per the complainant, United Bank of India's regional office is his tenant and many of its employees are known to him. One of its employees had approached the complainant to hand over the aforesaid vehicle for a few hours for urgent use by the employees of the Bank. The complainant handed the aforesaid vehicle by way of a good gesture and did not take any rent from the Bank in this regard. The vehicle met with an accident during the subsistence of the policy.

5. The complainant had lodged a claim before the respondent but it refused to allow the claim 2 inter alia on the ground that the vehicle was given on hire and as per the policy terms such use was not permitted and the insured was not entitled to any compensation for such unauthorised use.

7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the complainant preferred an appeal to the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission which vide its order dated 16.01.2004 dismissed the appeal as devoid of any merits. It was held that from the documents and circumstances it was established that the car was given on a hire. According to the State Commission, the surveyor's report was not challenged by the complainant.

17. For the reasons stated, we cannot affirm the order of the fora below. We direct the respondent insurance company to pay a consolidated sum of Rs.2,50,000/- even though compensation claimed is Rs.5,00,000/-.

18. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the said sum is to be paid to the appellant by the insurance company without any interest within a period of six weeks from date. However, if the insurance company delays the aforesaid payment beyond six weeks, then this amount will carry an interest of 9% from the date of the expiry of the period of six weeks till the date of actual payment.

19. The appeal is thus allowed to the extent indicated above.
Ajayapal Singh(D) Through Lrs. vs The Associated Cement Companies Ltd

2. The appellant (since deceased) approached this Court, aggrieved by his termination on account of involvement in a criminal case, which, according to the respondent – Management, amounted to moral turpitude. The appellant was convicted under Section 324 IPC and at the appellate stage, the punishment was confined only to payment of fine.

4. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the interest of justice would be met and complete justice would be done in case the legal representatives of the appellant, who have been substituted, are granted a monetary compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs). Ordered accordingly.

5. The above amount shall be paid to the legal representatives of the appellant, who have come on record, within four weeks from today. We make it clear that this Judgment is passed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and therefore, not to be treated as a precedent.

6. In view of the above, this appeal is disposed of.

July 12, 2018.
Gurswaroop Joshi vs Beena Sharma & Ors

VII. Smt. Shanti Devi d/o Shri H.L. Joshi In 1984, the 1st respondent herein filed an application purported to be under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 ('the Act', for short) for grant of probate in respect of the said Will. Objections were filed thereagainst. By an order dated 28.2.1996, the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi held that the said Will executed by the afore-mentioned Harbans Lal Joshi, was valid in law and had been executed by him in sound disposing mind. The prayer for grant of probate as made by the 1st respondent was, therefore, allowed. The widow of Shri Harbans Lal Joshi, Smt. Pushpawati Joshi, respondent No.2 Smt. Chandra Kala Joshi, widow of deceased B.K. Joshi s/o Harbans Lal Joshi and respondent No.7Dr. Sahib Swarup Joshi preferred an appeal against the said judgment and order dated 28.2.1996 before the Delhi High Court. It was registered as F.A.O.No.248 of 1996. Smt. Pushpawati, the widow of Late Harbans Lal Joshi died on 12.1.1999. The appellant herein filed an application for her transposition and/or substitution as an appellant in place of Late Pushpawati. The said application has been rejected by the Registrar of the Delhi High Court. One of the appellants in the said appeal, namely, Dr. Sahib Swarup Joshi moved an application for withdrawal from the said appeal and his name was deleted from the array of the appellants and was transposed to the category of a respondent.

For the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders cannot be sustained, which are, accordingly, set aside. However, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we would request the High Court to consider the desirability of disposing of the appeal as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order. The High Court, indisputably while disposing of the appeal, would take into account the effect of various interim orders passed at different stages.

The appeals are allowed with the afore-mentioned observations and directions.

No costs.
Cheriyath Jyothi vs Sainudeen

2. Briefly stated, the appellant made a representation to the Secretary, Karakulam Gram Panchayath on 6 th May, 2013, complaining that the occupant in the neighbouring plot had erected an unauthorised building and was using the same as a Plant for making Rubber Sheets on commercial basis. The Digitally signed by NEETU KHAJURIA Date: 2019.04.24 appellant claims to be occupying House K.P. No.V/168 of the 17:33:49 IST Reason: Karakulam Gram Panchayath in Survey No.43/2­1­3 of 2 Vattappara Village. The representation reads thus:

The respondent asserted that he had thereafter applied for permission to construct the structure as per the prescribed norms, and pursuant to the building plan submitted by him, 6 the same was approved by the competent authority and permit came to be issued on 9 th October, 2013. The respondent asserts that he was permitted to construct the new shed, having plinth area of 9.49 Sq.Mts., after leaving statutory open space, as provided in the approved plan. In conformity with the said approved plan, the respondent constructed a new structure which was compliant with the requirements specified as per the permit issued in his favour in that regard. The stand taken by the respondent found support from the affidavit filed by the Secretary, Karakullam Gram Panchayat, Nedumangad, Thiruvalla. The relevant portion of the said affidavit filed on 9th January, 2015, on behalf of the Panchayat, reads thus:

This report is submitting before Hon’ble family court nedumangad along with order and the rough plan. Dated this the 18th day of February 2015.

sd.

12. In view of the above, this appeal is dismissed but with the observations made hitherto. No order as to costs.

All applications are also disposed of.

……………………………..J (A.M. Khanwilkar) ……………………………..J (Ajay Rastogi) New Delhi;

April 24, 2019.