L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Union Of India & Ors vs Shantiranjan Sarkar

4. Subsequently, some other examinations were also held in which the respondent participated. Indisputably, he was a member of the Scheduled Caste. He filed several representations before the concerned various authorities contending that his candidature had not been considered despite the fact that he had obtained more than 30% of marks which was the cut-off mark for the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. As the said representations were not responded to, he filed an original application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, Kolkata. The said original application was dismissed on 12.9.2003 on the ground of limitation as also on merit, stating:

5. Respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court questioning the legality and/or validity of the said judgment and order which was marked as WP CT No. 194 of 2003. The said writ petition was initially dismissed on 9.7.2004 by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, stating:

15. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment should not be interfered with and is directed accordingly. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.1,00,000/-.
Smt. Kasturibai Sukharam Khandelwal ... vs Indore Development Authority .

1. Both the appellants (respondents before the High Court) being dissatisfied with the impugned judgment dated 4th November, 2008 have preferred these appeals.

2. The facts in brief relevant for the purpose are that the appellant Reason:

5. The Single Judge of the High Court, after hearing the parties, dismissed the writ petition under its order dated 1 st February, 2001 which came to be challenged in letters patent appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, taking note of the rival claim of the parties and noticing the fact that, in the interregnum period, the plot had also been allotted to Life Insurance Corporation(respondent no. 4) which was nowhere the subject matter but still taking note of the material on record and giving quietus to the dispute, disposed of the writ petition under its order impugned dated 4th November, 2008 with a direction to the authority to reconsider the matter of allotment of land afresh after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties and assess the comparative assessment and merit of the appellant Trust and 2nd respondent and pass speaking 4 order in accordance with law.

18. Consequently, both the appeals succeed and are accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 4th November, 2008 is hereby set aside. No costs.

19. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
Ropan Sahoo & Anr vs Ananda Kumar Sharma & Ors

3. Shorn of unnecessary details the facts which are requisite to be stated are that Mukesh Kumar, the respondent No. 6 before the High Court, had submitted an application for grant of licence to open an IMFL “Off” shop in Ward No. 16, Bargarh Town for the year 2007-08 on 28.1.2008. As a report was submitted that the proposed site was violative of sub-rule 1(c) of Rule 34 of Orissa Excise Rules, 1965 (for short “the Rules”), the said respondent chose to withdraw the application for the aforesaid year by indicating personal reasons. In respect of the next financial year he again submitted an application for grant of licence at the same place. The Collector, Bargarh, invited objections and pursuant to the same the writ petitioner filed his objection on 18.10.2008. The Inspector of Excise submitted a report on 2.2.2009 stating about the existence of a bathing ghat, Vishnu temple, bus stand and petrol pump within the prohibited distance, but recommended for relaxation of restrictions. The Collector, Bargarh, recommended for opening of the shop for remaining part of the year 2008-09 in relaxation of the restrictions and the Excise Commissioner also recommended to the Government on 19.2.2009 for sanction by relaxing of the restrictions. As the factual matrix would reveal, the State Government on the basis of the recommendations invoked the power of relaxation under Rule 34 of the Rules and granted licence in favour of the said respondent for the remaining period of 2008-09. Be it noted, in a similar manner relaxation was granted for opening of the IMFL/Beer (‘ON’ shop) at Hotel Sawadia for the period from 2.3.2009 to 31.3.2009.

charge.

25. In view of our aforesaid analysis, the appeals are allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside. It is further clarified that if the Government, if so advised, can invoke the power under the proviso to Rule 34(1) of the Rules for the purpose of relaxation for grant of exclusive privilege and licence pertaining to the said shops in respect of current and subsequent financial years. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their respective costs.

January 22, 2013
U.P.Avas Evam Vikas Parishad.U.P vs Durga Das & Ors

JUDGMENT O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO. 762 OF 2008 [Arising out of SLP(C) No.21022 of 2006] Having regard to the facts of the case, while considering the application for condonation of the delay in making the deposit in terms of the order dated 04.01.2007 and upon hearing counsel for the parties, we decided to dispose of the Special Leave Petition finally at this stage itself. Delay in making depositing 50% of the enhanced amount condoned. Leave granted.

We direct the High Court to accept such deposit and to proceed accordingly. The stay granted on 4/01/2007 will continue till the disposal of the appeal before the High Court. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
S. Satnam Singh & Ors vs Surnder Kaur & Anr

3. The parties hereto are successors of one late Surender Singh and one late Harikishan Singh. They were brothers. First respondent is the widow 2 of late Harikishan Singh and the second respondent is his son. The property which was the subject matter of the partition suit was a house premises bearing Municipal No.2-4-1099 situated at Nimbali Adds, Hyderabad admeasuring 671 sq. yards.

6. An application for amendment of the said written statement was filed, inter alia, stating :

25. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs.

December 02, 2008
Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd.& Ors vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr

3. First Appellant is a company incorporated and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and is engaged in the business of manufacturing Gutkha. Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are the Chairman and Managing Director of the company. It is said to be a large organization. It has multi-locational manufacturing units and each of them is said to be headed by senior officials of the company, who were responsible for the conduct of its business. Inter alia on the premise that the samples collected from the manufacturing unit of appellants at Solapur were found to be adulterated in terms of Rule 62(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (in short `1955 Rules) providing for restriction on the use of anti-caking agents, a criminal complaint was filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Akkalkot, Solapur. Cognizance was taken thereof and summons were issued to the appellants.

5. By an order dated 30th April, 2007 a limited notice was issued. It reads :-

15. In our considered opinion V.K. Jain (supra) does not lay down a good law. It is over-ruled accordingly.

16. For the reasons aforementioned the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The High Court is directed to consider the matter afresh on merits. The appeal is allowed.
State Of Orissa & Anr vs M/S. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. & Ors

4. The present appeals arise out of Special Leave Petitions filed by the State of Orissa, IDCOL and Jindal.

13. Since the matter is pending since long it would be desirable for the State Government to ensure that the technical bids and the revised financial bids to be submitted within three weeks as directed earlier, be evaluated and informed decision taken by end of June, 2008. The observations and conclusions about malafides of the officials and their alleged favoritism stand quashed.

14. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent without any order as to costs.
K.K Kuda vs Chief Enforcement Officer, ...

In the meanwhile, Opportunity Notice, dated 12.5.2002, followed by Complaint dated 29.5.2002, was filed under Section 56 of FERA, 1973 against the persons abovenamed for having credited Non-convertible Rupee Funds into the Non-Resident (External) Account of the person concerned, alleging contravention of Section 6(4), 6(5) read with S.49 of FERA having taken place with the consent, connivance of and attributable to the negligence of the Officials and the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, took cognizance of the complaint for the offence under Section 56 of FERA on 29.5.2002 itself and issued summons to the accused. Challenging the same, the appellant herein and other Officials sought for quashing the complaint proceedings in their petition in Crl.M.C.No.5096/2006, on the file of the High Court, Delhi. While the matter stood thus, the adjudicating authority passed the final Order dated 14.5.2010 holding that the Officials of the Bank have not consented or connived in the performance of the official duties and they were negligent. The High Court by the impugned order held that the prosecution of the accused persons shall be confined to the negligence on their part and not for they having consented or connived in the commission of the said offence. The said order is under challenge before us.

The appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside and the proceedings in Criminal Complaint No.704/2002, on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, insofar as the appellant is concerned are quashed.

January 06, 2015
Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba vs Tosiba Appliances Co. & Ors

3. The factual matrix obtaining herein shorn of all unnecessary details is as under :

7. The following chart will show the range of goods registered in favour of TOSHIBA and which had been sought to be rectified by the respondent :

9. In the year 1984, the name of the Tokyo Shibaura Electric Company was changed to Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba (Toshiba Corporation). The said change was also duly incorporated in the trademarks register.

On the premise that the respondent which had although not been producing or marketing washing machines or spin dryers, but has been using the trade name, which was deceptively similar to that of the appellant, a lawyer's notice was served upon it, stating:

11. It, however, filed an application purported to be under Section 46 and 56 of the Act read with Rule 94 of the Rules before the Registrar, Trade Marks which was marked as Application No. CAL No.573, praying for rectification of the said registered trade mark No.273758 in Class 7 alleging:

34. We may now consider the three-fold submission of Mr. Nariman that:

36. If the submission of Mr. Nariman is to be accepted, the result thereof would be that for all intent and purport, no distinction would exist in the situations covered by clause (b) and clause (a) except that whereas in the former no period is mentioned, in the latter a specific period is provided.

PERSON AGGRIEVED

Since we are not concerned with a certification trademark, the process for registration of which is entirely different, we may exclude the interpretation of the phrase "person aggrieved"

51. The petition, therefore, which was maintainable, did not cease to be so particularly when the respondent not only faced with a legal action but, in fact, later on a suit has also been filed by the appellant against it. We would leave the question at that.

Exercise of Discretional jurisdiction

59. We, therefore, are of the opinion that on this short ground, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. We would, however, request the Delhi High Court to consider the desirability of disposing of the suit filed by the appellant against the respondent as expeditiously as possible. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
S.B.I vs Hemant Kumar

Nevertheless, before the Enquiry Officer in course of the preliminary enquiry he expressed the intent to defend himself in the enquiry. The enquiry was 3 first fixed on November 15, 1994 but on that date the respondent did not appear without giving any intimation to the Enquiry Officer. Due to his non-

5. On December 14, 1994 the respondent was once again absent and there was no intimation from him.

The Tribunal, accordingly, set aside the order of dismissal and directed for the respondent's reinstatement with full back-wages.

10. We are of the view that both the reasons assigned by the Tribunal for condemning the departmental enquiry as defective are completely untenable. The principles of natural justice cannot be stretched to a point where they would render the in-house proceedings unworkable.

12. We are, therefore, satisfied that the Tribunal's findings are wholly unreasonable and perverse and fit to be set aside. The High Court, unfortunately, did not consider the matter as it should have, in light of the discussions made above. The High Court's order is equally unsustainable. We, accordingly, set aside the order passed by the High Court and the award made 11 by the Tribunal. The appeal is allowed but with no order as to costs.

April 6, 2011.
Narendra vs K.Meena

2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, in a nutshell, are as under :

14. Applying the said ratio to the facts of this case, we are inclined to hold that the unsubstantiated allegations levelled by the Respondent wife and the threats and attempt to commit suicide by her amounted to mental cruelty and therefore, the marriage deserves to be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground stated in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act.

16. We, therefore, quash and set aside the impugned judgment delivered by the High Court. The decree of divorce dated 17th November, 2001 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore in M.C. No.603 of 1995 is hereby restored.

17. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs.
Balbir Singh vs State Of Haryana & Ors

3. The grievance of the appellant before the High Court was that he was wrongly not appointed as an Art and Craft teacher. It was the case of the appellant that certain candidates belonging to backward class `A' category had been given appointment against the posts of general category and had it not been done so, the appellant would have got the appointment.

7. Factually, the court found that no candidate of general class, who had secured less marks than the appellant, was appointed as an Art and Craft teacher and, therefore, the petition had been rejected.

13. Upon perusal of the record, we find that the appellant had secured 62 marks whereas the last candidate of the general category who was selected had secured 71 marks. In view of the said fact, it can not be said that any candidate who had secured lesser marks than the appellant had been given appointment as an Art and Craft teacher so far as the general category is concerned.

15. For the aforestated reasons and for the reasons recorded by the High Court, we do not find any substance in the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and, in our opinion, the impugned order passed by the High Court is just and proper and, therefore, this appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
The Apsrtc, Rep. By Its General Manager ... vs M. Ramadevi And Ors

3. Background facts are as follows:

4. The Tribunal observed that the age of the deceased was 40 years of age and he was getting a salary of Rs.4,000/- p.m. and after deduction his take home pay was Rs.2,367/- and the total emoluments was Rs.3,983/-. Applying the multiplier of 12 the entitlement was fixed at Rs.2,16,000/-, in addition Rs.15,000/- for non-pecuniary damages and Rs.5,000/- as consortium was awarded. Thus the total compensation awarded was fixed at Rs.2,46,000/-. The same was directed to be paid with interest @ 12% p.a.

6. The High Court was of the view that the pay of the deceased was Rs.3,536/- and not Rs.2,367/- as noted by the Tribunal. Accordingly, it fixed the basic pay of Rs.3,500/- after deducting 1/3rd towards the personal expenses. The monthly contribution was fixed at Rs.2,333/- and the annual contribution at Rs.27,996/-. The multiplier was taken at 12. Accordingly, entitlement was fixed at Rs.3,35,952/- to which was added the sum of Rs.20,000/- additionally awarded by the Tribunal.

11. Considering the figure in the Ex.A/7 the monthly income taken at Rs.3,000/- after deducting 1/3rd therefrom the annual contribution is fixed at Rs.24,000/-.

13. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs.
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn.& Anr vs Chander Bhan & Anr

Appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing the writ petition of the respondent No.1 who had filed the writ application before the High Court seeking a declaration that the advertisement issued by the appellants on 13.7.2005 for allotment of retail outlet dealership of the appellant No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation') at Sector 53, Gurgaon was illegal. Further prayer was for a direction to the Corporation to allot the said retail outlet to the respondent No.1 purportedly on the basis of a letter of intent dated 24.6.2003. The High Court held that the writ application deserved to be allowed and quashed the advertisement so far as it related to appointment of dealer for retail outlet at the site in question i.e. Sector 53, Gurgaon. Further direction was given to allot the said outlet dealership to the respondent No.1.

Background facts as projected by the appellant in a nutshell are as follows:

The position was reiterated even in a writ petition which was filed earlier before the High Court i.e. CWP No. 7960 of 2004 wherein specific reference was made to the situation of the land at villages Siwana Moja, Gurgaon-Jhajjar Road (site at Chandu Budeda). While the matter stood thus, Haryana Urban Development Authority (in short 'HUDA') issued an advertisement offering land to Nationalized Oil Companies, Government Departments and State Government Undertakings. One of the Sectors which was allotted to the Corporation was Sector 53, Gurgaon and the size of the site was 30.30 mtrs. There was no letter of intent issued by the Corporation in respect of said land to the respondent No.1, as the letter of intent related to another site and not one at Sector

The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.
State Of Jharkhand & Others vs Tata Cummins Ltd. & Another

The facts giving rise to this civil appeal, briefly, are as follows:

The facts found by the High Court are, that, after obtaining 37.19 acres of land from TELCO, out of the lands held by TELCO from TISCO under a sub-lease, Tata Cummins Ltd. established its factory in its building. The building was constructed by Tata Cummins Ltd. The industry started its production on and from 1.1.1996. TELCO was the 50% owner in the Joint Venture known as Tata Cummins Ltd. The object of insisting on the ownership of the building or a lease for 15 years, was only to ensure that the industry did not run away after taking the advantage of the benefit granted under the Policy and that the company was really a bona fide investor of capital in the industry intended to be run in the State for a reasonable length of time. It is in this background that one has to see the investments made by Tata Cummins Ltd.. As stated above, Rs.302 crores were invested by Tata Cummins Ltd. which employs more than 800 workmen and which has paid taxes of about Rs.600 crores. In the context of these facts, we are of the view that the assessee herein is not a fly-by-night operator. We are confining this judgment to the facts of the present case. The above figures are not disputed. We are satisfied on the basis of the above figures that the industry set up by the Tata Cummins Ltd. will contribute to the industrial growth and development of the State.

SCOPE OF THE NOTIFICATION NOS.478 & 479:

On the facts of the present case, we need not examine the question as to whether the said two notifications no.478 and 479, quoted hereinabove, are repugnant to the incentive policy.

Accordingly, we find no merit in this civil appeal and the same is dismissed, with no order as to costs.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1006 OF 2004:
State Of M.P. vs Dungaji(D) By Lrs.

2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under:

That after he had married Kashibai and Nanibai, his first wife Kaveribai started quarrelling with him and consequently, being fed up with the daily quarrel in the family, he had divorced Kaveribai 17 years prior to the filing of the suit as per the custom prevalent in the community. According to the plaintiff after the said divorce he and Kaveribai had been living separately and there had been no relationship of husband and wife between them. According to the plaintiff, after the aforesaid divorce, Kaveribai started living with her mother Amritabai. Amritabai had died and as such Kaveribai had inherited the land owned by her mother­Amrita Bai and the same land had been even mutated in the name of Kaveribai. The plaintiff pleaded that he had no concern with the aforesaid land owned by Kaveribai and therefore the same cannot be included in the holdings of the family of Dungaji. According to the plaintiff, Kaveribai is wrongly being treated as member of the family of plaintiff even after the divorce. According to the plaintiff, Order dated 18.05.1976 was null and void and not binding upon the rights of the plaintiff. The plaintiff also pleaded that proper procedure had not been 5 followed by the Competent Authority while passing the order dated 18.05.1976.

2.3 Kaveribai as original defendant no.3 filed a written statement and admitted that she had been divorced from the plaintiff­Dungaji. She also admitted that she had inherited a land measuring 19.89 hectares from her mother­Amritabai. The original defendant nos.1 and 2­the State of Madhya Pradesh and another (appellants herein) opposed the suit by filing a separate written statement. Defendant nos.1 and 2 denied that Dungaji had ever been divorced with Kaveribai and the land inherited by her from her mother was not to be included in the land held by the family of Dungaji. The Trial Court framed the requisite issues. The parties led their evidence. On appreciation of evidence, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit by Judgment and Decree dated 22.10.2002. The learned Trial Court specifically observed and held that the plaintiff has failed to prove that there is any customary divorce which has taken place between the plaintiff and Kaveribai. The Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court came to be confirmed by the First Appellate Court. The original plaintiff carried the matter to the High Court 6 by way of Second Appeal No.580 of 2003. The High Court framed the following substantial questions of law :

5.5 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal.

10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal succeeds. Impugned Judgment and Order dated 29.10.2010 passed by the High Court is hereby quashed and set aside and the Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court confirmed by the learned First Appellate Court is hereby restored. Consequently, the suit preferred by Dungaji stands dismissed. No costs.