L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Ghanshyam Sharma vs Surendra Kumar Sharma & Ors

4. It is alleged that there was an agreement between the appellant and the contesting respondents (1 to 3) whereunder the said respondents agreed to sell a plot of land admeasuring 400 sq. yards to the appellant herein for an amount of Rs.44,00,000/-. It is alleged that as per the agreement, the appellant did, in fact, make some payment.

5. On 11.7.2009, the appellant complained to the police that the father of the contesting respondents herein had called the appellant herein on telephone and asked the appellant to make the payment of the balance amount to the first respondent herein. Accordingly, the first respondent approached the appellant. Both of them went to the bank in a car belonging to the first respondent wherein the appellant withdrew an amount of Rs.16,68,000/-. Both of them proceeded to the house of the father of the respondents. When they were about to enter the house, the first respondent insisted that the appellant leave the money in the car itself. The appellant left the money in the car and went into the house of the respondents. While the appellant and the father of the respondents were discussing, the first respondent went out of the house and returned after a while to inform the appellant that the glass of the vehicle, in which money was kept, was broken and the money was stolen.

11. Whether the respondents are guilty under Section 379 IPC or not is a matter of evidence. The fact that the police chose to file a chargesheet under Section 406 and 420 IPC is not conclusive regarding the offences for which the respondents-accused are to be tried. The trial Court can always frame an appropriate charge if there is sufficient material from the report of the police available before it. In case where the material is insufficient to frame a charge, the trial Court may either discharge the accused or may direct further investigation in the matter. Before deciding as to which one of the three courses of action mentioned above is to be resorted to, the trial Court must examine the content of the complaint, the evidence gathered by the investigating agency and also scrutinize whether the investigating agency proceeded in the right direction.

12. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order.

August 26, 2014
Dayaram vs Sudhir Batham & Ors

13. The High Court would dispose of these cases as expeditiously as possible within a period of three months. In case, as per its procedure, the writ petition/Miscellaneous petition/matter is disposed of by a Single Judge, then no further appeal would lie against that order to the Division Bench but subject to special leave under Article 136.

Re: Question (ii) : Whether civil courts jurisdiction could be barred?

Re: Question (iii) : Whether a right of appeal can be taken away by way of judicial order?

24. Direction (13) in Madhuri Patil directs that when a writ petition challenging the decision of the scrutiny committee is decided by a Single Judge of the High Court, no further appeal would lie against that order to the division bench and the decision of the learned Single Judge would only be subjected to special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.

(emphasis supplied)

(emphasis supplied)

29 Conclusion

29. In view of the above, we hold that the second sentence of clause 13 providing that where the writ petition is disposed of by a single judge, no further appeal would lie against the order of the division bench (even when there is a vested right to file such intra-court appeal) and will only be subject to a special leave under Article 136, is not legally proper and therefore, to that extent, is held to be not a good law. The second sentence of direction No.(13) stands overruled. As a consequence, wherever the writ petitions against the orders of the scrutiny committee are heard by a single judge and the state law or Letters Patent permits an intra-court appeal, the same will be available.

Civil Appeal No.3467/2005

30. In the light of the above, we allow this appeal (CA No.3467/2005) and set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court holding the writ appeal as not maintainable. Consequently, the writ appeal (earlier Letters Patent Appeal) will stand restored to the file of the High Court. We request the High Court to hear and dispose of the said appeal (against order dated 9.5.2003 in W.P.No.2074/2002) on merits, expeditiously. Civil Appeal No.3468/2005 :

31. In view of our order in CA No.3467/2005 as above, CA No.3468/2005 challenging the order dated 9.5.2003 of the learned Single Judge is dismissed as infructuous.

We record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Mr. Gopal Subramanian, as Amicus Curiae.
Sqn.Ldr. (Retd). Navtej Singh vs Union Of India .

5. Sometime in the year 2001 the appellant was diagnosed of Dysthemia and Alcohol Dependence Syndrome and Primary Hypothyroidism and since then was put in low medical category. A Medical Board was constituted to consider his medical condition and on 27.02.2009 the Medical Board found him to be unfit for all flying duties. The appellant was given the option of being transferred to the Administrative Branch but expressed his unwillingness. In the circumstances, Invaliding Medical Board was constituted to consider the case which declared that the appellant be invalidated out of service on medical grounds. The aforesaid recommendation of the Invaliding Medical Board was approved and the appellant was invalidated out of service with effect from 18.11.2009 in the rank of Squadron Leader.

13. The aforesaid judgment and orders dated 24.02.2015 and 03.07.2015 are under challenge in this appeal. After issuance of notice the pleadings were exchanged. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents following assertions were made:

16. The facts on record indicate that:

vi) Any violation on part of the officer of the mandate the concerned policy could visit him with the possibility of departmental action including dismissal or removal from service.

19. It is in this factual backdrop that the issue in question needs to be considered. The underlying idea behind the policy is that in case a person governed by the provisions of Indian Air Force Act, 1950 intends to contract marriage with a foreign national, requisite intimation in that behalf is required to be made and appropriate permission is also required to be obtained. As a part of the exercise, the foreign national with whom the marriage is to be contracted may be required to give up the original citizenship and acquire citizenship of India. If there be any infraction or violation of the mandate of the requirements, the concerned officer could be visited with penalty including dismissal or removal from service. The policy has well laid and designed procedure including the timelines and the time limit of 120 days within which the authorities are required to apply their mind and consider the application seeking permission. In case nothing is heard within 120 days, the policy incorporates the concept of Civil Appeal D.No.41636 of 2015 Sqn. Ldr. (Retd.) Navtej Singh vs. Union of India and ors. 13 deemed consent or permission. All these requirements are in respect of those governed by the Indian Air Force Act, 1950 that is to say the serving officials.

22. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we therefore direct the respondents to include the names of the wife and daughter of the appellant in the Service Certificate at least from the date of his release or retirement and direct the respondents to extend to the wife and the daughter of the Civil Appeal D.No.41636 of 2015 Sqn. Ldr. (Retd.) Navtej Singh vs. Union of India and ors. 15 appellant all such benefits which a spouse and children of a retired officer would be entitled.

23. The appeals stand allowed in aforesaid terms. No costs.
Anjali Arora vs Union Of India

The Petitioners seek mandamus under Article 32 of the Constitution, for grant of pay scale on the basis of parity as granted by this Court on 21.10.2010 to the appellants in Yogeshwar Prasad & Ors. vs. National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration & Ors. (in short, “National Institute”), (2010) 14 SCC

2. It is the contention of the petitioners that they are similarly situated as the appellants in Yogeshwar Prasad (supra), working in the National Institute and are therefore also entitled to the benefit of 1 Regulation 4(2) of the National Institute Regulations for grant of pay scale at par with that being given to persons holding similar posts in the Central Government. The petitioners have been pursuing the matter with the respondents by filing representations since 2015 and were assured that their claims were under consideration till it was finally rejected on 05.02.2018. Even while the respondents contend that this Court had confined the relief to the appellants only in the aforesaid appeal, nonetheless they have themselves granted similar relief to four other persons who were not parties to the appeal, by order dated 02.11.2012. The petitioners have therefore been subjected to arbitrary and hostile discrimination.

7. The pay scale of Rs.1640­2900 for the post of Stenographer ‘C’ (Senior Stenographer/Stenographer/Stenographer Grade­I) was operationalized in terms of Government of India’s order dated 31.07.1990, during the regime of 5 th Central Pay Commission which was during the period w.e.f 01.01.1996 till 31.12.2005. Both Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 were not holding the post of Senior Stenographer Grade­I. Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were promoted as Stenographer Grade­I only w.e.f. 02.11.2017 and 12.07.2018 respectively. Thus, both Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 became Stenographer Grade­I, only when the 6th and 7th Pay Commission were operational and they were already drawing their pay in the pay scale of Rs.9300­34800 with grade pay of Rs.4200. Petitioner No.3 never 4 got regular promotion during her entire period of service and retired on 28.02.2016 as Junior Stenographer (Stenographer Grade­II) only and thus is not eligible to claim the pay scale of Senior Stenographer (Stenographer ‘C’/Stenographer Grade­I) at all.

8. The petitioners not being similarly situated as the appellants in Yogeshwar Prasad (supra), we find no merit in the present Writ Petition. The Writ Petition is dismissed.
Chilakamarthi Venkateswarlu vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh

3. The Appellant No.2 had also filed a criminal complaint being Criminal Complaint No.518 of 2012 against the de facto complainant and others in the Court of the First Class Judicial Magistrate, Narsapur, West Godavari District under Sections 120B, 420, 463, 464, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470 and 471 of the IPC.

7. In the complaint filed in the instant case, it is, inter alia, alleged that the Appellants caused injuries on the body of the de facto complainant and made attempts to hit the de facto complainant on the head and hit him with an iron rod. It is further alleged that the Appellants openly threatened to kill the de facto complainant.

9. The High Court rejected the contention of the Appellants that the complaint was lodged as a counter blast, observing that the complaint of the Second Appellant was filed on 28 th September, 2012 whereas the instant complaint was filed on 21 st July, 2015 that is after almost three years.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
State Of Karnataka & Anr vs Pastor P. Raju

3. One R.N. Lokesha son of R.S. Narayanappa resident of Ramapura, Channapatna, lodged an FIR alleging that at about 7.30 p.m. on 14.1.2005, he along with some other persons was celebrating Sankranthi festival when the respondent Pastor P. Raju, who is a member of Christian community, came there and made an appeal to them to get converted to Christian religion where they would get many benefits and facilities which were not available to them in Hindu religion to which they belong. It is also alleged that many persons who were present there resented the appeal made by the respondent and strongly opposed the plea or assertion for their conversion from Hindu religion to Christian religion. On the basis of the FIR, a case as Crime No.8 of 2005 was registered under Section 153-B IPC at the concerned police station. The respondent was arrested on 15.1.2005 and was produced before a Magistrate on the same day who remanded him to judicial custody as no application for bail had been filed. Subsequently, a bail application was moved under Section 436 Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate which was rejected on the ground that the offence under Section 153-B IPC being a non- bailable offence, the power under the aforesaid provision could not be exercised as the said provision empowered the Court to grant bail in bailable offences only. The respondent filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on 27.1.2005 for quashing of the proceedings initiated against him under Section 153-B IPC in case Crime No.8 of 2005. This petition was allowed by the High Court by the order under challenge and the entire proceedings initiated against the respondent were quashed.

8. After the FIR had been lodged and a criminal case had been registered against the respondent under Section 153-B IPC, the police arrested him as the offence disclosed was a cognizable offence. Thereafter, the respondent was produced before a Magistrate and the Magistrate remanded him to judicial custody. The High Court seems to have taken the view that as the learned Magistrate remanded the respondent to judicial custody when he was produced before him in accordance with Section 167 Cr.P.C., it amounted to taking cognizance of the offence. The question that arises is whether passing of an order of remand would amount to taking of cognizance of the offence.

13. For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order dated 23.2.2005 of the High Court is set aside. It is made clear that any observation made in this order is only for the limited purpose of deciding the appeal and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
Kumaran vs State Of Kerala And Anr

3. In the present case, the facts are that the complainant approached the Magistrate under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in a transaction where the accused had borrowed a sum of Rs.2.75 lakh from the complainant. When the complainant demanded the amount, the accused issued a cheque for the said amount which was returned as dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. The requisite demand notice was sent by the complainant to the accused followed by the complaint. Ultimately, the accused was found guilty of the offence under Section 138, and was convicted, stating:

4. The accused challenged the aforesaid judgment before the Court of Sessions, and the Appellate Court, by an order dated 27th April, 2006, confirmed the conviction, but reduced the sentence to imprisonment till rising of the Court. The order to pay compensation with the default clause was, however, sustained. The accused underwent imprisonment till the rising of the Court and also underwent the default sentence for non-payment of compensation. The second respondent filed CMP No.2018 of 2008 before the learned Judicial Magistrate under Section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code for realising compensation by issuing a distress warrant against the accused. This CMP was allowed on 19th July, 2008, and a distress warrant for the realisation of compensation was issued. A recalling petition filed by the accused was dismissed on 29th March, 2011. The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 8th August, 2012, held that despite the fact that the default sentence was undergone, yet, under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, compensation was recoverable, and upheld the orders of the learned Judicial Magistrate.

30. This being the case, we uphold the conclusion of the judgment dated 8th August, 2012 of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court but for the reasons given in this judgment. The appeals are dismissed accordingly.

(NAVIN SINHA) New Delhi;

May 5, 2017.
Morinda Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd vs Morinda Coop. Sugar Mills Workers Union

The plaintiff Union filed the suit seeking declaration to the effect that the members of the plaintiff Union was entitled to the benefit of the Variable Dearness Allowance (for short the 'VDA') on the basic wages plus fixed allowance in accordance with para 317(ii) of the Third Wage Board Report with a consequential relief for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from withdrawing the payment of VDA from the fixed amount of Rs.150 which was being paid to the members of the Union. Defendant took the stand that since small notice under Section 79 of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (in short the 'Act') is required, the suit was not maintainable. The trial court on the basis of the pleadings framed five issues which are as follows:

79. Notice necessary in suits No suit shall be instituted against a co-operative society or any of its officers in respect of any act touching the business of the society until the expiration of three months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar or left at his office stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims, and the plaint, shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left."

The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Subhransu Sekhar Padhi vs Gunamani Swain & Ors

3. As the borrower did not make the repayments in terms of the agreement between OSFC and the borrower, the OSFC attempted to seize the truck which was also hypothecated to the OSFC. As the same was not traceable, the OSFC proceeded against the mortgaged property. The value of the said property was estimated at about Rs. 10,08,000/-. Eventually, the property was brought to sale by auction on 9.2.2009 where the appellant became the highest bidder for an amount of Rs.10,09,000/-. The OSFC confirmed the sale in favour of the appellant. On 31.3.2009, possession of the mortgaged property was handed over to the appellant.

4. On 10.6.2009, the OSFC after appropriating the amounts due to it intimated the three sons of the mortgagor (respondent Nos. 2, 7 and 8 herein) to collect the residue amount of Rs.2,86,460/- from the Corporation.

5. Challenging the seizure and sale of the mortgage property, the writ petition came to be filed by the wife and children of the mortgagor. The appellant herein and OSFC contested the writ petition. By the impugned judgment herein, the writ petition was allowed, hence the appeal.

“14. In view of the above, sale of the properties of the guarantors and subsequent execution of deed of transfer under Annexure-5 are liable to be quashed for being done in flagrant violation of the statutory provision contained in Section 31 of the SFC Act which we direct accordingly.”

12. Appeal is dismissed. Costs quantified at Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh) to be borne by the 9th respondent Corporation. It is open to the 9th respondent Corporation to recover the said amount from such of those officers who are responsible for taking a wrong decision to proceed against the property in question under Section 29 of the Act.

13. All the payments, as directed above, shall be made within a period of 30 days from today.

August 21, 2014
University Of Mysore vs Rajaiah (Dead) By Lrs.

7. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed relevant issues. The parties have let in evidence in support of their respective contentions. On appreciation of materials on record, the trial court dismissed the suits by judgment and decree dated 5.2.1998.

[(ii) * * * * *];

28. For the afore-stated reasons, the judgment and the decree, of the High Court in R.S.A Nos. 456/2000 and 457/2000, as also of the First Appellate Court in RA Nos. 87 and 88 of 1998 are set aside. The judgment and decree dated 5.2.1998 passed by the Trial Court in OS Nos. 20/95 and 21/95 is restored. The order of the High Court in W.P. Nos.1649/2001 and 4302/2001 is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the University are allowed. The order dated 5.6.1981 of the Land Tribunal, Mysore (at Annexure P-3) in No. KL/RF/4480/79-80 and 4481/79-80 is hereby quashed.

29. The appeals are accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

March 23, 2018.
Maharaja Amrinder Singh vs Comnr. Of Wealth Tax,Patiala

3) The appellant is the wealth tax assessee and is subjected to payment of Wealth Tax under the Act. The case pertains to the Assessment Years 1981-82, 2 1982-83 and 1983-84. The issue involved in these three assessment years was decided by the Tribunal in favour of the appellant (assessee) which gave rise to filing of the appeals before the High Court by the Revenue under Section 27-A of the Act questioning therein the legality and correctness of the orders of the Tribunal. As mentioned above, the High Court allowed the appeals filed by the Revenue, which has given rise to filing of these appeals by way of special leave before this Court by the assessee.

(5) The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the time of hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.

13) As a result, the appeals succeed and are allowed. Impugned orders are set aside. Both the cases are remanded to the High Court for deciding 9 the appeals afresh in accordance with the observations made above.

……..................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] New Delhi;

September 05, 2017 10