L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Abdul Azeez P V And Ors vs National Investigation Agency

3. The petitioners filed Criminal M.C. No.100 of 2013 on 22.10.2013 before the learned Special Court, NIA Cases submitting that they were entitled to get statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “ Cr.P.C.”) inasmuch as the investigating agency had failed to file the final report within 180 days. It was further submitted that the bank account details and mobile phone call details of the petitioners, as stated in the charge-sheet itself, were yet to be verified and that the charge-sheet filed on 19.10.2013 was not a final report as contemplated under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. The submissions were negated by the learned Special Court by its order dated 04.11.2013 holding that the petitioners were not entitled to statutory bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., which view was challenged by filing Criminal Appeal No.1711 of 2013 in the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. The High Court went through paragraph Nos.17.1., 17.2, 17.3 and 17.8 of the charge-sheet and found that the materials so disclosed and adverted to in the charge-sheet did show that it was a final report. The High Court, thus, dismissed the appeal. The present special leave petition has been filed to challenge the view taken by the High Court.

5. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.
Swapnil & Ors vs State Of M.P & Anr

2. The appellant is aggrieved by the order dated 02.09.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Indore. As per the impugned order, the High Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.PC’) for quashing the proceedings and charges framed against the appellants under Section 498A, 506 Part II of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The appellants 2 and 3 are his father and mother respectively. The Respondent No. 2 is the wife of the first appellant. She lodged a complaint with Mahila Thana, Indore Police Station on which FIR No. 50 dated 02.05.2012 under Section 498A, 506 and 34 of IPC was registered. It was alleged in the complaint that the marriage between the first appellant and second respondent was performed on 24.06.2009 and after two months of the marriage, the appellants and the sister of the first appellant started demanding dowry. It is seen from Annexure-P3-application filed by the first appellant on 14.07.2011 under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking restitution of conjugal rights that the second respondent had left the matrimonial house on 23.04.2011 and thereafter she had not gone back. On 23.05.2011, a lawyer notice had also been served on the second respondent which was replied on 02.06.2011. During the pendency of the proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights, the second respondent, on 07.09.2011, lodged a complaint before Mahila Thana, Indore Police Station raising allegations against the appellants, the maternal uncle, maternal aunt and the sister of the first appellant. Paragraph 4 of the complaint –Annexure-P4 reads as follows:

9. The first appellant and second respondent had in fact solemnized their marriage at Arya Samaj Mandir on 16.06.2007 privately, as they were stated to be in love with each other for sometime. Thereafter only, in the presence of the family members, marriage was solemnized on 24.06.2009.

12. The appeal is allowed as above.

May 9, 2014.

REPORTABLE
K. Janardhan vs United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr

2. The claimant- appellant a tanker driver, while driving his vehicle from Ayanoor towards Shimoga met with an accident 2 with a tractor coming from the opposite side. As a result of the accident, the appellant suffered serious injuries and also an amputation of the right leg up to the knee joint. He thereupon moved an application before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation praying that as he was 25 years of age and earning Rs. 3,000/- per month and had suffered 100% disability, he was entitled to a sum of Rs. 5 lac by way of compensation. The Commissioner in his order dated 18th November, 1999 observed that the claimant was 30 years of age and the salary as claimed by him was on the higher side and accordingly determined the same at Rs. 2000/- per month. The Commissioner also found that as the claimant had suffered an amputation of his right leg up to the knee, he was said to have suffered a loss of 100% of his earning capacity as a driver and accordingly determined the compensation payable to him at Rs. 2,49,576/- and interest @ 12% p.a. thereon from the date of the accident. An appeal was thereafter taken to the High Court by the Insurance Company - respondent. The High Court accepted the plea raised in appeal that as per the Schedule to the Workmen's 3 Compensation Act, the loss of a leg on amputation amounted to a 60% reduction in the earning capacity and as the doctor had opined to a 65% disability, this figure was to be accepted and accordingly reduced the compensation as already mentioned above. It is in this circumstance, that the aggrieved claimant has come up to this court.

5. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Commissioner but with no order as to costs.
Corporation Of Kochi vs Elamkulam Village Co-Operative ...

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:-

The Corporation by order dated 6.8.1998 rejected the application, returned the cheque. The said order was challenged in OP. No.15638/98 by some of the members of the Society. The Society filed O.P.No.17365/98 challenging rejection of the application. The above Original Petitions were dismissed by judgment dated 13.10.1998. Thereafter, the Society filed W.A. No.225/98 and W.A. No.226/98 against the judgments in O.P. No.17635/98 and O.P. No.15638/98 Both the Writ Appeals were heard together and disposed of by judgment dated 1712.1998. By said judgment, High Court directed the Corporation to pass fresh order in accordance with the directions contained in the judgment. The Corporation again considered the application and rejected the same by order dated 20.1.1999. Challenging the same O.P. No.3433/99 was filed.

The High Court itself has noted that the application for renewal has to be filed within the stipulated period. It, however, was of the view that there is no bar in making an application beyond that time. The view that application can be made at any time is not correct, because application for renewal was filed after the expiry of the period. The respondent no.1-Society itself had indicated that it had no intention to carry out the activities. Further, we find that every observation/direction given by the High Court in the earlier judgment had been duly and elaborately discussed and thereafter the order rejecting applications filed was passed. The High Court came to an abrupt conclusion that the directions given in the earlier writ appeal were not taken note of. Unfortunately, the High Court has not indicated as to which of the directions was not taken note of. As a matter of fact, a bare reading of the order which was passed on 20.1.1999 shows that all relevant aspects were elaborately dealt with. Each of the points was considered and conclusions were arrived at. It was specifically noted that the licence issued earlier expired on 31.3.1996 and, therefore, the market was functioning unauthorisedly w.e.f. 1.4.1996. There was no application for renewal made at any time even not belated for the year 1996-97. Obviously, the application could not have been made for renewal of the licence after the expiry of the period which is the case for the period 1997-98. For the year 1998-99 the application was made on 4.8.98 i.e. after the expiry of the period provided. The question of renewal of licence retrospectively after the expiry of the period during which the society had unauthorisedly carried on activities is not contemplated in law. Therefore, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is clearly indefensible, and is set aside. The appeals are allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
Mohammed Yassin vs Ramizabi Etc. Etc

1. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order dated 26th February, 2010 passed by the High Court in Second Appeal reversing the decrees passed in favour of the plaintiff by the courts below the present appeals have been lodged by the plaintiff in the suits being O.S. No.760 of 1996 and eviction suit being O.S. No.761 of 1996. The facts in brief are as follows:

2. The respondents in the two appeals before us as plaintiff Nos.5 and 6, along with four others, had instituted a suit [O.S. No.295 of 1981] against the appellant and other co-owners for declaration of title and injunction on the basis of adverse possession. The suit was dismissed by the learned trial Court on 1st October, 1982 and the said decree of dismissal was affirmed by the First Appellate Court on 30th March, 1984. The aforesaid judgment has attained finality in law inasmuch as it was not put to any further challenge. The dismissal of the suit in question i.e. O.S. No.295 of 1981 was founded on the principal basis that the plaintiffs therein (respondents in the present appeals) could not establish that they had acquired title by continuous possession which was adverse in character.

4. As part of the suit property remained in possession of the co-sharers who executed a release deed in favour of the present appellant on 3rd June, 1994, the appellant, as the plaintiff, after issuing legal notice instituted O.S. Nos.760 and 761 of 1996 against the respondents for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the property mentioned in the schedule to the suits. Both these respondents, as noticed, were the plaintiff Nos. 6 and 5 respectively in Suit No.295 of 1981.

11. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not correct in reversing the decrees passed by the learned trial Court which decrees were affirmed by the first appellate Court. We, therefore, set aside the orders of the High Court and restore the orders of the courts below decreeing the suits (O.S. Nos.760 and 761 of 1996).

12. The appeals are allowed in the above terms.

13. In the light of the above, the contempt petitions are also closed.

(N.V. RAMANA) NEW DELHI OCTOBER 29, 2015.
Nandram vs M/S Garware Polyster Ltd

4. Aggrieved, the respondent-Company took up the matter before the Industrial Court at Aurangabad in revision. The Industrial Court at Aurangabad vide order dated 04.07.2009 set aside the order passed by the Labour Court and dismissed the complaint of the appellant holding that the Labour Court at Aurangabad did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the appellant, since the termination took place at Pondicherry. The appellant moved the High Court of Judicature of Bombay at Aurangabad in Writ Petition No. 4968 of 2009. The High Court by judgment dated 07.06.2011 affirmed the view taken by the Industrial Court and held that the situs of employment of the appellant being Pondicherry, the Labour Court at Aurangabad did not have territorial jurisdiction to go into the complaint filed by the appellant. Thus aggrieved, the appellant is before this Court.

6. The Labour Court shall consider the complaint on merits and pass final orders within six months from today. The parties are directed to appear before the Labour Court on 08.03.2016.

7. It is made clear that all other contentions regarding the jurisdiction on other aspects in terms of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 are left open since such questions do not arise in the factual matrix of the present case.

8. The appeal is allowed to the above extent with no order as to costs.

FEBRUARY 16, 2016
Raj Nath vs State Of U.P

2. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the five appellants before the High Court. The present appellants, his two sons Yatindra and Surendra alongwith Ram Kripal, Gajendra and Govind were tried by learned IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 and Section 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). The trial Court acquitted accused Govind but rest of the five accused were convicted for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, 307 read with Section 149 and Section 148 IPC. Life sentence, five years rigorous imprisonment and two years rigorous imprisonment respectively were imposed.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Investigating Officer proceeded to the village Kusmara where the corpse of Narendra was lying and there he conducted the inquest on his dead body as Ex.Ka-38. Thereafter, he came to the place of the incident in village Nagla Tara near the dead body of Lalit Kumar and conducted the inquest. Thereafter he conducted spot inspection and prepared site plan Ex. Ka-47 collected blood stained and plain earth Ex. Ka-48. He also recovered empty cartridges (material Ex.1 to 3) from the roof of Kalka Prasad and prepared its recovery memo Ex.Ka-49. He thereafter arrested appellant Ram Kripal and recovered country made pistol and three cartridges from him. On 4 5.6.1978 he recorded the statement of the informant and thereafter in the morning he prepared the inquest report of Narendra Nath deceased who had expired in the hospital at 5.20 a.m. next day. Thereafter he was transferred. Shrawan Kumar also lost his life after four days in the hospital because of the sustained injuries in the incident. The post mortem examination on the dead bodies of Shrawan Kumar, Lalit Kumar, Narendra Nath and Mahendra Nath was held and various gunshot injuries and ante mortem injuries were found on their bodies.

13. Section 149 IPC has clear application to the facts of the case. Therefore, the trial Court and the High Court were justified in convicting the appellants. The appeals are dismissed.
Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P. Lucknow vs M/S. Sanjay Coal Traders

3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:-

5. According to counsel for the respondent the impugned judgment and order dated 12th November, 2013 is a reasoned order. The conviction of the respondent was suspended on the ground that the respondent is an actor and his profession requires him to travel abroad but conviction of sentence is coming in his way to travel abroad. Apart from this the High Court considered the hardship caused to the respondent and thereafter passed the order under challenge.

13. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 12th November, 2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous 11 Application No.718 of 2013 in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.905 of 2007 and remit the case to the High Court to decide the matter afresh. It would be open to the respondent to show that if the order of conviction is not stayed it will cause irreversible consequences/injustice to him which cannot be undone if he ultimately succeeds. It would be open to the State to oppose such prayer on the ground that non-suspension of conviction will not cause any irreversible consequences or injustice to the respondent and the same can be undone if he ultimately succeeds.

14. The appeal stands disposed of with aforesaid observations.
Pooja Bhatia vs Vishnu Narain Shivpuri & Anr

4) Respondent No.1 was charged under Sections 342, 326-B and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. The bail application was filed initially before the Sessions Court. After taking note of all the materials and the seriousness of the allegations levelled against him, the Sessions Court rejected his bail application. Thereafter, he preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court by the impugned order after taking note of the submissions made by both the sides and considering the injury report as well as other factual matrix and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, released Respondent No. 1 (herein) on bail. The said order is under challenge by the complainant in the present appeal.

Accordingly, the impugned order of the High Court dated 16.01.2014 is set aside and the Respondent No.1-accused is directed to surrender within a period of two weeks from today.

11) Learned Trial Judge is directed to take all endeavour for early completion of the trial preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

12) The appeal is allowed on the above terms.

…………………………………CJI.

(P. SATHASIVAM) ................J. (RANJAN GOGOI) NEW DELHI;

10TH MARCH, 2014
State Of West Bengal & Anr vs West Bengal Minimum Wages ...

[Note : The figures in brackets below the pay scale refer to the number of the pay scale]

2. The facts in brief are as follows. The respondents 3 to 295 were employed in or around 1975 as ad-hoc Inspectors-AMW, in Pay Scale No.9 (300-600). They were subsequently absorbed into regular service and appointed against permanent vacancies. Though Inspectors (Minimum Wages), Inspector (Trade Unions), Labour Inspectors, Supervisor (Labour Welfare), Investigators, Inspectors (Shops & Establishments) also in Pay Scale No.9 were included in the West Bengal Subordinate Labour Services, Inspectors-AMW were not included in the said Labour Services. The 3 Second Pay Commission recommended the revised Pay Scale No.9 to the Inspectors - AMW subject to the condition that the minimum qualification for recruitment for the said post should be a University degree. On 28.7.1981, the Government framed the West Bengal Services Revision of Pay and Allowances Rules, 1981 (for short `RPA Rules 1981') to implement the second Pay Commission Recommendations (effective from 2.4.1981) under which Inspectors-AMW, were assigned Pay Scale No.9 (380-910). Holders of the post of Inspector (Co-operative Societies), Extension Officer (Panchayats) and KGO-JLRO (Revenue Officers) who were also in Pay Scale No.9 earlier, but with a higher initial pay of Rs.330, were granted the higher Pay Scale No.11 (425-1050).

5. The State Government resisted the said writ petition, contending that the functions and duties of Inspectors - AMW were different from the functions and duties of Inspectors (Co-operative Societies), Extension Officers (Panchayat) and KGO-JLRO (Revenue Officers). It was also pointed out that though the pay scale applicable to Inspectors -AMW and the three reference category posts were the same (Pay Scale No.9) prior to RPA Rules 1981, there was a significant difference as those three reference categories were started on a higher initial Pay Scale of Rs.330 instead 5 of Rs.300.

13. On 27.1.2005, the Division Bench allowed the writ appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge and directed as follows:

The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

Re : Question (2)

Re : Question (3)

___________________J.

( R. V. Raveendran) __________________J.

(Swatanter Kumar) New Delhi;

March 15, 2010.
Union Of India & Ors vs Ram Prakash

3. The respondent was enrolled in the Indian Air Force in the month of May, 1970. After he rendered service for 15 years in the Air Force, the Respondent was unwell and consequently he was examined by a Medical Board which was constituted to consider the case of the respondent. After such medical examination, the Release Medical Board found that the respondent suffered from Retinal detachment to the extent of 60% and that the degree of disablement was permanent. He was also found to be suffering from Immature Cataract of both the eyes and his disablement was assessed at 40% by the Release Medical Board.

4. The Release Medical Board assessed the composite disability at 90% and gave an opinion that the said disability suffered by the respondent during his service was neither attributable to nor aggravated by Air Force Service and that the diseases were constitutional in nature.

6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent herein filed a suit claiming payment of disability pension on the ground that at the time of his entry to the Air Force service, no such disease was recorded in his records and therefore, onset of the aforesaid disease during the course of service should be considered as attributable to service, particularly due to the adverse service conditions which caused the disease.

7. The aforesaid suit was contested by the appellant herein by filing a detailed written statement. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, several issues were framed and the parties led their evidence in support of their cases, and finally by judgment and decree dated 27.9.1996, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit.

9. The respondent being aggrieved by the aforesaid concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the two courts below filed a second appeal in the Punjab and Haryana High Court which, however, after hearing the parties was allowed by the learned Single Judge, on account of which the present appeal was filed by the appellant herein. The appeal was listed before us and the counsel appearing for the parties were heard at length.

23. We, therefore, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, and allow the appeal filed by the appellant. As a result of this order, the suit filed by the respondent should be held to be dismissed.

.......................................J. [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma] ......................................J [Dr. B.S. Chauhan] New Delhi, July 5, 2010.
Rishiroop Polymers Pvt. Ltd vs Designated Authority & Additional ...

Common facts giving rise to the cause of action and the litigation are as follows:

rule (1) shall be concluded within a period not exceeding twelve months from the date of initiation of such review.

For the reasons stated above, this appeal is accepted only to the limited extent. The finding recorded by the tribunal in converting the anti- dumping duty for the period in question from rupee term to US dollar term without there being any appeal, counter appeal or objection by the respondent is set aside. The duty shall be payable in rupee term, in terms of the order passed by the designated authority. Except to the extent indicated above the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.

For the reasons stated herein above, we do not find any merit in these appeals. Accordingly, they are dismissed with costs in favour of the Union of India.

Civil Appeal Nos. 7159-7161 and 7162 of 2004 These appeals relate to continuation of anti- dumping duty after the expiry of five years for a further period of five years.

The Designated Authority, after analyzing the material placed before it, came to the conclusion that the cessation of the duty is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury and therefore it was necessary to continue with imposition of anti-dumping duty for another five years.

Aggrieved against the aforesaid order continuing the imposition of such duty, the appellant filed appeals before the Tribunal which were rejected. Against the order of the Tribunal upholding the above findings of the Designated Authority, the present appeals have been filed by the appellant.

The only challenge put forth in the instant appeals is to the non-evaluation of all the parameters listed in para (iv) of Annexure-II. This contention had not been urged either before the Designated Authority or the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be permitted to be urged for the first time in these appeals. Further, the records produced before us unambiguously shows that all the relevant parameters had been considered.

In this view of the matter, we do not find any merit in these appeals and dismiss the same with costs in favour of the first respondent, i.e., the Union of India.