L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Babu Singh & Ors vs Ram Sahai @ Ram Singh

We need not go into other issues between the parties.

5. The learned Trial Judge, although opined that the suit was bad for non-impleading Karam Kaur and Dalwinder Kaur, daughters of the testator as parties to the suit, proceeded to consider the validity of the Will in order to avoid any possibility of remand by the Trial Court, stating :

In the aforementioned situation, the Will was said to have not been proved.

22. For the reasons, aforementioned, the impugned judgment of the High Court as also the First Court of Appeal cannot be sustained. They are set aside accordingly. Appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
Rushi Guman Singh vs State Of Orissa & Ors

3. Briefly stated the facts are that the appellant, who was working as a Soil Conservation Officer (Class I) with the Government of Orissa, was placed under suspension by order dated 12th June, 1998 in contemplation of a disciplinary inquiry as envisaged under Rule 12(1)(a) of the Orissa Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1962 (in short “OCS (CCA) Rules”). However, the suspension was revoked during the pendency of the enquiry proceeding on 20th July, 1999. In his report, dated 30th March, 2000, the enquiry officer exonerated the appellant of all the charges. However, the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and issued a show cause notice to the appellant dated 4th February, 2002 proposing the punishment of dismissal. The appellant submitted his reply to the show cause notice on 4th March, 2002. By an order dated 14th February, 2003, the disciplinary authority passed an order imposing the punishment of removal on the appellant. It was also directed that the period of suspension from 13th June, 1998 to 20th July, 1999 is treated as such.

4. Aggrieved by the order dated 14th February, 2003, the appellant moved the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, (OAT), Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in OA No.994 of 2003. On 7th July, 2006, the OA was dismissed by the OAT. The appellant challenged the order of OAT in Writ Petition (C) No.10653 of 2006 in the Orissa High Court. By an order dated 24th June, 2008, the writ petition was allowed. The order of OAT was set aside and the order of the Government of Orissa dated 14th February, 2003 was quashed. A direction was issued to the disciplinary authority to provide reasonable opportunity to the appellant before taking a final decision in the matter relating to the findings on the charges framed against him. Special Leave Petition (C) No.24190 of 2008 filed by the State of Orissa against the aforesaid order of the High Court was dismissed by this Court on 17th October, 2008. After dismissal of the aforesaid SLP, pursuant to the orders passed by the High Court on 24th June, 2008, the disciplinary authority issued a show cause notice dated 25th February, 2009 to the appellant calling for his representation. He was also informed that as per the provisions of law in Rule 12(4) of the OCS (CCA) Rules, he has been placed under suspension from the date of the original order of removal, i.e., 14th February, 2003, from Government service and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of suspension, the appellant moved the OAT Bench at Cuttack in OA No.1915 © of 2009 which was dismissed. The appellant challenged the order passed by the Government of Orissa dated 25th February, 2009 and the order passed by the OAT, by filing the Writ Petition (C) NO.16450 of 2010. The aforesaid writ petition has been dismissed by the High Court by an order dated 15th September, 2011. It is this order which has been challenged in the present appeal.

April 09, 2013.
M/S. Ormi Textiles & Anr vs State Of U.P. & Ors

Appellant No. 1 is a partnership firm. It was constituted in the year 1973. It established a factory at Kadrabad in the town of Modi Nagar, U.P. A loan of Rs. 3.96 lakhs was applied for but a sum of Rs. 3.14 lakhs was sanctioned in 1974. Appellant No. 1 was in possession of 1100 sq. yards in Khasra Plot No. 397M, Khata No. 80 situated in Village Kadrabad Pargana Jalalabad. The factory is situated on a land measuring 800 sq. yards. The schedule of the land which was the subject matter of mortgage in favour of the respondent - Corporation reads as under:

4. A notice dated 28.12.2005 under Section 29 of the Act was issued by the respondent - Corporation.

A writ petition was filed questioning the legality thereof. Pursuant to an interim order passed by the High Court in the said writ petition, the appellant deposited a further amount of Rs. 2 lakhs. In the meantime, another unit of the appellant became sick and subjected to a notice under Section 29 of the Act wherefor also a writ petition was filed before the High Court which was marked as Civil Misc. Petition No. 7219 of 2006.

5. An advertisement was issued for sale of the appellant's unit covering the land area 7 Siswa, 5 Biswansi (951.25 sq. mtr.) in a newspaper known as 'Amar Ujala' on or about 6.06.2006.

6. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants questioning the validity of the said notice, stating:

14. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the right to sell the property by the Corporation must be exercised only in respect of the mortgaged property and not the one which is not the subject matter thereof.

15. Keeping in view the fact that the extent of property mortgaged has been described in the deed of mortgage, it will be open to the respondents herein to get the area of the said property duly demarcated.

17. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/-.
Vice Chancellor Guru Ghasidas ... vs Craig Macleod

3. The subject matter of the impugned interim order, is three directions given by the University on 02.02.2010. These three directions are: (1) suspending Craig Mcleod from attending classes in the University of which he is a student, (2) stopping him from availing the facilities of the University till final orders are passed in respect of his alleged gross misbehavior, and (3) restraining from entering the University premises.

4. All three directions were stayed by the High Court by the impugned interim order till the disposal of the Writ Petition. The interim stay was subject to the condition that Craig Mcleod gives an undertaking, inter alia, of good behaviour. The impugned interim order also directed the University not to pass a final order in respect of the alleged gross misbehaviour of Craig Mcleod.

The facts:

6. It is alleged that on 02.02.2010 Craig Mcleod grossly misbehaved on campus with two Professors of the University. As a result of the incident, a First Information Report was lodged with the police and the Proctorial Board of the University took an emergent decision to expel him from the University for violating the code of conduct and for beating and threatening a teacher. Pending a final decision on the allegations against him, Craig Mcleod was suspended from attending his classes, stopped from availing facilities of the University and restrained from entering the University premises by an order dated 02.02.2010.

7. Feeling aggrieved, Craig Mcleod challenged the said order by filing Writ Petition (C) No. 694 of 2010 in the High Court of Chhattisgarh. On 17.02.2010 notice was issued in the Writ Petition and in the interim, the passing of an order of rustication was stayed. This interim order was continued for a couple of months.

17. There is, therefore, a self-imposed limited discretion for interference available to this Court, and it would, generally, be more appropriate for an aggrieved litigant to approach the High Court for rectifying any error that may have been committed in passing (or declining to pass) an interim order. Of course, in an emergent and appropriate situation it is always open to a litigant to approach this Court in its remedial jurisdiction.

20. It is under these circumstances that we have entertained this appeal against an interim order.

Conclusion:

23. Under the circumstances, the impugned interim order is set aside and this appeal is accordingly disposed of.

August 16, 2012
New India Assurance Co.Ltd vs Priya Blue Industries Pvt. Ltd

1. This appeal under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is directed against the final judgment and order of the National Consumer Disputes 2 Redressal Commission. The National Commission by the impugned judgment allowed the complaint preferred by the respondent complainant and accordingly directed the appellant Company to pay a sum of Rs. 13.69 crores with interest at 9% per annum from 9th June, 1997 till its realization.

2. In order to consider as to whether the impugned judgment of the National Commission (for short `the Commission') suffers from any infirmity requiring our interference, it may be just and necessary to notice relevant facts.

3. The respondent-complainant at the relevant time was carrying on ship breaking and scrap dealing business. It had under a Memorandum of Agreement dated 2.6.1997 purchased and imported to Alang, a very large bulk ore and oil carrier by the name of "Vloo Arun" for the purpose of scrapping (ship breaking/demolition) from one M/s. Ruby Enterprises 3 Inc. Belgium. There is no controversy that the respondent has taken a marine insurance policy for hull and machinery on 4.6.1997 for the said vessel. The policy was obtained after taking possession of the vessel for covering only 9 kms. distance between Alang Anchorage to Alang Ship Breaking yard. Insurance cover was for a sum of Rs. 25.70 crores for which a premium of Rs. 1,14,280/- was paid. As per the special condition it was "Institute Voyage Clause (hulls) dated 1.10.1983 as attached with a specific condition, `but to cover and/or Constructive Total Loss only' including salvage and sue and labour and expenses."

5. It is under those circumstances the respondent complainant has claimed an amount of Rs. 18,30,44,912/- with interest @ 19.5% p.a from 14.6.1997 till its payment and Rs. 2.5 lakhs as costs and expenses of the litigation and further a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs towards harassment meted out by the appellant insurance Company.

6. In response to the claim, the appellant insurance Company appointed two Surveyors, and the respondent complainant with the acceptance and approval of the appellant insurance Company appointed Tony Fernandez Average Adjusters Pvt. Ltd. as its Surveyor. Each one of the Surveyors appointed by the appellant insurance Company submitted their respective reports on 24.6.1997 and 14.7.1997. 5

15. For the same reasons, we find no merit in the cross appeal preferred by the respondent complainant.

16. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. 16
Satishchandra Ratanlal Shah vs The State Of Gujarat

3. It is pertinent to note the facts giving rise to the appeal in a detailed manner. The respondent no. 2­ complainant is the director of a money lending company by the name of Dharshan Fiscal Pvt. Ltd. The appellant, who is a retired bank employee, approached the complainant’s company in the month of January 2008 for a loan of Rs. 27,00,000/­. Accordingly, the respondent no. 2 transferred the funds as a loan, which was to be repaid by the appellant within a year with interest. Thereafter, the appellant has not repaid the amount back to the respondent no.2. Further, respondent no.2 alleged that when he approached the appellant, he was threatened by the appellant with dire consequences. Thereafter, the respondent no.2 filed a complaint based on which the FIR bearing I/C.R. No. 22/2012, dated 25.01.2012, was filed before the Kagdapith Police Station, Ahmedabad, against the present appellant under Section 406, 409, 417, 420, 294 (b) and 506 (2) of IPC. On 23.02.2012, the appellant was enlarged on bail by the High Court after being arrested on 29.01.2012. The appellant 2 preferred an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C for the quashing of the FIR bearing I/C.R No. 22/2012.

4. The charge sheet No. 28 of 2012 dated 01.03.2012, came to be filed against the appellant under Sections 406, 420 and 417 of IPC. Pursuant to the same, the Magistrate issued summons. The appellant alleged that on 04.12.2013, he was given a copy of the said charge sheet, and that the charges were framed by the Metropolitan Magistrate on the same day in a blank sheet without giving him an opportunity of being heard, as the appellant was unaccompanied by any counsel. The appellant alleges that the same was in violation of Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

7. Vide order dated 12.04.2018, the High Court dismissed the quashing petition preferred by the appellant and directed the trial court to complete the trial within three months. The High Court further went on to observe that, prima facie an offence of cheating under Section 420 is made out but charge under Section 406 pertaining to criminal breach of trust is not applicable in the given factual scenario. However, the High Court did not remove the charges under Section 406 and observed that no case has been made out to get the charge quashed. Aggrieved by the aforesaid dismissal, the appellant has preferred the present Special Leave Petition. 4

This clearly reflected a loaded dice situation against the appellant herein.

18. In view of the above, we are unable to uphold the impugned order passed by the High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 4033 of 2012 and the same is hereby set aside. The application filed by the appellant under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is allowed and the proceedings initiated based on the FIR instituted at the instance of respondent no. 2 are hereby quashed.

19. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
T. Venkateswarulu vs Exe.Officer, Tirumala T.Devasthanam& ...

3. To understand the controversy involved, a few material facts may be stated, which are as under:

4. The appellant acquired BE Degree on 28th August, 1983. Aggrieved by the denial of the same benefit as was extended to the Supervisors, the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court. By judgment dated 22nd August, 1986, TTD was directed to consider the appellant's case for promotion as Junior Engineer, re-designated as Assistant Executive Engineer, if he was otherwise eligible according to the rules. 3

5. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the said direction by the High Court, the appellant made a representation to the authorities concerned, which was rejected on 19th April, 1987 for the reason that he was found to be not eligible for promotion as Assistant Executive Engineer under the TTD Service Rules, 1978. The appellant challenged the said order by filing another writ petition, which was again disposed of on 30th March, 1990, with a direction to the TTD Management to consider the appellant's case taking into consideration the promotional channels set out for Category 5 employees in the engineering department, meaning thereby the appellant was to be considered for promotion on the basis of the rules existing as on the date of the order. It may be noted that on 24th October, 1989, TTD Employees Service Rules, 1989 (for short `the 1989 Rules') had come into force. Pursuant to the said direction, the case of the appellant was considered under 1989 Rules and he was appointed, on conversion, as an Assistant Executive Engineer with effect from 26th October, 1989, i.e. the date 4 with effect wherefrom the 1989 Rules were enforced vide G.O. Ms. No.1060.

20.For all these reasons, we do not see any infirmity in the decision of the Division Bench warranting our interference in the exercise of discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. In our judgment, the appeals have no substance and, therefore, deserve to be dismissed.

21.For the reasons aforesaid, the appeals must fail and are accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

NOVEMBER 7, 2008.
Kokkilagadda Subba Rao vs Div.Mng.United India ...

1. The appellant (Subba Rao) was the owner of a fishing boat in Andhra Pradesh registered with the respondent insurance company. There is no dispute that the fishing boat capsized on 27th July 1992 while the insurance policy covering the boat was still valid.

2. Upon the boat having capsized, Subba Rao made a claim with the insurance company on 3rd August 1992 for a sum of Rs. 6 lakhs. The insurance company appointed M/s Reliance Surveillance as a surveyor. Reliance Surveillance submitted its report on 3rd May 1993 to the effect that the case may be treated as a total loss.

5. Feeling aggrieved, Subba Rao approached the Andhra Pradesh State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission seeking compensation from the insurance company of Rs. 6 lakhs with 24% interest. By an order dated 28th March 2002 the State Commission rejected Subba Rao’s claim and this led to his filing an appeal before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission being First Appeal No.397 of 2002. By an order dated 10th January 2005 (under challenge) the National Commission rejected the appeal filed by Subba Rao.

10. Under the circumstances, there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed.

………………………………J (Gyan Sudha Misra) ………………………………..J (Madan B. Lokur) New Delhi;

[HEARD BY HON'BLE GYAN SUDHA MISRA AND HON'BLE MADAN B. LOKUR, JJ.] Date:16/04/2014 This Appeal was called on for judgment today.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Gyan Sudha Misra and His Lordship.

For the reasons given in the Non-Reportable judgment, which is placed on the file, the appeal is dismissed.
Dasin Bai @ Shanti Bai vs State Of Chhattisgarh

This appeal has been filed by Dasin Bai against the judgment and order dated 1st December, 2006 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No.1171 of 2001 by which the High Court while upholding the findings of the Trial Court has dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant. The facts of the case as narrated by the prosecution are briefly stated as under:

The ground of defense taken by the appellant, that she did not have any motive to kill the deceased, is ill founded and does not break the chain of circumstances. Therefore, when facts are clear it is not necessary to have proof of motive or ill-will to sustain conviction. (See Mulakh Raj & Ors. v. Staish Kumar & Ors., (1992) 3 SCC 43.

Further, with regard to the aspect of the witnesses, PW-1 and PW-3, who recorded the dying declaration, were neighbours of the accused and hence the Trial Court correctly held that they are not interested witnesses. The findings of the Trial Court also bring to light the fact that they had no animosity with the appellant, and were visiting her house only on the fateful night.

The Trial Court and the High Court have rightly analysed the evidence of these witnesses and the statements made in the dying declaration referred to above and held the accused guilty. That being so, no interference is called for. This appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

............................................................J (M.Y. EQBAL) ............................................................J (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE) New Delhi;

February 11, 2015.
State Of Punjab & Ors vs Prem Sarup

(4) A disciplinary proceeding, however, was initiated against respondent on the same allegations wherein a punishment of forfeiture of salary was imposed upon him.

(14) In view of the fact that the appellants before us have not been able to show that those witnesses who turned hostile before the criminal Court have been examined in the departmental proceedings and, furthermore, as no material is brought on record to prove that; even otherwise, the charges against the respondent had not been proved, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for our interference with the impugned judgment. Furthermore, as noticed, hereinbefore the occurrence took place in the year 1974 and the respondent was acquitted in the year 1979 and, thus, at this distant point of time, no interference with the impugned judgment is warranted, particularly, in view of the fact that the appellants -5- have not placed before us any foundational fact in support of its plea that Clause (b) of Sub- section(1) of Section 16.3 of the Police Rules, 1934 would be attracted in this case. (15) For the reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Rajendra Rajoriya vs Jagat Narain Thapak

3. Appellant herein filed a complaint before the ASHA SUNDRIYAL Date: 2018.02.23 16:42:27 IST Reason: jurisdictional police station under Sections 420, 467, 1 468, 471,120B, 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter referred as ‘IPC’ for brevity] and under Section 3 of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 on the allegations that one Smt. Vidhyabai and others sold the disputed land to respondent no. 1 and got the appellant’s property mutated by committing fraud and forgery. It was further alleged that the respondents had threatened the appellant with dire consequence and swore at them with filthy language intended to belittle his caste/tribe. It may be noted that the concerned police station did not take any action on the aforesaid complaint.

4. Aggrieved by the inaction of the police, the appellant approached the Jurisdictional Magistrate, Gwalior, with the same set of facts under Section 200 of Cr.P.C.

5. The Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Gwalior, by Order dated 21.04.2012, dismissed the aforesaid criminal complaint on the footing that there was no sufficient proof on record provided by the appellant/complainant to prove that he belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and the dispute between the parties had trappings of civil nature.

6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid dismissal of criminal complaint, appellant approached Addl. District and Sessions Judge [hereinafter referred as ‘Sessions Court’ for brevity] in Criminal Revision No. 242/2012. The Sessions Court, by the order dated 07.12.2012, held that the complainant belonged to Jatav community which is a Scheduled Caste. Further the Sessions Court observed that the facts narrated portray that the respondent no. 1 in conspiracy with others had transferred the land belonging to the appellant in an illegal manner. 3 Thereafter, concluded that the lower court did not appreciate the facts as well as the law in a proper manner and remanded the case in the following manner: -

20. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside. Accordingly, the complaint be considered by trial court afresh. Before parting with this case, we may clarify that the trial court is directed to proceed with the case 15 uninfluenced by any observations made by this Court for the purpose of deciding the instant appeal.