L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Daya Sah & Ors vs Chandra Datt Pande & Ors

The case of the appellants-plaintiffs is that the suit property belongs to them and it is situated in Haysbarton compound and they had let out to the defendants land measuring 25x15 ft. on a monthly rent of Rs.30/- per month and the defendants in contravention of the conditions of the licence had occupied the land measuring 33.850 sq. meter and made construction and also encroached 16.988 sq. meter shown in the plaint plan and constructed two rooms illegally and hence they filed suit no.32/83 for demolition of the construction; suit no.38/83 for ejectment of the defendants and for possession in favour of the plaintiffs; and suit no.2/90 for permanent injunction restraining the defendants not to put illegal construction on the suit land.

All the three suits were tried together and the sole plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and the defendant examined himself as DW1 and documents were marked on both sides. The trial court on a consideration of oral and documentary evidence held that the plaintiff has neither identified the suit property nor proved his ownership to it and he is not entitled for the reliefs sought for and dismissed all the suits. The plaintiffs preferred three appeals and the appellate court confirmed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeals. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs preferred three independent second appeals and the High Court heard them on 13.6.2007 and held that the courts below had given concurrent findings on each of the issues and no interference is required under Section 100 C.P.C.; however there was no specific finding on the alleged sale deed dated 17.1.1927 and hence remanded the case to the trial court for specific finding on the said sale deed. Both the parties filed independent review applications and the High Court heard them on 17.11.2007 and recalled the order of remand dated 13.6.2007. Thereafter the High Court heard both the parties and by judgment dated 3.1.2008 dismissed all the second appeals. Challenging the said judgment the plaintiffs have preferred the present second appeals.

There are no merits in the civil appeals and they are dismissed. No costs.

October 07, 2015.
Delhi Administration vs Vidya Gupta

2. The accused, a vendor of M/s New Bikaner Sweet Center was in charge of the day to day business of the shop 1. On 08.04.2004 at about 7.00 PM, Food Inspector Shri S.K. Sharma purchased a sample of Ghee, a food article for analysis from the shop of the accused where the said food article was stored for sale.

with the help of a clean and dry long spoon. The sample was divided into three equal parts and stored separately as per the requirements in three separate clean and dry glass bottles under the supervision and direction of Shri B.M. Jain, SDM/LHA. The vendor's signature was obtained on the LHA slip and the wrapper of the sample bottles and the Panchnama was prepared on the spot.

One counterpart of the sample 2 was sent to the Public Analyst, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “PA”), and the other two counterparts were deposited with the LHA. The PA opined that the sample exceeds the maximum Butyro Refractometer (hereinafter referred to as “BR”) reading limit of 43 and has a Reichert value of less than 28. The sample also tested positive for Baudouin Test, which should be negative in case of Ghee. And thus, does not conform to the standard.

(2A) When an application is made to the court under sub-section (2), the court shall require the Local (Health) Authority to forward the part or parts of the sample kept by the said Authority and upon such requisition being made, the said Authority shall forward the part or parts of the sample to the court within a period of five days from the date of receipt of such requisition.

(2D) Until the receipt of the certificate of the result of the analysis from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, the court shall not continue with the proceedings pending before it in relation to the prosecution.

9. The law accords such great importance to the report from the Director that it prohibits the Court from continuing with the prosecution until the receipt of the certificate from the Director.

It is thus clear that the accused was not entitled to the acquittal and the acquittal is liable to be set aside. We, therefore, set aside the acquittal of the respondent and convict him for the offence under Section 2 (ia) (a) (c) & (m) of the Act, punishable under Section 16 (1) (a), read with Section 7 of the Act.

However, the proceedings commenced in the year 2004, the business has closed down since and the accused is now about 70 years 12 2005 (2) FAC 219 – Delhi High Court 13 2008 (1) FAC 177 12 old. In these circumstances, we direct that the sentence shall be confined to the period already undergone.

13. Appeal is allowed accordingly.
The State Of Maharashtra vs Shankar Ganapati Rahatol

1. The State of Maharashtra has preferred this appeal aggrieved by the order dated 13.06.2008, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in criminal Application No. 4504 of 2006. 2. On 01.09.1998 a complaint was lodged by one Shivram, who was examined as P.W.1 2 stating that on 29.08.1998 at around 9 O'Clock he was doing work in Hanuman Water Supply Society, sitting at Kalamma Milk Dairy. At that time the loud speaker was switched off. When he came out of Milk Dairy to know whey loud speaker was switched off, he found Ananda Ganpati Rhatol, Shankar Ganpati Rhatol, Yashvant Shripati Rhatol, Shivaji Bapu Khot, Rangrao Piraji Angaj, Shankar Ganu Metil, Samadhan Shankar Metil, Damodar Tukaram Raut, Ramesh Damodar Taut, Dattatraya Vasant Rhatol, Baburao Dattatray Rhatol, Baburao Jaysingh Rhatol, Ganpati Krishna Powar, Hanumant Krishana Powar and other persons approaching towards him and they had attacked and assaulted him. In the said attack, he stated that he was injured and hospitalized. Subsequently, after recovery, he lodged complaint on 01.09.1998, based on which FIR No. 1165/1998 was registered. Based on the complaint lodged, 3 investigation was made and the respondents herein were charged for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 323 read with 149, 325 of I.P.C. and 135 of Bombay Police Act. After charge sheet was filed, case was tried by the learned 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Kolhapur. Vide judgment dated 06.09.2005 all the accused were acquitted of the charges framed against them.

7. For the aforesaid reason this appeal is allowed and impugned order dated 13.06.2008 is set aside. Consequently, application filed before the High Court stands allowed. The criminal appeal preferred by the State challenging the acquittal in Sessions Case No. 140 of 2000 shall be taken on file.

8. In appreciation of the contention raised by the respective parties, we request the High Court to take up the appeal in terms of this order, as well as Criminal Appeal No. 849 of 2005 simultaneously and decide the same expeditiously.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 197 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 3359 OF 2010)

9. Leave granted.

11. We are of the view that as the impugned order in Criminal Application No. 4504 of 2006 has already been set aside by this Court in the appeal filed by the State, there is no reason to reject the revision filed by the complainant.

12. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 21.01.2010 in Criminal revision application No. 119 of 2006 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration, to decide the criminal revision on its own merit.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 798 OF 2010 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 800 of 2010

13. In view of order passed in the aforesaid appeals, it is stated that no further orders 9 are required to be passed in these appeals. Accordingly, these appeals also disposed off.
Union Of India vs Dattatray S/O Namdeo Mendhekar & Ors

2. The first respondent, who claimed that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe Halba, was appointed as an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry in G. B. Pant Hospital, New Delhi, in a post reserved for Schedule Tribes, vide O.M dated 21.6.1990 of the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, subject to caste status verification. He joined duty on 20.9.1990. One of the conditions subject to which he was offered appointment was that if any declaration given or information furnished by him was proved to be false, he will be liable for removal from service and other action which the government may deem appropriate. His claim that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe was referred for verification. The Tehsildar Mohadi, on verification, sent a communication on 9.5.1991 that first respondent did not belong to Halba community. As first respondent questioned the report of the Tehsildar and asserted that he belonged to Halba tribe, his claim was referred to the Tribal Research & Training Institute, Pune for verification on 16.10.1992. On 6.3.1999, the Scrutiny Committee for verification of certificates of Schedule Tribes, informed the Ministry that the respondent did not belong to the Halba Tribe (ST). The Ministry, therefore, issued an OM dated 15.3.1999 calling upon the first respondent to show cause why his services should not be terminated for falsely claiming to belong to Halba Tribe. The first respondent challenged the decision of the Screening Committee in W.P. No.1176/1999. The High Court by judgment dated 6.4.2005 upheld the order dated 6.3.1999 of the Scrutiny Committee invalidating the first respondent's claim that he belonged to 'Halba' tribe, and directed that the first respondent will not be entitled to any of the benefits as a member of the Scheduled Tribe, from the date of its decision. The High Court however directed that the first respondent's services shall not be disturbed on the ground that he did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe. The said benefit of continuation in service, despite invalidation of claim regarding tribe, was extended by the High Court, purporting to follow the decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Milind - 2001 (1) SCC 4.

8. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court in so far as it directs the appellant to continue the first respondent in service. However, as the first respondent has submitted his resignation even before the writ petition was decided, and has not attended to duty from 13.10.2004, his terminal benefits, if any due to him, may be settled. It is however made clear that he will not be entitled to any pensionary benefit.
Dharmarajan & Others vs Valliammal & Others

3. As against this, the present appellants claimed that this property in fact belonged to first defendant therein, (the appellant no.1 herein) in so far as the Eastern half of the property was concerned since it was purchased by the first defendant from one Venkataramana Iyer. It was claimed that the suit property originally belonged to one K.V. Krishnasamy and others and they were throughout in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and were paying house tax also. The other appellants claimed the other half of the property on the plea that they had purchased the same from the other co-sharer Venugopal Iyer who had inherited the property from K.V. Krishnasamy and others. It was claimed that Karuppayee was working as a maid servant under one Venugopala Iyer and it was he who had permitted her to put up the thatched shed in the suit property and after the death of Karuppayee, Doraiswamy started working as a servant of Venugopala Iyer and as such he was in occupation of the thatched salai (house) with the permission of Venugopala Iyer. It was claimed that the property stood in the name of Venugopala Iyer in Kavundapady Panchayat. In short it was contended that the present appellants were owners of the property which they had purchased on 15.7.1980 and 27.8.1980 vide different sale deeds. It was further claimed that after the purchase of the suit property, the present appellants who were the defendants in Suit No.555 of 1981 were paying the taxes and Doraiswamy was staying in the property with their permission. The original defendants, the appellants herein stoutly denied the right of ownership on the part of Doraiswamy to transfer the property in favour of the plaintiff. They also denied that Karuppayee and after her Doraiswamy were in independent possession of the property. They also denied that Karuppayee or, as the case may be Doraiswamy, had perfected their title by adverse possession. Thus, the Appellant No.1 Dharamrajan claimed half of the property whereas the rest of the appellants claimed the other half of the property being purchasers from the members of Iyer family.

17. In the result the appeals succeed with costs. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the First Appellate Court is restored.
M/S. Akriti Land Con Pvt. Ltd vs Krishna Bhargava And Ors. Etc. Etc

3) In order to appreciate the issue involved in these appeals, which lies in a narrow compass, it is necessary to state few relevant facts taken from the appeal paper books.

5) The dispute, which is the subject matter of the civil suits, is between the family members of one Bhargava family, who are sisters, brother and the mother - being the legal representatives of Late Nandan Bhargava. The appellant is the purchaser of the suit land from some members of the family.

6) The dispute relates to agricultural land of 18 Bigha 11 Biswa in total bearing Khasra Nos. 68, 46, 51, 54, 53, 48, 50, 49 and 52 (now re- numbered as Khasra Nos. 92 to 111) situated at Village Khedli Purohit (Kota) Rajasthan and some houses situated at Jaipur/Kota as detailed in the plaints (hereinafter referred to as the "suit property"). So far as these appeals are concerned, they relate to suit property only.

9) The defendants have denied the plaintiff's claim and justified the sale made by them. So far as the appellant is concerned, they alleged that they being the bona fide purchaser of the suit land for value without notice of any prior claim of any one, their title to the land acquired by sale deed is unimpeachable and thus legal. Apart from their defenses, the respective defendants have also taken several other pleas on points of law and facts in their written statements while opposing the suit which we do not consider it necessary to mention in detail here.

April 13, 2017
Hinsa Virodhak Sangh vs Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat & Ors

3. Respondent No. 1 claims to be a registered public charitable trust working for safeguarding the interests of the persons engaged in the business of slaughter and sale of livestock, mutton etc. It is alleged that it is functioning in the city of Ahmedabad in Gujarat since 1962 and has about 3000 members. Respondent No. 2 All Ahmedabad (Chhoti Jamat) Mutton Merchant Association is an association of persons who are engaged in the sale of mutton in the city of Ahmedabad. Respondent No.3 is an individual who is doing the business of selling mutton in the city of Ahmedabad.

4. The common grievance of the respondents herein (the writ petitioners before the High Court), is that with a view to appease the Jain community the State Government and the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (in short the Corporation) have, from time to time, taken decisions/passed resolutions for closure of the municipal slaughter houses in Ahmedabad during the period of the Paryushan festival (which is an important Jain festival) resulting in serious violation of their fundamental right to trade and do business in meat etc. They have alleged that in the year 1993, the State Government accepted the demand of some organizations belonging to the Jain community for closure of the municipal slaughter houses during the period of Paryushan and issued directions to the Corporation to take appropriate action accordingly. In subsequent years, the Corporation passed resolutions for closure of the municipal slaughter houses for different period ranging from 8 to 18 days during the Paryushan festival.

25. We are of the opinion that the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. In our opinion, the impugned resolutions of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation are valid, and there is no violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) or 21 of the Constitution.

31. However, we agree with Mr. Sorabjee that the restriction is only a partial restriction for a limited period, and it is not disproportionate. Hence it is not an unreasonable restriction.

55. If the Emperor Akbar could forbid meat eating for six months in a year in Gujarat, is it unreasonable to abstain from meat for nine days in a year in Ahmedabad today?

57. Emperor Akbar himself abstained from eating meat on Fridays and Sundays and on some other days, as has been mentioned in the Ain-I-Akbari by Abul Fazl.

67. As the great Tamil Poet Subramaniya Bharati wrote :

68. The great Tamil poet Kaniyan Pookundranar wrote :

69. Similarly, the great poet Saint Tiruvalluvar in Chapter 74 verse 735 of Tirukkural wrote:

70. In the Shanti Parv of Mahabharata Bhishma Pitamah tells Yudhishthir:

73. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and the impugned resolutions of the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad are held to be valid. There shall be no order as to costs.

74. Resultantly, all the connected appeals stand allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Trigun Chand Thakur vs State Of Bihar

(3) Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed the writ petition before the High Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, the service of the appellant was terminated on 23.12.1994. Learned Single Judge of the High Court vide Order dated 31.08.1995 disposed of the writ petition with the consent of both the parties observing that the appellant may agitate his rights before the Chairman of the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board and the Chairman of the Board shall consider the representation of the appellant and dispose of the same in accordance with law. On 03.08.1996, the Chairman, Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board, considered the matter on the basis of representation of the appellant against the order of dismissal passed by the Managing Committee and found that the punishment of termination of the appellant from service was disproportionate and directed reinstatement of the appellant. Being aggrieved, Managing Committee filed an appeal before the Special Director, Secondary, Primary and Adult Education- Respondent no.2, under Section 24 of the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board Act, 1981. The Special Director (Secondary Education) by Order dated 13.12.1997 remanded the matter back to the Chairman, Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board, with a direction to reconsider the matter in the light of the grounds taken in the appeal.

(7) In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Union Of India & Ors vs Amar Singh

3) The factual position in a nutshell is as follows:-

Aggrieved by the dismissal order, on 01.02.2000, the respondent herein filed a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Narnaul, inter alia, praying that the order of dismissal was bad and without jurisdiction and that he may be granted pensionary and retrial benefits. The learned Civil Judge, on 22.10.2002, decreed the suit of the respondent herein holding that the dismissal order was passed as per law but he was entitled to pension, gratuity, provident fund etc. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants herein filed Civil Appeal No. 418 of 2002 in the District Court, Narnaul praying for setting aside the same. The learned District Court, vide order dated 28.02.2004, dismissed the appeal of the appellants-herein by holding that the decision of the trial court was correct and based on proper appreciation of evidence and proper application of law and came to the conclusion that in view of the provisions of Section 2 of CCS (Pension) Rules 1972, Rule 24 of the said Rules would not be applicable to the respondent herein who is governed by the provisions of the CRPF Act, 1949. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants herein moved R.S.A. No. 3891 of 2004 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, by order dated 27.09.2004, dismissed the appeal of the appellants herein holding that there was no infirmity in the order of the courts below and held that the services of the respondent was governed by the provisions of the Act and the provisions of Rule 24 of the Central Civil Services Rules does not govern the service conditions of the respondent herein. Questioning the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, the appellants have filed the above appeal by way of special leave.

14) Civil Appeal is allowed to this extent as indicated above. No costs.
Miss Xyz vs The State Of Gujarat

4. The complaint was filed with the following averments:

5. In view of such allegations as referred above made in the complaint, a case is registered against the 2 nd respondent for the alleged offence under Sections 376, 499 and 506(2) of IPC.

7. Primarily, it was the case of the 2nd respondent before the High Court that there was absolutely no truth in the allegation of rape as alleged by the appellant and it was only consensual sex between the parties. It is further alleged that in view of the allegations made by the appellant, a settlement is purported to have been arrived at, between them in the Crl.A. @ SLP(Crl.)No.4294 of 2019 5 month of July, 2016. A written agreement was also entered into and the same is signed by the parties. It is stated in the agreement that the dispute between the parties is settled and the 2nd respondent has allegedly paid a huge amount to the appellant. It is further the case of the 2nd respondent that whatever the electronic and other materials lying with the parties were agreed to be destroyed. Further it was the case of the 2 nd respondent that the alleged telephonic calls made by the 2nd respondent to Mr. Shoukin Malik of Rajasthan was absolutely false and baseless. Pleading that the complaint filed and investigation taken up is a gross abuse of process, the 2nd respondent has sought quashing of the proceedings.

14. Though Learned senior counsel Sri Mukul Rohatgi relied on the judgment of this Court dated 21 st August,2019 in Criminal Appeal No.1165 of 2019, but we are of the view that the said judgment would not render any assistance to support his case. Whether in a given case power under Section 482 is to be exercised or not, depends on the contents of the complaint, and the material placed on record. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that it is a fit case to set aside Crl.A. @ SLP(Crl.)No.4294 of 2019 11 the order passed by the High Court and allow the investigating agency to proceed with the further investigation in accordance with law. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the complaint, and it is open to the investigating agency and competent court, to proceed in accordance with law.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, this criminal appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 13th December, 2018 passed in R/Special Criminal Application No.9897 of 2017 by the High Court of Gujarat is set-aside. The 2nd respondent shall appear before the concerned Police Station on 18-11-2019 at 11.00 a.m. and co-operate with the investigation. Till then no coercive action shall be taken against him.

October 25, 2019